Building Inclusion
Building Inclusion

Housing and Integration of Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands

Jeanet Kullberg
Isik Kulu-Glasgow

The Netherlands Institute for Social Research | SCP

Research and Documentation Centre | WODC
The Hague, July 2009
The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) was established by Royal Decree of March 30, 1973 with the following terms of reference:

a. to carry out research designed to produce a coherent picture of the state of social and cultural welfare in the Netherlands and likely developments in this area;
b. to contribute to the appropriate selection of policy objectives and to provide an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the various means of achieving those ends;
c. to seek information on the way in which interdepartmental policy on social and cultural welfare is implemented with a view to assessing its implementation.

The work of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research focuses especially on problems coming under the responsibility of more than one Ministry. As Coordinating Minister for social and cultural welfare, the Minister for Health, Welfare and Sport is responsible for the policies pursued by the Netherlands Institute for Social Research. With regard to the main lines of such policies the Minister consults the Ministers of General Affairs; Justice; Interior and Kingdom Relations; Education, Culture and Science; Finance; Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment; Economic Affairs; Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality; and Social Affairs and Employment.

The information contained in this publication does not necessarily reflect the position or opinion of the European Commission. The European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained in this publication.

SCP special 2009/36
DTP: Textcetera, Den Haag
Cover illustration: Wim Oskam/Hollandse Hoogte (Children in front of multicultural post-war housing estate in Hoograven, Utrecht)
Cover design: Bureau Stijlzorg, Utrecht
Figures: Mantext, Moerkapelle

NUR 740

Distribution in the USA & Canada: Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA)
Contents

Foreword 7

1 Building Inclusion 9

2 General context: definitions, numbers, migration flows 12
  2.1 Whom do we define as migrants and ethnic minorities? 12
  2.2 Profile of people with a foreign background 14
  2.3 History of post-war migration to the Netherlands 18
    2.3.1 Post-colonial migration 19
    2.3.2 Labour migrants and their families 20
    2.3.3 Political refugees 23
    2.3.4 Irregular migrants 26
    2.3.5 Roma, Sinti and travellers 26
  2.4 Towards a 'Modern Migration Policy' 28

3 Institutional and housing policy context 30
  3.1 Between corporatists and social democrats 30
  3.2 The Dutch housing system 31
    3.2.1 History of the housing system 31
    3.2.2 Some key facts and figures on housing 36

4 National policy on integration and access to housing 40
  4.1 Changing paradigms in national integration policy 40
  4.2 Housing policy for migrants 44
    4.2.1 Housing policy for ex-colonial minorities and refugees 44
    4.2.2 Irregular migrants depend entirely on the private sector 51
  4.2.3 No specific housing policy for labour migrants and their families 52
    4.2.4 Transparent housing allocation against discretionony practices 56

5 Actual housing position of migrants and their descendants 61
  5.1 Developments in housing quality 1982-2006 61
  5.2 Ethnic concentration and segregation 70
  5.3 Explaining differences in housing position 74

6 Area-based policies and practices: coping with residential segregation 82
  6.1 The national perspective on residential segregation 82
  6.2 From 'building for the neighbourhood' towards social mix 83
6.3 An impression of local attempts to cope with residential segregation 89
6.4 Some area-based inclusionary practices 91

7 Conclusions and discussion 95

References 103

Publications of the SCP in English 105
Foreword

Building Inclusion: Housing and Integration of Ethnic Minorities in the Netherlands traces the migration and housing histories of immigrants and their children since World War II. Central issues in the study are access to housing by different ethnic minority groups over time, the quality of housing in neighbourhoods where those groups often live, and residential segregation.

This volume is one in a series of seven reports on housing access and the social inclusion of vulnerable groups in Europe. The reports are part of the Building Inclusion project, supported by the European Community Programme for Employment and Social Solidarity (2007-2013).

The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) and the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice (WODC) have jointly produced the present report. We thank Dr Ellen Uiters for her involvement in the initial stages of the Building Inclusion project.

Dr Rob Bijl (Deputy Director, SCP)
Prof. Frans Leeuw (Director, WODC)
1 Building Inclusion

This country report was written in the context of the international EU project: ‘Building Inclusion. Access to housing and inclusion in Europe’. The focus in this project is on policies and practices that are designed to contribute to the integration of (vulnerable) groups such as immigrants, ethnic minorities, asylum-seekers and refugees through access to housing.

A collection of country reports has been made in order to enable countries to learn from experiences elsewhere and to assess to what extent policies and practices might be transferable to other countries. The report on the Netherlands is one in a series of seven reports (Finland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands). The character of the country reports is descriptive, but in the process of outlining general frameworks such as national and local contexts, as well as policy debates on migrants and minorities, there is some explanation of how inclusion is facilitated.

Participating countries show diversity along various lines. The group includes Mediterranean countries (Spain, Portugal and Italy), Western European countries (Germany, Austria and the Netherlands) and a Northern European country (Finland). The countries show vast differences in terms of the history of immigration: the countries of origin of the migrants differ, as do the numbers involved and the timing of the process. Spain and Italy, for instance, are now important immigration countries, whereas just a few decades ago they saw part of their labour force leaving as guest workers for – among others – Western European countries like Germany and the Netherlands.

The Netherlands has a long history of immigration, which we will describe mainly from the post-war years onwards. We will make an exception to this for a brief description (in chapter 2) of the Roma and Sinti communities in the country, despite the small numbers involved and the fact that many members of these groups migrated to the Netherlands much earlier, just like Spanish, Portuguese and German Jews as well as French Huguenots. These latter groups will not be discussed in this report, however. Roma and Sinti communities are a focus of attention in various European countries and for that reason we will provide some information on the position of these groups. Due to a long immigration experience in the Netherlands we present a historical overview of discourses, policies and practices, starting from the post-war years.

Differences between welfare regimes and social policy add further to the diversity of the participating European countries. These allow for different policies and practices in the field of housing and social inclusion. We need to understand this general framework in order to understand what kinds of facilities are or are not available for immigrants and their descendants in the specific countries. We will not discuss the role of welfare state arrangements in the admission policies for immigrants in
depth, although this relationship is relevant. The focus of attention when it comes to limiting admission of migrants is mostly on vulnerable or potentially vulnerable groups that might impose disproportionate claims on social benefits.

When dealing with the housing and inclusion of migrants and ethnic minorities, it is important to know more about the migration processes and patterns, as both national and local policies can be responsive to incidental topical events, rather than being a carefully considered, long-term strategy. We therefore first describe migration processes in the Netherlands during the post-war years. These migration waves will be primarily categorised in terms of the migration motives and legal position of the immigrants because these are most relevant for the housing facilities that were initially available to migrants. An alternative categorisation is by country of origin, or categories of countries, especially Western versus non-Western countries. In discourses on policies and practices the emphasis is often on non-Western immigrants, assuming the cultural and economic gap between indigenous and immigrant Dutch citizens is largest for these countries of origin. We will describe in chapter 2 the arrival of (post-)colonial minorities, ‘guest workers’ and their family members, asylum-seekers and irregular migrants.

Chapter 3 will focus on the institutional context in relation to housing. The degree of state intervention in housing has been extensive in the Netherlands, resulting in a large social rented sector (a third of all housing stock, and substantially more in cities), rent control and substantial rent rebates. In the Netherlands, housing corporations or housing associations are very important actors in this field, as they exclusively own and manage this large social housing sector. This sector is by far the most important provider of housing for migrants and ethnic minorities. Moreover, the housing corporations are involved in neighbourhood management and area-based integration policies and practices. The hybrid position of these organisations, between the state and the market, is quite exceptional in Europe. Chapter 3 provides some information on this issue.

After dealing with these more general but indispensable introductions, we will focus on national policies geared to providing immigrants or ethnic minorities access to (decent) housing (chapter 4). First, the chapter looks at the changing paradigms on migration and integration during the post-war years. Then we will concentrate on national housing policies and local housing practices. For post-colonial minorities as well as refugees and asylum-seekers, specific housing policy was agreed at national level and implemented at local level. Dutch Indonesians and Surinamese, who arrived in the Netherlands at a time when the former colonies gained independence, were helped into regular housing in accordance with a dispersal policy. This is still the case for asylum-seekers, provided they have a residence permit. On the other hand, there have hardly been any specific national or local housing policies for ‘guest workers’ and later labour migrants and their family members, although these labour migrants were legal residents. In chapter 4 we will describe the applied policies in detail. We will also describe national debates
which led to a laissez faire approach concerning housing for labour migrants and their families.

In chapter 5 we will present some statistics on the housing position of migrants and their descendants using indicators such as tenancy, dwelling size, dwelling age and social and ethnic composition of the residential neighbourhoods. Also, residential segregation and concentration will be described and we will seek explanations for the different housing market positions of the largest ethnic minority groups compared to the indigenous Dutch. To some extent, the data illustrate the previous chapters on migration history, housing policy and lack of such policy. By presenting the degree of residential segregation, this chapter also serves as an introduction to chapter 6 which concentrates on area-based policies and practices. These policies and practices are mostly directed towards neighbourhoods or districts with large representations of people with a (non-Western) foreign background.

Chapter 6 discusses area-based policies. It starts with a description of some national programmes for area-based social policy. The issues at stake are the socioeconomic and ethnic mix of neighbourhoods. Like national housing policy, area-based policies mostly cater for categories of citizens with social and economic arrears rather than for citizens of specific ethnic origin. Nevertheless, the impact of these general policies on migrants and ethnic minorities can be substantial. Coping with residential segregation is an important category of area-based policies. The other category is inclusionary practices. These involve explicit attempts to connect different ethnic groups as well as improving the quality of (social) life more in general.

Chapter 7 focuses on the lessons that can be learned from several decades of housing policy – or lack of housing policy – in terms of social inclusion of vulnerable population groups such as immigrants, ethnic minorities, asylum-seekers and refugees.
2 General context: definitions, numbers, migration flows

2.1 Whom do we define as migrants and ethnic minorities?

Who we define as migrants or ethnic minorities is subject to changing discourses. Definitions often relate to groups of people who are perceived as ‘us’ and ‘them’. For many decades travellers within national boundaries were seen as strangers, not fully belonging to the communities of the cities or regions of their destination. These days, it takes international migration to make the distinction, but the countries of origin of the migrants do not seem to be equally ‘foreign’; non-Western immigrants tend to be perceived differently from Western immigrants.

Minority communities may be centuries old, but they may also be relatively new, particularly if they stem from recent immigration flows. Over the years changes will occur in the cultural orientation of both majority and minority communities. This will affect their mutual relationships and the patterns of identification of individual members. Many immigrants tend to lose their ethnic identity after several generations, and assimilate into dominant cultural patterns. At some point, they stop being minorities. However, there are also examples of immigrant communities that have preserved their cultural or religious identity and that have developed into national minorities within a state system.

Since terms like minorities or foreigners imply a distinction between the indigenous population and the new arrivals, the words can come to emphasise the ‘otherness’ of groups and suggest inferiority of the ‘other’. For this reason, the concept tends to become contaminated. New words are then chosen for more political correctness, words that are supposedly more neutral until they gradually become contaminated as well. Words that have been successively used in the Dutch discourse were ‘foreigners’, ‘minorities or ethnic minorities’, ‘newcomers or new Dutch’, ‘people with foreign background (allochtonen)’ and – most recently – ‘immigrants and their descendants’, and more specific and following terminology in the USA: Moroccan-Dutch, Turkish-Dutch, etc.. We will deal with the terms ‘ethnic minorities’ and ‘people with foreign background’ in more detail.

Ethnic minorities was an important concept in the early 1980s for setting the agenda of national policies for certain groups. People of foreign background is a more recent concept which is nowadays often used. Moreover, it offers more scope to quantify the groups that are considered to be of special interest for national policy or concern.

The term ‘ethnic minorities’ was introduced into Dutch integration politics in 1983 in the White Paper on minorities (to be discussed later). This Paper was a response to an advisory report describing ethnic minorities as ethnic groups of whom the members’ identity is primarily connected to membership of that group. Part of the definition is that the members of the group have a low socioeconomic position in
society and lack sufficient numbers to exercise political power (Van Amersfoort 1974; Penninx 1988). At the time, the groups involved were (former) colonial minorities from the Moluccan islands in Indonesia and from Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, labour migrants and their offspring from Turkey and Morocco and refugees from various countries. Apart from recent immigrants, two native minority groups were included in the policies targeting ethnic minorities: so-called ‘gypsies’ and native Dutch mobile home-dwellers or ‘travellers’. The White Paper and the concept of minorities provoked discussion on the inclusion of Chinese Dutch and provincial minorities like the Frisians, who have their own language. These groups were initially not included in these policies.

In addition to the term ethnic minorities, we use the following terms in this report:

- **Someone with a foreign background** (‘allochtoon’): a person of whom at least one parent was born abroad. In daily use, the term ‘migrants’ or ‘immigrants’ is sometimes used to refer to this group, but the term ‘someone with a foreign background’, by definition, covers also the second generation. This definition is generally used for presenting statistical data, including housing data.

Dutch researchers and policymakers often also make a distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ people with a foreign background:

- **Persons with a non-Western background**: persons originating from a country in Africa, South America or Asia (excluding Japan and Indonesia) and Turkey.
- **Persons with a Western background**: persons originating from a country in Europe (excluding Turkey and including Asian parts of the former Soviet Union), North America, Oceania, Indonesia or Japan.
- **First-generation people with a foreign background**: people born abroad with at least one parent also born abroad.
- **Second-generation people with a foreign background**: people born in the Netherlands with at least one parent born abroad.
- **Origin**: Characteristic showing with which country someone is closely related given their own country of birth and that of their parents.
- **People with a Dutch background (autochtoon)**: people whose parents were both born in the Netherlands regardless of the country where they themselves were born.

The term ‘ethnic minorities’ is hardly used any more in Dutch within the context of policies targeting immigrants. Instead the term ‘people with a non-Western foreign background’ is used. However, in this report, we use the term ‘ethnic minorities’ and ‘people with a non-Western foreign background’ interchangeably. When we discuss minorities with a Western rather than non-Western background, this will be mentioned explicitly unless it is clear from the presented countries of origin.

Another term which needs clarification is ‘refugee’. In a legal sense, the term ‘refugee’ refers to an asylum-seeker whose asylum application has been granted under
the Geneva Convention of 1967. It is possible that asylum-seekers may be granted a residence permit under subsidiary protection. In this report, for the sake of simplicity and comparability with other country reports, we sometimes also use ‘refugees’ to refer to this latter group.

Broad definition
National concern and policies focus on ethnic groups depending on their country of birth rather than their nationality. This makes the target group larger than in countries where nationality is the distinctive factor. The definition of ethnic minorities becomes even broader because the second generation is also qualified as being ‘of foreign background’. On the other hand, the focus is narrowed by the fact that people of ‘Western foreign background’ are usually not included in any policy.

2.2 Profile of people with a foreign background

Number of people with a foreign background
According to Statistics Netherlands (CBS), as of 1 January 2008, the Netherlands has a population of 16.4 million people. About 3.2 million people of foreign origin live in the Netherlands, equivalent to around 20% of the total population (figure 2.1).

Photo 2.1
At this playground in Afrikaanderwijk, Rotterdam, children can hire mobile toys (see chapter 6). They pay with pretend money they earn by performing small tasks in the public domain.
Of these 3.2 million people, 1.6 million are first-generation immigrants and an equal number are second-generation. Of the total people of foreign origin, 55% have a non-Western background; the other 45% are people of Western foreign origin (CBS, Statline). People with a Western foreign background include large numbers of Germans (380,000), Belgians (112,000) and British (78,000) and smaller numbers from France, Italy, Spain and Portugal (between 20,000 and 40,000 per country).

Among the people of German and Belgian origin living in the Netherlands, the majority are of the second generation. For the other countries of origin about half the group belong to the second generation. Increasingly, ‘Western’ immigrants come from Eastern European countries like Poland (69,000), the former Yugoslavia (78,000), the former Soviet Union (53,000) and in smaller numbers from Romania and Bulgaria. Among these Eastern European migrants, the large majority are of the first generation (CBS Statline). In socioeconomic terms, Eastern European migrants seem to occupy an intermediate position between the ‘other’ Western immigrants and the non-Western immigrants (Forum, 2004). Most of these immigrant groups have not been an explicit target of minorities policies, although former Yugoslavians and many from former Soviet Republics came as refugees or asylum-seekers and were received accordingly (to be discussed later). Others came as labour migrants.

Turks, Surinamese, Moroccans and Antilleans are by far the largest non-Western groups (figure 2.2). Their share in the non-Western population is gradually decreasing, however. During the mid-1990s about three quarters of the people with a non-Western background consisted of people from these four countries. Currently, Turkish Dutch are the largest group, followed by Surinamese and Moroccan Dutch.
Each of these groups make up about 2% of the total Dutch population. The share of the second generation is also highest among people of Turkish, Surinamese, Moroccan and to a lesser extent Antillean origin. Among the three largest groups, the second generation is about half of the total group. This can be explained by the migration history of these groups to the Netherlands (see below); they have resided in the Netherlands longer than the other non-Western groups.

Figure 2.2
Countries of origin of the largest groups of people of non-Western foreign origin in the Netherlands, 1 January 2008 (absolute numbers)

People with origins from China, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia are the next largest non-Western groups, with a lower share of the second generation. The history and nature of their migration is different from the four groups mentioned above. The latter groups arrived in the Netherlands more recently due to asylum-seeking, while the migration of the ‘traditional’ four groups started in the 1960s due to labour-migration and post-colonial migration. The Chinese are exceptional in the sense that they are a very heterogeneous group with arrivals in several decades and from different parts in China, but also from Hong Kong and elsewhere. About half the Chinese in the Netherlands came as labour migrants and following chain migration, while the other half came as asylum-seekers (CBS Statline). Despite the economic vulnerability and cultural isolation of the first generation, they were initially not included in overall national minorities policies (Benton & Vermeulen, 1987).

It is expected that the heterogeneity of the Dutch and foreign-origin Dutch population will increase further in terms of countries and regions of origin. Within groups, especially the groups that have resided in the Netherlands for a longer period of time, socioeconomic diversity is also increasing. This raises questions
as to how the national and local authorities can focus their policies on vulnerable immigrant and minority groups (Forum, 2004). Recently, the national government has explicitly expanded its interest in the integration developments of – in addition to the four largest non-Western origin groups – recent non-Western immigrants (Iraqis, Iranians, Afghans and Somalis), as well as established ethnic minorities like Roma and Sinti. The Dutch Parliament has requested repeated research among these specific groups who presumably have diverse and specific problems (TK, 2008a).

People with a foreign background and double nationality
In the past fifteen years or so, the number of Dutch people acquiring at least one other nationality has increased considerably. On 1 January 2008, there were more than 1 million people living in the Netherlands who had Dutch nationality and at least one other nationality. This number was three times higher compared to that of on 1 January 19954. This increase is mostly caused by an increase in the number of naturalisations5; since 2003, however, the increase can be attributed mainly to an increase in the numbers of those acquiring Dutch nationality by birth. About half the Dutch people having at least one other nationality also have Turkish or Moroccan nationality (ibid; figure 2.3). Recent research shows that second-generation Turks and Moroccans more often have Dutch nationality than the first generation (Dagevos, 2008).

Figure 2.3
Original nationality of Dutch people with dual nationality (numbers), 2008
The Netherlands offers extra rights to residents who hold Dutch nationality. Those holding Dutch nationality can for example vote in national and local elections (provincial as well as municipal), while those who have a permanent residence permit but who do not have Dutch nationality can only vote in municipal elections. Furthermore, there are certain public service functions for which acquiring Dutch nationality is a prerequisite (e.g. government ministers, mayors, police officers, the armed forces or the judiciary). Having Dutch nationality is not a prerequisite for access to social housing or to financial markets for buying a house in the private sector. It is however not possible for immigrants with a temporary residence permit to obtain a mortgage.

Distribution of people with a non-Western foreign background in the country
The people of non-Western origin are geographically quite unevenly distributed in the Netherlands. They are traditionally concentrated in the urban agglomeration of western Holland (the ‘Randstad’) where the four biggest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) are located. One in three inhabitants of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague is of non-Western origin. This indicates a strong concentration of the non-Western population in these cities, considering that this group make up only about one tenth of the total Dutch population. When we consider the young (under 20 years old), the distribution of people of non-Western origin is even more distorted: in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, about one in two youngsters are of non-Western origin. In some smaller Dutch municipalities this ratio barely reaches one percent (Van der Vliet et al., 2007).

At local level, the concentration differences are even bigger. There are districts or neighbourhoods where the majority of the residents are of non-Western origin and there are districts and neighbourhoods with virtually no people of non-Western origin. The increase in the residential concentration of Dutch people of non-Western origin between 1999 and 2004 was higher than would have been expected based on the national population growth alone (Latten et al., 2005 in Van der Vliet et al., 2007). The process and patterns of residential segregation will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

2.3 History of post-war migration to the Netherlands
Several groups of non-Western immigrants have entered the Netherlands since the 1950s, for economic as well political reasons. They can be roughly divided into four groups. In chronological order of arrival in significant numbers, the first group consists of colonial ‘repatriates’ from the former colonies of Indonesia and Surinam. The second category includes invited labour migrants (guest workers) from Southern European countries and later Turkey and Morocco, and the chain of immigrants following. Recent labour migrants from eastern EU countries (Poland, Romania and Bulgaria) also fit into this category. The third group consists of refugees and asylum-seekers from various countries. Finally, the fourth group are irregular dwellers, such as labour migrants from non-EU countries and formally rejected asylum-seekers.
2.3.1 Post-colonial migration
Indonesia and Moluccan islands
Immigrants from the former Dutch colony in Indonesia came anticipating or responding to the Indonesian sovereignty in 1947. Between 1945 and 1965 about 300,000 people came, including wealthy colonial Dutch, middle and lower-class people who had been connected to the Dutch regime (Jansen, 2006). Among the migrants were descendants from mixed marriages and many had never been in the Netherlands. For them the term ‘repatriates’ is not appropriate. This group assimilated very rapidly and has, apart from initial housing provision and dispersal policy over the country, never been included in any national programme for migrants or minorities.

Among the repatriates were a group of approximately 4,000 soldiers from the Moluccan islands who had served in the overseas Dutch army. With their family members, they were a group of approximately 12,500 (ibid). Their situation differed from the other immigrants from Indonesia in the sense that they hoped for a return to an independent Moluccan republic, hopes that were initially fuelled by the Dutch government. Upon arrival in the Netherlands, the Moluccan soldiers were – to their frustration and anger – immediately dismissed from the Dutch army. Their immediate material basic needs were taken care of by the state as well as private care initiatives and churches. The temporary housing in barracks and resorts (more in chapter 4) was meant to last for half a year, but would last for about 20 years.

It took years to realise and accept that Indonesia would not tolerate an independent Moluccan republic. Hopes for repatriation and anger towards the Dutch government significantly slowed the economic, social and cultural participation in the Dutch society. Additional problems were the radicalisation of young Moluccans in the 1970s, resulting in a violent hijacking of a train and a school with a major impact on the perception of Moluccans by the general public. It was not until 1977 that the Moluccans were finally included as Dutch citizens, and in 1983 they were included in the minorities policy (to be discussed in chapter 4) (ibid: 81).

Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles
The second group of colonial minorities came from Surinam. Starting the 1960s, Surinamese people migrated mostly for educational reasons. Larger numbers arrived anticipating and responding to the independence of the country in 1975. Most people came in the year of independence (1975) and in 1979 and 1980. In 1980 a treaty between the Surinamese and Dutch governments ended. This treaty had allowed Surinamese citizens to switch between Surinamese and Dutch nationality. Choosing Dutch nationality was only allowed if they migrated to the Netherlands. As the end of the treaty approached, more and more people chose a future in the Netherlands. The troublesome economic and political situation in the young republic encouraged them to do so (Jennissen, 2009).

Between 1973 and 1980 approximately 148,000 people migrated from Surinam (Lucassen & Pennings, 1994: 43). Among the immigrants were Creoles, Hindus-
tani and Chinese people, including Christians, Hindus and Muslims. After 1980 Surinamese migration continued on a lower level, as family members joined their relatives in the Netherlands, while some came as refugees following the December revolution of 1982. As of January 2008 the number of Surinamese immigrants and their descendants in the Netherlands was over 330,000 (CBS, Statline).

The relationship between the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles (including Aruba) differs from Surinam. The islands have remained part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and immigrants from the Antilles have Dutch nationality. Migration between the Netherlands Antilles and the Netherlands has been more mutual and temporary, depending on economic up and down swings. Since 1995, there has been rapid immigration of youngsters from the Antilles, as a result of severe economic problems on the islands. Lack of job training, lack of knowledge of the Dutch language and lack of supervision by family members have caused quite large numbers of youngsters to get involved in criminal activities and cause serious neighbourhood nuisance. The Dutch and Antillean governments have agreed on integration trajectories and training programmes, as conditions for admission to the Netherlands. In 1995 the number of Antillean people in the Netherlands was about 96,000. On 1 January 2008 it was about 130,000 (CBS, Statline). The newly arrived comprise about a quarter of the total group.

2.3.2 Labour migrants and their families

Low-skilled labour migration and chain migration

When the Dutch economy recovered after the Second World War, demand for (low-skilled) labour in sectors like textiles, coal-mining and shipbuilding increased. Employers initially started looking for male workers in Italy, Spain, Yugoslavia and Greece and from the mid-1960s they headed for Turkey and Morocco (Lucassen & Pennings, 1994: 53). The assumption behind the recruitment of workers was that these migrants would stay only temporarily. This is why they were referred to as ‘guest workers’. As the Netherlands did not consider itself an immigration country, the labour-migration was regulated minimally, mostly through bilateral agreements (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2008; Doomernik, 2008).

With the oil crisis of 1973, Dutch society experienced an increase in unemployment; a change in the course of admission policies was introduced and the government decided to restrict labour migration. In addition, sanctions were introduced against employers to discourage the employment of illegal workers. By this time a large number of irregular migrants had obtained a legal residence permit, however (Jennissen, 2009). Many guest workers from Southern European countries returned to their home countries when the economies there started to grow. Some Italian immigrants have resided in the Netherlands for much longer and formed distinctive and appreciated niches in the Dutch labour market, such as chimney-sweeps, Italian ice-cream makers and terrazzo workers (Bovenkerk et al., 2004). Many migrants
from Turkey and Morocco stayed on in the Netherlands, as their home countries offered fewer economic opportunities.

Photo 2.2
Javastraat in Amsterdam, located in a 19th-century residential area with high densities of small, often private-sector rental flats. Many labour migrants settled in neighbourhoods like these in the 1970s and 1980s.

During the above period, Dutch employers were obliged to provide a minimum standard of housing for guest workers, but there was no effective control. The immigrants’ aim was to earn, spend as little as possible in the host country and send as much revenue as possible to their home country. The men lived in hostels, boarding houses or private rented rooms, often in crowded or otherwise substandard conditions. This changed when from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, many Turkish and Moroccan immigrants had their families come over for social as well as economic reasons. They began looking for regular housing (see chapter 4).

The continuing immigration led to increasing concerns regarding the socioeconomic position of the guest workers and their families. Among others, factors such as growing immigrant participation in the regular housing market and the influx of non-Dutch-speaking children with various educational backgrounds into Dutch schools were matters of concern (Van Amersfoort, 1999). Within this context, the Dutch government decided to implement a somewhat more restrictive family reunion policy. The maximum age at which children in the country of origin could join
their parents in the Netherlands was lowered from 21 to 18. This measure had hardly any effect, however (ibid).

From the early 1980s, family reunification slowed down and the chain migration increasingly consisted of marriage partners for guest workers’ children. The government tried to limit marriage migration and encouraged return migration. Financial incentives and training programmes were introduced for prospective return migrants. Development programmes were also introduced in the countries of origin, in cooperation with these countries, to combat emigration. Such programmes were also implemented by (then West) Germany. These measures did not appear to have long-term effects, however (Van Amersfoort, 1999).

In addition, in 1993 the Dutch government introduced restrictions for marriage migration. Those who wanted to ‘import’ a partner from another country were required to have a minimum level of income (corresponding to 70% of the social minimum for couples) and had to have resided in the Netherlands for at least three years. The required minimum level of income for family formation has been raised twice since then, first to 100% (in 2001) and then to 120% of the statutory minimum wage (in 2004). Together with this last rise in the minimum income requirement, the minimum age for both partners (the one already residing in the Netherlands as well as the one living abroad) wanting family formation has been raised from 18 to 21 years. The current policy does not require international couples to have their own independent housing. It is therefore possible that these couples sometimes live in the house of their parents(-in-law).

Recent Eastern European labour migrants

In recent years a new group of guest workers has come from the new EU member states Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. About 70,000 people from these countries are registered in Dutch municipalities, especially the ‘big four’: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Others are registered in rural municipalities, especially in glasshouse and flower-growing districts. There is some resemblance to the early Mediterranean guest workers in the sense that most of them seem to plan to stay temporarily and the housing situation tends to be substandard. Housing is often in sublet, crowded private rented homes and hostels.

There is no specific national housing policy for these groups. However, the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Housing (VROM-Inspectie), the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) and the Association of International Employment Agencies (VIA) intend to help provide better accommodation than was available for earlier cohorts of labour migrants. With this in mind they publish factsheets to show how employers and municipalities can work together to provide better local facilities. The argument is that although the labour migrants will in most cases stay only temporarily, the need for accommodation for temporary migrants will be permanent. (VROM-Inspectie, 2009). The scope for return migration seems to be better for these groups than for the earlier Turkish and Moroccan guest workers, because the economies in these countries are expected to develop. It is therefore expected that
many workers will return at some point, although there are also signs that Eastern European migrants are increasingly starting to settle permanently (ibid).

When it comes to temporarily lodging labour migrants in hostels, there is controversy between employers that advocate small-scale versus large-scale accommodations. Larger accommodation is generally cheaper for the users (and the employees appreciate cheap accommodation above all), whereas smaller accommodation units are more flexible, and according to those employers who are in favour of it, more social and easier to manage. Furthermore, larger accommodation is difficult to create in central locations where there is opposition from residents, whereas in the countryside there are often environmental restrictions that block the building of residential hostels (VROM-Inspectie, 2009). Nevertheless there are some examples of hostels in rural areas, such as the Flexhotel in (agricultural) Wateringen, a block of converted offices with space for 420 beds (ibid).

2.3.3 Political refugees

A literature review by Wijkhuis et al. (2009) shows that the Netherlands has a long history of receiving asylum-seekers and refugees, going back as far as the 17th century (for example 60,000 Protestants escaping from the Catholic French regime arrived in the Netherlands which at the time had a population of two million). At the beginning of the First World War, 700,000 Belgians came to the Netherlands but later returned to their homeland. In total one million Belgians spent some time in the Netherlands. During the 1930s en 1940s refugees from Germany and Austria arrived, some of whom made their way to other European countries or to the United States. Many of these asylum-seekers were not admitted to the Netherlands due to the restrictive admission policy at the time. After the Second World War, refugees from several Eastern European countries were admitted to the Netherlands. Between the end of the 1950s and 1960s, asylum-seekers from Hungary and then Czechoslovakia, in particular, were admitted. In the following years, the flow of refugees increased as they started to arrive from different parts of the world (Southern and Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and South America) (ibid).

From the end of 1970s, the Netherlands started to admit resettled refugees on a systematic basis within the framework of the resettlement programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Guiaux et al., 2008). In this case refugees took up residence at the invitation of the Dutch government, because they were in an emergency situation. With this resettlement policy the Dutch government was aiming to protect refugees and to demonstrate solidarity with recipient countries in the region of origin (ibid). In 1977, an initial quota was set and a maximum of 750 refugees were admitted to the Netherlands each year (about 200 asylum-seekers arriving independently and 550 resettled refugees). The resettled refugees were mainly from Vietnam. In 1984 the quota for resettled refugees was abandoned, as the number of asylum-seekers arriving independently exceeded the expected numbers. Until 1987 a maximum of 250 resettled refugees were accepted in the Netherlands each year; later the number was increased to 500. At the end of the 1990s the quota was
made more flexible; instead of a yearly maximum of 500 resettled refugees, it was possible to issue invitations to a maximum of 1,500 refugees every three years (ibid).

Figure 2.4  
Asylum applications in the Netherlands, 1975–2007* (first and renewed applications)

* Including a few thousand evacuees from Kosovo for the year 1999.

Source: IND; by CBS treatment

Figure 2.4 shows the numbers of asylum applications in the Netherlands since 1975. These numbers include first and ‘renewed’ applications. Renewed applications are applications submitted by asylum-seekers whose previous applications have been rejected in the Netherlands. Midway through the 1980s the number of asylum-seekers started to exceed the number of resettled refugees (Van den Tillaart et al., 2000). Due to the rapid increase in the numbers of asylum-seekers, asylum issues became important items on the political and social agenda. Problems perceived were the long duration of the asylum procedure in many cases and the relatively imbalanced distribution of asylum applications across Europe (in that the Netherlands had admitted more asylum-seekers than other European countries) (Kromhout, 2006). Shortening the procedure was considered necessary because the long procedures created a long-term need for accommodation in reception centres and ongoing uncertainty for asylum-seekers about their future (ibid). In addition, illegal residence by asylum-seekers whose applications had been rejected, and their return to their home countries, were considered important problems.

Due to these concerns, the Aliens Act was revised in 2001. After the new Aliens Act had come into force, the number of asylum applications began to decrease substantially. This decrease is thought to be partly a result of the new Aliens Act (Wijkhuis et al., 2009).
Almost half the current asylum applications are made by Iraqis and Somalis. In addition to these two groups, asylum-seekers from Afghanistan, countries belonging to the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia were the most important groups of asylum-seekers in the Netherlands between 2000 and 2008 (ibid).

Recently, there have been indications that the duration of the asylum procedure has decreased. For example, in 2008 the number of people staying in a reception centre for more than five years declined sharply from about 9,250 at the start of the year to around 2,750 at the end of 2008 (TK 2008b). Among other factors, this decline was due to the fact that applications by asylum-seekers who had applied before the new Aliens Act 2001 entered into force, were handled as a priority as part of a recent regularisation scheme. Many of those who received a residence permit have already been assigned regular housing (ibid). Of the asylum-seekers who applied in 2001 and 2002, 21% and 20% respectively, had received a (temporary or permanent) residence permit by 1 July 2007. The same figure was 42% and 36%, respectively, for those who made an application in 2005 and 2006 (IND, 2007). During the first six months of 2008 the Dutch government granted residence permits to 6,400 asylum-seekers (TK 2008c).

As mentioned above, one of the concerns of the Dutch government has been the illegal stay of asylum-seekers with a negative decision from the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND). In addition to this group, asylum-seekers whose temporary residence permits have not been prolonged or whose permits have been withdrawn are excluded from social benefits, including housing, and are to leave the Netherlands within a certain period of time (Kromhout, 2006)\(^8\). In reality, many asylum-seekers stay in the Netherlands, sometimes because they do not have the proper documents to return to their home countries. Local authorities have to deal with these residents on a day-to day basis. Church organisations and volunteers from the Dutch Refugee Council also provide support for these groups of former asylum-seekers (Bruguetas-Callejo et al., 2008).

Over the years the Dutch government has undertaken several initiatives to assist these groups with repatriation or resettlement (Wijkhuis et al., 2009). Due to the large influx of asylum-seekers at the end of the 1990s and the possibility in the Immigration Act of the day to lodge many appeals against decisions by the IND, large numbers of asylum-seekers waited for years before a decision was made final. This led to a heated public and political debate. As a result, the Dutch government implemented a number of amnesty regulations between 2000 and 2008 (ibid). The most recent regulation, enacted in June 2007, focused on asylum-seekers who had made their application before the new Aliens Act came into force (April 2001) and who had not received a status decision since then. According to the expectations of the Dutch government, 25,000 to 30,000 asylum-seekers will receive a status under this amnesty scheme (TK 2008d). The housing conditions of asylum-seekers in general and of those who have made use of this amnesty regulation, will be described in chapter 4.
2.3.4 Irregular migrants

Irregular migration to the Netherlands is strongly linked to the migration flows mentioned above: labour migration, family reunion or family formation and asylum-seeking. Although the Dutch admission policies regarding these migration flows have been restrictive for a long time, irregular migration has still continued (Kromhout et al., 2009). According to recent estimates, a substantial number of irregular immigrants resided in the Netherlands: during the period between April 2005 and April 2006 88,000 migrants from non-European countries and 40,000 from European countries were residing in the country illegally (Van der Heijden et al., 2006). The number of irregular migrants from Europe in the Netherlands has probably declined in recent years, as Eastern European countries became members of the EU (Kromhout et al., 2009). It is expected that the number of non-European irregular migrants has also decreased (or will decrease) as a result of the recent amnesty scheme mentioned above (according to Kromhout et al., 2008).

Since the early 1990s, successive Dutch governments have tried to reduce the number of irregular migrants through various laws, regulations and policies. Currently, irregular migrants are excluded from welfare state provisions such as access to social housing and social insurance schemes. Irregular migrants in the Netherlands mostly work in low-skilled and low-paid jobs in sectors such as the hospitality industry, the construction industry, the agricultural and horticultural industries, the retail trade and the temporary employment sector. Some illegal residents work in the sex industry or are involved in minor criminal activities to make a living (see Kromhout et al., 2009). Between 1997 and 2003 an estimated 40% of the irregular migrants were living in one of the four metropolitan regions, mostly in relatively socioeconomically poor and multi-ethnic districts, where most of their fellow-countrymen lived. There was also a relatively large group of irregular migrants in some rural areas, however probably due to the presence of a local agrarian labour-market, especially in horticulture (Leerkes et al., 2004).

2.3.5 Roma, Sinti and travellers

The Netherlands has modest numbers of people who are popularly referred to as ‘gypsies’. These people prefer to call themselves Roma and Sinti, and their number is estimated to be about 10,000, most of them Sinti. Most families were already residing in the Netherlands long before World War II (Forum 2009). Sinti people came to the Netherlands before the mid-19th century and for a long time they were not perceived as a separate group. They had been living in Western Europe and had German, French or Belgium passports. Sinti people distinguish themselves from Roma people, although they do speak a Romani dialect. Roma is the name given to various groups of immigrants from Eastern Europe. Many of them came in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and immediately after their arrival were labelled as gypsies (Lucassen, 1990). In the 1970s, a group of 550 Roma travellers settled in the Netherlands after they had received a residence permit. They were spread over eleven municipalities, where dwellings were allocated to them. With their offspring,
they now number about 3,000, almost a third of the total Roma and Sinti population. In the 1990s an additional number of Roma people migrated to the Netherlands from the Balkan countries and especially from war zones in the former Yugoslavia (Forum, 2008). Little is known about their number and residential status.

Approximately 3,000 to 4,000 Sinti and Roma live in caravans on camp sites, according to their own preference. Most of them belong to families that have resided in the Netherlands for a very long time. Housing in regular homes is often the result of a lack of vacancies on mobile home parks rather than preference, the lack of vacancies being the result of ‘normalising’ policies. The later Roma arrivals from former communist countries were more accustomed to regular housing, although the lifestyle of extended Roma families in Dutch neighbourhoods frequently causes conflict with neighbours (Forum, 2008; Jorna, 2007). Apart from Roma and Sinti, there is a group of approximately 30,000 indigenous travellers who adopted a nomadic lifestyle akin to that of the Roma and Sinti in the late 19th century. Like the Sinti and Roma, most of them opt for a caravan rather than a regular house, and they face a shortage of camp sites. Sometimes the Sinti or Roma and indigenous travellers live on the same camp sites and kinship relationships may occur as well. In most cases, however, there are separate camp sites for the different groups.

In the early decades of the 20th century, up to the Second World War, the national policy towards ‘gypsies’ became more repressive and uniform. A negative stigma was attached to all nomadic citizens, including native Dutch travellers. In 1918 the Caravan Act was introduced in order to put an end to the travelling habit. The Caravan Act lasted until 1999. In the years between, an episode of centralisation of camp sites was followed by decentralisation and ‘normalisation’. Unlike the centralisation period in the mid-20th century, when large ‘camps’ were created in just 50 municipalities, nowadays most of the more than 400 Dutch municipalities contain at least one camp site with up to a hundred places, adding up to 1,140 locations with slightly over eight thousand sites for mobile homes in all municipalities together. The shortage of sites is estimated to be 3,000 (Forum, 2008). It should be noted that nowadays ‘caravans’ are in reality chalets which are not mobile at all, while the space occupied on camp sites by each mobile home is approximately double the size of a modestly priced single-family terraced home.

Centralisation in the mid-20th century went hand in hand with camp facilities such as schools and medical care, whereas in the process of decentralisation the caravan population would use regular facilities in the municipalities. Since 1999 it has been up to local authorities to decide on the policy for municipal camp sites. Responsibilities related to the camp sites and Sinti, Roma and traveller communities were transferred from central State level to local level. Policies are diverse and may involve creating, removing or moving around sites and, in most cases, downsizing them (VROM-Inspectie, 2009). Camp sites of Roma and Sinti as well as Traveller sites have the reputation of being centres of disproportionate criminal activity, such as irregular building activities, social benefit fraud and school neglect, environmental offences (especially in car demolition firms on the site) and drug dealing and arms trade (ibid).
Until very recently, asylum, family reunion and family formation were practically the only ways of migrating to the Netherlands from non-Western countries. After the ‘chain-migration’ flows following guest workers, labour migration was very limited, and mostly from EU countries. In June 2006 there was a radical change in this policy. The Dutch government accepted a policy memorandum to ‘manage’ migration. The memorandum follows the principle that ‘a modern migration policy’ should be based on the existing needs of Dutch society for immigrants and that the contributions that immigrants can make should be taken as the underlying principle in the admissions policy (Ministry of Justice, 2006). The memorandum proposes to encourage the immigration of highly educated, high-skilled labour, where temporary residence is not a goal. Regarding the immigration of low and middle-skilled labour, restrictions remain\textsuperscript{12} (ibid). Study migration, family migration and humanitarian residence objectives are the most important alternative grounds on which migrants can receive a residence permit in the Netherlands (\textsc{tk 2007a}).
Notes

1 Definitions by Statistics Netherlands (CBS).
2 Based on their socioeconomic and socio-cultural position people from Japan and Indonesia are defined as ‘Western’. These exceptions are made because these are people who were born in the former Dutch East Indies as well as employees of Japanese firms and their family members.
3 In determining the origin of a person belonging to the second generation, the country of birth of the parents is taken into account. According to the definition by CBS, in cases where parents are born in different countries, the origin of the person in question is defined according to the country of birth of the mother.
5 Between 1 January 1992 and 1 October 1997, it was possible for non-Dutch people to keep their original nationality after naturalisation. Since 1 October 1997, people who acquire the Dutch nationality by naturalisation have to give up their original nationality. However, due to many exceptions to this rule, between 1998 and 2007 almost 80% of the naturalised people with a foreign background could keep their original nationality (CBS, idem).
8 This period is four weeks, with the exception of those asylum-seekers whose applications have been rejected in the accelerated procedure. This group has to leave the country immediately (Kromhout, 2006).
9 Forum factsheet Roma and Sinti and additional information by Peter Jorna, consultant at Forum on Roma, Sinti and travellers.
10 Personal information by Peter Jorna, Forum.
11 In fact, here is a parallel with repressive national policy towards Chinese in the Netherlands who had lost their jobs in the shipping industries in the 1920s (Wubben, 1986).
12 Before an employer can recruit employees from outside the European Union, the availability of priority of labour must be evaluated (Ministry of Justice, 2006). That is, a candidate from a non-EU country can only be employed if there is no alternative candidate available from the European Economic Area.
3 Institutional and housing policy context

3.1 Between corporatists and social democrats

The Dutch society is based on a highly developed welfare state which guarantees a certain level of income, social security, health care, education and housing. This is relevant for the position of ethnic minorities in the country, because in welfare states the government strives for more than just legal equality between migrants and minorities and the rest of the population. Within the national welfare system, large differences in social and economic position between population groups are not considered appropriate. Many immigrants make a start in the country from a weak socioeconomic position. They will need to become incorporated in the general welfare state arrangements or may face special arrangements for them to speed up their integration into the wider society. Meanwhile, the fact that there is access to extensive welfare state arrangements may undermine the goodwill and understanding of the public.

Esping-Anderson’s welfare state typology (see Soede et al., 2004) situates the Netherlands between the corporatist and social-democratic model, or ‘regime type’. The social-democratic, or Nordic welfare regime (mostly the Scandinavian countries), is characterised by a high level of social protection for all residents of the country and relatively low income differentials between citizens. The social-democratic regime is largely universalistic in that all inhabitants are covered for the same risks and under the same conditions. Corporatist welfare states (mainly the continental European countries) are less universalistic, but for specific groups the level of protection can be high. In the past, most welfare schemes were set up to generate loyalty by specific groups in society to the central state or the monarchy, and thus introduced separate schemes for the existing castes and classes. The liberal welfare regime (mainly the Anglo-Saxon countries) has low provisions, providing benefits mainly for the demonstrably needy. Several authors have added a Mediterranean welfare regime to Anderson’s typology, including Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy. Its most distinctive characteristic is the ‘polarised’ nature of the income protection. While benefits can be described as high for employees in the regular labour market, schemes for people without a permanent job (e.g. social assistance and unemployment schemes) are absent or very small (Soede et al., 2004).

Housing is often seen as an element within welfare state arrangements, the welfare state being a set of public services operating (mostly) outside the market (Malpass, 2008). According to this view the focus is on the public or social rented housing sector. Harloe (1995) distinguished two main models of social housing provision by states: the mass model, embracing a broad range of income groups in the social sector, versus a residual model, catering for the least well-off. The Netherlands, like the Scandinavian countries, fits the mass model. The Mediterranean countries without exception fit the residual model, as do most of the liberal or
Anglo-Saxon countries. Corporatist societies are diverse when it comes to the size of the social housing sector. Social housing is an important field of welfare arrangements and this is particularly so for the Netherlands, where social housing has been so extensive that it has been characterised as a public facility (Ghékiere, 1996). In evaluating discourses and housing policy for members of ethnic minorities, we will need to pay attention to general housing policy instruments and programmes. These will be described in the following sections.

3.2 The Dutch housing system

The policy outcomes for ethnic minorities are largely locally determined through local housing policies and practices, within the wider national framework. Relevant policies are the construction of dwellings in various tenancy forms and prices, urban renewal, rent levels, rent rebates and allocation policies, as well as area-based policies to create ‘liveable’ neighbourhoods. Before we present general facts and figures on the Dutch housing market we will look briefly at the history of the system. The special position of Dutch housing associations needs some explanation as to where this system comes from. In order to understand why the Dutch state invested in large numbers of social rented homes, owned and managed by housing associations, we need to peek (briefly) into late 19th-century discussions, resulting in the 1901 Housing Act. The changes in housing policy, investments in housing as well as the changes in the institutional framework over the years will prove relevant for the housing position of migrants who came in recent decades, as will be discussed in chapter 4.

3.2.1 History of the housing system

1850-1940: Origin and first blossoming of housing associations
The Netherlands has a long tradition of social housing. The first housing corporation was established in 1852. More housing corporations followed in the ensuing decades. Although the significance of these philanthropic housing corporations in housing production was small, they had great importance in showing the way ahead towards better housing quality for the working classes. In 1901, the Housing Act was passed by Parliament. The Housing Act set conditions for housing corporations, the most important of which was that housing corporations work exclusively in ‘the interests of housing’. If an association or a foundation meets these conditions, it can be accredited under the Housing Act. Until the mid-1990s, accredited institutions were eligible for government loans and subsidies for building and managing social housing. The Housing Act is still the foundation for the social housing sector.
Institutional and housing policy context

The legislator preferred housing construction and management by housing associations rather than municipalities, in order to create some distance between politics and housing management. It was feared that elected local authorities would manipulate rent levels to gain votes (Van der Schaar, 1987: 80). The other reason was ideological: the municipality should not hinder private initiative. Municipal housing companies could build housing in the event that no housing corporation was prepared to build.

Building social rented dwellings was, in the years of preparation of the 1901 Housing Act, deliberately chosen over providing subsidised owner-occupied dwellings. As in most European countries, industrialisation and large-scale migration towards the Dutch cities created vast housing problems in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but compared to surrounding industrial countries like the UK and Germany, both industrialisation and urban growth came late so the Dutch were able to learn from experiences abroad. According to Pooley (1992: 333), most European countries at the time emphasised the ideological importance of private property, in order to produce ‘responsible citizens in a stable capitalist society’. In 1870, the same arguments were employed in the Netherlands. However, around 1890, ten years before the Housing Act, Dutch proponents had abandoned the idea of home ownership for the
urban working classes. Home ownership, it was argued, would reduce the mobility of workers, which would make them dependent on local employers. Abroad, there was experience with economic recession in the 1880s and its effects on owner-occupiers. It had forced people to increase mortgages and finally to sell their properties to rack-renters. It was concluded that subsidised home ownership would not guarantee social housing in the long term. Generations of owners were expected to let or to sell their property rather than take good care of it (Van der Schaar, 1987: 74).

It took some time before the new housing corporation sector came to blossom (figure 3.1). World War I led to the first period of strong growth for the housing corporations as private building decreased sharply. The government decided to promote housing production by providing financial support for housing corporations. This period also saw an increase in the building of municipal housing. The period of growth ended when private housebuilding was resumed and housing subsidies were ended (Wolters, 2002).

**Figure 3.1**
Numbers of constructed social rented and private sector dwellings 1850-2008

1945-1990: Fighting the housing shortage
After World War II, housing corporations were used by the government to fight the housing shortage, which at the time was dubbed ‘public enemy number one’. Housing shortages were a result of war damage and the absence of building efforts during the war years, and they lasted for decades, in part because of the post-war ‘baby boom’. In the years 1945 – 1973 fighting the housing shortage was the dominant target in housing policy, resulting in large-scale housing construction, the peak being in the year 1973. The new construction consisted of modest quality, cheap, rent-controlled(!), rented homes with a view to keeping housing affordable,
so that wages could be held down and the economy could be revitalised. In order to produce large numbers of new dwellings in a short time and with limited financial resources, the production process and dwelling quality were standardised, resulting in many monotonous apartment blocks, no more than four stories so an elevator was not needed. The urban restructuring effort today (to be discussed in chapter 6) is focused predominantly on dealing with these housing estates.

Up to the end of the 1960s housing corporations had almost no independence. Among other things, many municipalities took it upon themselves to develop social housing and only transferred the housing stock to housing corporations afterwards. Rents and rent increases were determined by national government and the 1947 Housing Allocation Act gave municipalities authority over the allocation of rented housing (Wolters, 2002). The allocation was based on (urgent) housing needs and waiting lists, as will be further discussed in chapter 4.

In the second half of the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, housing production slowed down as housing shortages had diminished. The 1973 oil crisis marked the beginning of a period of economic decline, leading – among other things – to some liberalisation of rent levels, rent increases and a growing emphasis on affordability of housing. In 1974 a rent subsidy programme was launched to help tenants cope with rent increases. The amount of subsidy depended on income and rent levels. Rent subsidies still exist and have developed into the main form of public housing finance. A third of all Dutch tenants are enrolled in the rent subsidy programme, which includes both social and private rented sector tenants.

1990-2008: Towards independent housing corporations
At the end of the 1980s the national housing bill and the complexity of the national housing system led to serious concern. The strong post-war government intervention in housing had resulted in a very complex system of subsidies, rent control and allocation regulations. Between 1968 and 1984 the number of subsidies had grown from seven to over thirty different arrangements, while the amount of state money involved rose in the same period from 2.5 billion guilders to approximately 14 billion (Adriaansen & Fortgens, 1996: 101). A parliamentary investigation on fraud and corruption in the demand for housing subsidies further encouraged the transformation of the housing system.

In the 1990s the Dutch housing system changed considerably. The start of this change was marked by the publication of the policy document ‘Housing in the Nineties’ (Heerma, 1989). The policy document proposed a shift from building social housing to better use of the existing stock. In the 1990s the sale of social housing increased sharply, reflecting the fact that promoting home ownership was now an objective of housing policy as the size of the affordable social rented sector was considered to be too big for the target group.

One of the important issues in ‘Housing in the Nineties’ was decentralisation. Central government should no longer become deeply involved in local housing issues. Municipalities and housing corporations should set their goals in collabora-
Institutional and housing policy context

Central government promoted the use of ‘performance agreements’ between municipalities and housing corporations. In these agreements, housing corporations had to commit themselves to certain housing goals and municipalities had to offer them favourable conditions to achieve those goals.

Another development in the 1990s was a shift towards more independence for housing corporations from both national and local government. A new social management order implied a shift in focus from operational regulation to performance. Housing corporations were required to list their achievements annually in four areas of accountability: housing of lower-income groups; an increase in housing quality; financial continuity; and tenant participation. Later ‘liveability’ and ‘housing and care’ were added as areas of accountability. Supervision of the social performance of housing corporations was first transferred to municipalities. However, in 1997, the supervision was again transferred to the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. This was done because not all municipalities were equipped to supervise housing corporations and a supervision relationship between housing corporations and municipalities was inconsistent with the desired equal footing of these two parties. For financial supervision an independent ‘Central Fund for Housing’ (CFV) was created. The freedom to set and increase rents was also increased (Wolters, 2002).

In 1995, allocation of new housing subsidies to housing corporations ended. Moreover, a ‘grossing-up and balancing’ operation (known in Dutch as brutering) cut loose most existing financial ties by cancelling out existing subsidy obligations against interest-free government loans for the construction of social dwellings. Since this operation was launched, housing corporations have become financially independent and are required to operate accordingly. Although most housing corporations are financially sound, there are wide differences between housing corporations and between regions. Some corporations have more money than social tasks; others have too little money for their social tasks. To address this, the principle of ‘matching’ was introduced; housing corporations with surplus wealth are expected to support those corporations that need more money. This can be done by granting low-interest loans, by direct transfer of funds or by mergers (ibid).

Organisational change

In the 1990s, municipal housing companies were excluded from all government subsidies. After this, most municipalities either privatised their housing companies into housing corporations or transferred their stock to existing housing corporations. Council housing became extinct. The number of housing corporations has dropped sharply since the 1990s as a result of mergers: in 1990, 824 corporations were operating, in 2006 only 474 were left, according to the sector organisation of housing corporations (Aedes, 2007). At first, most mergers were at a local and regional level, but more recently a number of mergers have taken place between housing corporations in different parts of the country. This has resulted in some very large corporations.
Institutional and housing policy context

However, the majority of housing corporation still own fewer than 5,000 dwellings.

The sector organisation of housing corporations, Aedes, was itself the result of a merger in 1998 between a national umbrella organisation for Social Democrat housing associations (Nationale Woningraad – National Housing Council) and a Christian equivalent (NCIV – Netherlands Christian Institute for Housing).

A final, important change in the framework for housing corporations was the broadening of their activities. This was due to the government’s introduction of ‘liveability’ and ‘housing and care’ as new working areas and accountability fields for housing corporations in 1997, whereby social policies and inclusionary area-based practices are increasingly organised or financed by housing corporations.

3.2.2 Some key facts and figures on housing

The Netherlands has just under 7 million dwellings for its 16.4 million people. In a European perspective, the housing stock is relatively new; about half was built after 1970. Relative to the total stock, the social rented sector in the Netherlands is very large: a third of all dwellings. Table 3.1 shows the size of the different housing sectors. Since the 1980s, the number of owner-occupied dwellings has increased due to new construction of predominantly owner-occupier homes, demolition of social rented homes and the sale of social housing. The latter, however, was on a much smaller scale than in the United Kingdom (less than 1 percent annually in the Netherlands). In 1980, 40 percent of all dwellings were owner-occupied; today the figure is 56 percent. The picture for the cities is different from the national picture: the social and private rented sectors are much larger there. In Rotterdam and Amsterdam more than half the stock is social rented housing. As immigrants and ethnic minorities are strongly overrepresented in the (largest) cities, the social rented sector is of great relevance for them.

Table 3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
<th>Rotterdam</th>
<th>The Hague</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owner-occupier</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social rented</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private rented</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (absolute)</td>
<td>6,914,000</td>
<td>382,000</td>
<td>287,000</td>
<td>231,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: VROM (WoON 2006)

The private rented sector is split into cheap stock that is let by small landlords, mostly located in inner-city districts, and good-quality, expensive stock managed by pension funds and large estate agencies. It caters for well-off tenants who mostly choose this sector because their near-term settling plans are unclear. The private
rented sector is to some extent subject to rent control as rents must relate to quality levels, according to national standards. Tenants can complain to a ‘rent board’ in the case of excessive rents. The reality is that vulnerable tenants – in the cheap segment of the sector – tend not to complain because they often have no alternative housing options and risk being bullied out of their homes if they protest. Obviously, this sector is relevant to newly arrived migrants, especially illegal residents. For this reason, neighbourhoods with large quantities of private rented homes are considered to be hard to manage by municipal agents. The most vulnerable groups tend to cluster there, whereas private landlords are not quite as cooperative as social landlords when it comes to dealing with vulnerable groups and with liveability issues in the neighbourhood.

The majority of the rental stock is owned and managed by housing corporations or associations; council housing has disappeared as a result of privatisation. The council used to cater for tenants who were not readily accepted by social landlords, due to a history of rent arrears, neighbour nuisance or prejudice on the part of the wider public. The latter was often the case for migrants, as will be discussed in chapter 4. By the end of 2006, 474 housing associations were managing 2.4 million dwellings. Housing associations have to maintain an affordable ‘core stock’ of dwellings with rent levels that bring them within reach of people in receipt of rent subsidies.

Of the total of 3 million rental dwellings, 90% are in a rent range which makes the dwellings accessible for people who are eligible for rent subsidy. Income and rent levels that determine eligibility differ according to age and household composition. In 2009, maximum income levels were approximately €20,000 net per annum for singles and €28,000 for couples and families. The minimum rent level is slightly over €200 net per month for all tenants. Cheaper rented homes are almost non-existent (approximately 3% of the rental stock). Maximum rent levels are about €630 per month for most people and just under €350 for people under 23 years old. The amount of rent subsidy depends on the exact income and rent level. Within the eligible rent range, a number of ceilings determine whether 100%, 75% or 50% of the rent above a norm rent is reimbursed. Since higher rents imply better-quality dwellings, rent rebates are smaller for homes with higher rents, so as to make people financially responsible for choosing better-quality dwellings. Just one in three tenants receive rent subsidy because many tenants have income levels which are too high to be eligible. The rent rebates are well known to the public, especially among the clientele of housing corporations, and the numbers of non-users has become very modest (Wildeboer Schut & Hoff, 2007).

In the Netherlands, more than anywhere else, the national government reinforces the gap between renters and homeowners with its financial arrangements. Tenants are eligible for substantial monthly rent rebates provided they have modest incomes; the lower the income, the higher the rent rebates. Homeowners, on the other hand, receive tax relief on the full amount of mortgage interest, and that relief increases with income. The tax relief is higher than in any other country in Europe or else-
where. It is costly and therefore under discussion. People on middle incomes receive the least financial support in housing (Kullberg et al., 2005).

The local systems of actors
The national government is responsible for the rent subsidy programme and rent control (maximum average rent increases). It also formulates general elements in the allocation policy for social rented homes. Geographical borders must be open: applicants from all over the country and the European Union must be able to enrol in a municipal or regional rented housing market.

There is not very much variety within the Netherlands in terms of the local administrative framework for housing policy, as headlines in housing policy objectives are formulated in national papers and the Housing Act provides similar policy instruments for all districts of the country. The actors involved are basically the same in every district: local public authorities, private landlords, housing associations, residents, sometimes organised in tenants’ or residents’ associations but mostly not well organised. Among organised tenants, ethnic minorities are rare; the organised tenants are mostly elderly, native Dutch people who have lived in the estates for many years. The lack of formal representation of ethnic minorities is considered a problem, especially for landlords with many minority members among their clientele. In Rotterdam, for instance, half the tenants in the social rented sector belong to ethnic minorities. Landlords may try to contact these tenants in different ways (e.g. door to door interviews; mediation by group members; special separate information evenings for women and men, etc.), in order to get them involved, for instance in renewal projects. One of the explanations suggested for the low formal representation of minorities is that they would feel uncomfortable in a (sub)culture of endless formal meetings, negotiations and discussions. In general young people, a category overlapping with the ethnic minorities, are not very well represented for the same reasons.

In the three largest cities in the Netherlands, housing policy is organised at the supra-municipal or regional level. Municipalities in the region negotiate their policy priorities together and the housing associations in the area do the same. The regional administration then discusses the policy with the regional housing associations, organised in a federation. Through all these negotiations, it could be argued that policy extremes tend to be ‘filtered out’.
Photo 3.2
Some 3000 social rental flats are being demolished in Transvaal, The Hague, to be replaced by 1600 larger, mostly owner-occupied dwellings. This will enable families to pursue upward local housing careers and will broaden the neighbourhood’s socioeconomic mix.
National policy on integration and access to housing

This chapter will focus on integration and, more specifically, housing policies and practices from the national perspective. The views of subsequent governments on the integration of immigrants and their descendants are discussed in section 4.2, starting from the 1970s up to the most recent modifications in the national integration policy. The term 'integration' refers to the way in which migrants participate in economic, social and cultural domains. We use 'structural integration' to emphasise economic participation and equal access to basic facilities like (good-quality) housing and education. The terms 'social' and 'cultural integration' are used to discuss issues such as the ethnic composition of social networks, mutual perceptions and cultural values. The way in which successive governments have interpreted the issue of integration and tried to equip migrants to participate in society has varied over the years.

Section 4.3 describes national housing policy – as well as lack of housing policy – for different groups of immigrants. Certain groups of colonial repatriates and refugees have been actively helped into decent housing by national policy. Today, refugees are still accommodated according to national policy guidelines, as will be described in 4.2.1. On the other hand, guest workers and their families did not and do not receive such direct assistance with housing. Section 4.3 provides an insight into discussions and mechanisms that lead to a national choice for general housing policy rather than specific housing policy for labour migrants. In this chapter we will also describe why no 'ethnic' housing corporations were facilitated (such as those which exist in the United Kingdom) and what alternative housing practices were encouraged to address the housing needs of Mediterranean labour migrants and their families.

4.1 Changing paradigms in national integration policy

This section will follow national advisory reports and the White Papers on the integration of immigrants and minorities. In broad outline, we witnessed a turning point in the White Paper of 1983 (*Minderhedennota*), where it was acknowledged for the first time that the Netherlands had become a country of immigration rather than emigration as it had been in the 1950s. Moreover, we see a gradual shift in emphasis in the integration discourse from structural integration towards social and cultural integration.

1970s: dual policy

Until the end of the 1970s, national policy concerning immigrants depended mainly on the question of whether specific groups were likely to stay in the Netherlands. The ‘Indonesian repatriates’ in the 1950s were very likely to stay; their assimilation
was the goal to be achieved, with dispersal throughout the country being the tool within the field of housing. In the late 1970s it became clear that the Surinamese immigrants were likely to stay as well. In contrast, the ‘guest workers’ in the 1960s and early 70s were thought to be temporary guests. A dual national policy was implemented (‘two-track policy’): a much lower degree of integration was considered necessary, and attention for the ‘maintenance of group identity’ was thought helpful in the case of return migration.

1983: White Paper on minorities
It was not until the end of the 1970s that it was acknowledged that most of the immigrants of the past two decades were likely to stay. It was recognised that the Netherlands had become a country of immigration. For this reason, more attention was paid to the socioeconomic situation of migrants. In an advisory report, Etnische Minderingden (‘Ethnic Minorities’) (W.R.R., 1979) restriction of immigration was advocated, in combination with a co-ordinated policy for the integration of legal migrants. This resulted in 1983 in the ‘Minderhedennota’ (‘White paper on Minorities’) (Ministry of the Interior, 1983) the main policy aim being to reduce the socioeconomic deprivation of ‘minorities’. Co-ordination of the policy was in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior. The categories of ‘minorities’ were constructed on the basis of their socioeconomic deprivation. The appointed categories were Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, guest workers and their families from southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco, ‘gypsies’ and travellers, the latter being an indigenous deprived category. The Chinese Dutch were not included in the minorities policy, to their regret, as many provided their own income, often working in family restaurants all over the country (Vogels et al., 1999).

The White Paper recognised the importance of implementing a minorities policy, under the motto of ‘integrating while retaining one’s own ethnic identity’. During the 1980s, this policy was aimed at participation by minorities in Dutch society: participation in the labour and housing markets and enrolment in the school system for the younger generation. Welfare work and health care also profited from funds available within the context of this policy, as these two fields were also considered important areas of participation in a modern society. Maintenance of group identity was facilitated by means of subsidised education in the language and culture of the countries of origin (Van Amersfoort, 1999). The co-ordinating Ministry of the Interior would monitor the progress in closing the socioeconomic gap between minorities and the general population. Performance measures for equal participation in the field of housing were (and are): tenancy, dwelling size relative to family size, age and technical condition of the dwelling, dwelling price, affordability and enrolment in the rent subsidy scheme.

1990s: from minorities policy to integration policy
The results of the minorities policy were not easy to assess. Evaluations showed different results but certainly not an unequivocal improvement (Tesser & Van Praag,
Continuing immigration flows at times of high unemployment and flows of immigrant children entering the Dutch school system at a relatively late age, together with high dropout rates by immigrant teenagers, led to high levels of unemployment among young immigrants and low levels of school attainment among immigrant children. More positively evaluated was the rapid improvement in the housing situation of immigrant families (Van Amersfoort, 1999; to be discussed).

In a second advisory report (‘Allochtonenbeleid’, WRR, 1989) it was acknowledged that not only would the present immigrants stay, but immigration was likely to continue despite the economic decline. More attention was paid to the integration trajectories of immigrants. Specific national policy was advocated in relation to work and education. In the 1994 ‘Contourennota’ policy document, the ‘minorities policy’ was replaced by ‘integration policy’, expressing more than the previous policy that integration is a mutual process rather than a one-sided attempt to ‘catch up’ with the mainstream. ‘Citizenship’ was the key word in the new policy.

Reflections on citizenship, rights and duties resulted in 1998 in the Civic Integration (Newcomers) Act (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers) which provided obligatory Dutch language and culture training programmes for new immigrants who were considered to be at risk of deprivation. It was up to individual municipalities to decide who these categories were (usually non-Western immigrants) and how the training was to be provided. Municipalities were obliged to provide these civic integration courses, while immigrants were obliged to attend the classes. They risked losing social benefits if they did not attend, but people who earned their own income could not be forced to take part. Also, in some cases it proved to be difficult to provide courses, especially in more rural districts with small numbers of immigrants (Brink et al., 1997).

Within the field of housing, the ‘Contourennota’ expressed concern about the housing conditions of minorities. Although in absolute terms improvements had been accomplished, the gap between housing preferences (as known through repeated surveys on the matter) and reality was wide among minorities. This was – in part – attributed to demand aspects, such as generally low incomes and large families and concentration in the larger cities where pressure on the housing market was greatest. On the supply side, local allocation policy was held responsible (to be discussed).

Along with the shift from minorities policy towards integration, a series of measures to restrict immigration was introduced, mainly aimed at limiting family reunion and family formation. In addition to increasing the income and age limits for marriage migration (see chapter 2), civic integration examinations were introduced (see below). The common goal of these measures was to limit the immigration of new migrants belonging to ethnic groups with deprivation in terms of social, economic and cultural integration, and to improve the integration of members of these groups who were already in the Netherlands (Nota van Toelichting, 2004).
Latest integration policy

Following the national elections of 2002, the Minister for Immigration and Integration launched the ‘Integration Policy New-Style’. Following the paradigms of the ‘Contourennota 1994’, Integration Policy New-Style was based on citizenship and self-responsibility. Integration was defined as ‘participating in Dutch society’. Cultural integration was now seen as a prerequisite for participation: all migrants, regardless of whether they were newcomers or oldcomers, had to learn the Dutch language and familiarise themselves with the generally accepted norms and values of Dutch society. The government regarded control of immigration as an absolute prerequisite for permanent improvements in the integration of immigrant groups (TK 2006). Meanwhile, the Dutch Parliament set up a Temporary Commission for Research on Integration Policy (the Blok Commission) to evaluate the effectiveness of the integration policy between 1970 and 2003. The Commission’s findings emphasised that during this period the Dutch government had neither employed any clear integration policies nor achieved its integration goals (TK, 2003).

The government has introduced laws to improve the civic integration of migrants and has developed an ‘integration masterplan’ (Deltaplan Inburgering) to improve the quality of integration. Two laws relating to civic integration – the Civic Integration Abroad Act (Wet inburgering in het buitenland, WIB, March 2006) and the Civic Integration Act (Wet inburgering, WI, Januari 2007) – reflect the government’s desire to foster the integration of minorities in the Netherlands by setting standards for their knowledge of the Dutch language and culture. The central plank of the new integration system is that more strings are attached than in the past. Mandatory result targets have been set (which means that immigrants are expected to achieve a specified command of the Dutch language), and in principle immigrants are themselves responsible for passing the civic integration exams. Moreover, it is no longer only newcomers who are officially required to integrate, but also migrants who have been residing in the Netherlands for some time. It is expected that around 74,000 immigrants who are required to integrate will do so each year (Dagevos & Gijsberts, 2007).

Failing the civic integration exams has far-reaching consequences. The Civic Integration Abroad Act requires that migrants between 18 and 65 years old and wishing to live in the Netherlands for a longer time must first pass an integration test at a Dutch embassy or consulate in their country of origin1, 2. This group includes immigrants wishing to come to the Netherlands for family formation or family reunification purposes. Religious leaders coming to the Netherlands for employment, such as imams or preachers, are also required to take this examination3. Once in the Netherlands, immigrants are required to take a second integration exam according to the Civic Integration Act4. Failure to pass this examination has consequences for the granting of prolonged residency status and the possibility of naturalisation. Failure also carries financial sanctions. The target group of the Civic Integration Act is bigger than that of Civic Integration Abroad Act. All immigrants from outside the European Union, EEA and Switzerland are obliged to take this exam5.
Those arriving in the Netherlands for temporary stay purposes, such as students or labour migrants, do not need to take the exam sixth.

The expectation is that setting a language proficiency target means that more immigrants will achieve a standard which at least allows them to become socially independent. A first (short-term) evaluation of the Civic Integration Abroad Act shows that around 90% of candidates pass the examination. According to the same evaluation, on average, men and those with a high level of education achieve better results than women and those with lower levels of education. In general, potential migrants from non-Indo-European language regions achieve lower scores in the Civic Integration Abroad Act examination (Wilkinson et al., 2008).

4.2 Housing policy for migrants

This section discusses national housing policy programmes that have been implemented at local level. The policies discussed here are concerned with ensuring access for immigrants to decent housing. Colonial minorities and refugees have been actively allocated housing under national policy, either in new dwellings or existing vacant rented homes, almost exclusively in the non-profit sector. This was done under a dispersal policy across municipalities in all parts of the country. For guest workers and their families, national housing policy can be characterised to a large extent as laissez-faire, although some modest pressure has been put on local actors by the Ministry of Housing in order to stop discretionary housing practices, as will be discussed in the following sections.

4.2.1 Housing policy for ex-colonial minorities and refugees

Dutch Indonesians
The Dutch Indonesian repatriates in the 1950s and early 1960s were initially housed in camps (‘housing resorts’; ‘woonoordén’) and boarding houses. This was the case for those who could not provide their own abode in the Netherlands at the time: about half the immigrant group in the years 1950-1958 and a much larger proportion (90%) in later years (1958-1969) (Jansen 2006: 73). Churches and care organisations cooperated with central government to provide accommodation and other goods. Housing resorts, reception centres and private boarding houses were spread over the country in order to speed up the assimilation process, as it was called at the time. In the top year 1951, there were over 600 boarding houses with over 17,000 Dutch Indonesian migrants living in crowded conditions with very little privacy. Most of them could not find regular housing as housing shortages at that time were severe (see chapter 3). In the ‘housing resorts’ the repatriates received a modest integration course with the help of booklets on “Interior decoration and laundry matters” and “What we should know about food in the Netherlands”, as well as training classes in domestic work, childcare and hygiene (ibid: 74).
A spontaneous move towards more regular housing in municipalities did not happen. Municipalities were not willing to provide housing for repatriates as they were under pressure to deliver for indigenous home-seekers. At the time it was not uncommon for married couples to have to reside in the parental home for years before a place became available. The Ministry of the Interior introduced a scheme for housing repatriates in 1951 which lasted until 1955, under which municipalities had to provide rented housing for repatriates. If they failed to do so the dwellings were commandeered. Municipalities were rewarded for their efforts with state permission to build new dwellings in these years, when state intervention in building permits was total. Under this scheme, about 25,000 people were helped into vacant rented homes, but this was insufficient to address the need.

Apart from this scheme, an older arrangement was used to accommodate repatriates: 5% of newly built municipal dwellings were claimed by national policy (‘rvk’; Regeling Rijksoorkeurwoningen). These (like all) municipal dwellings were built with full state subsidy. At the time the quantity of newly constructed dwellings was very large compared to the size of the housing stock, as in the 1950s and 60s building efforts had been stepped up to make up for the loss of homes and severe housing shortages in the aftermath of World War Two. As far as is known, immigrants were eager to accept any housing offer, even in remote areas in the country, as post-war housing shortages were so severe. The people were housed all over the country, although somewhat more in the western region and in the largest cities in particular. Approximately 20,000 families (80,000 people) were housed with the help of this ‘5% rule’ (Jansen, 2006:76).

Moluccans
Since it was thought that the Moluccans would be returning to an independent Moluccan republic, housing in the Netherlands would be a temporary matter and assimilation neither necessary nor desirable. They were housed in housing resorts, army barracks, monasteries and former concentration camps; most resorts being at the fringes of the country and isolated from residential areas. In the late 1950s concerns grew about the substandard housing conditions of the Moluccans and the prospect of return migration began to fade. The Moluccans preferred to live together and were not eager to leave the resorts. Slowly, a transfer to newly built neighbourhoods was set in motion, which altogether took about 20 years. The process was slowed down by lack of state money, lack of enthusiasm among Moluccans and claims from indigenous Dutch for new housing.

For 1978 it was estimated that at the time approximately 75% of the Moluccans were living in newly built Moluccan neighbourhoods; 22%, mostly young people, lived among the indigenous Dutch, while 3%, most elderly, were still living in housing resorts. In that same year it was decided that despite demographic growth of the Moluccan population, their housing needs would neither be addressed by extending the concentrated neighbourhoods nor by creating new ones, but by providing regular housing options and thus gradually standardising housing conditions (ibid: 138-139).
It is likely that 30 years later, and now that a third of the Dutch Moluccans are third generation (Veenman, 2001: 29), the number residing outside ‘Moluccan neighbourhoods’ is much larger, but there are no reliable statistics available. However, within those municipalities where Moluccans are most numerous, the second and third generations – like the first generation – often live in Moluccan neighbourhoods. This is the case for half the first generation, 45% of the second generation and 40% of the third generation (Tunjanan, 2008: 14). Recent research on the weak school achievement of third-generation Moluccan youngsters revealed that living in a concentrated Moluccan neighbourhood did not add to explaining the relatively poor performance (ibid).

Surinamese
A proportion of the Surinamese immigrants in the 1970s had relatives in the Netherlands, who had already migrated, usually for educational reasons. Many had no such network, however. Housing was difficult and, apart from moving in with fellow countrymen, people would try to rent a place, squat or stay in boarding houses (Jansen, 2006). Many moved into new but relatively unattractive housing in urban areas, especially in high-rise estates such as those in the Bijlmer district of Amsterdam. Cohabiting was often used as a strategy to gain access to housing as well as to reduce housing costs (scp, 1998). Those who could not find housing on their own account could stay in a reception centre, of which there were several in the country. The number of beds in these centres was at least double the number of immigrants using them. In the centres a modest amount of information was distributed in the form of a booklet on ‘what the Dutch are like’, providing insights into things like ‘how to fill in bank forms, what a social worker is and how to behave in shops’ (Jansen, 2006: 87). From these centres people were helped into dwellings in various municipalities.

Some of the newly built municipal dwellings were requisitioned, under national policy, for housing Surinamese immigrants and smaller numbers of immigrants from the Netherlands Antilles. These requisitioned dwellings were intended for new immigrants as well as for voluntary transfers of Surinamese living in poor housing conditions in the urban districts to better-quality, new(!), housing on the urban periphery. As had been the case with the Indonesian repatriates, the 5% of new dwellings requisitioned were scattered around the country, regardless of the presence of job opportunities or social networks. This time, however, the four largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) were exempt from this dispersal policy, as the aim was to compensate for the spontaneous concentrations of migrants in these cities. In fact these municipalities had raised the issue of ‘the Surinamese problem’ in the early 1970s, claiming that central government could not allow large numbers of immigrants to enter the country and then close its eyes to the ensuing housing problems.
The dispersal policy was implemented in 1975 and lasted until 1981 (Jansen, 2006). The dispersal was supposed to help the assimilation of the immigrants but, since little attention was paid to local job options, it was in reality more a practical attempt to relieve the pressure on social housing in urban districts. Job opportunities had not been so much of an issue when the Dutch Indonesian migrants were spread across the country, as the labour market in the 1950s and 60s provided more opportunities compared with the 1970s and especially the early 1980s. Many Surinamese, however, were not interested in a house offer in the outskirts of the Netherlands and migrated directly or in stages to the urban areas. Apart from the lack of local job opportunities, many did not feel comfortable being the only Surinamese household in the area. It is estimated that just 10% of the Surinamese migrants actually used the 5% rule in order to find housing (Jansen, 2006:87).

Asylum-seekers
As with the Dutch Indonesians in the 1950s and the Surinamese immigrants in the 1970s, in the 1990's asylum-seekers, who began arriving in the Netherlands in around the 1990s, were (and are) initially received in group accommodation and from there – under national policy and only for those who are allowed to stay – helped into regular (social) housing all over the country.
Initially, no housing was arranged for asylum-seekers whose asylum claims were being processed, until the numbers of asylum-seekers began to increase so rapidly in the 1980s and especially the 1990s (figure 2.4 in chapter 2) that the larger municipalities started to raise the issue, as asylum-seekers moved into crowded substandard hostels. The city authorities in Amsterdam and The Hague held national government responsible for allowing people in and leaving it to local authorities to cope with the housing problems. The Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) supported the claim for more central reception of asylum-seekers. In 1987 a uniform policy was launched (under the name ROA ‘regulating the Reception of Asylum-seekers’) and housing asylum-seekers was made a matter of national concern. The intention was to set up a voluntary collaborative partnership between central government and the municipalities, and initially most asylum-seekers were immediately housed in regular homes in the municipalities. There were four reception centres to deal with the sudden arrival of larger numbers awaiting access to regular housing (Jansen 2006: 124). As the housing in the municipalities was insufficient to cope with the increasing numbers in the early 1990s, more reception centres were opened. In 1992 the immediate housing of asylum-seekers in regular housing ended. In 1994, the reception procedure was further formalised, providing a so called ‘parting of the waters’ between asylum-seekers with and without a residence permit, the latter residing in the centres and the former in regular housing.

In those years in the 1990s when the number of asylum-seekers exceeded the number of beds in the reception centres, alternative temporary housing had to be arranged in hostels, camp sites and regular dwellings, temporarily inhabited by groups of asylum-seekers living together, not necessarily from the same countries. In cases where a family inhabited the house without cohabiting with others, the house was sometimes converted administratively into regular housing after the residence permit had been granted. This would allow people to stay in that municipality, where their children had been attending school and networks had been created with Dutch neighbours. In the case of initial reception outside the reception centres, these centres were responsible for the coordination of the alternative, temporary housing facilities. Now that the numbers of asylum-seekers have dropped sharply, there is surplus accommodation in the centres; several centres have been closed and once again there is a clear division between those awaiting status in the centre and those leaving the centre for regular housing or being forced to leave the centre due to rejection of their asylum application. During the making of this report, however, the increase of the number of asylum-seekers has again caused shortage of reception centres.

Asylum-seekers awaiting the result of their application

Since 1994, the Ministry of Justice Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum-seekers (COA) has been responsible for the reception of asylum-seekers waiting for a decision on their application in the ‘normal’ procedure. While awaiting a decision on their application, asylum-seekers usually stay in a reception centre (nowadays called ‘orientation and civic integration’ centres) and receive modest financial support
(Van den Tillaart et al. 2000). If the IND accepts their asylum application, asylum-seekers stay at these centres until suitable housing is found by the municipalities. Asylum-seekers are allowed to work to a limited degree, namely up to 24 weeks per year. In addition, they are included in the health insurance system and children of asylum-seekers receive education (mostly) in mainstream schools. Those asylum-seekers (older than 16 years) who have a residence permit and are still staying in the reception centres for orientation and civic integration, receive integration courses as a first start on their integration into the Dutch society. These courses are offered within the context of the Civic Integration Act which became operative in January 2007 (see above). The integration programme offered includes Dutch as a second language, knowledge of Dutch society, preparation for living in a municipality and orientation towards work.

Photo 4.2
Asylum seekers teach one another to cycle in Wolvega Asylum Centre, in the rural north of the Netherlands. The centre was closed in 2005. Currently there are about 50 Dutch asylum centres.

Although the procedures have been shortened recently, it is still worth noting that a prolonged uncertainty about the result of the asylum application might cause problems concerning the future integration of asylum-seekers, if their application is granted. Firstly, as the procedure takes more time, the period of career interruption is also extended. Secondly, research shows that asylum-seekers have many different health problems. In addition to different physical health problems, psychological
problems such as anxiety, sleeping disorders, nightmares, depression and concentration disorders appear to be related to the asylum procedure (Den Brok, 1997; De Bakker et al, 2000).

Asylum-seekers with a residence permit
After the decision on the residence permit has been made, admitted asylum-seekers are allocated regular housing in municipalities. They are spread throughout the country according to a rule that resembles the policy for colonial repatriates. All municipalities in the country must reserve a percentage of the total housing stock for asylum-seekers holding residence permits. The difference between the arrangements for colonial repatriates and the latter group is that the requisitioned dwelling units are spread throughout the entire housing stock rather than just within the newly built stock. The construction of affordable rented housing has dropped to very small numbers compared with the period from the 1950s to the 1980s (chapter 3).

Roughly 0.2 percent of all dwellings are reserved for these asylum-seekers. This number is adjusted each year depending on the number of residence permits granted. The ‘target effort’ is announced annually by the government. Housing associations mostly supply these rental vacancies. Locally, there were differences in how well asylum-seekers with a residence permit were served in social housing, depending among other things on the size of the social rented sector and the ambition of the professionals involved, but the overall picture in the late 1990s was that 0.2 percent was not a severe problem. The – much smaller – private rented sector had the same responsibility but has not performed well.

In the years after 2000 the housing shortage has increased due to a drop in new construction as well as the demolition of older rented housing as part of urban renewal schemes (to be discussed). As a result, arrears have grown in housing residence permit holders. This issue was addressed in the 2005 Housing Allocation Act (Huisvestingswet). The municipality is responsible for housing people according to quotas agreed for the year. It can make arrangements with the COA as to who takes the initiative to offer dwellings or candidates to the other party. The municipalities are supervised in this housing task by the provinces. Within the municipalities, housing associations are responsible for providing housing for asylum-seekers holding a residence permit, as part of their social assignment. A complicating factor in the matching of housing is that 80% of the status-holders in the COA accommodations live alone (either single or awaiting family to join), whereas most housing is equipped to accommodate families. Small, cheap dwellings suitable for small households are mostly located in central urban areas. The 2005 Housing Allocation Act gives regions a mandate to switch housing targets between municipalities in order to be more flexible. The Act also forces municipalities that do not provide sufficient housing to reimburse the supervisor so that he or she can arrange (generally more expensive) housing solutions (VROM, 2005).

All in all, the dispersal policy seems to provide initial housing and privacy in an
effective manner. Status-holders are free to seek their own housing, but most of them need mediation through the COA. For recent years it is estimated that 60% have received such COA mediation (vrom, 2005: 1). Research in earlier years revealed that many status-holders prefer urban environments because of social networks or job opportunities and that they tend to relocate after they have been allocated housing in rural areas (CEBEOH, 1995, 1997; Van der Tillaart et al., 2000).

Asylum-seekers under the Amnesty of June 2007
We pointed out in chapter 2 that in June 2007 an amnesty came into force, under which the Dutch government expected to issue residence permits to 27,500 asylum-seekers. Within the context of this regulation, more than 400 municipalities in the Netherlands received an additional obligation (in addition to their obligation to provide housing to asylum-seekers with a residence permit) to provide housing to these asylum-seekers. A recent evaluation has shown that on 1 January 2009, 81% of these asylum-seekers had been housed (Taskforce Statushouders, 2009). When the amnesty regulation came into effect, 12,500 asylum-seekers were staying in COA reception centres. The rest had found accommodation through friends, family, emergency shelters, or rented housing. Some of them were even living on the streets (ibid). Since the municipalities had no overview of the exact location of this group of asylum-seekers, a governmental consultation body was established with the cooperation of various parties to locate these asylum-seekers who were living outside the COA reception centres. At the beginning of 2009, a total of 5,000 asylum-seekers had yet to be accommodated by municipalities and housing corporations (ibid).

4.2.2 Irregular migrants depend entirely on the private sector
Since July 1998 irregular migrants have been excluded from welfare state provisions, including social housing. A recent study of the literature on the social position of irregular migrants in the Netherlands gives an overview of their housing conditions. This study shows that irregular migrants depend heavily on housing in the private sector or cohabiting (Kromhout et al., 2008). Social networks, mostly consisting of family members residing legally in the Netherlands, play an important role. They may provide or help in finding housing or jobs for some of these irregular migrants. According to this study this seems to be the case particularly for irregular labour migrants from countries such as Turkey, China, Morocco, and Surinam.

Illegal residents who are not accommodated by family members or acquaintances may rent an apartment, a room or even a bed in the private sector. Some live in houses owned by housing corporations, mainly through subletting (ibid). The literature survey by Kromhout et al. (2006) shows that landlords are often legally residing migrants, sometimes originating from the same country as the irregular migrants themselves. These migrants who rent housing in the private sector, often, live in rather poor conditions: the properties are often subject to overdue maintenance and lack of hygiene. Irregular migrants accept these conditions out of sheer necessity. Current policy is aimed at fighting these unreliable landlords, by making renting out
houses to irregular migrants unattractive. Other forms of accommodation include a limited number of shelters offered to the homeless by charity organisations or shelters offered by churches for asylum-seekers whose asylum application has been rejected by the authorities (ibid).

4.2.3 No specific housing policy for labour migrants and their families

The unification with family members in the late 1970s and 1980s made labour migrants leave their hostels and boarding houses and look for alternative housing. Their options in the private rented sector were limited, partly as a result of discrimination. In the social rented sector labour migrants were trapped in a vicious circle. To be able to have the family come over, the migrant needed to have a work guarantee for the coming year as well as a dwelling 'suitable' to accommodate a family, according to council standards. For a family-size social rented dwelling, however, single guest workers would not qualify until their family was actually over and registered in the municipality. The only option left was to buy, and many did so during the (expensive) 1970s. They are referred to as ‘noodkopers’ (‘forced to buy’) as they bought low-quality for high prices, due to a lack of alternative housing options. Many workers lost their jobs in the early 1980s and got into negative equity problems.

During the 1980s, Turkish and Moroccan Dutch gained better access to the social rented sector, as will be illustrated later. They became better informed and interest groups put pressure on local authorities to facilitate their access by changing local allocation regulations. In the course of large-scale urban renewal schedules, several municipalities released the ‘noodkopers’ from their burdensome possessions by buying their dwellings and selling them to housing associations to improve and manage the properties. At the same time, municipalities bought privately rented units, and tenants as well as previous homeowners could either participate in the urban renewal scheme (and accept rent increases) or apply for alternative (social) housing provisions. People in the latter category were named ‘urban renewal nomads’ as they would keep moving to cheap housing districts. Migrants were over-represented in this group. Apart from the urban renewal schemes, there were municipal schemes to help reschedule debts between people with negative equity and the mortgage lenders. Despite the improvements in the 1980s, informal practices in allocation of rented homes by housing associations still hindered immigrants in their access to social housing until local allocation systems for social housing changed, as will be discussed later.

Laissez faire for guest workers

Some attention was paid to the accessibility of housing for ‘minorities’ in the 1980s as the Ministry of Housing put pressure on municipalities to stop or amend discriminating regulations on allocation of social rented housing. Conditional eligibility criteria like social ties with the municipality or thresholds in terms of number of years' residence in the municipality had to be modified in favour of minorities. Also, the problem of incompatible regulations on eligibility for housing on the one hand
and family reunification on the other, was addressed. In the national as well as the local arena, interest groups had put pressure on the housing authorities to accomplish these results (Jansen, 2000).

Based on archive research, Jansen (2000) concluded that it was an uphill effort to get the Ministry of Housing (VROM) to intervene in the specific housing conditions of migrants and minorities. The then Ministries of Internal Affairs and CRM (Culture, Recreation and Social Work), the ministries that initiated most of the policy on minorities, had to push the Ministry of Housing to use available instruments in order to help provide housing or improve housing conditions for minorities. It had been the Ministry of CRM that pushed VROM to implement the 5% arrangement for housing Surinamese immigrants. Improving housing conditions for minorities was an explicit goal in the 1983 White Paper on Minorities. Nevertheless, the Ministry of VROM was a clear advocate of general rather than specific policy and emphasised decentralisation and deregulation in housing policy, from the early 1980s to the late 1990s (Jansen, 2000:194).

According to Jansen (2000:193-200) this laissez faire attitude could be explained from the early post-war years, when the Ministry of Housing was involved with building and became a ‘ministry of construction’. Minorities were considered to be a matter of ‘care’, and therefore the responsibility of the Ministry for Welfare. The laissez faire attitude by the Ministry was also related to the decentralisation of housing policy in general, which started in the 1980s (chapter 3).

Coping with institutional discrimination
During the 1980s and early 1990s signs of organisational discrimination towards members of ethnic minorities reached the Ministry of Housing. Various local studies showed how institutional discrimination in the allocation of social rented homes negatively affected housing options for immigrant households (Ekkers, 1984; Tazelaar, 1989, 1990; Smit, 1991). As mentioned above, the responsibility for monitoring access options for minorities on the social housing market was unclear. By 1985, only 50 out of approximately 700 municipalities had voluntary reported to the Ministry of Housing on the allocation results for minorities compared to other groups, as was requested by the Ministry in 1983 (Jansen, 2000 : 165, 166). Despite some pressure from parliament and increasing signs of institutional discretion, the state secretaries for housing never enforced proper and obligatory local reports on allocation results. Monitoring was incomplete and ineffective, not obligatory and there were no sanctions applied in the event of poor performance.

One exception is known, which followed a court case in 1982, known as ‘Kaya versus Binderen’. Kaya, a Turkish house-hunter in the industrial city of Helmond, brought a civil case accusing the Binderen housing association of discrimination. The housing association had allocated only one ‘foreign’ household in the space of five years, a figure which could not possibly be in line with the demand from migrants. Kaya won the case (in: Jansen, 2000:186). The Ministry of Housing issued an official warning (aanwijzing) to the housing association that it would lose its con-
construction and management subsidies if it continued its discriminatory practices.55

Discussion and persuasion with municipalities and housing associations was the strategy chosen by the Ministry. The fact that housing associations organised professional meetings on the matter was seen as a positive sign of progress.

Discretionary allocation practices
The rationale of housing associations for discretion had to do with pressure from tenants and reflections on sustainable communities. In fact, one of the two umbrella organisations for housing associations of the time sanctioned a distinction between ‘hard to place’ applicants and others (NWR, 1989). The ‘hard to place’ applicants were split into ‘collectively hard to place’ and ‘individually hard to place’ or ‘rough’ applicants. ‘Rough’ applicants were tenants with personal records of rent arrears, nuisance or both. ‘Collectively hard to place’ applicants were applicants facing prejudice and negative reactions from tenants, often without any connection to their actual behaviour. This was the case with members of ethnic minorities. Both categories had to be ‘housed with care’ to avoid negative responses by neighbours.

Although contrary with the Constitution, this allocation policy was justified by housing officers with the argument that if members of ethnic minorities enrolled ‘too rapidly’ in an area, the neighbourhood would ‘destabilise’. As members of ethnic minorities were perceived by locals as ‘upsetting the balance’, in white as well as in more ‘ethnic’ neighbourhoods, the overall result was long waiting times for minorities, regardless of the quality they would opt for. ‘Destabilised neighbourhoods’, it was claimed, would affect the housing situation of minority tenants in a negative way as well as the indigenous Dutch tenants within that neighbourhood (Kullberg et al., 1996).

There was a strong feeling among many housing professionals that the social rented sector should face up to the discrimination problems and develop an overall coping strategy, in order to solve the problem from within. The next section will show that there were institutional as well as cultural obstacles to creating separate housing associations for ethnic minorities, as exist in the United Kingdom.

No ethnic minority housing associations in the Netherlands
Although policies of institutional discrimination have been subject of political debate, they have never led to the creation of ethnic minority housing associations to cover the needs of specific groups, as was the case in the United Kingdom (Tomlins, 1997). The question of why has never been discussed thoroughly, and we think it is interesting here to present some reflections on the absence of Muslim housing associations in the Netherlands.

According to Jansen (2000:124) the Dutch minority communities most likely lacked the tradition and experience to organise themselves. The labour migrants and their offspring may have been predominantly Muslim, but there was too much fragmentation for effective political pressure. On the other hand, we have seen how migrant organisations managed to put some pressure on the Ministry of Housing
National policy on integration and access to housing

and on municipalities to modify discretionary practices. Moreover, in an interview with one of the journals of the umbrella organisations for housing associations (Van Dieten, 1992) the former president of a national interest group for ‘foreigners’16, Mohammed Rabbae, ‘threatened’ that some minorities would create their own ‘Islamic’ housing associations if existing housing associations kept their doors closed. By the time he raised the issue in the interview, however, it had become practically impossible to create new housing associations, as financial ties were cut off from the Ministry and housing associations had to continue with the use of the financial reserves they had built up. However, the idea had come up before, in an administrative setting that could have facilitated the idea.

At the end of the 1970s, the LSoba interest group for foreign workers discussed the option of creating separate housing associations. An example of a migrant housing organisation in Brussels had inspired the LSoba managing board members. The idea was also discussed between LSoba and the ministry of Housing. The majority of LSoba members ultimately decided that it did not make sense to create separate housing associations and attention shifted to putting pressure on existing housing associations to address the problems. Also, participation by and employment of minorities within existing housing organisations became a focus of attention. A few years later, in the 1983 White Paper on Minorities, the possibility of separate housing associations for ethnic minorities was again mentioned (Jansen, 2000:188) as well as the difficult conditions for running these in a cost-effective way17. No case is known of migrant or minority groups actually requesting to have a new housing association admitted18.

The idea of Islamic housing associations seems – at first glance – to fit in with the Dutch tradition of political pluralism, the ‘pillarisation’ (verzuiling), where Catholics, Protestants and Social Democrats each have their social and political organisations. In fact, housing associations are a splendid example of the pillar system as from the beginning, separate Protestant, Catholic and Socialist housing associations existed. They still retain their identity to some extent, though it has partly disappeared as a result of successive mergers. This pluralist system can be seen as a Dutch ‘politics of recognition’, a multicultural society avant la lettre. However, at the time that the labour migrants came to the Netherlands, the pillar system had already begun to fall apart and the three traditional pillars had started to merge into a relatively homogeneous mainstream society (Koenis, 2001:31).

Hypothetically, the creation of Muslim housing associations would have been possible by building and renting out property or, more realistically, by taking over council housing. At the time, council housing still existed and it was, more than housing associations’ rentals, invaded by immigrants (chapter 3). The loans needed to build or buy properties and the subsidies for managing the properties could be provided by the government, if the housing association-to-be were admitted by the ‘admission committee’19. On the committee was a representative of the Ministry of Housing and the two umbrella organisations of existing housing associations, NWR (the Social Democrat umbrella) and NCIV (the Christian umbrella), which decided on the admis-
sion of new housing associations. It was not until the 1990s that a representative of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) and an organisation of tenant interest groups were added to the committee (Van der Schaar, 1991:386).

In the years that the access problems for migrants were most manifest, therefore – the 1970s and 1980s – admission of new housing associations predominantly depended on the approval of the Ministry of Housing as well as existing housing associations, well organised through their national (pillarised) umbrella organisations. They were in favour of having the existing housing associations address the housing needs of labour migrant families, whereas the migrants depended on the consent of these organisations to start their own housing associations.

4.2.4 Transparent housing allocation against discretionary practices
The Ministry of Housing finally had a systematic study carried out in 1993, to further investigate the effects of possible institutional discrimination in the allocation of social rented dwellings. This research (CEBEON, 1993) showed that the allocation results for members of ethnic minorities were more negative in municipalities where housing associations had a high degree of autonomy compared to situations where the municipality had more grip on the allocation process. It did not lead to specific action by the Ministry and to some extent the concern was fading as a result of new, experimental allocation practices. These ‘choice-based letting models’ seriously reduced scope for discretionary practices. The Ministry had approved of the allocation experiment, had monitored the results and commissioned a specific study to investigate the impact of the allocation practices on ethnic minorities in particular. The researchers concluded that access options were generally better in the case of ‘choice-based letting mechanisms’ (CEBEON, 1996). These letting mechanisms seemed to provide a coping strategy to fight officer discretion and institutional discrimination.

From needs-based to choice-based lettings
Under the 1947 Housing Act, a needs-based allocation system, or distribution model, operated at municipal level, allowing for local differences in the translation of ‘needs’ in eligibility, suitability and ranking criteria. Eligibility was related to local work permits or ‘social connections’ in terms of a personal housing history in the municipality or meaningful social networks. The degree of autonomy for housing associations in the allocation process varied from one place to another. In some municipalities all applicants had to join a municipal waiting list and were ranked according to their waiting time on the one hand and specific needs on the other. In other cases, housing associations would allocate a proportion of their vacant dwellings to members of the housing association, while another portion of their property (usually not the best homes) was left for candidates from the municipal waiting list. For needs as well as waits, applicants received points, which determined their ranking position. The vague definition of ‘needs’ offered scope for pressure and fraud (Kullberg, 2002).
In 1990, the town of Delft (approximately 100,000 inhabitants) and the local housing associations abolished the local waiting list and introduced a new allocation mechanism, now known in the United Kingdom as the ‘choice-based letting mechanism’ (Brown et al. 2000) and in the Netherlands mostly referred to as the ‘advertisement model’. Briefly, this system means that vacant dwellings are presented in a journal, and eligible applicants can respond to specific notices provided they fit the accessibility criteria, which are published alongside the adverts. Eligible applicants are ranked and allocated in accordance with open and quite objective criteria, such as age, number of years in their current residence, or length of time spent waiting. For ‘new applicants’, priority is often given to the oldest applicant. Transferring tenants are often ranked according to length of occupancy. The applicant with the longest residency period is given priority. Both criteria were chosen because they resemble waits in the old waiting list system.

Where the ‘needs-based system’ was abandoned, the definition of ‘needs’ was generally narrowed in the sense that only small numbers of applicants can escape the general criteria of waiting time. Small numbers are allowed priority for social reasons, which include health problems related to their housing situation, homelessness, catastrophe or urban renewal clearance. In most cases, divorce and overcrowding are not a reason to give priority over people with longer waiting times, as was the case before. This was done in order to emphasise the transparency and openness of the system and because divorced people or people in overcrowded housing situations are held responsible for their own situation. An independent committee decides on the priority given to applicants.

After the ‘Delft model’ had been introduced as a pilot project, the concept spread very rapidly across practically all parts of the country, including areas with high demand for rented homes as well as areas with low demand. Advertisement models have been implemented by individual housing associations, but more often by all housing associations within a municipality or within a regional housing market district. The advertisement model was considered to be more customer-friendly and thus fitted in with the concept of a liberalised, market-oriented social sector. The Ministry of Housing accordingly advocated the model. An additional reason for the Ministry to recommend this allocation model was that it seemed to be a remedy against institutional discrimination against ethnic minorities. It widened the options for members of ethnic minorities in the social rented sector, as research confirmed (CEBO, 1996; Van Kempen & Idamir, 2001; Brokken et al., 2001). Local actors implemented the new allocation practice at such a pace that at the turn of the 21st century a large majority of the social rented sector was – and still is – allocated through this mechanism.

Evaluating choice-based lettings
After ten years of experience, the benefits of choice-based lettings to the customer are somewhat under discussion. Although the open notification of practically all
vacancies to the public is still considered a major step forward, this is not so much the case for the effort that applicants have to make to get access to a vacancy. Repeatedly, forms have to be completed and sent in without any guarantee of access to one of the chosen dwellings. Through voice response, local cable television and especially the Internet, housing associations provide helpful personal feedback on people’s efforts.

Today, choice-based letting mechanisms and other transparent allocation procedures have become the dominant allocation practices locally. It is acknowledged that this method of allocating has banished institutional discrimination on the social housing market entirely or almost entirely. This is a real accomplishment and is evaluated and appreciated as such by the (ethnic minority) public. However, members of ethnic minorities may have some indirect disadvantage from the system, in two ways. It is not easy to qualify for emergency status other than for urban renewal reasons or medical condition. Overcrowding or divorce are usually not grounds for priority, and minorities are more often in such circumstances. The other thing is that the search process is time-consuming and easiest for people who use the Internet frequently. This applies to a lesser extent for minorities (Kullberg et al., 2009).

Discretionary practices in the private housing sectors

The concern about institutional discretion in the Netherlands has mostly been focused on the social rented sector. The explanation for this biased concern is not well documented. Part of the explanation may be that the social rented sector is much larger than the private rented sector (chapter 3). In the much smaller private rented sector, discrimination seems to occur in two forms. The first is charging vulnerable (illegal) tenants too much for too little. This malpractice is encountered by municipal maintenance and safety inspectors and is fought through municipal, often area-based maintenance policies.

Less is known about the second form of discrimination in private rentals, denying some candidates access to a vacant place. In a recent study involving focus group interviews with immigrants and second-generation members of ethnic minorities (Kullberg et al., 2009), this kind of discrimination was encountered by some Turkish, Moroccan as well as Antillean young men. These latter two immigrant groups are the most stigmatised in the sense that other population groups are most inclined to move neighbourhood as soon as more members of these categories move in (Van Ham & Feijten, 2008). The extent of discretionary practices in the private rented sector is not known and it could not be assessed in the focus group interviews. What was interesting in these interviews was that several speakers seemed to accept discretionary practices by private landlords (as opposed to social landlords) and rationalised it with statements like: “It is his house. He can decide who lives there. I think I would also choose a quiet student over a Moroccan” or, “Who would you choose as tenant? A noisy Antillean or a quiet Dutch person?” (Kullberg et al., 2009: 124).

Discretionary practices in the owner-occupied sector and mortgage market have not been subject to any investigation until recently. Following alarm signals about such
practices in Rotterdam, a study was carried out (Aalbers, 2006) on ‘redlining practices’ by mortgage providers in a number of Dutch cities (Rotterdam, Arnhem and The Hague). Redlining was found in these places, in the sense that some mortgage providers would impose bad mortgage conditions on ethnic minority borrowers in ‘vulnerable’ – i.e. ‘ethnic’ residential neighbourhoods. The study concluded that such practices existed, but were not serious and widespread enough to deny immigrants or minorities access to mortgages.
Notes

2 Foreign nationals from the EU, EEA, Switzerland, Monaco, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, United States and South Korea are exempted from this exam. Those who come to the Netherlands on a temporary basis, such as students or labour migrants, are not required to take the exam (www.ind.nl; www.postbus51.nl. Consulted in April 2009).
4 This Act replaced the old Civic Integration Act on 1 January 2007. Oldcomers who were living in the Netherlands before that date and who were not defined as ‘newcomers’ on 31 December 2006 (according to the old Civic Integration Act), are also obliged to take the civic integration exam. This was not the case under the old Act. Immigrants holding Dutch nationality, those who lived in the Netherlands for eight years or longer whilst of school age, those holding Dutch education diplomas, certificates or other evidence that they have followed an education in the Dutch language, are exempted from the exam. (www.postbus51.nl. Consulted in April 2009).
5 www.postbus51.nl. As is the case for the Civic Integration Abroad Act, those who come to the Netherlands for a temporary stay are exempt from this exam (www.postbus51.nl. Consulted in April 2009).
7 The next three sections mostly draw on a dissertation (in Dutch) by the historian Jansen (2006) on the housing history of Dutch immigrants.
8 Sometimes it concerns just a few streets.
9 Assimilation was interpreted as one-sided adaptation from Surinamese to Dutch society, similar to the successful assimilation of ‘Indonesian’ repatriates.
10 Note that water management metaphors are often used when it comes to immigration issues (flood, dam, ...). Muus (1995) refers to the use of this kind of phrasing as ‘aquatic language’.
11 All asylum-seekers are scrutinised at the beginning of their application in an ‘accelerated’ procedure to assess the potential success of their application. In that procedure their application is either rejected or accepted or referred to the ‘normal’ procedure, in cases where more investigation is needed for the assessment of the application.
12 In cases where the asylum application is rejected, asylum-seekers move to ‘repatriation centres’ (terugkeercentra) managed by the COA. If asylum-seekers appeal against the rejection of their application, they also stay in a repatriation centre to await the result of the appeal procedure.
14 Various regional interest groups for ‘foreigners’ frequently raised the housing issues, as well as two national interest groups, NCB (Netherlands Centre for Foreigners) and LSOBA (National Co-operating Organisation of Foreign Workers) (Jansen, 2000:126).
15 Interview with René Mascini, former president of LSOBA, a national interest group for foreign workers.
16 NCB Nederlands Centrum Buitenlanders The Netherlands Center for Foreigners
17 Which was actually a major problem with the Black and Minority Ethnic Minority (BME) housing corporations in the United Kingdom (Tomlins, 1997).
18 Inquiries from André Thomson, previous member of the Admission Committee as representative of tenant interest groups and René Mascini, previous president of the LSOBA interest group for foreign workers.
19 The ATW: Adviescommissie Toelating Woningcorporaties.

60 National policy on integration and access to housing
5  Actual housing position of migrants and their descendants

This chapter describes developments in the housing quality that is available for ethnic minorities. It provides both an illustration of some of the housing policies described in chapter 4, and a frame of reference for the discussions in chapter 6. Before we look at coping strategies for residential segregation and socialising opportunities between population groups, we illustrate the actual housing situation and degree of residential clustering. That is why this chapter is situated between a chapter on national policies and local practices concerning access to decent housing and a chapter on area-based policies to deal with residential (ethnic) segregation.

Not all ethnic minority groups are traceable in housing surveys which are used as a basis for describing available housing quality. Large surveys (50,000 to 80,000 respondents) have been conducted by the Ministry of Housing every four year since 1982, and these provide a good insight into trends in housing quality. However, ethnic minorities have not always been equally well represented in these surveys. Accordingly, we take population groups in the earlier years together to make a larger sample of members of ethnic minorities in those years. We first track developments in terms of housing tenancy, quality and affordability (5.1) and then describe residential clustering and segregation (5.2). Section 5.3 will provide explanations for remaining differences in housing quality and residential patterns between various minority groups and the indigenous population.

5.1  Developments in housing quality 1982-2006

Tenancy
Average housing quality differs between the housing sectors, following the hierarchy of private rentals (the cheaper end of this sector), social rentals and owner-occupied housing as the sector with the best quality. Of course there is variation within the sectors. Figure 5.1 shows the distribution across housing sectors for different population groups since 1982. The figure illustrates the issues of access options for minorities over the years as described in chapter 4. The Turkish and Moroccan Dutch well represented in the private rented sector were in the early 1980s. This was related to their initial lack of access to social housing. The same can be said for their early representation in owner-occupied dwellings. In most cases this was more a matter of necessity than an accomplishment. The dwellings were of poor quality and had been bought out of lack of access to social housing and the need to have somewhere to live in order to enable family reunification.
Photo 5.1
Schilderswijk, The Hague. This neighbourhood is now the most ethnically distinctive in the Netherlands, with virtually all residents having immigrant backgrounds. It has been an urban regeneration target for decades.

Figure 5.1
Presence in housing sectors among various population groups 1982 – 2006

Turkish and Moroccan Dutch

Source: WBO and WoON
By 1990, the number of homeowners as well as private sector tenants had dropped sharply and many had entered social housing. Access to social housing increased partly because the problematic owner-occupied homes as well as substandard private rentals were taken over by housing associations as part of urban renewal efforts (discussed in chapter 6). To some extent municipalities put pressure on housing associations to provide access (Jansen, 2006).

From the mid-1990s the number of owner-occupiers among Turkish and Moroccan Dutch started to increase again. This increase was mostly related to income
improvement and an autonomous demand for better quality housing. Gradually, middle-class Turkish and Moroccan Dutch are becoming more familiar and at ease with buying a home in the Netherlands. Just one out of ten minority members in this group possess a very cheap house (less than €120,000). This is mostly the case in Rotterdam and The Hague; in Amsterdam there is virtually no housing in this price category. A motive for buying such a cheap house rather than renting is that it provides faster access to housing as for a social rental waits are typically at least a few years.

Surinamese and Antilleans were already better represented in social housing in 1982 compared with Turkish and Moroccan Dutch, partly because they had been allocated social rented homes under national policy and partly because they migrated as families from the beginning and – as Dutch citizens – were eligible for suitable social rented housing (scp, 1998). Their level of home-ownership as well as housing aspirations are higher than among the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch. The figure of the indigenous Dutch population shows that their level of homeownership is much higher, partly because they are more represented in rural districts where home-ownership is more common. Section 5.3 will go more deeply into explaining these differences.

Dwelling size and other quality features
Figure 5.2 shows the number of people per dwelling over the years. It shows that the number of people per dwelling is significantly higher for Turkish and Moroccan Dutch, but the difference is decreasing. For Surinamese and Antilleans the initial gap compared with the indigenous Dutch disappeared in the mid-1990s. Smaller numbers per dwelling indicate that families are becoming smaller and that cohabitation is diminishing. Cohabitation mostly takes the form of living together by extended families, adult brothers, sisters, cousins or friends. Despite the decline, the level of cohabitation among Turkish and Moroccan Dutch is still higher (14 and 10 percent, respectively, of all households as opposed to 5 percent of all Dutch people). This is at least partly because young people who leave the parental home often prefer to cohabit with relatives or friends rather than live alone. They find it cosier to live together and – especially in the case of Muslim girls – it is considered safer to live with a family member such as a brother. Moreover, compared to the native Dutch, members of these groups more often marry from the parental home and skip the phase of living alone or with a partner without being married (Kullberg et al., 2009).

Compared to the indigenous Dutch, ethnic minorities have modest space in the home, as table 5.1 shows. The dwelling size is shown for different income groups, ethnic groups and different sizes of municipalities. The homes of Moroccan and Turkish Dutch are especially modest when related to the household size (square metres per household member).
Figure 5.2
Number of people per dwelling for various population groups, 1982-2006

![Graph showing the number of people per dwelling for various population groups (Turks and Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans, indigenous) from 1982 to 2006.](image)

Source: VROM (WBO’s, WoON 2006)

Table 5.1
Average home sites in square metres and average number of square metres per household member, by income, ethnic group and size of municipality, 2002 and 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>home size in square metres</th>
<th>square metres per household member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lowest 20% incomes</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%-80% incomes</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>highest 20% incomes</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antillean</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other non-Western ethnic minority</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>four largest municipalities</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 largest municipalities</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other municipalities</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: VROM (WBO’02; WoON’06)
The explanations for this are larger families and lower family incomes, as well as lower available housing quality in the urban areas where most members of ethnic minorities live. This also largely explains why fewer members of ethnic minorities live in single-family dwellings (35 to 43% as opposed to 73% of the indigenous Dutch). The dwelling size has increased over the last few years for all groups except the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch.

Figure 5.3 shows the construction years of the dwellings of different population groups. For Turkish and Moroccan Dutch it shows that in the early 1980s 45% had a pre-war dwelling, mostly 19th-century apartments around inner-city districts. In the course of the 1980s the number of households living in these older dwellings decreased rapidly due to urban renewal, the replacement of old rented homes with new-build housing. Part of this sector was not rebuilt, but renovated, so the representation in these dwellings is still quite substantial. There is an increasing representation in dwellings built after 1960. The picture for the Surinamese and Antillean Dutch is different. In the early 1980s they were living in older dwellings to a lesser degree. Their representation in early post-war housing was and still is modest; it is much higher in relatively new dwellings, even slightly higher than among the indigenous Dutch.

Figure 5.3
Construction year of dwellings inhabited by various population groups 1990-2006

Turkish and Moroccan Dutch

Source: VROM, WBO’s and WoON.
Property values, rents and rent rebates

Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of tenants within the various population groups who receive rent rebates. For all groups we see a steep increase over the years, which is due to steep rent increases. The increases in the 1980s were mostly related to urban renewal. The replacement of cheap old rented homes with new dwellings at much higher rents made more people eligible as they met the minimum rent level criterion. From the middle of the 1990s, rent increases were related to the new position of housing associations (see chapter 3) and their need to raise rents to built up their
financial reserves to fund investments which were no longer subsidised by the state. Rent increases made cheap rentals scarce and as a result more tenants were eligible for rebates because of the higher rents. The picture shows that since the beginning of the 1980s the number of Surinamese and Antillean Dutch receiving rent rebates has been substantially higher than among indigenous Dutch tenants. This is due to the significantly lower incomes of the former groups. Large numbers of single-parent families are partly the cause of this income gap. Meanwhile, the quality of the rented homes is not much lower among Surinamese and Antillean Dutch, as can be seen from table 5.2. The table shows the real estate values for dwellings in 2006, values which express the quality of the dwelling as well as the quality of the direct environment.

Figure 5.4
Tenants receiving rent subsidy, for various population groups, 1982-2006 (as a percentage of all tenants)

The strong increase in rent rebate beneficiaries among Turkish and Moroccan Dutch tenants during the 1980s mainly represents the participation in urban renewal in those years. Not only did this account for better quality dwellings and higher rents, it also came with a shift from renting from private landlords to renting from housing associations. Housing associations performed better in informing the public about the possibility of receiving rent rebates. Today, ethnic groups, including those of Turkish and Moroccan origin, receive rent benefit to the same extent as indigenous Dutch tenants: three-quarters of all those with an entitlement apply for this benefit. Tenants of housing associations are the most familiar with this benefit (Wildeboer Schut & Hoff, 2007).
Table 5.2
Real estate values of dwellings, by ethnic group of the dwellers, 2006 (x € 1000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Moroccans</th>
<th>Surinamese</th>
<th>Antillean</th>
<th>Other non-Western</th>
<th>Total non-Western</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>138</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rentals</strong></td>
<td>132</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Homeowners</strong></td>
<td>157</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age 18-34</strong></td>
<td>133</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age 35-64</strong></td>
<td>142</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age 65+</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- = insufficient observations

Source: VROM (WoOn 2006)

When it comes to homeowners, the quality gap between ethnic minorities and the indigenous Dutch is larger than among tenants (table 5.2). Turkish Dutch in particular own modestly priced homes, and this is still the case when the values are corrected for regional price differences (not shown in table) (Kullberg et al., 2009). However, the sharp rise in rateable values according to the Valuation of Property Act (woz) between 1998 and 2006 was almost the same for homes owned by members of ethnic minorities as in the indigenous population. In fact, for Moroccan Dutch with their own home the increase was actually larger; members of this group are increasingly buying their own homes, and those homes are increasingly at the more expensive end of the market.

Trend in housing market position

Over the years, the housing position of Dutch citizens of Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan origin has gradually approached that of the indigenous Dutch population. The initially very low home-ownership rate has increased, as has the number of rooms in the home. In addition, people of Moroccan origin, and to a lesser extent Surinamese Dutch citizens, increasingly live in a house rather than a flat. The housing position of Antilleans has not shown a comparable improvement for the group as a whole because the profile of this group changed considerably due to the immigration of young Antilleans with a low education and income level.

Satisfaction with their home increased more among people of Turkish and Moroccan origin than in the indigenous population, reflecting the improvement in real housing quality for these groups. People of Surinamese origin have from the start been more satisfied with their home, and this satisfaction level has remained roughly unchanged; among Antilleans – as a group – it has declined. Satisfaction with the residential setting did not change much in the different groups in
the period 1998-2006. The relocation rate and the desire to move home is very high among Antilleans in particular, but is also substantially higher among people of Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese origin than among the indigenous Dutch. To a large extent, dissatisfaction as well as the desire to move can be explained from the actual housing conditions (Kullberg et al., 2009).

The gradual improvement in the position of citizens of Moroccan origin, and to a lesser extent those of Turkish origin, has altered in character in recent years. The challenge of making the opportunities offered by the Dutch welfare state available to minorities, for example access to social rented housing and rent benefit, has been successfully met. The effects of economic decline in the early 1980s on people’s housing opportunities and conditions were greatly ameliorated by the urban renewal policy, which was geared towards accommodating the needs of incumbent residents rather than gentrifying urban districts (as will be discussed in chapter 6). The vast majority of tenants in these groups now live in housing association homes, and those with an entitlement to rent benefit receive it just as often as their indigenous counterparts.

Increasingly, people are now improving their position on the housing market through their own efforts as a rapidly growing middle class, especially in the second generation, are increasingly buying homes in the Netherlands. This trend is likely to continue, because of upward mobility in the young generation in particular and because the socioeconomic position of many households enables them to improve their position on the housing market. Many people, especially those of Moroccan and Turkish origin, are currently still living ‘beneath their station’. We will look at this more in detail in section 5.3. First, section 5.2 will describe residential patterns and ethnic segregation and clustering.

5.2 Ethnic concentration and segregation

This section describes ethnic segregation patterns and how they have developed over the years. Section 5.3 will explain in more depth why these patterns continue to exist, while chapter 6 will describe local attempts to reduce residential segregation.

Residential segregation

Immigrants with a non-Western background are by far the most widely represented in the west of the Netherlands, in the Randstad area containing the major urban agglomerations of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (figure 5.5). This is especially the case for Surinamese people, whereas migrants with a refugee background (from Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Somalia) are more evenly distributed across different parts of the country. It is interesting that the Surinamese as well as the later refugees have been offered dwellings outside the Randstad area. The ultimate effect of the dispersal policy for Surinamese Dutch was relatively limited. For refugees, however, the scheme seems to contribute to greater dispersal around the country, as figure 5.5 shows. The proportion of people using this allocation
scheme was approximately 60% for refugees, against just 10% among Surinamese immigrants (chapter 4). A proportion of the Surinamese settlers already had a social network in the cities, and this is much less the case among refugees. Nevertheless, it is too early yet to establish to what extent refugees and their families will stay in the initial areas of housing and to what extent they will eventually move into the Randstad area. The refugee groups in figure 5.5 mostly came to the Netherlands in the first half of the 1990s. They had some time to relocate, but not quite as much as the initial Surinamese settlers.

Figure 5.5
Percentage of various population groups in the Netherlands, living in one of the four largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague or Utrecht) 1-1-2008

Compared to the Surinamese and Moroccan Dutch, Dutch citizens of Turkish origin have settled in somewhat larger numbers in the old industrial towns in the east and south of the country. The distribution across the country does not say much about the distribution among neighbourhoods. Smaller municipalities can be highly segregated and the small social housing units to which refugees are often allocated tend to be concentrated in relatively deprived neighbourhoods, including in provincial towns. The Chinese seem to occupy an intermediate position when it comes to dispersal across the country. The popular image is that Chinese people in the Netherlands can easily be localised in the Chinatown districts in Rotterdam, Amsterdam and The Hague, but the reality is that most Chinese reside elsewhere. Employment of the initial immigrants in the popular local Chinese restaurants is an important explanation for this (Vogels et al., 1999).
Within the urban districts it is the Surinamese and Antilleans who are most widely dispersed across inner cities, suburbs and peripheral municipalities, while Turkish and to a lesser extent Moroccan Dutch citizens are the most densely concentrated, especially in old and early post-war urban districts. This is due to the history of housing and settlement as described in the previous section. The potential access to social housing for Surinamese arrivals and the orientation towards good-quality, relatively new dwellings are explanations for this settlement pattern (SCP, 1998). For the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch, the presence within the cities can be explained by the initial settlement in older private dwellings. With the renewal of these dwellings, new concentrations moved towards early post-war districts within the cities.

**Table 5.3**
Municipalities and neighbourhoods according to ethnic composition, 1-1-2000 and 1-1-2008 (absolute numbers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% non Western minorities</th>
<th>0 to 5%</th>
<th>5 to 10%</th>
<th>10 to 25%</th>
<th>25 to 50%</th>
<th>50 to 75%</th>
<th>75% or more</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities 1-1-2000</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3 *</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities 1-1-2008</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4 **</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhoods 1-1-2000</td>
<td>2908</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhoods 1-1-2008</td>
<td>2740</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS (Statline)

As the non-Western ethnic minority population is growing faster than the indigenous population, geographical concentrations in cities and urban districts are becoming more entrenched and more widespread. The number of districts with high concentrations of ethnic minorities is increasing (table 5.3), and so is the proportion of ethnic minorities within those districts. The postcode districts with the highest concentrations of ethnic minorities in the large and medium-sized municipalities have had high concentrations for a considerable time, and the proportion of ethnic minorities has increased further in these districts. In January 2008, 50 neighbourhoods consisted of over 50% (non-Western) ethnic minorities, including all sorts of nationalities but relatively large numbers of the groups described above. Most of these neighbourhoods are located in the three biggest cities. The most ‘ethnic’ neighbourhood is Schilderswijk in The Hague, with 87% non-Western immigrants and their descendants, followed by the adjacent Transvaal district with an almost equally high share. Rotterdam is the most multi-ethnic city, with a 36% non-Western immigrant population (Kullberg, 2007).

The geographical concentrations of minorities within the municipality are still the greatest in the cities of The Hague, Rotterdam and Amsterdam, and the chances of meeting indigenous Dutch citizens are statistically the lowest here. This
probability reduces as the number of ethnic minorities living in the municipality increases and as they are distributed across the municipality in a more imbalanced or more segregated way. The Hague has traditionally been the most segregated of these three cities. Clear segregation of Turkish and Moroccan Dutch citizens also occurs in smaller municipalities, such as Zaanstad, Roermond and Leerdam; no fewer than 60% of the Turkish Dutch residents of Leerdam would for example have to move in order to achieve a balanced distribution across the municipality. Provincial towns also have neighbourhoods with high shares of minorities. The segregation of Dutch citizens of Surinamese and Antillean origin is substantially lower at the level of residential neighbourhoods, and does not exceed 40% anywhere.

Surinamese, Turkish and Moroccan residents are increasingly moving out of the inner cities into the suburbs. Their place in the old inner-city neighbourhoods is often taken by immigrants from asylum countries. The trend towards suburbanisation is strongest in Amsterdam, and more specifically in the satellite town of Almere, where the proportion of Surinamese residents (10%) now surpasses that in Amsterdam (9%). The Moroccan and Turkish populations in Almere are also increasing rapidly. In other regions, too, the ethnic minority population is growing faster in suburban areas than in the central cities, although in absolute numbers those cities – with the exception of Amsterdam – still account for by far the greatest part of the growth in the ethnic minority population.

Housing quality in ‘ethnic’ neighbourhoods

Housing quality is poorest in the ‘black’ neighbourhoods and highest in the ‘white’ neighbourhoods, measured by characteristics such as owner-occupied homes, single-family homes and above all home size. All non-Western ethnic minority groups in each of the neighbourhood types live in housing of poorer quality. For Turkish and Moroccan Dutch residents, the number of square metres per occupant in the home stands out unfavourably. However, the groups with the biggest disadvantage have made the most rapid improvements since 1998.

The market value per square metre of homes in the four largest municipalities is substantially lower in relatively ‘black’ neighbourhoods than in mixed and ‘white’ neighbourhoods, including – albeit to a lesser extent – in newly built developments. When it comes to rented homes, by contrast, (gross) rents in ‘black’ neighbourhoods are significantly cheaper precisely in the new-built sector. The low status of these neighbourhoods is reflected in the market values. For between one in four and one in five owners of homes in ‘black’ neighbourhoods, the low cost was the main reason for choosing to live there. This applies to the greatest extent for indigenous and Surinamese Dutch residents.

‘Black’ neighbourhoods do not come out well as regards residential quality; the most frequent complaints from residents concern urban blight and nuisance in the neighbourhood. Three-quarters of the area codes within 40 areas designated by the minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration as problem neighbour-
hoods, are ‘black’ neighbourhoods. The residents of these neighbourhoods are less optimistic about the present situation in their neighbourhood and the way they expect it to develop in the near future. But the level of optimism in these neighbourhoods has grown since 2002. The different groups are unanimous in their view that having a large number of ethnic minorities in a neighbourhood is not a good thing. Most people in ‘black’ neighbourhoods have less contact with neighbours and fellow residents, and the occupancy turnover is also greater (Kullberg, 2007; Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2007).

High level of satisfaction for ethnic minority residents of newly built developments

The homes occupied by members of ethnic minorities in the last two years on government-designated new-build developments (‘Vinex’ developments) compare very favourably with those in all older neighbourhoods and also with new-build homes in urban regeneration areas: there are far more owner-occupied homes, three-quarters of the homes are single-family dwellings and on average they are almost 40 square metres larger than new-build homes in the old neighbourhoods. The ethnic minority population who have moved to these homes resemble the indigenous new-build pioneers socioeconomically: they are better educated, have higher incomes, are predominantly families and have made a deliberate choice for a new-build neighbourhood.

The level of satisfaction in the Vinex developments stands head and shoulders above that in other residential settings. The homes in districts built in the 1970s and 80s (and early 90s) are the most competitive for ethnic minorities in the old and early post-war neighbourhoods. Yet a proportion of ethnic minority residents of the old neighbourhoods make a very deliberate choice for a new-build home in the older neighbourhoods (built prior to 1971). The dissatisfaction among these residents with the residential setting, and in particular with the urban blight and nuisance, is marked, and is actually greater than that among the residents in the old areas of these neighbourhoods. This can be explained by the higher environmental expectations of the people who deliberately choose for a housing career within the ‘ethnic’ neighbourhood (Kullberg, 2007).

5.3 Explaining differences in housing position

People’s position on the housing market was measured using a number of objective criteria such as the size of the dwelling, type of dwelling (house or flat), owner-occupier or rented and whether or not the home was located in a predominantly ‘ethnic’ neighbourhood. These are characteristics that influence the value of property and in this sense they represent fairly general preferences: big is better than small; a house is better than a flat; buying is better than renting if it is financially possible; and it is preferable not to live in an (excessively) ‘ethnic’ neighbourhood. In practice, however, individual preferences and priorities within sometimes irreconcilable housing aspirations can be at odds with this picture. In the following we will seek expla-
nations for the gap in housing quality experienced by the largest ethnic minority groups.

Differences in housing position of ethnic minority and indigenous groups
Despite the improved housing quality of ethnic minority groups, they still compare unfavourably with the indigenous Dutch population on each of the criteria described, with the Surinamese and Antilleans traditionally occupying a position midway between the indigenous and the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch populations. An analysis set out to explain these differences (Kullberg et al., 2009). This was done in two stages. First, quantitative (decomposition) models were used to investigate how far the differences found correlate on the one hand with household characteristics such as household composition, age and income, and on the other with characteristics of the regional and local housing market: the available housing stock in the area where people live. In the second phase, focus group interviews were used to identify specific motives and experiences in order to provide explanations for the remaining differences. We will present results for two important differences: lower owner-occupancy rates on the one hand and overrepresentation in ‘ethnic’ neighbourhoods on the other hand (drawing from Kullberg et al., 2009).

Owner-occupier homes
There are wide differences across the different ethnic groups in the number of people in the Netherlands who own their own home. In the indigenous Dutch population, 60% of the households are home-owners; this applies for just over 30% of Surinamese households, 20% of Antilleans, 26% of Turks and 14% of Moroccans. The differences compared with the indigenous Dutch population can be explained largely by household characteristics, and especially lower household income. The available housing stock in housing market areas where ethnic minority groups live also plays a role. For example, the number of owner-occupier homes is low in the western conurbation of the Netherlands incorporating the cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht (the Randstad), and in the northern part of this region in particular prices are high. Limitations in the housing stock play an even bigger role if the housing stock within the neighbourhood is taken into consideration, since many people move home over only a short distance. For people of Surinamese origin, the difference in home ownership compared with the indigenous Dutch is largely explained by household characteristics and characteristics of the local environment. For Antillean, Turkish and Moroccan Dutch, between around two third and half (for Moroccans) of the difference can be explained by these factors (figure 5.6).

The focus group discussions revealed that neighbourhood preference plays an important role in relation to the available housing stock. It is mainly family ties which keep Moroccans and Turks together in the neighbourhoods where they originally settled and which reduces the tendency to look for an owner-occupier home in another neighbourhood. Urban regeneration with the associated creation of new...
owner-occupier homes in old(er) neighbourhoods meets a need in this regard (to be discussed in chapter 6). A further constraint is the fact that the country of origin still serves as a frame of reference, even for people who have lived in the Netherlands for a long time. Holidays spent in the country of origin or, for the first generation, regular ‘commuting’ back and forth to the Netherlands, mean that having a home in the country of origin is the main priority, and savings are first used to buy a home (in cash) there. The purchase of a home in the Netherlands may or may not follow. In addition, homes of equivalent quality are cheaper in Turkey and Morocco, as well as in the Netherlands Antilles, making the purchase of a home in the Netherlands a less attractive proposition. A further factor is that there is less encouragement to buy a home from the family network than is the case for indigenous Dutch people with a comparable income.

Figure 5.6
Difference in the number of homeowners between ethnic minority groups and indigenous Dutch. The difference is split in a part which can be explained by group characteristics like household composition, age and income as well as the availability of owner-occupied homes in the regional and local housing markets where members of the group live and the remaining, unexplained difference (in percentages).

The way in which the high price of property in the Netherlands has to be funded also arouses emotional and sometimes religiously inspired resistance. A lengthy mortgage makes some people feel that they do not really own their home, while a minority of Muslims feel that their religion prohibits the payment of interest.

Finally, a number of more general uncertainties play a role, uncertainties which probably affect Moroccan and Turkish Dutch more than other groups. On the one hand there is the labour market perspective: is their present job secure enough to take on long-term financial obligations? Then there is uncertainty about the pros-
pect of remaining in the Netherlands; at present, for example, well-educated and enterprising people have economic opportunities in Turkey and Morocco. In addition, since the terrorist assaults of 11 September 2001 and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004, Dutch Muslims increasingly feel they are under attack and that makes some people hesitant to invest in the Netherlands.

**Photo 5.2**
Somali and Sudanese men meet outside a Surinamese Islamic butcher shop, Dordtselaan, Rotterdam. Specialised shops such as halal butchers enhance the amenities in ethnically diverse neighbourhoods.

![Somali and Sudanese men meeting outside a shop](image)

**Photo: Jorgen Caris/Hollandse Hoogte (2006)**

**Living in ‘ethnic’ neighbourhoods**
Non-Western ethnic minorities by definition more often live in ‘ethnic’ neighbourhoods than the indigenous Dutch. Yet this geographical concentration is explained only partly by characteristics of households and the housing market (figure 5.7). The idea that geographical concentrations of cheap rented homes combined with the low incomes of ethnic minority groups are able to explain these concentrations adequately is no longer correct; they explain no more than half the difference compared with the ‘indigenous’ housing pattern, and considerably less in the case of people of Turkish origin.

These factors will however have dominated the initial settlement patterns of the various groups; cheap private rented homes around the old city centres, plus concentrations of housing association dwellings in pre-war and early post-war neighbourhoods. The rate at which different groups have achieved social advancement is
however greater than the rate at which they leave the old neighbourhoods. The focus group discussions made clear why.

As stated earlier, for many people having a network of family or friends close by is important. Family ties are especially important for Turkish and Moroccan Dutch, while having a circle of friends nearby is cited more often by Surinamese and Antilleans, especially those with a low education level. The impression is that this network is more important than for indigenous people with the same social status; the participants in the discussions in any event felt this to be the case. If a larger network is maintained, consisting not just of parents but also of brothers and sisters and sometimes nieces and cousins, who moreover must live close enough to walk to, it becomes virtually impossible for the whole group to move somewhere else.

Where family ties are looser and greater distances are acceptable, moving to another neighbourhood occurs more frequently. For some of the middle classes this is desirable, because it allows them to escape the social claims of family and friends, which no longer fit in with their modern, busy lifestyle with its associated progression through the social ranks. Since the family ties remain close, however, this suburbanisation is accompanied by high car use in order to maintain the network. In addition to their social network, ethnic provisions, shops and to a lesser extent the mosque, bind people to the ‘concentration neighbourhoods’. It is the aggregate effect of personal networks which makes neighbourhoods ‘black’ or ‘Turkish’, and not – or to a much lesser extent – the desire to live among people from the same country of origin. The outcome is however the same.

Apart from the attraction of ‘ethnic’ neighbourhoods for those who feel at home there and have a network, a reticence to living among indigenous Dutch people in a suburban neighbourhood as a member of a minority also plays a role. Research has shown that resistance to having an ethnic minority neighbour is still high among the indigenous Dutch. Many participants in the focus group discussions have themselves been confronted with this or heard of it happening. The biggest fears are of being ‘frozen out’, even for women not wearing a headscarf, or not being able to have contact with neighbours. Consequently, people prefer to move to neighbourhoods with an established ethnic minority population, so they will not feel alone. This influx in turn prompts the indigenous population to move away (‘when we move in, they move out’) and makes the destination neighbourhood susceptible to a high turnover rate, dwindling cohesion and a decline in the quality of life. The mechanism described by Schelling (1969, 1971) of a highly dynamic situation generated by relatively small differences in housing preferences between population groups means it is difficult to strike a balance in the population profile that is appealing to everyone.

Large concentrations of ethnic minorities are definitely seen as a problem, especially by residents with children, particularly if the concentrations are accompanied by benefit dependency and other social problems. These problems come out strongly in the socialisation and language skills of children, if there are no or few indigenous Dutch people, preferably from the middle classes, living in the neighbourhood and
attending the same school. Children are especially vulnerable because their social networks are more focused on the neighbourhood; adults can find compensation in their work.

Figure 5.7
Difference in the number of people living in a relatively ethnic neighbourhood (see footnote 2) between ethnic minority groups and indigenous Dutch. The difference is split in a part which can be explained by group characteristics like household composition, age and income, by characteristics of the dwellings as well as by the actual presence of relatively ethnic neighbourhoods in the housing districts where members of the group live. The black part of the bars represent the part of the difference which cannot be explained by the variables in the model (in percentages).

The paradoxical housing domain
There is a paradox at work here. Participants in the focus group discussions said they experienced virtually no institutionalised discrimination on the housing market. They have the same access to social rented homes, but obtaining one does not give access to indigenous neighbours. Experiences in the workplace and nightlife are the opposite: there is regular and sometimes frequent discrimination, but once inside, one can find indigenous colleagues and dancing partners.

Another paradox concerns the way in which certain groups are accused of not integrating properly in the housing domain. The perception is that it is ethnic minorities who cling together, but several quantitative studies have made clear that large numbers of indigenous people want to continue living with other indigenous neighbours and have no desire to have unfamiliar ethnic minority neighbours. The fears thus come from both sides and are real in the sense that housing is a very specific domain when compared with the labour market and nightlife. The home is
after all the basis from which the other domains are visited. People want to relax and be themselves in their own homes and to be able to feel at ease and safe. The need for familiarity and holding on to what is known is common to both ‘parties’ and is something that was very well understood by the focus group participants. What troubled them was that responsibility for integration in the area of housing is one-sidedly placed at the door of ethnic groups, and they feel this is not justified.

Photo 5.3
Under construction: the Essalam Mosque in Rotterdam (South Bank). It will be the largest mosque in Europe, enabling 1500 people to pray simultaneously. The approximately 800,000 Muslims in the Netherlands have access to nearly 500 mosques.
Notes

1 Figures in square metres are not available for the years before 2002.
2 As neighborhoods we used the postal area codes, which typically contain 400 to 4,000 addresses. The advantage of these administrative areas is that the boundaries do not change often, which allows for time series.
3 Relatively ‘black’ neighbourhoods are defined as those postcode areas with a minimum 10% non-Western population (the national average) and an overrepresentation of minorities compared to the municipal average with at least one third. In the larger cities this in practice means over 50% non-Western population.
4 The designated neighbourhoods have different boundaries from the postal districts and are generally larger.
6 Area-based policies and practices: coping with residential segregation

Apart from the issue of access to housing, a special element in the national concern about immigration and integration has been the residential segregation of immigrant groups.

This chapter deals with attempts to cope with the situation as it has developed in ‘coloured’, ‘ethnic’, ‘black’ or ‘multicultural’ neighbourhoods. First we will describe in section 6.1 how the residential segregation issue was discussed in national policy documents and what policy responses were accepted or not accepted. Section 6.2 deals with area-based policies and how the paradigm shifted from ‘building for the neighbourhood’ in the 1970s and 1980s towards creating social mix in the neighbourhood in the 1990s up to now. Then we will discuss some strategies or rather modest local (regional) contributions to reduce residential segregation (6.3). Finally we will discuss some coping strategies for ethnic neighbourhoods and their inhabitants to build inclusion in the sense of connecting population groups (6.4).

6.1 The national perspective on residential segregation

Without a conclusive or explicit balance between arguments for and against segregation, there has been political concern with segregation for some decades in the Netherlands. Segregation became most visible in the 1970s and 1980s as guest workers and their families found access to private rented homes in inner-city districts and initially did not manage to find housing elsewhere in large numbers. The 1983 White Paper on Minorities advocated policy to cope with the deprivation within residential neighbourhoods, rather than change the social composition of these relatively ‘ethnic’ neighbourhoods. At the local level, actors had tried to stop concentration and segregation processes by setting explicit or implicit neighbourhood quotas for members of ethnic minorities. In the early 1970s the municipal administration of Rotterdam attempted to bar certain dwellings to Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans in neighbourhoods where these groups already made up more than 5% of the population. The courts were fairly quick to ban this measure.

In the White Paper on Minorities (1983) the national government took a firm position by stating that any policy enforcing either concentration or deconcentration of minorities was unacceptable. The responsibility was placed at local level, the national level taking a (very weakly performed) supervisory role (see chapter 4). Concentration of minorities was a concern, but the position that was taken was merely responsive to local exclusion practices.

In the 1994 Contourennota residential concentration of minorities was put more explicitly on the political agenda, because it coincided with economic deprivation and neighbourhood nuisance problems. The paper again took a stance against
Area-based policies and practices: coping with residential segregation

enforced dispersal policies by local authorities or housing associations. Instead, allocation of social rented housing on a regional rather than municipal scale was advocated, in order to inform the audience more properly about affordable alternatives and to avoid formal barriers to renting in non-concentration areas. During the 1990s housing associations and municipalities did indeed co-operate more and more on a regional scale, allocation of social rented housing being one of the main issues of communal policy. Municipalities and regions were encouraged in the Paper to monitor allocation results for ethnic minorities, but these reports were never made obligatory. In fact, information on the ethnicity of applicants in the rented sector was and is rarely available. Another suggested strategy to cope with concentrations was to diversify the actual housing stock, by building affordable alternatives in new-build areas and by ‘restructuring’ urban districts in such a way that part of the cheap stock was replaced by more expensive dwellings. This resulted in the 1997 paper on urban renewal policy (Nota Stedelijke Vernieuwing) (discussed in next section).

In later papers, such as the Paper on Integration (2007) the concern for ethnic concentration was repeated as well as the position of not intervening in local housing allocation in order to create an ‘ethnic mix’ (tk2007b). Intervention in local housing allocation has been permitted since 2006, in the form of barring people on low incomes from rented homes in the most deprived urban neighbourhoods (more in section 6.3). However, a socioeconomic mix is mostly sought by creating diversity in the housing stock. To the extent that arguments for concern about segregation are brought forward in national policy documents, it can be said that over the years the emphasis has shifted away from concerns about access to housing either within or outside concentration neighbourhoods, towards concerns about ethnic mix and scope for socialising among different population groups.

6.2 From ‘building for the neighbourhood’ towards social mix

Urban renewal
In the 1970s and 1980s attention was paid to the reconstruction and renovation of nineteenth-century jerry-built dwellings in the cities. What was remarkable and exceptional about this urban renewal scheme was that the reconstruction was to a large extent targeted at the people within the neighbourhood. Neighbourhood protests against urban blight had started at the end of the 1960s. Inhabitants claimed that their housing situation and interests should be respected and they demanded good-quality housing at affordable rents. ‘Building for the neighbourhood’ became the slogan. The claims were related to more general processes of individualisation and democratisation (De Vreeze, 1993:390). According to Van der Schaar & Hereijgers (1991). ‘Building for the neighbourhood’ was made easier in the 1970s because economic decline halted city development, whereas housing subsidies strengthened the residential function compared to the economic function of urban space.

The urban renewal was encouraged out of concerns about selective migration movements out of the cities. The urban housing stock became increasingly the
domain of ethnic minorities, small households, people without jobs and with poor education. Between 1970 and 1988 there was an impressive reconstruction effort in the urban areas: from fewer than 2,000 dwellings in 1970 to 44,000 in 1988 (De Vreeze, 1993:392). Ethnic minorities benefited from the scheme either directly or indirectly. Directly, because many lived in the target districts for urban renewal and some of them accepted a new-build or renovated yet more expensive dwelling. Private landlords in the target areas were dispossessed, housing associations became the new owners and managers of the reconstructed dwellings. In the process, the tenants or owners had the right to return to the renovated or reconstructed dwelling or move elsewhere, with priority. Initially, on top of the rent subsidies, ‘habituation’ subsidies were given to people participating in urban renewal, to enable them to gradually get used to the substantially higher rents. The rebates were gradually run down over a number of years.

Compared to the indigenous Dutch, members of ethnic minorities initially participated to a lesser degree and more often moved to a different neighbourhood. This was especially the case with labour migrant families of Turkish and Moroccan origin. They benefited indirectly because they had priority access to neighbourhoods with higher-quality dwellings, mostly early post-war neighbourhoods. In any event, better housing quality eventually came with significantly higher housing expenses1 (SCP 2008:256).

It is generally acknowledged that urban renewal improved housing conditions of the people involved. People on low incomes, including many members of ethnic minorities, saw their housing quality improve in a period of economic decline where many lost their jobs. However, with hindsight, the urban renewal scheme had a drawback. The building of vast amounts of rent-controlled social housing in the cities reduced the scope for gentrification processes. During the 1980s, over 82% of all new construction within urban renewal districts was social housing (De Vreeze, 1993:256). It had turned the districts surrounding inner cities into relatively cheap residential areas with rapidly increasing numbers of ethnic minorities. The exodus of indigenous Dutch residents had continued despite the urban renewal and was increasingly heading out of the cities into surrounding municipalities. Middle-class indigenous residents of the early post-war districts joined the exodus following the ‘invasion’ of minorities. The concern about these selective moves gave rise to a new urban renewal paradigm which was intended to revitalise the cities and create a social mix within the neighbourhoods in question.

Urban restructuring: the paradigm of social mixing
In 1994 the urban renewal scheme was formally ended and followed by the urban restructuring scheme. Apart from some ‘left-over’ 19th-century districts, the restructuring policy shifted towards the early post-war housing zones. The ambitions in the restructuring scheme were different from the urban renewal of the 1970s and 80s (Vermeijden, 2001). The aim was and still is to revitalise cities and therefore provide higher-quality residential environments. A proportion of the old apartment blocks
are replaced by much larger, modern apartments or single-family dwellings, and the public space is upgraded simultaneously. More than in the 1970s and 1980s, upgrading, tenure mix and socioeconomic mix are the buzzwords, rather than ‘building for the people in the neighbourhood’. The dominant presence of social housing offered no scope for spontaneous gentrification processes, as can be witnessed in some urban districts with private rented and owner-occupied stock. Rent-controlled social housing did not allow rent increases and selection of well-to-do urban citizens.

The Ministry of Housing’s urban restructuring policy is part of the urban policy (Grootscholenbeleid), an integrated approach with physical, economic and social ‘pillars’. Alongside the physical restructuring come efforts to support economic activity and to empower residents. Funding for the urban restructuring policy is partly national and partly local, being a communal effort by the municipality and local housing associations. Municipalities had to submit plans in order to apply for national co-sponsoring of the policy. In total, 56 neighbourhoods have handed in restructuring plans which are currently being processed, meaning part of the housing stock will be demolished and replaced by larger, better and more expensive homes, predominantly owner-occupied dwellings.

This effort was justified in part by supply and demand estimates concerning cheap rented housing for people on low incomes. It was estimated on the basis of national surveys that there was a surplus of cheap rented homes, as a significant number of tenants spend less than they can afford. Also, alongside the restructuring efforts, there is the ‘mirrored construction’ initiative, which in practice generally means that 30% of new homes built on the government-designated ‘Vinex’ developments comprise social rented dwellings, to compensate for the disappearance of affordable rented homes.

Those who live in reconstruction blocks and who cannot afford the prices of new-build dwellings are allocated to old blocks within or outside the neighbourhood. Their experiences with the system differ locally, depending on the organisation of the process, and more specifically the information given on the operation, the timing of that information and the mediation towards alternative options (Kleinhans, 2005). In any event, relocated people have priority over other home-seeking tenants.

There has been animated discussion on the expected benefits of social mixing at the neighbourhood level (Duyvendak & De Rijk, 1998; Kleinhans et al., 2000; Bolt & Van Kempen, 2009). These benefits were sought in the area of reducing negative neighbourhood effects on individual residents, concerning their social status, educational and labour market career and cultural integration. Most commentators agreed that mixing was not going to solve or reduce the problems of the most deprived people in the area and that people and their problems risk simply being moved around. Moreover, the mixing was criticised from an economic perspective: new-build high-quality dwellings in inexpensive neighbourhoods would rapidly decrease in value, whereas the reverse would happen with cheap housing in more expensive districts (Musterd & De Winter, 1998).
Enabling local housing careers for the least deprived

It is increasingly acknowledged that the present middle-class residents in ethnic neighbourhoods represent social capital that can be helpful in empowering others in the neighbourhood. Large-scale rebuilding for affluent target groups outside the neighbourhood is criticised for this reason. Moreover, it has proved difficult to motivate middle-class people who have already left the urban neighbourhoods to return and buy new properties in old inner-city districts.

To some extent, the restructuring policy is starting to resemble the previous urban renewal scheme, in the sense that the building is partly geared to providing scope for a housing career within the neighbourhood for people who can afford it (Helleman et al., 2001). It is mostly this group of ethnic minority residents who show an interest in new-build units in the neighbourhood, mainly because they appreciate having their social network around them (Kullberg et al., 2009; Van Bergeijk et al., 2008). Regaining the indigenous middle-class Dutch for these districts is proving to be a much harder task. Socioeconomic mixing therefore does not always lead to ethnic mixing. The emphasis has shifted towards creating local housing career opportunities for the least deprived locals.

The housing preferences of ethnic minorities are sometimes explicitly taken into consideration by housing associations in reconstruction plans. This is for instance done by creating desired floor plans with separate kitchens, by creating symbolic architecture with expressive elements such as the ‘Moroccan fountain’ in the Schilderswijk district of The Hague or the Mediterranean-style newly constructed Le Medi in Bospolder district in Rotterdam. Some services also appeal to minority members, such as the tenancy construct ‘Koopgarant’2, which reduces the costs, profits and financial risks of owner-occupancy. According to local research in Rotterdam (Ket & Papa, 2001) this tenancy form is much in demand among members of Turkish and Moroccan communities, who more often have no (speculative) financial objectives when buying, partly for religious reasons. A recent evaluation shows that this kind of tenancy attracts first-time buyers who would not buy in the regular way (Elsinga et al., 2009).

The latest scheme: 40 ‘empowered neighbourhoods’ (krachtwijken)

While the restructuring scheme for 56 neighbourhoods in the larger municipalities is still being performed, another scheme was launched in 2007. The interim Minister for Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration, Pieter Winsemius, nominated 40 neighbourhoods for intensified social and urban policies. These neighbourhoods would be in ‘an explosive state’, meaning that social problems and living conditions in these areas should make us fear for ‘French conditions’3. The 40 neighbourhoods were – following the example of the United Kingdom – designated using a national database on social and housing quality indicators. These neighbourhoods partly overlap with those to be restructured, but are more located in the Randstad area and include more 19th-century districts which have been renewed under the ‘building for
the neighbourhood-scheme but still experience social problems such as educational deficit, joblessness and neighbourhood nuisance.

Apart from urban restructuring, which applies for just part of the neighbourhoods (predominantly in the post-war districts), the policy offers schemes for upbringing and school education, job training and job creation, integration of immigrants and their offspring as well as safety in the neighbourhood. According to this policy, the neighbourhoods must be converted into attractive residential areas within a period of ten years. The Minister for Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration coordinates and monitors the policy, which is financed to a large extent by the housing associations. An alliance of public and private organisations is created. It is increasingly being acknowledged that physical reconstruction alone cannot revitalise the urban districts and that intensified efforts are needed to empower the present population.

Assessment of pros and cons of ethnic residential segregation
In academic circles there has been and still is an animated debate between authors emphasising the positive versus those emphasising the negative aspects of residential segregation or clustering processes. Residential clustering may be helpful in enabling immigrants to gain access to the local housing market, to network support, ethnic labour market niches and facilities like ethnic shops and places of worship (mosques, temples). It may provide protection against mockery or intimidation from indigenous population groups. Negative aspects of segregation are that it may reduce the scope for socialising in the residential domain with the indigenous population and help perpetuate mutual stereotypes (Gijsberts & Vervoort, 2007). Also, exclusive socialising in specific inner circles could reinforce traditional or potentially threatening norms and values, such as radicalisation among ‘born-again’ Muslims (Varady, 2008). Or, as we saw in chapter 5, tight family networks may become just too suffocating for younger generations.

Geographical grouping of members of ethnic minorities can be a result of housing market selection processes, but it can also happen on a more voluntary basis, for instance because of social networks, facilities like shops and mosques and job opportunities in ethnic niches. Different authors emphasise the choice elements or the constraint elements. However, choice and constraint might not be so easy to separate, as constraints can be internalised to such an extent that they are not so much perceived as constraints. Also, within one and the same household, members may disagree on the benefits and disadvantages of the neighbourhood. In a small qualitative research in Rotterdam (Kullberg & Elsinga, 1995) we found for instance that some Turkish Dutch women in old, ethnic quarters emphasised their local networks and facilities in the neighbourhood as pluses, whereas their husbands emphasised the low status of the neighbourhood, moderate housing quality and lack of ‘quietness’.
The benefits and disadvantages of spatial concentration depend on the urban pattern as well. A large and good quality social housing sector in the Netherlands and the small scale of the urban structure have prevented the development of large no-go areas, although there are certainly serious concentrations of immigrants and members of ethnic minorities on the neighbourhood scale. Usually we are dealing with a mix of many nationalities, rather than an ethnic enclave. Concentration areas are not physically cut-off from the rest of the cities and the basic services are usually available. Moreover, ethnic entrepreneurs can add to the amenities of the neighbourhood, which can even result in gentrification processes such as those in the Pijp district of Amsterdam and the multi-cultural Lombok district of Utrecht (Dibbits & Meder, 1999).

For these reasons, ethnic concentrations are approached more positively in several cities. In The Hague, Almere and Delft, municipal plans incorporate existing concentrations of minorities and try to turn these into an asset. They help create services and shops which match the local population and provide amenities to passers-by. Chinatown districts in US cities are taken as an example for this ‘ethnic branding’.

As far as the negative side of residential ethnic clustering is concerned, segregation is increasingly seen as both a sign and a cause of the failed integration of these groups. In contrast to the United States, Dutch research reveals virtually no
correlation between living in ‘concentration neighbourhoods’ and factors such as the labour market position of ethnic minorities. A clearer relationship is found between living in concentration neighbourhoods and socio-cultural integration: ethnic minorities living in such neighbourhoods less often have contacts with the indigenous population than ethnic minorities who live in ‘white’ neighbourhoods (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2007).

Moreover, ethnic concentrations in combination with socioeconomic deprivation engenders discontent among all population groups in the neighbourhood, including immigrants and their descendants, as was shown in chapter 5.

6.3 An impression of local attempts to cope with residential segregation

Efforts to achieve greater ethnic distribution are not directly translated into policy; that policy is often based on promoting the socioeconomic differentiation of disadvantaged neighbourhoods as was discussed. We will now turn to some local practices that have been implemented to reduce socioeconomic (and sometimes implicitly ethnic) segregation processes at local level.

Exceptional local access criteria
In 2006, based on the ‘Rotterdamwet’ – a law laying down income requirements for establishment in priority neighbourhoods – the municipality of Rotterdam designated a number of neighbourhoods and streets which are not accessible for persons with a low income from outside the Rotterdam region wishing to settle in the city. The municipality of Culemborg also applies income thresholds for one district in order to restrict access by low-income groups. The ‘Rotterdamwet’ appears to have had little effect on the ethnic composition of neighbourhoods. Although widely discussed, the scope of this law is in reality not extensive (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2007).

The reverse occurs when middle-class people are invited to settle in deprived neighbourhoods. An example is the Bos en Lommer district of Amsterdam, where maximum income thresholds for cheaper rented homes were abandoned (ibid). However, since the homes are generally small and the neighbourhood reputation is not good, it is difficult to attract more affluent tenants.

Allocation of social rented homes: drawing lots
There are various, often still rather experimental initiatives which in theory increase the residential choice of low-income groups. One is a social rental allocation model based on the drawing of lots. It means that social rented homes are raffled off among eligible and interested applicants. This places people with a short term of residence – including many members of ethnic minorities – at less of a disadvantage than the widely used ‘choice-based lettings model’ (chapter 4). A large housing association in the area of Rotterdam operates in this way. Choice-based lettings helped deal with institutional discrimination and the presentation of rental vacancies on a regional scale increased the choice for the public. It did not make a substantial
contribution to reducing ethnic concentration, however. It is not yet clear whether drawing lots will lead to a reduction in segregation (ibid).

Regional agreements on construction and allocation of rented homes
In the Haaglanden region (The Hague and surrounding municipalities), an integral approach has been ongoing for some time which combines ‘mirrored construction’ with targeted allocation of homes to low-income groups. In the peripheral municipalities, more social rented homes are being built and few homes in the rental sector are being demolished or sold. In The Hague and Delft the opposite is occurring: substantial numbers of social rented homes are being demolished and more owner-occupied homes are being built in the middle price segment. In addition, agreements are in place between the municipalities in the Haaglanden region under which the peripheral municipalities house relatively more low-income groups and The Hague relatively fewer. Matching housing construction with allocation appears to be having an impact. What this project also makes clear, however, is that widening the distribution of low-income groups is a lengthy task; the policy has already been in operation for almost ten years and the changes in the characteristics of the housing stock and population profiles are still relatively limited in quantitative terms (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2007).

‘Gentripuncture’
Restructuring is far and away the most important intervention when it comes to creating socioeconomic diversity in the neighbourhood. Through demolition, amalgamation and new-build, an attempt is made to differentiate the housing stock sufficiently to make it attractive to households higher up the socioeconomic ladder. This can take very different forms, most of all concerning the scale and housing market context. Generally speaking: the hotter the housing market, and the more central the location, the more scope there is to upgrade for a non local audience, displacing the low and modest income residents. Increasingly, reconstruction is catering for the incumbent (ethnic) middle-class residents; at least that argument is increasingly used in neighbourhood restructuring plans (Van Bergeijk et al., 2008).

There are some interesting examples of modest scale reconstructions, intended to contribute to the neighbourhood quality in a more specific way by unleashing relatively large positive spill over effects to the benefit of all residents. The Steering Committee for Experiments in Public Housing (www.sev.nl) refers to this kind of intervention as ‘gentripuncture’, a mix of the words ‘gentrification’ and ‘acupuncture’. We will illustrate the idea with two interesting examples, both in the city of Rotterdam.

‘Renovation homes’ (klushuizen) are old homes in poor condition but with an interesting architecture, which are offered either free of charge or at a low price on the condition that the occupants make a substantial investment in renovating the building. In this way, a process of upgrading is orchestrated in a few neighbourhoods with a very poor external reputation, including the Spangen district. The renovation homes attract an audience of young, mostly indigenous Dutch middle-class people.
belonging to the ‘creative class’. More than other middle-class people, members of this group appear to be willing to socialise with less privileged and ethnic residents in the neighbourhood (Veldboer et al., 2008).

A second example is the Le Medi project in the Bospolder district of Rotterdam. In a 19th-century, low-quality, poor neighbourhood, some blocks have been demolished and replaced by Mediterranean-inspired new construction: colourful, diverse, provided with partly communal roof terraces and elegantly decorated. Young urban dwellers from various neighbourhoods are attracted by this project and are not bothered by the surrounding poverty. The semi-public spaces in the project are, with the agreement of the owners of the apartments, accessible for people in the wider neighbourhood. In this way children and adults from the different communities can socialise and the new estates will not have the character of a gated community. Moreover, the architecture draws attention and publicity and allows residents in the wider, deprived area of Bospolder to identify with this successful project rather than with a deprived neighbourhood. Inclusion in this example is in part sought in the symbolic sphere, through place attachment and identification.

### 6.4 Some area-based inclusionary practices

There was a surge in policy attention for the relationships between the ethnic and indigenous populations after the terrorist assaults of 11 September 2001 and the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004. More than ever before, these events brought tensions between different sections of the population to the surface. The idea of a peaceful multi-ethnic society, which had already been severely dented in the preceding years, was left in tatters. Fears of radicalisation and further polarisation led to the development of any number of local interventions, initiated at the national as well as the local level aimed at stimulating contacts between the ethnic and indigenous communities. An inventory identified almost 400 such interventions (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2007). The underlying assumption is that the initiatives strengthen the sense of mutual understanding and cohesion.

A distinction can be made between ‘ethnic’ and ‘general’ interventions. In ‘ethnic’ interventions the cultural or religious background of ethnic minorities forms the basis for bringing together different population groups. This may be a multicultural neighbourhood party, for example, discussion meetings on Islam or coming together to prepare and eat a non-Dutch meal. The primary aim is to breed familiarity with the ethnic and cultural diversity. In ‘general’ interventions an attempt is made to foster contacts by approaching people in their role as parents, neighbourhood residents, participants in sport, etc. The emphasis is on shared interests, for example in relation to the quality of life of the neighbourhood or the school achievements of children.

Given the large number of interventions begun in recent years, it is worrying that very little is known about their effects. In the first place, few interventions make explicit what their objective and target group is and what the expected and desired
results are. There is also a lack of (adequate) evaluation research in a great many cases. It is therefore difficult to judge whether interventions lead to more interethnic contacts (Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2007). The ‘ethnic’ interventions, in particular, seem to bear an ad hoc character and it remains to be seen how long the connection between groups will last. We will briefly present a few promising initiatives in the sphere of general interventions, where an infrastructure is being created that facilitates connections for the longer term.

Photo 6.2
Preparing dolma from freshly picked grape leaves at an allotment complex in Overschie, Rotterdam. Like sports, allotment gardening helps to connect different population groups. This has been increasingly acknowledged by policymakers in recent years.

‘Infrastructure of connection’
There is an important role here for ‘multifunctional accommodation’: accommodation that is planned to be built in a majority of 40 designated problem neighbourhoods. It is assumed that sharing the accommodation between different groups of users will help enable different social networks to connect. Likewise, the configuration and specific use of the public space can promote similar connections of networks, while good quality and good management of public spaces are also helpful.
The Thuis Op Straat (‘At Home on the Street’) initiative is an intervention in the public space to improve contacts between (young) neighbourhood residents by providing play facilities and accompanying the children whilst playing. It protects more vulnerable children and especially girls from being dominated by more aggressive, streetwise children. As a result, parents are more willing to let their children play outdoors and the public space consequently feels safer for the wider public. Initiatives involving gardening, providing school allotments and using fallow land to grow flowers and vegetables are also focused on the public space. These initiatives attract both ethnic and indigenous people and offer a place as well as a good reason to meet.

Some initiatives within schools (and school communities) attempt to foster contacts between ethnic and indigenous parents. It is interesting to see that, with a little encouragement, this contact does actually take place. The education and upbringing of children is a common interest, and this proves to be a good basis for the establishment of contact.

This is less the case when it comes to cooperating in neighbourhood improvement projects. Here, residents are invited by the municipality or housing association to decide collectively on local interventions to improve their street or neighbourhood. Members of ethnic minorities tend to be underrepresented in these projects, or dominated by indigenous dwellers, unless explicit efforts are made by social workers to get them involved.
Notes

1 In fact, rent increases after the renovation and reconstruction pushed some people into problems with rent arrears (Kullberg, 1991; Brand, 1989).

2 Koopgarant, a kind of shared equity, is a form of owner-occupancy where people buy from the housing association for a modest, below-market price. The housing association has the first right to buy if the owner wants to sell. A minimum price is guaranteed but if there is a profit, this is shared with the housing association. In this way the risks (and the profits) for the buyer are reduced, while the housing association can treat this kind of housing as part of the ‘affordable housing stock’.

3 The interim minister referred to riots in the French banlieus at the time.

4 These projects are known under the name ‘People make the city’ (Mensen maken de stad), using similar formats for creating a priority agenda for the street and working out the improvements step by step.
Diversity of immigrants and their descendants

In the early 1980s the Netherlands started seeing itself as a country of immigration, with substantial numbers of immigrants who were likely to stay rather than return to their home countries. At the time, the largest categories of migrants were post-colonial minorities from the former Dutch colonies Indonesia and Surinam, as well as low-skilled labour migrants and their family members from Turkey and Morocco. In later years, especially the 1990s, large numbers of asylum-seekers arrived in the Netherlands, coming from the former Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, China, Somalia and many other countries. In recent years a new wave of labour migrants has come from Eastern European countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. Along with the legal immigrants, substantial numbers of irregular migrants also live in the Netherlands. Legal residents of foreign background now make up 20% of the Dutch population; 10% are of non-Western origin. These figures include the second generation.

The population of immigrants and their descendants has become increasingly diverse in terms of countries of origin as well as socioeconomic position. Among the earlier cohorts of migrants, in particular, the socioeconomic diversity has increased over the years. Among the children of former low-skilled labour migrants, we may now find directors of large firms, politicians and governors including the mayor of the second biggest Dutch city (Rotterdam), journalists, well-known writers and other artists. Post-colonial migrants from Indonesia cannot be distinguished – in socioeconomic terms – from the indigenous Dutch, and the Surinamese Dutch are moving in the same direction. This socio-cultural diversity raises questions as to what kinds of inclusionary concerns and policies are desirable and productive and at what point such concerns may become intrusive. On the other hand, the extensive welfare state arrangements that exist in the Netherlands make it normal to provide help for vulnerable citizens, and these are still well represented among migrants, including the second generation.

From structural integration to cultural integration

The needs of vulnerable migrants can be met by specific policy or general policy. There has been specific integration policy for immigrant groups in the Netherlands since the 1980s, but the content of the policy has changed over the years. Initially, the focus was on equal participation of migrants and minorities in all facilities of the welfare state, including education, employment, housing, welfare and health care. Funds were available to increase the participation of the ‘target groups’, while the maintenance of group identity was facilitated as well (especially through courses in the languages of the countries of origin).
Over the years, the focus of attention in national integration policy has shifted to some extent from structural integration (participation in education, labour market and housing) to social and cultural integration (knowledge of the Dutch language, customs, norms and values and contacts with the indigenous Dutch population). Increasingly these are seen as prerequisites for a good educational and labour market performance, as well as for participating in the wider society, including the neighbourhood. The national concern about group identity and language performance in people’s ‘own’ language as it existed in the 1980s, is unimaginable today.

The Civic Integration Abroad Act (2006) requires mostly non-Western, new immigrants, especially those coming for family reunion or family formation, to take an obligatory civic integration exam in the country of origin before actually coming over. Additional courses and exams need to be taken after arrival in the Netherlands. For labour migrants, including Eastern Europeans, this is not required.

Access to housing: reserving social rented homes
National housing policy on access to housing has varied depending on the migration motives of the immigrants involved. Post-colonial migrants as well as admitted asylum-seekers have been mediated actively into social rented housing all over the country, according to a dispersal policy. The exact arrangement was different for each of these groups, depending on the housing context of the time (chapter 3).

Initial housing of these groups was seen in all cases as a national responsibility. Dutch Indonesians and asylum-seekers with a residence permit have made particular use of this housing arrangement (chapter 4). This was not so much the case among Surinamese immigrants, of whom only approximately 10% made use of the scheme. Contextual factors seem to be responsible here: an extreme housing shortage at the time of arrival of the Dutch Indonesians, less so at the time of the arrival of the Surinamese. Moreover, when the first group arrived in the Netherlands, local job opportunities were widely available, whereas at the time of arrival of the Surinamese migrants jobs were more difficult to find, especially outside the Randstad area.

Finally, in the dispersed housing policy for Surinamese immigrants, the four largest (and most popular) cities were explicitly excluded, whereas this was not the case for the Indonesians and the later asylum-seekers with a residence permit.

Admitted asylum-seekers often lack a social network in the Netherlands, so they rely more on state-provided opportunities. It is estimated that 60% accept the offer of a home; the other 40% seek their own accommodation. The arrangement for providing initial housing seems to work reasonably well. Under national policy, local housing associations reserve vacant dwellings for asylum-seekers with a residence permit. The required number of dwellings is announced annually. Recently, sanctions have been applied where municipalities and housing corporations fail to make vacant homes available in accordance with their ‘social task’.

A proportion of the asylum-seekers who are allocated a home later relocate towards larger municipalities, where they may find a job or a social network, or both. In the small municipalities, jobs are often not readily available, while in the large
cities housing is more difficult to find. It should be noted that asylum-seekers with a residence permit receive social benefits and therefore do not immediately suffer from being located further away from job opportunities. It is not known to what extent a remote housing allocation might discourage asylum-seekers from seeking work far away from their home.

There is no clear picture as to what the dispersal policy offers in the longer term. It seems to perform its distributing contribution, relieving the largest cities for some years at least, and it provides people with a decent home from the start. In this regard, the policy can be seen as a success. Within municipalities, however, admitted asylum-seekers, like other migrants, usually end up in the cheaper, low-status neighbourhoods where turnover rates are highest.

No national housing policy for labour migrants
For the labour migrants who were recruited in the 1970s, there has not been any national housing policy to help them find access to decent housing or lodging at the start. The housing conditions of individual workers were the responsibility of their employers, but there was no effective control over how they took up this responsibility and what the housing conditions were actually like. In recent years, there seems to have been more coordination between employers, municipalities and the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Housing (VROM-Inspectie) to house recent labour migrants from Eastern Europe more properly. It is acknowledged that even if the workers reside in the Netherlands only temporarily, the need to house temporary workers will be a permanent. Nevertheless, overcrowded, substandard housing conditions for labour migrants still occur in the private rented sector (chapter 2).

Most Turkish and Moroccan labour migrants did not return to their home countries, but brought their families over to build a future in the Netherlands. It was assumed that these families could find their way through the general housing policy and would not need a specific policy, especially since the Netherlands had and still has a very large social rented sector (a third of all housing and substantially more in cities) and rent subsidies for tenants in the private as well as the social rented sector. Due to institutional discrimination, however, access to this sector was initially difficult and this pushed migrants into the poor-quality private rented sector and into buying homes in the late 1970s, when prices were very high, and many later got into financial difficulties (chapter 4).

Institutional discrimination
Institutional discrimination was a serious issue in the 1970s and 1980s as housing associations kept their doors closed to labour migrants and their family members. The social rented sector at the time formed about 40% of the national housing stock (now: one third) and a much larger proportion in the cities where most migrants live. Housing associations feared the impact of a rapid invasion by minority members on the 'stability' and residential quality of neighbourhoods. Although the fear in itself was justified, as the indigenous Dutch were and still are inclined to move out once
minorities move in, the overall effect of discretionary local allocation practices was that minorities were excluded from social housing (chapter 4).

This discrimination was combated quite successfully by municipal pressure over the 1980s. Apart from this pressure by the local supervisors on the housing associations, it is quite possible that the increasing number of members of ethnic minorities in urban settings itself put pressure on housing associations to house these groups properly, as they became a substantial part of the clientele as the indigenous urban tenants increasingly moved into the suburbs. Moreover, urban renewal in the 1970s and 1980s targeted cheap rented districts where many migrants lived, and in the event private sector tenants became social rented sector tenants (chapter 6). The large social rented sector became the dominant sector for migrants and minorities in the 1980s and 1990s (chapter 5).

In the 1990s a new, choice-based letting mechanism took away the scope for discretion in the social rented sector, thanks to a transparent allocation system (chapter 4). Rental vacancies are publicly announced along with the allocation criteria and credentials of the ‘winning’ candidate (in terms of waiting time or age). Recent research suggests that members of ethnic minorities no longer encounter institutional discrimination in the field of social housing, as opposed to the private rented housing sector and the labour and leisure markets. This is an accomplishment for the social rented sector and choice-based lettings can be described as a promising initiative. A drawback of the choice-based letting system is that it is time-consuming and users need to understand the system well to get the best out of it. Moreover, the system did not seem to help avoid or reduce residential segregation as had been hoped at the time of its introduction. Choice-based lettings have become the dominant allocation practice in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Discrimination in the private rented sector is not well documented. It is known to exist in the form of charging too much for too little, a practice to which illegal residents are especially vulnerable. Also, there are indications that some landlords will discriminate against some ethnic minority members and deny them access, for instance young Moroccan or Antillean men, the most stigmatised groups. According to a recent study based on group interviews, there are indications that these youngsters internalise the rationale for this kind of discretion, reasoning that it is the owner’s right to choose tenants to his liking, whereas the public housing sector is expected to provide for all citizens equally. The modest attention for discrimination in the private rented sector can at least in part be attributed to the fact that the social sector is so dominant and provides a good alternative.

Discrimination in the owner-occupied sector seems to be modest. A study in three Dutch cities (Rotterdam, Arnhem and The Hague) on discrimination in the mortgage markets revealed that redlining occurred, meaning that some lenders offer mortgages in ethnic neighbourhoods on unfavourable terms to buyers as the loans are considered to be more risky. The practice was however not widespread enough to deny buyers access to the local market, as the victims of such practices usually find other providers willing to supply loans on regular terms (chapter 4).
Home ownership and housing quality

Some groups, especially Surinamese Dutch and Antilleans who came to the Netherlands before 1995, have gained access to owner-occupancy to a degree that compares quite well with indigenous Dutch with the same age, household types and economic situation, living in the same areas. This is much less the case with the other large groups, the Turkish and Moroccan Dutch, although home ownership is growing rapidly among these groups, too, especially among the second generation (chapter 5).

The remaining ‘gap’ between Turkish and Moroccan and indigenous Dutch in terms of buying homes is due more to preferences or economic uncertainty rather than to lack of opportunity. Reluctance to buy is connected to the desire to live in neighbourhoods where such dwellings are not readily available. Furthermore, the long-term loans (usually 30 years), which are unknown in the countries of origin, make the property feel less ‘owned’. Some Dutch Muslims also have religious objections to interest. It is also estimated that at least 25% of Turkish and Moroccan Dutch have invested savings in a second home in their country of origin.

Increasing home ownership has in recent years been an important vehicle for improved housing quality, especially among the larger groups of ethnic minorities. Owner-occupied homes often represent better quality, for example being larger. Moreover, better quality has also been achieved within the rented sector, due to the move from private rentals towards better quality social rented homes as well as urban renewal efforts which have disproportionately affected ethnic minorities as they were (and are) based in the target areas.

Residential segregation

Residential segregation, meaning socioeconomic as well as ethnic clustering, is considered an issue of concern, and has been for decades. Although negative neighbourhood effects on job opportunities have not been found in the Netherlands, there is concern about social and cultural effects of a persistent physical distance between population groups and lack of opportunity for chance meetings in the residential environment.

It seems that segregation was initially caused in part by lack of access to dwellings other than private rented homes in urban districts. Selective letting of the stock owned by housing associations further added to segregation. Of course the structure of the housing market, with large blocks of social housing in the central city areas, was also responsible. Once established, the vast concentrations are hard to change as on the one hand the minority members have built their social networks in these places, and on the other the indigenous Dutch (and immigrants of Western background) tend to move out as soon as minorities move in (no clear ‘tipping point’ has been identified in this process). Residents who move out of the area leave vacancies that are usually taken by newly arrived migrants in a more vulnerable situation than the people who have left.

In Dutch policy, enforced dispersal at the level of municipalities or urban agglomerations has never been embraced (for instance, working with a quota system). It is
unconstitutional, for one thing. One case of ethnic dispersal policy can be considered an exception: the allocation of housing by local authorities to asylum-seekers with residential status. This dispersal policy is aimed explicitly at ethnic groups but it is not unconstitutional because the people involved are free to accept or reject the dwelling offered by the housing association and to relocate after they have accepted this offer. The policy is a dispersal policy on a national scale but not so much at local level, as most vacancies are offered in relatively deprived areas with high turnover rates.

Other reasons to oppose dispersal policy were that it interferes with freedom of residential choice. It also carries the risk of excluding minorities from access to social housing as it is easier to close doors for them where quotas have been met than to open up areas where this is not the case. Furthermore, relatively or absolutely ‘ethnic’ areas which are unpopular among the indigenous Dutch will risk high vacancy rates when these indigenous people have to be forced in somehow. Alternative strategies have been to open up alternative options by providing information on dwelling offers throughout the whole agglomeration rather than just the municipality, and being transparent in the allocation of these dwellings.

Residential segregation in socioeconomic terms can be modified to some extent by intervening in the urban structure, as is done with the urban restructuring scheme and through building social rented housing in the surrounding, wealthier residential municipalities. In the urban restructuring, socioeconomic mixing is created through the demolition of cheap social rented homes and the construction of middle-class owner-occupied homes. This is a costly and time consuming process. Moreover, it is mostly the immigrant middle-class ethnic minorities already present in the neighbourhoods who are interested. Urban structuring thus works as a strategy for diversification in socioeconomic rather than ethnic terms. The cooperation of semi-public housing associations in the restructuring process makes it more feasible compared to situations where the municipality first needs to buy properties from private owners.

Some more targeted efforts are made to attract small numbers of middle-class indigenous Dutch people in ‘ethnic’ areas by creating interesting home offers, such as DIY (do-it-yourself) renovation homes (chapter 6). The interested people have a very different profile from the indigenous Dutch who left the areas in the first place; they are the young and creative class of people. Also, attempts are being made through ‘ethnic branding’ to turn ethnic concentration into an asset, providing these neighbourhoods with a distinctive element. Obviously, any attempt to keep or regain a middle-class population in the ethnic neighbourhoods implies that the area must be very well managed and that public spaces and facilities are at least in good order.

As turning around ethnic concentrations is difficult to accomplish and is always a slow process, alternative strategies are being adopted to connect people from different backgrounds. There is a whole gamut of area-based interventions in this sphere. Although not many well-substantiated evaluations are available, there seem to be a
number of promising initiatives in this domain (chapter 6). These kind of policies are – like the small-scale, targeted urban renovation projects and neighbourhood management projects – more transferable to countries with modest or no social housing sectors.

Discussion
All in all, we can conclude that the issue of access to decent housing for immigrants and ethnic minorities has been addressed quite well in the Netherlands, despite initial difficulties in providing access to labour migrants. Some key factors can be identified. There is the benefit of a large social rented housing sector which can (to some extent) be called upon by national or local authorities. This was done in order to provide access to housing for many members of post-colonial minority groups as well as asylum-seekers with residence status. They are helped towards their first home in the Netherlands, from where they may look for a different place if they wish. It is the combination of a cooperative social housing sector and targeted national policy to claim an explicit number of dwellings from this sector that determines the success.

Access to decent housing is further encouraged by virtually banning discretionary practices within the social rented sector with the help of choice-based lettings, a transparent allocation procedure. Here it was primarily a local working practice that was followed by national consent rather than the national government playing a leading role. The positive effects on the housing opportunities for ethnic minorities were a more or less coincidental side-effect of a practice which was implemented to give the general public more choice and autonomy. Again, the presence of a social rented sector was in itself not sufficient to accomplish good access for minorities. The combination with a transparent allocation procedure was decisive. It is an open question to what extent discretionary practices would have gradually ended anyway without any interference in the allocation practice, simply due to the rapidly growing minority population and the increasing dependence of this client group on housing associations in the most urbanised locations.

The issue of residential segregation has not been addressed as successfully as access to housing. It has become quite substantial, in (large) part because the number of people of foreign origin has increased rapidly and in part because of selective internal migration processes, mostly taking the form of ‘white flight’. Concerns in the early 1970s about neighbourhoods with 5% non-Western immigrants are now translating into concerns about areas with a population consisting of at least 50% ethnic minorities. It illustrates how rapidly immigration can proceed as well as how relative residential segregation is. As discussed in chapter 6, the debate among social scientists and policymakers about the choice versus constraint elements of ethnic residential segregation is still very much alive. Related to this discussion is the question of the extent to which residential segregation is actually a problem, or simply a fact of life. Our position is that it has elements of both and that the benefits
of combating residential segregation need to be balanced with the costs. Apart from fighting segregation, policy can focus on coping with segregation.

The fact that local policy concerns about ethnic segregation were already manifest more than 30 years ago, makes it interesting to reflect on what could have been done – with hindsight – at an early stage of the segregation process. After all, it is clear that interventions in a much later phase are complicated, time-consuming and – in the case of urban restructuring – costly. Might neighbourhood quotas for ethnic minorities have worked if they had been allowed 30 year ago? From international experience as well as discretionary practices and implicit quotas imposed by housing associations in the Netherlands, it is clear that such practices result in reduced access options for ethnic minorities. To compensate for barring dwellings in certain relatively ‘ethnic’ neighbourhoods, priority could have been given to members of ethnic minorities applying for dwellings in ‘white’ estates and neighbourhoods. However, this would have been politically difficult, as these estates would have been evaluated as ‘better quality’ by the indigenous tenants, so the policy would have been perceived as affirmative action. Moreover, it is questionable whether members of ethnic minorities at the time would have wanted housing in ‘white’ neighbourhoods and estates, or whether they would have sought refuge in the private rented and owner-occupied sectors in order to live among their fellow countrymen.

As far as socioeconomic segregation is concerned, there is a lesson to be learned from the Dutch urban renewal in the 1970s and 80s. With hindsight, we must conclude that the unconventional strategy of ‘building for the neighbourhood’ by exclusively replacing slums with new social rented housing, contributed to the perpetuation of large low-income housing zones. The latest urban restructuring policy is more balanced and seems to provide better housing career options within neighbourhoods.
References


cbs Statline is a national database available on internet: www.statline.cbs.nl


Den Haag: VROM.


Minderhedennota, 1983, Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (Den Haag).


Publications of the SCP in English


Market Place Europe. Fifty years of public opinion and market integration in the European Union.


