Europe meets U.S. in Crime and Policy

European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research

ARCHIEF EXEMPLAAR

NIET MEENEMEN !!!!
Europe meets U.S. in Crime and Policy

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Aims and scope
The European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research is a platform for discussion and information exchange on the crime problem in Europe. Every issue concentrates on one central topic in the criminal field, incorporating different angles and perspectives. The editorial policy is on an invitational basis. The journal is at the same time policy-based and scientific, it is both informative and plural in its approach. The journal is of interest to researchers, policymakers and other parties that are involved in the crime problem in Europe.


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Editorial

'Europe' as an entity does not exist. Europe can be characterized by referring to its diversity in language, culture and economic development. However, the US does not exist as an entity either. The United States can also be characterized by its diverse languages, cultures and economic development. The US does have one federal government, while Europe is (still) a continent of nation-states, slowly growing into one economic market and communautarian politics. Nevertheless, an edition of the journal dedicated to the comparison of crime and criminal justice on both sides of the Atlantic is, in some ways a 'tricky business'. How does one compare these two continents of tremendous pluralism? In this issue of the European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research an attempt at such a comparison is made. From a European perspective there are at least two reasons to do so. In the first place there is a common belief that everything happening in the United States now will happen some years later in Europe. Secondly American crime and justice problems seem - seen through European eyes - to have grown into mythological proportions. The American model fascinates and frightens at the same time. From an American perspective, on the other hand, there seems to be a growing interest in the ways European countries deal with their crime problems.

This issue at least reflects the mutual interest in criminal developments and approaches undertaken in criminal justice and research. The editors of this issue happily present a varied collection of articles by American and European experts. The issue begins with an article by Ineke Haen Marshall, who compares crime trends in Europe and the United States. The major trends in US criminality are described, followed by a discussion of recent trends in criminality on both sides of the Atlantic. The article concludes that the focus on American exceptionalism with regard to gun-related violent crime overshadows major convergences and similarities in criminality shared by both nations. The second article deals with drug policy. The American war on drugs is, in some European countries, seen as a bad example of criminal justice policy. This war was formally declared in 1988, eight years after all indicators of drug use began to decline sharply. The federal drug control strategy required that 70 percent of federal funds be expended on supply-side tactics (street-level law enforcement, harsher penalties, border controls, interdiction, source-country programmes) and only 30 percent be expended on treatment, education, and prevention. The war has in its own terms failed, according to the author Michael Tonry. Drugs availability remained the same and prices fell. Incarcera-
tion of drug offenders has been the principal cause of the recent record increase in imprisonment rates and is the principal reason why one in three young black men in 1995 was under the control of the justice system.

The third article deals with gangs in the United States and Europe. Malcolm W. Klein describes street gangs as they were found to exist in Europe in 1992. Included are examples in Stockholm, Zurich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Berlin, London, Manchester, Brussels, and a number of Volga cities in Russia. It then describes new research on gang structures in the US which yielded five somewhat distinct structural scenarios. This new typology is applied to the 1992 description of European gangs. New information on European gangs through 1995 is then presented with special attention paid to Sweden, England, Holland, and Germany. If anything, it seems that the street gang situation may be worsening in Europe, although a great deal of relevant information is missing.

The fourth article compares the United States and Switzerland with respect to family socialization and delinquency. Alexander T. Vazsonyi compared self-reported rates and aetiological factors of juvenile delinquency in a Swiss (N=970) and an American (N=232) sample of adolescents. While official statistics generally indicate sizeable differences in rates of juvenile delinquency, few studies have examined cross-nationally self-reported juvenile delinquency. Consistent with self-control theory (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990), the reported aetiological factors include self-control as well as family process variables (e.g., parental monitoring). Findings indicate that American youth were more delinquent than Swiss youth. Also, aetiological factors consistent with self control theory account for these cross-national differences. The discussion focuses on potential links between family socialization and delinquency.

In the next article Alan Block describes developments in organized crime. He is especially interested in the links between states and organized crime groups. In his opinion clientelism can be seen as the keyword in understanding the relation between powerful states and satellite states, and the way this relationship influences organized crime. In this respect he does not find any disparity between different economic systems in American states and European states.

The issue closes with a letter written by the German criminologist Christian Pfeiffer to Attorney General Janet Reno. The letter dates from 1994 and can be seen as a cri de coeur on American criminal policy. Incarceration rates and the 'three strikes and you're out' policy frightened the author. The editorial committee decided to publish the letter, but only after asking some colleagues to comment on the letter. The publication of letter and comments (by Fattah, Gottfredson, Joutsen, Lévy and Skogan) is intended to trigger further discussion. Readers are asked to respond to this debate.

The Crime institute profile – because of the subject of this issue – features the US Institute of Justice.
How exceptional is the United States?

Crime trends in Europe and the US

Ineke Haen Marshall¹

Tourists travelling to the US are told not to talk to strangers for fear of being robbed or killed. Executions by electric chair or firing squad, an incredible boom in prison construction to accommodate one of the largest prison populations in the world, youngsters carrying guns to school for protection – this is the image of the US typically portrayed by the European mass media. Hollywood reinforces the view of the US as a country with a perverted fascination for violence, gratuitous sex, and dangerous living. In many ways, the US is viewed as combining both the very best and the very worst of the industrialized world. Whether emphasizing its leading research institutes, technological innovations, superb universities, impressive modern architecture, and high level of prosperity, or its darker side of crime, violence, fear, racial discrimination, and economic inequality, the notion of 'American exceptionalism' runs as a common thread through most literature which compares Europe and the US.

'American exceptionalism' has implications for criminological theory as well as for crime policy. After all, if the US is indeed a clear outlier with regard to crime, specially-tailored crime theories must be developed to account for this uniqueness. European policy makers will be reluctant to adopt American crime policies, since these policies 'obviously' fail to control crime, and vice versa: Americans will have little reason to believe that policies successful in European countries (e.g., more tolerant drug policies) may be workable in the US. For Europeans it is often difficult to separate sensationalism (the OJ Simpson trial!), and a certain degree of continental chauvinism (the US is basically an uncivilized country with barbaric means of punishment, a poor social welfare system, thriving on a fast-food, fast-everything McDonaldized low culture).

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from the objective reality of American society. Americans themselves, too, share the view that somehow 'things are different in the US'. But how different are things in the USA, really? Is the US indeed more crime-ridden than Europe, or is this a popular belief unsupported by facts? What do we know about this, and how do we know?

**International police statistics**

The oldest source of statistical data on crime incidence cross-nationally are police statistics. The limitations of official statistics when used for comparisons between cities, regions, states, or time periods within one country have been amply documented (O'Brien, 1985; Biderman, 1991). Users of national statistics for international comparative purposes should proceed with even greater caution (Wolfgang, 1967; Lynch, 1994; Bennett and Lynch, 1990; Kommer, 1995). It is now a sociological truism that crime rates should not be viewed (primarily) as indices of criminal misconduct, but rather as the outcomes of social definitional processes. Official police statistics are not only 'indices of organizational processes' (Bottomley and Coleman, 1981, p. 145), but are also shaped by a society's legal philosophy, cultural values, political ideology, and technological infrastructure. The two main drawbacks of international police statistics are (differential) under reporting and non-standard indicators (Archer and Gartner, 1984) – problems which seriously hamper efforts to provide a definitive answer to questions about the comparative levels and trends in crime in the US and Europe. Police statistics are compiled internationally by Interpol, the United Nations, The World Health Organization (homicide data), Amnesty International, as well as by a number of independent researchers (Archer and Gartner, 1984; Bennett and Lynch, 1990). Perhaps the best-known comparative data are gathered by the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch of the United Nations (Kangaspunta, 1995a, 1995b). As with any international data collection effort, a number of problems have been noted with the United Nations Surveys: imprecise definition of the terms, classifications, coding structures and computation units used (Kangaspunta, 1995a, p. 2). Although by far the most comprehensive and ambitious official data source, the warning that 'comparisons will continue to be fraught with the risk of misinterpretation and generalization' (Kangaspunta, 1995a, p. 6) should not be taken lightly. A similar 'health warning' applies to Interpol statistics. This organization compiles national data received from a large number of countries on crimes recorded by the police, clearance rates and arrests. (In 1992, 93 nations submitted their crime statistics to Interpol.)

In order to improve the availability and quality of quantitative international crime data, the European Committee on Crime Problems (CDPC) of the Coun-
cil of Europe in 1993 appointed a group of specialists on 'Trends in crime and criminal justice statistics and other quantitative data on crime and the criminal justice system'. This group of experts developed a draft of a Model European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (Council of Europe, 1995), in which the standard definitions are elaborated and complemented for several European countries on a number of dimensions, and national computation rules are compared and summarized in a synoptic table (p. 190). Because of this, the European Sourcebook represents a considerable advancement over Interpol and United Nations data; for my discussion of Europe (in particular when referring to police statistics), I will rely primarily on this data source.

International crime surveys (ICS)

Since official crime statistics are beset with many problems, victimization surveys have more recently been introduced as an alternative way of measuring crime. For instance, since 1973 the US has been conducting the National Criminal Victimization Survey, a survey which samples 43,000 US households involving 100,000 persons aged 12 and older, and it reports on attempted as well as completed crimes. Selected European countries (e.g., the Netherlands, Britain, Ireland, and Switzerland) have also conducted national victimization surveys. However, these national victimization surveys are not suitable for international comparative purposes, because of differences in methodology, the wording of questions, or sampling.

In an ambitious attempt to overcome these problems, in 1988 the International Crime Survey (ICS) was initiated by a small group of international scholars (Van Dijk et al., 1990). Subsequently, the 1992 ICS expanded upon the efforts of the 1988 ICS (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 1993). Alvazzi del Frate and colleagues, in their 1993 publication Understanding Crime combine the findings of both surveys, reporting the results from 20 countries.

The utility of these international data sources for comparative purposes has been analyzed by Bennett and Lynch (1990) and others. These analyses support their usefulness for trend analyses (see also O'Brien, 1985), but seriously question the legitimacy of employing these measures to establish absolute levels of criminality.

The European Sourcebook has information on a limited number of European countries: England and Wales, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Scotland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Hungary.

Eight countries participated in both sweeps (Australia, Belgium, Canada, England/Wales, Finland, the Netherlands, the US and Japan); seven participated only in 1989 (West Germany, France, Northern Ireland, Norway, Scotland, Spain and Switzerland) and another five countries only in 1992 (Italy, New Zealand, Swede, Czechoslovakia – now the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic) and Poland (Beirne and Perry, 1994). Currently, the ICS is underway for a large number of countries. (Zveckic, 1995; Mayhew, 1994).
The ICS has met with mixed reviews. Critics have challenged the relatively small sample size in each nation, the wording of the survey, the comprehensiveness of the questions, differences in the administration (face-to-face versus phone), and the variable response rates, and it has been argued that 'the reliability of victimization surveys as a source of data on cross-national crime trends has not yet been established' (Beirne and Perry, 1994, p. 156). Other reviewers (e.g., Lynch, 1994) have been more appreciative of the potential of the ICS contribution recognizing it as being one more piece helping to solve the puzzle of international crime measurement. I shall use NCS data reported in Understanding Crime as one of the sources in answering the question on the 'exceptional' nature of criminality in the US.

Organization of the article

The European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (European Council, 1995, p. 2) categorizes comparative analyses of cross-national crime data into: distribution comparisons (aimed at answering questions such as: do theft offences dominate the crime picture in different countries?, level comparisons (which country reports the highest frequency of robbery?) and trend comparisons (e.g., have crimes reported to the police increased over the last decade?). In order to address the central question of this article (i.e., is the US more crime-ridden than Europe?), I make several distribution, level, and trend comparisons in this essay.

I first describe very briefly global, longer-term developments in crime trends in the US and Europe. Thereafter follows an overview of relatively recent (1988/1991) crime distribution figures and crime levels in the US and selected European nations,(based on comparative police data and the International Criminal Victimization Survey of 1993). The next section of the article gives a more in-depth discussion of major developments in US criminality, followed by a report on the most recent trends in criminality on both sides of the Atlantic. The major emphasis is on comparisons between Western Europe and the US; because of an absence of reliable comparative crime data, recent developments in criminality in Eastern and Central Europe are only touched on briefly. The final section summarizes the main conclusions about developments in criminality on both continents.

Global trends in European and American crime rates

There is no doubt that the US today has a higher degree of lethal violence than comparable industrialized nations. A popular view is that America has a long tradition of violence and crime, more so than Europe. Proponents of this view
refer to the more or less organized violence that has marked US history: massacres of Native Americans, election riots, and labour-management battles, lynchings, vigilante justice, and the frontier tradition. Although European countries, too, have had many examples of bloody conflict, it is often argued that those in the United States have generally involved more violence (Livingston, 1992, p. 81). Is a high degree of violence indeed a 'normal' condition for the US or is lethal violence a problem of relatively recent origin? Or, more specifically, to what degree do long-term developments in criminality show comparable trends in Europe and the USA? Historical analysis of criminality is hampered by a lack of reliable data as well as problems of interpretation and theoretical assumptions (Franke, 1994); a problem tremendously exacerbated when attempting an historical comparative analysis of crime.\(^5\)

It appears that historical analyses of America's experience with violent and property crime compared with what has happened in other Western societies in the more distant past, cast serious doubt on the notion that America's experience with crime are totally unique (cf. Gurr, 1979). The incidence of serious crime in both Europe and the US has 'traced an irregular downward trend' (Gurr, 1979, p. 296) for a long time, an observation often overshadowed by concern with the more recent increases in serious crime. Analysis of limited historical data available from US cities (Ferdinand, 1967; Lane, 1969; Monkkonen, 1981) indicates that – prior to World War I – the US had neither dramatically higher crime rates nor different patterns of crime commission; American crime at this time was 'not an international anomaly' (Shelley, 1992, p. 84). Shelley claims that American crime patterns have begun to diverge from those of other industrialized countries in the last forty years, when violent crime in the US has appeared to assume a larger share of total crime commission than in many other industrialized countries.

There is the danger that the current preoccupation with violent crime in the US obscures recognition of the continuing convergence between European and American criminality, even in post World War II developments. Eisner's (1995, p. 29) analysis of trends in police recorded crime between 1950 and 1992 of six European countries (England and Wales, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands) concludes that, 'despite some national differences (...) the data show a striking degree of similarity over time' (31); that is, a general increase from 1950 until the present. Eisner computed (unweighed) average annual crime rates across all six countries (presented in figure 1). The European data show a strong increase from about 1,600 crimes per 100,000 in the early 1950s to about 7,900 crimes per 100,00 in the early 1990s, corresponding

---

to a fivefold rise within 40 years and an average annual growth rate of about 4.1 percent. An analysis of mean growth rates over shorter periods shows that the increases were somewhat lower during the 1950s and the 1980s and higher in the 1960s and 1970s (p. 31). I expand Eisner's analysis by plotting total crime rates for the USA, starting in 1960. Figure 1 shows that the (index) crime rate for the US, generally speaking, followed the trend of the six European countries, albeit with a divergence in the early 1980s.

Table 1 shows the growth of average crime rates in six European countries and the US. In the six European countries and the US, the mean annual growth rate of crime was about 4% per year for the 1960-1990 period. On both sides of the Atlantic, criminality has been growing at an accelerated pace in the past four decades.

Admittedly, these very global comparisons do not reflect differences in developments in the violence/property crime ratio. However, Eisner (1995, p. 32) suggests that trends of violent crime (in his analysis of six European countries) did

6 I use index crime rates: homicide, aggravated assault, forcible rape, robbery, burglary, car theft, and larceny-theft, probably a more restricted 'total' crime category than Eisner's 'total' crime rate.
How exceptional is the United States?

Table 1: Growth of average crime rates in six European countries and the US; in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>period</th>
<th>mean annual growth rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1970</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1980</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1990</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1990</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes index crimes only.

Table adapted from Eisner, 1995, p. 31, and Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1990.

not differ much from the overall trend (reflected in figure 2). He notes some 'quite marked differences' (p. 32) between sub-categories of crime: in all European countries theft of and from vehicles, robberies and criminal damage have increased at a faster pace than total crime rates. Robbery, for example, has increased at least tenfold since the early 1950s in all the countries for which Eisner was able to find data. In contrast, 'sexual offences, assaults and simple thefts have increased at a lower than average rate' (p. 32). The global trends represented in figure 1 do not reflect national differences in rate and nature of development. For instance, Gurr (1979, pp. 362-263) points out that the patterns of crime escalation after the 1950s were different for the US and England, the Scandinavian countries, and the countries in the 'heartland' of Western Europe. For the Scandinavian countries, Gurr notes a somewhat slower increase (compared to the English speaking countries) in crimes against the person and more serious property crime; in countries like France and Germany crimes against persons did not begin to move up until the late 1960s (Gurr, 1979, p. 364). Franke's (1994) careful historical-sociological analysis of long term trends in violent crime in the Netherlands suggests that noticeable increases in violent crime did not occur until the 1970s and 1980s. And Switzerland has remained somewhat of an exception to the pattern of consistent increases in crime. I will return to a more detailed analysis of developments in (selected) European countries in the discussion of short-term (1987-1993) crime trends later in this article.

A 'snapshot' of US and European crime levels (1988/91)

Police statistics and victim surveys often provide seemingly conflicting pictures of crime levels and trends; this has been recognized since the results of the earliest victimization surveys were published (O’Brien, 1985; Binderman, 1991). By now most agree that police data and victim surveys simply measure different
Table 2: Violent and property offences recorded by the police (1990); US and selected European countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>violent offences</th>
<th>completed assaults</th>
<th>rape</th>
<th>robbery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>rate #</td>
<td>rate</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>23,438</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1,054,863</td>
<td>424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England/Wales</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>197,510</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>48,977</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany-West</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>197,793</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7,227</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,216</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>19,412</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>22,470</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Ireland</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3,346</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>46,472</td>
<td>911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>40,890</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3,376</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 For Europe includes euthanasia – except Italy – and infanticide – except Germany and Norway; excludes abortion.
2 For Europe excludes assault leading to death – except France, Germany, and Netherlands – and excludes threats, and sexual assaults – except England. For US includes aggravated assault, including attempts.
3 For Europe includes intra-marital intercourse – except Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland – and excludes sexual intercourse with a consenting minor – except Italy. For US includes sexual assaults and attempts to commit rape.

dimensions of ‘criminality’ and therefore, a certain degree of inconsistency is perfectly reasonable.

In his recent excellent critical analysis of criminality in a comparative perspective, Lynch (1994, p. 13) argues that both official police statistics and victim surveys ‘(...) can tell us something about the relative prevalence of crime across nations. Each also has its own set of distortions that can result in misleading comparisons across nations’. The key lies in the appropriate use of both data sources. Lynch (1994, p. 17) suggests that the (international) findings of police data and victim surveys may turn out to be consistent if we assume that the police statistics accurately characterize very serious violence (homicide, robbery, serious assault) and several classes of serious property crime (burglary with entry, car theft), and that the victim surveys better represent lesser violence and most larcenies, crimes not well reported to the police.

With this caveat in mind, I now turn to 1990 police data on criminality in selected European countries and the US (table 2) and 1988/91 ICS survey data
Table 2 (continuation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>property offences</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>all theft</td>
<td>car theft</td>
<td>burglary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>rate #</td>
<td>rate #</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>12,655,486</td>
<td>5,088</td>
<td>1,635,907</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England/Wales</td>
<td>3,334,400</td>
<td>6,595</td>
<td>494,209</td>
<td>977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2,216,312</td>
<td>3,928</td>
<td>433,497</td>
<td>768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany-West</td>
<td>2,692,246</td>
<td>4,225</td>
<td>106,973</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>231,445</td>
<td>2,231</td>
<td>7,144</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>74,208</td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>2,817</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1,605,324</td>
<td>2,778</td>
<td>313,400</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>825,080</td>
<td>5,531</td>
<td>49,810</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Ireland</td>
<td>43,386</td>
<td>2,729</td>
<td>7,042</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>178,791</td>
<td>4,215</td>
<td>26,593</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland</td>
<td>354,798</td>
<td>6,954</td>
<td>36,103</td>
<td>708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>8,581</td>
<td>85,258</td>
<td>996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>309,852</td>
<td>4,508</td>
<td>27,435</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 For Europe includes mugging – except Italy, excludes purse-snatching – except England, France, and Germany, and excludes extortion/blackmail – except Italy and Germany. For US includes attempts.
5 For Europe includes taking by an employee – except Germany and Italy – and theft of small value – except Hungary, Italy, Norway, and Switzerland. For US combines categories motor vehicle theft, burglary, and larceny-theft. Excludes forgery, fraud, embezzlement, and receiving stolen property.


Because of space limitations, Table 2 and figure 2 represent only selected offences. Figure 2 presents the percentage victimized for the US and Europe (a simple mean of the participating European countries), as well as the figures for the two European countries with, respectively the highest and lowest victimization percentages for each offence.

**Homicide**

Official homicide statistics are considered relatively reliable; yet, even for this offence, there is a considerable degree of international variation in legal definition and police recording practices. For example, since 1988 in the Netherlands cases of euthanasia have had to be reported to the police and are classified as intentional homicide, resulting in an apparent tremendous increase in homicide figures (Junger-Tas, 1995, p. 15). Also, Germany and Norway exclude infanticide. Fortunately, international homicide data are available from several
Figure 2: Percent victimizes once or more during the last 12 months, Europe and US (1988 and/or 1991)**

- Europe (mean)
- US

sources (World Health Organization, for example), sources which – although showing considerable variations in reported national homicide rates – consistently indicate that (among industrialized countries) the US ranks on top with regard to rates of intentional homicide. In 1990, the US homicide rate (per 100,000) was 9.4 (23,438 murders and non-negligent manslaughters). This rate is considerably higher than any of the 1990 rates reported for the European countries, where (with the exception of Northern Ireland with a rate of 5.2 in 1990) the rates are significantly lower (between 0.8 in Ireland and 2.4 in France). It is a well-established fact that rates of assault and murder with firearms are far higher in the US than in comparable nations (Mauer, 1994). Differentiating homicides into those committed with a firearm and those using other means substantially changes the position of the US relative to other countries. Lynch (1994, p. 25) excludes homicides caused by firearms, and finds that the British rate is 1.2 per hundred thousand and the US rate is 2.9 per hundred thousand, thus making people in the US only 2.4 times as likely to be victims of homicide as persons in England and Wales.
Robbery

In addition to being the leader with regard to homicide, the US also appears to have a high ranking for the violent property crime of robbery (Shelley, 1992). Police statistics on robbery suffer from problems of international comparability. In England, France and Germany, they include purse snatching (which in the US is classified as 'larceny-theft'). In the US 'robbery' is defined as 'the taking or attempting to take anything of value from a person by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear', including attempts. Thus, to claim for instance that the level of robbery in the US (257) was twice that of France (104) in 1990 conveys a false sense of exactness. We do know, however, that the rate of robberies with a gun in the US (about 40%) is considerably above that in Europe.

The differences between the US and other nations in terms of prevalence of violence are generally much less in the victim surveys than in police statistics (Lynch, 1994, p. 16). The mean robbery victimization rate for Europe (1.0%) was lower than the US (1.7%) (see figure 2); however, there were European countries with a higher rate than the US. The one-year NCS victimization rates for robbery were highest in Spain (2.9% in 1988) and Poland (1.9% in 1991), followed by the USA (a combined measure of 1.7% for 1988 and 1991). Rates in Italy (1.3% in 1991) were also relatively high. The ICS data are more consistent with police statistics when looking at robberies committed with a gun; on the average 10% were done with a gun; in Italy, 17% and in the US, 28% (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 1993).

Assaults

The US rate of 424 per 100,000 inhabitants (in 1990) for assault is based on reports of the generally more serious category of 'aggravated assault' (distinct from 'simple assault'). In the European statistics presented in table 2, assaults include also lesser forms of violence (e.g., only causing pain, slapping/punching: Germany, the Netherlands, Scotland, Sweden) – a possible explanation for the relatively high rates of these European countries (Germany 310, Netherlands 151, Sweden 475, and Scotland 911) - , as well as sexual assaults (England and Wales, Northern Ireland, Scotland). Significantly, in about a quarter of all aggravated assault cases in the US, a gun was used. Risk of assaults with a firearm is greater in the US (Lynch, 1994) than in Europe.

Simple assaults are 'assaults and attempted assaults where no weapon is used and which do not result in serious or aggravated injury to the victim'.
The ICS measures 'assault' in two different ways, the most serious form being 'assault with force' (i.e., the offender actually used force). The overall average risk in Europe was 1.3%, for the US it was 2.2% (see figure 2). However, within Europe, West Germany (1.9%) and the Netherlands (2.0%) reported levels close to the US. The lowest rates were in Italy (0.4%), Switzerland (0.7%), and Belgium (0.7%). (Actually, one-year risks higher than the US were reported in Australia – 2.8% –, New Zealand – 2.5% –, and Canada – 2.3%). It should be noted that the authors of Understanding Crime warn that 'ICS rates of assaultive behaviour are only a rough guide to national levels of interpersonal violence' (p. 24). The notion that the ICS primarily reflects less serious forms of interpersonal violence is supported by the observation that only about 10% of the assaults with force involved a weapon.

Rape

Questions about the validity of homicide, robbery, and assault statistics pale in comparison to concerns about rape and sexual assault data. Indeed, rape statistics are undeniably among the least reliable and most questionable crime data; this is true for official police data as well as for victim surveys. On a national level, there is considerable disagreement about the true extent of sexual assault; there is little reason to expect that these questions will disappear when making cross-national comparisons. Perhaps the relatively high US rate (41.2 per 100,000 in 1990) may be explained by the fact that attempted rape is included. Noteworthy in view of the ambiguous nature of this particular crime, is the relatively narrow range of variation among the European nations, with the exception of Sweden (16) and Italy (1.2).

The results from the ICS do not clarify this muddled international picture. The question on 'sexual assault' (rapes, attempted rapes, and indecent assaults) was answered affirmatively by 0.9% of the European respondents, lower than the US prevalence rate (1.5%). However, West Germany (1.7%), Czechoslovakia (2.4%) and Poland (2.0%) report higher victimization rates (as well as Australia – 1.9% – and Canada – 1.8%).

Car Theft

Police statistics on car theft are considered to be among the most reliable (insurance!). As Table 2 shows, the US rate (658) occupies a medium position among European countries: Sweden, Scotland, France, and England/Wales all have higher rates.

Results from the ICS are not inconsistent with this picture. The US figure of 2.3% is higher than the mean for Europe (1.2%), but it is still lower than Eng-
land (2.8%), Italy (2.7%), and France (2.4%). (Both Australia and New Zealand were higher than the US with 2.7%.) The ICS also shows a very low rate for Poland (0.6%), and Czechoslovakia (0.7%), which is in line with police data for Hungary (a low rate of 68 per 100,000), not surprising for countries with a relatively low level of car ownership.

**Burglary**

With regard to burglary, the US official police figures again reflect a medium position (1,236 per 100,000), lower than England/Wales (1,991), West Germany (1,596), the Netherlands (3,280), Scotland (1,994) and Sweden (1,800) (see table 2). The victim survey data (figure 2) on ‘burglary with entry’ show that the mean European rate (1.9%) is lower than the US rate (3.5%); however, England (2.5%), France (2.4%), Italy (2.4%), and the Netherlands (2.2%) score relatively close to the US; Czechoslovakia (4.3) scores even higher. Comparatively low rates are found in more rural countries such as Switzerland (1.0%), Norway (0.8%), Finland (0.6%), and Northern Ireland (1.1%) (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 1993). Interestingly, burglary rates in Australia (4.0%), and New Zealand (4.3%) are also higher than the US rates; Canada is close with 3.2%.

**Other theft**

The ICS also measured the prevalence of ‘other personal theft’ and ‘pickpocketing’. The national rates for ‘other personal theft’ (not included in figure 2) are difficult to interpret because of their heterogeneous composition (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 1993, p. 20). Rates were highest in the two participating East European countries, Poland (7.9%) and Czechoslovakia (6.7%). Other countries with high rates were Australia (5.7%), Canada (5.5%), New Zealand (5.3%), Spain (5.0%) and the US (4.9%). [Average for Europe is 4.2%].

With regard to ‘pickpocketing’, the European mean of 2.1% is above the US (1.2%) (see figure 2). Pickpocketing was most common in Poland (6.4%), Czechoslovakia (3.4%), Spain (3.3%), Italy (2.2%), France (2.1%) and the Netherlands (2.0%). As Alvazzi del Frate and colleagues conclude: ‘By and large, pickpocketing seems more common in Europe, though with variation within European countries’ (1993, p. 21).

**Focus on American crime trends**

Since 1933, the FBI has collected national statistics on crimes recorded by the police and – since 1973 – there has been an ongoing survey of victimization: the
Table 3: US Index crimes recorded by police, 1960-1994 (per 100,000 population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Violent Crime Rate</th>
<th>Violent Crime %-change</th>
<th>Property Crime Rate</th>
<th>Property Crime %-change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>161</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2,249</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3,621</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4,811</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5,353</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>4,650</td>
<td>-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5,088</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,903</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>4,737</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>4,658</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and robbery.
2 Includes larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and burglary.
3 Note that the %-change values between 1960 and 1990 are for 5-year intervals; thereafter, the changes are calculated for 1-year intervals. All percentage values are rounded.

Source: FBI. Uniform Crime Reports, various years.

National Criminal Victimization Survey (NCVS). As is true in other countries (i.e., the Netherlands, Great Britain and Sweden, see Junger-Tas, 1995), the crime patterns revealed by US police statistics and US victim surveys are not a perfect match.

FBI crime statistics

First, what do the FBI Uniform Crime Report statistics tell us about crime trends? Figure 3a reflects (1960-1994) trends in US rates of homicide, aggravated assault, rape, and robbery; figure 3b represents US rates (per 100,000) for burglary, car theft, and theft (1960-1994); table 3 presents percentage change in crime rates for violent crime (homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) and property crime (theft, car theft, and burglary) for selected time intervals between 1960 and 1994.8

American police statistics (not included in figures 3a and 3b) show that crime rates increased gradually after the 1930s until the 1960s, when they began to grow much faster. After 1960 the general pattern was an increase in rates (and volume) of index crimes until the early 1980s. The 1960-65 increase in violent

8 These numbers reflect changes in standardized (per 100,000) rates, rather than changes in total volume of offences.
How exceptional is the United States?

Figure 3a: Rates of violent crime per 100,000 populations, US, 1960-1994

- Murder
- Rape
- Robbery
- Assault

Figure 3b: Rates of property crime per 100,000 populations, US, 1960-1994

- Burglary
- Theft
- Motor vehicle theft
crimes was 24%, whereas the increase in property crimes was 30%. The trends continued from 1965 to 1980. However, between 1980 and 1984, both the absolute numbers of index crimes and the rates for these offences began to decline. For example, violent crime rates decreased by 7% between 1980 and 1985, property crime rates fell by 13% in the same period. Both violent and property crimes began to increase again in 1985, the violent crime rate at an accelerated pace (from 557 per 100,000 in 1985 to 723 per 100,000 in 1990, an increase of 31%). Even so, the total index crime rate in 1989 (5,741) was lower than it had been at the beginning of the decade (5,950) (cf. Gibbons, 1992).

Importantly, while the overall property crime rate remained fairly stable during the 1980s, more serious violent crimes have shown a significant increase in both number and rate, till quite recently. Starting in 1992, both the property and the violent crime indices have begun to decrease (see table 3).

Analysis of aggregate violent crime rates tell only part of the story; naturally, of most concern are trends in levels of homicide. Reiss and Roth (1993, p. 50) provide a succinct summary of US homicide trends in this century: From 1900 to the early 1930s, there was a substantial increase in homicide. The rate then fell for the next 30 years, reaching a low in the early 1960s. A rise in the 1960s and 1970s peaked in 1980 and was followed by a decline in the early 1980s and higher rates since 1985. The 1990 homicide rate (9.4 per 100,000) was slightly below that of the two previous peaks in the twentieth century (a mean of 9.5 in 1931-1934 and 10.4 in 1979-1981). It should be noted that, as the US population has grown over time, the annual number of homicides has grown to historically high levels even with slightly lower rates (Reiss and Roth, 1993, p. 83).

The most recent developments in serious US crime rates appear encouraging: The violent crime rate in 1994 (716 per 100,000) was 2% lower than the 1990 rate (732); the property crime rate for 1994 (4,658) was 8% lower than the 1990 rate (5,088). In nine US cities with a population of more than 1 million, the decrease in violent crimes was 8% in 1994; between 1994 and 1995, the number of homicides dropped by 25% in New York City (from 1,551 cases in 94 to 1,182 cases in 1995), 20% in Houston (Texas), 14% in Miami (Florida) and New Orleans (Louisiana), 12% in Chicago (from 930 in 1994 to 823 in 1995), and 10% in the nation's capital of Washington DC (from 399 to 360). In New York City, crime has been falling since 1989; in the last 2 years, crime has declined in all its 76 precincts – murder is down 39%, auto theft 35%, robberies have dropped by a third, burglaries by a quarter (Time, January 15, 1996, p. 54). Nationally, homicide rates fell 12% in the first six months of 1995, and serious crimes of all kinds dropped 1% to 2%.

Although it is too early to determine whether this rather dramatic decline in homicides (and serious crime in general) is a ‘blip’ or a ‘trend,’ speculations about possible explanations abound, ranging from a decline in the proportion
of young males in the general population, the levelling of crack cocaine use, a moderate unemployment rate, tougher sentencing, more police, or different policing methods (i.e., community policing). The fact that this decline has continued for 3 years may indicate that this is not a random occurrence, but rather a new trend (Aronowitz, 1995, p. 21). Still, these short-term fluctuations may mask longer-term developments (e.g., the ‘low’ 1994 rate of 716 is still 29% higher than the 1985 rate (557 per 100,000).

**National Criminal Victimization Survey (NCVS)**

What is the picture of American crime trends provided by victim survey data? Aside from the fact that the NCS does not provide information about homicide, there are a variety of other notable differences between the NCS figures and the UCR statistics. Figure 4 reflects victimization trends since 1975 for the percen-
tage of US households estimated to have been victimized by crime. With the exception of car theft (+14%), there is an overall pattern of decline since 1975. Rape, robbery, and assault declined together by 13%, personal theft without contact went down by 42% between 1975 and 1992, household burglary decreased by 45%, and the overall measure ('any NCVS crime') reflected a 29% decrease during this period. Victimization rates show a trend pattern of overall declining victimization since 1975 – a trend quite different from the police statistics (which have shown a decline only over the last 3 years). The NCVS violent crime rate in 1992 was lower than in the early 1980s. The percentage of households with a member who had been a victim of violence (other than homicide) in 1992, 5%, was the lowest recorded since 1975 when these estimates were first available.

**Increasing threat of violence in America's ghettos**

As is well-documented (Gurr, 1979; Reiss and Roth, 1993), violence – homicide in particular – has disproportionately affected the Afro-American population in the US. Non-white men and women have always been more likely to be murdered than white men and women in the US. In the 1950s and 1960s, the ratio of black to white homicide rates was as great as 11 to 1 (calculated by Gurr, 1989, from Holinger, 1987, cited by Reiss and Roth, 1993, p. 50); in 1989 the ratio was roughly 7 to 1. The persistently increasing involvement in violent crime, both as victim and offender, of the Afro-American population is reflected in both victimization surveys and police statistics. NCVS data suggest that for some segments of the population (in particular blacks and the young), crime has not been decreasing: in 1992 the violent crime rate for blacks was the highest since 1973 (BJS, Violent Crime, 1994, p. 1). According to the victim survey data, another disturbing trend has been that the victims of violent crime are becoming younger: the rate for those aged 12-15 was the highest ever in 1992; it was the highest ever for those aged 16-19 in 1991 (BJS, Violent Crime, p. 2) Analysis of trends in police statistics confirm the picture provided by the NCVS data about the expanding role of the young and racial minorities in the US crime picture. The levelling off (or even decline) of aggregate crime rates obscures the fact that the otherwise flat trend, when broken down by age and race, shows major distinctions (Blumstein, 1995, p. 2). Much of the general increase in the aggregate homicide rate in the late 1980s is attributable to the spurt in murder rates by young people that began in 1985. Blumstein points out that there has been 'some dramatic change in violent crime committed by young people' (Blumstein, 1995 p. 3).
After a period of relative stability in the rates of juvenile crime, there was a major turning point in about 1985. Then, as Blumstein documents, within the next seven years, the rate of homicides committed by young people, the number of homicides they committed with guns, and the arrest rate of non-white juveniles for drug offences all doubled. Beginning with the increased drug trafficking of the mid-1980s, there was a sudden upsurge in all three of these indicators (Blumstein, 1995, p. 3); there was, however, no shift in the number of no-gun homicides by juveniles (See also US Department of Justice, 1995).

Some additional comparisons of recent trends: Europe vs US

In a recent review of trends in violent crime among youth in Europe, Junger-Tas (1995) concludes that 'Since 1980 there has been an increase in recorded violence in all countries reviewed' (p. 24). She further notes a sizeable increase in assaults and in thefts with violence among juveniles; victimization studies show the increase in assaults and robberies to be considerably less than police data. In the following section, I expand on two of the sources employed by Junger-Tas (Essers et al., 1991; European Sourcebook, 1995), by adding US data. Figure 5 shows developments in recorded violent crime rates since 1980 in the US and 7 European countries (1980 = 100). Visual inspection of the figure suggests that (with the exception of Denmark) the violent crime rate in the US shows a more gradual increase (between 1980 and 1990) than the European countries (Germany is not included after 1988 because of the effect of unification). For example, in 1988 (as compared to 1980), the index for the USA was 107 (compared to 162 for the Netherlands, 165 for England, 105 for West Germany, 136 for Denmark, 147 for Sweden, and 176 for Norway). It should be noted, however, that figure 5 simply reflects changes in rates, taking the 1980 rate as the starting point (1980=100); figure 5 does not contain any information about national differences in the magnitude of these rates. For example, the absolute level of serious violence in the US measured by police statistics in 1980 was higher than in the European countries.

The European Sourcebook provides police data for the period 1987-1993 for a selected number of countries, for completed homicide, robbery, and rape. Table 4 presents the data for completed homicide (1990=100). The fact that these figures reflect volume (not standardized rates) limits the usefulness of this information; changes in volume may simply reflect changes in population growth. Even so (and considering that the US is a major immigration country), the actual volume of completed homicides in the US in 1993 has increased only by 5% since 1990, which is less than the increase in volume in Hungary (148), the Netherlands (132 – but note inclusion of euthanasia), Northern Ireland (129), Scotland (140), or Sweden (143). With regard to robbery (table not in-
Adapted from Essers et al., 1991, US data from FBI's Uniform Crime Reports including homicide, aggravated, rape and robbery.

cluded), the US actually shows a decline in the volume of recorded robberies (index of 98 in 1993); with the exception of Italy (1993 index of 86, i.e. a decline in volume by 14% compared to 1990), the other European countries for which data are provided vary between a low of 100 in 1993 (Sweden) to a high of 160 (in 1993) for England and Wales. We may speculate that – although the overall levels of lethal and serious violent crime remain considerably higher in the US – violent crime in Europe is now increasing at a somewhat faster (or at least comparable) rate than the US (albeit that the European countries start from a much lower base rate).

This conclusion finds some tentative support from the ICS data. The ICS was carried out twice in eight countries and so potentially allows an assessment of crime trends between 1988 and 1991. Prevalence rates in 1988 and 1991 (i.e.,
Table 4: Number of completed homicides recorded by the police, 1987-1993; selected European countries and the US (1990=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>88</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>101</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>England &amp; Wales</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>139</td>
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<td>115</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>82</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>135</td>
<td>129</td>
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<td>Scotland</td>
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<td>161</td>
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<td>129</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Since 1991, data for the new Federal States are included. Therefore, they cannot be compared with the figures of the previous years. Data for 1991 are incomplete and not comparable with the data for 1992.

Source: European Sourcebook, 1995, p. 183; US data from FBI Uniform Crime Reports, various years.

the percentage of respondents who reported a victimization of some sort or other over the year) have generally increased, in particular in England (56% increase), the Netherlands (17% increase), Belgium (9% increase), and Finland (26% increase). On the other hand, according to the ICS, victimization risk decreased in the USA (by 13%) (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 1993, p. 28). The more recent IVS results (Zvekic, 1995) make only global comparisons between aggregate victimization rates for selected crimes between developing countries, Eastern–Central countries, and industrialized countries, thus not allowing a more specific comparison between the US and Europe.

What about Central and Eastern Europe?

Statistical information from formerly socialist countries is extremely difficult to evaluate. Socialist countries are particularly vulnerable to 'politicized justice' (Fairchild, 1993). Socialist political ideology influences not only the administration of justice, but also crime definitions, types and patterns of criminal behaviour, and the type and quality of crime-related data available (Shelley, 1981). Historically, these nations have kept their crime data secret, or deliberately misrepresented the facts. Because of this, crime trend comparisons between Europe and the US get even more complicated once Eastern and Central European countries are included. Furthermore, many countries that existed prior to 1990 (Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia) have disappeared, to be replaced by several new states or have been absorbed into existing ones (Kangaspunta, 1995a, p. 2). With the recent changes in the political situation, more crime data on Eastern and Central Europe have become available. The quality of these data is likely to be even more questionable than that for Western Europe and the US. The ICS (in the second sweep) included Poland and Czechoslovakia; in the third sweep, several additional Eastern and Central European countries are included (Zvekic, 1995). The second ICS indicated that Poland and Czechoslovakia showed higher levels of crime than reflected in police-recorded figures (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 1993, p. 47). Alvazzi and colleagues even speculated about the possibility of a post-communist 'crime boom' (p. 47). In a preliminary analysis of the results of the 1992-1994 sweep (including former Czechoslovakia, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and Estonia), the urban areas in the Eastern and Central European countries appear to exhibit a higher overall victimization level (burglary with entry, personal theft, robbery, and sexual incidents) than the urban areas in industrialized countries.

This trend is consistent with the conclusion from the Fourth United Nations Survey (Joutsen, 1995, p. 4): the amount of recorded crime increased dramatically in Central and Eastern European countries at the end of the 1980s. This was especially marked from 1989 to 1990 for such property offences as theft, burglary and robbery. More recent data available from some of the former constituent republics of the USSR show that the increase in recorded crime in these countries has continued at a dramatic rate since 1990 (Joutsen, 1995, p. 4).

Some conclusions

Aggregate statistics and global comparisons

Using (aggregate) crime statistics to draw conclusions about comparative crime experiences grossly oversimplifies reality. 'Crime' is more than aggregate crime statistics; crime as a social construct can only be fully understood in a particular historical and cultural context. In-depth studies are essential if one wants to fully grasp the nature of the 'crime problem' in a particular country, or if one wants to appreciate how countries converge or diverge in this area. International statistics – even in the best of circumstances⁹ – only tell part of the story.

⁹ Several international efforts are currently underway attempting to improve the quality of international crime data (Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch of the United Nations (Joutsen, 1995); Council of Europe (1995); International Self-Report Delinquency Project (Junger-Tas et al., 1994); ICS (Zvekic, 1995)).
Also, lumping countries together is bound to impose an artificial homogeneity on the world. To pretend that 'the' United States and 'Europe' (or 'Western Europe') are two internally homogeneous analytic units is a gross oversimplification, of course. Granted, there is a growing number of Europe-wide policy initiatives (including on crime control), reflecting a new sense of 'we-ness' among European nations, there is Schengenland, the frontier-free territory for the main EC countries (Heidensohn and Farrell, 1992, p. xiii). On the other hand, and much more so than is the case for the American states, European national boundaries continue to reflect sharp differences in language, culture, history, and politics.

In short, aggregate rates and global comparisons between continents do not quite cut the mustard when it comes to addressing the complex issue of criminality in the US vis-a-vis Europe. Only the most obvious and persistent differences are bound to surface (i.e., lethal violence). Yet, the limitations of the available data notwithstanding, it is clear that the popular notion of the US as the most crime-ridden industrialized nation is wrong. A more appropriate answer to the question: Has the US more criminality than Europe? is 'It depends, sometimes yes, sometimes no'. Differences between the US and other nations are crime-specific (cf. Lynch, 1994). Mauer (1994, p. 9) expresses it most succinctly: 'The assumption that crime rates are substantially higher in the U.S. than in other industrialized nations is not true for most offences'. The risk of lethally violent crime and armed robbery is much higher in the US than in other nations, there is little question about that. However, the picture with regard to minor violence is different. Lynch's analysis (1994) concludes that the risk of minor violence is not greater in the US than it is in other common law countries (such as England, but also Canada and Australia); however, this risk is greater than the risk of minor violence in less similar countries such as Germany or France (p. 21). In contrast, the US has lower rates of serious property crime (car theft and burglary with entry) than many European countries. Furthermore, the data suggest that the US is not a significant outlier with regard to the prevalence of minor property crime (e.g. pickpocketing). In sum, then, 'the US stands alone, (...) not in the prevalence of violence but in its lethality' (Lynch, 1994, p. 24).

The answer also depends on where you are in the US, or in Europe: the odds of having your pockets picked are greater when in Italy than in Switzerland or the US; the odds of your car being stolen are lower in the US than in England or Sweden. The likelihood of being murdered in New York or Chicago is greater than it is in Amsterdam; however, your odds of meeting an untimely violent death are higher in Amsterdam, Stockholm, or Paris than in, for example, the rural town of Nebraska City in the US. Large metropolitan centres and cities or small rural communities, the US agrarian midwest or the US urban east coast,
Paris or the French Riviera, Budapest or the south of Spain – common sense tells us that the likelihood of sexual assault or pickpocketing, robbery with a gun or residential burglary, bike theft or purse snatching, soccer hooliganism or urban rioting will vary among and between most of these places, frequently ignoring artificial national boundaries.

**How is US criminality ‘exceptional’?**

There is no question that the US appears ‘exceptional’ (i.e. different from Europe) in a number of aspects. First, violent crime in the US compared to Europe did grow at a faster pace after the 1960s; however, unlike the situation in several European countries (in particular Eastern and Central Europe), serious crime in the US has stabilized over the last few years. Second, the (serious) violence/theft ratio in the US is higher (around 12%) than in (Western) Europe. Third, there are significantly more cases of gun-related violence (i.e., homicide, robbery, and serious assault) in the US than any European country; on the other hand, the US has lower car theft and burglary rates than several European countries.

**In what ways does criminality in the US converge with that in Europe?**

The focus on American exceptionalism with regard to gun-related violent crime too often overshadows major convergences and similarities in criminality shared by nations on both sides of the Atlantic. For instance, in both Europe and the US officially recorded crime accelerated rapidly after World War II, both for minor and serious crimes; in both the US and Europe, most of the increases occurred after the early 1970s. (This should be viewed within the historical perspective of a continuing trend to less violence in crime over time, in both Europe and the US.) In both continents, police data reflect sharper increases than victimization data (see Junger-Tas, 1995). In both Europe and the US, serious violent crime accounts for a relatively small proportion of all crime. For the bulk of offences, crime rates in the US are not substantially higher than in Europe. Burglary and car theft in the US are comparable (and sometimes higher, sometimes lower) to European countries; also the levels of minor violence and minor property theft are comparable. There are many other similarities in criminality across Europe and the US. For instance, drugs and drug control are playing an increasingly important role in

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10 A cross-national study of juvenile delinquency in twelve European countries and the US (Junger-Tas et al., 1994) found a considerable degree of cross-national similarity in patterns of juvenile misbehaviour.
both continents (reflected in higher incarceration rates for drug-related offenders, as well as a relaxation of procedural restraints on the investigative powers of criminal justice officials). The continuing increase in hate crimes is another disturbing problem in Europe as well as the US. Another area of convergence is that – in both Europe and the US – the concern with crime and fear of victimization has grown out of all proportion to the actual increases in criminality; fear which typically is most focused on traditional 'street crimes' and crimes allegedly committed by powerless minority groups. In the US, this focus is most concentrated on Afro-Americans, Hispanics, and to a lesser degree on illegal immigrants; in Europe, each nation has its own 'minority problem', based on either ethnic background, national origin, refugee status, or religion. Across Europe and in the US, increasing proportions of the prison population consist of 'minorities' and foreigners. The degree to which minorities are indeed more involved in crime remains a controversial issue in both the US and Europe.

European as well as American criminologists have noted problems with the interpretation of trends in violent crime. Much of the apparent rise in violent crime rates may reflect a higher sensitivity and lesser tolerance towards violence in every day social life, resulting in higher reporting and recording rates rather than a higher true incidence of assaults; (Tonry, 1995, p. 22; Franke, 1994; Eisner, 1995; Junger-Tas, 1995). However, analyses of aggregate police and victim statistics obscure the important fact that there has been a shift in the nature and the type of violence; once this is recognized, the different interpretations of recent violent crime statistics need no longer be viewed as incompatible (Franke, 1994, pp. 90-91). It has long been known that the risk of being a victim of serious street crime is not divided equally across all population groups; recently, the victimization gap between population groups has dramatically widened. This has been most extensively documented for the US, but comparable developments have been noted in European countries (e.g. Franke, 1994). Violence (in terms of offending and victimization) in the US and Europe is increasingly concentrated among socially dislocated young males – often 'minorities' – living in decaying urban areas; an urban underclass where violence is employed as one of the most efficient ways of dealing with the business of surviving. The possibility of ghettoization of major European cities (Wiles, 1994) – with its criminogenic effects – paralleling conditions in New York or Chicago with their embarrassing pockets of urban decay and racial

11 Tonry (1995, p. 22) argues that this can be seen to be true for assault by comparing the steadily growing rates for assault with the slightly declining rates for homicide. Given the greater availability of ever-more-lethal firearms, the proportion of assaults proving fatal (that is, the ratio of homicides to assaults) should be increasing. To the contrary, it has steadily fallen.
segregation – may potentially be one of the most disturbing developments on which Europe and the US converge.

Future developments

What does the future hold? If Europe continues to follow the lead of the US by continuing the gradual dismantlement of the welfare state, excluding growing segments of the population from full participation in society, Europe too may become a polarized society of winners versus losers. The absence of a reasonable social-safety-net does not necessarily result in violent crime, of course. Even the most confident criminologist has to admit that, to a large degree, the causes of crime remain elusive. But, there is one important crime-related factor on which Europe clearly differs from the US: guns. As long as Europe is able to prevent large scale easy availability of cheap handguns and powerful assault weapons in its city streets, it is unlikely that Europe's violent crime problem will reach the unacceptable high levels of American inner cities.

By focusing on traditional criminality (of the 'more-of-the-same' variety), I have ignored what may be the most significant trend in the nature and patterns of crime in post-modern society: i.e., the qualitative shift in the direction of transnational crime, international terrorism, and crime related to developments in cybernetics. Developments which will make such international comparisons between Europe and the US as made in this article obsolete.

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The effects of American drug policy on black Americans, 1980-1996

Michael Tonry

The most striking drug policy development in the United States in the mid-1990s is that increasingly vigorous and credible calls are being made for legalization or decriminalization of drug use. What is most surprising is that political conservatives have become outspoken proponents of change. Professor Milton Friedman, the Nobel Prize winning laissez-faire economist, is but one example. Early in 1996, the National Review, the most influential conservative political journal in the United States, devoted most of one issue to articles urging abandonment of prohibitionist drug policies. William F. Buckley, the journal's editor and for forty years one of America's most influential conservative intellectuals, joined the anti-prohibitionists.

Although no informed person believes that drug use will soon be legalized or decriminalized in the United States, the recently reinvigorated policy debate is important because of its premise. The premise is that the 'War on Drugs' has been lost and cannot be won. In order to demonstrate why that premise is true, this article provides an overview of American drug policies, and their effects, since 1980 with particular attention to changing patterns of drug use, police arrest policies, and imprisonment policies and trends. The last section examines the putative justifications for the war.

The conclusions to be offered are that drug use declined steadily after 1980, a pattern that began long before the federal drug war was declared in 1987, and for which the war can take no credit; that the war’s 'supply-side' emphasis on arrests of street-level drug dealers was a foreordained failure – drugs became no less available and prices declined; and that racial disparities among drug arrestees, convicted offenders, and prisoners steadily worsened.

Conceivably America's experience with its most recent drug war offers cautionary lessons to policymakers in European countries. Drug use is a complex

1 Sonosky Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Minnesota, 285 Law Center, 229-19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55455; this article draws heavily on Michael Tonry's Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America (1995), published by Oxford University Press.
phenomenon which provides psychopharmacological, psychological, and social satisfactions to users. Broadbased drug use patterns change slowly in response to underlying secular changes in social and economic conditions and social norms. America's prohibitionistic drug policies, however, were officially premised on the ideas that drug use is immoral and that sufficiently aggressive law enforcement methods would make drugs harder to get and through deterrence would diminish both drug use and drug trafficking. As a strategy, assuming that the state has a legitimate interest in limiting drug use, the American experience shows the weakness of drug control approaches that are highly moralistic and that subordinate harm reduction policies and investment in treatment and prevention programs to law enforcement methods.

The American experience also shows that the politicization of drug and crime policies into subjects of ideological and partisan politics drives rationality and balance from the policymaking process and makes it difficult to change policy directions. As it became clear throughout the 1980s that prohibitionistic approaches were not reducing drug prices, and hence were not making drugs more difficult to obtain, in a less politicized environment one option would have been to reconsider the established policies and perhaps to give greater emphasis to harm reduction and treatment approaches. Instead, the response was repeatedly to increase the intensity of law enforcement efforts and the severity of authorized, often mandated, prison sentences.

One conclusion about the effects of the American drug war that deserves special concern, particularly by policymakers in European countries in which ethnic and racial diversity is increasing, is that recent drug policies had disproportionate impact on black Americans. In 1995, one in three black men aged 20 to 29 was in jail or prison, or on probation or parole (Mauer and Huling, 1996). Although it is well-known that American incarceration rates, expressed as the number of county, state, and federal prisoners per 100,000 population, are the developed world's highest (nearly 575 per 100,000 in 1995), it is less well-known that there are enormous differences between black and white incarceration rates. According to the US Bureau of Justice Statistics (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1995), counting only state and federal prisoners serving sentences of one year or longer, there were 2,316 black inmates per 100,000 blacks and 291 white inmates per 100,000 whites. Thus the chance that a black American was in prison in 1994 was eight times higher (2,316/291) than the chance for a white. Recent drug control policies, especially law enforcement strategies emphasizing arrests of street-level drug dealers and sentencing strategies emphasizing lengthy and mandatory minimum prison sentences, are the principal reason for the worsening racial disparities.

These are startling racial disparities for a country in which race relations have been a paramount public policy issue for a half century. The article will show
that the disparities have been made much worse by the law enforcement and sentencing policies associated with the War on Drugs. Even were the war being won, its effects on black Americans would be hard to justify. It has been many years, however, since law enforcement officials believed the war could be won. I return to this subject in the conclusion.

Before the empirical evidence is discussed, the politics of American drug policy, in the present and in the past, merit discussion, for unless the politics are understood, little else will make sense. The first section provides an introduction to the history and politics of American drug policy.

The history and politics of illicit drugs

American drug policy must be seen in light of the contemporary political salience of drug control policy and the history of earlier prohibitionist periods in American history. Drug use, like crime, immigration, and welfare, has become entangled in the political symbolism of recent conservative politics, which means that debates about the goals or effectiveness of current policies are as much about normative as about empirical issues. The history of American drug policy instructs that, ironically, public and political attitudes toward drug use become most punitive and moralistic at times, like the present, when drug use is declining.

The history of drug control

The next section demonstrates – and it is not a controversial assertion – that drug use has been declining since the late 1970s. Under those circumstances, the well-known history of American drug policy should have made government officials especially hesitant to launch a war, for two reasons. First, excessively harsh laws and policies are often adopted when drug use is declining and considered by a large portion of the public to be immoral. Second, members of disadvantaged minority groups with different cultural attitudes towards drugs are often made scapegoats.

Well-documented historical experience instructs that policymakers overreact in formulating and executing anti-drug policies at times when social mores are becoming less accepting of drug use and use is falling. David Musto (1973; 1987), the leading historian of American drug policies, notes that ‘in the decline phase of drug use (...) we tend to have an overkill, that is to say people become so righteous and so zealous that we can have excesses in the name of fighting drugs. There is very little opposition to draconian policies because no one wants to stand up for using drugs’.

Musto has described a cyclical pattern of American tolerance and intolerance of alcohol and drugs. At least three times since the beginning of the nineteenth
century, the United States has moved from periods of widespread, tolerated, even approved recreational use of alcohol and drugs to puritanical periods of uncompromising prohibition. The first period of intolerance began in the 1820s and culminated in prohibition of alcohol in a dozen states by the 1850s. The temperance movement of the late nineteenth century led to national Prohibition; more generalized intolerance of drug use and users produced the first major federal narcotics legislation, the Harrison Act of 1914, and the first federal marihuana law, the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937. The contemporary period of intolerance began around 1970, when the Nixon administration declared its war on drugs.

Since then, public tolerance of drug use has fallen. Mandatory penalties for drug crimes have proliferated, and are now the harshest in the nation's history: mandatory prison terms of ten, twenty, and thirty years and life-without-possibility-of-parole now face many drug traffickers, especially in the federal system and often in cases in which tiny amounts are involved. In 1991, in *Harmelin v. Michigan*, 111 S. Ct. 2680, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of life sentences without possibility of parole for first-time drug trafficking convictions.

The important thing about Musto's work for purposes of this article is the idea of cycles and movements between them. According to Musto, live-and-let-live attitudes prevail in periods of tolerance, like the 1890s and 1960s. In the late nineteenth century, for example, cocaine and opium (and derivatives) were widely used in patent medicines, most addicts were conventional, law-abiding people, predominantly women, and cocaine was widely seen as a harmless recreational drug. The highest per capita use of opiates in American history occurred in the 1890s and the highest per capita use of cocaine in the first decade of the twentieth century. In the nineteen-sixties, marihuana was widely and openly used; it and many hallucinogens were seen by many as recreational drugs that were less harmful than alcohol.

During such periods of relative tolerance, traditional American notions of individualism and personal autonomy allow individuals to make their own choices about drug use, drug use is widely seen as only mildly deviant, or not deviant at all, and people feel able to argue on the merits for the benefits and pleasures of drug use, for individuals' moral rights to make their own choices, and against state intrusion on individuals' rights to make those choices. In periods of intolerance, drug use is widely seen as deviant and few people feel comfortable risking moral disapproval or stigmatization by arguing in favour of drug use or tolerance of drug users.

The most intrusive laws and the cruellest penalties tend to be enacted after intolerance has reached its peak and when drug use is falling. That is when self-righteousness is most uncompromising and voices in favour of tolerance are
most muted. People with reservations, particularly elected officials, are reluctant to speak out for fear of being disparaged as 'soft on drugs'. And that is where the danger lies.

Musto has described the dynamic that characterises a period of declining tolerance: 'Soon the trend reverses; drug use starts to decline faster and faster. Public opinion turns against drugs and their acceptability begins to evaporate. Gradually, drug use becomes associated, truthfully or not, with the lower ranks of society, and often with racial and ethnic groups that are feared or despised by the middle class. Drugs begin to be seen as deviant and dangerous and become a potent symbol of evil'.

In periods of high intolerance of drug use, minority group stereotypes have been associated with deviant drug use. Early in this century, even though mainstream women were the modal category of opiate users, Chinese opium smokers and opium dens were among the images conjured up by opponents of drug use and are part of the backdrop to the Harrison Act. In the teens and twenties it was blacks and cocaine. In the thirties, imagery of Mexicans and marihuana was prominent in the anti-marihuana movements that culminated in the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 and in many state laws prohibiting marihuana use. In the antidrug hysteria of the 1980s, crack cocaine, the emblematic drug of this war, is associated in public imagery with disadvantaged minority residents of the inner cities.

Given what we know about past periods of intolerance of drug use and their tendencies to scapegoat minority groups, and that disadvantaged urban blacks are the archetypal users of crack cocaine, and therefore the principal possessors, sellers, and low-level distributors, anyone who knew the history of American drug policy could have foreseen that this war on drugs would target and mostly engage young disadvantaged members of minority groups as the enemy. And it has.

The politics of drug control
The late twentieth century is an especially unfortunate time for a peak period of intolerance of drug use to have occurred, because it coincides and has become symbolically entangled with historic political changes. In the 1950s, both the Republican and Democratic Parties were politically heterogeneous organizations; in most parts of the country, Democrats were on average more politically liberal than Republicans but Democrats in the South were overwhelmingly dominant and were typically more conservative than Northern Republicans.

Most historical accounts of the transformation of American politics in the late twentieth century agree that Republican political strategists saw and seized an opportunity to lure Southern working-class whites from the Democrats by
appealing, sometimes directly but usually indirectly, to racial hostilities and resentments (Edsall and Edsall, 1991; Carter, 1995). For reasons both of past bias and current social and economic disadvantage, blacks are on average poorer than whites and more likely to be involved in crime (Tonry, 1995, chap. 2). Thus blacks are more likely than whites to be welfare recipients and to be arrested and prosecuted. A political strategy that focused on 'welfare cheats', 'street criminals', and affirmative action provided a way to appeal to whites' anti-black sentiments while seemingly addressing race-neutral issues.

Support for repressive crime control policies, with their foreseeable disproportionate impact on blacks, has been national Republican policy at least since the 1968 presidential campaign of Richard Nixon, part of what Thomas and Mary Edsall in their 1991 book *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics* call 'a conservative politics that had the effect of polarizing the electorate along racial lines'. The infamous Willie Horton ads run to support George Bush's presidential election campaign in 1988, ostensibly a critique of Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis's criminal justice policies, again quoting the Edsalls, 'tapped these concerns through a particularly threatening and dangerous archetype: of the black man as the rapist of a white woman'. In like vein, Harvard philosopher Cornel West in *Race Matters* (1993) observed that 'the Republican Party since 1968 has appealed to popular xenophobic images', playing the 'race card' to realign the electorate along racial lines.

So far as black Americans are concerned, the combination of the historically predictable intolerance of drug users, and harshness toward them, during prohibitionist periods, coupled with Republicans' use of crime control, including drug control, as emotionally powerful symbolic issues, has been disastrous. Drug control policies have been aimed principally at winning political support from white voters, and not at suppressing drug use. When therefore critics and many public officials have urged alterations in drug policies, because they have not effectively suppressed drug use, they have missed the point.

**Drug use patterns**

The United States government has been conducting large scale surveys of self-reported drug use, using representative samples of high school students, college students, and US households, since the early 1970s. Two stable long-term findings stand out: use of illicit (and licit) drugs has been declining since the late 1970s, and black Americans report lower levels of use of nearly all drugs than do white Americans.
Declining drug use
There was no need in the late 1980s for a War on Drugs. The ostensible goal of the drug war was to diminish drug abuse, and that goal, evidenced by a steady and continuing decline in drug use, had been achieved before the drug war began. By all available measures of drug use in the general population, use of the major illicit substances, except cocaine, began to decline in the early 1980s and use of cocaine declined from the mid-1980s onwards.
Because of the long-term decline in drug use, any comparison of levels of use in, say, 1985, before the war was launched, with levels of use in, say, 1989 and 1990, would appear to demonstrate that toughened drug laws and enforcement practices had deterred people from buying and using drugs, and accordingly that the war had succeeded. Year-to-year changes, however, are meaningless except in the context of known long-term trends.

Figures 1 to 4, all based on surveys of large representative samples of the US population conducted for or by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, show steady downward trends in use of dangerous substances over long periods for different age groups. All are based on surveys in which sample members are asked, in confidence, to answer questions about their use and frequency of use of different substances.

Figure 1 provides data for the period 1975-91 from a series of annual surveys of drug use by high school seniors. The samples are huge, ranging between 15,000 and 18,000 students per year. Figure 1 shows the percentages admitting to any use of marihuana, cocaine (any form), heroin, or alcohol during the preceding twelve months. For each substance, reported use declined. Reported heroin use was low at all times and fell throughout the period. The percentage reporting any marihuana use began at 40 percent in 1975, climbed to 51 percent in 1979, and fell continuously thereafter to 24 percent in 1991. For cocaine, the pattern is similar but with a later peak and a steeper drop. Fewer than 6 percent reported use in 1975, followed by a rise to 12 percent in 1979; reported levels of use fluctuated around 12 percent, reaching a 13 percent peak in 1985 after which there was a precipitate drop to three-and-a-half percent in 1991. Even alcohol follows the same pattern, rising to a modern high of reported use in 1979 and falling steadily thereafter to a level in 1991 below the starting point.

To show that the patterns in the high school surveys are real and believable, figures 2, 3, and 4 present data from the other major long-term surveys of Americans' drug use. Figure 2 shows trends in self-reported use within the preceding thirty days of marihuana, cocaine, alcohol, and cigarettes by full-time American college students one-to-four years beyond high school. Heroin is omitted because reported use levels are generally below one-tenth of one percent.

Because of self-selection, and economic and social background considerations that lead only some young people to college, the college survey represents a different, and less heterogeneous, population than the high school surveys. Nonetheless, the trends are the same as those for high school students. Marihuana and alcohol use declined steadily from the early 1980s onwards, cigarette use declined somewhat and the decline in cocaine use came later for college than for high school students, in 1986, but was steeper.
Figures 2 and 4, based on the National Household Surveys on Drug Abuse, summarize data on drug use among the American household population aged twelve and over and have been conducted periodically since 1972 for the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. The 1990 survey, the tenth conducted, included 9,259 interviews.

Figures 3 and 4 show percentages of survey respondents reporting use during the preceding year of marihuana and cocaine. Data are presented separately for respondents twelve to seventeen years old, those eighteen to twenty-five, and those over twenty-five. For the two younger age groups, the trends for both
Figure 3: Estimated prevalence of US marihuana use by age group within last 12 months, selected years, 1974-1990


Figure 4: Estimated prevalence of US cocaine use by age group within last 12 months, selected years, 1972-1990

substances resemble those from the high school and college-student surveys. Only among the oldest age group, those over twenty-five, are the patterns different. Most initiation of drug use occurs in the teenage years or the early twenties. People over twenty-five who report drug use are likely to be committed users and for both marihuana (figure 3) and cocaine (figure 4) the curves are essentially flat during the 1980s. For the younger groups, however, as in the high school and college surveys, marihuana use peaked in the late 1970s and fell sharply thereafter. For eighteen to twenty-five year-olds, cocaine use peaked around 1979 and declined thereafter.

Something was changing American attitudes toward drugs in the 1970s and early 1980s, long before the politics of crime control produced a state of war. The cigarette (figure 2) and alcohol (figures 1 and 2) trends are important because they signal a broadly based and widely shared change in American attitudes toward ingestion of dangerous or unhealthy substances that can have little to do with the deterrent effects of law enforcement strategies or criminal sanctions. Even coffee consumption fell by a fifth between 1970 and 1993, from 33.4 gallons per person to 26.0 (US Department of Commerce, 1995, table 227).

No doubt for a variety of reasons—a reaction to the hedonism of the 1970s, growing concern for personal health and fitness, a resurgence of social puritanism—Americans in the late seventies became less enamoured of drugs of most sorts, and less inclined to use them. Only cocaine followed a somewhat different trajectory, with use peaking later (but still before the declaration of war) and then declining more steeply. By September 1989 when the Office of National Drug Control Policy issued its first National Drug Control Strategy, it was well-known among public officials and drug policy scholars that drug use was in steep decline.

Drug use patterns by race

Although, as will be shown, blacks are far likelier than whites to be arrested and imprisoned for drug crimes, the national drug use surveys consistently show that proportionately fewer blacks than whites use drugs, as table 1 shows. Black Americans are less likely to have used drugs in their lives than whites for all major drugs of abuse except heroin. For alcohol, cocaine, and hallucinogens, blacks' self-reported drug use is also less than that for Hispanics. In 1990, for example, a year in which 41 percent of drug arrestees were black, NIDA's national household survey on drug abuse reported that only 10 percent of blacks reported that they had ever used cocaine (compared with 11.7 percent of whites and 11.5 percent of Hispanics), 1.7 percent reported ever using heroin (compared with 0.7 percent whites and 1.2 percent Hispanics), 31.7 percent reported ever using marihuana (34.2 percent whites, 29.6 percent Hispanics),
Table 1: US percentage of drug use by race, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>drug</th>
<th>white</th>
<th>black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>alcohol</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ever used</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>most recent use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within last year</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within last 30 days</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>marihuana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ever used</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>most recent use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within last year</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within last 30 days</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cocaine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ever used</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>most recent use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within last year</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within last 30 days</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hallucinogens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ever used</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heroine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ever used</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.0 percent reported ever using hallucinogens (8.7 percent whites, 5.2 percent Hispanics), and 76.6 percent reported ever using alcohol (85.2 percent whites, 78.6 percent Hispanics).

As table 1 also shows, whether the questions concerned drug use within the previous year or within the previous month, the comparative black, white, and Hispanic patterns were little changed. The only data in table 1 that show higher levels of black drug use are for marihuana and cocaine use in the last 30 days and the 'ever used' data on heroin. However, while in percentage terms blacks' reports of cocaine use in the preceding 30 days or heroin use ever are three times the white levels (1.7 to .7), in absolute terms these differences are insignificant. Fewer than two percent of blacks reported heroin or cocaine use within those time periods. Moreover, there were, after all, 213 million white Americans in 1991, compared with 30 million blacks. Seven-tenths of one percent of whites represents nearly 1,500,000 people while 1.7 percent of blacks represents only 500,000.
Drug Law enforcement strategies

Urban black Americans have borne the brunt of the War on Drugs. Cocaine and more recently crack have been the drugs primarily targeted and they, particularly crack, are notoriously used and distributed in the inner city. The political symbolism of cocaine has been high since the mid-1980s. Newspapers, television, and movies regularly portrayed trafficking in cocaine and crack as characteristic of inner-city minority neighbourhoods. Any mildly informed person in the late 1980s knew that the major fronts in the drug wars were located in minority neighbourhoods.

Institutional characteristics of urban police departments led to a tactical focus on disadvantaged minority neighbourhoods. For a variety of reasons it is easier to make arrests in socially disorganized neighbourhoods than in urban blue collar and urban or suburban white collar neighbourhoods. First, more of the routine activities of life, including retail drug-dealing, occur on the streets and alleys in poor neighbourhoods. In working-class and middle-class neighbourhoods, many activities including drug deals are likelier to occur in-doors. This makes it much easier to find dealers from whom to make an undercover buy in a disadvantaged urban neighbourhood than elsewhere.

Second, it is easier for undercover narcotics officers to penetrate networks of friends and acquaintances in poor urban minority neighbourhoods, than in more stable and closely knit working-class and middle-class neighbourhoods. The stranger buying drugs on the urban street corner or in an alley, or overcoming local suspicions by hanging around for a few days and then buying drugs, is commonplace. The substantial increases in the numbers of black and Hispanic police officers in recent decades make undercover narcotics work in such neighbourhoods easier. An undercover policeman of Irish or Polish descent in the 1960s was much less likely to be successful working undercover in a minority neighbourhood than is a black policeman today in New York City or an Hispanic policeman in Houston.

Both these differences between socially disorganized urban neighbourhoods and other neighbourhoods make extensive drug law enforcement operations in the inner city more likely and, by police standards, more successful. Because urban drug dealing is often visible, individual citizens, the media, and elected officials more often pressure police to take action against drugs than in other kinds of neighbourhoods. Although wholesale drug arrests are seldom strategically successful in reducing drug use or trafficking, they briefly disrupt the drug markets and win media and public approval.

There is another more powerful reason why the police focus their attention on the inner city. Both for individual officers and for departments, numbers of
arrests made have long been a measure of productivity and effectiveness. If it takes more work and longer to make a single drug arrest in a middle-class area than in a disadvantaged inner-city area, the trade-off may be between two arrests per month of an officer’s time in the first and ten arrests per month in the second. From the perspectives of the individual officer’s personnel record and the department’s year-to-year statistical comparisons, ten arrests count for more than two.

Experienced police officials and prosecutors confirm my analysis. Former Kansas City prosecutor Albert Riederer, for example, is one person who offered this analysis to me. The police chief in Charlottesville, Virginia, justifying police targeting of casual drug dealing in University of Virginia fraternities, observed that ‘local civil rights advocates had a good point when they argued that anti-drug efforts were directed mainly toward the poor and members of minorities’. Alfred Blumstein, in a 1993 article on drug policy, offers a similar analysis and, because of the absence of a literature, cites ‘personal communication with several individuals involved in drug-related police work’.

The police emphasis on disorganized minority neighbourhoods produces racial proportions in arrests that do not mirror racial proportions in drug use. Recall that levels of drug use among black Americans are generally lower than those of whites. Figure 5 shows the percentages of blacks and whites among drug arrestees reported in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports for the years 1976 to 1992. The black percentage climbed steadily throughout the period and by two-fifths – from 30 to 42 percent – between 1985 and 1989. Since the absolute number of arrests was also increasing, the number of arrests of blacks grew even faster. Between 1985 and 1989, the number of black arrests more than doubled, from 210,298 to 452,574; the number of white arrests grew only by 27 percent (Tonry, 1995, table 3-3).

The pattern of increasing black percentages is apparent in aggregate national data on arrests and in state data. Figure 6 shows national arrest rates per 100,000 population for whites and non-whites from 1965 to 1991. Non-white rates were higher than white rates, usually at least double, throughout that period. From the early seventies onwards, white drug arrest rates are basically stable, fluctuating around 300 per 100,000. After 1980, non-white rates rose steadily and then skyrocketed until by 1988 they were five times higher than white rates.

National drug arrest trends by race are mirrored in the states. Stephens Clarke (1992) reported that drug arrests of non-whites in that state climbed five times faster than white rates between 1984 and 1989. Non-white drug arrests increased from 5,021 in 1984 to 14,192 in 1989, a 183 percent increase. White drug arrests increased from 10,269 in 1984, twice the non-white number, to 14,007
in 1989, less than the black number – an increase of only 36 percent. Similar patterns exist in other states, as of course they must since the respective increases nationally in black and white arrests between 1985 and 1989 were 115 and 27 percent.
Figure 6: Arrest rates for drug offences, by race, 1965-1991

Source: A. Blumstein, 1993, figure 1.

Imprisonment trends by race

Two things stand out about American use of incarceration since 1980. First, the number of people in prison has more than tripled, rising from 328,695 at the end of 1980 to 1,104,000 at mid-year 1995. Second, the proportions of blacks among people sentenced to prisons and jails, and held there, have steadily increased. In 1994, blacks constituted 54 percent of state prison admissions (up from 42 percent in 1980), 52 percent of persons confined in state prisons (up from 44 percent in 1980), and 51 percent of jail inmates (up from 44 percent in 1980) (Tonry, 1994).
Figure 7: Prison admissions per 100,000 general population in North Carolina, by race, 1970-1990


Figure 8: Percentage of growth in prison commitments in Pennsylvania by race, sex and offense, 1980-1990

Drug-offence sentences are the single most important cause of the trebling in the prison population in the United States since 1980. In the federal prisons, for example, drug offenders constituted 22 percent of admissions in 1980, 39 percent in 1988, and 42 percent in 1990. In 1980, 25 percent (4,912) of federal prisoners were drug offenders; by 1991, 56 percent (30,754) were drug offenders, and by 1992, 58 percent. Drug-offence sentences are also the single most important cause of the increasing racial disparities. At every level of the criminal justice system, empirical analyses demonstrate that increasing black disproportions have resulted from the War on Drugs—in juvenile, county, state, and federal institutions. The title of a 1990 publication of the Department of Justice's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention captures the juvenile story: 'Growth in Minority Detentions Attributed to Drug Law Violators'. The experience in several state prison systems is illustrative. Figure 7 shows black and white admissions per 100,000 same-race population to North Carolina prisons from 1970 to 1990. White rates held steady during the entire period. Non-white rates doubled between 1980 and 1990 from a higher starting point, increasing most rapidly after 1987, the period when non-white drug arrests in North Carolina more than doubled.

Figure 8 shows prison commitments in Pennsylvania in 1980 and 1990 for drug and other offences by race and sex. Drug commitments of black males increased by 1613 percent during the decade; white males by 477 percent. The pattern for females was similar though the differences were less dramatic. In 1990, eleven percent of Pennsylvanians were black; 58 percent of state prisoners were black.

Figure 9 shows white and non-white drug commitments to Virginia prisons from 1983 to 1989. Sixty two percent of drug offenders committed in 1983 were white, 38 percent were non-white. By 1989, those percentages had more than reversed; 65 percent of drug commitments were non-white, 35 percent were white. Drug commitments have continued to rise since 1989; current data would show worse racial disproportion.

The role of drug policies in increasing racial disparities in American prisons is illustrated by table 2, which shows the racial and ethnic (black, white, Hispanic) make-up of state prison populations, by sex, in 1986 and 1991, and percentage increases between those dates. The numbers of black female and male prisoners increased by 828 percent and 429 percent, compared with increases of white female and male prisoners of 241 percent and 106 percent. The increases for Hispanics fell in between.

There can be little doubt that the War on Drugs resulted in disproportionate increases in arrests and imprisonment of black Americans. Conceivably those increased disparities could be justified if they could be shown to have resulted
in substantial reductions in drug use or substantial increases in Americans’ difficulty in obtaining drugs. Unfortunately, neither justification is available. As has been showed before, drug use began to decline long before the war was declared and, as the conclusion shows, there is little basis for believing the war succeeded in other ways.
Table 2: State prisoners incarcerated for drug offences by race, ethnicity and sex, 1986 and 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1986</th>
<th></th>
<th>1991</th>
<th></th>
<th>% increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>male</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>female</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>white*</td>
<td>12,868</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>26,452</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black*</td>
<td>13,974</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>73,932</td>
<td>6,193</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>8,484</td>
<td>664</td>
<td>35,965</td>
<td>2,843</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>35,930</td>
<td>2,370</td>
<td>137,672</td>
<td>12,633</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* non-Hispanic


Justifying the War on Drugs

There was no basis on which policy makers could have believed in good faith that the key strategies of the War on Drugs would be so successful as to justify the burdens they would impose on minority citizens. By trying principally to reduce the supply of drugs, rather than demand for them, by adopting a prohibitionist crime control approach, rather than a harm-reduction approach, policymakers chose strategies that had little prospect of succeeding but a high likelihood of worsening racial disproportions in the criminal justice system.

There is no reason to doubt that drug law enforcement has some modest dampening effect on drug use and trafficking, but there is no reason to believe that substantial increases or decreases in the scale of drug law enforcement would substantially increase or decrease drug use or trafficking.

Discussions of drug policy typically distinguish between supply reduction and demand reduction. Supply-reduction strategies aim to reduce the availability of drugs and, by reducing supplies and increasing risks, to increase their prices. The major supply-reduction approaches are source-country programs (crop eradication, financial support to other countries' drug law enforcement agencies, extraterritorial assignment of American military and law enforcement personnel), interdiction programs (border patrols, air and marine surveillance and apprehension of importers, baggage inspection at entry points), and law enforcement efforts at local, state, and federal levels to arrest and punish people involved in drug trafficking.

Demand-reduction strategies aim to persuade people not to use drugs and not to buy them. The major demand-reduction approaches are mass-media public education programs, drug-education programs in elementary and secondary
schools, drug-abuse treatment programs, and law enforcement efforts aimed at possession of drugs. In addition, supply-reduction efforts have collateral demand-reduction effects if their very existence shapes or reinforces social norms antithetical to drug use.

A second conventional distinction is between prohibitionist and harm-reduction strategies. Prohibitionist strategies forbid use or distribution of drugs and attempt to enforce those prohibitions by means of legal threats backed up by the criminal justice system. Principal reliance is placed on legal sanctions and, particularly in the United States, when the legal threats prove ineffective, the tendency has been to threaten harsher and yet again harsher penalties. The logic of prohibitionist approaches implies primary emphasis on supply-reduction strategies and on criminalization of use, possession, and distribution of proscribed substances. That is why drug law enforcement has been the principal cause of rapid prison population increases and why the US Congress and state legislatures in the 1980s repeatedly passed sentencing laws calling for mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes.

Harm-reduction strategies, by contrast, treat drug abuse as a social problem with undesirable effects for drug users and for society, and attempt to minimize their aggregate adverse effects. Adopting the public health perspective on health problems, that it is more important to alleviate suffering and loss of health, life, and property than to render moral judgements on individual behaviour, principal reliance is not placed on criminal processes and legal threats. Any imaginable Western country will simultaneously pursue elements of both prohibitionist and harm-reduction strategies, as the Dutch do and the United States does. The question is one of balance. In recent years, American policy has tilted heavily toward prohibition. This is exemplified by a long-standing 70/30 federal funding split between law enforcement programs and treatment and education programs (Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1989; 1990). Too many people in prison and too few people in treatment are among the results.

Every element of the supply-reduction approach has been shown to be ineffective. To quote conservative US Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1993), a sometime supporter of the drug wars, 'Interdiction and "drug busts" are probably necessary symbolic acts, but nothing more'. James Q. Wilson, for two decades America's leading conservative scholar of crime control policy and research, after surveying research and experience through 1990, concluded that 'significant reductions in drug abuse will come only from reducing demand for those drugs . . . the marginal product of further investment in supply reduction is likely to be small'. He reports 'that I know of no serious law-enforcement official who disagrees with this conclusion. Typically, police officials tell interviewers that they are fighting either a losing war or, at best, a holding action.'
Interdiction and source-country efforts have long been known by policy analysts and evaluators to be ineffective but, because they have had relatively little effect on racial trends in prosecution and incarceration, little about them is said here. The problem with interdiction efforts is that the boundaries of the United States are so long and so porous, and the volume of legitimate movement across borders so large, that it is impossible to intercept more than a small percentage of incoming drugs. A series of RAND Corporation analyses and evaluations commissioned by the Department of Defense so advised. In addition, the cost of imported drugs to US distributors accounts for less than 10 percent of their street price. A RAND analysis estimated that doubling the volume of intercepted drugs would increase street prices by only 10 percent (Reuter, 1988; Reuter et al., 1988).

Knowledge about the effectiveness of source-country programs is even less encouraging. With the notable exception of reductions in Turkish production of opium in the early 1970s that temporarily interrupted the flow of heroin into the United States, source country programs have been ineffective (Moore, 1990). Partly this is because suitable conditions for growing cocaine, opium, and marihuana exist in many countries, and production can shift from less to more hospitable places. Many of these places, in the Andes, in the 'Golden Triangle' of Thailand, Burma, and Laos, in the mountainous regions of Southwest Asia, are outside effective control of any government. Partly the ineffectiveness of source country programs results from the unavailability of alternate cash crops for peasant farmers and of the economic infrastructure for marketing them. Again quoting James Q. Wilson's 1990 summary, '... we should not expect much gain from even sharply increased (source-country efforts). It is a view shared by many top federal law-enforcement officials'.

Domestic law enforcement is the remaining supply-side strategy and the demonstrated success has been no greater. The ultimate measure of the effectiveness of drug-control efforts at reducing availability of drugs is their price. If drugs are getting scarcer, simple economic theory tells us they should become more costly. If the risks of arrest and incarceration associated with drug sales are increasing, simple economic theory tells us that those increased costs should be passed along and drugs should become more costly. To the contrary, since the early 1980s, prices of cocaine have fallen steadily and prices of heroin have alternated between stability and decline (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986; Moore, 1990; Walters, 1994).

There are at least two other places to look for evidence of positive effects of supply-side efforts. One is to look at the literature on the effects of efforts to achieve deterrence effects by increasing penalties. The most deliberate and publicized increase of drug penalties in this country occurred in the early 1970s in New York when the 'Rockefeller Drug Laws' mandated harsh prison terms for
traffickers and forbade plea bargaining that would avoid the mandataries. A massive multi-year evaluation concluded that implementation of the laws had no effect on drug trafficking, drug use, or drug-related health problems (Joint Committee on New York Drug Law Evaluation, 1978).

Another approach is to look at the effects of street sweeps in which police saturate an area in order to clean it. This tactic is highly popular with the public and with some drug policy scholars, but the best evidence is that sweeps move the drug markets around and, at least for a time, make drugs harder to find for some buyers, but that overall they have no effect on the volume of drug trafficking in a city or metropolitan area. Arrested dealers are quickly replaced by others willing to accept the risks in order to win the rewards (Reuter et al., 1990).

The harsh reality, ethnographic studies of the inner-city instruct, is that the potential economic rewards to disadvantaged inner-city young people from selling drugs, despite high risks of injury, death, and imprisonment, are so much greater than from any available legitimate occupations that willing replacements are waiting to take the places of those who die or go to prison (Fagan, 1993).

Scepticism about supply-side drug-control tactics does not mean that drugs should be legalized or that there are no social benefits from law-enforcement efforts. Drug law enforcement, for example, through its clear message that drug trafficking is illegal and wrong, may help reinforce social norms against drug use. For so long as private drug sales remain illegal, no one can disagree with enforcement targeted at wholesale distributors, manufacturers, importers, and organizations that perform those functions. Similarly, few would argue that it is inappropriate to try to stop the flow of drugs through airports, tollbooths, and seaports or that police should not make arrests in drug-ridden neighbourhoods to protect the right of residents to live in a safe and congenial environment.

Even source-country and extraterritorial interdiction programs may be justifiable, albeit largely for dramaturgical reasons.

Much less need be said about demand-side tactics because the evidence is so much more positive. A sizeable literature now documents the effectiveness of school-based drug education at reducing drug experimentation and use among young people. Recent work by Phyllis Ellickson and Robert Bell (1990) of RAND and Gilbert Botvin (1990) of Cornell Medical Center are the most prominent among many demonstrations of the effectiveness of drug abuse education. Another sizeable literature, recently summarized by Douglas Anglin and Yih-Ing Hser (1990) in Crime and Justice, and also by the General Accounting Office (1990) and the National Institute of Medicine (Gerstein and Jarwood, 1990), documents the capacity of drug-abuse treatment programs to reduce drug use and drug-related crime. The President's Commission on Model State
Drug Laws (1993), appointed by conservative Republican President George Bush following a congressional mandate, categorically concluded, 'Treatment works'. There is no credible literature that documents the effects of 'Just Say No!'-type mass-media campaigns on drug use but, given their ubiquity, it is not unreasonable to believe that such campaigns have reinforced changing social norms that have led to across-the-board falls in drug use in the United States since 1980.

The final article in a recent book on Dutch drug policy (Leuw and Marshall, 1994) asks and answers the question, 'Is Dutch policy an example to the world?' (Kaplan et al., 1994, p. 329). The parallel question might be asked about recent American drug policies. The answer would be that American experience should serve as a warning of how badly drug policies can go wrong when law enforcement efforts are not balanced with harm reduction efforts. Law enforcement has an important role to play in any country in which drug trafficking is illegal, but by itself it is too blunt an instrument. One irony in the American experience is that there is increasing evidence that public education programs can reduce the likelihood that young people will initiate drug use, and there is an emerging consensus among policy analysts and drug treatment specialists that drug treatment can reduce both drug use and crime commission among drug-using offenders. The moralism associated with the drug wars precluded sizable shifts of resources from ineffective law enforcement methods to effective treatment and education efforts. European countries that consider shifting their drug policies closer to the American model will ignore the American experience at their countries' and their countries' minority citizens' peril.

As this article is written in the Spring of 1996, little about the War on Drugs has changed. The national administration of Democratic President Bill Clinton lowered the visibility of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the 'Drug Czar's' base of operations, and reduced use of war rhetoric, but drug arrest rates after falling in 1990 soon regained the historically unprecedented high levels of the late 1980s (Blumstein, 1993). The harsh drug laws of the 1980s remain in place and new ones continue to be enacted. The percentage of black men between ages 20 and 29 who were in jail or prison, or on probation or parole, increased from 23 percent in 1990 (Mauer, 1990) to 32 percent in 1995 (Mauer, 1995); drug arrests and sentencing policies for drug crimes are the principal reason for the increase. The social and economic conditions, and life chances, of members of the black American underclass have steadily worsened since the early 1980s (Wilson, 1987; Hacker, 1992). No end to the damage disproportionately done by the politically-motivated War on Drugs to young disadvantaged black men is in sight.
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The general aim of this report is to bring up to date portions of the material published recently (Klein, 1995) on street gangs in the United States and Europe, much of which was current only through 1992. This will be done in two ways: by reporting on new material on European street gangs gathered since 1992, and by describing and applying new information on the structure of American street gangs. The emphasis throughout will be on street gangs, a term which, in this article, is used to indicate a group-accepted and acknowledged orientation toward anti-social or criminal activities. It includes some specially focused groups such as street-level drug sales groups but not organized, upper-level distribution systems and cartels. It includes some hate groups such as a number of skinheads, but not terrorist groups. It excludes prison gangs, motorcycle gangs, football hooligans, and the many youthful groups at school and elsewhere that may occasionally dabble in delinquent activities but do not orient themselves around these (see Klein, 1995, for a more complete discussion of street gang definitional issues).

Quite obviously, gangs in some form have existed in many eras and in many places, but when and where is essentially unknowable due to the absence of careful descriptions and acceptable or common definitions. The word ‘gang’ can be found in Chaucer and Shakespeare. It is forever associated in the public’s mind now with the romanticized and grossly inaccurate depictions in

1 University of Southern California, Social Science Research Institute, Allan Hancock Foundation B-51A, Los Angeles, California 90089-0375, USA.
2 The 1992 description of European street gangs was based on personal visits to and descriptions of a number of sites, along with material provided generously by many colleagues. The European update is based solely on written material collected at my request by many of these same colleagues: I have not been able to repeat my personal visits. Thus I am deeply indebted for their help to Alexis Aronowitz, Bojan Dekleva, David Farrington, Uberto Gatti, Boo Johannson, Hans-Jürgen Kerner, Joachim Kersten, Claudius Ohder, Nancy Pedersen, Walter Specht, Hans von Throtha, Lode Walgrave and Helmut Willems. In addition, I have been aided immeasurably by friendly volunteer translators of non-English material: Robbert Flick, Eli Heitz, Jovanka Nikolic, Dirk Vanderklein, Lode Walgrave and Dallas Willard.
'West Side Story' and Marlon Brando's 'The Wild Ones'. Europeans – lay, professional, and scholar alike – often deny the existence of street gangs in their countries because their groups do not resemble these stereotyped depictions of cohesive, leader-dominated, violent aggregations. Such denial is inappropriate because the image is journalistic, not scientific. American gangs are generally rather loosely organized, with ephemeral leadership and only sporadic violence in an otherwise humdrum, boring existence.

Many Americans, too – lay, professional, and scholar – accept a stereotype that seldom mirrors reality. I have had many interviews with gang observers throughout the US who offer reasoned depictions of their gangs and then add, 'but they're not like your typical Los Angeles-style gangs', not realizing that most of 'ours' are like most of theirs.

Fortunately, for the purposes of the updating report, I can avoid disputes about the gangs in ancient Greece or Palestine or Mongol China, and in a report on the US and Europe, I can avoid the complications of gang-like descriptions from more recent times in Africa and Asia. Readers seeking lists of nations with some form of gang experience can profitably refer to Clinard and Abbot (1973), Covey et al. (1992), Klein (1995) and Spergel (1995). The concern in this paper is with the most recent developments in Europe and the US only.

**Gangs in Europe in 1992**

I summarize briefly here what I learned while travelling to and from my temporary 1992 home at the National Center for Crime Prevention in Stockholm. For those who prefer that Scandinavia and Europe not be included under the same umbrella, I beg their indulgence. The combining of the two is a convenience for my own purposes.

My purpose at that time was to determine the degree to which American-style gangs might exist in Europe. This was prior to the data collection reported later in this paper on American street gang structures, so it would be more accurate to say that I was seeking any existence of the 'traditional' form of American gang structures, with large numbers of members separated into age-graded subgroups. I wanted to ascertain whether the American street gang, as I described it, was in fact a unique American phenomenon.

I should state at the onset that my 1992 exposures were not complete. All of Eastern Europe, with the exception of Russia, was omitted. Italy, France, and Portugal were omitted, as were Scotland, Ireland, and Norway. I was able to ascertain that street gangs seemed to be absent in Spain (in 1992 – prior years were different), Finland, Holland, and Slovenia (which did report networks of troublesome youth, but not gangs).
The trail I followed started in Sweden. Sarnecki's (1986) work in the mid-1980s, although initially labelled as gang research, really was about loose and rapidly changing networks of small-city youth who got into some trouble with the police. Their transitional status and level of delinquency involvement did not upon further study justify their being thought of as street gangs. Yet soon thereafter a form of street gang did evolve in Stockholm which was soon found elsewhere. Located in housing projects on the outskirts of the city, these groups were composed principally of second-generation immigrant youth, the progeny of guest workers and refugees. They were more ethnically mixed than American minority gangs, typically coming from such backgrounds as Morocco, Yugoslavia, Greece, Lebanon and Turkey. Also unlike most American gangs, they were not territorial or 'turf' conscious, and were not involved in intergang rivalries. But like American gangs they did have a strong sense of special group identity; they developed special symbols, dress, and argot; and they oriented themselves around a versatile pattern of criminal behaviour. Living on the edge of town, they typically gathered in the evening to ride the subway into the central city areas where their crimes were committed - smash-and-grab burglaries, robberies, 'rolling' of drunks or unwary tourists, drinking and loitering in selected spots. On one evening's tour with a Stockholm police officer, I found them gathered at the open market at Kungsgatan and in the underground area of Sergelstorg. When their night's predations were concluded, they returned to their homes by subway in a pattern seen later in Zurich, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart. An article on this pattern was later aptly subtitled by a journal editor, 'commuting to turf' (Klein and Gatz, 1993).

Three other cities – Zurich, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt – revealed very much the same pattern, although with some variation. In Zurich, there were also some centrally located groups preparing to become gangs; the police called them 'toys' for toy gangsters. In Frankfurt, the groups had learned to discard distinctive markings and names to avoid police detection, and flirted with drug distribution. In Stuttgart, football hooligans were more of a concern than the commuting gangs, since Stuttgart's reputation in the soccer world served as a magnet. Each city reported a different mix of foreign ethnicities in its gangs, although Eastern Europe, North Africa, and the Near East were generally prominent. But Chile, for instance, contributed to the mix in Zurich.3

With this pattern of suburban, ethnic street gangs established for several cities, I turned to England and found a very different picture. In London and Manchester, there were street gangs, and they were often composed of foreign-born

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3 At one point, I was alerted to a gang situation in Lucerne, but this turned out to be an ill-stated reference to some temporary political skirmishing. Still, it did justify a two-day excursion to that absolutely charming Swiss town.
members - Chinese, Pakistani, Indian, and Jamaican seemed the principal groups. However, unlike the groups across the Channel, these gangs were found in more central city areas, were ethnically more pure, and were often quite territorial. Most different of all, they were drug gangs. Their principal focus was on the sale of drugs. Their 'territories' were both residential and market-oriented. In function and form, including the use of violence in the furtherance of their business affairs, they more closely resembled the newly emergent drug gangs reported in a number of American cities, most particularly Detroit, Atlanta, and Washington, DC. But whereas these new American drug gangs were primarily involved with crack cocaine, the British groups revolved around hashish and heroin. The principal problem groups were reported to be the Jamaican gangs – 'Yardies', as they are called. There may have been other British cities involved – Liverpool and Nottingham were mentioned – but the heavy action was repeatedly attributed to London and Manchester. The latter city, with its rapidly deteriorating housing projects ('estates') in the Moss Side district, most closely resembled inner-city American areas that have traditionally spawned street gangs.

In all of the above – Sweden, Germany, England – the 1992 depiction was of a variety of street gangs which did not correspond well to the traditional American structure of age-graded cliques within a larger territorially-based agglomeration of youth. Elsewhere, however, such structures were clearly identified. These were in Berlin, Brussels, and a number of cities of the Volga region in Russia. The Berlin picture was particularly striking, and documented by police gang intelligence officers, refugee officials, and an active gang worker agency. Arising in protective reaction to right-wing extremist groups in the mid-1980s, second and third-generation immigrant youth had formed gangs in deteriorated inner city areas such as Kreuzberg, as well as Wedding and Tiergarten. They adopted such names as Black Panthers, Fighters, Bulldogs, Bomber Boys, Club 7, and Aderpower. In Kreuzberg, the 36ers were highly visible with their graffiti in typical American-style block letters, in English. The Berlin police gang intelligence officers provided some data on these groups, and when I sketched the structure of a traditional American turf gang for them, they exclaimed in unison, 'Yes, yes, that's it' with what seemed to me to be relief that finally someone had recognized what they were dealing with. The gang worker agency confirmed this picture, adding that the violence potential of some of these groups was such that the street workers, for their own safety, were instructed only to work with the younger, less threatening cliques.

The Berlin gangs were the first I encountered that clearly fit the best documented of the American gang structures. Soon thereafter, I was given a brief but similar depiction for Brussels; inner-city second and third-generation
immigrant youth had formed age-graded cliques, bound together by territorial identification, with the typical versatile crime patterns and intergang rivalries. Five such gangs were reported, along with several other, smaller groups focused on thefts from automobiles. I did not have occasion to visit Brussels, and a brief, tourists'-eye view in 1995 failed to locate outward signs of gang activity. Nonetheless, there is new confirmation of these gangs from a Belgian research team that is about to launch a major field study of them.

Finally, there is the case of Russia. As part of a criminal justice delegation that visited Moscow, Kiev, and St. Petersburg, I failed to turn up evidence of street gangs in those cities, although other forms of organized crime were alluded to with regularity. However, further east, a set of about a dozen cities have yielded reports of street gangs remarkably similar to those I was seeking. 'We borrow the worst from the West', commented an official of the National Procuracy.

Russian scholars differentiate between these street gangs and a far larger collection of 'Informal Youth Groups' (IYG). The street gangs, collectively referred to as the 'Kazan Phenomenon' because that city seems to be the most intensely involved, are - not surprisingly - composed principally of ethnic minorities. They are described as territorial, large, with age-graded subgroups, criminally oriented and versatile in crime pattern, having clear intergang rivalries, and patterns of cohesiveness that probably exceed those typically found in the US. Various of the Russian writers predict a worsening of their street gang situation as economic failures increase, ethnic nationalism rises, and effective social controls weaken further.

Street gang structures in the United States: new data

As part of an extended series of gang studies initiated in the 1990s (gang formation, gang resistance, gang member migration, gang proliferation), my colleagues and I undertook the first attempt to establish the national prevalence of different gang structures in the US. Several steps were involved. Interviews with police gang experts in 260 cities helped to establish structural dimensions that had meaning for the police and could help to distinguish between gang types. Such dimensions as age, ethnicity, subgrouping, membership size, criminal versatility, and territoriality were promising variables. Gang cohesiveness and leadership proved far less discriminating. These interviews also revealed that these police experts showed little consensus on terminology for types of gangs or levels of gang member involvement. They all revealed that the police often classify gangs according to presumed crime patterns, but seldom according to structural characteristics. To typologize street gangs from police-derived information could not fruitfully be pursued by direct question-
ing on 'types' of gang structures, but might be approached inductively by reference to structural dimensions from which types could be derived. Interviews with a stratified sample of 60 police gang experts confirmed the above conclusions and established six reliable dimensions along which these experts could describe the gangs best known to them. These six were sub-grouping, size, age range, duration (years in existence), territoriality, and criminal versatility. Ethnicity (black, Hispanic, Asian, white, mixed) proved to be less discriminating than we had expected. Possible crime specialization was omitted because it was not a structural dimension and because it was to be used later in our research program as a dependent variable tested empirically in relationship to the different structural types.

On the basis of the data from the sixty city police respondents, scenarios for five gang structures were derived and pre-tested with a small number of police gang experts whose knowledge we had come to respect over several years of contact. The five scenarios are reproduced below as taken from our final report. Other details can be found in Maxson and Klein, 1995.

Five gang types

The traditional gang
'Traditional' gangs have generally been in existence for twenty or more years – they keep regenerating themselves. They contain fairly clear subgroups, usually separated by age: OGs or Veteranos, Seniors, Juniors, Midgets and various other names are applied to these different age-based cliques. Sometimes the cliques are separated by neighbourhoods rather than age. More than other gangs, traditional gangs tend to have a wide age range, sometimes as wide as from nine or ten years of age into the thirties. These are usually very large gangs, numbering one hundred or even several hundred members. Almost always, they are territorial in the sense that they identify strongly with their turf, 'hood, or barrio, and claim it as theirs alone. In sum, this is a large, enduring territorial gang with a wide range and several internal cliques based on age or area.

The neotraditional gang
The 'neotraditional' gang resembles the traditional form, but has not been in existence as long – probably no more than ten years, and often less. It may be medium-size – say fifty to one hundred members – or also into the hundreds. It probably has developed subgroups or cliques based on age or area, but sometimes may not. The age range is usually smaller than in the classical traditional gangs. The neotraditional gang is also very territorial, claiming turf and defending it like the traditional gang. In sum, the neotraditional gang is a newer territorial gang that looks on its way to becoming traditional in time. Thus at this
Figure 1: Characteristics of five gang types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>traditional</th>
<th>neotraditional</th>
<th>compressed</th>
<th>collective</th>
<th>specialty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>duration</td>
<td>long-lasting</td>
<td>10 years or less</td>
<td>short history</td>
<td>10 to 15 years</td>
<td>under 10 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>size</td>
<td>large</td>
<td>medium to large</td>
<td>small</td>
<td>medium to large</td>
<td>small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subgroups</td>
<td>distinct subgroups</td>
<td>distinct subgroups</td>
<td>no subgroups</td>
<td>no subgroups</td>
<td>no subgroups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age range</td>
<td>wide</td>
<td>narrow</td>
<td>medium to wide</td>
<td>usually narrow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territory</td>
<td>strongly territorial</td>
<td>strongly territorial</td>
<td>territorial</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>narrow criminal focus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

point it is subgrouping, but may or may not have achieved the size and wide age range of the traditional gang. The subgrouping, territoriality, and size suggest that it is evolving into the traditional form.

The compressed gang
The 'compressed' gang is small – usually in the size range of up to fifty members – and has not formed subgroups. The age range is probably narrow – ten or fewer years between the younger and older members. The small size, absence of subgroups, and narrow age range may reflect the newness of the group, in existence less than ten years and maybe for only a few years. Some of these compressed gangs have become territorial, but many have not. In sum, compressed gangs have a relatively short history, short enough that by size, duration, subgrouping and territoriality, it is unclear whether they will grow and solidify into the more traditional forms, or simply remain as less complex groups.

The collective gang
The 'collective' gang looks like the compressed form, but bigger and with a wider age range – maybe ten or more years between younger and older members. Size can be under a hundred, but is probably larger. Surprisingly, given these numbers, it has not developed subgroups, and may or may not be a territorial gang. It probably has a ten to fifteen-year existence. In sum, the collective gang resembles a kind of shapeless mass of adolescent and young
adult members that has not developed the distinguishing characteristics of other gangs.

The specialty gang
Unlike these other gangs that engage in a wide variety of criminal offenses, crime in this type of group is narrowly focused on a few offences; the group comes to be characterized by the 'specialty'. The specialty gang tends to be small – usually fifty or fewer members – without any subgroups in most cases (there are exceptions). It probably has a history of less than ten years, but has developed well-defined territory. Its territory may be either residential or based on the opportunities for the particular form of crime in which it specializes. The age range of most specialty gangs is narrow, but in others is broad. In sum, the specialty gang is crime-focused in a narrow way. Its principal purpose is more criminal than social, and its smaller size and form of territoriality may be a reflection of this focused crime pattern.

These five scenarios were then sent to a random sample of 200 police experts in towns and cities known to experience street gang problems. This sample represents approximately 800 cities in the US which we have documented as being gang-involved (Klein, 1995). Respondents were asked a number of questions about their jurisdiction's gangs, particularly in relation to the five scenarios. From an 80 percent return, we note several findings.

- The five structural types encompassed the vast majority of the 2,860 gang involved in the responses, far exceeding our hopes.
- No additional structural types emerged.
- The most prevalent type was the compressed gang (39 percent), followed by the neotraditional form (24 percent). Since most research on American gangs has been carried out on the traditional form, which accounted for only 15 percent, a call for careful research on compressed gangs is obviously in order. This result also forces me to reconsider my 1992 approach to locating American-style gangs in Europe, as reported earlier.
- Some external validation of the five types was obtained in that they did differ, according to the 200 respondents, on such items as:
  - **Size**: traditional gangs averaged 182 members, specialty gangs averaged 24 members.
  - **Ethnicity**: traditional gangs, 57 percent Hispanic; collective, 47 percent black, while white and Asian predominated in no category.
  - **Arrest volume**: traditional gangs averaged 10.9 arrests per month, specialty averaged 5.7.
  - **Arrests per member**: specialty gangs averaged 0.29 per month, while traditional averaged 0.16 per month.
- **Duration:** 52 percent of cities with traditional gangs had gang onset prior to 1986, while only 22 percent of cities with specialty gangs did so.
- **City size:** collective gangs were located in cities over 100,000 in population in 52 percent of the cases, whereas other structures were found in these large cities in from 28 to 36 percent of the cases.
- **Predominance:** cities showing a preponderance of any one structure are most likely to report compressed gangs, least likely to report collective gangs. Traditional gangs are the predominant form in only 10 percent of cities showing predominance of any form.

The success of this inductive approach to deriving predominant street gang structures in the US clearly calls for independent validation by other researchers. It is also important to determine how these different structures relate to crime patterns, a process made difficult by the problems of police recording of gang crimes in most cities. Most other attempts at gang typologies have relied on ethnographic observations of gang activity; that is, they are really crime typologies, not structural. A structural typology, it seems to me, holds far more conceptual promise for its relationship to both group and contextual variables. Gangs are groups that are spawned by social contexts. Comparative research on street gangs needs an appreciation for the specific group and group member properties of gangs, and needs to be applicable and testable in a variety of contexts – different cities and different countries.

As a tentative first step in this direction, the next section reviews my 1992 observations in Europe by reference to the five gang types described earlier. I emphasize, however, the term tentative. My notes from 1992 were clearly not informed by the new structural findings.

**Five types of street gangs in Europe, 1992**

Some of the structural applications seem obvious. The Berlin, Russian, and perhaps Belgian gangs were of the traditional form – large, subgrouped, criminally versatile, territorial, with some strong intergang rivalries. While it is true that all were composed of ethnic minorities, this is true of almost all other types as well. It is not true of skinhead groups, if one wants to think of them as specialty gangs. From what I know of such groups in the US, Germany, and Stockholm, the only problem with that categorization would be territoriality. Berlin also included neotraditional gangs, not surprising since the onset of Moroccan and Turkish groups was in response to attacks by supremacist groups in the mid-eighties at the earliest. That leaves little time for the self-regenerating element typical of traditional gangs.

Also fairly clear is that the English gangs in London and Manchester best fit the specialty scenario. These are drug gangs, specifically, the most common of the
American specialty gangs as well (since the outbreak of crack cocaine in the mid-eighties).

Reviewing what I learned of the suburban, 'commuter' gangs of Stockholm, Zurich, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart, they strike me as non-territorial compressed gangs, the most common form found in the US, where their territoriality is also a non-defining dimension. Whether the location of many of these gangs in the outskirts of European cities yields an important difference from inner-city compressed gangs in the US is a question I cannot answer. One could hypothesize, for instance, that the inner-city location is more likely to lead to intergang rivalries due to physical proximity of gangs, and that in time the resulting increase in gang cohesiveness will lead these inner-city groups into longer duration and, therefore, into the more traditional form. Only time will tell, since the bulk of the compressed gangs in America are new formations, as they are in Europe.

In any case, even this tentative review of the 1992 situations suggests that traditional or neotraditional gangs, compressed gangs, and specialty gangs in the form of skinheads and drug gangs were in existence during my earlier observational period, and therefore the typology may indeed be reasonably applicable and useful. Certainly it applies a more differentiating palate to the European gang landscape and provides a framework for more careful comparative observations than I can supply from the other side of the ocean.

**European gangs beyond 1992**

In preparing this report, I have contacted about 20 colleagues throughout Europe. Most of these were unable to report any new gang developments since 1992. It is not clear in each case whether this is due to the absence of gangs, the absence of research on gangs, or my informants' lack of familiarity with new material. In any case, I cannot offer anything of value in response to inquiries about Slovenia, Italy, Switzerland, France or Spain. However, there is some new information from Belgium, England, Sweden, Holland, and Germany.

It must be stressed that the material on developments in these five countries between 1992 and 1996 should be viewed tentatively. For the most part, it is not based on solid empirical research, nor do I have any of my own personal observations upon which to rely. Rather, as the reader will see, the material is an amalgam of colleagues' views I have solicited, of newspaper articles, of magazine articles, and of professional publications only a very few of which directly speak to street gang issues.

Further, my occasional attempts to apply the five-structure category system to the gangs described below are admittedly speculative. The raw data required for accurate documentation have not been forthcoming. Nonetheless, specula-
tion seems worthwhile. At the very least, it allows us to consider the parallels between European and US street gangs. More hopefully, it provides the foundation for building a more adequate characterization of European gangs, both as similar to and distinct from their American counterparts. Of this much I am at least convinced, that during my period of attending to the European street gang situation, it has become more prevalent and, given the context of non-native immigrant and refugee populations, promises to increase in intensity as well.

**Belgium**

Belgian researcher Lode Walgrave has provided some information obtained from the gang unit first established by the Public Prosecutor in Brussels, in 1991. The very fact of the unit's existence would seem to confirm the official concern over the gang description offered earlier. By 1996, the few large gangs are reported by the unit to have evolved into a larger number of small, more mobile gangs. Fourteen such groups are noted, with 138 'hard core' members (and therefore an equal or larger number of fringe members) concentrated primarily in only two of the nineteen municipalities of the Brussels region. Given the prosecutorial source of the data and the absence of operationally clear definitions or structural characteristics, Walgrave suggests we be alert to bias in the depictions offered so far.

**England**

The best description here might simply be that gang activity is worsening. The famous killing of an innocent 14 year old boy in Manchester in 1992 has now been characterized as a 'hit' upon a known drug gang member, who dressed in gang style and had stashed away a substantial amount of secret funds. A following gang truce in the Moss Side area is said to have broken down in 1995 with 'ruthless gangs' now involved in a new spate of assaults in 'the Bronx' of Manchester. That same year, 1995, saw official acknowledgment of rival gangs in Liverpool. What was unclear was the basis of the rivalries — ethnic disputes, territorial claims, drug markets, and control of the criminal enterprises have all been suggested.

But it is in London that gang activity seems to be of greatest concern. In part, this seems to be fuelled by the increasing availability of crack cocaine. In 1993,

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4 Better Brussels data will become available within two years from the aforementioned research project being launched there. Some of the information from the gang unit is reported in Janssens and Janssen, 1996.
the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) catalogued at least 10 murders attributed to crack distribution, with still more likely but not confirmed due to reporting problems. In 1994, crack-selling gangs in the Mozart estate and territorial street gangs in the Four Corners estate drew substantial public and media attention. In 1995, the stabbing to death of a school headmaster drew widespread attention, and was soon attributed to that gentleman's intervention in a rivalry between street gangs modelling themselves after London's Chinese triads.

Finally, in the aftermath of a major violence outbreak in Manchester's Moss Side district, it was announced that the NCIS was giving serious consideration to a new gang crackdown. Initial reports were of a proposal to appoint a gang czar in charge of a 100 million pound, 1,000 staff antigang force at the national level. While this may represent a considerable over-reaction and quite possibly a wasteful bureaucratic response, it signals the increasing concern for England's status as a gang-involved nation. In almost all the reports from England, it should be added that whites are less often noted as gang members. Most are minority and/or immigrant groups clearly located in inner-city, deteriorating areas. The days of the Mods, Rockers, and Teddy Boys are long gone.

Sweden

Two Swedish research teams are engaged in studies that will provide some data on that country's gang situation. Jerzy Sarnecki has recently initiated a new study of 'youth networks' in Stockholm, but it will be some time before the data become available and the issue of network vs. gang can be clarified (c.f. Sarnecki, 1986). The Stockholm Project, directed by Per-Olof Wikström, has been gathering data on community characteristics and youth for several years now. Wikström reports that these include some gang data which have yet to be analyzed by his research team.

For the time being, then, we are limited to print media reports, but fortunately these are somewhat more informed and less sensational than is often the case in many countries. Three newspaper articles, all appearing in 1995, give evidence of a growing gang problem in Stockholm, with increased public attention to the problem compared to the 1992 situation. The first of these is a summary of a police report which maps out gang locations in the metropolitan area. Two patterns are reported; Swedish groups – usually described as skinheads – and immigrant groups.

Gang descriptions are minimal in this report. What is emphasized are the social conditions which spawn the immigrant gangs, and the recruitment of younger members to maintain their existence. The Swedish police, it seems, have now
discovered the 'inner city' problem, whether it is located downtown or in the suburban housing project areas. They have recognized that gangs can emerge from more innocent youth groupings, and that youth gangs can easily become seriously bothersome criminal gangs.

A second article carries the description further by reference to one group – the 'Skarholmen Gang' – which fits perfectly the immigrant commuter gang description of 1992, coming downtown to the Kunsgatan area for their evening diversions. To the extent that interviews with several gang members permit the placement on the gang dimensions, they strongly suggest classification of the Skarholmen Gang as a compressed gang.

A third article reveals the visibility of the gang situation. The skinhead groups have proliferated, with combined membership mounting into the several hundreds. If one considers their characteristics – small, criminally focused, each of a few year's duration, and territorial – then these fit generally with our scenario for specialty gangs.

The immigrant gangs, described as now occasionally including some Swedish members, have appeared in far more locations than before. Some of this is said to be movement due to police pressure, a fact made feasible by the non-territorial nature of compressed gangs which most of these are.

The reporting team from the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet surveyed the situation in all 25 political units (communes) within Stockholm county, using a base of almost 60 police districts. Although the article refers to criminal youth gangs, a number of the instances seem more to resemble small informal networks that only occasionally cause problems.

But in at least 20 districts, the description seems to merit the gang designation. In some of these, only one gang is listed while in others several distinct gangs are noted. They seem to be equally divided between the compressed and specialty (some skins, some not) categories. Significantly, there are now a number of reported gang rivalries and intergang fights, something not noted a few years ago. Given the importance of intergang rivalries to gang cohesiveness and perpetuation, it seems entirely feasible that Stockholm has now become a 'gang city' similar to many of the newly emergent gang cities in the US, and may well be on the road to developing traditional or neotraditional gangs as in Berlin, the Volga cities, and perhaps Brussels.

There are some generalizations that emerge from this comprehensive report from the Stockholm area. Most of the groups are young, with ages in the teens and early twenties. They are generally small, ranging in size from ten to forty members. Their violence level, despite the emerging rivalries, appears to be rather low with few lethal outcomes. Firearm use is rare, in a country where firearm proliferation has been held in check. It is a picture that suggests the
need for immediate attention to the etiology of gangs, not merely their control. Leaving the gang problem to the police alone could, as it has in many American settings, lead to solidification of street gangs.

Holland

Next to Sweden, I have spent more time in Holland than any other European country. Through 1992, I assiduously sought information on possible street gangs, especially since I viewed Amsterdam as a most likely location for their emergence. But try as I might, I could not confirm any gang formation, nor even get responses from researchers said to be in a position to speak to the issue. Holland seemed to be gang free.

Now, the picture is far more ambiguous. A rather amazing news report from The Hague in 1994 reports street gangs in existence for some years – fifteen groups according to the police, of small but highly active juveniles and young adults. They are described as criminally versatile with all the stylistic clothing, colours, and hand signs of Los Angeles gangs, and call themselves either Crips or Bloods in direct imitation of Los Angeles gangs. They are territorial, using the American designation of 'posses' or 'sets', with membership categories of Peewees, Baby Gangsters, and 'OGs' (Original Gangsters). If the description is at all accurate – it combines police, street worker, and news reporter sources – then this remarkable Americanized picture places street gangs, probably best categorized as compressed, clearly in the Dutch experience.

Academic research reports make the case less clear. Two articles by Van Gemert (1995a and b) use my own definition of gangs to discuss whether Moroccan groups in Amsterdam and Rotterdam can be considered to be gangs. He also refers to such groups in Utrecht. One of these groups, the Panthers in Amsterdam, is a self-defined gang with versatile crime patterns. Others are viewed sceptically, since Moroccan culture would yield groupings with cultural norms indigenous to that background but easily misperceived as gang-like from the outside. In Rotterdam, Van Gemert decides against the gang designation for similar groups, but in doing so seems to use a too stereotypical picture of American gangs to draw his conclusion. In contrast, he does apply the gang terminology to the Turkish group that was eventually broken up by police pressure.

Arie Kuijvenhoven, writing about Rotterdam in 1995 as well and employing the same Klein criteria, clearly places both Moroccan and Turk groups in the gang category. The groups are small, aged 15 to 25 years, non-territorial, criminally active and versatile. With a number of them adopting the Los Angeles Crips and Bloods terminology and imagery, they seem remarkably similar to the groups reported in The Hague: compressed street gangs.
Thus while street gangs may not be rampant in Holland, their presence whether over-stated or not is certainly more obvious than it was to this writer in 1992. Van Gemert's culturally-based cautions are well taken, but cannot easily be used to deny gang presence. It seems more appropriate, in the spirit of describing a potentially growing social problem, to add three or four Dutch cities to the two or three in England, one in Sweden, one in Belgium, one in Switzerland, three in Germany, and up to ten in Russia. Given the inadequacy of data from other countries, this list of twenty or more gang locations is probably an undercount, but still no match for the 800 or more American gang cities.

Germany

A colleague well-positioned to make such judgements reports that there has been no observed change in the Berlin street gang situation in the past few years. He does note, however, an increase in youth violence from small cliques of four to eight members, each with common ethnic or neighbourhood ties: 'So you have the necessary ingredients, but they usually disintegrate before gangs can form' (C. Ohder, personal communication).

I have received more bibliographic information from German colleagues than from any others. However, this tends to be even more confusing because the preponderant topic has become terrorism against immigrant groups. It is unclear in some instances when ethnic terrorism melts into gang-like structures such as skinheads, and whether German skinheads structurally resemble the specialty skin groups of the US or Sweden. Willems (1995) for instance provides a thoughtful categorization of right-wing extremist groups which includes some gang-like activity in opposition to refugee/immigrant groups. Kersten (1995) typologizes German youth groups into cliques, hooligans, and skins, with the first of these emphasizing territorial defensive battles and rivalries. Elsewhere, Kersten (1993) uses some gang materials to illuminate issues of masculinity and the social construction of manliness.

A hint of gang structure comes from a description (Köster-Schilling, 1994) of a five-member girls' specialty gang (thefts from cars) in Duisberg. It was a mixed ethnic, inner-city clique that broke off from a larger, male-dominated structure but later disintegrated due to internal dissension. An article by Grüner (1993) describes an intervention applied to a group of young school boys, mostly immigrants in Hamburg, whose delinquent pattern was influenced by older, more sophisticated youth. Another article, equally on the periphery of gang issues, discusses violence in three different contexts: at-risk youth, affluent youth, and the 'halbstarken' of prior decades in Germany (Hafeneger, 1993). One article clearly describing street gangs emerged from my search (Arnold
and Stuwe, 1993). Published about Frankfurt just one year following my visit, it really doesn't count as new information, but does serve to confirm my impressions. I noted earlier the tendency for Frankfurt gangs to abandon names and distinguishing characteristics in order to evade police attention. Arnold and Stuwe see this a bit differently, as the abandonment of gang locales or turfs, but then adopting residentially-based names. I suspect these authors and I relied on some of the same police informants, and interpreted the material slightly differently. But the gangs were there, contributing increasing levels of criminal acts. Arnold and Stuwe report about 25 such groups with age ranges, size, and non-hierarchical structure that place them in the compressed gang category, with both German and immigrant composition.

Discussion

Disentangling street gangs from other youthful structures in Europe, already difficult due to the ambiguities and variations in gang patterns, is complicated by the existence of xenophobic terrorism and the place of skinhead groups. Willems (1995) provides an analysis of violence and crimes against foreigners in Germany. Ninety-five percent of perpetrators were men, 75 percent being under 20. Further, over 90 percent of the incidents involved group offences, and 30 percent of these involved skinhead groups. In the US, I can classify many skinhead groups as specialty gangs. If their form is similar in Europe, as I am led to believe in many instances, then the ambiguities at one extreme of violence are well illustrated.

At the other end are those youthful groups such as mentioned in Berlin by Ohder, and many, many others based on school and residence patterns that are groups, but not gangs as described in the five scenarios or discussed in 'The American Street Gang'. Fixing the boundaries between gang and nongang, if now somewhat easier than it was some years ago, is nevertheless something of an art, still. Van Gemert's discussion of the Dutch situation adds the complexity of concretizing a conception of gangs in the context of differing ethnic cultural patterns.

This much seems clear: Europe is not over-run with street gangs. And this much is also clear: Europe does have a number of cities affected by street gangs. Policy makers, of both the welfare and justice persuasions, will increasingly be called upon to 'deal' with gangs via prevention, intervention, or suppression programs or some mix of the three. If these policy makers follow our American example, they will formulate their programmes in almost total ignorance of and appreciation for available empirical knowledge of street gangs. European nations have the opportunity to be far wiser than we Americans have been. My principal recommendation is that some European researcher, or
better yet a team of researchers, plan and mount a research program on the etiology, epidemiology, and structures of gangs in Europe. A comparative analysis would be particularly useful, especially one that paid special attention to the ethnic complexities involved. Social and enforcement programmes must be sensitive to ethnic differences, as well as acknowledging that street gangs comprise a variety of structures. My book title, ‘The American Street Gang’, is a misnomer. There is no one generic form, only similarities among diverse forms. American gang policies are still based on a gross, generalized (and usually erroneous) conception. European research could help to prevent a repeat of our US failures to deal effectively with gangs.

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Family socialization and delinquency in the United States and Switzerland

Alexander T. Vazsonyi

The vast majority of research on the aetiology of juvenile delinquency has examined intrasocietal data. This approach has facilitated a general understanding of this social problem, determined criminological theory, and influenced policy decisions. However, Arnett (1994) has pointed out the importance of intersocietal data for understanding juvenile delinquency. First, cultural contexts provide important information on adolescent developmental processes; and second, developmental processes as well as behavioural outcomes found in one country do not necessarily apply other national contexts. A growing number of researchers have recognized the shortcomings of intrasocietal research; they have also realized the importance of a cross-cultural comparative framework for understanding and preventing juvenile delinquency (see e.g., Gartner, 1993).

Official statistics on cross-national variability in criminal behaviours indicate tremendous variability in cross-national rates of delinquency and crime. Gartner (1990; 1991) reviewed data provided by the World Health Organization on adult male homicide rates in 18 developed democracies between 1950 and 1980 and on male (14 years and older) homicide rates between 1965 and 1980. Data consistently demonstrated tremendous variability between national contexts. In fact, American males were fifteen times more likely to be victims of homicide than males in Denmark, the Netherlands, or Switzerland. Cross-cultural differences for females were less dramatic, although American rates still exceeded the rates of European adolescents. For cross-national rates of juvenile delinquency, similar findings were made; however, intersocietal variability was

1 The University of Arizona, PO Box 210033, Tucson, Arizona 85721-003, USA. This research was supported by a dissertation fellowship from the Swiss National Science Foundation. I would like to thank Martin Killias and David Rowe for the use of their data. I would also like to thank Jennifer Maggs and Wendy Vesterdal for comments on a previous version of the manuscript.
less dramatic (Junger, 1994). This is in part due to the fact that less serious
types of offences account for the bulk of self-reported delinquency by ado-
lescents. Nevertheless, the question that begs to be answered is what accounts
for tremendous rate differences between nations? Do some countries socialize
their children more successfully? Alternatively, do we find different patterns
of socialization between nations that account for cross-national rate differ-
ences?
In the current article, I will attempt to further explore these very issues employ-
ing data from the United States and Switzerland. More specifically, I will com-
pare self-reported rates of adolescent delinquency between the two national
contexts. Next, I will examine aetiological factors consistent with control the-
ory. Finally, I will attempt to address the issue of cross-national rate differences
in juvenile delinquency and whether aetiological factors can partially explain
them.

The family and juvenile delinquency

Most social scientists now agree on the key role of the family in effective social-
ization of the young and in the aetiology of juvenile delinquency. Junger-Tas
(1992) recently reviewed the impact of the family on delinquency. She found
evidence that both family structural variables, and perhaps more importantly,
family process variables were consistently associated with juvenile delinquency
(see also Rankin and Wells, 1991; Sampson and Laub, 1993). A large number of
empirical investigations on the aetiology of juvenile delinquency has establish-
ed the importance of the family (e.g., Cernkovich and Giordano, 1987; Patterson
and Dishion, 1985), and more recent work has also done so in the cross-nation-
al context. For example, Zhang and Messner (1995) found that the family play-
ed a central role in decreasing the prevalence of delinquent behaviour in China.
This finding is consistent with early cross-national comparative work in cri-
minology.
In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of studies replicated Glueck and Glueck's
(1950) pioneering work on social prediction tables across a number of national
contexts. Researchers consistently identified the same correlates of delinqu-
ency and crime in different countries (e.g., Veverka, 1972). Furthermore, these
studies also found similar ranking or salience of different etiological variables.
For example, maternal supervision was consistently one of the most important
buffers against juvenile delinquency and later criminal behaviour in all coun-
tries (for more recent work, see e.g., Dishion et al., 1991; Patterson and Dishion,
1985). The more a child is monitored by his/her mother, the lesser the likeli-
hood of involvement in delinquent activities. Although the same correlates and
their respective importance in delinquency etiology have been identified, few
investigations have examined the causes of cross-national differences in rates of offending.

The present paper extends previous work by testing whether differences in aetiology exist and whether these differences can explain differences in rates of juvenile delinquency. The United States and Switzerland are very similar in their level of industrialization and affluence; yet, official statistics indicate that they are very different in rates of offending. It follows therefore that these two countries represent an excellent 'natural experiment' to examine whether variables can account for cross-national rate differences in juvenile delinquency. Two aetiological explanations seem plausible which could account for cross-national rate differences: effectiveness of socialization and patterns of socialization.

Effective socialization seems to include a number of universal qualities that societies seek to instil in their citizenry. These qualities include personal competence and self-sufficiency, but also social conformity and norm-abiding behaviour. These latter qualities ensure social order and structure, but also the very existence of a society. Suppose that two different countries seek to instil values of conformity in their children through 'effective socialization'. Also, suppose that both cultures generally agree upon what constitutes 'effective socialization' and associated behavioural outcomes. Assume for a moment that one culture fails to achieve this goal. From past research, we know that consistent parental disciplinary practices are the key in the development of socially conforming behaviour. Children who are 'left to their own devices' are more likely to engage in deviant behaviour, because they lack adult supervision and fail to internalize social norms. We find that children are closely monitored in one country, but inconsistently monitored in the other. Citizens in the latter case may simply not have the necessary resources to supervise children consistently. As a result, youths in this developmental context partially fail to learn to conform to social order, and a larger number of adolescents engage in delinquent behaviour. In this situation, lower levels of monitoring could partially explain rate differences in delinquency and crime between the two countries.

A second explanation for cross-national differences in delinquency and crime focuses on different patterns of socialization. Nations such as the Netherlands, Switzerland or Denmark may contain different socialization processes. Arnett (1992) has suggested that some cultures follow a broad socialization pattern that promotes individualism and self-expression, while other countries follow narrow socialization patterns which promote obedience and conformity. Children growing up in a culture consistent with Arnett's concept of broad socialization may be more likely to engage in norm violating behaviour because they do not have a stake in other people and the community at large.
Although parental monitoring is a salient predictor of delinquency in countries following Arnett's narrow socialization pattern, this predictor may not play an important role in the broad pattern socialization process. Monitoring in such contexts may matter less; alternatively, the effects of monitoring on delinquent behaviour may even be absent. Analytically, while parental monitoring is strongly associated with delinquency in one country, it may have a weak or non-existent association with delinquency in countries where children are socialized consistent with broad pattern socialization processes.

Control theories

One of the most influential theoretical frameworks that has emerged from criminological work over the past decades has been social control theory (Hirschi, 1969). Social control theory suggests that juvenile delinquency is the result of weak ties to the family. At a more distal level, this lack of 'attachment' to individuals and the family is also predictive of weak ties to the community and society. Early socialization experiences, such as the positive affective relationship with caregivers, effectively binds youth to parents, to parental values, and to social norms. The ensuing bond 'prevents' individuals from engaging in norm violating or delinquent conduct. On the other hand, individuals who were not effectively socialized and who did not develop this 'attachment' are effectively free to deviate. Hirschi's theory has been empirically tested and widely supported in the United States (e.g., Cernkovich and Giordano, 1992; Hirschi, 1969) and in other Western nations (Junger-Tas, 1992).

Self-control theory is a recent extension of social control theory (Polakowski, 1994). Although similar in stressing the importance of early childhood socialization experiences, self-control theory has a different emphasis. While social control theory stresses the importance of bonds to primary care givers, the emphasis of self-control theory is not on interpersonal bonds, but rather on stable individual-level propensities that result from early socialization experiences. Self-control theory suggests that effective socialization results in an individual's ability to delay gratification, control impulses, and to exercise self-control. This ability to delay gratification in favour of future long-term gains is a stable personality construct or trait which is both stable over time and across settings (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990).

Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) suggest that delinquent behaviour does not require any planning; that delinquent behaviour has no long-term pay-offs; and that delinquent behaviour provides a short-lived immediate gratification. An individual low on self control, that is, a person who did not learn to delay gratification, is at greater risk to act impulsively for a short-term gains. He/she is more likely to commit a delinquent act. So, in contrast to other theoretical
approaches, self-control theory focuses on the act rather than the actor. Crime is not limited to 'criminals' or certain underprivileged segments of society. Rather crime is fairly commonplace and given the right circumstances, many would deviate. Crime is committed for crime's sake, for the immediate, short-term advantage.

A small number of studies have recently tested self-control theory. In general, they were conducted in the United States, and they supported the main thrust of the theory (e.g., Arneklev et al., 1993; Brownfield and Sorensen, 1993; Grasmick et al., 1993). Few investigations have explicitly tested the theory outside the United States (see e.g., Junger, 1994). Given the focus of the theory and given that universal human behavioural qualities account for delinquency rather than contextual explanations or explanations which focus on the actor, there is little reason to believe that such studies would not support it. The theory is universal because the criminal act is universal. Although self-control theory is universal in focus, nevertheless, it must be empirically tested in different social and national contexts.

Comparative research

Cross-national and cross-cultural comparative work is becoming more and more common in this age of the 'global village'. In fact, almost three decades after Sheldon Glueck called for a discipline of Comparative Criminology in order to establish etiological universals 'irrespective of cultural differences among different countries' (1964, p. 304), Laub and Lauritsen conclude on the issue that 'a comparative study of diverse cultural contexts will allow us to isolate variations in family structure and socialization processes, especially child rearing practices regarding the use of discipline and the quality of parent-child relations, that appear important in the development of antisocial and violent behavior' (1993, p. 243).

There continues to be some discussion about the definition of delinquency and crime cross-culturally. Critics of comparative work immediately point to cultural differences in definitions of crimes and specific offences and to differences in criminal justice practices. The opposing view, more favourable to a comparative approach, suggests that delinquency and crime are negative concepts everywhere; they represent negative behaviour that violates values, property and/or persons regardless of national context.

Three decades ago, Cavan and Cavan (1968) examined this very issue of delinquency and crime cross-nationally. They suggested 'that delinquency and crime are the result of the failure of a society to completely socialize children into the values and behavior deemed important for the preservation of society. Delinquency and crime indicate the failure of the educational mechanisms of
society rather than a shortcoming of an individual. The noncriminal or non-delinquent is the one who has been successfully socialized to accept the values, to fit into approved patterns of behavior, and to find personal satisfaction within prescribed limits. The socialized person, steeped in the social values and their coordinated behavior patterns from childhood, accepts the values of society as his own' (p 3).

An assumption underlying this paper is that delinquency is free of a cultural definition. Stealing money from someone, throwing a rock through the school window, or fighting with someone is considered socially undesirable behavior everywhere. It seems very unlikely that any society would condone such behavior. Of course this does not mean that this type of behavior is rare. We know from official sources that such behavior is quite common and that it is more common in one national context than in another.

**Methods**

**Samples**

Self-report data were collected both in Switzerland and the United States. The Swiss data set was part of the International Self-Report Delinquency (ISRD) Project (Killias et al., 1994). A random sample of adolescents aged 14 to 21 (mean age = 17.0; sd = 1.9) was collected in 1993. The sample was stratified by language regions; Italian and French speaking communities were overselected in an effort to adequately represent Swiss minorities. Consequently, proportionately fewer adolescents from the German speaking majority were selected. The sample of N = 970 youth was equally divided by sex and representative of the Swiss population at the time (see table 1; for more detail, see Killias et al., 1994)².

The American data were also collected in 1993 as part of a longitudinal follow-up study (for more detail, see Rowe and Gulley, 1992). Self-report data were collected from N = 232 adolescents (mean age = 16.8, sd = 1.9), equally divided by sex, in a southwestern metropolitan region of the United States. In contrast to the Swiss sample, the American contribution was not a random sample. In

² Despite efforts by Killias et al. (1994) to obtain a Swiss national probability sample, the ISRD contribution from Switzerland had a substantial number of adolescents who refused participation. In order to rule out 'depressed' delinquency rates in Switzerland due to non-response, Killias and colleagues conducted a follow-up study on a subset of individuals who had declined to participate in the main study. Contrary to expectations, refusers reported a slightly lower average rate of delinquent behavior than main-study participants. This effectively eliminated the possibility that overall lower delinquency rates in Switzerland compared to other countries were the result of a large number of refusers.
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of Swiss sample

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<th>males n</th>
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<th>females n</th>
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<td>educational tracks</td>
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<td>119</td>
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<td>gymnasium</td>
<td>89</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>university students</td>
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<td>employed</td>
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<td>230</td>
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<td>15.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>8.4</td>
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<td>41.9</td>
<td>380</td>
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<tr>
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<td>106</td>
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<td>7.9</td>
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* Total sample size n=970. Educational track breakdown includes 884 subjects; remaining subjects were either unemployed or did not fit into categories presented here. Percentages are relative to the total sample.

In fact, the sample was predominantly white and middle-class and therefore not necessarily representative of adolescents' involvement in delinquent behaviours in the United States. Comparisons to other more diverse data sets collected in the United States, however, indicated that frequencies of self-reported delinquent behaviour were consistently similar, in some cases identical. For example, 'ever' frequency data were very comparable to figures from the American contribution to the ISRD study which were collected in a midwestern, metropolitan area (Marshall and Webb, 1994). About 54% of the Omaha sample reported vandalism as compared to almost 60% in the southwestern metropolitan area. Similarly, about 48% reported store thefts in the midwestern sample as compared to 47% in the southwestern metropolitan region. Finally, items tapping interpersonal violence and substance use were also generally similar.  

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3 Some comments about the representativeness of both samples are warranted. First, the empirical test of Gottfredson and Hirschi's self-control theory did not necessitate random, national probability samples. One main purpose of the current investigation was to test the theory employing data from two different national contexts. Second, although rates of delinquency in the American sample were comparable to rates found in the Omaha sample (Marshall and Webb, 1994), additional empirical research employing both samples from diverse developmental contexts as well as national probability samples will be necessary to further substantiate findings from this study.
Measures

Delinquency
Delinquency was measured by an 8-item scale in both studies. The items were consistent with previous criminological measures of self-reported delinquency. All items assessed less serious forms of delinquency. Respondents rated the following behaviour: vandalism (1 item); theft (3 items); violence (2 items); and drug use (2 items). One drug use item assessed consumption of 'soft drugs'; this included the use of alcohol and substances such as marijuana. The second item ('hard drugs') sampled more serious forms of drug use, such as crack or cocaine. Item responses by participants were transformed into a dichotomous scale (yes/no) for the purpose of this comparison. Items were scored as 'yes = 1' and 'no = 0'. Delinquency scores were computed by totalling the eight responses (range = 0 to 8). A high score indicated a large amount of delinquent behaviour.

Self-control
Self-control was measured by two items: 'I often act out of the spur of the moment' (US survey) and 'Do you spend much time thinking about doing something that is not permitted' (Swiss survey). Respondents rated each statement on a 4-point and 5-point Likert scale respectively. To achieve similar response ranges for the two items, scores were multiplied by 5 and 4 respectively.

Educational aspirations
Educational aspirations were assessed by a single item asking respondents about the importance of grades. Swiss respondents not attending school did not rate this question which reduced the original sample size to N = 799.

Mother-child and father-child relationships
The affective parent-child relationships were each assessed by a single item in the Swiss survey: 'In general, how well do you get along with your mother/father?' Ratings were made on a 4-point scale ('1 = not well at all' to 4 = 'very well'). Three items from the shortened CRPBI were used to measure these relationships in the American survey (Kawash, 1989). For example, 'My mother/father is a person who listens to my ideas and opinions'. Responses were made on a 3-point scale ranging from '1 = not like' to '3 = a lot like my mother'. Scores were multiplied by 3 and 4 respectively to achieve similar response ranges for the measures in the two samples. A high score indicated an affectively close parent-child relationship in both samples.
Parental monitoring
Two items parallel in content from each survey measured parental monitoring. American adolescents rated 'Is it important for your parents to know where you are all the time' and 'Is it important for your parents to know who your friends are' on a 4-point scale (1 = 'never' to 4 = 'always'). Swiss youth rated 'When you leave home, do you tell your parents where you go' and 'When you leave home, do you tell your parents who you spend your time with' on a 4-point scale (1 = 'never' to 4 = 'always'). The two items were totalled to measure parental monitoring for both samples. A high score indicated a large amount of parental monitoring.

Results

Frequency comparisons
Table 2 contains the self-reported frequencies of delinquent behaviour from both countries by sex. Chi square tests were used to compare item frequencies between males and females within each country, between males and between females across national contexts, and for comparing total sample by country. With the exception of soft drug use, Swiss males reported significantly higher frequencies of delinquent behaviour than Swiss females. Over half of the sample (both males and females) indicated that they had stolen something valued at less than US $50. Also, while sex differences in Switzerland were rather small in some cases, there was a tenfold difference in frequency of fights where persons required medical attention (0.7% for females and 7% for males). A similar pattern was found for American youth. In general, males were significantly more delinquent than females with the exceptions of soft and hard drug use. Again, there was a ninefold difference in serious forms of interpersonal violence (fights after which persons required medical attention; 4.5% versus 37.5%).
Comparing males cross-nationally, American adolescents reported significantly higher frequency of delinquent behaviour in 6 of 8 items. Drug use items were not significantly different. The most dramatic difference was found in violent behaviour requiring medical attention (7% versus 38%). Females differed to a much smaller extent by country, although the same large differences in more serious forms of interpersonal violence were found. American females were twice as likely to have engaged in a fight (16.1% versus 8.1%) and over six times more likely to have engaged in fights where the individuals involved required medical attention (4.5% versus 0.7%).
Finally, comparing the total populations (males and females combined) from each country, Americans were significantly more likely to engage in acts of van-
Table 2: Frequencies of delinquent behaviour

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>males</td>
<td>females</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(513)</td>
<td>(457)</td>
<td>(970)</td>
<td>(120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vandalism $^{1,2,3,5}$</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>store theft $^{1,2,3,4}$</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theft &lt; $50$ $^{1,2,3}$</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>theft &lt; $50$ $^{1,2,3}$</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fights $^{1,2,3,4,5}$</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medical att $^{1,2,3,4,5}$</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soft drugs</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hard drugs $^{1,4,5}$</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Comparisons by sex within the Swiss sample significant $p<0.001$.
2 Comparisons by sex within the American sample significant $p<0.001$.
3 Comparisons for males across countries significant $p<0.05$.
4 Comparisons for females across countries significant $p<0.05$.
5 Comparisons of totals across countries significant $p<0.001$.

delinquency, interpersonal violence, and hard drug use as compared to their Swiss counterparts (see figure 1). This global finding was consistent with previous comparisons employing official data, especially on the 'fighting' items.

Mean comparisons

Consistent with frequency comparisons of female delinquent behaviour, one way ANOVAS of the female mean delinquency scores indicated no significant differences by country. Table 3 contains the results of the analyses for within country comparisons and between country comparisons. In between country comparisons by sex, females admitted having committed between one and two delinquent acts in both Switzerland and the United States; their scores were not significantly different. On the other hand, male scores differed significantly. In fact, Swiss males reported having engaged in significantly fewer delinquent acts as compared to their American counterparts (Swiss mean score = 2.43, $sd = 1.9$; American mean score = 3.58, $sd = 2.2$; $p < 0.001$).

Results from the mean level comparisons of the predictor variables within country indicated that Swiss females were monitored more closely than Swiss males, and Swiss males had affectively closer relationships to their fathers than Swiss females. Parallel findings were made for American youths: Females were monitored more closely by parents; also, a trend ($p < 0.07$) was found indicating that males had closer affective ties to fathers as compared to females.
Family socialization and delinquency in the United States and Switzerland

Figure 1: Frequencies of delinquent behaviours by country

![Graph showing frequencies of delinquent behaviours by country]

Significant differences at p<0.05.

Table 3: Mean values of predictor variables by sex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>predictors</th>
<th>Swiss sample</th>
<th>American sample</th>
<th>d&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>delinquency&lt;sup&gt;1,2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>2.43 1.57 2.04 1.72</td>
<td>3.58 1.67 2.65 2.15</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parental mon.&lt;sup&gt;1,2,3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.42 6.85 6.61 1.66</td>
<td>5.67 6.11 5.87 1.46</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-control&lt;sup&gt;1,2,3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>15.93 16.16 16.28 4.29</td>
<td>11.83 12.47 12.12 4.33</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>educational asp.</td>
<td>17.04 16.65 16.92 3.32</td>
<td>17.04 16.65 16.84 3.45</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mother relat.&lt;sup&gt;1,2,3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10.55 10.35 10.47 1.78</td>
<td>9.18 9.38 9.26 1.95</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>father relat.&lt;sup&gt;1,2,3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>10.40 10.16 9.82 2.04</td>
<td>8.92 8.38 8.66 2.27</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Significantly different total scores at p<0.05.
2 Significantly different male scores between nations at p<0.05.
3 Significantly different female scores between nations at p<0.05.
4 Standard deviations are pooled estimates based on the total sample by nation.
5 Effect size based on pooled standard deviations.

Finally, American female adolescents reported significantly higher educational aspirations than American males.

Comparing Swiss and American adolescents as a group, the following observations were made: Swiss adolescents were monitored more closely by parents; they had closer affective relationships with both their mothers and fathers as compared to Americans; and Swiss youths reported substantially higher levels of self-control (d = 0.94).
Table 4: Correlations of predictor variables Swiss sample (n=707)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 delinquency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 age</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 monitoring</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 self-control</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ed. asp.</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 mother</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 father</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Incomplete data and listwise deletions resulted in a reduced sample size. Correlations in italics are significant p<0.05.

Table 5: Correlations of predictor variables for American sample (n=229)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 delinquency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 age</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 monitoring</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 self-control</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 ed. asp.</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 mother</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 father</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Correlations in italics are significant p<0.05.

Correlation comparisons

The next step was to compare developmental processes between the two countries. Developmental process here is used in a different, somewhat unusual way, namely the relationship of the set of five predictor variables with delinquency. In order to examine whether the variables consistent with a self-control theory approach were related to delinquency in a similar way in both national contexts, correlations (see tables 4 and 5) were computed from each sample and were plotted with delinquency in a scatter plot. Figure 2 graphically displays the results of this comparison. It shows that despite slight differences in the magnitude of correlation-pairs by country, the set of variables predicts delinquency very similarly in both samples. Hence, consistent with self-control theory, developmental processes influencing delinquency aetiology were very similar.
Regression analysis

The final analytic step examined whether the observed mean level differences on predictors could account for the mean level difference on male delinquent behaviour between countries. This analysis was done for males only as females did not significantly differ on the scaled delinquency measure by nation. Predictor variables which were significantly different by country were included for this analysis. Male delinquency was residualized by the predictor variables. The residual was computed by 'controlling for' the predictors (residual = delinquency - b1X2 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4 + b5X5). Practically, this meant that holding socialization variables constant or given that there were no differences in socialization between the two samples, how similar/different were levels of male juvenile delinquency in Switzerland and the United States. The age variable was also included in the set of predictor variables in order to rule out a spurious finding due to slight age differences in the two samples. In order to test whether residualizing the delinquency scores by the predictors changed the significant difference, male delinquency residual scores from both countries were compared employing an ANOVA (Swiss m = -0.06, sd = 1.7; American m = 0.25, sd = 2.1). Results indicated that the five predictor variables (age, parental monitoring, mother-child and father-child relationships, and self-control) explained the majority of the delinquency scores in both countries.
In addition, the sizeable mean level difference between Swiss and American males was reduced by approximately 70% (from $d = 0.58$ to $d = 0.17$) and was no longer statistically significant. Figure 3 graphically displays this finding.

**Discussion**

The most important findings include the following.

- American youths seem to engage in much more serious forms of delinquent behaviour such as interpersonal violence.
- Cross-national differences in delinquency were largely due to differences between the male delinquency scores from the two countries. Female scores were not significantly different by nation.
- Swiss youths were monitored more closely by parents and had closer affective relationships with both their mothers and fathers.
- Swiss youths reported substantially higher levels of self-control.
- Developmental processes between nations were strikingly similar.
- Finally, and perhaps most importantly, differences in family socialization processes were able to explain cross-national differences in male delinquency.

As social scientists, we are interested in explaining human behaviour. In this case, we want to explain differences in the frequency of delinquency in the two countries. The evidence suggests that males are responsible for the majority of delinquent behaviour in both nations. It also suggests that American males...
engage in much higher frequencies of offending in comparison to Swiss male adolescents. Social scientists, policy makers, and practitioners in the area of criminal justice are interested in understanding 'why' – why is it that we find quite large differences in deviant behaviour between cultures?

**Self-control theory**

Results suggest that control theories, more specifically, self-control theory finds empirical support in different national contexts. Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) conceptualized their theoretical approach as one that is general; one that applies to individuals committing different types of offences, with different frequencies, and across different cultural and national contexts. The authors argue that 'it is meant to explain all crime, at all times, and, for that matter, many forms of behaviour that are not sanctioned by the state' (p. 117). In a positivist tradition, Gottfredson and Hirschi's theory explains crime causation. Low self-control reliably predicts involvement in deviant acts. This has been supported by a large body of research. For example, in a recent test of the basic premises of self-control theory employing the American sample used in this paper, Vazsonyi (1995) found that self-control by itself accounted for over 25% of the variability in delinquent behaviour. It is important to note that self-control was measured by a set of items which excluded any delinquency or norm violating content; they were in effect 'pure' measures of self-control.

Critics have often argued that self-control is inevitably highly associated with delinquency because self-control is conceptually and analytically part of the same behavioural disposition. The evidence does not support this argument. Data also demonstrate how variables consistent with self-control theory explain cross-national differences in juvenile delinquency. We know from this study that adolescents differed the most cross-nationally on the measure of self-control; therefore, this variable may account for the majority of the cross-national differences in juvenile delinquency. So, what explains individual differences in self-control? Why do Swiss adolescents report such high levels relative to American adolescents?

Gottfredson and Hirschi have suggested two primary sources of individual variation in self-control: 'The first is the variation among children in the degree to which they manifest such traits to begin with. The second, is the variation among guardians in the degree to which they recognize low self-control and its consequences and the degree to which they are willing and able to correct it' (p. 96).

While the first explanation is fundamentally interesting, only the second explanation of individual variability in self-control seems important both
theoretically and pragmatically. We are interested in developing a coherent theoretical, aetiological explanation of delinquent and criminal behaviour. We are also interested in developing an understanding of how to deal practically with this social problem. How can we intervene in an individual's development to reduce the risk of his/her involvement in delinquent behaviour?

**Family socialization and delinquency**

This cross-national study provides evidence that levels of individual self-control vary by national context. It also demonstrates that these large cross-national differences in levels of self-control can explain differences in national delinquency rates. On average, Swiss youths are much more likely to calculate the consequences of their behaviour than American youths. As a result, they are less likely to commit delinquent acts. This suggests, consistent with self-control theory and with this empirical evidence, that Swiss youths are socialized differently, perhaps 'more effectively' in regards to social conformity. Data demonstrate that Swiss families supervise their children more closely and enjoy affectively closer relationships. This finding is not a new one; however, linking this finding to differences in cross-national delinquency rates is new.

In a series of studies and papers over the past twenty years, a group of sociologists has examined cross-cultural variability in socialization practices and values (Ellis et al., 1978; Ellis and Petersen, 1992; Petersen et al., 1982). They were interested in examining whether differences in structural variables by culture could account for variability in the degree to which individuals conform rather than becoming self-reliant. Their work has provided consistent empirical evidence from the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample and the Human Relations Area File that *closeness of supervision*, in a macrosociological sense (see Ellis et al., 1978), is highly predictive of differences on the conformity/self-reliance trait.

In their comparative work, the authors measured closeness of supervision employing seven socio-structural indices: economic complexity (the type of economy, ranging from individualistic activities to highly cooperative endeavours); political complexity (the total number of jurisdictional levels); family complexity (nuclear, stem, partly extended, and fully extended families); mode of descent (the structure of kinship systems, which is indicative of levels of supervision and identifies the primary socializing agents; in descending order of supervision intensity, societies include patrilineal, matrilineal, and bilateral); ancestor worship; control over mate choice (cultural rules over endogamy and exogamy); and religious taboos. With the exception of family complexity, all socio-structural predictors were highly correlated with the conformity/self-reliance measure (mean r = 0.37; Ellis, Lee and Petersen, 1982). As a set, these
predictors accounted for over 40% for boys and 36% for girls of the total variability in the conformity/self-reliance trait (Ellis and Petersen, 1992). Ellis, Petersen and Lee did not connect their findings to cross-national variability in delinquency; nevertheless, it seems a plausible next step. The authors have pointed out previously that accounting for cultural variability in socialization practices is of very limited use unless these values have 'real' consequences. Clearly, in this case variability in cultural socialization practices has profound social consequences. Based on the findings in the current study and on the work by Ellis and colleagues, we can conclude that cross-national differences in rates of delinquency may be largely explained by differences in basic values and practices of socialization found in developmental contexts; in turn, these cultural socialization practices result in large and robust cross-national differences in levels of conformity/self-reliance.

We know that Americans are much more individualistic compared to citizens of Central European countries. In addition to evidence from sociological and anthropological literature, psychologists have also provided evidence to this effect. For example, Schwartz and Billsky (1987) have suggested that cultural differences in valuing conformity may impact upon the expression of temperamental tendencies, such as impulsiveness. Americans are generally self-directed and autonomous; by contrast, the Swiss are much more collective in the sense that adult success, in educational, occupational, and interpersonal domains, is largely dependent upon conformity. This means that early socialization practices reflect a fairly rigid adherence to external standards. Violations of such standards are generally explicitly or implicitly punished. Cultures which value self-direction, on the other hand, encourage individual decision making and personal initiative. Parents in such cultures are less concerned with individual decisions their children make because children are supposed to learn to operate on their own. They are supposed to become internally controlled; of course, this inevitably occurs at the expense of group-oriented values. These same autonomous individuals are also more likely to violate social norms for personal, short-term, and immediate gain; they are more likely to engage in delinquent acts, that is, acts that involve personal property and acts that are directed against other persons.

Conclusion

This study provides evidence consistent with Arnett's idea of broad versus narrow socialization; it is also consistent with theoretical and empirical investigations in sociology, anthropology, and psychology which show that individuals from various nations may be socialized differently. In turn, these differences in socialization practices and values can account for cross-national differences in
rates of juvenile delinquency. The implications from this study are twofold. First, we know that early childhood socialization plays a very important part in a person's later behavioural disposition. To employ control theory terminology – we need to effectively prevent an individual from deviating by teaching him/her the importance of personal property, the value of other persons early in life, and the ability to conform to social norms. If we fail to do so, if there are no imposed restraints or controls, this individual will be free to deviate; he/she will be more likely to violate social norms and engage in delinquent behaviour. Secondly, this cross-national comparison suggests that intervention and prevention efforts in the area of youthful offending should be directed at the family, a person's socialization and education. The evidence demonstrated how individual variability was accounted for by cross-national differences in family processes and levels of conformity. In turn, this suggests that we need to examine more closely the quality of socialization and cultural social norms to understand why Swiss youths are much less impulsive than Americans. Rarely do such efforts take the long-term outlook necessary to focus on individual socialization processes. Most interventions occur once an individual has seriously violated social norms; at that time, adolescents enter the juvenile criminal justice system. Some preliminary links were established in this paper between national delinquency rates and cultural socialization patterns; perhaps future cross-national, longitudinal work will further examine this question between different countries. Inevitably, such efforts will influence delinquency aetiology and criminological theory and perhaps provide additional support for the thesis presented in this manuscript.

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Family deviance and delinquency
The new world order of criminal justice

Reflections on clientelism

Alan A. Block

Beginning around mid-point in the 1980s and carrying on since then, the US reoriented its rationale and methods for maintaining hegemony. The new rationale was conceived under the aegis of the international security threat posed by drug trafficking and its fairly recently discovered cousin transnational organized crime which means criminal syndicates whose operations transcend national borders. The US has sold itself and as much of the rest of the world as possible on the necessity of fighting a 'war on drugs' for international security. Though the claim is clear and its impact in the US and abroad awesome, there appears to me no intrinsic relationship between the ways in which national security or international security issues have been traditionally defined and drug trafficking. Traffickers in this century do not actually invade first-world foreign nations, hardened consumers of drugs hardly move at all. And despite government propaganda about the social impact of drug use, foolish drug consumption is really a minor public health problem. There is no comparing the medical costs of treating cocaine or heroin addicts or those who have overdosed and ended up in emergency rooms, with the immensely greater costs of treating cancers caused by industrial pollution or heart disease stemming from obesity, or maiming in traffic accidents. Equally significant, no government has much of an idea about the real size of drug markets though whatever they do publish 'suggests they are grossly overstated' (Reuter, 1966, p. 63). Economist Peter Reuter, an acknowledged expert on these matters, comments in a recent

1 The Administration of Justice, The Pennsylvania State University, 918 Oswald Tower, University Park, PA 16802, USA.
publication that the US government has what appear to be reasonable estimates about ‘domestic expenditures’ but ‘these coexist with an essentially madcap series of federal figures on international production and prices that make a mockery of the whole enterprise’ (Reuter, 1966, p. 63). He concludes the figures are fictions or ‘rhetorical conveniences for official statements’ used to drive the policy process. There is no adequate empirical base that underlines US drug policy.

Things are always different in the Third World. They certainly were in the nineteenth century when the first ‘war on drugs’ was fought and lost by the frail and incompetent government of China against British traffickers of Bengali opium. The British were soon joined by smugglers from other European colonial powers and the US. The Chinese government lost two wars to Britain over the opium issue and was forced to cede parts of the national territory to foreign powers. These are matters traditionally associated with national security. And in this century, third-world drug traffickers and consumers played very important roles particularly in Far Eastern European colonies where they helped pay for the costs of colonial administrations. Given the history of drug trafficking one might venture the opinion that it has more often represented the national security interests of the First World than not.

The US ‘war on drugs’ is a device for extending political control regardless of whether or not drugs truly threaten. Consider South America where US policing and intelligence agencies virtually run the antinarcotics effort using the carrot of ‘counternarcotics foreign assistance’, and the stick of ‘decertification’ which means the cutoff of access to international development funds. It is very important to keep in mind that certification decisions are unencumbered by any reasonable or reliable figures, are solely driven by political interests (Reuter, 1966, p. 77). By running the foreign antinarcotics enterprise, the US has burrowed ever more deeply inside the political, legal, law enforcement, and military structures of numerous nations.

Bolivia’s recent experience is instructive. Human Rights Watch/Americas in its summer 1995 report notes it is impossible to overestimate ‘the impact of US counternarcotics pressure on Bolivia. The US has forced Bolivia to pass repressive laws, create institutions, and adopt antinarcotics strategies shaped in and funded by the US. There is a large contingent of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) personnel assigned to Bolivia to train and guide their pupils’ (Human Rights Watch/Americas, 1995, p. 2). The most important legislation demanded by the US was the Coca and Controlled Substances Law (known as Law 1008) which was passed in the summer of 1988. This law ‘establishes the overall legal regime governing coca production and drug trafficking, delineates the responsibilities of the agencies that will be responsible for enforcing counternarcotics law and mandates harsh penalties and
procedures for drug offenses' (Human Rights Watch/Americas, 1995, p. 7). Under this law, Bolivians who are charged with drug crimes, 'no matter how minor', are imprisoned with no possibility of pre-trial release. Even if acquitted, the accused remains in prison until the Bolivian Supreme Court reviews the trial court's finding, a process that takes years. Additionally, torture by the US-trained antinarcotics police as well as 'human rights abuse by DEA agents' are not investigated for there is 'a mantle of diplomatic immunity and agency secrecy' that makes accountability quite impossible. Finally, from 1988 through at least April 1, 1995, a special operation called Snowcap directed from Washington, DC, sent teams composed of agents from the US Border Patrol, DEA, Coast Guard, and other organizations to 'conduct interdiction and search-and-destroy missions against major cocaine processing plants' (Human Rights Watch/Americas, 1995, p. 11).

A brief look at drug trafficking's cousin, transnational organized crime, is also instructive. Transnational organized crime experts, many of whom have either intelligence backgrounds or academic degrees in national security studies, tend to focus on the former Soviet states. They are particularly concerned with the smuggling of nuclear/radioactive materials from these states. An important example of this genre can be found in the work of Phil Williams, who is the director of the Ridgeway Center for International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. Williams and Paul N. Woessner, a research assistant at the Center, have recently written 'that trade in uranium and plutonium during the past five years has given smuggling unprecedented relevance to international security' (Williams and Woessner, 1966, p. 40). To counter the threat they recommend 'systematic multinational measures be taken as soon as possible to inhibit theft at the source, to disrupt trafficking and to deter buyers'. They also strongly recommend that 'the US, Germany, Russia and other nations with an interest in the nuclear problem should set up a flying squad with an investigative arm, facilities for counterterrorist and counterextortion actions and a disaster management team' (Williams and Woessner, 1966, p. 40).

However, this essay, published in the widely-read Scientific American, offers not a single example of transnational crime syndicates smuggling this stuff. There is a discussion about unsubstantiated rumours of such smuggling, and fears expressed that it could happen given the truly abysmal state of nuclear security in the former Soviet Union. In one real case of smuggling, agents from the German Federal Intelligence organization (the BND) produced a huge controversy when they were found to have induced a Colombian dentist and two Spaniards to smuggle lithium and plutonium from Moscow to Munich. In several other examples the smugglers are regular and secret police officers from a number of nations, engineers and businessmen, and an Italian
magistrate who was supposed to be investigating clandestine nuclear trading (Williams and Woessner, 1966, p. 42-43).

Any trade in nuclear material is exceptionally worrisome and a clandestine trade to so-called outlaw nations like Iran and Libya or to criminal and/or terrorist organizations might well qualify as a major international security threat to more than a few nations. But this possibility does not appear to involve transnational crime syndicates as John Deutch, Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency, averred in a recent report to the US Congress on 'The Threat of Nuclear Diversion' by Russian organized crime. Deutch said 'we have no evidence (...) that large organized crime groups, with established structures and international connections, are involved in the trafficking of radioactive materials'. Of course criminal syndicates, whether transnational or not, threaten many people and businesses; but to suppose they imperil international security seems inflated like the drug estimates Reuter wryly noted.

The 'new world order' spoken about by President Bush is based upon criminal justice precepts and institutions, and surely one of its primary purposes is a vast extension of the powers of surveillance. In the name of crime fighting, all the techniques of surveillance created by sophisticated policing have been merged with those created by both the military and intelligence services which have been seconded into arenas that traditionally belonged to criminal justice. Of course with the end of the Cold War the intelligence services eagerly embraced the new mission for it meant continued employment.

The 'war on drugs' and the threat of transnational organized crime are thus, to my thinking, a methodology to extend US control over as much of the globe as possible. As such they give the appearance of a new justification for clientelism as the Bolivian example indicates. However, a review of two clientele states – the Dominican Republic and Rumania – reveals that clientelism by necessity is clothed in criminal justice terms and, ironically enough, is criminogenic. One of the routine outcomes in the client state is the development of organized crime, particularly state-organized crime, and it matters not at all whether the patron state is democratic or totalitarian. The examination of the Dominican Republic and Rumania also reveals a somewhat remarkable convergence: organized criminals active in the US who forged their own relationships with the dictators of both countries.

2 Excerpts from DCI Deutch's report to Congress is available on the internet in IWR Special Report, vol. 3, no. 05, 31 March 1996, Tempest Co., Boston, Massachusetts; address: http://www.tempesteco.com
Clientelism and surveillance

Clientelism has typically been used to describe a form of political behaviour most noticeable in 'patron-client relationships in small rural villages' in which reciprocity and the inequality of status produce an asymmetrical exchange relation. Clientelism, however, characterizes ever larger structures of inequality (Chubb, 1982, p. 3). It is at the root of the mafia phenomena in Sicily and Calabria and the well-publicized troubles within the Italian political system – this is the core meaning in the Andreotti trial which began in Italy the last week of September, 1995 (Bohlen, 1995, p. 1). Modern clientelism has also been the glue holding together superpowers and third-world states. No one better explains the development than Anthony Giddens who argues that the nub of the clientele issue is surveillance.

Anthony Giddens comments in 'The Nation-State and Violence', written before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, that 'information storage is central to the role of “authoritative resources” in the structuring of social systems spanning larger ranges of space and time than tribal cultures', and that surveillance is 'the key to the expansion of such resources'. The term surveillance includes the 'control of information and the superintendence of the activities of some groups by others' (Giddens, 1987, p. 2). Giddens deliberates on the distinction between totalitarian rule, which immediately comes to mind when speaking of such matters, and a 'normative theory of political violence' (Giddens, 1987, p. 295). Totalitarianism, he sees as a 'tendential property of the modern state', despite its almost universal application to movements, parties, leaders and ideas expressed in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union under Stalin, and more recently the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea. Totalitarianism, indeed terror, rests upon the effectiveness of surveillance which, Giddens reckons, 'must be regarded as an independent source of power, maximized in the modern state' (Giddens, 1987, pp. 296-297, 302 and 310).

Giddens holds that the control of information produces mass support which 'generates the political leverage within which terror can be used against categories of deviants' (Giddens, 1987, p. 305).

The reformation of surveillance is part of the 'modernity' process in which the 'industrialization of war' is also vital. The term covers those related changes stemming from the industrial production of arms, along with the development for military purposes of innovative methods of transportation and communication. Technological transformations of such magnitude wrought significant modifications in the sociology of command and military service: officer corps and armies were reorganized and professionalized (Giddens, 1987, p. 223).

Giddens argues that these linked occurrences shaped the nation-state system
and led 'to the creation of a world military order that substantially cross-cuts the divisions between “First”, “Second” and “Third” worlds' (Giddens, 1987, p. 5). This structure is propelled forward by 'superpower hegemony', plus the global systems of alliance which include the training of military cadres by one or the other superpower (Giddens, 1987, p. 252). It is this evolution that makes grotesque states such as the Dominican Republic and Rumania more than simple tyrannies.

The Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic which shares the Caribbean island of Hispaniola with Haiti, has been and remains a US client state. It was American capital, especially in the period between 1897 and 1930, which transformed the Dominican Republic's sugar business into a modern industry. Two American companies controlled the Dominican industry: the South Porto Rico Company had 150,000 Dominican acres, and the West Indies Sugar Corporation another 100,000. Moreover, they owned six of the fourteen Dominican sugar mills which, because of the marked differences in mill output, meant control of three quarters of Dominican production by 1939. The industrialization of sugar in the Caribbean was keyed to the vertical integration of the industry - the sugar companies had huge cane growing factories, and their own modern railroads for moving the product to their own warehouses, wharves and steamers. Other ancillary industries cropped up here and there to service the industry. The American sugar juggernaut represented 67 percent of Dominican exports in the decade 1929-1938. In 35 years its output had increased by a factor of ten (Williams, 1984, pp. 423, 431, 439-440).

Dominican clientelism is only partially covered by noting US hegemony over its most important industry. In an even more direct way than so far noted, Americans grasped parts of the economy until all of the Dominican Republic was truly theirs. This larger development began during the regime of Ulises Heureaux (1882-1899) when American entrepreneurs organized the San Domingo Development Corporation. They extended some credits to Heureaux and in return were given control of the nation's customhouses. This cushy arrangement suffered when the dictator was assassinated in 1899, and chaos

3 There is a varied literature on the military and 'modernization' in which many authors, like Giddens, point out that 'the hesitation with which we have approached the study of the primary functions of armies', means 'little systematic thought has been give to the political sociology of armies and the roles that military institutions play in facilitating the processes of industrial and political development' (Pye, 1962, p. 70).
returned. Soon more than $32 million was owed to foreign nationals, and European nations threatened occupation or at least control of the customs revenue. To forestall this, and to protect the inflated claims of the San Domingo Development Corporation, the US secured control of the most important Dominican customhouse in 1904. The Dominican situation prompted President Theodore Roosevelt to issue his famous 'Corollary' to the Monroe Doctrine which held the US would reluctantly police the hemisphere acting in cases of flagrant 'wrongdoing or impotence'. The following year the US seized all Dominican customhouses and took over all revenue collection. Fifty-five percent was given to satisfy foreign creditors, the rest was remanded to the Dominican Treasury (Herring, 1965, pp. 440-441).

The customs receivership was the first dramatic instance of US intervention. Eleven years later, after more endemic internal discord, US Marines who were stationed in the country were ordered by President Woodrow Wilson to take control. The Dominican Republic was placed under military occupation, government and law. The occupation which lasted for eight years, joined with the industrialization of sugar in conveying a radically skewed modernity. American officials created roads, initiated public works projects, and drastically improved sanitation, communications and education (Wiarda, 1968, p. 9). Ruling by decree, Americans also organized the public treasury, and tried to streamline the government bureaucracies by firing 'useless employees'. These achievements, essential for the movement of goods and troops, were set alongside the most important advancement of all. Americans trained and armed a national constabulary (Herring, 1965, p. 440). Within a short span, the Dominican Republic had become an American client state.

A more-or-less modern military and industry had been created which were forever indebted to (and in debt to) the US. These had been crafted on a third world nation – even in 1968 it was reckoned that ‘the majority of Dominicans are without adequate food, water, and housing, have no medical or health facilities, no educational or recreational opportunities, no electricity, insufficient land, and above all, no hope’ – with an enormous penchant for violence, and a traditional political structure composed of a ‘hierarchy of despotisms’ (Wiarda, 1968, pp. 4-6).

The dictator Trujillo
The career of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo y Molina was a product of the Marine Corps occupation. He was born in 1891 in the little town of San Cristobal about eighteen miles west and slightly inland from the capital, Santo Domingo. The third child of eleven in a family characterized as upper middle class but only ‘within a small and isolated rural community, no element of which could aspire to high rank in the country at large’, Trujillo’s early upbringing appeared
normal except perhaps for an excessive passion for neatness and cleanliness (Crassweller, 1966, pp. 28-30). At the age of sixteen he took his first real job as a telegraph operator acquired through the influence of a relative. He was, however, more interested in petty criminality than anything else. Around 1916 he joined a gang known later as 'The 44' which robbed small 'bodegas', and engaged in minor graft and extortion. While running with the '44', Trujillo also worked for a couple of years in the sugar industry. He began weighing cane but it was antithetical to his style; he changed to a 'guarda campestre', a kind of private policeman (Crassweller, 1966, pp. 34-36).

In 1918, he finally found his true calling, one toward which he had been gravitating for some time. Trujillo enrolled in the National Police that December receiving his commission as a second lieutenant on January 11, 1919. Equivalent to a National Guard, the Police was directed by the US Marine Corps. Among their duties was suppression of rural bandits or, as some styled them, peasant guerillas fighting the Marines, disrupting the sugar estates. Called Gavilleros, they were eventually overcome (Crassweller, 1966, pp. 45-46). Trujillo had an instinct for both counterinsurgency and clientelism – he cultivated the patronage of Marine colonel Thomas Watson, an important occupation official – and rapidly moved up the police/military ladder. He also formed an abiding association with Marine officer Charles McLaughlin who became an intimate companion and counsellor. By the time the Marines pulled out in 1924, without McLaughlin who remained, Trujillo was Chief of Staff of the National Police which in the spring of 1928 officially turned into the National Army.

With his military power established and unquestioned, the Army his 'private instrument of coercion and terror', Trujillo began actively scheming for the Presidency (Crassweller, 1966, p. 69). His campaign was both subtle and brutal. Winning, of course, was paramount but so too was US recognition of his government. Through a series of stratagems he was assured of US support. Greatly relieved he plunged forward having the Army and a gang of terrorists called 'The 42' (whose leadership reached back to the youthful '44', and whose organization and personnel overlapped with that of the National Police) assassinate political opponents. On August 16, 1930, Trujillo was elected president. The prerequisite for the hierarchy of despotisms was in place; now it would express and refine itself in one cruel fashion or another over several decades.

4 One who considered the Gavilleros to have been guerillas and social bandits in the Hobsbawm sense was an FBI informant whose recollections were reported in US Department of Justice (1961).
One essence of the hierarchy was the elevation and enrichment of the family Trujillo which, in time, included Alma McLaughlin, daughter of Trujillo's Marine confidant. She married Trujillo's brother Hector, in 1960 after a fourteen-year engagement and the birth of a son. The marriage had been long delayed by Trujillo's wife, sensitive about sharing the Dominican spotlight with her. Hector was his brother's pawn used in many ways including 'standing in' for Trujillo as the President of the Dominican Republic in 1952. The puppet Hector also won re-election in 1957 when he ran as the only candidate. Hector was, of course, amply rewarded supposedly accumulating a fortune estimated at around $150 million (FBI, passim).

Trujillo himself owned, usually through 'false fronts', the cotton and rope industry, the country's only oil company, major shipyard, milk processing plant, brewery, airport, airline, and Dominican banks, hotels, power plants, the major insurance firm, the newspaper 'El Caribe', and so on. He also invested money abroad especially in US companies in construction, oil, transportation, finance, insurance, hotels, sugar, and real estate in Manhattan, New Orleans and Miami. He was rumoured to have extensive land holdings in Cuba, mining interests in Canada, and a fortune stashed in Swiss banks.

His wife, Maria Martinez de Trujillo, had a controlling interest in Atlas Motors (Dominican importers of General Motors cars), a medical supply outfit, and was a sort of government loan shark. She was reportedly in charge of an organization which lent money at exceedingly high rates to government employees strongly encouraged to borrow. One of Trujillo's sons, Rafael Leonidas commonly called Ramfis, partially owned the Dominican television station (probably in partnership at some point with his uncle Jose Arismendy called Petan), a large cement factory, a peanut oil processing plant, a lumber plant, and several large farms.

Petan also had extensive real estate interests in the Dominican town of Bonao and cattle ranches in the Cibao region where he maintained order through a private militia. Another brother, General Pedro V. Trujillo Molina, who had a reputation for stupidity and drunkenness, owned a slaughterhouse controlling meat exports to Miami and San Juan. Still another brother (it was after all a family of eleven children) known as Pipi ran the prostitution racket in the capital, while a sister concentrated on urban real estate (over 500 houses) and cattle ranches. Her houses were rented to working class people; the rent collected by a 'goon squad'. A Trujillo nephew, Romeo Trujillo Lora, was a partner in a construction company which built schools and hospitals under government contract. Another nephew became a medical doctor without ever attending school. Accompanied by armed friends, he took his medical exam from the thoroughly intimidated Medical Examination Board which merely asked him to identify 'an eye, a nose, and an ear'.
In order to usurp the economy, though this was hardly the only motivation, Trujillo created a terror state in traditional terms and a 'surveillance state' in the terms crafted by Anthony Giddens noted above. He developed several 'cliques' called by one writer shifting bodies of henchmen chosen for their personal loyalty but kept atomized and isolated to prevent their garnering too much power (Wiarda, 1968, p. 70). These methods created a familiar form of stable instability. Because it was never entirely clear who had Trujillo's real confidence, his cronies' endemic insecurity drove them to work harder and harder to please, to prove their loyalty. Under the Trujillo regime, citizens of the Dominican Republic naturally were quite a bit more insecure, exhibiting the sudden disturbing silences and clammy apprehensions typical of a terrorized populace. They had good reason to be fearful as the regime didn't hesitate to assassinate political enemies at home although not as many were killed as one might think. A few exemplary killings appear to have been sufficient to make the point. This was not the case with Haitians, however. In 1937, Trujillo's forces slaughtered around 18,000 along the Haitian/Dominican border (Crassweller, 1966, pp. 150-57).

The surveillance of Dominican society went far beyond the nation's borders to include a watch on Dominicans living abroad. Additionally, Trujillo's spies infiltrated other Caribbean secret services, newspapers, radical and revolutionary groups. A great deal of this effort was undertaken in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and Venezuela which broke diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic in 1945 when a radical government led by Romulo Betancourt came to power. Betancourt despised Trujillo and actively plotted with others including exiled Dominicans to bring it down. Trujillo's reaction was to turn up the heat on Betancourt by planning his assassination. Venezuela's effort was aided by radicals in Cuba, another Caribbean hotbed of political intrigue touching on indigenous and regional issues. Among the many ways Trujillo dealt with Cuba in the 1940s was through infiltration and subversion of Cuban organizations particularly those in league with Venezuela. He sent his subsecretary of Labor to Havana, for instance, to try and cut a deal with the Confederation of Workers of Cuba. The alleged purpose was to secure help from the Cuban organization in creating a national labor union in the Dominican Republic (FBI, 1974, p. 24). The real purpose was to create another outlet for infiltration also useful for 'agents provocateurs' (FBI, 1974, p. 26).

Clientelism demands on the part of the patron the most intimate knowledge possible of a client's intentions. Precipitous actions by a client state can be politically dangerous for its patron. Inscrutability used as a internal, domestic, coercive technique cannot be allowed to cross over and cloud the international
realm. Therefore, Dominican plotting was carefully watched by the FBI which had extensive spy networks throughout the Caribbean, Central and South America. The FBI knew in March 1946, for example, that conspirators were receiving financial assistance from Trujillo in order to overthrow the Betancourt regime in Venezuela (FBI, 1974, p. 21). The next year the newly-created Central Intelligence Agency was on the scene adding to the US surveillance capability. By the end of the Agency's first year, it reported on several Americans working for Trujillo as aviation advisors and instructors (FBI, 1974, pp. 21 and 28). The US Army was not left out of the Caribbean spying trade, fast resembling a booming post-war ‘cottage’ industry, and G-2 (Army Counterintelligence) was busy those same years keeping tabs on a number of Trujillo plans including one to conquer Haiti.

Obviously, there is nothing ephemeral about surveillance activities and organizations. They are now elemental, patrolling the inner space of the national territory whether in democracies or totalitarian states although clearly their methods differ, are more or less restrained, more or less covert, depending on the nature of the state. And, as we have seen, they patrol abroad penetrating and neutralizing threatening dissident groups, setting up false front propaganda organizations, countering the efforts of other secret services, and every once in a while assassinating opponents.

To say the very least, this is a very complicated business. Part of the complexity lies in the structure of secret police and intelligence organizations which are rigidly compartmentalized, and often in an internal state of near war. In the US the most notorious example is the way in which the Counterintelligence chief of the CIA, James Angleton, paralyzed the Agency for years while searching for a KGB mole (see Wise, 1992). The feared ubiquitousness of double and triple agents, in addition to the structured secrecy, keeps intraorganizational groups in the secret services deeply suspicious, innately hostile, toward each other. Distrust within a service is further multiplied when foreign jobs in ‘friendly’ nations are carried out because the operational groups typically utilize secret agents from the ‘friendly’s’ services who may have been doubled or are ‘agents of influence’, etcetera. To further complicate these matters, there are usually third parties – in the West invariably private detective firms, many created by the political police for cover – used to provide a layer of insulation from public scrutiny if things go wrong.

Many of the relationships among secret political police organizations (both foreign and domestic) and private detectives have been built over time out of a variety of often boring routine needs. But there are times when these are replaced by others calling for savage and yet delicate missions. The political assassination of a foreign notable in a patron state such as the US is the sort of job which requires precision, care, and a mix of foreign and domestic
operatives. It is also important to be able to manipulate Congressional and public opinion. Despite all these difficulties and apprehensions, the unknown and dangerous contingencies which do exist and can upset the best-laid plans, political assassinations in the US have been accomplished. In the 1950s, the Trujillo regime assassinated two particularly bothersome troublemakers living in New York. These murders were carried out by elements of his espionage services whose field commanders were a combination of high government official and old-fashioned thug, Americans from the public and private clandestine services, and US organized criminals involved in arms trafficking and other illicit enterprises in the Dominican Republic. The coverup following the second murder was financed by Trujillo and handled primarily by bent US lawyers, corrupt US politicians, and ambitious American liberals. The most egregious example of the latter was the head of the New York Civil Liberties Union.

*Rumania under Ceausescu*

Rumania was a Soviet client state run by Nicolae Ceausescu from 1965 until the revolution of 1989. Edward Behr, the author of a 1991 book on Ceausescu describes him as a man who created a state Mafia inspired in part from the normal totalitarianism of Soviet communism and the example of the Chinese Cultural Revolution that he saw in a state visit in 1971 (Behr, 1991). Ceausescu loved the 'social engineering' he witnessed in China, and in North Korea as well. This visit convinced Ceausescu that Rumania needed its own version of a mini-cultural revolution. The effects of this decision set Rumania on a path of destruction in a novel fashion and revealed its Mafia nature. It began a year later, at the July 1972 Party congress. Ceausescu set extremely high targets for both agricultural and industrial production to be achieved, however, without any additional capital investments. Instead, Ceausescu introduced a form of serfdom or indentured servitude: 'workers were bound to their factory for an initial five-year period, and during this period half the 'profits' resulting from the factory's balance sheet were held in a blocked account. Should a worker leave, he lost his share. But workers could be shifted at will by the state to other factories, without being allowed to quit and with no other form of compensation' (Behr, 1991 p. 200).

Stalinist economic principles leavened through the procedures of the Chinese cultural revolution eventually led to an economic and social calamity. The full impact of these decisions was not felt for a while because Ceausescu had two benefactors: an international banking consortium and the Shah of Iran. For reasons that will be clear below, international bankers 'stood in line for the
privilege of extending loan after loan to gallant little Rumania' (Behr, 1991, p. 201). And the Shah gave Ceausescu a marvellously generous trade deal for Iranian oil at a fixed low price.

But the money from the bankers resulted in ‘factories producing a range of goods so shoddy and obsolete that no developed country would even look at them’ (Behr, 1991 p. 201). There was little Rumania could pay for even cheap oil. Though the Shah was very forgiving, he was soon forced to leave Iran.

Under new leadership, the Iranian deal was drastically altered. Beginning in 1976, Rumania was forced to pay in hard currency for Iranian oil. Interestingly, Rumania got the same tough deal from the Soviet Union. The dilemmas stemming from Ceausescu’s new economic policy were insurmountable. The grotesquely inefficient factories constructed with capital from the banking consortium also used enormous amounts of energy that had suddenly turned much more expensive. Behr writes that ‘one aluminum complex at Slatina consumed almost as much electric power as the entire city of Bucharest’ (Behr, 1991 p. 201).

Rumania had its own oil industry and Ceausescu tried to expand its refining capacity to cover this unexpected financial crisis. This too ended in disaster.

By the end of the 1970s, Rumania’s refineries were barely running at all. They were only able to function at around ten percent of their theoretical capacity. By the 1980s the situation was very grave. Gasoline was rationed and the use of private automobiles was forbidden for months at a time.

One problem caused another. The energy problem forced food production to decline. In 1981 bread rationing was mandated, something not seen in Rumania since the end of World War II. The increasingly desperate population turned to hoarding, which then became a serious criminal offence. There were other emergency decrees, one of which made it a crime for factory workers who commuted from rural areas from buying food where they worked. There was a clumsy coverup of this spiralling disaster. Official figures ‘showed a steady increase in all forms of food production’ (Behr, 1991 p. 202). The figures were misleading, hiding one essential fact while promoting a false picture. Given that Rumania could not produce anything else of value, most of its high-quality food was exported to repay its ever expanding foreign debts.

Rumania sank deeper and deeper into a third-world abyss; the supplies of almost everything disappeared. In order to save fuel, Behr comments, ‘electricity and hot-water supplies were curtailed, (...) refrigerators and vacuum cleaners were banned, and only forty-watt bulbs were sold. Checks were instituted to see that the rule – one bulb, one room – was not broken’. The Rumanian energy crisis was marked by repulsive power shortages which forced surgeons to ‘abort surgical operations at the last moment’, stopped
life-support machines for infants and iron-lungs for patients. Thus, older patients, who could have survived their illnesses with major surgery, were simply left to rot (Behr, 1991 pp. 203-204).
Those, however, with either Communist Party or State Security (called Securitate) connections lived a kinder and gentler life. Vast resources from somewhere were allocated for Securitate's functions. All aspects of Rumanian life were surveilled. One primary example Behr discusses is the Rumanian Foreign Trade Ministry which he reckons was 'not simply a hotbed of Securitate agents', but 'was virtually a self-contained Securitate ministry'. And like its counterparts to the east, 'Securitate also ran its own network of trading companies, holding companies abroad, and even banks' (Behr, 1991 p. 232).
The ripoffs from the national treasury, such as it was, were unrelenting. And, interestingly enough, whenever Ceausescu thought salutary beatings and murders were necessary, Securitate farmed them out to what Behr calls 'client bullyboys', usually Palestinians (Behr, 1991 p. 242).
So the client state ran its own subset of clients who were kept around to kill and beat Rumanians when necessary.
According to Behr, Rumania's slide into poverty was caused by several interrelated events that had unintended consequences: Ceausescu's infatuation with the charm of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and North Korea; Stalinist economic policies; huge loans from a consortium of international banks; and a very friendly oil deal from the Shah. These set into motion a series of events in which ultimately Rumania couldn't pay its debt. Ceausescu took the bulk of Rumania's agricultural production and sold it on international markets in order to cover some of the debt interest while starving a large part of the population. At the same time energy use in Rumania was cut below the bare minimum for survival. This is a story of political rigidity, economic foolishness, and calculated savagery. But this is not the whole story.

The criminal ties that bind
Back in 1972, a US Internal Revenue Service undercover operative living in the Bahamas came across Ceausescu's American connections (for the details of this see Block, 1991). It happened when Emil Bodnaras, who was then the vice-president of Rumania's State Council, flew to the Bahamas en route to Florida. Bodnaras was flying on a false passport. He came through Luxembourg on International Bahamas Air. From the Bahamas he flew to Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and then Miami. Bodnaras was on his way to meet with Howard Cox, the father of President Nixon's new son-in-law. (Nixon's daughter Tricia married Edward Cox in the summer of 1971.) It was an oil deal. Bodnaras, it was reported by an intelligence operative in the Bahamas, 'owned some oil patents
and is working a deal with Cox, the father of the guy Nixon's daughter married, on some Rumanian oil rights'.

There was nothing that Bodnaras did that was unknown to Ceausescu and Securitate. In fact, Bodnaras's US contact had come through Ceausescu. In 1969, President Nixon paid a state visit to Rumania. The following year Ceausescu came to Washington. By then, Ceausescu had become one of Nixon's two secret back channels to China; the other was Pakistan (Hersh, 1983, p. 123).

At a White House state dinner for Ceausescu in October, 1970, President Nixon toasted him and then went on to publicly call China, the People's Republic of China. This was the very first time an American President had called China by its official name, thus it was an important signal (Hersh, 1983, p. 365). To make sure Ceausescu got the entire point, Secretary of State Kissinger met with him privately and told him the US wanted to normalize its relations with China. In late 1970 and early 1971, both Peking and the White House were sending messages back and forth through Rumania (Hersh, 1983, pp. 448-449). This was a development that the Soviets were aware of from the beginning, for it was they who had dangled a fake 'independent' Rumania, like bait on a hook, to see who would bite. Whatever the arcane reasons were, the Soviets encouraged and permitted Ceausescu to tweak their noses just a bit to establish his bona fides with the US.

If one wonders what Rumania got for its vital clandestine role, the quick answer was the bank loans and the deal with Iran. The Shah was after all a US client put on his throne in the 1950s following a CIA-engineered 'putsch'. But there was more to it than that. There was the incipient Mafia side to it. When Bodnaras made his secret flight to the Bahamas, the man who picked him up and then flew him on to Florida worked for Jack Cooper who ran a dog track in Miami. Cooper was the go-between in the Bodnaras-Cox deal. Cooper had also worked for a long time with the very top echelon of US organized crime – the Meyer Lansky syndicate (for the details about Jack Cooper, see Block, 1991).

Back in 1958, for example, Meyer Lansky's confederates put up the investment capital for Miami's International Airport Hotel. Among the investors were Jack Cooper, and Bryant R. Burton, a Los Angeles attorney connected to the mobster-dominated Sands and Freemont hotels in Las Vegas, who was vice-president and a director for the Airport Hotel. It is equally important to note that the Chairman of the Board was Maxwell M. Rabb, who had been the Cabinet Secretary for President Eisenhower, and years later would be appointed US Ambassador to Italy by President Reagan.

Jack Cooper owned the West Flagler dog track in Miami and most of the Miami Marlins, a minor league baseball team. He also sold munitions. One deal involved a squadron of supposedly inoperative P-51 fighters sold to President
Trujillo. This 1953 transaction led nine years later to Cooper's conviction for tax evasion. Cooper was also close to Lyndon Johnson's notoriously corrupt aide Bobby Baker. They often travelled together to the Dominican Republic working various deals. They were joined in these ventures by organized crime gambler Ed Levinson. Jack Cooper's criminal career spans both the Dominican Republic and Rumania.

**Conclusion**

Whatever else clientelism may do, it certainly generates organized crime. Emerging from the clientele relationship is some quotient of new power for both sides. The patron state seeks and gets security for its flank whether it be in the Caribbean or Eastern Europe, while the government of the client state secures a free hand for the internal expropriation of resources. And because there is always some opposition to this, the government also has a free hand to repress its population. Repression by state security forces creates endless opportunities for extortion. In short order these forces take on the characteristics of crime syndicates. This is reinforced because security forces are not monolithic organizations but, like all organizations, are composed of cliques and coalitions seeking to advance each over the other. Many of their activities must be hidden, particularly those that enrich through extortion. It is always best to move the proceeds of expropriation to some safe haven as a hedge against a precarious future, and it is always best to do this secretly. In clientele relationships at the personal level, it is imperative to limit information as much as possible, for in client states there are no general rules and regulations that apply to anything; any reference to such issues is pure propaganda. Given the free rein at the top leaves much room for criminal mischief by the rulers and their often extended families. The catalogue of enterprises and endeavours engaged in by the Trujillo family are not atypical. Neither is the expropriation of resources and the hiding of loot in secure foreign banks and real estate. Perhaps the only contemporary exception is the case of Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, another US client state, in which a concerted effort was made to recover some of the national treasure after his death.

I do not mean to suggest that looting by political elites in patron states is not endemic for it surely is. In the Soviet Union it became a kind of trademark of the Communist Party's key figures during the Brezhnev era. I also do not mean to suggest the Rumania was the most criminal Soviet client state. In Maria Los' (1987) pathbreaking study of the double economic structure of communist states, she investigated the Soviet Republic of Kyrgyzstan, a client state just like the rest of the republics. The Ottawa professor found that the entire political leadership of Kyrgyzstan 'had been in the pay of a highly ramified network of
black marketeers and underworld racketeers for many years. Gangsters had established dozens of factories and opium and cannabis plantations. There are clearly any number of organized crime permutations to be found under the clientele heading.

Finally, what can now be said about the 'new world order' based on the contemporary discourse about the traffic in drugs and transnational organized crime. Clientelism, by its nature, fosters organized crime whose variety has depended far more upon climate, geography, and the natural resource base than any restraint traditionally imposed by the patron. Indeed, it would be utterly unique if present circumstances rendered the control of organized crime, whether drug trafficking or simply transnational, more important than maintaining the traditional relationships. Perhaps we have reached that unique moment, although it does not appear likely to me. The undeniable failures of the 'war on drugs' lead me to conclude that it is not a 'first order of political business', though certainly at the center of political rhetoric. Controlling the infrastructure of criminal justice in client states such as Bolivia seems more like part of an ongoing experiment to test the patron's capacity for low-intensity warfare, to train its special forces, and to perfect high technology surveillance devices in rough terrain, rather than anything else.

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Questions and comments

During the preparation of this issue, which compares developments in crime and criminal justice in the US and Europe, a letter of Christian Pfeiffer to General Attorney Janet Reno came across our desk. The letter (dated 1994) can be seen as a criminological informed cri de coeur about American criminal policy. Although the author is fully responsible for style and contents of the letter, this voice of worry can be heard at other places and in other occasions. After ample discussion the editorial committee decided to publish the letter, if we could trigger comments on it from other criminal justice experts. This was the case. We are very happy to publish the letter together with five comments from American and European colleagues. In this way we hope to stimulate discussion and communication on preferred directions and solutions in criminal justice policy, which is in coherence with our editorial aims.

A letter to Mrs. J. Reno, Attorney General of the United States of America by Christian Pfeiffer

Dear Mrs. Reno,

Shortly before you gave your speech at the ASC Conference in Miami on November 11, 1994, I introduced myself to you as a participant from Germany. I am writing to you today because I would like to address the items which you emphasized at the beginning of your speech, i.e., the necessity of an international exchange of research results and of practical experience in the quest for answers to the problem of criminality. Your talk greatly encouraged me to write this letter. You were quite clear about the fact that you are open to unconventional ideas and that you are seeking close cooperation between people involved in criminal policy, law enforcement and criminology research in the interest of effectively combating criminality.

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What do we criminologists in Germany or in other European countries have to offer? Don't we have similar problems to those in the US, although we also cannot claim that we have the perfect answers? Are not the underlying social conditions too diverse on either side of the Atlantic to transpose European solutions to the United States? These questions and doubts are surely justified. Yet should I attempt in this letter to offer ideas for American criminal policy and for criminological research, then I do so because, over the past two decades, it has been my personal experience that it is possible to import criminal policy and scientific concepts from the United States to Germany.

In the mid 1970s, I had the opportunity to attend the Vera Institute of Justice and to learn how to sound out various new approaches to criminal policy via pilot programmes. After returning to Germany, we developed a diversion project in Munich in the area of criminal law relating to young offenders, that was based on the Vera Institute model, for testing non-custodial alternatives to imprisonment. This pilot programme became the starting-point for a diversion movement all over West Germany. Some years later, we integrated victim-offender mediation and reparation into this concept and again we were following American model projects. Finally I would like to mention the fact that the present German discussion about family violence is mostly oriented towards concepts developed in New York and other major American cities.

The foregoing examples indicate, in many respects, that we who are involved in German criminal policy have incorporated many ideas from the United States. However, during my most recent visits to your country, I have gained the impression that the time may have come to change the narrow one-way street into a broad avenue with two-way traffic. In my opinion, the United States is presently experiencing a deep crisis in its criminal policy; a crisis in which coming to grips with the concepts and the results of research, that we can present in Europe, may be of use. Kindly permit me to state some examples.

1 Utilization of prison sentences has nearly doubled in the US over the course of the past ten years. This rise is far greater than would normally be expected from the development of crime in your country. It would seem that the latest boom in prison construction is primarily the result of a strongly growing punitive attitude in your society. In this respect, I was able to ascertain during my last visit to the US that the mass media and politicians are powerfully stirring up the 'lock them up' mentality. This mode of thinking is reflected in American criminal justice with its inflexible sentencing laws. This development has reached its tentative pinnacle in the 'three strikes and you're out' legislation passed at the state and federal level.
From a European viewpoint, there is no evidence for the widely accepted assumption in the United States that the underlying idea of incapacitation would justify such thinking or legislation. On the contrary, we fear massive, negative results for the United States from this policy of sanctions. An analysis of data recently submitted by the London-based Home Office Research Unit supports this sceptical assessment. In the first place, the immense costs of a prison construction programme will drastically reduce options for taking action at the state or federal level to finance crime prevention strategies. Secondly, the expansion of the correctional facility system will develop its own internal dynamics, which should not be underestimated. The network of institutions and agencies affiliated with the 'correctional industrial complex' will push for a maximum utilization of prisons and will likewise massively oppose any attempt to alter the pursued course of criminal policy once it has been taken. Finally, the United States will be faced with the problem of integrating more than one million released prisoners back into society on an annual basis. The high rate of reconviction among released prisoners may significantly offset the incapacitation effect that one would normally expect.

In considering the American term 'correctional institution' one might believe that a released prisoner constitutes a person who has mended his ways. In Europe, one is inclined to hold the opposite expectation. Even the British government, which tends to be very conservative on criminal policy issues, expressed this view in a White Paper entitled 'Criminal Justice and Protecting the Public', published in 1990: 'It was once believed that prison, properly used, could encourage a high proportion of offenders to start an honest life on their release. Nobody now regards imprisonment, in itself, as an effective means of reform for most prisoners. ... Prison is a society which requires naturally no sense of personal responsibility from prisoners. Normal social or working habits do not fit. The opportunity to learn from other prisoners is persuasive. For most offenders, imprisonment has to be justified in terms of public protection, denunciation and retribution. Otherwise it can be an expensive way of making bad people worse.'

We do not maintain that European research into these emerging issues has already found convincing answers. For that reason, we are presently preparing a study at our institute that will look into one important point, namely, the effects of imprisonment on prisoners. I am assuming that this study could supply useful insights, if it were conducted in a similar way in the United States. A cohort of approximately 300 to 500 prisoners, ranging from 15 to 25 years of age and who are required to serve a first time sentence of at least 6 months, will be interviewed at the beginning of their term of imprisonment. Additional interviews will subsequently follow at the end of their imprisonment.
as well as at intervals of three months, one year and three years after their release from prison. In addition, we intend to acquire information from the prison and from the probation officer. One of the intended purposes of our study involves the issue of the effects which the prison confinement has on the prisoner. The other purpose is to find out how one can explain the high reconviction rate among ex-prisoners. Parallel to this, we intend to conduct a comparative study with a corresponding number of sentenced convicts, who received suspended prison sentences and who were placed under the care of the probation services.

2 The legislation on drug crimes apparently constitutes an essential reason for the rise in prison sentences in the US. In many European countries, scepticism is presently growing towards a drug policy that is primarily based on repression. A conspicuous feature of this scepticism is the fact that leading police representatives have declared previous drug policy a failure. They have justified this assertion primarily by the fact that the war on drugs had enabled organized crime to attain enormous profits and secondly by the fact that the number of addicts has continued to increase from year to year.

The alternative presently under discussion in Europe does not support legalization of drugs. Only a small minority are in favour of equating drugs with nicotine and alcohol. In lieu of this, a third course is being tested in a growing number of model experiments, i.e. waiver of criminal prosecution vis-a-vis drug addicts and care of these persons in medical facilities that permit them to withdraw from the drug scene. This policy is accompanied by an intensive anti-drug campaign. Considerable success has already been reported in some instances, which naturally will have to be reviewed by means of careful research. There is still no certainty that the reports of preliminary success in these programmes mean that we are on the right course. In any event, it is our view that positive weight should be given to the fact that experiments in drug policy are being conducted in many European countries. In the United States, by contrast, it seems that there is no leeway for this. Politics and the media defend the all-out war on drugs in a very dogmatic manner. For this reason, it seems increasingly important to me that the US at least comes to grips with the tests and research being carried out in Europe related to this issue.

3 Presently, we have an intensive debate whether the extreme increase of violence shown on television, as well as in video films and movies, is one main cause for a marked rise in youth violence in recent years. One interesting hypothesis purports that violence, as conveyed by films, has a negative impact on those types of youths, who have failed to develop a clear self-concept of themselves and a feeling of self-confidence due to desolate family conditions,
and that these youths are to be classified as unstable and in jeopardy. According to that theory, unstable young men, who have not found any positive role models in their lives, choose concepts of aggressive conduct from the mass media as a model and lose their inhibition toward attaining their goals with brutality. In the meantime, the first research results are available that support this thesis. Should research continue to confirm this assertion then there would be good reason for close cooperation with the United States. The majority of films, suspected of sharing responsibility for the rise in youth violence, were mainly manufactured in the United States.

4 The importance attached to the death penalty in the US is very disconcerting to many Europeans. Critics of American practice view this as a sign of the government's weakness and of a profound insecurity in American society. They interpret the support of the death penalty among a majority of the American population as evidence of a lack of positive vision in your country on how one should adequately respond to the present problems of crime. Over the past few weeks, I have had the opportunity to follow the election campaign in your country and especially to follow television debates which primarily focused on issues involving criminal policy. I got the impression that not only is your country in a crisis regarding criminal policy, but rather that the general political culture is in a deep crisis. The manner in which politicians debated the death penalty (or the usefulness of long term sentences) in the media was not worthy of this great nation. Cheap polemics replaced factual argument. The fact that especially in the US excellent empirical research projects have been conducted on the issue of whether tougher sentencing or the use of the death penalty has a deterrent effect seems to be totally forgotten in your country. When dealing with these crucial issues, the counsel of scientific experts is indeed no longer sought. Hence it seems that American criminology, at least in this area, no longer has any influence on government policy and the mass media.

European countries can possibly offer ideas on how to counteract the alienation between science, practice and criminal policy, as is presently observable in the US. In Germany, for example, criminology is offered across the board at law schools as a discipline and as an examination subject. The result of this practice is that a large number of law students, who are interested in criminal justice, thoroughly examine the findings of empirical criminology. This may be one essential factor which supports the fact that German criminal judges use the prison sentence in an essentially more reserved manner than their American colleagues and that a large majority of criminal judges oppose the concept of deterrence via the death penalty. An additional significant aspect seems to be that many criminologists in Germany closely cooperate with law
and judicial practitioners. Many of the associations, that promote continued training of judges and prosecuting attorneys as well as the implementation of practical reforms at the federal or state level, are headed by persons who work full-time as professors of criminology and criminal law. Many professors of criminal law also work as part-time judges. The previously mentioned model research programmes for testing new concepts in criminal policy are often jointly conceptualized and carried out by scientists and practitioners. For the past 20 years, the legislation passed by the German Parliament on criminal justice and criminal procedural law has profited to a major extent from this productive dialogue between science and practice.

In conclusion, I would like to come back to the thesis I mentioned earlier regarding a general crisis in your country's political culture. In this respect, my comments lack any scientific background. Rather they are based upon my personal perceptions which I acquired during many professional and private stays in America, between 1976 and 1994, in my capacity as a visitor who has been repeatedly attracted by your country's hospitality and openness. My first point is, that in my view the trend toward negative campaigning has significantly increased compared with the earlier campaigns. In this manner, politicians would appear to be sawing off the branch that they are sitting on. Conveying a negative image of competing candidates will generally cause the public to lose faith in the political system. To a great extent, the election campaign was self-destructive. Secondly, I gained an even stronger impression this time that apparently only extremely wealthy people can afford to run for the Congress or for governor. In pursuing the thought that less than 40% of the voting electorate turned out for the last election, it would seem to me that one is entitled to ask whether the United States is moving from a system of democracy to a system of oligarchy, i.e., into a nation ruled by a few who have large private wealth at their disposal. A wealthy person has the ability to influence public opinion by buying a lot of advertising time, without first needing to attract anybody to his views for purposes of fund raising. In this way a person without any political background or political base can manipulate voters through the media. It may be of interest to Americans, that campaigns of our political parties are to a large extent financed by tax revenues. I was especially taken aback by the fact that most Americans seem to have become accustomed to a very low election turnout. The danger is obviously underestimated, that within the minority who vote, radical factions attain much greater influence than they should have according to the number of their supporters. Apparently it is accepted that the majority of the population, and especially the lower class, has turned its back on the government. I have not been able to perceive a revival of a creative debate on how the vast majority
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of people over 18 could gain access to voting booths via an amendment of voting laws or by other means. Many apparently fail to realize that the US is in the process of an ongoing estrangement from the grand ideals of its constitution.

The loss of the integrative power of the American election system, which I have perceived, may moreover definitely attain criminological significance. The less the impoverished segments of the population consider themselves represented by politics, the less they have hope of relying on the political process, the greater the danger is, that they will attempt to emerge from their problematical life's situation in an egoistic and criminal manner.

I have written to you in such a detailed manner because what I have observed during my last two visits to the United States has filled me with major concern. We in Europe, and especially we Germans, have a lot for which we must thank your country. The United States brought freedom and democracy to Germany. The generous Marshall Plan indeed created the conditions for the German post-war Economic Miracle and for Germany's becoming again a respected member in the international community. For this reason the decline of political culture which presently characterizes your country deeply affects me. I am writing to you because I have great confidence in your personal integrity and your ability to openly come to grips with criticism.

Very truly yours,

Professor Christian Pfeiffer, Ph.D.
Director

'No answer!' came the reply

I originally wrote the letter, reprinted above in a slightly shortened version, in November 1994 on a return flight from the USA. I had just heard a speech by the US Attorney General, Janet Reno, on the relationship between crime policy and criminology, which she gave to the American Society of Criminology Congress in Miami. The speech, I must say, was a very good one. Mrs. Reno focused primarily on the issue of how to prevent juvenile delinquency and on the need for closer cooperation between those combating crime in practice and those doing research. Among the appeals she made to her audience was that they should strive to deepen the interchange of experience with criminologists all around the world. There were many points on which I simply had to agree with Janet Reno. Yet at the same time, her speech left me very disappointed. I had expected her to address the real problems of American policy on crime: such
problems as the debate on the right approach to drug policy, the drastic increase in the number of prisoners, the impact of the 'three strikes and you are out' ruling, or the rapid increase in the number of death sentences passed. In the event, she did not have one word to say about any of these problems which cause us mounting concern in Europe. And that was the reason why I wrote my letter.

To begin with, the response was one of silence. About two months later I received a reply from a member of Mrs. Reno's staff, thanking me for my 'thoughtful letter' in her name. Yet none of the questions I had raised were even mentioned. In November 1995, I again attended the ASC's Annual Congress. I made use of the opportunity while in Boston to give copies of my letter to another sixteen American professors of criminology several of whom I have known very well for many years. Another three months have now passed, and not one of them has responded.

Why do these critical questions produce such a stony silence? Is it because they are being posed by a German criminologist? Does it hurt Americans' patriotic feelings to have someone from outside diagnose a deep-seated crisis in their policy toward criminality and ask if democracy in America is not gradually being transformed into an oligarchy? Or, alternatively, should I treat the lack of response as one of tacit agreement?

Another reason why I have been concerned at the non-response is that the alarming signals coming out of the USA have not slackened off since I wrote the letter. Death sentences are being pronounced more frequently. There are now 2,800 people sitting in US prisons waiting for the day when their death sentence is exacted, or commuted. The number of prisoners overall has risen still further. Since 1980 the number of inmates in prisons and local jails had already tripled to a figure of more than 1.5 million in 1994. Nor is any end to this trend in sight. At one of the panel discussions during the Boston congress, it was stated that more than 3,000 people have now been sentenced to life imprisonment in California under the 'three strikes and you are out' rule. Had events such as these been reported from countries such as Cuba or Singapore, we Europeans might not feel threatened. But they were not: the story came from the western world's leading power that a court in California had passed a life sentence against a man who broke into a pizzeria. Nor can we console ourselves with the thought that this was just one judge who had made a harsh decision. He was compelled by law to pass such a sentence because it was the third time the accused had come before the court charged with a felonious offence. What is more, the whole country saw or heard of this happening without protesting. This is what we in Europe find so portentous: the fact that the American public has grown so indifferent to such a serious breach of the principle that the punishment should always fit the crime.
On the other hand, something else which became clear to me at the ASC Congress in Boston, was that such excesses of repression are still only one side of the coin in American policy on crime. Thankfully, we still have the other side which symbolizes the American power of innovation and social creativity. Good examples of this are provided by projects against family violence, or by the community-policing strategy in which the police forces of a growing number of American cities have been awarded a central role in crime prevention. The police force identifies and publicly names the social causes of criminality, it develops concepts on how citizens' sense of security could be enhanced, it seeks out cooperating parties to set about solving the problems identified, and it makes sure that people in the cities do not just talk endlessly about these things, but that prevention programmes really are implemented. Evidently, this 'problem-solving approach' is now far enough down the line to be able to point to its first successes. The recent decline in crime recorded by the police in a number of big cities in the USA is attributed by many experts to the community-policing approach. So both the repressive excesses on the one hand and the constructive approaches taken to dealing with family violence and community prevention strategies on the other ought to give us here in Europe good reason to intensify our dialogue with colleagues in North America. However, a constructive debate cannot develop unless our counterparts break their silent response to critical comments and questions.

A comment by professor Ezzat A. Fattah

As a Canadian criminologist I am dismayed, though not surprised, at the lack of response from the United States Attorney General and American criminologists to Professor Christian Pfeiffer's insightful and well-meaning letter. I am not surprised because I personally encountered the same reaction when I voiced criticism of the US criminal policy, particularly with regard to the death penalty or drugs. The US might pride itself that criminology as a social science and as an academic discipline is much more developed there than in continental Europe. But in the matter of criminal policy the US surely has a lot to learn from many European countries where criminological research is poorly or relatively underfunded. As Professor Pfeiffer's letter clearly illustrates, the American superiority complex is clearly unjustified. But no foreigner is supposed to tell US politicians what to do or what not to do. The US does not accept or take

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advice from non-Americans. The result of this outright rejection of external criticism and insights in an age of universalism and extensive international exchange, is detrimental to American criminal policy which reflects both arrogance and ignorance.

American politicians see nothing wrong in lecturing Singapore on its use of the cane to punish offenders, or China on its repression of human rights activists, but no one should criticize the US for clinging to a barbaric practice such as the death penalty, for executing offenders clearly suffering from mental disabilities, killers who were juveniles when they committed their crimes, or blacks who were defended by incompetent legal aid lawyers, etcetera. No one should be critical of the US rate of imprisonment, the highest in the Western world, the record number of offenders sitting on death row, the thousands of petty criminals sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment under the ridiculous laws of ‘three strikes and you are out’.

Countries like the US which are fond of taking the moral high ground should be more open to external criticism and would be much better off with a little soul searching. Those unwilling to accept constructive criticism and who shut their ears and their eyes to any advice from Europeans, Asians, or Canadians should have a close look into their own back yard before preaching to others. Such a look might help sensitize them to their moral daltonism. It was disgusting to recently hear a leading politician, (Mr. Jesse Helms), from a country that is willing to trade with dictators, human rights violators, oligarchical regimes, whenever it suits its political and economic interests, lecturing Canada on the immorality of trading with Cuba!

This is why no criminologist should remain indifferent to the US blatant and persistent attempts to force other countries to follow its insane, ineffective and costly drug prohibition policy. Criminologists world wide should also unite in their condemnation of barbaric practices such as the death penalty or prison chain gangs, inhumane prison conditions, discriminatory justice practices, whether they are taking place in the most powerful state in the world or anywhere else.

Fortunately, despite Canada's geographical proximity to the US and despite Canadians wide exposure to the American media, we have not been swept by the punitive wave that seems to have engulfed the US. In fact, as Canadian criminologists we are constantly able to use the example of our southern neighbour to show that harsh criminal policies and an extensive use of imprisonment are not the answer to the crime problem and that they do not alleviate public concern or public worry about crime. We are also able to use the US as a case in point in order to illustrate that harshness breeds harshness while mildness breeds mildness. It is surely telling that the resumption of executions in the US (after ten years of de facto abolition)
Crisis in American criminal policy?

and having almost three thousand inmates on death row has not altered the fact that the American criminal homicide rate is four times that of Canada, a country where no executions have taken place for over three decades and where the death penalty was abolished 'de jure' twenty years ago. Despite the absence of conclusive evidence one cannot but wonder whether some causal link exists between drug prohibition, wide accessibility to firearms, violence in the media, and the extremely high rate of criminal homicide in the US. As a Canadian, it is certainly a cause of worry to me, as it is for Professor Pfeiffer as a German, that the main exporter of violent movies and television programmes is the US. Surely, if violence in the media does have a contagious or a desensitizing effect then the US should bear the largest share of responsibility for the development of violent criminals whose violence could be traced directly to the violent models they have watched with admiration in movie theatres or on television. I doubt that anyone could maintain that American movies containing gory violence and extremely bloody scenes have any redeeming social value or are bearers of a positive cultural message. While devoid of any redeeming features, it is possible that they do have negative effects on young impressionable individuals who are in their formative years.

Any attempt to defend present American criminal policies or to deny that a major crisis in the US justice and penal systems exists is tantamount to hiding one's head in the sand and pretending that everything is fine and dandy. Sadly, Americans' perception of their superiority, a perception reinforced by the demise of the socialist block, has rendered them even more unresponsive than before to any external criticism. The way Professor Pfeiffer's letter was treated by the US Attorney General and by American criminologists exemplifies this haughty, insensitive and disdainful attitude. Unfortunately, it is an attitude that can be disastrous in many instances, particularly in areas such as criminal policy where the US has a lot to learn from European countries and Canada.

A comment by Michael R. Gottfredson

Professor Pfeiffer's concerns about the direction of some of the policy relating crime and justice in the United States and the apparent lack of impact of criminological research on policy are, without question, shared by many academic criminologists in the United States. Whether some aspects of this trend are sufficient to describe the policy as in crisis or to infer that there is a

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general crisis in the political culture of the United States is, to my mind, a good deal more questionable. There is today in the United States a lively debate, sometimes informed by social science research, at other times resting more strongly on political values, concerning nearly every aspect of crime policy mentioned in Professor Pfeiffer's letter. Although I was unable to attend the annual meetings of the American Society of Criminology to which Professor Pfeiffer makes reference, it would surprise me if those meetings were not full of panels and debates concerning contemporary crime policy – including the death penalty, drug policy, gun control, alternatives to incarceration, and policing strategies.

I do know that the Society has an active policy committee and that it seeks to integrate policy-makers and those involved in academic criminology into the Society itself. This is a very welcome stance and one that has enlivened the Society and its meetings. I believe that the impact of academic criminology on policy in the United States has been substantial in recent years. I also believe that much of the advice that the research community has offered to policy-makers (or, at least, seemed to have offered) has been wrong. The trend toward determinate sentencing, increased use of the death penalty, abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal, the putative advantages of incapacitation, variations in policing styles, and the war on drugs as a crime reduction strategy are all policies that have some support in academic criminology. I read the research literature differently and find little support for such policies, but there can be no doubt that influential criminologists disagree and have influenced criminal justice policy in the United States.

One problem, of course, is that many of these policy debates cannot be said to be settled yet on scientific grounds. For example, my own view is that the causal role asserted by Professor Pfeiffer concerning media violence on the aggression of youth is overstated; I also believe that the incapacitative and deterrent effects of imprisonment are marginal, at best. I believe that considerable social and behavioural research supports my views, but I am also aware that many academic criminologists disagree. In the face of lively debates within academic criminology about these matters, it is perhaps not surprising that the political community might adopt advice from the research community that is consistent with their ideas. Thus, the idea that prisons deter and incapacitate at levels that makes their increased use sound public policy is an idea favoured by many politicians and supported by some academic criminologists. I believe that both are wrong but do not see the adoption of such policies as evidence of either policy crises or something fundamentally our of sorts in the political culture. Short-term solutions to pressing political problems are nearly always appealing to politicians.
The very high level of crime, and its persistence, is a matter of great public concern and it is small wonder that the political community seeks quick answers to the problem. I believe that such answers will always be unsatisfactory, because the causes of crime and delinquency set the crime rate in motion long before the criminal justice system can reasonably be expected to take effect. The short-term solutions will be expensive (in many ways) and tend to deflect attention from the longer term solutions. On the other hand, I also increasingly detect policy consistent with research that I find valid. And, much of this research has strong roots in European criminology. The crime as opportunity movement, developed most impressively by the Research and Planning Unit of the Home Office has an impact. So too have studies and commentaries about drug use; nearly every discussion of drug policy now cites the drug policies undertaken in the Netherlands and much interest centres on the experiments now taking place in Switzerland. The international self-report and victimization studies are among the most sophisticated and interesting examples of basic research and will, I have no doubt, add critical data to policy-relevant theories.

There is more reason for optimism: if the crime control policies currently favoured are truly inconsistent with the facts about crime and its causes they will, sooner or later, tell on themselves. Serious reductions in the levels of crime and violence will not, I am convinced, be attributed to incarceration strategies or even to different types of policing. Politicians will then look elsewhere (I detect that movement already in the United States) and then, perhaps, the research I find convincing will convince them as well. The increased use of the death penalty is, by my observation, more closely associated with retributive instincts than with deterrence; I am afraid that reductions in the death penalty will be favoured by the public only when crime ceases to be of such great concern. The dilemma is that that is only likely, in my view, once the true causes of crime are addressed more fundamentally in our policy. As for the general decline in political culture, negative campaigns, alienation of the lower classes and a complacent electorate – things may not be quite as bad as suggested by Professor Pfeiffer. After all, the two most likely candidates for the Presidency in the fall of 1996 come from working-class backgrounds. The candidate with the greatest personal wealth and the one who made most use of negative campaigning dropped out of the race very early.
A comment by Matti Joutsen

Prof Christian Pfeiffer's open letter to Attorney General Janet Reno is an eloquent expression of the dismay many non-American criminologists feel when they look at recent developments in the United States.

I would like to emphasize at the outset that I share Prof. Pfeiffer's concerns: the prevailing mood among American politicians and the American public bodes ill for attempts to develop a more rational and humane criminal policy. (That is, to the extent that one can speak of a criminal policy in a country where so much takes place on the state and local level.) Perhaps of even more concern to Western Europe is the fact that the US strongly influences developments elsewhere. Here in Western Europe, we need be far less concerned that the same punitive orientation has developed throughout much of Eastern Europe and in many other countries: those responsible for criminal policy in Western Europe have so far not looked east for their models.

Having said that, I am not surprised that Prof. Pfeiffer's letter did not arouse much of a response. There are three reasons for this.

First, I have no doubt that Ms. Reno is very much aware that American criminal policy is in a crisis, and that new approaches must be tried. Indeed, this seemed to have been the essence of her message to the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Society of Criminology (ASC) in Miami. The problems that Prof. Pfeiffer points to are all well documented by the National Institute of Justice, which reports to the Attorney General. As Prof. Pfeiffer himself notes, there has been much innovative research and many promising pilot projects in the United States; some of these have been funded by the NIJ.

Also, Ms Reno probably gets a large number of letters, faxes, e-mail messages and other correspondence each working day. I would say that the response Prof. Pfeiffer did receive, a polite (and presumably standard) 'thank you for your thoughtful letter' from a member of Ms Reno's staff is about par for the course.

Second, some issues that Prof Pfeiffer raises – the use of negative campaigning, the fact that rich people can buy their way into office (a debatable point – at least Ross Perot and Steve Forbes have had difficulties here!) and the alienation of large sectors of the public from politics – are not issues that the Attorney General is in a position to deal with.

Third and perhaps most importantly, after having drawn attention to these problems, Prof. Pfeiffer does not offer any specific solutions to what are, after
all, quite intractable problems. He notes, in turn, the rapidly increasing use of prisons, the punitive sentencing policy for drug crimes, the amount of violence in the media and the use of capital punishment, but his suggestions to Ms Reno are limited (in effect) to do not sentence so many people to prison, depenalize (as opposed to decriminalize) some drug crimes, try to reduce violence in the media and do not sentence so many people to death. (Other problems which he does not raise, but which might be noted as well, are the proliferation of legal and illegal firearms, the general development of a ‘culture of violence’, and the deleterious impact of racial tension and poverty.)

Furthermore, it is true that Ms Reno can influence criminal policy in the United States by attempting to change federal legislation and by influencing the allocation of resources. However, it may be that she is not sufficiently convinced that the present criminal policy is in need of such radical change. The failure of the present criminal policy in the United States is not as self-evident as Prof. Pfeiffer would suggest. Audacious as this comment may seem to European criminologists, it can be argued that (especially given the cultural, political and other factors) there are more things right about US criminal policy than wrong.

One indicator that this may be the case is that crime rates in the United States appear to be going down. Prof. Pfeiffer notes that the ‘recent decline in crime recorded by the police in a number of big cities in the USA is attributed by many experts to the community-policing approach’. Others have argued that the new approaches in policing (e.g., identification of ‘hot spots’, working with gangs, the wider use of modern technology) are working. Still others (hard-line criminologists, politicians and practitioners) argue that the new punitive sentencing policies should be credited for the drop in crime. Clearly, research is needed to tease out the factors behind the drop in (reported) crime: which elements of the present policy seem to be working, which are not -- or is the drop largely the result of changed demographics?

Even if Ms Reno were convinced of the need to change the direction of American criminal justice, this may prove to be quite difficult. Leaving aside the dynamics of radical liberalization of criminal justice at a time when the 1996 political campaigns are heating up, it may be well-nigh impossible to ‘sell’ to the current Congress, for example, the depenalization of drug offences, or the junking of mandatory minimum sentences. Furthermore, as noted, Ms Reno can have only a limited and indirect impact on criminal policy at the state and local level.

Finally, it could be argued that the current punitive orientation in the United States is only part of a cyclical pattern. Criminal policy has gone through many swings in the US as well as elsewhere. One factor could be the economy: when times are bad, the public, politicians and practitioners appear to have a
tendency to become more punitive. I am optimistic enough to think that the present punitive swing in the US will come to a halt, and in time it will become ‘in’ to talk about fairness and moderation in the criminal justice system. (Which just shows you how much of a Pollyanna I can be.) Furthermore, as Prof. Pfeiffer himself has suggested, the US is quite a diverse country. It is easy to overlook the many very positive developments that are taking place in prevention schemes, in helping victims, in developing alternatives, in improving the efficiency of criminal justice agencies, in mediation and conflict-resolution, and so on. These developments, coupled by the strain that the huge prison population is already having on the national, state and local economy, may lead in time to greater rationality.

But to return to Prof. Pfeiffer’s underlying message, which is the need for closer interaction between policy and research, and for greater international exchange of research results and practical experience.

There are many reasons why the link between policy and research in the US is tenuous. Prof. Pfeiffer correctly notes the difference in the training of lawyers in Europe and the United States. He also notes the greater politicization of criminal policy in the US; one result of this is that those responsible for criminal policy must pay heed to many groups, not just the academic experts. Other factors that could be mentioned are that policy-makers are usually pressed to act immediately and do not have the luxury of being able to await the results of research; there are too many policy initiatives to allow research on more than just a few; there may be practical difficulties to implementing the policies suggested by research; and research cannot answer all the relevant questions.

However – as Prof. Pfeiffer had occasion to hear at the ASC Annual Meeting in Boston – the outlook is not that gloomy. There are clear signs that research has a long-term effect. This can be seen, for example, in the wide-spread disillusionment with coercive rehabilitation, and in the greater understanding that we have today of the dynamics of crime and victimization, and of the constraints on the criminal justice system. Furthermore, the current President of the ASC, Prof. Freda Adler, announced in Boston that the Society had assumed a new role in facilitating policy making in the United States: twelve task forces developed by the National Policy Committee have responded to the request of Attorney General Janet Reno for conclusions on the basis of research on a variety of topical issues.

As for the need for international exchange, Prof. Pfeiffer is completely right in suggesting that American criminology and criminal justice is quite insular. While US innovations and research have influenced criminology and criminal policy elsewhere, the exchange has long remained a one-way street. However, my own experience is that the times they are a-changing. The increasing
participation of foreign criminologists at the annual ASC and Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences meetings, the stream of visiting scholars to American universities, and the global reach of Internet is beginning to leave its mark: many leading American criminologists are becoming aware that even non-US research can provide the necessary tools for influencing policy.

A comment by René Lévy

1 Christian Pfeiffer gives, I think, a good summary of the aspects of American criminal policy which are the most disturbing for European observers. And if one believes in the common sense idea that what is happening in the US will sooner or later cross the Atlantic, there is indeed ground for serious worry! Indeed, many believe in France that some of our derelict suburban areas have already turned into American-type urban ghettos, despite the fact that homicide - to take but one indicator - remains exceptional.

If I had to define the present American situation, I would say that, as regards criminal policy, the US is in a state of complete disarray: it is as if everything had been tried and nothing ever worked. We, of course, know that everything has not been tried and that some things do work; and that is the message Chr. Pfeiffer is eager to convey to our American friends, urging them to 'stay cool', so to speak, and to turn to those specialists who know better, i.e. the criminologists.

However, I am not as surprised as Christian Pfeiffer that his kind proposal of help has not been welcomed, because this is a very commonsensical psychological reaction towards foreigners. First, one does not meddle in other people's business by giving unsolicited advice, especially one who does not live in the country and, therefore, has no direct and lasting experience of its criminality and daily fear of crime. Second, our American colleagues may feel that since criminological research is so much more developed in the US than in other countries, they have the widest available expertise (not to speak of the limited awareness to what happens outside the US).

2 That Christian Pfeiffer should be disconcerted by the present importance of the death penalty in the US surprises me. As the history of crime and punishment shows, a society which is terrified by crime, whether this terror is well founded or not, and which has a low expectation of catching the criminals,
almost always turns towards harsher penalties, and always favours incapacitation and deterrence of the criminal evil over other ends, especially – as George Rusche would have added – when there is no scarcity of manpower. Most of the available means to this effect have been attempted in the past, and there is not much left to try. The most efficient way, is of course the death penalty but it is difficult and even dangerous to use on a massive scale, as Ancien Régime government were well aware of, and even more so in democratic societies. Since transportation and penal servitude is no longer feasible, one is left with imprisonment only. Hence the trend, also manifest in France, to make it as long as possible, first by reducing the opportunities for early release by imposing a long mandatory duration of confinement; and second by lowering the threshold of life imprisonment (as in the ‘Three strikes ...’ system).

This increase in the length of prison sentences in France has been well documented by Pierre Tournier (1996). Since 1981, and even more so in recent years (1988-1995), the increase of the prison population has not been caused by an increasing number of convictions but by a greater severity of sentences: in other words, the annually number of people being imprisoned does not vary greatly, but they stay there longer and longer.

3 In fact, the present situation in the US, with its obsession with recidivism, is reminiscent of late 19th Century France. Given the limited range of solutions, it does not come as a surprise that in this climate past experiences are re-invented, albeit more or less unconsciously. The present ‘Three strikes and you are out’ trend is a case in point: although very few seem aware of it, it has been tried before. Following an act of 1885, any delinquent who, during a 10 year time-span, had been sentenced two to seven times, depending on the seriousness of the offence, was to be considered incorrigible and transported to a penal colony as a relégué. The relégation was thus a combination of banishment and transportation, which was mainly aimed at petty criminals (thieves, beggars and vagrants), since the tougher ones were routinely sentenced to hard labour abroad. Given the high mortality rate in the penal colonies, and especially in French Guyana (which became the main one after the New-Caledonia facility was closed at the very end of the 19th century), which earned the name of dry or green guillotine, and due to the fact that the survivors almost never earned enough to pay for their passage to France, most of the convicts or relégués never came back. The total number of convicts transported is estimated at 100,000 between 1848 and 1946, a quarter of them being relégués (Pierre, 1991). However, and this ought to be comforting, it is widely accepted among specialists that the relégation was much less effective in reducing recidivism at the turn of the century than the implementation of the suspended sentence
in 1891 (Schnapper, 1991). In France, at least, no one has ever proposed that this penalty be re-established, since its formal abolition in 1970.

To conclude on this point, I would not bet on the longevity of such a measure. Not (or not mainly) because it will arouse humanitarian feelings among the American people, but because of its enormous financial impact. The notoriously tax-shy Americans will soon realize that some less costly alternative ought to be found. It is here, perhaps, that criminologists have something to say.

4 Christian Pfeiffer is also correct, I think, in stressing the possible negative consequences of the present political system's functioning. However, he may miss the point here, in not addressing the issues of growing poverty, job insecurity, dwindling social benefits etcetera, which would seem much more relevant to criminology. If people become estranged from the political system is it not mainly because they increasingly lose control over the economic and social dimensions of their lives? This is an issue which is also very relevant to Europe.

5 Finally, I do not feel at ease with Christian Pfeiffer’s agenda for criminology. In my view the loss of influence of criminology in the area of policy-making is above all the failure of a certain kind of operational criminology. Unlike Pfeiffer and Reno, I do not think that criminal policy, law enforcement and criminology research ought to join into 'the interest of effectively combating criminality'. Our primary goal is certainly not to define the criminal policy agenda, even less to combat crime, which are the duties of administrators, and above all, of politicians. Our goal is a long-term one, it is to develop and to disseminate knowledge of what societies choose to treat as crime, the way they do it and the reasons why. In this way, we may help those in charge of government ask the right questions and understand the implications of various possible answers; in a democracy, however, the choice of the latter is left to them.

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A comment by Wesley G. Skogan

Christian Pfeiffer's thoughtful letter to Attorney General Reno touches on many important themes. It is difficult to find fault with much of what he says, both in the sections that deal with criminological matters and elsewhere in his letter. The frustration that he expresses with the seeming unwillingness of America's political system to confront its policy choices with 'the facts' in several major instances are no different from the frustrations felt by the rest of us - except that our experience with this indifference has lasted much longer, and perhaps we have grown more accustomed to it.

It is important to understand a few features of criminal policy making in the United States, and how they contribute to this situation. First, there is not much national criminal policy at all. The length of sentences, arrangements for early release, the rate at which prisons are constructed, who gets put to death, and the penalties for drug offences are decided by 51 different legislatures. The federal government (one of the 51) deals with a very tiny fraction of criminal offences, and less than ten percent of prisoners. Federal policy for the states consists of offering them money to do things, which is a very blunt policy instrument. Attorney General Reno is offering them money to do community policing, which Christian Pfeiffer rightly applauds; the other large pot of federal money supports prison construction, and that was a gift of the legislative rather than the executive branch of government. Almost all of the policy action is in the fifty state legislatures.

Similarly, what national policy there is is not pronounced by the Attorney General. The federal Congress is almost fully staffed by lawyers, a lot of them former prosecutors (a very political, locally elected position in the United States), and they have firmer opinions about criminal policy than about most other issues. We have divided government, not a unitary parliamentary system, and law enforcement is one policy domain in which this really has consequences.

We also have a political system in which public opinion counts a great deal. Those fifty state legislatures are also filled with lawyers (even more so than the national Congress) who live in the community and are only part-time politicians. They reflect grass-roots concerns, not high policy or even much 'ideology', at least in European terms. They know (for example) that public support for the death penalty is high and growing, and that is enough for them.

They are organized via an intensely conservative party system. A colleague at my university can document that both American political parties are about the
most conservative parties in the Western industrial world. It really does not matter which is in power, at least when it comes to crime. That is what the voting public wants, too. No American politician wants anyone to get to their right on a crime issue, and no American politician is going to take the lead pursuing serious drug policy reform. They want to keep their jobs.

Attorney General Reno's personal unresponsiveness to Christian Pfeiffer's letter? Well, it's a big country, and there are a very large number of people running around with the title 'criminologist' and willing to give policy advice. I suspect The General (her official title, which she hates) does not have a good system for screening and assessing the quality of all of that advice, and the prominent status of someone like Christian Pfeiffer would be difficult for her staff to assess. Attorney General Reno's gracious expressions of interest in research have been paralleled in my memory only by Edwin Meese, who was Attorney General under Ronald Reagan. He was an even more charming politician, and he made significant contributions to research by protecting the National Institute of Justice (the federal source of funding for criminological research), its leadership, and the autonomy of its research agenda, in an administration that was not very receptive to university researchers. But nothing that Christian Pfeiffer is concerned about was any different under the Reagan administration, either. This points again to the importance of the federal structure and conservative politics of crime policy in the United States, and not to the misfeasance of whoever happens to be in office.
International Police Training Conference
Birmingham, England, 31 August to 5 September, 1996

Police officers from around the world will be converging on Birmingham this summer for a major training conference, the first of its kind to be staged outside North America. The International Association of Women Police will stage its annual training conference in the city, which is expected to attract 800 delegates. West Midlands Police Chief Constable Sir Ronald Hadfield is the President of the event, which is aimed at improving standards in police forces around the world.

Members of the IAWP meet annually to discuss solutions to today's policing problems. Subjects for the 1996 event range from multi-national policing in Bosnia, Policing the Channel Tunnel and its trains, domestic violence from the male perspective to perceived images of policewomen in the media. Another first for the association is the announcement that officers from Pakistan, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe will be attending the conference for the first time in the IAWP's history. Delegates from the USA, Canada and Europe will also be at the event, which features a major input from the European Network for Policewomen (ENP), an organization based in the Netherlands.

West Midlands Police officer, Sergeant Carolyn Williamson is Conference Director for the event which has the theme 'Quality Policing into the 21st Century'. 'This is the first time in 33 years that the conference will have been held outside North America and is a great achievement for the West Midlands', she said. 'As well as attracting policewomen from around the world, there will also be policemen and delegates from other agencies, such as the prison service'. 'It gives officers the chance to share ideas and experiences about law enforcement and enhance their knowledge, as well as meeting colleagues from around the world'.

The International Association of Women Police was founded in 1915 in Los Angeles, USA and began holding annual training conferences in 1962. Its members work together to increase professionalism in Police work, further the use of women in law enforcement and the police service, and provide a forum for sharing ideas and development. The 1996 conference is financed by IAWP contributions, delegate fees
and sponsorship from commercial companies. The British Association of Women Police is affiliated to the IAWP and the Conference Director, Sergeant Carolyn Williamson and officer with West Midlands Police, is secretary to the BAWP. The BAWP bid against Dallas, USA to stage the 1996 conference and Birmingham was chosen for its central location and excellent facilities.

The European Network for Police-women was founded in 1988 and has a conference every two years. Based in the Netherlands, the ENP was set up to promote equality within the Police Service.

For full details and application forms to attend the Conference contact
- Police Constable Maria Houlihan
  c/o Sydenham Police Station
  179 Dartmouth Road
  Sydenham
  London SE26, England
  telephone 0181 699 3263, or
- Sergeant Carolyn Williamson
  c/o The International Police Training Conference
  West Midlands Police
  P.O. Box 52
  Birmingham B4 6NQ, England
  telephone and fax 0121 236 0431.
Crime institute profile

National Institute of Justice, US Department of Justice

As the research arm of the United States Department of Justice, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) sponsors research and evaluation with the aim of preventing and reducing crime and improving the operations of the criminal justice system. Established as part of omnibus national anti-crime legislation enacted in 1968, NIJ also conducts studies that contribute to the understanding of criminal behaviour, sponsors demonstration or ‘pilot’ projects that employ innovative or promising approaches in criminal justice, and identifies new issues emerging in the field. Developing new technologies and adopting existing technologies to assist law enforcement and investigations are also part of the NIJ mission, as is disseminating research findings and related information through the most advanced methods of communication. NIJ also administers a clearinghouse of criminal justice information, the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), whose data base and reference and referral services are accessible worldwide.

This profile will concentrate on the period of September 1994 to September 1995 which featured a number of milestones for NIJ. The Institute's commemoration of its 25th year of operation offered a vantage point from which to view past accomplishments, while enactment of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (the 'Crime Act'), the largest anti-crime bill in US history, provided a stimulus for further activity. NIJ also took a major step toward expanding its role as a member of the international criminal justice research community when in May 1995 it formally joined the network of criminological research institutes affiliated with the United Nations. Membership came at a propitious time, as NIJ has recently been taking steps to more actively promote the exchange of criminal justice information worldwide, most notably through the use of the Internet.

Research and project activities

The number of grants awarded by National Institute of Justice increased substantially in the reporting period (from 92 in the preceding year to 173),
in part because of the new initiatives of the Crime Act. The availability of these grants to criminal justice scholars and others was announced in the institute's research plan (NIJ Research Plan, 1995-1996) and in 15 special solicitations for research and evaluation published subsequently. Grants are awarded in a highly competitive process in which the proposals submitted are assessed through rigorous peer review.

**Areas of focus**

In general, the awards were made for projects that reflect the six goals that have characterized the Institute's research agenda for the past several years: reduce violent crime, reduce drug- and alcohol-related crime, reduce the consequences of crime, improve the effectiveness of crime prevention programmes, improve law enforcement and the criminal justice system, and develop new technology for law enforcement and the criminal justice system.

NIJ also sponsored studies in certain areas covered by the Crime Act (examined below) and continued its focus on violence (particularly youth violence), family violence, and substance abuse. For example, NIJ documented how plentiful and easily obtained firearms are in major urban areas of the United States, and how regularly they are used. NIJ evaluative research also demonstrated that intensive, directed police patrols can help reduce gun-related crime. Recognizing that violence has become a public health issue, NIJ is working with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to address firearms violence among young people. Along with several other US government agencies, NIJ has developed an information resource to locate anti-violence programmes operating all over the country. This resource, the Partnerships Against Violence Network (PAVNET), is available electronically.

Drug-related offending is responsible for much of the increase in the US prison population in recent years, and a major factor in youth violence. An example of NIJ's response is attempts to identify innovative mechanisms that complement traditional enforcement and sanctions. One promising innovation is the use of eviction proceedings, which an NIJ study showed to be effective in ousting drug dealers from residences and commercial properties. With enforcement remaining a crucial aspect of drug control, NIJ is studying mapping technology, which generates information about 'hot spots' of drug activity in specific locales.

Because the empowerment of communities is a linchpin of community policing, NIJ is sponsoring studies of anti-crime initiatives based in local areas. An example is an NIJ evaluation of a public-private collaboration to assist residents of public housing in making their neighbourhood safer. NIJ is also examining 'community courts', which help ensure accountability of
the offender to the community; and 'community prosecution', which helps prosecutors respond to the grass-roots public safety demands of neighbourhood residents.

**Budget**

For the reporting period (which coincides with the US federal government's fiscal year), the appropriation from the US Congress totalled $27 million. Of this amount, $11 million was for social science research, $9 million for research in and development of science- and technology-based solutions to criminal justice problems, and $7 million for programme development and dissemination of information.

**Technical cooperation and advisory services**

Many of the grants awarded in response to the solicitations NIJ published separately deal with research and evaluation related to the Crime Act. Among the programmes established by the Act are those in community policing, treatment drug courts, corrections (with the emphasis on boot camps), and violence against women. In each of these areas, the institute will be conducting evaluative studies to measure the efficacy of the programmes established and will also conduct related research. A number of these studies (on violence against women, for example) are specifically mandated by the Crime Act.

To aid and promote the worldwide exchange of criminal justice information, NIJ continues to administer the International Document Exchange (IDE) programme. In the past year the IDE welcomed four new members, and now has a total of 105 in 50 countries. To develop and promote online search and retrieval of criminal justice information, NIJ has been active in a number of areas in the reporting period. With the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch and the Mitre Corporation, NIJ is developing UNOJUST, a system that will electronically link and make available via the Internet the information housed in the Branch-affiliated research institutes. In a special project continuing this year, NIJ is helping the states of the former Soviet Union and other countries to find information about how to build institutions based on the foundation of law. The International Rule of Law Online Clearinghouse Project (ROL), as this project is called, is an electronic library for the exchange of this and related information.

At the Ninth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in spring 1995, NIJ representatives demonstrated how electronic communications technology can help disseminate information and link criminal justice practitioners, government administrators and officials, and researchers.
Conferences and meetings

In the reporting period, NIJ sponsored 45 conferences, meetings, and focus group sessions, notably including its annual conference on research and evaluation. Featured speakers included US Attorney General Janet Reno; Lee Brown, head of President Clinton's Office of Drug Control Policy; and such prominent criminal justice scholars as Alfred Blumstein, Douglas Lipton, and Jeffrey Fagan.

The services and resources of NCJRS were exhibited at 41 conferences/meetings held at various locations throughout the United States and abroad. The items and services exhibited included NIJ publications and grant opportunities, NCJRS reference and referral services, and information regarding online services. Among the conferences at which NCJRS was represented, was the Ninth United Nations Conference on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Other than NIJ, the professional, scholarly, and government organizations sponsoring these conferences included, among others, the American Society of Criminology, the American Jail Association, the National Sheriffs Association, the National District Attorneys Association, the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, the American Public Health Association, the United States Conference of Mayors, and the National Organization for Victim Assistance.

Information dissemination and publication services

In the reporting period, NIJ published 96 documents, including full reports of research and evaluation projects funded, summary reports, accounts of specific programmes in locales throughout the country, conference proceedings and reports, the NIJ Journal, the NIJ publications catalogues, the research plan and separate requests for research, the reports of the Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) programme, and such special publications as the report on the 25th anniversary of the founding of the institute. Some of these publications were prepared in collaboration with other US government agencies.

In the same period, 6,600 requests were made from outside the US for documents published by NIJ and the other bureaus of the US Department of Justice's Office of Justice Programs (Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and Office for Victims of Crime).

Online information services

In addition to the developments described above, NIJ has recently made a number of other advances that streamline, expand, and speed communication
through the use of electronic information technology. All NIJ documents are now published electronically and the 'backlist' of previously published documents is being converted to online availability. Accessibility is through NCJRS, which recently expanded online service. The NCJRS electronic bulletin board, the gateway to much of the information, is accessible via modem and the Internet, and the NCJRS Justice Information Center is accessible via the World Wide Web. These advances make it possible for users to download documents from terminals anywhere in the world, to order documents, and to obtain reference and referral assistance. The NCJRS International Overview and Guide was updated in November 1994 to include information on NCJRS online services available by modem and the Internet.

In February 1995, NIJ began publishing Justinfo, a twice-monthly electronic newsletter of information about recent research findings in criminal justice and related information about programmes and services of the institute and the other bureaus of the Office of Justice Programs of the US Department of Justice.¹ Justinfo now has some 1,500 subscribers in the US and other countries.

Resources

Staff
The institute's staff now consists of 61 people, an increase of almost 50 percent over the previous year. About 10 percent are administrative/support staff.

Organization
The institute consists of three divisions: Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE), Office of Science and Technology (OST), and Office of Development and Dissemination (ODD). The two divisions of ORE consist of Crime Control and Prevention, and Criminal Justice and Criminal Behavior. Within ODD are two divisions: one dedicated to publications and other dissemination activities, and the other to establishing pilot programmes, disseminating information about innovations in the field of criminal justice, and spotlighting emerging issues. Under consideration is the establishment of a third division – on international activities. Under the aegis of the OST, NIJ recently expanded its efforts in science and technology by establishing the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center. With regional centres located throughout the United States, the centre functions as the hub for information about law

¹ Justinfo is available on a subscription basis. To subscribe, send an e-mail to listproc@aspeinsys.com leave the subject line blank, and in the body of the message type 'subscribe justinfo' and your name (e.g.: 'subscribe justinfo john doe').
enforcement equipment, equipment testing, and equipment standards, and on evaluations, and data base development for law enforcement.

Funding
The institute is funded by the US federal government, with some of the research supported by NIJ through partnerships with various federal government agencies. In the past year NIJ's technology initiatives were augmented by a major appropriation by the US Congress of $37.5 million to the US Department of Defense to aid in adapting military technologies to domestic law enforcement use. These funds have supported projects developed under a memorandum of understanding between the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice. In the reporting period, some resources have come from the 1994 Crime Act.

Further information about the National Institute of Justice may be obtained by writing to the National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Attention Eric Kline, International Information Specialist, PO. Box 600, Rockville, Maryland, 20849-6000, USA. E-mail address (Internet) is ekline@ncjrs.aspensys.com.
Abstracts

This section contains a selection of abstracts of reports and articles on criminal policy and research in Europe. The aim of publishing these short summaries is to generate and disseminate information on the crime problem in Europe. Articles that generate comparative knowledge are seen as being of special interest. Most of the articles have been published in other journals in the English language.

More information can be supplied by the RDC Documentation Service. Single copies of the articles mentioned in this section can – when used for individual study or education – be provided by the RDC Documentation Service at your request. A copy charge is made.

RDC Documentation Service
P.O. Box 20301
2500 EH The Hague, The Netherlands
Tel: (31 70) 3706553;
fax: (31 70) 3707948

Albrecht, H.-J.
Ethnic minorities, culture conflicts and crime
Since the mid-sixties the debate among German criminologists has centred around the impact of cultural conflict on deviance and crime. Research in this area is restricted to individual level explanations of behaviour. There is, however, another avenue provided by culture conflict theories. This paper describes the contemporary German situation and suggests that shared values and collective morals are no longer the nucleus of stability in modern industrial societies; they have been replaced by a material culture. When large proportions of the population are denied access to this material culture, the potential for a collective reaction increases. Violent behaviour is then justified by the assertion that culture or national identities are being defended. Thus, collective reactions might lead to cultural conflicts between groups and go beyond individual violent acts or other types of deviance.

Crawford, A., M. Jones
Kirkholt revisited: some reflections on the transferability of crime prevention initiatives
Little attention has been paid to the transferability of 'successful' crime prevention projects. The Kirkholt Burglary Prevention Project has been hailed by academics and policy-makers as one of the most successful crime prevention projects undertaken in the United Kingdom. In this paper Crawford and Jones report on an ethnographic research case study of a crime prevention project which sought to transfer the mechanisms – both processual and those aimed at desired preventative outcomes – used in the Kirkholt Project to a different location. In doing so they develop a critique of dominant understandings of what constitutes 'success', 'multi-agency cooperation' and 'evaluation' in the field of crime prevention.
Eijken, T.W.M., R.F. Meijer
Prevalence and prevention of crime against businesses in the Netherlands
Crime is considered to be a serious problem by Dutch businesses and the incidence rate is high. Besides this, not only the economic, but also the social costs are considerable. After a short overview of commercial crime surveys in several countries the crime (prevention) situation of the Netherlands is depicted. The goal of the article is to give insight in the prevalence and prevention of crime against businesses in the Netherlands.

Franke, H.
The Emancipation of Prisoners: a Socio-Historical Analysis of the Dutch Prison Experience
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1995
Compared with most European countries, the Netherlands send few of its convicted criminals to prison, and those who are imprisoned have more rights and better treatment than their European counterparts. In this seminal study, criminologist Herman Franke presents the 'Dutch case'. Examining imprisonment in the Netherlands from the end of the Eighteenth century to the modern day, he gives a close historical and sociological analysis of the changing trends in the Dutch penal system, revealing the limitations of existing literature on the origins of imprisonment. He concludes that the works of Foucault, Ignatieff, Rothman and Rush, and Kirchheimer fail to explain long-term developments that are typical of Western prison systems, and provides a sociological interpretation of these changes.

Geis, G.
Is Germany’s xenophobia qualitatively different from everybody else’s?
This paper grapples with a fundamental question that emerged repeatedly during the conference on which this paper was presented: is German antipathy to foreigners qualitatively different from that of other nations and ethnic groups? The paper provides a historical perspective on German immigration policy and on the recurrence of state-sanctioned killings from the witch hunts of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries to the Holocaust. This paper concludes that there is evidence to support that xenophobia and hostility to ethnic minorities may be more dangerous in Germany than in other Western nations.

Graham, J., B. Bowling
Young People and Crime
London, Home Office Research and Statistics Department, 1995
The study aimed to provide an estimate of the extent, frequency and nature of self-reported offending among 14- to 25-year old offenders in England and Wales, to establish the reasons why some young people start to offend, and what influences those young offenders who desist from offending to sustain a non-criminal lifestyle. Exploring these areas involved a two-stage research strategy. Firstly, a national random sample of 1,721 young people aged 14 to 25 (plus a booster sample of 808 young people from ethnic minorities) were interviewed about their background, their family life, their school experiences and aspects of their current lifestyle. The second stage of the research involved life-history interviews with 21
'desisters' – young people identified as having offended in the past but not within the previous year. Chapter 2 describes the extent and nature of criminal offending and Chapter 3 looks at changes in these patterns of offending by age. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of why some young people start committing offenses, whilst Chapter 5 examines the notion that offenders 'grow out of' crime with age and identifies the main factors associated with desistance from offending. Chapter 6 explores the process of desistance through in-depth interviews with a sub-sample of desisters. Chapter 7 draws out the conclusions of the study and discusses a range of policy options.

Hugger, H.
The European Community's competence to prescribe national criminal sanctions
The objective of this article is to examine whether the European Community has any competence to adopt binding secondary law obliging the Member States to provide for national criminal sanctions to be imposed for the breach of certain conduct rules. The study starts with an analysis of the provisions of the treaties on European integration, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, and the legislative practice of the Community. Thereupon, the author endeavours some dogmatic reflections on the topic, and ends with a resume and an outlook of the topic, in the light of the results.

Jammers, V.
Commercial robberies: the business community as a target in the Netherlands
*Security Journal*, vol. 6, 1995, no. 1, pp. 13-20
In recent years, the number of commercial robberies in the Netherlands increased by 10-15% per annum. In reaction to the increase, a small taskforce was created to reduce the number of robberies on commercial targets. Based on an analysis of the reported robberies and a SWOT-analysis of the preventive and repressive approach to the problem, the Commercial Robbery Taskforce seeks cooperation with all the involved partners.

Jamieson, A.
The transnational dimension of Italian organized crime
*Transnational Organized Crime*, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 151-172
Jamieson describes the international dimension of Italian organized crime groups. She reviews the worldwide penetration of the Italian Mafia, for which four incentives can be pointed out: economic hardship, internal conflict, the intensification of repression, and the quest for new business opportunities to consolidate power and wealth. Several connections between the Italian mafia and other countries in Europe, the United States, Latin America, the Balkan and the former socialist states are drawn, for instance in drug trafficking, money laundering, arms trafficking and other fraudulent activities. The details provided in this article demonstrate the global penetration of the Italian mafia.
Kerner, H.-J., E.G.M. Weitekamp, W. Stelly
From child delinquency to adult criminality: first results of the follow-up of the Tübingen criminal behaviour development study
The longitudinal research project, bearing the German title of the Tübingen Jungäuter-Vergleichsuntersuchung (TJVU), was started in 1965 by the founder and director of the Institute of Criminology of the University of Tübingen, Hans Göppinger. The follow-up study started in 1987 and lasted, as far as the main data collection is concerned, to the end of 1994. This study is also qualitatively oriented, in order to prevent a rupture in the case history files. However, the new team tried more intensely to ask the subjects additional questions during the interviews that pertained explicitly to recent theoretical concepts in criminology and social sciences. Included were also more complex scholarly concepts like social network approaches, coping theories, and theories of social and cultural capital as developed in modern French sociology. The subjects were, on the average, between 50 and 55 years old when newly interviewed. The criminal history information is covering an average life span of 35 to 40 years, given the lower age limit of criminal responsibility in Germany (14 years).

Korf, D.J.
Dutch Treat: Formal Control and Illicit Drug Use in the Netherlands
Amsterdam, Thesis Publishers, 1995
In this dissertation Korf examines first whether there are connections between the criminalizing or decriminalizing of cannabis and the ways in which drug use has developed. This involves two questions: (1) how did the scale and nature of cannabis use evolve in the Netherlands, and to what extent is this evolution associated with the decriminalization of cannabis? and (2) how has the number of heroin users in the Netherlands evolved since the decriminalization of cannabis, and to what extent is this evolution related to the decriminalization of cannabis? He then turns to socio-medical control, focusing in particular on the provision of methadone to hard drug users. Two further questions are addressed concerning the relationship between methadone provision on the one side and (3) crime committed by heroin users and (4) the health of heroin users on the other side. His attempts to answer these four questions centre on the situation and the developments in the Netherlands. Where possible similarities and differences with other countries, especially Germany are drawn.

Krapac, D.
The position of the victim in criminal justice: a restrained central and eastern European perspective on the victim-offender mediation
It is well known that the role played by the victim in the interest of the criminal justice system may be very important: it is the victim who decides what offenses will be dealt with by this system, because he is the initial source of information on the basis of which the state prosecuting authorities determine the outcome of the criminal case. Krapac describes the legal position of the victim in criminal justice in the former socialist states. The favourable
climate of attention for victims which has developed in Western Europe after the Second World War did not expand to the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. An attempt to explain such a state of affairs must paint a rather complex picture: first give a general legislative framework for the position of the victim in criminal justice in these countries, and second, focus on the victim-offender mediation as an alternative to the use of the criminal justice system.

Kreuzer, A.
Delinquency in East and West Germany: results of a study on self-reported delinquency among first year university students
After first experiences with studies on self-reported delinquency in the United States and Scandinavia, such studies began in Germany for the first time with the 1970 Giessen surveys. The investigation at hand was conducted in 1990/91 immediately after German unification, again as an individual questionnaire by mail of all first semester Giessen students, this time also including all first semester students at three post-secondary institutions of the former German Democratic Republic in Jena and Potsdam. The main goals of these surveys included educational, criminological, and methodological aspects. The goal criminologically was, in general, to obtain information about normality and ubiquity of juvenile delinquency, about delinquency’s development, and the structures of detected and hidden crime. In addition, the investigation concerned changes in delinquency in a situation of anomie: the radical political, economic, and social change in Eastern Germany. Further, questions were posed dealing with victimology, socialization, and attitudes toward the criminal law system.

Morris, A., Ch. Wilkinson
Responding to female prisoners’ needs
We know a considerable amount about the difficulties female prisoners face before, during, and after sentence. Prisons have attempted to respond to this by introducing such devices as needs analyses, sentence plans, reviews, and the like. This article reports on a project that examined organizational response to prisoners’ needs. The fieldwork was carried out in three women’s prisons in England and involved interviews with 200 prisoners, both pre- and postrelease. The article specifically addresses the difficulties in translating good practice into actual practice, in translating rhetoric into reality.

Pease, K., A. Tseloni
Juvenile-adult differences in criminal justice: evidence from the United Nations crime survey
This analysis is concerned with juvenile/adult ratios of males and females at different stages of the criminal justice system, that is, apprehension, prosecution, conviction and imprisonment for the year 1975, and suspicion, prosecution, conviction, admission to prison and prison population in 1980 and 1986. Data from the second and third United Nations crime surveys, which covered about 90 countries, are employed. To counteract national age and gender population differences, in addition to raw ones,
weighted ratios are examined. The study addresses three questions: (1) is there any national distinctiveness in filtering out juveniles at different stages of the criminal justice system? (2) does a worldwide tendency exist in filtering out juveniles? and (3) is the gender of juveniles an influencing factor of the general practice for filtering out and, if so, at which particular stages of the system? A non-parametric statistical method, the sign test, is used to check upon the validity of the results.

Pitts, J., Ph. Smith

*Preventing School Bullying*
London, Police Research Group, 1995

The first section below describes the anti-bullying initiative in general terms together with its aims and objectives and a short description of the way in which it was introduced. The next section provides some key results from the initial bullying assessment questionnaire. The four schools are described, in turn, in the following section, which also provides data from the follow-up bullying assessment exercises. The conclusions from the research are pulled together in a final short section. Much of the detail on the operation of the schemes is provided in a series of appendices for those wishing to initiate similar activities in their schools.

Rozekrans, R.

*Fraud: an increasing problem for business today*

*Security Journal,* vol. 6, 1995, no. 1, pp. 47-52

KPMG recently conducted national fraud surveys in six countries around the world. Australia, Bermuda, Canada, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United States each conducted their own survey aimed at determining the level of awareness of fraud in the participant countries' largest businesses. All of the countries participating in the survey share common business practices. Companies were asked questions dealing with their: overall awareness of fraud; perceptions of fraud in business; specific experiences with fraud; procedures to prevent fraud occurring, both now and in the future; and vulnerability to fraud. The author presents the main findings of the national surveys, with special emphasis on the Netherlands.

Schneider, H.J.

*The interaction between criminology in German-speaking countries and Anglo-American criminology*

*Eurocriminology,* vol. 8/9, 1995, pp. 5-21

In this article the influences of German criminology on American criminology and vice versa are drawn. The first influences (in the Nineteenth century) on German criminology and the practice of penal law came from Anglo-American penology. After that the psychoanalytical line in criminology was developed in German speaking countries and promoted, among others by Freud himself in exile in London, in the English speaking countries. Further 'exchanges' were the sociostructural approach and psychopathology. The offender-oriented, individualistic German criminology of the thirties and forties played into the hands of National-socialism, which worked towards a provincial isolation of German criminology. Nationalsocialism also caused several criminologists to emigrate to the United States and England. After the War German criminology followed the lead of North American criminologists, and this influence is still very strong today.
Stangeland, P.
The Crime Puzzle: Crime Patterns and Crime Displacement in Southern Spain
Malaga, Miguel Gomez, 1995
This report tries to explain the spatial distribution of crime within one region: the Province of Malaga in Southern Spain. The theoretical framework is found in opportunity and pattern theory, which focus on the possibilities to commit a crime without being caught, and on how the physical environment and social arrangements enhance or inhibit such crime opportunities. Literature on these situational aspects of crime, reviewed in chapter 1, show that, for instance, burglary rates are quite distinct in various zones of urban areas. The hypothetical framework for this research report is that crime opportunities vary considerable between different parts of the Province of Malaga, and that we may identify the impact this makes on actual crime patterns. This study focuses on two different kinds of crime displacement which can occur: towards other types of crime: motivated offenders in Malaga may turn to car breaking and street robbery instead; towards other geographic areas: potential offenders from Malaga may be attracted by crime targets on the nearby coast, and commit their crimes there. The scarcity of empirical data on crime in Spain has made it necessary to devote a large part of this volume to methodological issues, and to describe the data collection carried out by the author.

Steinmetz, C.H.D.
Contacts with a violent public: profit and non-profit organizations
As in the United States, 'workplace violence' is becoming more and more problematic. In the Netherlands the interest in workplace violence is not only caused by the size of the problem, but also because recent legislation forces employers to take the necessary measures to prevent such violence. The author describes and comments upon this new legislation, and also describes possible causes of 'workplace violence' on the basis of the concepts of 'customer/patient,' 'employee,' 'company/institution' and 'neighbourhood/society'. Finally, he gives directions for possible ways in which the problem can be controlled and presents a plan of action.

Thornburgh, D.
The internationalization of business crime
The increasing international business activities has a dark side. With greater private sector activity has come an increase in business crime. And with a greater global reach of legitimate business has come a corresponding increase in the internationalization of illegal business activities. This phenomenon deserves serious consideration by those interested in worldwide economic progress.

Van Kalmthout, A.M.
Alternative sanctions in Europe: their counter-productive effects and their impact on prison conditions
Van Kalmthout tries to explain why, in spite of the in quantitative respect successful application of community based sanctions, they do not succeed in reducing the prison sentences to a greater extent. In other words, what are the limits and
shortcomings of these alternative sanctions and what is the impact of these alternatives on prison conditions.

Von Hofer, H.
Violence and youth in Sweden in a long-term perspective (conference paper), 1995
Since the mid-1980s, the Swedish public is increasingly concerned about juvenile violence, such as football hooliganism, excessive celebrations on Midsummer nights, acts of violence with racist and xenophobic motives, squatters’ actions, street fights and violence at schools. Von Hofer tries to explain the increase of juvenile violence in Sweden. He then looks at the court statistics and crime statistics to search for empirical evidence. His conclusion is that Sweden might be currently experiencing an enforcement wave with regard to juvenile violence.

Williams, J.L., A.S. Serrins
Using recently compiled data from the former Soviet Union, this paper describes major trends and patterns in the rate of violent crime in the Soviet Union during the period 1985-1991. The authors include, data on homicide, rape, robbery and aggravated assault. For comparative purposes, the authors present data on the rate of these offenses in the United States during this period. Data are also presented on characteristics of persons arrested for these offenses in the Soviet Union and the United States during this period. The findings indicate the persistence of significantly lower rates of violent crime in the Soviet Union compared with the United States, though significant increases were seen in the period after 1988. Age and gender differences in the characteristics of offenders in each country were noted as well.

Williams, Ph., P.N. Woessner
Nuclear material trafficking: an interim assessment
The growth of narcotics businesses in former Soviet bloc and Asian communist countries represents a dangerous and destabilizing phenomenon. Arguably, continuation of this trend could have serious, if indirect, implications for United States and Western security for the rest of the 1990s and beyond. These propositions will be explored using the examples of the People's Republic of China and the decommunizing states of the former USSR.