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At the start of the twenty-first century, safety has become one of the most important topics in the context of local social policy. Concern about increasing crime, insecurity and community safety has risen considerably over the past years. This issue of the European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research discusses this development of the 'security issue' from various points of view. More specifically, a growing convergence of the social institutions and the world of criminal justice can be observed.
Aims and scope. The *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* is a platform for discussion and information exchange on the crime problem in Europe. Every issue concentrates on one central topic in the criminal field, incorporating different angles and perspectives. The editorial policy is on an invitational basis. The journal is at the same time policy-based and scientific; it is both informative and plural in its approach. The journal is of interest to researchers, policymakers and other parties that are involved in the crime problem in Europe. The *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* is published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in co-operation with the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Ministry of Justice. The journal has an editorial policy independent from the Ministry.

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EDITORIAL NOTE

A time to come, a time to go. It has been 10 years now since the WODC decided to launch a journal for the European criminological market. Two objectives were kept especially in mind: the main focus had to be European and it should have a policy orientation. In addition to these, the journal should have a thematic character and an invitational policy. ‘Building bridges’ was the key concept in the development of this initiative. Bridges between research and policy-making, between the different European countries and between topical experts and starters in the criminological field. After 10 years of building a well-respected and inspiring journal, the time has come for us to stop our editorial activities.

When we started, Josine Junger-Tas was Director of the WODC and Hans Boutellier was head of its Information Department. Josine retired from this position and Hans became strategic policy-advisor at the Dutch Ministry of Justice. But we continued to run the journal in cooperation with the WODC. We got assistance from Carolyn Hunt, Kitty Slabbers and in the last five years from Adriëlle Baars-Schuyt. We were extremely happy with the assistance of Adriëlle, who played a growing role in the management of the journal. In 1996 we changed publishing houses: from Kugler to Kluwer Academic Publishers.

We have succeeded in publishing a great journal; at least we think it is and we loved to do it anyhow. We were especially inspired by all those authors who contributed to our special issues (see p. iv of this Note). Most of them were invited by us; some of them solicited for the publication of their papers and articles. We have also been supported by the Editorial Committee and the Advisory Board, which were of great importance in developing themes, suggesting authors and reviewing the draft articles.

The European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research has never been an academic journal in the traditional sense. The themes reflected the social problems and challenges in the criminal justice field in Europe. But not accidentally, the issues also reflected the state-of-the-art in European criminology of the subject. With the foundation of the European Society of Criminology, a new phase in the development of a European criminology has started. We flatter ourselves with the idea that the journal prepared fertile soil for this initiative.

Josine Junger-Tas
Hans Boutellier

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At the start of the twenty-first century, safety has become one of the most important topics in the context of local social policy. Concern about increasing crime, insecurity and community safety has risen considerably over the past years. This issue of the *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* discusses this development of the 'security issue' from various points of view. More specifically, a growing convergence of the social institutions and the world of criminal justice can be observed. It is important to understand and analyse this development because it gives way to new directions in the social sphere, criminal justice and criminology.

Hans Boutellier discusses the shift from crime as a problem of the police and judicial authorities to a subject of local policy. In particular, he examines the relationship between safety policy and social policy and recent initiatives taken in the Netherlands, such as Justice in the Community (as a helping hand from the judicial authorities) and Communities that Care. On the basis of a concentric model he distinguishes the different groups and activities which need to be addressed in a broad approach to local safety. In his opinion the development of community justice can be judged as a valuable and promising response to the urgency surrounding the crime problem which is experienced in nowadays society.

Daniel Gilling examines the development of community safety in the UK, from the late 1980s through to the present and suggests that there has been a certain continuity, between the end of the 1980s and the present, in the socio-political impact of community safety. Just as it is erroneous to detach community safety from wider policy developments in criminal justice, so it is erroneous to detach it from wider developments in social policy. Community safety policy sometimes veers towards the exclusionary because it criminalises social policy. Limited international comparisons are enough to suggest that what is evidenced in the UK may have parallels in other advanced liberal states, despite differences in political structures and cultures.

Loïc Wacquant points to the tremendous rise in prison populations in all advanced societies due to the increasingly frequent routine use of prison as an instrument for managing social insecurity. The situation in France is discussed as a counterweight to the American developments, although he
discovers some worrying trends as well. The solution, according to Wacquant, on the criminal policy and practice front is to examine the proliferation of measures to ‘widen’ the penal net and, where possible, systematically propose a social, health or educational alternative.

Distributive justice concerns the dispensation of benefits and services to people, and the systems of taxation which make that possible. It lies at the core of most political values. In the literature on distributive justice there is not much to be found on the issues of crime and safety. Although there is little which speaks directly to the distribution of crime, there is much which can be used for that purpose. Ken Pease outlines the current distribution of crime opportunities, and concludes that their extreme inequality, and linkage with other social indices, suggests distributive unfairness. Some policy suggestions are set out which would have the effect of remediying such unfairness.

Evelyne Baillergeau and Christine Schaut go into the development of security policy in Belgium and the Netherlands on the basis of a larger study. They especially focus on the consequences for the work of social workers. The Belgian part of the article concentrates on the analysis of the practices and the tasks assigned to the social workers in working-class areas working within the framework of new measures for the fight against social exclusion and insecurity, in particular the security contract. The situation in the Netherlands is different from that in Belgium, also because of other political views and interactions. But there are also similarities. Apart from the political differences in the two countries, the new methodologies – thinking on social problems and carrying out actions in public – appear in both countries to be identical. The new policies are applied at the neighbourhood level, on the basis that if the problems of insecurity occur at the local level, it is also there that the remedies must be carried out.

Starting from research that focuses on the interagency relationships within community crime prevention, Peter Goris offers a model that creates some possibilities for creating a safer community on the one hand and that holds back the dynamics of social exclusion on the other. He thereby focuses on the relations between (community oriented) welfare agencies on the one hand and police agencies on the other hand. On the basis of empirical research he points out the relevance of analysis and evaluation of the co-operation, starting from two different perspectives—the consensus model and the conflict model.
In the *Current Issues* section, *Angela Grier and Terry Thomas* discuss the UK’s Criminal Record Bureau. It can be seen as a new agency for administering a new social policy which will increase the number of people subject to pre-employment screening by means of a check on their criminal record.

*J.C.J.B.*
ABSTRACT. This article discusses the shift from crime as a problem of the police and judicial authorities to a subject of local policy. It will, in particular, examine the relationship between safety policy and social policy. Safety has become an important social theme in the last decades. There are at least three reasons to explain why this is the case: the increase of crime, increased attention for the victim and the legitimacy of the government. A concentric model is proposed to serve the development of a systematically set up local safety policy. In the Netherlands programmes such as Communities that Care and Justice in the neighbourhood (Jib) are important developments which stress the integral approach of the crime and safety problem. The article closes with a discussion on the convergence of criminal justice policy and social policy.

KEY WORDS: criminology, criminal justice policy, prevention policies, social policy

In the spring of 2000 a special issue of the British Journal of Criminology was published under the title ‘Criminology and Social Theory’. In the extensive introductory article to this issue David Garland and Richard Sparks state that criminology is ready for a reassessment. They typecast the emergence and development of criminology from the beginning of the twentieth century as “emphatically modernist” (Garland and Sparks 2000, p. 194), that is to say, it fitted the belief in social engineering that has dominated that period. Crime was seen as a social problem, and explained from various forms of deprivation — be it economic, educational, training or treatment. “The solution for crime was a welfare solution”, and although criminologists differed on the form of deprivation to be addressed, from individualised treatment, supervision and support for families to the enhancement of poverty, “there never was a right wing criminology” (Garland and Sparks 2000, p. 195).

Garland and Sparks point to important shifts away from this welfare criminology, such as the spread of criminology to other fields of expertise and — of course — the context of the crime problem which has changed completely over the last 30 years.

1Also published in the Series Clarendon Studies in Criminology (Garland and Sparks 2001).

2John Braithwaite (2000) typifies this in the same issue as ‘Keynesian’, which matches the building of a welfare state.
The restructuring of social and economic relations, the fluidity of social process, the speed of technological change, and the remarkable cultural heterogeneity that constitute ‘late modernity’ pose intellectual challenges for criminology that are difficult and sometimes discomfiting but which are ultimately too insistent to ignore. (Garland and Sparks 2000, p. 189)

They term these developments “the coming of late modernity”. In the economy, in the structure of families and households, in social ecology and demography, and in social and cultural life, massive changes take place at the same time. This has changed the collective experience of crime and welfare, and led to a radically different ‘crime complex’.

High crime rates are regarded as a normal social fact and crime-avoidance becomes an organizing principle of everyday life. Fear of crime is sufficiently widespread to become a political reference point and crime issues are generally politicised and represented in emotive terms. Concerns about victims and public safety dominate government policy and the criminal justice state is viewed as severely limited in its impact [...]. A high level of ‘crime consciousness’ comes to be embedded in everyday social life and institutionalised in the media, in popular culture and in the built environment (Garland and Sparks 2000, pp. 199-200)

This is a very accurate description of the contemporary crime problem. Crime has claimed a central position both in the individual and collective consciousness of our time. This has led to a massive shift in the reactions to crime. Criminology adapts to these changes — or this is what is expected from it when it is to influence the organisation of the reactions to the crime and safety problem. One of the developments that stands out is what has become known by several names, community justice, local prevention, safety policy, and so on.

Daniel Gilling (in this issue) gives an adequate, fivefold typology of this development. I want to name at least three interrelated characteristics. In the first place there is a tendency to a certain ‘moralisation’ of the crime problem. With regard to the ‘welfare complex’ surrounding crime, the moral significance has taken up a more central position. Secondly, the development of community safety has redefined crime as a ‘safety issue’. And thirdly, there is a convergence of social policy and criminal justice policy. On the ‘safety’ theme a new moral consensus is maturing which

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3It is my opinion that the fashionable term ‘post modern’ is better suited to indicate the radical character of the changes, especially the farewell to modern ideology. I hereby follow Bauman’s definition of postmodern as “modernity without illusions” (Bauman 1993).

4This thesis is treated more elaborately in Boutellier (2000).
among other things leads to a rearrangement of welfare and criminal justice institutions.

In this article I will discuss the state of affairs in the Netherlands from the policy-oriented perspective. I propose a concentric model of security policy, whereby stakeholders, institutions and citizens are all drawn in the extending circles. Contrary to most authors who contributed to this thematic issue I think that a certain moralising of the crime problem and a growing co-operation between social institutions and criminal justice agents is unavoidable and indeed to be desired. Perhaps my own Dutch experiences over the last few years have contributed to this favourable judgement.

SOCIETY AND SAFETY

At the start of the twenty-first century, safety has become one of the most important topics in the context of local social policy. There are some very good reasons for this. Theft and nuisance, violence and threats have become, at any rate in the major cities, widespread phenomena. Although the scale and the gravity must not be exaggerated, people are rightly concerned about the problems of crime. This concern has increased considerably over the past years. Maintaining public order had previously always been a responsibility of the mayor and local politicians. However, the extent to which local authorities are faced with problems of safety is relatively new. In many towns and cities, the local authorities are still getting used to this new policy domain. After all, the police and the judicial authorities had always been primarily responsible for the fight against crime.

Setting up a local safety policy is often complicated and in practice frequently leads to a laborious process. Many parties are involved in the local safety policy, such as youth care, youth work, welfare services, community work, education institutes and of course the police and the judicial authorities. All these organisations pursue their own objectives and are not always willing to include the problem of safety as their responsibility and co-operate. Moreover, these parties have their own administrative lines and finance flows—from the municipality, the province or central government. Along these lines, a wide range of projects and programmes often arises,

5 Part of this article is an adapted and translated version of a chapter in a book for local policy makers.

6 As a policymaker at the Dutch Ministry of Justice over the last six years, I have been very much involved with the development of local judicial policies.
usually of a temporary nature. Setting up and implementing these initiatives often requires so much energy that a structural and integrated embeddedness of the safety policy is difficult to realise.

This article will discuss the shift from crime as a problem of the police and judicial authorities to a subject of local policy. It will, in particular, examine the relationship between safety policy and social policy. Safety is usually associated with the concept of the quality of life and, subsequently, the quality of the social infrastructure of communities. This means that there is often a wide gap between the objective 'to improve the safety situation' and the actual activity. For that reason, some initiatives that have been taken over the past years to improve the connection between local social policy and safety policy will be examined. The article outlines a model for the development of a local prevention policy. The final part of the article will give a political judgement of the developments.

**SAFETY AND A SOCIAL THEME**

In population studies, lack of safety is time and again at the top of the list of problems, scoring much higher than health, the environment and the issue of asylum seekers. This is remarkable, as up to the beginning of the 1980s, experts believed that the problem of crime could be reasonably controlled. It was therefore not foreseen that 'safety' would become such an important social theme. There are at least three reasons to explain why this is the case: the increase of crime, increased attention for the victim and the legitimacy of the government.

As regards the first reason, there is little doubt that the problem of crime has increased, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. Since the 1960s, the crime registered by the Dutch police has multiplied by 10 amounting to approximately 1.3 million offences. The total number of criminal offences is estimated — on the basis of population surveys — at nearly a tenfold. Victimisation surveys show that annually approximately one-third of the population is faced with a criminal offence, one or more times. Although the increase of the total 'volume' of criminal behaviour has by now come to a halt, crimes of violence continue to increase. This also means that the nature of crime has changed. (I will not include relatively new types of large-scale drug trade.)

For example, in the 1990s, the Netherlands was faced with apparently unmotivated serious types of crime in nightlife spots, football stadiums and high-risk communities. A series of shocking violent crimes occurred after which the term 'senseless violence' was launched, probably because
the motives were difficult to understand. Above all, the term 'senseless violence' seems to have a demonstrative meaning: one cannot and does not want to understand the motives of the perpetrator. These new violent crimes give rise to emotional reactions of bewilderment and anger often elaborately depicted by the media. The ethnic-related mob violence by juvenile groups is also relatively new and a cause of much controversy.

This relates to the second reason for the prominent place of the safety issue in the 'post-modern' consciousness, the sensitivity to criminal or violent behaviour seems to have increased. The growth and the changing nature of crime are coupled with a larger visibility of victims. This also applies to the aforementioned problems of crime, but also, for example, to the so-called domestic violence. It turns out that the family is not the haven in a heartless world it was once assumed to be. Among other things, due to feminism, the private life has been disclosed as a location of violence. In other areas, suffering that until recently had been covered up was also 'discovered'. For example, bullying at school and on the work floor or threats to welfare workers and persons in authority.

In general, the victim of crime was only 'discovered' at the start of the 1970s. Before then, the victim was merely the person reporting the crime to the police and fulfilling a role in the furnishing of proof. In the Netherlands after the institution of the compensation fund for victims of crimes of violence in 1975, more attention was drawn to the approach to the victim by the police and the public prosecution department, to victim care and trauma support and the right to compensation. Although it is difficult to back it up with figures, it seems as if undesirable behaviour and the sensitivity to the position of the victim have both increased. We are faced with two sides of the same coin: an increasing number of perpetrators generate a corresponding number of victims and thereby increased attention for the position of the victim.

However, in order to be able to put the enormous interest in the safety issue in the context of the current age, a third factor must also be mentioned. Along with the upward movement of the idea of the perpetrator and the victim, crime also became a political problem. In this respect, it must be noted that the legitimacy of the government is directly at stake. The development of nations in the nineteenth century was motivated to a large extent by the issue of safety, both internally and externally. Citizens were prepared to comply with laws and regulations of the State, subject to the conditions that their safety is guaranteed by the government. The State derives its monopoly of violence from the following fictitious exchange: compliance with laws and regulations against protection by the law.
The police and judicial authorities— as traditional suppliers of safety— may be regarded as important pillars of the (legitimacy of the) nation. Once the population doubts the protection provided by the government, it in fact places doubt on the reliability of the government. The government will therefore be determined to control the problems of safety. The twentieth century to a large extent evolved around the expansion of social provisions such as education, social security and welfare services. During this development of the ‘welfare state’, the safety guarantee became a type of side product of the government provisions. More income, education and welfare seemed to result automatically into harmonious relationships between citizens. And if anything went wrong, one could fall back on the Dutch criminal law system that was among the smallest in the world in the 1970s. This situation has changed dramatically, given the current problems of crime.

Although the inequality seems to have increased since the 1980s, it can hardly be blamed for the tumultuous development of the crime issue. The increased welfare, expressed by the use of alcohol and drugs, the consumptive materialism and the increasing number of opportunities seem to facilitate rather than hamper criminal behaviour. The government is unable to fall back on the social and Christian democratic maxim that more welfare leads to less crime. The growth of crime, the increased attention for the victim and the interest at stake for the government have jointly turned the safety issue into an independent theme of government policy. Safety has therefore become a number one issue of the twenty-first century welfare state.

THE DEMAND FOR CRIMINAL LAW

The call for more safety in society did have some consequences. Some more figures are necessary for a proper understanding of this. In the Netherlands within a 15-year period (since 1986), the number of cells increased from 4,000 to approximately 18,000. In the same period, the number of task penalties for adults increased from nil to approximately 20,000; the task penalties for juveniles increased to approximately 15,000. A similar number of so-called HALT disposals (a sanction outside criminal law for minors for a limited number of criminal offences; see e.g. Van Hees 1999) were imposed. Within 15 years, the newly established criminal law units of the Child Care and Protection Board developed into essential institutions. The Ministry of Justice, meanwhile, changed from a classical Ministry of legislation into a policy department of which the budget tripled to around five billion euro.
Despite this gigantic expansion of the judicial system, the ‘scope’ of criminal law is ultimately limited. Of the estimated total number of 10 million criminal offences, the police register more than 1.3 million (the remainder is otherwise resolved or abandoned). Fifteen to twenty percent of these is actually solved, using as a general rule of thumb that the more serious the offence, the higher the chance that the perpetrator is found. In the past decades, this percentage gradually decreased; in 1960, the clearance rate was over 50%. Ultimately, more than 250,000 police reports are sent to the Public Prosecution Department. Ten percent of these cases result in some type of prison sentence.

Based on these figures, presented rather loosely, it becomes clear that there is something curious about the issue of crime. One might refer to it as a criminal justice paradox. Apparently, the ‘demand’ for criminal law increases, while the ‘supply’ — despite the increase — ultimately remains limited. The scale of the judicial system has increased, but nevertheless remains small compared to the total volume of crime. The supply is furthermore limited in a qualitative sense due to the fact that criminal law is ultimately ‘unable’ to do anything. The criminal law reaction is (too) late and is generally not very successful: the recidivism rates are high. Criminal law is by definition a (necessary) admission of weakness that must only be used when all other means fail.

This brings us to the more principal reason to refer to a criminal justice paradox. Criminal law is traditionally regarded as an ultimum remedium, a final resource that is preferably omitted, in order to restrict state power. For that reason, criminal law experts have mostly focused on the guarantees for the defendant on which the criminal law intervention must be based. Under pressure of the urgency of the safety issue, the demand for criminal law has however significantly increased. In other words, there is more demand for an ultimate remedy. This radically alters the role of criminal law in society. Instead of an ultimate remedy, it might be better to refer to it as a remedy regarded as urgent. This is reinforced by the recently published policy memorandum ‘Controlling Crime’ (Criminaliteitsbeheersing) of the Ministries of Justice and Home Affairs arguing for a drastic expansion of the police and judicial authorities amounting to nearly one billion euro.

CRIMINAL LAW POLICY

In various ways, criminal law policy has also sought to find concrete answers to the development of the nature and scale of crime and problems of capacity. A brief summary is given of the most striking developments such
as finding alternatives to detention, the development of victim care and crime prevention.

**Alternatives to Detention**

In the 1970s, reactions to criminal behaviour were sought outside the judicial system for idealistic reasons. An internationally renowned example of this is HALT (Dutch abbreviation of ‘the alternative’). In the case of first offenders and special (minor) offences, the police refer the juvenile to a HALT bureau that may ‘offer’ a limited sanction (to prevent prosecution). Recently, such a referral has also been made possible for under-12 juveniles (the so-called ‘STOP reaction’). This is referred to as a ‘pedagogic aid’ for the parents. But in the case of criminal law resolution, alternatives were also sought. These only really started to take off once pressure on the judicial authorities mounted and they were accepted as sanctions. Considerations of efficiency fulfilled an important role; the name ‘alternative sanctions’ was changed to ‘task penalties’.

There are two types of task penalty: community service orders and training orders (or a combination of these two). In the former case, it concerns a sanction for the common benefit, also referred to as community service. The underlying idea is that the perpetrator performs (reparation) activities that are directly connected with the offence committed and will therefore have a ‘pedagogic’ effect. This consideration applies especially in the case of a training order. This may consist of a course in ‘social skills’ or a development programme such as ‘The Visible Victim’ (*Slachtoffer in beeld*). ‘Electronic Monitoring’ is also regarded as an alternative to detention. It concerns a type of home detention that is monitored electronically via a transmitter attached to the ankle.

Before World War II, the fine and the suspended prison sentence had already been introduced. The Public Prosecutor may also propose a transaction in order to preclude arraignment before a court. In addition, it has recently been made possible, by means of so-called ‘penitentiary programmes’, to prepare prisoners for their return to society outside the prison walls. Finally, the individual supervision must be pointed out, a juvenile court may refer juveniles to an intensive type of supervision focused on ‘getting them back on track’. In other words, in the current judicial cycle, the Public Prosecutor and the criminal court have a wide range of penalties at their disposal; penalties have become increasingly made-to-measure.
Victim Care

In the mid-1970s, a fund for victims of violent crimes and traffic offences was instituted. It turned out to be the first sign of increased interest for victims. From the start of the 1980s, the police and judicial authorities issued various directives with respect to the proper approach to victims. The so-called Terwee laws and regulations were also adopted. This legislation enabled victims of criminal offences to join the proceedings in order to obtain compensation from the perpetrator.

In addition, an extensive network was developed in the Netherlands (as in other Western countries). The Ministry of Justice funds this organisation. A special characteristic is that volunteers carry out the actual support of victims. They are however supervised by paid professionals. In other words, victim care is only regarded to a small extent as a government task; fellow citizens are expected to make an effort to relieve the suffering. The underlying idea is that the community itself is responsible for the care of victims and that this type of sympathy must not be too ‘business-like’.

The increased attention for the victim may seem more natural than it actually is. Until the mid-1970s, the victim merely played the role of the person reporting the crime or the role of a witness in the criminal proceedings. This insignificant position of the victim is related to the so-called inquisitorial character of the criminal proceedings. Under the Penal Code, the State acts as the prosecutor of the defendant in cases of an offence; contrary to the civil proceedings where a conflict between legal persons is submitted to the court. In the 1980s, this was increasingly regarded as an unfair situation for those injured by the perpetrator.

Currently, the contribution of the victim in the context of criminal proceedings is under discussion. Apart from more care before, during and after the criminal proceedings, the victim may be given the right to speak in the courtroom. The desirability of this is not yet definite; after all, the interest of the criminal proceedings is to arrive at the truth and to determine the extent of culpability on the part of the perpetrator. A ‘heavy’ presence of the victim may disrupt the purity of the proceedings. In connection with the criminal law, other types of settlement are being developed, e.g. mediation, the right to reparation and meetings between perpetrator and victim that may sometimes meet the victim’s emotional needs in a better way.

Crime Prevention

In 1985, the Government report ‘Society and Crime’ (Samenleving en criminaliteit) was published. The committee chaired by the former Mem-
member of Parliament Hein Roethof inspired this Government paper. This committee had been concerned with so-called 'petty crime'. It had concluded that many crimes were the result of the increasing lack of social control, in particular, of juveniles. The recovery of control, in particular by officials close to juveniles—teachers, welfare workers, parents and other parties—was deemed necessary. Subsequently, the physical environment had to be adapted, e.g. by using vandalism-proof bus stops, and local authorities had to draw more attention to crime prevention.

In this context, the term 'administrative prevention of crime' was introduced. In particular, at a local level, the government had to take initiatives to prevent criminal behaviour. This idea would dominate the discussion regarding the safety issue in subsequent years. After more than 15 years, it may be concluded that this appeal as such has been a success. Local authorities appointed prevention officials, drew up community plans and created joint ventures; crime prevention has become widely accepted in local culture. The extent to which this development has also been effective, is more difficult to indicate. The overall crime rate may have reasonably stabilised, but crime has definitely become more violent.

In the 1990s, the tentative experimental policies of the 1980s with respect to the prevention of crime had developed into substantial programmes within the context of safety such as the integral safety policy, inner city policy, the juvenile delinquency programme and the policy concerning ethnic minorities. Although each of these programmes has its own political and official background, they all seek to establish a connection between municipal activities and the performance of the police and judicial authorities.

In the integral safety policy, crime is related to other subjects in the context of safety, such as fire safety and emergency relief. Local authorities are expected to draw up plans to prevent or combat these types of insecurity. The combination of these different types of safety has led to some terminological confusion. In practice, it became clear that activities with respect to crime and nuisance are independently worked out. In 1992, the so-called inner city policy was initiated. In the first instance, it was intended to lay down a comprehensive social policy for 19 cities, later expanded to 25. ‘Covenants’ were concluded with those municipalities with respect to the social-economic infrastructure, education, the quality of life and safety.

This type of integral policy is interesting because various policy areas may be intertwined. Such an urban policy is pursued in many other European countries. Parallel to the inner city policy, additional efforts are made with respect to juvenile delinquency. In 1992, the Van Montfrans
Committee completed its activities relating to this objective by submitting a large number of recommendations to reduce juvenile delinquency by taking both repressive and preventive measures. These recommendations varied from the development of social programmes to the expansion of the number of juvenile public prosecutors at the Public Prosecution Department. Recently, the Ministry of Justice announced a 'relaunch' of this policy.

Finally, it was proposed to examine crime among ethnic minorities separately. In the so-called Criem memorandum (Crime in relation to the integration of ethnic minorities, 1997), the relatively large representation of ethnic minorities in the criminal law sphere is explained by the relatively large 'cultural gap' with Dutch society. It is proposed to improve this situation along three lines: intensive supervision for (potentially) criminal juveniles; programmes to prevent juveniles from leaving school prematurely; supervision of families for the youngest children.

In this context, increasing attention is drawn to the supervision of families with young children in deprived urban areas. Although various experiences have been carried out in this respect, this policy is strengthened as it is assumed that providing supervision to child-raising people at an early stage may prevent criminal behaviour at a later stage. These programmes localise the prevention of crime in areas where local authorities and social organisations act. In this context, a further examination of this development is appropriate.

**FROM CRIME PREVENTION TO SAFETY CARE**

In the prevention policy, a new development is visible that I will further analyse in this paragraph. It is characteristic of this new development that the problem of crime in the past decade has been redefined as a safety problem. The nonchalant use of the term 'safety' is less obvious than it may seem. The large scale of the problems and the appeal to parties other than the police and judicial authorities has apparently led to a broader definition of the problem. In my opinion, the description from crime to unsafety has two important new meanings. In the first place, it refers to a new embeddedness of the problem of crime. Secondly, the term safety ties the problem of crime in closer with people's feelings about it.

The current government policy refers to 'integral safety' whereby crime, as stated above, is 'ideologically' put on one line with floods, fires and other disasters. Crime is therefore turned into an administrative issue as a specific type of insecurity, whereby 'means' other than criminal law may
also be deployed. For example, financial-economic offences, environmental offences, the catering law, integrity codes, etcetera. It also paves the way for preventive forms of crime control via physical and social measures and an increased functional control. Crime has thereby shifted from a specifically criminal law issue to a much broader problem of control.

Safety furthermore refers to the world of experience, fear and insecurity. It comments on the way in which one experiences one's surroundings and people's experiences with respect to nuisance and inconvenience. By including crime in this broader term, it is possible to refer to subjective safety. The distinction between objective and subjective insecurity is by now standard in population studies and in the development of policies. Many police activities focus on improving a feeling of safety rather than on solving crime. Along this subjective path, crime also becomes an increasingly normative problem. This causes a special tension between an administrative approach and a normative view by people.

On the one hand, people demand and enjoy maximum freedom in leading their lives, on the other hand, there is a clear demand for discipline once this freedom is at the expense of others. The considerable attention for the safety issue may therefore be characterised as a demand for 'safe freedom', for which the government is primarily held responsible. To put it simply, people like to feel safe in the street, in the swimming pool and in the football stadium. They want their children at safe schools and not have to worry when they are away from home. People expect risks that are typical of an individualistic, consumptive culture to be contained administratively by the government.

In government policy, safety and protection from criminal behaviour to a large extent seem to have pushed the terms welfare and emancipation away. In this context, one might refer to a 'safety state', which — it must be emphasised — is different from a police state. Another appeal, as it were, is made to the State to exercise its supervisory role, but in a new form. The relatively isolated phenomenon of 'crime' is more large-scale, more central and intertwined with the lives of people, as a result of which other parties have become involved. The developments outlined above show that new forms of safety policy are developed whereby the line between social policy and crime policy becomes increasingly blurred.

**SOCIAL PREVENTION POLICY**

People's call for a safe feeling of freedom puts pressure on local government. It calls for a broad preventive policy whereby the social policy is
linked more emphatically to the issue of safety. The social sector — education, social services, youth care, welfare work — increasingly realises that the demand for safety is also relevant to their own type of work. In addition, the police and judicial authorities increasingly define themselves in terms of social objectives that are broader than maintaining public order and enforcing the criminal law. Recently, the co-operation between ‘both worlds’ has been intensified, e.g. by exchanging cases between police, judicial authorities and youth care.

As regards the contents, this development is visible in the emergence of the so-called lifecycle model. This model is based on the assumption that a ‘healthy’ development of children may be disrupted if they are faced with too many high-risk factors. These risk factors are acknowledged at the level of the child itself (e.g. ADHD), the family (e.g. neglect or domestic violence), the school and community life (e.g. drugs nuisance or ‘bad’ friends). In particular, an accumulation of risk factors may give rise to problems at a later age. This accumulation may however be compensated for by protective factors (e.g. positive role models or a warm mother).

The Communities that Care (CtC) programme that is currently being tested in four locations (Arnhem, Zwolle, northern Amsterdam and the ‘Old North’ of Rotterdam) is an example of a programme that is based on this lifecycle model. This ‘control programme’ for social policy was developed in the 1980s by the criminologists David Hawkins and Richard Catalano on the basis of very extensive meta-evaluations of the criminological literature (see e.g. Hawkins 1999). They found 19 ‘definite’ risk factors that fulfil a role in the development of problems such as violence, excessive use of drugs and anti-social behaviour. Based on this analysis, they developed a strategic programme for community development, involving all relevant bodies and key persons.

The high-risk profile of a CtC community is determined, among other things, on the basis of a survey among school pupils. The strong points of the community (neighbourhood, urban district, municipality or any other unit deemed desired) are also determined. This analysis provides the opportunity of selecting aims for the social policy. A ‘prevention team’ makes the selection. A manual of methods that have proven to be effective is used for the approach to these aims. CtC has been introduced in virtually the whole state of Pennsylvania, USA, and it proves to be a forceful instrument for the establishment of joint social policy.

An entirely different attempt to improve the co-operation between the different government bodies is ‘Justice in the Neighbourhood’ (Justitie in de buurt, or Jib; see e.g. Boutellier 1997). The judicial authorities are organised via 19 districts and they are responsible for criminal law enforce-
ment. However, the gap with the problems in communities, urban districts and towns and cities is often wide. For that reason, some small-scale offices of the judicial authorities were opened a few years ago, Jib offices, to establish an immediate link with social programmes in the neighbourhoods. For example, if a youth group terrorises a neighbourhood, it is possible to prosecute the prime instigators and to co-operate with youth care, schools and community services in order to develop additional measures to get the juveniles back on track.

Currently, small-scale judicial services are present at approximately 20 locations. Preferably, apart from the judicial authorities, the Child Care and Protection Board, the probation and after-care service and victim support are also active. In most cases, there is an active collaboration with the police and other social organisations. The scale at which the Jib office works may vary from a neighbourhood or urban district to an entire town or city (in the latter case, the Public Prosecution Department also refers to front offices). By doing so, the judicial authorities follow the police that have already opted for a more neighbourhood-oriented deployment of police work at a much earlier stage.

CtC and Jib are two examples of an increasing convergence of the social sector and the judicial criminal law enforcement. In the former case, it concerns a strategy to focus the social work on the prevention of crime, nuisance and other anti-social conduct. In the latter case, the judicial authorities seek to link up with local efforts in order to handle the safety problem. An extensive review is made of both initiatives; the first report is expected in the spring of 2002. It must be noted that an increased involvement of other social organisations in effect means that they will assume more emphatically a normative position than is currently the case. The safety objective implies a larger orientation on behaviour that must be prevented as it is rejected.

**LOCAL SAFETY POLICY**

Based on the CtC and Jib, it can be shown that the collaboration between the different actors in the safety policy has gradually increased. Naturally, there are still many more initiatives and opportunities to attain a joint policy. In this context, it is important that the municipal safety policy is set up systematically. It must be pointed out that safety problems start and end with people themselves. If people regard the safety problem purely as a matter for the government, the danger of putting too much effort into a hopeless task is not inconceivable. It is then up to the differ-
ent bodies to make the next move and carry out increasingly more focused activities as necessitated by the gravity of the problems. For a broader approach to local safety, it is therefore more logical to opt for a **concentric model**.

**Outer (First) Circle: Citizens**
Crime is a problem of society and citizens. The government may facilitate by reinforcing the social web: volunteer work, clubs, educational advice and such. In general, it may be stated that people’s willingness to be concerned about the problem of safety is essential. In this context, the initiatives from the Moroccan community, silent marches etcetera incorporating an element of normative reflection may be noted. The civil society must ultimately be borne by individual citizens.

**Inner (Second) Circle: Social Organisations and Businesses**
Institutions in the field of education and welfare work must increasingly account for their pedagogic function in the transfer of standards and values. A strengthened ‘normative consciousness’ of institutions cannot be superimposed, but the government may propagate it. It is desirable that the government stimulate and facilitate the normative role of the institutions. Developments in the context of the broad school, co-operation between education and youth care, conflict mediation in communities and at schools are new types of contributions to the idea of safety in the preventive sense. The corporate sector may be requested more emphatically to make a contribution in the field of integration, naturalisation and the sponsoring of social projects.

**Inner (Third) Circle: High-Risk Groups**
The links between the worlds of the police and judicial authorities and youth policy and youth care provide many opportunities. The aforementioned initiatives such as Justice in the Community (as a helping hand from the judicial authorities) and Communities that Care (community building from the perspective of crime prevention) must be viewed in this context. They focus upon an effective approach close to the problem, on the one hand, by the social services, on the other hand, by the judicial authorities. The collaboration between the police and community work may also be strengthened. Such links must also be realised in the collaboration between penal institutions, the probation and after-care service, ambulatory mental health care and welfare services. The alternative settlement options in the con-
text of mediation and the right to reparation must also be noted in this context.

**Inner (Fourth) Circle: High-Risk Individuals**

Criminal law fulfils a crucial role in the reaction to serious criminal behaviour. The criminal law reaction, on the one hand, confirms the standard and, on the other hand, must keep the hope of improvement alive. The reintegration of ex-prisoners to prevent recidivism may also be promoted in penitentiary programmes and via community service. In the preventive sense, activities are also necessary for the benefit of individual children where problems accumulate and who will form part of the future hard core delinquents. As regards this group, educational institutions and youth care must intervene on the basis of signalling early signs. Training and intensive family supervision are necessary in this context.

**DISCUSSION**

Within approximately 15 years, safety policy has become one of the *hot topics* of local policy. Traditionally, controlling problems of crime was heavily based on criminal law enforcement. This situation is still topical, but people increasingly realise that this alone will not suffice. As stated earlier, criminal law has an important normative function, but it is limited in an instrumental sense. Although the police and judicial authorities are strengthened a more, integral approach is necessary to set up the local safety policy. From the point of view of the safety issue, a normative élan is required whereby citizens, social organisations, the local authorities and the police and judicial authorities are held accountable for their responsibilities.

Among (critical) criminologists the developments discussed above are met with quite some distrust (see e.g. Van Swaaningen 1997; Crawford 1998; Stenson 2000; as well as contributors to this special issue). Somewhat simplified the argumentation is as follows: in the past decades the context of the crime problem has changed dramatically. Western societies have developed along some crucial parameters: dominance of the market economy; diminishing influence of the state (see Garland 1996); and increasing importance/significance of expert knowledge and risk analysis (see Ericson and Haggerty 1997). These developments have led to new – sometimes contradictory – routes in ‘crime control’. Stenson (2000) for example, distinguishes punitive sovereignty, actuarial justice and community security.
According to Gilling (in this issue) the emergence of community safety encompasses especially these last two tendencies. In his opinion there is the risk that—at least in the UK—notwithstanding the social rhetoric on community safety, social policy threatens to be co-opted from a criminal justice policy point of view. This could lead to a policy of inequality and exclusion. “So, in the UK, community safety shows little sign of bringing about the socialisation or welfarisation of criminal justice” (Gilling 2001, p. 398). Although the local character of community safety offers opportunities for another broader reaction to crime problems, the danger exists that a reaction in terms of law and order will prevail. In other European countries he describes comparable risks.

That the convergence of criminal justice policy and social policy should be viewed with some distrust seems appropriate. It is a fact that the welfare state which emerged in most European countries after World War II has been replaced by a ‘safety state’ (Boutellier and Van Stokkom 1995). In particular the crime prevention policies of the last 20 years have contributed to reforms on the social platform (see also Baillergeau and Schaut in this issue) with more emphasis being placed on the management of risk situations and groups at risk. In schools, social work and family support the emphasis has shifted to the contribution of these institutions to the liveability and safety of modern society.

On the other hand, a moralising trend can be distinguished in the criminal justice reaction to crime. The hard core business of the criminal justice apparatus is more and more focused on organised crime and the prosecution of serious crimes. A whole range of alternative measures and sanctions with a more normative character has sprung up. In the Netherlands, 70% of the juvenile delinquents are no longer handled in juvenile court, but are cautioned by the police or the public prosecutor, or follow the alternative route of Halt (see e.g. Van Hees 1999). Alternative sanctions such as community service orders and educational measures are used more and more. Although a critical assessment is needed in terms of processes of exclusion, it is my view that the development of community safety as such needs to be judged as positive. At least three arguments need to be considered.

Firstly, the nature and volume of crime and insecurity form a serious and real problem. In theoretical criminology the reality of citizen’s experiences with crime are surpassed too easily—whereas according to Garland and Sparks (2000) it deserves special attention. The Left Realists already addressed the issue of the greater chance of victimisation for the less privileged in the 1980s, but this reality has not been drawn into the critical criminological analyses that much. Most of the time attention is
devoted to the possible punitive or exclusionary state measures, which bypasses the urgency of the crime problem.

For example, the reluctance on the part of criminologists to address the issue of crime among ethnic minority groups in order to avoid stigmatisation and discrimination has in my opinion been at the expense of these same groups. By not specifying the problems facing the minority groups they are in danger of becoming victims of unspecified sentiments against multi-ethnical society as such. The fact that crime has become an everyday — not wished for — experience, brings with it a sense of urgency which cannot be neglected. The insecurity in the public domain is a direct threat to the wellbeing of all citizens, also or maybe especially to those who are — socially speaking — underprivileged.

Secondly, many social institutions and welfare organisations are hindered by insecurity. In some cases the 'safety issue' is such a dominant factor that it keeps institutions from performing their core business. Especially in schools in deprived areas teachers and pupils become victims of threats and violence. The same holds for many welfare institutions, social security agencies and social work. Better co-operation with the police and criminal justice agencies can help these institutions to regain space to conduct their essential tasks. In this instance, it is not so much co-optation, as well as synergy by fine-tuning responsibilities and interventions.

Finally, an argument that has to be drawn into a critical discussion of the development of community safety is that it can be an alternative for a more dangerous option, namely the shift from a welfare state in the direction of a penal state (see Wacquant in this issue). The security problem has high stakes because it is directly attached to the legitimacy of the State. When citizens loose the trust in the protective functioning of the State this can be a real threat to the social functioning of the State. Although the possibilities of the post-modern sovereign State are limited/restricted (see Garland 1996), it disposes of a power apparatus, which can also be used and extended in other directions. The 'zero tolerance' and 'three strikes and you're out' policies in some American states point to the political temptation of a punitive law and order policy.

The development of community safety offers possibilities for the democratisation of safety/security policy that keeps in mind the context of the problems facing the citizens and the social institutions of democracy. A criminology which actually contributes to a just and solidary society has to take the safety problem into account. Given the volume of insecurity in the streets, schools and families of contemporary society, the development of a community based justice has a chance to shape a socially inspired safety policy. Research and analysis of changes and choices enclosed in
this concept form, in my opinion, a much more challenging perspective for 'late modern' criminology than sticking to the ideological unmasking of good intentions which characterised modern criminology in the last century.

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ABSTRACT. This article examines community safety policy. In many countries community safety has become a replacement discourse for situational crime prevention, although in some countries such as the UK, it too is threatened with replacement by the narrower concerns of crime reduction. Community safety represents the apparent merging of the concerns of criminal justice and social policy, specifically over questions of social inclusion and exclusion. Focusing in the main upon UK policy, but also drawing upon experience elsewhere, this article scrutinises the policy of community safety, arguing that while it offers an inclusionary vision of crime control, its practice may be something rather different. More specifically, and in common with the trajectory of much advanced liberal social policy, in practice community safety may have an exclusionary effect. Thus, while community safety may represent the convergence of social and criminal justice policies, it does so on neo-liberal rather than welfare liberal terms. It also means that community safety has a closer connection to policies of punitive sovereignty—particularly sentencing policies of mass incarceration—than might often be assumed.

KEY WORDS: community safety, crime prevention, social exclusion, social policy

INTRODUCTION

In the last decade or so there has been a significant international movement towards policies of community safety, not only in advanced liberal societies, but also in developing societies, as well as those in transition (United Nations 1999). The movement has been partially obscured by the high profile use of repressive crime control measures in some countries, and particularly by the heavy use of incarceration, but it is nevertheless there. This obscuration results from a separation between external responses to crime, which are populist and politicised, and perpetuate the myth of a sovereign state in a tough law and order stance (Stenson 2000 refers to this as punitive sovereignty); and internal responses (Garland 2001), which are necessarily lower profile and which seek to manage the everyday reality of levels of crime that despite recent falls remain significantly higher than they were 40 years ago (United Nations 1999).

In contrast to sovereign external responses, community safety emphasises a preventionist discourse, but not solely that of situational crime prevention. While situationalism is heavily promoted by some (Clarke 1992), the dominant judgement is that it does nothing about underlying risk fac-
tors, and that while it may prevent opportunities this comes at a heavy price of engendering a fortress mentality and generally enhanced insecurity. Community safety does not reject situationalism, but it does balance it with measures that address these risk factors, and this general insecurity. Now, by coincidence, addressing risk factors and insecurity is something traditionally associated with social policy: the risk factors may be things like unemployment, bad housing and low educational attainment; while insecurity is a feature of the inherent risks of market societies which social policy measures such as social insurance have traditionally guarded against (Vail 1999).

This coincidence suggests, then, that community safety may represent the co-option of social policy into the business of crime control. There is nothing particularly new in this, as David Garland's (1985, 2001) histories of penal welfarism have shown, and there is nothing unique about community safety practice either (O'Malley 1997). However, two significant facts do stand out. First, community safety is quite different from penal welfarism: the former is presented as being community-based, the latter is individualised, and both deploy quite different technologies of intervention. Second, given community safety's apparent parallels with social policy, it seems at least a little odd that it should have taken root in so many societies that have adopted a neo-liberal and neo-conservative approach to late-modern problems of governance.

Does the rise of community safety, then, represent the re-emergence of a welfarist discourse into the business of crime control, as if by the back door? If so, this may be a positive thing, and may provide a more socially inclusive foil to the exclusionary effect of external punitive sovereignty. Or is community safety not as it appears, with its inclusive rhetoric obscuring a more exclusionary politics and practice of crime control, and for that matter social policy? Is community safety, then, a case of the socialisation of criminal justice, or the criminalisation of social policy, or are these modernist questions which have not got to grips with the late-modern alloying of crime control and social policy? This article seeks answers to these questions, primarily by examining community safety developments in the UK. The empirical focus is on the UK because it reflects the bias of the author's own knowledge. The UK should not be regarded as in any way typical, and it is recognised that issues differ according to local political context. However, in so far as community safety is an international policy development, it is assumed that the issues raised have a wider significance. Before we examine UK policy, however, let us try to define community safety.
WHAT IS COMMUNITY SAFETY?

Community safety is a construction of the policy makers, practitioners and other experts (including academics) who deal in its currency. It is this that makes it interesting, since these constructions differ, to create a vibrant politics of community safety. It is a contested concept, both normatively and descriptively. Any definition offered here, therefore, is no more real than any other, although in order to escape an unhelpful relativism, it is possible to identify markers that constitute the main dimensions of community safety.

First, community safety is a response not only to crime, but to the insecurity that surrounds crime, indexical not to the risk of crime but to the social and cultural changes that define advanced liberalism (see Young 1998). These changes, which are more acute in urban areas, have contributed to the emergence of a society that is more plural, individualistic, divided, unequal and insecure. This insecurity in turn feeds not only off the perceived risk and media representation of crime, but also off an array of manifestations of disorder or incivility (Bailleau 1998). Thus, in addition to serious crime community safety focuses its attention equally upon minor crimes and regulatory offences; anti-social behaviour; and other environmental cues that may be taken as a diminution of the quality of life.

Incivility may cover an array of different phenomena, but they share the perception that they are perpetrated by a criminal other, those apparently disorderly beings who are likely to be youthful, of minority ethnic origin, or in some other way a member of an imagined underclass. Like the crimes community safety is most concerned with, the incivility that is perceived to occur is that that takes place in public space — ‘out there’. Thus, while there may be the occasional exception, community safety is largely confined to the crime and incivility of the streets, and not the crime that takes place within the home, or in the corporate world. There may be alternative visions, where practitioners successfully argue the case for community safety to be applied as much to the home or the corporate sphere, or to take on a genuinely pan-hazard approach, but the dominant community safety discourse remains the focus on the criminal other in public space.

A second main element of community safety, related to its first, is that it is presented as something different from traditional modernist criminal justice, the ‘failure’ of which may account for the rise of community safety. Thus, although criminal justice agencies are not excluded from the community safety domain, they are supposed to play a much-diminished role,
affording space for others such as local authorities and community groups.
It follows, then, that while criminal justice's concerns may be for justice
and due process, community safety's concern is less legalistic. It may be
about crime (and incivility) control, but unlike Packer's (1968) original
characterisation of crime control, this does not follow a narrow concern
for taking offenders out of circulation. Rather, it is about control by pre-
vention. Thus, rather than being concerned with principles of criminal
justice, community safety may be concerned with actuarialism (in the
situational and social management of risks) and traditional social policy
concerns such as social justice.

A third main feature of community safety is that it is essentially norma-
tive. Community safety constructs a vision of the good, well-ordered soci-
ety. The foundation of this positive vision is the community itself, envisaged
as comprising a horizontally integrated set of family and kinship ties, pro-
viding 'natural' insulation for its members against crime by establishing
an equilibrium between collective rights and obligations, between freedom
and security. The details of how this is to be achieved is vague, just as with
community policing. Etzioni's (1993) notion of communitarianism finds
favour with some, although others remain wary of its moral authoritarian-
ism, and the fact that community inevitably excludes as well as includes.
The notion of the rule of law underpinning traditional criminal justice is
generally taken to reflect a normative consensus (even if such a consensus
is illusory), whereas community safety is more expressly intended to build
such a consensus out of the conflicts and chaos characteristic of high crime
communities. Here, again, there are parallels with the social engineering
of social policy.

Fourthly, community safety offers a distinct institutional means towards
its ends, which entails a shift from a predominantly central statist approach
to problems of crime, to one that relies instead upon the forging of part-
nerships on a number of different fronts. The partnerships may be between
centre and locality; between the public and the private; and between crimi-
nal justice and social policy more broadly conceived. Partnerships are
presented as the new way to solve old problems, and are increasingly com-
mon across a range of policy contexts. As with the word community, part-
nership is often used in a normative sense (Crawford 1997), implying a
meeting of minds and shared concerns. The problem with this is that it
leaves the details unclear: the mechanisms by which partnerships are de-
veloped and sustained, and the respective roles and responsibilities of centre
and locality, criminal justice and social policy agencies, and public and
independent sectors are shrouded in a veil of uncertainty.
Fifthly, community safety is characterised by an eclectic set of measures designed for tackling crime and insecurity. The eclecticism is regarded as a virtue, 'hitting the problem from all sides', and dealing with symptoms and causes in a holistic approach that stands in stark contrast to the partial and limited nature of previous approaches. Thus community safety incorporates situational crime prevention, and social crime prevention; crime and disorder reduction, and fear and insecurity reduction; working with victims and offenders (both potential and actual). The flexibility of community safety allows it to be problem-focused, devising novel combinations of measures to tackle known problems — local solutions for local problems. Thus community safety is problem-led rather than practice-led. The question remains, however, of how far this problem-orientation can remain untainted by the inevitable politics of community safety.

While there may be other constituent parts of community safety, the above are probably the most significant. Taken together, they show the scope for considerable variation in the local construction of community safety. But what are the limits to this variation, particularly with regard to its incorporation of social policy? To answer this question, we now turn to policy developments.

**The Rise of Community Safety in the United Kingdom**

As Stenson (2000) has observed, there are three broad strategies of crime control in advanced liberal societies, namely punitive sovereignty, actuarial justice and community security. Community safety can incorporate all three of these elements (see below for the parallels between zero-tolerance and punitive sovereignty), although it is most usually associated with actuarial justice (e.g. situationalism) and community security (e.g. social crime prevention).

The balance between these three strategies varies according to local political contexts: in the USA, where rates on incarceration are very high, more emphasis tends to be placed upon punitive sovereignty, whereas in traditional welfare liberal states such as the Netherlands, greater emphasis may be placed upon community security. It may be that where punitive sovereignty is least emphasised community safety is most developed, although to assume a zero-sum relationship between the two is misleading, and ignores their potential for complementarity. In the UK the emphasis has gradually changed, and it is this change and its wider implications that we explore in this section.
It was the Morgan Report (Home Office 1991) that first lent quasi-official backing to community safety in the UK. Before then, for most of the previous decade, central government had encouraged responsible local crime prevention partnerships, but with limited success other than where it provided the funding itself, as with the Safer Cities Programme (Tilley 1993). Morgan reasoned that crime prevention tended to have narrow police oriented and situationalist connotations, whereas community safety was broader and more inclusive, and more likely to attract the support of local social agencies. The point, then, was an explicitly political one, and when translated into the specific recommendation that local authorities should be given a statutory responsibility for community safety, and a dedicated budget, it was effectively rejected by the Conservative government. This rejection requires brief explanation.

Conservative crime prevention policy has been grounded in a number of specific articles of faith. First, it rested on a neo-conservative explanation of crime causation (bad people making bad choices), which required punitive sovereignty to punish those who had offended, and situational deterrents to effectively block the bad choices. Crime prevention policy was therefore avowedly situationalist.

Second, it was premised upon a neo-liberal view of the state: responsibility for preventing crime should be shifted where possible from the public to the private, from state agencies to other sectors of a rediscovered mixed economy. The rhetoric may have been of ‘multi-agency’ or ‘partnership’ approaches, but this only thinly veiled the strategy of responsibilisation. Hence the investment in crime prevention publicity to individual householders; the massive expansion of neighbourhood watch and the private security industry during this period; and the effective disabling of statutory agencies. Local authorities (especially despised by the Conservatives) had few resources to devote to crime prevention even if they had the will, and by the 1990s even the police found it difficult to maintain an adequate patrol presence on the streets.

Thirdly, and closely related to the above, Conservative policy was anti-welfarist, as welfare liberalism had given way to neo-liberalism. This meant a changed role for social policy. No longer was social policy to be regarded as a means to social solidarity and social justice (although the extent to which it ever was should not be exaggerated). Rather, it was to become increasingly only a residual safety net for the most needy, and a vehicle for promoting individual responsibility and initiative, rather than a culture of dependency. Good examples include income maintenance policy, where benefit entitlements have been cut, measures taken to force recipients out
of dependency and into work, and to encourage private provision; and urban policy, where targeting services at the most needy have given way to encouraging the development of free enterprise in urban wastelands, in the expectation that there may be some 'trickle down effect' to the locally disadvantaged.

The shock of this anti-welfarism was also felt elsewhere. Penal welfarism was also effectively outlawed, which meant the erosion of discourses and practices deemed to be 'soft' on offenders, and the promotion of practices that emphasised responsibility (just deserts) and culpability. Crime prevention, too, did not deviate from this anti-welfarism, which meant the heavy promotion of the situational approach (and particularly themes of active citizenship) over social crime prevention, with its distinctly welfarist odour.

These articles of faith explain Conservative antipathy to the Morgan Report's main policy recommendations. Throughout the remaining years of their tenure in office, the Conservatives remained relatively silent about community safety, preferring to devote considerably more space to strategies of punitive sovereignty, under the slogan 'prison works'. It took the arrival of the first Labour government for 18 years to put community safety apparently back on the agenda as a national policy strategy, and to all appearances their flagship 1998 Crime and Disorder Act represents the implementation of the original Morgan recommendations. The Act establishes local statutory Crime Reduction Partnerships across the whole country, responsible for conducting crime audits, consulting on their findings, and implementing three-yearly strategies. However, there are important divergences from the Morgan proposals.

While Morgan speaks of community safety, the 1998 Act seems to talk more in terms of crime and disorder reduction – they are by no means the same thing as in the latter the space for tackling risk factors is not so apparent. In addition, while Morgan proposed a sole statutory responsibility for local authorities, the 1998 Act divides the responsibility between the police and the local authorities, thereby potentially weakening the influence of local authorities. And finally, while Morgan proposed a dedicated budget, this was not originally forthcoming, as it was envisaged funding would arise from anticipated future savings from successful crime reduction.

From this brief sketch it is tempting to interpret UK community safety policy developments over the last decade as following a simple political trajectory. According to such an interpretation, the Conservatives pursued a relatively narrow vision of crime prevention because of the constraints
imposed by their neo-conservative and neo-liberal agendas. They resisted Morgan's more welfarist vision of community safety, but the New Labour government did not, because, as befits a traditional left-of-centre social democratic party, they were not ideologically or politically opposed to it. Thus, one might conclude, community safety under New Labour represents the re-injection of welfarism back into criminal justice.

Unfortunately, however, this interpretation is not correct, and it does not do justice to the complex and contradictory patterns that are woven into community safety. While the Conservatives did not actively promote community safety as a national strategy, there was, nevertheless, a significant relaxation in its situationalist stance from about 1988 onwards, and local community safety rapidly developed, even without central governmental support, in many of the major towns and cities across the UK. This is evidenced in a Local Government Management Board survey (LGMB 1996), which showed that nine out of 10 local authorities regarded community safety as a legitimate policy area, with approximately one half having policy statements and specialist community safety officers appointed.

Similarly, while New Labour appeared in 1997 to be the champions of the community safety cause, their approach has not been as inclusive or as welfarist as may have been imagined. Consequently, while the change from one government to another has been radical in terms of a changed infrastructure, we should not forget that there has also been continuity. The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act should not be seen as community safety’s Year Zero (some critics would see it as the death knell). In this author’s view it has continued and refined much of what existed before.

The main driving force of continuity in UK community safety policy has been the perceived need to respond to a growing sense of insecurity. For whatever reason, situationalism did not address this, and thus did nothing to avert a legitimacy crisis, because the provision of security is an integral part of a state’s role and justification.

The shift from situationalism started with the launch, implementation and extension of the Safer Cities Programme from 1988, and the provision of a major source of community safety funding in the shape of the Single Regeneration Budget, also in the early 1990s. In these central government initiatives, community safety was effectively introduced as a measure of urban regeneration, in such a way that it did not contradict the punitive sovereignty which was simultaneously being pursued through the criminal justice domain. This incorporation of community safety into urban regeneration represents the recognition of the importance of security
and safety for urban fortunes (Taylor 1999). In other words, in order to attract and retain inward investment, it is important for governments and localities to be able to point to safe, well-managed urban landscapes and local populations. But how did this translate into practice?

On one level, there was a continuation of the situationalist theme, particularly through a massive expansion in the use of CCTV. There has also been a strong emphasis on physical urban regeneration, transforming residential, business and retail districts into aesthetically pleasing environments in ways that are reminiscent of the environmental criminological ideas of Oscar Newman (1973) and Jane Jacobs (1961). The creation of defended space was regarded as a prerequisite for the stimulation of commerce and local housing markets.

There have also been approaches more characteristic of social crime prevention, particularly with regard to work with youths. However, in terms of statutory inputs, this work had less to do with what might have been regarded as the 'natural' welfarist home of social crime prevention, namely local authority education, youth or social work departments, and rather more to do with the police (King 1991). Now, police-initiated social crime prevention has always been part of the British tradition of consensus-building policing, typified by community policing. But it is doubtful whether such activity is appropriate. As a necessarily authoritarian agency, the police service is not best-placed to deal with the complexities of social exclusion among the more marginalised groups in society. No matter how well intentioned, moreover, they may lack the necessary expertise: much of the police's work with youths is oriented towards improving mutual relations, which risks being undone once the police are drawn into more conflictual relations, either through law enforcement or the aggressive zero-tolerance approach which became popular in the late 1990s.

This incursion of the police into the traditional domain of education, youth and social services has been referred to as an instance of the criminalisation of social policy (Pearson et al. 1992), where social policy-type interventions are pursued for criminal justice-type ends. There are signs that this has continued under New Labour, but through a different institutional structure. Thus the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, in addition to introducing Crime Reduction Partnerships, also introduced a new partnership structure for youth justice with the establishment of Youth Offender Teams (YOTs). These YOTs have absorbed the court-based work of previous youth justice teams, but importantly, in addition they provide a new focus for youth-based social crime prevention, since YOTs possess a statutory duty to develop plans to prevent youth crime.
The establishment of the new YOTs could be seen as a radical departure from what existed before, representing the demise of police-initiated social crime prevention, and the renewed influence of local authority youth and social work. The YOTs are all locally based, but centrally monitored by the Youth Justice Board (YJB), and certainly the aspirations of the YJB look promising, in so far as YOTs have been encouraged to develop local policies to tackle such issues as employment and education exclusion, and early intervention in order to prevent young people from committing crime in the first place. Examples of schemes include Positive Futures, launched in 2000 and based upon a partnership between sports bodies, drug agencies and local YOTs, intended to encourage greater youth participation in sport at the expense of participation in drug misuse and other crimes; and the Youth Inclusion Programme, which establishes 70 projects aimed at the most deprived areas in the country, and intended to reduce truancy, arrest and crime rates among the 50 most at risk young people in each area aged between 13 and 16 years old. This programme, which was also launched in 2000, seeks various ways to support families and local communities, and the educational and training needs of these at risk young people.

It is too soon to be able to tell how successful the new arrangements have been, but there is space for some scepticism. The inclusion of the crime prevention duty for YOTs clearly draws agencies concerned with youth into the community safety net, and therefore gives community safety a less ad hoc local structure, making it less likely that youth crime prevention will be left to the police (although the police service is one of a number of agencies represented on the multi-agency YOTs). But, to put it in street language, while youth agencies appear to talk the talk of social inclusion, it is by no means clear they walk the walk. As Muncie correctly observes:

Some programmes may implicitly recognise structural constraints and determinants [of youth crime], but their targets invariably become individualised and behavioural. Primary attention is given to responding to the symptoms, rather than the causes of young people's disaffection and dislocation. (Muncie 1999, p. 245)

Schemes such as Positive Futures, for example, may end up simply channeling troublesome behaviour into pro-social activities such as sport, under the supervision and surveillance of responsible authorities. The Youth Inclusion Programme, meanwhile, along with other interventions with children in their earlier years, picks up on the what works agenda, which often seems less concerned with final outcomes than with questions of cost effectiveness (it is cheaper to track at risk young people in the community than to process them once they have offended through the criminal justice system).
If one side of social crime prevention is work directed towards youths, the other tends to be work focused upon communities where there is a spatial concentration of crime and indicators of poverty and social exclusion. Preventive work in such areas is a key constituent ingredient of community safety. The Conservative approach to this was heavily dependent upon the vehicle of neighbourhood watch. Even though evidence indicates it is most difficult to establish these in high crime areas (Rosenbaum 1986), attempts were nevertheless made to enhance its role as a means of community development.

The belief persisted that neighbourhood watch was a means of establishing the sort of neighbourliness that is a key ingredient of healthy communities that are horizontally integrated, and that exert a high degree of informal social controls over their members. It was not widely recognised that crime and insecurity were not bases on which to build community organisation, especially in high crime areas which are often, though not necessarily always (see Foster 1995), characterised by a high degree of plurality, social division, and insecurity. In such situations, where offence and offender rates are high, neighbours are possibly more likely to be fearful of their neighbours, as victims and offenders live in close proximity to one another.

While New Labour has not made so much of neighbourhood watch, it has ploughed much the same furrow. As Hope (1995) has observed, neighbourhood watch is best conceived as a form of community defence. One possible rationale for community defence may be found in the Wilson and Kelling (1982) broken windows hypothesis, which supposes that if minor signs of disorder go unattended, it is possible for a spiral of decline to ensue, where the area invites further disorder and more serious crimes, leading to a self-reinforcing neighbourhood decline. ‘Respectable’ residents move out, property values decline, ‘undesirables’ move in, and so forth. Under community safety’s strong communitarian themes, New Labour has continued this theme of community defence, based upon a civic intolerance of incivility.

The Home Secretary of New Labour’s first term in office, Jack Straw, was a particularly ardent enthusiast of zero-tolerance policing. Above all, though, he has adopted the left realist mantra of taking crime seriously, particularly for residents of high crime areas. Burney (1999, p. 13) quotes from a newspaper article penned by Straw:

For many years, the concerns of those who lived in areas undermined by crime and disorder were ignored or overlooked by people whose comfortable notions of human behaviour were matched only by their comfortable distance from its worst excesses.
While left realism has a point here, New Labour’s solution is distinctly moral authoritarian. In addition to zero-tolerance policing, this solution includes a new civil order introduced under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, namely the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO). Local authorities have been encouraged to apply for these ASBOs against rather ill-defined anti-social behaviour: the order imposes an injunction which, if broken, becomes an imprisonable criminal offence. It has not been widely used thus far, in part because of local authority reluctance and civil libertarian concerns, but its mere existence is revealing.

All of these things merge together into a community safety discourse which is not so inclusive as some might have thought. It is based upon Etzioni’s (1993) notion of communitarianism, which as others have observed (Hughes 1998) has strong moral authoritarian overtones. It tries to speak with a single majoritarian voice, but in so doing raises the question of ‘whose voice?’ Beyond the dangers of the tyranny of the majority, the potential is there for it to be the voice of a patriarchal, mono-cultural, dominant class, the moral standards of which are imposed upon the rest, who are invited to participate in the demonisation of youth street cultures, homeless beggars, squeegee merchants, noisy neighbours, and asylum-seekers. The intolerance would not have looked out of place in Salem. And this is where the reality of communitarianism strikes, for in making a case for inclusion, in the collective occupation of that space between the public and the private, it inevitably also makes a case for the exclusion of those who do not fit or belong. Hypocritically, such communitarianism often excludes corporate crime and family violence from its purview, problems that might call its moral authority seriously into question.

Defenders of New Labour’s approach to community safety might view this as an excessively harsh judgement. After all, an integral part of the Crime Reduction Partnership role is to consult local people on their own assessment of local crime and disorder problems, rather than relying on official audit information. This is sensible given the well known deficiencies of official statistics, but it also appears to be distinctly democratic. Yet it is not clear that it is democratic, and that it will not simply befall the fate of police community liaison panels, which have generally proved to be unrepresentative. For example, if community groups identify different problems to those revealed by the audit information, there is a possibility that their concerns will be overlooked anyway, especially as they will lack a hard factual basis, particularly in the case of under-reported crimes such as racial violence. Moreover, with local partnerships keen to limit the number of strategic priorities they set, and falling under managerialist pressure from central government, it is quite likely that their reference point
will be upwards, to the Home Office's national objectives, rather than downwards, to locally-identified problems.

Concern that this might happen is strengthened by the characterisation of some minority groups as hard-to-reach groups, as if there is a good excuse for not hearing what they have to say. In New Labour's defence, however, it should be pointed out that statutory guidance has made a point of emphasising the need to consult with minority ethnic groups, and to consider issues such as homophobic violence. However, the mere existence of guidance does not mean it will be followed.

As well as consulting with the community, Crime Reduction Partnerships are, as noted above, responsible for auditing local crime and disorder problems, and devising three-yearly strategies. There is scope here, surely, for localities to develop their own innovative approaches to crime, and since many urban local authorities might place themselves somewhere to the left of the present government, it might be here that one would expect to find evidence of a more inclusive community safety agenda.

The partnerships are too new for us to be certain of their impact, but there is reason to think that faith in them might be misplaced. Central government holds a relatively tight grip over them, albeit at a distance, by doing all it can to insist their business is crime and disorder reduction. Hence the partnerships are expected to pay heed to Home Office objectives that target politically important national crime problems such as burglary. Partnership performance will be measured and compared against the criteria of crime and disorder reduction, yet these are behavioural manifestations of the crime problem, rather than risk factors or underlying causes; which means that, as with previous experience (Gilling 1997), there may be pressure to adopt a bias in favour of situational measures, and against social measures of prevention. This is particularly likely when one considers that the police, as providers of the most important audit information and as holders of the main resources in local crime control, may be in a relatively dominant position to define local problems and solutions (Pearson et al. 1992).

Contrary to Morgan's recommendation (Home Office 1991), local Crime Reduction Partnerships are in receipt of no core funding for community safety. However, there are streams of temporary or competitive national funding that some partnerships have been able to key into, particularly through the £403 million Crime Reduction Programme (including a CCTV initiative), which runs for three years between 1999 and 2002. The Crime Reduction Programme inevitably reflects national priorities, seen in its various priority initiatives, such as burglary reduction, targeted policing, security improvements for pensioners, and CCTV schemes. There are also
more socially oriented initiatives, such as youth inclusion, and intervention in schools against truancy and exclusion, but funding here is more likely to be channelled through YOTs, and as we have seen above, the inclusive appearance here is deceptive. Although Crime Reduction Partnerships may be in a position to generate their own funds, these are likely to be quite limited, and certainly not suitable for the launching of major programmes of social intervention.

Just as it is erroneous to detach community safety from wider policy developments in criminal justice, so it is erroneous to detach it from wider developments in social policy. If community safety policy sometimes veers towards the exclusionary, perhaps this is because it criminalises social policy, something that may not happen in a social policy mainstream unpolluted by a criminalisation discourse. Indeed, in a conference in Exeter launching the Crime and Disorder Act, the Home Office minister Alun Michael made the point that certain social policy developments, such as the New Deal and changes to education policy, should be seen as a complementary inclusive backdrop to the more locally-oriented work of community safety. The implication was that the social causes of crime, or the criminogenic risk factors, would be nationally addressed in an inclusive way by social policy. However, the rhetoric does not quite match the reality.

Under the Conservatives’ mix of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism, UK social policy was radically transformed. The social democratic aspiration of state welfare as a vehicle for the pursuit of social justice and social solidarity under the inclusive theme of citizenship has given way to a policy of privatisation and, in the case of those things that cannot be privatised, managerialisation. Social policy has been re-engineered as a vehicle to promote individual responsibility, and to deter a culture of dependency. New Labour has not deviated from this path. It benefited in its first term from an economic upturn that led to a significant reduction in unemployment, but it is apparent that a significant residuum of dislocated and excluded people remain, often heavily racialised and spatially concentrated in inner cities and residual public housing. These people remain outside of New Labour’s communitarian vision (Jones Finer 1998).

As a consequence of this shift from collective risk management to privatised prudentialism (O’Malley 1992), social policy now is increasingly based upon the notion of stakeholdership, the idea that individuals can be responsibilised and empowered by social policy to become a part of the included club of stakeholders, benefiting from what society has to offer them as responsible consumers. But this does not appear to recognise the structural context of social exclusion, or the reality of a plural atomised society that sits uneasily with its implied homogeneity. Consequently, rather
as situational crime prevention is founded upon a rational choice view of offending (which implicitly blames those who fail to be deterred), the logic of stakeholdership is to pathologise and blame those who fail to become stakeholders. Given that crime and social exclusion are often spatially concentrated together, the same groups may therefore be excluded through social policies and community safety, with divisions being reinforced because the logic of both is to drive a wedge between the responsible and the irresponsible, the moral and the immoral.

UK social policy does not provide the vertical integration to communities that would give all of their members the cultural capital necessary for social inclusion. Without horizontal and vertical integration, a fair proportion of people within high crime communities will remain socially dislocated, and ultimately excluded (Pitts and Hope 1998).

COMMUNITY SAFETY IN OTHER ADVANCED LIBERAL STATES

There is no space here for a full description of community safety in other countries, but we can ask whether the UK situation pertains elsewhere. It is apparent, for example, that a similar community safety infrastructure is now found in New Zealand, France, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Belgium, as well as in some states in Australia. The basic model of community safety being nationally driven but locally developed and implemented is common, as is the general emphasis upon such themes as partnership, community and localism.

Our interest here, however, is to establish whether there is a similar leaning towards exclusionary community safety in these countries. In this regard, official reports and documents are of limited utility, as they do not distinguish the rhetoric from the reality, and in community safety this is very important, as appearances can be deceptive. Because of this, moreover, there is an unfortunate tendency for accounts of community safety to be self-justifying and self-congratulatory, as if community safety is so obviously a good thing that there is no need to scratch away at the veneer, as if good intentions are all that matters. Rock (1988) first identified this in the UK, but it may well exist elsewhere, and it is telling, as Crawford (1998) and others report, that in France community safety tends to be chronically under-evaluated.

However, we have to be careful what we mean by evaluation. Evaluation tends to service managerial concerns, seeking to establish, in the case of community safety, whether it works in terms of crime reduction, and whether it is cost-effective. Evaluation also carries an implicit concern with
replicability: if something is a success it should be replicated elsewhere, and there is quite a substantial market in the exchange of information about replicable best practice. While issues of effectiveness and replicability are clearly of considerable importance, they are nevertheless fraught with measurement and conceptual difficulties (O’Malley 1997). Our concern lies more with the socio-political impact of community safety, particularly in the light of its apparent co-option of social policy. Inevitably, in assessing this, there is rather less evidence available.

Pitts and Hope (1998) compare community safety practice on two estates in England and France in the early 1990s. Their analysis suggests that whereas the French managed considerable success in achieving horizontal and vertical community integration, the English did not, because community action was geared more to defence than development and solidarity, because partnerships were ad hoc and thrown off course by internal managerialist agendas, and because social policies such as social housing allocations effectively enhanced rather than reduced exclusion. However, the study is limited and now dated.

King (1991) lends support to Pitts and Hope’s (1998) finding that French community safety is more inclusive, not least because criminal justice agencies are not dominant, and because of value differences, where France has a much stronger theme of encouraging social solidarity, and explaining problems of integration in terms of the community’s failure to integrate marginal groups, rather than the fault of the groups themselves. However, there is a suspicion (Crawford 1998) that French practice has been romanticised, and both Sutton (1997) and Bailleau (1998) have noted that the French Bonnemaison model has receded in some areas in the 1990s, as police-led repressive crime control has come more to the fore. Crawford (1998), moreover, notes that crime prevention has been subsumed to some extent by urban regeneration, and it is possible that this produces similar results to that found in the UK, where the emphasis has been on improving conditions for enterprise by physical regeneration and enhanced physical security, which has inevitably been exclusive.

Bailleau (1998), furthermore, argues that social and economic changes in France have prompted the structural emergence of an underclass, associated with the growth of incivility. Bailleau says that the community social work which is an important part of French community safety cannot cope with this because it is structural and not individual, and it may well be that, in its place, repression and physical security is increasingly targeted at this spatially concentrated section of the population.

The story is not dissimilar in Belgium (Goris and Walters 1999), where despite a framework similar to the French Bonnemaison model, the police
have come to dominate partnerships, with a preference for punitive sovereignty which also seems to find favour with elected officials, whose populist concerns ensure that inclusive community safety is not given a chance to flourish. Sutton (1997) makes the same point in relation to community safety in South Australia, where attempts to emulate the Bonnemaison model failed due to a lack of political support, and due to a tendency to use community safety as a rather insincere cosmetic ‘spray-on solution’ gesture.

These international comparisons may be very limited, but they are enough to suggest that what is evidenced in the UK may have parallels in other advanced liberal states, despite differences in political structures and cultures.

**Conclusion**

This article examined the development of community safety in the UK, from the late 1980s through to the present. It suggests that there has been a certain continuity, between the end of the 1980s and the present, in the socio-political impact of community safety. Work with young people more often than not focuses upon those whose behaviour is perceived to make them at risk, and is not well geared to tackling the underlying causes of their social dislocation. Work in high crime areas, meanwhile, is under pressure to conform to New Labour’s vision of communitarianism and civic intolerance, while social policy more generally stresses a stakeholdership that does little to help the most marginalised. There are signs that the UK experience is mirrored elsewhere, where an inclusive vision of community safety finds it difficult to hold the line against populist law and order politics.

If we map this discussion on to the five dimensions of community safety identified at the outset, the following picture emerges. UK community safety extends the focus from crime to insecurity, and operates through the community, but in so doing we need to ask whose insecurity, and which community? As Vail (1999) notes, insecurity is socially constructed, so we have to ask which groups have the most social power to establish their insecurity as the problem to be addressed. The evidence suggests it is the insecurity not of the victims of neo-liberalism (the socially dislocated underclass), but of the ‘respectable classes’, whose enhanced freedom and affluence has come at the expense of growing insecurity about the dangerous other. This may not be the dystopian extreme of the *City of Quartz* (Davis 1990), but it is not so far away. The communitarianism of commu-
nity safety threatens to set the included against the excluded, whose behaviour is increasingly problematised as incivility, whose opinions are not convincingly canvassed, whose participation is not convincingly sought, and whose mere presence is perceived as a threat to enterprise.

UK community safety also differs from criminal justice; has embraced the notion of statutory partnerships; and incorporates an eclectic range of measures. However, while it may be different, it may not be that different. Home Office national objectives are still hugely influential in determining partnership objectives, and the police still have a very influential role within partnerships, not least in terms of providing the information upon which audits and strategies are based. The civic intolerance that is encouraged by central government also gives a degree of legitimacy to measures such as zero-tolerance policing, that are very criminal justice-oriented through their aggressive law enforcement, and not disconnected to the punitive sovereignty exercised through penal policy. In addition, the growth of CCTV and other security technologies suggests that while community safety is eclectic, it is still dependent upon a generalised (rather than problem-oriented) situationalism.

So, in the UK, community safety shows little sign of bringing about the socialisation or welfarisation of criminal justice. If new millennium social policy is being co-opted for the service of community safety, it is because this social policy is quite consistent with the risk management, responsibilisation and exclusionary trajectory of community safety. We have reason to presume the same applies elsewhere, since advanced liberal societies have all been subjected to similar late-modern social, economic and cultural changes, including normally high levels of crime and the rise of neo-liberalism as a governance strategy. What remains to be seen is what space there may be for human agency to develop a more inclusive community safety against these structural trends. This is a task for further research which asks more questions than simply what works.

The above discussion shows that New Labour has tried to shift the discourse of crime control from community safety to crime and disorder reduction, but even at central government level there is a contradiction here, as certain strong community safety themes such as neighbourhood regeneration and social inclusion remain in governmental discourse. Locally, there is stronger adherence to notions of community safety, and it is here that there may be genuine efforts to develop a more inclusionary agenda. This is not surprising, because local agencies, away from the limelight of populist politics, are well placed to recognise the inter-relationship of crime and social exclusion. For the present they come under less pressure than the central state to develop external responses to crime that emphasise
punitive sovereignty. However, if one effect of the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act is to enhance local accountability for crime control, then there is a danger that the external response, currently the main preserve of central government, gets transferred to or shared by local agencies. In many ways, the spectacular rise of zero-tolerance policing can be seen in this light, with the police making a bid for re-legitimisation in order to gain public support by reclaiming the streets. It would be a disaster if local authorities found it necessary to go down the same road.

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THE PENALISATION OF POVERTY AND THE RISE OF NEO-LIBERALISM

ABSTRACT. This article explicates and extends the analyses put forth by the author in his book, Prisons of Poverty, which argues that the generalised increase of carceral populations in advanced societies is due to the growing use of the penal system as an instrument for managing social insecurity and containing the social disorders created at the bottom of the class structure by neo-liberal policies of economic deregulation and social-welfare retrenchment. It retraces the steps whereby this 'neo-liberal penality' was elaborated in the United States and then diffused throughout the world, but contends that European countries are not blindly following the American road to mass imprisonment: Europe's path to the penal state entails the conjoint intensification of both social and penal treatments of poverty and the activation of the policing functions of welfare services leading to a form of 'social panoptism'. Only the building of a Europe-wide social state can check the spread of the penalisation of poverty and its deleterious social consequences.

KEY WORDS: penal state, neo-liberalism, poverty, criminalisation, social policy, penal policy

The criminalisation to which militants from many social movements battling joblessness, homelessness and xenophobia across Europe are currently being subjected — as represented in extreme form by the wanton police assaults on anti-globalisation demonstrators in Genoa during the G-8 meeting in the Summer of 2001 — cannot be understood outside of a broader pattern of penalisation of poverty designed to manage the effects of neo-liberal policies at the lower end of the social structure of advanced societies. The harsh police practices and extended prison measures adopted today throughout the continent are indeed part and parcel of a wider transformation of the state, a transformation which is itself called for by the mutation of wage labour and precipitated by the overturning of the inherited balance of power between the classes and groups fighting over control of both employment and the state. In this struggle, transnational business and the 'modernising' fractions of the bourgeoisie and state nobility, allied under the banner of neo-liberalism, have gained the upper hand and engaged a vast campaign aimed at reconstructing public authority. Social deregulation, the rise of precarious wage work (against a backdrop of continued mass unemployment in Europe and steadily rising ‘working poverty’ in the United States) and the return of an old-style punitive state go hand in hand: the ‘invisible hand’ of the casualised labour market finds its
institutional complement and counterpart in the ‘iron fist’ of the state which is being redeployed so as to check the disorders generated by the diffusion of social insecurity (Wacquant 1999a).

The regulation of the working classes by what Pierre Bourdieu (1998) calls “the left hand” of the state, symbolised by education, public health care, social security, social assistance and social housing, is being superseded – in the United States – or supplemented – in Western Europe – by regulation through its ‘right hand’, that is, the police, courts and prison system, which are becoming increasingly active and intrusive in the lower regions of social space. The sudden and obsessive reaffirmation of the ‘right to security’ by leading politicians of both Right and Left, concurrent with the quiet dereliction of the ‘right to employment’ in its traditional form (that is, to full-time work, with a complete entitlement package, for an indeterminate term and a liveable wage), and the growing interest in and increased means devoted to law enforcement also come in handy to compensate the deficit in legitimacy suffered by political leaders, owing to the very fact that they have renounced the established missions of the state on the economic and social front.

Everywhere in Europe governments are thus trying to undermine the new legitimacy of militants and ‘active minorities’ within emerging social movements, acquired in and through daily struggles, so as to prevent further increases in collective mobilisation. More than mere repressive measures, the criminalisation of the advocates of social and economic rights partakes of a broader political agenda leading to the creation of a new regime that can be characterised as ‘liberal-paternalist’: it is liberal at the top, towards business and the privileged classes, at the level of the causes of rising social inequality and marginality; and it is paternalistic and punitive at the bottom, towards those destabilised by the conjoint restructuring of employment and withering away of welfare state protection or their reconversion into instrument of surveillance of the poor.

THREE SPECIES OF IMPRISONMENT AND THEIR MEANING IN THE NEO-LIBERAL PROJECT

To put the unexpected resurgence of prisons at the forefront of the institutional horizon in advanced societies over the past two decades (King and Maguire 1998; Christie 2000), it is helpful to recall that putting people behind bars to punish them is a recent historical invention. This fact comes as a surprise to many since we have grown so accustomed to seeing people locked up that it seems perfectly natural to us: the prison presents
itself as an indispensable and immutable organisation, operating since times immemorial. In reality, up until the end of the eighteenth century, places of confinement served mainly to detain those suspected or found guilty of crimes to await the administration of their sentence, which consisted then in various corporeal punishments (whipping, pillorying, burial, branding or mutilation, being put to death with or without torture), supplemented by banishment and condemnation to forced labour or to the galleys (Spierenburg 1995). Depriving people of freedom became itself a punishment, and the criminal sentence *par excellence* (to the point that it has become difficult to conceive or implement other penal sanctions without them appearing insufficiently severe) only with the advent of the modern individual presumed to enjoy personal freedom, imbued with a natural right to bodily integrity that could be removed by neither family nor state, except for the most serious motives. Reminding ourselves that the prison is a very young institution on the scale of the history of humankind is to stress that its growth and permanence are not a foregone conclusion.

Secondly, once it becomes the normative form of criminal sanction, imprisonment can *fulfil several functions at the same time*, successively or simultaneously. Sociologist Claude Faugeron (1995) establishes a fruitful distinction between what she calls “imprisonment of safety”, aimed at preventing individuals considered dangerous from causing harm; “imprisonment of differentiation”, designed to exclude social categories deemed undesirable; and “imprisonment of authority”, whose purpose is primarily to reaffirm the prerogatives and powers of the state. One perceives immediately that these three forms of imprisonment do not target the same populations — e.g., paedophiles, illegal migrants and violent “trouble-makers” at demonstrations — and do not communicate the same message to society.

This plurality of functions fulfilled by the prison does not prevent such or such particular mission from predominating at a given time. Thus in European countries today, imprisonment for purposes of differentiation is applied with growing frequency to non-European foreigners (that is, immigrants from the former colonies of the old continent) who are thereby designated as not being part of the ‘social body’ of the emerging Europe (Palidda 2000, pp. 219–240). In America, prison has taken over the function of the black ghettos as an instrument of control and containment of a population considered as a lower caste with which one should not mix. And there it is African-Americans who ‘benefit’ from a *de facto* policy of *carceral affirmative action* resulting in their massive overrepresentation in the country’s jails and prisons: black men make up 6% of the national population but have accounted for over half of new admissions
in state and federal prisons every year since 1989 (see Wacquant 2000a, 2001).

Nonetheless, the signal fact of the end of the century is without doubt the tremendous inflation of prison populations in all advanced societies (Stem 1997; Tonry and Petersilia 1999; Garland 2001) due to the increasingly frequent, indeed routine, use of imprisonment as an instrument for managing social insecurity. This is what I argue in my book Prisons of Poverty: in all the countries where the neo-liberal ideology of submission to the ‘free market’ has spread, we observe a spectacular rise in the number of people being put behind bars as the state relies increasingly on the police and penal institutions to contain the disorders produced by mass unemployment, the imposition of precarious wage work and the shrinking of social protection.

**How Neo-Liberal Penality is Spreading and Mutating**

Erasing the economic state, dismantling the social state, strengthening the penal state: these three transformations are intimately linked to one another and all three result essentially from the conversion of the ruling classes to neo-liberal ideology. In fact, those who are glorifying the penal state today, in America as well as in Europe, are the same ones who, yesterday, were demanding the end of ‘Big government’ on the social and economic front, and who did indeed succeed in curtailing the prerogatives, expectations, and exigencies of the collectivity in the face of the market — that is, in the face of the dictatorship of large corporations. This may seem like a contradiction, but in reality these are the two components of the new institutional machinery for managing poverty that is being put in place in the era of mass joblessness and precarious employment. This new ‘government’ of social insecurity — to use Michel Foucault’s terminology — rests, on the one hand, on the disciplining of the deskilled and deregulated labour market and, on the other, on an intrusive and omnipresent penal apparatus. *The invisible hand of the market and the iron fist of the state combine* and complement each other to make the lower classes accept desocialised wage labour and the social instability it brings in its wake. After a long eclipse, the prison thus returns to the frontline of institutions entrusted with maintaining social order.

The overpowering ascent of the theme of ‘urban violence’ and street crime in the discourse and policies of European governments, and especially in France since the return to power of the so-called Gauche Plurielle [plural left, composed of the Socialist, Communist and Green parties], does
not have much to do with the evolution of ‘youth’ delinquency (one should always add: youths of working-class and foreign origin, since it is squarely they who are meant; besides, in many countries, such as Italy and Germany, politicians feel no discomfort in coming straight out and saying ‘immigrant crime’). Instead, its aim is to foster the redefinition of the perimeter and modalities of state action: the Keynesian state that was the historic vehicle of solidarity, and whose mission was to counter the cycles and damaging effects of the market, to ensure the collective ‘well-fare’ and to reduce inequalities, is succeeded by a Darwinian state that makes a fetish of competition and celebrates individual responsibility (whose counterpart is collective irresponsibility), and which withdraws into its kingly functions of ‘law and order’, themselves hypertrophied.

The usefulness of the penal apparatus in the post-Keynesian era of employment of insecurity is therefore threefold: it serves to discipline the fractions of the working class that buck at the new, precarious service jobs; it neutralises and warehouses its most disruptive elements, or those considered superfluous with regard to the transformations of the demand for labour; and it reaffirms the authority of the state in the limited domain that is henceforth assigned to it.

One can distinguish three stages in the worldwide diffusion of the new ‘made-in-the-USA’ ideologies and policies of law and order, and in particular the so-called ‘zero tolerance’ measures — which, interestingly, are called ‘quality of life’ measures in New York (see Wacquant 1999b, for a more detailed examination). The first is the phase of gestation, implementation, and showcasing in American cities, and especially in New York, which was elevated to the rank of the Mecca of security by a systematic propaganda campaign. During this phase, the neoconservative think tanks, such as the Manhattan Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute and a few others, play a pivotal role, because it is they who manufacture these notions before disseminating them within the American ruling class in the course of the war against the welfare state, which has been raging in the wake of the social and racial backlash experienced by America since the mid-1970s.

The second stage is that of import-export, facilitated by the links forged with the kindred ‘think tanks’ that have mushroomed throughout Europe over the past decade, and especially in England (Stone et al. 1999). Just as in matters of employment and social policy (King and Wickham-Jones 1999; Deacon 2000), England serves as the Trojan horse and ‘acclimation chamber’ for the new, neo-liberal penalty with a view to its propagation across the European continent (a major influence here is the Institute for Economic Affairs, which brought to the UK, first Charles Murray to ad-
vocate cutting welfare, then Lawrence Mead to urge workfare, and finally William Bratton to proselytise on 'zero tolerance'). But if the export of the new American law-and-order products is having stunning success, it is because it meets the demand of the state rulers of the importing countries: in the intervening years, the latter have converted to the dogmas of the so-called 'free market' and to the imperative of 'less government'—in social and economic affairs, that is.

A third and final stage consists in applying a thin scholarly whitewash to these measures, and then the trick is pulled: a conservative pig is sold in a criminological poke. In each country one finds local intellectuals who spontaneously take up the part of 'smuggler' (passeur) or relay by vouchsafing with their university authority the adaptation of US policies and methods for enforcing law and order to their own societies. In France, for instance, there are a number of academics who live solely off of the second-hand resale of American security ideologies (one of them is about to publish a book entitled Is There a French 'Broken Window'? when the so-called 'broken windows' theory has already been discredited among serious US criminologists). These are the ideologies that one encounters afterwards in the form of pseudo-concepts in the seminars of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Domestic Security (IHESI), in a Que Sais-Je on Urban Violences and Insecurity, in the documents handed to mayors when they negotiate their 'local security contracts' with the central state, and then in the newspapers and in everyday conversations.¹

This is not to say that Europe is importing US-style police and penal policies wholesale, blindly imitating politicians from across the Atlantic. European countries with a strong state tradition, either Catholic or social-democratic, are not headed towards a slavish duplication of the American model, that is to say, a sharp and brutal substitution of the social-welfare treatment of poverty by penal treatment backed by all-out 'carceralisation'. Rather, they are groping towards the invention of a 'European' (French, Italian, German, etcetera) road to the penal state, suited to the different

¹The IHESI is a state institute which conducts training seminars and 'studies' on security and law enforcement issues and policies; it is placed under the aegis not of the Ministry of Research but of the Minister of the Interior, who is in charge of the police, and its works pertain more to bureaucratic propaganda than to scholarly research. Que Sais-Je is a high-prestige book series published by Presses Universitaires de France consisting of short volumes reputed to provide the best, up-to-date scientific information on a given topic. Local security contracts (Contrats locaux de sécurité) are compacts signed with the central state through which municipalities plan, promote, and implement proactive anti-crime measures.
European political and cultural traditions, and characterised by a *conjunct*,
twofold accentuation of both the social regulation and the penal regula-
tion of social insecurity.

Thus the French State is simultaneously increasing its social interven-
tion and its penal intervention. On the one hand, it has multiplied youth
jobs and government-sponsored work contracts for the unemployed that
include training (CES, or *Contrats Emploi-Solidarité*); it has raised the level
of various public aid packages (however little) and significantly extended
the reach of the guaranteed minimum income plan (RMI); it has instituted
truly universal health coverage, and so on. But, on the other hand, it is also
stationing riot police squads in the so-called ‘sensitive neighbourhoods’
and it has set up special surveillance units for detecting and repressing de-
linquency there; it is substituting judges for social workers and educators
when ‘at-risk’ youth need to be warned to not run afoul of the law; cities
are passing and enforcing utterly illegal anti-begging ordinances that serve
to sweep the homeless and the derelict off the streets; the Jospin govern-
ment has refused to align the norms for remand detention through *com-
parution immédiate* (live arrests and fast-track prosecution) with the norms
for *affaires à instruction* (investigative cases following a police complaint),
on the grounds that one must fight ‘urban violence’ (thus granting the
youths of declining public housing estates a form of ‘carceral affirmative
action’); penalties for recidivism are made harsher; the deportation of for-
eigners subjected to ‘*double peine*’ are speeded up, and release on parole
has been practically eliminated.

A second difference between the United States and France (and the
countries of continental Europe more generally): the penalisation of pov-
erty à la française is mainly effected by means of the police and the courts,
rather than through the prison. It obeys a logic that is more *panoptic* than
retributive or segregative, with the significant exception of foreigners
(Wacquant 1999c). Correspondingly, the social service bureaucracies are
called on to take an active part in it since they possess the informational
and human means to exercise a close surveillance of ‘problem populations’
— this is what I call *social panopticism*.

The whole question is whether this European road is a genuine alterna-
tive to American-style carceralisation, or whether it is simply a stage on
the way to mass imprisonment. If one saturates neighbourhoods of social

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2The ‘*double peine*’ refers to the fact that most foreigners sentenced to prison in
France for serious crimes first serve the detention term to which the court sentenced
them and then are expelled from the national territory following an administrative decree
of banishment.
exclusion with police officers without improving the life chances and employment options of its residents, one is sure to increase arrests and penal sentences and thus, in the end, the incarcerated population. In what proportions? The future will tell. The same question arises, in much more dramatic and urgent terms, in Latin America, where US-style police and penal policies are being imported \textit{wholesale}. Two decades after the ‘Chicago Boys’ reshaped the economies of that continent, the ‘New-York Boys’ of William Bratton, Rudolph Giuliani and the Manhattan Institute are spreading their law-and-order gospel there, with devastating consequences due to much higher levels of poverty, the embryonic nature of social welfare programmes, and the corrupt and violent behaviour of the crime and justice bureaucracies. In the formerly authoritarian societies of the Second World such as Argentina and Brazil, the application of neo-liberal penalty amounts to re-establishing a dictatorship over the poor (see Wacquant 2000b on Argentina and Wacquant 2001b on Brazil).

\textbf{France’s ‘Plural Left’ Joins the ‘Washington Consensus’}

But it is at the heart of Europe that the worldwide battle for setting the transnational goals and norms of the penal institution in the era of hegemonic neo-liberalism and, through them, for shaping the visage of the post-Keynesian state, is being waged. And here the new crime and security orientations of France play a pivotal role. In the 1980s, the successive Mitterrand governments contributed powerfully to legitimating neo-liberal economic ideology by capitulating under the pressure from the financial markets and monetary speculation to adopt policies of budgetary austerity and privatisation. Today Jospin finds himself in much the same position on the penal front as a result of being perceived — rightly or wrongly — as the last truly Left leader in Europe and even in the world. He could anchor a breakwater of resistance to \textit{‘la pensée unique’} [one-way thinking] in matters of criminal justice. Instead, he rallies the ‘Washington consensus’ on law-and-order dictated by the US neo-conservative think tanks. When he denigrates the social causes of delinquency as so many “sociological excuses” (in a high-visibility interview published in \textit{Le Monde} at the beginning of 1999 under the unwittingly ironic title, ‘Against “one-way thinking”’), Jospin renounces sociological thought even though the latter is organically linked to socialist thought, and he legitimates the neo-liberal vision of the world in its most retrograde aspects. More generally, one might have hoped that the Left, back in power, would launch a bold policy of decriminalisation and decarceration, that it would increase the perimeter and prerogatives
of the social state, and diminish those of the penal state. And the opposite is happening (Sainatti and Bonelli 2000). The same pedagogy of retreat and renunciation that has guided economic policy is now being applied in the area of criminal justice.

The emergence in France of a so-called 'Republican left' which rues the days when minors received severe disciplining is a worrying trend in this respect, a teratological form of Republicanism fed by nostalgia for a 'golden age' that never existed. This old-fashioned education, some people seem to have forgotten, rested on fundamentally inegalitarian and violent social relations, especially between age groups and between the sexes. It is society as a whole that educates, and one cannot restore an old-fashioned system of discipline when everywhere else such a form of rigid authority has been questioned and overturned. When Mr Chevènement was Minister of Education in the 1980s under Mitterrand, his ambition was to sprinkle France with universities. When he took up the Ministry of the Interior [which oversees the national police] in the late 1990s, his plan was to line the neighbourhoods laid to waste by the government's economic policy with police stations, while waiting perhaps to open up jails in them.

In both scenarios, the presence of the state is being reinforced, but with diametrically opposed means and consequences: the first scenario translates into an expansion of life chances, the second into their amputation; the one reinforces the legitimacy of public authority, the other undermines it. Hardly caricaturing, one could sum up this duality by this formula: for the children of the middle and upper classes, universities and professional-managerial jobs; for the offspring of the working class confined in declining housing estates, precarious service jobs, or positions as police adjuncts, surveiling the outcasts and refuse of the new labour market—under threat of being locked up. Thus fully 10% of the government-sponsored 'youth jobs' are adjoints de sécurité, police officer's aides recruited in low-income areas and entrusted with facilitating and expanding the reach of the forces of order in these neighbourhoods.

**THE ADVENT OF THE PENAL STATE IS NOT A FOREGONE CONCLUSION**

Unlike in the United States, where the criminalisation of poverty has entered into custom and habit and is henceforth inscribed in the very structure of the state as well as in public culture, in Europe the dice is not yet cast, far from it. No more than precarious employment, which some try to present as a sort of natural necessity (it too comes from America), carceral inflation is not inevitable. Recourse to the prison apparatus in
advanced societies is not destiny but a matter of political choices, and these choices must be made in full knowledge of the facts and of their consequences.

To oppose the penalisation of social precariousness, a threefold battle must be waged. First of all, on the level of *words and discourses*, one must put the brakes on the semantic drifts that lead, on the one hand, to compressing the space of debate (e.g. by limiting the notion of ‘insecurity’ to physical or criminal insecurity, to the exclusion of social and economic insecurity) and, on the other, to the banalisation of the penal treatment of tensions linked to the deepening of social inequalities (through the use of such vague and incoherent notions as ‘urban violences’). It is imperative to keep close track of the pseudo-theories concocted by the American think tanks and assorted law and order ideologues, and to submit them to strict customs checks in the form of a rigorous logical and empirical critique.

Next, on the front of *judicial policies and practices*, one must thwart the multiplication of measures tending to ‘widen’ the penal dragnet and propose a social, health, or educational alternative whenever feasible. We must stress the fact that, far from being a solution, police surveillance and imprisonment typically aggravate and amplify the problems they are supposed to resolve. We know that, in addition to hitting mostly the destitute strata of the working class — the unemployed, the precariously employed, recent immigrants — incarceration is itself a powerful engine for impoverishment (Marchetti 1997). It is useful, in this connection, to recall relentlessly what are the deleterious conditions and effects of detention today, not only upon the inmates themselves but also on their families and their neighbourhoods.

Finally, much is to be gained from forging links between activists and researchers who work on the penal front and those who battle on the social front, and this *at the European level* so as to optimise the intellectual and practical resources to be invested in this struggle. There is a tremendous mine of scientific and political knowledge to be exploited and shared on the scale of the continent — and beyond: American scholars and activists have a wealth of experiences to offer that demonstrate the colossal social and human costs of mass imprisonment. For the true alternative to the drift towards the penalisation of poverty, soft or hard, is the construction of a European social state worthy of the name. The best means of making the prison recede is, again and always, to strengthen and expand social and economic rights.
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ABSTRACT: The heavy concentration of crime on a few areas, and the concentration on the chronically victimised within those areas, together illustrate the gross inequality of the risk of crime victimisation. This inequality also characterises other hazards of life. Criminology has too often reduced the problem of crime to the problem of the offender. Recognising crime hazard as an issue of distributive justice requires a different mind set. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 recognises the drivers of crime as lying outside criminal justice, but does not put in place a pan-hazard analysis of the kind required, community safety being presented as a type of crime prevention. Movement towards pan-hazard thinking may well be somewhat facilitated by the working-through of the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights, actions flowing from Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act, and a reconsideration of how emergency services might work.

KEY WORDS: community safety, distributive justice, hazard management, victimisation

A central and undisputed fact is that crime is heavily concentrated on certain places, and within those places on certain people and households (Farrell et al. 1996; Hope 1996; Pease 1998). Table I is reproduced from Pease (1998) and summarises data on the degree of crime concentration at the individual level from sweeps of the British Crime Survey. Analyses which restrict themselves to the areal level naturally show less dramatic, but still massive levels of disproportion. For example the analysis of Farrell

TABLE I


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Victimisations</th>
<th>Property</th>
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<th>Personal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proportion of Respondents</td>
<td>Proportion of events</td>
<td>Proportion of Respondents</td>
<td>Proportion of events</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4+</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
et al. (1996) showed that the 10% of sampling points in the 1988 British Crime Survey suffering the most property crime experienced some 42 times the level of the least victimised 10%. This order of magnitude of concentration is found whichever sweep of the British Crime Survey is subjected to analysis.

One should not rely on the precision of the numbers presented to measure crime concentration. There are conventions in the British Crime Survey concerning the maximum number of victimisation forms which a victim may complete, the maximum number of events recordable as a series against a chronic victim, and the like. Such conventions change the exact numbers arrived at. Neither should one stereotype all crime victims as the innocent and put upon. As yet unpublished research by Paul Wiles and Andrew Costello suggests that recent criminal involvement is a characteristic of some repeat victims. Insurance fraud is another possibility to explain some repeat victimisation. However, there is no challenge to the basic fact that crime is heavily concentrated, both by area and within area by victim and household. If one wants to address the problem of crime, repeat victims in high crime areas would be where most effect is to be had, whatever the dynamics of the problem.

Communities that suffer high rates of crime are often also characterised by poor housing, deprivation, exclusion, poor educational achievement, pollution and the like. This is not a coincidence. A wide range of social and physical variables contribute to and are contributed to by crime risk, both singly and in interaction (see e.g. Tseloni et al., forthcoming). These variables include affluence, region, area type, parity, household composition, land use and physical attributes of a home, car or person. The establishment of causal routes through which these allied ills manifest themselves is technically difficult and probably pointless. Social variables may both drive and be driven by crime and perceptions of crime, or be manifestations of other variables, overt or subtle. For example, concentration of single parent households may be associated with crime for many reasons, including the following:

- because crime changes population composition with the more desperate moving to less desirable areas;
- because the lifestyle of single parents changes natural surveillance and other area attributes which increase crime;
- because both single parent households and crime are attributes of an area's economic decline, which drives both;
- because the spending power of lone parents distorts local economies, leading to the decline or change of the business profile.
To this point, we have concluded that crime is heavily concentrated, and that crime and other social indices are intertwined in ways whose untangling is difficult to the point of impossibility. Next, we will address how crime risks are spread, inadvertently or otherwise.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF VICTIMISATION OPPORTUNITIES

The discipline of criminology has been overly concerned with retributive justice for the offender, and too little with the distribution of physical and social arrangements which generate crime. By being seen primarily as a product of wickedness, and reducing the problem of crime to the problem of the offender, crime has been ghettoised as a type of harm with a distinctive dynamic.

In reaction to the offender-focused outlook of criminology, a new perspective assumed the rationality of much offending, and social and physical arrangements were dissected to reveal the criminal opportunities which they afforded (see Cornish and Clarke 1986). Evidence accumulated that manipulating crime opportunities changes rates of crime (see Clarke 1992, 1997). Sometimes such manipulation was not based on adequate analysis. In the mid-1990s, some 78% of the Home Office’s crime prevention budget was spent on CCTV systems alone (Koch 1996), since that apparent means of opportunity reduction was in vogue. Whatever its occasional misuse amounts to, this perspective made it possible to think of crime as opportunity, both opportunity to offend and opportunity to be offended against. Offenders are the consumers of criminal opportunities supplied by victims.

Notions of distributive justice in the supply of opportunities for victimisation have been neglected. Indeed, the very idea of distributing opportunities for victimisation seems bizarre, and that of victims as suppliers of criminal opportunities positively distasteful. Yet levels of crime are indeed a product of our social and physical arrangements, from the ease of criminal use of artefacts, the growth to adulthood of those with no stake in society, and the ready means of expropriating goods and services. When the robber Willie Sutton was asked why he targeted banks, he is alleged to have replied "Because that’s where they keep the money". The answer is at once flippant and profound. Its profundity derives from the fact that ‘where they keep the money’ determines who gets victimised, where and when. The distribution of crime and disorder can be reduced by changing objects and processes or by changing the criminal inclinations of people. Banks can be made harder to rob (object change), or Willie Sutton and his ilk less inclined to rob them (people change). Proponents of people change and
object change may disagree about their relative importance. Only a fool would choose one approach over the other. The stress laid on each has changed with criminological fashion. Because object change has been historically neglected, its advocacy has been particularly strident in recent times.

Physical and social arrangements drive many things beside crime rates. Many of their other consequences are more readily thought of in terms of distributive justice. Land use, business and traffic regulation, the maintenance of public spaces, liquor licensing and the enforcement of trading standards all feed into most aspects of life, including the safeguarding of the health and welfare of citizens. We have noted earlier that crime risks often accompany other types of risk. Thus the search for distributive justice in terms of crime victimisation will have consequences for other aspects of life quality, and *vice versa*. The issue becomes one of juggling factors under at least partial control to ensure distributive justice, however roughly, across indicators of quality of life, weighted in some principled way. There is a sophisticated literature on this topic (see e.g. Elster 1989, 1992) which will become relevant when detailed trade-offs are discussed. However, for the moment we are merely at the stage of seeking to incorporate crime within the set of dependent variables shaped by policy and convention.

**THE CRIME AND DISORDER ACT: A FALSE DAWN?**

The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is underpinned by the recognition that many determinants of crime levels lie outside the criminal justice system. This recognition, though tardy, is welcome. It may be thought that the Act, by advancing the purpose of `community safety' over that of `crime prevention' requires some sophisticated trade-off between variables influencing quality of life, including crime, with community safety representing the chosen set of trade-offs. Is community safety ready to take its place as the rational set of compromises involving health, education, culture, freedom from crime and the like as social ends? Sadly, it is not. The reasons for this are outlined below, but developed more fully in Wiles and Pease (2000).

Disregarding its history, the phrase community safety implies the ranking of hazards by probability of occurrence and severity of harm, from whatever sources, crime, traffic, genetically modified food, and the rest. If, for example, a car is more likely to maim you than local villains, then good traffic management reduces risk more than locking up villains. How-
ever, in practice addressing hazards is a highly compartmentalised process. We have a health service, but no health policy involving the integrated consideration of food, agriculture, air and water quality, and the provision of health monitoring. The decision of the Peruvian government to reduce water chlorination in favour of fluoridation of the water supply in 1991 allowed cholera to flourish in the chlorine free water. 7,000 people died, 600,000 having been infected (Bate 1998). Further, the communication of hazard information is very far from straightforward, with systematic psychological biases operating on the perception of hazard (see e.g. Viscusi 1987). Even if hazard is objectively categorised across origins of hazard, the use of that information in rational decision-making is far from assured, being shaped by considerations of transient political advantage.

Clearly, as a minimum, the notion of community safety properly involves summing hazards across contexts. Also implicit within it is the notion of trade-offs, of compromises and hazards recognised but accepted. One needs the phrase community safety rather than just safety because community safety departs from the sum of individual safeties if hazards are distributed unevenly. If each person’s safety contributes equally to the safety of a community, community safety and individual safety are the same thing. When we are not all in the same boat, hazard-wise (and in crime and most other risks we emphatically are not) community safety involves sacrificing the safety of some for the safety of others. For example, some small areas host a red-light area, the remainder of the town thus being saved the troubles associated with prostitution. The notion of community safety thus involves both a consideration of all hazards together, and a difficult and perhaps painful process of trade-offs between areas and hazard types.

The phrase community safety in Great Britain does have a history which takes it far from the difficult but important policy process detailed above. The phrase derives from the influential Morgan Report of 1991. The full title of that report was Safer Communities: The Local Delivery of Crime Prevention through the Partnership Approach. Further, the report stated that it “could encourage greater participation from all sections of the community in the fight against crime”. Community safety, as legislated, is simply a style of crime prevention, not a broader way of ranking and dealing with dangers facing people. Insofar as the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 gives effect to the Morgan recommendations, community safety finds itself limited to the purpose of crime prevention. Community safety is legislated within a Crime and Disorder Bill, whereas the concentration of hazards, varying in concert, should mean that crime and disorder would find itself, with other hazards, in a Community Safety Act! This is rather like finding a discussion of general soccer economics within a volume
entitled The History of Manchester City FC. This matters because it serves to continue to keep separate the manipulation of crime risks from risks to wellbeing generally.

TOWARDS AN INTEGRATION

Some factors already press towards integrating risks in policy formulation. Under Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act local authorities are required to take into account the crime implications of their policies. Clearly how this policy works in practice will depend on the view the courts are prepared to take about what is reasonable, and whether particular trade-offs between crime and other risks reflected in local authority practice have been reasoned and are defensible. More widely, the incorporation into UK law of the European Convention on Human Rights will allow decisions to be called into question which impact upon personal safety. The same issues of trade-off of diverse risks and benefits will probably be invoked for the courts to decide on reasonableness. Instead of starting from the consideration of difficult trade-offs, let us consider how the provision of help might begin to reflect hazards across the board. Even an optimal help-dispensing service will not solve the problems of difficult trade-offs. However, it will alert providers of service as to the shape of the help which seems required across all categories of risk.

HELP! I NEED SOMEBODY’S HELP

As the Beatles song opined, people need help for a variety of reasons. The urgency of required assistance also varies. Rather than start with crime per se we have argued above that it would be more useful to start with the broader issue of hazard and hazard management, of which crime and disorder are subsets. When people dial 999, they are asked which of the emergency services they need, because urgent help is needed of various kinds. Public demand has to be quickly subdivided to make the assistance appropriate. ‘Emergency’ is, to state the obvious, a social construct. Given time, it would be of interest to look at the official papers leading to the creation of the 999 scheme, or the 911 scheme in North America. It would also be of interest to see how 911 spawned 311 as a sub-emergency service. The fuzziness and doubt about what constitutes an emergency will be familiar to anyone who has ever almost used the emergency service, or has done so only when there has been no reply to (for example) the line on
which one has to report gas leaks. At the time of writing, radio news reported a young man using 999 to contact the police to find out whether his application to join the force had been received. This was supposed to make us laugh at the caller’s stupidity, but the zone of genuine uncertainty cannot be overlooked. This shadowland of possible emergency was reflected in the Automobile Association’s campaign proclaiming itself to be the ‘fourth emergency service’ to its members, a claim angrily refuted by the Lifeboat Service. In the US, a computer maintenance and repair service exists named Service911.com, thus explicitly linking itself to the emergency services. Its advertising proclaims “Go with the pros instead of the cons” (www.service911.com). In the popular film Ghostbusters, the removal of poltergeists spawns a service clearly modelled on the emergency services.

It is difficult to argue that poltergeist possession or the crash of business-critical computers are problems requiring urgent help unlikely to be afforded by ringing the mainstream emergency services. With the process of disintermediation proceeding apace with the growth of e-commerce meaning that professional bodies are no longer the facility by which standards are maintained, there is an increased need for the validation of services which enter homes and businesses to deal with ‘emergencies’, either physically or electronically.

**WHO YOU GONNA CALL: GHOSTBUSTERS?**

We require the public to decide who can help them before they make their decision as to whom to call. They need to decide that the police service is the best body to advise about noisy neighbours rather than Environmental Health or Housing, that the fire service rather than the police is relevant to a Wheelybin on fire, and so on. This segmentation of help based upon citizen perception of the problem has many obvious disadvantages, not least that co-ordinated responses to complex problems is thereby made difficult, and that the citizen may embark upon an unedifying and costly process of being passed from official to official, before giving up or getting lucky.

If we ask “What is the function of government, centrally or locally, in late modern societies?”, one possible answer is the management of hazard in order to enhance the quality of citizens’ lives and to enrich their collective culture. Here we return to the pan-hazard view of community safety. The management of hazard is distinct from the traditional answer of modernity to this question – to provide services either as a public good or
which the market cannot provide — because we have learnt methods of extending market provision and because the diversity of late modern societies means that a single public good is not easy to identify. Furthermore, virtually all the thinking on late, or post-modernity identifies hazard as a key problem.

At present we have created processes at city level which attempt to identify and respond to circumstances attending heightened hazard. We have Crime and Disorder Partnerships, Health Action Zones, Educational Action Zones, etcetera. All have a common underlying hazard management framework: audit the distribution of a particular hazard; create an action plan to reduce the hazard; monitor the outputs; and evaluate the outcomes. The weakness of this empirically is that it does not tackle the inter-correlation of hazards, it does not order hazards across conventional policy boundaries, and in process terms it precludes a clear focus for local governance.

The first thing, therefore, is to make city authorities responsible for producing a hazard management strategy following the standard framework outline above but starting with a pan-hazard audit of the city. This could identify the totality of hazards and their relationships. It would be the basis for the joined-up hazard management, which we know is currently lacking. It ought to be more successful than single hazard management, which we know often fails because it ignores the relationships between hazards. It is not difficult to find examples of high multi-hazard neighbourhoods which over time have attracted a whole series of publicly funded single hazard reduction programmes, with the overall long-term effect being precisely nothing.

The process outlined would induce a city authority towards a detailed understanding of its hazard management problems. Central development help would be needed for the methodology of pan-hazard analysis. It would also immediately reveal some awkward problems.

- The public hygiene services which address hazards (be they police or hospitals) are often not co-terminous geographically with each other or with cities, and will hence be difficult to marshal into a pan-hazard reduction plan.
- The distribution of resources across different hygiene services at local level will almost certainly not match the relativities of hazard distribution. It will be based either on past distributions or more likely uninformed tradition or power differentials enshrined in local statute and practice.
- Not all the hygiene services are public services (e.g. private policing, water treatment, refuse disposal and hospitals).
The practices within hygiene services are usually not even based on a proper hazard assessment internally. For example, double crewing in police forces is rarely based on a proper hazard assessment. North Yorkshire Police, for example, double crew and all traffic wardens have been issued with stab proof vests – in Harrogate!

There are various possible ways of addressing these problems. The most obvious – re-locate all services to city level – is politically the most problematic and may be economically the least efficient (although economy of scale arguments do tend to win arguments without always being carefully examined). This route would involve a radical rethinking of local governance. An alternative is to ensure that each service provider has a city level sub-unit regardless of the overall organisational size – for example, in the case of the police, each city has a single Basic Command Unit. This would at least mean that sub-unit managers could constitute a hazard analysis and management group.

Another approach would be to create new city-wide organisations at a lower tier. For example, one could create a city police below the current regional police forces and national squads. This may be thought to create economic and organisational inefficiencies but would provide a better response to the problems of localisation. A more radical solution would be to re-visit the various forms of hygiene service designed to manage hazards. However, what such an analysis would illuminate is that all such services face constant pressures to move their service provision outwards from their core function precisely because of the interrelated nature of hazards. The job of policing, for example, has constantly oscillated between pressure for pure crime fighting, on the one hand, and a much broader problem solving service function, on the other. Medicine has constant arguments about how much to spend on medical repair as opposed to preventive work.

In fact hazard can be divided into two types. Firstly, there are hazards of harms, whether their provenance be predation by people, by disease or by environmental circumstances (e.g. traffic). Secondly, there are hazards to unfulfilled potential, such as poor schools or an impoverished local job market. The two types of hazard are typically inter-correlated and co-located spatially and socially.

As far as hazard of harms is concerned a novel response would be to create at city level a generic harm reduction patrolling force. Its functions would be:

- to act as a filter into the core hygiene services, with the advantage that they could then focus on their core businesses;
to deal immediately with minor hazards – that is, minor incivilities; immediate first aid; truant pupils, etcetera;

- to provide a visible public reassurance for a range of hazards;
- to identify and brand a civic responsibility for hazard management.

If this sounds too wacky then remember it is very much what the early police forces did and is very much like the best examples of current attempts to re-think the hazard problem – e.g. the Sedgefield Community Force. Taking the central issue to be the swift and efficient deployment of appropriate help, an alternative strategy may be appropriate, questioning whether patrolling is the best way of despatching timely help. This would be to stimulate the development of an information and help communication infrastructure, through help points on the street, dedicated non-emergency phone numbers where problems could be allocated to problem-solvers from refuse disposal to duty chemists. The strategy would then be to broaden the range of agencies to which the public has immediate access – the flat hierarchy at work in the public interest. The hazards of unfulfilled potential are not susceptible to such action response measures and need a longer-term improvement of service delivery outcomes. Some of these improved outcomes will be achieved by national action, such as league tables, inspectorates, performance units, etcetera, but there is still a need to harmonise the total hazard management strategy at local level.

The framework of hazard auditing and subsequent hazard management planning has already been addressed above. Ideally this would be managed by a mayor or chief executive, chairing a group of city-level unit heads from the various service delivery agencies. This group could have a legal existence and be responsible for such a process, in a similar way to the current Crime and Disorder Act partnerships, except with an all inclusive hazard and service delivery focus. Each individual local service delivery plan would then become a sub-set of this overall framework. The group could also be jointly responsible for a generic patrolling/help deployment service accessing core specialised services. Some equivalent of Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act would allow citizen redress against poor service, with the European Convention on Human Rights providing a backstop.

The framework could be extended to incorporate at least some private provisions. For example, private police could be licensed at city level in return for an agreed role within a city-wide policing and hazard management plan, and Chief Constables could be responsible for that process. Registered doormen could be brought into the network. This would ensure a better equality of service provision and a better targeted service
delivery. It would also ensure that whilst social and market fragmentation might push towards private interests (and the concomitant danger of ghettoisation and social exclusion) an overarching notion of public interest could be maintained city-wide. The purpose would not be to fight against market fragmentation but to ensure that any gross distortions of exclusion or access this produced were balanced by the allocation and deployment of public service provision.

The problem of defining a public interest which transcends private provisions would then become a key focus of civic politics—something which is lacking at present. Debates of this kind are already happening: for example, the use of the concept of ‘qualities’ within the Health Service to measure quality of extra years lived as a benchmark for medical decisions. However, such debates are often hidden because of fear of public reaction. The debates would more intelligible and politically manageable within a local civic political discourse of hazard management.

**Conclusion**

Within such an overall city management framework crime and disorder questions can be more sensibly addressed. Previously impossible questions for crime reduction—such as what to do to reduce high crime and disorder on a council estate with a declining tenant base and high levels of neighbourhood alienation—could now be dealt with in an holistic way. It took a long time for us to accept that rehabilitation of such neighbourhoods; target hardening the properties; putting in youth workers etcetera, often were doomed to failure in the face of a very poor neighbourhood reputation and changed aspirations about housing and choice: the market and social forces were all pushing in the wrong direction. However, an holistic approach might lead to more ambitious, but realistic, solutions, whether it be abandonment, clearance and large scale redevelopment; or significantly attacking market trends by inward investment or household equity value insurance schemes. In a similar way, declining city centres may need more radical solutions than simply controlling incivilities by additional policing, zero tolerance and local bylaws against street drinking if they are to compete with the best out-of-town shopping and leisure malls. City centres could examine changing highway designations to allow a similar level of overall management, control and customer care as is achieved in the private space of shopping malls in order to revitalise their use.

The overall point is that whilst we can come up with an evidence-based set of responses to specified crime problems commonly suffered in cities
their implementation will not necessarily lead to a city renaissance. Actions need to be integrated and based on a pan-hazard analysis. Our evidence-based responses are a tool kit but can only be sensibly applied after hazard analysis and in conjunction with other hazard management tools. Local government is going to need help both in developing the hazard assessment methods and by being offered a hazard-reduction tool kit—perhaps that is a role of national government as the provider of authenticated knowledge sets and pools and methodologies for analysis and application. Trying to prescribe (or even offer) crime actions, health actions, education actions etcetera, outwith a process for choosing the applicability of alternative responses and how to link them up, will replicate the failures of the past.

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SOCIAL WORK AND THE SECURITY ISSUE IN THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM

ABSTRACT. Over the past years security has become a central issue in political discussions both in the Netherlands and Belgium. This has led to the setting of new governmental schemes in urban areas that rely upon the commitment of social workers to a large extent. Besides that, a number of new professions linked to social intervention have appeared. The purpose of this article is to analyse the emergence of security as an issue and the effects of the new governmental schemes in the field of social work, and to compare the political and social backgrounds, how security is dealt with and the effects on social work in Belgium and the Netherlands. The general assumption is that the practice of social professions tends to a new balance between change and control, the two usual poles of social work, at the expense of emancipatory practices towards marginalised people. In other words, it is wondered whether the action of social workers is to put in place a system of control and risk prevention as a mix of social work and people policing. The article shows that the development in this direction in the two countries is similar, in spite of significant background differences.

KEY WORDS: community work, security contracts, security policies, social work, urban policies

INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the 1970s, the professional practices of all social workers in Western Europe were challenged by a number of intellectuals, including Michel Foucault. In particular, the latter accused them of contributing to the generalised surveillance of members of the public perceived as being dangerous or potentially harmful to the maintenance of public order, and beyond to hinder the reproduction of society by itself (Lenoir 1997). The social workers who were aware of this criticism but who had nevertheless not discouraged it, sought justification for it by emphasising the emancipatory nature of their work with respect to their clientele. This took the shape of methods of working more appropriate to community work or socio-cultural work than social assistance. One may ask, what remains of this notion of social work at the dawn of the third millennium, when, for several years, security has become a recurrent theme in Western European social workers’ everyday life. In fact, new measures to fight both social exclusion and insecurity have sprung up since the beginning of the
1990s, significantly integrating within them social workers who have found themselves with new roles.

This article covers two main subjects. Firstly, it covers the study of the changes that participation by social workers in the management of insecurity can bring to social work as a professional service and studies about how the principles of action that guide them and their practices can be modified. Put another way, it analyses the place of this new concern for the strengthening of security with respect to the other objectives of contemporary social work. Secondly, it covers the comparison of two sets of research carried out, one in the Netherlands, the other in Belgium.¹

The Dutch research specifically covers 'opbouwwerk' (community work) which comes within the framework of the trend towards community organisation that has developed in various Eastern countries from the 1950s onwards, with the aim of introducing a more collective form of social work for deprived people. In the 1970s, numerous Dutch opbouwwerkers (community workers) made their professional services widely known by siding with the inhabitants of older neighbourhoods in their fight against stronger parties involved in urban renewal (stadsvernieuwing); the community workers helped them to organise themselves collectively with a view to forming counter-proposals and putting forward their views to the authorities. Since then, things have changed significantly and most community workers have subsequently engaged in partnerships with the authorities and also with the police (Dozy 1999). Within the framework of such partnerships they are responsible for the establishment of coexistence compromises known to particularly help combat the feeling of insecurity in deprived areas. In some instances, co-operation with the police comes within the framework of the participation of the latter in social activities of a festive nature without them making any obvious effort to deal with criminality and insecurity; but in some other instances it is purely the community workers who undertake activities relating to the maintenance of public order.²

The Belgian part of the article concentrates on the analysis of the practices and the tasks assigned to the social workers in working-class areas

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¹This double study has been undertaken within the framework of TSER (Targeted Socio-Economic Research) research (1999–2001) financed by the European Community. It gathers together German, Greek, French, Dutch and Belgian teams with the aim of studying new forms of public management of deviance.

²The Dutch part is based on an inventory of co-operation initiatives between opbouwwerkers (community workers) and the police with the express object of combating insecurity throughout the Netherlands and a more detailed investigation covering the involvement of the community workers in this type of programme in the city of Rotterdam.
who operate within the framework of new measures to combat social exclusion and insecurity, in particular the ‘contrat de sécurité’ (security contract). This consists essentially of socio-cultural workers, street-corner workers and mediators. The Belgian part of the article also studies the complex nature of the relationships that the neighbourhood social workers have with people from other social organisations active in the same areas, and with local political bodies.

Comparisons are always a dangerous exercise that can produce partial, over-simplistic results pertaining to the actual complexities of local situations. This is even more the case in the situation here where monographic work was done differently in the two countries, the Netherlands having gone for the study of professional practice, whereas Belgium has analysed social work within the framework of public measures. The article is thus an attempt at a comparison a posteriori of analyses that were done using different methodological bases, but it is not so much a juxtaposition of two monographs since continuous exchanges of views during the writing up until its final version contributed to re-examined both the content and the form. It does not claim to be representative since it does not tackle all areas of social work and it covers only the French-speaking part of Belgium; but rather it shows, by way of several examples, how certain professional practices have been modified within a new ideological and institutional context.

**THE EMERGENCE OF THE SECURITY ISSUE**

To fully understand the changes that have occurred in neighbourhood social work in the two countries and the rest of Western Europe, it is important to present several elements of the social and political situation of the two countries that have contributed to the emergence of security as an issue.

In Belgium, during the last 20 years, the socio-economic situation has been marked by a transformation from a Fordist, national socio-economic model into a post-industrial, globalised model (Boltanski and Chiapello 1998). This transformation has led to massive exclusion of social groups from this new model and to the emergence of situations of socio-emotive disaffiliation (Castel 1995). It has further resulted in 'the deprived neigh-

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3 The references are to France, but the analyses of Boltanski and Chiapello and Castel describe a situation that is largely relevant beyond the French framework, and applies very well to the Belgian case in particular.
bourhoods crisis' where the effects of and the harm done by social exclusion are plainly visible: social tensions, 'riots', intensification of social and spatial segregation, increases in vagrancy and urban solitude, and feelings of insecurity. For some, particularly those from the media and the political world, the social issue has become and is limited to an urban problem. Two events legitimise this superposition. Firstly, what have been labelled the 'Forest Riots' (named after a suburb of Brussels) of May 1991, in which young working-class people were involved in clashes with the police, and, secondly, the legislative elections in November 1991, which were marked by the emergence of the extreme right, particularly in Flanders, but also in the Brussels region, especially in working-class areas of the inner city. For many, the second event was a direct consequence of the first; the vote for the extreme right in working-class areas was born out of the insecurity caused by minor urban delinquency. They, above all, believe that social exclusion, insecurity and the resulting extremism are inevitably and irredeemably linked. The 1990s were also the years when the Belgian political system suffered a severe legitimacy crisis, the Dutroux scandal being a symbol of this. This has manifested itself, amongst other ways, in the revelation of the malfunctioning of the police and the law, and corruption affairs affecting the political parties.

It is this context that produces both a particular reading of the social issue and a haunting concern for re-justification, at the various political levels of a strongly federalised country, that new measures to combat social exclusion and insecurity have been launched at the regional, community and federal State level, in which the targeted public all live in working-class, urban areas (Van Campenhoudt et al. 2000). On the institutional scene, these new measures and social actors involved are in direct competition with the association already in operation working within the framework of youth policies or in the socio-cultural sector whose aim is to promote social intervention in the beneficiaries' living space and to develop a range of community activities. In the eyes of these associations, other than the drift towards police control that some of them contain, the new measures amount to a take-over by the local authorities with respect to the social and socio-cultural intervention of the neighbourhoods in question (Schaut 1998). But these new measures compete with each other. Each level of authority strives to work, often without any dialogue between the various levels. Although most of these new

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4In 2000 new municipal elections took place. They marked a significant weakening of the extreme right in the French-speaking part of the country, its strengthening in Flanders and above all its spectacular rise amongst affluent social groups.
measures involved intervention in urban areas, it was only in 1999 that a policy for large cities was developed which covered urban objectives, finding employment, social cohesion and security, this policy making it possible to interface with town planners, architects, local administrations and new players on the scene: social workers, businesses and the police, but also the residents who were represented in the bodies of participation (Thibaut 2000).

In the Netherlands, the transformation of the socio-economic model has followed the same route as in Belgium. Even if the 'crisis' has been apparent for less time, it has likewise impacted on the least qualified of the Dutch population. At the same time the issue of social exclusion as well as the transformation of the social question with the crisis of deprived areas. Poverty is now seen as an urban problem even if there remain pockets of poverty in the rural regions in the East and in the North of the country. On the other hand, the extreme right has only carried some weight in the political arena since the beginning of the 1990s and no longer constitutes a major political problem, as it does in Belgium. This, however, has not prevented the spread of distrust of immigrant populations coming from the South and the association of 'immigration, poverty and criminality' among a not insignificant proportion of the Dutch population. Likewise, if the legitimacy of the Dutch State has been endangered by the progression of neo-liberal ideas during the 1980s, this was not in as radical a manner as in a Belgium inundated with 'scandals'. However, the concern of drawing closer together the State and the citizen exists, but from a slightly different point of view; it amounts to favouring the participation of citizens in public life, because on the one hand, it allows a certain amount of disengagement of State control, and, on the other hand, it favours social cohesion even if this double objective is sometimes contradictory.

The new institutional context of Dutch community work has been progressively brought into force from the 1980s onwards. Initially, during the course of the 1980s, Dutch community work suffered, like the rest of Dutch social work, but perhaps much more so, a major crisis of confidence linked with the legitimacy crisis of the welfare state in general and, on the other hand, by the fact that community workers were perceived as being agitators and sowed seeds of revolt against the authorities. Later, at the end of the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, social work experienced a renewal of interest in a new context, that of the reformulation of the policies for fighting against the persistence of zones of poverty in this time of economic growth from which certain parts of a city benefited, but not others. Indeed the Dutch policy is quite similar
in its objectives and in the forms with the French ‘politique de la Ville’ (city policy). In concrete terms, this new form of policies has been launched by a central government that bestows new credits to municipalities that contain pockets of poverty within the framework of contracts placed with the municipalities of large cities. The content of these contracts is negotiated on a case by case basis. These new urban policies thus contribute to the movement of the decentralisation of the competences of central government towards the municipalities in a much simpler context than in Belgium, since the State and the Dutch municipalities are the main agents of this policy. The contracts are based on locally defined projects for well defined neighbourhoods, with the involvement of most of the local players: the local public authorities, the specialist municipal services, the housing associations, but also the sector of voluntary organisations are equally very important in the Netherlands (Baillergeau and Duyvendak 2000).

In the 1980s criminality became a political subject for the central Dutch government (Boutellier and Van Stokkom 1995; Baillergeau and Duyvendak 2001). As in neighbouring countries, the Dutch policies to combat criminality are essentially based on ‘petty crime’ for which it is widely acknowledged that it has increased sharply since the 1970s, notably amongst juveniles. In the Netherlands, the general feeling is that this increase is linked with the weakening of social control in a society that is going through much change and which population is more and more concentrated in the cities and is more and more multi-cultural. Since 1985, the theme of prevention has developed considerably in the Dutch political discourse but it is only from the start of the 1990s that the security topic has spread in new urban policies.

EFFECTS ON NEIGHBOURHOOD SOCIAL WORK IN BELGIUM

Amongst the new measures at the Government’s disposal, the security contract, introduced by the Minister of the Interior in 1992, is the one which is

5Unfortunately these new urban policies have not received generic designation, one speaks sometimes of achterstandsgebiedenbeleid (policies for backward neighbourhoods), sociale vernieuwing (social renewal) or even, for some years now, grote stedenbeleid (big cities policies), but also wijkaanpak (neighbourhood approach) in Rotterdam. We are talking here of new urban policies.

6The housing associations are important players in urban policies of a part of a country where the proportion of the rental housing stock controlled by the authorities is on average over 50% and is up to 80% in certain parts of large cities.
most directly 'charged with combating petty urban crime and tackling its social causes'. It binds the federal State, the regions and the municipalities and consists essentially of two parts: a policing section and a socio-preventive section. All of these activities which are carried out at the local level follow the principle of global, integrated prevention which means going beyond the usual sector-based initiatives in social policies and involving the various players in the area, public and private, social and police (Cartuyvels 1996; Hacourt et al. 1999).

In the name of this principle of action, the security contract ties in with a new agreement between a socio-cultural logic and an explicitly security-orientated logic. By the means of intervention by the social workers in the neighbourhoods in question, the socio-cultural logic is meant to restore the social ties between the residents, but it is also supposed to meet the security contract policy objectives of restoring the forms of social control and rendering invisible the groups of juveniles considered to be threatening. As for the security logic, it is meant to suppress or to prevent petty urban crime, for example, by ensuring that youngsters, particularly immigrants of North African origin, are removed from public areas, or more generally, to prevent 'social risks' such as insecurity, 'petty urban crime' that are attributed to deprived populations, and the extreme right and their impact by their very presence within the community.

This security logic entails the presence of increasing numbers of police in 'sensitive' neighbourhoods, but also social workers who are asked to avoid 'riots', to ensure that there is peace in the neighbourhoods in question, and to keep the youngsters off the streets by urging them to return home or inviting them to a youth club. In the preventive or repressive aspects, the security question becomes prominent everywhere.

Social work, in the broad sense of the term, is thus more and more demanded by the political entities that are in charge of the new measures. But this central position must not hide the emergence of tensions within the profession, particularly within the framework of security contracts.

The Co-existence of Socio-Cultural and Security Logics

If, as we have seen, these two logics co-exist, the price is one of major difficulty for the social workers in the definition both of their daily practices and their ethical and political goals. In Brussels, some social workers organised a discussion group so that elderly people could speak of their feelings of insecurity elicited by the youngsters (security logic). At the same time and with the same people, they organised inter-generational meetings (socio-cultural logic). Neither the youngsters accused by the
elderly—the ‘beneficiaries’ of the discussion groups—nor the latter, perceiving the youngsters as a threat, were willing to meet each other in such a situation (Schaut forthcoming). Also in Brussels, some social workers under a local security contract, who wanted to deconstruct the notion of insecurity, wanted to organise an exhibition, but the Mayor wanted it to be entitled: ‘The prevention of insecurity in X’, putting precisely the emphasis on the insecurity theme where they did not want it. Elsewhere, social workers have been asked to intervene in neighbourhoods under the pretext that the situation has got worse, essentially transforming them into ‘social fire-fighters’ and preventing them completing a task in the long run. Likewise, the youngsters who come into contact with the social workers are not duped as to the ambiguity of their intervention, and know quite well the reason for their presence. They say: “You are only interested in us, when you believe us to be criminals” and quickly react to the stigma that the security logic puts on them, blackmailing the social workers into promising to steal if they do not give in. How, following this can they organise educational work and emancipation with the youth?

The difficulty of making these two logics work together is also reflected in the social workers’ unease about their identity: they very often refuse to perceive themselves as supervising and policing agents. This identity unease, born out of the contradiction of the image that they have of themselves and their assignments and assigned concrete objectives, enhances a sense of impotency with regards to the ‘missions impossible’ that they are given: those involving pacifying neighbourhoods and assuring the integration of the deprived [. . .] when they themselves are confronted more and more by precariousness, the lack of job security.

The Institutional Precariousness of Social Workers

Social workers have never been granted recognised professional status, but the new measures, and the security contract in particular, have weakened them even more. Their lack of job security is reflected in a number of ways, including the following.

Local Contractualisation

The security contract at the local level is, after evaluation, renewed from year to year. In some municipalities, the employment contracts are also annual ones. The renewal of their employment contracts is without any doubt a ‘Sword of Damocles’ for the community workers.
The Transversality of Work
All the work carried out at the local level is part of a global, integrated prevention strategy that demands the co-operation and co-ordination of different sets of people on the ground. Within the security contract this manner of working has legitimised the collaboration between the social workers and the police. First of all, social workers have been ordered to co-operate with the police. Progressively, by the strength of their practices and by their ethical requirements, they have succeeded in protecting themselves from unduly strong security measures by opposing all forms of collaboration with the police and by demanding, without yet obtaining it, a professional code of ethics. However, the margins for manoeuvre that have been created have been done so informally and do not carry with them any procedural guarantees as to their autonomy, nor stability of their practices.

The Lack of Training Provision
In numerous local security contracts, recruitment depends less on professional competence than on the local and community integration of the candidates. "people who came from the committees and neighbourhoods with which they are going to work are assumed to have a certain professional edge based on essentially ethical criteria and their presumed charisma" (Schaut 2000, p. 143). Apart from the competition that is created with the 'professionals' of the area, formally and under the new measures, this de-professionalisation proves in practice to be double edged. Whilst knowledge of the area can prove to be an advantage for bonding with contacts, it is not sufficient to organise social interventions and can even prove to be counter productive since the social worker can get deeply involved in a difficult and emotional relationship with beneficiaries who are at the same time neighbours or friends. If the training does not cover the importance of these subjective issues, it has at the very least, the merit of distancing the social worker.

Insufficient Professional Training
The budgetary amounts allocated to socio-preventive measures are used almost exclusively to pay wages. Little money is allocated for the development of educational programmes, which reinforces the social workers' impression that they are there merely for occupation and to 'prevent the youngsters from doing anything silly'.

The Qualitative Accounting of Social Work
If there is 'inflation' of social professions, its counterpart is their growing subordination to the local public authorities who are their direct employers, their marginalisation within the municipality's structure, and a lack
of symbolic recognition of their achievements. The primacy of policy logic in those of social workers is also shown by the transformation in the 'way in which social work is carried out'. Social workers often stress the requirement for work in the long term and argue for the quality of work over its quantitative aspects. But, this definition of the profession stands up with difficulty to the attempts at bureaucratic formalisation made by local political authorities demanding efficiency, quantitative evaluation and other forecasting and entering into conflict with the political agenda that demands visible, tangible results in the short term. Yield and efficiency along with many other special terms used only until recently in the economic field, are now penetrating the vocabulary of social work.

These multiple professional insecurities add to the socio-economic and psycho-effective uncertainties experienced by the beneficiaries and, together weaken the social effects expected from social work in the community.

Towards New Configurations?

The introduction of new measures has greatly modified the relationship between neighbourhood social work and politics. If these relationships have always existed alongside, amongst others, subsidy policies, we are currently witnessing a growing take-over of social workers by the political world, the local political organisations being their direct employers whilst by association, the employer is a social worker himself. But the transformations do not stop there; they have impact upon the organisations already present in the neighbourhoods.

One of the effects of introducing competition in a country with political, institutional and social systems that are strongly pillarised is that local voluntary organisations have been created within the Catholic pillar—some of which have developed an expertise in 'social community work'. These “generally defend a decentralised vision of socio-cultural action where each subsidised organisation retains a large amount of autonomy. Strengthened by the legitimacy of the ballot box, the secular parties, particularly the socialists, put forward to them a more centralised vision of socio-cultural work which must be co-ordinated by the local political authorities” (Van Campenhoudt 2001). This tension between two points of view partly explains the wish of the authorities, in particular their non-

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7 Belgium is a country that is characterised by having political, institutional and social systems that are strongly pillarised. A pillar consists of a network of institutions and associations, of political parties and unions in the schools and youth movements, coming under the same ideological family. “three major pillars are traditionally distinguished: the catholic pillar, the socialist pillar and the liberal pillar [. . . ]” (Van Campenhoudt 2001).
Catholic representatives, to ‘take-over’ a new field of activity—neighbourhood social intervention—through new measures and the competition between the latter and the local authorities. The placement and legitimacy struggles give rise to a duplication of proposed activities for the youth, creating a veritable market of activities in a free market, competitive and wild situation and an ‘over-supply’ situation, with the consequence of a generalised impoverishment of the educational work with all measures in force, because the ‘youngsters prefer to go where their brains won’t be picked’.

Besides this, the social workers note that there are more and more youngsters who flit between one activity and another and who fuel the competition by going to the party offering the most or to the one that is the most enticing. This competition also results in the creation of new boundaries within the social work field. On the one hand this brings a de-professionalisation of the field, hiring under the new measures, of local people who have not necessarily received social training, that demand ‘militant authenticity’ and a denouncement of social workers from the associations as they are not from the area, and are only interested, according to them, in earning a good salary. On the other hand, commitment to the new measures of numerous criminologists and psychologists leads to an over-qualification of social work. These boundaries—with confusing training programmes, new methods of legitimacy and reciprocal disqualification—establish for the social workers much more destabilisation of their professional identity and make them more vulnerable to political instructions.

But this competition must not hide porosity effects: the borrowing by the social workers of new measures of methodologies developed within the framework of ‘older measures’, such as, for example, the community work approach, the generalisation in the social work field of the notion of prevention to the detriment of autonomy and emancipation,8 generalisation to older measures of the concern about the visibilisation and the rapidity of activities (in the youth sector of the French-speaking community, installing temporary programmes with high media visibility so weakened the associations financially, whereas recurrent subsidies were reduced),9

8 In schools that are described as being deprived, it is almost no longer possible to organise educational and/or socio-cultural projects without calling them ‘violence prevention projects’. We are witnessing therefore a real expansion of the prevention field.

9 The development of programmes that do not benefit from regular subsidies on the basis of agreement weakens the associations that are less and less self-sufficient financially. The subsidies being no longer sufficient, they are thus obliged to get involved in the logic of projects and other ‘fist fighting’ operations.
the obligation on the part of the associations to work on a network basis in order to benefit from local financing, signifying an attempt at centralisation of activities, and the recent collaboration between certain associations and the security contracts.

The new practices and rationale for action are thus progressively invading the social work field. This brings about competition, some of it strictly professional, the others more ideological around the positioning of one or the other with reference to the security issue and the place of the authorities in neighbourhood social work. However, it is also subject to reciprocal influences that tend to bring the different forms of social work together.

**Effects on Community Work in the Netherlands**

At the beginnings of the 1990s security developed from an essentially urban question a question more specifically associated with deprived areas even though the latter did not have the monopoly on delinquent activity. From 1993 onwards, the security theme became very clear in the new Dutch urban policies, particularly in the *wijkbeheer* (‘neighbourhood management’) sector. In existence for a number of years, neighbourhood management consists of a variety of people active in the field (municipal services such as public works, road maintenance, police, but also the housing associations, residents’ organisations, social services, etcetera) who work together in a co-ordinated manner to design and lead the collective activities with a view to rendering the neighbourhood — notably its public areas — more ‘fit for living in’ for the residents and other users. The responsibility for these co-ordinations generally lies with local authorities. To be more precise, this entails ensuring that problems highlighted by the users are dealt with promptly and efficiently (Rood-Pijpers 1995). It also consists of promoting responsible behaviour on the part of the users with regard to public spaces. The activities under the neighbourhood management umbrella are actually quite diverse: meetings of the tenants of collective accommodation set up by the housing associations to establish rules for living in common areas and to ensure that they are complied with, the creation of work principally for the unemployed of the neighbourhood, especially in the field of social activities in public spaces, street cleaning, and receiving complaints from users but also the surveillance of public spaces.

Neighbourhood management is thus a good example of bringing together the concerns about tidiness and security that one can also observe in Germany, but also the co-operation between those who maintain law
and order and those who practise social work. But from May 1993 onwards
the security character of neighbourhood management was reinforced by
the obligation made to the co-ordinators of security measures clearly con-
taining an analysis of the problems and concrete proposals to solve them,
being placed under the responsibility of the local police force (Rood-Pijpers

In concrete terms the actions carried out by the community workers in
the security field are very diverse, but, in a general manner they are re-
lated to neighbourhood management and they are grouped around the same
concern which is that of removing the feeling of insecurity felt by the resi-
dents of the neighbourhoods, but also on the gap between actual criminality
and the public perception that it is generally disproportionately higher than
the actual threat. The actions of the community workers can, for example,
consist of organising mediation processes to handle neighbourhood con-
flicts (buurtbemiddeling): they appoint and train voluntary mediators in
order to help those who have made complaints and to establish compro-
mises to ensure peaceful co-existence. Within such a framework, the po-
lice can become a significant partner when they transfer the complaints
they received which do not come under their jurisdiction to the commu-
nity workers that co-ordinate the mediation. But it also happens that the
mediation measures operate without any liaison with the police when it is
generally known in the neighbourhood in question that such complaints
have to be handled directly by the community workers in charge of organ-
ising conflict mediation.

In other cases, the community workers are appointed in a neighbour-
hood facing a particular problem or a group of residents having expressed
their concerns about a problem, for example, the presence of drug addicts
in public areas of their neighbourhood who are perceived as being a nuis-
sance because of the threatening attitude, the noise they make, the used
syringes they drop in areas where young children play, etcetera. Some-
times, it is merely their presence that results in complaints. The commu-
nity worker can then be called to establish contact with the residents with
a view to coming up with a solution of the declared problem, in co-opera-
tion with the perpetrators if need be.

In certain cases, the community worker acts on his own, in others in
co-operation with a community policeman (wijkagent) to resolve the prob-
lem. Another initiative used, which was launched in 1995 in several towns
including Rotterdam, is the Local Support Team (Lokale Ondersteuning-
steam); this was actually at the instigation of a professional organisation
of community workers. The community worker/community policeman
pairs have to meet regularly in order to exchange information on their
contacts. In certain situations, the community workers have a hand in changing the representations that are made with those who consider the drug addicts to be a threat. In other instances, the intervention leads to the neutralisation or the moralisation of individuals or the groups perceived to be a threat and thus to the justification of the complaint rather than it only being formulated by those declared to have been bothered, this, at times, being subjective.

Another intervention area for community workers in the security field— and perhaps the most common one— is the prevention of conflicts. In such activities, the community workers offer the residents of the neighbourhood the opportunity to meet in order to create between themselves a climate of communication or even of confidence without which conflicts could break out that could not easily be handled by the protagonists. This is particularly the case with projects handled within the framework of the *Opzoomeren* campaigns in Rotterdam, which claimed aim is to support social cohesion, a major pole in the new Dutch urban policies, by organising, with the residents, neighbourhood festivals that everyone is invited to or by issuing challenges to the residents whereby they are expected to greet their neighbours or even to put their name on their letter box or on their bell. However, the promoters of the *Opzoomeren* campaigns also estimate that these campaigns can contribute to promoting mutual confidence and the impression of security (Duyvendak and Van der Graaf 2001, p. 23). Furthermore, the festive activities organised within this framework often provide an opportunity for the community workers to establish contacts with the residents, to be introduced to local problems or even to recruit voluntary mediators.

In the Netherlands, it is not very easy to evaluate the changes induced in the activity of community workers by fighting against the feelings of insecurity, as their commitment in this area has been done very progressively, on the basis of questions that they encountered themselves in the practice from the beginning of the 1980s. Their contacts with the community policemen were made in fact well before the emergence of the new multi-disciplinary policies of poverty and insecurity. Furthermore, the manner in which the security question is treated is often reformulated based on the priority of their actions, for example, the strengthening of the social cohesion in a neighbourhood or rendering the neighbourhood more fit for everyone. In certain instances it appears that this is above all a way of presenting things and that the projects do not really have the aim of going any further than the re-establishment of social peace in the neighbourhoods. In other cases, the community workers use security as a fashionable theme beyond which their work may contribute to the im-
improvement of the social situation of their clients, when it consists, for example, of providing the opportunity for their neighbours to see them in a new light.

In any case, it is important to distinguish, in the Netherlands, the changes that result from the invasion of the social work field with security themes from the changes arising from the emergence of multi-disciplinary policies of poverty that were developed within the professional practices of community work before the security theme could not be ignored. For instance, in the context of new urban policies, the working conditions of community workers have somewhat changed. Most of their activities are more or less linked to subsidies from central government and are bundled together with the new principles of working with multi-disciplinary policies. This implies, for the community workers, new ways of working in a network amongst other players who do not value the identity of their profession, since they are specialists in intermediation. Moreover, the community workers are henceforth required to work on the basis of projects that are financed in the short term and detailed with priorities of the time and the place. This is why they work more and more, for example, within the perspective of the prevention of criminality and combating the feelings of insecurity.

As for the changes to community work linked with the emergence of the security theme in the field of community work one has not noticed any major change in the relationships that community workers have with their partners, not even their clients, because the community worker-police association does not seem that controversial in the Netherlands anymore, even amongst community workers themselves and the residents’ organisations. On the other hand, what has changed is their work content and the community workers’ aid objectives with regard to their clients. The new activities do not appear to intend to greatly improve the social status of their clients which, for a long time, has been a major objective of Dutch community workers compared to the intention of strengthening social cohesion of all by the pacification of the neighbourhoods. The term pacification expresses well the ambiguity that can arise in the way that community workers operate in this type of activity: it can both lead to the neutralisation of a section of the residents perceived as being a nuisance by the others and thus the dismissal of them in some cases, but also to the empowerment of the residents up until then paralysed by a feeling of insecurity that made them suspicious of just about anyone.
It has already been stated that comparison is an exercise that is particularly difficult, even more so when it is done a posteriori on the basis of monographic work carried out in each country and hinged upon the particular concerns of each researcher. The following must therefore be considered as an attempt for future comparative work rather than completed work at the moment.

To understand the changes that have occurred in social work in the Netherlands and in Belgium, particularly neighbourhood social work, one must grasp and compare both the political context that at a given time has made the security question a central problem and the institutional context which has introduced new measures and new policies to handle them. Differences are apparent in the two countries.

Belgian politics unlike the Netherlands' was confronted, at the beginning of the 1990s, with two problems: on the one hand, an alarming rise of the extreme right, and, on the other hand, a serious crisis as to the legitimacy of the political world in general. The treatment of the security question and the newly introduced measures is a way of showing that insecurity is an important problem that the political world wanted to tackle without delay. In the Netherlands, the security question emerged around 1993, but it did not appear to be accompanied by the phenomena associated with it in Belgium, a real political upheaval. The degree of urgency was not of the same intensity in the two countries. This perhaps explains why from 1992 onwards new public socio-security measures were introduced in Belgium whereas in the Netherlands the emphasis was more on urban policies in a country where social housing stock is very important whereas in Belgium it is almost insignificant. The social town planning and security components of these new urban policies proved a large lever for action for the Dutch State.

Institutional Belgium is a highly federalised country. Each authority level produces new policies that are meant to address the security issue. The absence of dialogue between these different levels explains the overlap of measures and the extremely competitive nature of the political landscape in the working-class areas. This is not the case in the Netherlands.

Apart from these major political differences new ways of thinking about social problems and carrying out public policies arose in both countries in an identical way. The new policies are applied at the neighbourhood level, on the assumption that if the problems of insecurity occur at the local level, it is also there that the remedies must be carried out. Equally, both in Belgium and in the Netherlands, the agents who implement the new meas-
ures are mainly social workers and the police. New principles of public action are equally mobilised in both countries; in particular, the transversality of actions carried out on the ground, the contractualisation and territorialisation of the new measures in selected deprived areas with regard to the deprivation of the residents and/or their 'dangerousness'.

These action principles are implemented in other European countries as well. France, from where Belgium has largely imported several new measures, has implemented city policy since the 1980s. In several countries, including France, Germany and most recently Greece, security contracts have been introduced also guided by the principles of territorialisation, contractualisation and transversality of actions. A study of the spread, export and import of these new public action principles that more closely evaluates, amongst other things, the role of the European Union and other international bodies has, moreover, been undertaken within the framework of European research including the production of this article.10

The effects that this collection of transformations has had on social work are significant: this article has shown the points in common between the two countries. One can both observe a more central position for social work in the new measures and more precarious conditions of employment and modes of financing, new ways of thinking about social work on the ground, changes in its temporality, and the same story of a profession defined by the tensions between emancipation and control and whose definition varies as a function of the historical context. Within professional practices, the coexistence of socio-cultural and security logic is striking, even when, as we have stated, the equilibrium points between the two are positioned differently. The switch of merely socio-cultural practices to more social control and normalisation of the behaviour of the most deprived, the invasion of notions of mediation and prevention all demonstrate the ambiguities of this coexistence.

But, amongst social workers, differences between the two countries are still apparent, the most striking being the attitudes of the social workers toward working with the police. In the French-speaking parts of Belgium, as we have noted, many social workers of the old school have been the ones who have denounced the security slant of the new measures and have refused all collaboration with the police. Even within these new measures, most social workers are progressively becoming opposed to any collaboration with the police. Their action and public debates on the security contract have progressively given more weight to socio-preventive measures

10For more information on this topic, within the framework of the TSER European Research, a comparative aims glossary has been produced.
to the detriment of policing and repressive measures. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, everyone now appears to be in agreement that the police are not necessarily enemies and that co-operation is possible for the benefit of all. What explains these differences between the two countries?

We can formulate several hypotheses without being able to test them yet. Firstly, the collaboration between Dutch community workers and the police is possible because the relationships are markedly less damaged than in Belgium particularly because of the self-criticism which has allowed the Dutch police to reflect on their image in the eyes of the public from the beginning of the 1980s and to develop the role of community police based on availability and listening to the residents of the neighbourhoods. Furthermore, it appears that the security policies are defined in a more narrow framework in Belgium and more strongly controlled by representatives of the Minister of the Interior than in the Netherlands where the collaboration of the socio-cultural world is promoted, these people having more weight in designing policies.

Thus, insecurity is approached less as indisputable data and its deconstruction appears easier. It allows work on the victims’ feelings of insecurity in a constructive manner in particular by trying to allay fears when they seem groundless. This allows the avoidance of legitimising fears created by the general acceptance of the existence of dangerous people in the community. On the other hand, in contrast with their Belgian colleagues, opposition to the authorities appears unthinkable by all Dutch community workers who would see in this a return to a past still difficult to digest. This leads them in particular to accepting without any extensive critique that their roles be limited to trying to achieve social peace in the neighbourhoods without seriously developing links between the neighbourhood and the rest of society.

**Conclusion**

Social work, in particular neighbourhood social work, has been transformed within the framework of new government measures intended to combat social exclusion and insecurity in an urban environment. New methods of practising social work appear: territorialisation in the Netherlands and in Belgium, partnerships with other local players and contractualisation become the key words of the new public action in the Netherlands and in Belgium and produce new modes for the relations between local actors. Prevention becomes an indisputable objective. Social workers become mediators and are also requested by the authorities to act as peacemakers in
working-class areas considered to be insecure and insecurity producing. One witnesses also a certain subordination of social work at a time where security has become one of the priorities of governments throughout the Western world (Wacquant 1999).

This double empirical study, however, has shown that this trend has been neither uniform nor unchallenged. In the French-speaking parts of Belgium many have clearly voiced their opposition to this subordination, whereas in the Netherlands the security objective is generally defined in such a way that it is not incompatible with protecting the most deprived. It is however regrettable that in the two countries, as in others, the pre-eminence of security obliges the supporters of the socio-cultural logic to restrict themselves to a defensive position.

These practices will have to be developed to continue to deconstruct the security question. While the social relevance of the notion of insecurity must not be ignored, its media-political treatment can be proved perverse. In any case one is left to believe that it is the result of petty urban criminality even though it is very much the result of other social issues such as social isolation, the feelings of being abandoned and the desire to find a place in society. It is also, as has been shown, a difficult notion to handle for the social workers who often feel trapped by the assigned security tasks. Is it therefore necessary to envisage the abandonment of the notion of insecurity in order to treat it better in the end?

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COMMUNITY CRIME PREVENTION AND THE 'PARTNERSHIP APPROACH': A SAFE COMMUNITY FOR EVERYONE?

ABSTRACT. If creating a safer community is merely reduced to controlling and disciplining the most vulnerable groups, their opportunities for participation and emancipation are blocked. Installing such a crime prevention model leads to the further exclusion of these groups. Starting from research that focuses on the interagency relationships within community crime prevention, this article offers a model of creating some possibilities to create a safer community on the one hand and that holds back the dynamics of social exclusion on the other. It focuses on the relations between (community oriented) welfare agencies on the one hand and police agencies on the other hand. Starting from the empirical data, two polarising models are put forward in order to analyse and evaluate this co-operation: a consensus model and a conflict model. Referring to a normative framework, it will be argued that a conflict model has to be preferred in order to develop a socially just crime prevention model.

KEY WORDS: community crime prevention, interagency co-operation, security policies

INTRODUCTION

Community crime prevention is an actual integrated approach that can be characterised by a mix of goals. It seems evident that restoring networks will finally conclude in a safer community (see Etzioni 1995; Crawford 1996). Nevertheless, searching for a 'safe' community implies balancing several and possibly opposite tensions. Reducing crime and fear as experienced by one group of residents can result in the further exclusion of another group. If no attention is paid to constructing a socially just prevention model that holds back the dynamics of social exclusion, community crime prevention will be a model that refers to war strategies: the neutralisation of risk groups within the community (youngsters, prostitutes, illegal aliens, drug-addicts, homeless people, etcetera).

From an empirical point of view, the relationships between professional agencies within the community can give a good indication of the awareness of this tension. Will this co-operation only result in a strengthening of control strategies within an exclusionary community or will it be the solution for tackling the crime and security problem with respect for ethical principles within a democratic society? We conducted research on this theme. The results are presented in this article.
'Partnership' approaches to community or locally based crime prevention remain popular yet fluid and are often implemented without consistent theoretical underpinnings (Crawford 1997). Moreover, emerging from the 'partnership discourse' are numerous interconnected and ambiguous terms (collaboration, co-ordination, interagency, multi-agency) which have become contemporary crime prevention and community safety 'speak' within government rhetoric and policy, often arbitrarily applied and producing mixed results. As a 'model' it has been viewed by politicians and public servants as integral to community or locally based crime prevention initiatives and continues to receive support in continental Europe (see Van Dijk 1995; Crawford 1997a; Hebberecht and Sack 1997), England and Wales (Hope and Shaw 1988; Hope and Pitts 1996; Hughes 1998), Scotland (Monahan 1997), Australia (O'Malley and Sutton 1997), New Zealand (Walters 1996) and Canada (Canadian National Crime Prevention Council 1994). However, an increasing corpus of criminological literature suggests that it is a problematic concept.

Several studies identify the theoretical and ideological contradictions of interagency co-operation (Baldwin and Kinsey 1982; Gilling 1994). The extent to which interagency initiatives could be egalitarian whilst the police remained the major stakeholders in crime related efforts, is questioned (Bradley et al. 1986; Meijlaers 1993). In particular, inequalities of power influence struggle over control, ownership, resources and management (Blagg et al. 1988; Sampson et al. 1988). Can this kind of inequality and the resulting conflicts between agencies be counterbalanced by sound planning and personal or organisational qualities? (Meijlaers 1993; Liddle and Gelsthorpe 1994a, 1994b, 1994c; Synergie 1995; Duerinckx and De Jaegher 1997) Or is this relationship rather deterministically determined? (Crawford 1997; Walgrave 1998).

The answers to these questions are crucial in order to evaluate the community crime prevention approach. Some authors mention that a co-operation resulting in a domination of police and justice agencies over welfare agencies (youth work, community rebuilding, housing and employment facilities) lies at the base of an ethical and strategically highly problematic prevention model (Crawford 1997). Problems of exclusion and deprivation, as experienced by the most vulnerable residents will be translated and transformed as problems of crime and fear, as experienced by those residents who are more able to put their needs on the public
agenda (Hebberecht 1997; Hebberecht and Sack 1997). Inequalities between agencies will be transferred to inequalities between groups within the community: unbalanced interagency relationships lead to a further exclusion of the most vulnerable groups. For instance, the ‘problem’ of youngsters hanging around at corners or squares has to be dealt with by an integrated approach, realised by interagency co-operation. If we analyse this example more in depth, it becomes clear that in fact all partners are expected to reduce the insecurities and fears of some shop-owners or (elder) residents. This is the prior focus of the interagency co-operation, rather than the lack of leisure activities for youngsters within an urban environment. There is a clear and socially unjust shift in foci: from victims of undemocratic and exclusionary socio-political evolutions (for example, building commercial and financial complexes takes precedence over creating open squares) youngsters become a risk group that has to be controlled and neutralised. Similar examples could be given referring to the situation of prostitutes, illegal aliens, ethnic minorities, drug-addicted people, etcetera.

**Research Questions and Methodology**

In order to construct a socially just community crime prevention model, conducting research about relationships between professional agencies seems highly relevant (Goris 2000). In this way, we made some choices to focus very specifically on the relationships and — especially — related tensions.

1. We conducted our research in deprived neighbourhoods. In these areas, we can find a complex variety of processes of social exclusion and marginalisation on the one hand and crime and insecurity problems on the other hand.

2. We analysed the relationships between agencies, starting from the perspective of the most vulnerable residents within the community. We have already referred to our normative and ethical position, as expressed by the concept ‘socially just’: interagency relationships functioning within community oriented crime prevention should not increase or strengthen processes of social exclusion.

Referring to both choices, we formulated our research question: “What kind of relationships between professional agencies are functional in building a socially just community oriented prevention model of crime and insecurity problems in deprived neighbourhoods?”
We addressed this question both through the literature and an empirical study. The empirical study consisted of 17 interviews with field-workers from four deprived communities within four cities (youth workers, streetcorner workers, community rebuilders and police officers). We asked them how they experience and evaluate the relations with other agencies within the function of a community oriented crime prevention policy. Moreover, in a second empirical phase we analysed some topics in more depth. We gathered and processed data from only one of the four communities, using several methodologies. More specifically, we interviewed coordinators and local authorities (including the mayor of the city), observed ‘in real’ co-operation between agencies, and analysed written reports concerning relevant co-operation.

The Results

Co-operation between Consensus and Conflict

In our research we can find evidence to confirm that interagency co-operation functioning within a community oriented prevention of crime and insecurity problems, creates tensions and conflicts. Each agency puts forward its own analysis and solution towards a certain phenomenon (for instance, youngsters, refugees or prostitutes hanging around in the streets and causing fear and disorder). These differences can be complementary to each other, as well as contradictory (for instance from offering more housing facilities for refugees to excluding them systematically from the housing market). Moreover, the empirical data also confirm that these differences are not scattered throughout the several agencies. Rather cluster these differences: police agencies on the one hand and welfare agencies on the other hand.

As far as these points are concerned we can only confirm the findings and insights from the literature. Some new insights are offered concerning the way these differences and conflicts are dealt with within interagency relationships. Starting from the empirical data, we put forward two polarising models: a consensus model and a conflict model. In the first model, conflicts are perceived as temporary phenomena. Although power differences between police and welfare agencies are not denied, it is expected that they can be managed by techniques of good planning and co-ordination. The ‘hard core’ identity of this model can be characterised as an ‘ideology of unity’ (see Crawford 1997). Conflicts and inequality of power can be managed since in the end all agencies are bound by one communal
goal: building a safer community. The conflict model to the contrary highly criticises this ideology of unity. Conflicts between agencies cannot be perceived as temporary phenomena that can be managed by technical interventions. Such an approach denies the impact of the structural power differences between agencies. Moreover, trying to realise a kind of unity by presuming one communal and bonding goal, strengthens the dominant position of police agencies. Tension, contradictions and conflicts are 'filtered away' by imposing a homogeneity in interests and excluding the dissonant voices.

Our empirical research confirms the relevance of analysing and evaluating co-operation, starting from these two different perspectives. Experiences and the evidence of fieldworkers, co-ordinators and local authorities can be interpreted, referring to both models.

In order to build a safe community, agencies work in a contradictory but especially complementary way to each other. The contradictions can be managed and circumvented if there is enough communication. In this way, one has to build up the communication starting from the conception of 'general welfare': the community has to be safe for everyone. The interventions not only have to be favourable for the youngsters, but all members of the community have to be taken into account. In this way, a balance has to be found. In this situation there simply cannot be any problem within the co-operation. (free translation from original)

This respondent (implicitly) refers in his analysis and evaluation to the 'consensus' model. On the contrary, other respondents refer to the 'conflict' model.

Co-operation does not equal defending one communal interest. Moreover, within the co-operation the conditions to set up and deal with different interests in an acceptable way must be searched for.

The communication and co-operation between us and the police cannot be defined in one way. The final purpose of our communication is different. For us, the well being of the youngsters is the main purpose. On the contrary, police agencies focus on maintaining public order. Therefore, you can have a 'cosy' and stimulating co-operation, but in the end, your final purposes are different. (free translations from original)

Building a Socially Just Crime Prevention Model

This insight suggests that there will be important differences between both models, regarding the representation of residents' interests. The consensus model is built upon the conviction that all residents can find a consensus
about what has to be understood by 'a safe community'. On the contrary, the conflict model rejects this hypothesis, referring to the different meanings and a variety of interests that can be given to the aim of 'building a safer community'. The empirical data show that it is hard to install co-operation, based on this conflict model. For instance, welfare agencies working with the most vulnerable groups experience that they can no longer put the specific needs and interests of these groups on the co-operation agenda. The defence for supporting drug-addicted persons is no longer accepted within a co-operation that is dominated by a strategy of excluding and neutralising these 'risk groups'. Therefore, the only agency these groups still have contacts with, is the police.

The possibilities of putting the specific needs of the most vulnerable groups on the public agenda, are very limited. If there are no agencies left that work with these groups, then these agencies have a very marginal and isolated position. While at this moment a lot of financial energy is put towards the safety of these neighbourhoods, the opportunity is fully taken to exclude the most difficult groups. That is the price that has to be paid for the actual form of restoration and community rebuilding: it is favourable for one group, but another group is once again the victim. As a community rebuilder, I can only reduce the sharpest elements of this strategy.

Since the dominant position of police agencies, welfare agencies are resigned to their subordinate position. Consequently, there are no agencies left that work with the most difficult groups. If you would make an inventory of agencies working with vulnerable youngsters on the market-square, you would notice that only police agencies and streetcornerwork have contacts with this group. Youth work, the community centre, the mosque, [...], they all stopped working with this specific group. In this way, for these youngsters, all supporting initiatives disappear. As a consequence, streetcornerwork is diametrically opposed to the police. This is not a good and stimulating situation. (free translations from original)

Focusing on a normative point of view, we can conclude that the consensus model lies at the base of a socially unjust community oriented crime prevention model. The fundamentals of co-operation and interagency relationships are only built upon the interests and experiences of the less vulnerable groups that often cry for more safety by excluding the most vulnerable groups from the community.

Although it is hard to install a conflict model, the empirical data show that it can be done. In one community, explicit attention is paid to the representation of the interests of the most vulnerable groups within the interagency co-operation. Possibilities are offered for discussing all the different needs and perspectives. Conflicting interests within several groups are not a priori conciliated in favour of the less vulnerable groups. Rather, all the
different interests are well balanced against one another. For instance, the claim of local shop owners for the control of youngsters hanging around is not simply answered by installing more control without considering the needs of the youngsters themselves. The consequence is that a promising but misleading aim to work together around one bonding and communal aim is left behind. This leads to a less intrusive and far-reaching approach towards co-operation: interagency relationships are only developed in order to construct a model in which agencies hinder each other as little as possible. Co-operation is important and necessary, but the expectations towards co-operation have to be reduced. As such, the fact that all agencies have maximal possibilities ‘to do their own thing’, is a crucial element in protecting the rights and needs of the most vulnerable groups within the community. Only such an approach can result in a socially just community crime prevention policy that controls crime and insecurity problems on the one hand and holds back the dynamics of social exclusion on the other.

This variety of experiences within the empirical data is crucial. Namely, we can establish from it that relationships between police and welfare agencies can vary. They are not predetermined by structural power differences. Human creativity is an important element in breaking through any determinism. Moreover, comparing the different experiences, we can put forward some important elements that are critical for developing a conflict accepting interagency approach that lies at the base of a socially just prevention model.

As already mentioned, agencies make different analyses of the same phenomenon and suggest different solutions. These kinds of differences are only superficial, namely driven by opposite (ideological) concepts about human beings and society. These deeper and underlying causes of conflicts may not be circumvented by co-operation. On the contrary, interagency co-operation has to offer a stimulating and especially democratic forum to discuss them (cf. the concept of ‘herrschaftsfreie Kommunikation’ as developed by Habermas 1981 or the ‘agora’ concept as developed by Bauman 1999). Searching for a socially just crime prevention model, co-operation cannot be only an inventory of different meanings, followed by the choice of the majoritarian one. On the contrary, agencies have to search for a way to live and work together, realising that their starting points and fundamentas are not communal.

Building Your Own Identity before Working Together

Inter-organisational conflicts are often related to intra-organisational problems (Pearson et al. 1992; Crawford 1997a). Specifically, installing a con-
flict oriented interagency co-operation is hindered by intra-organisational elements.

The relationship is not: police agencies on the one hand and welfare agencies on the other hand. Rather it is police on the one hand and many other agencies that are in one way or another oriented towards the welfare-theme. Welfare agencies are less well-outlined, co-ordinated and organised than police agencies. If you would ask the chief of police for a 'mission statement', he could surely answer you. Within welfare agencies, there is no one who can take such a position and give a clear answer. In this way co-operation consists of one strong partner on the one hand, with a lot of dispersed, different weak partners on the other hand. (free translation from original)

The empirical data show the importance for a well-outlined profile for each organisation. Their own identity has to be clear before agencies start working together. In this way each organisation can argue which expectations can be answered and which cannot. For instance, youth work can now refer to its own ideological and methodological framework in order to argue why they cannot be merely used as an instrument to control youngsters on the street. Compared to police agencies, constructing a specific identity often seems a problem for those welfare agencies. Police agencies can determine their identity starting from their mission to maintain public order. On the contrary, welfare agencies find it much harder to put forward their 'mission statement' and derive their own identity. Within co-operation a deficient identified and profiled agency becomes a weak one. This weak agency will merely be used to help realise the goals of the strong and dominant (police) agency.

Can we therefore conclude that police agencies have no profiling or outlining problems? Starting from the empirical data, we noticed that on this level in particular the actual community-oriented police strategy is criticised by several respondents.

This intrusive socially and 'back to basics' orientation of the police only makes their tasks unclear and ambiguous.

I'm convinced that this 'widening' strategy of police agencies has to be stopped. They came to the neighbourhood, but I think they've gone too far. Some of the things they do within the neighbourhood are simply not their task. It's not their task to organise residents in order to tackle community related problems. There are a lot of other agencies that can do this. (free translations from original)

Therefore we conclude that building a conflict oriented approach towards multi-agency co-operation equals supporting and strengthening the mission statement of all agencies involved. Co-ordinators seem to have a cen-
tral responsibility to identify and profile their organisation in order to determine their specific position within co-operation oriented towards community crime prevention.

**CONCLUSION**

If community oriented crime prevention is not developed within a normative framework of what is socially just and what is not, it can be a threat to our current democratic society. Creating a safer community cannot be equal to neutralising the risk groups within the community. If creating a safer community is merely reduced to controlling and disciplining the most vulnerable groups, their opportunities for participation and emancipation are blocked. Installing such a crime prevention model leads to the further exclusion of these groups.

Starting from research that focuses on the interagency relationships within community crime prevention, we offered a model that creates some possibilities of creating a safer community on the one hand and that holds back the dynamics of social exclusion on the other. We hereby focused on the relations between (community oriented) welfare agencies on the one hand and police agencies on the other hand. The main result is that within co-operation, an 'ideology of unity' between these partners has to be left behind. On the contrary, interagency relationships have to be developed starting from an acceptance of the conflicting goals between agencies. One has to search for a democratic forum where not only communal but especially conflicting interests can be discussed equally. This leads to a less intrusive and far-reaching approach towards co-operation: interagency relationships are only developed in order to construct a model in which agencies hinder each other as little as possible. Expectations towards creating a safer community by strengthening several forces has to be evaluated critically. As such, the fact that all agencies have maximal possibilities 'to do their own thing', is a crucial element in protecting the rights and needs of the most vulnerable groups within the community.

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CURRENT ISSUES

ANGELA GRIER AND TERRY THOMAS

THE EMPLOYMENT OF EX-OFFENDERS AND THE UK'S NEW CRIMINAL RECORD BUREAU

ABSTRACT. This article outlines the development of the UK's Criminal Records Bureau designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the screening arrangements for potential employees by disclosure of their criminal records to employers. The Bureau builds on existing arrangements that have been in place for a number of years. The authors argue that this development, which includes a much wider availability of criminal records, is an example of a new social policy that has the potential for an unintended consequence of large scale social exclusion, by limiting the prospects of employment for ex-offenders.

KEY WORDS: criminal records, employment policies, ex-offenders, social exclusion

INTRODUCTION

The Police Act 1997 Part V provided the legal basis for the development of the UK's new Criminal Record Bureau (CRB). The Bureau, located in the city of Liverpool, started its operations in 2001 and becomes fully operational by 2002. The Bureau will replace the existing arrangements for the disclosure of criminal records to employers which have been carried out by the police on a local basis. The new operation will be a national disclosure service to England and Wales with Northern Ireland being included at a later date; Scotland will implement the Police Act through its own Scottish Criminal Record Office (SCRO) based in Glasgow.

The use of police-held records to vet certain applicants for employment has a long history in the UK. In earlier days the practice was to screen sensitive posts such as police officers, the judiciary and certain financial positions. The scope of employment vetting, however, widened considerably after 1986 when vetting was extended to all workers having contact with children. These workers included teachers, social workers, nursery workers, youth workers and others, and the aim was to safeguard the children they worked with from possible abuse.

In other parts of Europe the preferred method of screening is by means of a Certificate of Conduct (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, The
The certificates declare the suitability of the applicant rather than disclosing the whole of a person's criminal record. The full record is more likely to be produced in Denmark where the law specifically prevents certain people working in designated occupations (Penal Law Article 78) and similarly in France (Penal Code Article 776). Sweden initiated a working party to look at introducing screening for child care workers and their report (*Lämplighetsprovningsutredningen*) went out for consultation in May 1998 (for further general details of European schemes see Loucks et al. 1998; Thomas et al. 1999).

In the UK the increasing numbers of people being screened and the consequent workload demands on the police to service employers with these records, caused the Home Office to review the arrangements between 1993 and 1996 and to subsequently introduce what would become the Police Act 1997. The resultant Criminal Record Bureau has a remit to disclose criminal records on not just sensitive posts and child care posts, but on *any* post where the employer requests it; millions of people will now be subjected to employment screening for the first time.

What started life as an exercise to protect sensitive posts and promote and safeguard the welfare of children, has now grown into a massive social intervention that will affect millions of people. Questions are being asked about the possible breach of the European Convention on Human Rights Article 8 (the right to privacy) and whether the Bureau’s disclosure work is “necessary and proportionate” in terms of all and any employment position. The campaign group Liberty has called it “a recipe for disaster” and “with 12% of men born in 1973 having unspent convictions, the pool of people who would effectively become unemployable is a major concern” (Parratt 1999).

**BACKGROUND**

Over the last 100 years most developed societies have built up national repositories of the criminal convictions and sentences made by courts on their citizens. Traditionally these national collections of criminal records have been used by law enforcement agencies in the investigation and detection of new crimes and to help with the identification of criminals, and by judicial agencies to similarly assist with the passing of appropriate sentences on repeat offenders.

During the 1950s and 1960s the UK started to use criminal records for the screening of people before appointment to certain sensitive posts; such
posts included police officers, casino workers, dealers in securities, doctors, civil servants etcetera (see Home Office 1973 for a complete list at that time). This dissemination of criminal record information beyond the law enforcement and judicial agencies to a wider audience, increased dramatically in 1986 when records became available to employers of child care workers.

The incident which led to child care vetting was the murder of a child by someone who already had convictions for offences against children, but had been, nonetheless, allowed to work with children (Bosely 1984); he had not met his victim through the work but a government departmental working party was still established to look at how criminal records could be made available to child care employers for screening purposes (Home Office/DHSS 1985). The working party estimated that a total of 100,000 extra disclosures would need to be made by the police as custodians of the national criminal record collection (Home Office/DHSS 1985, § 6.21).

No substantive laws were passed to bring in the new post-1986 vetting arrangements, which were located entirely within administrative circulars from the Home Office (Home Office 1986a, 1986b). These circulars were subsequently updated with the most recent being issued in 1993 (Home Office 1993b). By this time disclosures had also been introduced on proprietors of private old people’s homes (Home Office 1991), on taxi drivers through the Road Traffic Act 1991 (see also Home Office/Department of Transport 1992) and from 1994 onwards voluntary workers with children were also subject to criminal record checks (Home Office 1994).

In essence, designated employers, and especially local authorities as employers and licence providers, were to receive disclosed criminal records from their local forces in accordance with the Home Office circulars. Critics pointed out the difficulties this would create for ex-offenders getting work (Apex Trust 1990) and the unfairness caused when employers varied widely in the decisions they made on the disclosed records (Smith 1998, 1999). Others referred to the fact that more black people per head of population were drawn into the criminal justice system and therefore more likely to get a conviction, and then to suffer secondary discrimination when looking for employment (Hebenton and Thomas 1993, p. 142). The National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) gave examples of people who felt they had been unfairly treated by the arrangements (NCCL 1988) and even a Government appointed task force was critical of the variation in decision making between authorities and the anomalies that this threw up (Haskins Report 1999).
Initially, however, it was not these criticisms of police checks *per se* but the ever rising numbers (see e.g. Hebenton and Thomas 1990) and the resultant workload being thrown on local police forces to service the demand for criminal records, that caused the Home Office to enter into a review of the disclosure arrangements. A 1993 consultation document found almost a million checks being carried out every year, including (to the year ending 31 March 1993) 97,200 on taxi drivers and 665,000 on child care workers; the latter a considerable increase on the original 1985 estimate of 100,000 (Home Office 1993a, § 23). A further 150,000 disclosures were categorised as 'others' (Home Office 1993a). The burden of cost to administer this workload was estimated at £14 million a year to the police alone (Home Office 1993a, § 26).

With such high numbers some observers detected what they saw as a 'culture of disclosure' coming into being whereby any presumption of confidentiality accorded to the repository of criminal records was effectively being eroded (see e.g. Hebenton and Thomas 1993, pp. 59–61). At one level the annual report of the Police Complaints Authority for 1991 recorded: "[...] A noticeable increase in the number of complaints about police officers making use of the police national computer or force intelligence records for other than official purposes" (PCA 1991, § 2.6). The idea that a criminal record should be regarded as confidential had been made manifest in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 Section 9, which made unauthorised disclosure an offence. Guidance from the Council of Europe to all its Member States had reinforced the idea, recommending that they: "[...] take appropriate steps to protect information contained in criminal records, particularly when the latter are computerised; (and) provide appropriate sanctions for breach of the confidentiality of information contained in criminal records" (Council of Europe 1984, §§ 8 and 9). Both the 1974 Act and the Council of Europe saw confidentiality as integral to the successful rehabilitation and re-inclusion of the offender back into society.

**On the Record**

The consultation exercise on the police disclosure of criminal records for employment vetting continued from 1993 to 1996 based on the original document issued by the Home Office (1993a). Some 180 responses were received and a final proposal document eventually appeared called *On the Record* (Home Office 1996a).
On the Record proposed legislation to put criminal record disclosure into substantive law and take it out of its current administrative circular context. More importantly it recommended extending the scope of disclosures beyond just sensitive posts and childcare posts to cover any post should the employer feel they needed a criminal record check on a potential employee. A new agency was proposed to take disclosure work away from local police forces and to centralise it on a new national footing; On the Record called this agency the Criminal Record Agency, but it would later be renamed as the Criminal Record Bureau.

The Home Office appears to have recognised the growing numbers of checks on job applicants but to have seen this growth as only problematic in terms of the increasing workload on the police. In future the new central agency would relieve the police of the task, but in doing so would actually take on the disclosure of an even greater number of criminal records on an even greater number of applicants. The intrinsic value of the police check was not to be questioned, despite the various criticisms aimed at it.

The other major innovation to be proposed was the idea that the new central agency should charge for each disclosure it undertook in order that it could ultimately be a self-funding agency; the police had never charged for this service which, as we have noted, reportedly cost them £14 million a year.

The idea that people's personal conviction histories could be 'commodified' and 'sold' as a 'product' was, for some politicians, quite controversial. Long before the publication of On the Record in 1996 a series of stories that the government were thinking of privatising disclosures started to appear in the national press (see e.g. Hooley 1994; Leppard 1995; Travis 1995). Whether or not these were 'official leaks' to the press by way of a sounding out exercise to see what public reaction there was, is uncertain. If it was such an exercise, it would be safe to say it raised very little public reaction.

The actual disclosures in future would be on a three tier basis:

1. an 'enhanced' check comparable to the existing checks on sensitive posts and childcare positions;
2. a 'full' check on those working with vulnerable adults or otherwise exempted under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 which allowed convictions to be considered 'spent' after a certain time period;
3. a new form of check to be called a Criminal Conviction Certificate and available on any potential employee if the employer requested it; 'spent' convictions under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 would not appear on it. (Home Office 1996a; Chapters 4–6)
The Criminal Record Bureau

The 1996 proposals were put into the Police Act 1997 Part V (see Uglow 1998) which received its Royal Assent as an Act on 21 March 1997; it was one of the last Acts of the Conservative Government, replaced in May 1997 by the new Labour Government, who had to decide on whether or not to implement it. If the government had any doubts about implementation they were erased by the continuing concerns raised over sex offenders generally and those offenders in particular who deliberately sought work with children in order to abuse them (see e.g. Home Office 1996b, 1998b; Utting Report 1997). With child abuse prevention uppermost in its mind the Government announced its intention to proceed and to create the Criminal Record Bureau to carry out the Police Act (Home Office 1998a); the press soon spotted the implications in terms of the numbers that would now be vetted regardless of child care considerations (Travis 1998), but there was, again, no great public reaction.

The Criminal Record Bureau (CRB) is a public-private partnership between the CRB as an executive agency of the Home Office and the private company Capita Group plc, who successfully bid to be the partner (Home Office 2000; Capita 2000). Work started in Liverpool to create the new national agency due to start work in 2001 and be fully operational by 2002.

During the first half of 2001 the CRB started to launch itself at a series of regional seminars across the country to which potential employers (customers) were invited. Employers of sensitive posts and child care posts were targeted first and they were told how they need to either register themselves (at a fee of £300) or register indirectly through an 'umbrella' agency that would channel the criminal records to them; registered employers could act as 'umbrella' agencies for smaller employers. The fee for each check has been set at £12 (Home Office 2001); no fee will be charged for the voluntary sector (DfEE 2001). Employers will be able to pass the fee on to the job applicant.

For ease of operation the CRB has renamed the three tier categories of On the Record and the Police Act 1997 Part V, to the more user friendly Enhanced Disclosures (ED), Standard Disclosures (SD) and Basic Disclosures (BD). These will be available to registered employers who agree to abide by a newly produced Code of Practice (CRB 2001); amongst other things, the code expects all employers to have in place a written policy on the employment of ex-offenders and to help them do this, the CRB has produced a specimen policy that can be used by employers. Registration has enabled disclosures at the two higher levels to start in the Autumn 2001.
and the Basic Disclosures in 2002 (see also Internet sites www.crb.gov.uk, and www.disclosure.gov.uk).

CONCLUSIONS

The UK’s Criminal Record Bureau can be seen as a new agency to administer a new social policy which will increase the number of people subject to pre-employment screening by means of a check on their criminal record. The CRB takes forward existing policies designed to protect children in various workplaces and to ensure only suitable people are appointed to sensitive positions, but now extends that service to the vetting of all applicants for work where the employer requests it. There appears to have been no real argument made out for increasing the number of checks in this way and whether or not the new policy will withstand an appeal to the European Convention on Human Rights as being a “necessary and proportionate” measure to reduce crime in the workplace remains to be seen; in the meantime we can estimate some of the implications for potential ‘social exclusion’ that the new policies will bring to those with a criminal record.

In our introduction we cited the views of Liberty that the CRB will implement policies that are “a recipe for disaster” (Parratt 1999). A government appointed Task Force has also warned that the increasing number of checks could lead to:

[...] increased or compounded social exclusion, if individuals are arbitrarily barred from large areas of employment on the basis of criminal convictions (bearing in mind the numbers of people with some form of minor conviction and the extent to which this and other societal pressures already impact on their ability to gain employment). (Haskins Report 1999, § 4.2.2)

The same report estimated that the number of checks each year could in future exceed 12 million (Haskins Report 1999, § 4.2.1) compared to the one million to be found in 1993 (Home Office 1993a, § 23); at a regional CRB seminar attended by one of the authors a figure of nine million a year was suggested. Whatever the exact figure, there is the clear potential for widespread exclusion from many ‘non-sensitive’ jobs for a large proportion of the working population, and as one observer has put it “it would be unfortunate if legislation designed to protect one vulnerable part of society had the effect of making vulnerable another and larger group” (Bell 2000).
Even if an applicant with a criminal record gets as far as being subjected to a disclosure, there is no certainty as to how that record will be assessed by an employer. The experience of the present police disclosures suggests widespread variation and inconsistency (see e.g. Smith 1999), and the effective ‘policing’ of the ‘low visibility’ decision making that will be carried out by thousands of different employers across the country will be virtually impossible.

The Code of Practice introduced by the CRB (2001) which all bodies registering for the disclosure service must abide by (Police Act 1997 Section 122), will be equally difficult to ‘police’. Much of the onus of ensuring compliance will fall on the so-called ‘counter signatories’, who will actually be the prime agents required to act in accordance with the Code; in other words, a self-policing exercise. The Code’s requirement that all employers who register must have a written policy on the employment of ex-offenders has to be seen in the light of the CRB’s willingness to produce specimen policies for employers, which again suggests a supine attitude towards the Code; employers having to think about and create their own policies might have taken the matter more seriously.

Not everything has gone smoothly for the CRB. The Bureau will have direct on-line access to the Police National Computer (PNC) carrying the national collection of criminal records but the quality of data on the PNC has been called into doubt. Police officers have been accused of being slow to input new data and the records have been inaccurate for months and sometimes years (Russell 1998; HMIC 2000). A House of Commons Select Committee took up these concerns and felt these quality matters should be corrected before the CRB starts operating (House of Commons 2001a, § 44). The government has responded and agreed, but thinks the quality concerns are not as great as others believe (House of Commons 2001b, § 11).

The role of the police in contemporary society as generators and disseminators of information for others to use for making risk assessments has been described by Ericson and Haggerty (1997). The UK’s CRB model has taken the idea further forward than most jurisdictions and under the guise of protecting children and the vulnerable has included the capacity to screen virtually everyone that employers might take on. As such the CRB and its policies of disclosure are potentially working directly against other agencies attempting rehabilitation and reintegration of the ex-offender; as Lord Haskins, the Chair of the government task force referred to earlier, has said of the existing arrangements:

Many people are unnecessarily excluded from work because of convictions received many years previously or which are totally irrelevant to the job. This appears to work
against other government initiatives [...] committed to creating job opportunities for ex-offenders. (quoted in Burrell 1999)

Whilst the CRB has made some attempts to be positive about employing ex-offenders (see e.g. CIPD 2001a, 2001b) it is clear that the primary thrust of its work has the potential to cause major social exclusion. Some work applicants will be forced into a new ‘no-questions asked’ category of employment and, at worst, some offenders will turn back to crime rather than attempt rehabilitation against such obstacles.

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SELECTED ARTICLES AND REPORTS

This section contains a selection of abstracts of reports and articles on the central topic of this issue. The aim of publishing these short summaries is to generate and disseminate additional information. Most of the articles have been published in other journals in the English language, although we aim to incorporate French, Dutch or German literature on the subject. The WODC Documentation Service (wodc-informatiedesk@best-dep.minjus.nl) can supply general information on criminal policy and research in Europe. Single copies of the articles can (when used for individual study or education) be provided by the WODC Documentation Service.


Randomised experiments have been increasingly used in the United States throughout the past 25 years. Thus, it seems timely to dedicate an issue of crime and delinquency to this research strategy. Its peculiarity emerges if one looks beyond the scientific community of American criminology. American social sciences strive toward elaborate and rigorous methodologies that come as close as possible to those used in the natural sciences. Social scientists in other countries, notably in Europe, prefer to see social sciences more as an interpretative enterprise, which uses ‘Verstehen’ rather than the search for causal laws as the stimulant for progress. For a better understanding, it may be useful to look more closely at experiences and queries with controlled trials within the international scientific community in the field of criminal justice research. The articles collected in this issue are an attempt to include international perspectives in that discussion.


Sumner’s opening chapter attempts a broad outline of the history of the concept of social control and its related politics, with a view to setting the scene and defining some of the key issues. In Chapter 2, Bergalli comments upon the reception and usage of the concept of social control in Latin America before moving into an exploration of the significance of the concept for Spain, a country in full flow of developing a new political order. Chapter 3 sees Dario Melossi arguing a strong case for the value of the concept of social control in understanding democratisation and for the importance of the concept in relation to the decline of the value of the idea of the state, especially in the formation of the new political arena in contemporary Europe. In Chapter 4, Massimo Pavarini, writing from within a kind of left-realist position, considers the importance of rethinking concepts of crime prevention in terms of a developed notion of social control, with a view to outlining the kind of social control which will both serve democratic ends and the necessity of crime prevention in contemporary Italy. Sebastian Scheerer and Henner Hess, in Chapter
5, present a thoroughgoing analysis of the value of the concept of social control as a general concept in social science. Their account amounts to a defence and reformulation of the concept in the light of the emergence of postmodernity. On the contrary, in Chapter 6, Colin Sumner suggests that the concept is not capable of a strong defence, arguing that any reworking of the idea of social control must be reconnected anew to political projects aimed at restricting elite power and reconstituting the discipline of resistance in an increasingly polarised and globalised social order. Finally, in Chapter 7, Roberto Bergalli sums up his conclusions from the debate.


Contemporary criminology inhabits a rapidly changing world, and if we look beyond the immediate data of crime and punishment to the processes that underpin them it becomes apparent that criminology’s subject matter is centrally implicated in the major transformations of our time. The questions that animate this collection of essays concern the challenges that are posed for criminology by the economic, cultural and political transformations that have marked late twentieth century social life. As the essays in this collection demonstrate, the social transformations of late modernity pose new problems of criminological understanding and relevance, and have definite implications for the intellectual dispositions, strategic aims and political commitments that criminology inevitably entails.


This article critically examines the relevance of behavioural and structural versions of the ‘underclass’ and argues that this distinction should be deepened in order to understand the policing of this population. This task is performed in the context of a society in transition from a Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) to a Schumpeterian Workfare State (SWS). The jobs that are created by the resultant changes in the labour market are not likely to be filled by the ‘underclass’ who will be doubly disadvantaged by the subordination of social policy to economic policy and crime fighting. Also, as a consequence of neo-liberal-led reforms of the police service the organisation no longer has the resources and government support to control and manage the ‘underclass’.


This essay discusses some of the major facets of the race, ethnicity, and crime topic and identifies the major questions that need to be addressed. It reviews the development of criminological interest in this topic from the 1920s to the present. Furthermore, it reviews the evidence on race and crime and on ethnicity and gang behaviour. Finally, it examines a number of recent statements that have addressed issues of public policy related to ‘underclass’ crime.

Hahn refers in his book to the “three pillars for a new proactive criminal justice system” that include expanded notions of community policing. This presentation emphasises prevention of crime in its early stages and the use of all sorts of less restrictive alternative facilities, while still providing for community safety, and reliance on secure incarceration only as a last resort.


This book reports on the development, structures and possibilities of the social services in criminal justice agencies. The Kriminologische Zentralstelle has undertaken some research projects in order to get a clearer sight of the functioning of the social services. Different sources were used for the gathering of data: questionnaires, case files and more general information. The book pays attention to the court services, probation services and supervision services, and discusses the organisational characteristics (communications, co-operation, competencies), contacts with clients, methods of supervision used, and possibilities for reform.


Evidence for a substantial deterrent effect is much firmer than it was two decades ago. However, large gaps in knowledge on the links between policy action and behaviour make it difficult to assess the effectiveness of policy options for deterring crime. Contents: overview of the interrelationship of crime rates, sanctions and policy; interrupted time-series studies; perceptual deterrence studies; ecological studies; the link between prescribed and actual policy, the technology of sanction delivery.


This article reassesses the work of Patrick Colquhoun by reconsidering his notion of prevention. It argues that Colquhoun has been badly served by having his notion of prevention understood in the light of the emergence of the new police in 1829. This has obscured the importance of poverty, indigence and political economy to Colquhoun’s understanding of police. It is suggested that Colquhoun’s work should be of interest as much to the discipline of social policy as police studies, and this argument is used as a springboard into a wider argument concerning the historical, political, and conceptual links between police and social policy as mechanisms for the fashioning of the market. The major suggestion is that the concept of a ‘social police’ may be a useful way to understand these links.

Based on a national sample of 1,775 youths, the authors explored the relationship of labour market participation on delinquency. Consistent with the limited existing research, the results revealed that working while in school, as measured by hours employed each week, increased delinquent involvement among high-risk males. These findings caution that unless carried out carefully and in conjunction with other treatment modalities, delinquency prevention programmes based on employment are likely to be ineffective if not criminogenic.

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