4.1 Crime and Justice in the City

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Crime and Justice in the City

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Aims and scope
The European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research is a platform for discussion and information exchange on the crime problem in Europe. Every issue concentrates on one central topic in the criminal field, incorporating different angles and perspectives. The editorial policy is on an invitational basis. The journal is at the same time policy-based and scientific, it is both informative and plural in its approach. The journal is of interest to researchers, policymakers and other parties that are involved in the crime problem in Europe. The Eur. Journ. Crim. Pol. Res. (preferred abbreviation) is published by Kugler Publications in cooperation with the Research and Documentation Centre of the Dutch Ministry of Justice. The RDC is, independently from the Ministry, responsible for the contents of the journal. Each volume will contain four issues of about 130 pages.

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Editorial address
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European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, P.O. Box 20301,
2500 EH The Hague, The Netherlands
Tel.: (31 70) 3706552
Fax: (31 70) 3707948

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Hans Meiboom (design)

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Editorial

Criminal law is legitimized on a national level. In most countries in Europe the substantive and procedural rules of criminal justice are decreed by the national parliaments. The institutions of police and justice are organized by national governments. The jurisprudence has a national eloquence. In most cases however, the crime problem itself has a local or even personal base. Petty crime in particular is a local affair, and can differ in many respects between rural and urban communities, between towns, or even between neighbourhoods in one town. Crime is, in most cases, located on a microlevel, while criminal justice stems from a macro-oriented system.

In the 1980s this micro-macro model of crime and criminal justice was challenged in many Western countries. Especially since the development of crime prevention policy it has been recognized that severe tension might exist between the scale of the problem and that of the solutions. In the United States there was the development towards community justice; in Great Britain and other countries the Safer Cities programmes were developed; in many countries community policing was introduced; in France initiatives were taken in terms of police et justice de proximité. Generally speaking, criminal justice policy became, problem-oriented instead of case-oriented, effectuated closer to the citizens.

This issue of the European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research is dedicated to this new community-oriented approach in criminal justice policy. It informs on and evaluates the effectiveness of this decentralist turn. The first article is based on the International Crime Survey and informs us that inhabitants of large towns are two or even three times more likely to fall victim to a crime than people living in small towns or the countryside. In comparison to cities in North America, Australia, South Africa and South America most European cities are still relatively safe. In Asian cities public safety is generally better assured. Professor Jan van Dijk thinks that if no more remedies are introduced in the socially most vulnerable neighbourhoods, serious crime is likely to go up.

Paul Ekblom (Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate) gives the latest data on the British Safer Cities programme. During the period from 1988 to 1995 over 3,600 schemes were introduced in twenty cities. The evaluation concentrates on domestic burglary, using surveys and recorded crime statistics. The author concludes that the cost of realizing a reduction in crime was generally less than the costs of burglary, and the cost-effectiveness increased where
burglary was more common. Some geographical displacement was found, but with more intensive action, a possible diffusion of benefit was experienced. Perceptions of area quality improved where action was greatest.

In Belgium a brand-new crime prevention policy was introduced after the 1991 election. The breakthrough of extremist opinions was explained by the feelings of insecurity in the Belgian cities. Sixty cities signed a so called 'security and prevention contract' with the government. The sum of sixty million pounds was injected into the Belgian safer city policy. The article apprises the eight objectives of this new policy: police nearer to the public, modernizing police work, more police on the streets, strengthening prevention policy, integration of particular groups, functional surveillance and techno-prevention, handling the drug problem, and dealing with crimes against property.

Jacques Faget and Anne Wyvekens report on urban policy and 'proximity justice' in France. In 1983 the National Council of Crime Prevention initiated a local strategy that resulted in about 700 Communal Councils of Crime Prevention and other initiatives. Crime prevention is part of a broader social policy that aims to improve housing conditions, provide more opportunities for employment, reinforce public services, and introduce social and cultural activity-organizing programmes. In response to this, a judicial urban policy was developed, in order to give easier access to justice for underprivileged social groups, to help the victims of crime, to deepen the relationship between judicial action and community problems and to facilitate the partnership with other institutions. In underprivileged districts so-called maisons de justice were established. This development symbolizes a new relationship between civil society and a 'structuring state' in troublesome areas, according to the authors.

The next article deals with a new Tale of Two Cities (Charles Dickens). Frankfurt and Stockholm are the main representatives of two networks of European cities addressing the issue of drug policy. The European Cities on Drug Policy (ECDP) was founded in 1990 by the signing of the 'Frankfurt Resolution'. It aims to support pragmatic risk reduction drug policies. The other network, European Cities against Drugs (ECAD), was founded in 1994 by the signing of the 'Stockholm Resolution'. Charles Kaplan and Ed. Leuw give an overview of these two European 'policy instruments', that were both recognized in the 'Action Plan of the European Union for the Fight against Drugs'. According to the authors the challenge facing the EU in the future will be finding a creative way to reinforce the accord between the two city networks. Otherwise a new 'Berlin wall' is likely to be built in the area of drug policy.

Finally, John Blad gives an impression of the neighbourhood-centred conflict mediation that has developed in the United States. More specifically the article informs about the San Francisco Community Boards (SFCB) that were founded in 1976 as an informal alternative for state-related policing and justice. Central
in the SFCB approach is the 'dispute resolution panel'. This panel consists of three to five trained dispute resolvers, living in the same community as the disputing parties. The rationale behind this approach is the empowerment of the community. In the article a project in three neighbourhoods in Rotterdam is announced, that will be based on the experiences in San Francisco. In the Varia section a summary of the policy bill on drugs of the Dutch government is published. The Swedish Council of Crime Prevention is responsible for the Crime Institute Profile in this issue.
Criminal victimization in European cities

Some results of the International Crime Victims Survey

Jan J.M. van Dijk, John van Kesteren

A universal finding of comparative analyses of levels of crime in the nineteenth century was that crime rates are higher in urban areas. For instance, Guerry’s and Quetelet’s classic studies of the crime rates in Europe in the nineteenth century showed that the inhabitants of relatively wealthy urban regions were less 'moral' than those of poor rural regions (Bonger, 1905; Van Kerckvoorde, 1990).

In the twentieth century increasing doubts about the validity of official statistics as measures of crime led to a decline of macro-criminological analyses in general. International and regional comparisons became uncommon (Shelley, 1981). Criminographic studies were predominantly focused on the distribution of recorded crime over city areas or neighbourhoods (ecology of crime or crime mapping).

Victimization surveys have led to a renaissance of international comparative criminology. This has also led to a renewed interest in the link between the degree of urbanization and the level of crime (Gibbs, 1979; Van Dijk and Steinmetz, 1984; Schneider, 1987). In the past few years standardized victimization surveys have been carried out in almost all European countries (Van Dijk et al., 1990; Van Dijk and Mayhew, 1992). The results of these surveys offer the opportunity to test the urbanization-crime hypothesis on the basis of international crime data which were collected independently of the police.

In this article we will first explore whether in Western Europe the proportion of

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1 Jan J.M. van Dijk is professor of criminology at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands; John van Kesteren is a researcher/lecturer at the same university's Criminological Institute.
the public victimized by crime is indeed related to the level of urbanization. This question will also be addressed by analyzing the risks of individuals: to what extent are inhabitants of urban areas more likely to be victims of crime than others, regardless of other factors?

In the second part of the article we will explore the possible causes of the over-representation of crime in urban areas. More specifically, we will try to show that urban crime problems can be interpreted as the result of a convergence in place of socio-economic strain amongst the lower strata of urban populations on the one hand and the presence of abundant criminal opportunities on the other (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Van Dijk, 1995). The article ends with a brief discussion of the policy implications of the findings.

Victimization by level of urbanization

The first two sweeps of the International Crime Survey (ICS) were carried out in 1988 and 1992. Samples in most of the participating countries were a modest 2,000 households. One randomly selected respondent aged 16 or over was questioned. Interviews in most countries were done by telephone interviewing (CATI) which allows tighter standardization of questionnaire administration. People were asked about their experience of crime in the previous year and over the past five years. For a more extensive description of the survey's methodology we refer to the literature cited above. In victimization surveys respondents are usually asked some questions about their social characteristics. One of the advantages of survey data over police data is that they can more easily be broken down by sociologically relevant criteria. In the ICS respondents are asked about the number of inhabitants in their town or city.

In table 1 a comparison is made between the rate of victimization in crime in general and the rate of victimization in three specific types of crime experienced by the inhabitants of towns/cities of various sizes. As can be seen the rate of victimization is strongly related to city size. For all crimes together the average Eurorates of criminal victimization go up from 16 per cent in villages or small towns to 30 per cent in cities with half a million of inhabitants or more. Put differently, urban dwellers are twice as vulnerable as villagers. In fact, urban dwellers are on average likely to be victimized once every three years. The urbanization link is strongest for burglaries and contact crimes. The risk of having one's house burgled is three times higher in large cities than in villages.

In table 2 are depicted the one-year victimization percentages among the inhabitants of larger cities in some European countries. As is shown the level of petty crime was the biggest in the cities of the Netherlands, Italy, Germany and Spain. In 1992 the rates were fairly high in England and Wales as well. The safest European cities were to be found in Switzerland and Northern Ireland.
Table 1: Percentages of the public victimized by any crime, car crimes\(^1\), burglaries\(^2\) or contact crimes\(^3\) during 12 months, by city size; results of the 1989 and 1992 International Crime Surveys (n=34,177)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>size of town</th>
<th>all crimes</th>
<th>car crimes</th>
<th>burglary and attempts</th>
<th>contact crimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt;10,000 (n= 11,241)</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>9.22</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>5.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-50,000 (n= 9,855)</td>
<td>22.51</td>
<td>11.71</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>6.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000 (n= 3,281)</td>
<td>26.77</td>
<td>15.29</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>8.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000-500,000 (n= 4,411)</td>
<td>26.97</td>
<td>14.36</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>9.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000-1,000,000 (n= 3,821)</td>
<td>33.66</td>
<td>21.64</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>11.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;1,000,000 (n= 1,568)</td>
<td>28.81</td>
<td>15.25</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td>11.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>21.03</td>
<td>11.69</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>6.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1  car theft, theft from a car, car vandalism.
2  incl. attempts.
3  pickpocketing, robbery, threats/assaults.

Table 2: Percentages of the public victimized by crime in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants in some European countries; results of the 1989 and 1992 International Crime Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>all crimes</th>
<th>car crimes</th>
<th>burglary and attempts</th>
<th>contact crimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England and Wales (88+91)</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scotland (88)</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands (88+91)</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(West) Germany (88)</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland (88)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (88+91)</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (88)</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway (88)</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (88+91)</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (88)</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (91)</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (91)</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To put these findings in perspective it is important to note that the victimization rates in cities in Eastern Europe are at the same level. Rates in North America, Australia, South America and South Africa are generally higher (Alvazzi del Frate et al., 1990). Cities in Asia, however, are generally much safer. Table 3 gives an overview. In a global perspective, victimization by contact crimes like...
street robberies and by burglaries are still relatively uncommon in Western European cities. Car related crimes and thefts are at a fairly high level though.

The city as a victimological risk factor

According to the various lifestyle-exposure models of victimology, the risks of individual citizens being criminally victimized are determined by their attractiveness as a target, their proximity to potential offenders and the quality of their (self) protection (Hindelang et al., 1978; Van Dijk and Steinmetz, 1984). City dwellers are not necessarily more attractive crime targets than people living in small provincial towns or rural areas. In this respect urban dwellers are not particularly vulnerable to victimization. However, due to greater anonymity and mobility, natural surveillance is probably weaker in big cities than elsewhere. Offenders have less to fear from intervening bystanders and neighbours. In this important aspect urban environments are more conducive to criminal victimization. In addition, if offenders are over-represented in cities, as will be argued in the second part of this article, urban residents live and work in closer proximity to offenders. On balance, victimological theory suggests that city dwellers run higher victimization risks.

In order to ascertain whether urban residence shows a relationship with victimization, independent of known risk factors such as a young age, high socio-economic status, an outgoing lifestyle and being male, an analysis was made with the help of a loglinear model. This analysis shows the extent to which belonging to a certain category increases or diminishes the likelihood of becoming a victim, irrespective of other relevant characteristics of the persons involved. The results are expressed in 'risk coefficients'.

Table 3: Percentage of the public victimized by various crimes over five years in the urban areas of six global regions (>100,000 inhabitants); results of the 1989 and 1992 International Crime Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime</th>
<th>Total (n=74,000)</th>
<th>Western Europe (28,000)</th>
<th>New World* (8,000)</th>
<th>South America (6,000)</th>
<th>Eastern Europe (14,000)</th>
<th>Asia (8,000)</th>
<th>Africa (10,000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Car crime</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other theft</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact crime</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any crime</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>75.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand
Table 4: Results of a loglinear model-based quantification of the extent to which certain social characteristics increase or diminish the risk to be victimized by any crime and by car crimes, burglaries and contact crimes respectively; results of the 1989 and 1992 International Crime Surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>all crimes</th>
<th>car crimes</th>
<th>burglary and attempts</th>
<th>contact crimes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>obs. %</td>
<td>risk factor</td>
<td>obs. %</td>
<td>risk factor</td>
<td>obs. %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>victim</td>
<td>33,412</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>town size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>small</td>
<td>10,117</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td>14,229</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large</td>
<td>9,066</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>4,821</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td>14,701</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>10,290</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>young</td>
<td>11,069</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium</td>
<td>11,997</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>old</td>
<td>10,346</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>15,510</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>17,902</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 In six countries the survey was carried out in both 1989 and 1992. The older data were not included.
2 Observed percentage.
3 Socio-economic status.

In table 4 we present the findings of an analysis of the independent links between town size and victimization, controlling for age, gender and socio-economic status. This analysis was carried out on the data of all Western industrialized nations (Western Europe, North America and Australia), using a loglinear procedure (SPSS-pc, 1990). For the average person, the likelihood of becoming a victim of a crime over a five-year period is 52 percent, or, the ratio of victims to non-victims is 1.08 to 1. For each category a risk coefficient was determined which estimates the extent to which the special victimization risk of persons belonging to that category deviates from the norm. For instance the ratio of victims to non-victims for...
Table 5: Results of loglinear analyses per country for overall five-year victimization rates; results of the 1989 and 1992 International Crime Surveys

| Nlre E/W Scl WGer NL Swi Bel Fr Fin Nor Sp It Swe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| average risk | 0.71 | 1.80 | 0.76 | 1.11 | 1.95 | 0.99 | 0.96 | 1.35 | 1.03 | 0.72 | 1.11 |
| town size | 1.38 | 1.52 | 1.30 | 1.56 | 1.37 | 1.95 | 1.35 | 1.03 | 0.72 | 1.11 | 1.38 |
| small | 0.63 | 0.78 | 0.67 | 0.63 | 0.55 | 0.89 | 0.84 | 0.57 | 0.68 | 0.56 | 0.59 |
| middle | 0.82 | 0.80 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 0.92 | 0.88 | 0.99 | 1.12 | 0.95 | 1.19 | 1.07 |
| big | 1.93 | 1.61 | 1.58 | 1.61 | 1.98 | 1.29 | 1.21 | 1.57 | 1.55 | 1.50 | 1.58 |
| young | 1.52 | 1.50 | 1.23 | 1.87 | 1.35 | 1.67 | 1.41 | 1.51 | 1.80 | 1.97 | 1.29 |
| middle | 1.11 | 1.16 | 1.23 | 1.05 | 1.25 | 0.69 | 1.12 | 1.15 | 1.20 | 1.14 | 1.04 |
| old | 0.60 | 0.58 | 0.66 | 0.51 | 0.59 | 0.63 | 0.64 | 0.58 | 0.46 | 0.45 | 0.74 |
| gender | 0.90 | 0.95 | 0.98 | 1.03 | 0.98 | 1.02 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.97 | 0.88 | 1.01 |
| male | 0.74 | 0.88 | 1.16 | 1.09 | 1.28 | 1.24 | 1.16 | 1.13 | 1.08 | 1.23 | 1.14 |
| female | 0.60 | 0.58 | 0.66 | 0.51 | 0.59 | 0.63 | 0.64 | 0.58 | 0.46 | 0.45 | 0.74 |
| going out | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 |
| often | 0.90 | 0.88 | 0.91 | 0.83 | 0.78 | 0.81 | 0.86 | 0.88 | 0.93 | 0.81 | 0.88 |
| not often | 0.74 | 0.88 | 1.16 | 1.09 | 1.28 | 1.24 | 1.16 | 1.13 | 1.08 | 1.23 | 1.14 |
| low | 0.55 | 0.79 | 0.54 | 0.62 | 0.75 | 0.54 | 0.83 | 0.54 | 0.94 | 0.78 | 0.38 |
| average | 0.99 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 1.02 | 1.17 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 0.93 | 1.14 | 0.89 | 1.13 |
| high | 1.83 | 1.27 | 1.80 | 1.60 | 1.15 | 1.89 | 1.25 | 1.99 | 0.93 | 1.44 | 2.33 |

As the results show, town size is consistently related to victimization risks. In this analysis there is little differentiation between types of crimes. Similar patterns were also found for sexual crimes and bicycle thefts. Controlling for other characteristics, living in a big city involves a higher vulnerability to crime across the board. Possibly the higher levels of victimization among urban populations is a country-specific phenomenon. In table 5 are presented the results of the separate

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3 As in any regression-like analysis, the estimated victimization percentage according to the model may slightly differ from the observed percentage. Risk coefficients may change a bit if variables are added to or left out of the model.
analyses of the national data of some Western European countries. In these analyses the variable lifestyle factor was included. The results show that victimization risks are positively related to town size everywhere. In Western Europe the urbanization-crime link seems to be fairly universal. City size is a very important risk factor in the Netherlands and a somewhat less important one in Switzerland. In general the deviations from the general pattern are marginal. The relationship between city size and victimization is probably somewhat deflated by the empirical fact that many inhabitants of smaller towns are victimized by crime during their visits to larger cities. If only victimization in one's place of residence were counted the urbanization-victimization link would probably be even more pronounced.

It follows from this assumption that the differences in vulnerability between city dwellers and villagers are the largest in the least urbanized regions (where isolated villagers do not often visit city centres). This hypothesis was tested with the help of a multi-level analysis (Prosser et al., 1991), which looks at the estimated effects, at the individual level, for regions with different levels of urbanization (Van Kesteren, 1996). Figure 1 shows the results.
The curves representing individual victimization risks are steeper for regions with a lower level of urbanization. The results of the multi-level analysis confirm the hypothesis that city size is a much stronger risk factor in less urbanized regions. For those who really want to be safe from crime, a flight to commuting towns near big cities won't suffice. They should opt for a life in an isolated small village in a real rural region.

**The city as a criminogenic factor**

According to modern criminological thinking the level of crime is determined by the joint influence of motivational factors such as the prevalence of socio-economic strain among the population and of the here-and-now presence of criminal opportunities (Van Dijk, 1995). Relevant indicators of strain are the employment rate and, more directly, the proportion of young males who are dissatisfied with their financial situation (Van Dijk, 1995). The extent of criminal opportunities is dependent on the presence of suitable targets and of adequate protection against crime. In general the availability of suitable targets is higher if levels of affluence are high. The level of protection is dependent on the extent of natural surveillance and of specific measures of self-protection such as anti-burglary devices. According to Felson (1994) the modern, divergent metropolis weakens 'localism' and thereby control. In order to understand the crime problems of Western European cities it is essential to determine how these places are faring in terms of the criminogenic factors listed above.

The International Crime Victims Survey data set contains information on most of these factors at the individual level. This information can be aggregated to the level of nations or national regions. Aggregation to the level of regions yields average scores for a total of 114 European regions on items such as unemployment, social cohesion, self-protection against crime etcetera. By aggregating individual data of the surveys we can of course also compute regional levels of urbanization and regional rates of crime. The regional data set can thus be used to explore statistically the relationships between level of urbanization, the prevalence of strain and of criminal opportunities and the levels of crime. We will explore here whether the data lend support to a model which assumes that the city-crime link is mediated by higher levels of strain, greater availability of suitable targets and less natural surveillance. This tentative model is depicted in figure 2.

The economic situation of European cities is somewhat ambiguous. Big cities continue to be generators of wealth as centres of successful service and information industries. Some of the well-to-do families show a tendency to relocate to smaller communities outside the city. At the same time the restructuring of
The ICS data set shows that the average score on a five-points scale for socio-economic status is unrelated to the level of urbanization (r=0.02). Interestingly, the standard deviation of the individual SES scores is higher within the more urbanized regions (r=0.18; p<0.05; N=114). This finding indicates that wealth among urban populations is more unequally distributed than in less urbanized regions. Our data also confirm that the population of the more urbanized European regions suffers more from socio-economic strain. The percentage of unemployed people is positively correlated to the level of urbanization (r=0.27; p<0.01). Also the percentage of young males who are dissatisfied with their financial situation is higher among urban dwellers (r=0.23; p<0.01). In sum, all available indicators of criminogenic strain show above-average scores among the inhabitants of urban areas in Western Europe.

The second category of criminogenic factors relates to the availability of suitable targets of crime. In our data set the regional ownership rates for car ownership and bicycle ownership are unrelated to the level of urbanization. Per capita city dwellers do not own more or fewer vehicles than people living in small towns or villages. However, if the availability of targets was calculated per square mile, the city rates would be very high. Opportunities for street robbery or pickpocketing are likewise greater in cities due to the greater numbers of passers-by in the streets and the high concentration of people near public transport and shopping centres. Unfortunately our data set does not allow the computation of such rates as the availability of targets per square mile. This obvious criminogenic aspect of big cities (Schneider, 1987) cannot be included in our empirical analysis.

The third category of criminogenic factors relates to various aspects of informal social control or surveillance as well as to measures of deliberate self-protection. In our data set natural surveillance is represented, firstly, by a question of the frequency of family gatherings. The rate of visits to family members not
living in the same household is lower among city dwellers \((r=0.39; \ p<0.001)\). This measure can be seen as a proxy for social cohesiveness. A relevant indicator of natural surveillance in relation to burglary is home occupancy. Home occupancy is negatively related to the proportion of females with outdoor employment. The percentage of females who are employed is significantly higher among urban populations \((r=0.28; \ p<0.001)\). For this reason, houses in urban areas are more often left unguarded during the day.

Finally, we have looked at the number of anti-burglary measures taken. The average score on a scale of such measures is positively related to the level of urbanization \((r=0.29; \ p<0.001)\). Urban dwellers are aware of the increased risks of having their houses burgled \((r=0.52)\) and subsequently invest more in self-protection. Urban dwellers are also more likely to avoid certain places at night. The latter findings confirm our notion that within certain limits potential victims, like potential offenders, respond rationally to existing opportunities and risks (Van Dijk, 1995).

To conclude, a multivariate analysis was carried out to test the causal model suggested in figure 2 with the use of our data on 114 European regions. For this so-called path analysis we used the programme Lisrel VI (Jöreskog and Sorbom, 1984). The statistical relationships in the statistical model are expressed in Beta-coefficients with values between \(-1\) and \(+1\). As can be seen in the correlation matrix in figure 3, the direct correlation between the level of urbanization and the level of crime among European regions is very strong \((r=0.61)\). As expected by the theoretical model, this correlation is partly explained by the links of urbanization with unemployment and weaker family ties and the links between the latter two factors and the level of crime. The remaining, unexplained link between urbanization and level of crime is...
Criminal victimization in European cities

still substantial (B=0.39). One explanation for this could be the higher availability of suitable targets per square mile (a factor not included in the analysis). This latter factor is probably partly offset, however, by the higher level of self-protection against crime in urban areas (also not included).

Discussion

The International Crime (Victims) Survey has so far been carried out in thirteen Western European countries. The data of the International Crime (Victims) Survey are collected independently of official crime registrations. The data set allows a fresh look at the classic hypothesis that big cities are breeding grounds for common crimes such as burglaries, thefts and street robberies. The data confirm the notion that in Western Europe the inhabitants of larger towns are more likely to be victims of crime than those living in small towns or villages. Almost universally city dwellers are two or even three times more likely to fall victim to a crime. For inhabitants of the urban conglomerates in the European Union victimization by crime is no longer a rare event. In most cities a third of the population is victimized at least once a year. Only those living in villages or small towns in the least urbanized European regions are safe from crime. In comparison to cities in North America, Australia, South Africa and South America most European cities are still relatively safe. In Asian cities, however, public safety is generally much better assured.

The analysis of the level of crime in 114 Western European regions showed that urban crime problems can be interpreted as the outcome of a convergence of relatively widespread feelings of strain among the poorer inhabitants of big cities on the one hand and the abundance of relatively unguarded, suitable targets for crime on the other. In the big cities of the EU both motivated offenders and opportunities for profitable crimes are widely available.

The present interactionist model can also offer some guidance for crime prevention policies directed at urban areas. Among urban populations a spontaneous trend towards better self-protection can be observed. This trend is driven by the rational choices of potential victims and will eventually help to stabilize the volume of crime. Governments should introduce financial incentives for this positive social trend, for instance by introducing legislation on minimum standards and by giving subsidies or tax benefits to households and companies which apply sophisticated security equipment. In this area insurance companies should be urged to take initiatives.

In addition, governments should promote the (re) hiring of functionaries who can exercise social control such as caretakers, concierges, bus conductors, car park attendants, city guards etcetera. Recruitment for these jobs should preferably be aimed at the long-term unemployed. In the Netherlands thousands of
jobs for the long-term unemployed have successfully been created in this way on the initiative of the Ministry of Justice. A further expansion is part of the ongoing Dutch policy plan for the revitalization of the larger towns. More ambitiously, governments should try to make inroads on the high illiteracy and unemployment rates among young males in certain parts of the urban conglomerates. In this respect Europe seems to be at a cross roads. If no remedies are introduced, serious crime is likely to go up. The public’s ensuing fear of crime will subsequently necessitate the building of ever more prisons. By North American standards the size of the European prison system is still modest. The number of prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants is currently almost ten times higher in the USA (600) than on average in the EU (80). By investing now in extra education and health provisions in the socially most vulnerable neighbourhoods, a further expansion of the European prison systems and budgets in the next century might be prevented.

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Safer Cities and residential burglary

A summary of evaluation results

Paul Ekblom

The Safer Cities programme

Phase 1 of the Safer Cities programme was inaugurated in 1988 and finished in Autumn 1995. Safer Cities was part of the British Government's wider programme to deal with the multiple problems of some of the larger urban areas. The objectives of Safer Cities were to reduce crime, lessen fear of crime, and create safer environments within which economic enterprise and community life could flourish (Home Office, 1993).

Safer Cities initiatives were locally based, with a 'partnership' or multi-agency approach to crime prevention.

The programme was developed in the light of experience of the earlier 'Five Towns' initiative (Liddle and Bottoms, 1991). In each of twenty areas - covering cities or boroughs - a local project was set up with a coordinator and a small team (Tilley, 1992; Sutton, 1996).

Safer Cities projects featured a wide range of activities, including awareness raising among citizens and local agencies, and the development of community safety strategies in local government. But at the core was the initiation of local preventive schemes. These schemes were implemented on the ground by a variety of local organizations, who were invited to bid for funds. The schemes drew on grants from Safer Cities - up to £250,000 annually per city - and other local or national resources. Altogether, Safer Cities initiated some 3,600 schemes at a cost of £22 million plus £8 million administration. The preventive action was intended to take the rational, problem-oriented
approach developed over the last decade (Tilley, 1993; Laycock and Tilley, 1995; Sutton, 1996). Coordinators were given a limited amount of training and support from professionals in the Home Office and elsewhere (few coordinators had much background in criminology). They were also provided by the Research and Statistics Directorate with an initial 'crime and social profile' of their area, including a beat-by-beat picture of recorded crime rates, to help develop priorities and set up an action plan.

The schemes deliberately addressed a wide range of crime problems using a wide range of methods. The crime problems ranged from residential and commercial burglary, assault, domestic violence, vehicle-related theft, and shop theft. In some cases the focus was more on fear of crime. Preventive methods included both 'situational' and offender-oriented action. The former included measures such as better security hardware, alarms, improved lighting, and surveillance measures. The latter covered youth work, holiday play schemes, credit unions, adventure playgrounds, employment advice, even morality plays in schools. Some schemes focused on the city as a whole (through publicity campaigns, information initiatives such as crime prevention buses, or multi-agency programmes). Many schemes, however, focused on vulnerable individuals, groups of homes, particular institutions (such as schools and clubs), or particular localities (housing estates, car parks or city centres).

The evaluation strategy

The focus in the Research and Statistics Directorate's evaluation was on the impact of the Safer Cities programme as a whole. Our approach was to look at the typical scheme – since this provides the best picture of what a large-scale prevention programme is routinely capable of implementing. The alternative approach – to pick a set of 'good prospects' in advance, or to comb retrospectively for 'success stories' – might say something about good practice, but not much about the cost-effectiveness of the programme. The Dutch government's attempt to evaluate a set of individual preventive schemes identified in advance met with severe attrition problems: poor implementation, poor data and weak scheme evaluations eliminated many (Polder, 1992; Junger-Tas, 1993). Wider discussions of the difficulties of evaluating crime prevention initiatives are in Ekblom (1990) and Ekblom and Pease (1995).

The evaluation required us to link measures of Safer Cities action to measures of outcome. This was challenging (Ekblom, 1992). In particular, many schemes were small in resource terms, or spread thinly over large areas. This meant that the impact of individual schemes was often likely to be modest, and that it was best to consider a large number simultaneously. To minimize the risks of delivering inconclusive findings, and to conduct a 'fair test', the strategy we
devised was path-breaking in several ways (Ekblom and Pease, 1995). It aimed to estimate the size and cost of any preventive impact, required the use of state-of-the-art computing (Ekblom et al., 1994) and equally new statistical techniques (Ekblom et al., 1993).

Residential burglary was chosen for this first evaluation because coordinators often targeted it, preventive practice is relatively well-developed, and burglary schemes tend to be local. If the Safer Cities programme was going to have a measurable impact on crime, we reasoned, it would be on burglary.

**Safer Cities action against burglary**

Up to summer 1992, just under 300 current or completed schemes in the first sixteen cities were targeted at residential burglary at the local level. Three-quarters focused on domestic target-hardening (including door, window and fencing improvements, entry systems, and security lighting around individual houses or blocks). Eight percent were focused on community-oriented action (providing crime prevention outreach workers, raising awareness of prevention, fostering Neighbourhood Watch, and property-marking). Offender-oriented action specifically targeted at burglary was rare. The amount spent per scheme varied from a few pounds to over £100,000. The territories covered by the schemes ranged from single blocks of flats to whole districts; the average was about 5,200 households.

The average Safer Cities funds spent per burglary scheme was £8,700. For about a third of the schemes there were additional levered-in funds raised from local agencies and institutions, and from other national programmes. For these schemes, the average Safer Cities spend was £11,300 and the average levered supplement £17,800.

**Measuring Safer Cities action**

There would be little prospect of finding impact by simply comparing cities. Rather, a fairer test meant taking account of the amount of local action, and looking for impact where one might expect to find it – in the vicinity of schemes.

The amount of action was measured in terms of money spent, combining Safer Cities and levered-in funds. Using data from the Safer Cities Management Information System, maps of scheme locations, and population data from the 1991 Census, an action score was calculated for each small area covered in the evaluation. This score represented the average amount of funds acting on each household over a given year. (It can be regarded as a measure of 'action intensity' – cf. Polder, 1992. It took into account the amount spent on each scheme.
affecting the area, the area over which each scheme was spread, and the length of time each scheme had been operating.) The amount spent was averaged over all households in the area because it was not possible to identify which individual household had or had not received action.

Besides this 'hard' data on Safer Cities action, 'softer' information of various kinds was used to guide and interpret our analysis. Brief descriptions of each scheme were available on the Management Information System; informal contacts with coordinators were regular, and open-ended interviews with them (Sutton, 1996) threw light on the process by which they assigned action to particular locations.

**Measuring outcome and assessing impact**

To measure outcome, two sources of local data were collected: information from sample surveys of adults, and police-recorded crime figures. The two sources were complementary, with different strengths and weaknesses. In each case the evaluation design involved comparing changes in burglary risk over time, between local areas which received Safer Cities action against burglary, areas in the Safer Cities which had no action and other cities matched demographically and by overall crime rate. Of course, the first two sets of areas could only be distinguished retrospectively, when the location of action was known. Our data were hierarchical.

For the survey we covered eleven Safer Cities and eight comparison cities. In these, we sampled over 400 high-crime Census Enumeration Districts (EDs) – areas of about 200 households. The EDs generated some 5,800 respondents, who gave over 7,500 interviews (some were interviewed twice – we used an embedded panel design). Half were interviewed before much Safer Cities action had been implemented (1990), half after (1992).

For the recorded crime data we covered fourteen Safer Cities (with comparison indicators derived from nine other cities). These were broken into 701 police beats (average 2,200 households), each with repeated measures for up to six 'beat-years' from 1987-1992 (according to data availability), making a total of nearly 3,300 observations.

To filter out extraneous factors, such as demographic differences between areas or survey respondents, and background trends in crime, we used statistical modelling (multi-level linear regression with ML3 – Goldstein, 1995). This sought to explain the variation in the risk of burglary over time and between areas, cities and respondents, as appropriate.

This paper is a summary of results reported in full in Ekblom et al. (1996). We first present the findings on Safer Cities impact on burglary from the survey;
then those from the analysis of recorded crime. The results for the survey and the recorded crime analyses are very similar. We then ask the key question: were the Safer Cities schemes value for money? We finally return to the survey to consider some of the less tangible consequences of Safer Cities in terms of people's perceptions of their neighbourhood, and worry about burglary. We also examine the consequences for security-related behaviour, including membership of Neighbourhood Watch and the installation of home security measures.

The survey

Our survey obtained a good-sized sample of areas with local action despite this being widely scattered over each city. Of the 300 local schemes targeted on residential burglary, 96 were covered; these were broadly representative, although somewhat larger. They fell in 117 of the surveyed areas. (Some schemes covered more than one area, and some areas received more than one scheme.)

In the 117 surveyed areas in which there was Safer Cities action, the intensity (including levered-in funds) varied from 1p to £113 per household over the year preceding the after-survey. The average was £16. A distinction was made between EDs in which under £1's worth of total action was present per household over the year ('low-action'); £1-£13 ('medium-action'); and £13+ ('high-action' areas).

Did the survey show a Safer Cities effect?

Figure 1 shows how the proportion of households burgled one or more times in a year changed between the 'before' surveys, and the 'after' ones. (These are risks of burglary prevalence, excluding attempts. They are unweighted; variables that would normally be included in weighting are instead incorporated within the statistical model described below.) There are five sets of surveyed EDs. From the left, we have the EDs in the comparison cities; those in the Safer Cities with no action; those with low action; medium action; and high action. Before any Safer Cities action, burglary risks were somewhat higher in the comparison cities than in Safer Cities, reflecting no more than inevitably imperfect matching. Between 1990 and 1992, burglary risks in the comparison cities rose (relative to the before-risk) by 7%; the areas in the Safer Cities where there was no action on residential burglary actually showed a bigger rise, of 18%. However, in areas where there was action, risks fell: by 3% in the low-action areas, by 35% in the medium-action areas and by 30% in the high-action areas. Burglary incidence (the number of burglaries per hundred households) showed a broadly similar pattern. Concentration (the average number of burglaries per burglary
Figure 1: Domestic burglary prevalence before and after implementation (survey)

Regression-to-the-mean?

Safer Cities was meant to target high-crime areas. However, if coordinators targeted areas with temporarily extra-high crime levels, then a downturn in crime might follow whether or not the action itself worked ('regression-to-the-mean').

This would mimic a Safer Cities effect. As figure 1 shows, the prior burglary levels in Safer Cities EDs with medium or high action were indeed markedly higher than in EDs which received less or no action. Could regression-to-the-mean explain away the Safer Cities effect? Three lines of evidence counter this.

1. The tendency for more action to be focused on areas with higher prior burglary risks is rather unreliable, varying strongly between EDs.
2. Safer Cities coordinators consistently stated that targeting of high-crime areas was more on the basis of stable 'bad area reputations' and longer-term high rates of recorded crime, than on short-term 'blips' (Sutton, 1996).
Recorded crime data were available going back yearly from 1992 to 1987 for a large number of the surveyed EDs in the Safer Cities. Each surveyed ED was linked (using a geographic information system) to the police beat in which it was sited, and assigned the recorded crime rates of that beat. The areas which subsequently received higher levels of action clearly did tend to have a consistent long-term history of higher recorded burglary rates – they were not just recent fluctuations. This indicated rather conclusively that regression-to-the-mean cannot explain away the Safer Cities effect.

Explaining variation in burglary victimization risks

Although regression to the mean was ruled out, figure 1 still remains only prima facie evidence for Safer Cities impact on burglary, because it shows the relationship between just three factors – time, location and action. The statistical modelling (hierarchical logistical regression) enabled us to take account of a wider range of demographic factors. Overall, net of all the other explanatory factors included in the analysis, Safer Cities burglary action in an ED was associated with a reduction in risk in the after-survey. The ‘Safer Cities effect’ was not straightforward. Unexpectedly, the mere presence of burglary action seemed to reduce the risk of burglary quite markedly. This could be called the step effect of action. Beyond and above the step effect, the greater the intensity of action, the greater the reduction in the after-risk. This could be called the marginal effect of action. The two effects together give a measure of the overall impact of the Safer Cities action. Neither step nor marginal effects are constant, but vary with the prior burglary level of the ED where the action was located. The step effect appears to grow somewhat stronger, the higher the prior burglary level in an area. This may mean it is easier to reduce burglary in areas at higher risk, perhaps because offenders are not accustomed to much preventive action and respond more readily. But it could merely be a measurement phenomenon. However, the marginal effect actually fades out in areas with higher burglary levels. Interestingly, this is the opposite of what would be expected with regression-to-the-mean.

Figure 2 focuses on burglary prevalence in the after-survey only, to illustrate these findings from the statistical model. It compares, for each of the sets of surveyed EDs, what was actually observed in the after-survey with our best estimate from the model of what we would have expected to have found in the same areas, had the Safer Cities action not been implemented, but all else had remained the same. From left to right, the EDs in the comparison cities and the Safer Cities with no burglary action both show the observed prevalence close to the expected. However, all three sets of EDs with Safer Cities burglary action show the observed prevalence in the after-survey to be markedly less than
Figure 2: Domestic burglary prevalence after implementation: expected and observed (survey)

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expected. The step effect is visible as the common drop, in the three action sets, from observed to expected.

On the face of it, this evidence for Safer Cities impact is extremely welcome. However, before we can convincingly attribute the reductions in burglary risk to the Safer Cities action, we have to examine the part played by other Safer Cities action not targeted on burglary; and action outside the Safer Cities programme which may also have influenced crime.

The role of other Safer Cities action

Obviously, burglary was not the only target of Safer Cities action. Schemes were implemented to tackle other problems such as vandalism and disorder, or to reduce the propensity to offend. The presence of this 'other Safer Cities action' could well have affected burglary risks in the surveyed areas. There was a strong tendency for burglary schemes to be located in areas which also had other action. It was therefore important to investigate whether the impact of the former was gaining strength from the latter. If this were so, our
estimates of the effectiveness of action targeted on burglary would be over-generous. Our original statistical model already included the 'other action' score, but this appeared, strangely, to be associated with an increase in risk. We therefore extended it to explore how burglary risk differed between EDs with, and without, other Safer Cities action. We compared three types of ED: those with burglary action alone (25 EDs); other Safer Cities action alone (96 EDs); and burglary plus other action together (92 EDs). Dividing the areas into these subsets considerably reduced the reliability of the findings, but the more robust ones are worth reporting for diagnostic purposes.

The impact of burglary action on burglary itself seems to depend on the presence of other action in the same area. The kind of burglary action implemented in the Safer Cities might not work by itself, even though the amount of action in the 'burglary action alone' areas was in fact quite high. The step effect of burglary action in particular seemed to disappear when there was no other action. (This may help explain why the step effect existed at all – after all, it is puzzling that the mere presence of burglary action in an ED substantially reduced risk even when the intensity of action was very small. (Low burglary action EDs, whilst receiving an average of only 11p of burglary action per household, were also receiving some £ 5.30 input of other action.)

The marginal effect of burglary action seemed more robust when accompanied by other action. There was some evidence of 'inward' crime switch: the presence of other action alone in an area appeared to increase the risk of burglary by possibly causing offenders to switch from other crimes to burgling homes. As a corollary to the last point, there may be a kind of 'protective' effect of burglary action: in areas where other action is accompanied by burglary action, there is no evidence of crime switch to burglary. Indeed, there may be a synergy – perhaps one that is necessary for the burglary action to work at all.

The role of action outside the Safer Cities programme

The Safer Cities programme did not exist in isolation. Urban areas with multiple problems received a great deal of remedial action – social, economic and architectural. Some of this other action is likely to have influenced burglary risks and its effects could, therefore, be confused with those of Safer Cities schemes targeted on burglary. If there was any tendency for Safer Cities coordinators to direct their schemes towards areas in receipt of extraneous action, then this could have boosted the measured impact of the Safer Cities schemes as a whole. Unfortunately, we could not measure such other action directly (it would have been a further major undertaking), so it cannot be ruled out as a factor in the results. But overall, our interviews with coordinators revealed they had no consistent tendency to site, or to avoid siting, schemes where extraneous action was present (Sutton, 1996). The coordinators had
to respond to a variety of policy considerations, and experienced a variety of constraints in deciding where to locate action.

Having eliminated a number of alternative explanations for the apparent Safer Cities effect, we can now estimate its size.

Size of reduction in risk

From the statistical model of burglary risk, we were able to produce numerical estimates of the overall and marginal impact of action. It is important to remember that the estimates relate to the impact of action on all households in an area – it is impossible from our data to estimate the impact of a certain sum spent on individual households. It should also be borne in mind that these are generalized estimates of impact in the kinds of areas we sampled. Unlike the reductions in risk in figure 2, they are not specific to the composition of areas and individuals in our sample. (For the moment they apply to all burglary schemes irrespective of whether these are accompanied by other action.)

At the burglary prevalence of 10% (average in our survey, but relatively high nationally), the best estimate of the step effect of action is that it reduced burglary risks by 29%. In other words, the mere presence of Safer Cities action against burglary seemed to reduce the risk of burglary by over a quarter. On the marginal impact, given the presence of action, for every additional pound of action per household the risk of burglary fell by a further 0.1%. Step and marginal effects combined showed an overall reduction of almost 30%.

Table 1 shows how these reductions vary with the prior burglary risk. We can see the fairly modest increase in the step effect with prior burglary risk, and the decrease in the marginal effect. At a prevalence rate of a little over 20%, the marginal effect drops out altogether, and in fact thereafter is linked to a rise in risk, which is difficult to interpret. However, as said, there were indications that this fade-out was confined to circumstances where burglary action was implemented alone, in the absence of other Safer Cities action. The impact on risk in the majority of burglary action covered by the survey, which was accompanied by other Safer Cities action, is indicated by the numbers in brackets in table 1. The step effect is rather less; the marginal effect is rather more, and it continues to exist at very high levels of risk. However, these estimates are less reliable.

Geographic displacement

If Safer Cities burglary action was doing no more than move some of the crime to neighbouring areas then, obviously, the cost-effectiveness picture would appear less favourable. We therefore took a close look at geographic displace-
Table 1: Reductions in burglary prevalence risk associated with Safer Cities action against burglary (survey results), in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>prior burglary prevalence</th>
<th>reduction in risk</th>
<th>step effect</th>
<th>marginal effect</th>
<th>overall effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>step effect</td>
<td></td>
<td>marginal effect</td>
<td>overall effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>27 (17)</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>30 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>27 (17)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>30 (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>29 (16)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>31 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>31 (15)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>32 (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>32 (14)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>32 (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>32 (13)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>33 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>33 (12)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>33 (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>34 (11)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>33 (16)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The action input comprises both Safer Cities and levered funds.
2. The reductions are estimated relative to the expected risk in the after-survey, in the absence of Safer Cities action (not proportional falls from the prior burglary risk).
3. 'Step effect': the reduction in risk associated simply with the presence of Safer Cities action in the relevant ED in the year of the after-survey. (It should be noted that while the step effect of the burglary plus other action decreases, this does not imply an increase in the step effect of burglary action alone. Rather, under these conditions some of the strength of the step effect has been transferred to the corresponding marginal effect.)
4. 'Marginal effect': the further reduction in risk for an extra £1 of action per household, beyond the average (£16), spent in the ED at the time of original implementation.
5. 'Overall effect': the reduction in risk associated with the presence of Safer Cities burglary action in an ED, at the average intensity of £16 per household over the year preceding the after-survey.
6. This column: all burglary action.
7. Column in brackets: from EDs where burglary action is accompanied by other Safer Cities action (less reliable).
8. The 3% burglary prevalence risk is the national average from the British Crime Survey.
9. The 10% risk is the average for the present survey.
in the 28 EDs with action in the bull's-eye and extra action in the immediately adjacent ring and an additional outer one, the overall reduction in risk is in the 60-70 percent range. Burglary action in the bull's-eye seems to deflect displaced burglars elsewhere.

When there is no action in the bull's-eye, the direction of the effect of extra adjacent action depends on its intensity. With low amounts of adjacent action, there is an overall increase in risk in the bull's-eye (for example, an almost 70 percent increase in risk with £1 extra action intensity in the rings). Burglary is therefore displaced into the bull's-eye. With high amounts of adjacent action, by contrast, the marginal effect prevails and there is an overall decrease in risk in the bull's-eye (for example, a decrease in risk of nearly 80 percent). In these circumstances, the more intense action may have driven offenders further off, caused them to switch to other targets, or forced them to give up altogether. This latter case may therefore be diffusion of benefit, although to be certain, we would have needed to measure burglary risk over a wider area. (Our survey design confined us to measuring outcome in the bull's-eye only.)

Did some types of action work better?

Basically, the answer here is no, since there were too few distinct differences in the types of action that schemes took. Nearly all schemes took some target-hardening action, and where it appeared a scheme's main focus was something else (e.g., fostering Neighbourhood Watch, or general anti-burglary publicity), target hardening was often implemented through other schemes in the same area. Moreover, coordinators indicated that they tended to implement 'other' action in areas which had already had target hardening installed by agencies outside the Safer Cities Programme. There appeared, however, to be a syndrome whereby 'target hardening, plus other action' had a particularly strong effect per pound of input. This was consistent with Tilley and Webb's (1994) finding (based on case studies of 12 Safer Cities burglary schemes) that comprehensive approaches to target hardening seemed especially beneficial.

The recorded crime statistics

As with the survey, we identified local Safer Cities schemes targeted on residential burglary which were in the right time and place to link up with our outcome measures. We succeeded in covering 240 schemes out of the total of 300 current or completed by summer 1992. Almost half of the beats (325 out of 701) had burglary action at some point. These units of place we call 'action beats'. We calculated the burglary action score as the average input of Safer Cities funds per household in the relevant
beat and over the year in question. While the scores in the survey had a once-only value (i.e., for 1992, the year of the after-survey), the scores for the recorded crime analysis were calculated separately for each beat-year in which there was action. These we call 'action beat-years'. They are units of both time and place. Altogether out of 3,277 beat-years for which we had recorded crime data, 734 had some action, mostly after 1989. The average action intensity in each of these action beat-years was just over £ 3.50 per household, combining Safer Cities and levered money.

For purposes of presentation, we divided the beats into sets on the basis of the total action present in this final year. There were 375 beats which never had action; 266 which ended up in 1992 with under £ 5-worth of action (average just under 50p); 26 with action between £ 5-£ 13 (average nearly £ 8); and 33 with action over £ 13 (average £ 34). Figure 3 shows, for these sets of low-, medium- and high-action beats, the time course of action over the years 1987-1992. The action in each set starts to appear between 1989-1990, and reaches highest cumulative levels in 1992.
Did the recorded crime data show a Safer Cities effect?

The recorded crime data were adjusted by population to produce burglary incidence rates for each beat-year. Figure 4 shows the average incidence rates for the low, middle and high sets of action beats, as they changed over time. It also presents the same burglary trends for two other series: the 375 beats with no burglary action, and the global comparison indicator, a weighted aggregate of the nine matched comparison cities.

Several things are apparent from figure 4. First, there is a trough in each series at about 1989 or 1990, corresponding to a trough in national crime rates at that time. Second, as with the survey, the middle- and high-action sets start off with markedly higher risks of burglary. Third, while all other series continue to rise through to 1992, the high-action set alone shows a return to a falling trend.

These patterns show some prima facie evidence of a Safer Cities effect, but this is confined to the high-action set. There is, moreover, a possibility that the final fall is no more than a resumption of the earlier fall.
Explaining variation in burglary incidence risks between beat-years
The statistical modelling sought to take account of several features of the crime data which could have masked, or mimicked, a Safer Cities effect. These include the high burglary risk in the early years in the middle- and high-action beats, and their steeper decline, from 1987, before Safer Cities action was implemented. Results from modelling confirm the indication in figure 4 of a possible Safer Cities effect.

*Net of all the other explanatory factors included in the analysis, Safer Cities action in a beat, in a given year, was associated with a reduction in risk.* Again, the mere presence of action in a particular beat-year, and the intensity of that action, showed independently measurable reductions in risk.

Figure 5 presents the differences between observed and expected burglary risk, as a proportion of the expected risk level. Up to 1990, this figure remains close to zero and fairly flat for each beat set, indicating that the beats with action were displaying trends that were expected on the basis of all the extraneous...
factors taken into account in the model. In 1991, however, all three sets show marked dips (ranging from 10-20 percent below expected). The only ones to continue below expected in 1992, though, are the medium- (4 percent below expected) and high-action beats (30 percent below, continuing on down). This suggests (but does not prove) that the effects of action of lesser intensity in a beat may be rather more short-lived.

The role of other Safer Cities action

It was hard to disentangle the effects of other Safer Cities action from those of burglary action, because over 90 percent of beat-years with burglary action also had other action present. We did, though, confirm the survey finding that where other action was present but burglary action was absent, there seemed to be an increase in risk of burglary, albeit statistically not very robust. This suggested (like the survey) that the other action may have led to a crime switch into burglary, fended off by the presence of burglary action.

Size of reduction in risk

Table 2 presents the estimated reductions in burglary incidence risk associated with the presence, and intensity, of Safer Cities action. Again, we are dealing with step effects (from the mere presence of Safer Cities action in a particular beat, in a particular year), marginal effects (from an extra £ 1-worth of action invested) and overall effects. The recorded incidence risks in this table are approximately equivalent to the prevalence risks in table 1 (for example a recorded incidence risk of 10 percent is equivalent to a 'real' incidence risk of 15 percent due to under-reporting of crime. But since we found an average 1.5 incidents per victimized household, a 'real' incidence risk of 15 percent is equivalent to a 'real' prevalence risk of 10 percent, in the survey.) At a 10 percent incidence level of risk (equivalent to the average prevalence risk in the survey) the mere presence of Safer Cities burglary action seemed to reduce the risk of burglary by about 7 percent. On the marginal impact, given the presence of action at the average intensity (£ 3.57), for an additional £ 1 of action the risk of burglary fell by a further 0.8 percent. Step and marginal effects combined showed an overall reduction of some 10 percent at the average action intensity.

These estimates differ from the main figures from the survey in table 1. However, the recorded crime estimates in table 2 were based on action beats in virtually all of which, the burglary action was accompanied by other action. The differences are rather less if we compare like with like, and use the estimates in brackets in table 1 – from only those surveyed areas in which burglary action was accompanied by other action. Reasons for differences that
Table 2: Reductions in burglary incidence risk associated with Safer Cities action (recorded crime results), in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>baseline burglary incidence</th>
<th>reduction in risk^2</th>
<th>step effect^3</th>
<th>marginal effect^4</th>
<th>overall effect^5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10^7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The baseline incidence rates in these example calculations have been chosen as equivalent to the corresponding prevalence rates for the survey results in table 1. (For every victim in the current survey there are an average 1.5 incidents; for every surveyed incident there are an average 0.66 recorded incidents, from the 1992 British Crime Survey.) The action input comprises both Safer Cities and levered funds.

2 The reductions are estimated relative to the expected risk on a given beat-year, in the absence of Safer Cities action.

3 'Step effect': the reduction in risk associated simply with the presence of Safer Cities action in the relevant beat in the relevant year.

4 'Marginal effect': the further reduction in risk for an extra £ 1 of action per household, beyond the average (£ 3.57), spent in an area at the time of original implementation.

5 'Overall effect': the reduction in risk associated with the presence of Safer Cities burglary action in an area, at the average value of £ 3.57 per household over the year.

6 The 3% burglary risk is equivalent to the national average from the British Crime Survey.

7 The 10% risk is equivalent to the average risk for the present survey.

remain are discussed in the full report (Ekblom et al., 1996), but the most obvious is that the larger area of the police beats than the survey EDs considerably reduced the average intensity of action in the former. It is thus not surprising that the step effect was somewhat smaller with the recorded crime. (Since this difference in average intensity is taken account of in the costing – below – the cost estimates from the two sources come considerably closer.)

Sort of money to prevent a burglary

We converted the figures in Table 2 into estimates of the average amount that one would need to spend, on local action of the kind and quality implemented in Safer Cities, to prevent one burglary incident. (We costed for a 'real' incident – not a 'recorded' incident, which would have cost about 1.5 times more to prevent.) There are two types of cost estimate that are of interest to decision
makers concerned with implementation of cost-effective preventive action. Overall cost is the cost of preventing one burglary, taking all the Safer Cities effects into account – both the presence of action and the amount of action. This figure informs the decision ‘Is this preventive action worth implementing at all?’ Marginal cost is of interest when the first decision has already been taken. It is the cost of preventing one more burglary through extra action. This figure informs the decision ‘Given that we have already decided to set up some preventive action, how much should we implement in the target area?’ All other things being equal, marginal costs are likely to be greater than overall costs, because they ignore the effects of the mere presence of action. Both Safer Cities scheme expenditure and leverage are included in our cost estimates. Local and central administrative costs over the lifetime of the programme were also taken into account (adding 50p overhead to every £ 1 spent on scheme funding). Finally, we assumed that any effect of Safer Cities action would endure for two years.

**Overall costs**
It was not straightforward to calculate the cost estimates from the values obtained in the statistical model and our other cost figures just described. In particular, the ‘mere presence’ of action (the step) had no cost dimension. To produce a sensible answer, we costed this at the average input intensity of £ 3.57. Since there was some evidence that the step effect gained strength from the presence of other Safer Cities action, it is reasonable to add the average amount of other action – namely £ 7.73. (The other action, may, of course, reduce other types of crime risk – but this cannot be estimated.) In total, the average input associated with the presence of Safer Cities burglary action plus other supporting action was taken to be £ 11.30, including levered funds.

**Marginal costs**
The marginal cost is, as said, how much more money needed to be invested in an area, at the time the action was originally implemented, to prevent one more burglary. The marginal cost of preventing one extra burglary was estimated in a similar way to the overall cost, with one additional step. This involved comparing the estimated overall effect on risk of £ 3.57-worth of burglary action (the average intensity) and £ 4.57-worth (the input of other action is taken into account by multiplying the burglary-action-only cost figure by average inputs of [burglary + other] / burglary). The following estimates of overall and marginal cost from the recorded crime analysis have wide margins of error (from statistical uncertainty and from assumptions we had to make in calculation). Equivalent cost estimates from
the survey (for areas with burglary plus other action only) are in brackets. They are remarkably close.
Where risks are very high – where there are 20 recorded burglary incidents per hundred households in a year – the Safer Cities cost of preventing one ('real') burglary is estimated to be about £ 360 (£ 200) overall, and £ 1,300 (£ 900) at the margin.
Where risks are high – in an area where there are 10 recorded burglary incidents per hundred households in a year – the cost of preventing one burglary is estimated to be about £ 550 (£ 400) overall, and a little over £ 2,000 (£ 1,500) at the margin.
For those in areas with a risk of 3 recorded incidents per hundred households in a year – equivalent to the nationally average prevalence risk from the British Crime Survey, of 3% – the cost of preventing a burglary is estimated at a little over £ 1,400 (£ 1,400) overall, and about £ 4,700 (£ 4,800) at the margin.
The figures for both overall and marginal costs show that when burglaries are common, it needs less expenditure in an area to prevent them than when burglaries are rare. This is consistent with common sense. A risk reduction of a fifth in an area suffering from a risk rate of six percent prevents twice as many burglaries for the money, as the same one fifth reduction in an area with a risk rate of only three percent. This underlines the importance of targeting, which the Safer Cities coordinators found difficult for various practical and policy reasons (Sutton, 1996).

Were the Safer Cities burglary schemes value for money?
To assess this requires estimates of what it cost, under various conditions, to prevent a burglary through Safer Cities action, to be set against the costs of burglary itself, to victims and the State. This comparison cannot be made with perfect rigour, even though our methods have taken us much further than other programme evaluations in assessing whether the preventive action was good value for money. For one thing, there are the inevitably complex problems discussed above in assessing the costs of preventing a burglary in Safer Cities action areas, and of knowing for certain whether the reduction in risk observed was entirely due to Safer Cities.
There is also the uncertainty of knowing how much crime in the action areas was displaced elsewhere. If one allows, conservatively, for the possibility of some displacement, then cost estimates would obviously be higher than we have given, because some of the apparent reduction in risk is shifted elsewhere into higher risks for others. By the same token, if diffusion of benefit extended the effects of higher-intensity burglary schemes beyond their intended (and funded) boundaries, then our cost estimates would be too high. Evidence for
both displacement and possible diffusion was found under different conditions in the survey analysis (it was not possible to do this for the recorded crime in the time available), and the conclusion there was that the most sensible position to adopt for costing was a neutral one.

1992 British Crime Survey figures indicate that burglaries with entry, on average, cost victims living in 'Inner City' areas (the nearest equivalent to where the Safer City action was targeted) about £800 gross. About half of this, on average, is recouped through insurance — though this does not take away the cost, but merely redistributes it, socially, in terms of the cost of insurance premiums.

A current Home Office estimate of the cost of a residential burglary to the criminal justice system — for the police, courts and prisons, etcetera — is about £300. (This is for a 'real' burglary, not a 'recorded' one.) The total financial cost of a burglary to victim and state is therefore £1,100.

In areas of high burglary risk (10 recorded incidents per 100 households), our estimate of the overall costs of preventing a burglary amounts to £550, with levered-in funds and administrative costs taken into account. The marginal cost is about £2,000. From the recorded crime analysis, typical Safer Cities burglary action would easily pay its way in overall terms, and is not far short in marginal terms. Only in areas of national average risk (3 recorded incidents per 100 households in a year) does the overall cost of prevention (£1,400) exceed the direct costs of burglary. (The marginal cost, at £4,700, is considerably greater.)

Very similar cost estimates emerged from the survey (although the marginal costs were much higher, if we included the minority of burglary schemes that were implemented without the 'boost' from other Safer Cities action). It is sometimes claimed that the introduction of a crime prevention scheme raises the proportion of crimes in an area that are reported to the police. This would mask the impact of the action on recorded crime. We found, among our surveyed burglary victims, an above-average increase in reporting in the low-action EDs but a fall in the high action EDs. This fall was based on a small sample of victims (only 81 interviews produced victims in the high-action EDs). But if it was more widely representative, it could have caused the recorded crime analysis to overestimate the size of impact.

The main report explores reasons for remaining differences and concludes in favour of the estimates from recorded crime, whilst acknowledging that the marginal cost may be somewhat higher. In particular, while there were no consistent changes in reporting burglary to the police across all burglary action areas, the areas with the highest action showed a decline in reporting. On the other hand, because the survey covered deprived areas it had a rather low response rate (60%), which may have introduced bias. Given the greater size of the police beats, it is likely that the recorded crime estimates will have automati-
cally taken account of a proportion of any displacement or diffusion of benefit that occurred. This is because some of these unintended consequences will have been contained within the beat boundary. But accounting for displacement is by no means complete.

We did not assess 'crime switch' from burglary to other offences. (This has not yet been explored. There was some evidence of crime switch to burglary when Safer Cities action not targeted on burglary was implemented in the absence of burglary action.) Taking a conservative view, we should continue to regard the current cost estimates as gross local estimates – i.e., applying to the gains in the action areas only. However, we should also take note of the indication that diffusion of benefit may have outweighed displacement in areas with more intense burglary action.

This means that we can conclude, moderately confidently, that on the financial balance sheet, the Safer Cities action against residential burglary was cost-effective, when targeted on areas above the national average burglary risk. Taking account of any non-financial benefits of action, such as the avoidance of misery, upset and worry suffered by burglary victims and fellow residents, would make for an even more favourable picture. Some of these are explored next.

**Impact on crime prevention behaviour and worry about burglary**

The survey enabled us to look for evidence of the impact of Safer Cities burglary schemes on membership of Neighbourhood Watch, domestic security levels, people's worry about burglary and their perceptions of the local area.

**Neighbourhood Watch**

Only one scheme covered by the survey explicitly set out to establish Neighbourhood Watch (through the employment of a community worker), although nine others also employed 'outreach workers' or sought to raise the profile of community safety through publicity. However, according to our interviews, membership of Neighbourhood Watch went up by over 70 percent in high-action areas, compared to under 7 percent in no-action areas, and 5 percent in the comparison cities. Could the increased Neighbourhood Watch membership in the high-action areas actually have contributed to the Safer Cities effect? Statistical analysis found no difference in the reduction in burglary risk, between high-action areas with (what appeared to be) old Neighbourhood Watch schemes, new schemes and those without any at all. However, low- and middle-action areas only showed a reduction in risk when Neighbourhood Watch was present. Neighbourhood Watch may therefore have been a
necessary ingredient for lesser amounts of Safer Cities burglary action to work, while more intense action seemed to function adequately alone. This may help explain the rather puzzling impact of the mere presence of Safer Cities action, and is consistent with the better performance of 'target hardening plus' burglary action, and 'burglary action plus' action against other crime problems. (Alternatively, the presence of Neighbourhood Watch may have made no contribution in itself, but merely indicated greater social cohesion in an area capable of founding a Watch scheme. The cohesion may have been the necessary ingredient.)

The overall effect of Neighbourhood Watch (with or without Safer Cities burglary schemes present in the area) seemed to be associated with an increase in risk. But it did appear that the presence of tangible Safer Cities burglary action was necessary for Neighbourhood Watch to work. (However, we did not set out to conduct a full and fair test on the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Watch, it must be said.)

Comparison with the Kirkholt burglary prevention project is instructive here (Forrester et al., 1988, 1990). This demonstrated that a combination of Neighbourhood Watch and target hardening worked well.

Domestic security

People were also asked, in the after-survey only, about a range of crime prevention measures they had taken in their home over the previous two years, or which their landlords had taken for them. We focused on the kinds of measures implemented within the Safer Cities schemes in the surveyed areas - mostly door locks, bolts, chains and viewers, and window locks. In some cases, the Safer Cities scheme had been directly involved in supplying and fitting the equipment; in others, there was more 'promotional' activity in publicizing available devices. From the survey data, we calculated a score representing the number of such measures installed.

The average number of domestic security measures installed proved to be greater in the high-action areas, relative to the low- and middle-action areas. There were, though, some complications - for example, there was a greater increase in the numbers installed in the comparison cities.

Perceptions of local area

Safer Cities was also intended to improve general community life. Although burglary is only one kind of crime - and 'incivilities' such as litter and vandalism have been shown to be more closely associated with people's feelings about their area - the results are interesting. People were asked to say whether the
area within 10 minutes' walk of their home was a good or a bad place to live. There were increases in the proportion perceiving their locality as bad in every type of area surveyed, including the comparison cities, except the areas receiving high levels of burglary action, which showed a 13 percent decrease. There appears to be a threshold below which action fails to make people feel happier about their surroundings. Below that threshold, it may serve only to draw attention to an area's problems.

Worry about burglary

Reducing fear of crime was the second Safer Cities objective. Worry about burglary fell more in the comparison cities. Those in areas selected for action were significantly more worried about burglary initially, and this is not surprising. But the more action was taken the significantly more worried householders were in the after-surveys. Why did this occur? One explanation is that coordinators had targeted areas where fear was rising. Another is that action itself awakened fear by focusing attention on the burglary problem. There is an important difference, though, between those people in scheme areas who were aware of action, and those who were not. Awareness of action was uniformly low – and this is true of any kind of preventive action, implemented by any agency, anywhere in the city or borough (it was difficult for people to distinguish Safer Cities from any other action). Only in Safer Cities EDs which received high action, was there an increase in the proportion of people saying they were aware of action (from 17% to 25%).

We looked at whether there was a 'Safer Cities effect' on worry separately for those who were and were not aware of preventive action, as broadly defined. This showed that generally people who were aware of any action experienced reduced worry. Further, the more Safer Cities action was taken, the less they were worried. The one exception to this was the people in the low-action EDs: they showed a nearly 10 percent rise in worry, even if they were aware of action. This picture is broadly confirmed by more detailed statistical analysis which sought to explain variation in people's worry, taking account of some additional extraneous factors such as respondents' gender, and whether they lived alone, or had been burgled.

There are difficulties in establishing a firm link between people's general awareness of crime prevention action, and their awareness of Safer Cities action in particular. Nevertheless, it is helpful to try to establish a coherent view from our results, even if a fairly speculative one. First, it seems that unless action is particularly intensive, or of a public nature such as Neighbourhood Watch, people remain unaware of what is being done, even if it is in their immediate locality. The only increase in awareness (just
over 50 percent) was in the small areas receiving high action. This seems to have limited the impact of Safer Cities schemes generally on worry about burglary.

Second, where people are aware of action, that action will only have a measurably beneficial effect on worry if it is substantial either in terms of the numbers of households targeted, or the amount of action per household, or both. This action may serve to reduce worry either indirectly, by reducing 'real' burglary risk, or directly (and subjectively), by convincing people that something substantial is being done to tackle their local burglary problem. Weak action (or action implemented in only a few households in the neighbourhood) may serve only to draw attention to burglary without reassuring those few householders who are aware of it, that something is being done for them. This may be so even though (as our earlier analysis showed) it is the presence of action as much as the amount which reduces objective burglary risk.

**What produced the Safer Cities effect on burglary?**

Among the findings we have so far reported are the following.

1. There was only limited awareness of the Safer Cities Programme and local preventive action among those exposed to it.
2. There was only a modest tendency for households within the Safer Cities action areas to report having more home security measures installed during the main phase of Safer Cities activity.
3. Both main analyses of Safer Cities' impact on burglary – survey and recorded crime – suggested that the presence of action was as important in reducing risk as the intensity of action, if not more so.
4. 'Mixed' action against burglary seemed to perform better than target hardening alone.
5. Other Safer Cities action (not targeted on burglary) seemed to have an important role in shoring up the burglary effect.
6. There was an increase in Neighbourhood Watch membership in high-action areas in the survey, although it was only low levels of action that seemed to need the extra presence of Neighbourhood Watch for the action to work. And Neighbourhood Watch itself appeared to work only in the presence of tangible Safer Cities action.
7. Geographic displacement seemed to have occurred from action areas to adjacent zones, but also, possibly, diffusion of benefit when action was high-intensity. Burglary action in an area seemed to protect against geographic displacement from other schemes in adjacent areas, deflecting it elsewhere perhaps; and against crime switch into burglary from schemes in the same area but targeted on different offences.
There is an apparent paradox between the tangible impact of Safer Cities action on burglary, and people's lack of awareness of that action, and only weak evidence of increased domestic target hardening. How, then, did the Safer Cities schemes have their impact on burglary? This evaluation was not designed to explore the causal mechanisms by which action may have led to outcome (Pawson and Tilley, 1994; Ekblom and Pease, 1995). A detailed study of individual schemes would have been a more appropriate strategy. But it is important to impose some sense on the results, although not all of the above observations are underpinned by rock-solid evidence. A number of possibilities emerge, which relate to measurement issues and mechanisms themselves. The measurement issues (such as the difficulty of getting accurate reports from survey respondents) are left aside here.

Preventive action against burglary may operate at two levels – individual and area – and in two ways – heightening objective effort and risk to burglars, and heightening subjective perceptions of effort and risk. With the protection of individual homes, the Safer Cities action could have physically blocked the offence, or made burglary seem more risky and less rewarding. At the area level, offenders may perceive that security has been enhanced in a particular neighbourhood, and avoid the whole area. Whether the area is objectively more risky for them (bristling with active Neighbourhood Watchers scanning across improved sight-lines, perhaps), or whether the risk is only subjectively perceived (the mere knowledge that something has been done to tackle burglary in an area) may not matter. Individual householders need not be aware of the presence of action in their neighbourhood, nor even of security measures installed in their homes for the action to have its impact through subjective enhancement of risks to offenders.

To the question 'If householders seem not to be aware of preventive action, why should burglars be?' it may be that burglars are more sensitive to changes in security measures than ordinary, honest residents. One recent study has, in fact, demonstrated that burglars were markedly better than non-burglars at recognizing security changes, such as fitting of new locks, to photographed houses (Wright et al., 1995).

Many of the findings from both survey and recorded crime seem to point to the operation of area processes. The fact that the mere presence of burglary action reduces burglary risk, suggests this. Other supporting evidence – ironically – comes from displacement to adjacent areas, and the 'protective' effects of existing burglary action in an area (against both displacement and crime switch into burglary). Any diffusion of benefit in particular would imply that offenders are being guided by illusory risks beyond the boundaries of objective action, when that action is of sufficiently high intensity. The better performance of mixed methods rather than 'pure' target hardening, and the importance of support
from 'other' Safer Cities action (and Neighbourhood Watch in lower-action areas) suggest more broadly that specific security improvements on specific homes may not always be enough to achieve reductions in risk (a finding consistent with the experience of the Kirkholt project – Forrester et al., 1988 and 1990).

An overview

The fairly 'typical' Safer Cities burglary prevention schemes evaluated here seemed to reduce the risk of burglary. The mere presence of action was as significant as the intensity of action – perhaps more so. The overall cost per burglary prevented – albeit estimated with a fairly wide latitude of uncertainty – was under most conditions rather less than the direct financial costs of that burglary to the household and the criminal justice system. With some reservations (notably from the survey results) the marginal cost, of preventing one more burglary by investing more funds at the inception of a scheme, was also less than the cost of the burglary itself when burglary was common. Overall, the cost of preventing a burglary diminished in areas where burglary was more common (although reducing the risk of burglary seemed in some cases to become more difficult). The ability of coordinators to select the highest-crime area seems constrained by lack of routinely available and easily retrievable local crime data and other information. The possibilities offered by geographic information systems should be pursued. There was some evidence for displacement, but intense action may possibly have led to diffusion of benefit. Less tangible gains in high-action areas, in any event, may include reduced worry, and increased confidence which may be reflected in wider social and economic benefits in the area. It needs to be said, here, that the findings on worry were not straightforward. It is quite usual for crime prevention evaluations to report little impact on crime but, as a 'consolation prize', that worry or fear went down. Paradoxically, this study found the reverse – tangible effects on crime, but little consistent impact on worry or on perceptions of improvement in the neighbourhood. The key to this seemed to be the overall lack of awareness of action except where this was most intensive. Future interventions should make sure that householders are aware that action is being taken. Such a message might have an additional effect in deterring offenders. (Tilley and Webb (1994) also emphasised the importance of publicity in these respects.) It goes without saying, though, that the protection delivered needs to be credible to both householders and to burglars. Among the minority of householders that were aware of action, low levels of action seemed actually to raise worry. Political constraints may also be important here. Coordinators and their steering committees were often concerned with issues of inequity ("Why should one
house, or one area, get preventive action, and not another?’). Publicity could exacerbate this. Under such circumstances, it is important to establish a clear and defensible policy, in consultation with those residents with a stake in security. (One example is the policy of targeting repeat victims (Farrell, 1995).) They could stress benefits to the whole area from action on individual homes or streets (as the ‘step’ effect of Safer Cities action suggests). However, monitoring against the possibility of displacement should also be offered as part of the package.

The evaluation broke new ground in linking ‘micro’ analysis of small areas, and the action they received, to the ‘macro’ scale of cities and to the overall performance of a major programme of prevention. Two very different sources of outcome measures – surveys and recorded crime statistics – produced answers which were in most cases remarkably similar, although some loose ends and uncertainties in the evaluation inevitably remain. (If such local data was available to a common standard this would also greatly facilitate both local and national evaluations of crime prevention initiatives.) Our attempts to estimate cost-effectiveness were also pioneering – and may well be open to debate. Having estimated costs of prevention through Safer Cities action, we still lack evidence of the cost-effectiveness of other ways of investing our resources for crime control – whether by other arrangements for implementing local preventive action, or wider alternatives such as police patrolling. Quantitative evaluation of these alternatives should be developed.

Burglary was, as explained at the beginning, the ‘best bet’. We have yet to see whether action targeted on other kinds of crime has the same measurable impact. But phase 1 of the Safer Cities Programme seems to have achieved an impact on burglary through interventions by local agencies with relatively limited experience of practical crime prevention, in the absence of particularly efficient targeting, and perhaps without full exploitation of deterrence through offenders’ awareness of action. Given this, the potential for further gains in phase 2 of the Safer Cities Programme is considerable. In a context where few large-scale interventions against social problems seem to have much measurable effect, this is good news.

The lessons for practice and policy

Our recommendations are brought together as they apply to several key decisions. These decisions are relevant to both central policy and local practice. Where relevant, we have also drawn on the conclusions of our implementation study (Sutton, 1996).
The decision

Action against burglary of the type taken in Safer Cities phase 1 seems worth implementing, in cost-effectiveness terms. We found some evidence of geographical displacement, but also (weaker) signs of the opposite effect – diffusion of benefit causing offenders to avoid wider areas than strictly necessary, when action was intense. We nonetheless lack evidence of the cost-effectiveness of other ways of arranging for local preventive action, or wider alternatives such as police patrolling. Quantitative evaluation of these alternatives should be developed.

Where to target action

Targeting very local high-crime areas, other things being equal, promises the best returns on investment in preventive action; however, this does not necessarily mean that it will be markedly easier to accomplish a given reduction in burglary risk. Any targeting policies adopted, however, must be comprehensible and justifiable to the local community. Clarification of such policies is needed.

The ability of coordinators to select the highest-crime area seems constrained by lack of routinely available and easily retrievable local crime data and other information. The possibilities offered by geographic information systems should be pursued. If such local data was available to a common standard this would also greatly facilitate both local and national evaluations of crime prevention initiatives.

How much action

With some reservations, the more intense the action in an area, the greater the reduction in risk – so deciding to spend more rather than less is justified. However, the reduction at the margin may diminish if the intended area of action has higher risk of burglary and burglary action is introduced alone. Against this, the more intense the action, the greater may be the gains from diffusion of benefit.

Moreover, there appeared to be a certain threshold of action, beneath which there was little measurable impact on people's perceptions of their area, their awareness of preventive action, or their worry about burglary. A tendency to avoid spending more on action in the highest-crime localities should be explored further as it raises the question of effectiveness and other policy issues.
**What sort of action**

Safer Cities action on burglary in a locality appeared to have the strongest effect, pound for pound, where target hardening was combined with other measures, and where action on burglary was itself combined with wider preventive action. (There were some doubts about whether burglary action alone had much effect at all.) The idea of synergistic, concerted action rather than isolated single-track schemes makes intuitive sense.

More generally, local area processes seem important to exploit, in addition to action targeted simply on a home-by-home basis. Bringing schemes together, or into adjacent areas, seems better at deflecting burglary elsewhere, if not preventing it completely.

More could be done to publicize action, thereby both reassuring householders and more deliberately sending a deterrent message to offenders. The action actually taken of course would need to be of an appropriate kind and intensity. The publicity would need to be sensitively handled to avoid raising unrealistic expectations, or awakening feelings of inequity of treatment.

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Criminal expertise and offender decision making: an experimental study of the target selection process in residential burglary

Belgian security policy prior to and after November 24, 1991

Kris Van Limbergen¹

In this article my aim is to present a brief overall review of some developments which have been responsible for important changes in the security landscape in Belgium over the last few years. November 24, 1991, a date often cited in this context, was that of the penultimate parliamentary election. It has become a significant date because it was then that some extremist and nihilist (political) views also had their breakthrough in the Brussels Capital Region. In hindsight commentators considered this to be the date when the existing yet imperceivable gap between citizen and politics became perceptible. The element most commonly referred to as the major contributing factor to the creation of this gap was the feeling of insecurity experienced by the public coupled with the unwillingness, and to an even greater extent, the incompetence of the government to combat the sense of insecurity efficiently.

After this political earthquake Belgium would never be the same again. Nevertheless the process that was to introduce a different security policy had already been initiated several years before. At least two other important factors can be found to support this. As a matter of course, after the State Reform in 1988, the Ministry of the Interior became the department responsible for security matters and the most important judicial reforms concerning police and security services were already in force at that time, but possibly not yet very evident in daily life.

However on November 24, 1991 a political fact that could not be disregarded presented itself. The formation of the government took more than a hundred days but it initiated a powerful security policy. The so-called security and prevention contracts, which form an important part of this plan, today inject extra means worth 60 million for the financing of crime prevention and policing in sixty cities with the greatest security needs. In our neighbouring countries this explosion of means in times of shortage is looked at with great jealousy.

¹ Head of the Permanent Secretariat for Prevention Policy, Ministry of the Interior, Wetstraat 26-28, Brussels, Belgium.
One way or the other November 24th is accountable for this. In the following paragraph I will discuss in short the three aforementioned sources which account for the developments in Belgian security policy. After this an overview is given of the most important measures taken to influence the sense of security experienced by the Belgian population via these contracts. To conclude, some initial evaluations will be presented and a closer look will be taken on future developments. It must be noted that the analysis of all this is being made by someone who has participated in the developments, which makes the reporting less detached. In spite of the practised self-discipline on objectivity it is necessary to understand this before reading further.

The way to security contracts

The way of thinking and acting towards criminality has never been so intense as it has been in the last quarter of this century. It seems that in Belgium the storm was more severe than in the rest of Western Europe. Maybe this is not surprising. Our neighbouring countries were able to respond more easily to the need for objective and subjective security because their justice and police systems were possibly better funded after the second world war than was the case in Belgium. At the time when the welfare state was being developed, Belgium was always landed with the problem of the discord between Flanders and Wallonie. This diverted the attention of the politicians away from classic areas and consequently finances were always stretched. Incidents that afflicted Belgium from the beginning of the eighties are often used to underline the insufficient equipment, manpower, organization and collaboration of the police services and the justice system. The murderous attacks of the as yet unapprehended Bende van Nijvel (Nijvel Gang), the derisive bombing campaign of CCC-terrorists and the hopeless confusion at the European Cup Final in and around the Heizel stadium, meant that the impotency of security guards in our country was also well publicized far beyond our borders. The political consequences were inevitable. After a lot of diversions, a parliamentary committee was set up to investigate the Heizel disaster and the way in which the fight against banditry and terrorism in our country was organized. What was to be expected, happened: such committees put pressure on the political machinery. Finally, this resulted in an important government initiative: on June 4, 1990 the Ministry Council approved a very ambitious plan which included measures to reform the police services and to assure better public security. This plan, that adopted the famous name Whit Plan because it was instituted on Whit Monday, was executed very quickly and brought some order to a string of opportunities which until then had remained untouched.
The organization of private guard agencies and security companies (L. April 10, 1990), the structuring of the private detective profession (L. July 18, 1991) and the introduction of some control on the police and intelligence services (L. July 18, 1991) and the demilitarization of the National Guard (L. July 18, 1991) were pioneering initiatives which resulted from this. Later there also came the new discipline laws, the adjustment of the syndical law for the National Guard and as a final act, Parliament passed the Law on the Police Forces. This law sanctioned for the first time in our country, administrative arrests, body searches, identity controls, and the use of firearms, etcetera. Further round-table conferences were held all over the country to reorganize the municipal police into a more vocational and modern service, to improve recruitment and to clarify the connection with the administrative government. All this resulted in inter-municipal cooperation agreements between the smaller communities and also brought important changes in the Community Law.

The plan accelerated the police policy enormously and the overwhelming parliamentary approval for all these laws guaranteed that it didn't include initiatives which could be challenged again by a change of government. Rarely was such a complete set of legal instruments giving such opportunities for development handed to the public sector in such a short time. It was the intention of these laws to give the police services new impetus.

In the meantime on January 1, 1989, the guardianship of the communities by the Ministry of the Interior was transferred to the Regions and the department searched for a new profile. The audit carried out by Team-Consult, an organization which had already been consulted by the previous government because of some discrepancies, pleaded for the restoration of a Ministry of Security Affairs. As regards the National Guard, the transfer of the general management from the Ministry of Defence to the Department of the Interior, something which had already been proposed in a law proposition of Philippe Moureaux in 1987, permitted from 1992 onwards, better coordination between the various police services. A great deal of hard work has been done and the Ministry of the Interior has become known over the last few years as the bastion of the security policy. The formation of the municipal police has been reviewed, the officers' uniforms have been professionalized, the extension of radiocommunication has become a priority, computerization has been accelerated, etcetera.

These developments have resulted in the foundation of the Permanent Secretariat for Crime Prevention Policy (R.D. May 16, 1993), in order to realize common support services for the police forces and for operations, international policing, computer science and statistics (R.D. July 11, 1994) and the organization of the Security Consultation Committee between the administrative and legal government and the three police services: municipal police, judicial police and the National Guard (R.D. April 10, 1995). Victim Service Programmes
have been set up, security duties for authorities minimized, inappropriate tasks of the police services restricted, and the maintenance of law and order improved, etcetera. In addition, and possibly much more important: The Ministry of the Interior has laid the basis for a general re-evaluation of the state, concentrating on financial aspects, and of the position of police officials. But despite all these efforts, the ordinary people in the street didn't seem convinced that things were improving as regards security. Their voting behaviour gave the government a lot of problems at the beginning of 1992. It became evident that in the big cities there was a serious impasse. The ageing of the population and the relocation of a lot of young people and well-off families to the city outskirts, the defacing of certain areas under the pressure of speculators and building promoters, and the filling of the vacuum by streams of migrants and illegal refugees created a difficult administrative situation. The municipal councils have been confronted with more difficulties and problematic situations and had less means to satisfy those needs. The so-called Brussels migrant riots in May 1991 in the boroughs of Vorst and St. Gillis brought this problem into sharp focus. Income from municipal taxes had decreased considerably in all the Belgian cities and because of the severe budget controls it was impossible to create bigger budget deficits. The power of Central Government to discharge the big cities from their debts belongs definitively to the past and has been replaced by a more severe budget discipline. While the mayors had to deal with dissatisfied citizens in their offices every week, they were not able to fill the vacant police positions or to give financial support to a neighbourhood committee that had worked out a useful crime prevention initiative. It became obvious that only federal means could bring some changes to this static situation. The pressure on the cities to take care of their own security problems increased dramatically, but there was a lack of means to practise any policy. And above all, it was a downward spiral which had to be dealt with. More delinquency meant that more and more people left the big cities, real estate speculation became more extensive, the marginalized community grew every day, criminality became more common, etcetera. The sociological analysis was for the negotiators of the government, who themselves lived or had lived mostly in metropolitan areas, quite simple to make. It took a lot of political courage to reserve an important package of financial means to intervene because of the very narrow margin left in government finances to implement policy. In 1992 it was decided to give this financial support to the big metropolitan areas of Antwerp and Ghent, Liege and Charleroi, and the centre of the Brussels Capital Region. Just one year later the government decided to make a contract with 15 provincial cities which had more than 100 policemen in employment and had
more than 500 citizens who had to rely on social security to reach the subsis-
tence level.
In addition to this measure, which will be clarified in the following paragraph,
means were created for small communities to attract extra police personnel
paid by the Ministry of the Interior. Extra money will be used to carry out a
drug prevention policy, to finance some new legal initiatives (mediation and
alternative sanctions), and to engage more administrative labour in the bri-
gades of the National Guard, etcetera. Nevertheless the core element of the
government policy were the security contracts. In 1995 communities were
financed with about 40 million from the Security Funds.

Eight concrete objectives

The financial contributions of the Federal Government are supplemented in
the security contract with pecuniary means from the Regional Governments.
The Brussels Capital Region and the Wallon Region also contribute to cities
which are part of the Brussels Region and Wallonie. Flanders does not make
any such contributions. About 70% of the initiatives are part of measures con-
cerning the communal police, the other 30% are prevention measures of all
sorts. Some measures are both police and prevention oriented and thus cannot
really be classified in one or the other category. Prevention and police work
have after all a lot to do with each other. Beside this, prevention contracts are
also concluded with small and medium-sized cities and communities for which
registered crime figures are higher than the average for the whole country. The
subsidies provided in the prevention contracts are substantially smaller than
those in the security contracts and do not explicitly provide for police initia-
tives. They will be left out of further discussion.
The proposals described in the security contracts as negotiated between the
Ministry of the Interior and the cities and for which money has been set aside,
can be divided into eight objectives which are often closely related:
1 Police to be in closer contact with the public;
2 modernizing and upgrading of police work;
3 more police on the streets;
4 strengthening of the municipal crime prevention policy;
5 better integration of particular groups;
6 functional surveillance, techno-prevention and dealing with feelings of
insecurity;
7 handling the drug problem;
8 dealing with crime against property.
The meaning of these objectives will be discussed briefly below. Table 1 gives
an idea of their relative importance in the total effort.
Table 1: Distribution of means from the security contracts among the different measures - 1995 (in Pound Sterling - $1 = 46,80 BEF)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>measures</th>
<th>budget</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Police to be in closer contact with the public</td>
<td>4,725,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Modernizing and upgrading of the police work</td>
<td>3,395,197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 More police on the streets</td>
<td>15,466,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Strengthening of the municipal crime prevention policy</td>
<td>3,132,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Better integration of particular groups</td>
<td>8,695,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Functional surveillance, techno-prevention and dealing with feelings of insecurity</td>
<td>1,991,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Handling the drug problem</td>
<td>2,761,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Dealing with crime against property</td>
<td>998,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>1,167,460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Police to be in closer contact with the public

One of the most important objectives of the security contracts has always been: to try to improve the relation between the police and the public, especially in metropolitan areas. The re-evaluation of the function of the police constable is one of the ways to achieve this. Policemen on foot and on bikes must become a familiar sight in the neighbourhood. An important effort was necessary to get most of the men away from behind their desks and back on the streets again. Not only in the various neighbourhoods, but also in all central police stations efforts were made to provide a better service for the public. Also the additional training given to police personnel regarding the reception and care of victims was improved, and if necessary infrastructural changes were made.

Modernizing and upgrading of police work

Some infrastructural changes have made things better for the public. In some cases it was absolutely necessary that labour patterns within the police force became adapted to the needs of modern times. The massive investment which went into the buying of personal computers and proper software was not only meant to make the system more consumer-oriented and to make rapid interventions possible, but also to facilitate the collection and processing of statistical material which in turn was to ensure that the production of updated, practical criminal analysis would become an option. A well-equipped and well-organized police force which has less administrative work to be concerned with, will be more motivated.
More police on the streets

When more policemen are present in the streets, they become more accessible and are more easily approached by citizens in need. More policemen patrolling – on foot, on bicycle, in the Underground or being on the beat with dogs in the city centre, carrying out surveillance work, controlling the traffic, etcetera – create a greater feeling of security and prevent potential criminals from committing delinquent acts. Civilians and special assistant police officers were engaged to take care of reception work and the administrative and technical tasks which are inherent in a police force, giving police officers more time for crime intervention. In this way the federal government created some 1,200 extra jobs divided between 29 contracts in 1995.

Strengthening of the municipal crime prevention policy

Each city with a security contract was also obliged to create a ‘Crime Prevention Council’ and to engage a crime prevention official. Together with the crime prevention service they had to propose ways of handling crime prevention in their city or community. Local and federal priorities had to be worked out in municipal policy and had to be translated into concrete actions. Some hundred new jobs have been created in this way, and after the inevitable growing pains a unique network has started to grow in almost 60 cities.

Better integration of particular groups

In all the cities and municipalities efforts were made to give those groups of people who confront or create more difficulties than other citizens, an opportunity to reintegrate into society. For example in the Brussels suburban municipalities mediation assistants were responsible for an amelioration of the relations between the police and the immigrant population. Neighbourhood management was initiated in a lot of places and is especially aimed at a qualitative improvement of diverse aspects of neighbourhood life. Cooperation and responsibility are the key elements of this strategy. Within this framework Reporting Points where neighbourhood residents can lodge their complaints were created in some cities. According to local needs specific initiatives are worked out. Feelings of insecurity in elderly persons are a serious problem: in addition to other measures alarm systems have helped to alleviate the anxiety. Truants are brought back into the classroom by efforts being made to meet their needs in various spheres, police interventions and socially oriented work. By, for instance, the organization of sporting activities one tries to reach the youngsters who cause a nuisance and to offer them meaningful sparetime
activities. The City-Coaching projects have had good results in this sphere. Dozens of streetcorner workers were employed to concentrate their efforts on unapproachable groups such as drug addicts or young people for whom deviant behaviour has become almost a normal way of life.

Functional surveillance, techno-prevention and dealing with feelings of insecurity

More surveillance in the neighbourhood supports the neighbourhood initiatives. The development of a police constabulary, and the designation of neighbourhood supervisors and park watchers has an important role in all this. The presence of those people in places prone to criminality has a positive influence on feelings of insecurity and uneasiness. Techno-prevention interventions in the living environment reduce registered crime, increase the chances of arrest and ensure that citizens are more at ease. More, and more efficient, public lighting, theft-resistant bicycle parking lots, the encouragement of the use of adequate locks combined with adoption of preventive behaviour make people more resistant in the face of criminality.

Handling the drug problem

The prevention of drug use and drug-related crime is one of the areas where police and social-preventive work come very close to each other. Prevention is focused on making the youth more aware of the dangers of drugs. Through informative programmes and without explicit referral to drugs, youngsters are taught social skills. 'Saying no' to drugs and alcohol and other products that can possibly lead to addiction and eventually to delinquency can be taught. Life skills projects and other such initiatives have already proven to be very successful. The so-called Transit Centres and Medical Social Reception Centres have been established to reach even the most degenerate heroine user. For example persons picked up by the police, but not arrested can be taken into a centre to be informed about proper aid services.

Dealing with crime against property

In all security contracts means were provided to elaborate at a local level the federal scheme of action to deal with vehicle crime and burglary. Preventive as well as repressive measures are included. A good analysis of the phenomena is the key element in making areas with high theft figures less attractive for thieves. Following the Dutch example parking watchers were introduced in some cities. Car theft has already been clearly influenced: in 1994 there was a
10 percent decrease in the total number of car thefts. The number of burglaries in Belgium has decreased by some 5 percent. The premium system which gives citizens the opportunity to make themselves more secure has contributed to this development.

What in the year 2000?

Very impressive indeed. But do these contracts actually work? Giving an answer to this question is not so easy. A mega-evaluation has not yet been made and it will be a tough job for anyone who undertakes such a task. The feelings of insecurity are hard to understand (and even harder to measure), the only crime figures available are those recorded by the official police and judicial authorities (which are not always reliable). We have in Belgium no tradition of auto-evaluation research and most university researchers have not had much experience with listings, etcetera. In spite of all this, there is in my opinion a consensus about some significant benefits. First of all there is the creation of employment. Over 2,000 jobs have been created which is in itself a considerable contribution to delinquency prevention. Except for some places, where bureaucratic reflexes rear their heads, the creation of work has been an impetus for the tackling of problems: particularly where there was an acute shortage of labour or where totally new services had to be introduced, an intense battle had to be fought. Often this was justifiable: victim assistance, crime prevention, drug assistance ... were until then practically untouched ground in our country. However, tackling something means almost automatically that you occupy ground from which others are threatened to be expelled. Hence, the security contracts raised a lot of questions for discussion, especially on those matters where collision was likely with community authorities or with the often neglected social sector. A normal reaction is to mobilize all reasonable means to protect one's own territory: the policeman would become too much of a therapist if he had to show overt concern for the victim while streetcorner workers paid with money from the Ministry of the Interior would suddenly lose their deontological code, every improvement on the part of the municipal police would be seen as an attempt to undermine the National Guard, etcetera. Still I think this annoyance and peevishness were the most stimulating factors for the contracts with the cities. The fact that suddenly everywhere people and organizations were shaken up was a totally unexpected and co-incidental effect. On the other hand the expectations are sometimes a bit too high. The management problems that afflict the five biggest forces of the municipal police in Belgium can't be resolved by any security contract. Other measures taken by other persons are necessary to resolve that problem. The injection of
funds has in these places had much less effect than elsewhere. Yet some forces in some medium-sized cities have overcome the crisis they were in thanks to all these fresh resources. However, in these places organization and problems were still manageable.

All in all the security contracts have proven to be a good instrument: necessary, but not entirely adequate in some cases, and not sufficient to tackle the fundamental problems. For the most part an integrated policy was preferable, but lack of funds made it difficult to realize this at times. It worked because parents, teachers, social workers, and the judicial authorities deliberated with each other about the way drug and other problems could be dealt with. This was a totally new approach on behalf of the cities, but employment, housing, education, etcetera, could hardly be involved in this approach.

That will be the challenge for the years to come. After the quantitative and qualitative adjustment of the police forces, the development of a variety of different preventative approaches and deliberation around this subject, the energetic tackling of problems such as drug crime, burglary and theft, and the development of new forms of judicial settlement, problems still exist in (very) problematic neighbourhoods of the big cities which have to be solved. Some extra police or more elaborate prevention schemes would not do the job: more drastic intervention on the urban level and in all the domains of social life will be necessary.

The government has after the latest parliamentary elections decided to transform the security contracts into society contracts in which the accent is placed on the recovery of normal life in these problematic neighbourhoods. Therefore the budget is to be raised to 110 million in 1998. The discussion about the specific use of the money has already started, and once again large numbers of people who are in one way or the other related to security practice, will be motivated to act.

Ultimately there is the need for feedback: November 24, 1991 was a black Sunday, but surely not for security personnel. A lot of democrats will not like my statement that the Vlaams Blok, as a whip party, has very indirectly and almost co-incidently through its agitation opened the way for us to overcome our shortfalls in the domain of security organization in comparison with our neighbouring countries. And right they are: it bothers me as well, and there were other factors that played a role in this process, but still ...
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Urban policy and proximity justice in France

Jacques Faget\textsuperscript{1} and Anne Wyvekens\textsuperscript{2}

The French penal policy which since 1945 had been primarily centred on minors’ rehabilitation and then from 1958 focused on the social reintegration of adult delinquents, has since the beginning of the 1980s turned to crime prevention. The intensification of feelings of insecurity, the significant rise of petty crime and the increase of social claims on the law have had to be confronted. Let us bear in mind that this period coincided with the first left-wing parties coming to power since the beginning of the ‘Fifth Republic’. As their first significant moves, these parties achieved a series of penal reforms among which the most spectacular ones were the abolition of both the death penalty and the emergency jurisdictions inherited from the second World War. But the symbolic importance of these reforms was not sufficient to prevent the rioting in some suburban districts during the summer of 1982.

A Mayors’ Commission on Security made up of representatives from all political tendencies meeting at the Prime Minister’s request pragmatically drew up around a hundred proposals for the setting up of genuine crime prevention measures. Prevention then became the basis of the new policy regarding the treatment of social misfits and delinquents. This policy took shape through political or administrative restructuring (e.g. the 1983 decentralization laws) rather than from the internal actions of the Ministries of the Interior (Home Office) and of Justice. Penal policy became dependent on choices which were beyond its control as shown by the shift in the public debate away from penal policy towards urban or security policy. The Justice Department’s strategy strove to catch up with this evolution, if not to bring it under its control.

We will first deal with this urban policy centred on crime prevention before

\textsuperscript{1} Researcher in National centre of scientific investigation (CNRS) and professor of penal sociology in the university of Bordeaux IV, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux, Domaine universitaire, BP 101, 33405 Talence Cedex, France.

\textsuperscript{2} Researcher in National centre of scientific investigation (CNRS), Université de Montpellier I, Faculté de droit et des sciences économiques, 39, rue de l’université, 34060 Montpellier Cedex, France.
tackling the various attempts judicial policies have made to adapt to this evolution through the establishment of proximity justice.

**The urban policy**

As the centralized management of social problems was ill-suited to the understanding of social intricacies and contributed to the breaking of social solidarity bonds, various processes ensuring the transformation of the Welfare state into a more modest *'Etat animateur'* (stimulating state; Donzelot, 1995), able to boost the social body's initiatives, were elaborated. The 1983 creation of a National Council of Crime Prevention and its branching into Departmental and Communal Councils was part of this strategy. Their action principle is three-fold.

- **Administrative transversality.** Numerous but segmented initiatives had to be brought together, institutional divisions had to be overcome in order to achieve more efficient responses.

- **Problem globalization.** There was a need to stop restricting the analysis of problems to institutional clientele and socially structured classifications and to start developing a general overview of all the problems of nonconformity. In this perspective, it was advisable not to separate the issue of petty crime and that of all the other deviant types of behaviour.

- **Localization of problem-solving.** Responses should not be elaborated from the top, but from particular local opinions in the areas where these responses were to be implemented by local actors.

This policy was administratively reorganized in 1988 with the creation of the *Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville* (DIV: Town ad-hoc Inter-Ministry Committee). The July 13, 1991 law granting 'justice to the city' symbolized this evolution and set the following objectives: social cohesion, the balanced growth of cities and the fight against all kinds of urban exclusion and segregation. Without delving too deeply into this complex organization, we will say that there are three main strands of actions: 'prevention/insecurity action contracts', 'town contracts' and big urban projects with only partial financial backing from the State so as to involve local authorities.

The 'prevention/insecurity contracts of action' can be signed by the representatives of the State and the towns which have set up a Communal Council of Crime Prevention. There are about 700 such councils located in almost all the big and medium-sized French towns. The mayors are in charge of these Councils which are composed of representatives of all the ministries involved – justice, interior, youth and sports, national education, employment, welfare – as well as 'field' representatives such as social workers or members of various associations.
The 'town contracts', established more recently, numbered 224 in 1995. They concern 750 municipalities and 1,300 districts. They have the two-fold objective of fighting social exclusion at the town level and of increasing the efficiency of public interventions in creating a synergy of all the actions in a given area. The range of their intervention is variable as they can involve groupings of municipalities, a single municipality, or one or several districts (neighbourhoods). They are financed on a five-year basis so as to allow in-depth action.

Lastly, there are 12 urban projects – eight within the Paris region, two in the Rhône-Alpes region, one in the Nord-Pas de Calais and one in Provence-Côte d'Azur – concerning bigger neighbourhoods with more than 10,000 council flats affected by both social and spatial handicaps. Their implementation requires considerable financial support from the State.

This system's complexity is further aggravated by the existence of organizations with more or less the same objective – albeit in different areas – which include the City Contracts of the Ministry of Social Integration, the local life-organizing projects of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the local back-to-work rehabilitation schemes, and the high-priority educational areas of the National Education Ministry.

The numerous and varied actions undertaken fall into five major categories.

— **Habitat** and living and housing conditions: rehabilitation or building of low-budget Council Houses, development of the social integration of neighbourhoods so as to prevent the creation of ghettos, creation of the position of warden on Council Estates.

— **Work**: measures to make it easier for young people with no previous professional experience and adults in long-term unemployment to find a job, the exemption of taxes and social contribution expenses for firms which create activities or work in the target neighbourhoods.

— **Reinforcement of public services**: improvement of consumer care and services, granting of bonuses to civil servants posted in 'hot' neighbourhoods, opportunities to do national service in risk schools and districts.

— **Social and cultural activity-organizing programmes**: fight against unequal access to culture, development of the cultural 'offer' in high-priority areas, development of entertainment and sport activities, nursery care, family mediation, accompanied access to care and treatment for patients.

— **Crime prevention**: prevention of recidivism, help for victims of crime, protection of high-risk schools and public transport lines, summer crime prevention programmes, support to Houses of Justice and Law, to the rapid processing of penal procedures, to penal mediation and compensation, action to promote diversification of alternatives to imprisonment and to rehabilitation, and the development of neighbourhood policing.
The results of these different programmes are difficult to assess scientifically. Despite a wealth of initiatives over more than ten years, the social decay of suburbs has slowed down but has not stopped, conditions for the socially vulnerable have worsened, crime has not decreased (except in 1985 and 1986), and prisons are still overpopulated. The economic crisis has certainly diminished the efficiency of these schemes but some pernicious side-effects have equally contributed to their relative failure. Among these, we can include the labelling of some target districts, the difficulty in socially mobilizing individuals who remain 'invisible citizens', the complexity involved in defining relevant target areas and the problem of articulating judicial, social, administrative, and political objectives so that they reach the less privileged social groups. In a phrase, 'the logic of the project' has slowly crumbled into a 'logic of the right counter'.

A research paper on Communal Councils of Crime Prevention (Faget, 1992) has shown that the weight of electoral interests centred on spectacular short-term programmes, did not allow time to create a team spirit among participants. Therefore, most of the administrative actors, among which are included the police and the justice system, only play a role in crime prevention while those in the field often limit their contribution to the defence or the promotion of their own particular interest. Lastly, associations and citizens are relatively excluded from decision-making procedures. But this scepticism also feeds on subjective elements such as the individual's inability to think of work in terms of cooperation.

The amalgam of the different occupational cultures bases the implementation of programmes more on personal affinities than on institutional policies. Yet, the effects of these local prevention policies are not negative. The Communal Councils have permitted the creation of debating groups dealing with and discussing the causes of social deviance and how it can be dealt with, thereby stimulating debate between actors who had never communicated with each other before. They have undoubtedly made political representatives and social agents more responsible towards the deprived social groups living in their areas. The numerous actions begun in a considerable number of fields have probably contributed to the improvement of these groups' living conditions. Lastly, on a more symbolic level, these Communal Councils of Crime Prevention seem to have managed to somehow dedramatize and depathologize crime and to have favoured the development of local non-judicial modes of handling conflict.

**Proximity justice**

Since 1983, the justice system has been more concerned with the need to modernize its own responses than with its participation in these new programmes.
The only exception concerned the establishment of a Community Service Order which relied on a large social consensus and on the support of political representatives. The justice institutions feared that their traditional functions would be diluted into social work.

The strong pressure exerted by both the evolution of public policies and by field requirements gradually led nevertheless to the elaboration of a judicial urban policy. Its objective, defined in 1991, was to bring justice back to the city by creating easier access to justice for underprivileged social groups, to the help given to victims of crimes, to a territorial embedding of judicial actions and to a more effective partnership between political representatives, the various administrative institutions and the network of associations. In departments (French intermediate local government authorities and territories) beset by serious problems, ‘sous-préfets’ in charge of the town were nominated, as well as judicial equivalents of the urban policy who were generally magistrates from the public prosecutor’s office. The first achievements concerned the acceleration of the treatment of criminal cases, the development of alternatives to legal prosecutions – reinforcement of therapeutic summonses for drug addicts, institutionalization of penal mediation, creation of reparation penalties for minors – and the development of Houses of Justice in underprivileged districts.

A critical analysis shows that the judicial urban policy strives to achieve the goals of both humanization of judicial responses and internal efficiency. It lies at the core of the complex dialectics between the interior and the exterior, marked until now by the pre-eminence of the internal logic of the institution when being confronted by impulses coming from the outside. This explains why this policy unfolds in a fragmented way dependent on the sensitivity of some magistrates or jurisdictions but not in a planned and rational manner.

An experiment currently being undertaken in the Courts of Appeal of Bordeaux, Toulouse and Lyon happens to aim at reinforcing the judicial coherence confronting all urban actors. It can be noted that this experiment allows better communication between the members of the judicial institution but that is not to say that it will transform the nature of the relationship with the partners outside the judicial institution in the particular fields – judicial and social treatment of family conflicts, help for the victims of crimes, preparation for post-imprisonment life.

The development of ‘proximity justice’ is one aspect of this policy. The phrase is used for a negotiated justice devoid of formality, chosen and preferred by juvenile judges, in which ‘proximity’ is indicative of ‘human’ closeness, whereas it is now used to mean territorial proximity. In fact, the two dimensions – humanistic and topological – meet and are superimposed, which renders this expression less obvious than it seems. Thus, without a rigorous conceptual
frame, the expression 'proximity justice' is used to represent a set of judicial practices such as the sectorization of the prosecutor's offices, and the sub-Houses of Justice or penal mediation. We will discuss the Houses of Justice, whose creation is symbolic of the evolution of judicial policy.

We have already seen that the judicial institution has entered interaction with the local partners with difficulty. The Houses of Justice (Wyvekens, 1995a) can in this perspective be analyzed as the way the penal system through original processes in which it retains the leadership, has incorporated into its own logic the concerns of 'proximity' which external dynamics led it to take into account.

What does this particular form of proximity justice teach?

The context in which it developed - the local policies of crime prevention - suggest, before all else, a geographic dimension. As regards security, urban policy has thus coined the notion of 'outlaw district'. With this background, the objective of proximity justice would comprise restoring, through a judicial presence, the law which has disappeared from these districts. The Houses of Justice remain described in general 'as being endowed with the double vocation of re-establishing and favouring access to law and participating in the treatment of petty crime "on the spot"' (orientation note). The picture created is that of a justice which has settled in specific places in order to develop this specific mode of intervention.

The analysis of the Lyon model of House of Justice\(^3\) adds some variations to this picture. Special or human, proximity can also be temporal. The Houses of Justice thus appear to be the loci of a complex proximity where the assessment of the stakes requires the respective positions occupied by the territorial, the human and the temporal to be identified.

The specific judicial treatment which is practised there is inspired by penal mediation practices which are also constantly developing in other fields. Its very substance is to bring people who have committed offences face to face with their victims in an attempt to make them reach agreements which settle the disputes between them. This conflict becomes the central element of the logic which rules the procedure, rather than the offence which just appears as the mere symptom of it. The judicial activity of Houses of Justice - 'third way', 'soft justice' (Bonnaffé-Schmitt, 1992) or even 'more adapted' treatment - shows a real specificity as a mode of regulation more centred on recreating social bonds than on the classic authoritarianism of penal law. Besides, the verbal comments of the actors are built around the differential comparison of

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\(^3\) The notion 'house of justice' covered in France in February 1995, 32 structures which were characterized by the diversity of their financing and operating modes. The ones which are dealt with here are the four houses of justice implanted within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal de Grande Instance (higher court).
the magistrates hearing. Thus, comes to life the face of humanely close justice which given in a non formal setting 'takes its time'. The trial of a given person gives way to the debate around a relationship. It is less about making rulings than about renewing relationships.

Several elements however contribute to put this difference into perspective. The first one has to do with those who administer the new treatment. Contrary to traditional penal mediation in which the mediator is a third party, mediation practised by Houses of Justice is entrusted to the magistrates of the prosecuting office. They are the persons who, since they are in a position to appreciate the prosecuting opportunities, will proceed to what is effectively a conditional dismissal (about the paradoxal character of this type of mediation, see Coppens, 1991; Faget, 1993; Leroy, 1995).

Instead of dismissing cases deemed less serious, the confrontation face to face of the conflicting parties allows the case to be dismissed after reparations or admonitions and thus cases are dealt with which, given their non-serious nature allied to the congestion of the jurisdiction, would otherwise lead to their non-processing or postponement.

The analysis of the processed cases reaffirms this first remark. Involved parties initially evoke family or neighbourhood disputes particularly illustrative of the mediation logic. These however have been shown to be a relatively rare occurrence. The routine case load of the Houses of Justice, the quantified activities of which are considerable (3,796 mediations in Lyon in 1993 against 10,132 criminal court judgements), is made up of a series of infractions, thefts, vandalism, bouncing cheques, confidence tricks, violent acts, and hit-and-run offences whose shared essential characteristics are that they are undisputed and can be repaired.

Last but not least, the treatment of some penal cases by the Houses of Justice takes place within a procedure of management which is far from being decentralized. The 'direct treatment' or 'real time treatment' of penal cases concern all penal litigation and aims at speeding the pace of the procedure. With this aim, the relations between the prosecuting office and the police force have witnessed the substitution of the traditional written procedure by an oral procedure in which the instructions of the orientation of the cases are given 'in real time' over the telephone by the magistrates to the policemen. The time saved allows a far greater number of cases to be dealt with and the Houses of Justice are the indispensable building-block of a system without which magistrates' courts would be overwhelmed with cases.

The criterium of geographic proximity is doubly blurred. On the one hand, being part of a centralized system, the Houses of Justice have authority to treat cases from the whole of the court's territorial jurisdiction and figures show that the ratio of strictly local cases is limited. On the other hand, on the qualitative
level, the principle of treating petty cases in Houses of Justice in which the accused are first offenders a priori excludes the crime from the most troublesome districts from their competence. The geographic proximity thus makes way for a temporal proximity. As for the human proximity, this is eroded as well. The magistrates' reflexes are prone to reappear and the time element of the direct treatment does not readily correspond with that of a soft justice option which takes its time (Wyvekens, 1995b). The treatment by Houses of Justice through its judicial nature is thus 'caught up' by management requirements which are those of the whole institution. Confronted by the urban crisis, this form of 'proximity justice' would thus consist less in answering elsewhere and differently than in answering fast to situations which used to be left without answers.

But the Houses of Justice are not devoid of territorial anchoring. Each House has as a 'referent', a magistrate from the prosecuting office who regularly meets the local partners – political representatives, police, associations, schools, Council Houses offices. As for the most serious crimes, it is in a roundabout way that proximity justice is established. It is not by the House of Justice but thanks to the House of Justice that these crimes will be more rapidly processed and will be met with more efficient social response.

Beyond its instrumental content, the verbal comments of the local actors expose the essentially symbolic dimension of the system. Whatever the content of the judicial intervention in the House of Justice, it is the getting closer that brings about unanimity. It is not only 'the mayor who has access to the prosecuting magistrate' but above all 'justice is in the shop-window of cities' (extracts of interviews). On the one hand, the Houses of Justice are the expression of the justice system's intention to face the issue of insecurity without betraying its own logic. On the other hand, they appear to local partners as an essential instrument of the requalification of public space.

Justice had difficulties getting into the partnership logic of urban policy, fearing to compromise itself and a loss of identity. With the Houses of Justice, it has elaborated a home-made product which reunifies both its concerns and those of urban policy. The analysis of this proximity shows the complexity which results from the mixing of multiple approaches to intervention. It also reflects the perversity of a process which as well as softening penal intervention under the consensual figure of mediation, strengthens its grip. This assessment of an extension of social control of a penal nature on the social field raises the absolutely crucial issue of the guarantees which should be granted to those on trial. For if we consider that the activity of Houses of Justice is quasi-jurisdictional, since public prosecutors behave as judges, how can we accept that lawyers are not present in them very often and that the proceedings used are barely or not at all judicial?
To a 'structuring state'

The research of a new type of relation between the State and civil society is the central issue of all public policies confronted by the challenges of the European dialectics of the global and the local. But the hyper-centralized context of French institutions makes this research particularly tricky. A two hundred year old tradition of centralism accounts for the difficulty of substituting old institutional cultures for new cultures founded on dialogue and accord. The impossible situation in which the judicial institution finds itself imagining a locus for the settlements of conflicts from which it will be completely excluded shows this. The fact that it can contemplate its participation in urban policy only in a leading position accounts for its lack of interest in the complex authorities it cannot control. This has not prevented the appearance of a wealth of initiatives in the field of prevention or recidivism, the results of which are however difficult to assess as this multitude of micro-actions has neither the means nor the function of fighting social disintegration caused by economic liberalism.

Our experience leads us, however, to believe that the energy poured out by thousands of socially-minded individuals who have worked in prevention programmes has undoubtedly contributed to curbing the scope of social unrest and to preventing a number of individual cases of distress. It also permits a response to a more and more spectacular social demand for justice which judicial institutions are structurally unable to meet. Thus, in the context of the crisis of ideologies and of social movements, with the lack of a grid interpretative of the complexity, law and justice have become blue chip stock values. Since the principle of a 'stimulating state' has shown its limits confronted by the increasing degradation of social solidarity, the policy of prevention seems today to turn towards a comeback of the State. What is needed is not a return to the principles of action of the 'Welfare state' but the re-affirmed presence of a 'structuring state' in troublesome areas since it is the State's withdrawal and not its massive presence, as conceptualized by the theoreticians of social control, which is today denounced. It is the absence of the police, of social workers, of public utilities which are the problem. Public speeches on the existence of ghettos as 'no-go' areas, and on impunity for youths who live in these ghettos, feed this demand for the State.

The implementation of proximity justice finds its justification in the willingness to compensate the demise of the public power missions confronting the collective demands for a return to law and justice. In this perspective, the judicial urban policy would essentially have a symbolic function of social maintenance (Dourlens and Vidal-Naquet, 1993) whose objective is not, as previously thought, to organize the social, but to prevent social break-up by providing
authority. Yet, this goal could only be reached provided that the judicial functionaries who are narcissistically focused on their institutions' internal stakes understand that they participate in the collective definition of the state's authority.

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A tale of two cities

Drug policy instruments and city networks in the European Union

Charles D. Kaplan, Ed. Leuw

Charles Dickens's Tale of Two Cities, a novel of London and Paris at the time of the French Revolution published in 1859, provides a classic literary example of the determinant role contrasting city-political contexts have on the daily lives of Europeans in times of great social upheaval and change. The story involves the interplay of insanity, cure, terrorism and abuse, themes still very much a part of everyday European public life. The revolution that previewed the 19th century can be sharply compared with the evolution that marks the movement of Europe into the 21st century, a European Union constituted by the Treaty of Maastricht. While the processes are very different in these transformations, the issues highlighted by Dickens show a remarkable continuity. The French Revolution became very much concerned with heads, or to put it more specifically the beheading of absolute monarchs. The Maastricht evolution is also very concerned with heads, but this time it is not with heads of state, but rather the heads of the average citizen.

The issues of the health and security of these citizens has become a theme in uniting Europe at least as important as money and trade has been in the earlier evolutionary stages from a European common market to a European Community. The movements of Dickens's characters in the book also indicate how the

1 The authors are respectively parttime professor sociology at the University of Texas (San Antonio) as well as lecturer at the medical faculty of the State University Limburg (section psychiatry) and researcher at the Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Justice, Schedeloekestaven 100, 2511 EX The Hague, The Netherlands.
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city in Europe has been the locus for the expression of national aspirations, ideologies and political differences. The abstraction of the nation is made concrete in the context of its cities. The protagonists of the novel move in the tale for instrumental reasons; in short, to find the health, justice and security they need in the policies of London and Paris at that time. A modern-day author might not do bad by rewriting Dickens's book (retaining the same title) in the more everyday political circumstances of gradual, small and incremental changes punctuated by explosions of political violence and galling nuisances of property crime. In the sequel, the modern-day Dr. Manette might again be called to open the book by treating the lower-class brother and sister who were both abused sexually and morally. Most certainly there would have to be drug abuse added to the list of complaints of these young patients presenting what is called today in modern psychiatry, the 'dual diagnosis' of psychopathology and substance abuse. The brother would have to be a 'junkie' and his sister probably a 'heroin whore'. And the brave physician, in order to be able to effectively treat his patients, would also probably move from his city of origin to the other city because the treatment is prohibited. In the modern tale this treatment might be either methadone or a drug-free residential therapeutic community. The names of the cities would have to be changed to Frankfurt and Stockholm and Dr. Manette would now be called Dr. Schmidt or Dr. Johansson depending on the sympathies of the author. Frankfurt and Stockholm are the rightful settings for the modern European tale of two cities. They have emerged as coordination points for two dynamic networks of European cities addressing the issue of drug policy. As political resources and policy instruments, they have been officially and formally recognized in the Action Plan of the European Union for the Fight against Drugs, 1995-1999 (KOM(94)0234 – C4-0107/94). In the Action Plan (paragraph G), it is recognized that there is a discrepancy between the practices at regional and city levels and the official standpoints at the national level. The Action Plan proceeds to acknowledge in paragraph 24 the two networks. The European Cities on Drug Policy (ECDP) was founded on November 22, 1990 according to the paragraph, the signature date of the 'Frankfurt Resolution'. This network is acknowledged in the paragraph to support risk reduction policies. The paragraph goes on to mention another European network consisting

of Berlin, Dublin, London, Paris, Madrid, Stockholm and nineteen other European cities. This network is dedicated to the 'stricter drug control policies' as expressed by its name, European Cities Against Drugs (ECAD). The ECAD was founded on April 28, 1994 by the signing of the 'Stockholm Resolution' affirming the decision of fighting against the spread of drugs. In this paper, we will provide an overview and description of these two emerging European policy instruments and attempt to draw some conclusions for future policy science research especially in the area of crime and public health.

The city as arena and thermometer

Drug use associated with a whole range of social and health-related problems has become a persistent Leitmotif in the evolution of European cities toward the European Union. The discrepancy cited in the Action Plan between the city and national levels of drug policy will continue to be a thorn in the side of the harmonization of crime, social security and public health policies in the EU. The emergence of the ECDP and ECAD networks provides a hopeful resource for future policy development. However, to appreciate their value, an understanding of the critical and specific role of the city in the formation of drug-related problems needs to be obtained. The evolution of European societies as a whole are more and more characterized by their urbanity. With some notable exceptions in areas where drug production is a major cash crop, the origin and consequences of drug problems are found in the basic fabric of city life and organization.

This was conclusively identified half a century ago in an American sociological study (O'Donnell, 1969). Two distinctive patterns of opiate consumption were identified. One pattern was characteristically found in the southern United States and in rural areas. This pattern involved mainly older men from established families who were socially integrated and were maintained secretly by their family physicians. The second pattern was prevalent in the northern cities. The profile of this type of drug user was that of a young man, often unemployed and of recent immigrant background. The profile also included characteristic criminal and deviant behaviour expressed in relation to the procurement of drugs from an illegal black market. While the person profiling the first pattern can be described as a drug user at best and drug dependent at worst, the person presenting the second pattern seemed clearly to fit the class of the deviant drug abuser.

The political consequence of this pattern differentiation was that the city became the political arena where concrete expressions of national and international policies directed to socially unacceptable drug consumption could be tried out. As the World Health Organization's Healthy Cities initiative under-
lines, the city represents the immediate context of persons' quality of life. Quality of life is not a naturally given state, but is the result of the promotion of healthy lifestyles in the individual and the reduction of risk factors in the environment. This becomes in the last analysis a matter of the politics of everyday life, i.e. the politics that effect the lifestyles and environments of the city and eventually the nation.

The ECDP and ECAD both recognize this arena and have oriented themselves with ideologies that select different scientific facts and stir different deeply held emotions. At the heart of these differences lie quite competing expectations and rational theories of explanation relating to the causality of the endangerment of health and security in contemporary cities (Van de Wijngaart, 1991). The theory that drug use and abuse is an effect and outcome of the poverty, racism and social inequalities that are increasingly visible in cities tends to support an expectation of help, toleration and acceptance for those who have lost control of their use. This is understandable in bad social conditions. In order to psychologically, economically and socially to function in daily high-stress conditions, vulnerable persons and groups will take drugs. Because of these adverse conditions, drugs become pathways of escape from life or an expansion of a life of narrowing options, sources of relief for the pains of existence and means of coping.

In stark contrast are the theorists who argue that the decline of European cities is not a cause of drug use, but rather an effect of it. Drugs breed crime, mental and physical illness and depravity. These drug-caused factors decrease the quality of life in cities. Once past a critical threshold, a spiral is set into action. Persons flee the cities changing the ratio of respectable, working and productive to drug-abusing citizens. This change leads to a higher proportion of drug-related activities and in turn to escalating poverty, racism and social inequality. The spread of drugs must be vigorously fought. Help should be made available to those drug abusers who really need it, but the issue is better served by strengthening the resistance of those in society who do not count themselves among the drug users. This is done through focusing on the maintenance of a simple attitude, 'just says no', to the social pressures to accept drug-using peer groups.

Both these theories express much more than scientific truths and popular expectations. They also represent deep ideological oppositions that are played out in the arena of drug policy in cities. In some city contexts, the ideology functions to legitimate existing governmental and social institutions, in others it mobilizes a broad social movement of opposition to the existing institutions. Both the ECDP and ECAD are fluid organizations insofar as they combine both elements of a social institution and social movement. Legalization, liberalization and harm reduction are variants of the ideology of ECDP while the ECAD
are proud in their commitment to repressive policies against all drug use and abuse. Prohibition, 'zero tolerance' and the war on drugs are variants of their ideological stance. Despite these ideological differences, both networks recognize themselves as networks. They both are closely linked to city governments which seem to have relatively stable links to the policies of their national or regional governments. They can use the resources of the city government in different ways to promote their goals with confidence that they will be backed up. This allows them to have a stability to fulfill their function of coordination in a fluid and volatile political situation.

The city is not only viable as a political arena, it is the 'window' upon which drug use patterns and trends can best be monitored and modeled for scientific and administrative purposes. It has been long recognized that the epidemiology of drug abuse varies greatly across cities and regions, not only between cities and the countryside. This has had its expression in the organization of the surveillance of drug abuse with the city as the unit of analysis. In the United States, the National Institute of Drug Abuse has been running for years a Community Epidemiology Working Group (CEWG) made up of standing representatives from a full range of American cities. The CEWG meets twice a year to report and exchange information on the latest data available. These data are useful in charting the spread of drug use and to provide information for early signalling of new problems. The Pompidou Group of the Council of Europe has also been organizing a 'multi-city' epidemiology group for many years that has included Stockholm as well as city members of the ECDP such as Hamburg and Amsterdam. The existence of these epidemiology groups give further support to the validity of the concept that the city is both the arena and thermometer of drug policy.

The Frankfurt Resolution cities: pragmatic harm reduction

The 'Frankfurt Resolution' was signed on November 22, 1990 following a conference on 'European Cities at the Centre of Illegal Trade in Drugs'. Out of the seven cities participating in this conference, four signed the Resolution expressing the need for a more pragmatic and less prohibitionistic drug policy and the signatories commitment to implement such a policy: Amsterdam, Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg and Zürich. In signing the resolution they constituted the European Cities on Drug Policy (ECDP). Three other cities, Liverpool (Merseyside), the Polish city of Wroclaw and the former DDR city of Leipzig participated in the Conference, but did not sign the Resolution. The Coordinating Office was established in Frankfurt. New member cities will only be allowed to join the organization on a decision of its city administration endorsed by a majority of the city council. Above this member cities have to
pay a contribution fee depending on the number of inhabitants. The city of Amsterdam pays an amount of roughly 7,000 ECU. Due to this rather high threshold for access, participation in the Frankfurt city group reflects a serious resolve on the city level to depart from the officially prevailing prohibitionistic drug policy. To some extent the more 'pragmatic' harm reductionary drug policy on the city level expresses the considerable gap between nationally declared drug policy aims devised in conference rooms and ministerial offices and the 'dirty' work of finding feasible solutions to the real-life urban problems of drug markets and deviant drug addiction.

Discrepancy between actual drug problems in the streets and the ideal solutions of drug prohibition stipulated by national policy plans also played an important role in the period immediately preceding the establishment of the ECDP. Starting in the late 1980s the hitherto sour relations on the issue of drug policy between Germany and the Netherlands quickly improved, certainly as far as the relations with the German states (Länder) bordering on the Netherlands were concerned (Korf, 1995). Official delegations of Rheinland Westphalia and the Hamburg region visited the Dutch Health and Justice Ministries as centres of national drug policy making. Like the representatives of German drug assistance organizations before them, they visited the long-established harm reduction facilities for deviant drug addicts in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Inevitably, on a professional or private basis, foreign delegations to the Dutch scene of drug use and drug control usually visit the cannabis coffee-shops.

Out of this context the Alderman of Frankfurt, Margarethe Nimsch belonging to the left wing 'Green Party', approached the Drug Policy department of the Amsterdam city administration, headed by Paul Vasseur. At the time Frankfurt was confronted with a rapid aggravation of deviant drug addiction problems in the inner city. In the beginning of 1990 the number of heroin addicts in the city had increased to some 8,000. The downtown area around the central railway station was ever more invaded by the threatening and pathetic presence of the hard-drug scene, causing much concern for public health, public order and security. In an attempt to relieve the pressure on this vulnerable inner city area the Frankfurt police cooperated in the institution of a 'free zone' for drug addiction in the 'Taunus Anlage', a nearby parklike setting where the drug scene could be concentrated and more or less separated from more traditional (if not 'respectable') inner city life. Once the misery, deprivation and menace of the hard-drug scene is no longer chased out of sight and kept at distance from the public conscience feasible attempts to ameliorate the threats to addicts and regular city life alike become inevitable.

At this point Frankfurt turned to Amsterdam for support and advice. Due to the relatively long-standing unmitigated harm reduction approach to hard drug
addiction in Dutch drug policy, the city of Amsterdam had much experience with the 'soft control' of the hard-drug scene (Leuw, 1994). (Municipal) institutions for extensive methadone maintenance accompanied by psychosocial assistance programmes were well established in the city of Amsterdam, along with a consistent coordination of the activities of the police, the law enforcement office and the drug assistance agencies. All of these vital institutions for the implementation of (hard) drug policy had long been operating under the commonly shared presumption that repression directed at the demand side would only add to the damage that drug addiction will do to users and the general society alike.

So Frankfurt sought the support of Amsterdam for fulfilling the need of managing a free zone for hard drug addiction the city had allowed to emanate. After establishing the relationship in the ECDP, Gerrit van Santen, one of the directors of the Amsterdam municipal methadone maintenance programme was commissioned to set up a similar programme in the city of Frankfurt. Up till that time the prescription of substitution substances had been legally all but impossible in Germany. The substitution programme in Frankfurt had to start out with the prescription of Polyamidon, compared to methadon a much more expensive and less effective drug. In recent years (large-scale) prescription of methadon has been made legal in several German States.

Obviously the establishment of a drug-related political coalition between the two cities was also favourable for Amsterdam. Lining up in harm-reductionary drug policy with an important city in a powerful neighbouring country was helping a lot in the legitimation of the Dutch 'pragmatic drug policy' approach in the increasingly interdependent European arena. Already existing contacts between Amsterdam and Frankfurt and two other cities confronted with open drug scenes, Zürich and Hamburg, were employed to constitute the basis of the European city coalition on 'pragmatic' drug policy.

The Resolution adopted at the end of the Frankfurt conference of 'European cities at the centre of illegal trade in drugs' springs from the sceptical pragmatism of officials and professionals who are more or less directly responsible for dealing with an urgent and intransigent problem of city life. A preliminary statement of presuppositions acknowledges drug addiction as an inevitability, reflecting fundamental societal deficits. It further maintains that a predominantly repressive drug policy has not only failed to redress or limit the problems of drug addiction, but in fact has aggravated the predicament of both the drug addicts and the general city population. According to the Frankfurt Resolution the demand for illegal drugs is preserved in spite of the prevailing repressive drug regime, while at the same time the social and (public) health consequences of drug addiction only seem to deteriorate. These include the spreading of HIV, the increasing problems of public order and security in con-
connection with illegal drug markets and the fateful and seemingly often irreversible personal consequences of drug addiction. Drug addiction is viewed as a problem that both drug addicts and the general society have to cope with and survive, instead of as a problem that could be eradicated from the present social reality. 'Criminalization is a counterpart to drug aid and drug therapy and is a burden for police and justice they cannot carry.'

In accordance to these ideological core elements of the Frankfurt Resolution a consistent policy of harm reduction is proposed as the most suitable solution to city drug problems. This can only be realized under the condition of a strict minimization of police repression of the use and the retail market of hard drugs. The activities of the criminal justice system are deemed essential for harm reductionary drug control, but they should be coordinated with medical and social drug assistance programmes. Extensive and easily accessible methadone maintenance programmes, along with needle exchange, are viewed as the most practicable immediate response. But the Frankfurt Resolution also advocates more drastic measures on an experimental basis, such as 'the option for “shooting galleries” providing medical help and the medical distribution of drugs to long term users'. And finally the Frankfurt Resolution lines up with the most controversial element of Dutch drug policy, moving towards legalization of cannabis for the sake of separating the worlds of 'dangerous' and less dangerous drugs.

From the presentations and the discussions of the four ECDP conferences there appears to be a solid consensus on the benefits of removing the pressure of criminal law from the use of hard drugs. The participating (often high-ranking) police officials to the conferences share a strong understanding that the demand side of drug addiction is a public health problem in which there is only a very limited role to play for the police. The Chief Constable of Frankfurt, participating in the first ECDP conference, expresses his opinion that the police should retain its authority to act against small-time street dealers as an instrument for restraining the public order and security liabilities in the drug areas of the city. But otherwise, he acknowledges the fact that the police in actual practice does not enforce the laws against drug use and possession ‘(...) we act differently here from our method for other crime prevention – e.g. in the field of larceny and burglary – and leave this side to the health and social welfare agencies' (ECDP, 1991, p. 55).

The subtleties of the sharing and allocation of responsibilities for city drug markets between the police and the drug assistance and welfare institutions remain a constant topic throughout all the discussions within the ECDP. Obviously this is caused by the inevitable contradiction between the two values that all parties within the ECDP recognize as legitimate and essential, the minimization of secondary harm for drug addicts on the one hand and the minimi-
zation of nuisance and insecurity for the general population in city areas where the drug markets reside on the other hand. All parties involved seem to accept the notion that public order and security interests are putting limits to the tolerance for open drug scenes. The British participants of the ECDP conferences (thus far no English cities have joined the ECDP) seem to draw the strictest line in the toleration of drug addicts.

The Liverpool delegation to the first conference declares that the police has agreed not to hamper the proceeding of harm reduction. Preventing and containing HIV has come as an overriding priority. They will tolerate a grey market of prescribed drugs. For the dilemma of maintaining drug laws and respecting harm reduction they have found an amazingly ingenious way out, by confiscating needles found on addicts and referring them straight away to the drug assistance clinics where clean needles are supplied (ECDP, 1991, p. 187). On an ideological level the Liverpool police representative made it quite clear that his force, while respecting harm reduction, will not take part in a debate on decriminalization or legalization of any form of drugs.

On the fourth ECDP conference in Hamburg a political representative of a 'run-down inner city area affected by drugs in London' tested the consensus on harm reduction by criticizing the idea that maintaining a less harmful open drug scene should have a high priority. He declares the main concern of his constituents to be that their children will start using dangerous drugs and enter the drug scene. So they want the drug scene to disappear from their doors and not having it sanitized (ECDP, 1993a, p. 9).

As perhaps could be expected the Amsterdam police seems to be at the other end of the ideological dimension of foregoing (formal) drug legislation for the sake of reducing the secondary risks of drugs in society. The police representative states that the Amsterdam police force accepts the existing (illegal) practice of providing the 'coffeeshops' with their stock of cannabis because 'in our society nobody makes any complaint and we can all live with it.' (ECDP, 1991, p. 145) On the other hand the same officer explains that the Amsterdam police has adopted a practice of putting the drug scene under some constant pression (harassment) to make sure that junkies and dealers are kept between limits in terms of numbers and offensive behaviour. The open scene is only allowed to manifest itself to a certain degree. At this point an Amsterdam police participant to the first ECDP conference ventured the opinion that drug assistance workers sometimes agree that some police harassment will be functional for steering drug addicts into treatment or regulating their lifestyle with heroin. The existence of easily accessible and adequate treatment and assistance facilities is a prerequisite of such a precarious compromise between the interests and the tactics of law enforcement and drug assistance.
The inherent clash between legitimate but conflicting values and interests in reacting on city drug problems can in no way be solved on the shaky ground of pragmatic drug reform on which the ECDP stands. The Stockholm Resolution may be viewed as a reaction against the experimentalism that the ECDP advocates and an attempt to restore the confidence in prohibition as a solid answer to drug problems in society.

The Stockholm Resolution cities: new methods to combat drugs

In April, 1994 the city of Stockholm hosted the first 'Mayor's Conference' constituting the European Cities Against Drugs. In contrast to the ECDP membership to the ECAD is free of charge and is open to 'private' persons or organizations without the explicit backing of the city political and administrative structure. The conference was presented a resolution for signature that was signed by 21 major European cities. The map of Europe was changing rapidly since the 1990 birth of the Frankfurt Resolution and the Stockholm signatures reflected these changes (see footnote 2). Compared to the original signatories of the Frankfurt Resolution, there was a relatively heavy presence of Eastern Europe. Also, some of the major Western capitals were included, which indicated the strong support of national and international governmental organizations. This is not at all surprising since the basic principles expressed in the resolution were a more vigorous and new interpretation of the 'prohibitionist expectancy' which has been the strongest pillar of the international narcotics control order for the last century (Kaplan, 1984; Kaplan et al., 1994).

Apart from these national and international influences, there was a particular anxiety in Sweden itself about joining the European Union in 1995. This anxiety was widespread in the Nordic European states and resulted in the Norwegian electoral decision not to join. In Sweden, the balance of power tipped the other way, but not without the characteristic anxiety of being corrupted by decisions made in Brussels and Strasbourg in favour of harm reduction and drug legalization. The 'drug-free society', a term that is borrowed from the American National Drug Policy Strategy of the 1980s, also emerged in Sweden in that period. This term became a symbol in Sweden of a firm national identity and traditional national values in a European situation of uncertainty and transition (Tham, 1995). This was clearly expressed by Ake Setreus, one of the current directors of the ECAD at the 4th Conference of the ECDP in Hamburg at the end of 1993 (ECDP, 1993b, p. 65): 'Sweden wants to be a member of the Common Market, or the government wants Sweden to be a member of the Common Market. We have a big discussion with the Common Market about alcohol and the policy on that. It is good if we have a monopoly on sale and distribution
and everything around alcohol. And we think we could have it still as it is, even after we are a member of the Common Market. And why we fight with this is because we think these sorts of relations are good, it works. We have quite a good situation with alcohol in Sweden, I mean the Swedish people drink about six litres per year per person, and that is very low if you look at other parts of Europe. And we think we are going to get an awful situation if we should have the same rules as most countries within the Common Market.

Let me say something else about the situation in Sweden when I have the word. I think Swedish policy is a little bit special when compared with many countries in Europe. Drug abuse, especially among young people, is slowing down in Sweden. We have very few young people starting with drugs, and we mean by drugs cannabis, hash everything. And I probably think you will say Sweden is a repressive country or something like that, but we do not think so ... Sweden fights to eliminate the drugs, we work for a drug-free Sweden and even for a drug-free Europe.

Less than a half year later, the work of fighting for a drug-free Europe was formally begun at the signing of the Stockholm Resolution. The second Mayor's Conference was held in London on June 15-16, 1995 and the third is planned for Athens in 1996. The first signatory of the Stockholm Resolution from the Netherlands, the mayor of Hulst, a small city in the southwest of the country close to the Belgium border was visibly present. This Dutch support is especially meaningful to the ECAD since they have been persistent and vocal critics of the drug policies of the Netherlands from the beginning. Not only were city officials present at the London conference, but also the director of the World Health Organization Programme on Substance Abuse and the Senior Legal Advisor to the United Nations Drug Control Programme expressing the support of international organizations as well as a number of activist non-governmental organizations. The international aspirations of the ECAD have been further expressed in stimulating similar initiatives in the United States and Asia. The former mayor of Stockholm was a opening plenary speaker at the first Mayor's Conference of the newly constituted American Cities Against Drugs in Atlanta in May, 1995. At the conference, an 'Atlanta Resolution' was signed that embodies much the same principles as the 'model' Stockholm document. And like the ECAD which receives government support from the Swedish National Institute for Public Health, so the American cities initiative is being supported by the national government's Centre for Substance Abuse Prevention as well as large and distinguished American non-governmental organizations such as the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.

The core principles of ECAD all serve the ultimate aim of a Europe free of all classes of drugs, be they 'hard' or 'soft'. Five basic principles have been spelled out by the ECAD; one negative and four positive. The leading organizational
principle is negative. The ECAD are against the legalization of drugs. For example, in the Atlanta American conference publicized in the ECAD newsletter, a workshop was organized entitled 'Legalizers & how to debate them'. The ECAD sees a strong movement in cities and regions of Western Europe towards legalization and therefore an organized fight against this movement must urgently be launched. The ECAD, therefore, is basically self-defined as a coordination point for a counter social movement that has its target in Frankfurt. The heated exchange on the letter of the Frankfurt politician Margarethe Nimsch is just one instance of the expression of this principle.

Under the leading negative principle are the positive principles of the ECAD. First and foremost is the promotion of new methods of combating drugs. The ECAD wants an offensive against drugs in Europe based on restrictive policies. They use as a basic reference work the widely distributed document 'A Restrictive Drug Policy: The Swedish Experience' published in English (and later in French) in 1993 by the Swedish National Institute on Public Health. The main point of the document is that Sweden did not always have a restrictive policy. In the 1960s the policy was more liberal including the prescription of hard drugs. But the Swedish experience according to the available evidence showed this policy a dismal failure. The restrictive policy was installed in its place and the Swedish government is proud of its success. This reference to a 'new' and restrictive policy gained from the bad experience of liberal policies is important in understanding the thinking behind the principle. New methods for combating drugs are to be seen as new ways of implementing restrictive policies in conditions where liberalization is strong.

Important positive principles are the development of care and treatment for drug users and pro-active and assertive prevention measures targeting the existing high-risk populations. The ECAD does not want to appear hard and uncaring for those drug users who cannot stop their use. They are not strong advocates of prison for drug users although they want more severe measures against drug traffickers. From their Swedish experience roots, they are supportive of a strong system of therapeutic communities and involvement of social workers in rehabilitation. The Swedish drug policy (and therefore the ECAD) has a strong predilection for treatment forced upon drug addicts by civil commitment procedures. It is felt that the police can play an important role in 'catching' the drug addicts in the streets and then committing them to abstinence-oriented treatment facilities. This strongly diverges from the Frankfurt presumption that drug assistance should be unconditional and not be merged with the objectives of law enforcement. According to Swedish drug policy thinking, however, there is '(...) almost no conflict between drug abuser care on the one hand and the activities of the police and the probation services on the other. (...) In recent years remand centres and correctional institutions have
become important fields of outreach activities for drug abuser care services' (Swedish National Institute of Public Health, 1993, p. 27).

Not unexpectedly, the ECAD tends to reject 'liberal prescribing', i.e. the involvement of ordinary medical practices for the treatment of the drug abuser. These forms of treatment are seen as the left-behind failures of the earlier Swedish experience. Harm reduction measures such as heroin prescription and even methadone are hardly acceptable. Pro-active and assertive prevention of drug use in children and adolescents is also basic to the ECAD. By pro-active, it is meant that these groups need to be taught and encouraged to positively reject all drugs. This requires an active engagement of the family in the prevention efforts. Therefore, it is logical that Sue Rusche was invited to address the London Mayor's conference as the founder of the American Cities Against Drugs. Long before this function, she has been an active and vocal leader in the American parents' movement against drugs for well over a decade. This movement has been strongly supported by both the Republican and Democratic administrations and can be seen as the prototype of pro-active and assertive prevention models. Nancy Reagen's famous phrase 'just say no' was embodied in the work of Sue Rashe over the years.

The ECAD has a final positive principle of increasing international cooperation. It expressly highlights the existing conventions of the international narcotics control order and want to extend the powers of the United Nations to control flagrant violations. Increase of international cooperation also involves inviting key persons from America and helping to support the establishment of an American and Asian 'sister' networks. The ECAD actively maintains contacts with the United Nations, the European Union and the Council of Europe for the purpose of stimulating and intensifying the campaign against drugs. Non-governmental organizations with an international interest in combating drugs are also contacted. Visible at the London conference was the participation of the Swiss-based NGO Association for the Advancement of Psychological Understanding of Human Nature (VPM), an organization which has vigorously opposed the harm reduction policies of Zurich and the principles of the Frankfurt Resolution.

The practical work of the ECAD has been largely ideological and organizational. Like the ECDP coordinating office in Frankfurt, the Stockholm office publishes a newsletter free of charge. This newsletter largely documents events supportive of the negative principle of the ECAD. It vigorously opposes the Dutch drug policy which gets special attention in every issue. Anything embarrassing to the harm reduction is printed and the failures of that policy are rather jubilantly written. For instance under the headline 'Harm Reduction?', the December 11, 1995 issue of the ECAD Newsletter reports on the death of John Watters, a prominent American research pioneer in needle exchange, by 'possible over-
dose', for the obvious purpose of throwing serious doubt on a whole policy approach through the sad personal fate of one of its advocates. The newsletter also publishes information on events that represent milestones to the success of the restrictive policy movement. While its reporting is highly selective, it does provide much useful information in a concise and easily accessible format. Other information is also provided on request and the ECAD staff travel extensively on fact-finding and representative missions. Contacts with governmental and non-governmental organizations are a priority. The ECAD also organizes regional meetings among the cities and an annual Mayor’s conference where all the yearly networking activities and contacts are concentrated. The work of the ECAD is all integrated under its ideological objectives. To this date, more attention has been placed on reinforcing and developing a specific attitude of a drug-free society in Europe, rather than in technology transfer and training in practical skills in areas such as drug treatment and prevention. The organizational style of the ECAD is consistent with its self-identification as a social movement. As a social movement its style has been to link the higher levels of the city political organization with international organizational counterparts and selected grassroots organizations and purposes. While housed in Stockholm City Hall and receiving support from the Swedish national government, the ECAD maintains the flavour of a grassroots, dynamic movement. In some ways, the organization, in contrast to the ECDP tends to by-pass the middle civil service and city government apparatus and its institutional affiliates in drug services and appeal directly to the individual consciences of its members. This mix of high government status supporters with grassroots individuals resembles quite closely the American style of combatting drugs that emerged during the Reagan years by appealing directly to the individual consciences of people. This can be seen in the procedures instituted for signing the Stockholm Resolution. Basically, any individual suitably positioned city official can sign the resolution on behalf of the city without necessarily having to obtain formal support from the legitimate city bodies and councils. This has the advantage of producing a large list of signatories with a minimum amount of investment in economic and political resources. The Frankfurt Resolution procedures are far more financially and bureaucratically problematic slowing the process, but extending the support into the deeper levels of the city bureaucracy and service sector.

Conclusion

Significantly, the last published words of the 4th ECDP conference before the signing of the Frankfurt Resolution and the official closing of the conference was the statement of Ake Setreus announcing the start of the ECAD and pre-
viewing the Stockholm Resolution (ECDP, 1993b, p. 90): 'I just want to say it has started a new movement in Europe this September with Paris, Madrid, Dublin and 17 cities around Europe. And of course, that is another approach than this movement. We are against legalization of drugs and so on. But we do not want the new Berlin Wall through Europe, we want to discuss, we want to learn, and we want to cooperate in some ways in the future. And thank you very much that I could be on this conference, and I think I and the Swedish delegates have been met with respect and have had a good time'.

The challenge facing the EU in the future years will be finding a creative way to reinforce the interaction between these two city networks. The 'some ways' of cooperation between the two organizations need to be defined in the coming years. Without this effort, a new Berlin Wall between national governments and cities will likely be built in the area of drug policy. This would be an unfortunate failure to address the discrepancy between the regional and city and national levels stated in the Action Plan of the European Parliament and a serious set-back to the political evolution of a European Union.

In the context of policy science the wide ideological gap that distinguishes the two city networks does not necessarily have to be regarded as negative. Charles Darwin, in the summary overview of his book 'The Descent of Man' observed that progress in science is not impeded by false interpretation, but rather by false facts. Interpretation (and ideologies) are strong influences, but they do not have the truth value of facts. Conflicts can in the end be productive in defining new issues and areas of policy research. In this light the European Parliament has been correct in recognizing the work of both these networks. Both networks have helped with very different ideological styles and theories to uncover and order new facts.

What has been lacking thus far is the integration of these facts into a coherent policy science theory which may further some consensus on the possibilities of an integrated European drug policy response and the requisites for truly autonomous national reactions to drug problems of the member states of the European Union. One area of great potential for future development of integrated/national European drug policy would be projects involving the role of the police vis-a-vis public health services in European cities. The police have played key roles in both Stockholm and Frankfurt in defining how drug users can be 'helped'. New facts on how this is done might modify the extremes in interpretation of these facts, because the police are the legitimate agents for coercive ways to further the interests of both specific problematic groups such as drug addicts as well as the interests of the general city population. This issue also bears upon the highly relevant problems for city neighbourhoods where high concentrations of drug users reside and are active. Definitions of drug
problems by these neighbourhoods may be regarded as informal mechanisms which define the limits of both repression and help. Policy-based research may hopefully help to prevent this Tale of Two Cities’ Networks to end in a nasty war.

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Neighbourhood-centred conflict mediation

The San Francisco example

John R. Blad

In 1995 two projects were initiated in the Netherlands, aimed at conflict mediation at the local community level. One is situated in Zwolle, the other in Rotterdam. The latter concerns a comparative experiment in three distinctly different neighbourhoods. The author is involved in the Rotterdam project. Both projects have been inspired by the San Francisco Community Boards. In preparing the Rotterdam 'community boards' a literature survey was done to get some idea of the experiences in the USA and the UK with these initiatives directed towards 'popular justice'. This contribution is largely based on the results of the survey and centres on the issues that we found relevant for the development of the Rotterdam project.

There are two broad categories of initiatives which lead to dispute resolution, an alternative to the formal processing of conflicts in legal terms. The first category is primarily motivated by a desire to build up or revitalize a local community, which is diagnosed as functioning at a sub-optimal level. The new Dutch projects fall into this category. The second category is primarily motivated by a desire to relieve the formal system of law of an excessive caseload, which is seen as a cause of malfunction in the law system.

In many cases both motives can be found, also as a result of the symbolic negotiation and legitimation strategies necessary to make the initiative acceptable to both the general public and the formal law system. But it is evident, that the

1 Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Faculty of Law, Criminal Law and Criminology, Burg. Oudlaan 50, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.

2 In this article the word 'neighbourhoods' is written in American spelling in the quotations taken from the American book my contribution is based on.
two basic motives can only be combined to a certain extent and may easily lead to contradiction and conflict within the framework of one initiative. The term 'Alternative Dispute Resolution' (ADR) can be understood as a denominator for all projects in both categories that function as an alternative to the instituted legal channels. But it must be noted that ADR is also a growing industry of lawyers, dealing with conflicts in the fields of consumer law, labour law, insurance law (whiplash cases) and other areas in which settlement out of court can be financially interesting for the parties involved and for the commercial lawyer. In such cases there is no community orientation whatsoever. In conceptual terms the field is still very complex and ADR is now gradually becoming an instituted legal channel (Adler, 1993, p. 70; De Roo and Jagtenberg, 1994).

This contribution is further limited to a discussion of the excellent in-depth study of the San Francisco Community Boards (SFCB) that was published in 1993 (Engte Merry and Milner, 1993). These community boards (CB) are the prototypes of experiments aimed at revitalizing urban communities and should be at the centre of our attention. A broader perspective, including many other conflict mediation schemes, has not been chosen for two reasons. First, the meaning and value of these different mediation programmes vary according to the specific model chosen and the specific social contexts in which they function; for this reason it is difficult to generalize. Second, our literature survey has shown that there is not a lot of reliable evaluative material around.

The experiences with the SFCB, which have been evaluated, may be used to the advantage of new (European) initiatives. The data with regard to the SFCB was collected between 1977 and 1984 and has only recently been published, apparently because the main evaluation researcher, Frederic DuBow died and many of his manuscripts had to be elaborated by others, who now figure as DuBow's co-authors. We will discuss these experiences after having outlined the ideology, structure and activities of the SFCB and the data that are gathered with regard to its functioning.

The San Francisco Community Board

We may consider the SFCB, founded in 1976 and first implemented in 1977 in Visitacion Valley, covering all neighbourhoods of San Francisco (SF) in 1986, as the 'grandfather' of all later projects in the USA with a community-building objective. The initiator, Raymond Shonholtz (1993), saw that the formal criminal justice system, with its reactive operational model and its excessive load of serious-crime cases, could not deal with minor but structural problematic situations in the local communities. Only when relatively minor conflicts had escalated to the level of 'serious crime' would police use their powers. The community board programme 'emerged out of an understanding that the vast
majority of homicides and felonious assaults are between people in longstanding, ongoing relationships'.

Urban neighbourhoods were diagnosed as disintegrated, as lacking cohesion and as structurally insecure and unsafe social environments. In view of this, Shonholtz’s community board scheme aimed to re-establish civic responsibility with members of the community able to react to problematic and disturbing events and to participate in steps taken to deal with them. The community had to be ‘empowered’ to deal with conflicts which are important enough to destroy its well-being, but not serious enough to be adequately dealt with by the police. Shonholtz speaks of the community boards as a ‘community-justice system that is able to address conflicts early and ideally, intervene to prevent or thwart any pending violence’.

Shonholtz argues that in American history ‘social cohesion, historical continuity and shared interpersonal values’ were more prevalent and that the CB can be seen as a modern cultural analogue, an attempt to redress the demise of the historical infrastructure underlying forms of community justice: ‘Without the community base for the peaceful expression and early settlement of conflict, how are communities to deal effectively with individual conflict, community disputes, or cultural, religious or ethnic differences?’

The SFCB ‘provided an opportunity for diverse citizens in a multiethnic and multiracial society to exercise their power to reduce local tensions and hostilities by encouraging citizens to establish and use a new, neighborhood conciliating structure’.

Central in the ideology of the SFCB however is the reclaimed role and function of the citizen as the primary intervener in the early settlement of conflict: ‘Community organizing was based on the rationale that in a democratic society only citizen-based conflict-settlement mechanisms could reach disputes early and provide some reasonable process for their peaceful expression and resolution’ (Shonholtz, 1993, pp. 202-207).

Geographical areas whose residents had some sense of shared identity were selected as ‘neighbourhoods’. The basic idea behind the SFCB is that by building a community board for conflict resolution, neighbourhoods could develop

3 In relation to this, conflicts are seen as social phenomena with an inherently positive character, and members of the community boards are imbued with the following five basic values: viewing conflicts as a normal part of life from which learning and change can take place; peaceful (verbal) expression of conflict is desirable because it provides an opportunity to identify ‘deeper’ community issues and lays the groundwork for resolution and safer neighbourhoods; individuals and neighbourhoods must take responsibility for expressing and seeking solutions to conflicts; participation in the dispute process and in making agreements must be voluntary; respect for cultural diversity and other differences must exist (Dubow and McEwen, 1993, pp. 15-17).
their own identity and become a vital urban community. In view of Shonholtz's diagnosis it is not surprising that the emphasis in the SFCB programme is placed on training resident-volunteers to process conflicts at the neighbourhood level.

Conflict mediation is seen as a means of rebuilding a sense of community and of community control over the social and physical surroundings. The training programme, which the volunteers have to go through to learn the skills to enable them to play a role in the mediation procedure has the implicit aim to imbue the participants with the fundamental values that are seen as inherent in a democratic attitude, and desirable in a multiethnic and multicultural society.

In the first phase of the SFCB, teaching the skills and values essential in the conflict conciliation procedure was geared to 'empowering' the local community to deal with its own problems independently. Later the SFCB saw themselves more modestly as providing a dispute resolution service, leaving the 'empowerment' aim more implicit. From 1977 to 1984 a total of over 1000 volunteers went through the training programme of the SFCB, serving a growing number of neighbourhoods (Dubow and McEwen, 1993, p. 159).

Central in the SFCB approach is the 'dispute resolution panel', which works according to a model that is related to the emotional and expressive needs associated with interpersonal conflict. The panel consists of three to five trained individuals living in the same community as the disputing parties. They meet openly with the disputants together and have no contractual, legal or formal power or authority over the disputants or the dispute. Disputants are invited to bring their dispute to be heard by the panel and are free to do so or not. Disputants can also invite anyone they would like to see at the hearing process.

The panel members are to be selected in each individual case, as a fair representation of the ethnic or racial composition of the community and according to specific needs such as the languages needed to communicate with and between disputants of different linguistic communities. 'The panel is an expression of resident skills in action and the ability of local people to administer a justice process on behalf of their peers.' Through the panel the neighbourhood 'provides a visible and cooperative process for residents to use to ameliorate differences and to reduce tensions regardless of the legal definition of the situation. (...) The presence of the community through the panellists served to reduce the propensity for violence or bad behaviour between disputing neighbors during the hearing process and, hopefully, afterwards' (Schonholtz, 1993, pp. 211-212).

The immediate aim of the dispute resolution panel is to conciliate, to bring people together: 'The conciliation process encourages disputants to express
to one another their feelings about the conflict before they get into the back-and-forth of negotiations.' The emphasis on the emotional aspects of conflicts is central to the envisaged concept of how the community boards will be able to contribute to the quality of life in the local community: '(...) it is clear from hundreds of conciliations that have reached written resolution that for the agreements to hold up it is necessary for disputants to fully express the emotive content in their conflict, to come to mutual understanding as to what is important about the dispute from the other disputant's perspective, and to make some reasonable accommodations based on this new understanding. To achieve an agreement in a limited period of time where the parties might be initially distrustful, suspicious, hostile, or uncertain of one another requires grounding the dispute-settlement process in the emotional needs of the disputants. If this can be addressed and reasonably satisfied, the non-legal agreement will hold up without force of law or formal authority behind it' (Shonholtz, 1993, p. 214).

Volunteers who are interested in serving their community in this way are recruited from the neighbourhoods. The community board process knows the following volunteer roles and stages:

1 'outreach' workers inform the residents about the CB and motivate them to bring disputes in the CB process;
2 'case developers' speak with identified first and second disputants, encourage each to conciliate and (if the parties agree) prepare a preliminary report about the dispute for the panel;
3 'panellists' come together with the disputants at a convenient time to everyone involved and deal with the dispute in a specified face-to-face procedure, aiming at conciliation and (written) agreement;
4 'follow-up workers' monitor the results of the agreement after some time has passed.

The hearing process itself (3) is specified in four phases. The sessions begin with a formal welcome and an explanation of the nature of the hearing and the basic ground rules. Then each party talks in turn to the panel about his or her perception of and feelings about the dispute. The panellists ask for clarifications if necessary (phase 1).

In the second phase the disputing parties are asked to talk to each other about how they perceive the position of the other party in the dispute and the panellists actively seek to establish points of difference and of common understanding and concern between the parties.

In phase three the panellists help the parties to understand that, to solve the problem at hand each should be willing to acknowledge what new understanding they may have gained from the first two phases. The parties are asked how they would handle the problem if it arose again, after hearing what they have
heard, and whether they have developed enough mutual understanding to
move on to a settlement.
If the latter is the case, phase four begins: the panellists ask both parties in turn
what they think would contribute to a fair solution and help them to find a
specific agreement. This agreement, once developed, is summarized, written
up and signed. Concrete actions as well as promised behavioural changes can
be and have been clauses in such agreements.

Volume of activities and other data

By 1984 the SFCB served an area of roughly one-third of the city of San Fran-
cisco with a population of approximately 210,000. From 1977 up to 1982 the
SFCB dealt with 1481 cases in the dispute resolution panel, approximately 365
cases per year. Volunteers spent approximately 21 hours of work on each case
that effectively went through the hearing process. Still, only 25 percent of
volunteer time went to actually working on disputes, while 75 percent went to
organizational work and training. Professional staff time was consumed mainly
by recruiting, coordinating and training the volunteers. All costs included, the
mediation process was calculated to cost $750 per case.
The sources of the caseload show the following division:
— justice system referrals4 (11%);
— referrals by other organizations (12%);
— inter-personal referral (11%);
— direct service requesting residents (35%);
— direct programme contact as source (15%);
— source unknown (9%).
Initial contact with the SFCB about a complaint led in 7 percent of these con-
tacts to the decision that the complaint was not appropriate for the SFCB to
deal with. Often these complaints were referred to other agencies. For a variety
of reasons, after the visit of a case developer the complaint was withdrawn by
the complaining (=first) party in 14 percent of all cases eligible for the SFCB
process.
At this case-development stage cases were also dropped after talks with the
second party. In 4 percent of the cases a resolution satisfying both parties
resulted; in another 5 percent circumstances changed in a way that made the

4 The justice system referrals are not from the court but from police or the prosecutor. The SFCB has
the policy only to take criminal justice referrals if the criminal justice authorities drop the case
unconditionally. The main object is to get cases from the residents, who are in fact the most
important source (81%).
case irrelevant. In 9 percent of the cases the disputing parties themselves found a resolution and in another 5 percent of the cases the problem had ceased to exist. In 6 percent of the cases the second party could not be identified or located and in 19 percent the second party refused to respond to the complaint or to proceed with the case in the SFCB process. In total, by the end of the case-developing stage, roughly 70 percent of all initial cases has been concluded one way or another.

The top ten issues in dispute cases, actually referred to the panel, shows the following rank order:

1. noise (17.9% of all cases);
2. inappropriate behaviour (17.5%);
3. insults/harassment (15.7%);
4. communication breakdown (13.2%);
5. violence/assaults (11.2%);
6. pet behaviour (10.2%);
7. vandalism (8.4%);
8. parking/access (7.8%);
9. property care (6.7%);
10. litter (6.4%).

It must be noted however that in many cases more than one issue was disputed. Of all cases that were mediated 91 percent resulted in a conciliation and a written agreement between parties. Follow-up evaluations of the actual implementation of the agreements were not systematically done by the SFCB personnel. Data are available concerning 150 cases. In 79 percent of the cases the first party, and in 58 percent also the second party reported that the agreement was still fully or partly working. Fourteen percent of the first parties and 30 percent of the second parties indicated the agreement was not working. It is striking that the agreements reached without a hearing appeared to be slightly more durable (90% working) than those reached through a hearing (81% working).5

Evaluation

The evaluative materials relating to the SFCB make it possible to assess to some extent the effects of the operations of the community boards. The findings can be grouped in four categories/sections: (1) community building and empowerment; (2) volunteers as community members; (3) service delivery to residents and (4) targeted and actual case load.

5 All data in this section are derived from DuBow and McEwen (1993).
Community building and empowerment

As we have discussed before SFCB sought to create neighbourhood communities through a kind of community justice system. Evaluators of the SFCB could, however, not assess any clear transformative effect that the community boards had had on the neighbourhoods in which they function.

By coincidence a telephone survey about fear of crime and views of the neighbourhood from a sample of, among others, Visitacion Valley was undertaken in 1977, the year in which the SFCB started there, and this survey was repeated in 1983. Although a large percentage of the respondents in 1983 knew of the SFCB and its work, the average resident's view of the neighbourhood had not changed. Compared to other neighbourhoods without CB there was no increase or decrease in the sense of attachment to, confidence in and involvement with the neighbourhood and not more nor less fear of crime (Dubow and McEwen, 1993, pp. 165-166).

This should hardly surprise us given the complexity of social life in urban areas and the many intervening factors that are present in such a real-life experiment. SFCB's chief evaluator concludes: 'It would be remarkable to find any evidence of transformation in general public attitudes and behavior attributable to the continuing presence of SFCB in the loosely organized, large and heterogenous urban areas where the program operated. No matter how visible and effective in conflict resolution and public education SFCB was, it remained, if anything, only a tiny part of the urban experience for most residents' (DuBow and McEwen, 1993, p. 165).

But not only urban reality, also factors related to the organization and the underlying theory of the SFCB are important here.

On the one hand, the SFCB scheme relies heavily on teaching and training individuals to deal with conflicts, but it has no explicit social political analysis nor a social project which would indicate a transformative direction for the localities. Dispute issues of the kind that could indicate structural problems are apparently not used as a diagnostic means or as a basis for social action, with the exception perhaps of a limited number of multiple-disputant conflicts.

Indeed, quite soon the SFCB concluded that it would not be an organization of advocacy, but of delivering a certain service. On the other hand, social effects are inexorably hard to assess and in the case of the SFCB they have not been systematically investigated. What we suspect is, that in many cases the introduction of social experiments such as community boards was not preceded by a thorough establishment (in quantitative and qualitative terms) of the social situation in a locality: as a consequence the social data that can be established after a certain period of functioning cannot be plausibly interpreted as 'effects' of the introduction of the conflict mediation initiative.
Also in the case of the SFCB one has the impression that the mediation project was introduced more as the result of a general idea of what was wrong in urban localities, than as the result of a thorough social diagnosis, and it was only by accident that the results of a criminological investigation in part of the area could be used as an image of the situation before the experiment began. Shonholtz insists that the establishment of SFCB had as an undeniable primary effect that a new forum was provided for the clarification of norms and values in the community. Also, several secondary effects are in fact experienced by staff and community members as well as disputants. Available data may be interpreted as indicating social effects such as more common understanding about appropriate behaviour, a greater sense of responsibility and accomplishment, respect for different lifestyles etcetera.

Shonholtz seems to be less evaluative and more programmatic when he concludes: 'Given the increasing ethnic and racial diversity of urban communities, and the growing tensions within them, it is significant that the neighbourhood-justice mode offers “less fault finding”, “reduces alienation”, “builds a sense of relatedness to others in the community”, “counteracts isolation”, “reduces fear of crime” and “gives impetus to action for social reforms”' (Shonholtz, 1993, p. 227).

**Volunteers as community members**

The SFCB does not know 'volunteers' in its vocabulary. They are called 'community members' and this name has both an internal and an external meaning. The internal meaning is that the individual has gone through the training and has a commitment to the SFCB. The external meaning stresses the fact that the person is indeed a community member quite apart from the SFCB. One could say, that working with the volunteers was much more important for building up the community than the processing of actual conflicts: it is noted that in actual numbers of cases dealt with, the community boards were not a great success. In terms of money, each case that was actually processed was rather costly. The community that was built was the community of volunteers, which can be understood as a *community model* for the neighbourhood. The development of the volunteers was an important means of developing the community: 'SFCB’s vision is that collectively the community members constitute a new grass-roots leadership who spread skills in dispute resolution and thereby strengthen the community' (Shonholtz, 1993, p. 244). Continuously the SFCB tried to maintain the largest and most diverse pool of volunteers possible. The volunteer population of the SFCB represented the diversity of the San Francisco population reasonably well, but not its distribution. Of the 'community members' about 34 percent were white, 18 percent black, 8 percent
Hispanic and 4 percent Asian, over-representing whites and blacks and under-representing Hispanic and Asian population groups of San Francisco. Volunteers had substantially more often (90%) a college education than the general San Francisco population (49%). They were predominantly female (60%) and under forty-five years of age (83%). The volunteer community was more often unmarried (82%) than the San Francisco population as a whole. In the early years of the SFCB the joining volunteers were in general more involved in their neighbourhoods than others and showed a greater concern about the developments in the areas in which they lived than non-volunteers.

From evaluations it appears that the volunteers themselves are also the ones who indicate that they have learned a lot from participating in the project and that their life was positively affected. With the institutionalization of the SFCB, however, the volunteer population has been changing: the original community members wanted to make their neighbourhoods a better place, but nowadays many of the volunteers are young and career-oriented in the field of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). According to some observers these new volunteers show little interest in improving the world and are 'very self-interested people' (Thomson and DuBow, 1993, p. 191).

Service delivery to residents

Residents were actively invited by outreach workers to bring cases to the dispute resolution process of the SFCB. The development in the annual number of cases was as follows: (1977) 31, (1978) 100, (1979) 387, (1980) 344, (1981) 350, (1982) 374. DuBow draws attention to the fact that the SFCB had already reached its peak intake in 1979 and that the expansion to new areas of San Francisco did not produce a net growth in the number of cases. (There were two areas served in 1979, six in 1982; two of the latter for the first year.) DuBow suggests that perhaps there are in fact fewer cases suitable for the SFCB process than was expected or that barriers to bring disputes to public third parties may be more difficult to overcome than hoped. But also other circumstances related to policy choices of the SFCB are relevant. First of all it was decided to minimize referrals from the criminal justice system. However from other (voluntary) organizations, such as the church, there were only a few referrals. The latter may reflect a lack of interest in conflict solving or it may indicate that these organizations have their own ways of resolving disputes. Since the SFCB started with an implicit diagnosis of urban neighbourhoods as being an estranged and atomized mass public, it did perhaps not see the many pre-existing social networks that were providing the service in part, or that might be clients for the services SFCB could offer. Social organizations were never addressed as such (DuBow and McEwen, 1993, pp. 137-138).
That the channel offered by the SFCB satisfies a certain need is made plausible by the actual number of cases that are brought in and by the fact that people have often tried but failed to resolve conflicts before using the conciliation procedure of the boards. Twenty-three percent of the disputants had made one unsuccessful attempt before contacting the SFCB, and 54 percent two or more attempts involving police, other service agencies and elected officials. Moreover, analysis of police logs and incident reports in one year led to the conclusion that 930 of these incidents were suitable for the SFCB procedure. They were not referred because the police were not willing to do so or one or more parties involved objected (Lowry, 1993, p. 98). Potentially the caseload of the SFCB might be greater if working relationships with the police were improved (Shonholtz, 1993, pp. 219-220).

I have already mentioned that the case development stage and the dispute resolution panel produced quite a high percentage of successful resolutions. The disputing parties were in general satisfied with both the procedure and the results of the dispute mediation panel and because of the many cases already solved in the case development stage this may be looked upon as a service in its own right. A further indication that the avenue offered by the dispute resolution panel was appreciated is that 10 percent of the disputants were 'repeat players' bringing in more than one case (DuBow and McEwen, 1993, p. 134).

Targeted and actual caseload

The SFCB programme targeted disputes in long-standing personal relationships that, if not remediated, may in time have led to violence. In actual fact, the caseload of the SFCB is dominated by petty aggravations of neighbourly life and public order. The disputes were obviously important for the residents involved, but only a minority of the conflicts dealt with appeared likely to lead to any violence. In this respect the SFCB has a different caseload than those mediation projects that draw a large number of cases from the criminal justice system. In these programmes sometimes half of the caseload consists of domestic assault cases, in the SFCB only 2.5 percent were such cases. Only 11 percent of all SFCB cases involved an assault or violence. Another 18 percent have to do with verbal harassments or insults. The dominant picture of the caseload is, generally, that of neighbourhood problems between residents who sometimes did, and sometimes did not know each other before the SFCB contact. In view of this it is plausible that the SFCB provided a forum for a wide range of residents to air grievances and seek resolutions to problems that could not be dealt with by other agencies.

If one looks at the social status of the disputants one concludes that not only the volunteers, but also the clients of the SFCB are mainly middle-class. Fifty
percent of the disputants had an income above $20,000, which is above San Francisco's median. In terms of ethnicity the variety of clients was wide and almost represents the distribution of ethnic groups in San Francisco in 1980. Sixty percent of the disputants were white, 20 percent Hispanic, 14 percent black and 8 percent Asian. Only Asians are under-represented (Rothschild, 1986, p. 108). In terms of gender: most individual complainants were female (56%), and 34 percent of the complainants were males, the remaining cases involved multiple disputants. The second parties (defendants) were however male in 50 percent of the cases, female in only 23 percent of the cases. DuBow and McEwen concluded from this: 'Drawing cases as it did from a variety of relatively stable, working- and middle-class neighbourhoods of San Francisco, SFCB's caseload reflected a concern with community stability and order, especially in the face of change' (DuBow and McEwen, 1993, p. 144).

Final discussion

We can divide the discussion of these evaluated experiences into two sections: the social diagnosis underlying the SFCB and such initiatives, and the SFCB as a recipe for the problems diagnosed.

The social situation in urban neighbourhoods

It is also a valid and valuable point for Europe, that the formal criminal justice system is reactive and responds mainly to the more serious offences. After all, it is and should remain an ultimum remedium. So it makes sense to look for social ways to prevent the escalation of small but recurrent irritations and aggravations of everyday life in urban neighbourhoods.

It is difficult however to conceptualize the subjective definitions of the situation in which residents of these neighbourhoods live, and even more difficult to generalize in this respect. The degree to which residents define their neighbourhoods as a negative or positive social environment, and the degree to which their lives are influenced by this evaluation are difficult to establish in 'questionnaire' research. It is also difficult to define what is to be understood as a vital neighbourhood, which is something that has to be done in a social programme aimed at 'revitalizing' urban neighbourhoods. Such a definition was not consciously developed before introducing the SFCB.

The ideal type of a vital local community, that is implied in the CB ideology, seems to comprise the following elements:

- members of the community are able to recognize socially important conflicts;
they are willing and able to resolve these conflicts with the help of fellow members of the community;
— there are fellow community members interested in helping the disputing parties;
— there are channels and procedures for resolving these conflicts in ways that are functional for both the disputing members and the community;
— the community as a social entity is aware of the mediated conflicts and thereby maintains social cohesion, continuity and shared social values;
— all or most members of the community are able and willing to contribute to conflict solutions that are not only in one's self-interest, but more in the inclusive interest of the community. They are able and willing to accommodate the needs and experiences of others;
— the shared social values concern a basic consensus, both with regard to the substantial social norms relevant for the resolution of conflict and with regard to the procedure in which these norms are established.

Such ideal-typical assumptions which were implicit in the CB ideology should be made explicit and the object of further research. The San Francisco experiences show that the degree to which these assumptions are descriptions of reality or to the contrary 'counterfactual' is decisive for the volume and the success of community boards. Special attention should be given to the assumptions of voluntariness and benevolence, or the willingness to conciliate. Conflict mediation in a context of intercultural conflict can also be counterproductive and drive out the minority culture (Debuyst, 1987).

As opposed to a 'vital neighbourhood' one could imagine an ideal-typical 'sick' or 'dead neighbourhood' which is characterized by residents who have virtually no local social life and who lock themselves up in their houses, defining the outside world as dangerous and hostile. The more a neighbourhood has such residents, the more it is 'sick' and indeed dangerous and hostile. Not many neighbourhoods will really be 'dead'. But nevertheless, those residents who do not participate in local social events are most dependent on media-provided information for knowing the world in which they live, and the images transmitted to them may be totally distorted and disturbing. Furthermore, for solving problems these residents would rely first on formal agencies and perhaps be disappointed in the services they get as a result.

It may be that many modern citizens actually live more in atomized, vertical relations of dependency on information and services from formal agencies than in horizontal social relations. In such a life situation, insights and skills

6 See for instance the case of 'The promised land' in which one of the disputants was not willing to conciliate but actually sought the enforcement of what he considered to be the law and his right (Rothschild, 1993, pp. 265-327).
needed for social life as such may be inadequately developed in general, let alone for solving conflict and for taking initiative in this direction, which includes taking risks. Not knowing how to deal with (horizontal) conflicts may in this way contribute either to further withdrawal or to aggression and violence. The question is whether these atomized urban residents can be reached by schemes such as the community boards and whether they would make use them.

In conclusion, what is needed is a better concept of ‘vital communities’ in order to diagnose problems and direct social policy. Experimental community boards could contribute to the development of such an improved concept.

*Dispute resolution as part of the recipe*

Although the evaluation study of the SFCB itself is exceptional in its degree of elaboration, its results can perhaps be considered exemplary of the social dimensions of neighbourhood-centred conflict mediation. Although there are indications that such dispute resolution schemes fill a gap and provide for a certain need to express concern with certain problems in the neighbourhood and to resolve them, we must avoid building up expectations too high. Surely the community board can make a contribution to the quality of social life and the well-being of individual residents, through the new insights and skills gained by volunteers, through offering a forum for the peaceful expression of conflicts and by producing relatively durable agreements about the disputed issues. But it can not on its own transform whole neighbourhoods or even ‘empower’ them to deal with the problems as a social collectivity.

Neither is it practically nor theoretically conceivable, that detrimental conditions that are partly or totally structurally determined (such as deterioration of urban areas, marginalization, deprivation of adequate education, poverty and violence) could be improved by and through mediation in the resulting conflicts. In so far as conflicts are the results of structural conditions, in the long term these conditions can only be influenced by other material and political processes. In view of this, the ‘mediation movement’ has been heavily criticized for taking the risk of becoming a latent expansion of formal social control instead of an empowerment of the weaker urban residents (Abel, 1982; Harrington, 1993).

This critique however seems to ignore that social control is not an inherently or dominantly negative phenomenon, but in fact constitutive of human society as such and that any endeavour to produce something similar is inherently socially controlling (Berger and Luckman, 1966; Foucault, 1975; Cachet, 1990). The SFCB sought to contribute to the development of self-governing localities and indigenous legal structuring in the modern urban neighbourhoods, but
perhaps the San Franciscan or any urban context is not the best suited to this aim, since a robust indigenous legal structure is lacking as such (Engle Merry, 1993, p. 58). If this is correct, the dilemma is whether we should accept that or whether we should try to develop such indigenous structuring – and indeed social collectivities as such – anyhow.

On the other hand, the SFCB scheme has been quite individualistic and individualizing in its approach to problems and seems not to have addressed properly the pre-existing social networks which function to create probably a multiplicity of small communities in neighbourhoods, even when they appear atomized and anomic at first sight. And the evaluation data indicate that individuals volunteering for such new initiatives as a community board may not be involved in those small communities but are hoping to build a social network for themselves or to start a professional career in ADR.

It seems paradoxical to claim to be building up a sense of community on the one hand and doing that by developing stronger individuals on the other; if it's not a paradox at least developing individuals should be recognized as a necessary but not an adequate condition for community building.

**Implications for new initiatives**

The Rotterdam initiative to create experimental 'community boards' is motivated by the desire to contribute to the well-being of residents in urban neighbourhoods. Learning from the San Francisco example the Rotterdam initiative group feels that it is necessary to pay sufficient attention to the collection of data and the formation of a theoretical framework of what can be understood as a 'vital community'. The answer to the question what community boards – in a specified design – can do for localities depends on such a framework.

For this reason the first year of the experiment, 1996, is to be used to develop qualitative, but quantifiable, indicators for the social climate in the neighbourhoods where the community boards will be introduced and to direct research to establish a satisfactory, well-grounded theoretical portrait of the neighbourhoods ex ante. Data from the resources of the formal institutions as well as data with regard to the informal social world (existing social networks of clubs and societies) of the localities are now being collected.

While developing these descriptions of three neighbourhoods in Rotterdam we are preparing the way for introducing some kind of community board, the model of which we aim to develop in discussion with the residents and in relation to the social problems considered important. In Zwolle however, the SFCB model has been copied and introduced already, managed by a city foundation for welfare work. In time we hope to be able to assess variable effects of the way community boards have been introduced in Zwolle and Rotterdam. Also, by
thoroughly assessing the situation in specific neighbourhoods *ex ante*, we will be able to answer the question, whether changes in these neighbourhoods can adequately be interpreted as effects of the experiment as such.

Theoretically we are not viewing urban neighbourhoods *a priori* as disintegrated and anomic settings but more as a locality in which different social networks, with varying activities and numbers of resident members, are operational. In view of this we are aiming at establishing structural links between the community board and the existing formal and informal social networks, by recruiting volunteers who are and will remain involved in these networks: not to be their representatives, but to be their intermediaries.

Furthermore we aim to investigate how attitudes and behaviour at neighbourhood level can be influenced by giving more publicity to the agreements that are reached and by promoting the popular discussion of these agreements as normative moments in community life.

Finally, we also feel that community building is not a task for administrators and academic professionals moving into the neighbourhoods, and that the development of a community board must be seen as an appeal to local residents to contribute to a more intensified social life of the locality. In this respect, we are able to link up to the climate of 'social renewal', which has already promoted to a certain extent face-to-face problem solving and local, civic self-reliance. The experiences with social renewal in Rotterdam have also shown that 'problem-solving' initiatives can be more effective when they approach problems from a positive angle and focus on positive rewards.

The notion that problems and conflicts are not necessarily socially negative, and that it can be rewarding and enriching to cope with them, can be recognized as a strong motivational message to get local people to cope with certain behaviour instead of denying it. But then it is also vital to recognize the cases where structural conditions reproduce the conflicts that result in everyday life and to exclude these conflicts from the horizontal conciliation-style of community boards. Such vertically determined conflicts can not be resolved by reconciliation without reproducing structural inequality and its frustrating effects. In these cases administrators and politicians cannot escape their own responsibility for community building on a larger scale.

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7 With regard to juvenile delinquency the relevance of social renewal is discussed by Rood-Pijpers.
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Statewatch on the Europol Convention

Statewatch is publishing the text of the Europol Convention in order to encourage open debate on the substantial issues it raises. When first proposed the convention was intended to cover 'organized crime' especially drug trafficking and money laundering. Now it covers a much wider area including those 'suspected' of offences. Whatever its objectives the rights of the individual require protection.

The convention has been signed by the governments of the fifteen countries of the European Union (EU). It was drawn up by the fifteen EU governments in secret and neither the European Parliament or national parliaments were involved in its drafting. The convention now has to be ratified by the fifteen national parliaments before it can come into operation. The national parliaments however can only agree the convention as a whole, they cannot amend or change it in any way.

Europol's origins

The rationale for creating Europol is that the opening of frontiers between the members states of the European Union requires a response from its police forces. Organized crime, it is argued, can now operate across borders without hindrance and can move its money-laundering activities with ease. A number of other factors are said to complement this: the collapse of the Soviet Union has introduced new threats of the trafficking of nuclear materials, vehicle crimes, and the growth of organized criminal networks in the former Soviet domain; the emigration of the Italian mafia; major increases in drug trafficking; the use of financial markets for money laundering; the emergence of organized illegal immigration networks. The overall case for Europol is: 'In the common struggle against international organized crime, the methods available to police forces seeking information were perceived as primitive. An effective response would require a modern computer based information system, with a central capacity for analysing intelligence' (Europol, House of Lords). The ideology underpinning the creation of Europol, and a number of

Statewatch is an independent group of lawyers, journalists, researchers, lecturers and community activists from the UK and Europe. It monitors civil liberties and the state. For further information contact: Tony Bunyan on (00 44) 0181 1882 (office) or (00 44) 0171 254 3597 (home).
other EU-wide state agencies, links organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism and ‘illegal’ migration as posing a new ‘threat’ to the stability of the EU. Throughout the 1980s the idea of a European-style FBI was put forward by a number of police chiefs in the UK, Germany and elsewhere. The creation of Europol was first formally put forward by the European delegation at the European Council meeting in Luxembourg on June 28-29, 1991. On December 4, 1991 the meeting of Trevi Ministers agreed that the European Drugs Intelligence Unit, set up in June 1990, should be renamed the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) and be the first step in creating Europol (the Trevi Ministers meetings were superseded by the Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers when the Maastricht Treaty came into effect on November 1, 1993). The European Council meeting of Prime Ministers on December 9-10, 1991 formally agreed on the creation of Europol as part of Title VI of the Treaty. The convention was signed on July 26, by the fifteen governments of the EU without deciding on the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Fourteen governments supported the ECJ inclusion in the convention to determine disputes on interpretation of the convention between member states, the UK alone opposed this. The deadline for deciding this issue has been set for June 1996 (the end of the Italian Presidency of the EU). A number of EU parliaments are not even going to consider beginning the ratification process of the convention until this question is resolved. Until the Europol Convention has been ratified by all EU member states the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU) will continue its operations in the Hague. Chapter 2 sets out a number of concerns resulting from its activities.

Secrecy and accountability
The Europol Convention was drawn up in secret by members of the Working Group on Europol comprised of police officers and interior ministry officials. Areas of dispute were discussed by top level Interior Ministry and judicial officials and, if necessary, by the twelve (later fifteen) Interior Ministers sitting on the Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers.

The European Parliament was not ‘consulted’ under Article K.6 of the Maastricht Treaty at any stage during the two years of negotiations over the convention’s content. This Article explicitly states that the council should ‘consult’ the European Parliament ‘on the principal aspects of activities’ and ensure its ‘views’ are ‘duly taken into consideration’. At the meeting of the Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers held in Luxembourg in June 1994 it was decided that the European Parliament should only be given a copy of the draft convention ‘informally’ so as not to formally ‘consult’ it.

The powers given to the European Parliament under the convention
being minimal, it will simply receive an annual report. It will only be consulted if there are amendments to the convention but as the Council of Ministers is empowered to extend the list of crimes covered by Europol indefinitely this is unlikely to occur before any future major revision (i.e.: giving Europol operational powers of arrest).

Defining 'organized crime'
No definition of 'organized crime' is given in the convention. The Meijers Committee (Utrecht, The Netherlands) told a House of Lords inquiry into Europol that: 'A member state might have to provide information about behaviour which under its own law was not criminal'. The 'list of crimes is arbitrary', they said, and argued for an objective standard (Europol, House of Lords, p. 12).
The report by the House of Lords on Europol notes that 'crimes' appear on the list: 'not because they are the most serious offences but because they are particularly transnational in character and therefore require a transnational response' (Europol, House of Lords, p. 26).
The UK Home Office said in evidence to the House of Lords inquiry that: 'As in other European countries, our knowledge of the nature and scale of organized crime (...) is at present largely descriptive.' Criminal statistics in the UK, like in a number of other EU countries, are collected by offence and as there is 'no offence of committing an act of organized criminal activity (...) it is not possible to identify amongst recorded offences those which result from organized crime'. What appears to be happening is that recorded crimes are being reassigned to this category on an ad hoc basis by EU police forces. Even 'suspected' organized criminals have rights. Neil Walker, of Edinburgh University, took up this point in written evidence to the House of Lords inquiry. The groups to be targeted by Europol – drug traffickers, money launderers, clandestine immigrant networks – are unlikely to get sympathy from the public: 'it is particularly important that a package of accountability measures is developed which is vigilant (...)'.

Data protection
When police agencies are given powers to hold information (and intelligence) on citizens an area of concern is the right to find out what is being held and the right to have incorrect information changed or deleted. The provisions on data protection in the convention are highly complex as they have to cover two different existing sets of data protection laws in EU member states (chapter 3). Among the concerns on the data protection provisions are that: Europol only has to 'take into account' the Council of Europe Convention 1981 (not should 'comply with'); the Joint Supervisory Body, to be set up to oversee data protection, will have no powers of enforcement; data can be included on the computer bases from
'third countries and third bodies' on which the Meijers Committee argued: 'Since Europol could store data received from non-Member States or through circuitous channels, there were serious risks of inaccuracy, and the right to information might well be illusory' (Europol, House of Lords, p. 17). Moreover, if equivalent standards of data protection were expected of states or bodies putting in or receiving information this would exclude a large part of the world; The UK Data Protection Registrar says that to allow refusal of a right of access request on the grounds it could affect 'the proper performance of Europol's tasks' was far too wide.

**Ratification and regulations**

All parliaments in the EU member states have to ratify the convention, which they have no power to amend in any way, before it can come into operation. As there is already a delay because of the dispute over the role of the European Court of Justice it is expected this process will take at least two years (the Dublin Convention signed in June 1990 will only complete its ratification process in 1996). Moreover, the Europol Drugs Unit, which is already working on setting up the computer systems, says in its latest report that the 'Post-Convention Information System' will not be ready for two years plus the time it will take for member states to link-up.

There are in addition some nineteen sets of regulations or rules still to be adopted (p. 31). The House of Lords report on Europol said it would expect that the 'important provisions which the Council must adopt' before the entry into force of the convention 'should also be made available in draft to national parliaments' but certainly in the UK these are not to be formally part of the parliamentary ratification process. One of the regulations currently being discussed by the Council of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers covers data files in the Europol computer system. Analysis files are to include information classified as 'not very reliable' (p. 33).

In the UK the convention will probably be ratified without debate. Most other national legislatures have written constitutions giving parliaments formal powers to ratifying treaties and agreements. UK parliament will only discuss the issue if enough MPs are able to get a debate inserted in the agreed parliamentary timetables of the frontbenches.

**Policing Europe**

The different perspectives on the convention can be summarized as follows.

1. There is a serious and growing problem posed by international organized crime and Europol is essential. The creation of Europol also demonstrates that the EU can respond effectively in furthering cooperation on law and order.
2 Europol is essential to combat the real threat by international organized crime but the draft convention should have been put before the European Parliament so that its views could be taken into account. It was drawn up in secret and there was no democratic input.

3 There may be a real threat from international organized crime but nobody really knows its extent.

If there is a problem, Europol's role should be strictly limited to a common definition of 'serious organized crime'. The draft convention should have been published so that a proper, open, democratic debate could have taken place on its provisions. There is little doubt that if the convention had been published before it was signed by fifteen EU governments the resultant public debate could have led to a significantly different convention – where concerns for the rights of citizens, the rule of law, and democratic accountability were safeguarded.

The Europol Convention cannot be viewed in isolation. It raises a number of issues that will re-occur in other planned EU-wide conventions – data protection, the role of the European Court of Justice, powers over the citizens.

The other conventions are: 'Simplified extradition', the Customs Information System, Community's financial interests already signed by the fifteen governments. In the pipeline are those on: the crossing of external borders, the European Information System and extradition between EU member states (to cover 'involuntary' extradition).

Furthermore, Europol is one of a number of inter-linking EU-wide computer databases being set up which, once created, will potentially impinge on the rights of a whole range of people for the foreseeable future. These include 'suspected' criminals, 'suspected' public order or security threats, 'suspected' illegal migrants and migrants to be excluded from entering the EU.

The Schengen Information System (SIS), which currently covers seven EU states and already holds 10,000,000 records (September 1995), is to become the European Information System (EIS), covering all fifteen states (when the External Borders Convention is signed). Europol and the EIS will work in tandem. Europol will deal with 'organized crime' – taking in intelligence from non-EU bodies such as the FBI and the US Drug Enforcement Agency – the EIS with 'low-level' crime, public order, security threats and migrants.

Tony Bunyan
The Europol Convention by Tony Bunyan (ISBN 1 874481 08 3) is available from Statewatch
P.O. Box 1516
London N16 0EW, United Kingdom
Continuity and change

Dutch drugs policy in the years to come

The Dutch government has published a policy document in which it sets out the main outlines of its policy on drugs for the years to come. No radical changes will be made, in view of the fact that, in comparison with other countries, the Netherlands has achieved relatively good results, especially in the field of public health. A number of shortcomings have, however, been identified, and the necessary adjustments are to be made. The main adjustments relate to:

- more forceful measures and closer international cooperation to combat international drug trafficking;
- more forceful measures to tackle drug-related nuisance and crime;
- the sale of soft drugs in coffee shops; prosecution proceedings will be initiated for the sale of quantities in excess of 5 grammes instead of the current maximum of 30 grammes; the number of coffee shops will be drastically reduced;
- measures to combat the large-scale production of cannabis in the Netherlands (nederwiet);
- a more active policy on the deportation of drug tourists and drug addicts residing illegally in the Netherlands;
- small-scale pilot projects involving the prescription of heroin on medical grounds. The legalization of either hard or soft drugs is not under consideration.

Continuity

The aim of Dutch drugs policy is the prevention and containment of possible risks to users, their immediate environment and society as a whole. It is based on a combination of measures geared to combating crime and ensuring addicts receive adequate care. In view of the fact that the risks are partly related to the nature of the drugs in question, since 1976 the Opium Act has drawn a distinction between hard drugs and soft drugs. The possession of a quantity of soft drugs for personal use – up to a maximum of 30 grammes – is regarded as a summary offence (a minor offence), which will not usually lead to prosecution. This will remain unchanged. In practice, prosecution proceedings will not be initiated in cases in which soft drugs are sold for personal use, which occurs in the cities in what are known as coffee shops, provided certain strict conditions are met. This allows young people who might wish to experiment with soft drugs to be protected from the criminal underworld in which the trade in hard drugs occurs (separating the markets). The possession of more than 30 grammes of soft drugs and the posses-
sion of hard drugs – regardless of the quantity – are regarded as indictable offences (serious offences). It goes without saying that the import and export, production, sale and transport of both soft drugs and hard drugs will continue to be regarded as indictable offences.

The pragmatic approach adopted in the Netherlands has been set out in guidelines, and policy is therefore more visible than in other countries which, in practice, have adopted much the same methods. Evidence of the success of the separation of markets is to be found in the fact that only a very few of the young people in the Netherlands who use soft drugs take to using hard drugs. At the same time, there has been no rise in the use of soft drugs.

Thanks to an intensive policy on prevention and care, drug addicts in the Netherlands are in better health than those living in many other countries. In this connection, attention is drawn to the fact that the HIV virus is less prevalent among Dutch addicts than among their counterparts abroad and its incidence is, moreover, on the decrease. There are an estimated 25,000 hard drug addicts in the Netherlands, i.e. 1.6 per thousand members of the total population. This figure is below the European average, and is far lower than in France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and Switzerland. The death-rate among addicts is also very low.

Measures to combat crime play a very important role in Dutch drugs policy. Every year, large quantities of both hard and soft drugs are confiscated. The Dutch police and criminal justice authorities work very closely with their counterparts abroad. The Netherlands has posted liaison officers to a number of countries, while many drug liaison officers from other countries are stationed in the Netherlands.

Change

Although Dutch policy has achieved relatively good results where public health is concerned, drug use and everything associated with it have given rise to great social and administrative problems. More than before, policy will therefore be geared to tackling and containing the nuisance drug use causes society. An amendment to the Municipalities Act, for example, will make it possible to seal off homes from which drugs are being sold. Cell space in Dutch prisons is to be expanded. Intensification of various measures will require the coordinated efforts of government authorities, the public prosecutions department, care institutions, the police and the aliens department.

More forceful measures to combat international drug trafficking

The emergence of criminal organizations involved in the drug trade is a source of great concern to the Dutch government. The increasing activity of these organizations and their economic strength constitute a threat to the democratic, constitutional state governed by the rule of law. Other
countries rightly object to the widespread involvement of Dutch nationals in international drug trafficking and to the role of the Netherlands as a producer of amphetamines and XTC (Ecstasy). The Netherlands will step up its efforts to detect and prosecute those involved in international drug trafficking. A national investigations unit is to be set up with special responsibility for assisting foreign investigations.

Reducing the quantities of soft drugs sold in coffee shops
Efforts will be made to address the consequences of policy on coffee shops, which has, unfortunately, led to problems in neighbouring countries. The sale of soft drugs has largely fallen into the hands of commercial operators. In the towns and cities on our borders, in particular, quantities of more than a few grammes which are sold to foreign nationals are almost certainly intended for export. It was never the intention that the coffee shops in the Netherlands should act as suppliers for other countries. The maximum quantity of soft drugs that coffee shops may sell without facing prosecution will therefore be reduced from 30 grammes to 5 grams and foreign visitors will find it more difficult to lay in supplies for sale at home. In addition, the number of coffee shops in most of the major cities will be drastically reduced – in many cases by more than 50%.

Consideration is being given to establishing clear boundaries within which coffee shop operators may perform their activities, insofar as this is possible under the terms of the international conventions to which the Netherlands is party. A proposal has been put forward to the effect that direct investigations should not be conducted of coffee shop operators who comply with the conditions laid down by the municipality in question and the public prosecutions department and who have no more than a few hundred grammes in their possession.

Countering the production of nederwiet
Cannabis produced in the Netherlands – nederwiet – is becoming increasingly popular. The Netherlands is thus in danger of becoming a production and export centre for soft drugs. This would be both unacceptable and intolerable from the viewpoint of public health and would rightly give rise to strong criticism from other countries. The government has therefore decided to give high priority to the investigation and prosecution of those engaged in the large-scale production of nederwiet.

Policy on the deportation of foreign drug addicts/drug tourists
Some of the nuisance encountered in the Netherlands is caused by foreign drug addicts residing illegally in the Netherlands and drug tourists from neighbouring EU countries who enter the country in order to buy hard drugs. A more active deportation
policy will be pursued in respect of foreign drug addicts residing illegally in the Netherlands who commit offences. Investigations will be conducted, prosecution proceedings initiated and the offenders in question will be brought to trial, and proceedings transferred to the country of origin. The Municipality of Rotterdam recently launched an offensive against drug-related nuisance. Several hundred foreign drug tourists and drug runners were arrested. This policy will be continued in the next few years. Foreign addicts should receive care in their own country. Dutch society cannot continue to foot the bill for the lack of care facilities in other countries.

Heroin on prescription on medical grounds – small-scale pilot projects
One or more small-scale experiments will be started involving the supply of heroin on strict medical grounds to seriously ill addicts whose physical state and social situation are beyond hope. Similar projects have been launched in Switzerland and the course of events there will be followed closely.

No legalization of drugs
The policy document states that the legalization of either hard or soft drugs is not an objective. As far as hard drugs are concerned, the serious health hazards their use entails constitutes the main argument against legalization. As far as soft drugs are concerned, the Dutch government would not expect any decrease in the criminal trade in drugs if the Netherlands were to legalize them unilaterally. Moreover, legalization would lead to even lower prices on the Dutch market, and thus to a further increase in drugs tourism, a development the government deems unacceptable.

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Organized criminal finances in Eastern Europe

A comment on issue no. 4, 1995

In considering Central and Eastern Europe, it is necessary to address two current misnomers applied to this entity, those of, ‘developing economies’ and, ‘new democracies’. Whilst the political will in these countries is strong for a more open society, the fact remains that most have governments and legislatures that contain substantial elements of old-guard communism. Some are experiencing a popular hearkening back to the old
regimes partly as a simplistic reaction when confronted with complex problems. In Lithuania, Poland and Russia this reaction has manifested itself in the ballot box. These problems are born of speedily-gained political freedom combined with the growing need to assume the accompanying responsibilities and economic transitions, the latter being linked to economic performance and large-scale criminal moneys. In this context, 'developing economies' with its implicit meaning of a near-inevitably improving economy, is mistaken.

Tracing the history of the Eastern and Central European bloc – by which is meant the politico-military entity comprising the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies – it can be seen that its course retained some partial balance. The apparent political strength of the former Soviet Union during the 1960s and 1970s was due to the following – summarized – historical sequence.

The former Soviet Union survived the Second World War after narrowly avoiding initial defeat. At a comparatively late stage its industry was mobilized and placed on a war footing. This tardiness was due to Stalin's disastrous priority of eradication of the internal political enemy; only during the period 1943-1945, with the military turning point achieved, was industrial production approaching full capacity, giving the standard false stimulus war affords to economic growth. Stalin remained suspicious of the Western allies, and at the very period when Western Europe was striving for retrenchment, demobilization and social reform and welfare the Soviet economy remained on a quasi-military footing in order to support Stalinist aggrandizement. Such a résumé is a general description. It does not detail the combined Western Europe and the United States' hard-line response to the various cold-war crises, a response which met with some undoubted success. The salient point of the above description, however, remains valid, that of the resulting totalitarian economic and financial planning. Such economic planning was made of necessity, without accepting ideologically, or taking into account the regional economic developments, and the shortfall involving cash/credit proportions. In this sense the removal of planning, or eradication of the command economy referred to in Sinuraja's article of the previous issue as occurring in the post-1991 transition had the seeds of its dismantling long before this date. Essentially the Soviet period from the late 1940s saw adaptations and modifications which steadily degraded the strict soviet-structured economy.

In global terms credit-flow and credit transfer increased in Western Europe and intensified commercial activity by increasing availability of large-scale funds. During a single decade, 1968-1978, deposits held in Western hemisphere tax havens by United States-based holders increased by 1.5 billion to 159 billion US dollars. In a
similar ten-year period, 1970-1980, the early growth rate of the Euro-dollar market was over 27 percent. By 1990 the Eurocurrency market was estimated to have standing resources of over 3 trillion US dollars. In historical terms, one can speak of a market economy when prices in the markets of a given area fluctuate in unison. In this context it is puzzling to view the digression, somewhat irrelevant, cited in Sinuraja's article in the previous issue whereby nations competing for wealth rather than territory is stated as a new development. The phenomena of competing for wealth as opposed to physical territory occurred long before 1945, as is proven by the late fifteenth century in Europe whereby city-states exercised political influence disproportionate to their size because of their servicing and monopolizing the financial service sector of Europe. The rise and eclipse of Bruges, Genoa, Lisbon, Venice, Antwerp and Amsterdam, and indeed the policy of Britain during the Congress of Vienna negotiations in 1815, all are classic examples of national policy eschewing the shadow priority of territorial gains for the substance of financial strength, a process occurring throughout modern history and pre-dating 1945. Once such price groupings fluctuate in a sort of unison, accompanied by the coordinates of forming politico-strategic blocs, a form of proto-capitalism in regional or central zones emerges. Within Eastern Europe this occurred during the period 1930-1983, particularly after the 1940s. Whilst free business initiative was stifled, a market economy within the Eastern bloc operated in that coherent, albeit illogical, trade circuits were established on the apparently contradictory axis of single trade centres. The former Soviet Union ascribed to itself the most favoured nation status in terms of export of produce in return for the alleviation of food shortages and the protection of industry, ensuring full, albeit false, employment rates: an Eastern-bloc form of mercantilism. This economic area was virtually bypassed by the massive increase in credit and currency-flow experienced by the United States and Western Europe from 1950 to the early 1970s. With the passage of time in the Central European states heavy, inefficient and outdated industry and grandiose construction schemes soaked up funds, whilst tourism, agriculture and light engineering were given scant support. Salaries were fixed, with little incentives. Slides into financial crises in the late 1970s were alleviated by the techniques of selling imported Soviet raw materials abroad for large amounts of foreign currency. In the case of Bulgaria, for example, this was Soviet oil. Such measures were merely short-term camouflage, causing anger to the former Soviet Union which was making sacrifices by selling such commodities cheaply. This spasmodic haemorrhaging of vital circulating capital left various investment vacuums which criminal
funds would eventually fill. That such criminal funds were available was partially due to the states' economic imbalance.

Of the Central European countries at this time Hungary was by far the most economically advanced. Yet even this state by the 1980s felt it necessary to legalize the 'black economy', acknowledging its existence as a viable alternative due to its ability to operate independent of bureaucratic controls. Such tacit discreet acceptance of an alternative economy, also gave rise to the development of criminal monopolies in the unenforced sectors.

Hungary serves as a neo-classical model of the development of Eastern-bloc organized crime, accompanied by the increase of circulating criminal capital. In a masterly survey of crime control in Hungary in an article in the previous issue, Gönczöl correlates the increase of social deviance with crisis in established political institutions and changes in the regime. She cites such periods of increase as far back as the 1950s and 1960s, and points out that at the time of major change in the regime the increase of social deviance 'grew explosively'. I would further suggest that, in terms of organized crime within Hungary four periods in its increase are clearly discernible; from 1980 to mid-1983, from mid-1983 to March 1989, from April/May 1989 to 1992, and from 1992 to the present day. It is not the purpose of this article to give an historical appraisal. Suffice to state that the most important stage was that of August 1989 to 1992, when the growth of the domestic drug market (as opposed to Hungary being a transit country) coincided with the privatization of the economy, with increased demand for large-scale capital investment.

The corollary to such a development is twofold, and Hungary serves as a prime example of what occurred throughout Central Europe during this period. The first is that a significant proportion of a state's economic performance becomes vulnerable to criminal control. In the case of Hungary such a trend was discernible over half a decade before 1989, the year viewed as the historical watershed in the demise of totalitarianism within the former Warsaw Pact countries. Secondly the orwellian double-think of such a process – de facto acceptance of a vital alternative economy whilst maintaining official pretence that it is not happening in order to maintain ideological totalitarianism – facilitated the growth of organized crime. It is a cardinal maxim in law enforcement that there is inevitably a time-lag between organized crime establishing itself in a state or society and its presence becoming apparent, and finally recognizable as a law enforcement problem of some magnitude.

With such ideological self-deceit prevalent in the chanceries of Central Europe, organized crime groups not only benefited from the time-lag, they also remained untrammelled
due to repeated state insistence that such phenomena did not exist within the people's regimes. Shelley's article points out that this wilful blindness to criminal realities lasted within the USSR well into the 1980s. In a comprehensive survey of Hungary Gönczöl speaks of the, 'unnerving dimensions, particularly in the realm of crime' and observes that a, 'considerable portion of today's demand for personal property and business security appears under market conditions,' and that this 'may be purchased, since it can be no longer guaranteed by the state'. In this lies the essence of the ultimate stage in the development of organized crime, that of it replacing the state and becoming a de facto alternative form of government. Thus organized-crime groups were present in Hungary, and in Central and Eastern Europe well before 1989. Egmond's article points out that there is nothing new in immigrant criminal groups from the East establishing themselves in the West, and provides comprehensive examples of this. I would suggest that, in support of this, the early 1980s saw an intensification of Soviet criminals of Israeli descent establishing themselves during the lessening of the refusnik policy by Gorbachov which was held to be incompatible with his détente foreign policy. A particularly salient point is made by Saberschinski's article in the previous issue when he states that in the 1980s immigrants from the former Soviet Union, including criminals, were already present in Berlin and the political upheaval enabled a speedy expansion of their criminal activities during the unification process in 1989. However significant that this date was in political terms, it was irrelevant in the development of organized crime. Criminal entrepreneurship, a vital sector of the Central European economies was developing in the 1970s and 1980s on a blueprint for a Pirenne model of criminal capitalism. It is therefore suggested that to state, as is done by Sinuraja in the article in the previous issue, that 1991 forms a watershed in terms of cross-border illegal transactions East to West, is somewhat extreme. Illegal transfer of funds from the former Soviet Union occurred, on a large scale, up to a decade before that date. In one sense this was mirrored by state policy which discreetly invested large-scale reserves in the Western banking system, in order to gain from the comparative stability of the Western European financial institutions, whilst concealing such investments as official policy in order to avoid ideological compromising of the regime. A spokesman from Bulgaria, at the December 1994 Stasbourg conference, pessimistically stated that the momentum was lost regarding East-West transfers of money, in that the so-called red money had been laundered in Western banks long before the events of 1988-1989. In this can be perceived the same phenomena cited by Handelman and quoted by Shelley's article of the previous issue,
of the smuggling of profits forming the basis of a working relationship between criminals and established nomenklatura.

Both Hungary and Bulgaria illustrate an important trend regarding the period 1985-1990. Political change encompassing most of Central Europe occurred with bewildering rapidity, leaving the new regimes struggling to come to terms with new-found freedoms and responsibilities. Yet, economic adoption of Western capitalism commenced a decade earlier, became an economic reality and pari passu, certain economic sectors of the Central and Eastern European economies became vulnerable to organized-crime control. It is an established historical precept that when the balance between the forces of continuity and the forces of change becomes disturbed, regional instability, often violent, results. Such was the period 1985-1990 in Central Europe. Yet, paradoxically, part of those very forces of continuity was the developing monetarism and freeing of markets, in which large amounts of criminal assets and control were responsible for such a development.

Hungary and Bulgaria, together with the other component former Warsaw Pact states, are also indicative of being infiltrated by post-Soviet organized crime. Shelley's article in the previous issue points out the border porosity of these states and are now providing bases for the same organized-crime activities as experienced in Russia and heavily emphasizes the transnational nature of such organized-crime groups.

In a recent study carried out by the United States' federal government-sponsored Strategic Research Institution, the concept of 'regional ungovernability' was cited. It was not describing areas where armed conflict or warlord government was in play but dealing with the results of organized crime.

It delineated a situation where a nation or groups of nations, apparently sovereign states, possess all the executive organs of state which are apparently functioning both in the realms of domestic and foreign policy, yet due to the level of organized criminality those very governmental and financial institutions are dependent upon organized crime. States may be economically dependent upon the amount and liquidity of criminal assets passing through their financial systems and providing large-scale investment. The result, however, is a de facto negation of sovereignty. The study cited as a crucial factor in the development of such organized crime the same factor pointed out by Shelley, that of border porosity.

Turning to the present situation concerning criminal funds, the situation in the Russian Federation is giving rise for grave concern. Since the early 1980s a series of interrelated short-term economic trends, adverse in the extreme, wreaked their combined effects on Russia. These were the constant degradation of the Soviet
economic system, which as described above, although flawed, did function and gave a certain regional economic stability. This degradation was exacerbated by misconceived economic reforms of Gorbachov. The constant fall in energy output, particularly oil, a commodity dealt with in a highly instructive way by Sinuraja's article in the previous issue; the ending of the Comecon trading bloc in 1990; and the splintering-off of national entities from the former Soviet Union structure. This last had three crucial effects of, firstly, speeding up the severing of industrial and economic links between the fifteen Soviet republics, secondly the creation of separate currencies after Russia made the rouble a national currency, and thirdly the reduction of Russian energy, and Russian subsidies, to the other republics.

Therefore to cite post-1991 as the crucial date whereby economic factors were intensely conducive to the growth of organized crime is at once too arbitrary and implies false suddenness of the rise of organized crime. I would suggest that this process was more gradual, though no less insidious, and can be seen to be continuous since the early 1980s, and a process encompassing the whole of the former Soviet Union and its Central European allies.

Addressing senior government officials, a senior Scotland Yard Police officer stated in 1992 that, 'we cannot afford to give two years free time to the Mafia, either in Palermo or Petersburg'. In this he was stating the essential issue of problem recognition by law enforcement authorities. In pure time-scale he was referring to the danger of allowing Russian organized crime a further, additional two years to develop, as organized-crime groups within the Russian Federation had remained unchecked since Andropov inaugurated a coordinated central government initiative against organized crime in the early 1980s which failed within six months.

In terms of economic survival certain Central and Eastern European states, quite simply, have little choice in assimilating large-scale criminal funds due to both their sheer amount, and the proportion which they form in the available development capital. This could not have been more trenchantly stated than in Shelley's article in the previous issue in the statement: '(...) money-laundering is central to post-Soviet banking (...) So many banks launder money that banks and bankers who refuse cannot stay competitive.' The normally stable banking business has acquired a violent dimension; in 1993 alone a wave of bank murders claimed the lives of eleven senior executives, two chairmen and several dozen middle managers, the motives being the acquisition of control. Sectors of the economies of Central European nations are at a vulnerable stage to the danger of dependency on illicit large-scale funds at the disposal of international organized-crime groups. During the period 1987-1991 the Cen-
Central European states asserted their political independence from the former Soviet Union as lynch-pin of the former Warsaw Pact. The period 1990-1991 saw the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the emergence of an uncertain Commonwealth of Independent States. This entity was somewhat nebulous in that Georgia and the Baltic states remaining aloof, and the five Central Asiatic states of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan tended initially to look to themselves as a neo-Asiatic federation distant from Moscow, whilst the Russian Federation became embroiled in traditional differences with Ukraine. Despite such changes, two constants remained. The first was the economic decline common to all, and secondly that of the organized-crime problem, again common to all, encompassing the former Soviet Union and Central Europe. Indeed the post-1993 period has been charted by Erickson, Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen, as witnessing a tightening up of the CIS nations, under the tutelage of the Russian Federation in areas of defence, economic planning and even closer political union. A major area that has not seen closer cooperation, as pointed out by Shelley’s article, is that of inter-CIS state law enforcement cooperation.

It is suggested that both academic and law enforcement responses to the criminal problems emanating from Eastern Europe have been caught in a dichotomy of territorial definitions and political changes involving new sovereign entities and definitions. Initially the problem concerned organized crime emanating from Eastern Europe, which then tended to be equated with the former Soviet Union, then the main thrust of attention was given to the Russian Federation. Whilst accepting that the various regions and countries of the former Warsaw Pact have obvious differences, the problems of organized crime emanating from this area and impacting upon the European Union originate from all parts of this area. Saberschinski’s highly informative article in the previous issue highlights not merely Russian criminal groups in Berlin, but a predominance of Polish, Romanian and Yugoslavian groups; heroin trafficking and dealing is mentioned with involvement by Russian, Polish and Czech transit points.

Sinuraja’s article expresses the laudable objective of finding the key unit of analysis to the problem of organized economic crime connected with the Russian Federation. From a criminal intelligence point of view, it is not so much analysis of the problem per se, and that within the Russian Federation, but rather responding and dealing with the effects of such organized crime on the European Union. It is suggested that one key unit in such analysis is the recognition that such criminal problems are indeed connected with the Russian Federation, but inseparable from the
wider problem of organized crime from Eastern and Central Europe. Accordingly the problem should be viewed as one component of a whole, in terms of its long-term impact upon the European Union. In view of the threat of large-scale criminal capital from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the debilitative effects upon the very economies of those countries, amongst which certain countries will constitute an expanded European Union in the mid-term future, there is a practical necessity for some form of European Union-wide intelligence exchange regarding suspicious international financial transactions.

Nick Ridley
Intelligence Analyst Europol
P.O. Box 90850
2509 LW The Hague, The Netherlands.
Crime institute profile

The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention

Marianne Håkansson

The Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet, BRÅ) was established on July 1, 1974 and is a governmental agency under the Ministry of Justice. The council is headed by a director-general appointed by the government. The council's Board of Management, consisting of nine members, is appointed by the government following proposals put forward by the political parties represented in parliament. The council has approximately thirty employees: researchers, investigators, public relations officers and administrative personnel. In addition to these there are staff taken on temporarily for research and other projects, and trainees and staff on loan from other authorities, e.g. from the police.

Objectives and activities

The overriding objective of the government's criminal policy and therefore also of the activities of the council is to reduce crime and increase people's security in society. According to instructions (annex) for the National Council for Crime Prevention adopted by the government in 1993 in the area of criminal policy the council is to

1. provide the government with a basis on which to take measures and set priorities;
2. conduct comprehensive investigations and analyses of the efforts of the society and individuals;
3. support the efforts of local authorities, organizations and other individuals;

pursue or assist in research and development work in which the results may shed light on the causes of crime;
5 pursue or assist in research and development work which can provide a basis for action or which apply to an evaluation of action taken;
6 be responsible for official statistics in accordance with the provisions of Ordinance 1992: 1668 on Official Statistics;
7 monitor and analyze crime trends and report on the present situation;
8 issue reports from research, development and information projects and in other ways compile and distribute information of relevance to the council on criminological research and crime prevention measures;
9 cooperate in its activities with other government agencies, local authorities and organizations.

For the first few years after it came into existence (in 1974), the National Council for Crime Prevention acted almost as a body for criminal policy investigation and action. One of its main tasks was to act as a body coordinating authorities under the government. However, the nature of its activities gradually changed, and it has focused for many years on more fundamental criminological research. In recent years, the council has been developed into a research and development body as a result of increasing emphasis gradually being given to applied research and development work.

According to the decision taken by the Swedish parliament in the spring of 1993 with reference to the government’s bill, ‘Research for knowledge and progress’ (1992/93, p. 170), the council is to continue to be a skilled expert body on criminal-policy matters under the government.

The council is engaged in research, development work and information activities. In recent years the emphasis in its activities has shifted from more fundamental, long-term research towards applied research, evaluations, statistical overviews and analyses, summaries of existing knowledge and other projects which are often more limited in time.

Research and development work

The council’s research and development work seeks to provide a scientific basis for crime policy decisions through surveys of criminality and the need for appropriate measures, the evaluation of action taken and the development of models for crime prevention work at central, regional and local levels.

The work is for the most part divided up by subject matter and pursued, with few exceptions, in the form of projects. With the majority of projects various forms of collaboration take place with national administrations, municipalities and/or organizations. The projects themselves are of varying nature. Some are
comprehensive, continue over several years and involve both national and international research workers and other experts. Other projects are less extensive, involve only one research worker or other expert and are begun and completed within a year.

The council's activities, according to its terms of reference dictated by the government, are to an increasing extent directed towards producing a basis on which the government can take measures and set priorities in its criminal policy work and towards evaluating new legislation and criminal justice reforms. A particularly significant task is to be responsible under the government for comprehensive investigations and analyses of the total efforts of society in the field of criminal policy. One such task was a government assignment in the spring of 1993 concerning an analysis of the future and the surrounding world. The National Council for Crime Prevention produced its report, which was prepared in collaboration with the National Police Board and the Swedish Prison and Probation Administration, the same year. Work on an analysis of the future and the surrounding world is continuing within the council with in-depth studies and a follow-up of forecasts.

As from July 1, 1994 the council is also responsible for the official judicial statistics. The responsibility includes both the criminal statistics and the statistics on the working of other parts of the judicial system. The council is required therewith to ensure that the need for statistics on civil law matters is properly satisfied.

The activities of the National Council for Crime Prevention are organized into the areas:

- crime statistics and crime trends;
- official judicial statistics;
- crime prevention;
- criminal justice policy;
- penal law;
- crime from a developmental perspective (from early childhood to adulthood);
- economic and organized crime;
- information and publishing.

National crime prevention programme

Following the analysis of the future and the surrounding world, the government in the spring of 1994 instructed the council to prepare documentation for a national crime prevention programme. According to the terms of reference, the documentation should, among other things, clarify the orientation and aims of crime prevention work, the delegation of responsibilities, coordination
and cooperation at different levels and the follow-up and evaluation of the results. A key question to be answered is what measures are required to prevent children and young people from drifting into criminal behaviour and abuse. It has been widely asserted that some of the less serious crimes, committed by young people, are often the first step towards more serious criminal behaviour. There is therefore reason, the government argues, for studying whether it is possible to identify what are referred to as strategic crimes, and if so, what can be done to increase the opportunities for taking action to deal with these to a greater extent.

A report was presented to the government in 1995. The council focused its work on four areas: early crime prevention, which is intended to prevent the recruitment of new individuals into criminal careers; situational crime prevention, which is aimed at limiting occasional crime; measures, particularly in the judicial system, to reduce recidivist crime; matters concerned with organization and responsibility. The government will publish the national crime prevention programme in the spring of 1996.

Two main functions

Summarizing, the National Council for Crime Prevention can be said to have two main functions. The first is to provide basic information for politicians and other decision makers, for private persons and for public discussion on crime policy matters. This function is important as a prior condition for rational public discussion on crime policy issues and to reinforce confidence in the crime policy system. The second function is to conduct research and development work that contributes to accumulative knowledge within the crime policy sector and continuously meets the demand for information overviews and other decision-making needs concerning current questions arising in the system.
Abstracts

This section contains a selection of abstracts of reports and articles on criminal policy and research in Europe. The aim of publishing these short summaries is to generate and disseminate information on the crime problem in Europe. Articles that generate comparative knowledge are seen as being of special interest. Most of the articles have been published in other journals in the English language. More information can be supplied by the RDC Documentation Service. Single copies of the articles mentioned in this section can – when used for individual study or education – be provided by the RDC Documentation Service at your request. A copy charge is made.

RDC Documentation Service
P.O. Box 20301
2500 EH The Hague, The Netherlands
Tel: (31 70) 3706553;
fax: (31 70) 3707948

Andvig, J.C.
Corruption in the North Sea oil industry: issues and assessments
The article explores the extent, the institutional mechanisms and economic consequences of economically motivated bribery in the Norwegian (and British) oil industry. It focuses on corruption directed against middle-level management in the oil companies. The empirical part of the study is partly based on public information collected from court cases, mainly from British courts; and partly based on systematic interviews with security experts in Norwegian and international oil companies, and British and Norwegian police.

Bauman, Z.
The strangers of consumer era: from the welfare state to prison
Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, vol. 37, no. 3, 1995, pp. 210-218
Bauman thinks that the evidence is overwhelming of the intimate link between the universal tendency towards a radical freedom of the market and the progressive dismantling of the Welfare state and the tendency to criminalize poverty. Subjects treated: the margin is ‘marginal’ no more; the ‘inner demons’ of the society of consumers; the new ‘dangerous classes’ of criminals; prison population and the death penalty in the United States; and the tyranny of the ‘economically correct’.

De Leonardis, O.
Training Needs and Integration into the Work Environment of Young People Leaving Penal Institutions
This study, commissioned by the European Commission, had the following objectives: (1) to identify educational needs necessary for a basic vocational training for young offenders in order to give them methodological and motivational tools which are indispensable to become integrated into the work environment; (2) to define and identify the general framework into which job opportunities can be implemented with the aim of granting employers human resources adequate to production needs; (3) to set up precise reference outline and elements useful to the creation of a func-
tional model for the integration into the work environment of 'maladjusted' juveniles, with the aim of combining the youth's training needs and the actual possibility of being involved into the work environment. The research was divided into the following stages: (1) survey of existing literature and reconstruction of the overall context; (2) definition of the subject under investigation; (3) analysis and interpretation of results obtained and set-up of a general model.

Europol Drugs Unit

Threat Assessment: First Discussion Document


The Europol Drugs Unit was asked at the meeting of Operational Heads of National Criminal Intelligence Services, held in The Hague in October 1994, to identify the criminal threats imposed upon member states of the European Union. As a result this document has been prepared which focuses upon the major identifiable organized groups and specific areas of criminality (drugs, illicit trade in radioactive and nuclear material, organized illegal immigration, vehicle trafficking and money laundering).

Farrell, M., J. Neeleman, M. Gossop et al.

Methadone provision in the European Union


This article describes the present level of methadone substitution in Europe and the changes that have occurred up to 1993. There has been a considerable expansion in the level of provision. It summarizes briefly the variations in the organization of opiate substitution treatment in Europe.

A key informant was used to gain an overview at national level of the following countries: France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Denmark. Each informant was interviewed using a semi-structured questionnaire, focusing on estimates for opiate prevalence, drug-related HIV and Aids spread, and the content and structure of methadone programmes.

Guyomarch, A.

Problems and prospects for European police cooperation after Maastricht


Despite the Maastricht Treaty provision for closer cooperation between EU police forces and a joint agency, Europol, common policy-making and joint actions remain very difficult and limited in scope. As in earlier institutional frameworks (notably the Trevi, Pompidou and Schengen Groups), the need for unanimity between member-state governments and the very different patterns and traditions in policing make greater collaboration problematic, despite the growing evidence of common problems. The end of the East-West divide in Europe has increased the advantages for the governments of EU member states in making effective joint policies, especially on cross-border movements. Achievements in this area, however, remain small, even though increasing numbers of professionals, experts and politicians are voicing their concerns.

Joubert, C.

National and international aspects of undercover policing


In this article the author begins by sketch-
ing the problem of the repression of organized crime and continues by making a non-exhaustive inventory of undercover policing methods. Then, giving an overview of the regulation of these techniques in the five original Schengen countries, she finally concludes by attempting to answer the question as to whether these policing techniques ought to be formally regulated in status.

Kutnjak Ivković, S.
Does gender matter: the role of gender in legal decision-making by Croatian mixed tribunals
In Croatia, mixed tribunals are utilized as decision makers for criminal cases in which offenders are charged with offences punishable by 5 or more years of imprisonment (Article 21, Item 2, Criminal Procedure Law 1993). Mixed tribunals meet at the regional and district courts, parts of the Croatian judicial system. The data for this study were collected as part of a larger study examining mixed tribunals in general.

Lacey, N., L. Zedner
Discourses of community in criminal justice
The aim of this paper is to address two puzzles about the frequency and power of appeals to community as a feature of the structuring and legitimating discourse of contemporary criminal justice. First, the authors consider the conceptual contours of the idea of community. Secondly, they sketch two historical accounts of the role of ideas of community in the development of British criminal justice policy over the last thirty years. Finally, they set out a theoretical framework within which the British example may be considered from a comparative point of view. The specific comparison which they develop is one between Britain and Germany; a country in which apparently institutionally similar developments have been realized in significantly different ways.

Oakley, R.
Police training in Europe on ethnic relations
*Police Journal*, vol. 68, no. 4, 1995, pp. 325-332
Following a special meeting of experts organized by the Council of Europe in late 1992, a set of practical guidelines for conducting training of police officers on these issues was drawn up, together with examples of specific projects (Police Training Concerning Migrants and Ethnic Relations: Practical Guidelines, Council of Europe Press, 1994). In connection with this meeting, a survey of member states of the Council of Europe was carried out, the aim of which was to identify to what extent and in what ways such training had already been introduced in the various countries of Europe. This article reports the results of this survey.

PA Cambridge Economic Consultants
Ex-offenders Budget Line Projects
Following a decision by the Social Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in 1992 a budget line was established in 1993 to fund the development of experimental actions addressing the issue of labour market reintegration of offenders. In early 1995, the Commission asked the ERGO Programme to utilize its experience in evaluat-
ing labour market actions in favour of disad
tantaged groups and undertake a series
of case study evaluations. The six case
studies presented here were drawn from a
group of over 20 projects funded under the
Reintegration of Offenders budget line. As
far as possible the projects were selected
to represent the diversity of both type of
activity and member state origin, however,
the choice was restricted to those projects
which had completed their activities. The
projects discussed are: Arsis/NACRO,
Greece; O Companheiro, Portugal; Equipo
Estrategias, Spain; Diagrama, Spain;
Access to training and employment for
offenders, England; and APRES, Belgium.

Paoli, L.
The Banco Ambrosiano case: an investiga-
tion into the underestimation of the rela-
tions between organized and economic
crime
Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 23,
no. 4, 1995, pp. 345-365
Moving from the Ambrosiano case, the
paper aims to analyze the links existing
between organized crime and economic
crime, showing the patterns of relation-
ship and highlighting the weaknesses and
strengths of both forms of crime as they
interact with each other. The paper also
underlines the peculiarity of such relations
in the Italian criminal situation, which is
categorized by deep, strong and long-
standing connections between organized
crime and economic crime.

Verbruggen, F.
Euro-Cops? Just say maybe: European
lessons from the 1993 reshuffle of US drug
enforcement
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law
and Criminal Justice, vol. 3, no. 2, 1995,
pp. 150-201
The genesis of Europol has now entered a
decisive phase, although the idea itself did
not come out of the blue. It is yet one more
institution in the plenitude of different
organizations, structures and regimes that
constitute the European networks in
matters of criminal law enforcement and
police cooperation. In this article the
author illustrates how a look at a distant
neighbour might provide an interesting
perspective for the study of international
law enforcement in Europe. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is precisely
the agency that is time and again used in
the Europol discussion, both as a negative
and as a positive model. The United States
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is
the chief exponent of international drug
prohibition enforcement. Surprisingly
even, the American federal police sys-
tem is rarely studied as a feasible model
for Europe. The hesitations in doing so not
only root in a suspicion towards centraliza-
tion of European criminal law enforc-
ment, but also spring from misconcep-
tions of what the situation in the United
States is like.

White, S.
A variable geometry of enforcement?
Aspects of European Community budget
fraud
Crime, Law and Social Change, vol. 23,
no. 3, 1995, pp. 235-255
This paper located the control of fraud
against the Community budget within the
wider context of the tensions engendered
by fiscal crises and successive enlarge-
ments of the European Union. Funds allo-
cated to the member states for agriculture,
whether in the form of subventions or
structural grants, take up more than half of
total budget expenditure, so the Common
Agricultural Policy has been at the heart of
the discussion on budgetary control. Since
the 1980s the Common Agricultural Policy
has been blamed for the repeated fiscal
crises affecting the Community budget,
and for frauds and irregularities. The paper
analyzes the prospects for future enforce-
ment.

Wright, J., K. Bryett
Multilateral policing and new conceptions
of security in the European Union
Police Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, 1994,
pp. 61-75
One of the consequences of the develop-
ment of the European Union is the relaxa-
tion of internal borders. Among the pro-
blems this creates is the relative ease with
which law breakers can move about within
the overall jurisdiction. This creates even
greater difficulties for already over-burden-
ed and hard-pressed police. One possible
solution which would improve the poten-
tial for police to deal with these contem-
porary criminals is to move towards a
single police capability for the entire Euro-
pean Union jurisdiction. Whilst there are
obvious difficulties with such a concept
based on notions of sovereignty and tradi-
tional forms of policing, there are no un-
assailable barriers to the eventual appear-
ance of a fully operational Europol as
crime-fighting agency.