

Building Castles in the (Dutch) Air

**Understanding the Policy
Deadlock of Amsterdam Airport
Schiphol 1989 - 2009**

Menno Huijs

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*Understanding the Policy Deadlock of
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol 1989 - 2009*

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
Chapter 1 Introduction

In this chapter we set out the problem that lies at the core of this thesis, i.e. the deadlocked policy debate about the development of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (1.1 – 1.3). Next, we discuss the goals, added value and research questions (1.4), followed by a short introduction of the approach that we develop in this thesis (1.5). The chapter concludes with an outline of the remainder of the thesis (1.6).


1.1 Policy Making about Schiphol: The Mainport–Environment Discourse

The development of Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, the 5th largest airport of Europe in terms of traffic volumes in 2010, has been one of the most persistent and difficult issues on the Dutch public policy agenda. Since the 1950s the Dutch government has struggled with the trade off between the economic importance of Schiphol and the environmental impact of the increasing air traffic (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996; Broër, 2006; Tan, 2001). Up until the 1960s this was relatively easy, but when the new Schiphol airport was opened in 1967 the policy controversy really took off.¹ Right from the start, the airport caused more noise pollution than expected, resulting in the increase of resistance against further expansions. However, as traffic numbers and flight movements continued to grow, the sense of urgency to expand grew as well, especially when traffic volumes exploded during the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s (see figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1 Traffic Volumes Schiphol; Amount of flights and amount of passengers



¹ Schiphol airport, originally a military airfield, was founded in 1916. In 1924 the flag carrier of the Netherlands was founded, KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines) and civic aviation entered Schiphol. During the decades that followed, the development of the KLM airline network configuration and the development of Schiphol went hand in hand. In 1967 a thorough reconfiguration of the airport infrastructure was finished and the new Schiphol airport was opened. The new design was meant to facilitate KLM's operations as good as possible (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996).



Source: Schiphol Group, 2009


At the same time, the attention for the negative effects that were caused by this growth increased. In particular the attention for noise, as this effect was immediately experienced by hundred of thousands of people living in the vicinity of the airport. The fact that the airport was located in a densely populated region near the economic heart of the Netherlands, and was encapsulated between different urban areas that were extending towards the airport, did not do much good in this respect (see figures 1.2 & 1.3 for specification of the location of Schiphol).

Figure 1.2 Airports in North West Europe, arrow points at Schiphol



Source: RPB, 2008

Figure 1.3 Schiphol (grey) located within densely populated areas (red areas), situation 2008



Source: Committee Spatial Development Schiphol, Report Mainport 2.0, 2008

In 1988 policy making about Schiphol had reached a deadlock. Actors participating in the policy debate could not agree on the future of the airport, nor on the kind of policies that were needed to regulate the environmental effects. There was a desperate need for a new policy strategy, which gradually emerged throughout the 1980s. In an attempt to break the deadlock the national government formulated the so-called dual objective: the ambitious growth strategy of the airport would be combined with the simultaneous realization of environmental objectives. It was a typical example of a policy of ecological modernization (Broër, 2006; Wagenaar & Cook, 2003), which became a popular discourse in many policy domains in several countries (Hajer, 1995). Discourse here refers to a social order that governs ways of thinking and acting within a given social domain.

For the next sixteen years (1989 – 2005) the policy discussion revolved around the translation of the dual objective in concrete policy measures. During those years the Schiphol issue earned its status as one of the most notorious and difficult issues on the Dutch public policy agenda. For sure, we have witnessed an extensive and heated debate among the stakeholders during those years, but there has been very little movement in the different positions on the growth-environment dilemma. A quick inventory of the many studies that have been conducted over the years allows us to discern great regularities in ways of talking and acting in the public policy debate about Schiphol.² Arguments have been repeated over and over again and policy actors have

² See for example Abma, 2001; Ale, 2000; Ale, 2005; Alexander, 2000; Bakker, 2003; BCP, 2006; Van Boxstel & Huys, 2005; Berkhout, 2003; Boelens & De Jong, 2006; Boons et al., 2010; Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996; Broër, 2006; 2007; Burghout,

become stuck with their specific roles and positions in the different policy processes around which the Schiphol discussion was revolving. The studies also show that various attempts to effectively deal with this tension, like enormous investments in research and information and experiments with all kinds of interactive policy arrangements, did not seem to have the desired effect (i.e. facilitate and relieve the tensions between the opposing coalitions and reframing of the discourse). Instead, proponents and antagonists have been legitimized in formulating diametrically opposed policy arguments, which are all valid in their own terms, while there is mounting evidence that none of the desired futures encompassed in their respective arguments shall ever come about.

In essence, we have witnessed the emergence and institutionalization of what Broër (2006) has labeled the mainport-environment discourse (2006). During the past 16 years this discourse seems to have hold the Schiphol policy debate in an iron grip, as two diametrically opposed coalitions of actors, one advocating continued growth, turning Schiphol into a mainport,³ and one advocating environmental protection continue to exist and talk past one another (see also Abma, 2001; Boons et al., 2010; Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996; Van Duinen, 2003; Van Eeten, 1999; In 't Veld, 2000; Teisman et al., 2008). As Van Eeten (1999; 2001) has contended, the Schiphol policy debate can be seen as a prime example of a dialogue of the deaf, referring to a deadlocked policy debate wherein stakeholders talk past one another (see also Sabatier, 1988). Such dialogues of the deaf are extremely problematic, as they tend to block further resolution of policy issues by suppressing other lines of argument. For example, in his analysis of the Schiphol policy debate Van Eeten has argued that the dominance of the two diametrically opposed stories about growth and environment worked to suppress three other lines of argument that he identified: societal integration of a growing airport, ecological modernization of the aviation sector and sustainable solutions to a growing demand for mobility (see also Abma, 2001; Boons et al., 2010; Kroesen, 2011). As policy actors stick to one of the dominant stories, these stories become more and more institutionalized, further narrowing down the scope for introducing new concepts, categories, metaphors that can give rise to alternative policy problematizations and solutions.

2004; Cerfontaine, 2005; De Grave et al., 2003; De Maar, 1976; Deelstra et al., 2003; Driessen, 1997; Van Eeten, 1997; 1999A; 1999B; Van Gils et al., 2009; Glasbergen & Driessen, 1993; Glasbergen, 1999; Hoppe & Peterse, 1998; Huys, 2006; In 't Veld & Verhey, 2000; De Jong, 2009; 2008; Huys & Koppenjan, 2010; Huys & Kroesen, 2008; Kroesen, 2011; Kroesen & Broër, 2007; De Roo, 1999; Smit & Van Gunsteren, 1997; Stallen & Van Gunsteren, 2002; Stallen et al., 2004; Tan, 2001; 2004; Teisman et al., 2008; Van der Heyden, 2001; Vriesman et al., 2009; Wagenaar & Cook, 2003; Weggeman, 2003; Van Wijk, 2007

³ The term mainport is a typical Dutch invention, as it is not recognized in English language. The Mainport served as a sort of umbrella concept, broadly referring to very large airports and seaports that have a significant international position (being a major hub for air or sea, road and rail traffic) in terms of both quantity and quality and that are assumed to have a great impact on a country's national economy (cf. Van Duinen, 2003; Pestman, 2000). In chapter 5 we elaborate on the emergence of the mainport concept.

Anno 2005 there was no doubt that the mainport-environment discourse had been one of the most persistent and influential discourses on the Dutch public policy agenda of the past 20 years. No doubt that it has become one of the most controversial ones too, as the policy ambitions that were both the precursor and the result of the discourse have received a lot of criticism over the years.

1.2 Criticizing the Mainport-Environment Discourse

The enduring strength of the mainport-environment discourse that has emanated from the dual objective is fascinating, especially when considering its persistence when confronted with mounting evidence against its practical value. To start with, the mainport objective itself has been put under severe criticism. During the 1980s mainport development became one of the cornerstones of the spatial-economic development strategy of the Netherlands. Turning Schiphol and the port of Rotterdam into mainports was essential for becoming a transport and logistic nation par excellence, as the national government desired. Thus, the mainports became the key assets and cornerstones of the Dutch economy, creating jobs and added value. This presumed economic importance of mainport development for the Dutch economy has been questioned time and again. At several times it has been argued that both the direct and indirect influence on jobs and added value were greatly overestimated, while the lack of diversity in the economic strategy made the Dutch economy highly volatile.⁴ Instead of merely investing in mainport development (understood as facilitating a maximum growth of volumes), economic downturns and diversity could be extended by investing in knowledge and tertiary sectors, thus broadening the economic development strategy for the Netherlands. For some, the persistence of the dual objective, and especially the continuing dominance of the mainport objective, has become emblematic for the inability of the Dutch government to innovate its spatial-economic policy focus. The call for a thorough revision of the outdated mainport concept is increasing anno 2010.⁵ Indeed, the Ministries of Transportation and Public Works (*Verkeer & Waterstaat*, V&W from now on) and Economic Affairs (*Economische Zaken*, EZ from now on)⁶, but also the lower tier governmental levels like Province of North Holland and the Municipality of Rotterdam, are exploring the very possibilities to do so.

⁴ This will come the fore in the case study presented in chapters 5 – 8.


⁵ Only recently a large amount of different studies have been developed to point out the need for a broader and more sustainable mainport policy in the Netherlands, see Atzema et al., 2010; Jacobs, 2009; Kuipers & Manshanden, 2010; McKinsey, 2010; SEO, 2009; TNO, 2010.

⁶ The new Cabinet Rutte I that has been in place since October 16th 2010 has fused parts of departments, giving rise to two new Ministries. The former Ministry of V&W is now called the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (*Infrastructuur & Milieu/I&M*). The former Ministry of EZ is now called the Ministry of Economics, Agriculture and Innovation (*Economie, Landbouw & Innovatie/ ELI*). In this thesis we use are dealing with the situation prior to this change in names. We therefore don't talk about the Ministry of I&M and the Ministry of ELI.

Moreover, as the years proceeded more and more actors involved in the Schiphol public policy debate began to doubt the feasibility of the dual objectives. At several occasions it turned out that both objectives were irreconcilable.⁷ Third, and related to this, according to some holding on to the dual objectives resulted in suboptimal solutions.⁸ It had resulted in a policy framework that made it both impossible to stimulate maximum growth and maximum environmental protection.

So over the years the trust in the feasibility of the dual objective of Schiphol, and therefore its legitimacy, has radically diminished. We can illustrate this with the example of the noise policy regulations that have been developed for Schiphol. From the perspective of the leading policy makers it has been claimed for years on end that the noise policy is working out very well. After all, the amount of people that is exposed to high levels of noise pollution has decreased dramatically (figure 1.4). Indeed, when this is compared to the situation around other airports, Schiphol is doing remarkably well (figure 1.5). However, when we compare the amount of complaints about noise pollution around different airports, Schiphol stands out (figure 1.6).

Figure 1.4 Estimated number of highly annoyed people based on exposure-response curve for Schiphol and annual number of flight movements at Schiphol between 1990 and 2009




Source: Kroesen, 2011

⁷ This will come the fore in the case study presented in chapters 5 – 8.


⁸ This will also come to the fore in the case study.

Figure 1.5 Amount of people exposed to serious levels of noise pollution and flight movements/year in 2005



Source: Stratagem, 2006

Figure 1.6 Amount of Complaints related to amount of people exposed to high levels of noise pollution, 2005



Source: Stratagem, 2006

There is an interesting tension involved here. On the one hand, policy makers claim that the noise policy is successful, while on the other hand the local residents clearly perceive Schiphol in terms of a primary noise generator.⁹ Noise policies that are argued

⁹ It can be argued that the amount of complainants is not necessarily a good indicator for illustrating the lack of legitimacy of noise policy. However, as shall come fore in the extensive case description, this perception of failing noise regulations is widely shared by many actors involved (not only the local residents). See also the report of Bijnsdorp Communicatie

to succeed do not work to solve the noise problem. This tension has given rise to numerous claims for revising Schiphol's policy regulations and the noise regulations in particular. Indeed, as shall come to the fore in our extensive case study members of the Upper and Lower House, grassroots organizations, research institutes, lower governmental authorities and the aviation sector time and again called for improved noise regulations. In essence, several actors involved have begun to sense that continuing along the existing path will not produce those outcomes that are desired and deemed necessary.¹⁰ Apparently, the need for policy change is widely supported. Indeed, during most interviews that have been conducted for this thesis during 2004 - 2010 respondents representing several of the key actors in the Schiphol debate clearly recognized that they were moving around in vicious circles, reproducing the same old arguments, interaction patterns and positions time and again. Something that they deemed very undesirable, as it resulted in very little progression whatsoever.

1.3 The Problem: A Persistent Policy Deadlock

However, in spite of the criticism the mainport-environment discourse seemed to have lost little of its influence on the public policy process anno 2005. Thus, despite the obvious shortcomings and problems of the mainport-environment discourse, it has remained in place. Indeed, instead of critically assessing the dual objective and looking for better solutions, members of the national government who are responsible for Schiphol policy regulations (i.e. the Cabinet, Parliament and the leading Ministries involved) kept arguing that the dual objectives were being realized at the same time. Here it is important to further clarify our understanding of a policy deadlock. That is, we already argued that it relates to great regularities in ways of thinking, talking and acting and we discussed the symptoms involved in a deadlock (which all seem to apply to a greater or lesser extent to the case of Schiphol). However, the term policy deadlock does not imply that no variety has been produced at all during the past decades. As we shall assert later on, there is always room for the production of variety, even in the most deadlocked situations. The point we want to make here is that at the outset of this study (2005) there is ample evidence, drawing on previous scientific studies and reflections of practitioners, that little of this produced variety has actually become institutionalized, i.e. become translated into political decisions, policies, research agendas, laws, investments, procedures and methods. Thus, variety has been produced, but the basic assumptions underlying the policy discourse and the regular daily practices involved seem to have remained in place. In order to assess the correctness of this hypothesis, and in order to assess the enduring permanence of the deadlock during the period 2005 -

Projecten, 2005 which consists of a large set of interviews wherein respondents often reflect upon the failing noise regulations around Schiphol.

¹⁰ Stakeholders are defined as those actors that can affect, or are affected by the outcomes of the policy process (Bryson & Crosby, 1992; see also Hermans, 2005).

2009 empirical investigation is required. Nonetheless, drawing on earlier publications and several of our initial interviews wherein the symptoms of policy deadlocks have been recognized, we assert that assuming the presence of a policy deadlock (thus defined) forms a plausible point of departure for our study.

The situation we described thus far as regards Schiphol is quite comparable with the perspective on public policy that Edelman developed some decades ago. According to Edelman the citizen does not face a world of facts (as he is made believe) but a world of political fictions. This implies that it is possible that a policy succeeds as a political device, while it fails to address or ameliorate the problem. Except of course in the terms defined by policy makers. Edelman has referred to this as ‘words that succeed and policies that fail’ (Edelman, 1977). From this perspective, policies may succeed at the symbolic, reassurance level, but fail in practice as in the expression ‘the operation was a success but the patient died’. In the case of Schiphol, the words have been changed several times, while the policy regulations by and large have remained in place (we already discussed the empirical evidence on regularities in arguments and coalitions). Thus, new meanings were given to the same policies. Nonetheless, these ‘verbal innovations’ (a quote borrowed from Van Twist, 1994 who used it to discuss innovative public arrangements) apparently failed to offer any symbolic reassurance to citizens. It is for this reason that the persistence of the mainport-environment discourse is problematical: when both words and policies fail (even citizens are made believe that this is not the case) it automatically works to organize its own resistance.

Persistent policy discourses, such as the mainport-environment discourse, are not necessarily a problem. As long as a policy discourse allows actors to arrive at the practical outcomes that they desire and deem necessary, it can be argued that resistance to change isn’t a problem. After all, the actors involved are satisfied and they do not really care about whether or not public policies fail. However, when policy discourse makes it impossible for actors to arrive at favourable outcomes, these actors will not be satisfied any longer. Moreover, the discourse becomes problematical when actors fail to induce change. The symptoms of such a situation are well-known and include the presence of taboos and myths, repetition of activities and discussions, vicious circles, exasperating delays, escalated conflicts, controversy and distrust among actors, policy accumulation, the creation of ad hoc policies, people talking past one another (dialogue of the deaf), groupthink and people clinging to inefficient rules even when there are clear signals of their finiteness (see Van Eeten, 1999; Hajer, 1995; In ‘t Veld, 1991; Sabatier, 1989; Sabel et al., 1999; Senge, 1990; Termeer, 1993; Termeer & Kessener, 2007). As both scientists and practitioners have pointed out, these symptoms can all be found in the case of Schiphol and are believed to have a devastating effect on the creation of practical outcomes that are desirable and deemed necessary. With regard to

the practitioners we already pointed out that most of our respondents recognized several of these symptoms when reflecting upon the Schiphol case.

Furthermore, from a normative point of view persistent policy discourses that have become hegemonic are always deemed undesirable, as they hamper the production and/or institutionalisation of variety. They have a totalising effect by suppressing diversity and variety. For this reason, there should always be the opportunity for change.¹¹ Especially when considering that firmly institutionalized policy discourses that allow actors to arrive at favourable outcomes in the present do not offer any guarantees that they will do so in the future (for example, when market conditions change). A firmly institutionalized policy discourse may be difficult to change at times when it is most needed.

Obviously, the mainport-environment policy discourse has had some practical value in the past, at least for some powerful actors; otherwise it would not have become so popular in the first place. Indeed, some have argued that the deadlock was knowingly and willingly sustained, as maintaining the status quo allowed them to realize their objectives (In 't Veld, 2000). At the same time, it seems that much of this initial practical value has been lost along the way, as both ambitions of actors and socio-economic and political circumstances started to change. Or in other words, the mainport-environment policy discourse has had a stagnating effect on what actors want to achieve. Again, the extent to which this is true and whether or not this is true for all actors involved demands empirical investigation. However, even if this is only partly true, we are confronted with an interesting, yet poorly understood phenomenon. On the one hand, those involved in the debate seem to acknowledge the need for change. On the other hand, they seem to be unable to induce this much-needed variety. It seems rather paradoxical that well-educated and motivated persons, like most stakeholders are, knowingly and willingly reproduce a deadlocked situation that hampers the achievement of their goals (cf. Termeer & Kessener, 2007). It seems that the actors have come to be in some sort of impasse that is destructive for the goals they want to achieve, and they cannot recognize or diagnose adequately the nature of this situation in a way that is necessary to get out of it.

1.4 Goals, Research Questions, Added Value

Goals

It is this problem of the persistence of Schiphol's policy discourse (i.e. the mainport-environment discourse) that has assumed the form of a policy deadlock in 2005 that is the object of study of this thesis. The core aim of this thesis is to increase our

¹¹ This argument will be extensively discussed in chapters 2 and 10.

understanding of the mechanisms that drove the emergence and ongoing reproduction (i.e. the persistence) of the Schiphol policy deadlock, which simultaneously allows us to assess the actual extent of the reproduction. A detailed understanding of the Schiphol case might also contribute to a more generic approach that allows us to describe and explain the emergence and ongoing reproduction of policy deadlocks.¹²

In scientific literature some clues can be found that can be used to explain how policy deadlocks come into being. For example, policy making takes place within the parameters of past policies and choices as well as inherited institutional arrangements (see e.g. March & Olsen, 1989; Scott, 1995), policy values and beliefs (see Sabatier & Jenkins, 1988), argumentative structures, storylines, frames and reassuring symbols (Abma, 2001; Edelman, 1988; Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1995; Pestman, 2001; Stone, 2002) and roles, positions, networks and coalitions (see e.g. Koppenjan & Klijn, 2003; Schön & Rein, 1994; Termeer, 1993; Yanow, 2003). These may all, and are indeed expected to contribute all, to the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks, as they all contribute to the path dependent character of firmly institutionalized policy debates.¹³ At the same time, it has been noted that it is very difficult to say something about the mechanisms at work in a deadlocked (policy) situation in general that lie at the root of its persistence (Laws & Rein, 2003; Schön & Rein, 1994; Termeer & Kessener, 2007). As we just argued, some actors might actually benefit from sustaining a deadlock, as long as it allows them to realize their objectives. However, such behavioral approaches do not suffice when we want to explain reproduction of deadlocks that are no good to anyone. They only tell one part of the story. A more institutional approach that allows us to understand how undesirable policy discourses that resist change are an unintended and perverse effect of past behavior (see e.g. Miller, 1994; Innes & Booher, 1999; 2001; Wagenaar, 2005) should be added. In essence, it is the interplay between this actor dimension and structure dimension (i.e. how they mutually sustain and reinforce one another) that is in need of thorough investigation. Most importantly, all options should be held open, thus one should not a priori define what factors are at work. In order to uncover the mechanisms that are really at work in a specific social domain we need to avoid a priori commitment to theoretical explanations and neatly defined hypotheses that forces data into pre-existing categories. The research is therefore problem-driven, instead of theory-driven, which calls for a broad conceptual

¹² In fact, the one thing all researchers that have studied the Schiphol policy process (see footnote 3) agree upon is that this process is rather an *extreme case*, due to the enormous controversy and stagnation that characterizes the policy debate. Nonetheless, findings are firmly and essentially grounded in the specifics of the Schiphol case and do not necessarily apply elsewhere. In chapters 4 and 11 we extensively argue that this certainly does not undermine the scientific value of this study, as we believe that one of the main contributions of social sciences lies in offering reflexive analyses that can contribute to public discussion. Nonetheless, we shall argue that the detailed knowledge we develop certainly allows for different types of generalizations (e.g. naturalistic and analytical ones). Thus, although the findings are firmly grounded in the specific context of Schiphol, they certainly have value beyond the Schiphol case.

¹³ In chapters 2 and 3 we discuss the concept of path dependency in more detail.

structure that consists of some initial research questions and some rudimentary understanding of the complex, situated, problematic relationships (e.g. the presence of a policy deadlock) (Stake, 1995; 2005). Most importantly, it contains a few sensitizing concepts, a term Blumer invented to describe theoretical terms which 'lack precise reference and have no bench marks which allow a clean cut identification of a specific instance' (Blumer, 1954; p.7). Such concepts are useful tools for descriptions, not for predictions, since their lack of empirical content permits researchers to apply them to a wide array of phenomena. They serve as heuristic tools that help the researcher to structure data. Besides, the open approach allows for the emergence of new sensitizing concepts along the way, as new empirical and theoretical insights are constantly developed and interrelated as the study proceeds.

The building blocks for such an approach have been offered by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Indeed, there is ample reason to assume that the thought and praxis of the famous French philosopher/historian Michel Foucault offers us a conceptual understanding and related methodology that allows us to describe, assess and explain the emergence and reproductive tendency of policy discourse. More specifically, it is especially his genealogical approach that holds this promise and that serves as the main point of departure for this thesis. Here we should immediately add that there is no blueprint for doing genealogy. Quite the opposite, as the approach basically consists of rather abstract suggestions for how one can study discourses.¹⁴ This allows us to use Foucault's ideas in ways that best suit our purposes, a way of working that Foucault himself recommended.¹⁵ Or in other words, although this thesis very much relies upon Foucauldian insights, in the end it is our interpretation and pragmatic use of these insights. Other readings are always possible.

Foucault's genealogical approach is very promising for our purposes, as it was exactly for those circumstances that change was most needed and most difficult to achieve at the same time that Foucault developed his methodologies and related conceptual outlook in the first place.¹⁶ Foucault's method and analyses were designed to make taken-for-granted ways of thinking, acting and talking seem problematic by encouraging people to look at situations from a different way. A genealogical study is exactly meant to explain how people have come to be in some sort of impasse and why they cannot recognize or diagnose adequately the nature of this situation (MacIntyre, 1990). In doing so, it also works to open up possibilities to break through this impasse, exactly by describing 'the genesis of a given situation and showing that this particular genesis is

¹⁴ As we shall argue in chapters 2 and 10, Foucault had very good reasons for not developing such blueprints.

¹⁵ See chapter 2.

¹⁶ In literature about Foucault usually a distinction is made between three methodologies that Foucault developed over the years: (1) archeology (2) genealogy (3) problematization. We shall elaborate on this in chapter 2.

not connected to absolute historical necessity' (Flyvbjerg, 2001). That is, a proper genealogy creates the right context for triggering change within any given social domain.

In this thesis we build upon both Foucault's insights and the work of those authors who applied his approach to the field of policy studies (most notably Hajer, Flyvbjerg and Richardson). We develop an approach that allows us to uncover the reproductive tendency of the discursive order at work in a specific policy domain (a three step procedure and a set of methodological guidelines for gathering, ordering, validating, analyzing and presenting the data required). As we shall argue, our approach can be enacted in a rather systematized way, while avoiding a priori commitment to theoretical explanations and neatly defined hypotheses that forces data into pre-existing categories. The development of this methodology forms the first goal of the thesis. The second goal is to apply this methodology to the Schiphol case in order to describe, assess and explain the emergence and the reproduction of Schiphol's policy discourse during 1988 – 2009 (the mainport – environment discourse that we presented in paragraph 1.1). The third goal is to explore the possibilities of the genealogical approach for triggering change, and more specifically the possibilities for breaking through the reproductive tendency of the Schiphol discourse that are delivered by the genealogy.

Research questions

In order to realize these goals we answer four research questions.

1. How can the genealogical approach be used for describing and analysing the reproductive tendency of policy discourses?
2. To what extent can reproduction in the Schiphol policy discourse be found and how can this reproductive tendency be explained?
3. How can the genealogy contribute to the transformation of the Schiphol policy discourse?
4. What contribution has the study made to our understanding of Schiphol's policy deadlock in particular, and to the study of policy deadlocks in general?

Added Value

By now it will be clear that the research has both an important societal and scientific value. The societal value of the research should not be underestimated. The entire research project is problem-driven, as it is the specifics of the reproductive tendency of Schiphol's policy discourse that we attempt to describe, explain and transform. It is exactly the development of a proper genealogy that might contribute to the creation of the necessary context for inducing change. Moreover, the detailed understanding of the specifics of the Schiphol case also helps to discern intervention strategies that might become effective. It can be argued that this societal value is also the main scientific

value. From the perspective that social sciences have not been very successful in its attempts to emulate natural science and produce explanatory and predictive theory, we can argue that its main value lies in its ‘... contribution to the reflexive analysis and discussion of values and interests, which is the prerequisite for an enlightened political, economic and cultural development in any society...’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.3). A genealogy is exactly meant to deliver such scientific knowledge, which is deemed of pivotal importance for scientific progress.

Nonetheless, we have already indicated that the study also holds scientific value in its more traditional understanding, i.e. in terms of holding value beyond this thesis and the Schiphol case. First of all, the research provides us with a useful three step procedure for uncovering the mechanisms that produce and reproduce a policy deadlock in a specific policy domain (which is something different than uncovering universal explanations for the emergence of such policy deadlocks). Developing such a rather systematized approach is not only valuable because the scientific toolkit lacks approaches for describing, assessing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks. It is also valuable for another reason, as the method of how to conduct a discourse analysis inspired by Foucault has received limited systematic attention thus far (cf. Howarth, 2005; p.316; Hewitt, 2009). There has been a good reason for this, because prescribing such a methodology would be un-Foucauldian as ‘... to do so would afford a particular position the status of truth in a perspective where truth is always conditional’ (Gilbert et al., 2003; p.792). Here we stress once again that our 3-step procedure is merely based on our interpretation of Foucault’s thought and it is not meant to serve as a blueprint. Nonetheless, we shall assert that our approach can be read as a systematized way for developing genealogies of (the emergence and persistence of) policy deadlocks. Second, the specific ways wherein genealogies can help to discern possibly effective intervention strategies certainly hold value beyond this thesis. Third and finally, there are only a few case studies available that offer an in depth insight in how policy making about large airports in Western democracies takes place.¹⁷ It should be stressed that this thesis cannot and will not develop universal cause-effect relations that explain the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks (i.e. predictive and explanatory theory), nor does it contain universal panaceas for breaking through such deadlocks. All findings (explanations and intervention strategies) are firmly grounded in the Schiphol case, and, as the genealogical approach assumes, all knowledge and explanations are by definition context-dependent.

In the remainder of this chapter we present a short introduction to the genealogical approach, as it further explains the promise of this approach to the reader and it

¹⁷ We shall elaborate on this in chapter 11 where we discuss the added value of the thesis in more detail. Here it can also be noted that there are little genealogies available about complex planning and policy processes in general.

positions the approach in the academic field (1.5).¹⁸ We end this chapter with a short outline of the thesis (1.6).

1.5 The Approach: A First Introduction to Foucauldian Genealogy

This thesis revolves around Foucauldian genealogy and its application to the policy domain. As discussed in the former paragraph, approaches that allow for a systematized and transparent application of Foucault's thought are rare in the social sciences. In this paragraph we position Foucault's approach in the scientific field and provide a first rudimentary introduction. We already introduced Foucault's basic idea that any social domain (like a policy domain) is governed by a specific discursive order that sets limits to the things that can be thought, said and done in a meaningful and legitimate way in that domain. Foucault's approach therefore belongs to the field of discursive studies, although his approach is very distinctive from other discursive approaches. Indeed, there are many different approaches to the study of discourse. However, they all share one common denominator. Any discourse analysis is based on the assumption that language profoundly shapes our view of the world and reality, instead of being merely a neutral medium mirroring it (Hajer, 2006). Thus, any discourse analysis aims to show how language shapes reality. Therefore, those policy scientists studying discourse in some way or another implicitly or explicitly ground their understanding of policy processes in a social constructionist epistemology. The critical stance towards truth and reality means that the objective of research carried out within this tradition is not the discovery of some ultimate truth, but rather a means of providing coherent and consistent explanations of events (Burr, 1995). For the rest, discursive approaches are very different. The most common distinction is made between those analyzing linguistic elements and those who include the study of institutional practices as well (Hajer, 2003; Potter & Whetherell, 1987; Sharp & Richardson, 2001).

It is the latter approach that is very promising when investigating the reproductive tendency of policy discourse in the open, yet systematized way, that is needed in the case of a problem-driven approach (as in this thesis). This approach is firmly based in Foucault's poststructuralist understanding and analysis of discourse, as defined in terms of social orders that shape our thought and actions. More specifically, for Foucault, and for the elaborations of Foucault put forward by researchers in spatial and environmental policy such as Hajer (1995; 2003; 2006), Flyvbjerg (1998; 2001), Jensen (1997), Richardson (1996), and Sharp & Richardson (2001), 'a discourse is not a communicative exchange, but a complex entity that extends into the realm of ideology, strategy, language and practice, and is shaped by the relations between power and knowledge' (Sharp & Richardson, 2001; p.195). Here we emphasize once again that for

¹⁸ As we shall discuss in 1.7 it is possible to read the Schiphol case after reading this introduction. However, a minimum of background information about genealogy is required to do so. This minimum is presented in 1.6.

those authors drawing on Foucault (like us) discourse is not synonymous with discussion. Instead, discourses are seen as patterns in social life that are institutionalized in particular practices, thus shaping discussions. In chapter 2 we give a much more extensive account of this understanding. For now it suffices to understand discourse in terms of social orders that influence how people think and act. In chapter 2 we shall also assert that Foucault developed at least three different approaches to the study of discourse, but that it was his genealogical approach that was especially designed for uncovering the mechanisms sustaining firmly institutionalized discursive orders. The genealogical approach therefore holds the promise to both describe and explain the emergence and ongoing reproduction of any discursive order (and therefore also of the persistent Schiphol discourse). But what does this genealogical methodology entail? Here we shall discuss the basic outlines in a nutshell.

Genealogy

Foucault's genealogical method entails a specific take on historiography and is meant to deliver real histories (describing what actually happened) that are believed to be effective histories as well (i.e. generate doubt and discomfort in order to stimulate a wider process of reflection, creating new opportunities for the future).¹⁹ Foucault also referred to them as 'histories of the present' as they contribute to the problematization of present discourse(s). Such histories are by no means complete and exhaustive, as the genealogical understanding of history rejects the possibility of such a full understanding in the first place.²⁰ Therefore, we don't pretend to write the complete history of 20 years of Schiphol public policy discourse, nor do we pretend to deliver the one and only true story about Schiphol. But we do attempt to write an *effective* history, i.e. one that triggers reflexive thought and one that contributes to opening up the future for new policy praxis. Its effectiveness exactly lies in uncovering the mechanisms of power at work in the constitution of a discursive order that has come to be self-evident in a given social domain. The strength of the genealogy is to create favorable conditions for developing new ways of thinking, talking and acting, exactly by making actors aware of the problems related to the existing self-evident discourse(s). As such, the approach opens up possibilities to break through the reproductive power of persistent (policy) discourse(s) like the mainport – environment policy discourse of Schiphol, without actually prescribing how a more desirable discourse would look like. Thus, its main effect is that it works to create the proper context that is needed to trigger change at all. One of the main arguments of Foucault in his genealogies was that proper analytical research aiming to uncover discursive orders in specific social domains should focus on the illumination of the smaller, often less conspicuous practices, techniques and

¹⁹ In chapter 2 we shall elaborate on doing genealogy.

²⁰ When one looks closer, there will always be new events, new causes, new effects, new practices. There are no clear beginnings or endings that can be found in history.

mechanisms. Foucault referred to these as the disciplines, which somehow determined how large institutional systems actually worked (Foucault, 1975; Hajer, 1995, p.47). Only by uncovering such regular daily (micro)practices one could understand the persistence of specific discursive orders and their disciplinary effect. Thus, for Foucault discourse and practice were inseparable and studying practice was the primary means to uncover how specific regimes of truth came into being that worked to pacify others by privileging certain ways of interpreting the world and disqualifying others (cf. Haugaard, 2002).

Uncovering micro-practices is not very easy. As we shall see, Foucault did only provide a rather abstract perspective on how to do this. The result was that there exists a large gap between his rather abstract principles and its application to a concrete policy processes. Fortunately, others have elaborated his approach, most notably Hajer (1995) and Flyvbjerg (2001). Hajer developed some middle range concepts for the study of policy discourse and Flyvbjerg offered some useful methodological guidelines, of which the focus on details, simultaneously accounting for structure and agency and including a polyphony of voices are very important. In this thesis we build upon both Foucault's insights and the work of those authors who applied his approach to the field of policy studies when developing our three step procedure that allows us to uncover the reproductive tendency of the discursive order at work in a specific policy domain.

Finally, the genealogical approach is based on the idea that the mechanisms sustaining the discursive order in a given domain are context-dependent. This means that one can only uncover the (micro)practices at work by conducting an in depth single case study. Genealogy values the detail over generalization, as generalizations often imply simplification of data, while genealogy is merely concerned about clarification. In fact, it is this detailed understanding of the specific case at hand that allows for the development of effective intervening strategies that might help to change the discursive order (or in our terms, break through the reproductive tendency of the policy discourse). Thus, doing genealogy in principle means to develop an in depth single case study in a way that has been propagated by Stake (1995; 2005) and Flyvbjerg (1998; 2001).²¹ The focus on the details of a particular case also helps us to position the genealogical approach within the field of policy analysis. As much policy analysis still tries to reduce conflict and uncertainty and respond to the need for stability by deriving generalizable knowledge and universal principles that can be applied to achieve policy goals across domains and settings, scholarship about the analyses of conflicts and ambiguities that policy actors experience and that treats their actions as intelligent and that tries to understand and support the efforts of these practitioners is growing (Hajer & Laws,

²¹ See chapter 4 for elaboration.

2006; Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). The genealogical approach belongs to this latter interpretive tradition (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006).

1.6 Outline

Now we have discussed some of the fundamentals of Foucault's genealogy we can further explicate our approach and the outline of this thesis. In essence, we use Foucault's genealogy and the more concrete elaborations of his work by several others who have applied it to the study of policy making and planning (most notably Hajer and Flyvbjerg) to develop a methodology that allows us to describe and explain the emergence and reproduction of any given policy discourse in an open yet systematized way (research question 1). This will be done in chapters 2 – 4. In chapter 2 we discuss Foucault's genealogical approach in more detail. In chapter 3 we apply the approach to the study of policy discourses. Here we present a three step procedure that allows the researcher to describe, assess and explain the reproductive tendency of any given policy discourse. In chapter 4 we present the methodologies used for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the necessary data. Together, chapters 2 – 4 form part I of this thesis, resulting in a systematized research approach for describing and analyzing the reproductive tendency of any given policy discourse from a Foucauldian perspective.

Next, we apply this approach (three step procedure and methodological guidelines) to the Schiphol case (research question 2), resulting in an extensive case description (chapters 5 – 8) and an explanatory analysis (chapter 9). The empirical description and the analysis have been deliberately divided, as readers are encouraged to develop their own interpretations and conclusions, asking themselves 'what is this case a case of?' Moreover, the genealogical procedure that we set out has made it possible to avoid embedding the case description within one specific scientific discipline. This makes the case potentially interesting and accessible for a wide audience of both scientists and practitioners. Chapter 5 serves as an introduction to the case, while chapters 6 – 8 are all dedicated to a specific time-period (chapter 6: 1989 – 1995; chapter 7: 1995 – 2003; chapter 8: 2003 – 2009).²² The case description certainly is extensive, but the payback will be something similar to what Flyvbjerg promised his readers when presenting the results of his study of rationality and power in Aalborg/Denmark: 'For readers who stick with the minutiae of the Aalborg story from beginning to end, the payback will be an awareness of issues of democracy, rationality, and power that cannot be obtained from "maps", that is, summaries, concepts or theoretical formulae' (Flyvbjerg, 1998; p.7). In our case, the payback will be a detailed understanding of the emergence, persistence and negative effects of Schiphol's policy deadlock. More specifically, readers might begin to realize how it has exactly come about that we are stuck with

²² The rationale behind these time-periods will be explained in chapter 4.


escalated conflicts, dialogues of the deaf, taboos, suboptimal policy solutions, low levels of trust and so on.

In essence, chapters 5 – 8 form the empirical part II of the thesis that forms the backbone of the thesis and which can be read without knowledge of the foregoing chapters (except for this introduction). Thus, those readers who are not interested in the further philosophical, conceptual and methodological considerations of this study can directly move on to these empirical chapters.

Readers who are merely interested in the analysis and/or recommendations can skip the case and directly move on to chapters 9-12, although they will fail to understand the specifics and subtle mechanisms at work in the Schiphol case. Moreover, such a reading would miss much of the point of a genealogy, i.e. that readers themselves are triggered to reflect upon the situation described. Likewise, one can choose to stop reading after finishing the case. However, for those who are interested in the interpretations and conclusions of the researcher about the reproductive tendency of Schiphol's policy discourse, chapters 9 – 12 provide an answer. In chapter 9 we analyse the Schiphol case. We do so by first assessing the reproductive tendency of the Schiphol policy discourse. Next, we explain the reproductive tendency (answering research question 2). The third research question is addressed in chapter 10, where we extensively discuss the potential of a genealogy for opening up a policy deadlock, and where we discuss the potential of our genealogy for opening up the Schiphol policy deadlock. In the chapter 11 we discuss the added value of this thesis (research question 4) and we sum up our main conclusions. In our epilogue (chapter 12) we reflect upon some of the difficulties that other researchers willing to develop effective histories by means of the genealogical approach might have to deal with. In this finishing chapter we also present some of our wider reflections on the practices of policy making and democratic decision making.

In sum, readers can go through this thesis following three different paths, depending on their own interests, i.e. (1) an empirical path (grey), (2) an analytical path (green), or (3) a combination of both paths (which means to read the entire thesis). The different paths are presented in figure 1.7.

Figure 1.7 Outline of the thesis and different ways to read it



Part I

Towards an Analytical Framework

In this part of the thesis we set out the methodology that we use for describing, assessing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks. We do this in three steps. We first discuss the genealogical methodology of Foucault, which serves as a backbone around which the entire thesis is organized (chapter 2). Second, we apply this approach to the study of policy discourses. This results in a three step procedure that allows us to describe, assess and explain the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks (chapter 3). As a third and final step we discuss how we have gathered, organized, validated and presented the data that we needed in order to develop a genealogy that has the potential to become an effective history (chapter 4).

Chapter 2 The Promise of Foucault's Genealogy

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is meant to outline the promise of Foucault's genealogy for the study of the reproductive power of (policy) discourse. In chapter 1 we argued that there is reason to assume that the genealogical methodology that has been developed by Foucault is very useful for the study of institutionalized (policy) discursive orders. It was exactly for those circumstances wherein changes in self-evident ways of talking and acting were deemed necessary but difficult to achieve that Foucault developed his methodology in the first place. He did so, because he believed in the need to be able to 'think differently', always and everywhere, something which he defined in terms of freedom.²³ As he asserted, the lack of possibility for thinking differently signals the existence of a social order with a totalizing tendency, which is always dangerous and undesirable. Therefore, genealogy takes as its objects of study exactly those institutions and practices which are usually thought to be excluded from change, like the policy practices around Schiphol (see chapter 1). The genealogy works to show how such institutions and practices too undergo changes as a result of historical developments, while simultaneously demonstrating 'how such changes escape our notice, and how it is in the interest of those institutions and practices to mask their specific genealogy and historical character' (Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.115). It also implies that genealogies are not executed just for fun. They are meant to have direct practical, often political implications, and it is for this reason that they need to be made for the urgent social issues of the day.²⁴ Exactly by uncovering the contingent character of those institutions and practices that traditional history sees as unchanging, genealogy creates the possibility of altering them, provided, of course, 'that the agents of these processes have the political courage to change things.'²⁵ The resulting effective histories can be seen as the agents of such change.²⁶

However, as Foucault never presented a thorough description of his genealogical method, it won't be an easy task to reconstruct the method. By common consensus, Foucault is an elusive thinker, who is also multifaceted as his thought was continuously evolving; there isn't a single key for unlocking his thought. As a consequence there is

²³ Foucault, 1985 (The Use of Pleasure); Foucault, 1994A (Essential Works 2 – Structuralism and Post-Structuralism, p.449)

²⁴ Foucault, 1980A (Questions on Geography). See also Foucault cited in Linssen, 2005; p.182

²⁵ Foucault, 2000A (Essential Works 3 – Interview with Actes, p.397)

²⁶ Citing the effect that his book on prisons had on the reading public, he remarks: "They sensed that something in present-day reality was being called into question." Reading the book was an experience that changed their relationship to their world. They found themselves involved in a process that was, in effect, "the transformation of contemporary man with respect to the idea he has of himself." And the book 'worked toward that transformation. To a small degree, it was even an agent in it. That is what I mean by an experience book, as opposed to a truth book or a demonstration book' (Foucault, 2000B, Essential Works 3 Interview with Michel Foucault, pp. 245 – 246).

not one blueprint for doing genealogy, nor has the methodology been widely applied in the social sciences, although it is an increasingly popular methodology.²⁷ Foucault deliberately refused to create such blueprints in general, as he did not want to tell people what was to be done.²⁸ The lack of clear-cut procedures and steps may make the methodology unorthodox, but it does certainly not imply that ‘any arbitrary construction will do’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.119). The genealogical method has its internal rules of performance despite the fact that there is no blueprint about procedure. Procedure is very much a matter of knowing what would be inappropriate given the epistemological and ontological assumptions of Foucault. When conducted in the proper way, the results of a genealogy can be confirmed, revised or rejected according to the most rigorous standards of social science, in relation to other interpretations (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2005).

Despite the lack of methodological imperatives, Foucault’s approach certainly provides us with an analytical framework for the study of reproductive tendency of discourse. In this chapter we use his work to develop several ‘cautionary indicators of direction’²⁹ that serve as suggestions for how to look, where to look and what to look for when studying the reproductive tendency of discursive orders. These insights form the basis for the development of our three step procedure for describing, assessing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks, which will be outlined in chapter 3. One disclaimer is needed here, in order to make sure that the presentation of the genealogical approach as presented in this chapter is perceived in its proper terms: it is nothing more, and nothing less, than the clarification of our interpretation of Foucault’s genealogical approach and, more specifically, our interpretation of its value for the study of the emergence and persistence of discursive orders that characterize any given social domain. We certainly do not intend to provide some sort of complete course on how to use his methodology, nor do we think that such an account is possible. This approach is in line with Foucault’s pragmatic perspective on the use of (scientific or philosophical) ideas, such as his own utilization of Nietzsche. He stated that ‘The only valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, deform it, to make it

²⁷ Quite likely, these two things are interrelated as many scientists assert that only a clearly defined method can result in scientifically valid results. A claim that is clearly not supported in this thesis.

²⁸ Foucault was well aware of the dangers that clung to giving prescriptions to both scientists and practitioners. With regard to the first, the emphasis of social sciences and political philosophy on abstractions, basic principles, utopias, theories and general criteria for the evaluation of existing conditions in society distracts from what is actually going on in the real world. They might block our view from reality, instead of enhancing our understanding of it (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; Gordon, 2000). For the same reason he did not tell practitioners what they should do. He intended to leave them behind in a state of confusion, messing things up by sweeping away the solid ground underneath their feet. By doing this he opened up ways for alternative futures, but without tying down or immobilizing those who could make changes.

²⁹ A quote borrowed from Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.129

groan and protest. And if commentators then say that I am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche that is of absolutely no interest.’³⁰

In order to understand the genealogical methodology properly it is fruitful to start with a short discussion of Foucault’s ethics, here understood as the political and intellectual task he set out for himself (2.2) and his understanding of change and continuity in history and the different methods he developed for describing this (2.3). Together they offer us the necessary background information for a proper interpretation of the four main concepts that are part of the genealogical approach, i.e. (1) power (2) discourse (3) practice (4) event, which shall be discussed in paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5. Based on the operationalization of these sensitizing concepts we develop a set of methodological guidelines for doing genealogy that are summarized in 2.6 and from which we derive a three step procedure that can be used to describe, assess and explain the emergence and persistence of discourses in any given social domain. In our rather extensive discussion of Foucault’s thought we especially draw on his two genealogies (*Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1*), his essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy and History’, the extensive collection of Foucault’s articles and interviews (*Essential Works of Foucault, 1954 – 1984, Volume 1 - 3*) and a large body of secondary literature (most notably the work of Flynn, 2005, Hajer, 1995, Flyvbjerg 1998; 2001, Richardson, 1996, Sharp & Richardson, 2001, but also of many others).³¹

2.2 Foucault’s ethics: Freedom as Reflexive Thought

Foucault described his ethics as ‘the practice of freedom.’³² For Foucault, suppressing conflict is suppressing freedom, because the privilege to engage in conflict is part of freedom (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Foucault was clearly envisioning an ethics that maximizes freedom by always subjecting the taken for granted to questions and creative adaptation and remaining open to new understandings.³³ Freedom consists simply of the ability to open new possibilities, to engage in new practices. Since this was the most important issue for him, he struggled against ideas and practices that confined silenced or disciplined people. In his own words, ‘The object was to learn to what extent the effort

³⁰ Foucault, 1980b, pp.53 – 54. As Rose (1999b, p.4) has pointed out ‘I think it is useful to take Foucault’s ideas... as a starting point...but I do not think that there is some general theory or history of government, politics or power latent in Foucault’s writings, which should be extracted and then applied to other issues.’

³¹ E.g. Bevir (1999A; 1999B), Clegg (1989), Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982), Flynn (2005), Flyvbjerg, (1998; 2001), Flyvbjerg & Richardson (2000), Gordon (2003), Haugaard, (1997; 2002), Hajer, (1995), McNay (1994), Richardson (1996), Scheurich & Bell McKenzie (2005), Sharp & Richardson (2001).

³² Foucault, 1988A

³³ Foucault understands freedom in different ways. One important way is freedom as reflective withdrawal. ‘Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem (Foucault, 1984A, p.388). Thus, freedom denotes the ability to pull back or disengage from an activity in order to gain perspective on it, that is, to make it an object of thought rather than ‘unthought’ behaviour. This is freedom as reflective withdrawal (Flynn, 2005; p.161). It opens up the space of freedom ‘... understood as a space of concrete freedom, that is, of possible transformations (Foucault, 1994A, p.449).

to think one's own history can free thought from what it silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently'.³⁴ Rather than 'legitimizing what is already known', Foucault's task was to seek the limits of ways of thinking to find possibilities for thinking differently.³⁵ He firmly believed in the necessity to be able to think and act in a different way. Therefore, he tended to take as his object of study exactly those institutions and practices which were thought to be excluded from change. Foucault described his political task as 'to criticize the working of institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticize them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them'.³⁶ More specifically, Foucault was concerned with enhancing the capacity for initiating change. This also reflects Foucault's belief in the possibility for change. He argued that 'so many things can be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constraints'.³⁷

He stated that it was his role to show people that they are much freer than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be criticized and destroyed.³⁸ Ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth was to be the main aim of the intellectual. With regard to his intellectual task he stated that 'The work of an intellectual is not to form the political will of others; it is, through the analyses he does in his own domains, to bring assumptions and things taken for granted again into question, to shake habits, ways of acting and thinking, to dispel familiarity of the accepted, to take the measure of rules and institutions and, starting from that re-problematization (where he plays his specific role as intellectual) to take part in the formation of a political will (where he has his role to play as a citizen)'.³⁹ In a 1983 interview, Foucault described how his research had enabled him to think about the role and function of the intellectual in contemporary society: 'I would say also, about the work of the intellectual, that it is fruitful in a certain way to describe that-which-is by making it appear as something that might not be, or that might not be as it is. Which is why this designation or description of the real never has a prescriptive value of the kind, 'because this is, that will be.'.... Since these things (contingencies that present themselves as necessities) have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know

³⁴ Foucault, 1985; p. 9

³⁵ Foucault, 1985; p. 9

³⁶ Foucault, cited in Rabinow, 1984; p.6

³⁷ Foucault, cited in Kritzman, 1988B; p.156

³⁸ See for example Foucault, 1984D; p.50

³⁹ Foucault, cited in Kritzman, 1988A, p.265

how it was that they were made.’⁴⁰ He even asserted that the attempt to alter ‘not only others’ thoughts, but also one’s own thoughts should be understood as ‘the intellectual’s *raison d’être*.’⁴¹ The ability to think differently was the necessary precondition for acting differently. In sum, as will be clear by now, reflexive thought aimed at action was the most important intellectual virtue for Foucault.

Foucault attempted to fulfill the intellectual task he set out for himself by offering a permanent type of criticism that worked to explore the horizons of possibility within a particular domain. If ideas and accepted practices have a way of hardening, of rigidifying over time, then criticism must not be an isolated event but an ongoing practice. If thinking differently, seeking freedom by creative engagement with new possibilities, is the objective, then there is no end to ethical criticism. And as Foucault himself suggested, it is not therefore a question of there being a time for criticism and a time for transformation. Instead, he emphasized the importance of a permanent criticism that allows us to always remain suspicious, predicated on the recognition of the contingency and lack of necessity of things. Permanent criticism allowed for a constant reflection on the constraints that contemporary modes of thought and related practices impose on individuals.⁴² Social critique was seen as one of the core tasks of social science, where critique was not meant to deliver some kind of academic truth, but to ‘..... undermine relations of domination by showing how the crutches of legitimacy of modern truth and impartial judgment are simply a reflection of social relations saturated with power (Haugaard, 2002; p.182).

Finally, as already indicated in the introduction of this chapter, Foucault did not prescribe what was to be done next. According to Foucault, making specific recommendations to actors in a specific (policy) field is neither within the rights nor within the capabilities of intellectuals. Foucault suggested that it should be those most closely involved in a domain of practice that should design strategies for change, while his own analyses merely convinced them of the need to do so.⁴³ Given the normalizing function that norms may serve, attempts to articulate and enforce regulatory, normative

⁴⁰ Foucault, cited in Kritzman, 1988A, pp. 36-37

⁴¹ Foucault, cited in Kritzman, 1988A, pp. 263-264

⁴² In fact, this ambition brought Foucault close to the ideals of the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurter Schule, of which his counteract Habermas was a part, something he himself also acknowledged (Foucault, 2000B). See also Foucault, 2000C; p.299).

⁴³ In addressing a group of geographers, he brought this stance explicitly to the fore by arguing that ‘it’s up to you, who are directly involved with what goes on in geography, faced with all the conflicts of power which traverse it, to confront them and construct the instruments which will enable you to fight on that terrain. And what you should basically be saying to me is, “You haven’t occupied yourself with this matter which isn’t particularly your affair anyway and which you don’t know much about.” And I would say in reply, “If one or two of these ‘gadgets’ of approach or method that I’ve tried to employ with psychiatry, the penal system or natural history can be of service to you, then I shall be delighted. If you find the need to transform my tools or use others then show me what they are, because it may be of benefit to me.” (Foucault, 1980A, p.65). One might easily substitute ‘policy making or planning’ for ‘geography’ in Foucault’s advice.

principles and concepts were perceived by Foucault as something akin to totalitarian in nature and, therefore, as undermining the very possibility for emancipation. According to Gandal (1986, p.124), Foucault ‘struggled for changes’ but, because ‘he was well acquainted with both the “futility and the dangers” ’ of guarantees, ‘he eschewed any impulse to lay out a blueprint for society.’ For Foucault the search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seemed catastrophic.⁴⁴ In a Foucauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger freedom, not empower it. Few things have produced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of the good (cf. Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 1998). The notion of guarantees, of security and certainty, is fundamentally opposed to freedom, where freedom is understood as the possibility to find new avenues for practice, to think and act differently.⁴⁵

In order to bring his ethical commitment into practice, Foucault developed different methodologies throughout his career, of which the genealogy is the one with the most far-reaching political implications. Especially the genealogical method was designed to deliver the social critique that Foucault was aiming for, exactly by showing how specific regimes of truth worked to secure relations of domination. Or, in our terms, to show how specific mechanisms were at work in the constant reproduction and further institutionalization of discursive orders in a given social domain. From the perspective of Foucault, the one way to do this was by developing specific histories that he labeled histories of the present.

2.3 Foucault’s Histories of the Present

In order to properly understand the genealogical method that we shall discuss in 2.4 we need to understand what Foucault meant by histories of the present (2.3.1) and we need to shortly introduce the different methodologies he developed for creating such histories, as this helps us to position his genealogical methodology vis-à-vis his other methodologies (2.3.2).

2.3.1 Histories of the Present

It was exactly Foucault’s preoccupation with the need to create the possibility to think and act differently, always and everywhere, that led him to investigate the historical conditions underlying dominant ways of thinking and acting that seemed to be problematic in the present. According to Foucault, it was only after clarifying the basic

⁴⁴ Foucault, 1984A

⁴⁵ Foucault’s stance with regard to truth and utopias also prevented him from developing normative universals. Philosophers like Habermas and Kant tend to see the Enlightenment as an unfinished project that needed to be completed, giving away an implicit belief in the possibility and the need to actually complete the Enlightenment. Foucault rejected such ideas about progression and final truths and utopias, which has led some to argue that Foucault was relativistic (see Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002 for more extensive discussion).

premises of systems of thought and uncovering those lines of legitimization and hypothetical necessity that control human behavior in the present in ways that we find intolerable, that space was created for thinking and acting differently (see also Flynn, 2005). This goal brings him to focus on history. However, Foucault was not interested in the past as such; the past was only interesting insofar as it helped to understand problematical self-evident ways of thinking and acting in the present. For Foucault, the past was therefore the main source for understanding current rationalities at work in institutions and the behavior of people, which brought him to the writing of histories.⁴⁶ In doing so, he discussed the price of such rationalization.⁴⁷ His histories were therefore essentially critical investigations.⁴⁸ It was by means of his histories that he attempted to demonstrate the contingent character of those institutions and practices that traditional history exhibited as unchanging, thus creating the possibility of altering them.

Foucault's histories therefore automatically depart from a specific problematical situation in the present. Indeed, with regard to his own objects of study he stated that he focused on phenomena of the past (e.g. the history of madness during 1500 – 1900, the emergence of medical science and practice at the start of the 19th century, the organization of social sciences in the 18th and 19th century) merely because he recognized specific self-evident ways of thinking and acting in them that were perceived to be problematical in the present.⁴⁹ According to some commentators it was always an urgent actual issue that was in need of change, but that seemed to resist change, that made Foucault decide to write a specific local history meant to further problematize the current issue (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; Karskens, 1987; Linssen, 2005; Roth, 1981). A Foucauldian approach is therefore not always necessary or suitable. It is most effective when societal feelings of doubt and discomfort about practices in specific domains already exist. In essence, the researcher should be aware that the impact of a Foucauldian history very much depends on the societal need for one. It is up to the researcher to assess the need for such an approach, which often implies a thorough understanding of a specific (policy) field and a keen sense for public concerns. Discourses, like the mainport-environment discourse of Schiphol, that constantly reproduce themselves, that have perverse effects, and that don't allow for 'thinking and acting differently' seem to sit comfortably with a Foucauldian approach.

⁴⁶ Foucault has argued that his prime concern is the rationalization of the management of the individual, arguing that 'the objective of my work is not a history of institutions or a history of ideas but the history of that rationalization that is at work in institutions and in the behaviour of people.' (Foucault, cited in Flynn, 2005; p.296).

⁴⁷ Foucault, 1994A; p.444

⁴⁸ Foucault, cited in Flynn, 2005; p.297

⁴⁹ Foucault, 2000D

Because it is not the past, but the present that was the main concern of Foucault, he labelled his own historical investigations histories of the present.⁵⁰ Thus, by means of his histories he attempted to diagnose the present. This brought Foucault to describe his methods for doing historiography as diagnostic, by which he meant that they yielded a form of knowledge that defined and determined differences.⁵¹ According to Foucault 'To diagnose the present is to say what the present is, and how our present is absolutely different from all that is not it, that is to say, from our past.'⁵² Such a diagnosis allowed Foucault to trigger possible transformations through reflexive thought aimed at action, i.e. what Foucault defined as freedom.

By now it will be clear that Foucault's histories of the present are committed histories. They are scarcely neutral. On the contrary, by uncovering the rationalities at work in a specific social domain they are meant to create the possibility of breaking through existing (firmly institutionalised) orders. They are therefore biased towards the socially and economically disadvantaged in our society.⁵³ However, this does not mean that these histories aren't objective.⁵⁴ There is a clear difference between being neutral and being objective (Flynn, 2005). As we shall discuss later on, this bias certainly influenced Foucault's focus in his real and effective histories. That is, while Foucault asserted that discourses both enable and constrain some behaviours (much like Giddens idea of duality of structure), he mostly emphasized the constraining workings of discourse, i.e. showing how in the present certain actors and truths were privileged and others marginalized. Hence, in the field of history (and philosophy) Foucault has become known as the historian of the present.⁵⁵

2.3.2 Foucault's Methodologies

Foucault developed three different methodologies that allowed him to develop histories of the present in order to diagnose the present. No matter what method Foucault deployed, his main approach was to compare ways of thinking and acting during one period with another period. This way, he could illustrate how interpretative horizons changed, i.e. how things that made sense and were deemed true and valuable once, were changing over the years. He almost always took up one period prior to the one he would

⁵⁰ Foucault, 1975/1991; p.35

⁵¹ Cf. Foucault, 1969/1972; p.131

⁵² Foucault 1996B; p.53; See also Foucault cited in Flynn, 2005; p.47 and Linssen, 2005.

⁵³ Here it should be noted that from a postmodernist understanding of history (like Foucault's understanding), there is no such thing as an unbiased history. All readings of the past are by definition positioned readings, i.e. based upon specific assumptions and beliefs (e.g. there are feminist readings, Marxist readings, bourgeois readings, Foucauldian readings etc., see Jenkins, 2003; p.45-46).

⁵⁴ Although the term objective has another meaning when assuming that no one history can be unbiased, the term is here used to historical work continuously seeks for disconfirming evidence (i.e. falsification of ones initial findings). That is, the researcher does not deliberately withhold countervailing evidences. As we shall discuss later, the presence of such countervailing evidences work to give Foucauldian histories more persuasive power, i.e. making them more effective.

⁵⁵ See e.g. Flynn, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Jenkins, 2003; Linssen, 2005; Roth, 1981

critique and he described this first period to lay the basis for his description and critique of the subsequent period (cf. Scheurich & Bell McKenzie, 2005; p.857). However, as we shall discuss here, his description of these periods was different when compared to conventional history.

It is common to demarcate three distinct phases in Foucault's thought, each related to a specific methodology: (1) the archaeology, (2) the genealogy and (3) problematization. Those three methodologies need to be understood in relation to each other. Thus, in order to understand the genealogical approach we need to understand all three methodologies. Each method was developed for a different purpose, but together they allowed Foucault to understand how people's experiences were shaped. Indeed, in the end Foucault was above all concerned with the idea of experience.⁵⁶ He even described his own books as means for establishing new experiences. Referring to his book *Discipline and Punish* he argued that he wanted '... to invite others to share an experience of what we are, not only our past but also our present, an experience of our modernity in such a way that we might come out of it transformed. Which means that at the end of the book we would establish new relationships with the subject at issue.'⁵⁷ Each of the three methodologies that Foucault developed was meant to uncover one of the three fundamental elements that shaped human experience.

(1) Archaeology

First, experience is shaped by games of truth, or what we perceive to be true and rational, and what not, within a specific time-space context. Foucault developed the archaeological method to describe the systems of thought that governed a certain societal domain during a certain period. Archaeology studies the rules of formation and transformation of discursive practices.⁵⁸ That is, there is a historically specific system of discursive rules at work that defines how to produce a true and rational statement (or serious speech act). The focus is therefore on the rules that need to be obeyed in order to develop truths. These series of rules make possible, during a given period, the appearance of specific statements about what is true and what is not about a given object.⁵⁹ The distinction between two of the most important concepts of archaeology (*savoir* and *connaissance*) is important here. Both refer to ways of knowing. 'Connaissance' refers to the formal knowledges/formal statements that are prevalent

⁵⁶ Cf. Foucault, 1984A; p.387

⁵⁷ Foucault, 2000B; p.242

⁵⁸ Foucault defined discursive practices as 'a body of anonymous historical rules, always determined in time and space, that have defined for a given period and for a given social, economic, geographical or linguistic area the conditions of operation of the enunciative function' (Foucault, 1969/ 1972; p.117).

⁵⁹ This is what Foucault labeled the archive, i.e. '... the series of rules which determine in a culture the appearance and disappearance of statements, their retention and their destruction, their paradoxical existence as events and things' (Foucault, 1994B, p.309).

within a given time-space context, i.e. what is regarded to be scientifically true and rational. Such knowing is dependent on the existence of several (discursive) conditions of possibility, derived from the entire set of concepts, practices, policies, procedures, institutions and norms at work within a given domain. This forms the implicit or tacit knowledge at work within a given social order, which Foucault referred to in terms of 'savoir'. Thus, this implicit or tacit knowledge (savoir) formed the broad conditions of possibility that were necessary for the development of formal knowledge (e.g. scientific or religious truths) (connaissance). Archaeology, then, is focused on the study of savoir, understood as the condition of possibility of formal knowledge (connaissance).⁶⁰ It allowed Foucault to show how formal knowledges (i.e. the ones that we give the status of truth) emerge from a broad array of complex (irrational and unintended) sources and conditions (cf. Scheurich & Bell McKenzie, 2005). Savoir refers to the interpretive grid that shapes the perceptions of an era, whereas connaissance refers to these perceptions. The formal statements, then, are gathered into a discursive order, referring to 'the always finite and temporally limited ensemble of statements alone which were formulated.'⁶¹ The archaeology is thus the project of a pure description of a discourse (here understood as ways of talking) and its conditions of possibility.⁶²

More specifically, the focus is on the changes that discourses undergo over time. By bringing to light the fissures, the breaks, the gaps as so many 'events' that undermine the standard line of evolution or development,⁶³ Foucault was able to uncover the historical a priori of a given period and how this conditioned practices of exclusion and inclusion. Thus, in the archaeologies not only systems of thoughts and the rules that sustain them were described, but also the changes that occurred in these systems of thought and rules, that is, mapping differences and miniscule displacements.⁶⁴

(2) *Genealogy*

Next to prevailing systems of thought, specific power relations at work in a time-space context shape experiences of people. We already discussed that the genealogical method was especially designed for uncovering power relations. Genealogy is very much related to archaeology, as it allowed Foucault to analyse how specific systems of thought or discourses could emerge and become institutionalised. In the genealogy the archaeological descriptions of systems of thought are supplemented with an account of how these systems are constituted by, and in turn constitute, relations of power. Thus, if the archaeological accent is on discourse, the genealogical is on relations of power and

⁶⁰ Foucault, 1994C; p. 262; See also Foucault, 1994D; p.460

⁶¹ More specifically, this is how Foucault defined discursive order during his early years, when he developed his archaeology. As we shall discuss later, his understanding of discourse changed somewhat over the years.

⁶² Foucault, 1969/1972; p.27

⁶³ Foucault, 1969/ 1972; p.171

⁶⁴ Foucault, 1969/ 1972; p.131

how these are related to the production and institutionalisation of specific discursive orders.⁶⁵ It is exactly for this reason that Foucault's genealogical approach holds such great promises for the study of the reproductive tendency of policy discourse. The archaeological description of the rules of formation and transformation of discursive practices is therefore supplemented with an account of the power relations that shape these formations and transformations of discursive practices. In essence, it means to include the variety of non-discursive (micro) practices.⁶⁶

Although the genealogy builds upon the archaeology, it does not imply that the highly structured procedure of archaeology is included. Instead, the primary focus is on the illumination of the wide array of small, often less conspicuous practices at work, which somehow produce and reproduce discursive orders. In genealogy, the focus is therefore on the practices at work through which specific knowledges are brought into play. This means that we need to know something of the systems of thought at work (in terms of *savoir* and *connaissance*), but that this understanding can be developed in a less structured and sophisticated way as Foucault had done in his archaeologies. Indeed, the genealogical method is less structured than the archaeological method, merely offering a set of critical tools that can be used in any sort of grouping. The main point for the genealogist is that he needs to understand both *savoir* and *connaissance* within a given social domain in order to bring to light the variety of (micro)practices that brings them into play. The main difference is that the prevailing systems of thought are described by illuminating the set of (micro) practices that are both their precursor and result (something that we will explicate in 2.4).

(3) Problematization

Third, in his latest works Foucault focused on the way individuals shape their own conduct as a means by which people shape their own experiences. It referred to the way people relate to themselves and to others. It is concerned with the moments that people began to sense certain behaviours as problematic. Therefore, this third methodology is referred to as problematization.⁶⁷ The issue is not so much power, as in his genealogies, or knowledge and truth, as with his archaeologies, but how a specific practice that has characterized a specific social domain becomes problematic (Flynn, 2005).

In the end, it was by combining the focus on systems of thought and their conditions of possibility, the relations of power at work that constitute these systems of thought and that were constituted by them, and the forms of relation to oneself and to others that

⁶⁵ Foucault, 1978/ 1990; Foucault, 1980C; p.83, 85

⁶⁶ The concept of practice is elaborated in paragraph 2.5

⁶⁷ Foucault, 1984A; p.384

Foucault tried to explain our present day experiences.⁶⁸ More specifically and in line with his ethics we extensively discussed in 2.2., he tried to make us aware of lack of historical necessity of our experiences, stimulating us to develop new experiences, by setting out the constructed nature of the rationalities and social relations of domination and control that sustained them.

Conclusion

This short introduction of Foucault's methodologies shows that it is especially the genealogical method that holds the promise of describing and explaining the emergence and persistence of specific discursive orders in any social domain (e.g. a policy domain). It also shows the interrelationship between his three different methodologies, pointing out how the genealogy builds upon the archaeology and how it contributes to problematizing specific practices. With regard to the first, the genealogy is meant to illuminate the interplay between the systems of thought at work (the discourses, here understood as both formal and implicit knowledges that constitute systems of thought that are discovered by means of archaeology) and the various (micro)practices at work that (re)produce these systems of thought. The systems of thought and the related practices are both the result and precursor of specific power relations at work, and understanding this interplay in terms of power relations is exactly what the genealogical approach is designed for. In the next paragraphs we discuss the genealogical approach into more detail.

2.4 The Genealogical Approach

Understanding how power works in the social domain under study is the main aim of any genealogy. As these workings of power are the outcome of the research, we cannot a priori define how it works (as we shall discuss more extensively in this paragraph). Fortunately, Foucault offered both a conceptual understanding of how power works and he offered some clues about how to uncover and analyse the power relations at work. It allowed us to develop a heuristic framework, based on our interpretation of his thought, that allows for uncovering these context dependent workings of power in any given social domain. This heuristic framework consists of four sensitizing concepts. The concepts of (1) power (2) discourse and (3) practice help us to develop a conceptual understanding of the reproductive tendency of discursive orders (2.4.1 and 2.4.2), whereas the concept of event (4) forms the crucial point of departure for the concrete empirical investigation of how power works in the social domain under study (as will be discussed in 2.5). We end this paragraph with a short conclusion on how the heuristic framework facilitates us in uncovering the workings of power in the social domain under study, as this forms the heart of the genealogical approach.

⁶⁸ Foucault, 1984A; p.384; Foucault, 1984C; p. 333; Foucault, 1994D; p.461; Foucault, 2000C; p.300.

2.4.1 Three Fundamental Concepts of Genealogy: Power, Discourse and Practice

(1) Power

In setting out the three methodologies of Foucault we argued that it was especially via the genealogical methodology that power relations are uncovered. In the genealogy the archaeological descriptions of systems of thought (or discourse) are supplemented with an account of how these systems are constituted by, and in turn constitute, relations of power. Note that Foucault was not interested in power *sec*; he merely intended ‘...to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects.’ He concludes that ‘it is not power but the subject that is the general theme of my research.’⁶⁹ Moreover, referring to the constitution and effects of human experience as his overall research aim, Foucault wanted to learn to understand how our experiences are shaped by the interplay between knowledge and power.⁷⁰

Before discussing Foucault’s understanding of power it is important to understand that how power works in the social domain under study was the outcome of his analysis. Thus, Foucault could not *a priori* define how power worked, as this was to be done by uncovering the context dependent interplay between the systems of thought (discourse) and (micro)practices involved. Nonetheless, Foucault did provide us with a conceptual understanding of this interplay and he also provided us with some important characteristics about the nature of power. We first discuss these characteristics. Next, we discuss the concepts of discourse and practice in this paragraph, which eventually allows us to complete the conceptual understanding of how power works.

Here it is important to note that Foucault’s perspective on power radically differs from other conceptualizations in social science. In essence, the concept of power is one of the most contested of the social sciences (Lukes, 1994). There are many different perspectives on, and definitions of, power, dependent on the specific context in which the concept is employed. In this thesis we do not intend to give a detailed overview of all these different approaches and schools of thought (see for overviews and discussions Goverde et al., 2000; Haugaard, 2002; Clegg, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 2001; Hindess, 1996; Lukes, 1994; Mann, 1993).⁷¹ However, in order to understand the unique position of Foucault we need to have at least some rudimentary understanding of the power debate. To start with, although there certainly is no single definition of power which covers all usage, during Foucault’s days scientific power debates centered on carefully defining, conceptualizing and measuring power (Clegg, 1989; p.2).

⁶⁹ Foucault, 2000E; p.326

⁷⁰ Here he also commented that he was sure he would never get the answer ‘...but that doesn’t mean that we don’t have to ask the question.’ (Foucault, 2000C).

⁷¹ It is possible to distinguish between behaviorist, structuralist or structurationist approaches to power; another partly overlapping distinction lies between instrumental, structuralist and discursive interpretations.

The power debate

Behavioral (or agency) theories define power in terms of the capacities of people to influence outcomes, for example by putting other people under pressure, by holding issues from the agenda or by shaping ideas of needs and wants of other people. In political theory, this approach was about answering the question ‘who was running the community?’ which originated in the 1950s and 1960s in the US (Peters, 1999). On the one hand, there were the elitists who argued that power was in the hands of a small power elite (Hunter, 1953; Mills, 1956), while on the other hand pluralists like Dahl saw a more dispersed power structure in most communities (Dahl, 1957). Dahl criticized the elitists for their lack of definition of power and he defined power himself in the following way: ‘A has power of B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would otherwise not do’ (1957; p.202). More specifically, he criticized the specific reputation methodology of the elitists, arguing that power had much more to do with what people actually did (as compared to their reputation). Barach and Baratz (1962) agreed to this, but they criticized Dahl’s approach for ignoring the fact that several issues would never become part of the agenda in the first place (i.e. pointing out the importance of institutional bias). Not only does A exercise power over B by directly influencing B’s course of action, but also by limiting the scope of the political process to issues that are relatively safe to A (1962, p.948), thus deliberately keeping issues off the agenda that are of importance to B. They referred to this exclusion of problems and their formulations as the process of non-decision making, meaning that A had the power to decide not to make a decision. Finally, Lukes (1974) pointed out the existence of a third dimension of power (where he understood the approaches of Dahl and Barach and Baratz in terms of the first and second dimension). This third dimension referred to the invisible and more fundamental level of power, where ‘A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping, or determining his very wants (Lukes, 1974; p.23). Thus, Lukes asserts that A exercises power by actively and deliberately shaping the consciousness of others, ‘... controlling their thoughts and desires’ (p.23), giving rise to a false consciousness.

Despite the fact that Lukes approach was highly problematical (for one, it was based on the modernist belief that there was something like real interests and a real consciousness, see Clegg, 1989), it triggered a more abstract power debate in the 1970s, where power was understood in terms of hidden layers and structures of society (Peters, 1999). Next to the behavioral approach to power, the institutional approach gained more attention. Problems may be constructed and agendas set in a dimension through systems of beliefs, values, assumptions and ideologies. This resulted in structural theories (as compared to the agency theories), where power was defined in terms of ideological and psychological structures, often understood as institutions, of which Marxist approaches were the best known. For example, Parsons (1963) saw power as the product of social

structures. The concept of path dependency played an important role in the institutional and structuralist approaches to power. That is, past decisions that have become firmly institutionalized (in policies, laws, procedures, techniques, rules and norms) exert great influence on ways of thinking and acting. Institutions are here understood as reifications of power and institutionalist argue that power can best be understood via the study of society's institutions (as institutions are power-bearers and power wielders, cf. Goverde et al., 2000).

Finally, some authors tried to bridge the gap between the behavioral (agency) and institutional (structure) approaches to power. The theory of structuration of Giddens is probably best known in this respect. According to Giddens (1984), the division between structure and agency is a false one. Social structures exist in the moment that they are reproduced by agents while, simultaneously, social agents constitute themselves as such through structured action. This moment of the reproduction of agency and structure is structuration (i.e. ordering of time and space). Authors like Clegg (1989) and Haugaard (1997) have developed perspectives on power that build upon this duality of structure and agency.

Foucault's understanding of power

Foucault's approach to power is very different from all approaches discussed before. This both makes it easy and difficult to position him within the academic field. For one, he refused to position himself and he (deliberately?) ignored the terms used in the debate. When others were developing (detailed) definitions and ways for measuring power, Foucault refused to do such a thing. In essence, Foucault was not interested in what power is, but in interpreting what power actually does. As others have asserted, this implied that Foucault belonged to the tradition of power research of Machiavelli, with a focus on strategy and organization as contrasted to the dominant tradition that built upon Hobbes modernist interpretation of power in terms of sovereignty and community (Clegg, 1989; Flyvbjerg, 1998; 2001). His interest in the actual workings of power and his specific perspective on history made sure that Foucault was not interested in the development of a theory of power. That is, the specific way that power works is context-dependent and historical contingency means to find out for each case separately what power is and how it works. For Foucault, theories of power, like all theories, assume too much and leave too little room for empirical investigation.⁷² Instead, uncovering the specific way wherein power was working within a given social domain could by definition only be the result of a thorough empirical investigation. Thus, power was the outcome of his genealogies. The only problem for Foucault then was to provide himself with a grid of analysis, which made it possible to analyse power relations at

⁷² He stated, 'If one tries to erect a theory of power one will always be obliged to view it as emerging at a given place and time and hence deduce it, to reconstruct its genesis' Foucault, 1980E; p.199

work within a given domain during a given period.⁷³ At least some rudimentary understanding of power was needed for this.

It is important to understand that Foucault used the term power in a more conceptual and metaphorical way (cf. Clegg, 1989; p.3). For Foucault, power was a fundamental feature of society; there was no outside of power, no way of escaping power. Power is immanent in all social relations and it takes effect during all actions. Therefore, instead of localizing power in some institutions or capacities, Foucault argued that power is everywhere, ‘...not because it embraces everything, but it comes from everywhere’.⁷⁴ In an evenly abstract way he asserted that power ‘... is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.’⁷⁵ For Foucault, all social relations are interpreted in terms of the interplay of forces of domination, resistance and control. Power is understood as the specific way wherein these force relations obtain effects. In order to uncover the specific mechanisms of power at work, the challenge is to uncover the multiplicity of force relations at work within a given domain during a given period.

Foucault transcends the structure–agency power debate, adding a more fundamental perspective on power. It is neither the intentions of subjects, as they are usually understood, nor the determination of structures which explains power. For Foucault, power is not something that can be possessed, like a capacity, nor is it an institution or structure.⁷⁶ Instead, power is relational; it designates relationships between institutions and actors.⁷⁷ It refers to the way in which institutions and actors are implicated in discourses (cf. Hajer, 1995). And it only exists in the moment of action, and only insofar as it bears upon the (possible) actions of others.⁷⁸ ‘What defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or future.’⁷⁹ How does this work then? Power takes its full effect when a specific action, procedure or process multiplies across a social field because of a complex set or collection of reasons or causes that are not entirely intentional or rational (cf. Scheurich & Bell McKenzie, 2005).⁸⁰ This

⁷³Foucault, 1980E; p.199

⁷⁴ Foucault, 1978/1990; p. 93

⁷⁵ Foucault, 1978/1990; p.93

⁷⁶ Foucault, 1978/1990; p.94

⁷⁷ Foucault, 2000E; p. 337

⁷⁸ Foucault, 1975/1991; p.26

⁷⁹ Foucault, 2000E; p.340. On the same page Foucault asserts that power is ‘a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it make easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action.

⁸⁰ See Foucault, 1980C; p.98

understanding of the nature of power is still rather abstract. We can clarify his power concept further by linking it to his twin concept power/knowledge.

Power/knowledge

In order to fully understand how all-encompassing Foucault's idea of power is, we need to link it to his understanding of knowledge (in terms of *savoir* and *connaissance*). As we have seen, Foucault asserted that any given social domain is governed by specific systems of thought that people draw upon in order to make sense of the world around them. Such systems of thought are constituted by, and constitute, relations of power. Thus, power is ultimately interrelated with knowledge in the sense that there can be no knowledge without power relations and vice versa (hence he often discusses power in the context of knowledge).⁸¹ From this perspective power and knowledge are not oppositional (as is assumed in the modernist/ Enlightenment perception of power as distorting the quest for 'real and true' knowledge), but mutually constitutive. Power produces rationality and truth, while rationality and truth produce power.⁸² The production of knowledge, especially the kind of knowledge that is perceived to be rational and true, is therefore an effect of the exercise of power.⁸³ Power is therefore also a productive force; 'it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.'⁸⁴ ⁸⁵ The knowledge that is invested with the status of truth emerges only within a structure of rules that control the language that can be used in a meaningful way by specific actors (cf. Rabinow and Rose, 2003).⁸⁶ Moreover, the rules in the discursive space for the production of meaningful statements also apply to whom is allowed to speak, where, when and how.

Foucault's understanding of how power works in terms of power/ knowledge can be further clarified by discussing his concepts of discourse and practice. In terms of

⁸¹ See also Jenkins, 2003 on this, when describing the importance of Foucauldian power for postmodernist writing of history.

⁸² 'The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power' (Foucault, 1980B; p.52).

⁸³ Flyvbjerg (1998) has argued that for Foucauldian thinkers, the dictum 'power is knowledge' is more accurate than the modernist idea that 'knowledge is power.'

⁸⁴ Foucault, 1975/1991; p.194

⁸⁵ Foucault stated 'What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression' (Foucault, 1980D; p.119).

⁸⁶ For example, as a consequence of the Enlightenment quest for knowledge, scientific method became the main procedure for the formation and accumulation of 'objective' and rational knowledge and scientists were given an important position, due to their assumed expertise to develop such knowledge (Knights, 1992; Rose, 1999A; Steffy & Grimes, 1992; White, 1998). From this perspective, the construction of science as a neutral sphere of truth as was done by the modernists is a highly political act. It was precisely through claiming political disinterestedness that science would be most valuable to the nation state. Its non partisanship would play a crucial role in making the evidence for highly negotiable programs and projects seem neutral and the ensuing policies in the general interest (White, 1998). For Foucault, procedures for investigation and research are essentially techniques of power, serving to produce biased knowledge. Hence, scientific discourse and the institutions that produce it are part of the taken-for-granted conditions for the production of knowledge, and they should therefore be questioned (Knights, 1992).

Foucault, it is especially the interplay between the discourse and the various micro-practices at work that specific regimes of power/knowledge come into being, reproduce themselves and are turned into naturalized discursive orders with self-evident ways of thinking, talking and acting.

(2) Discourse

Foucault uses the term discourse in different ways throughout his oeuvre. In his genealogies, his initial understanding of discourse, as developed during his archaeologies (i.e. the always finite and temporally limited ensemble of statements alone which can be formulated, including the rules governing this), becomes explicitly linked to his understanding of power. In his genealogies Foucault used the term discourse to refer to both the archaeological rules that govern systems of thought and the power relations these implied. Discourses are the media through which power operates. They must be understood as both the precursor and outcome of the specific power relations that govern a social domain. Thus, in the genealogy discourse refers to some kind of social order at work within a social domain that encompasses both the things that actors can say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way within that domain. Each discursive order sets specific norms to what counts as meaningful utterance (i.e. what are true and false statements), what topics are to be investigated, how facts are to be produced (e.g. which research methodologies, technologies and procedures have value in the acquisition of truth), who has the intellectual authority to define what is true etc. (cf. Gordon, 2000; p.xvi).⁸⁷ This shapes the conduct of actors who are part of the discursive order, as some actions (including speech acts) are deemed irrational or even illegitimate. And by acting, an actor shapes the possible future actions of another actor, partly directly by triggering a response, and partly indirectly by reproducing and thus further institutionalizing the discursive order that has shaped his actions in the first place.

It is not to say that actors are entirely defined by discourse, but it is to acknowledge that there are limits to what an actor can say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way in a specific time-space context. Thus, the things that actors do always take place within the boundaries of a specific discursive context (cf. Gottweis, 2003).⁸⁸ Discursive orders come with discursive formats (understood as the need to use specific jargon), with subject positions and they position actors and institutions vis-à-vis one another in a

⁸⁷ Foucault wanted to uncover why people needed '... to use these words rather than those, a particular type of discourse rather than some other type, for people to look at things from such and such an angle and not some other one' (Foucault, 1980E; p.211). See also Foucault, 1984D; p.112, 132). Foucault wanted to see '... historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false' (Foucault, 1984D, p.118).

⁸⁸ Foucault did not declare the subject dead (although he did so on one occasion). He merely insists that agency should be considered in the context of discourses that enable and constrain action. For him, the subject is not a function of discourse, but discourse sets boundaries to the type of actions that are deemed meaningful and legitimate (cf. Foucault, 1980C; p.117). His understanding does not mean that '... one is trapped and condemned to defeat no matter what' (Foucault, 1980F; p.142).

specific way. Discursive orders are therefore productive in the sense that they work to both enable and constrain some behaviors. Foucault was particularly well-known for emphasizing the constraining workings of discourse, which is understandable when considering his project of social critique which he accomplished by writing his real and effective histories of the present. Foucault wanted to show that discursive orders imply prohibitions, since they make it impossible to raise certain questions or argue certain cases and they imply exclusionary systems because they only authorize certain people to participate in a discourse (cf. Hajer, 1995; Richardson, 1996 Rydin, 1999; Rydin 1998a; Mazza and Rydin 1997). In essence, the discursive order gives way to specific (micro)practices that simultaneously work to sustain this discursive order when they are enacted. Foucault's concept of practice allows us to complete our conceptual understanding of how Foucauldian power works.

(3) Practice

One of the main arguments of Foucault in his genealogies was that discursive orders only sort effects when enacted, i.e. when they are brought into practice. For Foucault, practice was an integral part of any discursive order. As discursive orders come with sets of (implicit) rules that shape the things that a specific actor can think, say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way, they work to condition conduct and give rise to specific practices. Foucauldian discourse analysis must therefore be disciplined by the analysis of practices (Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.134). In essence, according to Foucault proper genealogical research that intended to uncover these power relations at work needed to illuminate the micro-practices at work. In the next paragraph we discuss the concept of practice into more detail. For our conceptual understanding of how power works it is sufficient to understand that it was especially the interplay of the smaller, often less conspicuous practices that needed to be studied.⁸⁹ Such practices somehow determined how large discursive orders actually worked (cf. Hajer, 1995; p.47). It is by uncovering the interplay between discursive orders and micro practices that mutually work to reinforce on another (i.e. were discursive orders give way to specific practices and were the enactment of these practices results in the reproduction and further institutionalization of the discursive order) that we can learn to understand how power works within a given social domain (which is the aim of a genealogy). In terms of Foucault, doing genealogy means to develop a micro-physics of power.⁹⁰

Here one final characteristic of Foucault's understanding of power comes to the fore. Power does not only work top down, but also, and especially, from the bottom up. It is through the cumulative effect of local, low level, capillary circuits of power relationships that specific systems of thought or discursive orders are (re)produced

⁸⁹ Foucault, 1975/1991; p.222

⁹⁰ Foucault, 1975/ 1991; p.26

(Gordon, 2000).⁹¹ As Foucault argued, ‘... in thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives’.⁹² From this perspective we can better understand what Foucault meant when asserting that power exists always and everywhere, at every point in society, and that all communications are at all times influenced by specific relations of power.⁹³

The above discussion of the concepts of power, discourse and practice allows us to develop an understanding of the reproductive tendency of discursive orders. This specific way how this reproductive tendency works out in a social domain further illustrates how power works to shape people’s conduct and experiences.

2.4.2 The Reproductive Tendency of Discursive Orders

Discursive orders come with sets of explicit and implicit rules and norms that define how to develop a meaningful (true) statement and legitimate actions. As such, they set boundaries to the things actors can think, say and do. As these rules and norms have become firmly ingrained, people often unconsciously enact them, thus reproducing the discursive order and the power relations it implicates. The more self-evident the discursive order becomes, the greater the tendency for reproduction. This reproduction makes the existing modes of talking and acting even more taken-for-granted, further framing future interactions and negotiations.⁹⁴ The process assumes the form of a causal circular loop, wherein discursive orders give way to specific micro-practices and where these micro-practices work to reproduce the discursive order.

The strongest reproduction is achieved when the norms and rules, and the conditions of possibility that they entail, have become naturalized, so people do not recognize the socially constructed nature of them anymore. The contingency of the existing social order is concealed. Naturalization takes its full effect when the biased ways of talking and acting (e.g. around a policy theme) will cease to be seen as arbitrary (in the sense of being one among several possible ways of seeing things) and will come to be seen as

⁹¹ It is not to say that the dominant sovereign perspective on power does not exist. It is merely to say that this focus is too narrow; that power works in different ways which are not recognized within the dominant tradition, leading towards rather unrealistic beliefs in dissolving or neutralizing power and reaching full consensus. Foucault’s frustration about the narrow focus on power comes to the fore in his criticism of political theory: ‘At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king’ (Foucault, 1980D; p.121).

⁹² Foucault, 1980B; p.39

⁹³ Foucault states: ‘Power’s condition of possibility ... must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point, in a unique source of sovereignty from which secondary and descendent forms would emanate ... Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere’ (Foucault, 1978/1990; p.93)

⁹⁴ A conclusion that is also drawn in discourse theory and institutional theory, see Phillips et al., 2004; see also Barley & Tolbert, 1997; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Jepperson, 1991.

natural and legitimate (Fairclough, 2002; see also Bourdieu, 1977 on this).⁹⁵ Naturalization involves a closure or restriction of the plenitude of potential meanings and of potential ways of acting and organizing. It means that social relations of dominance also become naturalized, and actors respect and enact the way they are positioned vis-à-vis one another. Fully naturalized discursive orders generate action in an unconscious and sometimes unintentional manner (Laws & Rein, 2003).⁹⁶ It shapes judgments of actors about what is right and what is wrong, what is true and rational and what is not. As these ways have become ingrained, actors automatically live by them in order to avoid self-contradiction. It also makes actors ignore or marginalize all kinds of counter-evidences that might disturb the self-evident views.^{97 98} Others have described similar processes of naturalization in terms of discourse ritualization (Edelman, 1988), discursive hegemony (Hajer, 1995), or black boxing (Callon & Latour, 1981). A black box contains ‘that which no longer needs to be reconsidered, those things whose contents have become a matter of indifference. The more elements one can place in black boxes, modes of thought, habits, forces and objects, the broader the construction one can raise’ (Callon & Latour, 1981; p. 284).⁹⁹ Foucault himself talked about the normalizing nature of discursive orders.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Bourdieu refers to this phenomenon of naturalization as the ‘recognition of legitimacy through misrecognition of arbitrariness’ (1977). Note that this illustrates the potential for marginalization, exclusion and manipulation of both the content (what is important and what is not) and process (who is important in what ways and who is not) of future policy debate (compare with Schattschneider, 1960). Critical theorists would argue that these ways originate in the social constructions of a dominant class or bloc, and that such taken-for-granted ways are serving those in power (see Clegg, 1989; Fairclough, 1995; Gramsci, 1971).

⁹⁶ Such action is often necessary for creating the kind of spontaneous action that so many concrete situations require. People do not have the time or the skills to think over all of their behavior. Successful actions in what Bourdieu calls a game (i.e. a domain or field wherein people act) is about having a *feel for the game*. Such a feel for the game allows an actor to act effectively within a given social domain, and develops with experience. People learn from experiences about what is possible and what is not; about how to work effectively within existing practices in the field and about how the rules might be modified. Bourdieu acknowledges that most experiences will serve to reinforce actors ways of thinking and acting, as people are more likely to encounter situations and interpret them according to their pre-existing dispositions rather than to modify their feelings. But he does accept that changes may occur (Bourdieu, 2002; Hillier & Rooksby, 2002).

⁹⁷ Festingers’ theory of cognitive dissonance is related to this process (1957). This theory focuses on post-decisional efforts to revise the meaning of decisions that have negative consequences. It is to say that people start with an outcome, and then render that outcome possible by constructing a plausible story around it.

⁹⁸ The taken for granted assumptions guide the future selection and interpretation of cues. As such, people tend to see only those things that they want to see and what they expect to see, since these are the cues that have meaning for the people: they are perceived to be important, rational and true. People make sense of things by seeing a world on which they already imposed what they believe. As Weick puts it ‘people discover their own inventions.’ Hence, while making sense, we actively shape what we have to make sense of (Weick, 1995).

⁹⁹ Callon and Latour also argued that black boxes never remain fully closed or properly fastened, although the actors sitting on them try to make this appear so (Callon & Latour, 1981; p.285). This is in line with Foucault, who argued that there were always possibilities for thinking and acting differently, otherwise there could be no relations of power.

¹⁰⁰ Normalization refers to the process of moulding people into ‘normal’ as opposed to ‘abnormal’ forms, and the process by which a culture encourages its people to regulate and achieve his or her own conformity with the established rules and norms (Dreyfus, 1982). It refers to the process wherein the norms and rules offered by discursive order become that self-evident that people cannot reflect upon them anymore. People automatically draw upon them to structure their conduct and to regulate the conduct of others, to select ways of talking and acting, in a natural and unconscious way. As such, they cannot recognize the constructed nature of these rules and norms anymore and they appear to be the natural order of things.

In order to better understand this normalizing function of discursive orders it is useful to discuss Foucault's idea of the normalizing 'gaze', which he also called disciplinary power.¹⁰¹ Normalization works both through external and internal controls. The external controls refer to how people are supervised and controlled by others whether they act in normal ways, whereas the internal controls refer to how people regulate their own thoughts and behaviour in accord with a certain concept of normality (cf. Bevir, 1999A; 1999/B; Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).¹⁰² It is the tricky combination of what Foucault labeled technologies of domination (the external constraints, the disciplinary power) and the technologies of the Self (the internal forces, the pastoral power) that shapes the subject, and his ways of making sense of the world and related courses of action in the world.¹⁰³ They clearly have a self-reproductive tendency, as they give way to actions that reproduce the existing discourse. Systems of thought and their normalizing tendency automatically set boundaries to the experiences people can have. When actors act to reproduce these systems, they therefore also act to reproduce these boundaries that bear upon the future possible actions of others.

Of course, people might intentionally or unintentionally enact different rules and norms. This happens intentionally when they are aware of them and when they think the sanction of disobedience is worth paying the price. However, deviation is costly in several ways; economically (it increases risk), cognitively (it requires more thought), and socially (it reduces legitimacy and the access to resources that accompany legitimacy) (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000, p.28). One may risk becoming declared irrational or even insane, with the result that one is not taken seriously and one cannot exert influence on the specific way a social domain is governed.¹⁰⁴ Enactment of the system of thought is therefore often likely to happen, especially due to its taken-for-granted nature. When enacted the systems of thought become more institutionalized, which makes deviations even more costly (cf. Lawrence, Winn, & Jennings, 2001), and more self-evident, which makes it even more difficult to reflect upon them.¹⁰⁵ It is to say that the reproductive power becomes stronger when the level of institutionalization of specific discursive orders grows stronger. Disobedience will become more and more

¹⁰¹ Foucault, 1975/1991; p.184; Foucault, 1980G; p.155

¹⁰² Through internalizing such ways of thinking and acting docile individuals are created in our society (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982).

¹⁰³ See Foucault, 2000C and 2000E for elaboration of *pastoral* power and internal and external controls.

¹⁰⁴ Foucault, 1980D; p.132; See also Foucault, 1978/1990; p.5

¹⁰⁵ Actors may have different interpretations of what counts as disobedience. Rules are never completely unambiguous, as they are never entirely clear to everyone and they never possess the same meaning for everyone (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Too precise and unambiguous rules can stifle creative responses to new situations. We can never fully anticipate future circumstances, so it is impossible to write rules that account for new facts, technologies and contexts. This implies that rules need to be flexible in order to be effective in different situations and too precise rules don't allow for this (Van der Waarden, 1999)

costly and deviation will be perceived as irrational and illegitimate. There will be fewer incentives to disobey and act or think differently.

In essence, firmly institutionalized discursive orders give way to strong path dependent behavior. This concept of path dependency is well known in policy theory, economic theory, historiography, system theories and complexity theory, describing the pattern in which changes are incremental and defined by the previous state of the system (Arthur, 1994; Capra, 1997; Gerrits, 2008; Greener, 2002; Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000; Walby, 2003). In the most extreme situation path dependent behavior may result in a lock in situation, referring to an escalating commitment of actors to an ineffective course of action (Pierson, 2010). In the field of transportation planning this may for example result in high cost overruns (Cantarelli et al., 2010) or holding on to outdated policy strategies (cf. Atzema et al., 2009). In the introductory chapter of this thesis (chapter 1) we have asserted that the Schiphol policy debate shows all the symptoms of such a situation. In chapter 3 we shall discuss the concept of path dependency into more detail, when applied to the policy domain. For now, it suffices to note that such path dependent behavior is the result of a firmly institutionalized discursive order, while this path dependent behavior works to reproduce and therefore further institutionalize this discursive order.

2.4.3 Conclusion: Doing Genealogy – Uncovering how Power works

In this paragraph we have discussed Foucault's genealogical approach, which is meant to uncover how power works in a given social domain. It has become clear that the Foucauldian concept of power is difficult to grasp, as it refers both to (1) the interplay between discursive orders and (micro)practices, resulting in specific regimes of power/knowledge or regimes of truth and (2) to a set of characteristics of power (it cannot be possessed, it is everywhere, it works both top down and bottom up). We discussed the three concepts of power, discourse and practice in more detail in order to develop a conceptual understanding of how power works according to Foucault. The concepts serve as a heuristic framework that offers us valuable suggestions about what to look for, how to look and where to look when attempting to develop a genealogy, i.e. thus attempting to describe the mechanisms at work in the emergence and persistence of a specific discursive order of a given social domain. In this paragraph we shortly translate Foucault's understanding of how power works in a few methodological guidelines that we shall use for developing our own three step procedure that allows us to describe and explain the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Recall the disclaimer in 2.1 about the different interpretations of Foucault's work.

Drawing on Foucault we assume that there are discursive orders at work in all social domains (running through the entire body of social society) that set boundaries to the things specific people can think, say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way. There are (implicit) rules that need to be obeyed in order to make a meaningful statement (i.e. one that makes sense to others within a given context) and (implicit) rules related to the specific activities that one actor can legitimately employ (i.e. that is in line with his position in the field). These boundaries are not exactly the same for all people, as they are positioned vis-à-vis one another in a specific way. It is the specific way wherein these (implicit) rules give rise to several interrelated sets of (micro)practices, which are both the result and the precursor of the discursive order, that actual behavior of people (their strategies and tactics) is influenced. That is, power only exists when these rules are enacted in these micro practices, marking a relationship between the acting agent and the discursive order. And people have to act in accordance with these (implicit) rules set by the discursive order and that gives rise to specific practices. When acting, conduct is governed by this discursive order and the micro-practices that sustain this order. This works both through internal and external controls, where external controls refer to how people are supervised and controlled by others whether they act in normal ways, whereas the internal controls refer to how people regulate their own thoughts and behaviour in accord with a certain concept of normality. Disobedience comes at a price, while obeying the rules means to reproduce and hence further institutionalize the existing discursive order (and its rules and practices). Moreover, when acting, people work to reproduce large parts of this discursive order. As such, they do not only trigger responses from other people, they also produce the specific boundaries within which their responses have to fit (i.e. in line with the rules necessary for making a meaningful statement, in line with their position in the field that helps others to assess whether their actions are legitimate).

This understanding of Foucauldian power, practice and discourse provides us with the means to develop a micro-physics of power, where power refers to the specific interplay between discursive orders and sets of micro practices that work to mutually reinforce one another and that give way to specific behaviors and specific ways wherein actors act upon one another. The specific micro-practices at work in the discursive domain and the specific way these work to shape how actors act upon one another is an empirical question. One can therefore never a priori define how power works (i.e. drawing on universal explanations in terms of structure and/or agency). As the workings of power are context dependent and historically contingent, this should be uncovered for each case separately. Nonetheless, a rudimentary understanding of power is needed in order to know what one is to look for. Fortunately, Foucault has provided us with several

clues about the nature of power, and the three most important ones are listed below (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.131-132):¹⁰⁷

1. Power is everywhere. It is a dense net of omnipresent relations and it works both from the bottom up and top down. It is not a capacity and one cannot possess power. There are no simple cause-effect relations and origins. Instead, there is a complex interweaving of events with often unintended and irrational outcomes that shape up to form discursive orders. This implies that we need to focus on events.
2. Power is productive. It enables and constrains specific behaviors by producing knowledge, truth, rationality (power and knowledge - understood as *savoir* and *connaissance* - are interrelated) and also subject positions. Power positions institutions and actors vis-à-vis one another. In the end, power produces discursive orders, which gave way to specific power relations when they are enacted.
3. How power works can be uncovered through the study of concrete practices. The interplay of micro-practices creates discursive orders (bottom up), while these orders give way to specific sets of micro-practices (top down). Power relations can only be uncovered by illuminating these micro-practices and their complex interweaving. The study of practice lies at the core of any Foucauldian analysis of power. More specifically, it is by illuminating the interplay between the micro-practices at work and the discursive order in place (and especially how they work to mutually constitute one another) that we can understand how power works.

This micro-physics of power is still rather abstract in the sense that it is difficult to apply to an empirical investigation. In order to apply these principles to the study of a concrete case we therefore need to elaborate the concept of practice that we already shortly discussed, while simultaneously introducing a fourth and final concept, i.e. the event. It is the further operationalization of practice and the introduction of the concept of event that allows us to gather the necessary empirical information that is required for analyzing how power works (i.e. uncovering the interplay between micro-practices and discursive orders).

2.5 Empirical Focus: Practices and Events

As Foucault himself indicated, the specific mechanisms of power at work in a given time-space context can only be uncovered by empirical investigation. Foucault is interested in how power works, instead of asking who has power, or where or in what does power reside.¹⁰⁸ Asking ‘how’ refocuses inquiry; not the static institutional

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Foucault, 1978/1990; pp. 92 – 102; Foucault, 1980C; p.98-99

¹⁰⁸ As posed in community theories of power, like the influence to make decisions (Dahl’s first dimension 1957), the influence to make non-decisions (Barach & Baratz second dimension, 1967) and the possibility to control the beliefs and interests of other, where people give consent unknowingly (Lukes’ third dimension, 1974).

descriptions of (sovereign) positions, but the process, the concrete strategies and tactics are to be analysed in relationship with the institutional context (Flyvbjerg, 2001; McNay, 1994, p.3). In the former paragraph we already concluded that the study of micro-practices lies at the core of Foucauldian genealogy. In this paragraph we elaborate this concept of practice, making it applicable for concrete empirical investigations (2.5.1). Moreover, we discuss the Foucauldian concept of event, which further sharpens our empirical focus (2.5.2). It is through the empirical study of practices and events that we can analyse the interplay practices and discourse, and thus understand how power works.

2.5.1 Practice: Uncovering Strategies and Tactics

We already indicated that Foucault asserted that the study of micro-practices could illuminate how discursive orders worked.¹⁰⁹ As with his concepts of power and discourse, Foucault never provided one clear definition of practices.¹¹⁰ In its most generic form, practice is understood 'simultaneously as modes of acting and of thinking'.¹¹¹ Such modes can be seen as preconceptual, rule-governed, socially sanctioned manners of acting and perceiving the world. It shows how practice is central to discourse, as discussed before (discursive orders are produced via a myriad of micro-practices which themselves are derived from the discursive order). The interrelation comes best to the fore in the definition of discourse that Hajer developed when drawing on Foucault, i.e. referring to an ensemble of ideas and concepts that are produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices (1995, p.44). Discourse is inherently related to the social practices in which it is produced, were the social practices are defined as 'embedded routines and mutually understood rules and norms that provide coherence to social life' (2006; p.70). In one of his own studies Hajer discusses tree-health surveys, excursions and awareness campaigns as examples of practices that worked to create an image of environmental damage of acid rain (1995).

¹⁰⁹ See e.g. Foucault, 1984B; p.374; Foucault, 1984C; p.335; Foucault, 1994D; p. 462; Foucault, 2000D; p.225 - 230; According to Foucault studying power means to focus '... at the point where its intention, if it has one, is completely invested in its real and effective practices' (Foucault, 1980C; p.97).

¹¹⁰ Generally speaking, practice has proven to be an important but difficult and elusive concept in social scientific work. See Wagenaar & Cook, 2003; Dunne, 1993 for the many meanings that have been given to the concept of practice in western philosophy.

¹¹¹ Foucault, 1994D; p.462; Elsewhere Foucault describes practices as 'places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted meet and interconnect' (Foucault, 2000D; p.225). It does not resemble an individual occurrence like an act, but it forms the intelligible background for actions by its twofold character of *judicative and veridicative*. On the one hand, they establish and apply norms, controls, and exclusions: they are instruments of power. On the other, they render true/false discourse possible. They open a field of games of truth. Thus, the practice of legal punishment, to name an example, entails the interplay between a code that regulates the ways of acting and the production of true discourse which legitimates these ways of acting (Foucault, 2000D; p.230).

Such a Foucauldian understanding of practice is similar to other interpretations in the social sciences, although the concept means different things to different people.¹¹² It is important to note that practice is not the same as a routine or an institution. According to Wagenaar and Cook (2003) it is not enough to point to a series of routine activities and declare it a practice. For example, when studying organizations it would only result in a superficial understanding of organizational routines, but it would miss the deeper practices (even though organizational routines are often referred to as practice in organizational theory, see e.g. Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Practices usually signify something much broader than mere doing, although action is a central component of it. It has its own cognitive and moral demands (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003). Through practice people negotiate the world. MacIntyre (1981) refers to practice as a socially established form of cooperative activity. He also pointed out that practice is not the same as institution. Institutions may contain reified or codified elements of practices, they may support practices, but they are nevertheless distinct in that institutions are empty without the practices that sustain them. But how can we actually study practices, as it is impossible to ‘read them from the surface of the world?’

Here, Foucault does not offer much help. Despite Foucault’s recommendation to focus on regular daily practice, his own analyses did not focus on the level of the acting subject. Instead, in his genealogies he mainly described techniques and procedures at the aggregate level, referring to them as practices (cf. Hajer, 1995; p.51). This certainly allowed him to uncover the main techniques and procedures at work, but he did often not relate this to people’s everyday strategies and tactics (the micro level of analysis where the real micro physics of power took their effect). In line with Flyvbjerg (1998; 2001) and Hajer (1995) we assert that it is exactly on this micro level of concrete everyday strategies and tactics of acting people that power relations are enacted and discursive orders are (re)produced. So, how to relate such strategies and tactics to practice?


To start with, it should be noted that the relationship between such everyday action and practice is a difficult one (Wagenaar & Cook, 2003; p.151). We already mentioned that practice refers to action and cognitive and moral commitments. Thus, action is a central component, but not all actions qualify automatically as practices. When action comes from an organized context or previous experience (routines) it becomes practice (cf. Cook & Brown, 1999). Practice implies that one’s action always points towards one’s position in a larger network of relations, conventions and obligations. To keep things simple, when specific strategies and tactics can be related to specific conventions or obligations, they signify the existence of a particular practice. Often, such strategies and

¹¹² See Wagenaar & Cook, 2003 pp.144 – 157 for an overview

tactics will be repeated time and again (after all, they are in line with the conventions and obligations in place), thus regularities in such strategies and tactics also signify some practice at work.

Thus, such everyday activities are both the precursor and result of various (micro)practices that are both the result and precursor of the discursive order (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.134). The immanent logic of the discursive order trickles down to the level of practice and strategies and tactics.¹¹³ In sum, from our perspective, practices are some sort of conceptual middle ground, existing somewhere between the level of everyday action and the overarching discourse (cf. Daamen, 2010; p.25). Practices are derived from the study of everyday strategies and tactics, while the discursive order is derived from the various micro-practices (which are both discursive and non-discursive) at work. From this perspective we can distinguish between the macro level (discursive order), the meso level (practices) and the micro level (everyday strategies and tactics of people) when analyzing power relations (see figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 Doing Genealogy – Interrelating three levels of analysis



It is via a detailed analysis of regular daily practice that we can uncover the rationality (immanent logic) of violent or dominating practices, the power relations that they implicate and the discursive orders that they give rise to. Moreover, by looking for how control mechanisms come into play we can automatically identify those who are responsible for their emergence and institutionalisation.¹¹⁴ This way, the genealogy calls for the names of those responsible for fostering such practices and urging to resist change (Flynn, 2005). Here it becomes clear once more that Foucault’s approach is derived from his project of social critique; by writing his histories of the present he

¹¹³ Reflecting on his Discipline and Punish he stated: “What I tried to analyse were the practices, the immanent logic of these practices, the strategies that supported the logic of these practices, and, consequently, the way in which individuals ... freely constitute themselves as subjects of their practices or, on the contrary, reject the practices in which they are expected to participate.” (Foucault, 2000A; p. 399).
¹¹⁴ Foucault, 1980C; p.101

could illuminate how particular knowledges have come into being that governed people's perceptions of the world, their ideas about truth and their subsequent behaviors.

Finally, it should be noted that the focus on strategies, tactics and micro practices makes it unnecessary to adopt an a priori definition of power. What matters will come to the fore by describing actor's everyday strategies and tactics and the institutional and contextual factors influencing these, and that get reproduced and/or transformed during these activities. As Jorgenson has noted (2001) environments, structures, cognitions and levels of analysis are penetrated, produced and exposed through practices. They are not outside or behind practices. They are in them. External environments are not really external for example. If they are outside, they are not there, or not relevant for the studied object.¹¹⁵ Again, the artificial dichotomy between structure and agency is dissolved in Foucault's genealogy (see also Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.137). Foucault offers an integrated approach, where all levels of analysis that matter for the object of study are represented. With the concrete link between everyday strategies and tactics and practices that has been forged by Flyvbjerg and Hajer we know how to relate these levels of analysis to one another.

One problem related to this detailed approach is that it is not possible to account for all practices at work. For one, the more closely we examine specific practices, the more we are led to correlative practices. The result is an increasing polymorphism as the gearing down proceeds and the implication is that one can never tell the complete story (because there are always more practices, events etc. at work). In essence, such an approach of downshifting is without limit. Therefore, Foucault advises historians to proceed by 'progressive and necessarily unfinished saturation.'¹¹⁶ Foucault asserted that 'Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a knowledge of details, and it depends on vast accumulation of source material. Its 'cyclopean monuments' are constructed from 'discreet and apparently insignificant truths and according to a rigorous method.'¹¹⁷ It is no problem that one cannot get the story complete, as this is impossible. However, it is important to make the story an adequate one, i.e. one that has the ability to become effective, exactly because it uncovers the interplay between discursive orders and power relations that have become problematical in the present.

¹¹⁵ Thus we reject the structure/agency dichotomy. Both structure and agency always play a role in our everyday affairs and it is of no use to a priori select a focus on one of them. Instead, by describing what actually happened it will become clear when and how structure and agency have been implicated (cf. Giddens, 1984; Sewell, 1992).

¹¹⁶ Foucault cited in Flynn, 2005

¹¹⁷ Foucault, 1994E; p.370

Therefore, the problem-driven nature of the approach is very important. As we have discussed, Foucault was not interested in the past as such, but only insofar as that it allowed us to uncover those lines of legitimization and hypothetical necessity that control human behaviour that we perceive to be intolerable in the present.¹¹⁸ It was the problem of the present, understood as a problematical discursive order in a given domain, which guided the historical inquiries. Foucault attempted to follow the many, often fragile, lines of descent that led to the emergence of this problematical discourse. Study of a problem involves ‘choice of the material as a function of the givens of the problem, a focusing of analysis on elements capable of being resolved, and the establishment of relations that allow this solution.’¹¹⁹ Thus, histories of the present are certainly not meant to provide a complete and exhaustive description of a specific historic period. On the contrary, the focus is on those concrete practices that allow us to uncover how a discursive order was socially constructed and how it works to reproduce itself (i.e. how power works). According to Foucault we had to look for what he labelled events in order to be able to describe this.

2.5.2 Events

By now, it won’t come as a surprise that Foucault’s notion of an event (which he deemed a fundamental notion of historiography)¹²⁰ was also rather abstract and quite different from the usual ways wherein it was used in social sciences. This is related to his specific perspective on history, which almost automatically implies a different perspective on the historical event. We first shortly discuss the conventional use of event in social sciences before we elaborate on Foucault’s conception.

In essence, events are important analytical devices in many academic disciplines (economics, sociology, history, public management, policy sciences etc.). Authors drawing on a case-study research strategy also tend to focus on a set of meaningful events (Yin, 1981). According to standard dictionary definitions, the term event can refer to a happening or occurrence of any kind, but the word is more commonly used to signify an occurrence that is remarkable in some way – one that is widely noted and commented on by contemporaries. Meaningful events are often understood in terms of dramatic changes. For example, in public management literature change events refer to unforeseen, unpredictable events that are difficult to manage and that have a large impact, i.e. changing the constellation of actors, action systems, the issues taken into account and the institutional context involved (Van Gils et al., 2010; p.79). Thus, a meaningful event that is worth describing is the event that has large impact. This does not necessarily mean that trivial events do not matter. On the contrary, as Giddens

¹¹⁸ See e.g. Foucault, 2000E; p.336; Foucault, 2000G; p.359

¹¹⁹ Foucault cited in Flynn, 2005; p.36.

¹²⁰ See e.g. Foucault, 1994F; p.423

already noted ‘... a seemingly trivial event may trigger changes far removed from it in time and space’ (1984; p.10). Complexity theories allow us to understand how trivial events can set off a chain of reactions of ever strengthening positive feedback loops that can eventually result in a change of the system.¹²¹ Thus, the impact of an event largely depends on how it resonates through the system, something that can often not be predicted (Gladwell, 2000; Van Gils et al., 2010).

The idea that events signify large changes (like system turnovers) is also quite common in theories about institutional change. Here, events that eventually trigger institutional change (understood as changes in policies and practices) are referred to as critical events (Hoffman, 1999; Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Pride, 1995), shocks (Fligstein, 1991), jolts (Meyer, 1982) and discontinuities (Lorange et al., 1996). They usually give rise to the collective definition or redefinition of social problems (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001). For institutionalists events always come from the outside, as they cannot be developed within a firmly institutionalized field. When such external events become the focus of public attention they might resonate through the institutionalized field, setting off the same type of positive feedback loops as those complexity theorists were talking about. This is much like how Latour (1987) described a new technological innovation (event). Such an event is like a rugby ball sitting on the ground. It cannot achieve anything on its own. A play needs to be developed around it by agents, who use it to fulfill their own agendas. Therefore, technological events may or may not become disruptive depending on how they are constructed, and how they succeed in mobilizing support by setting off a chain of positive feedback loops.

Such an understanding of event is also quite familiar in the field of history. As Sewell (1995) argued, the event has always been an important element of historical analyses, where events were understood in terms of battles, alliances, conquests, conspiracies, revolts, royal successions, reforms, elections, religious revivals, assassinations, great discoveries. Thus, the focus of conventional history clearly was on major events, i.e. the ones that signified great changes (much like the idea of meaningful events, change events and critical events). Sewell adopted a more refined perspective on the historical event, by linking it to a ramified sequence of occurrences (1995; p.844). This is quite similar to the idea of understanding events as setting off a chain reaction or triggering positive feedback loops, eventually resulting in durable transformations of structures.

Not surprisingly, Foucault developed a rather different perspective of event, which he derived from his particular understanding of history and which he deemed necessary for uncovering the relations of power at work within a given social domain. Before

¹²¹ Everybody knows the butterfly effect (and we don’t mean that annoying movie).

discussing Foucault's concept of event we therefore first elaborate on the genealogical perspective on history, thus refining the introduction provided in 2.3.

The Genealogical perspective on history

In order to diagnose the present adequately Foucault developed histories 'by following lines of fragility in the present – in managing to grasp why and how that-which-is might no longer be that-which-is.' His genealogical approach to do so was based on a specific understanding of historical progress.

The regime of traditional history is one that constructs a comprehensive view of history, retraces the past as a patient and continuous development, which dissolves the singular event into an ideal continuity.¹²² It confirms the belief that the present rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities. It is concerned with establishing continuity and totality across time and space (as if, beneath the apparent differences, the complexities and ambiguities, there could be found a single purpose or a grand narrative).¹²³ Foucault distanced himself from modernity's teleological assumption that history moves upward or forward from some well-defined origin.¹²⁴ According to Foucault, retracing the past as a patient and continuous development is to hold on to the illusion that there is something inevitable about the past. Instead, he allowed room for discontinuous developments, rejecting the presence of all-encompassing origins and final destinations. Beginnings (or origins) that seem pure and truly grand are nothing more than rather small events interacting in a specific way with other events.¹²⁵ Truth and reason are born from chance, from a partly coincidental intermingling of a multiplicity of discursive elements that have been put into operation in various strategies. There is no common essence behind things. Instead, the essence is continuously produced and changed in interplay between different knowledges in a specific historical context. When developing real histories, instead of simplified, one-sided interpretations of the past delivered by traditional historiography, what is found is randomness, piecemeal fabrications, dissension, disparity, passion, hatred, competition, details and accidents,

¹²² Foucault, 1994E.

¹²³ There are ample examples of this type of histories. For example, Fukuyama argued that after the Cold war, Marxism was disposed of and the liberal democracy had triumphed. History had ended, and we had entered a stable, prosperous and peaceful world. And Marx himself also asserted that we were heading towards a final destination, a communist paradise that would emerge after the working class had overthrown the capitalist system. Such histories are written to argue for or against a predefined cause, and therefore almost automatically selectively present and interpret past events in terms of utopians (see Gray, 2009).

¹²⁴ Foucault, 1980B; p.49.

¹²⁵ The sarcastic comment about the birth of mankind which Foucault adopted from Nietzsche in '*Nietzsche, Genealogy, History*' illustrates the point very clearly. 'We wished to awaken the feeling of man's sovereignty by showing his divine birth: this path is now forbidden, since a monkey stands at the entrance' (Foucault, 1994E; p.372).

errors, false appraisals and faulty calculations (savoir) mixed together with devotion to truth, to science (connaissance).¹²⁶

Foucault further marks the difference between his focus and the traditional focus by discussing the differences between the German words 'Urkunft,' 'Herkunft' and 'Entstehung' used by Nietzsche.¹²⁷ *Urkunft* is a word relating to 'the miraculous origin' that Foucault and Nietzsche are so strongly opposed to. *Herkunft* is translated into 'descent' and it refers to the sorting out of different traits that contributed to the phenomena. An examination will focus on the myriad of events that made their contribution to descent. It traces the heterogeneity of historical beginnings by identifying the intersection of 'subtle, singular and individual marks' that seem at once unified and natural. 'Entstehung' is translated into 'Emergence', and it refers to the 'moment of arising', when 'the current series of subjugations' comes together in a 'hazardous play of dominations' that has given birth to our way of existence.¹²⁸ This is something different than looking for a particular point in history where a given rationality is established, which from then has controlled everything. Foucault intended to replace historiography as *Urkunft* by historiography as the study of *Herkunft* and *Entstehung*. To stick to *Urkunft* means to impose a single order on the highly differentiated and fragmented past, which simplifies and even masquerades the differences and complexities involved in the shaping of any social pattern in the name of the grand narrative. As Foucault asserted 'I am completely opposed to a certain conception of history that takes for its model a kind of grand continuous and homogenous evolution, a sort of great mythic life. Historians now know very well that the mass of historical documents can be combined according to different series that have neither the same direction nor the same type of evolution.'¹²⁹

It is this specific understanding of history that makes Foucault argue that instead of looking for origins, linear causality and continuity (narratives of progress) we should focus on multiple causes, include a polyphony of voices and show discontinuities. With regard to the latter, the classic conception of historical time as a series of discontinuities described in the mode of continuity is replaced by a serial history that describes 'continuities in the mode of discontinuity' (Flynn, 2005; p.15). However, to qualify Foucault as the philosopher of discontinuity implies a great misunderstanding, as he has indicated himself too.¹³⁰ It was actually the longer-range continuities in cultural practices that were his main concern (cf. Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982). The persistence

¹²⁶ Foucault, 1994E.

¹²⁷ Foucault, 1994E; p.370.

¹²⁸ Foucault, 1994E; p.376.

¹²⁹ Foucault, 1989; p.66; This statement illustrates once again Foucault's postmodernist stance towards history. See also Jenkins, 1997; 2003 on this interpretation.

¹³⁰ Foucault, 1980D; p.111.

and strength of the continuities could be illustrated by uncovering the many discontinuities that emerged and disappeared over time.

It is this specific understanding of historical progress that underlies Foucault's genealogical method. It was his belief that this understanding allowed him to come as close to reality as possible, to record what had really happened, i.e. to develop a real history or *Wirkliche Historie* as Nietzsche called it. Genealogy should therefore first of all be perceived as 'an effort to take history seriously' (Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.115), and this is done by uncovering the real mechanisms at work in the production and institutionalisation of specific discursive orders that govern a social domain during a specific period. As can be derived from Foucault's understanding of history it was his particular understanding of the event that served as the crucial point of departure for developing such real and effective histories.

Foucauldian events

Foucault asserted that, in order to develop real and effective histories, we have to '... entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects'.¹³¹ This implies that we have to record what has happened without imposing an abstract and unitary (theoretical) order upon it (which will disguise and transform the events in the name of the grand narrative) (Linssen, 2005). In terms of Foucault we must try to '... record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality...'.¹³² Only then we can describe events in terms of their most unique characteristics and their most acute manifestations.

This singularity of events can be achieved by thinking of an 'event' in a particular way.¹³³ The notion of an event differs from that traditionally understood by historians as, say, a decision, a treaty, a reign or a battle. Instead, an event in the Foucauldian sense requires a 'breach of self-evidence'.¹³⁴ Such breaches should be understood as miniscule transformations, not as grand ruptures and fissures. Indeed, events thus understood imply miniscule shifts in existing (taken-for-granted) orders, which make them 'invisible, imperceptible for the contemporaries.' According to Foucault such

¹³¹ Foucault, 1980C; p.83; It can be argued that the focus on meta-narratives is derived from a narrow focus on formal knowledge (*connaissance*), where Foucault also included the much broader implicit and subjugated knowledges (*savoir*).

¹³² Foucault, 1994E; See also Foucault, 2000D; p.226

¹³³ In fact, the Foucauldian event is a multifaceted concept, which accounts for its theoretical versatility. Indeed, this was exactly what Foucault was up to when he argued that we should be aware that 'there are actually a whole order of levels of different types of events differing in amplitude, chronological breadth, and capacity to produce effects' (Foucault, 1980D; p.114; see also Foucault, 2000D; p.226; Foucault, 1975/1991; p. 138). In this thesis we don't attempt to develop a complete overview of the many definitions of events that Foucault provided over the years. See e.g. Flynn, 2005 for such a typology.

¹³⁴ Foucault, 2000D; p.226

invincible and imperceptible events determine finally and profoundly the history of the world.¹³⁵ He argued that there are always breaches of self-evidence, or attempts to forge such breaches, and they work to demonstrate that there is no ideal continuity or natural process at work. However, at the same time it is clear that events not necessarily imply a large impact. They can perfectly signify short moments of resistance that eventually become marginalized as the consequence of the workings of the discursive order. Thus, events are not defined in terms of the impact they have, but they signal a (short and miniscule) breach of self-evidence.

To search for such breaches means to look for resistances (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.123). Or, in other words, events can be understood as (very short) moments of resistance, understood as ‘.... the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it ...’¹³⁶ Understanding an event in terms of a breach of self-evidence is important, because it is exactly during those moments of resistance that the ‘forces of domination’ operating in history come about. It is during these moments that different rationalities or truths clash and the rules and norms of the discursive order are not automatically enacted.¹³⁷ It brings to light the strategies and tactics that are employed to effectively deal with these inconsistencies and tensions in order to secure a specific regime of truth (i.e. composed of the series of rules that need to be obeyed within a specific time-space context in order to make a true and rational statement). Or as Foucault stated, it allows one to rediscover ‘the linkages, encounters, dependencies, blockages, plays of force, strategies and the like, that at a given moment have formed what will subsequently function as evidence, universality, necessity.’¹³⁸

It is therefore important to localize events and describe their conditions of possibility, which allowed an event to occur when and how.¹³⁹ The detailed analysis of innumerable heterogeneous events and their conditions of possibility bring to light the mechanisms of power at work in the (re)production of discourse. The event (understood as a breach in self-evidence or a moment when variety is being produced) forms the point of departure for tracing down its line of descent. Or in other words, when we have localized an event, we can uncover the strategies and tactics involved in its emergence, its marginalization and/ or institutionalization. The implicit Foucauldian hypothesis is that the events won’t become institutionalized, as the mechanisms at work in the discursive order won’t easily allow for this. As argued in 2.2, Foucault’s genealogies are

¹³⁵ Foucault, 1994E

¹³⁶ Foucault, 1994E; p.380

¹³⁷ Foucault asserted that ‘... there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised...’ (Foucault, 1980F; p 142).

¹³⁸ Foucault cited from Flynn, 2005; p.70

¹³⁹ Foucault, 2000D; Foucault, 1994E

exactly about describing these historical continuities in the mode of discontinuity. Foucault thus both highlights the discontinuities in history and the longer-range continuities in cultural practices, where the event is used as the main point of departure for the description.¹⁴⁰

2.6 Towards a 3-Step Approach for doing Genealogy

In this chapter we extensively discussed Foucault's genealogical approach in order to discern methodological guidelines for describing and explaining the emergence and persistence of discursive orders in specific social domains. We did so by first extensively discussing Foucault's ethics, as his ethics are fundamental for understanding his genealogy as a project of social critique. Amongst other things we pointed out that uncovering power relations at work that sustain discursive orders within a given social domain (which in principle marginalizes some knowledges and people while privileging others) lies at the core of the genealogical approach.

After shortly presenting his different methodologies and stressing their interrelationship we discussed three main concepts of his genealogical approach (1) power (2) discourse (3) practice (later we added a fourth concept, i.e. the event). Power, discourse and practice turned out to be different sides of the same medal. These concepts are mutually constitutive and cannot exist without one another. In fact, the meaning of those concepts often overlaps in Foucault's own writings (in the sense that discourse is practice and that the interplay between practice and discourse is both the result and the precursor of the relationships of power at work).

The Foucauldian understanding of power, discourse and practice has provided us with valuable suggestions about what to look for, where to look and how to look when attempting to describe and explain the emergence and persistence (ongoing reproduction and further institutionalization) of discursive orders. In essence, we have some idea about the nature of power and it is through the interplay between discursive order and micro-practices that we can understand how power works within a given social domain, which is exactly the main goal of a genealogy. It is this specific interplay that shapes the conduct of actors and the way one actor acts upon another. As this interplay is always context dependent and historically contingent, we cannot a priori define how power works. We know some of the characteristics of power (e.g. it is everywhere, it is productive and constraining, it cannot be possessed, it is not located in institutions, it works from the bottom up), but we should avoid narrow definitions, conceptualizations and ways of measuring power. Instead, it is a concrete empirical investigation that is

¹⁴⁰ By allowing both the possibilities for discontinuity and continuity in relations of power/knowledge, he has developed a flexible grid of interpretation with which to approach their dynamics, allowing him to record what really happened (Rabinow, 1980).

needed, which is focused by a more sophisticated understanding of practice and events. We presented practice and events as the necessary middle range concepts that allow us to uncover how discursive orders actually come into being and work to mutually reinforce themselves.

The extensive introduction of Foucauldian genealogy has resulted in a set of methodological guidelines that can be used to develop a three step procedure for describing and explain the emergence and persistence (reproduction) of a discursive order in a social domain.¹⁴¹ Note that these guidelines are based upon our interpretation of Foucault's thought, although they are hardly idiosyncratic.¹⁴²

- In order to uncover the power relations at work that constitute a social domain we need to uncover the interplay between discursive orders and micro practices.
- Discursive orders refer to the things that can be thought, said and done in a meaningful and legitimate way by a specific actor within a given social domain. They come with (implicit) rules for making meaningful statements; subject positions; and a specific positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another.
- Micro practices can be derived from the study of concrete strategies and tactics of actors. It refers to what they actually say (discursive) and do (non discursive). Regularities in strategies and tactics and their relatedness to specific conventions or obligations signify the existence of a particular practice.
- Events need to be used as points of departure for the study of micro practices, where events are understood as moments of resistance or breaches in self-evidences.
- Events should be described as discontinuities in relation to longer-range continuities of hegemonic discursive orders. Thus, describe both the small, miniscule shifts that can be recorded and the overarching discursive order that these shifts attempt to transform or modify at the same time.
- When events are discovered, one needs to follow the lines of descent of events and examine the concrete strategies and tactics involved in their emergence and institutionalization or marginalization. Avoid endlessly gearing down, as the close examination of specific practices lead to correlative practices ad infinitum.

Based on these foundations of genealogy we argue that three methodological steps are needed, which allows for a rather systemized enactment of Foucauldian genealogy:

¹⁴¹ As noted earlier in the introduction of this chapter, the term guidelines is borrowed from Flyvbjerg, 2001/ chapter 9, as they serve as cautionary indicators and not as blueprint rules.

¹⁴² This interpretation is certainly not idiosyncratic as many elements are in line with interpretations made by others who extensively discussed Foucault's work, most notably Bevir (1999A; 1999B), Clegg (1989), Flynn (2005), Flyvbjerg (1998;2001), Hajer (1995), Haugaard (1997; 2002), Scheurich & Bell McKenzie (2005), Sharp & Richardson (2001), Richardson (1995), Flyvbjerg & Richardson (2000), McNay (1994), Gordon (2003), Dreyfus & Rabinow (1982).

1. Localize events in the social domain that is the object of study
2. Trace the lines of descent and assess the extent to which events become institutionalized / marginalized
3. Derive micro-practices and the discursive order from the analysis and uncover their interplay, which means to provide an answer to the question how power works within the social domain that is being studied.

Moreover, some additional guidelines can be derived from Foucault's writings about genealogy:

- When tracing lines of descent one does not look for origins but focus on the multiplicity of 'beginnings' in order to uncover the (interweaving) of the many lines of descent. This also means to allow for the ambiguity in history. As Foucault rejects the existence of a grand narratives and definite teleology's, ambiguity is perceived as an indicator of a realistic history. There are often many different perspectives about what happened during specific events. In order to avoid simplified and one-sided readings of the past, the researcher should account for the different interpretations available. When allowing room for different interpretations it comes to the fore that history is never entirely black or white. Many institutionalized stereotypes might become far more complex and unpleasant upon closer inspection. Good histories remind us that human affairs are complicated and help to make societies more mature, daring to question myths and other fallacies (MacMillan, 2009).
- When discussing the emergence, institutionalization and/or marginalization of events, one needs to account for structure and agency at the same time. This entails describing how specific ways of talking and acting become institutionalized and how this works to influence future possible strategies and tactics of the actors involved. Although this might sound easy, authors who have attempted to develop such a genealogy shall acknowledge that it is a very difficult and demanding task, as the researcher needs to be aware of all things that (might) have mattered and he needs to be able to make sense of enormous amounts of data, accounting simultaneously for the structural influences that shape individual actions, how those actions are constructed and what their structural consequences are (Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.138). In chapter 4 we shall elaborate on how we organized the data.

Enacting the three methodological steps, while taking into account Foucault's take on historiography (as set out in the foregoing two bullets) does not mean that one can develop a complete and exhaustive history. Instead, it intends to offer an effective history of the present, i.e. one that explains to the people involved how they have come to be in some sort of impasse and why they cannot recognize or diagnose adequately the nature of this situation. As explained in chapter 1, such a diagnosis opens up possibilities to break through this impasse, exactly by describing the genesis of a given

situation and showing that this particular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity.¹⁴³

The need for more focus?

The three step approach thus defined still implies a rather broad focus, offering the researcher few things to hold on to. As Foucault himself was fully aware, the methodology he presented offered historians too much and too little: too many diverse relations, too many lines of analysis, but not enough unitary necessity.¹⁴⁴ No doubt that Foucault deliberately used his (empirically empty) concepts of power, discourse, practice and event to allow himself with the minimum of focus and a priori assumptions and maximum of flexibility that he deemed necessary for developing a real and effective history. For sure, these concepts served to introduce differential relations and chance occurrences into the very core of historiography.¹⁴⁵

However, the broad focus can also be criticized for being a catch-all approach that is imprecise and therefore not useful as a research focus. The danger is that the enormous amount of data that is the result of any genealogical inquiry overwhelms the researcher, i.e. something that is also known as death-by-data-asphyxiation (Pettigrew, 1990). At the same time, it is exactly the lack of theoretical a priori that allows the researcher to uncover what really happened. In chapter 4 we shall discuss more extensively how we dealt with this well-known problem. For now it is sufficient to note that we can easily close at least a part of the gap between Foucault's abstract sensitizing concepts and concrete empirical investigations by relating them to the policy process. This is also a necessity, as we can only effectively apply the three step procedure and related methodological guidelines that we presented to the study of the emergence and institutionalisation of a specific policy discourse, like the mainport-environment discourse of Schiphol, when we understand the policy processes and the elements that they are made off. After all, this allows us to effectively discern Foucauldian events in the policy process, which can be used as the point of departure for empirical investigations. Drawing on events we can uncover the micro practices at work via the description of concrete strategies and tactics that created the emergence, institutionalization or marginalization of these events. The operationalization of the policy process and the application of the three step procedure to the policy process is the subject of the next chapter. It allows us to develop a genealogy of a policy discourse in a systemized and transparent way.

¹⁴³ If done properly, the result is a 'pragmatically oriented, historical interpretation' of 'those cultural practices in which power and knowledge cross, and in which our current understanding of the individual, the society, and the human sciences are themselves fabricated' (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, p.120).

¹⁴⁴ Foucault, 2000D; p.228

¹⁴⁵ Something that Flynn has argued in regard to Foucault's notion of event (2005; p.80).

Chapter 3 Genealogy of Policy Discourse

3.1 Introduction

In the former chapter we discussed the promise that the genealogical approach of Foucault holds for describing and explaining the emergence and persistence (reproduction) of specific discursive orders that govern a social domain. In the concluding paragraph (2.6) we discussed the methodological guidelines that we use for this, firmly grounded in Foucault's thought. More specifically, we set out three methodological steps that need to be enacted in order to be able to describe and explain the (re)production of any discursive order, i.e. (1) localize events (2) trace their lines of descent and assess their level of institutionalization/ marginalization (3) derive the interplay between micro practices and discursive order from steps 1 and 2. The latter provides the answer to the question how power works to sustain the discursive order, which may become a deadlocked order that comes with negative effects (e.g. it cannot result in courses of action that hold practical value for the actors involved). This chapter is meant to make this three step approach applicable to the concrete study of the policy process. As argued at the end of chapter 2, there is still a conceptual gap between Foucault's abstract ideas and the study of concrete everyday activities (cf. Hajer, 1995; p.51 and Sharp & Richardson, 2001). By explicitly relating each step to the policy process this gap can be closed.

In essence, each one of the three steps is related to the policy domain, resulting in a three step procedure that allows us to both describe and explain the emergence and persistence of a policy discourse in a given policy domain. In the case of policy deadlocks, like the Schiphol case, it holds the promise of uncovering the mechanisms that underlie the emergence and institutionalization (and eventual naturalization) of the policy deadlock. The three steps shall be elaborated in the following way:

1. First of all, in order to be able to localize events in the policy domain we need a conceptual understanding of the policy process that allows us to detect those moments when variety is being produced (i.e. the events). We develop this understanding by presenting our view on the nature of the policy process (3.2) and by identifying the different elements that the policy process is made of (3.3).
2. Second, we need to uncover the strategies and tactics involved that have caused an event to emerge and become institutionalized or marginalized (and the factors that influenced these strategies and tactics) (3.4).
3. Third, we have need for a procedure that allows us to use this information for uncovering the micro-practices at work and relate this to the (re)production of the discursive order of the policy domain (3.5). Based on this, we can assess the reproductive tendency of the policy discourse and uncover the driving mechanisms

that cause this reproduction. This, then, is how power works in the specific policy domain under consideration.

We end the chapter with a short summary of the three-step procedure that serves as the descriptive and analytical framework for our case study (3.6).

3.2 The Nature of the Policy Process

In order to be able to localize events in the policy process, understood as breaches in self evidence, or moments that variety is produced, we need to understand what elements the policy process is made of. For this, we need a conceptual understanding of the nature of the policy process, which is presented in this paragraph.

Over the years, several conceptual models have been developed in order to analyse complex decision-making processes (about policy), each based on specific assumptions about how decisions are actually made. From the perspective of discourse theory, policy making can be seen as an argumentative struggle for discursive hegemony. Fortunately, several researchers in the field of policy studies have discussed how this works (e.g. Hajer, 1995; Howarth, 2009; Jenssen, 1997; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Sharp & Richardson, 2001). So, how does it work?

To start with, many policy processes, especially those concerned with large infrastructure projects, can be seen as primary examples of wicked (Rittel & Webber, 1973) or ill structured problems (Dunn, 1994). Such problems are characterized by cognitive and social uncertainties. With regard to the first, the involved parties do not only disagree about the solution, but also about the nature of the problem. The main reason for this is that there is no agreement about what counts as (scientifically) valid and authoritative facts (De Graaf & Hoppe, 1989). Actors pose arguments that are all valid in their own right, each sustained by scientific evidence, while pointing towards fundamentally different directions (Van Eeten, 1999; Schön & Rein, 1994).¹⁴⁶ With regard to the second (social uncertainties), wicked problems cut across the traditional jurisdictions and routines of organizations and cross the traditional boundaries between the public and private sector. Governments, businesses and civil society are unable to tackle these issues by themselves, and none of them can impose policies or strategies unilaterally (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; p.1). Thus, in order to reach ones goals, the actor needs the support of others. For example, in the Netherlands large infrastructure planning is a matter of national concern, but the national government is not hierarchically superior to the other actors involved. The government is only one of the players involved, and depends just as much as the rest on support of others for the

¹⁴⁶ In scientific literature this is related to the idea that actors often hold different and incommensurable frames, resulting in their own perceptions of reality (cf. Rein & Schon, 1993/ 1994; Weick, 1995).

effectiveness and legitimacy of its functioning (we discuss this in more detail in chapter 5).

In such situations, actors need to form networks. A network can be defined as (1) a number of actors with (2) different goals and interests and (3) different resources, (4) who depend on each other for the realization of their goals. These dependencies can be expressed in several resources: funds, authority, land, information, political friends etc. (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008; p.1; see also Klijn, 1996; Kickert et al., 1997).¹⁴⁷ Interdependence with regard to resources compels actors to interact in order to achieve their own goals.¹⁴⁸ The result is that the actors engage in all kinds of (more or less formalized) interactions. Arenas of interaction emerge and decisions are made in networks.¹⁴⁹ Still, such decision making will always entail its own specific mix of command and control strategies (hierarchy), market mechanisms and network management strategies (cf. De Bruijn & Dicke, 2007; Rhodes, 1997).

In the case of wicked problems, decision-making in networks tends to assume the form of an argumentative struggle for discursive hegemony. By this we mean that actors try to secure their perception of the problem and preferred course of action (cf. Hajer, 2000; Termeer, 1993). However, since there is no unequivocal yardstick to assess which interpretation is most plausible, actors try to persuade each other about the validity of their arguments.¹⁵⁰ Hence, deliberation and conflict featuring rhetoric and persuasion become central to the policy process, with the aim to construct shared interpretations or at least to impose one's own interpretation on others (Dunn, 1994; Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hoppe, 1999; Majone, 1989; Throgmorton, 1993).¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Note that in this thesis networks refer to multi-actor networks and not to networks in technical domains (information networks, transportation networks).

¹⁴⁸ Of course, actors who are dependent on each other to achieve their objectives will be prepared to surrender only precisely the amount of autonomy necessary to achieve those objectives (Wassenberg, 1984; p.200).

¹⁴⁹ In scientific literature the shift from hierarchical decision making to decision-making in networks is broadly referred to as the shift from government to governance (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Kooiman, 1993; Pierre, 2000; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). There are several explanations available for the erosion of the steering capacity of the national government in the case of public policy making, ranging from macro-sociological explanations that cause global pressures (i.e. the rise of the network society, see Castells, 2000; Dicken, 1998; Salet et al, 2003; Scharpf, 1999) to the resurrection of civil society, that causes local pressures (Frissen, 1996; Van Gunsteren, 1994; Putnam, 1993). Due to both pressures the power of the nation state has shifted to both supranational and more regional or local actors, which even led some to proclaim the end of the nation state (cf. Ohmae, 1995). Such a thing has not happened yet, but there is ample empirical proof that internationalization and individualization have spread the resources among more actors, which has led to a horizontalisation of power and authority.

¹⁵⁰ Of course this is something different than discerning between sales talk or propaganda and serious research outputs (Fischer & Forester, 1993).

¹⁵¹ In fact, the communicative and collaborative turn in planning and policy making and the process management approaches in public management have thrived in the 1990s due to the recognition of this argumentative character of the policy process. Such approaches try to establish and facilitate a dialectical process believed to add to the creation of joint facts, shared meanings and informed decisions (De Bruijn et al, 1999; Cruickshank et al., 1999; Ehren & Stinson, 1999; Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 2001).

During the argumentative struggle, different actors have different possibilities to influence the outcomes.¹⁵² These possibilities are influenced by the prevailing discursive order, which already contains boundaries to what specific actors can say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way during the policy process. Note that these boundaries are different for the different actors. This is how power works to regulate the argumentative struggle, i.e. through influencing the set of possible future actions of actors involved, and thus indirectly influencing how actors act upon one another.¹⁵³ This understanding of the policy process is clearly social-constructivist, as are all discursive approaches. It shows how our truths, rationalities, norms, and the rules that we need to obey that emanate from these, are socially constructed during the argumentative struggle.¹⁵⁴ This is how discursive orders in the policy domain are (re)produced.

It is this understanding of the policy process that makes it easier for us to localize events. Most importantly, the argumentative struggle gives way to a specific policy space, while it also works to reproduce or change this policy space. In order to localize events, thus to uncover those moments that variety comes into play, we need to define which elements the policy space is made of.

3.3 Step 1: Localizing Events in the Policy Process

3.3.1 Two Levels of Analysis

To start with, in order to be able to detect and analyse events it is useful to distinguish between two levels of analysis. First, there is the overarching level of the discursive order, which refers to the ways of thinking, talking and acting that are deemed acceptable and legitimate within a given policy domain. Second, this discursive order is made up of different policy themes. A policy theme is understood as a topic around which the (public and governmental) debate and decision making is concentrated (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Pestman, 2001). Such themes are constructions of the researcher, although they are likely to coincide with some of the issues on the (national) public policy agenda's.¹⁵⁵ It is around these policy themes that the argumentative struggle becomes manifest. That is, discursive orders of policy domains cannot be read from the empirical investigations, but they are derived from the detailed description of argumentative struggles around specific policy themes. Actors develop different policy

¹⁵² In chapter 9, paragraph 9.2.2, we shall refer to the actors that can become responsible for passing judgment on what is true, e.g. what counts as valuable information and which storylines are more valuable than others, in terms of macro-actors (based on Callon & Latour, 1981).


¹⁵³ Which is something different than saying that these actions are determined. As we have argued in chapter 2, there is always a possibility for disobeying existing rules.

¹⁵⁴ The language that is used profoundly shapes our view of social and physical realities (Fischer & Forester, 1993; p.1).

¹⁵⁵ Policy themes are not necessarily restricted to one specific policy terrain. Especially in the case of large infrastructure development they are likely to cover different policy terrains, like infrastructure policy, spatial policy, environmental policy and economic policy.

stories around specific policy themes (e.g. aviation noise, third party risk, air pollution) and try to mobilize support for their respective stories. It is on the analytical level of the policy theme that events occur. These events might eventually influence ways of talking and acting about a specific policy theme, which directly impacts on the higher overarching level of the discursive order of the policy domain. The discursive order of the policy domain is therefore both the outcome of argumentative struggles on the level of the policy themes and precursor of these argumentative struggles, as it defines the policy themes on the agenda and it sets limits to the things that can be said and done in meaningful way (see figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Two levels of Analysis of Policy Discourse




Most importantly, events are localized on the level of the policy theme. This means that it is on this level that we can observe the production of variety (i.e. breaches in self-evidence) and that we can trace down the lines of descent by detecting the strategies and tactics involved (as shall be discussed in 3.4). For analytical reasons it is useful to imagine the level of the policy theme in terms of a policy space. Thus, each policy theme is surrounded by a specific policy space that contains the ways of thinking, talking and acting. Together, the different policy spaces that can be found in a policy domain shape up to form the discursive order of the policy domain. The discursive order than works to influence the future possible ways of talking and acting around each policy theme.¹⁵⁶

In order to detect variety on the level of the policy theme we need to know which elements the policy space is made of. Here it is useful to distinguish between a discursive space, understood as the specific ways of thinking and talking, and a political space, understood as the specific ways of acting (cf. Pestman, 2001; see also Broekhans,

¹⁵⁶ Note that this interplay between the policy domain and the policy themes is more fluid in practice. Indeed, sometimes it is easier to locate a new policy theme on the policy agenda, which then serves as a point of departure for localizing the events on the level of the policy themes that caused this change on the level of the policy agenda to happen.

2003).¹⁵⁷ Both the discursive space and the political space consist of a set of elements that can be used as indicators for detecting variety (see figure 3.2). These elements will be discussed in the remainder of this paragraph (3.3.2 and 3.3.3). In figure 3.2 we also included the middle range concept of practice that can be located somewhere between the level of the policy domain and the policy theme. This way it becomes clear how all three levels of analysis that we presented in chapter 2 are included (recall figure 2.1).¹⁵⁸

Figure 3.2 Levels of analysis and elements of the Policy Space



¹⁵⁷ Although the notions of policy space, discursive space and political space are derived from Pestman (2001), he uses the terms in a different way. For him, the discursive and political space refer to the accepted ways of talking and acting, while we use them to refer to all ways of talking and acting, i.e. the accepted and unaccepted. It is the unaccepted ways that mark events.

¹⁵⁸ In 3.5 we shall elaborate on the position of practice.

3.3.2 Variety in the Discursive Space

We defined the discursive space as the total variety in ways of talking about a policy theme. This includes both the dominant ways of conceptualizing the policy problem(s) and solutions and the marginalized ways. In this paragraph we further refine what we mean by discursive space. We distinguish between different elements that make up the discursive space (and around which variety can be created). Linguistic approaches to discourse analysis can help us to define these elements.

There are different levels of analyses of the discursive space possible, dependent on ones purpose. It will be clear by now that the genealogical approach is not concerned with extremely detailed analyses of texts that are developed by those drawing on narrow linguistic approaches. In such textual studies the focus is on the micro-politics of language, i.e. on how texts are structured, how specific parts of sentences are connected and sequenced, how words are left out (gap-filling), which grammars and nouns are used, how punctuation marks (e.g. commas, question marks and exclamation marks) are being used, the use of fillers etc. (cf. Fairclough, 2001; Wetherell, 2001; Wagenaar, 2006). As a consequence of focus on textual detail and nuance, the researcher limits his work to the microscopic deconstruction of the (sentences) of a few texts. Such a focus is far too detailed when one tries to uncover long-range continuities and discontinuities in a discursive order of a given (policy domain). First of all, it would be impossible to acquire all the data of the things that have been said during longer range time periods. Many things have never been laid down on paper at all, and for the part that has been written down, a large portion has been disposed of already. Second, even if it were possible to collect the entire corpus of language utterances, it would still be impossible to analyze it, due to its overwhelming enormity (see also Van der Arend, 2007). Third, such a focus does not allow us to explain why specific discursive utterances gain dominance, and others are marginalized. That is to say that such a detailed linguistic focus does not include the power relations that constitute a discursive order, which is exactly what the purpose of a genealogical approach is.

The importance of policy stories

Therefore, the focus is not on a microscopic deconstruction of sentences, but on the more general (hidden) structures that can be found in the language that has been used. The analysis is then meant to illuminate a particular discursive structure in a discussion: 'It brings out a certain regularity in particular ideas, concepts and categories in terms of which the policy issue is discussed' (Hajer, 2006; p.67; Laws & Hajer, 2006). The central element of discursive space thus understood is formed by the concept of policy stories, as it is such stories that specific ideas, concepts and categories are brought into the policy debate. The discursive space is made up of policy stories and actors try to mobilize as much support as possible for their policy stories in order to influence the argumentative struggle for discursive hegemony. Indeed, several authors have argued


that it is useful to conceptualize the argumentative policy struggle in terms of competing stories, narratives or storylines. It is by telling persuasive stories that actors in policy debates communicate and struggle for dominant ways of perceiving the policy situation, its causes and effects and the most desirable courses of action.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, the content of a story depends on one's purpose telling it. Policy stories are means for selective allocation of attention; they direct attention to specific situations, persons, and specific advantages and disadvantages (Stone, 1989). As such, constructing stories is an attempt to construct specific truths about reality. One chooses to 'include *this* but to exclude *that*, to start (and end) a story *this* way, rather than *that*, to use *these* words rather than *those*, to configure the events of the story *this* way rather than *that*' (Throgmorton, 2003; p.128; original italics). The stories tell us what is worth paying attention to, what we can do about a given problem and what the consequences are if we fail to act (Forester, 1999; McBeth et al., 2007; Throgmorton, 2003; Wagenaar, 1997).

It is by telling persuasive stories that people try to frame and direct the policy debate. The challenge is to construct the kind of stories that mobilize sufficient support for making them dominant. This challenge is essentially about making sure one's favored course of action appears to be in the broadest public interest (Stone, 2002). The way wherein a story can influence the direction of the policy debate depends on 'how others respond to it, twist it, take it up' (Laws & Hajer, 2006).

From the argumentative policy perspective, stories are crucial elements of the discursive space. In fact, Hajer put forward the concept of storyline as a middle range concept that can show how overarching discursive orders are maintained or transformed (Hajer, 1995; p.61). For reasons of clarification it is important to call the two levels of analysis that we set out in 3.3.1 back into memory. From our perspective, actors develop storylines around specific policy themes (i.e. on the level of the policy space). The total sum of all these stories, both the ones that become institutionalized and the ones that become marginalized, shape up to form a sort of overarching meta narrative on the level of the policy domain (i.e. the discursive order). Thus, the discursive order at work on the level of the entire policy domain consists of a meta narrative that gives way to specific policy themes on the agenda and to policy stories on the level of the policy themes, while this meta narrative is supported by the multiplicity of (institutionalized and marginalized) storylines that are enacted on the level of these respective policy themes. The relationship between the meta narrative (level of the policy domain) and the storylines sustaining this meta narrative (level of the policy themes) is presented in figure 3.3.

¹⁵⁹ See for example Roe, 1994; Abma, 1997; 2001; Eshuis, 2005; Fischer & Forester, 1993; Forester, 1999; Hajer, 1995; Kaplan, 1993; McBeth et al., 2007; Ockwell & Rydin, 2006; Rydin, 1999; Stone, 1989; 2002; Wagenaar, 1997; Wagenaar & Hartendorp, 2000; Wagenaar & Cook, 2003.

Figure 3.3 The relationship between the meta narrative and policy stories



It is these policy stories that are posed on the level of the respective policy themes that we can directly derive from empirical investigations, while the meta narrative is based on the integrating interpretation of the researcher. Defining storylines on the level of the policy theme allows us to fill the gap between Foucault’s conceptual understanding of discursive orders and regular daily action. In order to detect variety in the discursive space of a policy theme we therefore focus on the stories that actors bring into the debate. So, how can we detect variety in policy stories? In short, such variety can both be found in (1) the content of the policy stories and (2) the discursive formats used to tell the story.

(1) Variety in the Content of Policy Stories

The structure of a story offers us valuable insights in the elements that make up the discursive space, and around which variety can be created. Stories are the spoken or written presentation of sequences of events (as understood in the conventional way, i.e. in terms of happenings), meaningfully organized around a plot or causal theory (Eshuis, 2005; Kaplan, 1993; Polkinghorne, 1988; Stone, 1989). ‘Plot refers to the theme of a story that governs and gives significance to the succession of its events’ (Polkinghorne, 1988, p.131). A story therefore contains a presentation of a sequence of events; without temporal relations we only have a list. The essence of storytelling is sequencing, through which extracted cues are placed in a meaningful whole. After all, events can only mean something in relation to other events, and phenomena can only mean something in relation to other phenomena. Such sequences can be subdivided in a beginning, middle and an end, which are integrated in a plausible and coherent way (Kaplan, 1993).

At the beginning, the problem is presented; stories use a specific definition of the policy problem. As Stone asserted, ‘Policy makers as well as interest groups often create problems (in the artistic sense) as a context for the actions they want to take. This is not to say that they actually cause harm and destruction so they will have something to do, but that they represent the world in such a way as to make themselves, their skill, and their favorite course of action necessary’ (Stone, 2002; p.162). In the literature on policy

networks this strategy can be part of a priming strategy, i.e. creating a favorable context for ones preferred course of action (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008). Indeed, it can be argued that problems are ‘invented’ in order to make sure that ones preferred course of action fits in as the ideal solution. Defining policy problems is therefore a crucial step in the framing of a policy discussion.

Next, the challenge is to actually connect the problem to ones preferred course of action (solution) in a persuasive way. Here the prescriptive part of the story comes to the fore. As Rein and Schön have argued (1993, p.148) ‘... problem setting stories, frequently based on generative metaphors, link causal accounts of policy problems to particular proposals for action and facilitate the normative leap from ‘is’ to ‘ought’. The normative leap represents the jump from description to prescription. In order to make the entire story sound plausible and persuasive, the ‘normative leap from is to ought’ should at least be consistent, thus logically connecting a problem to a solution (cf. Kaplan, 1993).¹⁶⁰ This logic connection is often described in terms of cause-effect relationships (i.e. these are the causes of the problem, these are the effects, and this is how we can deal with them). Besides, actors often make use of trends, which are lines of reasoning wherein past, present and future are combined in a logical and consistent way (Broër, 2006). Another way of making ones preferred solution logically emerge from a story is by including enough negative consequences to outweigh the positive ones (Stone, 2002; p.203).¹⁶¹ One very important aspect for making the entire story persuasive is that it must be possible to actually implement the proposed solution(s) (Wildavsky, 1979; see also Kingdon, 1995).¹⁶²

It is important to acknowledge that the resulting policy stories also contain what might be called a moral order. With regard to the problem that is presented, some actors may be blamed for causing the suffering of others (Stone, 1989). With regard to preferred courses of action, some actors may be identified that have the capacity to actually bring this action into practice. In general, the moral order defines which actors are good, which are bad; in terms of Stone (2002, p.109), they depict who are the heroes and villains and innocent victims. Relations are structured by stories as they determine whether groups turn into opponents or collaborators.¹⁶³ We discuss this more extensively when deconstructing the political space (3.4).

¹⁶⁰ Kaplan asserted that a narrative has five core elements, i.e. agent, act, scene, agency and purpose (who, what, where, how and why), and there must be at least some underlying consistency among all five elements in order to make a meaningful story (1993).

¹⁶¹ Such a strategy can also be part of the priming strategy.

¹⁶² As Kingdon 1995) argued, in order for problems to get on the policy agenda, a window of opportunity has to open, implying that a specific problem definition and solution were to be linked at the right political moment. He argued that linking the problem to a practically achievable solution was crucial for actually using a window of opportunity.

¹⁶³ In chapter 2 we already discussed that Foucault explained that discursive orders come with a limited amount of subject positions and that actors are positioned vis-à-vis one another.

Finally, it should be noted that not all language utterances in the argumentative policy process assume the form of a policy story. Roe, for example, reserved the term non-stories for interventions that critique particular stories but do not have the full narrative structure of a beginning, middle, and end. According to him, the discursive space consisted of a constellation of stories and non-stories that together represent the policy debate, which he referred to as meta-narratives (1994, p.34). We do assume that all these language utterances may contribute to and are part of one or more overlapping stories or storylines (i.e. crisp, generative statements that bring together previously unrelated elements of reality, Hajer, 2003; p.104). Thus, actors may present their ideas via complete stories or by posing specific arguments or criticisms that effectively reinforce the storyline as a whole.

In sum, we can detect variety in policy stories (incl. those arguments and criticism that don't have a narrative structure) at 4 levels: (1) Problem definitions; (2) Preferred course of action; (3) The moral order implicated; (4) The way problems and solutions are linked together (cause-effect lines of reasoning, use of trends). It might be possible that actors use the same problem definition to arrive at different solutions. Or that actors use different problem definitions, but arrive at the same solutions. It is therefore also important to analyse the lines of reasoning that forge a problem and solution together, as this might contain variety. Finally, all arguments posed in the argumentative struggle are considered to be part of policy stories. Thus, they do not necessarily have to adhere to the form of the policy story, as long as they work to reinforce the storyline as a whole.

(2) Variety in discursive formats of Policy Stories

Shifts in terms or vocabularies that actors use to construct their stories are important indicators for the detection of variety. With regard to the concrete policy vocabularies being used, we already indicated that we are not interested in the micro-linguistics of textual analysis. Instead, we are interested in how concepts, metaphors, symbols, categories and numbers are used in the construction of policy stories. It is to say that actors use these elements as means or instruments in order to make their stories persuasive. Shifts in these terms signal the existence of variety.¹⁶⁴ Fortunately, others

¹⁶⁴ In fact, maps, images and figures also play an important role in discursive spaces, as they are the direct translation of policy vocabularies. Maps, images and figures are by no means objective representations, but they are value-laden images that guide our attention to specific aspects that are deemed important (Harley, 1989). They tend to tell a specific story, and are designed to make ones preferred story more plausible and attractive, hence more persuasive. Especially in matters of spatial planning, creating attractive images of future developments is of pivotal importance for persuading others (Carton, 2007). With regard to the use of figures, one can choose to set two indicators against one another, or one can choose to use specific scales, making some favorable effects appear extra favorable, while marginalizing the less favorable effects. The choice of figures, maps and images is therefore important in creating persuasive stories (Carton, 2007; Edelman, 1985). In the case of spatial planning, the political nature of maps comes to the fore in the fact that 'it seems to be distinctly more difficult to reach compromise about cartographic concepts than about verbal ones' (Faludi and Waterhout, 2002; p.154).

have already extensively discussed the different ways wherein these terms can be operationalized (most notably Hajer, see for example, 2003; p.104, and Stone, see for example, 2002; p. 163). This allows us to define the elements that might signal variety in discursive formats of policy stories:

- **Variety in Concepts:** Concepts express, in a condensed and synthesized form, through words and images how people would look at the intended organization of a specific (policy) domain. It is often not the introduction of entirely different concepts that can be detected, but the changing meaning of an existing concept. That is, the same concept is being used in policy story A and B, but it is given a different meaning. This is exactly why some concepts are so influential, as they allow for ambiguous interpretation, while at the same time structuring the policy debate to a large extent.¹⁶⁵
- **Variety in Metaphors:** Metaphors show the likeness between two things. The essence of a metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson, quoted by Hajer, 2006, p.68). Metaphors are vehicles for the discursive reduction of complexity, allowing people to communicate over complex policy issues. To introduce a metaphor is also to make a political claim: ‘There is a likeness that is important’ (Stone, 2002; p.138). Metaphors are used to develop analogies, to show that the case at hand is actually the same as a certain case in the past. As several historians have shown, political leaders like Hitler, Mussolini, Kennedy, Johnson, Bush sr. and Bush jr. drew analogies with previous wars (i.e. the First World War, the Second World War, the Cold war, the Vietnam War, the Golf War) in order to legitimize their foreign politics and military campaigns (see for example Khong, 1992; MacMillan, 2009).
- **Variety in Symbols:** Symbols can be seen as important types of metaphors (Stone, 2002).¹⁶⁶ Here we mean that different symbols may be created during a policy debate. All kind of different things (a famous product or company, buildings), institutions (the national government, interactive policy arrangements), technologies or personalities can become symbols. For example, technologies like space shuttles or airplanes can also become symbols of a nation’s or cultures progression or hegemony. And certain leaders can become a symbol of strong leadership, patriotism or intelligence.
- **Variety in Categories:** Categorization involves the establishment of boundaries in the form of rules or criteria that tell whether something belongs or not. For

¹⁶⁵ It is especially in the field of spatial-economic and infrastructure developments that concepts are important. For example, in the Netherlands, national spatial policy reports consist of (new) spatial concepts which comprise a (new) conceptualization of the national territory (Van Duinen, 2003; WRR, 1998; Zonneveld, 1991; 2005).

¹⁶⁶ To be even more precise, Edelman (1988) has distinguished between referential symbols and condensation symbols. Referential symbols are economic ways of referring to the objective elements in objects or situations: the elements identified in the same way by different people. Condensation symbols are used to evoke certain emotions of an audience.

example, when counting peas, one needs to define a pea: If it's green and round and small it is a pea (Stone, 2002; p.164). Translating effects in numbers can be seen as an important form of categorizing (Stone, 2002). Counting begins with categorization, which means to decide what to include and exclude from the counting. It is not only things or phenomena that can be categorized. It also applies to actors; distinguishing between the heroes and the villains, the ones who are victims and the ones who are to blame, and winners and losers can also be regarded as a form of categorization.¹⁶⁷

- **Variety in Numbers used:** Numbers are often an important aspect of policy vocabularies. Statistics have become the predominant form of identifying causal relationships. Most policy discussions begin with a recitation of figures purporting to show that a problem is big or growing, or both (Stone, 2002; p.163). Numbers are given great value in our society as means to create persuasive arguments about problems and solutions.¹⁶⁸ As Stone asserts, a common way to define a policy problem is to measure it. For example, how to measure the jobs that are generated by an airport, the amount of people seriously hindered by noise pollution, the safety risks in the vicinity of the airport, the economic benefits and environmental costs of an airport? Often policy goals are also defined in terms of numbers (i.e. 5% unemployment rate, 3 million electronic cars, 250,000 people exposed to specific levels of pollution). The selection of criteria and methodologies is important in this respect: by which criteria and methodology can we evaluate whether the intended goals have been achieved? The use of numbers automatically leads to a specific categorization, therefore including and excluding indicators. The choice for what to measure and what criteria and method to use will be determined by the purpose for measuring.

3.3.3 Variety in the Political Space

The focus on the discursive space around a policy theme allows us to localize events that are related to ways of thinking and talking (i.e. changes in content and format of policy stories). However, other types of events may be discerned in the policy space, which are related to changes in ways of acting (other than speech acts). These events cannot be derived from the mere focus on policy stories, although it must be stressed once again that changes in ways of acting are very much related to changes in ways of thinking and talking. Before discussing how we can localize events in the political space

¹⁶⁷ There are always structures of inclusion and exclusion built into choices of category labels and their contents (Yanow, 2003; p.240).

¹⁶⁸ To count something at all is to assert that the phenomenon is at least frequent enough to bother counting. Finally, in our profoundly numerical contemporary culture, numbers are symbols of precision, accuracy and objectivity. They suggest mechanical selection, dictated by the nature of objects, even though all counting involves judgment. In other words, numbers don't lie; people believe them to be right and objective. (Stone, 2002).

of a policy theme we first recall the relationship between the discursive and political space.

In chapter 2 we discussed how discursive orders both enable and constrain actions. For one, they come with subject positions, from which actors can speak and act. To be able to speak within the discursive order requires an actor to take up one of these few subject positions (see also Fairclough, 2001, p.85; Phillips & Hardy, 1997; Wetherell, 2001; p.23).¹⁶⁹ Moreover, the discursive order positions actors vis-à-vis one another, implying that only some actors qualify for taking up specific roles. This is related to the selection of resources that plays a role in the dominant policy stories (e.g. for solving the problem, for realizing the solution). It is the specific division of resources that determines the autonomy and dependency of an actor when trying to reach his goals.¹⁷⁰

Once an actor has taken up a position and assumed a specific role, he is expected to approach the world from the vantage point of the position he has taken up (Hajer, 1995; p.53). The moral orders policy stories imply are equally important, as these define who counts as an actor in a particular policy setting and who does not (cf. Gottweis, 2003). The moral orders implicated by specific stories contain a perspective on who is represented causing what to happen, who is represented doing what to whom, and who can act in what way to deal with the situation. The argumentative struggle for discursive hegemony is therefore not only about persuading others about one's perspective on the problem and solution, but also about attempting to position other actors in a specific way (Hajer, 1995; p.53). A specific framing results in a boundary that organizes some actors and factors in, and others out of the debate.¹⁷¹

It is within this context of a limited amount of subject positions, roles and dependency relations that actors have to decide which relationships are meaningful to pursue (i.e. who do I need to reach my goals?) and which possibilities actors have to actually pursue those relationships. This way, the discursive order influences the possible interactions that can take place.¹⁷² Think for example about a situation where a different conceptualization of the policy problem prevails. The result might be that other resources become relevant, that had been irrelevant or absent within the policy space so far. It might create new roles and dependency relations, and it might result in new

¹⁶⁹ In critical discourse theory the same point is made, in stating that discursive utterances (like research reports) provide us the concepts to produce objects, subjects and subject positions (Van Dijk, 1997; Fairclough, 2001; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Parker, 1992; Phillips & Hardy, 1997; Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

¹⁷⁰ For example, if the solution for traffic jams is sought in developing new highways on specific locations, the actors owning the land that is needed are implicated in the discursive space, and offered a relatively important position.

¹⁷¹ This often evokes great passions, because such mutual positioning '... confers advantages and disadvantages, rewards and penalties, permissions and restrictions, or power and powerlessness' (Stone, 1997; p.379).

¹⁷² But it does not determine them! As we have seen, there is always the possibility for acting differently, as long as one is willing to pay the price (whatever it may be).

possibilities for interaction. This understanding illustrates that the political space and the discursive space mutually imply one another. Still, it is very useful to make a distinction between them on the level of the policy theme for purely analytical reasons, as it allows us to localize events in a more sophisticated manner (i.e. events that would otherwise go unnoticed when merely focusing on the content and format of policy stories).

The obvious way for detecting variety in the political space, understood in terms of new ways of acting involved in the argumentative struggle other than speech acts, it to focus on the things actors are actually doing. However, such a broad focus is neither practically possible¹⁷³ nor necessary when doing genealogy. We already discussed that we organize the description of everyday strategies and tactics around events, as this allows us to uncover how events emerged and how they became institutionalized or marginalized. Thus, it is not changes in strategies and tactics that are used to signify events, but events are used to describe the strategies and tactics that matter. In order to localize events in the political space we have need for more practically applicable signifiers that guide our focus. That is, we need to know what structural elements the policy process is made of other than of the policy stories we already discussed. Policy network theory is extremely useful here, as it provides us with at least four of such structural elements.¹⁷⁴ In essence, changes in these four structural elements that are outlined below, signify events in the political space that would otherwise go unnoticed when merely focusing on the discursive space (content and format of policy stories).

- **(1) New Roles and Positions:** We already extensively discussed this category in this paragraph. Discursive orders come with a limited amount of subject positions, which give way to specific roles. New roles may be created, while old roles may be abandoned. Whether or not one actor can take up a new role is very much related to the dependency-relations the discursive order implicates. That is, actors are positioned in specific ways vis-à-vis one another. The availability of new roles and positions may be signified by (1) new actors entering the stage or by (2) old actors taking up a different role. An actor is here understood in terms of an organization, or an individual that represents an organization, that is involved in the policy process.

¹⁷³ This is of course not possible, given the enormous amounts of interactions that take place during extensive and heavily fragmented policy processes. Such decision-making processes tend to be far too capricious and unstructured in order to gain a detailed perspective on precise interactions (cf. Teisman, 2000; Cohen et al., 1972; Kingdon, 1995; Klijn, 1996; Kickert et al., 1997; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008).

¹⁷⁴ The policy network approach provides a theoretical perspective for analyzing, evaluating and improving interaction process regarding complex issues within networks of mutually dependent actors. It is therefore an approach that can serve both as an empirical focus for conceptualizing complex policy processes and a prescriptive model for realizing collaboration and win-win outcomes (Huys & Koppenjan, 2009).

- **(2) New policy networks:** In 3.2 we already explained that decision-making takes place in networks when confronted with wicked problems. There we already defined networks as (1) a number of actors with (2) different goals and interests and (3) different resources, (4) who depend on each other for the realization of their goals. Networks are therefore seen as specific constellation of actors, consisting of two or more organizations. The networks involved in the policy process may change, as may the composition of a specific network involved (when actors enter or abandon an existing network).¹⁷⁵
- **(3) New policy arenas:** In policy network theory arenas are defined as the places where actors meet, using strategies to influence policy making (Klijn, 2000). Actors implicated in different networks meet one another in the decision making arena, where the decisions are made. When confronted with extensive and fragmented policy problems, decisions are made in different arenas (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).¹⁷⁶
- **(4) New coalitions:** Within the arenas actors form coalitions to either support or oppose certain policy stories (problems and/or solutions) (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

Summary Step 1: Localizing Events in the Policy Process

To sum things up, we can detect variety (the events, or breaches in self-evidence) on the level of the policy theme. Here, variety may both be found in the discursive space and the political space. We presented the storyline as the overarching organizing principle of the discursive space, as can be derived from our understanding of the policy process as an argumentative struggle. Next, we discussed how these storylines that are posed on the level of the policy themes shape up to form an overarching meta narrative on the level of the policy domain. This meta narrative characterizes the discursive order and it gives way to specific policy themes on the agenda and the kind of stories that can be developed around these policy themes. The policy stories that are enacted during the argumentative struggle around policy themes are therefore both the result and the precursor of the meta narrative that governs the entire discursive order (which is a construct of the researcher, based on the empirical investigation of the policy stories). Changes in the discursive order of the policy domain can therefore be seen as the outcome of the argumentative struggles on the level of the policy themes.

We can trace variety (localize events) in both the content of policy stories as well as in the discursive formats used. In order to detect the variety that is not localized via

¹⁷⁵ In fact, it is possible to see networks of actors as an actor, but for the purpose of descriptive clarity we have decided not to do this.

¹⁷⁶ It might also be possible that a loss in one arena is compensated by a gain in another (cf. De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008).

changes in policy stories we deconstructed the political space (ways of acting other than speech acts) and presented four structural elements of this space that act as signifiers of events: (1) changes in roles and positions, signified by new actors entering the stage or existing actors changing roles (2) changes in policy networks (3) changes in policy arenas (4) changes in policy coalitions.

Localizing events by means of detecting variety is crucial for the genealogist, as it allows him to trace down their line of descent and uncover the many strategies and tactics (discursive and non-discursive) and other influences involved in the production of the event and its institutionalization or marginalization. This involves the second step of the three step procedure that allows us to describe and explain the emergence and persistence of specific (deadlocked) policy discourses.

3.4 Step 2: Tracing Lines of Descent by Detecting Strategies and Tactics

The second step in our procedure is to uncover the actual strategies and tactics (discursive and non-discursive) at work in the production of an event. But we are not only interested in the production of the event, we are also and especially interested in its impact. By this we mean that events do not necessarily have an impact on the prevailing discursive order (see our discussion of Foucauldian events in chapter 2). Or in other words, not all variety that is produced will bring change to existing ways of thinking, talking and acting. Some of the created variety actually becomes accepted, while other variety is marginalized right away. The production of variety is therefore no sufficient condition for creating actual change. Only when variety becomes institutionalized we can speak of actual change. Thus, the institutional dimension is essential for understanding the possibility that a lot of variety might be produced in the first place, while none of this variety actually makes an impact. This is important to understand, as it is during the struggle for institutionalization or marginalization of events that the micro-practices that sustain the discursive order become most apparent. These struggles are the actual instances where knowledges and rationalities clash (the resistances), and here actors draw on all strategies and tactics available that allow them to influence the outcome of the clash. Thus, when detecting strategies and tactics we need to focus on two specific moments:

- (1) Strategies and tactics involved in the emergence of an event;
- (2) Strategies and tactics involved in the struggle over institutionalization or marginalization of the event.

It is important to note that it is not so much the outcome of the clash that is of interest here. In fact, when assuming that a specific (policy) discourse has a strong reproductive tendency (because it has become firmly institutionalized), the consequential hypothesis is that the produced variety will indeed not become institutionalized (recall our earlier

point that Foucault is especially a focusing on short term discontinuities within a context of long term continuities). Thus, despite the amount of emerging events, their impact on existing ways of thinking, talking and acting will be limited. What is important here is the crucial idea that these struggles over the emergence, institutionalization and marginalization of an event form the key moments for uncovering the micro-practices at work, which forms the key for understanding how power works in the social domain that is studied.

We use the event as point of departure for describing the strategies and tactics involved. In words of Foucault, we trace down their line of descent and uncover the many strategies and tactics (both discursive and non-discursive) involved in the production of the event and in its institutionalization or marginalization. When applied to the policy domain, strategies and tactics refer to all discursive and non-discursive activities that actors employ to mobilize support for their preferred policy stories (when attempting to influence the outcomes of the argumentative struggle for discursive hegemony).

Uncovering these strategies and tactics is an empirical exercise. We simply need to record these discursive and non-discursive activities that actors employ during the argumentative struggle for discursive hegemony on the level of the policy theme (recall figure 3.2). Of course, scientific literature offers a whole list of possible strategies that actors can employ in order to make sure that they end up on the winning side of the argumentative struggle for discursive hegemony. We don't attempt to a priori develop such a complete list. After all, the strategies that matter come to the fore in the empirical investigations. Here we shall merely discuss some short general observations that illustrate what kind of strategies and tactics we need to look for.

Generally speaking, it is in the interest of those actors who are already on the winning side to restrict the scope for discussion, thus prevent events from occurring and making an impact. Those on the losing side try to do the opposite.¹⁷⁷ Strategies will be based on their position. Basically, four different categories of strategies can be distinguished (as is done in policy network theory): actors can opt for (1) go-alone strategies (when actors think they don't need any others); (2) for conflictual strategies (i.e. deliberately preventing or blocking the process); (3) for cooperative strategies (mobilizing support from others for ones preferred policy story); (4) and facilitative strategies (aiming for win-win solutions) (cf. De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). No matter what strategy is enacted, the very nature of the argumentative struggle implies that it is of pivotal importance for all actors involved to use discursive strategies

¹⁷⁷ According to Schattschneider (1960, p.16) winning groups try to restrict participation (issue containment) in a policy issue by limiting the scope of the conflict whereas losing groups try to widen participation (issue expansion) in a policy issue.

that make their policy stories sound good and persuasive.¹⁷⁸ Actors can also use all kind of non-discursive strategies in order to mobilize support for their policy stories. For example, actors may try to include and exclude specific actors, and they may try to obtain quick wins without taking the interest of others into account, they may lie, cheat, manipulate, or invest in good relations and trust by adequately managing winners and losers. Finally, the image of an actor, i.e. whether or not actors are perceived to be reliable and trustworthy by others, is very important for the possible strategies and tactics that he can employ (Bovens et al., 2001).

When describing the strategies and tactics we should simultaneously account for the contextual factors that influence these. For example, when the political or economic climate changes, this might imply chances for new policy solutions or problem definitions. More specifically, we argued that the existing discursive order (i.e. legitimated ways of thinking, talking and acting) very much influences the future possible actions of actors involved. This means that the strategies and tactics that actors employ are very much related to their position, role and the resources at their disposal during the argumentative policy struggle. As described in chapter 2 we need to simultaneously account for structure and agency in order to adequately trace the lines of descent. By adopting such a perspective we automatically include the contextual factors that are of importance for understanding the emergence, institutionalization or marginalization of events. Such contextual factors are therefore not really external. They are part of the argumentative struggle and when they matter, they will be included.¹⁷⁹

Summary Step 2: Tracing Lines of Descent by Detecting Strategies and Tactics

In sum, we use the events that we have localized in step 1 as a point of departure for tracing its lines of descent and for assessing the extent to which the event has become institutionalized or marginalized. We describe the discursive and non-discursive strategies and tactics of actors that contributed to the emergence and institutionalization or marginalization of the event. At the same time we take the factors into account that have worked to influence these strategies and tactics, thus combining structure and agency, and avoiding the dichotomy of an internal and external environment.

Together steps 1 and 2 allow us to describe the strategies and tactics (and the contextual factors influencing these) at work during the emergence, institutionalization or marginalization of the events at work in a given policy domain. It therefore provides a

¹⁷⁸ See for example McBeth et al., 2007; Stone, 2002; Throgmorton, 2003 for overviews of such strategies.

¹⁷⁹ This approach is of course quite different from most scientific theories that explain change and continuity in policy. In these theories external or contextual factors are often almost defined as a different category. Think for example about theories the garbage can model of Cohen et al., 1972; the stream model of Kingdon, 1995 and the ACF of Sabatier and Jenkins (1988).

detailed understanding of the kind of variety that has been produced over the years, the impact that this variety has made in terms of changes in ways of thinking, talking and acting and the strategies and tactics (and the contextual factors influencing these) responsible for this. However, in order to actually explain how power works to reproduce, and therefore sustain, the discursive order, one final step is needed. This step is about uncovering the interplay between micro-practices and discursive orders.

3.5 Step 3: Uncovering the Interplay between Micro-Practices and Discursive Orders

If we are to uncover the mechanisms driving the constant reproduction and further institutionalization and naturalization of a discursive order in a policy domain, then we need to do three more things: (1) we need to assess the level of reproduction of the discursive order; (2) we need to derive the micro-practices at work; (3) we need to illuminate the interplay between these micro practices and the reproduction of the discursive order. In the remainder of this paragraph we discuss these steps in more detail.

(1) Assess the level of Reproduction of the Discursive Order

In order to be able to assess the level of reproduction of the discursive order we need to be able to illuminate this discursive order and describe how this order changes over the years (or remains the same). In order to do this, we need to understand what elements the discursive order is actually made off. In this chapter we already pointed out that it consists of a meta narrative that gives rise to a set of policy themes on the agenda and a specific positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another in the policy domain. The discursive order also consists of a discourse coalition that sustains the specific structure of the meta narrative. Hajer originally developed the concept of discourse coalition to refer to coalitions of actors that share a set of storylines (Hajer, 1995; p.65).¹⁸⁰ Here it is important to emphasize that we reserve the term discourse coalition for the level of the policy domain. It implies that we can distinguish between different policy coalitions on the level of the policy theme, were these coalitions support a specific policy story (see our elaboration of the political space in 3.3.3) and one overarching coalition on the level of the policy domain that is made of all coalitions and storylines that are found on the level of the policy theme. This distinction in coalitions on the level of policy themes and the policy domain is very important, because actors that are part of opposite coalitions on the level of the policy theme (supporting conflicting storylines) can be part of the same discourse coalition on the level of the policy domain. For example, when discussing the issue of aviation noise, actors that favor calculation methods over measuring methods and actor arguing for the opposite are part of conflicting coalitions

¹⁸⁰ More specifically, he defines them as the ensemble of (1) a set of storylines; (2) the actors who utter these storylines; and (3) the practices in which this discursive activity is based (Hajer, 1995; p. 65).

on the level of the policy theme. However, by enacting their respective storylines they both work to reproduce an overarching meta narrative (i.e. that it is important to do something with aviation noise as it is a crucial part of aviation policy), which brings them together in the same discourse coalition, supporting the same overarching meta narrative. Together, the meta narrative and the discourse coalition shape the themes on the policy agenda, position actors vis-à-vis one another, and set boundaries to the things that can be said, done and thought during the argumentative struggles around these respective policy themes.

One important question that remains is how we can derive this meta narrative and supporting discourse coalition from the description of policy stories, everyday strategies and tactics and policy coalitions on the level of the policy theme. It is the level of institutionalization of these policy stories and strategies and tactics and policy coalitions that serves as important input for this. So, how to assess this level of institutionalization?

As a first step we need to know what is meant by institutionalization. In essence, such institutionalization means that the produced variety becomes embedded in institutions. There are many definitions of institutions, related to many different schools of thought, which we are not going to discuss here (see March & Olsen, 1989; Scott, 1995). In its most general sense, (and within the tradition of new institutional theory), institutions are reifications of past practices and understandings that set conditions on ways of talking and acting (Jepperson, 1991; Phillips et al., 2004). Reification means that specific (virtual) ways of talking become solidified as they become embedded in material things, e.g. the creation of a new organizational unit, a new policy, law, procedure, guideline, or perspective in a report, the development of a measurement system, expenditure commitments, the actual investments in physical space (e.g. building of a house or runway), new procedures for policy making, guidelines for divisions of responsibilities (cf. Abma, 2001; Van der Arend, 2007; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).¹⁸¹

Another useful way of thinking about institutionalization is in terms of implicit and explicit rules. Indeed, it is common to define institutions in terms of rules, both official and unofficial/implicit ones.¹⁸² When related to the discursive space it refers to the rules that must be obeyed in order to make a meaningful contribution to the debate or to

¹⁸¹ With regard to new procedures for policy making it might result in stable interaction rules that specify what is and what is not allowed in policy games between actors (e.g. access rules define who is to be included and excluded from the network or arena, and what exit opportunities there are; other rules include how to deal with third parties and what kind of strategies are permitted (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Termeer, 1993).

¹⁸² Official rules are consciously designed and most often laid down in laws or other official documents. Unofficial rules are more implicit and can be found in society's customs and traditions, informal norms of small groups and families, moral rules and principles, and the rules and bylaws of private associations (Stone, 2002; p.285; see also Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Klijn, 1996; Ostrom, 1986).

engage in legitimate action. The distinction made by Hajer between discourse structuration and discourse institutionalization is helpful here, although he originally developed these concepts for the level of the discursive order of a policy domain. When actors need to draw on specific ideas, concepts, categorizations, problem definitions, solutions, lines of reasoning and symbols (i.e. discursive elements) in order to make credible arguments, Hajer speaks of discourse structuration (1995; p.61). When these specific discursive elements become translated into institutions like concrete policies, rules, laws and new institutional arrangements, Hajer speaks of discourse institutionalization (1995, p.61; see also Abma, 2001).¹⁸³ Discourse institutionalization by and large means the same thing as reification, as it refers to ways of talking that become solidified in material things. Moreover, discourse institutionalization is also signified by the presence of myths and taboos. Some policy stories and the assumptions underlying them are not to be questioned (myths)¹⁸⁴, while some things cannot be said (taboos).¹⁸⁵ Myths have a tendency for reproduction, as problematizing popular myths is often felt as an immoral attack on the identities of a culture, a nation or specific individuals (De Neuville & Barton, 1987; Edelman, 1988; MacMillan, 2009).¹⁸⁶ It is a taboo to question myths. Taboos refer to the issues that are systematically excluded from the debate, since it is not allowed to talk about them (Van Aa, 2000; Stone, 2002). When related to the political space, institutionalization refers to the presence of a stable roles, stable positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another, stable policy networks and stable coalitions.

Institutionalization of events on the level of the policy theme can thus be assessed by looking at the outcomes of the struggle over the institutionalization or marginalization of an event. When marginalized, the event will not be laid down in institutions. However, when the variety becomes accepted, institutionalization serves as the indicator. This not merely refers to the materialization of events (in policies, procedures, investments), but also to the creation of (implicit) rules for thinking, talking and acting

¹⁸³ In chapter 2 we already explained that firmly institutionalised (policy) discourses make existing ways of thinking, talking and acting appear as necessary, true, legitimate, rational and thus natural. Even when actors can think and act differently, this will be very costly. Deviation will be perceived as irrational and illegitimate behaviour. The process assumes the form of a causal circular loop: the more reified and taken for granted the ways of talking and acting in a policy space, the more difficult or costly it is to enact behaviors not consistent with it, and the stronger the tendency for reproduction. This reproduction makes the existing modes of talking and acting even more taken-for-granted, further framing future interactions and negotiations.

¹⁸⁴ Drawing on Webster's dictionary De Neuville and Barton defined myths as 'a usually traditional story of ostensibly historical events that serves to unfold part of the world view of a people or explain a practice, belief, or natural phenomenon.'

¹⁸⁵ The role of myths and taboos has been discussed in the field of transportation policy, indicating how they might even hamper the development of sustainable solutions (cf. Black, 2001; Button, 2005; Koppen, 1995).


¹⁸⁶ According to Edelman (1988) myths let people believe that certain arrangements like inequalities in wealth, in income and in influence over governmental allocations of resources are just natural. Due to its unquestioned status, the myth is especially powerful in mobilizing bias, turning attention away from thorny or intractable issues, uncomfortable realities and discrepancies between public values and actual conditions.

(when actors need to draw on specific storylines, discursive formats, use myths, avoid taboos, respect positions and roles).

Next, this institutionalization on the level of policy themes works to influence the discursive order on the level of the policy domain. That is, it shapes up to form a meta narrative and discourse coalition, which in turn give rise to a specific policy agenda, a specific positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another and specific rules that have to be obeyed by the actors included in order to develop meaningful policy stories and to engage in legitimated strategies and tactics during the argumentative struggle for discursive hegemony around a specific policy theme. So how to uncover this meta narrative and discourse coalition? It involves basically nothing else than bringing the sum of the institutionalized policy spaces together on a higher level. Together, they make up for the totality of accepted ways of thinking, talking and acting within a policy domain, from which the researcher should derive the overarching meta narrative and discourse coalition. Again, the meta narrative and discourse coalition can not be directly read from the empirical data. It involves an interpretation of the researcher. In chapter 4 we shall more extensively discuss how this 'leap' can be made in a transparent way.

Change and continuity in the discursive order can be assessed by following the foregoing procedure. It means to account for the level of institutionalization of events on the level of the policy theme, thus assessing the extent to which new (elements of) policy stories (in terms of content and format), policy positions or policy coalitions become institutionalized. Next, its impact on the meta narrative and the discourse coalition (and related policy agenda and positioning of actors), that is, the discursive order, can be assessed. Lack of change on the level of the policy themes automatically signals a strong reproductive tendency of the discursive order. When dealing with firmly institutionalized or deadlocked policy debates the tendency for reproduction is expected to be high. Thus, few changes will be found in the institutional landscape on both the level of the policy theme and the policy domain. The indicators for institutionalization are summarized in figure 3.4.


Figure 3.4 Assessing Reproduction: indicators for institutionalization



(2) Uncover Micro Practices

In chapter 2 we already discussed how we can derive micro practices from everyday strategies and tactics (both discursive and non-discursive). Here we presented the concept of practice as a middle range concept that linked the macro level of the discursive order and the micro level of everyday strategies and tactics. In short, we argued that regularities in strategies and tactics and their relatedness to specific conventions or obligations signified the existence of a particular practice (see figure 3.5).

Figure 3.5 Interrelating Strategies and Tactics and Practice




Here it is important to note that practices can both be found on the level of the policy theme and on the level of the policy domain. As we shall see later, this distinction is not very important, as often the same kind of regularities can be found in the strategies and tactics included in the argumentative struggle around different policy themes. This

makes sense when considering that the discursive order on the level of the policy domain comes with specific (implicit) rules that shape similar kind of possibilities for action on the level of all different policy themes (i.e. who is allowed to act in what way, how are actors positioned vis-à-vis one another etc.). Thus, to make matters not unnecessarily complicated, the same practices can be found on the level of the policy theme as on the level of the policy domain.

(3) Illuminate the interplay between these micro practices and the reproduction of the discursive order

In order to uncover how power works to sustain a specific discursive order we need to illuminate the interplay between the micro-practices and the reproduction of the discursive order. This implies to illustrate that the micro-practices that we have found are both the result and precursor of the discursive order that we have found (understood in terms of a meta-narrative from which a policy agenda is derived and a discourse coalition). And it implies to show how this discursive order and the micro-practices it implicates give rise to specific (discursive and non-discursive) everyday strategies and tactics that work to hamper the institutionalization of events. Moreover, they also work to hamper the production of events, in the sense that much more events can emerge in less institutionalized discursive orders (although this cannot be proven in this thesis). In essence, this step means to clarify the relations between the discursive order, practices and strategies and tactics, as already been presented in chapter 2 (see figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6 Interrelating three levels of analysis



3.6 Conclusion: 3 Steps for making a Genealogy of Policy Discourse

Drawing on Foucault’s methodological guidelines as set out in chapter 2 and our conceptualization of the policy process in terms of an argumentative struggle for discursive hegemony we have developed a three step procedure in this chapter that allows us to describe and explain the emergence and persistence of policy discourses in a rather systematic way. These steps correspond with the three steps of genealogy that

we presented in chapter 2 (see 2.6), with the main difference that we now made them applicable to the policy domain. The three steps are listed below.

1. **Localize events in the policy process.** Events are defined as those moments that variety is being produced. Events can be located on the level of the policy theme. Each policy theme has a policy space, which consists of several elements. Those elements refer to the discursive space (content and format of policy stories) and political space (roles, positions, actors, networks, arenas and coalitions), and these act as signifiers. Events serve as the points of departure for uncovering power relations, as they signify the moments that different rationalities or truths clash and struggle for dominance.
2. **Tracing lines of descent of these events by detecting strategies and tactics.** By uncovering the strategies and tactics involved in the emergence, institutionalization or marginalization of events, while simultaneously accounting for the contextual factors that influence these strategies and tactics, we provide ourselves with the means to uncover the micro practices at work that regulate the discursive order.
3. **Uncovering the interplay between micro-practices and the discursive order.** Finally, we need to uncover the mechanisms of power at work in the (re)production of a discursive order in a given policy domain. This can be done by enacting the following procedure:
 - Illuminating the discursive order in place and the level of change and continuity. How to uncover the meta narrative and discourse coalition? It involves basically nothing else than bringing the sum of the institutionalized policy spaces together on a higher level. Together, they make up for the totality of accepted ways of thinking, talking and acting within a policy domain, from which the researcher should derive the overarching meta narrative and discourse coalition. Again, the meta narrative and discourse coalition can not be directly read from the empirical data. It involves an interpretation of the researcher;
 - Illuminating the micro-practices at work (which can be derived from the previous analysis of strategies and tactics, i.e. were regularities in strategies and tactics and their relatedness to specific conventions or obligations signified the existence of a particular practice);
 - Clarifying the interplay between the discursive order and the micro practices. This allows us to understand how power works in the social domain under study.

The three step procedure allows the researcher to develop a genealogy of a policy discourse (or discursive order in a given policy domain) in a systemized and transparent way. In the case of policy deadlocks, like the Schiphol case, the application of this three

step procedure holds the promise of uncovering the mechanisms that underlie the emergence and institutionalization (and eventual naturalization) of the policy deadlock. The three-step procedure has guided both our empirical investigations and analysis. More specifically, steps 1 and 2 have guided the empirical description, while step 3 forms the core of the analysis (as we shall clarify in the next chapter). Note that proper application of the steps does not guarantee the development of an effective history. Whether or not the history that is the result of this genealogical account will actually become effective depends on the validity of the knowledge claims that it contains. This is related to the way the data is gathered and validated, which will also be discussed in the next chapter. More specifically, in the next chapter we set out the methodologies we have used to gather, organize, validate and present the data and we discuss how the three-step procedure has been applied.

Chapter 4 Getting the Data Right

4.1 Introduction

In chapter 2 we argued that the genealogical approach does not prescribe the methods that should be applied for gathering, organizing, validating, presenting and analyzing data that is necessary for developing a real and effective history. Foucault offered some clues on how to do this, for example by arguing that it involves ‘choice of the material as a function of the givens of the problem, a focusing of analysis on elements capable of being resolved, and the establishment of relations that allow this solution.’¹⁸⁷ In essence, gathering, organizing and presenting the data in genealogy is problem driven and not method driven. Problem driven means that it is the uniqueness of a particular case that is to be captured, as contrasted to instrumental case-studies that seek theoretical generalization beyond the case (Stake, 1995; 2005; Yin, 1994). It implies an attempt to let the case speak for itself, restraining our pre-existing ideas and hypotheses. Such a problem-driven approach combines an inductive and deductive research strategy, which is called retroduction. It means to start with a problem, which is then made tractable in order to find explanations. It involves the production of a hypothesis that is tested through a to-and-fro movement between the available empirical data and the conceptual structure, until we are persuaded that we have developed a convincing explanation for the problem under consideration (cf. Howarth, 2009; p.325). Understandings increase as the research proceeds, and when insights evolve new theories and methods can be applied to further this understanding and bring more focus to the research.¹⁸⁸ Such an iterative research process calls for a flexible and emergent research design (Stake, 1995; 2005). In the case of genealogy such a design is secured by the choice of empirically empty sensitizing concepts that make up for a heuristic framework that allows room for the case to unravel without too much a priori commitments to specific theoretical explanations and methodological preferences. The main point is that the researcher makes sure that he can illuminate the interplay between the discursive order and micro-practices involved.

The problem-driven character of genealogy means that there are no blueprints available about what methods to use. When Foucault was asked about his concrete methodologies, he responded that he made use of the most conventional methods: ‘demonstration or, at any rate, proof in historical matters, textual references, citation of authorities, drawing connections between texts and facts, suggesting schemes of

¹⁸⁷ Foucault cited from Flynn, 2005; p.36

¹⁸⁸ Such a constantly evolving research design can also be understood as balancing between an etic and an emic perspective. The etic perspective refers to the issues and ideas brought in by the researcher from the outside, without previous experience with the case studied. During data gathering issues evolve and emic issues emerge. These are the issues of the actors who belong to the case, the issues from the inside (Silverman, 1993; Stake, 1995).

intelligibility, offering different types of explanation ... From this standpoint, what I say in my book can be verified or invalidated in the same way as any other book of history.’¹⁸⁹ In this chapter we discuss the methodologies we used to gather, organize, validate, present and analyse the data that we needed for enacting the three step procedure that we presented in the former chapter and that allows us to assess and explain the reproductive tendency of policy discourse.

It is important to align the research methodology with the ontological (i.e. our idea about the nature of reality) and epistemological (i.e. our idea about the way knowledge is created) premises of the genealogical approach in order to develop a coherent framework for the research. The assumptions about reality and the creation of knowledge profoundly influences the way data is gathered, organized, validated and presented. The research retains rigour when it respects the relationships between methodology and its underlying assumptions (Guba & Lincoln, 1995). Before setting out the methods used in this thesis we therefore first discuss the methodological guidelines that we need to take into account when gathering data in a way that fits Foucault’s genealogical approach (4.2). Next we subsequently discuss our data needs (4.3), the methods we used to gather these data (4.4), the specific way we organized this data into a useful database (4.5), and the way we constructed an effective historical narrative from the data (4.6). Before ending the chapter with a short conclusion (4.8), we discuss how we derived our analysis from the resulting case narrative (4.7). This is important, because (for several reasons) we made a clear distinction between the case description and the analysis of the case.

4.2 Methodological Guidelines for Data Gathering

In chapter 2 we have argued that Foucault’s genealogical approach belongs to the social-constructivist paradigm (as is the case for all types of discourse analysis). There may be different readings about the same past, dependent on the perspective that one has adopted. The genealogy therefore does not even pretend to develop the one and true reading of the past. Instead, it tries to develop an effective reading of the past, for which it is important that it describes the emergence, institutionalization or marginalization of events as realistically as possible. Realistic means that the people involved should recognize their perceptions in the case. The challenge is then to make the story unfold from the many-sided, complex and sometimes conflicting stories that the case contains. Thus understood, genealogy is firmly grounded in an interpretive epistemology, where actors construct meanings drawing on their own frames of reference and intersubjectively, as they negotiate on the meaning they give to their surroundings in interaction with each other (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). Of course, Foucault has

¹⁸⁹ Foucault, 2000B; p.242

learned us that such individual and intersubjective meaning making (or sense making) is also very much conditioned by the specific way wherein power works within a given social domain. A realistic and effective history should therefore account for both the different meanings that actors add to events and the factors at work that shape these meanings.

The attempt to get as close to reality as possible is also reflected in the focus on details and particulars. According to Foucault it is often in the deep and concrete detail that genuinely important interrelationships are expressed. It calls for a specific way of dealing with data: 'Genealogy is grey, meticulous and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.'¹⁹⁰ The larger patterns and their contradictions will slowly emerge by meticulously gathering details and placing them in the right chronology and context. The focus on detail also implies that the researcher should at all time be cautious to dismiss something as merely detail, for example when respondents tell a story that at first seems to be too detailed. As Forester states, 'Details presented are not mere details, worrisome minutiae (though these exist for sure), but they are often claims about value, claims about what one party is worried about ... or cares about enough to put on the table for discussion' (Forester, 1999; p.133). Or in other words, what counts as a detail and what does not is also a social construction.

The focus on the polyphony of voices, structure and agency and details hold the danger of a never-ending quest for multiple beginnings. Indeed, the more closely we examine specific events, the more we are led to correlative strategies and tactics and meanings. The inquiry can assume the form of a never-ending task, as there are always beginnings underlying each beginning.¹⁹¹ Tracing descent and emergence will therefore by definition result in an incomplete analysis, including ever more sources of origin and realization, and to an increasingly polymorphism of data sources.¹⁹² There is no one cause underlying an event, no origin, and no one interpretation that can claim final authority. In order to capture the full complexity and fragmented nature as good as possible, a variety of perspectives and related data sources is required.

The genealogical approach of infinite regress and broad focus has a clear danger of drowning in the shapeless mass of information, something Pettigrew has referred to as the 'death by data asphyxiation' (1990). So, the question becomes how to obtain the right data. The answer is simple and complex at the same time; one has gathered the right data when it allows for the construction of an effective history. It is about

¹⁹⁰ Foucault, 1994E.

¹⁹¹ Remember Foucault's argument that there is no such thing as 'the origin', see chapter 2.

¹⁹² Foucault, 2000D.

developing historical accounts that are adequate, instead of offering ultimate explanations based on complete histories. As we shall discuss later, adequate refers to the epistemic standards of the present discursive community (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Doing genealogy therefore calls for a pragmatic treatment of historical data; it is about getting the right data and getting the data right, where right is understood as fully adequate.¹⁹³

It is with these overarching methodological guidelines in mind that we selected methodologies for gathering data. This allowed us to align the research methodology with the ontological and epistemological premises of the genealogical approach, which results in a coherent analytical grid for research. It allows us to describe and explain how power works in a specific policy domain (i.e. how the specific interplay between the discursive order and micro-practices plays out), which delivers the kind of sophisticated understanding that is deemed necessary for creating awareness, triggering reflecting and stimulating change, which, after all, is the main aim of any genealogy.

In the next paragraph we discuss the methods that we used for data gathering. Here it should be stressed that the methodologies that we used for gathering the data, but also for ordering, validating and presenting the data, are not necessarily the only ones suitable when enacting the 3-step procedure. Different methodologies for data gathering might be required, depending on the specific problem that is being studied, as genealogy is essentially problem-driven (i.e. there is no prescription for what methods to use). In theory, different qualitative and quantitative methodologies are therefore available when gathering and analysing data about the specific case that is being studied. As long as the researcher makes sure that he can illuminate the interplay between the discursive order and micro-practices involved and as long as he attempts to let the story unfold from the many-sided, complex and sometimes conflicting interpretations that the specific case contains, in order to avoid simplified and one-sided readings of the past. In essence, it means that the researcher has to make sure that he selects the kind of methodologies that allow him to get the data right, that is, to obtain the data that allows him to construct a realistic and effective history of his particular case.

4.3 Getting the Right Data

To start with, in order to get the right data one needs to have at least some idea what to look for. Here, the tension between an open problem driven approach and the need for focus immediately comes to the fore. One simply needs a frame of reference for making sense of the empirical world under study (cf. Weick, 1995). The solution is found in the

¹⁹³ What is 'right and adequate' depends on the specific case at hand, or more specifically, the specific event that is being studied. In some instances it might be necessary to follow lines of descent all the way down. See for example Flyvbjerg's case study of rationality and power in urban planning in Aalborg (1998), where he went back 500 years to establish the historical context of policy making and planning in Aalborg in the 1980s.

application of a set of theoretical concepts with low empirical content, for it is exactly their lack of empirical content that gives them the flexibility for describing a variety of empirical phenomena (Kelle, 2005). Such concepts cannot be tested empirically, thus they are not suitable for forming a coherent network of explicit propositions from which precisely formulated and empirically testable statements can be deduced (as is required in the hypothetico-deductive model of science, see Flyvbjerg, 2005). They are simply too broad and too abstract for this. Instead, these heuristic concepts represent lenses through which the researcher perceives the empirical world under study. Blumer invented the term 'sensitizing concepts' to describe theoretical terms which 'lack precise reference and have no bench marks which allow a clean cut identification of a specific instance' (Blumer, 1954; p.7). Such concepts are especially useful tools for problem driven descriptions, since their lack of empirical content permits researchers to apply them to a wide array of phenomena.¹⁹⁴ With decreasing empirical content the risk that the data are forced is diminished (Kelle, 2005; Langley, 1999; Stake, 1995).

Fortunately, Foucault has provided us with a heuristic framework of concepts which help the researcher to focus attention on certain phenomena in the empirical field. In chapter 2 we presented this framework that consists of four interrelated concepts, i.e. (1) power (2) discourse (3) practice and (4) event. More specifically, we argued that the specific way wherein power works, could be derived uncovered by illuminating the interplay between the discursive order and practices at work, were this interplay could be derived from study of strategies and tactics (that shape up to form practices) and events. In chapter 3 we also discussed how to study practice and events in concrete policy processes and how to relate this to discourse and power. It resulted in the following three step procedure that allows us to describe, assess and explain the emergence and persistence of policy discourses:

1. Localize events
2. Describe strategies and tactics involved in their emergence, institutionalization or marginalization and the factors that influence these strategies and tactics
3. Derive practices and discursive orders and their interplay from the data


In essence, steps 1 and 2 form the core of our empirical investigations, whereas step 3 is part of the (explanatory) analysis of the empirical description (as we shall discuss in 4.7). This implies that steps 1 and 2 are leading when attempting to gather the right data. So, how did we use these steps for getting the data?

¹⁹⁴ For the same reasons, i.e. their lack of empirical content, they are not useful for predictions.

Step 1: Localizing events

Events, understood in terms of variety of ways of thinking, talking and acting, can only be localized when we know the existing ways of thinking, talking and acting. Thus, we need to have some understanding of the discursive order that can serve as a frame of reference. In other words, we needed to distinguish between different time periods in order to be able to describe how subsequent periods build upon one another (showing change and continuity/reproduction). In the case of Schiphol’s policy process it is quite common to distinguish between three different time periods during 1989 – 2009, where each period covers a comprehensive decision making process that is finished by a political decision. These three time periods cover the periods (1) 1989 – 1995; (2) 1995 – 2003; (3) 2003 – 2009. The variety in ways of talking and acting (i.e. the characteristics of the discursive order) anno 1995 (at the end of period 1) serve as the frame of reference for localizing events in the two subsequent periods. In the former chapter we defined the elements of the policy space where we could detect variety (i.e. the elements of the discursive space and the political space). Moreover, we discussed how to describe the level of institutionalization of specific events. Summing things up, we developed a database for each specific policy theme that was on the policy agenda during a specific policy period (one of the three periods), with as much information as possible about the elements of the policy spaces and their level of institutionalization (see figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1 Data needed for localizing events



Filling the scheme for the first period was most difficult, as we needed to establish a frame of reference for localizing events. This was less difficult for the second, as the description of the policy spaces of the first period served as their frame of reference, while the outcomes of the second period served as the frame of reference for the third period. In a way, almost everything that was said and done during this first period (1989 – 1995) could be understood in terms of an event, as it was a totally new policy process that was being enacted, marking a clear discontinuity with the past (the ways of talking and acting about Schiphol in the 1980s, which we shall discuss more extensively in chapter 5). It was during this first period (1989 – 1995) that the initial discursive order was created that would turn out to be rather immune to changes and that would slowly assume the form of a policy deadlock in the years to follow after 1995 (see chapter 1). By taking the final policy outcomes of the first period as a point of departure, we were able to fill in the scheme in a quite systematic way. How did this work?

- We first filled in the scheme (figure 4.1) for the moment that the first policy period had ended. This resulted in an overview of the policy stories and the political space that could be seen as the outcome of the argumentative struggle.
- Next, we used these outcomes as a frame of reference for tracing lines of descent, asking how these final outcomes had come into being. This automatically led to the localization of events, as the policy stories gained dominance over other stories (or parts of stories) that had become marginalized.
- For each event that we discovered we could then trace the lines of descent (i.e. how had they come into being, how had they become marginalized or institutionalized).

This way we were able to build an extensive database for the first period. Drawing on the outcomes of the first period, we used the same procedure and scheme for localizing events in the second period. Thus starting from the outcomes of the second period as laid down in the major policy decisions of 2003 we could easily mark the differences. These formed the points of departure for tracing lines of descent. For example, when the policy stories around noise had changed, we located these changes and traced their lines of descent. In order to be able to localize as much events as possible we applied the same procedure to the things that had not changed, as the main assumption underlying the genealogy is that these continuities have been marked by resistances that have been overcome in one way or another. It was our task to localize these resistances (understood as events) and describe the strategies and tactics involved in their emergence and marginalization. In turn, we used the outcomes of this second period in order to localize events in the third and final period.

When enacting this procedure it is important to add that we were in the fortunate position that we had already quite some information at our disposal that helped us to create focus during data gathering. For one, we could draw upon the publications that

had highlighted the policy stories and argumentative structures involved (Abma, 2001; Broër, 2006; Van Eeten, 1997; 1999; 2001; Huys & Kroesen, 2008), the different actors involved and their respective roles (Broër, 2006; Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996; Driessen, 1995; Tan, 2001; Wagenaar & Cook, 2003) and some institutional factors at work (Van Wijk, 2007). Those insights delivered important building blocks for organizing the data in terms of the elements of the scheme presented in figure 4.1.

Step 2: Uncovering strategies and tactics

As indicated before, the localized events served as the points of departure for uncovering the strategies and tactics involved in their emergence, institutionalization or marginalization. Here we also took the different factors into account that influenced these strategies and tactics, accounting for structure and agency at the same time. Hence the format presented in figure 4.1 can be extended with a process dimension; for each event we uncovered the strategies and tactics (discursive and non-discursive) involved employed by actors to produce an event and to make sure that this event became institutionalized or marginalized.

Together steps 1 and 2 focused our process of data gathering.¹⁹⁵ We knew what to look for and we knew how to position our findings in a broader conceptual scheme. However, we also had to make sure that the data that we were gathering was the right data, i.e. data that allowed us to actually develop an effective history. As we shall discuss later on in this chapter, validation strategies offered some clues about this effectiveness. However, it was the use of a trial balloon that was most important in this respect.

Trial balloon

At one specific moment in time we published partial results of the research in order to find out whether the research was going to make an impact or not (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.156). This was an important check for assessing the effectiveness of the study, which is of course of crucial importance when attempting to develop an effective history. As we shall discuss later on, our trial balloon drew national public and political attention, and it resulted in some important lessons for the final presentation of the Schiphol case. It further improved our understanding of the data needs for an effective history. As we shall discuss later on in this chapter, the trial balloon turned out to be one of the most important validation strategies of the research findings. This is not strange, as this is exactly what trial balloons are intended to do. Think for example about the use of trial balloons by politicians in order to gauge the public opinion (Bovens et al., 1993; Bovens et al., 2001)

¹⁹⁵ Finally, we used these empirical descriptions for uncovering the micro-practices involved and its interplay with the discursive order (step 3).

In the remainder of this chapter we discuss how we actually gathered, organized, validated and presented the data in order to arrive at the kind of effective history that a genealogy is meant to deliver. The first challenge was to obtain the data that we required for filling in the format presented in figure 4.1. The methods that we used to gather these data are outlined in the next paragraph (4.4).

4.4 Gathering Data

Data can be gathered by directly observing and participating in the process for a certain period of time, so-called ‘live’ action research, or by reconstructing the case afterwards (De Jong, 1999). The very nature of genealogy, as a specific take on historiography, makes it always, in large part, retrospective research. This implies that the researcher was not there to record what happened. Even when the researcher describes actual processes, he often has to rely on retrospection. This is related to the way the genealogist perceives the world, as the multiple and fragmented coalescence of processes at work. When studying public policy making about large infrastructure projects like Schiphol this isn’t difficult to understand. It typically involves an extremely comprehensive and fragmented debate. It is simply impossible to observe ‘live’ the myriad of (sub)processes that are part of the case. Several issues and processes unravel at the same time in different places. Given this fragmented nature of the processes that are investigated and given the fact that genealogies often cover long historical periods of time, most data is derived from written material. Indeed, Foucault himself spent large part of his time probing deeply in archives, annals and individual documents (Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.133). When focusing on problems that are closer to the present, like the Schiphol problem, interview data and data from observations can be added. Here we see how the genealogist makes use of the most conventional methods in order to obtain his data, as these three data sources (written material, interviews, observations) are frequently used in case-study research (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994).

In this thesis we have made extensive use of documents and interviews. In order to improve our ‘feel for the game’ we attended several meetings and conferences where Schiphol stakeholders met,¹⁹⁶ and we engaged in several informal talks with experts and stakeholders (sometimes in between meetings, conferences, and discussions, during lunches, dinners and drinks). The informal talks and observations were especially useful for becoming familiar with the specific nature of the case. But it was the data from the 57 other formal interviews (4.4.1) and a wide diversity of written documents (4.4.2) that

¹⁹⁶ Amongst other things, we attended (1) the Mainport Schiphol Debate organized by Airneth (2006) (2) debate organized by TNO about problems in current aviation (2007) (3) CROS meeting with LVNL (2006) (4) CROS expert meeting (2007) (5) Conference Mainport and Environment (2005) (6) several workshops of the Delft Centre of Aviation (2006 – 2008) (7) Public meeting Schiphol evaluation (2006) (8) Environmental professionals meeting Schiphol (2007) (9) Debate in the Lower House about the Cabinet’s Perspective (2006).

formed the input for our empirical description.¹⁹⁷ In the remainder of this paragraph we discuss both methods in more detail. We end this paragraph with a short discussion about one methodological principle that has guided the entire process of data gathering, i.e. the need to constantly look for disconfirming evidence (4.4.3).

4.4.1 Interviews

Much of what we cannot observe by ourselves has been or is being observed by others. It is therefore needed to obtain the descriptions and interpretations of others. The interview is one important way to access the multiple realities that surround the case. As such, long and open interviewing is an alternative to being in the field.

The social constructivist approach assumes that realities are constructed by people in processes of intersubjective meaning giving. This implies that the interview cannot be seen as delivering data that represents reality. Instead, the interviewer and the respondent actively construct reality through interacting (Kvale, 1996; Riessman, 1993). An interview is literally an *inter view*, an interchange of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest (Kvale, 1996). The meaning of questions and answers is therefore socially constructed by both the interviewer and the respondent, as they try to make sense of what they are saying to one another (Fontana & Frey, 2003). Such sense making is partly dependent on weight and character of a questioner, the imagined judgment of that person, and one's own resulting self feeling, because these all can affect individual interpretations and actions (Weick, 1995). This implies that the data derived from the interview is partly influenced by the specific context of the interview, and that we should take this into account when making interpretations. It is within the context of the interview that respondents tell their story about what happened. The whole method of interviewing in itself works as a structuring frame, because both interviewer and respondent take up their specific role and try to fulfill it in the way they think is most appropriate given the circumstances. For example, respondents of scientific research elaborate on their experiences in ways they think most appropriate for scientific research (Eshuis, 2005).

With these precautionary principles in mind, we conducted two types of interviews.

¹⁹⁷ There were several reasons for rejecting participatory observation as a means for data gathering. The extremely fragmented nature of the debate made it impossible to judge which meetings were becoming important and which were not. Besides, the politically sensitive nature of the policy debate made it difficult to get permission to participate in meetings. There were some possibilities for joining some of the enormous amount of meetings, but only if it was guaranteed that nothing that was said and done would be brought out into the open. Most importantly, for our purposes we did not need a detailed description of who said what to whom in which meeting. It is the very fact that such a meeting was organized in the first place, discussing a certain issue in a certain way with a specific constellation of actors attending, which is most important for discerning practices at work. For all these reasons, and especially the fact that we could obtain more valuable data via detailed document analysis and in depth interviews, we decided to use our scarce time for interviews and document analysis

1. First, there were the interviews that were especially meant to gain insight in the multiplicity of policy processes, projects and programs and placing them in their right chronological order and context. In these interviews actors were asked to explain how the debate was organized and who was involved in what ways. These interviews were well prepared, as we developed a short list of issue-oriented questions that we wanted to obtain information about. Somewhere halfway the conversation we assessed whether or not we had discussed all the topics on the list. If not, we brought more focus into the interview (i.e. enacting a more structured style).
2. Second, there were the interviews that were meant to detect events and/or record the strategies and tactics involved in the emergence, institutionalization or marginalization of these events. Most of the time, we started the interviews with more general questions about people's experiences with events. This allowed for the possibility of discerning new events during the interviews. Next, we asked about the personal and unique experiences of the respondent about specific events of which we knew that the respondent had been involved in some way or another. As we wanted to hear their stories (how they added meaning to events), we tried to influence their accounts of events as little as possible by avoiding interruptions and by giving neutral responses. For the same reason, we tried to create an informal atmosphere, if possible. These interviews were guided by an open and flexible approach; the use of a structured format with the same questions asked to each respondent was not very useful here (Fontana & Frey, 2003; Kvale, 1996; Stake, 1995; Wagenaar, 2000). The focus on particular events provided the necessary focus for the interviews. Often, the interviews assumed the form of narrative interviews. Such interviews are meant to record the stories of people about their concrete experiences and events witnessed. People are invited to elaborate on particular events (Czarniawska, 1998).¹⁹⁸ As accessing the stories of people about events was most important, and as we wanted to be as flexible as possible, we did not have a well-defined time-span for the interviews. Some interviews lasted for 45 minutes; some for 4 hours. The length of the interview mainly depended on the amount of events that a respondent had witnessed and the level of detail that he wanted to bring to the case.

Sometimes the narrative style of interviewing wasn't working out well, for example because not all respondents had the ability or willingness to engage in detailed storytelling. In such situations we switched to a more structured way of interviewing,

¹⁹⁸ Asking about what happened during specific events very much resembles critical incident theory. CIT is used to illicit data about what actors actually did. It allows us to capture actions taken, rather than statements of intended actions in response to hypothetical situations. It is theory in use, or what people actually did, rather than espoused theory, or what people thought they would do (Argyris, 1993).

asking more explicit questions about the events that were the topics of the interview. In the end, the pragmatic stance of the genealogist prevailed: it was about the quality of information, and not about the specific interview style or technique applied. Of course, in order to properly address the value of the interview data we need to be aware that these personal accounts of events are always biased: memories of people are imperfect and people want to make sure that they look good. In 4.6.3 we discuss the different biases that influence the validity of the database in more detail. For now it is sufficient to note that the most important task is to make sure that the people involved recognize the things that are described in the case. Therefore, the most important thing is to bring the different readings of events to the fore, as experienced by the people involved

It is important to mention that most of the interviews were taped (approx. 70%). Taping has the advantage that it makes it possible to be more accurate, as one can rewind the words spoken. This is especially useful when conducting a very detailed linguistic discursive analysis. As we already discussed in chapter 2, the level of analysis of a Foucauldian approach is less detailed. Nonetheless, taping allows for a more accurate description of the emergence, institutionalization and marginalization of events, as people tend to tell their stories in comprehensive and fragmented ways. On the other hand, taping has the disadvantage that it can prevent people from talking more openly, as they are on their guards for making ‘off the record’ statements. Thus, the presence of the tape recorder influenced the interview situation, and therefore the data we obtained. It is also important to mention that not all interviews were face-to-face interviews. A few of them (4) were conducted by telephone, for reasons of time and cost-efficiency. For these interviews it became more difficult to create an informal atmosphere. This was not that important, as we used these telephone interviews mainly for verification and clarification of stories that other people had told.

Finally, the politically sensitive context of the Schiphol debate had a great influence on the interviews. Especially those who were still involved in the public policy debate about Schiphol were rather cautious. No one wanted to become known as the ‘messenger of bad news’, as this could have great repercussions (e.g. social exclusion which implied the end of one’s career) (cf. Bovens et al., 2001; p.297). In general, we observed a clear difference between the political correctness of the stories told by respondents who had been on the winning side and of those who had been on the losing side of the argumentative struggle. The latter group was more willing to make outspokenly politically sensitive statements, which is quite logical when considering that they had not much to lose and when considering that several of these respondents had become rather frustrated and disappointed about the entire Schiphol debate over the years.

In the end, several stories about events could not be taken up in the thesis, as respondents labelled these confidential and off-the-record. And sometimes we decided that parts of stories could not be included, as they could harm others (naming and shaming). Interview ethics was important here. The ethical principle of beneficence was employed, meaning that the risk of harm to a subject should be the least possible (Kvale, 1996). As we shall discuss in the reflection of our closing chapter (12), there might exist a tension between this ethical principle and the need to develop an effective history. Later on in this chapter we shall discuss how the politically sensitive character of the Schiphol case and the interview ethics we employed influenced the final research results.

Selection of Interviewees

Respondents were purposefully selected, rather than randomly. They were selected because they had the ability to tell something about the policy debate in general (type 1 interviews) or because they could help us to localize events, add meaning to these events and trace their lines of descent (type 2 interviews). With regard to the selection of respondents for both types of interviews the detailed study of written documents was very helpful. In the case of events, it allowed us to uncover events and to find out who had been involved in their production, marginalization and/ or institutionalization. Besides, key informants were used to discern the respondents that lived up to this selection criterion. Moreover, during the actual interviews new potentially interesting names of people who could tell something about specific events or who could help to discern new events came to the fore (snowballing effect). Finally, the launch of the trial balloon allowed us to include respondents who added different meanings to the events that we had described.

It is important to note that the closer we came to the present, the richer the database became (in terms of amounts events and data about events). Or in other words, the interviews delivered more data for the description of the second and third period than for the first period. This is not difficult to understand, as it is easier to find respondents that can tell something about recent affairs than to find respondents that can tell something about things that happened 20 years ago.

Selection of interviews was also related to the willingness of actors to participate. There were at least five important examples of respondents that refused an interview. This was certainly related to the politically sensitive context of the Schiphol file.¹⁹⁹ As a rule of thumb it can be argued that actors that were highly critical about the Schiphol debate

¹⁹⁹ Some respondents therefore refused to give an interview, arguing that they did not see the relevance of the research. Others didn't even respond at all, despite repeated attempts to contact them. Participating by giving an interview meant to take a 'vulnerable stance', which in the politically sensitive Schiphol file is equal to putting ones head on the line.

were less concerned about the political correctness of their contributions than those who in some way or another received some benefits from the debate. The more critical actors were also more eager to participate in the research and tell their stories.²⁰⁰

At the same time, there were much more potentially interesting respondents who would probably have participated if approached. Unfortunately, the limited time span of the research forced us to stop gathering more data. The key criterion used to decide when to stop interviewing was when we thought that we had gathered sufficient data to make a realistic and effective history (which is something different than developing a complete and exhaustive history). In practice, this implied that we did not easily discover new important events anymore and new readings about events that were already included in the case. In a way, it is to say that not much new information was being discovered, which is the basic principle for other researchers to stop interviewing (Fontana & Frey, 2003; Kvale, 1996). At the same time, it should be mentioned that new questions and potentially interesting persons were constantly coming into view, whose stories could have made the history even more effective and realistic. Therefore, the limited time span available was also in some way a blessing in disguise, as tracing down lines of descent in the Foucauldian way automatically gives way to the detection of new correlative events. It is especially for this reason that research could go on and on that Foucault recommended a pragmatist stance, thus ending search for more data when sufficient information is available for constructing a realistic and effective history.

In the end, we conducted 57 interviews. 10 respondents have been interviewed 2 times for reasons of verification or further clarification (see appendix 4 for the full list of interviewees). Besides, 10 informal talks have been conducted throughout the research process. 4 of these were conducted at the very beginning of the research process, serving as a sort of informal helicopter interviews that helped us to develop our research focus. Those 10 informal interviews have not been used as empirical data for the case study. They have also not been formally validated, which serves as an additional reason for not using the data in the case description. The amount of interviews that we conducted and that we did use as input for the case description is in line with the suggestion made by Morse (1994) that 30 – 50 interviews are most of the time appropriate for context-bound research (even though he too asserted that the specific number is depended on the specific case).

Interview Ethics

We already shortly addressed the importance of interview ethics when doing research about extremely politically charged subjects like Schiphol. When trying to obtain and

²⁰⁰ The losers may be willing to share more inside information / acting in less politically correct ways, as they might benefit from challenging the status quo by trying to broaden the taken-for-granted scope of the debate (cf. McBeth, 2007).

using politically sensitive interview data, some important ethical considerations have to be made. First of all, the respondent should understand what research project he is participating in. Second, his confidentiality should be secured. Third, the possible consequences of the study for the subject need to be considered, both for the respondents as for the group or institution they represent (Kvale, 1996). In general, our main ethical principle was that we by no means wanted to harm the respondents in any way (Christians, 2005; Kvale, 1996). Thus, we hardly used the data from the interviews that might risk the well being of respondents. When we did so, respondents had given their permission for this. Often, during the interviews the respondents already indicated what was off-the-record information that was not meant for publication, and what was not. When we were not entirely sure, we asked the respondents during the interviews whether or not we were allowed to publish a specific anecdote.

This interview ethics is important, but there is also a subtle ethical dilemma involved here when doing genealogy. It might be necessary for a genealogist to choose between an effective history that works to uncover politically sensitive micro practices involved and violating some of the interview ethics involved, or living up to the interview ethics and risk the creation of the kind of history that lacks urgency and thus effectiveness, which undermines the very aim of genealogy. We shall elaborate this dilemma in our reflection (chapter 12). For now it is sufficient to note that we have been able to gather the adequate data for an effective history without violating the interview ethics. However, this does not mean that the final case description that is presented in this thesis isn't influenced by our interview ethics. On the contrary, as we shall explain later in chapter 11, the description could have been different, although the main claims of our concluding analysis that we present in chapter 9 would have remained the same. Finally, enacting the interview ethics was important for one other reason. It works to prevent conflicts, which is in line with the assumption that triggering a genuine dialogue is often more effective when seeking change in deadlocked situations than engaging in polemics and triggering further polarization.²⁰¹

4.4.2 Document Analysis

Written materials have played an important role in this thesis, which is quite normal for historical research (see e.g. Jenkins, 2003). The material allowed us to reconstruct the discursive space, i.e. the policy stories that were developed and the vocabularies used. They were therefore an important source for the detection of events and the extent to which they became institutionalised.

²⁰¹ Foucault, 1984A.

In line with Foucault's focus on history, and more specifically, historical events (see chapter 2), we certainly did not merely focus on the important documents, like the governmental White Papers, the political decisions, the strategic documents of the stakeholders (e.g. visions, year reports, strategies) and major research reports. No doubt that these contain important information, but the 'smaller' documents are equally important, especially for detecting events. As we have argued, many events might not become institutionalised, and can therefore not be found in the main policy documents that are usually examined in historical studies (of policymaking). The focus on both the main and smaller documents implied that we included as much written materials as possible of the policymakers, politicians, stakeholders, researchers, citizens and media involved. This includes policy documents, research reports, letters of correspondence between all actors involved (e.g. from policy-makers to other policymakers, politicians, stakeholders or researchers; from stakeholders to stakeholders, policy-makers, politicians and researchers), brochures, scientific publications, flyers, newspaper articles (including opinion articles of actors), minutiae of meetings, internet pages, e-mails. We were fortunate to probe deeply into different archives that accessed a wealth on information. The two most important sources are listed below:

- We received a very well documented DVD from the Ministry of V&W that contained an enormous variety of policy papers, research reports and letters to the Lower House (over 1000 documents) that had been developed by the Ministry as an archive of 20 years Schiphol policy.²⁰²
- The extensive database of Dutch Parliament that contains all political proceedings from 1995 onwards (including letters to the Lower and Upper House, detailed reports of debates, votes, motions etc.) was crucial for reconstructing the political decision making about Schiphol.²⁰³ The archive is ordered in the following way. Specific policy processes are brought together in a file number. Those files consist of several documents that also received a number, based on their date of publication. Documents of the Lower House are labelled with TK (= Tweede Kamer = Lower House), while documents of the Upper House are labelled EK (= Eerste Kamer = Upper House). When drawing on the documents we refer to their file number that assumes the following form: TK 29962, Nr.4. Typing in this number in the database will bring the reader to the document.

Much of the smaller documents were difficult to obtain, as they were not publicly available. Here we had to rely on the willingness of actors to share them with us. For this reason it is very important to have some informants who are willing to share such

²⁰² The DVD was labelled 'Luchtvaartbeleid door de jaren heen' and we received our first exemplar in 2008. After that we received an updated version. The DVD is made publicly available and one can request one at the Ministry.

²⁰³ This database is publicly available via <http://parlando.sdu.nl/cgi/login/anonymous>.

sensitive information (like e-mails, or personal letters of correspondence). Fortunately, several actors were prepared to do so. For example, a regional discussion platform (CROS), the organized platforms of local residents and the environmental organizations opened their archives for us.²⁰⁴ Several of the interviewees provided us with important letters of correspondence in order to give their story extra validity. The Ministry of V&W made it possible to study several internal documents about the research processes they initiated. Finally, with regard to the media, several archives of local and national newspapers with articles about Schiphol could be consulted via the Internet.²⁰⁵

One last source of written material that is worth mentioning here are the contributions of several stakeholders to a book that we have edited during 2007 – 2009 (Van Gils et al., 2009). The book was about dealing with the multiplicity of stakeholders in the planning of Schiphol and the port of Rotterdam, and seven of the most important stakeholders of the Schiphol debate made a contribution by writing a chapter on personal notice. These chapters can be seen as kind of personal diaries of the stakeholders; they reveal the perceptions of the actors and their intentions, and they elaborate on their strategies to achieve their goals.

All in all, we obtained an enormous amount of written materials, (at least six banana boxes could be entirely filled, making up for more than 6 metres of information). Again, the amount of materials that could be obtained increased as we came closer to the present situation. This is related to the increasing public concerns about making governmental information publicly available, as part of the ambition to improve transparency of the decision making process of complex governmental projects, like large infrastructure projects.²⁰⁶ Another important reason for this is that the Schiphol policy debate became more and more complicated and fragmented, resulting in an increasing production of documents over the years.

4.4.3 Looking for Disconfirming Evidence

The genealogical take on historiography is based on the expectation that different views of processes, causes, effects, events, actors etc. will come to the fore. The very fact that these emerge is the best proof that the assumptions underlying the genealogical method are valid. In fact, this holds true for all social-constructivist approaches, because a case narrative with multiple realities is more welcomed (and indeed, perceived to be far more realistic and credible) than a story wherein one reality dominates. This means that the genealogist is constantly looking for new data that contrasts with the existing data. This

²⁰⁴ To give one example, the Stichting Natuur & Milieu (Foundation Nature & Environment) offered us boxes full of material containing their input for the debate since 1989.

²⁰⁵ Often, merely typing down a few words in Google was sufficient for finding a rich amount of sources.

²⁰⁶ See for example TK 28645, Nr.2.

is not an easy task, as it basically boils down to conscientiously seeking for information that undermines carefully developed conclusions. It can be very tempting to leave aside specific information that contrasts with specific patterns that the researcher thought to have uncovered.²⁰⁷ However, when doing genealogy, the researcher needs to be prepared to abandon his pre-existing expectations when gathering data.

The genealogist develops a pride in self-challenge. Several authors who have conducted genealogical kind of case-studies have reported that their preconceived views, assumptions, concepts and hypotheses were wrong and that the case material forced them to revise them on essential points (Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.82; see also Flyvbjerg, 2005). When discussing the ethics of an intellectual (see paragraph 2.2), Foucault emphasized the importance of a permanent criticism that allows us to remain suspicious, predicated on the recognition of the contingency and lack of necessity of things. Permanent criticism allows for a constant reflection on the constraints that contemporary modes of thought and related practices impose on individuals.²⁰⁸ Curiosity was considered to be a vital virtue for leading a critical life. According to Foucault, being curious suggests ‘... a readiness to find what surround us different and odd; a certain determination to throw off familiar ways of thought and to look at the same things in a different way ...’²⁰⁹ Curiosity was the basis of the type of interrogative attitude that Foucault deemed necessary when attempting to think differently, showing a desire to not deceive anyone and especially not oneself. Indeed, it allowed Foucault to not only change his readers by means of his books, but also himself. This called for a specific research ethos that is an integral part of the genealogical approach, i.e. one wherein the researcher is constantly trying to falsify his own assumptions, hypothesis, cause-and-effect relations and conclusions.

At the same time, some authors have argued that Foucault himself was not always enacting this ethos himself. He has been accused of being highly selective in his use of sources when drawing up his histories (Megill, 1979). He cherry-picked specific statements from an immense archive in order to get his point across. A genealogist obviously has to balance between those extremes of including everything and selecting parts that are required for an effective history. Therefore it is important to emphasize once again that the genealogist does not attempt to write an exhaustive and complete history. Instead, he writes an effective history. This calls for a curious attitude, but it also calls for a pragmatist approach that allows the researcher to show how power works

²⁰⁷ This bias towards verification and the creation of a consistent narrative is related to the assumption that scientific knowledge is most valid when it concerns generalizations beyond the case (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2005).

²⁰⁸ In fact, this ambition brought Foucault close to the ideals of the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurter Schule, of which his counteract Habermas was a part, something he himself also acknowledged (see chapter 2).

²⁰⁹ Cited in Kritzman, 1988B; p.328

in a specific social domain, and, more specifically, how it has worked to create an impasse that the actors involved cannot adequately recognise any longer.

In sum, genealogical data gathering implies meticulously working through thousands of pages of a wide variety of (small and important) documents and large masses of interview material, while constantly looking for disconfirming evidence, all in order to get as close to the ambiguity of reality as possible. From this perspective one can better understand why Foucault argued that genealogy depends on a vast accumulation of source material which both requires patience and a knowledge of details.²¹⁰ Nonetheless, the approach still results in a rather extensive database that is only ordered to a limited extent (i.e. along the lines of the format that we presented in figure 4.1 and the myriad of strategies and tactics involved). In the next paragraph we discuss how we further organized the data.

4.5 Organizing Data

It is one thing to gather the data that one needs (i.e. locating the events and uncover the strategies and tactics involved - including the contextual factors influencing these- in their emergence and their level of institutionalization for each major time period involved). It is quite another thing to organize this database into a meaningful whole. The main organizing principle was to place the extensive descriptions about the events in the right chronology and context. So, how did we further organize our extensive database?

Time served as an overall organizing principle here. We already argued that we discerned between three different periods, were each period coincided with a comprehensive policy process. We refined these periods by breaking them down into different phases. Drawing on policy literature we can by and large discern between phases of policy preparation (agenda setting, problem formulation), political decision-making, policy implementation and evaluation (Bryson & Crosby, 1992; Hoogerwerf, 1982). Even though in practice such phases are rarely ever neatly followed and the phase model has been severely criticized (see e.g. Kingdon, 1995; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Teisman, 2000), it provided us with a means to organize the data, placing it in the right chronological order. In essence, by distinguishing between different periods and phases we could transform the shapeless mass of data into sequences of more discrete and connected blocks (Langley, 1999; see also Giddens, 1984 and his strategy of bracketing). This step resulted in a chronological overview of the many events involved in a specific policy period. The format of the overview is presented in figure 4.2. Each white box thus contained (1) a description of the event

²¹⁰ Foucault, 1994E.

(including how it induced variety into the policy domain by making reference to existing ways of talking and acting) (2) the strategies and tactics involved in its emergence and institutionalization or marginalization, including the contextual factors influencing these (e.g. the policy context, the political climate, the economic context, the specific way wherein actors were positioned in the field).

Figure 4.2 Matrix for organization of the data gathered

	Event 1	Event 2	Event 3	Event N
Period 1 (1989 – 1995)				
• Policy Preparation				
• Political Decision Making				
• Policy implementation & evaluation				
Period 2 (1995 – 2003)				
• Policy Preparation				
• Political Decision Making				
• Policy implementation & evaluation				
Period 3 (2003 – 2009)				
• Policy Preparation				
• Political Decision Making				
• Policy implementation & evaluation				

Putting the events in the right chronology and context is of pivotal importance for genealogy. It allows the genealogist to make proper judgments about the past activities, by acknowledging the specific circumstances at work back then. The primary goal of a Foucauldian historiography is to tell how it really was and to understand what conditions were at work, under which particular ways of talking and acting emerged, existed and changed (Dean, 1999; p.20).²¹¹ It involves recognizing and taking seriously the cultural and temporal specificity of past events, preventing to interpret and judge the past from our present socio-political understandings. This is needed in order to prevent that the result will be a product of contemporary understandings instead of a critical analysis of this understanding (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982; Jenkins, 2003). In other words, it means to avoid perspectivism, that is, avoid interpreting phenomena from our present way of making sense (Linssen, 2005). For example, an honest judgment of the behavior of Nazis and other war criminals can only be made when we know about their specific circumstances and motives (cf. MacMillan, 2009).

²¹¹ Here we see again why Foucault stressed the need to record events in their own terms, in their own singularity, without imposing a unifying theory of present logic upon it. To record and understand phenomena in their own terms, in their own context, increases our understanding of why and how things really happened in a particular way during a particular day. It means to acknowledge the specific conditions of possibility at work at a specific moment in time, setting margins to the things that can be said and done in a meaningful and legitimate way. This also implies that what might seem irrational from our present perspective might make perfect sense within another context.

While organizing the data we did not take position regarding the truth-value and significance ascribed by participants to their accounts of what had happened during events (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.135). The famous Thomas theorem served as a point of departure: 'If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.'²¹² In other words, the interpretation of a situation causes the action. This interpretation is not objective. Actions are affected by subjective perceptions of situations. Whether there even is an objectively correct interpretation is not important. This implied that there could be different readings of the same events, which gave way to different strategies and tactics. As argued before, in the social-constructivist paradigm multiple mental constructions of reality and different readings of the same events or actors are perfectly normal (Guba & Lincoln, 1995; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005).²¹³ People may tell different stories about what actually happened, dependent on their perceptions. The researcher should attempt to take the different views into account, as all of them can potentially enhance our understanding of a specific event. In the end, ambiguity is not seen as a weakness of the case. On the contrary, it is an indicator of the richness of the case, illustrating the complexities, contradictions and ambiguities of life itself. When allowing room for different interpretations it comes to the fore that history is never entirely black or white. Many institutionalized stereotypes might become far more complex and unpleasant upon closer inspection. Good histories remind us that human affairs are complicated and help to make societies more mature, daring to question myths and other fallacies (Jenkins, 2003; MacMillan, 2009). As such, it helps to create a real history, which is something different than ignoring discontinuities for the sake of the grand narrative (see chapter 2).

4.6 Constructing an Effective History

The last challenge was to translate the ordered data into an effective history. We already discussed that such histories do not attempt to develop complete and exhaustive readings of the past. Instead, they need to be adequate readings of the past that allow one to understand how power has worked to organize the specific domain under study. Adequate means that the history needs to be plausible and understandable for the specific reference group to which the researcher refers, while simultaneously contributing to societal discussion about the desirability of regular daily practices. In our case, this reference group is made up of both the scientific community and the practitioners involved in the Schiphol controversy. If they reject the problematization for whatever reason (e.g. they may perceive it to be irrational or untrue, and hence, as

²¹² Here quoted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_theorem, on October 16th, 2010.

²¹³ This does not only apply to events, but to all experiences of people. For example, people may have different ideas about Napoleon: was he a national hero, a great reformer or a racist dictator? And was the Marshall Plan an altruistic campaign of a disinterested superpower or an egocentric economic strategy to secure future economic growth and prosperity of the United States?

invaluable) it loses its potential to become effective. As with all other scientific inquiries, its effectiveness depends on the validity claims that researchers can place on their study, and the status these claims obtain in dialogue with other validity claims in the discourse to which the study is a contribution, both in the scientific discipline concerned and in the public sphere (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001). As such, genealogies are only plausible and persuasive if the specific reference group judges them to be so.

It should be emphasized that validity does not mean that the entire reference group has to agree with all knowledge claims. One can disagree with our interpretations (e.g. add different meanings to the findings), without immediately declaring them invalid. Such a thing is highly likely to happen in the case of a genealogy, as the genealogy describes a controversial case that includes people that hold diametrically opposed views and interests. From this perspective it is impossible (and undesirable for its dogmatic tendency) to strive for one overarching interpretation. It is far more important to make sure that the history contributes to the social debate about the future of Schiphol, exactly by triggering reflection on regular daily practices that used to resist such reflection. From this perspective, the existence of different interpretations is a strength, as it works to fuel the debate. Nonetheless, in practice it is difficult to draw a sharp line between validity and shared interpretations, as one's perception of validity is often very much dependent on one's interpretation. That is, people only tend to perceive their own truths in terms of validity.

Having said this, the genealogist does attempt to make the final findings as valid as possible for the reference group. Because our reference group contains both the scientific and the public sphere, we must make sure that our history 'feels good' and 'sounds right', while maintaining scientific rigor. In order to construct an effective history we thus have to make sure that (1) the reference group perceives the data to be valid and (2) we have to present the data in a specific way. With regard to the first it is very important that the different interpretations of the practitioners involved are included in case history. We already discussed the importance of including the polyphony of voices as a methodological guideline for doing genealogy. Next to this, it is very important to validate the data in different ways. With regard to the second it is important to understand that presentation is especially important for the genealogist, as merely posing valid data claims is not necessarily sufficient for making these claims effective. Indeed, how much scientific thesis have been published that have delivered scientifically valid data claims with none societal impact whatsoever? Such a scenario is a nightmare for the genealogist as his main aim is to make a constructive contribution to societal dialogue. Therefore, results have to be presented in such a way that works to trigger a process of reflection on behalf of the actors of the reference group. This basically means that the thesis (thus the knowledge claims it contains) should be located within the boundaries of what is still deemed acceptable within the discursive order of

the Schiphol policy domain. More specifically, the thesis should be located exactly on the boundaries, as this holds most opportunities for expanding the boundaries. We shall elaborate on this in chapter 10. For now it is important to understand that a history can only become effective when it makes sense to the people involved, but that it can only become effective when it creates room for exploring new ways of thinking, talking and acting. In the remainder of this paragraph we discuss the strategies that we employed to make our data valid for the reference group (4.6.1) and to present our data in a way that could trigger reflection on behalf of the reference group (4.6.2). We end this paragraph with a short reflection on the remaining biases of our genealogy (4.6.3).

4.6.1 Validating the Data

We already argued that the genealogist rejects the existence of one true reading of the past. This does not imply that ‘anything goes’ (i.e. the relativistic stance) and that all claims and interpretations are equally valid. The genealogist takes a pragmatist view on truth, implying that all knowledge is situated knowledge, and what counts as valid scientific research results is related to the specific rules and norms of the regime of power/knowledge in operation in the scientific domain. There are no permanent or unvarying (or foundational) standards by which truth-value of claims can be universally known. Truth, and any agreement regarding what is valid knowledge, arises from the relationship between members of some stakeholding community (Lincoln & Denzin, 2005).²¹⁴

It is conventional wisdom in social science that rigid methodological procedures, like standard quantitative designs, can limit the role of personal interpretation; at least for that period between the time the research design is set and the time the data are collected and analyzed statistically (Stake, 1995). And that these therefore can lead to the development of more objective conclusions that are perceived to be more valid. From a constructivist perspective there is no such thing as a value-free period. Most importantly, such rigid methodological procedures might hamper the creation of real histories (i.e. recording what really happened). As we have argued, the refusal to provide such blueprint procedures is exactly one of the particular strengths of a genealogical methodology. Localizing events can be done in a rather objective way, as it can be shown how they induce variety into the policy domain. However, the meanings that actors give to the events and the perceptions on how events have emerged and impacted cannot be less easy to qualify in terms of truth-value. In general, a particular interpretation is valid for as long as it is not replaced by another interpretation that is regarded even more valid in the light of the evidence presented.²¹⁵ At several occasions

²¹⁴ See also Haas (1992) who defines such reference groups as epistemic communities.

²¹⁵ Which does not mean that gathering, organizing, validating and presenting data cannot be done in a rather systematized way, as is discussed in this chapter.

different interpretations are likely to be evenly valid at the same time. Nonetheless, there is an ethical obligation to engage in a deliberative effort to minimize misrepresentation and misunderstanding and obtain the most valid data available, i.e. what Stake referred to as the obligation to ‘get it right’ (Stake, 1995; p.107; see also Daamen, 2010; p.43). There are several validation strategies available in the field of (intrinsic) case-study research that helps create an effective history, instead of turning the genealogy into a lousy or sloppy history.

The main purpose of these strategies is to look for disconfirming or confirming evidence. It is an attempt to deliberately falsify the data and interpretations, by constantly looking for alternative explanations that may undermine the developed rudimentary hypotheses. As we have seen, such an intellectual ethics is fundamental to a Foucauldian way of doing historiography. It is therefore falsification and not verification that characterizes genealogies. This is partly related to the fact that there is absolutely no incentive to keep silent about disconfirming evidence. There is no ultimate truth or essence for the researcher, there is only the polyphony of voices. There is nothing to gain by deliberately biasing the story into one direction or another, since a story with multiple realities is equally valuable as a story wherein one reality dominates.²¹⁶ So there is no reason for ignoring disconfirming evidence. On the contrary, it might even strengthen the experiential learning, since it better reflects real life and experiences (Stake, 1995). And, as indicated before, it shows that the basic assumptions about historical development that underlie a genealogical approach are valid.

Thus, the challenge is to constantly look for disconfirming evidence and new interpretations, while simultaneously making sure that the stories that are taken up in the research are as valid as possible.²¹⁷ The procedures applied in the constant search for disconfirming and confirming evidence are generally called triangulation. It refers to a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Stake, 1995). At the same time, it is acknowledged that no observations or interpretations are perfectly repeatable, due to their context-specific character. Triangulation can mean multiple sources of data or multi-method approaches, but it can also mean multiple researchers or multiple

²¹⁶ This should of course be understood within the context of a genealogy, which deliberately seeks the specific ways wherein power works to benefit some and disadvantage others, and which therefore has a concern for the knowledges and actors that have become marginalized.

²¹⁷ Note that there is an inherent tension at work in the genealogy. On the one hand, there is to desire to check all stories told on their validity, while on the other hand, it is exactly these stories told that reflect an actor’s perception and influence his actions.

theories (Abma, 1996; Denzin, 1989; Dunn, 1994).²¹⁸ Triangulation also serves to clarify meaning by identifying different ways the case is being seen. It helps to identify the different realities within which people live, and the multiple sources that can be used to provide dialectic between these realities.²¹⁹

In this thesis, triangulation by means of multiple sources of data has played an important role. The combination of several documents from a wide variety of sources and the many interviews conducted allowed us to verify the data. It helped us to ensure the inclusion of different perspectives that were valid in their own right. As long as the interpretations could lean on different sources, they were taken seriously, which sometimes gave way to contradictory accounts of the same event. After all, the researcher is not in the position to assess which account is more true, nor is such an assessment important for the genealogist. The ambiguity reflects the richness and complexity of the real world. By presenting as completely as possible the different viewpoints on the events studied the researcher makes the case valuable for a broad reference group, as it produces a sense of *déjà vu* among a wide diversity of readers (Langley, 1999; p.695).

Moreover, triangulation by means of the inclusion of multiple researchers has played an important role too. In the case of one specific episode, i.e. the Alders table (2007 –), we were in the fortunate position to be able to triangulate our findings with those of another researcher who was working on this case at the same time. Our research projects were carried out in individual tracks, thus independent from one another. When we both finished the case description and had developed our own conclusions about this particular episode, we compared both the description and conclusions and found that they were very similar (see the case study and conclusions in De Jong, forthcoming 2011). This was all the more important, as we interviewed different people who had been involved during this episode. As we have discussed, our approach gave way to selection of respondents that had been involved in the emergence and marginalization or institutionalization of specific events, which automatically included the marginalized voices. De Jong was mainly interested in respondents who were actively taking part in the negotiations, which resulted in a different selection of respondents.

With regard to several other episodes of our case description, comparisons could be made with descriptions and conclusions presented in earlier studies (i.e. Abma, 2001;

²¹⁸ The concept has been borrowed from the natural sciences and assumes that there is a truth that can be verified by examining three different perceptions of reality. This is inappropriate in a constructivist paradigm, where multiple realities are valid.

²¹⁹ The stronger one's belief in constructed reality, the more difficult it is to believe that any complex observation or interpretation can be triangulated. For them, these protocols of triangulation have come to be the search for additional interpretations more than the confirmation of a single meaning (Flick, 1992).

Ale, 2001; Broër, 2006; Boons et al., 2010; Cerfontaine, 2005; Driessen, 1995; Van Eeten, 1999; 2001; Huys & Koppenjan, 2010; In't Veld & Verheij, 2001; Kroesen, 2011; Tan, 2001; Teisman et al., 2008; Wagenaar & Cook, 2003; Weggeman, 2003; Van Wijk, 2007). In chapter 11 we shall discuss that our findings are in line with those findings. More specifically, we have brought all these different findings together in one overarching explanatory framework, showing how the different explanations that have been offered over the years are working to mutually reinforce one another, in line with the idea that the whole is more than the sum of its separate parts (see chapter 11, 11.3).

Finally, triangulation by means of multiple researchers has also been done by enacting another strategy, i.e. peer-debriefing (see Abma, 1996). Four colleague researchers who were familiar with the methodology or the Schiphol case were asked to reflect upon the data, my interpretations, and the entire genealogy. This influenced the outcomes in two ways: (1) some interpretations became more nuanced and (2) it led to the localization of several new events, as reading some parts of the case brought specific anecdotes back to memory (did you know that ...?).

Next to the ongoing triangulation we also added validity to the findings by enacting another important procedure during data gathering and interpretation, i.e. member checking (Abma, 1996; Guba & Lincoln, 1995). The credibility of interpretations in the eyes of stakeholders requires that respondents receive interpretations of our document analysis and interviews together with the question: do they recognize the analysis. For example, during the actual interviews we attempted to verify our interpretations of the respondents' answers. We tried to follow up and clarify the meanings of the relevant aspects of the answers. The ideal interview results are to a large extent interpreted throughout the interview (that is, during the interview itself) (Kvale, 1996). It is to check immediately whether the interpretations made by the interviewer are valid from the perspective of the respondent. Member checking can and has also been done afterwards. We have done so in two different ways. Some actors have examined the transcripts and commented on them. Others were not so much interested in reading through the entire transcript. These actors have been provided a list of statements that we wanted to take up in our case-study, asking their permission for publication. A third form of member checking is already enclosed in the genealogical research strategy. When a researcher has the intention to get as close to reality as possible, the research is automatically anchored in the context that is studied. A research strategy with a focus on detail and the context is therefore also an important validation strategy. Parties will test and evaluate the research in various ways along the way, i.e. member checking. As a consequence, the researcher becomes part of the phenomenon under study, without going necessarily native or taking roles (Flyvbjerg, 2001).

One primary example of such ongoing member checking is the trial balloon that we launched (that we discussed earlier at the end of 4.3). Once, we published partial results of the research in order to find out whether the research was going to make an impact or not (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.156; a strategy quite common for policy makers and politicians, see Bovens et al, 2001; Bovens et al., 1993). This was an important check for assessing the effectiveness of the study, which is of course of crucial importance when attempting to develop an effective history. The results drew a lot of national public and political attention,²²⁰ and it resulted in some important lessons for the final presentation of the Schiphol case. The main consequence was that several actors stood up to criticize our results, whereas others stood up to defend the results. In the case of a few events we were criticized for providing a too one-sided interpretation. This was an important signal, as it implied that at least some members of the reference group did not perceive all results to be valid (although even those critics supported most of the findings). In a response we initiated 5 additional interviews in order to complete the case description by including interpretations of these events that were missing.

Most importantly, it resulted in close contacts with the leading policy makers of the Ministry of V&W.²²¹ We discussed the concept of the manuscript with them in order to verify the facts and in order to include their interpretation of specific events (although we had already drawn upon several interviews conducted with people of the Ministry). This not merely contributed to the validation of the results. It also, and especially, contributed to our aim to turn the story about Schiphol's policy deadlock into an effective history. After all, as we noted before, in order to become effective the results should at least be deemed plausible by the actors who are immediately involved in the debate, and especially by those holding some of the more crucial positions. In essence, the trial balloon gave way to a more nuanced and rich representation of these specific politically charged events. The main point we want to make here is that the trial balloon made sure that the results were tested and evaluated, giving us an indication of the 'rightness' of our data and calling for some additional efforts to make the data even more right (i.e. valid for the members of the reference group). As we shall discuss more extensively in chapter 12 (12.2), the additional efforts have made our case description richer and more nuanced, but it did not influence our analysis and final conclusions. It is a prime example of how the discursive order of which the researcher is part works to influence his own research practices. Being aware of how this exactly works allows the

²²⁰ The report that we published was called 'The politics of evidence based policy: The Schiphol case' (Huys & Annema, 2009). Some of the media that reported about this report were some regional newspapers (Parool, Haarlems Dagblad, BN De Stem) and a national newspaper (Volkskrant). It triggered some debates on the internet and on radio and gave rise to some question in the Lower House. We declined offers for television interviews.

²²¹ We discussed the concept of the manuscript with Mr. Fukken (director aviation affairs), Mr. Alders (chairman of the Alders tables that have dominated the Schiphol debate since 2008) and Mr. Weggeman (secretary of the Alders Table) of the Ministry of V&W.

researcher to make his findings as transparent as possible without going native and it increases the potential for actually developing an effective history.

Finally, the fact that we have monitored the Schiphol case for a relatively long time period (from the beginning of the study in 2004 until mid 2010) also ensured validity and allowed us to avoid misrepresentation. It won't need further explanation that such a long time of close monitoring contributes to ones understanding of the specifics and ins and outs (i.e. contributing to our feel for the game). It was both necessary and helpful when localizing events, while it also allowed us to put the events in their proper context.

4.6.2 Presenting the Results: From Database to Narrative

In general, there are different strategies for making sense of dense process data (see for example Langley, 1999; Kelle, 2005; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006). The one strategy that allows for the most accurate reading of the case, as is the purpose of the genealogy, is the narrative strategy. To put it differently, the need to present the different interpretations of events and to account for structure and agency and micro and macro levels at the same time almost automatically gives way to a narrative strategy, as the narrative format allows for the integration of these demands. What is more, the narrative form itself is very useful in guiding the sense making process of people. Indeed, many have argued that it is through such narratives that people make sense of experience (see for example Flyvbjerg 2001; Jenkins, 2003; Weick, 1995). In essence, the narrative strategy basically involves the construction of a detailed story from the database. The narrative itself is therefore an organizing strategy as it allows for descriptively representing process data in a systematic organized form. The narrative itself must be seen as the main product of the research (Guba & Lincoln, 1995; Stake, 1995).

Developing a narrative from a large database is not easy. Compelling narratives, like genealogies are meant to be, have embedded plots and themes around which the story is organized. Such a plot is needed to give the resulting case narrative a clear focus, some urgency and internal logic, which makes it both understandable and sound plausible. Simultaneously telling the complete story while setting the plot is a tall order (see Flyvbjerg, 2001; Langley, 1999). As genealogies are developed with a specific purpose in mind, the story should revolve around this purpose. In our case, the purpose was to make people aware of the reproductive tendency of the Schiphol policy discourse by pointing out the myriad of micro-practices at work in the policy domain that gave way to specific self-evident ways of thinking, talking and acting that worked to produce and sustain the policy deadlock. Of course, we had already gathered and ordered the data with this purpose in mind. It resulted in deconstruction of the policy process in three different periods with different phases, where each period is characterized by several events and for each event the strategies and tactics are discussed that drove their emergence, institutionalization or marginalization (while simultaneously accounting for

factors shaping the possible strategies and tactics). So, how did we use this database for developing a compelling narrative? This called for several choices about the specific content and format of the narrative that we shall discuss in the remainder of this paragraph.

1. First, we presented the narrative in chronological order. Note that it is not necessary to present narratives in chronological order (imagine for example the many formats used in novels).²²² In our case we did choose to present the case in chronological order, as it allowed us to describe how subsequent periods built upon one another (i.e. showing reproduction). Although drawing a chronological narrative with a convincing plot from a large database is not easy, our systematic way of gathering and ordering the data was very helpful here. In fact, the very form of the database gave the narrative already its rudimentary shape, as it placed the myriad of events into the right chronological order and context. As Jorgenson (2001) has asserted, such sheer ordering of pieces in time and space makes much of the material really speak for itself, which implies that the researcher does not have to take liberties with reality (Jorgenson, 2001).
2. Second, the case history has to relate to people's experiences (or perceptions and logics). By providing information easily assimilated with the readers' existing knowledge, the reader can better make sense of the case. For this reason it is important tell the story in its manifold ways, based upon the wide diversity of available interpretations. Here the researcher should not a priori determine what interpretations and claims are valid or not, and what are details and what not. After all, people are likely to have different ideas about what counts as valid claims and details. Describing the story in its full diversity and complexity, including contradictory readings of past events, opens the door for the development of experiential understandings and naturalistic generalizations that are necessary aspects of triggering frame reflection (which is a precondition for change). It is exactly the contextual detail in the narrative that allows the reader to judge the transferability of the ideas to other situations. As argued before, good research of this type can produce a sense of 'déjà vu' among readers (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Langley, 1999).

Adhering to people's experiences also implies the need to present the case in the right discursive format. Thus, in the case of practitioners, scientific jargon is to be avoided in the case history as much as possible. We therefore didn't refer to the

²²² Sometimes it might be fruitful to present the report in story form, and sometimes it may be more appropriate to tell a few stories to illustrate what is going on. At other times, the development of the report will more likely follow the sequence of events, presenting a chronological or biographical development of the case, a researcher's view of coming to know the case or a description one by one of several major components of the case (Stake, 1995).

sensitizing concepts of our analytical framework (power, discourse, practice and event) in the case description. We only refer to the terms that we developed for localizing events in the policy domain that can directly be read from the surface (strategies and tactics, policy stories / arguments, actors, coalitions, institutionalization of outcomes) and thus not to things such as a discursive space or political space. Avoiding much of the terminology of our descriptive and analytical framework in the case description as much as possible does of course not mean that the case descriptions are not scientifically valid. But it does mean that we have to use the type of language that everyday practitioners involved in the Schiphol policy debate use. From this perspective, the choice to describe the case in English was a difficult one. In the scientific community it is common to report in English, while such a presentation obviously created barriers for practitioners. Besides, it is difficult to translate typically Dutch policy language in a way that is still understandable for the Dutch and foreigners at the same time. In an attempt to live up to the (discursive) rules of both communities we have attempted to present the case in relatively 'easy' English.

3. Third, in order to avoid as much as possible to impose the researchers interpretation about what really happened on the reader, the data is first deliberately presented in a descriptive and detailed way, rather than a codified and general way. This way, ample scope for readers is provided to make varying interpretations and to draw diverse conclusions (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Peattie, 2001). Readers should be able to find out for themselves what the case is a case of, without being directed by the researcher's analytical interpretations. Thus, we tried to make a demarcation between the description of what has happened and the analysis of the researcher, based on this description. We already know that our analysis is meant to assess and explain the reproductive tendency of the Schiphol policy discourse, but we think that the resulting empirical description of the case allows for many other (theoretical and practical) analyses as well.

Drawing a clear line of demarcation between description and analysis has the advantage that it makes the case potentially interesting for a wide audience. Moreover, it enhances the transparency of the researcher's validity claims, as it becomes easier to understand how the researcher arrived at some interpretations and conclusions in his own analysis. However, the disadvantage is that we avoid the use of our analytical concepts (like power, discourse, practice, event and policy space, as discussed in point 2), which might make it difficult for the reader to actually follow the plotline and for understanding how the description is translated in the analysis (i.e. readers might perceive a gap between the case description and the analysis of the case). Nonetheless, by using several notions from our descriptive framework (e.g. strategies and tactics, policy stories / arguments, actors, coalitions, institutionalization of outcomes) in the case description, and by building our

analysis around our three step procedure (see chapter 3) we believe that the reader has sufficient anchor points for both following the plotline and closing the gap between description and our analysis. Nonetheless, the fragmented nature and the technical complexity of the Schiphol debate makes it a rather demanding task to actually read through the whole case.

Here it is important to note that we believe that presentation in terms of a novel holds more potential for bringing the message across than a rather ‘dry’ and chronological representation of 20 years of policy debate. However, as part of not imposing our interpretation on readers we have attempted to avoid the use of tropes that contain our value-judgments, thus avoiding to impose meanings on statements that could not be derived from the database (e.g. including fiction), and avoiding to include additional storylines that could make the story more spectacular and tense, e.g. by building characters, using flashbacks and flashforwards and including dialogues (apart from the fact that most scientists lack the ability to actually develop such a story). When compared to a novel, the case description is therefore rather monotonous (maybe even boring). This is partly the result of the scientific conventions that we have had to live up to. However, at the same time, it is also a strength of the case description. Although we leave ample scope for differing interpretations, we believe that readers can go through a similar experience when reading the case. At some point in time the reader will start to recognize specific regularities, both in terms of talking and acting; he will also come to see the perverse effects of these regular ways of talking and acting, but he will simultaneously come to an understanding of why these ways continue to exist. In the end, the reader will understand how the policy deadlock that existed anno 2005 (see chapter 1) has come into being, and how it has worked to influence the debate during the subsequent years until our present day, including the rationalities and irrationalities involved. It is such an experience that we are intending to offer, and the monotonous and rather ‘dry’ chronological description of events seems fully adequate for this purpose.

It is by drawing on these principles that we have attempted to develop a narrative that assumes the form of an effective history. Most importantly, if a genealogical problematization of existing ways of talking and acting is to make an impact, the genealogy must be plausible and understandable for the specific reference group to which the researcher refers. In our case, this means that the case needs to be presented in a way that is both valuable from the perspective of practitioners and scientists.

Finally, it is worth noting that we did not immediately develop the final case narrative. It was during the actual writing of the case that the plot slowly emerged. During the process of writing we constantly applied and reshuffled the material in order to find a

structure that worked best for our purposes. We also encountered additional data needs, which influenced our further data gathering. The writing process can be seen as an integral part of the research methodology, as it was during the writing process that we were making sense of the data, working towards a realistic and effective plot. As Richardson has indicated, writing is not merely a mode of telling about the social world, nor is it a mopping-up activity at the end of the research project. 'Writing is also a way of "knowing"- a method of discovery and analysis' (Richardson, 2003, p. 499). Writing is an excellent way to induce reflexive thought and make sense of what is going on.²²³ Moreover, there is always a creative leap involved. By this we mean that, no matter what strategy is employed to translate a database into a narrative, there will always be uncodifiable steps involved that rely on the insight and imagination of the researcher (cf. Weick, 1989). Indeed, creativity, intuition and imagination are very important elements of how people make sense of the complex world around them (cf. Sloan, 2006; Weick, 1995).

In the end, it is the combination of the validation strategies and the narrative strategy that makes it possible to create the kind of effective history that the genealogical approach attempts to deliver. Real and effective does not mean that the resulting history doesn't contain any biases, as these are unavoidable.

4.6.3 Dealing with Biases

The genealogical database is biased as the focus is on the various moments of resistance, and on the marginalization of the ideas that come to the fore during those moments of resistance. Thus, the genealogy is automatically biased towards the socially and economically disadvantaged in our society. However, this is not done because the marginalized ways of thinking and acting are believed to be more true and rational. This is merely necessary for uncovering the knowledge clashes involved and the mechanisms at work in the construction of dominant interpretations and ways of acting. This is related to the fact that a genealogy attempts to deliver a committed history, i.e. one that uncovers the rationalities at work in a specific social domain and that is meant to create the possibility for breaking through the existing discursive order that has become self evident.

Next to this bias that is related to the aim of genealogy, the resulting database is also biased in certain ways (as is also the case when other methods of social science are used). We shall shortly discuss the specific biases that have influenced our history. We have distinguished between five such biases.

²²³ Indeed, as we have argued in the chapter 2, it was exactly by writing his books that Foucault did not only attempt to influence the experiences and conduct of others, but also of himself.

1. **Data asymmetry:** It was easier to obtain data about the more recent events than about events that occurred 20 years ago. The closer we came to 2009, the richer and finer grained the database became. Nuances and details were more easily accessed, as far more people could be interviewed about similar events, and as far more written material was available for more recent periods. This, in turn, often resulted in the localization of new events and/or interpretations of particular events. It is clear that this data asymmetry biases the interpretation, as the level of detail of the period 2000 – 2009 allows for more nuanced perspectives. This does not necessarily mean that the data about the period 1989 – 1999 is less valid. But it does mean that there were fewer opportunities for searching disconfirming evidence about specific interpretations of events and that there were less opportunities for localizing events in general. Finally, as we already noted, it was easier to obtain information from the actors that were on the losing side. This is not strange, as these actors had little else to lose, and those actors perceived this study as an excellent opportunity to make their marginalized stories heard.
2. **Context Bias:** Respondents have a tendency to frame their answers in ways that make them look good (Stone, 2002). The stories that people tell are therefore always biased by their self-interest. This is not something bad, as it is unavoidable. But it makes it all the more important to bring the different stories about similar events to light. Moreover, it also means that especially the winners have a tendency to make sure that they answer in ways that are politically correct, as incorrect contributions can greatly endanger their future careers (Bovens et al., 2001; p.297). This might sound exaggerated, but especially in politically charged debates like Schiphol people are actually afraid to express their real concerns. As pointed out in the former bullet, actors on the losing side have more incentives to act in politically incorrect ways, as they might benefit from challenging the status quo.
3. **Hindsight bias:** As we asked respondents to reflect upon events that often happened several years ago, their present-day understanding of the events influenced their stories. People make sense in retrospective. Reconstructions are based on ones current perspective about the desirability of an outcome, and they are by definition more plausible than accurate. If respondents perceive outcomes to be bad (drawing on their current knowledge), than antecedents are reconstructed to emphasize incorrect actions, flawed analyses, and inaccurate perceptions, even if such flaws were not influential or all that obvious at the time (Weick, 1995). Thus, past events are reconstructed knowing the outcomes, which influence the meanings people add to these events. It also means that the things never happened exactly the way as they are remembered to have happened.
4. **Researcher bias / subjectivity:** The researcher doing the genealogy is both involved in, and partially produced by, the interplay between the micro-practices and the discursive order that is studied. As this is how power works, Foucault repeatedly argued that there was no way of being outside of power. This obviously influences

the interpretations and knowledge claims of a researcher. In order to understand how our interpretations were influenced by our evolving understanding of the case and our increasing embeddedness in the case (as we became part of the problem that was studied), we made use of a reflexive logbook (see Abma, 1996). In the reflection presented in chapter 12 we shall explicate how our research process and results have been influenced by the mechanism of power at work in the Schiphol policy domain.²²⁴ For now it is important to note that we have attempted to minimize this bias by allowing the case history to unfold from the many-sided, complex and sometimes conflicting stories that the actors in the case have told us and by constantly looking for disconfirming evidence. This has helped us to avoid to deliberately or unconsciously emphasizing the perception of one actor over another, something that can happen easily when a researcher is 'going native' (Fontana & Frey, 2003) or is being captured (Denzin, 1989; Kvale, 1996).

5. **Generalization Bias:** This bias implies that the details of empirical investigations are sacrificed for the sake of uncovering consistent generic patterns. As a general rule of thumb one can assert that accurate descriptions tend to conflict with both the kind of simplicity and generality that is needed for building theory (Langley, 1999; Weick, 1995). Genealogies are always about the particulars of a certain case. As such, the genealogical approach does not allow much room for the generalization bias. Nonetheless, we have sought for recurrent patterns in order to be able to describe and assess the reproductive tendency of the discursive order. This certainly has influenced the way wherein the case has been structured and the data has been interpreted and presented. This is unavoidable, as there is always need for some sort of plot when developing a case narrative. Nonetheless, the emergent research design and the retroduction strategy made sure that we could let the plot emerge from the data, instead of the other way around.

4.7 From Case Description to Analysis

The final methodological step deals with the question how we derived our analysis from the case description (apart from the fact that the description was of course already based on an analysis of the database). In essence, it means to adequately deal with the final step of our three step procedure presented in chapter 3. Step 1 (localizing events) and step 2 (uncovering strategies and tactics involved in their emergence, institutionalization and marginalization and the factors influencing these strategies and tactics) form the fundament of the case description. Step 3 (uncovering the interplay between micro-practices and the discursive order) forms the backbone of the analysis, as this explains how power works in the reproduction of a specific policy discourse. This third step consists of three parts (see 3.5):

²²⁴ It can therefore be read as a researchers practice story, see Flyvbjerg, 2005; Forrester, 1999 for more on this.

- Illuminating the discursive order in place and the level of change and continuity. How to uncover the meta narrative and discourse coalition? It involves basically nothing else than bringing the sum of the institutionalized policy spaces together on a higher level. Together, they make up for the totality of accepted ways of thinking, talking and acting within a policy domain, from which the researcher should derive the overarching meta narrative and discourse coalition. Again, the meta narrative and discourse coalition can not be directly read from the empirical data. It involves an interpretation of the researcher;
- Illuminating the micro-practices at work (which can be derived from the previous analysis of strategies and tactics, i.e. were regularities in strategies and tactics and their relatedness to specific conventions or obligations signified the existence of a particular practice);
- Clarifying the interplay between the discursive order and the micro practices. This allows us to understand how power works in the social domain under study.

Although the analysis is derived in a rather transparent and systematic way from the case description (as shall be explicated in chapter 9), we need to understand that the translation from narrative to analysis always involves a creative leap (as was the case in the step from database to case description). Thus, no matter what procedure is employed to translate a descriptive narrative into an analysis, there will always be uncodifiable steps involved that rely on the insight and imagination of the researcher (cf. Weick, 1989). Indeed, as argued before, creativity, intuition and imagination are very important elements of how people make sense of the complex world around them (cf. Sloan, 2006; Weick, 1995). More in general, it can be asserted that analysis and theory building always involve three processes, i.e. induction, deduction and imagination (Langley, 1999; Weick, 1995).

4.8 Conclusion: The Promise of Genealogy

In the past three chapters we have set out the promise of the genealogical approach for describing, assessing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy discourses, which might eventually assume the form of policy deadlocks. In chapter 2 we discussed Foucault's work on genealogy, which resulted in both a conceptual understanding and an analytical grid with three different steps and several methodological guidelines for studying firmly institutionalized discursive orders in any social domain. In chapter 3 we applied these insights to the study of the policy process, resulting in a three step procedure that allows us to describe, assess and explain the emergence and persistence of policy discourses. The three step procedure should be regarded as a systematized approach for developing genealogies of policy domains, which is very valuable when considering that the method of how to conduct a discourse analysis inspired by Foucault has received limited systematic attention thus far (as noted in chapter 1; see Howarth, 2005; p.316; Hewitt, 2009). In this chapter (4) we presented

the methodologies we used for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the required data. Here it is important to emphasize once more that different methodologies might be required, depending on the specific problem that is being studied. Thus, the methodologies that we used for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the data are not necessarily the only ones suitable when enacting the 3-step procedure. As long as the researcher makes sure that he can illuminate the interplay between the discursive order and micro-practices involved and as long as he attempts to let the story unfold from the many-sided, complex and sometimes conflicting interpretations that the specific case contains, in order to avoid simplified and one-sided readings of the past. However, it does mean that the researcher should always focus on details, include a polyphony of voices, account for structure and agency at the same time, distinguishes between plausible and less plausible interpretations (e.g. by employing different means of triangulation), and keeps looking for disconfirming evidence.

Together chapters 2 – 4 provide an answer to our first research question, i.e. ‘How can the genealogical approach be used for describing and analysing the reproductive tendency of policy discourses?’ In chapters 5 - 8 the result of the application of steps 1 and 2 of our three step procedure are translated into an extensive case description. Chapters 5 – 8 therefore form the empirical heart of the thesis. Step 3, the analysis, is presented in chapter 9. Together, the empirical part and the analysis are meant to trigger reflection on behalf of our reference group, thus becoming an effective history.

Part II

A Genealogy of Schiphol's Public Policy Discourse 1989 - 2009

In this part of the thesis we present a realistic and effective history of 20 years of public policy making for Schiphol. This empirical part serves as the backbone of this thesis and consists of four chapters (5-8). In chapter 5 we introduce the Schiphol case. Here we provide the reader with the necessary background information for an adequate understanding of the case, exactly by setting out some of the main characteristics of the context wherein the policy debate had to unravel and by defining the initial starting conditions. In chapters 6 – 8 we describe 20 years of public policy making, where each chapter is dedicated to the description of a particular time period that ends with an important political decision (except for the last period); (1) 1989 – 1995; (2) 1995 – 2003; (3) 2003 – 2009. The result is an extensive case description, which allows us to assess and explain the emergence and persistence of the Schiphol public policy deadlock in part 3 of the thesis (chapters 9 – 11).

Chapter 5 Introduction to the Schiphol Case

5.1 Introduction

As indicated in chapter 1, the empirical part can be read apart from the rest of the thesis. It is meant to deliver an effective history of 20 years of Schiphol debate that allows the reader to understand how the policy deadlock that existed anno 2005 has come into being, and how this deadlock has worked to influence the policy making during the subsequent years (2006 – 2009). The case history works to open up possibilities to break through the impasse, exactly by describing the genesis of the discursive order and showing that this particular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity. However, in order to be able to understand the case history properly it is important to provide the reader with some crucial background information. The background information sets the initial starting conditions for the case description. Moreover, it provides the reader with the proper context for interpreting the case narrative. This chapter will provide this necessary background information. It also allows us to assess whether or not we are dealing with a typically Dutch case. As we shall argue in chapter 11, this is important for describing the generic value of the Schiphol case.

In setting out the initial starting conditions we subsequently discuss the Dutch policy making context (5.2), the history of Schiphol (5.3) and the emergence of the mainport concept that formed the cornerstone of the public policy debate from 1988 onwards (5.4). We end this chapter by providing a reading manual for the case (5.5). It should be noted that it was also possible to integrate the contextual information that is presented in this chapter into the case narrative (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Jorgenson, 2001). However, as the case narrative is already very long and complex we have chosen to present the necessary background information in a more systematized way in this separate chapter.

5.2 Dutch Policy Making Context

In this paragraph we present some background information about public policy making for large infrastructure works in the Netherlands. We do this by subsequently describing the Dutch culture of public policy making (5.2.1) and the way public policy making for large infrastructure projects is organized, with specific attention for the role of the national government (5.2.2). Based on these understandings we can discuss the initial starting conditions for the Schiphol case as regards the policy making context (5.2.3).

5.2.1 The Dutch Style of Public Policy Making

The case study is embedded within a typically Dutch context. It displays a particular Dutch take on public policy making, which is rooted in the Dutch culture of consensualism, characterized by corporatism and pragmatism. This Dutch culture of pragmatic consensus building processes can be related to the specific situation of the

Netherlands. Its low lands and high water levels and dense population called for collaboration between people in order to provide enough suitable land for building (Faludi, 1991; Woltjer, 2000). From the 13th century until the middle of the 20th century the Dutch have worked to alter the country's geography by draining marshlands and reclaiming land from the sea. More than a quarter of the country now lies below sea level, protected by a complex of dikes and drainage canals.²²⁵ It gave rise to a relatively comprehensive planning system in the Netherlands and according to Faludi and Van der Valk foreign observers widely agree upon the idea that the Netherlands has excelled in strategic planning over the past century (here understood as developing comprehensive long-range plans) (1994, p.xiii).

The Dutch consensualism is also characterized by high degree of corporatism, wherein a few powerful interest groups (i.e. labour unions, large multinationals) are included in the national policy making processes (Healey, 1997; Van Waarden, 1999). This dates back to the era of trading cities in the Dutch Republic (1581-1795). It was the first in Europe to have a bourgeois society organized into many formal organizations as guilds, chambers of commerce, and shipping trade companies (Van Wijk, 2007). According to Dijkink (1990), the fact that the Netherlands was relatively small in size, compared to the large outside world, strengthened the consensus orientation. Moreover, the lively trade business that derived from the entrepreneurial spirit of the Golden Age (17th century) gave rise to a tradition of making trade offs and negotiating. According to some authors this attitude transferred later into the political and managerial state apparatus, resulting in a so-called pacification politics, avoiding conflicts and seeking consensus (cf. Hendriks & Toonen, 1998; Klijn & Koppenjan, 1998; Tops et al., 1999; Weggeman, 2003). Moreover, it has resulted in an elite network of high placed managers that is still assumed to exert great influence on political decisions up until now.²²⁶

Finally, the Dutch consensualism is also highly pragmatic in nature, resulting in commonly used dispensations, policy experiments, policy evaluations and tolerance of illegal drugs and prostitution (Van Wijk, 2007). There are rules and laws, but there is always room to interpret them in a flexible way (Van Waarden, 1999). Another argument for this pragmatist nature has been offered by the historian Lok, who asserted that Dutch public managers and politicians lack real ideologies. He showed that several high placed politicians and public managers that worked to sustain the French Napoleonic government (around 1800) and the Nazis during the Second World War

²²⁵ It also led to the popular saying that God created the world, but the Dutch created the Netherlands.

²²⁶ See diverse publications on <http://www.elite-research.nl>; see for examples also Asscher, 2010; Mertens, 1967; Siddique, 1997

remained in place after the fall of these regimes, to serve totally different regimes (Lok, 2009).²²⁷

This specific Dutch take on policy making and planning has become well known over the world as the poldermodel, especially in the 1990s when it was assumed to be the key of the success of the Dutch miracle (i.e. economic boom period) (Visser & Hemereijck, 1997). Anno 2010 the poldermodel is perceived in a more negative way (the Dutch disaster), underlying the never-ending, syrupy character of much decision making processes, giving rise to a new governmental rhetoric of 'less talk and more action' (cf. Van Gils et al., 2009). It is against the background of this specific consensus oriented culture, with hints of corporatism and pragmatism, that the organization of the national government as regards complex infrastructural policy issues is to be understood.

5.2.2 Public Policy Making for Large Infrastructure Projects in the Netherlands

At least two things are important for understanding public policy making for large infrastructure projects in the Netherlands. First of all, it needs to be understood that infrastructure development has been one of the most important topics on the Dutch political agenda during the past decades and it has therefore been provided with ample resources. Second, large infrastructure planning is a highly fragmented activity, as it includes a wide variety of mutually dependent actors that engage in complex relationships. This is due to the fact that public policy making for large infrastructure projects in the Netherlands is not merely about infrastructure, and especially not when Schiphol is concerned. Large infrastructure planning is an extensive process wherein elements of different policy sectors are joined together, e.g. infrastructure, spatial planning, noise, third party risk and other environmental issues. Thus, when we talk about large infrastructure planning in the Netherlands (like Schiphol) we talk about extensive and integral processes.

1. The attention for Infrastructure Planning in the Netherlands

Ever since the VOC successfully sailed the world and came to dominate large parts of the worldwide trade in spices, giving rise to enormous prosperity of the Netherlands in the 17th century and therefore referred to as our Golden Age, trade and transportation have been core business of the Netherlands. Indeed, today's politicians love to call the Dutch Golden Age (17th century) into memory, setting the entrepreneurial spirit of the VOC as an example for the Dutch talent for trade and transportation.²²⁸ Moreover, the geographic situation of the Netherlands, with its deep waterways it could serve as a

²²⁷ Lok, 2009.

²²⁸ In fact, this is the type of simplified use of history often used to get a point across, but not meant to tell what really happened (MacMillan, 2009).

gateway to the rest of Europe, led to a strong emphasis on infrastructure development (cf. De Roo, 1996).

From the 19th century onwards, it became more and more recognized that infrastructure development could be a government investment. Strong entrepreneurs like King Willem I paved the way for this. In the beginning of the Kingdom in 1815, King Willem I had wide legislative powers to develop infrastructural works and he ordered to construct canals for waterworks, railways, national roads and reclaimed polder land in the name of national unity (Van Wijk, 2007; Van der Woud, 1998). The construction of the railroad network was made possible by setting up banks loans, and new investment companies in the 1860s and 1870s (De Klerk, 2006). After the economic spin-offs from investment in infrastructural and urban projects were proven, the conservative city governments that were then in charge of municipal investments started to follow this trend. The construction of Schiphol airport by the City of Amsterdam is one such example (Van Wijk, 2007).

Attention for large scale governmental investment increased ever since World War II, when the national government initiated a large-scale reconstruction program, including housing projects and infrastructure development. During those years, several ministries were involved in infrastructure development, resulting in a fragmented approach to infrastructure development.

2. The fragmented nature of infrastructure planning in the Netherlands

As indicated in the introduction of this paragraph, large infrastructure planning extends over a wide diversity of policy sectors and includes a wide variety of mutually dependent actors that engage in complex relationships. This situation is not unique for the Netherlands, as the same holds true for public policy making about large infrastructure projects in many other countries (something that we shall reflect upon in chapter 11). However, in the case of the Netherlands these relationships have assumed a particular form, with some specific characteristics. Here we discuss three of these specific relationships, as it helps the reader to understand the initial starting conditions of the Schiphol case and as it provides the reader with the proper context for interpreting the case.

- A. The relationship between different policy makers involved
- B. The relationship between the policy makers and the politicians
- C. The relationship between policy makers and other actors

A. The relationship between different policy makers involved

Relationships between different policy makers involved can be found on two levels: (1) on the level of the national government different departments are involved; (2) between different governmental tiers.

To start with the first, the Dutch national government itself has the characteristics of a network, as in most other countries (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008). The national government consists of departments (the national ministries), which may have conflicting interests, both within and between themselves. The reason is that the national government is, in part, the institutionalization of the many societal interests that exist. Departments, and even units within departments, have their own interests. This means that governments have to trade off one interest against another. When dealing with spatial and infrastructure policy issues, like Schiphol development, the need for trade offs between and within ministries becomes very clear (cf. Priemus, 1999). The construction of large infrastructural works is especially a spatial planning issue. That is, the infrastructure is to be embedded within the physical space of a country, making it necessary to attune the many different claims for infrastructure, housing, industry, nature, recreation, agriculture to one another. This has caused considerable tensions between ministries that pose spatial claims, like the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (*In Dutch: Verkeer & Waterstaat, referred to as Ministry of V&W from this point forward*), the Ministry of Spatial planning, Housing & Environment (*In Dutch: Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, referred to as Ministry of VROM from this point forward*), the Ministry of Economic Affairs (*In Dutch: Economische zaken, referred to as Ministry of EZ from this point forward*) and the Ministry of Agriculture (*In Dutch: Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit -voorheen Visserij-, referred to as Ministry of LNV from this point forward*).

In the case of large infrastructure and spatial planning projects, traditionally the most tensions exist between the Ministries of V&W and VROM,²²⁹ which can be related to their specific dependency relations and related ways of working (cf. Körper, 2010). The specific roles of each ministry differ with each spatial-infrastructure project, but most of the time the Ministry of V&W is in charge. This Ministry has far more resources at its disposal than the Ministry of VROM, and is therefore responsible for financing the projects. Most of the time interdepartmental project teams are established, wherein the policy makers of both Ministries cooperate to develop the policies that are acceptable from both perspectives. Due to the uneven allocation of resources, these interdepartmental teams are often dominated by the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W (for example, they can mobilize much more people than VROM). Moreover, both Ministries have developed their specific ways of working over the years. This implies

²²⁹ Actually, large parts of both Ministries have merged at the end of 2010, when the new Cabinet Rutte had been installed. The new department is called the Ministry of I&M (Infrastructuur & Milieu, Infrastructure & Environment) and contains also large parts of the former Ministry of VROM, which ceased to exist and which activities were spread over several other departments. Because the Ministries of V&W and VROM operated as separate departments during the time-period that we discuss in this thesis (1988 – 2009), we keep talking about the two separate Ministries.

that VROM and V&W have their own style of managing processes. In essence, the Ministry of VROM has always had a far greater need to act in a coordinative way than the Ministry of V&W. This is both related to the lack of financial resources of the Ministry and the specific way wherein the Dutch spatial planning system has been organized. This planning system can be traced back to the 19th century (Faludi & Valk, 1994). The system is organized around three governmental layers that Thorbecke introduced in the new constitution for the Netherlands in 1848: A national level, a regional (provincial) level and a local (municipal) level. Until 1965, this planning system worked in a hierarchical way, culminating in the reconstruction period right after the World War II, during which the national government made blueprints that needed to be implemented by the regional and local authorities. With the implementation of the Spatial Planning Act of 1965 the Dutch planning system was provided with a new legal and institutional basis. The new system was more decentralized (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000). Each level of government was given authority to develop its own spatial plan, wherein the plans of the lower tiers were to be aligned with the national strategic plans (and the national planning key decisions). This *matrouchka* system of interrelated plans was not strictly hierarchical.

During the past decades further decentralization of the system has been stimulated by the national government. The organization was based on the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that a decentralized approach was to be used if possible, and a central approach when necessary.²³⁰ Generally speaking, from the 1990s onwards the national policy and operational requirements and guidelines remained the responsibility of the national government, while regional and local governments were given more and more room to implement these national policies in their own way and to develop their own policies.

Since the enactment of the new planning Act the idea has always been that planning should above all be conceived of as a coordinative activity. The instruments for this coordinative activity were consciously always of a non-financial and communicative nature: concepts, plans and vision documents were to be used to capture the imagination of the various relevant actors, in order to mobilize support and acquire necessary funds (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000). The absence of financial resources and legally binding decisions made it necessary to develop a strong coordination, both within the sector departments on the national level (the so called horizontal axis of coordination) as well as at the other levels of government (the vertical axis/ *matrouchka* system) (Hajer & Zonneveld, 2000; Schwartz, 1998). As such, it can be argued that the culture of Dutch consensualism is clearly reflected in the Dutch planning system, which works to re-establish the culture of consensualism.

²³⁰ The principle of subsidiarity for instance was used for the United East Indian Company (VOC) and contributed to the success of this first MNO, and of the Dutch Golden Age (cf. Van Waarden, 2003).

The Ministry of V&W, on the other, hand lacked the incentive to cooperate with others for a long time. Most of the time, the Ministry of V&W had sufficient resources available to enact a project by itself. Its construction unit (Rijkswaterstaat) that directly springs from the first infrastructure development companies that King Willem I had established, is in the departmental corridors better known as a 'state within a state' (cf. Van Wijk, 2007). But times have been changing, and especially during the past 20 years the need to develop public support for infrastructure investments and policies has increased the need to cooperate with other Ministries, governmental authorities and stakeholders. The Ministry was no longer hierarchically superior to the other actors in society. This is reflected in the evolution of how Ministry has, *grosso modo*, been organizing its policy processes. From the 1970s onwards, and especially during the 1990s, the Ministry of V&W started to develop more and more possibilities for public participation and interactive ways of policy making (Woltjer, 2000; 2003). Despite the fact that dependency relations have changed (i.e. not one Ministry can achieve its goals all alone), it is still clear that the Ministry of V&W is less dependent on the Ministry of VROM for realizing its objectives as regards large infrastructure projects than vice versa.

With regard to the second type of relationships between policy makers involved, there are also relations between the policy makers acting on different governmental levels. The current three-tier system consists of one national government (i.e. the ministries and parliament), twelve provincial governments, and 441 municipalities²³¹ in 2009.²³² On the provincial and municipal level too, elections are held and majority coalition governments are created based on proportional representation. On the national level the political course for the country is set out, and policy matters of national interest (like large spatial-economic and infrastructure developments) are determined. Especially when considering these matters of national interest, the lower governmental bodies tend to have little influence on decision making (Peters, 1999; p.43; Van Putten, 1980). Provincial and municipal authorities are required to implement measures laid down by national government. However, in most other cases, the lower governmental bodies enjoy a large degree of autonomy. Provinces and municipalities have the instruments to make their own regulations on matters that affect them directly, as long as these regulations don't conflict with existing national legislation or, in the case of municipal regulations, with regulations issued by the province to which the municipality belongs. In essence, most of the time the lower tiers of government have rather large autonomy,

²³¹ <http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/methoden/classificaties/overzicht/gemeentelijke-indeling/2009/default.htm>, derived from the web on May 8th 2009.

²³² More specifically, there are also water boards, which are public authorities responsible for protection the land against water. Their work includes the construction and maintenance of dams, dykes and locks, the control of water flows and levels, and the maintenance of water quality.

although higher-tier bodies have instruments to prevent lower-tier bodies from intervening in their policies, resulting in a decentralized unitary state (Mastop 2001). This organization of government made it necessary to develop coordination mechanisms on the different levels (i.e. between different departments) and between the different tiers, clearly reflecting the culture of consensualism. As we have argued, this especially holds true for the field of spatial planning, and to a lesser extent for the field of infrastructure development. At the same time, lower governmental bodies tend to have little influence on matters of national interest, like large infrastructure projects (e.g. the development of Schiphol and the port of Rotterdam).

B. The relationship between the national policy makers and the national politicians

The national government does not only consist of different Ministries. In essence, the Ministries main function is to assist the politicians in developing proper political decisions. The national politicians are the ones who make the final decisions on infrastructure developments that are deemed to be of national interest. In order to understand how this works we need to have some insight in the way the political system of the Netherlands works.

The Dutch culture of consensualism gave rise to, and was further enacted by the new constitution that the politician Thorbecke introduced in the Netherlands in 1848, which turned the Netherlands into a constitutional monarchy with a system of parliamentary democracy. This parliamentary democracy applied to a three-tier governmental system of national, provincial and municipal government, which still exists anno 2011. On all three levels of government elections are held and majority coalition governments are created based on proportional representation. The Dutch have a multi-party system and coalitions have to be formed between Social Democrats, Christian-Democrats, Liberals and Greens in order to create a majority. On the national level, the majority coalition delivers the cabinet that governs the country for a 4-year period. The cabinet's duties include the day-to-day business of government, preparing legislation and putting it into practice, overseeing local government, and maintaining international relations.²³³ The cabinet is chaired by the Prime Minister and consists of ministers and Secretaries of State who are responsible for a specific policy domain (or sector).²³⁴ The Ministers and Secretary of State are backed up by large bureaucratic apparatus, the ministries (or departments), where the actual policy strategies and public policy measures are developed. Of course, the different ministers have different political goals and agendas.

²³³ Factsheet Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the Dutch State, 2006: <http://www.minbuza.nl/en/home>.

²³⁴ The amount of ministers and Secretaries of State varies per cabinet, but ever since the postwar period (1950s) by and large the following themes have been covered: General Affairs, Finance, the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Government Reform and Kingdom, Relations, Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation, Justice, Immigration and Integration, Education, Culture and Science, Defence, Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment, Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Economic Affairs, Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, Social Affairs and Employment, Health, Welfare and Sport

And since the policy makers working at the ministries are most of all expected to be loyal to their Minister, these conflicting goals may work to cause tensions between entire ministries. Indeed, we already discussed that this is certainly the case for large infrastructural issues.

After development of the policy strategies and public policy measures the cabinet decides which strategies and measures have to be laid down in law. The Acts the cabinet proposes have to be ratified by a majority of the Members of the Upper (75) and Lower House (150), who make up for the Parliament that works to control the cabinet.²³⁵ The role of the parliament should not be underestimated. In essence, the cabinet cannot govern without the support of the parliament. Ministers must have the confidence of parliament if they are to govern. The two houses of parliament have several rights enabling them to control the cabinet, of which the right of interpellation (i.e. the right of a member of parliament to draw a minister's attention to a subject not on the day's agenda and ask him questions) and the right to adopt motions to express opinions about a specific issue are amongst the most important ones. Such a motion must be backed by at least five members to come to a vote, and even when it is adopted, the government is not obliged to implement it. In the most extreme situation, a motion of distrust can be posed, and if accepted, it forces the cabinet to resign. Motions are often used to amend or reject specific Acts and decisions proposed by the cabinet.²³⁶

Thus, policy making on the national level in the Netherlands both involves civil servants that are related to specific departments and politicians, spread over the cabinet, the Upper House and the Lower House. There are several studies on national policy making available that point out different types of relationships between politicians and between politicians and their national civil servants (see Peters, 1999 for an overview). Some have argued that the Dutch parliament (consisting of the Upper and Lower House) has little influence on the cabinet where significant decisions are concerned. Especially in the policy domains of infrastructure and spatial development, where very specific expertise is needed for being able to engage in a meaningful discussion (Duivesteijn, 2004; Goverde, 1987; Huberts, 1988; Van den Berg et al., 1984; Visscher, 1994). The implication is that Ministers of V&W and VROM can greatly influence political decision making. Especially since 1990 the many difficulties that have arisen around political decision making about large infrastructure projects in the Netherlands, has increased political attention for such projects. The constant cost overruns involved in large infrastructure planning gave members of parliament the idea that they needed to get more grip on these projects. That is, they needed to be able to control whether or not

²³⁵ Of course, the amount of seats (members) each party holds is dependent on the elections; 0.66% of the national votes is needed for one seat in the Lower House.

²³⁶ Factsheet Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the Dutch State, 2006: <http://www.minbuza.nl/en/home>.

the decisions proposed by the responsible Ministers and their civil servants were actually plausible. Amongst other things, this has led to specific ways of organizing the policy process and the improved provision of information to the Upper and Lower House (WRR, 1994; Duivesteijn, 2004). Nonetheless, there are also several examples that show that the Lower House can exert influence on decisions (Peters, 1999).

The relationship between Ministers and their civil servants is worth mentioning here. It can be argued that a strong Minister brings his / her civil servants in an influential position. Some have asserted that there is something like a fourth power at work on the national level, indicating that it is not the politicians but the civil servants that make the real decisions (i.e. the influence of civil servants is high when compared to the legislative, executive and judicial bodies) (Bovens, 2000; Noordergraaf, 2000; Peters, 1999; Van den Berg, 1984). Others have argued that this influence of civil servants is sometimes neutralized by the ongoing struggles between different departments, especially in the case of the Ministries of V&W and VROM (e.g. Rosenthal, 1988). In the end, a wide range of relationships and roles of actors on the national policy level is possible. How these relations actually shape up and play out is an empirical question.

C. The relationship with other actors

Although these theoretical positions of actors involved in national public policy making have not changed much, in practice it has become more and more accepted that policy making about complex issues occurs in policy networks. That is, the influence of citizens, grassroots organizations, environmental interest groups, knowledge institutes, (large) corporations, and lower governmental authorities has changed considerably. We have already extensively discussed the drivers for the need of such policy networks, i.e. as no one actor has the resources to develop policy decisions on its own anymore. Several more recent network studies illustrate how policy decisions of national interest are developed in such policy networks (e.g. Koppenjan, 1987; Van Buuren, 2005; Van Buuren et al., 2004; Van Gils & Klijn, 2005; Gerrits, 2008; Daamen, 2010; Teisman, 1992; Termeer, 1993; Van Duinen, 2004; Pestman, 2000). Indeed, in the case of Schiphol, the importance of such policy networks has been described by different authors (Boelens, 2009; Driessen, 1995; Glasbergen, 1999; Huys & Koppenjan, 2010; Tan, 2001; Teisman et al., 2008; Weggeman, 2003). As extensively discussed in chapter 3, the inclusion of such a wide variety of actors makes it difficult to arrive at policy decisions that are perceived to be meaningful and legitimate. In essence, the mobilization of successful policy networks has become one key element of developing successful national policy decisions.

5.2.3 Initial Starting Conditions of the Case

This paragraph has provided the necessary background information that allows us to define some of the most important initial starting conditions for the case. Understanding

these starting conditions is important, as it provides the reader with the proper context for making sense of the case description. To finish this paragraph we give a short summary of the six most important initial starting conditions related to the Dutch public policy making context:

1. When compared to the public policy making culture of other countries it can be argued that the Dutch democratic culture of consensualism, with hints of pragmatism and corporatism, stands out (cf. Healey, 1997; Lijphart, 1968).
2. Large infrastructure projects are matters of national interest in the Netherlands. This implies that the national government has a decisive role.
3. The national government consists of politicians (the cabinet, the Upper House and the Lower House) and several departments (ministries) with civil servants. In theory, the Upper House and the Lower House make the final political decisions. However, in practice the cabinet can exert great influence on political decisions, especially in the field of infrastructure planning and spatial planning as one needs specific expertise to engage in meaningful discussion.
4. There is a difficult relationship involved between civil servants on the national level and their responsible Ministers. In theory, the politicians set the political agenda and make the final decisions, whereas the civil servants prepare the agenda, carry out the agenda and prepare the political decisions.
5. When dealing with large infrastructure projects the most important Ministries involved are the Ministry of V&W and the Ministry of VROM, where the Ministry of VROM is more dependent on V&W for the realization of its goals than vice versa. Other Ministries involved are the Ministry of EZ and the Ministry of LNV. These ministries often tend to pursue different goals and they cooperate in interdepartmental project teams. Here it should be mentioned that this situation has changed recently, with the introduction of the Rutte 1 Cabinet in October 2010. Large parts of the departments of the Ministries of V&W and VROM have been merged into one new Ministry, i.e. the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment (Infrastructuur en Milieu). However, as this falls outside the time horizon of this thesis (1989 – 2009), we don't take it into account.
6. There is an increasing need for the leading Ministries to cooperate with other governmental tiers (regional / province, local / municipalities) and other actors (citizens, grassroots organizations, environmental interest groups, corporations, knowledge institutes). Thus, policy decisions of national interest are made in policy networks that often consist of a wide diversity of such actors. This is already reflected in the complex system of Dutch Spatial Planning, where the spatial plans that are developed on the different governmental levels (local, regional and national) have to be aligned.

It is within this specific context of Dutch consensualism, with hints of pragmatism and corporatism, and the context of the complex and fragmented Dutch infrastructure planning system that the Schiphol policy debate is carried out. In the next paragraph we shortly discuss the history of Schiphol, which further enhances the readers' understanding of the specific policy context involved.

5.3 History of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol


The case study is about the public policy debate about the development Schiphol. As discussed in chapter 1, the Schiphol issue has been on the public policy agenda for a considerable time now. Schiphol Airport (AMS) is located 18 km from the Dutch capital Amsterdam and was Europe's fifth largest airport in 2010 welcoming 45.2 million passengers and 1.5 million tons of freight (Schiphol Group, 2011). Schiphol is not located in the municipality of Amsterdam, but covers 2878 hectare of lower polder land in the municipality Haarlemmermeer. Schiphol is relatively large in proportion to the catchment area of 6.8 million inhabitants in the Randstad or 16 million in the Netherlands. The Randstad, literally meaning edge city, is a ring of medium-sized towns and cities in the western part of the Netherlands, and is the most densely populated area of the Netherlands.

The Randstad city-region has a poly-nuclear urban morphology, which dates back to the time that the Randstad area was affected by regular floods (related to its location below sea level), and was reclaimed (by developing the waterworks in the polder). It has resulted in an inner core that is excluded from large scale urbanization, referred to as the Green Heart area, which has become one of the most powerful planning metaphors of the Netherlands, whereas the large cities are located on the edges of this core (Van Eeten, 1999). Since the 1950s the Randstad has rapidly urbanized, resulting in growing pressure on the scarce space. Especially after the economic crisis of the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, the Randstad and the corridors towards Germany and Belgium enjoyed an economic booming period in the 1990s, resulting in rapidly increasing urbanization and infrastructure development (see figure 5.1).

Schiphol is located in the Northern Wing of the Randstad area, in the middle of one of the most densely populated areas of the Netherlands. The name of Schiphol refers to ships that have run aground in the former Haarlemmermeer lakes that were reclaimed in 1852. Historians Bouwens and Dierikx have described the historical development of Schiphol, starting in 1916 when Schiphol was founded as a military airport (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996; Van Wijk, 2007). Despite the fact that the Netherlands were neutral during the World War I, it was agreed upon that it was 'better to be safe than sorry' (De Jong, 2006). After the war ended in 1918 Schiphol became an airport for civil aviation. Due to the founding of KLM (*Koninklijke Nederlandse Luchtvaartmaatschappij* = Royal Dutch Airlines in 1919) civil aviation grew more rapidly. After Amsterdam

bought the airport in 1926 of the national government, the city expanded the airfield into an airport with paved runways (before that it was merely a bumpy meadow). As a result of the Olympic Games of 1928, which were held in Amsterdam, the municipality developed Schiphol into one of the best equipped airports in Europe. During World War II Schiphol was bombed several times by both the Nazis and Allied Forces, which made it necessary to develop a new airport after the war.

Figure 5.1 Spatial Development in the Randstad (Schiphol = grey area in the middle) 1950 - 2010



Source: Committee Spatial Development Schiphol, Report Mainport 2.0, 2008

In the Netherlands, the post-war reconstruction period was primarily a matter of the national government. The reconstruction period resulted in large-scale urbanization and infrastructure development and was explicitly linked to fostering economic growth. Amongst other things, the result was that the national government took the reconstruction of Schiphol in hand. More specifically, Schiphol became part of the portfolio of the RLD (*Rijksluchtvaartdienst* = Civil Aviation Authority), which was part of the Ministry of V&W. Back then, in the Netherlands aviation was seen as part of the national cultural identity, as something that grows naturally and that is congruent with the course of the Dutch history as nation of international traders and travelers. In addition, it was argued that turning Schiphol into a major airport was necessary if the Netherlands were to play a role of significance in the world trade in the future. Based on this trend argument, which logically connects the past, present and future (Bröer, 2006),

the vision was created that Schiphol should develop into the 'global airport of the Netherlands' (Bröer, 2006; p.82). The result was that the national government wanted to expand the airport. The high costs involved in rebuilding Schiphol made the municipality of Amsterdam decide to sell a majority of its shares to the national government and the public limited company Schiphol was founded in 1958. From then on, the national government held 75.8% of the shares, the municipality of Amsterdam 21.8% and the municipality of Rotterdam 2.4%.

From the 1960s onward, developments in aviation accelerated. Because of rapid economic growth and the increasing prosperity that was both its result and precursor, the airplane as a mode of transport became more accessible for more people. The introduction of the jet engine strengthened this trend even further, because the invention triggered cost reductions by which the airplane seat trade slowly but steadily became a mass product. KLM, which still used Schiphol as its home base, profited greatly and became the third largest carrier in the world, thus delivering a major contribution to the development of Schiphol. Growth of KLM was supported by a national interest in the airport, i.e. the desire to be part of the worldwide network of air routes, which, amongst other things resulted in by effective international lobbying of the national government for bilateral contracts on air routes (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996). Besides, Schiphol and KLM represented the Dutch strength in trade, distribution and the nation's long history in traveling and trading all around the world. In the 1960s, Schiphol and KLM were therefore still perceived to be national symbols of Dutch wealth and trademanship.

From the 1960s onwards air traffic volumes started to grow rapidly, which was related to the introduction of the jet engine (recall figure 1.1). A new phenomenon emerged on the policy agenda, which was hitherto unknown: noise annoyance (Bröer, 2006). Schiphol became more and more perceived to be a noise generator. The noise issue complicated the discussion about the runway configuration of the new Schiphol, and it was not until the 28th of April 1967 that the rebuilding process was finally finished and the new Schiphol was opened by Queen Juliana (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996). Earlier plans about the new runway configuration had not taken the noise issue into account. The Ministry of V&W ordered to do so after all, for which purpose the Advisory Committee on Noise Annoyance by Airplanes was established on 28th September 1961. This committee was chaired by Prof. Kosten, and became known as the Kosten committee. In its final advice of 1967, the committee stated that the noise issue could be tackled by developing a central planning policy containing noise limits for wide areas. According to the committee, the distance between airport and housing locations was to be increased, for which spatial planning measures were deemed best suitable. Three of the main assumptions underlying this approach were that noise was primarily an acoustical problem (although there were also clues that non-acoustical factors played a role), that aviation growth was inevitably, so noise was to be accepted as some sort of

natural phenomenon and that central spatial planning could offer a solution for the problem (see Broër, 2006 for more extensive discussion). Finally, the Kosten committee proposed to develop contours and zones around the airport, based on the amount of noise pollution (decibels) that was deemed acceptable. However, the calculation methods for assessing noise pollution were not yet finished and the contours were drawn in a rather rudimentary way with a pencil on spatial maps, making it impossible to develop policies that could be enforced (Van Deventer, 2008). The Ministry of V&W was reluctant to lay down these zones and contours in law. As we shall see in the case, it would take until the 1990s before this was actually done (Bröer, 2006). The noise issue did play an important role in the development of the new runway configuration, which resulted in a four runway system, with one terminal in the middle (see figure 5.2). The parallel major runways were the north-south located Aalsmeerbaan and the Zwanenburgerbaan. The Buitenveldertbaan and Kaagbaan would come to serve as the crosswind runways.

Figure 5.2 Four runway system Schiphol 1967 (left) and its broader context (right, including the fifth runway that would be opened in 2003)



Source: Schiphol Group, 2006; Startnotitie MER korte termijn p.4,

The moment that the new configuration system was put into operation marked the beginning of a new phase of Schiphol development. According to Hakfoort and Schaafsma (2000) a distinction between airside and landside development was made, which, amongst other things, resulted in more attention for the generation of the share of non-aviation revenues. Traffic volumes increased but at the same time the issue of noise pollution became more urgent. Moreover, the Kosten Report that introduced noise contours based on calculations, made clear that there were limits to Schiphol's future

growth, as there were limits to the level of noise that the committee members deemed acceptable.

The first protest groups emerged, and the aviation sector and the national government admitted that noise pollution was a serious problem. In order to facilitate further growth on the mid-term within the context of noise pollution the airport authority argued that the 5th runway that they had been calling for since 1967 (Annual Report Schiphol, 1967; p.29) was necessary. This proposal caused an endless discussion, which boiled down to the questions whether or not a 5th runway was really necessary, and whether or not a new airport was to be built. The Ministry of V&W initiated a new committee, the Falkenhagen committee, which was to explore possible locations for a new airport, including an airport in the North Sea. Despite the economic recession that was caused by the first (1973) and second (1979) oil crisis, air traffic continued to grow and noise annoyance increased. Doubts about the costs of airport relocation and uncertainties about expected traffic growth led to postponement of a political decision about a revised Schiphol or a new airport until 1979. In 1979 the national government decided that a new national airport was undesirable.²³⁷ This decision was partly given in by the ongoing landside investments in the Schiphol location. The terminal building was further expanded and the Schiphol railway that connected the airport to the Dutch railway network had become operative in 1978. Several other infrastructure investments had already been prepared, connecting Schiphol to the regional infrastructure network and turning the airport an important multimodal node (Hakfoort & Schaafsma, 2000).


Instead of looking for alternative locations, the main question became which runway configuration at the current Haarlemmermeer location was most desirable (in terms of capacity and noise pollution) (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996). An answer was formulated in the Structure Scheme Civil Aviation Areas of November 1979, wherein the national government argued for a tilted Zwanenburgbaan (the so-called 4G alternative), thus rejecting the development of a new 5th runway. It was argued that the high levels of noise pollution above the residential areas of Amsterdam West and Zwanenburg could be reduced by tilting this runway 14 degrees to the east (figure 5.3).

The Ministries of V&W and VROM, the province of North Holland and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer were all in favor of this alternative, but KLM and Schiphol were not. One of the main reasons for this was that the 4G alternative would make the construction of a 5th runway in northwest area of Schiphol impossible. The decision wasn't immediately implemented and during the early 1980s the pressure

²³⁷ The following locations were explored: Dinteloord (Province of Brabant), Leerdam and the Meuse Plain in Rotterdam (South Holland), the shallow sea area at Goeree (Zeeland) and the Markerwaard area which was yet to be reclaimed (North Holland).

increased to develop an alternative policy strategy. This policy strategy would become known as the mainport strategy. We discuss the emergence of this mainport strategy in more detail, as it forms an important element of the discursive order that was in place in 1989, when our case study begins. Thus, the emergence of the mainport strategy forms a crucial initial starting condition for the case study.

Figure 5.3 The 4G alternative for Schiphol's runway configuration



Source: Structuurschema Burgerluchtvaartterreinen deel A, Beleidsvoornemen, 1979; p.176

5.4 The Emergence of the Mainport Strategy in the 1980s

During the 1980s several (partly coincidental) developments intermingled, which led to a reframing of the Schiphol policy debate. Schiphol was no longer merely seen as a noise generator, but also as a job generator, one of the key assets of the Dutch economy which was to be nourished and fostered. It was a time of deep economic recession and this made the emergence of a strong coalition that favored Schiphol expansion possible. The so-called Mainport concept played an essential role in this mobilization process. Actors in at least five different policy arenas embraced the mainport concept, and succeeded in elevating mainport development onto the national policy agenda (cf. Van Duinen, 2004).

First, there was the arena of the (air)port authorities of Rotterdam and Schiphol who both adopted a new corporate strategy wherein hub-development played a central role. From the 1980s onwards Schiphol airport was developing ideas about becoming a hub or gateway to Europe in the future. This new strategic perspective was triggered by the deregulation of the US domestic air transport market in 1978. In the annual report of 1983 the Board of Schiphol observed that, while the Dutch economy was still stagnating, Schiphol had witnessed a rapid growth as a result of the American recovery

(Bouwens & Dierikx, pp. 328-329). Due to the deregulation of the American aviation market airline companies developed a new network strategy in order to remain competitive. In order to increase the occupation rate of the airplanes, airlines started to concentrate the passenger flows by collecting all passengers at one assembly point (hub) after which they were further transported to their final destinations (spokes). Hub airports enabled connections between cities where regular direct connections would not be economically profitable (Burghouwt, 2005; Doganis, 1991).

Due to this American success, the European Commission started to prepare deregulation of the European aviation market from 1983 onwards, resulting in the implementation of a first package of measures in 1987. Liberalized agreements began to replace bilateral agreements, and Great Britain and the Netherlands led the way in this process (1984) supported by their pro-active national governments that did the negotiations (after all, they were in charge of the flight rights). In box 5.1 the changes on the aviation market of the 1980s and its consequences for the corporate strategies of airlines and airports are discussed in more detail.

Box 5.1 Changes in the European Aviation Regime

From World War 2 onward, the trinity of the national government, the national carrier and the national airport characterized the European aviation regime. The regime could be described as one of bilateral regulation (Burghouwt et al., 2002; Burghouwt & Huys, 2003; Burghouwt, 2005). Individual states negotiated the air services between the two countries on a bilateral basis: the bilateral air service agreements (asa's) (Doganis, 1991; Zacher & Sutton, 1996). Governments reached agreement on the number of gateways (airports) accessible to each carrier of each nation, the frequency on routes between the two countries, the designated carriers operating the routes between the two countries, the division of seat capacity between the designated carriers (mostly on a 50-50 basis) and the equitable exchange of traffic rights²³⁸. In most cases, the designated carriers were the two national airlines or 'flag carriers' of each country. For the Netherlands this was the KLM. When the bilateral did not regulate capacity itself, frequently the designated airlines themselves agreed upon an equal sharing of capacity and / or revenue in inter-airline pooling agreements. Tariffs in asa's were generally derived from decisions of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the organization of international airlines, founded in 1945. On the yearly IATA regional conferences, participating airlines set tariffs for air services. Yet, the bilateral system only applied to scheduled traffic. Charter operations were exempted from the system and were relatively free of restrictions (Doganis, 1991).

During the bilateral regime, the European air transport market was heavily centered around the national airlines and their respective national airports. Every European nation had its own national airline (e.g. KLM, British Airways, Air France). World or continent embracing, star-shaped national airline networks (e.g. Amsterdam, London, Paris) were pinned on the national airports of almost every European country. There was little room for competition since virtually no entry was possible for new scheduled airlines. Besides, ticket prices followed the IATA conferences. Moreover, the airlines were more or less a clone of governments. Most flag carriers were (partially) owned by their governments and heavily subsidized. The lack of competition resulted in high ticket prices for scheduled flights. Airlines had little incentives to reduce costs and improve efficiency.

²³⁸ See Button et al. (1998, p. 31) for a detailed description of the different traffic rights of freedoms of the air

During the 1980s within Europe pressure was mounting to break open the bilateral aviation regime. The European Commission tried to force the European Council to implement a deregulated Single European Aviation Market. The Commissions' viewpoint was related to a number of factors:

- The (positive) experiences with deregulation of the US aviation market in 1978. Ticket prices per seat mile were considerable lower than in Europe. US Airlines operated more efficient than their European counterparts.
- New economic theories: economists were convinced that airline deregulation would not lead to market failure because the threat of competition would be sufficient to keep prices down (theory of contestable markets) (Doganis, 1991).
- Non-IATA airlines such as Singapore Airlines undermined the IATA price cartel by offering lower prices (Doganis, 1991; Nayar, 1995).
- A lobby of airlines and consumers in favour of deregulation.
- In Europe, the unification process played an important role in changing the aviation regime. The Treaty of Rome (1957) stated that a free movement of commerce should be made possible throughout the European Community²³⁹. Article 84(2) of the same Treaty however, made an exception for the air and shipping industry because of the 'special character' of these industries. 'The Council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport'.²⁴⁰ Eventually, the European Court decided during the 'Nouvelles Frontières'-case in 1986 that the price regulation in the air transport industry was against the Treaty of Rome and therefore illegal (Dagtolou, 1994; Williams, 1994).

In 1987, the European Council adopted a first 'package' of deregulation measures. The package was a first step in the creation of a Single European Aviation Market without any significant regulatory restrictions on competition between European airlines. By implementing a second and third package in 1990 and 1993 respectively, the EU aviation market was further deregulated. The process was completed in 1997. Every package reduced the regulatory restrictions and widened the possibilities for airlines to set air fares, choose frequency and capacity and to entry and exit routes (Button et al., 1998). All member states of the European Union were part of the Single Aviation Market (Doganis, 2001, p. 42). Due to the deregulation of the European aviation market the regime of bilateral regulation of air services and IATA tariff regulation was gradually replaced by a regime of limited competition. The new regime was limited because some regulatory barriers to competition remained. The European Union held the right to intervene when the market was structurally out of balance, in case of the sustained downward development of fares and in case of the support of necessary but unviable routes in peripheral areas (Public Service Obligation). Moreover, the multilateral deregulation of the EU aviation market only applied to the air services within the EU. For their intercontinental air services, European airlines still depended on the bilateral air service agreements of the governments of the respective country of registration. Therefore, carriers without a designation in the bilateral treaties could not set up an intercontinental network (Burghouwt & Huys, 2003).

Due to the changes in the aviation regime, the major European airlines had to adopt new network strategies to cope with the intensified competition. The adoption of hub-and-spoke networks and the formation of global strategic alliances were among the most important of these new strategies, which had already been enacted in the US for some time (Reynolds-Feighan, 1998). Direct flights from medium airports to other medium airports were increasingly replaced by indirect flights via central airports or 'hubs'. Hub-and-spoke networks offered airline advantages on the cost and demand side that were needed to survive in the highly competitive market (see for extensive discussion on the advantages of hub-and-spoke systems Button, 2002; Hanlon, 1996; Pels, 2001). Airport authorities also had to adapt to the requirements of the new regime. More specifically, for the facilitation of hub operations additional investments were needed.

²³⁹ Article 85 (1) and Article 86, Treaty of Rome 1957. In: Goh 1997, p. 36.

²⁴⁰ Article 84(2), Treaty of Rome 1957. In: Goh 1997, p. 16; Dagtolou 1994, p. 30.

KLM anticipated slowly to the changing aviation regime by reconfiguring their airline network towards a hub-and-spoke network. Schiphol too changed its business strategy. In the Structural Outline Civil Aviation and Aviation Act of 1979 Schiphol had been designated as the only national airport, after long discussions about a possible second airport or the relocation of the current one. Future expansion would therefore be concentrated at Schiphol, and the airport authority prepared a large scale investment program to accommodate the expected growth in transport volumes that was presented in May 1985 (Van Duinen, 2004). The program was labelled Course '85 and marked a transition towards a volume growth policy (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1997). It was designed to allow Schiphol to evolve into one of the few future hubs of Europe, and in order to achieve this objective additional traffic was needed. A pro-active policy was initiated to attract extra line services and new airline companies (i.e. volume). By then, the airport authorities and KLM had convinced the Ministry of V&W that the intended turn of the fourth runway would hamper future expansion of the airport in the long run, since there would be no room left for a 5th runway. The Ministry recalled this intention in a so-called Reconsideration Report that was presented in 1985 (*Herbezinningsnota*, 1985), keeping the option for a future 5th runway on the northwest side open. Furthermore, Schiphol indicated the importance of a positive image of the Netherlands as a distribution country in order to attract passengers and goods. The hub strategy was therefore presented to facilitate the economic recovery of the Netherlands as a whole, were the national government was still struggling to get out of the economic recession of the early 1980s. The strategy was further elaborated in the 1988 draft version of Schiphol's Masterplan 1988 – 2003.

Second, next to the airport authorities there were several expert committees who emphasized the importance economic recovery and the role that Schiphol could play in this. The Wagner committee (1981) proposed a new industrial élan for the Netherlands and recommended investments in the strong sectors of the economy, i.e. the transport and logistic sector. More specifically, the committee recommended Schiphol as one of the 13 spearheads designated to enhance the Dutch economy and establish new élan. A few years later, in 1985, Schiphol launched the idea of establishing a project group that would formulate a plan for Schiphol on how to realize and take advantage of the opportunities Schiphol airport offered for the Dutch economy. In October of that year the Van der Zwan committee was installed for this task. The committee published its final report 'Schiphol towards the year 2000' (*Schiphol naar het jaar 2000*) in May 1986. The report presented a list of conditions under which Schiphol could enhance its contribution to the national economy (besides its local and regional significance). Amongst other things, runway capacity needed to be improved, land had to be supplied for a second passenger area and landside accessibility had to be improved. Furthermore, the committee explicitly called upon the national government's cooperation to facilitate Schiphol development (cf. Van Duinen, 2004). The Van der Zwan report was well

received by the Cabinet that was looking for economic stimuli and the generation of jobs. As such, the Van der Zwan committee (1986) succeeded in reframing airport development as a matter of national concern by indicating the enormous potential of Schiphol for the transport and logistics sector and for the economic recovery of the Netherlands (cf. Van Duinen, 2004; PAU, 2000). In a similar way, the national planning agency (NPA) succeeded in linking Schiphol development to the broader Dutch business climate (1986). The different experts of the Wagner Committee, the Van der Zwan Committee and the NPA therefore turned Schiphol expansion into a matter of national concern; Schiphol was perceived to be a key asset of the Dutch economy, and a key driver for its recovery.

Third, from 1985 onwards organizations in the logistics sector started to join hands. With the changing transport market (i.e. the emergence of cross-border hub and spoke networks) a national initiative was deemed necessary to promote and improve the position of the Netherlands as a distribution country. On June 3rd 1987, just before the new elections, the initiative was formalized as the Holland International Distribution Council HIDC (*Nederland Distributieland*), which consisted of the heavyweights of the Dutch corporate transport world (like Nedlloyd and ECT, banks, and the KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines), and the Ministry of V&W and the Ministry of EZ. The HIDC established a powerful lobby to Dutch politics to promote the Netherlands as a transport and distribution country and as a physical gateway to Europe (Van Duinen, 2004).

Fourth, the economic downturn triggered the regional public authorities involved in the spatial development of the Schiphol area (i.e. the Province of North Holland, the municipality of Amsterdam and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer) to reframe their spatial development strategy. In 1984 the Province of North Holland decided that the Regional plan of June 14th 1979 was in need of revision, especially to take full advantage of the economic potential of the Randstad, in order to stop the loss of jobs in the region (approx. 2% in 1979 to 7% in 1982, especially in Amsterdam (Regional Plan, Headlines, July 1987, p.9; p.13; *Nota van Toelichting Regional Plan*, July 1987, p.67).²⁴¹ In the Regional Plan of 1979 a restrictive policy was adopted, setting a passenger limit of 18 million passengers to Schiphol development. This prevented the regional approval for constructing a new terminal building, and further growth was out of the question (PAU, 2000). It was the Van der Zwan committee who problematized this restrictive regional spatial strategy in its 1986 advice, influencing the revision process that was unraveling at the moment. The revised Regional Plan indicated the kind of developments that were possible and deemed desirable until the year 2000, emphasizing the need to reap the benefits of the economic potential of Schiphol, both on

²⁴¹ Province of North Holland, *Streekplan voor het Amsterdam-Noordzeekanaalgebied*. Haarlem, July 1987; Province of North Holland, *Streekplan voor het Amsterdam-Noordzeekanaalgebied*, Toelichting. Haarlem, July 1987.

the regional and the national level. Two spatial strategies, which were in line with the new industrial élan that the Wagner committee (1981) and the recommendations of the Van der Zwan committee (1986), were of particular importance for Schiphol development: first, sufficient space for expansion of airport activities was being reserved and second, business locations needed to be developed in the vicinity of the airport.²⁴² In order to make sure that the right companies were to settle down at the right places, extra coordination efforts were needed. More specifically, airport related activities were allowed to settle down in the near vicinity of Schiphol, and non-airport related activities were to be distributed over a wider area.²⁴³

In order to coordinate the development of sites for airport-related companies the Province of North Holland established the Bestuursforum Schiphol (BFS) (*Managerial Forum Schiphol*) in 1987. The BFS consisted of the municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer, the Schiphol Airport Authorities and the Province of North Holland (who chaired it). The BFS was not meant to design legally binding spatial plans for the Schiphol area. The four actors remained responsible for their own statutory functions, and the BFS functioned as an advisory group to foster cooperation and align the different development plans. At the same time the four actors agreed on the foundation of the Schiphol Airport Development Company (SADC, 1987) to actually develop and operate high-quality industrial and offices sites (i.e. selling land, developing high-quality business parks) and increase the attractiveness of the airport area and the Netherlands as a Gateway to Europe. The objective of the SADC was to develop the Schiphol area as a leading business centre in Europe and to strengthen its position as a mainport, allowing at the same time better public control of this development (cf. ARC, 1999; Kleyn, 2009). The foundation of the SADC was in line with the recommendations made by the Van der Zwan committee, wherein the need for such a platform was indicated (1986).

The revised Regional Plan and the foundation of the BFS and the SADC indicated the growing awareness of the regional actors for improving the business climate of the airport region in order to secure the international competitive position of the entire region and even the Randstad. This was in line with emerging policy ambition of the Randstad to develop towards a metropolis that could compete with other globalizing city-regions. According to Zonneveld and Verwest (2005) this ambition became prevalent in different times of economic recession, like the 1980s. The assumed economic spin off of Schiphol activities for the local, regional and national economy was acknowledged and enacted by the regional actors, further directing the framing of a new national spatial development strategy. It was also noted that landside accessibility

²⁴² Province of North Holland, Regional Plan Province of North Holland, 1987, p.44; p.96.

²⁴³ Province of North Holland, Regional Plan, Nota van Toelichting, July 1987, p.82 – 84.

needed to be improved, so both Schiphol and the business sites could be reached without delays. The regional actors announced investments in landside infrastructure, and the Dutch Railways also decided to invest in improved railway connections (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996), giving the economic oriented development strategy an additional boost.

Fifth, the policy makers of the National Planning Agency (*Rijksplanologische Dienst*, RPD) (the government agency responsible for the administrative preparation of spatial policy) were reconsidering their perspective. Due to the broadly shared feeling in Dutch society that the Netherlands had been completed in terms of its spatial development, the role and necessity of the national planning department was questioned. In a struggle to regain its footing, the RPD was urged to reconsider the position of its organization and to rethink the content of planning (Van Duinen, 2004; Bureau PAU, 2000). When the Lower House requested a new spatial policy strategy it was decided to develop a Fourth Report on Spatial Planning in June 1985. During the preparation of this report two important policy reports were developed, indicating a harsh reconsideration of current spatial policy (cf. Korthals Altes, 1995; Zonneveld & Verwest, 2005). Both policy reports (RUEIN = Spatial Reconnaissance in Main Infrastructure) and NRP (Project spatial perspectives) deliberately linked to the pro-economic growth discourse of the Dutch Cabinet. The role that spatial policy could play in enhancing the competitive position of the Netherlands in the world was stressed. Hajer and Zonneveld refer to this as the economic turn of spatial planning (2000). In both reports the desirability of the enhancement of the international distribution function was indicated. Moreover, the expansion of the two mainports was considered to be an important policy issue that was most relevant for the upcoming 4th report.

Around the mid 1980s, the different pleas for bringing the mainport development to the national policy agenda started to become more successful. One important reason for this was that the national government became more and more convinced that such mainport development would greatly contribute to economic recovery. For one, the new Lubbers II Cabinet announced in its Coalition Agreement of July 30th 1986 that, given the economic downturn prevailing at that time, the central theme of the new national report on spatial planning would be economic recovery. Spatial policy needed to be based on the logistics strength of the Netherlands, and facilitating the development of Schiphol and Rotterdam had high priority (Faludi & Van der Valk, 1994). Here the importance of the mainports became institutionalized on the political agenda.

After having overcome its initial hesitation, the Ministry of V&W, who was legally in charge of Schiphol development, welcomed the planning department's proposal for new

infrastructure to support mainport development.²⁴⁴ The other important ministry involved, the Ministry of EZ (Economic Affairs), also agreed that Schiphol and Rotterdam called for special policy attention (although preferring laissez-faire policy) (Korthals-Altes, 1995). The Ministry's buzzwords were globalization and European integration, and it believed that investment in large infrastructure could improve international transport volumes (Pestman, 2001). The mainport strategy matched perfectly with this perspective. At the end of 1987 all three key ministries involved in Schiphol development (i.e. V&W, VROM and EZ) agreed upon the need to facilitate mainport development.

In the government decision on the Fourth report on Spatial Planning, issued in December 1988, the mainport concept was further embedded in national spatial policy. Because of the mainports significance for the Dutch economy, a political choice was made to enable the further growth and expansion of both Rotterdam and Schiphol. The Fourth report wanted to give space to mainport development in its spatial policy, so the mainports could contribute to the strengthening of the competitive position of the Netherlands as a whole. At the same time, there were growing concerns about the negative environmental and spatial impacts of mainport development. The reason for this was twofold. First, the Lubbers Cabinet resigned and the liberal minister Nijpels was succeeded by the leftwing Minister Alders in the new centre-left Lubbers III Cabinet.²⁴⁵ The new cabinet outlined the new direction of national policy in the Government Policy statement. It still wanted to enhance the economic competitive position of the Netherlands, but this endeavour was complemented with concerns for the environment (PAU, 2000). This new environmental consciousness was also triggered by the Brundtland report on sustainable development (1987), the report '*Zorgen voor Morgen*' (Concerns for Tomorrow, RIVM 1988) and the policy translation of this report in the first National Environmental Policy Perspective of the Netherlands (NMP, 1989). Furthermore, in 1987 need to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) became legally obligatory for spatial investments, like airport development (Van der Cammen & De Klerk, 1993). Environmental concerns were therefore on the political agenda, and the new Cabinet used it to counterbalance the rather one-sided economic perspective on mainport development.

On the regional level environmental concerns also did play a role. As argued, the regional actors reframed their spatial development strategy and Schiphol development was welcomed for economic motives, as they struggled with a rapid decrease in the

²⁴⁴ When the Ministry of V&W first heard about the new planning ideas on infrastructure and mainports they were displeased to find the planning department intruding on their territory.

²⁴⁵ Note that this is the same Mr. Alders as the one who would come to play an important part in the Schiphol debate in the future, i.e. during the Alders negotiations that started in 2007 (as shall be extensively discussed in the case study, chapter 8).

number of jobs. But on the other hand, it was also acknowledged that further expansion would further restrict possibilities for housing construction, due to the additional noise pollution, while new housing was desperately needed in the region (cf. Regional Plan, July 1987). For example, the municipality of Amsterdam still opposed the expansion of Schiphol via a 5th runway, as this would make housing construction in the rural areas west of Amsterdam impossible (Van Duinen, 2004). Moreover, the protests against noise pollution of local residents increased, which was something the local authorities had to deal with (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996; Broër, 2006).

In an attempt to reconcile both the economic and environmental perspective the Ministry of VROM stated that 'within the environmental conditions a maximum exploitation of the handling capacity of airplanes, passengers and freight of the airport Schiphol should remain possible. In spatial plans this needs to be taken into account and the construction of a 5th runway should not be made impossible' (VROM, 1988a, p.185). Here the translation of the mainport strategy in the famous dual policy objective was made for the first time.²⁴⁶ Similar translations emerged in the strategic policy perspectives of the Ministry V&W (the SVV 2, 1990) and the Ministry of EZ (Nota Economy with Open Borders, 1990), which was a sign of unprecedented unanimity in terms of spatial development on the national level. In general, in the Netherlands there had been a strong competition between policy making sectors in urban and regional development since the 1950s. All three ministries involved in planning (i.e. VROM, V&W and EZ) create their own national planning strategies for the urban development of the Netherlands. This does not only result in an overwhelming amount of spatial plans for which the Dutch are famous, especially when considering that the regional and local authorities also make various plans, but also to tensions between the different development strategies (Boelens, 1990; Kreukels, 1995; Priemus, 1999). Therefore, the important role attributed to the mainport strategy in all three documents illustrates the widely shared acceptance of the strategy on the national level.


However, especially the Schiphol noise contours that were in operation back then, laid down in the Aviation Act (*Luchtvaartwet*, 1979), did not allow for much more physical expansion of the airport. To find a solution, the Cabinet postponed further decisions regarding mainport development (leaving its strategy poorly elaborated) and deliberately left it to the local government authorities and companies in the region (Van Duinen, 2004; Huys & Koppenjan, 2010). Schiphol was among the few areas that were selected for an area based approach, a new form of policy making in which environmental and spatial development would be integrated in a close cooperation

²⁴⁶ This assumption that economy and environment could be improved at the same time (win-win strategy) falls under the umbrella of the internationally embraced idea of ecological modernization (Weale, 1992; Hajer, 1995), and relied heavily on developments in science and technology and market based policy instruments (e.g. environmental taxes).

between both public and private stakeholders (the so-called ROM-approach; VROM, 1988, p.146). As a first step for the concrete policy translation of the mainport strategy and its dual objective a separate plan of approach was to be made for the Schiphol area. The plan for Schiphol needed to consider how the future growth of Schiphol could be accommodated within the zoning contours of the SBL, and more generally, without further deteriorating the environment.

In sum, a sense of urgency had been built up throughout the 1980s, which gave way to a new policy strategy for Schiphol (and the port of Rotterdam), the mainport strategy. The economic recession was an essential driver in making the mainports a national economic issue rather than a mere local transport issue, by equating it with economic growth and the creation of jobs. As we shall see throughout the case description, further growth of Schiphol certainly contributed to the creation of jobs from 1960 onwards and ever-increasing revenues of the airport authorities during the past 15 years (see figures 5.4 and 5.5).

Figure 5.4 Amount of jobs directly related to Schiphol, 1960 - 2010




Source: Schiphol Group Statistics

It was the coalescence of the simultaneous development strategies of the port authorities (corporate strategies), the Schiphol experts committees, the logistics lobby, the regional and local planning authorities and the spatial policy making arena of the national government (which spread to the interdepartmental level when Ministries of V&W and EZ started to support the mainport strategy), coupled with a favourable political climate (with a Cabinet that had adopted the motto work-work-work), that made the

development of the mainport strategy possible. In 1989 the quest to translate the dual objective of the mainport strategy into concrete policy measures could begin by means of the new area based policy approach. The first step was to develop a broadly supported plan of approach, the so-called Plan of Approach Schiphol and Environment (PASO). This process forms the point of departure for our extensive case description of twenty years public policy making about Schiphol (1989 – 2009).

Figure 5.5 Revenues of the airport authority, 1993 - 2009



Source: Schiphol Group Statistics

5.5 Outline of the Case

In this chapter we have presented the initial starting conditions of the Schiphol case that is presented in the following three chapters. We now have some idea about the specific way wherein public policy about matters of national concern (like large infrastructure projects) is made in the Netherlands, and we have some understanding of the different actors involved and their (theoretical) relations of mutual dependency. We have also presented the historical development of Schiphol and the emergence of the mainport strategy, which culminated in the definition of the dual objective. This dual objective would play a crucial role in the next 20 years of public policy making about Schiphol (1989 – 2009), as shall come to the fore in the extensive case description.

The case description is organized around three subsequent time periods (see chapter 4 for reasons). Each period by and large covers a specific policy round, where each round has a clear beginning in terms of a political assignment and a clear ending in terms of an

important political decision of parliament. This political decision forms the beginning of a new round (cf. Teisman, 2000).²⁴⁷ Each round is discussed in a separate chapter.

1. Part I of the case (chapter 6) is about the initial framing of the dual objective. It would eventually take 6 years (1989 – 1995) before the final definition of the dual objective was politically ratified.
2. Part 2 (chapter 7) is about the enactment of the dual objective. Right after the dual objective had been defined in 1995 it was up for implementation. The next years (1995 – 2003) gave way to intense debate about the initial framing of the dual objective, which culminated in a new political decision about Schiphol's policy framework in 2003.
3. Part 3 (chapter 8) is also about the enactment of the dual objective. That is, the dual objective as it had been defined in 2003. Again, during the years to come (2003 – 2009) several changes were made to both the content of the dual objectives and the measures defined to realize them.

The specific focus and methodologies that we have used to describe each policy round have been discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 4. In short, the focus is on the chronological description of the events involved and the strategies and tactics involved in their emergence, institutionalization or marginalization. In terms of chapter 3, we describe the policy themes on the agenda, the policy stories / arguments actors pose around these themes, the strategies and tactics actors employ to influence the outcomes of the debate in terms of process and content. When doing so, we also take the factors into account that influence the strategies and tactics employed. We thus integrate structure and agency and different levels of analysis (micro and macro). We also integrate different readings of events in order to let the story unfold from the many-sided, complex and sometimes conflicting stories apparent in the case, which also leaves scope for readers to make their own interpretations.

Due to the large amount of references to empirical data involved, we have chosen to present these in footnotes. As indicated in chapter 4, we have gone through more than 3000 sources, covering thousands and thousands of pages. We eventually used over 1500 references for the case description, were some sources (like most interviews) have been used more than once and others only once (like newspaper articles). (See chapter 4 for the way we gathered, ordered, validated and presented the data). The empirical sources are not taken up in the list of references of this thesis, except for the scientific publications that we refer to in the case.

²⁴⁷ Policy rounds are constructions of the researcher, but the distinction between three large and comprehensive policy rounds since 1988 is well known in the field of Schiphol (see chapter 4).

Finally, one last disclaimer. As we discussed extensively in chapter 4, the case description is not intended to be complete and exhaustive, nor do we pretend that everything is correct. Indeed, the Schiphol debate has been very comprehensive and technically-complex and it is wrought with different numbers and calculation methods. However, we do argue that the case description is good enough to become an effective history, as it allows the reader to understand how the current situation has come into being and as it allows us to develop a transparent analysis of the emergence and persistence of Schiphol's policy deadlock.

Chapter 6 The Schiphol Policy Debate 1989 – 1995

Defining the Dual Objective

6.1 Structure of the Case Description (1989 – 1995)

This part of the case study describes how the dual objective became operationalized and institutionalized. As such, it describes the emergence and institutionalization of the mainport-environment discourse during 1989 – 1995, departing from the initial starting conditions presented at the end of chapter 5. In chapter 5 we described how the national government came to adopt the mainport strategy during the 1980s. It was the coalescence of the simultaneous development strategies of the port authorities (corporate strategies), the Schiphol experts committees, the logistics lobby, the regional and local planning authorities and the spatial policy making arena of the national government (which spread towards interdepartmental level when the Ministries of V&W and EZ supported the mainport strategy), coupled with a favourable political climate (with a cabinet that had adopted the motto work-work-work in order to deal with the economic recession), that made the development of the mainport strategy possible. In 1989 the quest to translate the dual objective of the mainport strategy into concrete policy measures began. The main goals were derived from the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning and were; to make sure that, within the environmental conditions, a maximum amount of planes, passengers and freight was not made impossible by spatial developments; to translate this in the spatial plans of all governmental tiers (national, regional, local); and to make sure that the construction of a 5th runway remained possible. The assignment was therefore predominantly defined as a spatial challenge, and for this reason the Ministry VROM was put in charge of the project. Up until then it had always been the Governmental Aviation Agency (*Rijksluchtvaartdienst, RLD*) of the Ministry of V&W that had been in charge of Schiphol policy affairs.²⁴⁸ The project was called PASO (*Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving, Plan of Approach Schiphol and Environment*). The resulting plan of approach would serve as the main input for the creation of formal policies.

The Ministry of VROM decided to apply a new participative policy approach that was designed to develop integral, tailor-made plans for specific spatial areas that could count on wide public support. As discussed in the Fourth report on spatial planning, this so-called ROM-method²⁴⁹ consisted of two steps: (1) developing a start covenant (6.2) and (2) translating this covenant in concrete policy measures (6.3).²⁵⁰ Both steps together would result in the final PASO report (Plan of Approach Schiphol and Environment). Only after these preparatory steps, the formal policymaking was to begin. In the end, the

²⁴⁸ Interview Klaver / Ministry of VROM, 2005; Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996.

²⁴⁹ ROM = Ruimtelijke Ordening & Milieu, Spatial Development & Environment.

²⁵⁰ Ministry of VROM (1989), Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening.

ROM-procedure would take almost 2 years. And it would take another 4 years to bring the formal political decision making to an end. The formal decision making was first prepared by the stakeholders and policy makers of the Ministries involved (6.4). They prepared different decisions for the short term (< 2003) (6.5) and the longer term (2003 – 2015) (6.6). Next, these policy decisions were discussed by the Upper and Lower House that needed to ratify them in order to give them legal status (6.7).²⁵¹ The entire process and structure of this chapter is presented in table 6.1. At the start of each new paragraph we shall use the table to indicate where we are.

6.2 The ROM-procedure (1): Developing the Start Covenant (February 1989 – September 1989)

Table 6.1 Structure of the case description 1989 - 1995

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
PASO 1989 - 1991	ROM procedure part 1 – 6.2						
		ROM Procedure part 2 – 6.3					
PKB 1991 - 1995				Preparing the PKB – 6.4			
					Decision making about the short term (< 2003) – 6.5		
					Decision making about the long term (2003 - 2015) – 6.6		
							Final PKB decisions – 6.7

In this paragraph we discuss the start up of the PASO process. We subsequently describe the mobilization of the policy arena (6.2.1) and the creation of a start covenant (6.2.2).

6.2.1 Preparing the Start Covenant: Ministry of VROM mobilizes a new policy arena

The first challenge for the Ministry of VROM was to develop a start covenant, for which a new policy network was to be formed. The department of Environmental Hygiene (*Dienst Gezondheid & Milieu, DGM*) of the Ministry of VROM was made responsible for this. The choice for VROM/DGM, and for example not the RLD of the Ministry of V&W, was related to the fact that the PASO project was seen as an elaboration of the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning that was issued by the Ministry of VROM, and because the cabinet Lubbers I had placed the environment prominently on

²⁵¹ In chapter 5 we discussed the different responsibilities involved in the case of large infrastructure projects. Such projects of national interest are finally decided upon by Parliament.

the political agenda.²⁵² The Ministry of V&W/RLD was not very pleased about this, and it further complicated the already troubled relationship between both Ministries (here represented by the RLD and DGM).²⁵³ The new role of DGM implied that the department had now become a stakeholder (i.e. it was responsible for environmental aspects like noise, stench and emissions) and project leader at the same time.²⁵⁴

From March 1989 onwards, the Province of North Holland, the Municipality of Haarlemmermeer and the Schiphol Airport authority were approached by the Ministry of VROM to join the PASO policy arena. These actors were eager to participate, partly because PASO had the backing of a government decree (i.e. the ratified Fourth Report on Spatial Planning). Therefore, it was likely that the results of PASO would influence the subsequent formal decision making process. Moreover, these actors felt the sense of urgency to find measures for securing future economic growth, while avoiding ecological deterioration and reserving sufficient space for housing.²⁵⁵ In the case of the municipality of Haarlemmermeer their inclusion was mainly the result of their own proactive approach. They thought it rather strange that decisions were made about their territory without their involvement. The local council deemed it of crucial importance to join in, a request that was eagerly granted by the Ministry of VROM/DGM because it was in line with the interactive nature of the ROM procedure.²⁵⁶

Only after these three actors had formed a policy network, the Ministry of V&W/RLD was invited to join in. The strategy of the Ministry of VROM/DGM to first establish some goodwill amongst the other parties worked out well. According to researchers who investigated this process in detail, this way the troubled relationship between both Ministries of V&W and VROM (represented by the RLD and DGM) did not hamper the creation of a coalition of actors that was willing to work on the operationalization of the dual objective, while it also created some pressure for RLD to join in, as matters were obviously becoming more serious.²⁵⁷ The Ministry of V&W/RLD reluctantly agreed to participate (for reasons that we shall discuss later on) and the five actors established a Steering Group that started to prepare the start covenant. The Steering Group was facilitated by a project group that DGM had developed, which included several airline companies (KLM, Fokker, Transavia) and some of the municipalities located in the vicinity of the airport territory (Amsterdam, Amstelveen, Aalsmeer and Haarlemmerliede).

²⁵² As discussed in chapter 5.

²⁵³ Interview Klaver/Ministry VROM, 2005; Interview Tan, 2010.

²⁵⁴ Tan, 2001.

²⁵⁵ Interview Rensen/ Province of North Holland, conducted by Yap, 2001; Driessen, 1995.

²⁵⁶ Interview Rensen/ Province of North Holland, conducted by Yap, 2001; Interview Kolpa/ Municipality of Haarlemmermeer, 2010.

²⁵⁷ Driessen, 1995; Tan, 2001.

6.2.2 Towards a Start Covenant (September 1989)

Working on a Pro Mainport Coalition

During the negotiations about the content of the start covenant the province of North Holland did not want to discuss the future of the airport in detail yet. They first wanted to finish their own long term spatial perspective (Structure Vision 2015) and they were afraid that promises made in PASO would limit their own space of possibilities. The Ministry of V&W/RLD made clear that the PASO project could not replace the existing aviation Acts and related responsibilities, including decision making procedures, which belonged to the portfolio of the RLD. For them, it was crucial to make clear that the PASO process was a rather informal and voluntarily process, holding little formal consequences. The other actors reluctantly agreed to this, after which the RLD assumed a more serious and prominent role in the network.²⁵⁸ Meanwhile, Schiphol attempted to make its own Masterplan that they were working on at the same time, and that included a detailed investment plan for the upcoming 15 years, part of PASO.²⁵⁹ The Masterplan was mainly based on the mainport strategy, which was in line with one of the main interests of the Ministry of V&W/RLD who was above all concerned about securing future hub development.²⁶⁰ Therefore Schiphol supported the more important role of the RLD within the policy arena.

For the same reason the Schiphol Airport Authority proposed to invite the department of Economic Affairs of the Municipality of Amsterdam into the Steering Group (removing Amsterdam from the facilitating project group, thus improving its position).²⁶¹ As all actors acknowledged the important relationship between the Dutch capital and the airport, the decision to include the municipality of Amsterdam could count on wide support.²⁶² The choice to let the Alderman of Economic Affairs represent the municipality instead of the Alderman of Spatial Development was important as the alderman of Economic Affairs was mainly concerned about proper mainport development, whereas the alderman of spatial planning was also very much concerned

²⁵⁸ Tan, 2001.

²⁵⁹ The Masterplan was based on the argument that mainport development was crucial for the recovery of the Dutch economy as a whole. In the plan, Schiphol distinguished between three 5-year planning periods, each with a detailed investment program in new gates, piers and terminals. Furthermore, Schiphol indicated that a fifth runway was to be build during the third period (1998-2003). The investments would cost more than one million guilders per day for the next ten years (approx. 400,000 euro). The revenues of aviation were by no means sufficient for this, and therefore Schiphol began to develop a more commercial business strategy to enhance non-aviation revenues. Meanwhile, KLM was also extending its hub-and-spoke network, profiting from the partly deregulated European market. Besides, KLM formed an airline alliance in July 1989 with North West Airlines, one of the largest American carriers that was on the edge of bankruptcy. This way, KLM improved its access to the American market. Despite its important role, KLM was not yet part of the Steering Group.

²⁶⁰ NVLS (1989), Masterplan Schiphol, 1989.

²⁶¹ Werther, 1993.

²⁶² Driessen, 1995; Tan, 2001.

about the impact on the environment.²⁶³ The PASO policy network now consisted of six actors (Ministry of VROM/ DGM, Schiphol, Province North Holland, Municipality of Haarlemmermeer, Ministry of V&W/RLD and the Municipality of Amsterdam) who started to negotiate about the PASO Start Covenant.

Signing the Start Covenant

On September 21st of 1989 the six actors signed the Start Covenant. The covenant could be read as a joint statement of intent and it specified the aim of the PASO project, the policy positions, the organizational structure and its financing.²⁶⁴ The main goals as presented in the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning were copied and refined.²⁶⁵ The initial dual objective remained in place; Schiphol was to become a mainport (for which there was still no shared definition available) and the quality of the living environment was to be improved (for which no clear indications were available yet). Amongst other things it was agreed to make an assessment of the spatial and environmental effects of the intended policy strategies as regards mainport development, as set by the RLD, the Masterplan of Schiphol and the plan of the Spatial Planning Committee (dating from 1987).²⁶⁶ The Ministry of V&W/RLD had made sure that they were still in charge of mainport development,²⁶⁷ which provided them with the opportunity to work on its very definition in the upcoming years. Schiphol had succeeded in bringing its own Masterplan into the PASO discussion, which was supported by the RLD and the department of Economic Affairs of the Municipality of Amsterdam. It indicated the corporatist turn that the interactive policy approach was taking.²⁶⁸ At that time the former secretary-general of the Ministry of V&W (one of the highest positions within the Ministry) had become CEO of Schiphol, while the representative of the Ministry of EZ was appointed director-general within the Ministry of V&W. Both appointments contributed to the idea that two parties involved in the PASO decision making process, i.e. Schiphol and KLM, particularly benefited from the inside knowledge, expertise and influence of the new appointees.²⁶⁹ Mainport development thus served as an important point of departure for further policy development about Schiphol. The negative environmental effects of future mainport development were to be assessed. The actors involved did agree to take the following indicators into account in the assessment of the environmental effects: aviation noise, industrial noise, road traffic noise, air pollution, pollution of soil and groundwater and third party risk.²⁷⁰ In order to get some feeling for

²⁶³ This question about which Alderman should be in charge of Schiphol Affairs was something that would become discussed occasionally on the municipal level (Interview De Jong / Municipality of Amsterdam, 2008).

²⁶⁴ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving. Bijlage Start Covenant PASO, 1989.

²⁶⁵ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving. Bijlage Start Covenant PASO, 1989; pp.91- 92.

²⁶⁶ See chapter 5.

²⁶⁷ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving. Bijlage Start Covenant PASO, 1989; p 92.

²⁶⁸ Driessen, 1995.

²⁶⁹ Interview Tan / Former Secretary of the CROS, 2010.

²⁷⁰ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving. Bijlage Start Covenant PASO, 1989; p 93.

the kind of effects that future traffic growth would cause, it was agreed that the actors would enact an extensive research program in the remainder of the PASO process. The Ministry of VROM/DGM remained in charge of the assessment of these environmental and spatial effects and they would cover 95% of the costs of the entire program (i.e. 1 million guilders, approx. 500,000 dollars at that time).

Signing the Start Covenant implied a first refinement of the dual objective. Moreover, it implied a further institutionalization of the dual objective, as the six actors that were seen as the main stakeholders as regards Schiphol affairs had agreed to take it as the point of departure for the public policy debate about the future of Schiphol. It also worked to position actors vis-à-vis one another as the Ministry of V&W/RLD and Schiphol had made sure that they were responsible for mainport development and that their perspective on mainport development would serve as input for the assessment of the environmental effects. The Start Covenant included the initial starting conditions for the further operationalization of the dual objective that was to be settled during the remainder of the PASO process.

6.3 The ROM-procedure (2): The PASO Policy Covenant, September 1989 – April 1991

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
PASO 1989 - 1991	ROM procedure part 1 – 6.2						
		ROM Procedure part 2 – 6.3					
PKB 1991 - 1995				Preparing the PKB – 6.4			
					Decision making about the short term (< 2003) – 6.5		
					Decision making about the long term (2003 - 2015) – 6.6		
							Final PKB decisions – 6.7

In this paragraph we describe the creation of the final PASO covenant. We start the paragraph with a short discussion of need to further enact the dual objective (6.3.1). Next we discuss the way the dual objective was framed during the process (6.3.2). In 6.3.3 the final decision making is presented.

6.3.1 Starting up PASO Negotiations

Renewed Political Attention for The Dual Objective

The Lubbers II cabinet that had developed the dual objective and the mainport strategy

resigned in May 1989.²⁷¹ The two political parties that formed the cabinet, CDA (*Christen Democratisch Appel*, Christen Democratic Appeal, a centre-right Christian democratic party) and the VVD (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, People's party for Freedom and Democracy, a conservative liberal party) could not agree on several things anymore and decided to split up, thus ending the cabinet.²⁷²

After the new elections had been held a different coalition was forged between the CDA and the PVDA (*Partij van de Arbeid*, Labour Party, a party more left of the center of the political spectrum). This cabinet, which was again chaired by Lubbers (CDA) and which was therefore referred to as Lubbers III, presented its Coalition Agreement in October 1989.²⁷³ On the one hand it was stated that there was need for tremendous investments in economic recovery. More jobs were to be generated (at least 100,000 per year).²⁷⁴ Investments in infrastructure were deemed necessary for this, further enacting the Netherlands Distribution land strategy that had been developed by the former cabinet Lubbers II.²⁷⁵ On the other hand, considerable attention was paid to the environment too. For this reason an updated and elaborated National Environmental Plan (NMP +, *Nationaal Milieu Plan*) was to be developed during 1990, including an implementation strategy of the initial NMP (1989). The main ambitions were to reduce the substances which contributed to acidification and the greenhouse effect, protection and development of nature and improving the quality of polluted soils.²⁷⁶ With regard to CO² (greenhouse) it was stated that it had to be reduced with 2% per year, resulting in a total reduction of 8% at the end of the cabinets' reign. The transportation sector was charged for 1.5% reduction.²⁷⁷ This implied that the cabinet thought it possible to extend the transportation activities (as part of the Distribution land Strategy), while at the same time reducing the (greenhouse) emissions of this sector. It was within this political setting that the PASO project was to unravel. Of course, this scope was in line with the dual objective that had been set for Schiphol in the Start Covenant of PASO.²⁷⁸

Broadening the PASO Steering Group: Including KLM and Ministry of Economic Affairs

The cabinet Lubbers III thus indicated that the dual objective was still valid. Investments in infrastructure were still seen as crucial for economic recovery. Hub

²⁷¹ See chapter 5.

²⁷² One important issue concerned the policy strategy as regards environmental protection as discussed in the National Environmental Plan.

²⁷³ TK 21132, Nr.8, October 26th 1989.

²⁷⁴ Coalition Agreement Lubbers III (1989), p.24.

²⁷⁵ Coalition Agreement Lubbers III (1989), p.39; see chapter 5 on this strategy.

²⁷⁶ Coalition Agreement Lubbers III (1989), p.35.

²⁷⁷ Coalition Agreement Lubbers III (1989), p.36.

²⁷⁸ And in line with the philosophy of ecological modernization that was becoming more popular in the Netherlands during those years, see Hajer, 1995.

development was seen as the cornerstone of mainport development, and it was clear to the members of the Steering Group of PASO that hub development was mainly dependent on the success of the future aviation network strategy of KLM (as KLM was Schiphol's home carrier). For this reason KLM was included in the Steering Group of PASO. Besides, due to the important economic value that was related to mainport development, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (*Economische Zaken, EZ*) also decided to join the PASO process. Both the KLM and the Ministry of EZ were immediately included, which was a heavy blow for some of the other municipalities and environmental parties who had attempted to gain access to the Steering Group, without any success whatsoever.²⁷⁹ Some of these municipalities were compensated, as they were allowed to join the supporting project group that was also extended with some airlines.²⁸⁰ The Ministry of VROM/DGM was still in charge of the PASO project, although tensions within the Ministry itself were rising. Several other sub departments thought that DGM did not take their interest adequately into account.²⁸¹

As a first step, the extended Steering Group, which now consisted of 8 actors instead of the 6 actors that had signed the PASO Start Covenant, used the Start Covenant to outline the further process. With regard to the mainport objective, the core concern was to develop a critical mainport barrier (i.e. the minimum amount of traffic that was needed in order to facilitate hub development). With regard to the environmental objective, defining adequate criteria and norms became the core challenge.²⁸² The Ministry of VROM was responsible for most spatial and environmental issues, whereas the Ministry of V&W, the Ministry of EZ, Schiphol and KLM were in charge of mainport development issues.²⁸³ The outcomes of the different research trajectories would form the input for defining the adequate balance between the critical mainport barrier and maximum environmental protection.

6.3.2 Framing the Dual Objective

In order to properly assess the effects, and further operationalize the dual objective, scenarios were needed. A scenario group was established, consisting of representatives of the Steering Group. Its main task was to develop future scenarios for Schiphol. The group developed 3 future growth scenarios (> 6% growth, 6% growth, and < 6% growth). In July 1990 a majority of the members who were part of the Steering Group

²⁷⁹ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Werther, 1993.

²⁸⁰ The Project Group: All actors of the Steering Group, and some extra actors from the aviation sector (Martinair, Fokker, Transavia) and some extra municipalities (Gewest Midden- en Zuid-Kennemerland, Amstelveen, Spaarnewoude).

²⁸¹ The interests of the different departments, DGM (reducing noise pollution), RPD (facilitating mainport development) and DG Housing (sufficient supply of housing), are mutually conflicting. For strategic reasons, VROM presents one perspective within PASO.

²⁸² More specifically, it was decided that 12 research projects were to be carried out in order to gain insight in the possibilities for future growth, the economic benefits, environmental effects (Tan, 2001).

²⁸³ Tan, 2001.

decided that the middle scenario would be used for further elaboration. From then on, elaboration of the dual objective took place within the context of the selected 6% growth scenario, which was largely the same scenario that Schiphol airport applied in its Masterplan of 1989 and which was deemed plausible and feasible by the NEI (*the Netherlands Economic Institute, Nederlands Economisch Instituut, an independent research foundation*).²⁸⁴

Towards a Critical Mainport Barrier

Next, it was to be decided what traffic was needed in order to become a mainport (both in terms of type and volume). Drawing on the Start Covenant and Schiphol's Masterplan it was assumed that hub development was crucial for mainport development. Indeed, this had been the main reason for including KLM into the Steering Group in the first place. However, there was still no adequate definition of a hub. More specifically, it was not clear to anyone what amount and type of traffic was deemed necessary in order to become a hub. This minimum amount of traffic was referred to as the critical mainport barrier.

Drawing on the middle growth scenario the NEI calculated that the critical mainport barrier implied the need for 30 million passengers and 2 millions ton of freight in 2003, while creating possibilities for further growth to 50 million passengers and 4.5 – 5 million tons of freight in 2015.^{285 286} This meant an extensive growth of both passengers (16.5 million in 1990) and freight (0.8 million in 1990) (recall figure 1.1). The NEI also defined the type of air traffic needed for mainport development. In essence, a high quality hub consisted of a wide diversity of direct and indirect national, continental and intercontinental connections.²⁸⁷ The immediate conclusion was that Schiphol needed much more capacity in order to become a hub airport (thus a mainport). In order to facilitate the growing traffic numbers and the related hub and spoke operations an additional runway was deemed necessary.

Economic Benefits of Mainport Development

The scenario with the critical mainport barrier was used to assess the expected economic benefits of the development of Schiphol, something that the Ministry of EZ thought of pivotal importance. Again the NEI was assigned and they concluded that becoming a mainport (hub) would result in 54,000 more jobs in 2015 when compared to

²⁸⁴ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving.

²⁸⁵ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving, p.14

²⁸⁶ These numbers are much like the forecasts made by Schiphol. In the Masterplan of Schiphol 30 – 34 million passengers and 1.6 – 2 million tons of freight are assumed for 2003 (1989).

²⁸⁷ NEI (1990) Verdeling van Luchtvaartactiviteiten, 1990; p.15

a situation that Schiphol would fail to become a hub and become a regional airport.²⁸⁸ Moreover, the NEI concluded that mainport Schiphol would contribute 1.1% more to the Dutch GDP in 2015.²⁸⁹ Based on these findings the Ministry of EZ argued that mainport development would result in great added value for the Netherlands as a whole in terms of both jobs and money. This policy argument was often used during the remainder of the PASO process by those in favor of further mainport development, most notably by the Ministry of EZ, the Ministry of V&W, Schiphol and KLM.²⁹⁰

The Environmental objective

Although the challenge for the mainport objective had been quite clear (i.e. setting the critical mainport barrier), it was less clear how to operationalize the second objective, i.e. how to improve the quality of the living environment. Initially, the members of the Steering Group wanted to take both the spatial and environmental effects into account. As we shall see later on, the spatial effects became less and less important as the discussion proceeded. Instead, the focus was more and more on the environmental limits. However, during the PASO process, the Ministry of VROM still invested heavily in the exploration of spatial effects of mainport development by conducting research about the possibilities for recreation,²⁹¹ the possibilities for improving the spatial quality (including green areas, office locations, housing, landside infrastructure),²⁹² and the possibilities for improving public transportation.²⁹³ Especially the municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam and the Province of North Holland thought this important, as they demanded clarity about the spatial restrictions related to further mainport development of Schiphol.²⁹⁴

Nonetheless, during PASO the attention was already very much focused on the environmental effects. This had much to do with the political ambitions taken up in the National Environmental Plan (1989). As discussed, the new Lubbers III cabinet devoted considerable attention to an upgraded version of this plan. The cabinet aimed for sustainable development within the period of one generation.²⁹⁵ For this, national emission reduction goals were set with regard to substances that contributed to acidification and the greenhouse effect, but also to noise, third party risk and stench. Drawing on the NMP and the political ambitions of the cabinet, four issues were to form

²⁸⁸ Nederlands Economisch Instituut (Mei 1990). Sociaal economische consequenties en knelpunten realisatie Masterplan NVLS en Masterplan +.

²⁸⁹ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving, p.21

²⁹⁰ See for example the reconstruction of the policy debate made by bureau PAU (2001); see references

²⁹¹ Bureau Maas (1990). Recreative Ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden in de regio Schiphol. June 1990

²⁹² OD 205 (1990), Studie Ruimtelijke kwaliteit regio Schiphol, October 1990

²⁹³ DHV (1990), Fysieke Maatregelen t.b.v. vergroting aandeel OV van luchtreizigers en werkers op de luchthaven Schiphol, May 1990

²⁹⁴ Interview Kolpa, 2010

²⁹⁵ Ministry of VROM (1989) Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan, p.1.

the heart of the environmental objective: Air pollution, Noise, Third Party Risk and Stench. For the aviation sector no policy measures or emission goals had been set yet, so the Ministry of VROM needed to clarify this during the PASO process. The focus on these four issues implied a further selection of the environmental indicators that had been taken up in the PASO Start Covenant (i.e. aviation noise, industrial noise, road traffic noise, air pollution, pollution of soil and groundwater and third party risks).²⁹⁶ In the research program that was carried out as part of the PASO process, day-time and night-time noise effects, third party risk, air pollution (including NO_x and CO₂) and the possibilities for substituting short-haul flights (<1000 kilometers) to rail, which was seen as an important way to reduce environmental effects, were being investigated.²⁹⁷

The Steering Group of PASO had decided to use the scenario with the critical mainport barrier for assessing the environmental effects. As the environmental limits were yet to be defined, it could not be assessed whether or not the environmental effects of this mainport development were acceptable. However, there was the promise of the dual objective that the quality of the living environment was not allowed to deteriorate, as taken up in the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning. This promise implied a standstill for (1) local air pollution (2) noise, (3) third party risk and (4) stench, and the initial research results immediately pointed out that it would become very difficult, if not impossible, to realize both the mainport objective and the environmental objective (the standstill) at the same time.

1. The issue of local air pollution

With regard to local air pollution it was argued that the contribution of air traffic to total air pollution was very small when compared to road traffic. In the specific case of CO₂ it was concluded that emissions would continue to increase, which undermined the feasibility of the environmental objective. However, it was indicated that CO₂ was an international problem, for which international agreements on European and world level were needed. Thus, the members of the Steering Group removed this issue to another policy arena. Nonetheless, the environmental interest groups tried to keep the CO₂ issue on the agenda. In a response, the members of the Steering Group argued that it would seriously affect the competitive position of KLM, and therefore the possibilities for becoming a hub airport, if the Netherlands were to introduce policy measures to reduce CO₂ on its own.²⁹⁸ The substitution of short-haul flights (<1000 km) to rail was perceived to be an important means for reducing CO₂ emissions. But again, members of the Steering Group deemed this an issue to be tackled on the European level.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁶ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving, Bijlage Start Covenant PASO, 1989; p 93.

²⁹⁷ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving.

²⁹⁸ Interview Fransen/SNM, 2009.

²⁹⁹ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving, p.51.

However, to the environmental interest groups this was unacceptable. By then, it had been clear that difficulties related to developing integrated action on the European level and the expected increase in aviation traffic would cause an increase of both NO_x and CO₂ emissions during the upcoming years.³⁰⁰ This clearly conflicted with the NMP (environmental) objectives set by Dutch government and with the promise of the dual objective of the PASO process. In order to find a way out of this problem, the members of the Steering Group decided to postpone the discussion and develop policy measures to limit the expected emissions after the PASO process had been finished (i.e. during the process of formal decision making).³⁰¹ As such, no decisions about limits for local air pollution were made during the remainder of the PASO process.

2. The issue of Noise

Before we discuss the norms for noise, we shortly introduce some historical background information about the way levels of noise were determined in the Netherlands. Ever since the Kosten Committee (1960s) had introduced its yardstick for assessing noise, Dutch levels of noise pollution were expressed in the Kosten Unit (*Kosten eenheid, Ke*).³⁰² More specifically, a complex calculation model was developed by the Ministry of V&W/RLD and the NLR (Dutch Aerospace Laboratory) that served as the blueprint for assessing aircraft noise, expressed in terms of Ke (see box 6.1).

Box 6.1. The calculation method for assessing aircraft noise in the Netherlands

The calculation model contains a description of the input data that is needed. The updated version (LL-HR-20-01) contains:

1. The estimated amount of take offs and landings during a year
2. The amount of take off and landings during a year for different aircraft types (ranging from extremely noisy chapter 3 aircrafts to quieter aircrafts of chapter 2 and 1)
3. Estimation of the runway use and flight routes
4. Estimation of flight times (at which hour does a specific type of aircraft make use of a specific route and runway).
5. Estimation of the horizontal and vertical spread around a flight route
6. Assumption about the ideal power setting of the aircraft motors (in practice aircrafts often have to use more power in order to reach the prescribed heights)
7. Assumptions about the ideal angle for ascending and descending (again, in practice those ideal routes can often not be followed)

The calculation model was developed in the 1970s by the Ministry of V&W/RLD and the NLR. The RLD was the sole actor that had access to the input data and the calculation model and NLR was assigned to carry out the calculations. More specifically, at first there had been three organizations that were allowed to do calculations, but when it turned out that they arrived at different results, due to the complexity and

³⁰⁰ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

³⁰¹ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving, p.52.

³⁰² See next page for elaboration of the Ke measure. See also chapter 5.

uncertainties about the input data, the RLD decided to make only one organization responsible (this was in the mid 1990s). The NLR was selected for this task.³⁰³

During the design of the model the data about measured levels, as obtained by the Kosten Committee, were not taken into account. In essence, the model was not validated, as the calculated results were not verified by comparing them with measured (actual) noise levels. Other international models that had gone through much more thorough validation procedures, like the Dutch model for calculating industrial noise (IL-HR-13-01) or the Integrated Noise Model (INM) of the Federal Aviation Administration were not taken into account either.³⁰⁴ Besides, the calculation method, the input data and all the results were not publicly accessible and therefore not verifiable.³⁰⁵ Finally, the model did not take all aircraft noise into account. Only those levels that were above 65 dB.³⁰⁶

The noise criterion was to be based on the existing policies as regards aviation noise. For one, the Ministry of VROM had stated in part D of the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning (1988) that the interim noise contours that had been set in the 'Structure Scheme Civil Aviation' of 1988³⁰⁷ served as the environmental limit to further mainport development.^{308 309} The interim contours were based on decisions made in 1981. Back then it had been decided that no new housing developments were allowed within the 35Ke contour, that houses within the 45Ke contour were to be isolated and that houses within the 65Ke contour were to be demolished.³¹⁰ The zones were based on the norm that a share of 25% seriously disturbed people was undesirable. Therefore, the 35Ke zone encircled the area in which 25% of the seriously disturbed people were living. This deviated from the norm that was taken up in the Noise Act that applied to noise pollution in the Netherlands in general, wherein 10% was taken as the norm of what was deemed acceptable. Therefore, the national government had decided to treat aviation noise differently than other types of noise pollution (i.e. higher noise levels were deemed acceptable).³¹¹ The zones were drawn in 1979, a time when policy makers drew lines on a spatial map by means of a pencil. These zones were therefore not very accurate. For example, the thickness of the contours was dependent on the type of pencil that was used.³¹² But, of course, no criteria for the selection of a pencil had been included. The 1979 zones are presented in figure 6.1.

³⁰³ Interview Muchall / Geluidsconsult, 2009.

³⁰⁴ Muchall, 1994; p.104

³⁰⁵ Interview Ten Wolde, 2010

³⁰⁶ See for example Berkhout, 2003

³⁰⁷ Ministry of V&W (1988) Structuurschema Burgerluchtvaartterreinen Deel D, 1988

³⁰⁸ Ministry of VROM (1988), Vierde Nota Ruimtelijke Ordening, Deel D. p.136


³⁰⁹ There was still no legally binding contour available. Originally, it was meant to lay down the 1979 contours in law, but due to the changing policy strategy (pro-growth), this was still not done anno 1990). In the meanwhile an interim-policy was employed (cf. Regional Plan North Holland, 1987).

³¹⁰ Ministry of V&W (1981), Besluit Geluidsbelasting Grote Luchtvaart

³¹¹ Broër, 2006, p. 95

³¹² Van Deventer, 2008

Figure 6.1 Indicative zones Schiphol for 35, 40 and 45Ke



Source: Ministry of V&W, Structuurschema Burgerluchtvaartterreinen Deel D, 1981, p.16

Initially, the noise contours had no legal status. They were indicative contours, to be used as guidelines when making decisions about spatial development (i.e. were to build and were not). Especially the province of North Holland and the municipalities needed such guidelines in order to make proper decisions about their housing schemes (e.g. about the amount and location).³¹³ As a consequence of the expected growth of the population, municipalities felt an urgent need to develop new housing locations and for this they needed to know which areas held prohibitions.³¹⁴ In other words, they needed to know the shape of the contours of the so-called '*vrijwaringszone*' (housing free zone), within which it was not allowed to construct new houses. Clarity was deemed necessary, as it wouldn't be the first time that the construction of new houses and the expansion of the airport would cause unnecessary noise pollution.³¹⁵ It would take until 1988 before the contours were actually laid down in law. However, even then the contours were still only temporary; they were interim contours. New insights that will be discussed next, made sure that the Ministry of V&W (RLD) designated new indicative zones in the spring of 1990. New housing plans needed to be located outside

³¹³ Interview Kolpa / Municipality of Haarlemmermeer, 2010; Clarity about the contours was also needed for assessing the possibilities of other spatial claims, concerning recreational areas and landside infrastructure.

³¹⁴ Interview Kolpa / Municipality Haarlemmermeer, 2010

³¹⁵ This was the case in the 1970s when noise pollution did not play a role in the field of housing, cf. Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996; Interview Krul / Schiphol, conducted by Yap, 2001

these zones, but the ones that had been prepared during the regime of the temporary interim noise contours, were allowed to proceed.³¹⁶

Although the contours entailed spatial restrictions, there were still no norms related to them. The development of adequate norms turned out to be one of the key challenges of the operationalization of the environmental objective. In the remainder of this section about noise we discuss this difficult process into more detail.

Reframing the environmental objective

During the PASO process a study group had been established, which was called ‘Capacity runway system Schiphol 1990’ and which consisted of the Ministry of V&W/RLD (chair), Schiphol, KLM and the Ministry of VROM/DGM.³¹⁷ The group concluded that it was not possible to accommodate the desired growth of the airport (as set by the critical mainport barrier) within the interim noise contours of the SBL, even though the aviation norms had already been less strict than the norms applied to other transportation sectors.³¹⁸ It was expected that growing aviation traffic would result in an increase in levels of noise pollution before the year 2000. Especially the locations in the immediate vicinity of the airport’s runways would be exposed to higher levels (i.e. Aalsmeer, Buitenveldert and Zwanenburg, see for example figure 6.2 that is presented later on).

Thus, the conclusion was that the further aviation growth that was deemed necessary for reaching the critical mainport barrier would result in broader noise contours (i.e. the areas bordering the 65Ke, 45Ke and 35Ke zone), thus including more houses within each zone. In other words, it became clear that the existing noise policy that had finally been legally ratified after so many years of political discussion frustrated the creation of a mainport. Moreover, it was clear that the dual objective as defined in Fourth Report on Spatial Planning Part D (1988) was not feasible. Here it was stated that the environmental quality was not allowed to deteriorate, which, amongst other things, at least implied a standstill as regards levels of noise pollution. As it had been clear that this would seriously hamper mainport development, the members of the Steering Group decided that the dual objective was in need of reformulation, which was done in one of the first draft versions of the PASO report (August 1990).³¹⁹ In the new formulation of the dual objective it was still about strengthening mainport development and improving the quality of the living environment of the Schiphol area. However, the notion that

³¹⁶ Bureau PAU, 2001; Interview Rensing / Province North Holland, 2001 conducted by Yap.

³¹⁷ And the Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaart Laboratorium (NLR) (National Laboratory on Aerospace Engineering, a government-subsided research institute) which was hired to do the actual calculations.

³¹⁸ Werkgroep Capaciteit Banenstelsel Schiphol (1990), Eindrapport, October 1990.

³¹⁹ Ket, 2001; p.101.

mainport development was to fit within the environmental conditions as defined in the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning (like the interim contours taken up in the SBL of 1988), was removed from the text.

Besides, the criterion for noise pollution was adapted: it was no longer derived from the amount of Ke in the housing areas around Schiphol, but it was derived from the amount of houses within the 35Ke zone. Thus, instead of calculating the amount of Ke within each residential area and assessing whether this did not deteriorate, one contour was drawn (between all 35Ke locations) within which a maximum amount of houses was allowed. Research had shown that this criterion offered more possibilities for combining the desired growth of aviation (of 6% per year) with an improvement of the noise situation. It was only by changing the noise criterion in this particular way that the members of the Study Group could continue to argue that reformulated dual objective was still feasible.³²⁰

Negotiating about a norm for noise

The reformulation was accepted by the other members of the Steering Group that were not part of the Study Group. However, it did ignite negotiations about the amount of houses that were deemed acceptable within the 35Ke zone. During this discussion two coalitions were formed within the Steering Group, an environmental coalition and an economic coalition.³²¹ The environmental coalition, consisting of the Ministry of VROM/DGM, North Holland and Haarlemmermeer, assumed that there would be 40 million passengers in 2015, and proposed a maximum of 9000 houses within the zone (that contained 16,500 houses in 1990). The pro-growth or economic coalition, consisting of Ministry of V&W/RLD, Schiphol, KLM and the Ministry of EZ opposed this claim, since it would frustrate further growth to 50 – 60 million pax. in 2015. They wanted to allow for at least 11.500 houses within the contour in 2015.

By that time, it had already become clear that a fifth runway was probably necessary for realizing the dual objectives in the long run. A new runway would make it possible to redirect flight routes over less densely populated areas, resulting in a reduction of noise pollution. Therefore, the new runway was not merely needed for reasons of additional capacity; its presumed positive effect on noise pollution was equally important. For this reason, the fifth runway was referred to as the Environmental Runway (*Milieubaan*).³²² Something which the environmental interest groups thought to be rather deceptive, as a reduction in people and houses exposed to noise did not imply an improvement of the

³²⁰ Ket, 2001; p.101.

³²¹ Driesen, 1995; Ket, 2001; Tan, 2001.

³²² Broër, 2006.

entire environment.³²³ This long term perspective of a new runway provided the members of the Steering Group with an opportunity to break through the impasse that characterized the negotiations about the amount of houses that would be acceptable within the 35Ke zone, by making a distinction between different norms for the short term and long term.³²⁴

The short term applied to the period that the four runway system was in operation (< 2003), whereas the long term applied to the five runway system (> 2003, as the fifth runway was planned to be opened in 2003). For the short term, the Steering Group agreed to a norm of 15,000 houses within the 35Ke contour. For the long term (> 2003) it was more difficult to forge an agreement. The Ministry of VROM/DGM engaged in bilateral negotiations with the Province of North Holland and Schiphol. In the end both actors thought a maximum amount of 10,000 houses within the 35Ke zone acceptable. The Minister of VROM presented these outcomes in the Steering Group and argued that the 10,000 houses norm was to be used during the remainder of the PASO process. The other members of the Steering Group were rather surprised by this announcement, but they did not protest, as it seemed to be the best solution possible for the time being, even though it had not been clear yet whether or not this norm was actually feasible.³²⁵ Nonetheless, it allowed the members of the Steering Group to break through the impasse, which was of crucial importance for developing the final PASO report on time. The noise norms for both the short term and mid term were thus approved by all actors part of the Steering Group and were eventually taken up in the end report of April 16th 1991.³²⁶ Nonetheless, the environmental coalition insisted on two additional agreements: (1) the aviation sector had to make an effort to lower the 10,000 to 9,000 houses (a so-called *inspanningsverplichting*) and (2) the level of noise pollution was to fall below 50Ke at the Aalsmeer location (the so-called enforcement point K). Besides, both the Ministry of VROM and the province of North Holland assumed that a considerable part of the additional flights could be substituted to rail in the near future.³²⁷

Noise during the night: postponing the issue of Night Flights

Still, the noise issue was not resolved entirely. In the scenario group that had been working on the critical mainport barrier, it had been assumed that night flights were essential for mainport development (especially as regards freight transport). However, night flights were deemed less acceptable, as they caused sleep disturbance. Several

³²³ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

³²⁴ Tan, 2001.

³²⁵ Interview Tan, 2010.

³²⁶ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving.

³²⁷ Ket, 2000; p.103.

actors thought it absolutely necessary to reduce these levels of sleep disturbance to a minimum and the issue of night flights therefore became part of the PASO discussion about noise. Especially the Ministry of VROM and the Province of North Holland argued that night flights had to be prohibited, or, at least, be minimized. The Ministries of V&W and EZ stressed that such a radical measure would seriously harm the position of Schiphol vis-à-vis other European airports in terms of competitiveness, thus endangering mainport development. From their perspective, banning night flights was only to be considered as part of the creation of a level playing field within the context of the European Union.³²⁸ They were backed by the conclusions of a research report of METRA (a consultant), wherein it was concluded that abandoning night flights would have a devastating effect on mainport development (1991).³²⁹ Again, a new impasse was on the rise. In order to allow for proper negotiations the right numbers about the current amount of night flights were required. These numbers were only available to the Ministry of V&W/RLD and Schiphol and they didn't want to include them in the PASO discussion. Tensions between the environmental coalition and the mainport coalition were rising further.

As a way out, the members of the Steering Group discussed the possibilities for a night regime that would reduce noise pollution to a minimum, while still making mainport development possible. Some of the critical issues that the Ministries of V&W and EZ on the one hand, and the Ministry of VROM and the Province of North Holland on the other hand, could not agree about were; whether or not to close the airport in between 0.00 and 3.00; whether or not to enforce a standstill of 13,000 seriously exposed houses in the spatial zone that was drawn around the airport; and whether or not to avert noisy airplanes. Meanwhile the sense of urgency to develop the final version of PASO increased. As the actors could not come to an agreement it was decided to postpone the issue of night flights and take it up again when the formal decision making was to begin (just as had been done with the issue of local air pollution).³³⁰

3. The issue of third party risk

Next to noise, third party risk was perceived to be an essential part of the environmental regulative system for Schiphol. In general, in the Netherlands third party risk policy was (and still is) about individual risk (IR) and group risk (GR), as described in the governmental decree 'Dealing with risks'.³³¹ Individual risk refers to the probability (per year) that a person permanently present (24 hours a day) at a particular location in the area around the airport would be killed as a direct consequence of an aircraft

³²⁸ Cf. Tan, 2001.

³²⁹ METRA (1991).

³³⁰ Tan, 2001.

³³¹ Ministry of VROM (1989), *Omgaan met risico's*, TK, 21137, Nr.5, 1989.

accident. Group risk refers to the probability (per year) that N or more people are killed as a direct consequence of a single aircraft accident within the defined area around the airport. The GR is not location specific and exists only where people are present temporarily or permanently.

During PASO a proper method for assessing individual and group risk was to be developed that could be applied to airport development.³³² The consultancy firm TECHNICA was assigned for this. In the research reports TECHNICA developed and applied a method. After application to Schiphol it was concluded that both the IR (1990) and the GR (1991) were already much higher than had previously been presumed.³³³ In essence, the results did not allow for any further expansion of the airport, a conclusion that was confirmed in the contra expertise. The reports were not made publicly available. According to one safety expert involved at that time this was deliberately done.³³⁴ Instead, decisions about third party risk were postponed. In the final report it was merely stated that policy measures for third party risk were to be developed in the near future.³³⁵ However, around the same time the advisory council for Environmental Hygiene, an independent council of the Ministry of VROM, noticed that PASO lacked any suitable norms for third party risk.³³⁶ More specifically, the Council stated that the risks of aviation greatly exceeded the norms that were laid down in the National Environmental Plan (NMP) that applied to other modes of transportation and to (chemical) installations (e.g. plants). It was obvious to all actors involved that application of similar norms to Schiphol would make further mainport development impossible.³³⁷ Moreover, it was obvious that further traffic growth would result in even higher third party risks. Despite this knowledge, the members of the Steering Group decided to include one important agreement about third party risk in the PASO report, namely that third party risks were not to increase in the future. It was especially this promise that would cause serious political problems in the future.

6.3.3 Developing the Final PASO report

Main decisions

The research and scenario track resulted in a first perspective on the future expansion of Schiphol. Next, it became important to draw up the final report based on all this information. Members of the Project Group were asked to develop a first concept of the

³³² Ale, 2000; Ale 2003.

³³³ Technica (1990), 1884/EJS/ib, Risk analysis of Aircraft Impacts at Schiphol Airport. Technica (1991), C2475/EJS Extension to Risk analysis of Aircraft Impact at Schiphol Airport.

³³⁴ Interview Prof. Ale / safety expert / member EIA committee Schiphol, 2009.

³³⁵ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving, p.54.

³³⁶ Advies over het Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving door de Centrale Raad voor Milieuhygiëne, 23 december 1991.

³³⁷ Ale, 2000; Interview Prof. Ale / safety expert / member EIA Committee Schiphol, 2009; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

final report, based on the available information and decisions that had been made earlier by the members of the Steering Group. This draft was presented in September 1990, but was rejected by the members of the Steering Group. Several issues were in need of further elaboration, like the issue of noise, night flights and third party risk, and the Steering Group did not want to take these issues already into account. In a response, a new committee was established, the Lauswolt Committee, that was to develop a new concept. The committee mainly consisted of members of the Steering Group, thus sidelining the members of the larger Project Group. Only after 3 months of negotiations the members of the Steering Group signed the Policy Covenant on December 14th of 1990.³³⁸

The final PASO report resulted in further operationalization of the dual objective in two ways. First, the critical mainport barrier was finally defined: at least 30 million passengers in 2003 and 50 million in 2015, with a mix of continental and intercontinental connections. Second, the environmental objective had been defined in terms of (1) noise limits: 15,000 houses within the 35Ke zone in 2003, and 10,000 after 2003; and (2) in terms of third party risk, i.e. a standstill. The construction of the fifth runway, a plan that had already been developed by Schiphol in 1967, and that was an important element of the new masterplan of the airport authority, was presented as the most important policy solution for realizing the dual objective. The new runway would reduce noise pollution, since its flight paths would run over less densely populated areas, while simultaneously delivering sufficient capacity to accommodate mainport development. The new runway was promoted as the *Milieubaan* (environmental friendly runway) and it clearly reflected the kind of win-win solutions between economy and environment that the interactive ROM approach had initially been designed for by the Ministry of VROM. Moreover, in the report it was argued that the 5P runway alternative seemed to be most effective (see figure 6.2). In the PASO report, the 5P alternative was therefore presented as the most desirable one, and it was given the status of preferred planning alternative for the years to come (during the formal decision making process).

Next to this primary policy solution (the need for 5P) two other important alternatives that could facilitate the achievement of both objectives were selected for further exploration. First, it was argued that short haul traffic could be substituted to rail, resulting in at least 11 -18% less air traffic. Several members of the Steering Group and the facilitating project group therefore wanted to make sure that Schiphol was to get connected to the European High Speed Train (HST) network, for which plans were

³³⁸ Bouwens & Dierikx, 1995; Driessen, 1995; Tan, 2001.

being made at that time.³³⁹ Second, the potential for relocating part of the traffic to regional airports had been explored by the research institute NEI. Based on the mainport definition that had been developed by this same bureau earlier (i.e. the critical mainport barrier) it was concluded that there was not much traffic that qualified for relocation, nor was there much support for this option.³⁴⁰ Concentration of air traffic was deemed more desirable than spreading it over different locations, especially because this would undermine the one-terminal concept of Schiphol that was believed to give Schiphol a competitive advantage compared to other potential hubs in Europe (as a consequence of the minimized walking distances between the gates, allowing for smooth transfers). Nonetheless, members of the Steering Group decided that both the connection to the HST and further exploration of the opportunities for relocating some traffic to Lelystad airport and other airports was to be taken up for further consideration during the process of formal decision making.³⁴¹

Figure 6.2 The desired 5th runway as negotiated during PASO (5P)



Source: Startnotitie MER Lange Termijn ONL (1999), p.15

In the end, the final PASO report contained 111 measures that were deemed necessary for achieving the dual objective. Besides, it contained recommendations for additional research that was deemed necessary for settling the different crucial issues that had been postponed during the PASO process (i.e. how to deal with local air pollution, night flights and third party risk).

³³⁹ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving, p.36-37; 61.

³⁴⁰ NEI, 1990; p.33.

³⁴¹ PASO (1989), Plan van Aanpak Schiphol en Omgeving, 1991; p.38.

Signing the PASO covenant, institutionalizing the dual objective

It would take five more months before the report was actually politically ratified. Once the draft plan was made public, the process of consensus building entered the next phase. The point was now to get social and political approval. The public actors that were part of the Steering Group organized separate public discussions. Sessions were held to inform the people, which was in line with the Dutch procedure that was legally required for decision making about spatial and infrastructure plans. This procedure had once been designed to make decision making more participatory, although it merely worked to inform people instead of triggering an interactive dialogue.³⁴² From the perspective of some local residents the procedure indeed felt like a formality, as the plans seemed to have passed the point of no return.³⁴³ As they were confronted with a plan that they had never heard of or seen before, and as there was little time to come to an organized response, some adjustments were made, but the main conclusions remained in place.

Next, the report was sent to the different governments involved (the local, provincial and national government) for political ratification (Parliament on the national level, the Provincial Board of North Holland and the municipal councils of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer). Although the plan had the status of a covenant, which held no legally binding obligations, the report was taken quite seriously by the politicians involved. The main reason for this was that the members of the Steering Group had decided that the covenant would serve as the main input for the formal decision making process that was to follow the PASO process. As such, the outcomes of the PASO process were expected to exert great influence on both the content and process of the next round of public policy making, wherein the PASO decisions would become elaborated and translated into formal policies.

Especially the members of the Provincial Board of North Holland weren't all that pleased with PASO outcomes. For one, a majority of the board members thought it unacceptable that there was still a possibility for an increasing number of night flights. This issue was therefore brought back on the agenda. Moreover, the board called for establishing maximum transport volumes that served as hard limits to growth. The other members of the Steering Group did not want to (re)negotiate these issues during the remainder of the PASO process (i.e. it had already been decided that additional research was to be carried out during the formal decision making process), whereas Schiphol and the Ministry of EZ opposed both provincial claims. Eventually the Ministry of VROM succeeded in developing an interim solution. They included the promise of an additional moment of evaluation. By 1993 a final norm for night flights had to be established. This

³⁴² See for example Woltjer 2000 on the participatory approaches enacted by the Ministry of V&W during the 1990s.

³⁴³ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009

norm would be used to assess future effects and the provincial board would be given the opportunity to decide upon its desirability. If not desirable or acceptable, the board was free to reject the PASO covenant afterwards. The Provincial Board hesitantly agreed with these terms and on April 16th of 1991 the PASO covenant was finally ratified by all members of the Steering Group. One main reason to sign PASO anyway was that the Province feared to be excluded from the formal decision making process about Schiphol's future.³⁴⁴ A few years later, the municipality of Haarlemmermeer indicated that they had signed the covenant for similar reasons.³⁴⁵ Not signing the covenant implied fewer possibilities for influencing the formal decision making process that was to follow up the PASO process. Such a perspective was not very appealing to the lower governmental authorities.

Criticism

The PASO covenant worked to further refine and institutionalize the dual objective, but according to the environmental interest groups the environmental limits were defined in such a way that they did not hamper mainport development. Several actors, most importantly the *Stichting Natuur & Milieu* (Foundation Nature & Environment, SNM) and some grassroots organizations of local residents, criticized the one-sided, growth oriented content of the Plan of Approach.³⁴⁶ From their perspective it was clear that mainport development had determined the kind of environmental limitations that were allowed, even though the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning (1988) had held the promise that it would be the other way around. A regional newspaper, *Haarlems Dagblad*, published the results of a survey, showing that 60% of the local residents thought that the improvement of the environment should be given top priority. The spatial planning department of the municipality of Amsterdam also pointed out the need to be more specific about the conditions under which growth was allowed. The RARO (the independent advisory council of the Ministry of VROM) also raised concerns about the feasibility of the dual objective, stating that a win-win approach was not very realistic.³⁴⁷ The same held true for the advisory council for Environmental Hygiene that kept criticizing the lack of suitable norms for third party risk. Nonetheless, no changes were made and the original PASO covenant served as a point of departure for the formal decision making process that was bound to begin.

³⁴⁴ Bureau PAU, 2001; Interview Rensing, province of North Holland, conducted by Yap 2001.

³⁴⁵ Interview Kolpa / Municipality of Haarlemmermeer, 2010; Interview Rensing, province of North Holland, conducted by Yap 2001.

³⁴⁶ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Griese / Local Resident, 2009.

³⁴⁷ Bouwens & Dierikx, 19976; Bureau PAU, 2001.

6.4 Preparing the PKB: Setting the Mainport Objective

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
PASO 1989 - 1991	ROM procedure part 1 – 6.2						
		ROM Procedure part 2 – 6.3					
PKB 1991 - 1995				Preparing the PKB – 6.4			
					Decision making about the short term (< 2003) – 6.5		
					Decision making about the long term (2003 - 2015) – 6.6		
							Final PKB decisions – 6.7

Setting up a new Project: Project Mainport and Environment Schiphol

In order to make sure that the PASO agreements were properly translated into formal policy measures on the national, regional and local level, the extensive government Project Mainport and Environment Schiphol (*Project Mainport en Milieu Schiphol, PMMS*) was set up.³⁴⁸ The establishment of a new Steering Committee Project Mainport and Environment Schiphol (PMMS) had already been announced in the final version of the PASO report (April 1991) and took effect in May 1991. It consisted largely of the same actors that had signed the PASO covenant (Province of North Holland, Ministry of V&W/RLD, Ministry of VROM/RPD & DGM, Ministry of EZ, Schiphol, KLM and the municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer). One new actor was included, Dutch Railways (*Nederlandse Spoorwegen, NS*), as a consequence of the large investments that were deemed necessary in national and international railway connections. Another important change was that the Ministry of V&W took over the leading role of the Ministry of VROM now the formal decision making period had started.³⁴⁹

The translation into formal policies required the enactment of different legal procedures. First and foremost the Spatial Key Decision procedure (*Planologische Kern Beslissing, PKB procedure*) was to be applied, as prescribed in article 2a of the Spatial Planning Act (*Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening, WRO*). The PKB procedure was an extensive

³⁴⁸ More specifically, the main tasks of PMMS were:

- > To supervise whether the PASO agreements were lived up to;
- > To control the policy procedures through which the PASO measures would be translated into policy;
- > To deal with fixations;
- > To prepare and coordinate the policy decisions for the decision making authorities (i.e. the Cabinet, the Provincial Board, the Municipal Boards, the Boards of Schiphol, KLM and Dutch Railways). PMMS prepared the decisions that had to be ratified by all these actors in order to become legally binding (PASO, 1991).

³⁴⁹ Interview De Waard / Ministry V&W, 2009

decision making procedure that resulted in a legally binding national spatial planning decision.³⁵⁰ The entire procedure consisted of four main parts (Part 1 Design, Part 2 Public Input, Part 3 Revised Version, Part 4 Final Version after Political Debate and Ratification). The Spatial Planning Act prescribed that for national decisions with great spatial consequences, like the development of new infrastructures or investments in the national economic structure, a PKB procedure had to be applied. The PKB decision was initially a spatial development tool, and most of the time the Ministry of VROM was in charge of the procedure. However, as already noted, the Ministry of V&W had taken over the leading role when the formal decision making had started. This could easily be legitimated, as Schiphol was in essence a piece of large infrastructure and such works belonged to the portfolio of the Ministry of V&W. Indeed, the Ministry had always been in charge of Schiphol affairs.^{351 352}

The PKB decision structured the decisions that were to be made on the regional and local level. More specifically, the PKB described the main decisions on mainport development and environmental improvements, and the consequential spatial reservations that had to be made in the Regional Spatial Plan (*Streekplan*, in this case of the province of North Holland). For example, spatial reservations were to be made for the development of new runways, office locations, for developing railway connections, for recreation, housing and additional airport capacity (e.g. new runways, terminals, aprons, taxiways). Both the PKB procedure for developing national spatial decisions and the procedure for revising a Regional Spatial Plan demanded an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).³⁵³ Due to their overlapping content it was decided to develop one extensive Integral EIA as part of the project mainport and environment Schiphol (PMMS), the so-called IMER (*Integrale Milieueffect rapportage, Integrated environmental impact assessment*). The IMER was not only meant for assessing the environmental effects, but also for deciding upon a further operationalization of the environmental objective. After all, during the PASO negotiations several environmental issues had not been solved but postponed (i.e. local air pollution, amount of night flights, third party risk).

At the same time, there was need for a further refinement of the mainport objective. For this reason the PMMS Steering Committee also called for a refined inventory of the Economic Effects (*Inventarisatie Economische Effecten, IEE*). In essence, the IEE was meant to gain insight in what was needed to become a mainport, whereas the IMER was

³⁵⁰ Van Buuren et al., 1999

³⁵¹ See chapter 5.

³⁵² Interview Klaver / Ministry of VROM, 2005

³⁵³ Project Mainport en Milieu Schiphol (1991) Startnotitie Integrale Milieu Effectrapportage Schiphol en Omgeving. Den Haag, Augustus 1991, p.9

meant to assess the environmental consequences of mainport development and to further define the criteria and norms that would apply. More specifically, the outcomes of the IEE were the input for the IMER calculations. In the end, both the outcomes of both processes were to result in a process of integral decision making, resulting in a final PKB report. In the remainder of this paragraph we first set out the IEE process. Next, we discuss the IMER process (in 6.5 and 6.6) and the further development of the final PKB reports.

Towards a Final Critical Mainport Barrier

The Ministry of EZ was made responsible for the IEE. Other actors included in the IEE project team were the Ministry of V&W/RLD, Schiphol, KLM, the Ministry of VROM/DGM & RPD, the Municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam, the Province of North Holland, Dutch railways and the *Centraal Plan Bureau* (CPB - Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis / Economic Policy, created in 1947).³⁵⁴ The Chambers of Commerce were consulted on ad hoc basis. The IEE project team was advised by an independent committee of experts, that advised about both the process and content, and that evaluated the quality of the final IEE report.³⁵⁵

Drawing on the work that had been carried out during the PASO process, the IEE taskforce assumed that the development of a hub and spoke network was crucial for becoming a mainport. This was based on the assumption that the ongoing deregulation of the aviation market would increase competition between airlines, and that only a few large airlines were to survive this fierce competition. This would automatically result in the concentration of air traffic on a few airports (i.e. the airports that served as the home base for the hub operations of these remaining airlines). Thus, Schiphol had to become one of the central hubs of Europe (in terms of routes, frequencies, passengers and freight), and this could only be achieved when the airport would serve as the home base of one of the future dominant carriers of Europe, preferably the KLM.³⁵⁶ The corporate strategies that Schiphol and KLM had brought into the PASO process had obviously paid off, as facilitating hub development was now formally included in the policy ambitions of the Dutch government. At the same time, it was stressed that the term mainport did not merely refer to becoming an aviation hub. It also referred to the development of a favourable and competitive business climate, suitable for attracting all types of economic activities, especially European Headquarters and European Distribution Centres.³⁵⁷ In short, mainport referred to becoming an aviation hub and a

³⁵⁴ CPB is one of the four large planning agencies in the Netherlands which are publicly funded and part of the national governmental structure, and which have a high degree of autonomy in defining their own research programs, as long as they are related to national policy issues.

³⁵⁵ PMMS (1993) Eindrapport Inventarisatie Economische Effecten, 1993

³⁵⁶ PMMS (1993) Eindrapport Inventarisatie Economische Effecten, 1993, p.6

³⁵⁷ PMMS (1993), Eindrapport Integrale Milieu Effect rapportage, 1993, p.6-7

focal point for economic activity. The main goal of the IEE was to develop a final and validated definition of the critical mainport barrier (still referring to the minimum amount of traffic needed for supporting mainport operations). It was assumed that such a minimum level of traffic was also needed for creating the kind of economic spin off that would turn the Schiphol area into a national focal point of economic activity. In order to refine the definition of the critical mainport barrier, three different steps were undertaken. First, as the aviation market was changing rapidly, new scenarios were to be developed by the IEE project team (step 1). It turned out that these new scenarios were different than those developed by the aviation sector, causing discussion (step 2). Based on these different insights the Steering Group developed a final definition of the critical mainport barrier (step 3).

Step 1. Developing New Air Traffic Scenarios

During the scenario development the CPB played a central role. Since its foundation in 1947, the CPB had developed macro-economic outlooks (long term), medium-term economic outlooks and long-term scenario studies in order to help the government manage and promote economic growth in the postwar reconstruction period.³⁵⁸ Anno 1993 the CPB was the main authority for developing future scenarios about the Dutch economy, and most of the time their advices exerted great influence on the decisions of the national government (and many others).³⁵⁹ Calling upon the CPB both showed the interests at stake and the technocratic foundation of policy making, which was characteristic for the Dutch government.³⁶⁰

In 1992 the CPB had developed three long-term scenarios for the Dutch economy.³⁶¹ Besides, traffic forecasts for aviation were developed, mainly based on the expected market growth and the expected effects of increasing competition on the aviation market. Theoretically speaking, nine scenarios could be derived from combining the economic scenarios and the aviation forecasts. However, it turned out that only three of them were internally consistent.³⁶² Those three scenarios were selected by the IEE project team to serve as the basis for further decision-making.

Next, the IEE taskforce elaborated the perspective on hub development. There was a minimum amount of traffic needed to sustain the hub and spoke network, and this minimum amount was to become the revised critical mainport barrier (after all, it was

³⁵⁸ CPB (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis) et al. (1995): *Planning in Overleg (Planning in Deliberation)*. Rijswijk: SCP.

³⁵⁹ Van Buuren, 2006; Van der Wouden et al., 2006

³⁶⁰ See chapter 5.

³⁶¹ Centraal Planbureau (1992), Dutch economy, 1990 – 2015.

³⁶² The CPB scenario Global Shift was combined with the aviation scenario Business as Usual, European Renaissance with European Liberalisation (ER/ELi) and Balanced Growth with Global Liberalisation (BG/GLi).

already firmly believed by the members of the taskforce that mainport development depended on hub development). As KLM had been designated the future hub carrier, the capacity demand was dependent on the market share that KLM would obtain and the specific way in which KLM would organize its network configuration.³⁶³ The IEE project team determined the yearly growth levels (3.5% for passengers and 4.9% for freight) by relating to the average growth of 5% of the period 1980 – 1991.³⁶⁴ In only two of the three scenarios (middle growth and high growth) hub development was assumed to be possible. For this reason the critical barrier was only determined for those two scenarios (the Er/Eli and BG/Gli scenarios). In ER/Eli a minimum amount of 37.7 million passengers was required for mainport development, while in BG/Gli a minimum amount of 54.9 was required.³⁶⁵

Step 2. Unrealistic scenarios? A different market reality

Meanwhile, both KLM and Schiphol were busy enacting their corporate strategies, which they expected to result in much higher growth rates. KLM assumed that becoming a leading intercontinental carrier could only be achieved by feeding its network with traffic from all over Europe. The KLM home market was simply too small to expand its operations. Therefore, in order to make hub-operations possible, KLM had to increase its amount of transfer passengers.³⁶⁶ In order to do so, they had to make sure that the connections were optimized and passengers were collected from all over Europe to fill the intercontinental network. A wave system structure was crucial for enabling this. Hence, in the winter of 1992, a wave system structure of three waves was implemented at Schiphol. Aircrafts from all over Europe would fly into Schiphol in the morning, making effective feeding to the departing intercontinental flights possible.³⁶⁷ This procedure would be repeated 3 times every 24 hours. The aim of such a ‘wave-system structure’ was to optimise the number and quality of connections offered by an airline and to make smooth transfers possible.³⁶⁸

The strategy was very successful: KLM grew at a rate of 10% a year in terms of traffic volumes, whereas the market was growing at a rate of 6%, and the share of transfer traffic would increase from 33% in 1990 to 44% in 1995. In August 1991, the KLM had already informed the IEE task force about their expectations about the consequences of their new network strategy. Furthermore, in the joint position paper on ‘capacity and

³⁶³ Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998; p.18.

³⁶⁴ PMMS (1993) Eindrapport Inventarisatie Economische Effecten, 1993, p.34.

³⁶⁵ PMMS (1993) Eindrapport Inventarisatie Economische Effecten, 1993.

³⁶⁶ Hub-and-spoke networks offer airline advantages on the cost and demand side in a highly competitive market. The advantages of these hub-and-spoke systems have been extensively discussed elsewhere (see e.g. Button, 2002; Hanlon, 1996; Pels, 2001).

³⁶⁷ Burghouwt, 2005.

³⁶⁸ Bootsma, 1997.

punctuality' of 1993, KLM and Schiphol discussed the need for and expected effects of future airline alliances. Building alliances was perceived to be one of the main strategies for further improving hub-operations. In order to deal with the tense competition on the airline market, it was expected that the airline market would eventually be dominated by a few global airline alliances. These global alliances linked together the hub-and-spoke networks of two or more large airlines that operated on geographically distinct markets, often on different continents. Such alliance building was needed to increase the scope and size of the airline networks, which normally meant an increase in passengers and freight volumes. Alliances lead to a reduction of the costs by producing economies of density, size and scope and by joint purchasing of aircraft. Moreover, an explosion of route-specific alliances or regional (continental) alliances was expected, as a means for reducing competition (which is most effective when the partners serve the same routes).³⁶⁹

In the 1993 position paper KLM indicated that the expected future growth of alliance building was not adequately addressed in the critical mainport barrier. For one, KLM was already intensifying its cooperation with its American counterpart Northwest Airlines (NWA). The KLM/NWA alliance got a tremendous boost when the Dutch and the US government signed what was effectively the first *Open Skies* agreement that inaugurated a new phase of international deregulation in September 1992.³⁷⁰ The agreement gave KLM full access to all destinations in the US (which increased from 9 to 200). Moreover, it allowed KLM to receive anti-trust immunity from the US Department of Transport.³⁷¹ The alliance resulted in the integration of the KLM and NWA networks. Besides, KLM announced its intentions to ally with other airlines, in order to increase the amount of destinations from which the intercontinental flights could be fed.³⁷² Based on these assumptions, KLM was actively looking for partners, which was likely to result in additional traffic volumes.

The success of KLM's hubbing strategy very much depended on the infrastructure at Schiphol airport. Schiphol's corporate strategy, as developed in its Masterplan (1989),

³⁶⁹ Doganis, 2001; Oum et al, 2001.

³⁷⁰ Amongst other things, the open skies bilateral consisted of (1) open route access: this meant that KLM was allowed to fly to any point in the US with full traffic rights; (2) no frequency or capacity control. The open skies agreement went much further than the previous open market agreements. They improved (amongst other things) market access and tariff regulation, further strengthening competition (Doganis, 2001, p.32).

³⁷¹ It enabled KLM to exploit more fully the potential benefits from its partnership with Northwest. This allowed to share codes, integrate their schedules and pricing policies. Code sharing means that airlines add their partner's code to their own flight number. It was the new open skies agreement of 1992 that granted KLM immunity from prosecution for a commercial agreement which might otherwise be considered anti-competitive in terms of the US anti-trust legislation (Mendes de Leon, 2002).

³⁷² Burghouwt, 2005; Jagersma, 2003.

was essentially about facilitating KLM's hubs operations.³⁷³ It was expected that only a few (three or four) of such hub-airports were needed in Europe in the future, since only three or four global airline alliances were expected to survive within a market of ongoing concentration of traffic volumes. As KLM wanted to become one of the remaining hub carriers, Schiphol wanted to become one of the remaining hub airports.³⁷⁴ As such, the growth potential of Schiphol was also largely dependent on KLM's success of becoming a leading global carrier. KLM and Schiphol were mutually dependent for making future profits, which was an important incentive for tuning their corporate strategies. Essentially, due to the adoption and intensification of hub-and-spoke systems, the function of airports in general changed significantly. Schiphol wanted to evolve from an origin-destination node to a transfer node for which heavy infrastructure investments were needed. Hub-and-spoke traffic had other requirements than origin-destination traffic. Hub-and-spoke networks implied both a concentration of traffic in space and time. From the airline or alliance viewpoint, spatial concentration required a vast daily capacity at the hub airport. Besides, because hubbing airlines operated wave-system structures to facilitate transfers, the hub airport needed a large peak-hour capacity, both at the runway, the terminal, but also of the land-side infrastructure.³⁷⁵ To ensure the competitive strength of a hub, the transfer process should become as reliable and smooth as possible. In the end, all kinds of investments were made by Schiphol in order to supply sufficient (peak hour) capacity and to minimize connection times between flights (in order to make the airport an attractive to transfer point). Turn around times for airplanes were made shorter and a new (faster) luggage system was developed. The optimization of the 4-runway system that would result in more capacity was already set in motion (two-sided use of Zwanenburgbaan and extension of Kaagbaan). A new air traffic tower that was needed to improve the overview over the airport was established in 1991. New piers were developed, which were designed to receive Jumbo jets. Extra gates were developed, which were necessary for KLM's new wave system (which was implemented in 1992) and check in times were made shorter. The terminal was extended to the west, which was opened in May 1993. This terminal enhanced capacity to 27 million pax. The unique one-terminal concept further improved transfer times. People did not need to take the bus to other terminals, as all gates were linked to one terminal.³⁷⁶ All in all, during the early 1990s

³⁷³ Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, Masterplan, 1989.

³⁷⁴ This trend of concentration is due to the fact that every alliance creates one mega-hub on each continent on which the intercontinental flights are concentrated. These airports are the primary hubs in the hub and spoke networks of the airlines and they function as the major transfer points between the networks of the alliance partners (Burghouwt & Huys, 2003).

³⁷⁵ Burghouwt & Huys, 2003; Doganis & Odoni, 2003

³⁷⁶ This successful one terminal concept was not derived from an intended strategy. In the 1970s and 1980s Schiphol wanted to build a second terminal, but the national and regional public authorities blocked this. In the 1990s this turned out to be in favour of the airport, since the one-terminal concept could become one of the trademarks of Schiphol (both in terms of smooth transfers and convenience for passengers) (cf. Bouwens & Dierikx, 1997).

both KLM and Schiphol were heavily investing to turn their operations into an efficient hubbing machine.

The Steering Committee of the PMMS had acknowledged the importance of the corporate strategies of KLM and Schiphol and therefore the elaboration of Schiphol's Masterplan had already been made an integral part of the PMMS project. This way, it was attempted to align the PKB decision making procedure with the actual (and intended) developments at the airport. Schiphol and the Ministry of V&W were the main responsible actors for this. However, when adjusting Schiphol's masterplan to the IEE results it became clear that there was a tension between the scenarios as developed by the IEE project team and the corporate strategies as enacted by KLM and Schiphol. The expected amount of traffic needed for successfully exploiting a hub and spoke network, which legitimated the heavy investments that were made by both the KLM and Schiphol, was higher than the amounts of traffic that were deemed necessary by the projectteam of IEE. Both KLM and Schiphol had been part of the IEE project team and they had brought this tension to the fore at several times. In doing so, they not merely referred to their own forecasts. They also pointed out that the average yearly growth had been 7,9% during period 1965 – 1990, while simultaneously arguing that the forecasts made by the aviation industry (like those of Boeing) were much higher.³⁷⁷ The Advisory Committee of the IEE also indicated that the lower growth levels that had been adopted by the IEE Taskforce were not very realistic.³⁷⁸ Especially when the real growth rates of 1990 – 1993 were taken into account. If this growth continued, Schiphol would meet its capacity limits within a few years. Nonetheless, a majority of the members of the IEE project team wanted to stick to the three scenarios that had been developed in cooperation with the CPB. The implication was that the IEE taskforce refuse to alter its definition of the minimum critical mainport barrier (of 37.7 million passengers).³⁷⁹ In the end, it was up to the Steering Group of PMMS to make a final decision about the critical mainport barrier.

Step 3. The Steering Group PMMS defines the critical mainport barrier

On the 6th of April 1993 the Steering Group of PMMS decided that the lowest critical mainport barrier was to be used as point of departure for further decision making during the remainder of the PKB process. Since mainport development was only possible in the middle and high growth scenario, the middle scenario was selected as the only scenario that was to be used from that moment onwards (i.e. with a barrier of 37.7 million passengers). This made it possible to speed up the decision making process, which was necessary due to increasing time pressure that was caused by a 1992 verdict of the

³⁷⁷ Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998; Interview Krul / Schiphol, 2000, conducted by Yap.

³⁷⁸ Advies Commissie IEE (1993), Letter to the Chairman of PMMS, September 20th 1993.

³⁷⁹ Interview Krul/ Schiphol 2000 conducted by Yap, 2001.

Supreme Court. The Court had ordered for a legally binding regulative system for noise as regards the four runway system before the end of 1995, as part of the lacking legal protection of local residents.³⁸⁰ The local residents had insisted on such legal protection ever since the 1960s. By 1979 it had been announced that legally binding norms were to be related to the different noise zones that were established at that time. Nonetheless, anno 1992 there were still no final norms available, which gave way to the 1992 verdict of the Supreme Court.³⁸¹

The IEE project team and KLM and Schiphol separately advised against the selection of this critical mainport barrier. The IEE team indicated that all scenarios were equally likely to occur in reality and it was not meant to choose one of them. KLM and Schiphol supported this argument, while simultaneously arguing that none of the three scenarios that the PMMS Steering Group had been choosing from was very realistic. Nonetheless, the Steering Group stuck to its decision to use the one scenario. Later, it would turn out that one important reason for adopting this scenario was that the preliminary results of the IMER (Integrated Environmental Impact Assessment) indicated that this scenario offered the best possibilities for reconciling the environmental objective (as was being operationalized during the IMER) and mainport objective (i.e. required developments for achieving the critical mainport barrier). From a political perspective, this made the scenario the most desirable one, although not necessarily the most realistic one. As such, the PMMS deliberately adopted a rather risky strategy by organizing all further decision-making around this preferable scenario, which, of course, was partly given in by the mounting time pressure.³⁸² The selected scenario was used for developing policy decisions about short-term development (< 2003; see 6.5) and the long term (> 2003; see 6.6).

6.5 Decisions Making about the short term Four Runway System (< 2003)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
PASO 1989 - 1991	ROM procedure part 1 – 6.2						
		ROM Procedure part 2 – 6.3					
PKB 1991 -				Preparing the PKB – 6.4			

³⁸⁰ Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998.
³⁸¹ Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.
³⁸² Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998; CPB, 1998

		Decision making about the short term (< 2003) – 6.5
		Decision making about the long term (2003 - 2015) – 6.6
		Final PKB decisions – 7.7

Around the same time that the critical mainport barrier was being defined, the environmental effects of further Schiphol development were being assessed as well. As indicated before, an integral Environmental Impact Assessment (IMER) was carried out, combining national and regional concerns. The IMER was a joint initiative of the three Ministries of V&W, VROM, EZ, the Province of North Holland (responsible for the Regional Spatial Plan) and Schiphol and was supervised by the Steering Group of PMMS.³⁸³ In line with PASO report, the IMER, distinguished between two planning periods (short term < 2003 and long term > 2003), within which different environmental limits were to apply. During the first period the right conditions were being created for realizing the environmental objectives set for the second period.

As regards the short term, the main task was to assess the environmental effects of further investments in the four runway system that had been agreed upon in the PASO and the increase in air traffic that would be its result. More specifically, it was to be assessed whether or not the intended southward extension of one runway with 250 metres (Kaagbaan) and the two-sided use of another runway (Zwanenburgbaan) and the additional capacity that this would deliver (as proposed during the PASO process), were possible within the environmental limits that had been set for the short term. As taken up in the PASO report, those limits were solely defined in terms of noise pollution: if there would be less than 15,000 houses within the 35Ke zone, the environmental objective was achieved. This turned out to be a difficult challenge.

Fitting 15,000 houses within 35Ke

The Work group responsible for developing the zone consisted of experts of the Ministry of V&W (RLD), Air Traffic Control (ATC, *Luchtverkeersleiding*), Schiphol, KLM, the Province of North Holland, and the research institute NLR. As discussed before, NLR was assigned by the Dutch government to do the noise calculations.³⁸⁴ These calculations were based on specific assumptions. We already introduced the calculation method that was being applied (recall box 6.1). In 1980 the prescriptions for calculations had been laid down in law.³⁸⁵ It contained prescriptions about input data for the model. The calculations were based on ideal type information about aircraft noise

³⁸³ PMMS (1991), Startnotitie IMER, 1991; p.7

³⁸⁴ Ket, 2001

³⁸⁵ Interdepartementale commissie geluidshinder, 1980.

per aircraft that was delivered by the airline producers (like Boeing and Airbus) and that could not be verified by others. That is, these input data had been measured, which made the noise calculation model an empirical model (i.e. based on noise levels that had actually been measured). Moreover, the airline producers had a clear incentive for being overly optimistic about the noise levels of their aircrafts, as low noise levels were becoming a more and more important selling point. For this reason, one could assume that the data delivered by the producers was based on ideal type scenarios that could never be realized in the real world, i.e. indicating too low levels of noise pollution.³⁸⁶ At the same time, in the case of Schiphol it was argued that it was not yet possible to measure aircraft noise, due to the impossibility of separating aircraft noise from other noises, like bypassing cars and gusts of wind.³⁸⁷ The fact that the calculation model itself depended on measures from the aviation industry as input data, while at the same time it was argued that measuring noise around Schiphol was not possible, appeared to be rather contradictory to some noise experts.³⁸⁸

Despite these difficulties the Work Group that had to fit 15,000 houses within the 35Ke zone decided to calculate the average noise pollution of a specific day by using the calculation method. Thus, the input data per aircraft delivered by the airline producers were used in the calculation procedure without further verification. Next, flight routes were forecasted, which were derived from the route schemes of the airline companies. Besides, other data about several input parameters were not exactly known, like the weather conditions, the weight of the airplanes, the mean deviation of the estimated flight routes, the height of the flights, the type of aircraft, and these data were therefore based on estimations. Estimations could differ for different years. This implied an opportunity for Schiphol and KLM, who were partly responsible for delivering the input data, to select more favourable data. After all, it was difficult to actually control whether the estimations equalled reality.³⁸⁹

The final outcomes were defined in terms of an average level of noise pollution during a specific day. This meant that the peaks that coincided with the incoming and outgoing bundles of flights of KLM's wave system were levelled by non-peak periods. It was clear that noise pollution was much higher during those peak periods, as there were much more flights arriving and departing. By taking the average of the day the peaks could be levelled out by the non-peak periods. If the peaks were taken as the main indicator the level of noise pollution would be much higher, resulting in a much broader

³⁸⁶ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise expert and Member of the EIA Committee Schiphol, 2010; Interview Muchall / Geluidsconsult, 2009.

³⁸⁷ Interview Muchall / Geluidsconsult, 2009.


³⁸⁸ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise Expert / EIA Committee Schiphol, 2010.

³⁸⁹ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Muchall / Geluidsconsult, 2009; Interview Wubben NLR / To70, 2009.

noise zone containing much more houses. This would have made it impossible to reach the critical mainport barrier within the environmental limit of 15,000 houses (as much more houses would fall inside the 35Ke zone, thus prohibiting additional flights). Nevertheless, the first calculations showed that the norm could also not be realized when using the averages as a yardstick. This was due to the fact that the expected amount of noisy aircrafts (so-called chapter 2 aircrafts) was still very high in 1995, the year that was taken as point of reference for the calculations. Schiphol proposed to change the reference year in 1997. It was expected that the share of noisy chapter 2 airplanes would be much lower by then as a consequence of fleet replacements of several airline companies that visited Schiphol. Furthermore, it had already been clear that the norms could never be enforced prior to 1997 as a consequence of the planned constructions to the two runways (two-sided approach of the Zwanenburgbaan and extending the Kaagbaan). These would temporarily result in less efficient flight routes, passing over densely populated areas. For both reasons it was agreed upon by the members of the Work Group that it was better to use estimated input data of 1997.³⁹⁰

Using these new assumptions as input for the model, the NLR calculated that it would reduce the amount of houses only a little bit (to 18,600). Thus, the norm of 15,000 houses was not met yet. Still, the deadline ordered by verdict of the Supreme Court was closing in (i.e. the regulative system was to be ready before the end of 1995). In fact, when the remaining formal decision making procedures were taken into account (i.e. the four steps that the PKB procedure entailed), there was no time left for further calculations. Instead of making new calculations, the Work Group decided to simply draw a zone that contained approx. 15,000 houses. The zone around one specific runway (the Buitenveldertbaan) that contained a lot of houses as its flight routes directly ran over south Amsterdam, was deliberately made smaller, and the zones around the less populated areas were extended (see figure 6.3).

Figure 6.3 Indication noise contours 35Ke (red line) and 40Ke (purple line) Schiphol for the four runway system



Source: Planologische Kernbeslissing (1993), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving, deel 1 Ontwerp PKB. P.44

³⁹⁰ Van Deventer, 2008; Ket, 2000.

The constructed zone contained 15,100 houses, but it was not clear whether this zone could be realized in practice. Therefore, in the PKB part 1 (December 1993) it was stated that the zone was indicative and that the final zone that was to be taken up in the final PKB report (Part 4) could be different.³⁹¹ However, the promise that the critical mainport barrier would not result in more than 15,000 houses within the 35Ke zone remained in place.

New calculations

After the presentation of the PKB part 1 the effects of the proposed zone were calculated in a so-called Executive Environmental Impact Assessment for the 4-runway system (*Uitvoerings Milieueffect rapportage, UMER S4S2*).³⁹² The proposed zone was translated into input data for the calculation model (amongst other things 5% of the arrivals on the Buitenveldertbaan had been removed to another runway, i.e. the Schiphol oostbaan). It turned out that the zone still occupied 17,000 houses. Simply moving traffic from one runway to another clearly was not sufficient. A new measure was introduced. The capacity of two other runways (the Kaagbaan and Zwanenburgbaan) was enhanced, which made it possible to reduce the use of the Buitenveldertbaan (with the densely populated area at its top). This resulted in 15,100 houses within the zone. However, there was a price to pay. The implication was that more flights would cross the centre of Amsterdam, considerably increasing noise pollution there. This was something that the municipality of Amsterdam did not accept. Different alternatives were explored and in the end three options were presented:

1. Reducing the amount of flights, resulting in 15,200 houses
2. Reducing the use of the Buitenveldert runway, resulting in 15,300 houses
3. Further reducing the share of noisy airplanes, resulting in 14,400 houses

Only the third option allowed for the realization of the 15,000 houses goal, and this option was therefore presented as the most favourable option in the final report of the UMER S4S2.³⁹³ Still, reducing the amount of noisy planes was not seen as a real solution and during the elaboration of the PKB part 3, the second option was elaborated too. It turned out that a reduction of the use of the Buitenveldertbaan implied that there would be only one runway available for arrivals for 18% of the time. This would bring the peak capacity below the capacity needs of KLM's wave system. The only solution

³⁹¹ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1993), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving, deel 1 Ontwerp PKB.

³⁹² PMMS (January 1994), Milieu effectrapport ten behoeve van het besluit over de vaststelling van de geluidszone van de luchthaven Schiphol voor het vierbanenstelsel met zuidelijk gebruik van de Zwanenburgbaan en het verlengen van de Kaagbaan. UMER S4S2.

³⁹³ PMMS (January 1994), Milieu effectrapport ten behoeve van het besluit over de vaststelling van de geluidszone van de luchthaven Schiphol voor het vierbanenstelsel met zuidelijk gebruik van de Zwanenburgbaan en het verlengen van de Kaagbaan. UMER S4S2.

was to stick to the old option, i.e. increase flights over Amsterdam. However, this was still something the municipality of Amsterdam opposed, especially because it would open the door for even higher levels of noise pollution in the near future. Nonetheless, a solution was to be developed somehow by rescheduling flights over three runways (Buitenveldertbaan, Kaagbaan and Zwanenburgbaan). Three actors, i.e. Air Traffic Control, Schiphol and the municipality of Amsterdam started to negotiate about this, which resulted in a so-called Letter of Intent that was signed in May 1994. It was agreed upon that the amount of direct approaches passing right over the center of Amsterdam was not to exceed 2% of the total amount of approaches, with the intention to not exceed 1%. In 1992 the amount was 0.9%.³⁹⁴ ³⁹⁵ The remaining flights were to be spread over other runways (i.e. Kaagbaan and Zwanenburgbaan).

Another round of calculations: PKB part 3

According to Air Traffic Control the changes in runway use and flight patterns in 1994 and 1995 made it necessary to update the existing calculations that had been based on the patterns of 1993. In September 1994 it turned out that the new patterns had given rise to a broader zone, containing 16,200 houses.³⁹⁶ The Work Group had already calculated almost all possible alternatives, so all hopes were set on the new calculation model that was being prepared at that time and that was to be used for calculating the contours for the long term (> 2003). The main difference with the old model was that it made use of the actual flight routes of the airplanes. A new system had been developed (FANOMOS: Flight track and Noise Monitoring System) that made it possible to register the actual flight routes of the airplanes by their radar tracks.

It resulted in different flight paths, and especially differences in the way the flight paths were horizontally spread around the routes (a route was a rather broad area, whereas the flight paths referred to the actual routes followed by the airplanes, which had to fit within the bandwidth of the routes). In the old model the flights were symmetrically spread around a central flight path that lied in the middle of the route. But application of the new model resulted in a different picture. The flights were not horizontally spread, but had a deviation to one direction of the routes.³⁹⁷ Thus the routes were to be changed, and by a lucky coincidence this resulted in different noise contours wherein only 14,900 houses fell within the zone.³⁹⁸ As such, the application of the new model to the short term development of Schiphol (< 2003) made it possible to combine the mainport objective and the noise objective for the short-term development. It also implied that, if

³⁹⁴ There were 120,000 landings, of which 1128 landed via the direct approach-route on the Kaagbaan.

³⁹⁵ Letter of Intent 'Direct Approaches Kaagbaan', 1994.

³⁹⁶ Ket, 2000.

³⁹⁷ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

³⁹⁸ Ket, 2000.

air traffic would grow any faster than assumed in the calculations (based on the scenario with the critical mainport barrier that had been selected by the PMMS Steering Group) the contour would broaden and the norm would not be met. Still, for the time being all actors were satisfied with the outcome. After all, it made the dual objective as defined for the short term possible, at least on paper. Nonetheless, the considerable doubts about the validity of the results of the calculations remained in place. Doubts increased when researchers showed that the amounts of aircraft noise they had been measuring were significantly higher than the amounts that had been used in the calculations.

A new problem emerges: Differences between measured and calculated noise levels (1989 – 1995)

In 1989 some employees of the newly established Environmental Agency of the Municipality of Amsterdam (*Milieudienst Amsterdam*) started to wonder whether the many calculations about expected noise levels that were used to draw the contours were actually valid. After all, the calculation method contained a large amount of assumptions and estimations. The municipal environmental service discussed this with the research agency of the municipality that was also recently established (OMEGAM), and together they decided to develop a measurement system, in order to assess whether the calculated levels were right. They had to develop this system by themselves, as the national government had clearly pointed out that noise levels could not be measured in a valid way, and was therefore not willing to invest in such research. The measurement system was called *Luistervink* and its first measuring point was brought into operation in October 1990 (on an apartment complex called Bolestein located in Buitenveldert location, in front of the Buitenveldertbaan). A second point became operative from January 1992 onwards (on an apartment building called Goereesepad in Amstelveen) (see figure 6.4). On April 12th of 1993 OMEGAM published the first results.³⁹⁹

As can be drawn from the figure, the selected measure points were located at both sides of one runway (the Buitenveldertbaan), which made it possible to compare the results. The measured noise pollution showed that the real noise pollution was much higher (approx. 5Ke) than the calculated pollution.⁴⁰⁰ In a subsequent report that was published on 21st of September in 1993, the method for measuring had been validated and it was concluded that there could be a maximum deviation of 2Ke in the final results.^{401 402}

³⁹⁹ Muchall, R.C., (1993) Akoestisch onderzoek naar de geluidbelasting vanwege de luchtvaart op woningen langs de oostelijke aanvliegroute van Schiphol door middel van meting. OMEGAM rapport nr. 1470101, April 12th 1993.


⁴⁰⁰ Muchall, R.C., (1993) Akoestisch onderzoek naar de geluidbelasting vanwege de luchtvaart op woningen langs de oostelijke aanvliegroute van Schiphol door middel van meting. OMEGAM rapport nr. 1470101, April 12th 1993, p. 13.

⁴⁰¹ Muchall, R.C., (1993) Validatie en ijking van de automatische vliegtuiglawaaimetingen van het meetsysteem Luistervink. OMEGAM rapport nr. 1470101-2, September 21st 1993, p. 9.

⁴⁰² See also Muchall, R.C., (1993) Onderzoek naar de verschillen tussen meting en berekening van vliegtuiglawaai op meetpunten in Amsterdam en Amstelveen. OMEGAM rapport nr. 1470101-3.

Therefore, the main conclusion of the research was that the calculation method that was used in the Schiphol policy debate underestimated the actual level of noise pollution. The 35Ke contour was therefore drawn too close to the airport. Based on the measurements the contour had to be twice as large (50% larger). However, drawing such a wider contour would imply that the amount of houses (60%) and people (100%) within the 35ke would considerably increase. Especially because the housing density was higher in these areas.⁴⁰³ This conclusion was not very desirable at a time when the PMMS Steering Group was struggling to develop a 35Ke contour containing a maximum of 15,000 houses (and 10,000 houses for the long term, as we shall discuss next). More specifically, if the measured results were used, this was simply impossible.⁴⁰⁴ The Ministry of V&W/RLD who was responsible for the calculated numbers rejected the findings of OMEGAM, arguing that the results were invalid. They argued that too much noise was included that was not caused by aviation (especially heavy gusts of wind, but also other sources that produced sound), which caused considerable higher levels of noise pollution.

Figure 6.4 Locations of the 2 Measuring Points, 1991 - 1992



Source: Muchall, 1994

By that time it was not clear anymore whether the calculated or the measured numbers were more realistic.⁴⁰⁵ In order to develop some clarity about this, the municipality of Amsterdam installed a task force Noise Pollution. However, during the execution of the

⁴⁰³ Muchall, R.C. (1994), Vliegtuiglawaaimonitoring met patroonherkenning, beter dan berekeningen? In *Geluid* Nr.3, September 1994, pp. 102 – 107.

⁴⁰⁴ Interview Muchall / Geluidsconsult, 2009.

⁴⁰⁵ See also Press Release *Dagblad Trouw*, November 18th 1999. De lange lijdensweg naar werkelijke geluidshinder, by Vincent Dekker.

research the department of Economic Affairs of the municipality of Amsterdam that was in charge of the Schiphol issue decided that they wanted to stick to the calculated numbers and thus end the measurement program. For this reason the task force Noise Pollution of the municipality was abolished in December 1993.⁴⁰⁶ At that time, the task force had clear indications that the measured levels had been valid. But these results were never presented in a final report. According to the researchers involved, Economic Affairs who chaired the committee refused to write it down.⁴⁰⁷ Nonetheless, the director of the Environmental Agency of Amsterdam did send a letter to the alderman of the Environment, wherein she explained that she expected her to take the results of the earlier OMEGAM studies seriously (including its far-reaching policy implications).⁴⁰⁸

The Municipal Board of Amsterdam decided to carry out a second opinion by an independent organization for which Dr. Isermann from the German Aerospace Laboratory was assigned. Isermann, who was known as an excellent scientist in the field of noise,⁴⁰⁹ was to explain the differences between the calculated (NLR) and measured (OMEGAM) levels of noise pollution. He concluded that, if some flaws were taken into account there would still be a difference between both methods, but this difference would be smaller (2Ke instead of 5Ke).⁴¹⁰ His main recommendation was to further refine the method for measuring noise and use it to validate and improve the calculation method. For one, the calculations could be improved by using a revised data base, for which improved measurements were needed (after all, it was an empirical method that needed to be validated).⁴¹¹

The project team that had been supervising the research and that consisted of people of the municipality of Amsterdam, the Ministry of V&W/RLD and other noise experts (of TNO, a well known research institute for applied science) agreed upon the results and called them scientifically valid. Members of the supervisory team therefore expected a lot of publicity when the report would become published.⁴¹² However, the report was never made publicly available. According to one member of the supervising team, the Ministry of V&W and the Municipality of Amsterdam (department of Economic Affairs) must have thought this to be undesirable, as they feared the political

⁴⁰⁶ Interview Muchall / Geluidsconsult, 2009.

⁴⁰⁷ Interview Muchall / Geluidsconsult, 2009.

⁴⁰⁸ Milieudienst Amsterdam (1994), Letter sent to the Alderman for Environmental Affairs "Collegebehandeling op 1 maart 1994 van Omegamrapport inzake vliegtuiglawaai Buitenveldertbaan." February 1994, Nr. 8700002/02.

⁴⁰⁹ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise Expert / Former member of the Isermann Supervisory Committee and Member of the EIA Committee Schiphol, 2010.

⁴¹⁰ Isermann, U.(1995), An investigation on the differences between Noise measurements and calculations performed at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol for 1992. Final Draft; p.37.

⁴¹¹ Isermann, 1995; p.45.

⁴¹² Interview Ten Wolde / Noise Expert / Former member of the Isermann Supervisory Committee and Member of the EIA Committee Schiphol, 2010.

implications.⁴¹³ Instead, the department of Economic Affairs of the Municipality of Amsterdam issued a press release. In the press release it was stated that OMEGAM had drawn some incorrect conclusions, which explained the higher levels of noise pollution. If all wrong assumptions were corrected, a marginal difference in between 1 – 2Ke was all that remained and this was deemed acceptable.⁴¹⁴ This was not in line with the results of the Isermann evaluation, which was selectively quoted.⁴¹⁵ His main conclusion, i.e. that the calculation method was in itself an empirical method that needed to be validated by actual measurements, was ignored.

Nonetheless, the issue of measuring noise was settled in this way and was removed from the agenda. As we shall discuss later, it was only during the political discussion in 1995 that the issue of measuring was shortly brought back on the agenda. For the time being, the Steering Group of PMMS could stick to their decision to solely rely on the calculation model for preparing policy decisions for the PKB report. As we shall see later on in the case, the Isermann report was kept hidden for quite some time. And during the few moments in time that researchers tried to bring his findings to the public attention, it would make little difference.⁴¹⁶

Preparing the PKB for the short term (December 1993)

In the Cabinets perspective of the PKB (part 3, December 1993), the dual objective for the short term was defined in the following way:⁴¹⁷

1. Southward extension of the Kaagbaan (250 metres)
2. Two-sided use of Zwanenburgbaan
3. 15,000 houses within 35Ke zone, based on the housing situation of 1990.

With regard to the southward extension of the Kaagbaan, the EIA Committee indicated that it was a missed opportunity that a northward extension had not been considered.⁴¹⁸ One of the essential conclusions of UMER S4S2 was that the proposed decisions were of crucial importance for establishing an effective and efficient five-runway system that was to become operative from 2003 onwards.⁴¹⁹ In the end, the PMMS team and the cabinet thought that the implementation of these three decisions would make it possible

⁴¹³ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise Expert Former member of the Isermann Supervisory Committee and Member of the EIA Committee Schiphol, 2010

⁴¹⁴ Press Release Municipality of Amsterdam issued by the Alderman of Economic Affairs, June 7th 1995. Geluidsoverlast van vliegverkeer onafhankelijk getoetst.

⁴¹⁵ Interview Muchall / Geluidsconsult, 2009.

⁴¹⁶ Interview Berkhout / Noise Expert / Former Chairman of the Schiphol Noise Committee, 2008; Interview Ten Wolde / Noise Expert Former member of the Isermann Supervisory Committee and Member of the EIA Committee Schiphol, 2010; Interview Muchall / Geluidsconsult, 2009

⁴¹⁷ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1993), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving Kabinetsstandpunt, deel 3

⁴¹⁸ Commissie MER (1994), Advice of the EIA Committee about UMER S4S2, August 23rd 1994; p.2

⁴¹⁹ PMMS (1994), UMER S4S2, 1994

to realize the dual objectives for the short term. As we shall discuss next, the PKB negotiations about the long-term development would confront the Steering Group with even greater challenges.

6.6 Decisions Making about the long term Five Runway System (> 2003)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
PASO 1989 - 1991	ROM procedure part 1 – 6.2						
		ROM Procedure part 2 – 6.3					
PKB 1991 - 1995				Preparing the PKB – 6.4			
					Decision making about the short term (< 2003) – 6.5		
					Decision making about the long term (2003 - 2015) – 6.6		
							Final PKB decisions – 6.7

In this paragraph we discuss the formal decision making about the period > 2003. When compared to the short term process (< 2003) that we just described, this decision making process was even more complex, as the environmental objective consisted of more criteria that were to be elaborated and negotiated (6.6.1). In 6.6.2 we discuss the final decisions that were made about the long term. These decisions had considerable spatial effects. In 6.6.3 the tensions with other spatial claims are discussed.

6.6.1 Setting the environmental objective

The main task for the long-term process was to reassess whether or not a 5th runway was really necessary for achieving the dual objective from 2003 onwards (although this was merely a formality), and if so, what runway configuration was the best (i.e. was the 5P alternative really the best). For this an extensive Environmental Assessment was to be carried out (*Integrale Milieueffect Rapportage, Integrated Environmental Impact Assessment*, IMER). The process began with the presentation of a plan of approach.⁴²⁰ In this report both the issues and the planning alternatives that would be taken into account were presented and it was emphasized once more that the PASO covenant served as the point of departure. Five planning alternatives were selected for further investigation. The preferred alternative that was developed during PASO (a 5th runway parallel to the Zwanenburgbaan, alternative 5P) served as the so-called planning alternative (*planalternatief*), i.e. the alternative that was seen as the most desirable one

⁴²⁰ PMMS (1991), Startnotitie IMER, Augustus 1991.

at the start of the process.⁴²¹ As discussed before, during PASO it had come to the fore that this 5P alternative would make the realization of the dual objectives possible (i.e. it was for this reason that 5P had obtained the nickname of environmental friendly runway). During the enactment of the IMER the definition of a mainport was broader in comparison to the definition used during the IEE. The mainport was not merely an airside hub and a focal point for economic activity (as in the IEE), but also landside hub, stressing the need for HST connections with Germany and France.⁴²²

Decision-making about the 5-runway system (> 2003) proved to be even more complex than about the short-term four-runway system (< 2003), because the environmental objective was defined in a more diverse way. For the 5-runway system the noise criterion was more stringent (10,000 houses within the 35Ke instead of 15,000 houses). Moreover, other environmental effects were not to deteriorate either and would become part of fierce negotiations. The main topics on the agenda for which legally binding norms were to be established were (1) noise (including nightly noise), (2) local air pollution (3) third party risk. Two additional issues were also included for further investigation, soil and water (including acidification) and spatial development issues (consequences for housing, recreation and nature). Based on the scenarios that were developed in the IEE process (the ones meant to define the critical mainport barrier), the effects of three different constellations of a five-runway system were assessed, including the preferred planning alternative (see figure 6.5). The list of five was completed with two more legally required alternatives, i.e. the so-called base-case or reference case (*nulalternatief*, referring to a situation wherein existing policies were not changed, business as usual) and the most environmental friendly alternative (*Meest Milieuvriendelijke Alternatief*, MMA), which was prescribed by the Environmental Hygiene Act (*Wet Algemene Bepalingen Milieuhygiene*, WABM).⁴²³

In its advice of December 4th 1991 the EIA Committee that had the legal task to assess the quality of all Environmental Impact Assessments in the Netherlands, had argued that it still had not been clear what the dual objective precisely entailed. Assessing the environmental effects was not very useful if it was not clear which norms were to apply. After all, this would make it impossible to judge whether or not the outcomes were deemed acceptable or not. It was argued that the dual objective needed to be clarified in


⁴²¹ Each EIA has such a planning alternative for which effects are assessed and compared with other alternatives. The planning alternative basically consists of a definitive spatial organization of the airport region, including the necessary investments (this area is reserved for a new terminal, this area for a new runway, aprons and taxiways, this area for housing, this area for recreation etc.).

⁴²² PMMS (1991), Startnotitie IMER, augustus 1991; p.5;13.

⁴²³ PMMS (1991), Startnotitie IMER, 1991; pp. 13-18.

order to make a sound decision about the future of Schiphol.⁴²⁴ Furthermore, the committee asserted that health effects of noise and air pollution were an important concern of local residents. Therefore, it was recommended to investigate these health effects, and especially the influence of noise on sleeping disturbance. For the same reason, the stench/odor related to aviation activities was to be taken into account.⁴²⁵ Finally, the committee emphasized the need to start measuring noise. According to the committee, by comparing the measured and calculated levels of noise pollution it would become possible to make a more realistic assessment of actual noise pollution.⁴²⁶ They thus supported the research carried out at that time by the Environmental Agency of the Municipality of Amsterdam, as discussed in the former paragraph about the short term debate (< 2003).

Figure 6.5 The different planning alternatives for a fifth runway in 1991 (left is the 5P)



Source: Startnotitie IMER, 1991; pp.13 - 18

Different comments were taken into account by the PMMS Steering Group and they presented a revised Plan of Approach. In this revised report (published on February 25th, 1992) the environmental objective was operationalized in terms of (1) noise (2) local air pollution (3) third party risk and (4) stench. Thus, the latter issue was included, while the issues of soil and water were given less attention. Conform the PASO

⁴²⁴ Commissie voor de Milieu Effect Rapportage (December 4th, 1991). Advies voor de richtlijnen voor de inhoud van het integrale milieu effect rapport Schiphol en Omgeving, pp.12-13
⁴²⁵ Commissie voor de Milieu Effect Rapportage (December 4th, 1991). Advies voor de richtlijnen voor de inhoud van het integrale milieu effect rapport Schiphol en Omgeving, p.44
⁴²⁶ Commissie voor de Milieu Effect Rapportage (December 4th, 1991). Advies voor de richtlijnen voor de inhoud van het integrale milieu effect rapport Schiphol en Omgeving, p.48

recommendations it was argued that improving the quality of the living environment was achieved when the levels of pollution of these four aspects of the environment would not deteriorate (standstill) or would improve. This definition would frame the entire formal decision making procedure. Indeed, the environmental objective thus defined would be taken up in the final PKB report (Part 4, 1995) that would eventually become politically ratified and therefore legally binding. As we shall discuss later on in more detail, in this final PKB report it could be read that, from 2003 onwards, the levels for stench, local air pollution and third party risk were not allowed to deteriorate in comparison with 1990 levels, and the level of noise pollution was to be improved in comparison to 1990.⁴²⁷ In its initial response on the revised plan of approach, the EIA Committee argued that this formulation implied a rather narrow understanding of what the quality of the living environment actually entailed. For example, other aspects like the quality of water, groundwater, soil, the entire ecosystem were lost from view.⁴²⁸ Nonetheless, the IMER Task Group decided to begin with the research, which meant to assess the four environmental effects of the five selected planning alternatives, based on the traffic forecasts developed in the IEE process.

A first overview of the environmental effects (IMER, December 1993)

When assessing the effects of the five different runway alternatives, the noise issue played a dominant role, as had already been the case during the PASO process. In PASO the 5P runway (parallel runway) had come to the fore as the favourable alternative. During the IEE it became clear that the 5P alternative received the highest scores in terms of punctuality and peak capacity, which were key assets for mainport development.⁴²⁹ However, in the IMER it was concluded that the 5P alternative did not satisfy the noise norm of 10,000 houses within the 35Ke zone that was agreed upon (when drawing on the same assumptions underlying the calculations as for the 4-runway system) (see figure 6.6). Calculations of May 1993 showed that 5P would result in 12.600 houses within the 35Ke zone.⁴³⁰ Moreover, 5P did not live up to the criteria that had been set for third party risk. In fact, 5P was one of the less desirable alternatives from an environmental point of view; only one of the four other alternatives scored worse on environmental impact.⁴³¹

When all research on behalf of the IEE and IMER was completed, the first draft of the PKB was presented in December 1993. Schiphol was given ample space to expand. As indicated before, for the short term it was decided to allow a two-sided approach of the

⁴²⁷ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1995), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving Eindbesluit, deel 4; p.8

⁴²⁸ Commissie voor de Milieu Effect Rapportage (1992, Tweede advies inhoud van het integrale milieu effect rapport Schiphol en Omgeving, April 8th 1992; p.3-5


⁴²⁹ PMMS (1993), Eindrapport Inventarisatie Economische Effecten.

⁴³⁰ PMMS (1993), Eindrapport Integrale Milieu effectrapportage, p.158

⁴³¹ Commissie voor de Milieu Effect Rapportage (1993), Advies IMER, August 23rd 1994; p.2

Zwanenburgbaan and the extension of the Kaagbaan. For the long term the 5P alternative remained the favoured option. In order to deal with the noise problems it was proposed to expand the noise zone from 10,000 to 12,600 houses.⁴³² Other issues, like a suitable norm for third party risk, dealing with night flights and local air pollution were yet to be settled (as shall be discussed later on in this paragraph).

Figure 6.6 Indication noise contours 35Ke (red line) and 40Ke (purple line) Schiphol five runway system




Source: PKB, deel 4 1995 p.43

Criticism on the PKB Design part 1

Next, the PKB was open for public consultation. Several public meetings were held and 750 written reactions were received, most of them reflecting concerns about the expected levels of noise pollution.⁴³³ The environmental party SNM (*Stichting Natuur en Milieu*, Nature & Environment Foundation) was very disappointed about the one-sided economically driven selection of alternatives. Therefore, they had proposed to include another environmental friendly alternative in July 1993 (the 5GG alternative, see figure 6.7).⁴³⁴

Figure 6.7 The 5GG alternative that was proposed by the SNM in 1993



Source: Aanvullende Milieueffect rapportage, 1994, p.14

⁴³² Planologische Kernbeslissing (1993), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving, deel 1 Ontwerp PKB

⁴³³ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1994), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving, deel part 2a

⁴³⁴ Interview Franssen / SNM, 2009

The municipality of Haarlemmermeer insisted upon taking this 5GG alternative seriously, since they thought this would be the best solution for realizing the dual objective.⁴³⁵ However, a majority of the Steering Group rejected the alternative, because it did not live up to the mainport objective. The main problem of this alternative was that the two runways on the westside could not be used simultaneously, due to the small distance between these runways. As such, 5GG did not offer sufficient peak hour capacity to sustain KLM's hub network. This made it difficult to achieve the critical mainport barrier, which was highly undesirable from the perspective of a majority of the members of the Steering Group PMMS. On the other hand, all other alternatives that were taken into account did not live up to the environmental objectives. According to the environmental parties, local residents and some other experts it was therefore clear that the mainport objective was setting the scope for the kind of environmental measures that were actually possible during the PKB process.⁴³⁶

After this initial decision the environmental parties left the larger project group that served as the 'feedback group' and started to rely on different strategies to influence the debate.⁴³⁷ For one, SNM decided to elaborate the 5GG alternative itself.⁴³⁸ At the same time a new environmental actor got involved in the discussion, Milieudedefensie (Environmental Protection Agency). Milieudedefensie had already been concerned about growing aviation for a while from a climate point of view (i.e. undesirable growth of greenhouse emissions), but in 1993 they decided to focus their campaign on the noise issue. They reasoned that there was a bigger chance to bring aviation growth to an end by focusing on noise than by focusing on CO₂.⁴³⁹ After all, noise was dominating the discussion, while the climate issue was only playing a marginal role, at least in the field of aviation. Instead of participating in the PKB discussion, Milieudedefensie decided to team up with the many different platforms of local residents that were protesting against the expected increase in noise exposure.⁴⁴⁰ Together they launched several protest actions that generated a lot of media attention. This was meant to influence public opinion and politicians.⁴⁴¹ The campaign culminated in buying parcels of land in April 1994, exactly where the preferred 5P runway was to be located. From November 1994 onwards, they started to plant trees on this land, resulting in the forest that would become known as the *Bulderbos* (Bulder Forest). This forest was meant to delay the

⁴³⁵ Interview Kolpa / Municipality of Haarlemmermeer, 2010. See also interview Rensing / Province of North Holland, conducted by Yap 2001

⁴³⁶ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Griesse / local resident, 2009; Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007

⁴³⁷ Werther, 1993

⁴³⁸ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009


⁴³⁹ Interview Hassink / Milieudedefensie, 2007; See also Broer, 2006; p.109

⁴⁴⁰ Broer, 2006; p.109

⁴⁴¹ Interview Hassink / Milieudedefensie, 2007

expropriation and therefore hinder the construction of the 5th runway (see figure 6.7).⁴⁴²
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Figure 6.8 Location of the forest of Milieudéfensie, 1994 (arrows point towards precise location).



Source: Milieudéfensie, <http://www.milieudéfensie.nl/verkeer/plaatjes/luchtvaart/bulderbosbuskaart.jpg>

The province of North Holland too wasn't very pleased about the proposed 5P alternative. In their own preparations for the revised Regional Plan they had concluded that a relocated 5th runway (the 5GG alternative) scored better on some environmental factors than 5P (for example on the amount of seriously hindered people within the wider area, the 20Ke zone).⁴⁴⁴ They recommended to take this alternative more seriously into account, a position that was supported by the municipality of Haarlemmermeer that also kept emphasizing its preference for 5GG.⁴⁴⁵

In its next advice, the EIA Committee asserted once again that the preferred runway system (5P) was amongst the worse from an environmental point of view. The Committee ordered the conduct of an additional EIA, the so-called AMER (*Aanvullende Milieueffect Rapportage*), wherein some additional runway systems and effects had to be studied again. One year later (July 1994), the RARO (*Raad van Advies voor Ruimtelijke Ordening, Advisory Committee Spatial Development*) would conclude in its PKB advice that the mainport objective had structured the IMER process too much. For a more balanced and nuanced perspective it would have been better to discuss what kind of airport development would have been possible within the environmental limits.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴² Places with special environmental, monumental or ecological value are more difficult to expropriate in the Netherlands.

⁴⁴³ De Kruijf, 2000

⁴⁴⁴ Province North Holland (1994), Draft Version Regional Plan, January 1994, p.18.

⁴⁴⁵ Interview Kolpa / Municipality of Haarlemmermeer, 2010.

⁴⁴⁶ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1994), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving, deel part 2a, p.161.

This was a remarkable statement on their behalf, especially when considering the important role that the RARO had played in placing the mainport objective on the political agenda during the 1980s (see chapter 5). Based on all these criticisms (especially from actors concerned with the quality of the living environment), the PMMS Steering Group and the cabinet decided that there was need for additional insights in the environmental effects of the different alternatives. However, at the same time, the sense of urgency to develop a final PKB report was increasing as well. And Schiphol and KLM were growing rapidly, so clarity about a fifth runway was deemed necessary as soon as possible. Therefore, parallel to the additional EIA that was to be carried out (the AMER), a process to further elaborate the actual construction of the 5P alternative was set in motion.

Narrowing down the scope: Elaborating the 5P alternative (January 1994)

The 5P alternative was taken up for more detailed calculations, via a so-called UMER-procedure (Execution of the EIA- procedure). Such an UMER-procedure was legally required when bringing a plan with environmental effects into the phase of execution. The UMER-5P demanded a more detailed calculation of the environmental effects of the runway use.⁴⁴⁷ Schiphol was in charge of the UMER-5P that was to result in a final design of both the runway (precise location, including related infrastructures) and noise contours.⁴⁴⁸ By already focusing on the actual implementation of the 5P alternative some environmental actors got the impression that the Steering Group PMMS had already chosen to implement the 5P alternative, thus closing further discussion about alternatives.⁴⁴⁹ Normally speaking, such an UMER was only carried out when the final decision about the winning alternative had already been made. Thus, carrying out the UMER-5P was not only legally required, it also signalled that the enactment of the additional EIA (AMER) was not expected to result in a different outcome.

Nonetheless, the AMER was also carried out as had been ordered by the EIA Committee. In this AMER the 5GG alternative posed by the environmental parties and that was supported by the municipality of Haarlemmermeer and the province of North Holland was to be studied into more detail (which was quite a success, at least from the perspective of the municipality of Haarlemmermeer).⁴⁵⁰ Moreover, other environmental issues that had not been adequately addressed in the former EIA (the IMER) were taken into account, like the nightly noise pollution, the effects of a northward extension of the Kaagbaan and the use of different assumptions when calculating the norms for noise

⁴⁴⁷ PMMS (1995), *Uitvoerings Milieu Effectrapportage 5P*.

⁴⁴⁸ Schiphol (NVLS) (1994), *Startnotitie UMER-5P*, January 1994.

⁴⁴⁹ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁴⁵⁰ Interview Kopla / Municipality of Haarlemmermeer, 2010.

and third party risk.⁴⁵¹ In the AMER it was concluded that the environmental norms could not be met in both the 5P and 5GG constellation (were the 5GG scored a little better). More specifically, the environmental effects of 5P were even worse than initially calculated. New calculations showed that third party risks would increase even more than initially expected, making a standstill impossible. Despite these negative results, the UMER-5P had been proceeding, resulting in a detailed implementation plan for the construction of 5P. The additional information from the new environmental impact assessments (AMER, UMER 5P)⁴⁵² was used for developing a revised PKB, part 3. This third part contained the cabinet's Perspective and was therefore up for political ratification (after the initial design and the public responses).

6.6.2 A Revised PKB: The Cabinet's Perspective (February 1995)

In the renewed version of the PKB (*Part 3*) the cabinet presented its final perspective to the Lower House that was to discuss it next.⁴⁵³ The cabinet stuck to the 5P alternative, arguing that 5P offered the best possibilities for achieving the dual objective. According to several other actors this was only partly true. As discussed in the former paragraph, several actors had indicated that 5GG was more preferable from an environmental point of view. In the meantime, SNM had been working on its own variant of the 5GG alternative, which was presented in June 1994. They concluded that the environmental benefits of their 5GG alternative were much higher when compared to 5P. They brought this information to the attention of the PMMS Steering Group. In the response that SNM received, the PMMS Steering Group repeated its earlier argument that the assumptions underlying the SNM alternative endangered the mainport objective (i.e. achieving the critical mainport barrier).⁴⁵⁴ Moreover, they argued that it was impossible to implement the 5GG alternative, as the new flight routes that were needed for its execution would cross a cemetery in Hoofddorp, which was prohibited by law (according to the *Wet op Lijkbezorging; Act on corpse deliverance*).⁴⁵⁵

Next to the criticism on 5P, SNM criticized the Cabinets Perspective for two more reasons. First, they argued that the noise criterion was not properly defined. Instead of using the amount of houses within the 35Ke, the amount of seriously hindered persons within the 20Ke zone was deemed a far more valuable yardstick. Second, only noise levels above 65 (Db) Decibels were included in the calculations, since lower levels were not perceived to be causing serious hindrance.⁴⁵⁶ SNM argued that 55 dB was a far more

⁴⁵¹ PMMS (1994), Aanvullende MER, p.4.

⁴⁵² And also the new information about the short term, i.e. the UMER S4S2 that we already discussed in 6.5.

⁴⁵³ TK 23552, February 17th 1995, Nr.7.

⁴⁵⁴ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁴⁵⁵ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1993), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving Kabinetsstandpunt, deel 3.

⁴⁵⁶ Nonetheless the calculation method was derived from Kosten, and he had opted for counting aircraft noise above 56 dB(A) (Bijsterveld, 2008; p.227; see also Berkhout, 2003; p.17).

realistic boundary. This would considerably broaden the 35Ke contour, and thus the amount of houses and people within it, further complicating the realization of the dual objective. According to the cabinet, the results of the SNM research (for which the NLR was assigned as well to do the calculations, i.e. the NLR also did the calculations for the PMMS Steering Group) were brought into the debate too late for actually influencing the PKB decisions. It would imply a new round of discussion about the amount of houses that was acceptable. Furthermore, within EU context new research was being conducted that was meant to develop a standardized tool to assess noise impact around airports and the cabinet thought it appropriate to await these results.⁴⁵⁷ When the EU had developed a standardized measure it would be the right moment to determine whether Dutch laws and policies were to be adapted. For the time being, the existing calculation method and norms were argued to be fully adequate.

Thus, despite the ongoing criticism the cabinet concluded that the 5P alternative did best fit the mainport objective (it scored best in terms of punctuality and peak capacity, which were key assets for mainport development). Moreover, the Cabinet argued that it could also contribute to the realization of the environmental objectives, if only some additional efforts were made (like improving ascending and descending procedures, reducing the share of chapter 2 planes, preventing new housing schemes underneath flight routes).⁴⁵⁸ In the remainder of this paragraph the most important decisions about the environmental objectives shall be discussed.

1. Extending the norm for daytime noise

The cabinet proposed to develop three noise contours: one for the short term (15,100 houses within 35Ke), and two for the long term (10,000 houses within 35Ke and 12,600 houses within 35Ke). As regards night flights it was merely mentioned that one contour was to be developed (the 26L_{aeq} zone), but no norm was attached to this yet. The issue of night flights, which had already been postponed during PASO, was not settled yet. When local residents insisted upon clarity about night flights, they were told by members of the cabinet that it was still not clear whether or not there was a causal relationship between night flights and sleeping disturbance.⁴⁵⁹ And such a causal relationship was deemed a necessary precondition for developing legally binding norms. In general, health had not been an important consideration in the plans of the cabinet, although a health impact assessment had been part of the research agenda that sustained the PKB decisions.

⁴⁵⁷ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1993), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving Kabinetsstandpunt, deel 3, p.36.

⁴⁵⁸ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1993), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving Kabinetsstandpunt, deel 3, p.8.

⁴⁵⁹ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

2. Postponing issues of Health and Night Flights

During PASO the actors involved had acknowledged the need for information about the health effects of growing aviation. It was decided that a special assessment program for health was to be developed. The Medical Inspectorate of the State (*Staatstoezicht van de Volksgezondheid*), the Ministry of VROM (department of DGM) and the Ministry of Health, Wealth and Sport combined their forces to set up an evaluation program. The ministries assigned the RIVM (*Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiëne*, National Institute for Public Health and Environment) to explore these effects. The RIVM initiated a research program labelled Health Impact Assessment Schiphol (*Gezondheidskundige Evaluatie Schiphol, GES*), which started in 1991. It was intended to deliver insights for PKB decision-making (e.g. offer clarity about the relationship between nightly noise and sleep disturbance) but this turned out to become very difficult due to the limited availability of data and the relatively short time span for the research (less than 2 years).

In November 1993 the RIVM published a first report that was part of the GES.⁴⁶⁰ The report presented an overview of the state of the art about assumed health effects. Most attention was devoted to the health effects of noise in terms of sleep disturbance, learning / school results, hearing damage and cardiovascular diseases. The effects of air pollution, stench / odor and risk perception were also taken into account. In the report it was stated that it was to be expected that higher levels of sleeping disturbance, stench annoyance, cardiovascular diseases and declining learning presentations could be found in the vicinity of the airport.⁴⁶¹ Moreover, it was concluded (based on a selection of interviews) that the local residents did not trust the numbers about health and third party risk that were presented by the aviation authorities (Schiphol and the national government).⁴⁶² Nonetheless, it was also stated that, due to a lack of data, it was difficult to make a reliable estimation of the relationship between exposure and health.⁴⁶³ Thus, statistical causal relationships that actually proved correlations between aviation activities and health were lacking. More research was needed (especially about the relationship between noise and health) in order to assess whether such statistically valid causal relationships existed. Moreover, there was also a lack of information about potentially effective policy measures that could work to reduce health effects of aviation. It was for these reasons that the RIVM recommended a research program and an evaluation program for monitoring health effects around Schiphol.

⁴⁶⁰ Staatsen, B.A.M., Franssen, E.A.M., Doornbos, G., Abbink, F., van der Veen, A.A., Heisterkamp, S.H., Lebre, E., *Gezondheidskundige Evaluatie Schiphol*, RIVM rapport 441520010, december 1993.

⁴⁶¹ RIVM Report (1993), p.11.

⁴⁶² Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007; Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

⁴⁶³ RIVM Report (1993), p.11.

Based on these findings, the Ministries of VROM, V&W and the Medical Inspectorate of the State asked the RIVM to prepare further studies about aircraft pollution and health effects. In order to design a research agenda, the RIVM organized an international workshop on 'Noise and Public Health' that took place from 2-4 October 1994 in the Netherlands. The main objective of this workshop was to discuss and review proposals for future research around Schiphol airport on exposure to aircraft noise and health effects, i.e. to design a research agenda and a monitoring program.⁴⁶⁴ The relationship between noise and sleep disturbance came to the fore as the most urgent issue in need of further clarification. Especially more clarity about the estimation of the number of people affected by night-time noise (night flights) and its impact on health in the long term was deemed necessary.⁴⁶⁵ The issue of health therefore brought back the issue of night flights on the PKB agenda, which had been removed from the agenda during PASO-negotiations. The main issue during the PKB was whether the night regime should apply from 23 PM to 6 AM (seven hour regime) or from 23 PM to 7 AM (eight hour regime). The night regime referred to the time slot that airport operations were reduced to an absolute minimum (thus merely facilitating the few flights that were absolutely necessary for sustaining effective hub and spoke operations). The environmental actors and the Province of North Holland were stressing the importance of an eight-hour regime, as it was an important aspect of the quality of the living environment (recall the demand of the Provincial Board of North Holland to bring back the issue of night flights during the PASO negotiations in 1991). The aviation sector on the other hand emphasized the devastating effects of this regime on hub operations, thus endangering mainport development (i.e. it was especially during 6AM and 7AM that a large amount of intercontinental flights was arriving at the airport).

The night issue was not only discussed during the Health Impact Evaluation. After PASO a new Study Group was set up (Noise Norms for Nightly Traffic, *Geluidsnormering Nachterlijk Vliegverkeer*). The main task of the Study Group, consisting of the Ministries of VROM, V&W, EZ and KLM and Schiphol (i.e. Ministries and sector), was to assess the effects of a night norm. Based on this the Ministry of VROM was to decide upon a norm, after consultation with the Ministry of V&W.⁴⁶⁶ During this research trajectory it was again concluded that there was no unequivocal relationship between noise and sleeping disturbance. Moreover, it was argued that if night flights were to be prohibited, this would have large economic consequences: a loss of 3 – 16% of passengers, 21 – 26% of freight and 7000 – 13,000 jobs. The members of the study group therefore concluded that a full closure of

⁴⁶⁴ Franssen E.A.M., Staatsen B.A.M., Vrijkotte T.G.M., Lebrecht E., Passchier-Vermeer W. (1995), Noise and Public Health, Workshop Report. RIVM Rapport 441520004.


⁴⁶⁵ Franssen et al., 1995; p.8.

⁴⁶⁶ Geluidsnormering Nachterlijk Vliegverkeer, Rapportage van de Werkgroep Nachtnormering, Mei 1993; p.5.

Schiphol during the night that would make mainport development impossible, was undesirable.⁴⁶⁷ However, the group did not settle the issue of how long the night regime should become, as they concluded that the available research did not offer sufficient information for deciding upon this.

In the Cabinet's Perspective (PKB part 3) no night norm was taken up. It was stated that no noise levels above $26L_{aeq}$ were allowed outside the $26L_{aeq}$ contour and that houses and bedrooms within the $26L_{aeq}$ zone were to be isolated. In figure 6.8 the $26L_{aeq}$ zone for the five-runway system is presented.

Figure 6.9 Indicative $26L_{aeq}$ noise contour for the night for the five-runway system



Source: PKB, Part 3, 1995, p.45

3. Finding a norm for Third Party Risk (1991 – 1995)

After PASO the issue of third party risk was not particularly important in the Schiphol debate, and especially not as regards short-term development. This was reflected in the IMER (i.e. the Integral Environmental Impact Assessment), wherein third party risks did not play a role for the short-term 4-runway system. For the longer-term 5-runway system a standstill situation had been announced, as had already been decided upon during the PASO negotiations (i.e. situation > 2003 was not to be worse than the situation of 1990). As already discussed, this was a rather harsh statement, since the TECHNICA reports that were developed during PASO already indicated that risks would increase when traffic increased. During the IMER, the TECHNICA reports were put aside and the NLR was asked to develop a new method for assessing and monitoring third party risks around airports, taking into account the policy intentions posed in the Nature and Environment Plan 2 of the national government. According to one safety expert involved this course of affairs was accepted without causing any political

⁴⁶⁷ Geluidsnormering Nachtelijk Vliegverkeer, Rapportage van de Werkgroep Nachtnormering, Mei 1993; p.6.

turmoil, because the mainport-noise dilemma absorbed all attention, and the safety issue only played a marginal role.⁴⁶⁸

This situation changed dramatically when a Boeing 747 freight plane belonging to El Al flew into the side of a block of flats in the Bijlmer district of Amsterdam on 4 October 1992 at 17.35, with the loss of 43 lives on the ground and four on the board (see figure 6.10).⁴⁶⁹ The crash subsequently occurred as the pilots struggled to bring the plane back to Schiphol and lost control of it while attempting to turn sharply to line up with their chosen runway. The crash was a traumatic shock in the Netherlands, and brought the issue of third party risk back on the political agenda.⁴⁷⁰ Especially one politician of the PVDA (Labour Party), Van Gijssel, struggled to give the issue more attention in the Lower House when debating about the crash (and afterwards).⁴⁷¹ For this reason he would obtain the nickname of ‘Bijlmerboy.’

Figure 6.10 Consequence of the Bijlmer Crash, 1992



Source: www.parool.nl/.../pe/3/8/9/media_xl_130704.jpg

In a response to the public concerns the national government assigned EAC-RAND (a well renowned international research institute) in November 1993 in order to investigate the measures that were needed as Schiphol continued to grow. The final report was

⁴⁶⁸ Interview Ale/safety expert, 2009.

⁴⁶⁹ It had taken off from Schiphol 15 minutes earlier, fully laden with freight and fuel. After climbing over Amsterdam and turning right for its flight path to Israel it lost two starboard engines, which fell into the Gooimeer, a broad stretch of water, 500 meter from the harbour of Naarden, luckily missing any boat traffic. The first engine pylon sheared off from under the wing when a pin with a fatigue crack fractured. As it broke off it crashed into the second engine, causing that to shear off. The pilots did not know they had lost the engines completely, thinking that they had only a fire and power loss.

⁴⁷⁰ Ale et al. 1996; Hale, 2001.

⁴⁷¹ Interview Van Gijssel / Former Member of the Lower House for PVDA, 2009.

presented in 1993.⁴⁷² The study formed the basis for a model to calculate the third party risk of an airport such as Schiphol and for drawing spatial risk contours around it. The conclusions were even worse than those drawn by TECHNICA during the PASO process, as the expected level of Group Risks was expected to increase even more.⁴⁷³ However, in the beginning of the report it was stated that Schiphol could be regarded as an extremely safe airport (especially when compared to other airports). It was especially this part of the report that would become frequently quoted during the PKB process by the PMMS Steering Group, whereas the other part, about the deteriorating Group Risks, was hardly mentioned in the debate.⁴⁷⁴ Recommendations of EAC-RAND focused on improvement of the internal safety at Schiphol and not on improving third party risk (Individual Risk and Group Risk). Amongst other things, EAC-RAND advised to set up an integrated safety management system (ISM) for the airport and its immediate surroundings and to install an independent Ministerial Advisory Committee on Safety for Schiphol (*Veiligheids advies Commissie, VACS*, which was established in 1995). The VACS was to give both requested and unrequested advice to the minister. Moreover, the VACS was to ensure that a review of safety and the ISMS was carried out once every five years and to monitor the international developments in the area.

The El Al crash and the subsequent EAC-RAND report led to a similar spatial planning approach for third party risk as had already been adopted for noise, i.e. calculating and drawing risk contours. The Ministry of V&W/RLD asked the NLR to develop a model and risk assessment technique to calculate the risks for the IMER (Integrated Environmental Impact Assessment), based on selected historical crash data from comparable airports in developed countries.⁴⁷⁵ The model consisted of three parts, based on three sub-models, which calculated independently the accident probability, the location in relation to the runway/flight path and the size of the effect of the crash given the terrain and the weight of the aircraft (see box 6.2).

Box 6.2. Method of calculating third party risks

The method used to calculate third party risk around airports consists of three main elements. First, the probability of an aircraft having an accident in the vicinity of the airport must be determined. This probability depends on the probability of an accident per aircraft movement, landing or take-off and the number of movements carried out per year. The probability of an accident per movement, the accident rate, is determined from historical data. The local probability of an accident is not equal for all locations around the airport. The probability of an accident in the proximity of the runways is higher than at larger distances from the runways. Also, the local probability of an accident is larger in the proximity of routes followed by arriving and departing air traffic routes.

⁴⁷² EAC-RAND (1993) Airport Growth and Safety, A study of the external risks of Schiphol Airport and Possible safety enhancement measures.

⁴⁷³ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

⁴⁷⁴ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009; See also Ale, 2000.

⁴⁷⁵ Piers 1993A, 1993B.

This dependence is represented in an accident location probability model, which is the second main element of the third party risk assessment methodology. The accident location probability model is based on historical data for accident locations. The accident location probability model defines the local probability of an accident provided an accident occurs; in other words, if an accident occurs, this model describes the probability that the accident aircraft will end up at a particular location. The way accident locations are distributed throughout the area before and after the runway, considered not to be time-dependent, allows the distribution of accident locations in the past to be used to predict the distribution of accident locations in the future. The accident location model is difficult to develop due to a general lack of accurate accident location data. 80% of available accident reports do not contain an adequate description of the accident location. This model determines the distribution of the risk around the airport and hence the shape of the individual risk contours, and the risk levels, in populated areas; this translates into societal risk. Effects of accidents may have lethal consequences at considerable distances from the impact location.

The dimensions of the accident area and the lethality of the accident effects, as a function of the aircraft parameters, impact parameters, and possibly terrain, are defined in the consequence model, the third main element of the third party risk assessment methodology. Individual and societal (group) risk can be calculated through the combination of the three main elements described above and input data describing the specific airport, its surroundings and its air traffic.⁴⁷⁶ Schiphol and the government can change the risk contours only by changing the number of flights, the types of aircraft or the position and direction of the landing strips and flight paths.⁴⁷⁷

The resulting calculation model was meant to assess both third party risks in 1990 and 2015 (the final planning horizon for the long term > 2003) in order to assess whether or not a standstill was possible. As the EIA Committee had argued, the standstill would refer to both the individual risks (IR) and Group Risks (GR) involved. Very soon it became clear that the group risk could not be calculated, since there was no adequate yardstick available that could be used to measure this with regard to aviation. According to one of the leading safety experts this was not entirely true. There were sufficient clues for developing a proper model, but there was no money or time made available for developing the model.⁴⁷⁸ Therefore, the safety norm of the dual objective was reframed by the Steering Group PMMS and was merely about the IR (Individual Risk). After all, no conclusions could be developed for Group Risk without the proper information available. As regards the IR, the number of people within the 10^{-5} , 10^{-6} , 10^{-7} and 10^{-8} contour was assessed. Especially the 10^{-6} zone was important: a person that remained permanently on a specific location was not allowed to have a greater risk to become victim of an airplane accident ones in every 1,000,000 year. The standstill situation implied that no more than 200 people in IR 10^{-5} contour and 9300 within the IR 10^{-6} contour (levels of 1990) would be allowed from 2003 onwards. In the IMER (1993) it was concluded that only the 10^{-6} criterion could be realized within the preferred 5P runway alternative. In the additional EIA that had been carried out (the AMER) this conclusion was revised and it was stated that a standstill for the 10^{-6} would also be

⁴⁷⁶ Ale & Piers, 2000; Driessen et al., 2007.

⁴⁷⁷ Ale et al., 1996; Hillestadt et al., 1993.

⁴⁷⁸ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

impossible. This impossibility to reconcile further growth and a standstill in terms of third party risks was no surprise to the safety experts that were involved, as they had been sending this message all along to the Ministries and the cabinet during the PKB process.⁴⁷⁹

In an attempt to create a stand still for IR, a new criterion was introduced by the PMMS Steering Group, the 'Summed Weighted Risk' (SWR, *Gesommeerd Gewogen Risico*) which referred to the sum of the value of the individual risk at each house within a defined contour.⁴⁸⁰ The SWR was calculated for two safety zones, 10^{-5} and 10^{-6} . The risk was calculated for each house within the zone. In order to satisfy the standstill criterion the sum of the risks of all those houses should equal (or fall below) the amount of 1990 during the period 2003 - 2015. It was assumed that only 1 person inhabited each house. This assumption considerably reduced the amount of people within the IR zones.⁴⁸¹

In the UMER-5P (1995) the SWR was calculated for the first time. Again, the results were rather disappointing for the Steering Group PMMS; within the 5P alternative the SWR would increase, making it impossible to achieve the standstill. Nonetheless, the SWR measure had one major advantage. By demolishing and / or removing houses it was possible to achieve the standstill in the near future. Thus, if traffic grew faster, the solution was to demolish some more houses. From this perspective, the Steering Group could argue that the standstill could be realized. Besides, one safety expert involved argued that the results were presented in a rather deceptive way, giving the politicians the impression that the standstill could be achieved. For example, by using different scales when drawing safety contours for 1990 (small scale) and 2015 (larger scale) the optical impression was given that the contours were of the same seize.⁴⁸²

Meanwhile, the Ministry of VROM had initiated another research process that ran parallel to the PKB process, called the ABEL process (*Algemeen Beleidskader Externe Veiligheid Luchtvaart, Generic Policy Framework External Safety Aviation*). In ABEL a norm for Group Risk was being developed. As we have seen, this norm for Group Risk was left outside the PKB process, something that the Ministry of VROM was not very pleased about. ABEL was carried out rather independently from the PMMS program. The ABEL work group consisted mainly of members of the Ministry of VROM and did not actively consult the Steering Group of the PMMS. Drawing on the results deriving from the ABEL process, the Ministry of VROM pointed out the need to develop spatial

⁴⁷⁹ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

⁴⁸⁰ Piers and Ale, 2000.

⁴⁸¹ Ale, 2000.

⁴⁸² Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

restrictions for the 10^{-6} contour in order to minimize Group Risks in the near future. The argument was very simple. When Schiphol was allowed to grow further into a mainport, prevention of constructions in the vicinity of the airport would contribute to a minimization of Group Risks. However, the Ministry of EZ immediately rejected this proposal. This Ministry feared that the strict spatial restrictions set by VROM would hamper the economic development potential of the region, and therefore mainport development (which was also defined in terms of becoming a focal point of economic activity).⁴⁸³ ⁴⁸⁴ More stringent restrictions would make it more difficult to build new houses and develop office sites and industrial sites, which were deemed necessary for stimulating economic development of the region. The Ministry of V&W was in support of the Ministry of EZ.

In order to deal with the impasse that emerged the Prime Minister organized a meeting with the three ministries in September 1993, wherein the policy framework for dealing with third party risk around Schiphol was discussed. The Prime Minister sided with the Ministries of EZ and V&W and rejected the more stringent spatial restrictions that VROM had proposed. However, it had also been clear that constructing offices and industrial parks in the vicinity of the airport would greatly increase the group risks involved. In order to settle this matter the Ministries of EZ and V&W reasoned that the spatial restrictions that were implicated by the noise regulations would also work to regulate Group Risks.⁴⁸⁵ So despite the efforts of the Ministry of VROM, no additional spatial restrictions would be taken up for the 10^{-6} contour. Instead, the spatial measures were confined to the 10^{-5} zone, as had already been the case.

In the end, the Cabinet's perspective on the issue of third party risk as presented in the PKB part 3 could be summarized in the following way. The standstill for Individual Risk (IR) as measured with the SWR was only to apply to the 10^{-5} and 10^{-6} contours. The 10^{-7} area was left outside the regulations.⁴⁸⁶ By then it had already been clear that much of the houses (and also new industries and offices) would be located in this 10^{-7} area, which would make a standstill for this contour impossible.⁴⁸⁷ Spatial restrictions were confined to the 10^{-5} contour. More specifically, the Cabinet stated that (1) All houses within the IR-contour of 5×10^{-5} would be demolished (2) and that no new houses and offices were to be built within the IR 10^{-5} (see figure 6.10).

⁴⁸³ Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998, p.135


⁴⁸⁴ This discussion unraveled at the same moment as the noise issue, wherein the ministry of VROM was being sidelined by the pro-growth coalition (i.e. the Ministries of V&W, EZ and the aviation sector parties). As such, VROM tried to regulate the negative external effects via setting stricter norms for external safety than the PMMS intended to do.

⁴⁸⁵ Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998.

⁴⁸⁶ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1995), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving, deel 4.

⁴⁸⁷ Interview Dassen/ MNP, 2005.

Figure 6.11 Safety zones for the five-runway system (10^{-5} (orange) and 5×10^{-5} (red)



Source: PKB, Part 3, p.46

According to the environmental parties it was remarkable that these two measures were based upon a different standard (i.e. a less stringent one) than the one used for major hazard sites (based on the so-called *SEVESO-directive*), where the limit was set at 10^{-5} for existing plants (demanding safety improvements at the plant or demolition of the houses) and at 10^{-6} for new plants.⁴⁸⁸ One safety expert argued that the choice for the 5×10^{-5} had nothing to do safeguarding the highest level of safety (living up to the ALARA principle applied in all safety issues in the Netherlands, meaning As Low As Reasonably Possible). This norm was merely chosen as it would make sure that only a few houses were to be demolished.⁴⁸⁹ If the norm of 10^{-5} had been chosen, at least 200 houses had to be demolished, which was a very expensive affair. Furthermore, by merely calculating the standstill for Individual Risk (IR) and not for Group Risk (GR), and by using the specific yardstick that had been developed (SWR), it would become possible to argue that a standstill for third party risk was possible. With regard to Group Risk the cabinet lacked a suitable model and yardstick to assess the standstill. Moreover, in the Cabinet's Perspective it was stated that the implementation of other policy measures (i.e. construction of a fifth runway redirecting flights over less densely populated areas and spatial restrictions for building) were deemed sufficient for regulating Group Risk, i.e. making sure that risks would not grow beyond levels that were deemed unacceptable.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁸⁸ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁴⁸⁹ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009; see also Ale, 2000; Hale, 2002.

⁴⁹⁰ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1995), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving, deel 3, Nota van Toelichting, p.60.

Later on, in the final PKB (part 4, which shall be discussed in 6.7) the standstill for Group Risk was included, although it was not yet clear how this standstill was to be assessed. In the meantime some additional spatial measures were deemed necessary. In principle no new houses or other environmental sensitive functions were allowed within the building free-zone, with the exception of the plans that were already taken up in the current regional and local land use plans. The environmental sensitive functions referred to those that contained high densities of people, with the exception of industries and offices.⁴⁹¹ The latter exception was the result of the resistance of the Ministries of EZ, V&W and the Prime Minister against the more stringent spatial measures that the Ministry of VROM had proposed during the ABEL process. By means of compensation, another criterion for allowing offices and industries was taken up, i.e. their relatedness to airport activities.⁴⁹² The draft version of the spatial restrictions was already taken up in the revised Regional Plan of North Holland (January 1994), introducing specific zones with specific building restrictions.⁴⁹³

Taking up a standstill for Group Risk from 2003 onwards was a rather risky strategy as it was not clear what effect the spatial interventions would actually sort. For example, the EIA Committee doubted whether the additional spatial policy measures would be sufficient. However, adequate models were lacking to assess the feasibility of this objective. Unlike the models used to calculate risk from fixed sites such as chemical plants, the aviation risk contour model did not have a causal structure. It was not possible to develop links between measures intended to increase safety (e.g. proper education of air traffic managers) and the reduction of the probability of accidents. The lacking causal structure was partly related to the insufficient data available on accidents to model causality.⁴⁹⁴ The model was also criticized for lacking Schiphol specific data (the model was based on average data of 40 comparable airports) and the fixed character of the accident rate and Maximum Take of Weight (MTOW) that had been assumed.⁴⁹⁵ A constant accident rate meant that a strong increase in traffic movements led to a proportional growth of the risk contours, which was not the case in reality. Finally, many factors that could influence safety levels were not included in the model (the quality of air traffic control, technological improvement of arrivals and departures, the quality of bird management).⁴⁹⁶ Thus, from the existing models it could not be derived whether or not a standstill was possible. Therefore, a new model was required in order to assess both the GR for 1990 and 2003 - 2015. The obvious consequence was that the

⁴⁹¹ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1995), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving, deel 4, p.27.

⁴⁹² Planologische Kernbeslissing (1995), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving, deel 4, p.29; Interview Rensing / Province North Holland, 2005.

⁴⁹³ Province of North Holland (1994), Draft Regional Plan North Holland – South Amsterdam- Noordzee Kanaal, 1994, p.21.

⁴⁹⁴ Piers et al, 1993

⁴⁹⁵ Hale, 2000.

⁴⁹⁶ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

calculation model and the norm had to be in place before 2003. Several safety experts asserted that such a model was certainly needed, but would not change much about the fact that an increase in air traffic and build spaces in the vicinity of the airport would always result in growing third party risks.⁴⁹⁷

4. Inserting the issues of Air Pollution and Stench

As decided during PASO and taken up in the IMER of the PMMS program, both the level of air pollution and stench were not to deteriorate (stand still) after the five-runway system was put into operation (i.e. the levels of 2003 - 2015 were not to exceed the level of 1990). No requirements for the short term 4-runway system were taken up, as the only requirement related to noise (15,000 houses within 35Ke). Air pollution consisted of CO², CO, NO_x, VOS, SO² and black smoke. During the IMER process the Ministry of VROM assigned TNO (*Instituut voor toegepast natuurwetenschappelijk onderzoek*, Institute for Applied Scientific research) to assess the effects of growing air traffic on levels of local air pollution and stench. TNO calculated the effects using the scenario that had been selected by the PMMS Steering Group (i.e. the one with the lowest critical mainport barrier) and concluded that growing air traffic would result in higher levels of air pollution. Nonetheless, the specific calculation method that was applied worked to make sure that the standstill could still be achieved. Instead of merely calculating the effects of aviation, the total air pollution of the area was calculated (also for technical reasons). This implied that it was not directly the air pollution caused by the aviation sector that was of concern, but of all traffic (including road traffic) in the 10 x 10 kilometres area. Thus, the increase of air pollution caused by growing aviation would be compensated by a decrease of air pollution of car traffic (which was expected as a consequence of the ongoing implementation of cleaner cars). Or in other words, decreasing emissions of cars made a further growth of aviation related air pollution possible.⁴⁹⁸ This allowed the cabinet to state in the PKB part 3 that the standstill for air pollution could be realized. However, several actors doubted whether levels of air pollution of road traffic would actually decrease.⁴⁹⁹ Moreover, especially the environmental actors thought it was a rather deceptive way of defining a standstill.⁵⁰⁰ For one, the choice to limit the measurements to a 10 x 10 area was a strategic one. Milieudefensie argued that if the effects were calculated for a larger area the contribution of aviation to the greenhouse effect and climate change would be much bigger, which could be less easily compensated by reducing other sources of air pollution.⁵⁰¹

⁴⁹⁷ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

⁴⁹⁸ PMMS (1993), IMER, 1993; p.5 – 6.

⁴⁹⁹ See for example doubts of Members of the Lower House, TK 23552, 1995, Nr. 16.

⁵⁰⁰ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

⁵⁰¹ Milieudefensie (1994) Press Release Milieudefensie, 1994.

The effects of stench were also assessed by TNO as part of the IMER procedure. With regard to stench it was stated that no robust conclusions could be drawn about the possibilities for a standstill. Amongst other things data about a solid doses-response relationship were missing. Still, as we shall see later on, during the political debate about the PKB, members of the Lower House would insist upon valid quantifications of the environmental effects for both stench and air pollution.⁵⁰² From the perspective of the members of the Lower House, only then it would be possible to assess whether or not a standstill was actually being achieved. As we shall discuss later on (in 6.7) these 1990 emissions that would serve as the maximum limits would be presented in the final PKB report.

6.6.3 The Dual Objective and Regional Spatial Planning Issues

The operationalization of the dual objective held spatial consequences that created some difficulties for the local and regional public authorities. In fact, it was those direct spatial implications that had signaled the urgency for the Ministries to include them into the PASO and PKB process in the first place. The feasibility of the dual objective very much depended on the willingness and the ability of the local and regional actors to implement the spatial claims related to further mainport development. Therefore, the revised Regional Plan of the Province North Holland (1994) became very important, which was the main reason for making this process an integral part of the broad PMMS process. It was during the alignment of the Regional Plan and the PKB decisions that several spatial tensions were to be settled. For one, the spatial planning approach on which the policy solutions for noise and third party risk were based resulted in the development of spatial contours that held building restrictions. At the same time, the regional (province of North Holland) and local (municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer) public authorities had to achieve other objectives that demanded space, like the construction of houses, the construction of business sites (industrial and office locations), the improvement of landside accessibility and the improvement of the quality of the living environment (cultural sites, green and recreational areas). Next to their own ambitions as regards these issues, the national government (especially the Ministry of VROM) ordered them to make specific investments in housing, landside infrastructure, green areas and business sites that were deemed of national interest, as prescribed by the Dutch spatial planning system.⁵⁰³ For example, with regard to nature and recreation conditions were set in the National Environmental Plan+ (NMP +) and the *Structuurschema Groene Ruimte* (Structure Plan Green Areas). During the PKB process it was especially the issues of housing, infrastructure and industrial sites and offices that received most attention. We already discussed the importance of finding sufficient suitable space for industrial sites and offices as part of the debate about group

⁵⁰² TK 23552, Nr.50.

⁵⁰³ See chapter 5.

risks. Before discussing the final spatial decisions we first reflect upon the tensions involved between mainport development, housing and infrastructure development.

Mainport Development versus Housing

The Ministry of VROM prescribed the amount of houses that were to be built within a specific planning horizon, and the province and municipalities had to make sure that these houses would actually get constructed. In the final edition of an updated version of the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning, the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning Extra, the Province of North Holland was asked to find room for 100,000 new houses on the provincial territory, of which 15,000 had to be located within the municipality of Haarlemmermeer.⁵⁰⁴ As had already been stressed in the Regional Plan of the province of North Holland of 1987, there was a desperate need for new housing locations in the vicinity of Schiphol. At the same time it was stated that mainport development was to be facilitated and that decisions about housing were to be adapted to this. In short, the province was asked to reserve the necessary space for the construction of the 5th runway and to take into account the building prohibitions that were implicated by the contours for noise and third party risk that were being negotiated, while simultaneously finding sufficient space for a large amount of new houses in the vicinity of the airport. The fact that the housing department that was part of the Ministry of VROM and that had been working on the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning (Extra) was not included in the PMMS project (i.e. no housing objective was taken up in the operationalization of the dual objective) made it rather complicated for the Province of North Holland. When the urgency to construct new houses increased as a consequence of the update of the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning (1993), it was still not clear which restrictions would be imposed by noise and safety regulations. As an ad hoc solution, a temporary interim zone was established. If it would turn out that housing projects that were already under construction would come to fall in the final zone that was yet to be developed, they would be allowed to proceed.⁵⁰⁵ Schiphol wasn't happy about this, since it was obvious that building houses in the vicinity of the airport would always eventually result in more noise annoyance and safety problems (given the fact that both issues had been defined in terms of amount of houses and people).⁵⁰⁶

Infrastructure

All three ministries (VROM, V&W and EZ) involved in the PMMS stressed the importance of landside infrastructure development for achieving the mainport objective.

⁵⁰⁴ Ministry of VROM (1993), Vierde Nota Extra (VINEX) Part 4, December 1993.

⁵⁰⁵ Interview Rensing / North Holland, conducted by Yap, 2001. This was confirmed in an informal interview conducted with Rensing in 2005.

⁵⁰⁶ Interview Krul / Schiphol, conducted by Yap, 2001. This was confirmed in an informal interview conducted with Krul in 2005.

In the update of the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning the importance of substitution from air transport to rail was stressed once again, which was believed to reduce air pollution. In practice, Dutch Railways had already been investing heavily in the rail side accessibility of Schiphol from 1990 onwards, e.g. by upgrading the existing station to make it possible to become a HST station, by improving the Schiphollijn (railway between Amsterdam-Leiden) and by constructing of a direct connection between the city of Utrecht and Schiphol and the city of Zaanstad and Schiphol. This was expected to result in a substitution of 5 million passengers from air to rail when the new five runway system was put into operation. The amount of 5 million was very important as it made the low growth rates that had been used during the PKB, and that had been necessary for achieving the dual objective, more realistic. After all, higher growth rates of air traffic would further endanger the environmental objective.

In the PKB Schiphol part 1 (1993) this argument was used by the Steering Group of PMMS to turn Schiphol into a HST station. However, KLM, Schiphol and also the Ministry of VROM indicated that this amount of 5 million was far too optimistic. The RARO (Advisory Council of the Ministry of VROM) also indicated that such a large number was highly unlikely.⁵⁰⁷ For one, the improved accessibility could also work to enlarge the catchment area of Schiphol (i.e. the area from which potential passengers are derived), resulting in a further increase in air travel demand. Nonetheless, the Steering Group PMMS decided to hold on to the assumption, thus making the conversion from air to rail an important part of the PKB (part 1). This was taken over in the Cabinet's Perspective (PKB part 3), wherein it was stated that at least 5 million passengers were to be substituted from air to rail when the new five runway system was put into operation.⁵⁰⁸

Furthermore, the regional public authorities (especially the Province of North Holland and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer) wanted to do something about the congestion on the regional roads that was expected to increase as a consequence of growing air traffic (which would also result in more landside traffic), something that had already been taken up in the PASO covenant. This was also in the interest of the aviation actors, as the congested roads considerably reduced the catchment area of Schiphol. Both the regional public authorities and Schiphol agreed that at least 40% of both employees and passengers should travel to and from the airport by public transportation in 2015. The new regional bus network (*Zuidtangent*, a fastlane dedicated to bus services connecting Schiphol with Amsterdam and other surrounding municipalities) was one of the crucial investments to be made. In part 3 of the PKB the cabinet also stressed the need to invest

⁵⁰⁷ Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998.

⁵⁰⁸ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1995), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving Kabinetsstandpunt deel 3, p.15.

in local infrastructure (improving congested roads and public transportation) as it was perceived to be a precondition for successful mainport development.⁵⁰⁹

Towards A Regional Spatial Plan (1994)

In order to make these spatial developments possible the Regional Plan (*Streekplan*) of the Province of North Holland needed to be revised. In essence, the PKB decisions needed to be coordinated with the decisions of the regional plan. Most importantly, sufficient space needed to be reserved in the regional and the local land use plans to allow for the construction of a 5th runway and additional infrastructure, and locations for development of business locations. In order to align the development of the Regional Plan of the province of North Holland and further decision making of the PKB, the Project Group of the Regional Plan was made an integral part of the broader national PMMS project (as we already indicated). The province of North Holland was in charge of the Regional Plan. Other actors involved were the municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer and the three Ministries involved in the PKB (V&W, VROM and EZ). By combining the PKB and the Regional Plan it was possible to interact between the national and the regional level (which was deemed to be of essential importance, or so it was stated in the PASO report of 1991). This allowed for the application of the same assumptions and the same scenario when assessing the regional implications of the mainport development. The draft version of the Regional Plan was established in close cooperation with the PMMS Steering Group, which consisted of the same organizations (although not always the same people). Besides, the province and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer held many bilateral meetings elaborating the consequences of the IEE and IMER of the PKB procedure and the draft version of the PKB decision (part 1) for the Regional Plan.⁵¹⁰

The dual objective served as the point of departure for the development of the new Regional Plan. It was stated that the main challenge was to find a proper balance between the benefits of the economic potential of Schiphol and the negative environmental consequences of further growth.⁵¹¹ In line with the hierarchy in objectives that had been driving both the PASO and PKB process thus far, further mainport development of Schiphol was presented as the cornerstone of the revised regional development strategy. According to the Province and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer, the mainport referred to ‘an airport that serves as the home base and central airport in Europe for at least one of the dominating carriers, with an optimal

⁵⁰⁹ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1995), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving Kabinetsstandpunt deel 3, p.30.

⁵¹⁰ Province of North Holland (1994), Draft Regional Plan North Holland – South Amsterdam- Noordzee Kanaal, 1994, p.5.

⁵¹¹ Province of North Holland (1994), Draft Regional Plan North Holland – South Amsterdam- Noordzee Kanaal, 1994, p.5.

interplay between airport and the regional business climate'.⁵¹² Thus, the regional business climate was an integral part of mainport development. At the same time, the Province had to deal with the housing assignment set by the revision of the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning, demanding 100,000 new houses within the area, of which 15,000 had to be located within the municipality of Haarlemmermeer. It resulted in a set of main decisions.

Main Decisions of the Regional Spatial Plan

Some of the major decisions of the Regional Plan, further enacting the dual objective on the regional level, were:

- The reservation of land for the construction of the 5th runway 5P (including landside infrastructure and adapted noise and safety contours and additional building restrictions);
- Several investments in landside accessibility, for which space was reserved in the Regional Plan;
- Several investments in green areas, which had resulted in the Regional Project Green Mainport (*Plan Projecten Mainport en Groen*);
- Establishment of zones wherein different restrictions for spatial development applied.

The precise spatial contours were part of a heated debate between the Ministries and especially the province of North Holland. The greater the zone, the more growth opportunities for Schiphol, but the lesser space that was left for the facilitation of different spatial claims that were also deemed of crucial importance. The matter of prohibitions for developing industrial and office sites in the vicinity of the airport was settled quite easily. Building such sites was important for the local and regional public authorities as they received tax revenues from companies that were located within their territory.⁵¹³ As indicated before, the Ministry of EZ was afraid that the building free zones hampered mainport development, as it made it more difficult to develop offices and industrial locations. A claim that was supported by the Ministry of V&W and the Prime Minister, which had settled the issue.⁵¹⁴ Besides, the Schiphol airport authority also supported this claim, stressing the importance of developing business sites close to the airport as an integral part of their mainport strategy. In fact, the shared interest of actors in creating added value by developing industrial sites and offices close to the airport had resulted in one of the earliest Public-Private-Partnerships (PPS) in the Netherlands. Back in 1987 the different actors involved had already seen the merits of

⁵¹² Translation by author; Province of North Holland (1994), Draft Regional Plan North Holland – South Amsterdam-Noordzee Kanaal, 1994, p.17.

⁵¹³ Interview Van Duin / Province North Holland, 2007.

⁵¹⁴ Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998; p.135.

matching office and industrial property supply and demand in order to fully exploit the economic potential available. The BFS (Bestuursforum Schiphol, including the province of North Holland and the municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer and the Schiphol airport authority) and the SADC (same members) had been established in 1987 exactly for coordinating and facilitating this development of industrial and office sites.⁵¹⁵

In 1992 the BFS actors presented a joint perspective on the Schiphol region, the 'Location Plan Schiphol Region', indicating where industrial sites and offices were to be developed. The municipality of Amsterdam was also coordinating business development sites and infrastructure development with other neighboring cities that were not included in the BFS and SADC. In 1992 the regional entity Amsterdam ROA (*Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam*) was established for this purpose.⁵¹⁶ Especially the BFS and SADC reflected the regional support for public-private coordination as regards spatial development of the airport region.⁵¹⁷ It also implied that Schiphol, who was part of both platforms, became a more active player in regional spatial development during the subsequent years.⁵¹⁸ This was a direct consequence of the need to diversify the revenues, which was deemed necessary from a corporate point of view (see box 6.3).

Box 6.3. Diversification of revenues by the Schiphol Airport Authority from 1990 onwards

During the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s the Schiphol airport authority was becoming a more important actor in the field of regional spatial development. The main reason for this was that from a corporate point of view it was wise to diversify the revenues. Therefore, Schiphol was developing and enacting a second strategy next to their main strategy that revolved around facilitating hub-development. The intensification and adoption of hub-and-spoke networks by KLM and its alliance partners increased volatility of Schiphol's airport traffic since transfer traffic generated by these networks was to a large extent footloose.⁵¹⁹ Airports and the home carrier competed for transfer traffic. Changes in the quality of the connecting service (transfer time, ticket price, frequency, quality of the hub airport) could therefore easily result in declining numbers of transfer passengers, since those transfer passengers could travel through other European hubs.⁵²⁰ The second strategy Schiphol adopted was designed to deal with this more volatile market. This strategy was about modifying and diversifying the airport product, about differentiation and commercialization, intended to spread risks and reduce the dependence on the aeronautical revenues.⁵²¹ This commercialisation process, which was also introduced by other airport authorities all over the world, introduced a more business-like, market-orientated approach to the management of airports.⁵²²

The increased focus on non-aeronautical or commercial revenues, the more proactive role of marketing and

⁵¹⁵ See chapter 5 on the BFS and SADC.

⁵¹⁶ Van Wijk, 2007.

⁵¹⁷ Kleyn, 2009.

⁵¹⁸ Interview Van Boxtel / Schiphol Group, 2010.

⁵¹⁹ Burghouwt, 2005.

⁵²⁰ de Neufville, 1995; Veldhuis & Kroes, 2002.

⁵²¹ Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996.

⁵²² Jarach, 2001.

the introduction of new business skills like financial management and quality management were visible indications of the commercialisation of airports⁵²³, and were all part of Schiphol's strategy too. Some examples:

- In 1991 Schiphol diversified its strategy further by becoming an airport consultant, managing operations at other airports and becoming more active as a real estate developer.
- Schiphol started pursuing a policy of acquiring equity shares and other interests in both domestic airports. Rotterdam airport was bought in 1990, Lelystad Airport in 1993.
- New (tax free) shops, parking possibilities and restaurants were developed on the airport site.
- In the surrounding area several new business areas were developed, especially in order to attract a large amount of European Distribution Centres to the area.
- Schiphol also supplemented its Masterplan with an investment program in nature. At least 60,000 trees would be planted on the airport territory.

The issue of housing proved to be more difficult to settle than the issue of industrial and office locations. The regional and local authorities needed space to build houses in order to realize the housing objectives that had been imposed by the housing department of the Ministry of VROM. Besides, it was in their own interest to establish sufficient and attractive residential areas. The aviation sector on the other hand called for broad building free zones when housing was concerned, because more houses in the vicinity of the airport implied more noise pollution. Schiphol insisted on broadening the zone to which housing restrictions applied, from 35Ke to 30Ke, but especially the Ministry of VROM (supported by the lower governmental authorities) wanted to stick to the 35Ke zone in order to realize its housing objectives.⁵²⁴

During the development of the Regional Plan the idea that different spatial regulations were needed for housing and business locations was widely supported. With regard to housing, it was agreed that no new houses were to be developed within the 30Ke zone. Thus, the province had extended the housing free zone from 35Ke (that was taken up in the Regional Plan of 1987) to 30Ke (see figure 6.12).

According to the province this outcome was the, by all means reasonable, result of the trade off between housing needs and protection against noise pollution.⁵²⁵ With regard to business sites, it was agreed that the Schiphol zone, i.e. the zone within which airport related companies were allowed to settle, was to be expanded.⁵²⁶ The argument brought forward by the Ministry of VROM and several safety expert that this would enhance Group Risks, was put aside, considering the great economic interests of the other actors involved (the province of North Holland, the municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam, Schiphol, KLM and the Ministries of V&W and EZ).

⁵²³ Graham, 2001.

⁵²⁴ Interview Krul / Schiphol Group, conducted by Yap, 2000. Confirmed in an informal interview with Krul in 2005.


⁵²⁵ Province of North Holland (1994), Draft Regional Plan North Holland – South Amsterdam- Noordzee Kanaal, 1994, p.77.

⁵²⁶ Province of North Holland (1994), Draft Regional Plan North Holland – South Amsterdam- Noordzee Kanaal, 1994, p.21.

Figure 6.12 Building free zones of the 4-runway system and 5-runway system (left) and major housing sites adjoining the zone (right, the black dots)



Source: PKB, deel 4 1995; p.48



Source: Province of North Holland, 1994;p.76

Nonetheless, the possibilities for constructing business parcs in the vicinity of the airport would cause difficulties in the years to come between project developers and Schiphol. The Chipshol affair is without doubt the most well-known in this regard (see box 6.4).

Box 6.4. Conflicting spatial claims: the Chipshol – Schiphol conflict

With regard to the issue of spatial development, tensions between different spatial claims come prominently to the fore in the ongoing legal conflicts between project developer Chipshol and Schiphol Group. Chipshol's aim is to develop business parks in the vicinity of the airport and they bought considerable pieces of land close to the airport in the 1980s. In 2002 Chipshol wanted to develop one such business park close to the airport (near the Aalsmeer runway, i.e. the so-called *Groenenbergerterrein*) on its own land. After some initial problems, the municipality of Haarlemmermeer provided Chipshol with the building permit that was legally required (see Duivesteijn, 2006 for a detailed discussion; see also Van Wijk, 2007; pp. 247-248). The Schiphol Group was all but pleased about this, as they feared an increase in third party risks, as flight routes ran over this area, thus fearing a loss of future capacity. Schiphol informed the Ministry of V&W about these concerns and within a week a building ban was issued by the Ministry. At the same time, Schiphol itself was allowed to construct a new air control tower, which also led to an increase in third party risks. Moreover, Schiphol continued building its own Airport City, which was based on the strategy to develop business parks close to the airport (thus increasing revenues from real estate development – i.e. the Airport City Strategy will be extensively discussed in chapters 7 and 8). From the perspective of project developer Chipshol this illustrated that it was not so much the issue of third party risk that was at stake, but the issue of competition between real estate developers. Schiphol Group obviously attempted to attain a monopoly position as regards real estate development in the vicinity of the airport, a strategy that seemed to be supported by the Ministry of V&W.

Chipshol demanded compensation for the material damage (*planschade*) of 97.2 million euros that had been the result of the building ban, and the Court ordered the Schiphol Group and the Province of North Holland to pay. Nonetheless, the financial compensation was lowered by a specialist committee to an amount of 16.8 million euros. Schiphol argued that the Ministry of V&W had to contribute to the costs, which resulted in additional tensions between the airport authority and the Ministry (Duivesteijn, 2006). Meanwhile, Chipshol

challenged the independence of this specialist committee, as at least two of the members had had close ties with the aviation sector and the Ministry of V&W (Van Wijk, 2007). Moreover, in October 2005 Air Traffic Control admitted that they could not prove that potentially dangerous situations would have been created when the Chipshol business park would have been developed. This resulted in a new legal conflict. Finally, history repeated itself when Chipshol initiated plans for developing a new business park at another location in the vicinity of the airport (Badhoevedorp-Zuid), exactly where Schiphol had reserved space for the construction of a second airport terminal (NRC Handelsblad, 2006).

During the subsequent years the legal conflicts between Chipshol, Schiphol Group and the Ministry of V&W continued and intensified. The CEO of Chipshol (Mr. Poot) launched an extensive and aggressive media campaign (which resulted in several books, interviews and page-wide advertisements in national newspapers), with the clear goal to convince both the politicians and the wider public about the dubious strategies and tactics involved that worked to the advantage of Schiphol (allowing the airport to enact its spatial development strategy) and to the disadvantage of Chipshol (see www.schipholwanbeleid.nl for an overview of the many publications about this). In 2011 the ongoing legal conflicts took an unexpected turn, as Chipshol could not prove that the judges who had ruled about the spatial conflicts had not been independent. This did not only result in the widely shared perception that Chipshol had been right all along; it also resulted in an animated political discussion about the independence, and thus trustworthiness, of the Dutch legal system.

6.7 Finalizing the PKB: Political Ratification (1995)

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995
PASO 1989 - 1991	ROM procedure part 1 – 6.2						
		ROM Procedure part 2 – 6.3					
PKB 1991 - 1995				Preparing the PKB – 6.4			
					Decision making about the short term (< 2003) – 6.5		
					Decision making about the long term (2003 - 2015) – 6.6		
							Final PKB decisions – 6.7

The final step of the PKB procedure was to offer the Cabinet’s Perspective (part 3) to the Lower House and the Upper House for political ratification (part 4). In this paragraph we first discuss the political debate (6.7.1), followed by the final PKB decisions (6.7.2) and the aftermath of the decision making process (6.7.3).

6.7.1 The Political Debate

A new Cabinet

The elections that were held after the Lubbers III cabinet gave way to the formation of a new cabinet. A rather unique coalition was formed by the VVD (Liberals), the PVDA (Labour Party), D66 (Democrats ’66, a centrist left-liberal and radical Democratic Party). As Kok (PVDA) became the Prime Minister the cabinet was referred to as the Kok cabinet. The cabinet presented their coalition agreement (*Regeerakkoord*) in

August 1994.⁵²⁷ In the coalition agreement the cabinet indicated that they would hold on to the dual objective. It was stated that the intended expansion of Schiphol (PKB part 1) was to proceed, within acceptable limits for noise, third party risk and other environmental issues. Furthermore, it was stated that different alternatives for a five-runway system were to be considered, by means of an AMER (the Additional EIA that we already discussed). The option to develop a nightly norm for noise was not settled in the coalition agreement. Turning Schiphol in a HST station was deemed of crucial importance. Finally the cabinet wanted to prepare investments in Lelystad Airport, to which some of the non-hub related traffic was to be replaced in the long run (charters, freight).⁵²⁸ The VVD, a political party heavily favouring further mainport development, delivered the Minister of V&W (Jorritsma, replacing the former CDA minister).

Political doubts in the Lower and Upper House about the dual objective (1995)

The political debate revolved around the question whether or not the dual objective as defined in the PKB part 3 was desirable and really feasible.⁵²⁹ More specifically, it was questioned whether or not the capacity demands and the limits to noise and third party risks were realistic. The environmental interest groups and platforms of local residents had launched an extensive lobby, meant to convince the politicians that there had been too much attention for the mainport objective and the 5P alternative during the PKB process. From their perspective this had resulted in the marginalization of disconfirming evidence, i.e. the many research outcomes from which it could be concluded that the quality of the living environment would deteriorate.⁵³⁰ They informed the different spokespersons of the political parties about the several clues that had been available to them that pointed out the impossibility to reconcile the dual objectives (e.g. by bringing the advice of the Taskforce IEE to use all three scenarios, the advices of the spatial planning committee / RARO and the EIA committee, the advices of KLM and Schiphol about higher traffic growth rates, the research results of the SNM and several other pieces of information to their attention).

Moreover, they indicated that the final reports of the IMER and AMER pointed out that the standstill for third party risk and noise would not be possible for the period 2003 - 2015. It was clear that the Cabinets Perspective was partly in conflict with the results of the IMER and AMER. According to the environmental parties the policy measures that were eventually taken up in the PKB part 3 clearly reflected that the cabinet favoured mainport development over environmental protection. On the one hand, there was a lack of measures to avoid uncontrolled growth, like BTW tax on tickets (a common tax that

⁵²⁷ Cabinet Kok I, Coalition Agreement. Letter to the Lower House, TK 23715, August 15th 1994, Nr.11.

⁵²⁸ Cabinet Kok I, Coalition Agreement. Letter to the Lower House, TK 23715, August 15th 1994, Nr.11, pp.22-23.

⁵²⁹ Interview Van Gijzel / Former member of the Lower House PVDA, 2009.

⁵³⁰ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

consumers had to pay for all commodities and services in the Netherlands) and taxes on kerosene. From the perspective of the cabinet the introduction of such measures needed to be considered on the European level. After all, if the Dutch government was the only country to implement such measures, it would undermine the competitive position of Schiphol and KLM.⁵³¹ On the other hand, the cabinet announced several measures to facilitate further growth. For one, the national government would continue stimulating liberalization by setting up new bilateral treaties with other countries, paving the way for further implementation of KLM's hub strategy. The environmental parties and local residents reasoned that the efforts to facilitate further growth and the lack of efforts to control unfettered growth were likely to result in higher growth numbers than initially forecasted. In an attempt to avoid such unfettered growth, the environmental parties advised politicians to include capacity limits in the final PKB decision. These would serve as an additional lock on future development, next to the few norms for noise and third party risk.⁵³²

The aviation sector also informed the politicians about the potential dangers stemming from the current framing of the dual objective, although for different reasons. Schiphol contacted all political parties of the Lower house and informed them about the much higher growth rates used in their Masterplan. After all, the aviation sector had nothing to gain by using unrealistically low traffic forecasts, as this resulted in too optimistic forecasts of the environmental effects from which the environmental limits were derived.⁵³³ In February 1995 the Lower House was informed about the high growth levels of 1990 – 1994 (7.9%), whereas the PKB policy strategy was based on an average yearly growth of 3,1%.⁵³⁴ During the political debate most politicians were acquainted with the flaws of the proposal, i.e. the rather low growth assumptions and the far-reaching consequences for the feasibility of the dual objective in case of higher growth.⁵³⁵

Part of the criticism was already partly countered by the Minister of V&W prior to the political debate. In order to explain the discrepancy in traffic forecasts the Minister echoed the response of the PMMS Steering Group when KLM and Schiphol had presented their joint paper to them in 1993; the high growth was not expected to have a structural nature due to the expected increase in ticket prices.⁵³⁶ Another reason that supported the rather low growth rates was that it was expected that an increasing part of air traffic would be substituted to the High-Speed Trains (HST). Nonetheless, the result

⁵³¹ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1995), PKB Schiphol en Omgeving Kabinetsstandpunt deel 3, p.23.

⁵³² Interview Fransen/SNM, 2009; Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

⁵³³ Interview Krul / Schiphol, conducted by Yap, 2000. Confirmed in an informal interview with Krul, 2005.

⁵³⁴ Bureau PAU, 2000.

⁵³⁵ Interview Van Gijzel / Former Member of the Lower House / PVDA, 2009.

⁵³⁶ Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998.

of all criticism was that both Members of the Lower and Upper House doubted the validity of the many calculations about future growth levels, noise and third party risks and therefore the feasibility of the dual objective.

During the political debate the politicians organized a hearing session, during which several experts were invited to give their opinion about the dual objective as had been framed in the Cabinet's Perspective. Most of the people that were invited criticized the critical mainport barrier, arguing that the choice for this barrier was rather arbitrary and not very well substantiated.⁵³⁷ The session gave rise to even greater doubts about the validity of the numbers that had been used and the feasibility of the dual objective. The subsequent political debate in the Lower House resulted in a large amount of motions (requests for amendments), submitted by a wide range of political parties. Some of the most important ones were:

- Motion Van Gijzel (PVDA), Van 't Riet (D66) & Te Veldhuis (CDA), requesting capacity ceilings (max. 44 million pax and ca 3 million tons of freight);⁵³⁸
- Motion Van Gijzel (PVDA), Van 't Riet (D66) & Te Veldhuis (CDA), request for extended night regime from 6AM to 7 AM;⁵³⁹
- Motion Van 't Riet (D66), Van Gijzel (PVDA) & Rosenmoller (Groen Links), request for deleting max. of 12,600 houses within the 35Ke zone for the five runway system (i.e. this was to be brought back to the initial 10,000);⁵⁴⁰
- Motion Rosenmoller, request for replacing the 5P alternative for more environmental friendly 5G;⁵⁴¹
- Motion Van Rooy, request to find a solution for diverting the congested N201 road around Schiphol;⁵⁴²
- Several motions for including measures for reducing CO² e.g. motion Van 't Riet⁵⁴³ motion Rosenmoller;⁵⁴⁴
- Motion Rosemoller for further quantification of environmental norms.

Next, the debate continued in the Upper House. After a similar discussion, one important additional motion was included. The Pitstra motion called for a second opinion about the growth assumptions that had been used during the PASO and PKB process.⁵⁴⁵

⁵³⁷ TK 23552, May 25th 1995, Nr.39.

⁵³⁸ TK 23552, Nr.41; June 21st 1995.

⁵³⁹ TK 23552, Nr. 45, June 25th 1995.

⁵⁴⁰ TK 23552, Nr.28.

⁵⁴¹ TK 23552, Nr.33; June 12th 1995.

⁵⁴² TK 23552Nr. 24, June 12th 1995.

⁵⁴³ TK 23553, Nr. 48.

⁵⁴⁴ TK 23552, Nr. 34.

⁵⁴⁵ EK 23552, 31c, November 28th 1995.

Outcomes of the Political Debate

The Pitstra motion and several motions proposed in the Lower House were accepted by a majority of the members in the Lower and Upper House, which implied that these were likely to be processed in some way or another in the revised (final) PKB decision (part 4).⁵⁴⁶ The capacity limits were accepted, thus passenger numbers were not allowed to exceed 44 million in any year and cargo tonnes were not allowed to exceed 3.3 million in any year. The Lower House also clung to the 10,000 houses norm for noise. The extended zone for 12,600 houses that was proposed in PKB part 3 was rejected. The proposals for replacing the 5P alternative for a more environmental friendly alternative and to reduce CO² were not taken over, and the debate about the N201 was to be settled in a later stadium. The construction of the 5P alternative remained of crucial importance to the cabinet. It was out of the question that 5P would not continue. In the final PKB the Cabinet repeated its statement that the 5P alternative did best fit the mainport objective, and that it could also live up to the environmental objectives with some additional efforts (like improving ascending and descending procedures, reducing the share of chapter 2 planes, preventing new housing in the vicinity of the airport).⁵⁴⁷

The extended night regime (from 6AM to 7AM) was a difficult issue. The motion to implement such an extended regime was accepted by a majority of the Lower House. However, the Cabinet overruled it, arguing that it brought further mainport development (and thus the realization of the mainport objective) in great danger (i.e. several intercontinental flights that were crucial for sustaining the hub and spoke network of KLM arrived in between 6AM and 7AM).⁵⁴⁸ Instead, it was announced that further research about the health effects of the night regime would be conducted in the upcoming years (as it was argued that these effects were still not clear) and in the meantime additional insulation measures would be developed and implemented (i.e. insulating houses and bedrooms), for which an insulation program would be initiated.⁵⁴⁹ The several other criticisms about the impossibility of the standstill for third party risk, stench and local air pollution did only play a marginal role in the debate. That is, questions were asked, and the standstill was doubted, but no additional measures were taken up.⁵⁵⁰

Finally, the differences between measured and calculated noise levels were brought into the political debate. This was partly caused by Milieudefensie (Environmental Protection Agency), who had managed to obtain the research reports wherein the

⁵⁴⁶ PKB part 3A; see TK 23552, June 26th 1995, Nr.51.

⁵⁴⁷ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1995), deel 4, p.9.

⁵⁴⁸ TK 23552, June 19th 1995, Nr.40.

⁵⁴⁹ Planologische Kernbeslissing (1995), deel 4, p.17.

⁵⁵⁰ Interview Ale / safety expert / Member of the EIA Committee Schiphol, 2009.

differences between calculated and measured noise levels were investigated.⁵⁵¹ In a response, the NLR was assigned to do research about the differences between the measured and calculated levels. The NLR concluded that the measured noise levels were far higher than the calculated ones, even higher than the measurements of OMEGAM had shown. Especially farther away from the airport (in the so-called outer areas) differences could be more than 10Ke. The results could further frustrate the already complicated political debate about the future of Schiphol and were not published by the Ministry of V&W.⁵⁵² It was only in 1997 after the final decisions had long been legally ratified that the report would become publicly available (as shall be discussed in chapter 7).⁵⁵³

6.7.2 The final PKB decision (December 1995)

After the political debate the final version of the PKB was developed. This implied that the final operationalization of the dual objective that had been debated for so long (since 1988) would be presented and would be laid down in legally binding decisions. The final operationalization of the mainport objective was relatively straightforward. Based on the critical mainport barrier it was stated that Schiphol was to become a mainport, understood as a hub of one large home carrier and a focal point for economic development, with a maximum of 44 million passengers and 3.3 million tons of freight (the capacity ceiling). With regard to the short term four runway system (< 2003) the sole environmental criterion was that no more than 15,100 houses in the 35Ke contour would be allowed. Within this boundary, the southward extension of the Kaagbaan (250 metres) and the implementation of two-sided use of the Zwanenburgbaan was allowed in order to facilitate further hub development until 2003.

For the long term (> 2003) the most important decision was that the 5P runway was to be constructed and that it was to become operative from 2003 onwards. Additional environmental norms were set, since it was assumed that the construction of the 5th runway (5P) would considerably improve the quality of the living environment (which was still nicknamed the Environmental Friendly Runway). The environmental objective was still made up of the four criteria that had been set during PASO (noise, third party risk, local air pollution and stench). The bottom line was that the situation as regards noise was to improve from 2003 onwards as compared to 1990 (in terms of houses and severely hindered people), while a standstill was announced for air pollution, third party risk (both in terms of Individual Risk and Group Risk) and stench for the same period. Moreover, levels would be calculated by means of the current models (although the

⁵⁵¹ Press Release NRC, 16th May 1995. Weinig verschil metingen geluidshinder Schiphol.

⁵⁵² Interview Muchall / Geluidsconsult, 2009.

⁵⁵³ Press Release Dagblad Trouw, November 18th 1999. De lange lijdensweg naar werkelijke geluidshinder, by Vincent Dekker.

models could be improved over the years) (see box 6.5 for extended overview of the final operationalization of the environmental objective). Furthermore, several checks and balances were announced to make sure that the norms were not exceeded, including several monitoring and evaluation programs.

Box 6.5. Environmental objectives from 2003 onwards as taken up in the final PKB in 1995

1.Noise

- The 5-runway system allows 10,000 houses within the 35Ke zone, based on the housing situation of 1990. The amount of seriously hindered people (within the 20Ke zone) must be lower than the amount in 1990 (54,000). As regard the night norms, the amount of people with sleeping problems, people that live within the 20dB(A) night zone, must drop below the 1990 number (39,000). And 10,100 houses were allowed within the 26dB night contour.
- Within the 40KE contours day zones and the L_{aeq} 26dB(A) night-zones houses and bedrooms are insulated.
- No new building plans are allowed within the 35Ke zone.
- As an extra policy measure, the housing insulation program, which had been under way since 1985 (see Part D SBL), would be extended.
- As regards the 4-runway system it was stated that no noise levels above $26L_{aeq}$ were allowed outside the $26L_{aeq}$ contour.

2. Air pollution

- This was calculated for an area of 10 x 10 kilometres around the airport. It consisted of the total air pollution (emissions) of the area (i.e. road, rail, air). Increasing emissions of airplanes could therefore be compensated by reduced emissions of road traffic. Both the reduction of emissions of road traffic and the substitution from air to HST were expected to make a standstill in the area possible. For 1990 the following numbers were set:
- CO^2 : 644,000 ton; CO: 8224 ton; NOx: 6446 ton; VOS: 1662 ton; SO^2 : 283 ton; Black Smoke: 246 ton

3. Stench

- Standstill as regards the amount of people within a specific area from 2003 onwards as compared to 1990
- 84,400 people within the 98 percentile
- 480,000 people within the 99.5 percentile

4.Third party Risk

- The demolition of all houses within the IR-contour of 5×10^{-5} (the inner contour);
- Prohibition of new houses and offices within the 1×10^{-5} IR-contour (the outer contour);
- Prohibition of new houses and industrial developments with a high density with a further, broader 'exclusion zone' defined partly in terms of the 10^{-6} IR-contour, but also in terms of noise contours and other planning considerations;
- A standstill on societal risk (SWR) inside the 10^{-5} and 10^{-6} IR-contours (a policy which was also shown not to be possible by the calculations made in the EIA). This summed risk is equal to the expected number of deaths per year assuming an occupation of only one person per house.
- Additional removal of houses inside the outer contour (10^{-5}) will be considered, depending on the further development of the risk, which will be monitored, for instance, using the yearly Environmental Balance issued by the RIVM.
- Within the context of the ABEL research program (Algemeen Beoordelingskader Externe Veiligheid luchthavens = General Policy Assessment Framework Third Party Risks Airports) research about the quantification of group risk shall be conducted.
- A standstill for Group Risk from 2003 onwards, compared to 1990 levels. Model and adequate yardstick are yet to be developed.

Source: PKB Part 4, December 1995; pp.16-17

In December 1995 the revised PKB was politically ratified, implying the formal institutionalization of the dual objective. Nonetheless, many actors involved (environmental parties, local residents, the EIA committee, researchers/scientists, politicians, policy makers of the environmental department of the municipalities of Amsterdam, Haarlemmermeer, the province North Holland and the Ministry of VROM) asserted that the way wherein the dual objective had been operationalized after six years of decision making was rather unbalanced.⁵⁵⁴ The heavy doubts about the validity of the facts and numbers that had been used during the development of the PKB decision remained in place. These doubts were also voiced by the aviation sector that especially criticized the traffic scenario that had been used to assess the environmental effects. These doubts were also reflected in the media, resulting in several critical newspaper articles in 1995.⁵⁵⁵ To many people it seemed that the most desirable assumptions and estimations had been used during the calculations in order to reduce the negative environmental effects, instead of the most realistic ones. Still, this was difficult to proof, as many of the calculations were not transparent and verifiable (like those for noise).

6.7.3 After the PKB

The PKB decision about Schiphol implied changes in national plans (a partial revision of the Structure Scheme Civil Aviation / changes in runway system and noise contours, and a modification of the Aviation Act / changes in runway use and flight routes). In the revision of the Aviation Act (scheduled for 1996) the final norms and contours would be taken up, so they could be enforced for the 4-runway system (from 1997 onwards) and for the 5-runway system (from 2003 onwards). The contours taken up in the PKB served as the indicative zones. The PKB decision also impacted on the regional level, as it implied the partial revision of the Regional Spatial Plan of the Province of North Holland that we already discussed. This, in turn, influenced the local plans of affected municipalities. On the regional level a specific platform called CORUS (*Coördinatie Regionale Uitvoering Schiphol Besluiten* = Coordination Regional Execution of Schiphol Decisions) was put in charge of the coordination of actions and decisions related to the implementation of the final PKB decision and the Regional Plan for the Haarlemmermeer area. CORUS had a more comprehensive scope than the specific project orientation of the other regional platform BFS (Bestuursforum Schiphol). It covered all types of policy areas (except for housing): infrastructure, transport, green areas, water resources and environmental protection. CORUS consisted of the BFS actors (Province of North Holland, Municipalities Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam,

⁵⁵⁴ Interview Ale / Safety expert and Member of the EIA Committee Schiphol, 2009; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007; Interview Van Gijzel / Former Member of the Lower House PVDA, 2009; Interview Klaver / VROM, 2005; Interview Muchall / researcher Geluidsconsult, 2009; Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

⁵⁵⁵ One example is the article in Het Parool, June 1st 1995, Hoe betrouwbaar zijn Schipholcijfers? By Arie Oosterlee.

Schiphol), plus the Water Management Board and Air Traffic Control, as well as other authorities that were involved in the construction of the 5th runway.

Furthermore, several checks and balances were announced to make sure that the environmental limits were not exceeded, including several monitoring and evaluation programs. Amongst other things, Schiphol had to develop a ‘runway use plan’ for each year anew, which included the expected air traffic and its distribution over the runways. The plan was to be evaluated by the Commission of Noise Experts Schiphol (Commissie Geluidshinder Schiphol, CGS) and the Ministry of V&W had to approve of it. After approval Schiphol was allowed to implement the runway use plan. If the norms were exceeded anyway during actual operations, the Ministry of V&W was allowed to intervene (for example by sanctioning the airport authorities). The Inspectorate of the Ministry of V&W was put in charge of the monitoring program, reporting its findings every year. Every 3 years an audit was to be executed, meant to evaluate the effectiveness of the entire monitoring and enforcement structure. The feasibility and effectiveness of the dual objective would be evaluated in 1999 and 2004 and possible improvements would be implemented.

In essence, the final framing of the dual objective that so many actors had been working on since 1989 had become institutionalised in December 1995, and it was accompanied by an extensive implementation and evaluation structure. For one, the new five runway system that would allow Schiphol to facilitate the desired future air traffic volumes (see figure 6.13) had been settled after many, many years, although the actual value of the final framing of the dual objective was yet to become clear in the years to come.

Figure 6.13 The future five runway system of Schiphol (including 5P Polderbaan)



Source: Schiphol Group, 2006; Startnotitie MER korte termijn p.4,

Chapter 7 The Schiphol Policy Debate 1996 – 2003

Enacting the Dual Objective

7.1 Structure of the Case Description (1996 – 2003)

From 1996 onwards, the policy debate unfolded against the background of ever increasing air traffic volumes. More specifically, traffic volumes rose much faster than was assumed in the final PKB report. This undermined the policies that had been worked on for so many years. Moreover, it confronted the policy makers and politicians with a new policy challenge that could be summarized as ‘how to deal with the unexpected traffic growth?’ Next to finding an answer to this question the debate was also broadened, as many politicians deemed a long-term perspective on aviation in the Netherlands necessary (> 2015), whereas the PKB decision only applied to the short term (< 2003) and mid term (2003 – 2015).⁵⁵⁶

The case description of the period 1996 – 2003 is structured in the following way. We have distinguished between policy debates for the (1) long term (the period after 2015), (2) the short term (the period prior to 2003, applying to the four runway system that was laid down in the PKB 1995) and (3) the mid-term (the period 2003 – 2015, applying to the five runway system that was laid down in the PKB 1995). Each policy debate about a specific period is presented in chronological order. However, as discussions about the different periods often unravelled in parallel fashion, and as these discussions ran totally different tracks, although sometimes influencing one another, we have chosen to present the case description in a way that we think is most convenient for the reader. We start with a discussion about the long term (7.3 – 7.4). Thereafter we discuss the first years of the discussions about the short term (7.5) and mid term (7.6). Next, we continue with the discussion about the short term, which was brought to an end in 2001 (7.7). Most attention is devoted to the remaining discussion about the mid-term, as this policy debate dominated the Schiphol debate from 1999 onwards (7.8 – 7.12). The entire structure is presented in table 1. At the start of each new paragraph we shall use the table to indicate where we are.

Table 1 Structure of the case description 1996 - 2003

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				

⁵⁵⁶ During the PKB debate it had been clear that the lack of such a shared long term perspective had complicated the decision making process.

Mid term 2003 - 2015	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6	Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10	Part 6. – 7.12
				Part 5. – 7.11	

In 7.13 we discuss one final policy issue (privatisation) that did not explicitly belong to one of the three policy trajectories, but that came to play an important role in the debate during one specific moment in time. The chapter is ended with a short conclusion (7.14). Before starting with the description of the different policy debates we first set out some contextual developments that influenced the policy debate directly after the PKB 1995 had been formalized.

7.2 Policy Context (1996 – 1998)

In this paragraph we subsequently discuss the national policy context (7.2.1), the regional policy context (7.2.2) and the corporate strategies of KLM and Schiphol that set the conditions for the real developments at the Schiphol location (7.2.3). The paragraph is ended with a summary (7.2.4). These contextual developments form the background against which the policy debate unravels.

7.2.1 National Policy Context: Enacting the dual objective (1996 – 1998)

On the national governmental level the many different plans and programs that had been developed during the PASO/PKB period and that had given mainport development a boost (as discussed in the former chapter) were further enacted (including the underlying assumptions and objectives).⁵⁵⁷ In essence, it meant holding on to the principle of the dual objective.

In September 1996 the cabinet issued a mission letter, stressing the importance of further economic growth and further spatial-economic investments, especially investments in infrastructure.⁵⁵⁸ The joint perspective of the four ministries involved in spatial investments (V&W, VROM, EZ and Agriculture/LNV) and the subsequent joint Note on Environment and Economy also stressed infrastructure development.⁵⁵⁹ More governmental money was made available for infrastructure development during those years. For example, the budget of the Infrastructure fund that was established in January 1994 increased from 5.7 million guilders in 1994 to 11.3 million in 2000. And the benefits from natural gas fed into a new fund, the Fund for Reinforcement Economic Structure, wherein 85% of the money was reserved for investments in physical

⁵⁵⁷ This includes the SVV 2 of Transport, VINEX of Spatial Planning, NMP 2 of environment, Room for Regions of Economic Affairs, Structuurschema Groen.

⁵⁵⁸ TK 25017, September 17th 1996, Nr.1.

⁵⁵⁹ Ministries of VROM, V&W, EZ and LNV (1997) Nota Environment and Economy, The Hague.

infrastructure.⁵⁶⁰ Furthermore, the Interdepartmental Committee Reinforcement Economic Structure⁵⁶¹ gained a more prominent role in national policy making affairs.⁵⁶²

At the same time, the focus on both economy and ecology gave rise to the idea of selective mainport development. Not all traffic was to be facilitated, but only the traffic that was necessary for sustaining the hub-status (i.e. for making hub and spoke operations possible). The selective development strategy was in line with a new concept, the Brainport that was first posed in the Nota Environment and Economy.⁵⁶³ Instead of merely investing in transport and distribution volumes (becoming the biggest), the focus shifted somewhat to more innovative activities, with higher added values (becoming the best). Investments in knowledge were deemed necessary to ensure balanced growth (i.e. smart and innovative solutions were deemed necessary for improving the competitive position of the Netherlands). Such a knowledge offensive could take place under the motto Brainport.⁵⁶⁴ However, the Brainport concept did not to replace the mainport concept. Instead, it was used as an extension of the mainport concept, as it served to add an extra (innovative) dimension to the mainport strategy, thus legitimising both investments in traffic volumes and high quality development (i.e. becoming the biggest and the best).

Finally, mainport development received an extra boost as a consequence of the increasing attention for the competitive position of the Randstad during the mid 1990s. Private initiatives were taken to discuss the further development of the Randstad, which, amongst other things resulted in the establishment of the Deltametropolis Association (1998). The main objective of the Deltametropolis Association was to make use of the potential of the delta area in which the Randstad was located by transforming the current fragmented region with individualistic medium-sized cities into a coherent metropolis, i.e. the Deltametropolis. From the perspective of the cabinet, infrastructure development, and particularly mainport development, was an important means for establishing the Deltametropolis.

7.2.2 Regional Policy Context: Increasing doubts but supporting the dual objective (1996 – 1998)

The regional and local public authorities also further enacted their spatial-economic strategies that were the direct consequence of the PKB decision of 1995. On November

⁵⁶⁰ In Dutch this fund is referred to as FES, Fonds Economische Structuurversterking.

⁵⁶¹ In Dutch: Interdepartementale Commissie Economische Structuurversterking, ICES.

⁵⁶² See Pestman, 2000.

⁵⁶³ Ministries of VROM, V&W, EZ and LNV (1997) Nota Environment and Economy, The Hague.

⁵⁶⁴ Interview Kuipers, Port Economist, 2010; see also Kuipers, 1999.

29th 1996 a covenant was signed by the Ministries of V&W, VROM, LNV (Agriculture), the province of North Holland, municipality of Haarlemmermeer, Schiphol and the SADC (Schiphol Airport Development Company), containing investments in the airport area (worth 128 million guilders = 60 million euros). The covenant was titled Mainport & Green (*Mainport & Groen*) and most projects improving the quality of life in the vicinity of the airport.⁵⁶⁵ The covenant was a further translation of the environmental objective of the dual objectives in terms of concrete regional projects.

The province was further enacting the dual objective in its Regional Plan. The Regional Plan that was developed during the PKB-procedure was finally politically ratified in April 1996. This was partly due to the fact that the results of the additional EIA that was carried out during the PKB process (the AMER) and the final PKB decision (1995) had to be taken into account. Not much had changed as compared to the 1994 version. Mainport development and the dual objective were still the cornerstones of the Regional Plan. The final zones to which building restrictions applied were based on the First Draft of the new Aviation Act (summer 1995) that was yet to be ratified by the High Court.

CORUS (*Coördinatie Regionale Uitvoering Schiphol Besluiten*, Coordination Regional Execution Schiphol decisions) was assigned to coordinate actions and decisions related to the implementation of the PKB decision and the Regional Plan. The platform consisted of the same actors as the BFS (Province of North Holland, the municipality of Amsterdam, the municipality of Haarlemmermeer, Schiphol), and was supplemented with the Water Management Board and Air Traffic Control. Water Management was included, as the construction of new infrastructure had consequences for the ground water levels that were strictly regulated in the polder where Schiphol was located (the Haarlemmermeerpolder). CORUS adopted a more comprehensive approach than the specific project orientation of the BFS and SADC (i.e. focussing on industrial and office sites). It covered all types of policy areas (except housing): infrastructure, green areas, water and environmental protection.⁵⁶⁶ CORUS also played a role in damage compensation issues, for which a special commission was established in 1998.⁵⁶⁷ This so-called *Schadeschap Schiphol* (Damage Compensation Committee Schiphol) served as the joint office for requesting compensation for damage that was caused by further mainport development (i.e. noise pollution, but also for example changing ground water levels as a consequence of construction work). It was initiated by the Province of North

⁵⁶⁵ <http://www.mainportengroen.nl/> quoted from the web on October 6th 2008.

⁵⁶⁶ Interview Rensing / Province North Holland, 2005.

⁵⁶⁷ Verslag van de vergadering ter gelegenheid van de installatie van het Schadeschap, 24 November 1998, Hoofddorp, 18.30 (www.schadeschap.nl).

Holland, the Ministry of V&W and the Water Control Board and consisted of 28 surrounding municipalities.⁵⁶⁸

Based on the revised Regional Plan and the earlier appointments made within the BFS context, the BFS developed a 'Landscape Vision for the Schiphol Region' in 1997. This report provided an overall strategy for regional spatial-economic development.⁵⁶⁹ Furthermore the BFS continually reviewed the potential sites for airport-related companies in order to determine ways to increase the economic potential, as part of the broader national strategy to improve the competitive position of the Randstad. In order to give this an additional boost, a new joint platform was set up, the Amsterdam Airport Area partnership (AAA). The AAA consisted of the BFS actors, KLM and some real estate investment funds. Its core task was to promote the region in order to attract corporate headquarters, logistic centres and other international companies.⁵⁷⁰

Despite the ongoing support for the mainport strategy and the investments in additional landside developments that were deemed necessary (in terms of land reservations, investments in infrastructure, industrial sites, offices) the province of North Holland was also worried about the feasibility of the environmental objective of the dual objective.⁵⁷¹ In its Environmental Report of 1997 an assessment of the environmental targets of the province was presented. The outcomes of the assessment were not all that positive. For example, of the 10 quantifiable objectives that the province had formulated in relation to noise in 1997, in line with the PKB-decisions, 4 were not realized. Nonetheless, the most important objective of the PKB decision (i.e. the number of houses within the 35Ke zone) was achieved. However, the promises taken up in the Letter of Intent (1994) were not lived up too: 2.1% (instead of 2%) of arrivals took a straight approach over central Amsterdam. The municipality of Amsterdam and the province were not very pleased about this. As we shall discuss later, the municipality of Amsterdam would start a legal procedure about this issue in 2001. The issue of night flights also remained part of the concerns of the province of North Holland. In the PKB it had been promised that the noise level was not to exceed 26L_{aeq} outside the 26L_{aeq} contour in between 23.00 – 6.00. However, this was assessed by taking the average of the sum of all night pollution during a year. This implied that nights with higher noise levels would be tolerated, as long as these were compensated by nights with lower levels. The province of North Holland had disapproved of this calculation procedure

⁵⁶⁸ Aalsmeer, Amstelveen, Amsterdam, Amsterdam Geuzenveld/Slotermeer, Amsterdam Oost/Watergraafsmeer, Amsterdam Osdorp, Amsterdam Slotervaart, Amsterdam Oud Zuid, Amsterdam Zuidoost, Amsterdam Zuideramstel, Beverwijk, Castricum, Haarlem, Haarlemmermeer, Haarlemmerliede/Spaarnwoude, Heemskerk, Kaag en Braassem (voorheen gemeente Alkemade), Nieuwkoop, Ouder Amstel, Teylingen, Uitgeest, Uithoorn, Velsen en Zaanstad (www.schadeschap.nl).

⁵⁶⁹ Airport Regions Conference, 1999.

⁵⁷⁰ www.aaa.com, quoted from the web on October 8th 2008.

⁵⁷¹ Interview Rensing / North Holland, 2005; see also Kleyn, 2009.

during the PKB negotiations and they still didn't agree with it in 1996, stating that it did not offer sufficient protection to local residents. According to the province compensation had to be related to a time-span of a week instead of a year. Too high levels during one night could then only be compensated if lower levels were reached during the 7 subsequent nights.⁵⁷² Finally, the province also doubted the feasibility of a standstill for stench. All in all, the province kept supporting and implementing the necessary measures for further mainport development during the years that followed the PKB decision, but their concerns about the quality of the living environment (the other part of the dual objective) were growing.

7.2.3 Corporate Strategies of KLM and Schiphol: Towards an Airport City

In the meantime, Schiphol and KLM continued implementing the corporate strategies that they had already been enacting throughout the PKB process. As discussed in the former chapter, only parts of the expected effects that these corporate strategies would sort had been taken into account when developing the final PKB decision. KLM further optimized its hub operations by introducing a wave system with 4 – 6 blocks (replacing the initial system with 3 waves), triggered by the ongoing deregulation of the European Aviation Market (the third and final package of deregulation measures was implemented in 1997, recall box 5.1). Schiphol facilitated this development by providing for the required infrastructure. Furthermore, Schiphol welcomed several new airlines to the airport. These airside strategies were highly successful; both the amount of passengers (especially the amount of transfer passengers of the KLM) and the amount of freight increased during those years (see figures 1.1).

Besides, Schiphol expanded its investments in non-aviation related activities. In the Masterplan of 1989 the major focus was on hub-development, which meant that there had to be sufficient capacity at the airport for accommodating passenger and freight demand.⁵⁷³ In the master plan of 1997, the mainport strategy was broadened; both on the airside and landside, the airport was to become an international and regional traffic node. In the end, the airport and its surroundings were to evolve into a multifunctional center of facilities, services and firms.⁵⁷⁴ This latter strategy was labeled the AirportCity Strategy. According to Schiphol an AirportCity provided services 24 hours a day in the form of shops and catering, hotels and recreation, and information, communication and business activities (see figure 7.1).⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷² Regional Plan, April 1996, p. 22.

⁵⁷³ Schiphol (1989), Masterplan, p.13.

⁵⁷⁴ Schiphol (1997), Masterplan.

⁵⁷⁵ In Dutch: 'De AC is een stad die aan haar bezoekers – passagiers, werknemers, afhalers en brengers – maar ook de op Schiphol actieve bedrijven – luchtvaartmaatschappijen, distributiebedrijven, logistieke en zakelijke dienstverleners – 24 uur per dag diensten biedt op het gebied van winkels, horeca, informatie en communicatie, zakelijke vestigings- en vergaderfaciliteiten, en recreatie en ontspanning' (Annual report, 1998, p.5).

Figure 7.1 Schiphol’s new corporate strategy: From Airport to AirportCity



Source: Schiphol Group, 2006

The potential to become an AirportCity was related to the success of maintaining a hub position on both the airside and the landside (i.e. regional/ national traffic node).⁵⁷⁶ It was argued that a central network position on the airside (mega hub) and landside (multimodal interchange node, especially further integration in the regional and High Speed Train networks) turned Schiphol into an attractive area for urban developments, concentrating various functions on the airport site (office buildings, shopping malls, casino’s, hotels, conference halls etc.).⁵⁷⁷

In the broader corporate strategy Schiphol linked hub development to extensive landside developments. The creation of a prestigious Airport City sat comfortably with the political ambition of improving the competitive position of the Randstad and with the ambition to turn the Schipol area into a focal point of economic development. Moreover, on the regional level the Airport City strategy was to be aligned with the other regional investments in real estate and industrial sites. The attempts to coordinate the regional spatial-economic strategies resulted in a growing ambition of the BFS actors (i.e. Schiphol, Province of North Holland, Municipalities Haarlemmermeer and

⁵⁷⁶ This is reflected in the definition of Güller and Güller of an Airport City: “... the more or less dense cluster of operational, airport-related activities, plus other commercial and business concerns, on and around the airport platform. However, this cluster is called the airport city only if it shows the qualitative features of a city (density, access quality, environment, services).” (Güller and Güller 2002; p.70).

⁵⁷⁷ Burghouwt, 2002; Hakfoort & Schaafsma, 2000; Interview Kranenburg / Schiphol Group, 2008; Interview Schaafsma / Schiphol Real Estate, 2004.

Amsterdam) to welcome new European headquarters and distribution centers to the region.

Finally, Schiphol wanted to create AirportCities all over the world. Schiphol started to invest in international airports (as we have discussed before, they had already invested in the national regional airports). In 1997 Schiphol took a 40% share in the JFK IAT (John F. Kennedy International Airport) company which was selected to provide a new terminal for international arrivals at New York JFK airport (both for building it and operating it until 2015). Moreover, Schiphol acquired 13% of the shares of Brisbane Airport Corporation (Australia) in 1997.

7.2.4 Summary: Institutionalization of the dual objective (1995 – 1998)

It was clear that further mainport development was one of the main policy ambitions of the national government. The dual objective was repeated time and again in several strategic policy documents of the national government (the white papers of the Ministries involved). On the regional level the province of North Holland and the municipalities were elaborating and implementing the PKB 1995. Amongst other things, this resulted in the reservation of land for the construction of the 5th runway, additional landside infrastructure and the development of an integral plan for the construction of offices and industrial sites. Moreover, it resulted in several investments in the improvement of the quality of the living environment, laid down in the covenant Mainport and Green that was signed in November 1996. Meanwhile KLM and Schiphol continued to invest in the hub and spoke network. Their corporate strategies were very successful, considering the high growth rates in traffic volumes during the period 1996 – 1998 (and especially the large amount of transfer passengers of KLM). Schiphol also broadened its strategy by introducing the AirportCity concept. The AirportCity still revolved around the hub operations, but consisted of much more than merely an airfield. It was a strategy meant to diversify the revenues of the airport (as the volatile aviation market made it risky to rely solely on flight operations). All in all, during 1996 – 1998 the dual objective became materialized in all kinds of (policy) documents (plans, white papers and covenants), buildings, infrastructures, airplanes, coordination networks, land reservations (for the 5th runway) and green areas.

It was within this context of (inter)national, regional, local and corporate strategies that the national policy debate about the future of Schiphol proceeded. Most importantly, the successful enactment of the hub and spoke strategy created new problems during 1996 – 1998. Air traffic volumes exploded, resulting in far more traffic than had been forecasted during the PKB process. The immediate policy challenge was to deal with these exploding traffic volumes on the short (< 2003), mid (< 2015) and long term (> 2015). The problems were discussed in two different policy trajectories. One was about the future of Dutch aviation in general. The aim of this process was to develop a long term perspective on the future of Dutch Aerospace Infrastructure, which very much

revolved around the long term future of Schiphol (7.3 and 7.4). The other process was about dealing with the problems caused by the unexpected traffic growth for the short term four runway system (< 2003) and the mid-term five runway system (2003 – 2015) (7.5 – 7.8). Or in other words, it was about making sure that the dual objective as defined in the PKB 1995 for the short term (<2003) and mid term (2003 – 2015) would be realized. The discussions about the long term on the one hand and the short and mid term on the other hand mainly followed separate trajectories during 1996 - 1998, although they necessarily influenced one another. After all, decisions on the short and mid term structured the possibilities for the long term and the ambitions as regards the long term influenced the decisions to be made for the short and mid term. In the following paragraphs these different policy debates shall be discussed, starting with the debate about the long term.

7.3 Debating the Long Term (1): Preparing Long Term Policy (1996 – 1998)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				
Mid term 2003 - 2015	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6			Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10 Part 5. – 7.11	Part 6. – 7.12	

In this paragraph we first introduce a new issue on the policy agenda, the long term future of aviation in the Netherlands (7.3.1). Here we also discuss how a new policy approach was enacted during 1996 -1998 that consists of three subsequent steps in order to deal with this issue. Next, we discuss each of the three steps into more detail, were each step covered approximately one year (1996 – 1998) (7.3.2 – 7.3.4)

7.3.1 A new Issue on the Policy Agenda (1995)

During the political debate about the PKB in 1995 it became clear that there was need for a long-term perspective on aviation in the Netherlands. The PKB only covered the short (< 2003) and the mid-term (< 2015). But what was to happen on the longer term, after 2015? Already in June 1995 the cabinet had decided that a more fundamental discussion about the long term future of aviation in the Netherlands was needed.⁵⁷⁸ As such, a new issue emerged on the policy agenda: the future of aviation in the Netherlands and the kind of aviation infrastructure that was deemed necessary in order to facilitate the emergence of this desired future. The process was organized by the Ministry of V&W, that was assigned as the main responsible actor. In order to facilitate

⁵⁷⁸ TK 24786, June 14th 1996, Nr.1.

the process, the Ministry of V&W established the Project Group Future of Dutch Aerospace Infrastructure (*Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart Infrastructuur*, referred to as TNLI), which also consisted of the Ministries of VROM and EZ. This meant a continuation of ministerial roles as all three Ministries that had been involved during the PKB process were included again, while the way they were positioned vis-à-vis one another hadn't changed either (V&W in the lead). TNLI's assignment was to develop a publicly and politically accepted vision on the future of airport infrastructure in the Netherlands, against the background of fast-growing passenger numbers and the political ambition to maximize economic spin-offs and minimize environmental effects.

A new interactive policy approach

The TNLI process was organized according to the new principles that an influential independent advisory Committee of the cabinet, the Scientific Council for Governmental Policy, (*Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid*, WRR) had developed in 1994 in order to improve decision making about large infrastructure projects.^{579 580} This new approach had been designed in order to prevent public and political resistance against large infrastructure projects. The early involvement of crucial stakeholders was deemed necessary for this. The WRR had advised to apply this new procedure to the large scale infrastructure projects in the future instead of engaging in new PKB procedures. According to the WRR, the new approach allowed for a more structured and less time consuming approach when compared to the PKB procedure. However, in the case of Schiphol the cabinet only took over part of the WRR advice. As a consequence, the TNLI process about the future of Dutch aviation became a complex mix of the new WRR procedure and the old PKB procedure, as we shall see in the remainder of this paragraph.⁵⁸¹ However, the three steps that the WRR had recommended as part of the procedure were taken over, where each step was closed with a final decision and document.⁵⁸² Furthermore, it implied that broad public discussion was important during all three phases and that an independent committee was to be established in order to monitor the entire process (this would become the Van Gelder Committee). Application to the Schiphol issue meant that three important policy documents were to be developed in the upcoming three years, based on an interactive approach: A Perspective Nota (*Perspectieven nota*, 7.3.2), an Integral Policy Perspective (*Integrale Beleidsvisie*, IBV, 7.3.3) and the Strategic Policy Choice Future of Dutch Aviation (*Strategische Beleidskeuze Toekomst Luchtvaart*, SBTL, 7.3.4). The final document (the SBTL) would contain the cabinet's perspective on the long-term

⁵⁷⁹ TK 24690, April 17th 1996, Nr.1.

⁵⁸⁰ WRR (1994) Besluiten over grote Projecten. Nr. 46. SDU Uitgeverij, Den Haag.

⁵⁸¹ See for example Volkskrant, 31 January, 1997. Kabinet legde WRR-advies over aparte wet voor grote projecten naast zich neer Snel besluit over tweede nationale luchthaven onmogelijk, by Theo Klein.

⁵⁸² 1) Het aanvangsbesluit; 2) het beginselbesluit; 3) Het uitvoeringsbesluit.

future of Dutch Aviation. In the remainder of this paragraph we discuss each step into more detail.

7.3.2 Developing the *Perspectievennota* (1995 – March 1997) (step 1)

The first round of decision-making was meant to develop a clear perspective on the problem and a shared problem definition. This shared problem definition would serve as the input of a broad public discussion on the utility and necessity of aviation in the Netherlands (i.e. the dialogical phase). The so-called Perspective Nota (*Perspectievennota*) was developed by the three ministries and was based on two different types of input: future air traffic scenarios and the perceptions of the stakeholders involved.

Scenario development (January 1997)

First, a research trajectory was initiated by the three ministries. RAND Europe was assigned to develop long term scenarios for the future of aviation, the role that the Netherlands could play (in these scenarios) and which strategies were needed to fulfil these roles.⁵⁸³ The key rationale behind this research project was to discern robust strategies to anticipate possible future growth. In the final report RAND/EAC presented five different development scenarios for 2025, wherein different assumptions about worldwide traffic growth of aviation, the future configuration of the European airport system (i.e. hub or non-hub development), the European Aviation Policies, the development of alternative transport systems (i.e. possibilities for substitution), Airport Capacity and Aviation technology had been applied. In the lowest scenario 14 million passengers were welcomed at Schiphol, while the highest scenario assumed that 103 million passengers would visit the airport in 2025. The more successful the hub and spoke operations would become, the more traffic was expected. As such, the scenarios were based on the assumption that it was not so much governmental policies but the success of the corporate strategy of KLM that would make all the difference. The main question then became the extent to which the national government was to facilitate this corporate strategy.

The scenario exercise resulted in a broad range of development perspectives, including no-growth options. This had been one of the preconditions that the three Ministries had set prior to the assignment,⁵⁸⁴ partly in response to the criticism of several actors about the use of only one (growth) scenario during the PKB process. It was also based on the idea that policy decisions had to be effective in different possible futures (i.e. be adaptive), which was deemed of particular importance in the case of aviation as a

⁵⁸³ RAND Europe (1997), Scenario's voor het evalueren van infrastructuuropties met betrekking tot de Nederlandse Luchtvaart. RE-97-02-V&W/VROM/EZ, January 1997, p.3.

⁵⁸⁴ Ministries V&W, VROM & EZ (1997), *Integrale BeleidsVisie*. The Hague, p.76.

consequence of the many uncertainties involved in the future development of the aviation market.⁵⁸⁵

Investigating stakeholder Perceptions

At the same time a project leader of the Ministry of V&W organized several round table sessions in 1996. Different stakeholders were invited to present their perspective on the future of Dutch Aviation (and especially the desirable size of Schiphol). The sector parties, the public authorities and the environmental organizations and platforms of neighbouring citizens were invited to participate in the round table sessions. These round table sessions did not have an agenda: participants could bring forward the issues that were important to them at that time.⁵⁸⁶ During the round table sessions the initial research question of the RAND/EAC assignment (i.e. how to accommodate further growth of aviation?) was redefined. The question whether growth was really necessary was deemed more important, allowing for reflection on one of the basic assumptions that sustained the mainport strategy (i.e. growth was taken-for-granted). The Delft University of Technology was hired to analyse the structure of the debate, mapping the different perceptions about the future of the airport.⁵⁸⁷ The study provided empirical evidence for the existence of two diametrically opposed arguments, one advocating the necessity of expansion of Schiphol (pro-growth) and the other describing such expansion as an unjustified use of public funds (anti-growth). The structure of the debate was therefore in line with the two objectives of the dual objective that had framed the Schiphol policy debate during the previous years (1988 – 1995). More specifically, the Schiphol problem was mainly framed in terms of a trade-off between airport capacity and aircraft noise (growth – no growth). According to the Delft researchers these polarized viewpoints suppressed three other arguments that could possibly lead to a more diverse policy debate and new policy options: Societal integration of a growing airport, ecological modernization of the aviation sector and sustainable solutions to a growing demand for mobility.⁵⁸⁸ They recommended to create more room for exploring these three marginalized policy options.

The Perspectievennota (Spring 1997)

Both the scenario exercise and the results of the round table sessions served as input for the Perspectievennota of the cabinet (i.e. the white paper containing the Cabinet's perspective). The Note was prepared by the three ministries and instead of making final choices about the desired development of aviation in the Netherlands, the range of

⁵⁸⁵ RAND Europe (1997), *Adaptief beleid, beleidsanalyse en beleidsvorming met betrekking tot de Nederlandse Luchtvaart*. RE-97-03-V&W/VROM/EZ, January 1997.

⁵⁸⁶ Abma, 2001B.

⁵⁸⁷ TU Delft, Faculteit Technische Bestuurskunde. *Studie naar de achterliggende visies in het debat rondom TNLI en hun consequenties voor procesontwerp*. Delft, februari 1997.

⁵⁸⁸ Van Eeten, 1999; 2001. See also chapter 1 on this.

choices was presented. The main extremes were (1) to hold on to the PKB capacity ceilings (max. 44 million passengers and 3.3 million tons freight), thus prohibiting growth beyond these levels, or (2) developing additional capacity when the market allowed for this. The Note served as the starting point for a next round of extensive dialogue and additional research, during which the utility and necessity of different development options would be further assessed.⁵⁸⁹ More specifically, further discussions were deemed necessary about five issues, i.e. (1) Aviation in a sustainable society (2) development of mobility (3) necessity of infrastructure investments (4) options for infrastructure development (incl. locations) and (5) timing of decisions, thus taking the recommendations of the Delft researchers to heart.⁵⁹⁰ This would eventually result in the Integral Policy perspective (Integrale Beleidsvisie, IBV) of the Cabinet, which was scheduled for the end of 1997. Despite the broad focus that served as the starting point for further discussion, the Cabinet included one important remark in the Note about the further assessment. It was asserted that the dual objective as had been laid down in the PKB of 1995 was to serve as the point of departure when investigating the different possible futures.⁵⁹¹ Thus, just as in the debates about the short term and the mid term the issues of the mainport barrier, noise, third party risk, local air pollution and stench were regarded as the most important themes on the agenda that needed to be taken into account when developing a clear perspective on the long term future of Dutch aviation, thus undermining the recommendations of the Delft researchers at the same time.

7.3.3 Developing the Integral Policy Perspective (March 1997 – December 1997) (step 2)

The preparation of the IBV started in March 1997. Again, the discussion unravelled alongside two trails. First, an extensive public dialogue was organized, which was line with the WRR procedure for large infrastructure projects. Second, an extensive research program was developed in order to assess the economic and environmental effects of future aviation growth were assessed and possible locations for additional aviation infrastructure were studied. The research insights were meant to fuel the dialogue, so both trajectories were meant to co-evolve.

Dialogue

The first process, the dialogue, was monitored by an independent advisory council, the Van Gelder committee, that was to make sure that the dialogue was 'fair' (i.e. everybody should have an equal opportunity to make its message heard). The key question that was to be answered during the dialogue was 'How much space does the Netherlands give to aviation in the future?' In answering this question, the dialogue

⁵⁸⁹ Cabinet (1997), *Perspectievennota toekomstige Nederlandse luchtvaartinfrastructuur*. The Hague, 1997, p.5.

⁵⁹⁰ TNLI (1997) *Rapportages heterogene groepen, dialoog TNLI*. June, 1997, p.1.

⁵⁹¹ Cabinet (1997), *Perspectievennota toekomstige Nederlandse luchtvaartinfrastructuur*. The Hague, 1997, p.49.

revolved around a core process and an additional, much broader, public debate. The dialogue covered 4 months (March 1997 – June 1997). During the core process 80 different actors participated in the dialogue, covering the totality of different perspectives on aviation in the Netherlands. The actors included airline companies, the airport authorities, other large companies, environmental organizations, platforms of local residents, employers and employee organizations, regional and local public authorities, experts and scientists with knowledge of specific issues and a small, representative group of citizens.⁵⁹² These actors were spread over five heterogeneous platforms, each organized around one of the five themes presented in the *Perspectievennota* (i.e. Aviation in a sustainable society, development of mobility, necessity of infrastructure investments, options for infrastructure development (incl. locations) and timing of decisions).⁵⁹³ The results of the dialogue within the platforms were bundled in a final report that was presented on July 2nd 1997.⁵⁹⁴

At the same time, a much broader public discussion was initiated, wherein everybody was invited to join in. TNLI established several ways through which the general public could make its messages heard. Public meetings were organized, people had the opportunity to present written reactions (via internet and letters) and a broad media campaign was launched to make the public aware of these possibilities. Furthermore, Intomart (a consultancy firm) was assigned by the TNLI project group to carry out a research project, wherein 500 randomly selected Dutch citizens were interviewed by telephone.⁵⁹⁵ The outcomes of the dialogue involved a wide range of perceptions about the most desired future of aviation in the Netherlands, and, more in particular, about each of the five themes. It was not surprising that the actors with economic stakes maximized the economic benefits and minimized the environmental effects, whereas the actors with environmental stakes did the opposite.

*Outcomes of the dialogue*⁵⁹⁶

Most actors agreed that a large (hub) airport could offer much economic benefits to the Netherlands, but they also agreed that there was no need to be overly pessimistic if there was no such hub airport on Dutch territory. In the end, a majority of actors in the core process and the majority of responses of the public debate seemed in favour of facilitating further growth, conditioned by environmental limits, exactly as during PASO and PKB had been decided. Another outcome of the extensive dialogue was that

⁵⁹² TK 24786, February 28th 1997, Nr.5.

⁵⁹³ TNLI (1997) Rapportages heterogene groepen, dialoog TNLI. June, 1997, p.1.

⁵⁹⁴ TK 24786, July 2nd, Nr. 8.

⁵⁹⁵ Intomart (1997), Toekomstige Nederlandse Luchtvaartinfrastructuur, dialoog over nut en noodzaak van verdere groei van de luchtvaart in Nederland - een onderzoek. In: TNLI (1997), Bundel Dialoog over de toekomst van luchtvaart in Nederland.

⁵⁹⁶ See for extensive overview of the outcomes of the dialogue TNLI (1997), Bundel Dialoog over de toekomst van luchtvaart in Nederland.

further growth was not only economically beneficial (necessary) but also possible without causing further harm to the environment, if only a new set of environmental norms and related enforcement procedures was developed. Related to this, a package of recommendations for future actions of the cabinet was derived from the dialogue. Amongst other things, the cabinet was to make clear what was meant by mainport development, which criteria were eventually to be used when making the trade off between environment and growth, which environmental limits were to apply and how these would be enforced. Furthermore, the cabinet was to invest in substitution from air to rail and in internalization of the external environmental costs in ticket prices. By and large, the dialogue had resulted in a set of questions that were in need of further elaboration and that had also conditioned the PASO/PKB debate.

The research program

Just like the dialogue, the additional research program was based on the Perspectievennota. A list with research topics was presented and most research was carried out during March 1997 – October 1997. The research program was set up by the TNLI project group (i.e. the three ministries), based on interdepartmental discussions they had had during 1996. The research program consisted of two subprograms. First, several research questions about the utility and necessity of aviation in the Netherlands were investigated. Second, a first and global exploration of locations for future infrastructure developments was initiated. The research agenda was already set before the dialogue had started and there wasn't much room for adaptations during the dialogue.⁵⁹⁷ The additional research questions that popped up during the dialogue could therefore only be partly integrated in the research program that was already being enacted. Moreover, if the interactive policy arrangement was properly followed (that is, if it was carried out in line with the procedure that had been presented by the WRR), the research outcomes were to serve as input for the dialogue. This way, actors could draw on the same data when engaging in discussions and actors would have sufficient material to weigh the costs and the benefits. In reality, most research results were not available during the dialogue. For this reason, several actors complained afterwards that they didn't have the proper information available during the dialogue. Moreover, they also complained that they could not influence the research program in general.^{598 599} Some politicians also noted this lack of integration between the dialogue and the research program, wondering how people could develop a proper perspective on utility and necessity without research results.⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁷ In 't Veld & Verheij, 2000.

⁵⁹⁸ In 't Veld & Verheij, 2000.

⁵⁹⁹ See also reflections of the Van Gelder committee in *Integrale Beleidsvisie*, 1997.

⁶⁰⁰ TK 24786, May 2nd 1997, Nr. 7.

Outcomes of the research program (1): economic & environmental effects

Nonetheless, an enormous amount of research was produced in six months time. Different research projects resulted in different numbers, facts and figures and as a consequence the discussion mainly revolved around the validity of these numbers. The debate about the added value of transfer passengers serves as a point in case. On the one hand of the spectrum, this added value was heavily questioned, while those favouring mainport development on the other hand emphasized the importance of such transfers for sustaining hub and spoke operations. Both positions were backed by research reports, and were therefore equally valid in their own terms.

The CPB developed three new economic scenarios, which they applied to the aviation market.⁶⁰¹ The CPB scenarios came to replace the earlier CPB scenarios that had played such an important role during the PASO and PKB rounds (i.e. the ones used for defining the critical mainport barrier). The scenarios of the CPB were based on economic theories and were especially used in order to assess the economic effects of aviation growth and decline.⁶⁰² In the CPB scenarios the amount of passengers in 2025 ranged from 60 to 95 million, whereas in the RAND scenarios that were developed during the previous step the range was much broader (14 - 103 million passengers). However, in the RAND scenarios wherein further hub-development was assumed, the range was almost similar to the CPB range (60 – 103 million). Therefore, both research institutes assumed that if hub development was allowed to proceed growth beyond the capacity ceilings laid down in the PKB of 1995 (i.e. 44 million passengers and 3.3 million tons freight) was to be expected (ranging from small growth to large growth). The scenarios containing hub development were taken most seriously, as further hub development was in line with the Cabinet's ambitions and its understanding of the mainport objective.⁶⁰³

The RAND and CPB scenarios were used to calculate the effects of future aviation (which was the main objective of the research program). Most research was about the economic effects of growing or declining aviation. The focus was on the expected returns on investments in terms of employment and money. The main conclusion was that further growth of aviation and extension of its hub function would have large positive economic effects. After a firm environmental lobby it was agreed to include a research question about the economic effects when enforcing the capacity ceilings of Schiphol from 2015 onwards (no growth scenario).⁶⁰⁴ The CPB carried out the research and concluded that there would be a serious loss of jobs (10,000 – 20,000 jobs) and further economic development options if Schiphol could not develop beyond the PKB

⁶⁰¹ Centraal Planbureau (1997), *Economie en fysiek omgeving. Rapport voor TNLI*, the Hague.

⁶⁰² Verbaan, (1997), *Het aanvullend onderzoek in het TNLI project, een introductie*. TNLI, The Hague.

⁶⁰³ TK 20517, Nr. 12.

⁶⁰⁴ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

capacity limits.⁶⁰⁵ The CPB expected that enforcing the capacity limits would result in a lower quality aviation product, higher ticket prices, loss of competitive position of KLM and Schiphol, indicating economic decline. However, at the same time it would reduce the emission of CO² with 1.5% - 3%. Still, additional noise measures were needed in order to make sure that the level of noise pollution would not deteriorate.

A few economists (with expertise in aviation) were asked to reflect upon the CPB outcomes by means of an essay. It resulted in a set of highly critical essays. Amongst other things it was indicated that a one-sided focus on mainport development led to a neglect of other non-airport related chances for economic development. It was therefore regretted that the mainport objective was not questioned.⁶⁰⁶ Indeed, several environmental actors had asked to investigate alternative ways for fostering economic development in the Netherlands other than investing in the aviation sector in an attempt to straighten the information asymmetry that surrounded the debate.⁶⁰⁷ The request was not honoured, as the research program was meant to shed light on the economic effects of further aviation growth (i.e. it fell outside the scope of the program and financial resources were limited). Safety experts had tried to bring the issue of third party risk more prominently on the agenda, but with little effect; the safety issue did not play a prominent role in the discussion about the long term.⁶⁰⁸ Finally, it was regretted that no attempt had been made to assess the environmental costs in economic terms. The project team of TNLI had argued that such a thing was not possible yet, but this argument was countered by the economic experts, indicating that adequate scientific methods were available for this.⁶⁰⁹

Outcomes of the research program (2): Locations for a new airport

At the same time, research was carried out to select possible locations for future airport infrastructure. The Spatial Planning Agency (RPD) of the Ministry of VROM selected eight locations with potential for future airport infrastructure development, spread all over the Netherlands (see figure 7.2).⁶¹⁰ The selection was based on previous ideas about promising locations (e.g. some locations had already been discussed in the 1970s, see chapter 5).

⁶⁰⁵ Centraal Planbureau (1997), *Grenzen op Schiphol*. TNLI, The Hague, see pp. i – xii.

⁶⁰⁶ Pols, 1997.


⁶⁰⁷ Press Release Milieudefensie, February 20th 1997.

⁶⁰⁸ Interview Ale/ safety expert, 2009.

⁶⁰⁹ Van Ewijk, C. (1997), *Kanttekeningen bij Kadernotitie Economisch Evaluatieonderzoek* TNLI. TNLI, The Hague, pp.14 – 15.

⁶¹⁰ Noord Groningen, Oostas, De Peel, Flevoland, Markermeer, Tweede Maasvlakte, Zuidas, Noordzee.

Figure 7.2 Possible locations for future airport infrastructure in the Netherlands, 1997



Source: Startnotitie MER ONL (1999), p.17

The effects (on economic development, ecology, mobility, spatial development) of different scenarios and different airport (runway) configurations⁶¹¹ were calculated for each of the eight locations. During the quick and dirty impact studies, the highest growth scenarios were used in order to take all possible effects into account. This was deliberately done in a response to the heated political discussion about the manipulative use of scenarios during PASO and PKB, which dominated the national political discussion at that time (which shall be discussed later on). In a nutshell, the main criticism was that the Steering Group had deliberately selected a scenario with unrealistically low growth assumptions during the PKB process in order to be able to argue that the dual objectives thus framed could be realized at the same time. The TNLI project team wanted to avoid such criticism in the long term project, and they decided to use the scenarios that allowed for the exploration of the maximum effects.

It was concluded that an airport that was situated too far away from the economic heart of the Netherlands (i.e. the Randstad) would be undesirable. A location in the periphery of the Randstad was not contributing to an improvement of the competitive position of the Randstad, which was a prime objective of the Cabinet (see paragraph 7.2).^{612 613} Moreover, it was expected to result in new damage to environment, noise pollution, longer travel times to the airport, while large additional investments in landside

⁶¹¹ New national airport, an additional national airport (independent of Schiphol), a satellite airport (connected to Schiphol), an overflow airport (like the satellite, only much smaller) (SH&E, 1997).

⁶¹² The Ministries of VROM, EZ, V&W and LVNL, Den Haag. VROM was in charge of the project. It is an elaboration of the joint perspective of 1996, wherein the importance of the dual objective is stressed once again. TK 25017, Nr.1, September 17th 1996.

⁶¹³ Cf. Zonneveld & Verwest, 2005.

accessibility were needed in order to broaden the smaller catchments area. The TNLI project team therefore advised the cabinet to take the following locations up for further consideration: An additional airport on (1) the Maasvlakte or in (2) Flevoland or (3) a new airport in the North Sea. As a result of the investigation of effects and the tremendous costs that were involved when developing an entirely new airport, the possibility of further development at the Schiphol location (4), that had not been a serious option for long term development before, was included. This Schiphol option became more important as Schiphol was rapidly nearing its capacity ceilings, due to the explosive growth in traffic volumes during 1996 - 1997. It was therefore likely that investments were needed in the short term if mainport development was to be facilitated, i.e. if growth on the mid term (2015) was not to be hampered. Such modifications to the existing Schiphol airport were more easily made than developing an entire new airport. The short-term urgency therefore required that the development options of the Schiphol location were also taken into account as regards the investigations for the long term. The focus was especially on developing another parallel runway (west – east), the so-called *parallele Kaagbaan* (see figure 7.3). Or in other words, the idea of having a fully operational 6th runway in 2025 was brought to the fore.⁶¹⁴ It was expected that this six runway system would allow for more flights within the environmental limits set by the PKB.

Figure 7.3 Exploring options for the long-term for Schiphol: the *parallele Kaagbaan*



Source: Schiphol Group, 2007

In order to assess the potential of different options for extending Schiphol (including the idea of a 6th runway) two research projects were initiated, resulting in radically different results. The NLR (1997)⁶¹⁵ concluded that no further growth would be possible at the Schiphol location (beyond the 44 million pax.), while ADECS (1997) concluded that 60

⁶¹⁴ Which was actually a seventh runway, as the fifth runway that was being prepared was actually the sixth runway.

⁶¹⁵ NLR (1997) Toekomstige Nederlandse Luchtvaartinfrastructuur. Vliegtuiggebonden gegevens. Report Nr. CR 97404 L.

– 70 million passengers would be possible.⁶¹⁶ From the perspective of the local residents and environmental interest groups, these contradictory numbers once again illustrated the arbitrary use of facts and figures they thought representative for the entire Schiphol debate.⁶¹⁷ According to both the NLR and the cabinet, these differences were caused by different assumptions about the future amount of night flights, the use of large airplanes (large bodies) and procedures for ascending (when departing) and descending (when arriving).⁶¹⁸

Finalizing Step 2: The Integral Policy Perspective

In September 1997 most of the research was finalized and a few sessions were organized to integrate the input from the dialogue and the research in order to develop the Integral Policy Perspective (IBV) of the cabinet. The fact that the research program and the dialogue had unravelled rather independently made it more difficult to integrate the outcomes, resulting in a few months of delay. Besides, not all research projects had already been finished when the policy makers of TNLI started to write the IBV. Due to the political deadline involved (delivering the final report before the end of the year), writing had to get started in order to avoid further delays. In order to make sure that the new research results could be integrated in the final IBV report the TNLI project group installed a group of people that had to make summaries of the research results in a way that was easily digestible for the policy makers. According to scientific observers the alignment of the three trajectories (dialogue, research and writing the policy document) was quite poor, which, amongst other things, hampered the use of the highest quality information available.⁶¹⁹

The final IBV report was finished in December 1997. In the report at least two important decisions were announced by the cabinet. First, the debate about the long term development of aviation was to get linked to the development of Schiphol on the short and mid term (at least, in a more integral way than had been the case up until then). This was related to the fact that the unexpected high growth rates of Schiphol during 1996 and 1997 caused immediate capacity problems. This implied that decisions about additional capacity were needed much earlier than expected, which had consequences for decisions about the long term. Second, the cabinet made clear that further mainport development was to be pursued, although in a selective way (i.e. aiming for the highest quality). Selectivity referred to mainport or hub related traffic. The selective approach would therefore stimulate hub-related traffic, while discouraging

⁶¹⁶ ADECS (1997), Geluidseffect van een zevental ontwikkelingsscenario's. Locatie Schiphol. TNLI, The Hague.

⁶¹⁷ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

⁶¹⁸ Cabinet (1997), Integrale Beleidsvisie. TNLI, The Hague.

⁶¹⁹ In 't Veld & Verheij, 2000.

non-hub related traffic.⁶²⁰ Such selective mainport development did not only have consequences for the long term, but also for the short and mid term as it brought the need for additional capacity for hub related traffic to the fore.

In essence, the cabinet argued that policy measures for selective growth were to be developed during the upcoming years. Moreover, it was clear that this growth was to be concentrated on Schiphol for the short (<2003) and mid term (2003 – 2015), while for the longer term (>2025) a second airport was to be considered. In order to facilitate this further selective growth the cabinet was willing to let go of Schiphol's capacity limits that had been set in the PKB of 1995, but only if this did not cause environmental deterioration. The decisions about the short and mid term shall be discussed in paragraph 7.5. As regards the long term the cabinet took over the advice of the TNLI organization; the four locations that were expected to contribute most to the competitive position of the Randstad were selected for further research: (1) an additional airport on the Maasvlakte or (2) in Flevoland, (3) a new airport in the North Sea, or (4) further expansion at the current Schiphol location. The other four options that had been considered during the quick scan were located too far away from the Randstad (Noord Groningen, Oostas, De Peel, Southern Netherlands, Markermeer) and were therefore rejected (see figure 7.4).⁶²¹

Figure 7.4 Remaining locations for additional aviation infrastructure for the long term



Source: Startnotitie MER ONL (1999), p.18

7.3.4 Developing the Final Cabinet's Perspective (1998) (step 3)

After the IBV report had been discussed in the Lower and Upper House, which did not result in any complications, the process entered its third and final step. The cabinet was

⁶²⁰ Cabinet (1997), *Integrale Beleidsvisie*, TNLI, p.11.

⁶²¹ Cf. Zonneveld & Verwest, 2005.

to develop a final and fully integrated perspective on the short, mid and long term in a new report, the Strategic Policy Choice Dutch Aviation (Strategische Beleidskeuze Luchtvaart Nederland, *SBTL*).⁶²² At that time, most attention was devoted to the short and mid term, as the new regulative system for noise did not allow for further traffic growth (which shall be discussed in 7.5). Nonetheless, the debate about the long term development also continued. The SBTL was to contain a final choice about the most desirable location(s) for selective mainport development from 2025 onwards. In order to develop the SBTL report further research about the opportunities and constraints concerning growth at the four selected locations (i.e. Flevoland, Maasvlakte, North Sea, Schiphol) was carried out. This resulted in 75 studies conducted by a wide variety of actors.⁶²³ The process was primarily a research process with little interaction between stakeholders, except for the interaction between the researchers and the TNLI project team.

The Cabinet's Perspective

Based on the results of these studies, the cabinet concluded that only two out of the four remaining options did have the potential to facilitate long-term growth. The locations of Flevoland and Maasvlakte were rejected (see figure 7.4). The negative environmental effects of the Flevoland location (the costs) in terms of green areas, quietness and recreation possibilities were considered to be too high when compared to the benefits. Moreover, Flevoland had to deal with considerable amounts of birds in the area, making large flight operations a dangerous enterprise.⁶²⁴ The Maasvlakte location was confronted with similar problems. Besides, the unfavourable weather conditions of this location implied another additional capacity constraint.⁶²⁵ The bottom line was that both locations lacked the potential to meet the expected capacity needs. A dual airport system was needed when expansion was to be located at one of these two locations, meaning that capacity was to be spread over Schiphol and Flevoland/ Maasvlakte. More specifically, the new airport at Flevoland or the Maasvlakte would serve as a satellite of the Schiphol airport. This implied the development of a multi-hub system, which led to considerable protests of the KLM and Schiphol Group (i.e. as part of its international branding strategy the airport authority had changed its name in the meantime) who both wanted to concentrate hub development at one airport.^{626 627} From their perspective a fragmented hub-function spread over two airports was doomed to failure, since the competitive position on the transfer market was related to the ability to offer smooth

⁶²² TK, 24786, December 2nd 1997, Nr.9.

⁶²³ For an overview see TNLI Conference Proceedings, 17 & 18 September 1998 'Hoeveel ruimte geeft Nederland aan de luchtvaart?'

⁶²⁴ A conclusion derived from the research report of Haskoning, 1998.

⁶²⁵ A conclusion derived from the research report of RIKZ, 1998.

⁶²⁶ Startnotitie Milieu Effectrapportage lange termijn Schiphol, October 1999, p.19.

⁶²⁷ Cabinet (1998), Strategische Beleidskeuze Luchtvaart Nederland. TNLI, The Hague.

transfers (i.e. short transfer times, minimized walking distances etc.).⁶²⁸ It was deemed impossible to optimize the hub operations when these were spread over two different airports. This would seriously danger Schiphol’s hub status, which was not in the interest of the stakeholders involved that desired mainport development.⁶²⁹ Therefore, as regards the long-term development, all aviation activities were to be concentrated at one location. Only two locations were deemed suitable for such long-term development: the current Schiphol location and an offshore island in the North Sea.⁶³⁰ Thus, at the end of 1998 the broad and interactive three step procedure was completed and the Cabinet announced that two locations were up for further consideration during the process of formal decision making that was bound to begin. The TNLI organization was replaced by a new project organization, as the formal decision making was regarded in terms of a new project. This formal decision making process would eventually take more than 4 years (1999 – 2003).

7.4 Debating the Long Term (2): Formal Decision Making (1999 – 2003)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				
Mid term 2003 - 2015	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6			Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10	Part 6. – 7.12	
						Part 5. – 7.11		

7.4.1 A new Project Organization: ONL (1999)

At the start of 1999 the Program Direction ONL (*Onderzoek Nederlandse Luchtvaart*, Research Dutch Aviation) was established. The main difference with the TNLI organization was that the ONL organization was not an interdepartmental organization. It only consisted of policy makers of the Ministry of V&W. Hence, the Ministries of VROM and EZ that had participated in the TNLI project team were not formally included anymore. After 3 years of interactive policymaking and interdepartmental debates, the Ministry of V&W seized the reins now the formal policy making was bound to begin. This strategy was similar to what had happened at the end of the PASO process, prior to the start of the PKB process in 1991, although the PKB project team had been interdepartmental. Within one year, ONL was to present a final perspective on the long term development of Schiphol. However, as had been announced in the SBTL of 1998, this long term perspective was to be accompanied by a short and mid-term perspective, as it had become clear during the three step procedure of the TNLI that one

⁶²⁸ Interview Kranenburg / Schiphol, 2008.
⁶²⁹ Since hub development was still seen as one of the main requirements for mainport development.
⁶³⁰ Cabinet (1998), Strategische Beleidskeuze Luchtvaart Nederland. TNLI, The Hague.

perspective that contained all three time periods was necessary. ONL decided to adopt two different steering strategies, one for the short and mid term (1) and one for the long term (2). In practice, both strategies developed their own dynamics and they evolved quite independently from one another. Therefore, we discuss them in separate paragraphs (although pointing out the points of intersection). In this paragraph we continue with the debate about the long term. The organization of the long term process was straightforward.

The Project Direction of ONL was in charge of the further investigation of the two remaining policy options for the long term (1) Schiphol and (2) North Sea. This further investigation was to be carried out in close cooperation with the aviation sector. In the SBTL of 1998 it was announced that a so-called first moment of evaluation (*Eerste Moment van Afweging*) was to take place in December 1999, wherein the Cabinet would indicate which of the two locations held most potential. A new report was to be developed for this, the so-called Future of the Dutch Aviation report (*Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart*, which we shall discuss in 7.4.2). Next, the several policy directions set out in this report were discussed in a policy program for the long term, considering the potential of the Schiphol location (7.4.3) and the very long term, considering the potential of an offshore island in the North Sea (7.4.4). In 2003 some final decisions were made about the long term (7.4.6), which were heavily conditioned by the developments on the aviation market (7.4.5). The paragraph will be ended with a short review of the decision making process about the long term during 1996 - 2003 (7.4.7).

7.4.2 Developing the TNL report (1999)

The costs and benefits of different long term development options were investigated by means of a legally required Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). In October 1999 ONL presented the Start Document of the EIA-procedure, setting out the six alternatives that were up for further research:⁶³¹

- Current system
- Small redesign Schiphol
- Large redesign Schiphol
- North Sea satellite of Schiphol
- North Sea island
- Most Environmental Friendly alternative.

The aviation sector, especially Schiphol, played an important role during the enactment of the EIA procedure. Schiphol was in charge of exploring the market developments and

⁶³¹ Startdocument Lange termijn ontwikkeling Schiphol, 1999.

the assessment of the operational, logistical and financial effects of the different options. The airport authority concluded that the North Sea alternative contained very high financial risks. Therefore, Schiphol who had introduced the island option two years earlier, became less enthusiastic about this option, while shifting the focus to the possibilities for redesigning the Schiphol location itself. Quite soon it came to the fore that large-scale expansions were not feasible within the regulative framework. Several options that implied large-scale expansions to eight or even nine runways (i.e. De Reus or Van Stappen-variant) were therefore rejected. Two of the remaining smaller redesign variants were deemed feasible, i.e. the development of a parallel Kaagbaan (6PK) or the development of a 6th runway in between the Zwanenburg runway and the new Polder runway (6P) (which was to be opened in 2003) (see figure 7.5).⁶³²

Figure 7.5 Different development options at Schiphol location for the long term 1999, related to the base case (5P)



Source: Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart, 1999; p.36

The ONL project team (i.e. policy makers of the Ministry of V&W) took over the advice of Schiphol and reasoned that there were too many (especially financial) risks involved in the creation of a North Sea island. Meanwhile, the province of North Holland, who had not been formally included in the ONL process, had also initiated its own research project. From the perspective of the province, the North Sea island option was the most desirable option, as long as this new location became linked to the existing Schiphol location by means of excellent landside infrastructure in order to make sure

⁶³² ONL Nieuwsbrief, Nr. 2, Januari 2000.

that the competitive business environment of the region was not harmed.⁶³³ After all, it was still assumed that the vicinity of a large airport was a crucial precondition for a competitive business environment. An additional benefit was that it would reduce the environmental problems in the province and that it would offer the province sufficient space to facilitate some of the other urgent spatial claims as regards landside infrastructure (roads), housing and recreational areas.⁶³⁴ Back in 1996, this option had already been considered by members of the Lower House related to the political party PVDA, but the members held different ideas about the desirability of such an island. There were some influential proponents (like Van Gijssel/ PVDA) and some influential opponents (like Melkert/PVDA). Back then, the proponents decided not to make a political issue out of it.⁶³⁵

Final Choice for the Schiphol location (December 1999)

In the TNL report of December 1999 the cabinet decided to concentrate further growth at the Schiphol location, thus taking over the advice of Schiphol and the ONL project team. Moreover, only small-scale redesign options were to be taken into account. The other option, to move the airport to a new, offshore location in the North Sea, was still considered to be a viable and possibly beneficial alternative, but only for the *very* long term development (> 2030). This island option was therefore not totally removed from the agenda, but the cabinet asserted that the large uncertainties about future traffic demand (> 2030) did not warrant extensive investments in an airport island yet. In order to explore the further possibilities of a North Sea island in the very long term an extensive research program would be carried out from 2000 onwards.⁶³⁶ By further concentrating aviation at Schiphol in the long run (2025) the Cabinet introduced a stepwise approach for developing the Schiphol location. Different steps were needed for the short, mid and long term in order to selectively induce capacity, while simultaneously enhancing the quality of the living environment (in terms of the indicators that were part of the dual objective).

Responses to the TNL report

The aviation sector (Schipol, KLM, Air Traffic Control) supported the choices made in the TNL report. This was not surprising, as the choices had been in line with their own advices. The four main environmental actors (Milieudefensie, SNM, Milieufederatie Noord Holland, Platform Luchtvaart Schiphol) were pleased that the North Sea island option was rejected, at least for the long term.⁶³⁷ From their perspective such an island

⁶³³ Research report 'Alle Luchtvaart naar Zee', November 1998.

⁶³⁴ Interview Rensing / Province of North Holland, 2005.

⁶³⁵ Interview Van Gijssel / Former member of the Lower House / PVDA, 2009.

⁶³⁶ Cabinet (1999), Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart. ONL, The Hague.

⁶³⁷ Press Release Milieudefensie, May 1997, Noordzeeluchthaven is niet meer dan een droom van de luchtvaartlobby. By Wynand Duyvendak.

could only further harm the environment.⁶³⁸ The regional public authorities (province and municipalities) feared that further growth at the Schiphol location would cause additional pressure on the landside accessibility of the region, increasing the already heavy traffic jams in the long run. The province had elaborated its own research findings of 1998, which had resulted in several opportunity maps (*Kanskaarten*).^{639 640} Based on the outcomes of their own research the province kept arguing that a North Sea island that was connected to the current Schiphol location by means of excellent infrastructure held most potential (in terms of capacity, competitive business environment and quality of the living environment).^{641 642} The province of North Holland therefore stressed the importance of keeping the North Sea alternative open for the *very* long term. This claim was backed by the outcomes of the EIA, wherein it had been concluded that the North Sea option was very expensive, but also very promising. Both the province and the municipalities were therefore quite satisfied that the cabinet had announced to explore the feasibility of the North Sea option during the upcoming years. According to a public poll executed by the policy makers of the ONL a majority of Dutch citizens (60%) supported the decisions proposed in the TNL.⁶⁴³

Further Steps

As a consequence of the Cabinet's decisions, the long term debate was now subdivided into two different periods, the long term (2015 – 2025) and the very long term (> 2025). The Dutch aviation sector was asked to formulate and evaluate different small-scale redesign alternatives for the Schiphol location for the long term development (2015-2025). The different alternatives would eventually be subjected to a cost-benefit analysis that would be carried out by the CPB (Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis). The options that would then remain (i.e. for which the benefits would outweigh the costs) would be subjected to an Environmental Impact Assessment. Based on these outcomes the Cabinet would select the most desirable option for the long term, which was to be discussed in the Lower House and Upper House. In the meantime, the ONL project team would initiate and supervise a new research program that was to be established for the further exploration of the North Sea Island option for the very long term (> 2025). Before discussing the final decisions (7.4.5 and 7.4.5) we first subsequently discuss the policy debates about the Schiphol location (7.4.3) and the offshore option (7.4.4).

⁶³⁸ Van Arendonk / Milieufederatie Noord Holland, 2007; Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

⁶³⁹ Province of North Holland, Opportunity Maps long term development Schiphol. October 1999.

⁶⁴⁰ Newspaper Article Trouw, October 6th 1999, Randstad gebaat bij Schiphol in zee.

⁶⁴¹ Press Release Province of North Holland, October 20th 1999, Ontwikkeling Nationale Luchthaven.

⁶⁴² See also Questions of Groen Links for the Provincial Board, January 26th 1999, by J.C.M. Ostenk.

⁶⁴³ ONL Newsletter, Nr.3, April 2000.

7.4.3 Discussing the Long Term Schiphol options (2000 – 2003)

Part of the reason to give the sector such a prominent role in this process was that the Cabinet had already stated that Schiphol was to be treated as a normal company (which was intended to result in full privatization).⁶⁴⁴ This implied that Schiphol was responsible for its own long-term strategy, including the small-scale redesign options that were needed for the enactment of this strategy. Before further elaborating this long-term strategy, and as a response to the TNL and the request of the Minister of V&W, Schiphol initiated a study on the future small-scale redesign options: the Business Case Redesign (BCR) project. The results of the BCR were later to be used as input for the new Masterplan of the airport, which included the company's long-term development strategy, while also providing the input for the cabinet's decision about the most desirable long term option for the Schiphol location.⁶⁴⁵

The BCR assignment was to explore and report about the possibilities for facilitating the expected traffic growth within the existing environmental and spatial conditions that were being prepared for the mid term, by making limited adaptations to the five-runway system (that was to become operative in 2003). In order to carry out the BCR, Schiphol established a strategic partnership with KLM, Martinair, Transavia (both airlines) and Air Traffic Control Netherlands. The BCR was therefore primarily an affair of the civil aviation sector; it considered the business-economic value of the growth alternatives for the air transport sector, but not for other stakeholders or other interests (local and regional governments for example).⁶⁴⁶

Long-term traffic scenarios

The cornerstone of the BCR was the traffic demand forecast for 2020, which formed the point of departure for the discussion about future capacity requirements. The traffic forecasts were, as always, mainly based on KLM's corporate strategy. It was assumed that KLM would intensify its hub operations and establish new waves in its wave system to enhance daily frequencies. Amongst other things, it was expected that the % of transfers would increase from 40% in 2000 to 50% in 2010. Based on the KLM strategy, a traffic growth of 4.5% per year was assumed, resulting in 800,000 flight movements in 2020 (with 430,000 in 2001) and approx. 85 million passengers.⁶⁴⁷ The traffic forecasts were based on one scenario wherein KLM and Schiphol extended hub-operations. The BCR was totally based on the assumption that hub-development would continue in the upcoming decades, which was no surprise given the leading roles of KLM and Schiphol in the process (who's corporate strategies revolved around hub-

⁶⁴⁴ ONL Newsletter Nr. 3, April 2000.

⁶⁴⁵ Burghouwt, 2005.

⁶⁴⁶ Burghouwt, 2005; See also Schiphol Group, Press Release BCR, January 2001.

⁶⁴⁷ Schiphol Group, Press Release BCR, January 2001.

development). Other (non-hub) scenarios, such as those developed during TNLI and ONL were not considered in the BCR project. KLM's main interest was that it could extend its hub operations, which was translated into user requirements of sufficient peak-hour capacity, a dedicated terminal area, short taxi times from apron to runway, an efficient and reliable baggage handling system, a reliable runway system and good landside accessibility.⁶⁴⁸ The main criteria for evaluating the redesign options were these KLM requirements, the reliability of the runway system and value creation for Schiphol and KLM. Next to the expected capacity requirements the weather conditions and the national policy context (here understood in terms of the new regulatory system as outlined in December 1999) were also taken into account during the assessment of the alternatives.⁶⁴⁹

A first assessment of long-term alternatives (January 2001)

In January 2001 an interim-report with the rudimentary results was presented. The BCR team stated that three small-scale redesign options were deemed desirable (recall figure 7.4):

1. 6P: 6th runway north-south direction in between Zwanenburgbaan and 5th runway. Offered a lot of additional capacity, but during extreme weather conditions (especially strong winds, expected in 10% of the time) 50% of the additional capacity could not be used, which was a serious drawback for operating a reliable hub-system.
2. 6PK: 6th runway east-west, parallel to the Kaagbaan runway.
3. 7PK: Both runways would be constructed and the 6PK would only be used when weather conditions made this necessary.

The aviation sector argued that additional research was needed in 2001 to further explore the potential of the three remaining options. In the meanwhile, Schiphol airport authority sent a letter to the Minister of V&W on behalf of the BCR team, informing him about the interim results and already requesting an option for a spatial reservation for a 6th and/or 7th runway.⁶⁵⁰

Criticizing the alternatives

The proposed alternatives of the sector were confronted with a lot of criticism. The environmental party Milieudefensie argued that the traffic scenario that was used and that gave rise to the claim for a spatial reservation was not being questioned. They

⁶⁴⁸ KLM (2002), Belang van verdere groei van de Schiphol hub. Unpublished document, here quoted from Burghouwt (2005), p.253.

⁶⁴⁹ Burghouwt, 2005; p.258.

⁶⁵⁰ Schiphol Group, Results of the BCR. Letter January 10th 2001 to the Ministry of Transportation, Nr. 13684.

argued that history repeated itself. Just as during decision-making about the 5th runway during the PKB process, the assumed increase in traffic volumes was taken for granted by the Ministry of V&W. It was not questioned whether such high growth was desirable for all actors involved (i.e. the BCR was merely based on the interests of the aviation sector), or whether they fitted into the long-term development perspectives of the Randstad (i.e. the need for selective mainport development). And again, it seemed that the environmental effects were to be assessed only after the development options had been developed. When taking the environmental quality seriously, the environmental regulative system should set the boundaries for development, instead of reasoning the other way around (i.e. developing the kind of regulative system that allowed for realization of the growth ambitions).⁶⁵¹

The Ministries (V&W, VROM, EZ) responded by announcing that they would critically examine whether or not the BCR options fitted within the environmental capacity limits of the new regulative system that was being prepared at that time as part of the debates about the short term and the mid term. Moreover, the ministries stated that it was not clear why the other development options proposed in the TNL (1999) had been rejected by the aviation sector. Crucial information was lacking, especially about the consequences for third party risks and the additional noise pollution for residential areas in the vicinity of the airport. Finally, the ministries stated that, for the time being, they didn't think that a 7th runway was a realistic option.^{652 653} Milieudefensie argued that the ministerial focus on the 7th runway was a strategy for diverting attention from the 6th runway, as nothing was said about the desirability of a 6th runway.⁶⁵⁴

The municipality of Amsterdam wasn't all that pleased with the initial outcomes of the BCR. From their perspective the main problem of the 6PK and 7PK alternatives was that its flight paths ran over residential areas of Amsterdam. More specifically, the 6PK option would increase east-west flights, which was out of question for the municipality. As discussed earlier, back in 1994 an appointment was made between Schiphol, the municipality of Amsterdam and Air Traffic Control, wherein it was stated that only 2% of the flights was allowed to pass over residential areas of Amsterdam (i.e. the Letter of Intent). Anno 2001 it had become clear that Schiphol had not lived up to these intentions (with 2.8% of the flights in 2001 and an expected amount of 4% in 2002).⁶⁵⁵ Therefore, when Schiphol asked to reserve space for the development of a future 6th and/or 7th runway the municipality of Amsterdam stated that the proposed runway

⁶⁵¹ Press Release Milieudefensie, 2001, Official response to the BCR plans.

⁶⁵² Letter of the Ministry of Transportation about the BCR to Schiphol Group, March 15th 2001, DGRD/ONL/L01.450100.

⁶⁵³ ONL Newsletter, Nr.6, February 2001.

⁶⁵⁴ De Kruijf, A. (2002) *Het Bulderbos. Verzet tegen de uitbreiding van Schiphol 1993 – 2002*. Mets & Schilt, Amsterdam. Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

⁶⁵⁵ Proceedings of juridical procedure Platform Vliegoverlast Amsterdam, June 24th 2002.

configurations were likely to cause unacceptable additional noise pollution. As such, the municipality did not want to reserve space for an additional east-west runway.⁶⁵⁶ An additional north-south runway (the 6P alternative) did not harm their interests, so they did not protest against this option.

Schiphol's further research about the long term alternatives (2001 - 2002)

Meanwhile, Schiphol continued to conduct further research about the 3 remaining options.⁶⁵⁷ In the final report on Schiphol's redesign issued in 2002 the 6PK option was presented as the best option, at least, from the perspective of the aviation sector parties. 6PK would offer a more reliable peak hour capacity than 6P. In the final report the BCR partners called for land reservations for a 6th and 7th runway and for more stringent building restrictions for the areas that would be subjected to more noise pollution as a consequence such a 6th and 7th runway. Both claims were to be taken up in the Regional Plan of the Province of North Holland.⁶⁵⁸

The preliminary results of the BCR had also triggered a new internal master planning process of Schiphol in 2001, which was to result in the new Masterplan, the so-called Airport Development Plan 2020 (ADP). The ADP process was primarily an internal Schiphol affair. The local and regional authorities were not involved and the airlines (i.e. KLM) were also less involved than during the BCR. They were considered customers during the ADP, which made it possible for Schiphol to independently develop its future corporate strategy.⁶⁵⁹ The ADP was based on the ambition that Schiphol was to become one of the four major hubs in Europe by optimally accommodating one of the three major worldwide alliances. Next to hub development the ADP was to provide a set of concrete actions for turning the airport into an AirportCity, taking into account environmental and safety issues as well as the impact on land-use in the airport region. During the ADP process some other scenarios that had not been used in the BCR were discussed, and in one of them an explosion of low cost traffic was assumed. However, during the ADP process the focus was not so much on such low cost traffic, but especially on hub-development (in line with the focus of the BCR).⁶⁶⁰ The main objectives of the ADP were to indicate the land reservations that would be required on and off the airport site and providing a framework for the medium-term airport site planning (development plans).⁶⁶¹

In the 2003 version of the Masterplan it was indicated that optimization of the hubbing process (i.e. mainport strategy) demanded clustering of KLM activities in the central

⁶⁵⁶ Nieuws uit B&W Amsterdam Nr.10, March 2001.

⁶⁵⁷ See Burghouwt, 2005, chapter 10 for extensive discussion of this airport planning process.

⁶⁵⁸ BCR (2002), *Ruimte voor luchtvaart: Redesign: de mogelijkheden op Schiphol nader onderzocht*.

⁶⁵⁹ Burghouwt, 2005.

⁶⁶⁰ Schiphol Group (2001), *Inventarisatie lange termijn scenario's*. Here quoted from Burghouwt, 2005; p.263.

⁶⁶¹ Schiphol Group (2003), *Ruimtelijke Toekomstvisie 2020*. Concept.

terminal area (with minimized walking distances to other piers and check-ins). Other alliances would get their own terminal area; the J-pier. This full service pier was to be connected to the central terminal area by a People Mover System. Low cost carriers would be tolerated as far as capacity would allow for this, but facilitating KLM's hub operations formed the core of the investment strategy. For the long term an option was taken up to accommodate other alliances and low cost carriers in a decentralized terminal area in the northwest territory of Schiphol.⁶⁶² This ambition immediately confronted the more general ambition of selective mainport development (i.e. accommodating only hub-related traffic) that had come to the fore in the national policy debate. However, as the main ambition still was to accommodate hub development, it received little attention at that time. In the Masterplan it was stressed that more peak capacity was needed in order to improve the network quality (in terms of destinations and frequencies). And in order to improve network reliability both an additional east-west runway and north-south runway were deemed necessary (i.e. a 6th and 7th runway, as had been argued in the BCR). The outcome of the Masterplan was the same as the outcome of the BCR. Again, the province of North Holland and the surrounding municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam were asked to reserve space for the development of a six and/or seven runway system.

Employing a Cost Benefit Analysis (2002)

Meanwhile the ONL project team (i.e. the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W) had assigned the CPB to carry out a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) of the different options. Before the CBA could be carried out, the CPB had to modify the methodology. Besides, the CPB needed more information in order to assess all costs and benefits, for which additional research was carried out.⁶⁶³ An economic advisory committee that was chaired by Prof. Wolfson monitored the entire process. The Ministry of EZ had insisted upon this monitoring committee, and the committee's main task was to report back to the Ministry of EZ.⁶⁶⁴ The assessment procedure was discussed with all stakeholders involved, and according to the ministries there was wide agreement about the need for such a cost-benefit analysis. Still, the environmental actors doubted whether the environmental effects could be assessed in a honest way using the CBA methodology and they questioned the way the different criteria would be weighed vis-à-vis one another. The Ministry of V&W responded by making the CBA process as transparent as possible (as we shall discuss in 7.5 this focus on transparency was in line with the ambitions of ONL as regards the policy processes about the short and mid-term).⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶² Schiphol Group (2003), Ruimtelijke Toekomstvisie 2020. Concept.

⁶⁶³ ONL Newsletter, Nr.5, November 2000.

⁶⁶⁴ ONL Newsletter, Nr 8, October 2001.

⁶⁶⁵ ONL Newsletter Nr. 7, June 2001.

In April 2002 the results of the CBA were presented. The CPB concluded that the reservation of space for a 6th and 7th runway was a no-regret option.⁶⁶⁶ According to the CPB, further growth of aviation would have positive economic effects for the Netherlands as a whole (*per saldo*).⁶⁶⁷ The Wolfson Committee supported the conclusions of the CPB.⁶⁶⁸ The committee concluded that sufficient information had been available for making a proper assessment between costs and benefits. However, the CPB also indicated that the positive outcome was related to the fact that some of the negative effects of further growth had not been taken into account properly. More specifically, this concerned the environmental impact on the outer areas, i.e. the areas located farther away from the airport to which no environmental regulations applied. These costs were therefore not included in the trade off, thus biasing the outcomes in favor of the benefits. In order to make a more detailed assessment about the feasibility of the redesign options, more information about the exact environmental effects of the different options was deemed necessary. As it was not clear what the real environmental effects were, the results of the CBA were not supported by the environmental actors. They called for the application of other assumptions and methods in order to develop realistic and trustworthy results.⁶⁶⁹

Doubts on the Regional level

Both the municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam too had some doubts about the outcomes of the CBA. The alderman of spatial planning of Haarlemmermeer indicated that further growth at the Schiphol location would be beneficial for the Netherlands as a whole, but that this would come at the expense of the quality of the living environment of the region, and not only in terms of noise.^{670 671} Moreover, Haarlemmermeer thought it quite inappropriate to already discuss a 6th and 7th runway while the debate about the five-runway system wasn't even properly settled yet. At that time, the environmental regulations for the five runway system were still being discussed and nothing had been politically ratified yet.

The municipality of Amsterdam was still not convinced about the merits of an additional east-west runway that would increase flights over Amsterdam. The municipality of Amsterdam had some heavy doubts about whether the benefits would outweigh the costs for the municipality, and in order to assess this CE Delft (a consultant) was assigned by the Environmental Department of the municipality. In August 2002 CE Delft concluded that the CPB had underestimated the negative effects

⁶⁶⁶ CPB (2002), KKBA Schiphol. Den Haag, Centraal Planbureau.

⁶⁶⁷ See also http://www.cpb.nl/nl/news/2002_22.html. Derived from the web on June 9th 2007.

⁶⁶⁸ ONL Newsletter Nr.11, September 2002.

⁶⁶⁹ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁶⁷⁰ <http://www.geluidnieuws.nl/2002/mei2002/schiphol.html>. Derived from the web on February 14th 2008.

⁶⁷¹ Marsman, G., Leidelmeijer K. (2001). Leefbaarheid Schipholregio: meer dan geluid alleen. Rapport 77940. Amsterdam: RIGO Research en Advies BV.

(costs) of further expansion for Amsterdam.⁶⁷² The main point was that the CPB had underestimated the costs of the additional building restrictions for the municipality. These costs had been based on unrealistically low assumptions about the spatial needs for housing, recreation and industrial and office sites. Especially the amount of new houses that the municipality was expected to construct, as had been agreed upon in the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning Extra (VINEX, 1994), would become far more costly as a consequence of finding new suitable locations. For example, the lack of alternative development options implied that houses were to be built in a valuable environmental area (IJburg), which would greatly increase costs. Finally, CE criticized the different assumptions used as regards the expected reduction of noise of aircrafts in the CPB study and the EIA Schiphol 2003 that was carried out at the same time in the policy process wherein the mid-term development of Schiphol (2003 - 2015) was being discussed. In the EIA lower levels of noise reduction had been assumed, resulting in higher levels of noise pollution than calculated by the CPB. Therefore, it seemed that the costs of additional noise pollution were underestimated in the CBA. The lack of support of the municipality was related to the broken promises of Schiphol that had been laid down in the Letter of Intent of 1994, which was causing a more tense relationship between the municipality and the aviation sector at that time.

Tensions between the Municipality of Amsterdam and the Aviation sector (May – September 2002)

In May 2002 the municipality of Amsterdam asked the Schiphol Group and Air Traffic Control to live up to the agreements laid down in the Letter of Intent (LoI) signed in 1994 that had been part of the PKB negotiations. As argued before, in the LoI it was stated that only 1% of the arrivals was allowed to follow routes passing over the residential areas of Amsterdam. This amount was to increase to 2% when confronted with extraordinary circumstances (i.e. runway maintenance, extreme weather conditions). In practice, both agreements were violated by the sector. When the sector parties refused to live up to the LoI, stating that a LoI was not a legally binding instrument, the municipality decided to bring the issue to the court. Moreover, the sector parties, who were supported by the KLM who decided to join them to strengthen their claim, argued that the LoI wasn't necessary anymore because a new Aviation Act was to be implemented in February 2003 (i.e. the new regulative system that was to be in place before the new five runway system would be put into operation). The municipality of Amsterdam did not agree to this, as at that time it was still not clear whether or not the new regulative system that was being developed would offer sufficient legal protection against further noise pollution in the future. They derived this claim from the conclusions of a committee that had been established to advise about the new regulative

⁶⁷² CE Delft (2002), KBA uitbreiding Schiphol voor de gemeente Amsterdam. Delft, see pp.1-2.

system, i.e. the Commission Experts Aviation Noise (Commissie Deskundigen Vliegtuiggeluid, CDV) that was chaired by Prof. Berkhout. We shall discuss their findings in more detail when we discuss the mid-term debate, but for now it is important to know that the Berkhout Committee argued that it was all but certain that the new regulative system for noise would offer sufficient legal protection. Since it had not been clear yet what level of protection was actually secured by the new Aviation Act, the municipality perceived the LoI as an extra safeguard against increasing levels of noise pollution. In order to strengthen its case, the municipality investigated whether the additional flights that passed their residential areas during the past years were caused by extraordinary conditions (which would make them legal). In the final research report, developed by two independent research institutes, it was concluded that this had not been the case, as several of those flights had merely served to enhance capacity.⁶⁷³

Nonetheless, the court decided in favour of the sector parties. The court did not question the violation of the agreements taken up in the LoI, as it had been clear that the sector had done this. But the court questioned the legal status of the LoI. The juridical status of the Letter of Intent allowed the participants to withdraw from it, without consent of one of the other actors involved. It was a document based on mutual levels of trust (e.g. like a covenant), but it bore no legal obligations. Thus, the sector had the right to ignore the appointments laid down in the Letter. The municipality was disappointed about this verdict. After this, the alderman concerned with Schiphol affairs decided to investigate the perceptions of the inhabitants of Amsterdam as regards the airport. Of the 410 people that participated in the research, 90% acknowledged the importance of the airport for the city, and 48% even stressed that the airport was of pivotal importance for Amsterdam, especially for reasons of economic development and employment. 36% of the people was exposed to noise pollution, but only 45% of them were seriously annoyed by this and only 5% actually complained about it. The alderman was surprised by the outcomes. It turned out that most of the inhabitants held a much more positive image of Schiphol than had previously been assumed by the local politicians.⁶⁷⁴ In a way, this made the violation of the Letter of Intent less important. Nonetheless, it was also stated that the municipality was to become less naive when making presumably ‘hard’ and binding appointments with the aviation sector.⁶⁷⁵

7.4.4 Discussing the Offshore Island option (2000 – 2003)

Alongside the debate about the Schiphol options (2015 – 2025), the Ministry of V&W started to investigate the potential of an offshore island in more detail (*very long term* >

⁶⁷³ Press Releases Municipality Amsterdam, October 21st, 2002; April 16th, 2003; September 19th, 2003. <http://www.amsterdam.nl/nieuwsactueel/2002/pb/index.html>. Derived from the web on February 14th 2008.

⁶⁷⁴ Omnibus 62 Schiphol. Gemeente Amsterdam, Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek, J. Greven, November 2003.

⁶⁷⁵ Press Release Amsterdam, November 5th, 2003.

2025/2030).⁶⁷⁶ In the TNL report (1999) the Cabinet had announced to establish a research program in order to find out under which environmental and economic conditions an island would be a rewarding investment.⁶⁷⁷ More specifically, the program was meant to select the best location for an island (see figure 7.6).

Figure 7.6 Search area for North Sea Island (area within yellow lines)



Source: Flyland, 2003; p.17

The Ministry established a program bureau (Flyland) for the coordination of the research program.⁶⁷⁸ In the *Programma van Eisen* (program of requirements), in which the research program was outlined, it was stated that the focus was on the bird-problematic, the ecological effects, the morphological effects, technical-operational problems, accessibility, other spatial development issues and the juridical aspects.⁶⁷⁹ The research program was a continuation and elaboration of the earlier, less detailed studies that had been conducted as part of the TNLI process. The ministry of V&W was in charge of the program. A lot of money was invested in research (approx. 9 million Euros in the first two years), mostly paid by the Ministry of V&W, and to a lesser extent by the Ministries of VROM and EZ, reflecting their respective roles in the process.^{680 681 682}

However, before a final decision was to be made about the very long term (whether or not invest in an offshore island) and the long term (which option for Schiphol), traffic growth started to slow down. From 2001 onwards, there were clear signs that growth on

⁶⁷⁶ ONL (1999), Toekomst Nationale Luchthaven. Final Report, December 1999; p.31

⁶⁷⁷ TK 26959, May 30th 2000, Nr.4

⁶⁷⁸ Interview De Laat / Former of the Ministry of V&W / Flyland, 2004.

⁶⁷⁹ Flyland (2000) Programma van Eisen Flyland, May 2000; p.8-9.

⁶⁸⁰ Flyland (2000) Programma van Eisen Flyland, May 2000; p.19.

⁶⁸¹ ONL Newsletter Nr.5.

⁶⁸² As is quite common, the one who pays most is most legitimated to make decisions.

the aviation market was stagnating, which firmly impacted on the decision making processes about the long term and very long term.

7.4.5 Stagnations on the Aviation Market (September 2001 – 2003)

It was because of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the economic downswing that started in 2002 (and that would continue until 2005), the SARS lung disease, the rising oil prices and the war in Iraq that traffic growth slowed down from 2001 onwards and even became negative in 2003 (as compared to the numbers of 2002, recall figure 1.1).⁶⁸³ Both KLM and Schiphol Group immediately responded by reviewing their corporate strategies as a consequence of this stagnation on the aviation market.

KLM merges with AirFrance

The worldwide crisis in aviation brought several (former hub) airlines to bankruptcy (e.g. Sabena and Swiss). KLM responded by announcing its ambition to merge with Air France. The joint venture of KLM with Northwest Airlines (who was also on the brink of bankruptcy), known as the Wings alliance (the fourth largest global alliance of airlines) ended in 2007. KLM didn't know for sure whether or not the venture was to be renewed, and if so, whether or not the alliance would be able to compete with the three larger alliances (Star, Oneworld, Skyteam).⁶⁸⁴ It was expected that only two or three global alliances would remain in the long run.⁶⁸⁵ Therefore, KLM thought it a more robust strategy to merge with Air France and join the Skyteam alliance.⁶⁸⁶ KLM opted for a type of far-reaching cooperation, in terms of a full merger, which offered best possibilities for economies of scale and scope. Moreover, it served as an extra safeguard for continuation of cooperation on the long term. The national government still held 14% of the shares of KLM, as an inheritance of the national ownership and the bilateral treaties and they therefore needed to be convinced about the importance of the merger for the future of KLM.

More specifically, the national government wanted some safeguards before agreeing upon the merger in order to secure future mainport development, which was deemed to be in the public interest as it was assumed to be of pivotal importance for the economic development of the Netherlands.⁶⁸⁷ One of the main concerns was to secure the network quality (i.e. amount and type of destinations and frequencies that these are served). Therefore, the national government would only accept the merger if an excellent airside

⁶⁸³ Schiphol Group (2002), Annual report.

⁶⁸⁴ Star alliance (United Airlines / Lufthansa/ SAS) was the largest one, followed by the Oneworld alliance (American Airlines / British Airways / Iberia) and Skyteam (Air France, Delta, Alitalia). In 2003 the four strategic global alliances made up for about 60% of the world passenger-kilometers.


⁶⁸⁵ Doganis, 2001.

⁶⁸⁶ cf. Jagersma, 2003.

⁶⁸⁷ TK 29232, September 30th 2003, Nr.1.

accessibility of the Netherlands was guaranteed. In the end, Air France/KLM agreed to continue to serve 42 intercontinental key destinations from Schiphol for the next five years, as long as normal economic circumstances allowed for this.⁶⁸⁸ These 42 destinations formed the most important parts of the network configuration and counted for 70% of the key destinations and 80% of all traffic.⁶⁸⁹ This way the national government tried to secure further hub-development.⁶⁹⁰ In 2004 the merger was agreed upon by both the European Union and the two nation states involved (Netherlands and France). In figure 7.7 the three remaining alliances anno 2003 are presented, including their home base airport.

Figure 7.7 Three global airline alliances. AirFrance (Paris CDG) and KLM (Schiphol) form the Skyteam alliance



Source: Schiphol Group, 2006

The aviation sector expected that only the airports that harbored a hub carrier that was part of one of the three global alliances would be able to maintain its hub status. Schiphol was therefore very happy about the merger, since it was deemed necessary for maintaining its hub-position, which was the cornerstone of its future corporate strategy (as was laid down in the new Masterplan). Back in 2002 KLM and Schiphol had signed a covenant with strategic appointments about securing the hub position for the upcoming years, including the necessary investments in infrastructure and the development of airline taxes (i.e. visit costs, the costs for visiting Schiphol; these have

⁶⁸⁸ TK 29232, September 30th 2003, Nr.1.
⁶⁸⁹ As part of the appointments it was also stated that KLM would use Schiphol as its home base for at least eight years. Moreover, during this period KLM was to maintain its name and logo.
⁶⁹⁰ Interview De Laat / Former policymaker of Ministry of V&W / Flyland, 2004.

to be competitive, otherwise airlines replace operations to other, cheaper airports).⁶⁹¹ At the same time, the merger implied that Schiphol was no longer the only hub available to KLM. The home base of Air France, Paris Charles de Gaulle, became a second growth option for the hub operations of KLM-AirFrance as the Parisian airport had sufficient possibilities to significantly expand its peak hour capacity. Moreover, the Parisian airport had a larger origin-destination market and better landside accessibility, making it all the more attractive. Hence, despite its benefits, the merger also created uncertainty about the future role of Schiphol in the European aviation network. Especially considering the period from 2008 onwards, when the state guarantees would have been expired (i.e. the guarantee to keep serving 42 intercontinental destinations from Schiphol).⁶⁹² Both the merger and the stagnation on the aviation market dramatically changed the context of the debate about the long-term development of Schiphol. For one, the stagnation undermined the strategic premises of the Masterplan that Schiphol had been working on. It resulted in a strategic mismatch between the envisioned projects in the Masterplan and the actual market developments.

A revised corporate strategy of Schiphol (2003)

The corporate strategy of Schiphol therefore changed somewhat, illustrating the flexibility of the airport authorities and their ability to adequately respond to market developments. On the airside, the mainport strategy (accommodating the hub carrier) was still the most important strategy, but the accommodation of point-to-point airlines (especially served by low cost carriers) became more important as well.⁶⁹³ The reason for this was that business was booming for point-to-point traffic, while the transfer market was stagnating. Especially the low cost market seemed to be recession proof with growing traffic volumes (see box 7.1).

Box 7.1 Changes on the Aviation Market: The boom of the low cost market

The low-cost concept was originally introduced by the U.S. airline Southwest in 1967. Ryanair started the low-cost revolution in Europe, when it began with genuine low-cost operations on the British Isles in 1991, patterned after the Southwest model. The real revolution started after the implementation of the third deregulation package in 1993, which deregulated the international air services within the European Union. The development of low-cost carriers started in the UK, because of the lower labour costs, the huge London market and the light-handed regulatory environment.⁶⁹⁴ LCC's like Go, Buzz and easyJet all started up here. After the expansion in the UK, the low-cost carriers began increasingly to take hold on the continental market since 1999. The only exception was Virgin Express, which started up a home base in Brussels in 1994. With growth rates of 15 - 60% per year the low-cost carriers rapidly expanded their market shares.

The success of the low-cost carriers is a result of the business model of these airlines that can be defined by three key elements. The most important element is the low operating costs, caused by low wages (ticket less

⁶⁹¹ Schiphol Group (2002) Annual report .

⁶⁹² The guarantee to serve at least 42 crucial intercontinental destinations.

⁶⁹³ Interview Kranenburg / Schiphol, 2008.

⁶⁹⁴ Doganis, 2001.

sales, cheap labour), low airport fees (use of secondary airports), low-costs for maintenance (single aircraft type) and high levels of productivity (high daily utilisation by reducing turnaround time). The second element considers the simple product (no frills) offered. No free in-flight catering or entertainment, narrow seats (higher seating density) and no seat reservation are the most important features of the product. The third element of the business design considers the positioning in the market. Low-cost carriers offer high frequency, scheduled, point-to-point short haul services, which they promote with very aggressive marketing strategies.⁶⁹⁵ The ongoing low-cost revolution has had serious consequences for the airports, since LCC's have other requirements. Regional airports benefit the most from the low-cost revolution, because they can offer low-cost airlines remarkable opportunities for growth: they are uncongested and they charge relatively low airport fees. The expansions of Ryanair's operations at Brussels South (Charleroi) and at Frankfurt-Hahn, but also at Eindhoven airport, are good examples of booming low-cost operations from a regional airport. The point-to-point operations make the specific facilities for easy transfers unnecessary and the low-cost carriers are certainly not willing to pay for these expensive (hub) infrastructures. In order to make an airport suitable for low-cost carriers the airport has to be adapted to their specific infrastructure needs and facilities. These facilities include single storey terminals, lower (and cheaper) service levels, quick turnaround times and high-speed check-in facilities.⁶⁹⁶ Thus, especially airports that were dedicated to hub operations needed to create additional investments plans when willing to compete for low cost carriers.

Schiphol's investment strategy changed. Instead of merely focusing on hub operations the focus was now also on facilitating low cost carriers. This implied other investments than facilitating hub operations. It meant to develop dedicated facilities where the low cost carriers could be clustered, a facility with short turn around times, self-service check in and baggage drop-off points, boarding without buses or tube gates, boarding and de-boarding at two aircraft doors, lower levels of service, cheaper materials, and limited frills.⁶⁹⁷ In essence, the investments posed in the new masterplan that Schiphol had been working on when creating the BCR (Business Case Redesign) were revised and, for example, the J-Pier with a people mover was no longer considered to be the best option in the uncertain market environment.⁶⁹⁸ Instead, a new medium-term plan was developed, the so-called GHJ plan, which was deemed more suitable for the new circumstances. The objectives of the GHJ plan were to resolve capacity problems in the short and medium term and to accommodate Low cost carriers without damaging the hub operations of KLM. The Schiphol Group accepted the new strategy in April 2004, and it came to replace the master plan that they had been working on during the previous years. We already discussed that this was not entirely in line with the ambition of selectivity (i.e. merely facilitating hub-related traffic) that was promoted by the governments involved in the national policy debate.

Moreover, the stagnation on the aviation market and the increasing uncertainties about the future made Schiphol focus even more on the landside than before, in order to increase its revenues from AirportCity developments. Schiphol began to raise concerns about the future development of the competitive strength of the Randstad more often

⁶⁹⁵ Doganis, 2001.

⁶⁹⁶ Burghouwt & Huys, 2003.

⁶⁹⁷ Burghouwt & Huys, 2003.

⁶⁹⁸ Burghouwt, 2005.

than before. The region was losing ground to other airport regions (i.e. London, Frankfurt, Paris), especially as a consequence of the relatively poor landside accessibility. This was believed to exert a negative influence on airside developments, which, in turn, would result in further loss of potential as regards landside development. In short, the interrelationship between airside and landside was being stressed more and more by the airport authority, resulting in the argument that a competitive Randstad with economic development was essential for mainport development, and vice versa.⁶⁹⁹

7.4.6 Postponing Final Decisions about the Long Term and Very Long Term

Postponing the decision about the 6th and 7th runway

Against the background of the worldwide stagnation on the aviation market and the increasing volatility of future traffic volumes the discussion about a possible 6th or 7th runway became less urgent. New investment plans were made, but these did not imply large changes in the existing zones to which restrictions to land use applied. The legally required EIA procedure that was to be carried before finally deciding upon the need and location of a 6th and/or 7th runway was not deemed necessary by the cabinet for the time being. Thus, plans for the very long term were frozen and the Cabinet did not make final decisions about a 6th and/or 7th runway. Several stakeholders were rather pleased about this turn of affairs. After all, the environmental actors had indicated that they believed that the environmental effects had been underestimated once again. The municipality of Amsterdam had feared that further growth would result in additional noise pollution for major residential areas, which was unacceptable to them. And the municipality of Haarlemmermeer feared the additional deterioration of the quality of the living environment that would be the result of constructing additional runways in the polder. Nonetheless, the cabinet did decide that the no regret option was to be kept in place, meaning that spatial reservations were to be made in order to make sure that the construction of a 6th and 7th runway would not become impossible in the future. The cabinet asked the province of North Holland to reserve that necessary space that this growth option implicated in its Regional Spatial Plan.

Province of North Holland: creating a growth option for 2002 – 2006

Despite the doubts of the environmental actors and the municipalities, the final decision about the reservation of space for a 6th and 7th runway was in the hands of the province of North Holland. The province had been busy preparing a new Regional Plan during 2001. In the plan it would be indicated whether or not the province would facilitate further development on the Schiphol location by making the spatial reservations that were deemed necessary by the aviation sector, the ONL team and the cabinet (including space for new infrastructure and the new zones for noise and safety). It had been clear

⁶⁹⁹ Schiphol Group (2003), Annual Report.

that the province was advocating the North Sea option, thus removing airport operations to an island after 2025/2030. Even though the national government had decided that this was only an option for the very long term, the province emphasized its preference once again in the Regional Plan. After all, if it was decided that a North Sea island was to become operative in 2030 it could be questioned whether or not heavy investments in the Schiphol location were still warranted.

The concept of the Regional Plan was presented one day after the publication of the CBA results of the CPB study about the costs and benefits of the 6th and 7th runway. The Regional Plan was a continuation of the earlier plans, and implied a further enactment of the dual objective. The province particularly stressed the economic benefits that were related to hub-development and indicated its intention to reserve the space that was expected to be necessary for facilitating such development. Therefore, the necessary lands that were needed for the construction of an east-west and north-south runway (including space for the development of a second terminal in the northwest area) were reserved. However, the Province set one precondition: in 2006 at the latest it should be clear whether or not the reserved lands were actually needed for the extension of the airport. If not, the lands were to be used for different purposes from 2006 onwards. The Cabinet promised to present its final decision about lifting or rejecting this option for new runways in 2006 at the latest. As such, the province created a growth option for Schiphol that had to be exercised (or not) within 4 years.⁷⁰⁰

Postponing the North Sea Island Alternative

On the 26th of May 2003, three years after the research program about the North Sea island alternative had started, the Ministry of V&W decided to stop the project and to dismantle the program bureau (Flyland).⁷⁰¹ The recent developments on the aviation market (decline in economic growth, rising oil prices, 11th September, SARS) had changed the prospects for traffic growth at Schiphol. Based on the new forecasts it was expected that the Schiphol location held sufficient opportunities to handle traffic growth until 2040 (instead of 2025). The ministry of V&W argued that an offshore airport was therefore not likely to be needed before 2040, which also made further investments at the Schiphol location more legitimate. The stagnating growth had made sure that a majority of stakeholders deemed it necessary to discuss whether or not an island was still desirable, instead of already investigating the feasibility of such an island.⁷⁰² This was in line with the advice that the RMNO (*Raad voor Ruimtelijk, Milieu- en Natuuronderzoek*, Council for spatial environmental research) had published in 2002, wherein it was concluded that it was not the feasibility but the desirability that needed to

⁷⁰⁰ Province of North Holland, (2003), Regional Plan North Holland-South, final version.

⁷⁰¹ TK 26959, May 26th 2003, Nr.33.

⁷⁰² Flyland (2003), Eindrapport. Conclusies bij het voortijdig einde van het onderzoek naar een luchthaveneiland, p.11.

be discussed.⁷⁰³ Finally, it was argued that the many uncertainties, problems and high financial costs surrounding the construction of offshore airports in Hong Kong and Japan also called for serious reconsideration.⁷⁰⁴ However, the offshore option was not completely abandoned. It was merely argued that, for the time being, investments in additional knowledge were not deemed necessary.⁷⁰⁵

7.4.7 Final Outcomes of the Long Term Debate (1996 – 2003)

Although TNLI project and its successor, the ONL project, had been designed to develop a long-term perspective on Dutch aviation infrastructure, no real long-term vision was developed during 1996 – 2003. During the TNLI discussion (1995 – 1998) the Cabinet decided that further growth of aviation was to be allowed in the long run, although the growth was to be selective. This implied that it had to contribute to hub-development, which was still regarded to be the essential aspect of mainport development. After TNLI, more formal decision-making began and the Ministry of V&W installed a new project direction (ONL). At the end of 1999 it was decided that a distinction was to be made between the long term and the very long term. An airport on an island in the North Sea was only deemed possible and maybe necessary in the very long run (> 2030). Until then, further growth was to be facilitated at the Schiphol location.

Schiphol was assigned to explore the different options at the current location and the airport authorities established a strategic alliance with several airlines (KLM, Transavia, Martinair) and Air Traffic Control to conclude that a 6th parallel Kaagbaan runway (west- east) and a 7th parallel Zwanenburgbaan runway (north-south) were needed to ensure future hub development. The CPB was assigned to conduct a cost benefit analysis about these options and they concluded that it was wise to reserve lands for the development of both these runways. However, the environmental parties, the local residents, the municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer and the province of North Holland were not convinced about the need for more runways. When the aviation market faced stagnations as a consequence of rising oil prices and reduced demand for air transport during the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, the cabinet decided to postpone the final decision making about a 6th and 7th runway. Nonetheless, spatial reservations were made in the regional spatial plans for the construction of the new runway(s) somewhere in the future. The cabinet promised to make a final decision about the need for a 6th and/or 7th runway in 2006 at the latest, a precondition set by the Province when making the spatial reservations. Moreover, ONL had installed another research program (Flyland) that was to explore the costs and

⁷⁰³ RMNO (2002), *Ligt Flyland op Koers? RMNO advies Flyland 2002*. Nr. 154, Den Haag.

⁷⁰⁴ Flyland (2002), *Eindrapport. Conclusies bij het voortijdig einde van het onderzoek naar een luchthaveneiland*, p.11.

⁷⁰⁵ Interview De Laat / Former Policy Maker Ministry of V&W / Flyland, 2004.

benefits of the North Sea island. This research program was brought to an end rather abruptly as a result of the crisis on the aviation market. It was assumed that until 2040 the Schiphol location harboured sufficient development opportunities.

Initially TNLI was designed to develop a long-term perspective on aviation in the Netherlands. With regard to the short term (< 2003) and mid term (< 2015) the main issue had been to make sure that the PKB decisions were implemented and monitored. At first, these policy processes did not receive much policy attention, as the heated PKB process had just been finished. However, exploding traffic volumes created urgent capacity problems, bringing the debates about the short and mid term back into midst of the political spotlights. As we already discussed in this paragraph (7.4), the debates about the short and mid term gradually became more and more interwoven with the debate about the long term. Indeed, both the debates about the short and mid-term actually became part of the TNLI program and the ONL program. The policy debates about the short and mid-term shall be discussed in the next paragraphs.

7.5 Debating the Short term (1) 1996 – 1998: The Four Runway System (< 2003)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				
Mid term 2003 - 2015	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6			Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10 Part 5. – 7.11	Part 6. – 7.12	

From 1997 onwards, the debate about the short term (< 2003) and mid term (< 2015) gained more and more attention. Just as during the debate about the long term, the period 1996 – 1998 was devoted to the preparation of policies. And just as during the PKB process the debate about the short term was about the four-runway system (< 2003) and the debate about the mid term about the five-runway system (2003 – 2010/2015). In this paragraph (7.5) we discuss the preparation of policies (1996 – 1998) for the short term. In 7.6 we do the same thing for the mid term. The formal decisions were taken in the period thereafter (1999 – 2003), which shall be discussed in 7.7 (short term) and 7.8 (mid term).

With regard to the policy preparations for the short term the main problem during 1996 – 1998 was that the new regulative system that had been laid down in the PKB of 1995 was not working out well. The noise limits that had been set were exceeded immediately. Before discussing how this was dealt with (7.5.2 – 7.5.6) we first discuss the translation of the PKB decision into the Aviation Act (7.5.1). The paragraph is ended with a short review of the main outcomes of the short term debate 1996 - 1998 (7.5.7).

7.5.1 The Aviation Act (1996)

After the PKB was ratified by the Parliament in 1995 the environmental limits for the short-term four –runway system and the longer term five-runway system needed to be translated in different Aviation Acts. With regard to the four-runway system, the first design of the new Aviation Act, which was up for political ratification, was presented on October 31st 1996.⁷⁰⁶ It basically contained the exact noise zone and the enforcement procedures (since there were no agreements in PKB about other environmental effects than noise), based on an improved calculation model.⁷⁰⁷ The new Act was ratified by the Lower and Upper House and finally the requested noise zones that had been announced in the former Aviation Act of 1978⁷⁰⁸ were implemented (although 16 years too late: in the 1978 Act it had been stated that the zones would become effective in 1979).

The members of the cabinet and the entire parliament did know that the zone was based on a rather dubious methodology.⁷⁰⁹ In the evaluation program that accompanied the Aviation Act it was stated that the ‘knowledge about noise annoyance was up for improvement’.⁷¹⁰ Nonetheless, parliament had ratified the new zone, as it was needed for assessing the yearly runway use plans that Schiphol had to develop from 1997 onwards, as decided in the PKB (so-called *Gebruiksplan Schiphol*). Based upon this plan it could be calculated whether the proposed operations fitted within the legally binding 35Ke noise contour. The final noise contour was made up of 235 enforcement points. At each point the noise level was exactly 35Ke during a year (according to calculations). It was monitored whether or not the 35Ke was exceeded at the enforcement points. And no more than 15,100 houses were allowed within the 35Ke zone. For the night (23.00 – 6.00) a similar zone was developed, the 26L_{aeq}. It was assessed whether Schiphol’s yearly runway use plans lived up to these norms. If so, the Ministry of V&W approved of them (after having obtained the advice of the Noise Pollution Committee, CGS), giving Schiphol permission to implement the plan during the upcoming year (licence to operate). Meanwhile, the Inspectorate of the Ministry of V&W would constantly monitor whether the operations unravelled according to the plan, thus assessing whether or not the limits were exceeded. If so, the Ministry was allowed to undertake measures. Thus, in the autumn of 1996 both the enforcement points (the 35Ke contour and the 26L_{aeq} contour) and the enforcement procedures were finally laid down in law and had become legally binding.

⁷⁰⁶ In Dutch: Aanwijzingsbesluit Schiphol, 1996.

⁷⁰⁷ The calculated exact noise contour was based upon amount of flight movements, fleet composition, distribution of traffic over runways, distribution over day and night time, *meteo marge* for deviant weather conditions.

⁷⁰⁸ In Dutch: Luchtvaartwet.

⁷⁰⁹ Interview Van Gijzel / Former member of the Lower House / PVDA, 2009.

⁷¹⁰ Het Parool 22 januari 1998. Geluidsbeheersing Schiphol binnen of buiten de grenzen. F. de Zeeuw (GS Noord Holland / PVDA) en B. Linders (PvdA).

7.5.2 Dealing with Noise Problems (in 1997 and 1998)

In the PKB of 1995 it was stated that the noise limits would become effective from 1997 onwards. This implied that Schiphol had to develop a runway use plan for 1997. The plan was accepted, but very soon it became clear that Schiphol would exceed the limits at several locations. This triggered political discussion, but in the end, the Minister of V&W decided to tolerate the foul. The reason for this was that there were extraordinary circumstances involved, which the Minister and her Ministry deemed incidental and not structural. One runway, the Kaagbaan, was upgraded, and could not be used for several months. This resulted in temporary different flight patterns, resulting in more noise pollution at specific locations than previously expected.⁷¹¹ However, this was not the only reason for unexpectedly high noise levels at these points. The traffic volumes grew much faster than was assumed during the PKB process, which had consequences for the operation of the runways. The runway use plan that had been used to calculate the noise contour differed from the actual use of runways and related flight paths. The result of this mismatch between the assumed flight patterns and runway use and the actual situation was that the 35Ke was exceeded at some enforcement points, while ample space was left at other enforcement points (i.e. here levels of noise pollution were lower than initially expected) (see figure 7.8).


This was especially problematic for the night zone, which contained several locations where levels had already been exceeded in May 1997. Schiphol had to develop a new runway use plan, including measures for reducing the amount of night flights for the remainder of 1997. The airline companies were not happy about this, since it implied that they had to revise their schedules, which was a costly affair. Therefore, the airlines protested and summoned the airport authority. At first sight, this was rather strange, as Schiphol was actually siding with the airlines. However, from the perspective of the airlines they were a client of Schiphol, and therefore Schiphol was to blame for their problems. At that time, it was not yet clear how different responsibilities were spread amongst the ministry and the airport authority. The judge decided that the Minister of V&W had the legal authority to impose the measures and the airport authority was not to blame for this. The Minister implemented the restrictions to night flights that would apply for the remainder of 1997 in October 1997, thus preventing further exceedings of the nightly noise limits. Meanwhile, the noise limits for the day had also been exceeded at some points.⁷¹² More specifically, the problems with the existing noise contours for both the day and night that had just been laid down in the Aviation Act pointed out that any further traffic growth in the near future was impossible. According to most actors this was undesirable and not in line with the ambitions that had been laid down in the PKB decision of 1995. Obviously, further mainport development was endangered and

⁷¹¹ TK 25466, September 24th 1998. Nr.19.

⁷¹² TK 25466, September 24th 1998. Nr.19, pp. 3-4.

urgent measures were deemed necessary to avoid this. Only two years after the PKB decision had been forged, the growth-noise dilemma was brought back into the midst of the political attention.

Figure 7.8 Mismatch between the 35Ke zone taken up in the Aviation Act and actual 35Ke zone in 1997. Areas in red indicate the locations where levels were exceeded, areas in blue locations with space left.



Source: Milieueffect rapportage S4S2, 1999; p.12

Facilitating Growth (1997)

On October 3rd the Ministry of V&W decided to tolerate the exceeding of all noise limits for the remainder of 1997.⁷¹³ It was argued that mainport development was seriously endangered if further growth was not facilitated. And mainport development was still one of the cornerstones of the cabinet's economic development strategy. In a response, the environmental parties summoned the Ministry to court, starting the next legal procedure. Due to its promise that this policy of toleration was only meant to buy some additional time to develop and implement new policy measures that would reduce noise pollution in the future, and due to its promise that such tolerations would not happen anymore in the future, the judge decided in favour of the Ministry. The environmental parties did not understand this: not even a year had passed and the only environmental restriction that was part of the dual objective of the PKB as regards the short term (i.e. the noise limits) was not adequately enforced.⁷¹⁴

At the same time, new input data were used for calculating the levels of noise pollution, further extending the growth options of Schiphol. The aircraft engines of one type of

⁷¹³ TK 25466, October 3rd 1997, Nr.5.

⁷¹⁴ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

aircraft, the Boeing-737 that was much used by KLM, had been revised, making them somewhat quieter. Since the method prescribed that aviation noise was only to be calculated for levels above the 65 dB, the minor revision made it possible to greatly reduce the noise contours (i.e. making them smaller, thus locating them closer around the airport).⁷¹⁵ Only 13 kilometres away from the runway the level of noise fell below the 65 dB, were it used to be after 18 kilometres. This implied that the people and houses located in between 13 – 18 kilometres from the runway were not taken into account anymore, as this area was not considered to be exposed to serious noise pollution. In reality the amount of decibels to which these areas were exposed had become only 3 or 4 dB lower (from 67 to 64 dB), which made no difference to the people dwelling there. Besides, the Ministry of V&W subsidized the revision of the engines, as it was seen as an environmental friendly measure.⁷¹⁶ Due to the new input data about the 737 engines the amount of houses within the zone (12,800) was far below the maximum (15,000). Nonetheless, the 35Ke contour was still exceeded at a few locations, as a consequence of the different way wherein the runways were used. More urgent measures were therefore still required, especially because traffic volumes were expected to grow much faster in the upcoming years than had been assumed during the PKB procedure.

Installing A New Committee (In 't Veld, 1997 – January 1998)

It had been clear to everyone involved that facilitating further growth on the short term (< 2003) was impossible if the 1996 noise contours were kept in place. The discrepancy was attributed to the specific shape of the calculated and legally binding noise zone. In order to repair the misfit, the Ministry of V&W established a new independent committee, the In' t Veld Committee, that was to assess the effectiveness of the current noise system (i.e. the zones and the enforcement procedures).⁷¹⁷ The committee was asked to find ways for improvement that would make it possible to increase the capacity of the short term four runway system (< 2003). In essence, the Committee's main assignment was to find a renewed balance between short term growth and acceptable levels of noise pollution.

The committee presented its final report on January 27th 1998. The committee observed some 'absurdities' as regards the existing noise system and explained that repairing these absurdities would create a win-win strategy, wherein both the amount of houses exposed to levels of noise pollution within 35Ke would decrease and capacity would increase.^{718 719} According to the committee it was rather inefficient and useless that the

⁷¹⁵ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁷¹⁶ Trouw, September 6th, 1997: Geluidstruc geeft Schiphol ruimte. Vincent Dekker.

⁷¹⁷ TK 25466, February 16th 1998, Nr. 9.

⁷¹⁸ Eindrapportage Commissie van Deskundigen, January 27th 1998, Een verstandshuwelijk tussen luchtvaart en milieu.

35Ke zone was exceeded at some points, especially points where nobody lived (the so-called pasturelands), whereas ample space was left at most other points. The problem was that existing procedures as determined in the PKB and the subsequent translation in the Aviation Act did not allow for compensation between points. According to the Committee this problem could be solved by drawing a new noise contour without absurdities.

Both KLM and Schiphol were very happy with the committee's recommendations.⁷²⁰ Despite the fact that the committee also emphasized that the amount of houses within the 35Ke could be improved too when repairing the absurdities, the environmental parties (Stichting Natuur & Milieu and Milieudefensie) and the local residents were not pleased with the advice. They argued that the committee had ignored the greatest absurdity of the entire system, i.e. the tendency to only include extremely loud noise levels (> 65 dB) in the calculations.⁷²¹ Furthermore, the committee was not asked to take additional environmental effects of further growth into account. For example, more growth would greatly increase the third party risks and CO² emissions.⁷²² Therefore, the committee defined the Schiphol problem very much in terms of growth versus noise, as they had been assigned to do. Some of the local residents did not trust the motives of the committee. Some believed that the committee was merely assigned to pave the way for further growth.⁷²³ Since they expected the chairman to draw exactly the conclusions that the Ministry of V&W and the sector parties desired, they gave him the nickname 'His Master's Voice'.⁷²⁴ Nonetheless, a few years later this same chairman wrote some highly critical articles about the specific way wherein the Ministry of V&W dealt with information and he pointed out the problems related to the narrow framing of the Schiphol policy debate (in terms of noise and growth).^{725 726}

Growth towards 460,000 flights in 2002

The court ruling of 1997 did not imply a structural solution for dealing with the growth – noise dilemma. At the start of 1998 the urgency to adapt the existing noise system on short notice increased, as there were already some indications that Schiphol would exceed limits at several locations when carrying out the runway use plan of 1998 that had been accorded earlier. The initial 1998 plan was based on 360,000 flight movements and it was calculated that 8400 houses would fall within the 35Ke zone and

⁷¹⁹ NRC, January 28th 1998, In 't Veld: meer lawaai Schiphol niet gedogen.

⁷²⁰ Staatscourant, January 28th 1998, Milieuorganisaties vinden Commissie In 't Veld te lichtig over geluidshinder. Nr. 18.

⁷²¹ Staatscourant, January 28th 1998, Milieuorganisaties vinden Commissie In 't Veld te lichtig over geluidshinder. Nr. 18.

⁷²² Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁷²³ The Chairman was In 't Veld.

⁷²⁴ Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

⁷²⁵ In 't Veld, 2000.

⁷²⁶ In 't Veld & Teisman, Loopgravenoorlog legt Schiphol lam. In: NRC, 13-2-2008, p.7.

that no enforcement points would be crossed. After the positive advice of the CGS about the plan, the Ministry of V&W had also approved of it. However, early 1998 Schiphol expected to accommodate more traffic and the recommendations of the In 't Veld committee allowed them to develop a new plan. The new plan was based on 400,000 flight movements and 9300 houses within the 35Ke zone, but the complication was that the 35Ke zone would be exceeded at five enforcement points. According to the airport authorities, these 5 points belonged to the absurdities that the In 't Veld committee was talking about. KLM and Schiphol also argued that this additional traffic was needed, as a minimum growth of 5% was necessary for sustaining the hub operations in order to deal with the fierce competition with other airports and airlines. This way sector parties strategically linked the new political possibilities that the In 't Veld Committee had opened (i.e. reviewing the noise contour) to the mainport objective.

In practice, facilitating 5% growth a year implied a mean of 20,000 extra flights for each year during 1997 - 2002, starting in 1997 (360,000), resulting in 460,000 flights in 2002. Both the Ministries of V&W and VROM would allow for these 100,000 additional flights in the upcoming 5 years, as long as the maximum amount of houses within the 35Ke zone was reduced to 12,000 in return (used to be 15,000).⁷²⁷ This meant that the Aviation Act was to be changed in order to change the 35Ke contour and the housing norm. It was expected that further growth to 460,000 flight movements in 2002 would result in problems at 65 of the 235 points if the contour was not adapted. As argued by the In't Veld committee, the irrational shape of the existing contour was to blame for this. The cabinet thought it plausible to assume that 100,000 extra flights were possible within the environmental limits set by the PKB, if only the shape of the contour was changed.⁷²⁸ The cabinet took over the idea of the win-win solution proposed by the committee, i.e. that adapting the contour by getting rid of its absurdities would make it possible to both facilitate 100,000 additional flights, while simultaneously sharpening the environmental limits (i.e. reducing the maximum amount of houses from 15,000 to 12,000 within the 35Ke zone). Schiphol and KLM were not very pleased about this win-win solution. In fact, they had indicated that it would become very difficult to reach both objectives at the same time (460,000 flights and 12,000 houses). They indicated that this was only possible if a slot coordinator was appointed as soon as possible. Such a coordinator could allocate the available slots of the airport in a way that greatly improved the efficiency of operations, thus creating capacity within the same environmental limits.

⁷²⁷ TK 25466, February 16th 1998, Nr. 9.

⁷²⁸ TK 25466, February 16th 1998, Nr. 9.

The cabinet assigned the NLR to calculate whether both demands (100,000 additional flights and 12,000 houses within 35Ke) could be realized at the same time. Prior to the research the assumptions that had to be used when making the calculations were being discussed by Schiphol, the Ministry of V&W/RLD, VROM and the NLR. Amongst other things, these included a further reduction of the share of noisy airplanes, different runway use, a *meteomarge* of 20%⁷²⁹ and other technical measures (new take off procedure, reduced flaps use and revision of motors). Each assumption lowered the amount of noise pollution and increased the chance that a match could be made. The NLR concluded that when drawing on these assumptions the 100,000 additional flights could be matched with the 12,000 houses norm.⁷³⁰ The cabinet took over the advice and decided to allow the further growth of 20,000 flights per year for the upcoming 5 years, although it was stated that some extra measures were needed as regards the night flights. The sector parties (KLM and Schiphol) rejected the demand to reduce the amount of houses from 15,000 to 12,000. They kept arguing that this was simply not possible and they wanted by all means to prevent that unrealistic policy goals would again result in a new round of political debate.⁷³¹ In the end, the Ministry of V&W and the cabinet were convinced by the arguments of the aviation sector and the Cabinet decided to allow for the additional 100,000 flights, while rejecting the implementation of a lower housing norm.⁷³² The Aviation Act of 1996 that contained the existing 35Ke contour was to be adapted to the new situation. As part of this procedure an EIA was carried out, and, by means of compensation, the Cabinet argued to 'strive for' a new 35Ke zone with a maximum of 12,000 houses, even though 15,000 houses remained the legal norm.⁷³³ The Lower House accepted this proposal at the end of 1998. According to the environmental parties, who were quite furious about this course of affairs, the members of the Lower House wanted to avoid more discussion about Schiphol as new elections were coming soon and political parties wanted to neutralize the Schiphol issue.⁷³⁴

Abandoning the PKB capacity ceilings

The changes in the Aviation Act that were announced implied that the capacity limits that had been so heavily negotiated during the PKB were to be removed too. That is, it was expected that for facilitating 20,000 additional flights during the upcoming five years (from 360,000 – 400,000 in 1999 and 460,000 in 2002) the capacity limits that had been so heavily negotiated during the political debate about the PKB (maximum of 44 million pax. and 3.3 million tons of freight) could not be enforced. Since the growth was deemed necessary to facilitate mainport development, holding on to the capacity

⁷²⁹ The surplus of noise pollution that was allowed as a consequence of unpredictable weather conditions.

⁷³⁰ TK 25466, September 24th 1998. Nr.19.

⁷³¹ TK 25466, September 24th 1998. Nr.19.

⁷³² TK 25466, March 6th 1998, Nr.10.

⁷³³ TK 25466, March 6th 1998, Nr.10.

⁷³⁴ Press Release Milieudefensie, November 4th 1998, Kluchtvaart.

limits would endanger the feasibility of the mainport objective. The environmental parties indicated that they would accept to let go of the capacity ceilings, as long as the improved noise contour implied a further improvement of the quality of the living environment.⁷³⁵ From the perspective of a member of the Lower House who had played an important role in establishing the capacity ceilings in 1995, it was rather strange that the environmental parties were voluntarily willing to let go of the capacity ceilings. The ceilings functioned as their main legal protection against unfettered growth.⁷³⁶ However, it was by making the removal of the capacity ceilings part of the discussion that the environmental parties opened the door for a new round of negotiations. This was important, as the In 't Veld committee had also recommended to install a new network of actors for negotiating trade offs between additional growth and environmental protection, wherein both representatives of the environmental lobby and the aviation sector were represented.⁷³⁷

Anticipation Decision

The policy intention to facilitate further growth from 360,000 to 460,000 implied the revision of the Aviation Act of 1996 (including the new noise contours). The legal procedures that had to be applied would take at least 10 months. Until then, the old Act, and thus the old zone, would hold their legally binding status. This implied that the limits would be exceeded at several locations during 1998. The cabinet indicated that this would be tolerated (just as was done in 1997) as long as it was in line with the new policy intention (i.e. the new noise contour, without absurdities that had yet to be translated into the revised Act). This decision made further growth beyond the existing noise limits possible, in anticipation of the new Aviation Act (which was not yet available and effective). It was therefore referred to as an 'anticipation decision'.⁷³⁸ The environmental parties and local residents were not very happy with the decision to tolerate violations of noise limits for the second time in a row.⁷³⁹ After all, back in 1997 the Minister of V&W had promised that violations would only be tolerated once (in 1997).

7.5.3 Putting the Noise System under pressure (Spring 1998)

The recommendations of the In't Veld committee were based on the existing noise systematic. This implied that it was only possible to facilitate more flights if the existing calculation method remained in place, with minor revisions (as we have seen, some assumptions were altered in order to make more flights possible). However, the

⁷³⁵ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁷³⁶ Interview Van Gijzel / Former member of the Lower House / PVDA, 2009.

⁷³⁷ Eindrapportage Commissie van Deskundigen, January 27th 1998, Een verstandshuwelijk tussen luchtvaart en milieu.

⁷³⁸ In Dutch: Anticipatiebesluit; see TK 25466, September 24th 1998. Nr.19.

⁷³⁹ Press Release Milieudefensie, January 20th 1998.

calculation method itself became questioned too. Two types of criticism emerged during those years, further complicating the political discussion about the short term measures.

(1) New evidence from Measured Noise Levels

First, new results of measured noise levels became available. In 1997 it had become clear that the NLR had conducted research about the differences between measuring and calculating noise, as a sort of second opinion of the Isermann report. The report was antedated on 1997, but had already been available during 1996.⁷⁴⁰ The main conclusion was that the measured results were indeed much higher, even higher than Isermann had concluded in 1994.⁷⁴¹ These results implied more houses within the 35Ke zone, and more severely hindered people, which was not very desirable at that time. In 1997 a local resident got a hand on the report and he mobilized the media in order to bring it to the public attention.⁷⁴² This caused a serious political riot. For one, the environmental parties were furious. In order to deal with the tension the Ministry of V&W/RLD promised to measure noise at 19 locations and compare this with the calculated levels. However, two years later (December 1999) the research was not carried out yet.⁷⁴³

The Environmental Agency of the municipality of Amsterdam had continued to further refine tools for measuring aircraft noise in cooperation with OMEGAM. Additional measurement stations had been installed at the Assendelft location in July 1997.⁷⁴⁴ Another municipality, Beverwijk, did not trust the calculations of the Ministry any longer and they had hired OMEGAM to install measurements stations on their municipal territory. The first results of the Beverwijk station pointed out that the measured levels (20Ke) were much higher than the calculated ones (16Ke).⁷⁴⁵ The other measurement stations provided similar results. Based on these results, other municipalities like Zaanstad also started to invest in measurement stations.⁷⁴⁶

The local and national newspapers published several critical articles about the validity of the existing calculation method that had to be improved according to the In 't Veld committee.^{747 748} OMEGAM too contributed to the discussion by publishing the results of the new measurement stations that had been installed since 1995. The new results of the two oldest measurement stations (Buitenveldert and Amstelveen) and the new

⁷⁴⁰ NLR rapport (1997) Oorzaken Verschil gemeten en berekende geluidsniveaus. NLR rapport Nr. CR97263L; Interview Muchall / noise expert, 2009.

⁷⁴¹ NLR rapport (1997) Oorzaken Verschil gemeten en berekende geluidsniveaus. NLR rapport Nr. CR97263L, p.23.

⁷⁴² Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

⁷⁴³ Trouw, December 18th 1999, De lange lijdensweg naar werkelijke geluidshinder. By Vincent Dekker.

⁷⁴⁴ Interview Muchall / noise expert, 2009.

⁷⁴⁵ *Uitdijder Courant*, February 3rd 1998, Beverwijk ondervindt meer hinder van vliegtuigen dan officieel berekend.

⁷⁴⁶ *Dagblad Zaanstreek*, February 5th 1998, Zaanstad gaat nu zelf overlast Schiphol meten.

⁷⁴⁷ *Volkskrant*, January 24th 1998, Schiphol rekent de meeste vliegtuigen niet mee.

⁷⁴⁸ *Haarlems Dagblad*, January 13th 1998, Vliegtuiglawaai blijkt veel erger dan gedacht. By Jan Kuys.

station in Assendelft showed that the amount of noise was approx. 3.2Ke higher than calculated. This implied that only 249,000 flights could be facilitated within the 35Ke zone, instead of the calculated 360,000 flights (and 460,000 after the absurdities had been repaired).⁷⁴⁹ By publishing the results, the research bureau openly questioned the potential of further growth of traffic volumes, as had been proposed by the In 't Veld committee.⁷⁵⁰

The media attention that the OMEGAM results received caused some political tensions within the municipal board of Amsterdam. The alderman of Economic Affairs argued that OMEGAM undermined the municipal policy as regards Schiphol, whereas the alderman of Environmental Affairs argued that OMEGAM merely wanted to improve the environmental conditions.⁷⁵¹ In the end, the municipality of Amsterdam chose to support the national noise policy, which was based on the calculation model. In the meantime, the Isermann report was kept silent. When one former member of the supervisory committee of the Isermann report asked Dr. Isermann to write an article about his findings in order to contribute to the discussion and stress the importance of measuring noise, he was told that the Ministry of V&W had asked Dr. Isermann not to talk about the research results in public. Nonetheless, Dr. Isermann wrote an article about the flaws of calculation models in general, and the need to combine them with measurements. But in the article he did not refer to the specific case of Schiphol.⁷⁵² Thus, the Isermann report was still successfully kept outside the public debate.⁷⁵³

(2) Criticizing assumptions underlying the calculation model

The fact that the revised noise model did not take the noise levels below 65 dB into account was also very much criticized. The environmental parties mobilized the media to bring this message to the fore.⁷⁵⁴ According to them, this flaw in the calculation method could also explain the differences between the measured levels of noise and the calculated levels.

Most political unrest was caused by several broadcasts on Dutch television. RTL news paid attention to calculation method and one program on the public channel (Netwerk) discussed the decision making process about Schiphol into more detail. Amongst other things, the program highlighted that the Ministry of VROM/DGM had been very displeased about the way the Ministry of V&W/RLD had dealt with the noise

⁷⁴⁹ Amstelveens Weekblad, February 4th 1998, Metingen leggen zwakte bloot van geluidscontouren. By Rene de Leeuw; Interview Muchall / Noise expert, 2009.

⁷⁵⁰ Parool, January 14th 1998, Jorritsma staat meer vliegtuiglawaai niet toe.

⁷⁵¹ Letter Milieudienst Amsterdam to the Municipal Board, March 4th 1998, Geluidsmetingen OMEGAM, Nr. 8700002/29.

⁷⁵² Isermann, 1996.

⁷⁵³ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise expert and member of the EIA Committee Schiphol, 2010.

⁷⁵⁴ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

problematic during the PASO negotiations (1989 – 1991), during which the foundations of the current noise regulations were laid.⁷⁵⁵ Poor relations and poor cooperation between both Ministries came to the fore. In a response to the program the Minister of V&W reassured the members of the Lower House that this relationship had been improved considerably after the PASO process, and there was no distrust between the Ministries anno 1998.⁷⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the many complaints about the noise model brought to the fore by the media received a lot of attention and worked to increase political unrest.

Doubts in the Lower House

In essence, the new criticism about the dubious assumptions underlying the existing noise calculations and the new results derived from the measurement stations further lowered trust of politicians in the noise systematic. This came to the fore when several politicians started questioning the policy intention of facilitating further growth of Schiphol in the spring of 1998. First of all, questions were asked in the Lower House about the way the yearly runway use plan 1998 was actually being developed, especially by the opposition party Groen Links.⁷⁵⁷ More specifically, they wondered whether it was legal to approve of such a plan based on an anticipation decision, thus questioning the legal status of this type of decisions. Secondly, doubts about the facts and figures that had been used during the PKB procedure increased. After all, most problems related to the short term development of Schiphol that were on the political agenda were directly caused by the unrealistic decisions that had been laid down in the PKB document of 1995. Members of the Lower House submitted several motions, calling for contra expertises and independent research.⁷⁵⁸ The Minister agreed to assign an independent research institute that was to evaluate the traffic forecasts that had been used during the PKB procedure.

In spite of the political doubts about the validity of the noise calculation model that had been applied, and despite the broken promise of the Minister of V&W that exceeding the noise limits was only to be tolerated once (in 1997), a majority of the members of the Lower house decided to support the anticipation decision (thus tolerating exceedings at several enforcement points in 1998). A majority believed that the win-win solution that had been proposed by the In 't Veld committee was possible, thus believing that the revision of the system that was under way would make it possible to facilitate the requested 400,000 flights in 1998 and 460,000 in 2002 within the environmental (noise) limits. The environmental parties emphasized once again that further growth would

⁷⁵⁵ Television program Netwerk, March 19th & 20th, 1998.

⁷⁵⁶ TK 24786, March 16th, 1998, Nr.18

⁷⁵⁷ TK 24786, March 26th 1998, Nr. 19 & TK 24786, March 26th 1998, Nr.25.

⁷⁵⁸ TK 24786, April 15th 1998, Nr.44.

increase the other negative effects as well (like third party risks, stench, local air pollution, CO² emission) to unacceptable levels. This criticism was taken seriously and the Lower House insisted upon bringing back the issue of third party risk on the policy agenda about short term development of Schiphol. Thus, they demanded that the consequences for third party risks were also taken into account when revising the Aviation Act.

7.5.4 Dealing with other Environmental Criteria

Bringing third party risk back into the debate (spring 1998)

One member of the Lower House who had been particularly concerned about the issue of third party risk ever since the Bijlmer disaster submitted a motion wherein it was stated that the further growth in the upcoming 5 years was not allowed to result in increasing levels of individual risk and group risk.⁷⁵⁹ In the PKB it had been stated that the standstill principle for third party risk would come into effect from 2003 onwards (after the 5th runway was put into operation). Nonetheless, a majority of the members of the Lower House voted in favor of the motion and it was adopted.⁷⁶⁰ At that time the Ministry of V&W had already had some indications that a standstill for third party risk could be achieved by revising the calculation model.⁷⁶¹ Therefore the Minister of V&W did not bother to fight against the inclusion of the standstill. In June 1998 the Minister informed the Lower House that the improved risk calculation model that the NLR and RIVM had been working on resulted in a considerable reduction of the risks. The core assumption that accident rates remained constant as traffic volumes increased was abandoned (i.e. the assumption of proportional development) and all kind of other assumptions were modified (i.e. technological development, fleet composition – newer airplanes have lower accident rates, internal safety elements)⁷⁶² and the latest safety improvements were processed. The improved model of NLR showed that the probability of an accident per flight movement was 70% lower than had come to the fore during the PKB process in 1993, by means of the old model.⁷⁶³ Nonetheless, it was also clear to the Minister and the Lower House that this improvement could only partly compensate for the expected increase in air traffic volumes.⁷⁶⁴ Therefore, the motion that had been adopted by the Lower House was necessary for making sure that safety levels did not deteriorate any further.

Ignoring other environmental issues

The line of reasoning that gave rise to the inclusion of the issue of third party risk could

⁷⁵⁹ TK 25466, April 23rd 1998, Nr.11; Interview Van Gijssel / Former member of the Lower House / PVDA, 2009.

⁷⁶⁰ TK 25466, April 28th 1998, Nr.49.

⁷⁶¹ Kahan (1997).

⁷⁶² Derived from Minutiae of Safety Expert Meetings January 9th and 14th 1998, RLD.

⁷⁶³ VACS (2000), Advice to the Minister of Transportation, March 7th 2000; Pikaar et al., 2000.

⁷⁶⁴ TK 25466, July 1st 1998, Nr. 15H, p. 10.

also be applied to all other environmental indicators. Further growth of air traffic was likely to hold consequences for levels of air pollution and stench as well. This was brought to the fore by the province of North Holland and the environmental interest groups. With regard to air pollution the Minister V&W had sent a letter to the Lower House wherein new numbers were introduced for the maximum amounts of pollution for the six gasses that were taken up in the PKB. It was argued that the numbers of the PKB were too low, as they were based on air traffic only. However, air pollution was to be calculated for all traffic within the area (e.g. including emissions of road traffic) and therefore new and considerably higher numbers were to be inserted.⁷⁶⁵ Nothing else was said about the issue of air pollution, thus during the debate about the additional growth the issue of local air pollution did not play a role. The same held true for the issue of stench.

7.5.5 Increasing political doubts: New information on the PKB numbers (Autumn, 1998)

As a consequence of the accepted motion about the need to evaluate the traffic forecasts that had been applied during the PKB process, an independent government advisory council was assigned (i.e. the 'Algemene Rekenkamer' or AR).⁷⁶⁶ The AR concluded that the forecasts that had been used during the PKB process were unrealistic (far too low). Moreover, they concluded that they had probably been used because they made the dual objective possible, which made these forecasts politically desirable. Higher growth rates would have made the reconciliation between expansion and environmental improvement impossible, as had obviously come to the fore in actual practice (otherwise there would not have been any problems).⁷⁶⁷ In an earlier study of the CPB about the traffic forecasts that had been used, conclusions were less harsh. According to the CPB state of the art insights had been used and the aviation market was filled with uncertainties.⁷⁶⁸ Still, with these conclusions in mind it was not difficult to understand the problems that had arisen about the noise limits during 1997 and 1998. Especially the AR report led to several critical reactions of members of the Lower House. At that time, no one trusted the facts and figures anymore, and therefore the feasibility of the policy intention to facilitate further growth on the short term while simultaneously improving the situation as regards noise pollution became heavily doubted.^{769 770 771} Moreover,

⁷⁶⁵ Letter from Minister of Transportation to the Lower House, July 11th 1997, Luchtverontreiniging in PKB Schiphol en Omgeving. Nr. DGRLD/VI/97.730201 – The new numbers: CO²: 4,811,000 ton; CO: 38,804 ton; NOx: 16,334 ton; VOS: 15,755 ton; SO²: 1,562 ton; Black smoke: 790 ton.

⁷⁶⁶ TK 25466, May 25th 1998, Nr. 13.

⁷⁶⁷ Algemene Rekenkamer (1998). Groeicijfers Schiphol. Den Haag, Sdu Uitgeverij.

⁷⁶⁸ Letter of the CPB to the Minister of Transportation, March 25th 1998, Toekomstige Vervoersontwikkeling op luchthaven Schiphol, see p.11. Note that the CPB was the main actor in the development of the development of scenarios.

⁷⁶⁹ Newspaper article Trouw, October 28th 1998, Ook Kamer wist dat cijfers over Schiphol niet klopten.

⁷⁷⁰ Newspaper Article Volkskrant, December 20th 2003, Dubbeldoel werd dubbelspel. By Jan Meeus & John Schoorl.

⁷⁷¹ Newspaper Article Trouw, December 17th 1998, Rosenmoller wil punt zetten achter discussie groeicijfers Schiphol.

members of the Lower House were getting weary of the ongoing Schiphol debate (i.e. by then it had been on the political agenda from 1988 onwards) and called for more transparency. In the summer of 1998 a new Cabinet was installed, which was deemed to be an excellent opportunity for handling Schiphol affairs differently, i.e. by enhancing transparency.

7.5.6. Political Turmoil: time to ‘make a clean sweep’

A new Cabinet: Kok II (August 1998)

In August 1998 a new cabinet was installed, consisting of the same purple coalition as the former cabinet (PVDA, VVD, D66), although D66 had suffered a considerable blow during the elections. In its coalition agreement of August 3rd the cabinet emphasized the need to find a balance between economic development and preservation of the quality of the living environment and the need to invest in sustainable infrastructure, for which a lot of money was reserved.⁷⁷² Moreover, the Cabinet stressed the need to further facilitate mainport development. With regard to Schiphol this implied securing sufficient capacity for carrying out hub operations. Additional capacity was to be sought after, both at Schiphol and at a possible new location. Decision-making about large spatial and infrastructure projects was to become more transparent and organized in a more structured way. Finally, the emission of CO² was to be reduced with 6% in 2012, compared to levels of 1990. The cabinet stressed that it would lobby for additional charges on airplane tickets within EU context.⁷⁷³ Both the new Ministers of V&W (Netelenbos) and VROM (Pronk) belonged to the PVDA. According to some this was deliberately done to improve the traditional poor relationship between both Ministries, especially as regards Schiphol affairs.⁷⁷⁴ Right after the new cabinet had been installed, the political debate about the short term measures for Schiphol was taken up again. This immediately resulted in chaos in the Lower House.

Chaos in the Lower House (autumn 1998)

In September 1998 members of the Lower House complained about the complex nature of the Schiphol debate. They had seen so many facts and figures come by the past few years that it was argued that no one really did know what to believe anymore. Members of different political parties, including those that were part of the cabinet (like D66 and PVDA), pointed out that they were getting crazy of the ever growing piles of research reports with advices and forecasts and they called for bringing the endless discussion about facts and figures to an end. One member of the lower house (Melkert/PVDA)

⁷⁷² TK 26024 August 3rd 1998, Nr.10, p.6.

⁷⁷³ TK 26024 August 3rd 1998, Nr.10, pp. 53-57.

⁷⁷⁴ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

asked the Cabinet to make a clean sweep and make the cabinet's decisions of the last year transparent.^{775 776}

In a response the cabinet presented a reconstruction of the decision making process about the approval of 100,000 additional flights, as part of the strategy to handle Schiphol affairs more transparently.⁷⁷⁷ Environmental parties had requested to bring to light whom had made the decisions and why nothing had been done to prevent the use of wrong numbers. Especially the presumably dubious roles that the Prime Minister (Kok) and the Minister of V&W (Jorritsma) had played during the final decision-making process were deemed to be in need of thorough investigations.⁷⁷⁸ The Cabinet did not include these latter questions, as the reconstruction was meant to assess whether or not the right numbers had been used during the decision-making. From the reconstruction it could be derived that the assumptions that had been used in the calculations, and thus the data that had been used as input for assessing whether the maximum of 12,000 houses fitted within the 35Ke zone, had been wrong.⁷⁷⁹ This caused some additional political tensions. The political turmoil even increased when it came to light that Schiphol would exceed the limits of several enforcement points in October 1998 (10 points for the night, and 16 for daytime) and when the Minister of V&W announced to tolerate this by means of the anticipation decision (that we already discussed).⁷⁸⁰

Clarifying Relationships between the Ministry of V&W and the aviation sector (1998)

One of the main outcomes of the political turmoil was that the distribution of responsibilities between the aviation sector and the Ministry of V&W was in need of clarification, as part of the broader claim for more transparency. For example, was Schiphol to held responsible for exceeding of the noise limits, or were airlines and the Ministries also responsible? This resulted in a so-called disentanglement operation (in Dutch *ontvlechtingsoperatie*) aimed to separate the responsibilities for the daily management affairs of the airport and the development and the enforcement of clear and hard norms within which the daily operations needed to fit. Anno 1998 the dominant perception was that the Ministry of V&W acted more as an actor of the aviation sector than as an independent department that tried to make balanced trade offs. Members of the Lower House, environmental parties and local residents therefore had great doubts

⁷⁷⁵ Volkskrant, September 17th 1998, Uitbreiding van Schiphol maakt kamer radeloos.

⁷⁷⁶ Griensven, P. van (1999), *Parlementaire Kroniek* 1998 – 1999, pp. 144 – 145.

⁷⁷⁷ TK 25466, October 5th 1998, Nr.19.

⁷⁷⁸ Trouw, September 23th 1998, Met een Schoon schip nota is Schiphol nog niet schoon. Article submitted by Wynand Duyvendak, Milieudefensie.

⁷⁷⁹ Several motions were submitted. Groen Links requested to take the 12,000 houses norm as an absolute limit for the upcoming 5 years (TK 25466, Nr.23, October 7th 1998) while the PVDA demanded clarity about the Cabinet's Perspective on Schiphol's future growth within 6 months (TK 25466, Nr. 22, October 7th 1998). Both motions were withdrawn.

⁷⁸⁰ TK 25466, October 16th 1998, Nr.24; TK 25466, October 30th 1998, Nr.26.

about the level of independence of the Ministry when developing and enforcing norms.⁷⁸¹ The Ministry of V&W acknowledged this and they also felt the urgency to clarify responsibilities between sector and Ministry.⁷⁸² Disentanglement was perceived to be an important means to restore the waning levels of trust.

A refined Cabinets Perspective: Strategic Policy Choice Future Aviation (December 1998)

In December 1998 the cabinet presented the Strategic Policy Choice Future Aviation (Strategische Beleidskeuze Toekomst Luchtvaart, SBTL), which was an elaboration of its Policy Perspective presented one year earlier (IBV, 1997). In this document the Cabinet stated how it was to continue with the problems on the short and mid term and the development of a vision for the long term (recall paragraph 7.4). With regard to the short term, the decision had already been made. Schiphol was allowed to grow to 460,000 flights in 2002, as long as there was a maximum of 15,100 houses within the 35Ke (and as long as the aviation sector strived for a maximum of 12,000 houses). An EIA procedure was to be carried out for changing the noise contours around Schiphol (S4S2), meant to assess whether both objectives could really be reached. We already discussed the long term that was split in an exploration of options for expanding Schiphol and the creation of an offshore island in the North Sea. Most attention was devoted to the mid term, as there was little time left for the development of a new regulative system that was to apply to the five-runway system (> 2003) (which we shall extensively discuss in paragraph 7.6).

7.5.7 Final Outcomes of the short term debate (1996 – 1998)

At the end of 1998, a majority of the Lower house was still in favour of facilitating further growth of Schiphol. In line with the conclusions of the In 't Veld committee, it was argued that the noise regulations were in need of revision. In the meantime, anticipation decisions had been made in order to make sure that existing noise limits did not hamper further hub developments. The cabinet stuck to its argument that a revised system could both enhance capacity and lower the amount of houses within the 35Ke zone, which still served as the main environmental criterion as regards the short term. The standstill for third party risk was also included in the short term debate (used to apply only to the period > 2003), but other environmental indicators were not included. At the same time, doubts about the validity of the facts and figures that were used had increased. Those doubts were not only related to the validity of the existing methodology to assess levels of noise pollution when repairing the absurdities of the short term noise contour, but also to the different results of the measurements versus the

⁷⁸¹ Interview Van Gijzel / Former member of the Lower House / PVDA, 2009; Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

⁷⁸² Interview Dortland / Former Policy Maker Ministry of V&W, 2009.

calculations and the critical evaluation of the PKB forecasts that had been requested by the members of the Lower House.

The much higher traffic volumes did not only complicate the elaboration and implementation of the PKB decisions about the short term four runway system (< 2003). It also caused problems for the legal translation of the regulative system for the five-runway system that was to become operative from 2003 onwards. In essence, the feasibility of the different promises that had been made in the PKB of 1995 about the five runway system (> 2003) were in need of revision too, similar to the case of the four runway system (< 2003).

7.6 Debating the Mid Term (1) 1996 – 1998: The Five Runway System (> 2003)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				
Mid term 2003 - 2015	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6			Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10	Part 6. – 7.12	
						Part 5. – 7.11		

After the PKB had been developed, the decisions about the five runway system were to be elaborated and translated into the Aviation Act. As time proceeded more information became available indicating that the dual objectives that had been set for the mid term could not be realized simultaneously (7.6.1). Amongst other things, this led to political turmoil (7.6.2) and a decision of the cabinet to develop an entirely new regulative system for the mid term that was to apply from 2003 onwards (7.6.3). The paragraph is ended with a short review of the main outcomes of the 1996 – 1998 debate about the mid term (7.6.4).

7.6.1 Fighting over the Aviation Act for the Mid Term Five Runway System

In the PKB of 1995 not only an improvement as regards noise, but also a standstill as regards third party risk, local air pollution and stench was promised for the five runway system. For this system too, the PKB measures were to be translated into an Aviation Act (Aanwijzing Luchtvaartterrein Schiphol, ALS), which was sent to the Lower house on August 22nd 1996. When it became clear that traffic was growing much faster than initially assumed, and that the Cabinet was willing to facilitate this growth, doubts about the feasibility of the environmental objectives that had been set for the mid term increased.

No standstill for third party risks

In the initial ALS no information as regards third party risks was taken up. It was

argued that this would be inserted afterwards, as more research was needed.⁷⁸³ One important conclusion of the further research that was conducted by the RIVM was that the amount of residents within both zones to which the standstill would apply had increased dramatically during the period 1990 – 1997 (with a factor 14 in the IR 10^{-5} and a factor 3 in the IR 10^{-6}).⁷⁸⁴ Based on these outcomes at least 1900 houses were to be removed in order to achieve the standstill objective (within the 10^{-6} zone). This increase of risk was caused by the growth of the amount of traffic, the increase of the MTOW (maximum take off weight) and the further growth of the population within the zones.⁷⁸⁵ The RIVM stated that the desired safety level of 1990 could never be reached without additional policy measures.

As regards the MTOW, in 1998 it also became clear that the average Maximum Take of Weight (MTOW) of airplanes had been much higher in 1996 and 1997 (92 ton), than had been assumed during the PKB (80 tons) for 2003 and 2015.⁷⁸⁶ The feasibility of the standstill on the mid-term very much depended on this parameter. A higher MTOW would result in a broadened accident area (the risk zone). In the 1998 evaluation of the PKB process that was carried out by the Algemene Rekenkamer it was concluded that deliberately low numbers for the MTOW had been used as input data. The NLR had used 80 tons as a mean, whereas a much higher MTOW was taken up in the Schiphol statistics (already 88 tons in 1990).⁷⁸⁷ The NLR argued that the difference was to be explained by the different airplane categories that were used. The reason for adopting these low levels, and for keeping them fixed for 25 years, was that higher levels would make it impossible to reach the desired standstill, as was taken up in the dual objective.⁷⁸⁸ At the end of 1996 the Ministers of V&W and VROM had stated that they were holding on to the MTOW of 80 tons that had been used during the PKB negotiations.⁷⁸⁹ The final zones that were presented were therefore based on the old input data that allowed for the politically desirable outcomes. As prescribed by the spatial planning system in the Netherlands,⁷⁹⁰ the province of North Holland and municipalities to whom it concerned were expected to take up the final zones with building restrictions in their land use plans.⁷⁹¹

⁷⁸³ TK 23552, September 6th 1996, Nr.62.

⁷⁸⁴ This was taken up in the Environmental Monitor of 1998. The RIVM developed such a monitor each year, providing an overview of the state of the Dutch environment.

⁷⁸⁵ TK 23552, April 12th 1995, Nr. 13, pp. 54–55.

⁷⁸⁶ TK 23552, October 30th 1996, Nr. 66.

⁷⁸⁷ Schiphol Airport Authority, Statistical annual review 1990, pp. 47 – 88.

⁷⁸⁸ Algemene Rekenkamer (1998). Groeicijfers Schiphol. Den Haag, Sdu Uitgeverij.

⁷⁸⁹ TK 23552, October 30th 1996, Nr. 66.

⁷⁹⁰ See chapter 5.

⁷⁹¹ TK 23552, February 13th 1997, Nr.68.

No standstill for Air pollution and Stench

With regard to local air pollution and stench, the province of North Holland had monitored the development during 1995 and 1996. They concluded that the cumulative level of local air pollution (i.e. the sum of all emissions, not only aviation) had not changed much when compared to 1990 levels, making a standstill possible for all emissions, except for CO². In a response to these numbers, the cabinet stated that CO² emissions were not a local problem, but a global problem, thus repeating the argument of the previous cabinets. It was therefore not useful to measure CO² on the local level, since policy measures were to be developed on the international level. If the Dutch Cabinet was to introduce stringent CO² measures, while other nation states refused to do so, this would greatly undermine the competitive position of the Dutch aviation sector (and undermining the level playing field for other sectors as well). Moreover, it would not result in an overall decrease of levels, as the additional traffic would merely move to hub airports located in neighbouring countries. Therefore, the cabinet proposed to leave CO² outside the new regulative system.⁷⁹²

With regard to stench it was concluded that in 1995 20% more people, and in 1996 8% more people were exposed to unacceptable levels when compared to 1990. Despite the reduction the expectation was that the further growth of aviation would make a standstill for stench impossible.⁷⁹³ However, the Ministry of V&W argued that this did not necessarily mean that a standstill was impossible in the long run. Moreover, in the meantime a different calculation model for stench had been developed, which made it difficult to compare the levels of 1990 and 1995/1996.⁷⁹⁴

The perspective of the Ministry of V&W

According to the Ministry of V&W the five runway system would make it possible to both achieve the standstill and facilitating growth to 600,000 flights. They had assigned the NLR to assess this claim and the NLR concluded that it was indeed possible when drawing on the assumptions that were made. However, the RIVM concluded that the five-runway system could handle 520,000 flights at best (in the most ideal world).⁷⁹⁵ The large difference in outcomes was explained by the different assumptions that were used in the calculations (e.g. about flight procedures for departures and arrivals, shares of noisy chapter 2 airplanes, and other technological innovations, the MTOW). Again, the choice for which assumptions to use was a political one.

⁷⁹² Cabinet (1997) *Integrale Beleidsvisie*. TNLI, The Hague.

⁷⁹³ See Province North Holland (19967), *Milieumonitor* 1997.

⁷⁹⁴ Algemene Rekenkamer (1998). *Groecijfers Schiphol* Den Haag, Sdu Uitgeverij.

⁷⁹⁵ Interview Dassen / Milieu en Natuur Planbureau, 2007.

Environmental coalition does not believe in a standstill

The different facts and figures further increased the doubts of the environmental parties and local residents about the possibilities for a standstill. In fact, they did not believe that a standstill was possible, nor did the safety experts.⁷⁹⁶ Milieudefensie kept investing in its forest (i.e. the Bulderbos), which was located on the area where the new (5th) runway was to be constructed. This gave them a powerful resource for further negotiations about the content of the new regulative system that was to be developed.⁷⁹⁷

Meanwhile, the environmental actors (Stichting Natuur & Milieu and Milieudefensie) and several grassroots organizations of local residents had started a legal procedure. They argued that the concept of the Aviation Act for the five-runway did not live up to the standstill promises laid down in the PKB decision of 1995. This time, they won. In July 1998 the High Court (Raad van State) destroyed the new Act because the environmental norms presented in the PKB for third party risk, stench and local emissions (air pollution) had not been taken into account adequately.⁷⁹⁸ ⁷⁹⁹ As a consequence, the cabinet had to revise the Act. This put the Cabinet and the aviation sector under pressure, because the construction of the 5th runway was only allowed to begin when the Act had been approved of. Time pressure was mounting, as the 5th runway needed to be ready for operation early 2003.

Around that same time, the In 't Veld committee who had been advising about repairing the regulative system for noise that applied to the four runway system tried to bring back the 5GG variant on the political agenda.⁸⁰⁰ From the perspective of the Committee 5GG held most potential for reconciling further growth and reducing noise pollution. Especially the province of North Holland was very happy about this, as they still preferred this more environmental friendly runway alternative that had the additional benefit that it demanded lesser space. And the province was always heavily in need of space in order to facilitate the other urgent spatial claims that had to be dealt with (especially for housing).⁸⁰¹ The aviation sector, on the other hand, still fiercely opposed the 5GG variant. According to them, it was more expensive and it would cause more noise pollution.⁸⁰² In the end, the cabinet did not take over this part of advice of the expert committee and decided to stick to the 5P alternative, as agreed in the PKB of 1995.

⁷⁹⁶ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Griesse / local resident, 2009.

⁷⁹⁷ De Kruijf, A (2002), *Het Bulderbos. Verzet tegen uitbreiding van Schiphol 1993 – 2002*. Mets & Schilt, Amsterdam. Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

⁷⁹⁸ De Kruijf, A (2002), *Het Bulderbos. Verzet tegen uitbreiding van Schiphol 1993 – 2002*. Mets & Schilt, Amsterdam.

⁷⁹⁹ TK. 25466, November 4th 1998, Nr. 27.

⁸⁰⁰ Eindrapportage Commissie van Deskundigen, January 27th 1998, Een verstandshuwelijk tussen luchtvaart en milieu.

⁸⁰¹ Interview Rensing / Province of North Holland, 2005.

⁸⁰² Staatscourant Nr.18, January 28th 1998, Milieuorganisaties vinden commissie In 't Veld te luchtig over geluidshinder.

However, as time proceeded, more and more information became available that pointed out that it would become impossible to live up to the environmental limits that had been set in the PKB of 1995 for the five runway system (> 2003), just as had been the case during the debate about the short term measures. It was obvious that it would become very difficult to develop an Aviation Act that could live up to the PKB promises (and thus live up to the legal requirements), while simultaneously making sure that such a new Act could lean on sufficient public support. Moreover, it put the construction of the 5th runway under increasing time pressure (after all, no new runway without a new Aviation Act).

7.6.2 Political Turmoil: The need for a new regulative system for the Five Runway System

When setting out the debate for the short term we already discussed the increasing political doubts of members of the Lower House during 1998, and the call for more transparency (7.5.6). This changing political context also had great impact on the debate about the mid-term. The newly established cabinet Kok II had promised to make a clean sweep and create more transparent Schiphol policies for the short, mid and long term. For the mid term, this turned out to be particularly important, as it became clear that the environmental limits set by the PKB 1995 could not be matched with the desire to facilitate further mainport development. One thing was clear to the members of the Lower House; there was need for an improved regulative system that had to be ready as soon as possible to make sure that the 5th runway could become operative from 2003 onwards. The new system was to offer equal protection when compared to the old PKB system, but had to be more transparent and better enforceable. The latter implied that, amongst other things, the relationships between the Ministry of V&W and the aviation sector were to be clarified (i.e. the disentanglement procedure that we already discussed in the debate about the short term were the same problems had popped up).

7.6.3 A Cabinet's Perspective on the Mid Term

In December 1998 the Cabinet presented the Strategic Policy Choice Future Aviation (Strategische Beleidskeuze Toekomst Luchtvaart, SBTL), which was an elaboration of its Policy Perspective presented one year earlier (IBV, 1997). In this document the Cabinet stated how it was to continue with the problems on the short and mid term and the development of a vision for the long term. Most attention was devoted to the mid term, as there was little time left for the development of a new regulative system that was to apply to the five-runway system (> 2003).

A new regulative system based on old objectives

As regards the mid term period, the information that had become available during the past few years offered ample evidence for concluding that the PKB system that had to be elaborated for the five runway system (> 2003) was not effective. As part of the

strategy to make a clean sweep the Cabinet announced that a totally new regulative system was to be developed. The new regulative system had to offer as much protection as the old one, with the main difference that it had to be better enforceable and more understandable (transparent) for outsiders.^{803 804} After all, the main problem of the current systematic was that no one believed the facts, figures and numbers that sustained the policy measures anymore, resulting in a lack of support for the policies. The notion of equal protection was central and implied that the situation for noise still had to improve from 2003 onwards, while the standstill for stench, air pollution and third party risk remained in place (compared to 1990). Therefore, the original framing of the environmental objective that had been developed during the PASO/PKB processes served as a point of departure for the new regulative system. It was also argued that Schiphol had to be able to facilitate 600,000 flights in 2010, a number that was deemed necessary for proper mainport development. The Cabinet and the Ministry of V&W assumed that both objectives could be reached simultaneously by revising the regulative system. The dual objective itself was therefore not questioned. Only the means for achieving it were deemed in need of change.

7.6.4 Final Outcomes Mid Term (1996 – 1998)

During 1996 – 1998 most attention was paid to the short term problems, which called for immediate policy solutions. However, for the mid-term it became clear that the regulative system that was to apply to the five runway system, as set out in the PKB, would make it impossible to realize the dual objectives. Increasing doubts about the possibility for an improvement of the noise situation and a standstill for the other effects (third party risks, local air pollution, stench) made the members of the Lower House call for a new regulative system. A system that was to offer equal protection as the one that it came to replace (the PKB system), while being more transparent and better enforceable. As a consequence, the development of an Aviation Act in which the regulations for the five runway system were laid down was delayed. An earlier Act had been rejected by the High Court, making it impossible to start the construction of the 5th runway. After all, constructions could only begin after a legally ratified Act was in place. Time pressure increased, as it was still deemed of pivotal importance for proper mainport development to put the five runway system into operation from 2003 onwards.

Now the policy preparations had come to an end, a new round of formal policy making was bound to begin. As a first step, the Ministry of V&W/RLD started a new policy program in order to elaborate and formalize the strategic decisions made in the SBTL, both for the short term (7.7) and mid term (7.8).

⁸⁰³ Cabinet (1998), Strategische Beleidskeuze Luchtvaart Nederland. ONL, The Hague.

⁸⁰⁴ Interview Dortland / Former Policy Maker Ministry V&W, 2009.

7.7 Debating the Short Term (2): Formal Decision making (1999 – 2000)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				
Mid term 2003 - 2015	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6			Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10 Part 5. – 7.11	Part 6. – 7.12	

In the reconstruction of the debate about the long term we already discussed that the Ministry of V&W established a new program direction ONL (*Onderzoek Nederlandse Luchtvaart*, Research Dutch Aviation) at the start of 1999. The main difference with its precursor, the TNLI organization, was that the ONL organization was not an interdepartmental organization. It merely consisted of policy makers of the Ministry of V&W, meaning that the formal decision making was in their hands. The policy makers of the Ministries of VROM and EZ that had participated in the TNLI project team therefore became even more dependent on the Ministry of V&W for realizing their own objectives. The ONL task was to develop an integrated perspective on both the short, mid and long term within one year. In this paragraph we reconstruct the policy debate about the short term, which departed from the political ambition to make sure that 460,000 flights could be accommodated in 2002, with a maximum of 15,000 houses within 35Ke and a standstill for third party risk. We first discuss the steering strategy that was selected by ONL, which was to apply to both the short term debate and mid term debate (7.7.1). Next, we discuss the debate about the short term that was ended somewhere at the end of 2000 (7.7.2).

7.7.1 A dual steering strategy (January 1999)

With regard to the short and mid term, a more complex process organization and underlying steering strategy was enacted. This was due to the politically sensitive challenge that lay ahead. The upcoming year (1999) was to be used for designing the kind of regulative system that could make the desired growth on the short and mid-term possible. The two main design principles were that the new system was to make an end to the absurdities of the PKB-system, while still offering equal protection as the PKB-system (especially in terms of noise and third party risks). ONL was formally in charge of the development of the new regulative system. They would do the final decision-making. At the same time, the past years had learned the ONL project team that it was important to include other stakeholders in the design of the new system as well, as it was a precondition for mobilizing sufficient (public and political) support. And especially to prevent that the local residents and environmental interest groups did not

trust the facts and figures that were used.⁸⁰⁵ It was crucial for the aviation sector to get on speaking terms with the environmental parties, as they held considerable pieces of land that were needed for the construction of the 5th runway (recall figure 6.8). Besides, the ongoing juridical struggles caused enormous delays, which endangered the ambition to put the new five-runway system into operation in 2003. Thus, the juridical victories of the environmental coalition had made sure that other actors (especially the aviation sector and the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W) had to take them more seriously. If issues were not settled in harmony, it was very probable that the new Act about the five-runway system was not ready on time. And further delays and disharmony was something that both the aviation sector and the cabinet wanted to prevent at all costs.⁸⁰⁶

The cabinet decided to apply a new steering strategy (or governance arrangement) to the Schiphol case, that was designed for facilitating policy discussions around wicked environmental and infrastructure problems of national character: the Dutch green polder model. This implied that a dual steering strategy was employed with regard to the short and mid term: on the one hand, ONL was working on the design of a new regulative system, while on the other hand a new interactive policy arrangement was being implemented.

Activating a new policy network (January 1999)

At the end of 1998 the cabinet thus decided to declare the problem of the environmental norms for the airport to be a test case of the green polder model (as it had been a test case for the area based approach in 1989, resulting in the interactive PASO process). The Minister of V&W called for the establishment of the Interim Debate on Schiphol (*Tijdelijk Platform Overleg Schiphol, TOPS*), a platform for negotiations based on the principles of the green polder model.⁸⁰⁷ TOPS was one of the first attempts to give environmental and nature conservation groups a formal place in an early stage of political decision-making, alongside other public interest groups and private interest groups. In essence, the model implied the establishment of an informal policy network, which did not interfere with the existing formal consultative and advisory mechanisms or with the opportunities for comment and appeal that were laid down in law. Environmental organizations and others were allowed to join the discussion, but the responsibility for decision-making remained in the hands of the formal project team (i.e. the ONL team of the Ministry of V&W) and the national politicians that were to make

⁸⁰⁵ Cabinet (1998), *Strategische Beleidskeuze Luchtvaart Nederland*. ONL, The Hague.

⁸⁰⁶ Interview Dortland / Former Policy Maker Ministry of V&W, 2009.

⁸⁰⁷ The procedure consists of three steps (see *Startnota Ruimtelijke Ordening*, 1999):

1. A process covenant is developed wherein the rules and time limits and the various roles are defined.
2. Stakeholders start to negotiate and try to reach some workable agreements (or even consensus if possible).
3. The results of the consultation are then submitted to parliament, which uses the results in its final decision making.

the final decisions.⁸⁰⁸ This was in line with the recommendations of the In 't Veld committee and its successor, the Van der Vlist committee.⁸⁰⁹ Both had recommended installing a new policy network wherein environmental parties and the sector could negotiate about the future of Schiphol.

The ONL project team first assessed whether or not there had been sufficient support for the new interactive policy approach. It turned out that both the aviation sector and the environmental parties wanted to participate. Previously, Milieudefensie had not been very enthusiastic when it came to negotiations, as their strategy was more action oriented and meant to mobilize as much negative media attention about Schiphol as possible. But this time, the threat of new juridical procedures and the possession of valuable pieces of land had turned them into a serious negotiation partner. There was actually something to negotiate about, which was the main reason for them to support the interactive approach.⁸¹⁰ The sector motives to participate were clear, i.e. acquire the necessary lands and prevent further delays. It was the first time that the aviation sector acknowledged and accepted a role for environmental parties in a process of political negotiation.⁸¹¹ As an additional consequence, part of the policy debate was removed from the Lower House to the regional level. It offered a way out of the political impasse, as both the cabinet and the members of the Lower House didn't really know anymore how to continue with the Schiphol issue.⁸¹² If matters were settled properly on the regional level, the cabinet and the Lower House merely had to take over their decisions.

Organization of TOPS

The new platform for negotiations (TOPS) consisted of fifteen members. Initially it was meant to gather the sector parties (Schiphol, KLM, Martinair and BARIN = organization of airlines) and environmental parties (Milieudefensie, SNM, Milieufederatie Noord Holland) around the table, with the Ministries of V&W and VROM facilitating and observing the debate. In the end, it was decided that the lower public authorities were also to be involved in the debate. They were the ones with the political mandate and in charge of formal decision-making. As such, the Province of North Holland and the municipalities of Amsterdam, Haarlemmermeer and Aalsmeer were invited to participate. For the sector, including these public authorities was interesting, as they had to make trade offs between the environment and economy, whereas the environmental parties and the citizen platform were merely concerned

⁸⁰⁸ cf. Glasbergen, 2002.

⁸⁰⁹ TK 25466, November 4th 1998, Nr. 27.

⁸¹⁰ De Kruijf, 2002; Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

⁸¹¹ Weggeman, 2003.

⁸¹² See for example Volkskrant, September 17th 1998, Uitbreiding Schiphol maakt Kamer radeloos.

about reducing the (noise) pollution. As a sign of goodwill, the Minister of V&W decided that the local residents were also to be involved in TOPS, represented by the *Platform Leefmilieu Regio Schiphol* (Platform Living Environment Schiphol Region, *PLRS*), something that was requested by the environmental parties.⁸¹³ Still, Schiphol and KLM (aviation sector) on the one hand and Milieudefensie and SNM (environmental interest groups) on the other formed the core of TOPS. These four actors did the main negotiations, whereas the others actors adopted a more reactive role, reflecting on the outcomes.⁸¹⁴

Problems starting up TOPS

When TOPS was being established, both the composition and the status and assignment of TOPS were not very clear. TOPS was first of all meant to increase mutual understanding between the sector and the environmental parties in order to restore trust and bring the ongoing juridical procedures that heavily frustrated policy making to an end. However, even before TOPS got started, tensions between the core actors of TOPS (aviation sector and environmental actors) were rising. This was related to the different outcomes of the calculations that different research institutes had carried out when assessing the capacity of the new five runway system (recall 7.6.1). According to calculations of the Ministry of V&W a modified environmental regulative system, offering the same protection as the PKB systematic but leaving out the absurdities that the In 't Veld Committee had pointed out, would allow for 600,000 flight movements on the five runway system that was being developed. In a second opinion study both the authoritative knowledge institutes CPB and the NLR confirmed this perspective (NLR & CPB, 1998; CPB, 1998).⁸¹⁵ ⁸¹⁶ However, as we already discussed, the RIVM had been less optimistic. In their calculations, the assumed pace wherein noise pollution was to decrease was much lower (i.e. from their perspective the enormous faith put in technological innovations was rather optimistic and unrealistic), leading to less environmental capacity, with a maximum of 520,000 flights in 2010.⁸¹⁷ Still, on November 16th 1998 the Cabinet had already announced that Schiphol was allowed to grow to 600,000 flight movements and 80 million passengers a year during 2003 - 2015.

From the perspective of the environmental parties and the local residents this was rather strange, as it had not been clear at that time which environmental limits were to be

⁸¹³ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

⁸¹⁴ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁸¹⁵ Centraal Planbureau (1998), 'De geluidsproblematiek rond Schiphol: een gezamenlijk visie van CPB en NLR', CPB Externe notitie 98/30, 's Gravenhage.

⁸¹⁶ Centraal Planbureau (1998), 'Toekomstige ontwikkeling vervoersontwikkelingen op luchthaven Schiphol: een second opinion', CPB Externe notitie 98/23, 's Gravenhage. See also Centraal Planbureau (1998), 'Geluidsproblematiek rond Schiphol', CPB-rapport, 's Gravenhage.

⁸¹⁷ RIVM (1998), Schiphol Airport, future growth within environmental constraints. RIVM rapport 408130004.

applied (for this a new regulative system was yet to be developed).⁸¹⁸ This made the political promise that future growth would be determined by the environmental limits that would be negotiated in TOPS rather difficult to believe for them. The question whether such growth was really possible within environmental limits was already answered before TOPS had even begun. Besides, as discussed before, in 1998 Parliament had already decided that Schiphol was allowed to grow with 20,000 flights a year during the upcoming 5 years. The environmental parties were not convinced that this would not increase noise exposure.

In order to restore trust and organize sufficient support for the TOPS experiment, the Minister of V&W promised in December 1998 that the desired growth was only acceptable if it fitted within the environmental limits that were to be developed in TOPS.⁸¹⁹ More specifically, in the SBTL of December 1998 it was stated that the TOPS task was twofold. TOPS was first to give advice about the short term modifications of the noise contours for the four-runway system in July 1999 (in line with the Court ruling of 1998, wherein the old zones were rejected). Second, TOPS would advice about a new regulative system for the mid-term in December 1999.⁸²⁰ The possibilities for long-term development were already discussed in different policy trajectories.⁸²¹ After this promise the environmental actors decided to participate in TOPS, and the first meeting of the new policy network took place on January 12th 1999.⁸²² At the same time, this promise made matters more difficult for the ONL project team. ONL had to balance between restoring trust by facilitating broad societal discussion via TOPS, and speeding up the decision making process in order to make sure that the 5th runway could become operative in 2003.⁸²³ ⁸²⁴ The promises laid down in the SBTL of 1998 seemed to increase the influence of TOPS on the formal decision making processes about the short and mid term.

7.7.2 The TOPS debate about the Short Term (January 1999 – June 1999)

The first task was to design an improved regulative system for the short-term four-runway system (<2003). More specifically, this was about repairing the absurd noise contours, in order to facilitate the 20,000 extra flight movements per year (in line with the recommendations of the In 't Veld Committee), which were already being

⁸¹⁸ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

⁸¹⁹ Cabinet (1998), Strategische Beleidskeuze Luchtvaart Nederland. TNLI, The Hague.

⁸²⁰ TK. 26428, June 11th 1999, Nr. 2, p.62.

⁸²¹ The assignment overlaps with the work of another formal advisory organ, the Noise Pollution Committee Schiphol (Commissie Geluidshinder Schiphol, CGS), that gives advice about environmental issues, especially noise, around Schiphol. The configuration of CGS also overlaps as it consists of citizens and policy makers of 19 surrounding municipalities, the environmental parties, the sector, the provinces of North and South Holland and the Inspectors of Spatial Planning.

⁸²² De Kruijff, A (2002), Het Bulderbos. Verzet tegen uitbreiding van Schiphol 1993 – 2002. Mets & Schilt, Amsterdam.

⁸²³ ONL Newsletter Nr. 1, 1999; see also Weggeman, 2003.

⁸²⁴ Interview Dortland / Former Policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009.

welcomed at Schiphol. ONL initiated the legally required EIA procedure for changing the noise contours Schiphol (S4S2). The EIA was meant to assess whether 460,000 flights were possible within the PKB objectives that had been set for the short term (i.e. 15,100 houses within the new 35Ke zone and a standstill for third party risk). ONL assigned Schiphol to carry out the EIA procedure, since they had to find ways to facilitate the additional flight movements within existing noise limits. Thus, it was clearly pointed out that drawing an appropriate contour was mainly seen as the responsibility of the aviation sector. It was part of the new division of responsibilities announced in the SBTL (1998) that was meant to disentangle corporate strategy and supervision. Schiphol designed a new noise zone, in close cooperation with the sector parties (KLM and Air Traffic Control), and wanted to create a package deal about the results with the environmental actors via TOPS.⁸²⁵ This was more easily said than done.

An EIA for the short term

In the EIA four alternatives were assessed: (1) continuation of current situation, (2) the planning alternative (which is always the desired option), (3) the most environmental friendly alternative, and (4) the business as usual alternative (*nulalternatief*).⁸²⁶ Schiphol concluded that for all alternatives a 35Ke zone with less than the legally required 15,100 houses was possible. The planning alternative resulted in circa 14,500 houses within the zone. However, at some locations more houses would fall within the zone, whereas houses fell outside the zone at other locations. *Per saldo*, this resulted in 14,500 houses (see figure 7.9). In essence, changing the zone meant that some municipalities that were less densely populated were exposed to higher noise levels, while the more densely populated municipalities benefited from lower levels. These were the absurdities that the In 't Veld committee had been talking about and there were in need of repair.

The most environmental friendly alternative would result in fewer houses (12,000) with a maximum of 450,000 flights. For the business as usual alternative only 295,000 flights could be facilitated before the limit of 15,100 houses was reached (i.e. holding on to the existing PKB contour).⁸²⁷ With regard to the standstill for third party risk (defined in terms of 5×10^{-5} and 10^{-5} contours) it was concluded that this was impossible, no matter what alternative was chosen. Further growth would result in broader contours.^{828 829} Finally, further growth would also increase the levels of CO² emission.⁸³⁰ Schiphol

⁸²⁵ Weggeman, 2003.

⁸²⁶ Schiphol Group (1999), Milieueffectrapport S4S2. Hoofdrapport. Schiphol Group, Mei 1999, p.27.

⁸²⁷ Schiphol Group (1999), Milieueffectrapport S4S2. Hoofdrapport. Schiphol Group, Mei 1999, pp.31 & 50.


⁸²⁸ Schiphol Group (1999), Milieueffectrapport S4S2. Hoofdrapport. Schiphol Group, Mei 1999, p.51.

⁸²⁹ NLR (Pikaar, A.J. & B. van Deenen) (1999), Externe veiligheidsberekeningen voor de luchthaven Schiphol in het kader van de MER S4S2. NLR-CR-99194.

⁸³⁰ TNO (Boeft, J. den & M.G.M. Roemer), Luchtkwaliteitberekeningen voor het MER gebruiksplan van de luchthaven Schiphol. TNO R99/161, April 28th 1999, p.83.

concluded that the planning alternative met the main requirement that was set by the Cabinet (i.e. 15,100 houses within 35Ke zone), while simultaneously allowing for the desired capacity and this alternative was therefore fit for implementation. However, when the alternatives were discussed in TOPS, it turned out that the environmental parties had different ideas about this.

Figure 7.9 Proposal Schiphol for revised 35Ke zone, including areas that were previously outside the zone (red areas) and that were previously inside the zone (blue areas)



Source: Milieueffect rapportage S4S2, 1999; p.40

Discussing the EIA results in TOPS

During TOPS negotiations two older issues that had been postponed in the past were brought back on the agenda: the length of the night regime (7 or 8 hours) and the minimum amount of decibels that an airplane needs to produce in order to get involved in the noise calculations (65 Db or 50Db). Both issues had been major concerns of the environmental actors during the PKB-process, but had been put aside by the PKB decision makers (the Steering Committee PMMS). Including airplanes that produced in between 50 – 65 Db implied that much more noise was produced within the same zone. The environmental actors had requested additional research as part of the EIA procedure, which was carried out by DHV (an international consultant). According to one local resident, it could be concluded from the report that environmental situation would deteriorate considerably if the short-term measures were implemented.⁸³¹ This

⁸³¹ This information is derived from an interview. Unfortunately, I could not obtain the report itself. Interview Griesse / local resident, 2009.

complicated the TOPS negotiations, with on the one hand the sector's proposal and on the other hand the refusal to accept this proposal by the environmental actors.

Choosing the Schiphol alternative

Time pressure to come to a decision was mounting, as the cabinet had intended to have the new regulative system for the five runway system ready before the end of 1999. As a consequence, the debate about the short term four runway system had to be settled as soon as possible. After all, the mid term debate was only to begin after TOPS had advised about the short term. The cabinet had therefore announced that the debate about the short term had to be finished in June 1999 at the latest as the final political debate was scheduled for June. It took the sector more time than expected to develop the EIA and as a consequence there were only four days in between the discussion of the EIA of the aviation sector in TOPS and the deadline for political decision-making. The direct implication was that the TOPS advice could only be taken into account if it was a positive one, as there was no time left for revisions. In the end, the environmental parties rejected the planning alternative and thus the new zone that was to be included in the Aviation Act and the TOPS actors failed to reach an overall agreement.⁸³² Eventually, the cabinet decided to support the aviation sector and select the planning alternative, and the revised Act was sent to the High Court for advice. The environmental parties and local residents put all their faith in the verdict of the independent judge, as they kept on opposing the new Act. Meanwhile Schiphol could continue growing, as this was secured by the anticipation decision the cabinet had made earlier (in which they anticipated the intended further growth).

Exceeding noise limits in 1999 and 2000

In the meantime, Schiphol exceeded the noise limits again in 1999 and 2000. In 1999 the Minister of V&W had argued that this was the last time that it would be tolerated. Indeed, in 2000 the Minister fined the airport for 5 million euros. Schiphol was not amused about this fine, as they argued that they could still not carry out the operations that the cabinet desired (i.e. the ones that were deemed necessary to sustain the hub and spoke network) within the existing limits. Moreover, Schiphol argued that they did everything that was possible to stay within the limits. At least, much more than other European airports were forced to do by their national governments. The Minister decided to maintain the fine, but she also decided that the money was to be spent on the removal of the aviation museum that was located on the territory of Schiphol to Lelystad airport. This triggered a furious reaction of Milieudefensie. From their

⁸³² Glasbergen, 2002; Weggeman, 2003.

perspective this meant that the money of the fine was flowing back to the aviation sector, although in a more indirect way.⁸³³

7.8 Debating the Mid Term (2): Formal Decision Making (1999 – 2000)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				
Mid term 2003 - 2015	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6			Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10 Part 5. – 7.11	Part 6. – 7.12	

Initially, TOPS was also meant to negotiate about the policy solutions for the mid term. However, due to the problems that arose about the negotiations about the short term, ONL decided to revise its steering strategy (7.8.1). A more select group was included in the development of the concept of the new regulative system for the five runway system (7.8.2). The new system was heavily criticized (7.8.3), which influenced the final Cabinet’s Decision about the mid-term (7.8.4).

7.8.1 Sidelineing TOPS

In the SBTL of December 1998 it had been argued that a first design of the new regulative system for the five runway system (mid term) needed to be ready at the end of 1999, to make sure that the new system could be implemented from 2003 onwards (due to the lengthy legal procedures that were to be enacted thereafter). The discussion about the new regulative system gained momentum after the discussion about the short term was brought to a provisional ending in the summer of 1999 (as discussed, the case was brought to the High Court and actors had to await the verdict).

During the TOPS debate about the short term the ONL project team had already been developing different alternatives for the new regulative system for the mid term, based on the results of TNLI and in close cooperation with the NLR. In September 1999 ONL initiated bilateral appointments with the environmental parties and the sector to discuss these different alternatives. The environmental parties thought one of the alternatives was suitable, but the sector rejected all alternatives and wanted to negotiate with the ONL project team about a revised system. The sector emphasized that they only wanted to negotiate directly with the ONL project team (thus the Ministry of V&W), and not within TOPS.⁸³⁴ In order to legitimize this strategy the sector and ONL referred to the

⁸³³ Newspaper article Volkskrant, February 21st 2001, Netelenbos: boete Schiphol moet naar Aviodome. Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

⁸³⁴ Glasbergen, 2002; Weggeman, 2003.

annexes of the SBTL (1998), wherein it was stated that the national government was to design a new system with environmental and third party risk norms during 1999, in close cooperation with the sector. If the earlier TOPS negotiations that had failed and the frustrations about the ongoing juridical struggles were added to this, it was not that surprising that both the aviation sector and the Ministry of V&W/ RLD thought it more beneficiary to stick to their bilateral negotiations. Moreover, from the perspective of ONL this way of working was perfectly in line with the intended disentanglement of responsibilities between the national government and Schiphol. Schiphol was responsible for the daily management of the airport, and was therefore the one actor that could and should assess what kind of operations were possible, and therefore, what kind of regulative system was needed for the feasibility of the dual objective.

From the perspective of the environmental parties this implied a hollowing out of the initial TOPS assignment. And they were already becoming more and more furious as a result of the way the discussion about the short term had been dealt with in TOPS.⁸³⁵ The ONL project team still acknowledged the importance of TOPS for gaining public support.⁸³⁶ As a matter of compromise, TOPS was asked to give advice about the new regulative system before the final advice was sent to parliament for political ratification.⁸³⁷ Unfortunately, ONL was confronted with delays when developing the new regulative system and there was no time left to discuss the results in TOPS before the report was sent to parliament. In the SBTL report (1998) a so-called first moment of consideration (*Eerste Moment van Afweging, EMA*) was announced for December 1999 and the Minister wanted by all means to hold on to this deadline, as it was deemed necessary for timely implementation of the new regulative system. Thus, the choice to hold on to the tight time schedule made it impossible for TOPS to respond. The environmental parties informed some members of the Lower House about this and these members insisted upon giving TOPS the possibility to respond (i.e. by submitting a motion).⁸³⁸ The motion could not count on a majority support and was therefore rejected.⁸³⁹ After being sidelined for the second time, the environmental parties drew their conclusions and abandoned TOPS in December 1999.⁸⁴⁰ Environmental actors and local residents were further strengthened in their conviction that the sector could exert great influence on the design of the new regulative system that was to regulate the activities of this same sector.⁸⁴¹ From the perspective of ONL and the aviation sector

⁸³⁵ De Kruijf, A (2002), *Het Bulderbos. Verzet tegen uitbreiding van Schiphol 1993 – 2002*. Mets & Schilt, Amsterdam. Interview Fransen / Stichting Natuur & Milieu, 2009.

⁸³⁶ Interview Dortland / Former Policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009.

⁸³⁷ Cabinet (1999), *Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart*. Eindrapport. ONL, The Hague, p.10.

⁸³⁸ TK 23552, December 15th 1999, Nr.77.

⁸³⁹ TK 36-2833, December 16th 1999.

⁸⁴⁰ Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

⁸⁴¹ De Kruijf, A (2002), *Het Bulderbos. Verzet tegen uitbreiding van Schiphol 1993 – 2002*. Mets & Schilt, Amsterdam. Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007; Interview Bakker / Former policy maker of the CROS, 2007.

this wasn't strange at all. The sector harbored the experts that were needed for the design of a system that was fit for implementation.⁸⁴² ONL was to control whether the new system was based on realistic assumptions and whether or not it helped to achieve the dual objectives.⁸⁴³

7.8.2 The Outline of New Regulative System for the Five Runway System (December, 1999)

In the cabinet's report Future of the National Airport (1999, *Toekomst van de Nationale Luchthaven*) the new regulative system was presented. According to ONL the new system lived up to all the requirements that had been laid down the SBTL (1998): it offered an equal level of protection as the PKB system that it came to replace, while its norms were better enforceable, thus improving the level of transparency and the protection of citizens against negative effects.⁸⁴⁴ As indicated in the SBTL, the main issues that had to be dealt with in the new regulative system were noise and third party risks.⁸⁴⁵

The issue of Noise

Assessing equal protection was complicated by the fact that a new yardstick was introduced for calculating the amount of noise during daytime, L_{den} (day evening night level), which came to replace the Ke . The European Commission was developing a directive for noise policy, for which it was needed to harmonize all different measures and create one standard measure, the L_{den} .⁸⁴⁶ The level of equivalence that was demanded in the PKB served as a point of departure for the translation of Ke into L_{den} : Max. 10,000 houses within the 35 Ke zone and 10,100 within the 26 L_{aeq} zone. Furthermore, the amount of seriously exposed people within the 20 Ke zone was to be reduced with 50% and the amount of people within the 20 L_{aeq} was to be reduced by 70% in 2003 when compared to the situation of 1990 (as part of the measures to reduce sleep disturbance).

The closed noise contour of 235 connected enforcement points that made up the 35 Ke contour was replaced by 29 enforcement points in residential areas, up and around the old 35 Ke zone. The problems with the old system could partly be related to the fact that limits were crossed in enforcement points that were located in places where no one resided (i.e. above pasturelands and meadows, recall the absurdities that the In 't Veld committee was talking about). In the new system, the idea was to trigger the aviation

⁸⁴² Interview Dortland / Former policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009; Interview Krul / Schiphol, 2005.

⁸⁴³ Interview Wubben / Noise expert hired by the Ministry of V&W, 2009.

⁸⁴⁴ Cabinet (1999), *Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart*. Eindrapport. ONL, The Hague, p.6.

⁸⁴⁵ Cabinet (1998), *Strategische Beleidskeuze Luchtvaart Nederland*. TNLI, The Hague, p.29.

⁸⁴⁶ Cabinet (1999), *Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart*. Eindrapport. ONL, The Hague, annex p.12; see also Bijsterveld, 2008; p.227.

sector to concentrate traffic above those scarcely populated areas, so that noise pollution above residential areas could diminish.

According to the ONL and the cabinet, the new system was an improvement when compared to the PKB system. The heavily criticized 65 Db limit was removed, so lower noise levels were also taken into account (not only above 65 Db as was done in the prior calculation method), something that the environmental parties had been very happy about.⁸⁴⁷ Moreover, a new measure was introduced to regulate noise pollution, the total volume of noise pollution (TVG). The total volume of noise pollution was determined by taking the sum of the noise pollution in the 29 enforcement points. In a way, it served as a new capacity ceiling, only the ceiling was defined by noise pollution instead of traffic volumes (remember the old ceilings of 44 million pax. and 3.3 million tons of freight).

In line with the disentanglement program the aviation sector was made responsible for the optimization of flights within this noise system. This implied that capacity could be enhanced, if they implemented the use of quieter planes, flight routes, ascending and descending procedures, especially during night time (i.e. when flights contribute more to the amount of noise). As such, the system was clearly meant to trigger innovation.⁸⁴⁸ The environmental parties and the local residents indicated that it was unfair that all improvements as regards noise pollution could be used by the sector to increase capacity. A 50% - 50% allocation of the benefits was considered to be more fair.⁸⁴⁹

The issue of Third Party Risk

The improved calculation model for third party risk of the NLR, in which different assumptions led to a reduction of 70% in the probability of an accident per flight movement, was used for the development of the new regulative system for third party risk (i.e. it was the same model that had been applied to the new calculations about the standstill for the short term). However, in the TNL report of December 1999 the safety policy was still merely elaborated for Individual Risk (IR) and not for Group Risk (GR). With regard to IR, the target of a standstill in SWR level was abandoned in the formulation of the risk criteria.⁸⁵⁰ The regional actors were happy about this, as they had indicated that it was too complex and difficult to use for spatial planning decisions. The standstill for third party risk was now defined in a very narrow way. It was achieved when the IR 5×10^{-5} contour was not broadened.⁸⁵¹ With regard to Group Risk, the

⁸⁴⁷ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁸⁴⁸ Interview Tan / Former secretary of the CROS, 2010.

⁸⁴⁹ Interview Arendonk / Milieufederatie Noord Holland, 2008; Interview Dassen / Milieu en Natuurplanbureau, 2007.

⁸⁵⁰ Recall that SWR refers to Sum Weighted Risk, a yardstick that had been already criticized by safety experts during the PKB.

⁸⁵¹ Cabinet (1999), Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart. ONL. The Hague, p.21.

cabinet argued that there was still not an adequate yardstick and norm available (as had been argued during the PASO/PKB process). In order to prepare decision making about the GR the cabinet announced the organization of an international meeting including safety experts from all over the world.⁸⁵² During this meeting it was to be determined how GR could best be calculated and what kind of norm was suitable. These results would be used in the next elaboration of the new regulative system. Thus, the standstill for GR was postponed again, as the method for assessing Group Risk and the measures for creating a standstill were yet to be developed.

The issues of Local Air Pollution and Stench

The standstill objective for local air pollution and stench were also reframed in the TNL report. During the preparations of the TNL report it had become clear that the standstill for stench could not be achieved. In the TNL it was announced that the standstill for stench was no part anymore of the new regulative system. Instead, it was argued that new policy measures were to be developed by the Province of North Holland in order to prevent new stench pollution, but that no standstill objective was to be included in the new regulative system.⁸⁵³ Finally, the Ministry of V&W argued that abandoning the standstill for stench was in line with the more general policy-framework as regards stench, which applied to all other policy fields (i.e. guiding other spatial planning decisions), and that was laid down in the White Paper about national stench policy of 1994 (i.e. the *Nota Stankbeleid, Nota Stench Policy, 1994*).⁸⁵⁴

With regard to local air pollution it was stated that the cumulative standstill was achieved, even though local air pollution caused by aviation had increased in 1998 when compared to 1990 levels. However, due to decreasing levels of other sectors the cumulative standstill was still reached.⁸⁵⁵ In the new regulative system, an emission ceiling was set for each individual gas. Those ceilings were to be based on the expected evolution of emissions in aviation. There was one exception: CO² levels had increased. In the TNL report it was stated that the CO² problem could not be tackled on the Schiphol-level. It was an international problem, so international policies were to be developed in order to bring increasing CO² levels to an end. The cabinet asserted that it therefore did not make much sense to make CO² emissions part of the Schiphol regulative system. The CO² promise made in the PKB was therefore left behind, while the cabinet promised to increase its efforts to place the issue on the European and global agenda (Kyoto-protocol) in return.⁸⁵⁶ With regard to the latter, the environmental actors,

⁸⁵² Cabinet (1999), *Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart*. ONL. The Hague, p.22.

⁸⁵³ Cabinet (1999), *Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart*. ONL. The Hague, p.19.

⁸⁵⁴ *Luchthavenverkeersbesluit* (2002), *Memorie van Toelichting*.

⁸⁵⁵ Cabinet (1999), *Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart*. ONL. The Hague, p.20.

⁸⁵⁶ Cabinet (1999), *Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart*. ONL. The Hague, p.22.

especially Milieudefensie, initiated a political lobby to influence the Minister of VROM to place CO² on the global agenda during the upcoming Kyoto negotiations. They even went to Schiphol Airport on the morning that the Minister was flying to Japan for joining the international negotiations to wish him good luck and wave him goodbye.⁸⁵⁷ The Minister promised them he would try his best, but despite his attempt to do so, the Kyoto treaty (1999) that was drawn up for dealing with the green house effect contained no measures whatsoever as regards aviation. The European Ministers argued that this was especially due to the refusal of the US to include aviation. The Dutch environmental parties that were involved in the Schiphol policy debate were very disappointed about this. After all, the cabinet had removed the CO² issue from the Schiphol agenda with the promise to tackle it on the international level.⁸⁵⁸

After the publication the TNL report became heavily criticized. The one thing that all criticism had in common was that it was very much doubted that the new regulative system offered an equal level of protection as the PKB system would have done.

7.8.3 Criticizing the TNL

In a joint response, the environmental parties (Milieudefensie, Stichting Natuur & Milieu), the province of North Holland and the local residents stressed that the old and new regulative system did not offer an equal level of protection. The EIA committee too indicated the growing tensions between the dual objectives (i.e. further growth and environmental objectives). The committee stated that they expected that, from 2010 onwards, further growth would only be possible if the environmental limits were violated.⁸⁵⁹ One of the main criticisms was that hardly any attention was paid to the health effects of further growth in the TNL report.

Health Impact Assessment (1999)

The results of the health impact assessment of the Health Council of 1999 were mainly ignored.⁸⁶⁰ In this report the committee tried to link the negative external effects of aviation to health. Although the committee indicated that more research was deemed necessary for assessing the real effects, they also concluded that aviation activities certainly had a negative effect on health. Noise exposure was perceived to be the main problem. With regard to local air quality it was stated that aviation activities exerted only a minor influence on local air quality. The Health Council also stated that it was

⁸⁵⁷ De Kruijf, A (2002), *Het Bulderbos. Verzet tegen uitbreiding van Schiphol 1993 – 2002*. Mets & Schilt, Amsterdam.

⁸⁵⁸ See for example newspaper article BN de Stem, November 23rd 2000, Luchtvaart: de blinde vlek van het klimaatverdrag, by Kees Kodde.

⁸⁵⁹ ONL Newsletter, April 2000, Nr.3.

⁸⁶⁰ Gezondheidsraad: Committee on the Health Impact of Large Airports. *Grote luchthavens en gezondheid*. (Deze publicatie is een onder verantwoordelijkheid van het secretariaat van de Gezondheidsraad vertaald rapport 'Public health impact of large airports'.) Den Haag: Gezondheidsraad, 1999; 1999/14. September 2nd, 1999.

important for people to have the idea that they could influence their own living environment. According to the cabinet, TOPS had been designed to stimulate this feeling, although the final effects of TOPS had been quite the reverse.⁸⁶¹

The environmental parties and local residents were not very pleased with the way the cabinet (and the policy makers of ONL) had been dealing with the results of the Health Impact Assessment. Milieudefensie and some groups of local residents tried to stir up discussion about the health effects of aviation, starting up a political lobby by bringing results of the Health Impact Assessment and the results of another important research report about health and aviation that was issued by the World Health Organization (WHO) to the attention of members of the Lower House. Sleep disturbance was considered to be a major adverse health effect of environmental noise by a WHO expert committee⁸⁶². The WHO argued that noise levels exceeding 45 dB(A) L_{aeq} had to be avoided for a good night of sleep. Offering sound insulation to complainants as compensation could help in diminishing sleep disturbance and annoyance due to aircraft noise. A reduction in the number of people who complain could then be achieved as well.⁸⁶³ According to the lobbyists several political parties did not want to hear about the health issue. The environmental parties and local residents had the idea that the political parties that were part of the cabinet deliberately kept the health issue off the agenda, as it would make it even more difficult to hold on to the dual objective thus defined.⁸⁶⁴ The issue of health only came to the fore when the issue of the night regime was being discussed.

Postponing decision making about an extended night regime

The new night contour was designed in a way that it contained less than 10,100 houses within the new 26 L_{aeq} contour. The night regime applied to the period in between 23.00 – 6.00. In October 1999 the Health Council had concluded that noise during nighttime had perverse health effects, a claim that was supported by the Province of North Holland. Moreover, the environmental actors referred to research results of the World Health Organization again, wherein the importance of an extended night regime (23.00 – 7.00) was stressed. Although the cabinet had announced that the results of the Health Impact Assessment were to be used for improving the night regime in the SBTL (1998), in the TNL report (1999) it was argued that additional research was to be done to both assess the health effects in between 6.00 and 7.00 and the effects of such an extended

⁸⁶¹ TK 26800, Nr. 86, April 10th 2000.

⁸⁶² Berglund B., Lindvall T., Schwela D.H., eds. (1999) *Guidelines for community noise*. London: World Health Organization.

⁸⁶³ Although the committee also argued that the role of sound insulation within the relation between noise exposure and complaint behaviour needs to be further established.

⁸⁶⁴ Press release Milieudefensie, October 11th 1999; Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Fransen / Stichting Natuur & Milieu, 2009

regime on mainport operations.⁸⁶⁵ The cabinet once again postponed decision making about the night flight issue, as they had already done during the PASO and PKB process. However, further research was already being conducted by the RIVM, who had started up a pilot study for investigating the relationship between sleep disturbance and aircraft noise. It was promised to the local resident that the results were to be taken into account in the creation of a new regulative system.⁸⁶⁶

No legal protection for the outer areas

In the PKB of 1995 it was promised that the five runway system would offer legal protection against noise pollution in the so-called outer areas (i.e. the areas that fell in between the 35Ke – 20Ke zone). These areas were confronted with considerable levels of noise pollution, but were not protected during the regime that applied to the old four runway system. Despite these PKB promises, the new regulative system did not contain any enforcement points in the outer areas either (see figure 7.10).

Figure 7.10 Difference between outer area (20Ke zone, blue contour) and inner area (35Ke zone, red contour)



Source: www.vlieghinder.nl

Thus, no legal norms for the outer areas that could be enforced were included in the new regulative system. Instead, the cabinet announced improved rules for the use of the airport and the airspace (runway use and flight routes, that pilots and air traffic controllers should take into account), which they expected to result in a considerable

⁸⁶⁵ Cabinet (1999), Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart. ONL. The Hague, p.17.

⁸⁶⁶ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

improvement of the levels of noise pollution in the 35 – 20Ke zone.⁸⁶⁷ Moreover, a legal obligation for the sector to negotiate with the local residents and municipalities to prevent avoidable noise annoyance in both the inner and outer areas was taken up. A new discussion platform was to be established in 2003 in order to facilitate this process.

Still not measuring noise

Finally, the PKB promise to make measurements of noise pollution part of the regulative system for the five runway system (> 2003) was not fulfilled. The cabinet held on to its earlier argument that such measurements were technically infeasible, due to the impossibility of filtering aircraft noise from other sounds (car traffic, wind etc.).⁸⁶⁸ According to one noise expert they deliberately let go of the chance to repair the systematic mistake that had been part of the calculation model for noise, i.e. aligning the calculations by calibrating it with the measured levels of noise. The development of the new regulative system had given the policy makers and the cabinet the opportunity to repair this mistake once and for all, making sure that proper noise levels were calculated in the future.⁸⁶⁹ Nonetheless, the main policy makers and the Minister held on to the flawed calculation model. The local residents, the environmental parties, several municipalities and experts were still convinced that the calculated noise levels were lower than the actual noise levels. In order to deal with the real effects, they wanted to make sure that the cabinet held on to the promise made earlier in the PKB of 1995, i.e. that noise was to be measured as well from 2003 onwards.

Rejecting a social-psychological approach to noise annoyance (1999)

During the development of the new noise regulations there were some serious tensions between policy makers of the Ministry of V&W. Some policy makers didn't like the way the new noise system was evolving, as was being developed by the ONL program direction, and they were looking for alternatives. They assigned two researchers (Stallen and Van Gunsteren) who had been arguing since 1997 that noise annoyance was mainly caused by non-acoustical factors. Their final advice was published in April 1999 and could count on support of several of the policy makers of the Ministry and the sector parties.⁸⁷⁰ In the report it was argued that the entire regulative system for noise was based upon wrong assumptions. Noise exposure alone could account for only a small percentage in the variance of human (subjective) reaction to noise (typically in the range of 9% - 29%).⁸⁷¹ The other part does not relate to random variation, but can be explained by so-called non-acoustical factors, which are social-psychological in nature.

⁸⁶⁷ Cabinet (1999), Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart. ONL. The Hague, annex p.18.

⁸⁶⁸ Interview Muchall / Noise expert, 2009.

⁸⁶⁹ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise expert and Member of the EIA Committee Schiphol, 2010.

⁸⁷⁰ Stallen et al., 1999.

⁸⁷¹ See also Job, 1988.

These factors lie with the individual (e.g. age, noise sensitivity) but are also social in nature (e.g. the trust in the noise source authorities, social control, perceptions of the costs/benefits of aviation), and are therefore important to take into account in public policy. Hence, according to the researchers not only exposure *sec* was important, but also the social relationship between the source authorities and those exposed.⁸⁷² Frustration (which becomes expressed in a high annoyance score in large-scale surveys) arises when residents believe that the accountability of the designated authorities has failed, which, in turn, is derived from the performance of the institutions they have put into place. These insights would lead to a totally different type of noise policy. In essence, the policies would be based upon agreements that were made on the regional level, instead of regulation via norms based on maximum amounts of decibels. It would result in noise policy that was much more directed at the individual level instead of on the collective level (i.e. regulating the maximum amount of noise that is acceptable within a society).⁸⁷³

The policy makers within the Ministry of V&W that had requested the research were very enthusiastic, as were the sector parties. However, the other policy makers that were in charge (i.e. the project direction) were not interested in a radical change of policy. In personal meetings with the researchers, these policy makers indicated that they agreed with the social-psychological perspective and they even acknowledged that the current technical-rational systematic that was being developed didn't function well. Still, they indicated that there was simply not enough time to translate the alternative in policy measures, as the new system had to be ready before the end of 1999.⁸⁷⁴ Moreover, it would be very difficult to assess the level of equivalence between the old PKB system and an entirely new system. Therefore, the alternative was not taken up in the policy debate (and for example the alternative was not part of the TOPS negotiations). However, most local residents and environmental interest groups were not very disappointed about this. From their perspective, the only thing that was required was a set of hard, legally binding norms that could be enforced in a transparent way. Pointing out that noise annoyance was a psychological problem was not necessarily in their interest.⁸⁷⁵

In another attempt of the researchers to include their approach into the public policy debate, they sent the report to the Committee on Noise Pollution Schiphol (Commissie Geluidshinder Schiphol, CGS), which consisted of several local residents and

⁸⁷² Stallen et al., 1999.

⁸⁷³ Interview Abspoel / Policy Maker Ministry of V&W, 2009.

⁸⁷⁴ Interview Stallen / Noise expert 2008.

⁸⁷⁵ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2008; Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

municipalities that were to advise about the noise policy regulations of the national government. The CGS was very enthusiastic too and they sent a letter to the Minister of V&W, pointing out the need to broaden the noise regulations.⁸⁷⁶ Instead of merely developing measures for reducing the overall level of pollution there was also need to steer on non-acoustical factors. For this, more research was to be conducted as soon as possible, which would make it possible to develop fully-fledged policy alternatives. The Minister responded that already sufficient research was being done that linked to the non-acoustical factors and that no additional funds were available for setting up new research.⁸⁷⁷ The social-psychological approach to noise pollution was removed from the policy debate. It would take until 2003, after the political ratification and implementation of the new regulative system, before the social-psychological perspective was brought back into the debate again (as we shall discuss in chapter 8).⁸⁷⁸

Criticizing third party risk

The VACS (i.e. Safety Advisory Committee) had not been very pleased with the way third party risks were dealt with in the TNL report. In its advice about the new regulative system, the VACS made some critical remarks.⁸⁷⁹ First of all, they were rather disappointed about the decision to maintain the IR 5×10^{-5} , instead of replacing it by the IR 10^{-5} , which would be in line with the more general SEVESO directive that applied to other industries. From the perspective of the VACS the lower risks that were calculated with the improved NLR model were therefore not meant to actually improve safety, but merely to enhance capacity. Second, the VACS stated that it was very important to include some GR policy in the regulative system in order to prevent the construction of sites with high concentrations of people just outside the IR contour. Besides, by only including the IR contour in the policy framework, the ALARA principle (As Low As Reasonably Possible) that applied to safety issues in other policy fields, was ignored. Finally, the VACS emphasized the importance of developing a causal model, repeating one of its earlier advices.⁸⁸⁰ More in general, to the safety experts it had been clear that the safety issue had not been translated in an equal fashion.⁸⁸¹ They had put their faith in the international expert meeting that was announced in the TNL, during which a norm for Group Risk would be developed.

7.8.4 Revising the TNL: the May Letter (2000)

After several advisory committees had given their feedback on the TNL report, the

⁸⁷⁶ Press Release CGS, June 2nd, 1999, Nr. PB99-04.

⁸⁷⁷ Letter from the Minister of V&W Netelenbos to CGS / Mevr. Wildekamp, October 7th 1999, DGRLD/VI/L99.340580.

⁸⁷⁸ Interview Stallen / Noise Expert, 2008.

⁸⁷⁹ VACS advice to the Minister of Transportation, March 7th 2000.

⁸⁸⁰ VACS advices to the Minister of Transportation of June 14th 1997 and May 31st 1998.

⁸⁸¹ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

cabinet presented its final policy intentions in the so-called May-letter.⁸⁸² Not much had changed as regards the issues of noise, local air pollution and stench. Two important points were discussed: (1) the juridical instrument that had been chosen to formalize the new regulative system (i.e. an Aviation Act instead of a PKB decision) and (2) the future policy measures as regards Group Risk, which had been excluded from the earlier TNL report.

(1) A new legal instrument

First, the Cabinet discussed the juridical design of the new regulative system in the letter. The main question was whether the new system was to be embedded in a new PKB (PKB+) (which implied that the comprehensive PKB-procedure had to be enacted (just like during 1991 – 1995) or whether the new system was to become a separate chapter of the Aviation Act and two legally binding policy decrees in which the Act was elaborated, i.e. an Airport Planning Decree (*Luchthaveninidelingsbesluit, LIB*) and Airport Traffic Decree (*Luchthavenverkeersbesluit, LVB*).⁸⁸³ The cabinet had opted for the second construction, which allowed for a less comprehensive procedure than the PKB procedure (e.g. a much less comprehensive EIA).⁸⁸⁴ Moreover, opting for a PKB decision implied that lengthy procedures had to be initiated to revise additional Acts like several spatial Acts (WRO) and the Noise Pollution Act (*besluit geluidsbelasting*), which was not needed when a new Aviation Act was made.⁸⁸⁵ The new juridical construction offered less legal protection, because it took away the possibility to lodge an appeal at the administrative judge. There was still the possibility to use the civil judge, but the barrier to start a civil procedure was much higher: it was far more complicated, had higher costs and thus bore higher risks for all actors involved. From the perspective of the environmental interest groups, the cabinet's decision for this specific format could therefore be seen as an attempt to put an end to the proliferation of juridical procedures that has characterized the Schiphol debate since 1995.⁸⁸⁶ Moreover, it was easier to change the decrees than it was to change a PKB decision.⁸⁸⁷

⁸⁸² TK 26959, May 31st 2000, Nr.3.

⁸⁸³ Amongst other things, the Airport Planning Decree specified the spatial layout of take-off and landings strips and terminals and defines the areas around the airport where there is need for a complete ban, or at least, restrictions on land uses (especially housing) for noise and safety reasons (APD, 2002). Local government authorities adapt their Municipal Zoning Plans according to the Airport Planning Decree. The building plans of the local authorities will have to be assessed in the light of this Decree. The Air Traffic Decree sets environmental and safety standards at the national level (Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 2002). It defines the limits for the use of runways, flight paths and traffic regulations (ATD, 2002).

⁸⁸⁴ Although the reasons to do so remained rather vague cf. TK 27603, Nr.6/2001, pp.6 – 14; NovioConsult & Van Spaendonck, 2006). It is very likely to assume that the time-pressure involved influenced this decision (i.e. the regulative system had to be operative in 2003).

⁸⁸⁵ TK 27603, May 11th 2001, Nr.6, p.7.

⁸⁸⁶ Proceedings of discussion environmental law panel, June 7th 2006; Interview Griesse / local resident, 2009.

⁸⁸⁷ Interview Van Kessel / consultant, 2009.

(2) Dealing with third party risk

Second, the May letter contained the further actions to be taken as regards third party risk (IR and GR). In line with the promise made in the TNL report an expert meeting had been organized, wherein international safety experts had gathered to discuss how to calculate Group Risks and what levels of risk were deemed acceptable. During the conference all experts agreed that some kind of Group Risk policy was necessary. A lacking group risk policy would allow high-density building immediately outside the individual risk contour defined as the limit for building development. This would greatly increase the probability of an accident with a very high death toll. It was deemed important to consider such low probability, but very high consequence risk outliers, but no decision had yet been made about how to do this, i.e. how to set a proper norm. Nonetheless, the experts had agreed that it was possible to calculate Group Risks and develop policy measures in order to reduce Group Risks and they informed the cabinet about their findings.⁸⁸⁸

The cabinet took the different advices of the VACS (who had already repeatedly indicated the importance of GR policy) and international experts into account and after debate in the Lower House it presented a modified version of the new policy framework in the May Letter. The most important changes when compared to the PKB of 1995 were:⁸⁸⁹

1. The SWR was abandoned; a standstill as regards the old SWR criterion could always be achieved, since demolishing or removing houses from the zone was always possible. It was a flexible zone, without a hard limit as regards third party risks, which was deemed undesirable by the cabinet. In the new Aviation Act a new limit was to be introduced, the TRG (Totaal Risico Volume = Total Risk Volume),⁸⁹⁰
2. The TRG defined the maximum risk volume of the airport and it was based on the sum of all probabilities that a plane crashes, and maximum Take of Weight of a plane. The spatial distribution of a possible accident did not play a role within this criterion. It did therefore not say anything about the IR and GR, since it did not take the probability of an accident at a particular location into account. It served as a replacement of the old capacity ceilings of the PKB, with the main difference that the TRG allowed for much greater capacity;
3. As regards individual risks, the subsequent pressure of the VACS had resulted in an acceptance of the 10^{-5} IR contour for the demolition zone (instead of retaining the 5×10^{-5} IR-contour as the limit of the demolition zone). This implied that the more

⁸⁸⁸ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

⁸⁸⁹ TK 26959, May 31st 2000, Nr.3.

⁸⁹⁰ See for example TK 27603, March 6th 2003, Nr 99A, p.4.

positive outcomes that resulted from the new assumptions underlying the calculation model were both used for enhancing the amount of aircraft movements and a reduction of risks;

4. As regards Group Risk, it was stated in the PKB that additional research would be conducted in order to assess how to quantify and regulate GR.⁸⁹¹ In the new Act no specific policy or norm for GR was taken up. Instead, it was announced that the Ministry of VROM would discuss the spatial policy with the region (Province of North Holland and the municipalities of Haarlemmermeer, Hoofddorp and Amsterdam) in order to find additional spatial measures to regulate GR. This was in line with the new Environmental Plan (NMP 4, 2000), wherein the Ministry of VROM presented its future strategy for dealing with GR;⁸⁹²
5. The importance of developing a causal model (linking causes and effects of accidents to one another) was emphasized, and as a first step a research project was to be initiated to assess the feasibility of such a model.
6. It was repeated that third party risks were not to deteriorate during 2003 – 2015 when compared to 1990. The standstill was now defined in terms of 1 criterion: The number of houses within the IR 10^{-6} . The SWR was not part of the policy framework anymore.

After the presentation of the May Letter the main challenge for ONL was to translate the new regulative system in the Aviation Act and two Aviation Decrees. These were to be ratified by the members of the Upper and Lower House. During the preparations of the political debate, the presumed level of equivalence became more and more questioned.

7.9 Debating the mid term (3): Formal Decision making (2000 – 2001)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				
Mid term 2003 - 2015	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6			Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10 Part 5. – 7.11	Part 6. – 7.12	

During the period 2000 – 2001 more and more pieces of information became available from which it could be concluded that the new regulative system and the old one were all but equals. Especially the noise issue was wrought with heavy doubts. In this

⁸⁹¹ Cabinet (1995), Planologische Kernbeslissing. PMMS, The Hague, p.16.

⁸⁹² Ministerie VROM (2000), Nationaal Milieubeleidsplan 4. The Hague.

paragraph we first discuss these doubts and the way that was dealt with them (7.9.1). Next, the regulative system was up for political ratification by the Lower and Upper House. Prior to this political debate three issues were to be settled yet: (1) The cabinet had to conduct an EIA which was legally required; (2) the cabinet had to clarify its final policy measures as regards third party risks and (3) the construction works of the 5th runway had to get started in order to make sure that the necessary infrastructure was available on time. These issues are subsequently discussed in 7.9.2.

7.9.1 Disconfirming evidence about noise

During the preparation of the new Aviation Act the new regulative system for noise was attacked once more from at least three different sides.

(1) *An independent noise committee (2000 – 2001)*

The Lower House repeatedly brought forward its considerable doubts about whether or not the new Act offered equal protection against noise pollution. In a response the cabinet installed a new independent committee of noise experts, chaired by Prof. Berkhout (Committee of Noise Experts, *Commissie Deskundigen Vliegtuiggeluid, CDV*).⁸⁹³ After the failed experiment with the green polder model (i.e. TOPS) the cabinet thus adopted a different strategy. It was by calling upon a committee of independent experts that Cabinet tried to create support for the new system. The assignment of the CDV was to advice about the transition from K_e to L_{den} , and to advice about the transition from calculating to measuring noise. Later, in 2001, the Lower House added a third assignment: to develop proposals for the new noise system, especially about creating protection for the outer areas (i.e. in between the 35-20 K_e and 26 Db(A) - 20 Db(A) L_{aeq} (night) contour).⁸⁹⁴ These were all preconditions for making sure that the new regulative system would offer an equivalent level of protection as the old PKB system would have done.


The CDV was very critical about the new noise system that had been presented in the TNL report of 1999. The way the TVG (total volume of noise) was calculated was not deemed valid (and the measure itself was not deemed effective) and the protection of the outer area (35 – 20 K_e) was deemed insufficient. The CDV advised to add 9 additional enforcement points outside the 35 K_e zone and 10 monitoring points outside the 20 K_e zone in order to protect the outer areas. Furthermore, some of the existing points had to be relocated, positioning them in the more densely populated areas. Thus, the committee members asserted that system of enforcement points was not to get

⁸⁹³ Staatscourant, June 20th 2000, Installatie Commissie Berkhout.

⁸⁹⁴ Cf. TK. 26959, April 24th 2003, Nr.32.

changed, but the location and the amount of the enforcement points needed to be changed in order to make the system effective (see figure 7.11).⁸⁹⁵

Figure 7.11 The new regulative system for noise as proposed by the Berkhout Committee (left, including the outer areas) and the cabinet (right)



Source: Berkhout, 2003

The final conclusion of the CDV was that the new system did not offer adequate protection against noise pollution, and that the sector was not sufficiently triggered to search for innovations to reduce noise pollution outside the 35Ke zone. Moreover, the committee suspected that the new system had been designed to make it possible to facilitate more flights. To put this to the test the committee proposed to calculate the maximum amount of flights that could fit within the old and new system. However, the Minister did not put the requested funds that were needed to carry out the research at their disposal, although it concerned a relatively small amount of money.⁸⁹⁶ Finally, the committee argued that the new system was not designed to take the degree to which people actually experienced noise annoyance into consideration.⁸⁹⁷

The CDV did not focus on the question whether the old and the new system were equal, but on the more critical question whether the new system offered sufficient protection (which was the far more important question according to the committee).⁸⁹⁸ The

⁸⁹⁵ Interview Berkhout / Noise expert and former chairman of the CDV, 2007.
⁸⁹⁶ Interview Berkhout / Noise expert and former chairman of the CDV, 2008.
⁸⁹⁷ CDV advice 1A, September 2000; CDV advice 1B, January 2001; CDV advice 2, June 2001.
⁸⁹⁸ Berkhout, 2003; Interview Berkhout / Noise expert and former chairman of the CDV, 2008.

committee and the Minister of V&W were in constant conflict. The advices that the committee developed were not in line with the expectations of the Minister.⁸⁹⁹ However, according to policy makers of the Ministry of V&W it was not the negative advices that caused the conflict, but the different ideas about the assignment. From their perspective the advices did not contribute to the questions that the CDV was supposed to answer.⁹⁰⁰ After several escalations the committee gave back its assignment in December.⁹⁰¹ The Minister of V&W announced that a new committee of noise experts was to be established, with new people and a new and clear assignment.⁹⁰² The resigned chairman, Berkhout, was not amused by this course of affairs. He wrote an essay wherein he reconstructed the decision making process drawing on his own experiences, which was titled 'Notes on a Failing Democratic Process'.⁹⁰³ In this essay he heavily criticized the hierarchical way in which the Minister of V&W and the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W made decisions about Schiphol. Afterwards, Berkhout received a lot of media attention and his story was published in several newspapers and brought forward in several radio and television programs.

According to members of the Berkhout noise committee, several strategies were employed by the Ministry of V&W to influence their advices.⁹⁰⁴ First of all, the committee was put under constant pressure to revise its advices. For example, when the committee had submitted its confidential concept of the advice 1b to the Ministry of V&W, the CEO of Schiphol phoned Berkhout within a few days. The CEO argued that the advice endangered the future growth of Schiphol as it implied new delays for the implementation of the five runway system and, according to Berkhout, he asked him to withdraw the advice. According to Berkhout, the most remarkable aspect of this affair was the fact that he had only given the confidential advice to the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W. Apparently, they had immediately passed the confidential information on to Schiphol, without notifying Berkhout.⁹⁰⁵ And this was only one of the many examples of the close interrelationships that the policy makers of V&W and Schiphol maintained.⁹⁰⁶ Unsurprisingly, the Ministry of V&W was also not very pleased with the report. The conclusions clearly undermined the new regulative system that ONL and the aviation sector had been working on for more than two years. Starting all over again was not an option, considering that the new five runway system was to

⁸⁹⁹ Interview Berkhout / Noise expert and former chairman of the CDV, 2007.

⁹⁰⁰ Interview Dortland / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009; Interview Wubben / Former researcher at the Ministry of V&W / To70, 2009.

⁹⁰¹ Interviews Berkhout / Noise expert and former chairman of the CDV, 2007/2008.

⁹⁰² TK 26959, December 17th 2002, Nr.24.

⁹⁰³ Berkhout, 2003.

⁹⁰⁴ Interview Ale / safety expert and former member of the Berkhout Committee, 2009; Interview Berkhout, 2007.

⁹⁰⁵ Interview Berkhout, 2008.

⁹⁰⁶ Volkskrant, August 20th 2003, Te deskundig voor Schiphol. By John Schoorl and Jan Meeus.

become operative from 2003 onwards.⁹⁰⁷ From the perspective of the Ministry of V&W and the aviation sector the Berkhout committee clearly lacked political sensitivity. This was exactly what the Minister of V&W (Netelenbos) told Berkhout personally.

Nonetheless, the Berkhout advices very much supported the ideas of the policy makers of the Ministry of VROM, who had only been partly included in the design of the new regulative system. According to VROM the new system was pure fiction; it had little to do with the actual levels of noise pollution, and even less with noise annoyance.⁹⁰⁸ VROM had the idea that the public was fooled by the new system, but they had no means to influence the outcomes.⁹⁰⁹ The second advice of the committee of June 2001 met similar resistance. By then, it had been clear to the members of the CDV that their advices were only tolerated if they supported the policy strategy of the Ministry of V&W and the aviation sector.

Second, several strategies had been employed in order to frustrate the work of the committee. For example, Berkhout had requested additional research funds for investigating the possibilities for measuring noise pollution. These funds were rejected. And when the committee asked for all prior information on measuring noise, one important report was not given to them. This was the so-called Isermann report, dating back to 1995, wherein it was concluded that aircraft noise could be measured.⁹¹⁰ Indeed, it was only years later (in 2006) when one other noise expert handed over the Isermann report to Berkhout that he took notice of it for the first time in his life.⁹¹¹ Finally, some of the members of the committee were threatened in indirect ways that their continued participation in the committee would not do any good to their future careers.⁹¹² From the perspective of the Ministry of V&W the main reason for rejecting the advices and requested information and funds was that the committee tried to develop a new noise systematic, which was not part of its assignment.⁹¹³ The cabinet repeated this argument in a direct response to the essay that Berkhout had published in 2003.⁹¹⁴

(2) Report of the Dutch Aerospace Laboratory (2001)

During the political discussion about the new regulative system the question about the necessary amount of enforcement points played an important role. The Ministry of V&W had proposed 29 (later 30 points), which was deemed sufficient for offering the

⁹⁰⁷ Interview Dortland / Former Policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009.

⁹⁰⁸ Interview Klaver / Former policy maker of the Ministry VROM, 2005.

⁹⁰⁹ Volkskrant, August 20th 2003, Te deskundig voor Schiphol. By John Schoorl and Jan Meeus.

⁹¹⁰ Interviews Berkhout, 2007/2008.

⁹¹¹ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise expert and member of the EIA committee Schiphol, 2010.

⁹¹² Interview Ale / safety expert and former member of the Berkhout Committee, 2009; Interview Berkhout, 2007.

⁹¹³ Interview Dortland / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009; Interview Wubben / Former researcher at the Ministry of V&W/To70, 2009.

⁹¹⁴ TK 26959; April 24th 2003, Nr.32.

same level of protection as the PKB systematic that it came to replace. However, the Lower House doubted whether this was sufficient (in line with Berkhout's advices and triggered by the lobby of environmental actors). In order to settle the matter, the Ministries of VROM and V&W decided to assign the NLR to answer this question. In the spring of 2001 NLR had already written a draft report about the issue and the results were not in favour of the conclusions that were desired by the Minister of V&W. The system of 30 enforcement points was not deemed sufficient, since a large part of the noise pollution was caused at other locations and was therefore not taken into account. This was true for both the inner area and (especially) the outer area. For this reason, the Ministry of VROM was convinced that more points in both areas were needed than the Ministry of V&W had proposed.⁹¹⁵

Instead of making the results publicly available, the Ministry of V&W decided to reformulate the research assignment that was originally given to the NLR. The Ministry of VROM was not consulted about this. In the new research assignment, the initial research question was split into two parts; one was about the level of protection of the inner area and one about the level of protection of the outer area. The results did not change much, but the conclusions did. With regard to the inner zone, it was concluded that with the implementation of a few more enforcement points the required level of protection was assured. This gave the impression that the overall level of protection was sufficient, although the protection of the outer area was still lacking.⁹¹⁶

This allowed the Minister of V&W to state that the inner area was sufficiently protected, if only a few more enforcement points were added. With regard to the outer area, the Minister announced that new research was to be conducted in the upcoming years, which was to result in legally enforceable norms in the near future. As we shall see later on, this is how the new regulative system was laid down in the new Aviation Act that would become politically ratified. Thus, without norms for the protection of the outer area.⁹¹⁷

According to a policy maker of the ministry of VROM the ministry of V&W deliberately manipulated the research question that was to be answered by the NLR. Moreover, he asserted that the NLR had allowed this to happen.⁹¹⁸ According to the ministry of V&W the NLR was fully responsible for its own research reports. From their perspective, the accusation that V&W manipulated the research process was

⁹¹⁵ Interview Klaver / Former policy maker Ministry of VROM, 2005.

⁹¹⁶ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁹¹⁷ Newspaper Article Volkskrant 'Minister Verhulde Werkelijkheid' October 28th 2003.

⁹¹⁸ Internal Memo Ministry of VROM, Fred van Deventer, September 5th 2001: Manipulatie NLR rapport 'beschermende werking' door ONL?

therefore not true.⁹¹⁹ Nonetheless, the accusations as regards manipulation were published in an important national newspaper.⁹²⁰ This triggered political arousal and the members of the Lower House demanded to know whether the Ministry of V&W had forced the NLR to change its conclusions. In a response, the Secretary of State of the Ministry of V&W denied that such a thing had happened. Nonetheless, the NLR who had carried out the research did not support the way the Ministry of V&W had interpreted the conclusions. The conclusion drawn by the Ministry, stating that the new regulative system provided a proper protection against noise pollution, was certainly not derived from the NLR report. From the perspective of the Ministry of V&W the entire affair was taken out of its context. The draft report was never intended as a serious report. Instead, it was to serve as background information for designing the new Aviation Act. To talk about manipulation was therefore a great exaggeration.⁹²¹ In the end, appointments about further research for proper protection of the outer areas were made, and further investigations in the presumed manipulation were therefore not considered to be of importance anymore by a majority of the members of the Lower House.

(3) New information about measuring noise

The Environmental Agency of the Municipality of Amsterdam had used the measured results in order to assess the conversion from K_e to L_{den} (the new measure for noise, conform the European standard). The results were presented on April 21st 2001. In the calculation model 35 K_e corresponded with 58 L_{den} . But the measured results showed that 35 K_e corresponded with 55 L_{den} . As the 55 L_{den} contour would have been much broader, drawing a 58 L_{den} contour made it possible to facilitate twice as much flights.⁹²²

The extensive media attention during 1997 and 1998 for measuring noise had not brought the issue on the political agenda. The researchers of OMEGAM had tried to bring their method for measuring to the attention of the policy makers of V&W. The policy makers told them the same thing as had been told to them before, i.e. that it was not yet possible to measure aircraft noise in a reliable way. Therefore, the results could not be used for policy making purposes.⁹²³ The only thing left to do was conducting additional research. However, as we already discussed, when Berkhout asked for additional funds to investigate the possibilities for measuring, they were refused. And the Isermann report that contained important information about measuring noise was not given to the committee. From the perspective of another noise expert, the policy makers

⁹¹⁹ www.volkskrant.nl/binnenland/article138955.ece/Manipulatie_onderzoek_Schiphol.

⁹²⁰ i.e. de Volkskrant, see footnote 363.

⁹²¹ Interview Wubben / Former researcher at the Ministry of V&W/To70, 2009.

⁹²² Muchall, R. (2001) Notitie Conversie Kosteneenheden – L_{den} . OMEGAM, Amsterdam April 21st 2001.

⁹²³ Interview Muchall / noise expert, 2009.

of the Ministry of V&W had missed a golden opportunity to repair the calculation method when designing the new Aviation Act. This was the right time to get rid of the systematic mistake that it contained, thus developing a model based on proper measurements that approached real noise levels far better. According to him, the policy makers were aware of this golden opportunity and necessity, but they did not want to change the (flawed) calculation method, probably fearing that the more realistic outcomes would endanger further airport development.⁹²⁴

7.9.2 Preparing the new Aviation Act – the Schiphol Act

Before the political debate about the new Aviation Act could start, which was referred to as the Schiphol Act, three important issues were to be settled. First, the cabinet had to conduct an EIA procedure, which was legally required. Second, the cabinet had to clarify its final policy measures as regards third party risks. Third, the construction works of the 5th runway had to get started in order to make sure that the necessary infrastructure was available on time. These challenges had to be settled while making sure that the PKB promises were adequately translated in the new Schiphol Act.

(1 Starting another Environmental Impact Assessment (2001))

The report containing the guidelines for the EIA was presented in February 2001.⁹²⁵ The procedure of the EIA was adjusted. More specifically, paragraph 7.4 of the Environmental Act (*Wet Milieubeheer*) was excluded from the EIA. This article prescribed the need for evaluating different alternatives, including the Most Environmental Friendly Alternative and a business as usual alternative (i.e. situation wherein nothing changes). However, the cabinet argued that the current EIA was a special one, as it was primarily meant to assess the level of equivalence between the old and new regulative system. Therefore, it was not deemed necessary to take other alternatives into account. Both the environmental parties and the EIA committee criticized this line of reasoning.⁹²⁶ In March 2001 Milieudéfensie and SNM sent their criticisms about the guidelines to the Ministry of V&W.⁹²⁷ The EIA committee made critical remarks on several occasions. The main point was that not even half of the criteria of the PKB 1995 were included in the assessment of equivalence in the EIA. How was one then to evaluate the level of equivalence? In general, the following aspects were taken up in the criticisms:

⁹²⁴ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise expert and member of the EIA committee Schiphol, 2010.

⁹²⁵ Schiphol (2001), Startnotitie Milieu effectrapportage Schiphol 2003.

⁹²⁶ Interview Ale / safety expert/ EIA committee, 2009; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁹²⁷ SNM & Milieudéfensie, (2001), Notitie over de richtlijnen voor het MER-rapport 'Schiphol 2003' send to the Ministry of Transportation, 12th March 2001.

1. The exclusion of paragraph 7.4 of the Environmental Act was emphasized once more.
2. The scenario that was being used resulted in more environmental capacity than was initially allowed.
3. Third party risk was merely calculated and compared for the 10^{-6} IR. Other IR contours and the Group Risk were not taken into account. According to the EIA committee the EIA held some 'essential shortcomings' as regards the third party risks related to airport development. The Committee doubted whether the new measure TRV (i.e. the total volume of all risks involved) and the lack of a norm for GR offered the same level of protection as the PKB system did.
4. With regard to noise the focus was merely on the 35Ke zone. The outer areas were not included in the assessment (area in between 35 – 20 and 26 L_{aeq} – 20 L_{aeq}).
5. The so-called enforcement point K, which was located in Almere, was left outside the assessment. This point had explicitly been included in the PKB in order to prevent further noise pollution at this specific location.
6. The numbers used in the EIA were wrong. In the guidelines it was stated that the 20Ke was the same as 50 L_{den} , while the NLR had calculated that 20Ke corresponded with 48 L_{den} .⁹²⁸ Higher levels implied a smaller area, so less houses and people.
7. The Housing file was not updated yet, although the EIA committee had advised to do so at several occasions.⁹²⁹ The consequence was that the houses built in the 20Ke zone and 35Ke zone from 1990 onwards were not taken into account in the calculations.⁹³⁰ This resulted in biased and too optimistic outcomes (in terms of amounts of houses located within the zones).
8. The EIA committee indicated the need to calculate the CO₂ emissions. This was already being done for regional airports, and it was not clear why a special position was created for Schiphol.

The rationale underlying the narrow framing of the EIA procedure was clear to the environmental parties. Criteria that would show that the new system offered less protection were to be excluded.⁹³¹ The result was that the EIA did not take the actual developments and environmental effects into account. From their perspective it was merely a theoretical exercise that had nothing to do with the real effects and the way people experienced these real effects.

⁹²⁸ NLR Herberekening Aanwijzing Schiphol.

⁹²⁹ EIA committee, advice March 8th 2000 & EIA committee, advice October 20th 2000.

⁹³⁰ For example, the Algemene Rekenkamer had argued 1079 additional houses were located within the 30Ke zone in 1998, when compared to 1990. Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998.

⁹³¹ Interview Ale / safety expert / EIA committee, 2009; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

(2) Final perspective on third party risk

The issue of third party risk was also yet to be properly settled in the new Schiphol Act. From the criticisms of the EIA committee and environmental parties presented above it can be derived that they were not very pleased about the way equivalence as regards third party risk was being assessed. In essence, the third party risk debate revolved around the development of a statistical causal model (2a) and the norm for Group Risk (2b) after the publication of the May Letter (2000).

(2A) The statistical causal model

Most attention as regards safety was devoted to the development of a statistical causal model. Safety experts (e.g. the VACS) had insisted upon the development of such a model for several years, since it would make it possible to develop policy tools for dealing with risks. As a first step, the feasibility of such a causal model was investigated. Right after the presentation of the May letter in 2000 that contained the cabinet's response to the criticisms on the TNL report (1999), two studies were conducted to assess the technical (NLR) and managerial and societal (RAND) feasibility of such a causal model. The research was supervised by the Ministry of V&W/RLD. The NLR concluded that the data requirements for risk assessment using a causal model would be much more extensive than for the existing model. In particular, a causal model imposed much greater demands on a detailed causal analysis of accidents and incidents, going into the details of not only technical, but also human and underlying organizational factors. As such, data about technical and human failures and about the influences of procedural and organizational factors on these failure rates was deemed necessary.⁹³² In order to obtain such data extensive cooperation of the aviation sector was required. However, during the 1990s the aviation sector had refused to deliver these data, as they were merely to be used for developing additional policies, threatening short- or longer-term growth and commercial interests. In short, no adequate causal model could be developed without sector involvement, but it was not in the interest of the sector to participate when it would result in more policy restrictions.⁹³³

In the assessment of managerial and societal feasibility, a broad range of actors was consulted: the National government (five ministries), provincial and local governments in the region around Schiphol, the aviation sector, social activist groups/grassroots organizations, local residents and several experts. One of the main conclusions was that the sector acknowledged the positive effects that could be derived from the causal model. A detailed causal model could serve to clarify and guide management decisions about controlling and improving safety and it could be used for setting priorities as

⁹³² Roelen et al., 2000.

⁹³³ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

regards investments in safety measures. In the end, the sector would benefit from the more positive image of a safer aviation industry, especially when considering the devastating effects an airplane crash could have on passenger volumes. The sector was therefore in principle willing to share information. However, under the precondition that this information was not used for developing and enforcing regulations that worked to hamper aviation operations. If such a thing would happen, the sector would immediately withdraw support. Moreover, guarantees of confidentiality were needed for different purposes. For example, data about errors during flight procedures could only be acquired when pilots reported their own errors, or those of their colleagues. This felt like betraying ones colleagues. Besides, the sanctions could be harsh: pilots or traffic controllers could even get fired when the mistakes would come to light.⁹³⁴ The reluctance of reporting errors made it difficult to acquire the real data that was needed for developing a proper causal model.

Based on the research results it was concluded that a causal model was both technically and managerially feasible. At that time, the experts of the VACS and the EIA committee continued to express the importance of a causal model. This eventually resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding, signed by the Ministries of V&W and VROM and the sector parties (KLM, Schiphol, Air Traffic Control), which formalized their joint commitment for developing a causal model.⁹³⁵ The Ministry of V&W who had taken the initiative for the Memorandum would also coordinate the further development of the model. The NLR was assigned to develop a first prototype before the end of 2001.⁹³⁶ The final version of the model was to be delivered before 1st January 2005. After that, additional policy measures were to be included in the Schiphol Act.

(2B) Group Risk

Meanwhile, there were clear indications that risks would considerably increase. In one study that had been assigned by the Ministry of VROM, it was concluded that the GR was expected to increase by a factor 5 to 8 in 2010 (compared to 1990).⁹³⁷ And in the yearly Environmental Monitor of 2001 the RIVM concluded that both IR and GR levels would increase as a consequence of further growth of flight movements and all kinds of spatial developments in the vicinity of the airport. The RIVM expected that the third

⁹³⁴ Huys, M.G. & M.K.A. van Gils (2005), *Betrekkelijke rust in AD-vlucht*. Report for the Inspection of the Ministry of Transportation. Delft University of Technology, December 2005. See the interviews we conducted for this research report: (Interview Paul van Eenige / IVW, 2005; Interview Bart de Vries / KLM, 2005; Interview Kees Hoogervorst / KLM Cityhopper, 2005; Interview Rob Verschoor / Transavia, 2005).

⁹³⁵ TK 24804, September 18th 2000, Nr.24.

⁹³⁶ Ministry of Transportation, Plan of approach Causal Modelling, December 19th 2000, VW00001451.

⁹³⁷ Post et al., 2001.

party risks would increase and grow beyond the level of 1990, after a short reduction right after the five runway system was put into operation.⁹³⁸

When developing the final draft version of the new Schiphol Act, the cabinet held on to its earlier argument that there was no adequate norm for Group Risk available. The cabinet added that such a norm wasn't needed either, since the GR was already sufficiently regulated by means of several indirect measures, like the noise contours, the IR risk zones, the new TRV (total risk volume), which all worked to set limits to the maximum amount of flights. Besides, the cabinet pointed out that additional spatial measures would be developed on short notice, in close cooperation with the regional and local public authorities. Safety experts indicated that these measures were not sufficient and that a specific norm for Group Risk was both needed and possible.⁹³⁹ Environmental interest groups brought forward the promises made in the PKB of 1995, wherein it had been stated that a standstill for Group Risk would apply from 2003 onwards (as compared to the level of 1990). According to the cabinet, the development of additional spatial measures could easily replace this promise, as it resulted in the same level of protection. The environmental parties doubted this very much, and they included the issue of Group Risk in their political lobby that was bound to begin.

(3) *Constructing the 5th runway*

In order to make sure that the new five runway system could be brought into operation in 2003 the necessary infrastructure (runway, taxiways, aprons and gates) needed to be ready on time. Anno 1999 it had been highly uncertain whether or not this would be the case. At that time Schiphol did not own all the pieces of land that were required for the construction of 5P. Most importantly, the pieces of land where Milieudefensie had planted its forest (Bulderbos) were yet to be obtained. The TOPS affair had further deteriorated the relationship between Milieudefensie and Schiphol, which made it all the more difficult to acquire the missing pieces of land. However, in January 1999, prior to TOPS, the cabinet had already created a new emergency act, i.e. the *Noodwet Procedures Vijfde Baan (Emergency Act Procedures Fifth runway)*. This Act had been designed to accelerate the enormous amount of procedures that needed to be completed in order to get the necessary permits required for starting constructions. Moreover, the Act contained procedures that made it possible to speed up expropriation of land.⁹⁴⁰ The Act allowed the responsible Minister to take over decision making power from the lower authorities if they did not make a decision within the time that was legally prescribed for such decisions. Despite the fact that the Act had been heavily criticized, as many actors like members of the Lower and Upper House and even the Highest

⁹³⁸ RIVM Milieubalans, 2001, pp.111 -112.

⁹³⁹ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

⁹⁴⁰ Ministry of Transportation (2002), Voortgang van de PKB. ONL, The Hague.

Legal Advisory Council of the Cabinet (*Raad van State*) believed that it worked to undermine the legal protection of citizens, it became operative in January 1999.⁹⁴¹ However, Schiphol did not have an environmental permit yet for operating the new five runway. Expropriation could only begin after such a permit was provided.

In August 2000 the revised Act for the five runway system based on the PKB on which the environmental permit depended was rejected again for the same reasons as it had been rejected earlier (i.e. not taken all PKB effects adequately into account).⁹⁴² Therefore, a permit was still lacking, and the expropriation procedure was delayed once again. However, in the same ruling the Court did accept the specific location of the 5th runway (5P). Thus, the location was now laid down in law. This opened a different route to expropriation for Schiphol. In 2001 Schiphol started another legal procedure in order to acquire the land, arguing that building a runway was not the same thing as actually using it. And for building a runway an environmental permit was not necessary. Such a permit was only necessary when the runway was actually brought into operation. The Court agreed to this. And because the specific location of the 5th runway had been laid down in law, it was clear which lands were to be expropriated yet. The court ruling of September 2001 allowed Schiphol to acquire the missing pieces of land and complete the construction of the 5th runway. The argument of Milieudefensie that the runway was only being built in order to get used did not have any effect on the High Court's final decision.⁹⁴³

So the land could be acquired and the runway could be constructed, but there was still the issue of developing a proper legally embedded regulative system that offered equal protection as the PKB of 1995. After August 2000, when the High Court had rejected the revised Aviation Act again, and thus made it impossible to yet provide an environmental permit for the five runway system, it had been clear for some time that the PKB systematic was going to be replaced by a totally new Schiphol Act with a new regulative system. Therefore, instead of making another attempt to repair the old Aviation Act of the five-runway system that was an elaboration of the old PKB, the cabinet decided to wait for the new Act, i.e. the Schiphol Act that was to replace the entire PKB decision, including the elaboration in different Acts for the four runway system and the five runway system. Thus, instead of trying to repair the Aviation Act that was based upon the PKB decision of 1995, the Ministry of V&W decided to put all efforts in the development of the Schiphol Act that came to replace the PKB and its

⁹⁴¹ De Kruijf, 2002, p.95.

⁹⁴² Press Release Raad van State, August 8th 2000. The original text said 'Raad van State vernietigt wederom aanwijzingsbesluit voor Schiphol. De Raad van State (...) is tot het oordeel gekomen dat de voor Schiphol in de PKB gestelde milieunormen (externe veiligheid, stank en emissies van luchtverontreiniging) niet goed in het aanwijzingsbesluit zijn verwerkt.'

⁹⁴³ De Kruijf, A (2002), *Het Bulderbos. Verzet tegen uitbreiding van Schiphol 1993 – 2002*. Mets & Schilt, Amsterdam.

related Acts.⁹⁴⁴ As we discussed before, the new regulative system was not decided upon via a PKB procedure, but via a less comprehensive procedure that was used when developing ‘normal’ Acts (even though the PKB procedure had once specifically been designed for proper decision making about large scale spatial and infrastructure projects). Despite the application of the less comprehensive procedure, the many doubts about the level of equivalence between the old and the new regulative system posed during 2000 – 2001 proved that political ratification of the new Schiphol Act would become an extremely difficult matter.

7.10 Debating the Mid Term (4): Political Ratification of the Schiphol Act in the Lower House

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				
Mid term 2003 - 2015	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6			Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10 Part 5. – 7.11	Part 6. – 7.12	

At the start of 2001 both the new regulations for noise and third party risks that had been proposed by ONL project team had become part of heavy doubts. Nonetheless, ONL had continued working on the new Schiphol Act and the design was finished early spring 2001. The Act had been prepared by a few jurists, in close cooperation with the aviation sector and the ONL project team of the Ministry of V&W.⁹⁴⁵ Next, the concept design of the Act was to be discussed in the Lower House and Upper House. Prior to this, the final EIA results had to be ready, so they could be included in the debate. Unfortunately, the EIA procedure was still under way, so the political debate could not start yet. At the same time, the five runway system had to become operative in February 2003, so in order to prevent further delays, the Minister of V&W insisted upon already starting the political ratification process of the new Act. After all, the political debate about the PKB had shown that it would consume a considerable amount of time. This was accepted by the Lower House and so the political debate about the new Act had begun even before the EIA results had been published. Moreover, the Ministry of VROM had not been involved in the design of the new Act. They received it only three weeks prior to the start of the political debate, which made it scarcely impossible to make considerable improvements and adjustments.⁹⁴⁶

⁹⁴⁴ This thus implied that the PKB norms for the five runway system that had been the result of six years of decision making, would never get implemented.
⁹⁴⁵ Interview Dortland / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009.
⁹⁴⁶ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

When the political debate began, the politicians of the Lower House that were dealing with the Schiphol issue gathered background information about the new Aviation Act.⁹⁴⁷ Prior experience with the Schiphol issue taught politicians to be more cautious about the facts and figures that were presented to them.⁹⁴⁸ At that time, there was also considerable discussion going on about how to improve the dissemination of information between departments and the Lower House, especially when large infrastructure projects were concerned.⁹⁴⁹ The many cost overruns regarding large infrastructure projects of the previous years in the Netherlands had been partly blamed to the poor way information was being developed and disseminated. These findings certainly contributed to the creation of a context wherein politicians became more susceptible for proper use of facts and figures. The environmental parties and local residents too did not trust the numbers that the cabinet had used to sustain the new Schiphol Act. They started an extensive political lobby in order to inform the members of the Lower House about their doubts (7.10.1). Next, the debate in the Lower House started (7.10.2). During the debate it became clear that some additional information about environmental effects was required (7.10.3). Thereafter the debate was resumed and some conclusions were drawn (7.10.4).

7.10.1 Political lobby of the Environmental Parties (Spring 2001)

The environmental parties decided to bundle their forces and team up with the local residents in order to launch an influential collective lobby towards the members of the Lower House. On March 15th SNM, Milieudefensie, Milieufederatie Noord Holland and the PLRS (the platform with all grassroots organizations) sent their advice about the new Schiphol Act to the Lower House.⁹⁵⁰ Their main argument was that the new Aviation Act by no means offered the same level of protection as the old PKB systematic. Several promises that had been made in the PKB had been ignored or had been reframed. In essence, from the perspective of the environmental lobby the notion of ‘equivalent protection’ had been framed in an unequal way. In the May letter (2000) the Minister of V&W had already pointed out how the cabinet defined equivalent protection.⁹⁵¹ Equivalent protection did not mean that the protection was exactly the same. Different criteria and norms could be applied, as long as they offered a similar level of protection against environmental effects as the PKB decisions would have done. From the perspective of the environmental lobby this rather vague description allowed for diverse interpretations. For example, the quote that the noise situation was not to deteriorate *per saldo* (*overall*) meant that growing levels of exposure in location A

⁹⁴⁷ TK 27603, Nr.5, April 10th 2001.

⁹⁴⁸ Interview Van Gijzel / Former member of the Lower House / PVDA, 2009

⁹⁴⁹ See for example Hoppe, 2002. See also chapter 5 on this.

⁹⁵⁰ SNM, Milieudefensie, MFH & PLRS, (2001) Wetsontwerp Wet Luchtvaart Schiphol. Letter to the Lower House, March 15th 2001.

⁹⁵¹ See Cabinet (2000), Letter to the Lower House, May 31st 2000, p.3.

could be compensated by lower levels at location B. This implied a loss of legal protection for local residents, as it was no longer sure how noise levels in their backyards would evolve.

The environmental lobby insisted upon a further clarification and reframing of the term 'equivalent protection.' Most importantly, the several norms that had been taken up in the PKB, but that were left outside the new Act, were yet to be included in the new Act. This included norms and limits for amounts of seriously hindered and sleep disturbed people and norms and limits for third party risks (both the IR zones and the GR). And why had the norms for local air pollution become relative ceilings instead of absolute ceilings? This implied that, if traffic volumes were to grow, the ceilings (i.e. the levels that were deemed acceptable) would grow at a corresponding rate. This was even stranger when considering that such a relative ceiling did not apply to any other sector. According to the environmental lobbyists, the cabinet was making an exception for the aviation sector once again, which they not deemed to be legitimate.

Besides, the environmental parties argued that in order to allow for a realistic political debate about the feasibility of the dual objective, the results of the EIA needed to be taken into account. Moreover, several other pieces of information that were not available yet were deemed necessary for proper decision making (the final advices of the EIA committee, the third advice of the Berkhout committee, and the designs of the two Decrees that were to accompany the new Schiphol Act). But even when the EIA results would be delivered and included, the environmental parties still believed that crucial information was lacking. After all, they had firmly criticized the Guidelines for the EIA before for its narrow focus.⁹⁵² Therefore, in order to be able to engage in proper political discussion they not only thought it necessary to await the EIA results, but also to improve the EIA.

The choice to develop a Schiphol Act instead of a revised PKB decision was also criticized. Even the High Court had advised to opt for a revised PKB, as this procedure was more extensive and contained more (legal) checks and balances.⁹⁵³ In another letter, the SNM proposed to use the Environmental Conservation Act to develop and lay down the environmental norms.⁹⁵⁴ Such a juridical instrument implied that the Ministry of VROM provided a license to operate as long as the operation stayed within environmental norms. Moreover, this juridical instrument had been applied to comparable companies and according to the environmental parties it offered far better

⁹⁵² Only a few alternatives had been assessed and the criteria that had been used for the assessment were not equivalent to those of the PKB.

⁹⁵³ TK 27603, Nr.A. February 8th 2001.

⁹⁵⁴ SNM, (2001), *Wet milieubeheer als kader voor de milieunormen aan Schiphol*. Note published on March 22nd, 2001.

possibilities for influencing Schiphol development.⁹⁵⁵ For one, it resulted in transparent and serious legal protection.

The environmental parties also raised their concerns about the effectiveness of the Schiphol Act and the possibilities for actually enforcing the regulations. First of all, the calculation model could never even approach the real levels of noise pollution, due to the many unrealistic assumptions about flight routes and weather conditions that had to be made. Second, the new measures (total volume noise and total volume safety) did not contain any steering opportunities. Third, the aviation sector itself took over the task of the Ministry of V&W (Enforcement Agency Aviation, *Handhavingsdienst Luchtvaart*) of monitoring the environmental effects. With regard to noise, Schiphol itself provided the input data and made the calculations from which it was to be derived whether or not the norms had been exceeded. The Inspectorate of the Ministry of V&W would do some random checks to verify whether or not the input data had been valid. This enforcement procedure held great possibilities for the aviation sector to manipulate the input data.⁹⁵⁶ And environmental parties and local residents were quite sure these possibilities would get used, drawing on their prior experiences with the aviation sector.⁹⁵⁷ From the perspective of the environmental lobby it was therefore unbelievable that the Ministry of V&W wanted to transfer this responsibility to the aviation sector.⁹⁵⁸ In essence, the new Schiphol Act implied a whole new division of responsibilities, as the Ministry of V&W would take over several of the former tasks of the Ministry of VROM (who used to be in charge of noise and other environmental effects), and the aviation sector would take over some of the tasks of the Ministry of V&W. The fact that enforcement of other environmental effects (noise) was transferred from VROM to V&W was related to the idea that this would make Schiphol policy less fragmented and to the fact that the Ministry of VROM simply did not have sufficient people and expertise available to enforce the new Act.⁹⁵⁹ Still, the fact that the aviation sector was to regulate itself did create some doubts within the Ministry of V&W. The main reason for this division of tasks seemed to be that there were no sufficient means available within the Ministry (expertise, time, people) to carry out this task, so it had to be done by the sector.⁹⁶⁰ On the other hand, it was also seen as the responsibility of the aviation sector to stay within the environmental limits, so it could be argued that it was part of the disentanglement of responsibilities that the aviation sector had to control its own operations.⁹⁶¹

⁹⁵⁵ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁹⁵⁶ Interview Wubben / Former researcher of the Ministry of V&W/To70/ NLR, 2009.

⁹⁵⁷ Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

⁹⁵⁸ Interview Van Arendonk / Milieufederatie Noord Holland, 2008.


⁹⁵⁹ Interview Abspoel / Policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009; Interview Klaver / Former policymaker of the Ministry of VROM, 2005.

⁹⁶⁰ Interview Wubben / Former researcher of the Ministry of V&W/To70/NLR, 2009.

⁹⁶¹ Interview Dortland / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009.

Finally, the cabinet’s claim that the new enforcement points were located in densely populated areas was not true, according to the environmental lobbyists. The SNM showed where the points were to be located in order to make this promise true (see figure 7.12).

Figure 7.12 Proposal of the Stichting Natuur & Milieu (Nature & Environment) to locate enforcement points in densely populated areas (yellow dots indicate the locations as taken up in the new regulative system, black crosses indicate new locations)



Source: SNM, 2006

The environmental lobby culminated in the development and presentation of an alternative Aviation Act, based on their definition of equivalent protection. This Act was called the Citizen Initiative Act (*Burgerinitiatiefwet*, 2001).

The Citizen initiative Act (2001)⁹⁶²

The Citizen initiative Act was meant to show how the new regulative system would look like when the cabinet would actually live up to their promises of the PKB decision of 1995. The Act deviated considerably from the one that the Cabinet had proposed, especially with regard to the issues of noise and third party risks. The proposal was developed with help from some juridical experts. With regard to noise, an alternative system was presented based on the requirements set by the PKB for the five runway system and the noise zones taken up in the Aviation Act of 1996. Instead of 30

⁹⁶² <http://www.geluidnieuws.nl/2001/jul2001/nm.html>. Derived from the web on 12th of June 2008.

enforcement points, 389 enforcement points were needed, spread over residential areas and protected nature areas in both the inner and outer areas of Schiphol.⁹⁶³ ⁹⁶⁴ The reason for this multiplicity of points was related to flawed assumptions underlying the system of the cabinet. The cabinet assumed that aircrafts followed precise routes, but the environmental parties and the aviation sector had already repeatedly argued that this was not possible in practice.⁹⁶⁵ This implied that noise pollution could vary considerably in specific areas, and this variety had to be taken into account in order to create a realistic system.⁹⁶⁶ The NLR was assigned by the environmental parties to calculate the norm (maximum level of pollution allowed) for each enforcement point, expressed in the new European measure (L_{den}).⁹⁶⁷ As several actors believed, the main difference with the proposal of the cabinet was that the extended system was more reliable, since it was better able to assess actual noise pollution. After all, if noise was calculated for 389 locations that were spread over a much broader area, much more information would be available about noise levels. Moreover, it implied legal protection for people living in both the inner (35Ke) and outer areas (35Ke-20Ke), thus not merely for those living in the inner area.⁹⁶⁸ Besides, the night regime was to be extended to 8 hours (23:00 – 7:00), instead of seven hours (23:00 – 6:00). Next to noise, the alternative Act also contained a proper translation of the other PKB promises as regards third party risks (standstill for several IR zones and GR), local air pollution (including CO²) and stench, calling for norms and limits that could be enforced in a transparent way.

The SNM who had developed the new regulative system for noise containing 389 enforcement points that was part of the Citizen Initiative Act had succeeded to organize broad support for this alternative regulative system for noise. At least 30 local municipalities supported the alternative design, especially those located outside the 35Ke zone. We already discussed that several of these municipalities had invested in measurement gear, as they distrusted the outcomes of the noise calculations of the Ministry of V&W. In essence, the environmental lobby was very well organized prior to the political debate about the new Schiphol Act in the Lower House. This made sure that their arguments were taken seriously by several members of the Lower House, giving rise to a heated political debate.

⁹⁶³ Fransen, J.T.J. (2000) Voorstel Meetpuntennetwerk geluidhinder. Utrecht, May 2000.

⁹⁶⁴ Fransen, J.T.J. (2000) Voorstel Meetpuntennetwerk geluidhinder. Utrecht, May 2000, p.2.

⁹⁶⁵ Newspaper Article NRC Handelsblad, May 3rd 2000, Netwerk van meetpunten om Schiphol.

⁹⁶⁶ Fransen, J.T.J. (2000) Voorstel Meetpuntennetwerk geluidhinder. Utrecht, May 2000, p.3.

⁹⁶⁷ NLR (2000) Herberekening Aanwijzing Schiphol; geluidsnormen Schiphol na 2003 met vijfbanenstelsel. NLR-CR-2000-222.

⁹⁶⁸ See for example Newspaper Article NRC Handelsblad, May 3rd 2000, Vliegelaai tot op huis bepaald.

7.10.2 Political debate in the Lower House Part 1 (April 2001)

Most arguments that made up the environmental lobby were taken up by a small political party that was part of the opposition (i.e. not one of the parties in the cabinet), the Christen Unie (Christen Union, CU). The CU is a Christian party, which mostly concentrates on ethical issues, such as a resistance against abortion, euthanasia and gay marriage. In other areas (e.g. immigration and the environment), the party often is closer to the left-wing parties.⁹⁶⁹ Therefore, they were concerned about the environmental impacts of aviation, and they tended to support the environmental interest groups. As part of the political lobby, Schiphol experts of the SNM prepared a report for the CU, containing several questions for the cabinet.⁹⁷⁰ By informing the CU the environmental lobby made sure that almost all of their doubts and considerations were brought into the debate. Amongst other things, members of the CU asked to treat the Citizen Initiative Act as a serious alternative. In general, the members of the CU argued that the new Act was not living up to the dual objective as it had initially been framed in the PKB (1995). More specifically, the members of the party that were part of the Lower House argued that it appeared that the mainport objective was redefined in a way that made additional growth possible, while the environmental objective was downsized in order to make this additional growth possible.

Some members of one of the larger political parties (PVDA) that was part of the Cabinet were also highly critical about the new Schiphol Act.⁹⁷¹ Prior to the design of the new Act politicians had agreed that the new Act was to be based on information (i.e. facts and figures) that was supported by all parties involved, especially the environmental parties and local residents (in order to increase transparency as part of the strategy to make a clean sweep). The reactions that the PVDA received proved that this was clearly not the case. The PVDA thought it necessary that the political debate was postponed until after the additional research had been presented (i.e. the third advice of the Berkhout committee, a concept of the EIA, a comparison with the noise situation anno 1990 using the new yardsticks, more precise explanation of enforcement procedures). A majority of the members in the Lower House agreed to this and the political debate was postponed, at least until after the EIA procedure had been finalized.

The critical attitude of the PVDA threatened a swift decision making process, and the Minister of V&W who was also a member of the PVDA, was not very pleased about this. Summer recess was crouching near, during which the PVDA had some internal deliberations. After summer the PVDA withdrew several questions and according to

⁹⁶⁹ <http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/ChristenUnie>. Derived from the web on June 8th 2008.

⁹⁷⁰ SNM, (2001), Report prepared for the CU 'Wijz. Wet luchtvaart inzake de inrichting en het gebruik van Schiphol', April 3rd 2001

⁹⁷¹ Interview Van Gijssel / Former member of the Lower House/PvdA, 2009.

some commentators they seemed to have let go of their more critical attitude as regards Schiphol affairs.⁹⁷² When the Lower House resumed the debate in autumn of 2001, the possibility for creating a majority coalition in the Lower House in support of the new Schiphol Act was growing. At that time, the concept results of the (narrowly defined) EIA were made available.

7.10.3 Environmental Impact Assessment Schiphol 2003 (October 2001)

In order to assess the environmental impacts new traffic forecasts were needed. The aviation sector delivered traffic scenarios for 2005 and 2010, from which the environmental effects were derived. These effects were compared to the criteria taken up in the EIA (especially 10,000 houses within 35Ke) and the scenarios were downscaled until these maximum amounts had been reached. Next, the resulting scenario (i.e. the one that had a fit between traffic growth and environmental limits) was used to calculate the environmental effects in terms of the new measures (L_{den} and TVG for noise, TVE for safety). Almost all actors involved criticized this way of assessing environmental effects. Within the Ministry of V&W some advisors indicated that this procedure resulted in a scenario that had nothing to do with the real world.⁹⁷³ Besides, the aviation market was highly volatile, which made it a risky affair to use only one scenario, as had been illustrated during the aftermath of the PKB decision. The aviation sector (KLM and Schiphol) also had considerable doubts about this way of working. Especially the KLM indicated several times that the resulting scenario was probably a far cry from what was really going to happen.⁹⁷⁴ The environmental actors agreed to this. Moreover, they argued that the real environmental effects could not be assessed with such a fictive scenario.⁹⁷⁵ In sum, both the procedure and the choice for one scenario were criticized within the Ministry of V&W and by the aviation sector. But in the end, the leading policy makers of the Ministry decided to hold on to this way of working, thus using this rather arbitrary scenario to argue that the dual objective as defined (and that was argued to offer the same level of protection as the old one) in the new Schiphol Act could be realized. There was no time left for other solutions.

In the concept of the EIA report it was concluded that the old (PKB) and new (Schiphol Act) system offered the same level of protection, at least, when the equivalent protection was framed in the specific way as had been done by the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W. In the EIA report several differences between the old and new system were summed up:

⁹⁷² Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

⁹⁷³ Interview Wubben / Former researcher of the Ministry of V&W/To70/NLR, 2009.

⁹⁷⁴ In a sector report of 2005 that we shall extensively discuss in the next chapter, they argued that they had indicated this at several occasions.

⁹⁷⁵ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

1. The standstill for third party risk was solely defined in terms of the IR 10⁻⁶ contour. Other IR contours and a norm for Group Risk were not taken into account. The cabinet argued that the norm for Group Risk was to be included in 2005.
2. CO² emissions were not included in the standstill for local air pollution anymore (and the norms had already been increased). It was argued that CO² did not fall under the category of local air pollution. It did not contribute to the local air quality. It was a problem that had to be dealt with on an international level.⁹⁷⁶
3. The standstill for stench was also released. The cabinet had already argued that stench was not part of the environmental objective anymore.⁹⁷⁷
4. With regard to noise it was argued that the amount of seriously hindered people and houses was to improve. However, this was only calculated for the inner area (35Ke zone), and no protection was taken up for the outer areas, despite the promise to do so in the PKB of 1995. The cabinet argued that the so-called shadow working⁹⁷⁸ of the 35Ke enforcement points would make sure that noise levels were lower than 35Ke beyond the points. Furthermore, additional research was needed to decide about the extended night regime (from 6AM to 7AM) that had been promised in the PKB.
5. With regard to noise, the promise to measure pollution was not fulfilled. The cabinet argued that the measurement tools needed to be revised in order to be reliable.

In an immediate response to the concept of the EIA, the EIA committee still doubted very much whether the old and the new system really offered an equivalent level of protection. Moreover, the committee raised a more fundamental question. They wondered whether the right question had been asked when designing the new Schiphol Act. The main design principle was the level of equivalence, but wouldn't it be much more effective to focus on a system that offered the best environmental protection?⁹⁷⁹ This question had also been asked by policy makers of the Ministry of V&W, but in the end it did not change the focus of the Ministry.⁹⁸⁰ Moreover, to answer this question was not the concern of the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W. They had been given a political assignment and it was their task to carry out this assignment as good as possible, i.e. developing a regulative system that offered an equivalent level of protection as the one it came to replace.⁹⁸¹ As we have seen, during the previous years several experts had tried to reframe the focus of the assignment in order to develop the

⁹⁷⁶ Environmental Impact Assessment Schiphol 2003, (2002), Final Report, February 2002. p.33.

⁹⁷⁷ Environmental Impact Assessment Schiphol 2003, (2002), Final Report, February 2002. p.36.

⁹⁷⁸ In Dutch: Schaduwwerking.

⁹⁷⁹ Interview Ale / safety expert and member of the EIA committee Schiphol, 2009.

⁹⁸⁰ Interview Wubben / Former researcher of the Ministry of V&W/To70/NLR, 2009.

⁹⁸¹ Interview Dortland / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009; Interview Gosse / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009.

most effective regulative system (e.g. the several advices of the Berkhout Committee, OMEGAM who had proposed to measure noise, Stallen, who had proposed a social-psychological approach to noise).⁹⁸² In the end, this had very little effect on the final design of the Schiphol Act.

7.10.4. Political debate in the Lower House Part 2 (October – November 2001)

After the publication of the concept EIA report the Minister of V&W wanted to resume the political debate as soon as possible. In order to influence the debate, the joint environmental parties sent another letter to the Lower House on October 2nd, repeating their arguments of the letter they had sent in March.⁹⁸³ At the same time, the aviation sector also engaged in an intensive political lobby, as was always the case prior to important political decision making. They urged the politicians to ratify the new Act as soon as possible, as it needed to be in place before 2003. To them, this was of crucial importance for facilitating the hub-and-spoke operations.

During the political discussion in the Lower House all the smaller political parties (Groen Links/GL, Socialistische Partij/SP, D66 and CU) were very critical about the new Act. Only one out of the three larger parties (PVDA) also doubted the level of equivalence (the other coalition parties VVD and CDA were already in favor of the Act). Members of D66 brought forward that the main objective for which the new regulative system was developed, i.e. building more support for Schiphol policy, had clearly not been achieved.⁹⁸⁴ Besides, they argued that they were not convinced about the equivalent protection themselves either. Another party, i.e. the Groen Links party, inserted a motion requesting to include a different and better yardstick for noise.⁹⁸⁵ The EIA committee had clearly indicated that the TVG (total volume noise) didn't say anything about the total amount of seriously hindered people. As an alternative the committee proposed a different yardstick, the TAEG (*Totaal Aantal Ernstig Gehinderden*, total amount of seriously hindered people) which allowed them to assess and compare the amount of seriously hindered people. This idea was brought forward in the motion of the Groen Links party, but was voted down.

The publication of the Environmental Monitor 2001 (published by the RIVM in September 2001) that the Minister of VROM discussed in the Lower house had also enhanced political unrest.⁹⁸⁶ This was reflected in the large amount of motions that was submitted during the debate. The feasibility of the pronounced level of equivalence was

⁹⁸² Interview Muchall / noise expert, 2009; Interview Stallen / noise expert, 2009; Interview Wijnen / Noise Expert, 2009.

⁹⁸³ SNM, Milieudefensie, MFH & PLRS, (2001) Wetgevingsoverleg Wet Luchtvaart Schiphol. Letter to the Lower House, October 2nd 2001.

⁹⁸⁴ See for example, TK Handelingen 2001 -2002, Nr.14.

⁹⁸⁵ TK 27603, Nr.35, October 8th 2001.

⁹⁸⁶ TK 27603, Nr.35, October 8th 2001.

questioned in at least 28 motions and amendments.⁹⁸⁷ With regard to noise, the members of the Lower House brought forward their serious doubts about the definition of equivalence and about the ways this level of equivalence had been assessed. One of the main concerns was the lacking legal protection of the outer areas. As a matter of compromise the Minister of V&W agreed to add 15 -30 new enforcement points within the 35 – 20Ke zone (the outer areas). However, these points were to serve as monitoring points, meaning that no limits that could be legally enforced were attached to them. From 2005 onwards, these monitoring points, or a similar system, would become legally embedded, thus promising that noise pollution in the outer areas was to be controlled and enforced from 2005 onwards.⁹⁸⁸ From the perspective of the environmental parties this was only a minor gesture. After all, they had requested 389 enforcement points spread over the inner and outer areas, all offering immediate legal protection. According to the Minister, only 35 – 50 points were needed because these were precisely located at the spots where flight routes ran over. However, the aviation sector (and especially Air Traffic Control) indicated once more that these flight routes could never be followed exactly. They had suggested to broaden flight routes (5 – 10 kilometers), making sure that the real flight routes fell within these boundaries (and not outside the routes, where flying was prohibited). This advice was taken over by the Minister, but the amount and location of enforcement points was not changed. The consequence was that aircrafts were allowed to fly over much broader areas, while noise pollution was still calculated for the same locations that had been proposed earlier.⁹⁸⁹ According to the environmental parties this practice had nothing to do with assessing the real noise effects.⁹⁹⁰ The issue of Group Risk caused similar conflict during the debate.

Debating Group Risk

Ever since the Bijlmer disaster, third party risk, and Group Risk in particular, had been one of the main concerns of the PVDA.⁹⁹¹ In line with the PKB promise, a majority of the Lower House wanted to include a norm for Group Risk. However, the Minister argued that the statistical causal model that was being developed needed to be ready first before it was possible to develop a proper norm. This way, the development of the statistical causal model became linked to the issue of Group Risk. The PVDA had submitted a motion wherein it was stated that a standstill for Group Risk was to be included in the new Schiphol Act right after the statistical causal model had been finished (in 2005).⁹⁹² A majority supported the motion and therefore there was still need to develop a norm for Group Risk in the near future. However, it also implied that the

⁹⁸⁷ TK Stemmingen, Oktober 18th 2001, Nr. 15.

⁹⁸⁸ ONL, 2001, Nr. 9.

⁹⁸⁹ Newspaper Article Volkskrant, Milieubeloften Schiphol zijn vergeten. October 8th 2001 by Kees Kodde & Jan Franssen.

⁹⁹⁰ Interview Van Arendonk / Milieufederatie Noord Holland, 2008; Interview Franssen / SNM, 2009.

⁹⁹¹ Interview Van Gijssel / Former member of the Lower House/PVDA, 2009.

⁹⁹² TK 27603, Nr. 53, October 17th 2001, later revised, Nr. 62, October 18th 2001.

GR discussion was postponed, and the GR was no longer a stumbling block for gaining political approval for the new Act. At the same time, safety experts had repeatedly indicated that such a statistical causal model was not important for defining a norm for Group Risk. Moreover, they argued that a standstill was impossible. According to them, postponing the Group Risk decision-making by linking it to the development of a causal model was merely a strategy to speed up political decision making.⁹⁹³ By means of compensation the cabinet emphasized that they had already been working on the development of additional spatial measures that would greatly reduce Group Risks. This was done in close cooperation with the regional actors, as had been promised in the May Letter of the cabinet (2000). This way, the issue of Group Risk was very much turned into a regional spatial planning affair, which probably contributed to making the urgency for decisions about Group Risk on the national level (in the Lower House) less urgent.⁹⁹⁴

Ratification of the Schiphol Act (October 30th 2001)

On October the 30th the Lower House was to vote about the Schiphol Act. Time pressure to put the 5-runway system into operation had made the Minister of V&W to insist upon a quick vote. From the perspective of the environmental lobbyists this was a strategy to make careful discussion impossible.⁹⁹⁵ Nonetheless, the prior political debate resulted in a whole list of amendments and motions, as discussed before, most of which led to minor revisions of the initial Act.⁹⁹⁶ It had been clear that the smaller political parties were going to vote against the Act (SP, Groen Links, CU and D66). The vote against the Act of D66 was important, as D66 was part of the cabinet. Members of D66 once again repeated that the main objective for developing a new regulative system, i.e. replacing the PKB for an Act that could count on public support and that was more transparent and better enforceable, was not achieved. The local residents and environmental actors seemed to put even less trust in the Schiphol Act than they had put in the PKB decision of 1995.⁹⁹⁷ For this reason of lacking transparency and lacking societal support, D66 could not vote in favor of the new Act.⁹⁹⁸ It had also been clear that two out of the three larger political parties would vote in favor of the new Act (VVD and CDA). Therefore, the vote of the PVDA members would become decisive.

⁹⁹³ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

⁹⁹⁴ I could not find direct empirical proof for this claim, hence the use of the word 'probably' (although suggestions of the like were made in several interviews).

⁹⁹⁵ SNM, (2001), Internal Memo Evaluation Decision Making Process Schiphol Law, October 25th, 2001.

⁹⁹⁶ See for overview of amendments TK Handelingen 2001 -2002, Nr.14, Nr. 15 873- 876 October 25th and October 26th.

⁹⁹⁷ And indeed, local residents indicated that this was the case (Interview Griesse / local resident, 2009; Interview Van Ojik/local resident, 2008).

⁹⁹⁸ TK Handelingen 2001 – 2002, Nr.6 – October 30th 2001.

The spokesperson of the PVDA (Van Gijzel) did not believe that the old and new systems offered equal protection. He had already had several discussions about this with the leader of the party (Melkert) and the Minister of V&W (Netelenbos) who was also a member of the PVDA. Van Gijzel insisted upon a norm for Group Risk, as a precondition for voting in favor of the new Act. Both the Minister and the party leader were not very pleased about this and they invited a leading policy maker of the Ministry of V&W to convince the other members of the party about the need to vote in favor of the Schiphol Act.⁹⁹⁹ Nonetheless, the majority of the party remained in favor of a norm for Group Risk. In one last attempt to reach consensus, the conflict between Van Gijzel on the one hand and the Minister and party leader on the other hand escalated. They requested him to withdraw the motion. Van Gijzel responded that he would only do this when the Minister would explain to the public that further growth of Schiphol would lead to an increase of Group Risks. The Minister declined this offer.¹⁰⁰⁰ Van Gijzel submitted the motion during the political debate, and it was supported by a majority of the Lower House. Now the motion had been accepted and the need to develop a norm for Group Risk in the near future was included in the new Schiphol Act, most PVDA members were satisfied and voted in favor of the Schiphol Act. This meant that a majority of the Lower House supported the Act and that the Act was ratified on October 30th 2001.¹⁰⁰¹ Nonetheless, not long after the motion had been accepted, Van Gijzel left the Lower House on November 28th 2001. It was the result of different problems between him and some of the party leaders, of which the Schiphol problem was only one.¹⁰⁰²

After the ratification in the Lower House, the Act was passed on to the Upper House for final decision making. In the meantime, the Ministry of VROM had been developing additional spatial measures as had been promised to the Lower House during the debate about Group Risk. Before discussing the political debate in the Upper House (7.12) we first discuss the issue of Group Risk (7.11).

7.11 Debating the Mid Term (5): Elaborating Group Risk (November 2001)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				
Mid term	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6			Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10	Part 6. – 7.12	

⁹⁹⁹ Interview Dortland / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009.
¹⁰⁰⁰ Interview Van Gijzel / Former member of the Lower House/PVDA, 2009.
¹⁰⁰¹ TK 27603, Nr.16, October 30th 2001.
¹⁰⁰² Hence, there is certainly not a causal relationship between the troubles about Schiphol and his leaving.

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During the political discussion about the GR it had been decided that additional spatial measures were to be developed. It was especially the Ministry of VROM who had argued for this, as the conclusions of the Environmental Monitor of the RIVM pointed out that increasing traffic volumes would increase risks. The Ministry of VROM took the lead and started to develop spatial measures in close cooperation with the province of North Holland and the municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam. Settling the issue was important, because at that time the Group Risk issue involved a real danger for gathering a majority supporting the new Schiphol Act in the Lower House.

The discussion had to take place within the context of the debate about regional spatial-economic development. After all, space was scarce in the region, and there were a lot of spatial claims for which a trade off was to be made. Establishing building free zones in order to reduce the Group Risks made it more difficult to fulfill claims for housing, office sites, industrial sites etc. Before discussing the regional debate about Group Risk (7.11.2) we shortly set out the context, discussing the different, often high stakes involved in the debate (7.11.1). We start with a short introduction of the new corporate strategy of Schiphol, which led to considerable demands for space in the airport region.

7.11.1 Regional context: Spatial development and Group Risk

Schiphol: extending the Airport City

We already mentioned that Schiphol had broadened its mainport strategy with the Airport City Strategy. This basically implied that Schiphol wanted to become an airside and landside hub and an attractive area for economic and urban developments. The airport company had been adapting its organizational structure to reflect the changing business strategy. Separate business units, labelled Schiphol Project Consult and Schiphol International were set up for the consultancy and international undertakings. In 1998 these units became independent limited liability companies. In 1999 the name of the airport company was changed to reflect the increasing diversity of activities. The overall company name became Schiphol Group, rather than Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, which was now just one organization within the structure. In addition there were three independent subsidiaries – Schiphol Project Consult, Schiphol International and Schiphol Real Estate, a unit for domestic airports, and units for Schiphol Support Services and ICT.¹⁰⁰³ The increasing focus on landside development was mostly

¹⁰⁰³ Schiphol Group, Annual Report, 1999; Several initiatives were undertaken to work together with other airport companies. In 1999 for example the Pantares alliance with Frankfurt Airport (Fraport) was formed in order to cooperate in areas such as IT, handling and cargo, retail, property development and international activities. The main reasons for Schiphol Group to expand overseas and entering into new alliances is its relatively small home market and the uncertainty about the long-term growth of the airport.

reflected in the BU Schiphol Real Estate. Schiphol Real Estate (SRE) was established to develop and manage the real estate sites on the airport territory and at some of the airport related locations in the region.¹⁰⁰⁴ SRE's focus included platform-related industrial sites and airport-related office locations, thereby distinguishing itself from the airport-related industrial activities that the Schiphol Airport Development Company developed, in which the Schiphol Group was also still participating.¹⁰⁰⁵ All in all, the broader corporate strategy (i.e. the inclusion of the Airport City objective) had turned Schiphol into a more important actor in the field of regional spatial development than before. Figure 7.13 gives a future impression of the Airport City, as visualized by Schiphol.

Figure 7.13 Impression AirportCity Schiphol



Source: Schiphol Group, 2006

Regional and Local authorities

At the same time, the regional and local public authorities held on to their joint spatial-economic development strategy, supported by the cabinet's emphasis on strengthening the competitive position of the Randstad. This strategy had been successful during the 1990s in the sense that several European headquarters and distribution centers had settled in the airport region and retail and office facilities had settled at the centre of the airport complex.^{1006 1007}

One additional development that urged the regional and local public authorities to reap the benefits of the economic potential of Schiphol was related to the changing structure

¹⁰⁰⁴ Interview Van Boxtel / Schiphol Group, 2010.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Van Wijk, 2007.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Ministerie van Economische Zaken (1999), Nota Ruimtelijk Economisch Beleid. The Hague.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Bleumink, P. (1995), Mainportregio Nederland. Buck consultants international. Here quoted from Kuipers. B. (1999), Flexibiliteit in de Rotterdamse Havenregio. Uitgeverij Eburon, Delft.

of the tax system in the Netherlands (i.e. the fiscal system). The Netherlands had a rather centralized tax system, implying that local governments could hardly influence the income and expenses flows.¹⁰⁰⁸ In order to stimulate a more pro-active, entrepreneurial municipal attitude the Government Scientific Advisory Council (WRR, i.e. the same council that had recommended a new procedure for large infrastructure projects, see 7.3) argued for making the local level in the Netherlands, in particular major cities like Amsterdam, more sensitive for their revenue structure.¹⁰⁰⁹ This was all part of the government wide decentralization strategy that emerged during the 1990s, making municipalities more responsible for their own territories and finances, including attracting their own tax revenues. Still, financial independence increased only slightly in the 1990s: in 2002 the largest source of income were specific grants awarded by the national government (44%), the general grants from the Municipal Fund, based on size and income of the municipalities (38%), and 18% local taxes.¹⁰¹⁰ At the same time, it was the dependence on the general grant that made Dutch municipalities relatively independent: a stabile source of income was guaranteed and the municipalities were relatively free to decide about investments. Airport revenues were therefore no direct income tax base for the municipalities near the airport, but selling land and booming land prices were becoming more and more important.¹⁰¹¹

At the same time, the Schiphol Group argued that lower taxes would improve the airport's attractiveness to businesses, facilitating the development of an AirportCity and therefore mainport development. A more attractive fiscal structure (i.e. low taxes, subsidies to attract companies) was deemed to be an important location factor in the competition with other (international) regions.¹⁰¹²

In order to deal with the Airport City development and make sure that there was no mismatch with other spatial developments, the BFS platform (i.e. North Holland, Haarlemmermeer, Amsterdam, Schiphol) developed the Spatial-Economic Perspective on the Schiphol Region in 2001 (*Ruimtelijk-Economische Visie Schipholregio*, REVS). The REVS was a joint perspective on the spatial-economic development of the broad Schiphol area. The REVS was developed to coordinate the development of business locations and industrial sites and several areas were reserved for this (see figure 7.14).¹⁰¹³

¹⁰⁰⁸ Terhorst & van de Ven, 1997; Van Wijk, 2007.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Wetenschappelijke Raad Regeringsbeleid (1990), Van de stad en de rand. Government Report, The Hague.

¹⁰¹⁰ Korthals Altes, W.K. (2002). Local government and the decentralization of urban regeneration policies in the Netherlands. In: Urban Studies, Vol. 39, Nr.8, pp.1439-1452.

¹⁰¹¹ Van Wijk, 2007, p.196.

¹⁰¹² Interview Kranenburg / Schiphol Group, 2008.

¹⁰¹³ Provincie Noord Holland, Gemeente Amsterdam, Gemeente Haarlemmermeer & Schiphol Group (2002) *Ruimtelijk Economische Visie Schipholregio*. De uitwerking. Haarlem.

Figure 7.14 Regional perspective on land reservations for industrial sites (left) and offices (right)



Source: REVS, 2002

Instead of developing competing sites, synergies were sought after through adequate coordination. The REVS was therefore an actualization and further elaboration of the earlier reports issued by the BFS. Moreover, it served as a background document for the discussion about the Group Risk appointments that were being made with the Ministry of VROM in 2001. A clear perspective on economic development sites was needed in order to assess the desirability of spatial restrictions. The Perspective was laid down in a concrete development strategy, including concrete investments and planning, and this was ratified by the BFS in November 2003.¹⁰¹⁴

A new regional platform: Bestuurlijke Regiegroep Schiphol (2001)

Nonetheless, in order to increase the influence on both the airport planning of Schiphol Group and the political decision making of the national government the regional and local authorities felt the need to bring the regional public perspective more to the fore. Therefore, the province of North Holland initiated a new regional coordinative platform, the *Bestuurlijke Regiegroep Schiphol* (BRS, Managerial Directing Group Schiphol) in 2001.¹⁰¹⁵ The BRS consisted of a small core group (Province of North Holland, municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer – *BRS-klein*) and a large advisory group (i.e. members of BRS-klein plus the provinces South Holland, Utrecht and 36 municipalities affected by airplanes – *BRS-groot*). The BRS differed from the BFS in two important ways. First, the BRS did not involve the Schiphol Group, so it dealt with public interests only. Second, BRS adopted a much broader focus, coordinating all spatial developments of the region (and not only the development of industrial and office locations).¹⁰¹⁶ The BRS aimed to coordinate the regional decision making as regards the future development of Schiphol and to bring the regional perspectives and

¹⁰¹⁴ Interview Rensing / Province North Holland, 2005.

¹⁰¹⁵ Interview Van Duin / Province of North Holland, 2007.

¹⁰¹⁶ Interview Van Duin / Province of North Holland, 2007.

interests into the Schiphol debate in a structured way. The three core partners reasoned that one strong regional perspective would have more chances to exert actual influence than three rather fragmented voices.¹⁰¹⁷ In essence, the BRS served to align the different spatial perspectives and bring these to the attention of the national policy makers and politicians.

Summing up: a shared regional interest

It was clear that the most important actors involved in matters of regional spatial economic development shared some major interests. Schiphol wanted to create an Airport City and the local and regional authorities wanted to benefit as much as possible from the economic spin offs of the airport by developing industrial sites and office sites in its vicinity. Moreover, regional economic development was becoming more important for the lower governmental authorities as the regional and local authorities became more and more dependent on their own sources of income, as a consequence of the new decentralized tax system. As such, it was in the interest of both Schiphol Group and the regional and local public authorities to make sufficient spatial reservations for economic development. Additional spatial restrictions to minimize Group Risks were therefore only welcomed if these did not harm the economic development potential. The joint interest provided the regional and local actors with a strong position in the negotiations with the Ministry of VROM as regards these additional spatial measures.

7.11.2 Spatial measures for dealing with Group Risk (November 2001)

Only one month later the Minister of VROM stated that these additional appointments had been made with the regional and local public authorities (North Holland, Haarlemmermeer, Amsterdam), meant to selectively restrict further development of offices and industrial sites.¹⁰¹⁸ The proposal concerned the introduction of a more refined density-politics for offices and industries, elaborating on earlier decisions about spatial restrictions.¹⁰¹⁹ Specific areas were reserved for Schiphol-related business activities only, which allowed for controlling Group Risks and facilitating mainport development at the same time. The restrictions that were already in place were further elaborated. In the end five zones were distinguished, with different gradations of spatial restrictions, dependent on their distance from the airport (i.e. becoming less strict as distance from the runways increased). A new measure was introduced in order to design the different zones, i.e. the accident ratio. These accident ratios referred to the % chance that if a plane crash was to occur, it would occur within this territory. Thus, the 80% ratio indicated the area where 4 out of 5 crashes would take place. The five zones were:

¹⁰¹⁷ Overview BRS (2001), Internal report Province of North Holland, 2001.

¹⁰¹⁸ TK 26959, Nr.19, November 23rd 2001.

¹⁰¹⁹ As taken up in the PKB, Partial Revision Regional Plan ANZKG, 1995, TNLI 1997, SBTL, 1998, TNL, 1999, May letter 2000.

1. Total Free-zone (stays the same)
2. IR 10^{-5} (stays the same)
3. Between IR 10^{-5} and 80% broadly corresponding with the IR 10^{-6}
4. Between 80% and 95%
5. Between 95% and Free-zone

Due to the fact that the accident ratio was a new measure, it was translated into the old measure, where the 80% area corresponded with the IR 10^{-6} (broadly). This measure was to be included in one of the two Decrees that were to accompany the new Schiphol Act, whereas the measures concerning the area outside 10^{-6} were to be included in the Fifth Report on Spatial Planning (which would never be finished and published). Houses had to be demolished in zone 1, and the prohibition of new constructions applied to all other zones. Less stringent criteria were developed for the construction of offices and industrial sites, in line with the policy strategy that had already been developed during the PASO/PKB process.

The appointments were translated into the new Regional Spatial Plan of the Province of North Holland.¹⁰²⁰ The Regional Plan did not differ much from its 1996 precursor. Three circles were drawn around Schiphol for office and industrial locations that were related to aviation.¹⁰²¹ Airport relatedness was still the main criterion for granting companies permissions to settle in one of the three zones. In practice, the decision to grant permission for constructions was mostly dependent on the expected added value for economic development of the region (from the perspective of the BRS) and the added value for the Airport City development (from the perspective of Schiphol Group).¹⁰²² After all, in an era of globalization almost all economic activities had some direct or indirect relationship with aviation.¹⁰²³

In the end, the zone with housing restrictions was much larger than the zone to which restrictions for offices and industries applied (see figure 7.15). This was in everyone's interest, although it made it difficult to reduce the level of Group Risk.

¹⁰²⁰ Provincie Noord Holland (2003), Streekplan Noord Holland Zuid. Haarlem.

¹⁰²¹ 1. Schiphol-Centrum is designated for platform-related activities and high-dynamic internationalised business services;
 2. The locations Elzenhof, Schiphol-Oost, De Hoek-Noord and Badhoevedorp-Zuid are in circle two, which allows all activities of the centre plus aviation industry offices, airport related offices, industries and distribution etc., where the added value or volume of goods is at least 25% air cargo;
 3. The third circle allows all previously addressed activities and international operating companies in the areas Beukenhorst-Zuid and Beukenhorst-Oost-Oost, De Hoek-West, Zuidas, IBM-location, Riekerpolder and Oude Haagsewegzone.

¹⁰²² Interview Van Bortel/Schiphol Group, 2010.

¹⁰²³ Van Wijk, 2007.

After the issue of Group Risk had been settled (i.e. by postponing the decisions for a norm to 2005 and agreeing upon additional spatial measures), the political debate about the Schiphol Act continued in the Upper House.

Figure 7.15 Difference between area to which restrictions for offices and industries applied (yellow zone) and to which restrictions for housing applied (blue zone)



Source: Milieu & Natuurplanbureau, 2005; p.35

7.12 Debating the Mid Term (6): Political Ratification of the Schiphol Act in the Upper House (November 2001 – July 2002)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Long term > 2015	Part 1: Preparing policy – 7.3			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.4				
Short term < 2003	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.5			Part 2: Formal decision making – 7.7				
Mid term 2003 - 2015	Part 1: Preparing Policy – 7.6			Part 2. – 7.8	Part 3. – 7.9	Part 4. – 7.10 Part 5. – 7.11	Part 6. – 7.12	

The discussion in the Upper House about the new Schiphol Act started in November 2001. The Members of the Upper House were extremely critical about the new Act. They heavily doubted whether the new regulative system would offer the same level of protection as promised in the PKB of 1995. This resulted in a rather lengthy and agitated discussion between the Members and the responsible Ministers, who kept stressing the sense of urgency to make sure that the new Act was ready on time (7.12.2). In the meantime, the final version of the EIA Schiphol 2003 had become available, which contained important information that fuelled the debate (7.12.1).

7.12.1 Environmental Impact Assessment (February 2002)

Final Report

In February 2002 the final report of the EIA Schiphol 2003 was presented, with minor revisions when compared to the concept. The main conclusion did not change: the old and new regulative systems offered an equivalent level of protection.¹⁰²⁴ In its final advice about the new Schiphol Act the EIA committee remained highly critical; they heavily doubted the level of equivalence, and especially the way in which it had been assessed.¹⁰²⁵ They repeated their earlier criticisms. For example, both the EIA committee and the environmental experts of the SNM argued that the scenarios that had been used to determine the limits of the enforcement points and the Total Noise Volume (TVG) were wrong, resulting in unrealistic conclusions.¹⁰²⁶ Again, they advised to conduct an additional EIA that was meant to assess and compare the actual environmental effects.

The Ministers of V&W and VROM responded by stating that they didn't agree with the advice. However, they merely responded to a small part of the advice, and the advice itself was presented in selective and incomplete way.¹⁰²⁷ For example, the Ministers ignored the argument of the EIA committee that the calculated levels of noise pollution were too low as a consequence of the specific scenario used and the specific assumptions underlying the calculation method. The same held true for their comment that the proposed 30-50 enforcement points of the new system could never offer equal protection as the 300 points of the old system would have done. The TVG was rejected as an adequate norm and the lack of a norm for Group Risk was condemned once again, but the Ministers did not respond to these allegations. But the Ministers did respond to the assertion that there was need for enforcement points in the outer area, arguing that this would be settled before 2006. An advice of the EIA committee did not have any binding power, but due to the selective and wrong way wherein it was interpreted by the Ministers, the chairman of the committee decided to send a letter to the Lower House on May 2nd 2002. This was a highly unusual strategy, as it did not often happen that the EIA committee sought public attention. In fact, the members of the EIA committee had been furious about the way the Ministers had dealt with their advice in the Upper House.¹⁰²⁸ All the advices they had issued during the previous years that were meant to develop a realistic understanding of the environmental effects of air traffic had been

¹⁰²⁴ Environmental Impact Assessment Schiphol 2003, February 2003.

¹⁰²⁵ Environmental Impact Assessment Committee, Final Advice EIA Schiphol 2003, March 11th 2002.

¹⁰²⁶ As explained before, the scenarios were therefore downscaled in a linear way, until they matched the levels that were required (i.e. that were argued to be equivalent).

¹⁰²⁷ EIA Committee, (2002), Letter to the Members of the Lower House about the EIA advice of March 11th, May 2nd, 2002. In this letter the committee states that 'De kritiekpunten van de Commissie voor de m.e.r. worden in de reactie van de ministers slechts ten dele besproken en inhoudelijk selectief en onvolledig weergegeven.'

¹⁰²⁸ Interview Ale / Safety expert and member EIA committee Schiphol, 2009.

structurally ignored by the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W. As such, the proper research questions, i.e. the ones that really mattered from the perspective of the experts of the EIA committee, had not been asked.¹⁰²⁹ The timing of the criticism was very unlucky for the Ministers, as it was just before the political decision making about the new Schiphol Act was to begin in the Upper House.

Criticism of environmental lobby (Winter 2002)

The joint environmental parties assigned the NLR to compare the old (as laid down in the PKB and the related Aviation Act *Aanwijzing Luchtvaartterreinen Schiphol, 1996*) and new regulative system, based on their own list of criteria (i.e. all criteria as taken up in the PKB 1995). In its final report that was, issued in February 2002, the NLR concluded that the systems did not offer equal protection.¹⁰³⁰ In a few residential areas the levels of noise pollution would decrease (Zaanstad-zuid, Leiden-noord), while it would increase in several other areas (municipalities of Koog aan de Zaan, Spaarndam, Hilversum West). At night overall levels would increase even more, resulting in more sleep disturbed people. The reduction of enforcement points further undermined the possibilities to properly account for real levels of noise pollution. For example, in order to develop an adequate perspective on pollution in Amsterdam West and Amstelveen at least 10 points were deemed necessary instead of 1. Drawing on the NLR report, the joint environmental parties heavily criticized both the EIA report and the new Schiphol Act and related Decrees. The environmental lobby also repeated the advice of the EIA committee.¹⁰³¹ The EIA did not prove that the old and new regulative system offered equal protection, and therefore there was need for an additional EIA wherein the real effects were assessed, based on realistic assumptions.¹⁰³² For example, in order to be really equivalent in terms of noise pollution, at least 60% less traffic should be assumed in between 6.00 – 7.00 AM.¹⁰³³ Moreover, the environmental parties and the local residents ventilated their disappointment about the fact that the results of the RIVM research about the relationship between sleep disturbance and aircraft noise had not been available yet. This way, the issue of health had hardly played a role during the design of the new regulative system, and it wouldn't play a role during the political deliberations either, even though this had been promised back in 1999.¹⁰³⁴

In April 2002 the environmental parties strengthened their political lobby. The SNM and the PLRS (platform uniting all grassroots organizations) did most of the

¹⁰²⁹ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise expert and member of the Schiphol EIA Committee, 2010.

¹⁰³⁰ NLR-rapport 'Vergelijking geluidbelasting MER Schiphol 2003 met herberekening Aanwijzing S5P 1996'.

¹⁰³¹ SNM, (2002), Notitie consequenties toetsingsadvies Cie MER voor Verkeersbesluit (procedurevergadering), March 19th 2002.

¹⁰³² SNM, Milieudefensie, MFH & PLRS, (2002), Press Release Vliegtuiglawaai Schiphol straks groter. February 28th 2002.

¹⁰³³ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

¹⁰³⁴ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

lobbying.¹⁰³⁵ As a first step, experts of the SNM sent a personal letter to one senator of the Upper House, Mr. Baarda, who had adopted a critical attitude as regards the assumed level of equivalence. The main message of this letter was that the members of the Upper House should not give in to the pressure of the cabinet to hurry up with the decision-making. The necessary information was not available yet, and accelerating decision-making could only come at the expense of the quality of the final decisions.¹⁰³⁶ At the same time, the SNM experts directly informed the members of the Upper House about the shortcomings of the new Schiphol Act and especially about the lower levels of legal protection that the new Act offered.¹⁰³⁷

Finally, the environmental parties insisted upon a second opinion of the High Court about the Act. The Upper House wanted to take over this request.¹⁰³⁸ The Minister of V&W was not very pleased about this. She stated that the inclusion of the High Court would only result in further delays, making it impossible to reach the deadline.¹⁰³⁹ According to the Minister further delays resembled capital destruction (i.e. as new infrastructure was available, while not being used). Her arguments did not miss their effect, as the members of the Upper House decided to not request a second opinion of the High Court. However, it was still not clear what the final decision would be, as the members of the Upper House kept their doubts about the level of protection. These doubts were once more brought to the fore by means of a letter of the members of the Upper House to the Minister of V&W.¹⁰⁴⁰

7.12.2 The Political debate in the Upper House

Hearing Sessions (May 2002)

Prior to the political debate in the Upper House the Infrastructure Committee of the Upper House (i.e. members of the different political parties that represented their parties as regards Infrastructure Affairs) decided to initiate a hearing session. The session was primarily meant to gather as much and as diverse information about the new Schiphol Act as possible in a relatively short time period. Amongst others, the aviation sector, the local and regional authorities, the local residents (PLRS), the EIA Committee, and the Berkhout Committee (CDV) were allowed to give their opinion about the new Act. The representatives of the aviation sector indicated that the new Act seemed to be sufficient from their point of view. The environmental actors criticized the new Act for lacking equal protection. During the hearing session it came to the fore that several other actors

¹⁰³⁵ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹⁰³⁶ SNM, (2002), Letter to Ing. Baarda behandeling Schipholwet en tijdsdruk. April 11th 2002.

¹⁰³⁷ SNM, (2002), Letter to the Upper House Commentaar op Wet luchtvaart aan Eerste Kamer. April 15th, 2002.

¹⁰³⁸ EK 27603, 88d, pp 1 – 2, March 19th 2002.

¹⁰³⁹ EK 27603, 88d, pp 5- 13, March 19th 2002.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Baarda, (2002), Letter to the Minister of Transportation, May 17th 2002.

like the province of North Holland and several municipalities also had some doubts about the environmental protection offered by the new Act.

The Baarda Motion (May – July 2002)

After the hearing session the Infrastructure Committee of the Upper House remained highly critical about the new Schiphol Act. During the debate several senators questioned the lack of protection in the outer area. For example, one senator of D66 (Terlouw) asked for 250 enforcement points during the debate.¹⁰⁴¹ The Minister of V&W held on to the initial proposal. In the end, the members of the Infrastructure committee decided to vote in favor of the Act, but under one precondition. It was to be evaluated within 3 years whether or not the new regulative system really offered the same level of protection as the old one would have done. They wrote a motion reflecting this content, and they wanted to bring it into the plenary debate. The motion was referred to as the Baarda motion, named after its initiator senator Baarda (CDA) who chaired the Infrastructure Committee. In essence, the motion implied a legal obligation to evaluate the new system within 3 years (2006).¹⁰⁴² If it turned out that the new system did not offer equal protection in practice, the Schiphol Act was to be changed to make sure that equal protection was guaranteed.

During the plenary debate it became clear that the motion contained an important gap. In the last paragraph it was stated that the level of equivalence was to be measured in terms of the norms taken up in the Transition articles (*Overgangsartikelen*) that were part of the new Schiphol Act. However, these norms were not the same as the ones taken up in the old PKB decision. Instead, the Transition articles contained a selective translation of the PKB norms.¹⁰⁴³ For example, the protection of the outer areas was not part of the articles and would therefore not be taken into account during the evaluation.¹⁰⁴⁴ According to the environmental lobby, one of the lawyers of the Schiphol Group (Koeman) had been involved in the formulation of the content of the motion, which explained its specific framing.¹⁰⁴⁵ Two representatives of the environmental lobby followed the political debate from the public stand and read the content of the motion that had been spread prior to the political vote that was to take place that day.¹⁰⁴⁶ They immediately observed the gap and during a break they

¹⁰⁴¹ Press Release Milieufederatie Noord Holland, June 25th 2002, Afronding Schipholdebat opgeschoven naar 2005. Senaat te snel tevreden over Wet Luchtvaart. Interview Van Arendonk / Milieufederatie Noord Holland, 2007.

¹⁰⁴² EK 27603, 88K, June 25th 2002.

¹⁰⁴³ See for example PLRS, (2002), Letter to the Upper House about the need to revise the Baarda Motion. June 27th 2002.

¹⁰⁴⁴ The criteria used were the ones that had also been used in the EIA Schiphol 2003 that had been criticized by so many actors. For third party risk the only norm was the maximum (774) amount of houses within the 10⁻⁶ IR (based on the housing file of 1990). The other PKB norms, standstill of houses within 10⁻⁵ and the removal of houses within 5 x 10⁻⁵, were not included anymore.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹⁰⁴⁶ These people were Fransen of the SNM and Griese of the platform of local residents.

succeeded in arranging a personal meeting with four of the senators that had been responsible for submitting the motion.¹⁰⁴⁷ They told them about the gap and when the debate continued after the pause had ended, senator Baarda asked to include protection of the outer areas in the evaluation. The Minister agreed to do so and stated that she would change the Act as soon as possible (i.e. the Transition Articles).¹⁰⁴⁸ Based on this promise, even the most critical senators like Baarda (CDA) and Terlouw (D66) agreed to vote in favor of the new Act. After all, even when the Schiphol Act didn't offer a similar level of legal protection as the old PKB would have done, this would come to the fore during the evaluation period. Because the Baarda motion was included, a majority of the members of the Upper House supported the new Act.¹⁰⁴⁹

After the ratification in the Upper House the marginally revised Act was sent back to the Lower House, who accepted it with minor changes and a remarkable level of support of the PVDA (i.e. one of the more critical spokespersons had already left the Lower House in November 2001). In December 2002 the cabinet finalized the two new Decrees for Schiphol that accompanied the Schiphol Act and both decisions were officially published in the *Staatscourant* (in line with the formal procedure that new Acts have to follow in the Netherlands).¹⁰⁵⁰

The cabinet, the ministries involved and Schiphol and KLM were relieved that the Schiphol Act and related Decrees had finally been ratified. Just in time to bring the new 5th runway (5P) into operation in February 2003.¹⁰⁵¹ The two main preconditions, i.e. finishing the construction works and a new regulative system, had been fulfilled. Of course, the new Act was to be evaluated in the years to come, but for the time being, the new 5th runway could become operative. The final noise contours that had caused so much political discussion and that were to apply from 2003 onwards are presented in 7.16.

¹⁰⁴⁷ In fact, another senator of the Groen Links party helped them to make this informal meeting possible.


¹⁰⁴⁸ EK 25602, June 25th 2002, p.38.

¹⁰⁴⁹ EK 27603, Nr. 33, 1615 – 1625, June 25th 2002.

¹⁰⁵⁰ In the Netherlands all new laws need to be announced in the *Staatscourant* before they can be put into force.

¹⁰⁵¹ After all, the basic condition was that the laws were ready. 2003 was announced as a year of transition; it was not possible to implement the new runway system and additional rules all at once, so this would be done in incremental steps throughout 2003. From 2004 onwards the new system would be fully operative.

Figure 7.16 Politically ratified noise contours for 2003 onwards for daytime (left) and nighttime (right).



Source:
Ministry of V&W (2006), Schiphol en U: De regels, p.5
Milieu & Natuurplanbureau, 2005; p.47

7.13. A new Issue on the Agenda: Privatization of Schiphol (2000 – 2003)

In the introductory paragraph (7.1) we already indicated that there was one issue that emerged on the agenda during the period 1996 – 2003 that did not belong specifically to one of the debates about the short, mid or long term. Instead, this issue played a role on the background of all debates. We already indicated that the disentanglement of responsibilities of the Ministry of V&W and the aviation sector was an important objective from 1999 onwards. From 2000 onwards, the issue of privatisation especially played an important role in this process.

To privatize or not to privatize Schiphol?

In 2000 the Schiphol Group stated that privatisation was deemed necessary ‘to continue playing a role in this highly dynamic aviation market.’¹⁰⁵² According to Schiphol, continued state ownership reduced its flexibility and limited its ability to co-operate with other airports and limited its the access to capital markets. In particular, Schiphol Group wanted to use the revenues of a public float to expand its non-aviation activities and to participate in airport alliances abroad.¹⁰⁵³ The main reasons for Schiphol Group to expand overseas and entering into new alliances were its relatively small home market and the uncertainty about the long-term growth of the airport.¹⁰⁵⁴ In short, for

¹⁰⁵² Press Release Schiphol Group, 2000.
¹⁰⁵³ Canoy & Hakfoort, 2000.
¹⁰⁵⁴ See for example Graham, 2001.

Schiphol privatisation was perceived to be an essential condition for a successful international enactment of the Airport City formula (i.e. creating airport cities worldwide).¹⁰⁵⁵ The political discussion in Parliament about the possible privatisation of Schiphol had already started in 1995, when the privatisations of the railway and energy sector were being discussed. This led to the cabinet's intention for minority share flotation.¹⁰⁵⁶ Again, the PVDA appeared to be the crucial political party. They had been part of the cabinet at that time, and some members of the party were against privatisation. From their perspective, Schiphol held an important public function for the Netherlands as a whole, which made it the responsibility of the national government.¹⁰⁵⁷ As a consequence of the major problems that surrounded the privatisation of the Dutch railway and energy sector in the subsequent years, the PVDA withdrew its support for the privatisation of Schiphol in 2000.¹⁰⁵⁸

After the development of a new business strategy and related organizational structure the Schiphol Group brought the issue back on the agenda. The main question was whether a privatised Schiphol would act in the public interest. The CPB was assigned to investigate the positive and negative aspects of privatisation. In its final report, presented in 2000, the CPB concluded that privatisation was a realistic option for the future of Schiphol.¹⁰⁵⁹ On the one hand, privatisation sat comfortably with the cabinet's intention to clarify responsibilities between the national government and Schiphol (as part of the disentanglement program that was being enacted). For one, the regulation of noise, third party risks and spatial developments was likely to become more transparent after privatisation.¹⁰⁶⁰ After all, the government was still stakeholder, owner, policy maker and regulator at once, which made it almost impossible to treat Schiphol as a normal company. At the same time it had also become clear that the commercial interests of Schiphol did not always coincide with the public interest, resulting in the need for additional government interventions. For example, the existence of negative externalities such as noise pollution and risks were not the main concerns of an airport when considering expansion (i.e. while developing an efficient airport system and optimising capacity). Therefore, it was clear that a trustworthy and efficient regulatory regime needed to be in place before the privatisation process could start.¹⁰⁶¹

This was acknowledged by the national government, and the cabinet was willing to sell at least part of its shares. The Ministry of EZ (Economic Affairs) brought forward

¹⁰⁵⁵ Schiphol Group (2000), Annual Report.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Van Wijk, 2007; p.218.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Interview Van Gijssel / Former member of the Lower House/PVDA, 2009.

¹⁰⁵⁸ Although it was clear that the aviation sector could not be compared with those sectors.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Centraal Planbureau (2000), Schiphol: een normaal bedrijf? Werkdocument 126, Den Haag.

¹⁰⁶⁰ See also Graham, 2001 for elaboration of this claim.

¹⁰⁶¹ Canoy & Hakfoort, 2000.

another argument in favour of privatisation, arguing the diminishing influence that national governments could exert on mainport operations. For example, in the governmental White Paper on Spatial Economic Development (*Nota Ruimtelijk Economisch Beleid*, 1999) it was clearly acknowledged that mainport development was heavily influenced by developments on the international transportation market.¹⁰⁶² In order to remain competitive the airport authorities needed to have possibilities for further commercialization, and privatization was a possible means to achieve this.

However, the low levels of trust of several stakeholders (environmental parties, local residents, the municipality of Amsterdam) in the integrity of Schiphol created an extra barrier for privatisation. Privatization implied that Schiphol would get more possibilities to develop and implement its own strategy.¹⁰⁶³ From the perspective of Schiphol this was exactly what was needed in order to remain competitive. On the national level the PVDA remained highly critical about privatisation. In the end, no final decisions were made yet. Nonetheless, Schiphol Group was already looking for initiatives to work together with other airport companies. In 1999 for example the Pantares alliance with Frankfurt Airport (Fraport) was formed in order to cooperate in areas such as IT, handling and cargo, retail, property development and international activities.¹⁰⁶⁴ The debate about privatization was to be continued from 2003 onwards.

7.14 Final Outcomes Schiphol Debate (1996 – 2003)

At the start of 2003 it seemed that the new five-runway system could be put into operation in February 2003, just as was announced in the PKB decision of 1995. Still, it had cost a lot of effort to make this actually happen. Unexpected high growth rates of traffic volumes had caused considerable problems right after the PKB decision and its elaboration in the 1996 Aviation Act had been finalized. It seemed that the dual objectives as had been defined in the PKB of 1995 could not be realized if growth continued and the regulative system was not changed. Different challenges for the short, mid and long term Schiphol policies emerged.

As regards the short term, the existing noise systematic seemed to hamper further growth and mainport development. Committees were installed, research programs carried out and negotiations were facilitated, which led to the decision to revise the regulative system and allow for an additional growth of 100,000 flights until 2002. Meanwhile, it became clear that a new regulative system was needed for the five runway system, thus creating a new policy challenge for the mid term (2003 – 2015). The new system was to replace the old PKB system that had been developed during

¹⁰⁶² The same point was made with regard to the port of Rotterdam in the *Tweede VoortgangsNota Zeehavenbeleid*, 1999.

¹⁰⁶³ Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007; Interview De Jong / municipality of Amsterdam, 2008.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Schiphol Group (2000) Annual Report 1999.

1989 – 1995. The main precondition was that the new system offered the same level of protection as the old system. Besides, the new system was to become more transparent, easier to understand and better enforceable, as almost everybody distrusted the existing system (including the methodologies used for calculating environmental effects, the outcomes and the way it was enforced). After 3 years of intensive debate the new regulative system was ratified and laid down in a new Schiphol Act and two related Decrees. The entire discussion revolved around the question whether or not the new system offered an equal level of protection as the old PKB system would have offered. Several experts, committees and environmental parties had concluded that this was not the case. Nonetheless, from the perspective of the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W who were in charge of the policy preparation and from the perspective of the cabinet it was the case and the cabinet wanted to get the new Act ratified as soon as possible. In the end, both the Lower House and Upper House voted in favour of the Act, but with at least 3 important additions. First, a norm for Group Risk was to be taken up in the Act in 2005, making sure that the standstill could be enforced. Second, the new Act was to be evaluated within 3 years in order to assess whether or not it offered equal protection in reality (i.e. the Baarda motion). If not, a new system was to be developed that did live up to the PKB promises of 1995. Third, legal protection of the outer areas was to be in place after the evaluation.

In the end, the dual objective was still going strong, although it had been reframed considerably during 1996 - 2003. The mainport objective had been revised, as it turned out that more traffic was needed in order to sustain hub development. Thus, in other words, the critical mainport barrier had become higher and the capacity ceilings were released. Moreover, Airport City development had become part of the mainport objective. That is, a mainport was not only characterized by hub operations but also by Airport City development. In essence, Schiphol and KLM had succeeded in making their corporate strategies part of the national mainport objective once again (just as during the PASO/PKB process). The broadened mainport objective was further enacted by the regional and local public authorities that wanted to maximize their revenues by developing airport related industrial sites and office locations as part of their spatial-economic development strategies. The interrelationship between the airside developments (sustaining hub and spoke operations) and landside developments (potential for industries and offices) was believed to be strong. Both successful airside and landside development (including investments in landside accessibility) were therefore deemed necessary for supporting mainport development.

The environmental objective was also reframed along the way. A new noise system was developed, and several assumptions underlying the calculation model had been revised. Nonetheless, there was still no protection for the outer areas, the night regime was still not extended from 6AM to 7AM and noise measurements were still out of the question.

Assumptions for calculating third party risk had also been revised. Old measures were replaced by new ones and the norms for a standstill were brought back to only one criterion ($IR\ 10^{-6}$). A new norm for Group Risk was yet to be developed, as was the statistical causal model from which it was to be derived. The standstill for stench and CO_2 were abolished, as it had turned out that these were unfeasible or to be settled on the level of the EU. In essence, the initial environmental objectives laid down in the PKB of 1995 had been reframed considerably in the Schiphol Act of 2003. The question was whether or not both the old and new promises offered an equal level of protection. Indeed, most discussion revolved around this question, and a whole myriad of strategies was enacted in order to settle the discussion (e.g. experimenting with interactive policy arrangements, developing large piles of research reports, selectively involving stakeholders, postponing decisions). Nonetheless in the end many actors still heavily doubted the level of equivalence. These doubts further increased when the cabinet decided to lay down the new regulative system for the mid term five runway system (2003 – 2015) in an Act, instead of a PKB decision or instead of linking it to an Environmental Permit. This made it possible to get around the many checks and balances of the extensive PKB procedure (e.g. developing a less extensive EIA) and it would make it easier to implement changes in the near future. Nonetheless, the final outcome was that a majority coalition decided to give the new system the benefit of the doubt, at least for the time being, thus supporting the choice to replace the PKB system for the new system taken up in the Schiphol Act.

However, both the debates about the short and mid term further troubled relationships between environmental parties and grassroots organizations on the one hand and the aviation sector and the Ministry of V&W on the other hand. The ongoing legal procedures about different issues (e.g. expropriation of land, the violation of limits in enforcement points, the Letter of Intent) reflected this. In the end, the configuration of the pro-environment coalition and pro mainport coalition that had been formed during the PKB process and the way these were positioned vis-à-vis one another did not change much, were pro-environment actors were constantly pointing out the hollowing out of the environmental objective and those supporting mainport development pointed out the importance of adequately facilitating traffic growth.

In the meantime, the issue of long-term development of aviation in the Netherlands had also conquered an important place on the policy agenda from 1996 onwards. During this debate, several alternatives were discussed. Finally it was decided that the Schiphol location was sufficient for facilitating growth in the long term (2025) and that an island in the North Sea was promising as regards the very long term (> 2030). Schiphol started to investigate options for a 6th and 7th runway, while the national government established a research bureau for investigating an offshore location for the very long term (Flyland). An intensive debate about the desirability of extending Schiphol with a

6th and/or 7th runway broke loose. Again, the environmental coalition and the aviation sector held diametrically opposed views. When the aviation market started to stagnate from 2001 onwards the decisions about the long term and very long term were postponed. The most important thing that had been decided was that sufficient space was to be reserved in the local and regional plans for making the development of a 6th and/or 7th runway not impossible (i.e. a no regret growth option was created).

Anno 2003 the discussion about the four-runway system was nearing its end, since the five-runway system would become operative in February 2003. The discussion about the long term development had lost some of its urgency, due to stagnating aviation market. From 2003 onwards most attention was devoted to the implementation of the new Schiphol Act (and the related Decrees) and the evaluation of the new regulative system. When the five runway system was brought into operation in 2003, a new round of policy making was bound to begin.

Chapter 8 The Schiphol Policy Debate 2003 – 2009

Enacting the Dual Objective

8.1 Structure of the Case Description (2003 – 2009)

February 2003 the 5th runway (5P, Polderbaan) was opened, and the Schiphol Act and additional decrees came into effect. As promised by the cabinet, the new regulative system was to be evaluated within three years, assessing the level of equivalence compared to the old PKB system (before February 2006). There was a lot of political discussion about the actual scope and content of this evaluation. What was to be included during the evaluation and what not? How was the Baarda motion to be interpreted (i.e. the motion that prescribed the evaluation)? On March 6th of 2003 the Minister of V&W responded to this, setting out the lines of the evaluation.¹⁰⁶⁵ It was stated that the criteria taken up in the Transition Articles of the Schiphol Act served as the core of the evaluation. At the same time, the issues that were postponed during the political decision-making were to be settled in the upcoming years. A new committee of Noise experts was established in March 2003 (the successor of the Berkhout Committee, who had given back its assignment in December 2002 as a direct consequence of the troubled relationship with the Ministry of V&W), which was to advise about policy measures to reduce noise pollution in the outer areas (i.e. the zone between 35Ke and 20Ke), as was promised during the political debate. The norm for Group risk that was to be implemented in 2005 was also part of the agenda, as was further research about the costs and benefits of an extended night regime (from 6AM to 7AM).

Although it was clear that the evaluation program formed the core of the policy activities for the next three years (in terms of political attention and resources), the discussion about the long-term development options was also continued.¹⁰⁶⁶ As discussed in the former chapter, it was expected that the capacity of the five-runway system (in between 500,000 – 600,000) would at least be sufficient until 2010/2015, against the background of the stagnation on the aviation market. Thereafter, further development options for Schiphol were to be elaborated (i.e. the 6th and 7th runway). The main challenge was to further explore the possibilities for matching these future development options and the other spatial investments that were deemed necessary. In order to do so, the Ministry of V&W initiated a broad new research program, focusing on coordinated development of the mainport and the Randstad economy, the Project Mainport Schiphol (PMS).¹⁰⁶⁷ Research about the very long term, i.e. the Flyland

¹⁰⁶⁵ TK 27603, March 6th 2003, Nr. 99A.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Interview Rienstra / Researcher / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2006.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Interview Rienstra / Researcher / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2006.

program exploring the potential of an island in the North Sea, had already been put to an end in 2001 and would thus not continue for the time being.¹⁰⁶⁸

Together the extensive evaluation program (8.4 – 8.8), which included research about a GR norm, an extended night regime and additional housing locations, and the PMS (8.3) were to result in a Cabinet’s perspective on the future development of Schiphol in 2006 (8.9). This perspective included short, mid and long term policy measures. In order to elaborate the short and mid term decisions presented in the Cabinet’s Perspective a new round of negotiations on the regional level was initiated, the so-called Alders Table (8.10 – 8.11). For the subsequent years the Alders negotiations dominated the debate. The decision making about the long term followed its own policy trajectory from 2006 onwards (8.12). The main outcomes of the Schiphol policy debate 2003 – 2009 will be summarized in 8.13.

The reconstruction of the Schiphol debate during 2003 – 2009 was very complex due to the many and partly overlapping policy trajectories that unravelled at the same time. Still, we have tried to present the policy debates in chronological order. The entire structure is presented in table 8.1. At the start of each new paragraph we shall use the table to indicate where we are. The scope of the debate of these different policy trajectories was very much shaped by several contextual developments that we shall discuss first (8.2).

Table 8.1 Structure of the case description 2003 – 2009

		2003 - 2006			
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006 8.3 – 8.9					
	Long term (PMS) – 8.3				
	Evaluation Program –8.4 –8.9				
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation			
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation			
	8.6	Night Flights			
	8.7	Group Risk			
	8.8	Housing locations			
		Cabinet’s Perspective – 8.9			
			2007	2008	2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009 8.10 – 8.11			Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11		
Long term 2006 – 2009 8.12			Long term > 2025 – 8.12		

¹⁰⁶⁸ TK 26959, 26th May 2003, Nr.33.

8.2 Contextual Developments

During the period 2003 – 2006 the Schiphol debate was very much shaped by the national (8.2.1) and regional (8.2.2) policy context and the problems associated with the new regulative system (8.2.3). Finally, the issue of privatization was also of influence on the policy debate (8.2.4). These contextual developments and the ongoing changes on the aviation market set the context for the Schiphol policy debate for the years to come (8.2.5).

8.2.1. National Policy Context (2003 – 2006)

In the former chapter it came to the fore that mainport development and concerns about the deteriorating competitive position of the Randstad were more and more linked together by several actors. This trend was continued during 2003 – 2006. The economic downswing in 2002-2005 formed the main reason for further enactment of the revised national spatial-economic development strategy, and the Randstad was designated as the main investment area by the national government. Several research reports were presented wherein the deteriorating competitive position of the Randstad was stressed, referring to benchmarks like the best European Business Cities (i.e. the Randstad was no longer part of the top 5),¹⁰⁶⁹ the most competitive countries in Europe with less than 20 million inhabitants (from 1 to 8),¹⁰⁷⁰ and the municipality of Amsterdam loosing market shares as regards tourism and conferences (from 3 to 8).¹⁰⁷¹ Employment rates of Amsterdam's business service industry and particularly information technology decreased.¹⁰⁷² Economic growth in the larger Amsterdam area near the airport, Haarlemmermeer, slowed down. And in 2004, the province of North Holland lost employment (as did almost all Dutch provinces, except for Flevoland).¹⁰⁷³ The main conclusion was that the Amsterdam region was loosing its competitive position vis-à-vis other European (global) city regions, and therefore the Randstad as a whole, and that something had to be done about this in order to prevent that things would even get worse.¹⁰⁷⁴ During those days, it was a widely shared belief that the business climate of the Randstad was in need of rapid improvement and that further economic development of Schiphol would play a crucial role in this (i.e. shared by the cabinet, the province of North Holland, the municipalities involved and the aviation sector).

¹⁰⁶⁹ Cushman & Wakefield Healey & Baker (2003). *European Cities Monitor 2003*; Cushman & Wakefield Healey & Baker (2004). *European Cities Monitor 2004*.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Institute of management Development, 2003.

¹⁰⁷¹ Regio Randstad (2004a). *Randstad Monitor 2004*. Regio Randstad (2004b). *Economische Strategie Randstad*. Juni 2004.

¹⁰⁷² Van Wijk, 2007; p.40.

¹⁰⁷³ Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2005). *Kerncijfers* <http://www.cbs.nl>. Derived from the web on September 14th 2009.

¹⁰⁷⁴ The choice of indicators of benchmarks was, as always, highly arbitrary, framing quality in terms of economic competitiveness.

Once again, Randstad development was set on top of the national political agenda.¹⁰⁷⁵ This national ambition was reflected in the new strategic perspectives that were being prepared by the Ministries concerned. From their perspective, the previous White Papers that had been developed by the national government (i.e. Fifth Nota Spatial Planning, 2001 and the National Mobility Plan, 2001) had not adequately taken the new economic reality into account. Amongst other things, the Ministry of VROM's advisory council argued that the Ministry had not given enough attention to infrastructure development and economic interests in the preparation of the Fifth Memorandum on Spatial Planning.¹⁰⁷⁶ Moreover, less money was made available by the Upper and Lower House than the Ministries of VROM and V&W had assumed during the development of their previous White Papers. Thus, investments in spatial development and infrastructure development had to be downsized. This increased the need to develop a more selective focus with more concrete, short-term investment plans that worked to give economic development of the Randstad the boost that the cabinet desired.

In order to bridge the time-gap between the presentation of new White Papers that contained the revised strategic spatial-economic strategy and the outdated ones, the policy intentions of the cabinet were presented in November 2002.¹⁰⁷⁷ In this letter, the main policy strategy that the cabinet wanted to enact during the upcoming years was presented. The cabinet wanted to support only those projects that were deemed to be of national importance for strengthening the competitive position of the Randstad. Especially so-called national key infrastructures (like the mainports)¹⁰⁷⁸ were considered important here, since it was assumed that proper airside, seaside and landside accessibility were an essential asset of further economic growth. Six key projects of national importance were designated (i.e. *sleutelprojecten*) that could count on firm support of the national government during the upcoming years, two of which concerned further mainport development. The lower financial budgets of the cabinet made sure that choices had to be made. Investments in the national key infrastructures came at the expense of investments in the environment. For example, the investments in the measures that were needed for reducing air pollution, as taken up in the 4th National Environmental Plan (NMP 4), were postponed.¹⁰⁷⁹

The cabinet also announced a new steering philosophy that was to be enacted during the upcoming years, based on the adage 'Decentral when possible, central when necessary.'

¹⁰⁷⁵ A recurrent pattern in times of economic hardship, see Van Wijk, 2007; Zonneveld & Verwest, 2005.

¹⁰⁷⁶ VROM-Raad (2004). Nederlandse steden in international perspectief: profileren en verbinden. Advies 043. Den Haag: VROM-Raad.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Stellingname Brief nationaal ruimtelijke beleid, November 2002; p.5.

¹⁰⁷⁸ The mainports are perceived to be the linking pin between the national and international infrastructural networks and urban regions.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Stellingname Letter, 2002; p.17.

This regulatory principle relegated several responsibilities of the national government to the regional and local governments. At the same time, it created opportunities for centralization of governing tasks that were deemed of national interests. This new division of responsibilities as regards spatial-economic development was part of a much wider reorganization of the national government that was desired by the new cabinet that had entered the stage in 2002.

A new Centre Right Cabinet: Balkenende I (July 22nd 2002 – May 27th 2003)

The political parties that were part of the purple coalition that formed the cabinet Kok I and the cabinet Kok II received a heavy blow during the elections of 2002. At that time, a new politician had entered the political arena, Pim Fortuyn who fiercely and eloquently attacked the achievements of the purple coalition.¹⁰⁸⁰ Especially as regards issues of immigration, a typical concern of the many populist parties that were emerging all over Europe at that time. According to Fortuyn, the purple coalition had created a large gap between the citizens and the politicians. A radically different approach was needed. The government itself was to get reorganized (i.e. become more effective) and the gap was to be closed again. Instead of pursuing the elite politics as the two purple cabinets had done, politicians were to become the civil servants of all Dutch citizens again.¹⁰⁸¹

Nine days before the elections, on May 6th 2002, a radical environmentalist who feared Fortuyn's views about integration and multiculturalism murdered the charismatic Pim Fortuyn.¹⁰⁸² The Upper and Lower House decided to carry on with the elections and the political party of Fortuyn (i.e. the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*, LPF) gained a major victory. One other political party, the CDA, also benefited greatly from the lack of trust in the political parties that made up the former purple coalitions. The resulting cabinet consisted of the CDA, LPF and the VVD. The VVD had lost votes (i.e. they were partly blamed for the purple disaster), but they were needed to create a majority coalition. The center left cabinet of Kok was therefore replaced by a center right cabinet chaired by Balkenende: the cabinet Balkenende I. The LPF provided the Minister of V&W, while the VVD provided the Minister of VROM.

In the coalition agreement at least two important points were made.¹⁰⁸³ First, it was argued that a different kind of national government was needed. One that set out the strategic perspectives and that removed all other responsibilities to the decentral

¹⁰⁸⁰ For more extensive discussion about the mess that Kok I and II had left behind see Fortuyn, P. (2002), *De puinhopen van Paars*.

¹⁰⁸¹ The quote 'At your service' became the trademark of Fortuyn, who used it as a political slogan during his campaign.

¹⁰⁸² http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moord_op_Pim_Fortuyn. Derived from the web on September 10th 2009.

¹⁰⁸³ TK 28375, July 3rd 2002, Nr.5. Title *Werken aan Vertrouwen, een kwestie van aanpakken*.

governmental tiers. Second, it was argued that improved accessibility (physical infrastructure, but also virtual infrastructure) was essential for economic growth. The cabinet announced several investments in accessibility. In order to finance these investments a minority share of Schiphol was to be sold. According to the cabinet Schiphol would be partly privatized during the upcoming years.

Quite soon it became clear that the coalition did not work out well. It was especially the instability of the LPF party, who were clearly missing their leader Pim Fortuyn, that undermined the success of the Balkenende I cabinet. New elections were held and the trust that many citizens had put in the LPF appeared to be short-lived, as they lost most of their votes. The CDA won again, and formed a new coalition with the VVD and D66 (although D66 only held a few seats) that lasted from May 27th 2003 to July 7th 2006. The two main ambitions of the new Balkenende II cabinet were in line with those of Balkenende I, i.e. to strengthen the Dutch economy and to reform the national government.¹⁰⁸⁴ Balkenende II was also centre right. The VVD delivered the Minister of VROM and the CDA provided the Minister of V&W.

Enacting the Cabinet's ambitions (2003 – 2006)

In order to create a more effective (lean and mean) national government a special research committee was established, the De Grave Committee. This Committee presented its advice 'Different Government' in 2005. In the final report it was stated that the main task of the national government was merely to set the strategic objectives, which were to be carried out by other actors (both lower public authorities and market). The national government was there to supervise and regulate the execution.¹⁰⁸⁵

The political ambition was elaborated in the new spatial-economic perspectives (White Papers) of the three ministries involved: The *Nota Pieken in de Delta* (Peaks in the Delta, Ministry of EZ), the *Nota Ruimte* (Spatial Strategy, Ministry of VROM) and the *Nota Mobiliteit* (Nota Mobility, Ministry of V&W). In all these White Papers the pivotal importance of the (improvement of) the Dutch economy was emphasized, as was the new steering philosophy. In the remainder of the national policy context we discuss the three main White Papers in more detail.

White Paper Ministry of VROM

Improving the international competitive position of the Randstad formed the focal point of the White Paper of the Ministry of VROM (2004).¹⁰⁸⁶ Amongst other things, it was

¹⁰⁸⁴ Coalition Agreement Balkenende II (2003), Meedoen, meer werk, minder regels.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Andere Overheid (2005). Je gaat er over of niet. Rapportage Gemengde Commissie Bestuurlijke Coördinatie. Den Haag: Andere Overheid.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Ministry of VROM (2004) *Nota Ruimte*. The Hague.

stated that the spatial bottlenecks around the major cities and Dutch mainports had to be solved and that sufficient space for offices and industrial sites was to be made available. With regard to Schiphol it was stated that further mainport development was to be facilitated on the current location within existing environmental and safety conditions, at least until 2030. Moreover, due to the complexity of the different spatial investments that were needed, the ministry of VROM designated four regions that were to coordinate their own spatial developments (part of the area specific approach). The North Wing of the Randstad was one of these. Schiphol was located within the North Wing. It was within this North Wing context that Schiphol development was to be discussed.

The focus on the North Wing was meant to make an integral trade off between airport development and other spatial claims on the regional level possible. One of the main tensions in the North Wing was that further airport development demanded more restrictions on housing. Thus, it implied that the existing zone with a housing ban was to be broadened (i.e. to the 20Ke zone of the five-runway system and the areas immediately adjoining this zone). Only by broadening this zone, further increase of third party risks and noise annoyance could be prevented.¹⁰⁸⁷ However, it implied that there was less space left for the development of houses. This caused a lot of friction with the municipalities and the province, who were struggling to achieve regional housing goals as taken up in the VINEX appointments made with the housing department of the Ministry of VROM. More specifically, the assignment was to build 150,000 new houses in the area until 2010.¹⁰⁸⁸ Broadening the zone would make this very difficult, if not impossible. More specifically, the discussions between the national government on the one hand and the province and the municipalities on the other, centered around the possibilities of 3 potential construction sites situated at the fringes of the 20Ke zone: the new housing location Hoofddorp-West (1) (municipality Hoofddorp-west), the new housing location Noordwijkerhout (2) (municipality Noordwijk), and the planned industrial site at Legmeerdijk (3) (municipality of Amstelveen) (see figure 8.1).¹⁰⁸⁹

During discussion in the Lower House a motion to delete the latter part was submitted and accepted: construction was now merely prohibited within the 20Ke zone, and not in the adjoining zones.¹⁰⁹⁰ This change made it possible to both achieve the housing goals and further mainport development at the same time. However, the cabinet thought it

¹⁰⁸⁷ Note that in the white paper no additional bans for the construction of industrial and office sites were proposed, since this was perceived to be essential for further Randstad-Mainport development.

¹⁰⁸⁸ Although it did lead to more innovative housing policies with more intensive and mixed land use inside the cities. See for example Gerritsen, A. (2005), *De stempel van Schiphol*. In: *Rooilijn*, nr.4, pp.185 – 190.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Interview Bossink / Policy maker Province of North Holland, 2007.

¹⁰⁹⁰ TK 29435, 2005, Nr.54.

necessary to further investigate the effects of further mainport development on the three locations that had been selected for large scale housing and industrial development. Based on the outcomes of this study, the cabinet would make a final decision about whether or not to allow for large scale housing at those three locations. This final decision was scheduled for 2006, when the evaluation of the new regulative system had been ended and the cabinet would present its perspective on further development of Schiphol. We shall discuss the outcomes of the housing discussion in 8.8.

Figure 8.1 The three housing locations that were evaluated



Source: Kabinetsstandpunt, 2006; p. 38

White Paper Ministry of V&W

In the White Paper of the Ministry of V&W (*the Nota Mobiliteit/Nota Mobility*), the White Paper of the Ministry of VROM was further elaborated from an infrastructural point of view.¹⁰⁹¹ The White Paper was based on the assumption that further development of infrastructure was essential for further economic and growth. More specifically, the importance of the Dutch mainports as cornerstones of the Dutch economy was stressed. It was argued that Schiphol was to remain one of the 4 largest airports of Europe in the future. The expected traffic growth of 4 – 6% a year was therefore to be facilitated, while it was once again asserted that the national government would do everything to make sure that noise annoyance and risks wouldn't increase at the same time (thus holding on to the promise of the dual objective). Several measures to improve the landside accessibility of the North Wing of the Randstad were announced, supporting the mainport function of Schiphol.

¹⁰⁹¹ Ministry of V&W (2005) *Nota Mobiliteit*. The Hague.

During the discussion about the content of the White Paper a few actors that played an important role in the Schiphol discussion were allowed to respond.¹⁰⁹² The environmental party SNM criticized the one-sided focus on transport oriented development. They argued that growing transport volumes were taken for granted, as if this growth was some kind of natural phenomenon. They were disappointed about the fact that no measures or strategies for discouraging transportation were taken up. They asserted that both health effects and climate issues were largely ignored again, an argument that was supported by other environmental interest groups.¹⁰⁹³ ¹⁰⁹⁴ The Schiphol Group on the other hand was very happy about the white paper, due to the pivotal role that was assigned to Schiphol as cornerstone of the Dutch economy. However, the CEO (Cerfontaine) indicated the importance of making transparent trade offs between economic development and environmental protection. More specifically, he stated that continuation of attempts to achieve the dual objective could easily exert a negative influence on the public opinion. This latter point was also stressed by the grassroots organizations and also Milieudefensie indicated that the promise to hold on to the dual objective had to be practical joke for sure.¹⁰⁹⁵

White Paper Ministry of EZ

In the White Paper of the Ministry of EZ (*Nota Pieken in de Delta*/Peaks in the Delta, 2005), the White Paper of the Ministry of VROM was further elaborated from an economic development point of view.¹⁰⁹⁶ In the White Paper the improvement of the competitive position of the Netherlands was the main objective. The White Paper described the economic agenda for six regions in the Netherlands, all located within or around the Randstad. Especially the improvement of the accessibility of the Randstad (i.e. gateway to Europe) and the development of a favourable business climate in the Randstad was emphasized. The North Wing of the Randstad was perceived to be the center of international business development, and further development of Schiphol was deemed to be of crucial importance for this. For each of these six core regions a specific development plan was to be developed, consisting of several concrete spatial-economic projects. Such a plan was also developed for the North Wing. The plan was based on the notions taken up in the three respective white papers.

8.2.2. Regional Policy Context: A new spatial-economic development strategy

In line with the new steering philosophy (i.e. decentral when possible, central when necessary) the national White Papers were further elaborated on the regional level. It

¹⁰⁹² Formeel Maatschappelijk Beraad, September 2th 2004.

¹⁰⁹³ Stichting Natuur & Milieu (2004), Press Release 'Nota mobiliteit negeert gezondheid en klimaat', issued December 7th 2004.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Milieudefensie (2005), *Nota Mobiliteit*: Oliedom. November 2005.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Milieudefensie (2004), *Hoofdpijnen Nota Mobiliteit* vaag maar verontrustend genoeg. By Joris Wijnhoven, June 2004.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Ministry of Economic Affairs (2005), *Nota Pieken in de Delta*. The Hague.

demanded a more pro-active role of the lower public authorities. Especially the Province of North Holland became more active as regards regional development.¹⁰⁹⁷ Another indication of the national government taking a few steps back was the much lower frequency of discussions between the regional and local authorities and the Ministry of V&W concerning Schiphol affairs, when compared to the previous years (e.g. the ONL-program of 1999 – 2003). According to the regional and local authorities this was partly related to the intended privatization of Schiphol.¹⁰⁹⁸

From Mainport strategy to Metropolitan strategy

On the regional level the so-called metropolitan development strategy was developed. This strategy was presented for the first time in the Nota Economic Strategy Randstad in June 2004.^{1099 1100} This new broad regional development strategy built upon the existing regional plans we have discussed in the former chapter (7), such as the REVS (2001) (i.e. *Ruimtelijk-Economische Visie Schipholregio* the joint perspective on the spatial-economic development of the Schipholarea) and the Regional Spatial Development Plan of the Province of North Holland. The main goal of the new strategy was to create one of the top 5 European business climates in the North Wing area of the Randstad. The metropolitan strategy departed from the assumption that the entire metropolitan region (i.e. North Wing of the Randstad and South Wing of the Randstad) was important for attracting and maintaining business activities worldwide. This implied that a broader area was to be taken into account for developing a spatial-economic development strategy than had been done before (see figure 8.2).

Figure 8.2 From mainport area (left) to metropolitan area (right)



Source: BRS (2006), p.6

¹⁰⁹⁷ See also Kleyn, W.H. (2007) Van mainport naar metropolitane strategie. Nova Terra; Den Haag.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Kleyn, W.H. (2009); Interview Van Duin / former policy maker Province of North Holland, 2007; Interview De Jong / Policy maker Municipality Amsterdam, 2008.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Regio Randstad (2004), Economische Strategie Randstad, een gezamenlijke metropolitane strategie en een economische agenda voor een internationaal concurrerende de Randstad. Utrecht.

¹¹⁰⁰ Uitkomsten 5^{de} Noordvleugelconferentie (2005). Amsterdam.

A high quality airline network configuration, i.e. serving the main economic destinations with high frequencies, was deemed to be an essential asset of the business climate of the North Wing. This implied that further growth of Schiphol was not a goal in itself anymore. Growth was only to be allowed when it contributed to the improvement of the business climate. More specifically, selective hub-development became a cornerstone of the strategy. It called for a high quality hub network. But this selective hub development was only one part of the strategy; it was the combination of a high quality living and working environment and the accessibility (the total package) that was of importance. As such, the metropolitan strategy matched perfectly with the broader perspective on mainport development, as was being developed in the foregoing years (i.e. Airport City development).

All public authorities of the North Wing, including the Province of North Holland, the municipalities of Amsterdam, Haarlemmermeer and Almere, supported the metropolitan strategy. Especially the latter municipality started to play a more important role within the North Wing context, as Almere had most space left for spatial developments (housing). The Schiphol Group kept stressing the interrelationship between a competitive Randstad and mainport development.¹¹⁰¹ Moreover, Schiphol Group sometimes joined the North Wing conferences, especially when matters of landside accessibility were on the agenda.¹¹⁰² All in all, on the regional level a broad coalition was emerging, in favor of selective mainport development, although such selectivity was not necessarily in the interest of the airport authority. Indeed, as discussed in the former chapter Schiphol Group wanted to diversify its airside product by facilitating both hub development and point-to-point traffic. Nonetheless, it was on the level of the North Wing that the metropolitan strategy of the region and the ambitions of the national government as laid down in the different white papers came together.

Integral assessment key projects North Wing Randstad

In essence, the White Papers had resulted in a list of eight priority projects that were deemed of crucial importance for a proper spatial-economic development of the North Wing, and thus enacting the metropolitan strategy. In the plan of approach for the North Wing these 8 complex issues were presented and it was stated that they were to be investigated in an integral way (see figure 8.3).¹¹⁰³

Almost all projects were related to the further development of Schiphol (project D). As regards the further development of the airport, one project was particularly important, the project Haarlemmermeer-Bollenstreek (project C). The project was to offer clarity

¹¹⁰¹ See for example Schiphol Group (2004), Annual Report 2003 & Schiphol Group (2005), Annual Report 2004.

¹¹⁰² Interview Kranenburg / Schiphol Group, 2008.

¹¹⁰³ Structuurdokument Noordvleugelprogramma, 2006.

about the possibilities to facilitate the construction of 20,000 houses within the Schiphol Region.¹¹⁰⁴ More specifically, it included an assessment of the potential for large scale housing and industrial development at the three locations mentioned in the white paper of the Ministry of VROM (recall figure 8.1). The outcomes of the project Haarlemmermeer-Bollenstreek were to be included in the development of the Cabinet’s Perspective on the future of Schiphol that was to be presented in 2006.

Figure 8.3 Eight priority projects for the spatial economic development of the North Wing of the Randstad, 2006



Source: Structuurdokument Noordvleugelprogramma, 2006

Enacting the metropolitan strategy

However, the metropolitan strategy was not only enacted on the level of the North Wing. At the same time, different municipalities were working on their own plans. After all, the metropolitan strategy emphasized the importance of a high quality living environment as integral part of a strong competitive position and attractive business climate. Moreover, from the perspective of these municipalities such investments worked to bring back the balance in the (economically biased) dual objective. For example, the municipality of Haarlemmermeer asserted that more investments in ‘green functions’ were needed and that the environmental part of the dual objective had been neglected over the past years.¹¹⁰⁵ In 2002 the municipality of Haarlemmermeer developed an ‘environmental opportunity map’ containing several concrete investment projects for the period until 2030 for improving environmental quality of the municipal territory.¹¹⁰⁶ In figure 8.4 the investments in green areas are presented.

¹¹⁰⁴ Interview Bossink / Policy maker Province of North Holland, 2007.
¹¹⁰⁵ Haarlems Dagblad Zuid Kennemerland (2005), Snel beter leven rond Schiphol. By Coen Polack, July 14th 2005.
¹¹⁰⁶ Gemeente Haarlemmermeer (2002), Milieukansenkaart Haarlemmermeer 2030.

Figure 8.4 Investments in green areas in the vicinity of Schiphol 2004 – 2011



Source: BRS (2006), p.38

From the perspective of the municipality further expansion of Schiphol was not to come at the expense of an increasing amount of people exposed to high levels of noise pollution. Besides, the municipality argued that additional capacity was to be derived from further optimization of the five runway system. They were therefore not supporting the ideas of the sector about constructing a 6th and/or 7th runway.

In 2002 the municipal council decided to opt for selective growth of the airport, in order to realize the dual objective. In 2004, the doubts about the feasibility of the dual objective had increased, and it was questioned whether it was really feasible at all.¹¹⁰⁷ In a 2004 report, the urgency to invest quickly in the quality of the living environment was stressed. From the perspective of the municipality this issue had largely been ignored by the national government.¹¹⁰⁸ In essence, during the years after the Schiphol Act had been ratified, the municipality of Haarlemmermeer was working more and more on the realization of the environmental objective in an attempt to bring back the balance in the enactment of the dual objectives.

Finally, within the BRS context (main members Province of North Holland and the municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer), the 'Broadened Mainport Program' (*Verbreed Mainport Programma*, VMP) was developed in 2005.¹¹⁰⁹ In the VMP a menu of measures for improving the quality of the living environment was

¹¹⁰⁷ Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, Report Schiphol Lusten en Lasten, March 2004, p.17.

¹¹⁰⁸ Gemeente Haarlemmermeer, Report Schiphol Lusten en Lasten, March 2004, p.23.

¹¹⁰⁹ Bestuurlijke Regiegroep Schiphol (2005), *Verbreed Mainport Programma*. Haarlem.

developed (i.e. investments in green areas, recreation, insulation measures).¹¹¹⁰ In order to finance the program, a special fund for improving the quality of the living environment around Schiphol (*Leefbaarheidsfonds*) was established in 2006. The fund consisted of contributions of the local and regional authorities and the Schiphol Group. The new fund was meant to compensate people who suffered from the negative effects of Schiphol, but who fell outside the scope of already existing compensation or insulation programs (and thus could not call upon these programs).¹¹¹¹ The improvement of the quality of the living environment was not only seen as a means to contribute to an attractive business climate, but also as an essential way to restore trust of local residents in the public authorities and the airport authorities.¹¹¹²

The metropolitan strategy was further enacted in the Economic Development Plan Region Amsterdam (referred to as OPERA, 2004) of the ROA (*Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam*).¹¹¹³ The ROA was meant to coordinate long term spatial-economic developments of different North Wing municipalities. In the OPERA four objectives were introduced, which were all related to improving the international profile of the region. The importance of the gateway function and further hub development of Schiphol was stressed, while other non-hub oriented traffic was not deemed necessary for a competitive business environment. Besides, the focus was on a further improvement of the business climate, increasing the share of knowledge industries in the area.

Finally, the North Wing conference meetings that had been organized since October 9th 2001 in order to coordinate spatial developments in the North Wing (especially housing and industrial and business sites) were continued.¹¹¹⁴ On February 4th 2005 during the Fourth North Wing conference the short-term economic and infrastructure investments were being discussed in order to improve landside accessibility of the area. This was perceived to be an important criterion for Schiphol's competitive position, as better accessibility was needed to maintain (and if possible extend) the catchment area.¹¹¹⁵ It was also within the context of the North Wing conferences that a new platform was established, focusing on the coordination of the development of non airport related industrial and office sites (Platform Industrial sites and office locations referred to as

¹¹¹⁰ Interview Van Duin / Former policy maker Province of North Holland, 2007

¹¹¹¹ Interview Van Duin / Former policy maker Province of North Holland, 2007

¹¹¹² Provincie Noord Holland (2006), Nota Provinciale Board North Holland, Discussion Document Schiphol Policy, March 30th 2006.

¹¹¹³ Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam (2004) Ontwikkelingsplan Economie Regie Amsterdam. Amsterdam.

¹¹¹⁴ Some authors have argued that the *Noordvleugeloverleg* coordination platform of local governments in the northern wing of the Randstad recently became more and more important for cooperation in spatial and economic strategies because of its noncommittal character. As a result, there is wide public support in the region (Salet and Molenaar 2003).

¹¹¹⁵ Interview Van Boxtel / Schiphol Group, 2010; See also Kleyn, W.H. (2009)

PlaBeKa).¹¹¹⁶ As we discussed before, the smaller Bestuursforum Schiphol (1987) already coordinated the airport related sites. PlaBeKa and the BFS started to coordinate their strategies in order to develop an integrated strategy as regards regional development of airport related and non-airport related sites.¹¹¹⁷

Restoring the balance between the dual objectives on the regional level

In sum, a whole range of organizations, spatial plans and strategies emerged on the regional level during 2003 – 2006, partly reflecting the delegation of several planning tasks from the national level to the regional level. These organizations, plans and strategies had in common that they worked to further enact the broadened mainport strategy. Both the national government and the sector stressed the importance of further hub-development, as part of the wider objective to boost economic development of the Randstad (especially of the North Wing). On the regional level, the metropolitan strategy also stressed the importance of facilitating further hub-development, although it was also attempted to do this selectively, while simultaneously working on the improvement of the quality of the living environment. With regard to the latter, the proper enactment of the environmental objective was perceived to be of pivotal importance, also for developing an attractive business climate in the airport region.

It was not only this national and regional policy context that influenced the Schiphol policy debate. Right after the implementation of the new regulative system several problems came to the fore that raised doubts about the effectiveness and legitimacy of the new system. This greatly influenced the context within which the Schiphol policy debate had to unravel during 2003 – 2006.

8.2.3. Problems with the New Regulative System

The new regulative system did not work out very well. The amount of complaints about noise annoyance increased and the new noise system did not allow for the amount of flights that had initially been assumed. The opening of the fifth runway had resulted in new flight routes passing over municipalities located north of Schiphol. Residents of these municipalities had not been used to noise pollution and started to complain.¹¹¹⁸ See figure 8.5 for explosion of amount of complaints.¹¹¹⁹

More specifically, three important problems emerged that greatly undermined trust in the new regulative system, the aviation sector and the national government, i.e. (1) the

¹¹¹⁶ In Dutch: Platform Bedrijventerreinen en kantoorlocaties.


¹¹¹⁷ Bestuurlijke Regiegroep Schiphol (2006), Middellange termijnvisie Schipholregio.

¹¹¹⁸ BRS (2006), Naar een betere relatie tussen luchthaven en omgeving, p.22.

¹¹¹⁹ Note that it was not so much the amount of complainants that increased (remained rather stable). It was the spatial distribution of complaints that changed, and the amount of complaints issued by the same people that increased.

system had been based on wrong calculations, and (2) promises as regards levels of noise pollution were violated. Later, a third problem was added to this, i.e. (3) the impossibility to implement the desired runway use plan.

Figure 8.5 Development aircraft movements, complainants and explosion of complaints, 1986 - 2009



Source: Ministry of V&W, Feiten & Cijfers Schiphol 2007

(1) The Input Mistake

The first problems emerged as a consequence of the so-called input mistake (*invoerfout*). In the environmental impact assessment (EIA) from which the enforcement points had been derived a crucial mistake had been made. The sector had used rather low estimates for the use of one specific runway, the *Zwanenburgbaan*, resulting in lower expectations about the amounts of noise pollution. In return, the intensive use of the new 5th runway made it possible to shift some noise pollution from one area to the other. However, the expected more intensive use of the 5th runway turned out to be infeasible.¹¹²⁰ The problem was that the *Zwanenburgbaan* could not be used to its full capacity (as a consequence of the more restricting noise limits), while the *Polderbaan* (5P) lacked the capacity to compensate for this. Schiphol, KLM and Air Traffic Control stated that further mainport development would seriously become endangered if the input mistake was not repaired soon. According to their calculations only 340,000 flights could be facilitated instead of the 528,000 flights that had been assumed.¹¹²¹ New calculations based on a more realistic traffic distribution scenario were deemed necessary in order to modify the location of the enforcement points, and to make sure that there was sufficient capacity available to facilitate traffic demand. In

¹¹²⁰ Joint letter Schiphol Group and Air Traffic Management to the Minister, June 23rd 2003.

¹¹²¹ Joint letter Schiphol Group and Air Traffic Management to the Minister, June 23rd 2003.

order to repair the input mistake one of the new Decrees that accompanied the Schiphol Act (*Luchthavenverkeersbesluit*) was to be revised, for which a new EIA procedure was necessary.

As a first response to the request of the sector and the huge amount of criticism that had arisen, the Ministry of V&W assigned the NLR to investigate whether or not it was really a mistake. The NLR concluded that indeed a mistake was made in the input numbers that had been delivered by the sector, resulting in too low limits for noise pollution.^{1122 1123} This had resulted in much lower capacity than was assumed during the preparation of the new regulative system. Based on these findings, the cabinet decided that the input mistake was to be repaired in order to realize the dual objectives.¹¹²⁴ The reparation basically entailed that traffic was to be moved back from the Polderbaan to the Zwanenburgbaan. This would result in a different distribution of noise and safety effects, which caused a lot of unrest in the region. After all, the local residents of Zwanenburg had been promised that the level of noise pollution to which they had been exposed prior to 2003 would greatly diminish when the new 5th runway was put into operation. Again, local residents and municipalities felt that the national government and aviation sector had violated the promises that had been made.¹¹²⁵ Since 2003 a new coordinative platform had been established on the regional level (i.e. the CROS, *Commissie Regionaal Overlegorgaan Schiphol*) in which most municipalities and representatives of local residents were seated in order to negotiate about concrete measures to reduce noise annoyance in the region (as had been announced in the Schiphol Act). The CROS members were furious and they stated that their trust in the national government had further decreased.¹¹²⁶

The local residents were convinced that the mistake had been made deliberately. According to them, the sector already knew that the new regulative system wouldn't work out, but the urgency to make sure that the 5th runway could be put into operation in February 2003 provided them with the incentive to conceal this fact.¹¹²⁷ From the perspective of the sector this was nonsense, as they had nothing to gain by deliberately restricting their own capacity.¹¹²⁸ The cabinet had already decided that the input mistake was to be repaired. Nonetheless, the CROS members insisted upon employing an

¹¹²² TK 26959, August 20th 2003, Nr. 38.

¹¹²³ Dolderman, A.B., R. de Jong, M.E.S. Vogels (2003), *Contra expertise: Verzoek tot aanpassing Luchthavenverkeersbesluit Schiphol*. NLRrapport, Nr.CR-2003-388, Augustus 2003.

¹¹²⁴ TK 26959, August 22nd 2003, Nr. 39.

¹¹²⁵ Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

¹¹²⁶ Commissie Regionaal Overlegorgaan Schiphol (2003). Proceedings CROS meeting July 2003.

¹¹²⁷ Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

¹¹²⁸ Interview Van Boxtel / Schiphol Group, 2010.

extensive EIA procedure this time, in order to assess the real effects on noise and third party risks. This request was granted by the cabinet.¹¹²⁹

(2) Problems in the municipality of Spaarndam

At the same time, another effect of the new regulative system caused some irritation among the local residents. The municipality of Spaarndam had to suffer from a lot more noise pollution after the opening of the 5th runway than had been promised during the development of the new Schiphol Act. The westward flight routes that were followed after take-offs from the Polderbaan (the new fifth runway) ran directly over the municipality, although it had been promised that this would not be the case (see figure 8.6).

Figure 8.6 Take off routes after opening of the Polderbaan



Source: Ministry of V&W, Schiphol en U: de regels, 2007

During the EIA that had been conducted as part of the preparation of the new Schiphol Act (the EIA Schiphol 2003) the municipality had asked the Ministry of V&W to clarify the noise effects of the new distribution of flights for the municipality. The ministry had ignored the request and no answer was given. In the end, this had caused false expectations and it resulted in a lot of commotion amongst the residents of this municipality and an explosion in the amount of complaints about aircraft noise. During an information meeting in August 2003, the CEO of Schiphol Group had promised that the flight route would be removed so it would no longer run over the residential areas of

¹¹²⁹ Startnotitie MER Wijzigingsbesluit Schiphol, 2003.

Spaarndam.¹¹³⁰ However, the CEO also argued that they had little possibilities to change the flight routes on short notice. A new EIA was to be carried out first. According to the Schiphol CEO the new regulative system was inflexible; it was an 'insane' system.¹¹³¹ Later, several local residents who had heard about this statement on behalf of the Schiphol Group got angry. From their perspective it was rather strange that the Schiphol Group who had been lobbying so much in favour of the new regulative system during the political debate of 2001 was now criticizing this same system.¹¹³²

After the meeting in Spaarndam the municipalities of Haarlemmerliede-Spaarnwoude and Haarlem and Schiphol Group wrote a joint letter to the CROS (September 1st 2003) wherein they requested the CROS to explore possibilities for different flight routes and to advice the ministry of V&W about this.¹¹³³ However, it turned out to be more difficult to find a solution than initially expected. A third problem that had arisen after implementation of the new regulative system was related to this.

(3) Dangerous simultaneous take-offs

In November 2003 Air Traffic Control reported that simultaneous take-offs from the Polderbaan and the Zwanenburgbaan were not possible, even dangerous, due to the small distance between the aircrafts.¹¹³⁴ This led to a further reduction of capacity and it further decreased the trust of the sector parties (Schiphol Group, KLM, other airlines) in the growth potential offered by the new system. Moreover, KLM representatives complained that other airports with two runways that were situated even closer together could deal with simultaneous take-offs. According to the Ministry of V&W this was to be explained by the fact that at those airports airplanes had the possibility to fan out in different directions, which was impossible at Schiphol as a consequence of the rigid environmental norms, based on rigid flight paths. This once more illustrated the inflexibility of the new regulative system.¹¹³⁵ In the meantime, it also complicated the search for solutions for the input mistake and the noise problem in Spaarndam.

Air Traffic Control started to investigate different opportunities for changing flight routes. All three issues were to be taken up in the new EIA procedure that was initiated in order to revise the Decrees that were part of the new Schiphol Act.

¹¹³⁰ IJmuider Courant (2004), Andere vliegroute Spaarndam zeer onzeker. By Coen Polack, March 12th 2004.

¹¹³¹ Volkskrant (2003), Een krankzinnig systeem. By Jan Meeus & Bert Wagendorp, August 30th 2003.

¹¹³² Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹¹³³ Haarlemmerliede-Spaarnwoude, Haarlem & Schiphol Group (2003), Joint letter to the CROS 'New flight routes Spaarndam', September 1st 2003.

¹¹³⁴ LVNL (2004), Letter to the Secretary of State of the Ministry of V&W, Parallel starten. January 19th 2004.

¹¹³⁵ De Jong, B. (forthcoming).

A new EIA (2004)

In line with the legal procedure, the EIA was to be carried out by the Schiphol Group and Air Traffic Control. The CROS delivered different alternatives for replacing flight routes alongside Spaarndam, which were taken up in the Start Document.¹¹³⁶ In order to prevent new unrealistic expectations, the municipalities organized within the CROS demanded a very clear perspective on the distribution of the environmental effects as a consequence of the proposed changes. The final report was presented on March 26th, 2004.¹¹³⁷ The environmental effects had been assessed for four different alternatives:

1. No changes in the existing situation
2. Repairing the input mistake
3. Repairing the input mistake and the flight routes around Spaarndam (which was developed by the CROS members)
4. The most environmental friendly alternative (same as 3, but with different flight routes)

Alternatives 3 and 4 would result in similar amounts of capacity and negative external effects. Therefore, those alternatives were most desirable, making the achievement of the revised dual objective possible. Based on these results the Ministries of V&W and VROM developed a proposal for a revised aviation Act.¹¹³⁸ At the same time, the cabinet had also assigned the NLR to do some additional research about the consequences of the input mistake. The results once more underlined the loss of capacity if the input mistake was not repaired, which, from the perspective of the cabinet, further legitimated the revision procedure that was being enacted.¹¹³⁹

However, the revised flight routes implied a redistribution of the noise pollution over the municipalities, which led to a large amount of negative responses of several municipalities (i.e. Zwanenburg, Aalsmeer, Castricum, Zaandam, Haarlemmermeer, Haarlemmerliede-Spaarnwoude etc.).¹¹⁴⁰ For one, the intensified use of the Zwanenburgbaan would result in additional noise pollution for the municipality of Zwanenburg and Zaandam. So, even after the reparation of the input mistake, the municipality of Zwanenburg would get more noise pollution than initially expected, and than had been promised in the PKB of 1995. This caused a lot of local protests.¹¹⁴¹ The

¹¹³⁶ Startnotitie MER Wijziging Uitvoeringsbesluiten Schiphol, November 2003.

¹¹³⁷ Schiphol Group, MER Wijziging Uitvoeringsbesluiten Schiphol 2004.

¹¹³⁸ Ontwerp Wijziging Luchthavenverkeersbesluit en Luchthavenindelingsbesluit, 2004.


¹¹³⁹ Vogels, M.E.S., A.B. Dolderman, A.B. & R. de Jong (2004), Nadere analyse van het effect van de invoerfout bij het vaststellen van de grenswaarden in het Luchthavenverkeersbesluit Schiphol 2003. NLR rapport, Nr.CR-2004-060, March 2003.

¹¹⁴⁰ www.vliegghinder.nl. Derived from the web on January 21st 2007.

¹¹⁴¹ Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2009.

platform that included a large amount of grassroots organizations (*Platform Leefmilieu Regio Schiphol*, PLRS) rejected the EIA alternatives. Moreover, it was stated that they were fed up with all the mistakes, lies and manipulations and they called for the creation of a new independent institute that was to assess the real environmental effects in order to restore levels of trust (both in the national government and the aviation sector and in the entire regulative system).¹¹⁴² ¹¹⁴³ The municipalities of Beverwijk, Heemskerk, Velsen, Uitgeest and Castricum that were located north of Schiphol (and that formed the cluster North of the CROS), also rejected the EIA alternatives. Especially in these municipalities the level of noise pollution had increased enormously after the 5th runway had become operative.¹¹⁴⁴ The proposed change of the flight routes, northwards of Spaarndam, would cause even more noise pollution for the municipalities, which they deemed unacceptable (see figure 8.7).¹¹⁴⁵ However, these municipalities were located in the outer area, and no formal legal protection for this area had been taken up in the Schiphol Act.

Figure 8.7 Proposals to change flight routes to relieve Spaarndam (green line is old route, blue is new route)



Source: MER wijziging uitvoeringsbesluiten Schiphol, 2004

The municipality of Haarlemmermeer posed its concerns about the commotion caused by the input mistake and the Spaarndam noise problem. They emphasized the need to restore trust in the Schiphol policy framework, in order to facilitate further mainport

¹¹⁴² PLRS (2004), Letter to the Minister, EIA response Nr. 210.
¹¹⁴³ PLRS (2004), Nota of 11 residential platforms ‘Als een goed instrument’, April 6th 2004.
¹¹⁴⁴ Interview Von der Meer / local resident, 2009.
¹¹⁴⁵ Cluster North, Response to the EIA, May 19th 2004.

development.¹¹⁴⁶ More specifically, the municipality emphasized the need to improve communication with local residents and to invest in the quality of the living environment in order to do so. Some members of the Lower House did not accept that the removal of the flight route over Spaarndam would lead to a considerable increase in levels of noise pollution at other locations. Members of the political parties Groen Links and PVDA even submitted a motion to prevent this.¹¹⁴⁷ Still, the motion was rejected and a majority of the Lower House voted in favour of the revised Aviation Act.¹¹⁴⁸ From the perspective of most politicians it was inevitable that some municipalities would be better off and some would be worse off, but the proposed solutions were believed to be the most effective ones if the total amount of people exposed to high levels of noise pollution was considered.

Summer 2004 it had been clear that the regional and local public authorities, local residents and several Members of the Lower and Upper House had lost all faith in the new regulative system. The public opinion reflected the idea that this was only the next episode in the ongoing Schiphol policy game, and the mistakes were made on purpose, and false promises had been made to make sure that the new Schiphol Act was ready on time in order to facilitate further mainport development.¹¹⁴⁹ Five years later these accusations would become more persuasive when the 2004 CEO of Schiphol asserted that the both Schiphol and the Ministry of V&W had not communicated the expected noise effects for the municipality of Spaarndam properly, thus creating wrong expectations. Looking back, the former CEO argued that a lot of commotion could have been avoided if only they (i.e. the national government and the sector) had communicated more transparently that the 5-runway system would decrease the total amount of people and houses exposed to serious noise levels, while this would come at the expense of some locations, like Spaarndam.¹¹⁵⁰ In a response to this interview the Spaarndam municipality announced that they would start a juridical procedure for being wrongfully informed during the decision making about the new Schiphol Act of 2003, demanding financial compensation.¹¹⁵¹

In the summer of 2004 the revised Act was politically ratified and it was put into operation on September 2nd 2004.¹¹⁵² Prior to the final ratification representatives of the municipalities of Zwanenburg and Spaarndam had initiated bilateral negotiations with the Ministry of V&W, Schiphol Group and Air Traffic Control in an attempt to decrease

¹¹⁴⁶ Letter of Haarlemmermeer to the Ministry of Transportation, May 19th 2004.

¹¹⁴⁷ TK 26959, July 1st 2004, Nr. 76.

¹¹⁴⁸ TK Handelingen 2003 – 2004, July 1st 2004, Nr. 91, pp. 5908 – 5909.

¹¹⁴⁹ See for example the several interviews taken up in the research report *Bijnsdorp Communicatie Projecten*, 2005

¹¹⁵⁰ *Intermediair* (2009), *Terugblikken met Gerlach Cerfontaine*. By Hugo Logtenberg, February 18th 2009.

¹¹⁵¹ *Volkskrant* (2009), *Woedend Spaarndam doet aangifte tegen Cerfontaine*. By Michiel Haighton, March 7th 2009.

¹¹⁵² *Staatsblad*, August 30th 2004.

levels of noise pollution on their respective territories. In the end, they had had success.¹¹⁵³ The final new flight routes that had been put into operation in September 2004 resulted in lower levels of noise pollution than would initially be the case. Some of the noise was removed from Zwanenburg to Lijnden, something that, in turn, triggered furious reactions of the residents of Lijnden.¹¹⁵⁴ The residents of Zwanenburg were of course very pleased about the new flight route.¹¹⁵⁵ The same old problem came to the fore again. Changing flight routes always implied that noise pollution was removed from one location to the other, resulting in ‘not in my backyard’ (NIMBY) protests.

Policy makers of the Ministry of V&W acknowledged that the revised Act had prevented economic damage, but that this had come at the price of increasing distrust among local residents and the regional and local public authorities.^{1156 1157} The policy makers acknowledged that the management of the expectations of the local residents spread over the many municipalities in the vicinity of Schiphol was up for improvement. Amongst other things, a new brochure with an explanation of all the policy rules was being prepared in order to achieve this.^{1158 1159} It was also argued that the current (negative) experiences with the new regulative system were to be used as input for the evaluation of the new regulative system that was carried out at that time. For one, the entire affair had clearly illustrated the inflexibility of the new regulative system. And it had resulted in decreasing levels of trust in the new regulative system, the Ministry of V&W and the aviation sector. Several local residents indicated that providing them with some nice looking (shiny) brochures would not be sufficient for winning back their trust.¹¹⁶⁰

8.2.4 Privatization

Finally, the issue of privatization was also part of the policy debate. As indicated in the former chapter (7), this issue did not belong to one specific policy trajectory. Instead, it followed its own trajectory and it influenced the other policy trajectories on the background.

As discussed in chapter 7, in 2003 the Ministry of V&W had already stated that it was their intention to bring a minority share of 49% of Schiphol Group shares to the stock market. In 2004 the cabinet agreed upon this plan, arguing that it contributed to a further

¹¹⁵³ Haarlems Dagblad (2004), Minder vliegheerrie Spaarndam. By Coen Polack, October 19th 2004.

¹¹⁵⁴ NRC (2004), Afbuigen vliegroutes leidt toestellen pal over Lijnden. By A. Schreuder, November 4th 2004.

¹¹⁵⁵ Haarlems Dagblad (2004), Zwanenburgers opgetogen over nieuwe vliegroutes. October 19th 2004.

¹¹⁵⁶ TK 26959, August 27th, 2004, Nr.83.

¹¹⁵⁷ Interview Gosse / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009; Interview De Waard / Policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009.

¹¹⁵⁸ Interview Abspoel / Policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009.

¹¹⁵⁹ Ministry of V&W (2004) Schiphol en U: De regels. The Hague.

¹¹⁶⁰ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

disentangling of responsibilities (i.e. clear role differentiation of the government as shareholder, controller and legislator), while simultaneously enhancing airport competitiveness (i.e. it would be easier for the Schiphol Group to obtain financial loans). However, during the further discussion the municipality of Amsterdam, who held 22% of the shares, vetoed the decision of the national government in September 2006. The municipality was afraid that the public function of the airport was not sufficiently safeguarded anymore when the airport was turned into a private enterprise. According to the municipality the main interest of Schiphol's new shareholders was probably to make as much profit as possible on the short term, which was not always the best strategy when aiming to secure sustainable development of the regional economy in the long run. Since Amsterdam perceived Schiphol to be of pivotal importance for the sustainable development of the regional economy, privatization was deemed undesirable.¹¹⁶¹ In a response, the then Minister of Finance (Zalm) wanted to destroy this veto by making an appeal to a Royal Decision (*Koninklijk Besluit*). Such a decision could be requested when crucial affairs of national concern were jeopardized, and it would therefore allow the national government to overrule the veto.

By then, tensions were growing between the Minister and the Alderman of the municipality of Amsterdam who had been responsible for Schiphol affairs (Asscher). For one, the alderman would argue in his memoirs that were published in 2010 that he was put under heavy pressure by the 'old boys network' of the aviation sector to quit his resistance against privatization.¹¹⁶² However, instead of giving in to this political pressure, the municipality of Amsterdam started a juridical procedure to fight this decision in November, while in the meantime the cabinet Balkenende III fell and new elections were held. In the Coalition Agreement of the new cabinet (Balkenende IV) it was stated that the national government wasn't going to pursue its ambition to privatize Schiphol. Since it was still deemed necessary that Schiphol Group could acquire additional money for making investments in order to remain competitive within the global aviation market, it was argued that different strategies would be developed to enable the airport to do so.¹¹⁶³ Of course, the Schiphol Group, who had been fighting for privatization for almost over a decade, was heavily disappointed about this decision.¹¹⁶⁴

8.2.5 Conclusion

It was within the context of the national and regional elaboration of the dual objective, the shortcomings of the new regulative system that came to light right after its

¹¹⁶¹ Municipality Amsterdam (2006), Press Release Municipality Amsterdam, October 2006.

¹¹⁶² Asscher, L. (2010), *De ontsluitende Stad*. Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, Amsterdam.

¹¹⁶³ TK 29664, October 18th 2007, Nr.72.

¹¹⁶⁴ The author attended a presentation about the corporate strategy of Schiphol CEO Cerfontaine on the night that the decision was made to stop the privatization process. In a direct response the CEO stated that he was very disappointed about this decision.

implementation and the debate about privatization that the Schiphol policy program 2003 – 2006 was to be carried out. Besides, the changes on the aviation market that we discussed in chapter 7 (e.g. slowdown of traffic growth, increasing competition, airline alliances) started to make an impact. The different policy trajectories that unraveled during 2003 – 2006 shall be discussed next (8.3 – 8.9). We start with the policy debate about the long term (Project Mainport Schiphol).

8.3 The Long Term: Project Mainport Schiphol (2003 – 2005)

	2003 - 2006			
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006 8.3 – 8.9				
	Long term (PMS) – 8.3			
	Evaluation Program –8.4 –8.9			
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation		
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation		
	8.6	Night Flights		
	8.7	Group Risk		
	8.8	Housing locations		
	Cabinet’s Perspective – 8.9			
		2007	2008	2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009 8.10 – 8.11		Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
		Mid term < 2020 – 8.11		
Long term 2006 – 2009 8.12		Long term > 2025 – 8.12		

In order to continue to explore the long term alternatives the Ministry of V&W initiated a new policy trajectory, the Project Mainport Schiphol (PMS). We subsequently discuss the plan of approach (8.3.1), the outcomes (8.3.2) and some of the problems that occurred during the policy process (8.3.3).

8.3.1 Plan of Approach for the long term

In order to arrive at a long term perspective (which included a decision about the need for a 6th and/or 7th runway), first a background document was to be developed wherein all expected impacts of relevant future aviation developments on the mid and long term were to be presented in an as objective way as possible. The many criticisms about facts and figures used in the Schiphol debate were the main reason for enacting this strategy. The national government reasoned that the outcomes could be used to make transparent and objective trade offs about long term policy options. The background document was to serve as a widely shared problem analysis, from which an integral vision on the

future development and a related set of concrete policy measures was to be derived.¹¹⁶⁵ More specifically, the PMS was to result in an adequate development strategy and policy measures to successfully implement Mainport Schiphol in the Randstad. The approach of the PMS indicated the acknowledgment that new policy measures and investments were only possible if based on wide support. Trust in the research results that were used for deciding about long term policy options was deemed to be of crucial importance.¹¹⁶⁶

In the PMS the mainport concept was reframed somewhat; it did still refer to hub-development, but it was also more clearly related to the landside development of the wider region (the entire Randstad, but especially the northern part of the Randstad), stressing the interrelationship between airside development and landside development (both the landside in the immediate vicinity and the wider region).¹¹⁶⁷ This was reflected in the definition of a mainport that was used during PMS.¹¹⁶⁸ In essence, the quality of the mainport was now based on three different aspects:

1. Excellent airside (amount of destinations, type of destinations and frequency of serving the destinations) and landside accessibility (road and rails);
2. Excellent airport, facilitating traffic (passengers and freight)
3. High quality airport environment, here understood as the availability of an excellent business climate, including high-quality industrial and office sites and a high quality of life (adequate housing, recreation, green areas etc.), excellent landside accessibility and a high quality living environment and sufficient housing supply.

These three ambitions were translated in a set of preconditions for mainport development:¹¹⁶⁹

- A strong home carrier and a high quality network configuration;
- Sufficient runway capacity, terminal capacity, gates;
- Good landside accessibility (to increase the catchment area);
- A good regional business climate, including the fiscal climate, the regional labour market, sufficient high quality industrial and office sites, high quality housing and quality of life.

¹¹⁶⁵ Plan of Approach Project Mainport Schiphol, October 16th 2003, pp.8-9.

¹¹⁶⁶ Interview Rienstra / Former policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2007.

¹¹⁶⁷ Interview De Laat / Former policy maker of Ministry of V&W, 2004.

¹¹⁶⁸ In Dutch: 'De mainport Schiphol is het grootstedelijk gebied dat functioneert als essentiële draaischijf tussen de internationale netwerken van personen, goederen en informatiestromen en onze nationale netwerken, mede omdat in dat gebied de centrale luchthaven in Europa voor ten minste één sterke Europese luchtvaartmaatschappij (al dan niet als partner in een fusie of alliantie) is gelegen.' (PvA, 2003, p.3).

¹¹⁶⁹ Plan of Approach Project Mainport Schiphol, October 16th 2003, p.5.

Possibilities for landside development (i.e. creating an Airport City on the airport territory and creating a competitive region on the regional level) were now explicitly linked to airside development; it was assumed that an excellent international accessibility was one of the main competitive factors at work in a globalizing world, and that this required a high quality network configuration. And possibilities for airside developments were partly dependent on landside developments; i.e. an attractive and competitive region with a large catchment area triggered airlines to use Schiphol.¹¹⁷⁰ Next to this clarification of the interdependence between airside and landside, the basic preconditions underlying Schiphol policies remained in place. It was still attempted to both facilitate mainport development and improving the quality of life, implying a further enactment of the dual objective.

The PMS organization

The PMS was an interdepartmental project. The Ministry of V&W/DGL was in charge of the project and the Ministries of EZ and VROM were part of the program direction. The Ministry of EZ was in charge of the economic aspects of the project. Their main concern was to prevent a too one sided orientation on the negative environmental effects. From their perspective, this had been the case during the entire policy debate about the new regulative system, which had mainly revolved around the noise issue (1999 – 2003).¹¹⁷¹ The ministry of VROM was in charge of the spatial aspects of the project. At that time the ministry was busy preparing a new national spatial-economic development strategy for the Netherlands (i.e. the White Paper called the *Nota Ruimte*, see 8.2.1) and this was to be combined with the PMS, as Schiphol was to play an important role in the new spatial strategy. The ministry of V&W was in charge of all other aspects and was to integrate the different findings into a coherent problem analysis.¹¹⁷²

In order to discuss the findings and the progress of the project an inner Circle was established, consisting of the stakeholders that were deemed most important (i.e. Schiphol, KLM, Air Traffic Control, Province of North Holland, Municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer). An outer circle, consisting of the other aviation actors, the CROS, other provinces and municipalities, the Chamber of Commerce, environmental actors, knowledge institutes (universities, advisory committees, planning agencies) was consulted on a regular basis in order to discuss preliminary findings and additional needs. The three Ministries were responsible for the final decision-making.¹¹⁷³

¹¹⁷⁰ Interview De Laat / Former policy maker of Ministry of V&W, 2004.

¹¹⁷¹ Interview Van Putten / Policy maker of Ministry of EZ, 2007.

¹¹⁷² Interview Rienstra / Former policy maker of Ministry of V&W, 2007.

¹¹⁷³ Plan of Approach Project Mainport Schiphol, October 16th 2003.

8.3.2 Developing PMS outcomes

In order to develop the background document, the existing knowledge was gathered and knowledge gaps were detected. All existing research documents were listed and the different Ministries were asked which research questions needed to be included.¹¹⁷⁴ Based on this information a research agenda was developed. The CROS was also involved in setting the research agenda.¹¹⁷⁵ At the same time, an extensive research program was being established for the evaluation program (as we shall discuss later). Policy makers of the Ministry of V&W tried to make sure that the different research programs complemented one another, which would turn out to become a difficult challenge.¹¹⁷⁶ The final research agenda of the PMS was clustered around four main themes that related to the four preconditions that were set for achieving the dual objective in the plan of approach.¹¹⁷⁷

1. The economic potential of the airport
2. The negative external effects (mostly derived from the findings of the evaluation program)
3. Future developments of the aviation sector, including the expected trends and the development of new aviation scenarios
4. Competitive position of Schiphol

In total, 11 research projects were carried out during PMS, all of which concerned the possible future developments in the aviation sector and the economic effects of Schiphol.¹¹⁷⁸ The research organizations that were usually asked by the Ministry of V&W were assigned to carry out most of the research (e.g. SEO, Rand, TNO, BCI, Bureau Louter, Strategem). The research process was supervised by the policy makers of the three Ministries, who had together assigned them and framed the research questions and approach. The research was used to develop the final report, which was presented on December 16th 2005.¹¹⁷⁹ The report contained an as complete and objective overview of several important aspects of mainport Schiphol as possible. It was meant to serve as a joint fact basis for all actors involved in the public policy debate. It was to end the ongoing war of reports, preventing that future debate would revolve around the validity of facts and figures instead of focusing on developing joint solutions. Thus, it

¹¹⁷⁴ Interview Van Putten / Policy maker of Ministry of EZ, 2007; Interview Rienstra / Former policy maker of Ministry of V&W, 2007.

¹¹⁷⁵ Interview Bakker / Former policy maker CROS, 2007.

¹¹⁷⁶ Interview Rienstra / Former policy maker of Ministry V&W, 2007; Interview Wulffraat / Former policy maker of Ministry V&W, 2008

¹¹⁷⁷ Proceedings PMS, September 2005.

¹¹⁷⁸ The PMS budget was 2.05 million euros of which 1.945 would actually be used. See PMS proceedings, September 2005, p.15.

¹¹⁷⁹ Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Spatial planning (December 2005), Mainport Schiphol Beleidsinformatie. Achtergronddocument. Ministry of Transportation. See also TK 29665, Nr.107.

was important that the information taken up in the final report was indeed perceived to be valid by all actors involved. This implied that these actors had to validate the content of the report.

In the initial plan a broad validation procedure was taken up. Some of the actors that had commented the proceedings were knowledge institutes (NLR, SEO and the Advisory Council on Traffic, *Adviesdienst Verkeer Vervoer*), planning agencies (CPB, MNP), the BRS and the aviation sector. In the initial plan, the CROS would also be asked to verify the content of the report. However, in the end the CROS did not have the opportunity to reflect upon the report. The Lower House wanted the final report to become available before the end of 2005, instead of the date (February 2006) that was proposed earlier. This complicated the involvement of the stakeholders, making it less validated than initially attempted.¹¹⁸⁰ Nevertheless, according to the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W there was wide agreement about the validity of the content of the report.¹¹⁸¹ Thus, at the end of 2005 the PMS had delivered a background document that included the economic benefits of Schiphol, the environmental impact of Schiphol, the future trends on the aviation market and the consequences for the competitive position for Schiphol. However, it did not contain any policy directions for long term development of the Schiphol region. Nor was there time left to work on such an integral perspective for the long term. It turned out that the PMS ambitions had been changed somewhat along the way.

8.3.3 Problems: no clear objectives

As discussed before, the initial ambition was to develop a long-term perspective on the Schiphol region.¹¹⁸² Along the way, the ambitions were readjusted and the development of a shared set of facts and figures became the core focus.¹¹⁸³ Those facts and figures could serve as useful input for the development of the Cabinet's perspective that was scheduled for 2006. From the perspective of the Ministry of EZ, the Ministry of V&W had not really known what they wanted to achieve with the PMS. Over the years, different project leaders had been assigned and replaced by the Ministry of V&W, while the other Ministries involved (i.e. it was an interdepartmental project) had had no idea about what was going on.¹¹⁸⁴ The same held true for the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W that had been concerned with the evaluation program. They had hardly had any idea about what their colleagues were doing in the PMS program, which greatly undermined the possibility to develop an integral Cabinet's Perspective concerning

¹¹⁸⁰ Letter from the Ministry of Transportation to CROS about the presentation of the final document 'Mainport Schiphol policy information', December 16th 2005.

¹¹⁸¹ Interview Rienstra / Former policy maker of Ministry V&W, 2007.

¹¹⁸² Interview De Laat / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2004.

¹¹⁸³ Interview Rienstra / Former policy maker of Ministry V&W, 2007.

¹¹⁸⁴ Interview Van Putten / Policy maker of Ministry of EZ, 2007.

Schiphol’s short, mid and long term (as had initially been the goal).¹¹⁸⁵ One main reason for the readjusted ambitions as regards the PMS and the minor role that its final product would eventually play in the development of the Cabinet’s Perspective was that the evaluation program received far more attention of the actors involved in the Schiphol debate. The evaluation program would shed light on the effectiveness of the new regulative system, which was deemed far more important and urgent by all actors involved (including Ministries, politicians, regional and local actors) than engaging in rather vague discussions about highly uncertain long term developments, while the aviation market development was stagnating for the time being.

8.4. Preparing the Evaluation Program (2003 – 2004)

		2003 - 2006			
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006 8.3 – 8.9					
	Long term (PMS) – 8.3				
	Evaluation Program –8.4 –8.9				
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation			
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation			
	8.6	Night Flights			
	8.7	Group Risk			
	8.8	Housing locations			
	Cabinet’s Perspective – 8.9				
		2007	2008	2009	
Alders Table 2006 – 2009 8.10 – 8.11			Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11		
Long term 2006 – 2009 8.12			Long term > 2025 – 8.12		

The Minister of V&W had clearly stated that the evaluation program formed the core of the policy activities of the upcoming years (in terms of political attention and resources) and the results formed important input for the new Cabinet’s Perspective that was scheduled for 2006. In chapter 7 we discussed the many doubts about the level of protection that the new regulative system would offer, especially against noise pollution and third party risks. More specifically, the claim that the system would offer at least an equivalent level of protection as the old PKB system would have done was doubted. In the end, this had given rise to the inclusion of the Baarda motion in the new Schiphol Act.¹¹⁸⁶ In a response to the motion, the Minister of V&W had promised on June 26th 2002 that the new regulative system was to be evaluated within three years by assessing the level of equivalence compared to the old PKB system (i.e. before February

¹¹⁸⁵ Interview Lap / Former Policy maker Ministry of VROM, 2007; Interview Wulffraat / former policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2007.
¹¹⁸⁶ TK 27603, June 25th 2002, Nr. 88K.

2006).¹¹⁸⁷ The problems that came to the fore right after the implementation of the new regulative system (see 8.2.3) made the evaluation program all the more urgent. Apparently, the system was up for improvement. The preparation of the evaluation turned out to be a rather challenging task, given the high stakes and political sensitivities involved. In this paragraph we discuss how the evaluation program was framed. We first discuss how the Ministry of V&W developed an initial scope (8.4.1). Next we discuss the political debate, as the Lower House was to ratify the approach (8.4.2). Finally, we discuss the criticisms that were posed on the eventual framing (8.4.3).

8.4.1 Defining the scope of the evaluation

After the ratification of the new Schiphol Act there had been a lot of political discussion about the actual scope and content of the Baarda motion.¹¹⁸⁸ What was to be included during the evaluation and what not? On 6th of March 2003 the Minister of V&W presented the main outline of the evaluation in the Lower House.¹¹⁸⁹ Most importantly, it was stated that the criteria taken up in the Transition Articles (*Overgangsartikelen*) of the Schiphol Act were to serve as the core of the evaluation program. However, before the final plan of approach for the evaluation was developed the first problems with the new regulative system had already emerged. On the one hand, the trust of local residents, regional and local public authorities as regards the protective workings of the new regulative system was diminishing. On the other hand, the trust of the sector also decreased as a consequence of the inflexibility of the system, which seemed to make full use of capacity impossible.

The specific content of the Baarda motion was discussed one more time during the determination of the financial budget of the Schiphol policy program in May 2004. During this discussion it was decided that both the Members of the Upper and the Lower House were allowed to indicate which issues they wanted to add to the ones taken up in the Transition Articles of 2002. One of the main requests was to gain insight in the development of noise pollution in the outer areas (35 - 20Ke zone and beyond) since 1990. During the debate in the Upper House in 2002 about the Baarda Motion, the Minister of V&W had already promised to include this issue in the Transition Articles, which had not been done yet anno 2004. At the same time it was acknowledged that merely assessing the level of equivalence didn't say much about the effectiveness of the regulative system, or about possibilities to make the system more effective. The Ministries of V&W and VROM who were in charge of the evaluation program, had received diverse signals, both from the CROS members (local residents and

¹¹⁸⁷ TK 27603, June 26th 2002, Nr. 88L.

¹¹⁸⁸ See for example TK 27603, May 7th 2003, Nr. 99B.

¹¹⁸⁹ TK 27603, March 6th 2003, Nr. 99A.

municipalities) and the aviation sector parties, that, based on their practical experiences, there were possibilities for improving the regulative system.¹¹⁹⁰ The scope of the evaluation was therefore broadened¹¹⁹¹ and two main objectives were formulated in the final plan of approach of the evaluation:¹¹⁹²

1. Was the intended level of protection offered? (defined in terms of the Transition Articles of the Schiphol Act, articles XI tm XIII);
2. Did the policy regulations actually work? (Was there sufficient room within the environmental capacity limits to facilitate mainport development and did the implemented policy measures -limits and rules - secure acceptable negative effects? And which improvements were possible?).

Three different trajectories were set up to answer these questions:

1. The execution of the Baarda Motion (assessing the level of equivalence of the old and new regulative system);
2. Assessing the effectiveness of the current Schiphol policy framework;
3. Possibilities for improvements, against the background of achieving the dual objective.

Moreover, it was agreed that research would be conducted to explore the possibilities for legal protection of the outer areas against noise pollution. The new CDV was assigned to do so, i.e. the one that succeeded the Berkhout Committee that had given back its assignment in December 2002. More specifically, in the Plan of Approach the role of the new CDV was explicated.¹¹⁹³ The CDV was assigned to answer three questions:

1. How to protect the outer areas? (zone between 35Ke – 20Ke);
2. How to measure noise, instead of merely calculating it, and use this for policy purposes?
3. Monitoring the implementation of the new measure (from Ke to L_{den}).

The promise to protect the outer areas and measure noise dated back to the PKB promises of 1995, but had been postponed during the development of the new regulative system (see chapter 7).

¹¹⁹⁰ Interview Lap / Former policy maker Ministry of VROM, 2008; Interview Wulfraat / Former policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2008.

¹¹⁹¹ TK 27603, May 13th 2004, Nr. A.

¹¹⁹² Plan of Approach Evaluation, 2004; p.6; TK 29665, Nr. 1; June 18th 2004.

¹¹⁹³ Plan of Approach Evaluation, 2004; p.6; TK 29665, Nr. 1; June 18th 2004.

Finally, it was also promised to take up the two other issues that had been postponed during the debate about the Schiphol Act, i.e. a norm for Group Risk was to be introduced in 2005 and a final decision about the extension of the night regime from 6AM to 7AM was to be taken. Together, these issues formed the backbone of the plan of approach of the evaluation program. In the end, the evaluation was meant to assess the extent to which all promises taken up in the PKB of 1995 were sufficiently lived up to by means of the Schiphol Act 2003 and related Decrees.

8.4.2 Political debate about the plan: placing an emphasis on Trust (2004)

After the presentation of the plan of approach, the Members of the Upper and Lower House were once more invited to respond and advice about possible additions. Members of the Upper House stressed the importance of keeping the entire process as transparent as possible. From their perspective, the low levels of trust were the main problem of Schiphol policy. The evaluation could be used to restore at least some of the trust in both the policies and the national government.¹¹⁹⁴ The members of the Upper House advised to establish an independent process committee that was to guard the objectivity and transparency of the evaluation. Besides, they pointed out the gap between the calculated noise levels and the way people experienced these effects. From this perspective, concluding that the environmental limits were not exceeded did not matter much for people's feelings and opinions. It was deemed very important to take these perceptions of the people living in the vicinity of Schiphol into account. The evaluation program therefore needed to balance between the calculations and people's perceptions, thus adding a qualitative dimension to the evaluation. In the end, the Upper House was very pleased about the open way in which the evaluation program was being framed and organized. In a response to the advice, the Minister of V&W stated that reducing the level of distrust was indeed to become one of the key aims of the evaluation program.¹¹⁹⁵ ¹¹⁹⁶ Moreover, a specific theme as regards the experiences of the local residents was to be part of the research program, as was the establishment of an independent monitoring committee.

In the subsequent discussion in the Lower House most points made in the Upper House were supported and emphasized. Most importantly, it was stressed that the evaluation offered an excellent opportunity to restore trust in both the national government and the new regulative system. The members too argued that the way to achieve this was by keeping the process as transparent as possible and by establishing an independent process committee.¹¹⁹⁷ Everybody needed to have the possibility to see and understand

¹¹⁹⁴ TK 27603, July 7th 2004, Nr.B.

¹¹⁹⁵ TK 27603, August 27th, 2004, Nr.B.

¹¹⁹⁶ TK 29665, October 6th 2004, Nr.2.

¹¹⁹⁷ TK 29665, Nr.3.

what was happening and for this, all documents were to be made easily accessible.¹¹⁹⁸ One Member of the political party Groen Links demanded a lot of additional information: an extensive overview of the real effects of noise, third party risks, air pollution and stench since 1990.¹¹⁹⁹ By this he meant that not only the effects on the policy area were to be taken into account (i.e. those areas to which the Act applied), but also the effects on other areas for which no legal protection was provided. Several members of the Lower House were convinced that negative effects had increased for those areas that were located farther away from the airport (even outside the outer area, i.e. outside the 20Ke zone). Finally, Members echoed the advice of the Upper House to take the experiences of the local residents into account. The Minister indicated that a less technocratic approach had already been adopted in the evaluation program, since several research projects were conducted to get a grip on the actual experiences of the local residents and other stakeholders.¹²⁰⁰ It was acknowledged that this aspect had been largely ignored in the foregoing policy debate, and that it had to be taken seriously in order to restore trust the feelings of local residents.

The political debate had shown that both the members of the Upper and Lower House were unanimously calling for an approach to restore trust and the Ministers of V&W and VROM had shown a willingness to do so. On November 22nd 2004 the final plan of approach of the evaluation was presented, with a strong emphasis on transparency and restoring trust.¹²⁰¹ An independent process committee would monitor the entire process, and the evaluation itself was to be carried out by a third party (and not by the Ministry of V&W). Transparency was further guaranteed by making all documents publicly available by means of a dedicated website, by organizing several information meetings, by doing a lot of additional research, and by asking several expert committees for advice.¹²⁰²

8.4.3 Criticism on the framing of the evaluation (2004)

Despite the various strategies to increase transparency, there was still considerable criticism about the way the evaluation program was framed. Most often heard were claims that the outcomes of the evaluation were already clear up front and that the wrong questions were being asked.

With regard to the first, several of the grassroots organizations of local residents and other environmental actors stated that, even before the level of equivalence was actually

¹¹⁹⁸ Except for the internal memoranda of the ministerial meetings. I have attempted several times to obtain these, but each time my request was turned down.

¹¹⁹⁹ Letter to the Minister of Transportation by W. Duyvendak, 21st September 2004.

¹²⁰⁰ TK 29665, Nr.3.

¹²⁰¹ TK 29665, Nr.4.

¹²⁰² Interview Abspoel / Policy maker Ministry V&W, 2009; Interview Gosse / Former policy maker Ministry V&W, 2009.

assessed, the conclusion would be that it was equal.¹²⁰³ During the creation of the new regulative system it had already been assessed whether or not the selected criteria lived up to the PKB conditions. Indeed, this was one of the main reasons for selecting the criteria in the first place (and excluding other criteria - see chapter 7). Moreover, during this assessment traffic scenarios had been used (i.e. 500,000-625,000 flights) that contained higher passenger numbers than those actually welcomed in 2004 and 2005. It was quite obvious that the lower input rates would result in lower negative effects, hence more positive results.¹²⁰⁴ In order to conduct a valid assessment these actors argued that the original PKB promises would have to be used as a frame of reference and not the Transition Articles. In order to bring this argument to the fore one last time the PLRS (consisting of 18 platforms of local residents at that time), sent a letter to the Upper House on June the 15th 2004, wherein they indicated which criteria were to be taken into account from their perspective, in order to really live up to the Baarda motion.¹²⁰⁵ The SNM added that calculations of the amount of seriously hindered people underlying the old PKB and the new Schiphol Acts (here referring to one of the two Decrees the *Luchtverkeersbesluit/LVB*) applied to a different geographical area. In essence, in the LVB a much smaller area was included, so it was concluded that the amount of seriously hindered people had dropped considerably.¹²⁰⁶ By indicating that the local residents and the environmental parties rejected the Transition Articles it was already clear that they wouldn't support the outcome of the evaluation if these Transition Articles would serve as a frame of reference.

The SNM argued that the level of equivalence could only be assessed when comparing the maximum environmental capacity that the old PKB system would have offered to the maximum environmental capacity of the new system.¹²⁰⁷ This was something different than drawing upon the situation of 2005, wherein the final limits of the regulative system were not in sight yet. To conclude that there was equivalence in 2005 did certainly not imply that both systems allowed for the same amount of traffic. Several actors (i.e. the EIA Committee, SNM, PLRS, Milieudefensie, Milieufederatie North Holland) argued that the central question of the evaluation was therefore in need of reframing. It was not meant to assess whether the environmental effects anno 2005 remained within the PKB norms, but rather to assess the legal protection that the new system offered in a situation based on the maximum amount of traffic that would have

¹²⁰³ Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007; Interview Van Ojik /local resident, 2007.

¹²⁰⁴ Milieu & Natuurplanbureau (2005), *Het milieu rondom Schiphol 1990 – 2005*, p. 64. Interview Dassen / Milieu & Natuurplanbureau, 2007

¹²⁰⁵ PLRS, (2004), Letter to the Upper House 'Uitvoering Motie Baarda'. June 15th 2004.

¹²⁰⁶ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

¹²⁰⁷ SNM, (2003), *Notitie: Deugdelijke bescherming woonwijken tegen geluid van Schiphol nodig*. March 6th 2003.

been allowed in the old PKB system.¹²⁰⁸ The environmental actors and local residents believed that such a comparison would illustrate that the new regulative system held higher maximum environmental capacities (allowing for more flight movements) than the old PKB system would have allowed. Note that the Berkhout committee had already insisted upon carrying out such calculations during the development of the regulative system, but the Minister had declined their requests for the funds that were needed to do the research.¹²⁰⁹

Second, the question underlying the evaluation was also heavily criticized. According to the local residents and environmental interest groups the main question had to be whether or not the new regulative system was reliable and whether or not it worked to offer maximum protection against negative environmental effects and risks. This was something altogether different than assessing whether or not it was equivalent to the 1995 regulations and whether it was working to realize the traditional dual objective.¹²¹⁰ Furthermore, the narrow framing of the evaluation allowed only for improvements of the existing system (i.e. optimization), and there was no room for the development of alternative systems. During the enactment of the evaluation this latter point would become one of the main criticisms. Throughout 2004 and 2005 the point was not only repeated by several environmental parties and local residents,¹²¹² but also by several policy makers of the Ministry of V&W¹²¹³ and other ministries involved,¹²¹⁴ by several researchers involved,¹²¹⁵ by the process committee that was installed in order to closely monitor the evaluation process, meant to guarantee independent decision making and by the Environmental Impact Assessment Committee.

Finally, the CROS raised some doubts about the time planning. The cabinet announced an enormous amount of research, spread over several different policy trajectories (about the long term, the Baarda motion, Group Risk, the night regime), that was to result in an integral Cabinet's Perspective in 2006. The Members of the CROS indicated that they thought this planning was too ambitious, because they doubted whether there was sufficient time to obtain the input that was required, while simultaneously making balanced trade offs. According to the Ministry of V&W the time schedule was realistic and the high dynamics of airport and economic development demanded short-term

¹²⁰⁸ Interview Van Arendonk / Milieufederatie Noord Holland, 2008; Interview Fransen / Stichting Natuur en Milieu, 2009; Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

¹²⁰⁹ Interview Berkhout / Noise Expert and Former chairman of the CDV, 2008.

¹²¹⁰ Geudeke, M. (2006), *De kunst van vliegwerk*.

¹²¹¹ Interview Ale / Safety expert and member of the Schiphol EIA committee, 2009; Interview Van Ojik/local resident, 2007.

¹²¹² Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

¹²¹³ Interview Wulfraat / Former policy maker Ministry V&W, 2007.

¹²¹⁴ Interview Lap / Former policy maker Ministry of VROM, 2007.

¹²¹⁵ Interview Wubben/To70/ NLR, 2009; Interview Wijnen / Delft University of Technology, 2009.

decision-making.¹²¹⁶ In the end, the criticism sorted little effect and the initial plan of approach served as the point of departure for the threefold evaluation process: 1. Assessing equivalence 2. Assessing effectiveness 3. Find ways to improve the current system.¹²¹⁷

8.5. Carrying out the Evaluation Program (2003 – 2006)

In practice, the evaluation program unraveled alongside three different trajectories. One was about the assessment of the level of equivalence (i.e. the Baarda Motion) (8.5.1), one was about the effectiveness of the regulative system (8.5.2) and one was about finding improvements for the current system (8.5.3).¹²¹⁸ Besides, a wide variety of actors was asked to present their perspective on the future of Schiphol (8.5.4). Finally, the findings of the new Committee of Noise Experts (CDV) would also serve as input for the evaluation (8.5.5). These different policy trajectories were brought together in an evaluation report (8.5.6). The evaluation program was coordinated by a program committee, MEIS (*Monitoring en evaluatie Schipholbesluiten*, Monitoring and evaluation Schiphol policy), that consisted of policy makers of the Ministry of V&W, VROM and EZ. The Ministry of V&W was in charge of the coordination.¹²¹⁹

			2003 - 2006			
Cabinet's Perspective 2003 – 2006 8.3 – 8.9						
	Long term (PMS) – 8.3					
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9					
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation				
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation	Equivalence – 8.5.1			
			Effectiveness – 8.5.2			
			Proposals – 8.5.3			
			Advices – 8.5.4			
			CDV – 8.5.5			
			Evaluation Report – 8.5.6			
	8.6	Night Fights				
	8.7	Group Risk				
8.8	Housing locations					
Cabinet's Perspective – 8.9						
			2007	2008	2009	
Alders Table 2006 – 2009 8.10 – 8.11				Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
					Mid term < 2020 – 8.11	

¹²¹⁶ Plan of Approach, 2004.

¹²¹⁷ Which is different from finding improvements in general, i.e. those that fell outside the scope of the existing system.

¹²¹⁸ Interview Lap/policy maker Ministry VROM, 2007; Interview Wulffraat/Former policy maker Ministry V&W, 2007.

¹²¹⁹ Meanwhile, the debate about an extended night regime (8.6) and the debate about a norm for Group Risk (8.7) proceeded relatively independently from the evaluation program and shall therefore be described in separate paragraphs. In the end, all these different policy trajectories and the policy process about the long term (PMS) and the policy trajectory about housing (8.8) served as input for the Cabinet's Perspective that was scheduled for April 2006 (8.9).

Long term 2006 – 2009		Long term > 2025 – 8.12
8.12		

8.5.1 Assessing Equivalence (Baarda Motion)

We already discussed that the cabinet stuck to its decision to use the Transition Articles as the frame of reference for the evaluation, just as had been decided during the political debate in 2002, despite the criticisms that arose prior to the enactment of the assessment procedure. In order to further safeguard independence, the project committee MEIS assigned the new CDV (committee noise experts that succeeded the Berkhout Committee) to advice about the execution of the Baarda motion.¹²²⁰ MEIS had assigned a third party, a research consultant (ADECS) to carry out the assessment, which was part of the strategy to avoid problems about independence and objectivity.¹²²¹ From the perspective of the CDV the assignment was deemed adequate.¹²²² ADECS involved another consultant (DHV) in order to write down the results of the assessment in an understandable way that also took the politically sensitive character of the evaluation into account.¹²²³ The latter had been a demand of the project team MEIS.

The entire assessment procedure was relatively straightforward. The criteria were laid down in the Schiphol Act (Transition Articles) and the rules for calculating noise, risks and pollution that ADECS had to use were also taken up in several documents.¹²²⁴ The quantitative and procedural character of the research made sure that there was no discussion about the way ‘equivalence’ was framed.¹²²⁵ But ADECS did not do all calculations. The NLR and another consultant (ADSE) did some calculations as well. All calculations were done for both 2004 and 2005, based upon the actual flight data (e.g. amounts of flights, routes that were followed, type of aircraft, take off weight). The research process was carried out under close supervision of the Ministry of V&W. According to the researchers involved, they had most contact by far with policy makers of the Ministry, although on paper MEIS was an interdepartmental project. Apparently, the policy makers of the different Ministries had decided that the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W were best fit for the supervisory task. This was in line with the financial situation (V&W paid the most) and the expertise available (only V&W had

¹²²⁰ Staatscourant February 10th 2005, Nr.29. p.15.

¹²²¹ Letter from the Ministry of Transportation to the CDV, DGL/05.U00441; January 28th 2005.

¹²²² Letter of the CDV to the Ministry of Transportation, March 1st 2005; CDV03.br050.

¹²²³ Interview Frankena / ADECS, 2008.

¹²²⁴ See for example Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (2001), Voorschrift voor de berekening van de L_{den} en L_{night} geluidsbelasting in dB(A) ten gevolge van vliegverkeer van en naar de luchthaven Schiphol. NLR-CR-2001-372-PT-1. NLR (2004), Voorschrift en procedure voor de berekening van Externe Veiligheid rond luchthavens. Weijts J, Vercammen R.W.A, Vijver van de Y.A.J.R, en Smeltink J.W. NLR-CR-2004-083. TNO (2003), Berekeningsmethode voor emissies en emissies per MTOW voor luchtverontreinigende stoffen ten gevolge van het vliegverkeer op Schiphol, inclusief maatregelen, R2003/313, J.H.J. Hulsotte, J. den Boeft.

¹²²⁵ Interview Frankena / ADECS, 2008.

some (hired) experts left that were able to actually understand the calculations). In essence, it was especially with the policy makers of V&W that the proceedings of the research and the way that things had to be written down were discussed.¹²²⁶

The Ministry of V&W had also asked the EIA committee to give its opinion about the way the assessment was carried out.¹²²⁷ In their advice the committee repeated some of its earlier criticism, stating that the scope of the assessment procedure was too narrow. Instead of merely assessing the Transition Articles, it was deemed necessary to evaluate the protective workings of the new regulative system for a scenario wherein the environmental limits were reached. In this situation, the maximum amount of negative externalities would come to the fore, making it possible to assess whether the system still offered sufficient protection when compared to the maximum pollution levels that would have been allowed according to the PKB decision of 1995. Moreover, the protection offered by the new policy measures (Total volume for noise, Total volume Risk Weight) was to be assessed too.¹²²⁸ This way, the effectiveness of these new measures could be assessed, which was deemed of importance, as the committee doubted the usefulness of these measures very much.

The Process Committee (Derksen) dedicated its second advice partly to the interim assessment of the level of equivalence.¹²²⁹ That is, the initial results of the assessment had been published in an interim report. The committee stated that, in order to be fully transparent, it was to be clarified that the criteria taken up in the Transition Articles (*Overgangsartikelen*), that served as the point of departure for the evaluation, were not similar to the criteria taken up in the old PKB. Therefore, strictly speaking, the actual developments were not compared with the PKB but with the requirements set by the new Schiphol Act of 2003 (which was something different). According to the committee, this might work to cause some false expectations. This was especially dangerous, since the committee had the idea that the very fact that a thus framed assessment worked to further decrease trust of local residents in the regulative system. Furthermore, the rather technocratic approach (i.e. the assessment procedure was a technical calculation exercise) was also working to increase distrust, since local residents had learned to suspect calculations that had been made over the years. In order to prevent this from happening, and manage expectations adequately, the committee advised to honestly state what the assessment procedure was about and what not. From the perspective of the Ministry of V&W this had already been done several times.

¹²²⁶ Interview Frankena / ADECS, 2008.

¹²²⁷ Letter from the Ministry of Transportation to the EIA Committee, December 15th 2004; DGL/04.402909.

¹²²⁸ EIA Committee (2005), Advies Gelijkwaardigheidstoets, July 1st 2005.

¹²²⁹ Process Committee Evaluation Schiphol Policy, Second Advice, June 10th 2005.

In the final report it was concluded that the old and new regulative system offered equivalent levels of protection.¹²³⁰ All criteria that were taken up in the Transition Articles were easily met. However, after the first interim report had been published (2004), the CDV had posed some criticisms. According to the CDV, in the old PKB system, the amount of houses within the 35Ke zone was calculated with inclusion of the so-called *meteomarge*. The *meteomarge* compensated for the uncertainties in flight routes and runway use as a consequence of unpredictable weather conditions. It meant that levels of noise pollution were allowed to be approx. 15-20% higher than when compared to normal circumstances. The inclusion of the *meteomarge* had broadened the contours. In the assessment procedure the amount of houses had been calculated without this *meteomarge*, making the 35Ke smaller. This made it easier to satisfy the norm of 10,000 houses within the zone. In essence, ADECS calculated that 5925 houses fell within the zone in 2004.¹²³¹ This number would be higher if the *meteomarge* was included, although the CDV assumed that it was probably still within the norm of 10,000.¹²³² The advice was to calculate the amount of houses within the noise zone with inclusion of the *meteomarge*. This advice was not taken over by the Ministry of V&W. In the same advice, the CDV members also stated that they were not able to find out whether the legally requested methods had been used for assessing the levels of equivalence of third party risk (for the IR, as a norm for GR was still lacking) and local air pollution.

The Ministry of V&W took over the conclusion that the old and the new regulative system offered an equivalent level of protection. They argued that this was the result of the introduction of safer, cleaner and quieter airplanes, the introduction of the 5th runway that led to flight routes over less densely populated areas and the lower growth rates than expected. The conclusion did not come as a surprise to the actors involved; as we have discussed, most actors involved expected this to happen. Nonetheless, the final conclusions did receive considerable criticism.

Criticism on the final report

In its third advice, which was about the proceedings of the evaluation program, the process committee (Derksen) discussed the selective way wherein the project team MEIS had dealt with the advice of the CDV about the Baarda motion. Of course, the CDV had concluded that most of the assessment procedure had been carried out in an adequate way. This part was quoted in the proceedings. But the more critical part about the exclusion of the *meteomarge* and the lack of transparency about calculation methods being used were not taken up in the proceedings. From the perspective of the process

¹²³⁰ NLR, DHV, ADECS Airinfra (2006), Evaluatie Schipholbeleid. Gelijkwaardigheidsstoets.

¹²³¹ ADECS Airinfra (2004), Tussenrapportage Gelijkwaardigheidsstoets evaluatie Schipholbeleid.

¹²³² CDV letter to ministry of Transportation, March 10th 2005; CDV05.br052.

committee, the selective use of the CDV advice did result in an overly optimistic perspective of the assessment procedure.¹²³³ The Ministry of V&W responded that these issues had been discussed with the CDV, and that no revisions had been deemed necessary afterwards.

In a response to the report, the EIA committee made two important remarks.¹²³⁴ First, repeating their old criticism, they asserted that even though a standstill had been achieved for all the criteria that had been evaluated, it still was not possible to say something about the level of equivalence of the old and new regulative system. Merely determining that the limits had not been reached yet was not the same thing as concluding that both systems offered equal protection. Second, the Committee stated, again, that it was not useful to continue discussing the level of equivalence. Assessing equivalence did not contribute to making policies that offered most protection in the future.¹²³⁵ The debate needed to be reframed. Instead of discussing equivalence the debate should be about finding ways to adequately deal with the real effects. Levels of equivalence did not say much about the actual situation and the real experiences of the people.¹²³⁶ According to a policy maker of the Ministry of VROM the assessment procedure was a missed opportunity, as it did not offer the kind of information that was needed to really move forward.¹²³⁷

8.5.2 Effectiveness of the new regulative system

2003 - 2006		
Cabinet's Perspective 2003 – 2006 8.3 – 8.9	Long term (PMS) – 8.3	
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9	
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation
		Equivalence – 8.5.1
		Effectiveness – 8.5.2
		Proposals – 8.5.3
		Advices – 8.5.4
		CDV – 8.5.5
		Evaluation Report – 8.5.6
	8.6	Night Fights
	8.7	Group Risk
	8.8	Housing locations

¹²³³ Process Committee Evaluation Schiphol Policy, Third Advice, June 7th 2005. Note that the second advice was presented after the third advice.

¹²³⁴ EIA Committee, Toetsingsadvies Commissie MER Gelijkwaardigheid Oude en Nieuwe normenstelsel Schiphol, 22 maart 2006.

¹²³⁵ Of course, the debate about equivalence has had its practical value, since the level of protection of the new system was not very clear before it was implemented. But with regard to the future development of the airport it is not useful anymore to use outdated spatial plans (i.e. housing files) from 1990 and old noise quantities.

¹²³⁶ Interview Ale / safety expert and member of Schiphol EIA committee, 2009.

¹²³⁷ Interview Lap / Former policy maker Ministry of VROM, 2008.

	Cabinet's Perspective – 8.9			
		2007	2008	2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009		Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
8.10 – 8.11			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11	
Long term 2006 – 2009		Long term > 2025 – 8.12		
8.12				

The second aspect of the evaluation was the assessment of the effectiveness of the new system. The dual objective served as a point of departure. The policy framework was deemed effective if it worked to preserve or improve the quality of the living environment and to facilitate mainport development.¹²³⁸ An extensive research program was set up in order to assess this. At the same time, a possibility for submitting proposals for improving the current regulative system was created (which will be discussed in 8.5.3).

The research agenda for assessing effectiveness was presented in March 2005.¹²³⁹ Initially, the agenda was developed by the Ministries of V&W and VROM and the agenda was meant to be complementary to the research agenda of the PMS project (about the long term – see 8.3). The Ministry of V&W wanted to discuss the research agenda with as much stakeholders as possible. In the end, the agenda had been discussed with the CROS, the BRS, the sector parties, several planning agencies and the Upper and Lower House.¹²⁴⁰ However, the third partner of the project committee MEIS, the Ministry of EZ, wasn't very pleased with the agenda, due to the lack of attention for the economic benefits. More specifically, the Ministry thought it important to invest more in knowledge that was useful for stimulating further economic development of the airport region.¹²⁴¹ From the Ministries perspective the debate about Schiphol was already too much focused on environmental aspects. According to the Ministry, this perspective was shared by the aviation sector parties.¹²⁴²

In the end, research was carried out about the effects on the environment, the effects on mainport development, the effects of the choice for a specific legal framework (i.e. an Act instead of a PKB decision), and about the experiences of the people involved.¹²⁴³ Especially the latter issue was new on the V&W agenda, and it was a response to the increasing criticisms about the technocratic way of policy making (piling up

¹²³⁸ Interview Wulfraat / Former Policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2008.

¹²³⁹ Projectbureau MEIS (2005), Evaluatie Schipholbeleid, Onderzoeksagenda effectiviteit. The Hague.

¹²⁴⁰ Response of the Ministry of Transportation to the second advice of the Process Committee, 2006.

¹²⁴¹ Interview Van Putten / Policy maker Ministry of EZ, 2007.

¹²⁴² Interview Van Putten / Policy maker Ministry of EZ, 2007.

¹²⁴³ TK 29665, December 22nd 2005, Nr.19.

calculations) of the previous years and the increasing political attention for qualitative aspects (e.g. people's perceptions).¹²⁴⁴ The Ministry of VROM had insisted upon including this qualitative side, as the department had already been experimenting with ways of policy making that connected to the experiences of the people involved for some time (in other spatial projects).¹²⁴⁵ Finally, the research program was complemented with an international benchmark.

The research was assigned in line with the rules that the Ministries had to live up to. Most of the time, the Ministry of V&W selected three (the required minimum) research institutes and invited them to submit an offer.¹²⁴⁶ Based on these offers, policy makers of the Ministry selected the best one, which was the one that was believed best equipped for answering the research questions asked. Formally, the Ministries of VROM and EZ would also be included in the development of the assignment (research question) and the selection of the research institute, but in practice the Ministry of V&W made these decisions. This was not unusual, as they were the ones in charge of the process and they were investing most resources (finances, people) in the entire evaluation.¹²⁴⁷ One main selection criterion for assigning the research was that the research results had to be presented in a publicly friendly way such that it respected the sensitive political context.¹²⁴⁸ The Ministry therefore recommended the assigned research bureaus to hire a professional writer for this task. It was a deliberate (and quite common) strategy to secure transparency and to avoid unnecessary political disputes.

Policy makers of the different Ministries were assigned to supervise the research process and to discuss the initial findings. Each supervisory committee was made up of at least one policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, most of the time complemented with someone of the Ministry of VROM. One additional problem here was that there were much more policy makers of V&W available than of VROM, which made it difficult for the Ministry of VROM to participate in the supervision of all projects. In practice, this automatically resulted in traditional role taking, where the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W were often in the lead.¹²⁴⁹ The research program resulted in a wide diversity of insights about the effectiveness of the Schiphol Act. Some of the main results are discussed next.¹²⁵⁰

¹²⁴⁴ Interview Abspoel / Policy Maker Ministry V&W, 2009.

¹²⁴⁵ Interview Lap / Former policy maker Ministry VROM, 2008.

¹²⁴⁶ The rules are taken up in the ARVODI (Algemene Rijksvoorwaarden voor het verstrekken van Opdrachten tot het verrichten van Diensten 2008), as ratified by the Ministerie van Algemene zaken. See Staatscourant (2008), Nr.52.

¹²⁴⁷ Interview De Waard / Policy maker Ministry V&W, 2009.

¹²⁴⁸ Interview De Waard / Policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009.

¹²⁴⁹ Interview Lap / Former Policy maker Ministry VROM, 2008.

¹²⁵⁰ Our research approach makes it impossible to discuss the enormous amount of findings in great detail.

Outcomes of the research program

Overall, it was concluded that the new regulative system was effective, but that it was possible to make it even more effective. The system worked to facilitate mainport development for the time being, but it would start to hamper further mainport development in the very near future. Depending on growth rates it was expected that in 2008 in between 10,000 – 40,000 flights could not be facilitated within the existing limits, calling up to in between 60,000 – 120,000 in 2012.¹²⁵¹ Furthermore, it was concluded that the current policy tools did not really contribute to the regulation of local air pollution. Total air pollution caused by airplanes was increasing as a consequence of growth, while overall levels were decreasing as a consequence of the specific calculation method (i.e. assessing the sum of all air pollution, including road traffic). It was also concluded that aviation had become cleaner, but that this was not the effect of the policy tools available.¹²⁵²

One research project in particular that was meant to explore the experiences of people contained a considerable amount of criticism. This report was based on a wide variety of interviews with different stakeholders (municipalities, the province of North Holland, local residents, aviation sector parties and the Ministries) and was presented in a journalistic way. Almost all respondents agreed that the regulative system was not functioning properly. For example, it lacked flexibility as there was no room to implement new flight routes that could reduce levels of noise pollution and enhance capacity; it did not coincide with the actual experiences of people; it was difficult to understand; there was a lack of direction and vision of the national government; local residents felt their concerns were not adequately addressed; and the calculation models were incomprehensible.¹²⁵³ Overall, the conclusion was that the image of the regulative system was certainly up for improvement.

Finally, one important research project was concerned with the legal protection that was offered by the Schiphol Act and underlying Decrees when compared to a PKB decision. That is, whether both legal instruments offered equal legal safeguards. This research project caused some problems between the Ministry of V&W and the research consultant that was hired. The consultant concluded that the Act did not offer equal legal protection. A Planning Key decision or for example a system with environmental permits would offer more legal protection than the Schiphol Act of 2003 did.¹²⁵⁴ From the perspective of the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W the quality of the research report was insufficient. The scope was too broad and the results were written down in an

¹²⁵¹ SEO (2005), Mainportontwikkeling in het kader van de evaluatie Schipholbeleid, p.5.

¹²⁵² ADSE & ADECS (2005), Schonere lucht, schonere vliegtuigen, meer uitstoot vliegverkeer. P.6.

¹²⁵³ Bijnsdorp Communicatie Projecten (2005), Twee jaar ervaring met Schipholbeleid.

¹²⁵⁴ Novioconsult, 2006; p.12.

incomprehensive way. With regard to the latter, two of the preconditions when assigning the consultant had been that the results were presented in a publicly friendly way and needed to respect the sensitive political context. From the perspective of the Ministry of V&W this had not been the case.¹²⁵⁵ From the perspective of the consultant, there was nothing wrong with the quality of the report. Still, they needed to revise the report in order to bring the assignment to a good end. Amongst other things, the consultant left aside some aspects of the earlier draft version, which made different and less harsh interpretations possible. However, the final conclusions were not changed.¹²⁵⁶ Nonetheless, the report needed to be revised several times and its publication was delayed time and again.

Meanwhile, the local residents had especially been awaiting the results of this specific report, as they expected that it would be concluded that the Schiphol Act offered less legal safeguards than a PKB decision.¹²⁵⁷ When all the results of the evaluation research program were presented to the wider public, this specific report was not available yet. The local residents suspected that something altogether different was going on. They believed that it was not the quality of the report that was at stake, but it was the conclusions that did not suit the policy goals of the Ministry of V&W and the cabinet.¹²⁵⁸ And when it was finally approved of by the Ministry of V&W, it was too late to play a role in the evaluation. Thus, in the end, this research report would hardly play any role in the evaluation process. Nonetheless, the conclusions had still been rather negative in terms of levels of equivalence. The consultant who had carried out the research was therefore rather surprised that the final outcomes did receive so little attention in the end. On the other hand, he reasoned that it was not his job to tell the policy makers what information to use.¹²⁵⁹

8.5.3 Proposals for Improvement

2003 - 2006		
Cabinet's Perspective 2003 – 2006 8.3 – 8.9	Long term (PMS) – 8.3	
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9	
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation
		Equivalence – 8.5.1
		Effectiveness – 8.5.2
		Proposals – 8.5.3
		Advices – 8.5.4

¹²⁵⁵ Interview Gosse / Former policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009; Interview De Waard / policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009.

¹²⁵⁶ Interview Van Kessel / Novioconsult, 2009.

¹²⁵⁷ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹²⁵⁸ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹²⁵⁹ Interview Van Kessel / Novioconsult, 2009.

8.5.3.1. Organizing the Proposals

As a first task, the project direction assigned the research consultant To70 to categorize the different proposals and to assess their potential for achieving the dual objective. Furthermore, the feasibility of the different proposals was also assessed. There was not much time, nor was there much clarity about the criteria that were to be used to make the categorization (except for the three criteria we already mentioned, as taken up in the final plan of approach of the evaluation).¹²⁶¹ More specifically, in the plan of approach of the evaluation (2004) it had been stated to keep the criteria open in order to receive an as wide variety of proposals as possible. It was merely stated that proposals needed to contribute to the realization of the dual objective.

After the proposals had been submitted, the hired research consultant (To70) made a first overview of the projects that were up for further consideration and those that were not. First, all proposals were categorized per theme.¹²⁶² The Ministry of V&W had proposed ten different themes that were to be involved: With regard to the environmental objective measures relating to noise pollution, noise annoyance, sleep disturbance, safety, pollution, health effects and experiences, and with regard to the mainport objective measures about increasing employment, economic benefits and accessibility were included.¹²⁶³ The proposals did not neatly fit into the categorization and researchers decided to develop a different one, distinguishing between: departing traffic (103), arriving traffic (72), runway use and flight routes (134), setting environmental norms (149), spatial planning (80), mainport development (6), compensation measures (44), communicative measures (38), institutional and legal framework (40) and other (16). The assessment of the potential was based on the expectations of the experts involved (i.e. real effects were not calculated). Several proposals reflected the need for more detailed and transparent information. Several proposals concerned improved flight routes and procedures, in order to avoid (specific) residential areas. More specifically, the many proposals submitted by municipalities and local residents were mostly meant to divert flight routes that were running straightly over their residential areas (see figure 8.8 for illustration). The problem of those proposals was that the noise pollution was often replaced to other areas, implying an increase in levels for other municipalities.¹²⁶⁴

Several request for compensation illustrated the shortcomings of existing compensatory measures (insulation project, *Leefbaarheidsfonds*: fund for improving living environment, *Schadeschap Schiphol*: fund for requesting damage compensation). The

¹²⁶¹ Interview Vinkx / To70 / inhouse researcher Ministry of V&W, 2009.


¹²⁶² To70 (2005), p.5.

¹²⁶³ Ministry of V&W (2005), Letter to Lower House DGTL 5095, December 1st 2005.

¹²⁶⁴ A clear indication of the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) Syndrom.

enforcement points of the current regulative system were deemed inefficient and there were requests for making experiments possible and for establishing a new independent knowledge institute. Especially the idea to allow for experiments was important for many actors, as it allowed created the possibility for testing the effectiveness of new flight routes, which was heavily needed but impossible as a consequence of the (legal) inflexibility of the regulative system.¹²⁶⁵ Moreover, the usefulness of the different methods and calculation procedures had to be evaluated time and again. Several proposals indicated the need to explore possibilities for facilitating further growth at regional airports, indicating the need to add the potential of a multi-airport system to the future policy agenda. Some proposals were rejected for falling outside the scope of the evaluation program (i.e. building a new airport, constructing a new runway and enacting a parliamentary questionnaire). Finally, there was no time to focus on the interrelationships between different proposals. Implementing some proposals would make the implementation of others impossible. At the end of this initial shifting, a first selection of ideas was made by the researchers and some policy makers of the Ministry of V&W that was believed to hold some potential for improving the regulative system and for increasing chances to realize the dual objectives.

Figure 8.8 Illustration of proposals for new flight routes (green arrow), avoiding residential areas.



Source: To70 (2005), p.16

Bus Tour (October 2005)

The project direction MEIS put a lot of effort in the communication process that surrounded the proposals. After the initial categorization and assessment of To70 the project direction wanted to better understand the background of the proposals. In order to achieve this, they went on a field trip. During one week (17 – 21 October 2005) they visited 74 of the people who had submitted a proposal (mostly local residents). The

¹²⁶⁵ Interview Tan / Former Secretary of the CROS, 2010.

policy makers were amazed about the amount of detailed expert knowledge that many of the visited residents possessed. It turned out that most of them knew the exact details of the current flight routes, approaching and descending procedures and the like.^{1266 1267} During the visits the lack of trust in the regulative system and the national government were brought forward several times. For example, it was a widely shared feeling that presenting the new 5th runway in terms of the '*Milieubaan* – Environmental friendly runway' had been deceptive, resulting in false expectations that in the end had worked to undermine trust in the national government, and the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W in particular. Moreover, it was often argued that the Schiphol discussion had become too complex (technocratic) and comprehensive over the years. Especially municipalities indicated the difficulties of comprehending the many things going on at the same time. Finally, the lack of a clear assessment framework for judging the proposals was brought to the fore several times, which made it difficult for outsiders to understand how the first selection had been made.

Diner pensants (November 2005)

In November 2005 the project direction decided to organize three diners during which some of the most important themes that had come to the fore in the proposals were to be discussed in a small-scale setting (so-called *Diner Pensants*).¹²⁶⁸ During these meetings improvements of the institutional setting, compensation measures and the distribution of traffic were being discussed in an informal way. One important conclusion was that no matter what the topic, the people involved (sector, environmental parties, local residents, municipalities) constantly indicated the need to restore trust, to improve communication and transparency and to develop a clear perspective on mainport development.

8.5.3.2 Final evaluation of the proposals

The bus tour and the diners were an essential part of the communication strategy of the project team in an attempt to improve transparency, openness and trust. Besides, it gave the policy makers a better 'feel for the game'. It had certainly worked to improve the understanding of the perceptions of people involved. Moreover, the personal explanations of the proposals allowed them to make a better judgment of the several proposals that had been submitted.¹²⁶⁹ Each proposal was individually assessed and provided with comments, resulting in a large volume of more than thousand pages. It was clarified why specific proposals were rejected and why specific proposals were

¹²⁶⁶ MEIS (2005), Proceedings Report on Bus Tour, November 2005.

¹²⁶⁷ Interview Abspoel / Policy maker Ministry V&W, 2009; Interview Gosse / Former policy maker Ministry V&W, 2009; Interview De Waard / Policy maker Ministry V&W, 2009; Interview Wulffraat/Former policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2007.

¹²⁶⁸ MEIS (2005), Proceedings *Diner Pensant*, November 9th, 16th and 22nd 2005.

¹²⁶⁹ Interview Abspoel / Policy maker Ministry V&W, 2009.

taken up for further consideration. The expected contribution that a proposal was to make to the realization of the dual objective still played a major role. Proposals that contributed to a reduction of noise pollution, but that would also lead to a reduction of capacity (i.e. the mainport objective) were rejected. For example, the SNM called for improvements of the legal protection of residential areas against noise (5 proposals), improved flight procedures (5 proposals) and better tuning of airside and landside developments (3 proposals), all of which were rejected for endangering further mainport development.¹²⁷⁰

Another criterion was that proposals needed to contribute to the optimization of the existing regulative system. Thus, proposals that were about different regulative systems were not taken up for further consideration. For example, Prof. Stallen brought forward his social-psychological approach once more (which we discussed in chapter 7),¹²⁷¹ but he never got a response to his proposal.¹²⁷² Besides, researchers from the Delft University of Technology had developed a new system with new flight procedures, concluding that this would result in 35% less noise pollution. In a response the Ministry of V&W stated that their proposal fell outside the scope of the evaluation. After all, the evaluation was meant to further optimize the existing system, and not to replace it by a different system. As a follow up, some policy makers would contact the researchers of the Delft University, but they did not do so until after the evaluation.¹²⁷³

Most of the time, policy makers of the Ministry of V&W visited the submitters in order to explain the evaluation of their proposal. Next, they were given time to respond to the evaluation. However, due to time pressure there was little time to respond. For example, the proposals of the environmental party Milieufederatie Noord Holland were rejected and they had to respond to this within 2 days time. They indicated that they needed more time to develop a proper reaction, which was not given to them.¹²⁷⁴ In the meantime, considerable criticism had been posed on the entire procedure. This criticism was partly initiated by the Ministry of V&W itself, as they had asked several of the stakeholders for advice.

8.5.3.3 Criticizing the process

Criticism from the aviation sector

The aviation sector parties AirFrance/KLM, Schiphol Group, Air Traffic Control and the VNV (Vereniging Nederlandse Vliegeniers, Network of Dutch Pilots) were asked to

¹²⁷⁰ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

¹²⁷¹ Stallen, 2004.

¹²⁷² Interview Stallen / Noise expert, 2008.

¹²⁷³ Interview Wijnen / Delft University of Technology, 2007; This information was also validated by an e-mail I received from Dries Visser, who submitted the proposals.

¹²⁷⁴ Interview Van Arendonk / Milieufederatie Noord Holland, 2009.

give their opinion about the submitted proposals. After all, they could quickly assess the effects for hub and spoke operations and the technical feasibility. At the same time, AirFrance/KLM, Schiphol Group and Air Traffic Control had already presented their perspective on the regulative system and the future of Schiphol, including proposals for improvement, in their joint document ‘Working on the future of Schiphol and the Region’ (Werken aan de toekomst van Schiphol en de regio) in June 2005.¹²⁷⁵ The three different advices that these actors brought forward were mostly derived from this joint report.

AirFrance/KLM supported the several proposals about changing runway use and flight routes, as these were in line with their own ideas.¹²⁷⁶ In essence, AirFrance/KLM argued that there should be opportunities to discuss new routes and procedures with the local and regional actors. Room for experimenting was deemed necessary and the CROS was seen as the proper platform to coordinate the experiments. At the same time, Air France/KLM raised some concerns about the too easy conclusion that such changes would not affect further mainport development (as was assumed in the To70 report). According to the AirFrance/KLM this illustrated the dangers of a lack of a clear perspective on mainport development. From their perspective, such a vision was essential for meaningful further discussion. Moreover, AirFrance/KLM was concerned about the way the sector perspective was to be included in the evaluation. Up until then it still had not been clear what was to be done with it.

Schiphol Group rejected all proposals that limited further growth and/or undermined the competitive position of the mainport.¹²⁷⁷ They made similar comments as AirFrance/KLM, arguing that there should be room to experiment with new routes and procedures and to explore possibilities for selective growth (i.e. facilitating hub-oriented traffic, outplacement of other traffic to regional airports). Finally, they also criticized the unclear way in which To70 had drawn conclusions about the expected effects of proposals on mainport development. How could one assess effects on mainport development if it was not clear what this exactly entailed? Schiphol Group rejected several of the assessments of proposals made by To70, and advised to conduct additional research to assess the real effects. Again, the need for a clear perspective on a mainport was deemed necessary to do so. In the same response the Schiphol Group also indicated the inefficiency related to the wide variety of discussion platforms. Instead, they called for the establishment of one regional platform within which the most important stakeholders were mandated to make trade offs.¹²⁷⁸ More specifically, the

¹²⁷⁵ Schiphol Group, KLM, LVNL (2005), Werken aan de toekomst van Schiphol en de regio. Juni 2005.

¹²⁷⁶ KLM (2005), Advice about the evaluation proposals. AMS/DE.0180.05; December 30th 2005.

¹²⁷⁷ Schiphol Group (2005) Letter to the State Secretary Schiphol Group, Nr.1173, December 30th 2005.

¹²⁷⁸ Schiphol Group (2005) Letter to the State Secretary Schiphol Group, Nr.1173, December 30th 2005, p.4.

abundance of discussion platforms was seen as a main bottleneck for creating any policy progression, and was perceived to seriously danger the competitive position of Schiphol and region (i.e. the problem of excessive governance).¹²⁷⁹

The third sector party (Air Traffic Control) responded in a similar fashion, also referring to their joint perspective.¹²⁸⁰ Again, possibilities for regional trade offs as regards flight routes and procedures, and the need for experimenting, were stressed. The current regulative system was perceived to be far too rigid, and flexibility was needed for making improvements. The problems with designing a redistribution of flight routes as a consequence of the exploding noise pollution above the municipality of Spaarndam, the input mistake and the problems with parallel take offs (8.2) had illustrated this inflexibility. Those proposals that could work to create such flexibility were seen as most important. Again, the selection procedure (and thus the research report holding the resulting selection) was criticized for the unconvincing argumentation underlying most conclusions.

Finally, the ministry of V&W also asked the pilots for advice, organized in the VNV (*Vereniging Nederlandse Vliegeniers*, Network of Dutch Pilots). After all, the pilots were the ones who had to do the actual flying, making them suitable for assessing the feasibility of some of the proposals. The VNV responded on January 26th, 2006.¹²⁸¹ The VNV discussed the legally ratified technical and operational requirements that were needed during a flight, resulting in the questioning of the feasibility of several proposals. Approaching and Descending on higher altitudes was pointed out as one of the best ways to improve the current regulative system. However, due to safety procedures, such measures were merely possible farther away from the airport, implying that most environmental improvements could be achieved in the outer areas.

In sum, the aviation sector parties stressed the need to develop a clear perspective on mainport development, measures for making the regulative system more flexible, especially enhancing possibilities for regional trade offs about flight routes and procedures (incl. room for experimenting), while also reducing the wide variety of discussion platforms (excessive governance). Providing transparent and honest information and implementation of measures to improve communication were deemed necessary for restoring trust. The initial selection of the proposals was not supported and the selection procedure was deemed to be rather arbitrary.

¹²⁷⁹ Interview Kranenburg / Schiphol Group, 2008; Interview Van Boxtel / Schiphol Group, 2010.

¹²⁸⁰ LVNL (2005), Letter to the State Secretary, CEB/2005/31687, December 28th 2005.

¹²⁸¹ VNV (2006), Letter to Project Leader Evaluation Program, 133/kdr.

Criticism from the CROS

The CROS was mobilized by the Ministry of V&W.¹²⁸² The CROS criticized the lack of individual assessments per proposal, the lack of transparency about the way in which proposals had been categorized and the total lack of quality of the assessment procedure.¹²⁸³ Furthermore, the CROS stated that it was practically impossible to bring out a meaningful advice within one month, as was requested. After all, To70 had been given 3 months and failed to do so. Therefore, the CROS was not able to deliver a more elaborated advice within the requested period.

Criticism from a Citizen Panel

The project direction MEIS thought that it was important to find out what the average citizen living in the vicinity of the airport thought about the different proposals. The local residents that were already involved in the debate and that were organized in the different platforms were not necessarily representative for all residents. Indeed, these were likely to be the activists. In an attempt to include the other more passive citizens into the Schiphol debate, the project direction installed a citizen panel.¹²⁸⁴ It was especially the Ministry of VROM who had insisted upon this inclusion of citizens, as the entire department was busy enacting more interactive ways of policy making wherein policies were not only made for the citizens, but also with their help in order to guarantee public support.¹²⁸⁵ For one, the Ministry was busy starting up a policy program that was meant to generate policies that linked to the priorities and initiatives of citizens.¹²⁸⁶ With regard to the evaluation, the citizen panel was perceived to be a good means to stress the independent and objective character of the evaluation program and to influence the general public opinion. The citizen panel was especially established for advising about the proposals that had been submitted. By giving them a formal role it was expected by the Ministries that specific proposals could count on more public support (making it easier to actually implement them).¹²⁸⁷ Thus, a panel was selected.

The panel consisted of 22 selected citizens, residing in the vicinity of Schiphol. It was attempted to create a panel that could represent all people living in the vicinity of the airport.¹²⁸⁸ In three subsequent meetings, the panel members categorized and judged the proposals. During the sessions there was most agreement on the need to improve

¹²⁸² Ministry of Transportation (2005), Letter to the CROS, DGTL05.005004; September 9th 2005.

¹²⁸³ CROS Advice Proposals, October 14th 2005; Interview Tan / Former Secretary CROS, 2010.

¹²⁸⁴ Interview Abspoel / Policy maker Ministry V&W, 2009.

¹²⁸⁵ Interview Lap / Former policy maker Ministry of VROM, 2008.

¹²⁸⁶ The policy program that was meant to do this was called 'Beleid met Burgers' (Policy with citizens). See for example Ministerie VROM (2007), VROM programma Beleid met Burgers. Informatiebrochure, The Hague.

¹²⁸⁷ QA+ (2005), Advies Omwonendenpanel over verbetervoorstellen Schipholbeleid. November 20th 2005.

¹²⁸⁸ See appendix 1 of the report. 9000 people were invited to join in. 3000 responded, of which 635 qualified for being representative. From this selection, a representative group was selected (man/wife, political interest etc.) (QA+, 2005; Appendix 1.

communication, to be transparent and honest, the use of trustworthy data in calculations, the need for measures to decrease third party risks, the need for clear and enforceable rules, the need for a perspective on airport development (vision), improved compensation measures and the need to create possibilities for experimenting with flight routes and procedures. The value of the CROS was questioned; it was stated that the CROS did not work out well, and that it was better to replace it by an independent knowledge institute, designed to develop joint facts.¹²⁸⁹ This was interesting, as the CROS consisted of several local residents that represented the different municipalities in the vicinity of Schiphol. However, as we shall see later on, the citizen panel itself would receive considerable criticism too.

Criticism from the Process Committee

The Process Committee used its fifth and eighth advice for reflection on the process of submitting and evaluating proposals for improvement.^{1290 1291} The committee stated that the entire procedure was rather unclear. Clarity about deadlines and requirements for the proposals was lacking. Opportunities for guidance (i.e. how to write a decent proposal) were not well-known. Furthermore, the committee observed that several of the requested advices about the proposals did not really deal with the proposals, but assumed the character of a much broader perspective, encompassing the whole evaluation program and the future of Schiphol. The committee received some negative signals of submitters about the way that was dealt with their proposals. Transparency was deemed essential here to restore trust.

Policy makers of the Ministry responded that they had attempted to give careful feedback and to take each individual proposal seriously. As discussed, submitters were individually informed about their projects, the criteria that had been used were clarified and public meetings were organized. The problems with the criteria could have been prevented. Along the way, the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W had argued that a proper evaluation framework for the proposals was partly dependent on the results of the research projects that were dealing with the effectiveness of the regulative system (8.5.2). According to the committee this had not been necessary. Nonetheless, the Ministry of V&W stuck to its argument that this was needed and deliberately done in order to be able to include new insights in the assessment procedure. Still, the committee argued that several evaluation criteria were missing in the framework that had eventually been applied. There were no criteria about the juridical and broader economic consequences. Moreover, the relative weight of the different criteria (in comparison to other criteria) was not clear. How were outsiders to understand how trade

¹²⁸⁹ QA+ (2005), p.13.

¹²⁹⁰ Process Committee Evaluation Schiphol Policy, Fifth Advice, July 29th 2005.

¹²⁹¹ Process Committee Evaluation Schiphol Policy, Eighth Advice, January 23rd 2006.

offs were made? Which criteria were deemed most important? The report offered insufficient grounds for selecting and rejecting proposals. Besides, the committee argued that the contribution that the different proposals would make to restoring levels of trust (improved communication, transparent rules, less rules etc.) should have been included, instead of merely focusing on the potential contribution to the realization of the dual objectives. Finally, the committee thought it rather strange that different actors (e.g. the CROS, the aviation sector) had been asked to both submit proposals and to bring out advice about proposals.

The overall perception of the committee about the process was rather negative, as it seemed to fail to contribute to improving relationships of trust. This also came to the fore when the committee continued questioning the role and status of the citizen panel. From the committee's perspective the citizen-panel was not contributing to a more legitimate assessment procedure as regards the proposals. The entire debate was deemed too complex by far for lay-people to make an adequate assessment within the 48 hours that had been given to the citizen panel. Based on the observation of two of the meetings of the citizen panel, the committee concluded that the discussions did not do justice to the actual content of the proposals. Moreover, the panel worked to give other local residents, who had been involved in the Schiphol debate for many years, the idea that their opinion was less valued than the opinion of a randomly selected group of residents. Indeed, this reflected the opinion of several local residents.¹²⁹² According to the committee, the panel was therefore working to increase levels of distrust.

Finally, the process committee rejected the way the hired research consultant had summarized the results of the citizen panel in the final report. According to the committee, the panel was merely allowed to respond to the report, making it especially an interpretation of the researchers that had prepared and summarized the sessions of the panel. Besides, the entire process was designed to support the current policy framework, instead of generating new ideas. But this was of course related to the specific assignment that had been given to the panel (i.e. evaluate the proposals). Nonetheless, the Ministry of VROM who had been insisting upon inclusion of citizens all the time, agreed that the panel could have been used in a broader way.¹²⁹³ In conclusion, the committee stated that it would not be wise to actually use the advice of the citizen panel in the Schiphol discussion.

The project direction responded by arguing that the only function of the panel was to gain insight in the general public opinion of local residents about specific proposals. It was never intended to value their advice more than the opinions of the other local

¹²⁹² Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

¹²⁹³ Interview Lap / Former policy maker Ministry of VROM, 2008.

residents who had been involved for many years.¹²⁹⁴ In its own evaluation of the citizen panel, the research consultant responded to the negative remarks of the process committee. The process was by no means meant to organize support for proposals that would strengthen the current policy framework, nor was the panel assigned to generate new ideas. Moreover, they asserted that the accusation that the final report was the interpretation of the researchers instead of the citizens was not true; all panel members had indicated that they agreed with the content and stated that it was their own advice.¹²⁹⁵ Nonetheless, it was clear that the committee's point about the perverse effects of the panel on the local residents, who had been involved in the debate for many years, was echoed in the criticism of these local residents.

Criticism of Local residents

As was to be expected, the local residents were both displeased about the way the proposals had been evaluated and about the establishment of a citizen panel. With regard to the latter, 19 platforms wrote a joint response wherein it was stressed that they did not support the conclusions of the panel.¹²⁹⁶ They wanted to make clear that the advice was therefore not to be presented as 'the' perception of the local residents. They thought it was rather strange that the panel was established in the first place. Several local residents were already involved in the evaluation process and this was deemed to secure a better reflection of their interests and objectives than a random selection of citizens who had not much to do with the airport anyway (or so was their perspective about the members of the citizen panel). Moreover, from their perspective, the actual reasons for including a citizen panel remained rather opaque. In the initial and formal Plan of Approach of the evaluation the citizen panel was not even mentioned. Somewhere along the way the idea had emerged, but the underlying rationale of the project direction to set up such a panel was not explained. Or at least not to the platforms of local residents.

The local residents made similar comments as the process committee had done about the complexity of the Schiphol debate. From their perspective, the entire Schiphol file was by far too complex to be adequately understood by lay people within such a short time span, let alone to allow them to have a meaningful discussion about it. The fact that the entire discussion was organized around the outcomes of the selection process that was not supported by many actors only worked to illustrate this. The local residents (and many others as we have seen) had already pointed out that the categorization and qualification was based on some hitherto unknown preconditions and criteria. Organizing a citizen panel with this selection as input did by no means do justice to the

¹²⁹⁴ MEIS (2006), Letter from the project direction to the process committee, DGTL/06.007764; March 30th 2006.

¹²⁹⁵ QA+ (2006), Evaluation Citizen Panel; April 29th 2006.

¹²⁹⁶ Platforms of local residents (2006), Response to Advice Citizen Panel, January 10th 2006.

richness and diversity of the actual proposals. The selection was no neutral source of information; it was a rather arbitrary interpretation of the 682 proposals, not validated by many of the submitters. But how were the members of the citizen panel to understand this? They were to assume that the selection was done properly, instead of critically reflecting upon the process. Indeed, they lacked the critical attitude and expertise that was needed to understand the selection, or so the local residents involved in the CROS and the other platforms claimed. The lack of knowledge was further illustrated by fact that the contribution to the realization of the dual objectives served as the main criterion during the discussion. This was logical, as it was part of their assignment to use this as a point of departure. But their lack of knowledge made them unaware of the fact that the dual objective was by no means feasible. More experienced local residents would have brought more realistic criteria to the table and this would likely have resulted in totally different outcomes than those delivered by the citizen panel.¹²⁹⁷ In essence, according to the joint platforms the advice was of very low quality and not even slightly reflecting the actual perceptions of the local residents involved in the evaluation debate. The platforms therefore asked the project direction to ignore the advice in its further considerations when drawing up the Cabinet's Perspective.

Criticism of the Inspectorates of the Ministries involved

The Inspectorate of the Ministry of V&W was also invited to give its opinion about the proposals,¹²⁹⁸ while at the same time the Inspectorate had submitted several proposals by itself.¹²⁹⁹ They indicated that they lacked the expertise to adequately assess several of the proposals. The Inspectorate of the Ministry of VROM was asked to do the same. They pointed out the need of better enforceable rules about possibilities for spatial development in the Schiphol area.¹³⁰⁰

8.5.3.4 What to do with the proposals?

At the end of 2005 it still had not been clear what was exactly to be done with the many proposals that were approved of and the ones that were rejected. The intention was to use some of the most beneficial proposals (i.e. the ones that helped to realize the dual objectives) as recommendations for future policy, thus including them in the Cabinet's Perspective on the future of Schiphol that would be issued in April 2006. At the outset the policy makers had intended to take all proposals seriously and to start up a dialogue with the submitters. But they were somewhat overwhelmed by the enormous amount of proposals submitted. In practice, the lack of time made it very difficult to extensively

¹²⁹⁷ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

¹²⁹⁸ Inspectie V&W (2005), Advies Verbetervoorstellen evaluatie Schipholbeleid. Appendix A, December 14th 2005.

¹²⁹⁹ Inspectie V&W (2005), Advies Verbetervoorstellen evaluatie Schipholbeleid. Appendix B, December 14th 2005.

¹³⁰⁰ Inspectie VROM (2006), Letter to the State Secretary, VI/NW/2005220077/RN, January 20th 2006.

reflect upon each separate proposal.¹³⁰¹ At the same time, submitters had had the expectation that their proposals would be taken very seriously. According to the Ministry of VROM the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W had underestimated the amount of work that the entire process implicated, while expectations hadn't been managed in an adequate way either.¹³⁰² In the end, it was the question whether or not the entire procedure had contributed to restoring levels of trust and increasing transparency. The rationale behind giving everyone the opportunity to submit proposals for improvements was that it would make the debate more interactive and that this would enhance support for the resulting Schiphol policies. But the lack of clarity about the selection procedure and the introduction of a citizen panel seemed to have had the opposite result.

8.5.4 General advices about the future of Schiphol

2003 - 2006				
Cabinet's Perspective 2003 – 2006				
	Long term (PMS) – 8.3			
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9			
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation		
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation	Equivalence – 8.5.1	
			Effectiveness – 8.5.2	
			Proposals – 8.5.3	
			Advices – 8.5.4	
			CDV – 8.5.5	
		Evaluation Report – 8.5.6		
	8.6	Night Fights		
8.7	Group Risk			
8.8	Housing locations			
Cabinet's Perspective – 8.9				
		2007	2008	2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009		Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
8.10 – 8.11			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11	
Long term 2006 – 2009		Long term > 2025 – 8.12		
8.12				

Several stakeholders and organizations brought their perspectives on the future of Schiphol into the debate. Most of the advices were requested by the project committee MEIS and were to serve as input for the Cabinet's Perspective of 2006. The different advices are discussed in this paragraph.

¹³⁰¹ Interview Abspoel / Policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009; Interview Vinckx / inhouse researcher Ministry of V&W/To70, 2009.
¹³⁰² Interview Lap / Former policy maker Ministry of VROM, 2007.

The Perspective of the Aviation sector

In order to influence the Cabinet's perspective, the aviation sector parties decided to join hands and develop one sector perspective on the future development of Schiphol, which would include measures that were deemed necessary to improve the regulative system. The perspective was sent to the Secretary of State of the Ministry of V&W on June 29th 2005 and was labeled 'Working on the Future of Schiphol and the Region' (*Werken aan de toekomst van Schiphol en de regio*).¹³⁰³ The main point of the perspective was that the current regulative system was far too rigid for an adequate facilitation of mainport development. There were no opportunities for changing flight routes, which could both increase capacity and reduce noise pollution. This was deemed highly undesirable by the aviation sector. Their joint perspective was based on the revised mainport strategy. The sector perceived the mainport as the total package of airside development, airport development (landside) and regional development. Stimulating mainport development meant to stimulate an integral development of all these three parts.¹³⁰⁴ Maintaining the primary hub position was deemed to be an essential part of this. In the joint report, possibilities for exploring a multi-airport system (removing non-hub traffic to regional airports) were presented as a serious option for the longer term development. Moreover, the sector stressed the importance of restoring levels of trust and improving regional coordination. Public support and efficient regional coordination were deemed crucial elements for successful mainport development.¹³⁰⁵

The sector explained the rigidity of the regulative system by referring to the way the limits for noise had been calculated for Schiphol Act of 2003. The sector was asked to deliver detailed scenarios for 2005 and 2010, with the precise amount of flights, the expected runway use, precise flight routes and type of aircraft being used. Based on this detailed flight schedule the distribution of noise pollution was calculated. The results of these calculations were compared to the limits that had to be taken up in the new Act in order to guarantee equivalent protection (when compared to the old PKB system). If the limits were exceeded, the scenarios were downscaled, until there was a match between the flight schedule and the limits. Based on this calculation procedure the environmental capacity was assumed to range somewhere in between 520,000 – 600,000 flights, which was deemed sufficient for the upcoming years. This entire procedure of downscaling had been criticized by the sector during the creation of the new regulative system. Moreover, as already discussed in chapter 7, several policy makers involved by the design had also disapproved of this procedure, as it would obviously result in unrealistic

¹³⁰³ Schiphol Group, KLM, LVNL (2005), *Werken aan de toekomst van Schiphol en de regio*. June 2005.


¹³⁰⁴ Schiphol Group, KLM, LVNL (2005), *Werken aan de toekomst van Schiphol en de regio*. June 2005, p.6.

¹³⁰⁵ Schiphol Group, KLM, LVNL (2005), *Werken aan de toekomst van Schiphol en de regio*. June 2005, p.14.

flight patterns.¹³⁰⁶ Besides, at the time of the calculations (2001) it had not been clear whether the assumed flight routes were actually feasible. The new routes were not implemented yet, since the new five-runway system was yet to become operative in February 2003. As such, the flight schedule was based on highly uncertain expectations and assumptions. Back then (2001), especially representatives of KLM had pointed out several times that it was far too risky to base the entire regulative system on one scenario wrought with uncertainties. In essence, the maximum capacity that was deemed possible within the new regulative system could only be reached if the exact flight schedule/routes and procedures were implemented.

In practice both flight routes and runway use turned out to be rather different, just as the aviation sector parties had feared. The direct implication was a different distribution of noise pollution, with higher levels in some areas and lower levels in other areas (recall the problems discussed in 8.2, i.e. the input mistake and the problems in Spaarndam). Due to the inflexible system, changes could not easily be made. The final result was that there was both less capacity and more noise pollution than necessary. The aviation sector perceived this situation as highly undesirable. The inflexible noise system was therefore criticized and deemed in need of revision. Figure 8.9 illustrates how the sector parties perceived the noise system.

Figure 8.9 Mismatch between calculated, legally embedded noise contours (green dots) and actual noise pollution (grey area) around Schiphol, 2003 - 2006



Source: Schiphol Group, 2007

The Perspective of the regional and local public authorities

The province of North Holland and the municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam also tried to influence the outcomes of the evaluation process and the

¹³⁰⁶ Interview Wubben / Former researcher Ministry of V&W/To70/NLR, 2009.

development of the final Cabinet's Perspective. Their main way to do this was by submitting proposals for improvement. The three actors decided to join hands and develop the proposals with the core partners of the BRS (i.e. the BRS-small – which was formed by these three partners). The BRS partners reasoned that joint proposals would make a bigger impact, as these were supported by a broader coalition (i.e. they had some critical mass).¹³⁰⁷ The proposals were sent to the Ministry of V&W on June 15th 2005.¹³⁰⁸ The final proposals were based on the metropolitan strategy (see 8.2) that had been adopted during the 4th North Wing Conference. The main point was to better integrate selective hub development and landside spatial planning and to improve the quality of the living environment. Measures for selective hub development, and increasing capacity for hub operations were proposed. With regard to the quality of the living environment a menu for concrete investments was to be developed, including a fund for improving the quality of life (*Leefbaarheidsfondsen*), new compensation and insulation measures, and reduction of ground noise.¹³⁰⁹ The partners emphasized the need to restore the balance between the dual objectives by calling for investments in environmental quality.

In 2005, the proposals for improving the quality of the living environment were elaborated within the BRS. Several of these proposals were submitted. However, instead of awaiting the response of the national government, the BRS partners decided to initiate a new investment program for the short term, in cooperation with Schiphol Group, brought together in the 'Extended Mainport Program' (*Verbreed Mainport Programma*).¹³¹⁰ The creation of this program was the result of the evaluation program of the national government. After all, if it wasn't for the evaluation program no efforts would have been made to develop joint proposals for improvements. The positive effect of the entire evaluation process was therefore that different actors were invited to bring their concrete ideas about improvements to the fore. This made sure that the similarities between the plans of North Holland, Haarlemmermeer, Amsterdam and Schiphol Group were recognized, after which it was only a minor step to bring them together under the umbrella of a new regional investment program (see 8.2 for more extensive discussion about the content of the program).¹³¹¹

With regard to spatial planning the BRS stated that no further restrictions were to be established for the area outside the 20Ke zone. As we shall see later on, this was in conflict with the latest insights about effective measures for dealing with Group Risk.

¹³⁰⁷ Interview Van Duin / Former policy maker Province of North Holland, 2007.

¹³⁰⁸ BRS (2005), Letter from the BRS to the State Secretary of V&W. June 15th 2005.

¹³⁰⁹ Interview Van Duin / Former policy maker Province of North Holland, 2007.

¹³¹⁰ BRS (2005), *Verbreed Mainport Programma*, August, 2005.

¹³¹¹ Press Release Haarlems Dagblad Zuid Kennemerland 'Snel beter leven rond Schiphol'. July 14th 2005.

Moreover, the BRS wanted to be able to build houses within the zones with spatial restrictions in order to keep the housing stock up to date. The BRS also insisted upon allowing large scale housing in Hoofddorp-West, one of the three large scale housing locations whose potential was being evaluated at that time (recall figure 8.1). More specifically, during the 2nd North Wing conference the regional actors had already agreed to use this site for housing.¹³¹² It was deemed necessary and desirable, due to a lack of suitable alternative spaces. In fact, the space had already been reserved for housing by the province in the Regional Plan of 2003.¹³¹³ In general, the BRS asked for more policy space to maneuver at the regional level in order to be able to optimize their spatial plans. They wanted to have more control over the trade offs between spatial claims that were to be made on the regional level.

The Perspective of the CROS

The CROS was home to local residents from all the clusters involved, the municipalities, the province and the aviation sector. The proposals of the CROS could therefore count on broad regional support. The CROS members also indicated they had had the idea that some of their proposals had been rejected because they did not improve mainport development.¹³¹⁴ In a response, the Ministry of V&W had guaranteed the CROS members that all proposals had first of all been assessed on their contribution to reducing negative environmental effects. Only then, the consequences for mainport development and feasibility had been taken into account.¹³¹⁵ Thus, the final judgment was based on the contribution that each proposal would make to the realization of the dual objectives. This did not really take away the concerns of the CROS members, but instead of further criticizing the process, the members decided to focus on elaborating some of their proposals that had been approved of.

The Perspective of the Council of the Ministry of V&W

In July 2005 the Council of the Ministry of V&W presented a strategic perspective on the future development of Schiphol.¹³¹⁶ The council served as an independent advisory committee of the Ministry. Their advice focused on how the aviation sector was expected to evolve until 2020, which public interests were at stake, whether the mainport strategy could be continued, and under what conditions this could be done. Several uncertainties as regards future developments were distinguished (like the development of traffic, the low cost market, the alliance of AirFrance/KLM). The main advice was that the mainport strategy needed to be continued, where the Council still

¹³¹² Noordvleugeloverleg (2005), Proceedings 2nd North Wing Conference, November 22nd 2002.

¹³¹³ Interview Bossink / Policy maker Province of North Holland, 2007.

¹³¹⁴ Interview Van Ojik / local resident/ CROS member, 2007.

¹³¹⁵ Ministerie van V&W (2006), Letter to the CROS. DGT/06.006683, March 9th 2006.

¹³¹⁶ Raad van V&W (2005), Vluchten kan niet Meer. July 2005.

defined the mainport mainly in terms of transportation. It referred to high quality airside and landside accessibility, resulting in high traffic volumes which they deemed essential for the Dutch economy.¹³¹⁷ The council expected that further mainport development (thus defined) would be seriously hampered from 2008 onwards, as a consequence of lacking environmental capacity. According to the council, this would be highly undesirable as it was likely to result in a deteriorating competitive position of the entire region. From their perspective, the main challenge was therefore was to facilitate further growth in order to secure the mainport status, while acknowledging the environmental limits.

The council explored three policy options (restricting further growth, growth within conditions, limitless growth), and asserted that the second option was most the desirable one. The main point was to develop a revised and more realistic mainport strategy, one that did not result in false expectations and other misunderstandings. As such, it was in line with the criticism posed by the aviation sector (and the Ministry of EZ and several local residents) that it was time to develop a clear definition of a mainport. Moreover, according to the council this would clarify what was needed to remain a mainport. As they saw it, some of the necessary ingredients were:¹³¹⁸

1. Accepting that air traffic growth was part of a worldwide trend;
2. Accepting that Schiphol was of pivotal importance for the Dutch economy that heavily relies on the transport and logistics sector;
3. Accepting that the current regulative system was too rigid and hampered further mainport development;
4. Accepting that this growth of Schiphol was likely to cause additional negative external effects;
5. Accepting that this further growth was a joint responsibility of the national government and the sector.

Especially point 4 was important as the council more or less questioned the feasibility of the dual objective (as it was defined). Convincingly pursuing the objective of further mainport development would always hold some additional negative implications for the environment. This was the price that needed to be paid, and was fully worth paying. The council acknowledged that enacting the revised mainport strategy was not going to be an easy operation, due to the enormous levels of distrust. Therefore, measures to improve communication were deemed necessary. Finally, the council offered a concrete set of measures for the short, mid and long term to enact this revised mainport strategy, focusing on increasing capacity, revising the regulative system, selectivity, reducing

¹³¹⁷ Raad van V&W (2005), *Vluchten kan niet Meer*. July 2005, p.9.

¹³¹⁸ Raad van V&W (2005), *Vluchten kan niet Meer*. July 2005, pp.15-16.

noise, new environmental effective solutions. It was up to the project team MEIS to decide what to do with all these advices when advising the cabinet about the short, mid, and long term development of Schiphol. One more important set of advices was delivered yet to be added to the long list of advices, i.e. the ones developed by the new Committee of Noise Experts.

8.5.5 The Committee Noise Experts: protecting Outer areas and Measuring Noise (2003 – 2006)

2003 - 2006				
Cabinet's Perspective 2003 – 2006	Long term (PMS) – 8.3			
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9			
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation		
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation	Equivalence – 8.5.1	
			Effectiveness – 8.5.2	
			Proposals – 8.5.3	
			Advices – 8.5.4	
			CDV – 8.5.5	
			Evaluation Report – 8.5.6	
	8.6	Night Fights		
	8.7	Group Risk		
	8.8	Housing locations		
Cabinet's Perspective – 8.9				
		2007	2008	2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009		Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
8.10 – 8.11			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11	
Long term 2006 – 2009		Long term > 2025 – 8.12		
8.12				

As was explicated in the Plan of Approach of the evaluation, the CDV was assigned to advice about the protection of the outer areas against noise (zone between 35Ke – 20Ke) and about possibilities for measuring noise.¹³¹⁹ ¹³²⁰ The local residents that were organized in 19 platforms put more trust in the CDV than they had done in the project direction MEIS. Therefore, they started a lobby to influence the CDV (8.5.5.1). Next, we discuss the advices of the CDV (8.5.5.2). For one, their advice about measuring noise linked well to other information about measuring noise that had become available (8.5.5.3).

¹³¹⁹ Plan of Approach Evaluation, 2004; p.6; TK 29665, Nr. 1; June 18th 2004. Moreover, the committee also monitored the implementation of the new measure (from Ke to L_{den}).

¹³²⁰ Lower House (2003), Letter of the Chairman of the Lower House to the Chairman of the CDV. Nr. DGL/03.U1264, May 16th 2003.

8.5.5.1 The lobby of the local residents and environmental parties

The local residents stated many times that the evaluation was about the wrong things. Over the past few years it had become clear to them that there was a big gap between the calculated levels of noise pollution and the amount of noise annoyance people were actually experiencing. From their perspective, assessing whether the calculated noise pollution had not deteriorated compared to 1990 levels was not very useful. After all, the expected conclusion would be that there was no deterioration, while the amount of experienced noise annoyance had dramatically increased (see for example the rise in complaints, and most people didn't even want to complain, as they thought that it wouldn't make any difference). According to the local residents and several environmental parties, with regard to the noise issue the policy world and the actual world had very different realities, where the policy world was more like a fantasy world that didn't do justice to the actual world.¹³²¹ Concluding that the system offered a sufficient level of protection was not helping to bridge the gap. The joint platforms proposed more radical measures, i.e. developing a new regulative system. Since the CDV was already working on this (for example, by finding ways to legally protect the outer areas), and since the former chairman of the CDV (Berkhout) had shown that he was independent, the local residents put a lot of trust in the CDV. More specifically, the local residents of the joint platforms put more trust in the CDV than in the entire evaluation program. The CDV in turn, took the advices of the platform serious, and used them as input for their advices.¹³²²

The advices of the joint platforms about the evaluation and the regulative system that were offered to the CDV were presented in several documents that they produced during 2004 – 2006. In one of the reports it was concluded that the current policy tools were merely useful for estimating levels of noise pollution (in terms of decibels), but did not offer possibilities to manage noise pollution. There was no flexibility whatsoever, no steering mechanism available.¹³²³ Moreover, the joint platforms indicated the need to actually protect the outer areas and to establish a '*Nederlands Luchtruimschap*', an independent organization that was to develop state of the art knowledge about the actual noise situation and to find solutions for dealing with it, and monitoring whether appointments were actually lived up to.^{1324 1325 1326}

¹³²¹ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Ten Wolde / Noise expert and member of the Schiphol EIA Committee, 2010.

¹³²² Commissie Deskundigen Vliegtuiggeluid (2005) Letter of CDV to the joint platforms, CDV03.br.47, February 8th 2005.

¹³²³ Platforms of local residents (2004), Zorgzaam sturen. March 29th 2004.

¹³²⁴ Platforms of local residents (2004), Als een goed instrument. March 29th 2004.

¹³²⁵ Geudeke, T. & K. van Ojik (2009), Het Perspectief van de Omwonenden. In: De Nederlandse Mainports onder Druk (2009), Van Gils, M., M.G. Huys & B. de Jong (red). Uitgeverij Spectrum, Houten.

¹³²⁶ Platforms of local residents (2004), Wikken & Wegen. December 6th 2004.

8.5.5.2 Advices of the CDV

The CDV presented its final advice on January 15th 2006.¹³²⁷ It contained four important recommendations.

(1) Need for honest communication and trust

The CDV emphasized that they had been surprised by the lack of trust among the different stakeholders that they talked to during the research process. Local residents/ environmental parties and aviation sector parties all blamed one another for not listening. This type of antagonistic relationships prevented the development of workable agreements. More specifically, according to the committee, this was the main cause for the reproduction of the stalemate that they encountered.¹³²⁸ There was disagreement about the current situation and about the most desirable future developments. Moreover, the CDV argued that the entire discussion was wrought with wrong assumptions or interpretations of information. This was related to the complexity of the technocratic debate, creating a lack of understanding about the issues and methods involved.¹³²⁹ All in all, the CDV emphasized the importance of communication as an essential precondition for improving the situation (in order to avoid miscommunication and further misunderstandings). According to the CDV it had to be communicated 'loud and clear' that there would always be negative effects associated with aviation growth (i.e. loud and clear, *Luid en Duidelijk* was the title of their final advice). Only after this was publicly acknowledged, it would become possible to deal with it in an effective way. Increased levels of trust were deemed essential here, and this was to be created by communicating loud and clear.¹³³⁰

(2) The need for a more flexible system

The committee pointed out that there was broad support for a more flexible regulative system for noise. Both the sector and the CROS members had informed them about their concerns.¹³³¹ More specifically, the CROS pointed out the importance of a legally founded system of enforcement that also allowed for negotiations about the distribution of noise and measures to reduce noise pollution. In order to arrive at such a legally founded system of enforcement there was need for room to experiment.¹³³² Current experiences with the regulative system illustrated that there was neither room for negotiations nor for experiments.¹³³³ The CDV thus acknowledged this need for

¹³²⁷ TK 29665, February 10th 2006, Nr.22; TK 29665, February 27th 2006, Nr.27.

¹³²⁸ Commissie Deskundigen Vliegtuiggeluid (2006), *Luid maar duidelijk*. Eindrapport CDV, January 15th 2006; p.i-x.

¹³²⁹ As we shall see later on, this lack of understanding did also concern the policy makers involved.

¹³³⁰ Commissie Deskundigen Vliegtuiggeluid (2006), *Luid maar duidelijk*. Eindrapport CDV, January 15th 2006; p.vi.

¹³³¹ Commissie Regionaal Overlegorgaan Schiphol (2004), Letter to the CDV, response to the third interim report. Nr. CROS 04.232. December 21st 2004.

¹³³² Interview Tan / Former Secretary CROS, 2010.

¹³³³ Commissie Deskundigen Vliegtuiggeluid (2005), *Vierde Voortgangsrapportage*, June 9th 2005; p.9.

flexibility. In the end, they advised to consider content and procedural flexibility.¹³³⁴ The first referred to possibilities to exceed specific enforcement points, under specific conditions. This was the type of flexibility the sector had been asking for, but which was rejected by the local residents, as it offered no certainties about noise levels. The second referred to making changes in flight routes and procedures, as long as the limits were not exceeded. This type of flexibility was supported by the local residents, since it allowed for redirecting routes over less densely populated areas.

(3) Protecting the outer areas

The CDV offered some proposals for dealing with noise pollution in the outer areas. Several systems for monitoring noise in the outer areas were explored. The advice was to focus only on monitoring systems with locations in residential areas, a statement that was already made in the second advice of the committee.¹³³⁵ In an earlier response, both the Ministries and the Lower House had approved of this idea.^{1336 1337} The proposal implied a repositioning of existing points and an introduction of additional points (see figure 8.10). The proposal was in line with the enforcement system that was developed by the researchers of the SNM (although it contained far less enforcement points).

Figure 8.10 Enforcement Points (79) that the CDV proposed and used for its noise calculations



Source: CDV, *Eerste Voortgangsrapportage* (2003), p.13

¹³³⁴ Commissie Deskundigen Vliegtuiggeluid (2005), *Derde Voortgangsrapportage*.
¹³³⁵ Commissie Deskundigen Vliegtuiggeluid (2004), *Tweede Voortgangsrapportage* April 28th 2004.
¹³³⁶ MEIS (2004), Letter to the CDV, June 11th 2004.
¹³³⁷ TK 26959, Nr. 81.

(4) Measuring Noise

Finally, the committee researched the possibilities for measuring noise pollution. During the research, members of the Schiphol EIA Committee had a meeting with members of the CDV. Here they handed over the Isermann report to them, presented the results and indicated the pivotal importance of including the findings of Isermann in the CDV research process. One member of the Ministry of V&W that acted as the secretary of the CDV committee was furious and he argued that the work of Isermann was not scientifically valid. Nonetheless, the members of the EIA committee insisted upon taking the report seriously, as it was a very valuable report from their perspective that had already been ignored far too long.¹³³⁸ Members of the CDV promised to take the report seriously, and initially this was actually the case. For example, during the research that was carried out by one committee member it was concluded that the difference between calculated and measured levels could differ up to 10 dB during daytime.¹³³⁹ Moreover, in order to draw scientifically valid conclusions the CDV had to point out the systematic flaw that was part of the calculation method and the related weakness of the database that served as input for the model.

Initially, the EIA committee had the impression that this would finally be done, after all those years. Indeed, in June 2005 the chairman of the committee had argued in the media that measuring noise was of crucial importance for honestly informing citizens. From the perspective of the chairman, measuring noise meant to be more honest and open, which was of pivotal importance for restoring the lack of trust involved that made all serious policy debate about Schiphol impossible.¹³⁴⁰ However, when the final report was presented, it appeared to the EIA committee that the researchers of the CDV had been overruled by the Ministry of V&W. Here rather opaque conclusions were drawn about the potential and need for measuring noise. It was stated that measured levels were much higher than the calculated levels (as the research had pointed out), but it was also stated that this did not mean that the current enforcement procedure was not adequate, or that existing noise levels were unacceptable. In the end, the CDV did advice that calculations and measurements needed to be combined in the future to determine noise levels more adequately, but the EIA committee was not very pleased about the overall conclusions. Again, the interrelationship between measuring and calculating was not adequately addressed and, again, the opportunity to improve the calculation method (i.e. repair the systematic flaw) was missed. Moreover, from the perspective of the EIA committee the conclusions were clearly not independent scientific findings. They were the politically desirable ones, allowing the Ministry of

¹³³⁸ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise expert and member of the Schiphol EIA Committee, 2010.

¹³³⁹ Eisses et al. (2006) Onderzoek naar verschillen tussen gemeten en berekend vliegtuiggeluid. Deelonderzoek, Januari 2006. TNO Report Nr. IS- RPT- 060017.


¹³⁴⁰ Eversdijk: 'Vliegtuiglawaai Schiphol moet je meten' in Noord Hollands Dagblad, June 11th 2005.

V&W to hold on the existing calculation method (including its flaws).¹³⁴¹ Finally, the CROS members, especially the representatives of inhabitants around Schiphol, too weren't all that pleased with the final recommendations of the CDV. For one, they feared that the more flexible system of noise enforcement would contribute to woolly solutions that would eventually come at the expense of the inhabitants, while favoring the aviation sector.¹³⁴² Or in other words, more flexibility was not to come at the expense of less legal protection.

8.5.5.3 More information about measuring noise (2003 - 2006)

At that time, more information was coming available about the possibilities for measuring noise. In the noise monitor of 2006 of the RIVM that contained information about experiments and the state of the art knowledge as regards measuring noise, it was concluded that measurements for road and rail traffic were scientifically valid.¹³⁴³ With regard to aircraft noise it was stated that pilot measurements showed that trend monitoring was also possible by fully automatic measurement sites, provided that the measurement system had an adequate device for aircraft noise recognition.¹³⁴⁴ In the meantime, several measure points had been established around Schiphol. Next to Schiphol's own system (NOMOS), two other companies had been working on new points (Luistervink, see chapters 6 and 7, and Geluidsnet, who started to measure noise from 2003 onwards).¹³⁴⁵ This counted up to a total amount of 75 measurement points in 2007, located in both the inner and outer areas (see figure 8.11). Information was derived from these measurements that allowed for comparisons with calculated levels.

Figure 8.11 Locations of measurement points anno 2007



Source: Geluidsnet, 2009l

¹³⁴¹ Interview Ten Wolde / Noise expert and member of the Schiphol EIA Committee, 2010.

¹³⁴² Interview Tan / Former Secretary CROS, 2010.

¹³⁴³ RIVM Geluidmonitor (2006) Trend en validatie metingen omgevingsgeluid. Nr. 680300001/2006.

¹³⁴⁴ See also RIVM (2005) Praktijkmogelijkheden geluidmetingen Luchtvaart in het buitengebied van Schiphol (2005). Jabben J. & C. Potma (2005). RIVM report 680001001/2005.

¹³⁴⁵ See www.geluidsnet.nl. Derived from the web on August 16th 2009.

In 2003 Milieudefensie conducted several actions in order to convince municipalities that they had to invest in measurement tools.¹³⁴⁶ It was a continuation of the campaign that Milieudefensie had started in 2000, when 35 municipalities supported their call for more measurement points.¹³⁴⁷ In 2004 two additional measurement points were installed in the municipalities of Krommenie and Velsen, making up for a total of 8 measurement points.¹³⁴⁸ Moreover, in a response to the claim of the Minister of V&W made during the political debate of 2002 when she was gathering a majority support for the new regulative system as laid down in the Schiphol Act and related Decrees, another organization started to develop measurement gear (*Geluidsnet*).¹³⁴⁹ They placed 25 measurement points north of Schiphol and presented the real-time results (live) on their website. Their main concern was to inform citizens and municipalities about the real levels of noise pollution, while simultaneously showing them that this was technically feasible. The RIVM compared different measurement systems in order to assess the validity of the results. It turned out that the system that was developed by OMEGAM was amongst the best.¹³⁵⁰ Finally, as we have already seen when discussing the CDV findings about measuring noise, the EIA committee also stressed the importance of assessing the real noise effects and argued that measuring noise was seen as an important means to do so.¹³⁵¹

All in all, the advice of the CDV was in favor of protecting outer areas and measuring noise. However, especially with regard to the latter the final conclusions had been far too weak and were not deemed scientifically valid by some experts (like the EIA committee). From their perspective, the CDV had missed an excellent opportunity to improve the regulative system for noise once and for all. Nonetheless, the joint platforms of local residents and the environmental parties were quite pleased with the CDV results, as it was more innovative than the usual policies of the Ministry of V&W.¹³⁵² Still, it remained to be seen what the cabinet was to do with the advice.

8.5.6 Evaluation Report (February 2006)

2003 - 2006		
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006		
	Long term (PMS) – 8.3	
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9	
8.3 – 8.9	8.4	Preparing the evaluation

¹³⁴⁶ Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2003.
¹³⁴⁷ This campaign was called ‘Vliegtuiglawaai: houdt het in de hand’. See <http://www.geluidnieuws.nl/2003/maart2003/md.html>.
¹³⁴⁸ Interview Muchall / Noise expert, 2009.
¹³⁴⁹ Schiphol Nieuws (2009), Meten is weten. By Susanne Coppoolse, January 30th 2009.
¹³⁵⁰ RIVM (2006), Geluidsmonitor 2006. Nr. 680300001/2006; Interview Muchall / Noise expert, 2009.
¹³⁵¹ Commissie voor de MER (2005), Advice July 1st 2005.
¹³⁵² Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation	Equivalence – 8.5.1		
			Effectiveness – 8.5.2		
			Proposals – 8.5.3		
			Advices – 8.5.4		
			CDV – 8.5.5		
			Evaluation Report – 8.5.6		
	8.6	Night Fights			
	8.7	Group Risk			
	8.8	Housing locations			
	Cabinet’s Perspective – 8.9				
			2007	2008	2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009			Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
8.10 – 8.11				Mid term < 2020 – 8.11	
Long term 2006 – 2009			Long term > 2025 – 8.12		
8.12					

The three policy trajectories (assessing the level of equivalence, the effectiveness and proposals for improvement) and the different advices were brought together in the final evaluation report. Prior to the presentation of the report six information meetings were held, during which everyone was free to join in, and during which the project direction reported about the proceedings of the evaluation program. During the last meeting, the results of the evaluation were presented. But not all reports were finished at that time. For example, the critical report about the choice for a specific juridical figure (i.e. developing an Act instead of a PKB decision) was not available at that time. According to one local resident, the Ministry of V&W did not want to discuss this report in public. When he asked the responsible policy maker of the Ministry of V&W about the report during the information meeting, he was told that she didn't want to talk about it.¹³⁵³ Nonetheless, several actors thought that the information meetings sorted a positive effect on restoring levels of trust (like the process committee and members of the CROS).¹³⁵⁴ In this paragraph we subsequently discuss the final report of the evaluation (8.5.6.1) and the criticisms that were posed on the report and the entire evaluation by the environmental lobby (8.5.6.2).

8.5.6.1 Final Report of the Evaluation

On February 15th 2006 the final evaluation report was published. In the report it was concluded that the new system did live up to demands of equivalence, but the system could become more effective (although it was judged to be quite effective already by the

¹³⁵³ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹³⁵⁴ Process Committee Evaluation Schiphol Policy, Eight Advice, January 23rd 2006; Interview Tan / Former Secretary CROS, 2010.

project direction).¹³⁵⁵ More specifically, improvements could be made that accounted for mainport development (i.e. enhance capacity) and reduction of negative environmental and safety effects at the same time. This rather positive conclusion drawn by the project team MEIS did not totally coincide with the different reactions of stakeholders that had been posed throughout the evaluation procedure. Almost all actors involved had indicated that the current system was not working out well. Especially the rigidity of the system was deemed undesirable. To make matters even more urgent, the aviation sector had announced in 2005 that the limits of specific enforcement points would be reached soon if no measures were taken. At the same time, the maximum amount of houses within the 35Ke zone and the maximum amount of seriously hindered people was not met yet, so it was clear that the current system did not allow for optimization.¹³⁵⁶ In order to both increase capacity and reduce noise pollution the rules of the regulative system needed to be changed. The BRS parties agreed to this, as did the CROS members who indicated that measures for reducing noise hindrance could not be implemented within the regulative system (i.e. the possibility to test new solutions was all but absent). Moreover, the trust in the system had radically diminished after the input mistake and the increase of noise pollution in some areas after the opening of the 5th runway. At that time, it still hadn't been clarified what was going to happen with the different proposals that had been submitted, which triggered additional irritations on behalf of the submitters.

8.5.6.2 Criticism on the evaluation process of the environmental interest groups

During the execution of the evaluation the SNM kept on criticizing the way it had been framed. Not only via political lobby, but also by informing the policy makers involved. For example, on March 18th 2005 and June 14th 2005 SNM sent letters to the Project team MEIS about the need to broaden the research agenda. These letters included the proposals for improvement that were submitted by SNM and that had been rejected for endangering mainport development.¹³⁵⁷ Furthermore, during a visit to the Director General (i.e. one of the most important civil servants) on October 4th 2005 they raised their concerns about the direction that the evaluation was taking. The two main questions that were to be answered, and that the entire environmental coalition had been asking for time and again (i.e. protection when confronted with high growth and whether or not the system led to the most optimal flight patterns), were still not included. They asserted that merely assessing the current flight patterns did not say much about the most optimal system. For both issues calculations with unorthodox

¹³⁵⁵ TK 29665, February 15th 2006, Nr. 24.

¹³⁵⁶ Or in other words, the new regulative system seemed to hold the same type of absurdities that had to be repaired in the old one (recall the advice of the In 't Veld committee that we discussed in chapter 7).

¹³⁵⁷ SNM, (2005), *Verbetervoorstellen Geluid evaluatie Normenstelsel Schiphol*, Letter sent to the project committee MEIS. March 18th 2005.

flight scenarios were needed. In essence, according to SNM and the other environmental actors the wrong questions were being asked and the possibilities for optimizing the existing system were ignored. SNM brought this also to the attention of the process committee, the Upper and Lower House, the CROS and the CDV.¹³⁵⁸

The representatives of the SNM were not pleased about the final evaluation report. They decided to send a letter to the process committee, in which they criticized both the conclusions and the way that was dealt with the proposals for improvement.¹³⁵⁹ Moreover, they complained about the very small role the conclusions of the CDV had eventually played. The CDV had advised to improve the legal protection of the outer areas, and it seemed that nothing was done with this advice. In the final evaluation report, the project committee stated that the CDV had concluded that additional enforcement points would come at the expense of capacity loss. However, according to the SNM this was not what the CDV had actually said. They had merely stated that abandoning all enforcement points was the only way to prevent any loss of capacity.¹³⁶⁰ This was something altogether different and from their perspective it was therefore not justified to reject all CDV recommendations by making reference to this false argument. Moreover, according to the environmental parties the final report presented a biased perspective on the Schiphol problemacy. According to them, it was suggested that the noise problem was only a minor problem when compared to the capacity problem. With regard to noise it was concluded that the system did actually work (i.e. it was equivalent) and that the situation had considerably improved since 1990. However, it was not mentioned that the noise effects would be much higher if the maximum capacity was used than would have been possible within the limits of the old system, nor was it mentioned that different geographical areas had been used for calculations, that the input data was outdated and that pollution levels had been rising again over the past years. At the same time, the story presented about capacity held more urgency. With regard to capacity it was argued that urgent measures were needed in order to avoid degeneration. According to the environmental actors, the final result was that the report framed the Schiphol problem very much in terms of a capacity problem, thus paving the way for policy measures aimed at increasing capacity.

Finally, the SNM complained about the way the proposals for improvement had been treated. The communication about the process had been rather poor and the way the proposals had been evaluated was unclear. From the perspective of SNM, the evaluation

¹³⁵⁸ SNM, (2005), Evaluatie Schipholbeleid. Letter to DG Ministry of Transportation, November 2nd 2005; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

¹³⁵⁹ SNM, (2006), Letter to the Process Committee about the evaluation project. March 13th 2006.

¹³⁶⁰ Volgens het Eindrapport zegt de CDV dat 'Extra geluidspunten ten koste gaan van de groei ruimte', maar dit is veel te kort door de bocht. De CDV zegt uitdrukkelijk "Als men elk capaciteitsverlies wil uitsluiten dan moet men geen handhavingspunten in het buitengebied hanteren".

of the proposals as carried out by the researchers and policy makers of the Ministry of V&W was very much biased; all proposals that could hamper maximum growth were rejected at first hand.¹³⁶¹ These criticisms were supported by several other stakeholders (platforms of local residents, Milieudefensie, Milieufederatie Noord Holland).¹³⁶² Part of the criticism was also shared by experts of the EIA Committee.¹³⁶³

Other experts too, like those of the MNP (Environmental Planning Agency), criticized the effectiveness of two of the new policy tools of the Schiphol Act, the Total Volume Noise (*Totaal Volume Geluid* = TVG; i.e. the maximum volume of noise that was allowed during a year) and the Total Risk Weight (*Totaal Risico Gewicht* = TRG, i.e. the total volume of weights of airplanes that was allowed during a year) were not effective (i.e. contributing to the realization of the dual objectives). According to the MNP the calculation method that had been used when determining the maximum values had made it almost impossible to exceed the levels that were taken up in the Schiphol Act.¹³⁶⁴ For example, the final limit of the TRG (i.e. the max. volume of TRG that is allowed) was based on the idea that the amount of houses within the IR 10^{-6} in 2010 was not to increase when compared to 1990 levels (i.e. the IR is also based on the probability of an aircraft accident). Based on this ‘fitting’ scenario for third party risks in 2010, the limits for the TRG were calculated. Thus, the maximum limit of the TRG was based on the maximum scenario. This automatically made sure that the limit was not exceeded as long as the maximum capacity wasn’t utilized. As the noise system prevented the maximal use of capacity, the TRG limit could never be reached. Moreover, the lower actual growth rates assured that the TRG was quite easily met: approx. 30% of the available capacity was used (3 tons, whereas 9.2 tons were allowed).^{1365 1366}

Besides, the TRG did not allow for any useful interventions. The specific way wherein it was calculated, i.e. it was based on the sum of all chances that a plane crashed and the maximum Take of Weight of a plane, made sure that the spatial distribution of a possible accident did not play any role. According to the EIA committee the implication was that the TRG did not take the probability of an accident at a particular location into account, making it impossible to say something about the levels of IR and GR.¹³⁶⁷ For this reasons, the EIA Committee advised to replace the TRG criterion for an area based

¹³⁶¹ SNM, (2006), Letter to the Process Committee about the evaluation project. March 13th 2006.

¹³⁶² Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007; Interview Van Arendonk / Milieufederatie Noord Holland, 2008.

¹³⁶³ Interview Ale / safety expert and member EIA committee, 2009.

¹³⁶⁴ Interview Dassen / MNP, 2007.

¹³⁶⁵ Inspectie V&W (2006), Handhavingsrapportage Schiphol 2005.

¹³⁶⁶ Inspectie V&W (2007), Handhavingsrapportage Schiphol 2006.

¹³⁶⁷ Commissie MER (2006), Advies Schipholbeleid, March 2006.

approach to third party risk that was being elaborated at that time (resulting in improved spatial measures). From their perspective, the TRG was an ineffective policy measure as it did not provide insight in useful interventions. In its final advice, the CDV (Committee of Noise Experts) drew the same conclusion as regards the TVG, stating that the measure did not protect anyone and had no preventive value whatsoever.¹³⁶⁸

The evaluation report served as important input for the Cabinet’s Perspective. In the next paragraphs we discuss the other policy processes that delivered input for the Perspective.

8.6. The Issue of Night Flights (2003 – 2005)

2003 - 2006				
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006	Long term (PMS) – 8.3			
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9			
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation		
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation	Equivalence – 8.5.1	
			Effectiveness – 8.5.2	
			Proposals – 8.5.3	
			Advices – 8.5.4	
			CDV – 8.5.5	
		Evaluation Report – 8.5.6		
	8.6	Night Fights		
	8.7	Group Risk		
	8.8	Housing locations		
Cabinet’s Perspective – 8.9				
Alders Table 2006 – 2009		2007	2008	2009
8.10 – 8.11		Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11	
Long term 2006 – 2009		Long term > 2025 – 8.12		
8.12				

In this paragraph we discuss the research that was conducted to assess the effects of the extended night regime (8.6.1), the final decision of the cabinet about the extended night regime (8.6.2) and the criticism that was posed on this decision (8.6.3).

8.6.1 Investigating the effects of an extended night regime

During the preparations of the new Aviation Act (1999 – 2001) the decision-making about an extended night regime had been postponed, as the Minister of V&W had

¹³⁶⁸ Commissie Deskundigen Vliegtuiggeluid (2006), Luid maar duidelijk. Eindrapport CDV, January 15th 2006; p.ix.

argued that no adequate research results were available yet. It was promised that research would be conducted in order to assess the effects of an extended night regime (from 6 AM to 7 AM) on health (sleep disturbance) and capacity (mainport function). The research about sleep disturbance was part of the larger Health Impact Assessment that was continually carried out by the RIVM.¹³⁶⁹ The RIVM concluded that extending the night regime from 6 AM to 7 AM would sort positive effects on sleeping disturbance. The RIVM had calculated that 18% less people would be disturbed in their sleep within a 55 x 55 kilometer area.¹³⁷⁰ However, a much smaller area was legally protected, which allowed for less harsh conclusions when discussing total amounts of people (instead of relative shares).

In another research project the consequences for mainport development were assessed. The researchers concluded that extending the night regime decreased runway capacity, which, eventually, would hamper further mainport development.¹³⁷¹ All calculations were based on input of the aviation sector parties (Schiphol, AirFrance/KLM, Air Traffic Control) about the consequences for their daily operations. The researchers concluded that the costs of the extended night regime were to range from 35 – 75 million euro until 2015, which was not particularly high.¹³⁷² Nonetheless, the sector parties asserted that the actual negative effects would be much higher. It was not only the loss of capacity that was important. The problem was that the type of flights arriving in between 6 AM and 7 AM were crucial for operating a hub and spoke system, and thus for sustaining mainport development. During this hour 26 of the 42 intercontinental flights that the national government had defined as being crucial for the mainport during the negotiations with AirFrance/KLM arrived at Schiphol. Most of the passengers transferred to early intra-European flights that departed shortly after the arrival of the intercontinental flights. If such smooth connections became impossible at Schiphol, these passengers would likely transfer via another airport in the future. At the same time, both Schiphol and AirFrance/KLM stressed the many measures they had already implemented throughout the previous years in order to reduce noise pollution in between 6 AM and 7 AM. Besides, they promised that many more such measures were to be implemented during the upcoming years (i.e. limited use of runways and insulation of houses).¹³⁷³ The response coincided with the findings presented in a third report. In an international benchmark it was concluded that Schiphol was already

¹³⁶⁹ More specifically, the research was part of the evaluation framework Health and Environment that was developed by the Ministries of Spatial Planning and Health (VWS) (Beoordelingskader Gezondheid en Milieu, 2003). The framework was basically a checklist of factors that might influence decision making about environmental matters that have health effects (including the type and quantity of the effects, the way the effects are experienced and possible measures to deal with them).

¹³⁷⁰ RIVM/Fast et al., 2004.

¹³⁷¹ The Report is called 'Geluidsbelasting bij een verlengd nachtregime' November 2004.

¹³⁷² TNO-INRO, SEO, AAC, De maatschappelijke effecten van het verlengen van het nachtregime voor de mainportfunctie van Schiphol, June 2004 (Muskens et al.)

¹³⁷³ Gezondheidskundige evaluatie Schiphol (2006), GES newsletter Nr. 10. January 2006.

dealing with more stringent night regimes than several other European airports (e.g. Frankfurt, London, Paris). Further measures would therefore seriously harm the competitive position of the airport, resulting in loss of transfer passengers and destinations.¹³⁷⁴

8.6.2 Cabinet rejects an extended night regime

With all this information available, the cabinet finally decided about the night regime in 2005 (after 16 years of postponing the issue, as it had already been part of the agenda during the PASO negotiations of 1989 – 1991). The positive effects of an extended regime on sleep disturbance were acknowledged, but the dangers of loosing the mainport position weighed in heavily. Therefore, the cabinet decided that the 23:00 – 6:00 regime that had become operative after the introduction of the five runway system in 2003 was to remain in place, but that additional measures were to be implemented in between 6 AM and 7 AM, as long as these wouldn't hamper mainport development (i.e. loss of capacity and intercontinental destinations).¹³⁷⁵ Obviously, the sector parties were satisfied with this decision, while the environmental parties and the local residents weren't.

8.6.3 Criticism of Environmental interest groups

In a direct response to the cabinet's decision about night flights, the SNM argued that they couldn't possibly understand that the regime was not extended, as the research results that had been produced the past few years clearly pointed out the positive consequences for people's health. The SNM had been the main organizer of the lobby for an extended night regime for some years by then.¹³⁷⁶ Besides, the SNM stated that the effects on sleeping disturbance had been underestimated by the cabinet, due to the absurd calculation method that had been used. The RIVM had pointed out that the effects on sleeping disturbance covered a much larger area (55 x 55 km) than the direct surroundings of the airport that were taken into account in the calculations (i.e. the area to for which legal protection was promised, i.e. the 26L_{aeq} area). For example, the areas that received a lot of additional noise pollution as a consequence of the 5th runway (Schiphol North area, consisting of the municipalities of Castricum, Uitgeest and Heiloo) were not part of the assessment zone. Besides, in the calculation model it had been assumed that people slept with the windows closed. In practice, most people slept with open windows, increasing the level of noise pollution with 7 – 10 dB.¹³⁷⁷ In 2004 the Northern municipalities (organized in the northern cluster of the CROS, consisting of Beverwijk, Castricum, Heemskerk, Uitgeest en Velsen) also coordinated their efforts

¹³⁷⁴ To70 (2004), Night time restrictions at Amsterdam-Schiphol, an international comparison, March 2004.

¹³⁷⁵ TK 25466, April 27th 2005, Nr. 52.

¹³⁷⁶ See for example SNM (2004), Stiller Vliegen boven Nederland. Brochure Augustus 2004.

¹³⁷⁷ Gezondheidskundige evaluatie Schiphol (2006), GES newsletter Nr. 10. January 2006; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

and developed a strategic perspective on Schiphol.¹³⁷⁸ In 2007 this perspective was updated, and the key message was that the amount of noise pollution needed to be reduced. One of the main policy measures the municipalities demanded was the extension of the night regime to 7 AM.¹³⁷⁹ So, after 16 years the cabinet had finally made a decision about the extended night regime, but it could certainly not count on broad support.

8.7 The Issue of Group Risk (2003 – 2006)

2003 - 2006				
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006	Long term (PMS) – 8.3			
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9			
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation		
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation	Equivalence – 8.5.1	
			Effectiveness – 8.5.2	
			Proposals – 8.5.3	
			Advices – 8.5.4	
			CDV – 8.5.5	
		Evaluation Report – 8.5.6		
	8.6	Night Fights		
8.7	Group Risk			
8.8	Housing locations			
Cabinet’s Perspective – 8.9				
		2007	2008	2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009		Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
8.10 – 8.11			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11	
Long term 2006 – 2009		Long term > 2025 – 8.12		
8.12				

With regard to third party risks, the Transition Articles had prescribed that a standstill for the 10⁻⁶ Individual Risk contour (i.e. the amount of houses that fell within this contour) was to be achieved in order to illustrate equivalence. During the design of the new regulative system it had been assumed that this standstill was possible as a consequence of the implementation of more ideal flight routes that passed over less densely populated areas. During the assessment of the level of equivalence it was concluded that this was realized. However, just like the issue of the extended night regime, the cabinet was also to settle the issue of Group Risk before the end of 2005 (as had been promised during the political debate about the Schiphol Act of 2003). Back then, it was argued that a norm for Group Risk would be developed in the upcoming

¹³⁷⁸ CROS cluster Noord (2004), Strategische Nota Schiphol 2004.
¹³⁷⁹ CROS cluster Noord (2007), Strategische Nota Schiphol 2007.

years that was to be used to assess the level of equivalence between 1990 – 2005. As discussed, the creation of this norm was linked to the development of a statistical causal model that was to be finished in 2005.¹³⁸⁰ In the meantime, some additional spatial measures had been negotiated in order to prevent further increase of Group Risks. Before discussing how the policy debate unraveled (8.7.2 – 8.7.4), we first recall the policy context by presenting the background of the debate (8.7.1). We end this paragraph with a short review of the final outcomes of the debate about Group Risk (8.7.5)

8.7.1 Background of the debate: the impossibility of a standstill (2002 – 2003)

From 2002 onwards, the criticism about the presumed standstill and the link to the causal model increased. With regard to the standstill promise, two research reports became available during 2002 wherein it was concluded that a standstill for GR could never be achieved. First, in a report of the NLR that was presented on April 9th 2002, the GR was calculated, based on the refined model, for the situation wherein the limits of the TRG were met. It became clear that the probability of accident like the Bijlmer disaster had increased tremendously (5 to 8 times higher than in 1990). In the report it was concluded that the continuation of the construction of new houses (conform the PKB-VINEX ambitions) and the new industrial and office sites that were developed since 1990 had resulted in a rather large increase of GR. It was also stated that the increase of GR was mainly caused by the spatial developments in the airport area (56 x 56 km) and less by the increase of flight movements sec. Despite the additional spatial measures that had been developed in 2001 in cooperation with the regional public parties, the GR was still expected to rise, although at a much lower pace. Similar conclusions were drawn in the Environmental Monitor of the RIVM in 2002. From both research reports it could be derived that, in order to realize a standstill compared to 1990 levels, either no traffic growth was to be allowed anymore (i.e. an immediate growth stop) and/or the construction of buildings was to be prohibited in a large area, while the new locations that had been developed since 1990 had to be demolished.

The link that had been forged between the creation of a norm for GR and the development of a statistical causal model was also firmly criticized by several experts. Especially the VACS (i.e. Committee of safety experts Schiphol) repeatedly warned the Minister of V&W that a causal model could not deliver any additional insights in the consequences of an accident. Such a model could only gain insight in the factors that caused an accident and the interrelationships between these factors.¹³⁸¹ The development of the causal model was very important to reduce risks around the airport,

¹³⁸⁰ As taken up in both the Schiphol Act and the related Air Traffic Decree (Luchthavenverkeersbesluit).

¹³⁸¹ VACS (2002), Advice to the minister of Transportation, April 18th 2002.

but the link to the GR was of no additional value.¹³⁸² No such model was necessary for setting a norm for Group Risk, something that experts had already brought forward during the design of the new regulative system. Nonetheless, as discussed before, the link had remained in place. However, linking the causal model and the development of a norm for GR turned out to have one rather perverse effect. It made the aviation sector decide to draw out of the project, since they did not want to cooperate in the development of a tool that would eventually get employed to further regulate their activities. Developing a GR norm was likely to lead to additional restrictions as regards further mainport development (both on the airside and the landside), as all experts already knew at that time that a standstill could not be achieved. In the year 2000, when the feasibility of the development of a statistical causal model was assessed, it was concluded that such a model could only be developed when the sector cooperated. After all, they held much of the necessary input data. The value of the model was beyond doubt, irrespective of the dubious link to the norm for Group Risk. Therefore, the model was deemed necessary and for this reason the experts of both the VACS and the EIA committee strongly advised against a legal link between a norm for GR and a statistical causal model.¹³⁸³ As discussed in the former chapter 7, nothing was done with these advises. At that time, the new Schiphol Act had to be finalized before the five-runway system was put into operation in February 2003. Time was running out, and linking the GR discussion to the decision to develop a causal model that was to be ready in 2005 offered an opportunity to postpone the discussion.¹³⁸⁴ The debate was resumed in the autumn of 2003.

8.7.2 Cabinet wants to get rid of the standstill for Group Risk (November 2003)

In November 2003 the Ministries of V&W and VROM announced that the standstill for Group Risk could not be achieved. The Balkenende II cabinet wanted to get rid of the standstill promise that was made by the Kok II cabinet and for this the Schiphol Act was to be changed. The conclusions of the research reports of the NLR (2002) and RIVM (2002) that were marginalized during the decision making about the new Act were now used to argue against the standstill. The new Secretary of State of VROM (Van Geel, PvdA) even criticized the former cabinet for including the standstill for Group Risk in the Schiphol Act.¹³⁸⁵ According to him, it had been clear during the political debate about the new Act that such a standstill was by no means feasible. Both the increase of flight movements and the continuation of constructing new buildings on the airport territory and adjoining territories had not been taken seriously into account by the

¹³⁸² Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

¹³⁸³ VACS (2006), Advice to the minister of Transportation, October 2nd 2006; Interview Ale / Safety Expert and member Schiphol EIA Committee, 2009.

¹³⁸⁴ Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

¹³⁸⁵ TK 23552, Nr.83.

decision makers. Moreover, he also criticized the assumption that the new causal model would make the standstill possible, using the same arguments as the VACS had already been posing for several years.

In the subsequent political discussion in the Lower House the Secretary of State even stated that a political compromise was forged knowingly and willingly back in 2002, while the participants had to know that a standstill was out of the question.¹³⁸⁶ ¹³⁸⁷ He actually went so far as to actually blame the former cabinet for including the standstill and basing this decision on a new model with unknown effects.¹³⁸⁸ The Secretary of State regretted the fact that no proper assessment had been carried out at that time in order to determine the actual feasibility of the standstill for GR. In the end, the former cabinet had left him with no other choice than to let go of the standstill for Group Risk. He concluded that the standstill for GR had to be replaced by an alternative policy framework for dealing with GR. Such a change of policy was in line with the new directions for dealing with GR in general, as set out by the advisory Councils of VROM and V&W in their joint advice of 2003.¹³⁸⁹ In this joint advice the Councils had argued for an area-based approach. Such an approach would make it possible to localize those areas with (too) high third party risks, and develop location specific spatial measures for them.

As regards the statistical causal model the Secretary of State argued that the development was to be continued. The value of the model was beyond doubt, as it increased the insights in the factors that influenced safety levels. However, the link with developing a norm for Group Risk that could be used for assessing the standstill that had been carefully forged to speed up political decision making in 2002 had been broken.¹³⁹⁰ The further discussion about GR was to continue alongside two lines. First, the Ministry of VROM was in charge of developing alternative GR policy, and second, the Ministry of V&W was in charge of developing a causal model. There was no need to evaluate the standstill of Group Risk anymore, as it would get removed from the Schiphol Act. Thus, the standstill for third party risks was then only to be measured in terms of the IR 10^{-6} contour. As indicated before, based on this criterion, the cabinet could conclude that the standstill was being achieved and that the new regulative system offered an equivalent level of protection against safety risks as the old one would have done. However, not everyone was pleased about the way wherein the promises as regards Group Risk were being changed.

¹³⁸⁶ TK 23552, November 25th, 2003, Nr.84.

¹³⁸⁷ See also Trouw (2003), Schiphol, knollen voor citroenen. October 30th 2003.

¹³⁸⁸ TK 23552, Nr. 83/84.

¹³⁸⁹ Raad voor VROM & Raad voor V&W (2003), Verantwoorde risico's, veilige ruimte. Advies 037, June 2003.

¹³⁹⁰ TK 23552, November 25th, 2003, Nr.84.

Reactions to removing the standstill for Group Risk

During the political debate about this change of direction the Lower House criticized the decision-making process. At the same time, most political parties agreed that the most important thing was to find suitable measures to minimize risks, and that setting a GR norm was not the right way to do just this.¹³⁹¹ The aviation sector was very pleased about the new direction the debate was taking. The new policy direction opened the door for them to rejoin the development of the causal model. The VACS too was pleased about the decision to cut loose the link between the causal model and the GR. But the VACS also suggested to implement a temporary interim-policy to prevent further increase of the GR.¹³⁹² The Minister rejected this latter option, stating that the new regulative system already contained more severe restrictions than the old one (i.e. the additional appointments about spatial restrictions that former Minister of VROM - Pronk - had made with the region in 2001), and that the introduction of new restrictions was undesirable from the perspective of further mainport development.¹³⁹³

The environmental parties and several grassroots organizations were less pleased with the decisions. To them, the promise of a standstill for GR had been one of the very few safeguards against unfettered growth of aviation after the PKB had been replaced by the Schiphol Act.¹³⁹⁴ Therefore, they initiated a juridical procedure to fight the political decision to let go of the standstill principle.¹³⁹⁵ The environmental parties argued that the Schiphol Act clearly contained the promise that the cabinet would develop a statistical causal model before the end of 2005, from which a norm for Group Risk was to be derived. Fortunately for the cabinet, the original amendment in which it had been stated that the causal model was to be ready in 2005¹³⁹⁶ had been replaced during the political debate of 2001 by the phrase that the model was to be ready in 2005 *if possible*.¹³⁹⁷ This implied that there was no legal obligation to develop the model and deliver it in 2005, only an intention to do so. In its final ruling, the Court decided that it was legal to change the Act and thus to cross out the standstill for GR. But it was also stated that the cabinet needed to put additional efforts in developing a causal model and an alternative policy framework for GR.¹³⁹⁸ In the remainder of this paragraph we discuss both policy debates in more detail.

¹³⁹¹ TK 26959, November 17th 2003, Nr.54 & TK 26959, November 25th 2003, Nr. 57.

¹³⁹² VACS (2003), Advice to the minister of Transportation, December 16th 2003.

¹³⁹³ TK 26959, May 25th 2004, Nr. 68.

¹³⁹⁴ Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007; Interview Van Arendonk / Miliefederatie Noord Holland, 2008.

¹³⁹⁵ Van den Biesen, A.H.J. (2004), Pleitnotitie standstill Groepsrisico. January 22nd 2004.

¹³⁹⁶ TK 27603, October 18th 2001, Nr. 62.

¹³⁹⁷ Amendment Te Veldhuis, TK 27603, October 18th 2001, Nr.63.

¹³⁹⁸ Rechtbank Den Haag (2004), Vonnis in kort geding van 4 februari 2004. Nr. KG 03/143.

8.7.3 Towards an area based approach for dealing with Group Risk (2004- 2006)

The evaluation program was changed, in line with the changed Schiphol Act that became operative on December 7th 2005. Instead of establishing a standstill for GR the Ministries of V&W and VROM would conduct an ex ante evaluation of the alternatives for new area-based group risk policy. The evaluation was to be finished before February 20th 2006, so the results could be used during the development of the Cabinet's Perspective about the short, mid and long term of Schiphol that was scheduled for April 2006.¹³⁹⁹

In order to develop an adequate area-based approach for GR the real levels of Group Risk needed to be known. Most experts had known for a long time that the real effects (of noise and safety) were spread over a much larger area than the area to which the Schiphol policies applied.¹⁴⁰⁰ Assessing the real effects included an actualization of the spatial maps that were used, since the maps of 1990 left out all the new houses, offices and industrial sites that had been developed afterwards. Thus, there was an urgent need to update the file with spatial programs that was used as input data. The removal of the standstill requirement actually made it possible to assess the real effects. In a way, it was not 'dangerous' anymore to take other areas into account that would show that risks were much higher than had initially been presumed, as it would not have direct consequences for further airport development.¹⁴⁰¹

Assessing the real Group Risks

The NLR and the RIVM were assigned to determine how the GR around Schiphol had really evolved ever since 1990.¹⁴⁰² First of all, they concluded that the GR had doubled by 2005, when compared to 1990 levels.¹⁴⁰³ Both the increase of air traffic and the construction of new buildings were to blame for this. It was expected that the GR wouldn't increase much in between 2005 – 2010, due to the rather low traffic growth expectations and the additional spatial measures that had been developed. Furthermore, a more detailed approach was applied that made it possible to develop an area based approach to GR. The new methodology used made it possible to calculate the level of GR for specific 100 x 100 meters areas. Previously, the GR was merely calculated for the entire zone 56 x 56 km zone, by adding up all accident probabilities, resulting in the probability of a specific number of victims. Such an approach did not distinguish

¹³⁹⁹ As taken up in the new article XVI of the revised Schiphol Act, December 2005.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Interview Dassen / MNP, 2007.

¹⁴⁰¹ As we have seen, things were different as regards noise. Here the focus was still on the limited policy area largely ignoring the noise pollution outside this zone (i.e. the outer area).

¹⁴⁰² RIVM & NLR (2005), Ontwikkeling van het groepsrisico rond Schiphol 1990 – 2010. Nr. 620100004/2005 by Post, J.G., E.S. Kooi & J. Weijts.

¹⁴⁰³ More specifically, for N>10 it doubled, for N>40 the chance is tripled, while for N>200 it has increased with a factor of 10.

between areas with high risks and areas with low risks (i.e. it resulted in one overall number for GR). Thus, the new method allowed for the development of a far more detailed perspective on the distribution of GR, making it possible to localize the areas with the highest GR. After all, some areas contained a high density of offices, houses and other functions with high concentrations of people, while other areas contained mere pasturelands. It became clear that a large part of the increase of the GR was to be attributed to a relatively small set of 100 x 100 meters areas around the airport: 90% of the GR was located within 3% of the area.¹⁴⁰⁴ The Ministry of VROM had announced that those hotspots were the focal points for developing an area-based approach. Additional spatial planning measures were to be developed for those spots (i.e. no high densities constructions at those hotspots).¹⁴⁰⁵ Parallel to the assessment of the GR evolution possibilities for an area-based approach were explored in more detail.

Exploring the feasibility of an area-based approach

The RIVM was assigned to assess the feasibility of an area-based approach. In the research a municipal perspective was adopted to answer the question of how different local risks related to one another and how one was to visualize the change in societal risk when new spatial plans were being realized.¹⁴⁰⁶ It was concluded that this approach offered good opportunities for an area-specific approach for dealing with GR. At the same time, a consultant carried out another research project, assessing the managerial feasibility of the area-based approach.¹⁴⁰⁷ In the report, the regional authorities were asked to reflect upon the practical value of the new area-based approach. It was concluded that there was a lot of support in the region for an improved, more area-specific approach that was to build upon the spatial restrictions developed in 2001 – 2003. Several local authorities indicated that the existing zones with building restrictions were too rigid to safeguard an adequate spatial planning. This was in line with the proposals for improvement of the regulative system that the BRS partners had submitted during the evaluation program. One of these proposals was about enhancing possibilities for making trade offs between different spatial claims on the local level.¹⁴⁰⁸ Besides, it was not clear to many municipalities whether or not the appointments about spatial restrictions that had been made in November 2001 were legally binding or not.¹⁴⁰⁹ Back then, it had been agreed upon that these appointments were to be included in

¹⁴⁰⁴ RIVM & NLR (2005), *Ontwikkeling van het groepsrisico rond Schiphol 1990 – 2010*. Nr. 620100004/2005 by Post, J.G., E.S. Kooi & J. Weijts.

¹⁴⁰⁵ See also Ministry of VROM (2004) *Vierde voortgangsrapportage externe veiligheidsbeleid*. The Hague, p.5; Interview Dassen / MNP, 2007.

¹⁴⁰⁶ RIVM (2005), *Groepsrisico en gebiedsgerichte benadering*. Nr. 620002001/2005 by Vliet, A.A.C. van, E.S. Kooi & J.G. Post.

¹⁴⁰⁷ *Beleidsonderzoek en Advies* (2005), *Advies Vernieuwing Groepsrisicobeleid Schiphol vanuit een bestuurlijk perspectief*. Den Haag, April 21st 2005, by Anne van Galen.

¹⁴⁰⁸ BRS (2005), Letter to the Ministry of Transportation about the evaluation, June 2005.

¹⁴⁰⁹ See chapter 7 for an overview. See also TK 26959, November 2001, Nr.19.

the Fifth Memorandum on Spatial Planning (i.e. the successor of the Fourth Memorandum of 1989 and the Fourth Memorandum Extra of 1994). However, this Memorandum was never formally published. Instead, it had been replaced by the *Nota Ruimte* (2004), in which less detailed appointments were laid down (see 8.2). The municipalities therefore deemed it important to clarify the legal status of the appointments. Finally, the municipalities also argued for more clarity about responsibilities. It was not clear whether the national government was responsible for dealing with Group Risks, or the regional and local authorities, or a mix of them. In the end it was concluded that the municipalities and the province supported the development of an alternative area-based approach to GR, as long as a clear division of roles and tasks between the different governmental levels was included.¹⁴¹⁰

Ex ante evaluation of policy options as regards dealing with Group Risk

The cabinet decided to initiate an ex-ante policy evaluation for GR alternatives, based on the insights of these three aforementioned studies. The results of the evaluation would serve as important input for the Cabinet's Perspective on the development of Schiphol that was scheduled for 2006.¹⁴¹¹ In the plan of approach of the ex ante evaluation the assignment was presented, and three research questions were posed:¹⁴¹²

1. Within which areas were GR measures possible and effective?
2. Which steering model was to apply (i.e. who is responsible for what)?
3. How could measures on the airside influence the GR and how was this taken up in existing Schiphol policy?

There was not much time left for the evaluation, which implied that the development of policy scenarios and the assessment of relevant effects co-evolved.¹⁴¹³ The ex-ante evaluation was carried out by a consultant, Twynstra & Gudde, directed by policy makers of both the Ministries of VROM and V&W, and assisted by the RIVM, who provided the technical input. Moreover, the research was carried out in close cooperation with the regional public authorities (amongst others the municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer and the Province of North Holland – the core group of the BRS, which were all interviewed and which all participated in round-table

¹⁴¹⁰ Beleidsonderzoek en Advies (2005), Advies Vernieuwing Groepsrisicobeleid Schiphol vanuit een bestuurlijk perspectief. Den Haag, April 21st 2005, by Anne van Galen.

¹⁴¹¹ TK 29665, February 15th 2006, Nr.25.

¹⁴¹² TK 26959, June 1st 2005, Nr 96.

¹⁴¹³ Ministeries van V&W & VROM (2005), Plan van aanpak ex ante beleidsevaluatie groepsrisico in relatie tot Schiphol, mei 2005, p.7.

discussions). The CROS and VACS were kept informed, and the ideas of VACS were included during the research.¹⁴¹⁴

It was concluded that there was no support from the regional actors for more stringent spatial measures other than those that had already been developed in 2001, which applied to the areas within the 10^{-7} zone (recall the BRS proposals during the evaluation). However, there was support for local-specific measures in between the 10^{-7} and 10^{-8} zone, in order to prevent further increase of GR farther away from the airport. This was important, as the RIVM had calculated that imposing additional restrictions for building offices in the 10^{-8} area would significantly reduce GR. In the final report it was recommended to fully implement the spatial measures of 2001, to create additional measures for the hotspots outside the 10^{-7} area and to make sure that new measures were based on the mix of measures already in place in the spatial policies of the regional authorities (i.e. the regional actors had indicated that they thought such an approach was most effective).¹⁴¹⁵ As we shall see later, these recommendations were by and large taken over by the cabinet, when presenting its Perspective in April 2006 (in 8.9). Here we already mention the cabinet's intention to insert additional spatial restrictions for the 10^{-7} contour (see figure 8.12).

Figure 8.12 Indication of additional restrictions for companies (2006)



Source: Cabinet's Perspective (2006), p.36

¹⁴¹⁴ Twynstra & Gudde (2006), Groepsrisicobeleid Schiphol: Onderzoek naar beleidsalternatieven, J.A. ter Avest, J.M. Groenendijk, J. Kalfsbeek, G.J. Meijer, February 7th 2006.

¹⁴¹⁵ Twynstra & Gudde (2006), Groepsrisicobeleid Schiphol: Onderzoek naar beleidsalternatieven, J.A. ter Avest, J.M. Groenendijk, J. Kalfsbeek, G.J. Meijer, February 7th 2006.

8.7.4. Developing a statistical causal model

Before the development of the model could be resumed, the sector parties had to be persuaded to regain participation. As discussed, the link that was politically forged between the causal model and the norm for GR had made the sector decide to step out of the project (only 2 years after they had agreed to participate in 2000). The broken link between the causal model and the norm for Group Risk had opened the door for renewed participation. Of course, the aviation sector had an important incentive to participate, since there was much to gain for them.¹⁴¹⁶ Furthermore, the judge had ruled that a causal model was to be developed as soon as possible, which meant an extra incentive for all parties to join hands. Nonetheless, it was already clear that the development of the model would take more time than had initially been expected (finalization in 2005).¹⁴¹⁷

Linking the model to the development of Integrated Safety Management System

In May 2005 the Ministry of V&W presented its Aviation Safety Policy Agenda, setting out the different safety issues that were to be addressed during 2005 – 2010.¹⁴¹⁸ The new agenda was the successor of the Nota Civil Aviation Safety of 1997, and it was developed in close cooperation with the sector parties (Schiphol Group, several large airline companies, most notably AirFrance/KLM, Air Traffic Control) and other related departments. The agenda was based on the overall perspective of the national government on safety. In terms of aviation the challenge was to make sure that further growth of traffic volumes would not increase risks of accidents and incidents.¹⁴¹⁹ A more integrated approach for aviation safety was deemed necessary for this, encompassing the entire chain of checking in, taxiing, taking-off, flying, landing, taxiing, checking out. Different actors were responsible for different aspects of safety, but anno 2005 there still was no proper coordination between all those separate elements, despite the various calls that had been made for improving this coordination. For example, the development of an IVMS (*Integraal Veiligheids Management Systeem* = Integrated Safety Management System) had already been one of the recommendations of the research report of RAND Europe that was issued immediately after the Bijlmer disaster (see chapter 6). Thereafter, the point had been repeated several times by both researchers and the VACS, but with very little effect.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 gave the IVMS a new political boost, as security measures became an important aspect of safety in civil aviation. Furthermore, the development of the causal model was seen as an important means to gain insights in the interfaces

¹⁴¹⁶ See Hale, A. (2000) on this.

¹⁴¹⁷ TK 23552, Nr. 84.

¹⁴¹⁸ TK 24804, May 2nd 2005, Nr. 28.

¹⁴¹⁹ Ministry of V&W, Veiligheidsagenda Luchtvaart 2005-2010. The Hague, p.8.

between the different parts that made up the whole system,¹⁴²⁰ something the VACS also emphasized.¹⁴²¹ This was just one of the reasons to continue with the development of the statistical causal model. More specifically, by linking the IVMS (that was very much desired by the aviation sector parties) to the development of the statistical causal model, the interest of the aviation sector in supporting the development of the model was renewed (as the sector had much to gain from the IVMS that would considerably improve safety levels). Moreover, by stating that the causal model was to be used for management purposes only, the aviation sector agreed to participate again.¹⁴²² The sector was to be involved in the constant monitoring of the results, and the management of the project, and they were responsible for important input data.¹⁴²³ The research project was called CATS (Causal Model for Air Transport Safety) and NLR, that was also part of the consortium, was assigned to do most of the modelling (in cooperation with experts from other countries, like the US, UK, Germany and France).¹⁴²⁴

Focusing on the IVMS

The policy debate as regards aviation safety was now revolving around the development of an IVMS. The development of safety standards on the national level was very much conditioned by the standards set on the international level. Approx. 90% of aviation safety policy was a direct translation and implementation of ICAO standards (International Civil Aviation Organisation), EU policy, EASA (European Aviation Safety Agency) policy and Eurcontrol policy. Within this context, the Ministry of V&W initiated the Safety Research program Dutch Aviation (*Veiligheidsonderzoek luchtvaart Nederland*, VON), covering aspects of the entire aviation chain in the Netherlands. Specific research was conducted to discern measures for improving safety levels at Schiphol. A consultant was hired (K+V) to do the research and the results were presented in May 2005.¹⁴²⁵ The report contained several recommendations for improving the safety situation at Schiphol. One of the main conclusions was that most actors involved in the aviation sector already tried to optimize safety levels, but that proper coordination between the actors was often lacking. The VACS, who was closely involved in the framing and monitoring of the research, once more marked this coordinative effort as one of the most important future tasks. According to the VACS, extending the scope and improving the coordination within a specially designed Safety platform Schiphol (*Veiligheids platform Schiphol*, VPS) were needed.¹⁴²⁶

¹⁴²⁰ Ministry of V&W, *Veiligheidsagenda Luchtvaart 2005-2010*. The Hague, p.1.

¹⁴²¹ VACS (2005), *Advice to the Minister of Transportation*, September 6th 2005.

¹⁴²² Interview Ale / safety expert, 2009.

¹⁴²³ TK 24804, November 8th 2005, Nr. 36.

¹⁴²⁴ Ministry of V&W (2005), *Proceedings Policy Agenda Airport Safety 2005*.

¹⁴²⁵ K+V (2005), *Veiligheidsonderzoek Schiphol*, 2005.

¹⁴²⁶ VACS (2005), *Advice to the minister of Transportation*, September 6th 2005, p.3.

In a response to the K+V research report and the VACS advice, the ministry of V&W took up the responsibility to improve the coordination between the different parts. They announced that they were going to manage the interfaces to improve the overall safety level in the entire aviation chain as regards Schiphol.¹⁴²⁷ In 2006 the results of the VON were published and one of the main conclusions was that the national government did not adequately coordinate all the different elements of the safety chain on the level of civil aviation in the Netherlands (including Schiphol, but also other airports and non-civil/military air traffic). Of course, all different actors were responsible for their own parts, but the need to integrate all these individual pieces was seen as a prime governmental task. In a response, the ministry repeated its ambition to improve coordination.¹⁴²⁸ One of the main problems of the new systematic was the difficulty of obtaining the right data. For example, safety levels could only be improved when incidents were actually reported. However, the people involved in incidents were reluctant to report them, since they were basically admitting their own mistakes or those of direct colleagues.¹⁴²⁹ Therefore, it was likely that most incidents were never reported. If air traffic controllers or inspectors of the Ministry of V&W were lucky enough to find out about them, it would be impossible to recover their nature and cause. In order to deal with this difficult situation it was decided that a special Act was to be developed, meant to protect the people who brought the incidents to light (i.e. reports would be dealt with in a confidential way). It was emphasized that the learning effect was most important, and that the data would not be used to actually punish individuals who were causing the incidents.

8.7.5. Final outcomes Group Risk

The different policy trajectories delivered input for the Cabinet’s Perspective on the future of Schiphol. The removal of the standstill for Group Risk, the insights about an area based approach and the development of an IVMS (for which the causal model that was still being developed could deliver useful insights) were the main outcomes of the different policy trajectories. It remained to be seen which recommendations the cabinet would include in its final perspective.

8.8. Finding suitable Housing Locations

	2003 - 2006
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006	
	Long term (PMS) – 8.3
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9

¹⁴²⁷ TK 24804, November 8th 2005, Nr. 36.
¹⁴²⁸ See TK 24804, February 7th, 2007, Nr. 42.
¹⁴²⁹ Interview Beemster / Transavia, 2005; Interview Van Eenige / Inspection Ministry V&W / 2005; Interview Gooijer / Martinair, 2005; Interview Temme / Pilot-IVW, 2005; Interview De Vries / KLM, 2005.

8.3 – 8.9	8.4	Preparing the evaluation	
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation	Equivalence – 8.5.1
			Effectiveness – 8.5.2
			Proposals – 8.5.3
			Advices – 8.5.4
			CDV – 8.5.5
			Evaluation Report – 8.5.6
	8.6	Night Fights	
	8.7	Group Risk	
	8.8	Housing locations	
	Cabinet's Perspective – 8.9		
			2007
			2008
			2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009			Short term < 2010) – 8.10
8.10 – 8.11			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11
Long term 2006 – 2009			Long term > 2025 – 8.12
8.12			

Finally, the need for sufficient suitable housing locations was also part of the evaluation program (see 8.2). In the White Paper on Spatial Development of 2004 (i.e. *Nota Ruimte*) the cabinet had argued that no new houses were to be build within the 20Ke zone (Schiphol's outer area). Next to the 20Ke contour, three exclusion areas adjoining the 20Ke zone were designated in the White Paper on Spatial Development where no new extended locations for housing construction (or industrial sites) were to be developed: Hoofddorp West (1), Noordwijkerhout (2) and Legmeerpolder (3) (recall figure 8.1).

During the evaluation it was to be assessed whether or not it was necessary to enforce the construction bans at those three locations. Based on the evaluation of the Schiphol policy the cabinet decided to continue the bans on Legmeerpolder (3) and Noordwijkerhout (2), as a consequence of high noise levels in the present (Legmeerpolder) and maybe in the near future (Noordwijkerhout). However, the ban on Hoofddorp-West (1) was removed by the cabinet. This implied that in between 4000 – 8000 houses could be built here, which was important for the province and municipalities as it enabled them to live up to the housing needs in the area. The cabinet set one precondition: potential buyers of the new houses were to be thoroughly informed about the noise pollution. This was intended to make sure that the new residents had made the conscious choice to live near a flight path.¹⁴³⁰

¹⁴³⁰ Cabinet (2006), Kabinetsstandpunt, p.37.

At the same time, the Ministry of VROM had asked the province of North Holland whether it was possible to build approx. 30,000 new houses in the vicinity of Schiphol in the upcoming years.¹⁴³¹ After an arduous process it was concluded that this was possible, although the Hoofddorp-West location was needed for this.¹⁴³² The province was therefore very happy about the choice to remove the housing ban for Hoofddorp-west, as were the municipalities involved (e.g. Haarlemmermeer).¹⁴³³ From their perspective, the housing ban had been unnecessarily restrictive. They too argued that a proper provision of information to potential buyers would be more effective than a construction ban.¹⁴³⁴

8.9 The Cabinet’s Perspective

2003 - 2006				
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006	Long term (PMS) – 8.3			
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9			
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation		
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation	Equivalence – 8.5.1	
			Effectiveness – 8.5.2	
			Proposals – 8.5.3	
			Advices – 8.5.4	
			CDV – 8.5.5	
		Evaluation Report – 8.5.6		
	8.6	Night Fights		
	8.7	Group Risk		
8.8	Housing locations			
Cabinet’s Perspective – 8.9				
		2007	2008	2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009		Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
8.10 – 8.11			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11	
Long term 2006 – 2009		Long term > 2025 – 8.12		
8.12				

In February 2006 all the different policy trajectories that were part of the extensive evaluation program had come to an end. The results of all these different processes served as input for the Cabinet’s Perspective on the short, mid and long term future of Schiphol that the project committee MEIS was preparing. A special writing committee was installed. The writing process turned out to be extremely complex, due to the

¹⁴³¹ Interview Bossink / Policy maker of the province of North Holland, 2007.
¹⁴³² Province of North Holland (2006), Gebiedsuitwerking Haarlemmermeer-Bollenstreek, Summary, p.2.
¹⁴³³ Interview Bossink / Policy maker of the province of North Holland, 2007.
¹⁴³⁴ See also Ministry of V&W and Ministry of VROM (2006), Evaluatie Schipholbeleid. Eindrapport, 2006.p.57.

difficulties of integrating the enormous amount of (highly technical) information that had been produced during the past three years.¹⁴³⁵ Moreover, it was the first time that several of the different policy trajectories were actively linked together, which caused some additional complications. For example, according to a policy maker of the Ministry of EZ the project committee had little idea what to do with the results of the Project Mainport Schiphol (PMS - about the long term, see 8.3).¹⁴³⁶ During the writing process the Ministry of V&W was in charge. The main policy makers of this ministry had frequent meetings with the Secretary of State of the Ministry V&W in order to discuss the proceedings.¹⁴³⁷

At the same time, the policy makers of the other Ministries felt that they were being sidelined more and more. A policy maker of the Ministry of VROM indicated that she wasn't invited for meetings anymore, or she suspected that meetings were deliberately planned at times that she was unable to attend.¹⁴³⁸ Policy makers of the Ministry of EZ were also marginally included during the writing process.¹⁴³⁹ Other actors too did not have many opportunities for influencing the report. Of course, the usual lobbies of the environmental parties, the other public authorities and the aviation sector were starting up as political decision making was crouching near. For example, the environmental party SNM sent a letter to the Secretary of State of the Ministry of VROM.¹⁴⁴⁰ In this letter they asked the Secretary to focus on selective growth (instead of maximum growth) and to put efforts in the design of an improved noise system that actually worked to regulate growth, protect people and stimulate innovation.¹⁴⁴¹ Other actors adopted similar strategies, but in the end the Cabinet's Perspective was mainly developed by the Ministry of V&W, in close cooperation with the Secretary of State.¹⁴⁴² From the perspective of the Ministry of V&W this was not strange at all. After all, they were in charge of the process and they had most people available to actually write the report. Moreover, the input for the report had been gathered in a highly interactive process, thus reflecting the many different interests and perceptions involved.¹⁴⁴³ In the remainder of this paragraph we subsequently discuss the content of the Perspective (8.9.1), the reactions of stakeholders that the perspective evoked (8.9.2.), the political debate about the Cabinet's Perspective (8.9.3) and the changing policy strategy of the

¹⁴³⁵ Interview Gosse / Former policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009; Interview Wulffraat / Former policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2007.

¹⁴³⁶ Interview Van Putten / Policy maker Ministry of EZ, 2007.

¹⁴³⁷ Interview Gosse / Former policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009.

¹⁴³⁸ Interview Lap / Former policy maker of Ministry of VROM, 2007.

¹⁴³⁹ Interview Van Putten / Policy maker Ministry of EZ, 2007.

¹⁴⁴⁰ SNM, (2006), Letter to the State Secretary P. van Geel 'Verbeteren geluidsnormenstelsel en andere geluidsbeperkende instrumenten'. March 31st 2006.

¹⁴⁴¹ See also SNM, (2006), Press Release 'Kabinet moet streven naar selectieve groei'. April 21st 2006.

¹⁴⁴² Of course, it was not possible to reconstruct the private phone calls etc. that were surely made at that time, as always prior to important political decisions.

¹⁴⁴³ Interview Gosse / Former policy maker of the Ministry of V&W, 2009.

cabinet that resulted from the many criticisms and the political debate (8.9.4). The paragraph is ended with a short summary of the main outcomes of the policy period 2003 – 2006 (8.9.5).

8.9.1. The Cabinet's Perspective (April 2006)

On 25th of April the Perspective, also referred to as White Paper Schiphol, was presented to the Lower House.¹⁴⁴⁴ It contained the perspective of the cabinet on the short, mid and long term future development of Schiphol. The cabinet emphasized that contributions of many parties, including committees, advisory councils, planning offices, municipalities, provinces, interest groups, local residents and many others had been used during the development of the perspective.¹⁴⁴⁵ The main conclusions were not very surprising to most actors involved. In essence, the cabinet indicated the intention to continue the enactment of the dual objective during the short, mid and long term. First of all, the cabinet wanted to maintain Schiphol's position as a major hub in northwest Europe, by ensuring sufficient room for further development of Schiphol. Second, the cabinet wanted to curb the negative external effects, especially noise pollution, and particularly in the area farther away from the airport where most people lived who suffered from air traffic (the outer areas).¹⁴⁴⁶ Together, both objectives would contribute to further mainport development, where the mainport was defined as 'an airport that serves as a hub – a junction where many national, European and intercontinental connections converge' and a large metropolitan area with a high-standard housing, living and business climate where many companies compete in international networks of production and consumption and where many people live, work and enjoy recreational activities.'¹⁴⁴⁷ The cabinet argued that this perspective was in line with the national spatial-economic strategy that the cabinet had set out earlier in the three major White Papers about Spatial Planning (*Nota Ruimte*), Mobility (*Nota Mobiliteit*) and Economy (*Nota Pieken in de Delta*) (see 8.2).

Thus, the further enactment of the dual objective served as the backbone of the Cabinet's Perspective. In the white paper the cabinet concluded that the old and new regulative system offered similar levels of protection. At the same time, the cabinet asserted that the evaluation process had pointed out that there was considerable room for improvement, i.e. for creating a more effective regulative system. This was also deemed desirable, as the total capacity that had been assumed when drawing up the Schiphol Act of 2003 could not be fully utilized. The main reason given for this were derived from the results of the evaluation, i.e. different flight routes and runway use

¹⁴⁴⁴ TK 29665, April 25th 2006, Nr.28.


¹⁴⁴⁵ Cabinet (2006), White Paper Schiphol Policy. The Hague, p.1.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Cabinet (2006), White Paper Schiphol Policy. The Hague, p.5.

¹⁴⁴⁷ Cabinet (2006), White Paper Schiphol Policy. The Hague, p.9.

were implemented in practice than had initially been assumed. The result was that noise limits in some enforcement points were (nearly) exceeded, while a lot of spare room was left in other points (see fig. 8.13 for this mismatch). Moreover, the tight rules about flight paths, and ascending and descending procedures also hampered the introduction of new measures to reduce noise hindrance. This had never been the cabinet's intention, and they therefore announced to amend these policy instruments. Three important actions for the short term (until 2010) were announced.

Figure 8.13 Enforcement points and the degree of limit values reached in 2005



Source: Cabinet's Perspective (2006), p.29

1. The cabinet wanted to make 'compensatory balancing' (*salderen*) between noise enforcement points possible, in order to increase capacity. In practice, this implied that enforcement points could be exceeded with a maximum of 1 dB(A) as long as this was compensated by a lower rate of at least 1dB(A) in another point. During the preparation of the White Paper this solution popped up in the writing committee.¹⁴⁴⁸ Next, they immediately assigned the research consultant To70 to carry out a first exploration of the effects of this measure. In the final report of March 31st 2006, it was concluded that this measure would enhance capacity with 60,000 flights, to approx. 520,000 – 530,000 on yearly basis.¹⁴⁴⁹ The amount of seriously hindered people was expected to increase with a maximum of 5%, which was still below the amount that was legally required. However, in order to make 'compensatory balancing' possible, the prevailing Schiphol Act needed to be

¹⁴⁴⁸ Interview De Waard / Policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009; Interview Vinckx / inhouse researcher Ministry of V&W/To70, 2009.

¹⁴⁴⁹ To70 (2006), *Saldering tussen Handhavingspunten: Effecten op Capaciteit en hinder*. March 31st 2006, p.3.

revised. The sector was therefore asked to initiate a new EIA procedure, which was legally required when changing the Aviation Act. In essence, the introduction of compensatory balancing implied only a minor revision of the existing regulative system for noise.

2. The cabinet wanted to develop a covenant in cooperation with the aviation sector (Schiphol, Air Traffic Control and the airlines, especially AF/KLM), in which firm and enforceable measures for reducing noise nuisance were drawn up.¹⁴⁵⁰ The measures that the cabinet had in mind included technological innovation, quieter flight procedures (e.g. introducing continuous descent approaches, *glijvluchten*) and fewer flight paths over residential areas (e.g. reroute them over the sea). The measures were meant to reduce noise nuisance as much as possible, especially in the outer areas.
3. The cabinet deemed that it was desirable to be able to first test the effects of the new measures in practice, before translating them into legally binding regulations (that would be difficult to change). During the evaluation process the CROS had asked to create the possibility of experimenting with new flight routes. In a response, the cabinet and the CROS had already been preparing a special Act (*Experimenteerwet* – Act for Experimenting) that would legalize a temporary exceeding of limits in enforcement points when new measures were tested that could potentially improve the quality of the living environment (e.g. by reducing the levels of noise pollution involved).^{1451 1452} Hitherto it had only been possible to deviate from the legal rules for flights and runway use when ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were at stake.¹⁴⁵³ With the new Act it would become possible to experiment.¹⁴⁵⁴

With regard to the mid term (2010 – 2015) it was assumed that further measures for enhancing capacity (at least to 600,000) and reducing noise pollution were to be implemented. With regard to the long term (until 2030) it was assumed that the capacity limits of the existing runway configuration (i.e. the physical capacity) and revised regulative system (i.e. the environmental capacity) would be reached. Therefore, the Schiphol Group was asked to explore possibilities for creating additional capacity by expanding the runway system (by adding a 6th runway) or by diverting part of the air traffic to other airports (developing a multi-airport system). Since the creation of additional capacity was expected to take a considerable amount of time, the cabinet wanted to start a new policy trajectory for the long term as soon as possible.¹⁴⁵⁵

¹⁴⁵⁰ Cabinet (2006), White Paper Schiphol Policy. The Hague, p.6.

¹⁴⁵¹ TK 29665, February 24th 2006, Nr.26.

¹⁴⁵² Interview Tan / Former Secretary CROS, 2010.

¹⁴⁵³ Schiphol Act (2003), See Article 8.23a.

¹⁴⁵⁴ TK 30809, Nr. 1- 5.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Cabinet (2006), White Paper Schiphol Policy. The Hague, p.7.

With regard to the other issues that had been on the agenda the following decisions were made.

- The earlier decision to not extend the night regime from 6 AM to 7 AM was repeated. During the creation of the covenant additional measures for reducing nightly noise annoyance were to be developed;
- The recommendations of the CDV for implementing a monitoring system for noise in the outer areas by introducing additional enforcement points and by combining measurement and calculations were not taken over by the cabinet. According to the cabinet, additional enforcement points in the outer areas merely provided local information, but didn't contribute to actually reduce noise pollution. Instead, in the covenant measures were to be taken up for reducing nuisance in the outer areas;¹⁴⁵⁶
- The TVG (Total Volume of Noise) did not turn out to be a proper tool for total noise nuisance (i.e. it did not offer any specific protection for local residents and it did not indicate the amount of people exposed to noise). Therefore, the cabinet decided to get rid of the TVG;¹⁴⁵⁷
- As regards third party risks the cabinet stressed that the spatial measures were functioning well, but that the TRG, which was also not deemed effective, needed to be replaced by a more effective norm that could contribute to the protection of local residents;
- As regards GR (Group Risk) it was stated that the zone with building restrictions was to be extended from 10^{-6} to 10^{-7} and that outside the 10^{-7} zone area-specific measures were to be implemented, in line with the new area-based approach that had been developed. It was also announced that the appointments made in 2001 between the Ministry of VROM and the regional public authorities would finally be laid down in law. Thus explicating their status by giving them a legal status. Next, the need for additional research for developing the area-specific measures and for assessing possibilities for reducing GR (like changing flight routes and improving internal safety (reducing the probability of accidents) were stressed;
- As regards local air pollution, the cabinet wanted to get rid of the limiting values for the emissions. Reducing air pollution was not something that could be arranged by means of national Schiphol policy, or so it was argued. Instead, a more broad climate plan, the Air Quality decision or the European Directives on national emission ceilings were the suitable means here. Nonetheless, the cabinet did ask the aviation sector to develop an air quality action program;¹⁴⁵⁸
- With regard to spatial development the existing policies were to be continued, despite several municipal complained about its inflexibility. The cabinet wanted to

¹⁴⁵⁶ Cabinet (2006), White Paper Schiphol Policy. The Hague, p.45.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Cabinet (2006), White Paper Schiphol Policy. The Hague, p.34.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Cabinet (2006), White Paper Schiphol Policy. The Hague, p.35.

make sure that no, or as little as possible, constructions were to take place in areas that contained bans as a consequence of noise and third party risk contours;

- The cabinet decided to enforce two out of the three construction bans for large-scale constructions that had been introduced in the white paper on Spatial Planning (*Nota Ruimte*). Building was still prohibited at Legmeerpolder and Noordwijkerhout (recall figure 8.1). However, with regard to the third area, Hoofddorp West, new housing would be allowed;¹⁴⁵⁹
- With regard to the many proposals that had been submitted for improving the regulative system the cabinet merely stated that several of the proposals were useful for realizing the dual objectives, without actually pointing out which proposals it concerned. In the upcoming years, the effects of these proposals were to be assessed, resulting in possible agreements about which proposals to implement (for example, by including them in the covenant that was to be developed);
- Finally it was announced that the criteria for assessing equivalence needed to be updated in order to assess the real environmental effects (*actualisatie gelijkwaardigheidsnormen*, actualization or update). The updated numbers were to be inserted in the Schiphol Act and these would serve as the new frame of reference for assessing the level of equivalence in the near future. The main precondition was that the new criteria were not to result in a change of the available capacity and in the levels of protection. In other words, the cabinet called for a process that implied to assess the real effects of the situation anno 2006. As the evaluation process had shown that the situation anno 2006 was equivalent to the situation of 1990 in terms of environmental effects, this update was merely meant to improve the existing methodologies.

8.9.2 Responses to the Cabinet's Perspective

The Cabinet's Perspective received a lot of criticism, from almost all actors involved.¹⁴⁶⁰ First of all, it was the Secretary of State of the Ministry of VROM who opposed the Cabinet's intention to not legally protect the outer areas. For him and his Ministry, this was out of the question. Thus, some of the results of what was presented as an interdepartmental decision making process were not supported by the departments that had been part of the interdepartmental team. Apparently, such issues had not been settled in the team during the preparation of the Cabinet's Perspective, even though this would have been the proper place for dealing with them.¹⁴⁶¹ Nonetheless, most local residents did not put a lot of trust in this criticism. From their perspective, the Ministry of VROM simply lacked the resources to actually influence Schiphol policy, as had

¹⁴⁵⁹ Cabinet (2006), White Paper Schiphol Policy. The Hague, p.37.

¹⁴⁶⁰ Which, in fact, is quite common in the Netherlands when the Cabinet presents a new intention as regards any specific policy domain.

¹⁴⁶¹ Interview Lap / Policy maker Ministry of VROM, 2007.

been the case during the past 15 years. Thus, they did not really expect that, in the end, the opposition of the Ministry would make any difference.¹⁴⁶² In the remainder of this paragraph we discuss the several responses on the Cabinet's Perspective.

Municipality of Haarlemmermeer

The municipality of Haarlemmermeer was very disappointed about the White Paper and they wrote a response to the Cabinet.¹⁴⁶³ According to the municipality, there was no doubt that the mainport objective was privileged once more, coming at the expense of the environmental objective. According to the municipality, such a one-sided focus on further growth would not work to restore trust in the national government and its policies. On the contrary, by already deciding that compensatory balancing was going to be permitted, and by ordering the sector to develop a covenant to reduce noise annoyance, the other actors (i.e. the local residents, environmental parties and local and regional authorities) were sidelined. From the municipal perspective it was deemed essential to work together on new noise reducing measures in order to enhance trust.

In the same letter the municipality also criticized the way wherein the cabinet dealt with the proposals for improvement. The extensive procedure for submitting proposals had raised some expectations about governmental decisions to be made. However, looking backwards, the municipality had to conclude that these had been false expectations, resulting in further decrease of trust in the national government. Besides, in the Cabinet's Perspective it was stated that all proposals as regards the improvement of the quality of the environment and the reduction of noise annoyance were to be evaluated by the sector, when drawing up the covenant. This way, the cabinet handed over its responsibilities to the aviation sector, while it was the responsibility of the cabinet to secure a high quality environment. Therefore, the municipality asked the cabinet to not hand over this responsibility to the aviation sector.

Municipalities of Haarlemmerliede & Spaarnwoude

The municipalities of Haarlemmerliede & Spaarnwoude (both part of the cluster North of the CROS) who had been subject to the highest increase in noise levels after the opening of the 5th runway were disappointed about the prospect of an even further increase of noise levels.¹⁴⁶⁴ This was the direct result of the intention to implement compensatory balancing and the refusal of the cabinet to develop legal protection for the outer areas (as had been advised by the CDV). At the same time, no additional compensatory measures were taken up in the Perspective, which led to the conclusion that the quality of the living environment of the northern municipalities would

¹⁴⁶² Volkskrant (2006), Omwonenden Schiphol blijven sceptisch. April 6th 2006.

¹⁴⁶³ Municipality Haarlemmermeer (2006), Letter to the Cabinet, Nr. 06.0137905/sbv, June 1st 2006.

¹⁴⁶⁴ Municipality of Haarlemmerliede & Spaarnwoude (2006), Letter to the Ministries V&W and VROM, June 9th 2006.

deteriorate even further. The fact that nothing was done with the diversity of proposals for improvement was also heavily criticized. In essence, the municipalities stressed that the White Paper worked to further reduce their trust in the national government.

Province of South Holland

The Province of South Holland also sent a direct response to the Ministries.¹⁴⁶⁵ The province was not located in the immediate vicinity of the airport, but most of its territory belonged to the outer area. The province rejected the way the cabinet decided to deal with the outer area. Additional enforcement points, as was proposed by the CDV, were deemed of crucial importance for an effective noise policy. Compensatory balancing was not perceived to be an effective means to guarantee protection. Besides, the night regime needed to be extended in order to secure a sufficient level of protection against sleep disturbance.

Local residents that were part of the CROS

The local residents that were part of the CROS sent a response to the Lower House on June 14th 2006.¹⁴⁶⁶ They directly turned towards the Lower House, as these members were bound to discuss the Cabinet's Perspective. First of all, the local residents indicated that the entire evaluation procedure resembled a sham. Right from the start it had been clear what the outcomes would be, and it was therefore no surprise that all policy solutions that could danger further mainport development were sidelined.¹⁴⁶⁷ Second, the local residents stressed that the only way to restore trust was to include the CROS in some way or another in the negotiations about a new covenant, instead of making this a sole affair of the aviation sector. Finally, it was stated that:

1. Compensatory balancing was out of the question, since it was likely to increase the amount of people exposed to serious levels of aircraft noise;
2. There was need to develop proper protection for the outer areas, in line with the proposal of the CDV;
3. Both of the dual objectives needed to receive equal attention for a balanced policy approach, thus favoring the mainport objective over the environmental objective was out of the question.¹⁴⁶⁸

19 Platforms of local residents (not part of the CROS) & Milieudefensie

The local residents that were part of the 19 platforms (i.e. not the ones who were participating in CROS) were furious about ongoing lack of legal protection for the outer

¹⁴⁶⁵ Province of South Holland (2006), Letter to the Ministries of V&W and VROM. DGWM/2006/8840A, June 22nd 2006.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Local residents CROS (2006), Letter to the Lower House, June 14th 2006.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

¹⁴⁶⁸ CROS (2006), Proceedings CROS meeting June 29th 2006.

areas. They sent their response to the Ministries involved (titled ‘The world on its head’) and organized a big manifestation right in front of the Parliament in The Hague on May 30th 2006, handing over a petition.¹⁴⁶⁹ Milieudefensie was also involved in this manifestation. They were especially disappointed about the way the cabinet had dealt with the advice of the CDV (committee of noise experts).¹⁴⁷⁰ To them, the fact that the PKB promise about legally protecting the outer areas was still not fulfilled weighed in heavily.

CROS

A majority of the CROS members was very disappointed about the Cabinet’s Perspective. Despite the enormous amount of research that had been conducted during the evaluation process, no real policy changes were proposed by the cabinet. However, instead of looking back, the CROS members advised about how to proceed in the future. The CROS indicated that they were the right platform for negotiating about the covenant. It would be unwise to leave this task to the aviation sector alone, as the sector parties could count on very little trust from others.¹⁴⁷¹ The CROS members stated that three issues needed to be taken into account when drawing up the covenant: (1) the pilots, i.e. experiments with new flight routes (2) the program to improve the quality of life and (3) the protection of the outer area. This implied a much wider framing of the process than proposed by the cabinet, who had stated that the covenant was merely meant to focus on reducing noise pollution.¹⁴⁷²

BRS

The BRS response was based on the BRS perspective on the mid-term development of the Schiphol region, which they were preparing for publication in June 2006.¹⁴⁷³ The perspective was also a further elaboration of the different proposals for improvement that had been submitted during the evaluation process. Both the perspective and proposals were part of the enactment of the broader metropolitan strategy that had been developed within the North Wing context. In the final response the BRS actors stressed that they were disappointed about the White Paper.¹⁴⁷⁴ Especially the lack of interest in the improvement of the quality of the living environment was criticized. The cabinet was also responsible for this part of the dual objective, and should therefore take up this responsibility and restore the balance between both objectives.

¹⁴⁶⁹ PLRS (2006), De wereld op z’n kop. May 23rd 2006. Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹⁴⁷⁰ Interview Hassink / SNM, 2007.

¹⁴⁷¹ Interview Tan / Former Secretary CROS, 2006.

¹⁴⁷² CROS (2006), Proceedings CROS meeting April 27th 2006.

¹⁴⁷³ Kleyn, W. (2006), Nota Prepared for the Provincial Board of North Holland, March 30th 2006.

¹⁴⁷⁴ BRS (2006), Press Release BRS, April 21st 2006.

In the strategic perspective of the BRS that was presented a few months later the focus was on measures to improve the quality of the living environment (i.e. by reducing noise annoyance and by investing in green areas and housing), a further optimisation of the five-runway system as part of a selective growth strategy, and matching different spatial claims.¹⁴⁷⁵ In this report, more specific differences between the policy intentions of the cabinet and the needs and wants of the regional and local authorities came to the fore. Amongst other things the BRS wanted to implement a more strict night regime, additional measures to protect the outer areas (but also no enforcement points holding legal norms in the outer areas, like the cabinet), relocation of traffic to the regional airport of Lelystad, no compensatory balancing, clarity about the spatial reservation for a 6th and/or 7th runway before April 2008 and allowing for construction at Legmeerpolder and Noordwijkerhout.¹⁴⁷⁶ From the perspective of the BRS it was obvious that the cabinet had not adequately considered the specific spatial problems that confronted the Schiphol region.¹⁴⁷⁷ Finally, the BRS partners thought it important to develop a covenant, but they rejected the idea of putting the aviation sector in charge of this. From their perspective, this was clearly a joint challenge for all regional actors involved.¹⁴⁷⁸

Aviation Sector

Schiphol Group and AirFrance/KLM also posed a joint response to the White Paper.¹⁴⁷⁹ They stressed that they were satisfied with the choice for further mainport development, but they had their doubts about the cabinet's promises for improving protection of both the inner and the outer area. With regard to the covenant the importance of including the local and regional actors in the negotiations was indicated. As such, the sector supported the requests of the BRS and CROS (of which they were also a part) to broaden the discussion arena. Moreover, the initiatives that these actors had already set in motion (the experiments with runway use and new routes of the CROS and the investment program for improving the quality of the living environment of the region) contained several promising measures that had to become part of the covenant. With regard to the update of the environmental norms, the sector parties were concerned that the new criteria would hamper further mainport development.

¹⁴⁷⁵ BRS (2006), Towards an improved relationship between airport and region: A regional vision for mid-term development. BRS, June 2006.

¹⁴⁷⁶ Province of North Holland (2006), Fact sheet Province North Holland, Overview Differences between White Paper Cabinet and BRS Perspective, June 6th 2006.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Interview Van Duin / Province North Holland, 2007.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Interview Kolpa / policy maker Municipality Haarlemmermeer, 2010; Interview De Jong / policy maker municipality Amsterdam, 2010.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Schiphol Group & KLM (2006), Letter to the Ministry of Transportation Nr.486, June 19th 2006.

CDV

The CDV did not say much about the way their advice had been treated by the cabinet. It was obvious that their main advice, i.e. to develop legal protection for the outer areas, had been ignored. As discussed earlier, their advice to measure noise had already been ignored in an earlier stadium and had been taken up in the final advice in rather opaque ways. Both issues had been brought forward by several of the other stakeholders involved when criticizing the Cabinet's Perspective, but the CDV did not openly respond. However, from earlier responses prior to the Cabinet's Perspective, it was possible to conclude that the CDV wouldn't have been very happy about the advice. For example, the chairman of the CDV himself (Eversdijk) had told the media on personal notice (i.e. not as member of his committee) that he thought that an airport in the North Sea would be the best solution.¹⁴⁸⁰ As we saw earlier, the chairman had also discussed the importance of measuring noise in the media in the summer of 2005.¹⁴⁸¹

SNM

The environmental party SNM concluded that the new policy intentions would further reduce the level of legal protection. For the sake of flexibility the 10,000 houses norm within the 35Ke zone would be left, while flight routes, the amount of flights following the routes and the type of aircraft following a route were not precisely determined anymore. This would make the prediction of future noise levels impossible. The SNM stated that they were not so much opposed to further growth of Schiphol, but more attention had to be paid to the effects of aviation on climate change, to closing the gaps in between enforcement points and to provide legal protection against noise pollution in the outer areas.¹⁴⁸² Compensatory balancing was deemed unacceptable. According to the SNM, new development scenarios needed to be explored, like a subhub development (implying far more selective growth), instead of blindly pursuing further growth for the sake of mainport development.¹⁴⁸³

Finally, the SNM also rejected the rather arbitrary way the need for compensatory balancing was brought forward. The cabinet argued that the sector could not make use of full capacity as a consequence of the limits in specific enforcement points (i.e. the system could only facilitate a maximum of 460,000 flights instead of the approx. 520,000 that had been assumed during the design of the system). However, it had also been assumed that the 520,000 flights were only possible if quieter airplanes and flight routes were introduced and if the amount of nightly traffic was reduced. According to the SNM the lack of capacity was therefore not caused by the limiting working of the

¹⁴⁸⁰ Trouw (2006), Een verplaatsing van Schiphol naar de Noordzee blijft het beste alternatief. January 18th 2006.

¹⁴⁸¹ Eversdijk: 'Vliegtuiglawaai Schiphol moet je meten' in Noord Hollands Dagblad, June 11th 2005.

¹⁴⁸² Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; See also CROS (2006), Proceedings CROS meeting April 27th 2006 – Presentation SNM.

¹⁴⁸³ SNM (2006), Press Release Kabinet moet streven naar selectieve groei Schiphol April 25th 2006.

enforcement points alone, but also, and especially, by the fact that the sector had not yet introduced quieter planes, better flight routes and reduced nightly traffic.¹⁴⁸⁴

Moreover, the *meteomarge* was used in a manipulative way (a point that would also be made by the MNP – Environmental Research Agency later on). The system was based on 20% overcapacity. This 20% was the *meteomarge* that was meant to make sure that flight operations could be handled within the limits, no matter what the weather conditions. So, if extreme weather conditions made it necessary to change the use of the runways, the noise limits would not be exceeded. Somehow the sector had managed to turn the *meteomarge* into additional capacity. They argued that the system did not work, because there was a lot of left-over capacity at several locations that could not be used. But according to the environmental researchers, much of this over-capacity was the consequence of the *meteomarge*, and the system was never designed to make it possible to reach all limits simultaneously. Nonetheless, the aviation sector succeeded in developing an overly pessimistic perspective on the regulative system: it was too much of a straightjacket and Schiphol could never actually reach the maximum amount of capacity that had been assumed when determining the limits. Both the SNM and the MNP argued that such a statement could only be made by using the *meteomarge* in a deceptive way.¹⁴⁸⁵ According to a policy maker of the Ministry of VROM this manipulation was the logical consequence of the technical complex and untransparent character of the regulative system. Both policy makers and politicians had not really understood what had been going on.¹⁴⁸⁶

Joint Letter of aviation sector, BRS and CROS

When drawing up and discussing their subsequent responses to the Cabinet's Perspective, the actors found out that they were going to pose quite similar criticisms. It was assumed that the criticism would be even more effective if the aviation sector, the CROS and the BRS parties sent a joint letter. It was the municipality of Haarlemmermeer who did most of the work to make this joint initiative possible.¹⁴⁸⁷ In the letter it was stated that drawing up a covenant with measures to reduce noise hindrance was a regional affair, and not a national affair.¹⁴⁸⁸ In order to invest the covenant with trust, making it valid and legitimate, it was deemed necessary that both the CROS and the BRS were included in its development. For the aviation sector it had been clear that developing a covenant that was not supported by the other actors involved was not of much use. Therefore, the effort was only worth the time as the

¹⁴⁸⁴ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

¹⁴⁸⁵ Interview Dassen / MNP, 2007; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Interview Lap / Former policy maker Ministry of VROM, 2007.

¹⁴⁸⁷ See CROS (2006), Proceedings CROS meeting May 23rd 2006.

¹⁴⁸⁸ BRS, CROS, Aviation Sector (2006), Joint Letter of Region to the Ministry of Transportation, 16th May 2006.

result could lean of broad support, and the inclusion of the local and regional actors was deemed necessary for this.

In sum, the Cabinet's Perspective received a lot of criticism from almost all actors involved in the Schiphol policy debate. Two issues in particular roused a lot of commotion after the presentation of the White Paper: (1) the narrow framing of both the process and content of the covenant that was to be developed and (2) the way that was being dealt with the legal protection of the outer areas against noise pollution. Other sources of disappointment were the decisions to not extend to night regime, the refusal to start measuring noise for improving the calculation model and the relative neglect of the issue of air pollution and climate change. After this large amount of criticism, the Perspective was to be discussed by the members of the Lower House. However, before this political debate started the MNP presented a research report wherein different policy options had been explored.

MNP Report (June 2006)

The MNP intended to discern the different alternatives for Schiphol policy within the context of the dual objective.¹⁴⁸⁹ More specifically, the focus was on finding options that could enhance capacity, while at the same time diminish noise nuisance. The main conclusion of the report was that it was impossible to facilitate further growth and improve levels of noise pollution in both the inner and outer areas at the same time. If growth was to be pursued, this would always come at the expense of the inner area or the outer area. More specifically, growth would always result in a reduction of noise in the outer areas, and an increase in noise in the inner areas, or vice versa.¹⁴⁹⁰ If it was for example accepted that the noise levels in the inner area would increase, than this would lead to an overall reduction of noise pollution (i.e. most annoyed people lived in the outer areas), while simultaneously improving the situation for third party risks. Such a decision would also make it a lot easier to build sufficient houses in the region. The perspective set out by the MNP was clear. Of the three main policy ambitions that the Cabinet was pursuing (further growth, improving noise protection in the inner areas, improving noise protection in the outer areas), only two could be achieved at the same time.

The report was published in June 2006, well after the White paper had been presented. However, the researchers of the MNP had informed the policy makers about their expected results in an earlier stadium, before the White paper had been finished. This allowed them to present the different policy options in a transparent and understandable

¹⁴⁸⁹ Interview Dassen / MNP, 2007.

¹⁴⁹⁰ Milieu & Natuurplanbureau (2006), Opties voor Schipholbeleid. June 6th 2006.

way (i.e. there are 3 main goals, of which only 2 can be reached simultaneously).¹⁴⁹¹ However, in the White Paper it was argued that in the near future both the inner and outer area would be legally protected against increased levels of noise pollution, against the background of further mainport development. A scenario that wasn't possible, as the researchers of the MNP had tried to point out.

After the publication of the MNP report, the cabinet responded by arguing that the report was very valuable, although the lack of a time-planning made it difficult to assess what measures could be taken on what notice.¹⁴⁹² The cabinet announced that the aviation sector had to take the MNP options into account when drawing up the covenant that they were assigned to develop. Taking up the main conclusion of the MNP, that the largest decrease of noise pollution was to be achieved at the expense of increased noise levels in the inner areas, was out of the question. After all, an equivalent level of protection for the inner areas was to be secured, as the cabinet had been promising this ever since the PKB decision had been made in 1995. Thus, the cabinet stuck to its ambition to improve the situation in both inner and outer areas, even though the MNP report pointed out that this was a mission impossible. The report was published at a strategic moment, just before the debate in the Lower House began, although this was not deliberately done by the researchers.¹⁴⁹³ However, it made sure that the report received some attention during the political debate.

8.9.3 Political Debate about the Cabinet's Perspective (June 2006)

Next, the White Paper was being discussed in the Lower House. In order to prepare the political discussion the Infrastructure Committee of the Lower House organized a public hearing on June 8th, for which all relevant stakeholders were invited to express their views on the White Paper.¹⁴⁹⁴

Political public inquiry

Throughout the day the CDV, CROS, NLR, MNP, local residents, BRS, SNM, Milieudefensie, VNV (pilots), PNL, VROM council, V&W Council, RIVM, Prof. Stallen, Schiphol Group, KLM and ATM subsequently presented their perceptions. Much of the criticisms that they had already posed was repeated in front of these members of the Lower House. The CDV (committee of noise experts) was disappointed about the neglect of their advice about the protection of the outer areas and warned for the negative impact this would sort on the level of trust. The CROS insisted on making experiments possible as soon as possible. The BRS, the CROS, Prof. Stallen and the

¹⁴⁹¹ Interview Dassen / MNP, 2007.

¹⁴⁹² TK 29665, June 23rd 2006, Nr.33.

¹⁴⁹³ Interview Dassen / MNP, 2007.

¹⁴⁹⁴ CROS (2006), Proceedings Public Hearing Lower House, June 14th 2006, minutes made by the CROS Secretary.

sector parties all stressed the importance of including the local and regional authorities and local residents in drawing up the covenant. The BRS also insisted on broadening the scope of the covenant, including all aspects as regards the quality of the living environment. The MNP repeated its claim about the impossible mission that the cabinet had set out for itself, trying to achieve three objectives that could not be realized at the same time. The local residents pointed out that their expectations had not been managed adequately. Promises had been made and the cabinet had (again) raised false expectations, which eventually further undermined the already very low levels of trust in the national government and Schiphol regulations. Moreover, the juridical construction of the covenant was questioned. In order to secure legal protection they preferred norms and limits laid down in law. A covenant was not legally binding and therefore lacking real commitment. Finally, the platforms of local residents indicated that they felt not adequately represented by those local residents who were participating in the CROS. From their perspective, the platforms needed to be included in a different way in the future of the policy debate. The SNM argued that the research that had been conducted during the evaluation had not been carried out in an adequate way. They stressed the need for selective growth and an improved noise system once more. Milieudefensie regretted the lack of attention for the issues of local air pollution, CO² and climate change. Merely referring to the fact that these were global problems didn't release the national government of taking its own responsibility in the search for adequate policy measures. The Councils of the Ministries of VROM and V&W stated that the White Paper did not offer the required clarity about long-term development and division of responsibilities that was deemed necessary for restoring levels of trust.

During the subsequent discussion of the White Paper in Parliament, which was heavily influenced by the many reactions and opinions, it was agreed that the local and regional actors were to be included in the development of the covenant.¹⁴⁹⁵ Moreover, measures like compensatory balancing were rejected by the Lower House, and several members emphasized the need to develop norms for the legal protection of the outer areas.¹⁴⁹⁶ The need to update the current database in order to get a proper understanding of the real effects of aviation was widely supported. With regard to the latter, the advice of the EIA committee had played an important role. However, only half of the EIA advice had been taken over. As discussed, the Committee had not only criticized the use of outdated input data, but also the need to reframe the discussion in order to get beyond the endless debate about levels of equivalence. Thus, updating the input data was necessary for increasing the understanding of the real effects of aviation, in order to be able to arrive at the most effective policy measures. But the cabinet merely wanted this update in order to be able to better calculate equivalence in the future. The core assumptions

¹⁴⁹⁵ TK 29665, June 28th 2006, Nr.38 .

¹⁴⁹⁶ See for example Nieuwsbrief SNM 'Meerderheid Parlement wil omwonenden Schiphol beter beschermen' 11th July 2006.

underlying the discussion were therefore not changed; only the numbers that were used in the discussion would change. Moreover, the principle of equivalence made sure that again not all effects were to be taken into account, but only those that fell within the geographical areas that were legally protected.

8.9.4 Cabinet revises the policy strategy (Summer 2006)

The debate in the Lower House had made sure that a different policy strategy was needed in order to develop constructive and durable solutions as regards further development of Schiphol. Therefore, during the summer of 2006 the Ministries of V&W and VROM discussed how to continue.¹⁴⁹⁷ With regard to the short and mid term, the development of a covenant was by far the most important issue. The criteria for equivalence were to be updated as a part of this process, making sure that the latest insights as regards housing locations, flight routes and runway use were taken into account. The question was how to develop a covenant. Several discussions were organized around this question, for example in the CROS.¹⁴⁹⁸ Several members of the CROS thought that they were the appropriate platform for drawing up the covenants.¹⁴⁹⁹ Moreover, this would perfectly fit within their legally defined task (that was part of the Schiphol Act 2003), i.e. to find solutions for dealing with noise pollution that could count on wide support. Thus, the CROS secretary volunteered to take up the task. However, the Ministry of V&W was not convinced that the CROS was up to this task. At that time, they were also evaluating the way the CROS was functioning, and they weren't all that positive about the achievements of the CROS thus far. From the CROS perspective, it was therefore obvious that the Ministry of V&W wanted to prevent that the CROS would take up an important role during the elaboration of the Cabinet's Perspective.¹⁵⁰⁰ Besides, the aviation sector parties, who were also part of the CROS (holding 5 seats), indicated that they thought the CROS platform was too instable for successful negotiations. Therefore, in the end the Ministry of V&W decided not to assign the CROS for the task. On the contrary, the tasks of the CROS were narrowed down, and their budgets were cut.¹⁵⁰¹ But how were the covenants to be developed then?

On October 25th 2006 the Ministry of V&W finally set out how to continue.¹⁵⁰² Both the content and the process of the covenant had been changed. It was decided that two covenants were to be created for both the short and the mid term, one for hindrance reduction and one for improving quality of life in the region (making a total of 4 covenants). The BRS had thus successfully insisted upon broadening the scope and

¹⁴⁹⁷ Interview Abspoel / Policy maker Ministry V&W, 2009.

¹⁴⁹⁸ CROS, (2006), Verslag bijeenkomst CROS, August 31st 2006, by Gert-Jan Bakker.

¹⁴⁹⁹ Interview Tan / Former Secretary of the CROS, 2010.

¹⁵⁰⁰ Interview Tan / Former Secretary of the CROS, 2010.

¹⁵⁰¹ Interview Tan / Former Secretary of the CROS, 2010.

¹⁵⁰² TK 29665, October 25th 2006, Nr.39.

including a covenant for the quality of the living environment.¹⁵⁰³ At first, the covenants for the short term were to be developed. The covenants for the mid-term were to build upon these. The dual objective still served as a point of departure, making sure that all appointments taken up in the covenants did not hamper airport capacity, in spite of the several clues available indicating that reduction of noise pollution and further growth was to result in a deteriorated situation in either the inner or the outer areas.¹⁵⁰⁴ With regard to the process it was decided that an independent chairman would supervise the development of the covenants. Actors that were to be included in the process were the aviation sector (Schiphol Group, AirFrance/KLM, Air Traffic Control, the CROS members (both municipalities and the local residents), the BRS (Province of North Holland, Municipality Haarlemmermeer & Municipality Amsterdam). The Ministries of V&W, VROM and EZ would participate as observers.¹⁵⁰⁵ At the end of October 2006 a new period of intensive negotiations was bound to begin.

8.9.5 Final outcomes (2003 – 2006)

Finally, more than three years of intensive policy making had come to an end in October 2006. During the previous years the new regulative system had been revised as a consequence of the child diseases that had come to light right after its implementation and the revised system had been evaluated. During the extensive evaluation it was concluded that the system offered an equal level of protection as the old PKB system would have done, while considerable improvements could be made. Stakeholders submitted an enormous amount of proposals for improvements, and some of them were selected for further investigation. Amongst other things, a special Act that allowed for temporary experiments was being developed (the Experiment Act). The issues that had been postponed during the preparation of the Schiphol Act (1999 – 2002) were partly settled during the evaluation period. It was decided that the night regime was not to be extended from 6 AM – 7 AM and that there would come no standstill for Group Risk, which removed the difficult and delicate issue about the development of a norm for Group Risk from the policy agenda. Instead, a statistical causal model was to be developed that would make it possible to design policy measures that lowered the probability of aircraft accidents. The amount of new houses that the Ministry of VROM wanted in the Schiphol area was deemed possible, partly as a consequence of lifting the construction ban at the location Hoofddorp West. The desired perspective on the long term had not been finished yet. Right from the start it had not been clear what the long-term process was meant to deliver (the Project Mainport Schiphol – PMS). In the end, after several project leaders had been replaced, a background document containing an overview of the environmental and economic effects of Schiphol was developed.

¹⁵⁰³ De Jong, B. (forthcoming).

¹⁵⁰⁴ TK 29665, October 25th 2006, Nr.39.

¹⁵⁰⁵ TK 29665, October 25th 2006, Nr.39.

However, the poor link of the long term to the evaluation process complicated the integration of the final results.

The final Cabinet’s perspective was presented in April 2006, wherein it was stated that the dual objective was still to serve as the backbone of Schiphol policy. Mainport development was perceived to be of pivotal importance for the Dutch economy and especially for the competitive position of the (North Wing) of the Randstad. The cabinet wanted to support further hub development, although not all traffic was to be facilitated (selective mainport development). Moreover, it implied further investments in the business environment, resulting in high quality offices and industrial sites in the vicinity of the airport and a high quality living environment. Legal protection for the outer areas was not deemed necessary, while the aviation sector was invited to develop a covenant with measures to improve the quality of the living environment. The Perspective received a lot of criticism.

During the evaluation process and after the publication of the Cabinet’s Perspective an enormous amount of information was brought into the debate, showing that the dual objectives could not be met simultaneously, that noise could be measured and that those levels were higher than the calculated levels, that the calculation method had many flaws, that the outer areas lacked legal protection against noise pollution, that it was impossible to both improve the noise situation in both the inner and the outer areas at the same time when pursuing further growth, that the juridical design of the Schiphol Act (it was not a PKB decision) offered less legal safeguards, that Group Risks were increasing to unacceptable levels and that the CO² pollution was ignored during the debate. In short, the entire process was criticized for violating the many promises of the PKB and the conclusions (i.e. the PKB system and the new system offered equal protection) were deemed invalid and based on a dubious framing of the evaluation and dubious outcomes of calculations.

Finally, the proposal to make the further elaboration of the policy measures for the short, mid and long term a sole affair of the aviation sector was also confronted with great criticism (including from the sector itself). After some deliberation, the policy strategy was changed. It was acknowledged that future policy needed to be sustained by a wide variety of actors involved. Therefore, a far more interactive policy process was the result, wherein the different stakeholders would negotiate about the short and mid term future of Schiphol. The process was to be facilitated by an independent chairman.

8.10 The Alders Table: Decision Making about the short term (2006 – 2007)

	2003 - 2006
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006	
	Long term (PMS) – 8.3
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9

8.3 – 8.9	8.4	Preparing the evaluation	
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation	Equivalence – 8.5.1
			Effectiveness – 8.5.2
			Proposals – 8.5.3
			Advices – 8.5.4
			CDV – 8.5.5
			Evaluation Report – 8.5.6
	8.6	Night Fights	
	8.7	Group Risk	
	8.8	Housing locations	
	Cabinet's Perspective – 8.9		
			2007
			2008
			2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009			Short term < 2010) – 8.10
8.10 – 8.11			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11
Long term 2006 – 2009			Long term > 2025 – 8.12
8.12			

Before discussing the negotiations in more detail for both the short term (8.10.2) and the mid-term (next paragraph, 8.11) we first set out the national policy context that conditioned the negotiations (8.10.1). The remainder of this paragraph is dedicated to the negotiations on the Alders table about the short term (8.10.2) and the final decisions that were made as regards the short term (8.10.3).

8.10.1 National policy context: Strengthening the Randstad economy (2006 – 2009)

The Ministries of V&W and VROM indicated the interrelationships between the long-term development strategy of Schiphol and the national policy strategy to strengthen the competitive position of the Randstad.^{1506 1507} The integral elaboration of the three main strategic perspectives on spatial-economic development that had been developed during 2004-2005 (*Nota Ruimte, Nota Mobiliteit, Nota Pieken in de Delta*, see 8.2) had, amongst other things, resulted in a spatial-economic development strategy for the Randstad, including a concrete investment program. This need for such a development program and short-term investments was further emphasized by a special committee that had been installed by the cabinet, and that was meant to advice about ways to strengthen the competitive position of the Randstad (*Advies Commissie Versterking Randstad*). Both CEOs of the Dutch mainports¹⁵⁰⁸ (Schiphol and the port of Rotterdam) were part of this prestigious committee, which was chaired by the former president of

¹⁵⁰⁶ TK 29665, May 25th 2007, Nr. 47.

¹⁵⁰⁷ TK 29665 October 18th 2007, Nr.71.

¹⁵⁰⁸ Cerfontaine & Smits.

the Netherlands (Kok).¹⁵⁰⁹ In its final advice (17th January 2007) the Kok Committee called for a Randstad development strategy, wherein all spatial-economic claims were dealt with in an integral fashion.¹⁵¹⁰ The main objective was to bring back the Randstad in the top 5 competitive regions of Europe, which was measured in terms of economic benefits.¹⁵¹¹ In order to deal adequately with the spatial-economic dynamics immediate investments were deemed necessary by the committee.

One year earlier, the mayors of the four largest cities of the Netherlands, which surrounded the Randstad (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Utrecht and The Hague), had called for strong investments in the Randstad region as well, while indicating the need to deal with the excessive governance that characterized the region.¹⁵¹² The Kok Committee also blamed the excessive governance structures for causing endless decision-making processes (i.e. an abundance of rules, decision making arena's, procedures and juridical fights caused delay upon delay). The main conclusions were backed by the conclusions drawn by the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), who had been asked by the national government to advice about ways to strengthen the competitive position of the Randstad.¹⁵¹³

In the coalition agreement of the new cabinet Balkenende IV the points were repeated. It was stated that one of the main challenges of the new cabinet was to develop a so-called Randstad Urgency Program (*Randstad Urgent*), containing the most urgent spatial-economic (infrastructure) investments. This program was to be accompanied by a long-term development perspective on the Randstad (*Structuurvisie Randstad 2040*).¹⁵¹⁴ The program was forged together by combining the several programs that had already been developed for the North Wing and South Wing of the Randstad, as part of the further elaboration of the white paper on spatial development of 2005 (*Nota Ruimte*). The North Wing development plan was to fit within the metropolitan strategy, which was also being implemented by the regional and local authorities of the North Wing. On June 22nd 2007 the cabinet presented both the long-term perspective Randstad 2040 and the Randstad Urgency Program (RUP).¹⁵¹⁵ The RUP contained 33 concrete investment projects, and one of them was labelled 'Long term development options Schiphol and Lelystad'. The exploration of development opportunities at Schiphol and Lelystad had already been taken up in the North Wing letter of August 2006 that was

¹⁵⁰⁹ Recall the Cabinet Kok I and Kok II presented in chapter 8.

¹⁵¹⁰ Commissie Kok (2007), Advies Commissie Versterking Randstad. January 17th 2007, pp.16 – 17.

¹⁵¹¹ Commissie Kok (2007), Advies Commissie Versterking Randstad. January 17th 2007, p.31.

¹⁵¹² Holland 8, 'Slagvaardig Bestuur voor de Randstad', 2005.

¹⁵¹³ OESO (2007), Territorial Review Randstad, January 2007.

¹⁵¹⁴ Regeringsakkoord Balkenende 4, February 7th 2007.

¹⁵¹⁵ Cabinet (2007), Randstad 2040 Startnotitie: Naar een duurzame en concurrerende topregio, June 22nd 2007.

presented by the six ministries involved in spatial affairs.¹⁵¹⁶ In the next years, the long-term perspective was to be elaborated and the 33 projects were to be carried out. It was within this national policy context that was dominated by the need to strengthen the competitive position of the Randstad that the Schiphol discussion was carried out.

8.10.2. Negotiating about the short term (<2010) (October 2006 – September 2007)

The Ministry of V&W had assigned a consultant (Boer & Kroon) to advice about the most effective process organization for drawing up the covenants about the short term development of Schiphol. The consultant held several bilateral meetings with the sector parties (Schiphol Group, AirFrance/KLM, Air Traffic Control), the BRS and the CROS and it was decided that the process was to be facilitated by an independent chairman, Hans Alders, who was familiar with the ins and outs of Dutch politics.¹⁵¹⁷

Setting up the Alders Table

Alders was proposed by the BRS, and this was supported by the other actors involved, implying that most actors trusted him to be independent. It was decided that the covenant was to be drawn up under his supervision; a special Alders-table was to be established that was to be used for negotiations. The table included far more stakeholders than was originally intended by the former cabinet, who had proposed to make it a sole affair of the aviation sector. The complete table consisted of the sector parties (2x Schiphol Group, 2x AirFrance/KLM, ATM), the BRS parties (2x North Holland, Amsterdam, Haarlemmermeer, but also the municipalities of Amstelveen, Uitgeest), the CROS (represented by 2 members), the Ministry of V&W (1x) and VROM (1x), the chairman, and an additional process manager. The table was completed with a few experts (like a research consultant of To70 that was hired by the Ministry of V&W) in order to make sure that the right assumptions and data were being used.¹⁵¹⁸

Initially, it had not been clear what role the CROS was to play yet. Who were they representing? In the end it was decided that they were acting on behalf of all CROS members (thus including the local residents, public authorities and aviation sector). At the end only two places were granted to the inhabitants. They were represented by the chairman of the CROS, formally assisted by the secretary of the CROS, and Mr Van Ojik, a famous inhabitant around Schiphol. For the first time representatives of the inhabitants, not being elected aldermen or mayors, were involved in the formal

¹⁵¹⁶ Noordvleugelbrief, August 2006.

¹⁵¹⁷ Alders is commissioner of the Queen of the Province of Groningen and ex-member of the Lower House and a former Minister of Spatial Planning (see chapter 5).

¹⁵¹⁸ Interview Vinckx / researcher hired by the Ministry of V&W/To70, 2009.

negotiations about Schiphol (i.e. during the TOPS episode described in chapter 7 they had also been involved, but TOPS served as an informal advisory organ).¹⁵¹⁹

However, the platform with grassroots organizations of local residents (VGP) didn't think that they were properly represented by the CROS members, so there was no such thing as *the* one and only all-encompassing perception of the local residents.¹⁵²⁰ On the other hand, choices had to be made and it was most obvious to include the local residents that were already involved in the debate via the CROS.¹⁵²¹ The platforms were made part of the 'reflection group' (*Klankbord Groep*) that would be kept informed about the negotiations and that would be asked for advice. For the rest, they were to rely on the CROS representatives and the other actors involved for bringing their interests to the fore during the actual negotiations.¹⁵²²

Initially, the BRS actors (local and regional public authorities) were not very happy about the direct participation of the local residents. From their perspective, they were the ones that had to account to the citizens they represented. They were the ones with the political mandate, and they had been assigned to make trade offs.¹⁵²³ The environmental parties did not participate in the negotiations at all. Some of them, most notably Milieudefensie, didn't think negotiations would bring them much gain. After the TOPS debacle of 1999 they had decided to fall back on their old strategy of protesting, lobbying and juridical procedures, as they expected more gains from this.¹⁵²⁴ The main difference with TOPS was that there was no other formal policy trajectory running alongside the Alders negotiations. Others (like the SNM and the Milieufederatie of the Province of North Holland) were not involved in the negotiations, although it was promised that the experts of the SNM would be included in order to validate outcomes.¹⁵²⁵

Prior to the negotiations an overview of the different short term and mid-term development options was needed, including their effects. As was indicated in the Cabinet's Perspective, Schiphol Group and Air Traffic Control were assigned to initiate an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for this. The EIA outcomes would serve as the main input for the Alders negotiations, as could be read in the original assignment of the Alders-table. The intention was 'to formulate an advice concerning the possibilities to come to a better utilization of environmental standards and to underpin these

¹⁵¹⁹ Interview Tan / Former Secretary CROS, 2010.

¹⁵²⁰ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹⁵²¹ Interview Van Ojik / local resident and CROS member, 2010.

¹⁵²² Interview Von der Meer / local resident, 2009.

¹⁵²³ See also, De Jong, E. (2009); Interview De Jong / municipality of Amsterdam, 2008.

¹⁵²⁴ Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

¹⁵²⁵ Interview Van Arendonk / Milieufederatie Noord Holland, 2008; Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

suggestions with an environmental impact assessment. This will be done in combination with the creation of hindrance restrictive arrangements and measurements to improve the environment surrounding Schiphol. These arrangements and measurements must be institutionalized in one or more firm and maintainable covenants'.¹⁵²⁶

Preparing the Environmental Impact Assessment (October–December 2006)

As Schiphol exceeded the noise limits in a few enforcement points in 2006 there was some urgency to get the Alders table started and thus to carry out the EIA on short notice. The cabinet tolerated the violation of the norms due to the incidental nature and in anticipation of the revision of the rigid noise system.¹⁵²⁷ It was also stated that further violations in 2007 and 2008 were to be expected as a consequence of the failing regulative system. Again, exemptions would be granted, but the system was to be repaired as soon as possible.¹⁵²⁸ At the same time, several experiments were being prepared by the CROS, designed to assess the effects of improved flight routes and procedures. This offered valuable information for the type of measures that were to be taken up in the covenants. However, the Experimenting Act (*Experimenteerwet*) that would make it possible to temporarily tolerate violations of limits during the experiments (which was needed to assess the impact of the measures on the quality of the living environment) was yet to be developed and ratified.

Although the aviation sector was assigned to conduct the EIA, the cabinet had insisted upon including at least the following four options:

1. Option with updated limits in the enforcement points
2. Option with 'compensatory balancing' (*salderen*)
3. New runway use system (2 + 2)
4. MNP alternative (derived from the MNP report) (trade off between inner and outer areas)

Next, Schiphol and ATC started to develop an initial concept of the EIA. Although Schiphol Group and ATC acted as the initiators, there was frequent deliberation with the Ministries, the BRS, the CROS and AirFrance/KLM behind the scenes and the draft versions were distributed and revised by all those actors.¹⁵²⁹ This interactive process made sure that the actors involved in the Alders negotiations supported the line of reasoning taken up in the concept of the EIA of December 2006. In this concept five different alternatives were selected for further elaboration (which were different from

¹⁵²⁶ Alders, 2007; p.1.

¹⁵²⁷ TK 29665, October 26th 2006, Nr.39.

¹⁵²⁸ TK 29665, Nr.43/ 2007; TK 29665, Nr.68/2007; TK 29665, Nr.103/ 2008.

¹⁵²⁹ B. de Jong, forthcoming.

the ones that the cabinet had requested).¹⁵³⁰ The two most prominent alternatives were based on the desire to facilitate further growth to 600,000 flights, i.e. the capacity that the cabinet wanted to ensure. The concept was to be elaborated during the Alders negotiations that started on January 17th 2007. During those early negotiations, the local residents managed to include an additional alternative.

The alternative of the local residents

The local residents that were part of the platforms and that were not attending the Alders negotiations aligned their interests with the CROS representatives in order to bring their interests to the fore. It turned out that all local residents (both the ones representing the CROS and the ones organized in the platforms) initially supported a similar strategy. They rejected the idea of compensatory balancing and the update of the noise limits. From their perspective, these were merely strategies to enhance capacity, while further hollowing out legal protection against noise pollution.¹⁵³¹ However, instead of protesting, as they had always done before, they decided to adopt a pro-active attitude.¹⁵³² They started to develop their own scenario for the future development of Schiphol. The scenario implied (1) a maximum growth of Schiphol to 500,000 flights, (2) a relocation of 100,000 flights to other regional airports and (3) holding on to the enforcement points. Thus, the scenario was based on the dual objective as it had originally been defined, implying that the original environmental limits were restored and enforced.¹⁵³³

The scenario was further developed in cooperation with experts and resulted in a fully-fledged development alternative for Schiphol.¹⁵³⁴ The proposal of the local residents aimed at qualitative growth: only the hub-operations of AF/KLM were allowed to grow to a maximum of 500,000 flights. Freight traffic and charters were to be removed to the regional airports of Lelystad and Eindhoven and the enforcement points and their limits were to be secured. As such, the local residents reasoned that their alternative sat comfortably with the ambition to pursue selective mainport development. During the next months the local residents involved in the Alders negotiations and in the reflection group attempted to include their alternative in the Starting document of the EIA.^{1535 1536} This was deemed of crucial importance, since it was only the alternatives selected in

¹⁵³⁰ Het nulalternatief; doorontwikkeling huidige operationeel concept; nieuw operationeel concept; doorontwikkeling huidige operationeel concept met uitplaatsing van charterverkeer; nieuw operationeel concept met uitplaatsing van charterverkeer.

¹⁵³¹ Conceptverslag Raadsessie Gemeente Haarlemmermeer 'Overleg met de heer Van Ojik', January 11th 2007, see p.9.

¹⁵³² Geudeke, T. (2009); Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2007.

¹⁵³³ Voortgang Werkgroepbesprekingen Alders, (2007), Standpunt Bewoners MER/Convenanten.

¹⁵³⁴ Bewonersvoorstel, 2007, p.1.

¹⁵³⁵ Conceptverslag Raadsessie Gemeente Haarlemmermeer 'Overleg met de heer Van Ojik', January 11th 2007, see p.6.

¹⁵³⁶ Internal Memo Local residents, (2007), Input for meeting of the Klankbordgroep, March 15th 2007. In this Memo it says 'Grenswaarden van handhavingpunten horen onverbrekelijk bij de grens die de politiek voor Schiphol heeft getrokken. Salderen en actualiseren zijn voor de Platforms geen begaanbare weg' (p.1).

this document that would be elaborated and that could be included during further negotiations.

Final Starting Document EIA (April 2007)

In April 2007 the Schiphol Group and Air Traffic Control published the final, thus formal, starting document of the EIA procedure. It included the different alternatives that were presented in the earlier concept and the alternative that was brought forward by the local residents. More specifically, the report contained the guidelines of the EIA that was to be made for the short term (2010) and for the EIA that was to be made for the mid-term (2020). The report was called 'Elaborating on the future of Schiphol and the region' (*Verder werken aan de toekomst van Schiphol en de regio*), which was a clear link to the report that the aviation sector had published 2 years before during the evaluation process that was called 'Working on the future of Schiphol and the region'. In the report it was stated that the short term measures were to contribute to both further development of reliable and sustainable hub operations of KLM/AirFrance and the reduction of (noise) nuisance. It was to result in a transparent perspective on sustainable development of the region.¹⁵³⁷ At the end of the negotiations, one alternative was to be selected that was to represent the shared ambition for the future development of Schiphol until 2020. However, before negotiations about the mid term started, the short term update was to be settled at the Alders table. Thus, while experts were elaborating the mid term alternatives, the negotiations about the short term began.

8.10.3. Decision making about the short term (< 2010) (April – June 2007)

The short-term negotiations focused on implementing short-term measures (< 2010) to repair the rigidity of the existing regulative system (as was announced in the White Paper of April 2006). The immediate problem was that noise limits were exceeded at several locations, and it was expected that this would occur more often in the future if hub development was to continue. The regulative system was therefore in need of reparation, just as had been the case in 1998. This time, the effects of the update and compensatory balancing were to be assessed.¹⁵³⁸ The main decisions were that the limits of the enforcement points as taken up in the Decrees of the Schiphol Act needed to be changed in order to make sure that the desired amount of 480,000 flights was possible in 2010 (with 435,000 in 2007). Other proposals for 500,000 and 520,000 flights in 2010 were rejected. Compensatory balancing was rejected too, since it was concluded that it did not really contribute to the realization of the dual objectives. At that time, the criteria for noise were updated (the actualization) and the challenge was to make sure that the revised noise system offered an equivalent level of protection as an old system

¹⁵³⁷ Schiphol Group & LVNL (2007), *Verder werken aan de toekomst van Schiphol en de Regio*. Startdocument Milieu effectrapportage, April, 2007.

¹⁵³⁸ Final Report Results EIA Short-term development, 2007.

with updated noise criteria would have offered.¹⁵³⁹ In the end, the actors at the Alders table reached an agreement. In order to make the desired 480,000 flights possible the limits in 13 enforcement points would increase, 15 decrease and 7 would remain the same. All in all, this would result in an equivalent level of protection as the old system with updated criteria would have offered. Moreover, those areas that were exposed to higher levels of noise pollution were compensated. By means of compensation, concrete measures for the short term were laid down in two covenants (hindrance reduction and spatial quality). These measures were to be implemented right away.¹⁵⁴⁰ According to chairman Alders, the decision to facilitate growth to 480,000 flights in 2010, under the condition that the limiting values of the enforcement points were updated in a way that did not undermine the level of legal protection, was unanimously shared by all actors involved.¹⁵⁴¹

Cabinet takes over the advice

The cabinet was very happy with the advice, as it was widely supported and as it secured further growth on the short term, which was in line with its ambitions. It was very important for the cabinet that the advice was unanimously supported, because for the first time in history there had been a majority in the Lower House that did not want to tolerate violations of the limits in enforcement points any longer. Indeed, in their personal communication with some of the local residents, the politicians had indicated that they really wanted to enforce the limits this time.¹⁵⁴² The only thing that could prevent this from happening was a short term solution that was supported by all stakeholders that were part of the Alders-table. The cabinet was therefore eager to take over the advice. The Minister of V&W had repeatedly asserted that the trade off between capacity and noise was especially a regional affair, holding the consequence that the outcomes of the regional deliberations at the Alders table were to serve as pivotal input for the further elaboration of the national Schiphol policy strategy.^{1543 1544} In line with this earlier statement, the Ministries of V&W and VROM both wanted to take over the advice, something to which the Members of the Lower House agreed.¹⁵⁴⁵ The political debate therefore caused little problems, although the members of the Lower House stressed the need to develop legal protection against noise pollution in the outer areas in the remainder of the Alders debate.¹⁵⁴⁶

¹⁵³⁹ Newsletter Schiphol Policy, Nr.10, July 2007.

¹⁵⁴⁰ See Covenant Hinderbeperkende Maatregelen Schiphol, Appendix 3 of TK 29665 Nr.48 and Covenant Leefbaarheid, Appendix 4 of TK 29665, Nr.48.

¹⁵⁴¹ Alders letter to the Cabinet, 2007.

¹⁵⁴² E-mails from Paul Tang (PVDA) and Wijnand Duyvendak (Groen Links) to Jan Griese, June 7th 2007.

¹⁵⁴³ TK 29665, June 7th 2007, Nr. 64.

¹⁵⁴⁴ Newsletter Schiphol Policy Nr.10, July 2007.

¹⁵⁴⁵ TK 29665, June 26th 2007, Nr. 90.

¹⁵⁴⁶ Motie Haverkamp-Tang, July 5th 2007.

The several criticisms that had been posed on the EIA on which the Alders advice about the short term had been based hardly played a role in the political debate. For example, the EIA committee had criticized the way in which third party risks had been taken into account. The only effect that was to be calculated for the different scenarios was the amount of houses within the 10^{-6} contour, which was clearly not in line with the ALARA principle (As Low as Reasonably Possible).¹⁵⁴⁷ The SNM also criticized the advice.¹⁵⁴⁸ They sent their criticism to the members of the Lower House who were to discuss the EIA on June 7th 2007.¹⁵⁴⁹ Their main concern was that the climate issue was not adequately taken into account, which they deemed rather odd given the high ambitions of the cabinet as regards climate change. From the perspective of SNM experts, it was no longer politically credible to exclude the climate issue from the Schiphol agenda, as had always been done before. However, in the end these criticisms didn't really matter anymore to the members of the Lower House, as the main condition that had been set (i.e. unanimous support for the Alders advice) had been met. Nonetheless, not long after the political debate about the short term advice had been finished, it turned out that not all local residents had been in favor of the advice.

Local residents for or against the advice?

One of the immediate problems was that limits had been exceeded at one specific location, behind the Buitenveldert runway. Actualization was needed to enhance the limits in order to make sure that daily (hub and spoke) operations could continue. The local residents had agreed to a maximum increase of 0,7dB, which was not deemed sufficient from the perspective of the aviation sector. The local residents decided to make a joint statement as regard the update, which was laid down in a letter that was sent to Alders. Moreover, they informed several members of the Lower House about their joint statement, thus arguing that they were not supporting a further increase than 0,7dB at this particular location.¹⁵⁵⁰ More specifically, this implied that they did not support the Alders advice about the short term, as the advice contained a further increase of the limit in this specific enforcement point. In line with the promise of the members of the Lower House, the lacking unanimity as regards the advice would make sure that a majority of the members of the Lower House would reject the advice and call for the enforcement of the existing limits, thus condemning the current violations. This implied that the violation of noise limits would not be tolerated for the first time in history.

¹⁵⁴⁷ Commissie MER (2007), Advies over korte termijn MER, 2007.

¹⁵⁴⁸ SNM, (2007), Startnotitie MER - Verder werken aan toekomst Schiphol en regio, Response sent to the Ministry of Transportation. MMMay 15th 2007.

¹⁵⁴⁹ SNM, (2007), Letter to the Lower House 'Algemeen Overleg Schiphol'. May 31st 2007.

¹⁵⁵⁰ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

However, according to two local residents, something odd happened during the political debate in the Lower House.¹⁵⁵¹ In the midst of the political debate the Minister of V&W, who had had a hard time until that moment, interrupted the debate to announce that he had just received a phone call of the representative of the local residents (i.e. one of the two persons that sat at the Alders table on behalf of the CROS) wherein this local resident announced that they (i.e. the local residents) agreed after all with the update and therefore with the higher limits in specific enforcement points. This implied that the last barrier was removed and the Alders-stakeholders unanimously supported the short term advice. The members of the Lower House that were on the brink of voting down the advice and thus rejecting any further violations of the limits in enforcement points were flabbergasted, or so the local residents who contacted them afterwards would tell.¹⁵⁵² Nonetheless, the main precondition for voting in favor of the advice had been met, and therefore the short term solution was accepted.

Including a new actor: Local residents of the joint platforms

The political debate in the Lower House about the short term advice of Alders gave rise to an internal riot amongst the rank and file of the local residents. Especially the local residents that were organized in the platforms (at that time 26) were very disappointed about the unexpected turn of affairs. From their perspective, the local residents that were involved in the Alders negotiations (i.e. the ones that participated in the CROS) had violated their appointments. In fact, the local residents of the platforms were furious and they demanded an explanation of the local residents who were representing them at the Alders table. They never received a formal explanation, but two local residents that were part of the platforms claimed that the CROS representatives had argued that they had to sacrifice a little fish (i.e. supporting the short term update) in order to catch a far bigger one in the negotiations about the mid term that were bound to begin.¹⁵⁵³ Even if this was true, the joint platforms of local residents didn't trust the CROS representatives anymore. They did not feel that they were adequately represented by the two local residents of the CROS that were acting on their behalf. In a response to this entire affair, the CROS representatives pointed out that there had been different opinions amongst local residents about the short term advice, and that it was true that some of the platforms felt that they were not adequately represented by them.¹⁵⁵⁴

The different grassroots organizations that felt disadvantaged teamed up to form one joint platform of local residents, called the '*Vereniging Gezamenlijke Platforms*' (VGP

¹⁵⁵¹ Interview Griese / local residents, 2009; Interview Von der Meer / local resident, 2009.

¹⁵⁵² According to Griese, who had contact with two politicians, both Paul Tang / PVDA and Duyvendak / Groen Links were rather surprised (see also e-mails sent from Duyvendak to Griese).

¹⁵⁵³ Interview Gosliga / local resident, 2009; Interview Von der Meer / local resident, 2009.

¹⁵⁵⁴ Interview Van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010.

= Association of Joint Platforms). The VGP started a political lobby to explicate that they had not been in favor of the short term advice, and that it had only been the local residents that participated on behalf of the CROS who had been in favor.¹⁵⁵⁵ For one, the VGP sent a letter to the cabinet in which they pointed out that they did not support the Alders advice as it would cause considerably more hindrance in some of the outer areas.¹⁵⁵⁶ Moreover, the VGP members indicated that they wanted to join the Alders negotiations about the mid-term themselves in order to make sure that their interests would be adequately represented this time. The basic question thus became how to find an adequate representation of the local residents during the Alders negotiations about the mid term.¹⁵⁵⁷ In the end, several members of the Lower House (of the PVDA and Groen Links) who had been informed about the internal turmoil amongst rank and file of the local residents proposed to include one representative of the joint platforms during the remaining negotiations. The same advice to include one new local resident acting on behalf of the VGP also came to the fore during the self-evaluation of Alders as regards the short-term process.¹⁵⁵⁸ The cabinet therefore decided that the VGP was to be included at the Alders table for the mid term.¹⁵⁵⁹ Thus, the political lobby of the VGP had sorted its effects. However, the precondition was that the VGP would no longer oppose the short term advice (and thus the update).¹⁵⁶⁰ This way, negotiations about the short term had been finished and all attention could be pointed towards the debate about the mid term development of Schiphol.

8.11. Decision making about the mid term (< 2020) (September 2007 – September 2008)

2003 - 2006		
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006 8.3 – 8.9	Long term (PMS) – 8.3	
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9	
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation
		Equivalence – 8.5.1
		Effectiveness – 8.5.2
		Proposals – 8.5.3
		Advices – 8.5.4
		CDV – 8.5.5
		Evaluation Report – 8.5.6
	8.6	Night Fights
	8.7	Group Risk

¹⁵⁵⁵ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹⁵⁵⁶ VGP (2007), VGP letter to the Cabinet, June 25th 2007.

¹⁵⁵⁷ Interview Tan / Former Secretary CROS, 2010.

¹⁵⁵⁸ Alders, H. (2007), Letter of Alders to the Cabinet, October 5th 2007.

¹⁵⁵⁹ TK 29665, October 16th 2007, Nr.70.

¹⁵⁶⁰ This can be derived from the letter Van Ojik & Von der Meer, (2007), ‘Bewonersdelegatie Aldersoverleg’ sent to Alders on September 18th 2007.

	8.8	Housing locations				
	Cabinet's Perspective – 8.9					
				2007	2008	2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009				Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
8.10 – 8.11					Mid term < 2020 – 8.11	
Long term 2006 – 2009				Long term > 2025 – 8.12		
8.12						

In this paragraph we continue with the description of the Alders negotiations about the mid-term. We start discussing the initial negotiations (8.11.1). New problems with the regulative system for noise emerged, which caused the next wave of political turmoil. This eventually resulted in a broadening of the assignment that was given to Alders (8.11.2). In essence, members of the Lower House called for an entirely new regulative system in the winter of 2008, which was being prepared in the subsequent months. Thereafter, the negotiations at the Alders table were resumed (8.11.3), which resulted in a final advice that was followed by a difficult decision making process (8.11.4). The final advice was criticized by some actors (8.11.5), while the cabinet was already enacting it by outlining the new steps that were to be taken (8.11.6).

8.11.1 Initial negotiations about the mid term

As the cabinet initiated the necessary procedures for translating the short-term advice into the Schiphol Act, the Alders table continued to discuss the possibilities for midterm development after the summer recess had ended, in September 2007. The assignment was to develop a widely supported and clear development strategy for the period 2010 – 2020, including concrete measures for accommodating selective mainport development, reducing noise annoyance and improvement of the quality of the living environment.¹⁵⁶¹

¹⁵⁶² These measures were to be translated into two covenants. The SNM again criticized the lack of attention for the growing climate problems. One of the main ambitions of the cabinet (Balkenende IV) was to seriously address the climate problem. In the Coalition Agreement it was stated that the cabinet wanted to reduce CO² emissions with 30% in 2020, compared to the level of 1990. The SNM wondered why the future development of Schiphol was not linked to this ambition, considering the great contribution of aviation to the total of CO² emissions. They argued that further growth of Schiphol wasn't realistic, or credible within this context.¹⁵⁶³ Nonetheless, the mid-term negotiations proceeded without taking these notions into account.

¹⁵⁶¹ Cabinet (2007) Letter to the Lower House from the Cabinet, October 10th 2008.

¹⁵⁶² Alders, H. (2007), Letter from Alders to the Ministers of Transportation and Spatial Planning, October 5th 2007.

¹⁵⁶³ SNM, (2007), Letter to the Lower House 'Algemeen Overleg Schiphol'. May 31st 2007.

Discussing alternatives

Six different alternatives for Schiphol 2020 were taken into account, including the one that was developed by the local residents. Except for the zero-alternative (base-case) all scenarios were based on the accommodation of 600,000 flight movements in 2020. The solution for facilitating this growth differed per scenario, with on the one extreme further concentration at Schiphol and on the other extreme distribution of growth over different regional airports. Three scenarios called for such decentralization. Two of them were developed by the aviation sector, allowing for 560,000 flights at Schiphol and 40,000 at regional airports. The one proposed by the local residents called for 500,000 flights at Schiphol and 100,000 located elsewhere.¹⁵⁶⁴ The effects were assessed and compared with the updated criteria that were to be taken up in the revised Decrees of the Schiphol Act. Some environmental parties, like the SNM and Milieudefensie, questioned the rationale behind decentralization. From their perspective it would greatly increase the areas exposed to serious noise pollution, something which they deemed undesirable. The SNM argued that it was more fruitful to improve rail-connections in order to stimulate substitution from short term flights to rail (in line with the 1995 PKB promises).¹⁵⁶⁵ ¹⁵⁶⁶ The EIA Committee indicated that two alternatives had not been adequately elaborated (i.e. the most environmentally friendly alternative and the zero-alternative/ base-case).¹⁵⁶⁷ However, these actors were not part of the negotiations and their criticisms had little effect on the actors seated at the Alders table.¹⁵⁶⁸

During the discussion about the different alternatives tensions rose within the rank and file of both the aviation sector and the BRS.¹⁵⁶⁹ The actors representing the aviation sector were discussing the merits of a 2+2 runway use (two runways for take offs and two for landings), as compared to the existing 2+1 system. According to Air Traffic Control this was the best solution for reconciling the dual objectives. However, KLM/AirFrance rejected the proposal, as it didn't offer sufficient peak hour capacity (60 take offs, instead of 80). The BRS actors (i.e. Province of North Holland, Municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam) had agreed to represent one mutual point of view in order to make their claims more powerful. Nonetheless, the municipality of Haarlemmermeer issued a press release wherein it was stated that the airport was not allowed to grow beyond 500,000 flights.¹⁵⁷⁰ The reason for this was that

¹⁵⁶⁴ Schiphol Group & LVNL (2007), *Verder werken aan de toekomst van Schiphol en de Regio*. Startdocument Milieu effectrapportage, April, 2007, p.26.

¹⁵⁶⁵ SNM, (2007), Letter to the Lower House 'Algemeen Overleg Schiphol'. May 31st 2007.

¹⁵⁶⁶ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009; Interview Hassink / Milieudefensie, 2007.

¹⁵⁶⁷ Commissie MER (2007), Advies November 22nd 2007.

¹⁵⁶⁸ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

¹⁵⁶⁹ See for extensive discussion De Jong, B. (forthcoming).

¹⁵⁷⁰ Municipality Haarlemmermeer (2008), Press release 'Limits to Schiphol Growth' 27th February 2008, p.1.

further increase of levels of noise pollution in the inner areas (that contained the Haarlemmermeer territory) would not be accepted by the city council and the municipal inhabitants anymore. This created additional tensions, since the BRS parties had agreed to assume one joint standpoint.¹⁵⁷¹ However, before things could escalate, the BRS partners were on speaking terms again.¹⁵⁷² In the end, the solution of Air Traffic Control was rejected and it was decided to stick to the current system (2+1), and only use four runways during the inbound and outbound peaks. No final decisions were made yet when a new problem emerged, related to the former update of the noise criteria. This problem would give the Alders negotiations about the mid term a different twist.

8.11.2 Broadening the Alders assignment for the mid-term (winter 2008)

After the short-term advice had been ratified, the cabinet started with the revision of the Aviation Act in order to insert the updated criteria. First, the final criteria were to be discussed. Second, these updated criteria were criticized, causing a political riot that resulted in a broadening of the initial Alders assignment.

Updating the criteria

The update was neither allowed to result in more or less growth capacity for the airport, nor in more or less environmental effects. On May 25th 2007 the final results of the update of the criteria and norms was presented.¹⁵⁷³ The housing file was updated. The old file dated from 1990, and in the meanwhile a lot of new houses had been built and demolished in the airport region. The new file reflected the situation anno 2005, thus including the spatial investments of the period 1990 – 2005.¹⁵⁷⁴ The Dutch measures for noise (K_e and L_{aeq}) were finally replaced by the new measures (L_{den} and L_{night}), that were assumed to give a better estimation of the levels of noise pollution.¹⁵⁷⁵ This resulted in new doses-effect relationships, resulting in higher levels of sleep disturbed and annoyed people, given the same levels of noise pollution. Thus, negative effects were higher when exposed to the same dose of noise pollution. Finally, more realistic flight routes were modeled. In the new procedure the routes were based on the real radar-tracks of 2003 – 2005. Changes in flight patterns resulted in changed distribution of environmental effects over the area.

For both noise pollution and sleeping disturbance the effects in the outer areas were also calculated. However, the area for assessing third party risks remained the same, even

¹⁵⁷¹ Interview E. De Jong / municipality of Amsterdam, 2008.

¹⁵⁷² Interview Kolpa / policy maker Municipality Haarlemmermeer, 2010; Interview De Jong / policy maker municipality of Amsterdam, 2010.

¹⁵⁷³ TK 29665, Nr.46, May 25th 2007.

¹⁵⁷⁴ RIVM, 2005.

¹⁵⁷⁵ Something that had already been recommended by the European Union at the end of the 1990s, Interview Ten Wolde / Noise expert / Former researcher EU / member of the EIA Committee Schiphol, 2010.

though it had been argued during the evaluation process that there were also considerable risks involved in flying over the outer areas. With regard to third party risks, the IR (Individual Risk) criterion was reframed. The old procedure for calculating the amount of houses that was exposed to an IR of 10^{-6} or more in an average year did not take the variance of runway utilization and flight routes into account that was caused by changing weather conditions. This so-called *meteomarge* was already being used in the calculation models for noise pollution and sleeping disturbance (as discussed before), and it was deemed necessary to also include it in the procedure for assessing third party risks. This resulted in an increase of those risks (i.e. a larger area was now being exposed to potential accidents, including some high concentration areas). One safety expert pointed out that the *meteomarge* had already been included in the noise calculations during the 1990s, allowing for more pollution and additional capacity, while it was only included in the third party risk calculations after it had been decided that the old norm was being replaced by a new one. If the *meteomarge* had been included in an earlier stadium, it would have implied an increase in risks, thus reducing capacity. By including it via the update procedure, it did not have any effect on the capacity.¹⁵⁷⁶ Finally, the issue of local air pollution was not taken into account anymore, since it had been decided in the White Paper that no capacity limits for emissions were needed anymore. Limits for Group Risk and stench had already been abandoned before 2006.

The new calculation procedures were used to develop a new set of norms for the criteria that were still part of the environmental objective. For example, with regard to third party risk the old criterion was that a maximum of 781 houses was allowed within the IR 10^{-6} .¹⁵⁷⁷ The improved flight tracks resulted in 1040 houses, the updated housing file resulted in 2400 houses and the inclusion of the *meteomarge* resulted in 3000 houses. As such, the old norm of 781 houses was replaced by the new norm of 3000 houses.¹⁵⁷⁸ A similar procedure was applied to the calculation of the updated noise criteria (see table 8.2). The higher numbers thus did not mean that the real effects had increased, but only that a more realistic calculation method had been applied. The research consultant To70 that was assigned to carry out the calculations and to assess their equivalence, concluded that the old and new outcomes did not result in more capacity or environmental deterioration.¹⁵⁷⁹ The research results were validated by discussing them with the sector parties, the CROS and the regional authorities and at the Alders table, and with the experts of the MNP (Environmental Planning Agency). It was the experts of the MNP who argued that the results were not valid.

¹⁵⁷⁶ Interview Ale / Safety Expert Delft University of Technology, 2009.

¹⁵⁷⁷ Strangely this was not consistent with the amount 774 that was used during the evaluation procedure.

¹⁵⁷⁸ TK 29665, Nr.46, May 25th 2007, p.13.

¹⁵⁷⁹ To70, 2007.

Table 2 Old and new (actualized) environmental norms for Schiphol, 2008

	Old Criterion Schiphol Act / Decrees				Updated criterion
	Housing File 1990	Improved Model	Housing File 2005		Translation Ke to L_{den}
Amount of houses within 35Ke	10,000 35Ke	10,800 35Ke	14,500 35Ke		12,300 $58dB(A)L_{den}$
	Old Criterion Schiphol Act / Decrees				Updated criterion
	Housing File 1990	Improved Model	Housing File 2005	Translation Ke to L_{aeq}	Broadening area
Amount of people seriously hindered by noise	33,500 20Ke	40,500 20Ke	47,500 20Ke	77,000 $52dB(A)L_{aeq}$	239,500 $48dB(A)L_{aeq}$
	Old Criterion Schiphol Act / Decrees				Updated criterion
	Housing File 1990	Improved Model	Housing File 2005		Translation L_{aeq} to L_{aeqn}
Amount of houses within $26db(A) L_{aeq}$	6,900 $26dB(A)L_{aeq}$	6,000 $26dB(A)L_{aeq}$	8,300 $26dB(A)L_{aeq}$		11,700 $48dB(A)L_{aeqn}$
	Old Criterion Schiphol Act / Decrees				Updated criterion
	Housing File 1990	Improved Model	Housing File 2005	Translation L_{aeq} to L_{aeqn}	Broadening area
Amount of sleep disturbed people	23,000 $20dB(A)L_{aeq}$	24,500 $20dB(A)L_{aeq}$	32,000 $20dB(A)L_{aeq}$	23,500 $43dB(A)L_{aeqn}$	66,500 $40dB(A)L_{aeqn}$
	Old Criterion Schiphol Act / Decrees				Updated criterion
	Housing File 1990	Improved Model	Housing File 2005		<i>Meteoromarge</i>
Amount of houses within 10^{-6}	781	1,040	2,400		3,000

Source: TK 29665, Nr.46, 2007

MNP criticizes the update

According to the MNP the updated norms did not offer the same level of protection as the ones that they came to replace. The MNP criticized the way in which was dealt with the improved flight routes. With regard to noise, the improved routes resulted in 10,800 houses within the 35Ke zone, whereas all former decisions were based on a maximum

of 10,000 houses within the 35Ke zone.¹⁵⁸⁰ The MNP suggested that capacity was therefore to be downscaled to the amount that fitted the 10,000 houses norm. After all, 10,000 houses was the limit and if an improved calculation method showed that this limit was reached earlier than expected (i.e. with less flights), then the only option was to reduce capacity. It only meant that the former calculation method had had heavy flaws that had biased the outcomes in favor of mainport development.

However, the cabinet had clearly stated that the new calculation method was not to lead to a reduction of capacity. From the perspective of the cabinet 10,800 houses in the new regulative system offered the same protection as 10,000 in the old regulative system, hence living up to the demand of equal protection. The MNP experts pointed out the ‘failure of thought’ involved here: if the real effects had been assessed in the 1990s, then capacity would have been lower when holding on to the 10,000 houses limit. Only because the wrong assumptions had been made, the real effects had not been taken into account, resulting in higher capacity than was actually allowed.¹⁵⁸¹ Another environmental party, Milieudefensie, presented a metaphor in order to explain the strange way of thinking of the cabinet. If it turned out that most automobilists drove 56 km/h on a 50-kilometer highway, the logics of the cabinet would imply that the maximum speed was to be raised to 56, instead of enforcing 50 kilometers per hour.¹⁵⁸² They asserted that increasing the maximum amount of houses from 10,000 to 10,800 was based on a similar way of reasoning.

On top of this, the SNM and the EIA-Committee argued that the entire update process hadn’t been transparent.^{1583 1584 1585} It was difficult for them to find out how the improved models, the updated housing files and the translation from Ke to L_{den} had actually taken place. The criticism caused some political unrest which even further increased after a few researchers of the MNP had published an article in a national newspaper. In this article they argued that politicians were to make decisions about Schiphol again, without hiding behind numbers.¹⁵⁸⁶ Thus, they called for the politicians to finally take up their responsibility and decide whether or not Schiphol was allowed to grow, and whether or not this was to come at the expense of additional noise pollution in the inner and/or outer area. Endless debates about the technological features of models would not be able to provide straightforward answers, as the past 20 years had

¹⁵⁸⁰ Press Release MNP (2007) ‘Voorgestelde nieuwe milieugrenzen voor Schiphol bieden minder bescherming’

¹⁵⁸¹ MNP (2007) Letter to the Ministries of V&W and VROM, Nr. 2053/07. May 4th 2007; Interview Dassen / MNP, 2007.

¹⁵⁸² Milieudefensie (2008), Newsletter February 1st, 2008.

¹⁵⁸³ TK 29665, December 5th 2007, Nr.76.

¹⁵⁸⁴ See also NRC (2007), Letter of the MNP published in NRC, November 13th 2007.

¹⁵⁸⁵ SNM, (2007), Reactie op Ontwerpwijziging LVB Schiphol en MER. October 21st 2007. See also SNM, (2007), Versoepeling geluidsnormen Schiphol berust op rekenfout. Letter to the Minister of Transportation, November 1st 2007.

¹⁵⁸⁶ ‘Niet de computer maar de kamer gaat over Schiphol’, MNP letter in NRC November 13th 2007.

clearly illustrated. The media attention resulted in some critical questions in the Lower House about Schiphol policy and the Minister of V&W responded by announcing that the NLR would carry out a contra-expertise about the level of equivalence between the old and updated criteria.¹⁵⁸⁷

Contra expertise by the NLR: Politicians call for a new regulative system

The NLR concluded that the update had been carried out in an adequate way.¹⁵⁸⁸ However, the MNP didn't agree with the NLR conclusions and was still convinced that the updated criteria for noise provided the aviation sector with additional capacity. Thus, two renowned knowledge institutes drew diametrically opposed conclusions about the validity of the updated criteria. An important national newspaper reported that the members of the Lower House were getting weary of the ongoing problems related to the far too complex and rigid regulative system for noise. In the article a politician of the PVDA (Tang) even argued that the noise system had been one big failure and that we needed to get rid of it as soon as possible.¹⁵⁸⁹ In the political debate Tang repeated his claims and he argued that the regulative system was too complex to understand for almost everybody involved, constantly causing unnecessary distrust. Members of the Infrastructure Committee of the Lower House agreed to this and called for a new solution. In the end, a majority in the Lower House declared the noise system bankrupt. The Ministers of V&W and VROM responded by broadening the initial assignment of Alders, thus passing the problem on to the Alders table.¹⁵⁹⁰ The chairman Alders was to report about a new less complex and more transparent regulative system for noise in its final advice about the mid-term that could count on the support of the stakeholders involved.¹⁵⁹¹ From then on, the Alders negotiations about the most desirable development alternative for 2020 was conditioned by the need to develop a new way for dealing with noise pollution.

8.11.3 Resuming Negotiations

Negotiating a new noise system

The Ministry of V&W decided to establish a new study group for developing different options for a new systematic. The group that, amongst others, included representatives of To70 (the in-house experts of V&W), the Ministries of V&W and VROM, developed 3 initial options that were discussed at the Alders table on March 17th.¹⁵⁹²

¹⁵⁸⁷ TK 29665 December 5th 2007, Nr.76; TK 29665, January 30th 2008, Nr.80.

¹⁵⁸⁸ NLR (2008), Dolderman, A.B. & A.M. Kruger-Dokter (NLR), Analyse actualisatie Gelijkwaardigheidscriteria, January 2008.

¹⁵⁸⁹ Volkskrant (2008), Geluidsberekening Schiphol failliet, February 5th 2008.

¹⁵⁹⁰ TK 29665, Nr.84.

¹⁵⁹¹ Alders, H. (2008), Letter from Alders to the Ministers of Transportation and Spatial Planning, February 25th 2008; See also TK 29665, February 25th 2008, Nr. 83.

¹⁵⁹² Derived, from De Jong, B. (forthcoming).

1. An option similar to the prevailing system, although with updated enforcement points and no cap concerning total aircraft noise (as was the case in the current system);
2. An option based on the handling of air traffic in coherence with the most preferred operational use of the airport in combination with a cap concerning the total amount of air transport movements and/or a 'noisebudget', the so-called *vliegen volgens afspraak* (flying according to agreement, VVA);
3. An option based on spatial contours in combination with limit values that determined the maximum amount of hindrance within those contours, i.e. the option that was favoured by the Ministry of VROM.

The Ministry of V&W argued that the second option held most potential, especially when it was combined with removing the limits in the enforcement points. From the perspective of the local residents, removing the limits in enforcement points was out of the question, as these were their main source of legal protection.¹⁵⁹³ Indeed, as we saw, all local residents had at least one shared interest prior to the Alders negotiations, i.e. to secure the existence of the enforcement points and their limiting values. The aviation sector had already been arguing for some years for a less complex and rigid systematic. During the elaboration of the different options different experts were invited to join the study group. This included the environmental party SNM that did not participate in the Alders negotiations. According to the researcher of the SNM, it was already clear during the first meeting that he attended that the Ministry of V&W and their in-house researchers (of To70) were in favor of option 2 (VVA), while SNM wanted to discuss the merits of other options as well. Second, and even more importantly, there was disagreement about the basic premises of the new system and the goals it was to serve. The goals of SNM were not the same as the goals of the other actors involved.^{1594 1595} And it mattered a great deal for the outcomes which point of departure was chosen: to strive for reducing noise pollution and offer legal protection, or to strive for enhanced

¹⁵⁹³ Interview Von der Meer / local resident VGP, 2009.

¹⁵⁹⁴ SNM, (2008), Propositions Nieuw Normen- en handavingsstelsel Schiphol. March 19th 2008.

Een zinvol ruimtelijke ordeningsbeleid mogelijk maken door nu voor altijd vast te leggen wat de rustige gebieden in de regio zijn:

1. De bevolking zekerheid bieden over de geluidbelasting in de nabije én verdere toekomst;
2. De luchtvaart ruimte bieden voor (en stimuleren tot) innovatieve overlastarme geluidsprocedures.
3. Meten moet nu een plaats krijgen in monitoring én handhaving. Handhaving van de rust in als zodanig vastgestelde gebieden (normen op L_{den} 45 à 53 dB).

¹⁵⁹⁵ SNM, (2008), Memo sent to the Alders table 'Voorwaarden nieuwe stelsel'. April 22nd 2008. The memo included 7 basic premises: 1. mag niet leiden tot meer geluidsoverlast; 2. moet mensen en ruimtelijke ordening op korte en lange termijn zekerheid bieden (waar rustig, waar lawaaiig); 3. moet (geluid)innovatie sector stimuleren; 4. moet luchtverkeer stimuleren om o.a. zoveel mogelijk afstand te houden van woongebied; 5. moet beschermen met voor niet-ingevoerde inzichtelijke normen en regels (transparant); 6. moet objectief toetsbaar zijn aan de gelijkwaardigheidscriteria; 7. moet monitoring én handhaving op basis van geluidsmetingen mogelijk maken

capacity.¹⁵⁹⁶ After the first meeting the expert of the SNM wasn't invited anymore for a while, nor did he receive any information about the proceedings. According to the SNM the Ministry of V&W had deliberately excluded them from the discussion.¹⁵⁹⁷ However, later on, when the new option was being elaborated, SNM would be invited again, partly because the local residents insisted on their inclusion.¹⁵⁹⁸ Nonetheless, in the meantime the second option was selected for further elaboration and during the remainder of the Alders table this elaboration would very much dominate the debate.

Negotiating future development alternatives

During the negotiations several research projects were carried out, in order to deliver the information that was needed to make trade offs. At least three research reports worked to fuel the debate. First, the Schiphol Group had developed a perspective on the long-term development of its future airline network configuration, in close cooperation with AirFrance/KLM and ATC. This research report was actually carried out as part of the long-term development policy trajectory, but played an important role during Alders, since the mid-term developments needed to sustain the desired long-term developments. The airline network perspective was already published in May 2007 and was thus to serve as important input for both the development of a national perspective on long-term development of aviation in the Netherlands, and for the negotiations about the mid term at the Alders table.

The report was based on the assumptions of the sector about the future developments on the aviation market. Forecasts were made and these were used for discerning the requirements of maintaining a hub position. The sector still assumed an expected amount of 600,000 traffic movements in 2020 (650,000 in 2025).¹⁵⁹⁹ Most future traffic was still hub related, while charter traffic could spill over to a regional airport. With regard to capacity, AirFrance/KLM insisted on reliability. In order to make sure that sufficient capacity was available, both AirFrance/KLM and Schiphol argued that maintaining the spatial reservation for a 6th east-west runway (*parallelle Kaagbaan*) was still a no-regret option. The other spatial reservation for a new north-south runway was not contributing much to more reliable capacity and was therefore deemed of lesser importance by AirFrance/KLM. The regional airport of Lelystad was brought forward as the most important candidate for taking over non-hub related traffic (presumably 4 – 5 million pax.). The corporate strategy that was set out in the report was in line with the different alternatives that the aviation sector had taken up in the EIA procedure.

¹⁵⁹⁶ SNM, (2008), Internal Memo 'Bevindingen uit overleg over geluidsnormenstelsel Schiphol op 7 mei', May 8th, 2008.

¹⁵⁹⁷ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

¹⁵⁹⁸ Interview Van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010.

¹⁵⁹⁹ Schiphol Group (2007), Een wereldwijd netwerk voor een concurrerende Randstad regio. May 2007, p.8.

During the EIA lower traffic numbers were taken up than those presented in the Starting Document of the EIA, wherein the different development alternatives for Schiphol had been sketched. This was the direct result of the stagnation on the aviation market. The aviation sector now expected approx. 575,000 / 580,000 flights in 2020 instead of 600,000. The stagnation on the aviation market was related to the worldwide economic recession that had started during 2008, the high oil prices and the high visiting costs of Schiphol vis-à-vis other European airports (which was partly caused by the implementation of the so-called environmental ticket tax that we shall discuss later).¹⁶⁰⁰ It turned out that none of the six alternatives that were being investigated allowed for sufficient capacity and environmental protection at the same time.¹⁶⁰¹ Therefore, the aviation parties developed a new alternative, labeled 'Mainport in Balance', that did live up to all demands. It basically implied a continuation of the current corporate strategies. This alternative made achievement of the dual objective possible (i.e. desired capacity within environmental limits), although for example a quick implementation of the Single European Sky was one important precondition for this. This was part of the European SESAR project, which was particularly important from the perspective of AirFrance/KLM.¹⁶⁰² Besides, several other measures were deemed necessary, like a more efficient coordination of the slots.¹⁶⁰³ The new 'Mainport in balance' alternative was very similar to the proposal that had been developed by the local residents, so they were quite pleased with it, as were the other actors involved. However, two main issues remained to be settled before a final agreement could be forged.

First, the three local residents involved (2x CROS and 1x VGP) and the aviation sector had different ideas about the amount of flights that were to be welcomed at Schiphol in 2020. The local residents had proposed a maximum of 500,000, whereas the aviation sector wanted to facilitate approx. 525,000 flights. The remainder of the expected 580,000 flights was to be facilitated at the regional airports.¹⁶⁰⁴ Second, the local residents wanted by all means to hold on to the enforcement points and their limiting values. The new regulative system that had been selected for further elaboration (i.e. the VVA system) implied eventually a removal of the legal protection of the limiting values in the enforcement points, and thus less legal protection as the local residents perceived it. In September 2008 time was running out for developing a final advice about the mid term. Negotiations became more fierce and final decisions were made.

¹⁶⁰⁰ Final Report Alders, 2008; p.4.

¹⁶⁰¹ Strategische Milieuverkenning voor de ontwikkeling van Schiphol op de middellange termijn, najaar 2008, Schiphol Group & LVNL.

¹⁶⁰² Bruggemans, 2009; In Van Gils et al, 2009.

¹⁶⁰³ Van der Zee, Final Report, March, 2008.

¹⁶⁰⁴ Interview Von der Meer / local resident / VGP, 2009.

8.11.4 Developing the final advice about the mid-term

The concept advice

In September the participants of the Alders-table discussed the concept of the final advice about the mid term, wherein the Mainport in balance alternative was elaborated.¹⁶⁰⁵ It contained two main conclusions. (1) Schiphol was allowed to grow to 510,000 aircraft movements in 2020 (of which only 32,000 flight movements were allowed during the night regime). Accommodating more traffic was simply not possible without breaking the environmental rules. The amount of 510,000 implied a compromise between the demands of the local residents (500,000) and the aviation sector (525,000). Furthermore, additional air traffic, approx. 70,000 flight movements, was to be relocated to several regional airports in the Netherlands, most probably to Lelystad and Eindhoven and Twente (see figure 8.14).

Figure 8.14 Locations of regional airports in the Netherlands that could be used to facilitate non-hub related traffic



Source: Ministries of V&W and VROM (2008), Lange termijn verkenning Schiphol, p.41

More specifically, only the hub-related air traffic was to remain at Schiphol, whereas the freight carriers and the charters were to be removed. This implied that Schiphol would, as always, attempt to facilitate the future operations of AirFrance/KLM as good as possible, for example, by providing them with sufficient possibilities to expand.

Second, the current noise systematic with enforcement points was to be replaced by a set of appointments between the participants of the Alders table. Most actors agreed that the only way to get rid of the technical discussion was by getting rid of the enforcement points and their limiting values, including the complicated calculation methods and the

¹⁶⁰⁵ Final Report Alders, October 5th 2008.

hampering enforcement procedures. In the new system noise was regulated through the development of new and flexible rules for runway use, restricted flight paths and flight heights, designed to ensure the lowest amount of noise pollution and a maximum amount of flight movements (510,000). Moreover, limits for the total amount of houses and people exposed to serious pollution would be taken up, as an extra safeguard. The two other options that had been tested had been more in line with the old system of enforcement points and it was concluded that these options did not offer the kind of flexibility that was deemed necessary to increase capacity and reduce noise pollution at the same time.¹⁶⁰⁶ Besides, options that more or less implied a continuation of the existing systematic were not convincing, as the Lower House had made it quite clear that the existing system was considered to be bankrupt. The new system was all but ready and the idea was to develop a final version during 2009, while testing the system during 2010 – 2012 by means of an experiment. During this experiment the prevailing system would also remain in place. After 2012 a final decision about the implementation of the new VVA systematic was to be made, dependent on the results of the experiment.


The concept advice also contained proposals for several experiments meant to reduce noise pollution, like the implementation of new descending procedures with practically no use of the jet engines (the so-called continuous descent approaches or *glijvluchten*), higher approaches and flying in broader corners (see figures 8.15).

In the advice it was also announced that if new measures to reduce further noise pollution would be developed from 2020 onwards, only 50% of the additional capacity would come to the benefit of the sector (which used to be 100%). This implied that both the aviation sector and those favouring the environmental quality would benefit from new measures. Finally, it was announced that a reduction of noise pollution was simply not possible for some areas. The cabinet reserved 10 million euro for improving the quality of life in these areas, by means of compensation. Those were the main strategic decisions of the mid term advice. These strategic notions served as the point of departure for developing three different covenants with more concrete policy actions: (1) one with measures to reduce noise annoyance, (2) one with measures to improve the quality of the living environment and (3) one with measures to maintain and strengthen the mainport function and airline network quality. These covenants would be presented to the Lower House for political ratification on December 10th 2008.¹⁶⁰⁷

¹⁶⁰⁶ NLR, 2008

¹⁶⁰⁷ TK 29665, December 10th 2008, Nr.115.

Figure 8.15 Illustration of continuous descent approaches (*glijvluchten*) and flying in broader corners (green line represents new procedure, the purple line the current one)



Source: To70 (2005), p.28 & 33

Broad support for the Alders Advice

Just as was the case with regard to the short term, it was important that the stakeholders involved unanimously supported the advice. After all, the main goal of the Alders table was to reach an agreement about the mid-term development that could count on broad support. Moreover, the advice was presented as one integral package. One was to vote for or against the entire package. It was indivisible so it was not possible to merely agree with some of the elements that made up the advice.

In the end, almost all stakeholders that had been involved in the negotiations were pleased with the agreement.¹⁶⁰⁸ This was related to the broad coalition that desired selective mainport development at Schiphol. By allowing only hub-related traffic AirFrance/KLM would get sufficient possibilities to expand in the near future. They were therefore quite pleased with the agreement.¹⁶⁰⁹ Furthermore, the BRS parties were also very pleased, since the selective development fitted perfectly in their metropolitan strategy. The main concern for the BRS parties was to secure the network quality of the airport, i.e. the amount of destinations and the frequency wherein specific destinations were served.¹⁶¹⁰ The AirFrance/KLM network was perceived to be crucial for delivering this quality, while the other traffic was not necessarily needed.¹⁶¹¹ This concern about

¹⁶⁰⁸ Interview Kolpa / Municipality of Haarlemmermeer, 2010; Interview De Jong / Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010; Interview van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010.

¹⁶⁰⁹ Bruggemans, 2009.

¹⁶¹⁰ Interview Kolpa / Municipality of Haarlemmermeer, 2010; Interview De Jong / Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010

¹⁶¹¹ Kleyn, 2009.

the network quality had also been the main reason for the municipality of Amsterdam to veto the privatisation of Schiphol in 2007.¹⁶¹²

The Schiphol Group was also pleased, although there was one drawback. Their main interest was of course to accommodate as much traffic as possible. Thus, a more selective approach was not the most optimal result. But they were to accept this, as the advice also contained two important elements that they had been arguing for. First, additional capacity at the regional airports was promised (70,000 flights until 2020). Second, the complex noise system with its impossible enforcement points would finally be removed from the Act, even though it was not yet clear what the alternative (flying according appointments) would actually entail.¹⁶¹³ Moreover, during the autumn of 2008 traffic forecasts for the period until 2020 (i.e. the time horizon of the advice) became lower and lower as a consequence of the persisting economic recession. This implied that Schiphol had sufficient capacity for more years to come than initially (i.e. anno 2006) expected.

In the end, only the local residents were not yet supporting the total advice. That is, they supported almost the entire advice, but they disagreed on one element, i.e. the intention to get rid of the enforcement points and their limiting values.¹⁶¹⁴ During the month September the three local residents that participated in the Alders negotiations would fiercely discuss the Alders advice in order to decide whether or not to vote for or against it.

Voting for or against the advice? Tensions in the ranks and file of local residents (September 2008)

In September 2008 three local residents were seated at the Alders table: two that were representing the CROS and one that represented the 26 joint platforms of local residents (Vereniging Gezamenlijke Platforms, VGP).¹⁶¹⁵ They maintained close ties with their rank and file, especially the chairmen of the united platforms.¹⁶¹⁶ After the presentation of the concept of the final advice a heated discussion began. For the most part, the local residents were quite pleased with the package deal. However, there was one pivotal issue that raised concerns and that contradicted with their basic principles: the choice to

¹⁶¹² Municipality Amsterdam (2007), Press release Amsterdam. They thought that a privatised Schiphol might focus too much on short term benefits and further real estate developments, at the expense of the network quality, which was by far the most important asset of Schiphol from the perspective of Amsterdam. The municipality therefore rejected the privatization, which complicated the relationship between the airport and Amsterdam. The Cabinet could do nothing else than accept this and removed the privatization issue from the agenda in 2007.

¹⁶¹³ Strategic Environmental Exploration, Schiphol Group/LVNL, 2008; p.4.

¹⁶¹⁴ Interview Gosliga / local resident, 2009; Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Von der Meer / local resident, 2009

¹⁶¹⁵ Van Ojik and Geudeke acted on behalf of the CROS and Von der Meer on behalf of the VGP.

¹⁶¹⁶ Interview Von der Meer / local resident-VGP, 2009.

let go of all enforcement points and to replace this for appointments about how to fly (i.e. the VVA systematic). Within such a system the criteria of equivalence (i.e. yearly amounts of houses and people that were allowed to be exposed to levels above $58L_{den}$ en $26L_{aeq}$) would remain in place (although these were the actualized / broadened criteria). But these would serve as the only hard limits for protection against noise, and most local residents of the joint platforms expected that this would greatly diminish the legal protection against noise. According to the noise expert that had chaired the Noise Expert Committee in between 2000 – 2002 (Berkhout), it would even turn them into outlaws,¹⁶¹⁷ something that the SNM agreed with.¹⁶¹⁸

This issue stood high on the agenda of several VGP meetings and during all these meetings the final conclusion was that VVA system was unacceptable and in contradiction with the main interest of the platforms: to secure as much legal protection as possible.¹⁶¹⁹ Initially, the CROS representatives also wanted to hold on to the enforcement points. However, during the negotiations about the mid term one of the CROS representatives changed his mind. From July onwards he became a supporter of the new regulative system (flying according to appointments), as he believed that the new system would actually be an improvement. Moreover, it was part of a far bigger package deal that satisfied almost all the other demands that the local residents had brought forward during the Alders negotiations.¹⁶²⁰ The other CROS representative and the representative of the VGP were not yet convinced about the value of the new regulative system. This reflected the opinion of the joint platforms, of which the majority at that time still disapproved of the VVA alternative.

In September, when the deadline for the final advice was approaching rapidly, political pressure to vote in favor of the VVA increased.¹⁶²¹ During a VGP meeting about the draft version of the Alders agreement for the mid-term on September 11th, it was once again concluded that a majority was against VVA. Moreover, it was decided that this message was to be sent to Alders, with the note that they would withheld their support for the entire agreement and would abandon the negotiations if VVA was pushed through.¹⁶²² The CROS representative that had been against the VVA also repeated that he still doubted whether or not to support the VVA.¹⁶²³ Thus, mid September there was

¹⁶¹⁷ Interview Berkhout / Noise expert, 2008.

¹⁶¹⁸ See also the documentaries about the Alders agreement broadcasted by the regional television of North Holland (October 2008) and Public Net (Zembla, May 2009) wherein several experts criticize the sacrifice of the enforcement points. Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009.

¹⁶¹⁹ See for example Minutiae of VGP meeting July 16th 2008, p.2.

¹⁶²⁰ Interview Van Ojik / local resident, 2010.

¹⁶²¹ Interview Gosliga / local resident-VGP, 2009; Interview Von der Meer / local resident-VGP, 2009.

¹⁶²² Minutiae of VGP meeting September 11th 2008, p.4.

¹⁶²³ Mail send by Geudeke to Jan Griese (amongst others), September 11th 2008. In this mail he states that he was not intending to support a system without norms that can be legally enforced.

still only one of the three formal representatives at the Alders table in favor of VVA. The VGP representative even argued that he would leave the Alders-table if VVA was not left outside the final agreement.¹⁶²⁴

Just before the final decision had to be made, the joint platforms organized an emergency meeting on September 26th. The meeting was attended by 12 of the 26 platforms that were part of the VGP. During this evening session a voting was held about whether or not to support the Alders advice. The voting was essentially about the VVA system. It turned out that 7 of the 12 platforms voted against the VVA system. However, this did not automatically imply that the VGP would immediately leave the negotiations and reject the entire advice, of which the VVA was only one component. A second voting was held about whether or not the VGP would leave the Alders table and a majority (7 out of 12) voted for continuation of participation.^{1625 1626} After all, the VVA was merely one element of the total package and they wanted to see what would happen in the weeks to come. Nonetheless, the representative of the VGP had already made up his mind and sent a letter to chairman Alders wherein he stated that he would leave the Alders table.¹⁶²⁷ The majority of the VGP platforms was not very happy with this action and they also sent a letter to Alders, indicating that they would continue the negotiations.¹⁶²⁸ The next week it was to be decided whether or not the VGP would support the Alders advice. At that time, the confusion within the rank and file of the platforms that were part of the VGP was growing. It was not clear whether or not a majority of the platforms would eventually support the final Alders advice. The CROS representative who was in favor of the agreement asserted in a regional newspaper (i.e. *Haarlems Dagblad*) that a majority was in favor of VVA.¹⁶²⁹ This even further increased the unrest amongst the local residents.¹⁶³⁰

During the days that followed the chairman Alders himself undertook one more attempt to convince as much platforms as possible about the merits of the advice. Together with his project leader he organized a special information session on the 29th of September. During this meeting it was made clear by the project leader that not supporting the advice meant to exclude oneself from further decision making. According to some local residents of the VGP that were against the advice, this was a blackmail strategy that had been tried several times before on them.^{1631 1632} However, according to other actors

¹⁶²⁴ Interview Von der Meer / local resident-VGP, 2009.

¹⁶²⁵ Interview Van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010.

¹⁶²⁶ Minutiae of VGP meeting, September 26th 2008 by G. Paap.

¹⁶²⁷ VGP, (2008), Letter from Von der Meer to Alders 'Deelname Alders-tafel.' September 26th 2008.

¹⁶²⁸ Letter to Alders send by Haverkort, September 28th 2008.

¹⁶²⁹ *Haarlems Dagblad*, (2008), Van Ojik hekelt opstapbesluit: Ruzie bewoners Schipholoverleg. September 29th 2008.

¹⁶³⁰ I have obtained several e-mails in which different local residents call each other names and accuse each other of foul play and treason. In order to protect the people concerned I will not quote them here.

¹⁶³¹ See also Siebe, P.H. (2009), Ministeriële Manipulatie – revisited. *Tijdschrift Geluid*, Nr.1 2009, p.1.

involved in the negotiations there was no such thing as blackmailing involved, as it had been clear to everyone involved that this had been part of the rules of the game.¹⁶³³

It was becoming more and more important to make sure that a majority of the VGP platforms would vote in favor of the advice, because it turned out that the second CROS representative that had been against VVA before would vote in favor of the advice too. Several local residents were rather surprised by this and they argued that they never got a straight answer on their question about his reasons to vote in favor.¹⁶³⁴ Nonetheless, it implied that an unanimous agreement was within reach, if only the VGP would support the advice. But even this wasn't all that important anymore, as two out of three representatives of the local residents were now in favor of the advice, which was enough to give the impression that a majority of the local residents was supporting the Alders advice. The CROS representatives argued that they voted in favor of the advice because the benefits were deemed to outweigh the costs.¹⁶³⁵ Indeed, as we discussed before, much of their initial demands were satisfied. And with regard to the VVA system, it was argued that it was first to be tested in the upcoming two years. Only if it would be concluded that it actually offered an equivalent level of protection, it would be implemented. If not, the system of enforcement points with limiting values would remain in place. Moreover, the CROS representatives had demanded that the evaluation of the level of legal protection would be carried out by an independent researcher (i.e. a Professor of Law from the University of Tilburg). The request was granted. Thus, from their perspective sufficient checks and balances were built in to make sure that the level of legal protection would not deteriorate. And in the meantime they had made sure that Schiphol could only develop in a selective way until 2020.¹⁶³⁶ Of course, it would be even better if all three local residents would support the final advice. However, despite all attempts to persuade the VGP to also vote in favor of the advice, 14 of the 26 platforms still rejected the VVA (a majority).

In the end, both CROS representatives voted in favor of the advice and the third local resident had left the negotiations. From his perspective, leaving the negotiations was the only way of making sure that his vote was heard, thus making clear to the outside world that not all local residents supported the Alders advice about the mid term.¹⁶³⁷ At the same time, he could not rely any longer on unanimous support of his rank and file.

¹⁶³² Interview Griese / local resident-VGP, 2009; Interview Von der Meer / local resident-VGP, 2009.

¹⁶³³ Interview Kolpa / Municipality of Haarlemmermeer, 2010; Interview De Jong / Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010; Interview van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010.

¹⁶³⁴ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Von der Meer / local resident, 2009; Interview Gosliga / local resident, 2009.

¹⁶³⁵ Interview Van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010.

¹⁶³⁶ Interview Van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010.

¹⁶³⁷ Interview Von der Meer / local resident, 2009; See also Parool, 2008.

Nonetheless, the support of the two CROS members was enough for Alders cs to assert that a majority of the local residents was in favor of the advice.¹⁶³⁸ At that time, it still had not been clear whether or not a majority of the VGP members was in favor of the advice, or against the advice. Both coalitions claimed a majority support, and both could overhand documents that could warrant their respective claims, which were used to influence the members of the Lower House who were to discuss the advice.¹⁶³⁹

The Cabinet takes over the advice (October 2008)

The chairman Alders received wide praise for his achievement to develop a widely supported package deal.¹⁶⁴⁰ From the perspective of the cabinet, a majority of the local residents favoured the advice, which meant that all actors supported the advice. Due to the unprecedented unanimity the cabinet was very eager to take over the advice completely.¹⁶⁴¹ The development strategy was in line with the preconditions that were set by the cabinet before the negotiations had started. It contributed to an improvement of the competitive position of the Randstad and the agreement favoured selective hub development and decentralization of air traffic to regional airports. The new approach as regards noise pollution (flying according to appointments) matched perfectly with the political ambition to make an end to 20 years of discussions about incomprehensible calculation methods, assumptions and valuations of effects. The covenants with concrete policy actions to enact the proposed strategy were signed in December 2008.¹⁶⁴² However, the local residents that did not support the advice tried to make clear that the advice was certainly not supported by all local residents, which caused some political debate.

8.11.5 Criticizing the Alders Advice

Local residents that left negotiations reclaim their seat without success

The fact that the advice was presented as a unanimous advice was unacceptable to the different platforms of local residents that had rejected it. At that time, there were different opinions about whether or not a majority of the platforms was actually supporting the advice. The platforms that had rejected the advice argued that only a minority of the VGP platforms was in favor of it, while the platforms that supported the advice argued the exact opposite.¹⁶⁴³ By that time, the internal riot within the rank and file of the local residents was not understood by outsiders anymore. Nonetheless, both

¹⁶³⁸ TK 29665, September 30th 2008, Nr.106.

¹⁶³⁹ E-mail from Haverkort to the author with a reconstruction of the process, November 10th 2010. Interview Von der Meer / local resident, 2009.

¹⁶⁴⁰ Newsletters Schiphol Policy Nr.10 – 12.

¹⁶⁴¹ TK 29665, October 10th 2008, Nr. 119.

¹⁶⁴² TK 29665, December 10th 2008, Nr.115.

¹⁶⁴³ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Gosliga & Von der Meer, 2009; Interview Van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink, local residents, 2010.

sides tried to convince the outside world about their respective perceptions on the entire affair.

In the meantime, it was not clear what role the VGP was to play in future. On October 9th 2008 a meeting was organized to discuss this future, which was attended by 16 members of the VGP. During this meeting, a vote was held about whether or not the VGP was to continue participation. It turned out that 11 of the 16 members that were attending the meeting voted in favor of further participation.¹⁶⁴⁴ On October 10th the VGP secretary sent a letter to Alders wherein he explained that the VGP actually did support the advice (as 2/3 of the platforms was in favor of it) and that they too wanted to participate in the elaboration of the Alders advice.¹⁶⁴⁵ The VGP repeated this request in another letter to Alders, sent on October 27th 2008.¹⁶⁴⁶

However, the platforms that had voted against the advice informed the Lower House about the minority of platforms actually supporting the agreement.¹⁶⁴⁷ From their perspective, the vote that had been held during the VGP meeting on October 9th was not representative, as almost all platforms that were against the advice had not been attending.¹⁶⁴⁸ One representative had asked all platform representatives about their opinion and he concluded that 14 of 26 platforms rejected the advice.¹⁶⁴⁹ These 14 platforms left the VGP and installed a new joint organization on October 29th 2008, the BLRS (*Bescherming Leefmilieu Regio Schiphol*, Protection Living Environment Schiphol). The remaining 12 platforms would form the new VGP. However, new platforms were gathered to broaden the VGP.

A few days later, on November 1st, the BLRS sent a letter to the Minister of V&W wherein they reclaimed their seat at the Alders table in order to take part in the further elaboration of the advice.¹⁶⁵⁰ By that time, it was not clear to outsiders anymore how the local residents were organized and whether or not the local platforms supported the advice.¹⁶⁵¹ The political debate about the Alders advice was bound to begin, thus both the BLRS and the new VGP felt an urgency to clarify what was going on. On November 3rd the municipal board of Castricum sent a letter to the Infrastructure Committee of the

¹⁶⁴⁴ Minutiae VGP meeting, October 9th 2008, by G. Paap.

¹⁶⁴⁵ Letter to Hans Alders of the new VGP, October 10th 2008, by G. Paap; E-mail from Haverkort to the author with a reconstruction of the process, November 10th 2010.

¹⁶⁴⁶ Letter to Hans Alders of the new VGP, October 27th 2008, by G. Paap; E-mail from Haverkort to the author with a reconstruction of the process, November 10th 2010.

¹⁶⁴⁷ Letter to the Lower House, containing a list with platforms in favour and against the final advice.

¹⁶⁴⁸ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹⁶⁴⁹ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹⁶⁵⁰ BLRS, (2008), Letter to the Minister of V&W 'Gelijke behandeling BLRS en VGP tijdens uitwerking Alders-advies'. November 1st 2008.

¹⁶⁵¹ Interview Abspoel / Policy maker Ministry of V&W, 2009.

Lower House, wherein they stated that they were very disappointed about the advice. The letter was intended to point out that there was no such thing as unanimous support within the rank and file of local residents, nor support from the municipal board of the region.¹⁶⁵² The Alders advice implied more noise for Castricum, while less noise for the municipalities located in the Haarlemmermeer. Indeed, 8 out of the 12 the remaining platforms of the VGP that were in favor of the Alders advice belonged to the municipality of Haarlemmermeer. The platforms of people living in other municipalities were almost all against the advice.

On the other hand, the local residents that had voted in favor of the advice too tried to convince the Lower House that they were backed by a majority of their rank and file. On November 3rd one prominent CROS representative acting on behalf of the local residents, who was also part of the new VGP, sent a letter to the Ministers of V&W and VROM asserting that a majority of the local residents, both the CROS representatives and the platforms organized in the VGP, were still in support of the Alders advice.¹⁶⁵³ In order to strengthen his argument he included a letter wherein it was clearly stated that 30 small villages that fell within the Haarlemmermeer territory were in support of the plan. The letter allowed the Minister of V&W to inform the Lower House that a majority of the local residents was in favor of the advice, which meant that the advice was supported by an unprecedented unanimity.¹⁶⁵⁴

One day later the BLRS informed the members of the Lower House about their interpretation of this letter. According to them it was an obvious attempt to deceive the politicians, and to remove the sting from the upcoming political debate.¹⁶⁵⁵ Several of the 30 small villages that signed the letter had not been involved in the Alders debate. Furthermore, support from those villages was something altogether different than holding the support of a majority of platforms. From their perspective, the majority of platforms was still against the advice, even though they demanded an equal treatment in the remainder of the Alders negotiations (i.e. during the elaboration of the advice).

During the political debate in the Lower House these internal struggles within the rank and file of the local residents received little attention. In the end, the outside world was confronted with two diametrically opposed stories of two groups of local residents (those that were in favor of the advice and those that were against it) and it was deemed impossible to assess which of the stories was more valid (as both were deemed valid in

¹⁶⁵² Municipality of Castricum, (2008), Letter to the Infrastructure Committee of the Lower House ‘Alders-advies Schiphol.’ November 3rd 2008.

¹⁶⁵³ Van Ojik, (2008), Letter to the Ministers of V&W and VROM ‘Bewonersdelegatie Alders-tafel’. November 3rd 2008.

¹⁶⁵⁴ Letter from Eurlings to the Lower House, November 4th 2004 (incl. Attachments).

¹⁶⁵⁵ Mail sent to several members of the Lower House (PVDA, Groen Links, D66, CU, SP) by Jan Griese. November 5th 2008.

their own terms). As the two groups of local residents kept on accusing one another, all other actors involved had been in favor of the advice. Therefore, most political parties were very happy with the Alders advice. After all, the regulative system for noise that had been declared bankrupt was going to be replaced and it seemed that the advice was supported by all actors involved in the negotiations. These had been the two main preconditions for most members of the Lower House to vote in favor of the advice. As these were both satisfied, a majority of the Lower House supported the Alders advice. Of course, some politicians had been informed about the situation within the rank and file of the local residents. However, the internal struggles were seen as something that had to be solved by the local residents themselves.¹⁶⁵⁶ In line with the rules that came with the advice it was decided that only those actors that supported it were allowed to take part in its elaboration. Here, the BLRS succeeded in making sure that the Lower House made the amendment that they were to be kept informed about the proceedings of the elaboration (as had been requested by the political party Groen Links). However, this was something different than actually participating, as it merely meant that they would obtain the reports and that they would be invited for information meetings. The BLRS was therefore not formally included anymore, while the new VGP would still be allowed to participate.

Criticism of the environmental interest groups

The local residents that had been excluded from further negotiations were not the only ones criticizing the Alders advice. On behalf of several environmental parties (Milieudefensie, Milieufederatie Noord Holland) the SNM sent a letter to the members of the Infrastructure Committee of the Lower House.¹⁶⁵⁷ In this letter the SNM criticized the Alders advice in two important respects: the new regulative system for noise (VVA) would result in an unnecessary deterioration of the level of local protection and the traffic forecasts that had been used were not realistic (580,000 flights in 2020). This was important because using lower growth rates that were deemed more realistic would make the entire discussion about the relocation of flights to the regional airports of Eindhoven and Lelystad unnecessary. From the perspective of the environmental parties such decentralization meant that much more people would be exposed to unacceptable levels of noise pollution, which was deemed highly undesirable. In essence, decentralization worked to increase overall capacity for aviation in the Netherlands, but it also implied a relocation and growth of the noise and safety problems. Therefore, it was not seen as a solution that worked to realize the dual objectives.¹⁶⁵⁸ Finally, the

¹⁶⁵⁶ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009.

¹⁶⁵⁷ SNM, (2009), AO Schiphol. Letter sent to the Infrastructure Committee of the Lower House, January 19th 2009.

¹⁶⁵⁸ Interview Fransen / SNM, 2009

further growth would result in an increase in CO² emissions. From their perspective it was a shame that the CO² issue had not been taken into account at the Alders table.¹⁶⁵⁹

Criticism of actors around regional airports

At the same time, the decision to facilitate 70,000 additional flights spread over Lelystad, Eindhoven and Twente airport immediately evoked heated discussions in these regions. Especially the local residents started to resist. For one, the current legally ratified spatial plans and appointments about Lelystad airport made it impossible to accommodate additional flights. The limits to noise pollution and infrastructure development taken up in the Planning Key Decision Lelystad Airport (2004) (PKB Lelystad) were important in this regard. The fact that no night flights were allowed according to the planning key decision diminished the feasibility of the Alders solutions. The platform of local residents of Flevoland, (*Vereniging Inwoners Vliegveld Flevoland - VIVF*), immediately started to protest against further development of Lelystad airport.¹⁶⁶⁰ Around Eindhoven, the local residents that were organized in the BOW (*Belangenorganisatie Omwonenden Welschap*) also voiced their disappointment.¹⁶⁶¹ Prior to Alders, several appointments had been made on the regional level between the actors involved (airport, residents, local and regional authority). These carefully forged appointments were now ignored in the Alders advice. The same responses were evoked around the airport of Twente.¹⁶⁶² In the end, the local residents and the environmental parties around the regional airports thought it was rather strange that the decision to replace flights to Lelystad, Twente and Eindhoven had been made without their involvement.¹⁶⁶³ To them, it seemed that the Schiphol actors were glad to get rid of additional noise problems, safety problems and lack of space by removing traffic.

Criticism of excluded airlines

There was at least one other group of actors that deemed it unfair that decisions had been made that influenced their stakes, while they had not been allowed to join the negotiations. These were the other airlines that used Schiphol, most notably the low cost carriers. The decision to concentrate hub-oriented traffic (i.e. AirFrance/KLM operations) at Schiphol, while replacing non-hub oriented traffic (especially low cost point-to-point charters), was made without consulting the low cost carriers. This implied that those airlines that had plans to expand their operations at Schiphol, like easyJet, would only be allowed to expand if capacity needs of the hub carrier AirFrance/KLM

¹⁶⁵⁹ Trouw (2008), Aan de tafel van Alders zijn te weinig plaatsen. December 4th 2008.

¹⁶⁶⁰ Milieudéfensie (2008), Press Release Milieudéfensie Magazine, June 2008

¹⁶⁶¹ Milieudéfensie (2008), Newsletter Milieudéfensie, October 2nd 2008

¹⁶⁶² Volkskrant (2009), Groter, maar waarom eigenlijk? November 25th 2009

¹⁶⁶³ Trouw (2008), Aan de tafel van Alders zijn te weinig plaatsen. December 4th 2008.

allowed for this. Moreover, it would eventually imply that easyJet and other low cost airlines were eventually to leave Schiphol in order to make room for the expansion of AirFrance/KLM operations. easyJet, who was the second largest carrier in terms of passenger volumes at Schiphol in 2008, made clear that they did not have the intention to remove their operations from Schiphol to a regional airport, just to make room for AirFrance/KLM. From their perspective, this was a clear example of unfair competition that worked to strengthen the competitive position of AirFrance/KLM at Schiphol while undermining the position of the other non-hub airlines. From the perspective of easyJet it was rather strange that AirFrance/KLM was the only airline that had been part of the negotiations, securing its own future on Schiphol by calling for a removal of its competitors.¹⁶⁶⁴ Here, Schiphol Group was trapped in a difficult situation. From the viewpoint of their business model, it would be best to facilitate low cost carriers as much as possible. After all, future growth was especially expected on the low cost market. At the same time, they were dealing with a strong home carrier, a national government and several other parties that had participated in the Alders debate that opposed such development. At least, at the Schiphol location. This dilemma would cause some additional tensions between AirFrance/KLM and the Schiphol Group in the years to come.

8.11.6 Elaborating the mid-term Alders Advice (2009)

After the Alders advice had been discussed, amended and ratified, it was to be enacted. For this, there was need to elaborate and implement the measures that were needed at the Schiphol location and to investigate the possibilities for replacing traffic to the regional airports (i.e. the decentralization). As everyone involved was rather pleased with the achievements of the chairman Alders, he was assigned to take up both tasks.

Elaborating decentralization

With regard to decentralization issue, regional Alders-tables were established around which negotiations with the stakeholders of the regional airports of Lelystad and Eindhoven were to take place. The main assignment was to assess the actual development potential of both airports and to advice about the policy actions required.¹⁶⁶⁵ ¹⁶⁶⁶ In essence, Alders was asked to bring out a first advice about the possibilities for growth on both airports before the summer of 2009.

At the same time, it had become clear that the enduring financial crisis had resulted in a further stagnation on the aviation market. Traffic volumes at Schiphol were dropping below the levels of the previous year. Therefore, a majority of the members of the

¹⁶⁶⁴ Volkskrant (2008), easyJet laat zich niet van Schiphol weggagen. October 30th 2008.

¹⁶⁶⁵ TK 29665, February 16th 2009, Nr.118.

¹⁶⁶⁶ Ministries of V&W and VROM (2009), Letter from the ministries to Alders, February 5th 2009.

Lower House had voted in favor of conducting new research to assess the validity of the forecasts that had been used during the Schiphol negotiations.¹⁶⁶⁷ It might be necessary to revise these numbers, which would make the decentralization of air traffic to regional airports less urgent. As this caused some unexpected additional work, Alders could not make the deadline of summer 2009. Instead, he asked the cabinet for more time.¹⁶⁶⁸ The request was granted by the Minister of V&W.¹⁶⁶⁹

On October 1st Alders informed the cabinet, indicating that the growth scenarios used during the initial Alders negotiations had been too optimistic.¹⁶⁷⁰ One direct implication was that Schiphol Group did not think it was necessary to already invest in an extended runway at Lelystad airport (i.e. the extended runway was needed in order to facilitate the 35,000 flights that would be decentralized).¹⁶⁷¹ As was laid down in the Alders agreement, such decentralization was only to take place when there was not sufficient capacity available at Schiphol. Thus, it was up to Schiphol to decide when investments in Lelystad were deemed necessary from a business point of view.¹⁶⁷² As there was sufficient capacity available at Schiphol for the time being, expensive investments were therefore to be postponed (especially in times of crisis). At the same time, the Minister of V&W argued that this allowed them to take more time to develop widely supported regional development plans.¹⁶⁷³ At the end of 2009 no final decisions had been made yet about the future development of Lelystad, Eindhoven and Twente.¹⁶⁷⁴ In 2010 negotiations continued. It was decided that investments in Lelystad would be postponed until later order and it was yet to be decided whether the airport of Twente could be used in the future at all. Only capacity at Eindhoven Airport was allowed to grow with 25,000 flights until 2020.¹⁶⁷⁵ However, the enduring economic crisis and low growth rates at Schiphol implied that this capacity wasn't expected to be needed anytime soon (or so was the case in the summer of 2010).¹⁶⁷⁶

Elaborating measures for Schiphol

The elaboration of the Alders advice at the Schiphol location turned out to be more complicated than initially expected. Several experiments with different flight routes and procedures were carried out, some of which resulted in proposals to revise the existing

¹⁶⁶⁷ TK 29665, February 19th 2009, Nr.123.

¹⁶⁶⁸ Letter from Alders to the Minister of V&W, August 3rd 2009.

¹⁶⁶⁹ TK 31936, August 27th 2009, Nr.5.

¹⁶⁷⁰ Letter from Alders to the Ministers of V&W and VROM, October 1st 2009.

¹⁶⁷¹ TK 31936, October 6th 2009, Nr.9.

¹⁶⁷² Interview Van Boxtel / Schiphol Group, 2010.

¹⁶⁷³ TK 31936, October 5th 2009, Nr.8.

¹⁶⁷⁴ TK 29665, November 17th 2009, Nr.147.

¹⁶⁷⁵ 'Alders-advies Eindhoven' Press release June 22nd 2010, www.alderstafel.nl/eindhoven.

¹⁶⁷⁶ In May 2011 further investments in Lelystad Airport on behalf of the Schiphol Group were announced, although it concerned minor investment. The first goal was to extend the runway from 1200 to 1600 metres. Eventually the runway could be extended to 2100 metres. See 'Schiphol wil Lelystad verder ontwikkelen' Newspaper article, Het Parool, 17 mei 2011.

Aviation Act and Decrees.¹⁶⁷⁷ Most difficulties were related to the elaboration of the new noise systematic, the VVA. It was the technical design of the system (i.e. what appointments about runway use, flight routes and flight procedures were to be included) that caused extensive debates between stakeholders and experts. In line with the demand of the local residents an independent researcher was assigned who was to assess whether or not the legal protection of the VVA system was similar to the level offered by the old system with enforcement points.¹⁶⁷⁸

In a first report, the researcher concluded that both systems could in principle offer the same level of protection.¹⁶⁷⁹ However, it was also stated that this would only be possible if a whole set of transparent and enforceable rules could be developed. The report was finished on May 28th, but the information was not yet spread to the actors who were not participating in the Alders negotiations. From the perspective of the BLRS (i.e. the local residents that had not supported the Alders advice) this was deliberately done, as one could interpret the report in a way that could give rise to political unrest (i.e. many rules were needed for equivalent legal protection, while it would be difficult to enforce all these rules).¹⁶⁸⁰ As the BLRS had heard about the existence of the report, they contacted the researcher asking him to send them the report. However, the researcher indicated that it was up to the Ministry of V&W, his client, to decide when to make the report publicly available. Thus, the BLRS requested the report at the Ministry. The request was not answered, and another request was addressed to the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W on July 2nd 2009. They were told that they could not obtain the report, as it was merely a concept.¹⁶⁸¹ The report would be finalized after the new systematic was ready, which was still under construction. The BLRS was not happy about this, as they reasoned that they also needed to obtain the concepts of research reports in order to be able to monitor the process and form an opinion about the new VVA.¹⁶⁸² However, the other actors that were involved in the Alders negotiations, and thus in the development of the report about legal protection, pointed out that things were exactly going as had been promised. After all, it was quite obvious that only final reports and findings would be presented to the outside world (i.e. everyone not participating in the negotiations).¹⁶⁸³

¹⁶⁸⁴ Therefore, the assertion of the BLRS that the promise made in the Lower House that

¹⁶⁷⁷ TK 29665, September 2nd 2009, Nr.143.

¹⁶⁷⁸ Professor Michiels, Prof. of Law at the University of Tilburg.

¹⁶⁷⁹ Michiels, L. (2009) Niet Minder, wel Anders. Een advies over de rechtsbescherming onder het nieuwe normen- en handhavingstelsel voor Schiphol. Advies Alders-tafel, Mei 2009.

¹⁶⁸⁰ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Griese also argued that the title of the report had been deliberately changed in order to make it appear less critical, i.e. the original title 'Stick to an agreement' (Afspraak is afspraak) was changed into 'Nothing worse, but Different' (Niet Minder, Wel Anders).

¹⁶⁸¹ Interview Von der Meer / local resident, 2009.

¹⁶⁸² Interview Gosliga / Von der Meer / local residents, 2009.

¹⁶⁸³ Interview Van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010.

¹⁶⁸⁴ Interview Kolpa / de Jong, policy makers municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam, 2010.

they were to be kept informed was clearly violated was not supported by the other actors involved.

In the end, the BLRS would finally obtain the report, although via a different route. When some politicians of the Lower House requested the report, the Minister decided to send it to the Lower House. This implied that the report was made publicly available. However, as the new VVA was not ready yet, there was no way that conclusions could already be drawn about its level of legal protection. Therefore, the remainder of the discussion was about the design of the VVA.

It would eventually take until the 19th of August 2010 before Alders handed over the advice with the final design of the VVA to the Ministers of V&W and VROM.¹⁶⁸⁵ The new system had been developed with help of several experts, including those of the SNM who had rejoined the debate again, after their earlier rejection of the principle of VVA in 2008.¹⁶⁸⁶ According to Alders the new system would offer at least a similar level of protection against noise pollution, while simultaneously allowing for further growth to 510,000 flights in 2020.¹⁶⁸⁷ The system consisted of a set of appointments about preferred runway use and about flight procedures, most notably procedures for continuous descent approaches (*glijvluchten*) that were expected to greatly reduce the levels of noise pollution in the outer areas (recall figure 8.15). The advice was to test the new VVA for 2 years, starting on November 1st 2010. The test results would be used to evaluate whether or not the VVA system offered an equivalent level of protection as the old system would have offered. Only then it would be decided whether or not to really implement the VVA, thus changing the Schiphol Act and related Decrees.¹⁶⁸⁸

The final advice triggered diverse responses. Several media reported that Schiphol was allowed to expand at its current location and that legal protection of local residents was likely to decrease.¹⁶⁸⁹ Several actors indicated that it was far too premature for drawing such conclusions.¹⁶⁹⁰ However, it was also commented that an experiment of only 2 years would not suffice. From the perspective of SNM, the level of protection could only be assessed when the full amount of 510,000 flights was realized, which would not be the case during the upcoming 2 years.¹⁶⁹¹ One local resident commented that it was likely that Schiphol was going to behave nicely during the experiment and until 2020,

¹⁶⁸⁵ Letter from Alders to the Ministers of V&W and VROM, August 19th 2010.

¹⁶⁸⁶ Interview Van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010.

¹⁶⁸⁷ Press Release 'Een nieuw geluidsstelsel voor Schiphol', August 19th 2010, www.alderstafel.nl.

¹⁶⁸⁸ Interview Van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010.

¹⁶⁸⁹ See for example 'Alders kiest voor groei', *Volkskrant*, August 19th 2010; 'Een boel boterzachte beloften', *Volkskrant* 21st August 2010; Cartoon 'Hoera... op naar de 500,000!', *Parool*, August 26th 2010; 'Alders: gebruik 2 hoofdbanen', *Trouw*, August 20th 2010.

¹⁶⁹⁰ See for example 'Bewoners beter beschermd met advies Alders', *Parool*, August 24th 2010.

¹⁶⁹¹ SNM Press Release 'Schiphol mag groeien is voorbarige conclusie', August 20th 2010.

just to grow beyond 510,000 flights from 2020 onwards. After all, the Alders advice was only about the period until 2020. From 2020 onwards the enforcement points would be removed, paving the way for further growth.¹⁶⁹²

Despite these critical remarks, all actors that had been involved as stakeholders during the elaboration of the Alders advices from the beginning indicated that they were very pleased with the new regulative system for noise. Indeed, from their perspective only those local residents that had rejected the advice of 2008 and that represented a minority perspective (or so they claimed) were not supporting it. From their perspective, the Alders negotiations had been a success and the new regulative system was part of this success.¹⁶⁹³ Even the Schiphol EIA committee argued that things had much improved ever since the Alders negotiations had started. For one, they had observed a much more pro-active attitude and a willingness to discuss different perspectives, something that had not happened before. The Committee itself had also deliberately adopted a more cooperative strategy, as from 2007 onwards the new secretary had been investing heavily in improving the rather poor relationship between the committee and the Ministry of V&W (which had been the result of ignoring and selectively interpreting their advices for years on end).¹⁶⁹⁴ For one, they had been working on ways to include the EIA procedure in a more effective way during the decision making process. The result was that the EIA played a different role during the Alders negotiations than it had done before 2006. It really served as input for the debate.¹⁶⁹⁵

Despite those mostly positive perceptions about the Alders negotiations, and despite the fact that final conclusions could only be drawn after the experiment had been carried out (approx. at the end of 2012), political unrest on different governmental levels was growing. For example, politicians of the Groen Links party working for the Municipality of Amsterdam argued that the new system was rather vague. To them, it appeared that local residents of Amsterdam would even get less guarantees about the amount of flights that would run over their backyards.¹⁶⁹⁶ Moreover, the overall amount of people and houses exposed to serious noise pollution would diminish, but this would come at the expense of increasing levels above other locations in Amsterdam (e.g. Osdorp, Geuzenveld, Slotermeer), which was deemed unacceptable. The two different groups of local residents that had been fighting ever since the Alders negotiations of

¹⁶⁹² 'Schiphol speelt mooi weer', Trouw, August 20th 2010.

¹⁶⁹³ Interview Van Ojik / Paap / Geerdink / local residents, 2010; Interview Kolpa / De Jong / policymakers municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam, 2010.

¹⁶⁹⁴ Interview Laeven / Secretary Schiphol EIA Committee, 2010.

¹⁶⁹⁵ Interview Laeven / Secretary Schiphol EIA Committee, 2010.

¹⁶⁹⁶ 'Groen Links vindt akkoord Schiphol vaag', Parool 26th August 2010.

September 2008 attempted to mobilize support for their respective perspectives on the VVA system (for or against).¹⁶⁹⁷

In the end, the final decision about whether or not to continue with the experiment was postponed. At that time, the formation of a new cabinet was still going on (elections had been held on June 9th 2010), and a majority of the members of the Lower House had agreed to label the Schiphol file a ‘controversial file’. According to Dutch law, a caretaking (interim) cabinet is not allowed to make decisions about issues that have been declared controversial issues. This implied that both the extension of capacity at Eindhoven and the enactment of the experiment were postponed until later order.¹⁶⁹⁸ However, on October 14th a new cabinet was established (Rutte I), that was also very much in favor of further mainport development.¹⁶⁹⁹ The Schiphol issue was no longer controversial and the initial timing of the experiment could proceed. Thus, on November 1st the new Secretary of State of the new Ministry of V&W (which was now labeled the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment = Infrastructuur en Milieu) gave the kick off for the experiment.¹⁷⁰⁰

In the meantime, the tensions between AirFrance/KLM and Schiphol were growing. Schiphol wanted to raise the rates for transfer passengers (thus increasing the visiting costs for the airline). At the same time, Schiphol did not want to raise the rates for low cost carriers. This would make the airport more attractive for low cost operations, and business was still booming on the low cost market (and not on the hub market). AirFrance/KLM was not amused about this proposal. According to the Dutch CEO of AirFrance/KLM such measures would undermine KLM’s hub operations. As this was still considered to be the heart of the mainport strategy, this would greatly harm the competitive position of the Netherlands as a whole.¹⁷⁰¹ Moreover, in the Alders advice for the mid term the different actors had clearly decided to facilitate selective mainport development, thus merely focusing on facilitating hub development. According to Schiphol Group, the change in rates would neither influence the hub operations of AirFrance/KLM, nor the mainport position of Schiphol. Nonetheless, as a consequence of political pressure Schiphol announced the rates would not be changed before further research was carried out to assess the real impact on the competitive position of AirFrance/KLM and Schiphol’s mainport status.¹⁷⁰² For the time being, the prevailing rates would remain in place. This, in turn, was not accepted by easyJet who argued that transferring passengers had been subsidized and favored far too long already at

¹⁶⁹⁷ See for example ‘Doodgepolderd Schiphol-verzet’ Volkskrant, August 28th 2010.

¹⁶⁹⁸ TK 29665, September 15th 2010, Nr.155.

¹⁶⁹⁹ See for example Coalition Agreement VVD –CDA (Rutte I) ‘Vrijheid en verantwoordelijkheid’, October 2010, p.11.

¹⁷⁰⁰ Press Release Rijksoverheid ‘Atsma geeft startsein voor nieuw geluidsstelsel Schiphol’, November 1st 2010.

¹⁷⁰¹ ‘KLM topman kwaad op Schiphol’, ANP October 9th 2010.

¹⁷⁰² ‘Schiphol stelt wijziging tariefstructuur uit’, ANP October 27th 2010.

Schiphol. From their perspective, this had caused unfair competition between AirFrance/KLM and all other airlines serving Schiphol. Postponing the introduction of the new rates was therefore a clear sign that Schiphol was favoring its main client, i.e. AirFrance/KLM, or so it seemed from the perspective of easyJet. easyJet would not accept this false competition any longer and started to complain about this by the European Commission, who was to ensure a level playing field.¹⁷⁰³

8.12 Decision Making about the long term (2006 – 2009)

		2003 - 2006			
Cabinet’s Perspective 2003 – 2006 8.3 – 8.9					
	Long term (PMS) – 8.3				
	Evaluation Program – 8.4 – 8.9				
	8.4	Preparing the evaluation			
	8.5	Carrying out the evaluation	Equivalence – 8.5.1		
			Effectiveness – 8.5.2		
			Proposals – 8.5.3		
			Advices – 8.5.4		
			CDV – 8.5.5		
		Evaluation Report – 8.5.6			
	8.6	Night Fights			
	8.7	Group Risk			
8.8	Housing locations				
Cabinet’s Perspective – 8.9					
			2007	2008	2009
Alders Table 2006 – 2009 8.10 – 8.11			Short term < 2010) – 8.10		
			Mid term < 2020 – 8.11		
Long term 2006 – 2009 8.12			Long term > 2025 – 8.12		

In the Cabinet’s Perspective of April 2006 it was announced that Schiphol would be asked to explore the possibilities for long-term development at the current location. The main reason to do so were the capacity problems that were being expected to emerge somewhere during 2015/2025 – 2030. But there were at least two more reasons. First, the province of North Holland had insisted on providing clarity about the construction of a 6th and/or 7th runway. The spatial reservation for a 6th east-west runway (*parallelle Kaagbaan*) was ending on April 1st 2008 and by that time the province demanded a straightforward answer. From their perspective, extending the reservation option for the third time in a row (i.e. they had already extended it two times) undermined the credibility of the local politicians. Second, on the national level the spatial-economic

¹⁷⁰³ ‘easyJet stapte naar de Europese Commissie om tarieven Schiphol’ ANP, October 29th 2010.

development strategy was further elaborated (see 8.10.1) and further development of Lelystad Airport was perceived to be a serious option to relieve Schiphol. This was first stressed in the Northwing letter that was published by the six ministries involved (V&W, VROM, Economic Affairs, Agriculture, Finance and Internal Affairs).¹⁷⁰⁴ Especially the potential tension between investments in housing locations in the municipality of Almere adjoining Lelystad airport, and further development of Lelystad Airport were in need of further exploration. Moreover, the letter contained eight spatial-economic projects that were to be carried out to strengthen the international competitive position of the Randstad, and the North Wing of the Randstad in particular. Later, the new cabinet Balkenende IV that had been installed in February 2007 explicitly mentioned in its coalition agreement that the Lelystad option was to be explored in the upcoming years (as we saw in the previous paragraph the Lelystad option played an important role in the Alders debate about the mid-term).¹⁷⁰⁵ For all these reasons, it was important to make a decision about the long term. This decision making process also unravelled within a national policy context that strongly favoured investments in the competitive position of the Randstad region, as had been the case for the debates about the short and mid-term development of Schiphol (see 8.10).

Nonetheless, this long term process received far less political and public attention than the Alders negotiations. We therefore discuss the process in a less detailed way. In this paragraph we first discuss the long term perspective that was developed by the Schiphol Group (8.12.1). Next, the Ministries of V&W and VROM took over the decision making (8.12.2). The main decisions are discussed in 8.12.3, whereas the aftermath of the decisions is discussed in 8.12.4.

8.12.1 The Perspective of the Schiphol Group (May 2007)

In May 2007 Schiphol Group presented its perspective on the long-term development, which was called 'A worldwide network for a competitive Randstad'. Schiphol developed the report in close cooperation with AirFrance/KLM and ATC. The results had also been discussed with the BRS actors, who were working on their own long-term perspective at the same time.¹⁷⁰⁶ In the report the core assumptions about future trends in aviation were presented, including the possibilities for adequately dealing with them. We already discussed the main points of the report in the former paragraphs, as the perspective also served as input for the Alders negotiations about the short and mid-term. This was quite logical, since the long term development was to build upon the short and mid-term investments.

¹⁷⁰⁴ Noordvleugelbrief, August 2006.

¹⁷⁰⁵ Regeringsakkoord Balkenende 4, February 7th 2007, p.16.

¹⁷⁰⁶ Interview Van Duin / Former policy maker Province of North Holland, 2007.

The long term perspective of Schiphol was part of the broader new corporate strategy. The obvious link to the Randstad was based on the idea that Schiphol development and Randstad development mutually reinforced one another, a message that Schiphol had already been posing for several years and that was reflected in its Airport City strategy. However, the revised corporate strategy was based on a reframing of the AirportCity strategy. It was both broadened and deepened at the same time.¹⁷⁰⁷ According to the airport authority three aspects were important for future mainport development:¹⁷⁰⁸

1. *A high quality worldwide network configuration:* With regard to this issue the Schiphol Group cooperated with AirFrance/KLM in order to optimize operations. This network development was the primary concern of the airline. More specifically, AirFrance/KLM wanted to continue its hub-operations at Schiphol and for this a minimum peak capacity of 80 flights an hour was deemed necessary. As we have seen, this requirement was one of the reasons that AirFrance/KLM and Schiphol rejected the alternative that the ATC had proposed during the short term negotiations at the Alders table. Second, a swift implementation of the Single European Sky was also deemed of crucial importance for this;¹⁷⁰⁹
2. *A competitive airport:* With regard to this, the Schiphol Group continued to invest in landside development, in line with its Airport City strategy that had been initiated in 1998. More specifically, Schiphol wanted to become a Green Airport City, for which a deepening of the strategy was deemed necessary.¹⁷¹⁰ Climate change had become a key concern of the airport.¹⁷¹¹ Becoming a climate neutral airport was now one of the important concerns of the airport.¹⁷¹² This was reflected in the production of a Climate Plan (December 2007), wherein reducing CO² pollution was an important goal.¹⁷¹³ Investments in cleaner gasses and greener energy, for which a special plan of approach was developed, was to contribute to this.¹⁷¹⁴ The Perspective on Sustainable mobility that was to reduce the amount of car traffic was also part of this strategy. Finally, according to Schiphol the construction of a 6th runway was essential for reducing Schiphol's contribution to climate change, since it allowed for more efficient flights routes and procedures;

¹⁷⁰⁷ Interview van Boxtel / Schiphol Group, 2010.

¹⁷⁰⁸ Cerfontaine, G. & M. Schaafsma, 2009.

¹⁷⁰⁹ Bruggeman, 2009.

¹⁷¹⁰ Schiphol Group (2008), Annual Report 2007.

¹⁷¹¹ More specifically, it had become a key concern of many large companies in the Netherlands. For example, when Al Gore visited the Netherlands to promote his 'Inconvenient Truth', 80 CEO's of leading multinationals (including Schiphol) signed a letter of intent to reduce CO² pollution. See for example 'Iedereen wil plotseling ook een beetje Al Gore zijn', Volkskrant, November 1st 2006.

¹⁷¹² Interview van Boxtel / Schiphol Group, 2010.

¹⁷¹³ Schiphol Group (2007), Klimaatplan.

¹⁷¹⁴ Schiphol Group (2008), Blauwdruk Energie.

3. *A competitive region:* With regard to this the need for an integrated spatial-economic development strategy for the entire region was emphasized, implying a broadening of the Airport City strategy. The Airport City was now to become an Airport Corridor, linking the different business locations of the region together. The Airport Corridor was part of the metropolitan strategy that was developed by the municipalities of Amsterdam and Haarlemmermeer and the province of North Holland. The Airport Corridor concerned a large area with a high quality business environment, wherein airport and non-airport related business activities were integrated. In order to facilitate this process, the Schiphol Group and the local and regional authorities were working on a revised version of the REVS (*Ruimtelijk Economische Visie Schipholregio*) that had been developed in 2001 in order to coordinate the development of business locations and industrial sites until 2030. Instead of developing competing sites, synergies were sought after through adequate coordination. The concept of the revised REVS was presented in 2009.¹⁷¹⁵

The strategy to deepen and broaden the Airport City strategy, and to link this strategy to green/sustainable airport development, a selective but high quality hub-airline network and the competitive position of the Randstad matched perfectly with the ambitions of the national government (recall 8.10.1) and the ambitions of the local and regional authorities (i.e. their metropolitan strategy). The shared concern was to strengthen the competitive position of the (North Wing) of the Randstad, for which sustainable and selective AirportCity development was deemed of crucial importance. As we have seen in the previous paragraphs, this shared perspective proved to be an effective point of departure for the Alders negotiations about the short and mid term development of Schiphol, which eventually resulted in widely supported advices.

8.12.2 A problem analysis (October 2007)

The network perspective served as a point of departure for assumptions about future traffic volumes and related environmental and spatial effects. The Ministries of V&W and VROM took over the initiative again and used the network perspective for the creation of a problem analysis for long-term development.¹⁷¹⁶ The problem analysis was the first step in the development of a long term policy perspective on aviation in the Netherlands. The main aim of the analysis was to discern the bottlenecks related to further enactment of the dual objective in the long term, based on assumptions about future developments (i.e. 2015/2025 – 2030).

¹⁷¹⁵ REVS, 2009.

¹⁷¹⁶ Ministries of V&W and VROM (2007), Final Report Problem Analysis Long term Development, October 2007; See also TK 29665, October 18th 2007Nr. 71.

In the problem analysis, the main bottleneck was defined as to find ways to balance and mutually reinforce further hub development (airside) and improvement of the quality of the living environment on the landside. This included finding sufficient space for high quality office and industrial sites, ways to deal with negative environmental effects, a sufficient housing stock and adequate landside accessibility.¹⁷¹⁷ In short, the bottleneck consisted of making proper trade offs between the dual objectives. The dual objective was now defined in terms of fostering mainport development and developing a multi-airport system (economic) and reducing negative external effects and improving the quality of the living environment (environmental/spatial). Both aspects were perceived to be of pivotal importance for strengthening the competitive position of the North Wing and the Randstad as a whole. The inclusion of the idea of a multi-airport system was related to the negotiations about the mid-term at the Alders table, where relocation of flights to regional airports became a more and more serious part of the advice.

The problem analysis was based on several research projects, like the assessment of the societal-economic value of Schiphol, which included a brainstorm session with many stakeholders and experts,^{1718 1719} an international benchmark¹⁷²⁰, research about airport systems¹⁷²¹ and research about selectivity measures.¹⁷²² The national independent planning agencies (CPB, MNP and RPB) and the Knowledge Institute for Mobility of the Ministry of V&W (*Kennisinstituut Mobiliteit*, KiM) were asked for advice about the completeness and validity of the problem analysis. In their joint advice the four agencies had only some minor recommendations (i.e. adopt a longer time horizon, use more traffic scenarios, make a Cost Benefit Analysis).¹⁷²³ Most importantly, they tried to bring back the location issue (i.e. were to locate further development) on the agenda. The question about the desirability of future development was not an issue anymore, but the question of where and how to accommodate further growth was. It was deemed wise to investigate more alternatives for future development than the five that were discussed in the report and that had been developed by Schiphol. For example, the national government was exploring the possibilities for further development of several regional airports (Maastricht-Aachen, Eindhoven, Twente, Groningen, Lelystad, Rotterdam), and the Province of North Holland explored possibilities for an Airport in the North Sea, a new European Airport in sea (Megahub), different alternatives for new runway systems

¹⁷¹⁷ Ministries of V&W and VROM (2007), Final Report Problem Analysis Long term Development, October 2007. p.8-9.

¹⁷¹⁸ TNO & SEO, 2007, Maatschappelijk-economische analyse Mainport Schiphol.

¹⁷¹⁹ Ecorys, 2007.

¹⁷²⁰ Strategem & Adecs Air Infra, 2007, Internationale Benchmark capaciteitsontwikkeling luchthavens.

¹⁷²¹ SEO, 2007, Luchthavensystemen.

¹⁷²² The author participated in the brainstorming session. His main observation was that the old arguments that had already been posed over and over again by the stakeholders dominated the session. The trade off between environment and capacity, more specifically between noise and hub-development, dominated the debate.

¹⁷²³ Advice on Problem Analysis, 28th September 2007: TK 29665, Nr.71; appendix 2.

at Schiphol, a new airport in the Markerwaard¹⁷²⁴ and the planning agencies had explored shrinkage of Schiphol, closure during night time or optimization of existing capacity.^{1725 1726} Furthermore, the potential of military airfields for civil aviation were to be taken into account. From the perspective of the joint agencies, all those different alternatives were to be taken up for serious consideration by the national government when deciding upon future long term development, instead of limiting oneself to the five Schiphol options.¹⁷²⁷

In another document the national government argued that several of those options for a new airport / additional capacity had already been explored and rejected in the past.¹⁷²⁸ Besides, shrinkage or closure of Schiphol was not an option for the cabinet, as was made clear in the several strategic national policy documents. So, the main focus was on further development of Schiphol, if possible in relation with the development of other Dutch regional airports. In a direct response to the advice of the joint planning agencies, the Minister of V&W acknowledged the need to use several scenarios and to make use of a CBA in the remainder of the process.¹⁷²⁹ The next step was to further explore different solutions for achieving the dual objective on the long term.

Exploring long term development options

On March 25th 2008 the Ministries of V&W and VROM sent the report with the results of the further exploration of long-term development options to the Lower House.¹⁷³⁰ It was explicitly stated that the long-term perspective of Schiphol (report of 2007) served as an important input for the study.¹⁷³¹ Furthermore, the four scenarios about the future aviation market that had been developed back in 2006 by the Ministries of V&W, VROM and Economic Affairs, in close cooperation with the planning agencies, were used to assess the effects of the selected options. In short, according to the Ministries the following four scenarios were possible (see figure 8.16):

1. Global Economy: Strong economic growth, strong demand for aviation, further development of the hub-and-spoke system at Schiphol;
2. Strong Europe: Slower economic growth on European level, slower growth of aviation, but Schiphol maintains its hub position;

¹⁷²⁴ Provincie Noord-Holland, 2007, Vestigingslocaties Schiphol; Een globale verkenning voor de lange termijn; Interview Van Duin / Former policymaker Province North Holland, 2007.

¹⁷²⁵ Ruimtelijk Planbureau, 2007, De toekomst van Schiphol; Interview Gordijn / Researcher RPB and KIM, 2009.

¹⁷²⁶ Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau, 2006, Opties voor het Schipholbeleid.

¹⁷²⁷ Advice on Problem Analysis, 28th September 2007: TK 29665, Nr.71; appendix 2.

¹⁷²⁸ Ministries of V&W and VROM (2007), Strategische Agenda Randstad 2040.


¹⁷²⁹ TK 29665, Nr. 71.

¹⁷³⁰ TK 29665, March 25th 2008, Nr.85.

¹⁷³¹ Ministries of V&W and VROM (2008), Verkenning Lange Termijn Schiphol, 2008; p.4.

3. Transatlantic Market: Strong economic growth, strong growth in demand for aviation, especially due to growth of the Europe-US connections, Schiphol maintains its hub position, but falls behind on other European hubs, since the transfers stagnate;
4. Regional Communities; Slow economic growth, almost no new demand for aviation, Schiphol loses its hub-position, since the transfers disappear.

Figure 8.16 Four views on Schiphol



Source: Cabinet’s Perspective (2006), p.17

Next, it was assessed to what extent further mainport development and improvement of the competitive position of the region were achieved in each scenario. The criteria used in the scenario policy assessment were:¹⁷³²

1. Mainport development: Capacity shortages, Quality of the airline network, hub-operations / hub-status;
2. Competitive position landside: Quality of the business environment, spatial pressure, employment market, housing market, Mobility / landside accessibility.

Options to deal with the potential issues were subdivided into three categories:¹⁷³³

1. Reconfiguration Schiphol location (i.e. a 6th runway)
2. Relocation options (i.e. Lelystad, other regional airports, military fields)
3. Other alternatives (i.e. airport in North sea, Tweede Maasvlakte, shrinkage strategy)

The Ministries had thus acknowledged the need to include a far bigger range of long term development alternatives, as had been advised by the different planning agencies in their joint advice. In the remainder of the process, the costs and benefits of the

¹⁷³² Ministries of V&W and VROM (2008), Verkenning Lange Termijn Schiphol, 2008; p.12 & 16.
¹⁷³³ Ministries of V&W and VROM (2008), Verkenning Lange Termijn Schiphol, 2008; p.23.

different options were mapped and compared, which resulted in some main decisions about the long term development of Schiphol.¹⁷³⁴

8.12.3 Main decisions: Space for a 6th runway and further exploration Lelystad and Eindhoven

With regard to further development at the current Schiphol location, it was concluded that there were several fruitful options available, like developing a six or even seven runway system. For this reason the Ministries advised to extend the spatial reservation for the creation of a 6th (east-west) runway (*parallelle Kaagbaan*) one more time. The province of North Holland was asked to update the Regional Plan once again as the current option was expiring in April 2008. According to the Ministries, maintaining the option was still a no-regret strategy.¹⁷³⁵ With regard to Lelystad airport it was concluded that there were certainly opportunities for further growth. However, there were also other possible locations within the province of Flevoland, which implied a relocation of Lelystad Airport. Eindhoven and some other military airfields also offered some potential for increasing capacity, as did the airport of Twente. The other regional airports did not hold any potential and were therefore not taken up for further consideration. The focus was merely on the creation of a multi airport system in the Netherlands. The growth potential of fast growing airports just outside the Netherlands, like the airport of Weeze in Germany, were not taken into account. Some experts deemed this rather strange, as it obviously influenced the potential of development of the Dutch regional airports.¹⁷³⁶

The issue of an airport in the North Sea was brought back on the agenda by the province of North Holland. Increasing spatial pressure on the Schiphol region was the main reason for this. The option even got a boost when a majority of the Lower House wanted to conduct further research about land reclamation in the North Sea.¹⁷³⁷ However, this land was then not to be used for an airport, but for nature and recreation in order to compensate for the lack of possibilities in the northern area of the Randstad. Such a solution could also compensate for further development of Schiphol at the current location. In the end, the Ministries concluded that an airport in the North Sea still wasn't a realistic option. The reasons for this were the same as those used to legitimate the end of the Flyland research program back in 2003. The same held true for an airport on the Tweede Maasvlakte, that was also reconsidered, but rejected, as was the case in 1999. Finally, with regard to the no-growth / shrinkage option it was

¹⁷³⁴ Interview Abspoel / Ministry of V&W, 2008.

¹⁷³⁵ Ministries of V&W and VROM (2008), Verkenning Lange Termijn Schiphol, 2008; p.35.

¹⁷³⁶ Interview Gordijn / researcher RPB and KIM, 2009; See also television documentary of Zembla 'Luchtkasteel Twente', broadcasted on September 11th 2010.

¹⁷³⁷ Motie Atsma, 2007; 'Noordzeeland moet landhonger stillen', NRC November 7th 2007.

concluded that it would work to release much of the spatial pressure. At the same time, such shrinkage seriously endangered the network quality of Schiphol, which was highly deemed undesirable by the Ministries and the cabinet. Nonetheless, it was agreed that the danger of shrinkage was realistic, and this option was therefore not to be ignored. In the end, the cabinet decided to select four alternatives for further investigation about the long term development of aviation in the Netherlands.¹⁷³⁸

1. Business as usual (base-case): Here all measures that had been agreed upon at the Alders table were implemented in 2020, but no other infrastructure investments would be made;
2. Reconfiguration Schiphol (especially 6th east-west runway);
3. Multi-airport system (Lelystad, Eindhoven, other fields, which was in line with the initial outcomes of the Alders negotiations about the mid term);
4. No growth / shrinkage alternative

The councils of V&W and VROM had been asked to give advice about the report. In their advice, the councils emphasized the need to make clear choices and explain those choices in an understandable way. Thus, again not the choices in themselves, but the need for a transparent communication were seen as more important within the given context of troubled relationships. The title of the report (*Helder Kiezen, Keuzes Helder Maken* = Make Clear Choices, Making Choices Clear) reflected this message.¹⁷³⁹ The Councils asserted that a more selective focus had been adopted already, which made it unnecessary to hold so many different options open. According to the Councils Schiphol was to be used for accommodating hub-traffic, while non-hub traffic was to be relocated to regional and military airfields. Furthermore the Councils agreed with the decision to extend the land reservation for a 6th east-west runway and stressed the need for designing a new regulative system for noise, that was already made part of the broadened assignment of the Alders table. The Council also argued the need to pay more attention to the CO² issue (climate), which had been largely neglected during the discussion about long-term development.¹⁷⁴⁰ From the perspective of the Council, the Ministries should communicate these implicit decisions in a way that was much more transparent and clear.

8.12.4 Further elaboration of the decisions

The province of North Holland rejects the advice (March – April 2008)

The Ministry of V&W asked the Province of North Holland to voluntarily extend the

¹⁷³⁸ Ministries of V&W and VROM (2008), *Verkenning Lange Termijn Schiphol*, 2008; p.85.

¹⁷³⁹ Raad voor V&W en Raad voor VROM (2008), *Helder kiezen, keuzes helder maken*. See also TK 29665, Nr.85, Appendix 2.

¹⁷⁴⁰ Raad voor V&W en Raad voor VROM (2008), *Helder kiezen, keuzes helder maken*, p. 3-4.

spatial reservation for the 6th runway, which was to expire on April 1st 2008. However, after an initial approval, the provincial board reconsidered this and decided to turn the request down, thus not renewing the reservation. There were several reasons for this refusal. First, the political credibility of the Provincial board was at stake as extending the reservation for the third time in a row was perceived to undermine this credibility.¹⁷⁴¹ After all, during the second extension it had been promised that this would be the last time. Second, the desire of the BRS actors to find a better balance between mainport development and improvement of the quality of the living environment had made them more critical about further physical expansions at the current Schiphol location.¹⁷⁴² In sum, the space could be used for different purposes and there was no political support on the regional level for decisions that were associated with further physical expansion of Schiphol.

Minister of V&W overrules the rejection

In a response, the Ministry of V&W announced that they were going to overrule the decision, by taking up the land reservation in the Structure Perspective that was under development.¹⁷⁴³ The Structure Perspective was a new policy instrument that was part of the revised Spatial Planning Act (*Wet Ruimtelijke Ordening – WRO*). The Ministry of VROM had been preparing the new act since the early 2000s, because the old act (dating back to 1965) did not allow for adequately dealing with the current spatial and economic dynamics. The new Act permitted the national government to define land use plans for situations wherein national interests were at stake, or when regional and local actors could not agree on land use. It also implied that the national government could overrule regional decisions when they were perceived to contradict with national interests. In essence, the new Act provided the national government with a new instrument to speed up spatial-economic developments that were perceived to be of national interest. It was assumed that it would lead to shorter planning procedures with fewer moments for appeal.¹⁷⁴⁴ The new Spatial Act became effective on July 1st of 2008, which provided the national government with the means to overrule the decision of the province of North Holland. Which was exactly what was done.¹⁷⁴⁵ However, another local authority (i.e. the municipality of Haarlemmermeer) also raised concerns about the noise effects and the deteriorating quality of the living environment that would be caused by an additional 6th east-west runway. The Minister of V&W therefore promised the municipality to take these issues into account when making a final

¹⁷⁴¹ Province of North Holland (2008), Letter from the Province of North Holland to the Minister of Transportation, Nr.2008-19435, April 10th 2008.

¹⁷⁴² Interview Van Duin / Former policy maker of the Province of North Holland, 2007.

¹⁷⁴³ TK 29665, April 1st 2008, Nr.96.

¹⁷⁴⁴ Van Gils, M.K.A., M.G. Huys & B. de Jong (2009), *De Nederlandse Mainports Onder Druk*. Spectrum Uitgeverij, Houten.

¹⁷⁴⁵ TK 29665, October 2nd 2008, Nr.109.

decision about whether or not to lift the renewed option.¹⁷⁴⁶ Nonetheless, for the time being the spatial reservation was renewed.

Enacting the Lelystad alternative (2008)

With regard to Lelystad Airport the existing spatial restrictions of the Regional Plan of the province of Flevoland (in which the airport was located) needed to be removed in order to facilitate future growth. Further growth was only possible when the length of the runway was extended (from 1400 to 2100 meters) in order to accommodate larger aircrafts, noise limits were extended and the night regime was extended (allowing for flights in between 23.00 – 24.00). For this, both the Planning Key Decision about the Lelystad airport (2004, which also included a decision about Maastricht Aachen Airport) and the Regional Plan had to be revised. Moreover, solutions were to be found for the 60,000 houses that the municipality of Almere expected to build in the upcoming years. After it was concluded that the desired runway extension was possible, the legal procedure to change the law was set in motion.^{1747 1748}

Nonetheless, at the end of 2009 no final decisions were taken as regards the long term development of aviation in the Netherlands. Both the options for constructing a 6th east-west runway at Schiphol and extension of Lelystad Airport were up for further consideration. The long term perspective had become more and more integrated with the Alders negotiations about the mid-term, as a consequence of the lower traffic forecasts. As we have seen during the elaboration of the Alders advice, this made decision making for the period 2020 onwards less urgent. After all, the existing Schiphol runway configuration was expected to offer sufficient capacity for more years than initially expected. Next, there was sufficient capacity available at the regional airport of Eindhoven to alleviate Schiphol when necessary.¹⁷⁴⁹

8.13 Main outcomes of the Policy Debate (2003 – 2009)

The period 2003 – 2009 was characterized by two extensive policy programs. First, during 2003 – 2006 the cabinet developed a perspective on the short, mid and long term future of Schiphol. Second, the perspective was elaborated during an intensive period of

¹⁷⁴⁶ Minister of V&W (2008), Letter from the Minister of Transportation to the municipality of Haarlemmermeer, V&W/DGLM-2008/1225, October 2nd 2008.

¹⁷⁴⁷ TK 29665, March 31st 2009, Nr.138.

¹⁷⁴⁸ TK 29665, May 27th 2008, Nr.99.

¹⁷⁴⁹ By May 2011 things had become more clear as regards the possibilities for expanding regional airports in the Netherlands. We already mentioned the intention of Schiphol Group to invest in Lelystad Airport, which was supported by the Province of Flevoland (See e.g. Press Release Province of Flevoland 'Luchthaven Lelystad gaat voor zelfstandige, stapsgewijze ontwikkeling', May 17th 2011). As regards Eindhoven Airport it was decided by the partners involved in the negotiations that the airport was to expand its operations with 25,000 flights per year until 2020, in line with the Alders advice about the mid term (See e.g. Press Release Rijksoverheid 'Eindhoven Airport mag groeien met 25,000 extra vliegbewegingen'), issued on December 14th 2010).

negotiations between several stakeholders and policy makers about the short term and mid term (the Alders table). The decision making about the long term followed its own trajectory from 2006 onwards, although it often intervened with the negotiations about the short and mid term.

Cabinet's Perspective 2003 – 2006

The first period was brought to an end in the summer of 2006 after three years of intensive policy making. The new regulative system had been revised as a consequence of the child diseases that had come to light right after its implementation and the revised system was evaluated. During the extensive evaluation process it was concluded that the system offered equal protection as the old PKB system would have done, but that considerable improvements could be made. Stakeholders had submitted an overwhelming amount of proposals for improvements, and some of them were selected for further investigation. Amongst other things, a special Act that allowed for temporary experiments was to be developed. The issues that had been postponed during the preparation of the Schiphol Act (1999 – 2002) were partly settled during the evaluation period. It was decided that the night regime was not to be extended from 6 AM – 7 AM and that the need to include a standstill for Group Risk was to get removed from the Act. Moreover, no norm for Group Risk would be developed. Instead, a statistical causal model was to be developed that would make it possible to design policy measures that lowered the probability of aircraft accidents. Besides, some additional spatial prohibitions for locating companies were established. The amount of houses that the Ministry of VROM had requested could be honored, partly by lifting the construction ban on the location Hoofddorp West. The desired perspective on the long term had not been finished yet. Right from the start it had not been clear what the long-term process was meant to deliver. It resulted in a discontinuous process, with several replaced project leaders and changing objectives. Moreover, the long term process was not adequately linked to the evaluation process, which complicated the integration of the final results.

The final Cabinet's perspective was presented in April 2006, wherein it was stated that the dual objective was still to serve as the backbone of national Schiphol policy. Mainport development was still perceived to be of pivotal importance for the Dutch economy and especially for the competitive position of the (North Wing) of the Randstad. It implied further hub development, although not all traffic was to be facilitated in the near future. Schiphol would especially be used for hub related traffic, which implied a selective approach to mainport development. Moreover, it implied further investments in the business environment, resulting in high quality offices and industrial sites in the vicinity of the airport and a high quality living environment. Both were in line with the ambitions of the regional and local public authorities, although they were also stressing the need to restore the balance between mainport development

and improving the quality of the living environment. According to them, and several environmental interest groups and platforms of local residents, the latter had been ignored during the past decade and tended to be ignored again if the Cabinet's Perspective was carried out. Therefore, these parties had been working on their own policy measures while the national government was preparing the Cabinet's Perspective. The mainport strategy was replaced by the Metropolitan Strategy. Previously, mainport development was facilitated and the regional spatial-economic investment strategy was based on this. Airport development therefore worked to structure the spatial development strategy. With the introduction of the metropolitan strategy the roles were reversed. It was first determined what kind of regional spatial-economic development was desired and only then it was decided what kind of airport was needed for this. This implied a broader perspective, and the planning area was also broadened aiming for an integral spatial-economic development of the North Wing of the Randstad (instead of the immediate surroundings of the airport). By making mainport development subordinate to regional development the regional and local public authorities tried to restore the balance between the dual objectives. Moreover, it would contribute to bringing the years of ad hoc policy to an end. Instead of constantly responding to uncertain developments on the aviation market, the regional spatial economic development strategy served as the leading strategy.

The lack of balance between the dual objectives was not the only criticism that was posed during 2003 – 2006. Along the way, an enormous amount of information was brought into the debate, showing that the dual objectives could not be met simultaneously, that noise could be measured and that those levels were higher than the calculated levels, that the calculation methods had many flaws, that the outer areas lacked legal protection against noise pollution, that it was impossible to both improve the noise situation in both the inner and the outer areas at the same time, that the juridical design of the Schiphol Act (it was not a PKB decision) offered less legal safeguards, that Group Risks were increasing to unacceptable levels, that a standstill for Group Risk was out of the reach and that CO² pollution was ignored during the debate. In short, the entire process was criticized for violating the many promises of the PKB of 1995 and the conclusions of the evaluation (i.e. the PKB system and the new system offered equal protection) were deemed to be invalid by many actors involved and based on a dubious framing of the evaluation and dubious outcomes of calculations. According to several actors involved, the cabinet had ignored too much of this information when drawing up the perspective, which had resulted in a too one-sided orientation in favor of the mainport objective (e.g. local residents, environmental interest groups, lower governmental authorities, the Ministry of VROM, several renowned researchers, several advisory committees - like the EIA committee, the Committee with Noise Experts/CDV and the Process Committee that monitored the evaluation - and on some occasions also by the aviation sector). The sense of urgency to

do something about those things increased, but the same was true for the need to further facilitate selective hub development, as several limiting values of enforcement points were exceeded in 2006 and 2007. During the period 2006 – 2009 several decisions were made to deal with both the problems on the short and mid term.

The Alders-table 2006 – 2009 (short and mid-term)

The cabinet had asked the aviation sector to elaborate the policy measures for the short, mid and long term. This proposal received great resistance and the policy strategy was revised. It was acknowledged that future policy needed to be sustained by a wide variety of actors involved and proposals of the aviation sector were unlikely to hold such support. Therefore, a far more interactive policy process was the result, wherein the different stakeholders would negotiate about the short and mid term future of Schiphol, which was to be managed by an independent chairman. It illustrated the willingness of the aviation sector to cooperate with the local and regional actors. They recognized that they needed their support in order to facilitate further growth. Before, the aviation sector could always rely on the cabinet, favoring mainport development. But due to the fact that the resistance against unfettered mainport development had increased as a consequence of the many unfulfilled promises, the more prominent roles that the BRS actors and local residents started to play and the increasing insistence of the national government to decentralize policy making, the aviation sector became more dependent on other actors. This gave rise to the Alders table, named after Alders who had been assigned to chair the negotiations.

During the Alders table the Ministries involved, the BRS parties, the CROS and the aviation sector were represented. The CROS representatives included local residents. It was the first time that the aviation sector and the local residents were negotiating in a formal policy making process about Schiphol. The local residents even developed their own alternative that was taken into account during the negotiations. During the short term discussion it was agreed to change some of the limiting values in order to prevent short term capacity problems. At that time, Schiphol had been violating the noise limits at several locations and for the first time in history there was a majority in the Lower House that wanted to enforce the limits. Further violations could only be tolerated if the Alders actors would unanimously support a repaired system, which was exactly what happened. Indeed, even the local residents involved in the negotiations agreed to this, but the local residents that were organized in 26 platforms (grassroots organizations) who had not been involved in the negotiations were not pleased about this. It brought the issue of representation to the fore. How to deal with the local residents? Who represented whom? How to create a valid representation? The displeased local residents claimed a seat for the mid-term negotiations, which was granted to them.

During the mid-term discussion the most important decisions were taken for further development of Schiphol until 2020. A capacity limit was established (510,000 flight at Schiphol, 70,000 flight spread over regional airports). In the meantime, the regulative system had been declared bankrupt by the Lower House, after the next controversy about the calculation method had emerged. The Lower House had broadened the Alders assignment, and assigned him to chair the development of an alternative system that would bring the problems about the limiting values to an all time ending. During the negotiations a new systematic was developed, without limiting values in enforcement points, but with precise appointments about runway use, flight routes and procedures (i.e. the flying according to appointments, *Vliegen Volgens Afspraak*, VVA system).

During the final decision making almost all actors agreed with the new capacity limits and the VVA system. However, the local resident representing the 26 platforms feared a further loss of legal protection and they rejected the advice. After some turmoil they left the negotiations and the advice was presented as a unanimous advice. The negotiations were declared a great success, both by all actors involved and by the Minister of V&W acting on behalf of the national government. During the further enactment of the advice several problems emerged. First, AirFrance/KLM and Schiphol didn't want to hurry up too much with investments as there was still sufficient capacity available at the Schiphol location as a consequence of the decreasing traffic numbers that were caused by the worldwide financial crisis. Second, the negotiations with the regional airports proved to be more difficult than initially expected, as a lot of resistance was mobilized. Third, the elaboration of the new regulative system too brought more technical and societal problems along than initially expected. Especially the question how to make sure that the level of legal protection would not deteriorate proved to be a difficult one. By the end of 2009, no final decisions were made, and it remained yet to be seen what part of the Alders advice would eventually be enacted. During 2010 the new regulative system was finally presented, but it was first to be tested during the upcoming years before it could be assessed whether it provided a sufficient level of legal protection. If so, it would replace the existing regulative system in the Schiphol Act and Decrees. Autumn 2010 the experiment with the new system was finally beginning and all actors that had been part of the Alders table around Schiphol were proud on this. Indeed, even in other countries the success of the Alders negotiations had not gone unnoticed and several foreign delegations (e.g. from France) visited the Netherlands to learn from the approach. Meanwhile, Schiphol wanted to further facilitate the booming low cost market as part of a robust airside corporate strategy, which triggered furious responses of AirFrance/KLM. The latter argued that this would greatly endanger their hub and spoke operations, with devastating consequences for the competitive position of the Dutch economy. The tension came to the fore when Schiphol announced to increase the taxes on transferring passengers (thus increasing the visiting costs for AirFrance/KLM). Due to heavy protests of AirFrance/KLM and political pressure the measure was

postponed and anno 2011 the effects of the new fares on hub and spoke operations are still under investigation.

In the meantime, the usual disconfirming evidence was brought forward, as had been done during the entire Schiphol debate from 1989 onwards. Despite the fact that several issues had been settled during 2003 – 2009, the calculation methods, the increasing Group Risks, the lack of protection of the outer areas and the extended night regime were further criticized. The increasing Group Risk was tolerated, as it was in the interest of almost all actors to attract companies in the vicinity of the airport, as long as adequate spatial measures for a few hotspots would be implemented. With regard to measuring noise, the Ministry of V&W kept on arguing that the measurement results were still not valid. In autumn 2009 the Ministry had organized an information meeting for the CROS members discussing the state of art about measuring. During this meeting the argument was repeated. However, one noise expert that had been measuring noise since 1989 had managed to attend the meeting (i.e. he was not invited, but a local resident informed him about the meeting). During the discussion he criticized the several arguments that were presented by the Ministry of V&W (i.e. that the sounds of the wind undermined the measurements, that the technology was lacking). The meeting was brought to a preliminary ending.¹⁷⁵⁰ From the perspective of the researchers and local residents, the affair had been illustrative for the way the Ministry of V&W, the aviation sector and the cabinet had been dealing with the issue of measuring noise for the past decades.

The debate about the long term

Finally, no decision had been made yet about whether or not to extend Schiphol with a 6th runway. That is, it had been decided that only one alternative held some future potential (i.e. the 6PK), and that space was to be reserved for this. The province of North Holland didn't want to reserve space in its Regional Plan for the third time in a row, but the Planning Act that had been revised made it possible for the national government to overrule this decision. Therefore, the land reservations for 6PK were extended in 2008. Nonetheless, it was already clear that the option was not to be lifted soon as a consequence of the enduring crisis and the low traffic volumes. This made it possible to decide in favour of the expansion of the regional road (N201), which had already been decided upon during the PASO/PKB debate. The problem was that the road passed through the area where a possible 6th and/or 7th runway was to be constructed. But the Minister of V&W also argued that the road would get demolished if the new runway was to get constructed after all in the future. It was expected that the road would be ready at the end of 2012.

¹⁷⁵⁰ Interview Griese / local resident, 2009; Interview Muchall / noise expert, 2009.

Final conclusions

It is clear that the he dual objective was reframed again during the period 2003 – 2009, although it stills served as the guiding principle for the entire policy making period. The policy context changed somewhat too. On the national level the focus was on improving the competitive position of the (North Wing) of the Randstad. On the regional level it was the metropolitan strategy that dominated the agenda, wherein regional development structured airport development instead of the other way around (as it used to be). From both strategies it was derived that selective hub development was desired. The revised corporate strategy of Schiphol (i.e. building airport cities and airport corridors) sat comfortably with this. The choice to become a selective mainport (not the biggest, but the best) was the most important decision related to the mainport objective. It resulted in the decision to update the limiting values of the enforcement points (short term), to set capacity limits to Schiphol (510,000 flights in 2020) and to decentralize non-hub related traffic (approx. 70,000 flights) (mid-term), to make spatial reservations for a possible 6th runway (6PK) including the related bans on housing (long term), but also to reserve sufficient spaces for attracting companies.

With regard to the environmental objective several actors argued that this objective had been ignored too much in the past. That is, the balance between the dual objectives needed to be restored. Amongst other things, this resulted in several investments that were meant to improve the quality of the living environment on the regional level. However, the initial ambitions of the environmental objective (as taken up in the PKB of 1995) were further lowered. The cabinet had made final decisions about not extending the night regime from 6 AM to 7 AM, about removing the standstill for Group Risk and about a new regulative system for noise without limiting values in enforcement points. With regard to the latter it remains yet to be seen whether or not the new regulative system for noise results in lower levels of legal protection. The evaluation of the new system is scheduled for 2012. The PKB promises of 1995 to measure noise and to protect the outer areas were still not fulfilled, as was the promise to substitute 5% of the short distance flights to the HST. The climate issue was taken more seriously by all actors involved, including the aviation sector parties, but many actors believe that, despite cleaner aircrafts and procedures, further growth of air traffic will eventually result in further increase of CO² levels. Finally, it remains yet to be seen what the many appointments that have been laid down in the Alders covenants are actually worth. By 2020 we can evaluate whether or not the celebrated outcomes of the Alders negotiations have been put into practice. For some, the outcomes of this evaluation are already clear. However, several other actors really believe that things have changed in a positive way, making sure that this time the promises about the dual objectives will be fulfilled.

Part III

Analysis, Conclusions & Recommendations

In this third and final part of the thesis we present our analysis, conclusions and recommendations. In chapter 9 we assess and explain the reproductive tendency of the Schiphol policy discourse (answering research question 2). In chapter 10 we discuss the potential of a genealogy for opening up a policy deadlock in general, and the possibilities for opening up the Schiphol policy deadlock in particular (answering research question 3). In the chapter 11 we discuss the added value of this thesis (research question 4) and we sum up our main conclusions. In our epilogue (chapter 12) we reflect upon some of the difficulties that other researchers willing to develop effective histories by means of the genealogical approach might have to deal with. In this finishing chapter we also present some of our wider reflections on the practices of policy making and democratic decision making

Before presenting our analysis one disclaimer should be repeated here. The answers provided to research questions 2 and 3 are based on our understanding and analysis of the case. We therefore don't claim to have uncovered some final truth, as such a thing is impossible and undesirable from a Foucauldian perspective. We merely claim to offer a thoroughly motivated and sophisticated understanding of what has been going on in the

Schiphol case in such a way that it can make a meaningful contribution to societal debate about the future of Schiphol. As argued throughout this thesis, people are invited and challenged to develop their own interpretations of the case. In line with the social constructivist and interpretive principles that underlie this thesis, people will give different meanings to the case and develop different analyses. Thus, we already know that the case means different things to different people. For example, as part of our validation procedure we discussed the results of our analysis as presented in chapter 9

with some of the people who have been participating in the Alders negotiations (e.g. the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W). From their perspective the policy deadlock has been loosened from 2007 onwards, thus arguing that the reproductive tendency has been greatly diminished from 2007 onwards. The existence of such different interpretations is not a problem, as long as the case description itself is not rejected. It merely illustrates that the case triggers the same ambiguous reactions as can be found in real life. This is important as it relates to the different perceptions and rationalities involved, which is an important precondition for making a meaningful contribution to the societal debate about Schiphol, thus turning the thesis into an effective history.

Chapter 9 Analyzing Schiphol's Policy Deadlock

9.1. Introduction

In this chapter we analyse Schiphol's policy deadlock by assessing and explaining the reproductive tendency of Schiphol's policy discourse, thus answering the second research question 'To what extent can reproduction in the Schiphol policy discourse be found and how can this reproductive tendency be explained?' It should be stressed once again that this is our interpretation of what is going on in the Schiphol case, and the analysis is based on our interpretation of Foucauldian genealogy as set out in chapters 2 and 3. We don't want to give the impression that this is the only true or valid interpretation, but we do argue that our knowledge claims can be derived from the case and are therefore valid interpretations.

In chapter 4 (paragraph 4.7) we discussed how we derived our analysis from the case narrative. In short, it means to properly enact the third step of the three step procedure that we presented in chapter 3. The first step (localizing events) and the second step (uncovering strategies and tactics involved in their emergence, institutionalization and marginalization and the factors influencing these strategies and tactics) formed the fundament of our case narrative. The third step, i.e. uncovering the interplay between micro-practices and the discursive order forms the backbone of the analysis, as this explains how power works in the reproduction of a specific policy discourse. This third step entails three substeps (recall 3.5 and 4.7).

- (1) We need to illuminate the discursive order and assess its level of reproduction. This can be done by determining the level of institutionalization of the discursive order in terms of its meta narrative that is both the result and the precursor of the many policy stories that characterize the policy domain and the discourse coalition(s) at work, referring to the coalitions of actors sustaining this meta narrative (9.2). Those shape the themes on the policy agenda and the specific way wherein actors are positioned vis-à-vis one another in the policy domain (recall figure 3.4).
- (2) We need to derive the micro-practices at work from the case description: as argued in chapters 3 and 4, regularities in strategies and tactics and their relatedness to specific conventions or obligations signify the existence of a particular practice (9.3);
- (3) We need to illuminate the interplay between these micro practices and the reproduction of the discursive order. Here we illuminate how the uncovered micro-practices give way to the uncovered discursive order and vice versa (9.4 – 9.5).

In this chapter we enact this third step. It is especially the third step that allows us to explain the reproductive tendency of the Schiphol policy discourse, i.e. how

Foucauldian power works in Schiphol policy domain. We finish the chapter with a short conclusion (9.6), answering the second research question of this thesis.

9.2 Step 1: Illuminating the Discursive Order

The discursive order on the level of a policy domain is always a construction of the researcher. Although we also argued that the translation from narrative to analysis always involves a creative leap, i.e. an uncodifiable step that relies on the insight and imagination of the researcher (cf. Langley, 1999; Weick, 1989), the discursive order can be developed in a rather systemized and transparent way. Indeed, as we have argued in chapter 3, when ways of talking (policy stories) and acting (strategies and tactics, roles, positions) become firmly institutionalized on the level of the different policy themes involved, they shape up to form a meta narrative on the level of the policy domain. The meta narrative is both the outcome and precursor of the policy themes on the agenda and the different storylines (both the winning and loosing ones) that are posed during the argumentative struggle about these policy themes. It is sustained by a discourse coalition, which includes the actors that support one or more of the storylines that sustain the meta narrative.

The meta narrative of Schiphol's policy discourse is derived from the regularities in policy themes on the agenda and the storylines posed around these policy themes (both the winning and loosing storylines) (9.2.1). The stable discourse coalition that sustained this meta narrative is discussed in 9.2.2. We end this paragraph with a short conclusion, arguing that the discursive order has remained remarkably stable during the period 1989 - 2009 (9.2.3).

9.2.1 The Meta Narrative: the Dual Objective

As part of our analysis we first categorized the different policy themes on the agenda and the many policy stories that were posed around these policy themes during 1989 – 2009. More specifically, the many different arguments that have been posed during those years, as described in the case study, have shaped up to form a set of policy stories around each policy theme (were those arguments were actually enacting the entire policy story by enacting only one aspect of this story). The results of this exercise are presented in appendix 1. To start with, during the past 20 years the same main policy themes have remained on the agenda (1) mainport development (2) noise (3) third party risk (4) local air pollution & stench (5) spatial development.¹⁷⁵¹ But the policy stories that have been posed around these policy themes, and the specific way these stories were positioned vis-à-vis one another (winning versus loosing) also remained rather stable. This latter analysis is in line with the conclusions of other authors who

¹⁷⁵¹ The theme of privatization was also important, but to a lesser extent.

uncovered some of the storylines involved the Schiphol policy debate (see Abma, 2001; Broër, 2006; Van Eeten, 1999; 2001; Huys & Kroesen, 2008). These stabilities in policy themes and the storylines around these themes and their positioning resulted in a rather stable meta narrative on the level of the policy domain. When all policy stories are taken into account it is clear that they share one fundamental principle. They all somehow relate to the political ambition of the dual objective. This gave way to the meta narrative of the dual objective. In chapter 1 we already argued that we were in the favourable position to already know some of the characteristics of this meta narrative, which we referred to in terms of the mainport – environment discourse (based on Broër, 2006). By means of our genealogy we can further define this meta narrative and validate its existence.

In essence, the dual objectives served as the initial starting conditions of the debate (back in 1989) and after its initial framing (as laid down in the PKB of 1995) it served as a frame of reference for setting the relevant policy themes on the agenda and for developing meaningful policy stories around these different policy themes. This, in turn, firmly influenced the policy decisions (outcomes) in the subsequent years, resulting in a further institutionalization of the dual objective on the level of the policy domain. Of course, the dual objective was necessary for starting up a debate in the first place. It turned the Schiphol debate into a multi issue game (see De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004), as the broad policy objectives made it attractive to other actors to get involved. Moreover, the inclusion of different problems and solutions that it entailed created possibilities for designing a package deal. This was important, as actors were mutually dependent on one another for realizing their respective goals, although these dependency relations were asymmetrical.¹⁷⁵²

Nonetheless, the credibility of the promise of the dual objective was greatly undermined when the years passed by. At several moments in time it seemed that the dual objectives could not be realized simultaneously. Indeed, several storylines have been developed around policy themes of noise and third party risk that warranted such a claim. However, these storylines were always countered by storylines that emphasized the feasibility and desirability of the dual objectives. It was not so much the dual objectives but the means to realize these that were deemed in need of change. As these latter storylines were always supported by a majority of actors (in terms of influence), the dual objectives remained in place. It did result in several attempts to improve the regulative system. However, as the main design principle that governed each attempt to revise the means for achieving the dual objective during 1998 - 2009 was the level of

¹⁷⁵² Package deals hold the promise of win-win solutions for each individual actor; the package should bring more 'gain' than 'loss', creating gain for each party and ensuring sufficient support for the package (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

equivalence, the underlying objectives were not discussed. Thus, new policy measures were deemed necessary (e.g. the policy regulations were to be released from their ‘absurdities’, new indicators were developed and assumptions of calculation models were changed), as long as they resulted in the realization of the dual objective as it was initially framed. The notion of equivalent protection therefore automatically reproduced the ideal of the dual objective. In essence, instead of discussing a replacement or adjustment of the ideal of the dual objective by new, more realistic and hence trustworthy objectives, the feasibility of the reconcilability of the initial dual objectives remained in place. Thus, the fundamental assumption that further mainport development and improvement of the environment (mainly understood in terms of noise) could go hand in hand remained in place. In the end, the specific way wherein the dual objective was framed has changed somewhat over the years, but by and large it can be concluded that the initial framing that was laid down in the PKB of 1995 has hardly changed (see table 9.1).

Table 9.1 Regularities in framing the dual objective during 1989 - 2009

Period	Dominant and marginalized storylines and actors posing them	Final Framing Dual objective
1989	Further growth of aviation and Schiphol without environmental deterioration was possible. Further growth was to be facilitated within the environmental conditions that were to be set.	In 1989 the dual objective was set out for the first time in the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning, wherein it was stated that ‘within the environmental conditions a maximum exploitation of the handling capacity of airplanes, passengers and freight of the airport Schiphol should remain possible. In spatial plans this needs to be taken into account and the construction of a fifth runway should not be made impossible’ (VROM, 1988a, p.185).
1989	It was difficult to assess the feasibility of the dual objective, as it was not yet clear what these environmental conditions exactly entailed. This needed to be clarified.	In part D of the Fourth Report on Spatial Planning the Ministry of VROM further clarified this by stating that one of the main preconditions was that future growth was to be facilitated within the interim contours for noise that were taken up in the Structuurschema Burgerluchtvaartterreinen (SBL Part D, 1988).
1990 - 1995	During the first calculations that were carried out during PASO, it came to the fore that the forecasted growth could not be facilitated within the contour. This was undesirable, as it would hamper the achievement of the mainport objective.	During PASO the dual objective was reformulated and in the final PASO report it was defined in terms of strengthening mainport development and improving the quality of the living environment of the Schiphol area (PASO, 1991). The notion that mainport development was to fit within the environmental conditions was left outside this new definition. This specific framing of the dual objective formed the point of departure of the entire PKB process. In the final PKB report (1995) the

		Cabinet repeated that it's main aims were to strengthen mainport development and improving the quality of the living environment in the vicinity of Schiphol (PKB Part 4, 1995; p.6).
1989 - 1995	<p>The main indicators for assessing the quality of the living environment were noise, third party risks, local air pollution and stench.</p> <p>The construction of a 5th runway was essential for improving the quality of the living environment. Therefore, different dual objectives were to be formulated for the short and mid term. The 5th runway was referred to as an Environmental Runway.</p> <p>An increased level of noise pollution on the short term was unacceptable.</p> <p>With regard to the mid-term the dual objective was realized as further mainport development went hand in hand with an improved situation as regards noise and a standstill for third party risk, local air pollution and stench.</p> <p>Developing a 5th runway would only allow for a partly realization of the dual objective. It might contribute to an improvement of the amount of people exposed to noise pollution, but it would worsen other environmental effects (local air pollution, third party risk).</p> <p>The specific way wherein the dual objective was framed was more given in by the desirability to reconcile both traffic growth and improvement of the quality of the living environment and not by making a realistic assessment of negative effects, nor by developing the system that offered most protection against negative environmental effects.</p>	Facilitating mainport development, improving the situation as regards noise, while establishing a standstill for third party risks, local air pollution and stench.
1995 - 1998	The dual objective could not be realized. However, this was not due to the irreconcilability of the dual objectives, but the consequence of the specific regulative system that had been developed. If the regulative system was released from its 'absurdities' the dual objectives could be	<p>A new regulative system was developed in order to realize the dual objectives as had been framed during 1989 – 1995.</p> <p>In its Strategic Policy Perspective of 1998 (SBTL, 1998) the Cabinet had decided that a new regulative system was to be developed for the five-</p>

	<p>realized. Therefore, there was need for a new regulative system that was more transparent and better enforceable.</p>	<p>runway system (2003 – 2015). The new system was to offer an equivalent level of protection as the old PKB system would have offered after implementation in 2003. Equivalent meant that the exact level of protection was not necessarily equal, as long as the PKB objectives were met. This implied that the dual objective served as the basic design principle for the new regulative system: facilitating mainport development, improving the situation as regards noise, while establishing a standstill for third party risks, local air pollution and stench.</p>
1999 - 2003	<p>The new regulative system needed to offer an equivalent level of protection as the old PKB system would have done. Therefore, it still made it possible to reconcile the initial dual objectives.</p> <p>The new regulative system would offer an equal level of protection. Equal did not mean 'the same'.</p> <p>The new regulative system did not offer an equal level of protection. The environmental part of the dual objective was dressed down. The dual objective could only be realized by reframing it (i.e. undermining the environmental objective).</p>	<p>The new regulative system made it possible to realize the initial dual objectives. As such, it offered an equivalent level of protection as the old PKB system had done.</p> <p>The new system was presented in the 1999 Nota of the Cabinet (TNL, Toekomst Nederlandse Luchtvaart, 1999). During the following 3 years, the new system was laid down in a new Aviation Act (the Schiphol Act) and two accompanying Decrees. The members of the Lower House and Upper House who were to ratify the new Act heavily doubted whether it offered an equivalent level of legal protection as the old PKB system would have done. They agreed to ratify the Act under one condition: that it was to be evaluated within three years whether or not the new regulative system really offered an equivalent level of protection.</p>
2003 - 2006	<p>The evaluation of the new regulative system showed that it offered an equivalent level of protection. And if equal protection was offered, it could be concluded that the system worked.</p> <p>The evaluation was framed in a specific way, making it possible to conclude that the dual objective was met.</p> <p>There were possibilities for improving the regulative system (i.e. it was inflexible and still not transparent), so the dual objectives could be realized in a more effective and efficient way.</p> <p>The dual objective could still be realized, but it needed to be understood in a different way. Instead of focusing on equivalence as the main design criterion,</p>	<p>The evaluation procedure was carried out during 2003 – 2006, and it was concluded that the new regulative system offered an equal level of protection as the old PKB system would have done. Nonetheless, almost all actors involved agreed that the regulative system was in need of improvements, as it did not offer the maximum level of protection, nor did it allow for maximum capacity. From autumn 2006 onwards, an interactive policy arrangement was established to negotiate about revisions of the dual objectives.</p>

	<p>the focus was to shift to the development of a regulative system that offered a maximum level of protection against negative external effects. That is, equivalence was not the right criterion to structure the debate.</p> <p>The current framing of the dual objective had lost all credibility. Nobody really believed that the initial objectives could be realized at the same time. It could only be realized by using dubious, calculation methods, based on dubious assumptions.</p>	
2008	<p>The regulative system for noise did not function well anymore. It was time to develop an entirely new system that made it better possible to reconcile the dual objectives. The current system was bankrupt. The new system was to offer an equivalent level of protection as the old one had done.</p> <p>The new system did not offer an equivalent level of protection. For one, it reduced the legal protection against noise considerably, while at the same time expanding capacity.</p>	<p>After the Lower House had decided in 2008 that there was need for an entirely new system, much of the negotiations revolved around the design of this new system. Again, the new system was allowed to be different than the existing one, as long as it would offer the same level of protection (equal protection). A new system was developed, but at the end of 2009 discussion still revolved around the question whether or not it offered an equivalent level of protection.</p>

The result was that, as the years went by, the policy themes on the agenda and the policy stories that were developed around these themes became more and more institutionalized. The winning stories about mainport development, noise, third party risk, stench / air pollution and spatial development resulted in laws, procedures (for calculating external effects, for monitoring outcomes, for inspections, for flight routes, for spatial development), specific calculation models (and investments in specific types of knowledge), infrastructure (new runways, gates, offices, the AirportCity, landside accessibility), in roles available and positions. Moreover, it resulted in several taken-for-granted assumptions that assumed the status of myths (e.g. the dual objectives are desirable and feasible, aviation growth is good for the economy, the main problem related to aviation is noise, we cannot measure noise, we cannot adequately assess health effects of aviation). This automatically resulted in some taboos (don't measure noise, don't question the calculation methods (e.g. of noise and third party risk), don't question the dual objective, don't question the policy themes on the agenda, don't question the added value of additional flights). This all shaped up to a firm institutionalization of the meta narrative, i.e. the dual objective or the mainport – environment discourse. This, in turn, set the (implicit) rules for the things that could be said and done meaningfully in the policy domain. Thus, it resulted in specific themes on

the policy agenda and specific assumptions that actors should draw upon when developing stories about these specific themes. The resulting reproduction of storylines around the policy themes resulted in their further institutionalization, which also worked to further institutionalize the meta narrative of the dual objective that was both their precursor and outcome.

In sum, the meta narrative of the dual objective resulted in remarkable stable policy themes on the policy agenda, and remarkable stable storylines that were posed around these policy themes. Indeed, great regularities can be found in both themes on the policy agenda and in the storylines that came to dominate around the policy themes and the ones that were marginalized.¹⁷⁵³ These regularities in turn shaped up to form a remarkable stable meta narrative on the level of the discursive order, i.e. the mainport – environment discourse that reflected the dual objectives.

9.2.2 One Strong Discourse Coalition

As argued before, in this thesis the term discourse coalition refers to the level of the policy domain (and not to the level of the policy theme). They sustain the meta narrative, and they consist of the actors that support one or more of the storylines that sustain this meta narrative. Thus, we are looking for the actors that enact policy stories that sustain the mainport-environment discourse (i.e. the meta narrative).

In essence, all actors that have been described in the Schiphol case have been enacting the meta narrative of the dual objective. This means that one strong discourse coalition developed on the level of the policy domain, containing the several storylines via which different actors involved enacted the dual objective. Indeed, actors involved all related their specific storylines to the dual objective in some way or another. Most of the time, actors pointed out how their respective storylines contributed to the reconciliation and realization of the dual objectives at the same time. Thus, when developing policy stories around the policy theme of noise, actors constructed their stories around the promise to both improve protection against aviation noise while simultaneously securing further mainport development. However, at times when the real trade offs had to be made between the dual objectives, some actors favored the mainport objective over the environmental objective, while other actors did the opposite. This gave rise to two sub coalitions that both worked to enact the dual objective, i.e. a mainport coalition and an environmental coalition (in line with the structure of the meta narrative). These two sub coalitions were positioned in a specific way vis-à-vis one another. This is related to the specific way the meta narrative positioned the different actors vis-à-vis one another and the specific roles that actors were allowed to enact. In essence, in order to understand

¹⁷⁵³ See appendix 1 for a more detailed overview.

the specific structure of the discourse coalition we need to understand these regularities in positioning and role playing. For one, it allows us to uncover the macro actors, i.e. the actors that could exert decisive influence on the decisions being made.

Regularities in Positions and Roles: Uncovering Macro Actors

In chapters 2 and 3 we discussed that discursive orders come with a limited amount of positions. Moreover, we argued that actors are positioned vis-à-vis one another in discursive exchanges. In essence, the resulting framing of the debate gives way to specific roles available and the specific dependency relations between actors. And it is these dependency relations that very much determine the extent to which a specific actor can influence the debate, by setting boundaries to what this actor can say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way. For example, to pose a specific storyline that stresses the success of the dual objective or the policy measures to regulate noise pollution is to say that the policy makers and the Cabinet have done a good job, that the actors monitoring the system perform well (e.g. the Inspection Services of the Ministries involved and the aviation sector), while it delegitimizes the capacity of critics to judge this state of affairs. Arguing that the regulative system does not work is to call for repositioning by undermining the decision making expertise of the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W, the Ministers involved and to point out the failure involved in the way that the aviation sector and the inspectorate monitor the system, often legitimating a more prominent role of the actor that posed the argument in designing an improved regulative system that works better (cf. Hajer, 1995; p.273).¹⁷⁵⁴ Or when arguing that the calculation model of noise offers the most valid and true results, is to make sure that the actors that hold the input data for the model (the aviation sector) and the actors holding the expertise and legitimacy to use these models (the NLR knowledge institute and experts from the aviation sector) can exert most influence on its outcomes.

In the case of Schiphol, the problem was perceived to be a public policy problem of national interest. By making the dual objective a public policy problem of national interest, the main dependency relations were set and they remained remarkably stable during the entire 20 years. The main implication was that the leading decisions were to be made by the national government. The Cabinet proposed the final decisions, which were prepared by the Ministry of V&W and, to a lesser extent, by the Ministry of VROM. The Lower and Upper House had the final say, as they were to ratify the Cabinet's decisions. More specifically;

¹⁷⁵⁴ Hajer also noted that such positionings are only politically effective to the extent that they are taken up by the actors, enacting them (Hajer, 1995; p.273).

- The Cabinet was dependent on the Upper and Lower House for the political ratification of their final decisions;
- Both the Cabinet and the Upper and Lower House were dependent on the elections and therefore the public perception about the way the different politicians and political parties were acting;
- The Cabinet was dependent on the Ministry of V&W (and to a lesser extent on the Ministries of VROM, EZ and LNV) for information and preparing the Cabinet's decisions;
- The Upper and Lower House were dependent on the Cabinet and the involved Ministries for information;
- The policy makers of the Ministry of V&W were dependent on the Cabinet (i.e. the Minister of V&W) for their specific policy assignment. Moreover, the ethos of political loyalty illustrated a strong desire of the policy makers of the Ministry to be loyal to the Minister;
- The Cabinet was dependent on the information that the Ministry of V&W developed for making its decisions;
- The Ministry of V&W was dependent on the Ministry of VROM, and to a lesser extent on the Ministries of EZ and LNV, as the Schiphol problem was an interdepartmental policy problem. However, because the Ministry had most resources available, and because the Ministry was assigned as the leading policy making authority, the other Ministries were more dependent on them than vice versa;
- Especially the Ministry of VROM was dependent on the Ministry of V&W, as they lacked resources (time, money, people, and later also expertise) for making decisions;
- The policy makers of the Ministries involved (especially V&W) were dependent on the aviation sector for proper aviation scenarios and input data for the calculation models for noise and third party risks. These actors held the necessary information and expertise that was deemed necessary for decision-making.
- As the Ministries lacked the expertise to make calculations and to judge the validity of the knowledge claims of the aviation sector, they became dependent on external experts that were hired fulltime. Two of the main research institutes that the Ministry heavily relied on were the NLR and the consultants of To70
- The aviation sector (KLM, Schiphol) was dependent on the final decisions and thus on the national government for enacting their corporate strategies. The policy decisions defined their possibilities for growth.
- The actors of the aviation sector were dependent on one another for mobilizing as much support as possible for their corporate strategies on the national level. It was rewarding for the sector to cooperate. KLM (later KLM/AirFrance) and Schiphol

aligned their corporate strategies, often complemented by Air Traffic Control who was to make the airside strategies operationally possible.


- The corporate strategies of the aviation sector were dependent on the developments on the aviation market and international standards (about third party risks and noise pollution).
- The Ministries were dependent on the international agreements made on global or EU level about global trade and environmental issues (noise, third party risk and emissions).

These main dependency relations between the Ministry of V&W, the Cabinet, Parliament and the aviation sector did not change much over the years, which was of course very much related to the lack of change in the meta narrative. Indeed, the stability of the meta narrative and the stability of the discourse coalition mutually imply one another (thus reinforcing one another). The meta narrative positioned actors and 'defined' who were important and who were not. By enacting their positions, actors had a strong tendency to reproduce the meta narrative. The same actors were deemed important for solving the same problems. The only thing that did change was that the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W became more and more dependent on the expertise of the aviation sector, as the Ministry of V&W gradually removed the people with technical expertise from the department. This was in line with the more general policy of the national government, based on a profile of the more process-oriented policy maker who was to connect different societal interests, and who would preferably change files every four years. However, in the case of technical complex debates like the Schiphol debate it had the perverse effect that the dependency on the expertise of the aviation sector increased, as their people were not replaced after four years of service. This, in turn, increased the need for the Ministries to hire external experts who could independently judge the validity of the information on the table. The heavy reliance on the aviation sector for policy purposes explains the corporatist way of policy making and helps us to understand why both KLM (and later KLM/AirFrance) and Schiphol repeatedly succeeded in making their corporate strategies (hub and spoke development, AirportCity development) cornerstones of national policy. The main dependency relations that were both the precursor and the result of how the meta narrative positioned actors are outlined in figure 9.1.

These dependency relations, that must be understood as both the precursor and outcome of the meta narrative, explain how actors were positioned vis-à-vis one another. Together, these actors formed a coalition that assumed the form of an iron triangle (i.e. Ministry of V&W, Cabinet and Aviation Sector) wherein decisions were prepared and made. Over the years the iron triangle further institutionalised, which turned the actors involved into what Callon and Latour (1981) have called a macro-actor. Such actors become responsible for passing judgment on what is true, e.g. what counts as valuable

information and which storylines are more valuable than others. It also explains why decision-making had a corporatist character (the consequence of the specific expertise that was deemed necessary was a heavy reliance on the input of the aviation sector) and why all actors attempted to influence policy makers of V&W and politicians of the parliament. All other actors involved were dependent on this iron triangle of main decision makers. In a way, the actors that were not part of the iron triangle were dependent on one another for opening up the iron triangle. For example, the municipalities of Haarlemmermeer and Amsterdam and the Province of North Holland acknowledged that they increased their chances to influence the Schiphol debate by teaming up. And the different groups of local residents spread over different platforms and the environmental interest groups were dependent on one another for organizing resistance against ongoing mainport development during much of the policy debate (via the media, the legal system, political lobby and creating countervailing evidence). Note that such iron triangles have also been uncovered in the field of Dutch Agriculture policy, where policy makers of the Ministry of Agriculture, representatives of the Agricultural sector (farmers) and some politicians could exert most influence on final decisions (see Frouws, 1993; Louwes, 1980).

Figure 9.1 Institutionalized dependency relations main decision makers during 1989 – 2009




The persistence of the iron triangle of macro actors does not mean that dependency relations did not change at all. The case study shows that the roles that actors were playing changed somewhat over the years. For example, during the past few years the Ministry of V&W and the Cabinet have relegated a part of the decision making towards the regional level (Alders negotiations), arguing that they would support decisions that were unanimously made on the regional level (although the Ministry of V&W kept playing an important role in these negotiations). This has created new dependency relations between the local residents, the local and regional public authorities and the aviation sector. For one, the aviation sector has become more dependent on these actors for securing future growth and needed to engage in direct negotiations with them. Nonetheless, even then the final decisions were made by the Cabinet and prepared by the Ministry of V&W, very much relying on the expertise of the aviation sector. The main point is that the actors making up for this iron triangle could exert most influence on the decision making process during the past 20 years of policy making (1989 – 2009). This, in turn, shaped the specific structure of the discourse coalition.

The structure of the Mainport – Environment Coalition

The case description clearly illustrates that the macro actors we identified (the iron triangle) all favoured mainport development over environmental improvement. Or in other words, the subcoalition favouring mainport development was hierarchically superior to the environmental subcoalition. As these macro actors could exert most influence on passing judgment about the value of different storylines, they could make sure that the storylines that favoured their main objective (mainport development) could gain dominance vis-à-vis other storylines. As a result, the mainport objective conditioned the environmental objective more than vice versa, giving way to a clear hierarchy in objectives. We are not claiming that the environmental objective did not condition mainport development. On the contrary, the way the actors of the mainport coalition perceived the policy problems and the type of solutions were very much conditioned by the environmental objective as can be derived from the case. Indeed, if not, no policy debate would have been necessary, as there would have been no urgency to make trade offs between mainport and environment in the first place. However, it is to argue that at the moments when the crucial decisions were made these actors privileged one of the two objectives over the other, and that the mainport objective exerted a greater influence on the environmental objective than vice versa as a consequence of the stronger coalition. Thus, the mainport coalition could become the stronger one as a consequence of the positions of the actors that supported this coalition. As we shall discuss in 9.3, the specific way the meta narrative positioned actors vis-à-vis one another offers an important explanation for the stability that we found in the discursive order.

Over the years, both coalitions evolved somewhat, as new actors entered the debate and some roles and positions changed, but the main structure remained in place. Here we present the structure of the coalitions at three moments in time, similar to the way we structured the case study. Each coalition refers to the moment that a period of decision-making was ended (PASO/PKB/1995, Schiphol Act/2003, Evaluation & Alders/2009). They are therefore merely snapshots of three moments in time, and it must be emphasized that they entail a gross oversimplification of the many (short-lived) coalitions that have been developed over the years on the level of the policy themes.¹⁷⁵⁵ Besides, the simplification also relates to the fact that we have not taken all actors that have played a role in the debate during the past 20 years into account. Instead, we have selected those actors that played a significant role during the selected decision-making period (as can be derived from the case description). One implication is that, for example, most of the research institutes that have been assigned over the years are not included in the coalitions. The same holds true for the European Commission (see box 10.2 on this). Despite the oversimplification the regularities in the discourse coalition and its structure of two sub coalitions offer an important explanation for the reproductive tendency of the Schiphol debate, as we shall discuss in 9.3. The evolution of mainport-environment discourse coalitions is presented in figures 9.2 – 9.4.

Figure 9.2 Discourse coalition Dual Objective, Schiphol Policy Debate 1995 (mainport coalition left).



¹⁷⁵⁵ For example, when bringing the issue of measuring noise into the debate a researcher of OMEGAM, a few policy makers of the Environmental Agency of the municipality of Amsterdam, the Alderman for the Environment of the municipality of Amsterdam formed the initial coalition. Some policy makers of the Ministry of V&W and Economic Department of the Municipality of Amsterdam and the Alderman of Economic Affairs formed the opposing coalition.

Figure 9.3 Discourse coalition Dual Objective, Schiphol Policy Debate 2003





Figure 9.4 Discourse coalition Dual Objective, Schiphol Policy Debate 2009



At least three important observations can be drawn from figures 9.2 – 9.4.

- The macro actors (the actors that could pass judgment on what information and stories were most valuable and relevant, i.e. the main decision makers) were all part of the mainport coalition. As the discursive order remained in place, positions and relations of mutual dependency did not change much, implying that the leading decision making actors could easily reproduce their favourable storylines and related positions.
- Despite the regularities in positioning, a slight change in the strength of the two coalitions can be noticed over the years. However, this is more related to the

changes in the policy goals that actors pursue than to changes in dependency relations (which have remained rather stable, as we have argued before). In essence, from 2000 onwards several actors have come to acknowledge that the balance between the dual objectives needed to be restored somewhat in order to maintain its credibility. Even actors that always fanatically supported the mainport objective acknowledged that the constant breaking of policy promises and resulting lack of trust and ad hoc policies had made it almost impossible to develop long term policy gains. The result was that the support for the environmental objective seems to have grown somewhat, although the balance was still in favour of the mainport objective in 2009.

- Together, both coalitions formed the reflection of the dual objective. Indeed, the dual objective first gave rise to the structure of the coalition. When actors were pursuing their goals, they automatically developed storylines that supported their coalition and/or undermining the opposing coalition. At all times, these storylines worked to reproduce the discursive hegemony of the dual objective. In the introductory chapter 1 we have labelled this the mainport-environment discourse. This discourse both constituted and is constituted by one strong discourse coalition. By this we mean that both the actors that were part of the mainport coalition and the actors that were part of the environmental coalition enacted and further institutionalized the discourse of the dual objective.

9.2.3. Stability in the Discursive Order

The stability in dependency relations gave way to stable positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another in the policy domain. It also gave way to stability in actors involved and excluded from the debate. Most of the actors that had been involved in the debate in 2009 were already involved in some way or another in 1989. Of course, many committees have come and gone, and some actors have obtained a more influential positions (e.g. the local residents), but by and large positions and positioning did not change much.

In this paragraph we have illuminated the discursive order. We first identified the meta narrative of the dual objective, also referred to as the mainport – environment discourse, by showing how the policy themes on the policy agenda and the different policy stories that were posed around these policy themes (both the winning stories and the losing ones) all used the dual objective as a frame of reference. The consistency of the dual objective made sure that the same policy themes were constantly on the agenda. The dual objective was reproduced and institutionalized on the level of the policy themes (in policies, laws, procedures, techniques, investments etc.), where we also found a remarkable stability on storylines posed over the years. It gave way to a firmly institutionalized meta narrative we referred to as the mainport – environment discourse (following Broër, 2006, see chapter 1) that was sustained by a highly stable set of policy

stories that were developed around the stable set of policy themes on the agenda.¹⁷⁵⁶ Moreover, we pointed out how the dual objectives were positioned vis-à-vis one another. During the entire 20 years of policy debate there was a clear hierarchy in objectives involved, where the mainport objective was always hierarchically superior to the environmental objective. It must be noted that both objectives very much conditioned the policy stories that were developed, but the policy stories favouring mainport development conditioned the storylines about environmental improvement more than vice versa. It has resulted in a firm institutionalization of the meta narrative, which made sure that the same policy themes were part of the policy agenda and the same policy stories were being developed around these themes.

Next, we discussed how the stable meta narrative was sustained by a stable discourse coalition on the level of the policy domain. The discourse coalition consists of the different actors that enacted policy stories that sustained the meta narrative. We indicated the presence of one strong discourse coalition, the mainport-environment coalition, that consisted of two subcoalitions that formed two sides of the same medal. On the one hand there was the mainport coalition, and on the other hand, there was the environmental coalition. It is important to understand that all actors involved, thus both the ones that were part of the mainport coalition and the ones that were part of the environmental coalition, contributed to the reproduction of the meta narrative of the dual objective. As such, together the mainport coalition and the environmental coalition need to be perceived as one overarching discourse coalition that worked to firmly institutionalize the dual objective, as they developed stories for undermining / stimulating mainport development and/or undermining / stimulating environmental protection. Moreover, the positioning of two sub-coalitions that made up for the discourse coalition also remained remarkably stable. We argued that the macro actors, i.e. the ones that could exert most influence on the final decisions, all belonged to the mainport coalition. In essence, policy makers of the Ministry of V&W (and their hired experts), the aviation sector and the Cabinet formed an iron triangle in which the main decisions were being prepared. The macro actors could play their role as the meta narrative provided them with these positions. At the same time, the macro actors could make sure that their preferred storylines (i.e. the ones favouring mainport development) gained dominance, which explains the hierarchy in the dual objectives as defined in the meta narrative.

¹⁷⁵⁶ As the detailed analysis in appendix 1 illustrates, on the level of the policy themes, new storylines have been developed occasionally, but the main storylines (both the dominant and marginalized ones) that gave way to the specific structure of the debate have remained in place. Indeed, they have been improved over the years, when new information came available that could be used as evidence.

Both the regularities in the meta narrative of the dual objective with its specific hierarchy in objectives and in the discourse coalition, with its hierarchy in positions of two sub-coalitions lead us to the conclusion that we are dealing with a firmly institutionalized discursive order. This institutionalization is further reflected by the stability of the policy themes that are on the policy agenda and the specific way wherein actors are positioned vis-à-vis one another. However, we want to emphasize that this reproduction that is found on the level of the discursive order does not mean that no variety has been produced and become institutionalized at all. On the contrary, as our entire case study is built around those moments that variety has been produced, i.e. the events. More specifically, on the level of the policy theme we have witnessed several changes, especially during the Alders episode (2007 – 2009). New roles and relationships have been developed during the past few years. For example, local residents hold a formal position in the process, the Ministry of V&W acts more in terms of a stakeholder, there is the shared ambition of developing a joint and broadly supported advice, there are majority supports for the Alders outcomes in the Lower House, new ways of gathering knowledge via joint fact finding strategies and joint experiments have been enacted, there has been an explicit recognition that further aviation growth will increase noise annoyance, and new alliances like the one between the KLM/AirFrance and the local residents have been forged. As asserted in this paragraph, some of this variety has become institutionalized on the level of the discursive order, as the specific framing of the dual objective has changed and as the configuration of the discourse coalition has changed. However, the main point is that remarkable stabilities can be discerned on the level of the discursive order when considering the entire period 1989 - 2009. Thus, many of the events that we have detected in the Schiphol case failed to make an influential impact on the level of the policy discourse. Here it is important to recall our understanding of a policy deadlock as presented in chapter 1. The deadlock refers to the level of the policy domain and not to the level of the individual policy themes (although both are interrelated). Stability of the discursive order on the level of the policy domain (i.e. the meta narrative, the discourse coalition, the policy themes on the agenda that set the boundaries to what specific actors can say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way) works to hamper the kind of variety that can be produced on the level of the policy themes, whereas the variety that is produced can only make little impact on the level of the discursive order at best. In line with our three step procedure for analyzing this reproductive tendency we now continue with the enactment of the second step, i.e. uncovering the micro practices that work to reproduce (and therefore further institutionalize) the discursive order.

9.3. Step 2: Uncovering Micro Practices

Discerning the micro practices involved is a crucial element for understanding the strong reproductive tendency of the discursive order. It is only through the ongoing (self-evident) enactment of such micro-practices that specific discursive orders are

constantly reproduced and become further institutionalized. In chapters 2 and 3 we defined micro practice as a middle range concept, lying somewhere between the everyday strategies and tactics involved that can be observed and the overarching discursive order that conditioned ways of thinking, talking and acting in a specific social domain (like a policy field). Moreover, we asserted that regularities in strategies and tactics and their relatedness to specific conventions or obligations signify the existence of a particular practice. Based on this understanding we can derive the specific micro practices at work in the Schiphol policy domain from a detailed analysis of the strategies and tactics that actors employed during the argumentative struggles around the policy themes. This detailed analysis is presented in appendix 2. A limited set of strategies and tactics is employed around most policy themes. We can summarize these in a set of micro practices that work to (re)produce the discursive order (i.e. the mainport-environment discourse, including the hierarchy in storylines and related discourse coalition and resulting themes on the policy agenda). We first set out the discursive practices at work (9.3.1), followed by the non-discursive practices (9.3.2). Before discussing the practices in more detail it is important to understand that not all practices have played an evenly important role during the entire period that we have studied (1989 – 2009). Besides, the importance of individual practices also differs, as they worked to regulate behaviour more or less during specific episodes. Nonetheless, we assert that all practices that we have discerned by and large played an important role in the reproduction of the Schiphol policy discourse during 1989 – 2009.

9.3.1 Discursive Practices

Discursive practices are the language rules that actors obey when attempting to make a meaningful contribution to the debate. From the case description and the analysis it can be derived that historically specific ways of arguing have appeared in the Schiphol policy domain. This comes to the fore in both the regularities in storylines (including underlying objectives, concepts, metaphors, basic assumptions) and discursive formats that we have found. There seem to be specific language rules that have to be enacted in order to add credibility to the case that is being argued. As argued in chapter 3, deviating from the formats is possible, but comes at a cost (see also Abma, 2001; Hajer, 1995; Van Twist, 1995). In practice it implies that actors initially tend to follow the language rules that can count on a certain amount of respectability (validity and authority). We have identified 9 discursive practices at work in the Schiphol policy domain that constitute and are constituted by these language rules. The list is not meant to be exhaustive, but is meant to uncover some of the main practices at work in the reproduction of Schiphol’s policy discourse. The practices are presented in table 9.2.

Table 9.2 Discursive Practices that work to reproduce the Schiphol Policy Discourse

	Practice	Explanation
1	<i>Referring to the dual</i>	Actors had to make constant reference to the dual objective in order to

	<i>objective</i>	make a meaningful contribution to the debate. The initial framing of the dual objective (PKB 1995) formed the frame of reference for all policy stories that were developed afterwards. Actors needed to show how their policy stories related to the realization of the dual objectives. Stories that did not take them into account were perceived to be meaningless.
2	<i>Winners: using an optimistic discursive format</i>	The dual objective in itself is based on the idea that win-win solutions are possible. It is therefore an optimistic format that symbolizes the possibility of reconciling economic growth and environmental improvement. The rather positive discursive format (win-win) was mainly enacted by the actors that were part of the winning coalition. It was in their interest to maintain the status quo, as they could realize much of their policy ambitions within the current framing of the dual objective. Therefore, it was in their interest to argue that there were no real losers, that all actors won some and lost some and were getting an equal share of the pie in the sky. In order to add plausibility to their claim (i.e. the dual objective was a win-win solution), the feasibility of the dual objectives was consequently overestimated. Even when information that disconfirmed this was mounting and it was plausible to assume that the dual objectives could not be realized simultaneously, the leading decision makers held on to its presumed feasibility, not willing to set aside the too positive representation of reality. The need to discuss the Schiphol policy problem in terms of package deals was one of the main effects of the optimistic discursive format. Storylines that did not explicitly name winners and losers, but that pointed out how both actors won some and lost some were more popular.
3	<i>Losers: using a negative discursive format</i>	The actors that were not content about the way the dual objectives were framed and did not support the belief that it resulted in win-win solutions employed a more negative discursive format. That is, these actors too made constant reference to the dual objective, but in negative terms. Their discursive format was a response to the one employed by the actors that were part of the winning coalition. It was in their interest to show the negative effects of the dual objective, to make actors aware of their losses. The negative discursive format was employed in order to escalate conflict, something that the winners wanted to prevent by using the positive discursive format. The negative discursive format implies naming and shaming in order to undermine both the authority of the leading policies and leading policy makers (the winners). Accusations of manipulation, lying, cheating are often made when discussing the dual objectives.
4	<i>Referring to the mainport objective</i>	For each contribution to the debate it was essential to point out the effects on mainport development, which automatically led to the need to properly use the mainport concept. The assumptions underlying mainport development were not questioned. Contributions to the debate that questioned the added value effects of mainport development, or that called for different development perspectives were considered to fall outside the scope of the debate. Mainport development was crucial for the national economy, for strengthening the Dutch status of Distribution land <i>par excellence</i> , for improving the deteriorating competitive position of the Randstad. Mainport development was therefore not questioned, but taken-for-granted. Contributions to the Schiphol debate

		needed to refer to the mainport concept in order to be taken seriously. That is, each contribution that (appeared to) undermine further mainport development was rejected.
5	<i>Referring to the environmental objective in terms of noise, third party risk, local air pollution and stench</i>	The environmental objective was defined in terms of 4 indicators: Noise, third party risk, Local air pollution and third party risk. Over the years, some of the objectives as regards each issue were changed, but the need to refer to these four issues when debating the environmental objective remained in place. That is, the effects on these four indicators were assessed for each contribution to the debate. Reference to other issues was not possible, without running the risk of sidelining oneself (as stories about other issues were not meaningful within the specific context of the policy debate). For example, the climate issue or the issue of housing was important, but not institutionalized in formal policy objectives that influenced decision making about the Schiphol debate.
6	<i>The dominance of the noise issue when discussing the environmental objective</i>	By far the most attention was devoted to the noise issue. That is, when actors discussed the possibilities for further aviation growth (in order to realize the mainport objective), the consequences for noise were the main conditioning factor. Proposals for further mainport development were always first of all discussed in terms of their noise effects (i.e. did it still result in a 35Ke contour with less than 10,000 houses?). As long as the noise objectives could be realized it was deemed acceptable. The other environmental objectives were often not taken into account, or only afterwards. As a consequence, several of the initial objectives (standstill for stench, standstill for CO ² , standstill for Group Risk, standstill for IR 10 ⁻⁷ / 10 ⁻⁸) could not be realized.
7	<i>Draw on technical engineering vocabulary: Quantification of the debate</i>	The technical-rational approach that was used in the policymaking resulted in a heavy reliance on (scientific) research, which gave rise to a specific engineering vocabulary. Contributions to the policy debate needed to draw on this vocabulary in order to fall within the scope of the debate and thus being considered relevant. The technical approach gave way to a quantification of the mainport objective and the environmental objective, which made sure that the debate was about numbers, and especially about the validity of the numbers. That is, actors had to indicate the effects of their proposals in terms of numbers in order to be taken seriously; how much traffic was possible, how much houses fell within each noise contour, how much people resided within the third party risk contours, which emission ceilings and capacity ceilings were to be allowed etc. Much of the debate was about the (validity of) numbers and not about the different policy solutions that were available.
8	<i>Acknowledge Hierarchy in objectives: Mainport objective structures environmental objective</i>	One of the main practices was that the mainport objective structured the environmental objective. That is, each time when further mainport development was hampered, solutions were developed to allow for further growth that made the realization of the environmental objectives impossible. On the other hand, when measures were proposed to realize the environmental objectives and improve the quality of the living environment, they were often rejected for hampering further mainport development. The space of possibilities for improving the quality of the living environment was therefore defined by the requirements for mainport development. In essence, the main objective was to reconcile both objectives, but each time when it became clear that this was not

		possible, the mainport objective was favoured over the environmental objective.
9	<i>Develop spatial solutions based on technical-rational calculations</i>	In order to realize the dual objectives, most of the time spatial solutions were developed. Space was reserved for extension of airport infrastructure. Noise contours were drawn, third party risk contours were drawn and stench contours were drawn. The spatial solutions were the result of the specific way wherein the problems were framed. The implication was that other kind of solutions (i.e. social-psychological solutions) were taken less seriously.

9.3.2 Non Discursive Practices

In this paragraph we discuss a set of the most important non-discursive practices that can be derived from the analysis of the case description. Non discursive practices are not meant to create statements. Instead, they are the modes of thinking and acting at once that actors employ when trying to mobilize support for the policy stories they favor. Again, the practices that we uncovered are derived from the more detailed analysis of the strategies and tactics employed on the level of the policy theme (see appendix 2). And again, the list is not exhaustive, nor is it meant to be so. But it does contain the main non-discursive practices at work in the reproduction of Schiphol's policy discourse. The practices are presented in table 9.3.

Table 9.3 Non discursive Practices that work to reproduce the Schiphol Policy Discourse

	Practice	Explanation
1	<i>Respect the positions of the Macro Actors</i>	<p>Macro actors (Ministry of V&W, Cabinet, Aviation Sector) made the final decisions about the policy goals, the research agenda, the organization of the process, the value of the research outcomes and the policy solutions</p> <p>As the macro actors benefited from the dual objective (i.e. the mainport objective was privileged over the environmental objective), they made sure that the dual objective remained in place and was defined in a way that allowed them to realize most of their policy ambitions.</p>
2	<i>Heavy reliance on Aviation sector</i>	<p>The specific framing of the policy debate made sure that the aviation sector could play a dominant role. They were the ones with the necessary expertise about mainport development. Moreover, as a consequence of the brain drain at the departments, the reliance on their expertise further increased over the years.</p> <p>As the aviation sector benefited most from mainport development, they could make sure that the hierarchy in objective became firmly institutionalized. They reproduced the technical discursive format in order to avoid the real discussions and frame the debate in terms of the validity of facts and figures. The dual objective was not questioned, nor the standards taken up, allowing for the maintenance of the status quo.</p>
3	<i>Heavy reliance on in-house researchers</i>	In order to make sure that the aviation sector did not deceive the policy makers, other experts needed to be hired. Paradoxically, the departments cut back expenses by firing their experts, thus increasing the need to hire external experts to make policy. The specific personnel policy of the

		<p>departments that requires policy makers to preferably change jobs every 4 years further increases the need to rely upon hired experts when dealing with extremely technically complex projects like Schiphol.</p> <p>By reproducing the technical discursive format, experts were needed on the side of the department. Hiring these experts automatically resulted in the acceptance of the technical discursive format.</p>
4	<i>Defining policy objectives a priori in terms of quantified standards and fix these. Frame these standards in a way that makes it possible to realize the dual objectives.</i>	<p>Policy Objectives were defined in quantified standards that were based upon earlier decisions. Consequently, the policy debate was about standard conformance, which was something different than finding optimal solutions.</p> <p>Discussing the validity of the dual objectives in general and the standards being used in particular was not possible. These standards had been developed in a way that they made it appear that the ambition of the dual objective was feasible.</p>
5	<i>Selection of preferable scenarios</i>	<p>The selection of future traffic scenarios was not based on state of the art forecasts, but on the development of scenarios that made the alignment of the dual objectives possible. Scenarios were therefore more desirable than realistic. The biased selection of the scenarios was given in by the need to realize the dual objective. The selection and utilization of these scenarios therefore reproduced the dual objective, including the hierarchy in objectives.</p>
6	<i>Heavy reliance on calculation models and biased selection of models (that were themselves biased too)</i>	<p>Calculations of environmental effects played a dominant role in the policy debate. It allowed politicians to avoid difficult political decisions, as the outcomes made the decisions for them. It also worked to enhance technocracy, thus creating a barrier for participation. The main challenge was to create outcomes that allowed them to argue that the dual objectives could be realized simultaneously, instead of assessing the real effects of aviation as good as possible. The underlying assumptions and input data therefore contained a bias.</p> <p>The reliance on calculations allowed for the creation of a subpolitical realm, avoiding decision making about the real conflicts between environment and economy. The biased selection of models made sure that outcomes were in line with the dual objective. Thus, the models themselves were also biased. For example, the model for calculating noise depended on ideal type input data as regards noise pollution (lowest level possible), as these were derived from the manufacturers who used low levels of noise pollution as an important selling point. In essence, the dual objective was both the result and precursor of the calculation models used. By relying on calculations the real world problems could be ignored, while simultaneously reproducing the technocratic discursive format making it difficult for others to assess what was actually going on.</p>
7	<i>Heavy reliance on research in general. Creating a bias in the production and utilization of information.</i>	<p>In order to avoid political conflicts, there was a constant call for more research and new expert committees. Besides, a clear bias was created in the production of information. Only some questions were taken up on the agenda, often questions that had been on the agenda before. Other questions that could deliver new insights that could undermine the feasibility of the dual objectives were ignored (e.g. no money was made available to answer them). Researchers had little opportunity to influence</p>

		<p>the research questions, the assumptions and/or prescriptions for calculations. Because the same questions were asked over and over again, the same research institutes were contracted over and over again. The macro actors influenced the research process and final outcomes, making sure that these were not too critical. Instead of embracing complexity, the macro actors tried to reduce uncertainties to a minimum. This made the policy problem manageable, although it was less clear whether the actual problem was being tackled. Research was made selectively available and results were used in a selective way by the macro actors (cherry picking behaviour). Results that could undermine the dual objective were marginalized (e.g. results from measuring noise or Group Risk). In essence, existing research practices had to make sure that it appeared that the dual objective was feasible.</p> <p>The macro actors, making sure that only information that supported the feasibility of the dual objective was produced and institutionalized, controlled information flows. Moreover, the heavy reliance on research allowed to avoid the controversial questions that really mattered and worked to reproduce the technocratic discursive format.</p>
8	<i>Postponing difficult decisions</i>	<p>One of the main practices was that the macro actors postponed difficult decisions, mostly by arguing that there was insufficient information available. This resulted in a call for more research, which had to be delivered first in order to make decisions.</p> <p>Each time when it became clear that the dual objectives could not be realized simultaneously, decisions were postponed by calling for more research. This allowed the macro actors to hold on to the feasibility of the dual objective.</p>
9	<i>Sidelining Opponents</i>	At several occasions, actors that worked to frustrate mainport development (mostly actors that were part of the environmental coalition) were not allowed to play an important role in the debate. Sometimes they were included, but sidelined when the real decisions were to be made.
10	<i>Compensating losers</i>	A frequently used practice is the compensation of losers by the winners, in order to make sure that losing actors would reduce their resistance, asking difficult questions and undermining the validity of the dual objective. It is a practice that works to legitimate decisions that have negative consequences for some actors. Implicitly, this practice shows that the dual objective does not result in win-win solutions. As such, the very need for this practice undermines the underlying assumption of the dual objective.
11	<i>Breaking Policy Promises, while arguing that promises are not broken at all.</i>	This practice is often used by the macro actors. At several moments it turned out that the environmental standards were exceeded and that further mainport development could only come at the expense of increasing environmental pollution. At these times, policy promises were broken. However, by maintaining that the promises were not broken at all, but that they were only realized in different terms, credibility of the macro actors and the regulative system was further undermined. Finally, the compensation measures that were promised to the losers were also not implemented in a satisfactory way.
12	<i>Engaging in juridical procedures</i>	The actors in the environmental coalition often enacted this practice in order to hamper the implementation of undesirable policy decisions. It was also their only means to do so, as they could otherwise exert little

		influence on the decision-making. Legal proceedings were automatically about the promises of the dual objective, i.e. during the procedure it was being assessed whether or not the promises were lived up to. As such, proceedings did not broaden the debate, but merely worked to reproduce the dual objective. At the same time, legal proceedings define clear winners and losers. This works to further trouble relationships between actors, further undermining levels of trust, and further complicating the search for new solutions.
13	<i>Mobilizing the Media: Naming and Shaming</i>	Both actors favouring mainport development and environmental protection often called upon the media as a means to influence the public opinion and mobilize public support. Naming and Shaming also works to undermine relationships and reinforce the diametrically opposed positions implicated by the dual objective.
14	<i>Hierarchical decision making when political deadlines closed in</i>	<p>Often, policy processes were organized in rather interactive ways. Indeed, the Schiphol debate has proven to be a valuable domain for experimenting with interactive policy arrangements. However, when the final decisions were to be made, the macro actors used to fall back on a more hierarchical management style. The doors of the department were closed and the final decisions were prepared by the macro actors. Much information that was developed during the more interactive pre-phase became marginalized. Moreover, expectations of excluded actors were violated, undermining trust in the macro actors.</p> <p>By promising interactive policy arrangements actors create certain expectations. Actors who are invited to participate think that they can actually influence final decisions. When the macro actors revert to hierarchical modes of decision making when deadlines are closing in, they not only undermine levels of trust (as actors feel their expectations are violated), but they also fall back on their own policy ambitions (i.e. the persistence of the dual objective and the hierarchy in objectives). This makes sure that the variety that has been produced in the pre-phase becomes marginalized, which further undermines levels of trust.</p>

9.4 Step 3: Explaining reproduction: The Self-Reinforcing Loop


The illumination of the discursive order and the uncovering of the micro practices allow us to illuminate the interplay between the micro practices and the reproduction of the discursive order. This forms the third step of the procedure that allows us to explain the reproductive tendency of the Schiphol policy discourse. It provides the answer to the question how Foucauldian power works in the specific case of Schiphol.

The interplay between the discursive order and micro-practices

To start with, as argued in chapter 2, discursive orders both constitute and are constituted by specific micro practices. Discursive orders come with specific (implicit) rules for making a meaningful statement and for acting in ways that are perceived to be legitimate. These rules don't automatically reproduce discursive orders. They give way to specific discursive and non-discursive micro practices. The rules only exist and only become effective when enacted in micro-practices. Each time when these discursive and

non-discursive micro-practices are enacted, the discursive order is reproduced. The result is a further institutionalization of the discursive order (in our case of the meta narrative of the dual objective, the hierarchy in objectives, the mainport-environment coalition with two sub coalitions), making the future enactment of the micro-practices that sustained this discursive order even more self-evident. This simple principle is presented in figure 9.5

Figure 9.5 Self-Reinforcing tendency of Discursive Orders



Each time the discursive order is reproduced (with its meta narrative, discourse coalition, positioning and micro-practices), the black box that makes up the policy discourse is further closed. The black box contains that which no longer needs to be reconsidered, those things whose contents have become a matter of indifference. The more elements one can place in black boxes – modes of thought, habits, forces and objects – the broader the construction one can raise (Callon & Latour, 1981, p.284; see Hajer, 1995; p.272).¹⁷⁵⁷ The preceding analysis shows that the black box contains several self-evident practices that are beyond questioning and that automatically work to reproduce Schiphol’s policy discourse. More precisely, different actors engaged in different practices, which was very much related to their specific position, but all these practices worked to reproduce the discursive order in some way or another.

With regard to the discursive practices, all actors involved felt the need to frame their policy stories within the context set by the dual objective. Stories needed to show at least how they contributed to mainport development and environmental improvement (especially noise). Moreover, actors needed to respect the hierarchy in objectives, making sure that mainport development was not undermined. The specific way wherein they did this was related to their position in the debate. Most of the time the winners used an optimistic discursive format, showing the potential for win-win solutions. The

¹⁷⁵⁷ Hajer has argued that black boxing is perhaps one of the most fundamental of discursive mechanisms. Making things appear as fixed, natural, or essential is the most effective way of steering away latently opposing forces (p.272)

losers used a more negative format, arguing that environmental objectives were neglected. In fact, both the negative and the positive formats mutually reinforce one another, as those selling optimistic stories about the dual objective got a response from the negative side and vice versa. Both sides needed to adopt a rather technical-complex jargon, drawing on specific calculation methods and scenarios in order to make a meaningful statement.

With regard to non-discursive practices, the macro actors (part of the mainport coalition) had more possibilities for influencing the actual outcome of the debate than actors on the losing side (environmental coalition). They could pass judgments on what stories were true and which were not. They could manage the streams of information by defining the policy agenda, the research agenda, the research question and the value of the research outcomes. Indeed, we have pointed out several of the strategies and tactics that they employed in order to do so, including priming, hierarchical decision making / bilateral negotiations at crucial moments in the decision making process, breaking promises, postponing difficult decisions, turning political issues into scientific issues, asking the same research questions, using the same methodologies and assumptions, selective allocation of resources, keeping questions and issues off the agenda, manipulation of research results, selective publication of research results, sidelining opponents, promising compensation to losers and so on. This way, they did not only create a bias in the production of information (and thus the kind of storylines that actors could develop), but also in the use of information (some information was made dominant, while other information was ignored or marginalized). Actors on the losing side had far less possibilities to influence the outcomes of the debate. Most often they tried to organize their own research (although often resources were lacking) mobilize the media, engage in juridical struggles and tried to gain influence in interactive policy arrangements.

All these discursive and non-discursive practices were constituted by the discursive order, while simultaneously working to reproduce this discursive order. Thus, the policy discourse of the dual objective that we also referred to as the mainport-environment discourse became more and more institutionalized. It should be stressed once more that it was not only the macro actors who were responsible for putting the dual objective in the black box. Instead, all actors involved in the debate have contributed to the black boxing of the dual objective via their discursive and non-discursive practices. Indeed, it is exactly this fact that all actors involved engaged in reproductive practices that has made it so persistent. These practices obeyed the rules set by the discursive order, about what could be said and done at a specific moment by a specific actor. As such, these practices can be seen as the specific power mechanisms at work in the reproduction of Schiphol's policy discourse. Each time when these practices are enacted, they become more institutionalized, making them more self-evident and making it more costly to

disobey the rules that constitute them. The practices clearly govern the space of possibilities that different actors have to make a meaningful contribution to the debate or to mobilize support for their policy stories. The wide variety of practices involved also shows that there is not one cause underlying the reproduction, nor is it possible to draw one linear line of descent. Instead, it shows that there is a multiplicity of beginnings that have been uncovered by showing the lines of descent that gave way to the emergence and institutionalization or marginalization of events. Existing practices govern the everyday strategies and tactics of actors involved, by setting boundaries to their possible ways of acting. A specific actor can only say and do some things at a specific moment in time.

The self-reinforcing tendency of Schiphol's Policy Discourse


In essence, the self-reinforcing tendency of discursive order gave way to an ongoing reproduction and institutionalization of the meta narrative of the dual objective, with its specific hierarchy in objectives (i.e. the mainport objective conditioning the environmental objective), and its specific structure of the discourse coalition (mainport coalition hierarchically superior to the environmental coalition) that sustained this meta narrative. The self-reinforcing tendency of the dual objective is presented in figure 9.6, where the arrows point out the positive feedback loop involved.

Drawing on the foregoing analysis it is easy to understand the scheme. To start with, the initial framing of the dual objective gives rise to specific positions and dependency relations, thus positioning actors vis-à-vis one another. As the existing discursive order positions actors vis-à-vis one another it gives way to the emergence of a few macro actors (i.e. the iron triangle of the Ministry of V&W, the Cabinet and the aviation sector) that can exert most influence on what was true and relevant and what was not. At the same time, the discursive order comes with (implicit) rules that set boundaries to the things actors can say and do in a meaningful way. The resulting micro-practices condition what storylines actors develop and the strategies and tactics that actors can legitimately employ when creating support for their preferred storylines. It is within this context of positioning and micro practices that actors develop storylines and try to mobilize support for their preferred storylines.

The analysis thus far has provided us with a detailed understanding of how the discursive order gives way to a specific context of positions and micro-practices that work to reproduce the discursive order, thus further institutionalizing it and making it appear more self-evident and natural. This process thus assumes the form of a strong self-reinforcing loop, which is how Foucauldian power works in the specific case of Schiphol. Our case descriptions allow for a further explanation for this self-reinforcing loop. As can be derived from the case, the ongoing reproduction of the discursive order resulted in ever-increasing levels of distrust, both between actors involved and in policy

regulations. In the next paragraph we shall argue that distrust was one of the main perverse effects that the discursive order produced, which, rather paradoxically, worked to further reinforce the reproductive tendency involved.


Figure 9.6 Self-reinforcing loop of Schiphol’s policy discourse



9.5 Explaining Reproduction (2): The Role of Distrust

From the extensive case narrative we can derive that distrust has played an important role in the Schiphol policy debate during the past 20 years. Indeed, throughout the case trust emerged as an important sensitizing concept for this thesis. The problem driven and open approach of the genealogy allows for such sensitizing concepts to emerge along the way, as a result of ongoing empirical investigations.¹⁷⁵⁸ In this paragraph we shall explain how distrust worked to further reinforce the reproductive tendency of Schiphol’s policy discourse.¹⁷⁵⁹ The self-reinforcing mechanism is presented in figure 9.7. In the remainder of this paragraph we discuss this mechanism in more detail.

Figure 9.7 Distrust and the Reproduction of the Schiphol’s Policy Discourse



Point of departure is the specific way the dual objective (meta narrative) has been framed and reframed over the years. The lack of trust is rooted in the impossibility of reconciling the dual objectives. Or, to put it differently, the dual objective invites actors to form (mutually exclusive) ambitions that simply cannot possibly be satisfied at the same time. As actors cannot realize their policy ambitions their trust in the promise of the dual objective is undermined, as well as trust in the leading decision makers (the macro actors) propagating its potential for win-win solutions and the resulting policy regulations. Even in the face of mounting evidence that showed the impossibility of the dual objectives, the macro actors constantly chose to hold on to it. Once this choice was made, the process assumed the form of a funnel. The leading policy makers could not possibly admit anymore that the dual objectives had failed without undermining the

¹⁷⁵⁸ We shall discuss the importance of allowing for emerging sensitizing concepts in more detail in chapter 11.
¹⁷⁵⁹ The concept of trust shall be further operationalized in chapter 10, when we discuss the importance of trust for triggering change in the discursive order of the Schiphol policy domain.

legitimacy of the entire policy framework in place. Besides, as this policy framework allowed for mainport development (the main objective of the macro actors), there was no reason for doing such a thing. The main challenge was to develop evidence that showed the success of the dual objectives. Such evidence could only be created by means of specific strategies and tactics that shaped up to form specific micro practices (discursive and non discursive). It resulted in the creation of a fictive policy reality, based on specific ways of calculating noise and third party risk. It was only in this fictive policy world that the macro actors could continue to argue that the dual objectives were being realized simultaneously. However, the fictive policy world did not coincide with the experiences of actors involved. Amongst other things, they could not realize their policy ambitions, and many actors certainly did not perceive the calculations for noise and third party risk to be valid. It automatically fuelled their distrust in both the macro actors and the existing policy regulations.

Paradoxically, it was this very lack of trust that also made sure that the position of the macro actors and the policy regulations were not really questioned. To start with the latter, the lack of trust turned out to be an important mechanism in the reproduction of the existing regulatory systems, despite their obvious shortcomings. The lack of trust as a mechanism for coordination results in a desire for more formal control and technocratic instruments that support this, a well-known mechanism in the case of environmental – economy disputes (Tenbrunsel, 1999). Thus, as several actors do not trust the aviation sector and the Ministry of V&W, they cling to strict, detailed, technical and enforceable rules and regulations to control their behaviour.¹⁷⁶⁰ The fact that many actors that were part of the environmental coalition insisted upon holding on to the limiting values in noise enforcement points, even though they never functioned properly and were never enforced correctly, serves as a point in case. Holding on to existing regulations provided the members of the environmental coalition at least with some (fake) certainties, although it was shown at several moments in time that more optimal solutions were possible. The mindless compliance to suboptimal solutions that conformed to the standard is well known in the case of environmental-economic disputes (Cheek et al., 1995; Tenbrunsel et al., 1998; Tenbrunsel, 1999). The self-reinforcing circle at work here will be clear by now, i.e. failing technocratic regulations work to increase distrust, while distrust increases the desire to cling to existing technocratic regulations that fail once more.¹⁷⁶¹

¹⁷⁶⁰ Although calling for revisions all the time, e.g. asking for more enforcement points in the inner and outer areas, asking for measuring noise, asking for an independent organization that could enforce the norms.

¹⁷⁶¹ In fact, distrust is even further enhanced as a consequence of the fact that surveillance systems send out a clear message that actors being supervised are not trusted (Cialdini, 1996; Tenbrunsel, 1999).

The second paradox involved is that the distrust resulted in a reinforced call for centrality. Actors distrust the national government, but at the same time call upon this actor to take the lead and develop adequate solutions for the Schiphol problematic (thereby expressing trust in this actor). Indeed, as it can be observed from the case, multiple actors call upon the Ministry of V&W and the Cabinet to make clear choices, to explicate their intentions and to be more decisive and exert formal control. This can be explained by the failing of trust as a coordination mechanism in the policy network. In a situation of mutual distrust people expect the government to show leadership, which certainly seems to relate to the Schiphol case (see also Boons et al., 2010; Van Gils et al., 2009; Kroesen, 2011; Tan, 2001; Teisman et al., 2008). As implied by the technical administrative model actors (falsely) expect this actor to oversee the inherent complexities and uncertainties of the airport system and its environment and holding the capacity of creating actual win-win solutions. We already pointed out that this call for centrality made sure that the macro actors of the national government (Ministry of V&W and the Cabinet) could reinforce their positions. The fact that there was no legitimate way and no real reason for them to let go of the promise of the dual objective made sure that they worked to further institutionalize the fictive policy reality, while in practice actors were not able to realize their policy ambitions. Again, the self-reinforcing circle at work here will be clear by now, i.e. distrust in one another increases the call for centrality, while the central actors fail to live up to their promises further fuelling distrust, which leads to a renewed call for centrality.

Both paradoxes fuel the reproduction of the existing discursive order. As the policy discourse is reproduced, levels of distrust tend to grow, as actors cannot realize their policy ambitions, policy regulations result in suboptimal solutions and fictive policy worlds, and leading macro actors fail to offer a way out. At the same time, the increasing levels of distrust makes actors cling to existing regulations and call for strong leadership on behalf of the national government, which both work out to reproduce the discursive order and hence work to fuel distrust. The ever-increasing lack of trust hampers the kind of learning that is needed to create variety and develop new or modified practices. Transaction costs are high, exchange of information is low and actors don't dare to let go of their (fake) certainties and reflect upon their basic assumptions. Actors do not explore new overarching storylines, or new storylines that will be to the benefit of both coalitions. Instead, they automatically choose sides (for/against) and the dichotomy of the existing storylines that diametrically oppose one another (dual objectives) is reinforced. The hierarchy in storylines, the available positions and the positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another and the multiplicity of micro-practices that is constituted by the discursive order are also reproduced.

Each time existing practices are enacted the policy discourse becomes further institutionalised. Thus, the specific framing of the dual objective is reproduced, as is the

hierarchy in objectives, the available roles and the way the actors are positioned vis-à-vis one another. Not surprisingly the policy discourse fails to resolve the existing tension, as it is based on unrealistic assumptions. Despite the promise of the dual objective, actors fail to realize their policy ambitions once more. As we have seen, a whole set of discursive and non-discursive micro practices is at work to reproduce the feasibility of the promise of the dual objective. Distrust grows, learning potential diminishes and the reproductive tendency is further strengthened. The self-reinforcing mechanism at work makes sure that actors organize their own disappointment (Teisman et al., 2008).

9.6 Conclusion

In this chapter we enacted the third step from our three-step procedure that allows us to explain the reproductive power of Schiphol's policy discourse, and thus to develop an answer to our second research question 'To what extent can reproduction in the Schiphol policy discourse be found and how can this reproductive tendency be explained?' In essence, the third step is meant to illuminate the interplay between micro-practices at work and the reproduction of the discursive order. In order to be able to do so, we needed to (1) illuminate the discursive order and (2) uncover the micro practices at work.

When defining the discursive order we discussed the meta narrative (the dual objective or the mainport – environment discourse, where the mainport objective was hierarchically superior), the specific positions and positioning this meta narrative implicated (identifying the macro actors, i.e. the ones who could pass judgment on what was true and valid and what was not) and the discourse coalition that sustained this meta narrative (the mainport – environment coalition, consisting of two subcoalitions, where the mainport coalition was hierarchically superior to the environmental coalition). All in all, we concluded that the discursive order has remained remarkably stable over the past 20 years (i.e. with little changes in the meta narrative of the dual objective with its specific hierarchy in objectives and in the discourse coalition with its hierarchy in positions of two sub-coalitions, the stability of the policy themes that are on the policy agenda and the stability in the specific way wherein actors are positioned vis-à-vis one another). We are by no means arguing that no variety has been produced in ways of talking and acting. On the contrary, the entire Schiphol case is built around the multiplicity of moments that variety comes into being (i.e. the events).¹⁷⁶² Thus, although variety was constantly produced on the level of the policy theme it was the lack of institutionalization of this produced variety that caused the reproduction (e.g. new ideas easily became marginalized during the debate). Nonetheless, at some

¹⁷⁶² Indeed, from a Foucauldian perspective the very presence of variety is the main indicator of power relations at work. If there would be no possibility for creating variety, there would be no relations of power (see chapter 2).

moments variety became institutionalized too; we for example discussed how the mainport concept evolved over the years and how the environmental coalition grew larger as positions changed, new actors entered the stage and more and more actors called for the need to restore the balance between the dual objectives. Indeed, from our case description in chapter 8 it can be derived that especially from 2007 onwards during the Alders episode much of such variety has been produced, and some has become institutionalized. However, the main point of this chapter is that the discursive order on the level of the policy domain has remained remarkably stabile.

Here it is useful to recall our understanding of a policy deadlock as presented in chapter 1. The deadlock refers to the level of the policy domain and not to the level of the individual policy themes (although both are interrelated). Stability of the discursive order on the level of the policy domain (i.e. the meta narrative, the discourse coalition, the policy themes on the agenda that set the boundaries to what specific actors can say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way) works to hamper the kind of variety that can be produced on the level of the policy themes, whereas the variety that is produced can only make little impact on the level of the discursive order at best. So in the end, relationships may have changed over the years but the basic assumptions underlying the Schiphol policy debate about ways of talking and acting that are deemed meaningful and legitimate have changed very little during 1989 - 2009.

Next, we uncovered the micro-practices at work by discerning regularities in discursive and non-discursive strategies and tactics from the case. It resulted in 9 discursive and 14 non discursive micro practices that have worked to condition actor's behaviour during the past 20 years. Thus, the micro practices conditioned both the kind of stories that actors could meaningfully develop and the kind of strategies and tactics they could enact when mobilizing support for their preferred stories. Possibilities for acting were very much related to the positions of actors that were derived from the meta narrative.

Finally, we highlighted the interplay between the discursive order and these micro practices, as this is how Foucauldian power works in any specific domain. Here we explained how the discursive order gave way to specific micro practices and a specific positioning and how these worked to reproduce the discursive order (i.e. the meta narrative with its hierarchy in dual objectives, the discourse coalition with its hierarchy in sub coalitions and the positioning it implicated). The reproduced discursive order, in turn, gave way to further enactment of existing positions and micro practices, resulting in an ongoing institutionalization of both the discursive order and the micro-practices that it implicated. Each time the discursive order became further institutionalized, underlying micro practices and positions became more self-evident, giving way to a strong self-reinforcing loop and further naturalization of the discursive order.

We argued that this self-reinforcing loop was further strengthened as a consequence of one of the main perverse effects of this ongoing reproduction, i.e. the ever growing levels of distrust, both between actors involved and in the policy regulations. We illustrated how the existing discursive order does not allow different actors to realize their policy ambitions (related to mainport development or environmental improvement) at the same time, despite the promise of the dual objective that this would be possible. The discursive order gave way to suboptimal solutions and fictive policy worlds, and leading macro actors failed to offer a way out. Note that we are not arguing that the dual objective itself was the main problem; it was the specific way wherein the dual objective was framed that eventually caused the need to create such policy fictions.¹⁷⁶³ At the same time, the increasing levels of distrust made actors cling to existing regulations and call for strong leadership on behalf of the national government, which both worked to reproduce the discursive order and hence worked to fuel distrust. The ever-increasing lack of trust hampered the kind of learning that was needed to create variety and develop new or modified practices. Transaction costs were high, exchange of information was low and actors didn't dare to let go of their (fake) certainties and reflect upon their basic assumptions. Instead of developing new, potentially better storylines, actors automatically choose sides (for/against) and the dichotomy of the existing storylines that diametrically oppose one another (dual objectives) was reinforced. The hierarchy in storylines, the available positions and the positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another and the multiplicity of micro-practices that is constituted by the discursive order were also reproduced.

The analysis thus allows us to develop an answer to our second research question, i.e. 'To what extent can reproduction in the Schiphol policy discourse be found and how can this reproductive tendency be explained?' With regard to the extent of reproduction we asserted that variety has been produced throughout the years, with increasing levels during the Alders episode, but that the discursive order on the level of the policy domain has remained remarkably stabile. The basic assumptions underlying the Schiphol policy debate about ways of talking and acting that are deemed meaningful and legitimate have changed very little during 1989 - 2009. Thus, we believe that the policy deadlock thus defined still existed at the start of 2010, although it remains to be seen if the variety that is being created during the Alders debate will make an impact in the years to come. The strong reproductive tendency is explained by the presence of a strong self-reinforcing loop that is implicated by the firmly institutionalized mainport – environment discourse,

¹⁷⁶³ Indeed, a different framing of the dual objective could have sorted totally different results, as the case of the expansion of the Port of Rotterdam illustrates. Here the dual objective also served as a point of departure, which resulted in policy solutions that were feasible and deemed acceptable by all actors involved: For example, port authorities and other companies were pleased about the possibilities to increase volumes, while environmental interest groups were pleased about the large amount of nature that would be developed by means of compensation.

the multiplicity of micro practices that constitute and are constituted by this discursive order and the enormous amounts of distrust that the discursive order produces and that works to undermine the kind of learning potential that is necessary for inducing variety. These different mechanisms at work are intrinsically interrelated, and it is the specific way wherein they mutually reinforce one another that makes the reproductive power of Schiphol's policy discourse so strong.

Two important research questions remain: (1) How, if possible, can the genealogy contribute to the transformation of the Schiphol policy discourse? and (2) What contribution has the study made to our understanding of Schiphol's policy deadlock in particular, and to the study of policy deadlocks in general? Both questions shall be answered in the following chapters, were the first question is the topic of the next chapter.

Chapter 10 The Potential of Foucauldian Genealogy for transforming Schiphol's Policy Discourse

10.1 Introduction

In the former chapter we argued that the Schiphol policy discourse has a strong reproductive tendency. The obvious question that popped up at the end of the chapter was what, if anything could be done to break through this reproductive tendency, drawing on Foucauldian genealogy (our third research question as presented in chapter 1). This is essentially about finding ways to induce variety into the discursive order, i.e. creating the possibility for new ways of talking and acting (e.g. new policy stories, new discursive formats, new roles, actors taking up different roles, new strategies and tactics). In this chapter we explore the possibilities for creating such variety in the Schiphol policy domain.

As the Schiphol policy debate has been a thankful object of scientific investigations, it is not surprising that a wide diversity of scientists and consultants, advisory boards and policy makers has made recommendations for inducing variety in the Schiphol policy debate in some way or another during the past years.¹⁷⁶⁴ As can be derived from the extensive case description, several of these recommendations were actually put into practice. For example, we have seen several experiments with interactive policy arrangements and several attempts to bring new research findings to the fore. However, we also saw that the discursive order did not really change, by which we mean that the dual objectives, the hierarchy in objectives, the sustaining discourse coalition and the hierarchy between its two subcoalitions (mainport and environmental coalition), the roles and positions and micro practices implicated by this discursive order largely remained in place. Thus, despite the numerous interventions, which we have described in our case study in terms of events (as they were attempts to create breaches in everyday self-evidences) very little variety has been institutionalized during the past 20 years. What is more, the interventions often fuelled the further institutionalization of the discursive order, as the promises they held (i.e. allowing actors to realize their mutually opposing policy ambitions at the same time) were violated. As a consequence, levels of trust diminished, which further strengthened the self-reinforcing cycle of the discursive order. The effects of the different interactive policy arrangements serve as a point in case (see box 10.1).

Box 10.1. Interactive Policy Strategies Fuelling the Reproductive Tendency of Schiphol's Policy Discourse

The Schiphol case allows us to argue that the improper application of the policy arrangements is likely to have resulted in increasing levels of distrust (see also Huys & Koppenjan, 2010). In the case of the ROM approach,

¹⁷⁶⁴ Recall the list of references referred to in chapter 1, footnote 2.

which was meant to combine spatial development and environmental development, the environmental interest groups were not included. During the TNLI dialogue important pieces of information were missing, making it impossible to discuss the real costs and benefits of growing aviation, which was disappointing for most stakeholders involved. During TOPS, the parallel bilateral negotiations between the aviation sector and the Ministry of V&W undermined the entire arrangement. During the evaluation several actors who submitted a policy proposal for improvement were disappointed by the way the proposals were being dealt with (i.e. from their perspective, hardly anything was done with it). Moreover, during the evaluation the local residents organized in the platforms were not happy with the creation of a citizen panel. From their perspective, the Schiphol file was far too complex to comprehend in the short time-period of two days for disinterested citizens. Finally, during the Alders negotiations at least one part of the local residents was disappointed by the way they were being treated during the negotiations, as were the environmental interest groups. After the Alders negotiations, the ongoing debate about the implementation of the measures meant to reduce noise pollution proceeded in a different way than most actors expected. For different measures it turned out that they came at the expense of capacity (like a stricter night regime, the potential of Idle Reverse Thrust and the potential of changes in routes), which means that they cannot be implemented. As a consequence, several actors involved in the elaboration and implementation of those measures have become rather disappointed about its final effectiveness. The result is that the actors on the loosing side claim that the interactive policy arrangements resemble a sham: the macro actors never intended to really listen to their stories and take them up for serious consideration. This is in line with the observations of other authors who argued that especially activist groups perceived interactive participative processes as shams (Mayer et al, 2005; Young, 2000). All in all it can be concluded that the wrong expectations created with the application of the interactive arrangements and the poor way several arrangements were carried out, worked to enhance levels of distrust instead of improving them, at least when some relations are considered. The interactive policy arrangements therefore turned out to hold perverse effects, as distrust fuelled the tendency for reproduction, thus further institutionalizing the policy deadlock (as we extensively discussed in 9.5). In the case of the last interactive process, i.e. the Alders negotiations, this picture is more nuanced, as most relationships between actors have considerably been improved, while a few relationships have further deteriorated.

So, what, if anything, can we do to break through the strong reproductive tendency after all, drawing on Foucauldian genealogy? From Foucault's point of view, a proper genealogy that is purely descriptive in nature has the capacity to trigger such transformation by itself. It is exactly its function of creating wider societal debate that turns the genealogy into an effective history. That is, the effective history that a genealogy delivers is meant to create the right context for change by establishing the one crucial precondition, i.e. making people aware of the reproductive mechanisms at work and their perverse consequences. We discuss this presumed transformative capacity of the descriptive genealogy more extensively in 10.2, where we also assess whether or not our genealogy of Schiphol holds such capacity. At the same time, it can be argued that the in depth understanding delivered by a genealogy provides us with an extremely fruitful starting point for discerning effective interventions. Or, in other words, we believe that the transformative capacity of a genealogy can be enhanced by accompanying it with the recommendations that fit within the specifics of the context described. Even though this might appear to contradict with some of Foucault's fundamental genealogical principles (don't provide prescriptions!), we shall argue that

this is certainly not the case. Indeed, one can perfectly develop recommendations without violating the ethical assumptions underlying the genealogical approach.¹⁷⁶⁵ As indicated in chapter 4, this is important for presenting a consistent and coherent research framework as this adds rigor to the research. The potential for providing recommendations is discussed in 10.3. Based on this argument we continue to present our recommendations for transforming Schiphol's policy discourse (10.4). We end the chapter with a short conclusion (10.5), reflecting upon the value of the recommendations and their potential for actually breaking through the self-reinforcing reproductive tendency of the Schiphol policy discourse.

10.2 The Transformative Capacity of Genealogy

In this paragraph we first set out Foucault's belief in the transformative capacity of a genealogy (10.2.1). Next, we discuss whether or not our genealogy holds the potential of transformation, which basically boils down to the question whether or not we have developed an effective history (10.2.2).

10.2.1 Genealogy as Effective History

In chapter 2 we extensively discussed that Foucault certainly puts a lot of trust in the transformative capacity of his genealogies, if carried out in the proper way. Foucault believes that the establishment of a concrete genealogy opens possibilities for action by describing the genesis of a given situation and showing that this particular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity (cf. Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 1998). Moreover, he believes that this allows people to 'separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think'.¹⁷⁶⁶ According to Foucault such genealogies may effectively lead to action and change in themselves, without providing directives or recommendations. Thus, he assumes that the descriptive power should be sufficient to turn the genealogy into an effective history. The normative idea is that in order to induce change (i.e. in existing ways of thinking, talking and acting), practical examples are typically more effective vehicles of communication than are discussions on theory and methodology (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 1998). Instead of offering solutions and prescriptions new problems and difficulties are brought to light, making the problematic issue even more problematic. It is by making these issues extremely complicated and messy that the possibility for new options and ways are opened up which previously seemed beyond the scope of the discussion. Indeed, they might be so effective that the

¹⁷⁶⁵ If it would have been the case that providing recommendations conflicted with the genealogical assumptions, it still would have been possible to develop recommendations, although this would have undermined the consistency of the research framework and probably also the validity of the recommendations (as the method was not designed for developing recommendations).

¹⁷⁶⁶ Foucault, 1984D; p.46

people to whom it applies start to ask themselves what on earth they are doing (cf. Fischler, 2000). Instead of taking people by their hand and telling them what to do, the analyses are meant to confuse people, to make them feel uneasy about specific practices of the present, to urge them to think the thought of change, without prescribing what is to be done. Foucault had at least two reasons to avoid giving directions for future action.¹⁷⁶⁷

1. *He feared the totalizing tendency of universals:* In chapter 2 we already pointed out Foucault's stance towards universals. He deliberately did not provide guidelines and universal norms for doing genealogy. He argued that too much (theoretical or methodological) focus might block our view to reality, making it impossible to develop a realistic history that has the potential to become an effective history. For the same reason, Foucault refused to offer normative directions that could serve as universal recipes for dealing with firmly institutionalized discursive orders. Given the normalizing function that norms may serve, he views attempts to articulate and enforce regulatory, normative principles and concepts as something akin to totalitarian in nature and, therefore, as undermining the very possibility for emancipation. As Keith Gandal puts it, Foucault 'struggled for changes' but, because 'he was well acquainted with both the 'futility and the dangers' of guarantees, 'he eschewed any impulse to lay out a blueprint for society' (Gandal, 1986; p.124).¹⁷⁶⁸ In a Foucauldian interpretation, such a morality would endanger freedom, not empower it. Few things have produced more suffering among humans than strong commitments to implementing utopian visions of the good (cf. Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002; Gray, 2009). Foucault thus rejected ideas about progression and final truths and utopias. This makes him more modest in his ambitions, and very cautious in offering prescriptions (given their totalizing tendency). Instead, he suggested that it should be those most closely involved in a domain of practice who should design strategies for change. His genealogies were meant to facilitate this process by inducing the sense of urgency for the need for change. Based on the new understanding actors obtained after reading the genealogy, they were the ones who could best judge how to do things differently. Indeed, Foucault thought that making specific recommendations to actors in a specific (policy) field is neither within the rights nor within the capabilities of intellectuals (see also Fischler, 2000; Flyvbjerg 2001 for this interpretation).

¹⁷⁶⁷ In fact, we can add a third reason ourselves. A researcher can choose not to deliver recommendations. Drawing up a genealogy is quite a time-consuming task and the researcher might want to leave the normative consequences to others, preferably to those practitioners most closely involved.

¹⁷⁶⁸ In chapter 2 we already quoted Foucault, stating that 'The search for a form of morality acceptable by everyone in the sense that everyone would have to submit to it, seems catastrophic to me' (Foucault, 1988; p.245)

2. *Recommendations result in easy solutions that cannot result in real change:* According to Foucault real change requires changing our selves, our bodies, our souls and our ways of knowing in addition to changing the economy and society. Thus, opportunities for real change reside in the ability and willingness of people to change the way they govern themselves. To put it more simply, it was not the institutions that were to change, but the behaviour of the people. As Foucault noted, 'Whatever the project or reform, if its basis has not been thought working in itself; and if ways of thinking – which is to say, ways of acting – have not actually been modified, we know that it will be phagocyted and digested by behavioral and institutional modes that will always be the same'.¹⁷⁶⁹ From his perspective, offering easy solutions was not the most effective way of changing behaviour. For example, reforming institutions (as is often recommended in the field of political studies) is not sufficient for changing the daily practices of actors involved. As Putnam has noted when discussing the phenomenon of constitution writing '... designers of new institutions are often writing on water.... That institutional reforms alter behavior is a hypothesis, not an axiom' (here quoted from Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.92).¹⁷⁷⁰ In such a situation we are dealing with paper tigers, i.e. there are nice words and intentions, but business is going on as usual and there is no real change in ways of talking and acting. Instead of offering easy solutions, the lack of recommendations served to challenge the people involved to critically reflect upon their existing practices. Only if people are really convinced that they need to change these practices, the precondition for actually doing so is in place. Not offering solutions was therefore also a strategy for stimulating the adoption of a more critical and curious attitude. For Foucault, people have both an opportunity and a moral obligation to begin to challenge themselves and others to think, act and make connections in non-normalizing ways, to experiment, to take risks (cf. Cooper & Blair, 2002; Taylor, 2003). He continued to argue that such reflexive thought is the most important intellectual virtue since it refers to the ability to think differently in order to act differently.¹⁷⁷¹ Indeed, drawing on his own experiences, Foucault stated that his own work, his writings, allowed him to change himself.¹⁷⁷² In essence, Foucault uses his genealogies to urge people to analyse and reflect upon the limits, and by doing this he wants to trigger them to go beyond those limits. At the same time, these genealogies worked to change his own thoughts, feelings and behavior too.

¹⁷⁶⁹ Foucault, 2000H; p.457

¹⁷⁷⁰ Putnam, R.D., R. Leonardi and R.Y. Nanetti (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press, New York.

¹⁷⁷¹ See e.g. Foucault, 1988B; p.263; Foucault, 1994A; p.450

¹⁷⁷² Foucault, 2000B; p.240; Foucault, 1984E; p.130

From this discussion of the normative dimension of the genealogical approach it comes to the fore that Foucault certainly put a lot of trust in the transformative capacity of a genealogy. In fact, his realistic histories only deserved to wear the label of genealogy when they were effective histories as well. For this reason Foucault's book *Discipline & Punish* can be seen as the prime example of a genealogy, as it triggered a heated political debate about practices of punishment. Another example of such an effective history is Flyvbjerg's study of *Rationality & Power in Aalborg* (1998), that also received a lot of political attention and influenced societal debate.¹⁷⁷³ These studies show that a proper genealogy that is purely descriptive in nature has the power to transform fixated discursive orders, exactly by creating the right context that is needed for change. People are made aware of the reproductive mechanisms involved, including their own role in this reproduction, and the perverse (sometimes even dangerous) consequences of this ongoing reproduction. Two important questions come to the fore here. (1) Has our Schiphol study the potential to become an effective history? (2) Can we facilitate the process of transformation in other ways, drawing on Foucauldian genealogy? In the next paragraph we start discussing the first question.

10.2.2 An Effective History of Schiphol's Policy Discourse?

A genealogy really becomes an effective history when actors find the history sufficiently interesting to be made part of the public and political debate. In such instances, the genealogy has apparently triggered the interest of at least some actors, working to problematize existing regular daily practices. It means to critically assess the desirability of these practices, which is the first step in creating the sense of urgency that is necessary for exploring new futures. So, did this already happen or is this likely to happen in the case of Schiphol?

At this point in time it is difficult to say whether or not such a thing has happened. Often, whether or not a genealogy has become an effective history can only be assessed after many years (as in the case of the studies of Foucault and Flyvbjerg). Nonetheless, there are some clear indications that this genealogy has already become effective and holds the potential of becoming even more effective. To start with, we published some parts of our research findings in the autumn of 2009, as a sort trial balloon. The media picked up the results in the spring of 2010, requested an interview with us and reported about it in several national and regional newspapers.¹⁷⁷⁴ The main message that they conveyed was that research findings had been manipulated in the case of Schiphol. This triggered an enormous amount of reactions. Several radio stations and television

¹⁷⁷³ See Flyvbjerg 2001, chapter 10.

¹⁷⁷⁴ 'Gerommel met cijfers Schiphol', *Haarlems Dagblad*, June 5th 2010; *Brabants Dagblad*, June 5th 2010; *Noordhollands Dagblad*, June 5th, 2010; *Parool*, June 5th 2010; 'Ministerie verfraaide studies Schiphol', *Volkskrant*, June 7th 2010; See also 'Doodgepolderd Schiphol-verzet' *Volkskrant*, August 28th 2010.

programs asked for a response. The Schiphol issue was brought back to the attention of the national politicians, and questions based on our research report about manipulative practices related to the promise of the dual objective were asked in the Lower House.¹⁷⁷⁵ For some, the conclusions of the report were emblematic for the state of Dutch democracy, pointing out the increasing gap between politicians and citizens. This resulted in taking up the findings of the report in a documentary that will probably be shown in cinemas in autumn 2011.¹⁷⁷⁶ Finally, the leading policy makers of the Ministry of V&W¹⁷⁷⁷ invited us to discuss and validate the findings of this thesis, showing a willingness to take our findings into account when continuing their ambition to create a constructive societal dialogue about the future of Schiphol (and aviation in the Netherlands in general). So, we can conclude that prior publications have already found their way to the public and political debate about the future of Schiphol.

There is at least one more important precondition in place that can make our genealogy more effective. The past few years some momentum has been built up to critically appraise the Dutch Mainport Policy.¹⁷⁷⁸ In short, more and more authors have commented that the mainport strategy is too narrow for an adequate spatial-economic development of the Netherlands in the long term. It mainly focuses on maximizing volumes (quantity), while chances to create maximum added value (quality) are missed. The storyline of this thesis has the potential to strengthen this emerging story line in Dutch society that questions the merits of thinking in terms of traditional mainport development when debating the future development of Schiphol, the port of Rotterdam, the Randstad and even the Netherlands as a whole, without directly pointing towards a specific direction. From this perspective, our study is placed in the right time and place, just as a genealogy is meant to make issues that are already perceived to be problematic even more problematic.¹⁷⁷⁹ One indication for this is that several actors have already indicated that they were eagerly awaiting the results of this thesis.

However, even though becoming part of the public and political debate is the first step in becoming an effective history, it remains to be seen whether or not our genealogy contributes to breaking through the reproductive power of Schiphol's policy discourse.

¹⁷⁷⁵ Questions TK 201063312, June 15th 2010; Answers by the government TK 2880, July 12th 2010; See also 'Kamervragen manipulaties Schiphol', *Haarlems Dagblad*, June 14th 2010;

¹⁷⁷⁶ A movie made by Frans Bromet, see www.fransbromet.nl.

¹⁷⁷⁷ At the time that this appointment took place (February 21st 2011), the Ministry of V&W was already reformed into the Ministry of I&M (see chapter 5).

¹⁷⁷⁸ See for example Boelens et al., 2009; Frenken, 2009; Jacobs, 2009; Kuipers, & Manshanden 2010; Kleyn, 2009; McKinsey, 2010; Teisman et al., 2008; TNO/Buck, 2010; Vriesman et al., 2009). As we have seen in the case, this criticism stands in a longer tradition, as several economists questioned the added value of transport and logistics for the Dutch economy as a whole throughout the 1990s.

¹⁷⁷⁹ See chapters 1 and 2, where we argued that genealogies are not carried out for fun, but for delivering a contribution to challenging discursive orders that are perceived to be more and more problematical in the present.

We know that we are dealing with extremely institutionalized practices and that it will be very difficult, if not almost impossible, to change them. It is important to note that one should not expect any genealogy to make a revolutionary impact (that is, that people will immediately change their regular daily practices after finishing the case). Firmly embedded policy discourses only change gradually, if changing at all. Moreover, in the specific case of Schiphol a revolutionary impact is not necessarily required, as the main ambition underlying the Schiphol debate can count on wide support, i.e. the dual objective of creating economic growth and environmental improvement. As we have seen, it has been the specific way wherein this dual objective has been framed and reframed time and again that has resulted in suboptimal policy solutions and low levels of trust. Besides, we need to be modest for one different reason: the study is just one of the many research reports that can be added to the ever growing pile of Schiphol studies. We cannot expect practitioners to read all these reports. Whether or not regular daily practices have really changed can only be assessed *ex post*. And even then it will be very difficult to assess the actual impact of the genealogy. Scientific literature on power teaches us that it is impossible to find a causal relation between for example our report and policy change in the Schiphol policy domain. For one, there is always time involved and during this time several other circumstances change too, meaning that we can never know for sure whether or not our research was the one and only cause. Besides, we cannot know whether or not change would have occurred when we wouldn't have published this thesis (cf. Van Schendelen, 1990).

We conclude that we are satisfied with the contribution that the research has made to the public debate so far. We also note that there is reason to assume that this contribution can become stronger, although we recognize that this can only result in small changes and marginal improvements and although the actual impact of a genealogy can never be captured in terms of causal relations. Based on this it is fair to conclude that our genealogy may hold some transformative capacity in itself. At the same time, it can be argued that the in depth understanding that a genealogy offers in the interplay between the multiplicity of force relations at work and the discursive order offers an extremely fruitful starting point for discerning effective interventions. Or, in other words, we believe that the transformative capacity of a genealogy can be enhanced by accompanying it with the recommendations that fit within the specifics of the context described, without violating Foucault's approach (the second question that we posed at the end of 10.2.1). We shall elaborate this in the next paragraph

10.3. Enhancing the Transformative Capacity: The potential for Recommendations

Foucault reasoned that providing recommendations was undesirable and even dangerous. Instead he attempted to assist people to become reflexive practitioners by means of his genealogies. For this, he emphasized the need of a critical attitude. It

remains to be seen whether people really have both the ability and willingness to adopt such an attitude in situations that are characterized by extremely institutionalized ways of talking and acting. Foucault may ask people to start living a critical life, to adopt an attitude of permanent criticism, but as some commentators noted, asking people to work, and work hard, not only on society but also on themselves without guidance and with no guarantee of success is not a request many today would gladly grant (Gandal, 1986; Taylor, 2003). Moreover, everybody can acknowledge that it is very difficult to actually dispose of specific bad habits (like addictions or losing one's temper too easily). Good intentions are necessary, but will-power is even more important. And it remains to be seen whether people care enough to mobilize the required will power. It is to say that triggering reflection is one step, but going on to actually change one's behavior and regular daily practices is quite another matter.

Maybe Foucault was too optimistic about the ability of people to actually think and act differently; to embrace doubt and discomfort; to leave behind the ontological certainties that allowed them to act spontaneously; in short, to adopt the kind of critical attitude that Foucault thought necessary for people to create themselves as works of art without any guidance and with no guarantee of success.¹⁷⁸⁰ It is equally likely that people who obtain the kind of understanding that blows away the solid ground beneath their feet, so that they don't know what to do anymore, revert to business as usual. Indeed, in psychology it has become clear that people have a tendency to ignore clues that question their basic assumptions or to make them consonant with the beliefs they already held (Festinger, 1957; Weick, 1995). Moreover, in politically sensitive situations (like Schiphol) opening the black box might be somewhat equal to opening Pandora's Box. It implies that several issues that appeared to be settled in the past have to be discussed all over again. For many, this will feel like doing one step back instead of moving forward. As a consequence, a situation might arise wherein a majority of actors silently agrees that it is better to keep the box closed, instead of facing the real problems as they are likely to result in political turmoil. In essence, becoming aware of the constructed nature of one's practices and its lack of historical necessity is one thing, but it might not be sufficient for real change. From this perspective, all help that can enhance the transformative capacity of genealogy is welcome.

Fortunately, a genealogy offers a very fruitful breeding ground for delivering recommendations that sit comfortably with ethical assumptions underlying the genealogical approach.¹⁷⁸¹ The main point is that recommendations should not be derived from universal goods, but from the specific situational ethics at work in the

¹⁷⁸⁰ See Foucault, 2000B; p.294; Foucault, 2000A; p.397, 399 for illustrations of his optimism.

¹⁷⁸¹ As indicated in chapter 4, this is important for presenting a consistent and coherent research framework that increases the validity of the research.

case. This can better be understood by recalling Foucault's philosophical position. The rejection of universal goods places Foucault in the ethical philosophical tradition of Aristotle, as opposed to the tradition of Plato. Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not believe in the existence of a universal good and bad. What is good and what is not depends on a specific situation.¹⁷⁸² Denying the need for dogmatic systems that people should enact does not mean that one is relativistic. It means that we have to find out what is good and what is not for each specific situation anew.¹⁷⁸³ The detailed understanding of the complexities and ambiguities in a specific case that is offered by a proper genealogy provides a valuable starting point for judging what is good and bad within a given situation. Such contextualism implies a situational ethics, that is, norms that are contextually grounded. Foucault is therefore certainly not a relativist (i.e. anything goes), but a pragmatist, as it is the socially and historically conditioned context that serves as the best basis for action (see Flyvbjerg 2001; Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 1999). The sophisticated understanding of a specific case that a genealogy offers, allows us with the means to uncover the specific situational ethics at work. Interventions should be based on these ethics in order to stand a chance of making an impact.

To put it differently, contextualism means to acknowledge that the present (or specific context) effectively limits the possible preferences; humans cannot think or do just anything at any time (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Indeed, we have extensively discussed how the existing discursive order sets boundaries to what can be said and done in a meaningful and legitimate way. Calling for (large scale) reforms or interventions that don't comply with the rationale of the discursive order are likely to be very ineffective, exactly because they fall outside these boundaries of what is deemed rational and legitimate.¹⁷⁸⁴ Moreover, it can even be doubted whether or not actors are really capable of totally abandoning the specific practices at work, as this would imply that they have to let go of their ontological securities (i.e. it is these practices that make sense to them, that feel good etc. and not others). The trick is then to modify these practices to the extent that these are still deemed legitimate and meaningful. Or, in words of Foucault, we need to seek the limits of what is deemed acceptable within any given discursive order. The sophisticated understanding of a case that a genealogy offers allows us to develop the kind of interventions that are exactly *at* the boundaries of what is perceived to be legitimate.¹⁷⁸⁵ Thus, we can use the principle of contextualism to develop a situational

¹⁷⁸² Nonetheless, he set certain emotions (e.g., hate, envy, jealousy, spite, etc.) and certain actions (e.g., adultery, theft, murder, etc.) as always wrong, regardless of the situation or the circumstances (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotelian_ethics, derived from the web on November June 16th 2010).

¹⁷⁸³ See for example MacIntyre, 1990 and Flyvbjerg 2001 for a more extensive discussion about this.

¹⁷⁸⁴ Recall Foucault's limited trust in institutional reforms (10.2), as they do not necessarily change the thoughts and behaviour of people.

¹⁷⁸⁵ We already discussed this limit-attitude in chapter 2; See e.g. Foucault, 1984D; p.45 – 47; Foucault, 2000B; p.241; Foucault, 1994G; p.73.

ethics that is enacted in practices that work to partly reproduce and partly change the existing discursive order.

In essence, interventions in a given (policy) domain should be based on a sophisticated understanding of the discursive order of that domain. From this perspective we can better understand why the implementation of several of the prior recommendations for loosening Schiphol's policy deadlock have failed. They were derived from analyses that sought universal patterns. In order to arrive at universal patterns, the specifics of the case needed to be ignored. We already quoted Flyvbjerg, stating that such simplification might make things easier to understand, but it is less clear whether it works to clarify things. As Innes and Booher have argued 'Simplification results fundamentally in wrong answers and policies based on a reductionist approach in which complexity is reduced and ignored, will probably be counterproductive' (Innes & Booher, 2003). We are certainly not arguing that reducing complexity for the sake of generalizations is wrong, but we do believe that recommendations derived from a more detailed understanding of the case at work hold a higher potential for triggering change, exactly because it allows for the kind of contextualist understanding that is deemed necessary for discerning potentially effective interventions that are located exactly *at* the limits of the discursive order.

In sum, while recognizing that offering recommendations that might assume the form of quick and easy solutions dangers the creation of the kind of deep frame reflection that is really needed for changing behavior, we believe that the transformative capacity of our genealogy about Schiphol can be enhanced by providing accompanying recommendations, as long as these recommendations are firmly grounded in the specific context studied. This implies to ground them in the norms of what is deemed acceptable and what is not (situational ethics), while making sure that they stand a chance of changing regular daily practice by positioning them within (or on) the boundaries of possible actions set by the discursive order in place. When done properly, the recommendations can enhance the transformative capacity of the genealogy, without undermining the fundamental ethical principles underlying a genealogy (don't try to develop universal panacea). Together, the reflexive thought that the effective history of the case triggers and the recommendations that help practitioners to find a way out of the messiness and confusion have the potential to break through the reproductive power of the firmly institutionalized discursive order.

10.4 Transforming Schiphol's Policy Discourse

Most importantly, despite the strong reproductive tendency of the firmly institutionalized discursive order that we discussed in chapter 9, our case study illustrates that variety has been produced at numerous moments during the past 20 years of Schiphol debate (i.e. the events). In chapter 9 we argued that it is not so much the

lacking production of variety that causes the ongoing reproduction of the discursive order (although it is obvious that the discursive order hampers the possibilities for actually producing variety), but it is especially the lack of institutionalization of this produced variety that is responsible for this. That is, our detailed description of the debates that revolved around the policy themes, illustrate that variety is produced, only to become marginalized during the remainder of the process (at least, most of the time). Nonetheless, we also pointed out that changes did occur on the level of the policy themes, and, to a lesser extent on the level of the discursive order of the policy domain (in the meta narrative, the structure of the discourse coalitions, the positioning of actors, the policy agenda). The main point was that these changes were only very limited when compared to all the things that remained stable. However, the existence of so many events that we uncovered also illustrates that there is room for change.¹⁷⁸⁶ Understanding the practices at work that hamper the institutionalization of this produced variety is the first precondition for triggering such change, which is what is done by developing an effective history. More specifically, the effective history has to create a sense of urgency for actors to stop enacting these specific micro practices. That is, the discursive order can only be changed when the actors involved in its daily reproduction sense the urgency for this and have the willingness to do so. When the case does not work to trigger this sense of urgency, and when there is a lack of willingness, all proposed interventions are doomed to failure. After all, no real change will take place in ways of thinking and acting. It won't be the first time that nice words are uttered and promises are made, while business as usual continued in actual practice.¹⁷⁸⁷ Departing from the positive assumptions that there is always room for change and that our case study works to trigger reflection, we first shortly discuss whether or not there is a willingness to facilitate change (10.4.1). Based on the outcomes we discuss the situational ethics of the Schiphol case (10.4.2) that forms the basis of a potentially effective transformation strategy set out in 10.4.3.

10.4.1 A Willingness for Change?

To start with, it is legitimate to ask whether or not things are really that bad in the specific case of Schiphol. It can be argued that the Dutch mainport policy is highly successful, considering the important hub function that both Schiphol and the port of Rotterdam have in the world economy anno 2011 and the worldwide recognition of the Dutch status as Distribution Land par excellence. Indeed, such an interpretation is widely shared in the Netherlands. Moreover, it can be argued that the regulatory system of Schiphol has made sure that the environmental effects have stayed within the legal norms. After all, one main policy message that has been posed over and over again by

¹⁷⁸⁶ Indeed, as argued in chapter 2 there is always room for such change, otherwise there would be no relations of power.

¹⁷⁸⁷ In chapter 1 we referred to Van Twist, 1994 and Edelman, 1979 who both pointed out how words can succeed and policies or interventions can fail.

the winning coalition is that the actual level of noise pollution has been improved since 1990 (recall figure 1.3 of chapter 1). Similarly, it can be argued that the level of noise pollution, the third party risks and the level of local air pollution would have been worse if there had been no policy at all. And when we compare the Schiphol policy processes with the processes about airport development in other countries, it can be argued that the process has been at least as interactive (indeed, most of the time even more interactive) and that there have been no less (even more) attempts to create public support and develop mutually satisfactory results for both actors that favored mainport development and actors that favored environmental development (see for example Andre, 2004; Donnet, 2009; Van Wijk, 2007; Soneryd, 2003; Goetz & Szyliowicz, 1997; Dempsey et al., 1997; Griggs & Howarth, 2004; Lidskog & Soneryd, 2000; Marshall, 2010; Sua-Sanchez et al., 2011). Indeed, policy makers dealing with airport planning in France have even visited the Netherlands, as they perceived the Alders negotiations (2007 -) as a best practice for interactively developing aviation policies (as described in the case study). In line with this it can be argued that the Dutch polder culture of consensualism (see chapter 5) works to prevent extreme forms of domination or manipulation that might occur in other countries lacking democratic constitutions. Everyone involved in the decision-making process knows about the latest gossips and tricks that actors play at one another. And everyone involved implicitly knows that the strict norms, enforcement points, modelling exercises, research programs and contra expertises are a bit of play, as it is clear that Schiphol is allowed to grow finally (see Huys & Annema, 2009). The point here is that strategic behaviour is accepted, as long as it fits within the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable, because actors know that they will meet again in the next round of policy making as regards Schiphol or another large infrastructure project. Thus, playing games and even lying is permitted, as long as it is deemed to be proportional within a given context (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008). Of course, one's answer to the latter question is crucial here. Some might think that the practices have stayed within the limits of what is deemed acceptable, whereas others would argue that the entire debate has been wrought with manipulations or strategic misrepresentations.

Even when one concludes that the actual policies have not failed (although such a conclusion of course depends on how this is assessed) and even when one concludes that we are not worse off than other countries, one can still wonder whether the reproduction of the policy discourse is desirable (and the persistence of the policy deadlock that it implies in the case of Schiphol). In chapter 9 we have argued that the focus on norms (for noise and third party risks) has made standard conformance the main goal, which hampers the production of more optimal solutions that hold more practical value (cf. Tenbrunsel, 1999). And we have argued that actors fail to realize their policy ambitions within the existing framing of the policy discourse, which undermines trust in both the policy regulations and the responsible public authorities.

Here we should add that it is certainly true that the discursive order allowed the macro actors to realize much of their policy ambitions, at least until recently. We have seen that they consciously engaged in all kind of strategies and tactics in order to proof the success of the dual objective, even when it was quite obvious that both objectives could not be realized at the same time (that is, in the specific way wherein they had been framed and reframed over and over again). Maintaining the status quo was beneficial to them, although especially from 2003 onwards the macro actors too have come to sense that continuing along the existing path hampers the realization of their policy ambitions. Moreover, the focus on short term gains (mainport development) made sure that the macro actors underestimated the devastating effects of the policy discourse in the long run, i.e. that it results in suboptimal solutions and growing levels of distrust, making actors to organize their own disappointment.¹⁷⁸⁸ Several of the micro-practices that are now at work in the reproduction of the policy discourse have lost the practical value that they once had, even for those actors who enacted and institutionalized them in the first place.

More specifically, we asserted that the dual objective in itself is not so much a problem, as such a framing of the debate is necessary for setting the right context for creating package deals. It is the specific way wherein the dual objective has been framed and reframed time and again in the Schiphol case that has created so many problems. For one, it forced policy makers to develop policy fictions in order to create the politically desirable solutions. When those policy fictions became untenable the castles of air exploded, resulting in decreasing levels of trust in both the policy framework and the macro actors responsible for this framework (i.e. the iron triangle of the Cabinet, the Ministry of V&W and the aviation sector). As we have seen, the high political pressure to continuously hold on to the untenable assumptions underlying the dual objective thus framed resulted in an ongoing reproduction of those policy fictions, including the perverse effects these sorted (suboptimal policy solutions, high levels of distrust).

In essence, it has resulted in a widely shared desire for change, which became especially pregnant from 2007 onwards as we have described in the case study. Apparently, despite the ongoing argument of the national government (both the politicians and the policy makers involved) that the Schiphol policies are successful and effective, the gap between the actual experiences of the actors involved and the policy world has been growing ever since 1995. From this perspective, Schiphol policies merely succeed in world of fiction, while in practice it fails to address the problem and even works to ameliorate the problem. To paraphrase Edelman (1977) one final time, the words succeed, but the policies fail. The crucial point here is that we have seen that many

¹⁷⁸⁸ This too is quite a common feature of failing decision making networks, see De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008.

actors have pointed out the need for a new policy framework over the years, one that allows them to realize their policy ambitions and one that does not undermine their relationships of trust (see also chapter 1). Indeed, the case study is wrought with examples (the events) of actors that try to induce variety in ways of talking and acting in the public policy debate, culminating in the Alders negotiations of 2007 (which were still continuing anno 2011). As described in the case study several actors believe that things have much improved since 2007. For example, relationships between local residents (or at least a part of them) and the aviation sector and the Ministry of I&M have improved, parts of the strategy of joint fact finding have been enacted, and hierarchical decision making has been replaced by network-like forms of steering. However, as we asserted in chapter 9, little of this variety has worked to change the discursive order of the policy domain yet and several of the regular daily practices have remained in place.

Drawing on the analysis set out above it is reasonable to assume that actors do not deliberately engage in these micro practices anymore, as it hampers the realization of their ambitions. Nonetheless, the practices remain in place, because they are perceived to be the correct ways of doing things.¹⁷⁸⁹ We therefore argue that the reproduction is not merely a result of conscious action. Indeed, we have seen that much of the reproductive power is hidden within the implicit rules that are set by the discursive order and that shape the possible actions of actors involved. How else can we explain the paradoxical situation that a policy discourse that only allows for suboptimal solutions with little practical value is reproduced time and again? And how else can we explain the desire to improve levels of trust (as we have seen one of the key ambitions of the national government from 2003 onwards), while undermining this by constantly reproducing a policy discourse that works to frustrate the realization of this ambition? The implicit rules for talking and acting that have become firmly institutionalized make sure that reproduction is also an unconscious affair. In essence, actors are not merely knowingly and willingly enacting the discourse of the dual objective anymore.¹⁷⁹⁰ Regular daily practice at the Ministries can clarify this.

- At the Ministries policy makers are often involved in the Schiphol issue for a limited amount of years. Often, they start doing new files after four years (a policy that is stimulated by the Ministry), thus turnover in personnel is high. One of the

¹⁷⁸⁹ To give the example of noise once more, the way to calculate levels of noise are laid down in different legally ratified protocols that have to be lived up to by law. The dubious assumptions underlying the calculation protocols are lost out of sight and resist reflection.

¹⁷⁹⁰ Indeed, they might have done this knowingly and willingly in the past, when they constructed specific practices with a specific purpose in mind (see for example In 't Veld, 2000 for this interpretation). However, such an argument doesn't make much sense anymore when actors clearly point out that they fail to realize their policy ambitions within the existing context, as has come to the fore in the case of Schiphol from 2003 onwards.

negative side effects is that actors don't see the implications of their own practices, which makes it harder to reflect upon them. Moreover, just when the policy makers start to understand the specifics of the extremely technical and fragmented Schiphol file, they move on to another position. This results in a sort of brain drain, which undermines the 'memory' of the organization. As a consequence, (research) questions that have been asked many times before keep returning to the agenda.

- Many individuals have disappeared from the stage and new actors have taken over their positions, including the daily routines that came with the job. For the new actors existing practices were the taken-for-granted inheritance of their predecessors. They lost the constructed nature of the practices out of sight. For example, new policy makers are given an assignment, including specific research questions that they have to answer, calculation methods and scenarios they have to use, and relationships they have to draw upon. Political deadlines and lack of knowledge often make sure that there is no time to critically reflect upon the calculation models and scenarios, let alone to reflect upon the need to actually use calculation models and scenarios in the first place. Instead, people start to continue with business as usual, drawing upon existing, self-evident practices that resist reflection and that work to reproduce the Schiphol policy discourse and its perverse effects

The positive aspect of our analysis so far is that there seems to be a willingness of almost all actors involved to do things differently, a willingness that has gained more support from 2007 onwards. The difference with the previous years is that these actors now also include the macro actors (i.e. the Ministry of I&M, the aviation sector and the Cabinet), who have sensed that continuing along the existing path was no longer effective. Also, in the broader context momentum is building up for critically appraising the one-sided mainport strategy as the cornerstone of the Dutch spatial-economic development strategy, as we discussed in the former paragraph. At the same time we have concluded that the discursive order has remained highly stabile during 1989 – 2009, and we have explained this by pointing out the ongoing influence of the micro-practices involved. Thus, people want to transform the discursive order (thus breaking through the policy deadlock), but it proves to be very difficult to actually do this, exactly due to the taken-for-granted character of the micro-practices involved. We conclude that the ongoing reproduction and naturalization of the discursive order in the Schiphol policy domain is deemed undesirable by the practitioners involved (including the macro actors).¹⁷⁹¹

¹⁷⁹¹ Note that we are not arguing that discursive orders with a strong reproductive tendency are always undesirable. As long as it allows actors to realize the practical outcomes they desire, there will be no need for change.

Moreover, from a (normative) ethical point of view one can argue that strong reproductive systems that hamper the production and institutionalization of variety are always undesirable as they assume the form of totalitarian and dogmatic systems that endanger freedom (were freedom is understood as the possibility of thinking and acting differently, see chapters 2 and 10). This implies that we have a moral obligation to create possibilities for thinking and acting differently within the Schiphol policy domain. Drawing on this widely shared willingness for change, the different strategies to realize such change that we have witnessed the past few years by means of the Alders negotiations and the persistence of the discursive order makes one wonder how such change can be created.

The obvious way to break through the reproductive tendency of the policy discourse is by changing the micro-practices that work to reproduce the discourse. It is these micro practices that work to regulate the conduct of the actors involved. However, we already pointed out the paradox at work here, as it is these micro-practices that embody the ways of talking and acting that actors perceive to be meaningful and legitimate. Actors will therefore not easily replace these practices. New practices or modified practices need to sit comfortably with the rationalities at work in the Schiphol policy domain. This means that we have to try to position the interventions on the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable. So, were to begin? The situational ethics of the Schiphol case offer the obvious point of departure.

10.4.2 Situational ethics of the Schiphol case

Practices do not automatically change. They only change as a result of changes in the external environment (economic crises, high oil prices, great disasters etc.) or by interventions made by actors.¹⁷⁹² As we cannot influence the external conditions, we focus on the potential of interventions of actors.

The context of the Schiphol case sets clear limits to the type of interventions that can be made, and especially to whom is allowed to intervene. The latter is important, as there is need for some actors to take the lead in order to stimulate the process of change. Of course, we have seen that the reproduction works through the practices of all actors involved, which implies that all actors have the potential to contribute to change by changing their regular daily practice. However, the problem is that none of the actors can do this alone without running the risk of exclusion. For example, when environmental organizations start to relate the future of Schiphol to the climate issue instead of the noise issue, they do this with the risk of getting sidelined. After all, the

¹⁷⁹² See for example Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier & Jenkins, 1989; Schon & Rein, 1994 for discussions about the importance of grand external events as drivers of policy change.

entire policy system is based on the fundamental principle that limiting values in noise enforcement points may not be exceeded.

So we are left with two options; (1) all actors start to behave differently at the same time, or (2) a (few) strong actor(s) take the lead and trigger a process of change. The first option is unrealistic within the Schiphol context, as actors won't trust the promises made by one another and actors automatically assume that promises are part of their strategic behaviour. Therefore, the second option offers the best chances of moving forward, especially within the case of Schiphol where different actors repeatedly stressed the need for (central) leadership (see our case study; see also Boons et al., 2010; Van Gils et al., 2009; Tan, 2001; Teisman et al., 2008). Or in other words, within the specifics of the Schiphol context a top down approach seems to be necessary for setting the process of change in motion. At the same time, this process of change needs to be enacted by all actors involved, or at least a majority, in order to become effective. After all, it is the sum of the regular daily micro-practices of all the actors involved that has caused the ongoing reproduction and institutionalization of Schiphol's discursive order. As we have described in the case study, such a movement is already taking place during the past few years. That is, the macro actors have acknowledged the need to do things differently and a new leader who was deemed to be independent has been put forward (Alders). The context has been gradually changing the past few years (including the political context, especially when we compare the perceptions of the members of the Lower House anno 2010 with those of 1998 regarding Schiphol affairs), although we have argued that the discursive order has by and large remained in place. Nonetheless, the new strategies enacted during the past few years, the widely shared ambition of actors to do things differently (including the macro actors) and our detailed understanding of the micro-practices involved that cause the ongoing reproduction and the role that distrust plays in the Schiphol debate, provide us with a fertile breeding ground for moving forward. In the next paragraph we set out a five step procedure and some necessary preconditions that might contribute to transforming Schiphol's policy discourse.

10.4.3 Transforming Schiphol's policy Discourse

In this chapter we discuss a five step procedure that might offer practitioners inspiration for finding new ways that help to transform Schiphol's policy discourse. The procedure is derived from the situational ethics of the Schiphol case, but, when possible, we relate the steps to broader theoretical insights. Drawing on the specific case of Schiphol, this procedure should especially be understood as a possible way to reframe the dual objective. As argued in chapter 9, it is not so much the dual objective itself that is the main problem, but it is the specific way wherein this objective has been framed and reframed over and over again during the past 20 years that is the problem. The specific framing resulted in unfeasible political ambitions that gave way to policy fictions that

caused suboptimal policy solutions and high levels of distrust. At the same time, the ongoing reproduction of this specific framing has made it rather immune to changes due to its high level of institutionalization. The procedure we set out in the remainder of this paragraph might contribute to a new understanding (reframing) of the dual objective that can result in more optimal policy solutions (that hold practical value for actors involved) and that does not work to further undermine levels of trust. The procedure should not be understood as a blueprint for successful action. Instead, it is meant to offer practitioners inspiration by providing a potentially effective example of how things might be done differently, based on the sophisticated understanding of the situational ethics that our genealogy has provided for. Finally, it builds upon the changes that have been set in motion during the past few years, but in a way that it can make an actual impact on the level of the policy discourse.

Step 1. Political Recognition and Political Champions

As discussed in 10.4.2. there is need of a (few) strong actor(s) who take(s) the lead and trigger(s) a process of change. However, in the case of Schiphol the high levels of distrust make it difficult to find an actor that is allowed to effectively enact such a role. Fortunately, one of the paradoxes involved that we discussed in paragraph 9.5 is that this lack of trust resulted in a reinforced call for centrality. Indeed, from the case description it clearly comes to the fore that most actors constantly call upon the national government to deal with the complex Schiphol situation, even despite the fact that the both national politicians and national policy makers subsequently failed to live up to their earlier promises. When we add the dependency relations involved in the case to this, the Cabinet and the members of the Lower House are in the best position to take up the leadership role and ignite a wider process of change. After all, the national government is still in charge of the final decision making. Thus, we have need for what Cervero has called political champions. Such political champions are critical in marshalling resources, building winning coalitions, and resolving disputes that invariably crop up along the way (Cervero, 1998; Cervero et al., 2004).¹⁷⁹³ Note that calling for such political champions is something different than calling for a hierarchical style of management. Instead, within the context of fragmented policy networks leadership implies a capability of actors to make the right connections at the right time, to bring the right actors together and create a context that allows them to arrive at package deals (see for example De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Teisman, 2005).¹⁷⁹⁴ The main point here is that national politicians are in the best

¹⁷⁹³ For example, when discussing transit oriented development, Cervero has argued that several complex projects, like the the Fruitvale Transit Village in Oakland, California and Arvada in suburban Denver owe a lot to the dedication and savvy of one or more local leaders who were willing to put their political careers on the line.

¹⁷⁹⁴ Indeed, both network theory and complexity theory learn us that there is no other way to become a successful leader within a context that is characterized by great uncertainties and mutual dependencies. Hierarchical types of command and

position to assume such a role in the specific case of Schiphol (cf. Boons et al., 2010; Tan, 2001). Thus, political recognition of the lack of present-day practical value of the dual objective thus framed might be the crucial first step in transforming the discursive order.

To some extent, such a political champion has already stepped forward, i.e. the chairman of the Alders negotiations that started in 2007. However, as the Alders negotiations still use the traditional framing of the dual objective as the point of departure for the negotiations, one can argue that this seriously limits the possibility for altering existing micro-practices. Or in other words, the firmly institutionalized discursive order allows for very little room to manoeuvre, i.e. to do things differently. Nonetheless, Alders cs have been working on a favourable context for triggering change. We should therefore build upon the trust that this political champion holds, although this trust is not necessarily shared throughout society. If Alders is accompanied by some new political champions, preferably members of the Cabinet or the Lower House, but also influential people from the aviation sector and the academic field, new momentum is created for altering the rules of the game somewhat. For one, the effectiveness of the strategies that are now conducted will be much higher when one avoids the enactment of the micro-practices involved, thus room should be created for this. This implies that totally different research questions are included in the debate and that policy solutions are explored that don't necessarily live up to the principle of equivalence. These are allowed to draw upon fundamentally different assumptions, scenarios, norms and methodologies.

Step 2. Actors act in accordance with this political recognition

When the political champion(s) have created political recognition of the perverse effects of the existing discursive order (i.e. acknowledging its suboptimal outcomes, its devastating effect on levels of trust) and the micro practices at work that sustain this discursive order, a context is created for others to speak out their desire for change and the need for some new rules of the game to actually enact different ways of talking and acting without running the risk of immediately excluding oneself. Thus, the political recognition of the problem and the need to adequately do something about this problem should be enacted by all other actors involved. This implies that the other actors involved speak out their willingness to let go of the policy regulations in order to explore new possibilities. At this point there will be a shared recognition of the need to do things differently. The case description offers ample reason to assume that actors will actually do this, as most of them have already loathed the unrealistic promise of the dual objective several times. The paradox involved here is that it will be very difficult to

control and explicit visions of leaders deprive networks (or systems of actors) of their agility and adaptiveness (see for example De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008; Senge, 1990; Teisman et al., 2009).

actually think and act differently, as existing micro-practices set boundaries to things that are deemed meaningful and legitimate. Nonetheless, the awareness of the micro-practices and the perverse effects they sort (i.e. ongoing reproduction of the discursive order) makes them less self-evident and turns them in potential objects of change. This is very important as the existing micro-practices limit the possibilities for enacting new strategies and tactics, and the few new strategies are likely to sort little effect, as the enactment of the micro-practices that reproduce the discursive order also continue.

Thus, if other actors don't support the political call for extended boundaries and new 'rules of the game' in order to allow for new ideas and relationships, and continue enacting their regular daily practices, the result will be an ongoing reproduction and further institutionalization of the existing discursive order. In fact, as described in the Schiphol case, such a thing has already repeatedly happened in the past. For example, in 1998 national politicians promised to 'make a clean sweep', restore levels of trust and critically reflect upon the fundamental assumptions of the national Schiphol policies. In spite of this political promise and the good intentions involved, its implementation failed as a consequence of the continuation of regular daily practice on behalf of other actors involved.¹⁷⁹⁵ It illustrates that it is impossible to stop enacting the micro practices involved (i.e. the list of practices that we presented in chapter 9). However, the awareness of existing practices makes it possible to modify them (e.g. start measuring noise and use the results for the calibration of calculation models; compensate losers in a proper way; avoid naming and shaming via the media; develop research questions and organize supervision in more interactive ways; try to avoid new legal procedures) and to allow room for new strategies and tactics that can eventually become new practices. The widely shared political recognition of the perverse effects of the current discursive order (including the micro-practices it implicates) and of the need for additional rules of the game that make it possible to explore new policy solutions are crucial for transforming the discursive order. The creation of room for acting differently is crucial because otherwise nice words may be uttered, while acting in contradictory ways proceeds.

Step 3. Developing Joint Facts

When the shared intention to do things differently has become widely supported, and the rules of the game have been changed to allow for this, the door is opened for

¹⁷⁹⁵ Some ideas from configuration theory might help to explain this. In theory, it can be effective to intervene in the process when dealing with fixations in the content, and vice versa. This is the principle of context variation (Voogt, 1991). For example, the introduction of new actors and new interaction rules make it possible for new ideas to seep in, while new contents might result in new relationships and interactions (Termeer, 1993; Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997). As firmly institutionalised discursive orders are characterized by fixations in both content and process (i.e. the different fixations shape up to form one social-cognitive fixation on the level of the policy domain), interventions need to be aimed at both sides simultaneously. Thus, both the modification of discursive and non-discursive practices has to be taken up at the same time. The many interventions that we have described over the years most of the time worked to influence only one side of the medal (i.e. interactive policy arrangements or investments in new research agenda's), which might explain their limited success.

developing the kind of information that really matters for making trade offs between economy and environment. This is important, as most of the problems related to the public policy debate are related to the validity of information in the case of Schiphol. The information production should not be influenced by political ambitions in the first place, as these give rise to all kind of dubious practices (e.g. specific research agenda's, specific framings of research questions, deliberate use of old data files, dubious calculation protocols - including prescriptions for the territories that are to be taken into account -, selection of desirable scenarios, selective presentation of information to the Lower House). It is important to make sure that the information that is developed is perceived to be valid by all actors involved, i.e. developing negotiated knowledge (Van de Riet, 2003) or joint facts (Ehrmann & Stinson, 1999). Note that such joint facts are not necessarily based on scientific knowledge only. Instead, the practical knowledge of practitioners involved that lack theoretical insights might be just as valuable (see e.g. Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1991; Ockwell & Rydin, 2006). More specifically, an interactive research process may be a promising tool for generating such joint knowledge and mutual learning (Van Buuren, 2005; Edelenbos et al., 2003; Van Eeten & Ten Heuvelhof, 1998; Ehrmann & Stinson, 1999; In 't Veld & Verhey, 2000).¹⁷⁹⁶ Laws & Forrester (2007) discussed such a process in terms of joint fact finding *plus*, referring to the need for ongoing learning during the process. Difficulties and solutions that actors encounter in the process are necessary for improving understanding of both problems and solutions involved.

As can be derived from the case-study, several principles of the joint fact finding strategy have already been enacted during the Alders negotiations. Thus, actors involved have already experimented somewhat with the approach, which offers a fruitful point of departure for further employment. However, as the Alders debate was still firmly conditioned by the micro-practices that we uncovered in chapter 9, the joint fact finding process itself was also very much conditioned by these micro practices. By this we mean that the research questions that were asked, the prevailing norms of the dual objective, the technocratic-discursive format, the existing scenarios and methodologies and the supervision of the research process were very much the same as those of the years before. The outcomes of the process, i.e. the joint facts, were therefore not likely to result in real change, i.e. change on the level of the discursive order. However, the process itself can work to improve relationships of trust, as all actors involved are included in the validation of the research results. The main point we want to make here is that actors should be allowed to ask all the research questions that

¹⁷⁹⁶ Amongst other things, this might imply (1) the joint development of research questions in order to take into account the problem definitions of the stakeholders (2) the collaborative choice of scenarios and research methods (3) consensus about the used theory or causal model in order to take the different opinions about the policy problem, its causes and consequences seriously (4) the joint interpretation of the results and the collaborative formulation of the conclusions.

they deem of importance and decide upon how to find answers to these questions in ways that are deemed to be legitimate. In essence, we think it is fruitful to bring the joint fact finding process one step further than has already been done during the Alders negotiations, while we also think that the process of joint fact finding should play a far more important role in the entire policy process. This won't be easy to realize within the Schiphol context that is characterized by high levels of distrust and high political stakes. Actors involved are asked to further let go of existing certainties and positions, for which mutual trust is a crucial precondition. In fact, the process should be seen as an essential means to restore levels of trust. Maybe it will turn out that such increasing dominance of joint fact finding, including the additional rules that we propose, will be infeasible. However, if actors really want to change the discursive order (e.g. the specific framing of the meta-narrative, the structure of the discourse coalition, the policy themes on the agenda, the existing roles and positions available) such improved joint fact finding offers a promising way forward.

Step 4. Assign an independent committee with status and that is trusted

One way to facilitate a beneficial process of joint fact finding (including the implementation of the additional rules of the game) is by assigning an independent committee with high political status and people who are trusted by the actors involved. For example, one of the political champions who has ignited the process of change by bringing it on the political agenda can become chair of the committee. The committee monitors the entire process and makes sure that the best information is mobilized and used. Such a committee has further need of persons that can play the role of boundary spanners, i.e. people that have the capacity to build bridges between the different rationalities at work in the policy domain (market economics of aviation sector versus environmental logics and spatial logics) and between the world of politics and the world of (scientific) research.¹⁷⁹⁷ The importance of such an independent committee with high political status and members who are trusted has been acknowledge in the field of large infrastructure planning in general (see Flyvbjerg et al., 2003 and Flyvbjerg, 2008). In the case of Schiphol, several local residents repeatedly called for such a committee as one crucial precondition for delivering information about Schiphol that they want to trust (Geudeke & Van Ojik, 2009).

Step 5. Allow politicians to make transparent political decisions

Finally, the information can be presented to the national politicians who can use it for making transparent political decisions. During the process of actual political negotiations, all actors involved are of course free to mobilize as much support for their preferred solutions as possible. The main point here is that the debate will revolve

¹⁷⁹⁷ See Jasanoff, 1990 for extensive discussion about this. See Termeer, 1993 on the importance of bridge builders.

around the questions that really matter and it will be based on information that is deemed valuable by all actors involved. That is, the information database is as little as possible biased by political ambitions. Moreover, there is room for new alternatives that draw on different assumptions, scenarios, norms, methodologies and that use different discursive formats. These new alternatives do no longer fall outside the boundaries of what is deemed meaningful, rational and legitimate within the discursive order. It is up to the politicians to decide about these alternatives (e.g. full closure of Schiphol, an entirely new airport in the North Sea, noise policy without norms but with non-acoustical measures, compensation in terms of money, insulation, sustainable / climate neutral aviation, design of theoretically most optimal flight routes, discussing optimization of the airport system on the European scale – see box 10.2). The final political decisions are not necessarily resulting in better solutions than we have nowadays, but there are at least two important advantages involved:

- (1) The range of options to choose from will be far bigger. Moreover, new ideas are developed and explored, and this will automatically trigger the creation of more new ideas as possibilities for crossovers increase.
- (2) It will be clear who wins and who loses. Such honesty will be appreciated, as all actors already know that the win-win promise of the dual objective resembles a sham. Moreover, actors can better understand how the final decisions have been developed. Such transparency will be appreciated too, as it does not work to fuel distrust; it is not sheer manipulation of data but the rules of the political game that have framed the final political decisions.

Box 10.2. Schiphol development and the role of the European Commission

Throughout the case it came to the fore that the European Commission sometimes played a role of significance in the development of Schiphol. On the one hand, they cleared the way for further aviation growth by pursuing deregulation and the creation of a Single European Sky. On the other hand, the Dutch Ministry of V&W often referred to the European level when new requests were made for improved environmental standards (CO² emissions, dealing with safety, noise regulations).¹⁷⁹⁸ Nonetheless, we have also seen that the desirability of further growth at Schiphol development has hardly been discussed within the context of the European transport system (which is actually the case for all European airports). Indeed, airport development within Europe has predominantly remained a national concern thus far. This is not only related to the competition between nation states that are eager to facilitate a megahub airport on their own territory. It is also related to the inheritance of several aspects of the bilateral aviation regime, resulting in historically grown close ties between national airlines (flag carriers) and national governments (see chapters 5 and 6).

In the case of airport development, the national interests involved make it difficult to find joint issues that can be tackled on the European level. Yet airlines expect a continuing growth of air traffic in the years to come.

¹⁷⁹⁸ Goals as regards the improvement of the environment have been set back in 2001. For example, the further reduction of noisy airplanes, improving safety standards by means of the establishment of the European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA), which will provide the essential machinery for all aspects of air transport activities, from aircraft certification to the operational rules. See European Commission (2001), White Paper: European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to decide.

Attempts have been made to find solutions for this continuing growth on the European level. Back in 2001 the European Commission presented its ambitions as regards aviation.¹⁷⁹⁹ To sustain the expected growth, air traffic management was to be reformed and sufficient airport capacity needed to be guaranteed in the enlarged European Union. With regard to the first, the creation of a single European traffic control system (Single European Sky, SESAR) formed the core challenge (back in 2001 the European airspace consisted of 26 subsystems, with 58 en route control centres which all applied different rules and procedures as regards flights over their territories). With regard to further development of airport capacity, the challenge was to concentrate European traffic at a few European megahub airports, resulting in the ambition to focus European investments on those few airports and, for example, limit the construction of new airports. Moreover, not only the airport system was to get optimized, but it was also to become integrated into the total European transport system. This was part of the ambition to develop TransEuropean Transport networks (*Transeuropese Netwerken, TEN's*), which was already set in 1992 (Richardson, 1995).¹⁸⁰⁰

From 2000 onwards, the TransEuropean network strategy mainly revolved around establishing the missing links in the European railroad network and road network and, more recently, around improving the connections between seaports, inland waterways and rail. Anno 2010 improving coordination between European airports was still in its infancy, although it was clear that freight and passenger streams could be facilitated in a much more efficient and effective way (i.e. cheaper and with lower environmental impact) when coordination within and between modalities was improved.¹⁸⁰¹

When considering new perspectives on Schiphol development, focusing on the European level might be interesting. For one, discussing optimization of the airport system on the European scale (instead of on the national scale) might give rise to new ideas and solutions as regards future airport development. Despite the ongoing strong national interests involved in the airport file, the adoption of such an European perspective has become more likely with the introduction of the comprehensive strategy (Transport 2050) that the European Commission only recently developed (in 2011), aiming for a competitive European transport system that is meant to increase mobility, remove major barriers in key areas and fuel growth and employment.¹⁸⁰² Besides, as came to the fore in our case description, airline networks are likely to get integrated more and more in the near future (think for example about the ongoing rationalization of route configurations of KLM and AirFrance that resulted from their merger). The further integration between HST networks and airline networks is also expected to continue. At the same time, the revised European transport strategy contains proposals that will dramatically reduce Europe's dependence on imported oil and cut CO₂ emissions in transport by 60% by 2050 (e.g. with regard to aviation the goal is 40% use of sustainable low carbon fuels in aviation in 2050). In essence, when intending to bring more variety into the Schiphol policy debate in the near future, a more important role of the European Commission might be rewarding.

Obviously, the existing low levels of trust in the case of Schiphol make it difficult to enact this five step procedure successfully. At the same time, as we argued before, a proper enactment of the process is in itself a precondition for restoring levels of trust. Thus, trust is both the precursor and the outcome of a successful process that gives rise to (modified) ways of talking and acting that not directly reproduce the existing discursive order. In order to convince the actors involved in the enactment of the five

¹⁷⁹⁹ European Commission (2001), White Paper: European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to decide.

¹⁸⁰⁰ Richardson T. (1995) Trans-European Networks: good news or bad for peripheral regions? Proceedings of Pan-European Transport Seminar, pp 99-110. European Transport Forum, Warwick.

¹⁸⁰¹ European Commission (2011), White Paper: Transport 2050.

¹⁸⁰² European Commission (2011), White Paper: Transport 2050.

step procedure of the pivotal importance of trust, we end this paragraph by shortly providing a theoretical discussion about the importance of trust in policy networks. We assert that actors who understand the crucial function of trust are more eager to act in ways that won't undermine levels of trust.

The Crucial Precondition: Trust

In a context wherein actors are mutually dependent on one another for realizing their policy goals, as resources are spread amongst them, hierarchical ways of decision-making are often not effective. Instead, actors have to work together, forming networks and seeking for strategic alliances.¹⁸⁰³ The presence of a certain amount of trust seems to be an important precondition for networks to function effectively (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Keast et al., 2005; Huys & Koppenjan, 2010; Parker, 2007). Without trust it may be 'just networks' that we are left with, holding little joint decision making despite intensive interaction patterns. Trust is therefore mentioned as one of the important success factors for interorganizational cooperation (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Woolthuis, 1999).

Trust is regarded as perceptions of the good intentions of other actors. It concerns an expectation about the intention of another actors and that intention concerns the expectation that the other actor will respect the interests of the 'trusting' actor (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Nooteboom, 2002). This includes the expectation of an actor that other actors will refrain from opportunistic behaviour (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). When expectations are repeatedly violated, the trust in another actor must be reviewed or may even disappear entirely. Trust is important in joint decision making for at least two reasons.

- *It decreases transaction costs between cooperating actors:* joint decision-making is costly, as participation demands investments in terms of money, time and energy. It also includes the costs of compromises that actors have to accept. Moreover, drawing up contracts also involves transaction costs (Williamson, 1996). When actors trust one another, fewer investments are needed (e.g. contractual clauses and regulations) when interacting (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.84; see also Eshuis, 2005). Actors are therefore more likely to interact, which is a precondition for interorganizational learning. Besides, when actors trust one another they can handle difficult times more easily and conflicts are less likely to escalate. Actors are more willing to believe that the reason for the breach of confidence cannot be attributed

¹⁸⁰³ See chapter 3 for more extensive discussion on this.

to the other actors (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008). Or they want to believe that a specific actor did not have the intention to undermine their interests.

- *It enhances the probability that actors will exchange information:* trust is important for sharing information and knowledge (Van Buuren, 2005; Cross and Prusak, 2003; Innes, 1994; Yankelovich, 1999). When actors trust one another they are more likely to share information. After all, they don't expect that the information will be used against them for strategic reasons. The more information that floats through a network, the bigger the chances for developing high quality solutions. Or in other words, the problem solving capacity of the network is enlarged (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Huys & Van Gils, 2010). For one, it allows actors to check and double check information that they receive from specific actors. This is important, as actors in a network behave strategically and will spread information strategically (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008). Besides, more information provides more opportunities for coupling the solution to the problem of other actors or decoupling it. Moreover, knowledge sharing can also work to reduce transaction costs, as actors receive information about positions and perceptions of actors, the problems they are faced with, their resources, the extent they are able to cooperate and the conditions under which they are willing to do so. Such information allows an actor to develop strategies that have the potential to be successful within the context of the policy network (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008).¹⁸⁰⁴

Low transaction costs and high exchange of information are crucial preconditions for stimulating such learning, but such preconditions are absent when there is a lack of trust. Without sharing information there is a great danger of report wars (DeLeon, 1988). Actors mobilize their own research in order to gather evidence that supports their preferred storylines, a process that is facilitated by the existence of a diversified arena of research producers (Van Buuren, 2005; Van Buuren & Edelenbos, 2005; Nowotny et al., 2001; WRR, 1998). The result is a dialogue of the deaf, as actors develop stories that are all true in their own terms, while pointing in conflicting, and sometimes even mutually exclusive directions (Van Eeten, 1999B; Roe, 1994; Sabatier, 1988).¹⁸⁰⁵

This tendency for actors to behave self-interestedly when there is a lack of trust is also recognized in psychological literature. It leads to egocentric interpretations of the appropriate resolution, and there is no willingness to search for mutually beneficial solutions (Tenbrunsel, 1999; Wade et al., 1996). Others have indicated that there is also a cognitive reason for this, as uncertainty produces a cognitive focus that favours the

¹⁸⁰⁴ For example, as a discursive strategy actors can use the information to frame a storyline that works to mobilize support of other actors by making it appear that the problem and solutions are in their interest too.

¹⁸⁰⁵ See chapter I for more extensive discussion about a dialogue of the deaf. Here we also argued that the Schiphol case has been marked as a prime example of a dialogue of the deaf (based on Abma, 2001; Van Eeten, 1999A).

self (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). Indeed, people have the tendency to ignore the information that undermines their taken-for-granted certainties, while focusing on the information that provides legitimation for their certainties (Festinger, 1957). From this perspective, people have a tendency to see the things that they want to see, which gives ways to self-fulfilling prophecies (Weick, 1995). The lack of trust between actors makes them less susceptible to let go of certainties, thus strengthening the tendency for self-interested behaviour. Whatever the exact causes, the result is the same. In dialogues of the deaf actors create contradictory certainties (Hoppe, 1999), while there is no yardstick to assess what is most true (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Trust is needed to improve the joint production of information, to stimulate the exchange of information, and to influence the perception of an actor about the validity of information. In short, to arrive at negotiated knowledge, i.e. knowledge that is perceived to be reliable, valid and authoritative by all actors involved (De Bruijn et al, 1999; Innes, 1999; Van de Riet, 2003).¹⁸⁰⁶

When taking the above discussion into account, it won't be difficult to see the crucial importance of trust for turning the five step procedure into a success. For one, it illustrates the need for actors to avoid enacting the many discursive and non-discursive practices that we discussed before, which work to undermine levels of trust (violating political promises, not compensating losers properly, starting legal procedures etc.).

10.5 Conclusion: Transforming Schiphol's Policy Discourse

This chapter was meant to provide an answer to our third research question, i.e. 'How can the genealogy contribute to the transformation of the Schiphol policy discourse?' Our main point of departure (based on Foucauldian genealogy) is that there is always a possibility for changing, no matter how strong the reproductive tendency of the discursive order. Indeed, our entire Foucauldian methodology is based on this assumption, otherwise there would be no events that could be studied. We argued that a proper genealogy makes an important contribution to change, exactly by creating the right context for such change. People are made aware of the reproductive mechanisms involved, including the contribution of their own taken-for-granted everyday strategies and tactics, and the perverse and sometimes even dangerous consequences of this ongoing reproduction. People are also made aware of the 'boundaries' within which they develop their thoughts and formulate their ideas and actions. A genealogy tends to leave the reader behind in state of confusion, as the very basic assumptions and beliefs (the ontological securities) of people have been put to the question. Foucauldian genealogies thus tend to mess things up and create additional problems instead of offering easy solutions.

¹⁸⁰⁶ The dilemma is of course that one needs at least some level of trust in the first place in order to create the trust that is needed for creating a fruitful dialogue.

Nonetheless, we asserted that the potential for change can be enhanced by presenting some recommendations for future action. We believe that it is more effective to give actors some guidance when exploring new avenues to practice than leaving them behind in a state of confusion. Such recommendations need to be based on a detailed understanding of the specifics of the context studied, i.e. being grounded in the norms of the case and fit within the boundaries of ways of talking and acting that are deemed acceptable. That is, the specific context of the case sets boundaries to the kind of interventions that hold a chance of succeeding, for which an extremely sophisticated understanding of the case at hand is deemed necessary. Interventions often necessarily imply minor modifications to existing practices, as large-scale institutional reforms are doomed to fail. For one, they tend to fall outside the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable within a discursive order. Moreover, real change implies a change of the inner Self of the people involved. People need to come to the conclusion that change is necessary, otherwise reforms that are implemented top down won't influence their actual conduct.

When discussing the situational ethics of the Schiphol case we pointed out that things have already been changing somewhat since the Alders negotiations began in 2007. New room for negotiations has been developed, which has resulted in new relations and new policy solutions (e.g. the new regulative system for noise, the possibility to experiment with new flight routes and procedures). As we asserted throughout this thesis, this has not (yet) resulted in changes on the level of the discursive order of the policy domain. Thus, we are still very much drawing on the same assumptions underlying the meta narrative, we are still by and large dealing with the same discourse coalition that consists of two subcoalitions, policy themes on the agenda are the same, the policy stories that are developed around the policy themes are by and large the same, the research questions that are asked, the technocratic-discursive format, the methodologies used for calculating noise and other negative effects, all remained rather stabile. We explained this in the former chapter by pointing out the firmly institutionalized discursive order, which sets 'hard' boundaries to the things that can be said and done in a meaningful and legitimate way. However, within this very limited room for manoeuvre, and thus for triggering change, some steps have been set towards change.¹⁸⁰⁷ For one, several key players reached agreement about the further development of Schiphol until 2020, which would have been impossible in the year 2000. Thus, the new context that is slowly emerging offers a fruitful point of departure for actually transforming the discursive order.

¹⁸⁰⁷ As described in the case study, some believe giant steps have been set (i.e. actors involved in the Alders negotiations), while others argue that steps have been minor at best (i.e. actors who are not involved in the Alders negotiations).

Drawing on our understanding of the past (1989 – 2009) and on the strengths of the existing situation (anno 2009) we presented a five step procedure that might actually contribute to breaking through the reproductive power of Schiphol's policy discourse: (1) political recognition of the need to get rid of dual objective thus framed; (2) support for this by all actors involved; (3) production of state of the art information about the real costs and benefits that is perceived to be valid; (4) installing an independent committee with strong political leaders that can span boundaries and that can count on legitimacy; (5) transparent political decision making with honest statements about winners and losers and adequate compensatory measures. We argued that this process can only become successful when actors avoid acting in ways that undermine relations of trust. This implies that actors refrain from prevailing practices that undermine such relations of trust (and that simultaneously work to reproduce the discursive order, including its perverse effects).

We pointed out that to some extent several of these steps have already been set in motion, but we discussed how their actual impact is hampered by the little room for manoeuvre that the existing discursive order implicates. Thus, existing micro-practices continued to regulate regular daily conduct and there is little room for actually transforming the discursive order. The simple conclusion was that our current understanding of these micro-practices at work (and the perverse effects that they give rise to) allows for the creation of more room for developing new alternatives that draw on different assumptions, scenarios, norms, methodologies and for the use of different discursive formats, this would give rise to new ideas, roles and relationships (e.g. full closure of Schiphol, an entirely new airport in the North Sea, noise policy without norms but with non-acoustical measures, compensation in terms of money, insulation, sustainable / climate neutral aviation, design of theoretically most optimal flight route, discussing optimization of the airport system on the European scale – see box 10.2). That is, our current awareness of the hitherto taken-for-granted micro-practices makes it possible to diminish the grip of these micro-practices on ways of thinking and acting. New ways (like the alternatives we just presented) would no longer fall outside the boundaries of what is deemed meaningful, rational and legitimate within the discursive order of the Schiphol policy domain. The range of options to choose from will be far bigger and new ideas are developed and explored that will automatically trigger the creation of more new ideas as possibilities for crossovers increase. Besides, it will be clear who wins and who loses. Such honesty will be appreciated, as all actors already know that the win-win promise of the dual objective resembles a sham. Moreover, actors can better understand how the final decisions have been developed. Such transparency will be appreciated too, as it does not work to fuel distrust; it is not sheer manipulation of data but the rules of the political game that have framed the final political decisions.

Finally, we argued that the five step procedure should not be understood as a blueprint for successful action. Indeed, the procedure is no guarantee for success, and there are possibly several other ways to induce change. In fact, a truly deep understanding of the different rationalities and deep-rooted levels of distrust involved can make one question whether it is really possible to change regular daily practice without help of serious changes in the external environment (like great natural disasters, economic crises, rising oil prices). Nonetheless, we believe that the procedure can give practitioners inspiration when thinking about possible ways to do things differently. Some political champions are deemed necessary for getting such a process started, but in the end it can only succeed when all actors involved understand the need to act differently, as it is the co-evolution of all of their micro practices that works to reproduce or change the existing discursive order. We already pointed out that such changes are likely to evolve gradually, as only small wins seem to be possible when avoiding the violation of the prevailing rules of the discursive order. However, each small win triggers another small win, and in the end they together can churn old routines into new learning (Termeer & Kessener, 2007; Weick & Westley, 1996). In fact, from a Foucauldian perspective such gradual and incremental change is also more desirable, as it increases the likelihood that people actually change their inner Selves (their deepest thoughts and soul which Foucault understood as quintessential for real change). Drawing on the situational ethics of the Schiphol case we should therefore build upon the small changes that have been set in motion during the past few years (2007 – 2009), gradually expanding the ‘boundaries’ of what is deemed meaningful and acceptable within the discursive order of the Schiphol policy domain.

Chapter 11 Conclusion

11.1 Introduction

In this chapter we provide an answer to the four research questions that we posed in chapter 1.

1. How can the genealogical approach be used for describing and analysing the reproductive tendency of policy discourses?
2. To what extent can reproduction in the Schiphol policy discourse be found and how can this reproductive tendency be explained?
3. How, if possible, can the genealogy contribute to the transformation of the Schiphol policy discourse?
4. What contribution has the study made to our understanding of Schiphol's policy deadlock in particular, and to the study of policy deadlocks in general?

We first provide a short answer to questions 1 – 3, which basically entails a recapitulation of the thesis so far (11.2). Next, we discuss the fourth research question in more detail. In order to develop an answer to this question we first discuss the contribution to our understanding of Schiphol's policy deadlock (11.3), followed by an extensive discussion on the value of our findings beyond the Schiphol case (11.4). We end this chapter with a short conclusion (11.5). In the next chapter (12), the epilogue, we shall then critically reflect upon the genealogical method and our research outcomes in line with the critical and curious ethos that the genealogical researcher is expected to practice.

11.2 Recapitulating Research Questions 1 – 3

The main aim of this thesis was to develop an approach that allowed us to describe and explain the emergence and persistence of policy discourses in a given policy domain, which might sometimes assume the form of policy deadlocks. We argued that Foucault's genealogy provided us with the building blocks for developing such an approach. Based on an in depth discussion of Foucault's thought (chapter 2) we developed a heuristic framework composed of four sensitizing concepts (power, discourse, practice and event) that provided us with a valuable conceptual understanding of the emergence and reproduction of discursive orders. The discursive order refers to the ways of thinking, talking and acting that can be done in a meaningful and legitimate way by a specific actor within a specific time-space context. In line with Foucault, we asserted that the main challenge lies in uncovering the power relations at work that sustain the specific discursive order at work. Thus, understanding how power works in the social domain under study is the main aim of any genealogy. As these workings of power are the outcome of the research, we cannot a priori define how it works. The

heuristic framework provided by Foucault allows for uncovering these context dependent workings of power in any given social domain. Building upon Foucault we argued that we can understand how power works by studying the interplay between the discursive order and micro practices involved (i.e. that are both the result and precursor of this discursive order). This interplay works to shape the conduct of people: what can be said and done in a meaningful way by a specific actor in the specific context of the policy domain. Power then works through influencing this conduct; and it works by influencing how actors act upon on another, i.e. as one actor acts, he shapes the possible future actions of another. Partly directly (by triggering a response) and partly indirectly by reproducing the specific discursive order and micro practices.

Drawing on this Foucauldian understanding of power we distinguished between 3 different steps that need to be applied for describing, assessing and explaining the emergence and ongoing reproduction at work. We applied these three steps to the study of the policy domain, closing the gap between Foucault's rather abstract principles and the detailed study of concrete policy processes, in line with the previous work developed by authors like Flyvbjerg, Hajer and Richardson. It resulted in a 3-step procedure that allowed us to describe and explain the emergence and ongoing reproduction (thus persistence) of policy discourses.

1. **Localize events in the policy process.** Events are defined as those moments that variety is being produced. Events can be located on the level of the policy theme. Each policy theme has a policy space, which consists of several elements. Those elements refer to the discursive space (content and format of policy stories) and political space (roles, positions, actors, networks, arenas and coalitions), and these act as signifiers. Events serve as the points of departure for uncovering power relations, as they signify the moments that different knowledges, rationalities or truths clash and vie for dominance.
2. **Tracing lines of descent of these events by detecting strategies and tactics.** By uncovering the strategies and tactics involved in the emergence, institutionalization or marginalization of events, while simultaneously accounting for the contextual factors that influence these strategies and tactics, we provide ourselves with the means to uncover the micro practices at work that regulate the discursive order.
3. **Uncovering the interplay between micro-practices and the discursive order.** Finally, we need to uncover the mechanisms of power at work in the (re)production of a discursive order in a given policy domain. This can be done by (1) illuminating the discursive order in place and the level of change and continuity; (2) illuminating the micro-practices (which can be derived from the previous analysis) at work; ((3) clarifying the interplay between the discursive order and the micro practices. This allows us to understand how power works in the social domain under study.

Next, we discussed the data needs of this 3-step procedure and we presented the specific methodologies that we used for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the data. Here we pointed out that different methodologies for data gathering might be required, depending on the specific problem that is being studied. Thus, the methodologies that we used for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the data are not necessarily the only ones suitable when enacting the 3-step procedure. Together, the 3-step procedure and the methodologies for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the data required resulted in an approach that can be used for describing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks, thus providing an answer to our first research question (1) **‘How can the genealogical approach be used for describing and analysing the reproductive tendency of policy discourses?’**

In the next step we applied the approach to the Schiphol policy debate, resulting in an extensive description and analysis of 20 years of public policy making about the largest airport of the Netherlands. We argued that the Schiphol case qualified for doing genealogy, given the widely shared perception by both practitioners and scientists alike that its policy debate had been deadlocked for many years. Indeed, we argued that a genealogy is only needed in specific situations, as there need to be certain preconditions in place for creating an effective history. Application of steps 1 and 2 resulted in an extensive case description of the Schiphol policy debate (chapters 5 – 8). The third step formed the core of the analysis (chapter 9), from which an answer to the second research question was derived, i.e. (2) **‘To what extent can reproduction in the Schiphol policy discourse be found and how can this reproductive tendency be explained?’**

With regard to the extent of reproduction we asserted that variety has been produced throughout the years, with increasing levels during the Alders episode, but that the discursive order on the level of the policy domain has remained remarkably stabile (i.e. with little changes in the meta narrative of the dual objective with its specific hierarchy in objectives and in the discourse coalition with its hierarchy in positions of two sub-coalitions, the stability of the policy themes that are on the policy agenda and the stability in the specific way wherein actors are positioned vis-à-vis one another).¹⁸⁰⁸ Here it is once again important to emphasize that the term policy deadlock refers to the level of the discursive order of the policy domain. The basic assumptions underlying the Schiphol policy debate about ways of talking and acting that are deemed meaningful and legitimate have changed very little during 1989 – 2009, although it remains to be

¹⁸⁰⁸ At some moments variety became institutionalized too; we for example discussed how the mainport concept evolved over the years and how the environmental coalition grew larger as positions changed, new actors entered the stage and more and more actors called for the need to restore the balance between the dual objectives.

seen if the variety that is being created during the Alders debate will make an impact on the level of the discursive order in the years to come.

In order to explain the strong reproductive tendency of the discursive order that we found we illuminated the regularities in the discursive order (composed of the meta narrative, the discourse coalition and the policy themes on the agenda) and uncovered the variety of micro practices at work in the Schiphol policy domain (both the discursive and non-discursive practices), in order to show how these practices were both the precursor and the outcome of the discursive order in place. Here we explained how the discursive order gave way to specific micro practices and a specific positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another and how these worked to reproduce the discursive order (i.e. the meta narrative with its hierarchy in dual objectives, the discourse coalition with its hierarchy in sub coalitions and the positioning it implicated). The reproduced discursive order, in turn, gave way to further enactment of existing positions and micro practices, resulting in an ongoing institutionalization of both the discursive order and the micro-practices that it implicated. Each time the discursive order became further institutionalized, underlying micro practices and positions became more self-evident, giving way to a strong self-reinforcing loop and further naturalization of the discursive order.

We argued that this self-reinforcing loop was further strengthened as a consequence of one of the main perverse effects of this ongoing reproduction, i.e. the ever growing levels of distrust, both between actors involved and in the policy regulations. We illustrated how the existing discursive order does not allow different actors to realize their policy ambitions (related to mainport development or environmental improvement) at the same time, despite the promise of the dual objective that this would be possible. The discursive order gave way to suboptimal solutions and fictive policy worlds, and leading macro actors failed to offer a way out. Note that we are not arguing that the dual objective itself was the main problem; it was the specific way wherein the dual objective has been framed that eventually caused the need to create such policy fictions. At the same time, the increasing levels of distrust made actors cling to existing regulations and call for strong leadership on behalf of the national government, which both worked to further reproduce the discursive order and hence worked to fuel distrust. The ever-increasing lack of trust hampered the kind of learning that was needed to create variety and develop new or modified practices. Transaction costs were high, exchange of information was low and actors didn't dare to let go of their (fake) certainties and reflect upon their basic assumptions. Instead of developing new, potentially better storylines, actors automatically choose sides (for/against) and the dichotomy of the existing storylines that diametrically oppose one another (dual objectives) was reinforced. The hierarchy in storylines, the available positions and the positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another and the multiplicity of micro-practices that

was constituted by the discursive order was also reproduced. Here it is important to stress once again that we did not argue that no variety had been produced at all. On the contrary, as the entire case description has been built around those moments that variety was produced. But we did assert that little of this variety became institutionalized on the level of the policy domain, which explains the great regularities in ways of thinking, talking and acting that we have found.

By then, we knew how power worked in the specific case of Schiphol's public policy debate, i.e. giving way to a specific discursive order and a set of micro practices that set boundaries to the things specific actors could think, say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way during a specific moment and that could only result in suboptimal policy solutions and growing levels of distrust. The obvious next question to be answered was **(3) 'How can the genealogy contribute to the transformation of the Schiphol policy discourse?'** although we noted that this normative question fell outside the scope of Foucault's genealogy. The main outcome of the genealogy was to provide the reader with an understanding of how power works, thus creating additional problems and messy situations without providing answers for how to move forward.

In chapter 10 we developed an answer to this third research question of the thesis. The main point made here was that a proper genealogy could be turned into an effective history, thus creating the right context for triggering change, exactly by making the people involved aware of the perverse effects of their regular daily practices. The idea that the genealogy itself held some transformative capacity by creating the preconditions for change formed the first part of the answer to the third research question. However, we also asserted that the detailed understanding of how power works in a specific domain allows for the creation of potentially effective intervention strategies. Such strategies need to be firmly based on the specifics of the case, i.e. its situational ethics that define what kind of interventions are probably deemed to be legitimate and meaningful and what kind of interventions are not (because they fall outside of the discursive order). More specifically, we asserted that it is the challenge to discern the kind of interventions that are exactly on the boundaries of the discursive order, creating an opportunity to expand these boundaries. Moreover, we pointed out that providing such recommendations for interventions is not opposed to the ontological, epistemological and ethical foundations of the genealogical approach, thus leaving the consistency and the robustness of the approach unharmed.

Drawing on our understanding of the past (1989 – 2009) and on the strengths of the existing situation (anno 2010) we presented a five step procedure that might offer inspiration for transforming Schiphol's policy discourse: (1) political recognition of the need to get rid of dual objective thus framed; (2) support for this by all actors involved; (3) production of state of the art information about the real costs and benefits that is

perceived to be valid; (4) establishing an independent committee with strong political leaders that can span boundaries and that can count on legitimacy; (5) transparent political decision making with honest statements about winners and losers and adequate compensatory measures. We argued that this process can only become successful when actors avoid acting in ways that undermine relations of trust. This implies that actors refrain from prevailing practices that undermine such relations of trust (and that simultaneously work to reproduce the discursive order, including its perverse effects). Finally, we asserted that part of this process has already been set in motion from 2007 onwards, with the installation of the Alders negotiations. This new interactive approach was derived from a widely shared urgency and political recognition to do things differently, as can be derived from the case description. Nonetheless, we concluded that anno 2009 very little change had been realized on the level of the discursive order, which we already explained by pointing out how the firmly institutionalized discursive order sets hard and rather narrow boundaries to the things that can be thought, said and done in a meaningful and legitimate way, thus allowing very little room to manoeuvre. Therefore, existing micro-practices continue to regulate regular daily conduct and there is little room for actually transforming the discursive order. Thus, although some steps have been (partly) set in motion, we argued that more can be gained in the future by extending these steps.

The rationale behind this belief is that our current understanding of the micro-practices at work (and the perverse effects that they give rise to) allows for the creation of more room for developing new alternatives that draw on different assumptions, scenarios, norms, methodologies and for the use of different discursive formats, would give rise to new ideas, roles and relationships (e.g. full closure of Schiphol, an entirely new airport in the North Sea, noise policy without norms but with non-acoustical measures, compensation in terms of money, insulation, sustainable / climate neutral aviation, design of theoretically most optimal flight route, discussing optimization of the airport system on the European scale – see box 10.2). That is, our current awareness of the hitherto taken-for-granted micro-practices makes it possible to diminish the grip of these micro-practices on ways of thinking and acting. New ways (like the alternatives we just presented) would no longer fall outside the boundaries of what is deemed meaningful, rational and legitimate within the discursive order of the Schiphol policy domain. This, in turn, can help to transform the policy discourse on the fundamental level, i.e. by altering the basic assumptions and micro practices involved. Drawing on the situational ethics of the Schiphol case we assert that it is exactly by building upon the strengths of the existing situation (anno 2009/2010) that an additional boost can be given to this process of transformation.

We emphasized that the five step procedure should not be understood as a blueprint for successful action. Indeed, the procedure is no guarantee for success, and there are

possibly several other ways to induce change. Moreover, we also assumed a modest role, arguing that a truly deep understanding of the different rationalities and deep-rooted levels of distrust involved in the case of Schiphol can make one question whether it is really possible to get out of the impasse without help of serious changes in the external environment (like great natural disasters, economic crises, rising oil prices). Nonetheless, we asserted that the five step procedure can work to give practitioners inspiration when thinking about possible ways to do things differently. Some political champions are deemed necessary for getting such a process started, but in the end it can only succeed when all actors involved understand the need to act differently, as it is the co-evolution of all of their micro practices that works to reproduce or change the existing discursive order. We pointed out that such changes are likely to evolve gradually, as only small wins seem to be possible when avoiding the violation of the prevailing rules of the discursive order. However, each small win triggers another small win, and in the end they together can churn old routines into new learning. In fact, from a Foucauldian perspective such gradual and incremental change is also more desirable, as it increases the likelihood that people actually change their inner Selves (their deepest thoughts and soul which Foucault understood as quintessential for real change). Drawing on the situational ethics of the Schiphol case we should therefore build upon the small changes that have been set in motion during the past few years (2007 – 2009 and onwards), gradually expanding the ‘boundaries’ of what is deemed meaningful and acceptable within the discursive order of the Schiphol policy domain.

Before discussing research question 4, we repeat our disclaimer about the answers that we provided to the research questions 1 – 3. The answers are based on our understanding and analysis of the case. We therefore don’t claim to have uncovered some final truth, as such a thing is impossible and undesirable from a Foucauldian perspective. We merely claim to offer a thoroughly motivated and sophisticated understanding of what has been going on in the Schiphol case in such a way that it can make a meaningful contribution to societal debate about the future of Schiphol. As argued throughout this thesis, people are invited and challenged to develop their own interpretations of the case. In line with the social constructivist and interpretive principles that underlie this thesis, people will give different meanings to the case and develop different analyses. Thus, we already know that the case means different things to different people. For example, as part of our validation procedure we discussed the results with some of the people who have been participating in the Alders negotiations and they believed that the reproductive tendency is less strong than we discussed and that the policy deadlock has been loosened from 2007 onwards. The existence of such different interpretations is not a problem, as long as the case description itself is not rejected. It merely illustrates that the case triggers the same ambiguous reactions as can be found in real life. This is important as it relates to the different perceptions and rationalities involved, which is an important precondition for making a meaningful

contribution to the societal debate about Schiphol, thus turning the thesis in an effective history.

At the end of chapter 10 we had developed an answer on research questions 1 – 3, thus leaving only the fourth and final research question awaiting for an answer, i.e. **(4) ‘What contribution has the study made to our understanding of Schiphol’s policy deadlock in particular, and to the study of policy deadlocks in general?’** This fourth research question will be answered in the remainder of this chapter. In 11.3 we discuss the contribution of the study to our understanding of Schiphol’s Policy Deadlock. In 11.4 we discuss the more generic value of our study.

11.3 Contribution to our understanding of Schiphol’s Policy Deadlock

In chapter 1 we pointed out that many studies have been conducted with the aim of explaining the policy controversy and policy deadlock around Schiphol. It has led to a diverging explanations, some explicitly focusing on the agency part of the policy process (behavioralist explanations), some explicitly focusing on the structural part of the policy process (institutional approaches and linguistic approaches). The behavioralist explanations all describe and explain the policy controversy and deadlock in terms of actor behavior (drawing on policy network theory or process management theory): e.g. how actors are part of two mutually opposing coalitions that held one another in an iron stronghold and how actor behavior has worked to undermine levels of trust (see e.g. Boons et al., 2010; Driessen, 1995; De Jong, forthcoming; Huys & Koppenjan, 2010; Tan, 2001; Teisman et al., 2008; Weggeman, 2003). Such approaches explain the relative success of the macro actors in terms of their ability to build winning coalitions. The institutional approaches explain the policy controversy and deadlock in terms of a lacking institutional framework involved (socio-cultural institutions, financial institutions, economic institutions, legal institutions, institutions of governance) (see e.g. Cerfontaine, 2005; Huys & Koppenjan, 2010; Van Wijk, 2007). The linguistic approaches seek explanations in the argumentative structure of the policy debate, pointing out that it consists of two opposing grand stories (an economic growth and an environmental story) that keep the participants captive in a linguistic cage (Abma, 2001; Van Eeten, 1999; 2001; Kroesen, 2011; see chapter 1). No doubt that all these explanations contribute to our understanding of Schiphol’s policy deadlock. But they all tell only part of the story, partly given in by the theoretical *a priori*’s from which the different studies depart. The agency approaches fail to link the process to the content of the policy process, the institutional and linguistic approaches fail to link the content (argumentative structures) and resulting institutions to the process dimension. A few studies have tried to integrate these different approaches by taking regular daily practice as a point of departure, e.g. Broër, 2006 and Wagenaar & Cook, 2003. However, their studies were not meant to discuss the reproduction of the policy discourse involved, but more to illuminate parts of the discursive order (the specific way wherein noise has been

framed and the specific way wherein the mainport objective has been framed) and the practices involved that sustained these specific parts.

We believe that we have succeeded in bringing together all these different explanations in one study, showing how process and content, structure and agency and micro and macro level co-evolve in a complex way, shaping up to form a firmly institutionalized discursive order with a strong reproductive tendency. Thus, we have not falsified the existing explanations, but, in a way, we have brought them together in order to show how they actually work to reinforce one another. The idea is akin to the notion that the whole is more than the sum of its separate parts. It also means that our findings are in line with several of the findings that have been developed in other studies seeking explanations for Schiphol's policy deadlock.

Besides, we believe that our study has made another important contribution to our understanding of Schiphol's policy deadlock. We have deepened the existing understanding by highlighting the discursive order at work (including the micro-practices it implicates), showing how this discursive order works to shape the things that actors can think, say and do. In other words, we show how the behavioral and the institutional and linguistic explanations are actually the outcomes of the workings of the discursive order. They are not the disease, but merely the symptoms of the disease. We have shown how existing strategies and tactics of actors, the main policy stories involved and the institutions involved have been shaped by the discursive order. In essence, we have added one deeper, more fundamental level to existing explanations, i.e. the workings of the discursive order involved.

To sum things up, the contribution of this study to our understanding of Schiphol's policy deadlock is twofold. (1) We have shown how all the different explanations available are intrinsically interrelated, working to mutually reinforce one another; (2) We have deepened existing understandings by adding the fundamental level of the discursive order involved. All in all, we believe both contributions have improved our understanding of the emergence and persistence of Schiphol's policy deadlock. More specifically, the sophisticated understanding that is offered by this thesis contributes to the creation of the right context for inducing change. It does not merely create the precondition for such change (i.e. allowing for reflection upon previously taken-for-granted practices and their perverse consequences), it also helps to discern intervening strategies that might contribute to inducing change (based on the situational ethics of the specific Schiphol situation).

11.4 Contribution to the Study of Policy Deadlocks

In order to discuss the contribution that this thesis has made to the study of policy deadlocks in general we distinguish between its contribution to scientific method

(11.4.1) and scientific theory (11.4.2). As regards the methodology we argue that this thesis delivers valuable knowledge for describing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy discourses in general (although application is only useful when this persistence is deemed undesirable by the actors involved, i.e. in the case of policy deadlocks). Thus our methodological approach for the study of policy deadlocks certainly holds value beyond the case (11.4.1). As regards the creation of explanatory and predictive theory and intervening strategies we are modest in our claims, as all our explanations and recommendations are firmly grounded in the specifics of the Schiphol case and therefore do not necessarily apply elsewhere. However, this does not imply that the study doesn't hold any theoretical value beyond the case as one can generalize in different ways (11.4.2).

11.4.1 Contribution to Scientific Method

This thesis is built around the assumption that Foucauldian genealogy can make a valuable contribution to the study of policy deadlocks, exactly by providing the building blocks of a methodology that allows us to describe, assess and explain the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks. In doing so, two important knowledge gaps are filled (1) approaches that allow for the study of policy deadlocks are lacking in the social sciences (2) the method of how to conduct a discourse analysis inspired by Foucault has received limited systematic attention thus far (see chapter 1).

With regard to the first we asserted in chapter 1 that there is little knowledge available that allows us to describe, assess and explain the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks. Some of the approaches that have proven to be valuable have already been discussed in the former paragraph. For example, process management theories allow us to discern the strategies and tactics of actors involved when trying to realize their (policy) goals, within a context of mutually dependency (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008). Institutional approaches highlight the workings of institutions at work (in terms of past policies, beliefs/belief systems, economic, financial, socio-cultural, legal institutions) (March & Olsen, 1989; Sabatier & Jenkins, 1989; Scott, 1995) and linguistic approaches allow us to discern the argumentative structures, storylines, frames and reassuring symbols involved (Abma, 2001; Edelman, 1988; Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1995; Pestman, 2001; Schön & Rein, 1994; Stone, 2002). Policy network theories allow us to discern the policy networks involved and the specific way wherein policy games are played out in (and in between) such networks, thus combining the strategies and tactics of actors involved and the more institutional characteristics involved (e.g. rules of the game, roles, positions) (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2003). Moreover, social configuration theory can be used to uncover the cognitive and social configurations involved. Such a social-cognitive configuration is characterized by a group of people with an intensive interaction pattern, agreed-on interaction rules and shared meanings (Van Dongen et al., 1996; Termeer & Kessener, 2007). Such

configurations can be uncovered by means of empirical investigation, but they are always a snapshot of a historical and ongoing process. When policy processes are characterized by a set of firmly established configurations, these can give rise to a policy deadlock. That is, meanings and rules have become so self-evident that it is no longer possible to reflect on them, and variety is not allowed in the process (cf. Termeer, 1993). All in all, these approaches certainly contribute to the study of policy deadlocks but they are based on (1) theoretical *a priori*'s, thus *a priori* focusing the study on specific phenomena, and/or (2) they fail to acknowledge the process dimension involved (i.e. they merely provide an explanation of one specific moment in time). Moreover, we pointed out that these approaches fail to acknowledge one more fundamental explanation that works to set boundaries to the things that specific actors can think, say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way within a specific time-space context. That is, things like policy networks, belief systems, strategies and tactics and configurations need to be understood as both the outcome and the precursor of the discursive order (including its micro-practices) at work in the social domain that is being investigated.

In this thesis we have asserted that Foucauldian genealogy allows us to meet these demands. That is, it allows us to integrate all different explanations and analytical levels involved, it allows us to take the dynamics into account and it allows us to uncover the most fundamental level of the discursive order at work. Moreover, we pointed out that the genealogical approach is especially well suited for the study of policy deadlocks, as it was especially designed by Foucault for the study of such situations, i.e. explaining how people have come to be in some sort of impasse and why they cannot recognize or diagnose adequately the nature of this situation (MacIntyre, 1990). A genealogy works to open up possibilities to break through this impasse, exactly by describing 'the genesis of a given situation and showing that this particular genesis is not connected to absolute historical necessity' (Flyvbjerg, 2001; see also chapter 1). Here it is important to emphasize that a genealogy is certainly not always a useful tool, nor is it always needed. In fact, it is merely a useful tool when it is most needed, for example in the case of policy deadlocks. The implication is that the genealogical method can and should not be applied to randomly selected cases.

The strength of the genealogical approach, i.e. its ability to uncover the emergence and persistence of discursive orders in specific social domains, can also be regarded as its weakness. For one, the need to avoid *a priori* commitment to theoretical explanations and neatly defined hypotheses that forces data into pre-existing categories has resulted in a rather open catch-all approach. Moreover, Foucault allows us to develop a heuristic framework with a few sensitizing concepts that provides some guidelines for what to

look for, how to look and where to look, but he does (deliberately not) provide a blueprint procedure for doing genealogy.¹⁸⁰⁹ The refusal of such well-defined steps and rules is exactly what makes the genealogical method so valuable when trying to uncover the specific power mechanisms at work in a specific domain, which is needed for developing a realistic and effective history. Indeed, one of the strengths of the approach is that it allows considerable room for variation concerning subjects of study, the levels of analysis included, the methods for data gathering and the process of analysis (see also Flyvbjerg, 2001; 2001B; 2005; Jorgenson, 2001; Sharp & Richardson, 2000).¹⁸¹⁰ It provides the researcher with the opportunity to develop his own more specified approach, while still drawing on the fundamental (ontological, epistemological and ethical) principles of the Foucauldian genealogy. However, in order to apply such a principles in a rather systematic and transparent way, some important operationalizations have to be made. This is exactly what we have done in this thesis, thus filling a second important methodological knowledge gap, i.e. that the method of how to conduct a discourse analysis inspired by Foucault has received limited systematic attention thus far (see chapter 1; see Howarth, 2005; Hewitt, 2009). We are fully aware that prescribing a methodology would be un-Foucauldian as ‘... to do so would afford a particular position the status of truth in a perspective where truth is always conditional’ (Gilbert et al., 2003; p.792). Nonetheless, we believe that our approach finds a proper balance between too much and too little focus. We are not going to repeat the approach that we developed (see our answer to research question 1, presented in 11.2 for this). Here we only discuss the contribution to similar approaches.

As we set out the rather abstract principles of Foucauldian genealogy and used these to develop a 3-step procedure for the study of policy deadlocks, we built upon the work of authors who previously applied Foucault’s work to the study of the policy process, like Flyvbjerg, Hajer, Jensen, Jorgenson, Richardson and Sharpe. The main difference with these authors is that their approaches were not specifically developed for the study of

¹⁸⁰⁹ In the introduction we indicated that this might be one of the reasons for the limited application of the methodology yet, at least when considering the field of policy studies.

¹⁸¹⁰ In essence, Foucault offers an integrated approach, where all levels of analysis are represented. We therefore believe that a Foucauldian approach offers more useful information for understanding what actually happens than do institutional, communicative approaches and process oriented approaches. For example, institutions are only powerful insofar as they are constituted as authorities vis-à-vis actors through discourse (Hajer, 1995). Actors need to enact them to make them relevant for a study. Listing institutions is not useful for understanding what actually happens. It is via the study of how specific institutions are put into action at specific moments in time by specific actors that we learn to understand how they actually work to influence behavior and (re)produce discourse. The same holds true for the way people interact. Process rules and interaction rules only matter when they are enacted. It is exactly because the genealogical approach goes beyond distinctions of structure/agency, macro/micro and process/content that allows for the creation of a realistic and effective history. What elements play a role, where, how and when, comes to the fore by describing events and the practices underlying them in detail, including the rationalities that are employed and the strategies and tactics that are employed. We therefore conclude that we could not have achieved such a thorough understanding of the (re)production of the Schiphol policy discourse if we had departed from an institutional (i.e. merely focusing on the institutions that were in place), process oriented (i.e. merely focusing on how the process was organized) or linguistic discursive approach (i.e. focusing on language use).

policy deadlocks. They attempted to illuminate the discursive order at work and the micro-practices involved, whereas our 3-step approach highlights the self-reinforcing mechanisms at work in the ongoing naturalization of the discursive order. More specifically, we believe that our approach allows the researcher to uncover the emergence and ongoing reproduction of specific policy discourses in a more systemized way. Our approach provides the genealogist with the means to systematically localize events in the policy process and describe the many factors at work in their production and institutionalization or marginalization.

The 3-step procedure can be applied to different cases of policy deadlocks as well, as long as the right conditions are in place (i.e. actors involved sense that change is deemed necessary and desirable and sufficient data sources should be available for developing the kind of detailed and sophisticated understanding of the case that is necessary for turning it into a realistic and effective history). As such, our 3-step approach certainly holds value beyond the Schiphol case as it can serve as a valuable heuristic framework for describing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks in general.

The methodologies we applied for gathering, ordering and presenting the data that we required can also be applied to other cases. Indeed, we drew on insights of in-depth single case studies by means of retroductive logics (see especially Flyvbjerg, 1998; 2001; Stake, 1995). Here it needs to be stressed that the specific methodologies that we used in this thesis for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the data are not the only ones available to the researcher. The 3-step approach is problem driven, and not method driven. The most important thing is that the researcher obtains the necessary data that enables him to go through the 3-step procedure. This might result in different approaches for different cases, whereas all sorts of combinations of quantitative and qualitative approaches can be put into practice. Nonetheless, we believe that the specific methodologies that we applied will often be useful when developing genealogies for other policy deadlocks as well. The most important point we want to make here is that the 3-step procedure can be enacted in a rather systemized way, as long as the researcher explicates his methodologies for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the data he requires to go through the 3 steps.

In sum, in this paragraph we have tried to point out how the 3-step approach and related methodologies developed in this thesis contribute to the existing toolbox of social science approaches for the study of policy deadlocks. We argued that our approach is more systemized than existing approaches, while it allows for the emergence and integration of different types of explanations (i.e. avoiding theoretical a priories and hypothesis) and we argued that our approach adds a more fundamental level to existing approaches that can be applied to describe, assess and explain the emergence and

persistence of policy deadlocks (by taking into account the overarching discursive order that works to shape the things that people can think, say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way within a specific time-space context). In the end the reader should decide for himself whether or not our approach has proven to be valuable for describing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks. Moreover, it will only be possible to actually assess this more generic methodological value when the approach has been applied to other cases as well.

11.4.2 Contribution to Scientific Theory

The discussion about how this study has contributed to the development of scientific theory is complex. For one, the genealogical approach is not designed to deliver universal explanatory and predictive theory in the first place.¹⁸¹¹ This gives way to a more nuanced perspective on the value of theoretical generalizations. However, it does not necessarily mean that the reproductive mechanisms that we uncovered and intervention strategies that we proposed don't hold any value beyond the Schiphol case, although it is stressed once again that all the findings are firmly grounded in the specifics of this case. To what extent can we generalize these findings beyond the Schiphol case? In order to answer this question we distinguish between naturalistic generalizations and theoretical generalizations, where the latter can be derived from comparing cases and from analytical generalizations.

Naturalistic Generalizations

Genealogies, and similar detailed in depth single case studies, help readers to recognize similar situations in their regular daily practice and they can learn from the case what kind of behaviour is desirable. Good genealogies approach the experiences and perceptions of practitioners. They provide vicarious experience of a real setting in all its

¹⁸¹¹ The assumption underlying the genealogical approach is that context specific knowledge that can be derived from a single case is at least just as valuable as more general, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge. From both understanding-oriented and action-oriented perspective it is often more important to clarify the deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences than to describe the symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur (Flyvbjerg, 2001). This is in contrast with the positivist approach in social science wherein it is assumed that scientific knowledge is especially (and only) valuable when it is generalized knowledge. That is, knowledge that can apply to different cases. From such a positivist perspective intrinsic case studies tend to be perceived to be useful means as an early step in the research process, in order to create hypotheses. From a social-constructivist perspective, such an interpretation is far too one-sided. Knowledge that cannot be formally generalized can still enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or society, and may eventually lead to scientific innovations (Flyvbjerg, 2005). Therefore, the difficulty of summarizing case study into generalisable theory should not be thought of as a negative, but as a sign of the richness of data that cannot fit into neat categorical boxes. To generalize means that we have to skip details that resist generalization (i.e. the so-called reductionist fallacy, see Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This might make things simpler, easier to understand, but it does not necessarily clarify them as damage occurs when the commitment to generalize or to theorize runs so strong that the researcher's attention is drawn away from features important for understanding the case itself (Peattie, 2001). Clarification works through making people aware of the specific mechanisms at work, mechanisms that often "... cannot be obtained from 'maps', that is, summaries, concepts, or theoretical formulae" (Flyvbjerg, 1998, p. 7). Moreover, it is such detailed genealogies or case studies that provide "far better access for policy intervention than the present social science of variables" (Abbott, 1992, p. 79). And triggering policy change in real life situations is exactly what a Foucauldian genealogy is meant to do.

richness and complexity (cf. Lincoln & Guba, 1985; p.359). Good research of this type can produce a sense of 'déjà vu' among readers (Langley, 1999). As such, the research findings are epistemologically in harmony with the reader's experience, acting as a natural basis for generalization to that person (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Stake, 1995). It is exactly the contextual detail in the genealogical narrative that allows the reader to judge the transferability of the ideas to other situations. It allows the reader to develop his own generalizations, based on his own personal and vicarious experience. Such generalizations are referred to as naturalistic generalizations (Stake & Trumbull, 1982) and they are derived from their practical wisdom (inside-the-head generalization) and formal knowledge (being-able-to-communicate-the-reasons-for-making-the-generalization). It is the own responsibility of the person who seeks to transfer the findings of the Schiphol case to a new setting to find out whether this is possible (cf. Guba & Lincoln, 1985; Schwartz-Shea, 2006). For example, it depends on the expert judgment of practitioners involved in a situation that shows similar characteristics as the Schiphol case whether or not the intervention strategies that we have proposed for Schiphol might make an impact.

Here we want to stress that we believe that our genealogy of the Schiphol case is very well suited for making such naturalistic generalizations. The extensive case description that is meant to highlight the full complexities and ambiguities involved will almost certainly relate to experiences of people who have been involved in complex decision making processes (e.g. about large infrastructure projects) elsewhere. More specifically, to our knowledge there are only a few studies available that provide such an in depth description of the policy debates around airport development in western democracies. Therefore, the high potential for drawing naturalistic generalizations from the Schiphol case brings us to the assertion that the scientific value of our empirical findings should not be underestimated.

Theoretical generalizations

Theoretical generalizations beyond the case can be developed in at least two ways. One can look whether the mechanisms found in the Schiphol case apply to other cases as well (1), and one can develop analytical generalizations (2). The latter are generalizations to theory, not to other cases, and they link the findings to existing theories in order to verify or falsify these theories (Yin, 1994). In the remainder of this paragraph we discuss the potential of the Schiphol findings for these two types of generalizations.

(1) Comparing cases

The potential for applying the patterns and regularities to other cases depends very much on the type of case one is dealing with (Flyvbjerg, 2001; 2005; Stake, 2005; Yin, 1994). That is, possibilities to make generalizations of case studies can be increased by

the strategic selection of cases (Ragin, 1992; Yin, 1994). Representative cases hold most potential for making generalizations. Such cases are chosen for their external validity (Yin, 1994). However, a genealogy is developed in order to obtain the greatest possible amount of information about a specific problem and such cases are likely to be extreme or atypical rather than typical.¹⁸¹² Indeed, as discussed before, the genealogical approach is only useful when applied to such cases. The Schiphol policy problem is a clear example of an extreme case, as there is an extremely strong reproductive tendency of the policy discourse involved. When such cases allow for logical deductions of the type ‘if this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.79), they become critical cases that have strategic importance in relation to the general problem that is studied.¹⁸¹³ ¹⁸¹⁴ Such critical cases have great value beyond the initial case.

The Schiphol case has been defined as an extreme case, holding loads of information about the reproductive tendency of policy discourse, although firmly embedded within the specific Schiphol context.¹⁸¹⁵ In chapter 1 we argued that we know very little about how policy deadlocks come into being and why they are so persistent (cf. Laws & Rein, 2003; Termeer & Kessener, 2007). By now, we know the mechanisms at work in the specific case of Schiphol, but we don’t know whether these findings also apply to other cases. In order to answer this question we need to assess whether or not the case is critical. In order to do this we can (1) compare our findings to other case studies, and (2) develop propositions that need to be empirically tested in other cases in the future. Here we merely refer to the first strategy, as the second strategy can only deliver information that we can use for our assessment after the conduct of new case studies. We do not intent to develop an extensive comparison between different cases in this thesis, as it is not part of our goal.¹⁸¹⁶ Nonetheless, it is possible to make a quick and dirty comparison

¹⁸¹² Atypical or extreme cases often reveal more information because they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied (Flyvbjerg, 2005). These are deviant cases that describe a phenomenon in its most dramatic appearance.

¹⁸¹³ It is difficult to identify a critical case up beforehand. There are no universal methodological principles available by which one can identify a critical case. The best thing to do is to look for a case, which is likely either to confirm or falsify propositions and hypotheses (Flyvbjerg, 2001; 2005; Ragin, 1992).

¹⁸¹⁴ Some critical cases might even turn out to be paradigmatic cases. Such cases highlight more general characteristics of the societies in question (e.g. Foucault’s studies of disciplinary and pastoral power, which can be applied to the functioning of discipline throughout society). Such cases have metaphorical and prototypical value. It is not possible to know whether a case is paradigmatic at the outset, and therefore, a priori selection of such a case is not possible (although a researcher might have an intuitive idea about this) (Flyvbjerg, 2005). Of course, a case can turn out to be simultaneously extreme, critical and paradigmatic. The interpretation of such a case can provide a unique wealth of information, because one obtains various perspectives and conclusions on the case according to whether it is viewed and interpreted as one or another type of case.

¹⁸¹⁵ Indeed, in chapter 5 we discussed the specifics of the Dutch policy context. The context was characterized by consensualism, with hints of pragmatism and corporatism, and a complex and fragmented policy and planning system.

¹⁸¹⁶ This is not only related to the main goal of doing genealogy, but also to the fact that developing a proper genealogy of one case is a demanding and time consuming task and because it is a sign of mature social sciences when different scientists focus on different things (e.g. some develop detailed empirical stories, while others try to find similarities between different cases, cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001B; p.286).

with similar cases, which allows us to get at least some idea about the value of our findings beyond the Schiphol case.

There are some examples of case studies where the reproductive mechanisms that we uncovered can also be observed (more or less implicitly). For example, when we look at the reproductive practices at work, several case studies on large infrastructure projects in the Netherlands, like the Betuweroute (Pestman, 2001), the expansion of the port of Rotterdam (Daamen, 2010; Van Gils & Klijn, 2007) reveal similar practices at work. However, they don't end up with such an extremely controversial and deadlocked debate as is the case for Schiphol. Other studies in the field of (environmental) policy making and (large infrastructure) planning also reveal similar practices (cf. Altschuler & Luberoff, 2003; Dempsey et al. 1997; Flyvbjerg, 1998; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Goetz & Szyliowicz, 1998; Hajer, 1995; Priemus et al., 2008; Richardson, 1997; Termeer et al., 2007), without immediately resulting in the kind of extremely deadlocked and undesirable policy situation that characterizes the Schiphol case. As such, the study does not say anything about the existence of some universal mechanism at work in the case of policy deadlocks, for the simple reason that such general explanations don't seem to exist. However, the thesis holds the advice that a genealogical investigation that uncovers the specific interplay between micro-practices and the discursive order might offer valuable explanations for each policy deadlock specifically.

Despite the lack of a kind of overarching universal mechanism at work, specific findings of the Schiphol case are similar to findings in other cases. For example:

- Several cases show similar ways of how political rationalities interfere with more technical-rational policy practices. One specific example of such a practice is the way wherein forecasts are used in policy making for Schiphol. We have argued that the forecasts were based on specific assumptions and calculation methods in order to promote outcomes that were politically desired. This conclusion echoes the findings of other studies wherein the use of forecasts in (transportation) planning have been critically examined (see for example Banfield, 1959; Dempsey et al., 1997; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; Peters, 2010; Wachs, 1982; 1987).¹⁸¹⁷ Thus, the conclusion that forecasts are as much driven by politics as by technical expertise in projects where large interests and prestige are at stake seems to hold some universal value.
- Several cases show similarities in positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another when spatial-economic (infrastructural) policy matters of national concern are involved.

¹⁸¹⁷ de Neufville & Odoni, 2003; Dempsey et al., 1997 have indicated that performance of air traffic demand forecasting has been poor. Burghouwt (2005) has argued that it is likely to get poorer in volatile deregulated markets. Here we can ask ourselves whether or not it is desirable to put so much trust in traffic forecasts as a basis for policy making.

We uncovered the existence of an iron triangle of policy makers of the Ministry of V&W (including the research institutes that draw upon for expertise), the aviation sector and the Cabinet (responsible Minister). Together, these actors could exert most influence on both the policy process and its outcomes. These actors are the macro actors in the Schiphol policy domain, and as they all belong to the same mainport coalition (as opposed to the environmental coalition) they can constantly reproduce their positions and the dependency relations that these implicate. As discussed in chapter 5, the existence of a few macro-actors that mutually reinforce one another and the strong corporatist character of the decision making are not unfamiliar in policy matters of national concern in the Netherlands. Moreover, several specific dependency relations can be found in other cases as well (e.g. the Ministry of V&W is hierarchically superior to the Ministry of VROM in large infrastructure planning; the Lower House can exert little control over the decision making process; strong corporations, like the aviation sector parties, can exert great influence on the decision making process; lower governmental bodies can exert little influence on policy matters of national concern) (see for example Duivesteijn, 2004; Frouws, 1993; Van den Berg et al., 1984; Van Gils & Klijn, 2007; Healey, 2007; Huberts, 1988; Peters, 1999; Tan, 2001; Termeer, 1993).

- Several cases that highlight conflicts about airport development and noise illustrate the importance of the lack of trust of local residents in the leading authorities. This has been related to the lack of voice for local residents and the lack of possibilities for public participation that residents perceive to be meaningful (e.g. Lidskog and Soneryd (2000) concluded this for Örebro Airport, Andre (2004) for Boston Airport, Maris (2007) for Schiphol Airport, May & Hill (2006) for Canberra Airport and Suau-Sanchez et al. (2011) for Barcelona Airport). Several of these cases also show how these conflict situations have been improved by giving local residents more voice. This is quite similar to the Schiphol case, where the formal inclusion of the local residents in the negotiations has improved relationships between local residents on the one hand and the aviation sector and policy makers of the Ministries involved on the other hand. At least, from the perspective of some of the local residents. Other local residents still distrust the aviation sector and the national government. Therefore, the formal inclusion of some local residents has given rise to new conflicts about securing adequate representation on behalf of the local residents. We shall reflect upon this question of representation in our Epilogue (12.4).

More generally speaking, when comparing the intervention strategies that actors have developed in different cases in order to loosen policy deadlocks these tend to differ. Amongst other things, new rules are implemented, new actors are invited to join the debate, interactive policy arrangements are tested (e.g. by giving local residents more voice as discussed above), decision making power is reversed, joint fact finding

strategies are implemented, reorganisations or new leaders are introduced, new agendas are defined and new information is being gathered. Quite often, intervention strategies are based on universal principles, like Habermasian dialogue, thus a priori assuming that such solutions are always desirable and effective (see for example literature on collaborative planning and consensus building, e.g. Cruickshank et al., 1999; Innes & Booher, 2003). The main point of our approach is that the specific context under study defines what kind of interventions will work best (see also Flyvbjerg & Richardson, 2002). Thus, a priori assuming that the principles of Habermasian dialogue need to be implemented should be avoided. Indeed, in the case of Schiphol such an approach isn't very likely to work. The specific intervention strategies that we proposed (e.g. taking up political responsibility and avoiding to enact the micro practices uncovered) do not necessarily work in other deadlocked situations. They are grounded in a sophisticated understanding of the specifics of the case, and especially the situational ethics at work in the case. Nonetheless, part of the intervention strategies that we proposed have been proposed by others as well (like the need for political champions and the creation of an independent committee that monitors the fact finding process whose members are trusted and have high political status, see chapter 10). Finally, it should be noted that the main intervention strategy is the genealogy itself, as its effective history works to create the right context for change (by making reflection on hitherto self-evident ways possible). The other intervention strategies proposed should be seen as an example of a possibly effective way of doing things differently. It is therefore not a blueprint for success. Instead, its main function is to offer some inspiration to the practitioners involved.

In the end, our quick and dirty comparison shows that the practices that we uncovered in the Schiphol case are certainly at work in other cases as well, although their effects might be different. For one, there is certainly no causal relationship between the practices observed and the existence of a policy deadlock. In theory it might be possible that the same reproductive mechanisms are found and the same effects are produced (deadlocks), but this is highly unlikely. The same holds true for the intervention strategies developed. These do not necessarily work in other cases that are characterized by deadlock, and should therefore not be seen as universal panacea.¹⁸¹⁸

(2) *Analytic generalizations*

Analytic generalizations link the findings of the case to existing theories in order to

¹⁸¹⁸ Nonetheless, it is possible to make other propositions (see Flyvbjerg, 1998). For example, the study allows us to argue that it will become more difficult to create variety (e.g. develop new problem conceptualisations, place new policy themes on the agenda, define new policy indicators, arrive at new policy solutions, include new actors, develop new coalitions, define new interaction rules) when regular daily practices have become firmly ingrained. And it allows us to argue that the production and use of information in the case of such wicked problems will always be a matter of political will to power (i.e. the macro actors define what counts as rational and true knowledge and what does not).

verify or falsify them (Yin, 1994). The detailed case knowledge that is developed by means of the genealogical approach is useful for conducting one of the most rigorous tests to which a scientific theory or proposition can be subjected: falsification. The test was developed by Karl Popper and implied that a theory or proposition was not valid anymore if one observation could be found that did not fit the theory or proposition (see e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2006). We already discussed the importance of finding black swans. To use this example once more, falsification means that the proposition that all swans are white needs to be rejected or revised when one black swan is observed. The detailed knowledge of in-depth case-studies allow researchers from different disciplines, drawing on different theories, to find black swans and thus test and modify their theories. In order to allow for this possibility, we attempted to make a clear distinction between description and analysis and to use sensitizing concepts that don't belong to one particular scientific discipline. In the end, we believe that the empirical data allows political scientists, environmentalists, planners, researchers in public management, policy analysts, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, philosophers to verify or falsify some of their theories. Here we give two examples of how this might work, illustrating how our case findings undermine some of the underlying assumptions of policy network theory (box 11.1) and theories of evidence based policy (box 11.2).¹⁸¹⁹

Box 11.1 Theory building in the field of Network Governance

The policy network theory may be considered an empirical theory, aimed at describing and explaining interactions in complex network-settings and a normative theory, aimed at developing prescriptions for adequate practices for governance of policy networks. Theories on network governance prescribe promoting interaction and collaboration, and suggesting supportive institutional arrangement and network governance to enhance these (Kickert et al. 1997; Agrinoff and McGuire 2003; Keast, Brown and Mandell 2002; Sorenson and Torfing 2007). It is assumed that policy networks will be adequately managed if these conditions are realized. The case of Schiphol contains several examples of practices that qualify as 'state of the art' network governance, but they don't contribute to successful policy development. The question is then whether this lack of success can be attributed to the inappropriate *application* of network governance practices or to the inappropriateness of *network governance itself*. In the first situation efforts to improve network governance practices are to be considered. In the latter situation it would be wise to give up the assumption that implementation of state of the art network governance prescriptions automatically leads to adequate governance of policy networks in the case of wicked problems (cf. Huys & Koppenjan, 2010). For example, maybe all kind of other preconditions need to be in place in order for such network governance practices to succeed, like a minimum level of trust. Indeed, the Schiphol case makes a strong argument for the idea that network governance practices will only become effective when there is already some level of trust available (see also Keast et al, 2005; Parker, 2007). The Schiphol case offers reason to believe that the normative assumption underlying network governance lacks universal value. Instead of automatically assuming that implementation of network governance practices are always desirable and effective, it might even be more effective to apply different modes of steering (e.g. hierarchical modes). Of course, as far as the success of network governance in the Schiphol case is concerned, our analysis is not conclusive. Before making decisive statements on the applicability of network governance practices in the Schiphol case and beyond, it would be wise to compare the performance of Schiphol in terms of growth and environmental performance with airports

¹⁸¹⁹ Again this will be done in a quick and dirty way and for illustrative purposes only. Recall our comment of footnote 1800.

in other countries, regulated by more hierarchical or new public management orientated governance modes (see also Huys & Koppenjan, 2010).

Box 11.2 Theory Building in the field of Evidence Based Policy Making

Those authors arguing for evidence-based policy making in the field of policy analysis and planning are invited to reflect upon their basic normative assumptions once again. Evidence based policy making refers to a rigorous approach to policy making, wherein high quality research evidence to inform policy making and profession practice is gathered, critically appraised and used (Davies, 2004). The approach is concerned with promoting the use of state-of-the art scientific research evidence as a basis for policies (cf. Trinder, 2002). In public discussion in the past decade there seems to be an increasingly expressed enthusiasm for ‘evidence-based policy’ (Nutley et al., 2001; Sanderson, 2002; Solesbury, 2002), or evidence informed policy’ (Davoudi, 2006). The main argument for the evidence-based turn is that policy and plan making is not only about creating agreement; it is evenly important that this agreement is embedded in a sound evidence base (Nutley, Davies & Tilly, 2001). In planning and policy theory it is argued that the increasing call for evidence based policies can be seen as a countermove to the communicative turn in planning that boomed during the early 1990s, and that aimed to facilitate the interactive process of policy making (Faludi & Waterhout, 2006). The Schiphol case undermines the main normative theoretical assumption of the evidence based policy model. The Schiphol case shows that the things that count as evidence are politically produced. That is the policy ambitions of the macro actors make sure what comes to be counted as evidence and what information is considered to be irrational and invaluable. From this perspective the usual prescriptions for stimulating evidence based practices, like improving research communication and dissemination, improving awareness and absorption of research, long-term engagement of researchers with potential users in order to create common understandings and identities and even the creation of a culture of policy learning, are rather naïve. The Schiphol case invites actors working in the field of evidence-based policy making to critically reflect upon the validity of their normative assumptions. It would be wise to redefine the ambition and take the political nature of the policy game far more seriously. That is, by ignoring the political influence on the research-policy dynamics it won’t go away. This implies a less ambitious but perhaps more realistic approach to evidence based policymaking (Huys & Annema, 2009).

11.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we provided an answer to all four research questions posed in the introductory chapter of this thesis (chapter 1). More specifically, we recapitulated the findings of chapters 2 – 10 in order to answer research questions 1 – 3. Next, we discussed the fourth research question in more detail in this chapter, i.e. ‘What contribution has the study made to our understanding of Schiphol’s policy deadlock in particular, and to the study of policy deadlocks in general?’ We asserted that the study contributed to our current understanding of the Schiphol policy deadlock by; (1) Developing one overarching story wherein all earlier explanations have been included in some way or another, showing how it is exactly the interplay of the many different explanations (about process or content, structure or agency, micro or macro level phenomena) that allows one to develop a sophisticated understanding of the mechanisms at work in the emergence and persistence of Schiphol’s policy deadlock; (2) Adding one more fundamental explanation to the existing repertoire, i.e. the discursive order at work that shapes the things actors can think, say and do in a meaningful way, and that therefore gives rise to specific argumentative structures, policy networks, winning and loosing coalitions and the like. Note that the first finding

works to verify much of the already existing explanations about Schiphol's policy deadlock, instead of falsifying them. The main difference lies in the understanding of the intricate interplay of all these different explanations, which shows that the whole is more than the sum of its separate parts. Furthermore, we argued that it is especially the kind of sophisticated understanding that is offered in this thesis that contributes to the creation of the right context for inducing change. It does not merely create the precondition for such change (i.e. allowing for reflecting on previously taken-for-granted practices and their perverse consequences), it also helps to discern intervening strategies that might contribute to inducing change (based on the situational ethics of the specific Schiphol situation).

Next, we discussed the contribution to the study of policy deadlocks in general. With regard to scientific method we argued that the 3-step procedure that we developed (1) contributed to the scientific toolkit for describing, assessing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks, and (2) contributed to the creation of a systematic and transparent approach of Foucault's method. We argued that our 3-step procedure can be applied to the study of other policy deadlocks as well (and even to less deadlocked situations) when aiming to describe and explain their emergence and persistence. Of course, when considering the application of the 3-step procedure the researcher should check the sense of urgency involved, as a genealogy is most needed in situations where actors sense the need for change. With regard to the specific methodologies that we used in order to gather, organize, validate and present the data required we argued that these can also certainly be applied to other cases. However, here we also discussed that researchers can use all kind of other methodologies as well (both qualitative and quantitative) when enacting the 3-step procedure, as the approach is inherently problem driven (and not method driven). The researcher will have to find out which methodologies will allow him to develop a proper genealogy of his specific case. Nonetheless, we did argue that the methodologies we used are likely to be useful to other cases as well. The main point is that the researcher explicates which methodologies he employs when enacting the 3-step procedure. When done properly, the 3-step procedure can be enacted in a systemized and transparent fashion. This is valuable because, as we asserted in chapter 1 the method of how to conduct a discourse analysis inspired by Foucault has received limited systematic attention thus far (cf. Howarth, 2005; p.316; Hewitt, 2009). Here we also stress once again that our 3-step procedure is merely based on our interpretation of Foucault's thought and it is not meant to serve as a blueprint. Indeed, as discussed before, prescribing a methodology would be un-Foucauldian as '... to do so would afford a particular position the status of truth in a perspective where truth is always conditional' (Gilbert et al., 2003; p.792). Within this context we believe that the 3-step procedure and the specific methodologies we set out for its enactment provide the researcher with a potentially powerful and systematized

approach for uncovering the mechanisms at work in the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks.

When discussing the contribution to scientific theory we stated that all our findings are firmly grounded in the specifics of the Schiphol case. The specific way wherein micro practices and the discursive order work to mutually reinforce one another is context dependent and should therefore be uncovered for each case separately. Thus, the micro practices at work in the case of Schiphol will not necessarily be found in the case of other policy deadlocks, nor does the existence of similar practices automatically gives way to an (undesirable) policy deadlock. There is no linear causal relationship between the mechanisms found and policy deadlocks, meaning that we have not developed explanatory and predictive theory that holds universal value.¹⁸²⁰ The same holds true for the recommendations that we developed for breaking through the reproductive tendency. They are based on the principle of contextualism, which automatically grounds them in the specific norms of the case (and even in the case of Schiphol their main function is to inspire practitioners instead of defining their course of action).

Nonetheless, we did point out that the study has contributed to the development of scientific theory in specific ways. The distinction between description and analysis has resulted in an empirically dense case study that holds great potential for (1) naturalistic and (2) analytic generalizations. With regard to the first, people are invited to draw on the experiences of the case when they encounter similar situations in real life. More specifically, we argued that to our knowledge there are only a few studies available that provide such an in depth description of the policy debates around airport development in western democracies. Therefore, the high potential for drawing naturalistic generalizations from the Schiphol case brought us to the assertion that the scientific value of our empirical findings should not be underestimated. With regard to the second (analytical generalizations), scientists are invited to use the empirical data for verification or falsification of their own theories. Finally, the normative approach we discussed also holds some general value. That is, the idea of contextualism can be applied to other cases, but the specific solutions it delivers are likely to be different.

Most importantly, by pointing out the value of the (scientific) knowledge that a genealogical approach is able to deliver, we hope to have contributed to a further legitimization of the approach in the social sciences, and especially in the field of policy studies. It delivers knowledge that is extremely valuable for making the kind of reflexive analyses that social science is good at. From our perspective it certainly deserves wider application. Of course, it does not likely result in easy solutions. On the

¹⁸²⁰ As will be obvious by now, this is not the aim of a genealogy, nor does the genealogist believe that such theories are possible.

contrary, it might make things even more complicated and messy, giving rise to new problems, uncertainties and confusion. This is exactly what most policy makers and practitioners try to avoid, especially when dealing with wicked problems that are already technically and socially complex. However, it is by making existing taken-for-granted practices appear to be problematical and undesirable in a way that is perceived to be meaningful and legitimate by the specific reference group involved that the precondition for change is developed. If the researcher can accompany his effective history with some inspiring perspectives for doing things differently, that are firmly embedded within and build upon the situational ethics of the specific case, new ways of thinking, talking and acting might actually come within reach. In the end, such changes are likely to be marginal improvements, but these might eventually result in new discursive orders that allow for the development of the kind of policy solution and policy making practices that hold more practical value and are perceived to be more legitimate by those involved.

Chapter 12 Epilogue

12.1 Introduction

In this chapter we reflect on the genealogical method, in line with the critical and curious ethos that the genealogical researcher is expected to practice. We do so by discussing how our research findings have been influenced by the discursive order at work in the Schiphol policy domain (12.2) and by discussing five of the main difficulties that researchers willing to do genealogy should be prepared to deal with (12.3). Next, we present some final reflections on the value of our findings for the practice of policy making itself and functioning of western democracy (12.4). We end the chapter with a short conclusion (12.5).

12.2 The interplay between the research findings and the discursive order

Now we have finished the study we can try reflect upon how our research findings have actually been influenced by the discursive order. We do so by first presenting some general background information about how this interplay works. Next, we discuss how our own results have been shaped by the discursive order of the Schiphol policy domain. We close this paragraph with a short conclusion.

Background

The fact that our research findings have been shaped by this discursive order is not unique, as all research findings are always influenced by the discursive order within which they are developed. Indeed, the researcher cannot exist outside this order, as has been argued throughout this thesis. The researcher is therefore both involved in, and partially produced by, the same practices studied. Thus, the analysis is firmly influenced by the specific contexts within which the research has been carried out. For example, we needed to live up to specific discursive formats for asking questions that made sense to respondents and we needed to deal with the sensitive political context when gathering and presenting the data. In chapter 4 we also discussed the importance of the researcher bias when gathering, ordering, interpreting and presenting data.¹⁸²¹

In order to determine how the research findings have been influenced by the discursive order that is studied, keeping a detailed logbook can be a valuable tool (cf. Abma, 1996). In this logbook the researcher discusses how his positive and negative experiences (as a consequence of interviews, newsflashes or new findings in archives) have worked to influence his feelings and values towards the case; and how they worked to influence the next research steps (for example, when making decisions about

¹⁸²¹ In chapter 4 we reflected on 5 biases that influenced the way we gathered, organized, interpreted and presented the data, i.e. data asymmetry, hindsight bias, context bias, researcher bias, generalization bias.

events that need further investigations and about events that don't need further attention). The logbook helps one to understand how the research findings have been influenced by the discursive order that has been studied (and how they actually work to (re)produce this discursive order). In essence, it calls for what Flyvbjerg (2002) has labelled a researcher's praxis story. We don't think it is necessary for our purposes to present our entire praxis story. Instead, we discuss one of the main events (breaches in self-evidence) of our research process and discuss how this influenced our final findings. More specifically, it was a series of events that was triggered by the trial balloon that we published in 2009.

How the Schiphol policy discourse influenced our research findings: the trial balloon

On the one hand, the trial balloon triggered several positive reactions. People drawing on their own experiences with the Schiphol case supported the conclusions (e.g. that the political ambitions had influenced the policy making process too much), and they sent e-mails or requested interviews in order to add new examples to our case description that further strengthened these conclusions. We included as much of this information as possible (although time was limited, so selections had to be made). On the other hand, it also triggered negative reactions. Several actors argued that our findings were too much biased in favour of the 'losers'. They called for a more nuanced case description, by including new interpretations about the described events. From their perspective, this would add validity to the case. Especially people representing the macro actors pointed out the need for such nuance. As our ambition was to create an effective history it was certainly important to take the claims of the macro actors very seriously. After all, if they think that their perceptions are not adequately represented in the case, they will argue that the entire study is meaningless to them. It resulted in a few additional interviews and thorough validation of the facts by the policy makers of the Ministry of V&W. In the end, the different responses to our trial balloon allowed us to develop a richer and more nuanced case description and analysis. That is, more interpretations about similar events have been included.

Another effect of the trial balloon was that it became part of the existing polemic. Thus, it did not really work to trigger reflection on the perverse effects of the ongoing reproduction of the policy deadlock (as we originally intended), but it was used to fuel the existing tensions, as parts of the conclusions were used by different actors to support their existing storylines. As pointed out in chapter 1, the challenge was exactly to create the right context for triggering change. Therefore, the very fact that the trial balloon created polemics taught us that we needed to present the research in a different way. We did not want that actors used our findings to strengthen their existing storylines, reproducing and further institutionalizing the prevailing discursive order with its diametrically opposed positions. Instead, we wanted actors to understand that this ongoing reproduction was not beneficial to anyone, as it did not result in outcomes with

practical value and increasing levels of trust. This was another important reason to opt for a more diverse case description, pointing out how all actors involved have been acting to produce, reproduce and institutionalize the deadlocked policy situation. It was also an important reason for excluding specific anecdotes from the case description, most notably the personal assaults that some actors fired on one another.

The main point we want to make here in this reflection is that we think it is important for all researchers to understand and clarify how his/her research findings have been influenced by the discursive order of the domain that is being studied.¹⁸²² Such an understanding might help the researcher to avoid that he is merely contributing to the reproduction of a discursive order that holds perverse effects, thus allowing him to critically assess this discursive order and his own role within this order. It might also contribute to the development of an effective history, as the researcher can consciously present his results in specific ways that hold value and meaning to everyone involved in the debate. Finally, it might help the researcher to avoid that he is 'going native' and advocating one interest or interpretation above that of another (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001; p.132).

With regard to this latter point it is important to discuss how we dealt with the media attention. The trial balloon resulted in a large amount of request for interviews in newspapers, on the radio and on television. Such interviews could have easily resulted in stereotyping our research findings, thus arguing that we were advocating one side over the other. As we wanted to avoid such stereotyping and as we wanted to hold on to our position of 'independent' researcher as much as possible, we turned most offers down. Nonetheless, the unexpected amount of attention certainly influenced the way wherein we have presented our research findings, i.e. opting for a more nuanced description, as it was obvious that the trial balloon allowed for positioning us in the field.

Conclusion

To sum things up, we have argued that an adequate understanding of the interplay between research findings and the discursive order that is being studied (and that the researcher is part of) might help the researcher to avoid going native, to make his findings as transparent as possible and to increase the potential of actually developing an effective history. The different strategies and tactics we employed during the

¹⁸²² When we take this consideration one step further, we also need to reflect upon the discursive order of the scientific domain that the researcher is part of. That is, there are certainly specific practices at work that condition how the researcher involved thinks about science and about adequate rules and methodologies for arriving at knowledge claims that the scientific community that he is part of perceives to be scientifically valid. Therefore, it is of crucial importance that the researcher positions himself adequately within the scientific field, discussing his ontological, epistemological and ethical assumptions (as we set out in chapters 2 – 4).

aftermath of the trial balloon illustrate how our research process has been influenced by the discursive order of the Schiphol policy domain, as our own research steps have been conditioned by the micro-practices at work (see chapter 9 for an overview of these micro-practices). In the end it was especially the content of the case description and the way wherein the description has been presented that has been changed as a consequence of our trial balloon. The main conclusions about the emergence and persistence of the policy deadlock and the potential for transforming the deadlock have not been changed, although we have further clarified how we came to this conclusion (e.g. by emphasizing our definition of policy deadlock time and again).

12.3 Five Difficulties when doing Genealogy

In this paragraph we further reflect on the genealogical methodology by pointing out five main difficulties that we encountered along the way and that researchers willing to do genealogy should be prepared to deal with: (1) When to stop gathering data; (2) How to make sense of the data; (3) How to enact the specific ethos that is needed for a genealogy; (4) How to balance between need for politically sensitive data and interview ethics; (5) How to be prepared for public debate.

1. *When to stop gathering data:* The constant search for disconfirming evidence, for gathering as much events as possible and as much strategies and tactics involved in their production and institutionalization or marginalization as possible, implies a focus on details that can easily result in a never-ending quest for more data. The deeper one tends to dig, the more diverse interpretations become and the more new events and strategies and tactics emerge. There are always more documents that can be read, there are always more people that one should have talked too, especially when focusing on comprehensive policy processes like large infrastructure projects that span 20 years of time. Therefore, a genealogy can never be complete and exhaustive (nor can any other history), although it is not the intention to make such a story in the first place. The difficulty is to create a history that is as complete as is necessary for becoming plausible and effective. So when to stop? One rule of thumb is to stop when additional interviews deliver little extra data. Unfortunately, such tricks don't work that easily in the case of a genealogy, as all interpretations of the same events tend to hold subtle differences. In the end, time is most important. When there is no time left anymore, the researcher stops gathering data. As regards this thesis, we would have liked to interview at least 20 more people and include hundreds of additional documents. This would certainly have made the story more diverse and persuasive. But one has to draw the line somewhere. Researchers should be aware that the open and bottom up approach of a genealogy makes it difficult to judge when to stop gathering data.

Most importantly, the researcher has to make sure that he has included as much of the different perceptions as possible (including the polyphony of voices). After all,

the study will only hold meaning for people when it makes sense to them (e.g. when they recognize at least part of the world that is being presented in the genealogy). Trial balloons are very useful for assessing whether or not this has been the case. It is by means of a trial balloon that the researcher can easily determine which interpretations are missing. It focuses his final inquiries that are deemed necessary to increase the potential effectiveness of the history.

2. *How to make sense of data:* It might sound simple to let patterns emerge from the data, to use as little focus as possible during data gathering, to combine structure and agency and micro and macro developments in a natural way, and to include a polyphony of voices and embrace complexity and ambiguity. In practice, there is a clear danger of drowning in the shapeless mass of information. The researcher should be aware of the need of a focus, and should find a way of balancing between too much and too little focus in order to make sure that he can get as close to reality as possible, without being overwhelmed by the diversity or without going native. Moreover, when writing the final case narrative the researcher needs to have some plot in mind in order to make sure that he can bring his message across. It will often contain a process of trial and error before the researcher finds the conceptual focus that is necessary for this. The researcher should be aware of the fact that the research process will become highly uncertain, filled with many doubts and feelings of getting lost in the data spaghetti. Fortunately, the sensitizing concepts that we developed and operationalized in this thesis (power, discourse, practice, events, strategies and tactics)¹⁸²³ provide the minimum of focus that seems to be required for a systematic research procedure. Nonetheless, the researcher should be aware that the focus is still rather broad and still results in an overwhelming amount of data. Therefore, one needs to be ready to deal with such a situation. One can only bring such an approach successfully in practice if a specific ethos is employed.
3. *Enacting a critical and curious ethos:* The need for a critical and curious ethos on behalf of the researcher is necessary for developing a successful genealogy. Such an ethos implies that the researcher should be willing to work with very little structure and certainties, as he needs to be willing to let go of his initial ideas and basic assumptions. This might be difficult for many researchers, as it is impossible to say up front what direction the research eventually takes, and whether or not the findings can be turned into an effective history. Thus, researchers should be willing to let go of the idea of a clear-cut four-year plan with exact phases prescribing what doing when. This might feel contradictory to many scientists as they intend to work in technical-rational way, setting out clear-cut research steps, including the choice

¹⁸²³ And later we added the concept of trust to this.

of theory, method and desired type of conclusion. Indeed, such four-year plans with clearly outlined courses and deadlines for different products come to dominate scientific practice more and more. Doing genealogy calls for a totally different type of working, a way wherein the researcher dares to let go of existing time schedules that neatly follow the different steps of the hypothetical-deductive model (year one: theory, year two: methodology, year three: empirical part, year four: analysis and conclusion), and finds challenge in constantly questioning his own ideas about useful conceptual understandings and what is happening within the case. It cannot be predicted how much time will be needed to deliver a genealogy that can assume the form of an effective history, as it totally depends on the specifics of the case that is being studied. However, as brought forward in the first point of this paragraph (i.e. when to stop gathering data), no one researcher can endlessly continue gathering data. It is up to the researcher to constantly make a trade off between the costs and benefits of investing additional time in the research.

4. *Balancing between the need for politically sensitive data and interview ethics:* As a genealogical project is often most needed in extremely controversial and violated situations, the need to find a balance between obtaining the politically sensitive data and interview ethics is an important challenge. It might be necessary for a genealogist to choose between an effective history that unravels all political sensitivities involved and violating some of the interview ethics involved, or living up to the interview ethics and create the kind of history that lacks urgency and thus effectiveness. Those willing to use the genealogical method might have to find an answer to this question. It is up to the researcher to decide in which way he can get the best of both worlds.
5. *Getting prepared for Public debate:* Although the researcher attempts to include as much interpretations as possible in the case description (e.g. by allowing for the polyphony of voices), the resulting analysis and conclusions are merely the researchers' interpretation of the case description. Thus, it is the specific meanings that the researcher adds to the case. These meanings are likely to differ from the meanings that other actors add to the case. Not everyone will therefore share the analysis and conclusions as developed by the researcher. This is not a problem, as the researcher takes a modest stance and does not pretend to be able to uncover some final truth or rationality at work (in line with the social constructivist and interpretative assumptions that underlie the genealogical approach). However, as pointed out before, this does certainly not imply that 'anything goes'. The researcher does present an interpretation that is based on his sophisticated understanding of the case and that has been verified by means of different strategies, which means that he is just as prepared to defend his knowledge claims as any other scientist drawing on any other methodology or theoretical framework

is. This is important, because the politically charged nature of the genealogical topics is expected to trigger extreme reactions (ranging from positive/supportive to extremely negative/hostile ones). As contributing to praxis by influencing the public debate via reflexive analyses is perceived to be the main tasks of the genealogist, the researcher knows that he should be able and willing to defend his knowledge claims in public. Nonetheless, actually bringing results that are meant to generate doubt and discomfort in order to stimulate a wider process of reflection on self-evident (and perverse) micro-practices to the public attention in a politically charged context, can be more challenging than the researcher might think of up front. The genealogist should be aware of the impact that his study can make and of the role that he is expected to play and willing to play in the public debate. That is, the work does not end when the research results are presented. Turning the genealogy in an effective history might imply that the researcher disseminates the findings in broad circles, using different media (scientific articles, presentations, opinion articles, interviews etc.), but also, and especially, that the researcher is able to deal with political pressure and criticism.

It can be concluded that using the genealogical method is likely to confront the researcher with these 5 difficulties that he should be prepared to deal with. Throughout the thesis we have explained how we have dealt with these issues. Drawing on our own experiences (from which these difficulties have been derived in the first place) we assert that researchers that cling to rules and order, certainties and control, are better off opting for another method that implicates a research process with clear-cut steps. Researchers willing to dig deep in a controversial case in order to contribute to public debate and willing to let go of their a priori assumptions and certainties might find solace in the genealogical methodology (and underlying philosophy).

12.4 Reflections on Policy Making and Democracy

This study does not merely hold value for those interested in the study of the reproductive tendency of policy discourse or policy deadlocks. In this paragraph we argue that it gives rise to a critical appraisal of the practice of policy making itself and a critical appraisal of debates about improving western democracy.

Reconsidering the practice of policy making

The Schiphol case offers us a nuanced perspective on the practice of public policy making itself and challenges policy scholars to question the taken-for-granted truths that they often adopt about the progressive, rational and regulatory promise of policy making. The entire idea of policy making is firmly grounded in the (Enlightenment) idea of rationality and existing policy practices are believed to contribute to the realization of these ideals, while these policy practices work to further institutionalize and naturalize these ideals. However, from the Schiphol case it can be derived that

sometimes policy is not setting out rational directions for future development, as is often assumed. Instead, sometimes policy is constantly developed afterwards, merely serving as an *ex post* legitimization of developments that were already taking place. Although we cannot know whether or not this is true for all cases, the Schiphol case illustrates that the idea that policies always allow us to exert control over developments and actually steer (market) developments provides for a far too optimistic perspective on the practice of policy making. This conceals the actual role of policy making, as it sometimes merely serves as *ex post* legitimization of developments that cannot be predicted or controlled. Such understandings about the practice of policymaking invite policy scientists to critically reflect upon the role that policy plays in a given society and in a particular social domain.

Second, the value of policy in general can be questioned in the case of Schiphol. We can wonder whether or not public policy making has made a positive contribution to the societal debate about Schiphol. There are different answers possible. Some would argue that the policies have worked, as Schiphol has become a successful mainport and as they argue that the legally required norms are not violated (although the case tells a different story). Others would argue that Schiphol would have become a mainport anyway (indeed, policies followed actual hub development instead of vice versa) and that the policy regulations have greatly contributed to the creation of distrust amongst actors. It might be possible that the final result would have been the same without policy (e.g. capacity at the airport, levels of noise pollution), while the relationships between actors would have been less disturbed (cf. Broër, 2006; Kroesen & Broër, 2008). In the end, it seems plausible to assume that Schiphol policies have made a contribution to the regulation of negative external effects of growing aviation and they also more or less have worked to stimulate innovation in the aviation sector (e.g. speeding up the development of cleaner and quieter airplanes and flight procedures). However, it also seems fair to conclude that the constant violation of policy promises has triggered the emergence of extremely hostile relationships between actors involved in the debate.

Both considerations discussed above help us to understand that the practice of policy making is in itself an important way for institutionalising specific societal discourses. On the most general level, policy making as it is currently practiced in most western countries seems to be firmly grounded in the Enlightenment ideals of rationality, progress and control. It is then on the level of the specific policy domain that specific ideas, strategies and tactics are legitimated by turning them into policies. Such an understanding of policy making calls for a critical policy analysis wherein one of the core aims is to reflect upon the knowledge that is actually being produced (i.e. do they strengthen the current discourse and is this desirable) and the specific practices at work that are both their result and precursor, instead of automatically reproducing these practices and truths. Others have also indicated the need for more reflexive policy

analyses (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003) and more reflexive social sciences (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2001) that can contribute to improve the functioning of our (democratic) society.¹⁸²⁴

Reconsidering Democracy: Towards a Discursive Democracy?

Those working in the field of democracy can also obtain interesting insights from the Schiphol case. In general, the case illustrates the problems related to both representative and deliberative approaches to democracy, were democracy is defined as a way of sharing political influence equally in a society that is characterized by social inequality (Sorenson, 2002).¹⁸²⁵ The idea of representative democracy is that individuals who do participate are in some way representatives of those who do not and that those representatives reflect the will of the people. Decision making authority is in the hands of elected politicians, clearly reflecting the idea of the primacy of politics (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Elections for representative bodies are seen as the most important mechanisms for creating democratic legitimacy (Dryzek, 2000). The Schiphol case shows that the elected politicians have little room for real political discussion. That is, most decisions are often already prepared before the political discussion starts, while these decisions have been regulated by the political ambitions of a few Ministers in the first place. There are several explanations for this situation, like the influence of the political preferences of the Cabinet, the biased way wherein information is developed and presented to the Lower House, the politically charged nature of the Schiphol problem and the technical jargon that is used that focuses the discussion on the validity of facts and figures instead of on the questions that really matter, the lack of transparency involved in how decisions are actually prepared (recall for example the confusion about the representation of the local residents during the Alders negotiations). In essence, members of the Lower and Upper House who should critically discuss the Schiphol issue seem to lack the knowledge that is needed to actually assess the costs and benefits of the prepared decisions, and they lack the knowledge of alternatives. They can hardly oversee the problems and dangers related to the policy proposals and decisions that they are discussing. When the ratified decisions turn out to be infeasible (as has often happened in the case of Schiphol), political promises are violated and trust

¹⁸²⁴ Here we don't want to probe deeply into the ongoing discussion of the so-called science wars between reflexive social sciences and social sciences that emulate natural sciences (cf. Laitin, 2006; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Schram, 2006). Instead, we want to stress that developing genealogies about specific policy debates that are perceived to be problematical in some way or another (e.g. policy deadlocks), should be a core task of the policy sciences, and the study of problematical discursive order in any social domain a core task of the social sciences in general. Social science is then regarded as a practical, intellectual activity aimed at clarifying the problems, risks and possibilities we face as humans and societies, and at contributing to social and political praxis (Flyvbjerg, 2001). Such knowledge is deemed as valuable as the more general knowledge delivered by universal explanatory and predictive theories. Moreover, both tasks are complementary and deserve equal attention in the social sciences (including the policy sciences).

¹⁸²⁵ More specifically, a distinction can be made between those who perceive democracy in instrumental terms (i.e. it is an effective means to regulate conflicts between individuals and resolve issues), and those who perceive democracy from an ethical (or substantial) perspective (i.e. it is a social ideal that is worth fighting for in its own right, rather than merely an effective decision making procedure, see Pateman, 1989; Edelenbos, 2000; Mayer et al, 2005; Sorensen & Torfing, 2003).

in politicians decreases. Indeed, Schiphol is a point in case as trust in politicians has lowered during the past twenty years, which in turn has worked to greatly undermine the legitimacy of their decisions as regards Schiphol affairs. From this perspective, Schiphol is a nice example of failing traditional politics that has triggered the rise of populist political parties that can be observed in several western democracies in Europe during the past decade.

One can wonder whether or not those nationally elected politicians that lack relevant knowledge and that lack legitimacy should still be in charge of the final decision making. Indeed, those calling for more deliberative forms of democracy argue that the eroding jurisdictional integrity of these representative bodies and the emergence of new political spaces undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of the decisions (and policies) that these institutions produce (Hajer, 2002; Skelcher, 2005). Besides, citizens have become more critical, and they doubt the ability of the traditional representative bodies to serve their individual interests (Frissen, 1996; ROB, 2000; SCP, 2002). This declining political trust has led to lower voter turnouts at local and national elections, the emergence of new political parties (especially populist parties), and other constitutional reforms (like the implementation of consultative referenda or reforms of the election system) (Akkerman et al., 2004; Michels, 2004). From the deliberative democratic perspective, democracy is regarded as a means of social coordination for creating a shared political identity. It is assumed that civil society needs to be revitalized for this. This often results in more interactive ways of decision-making that empower citizens and ‘deepen the ways in which ordinary people can effectively participate in and influence policies that directly affect their lives’ (Fung & Wright, 2001). In practice, this often result in attempts to make the policy making process more interactive, making sure that all relevant stakeholders (including citizens) are given a voice.

The Schiphol case shows that the practices of deliberative democracy are not without their problems too. There have been several attempts to make the policy making process more interactive. Different approaches have been employed, but the result was often the same: participating actors became disappointed about the actual influence they could exert on the final policy decisions. It turned out to be impossible to please everyone when confronted with diametrically opposed interests and positions, and expectations were not managed adequately. In the end, the representative bodies still held the final decision making power, which allowed the Ministry of V&W (and the other macro actors) to prepare these decisions in relative isolation. The need to focus and summarize made sure that the richness of the deliberations was lost, and the resulting selection was based on what the macro actors deemed to be of pivotal importance. During the last episode of deliberations (the Alders table) it was possible to get round this problem by installing an independent chairman who directly reported to the Minister and Lower

House. Here two other problems popped up. It turned out to be impossible to find adequate representatives for the local residents involved. None of the local residents could speak or was allowed to speak on behalf of all local residents. So how to select adequate representatives when pursuing the ideal of deliberative democracy? Second, the representatives of the municipalities and province were all but pleased about the important role that was given to the local residents. They were the ones with the political mandate to make decisions, a mandate that local residents did not have. From the perspective of these representative bodies the line between discussion and decision-making should be drawn much sharper. That is, local residents are allowed to join the discussion, but they actual the representative bodies make decisions. The inclusion of citizen panels met similar types of criticism.

Both the problems with representative and deliberative democracy stem from the difficulty to find a balance between these two forms of democracy. As practices related to both approaches are enacted at the same time, the promises that each particular approach hold cannot be realized. Thus, those expecting representative democracy are disappointed and those expecting deliberative democracy are disappointed. The Schiphol case helps to understand the dangers of each specific approach, and the dangers of mixing both approaches at the same time. Of course, no final and universal solution can be offered. But it can be argued that a third way holds some potential, i.e. discursive democracy. Such a democracy avoids the question of representation of actors, which is a problem in both representative and deliberative democracy. Instead, discursive democracy is based on the belief that the entire diversity of stories that is of importance with regard to a specific issue should be represented, instead of groups or persons (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008). The main challenge then becomes to make sure that the diversity of stories becomes available.¹⁸²⁶ One can think of a situation wherein the traditional elected representative bodies (e.g. the Lower and Upper House) still have the mandate to discuss these different stories and the policy decisions they implicate. Thus, (deliberative) democracy then means to gather all stories that seem to hold some support in society and offer these to the elected politicians. Such an approach should of course not be seen as an universal panacee, but the Schiphol case shows that it might be worthwhile to experiment with.

At first sight, the weakness of such an approach is that one can only take the existing stories into account, thus ignoring the importance of creating new stories. Indeed, drawing on Foucault all existing storylines of a policy domain (or any other social domain) are both the result and precursor of the existing discursive order. Thus, existing

¹⁸²⁶ Q-methodology can be helpful here, as it helps to construct the different discourses within a specific policy domain (Davies et al., 2005). See Van Eeten (1999, 2001), Broër & Kroesen (2007), Huys & Kroesen (2008) and Kroesen (2011) for application of the Q-methodology to the Schiphol case.

stories may all lack practical value when one is for example confronted with a deadlocked policy situation. However, we believe that this is not so much a weakness, as the illumination of the many policy stories that shape up to form the discursive order allows one to develop new stories as well, by pro-actively combining parts of these existing stories and by looking for potentially valuable storylines that are part of other discursive orders in other policy domains. After all, new ideas and storylines always build upon the existing ideas and storylines. They do not come from nowhere, they are firmly grounded in existing discursive orders. Making sure that existing stories are illuminated and brought forward in the political debate while simultaneously seeking for additional innovative storylines and allowing room for their inclusion in the public debate seems to be a promising way to get out of the dilemma of representative and deliberative democracy.

12.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we critically reflected upon the value of the genealogical approach as it has been applied in this thesis. We pointed out the importance of clarifying how the discursive order has worked to influence the research practices and research findings and we discussed five difficulties that the researcher doing genealogy should be prepared to deal with. With regard to the first, we pointed out that our case description has been changed after the publication of the trial balloon, although this did not influence our analysis and conclusions about the emergence and persistence of Schiphol's policy deadlock and our recommendations very much. We also provided some wider reflections on the practice of policy making and western democracy, holding a plea for more reflexive policy sciences that contribute to social dialogue by providing persuading reflexive analyses (in line with the plea for more reflexive social sciences) and pointing out the potential (and weakness) of discursive democracy for improving the working of western democracy. In the end, many interesting directions and questions for future research remain. We have outlined some of these directions in chapter 11 and in this epilogue, but in line with our approach we also and especially invite other researchers to develop their own hypotheses and research questions that pop up when reading this thesis. Furthermore, we invite others who are studying deadlocked policy situations to apply and further improve our approach or to simply use the approach for inspiration.

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Appendix 1. Regularities in Storylines around Policy Themes

Can be downloaded from <http://repository.tudelft.nl>

Appendix 2. Regularities in Strategies & Tactics around Policy Themes

Can be downloaded from <http://repository.tudelft.nl>

Appendix 3. Institutionalization of the Dual Objective

Can be downloaded from <http://repository.tudelft.nl>

Appendix 4. List of Interviewees

No.	Naam	Organization	Function	Date
1.	Tom de Laat	Ministry of V&W	Policy maker	04-05-2004
2.	Gert Jan Bakker	CROS	Policy maker	05-03-2007
3.	Michel de Weijs	Amsterdam (RO)	Policy maker	12-05-2005
4.	Jan Rensing	Province NH	Policy maker	12-05-2005
5.	Jan Jaap Kolpa	Haarlemmermeer	Policy maker	16-09-2010
6.	Jan Klaver	Ministry of VROM	Policy maker	19-05-2005
7.	Wim Kranenburg	Schiphol Group	Senior Planner	18-01-2007
8.	Marieke van Putten (1)	Ministry of EZ	Policy maker	08-02-2007
9.	Marieke van Putten (2)	Ministry of EZ	Policy maker	19-05-2005
10.	Sietze Rienstra	Ministry of V&W	Policy maker	18-01-2007
11.	Emy Lap	Ministry of VROM	Policy maker	06-02-2007
12.	Kees Wulffraat	Ministry of V&W	Policy maker	01-02-2007
13.	Elzeline de Jong	Municipality Amsterdam (EZ)	Policy maker	12-02-2008
14.	Elzeline de Jong	Amsterdam (EZ)	Policy maker	16-09-2010
15.	Kees van Ojik	Local resident/ CROS	Local resident	18-01-2007
16.	Evert Hassink	Milieudefensie	Policy maker	28-11-2006
17.	Rolf van Arendonk	Milieufederatie NH	Policy maker	27-02-2007
18.	Ton Bossink	Province NH	Policy maker	29-01-2007
19.	Jan Van Duin	Province NH	Policy Maker	29-01-2007
20.	Guus Berkhout (1)	TU Delft	Professor and chairman Berkhout Committee	25-1-2007
21.	Guus Berkhout (2)	TU Delft	Professor and chairman Berkhout Committee	26-1-2008
22.	Roland Wijnen	TU Delft	Researcher	20-04-2009
23.	Johan de Waard	Ministry of V&W	Policy maker	06-05-2009
24.	Johan de Waard (2)	Ministry of V&W	Policy maker	08-06-2009
25.	Lodewijk Abspoel (2)	Ministry of V&W	Policy maker	03-07-2009
26.	Lodewijk Abspoel (1)	Ministry of V&W	Policy maker	04-05-2009
27.	Hugo Gordijn	RPB/KiM	Researcher	03-07-2009
28.	Rob Dortland	Ministry of V&W	Project leader	03-07-2009
29.	Jeroen Gosse	Ministry of V&W	Project leader	22-07-2009
30.	Erwin von der Meer	Local Resident/ VGP – BLRS	Chairman VGP	07-10-2009
31.	Ymte van Gosliga	Local Resident/ VGP - BLRS	Local resident	07-10-2009
32.	Martijn van Boxtel	Schiphol Group	Airport Planner	21-09-2010
33.	Jan Fransen	Stichting Natuur & Milieu	Researcher	16-06-2009
34.	Ben Ale	TU Delft	Professor and Schiphol EIA Committee	29-06-2009
35.	Kjeld Vinx	To70/ Ministry of V&W	Researcher	04-05-2009

36.	Ton Dassen	Milieu & natuur planbureau	Researcher	12-03-2007
37.	Bart Kuipers	Erasmus University	Researcher	07-04-2010
38.	R. Muchall	Geluidsconsult	Researcher	02-09-2009
39.	M. Laeven	EIA Committee Schiphol	Secretary	17-09-2010
40.	R. van Gijzel	Member of Lower House/ PVDA	Politician	02-09-2009
41.	Giap Tan	CROS	Secretary	04-10-2010
42.	Tjeerd Ten Wolde	EIA Committee Schiphol	Researcher	06-07-2010
43.	Kees van Ojik	Local resident/ CROS/ VGP	Local resident	06-07-2010
44.	Gerard Paap	Local resident/ VGP	Local resident	06-07-2010
45.	Gerard Geerdink	Local resident/ VGP	Local resident	06-07-2010
46.	Jan Griese	Local resident/ BGp – BLRS	Local resident	08-05-2009
47.	Peter Frankena	Adecs Airinfra	Researcher	06-05-2009
48.	Frenk Wubben	NLR/TO70/ Ministry of V&W	Researcher	28-09-2009
49.	Henk van Kessel	Novioconsult/ Van Spaendonck	Researcher	28-09-2009
50.	Pieter Jan Stallen (1)	Leiden University	Professor	11-02-2008
51.	Pieter Jan Stallen (2)	Leiden University	Professor	21-04-2008

Interviews for validation of the manuscript.¹⁸²⁷

52.	Hans Alders	Ministry of V&W	Chairman Alders Table	22-03-2011
53.	Jeroen Fukken	Ministry of V&W	Director Aviation	22-03- 2011
54.	Johan Weggeman	Ministry of V&W	Secretary Alders Table	22-03-2011
55.	Hans Alders	Ministry of V&W	Chairman Alders Table	17-08-2011
56.	Andre van Lammeren	Ministry of V&W	Director Aviation	17-08-2011
57.	Johan Weggeman	Ministry of V&W	Secretary Alders Table	17-08-2011

People who have been interviewed as part of another research project, but who have been quoted in this thesis.

58.	Paul van Eenige	IVW	Unit Luchtvaartuigen; Vergunningen en ontwikkelingen	2006
59.	Gerard Temme	IVW	Testvlieger	2006
60.	Frank Beemster	Transavia	Quality Engineer Safety & Quality Assurance	2006
61.	Ben Gooijer	Martinair	Director Flight Operations Engineering	2006
62.	Bart de Vries	KLM	Hoofd Vliegdienst	2006

¹⁸²⁷ The three respondents were interviewed together.

Summary

Building Castles in the (Dutch) Air

Understanding the Policy Deadlock of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol 1989 - 2009

The problem: A Persistent Policy deadlock?

The development of Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, the 5th largest airport of Europe in terms of traffic volumes in 2010 (with 45.2 million passengers and 1.5 million tons of freight), has been one of the most persistent and difficult issues on the Dutch public policy agenda of the last decades. The airport is located in one of the most densely populated areas of the Netherlands and ever since the 1950s the Dutch government has struggled with the trade off between further growth and reducing the environmental impact of the increasing air traffic. Anno 2005 there were several clues available that the Schiphol policy debate had become firmly deadlocked. On the one hand, evidence for the existence of this deadlock had been delivered in several scientific studies that had been produced over the previous years. On the other hand, several respondents acknowledged the existence of the different symptoms that characterize such a policy deadlock (e.g. the presence of taboos, exasperating delays, escalated conflicts and the ongoing reproduction of the same old arguments, roles and positions; in short, they felt that they were moving around in vicious circles). What is more, people involved sensed that continuing along existing paths was not desirable, as it hampered them to realize their respective goals. Thus, we asserted that the actors involved had come to be in some sort of impasse that was destructive for the goals they wanted to achieve, while they could not recognize or diagnose adequately the nature of this situation in a way that was necessary to get out of it.

Goals, Approach and Added Value

Apparently, existing ways of thinking, talking and acting that could be done in a meaningful and legitimate way within the Schiphol policy domain, which we defined in terms of Schiphol's policy discourse, had become firmly deadlocked in 2005. In order to assess the correctness of this hypothesis, and in order to assess the enduring permanence of the deadlock during the period 2005 – 2009, empirical investigation was required. The main aim of this thesis was to describe, assess and explain the emergence and persistence of the Schiphol policy discourse during 1989 – 2009. This was all the more important as we asserted that it was exactly by describing the genesis of the situation and by showing that this particular genesis was not connected to absolute historical necessity that possibilities could be created for breaking through the strong reproductive tendency that we assumed to be at work in the Schiphol policy domain.

Foucault's genealogical approach was very promising for our purposes, as it was exactly for those circumstances that change was most needed and most difficult to achieve at the same time that Foucault developed his methodologies and related conceptual outlook in the first place. In this thesis we built upon both Foucault's insights and the work of those authors who applied his approach to the field of policy studies. We developed an approach that allowed us to uncover the reproductive tendency of the discursive order at work in a specific policy domain, consisting of a three step procedure and a set of methodological guidelines for gathering, ordering, analyzing and presenting the data required. This approach can be enacted in a rather systematized way, while avoiding a priori commitment to theoretical explanations and neatly defined hypotheses that force data into pre-existing categories. The development of this methodology formed the first goal of the thesis. Developing such a rather systematized approach was not only valuable because the scientific toolkit lacks approaches for describing, assessing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks. It was also valuable for another reason, as the method of how to conduct a discourse analysis inspired by Foucault in general, and its application to the policy domain in particular, has received limited systematic attention thus far. The second goal was to apply this methodology to the Schiphol case in order to describe, assess and explain the emergence and the reproduction of Schiphol's policy discourse during 1989 – 2009. The third goal was to explore the possibilities of the genealogical approach for triggering change, and more specifically the possibilities for breaking through the reproductive tendency of the Schiphol discourse. In order to realize these goals we have answered four research questions.

<p>1. How can the genealogical approach be used for describing and analysing the reproductive tendency of policy discourses?</p>

Based on an in depth discussion of Foucault's thought and practice we developed a heuristic framework composed of four sensitizing concepts (power, discourse, practice and event) that provided us with a valuable conceptual understanding of the emergence and reproduction of discursive orders. The discursive order refers to the ways of thinking, talking and acting that can be done in a meaningful and legitimate way by a specific actor within a specific time-space context. In line with Foucault, we asserted that the main challenge was to uncover the power relations at work that sustain the specific discursive order at work. Understanding how power works in the social domain under study is the main aim of any genealogy. As these workings of power are the outcome of the research, we cannot a priori define how it works. The heuristic framework based on our interpretation of Foucault's thought allows for uncovering these context dependent workings of power in any given social domain. Building upon Foucault we argued that we can understand how power works by studying the interplay between the discursive order and micro practices involved (that are both the result and

precursor of this discursive order). This interplay works to shape the conduct of people: what can be said and done in a meaningful and legitimate way by a specific actor in the specific context of the (policy) domain. Power then works through influencing this conduct; and it works by influencing how actors act upon one another, i.e. as one actor acts, he shapes the possible future actions of another. Partly directly (by triggering a response) and partly indirectly by reproducing and thus further institutionalizing the specific discursive order and micro practices.

Drawing on this specific Foucauldian understanding of power we distinguished between three different steps that need to be applied for describing, assessing and explaining the emergence and ongoing reproduction of discursive orders. We applied these three steps to the study of the policy domain, closing the gap between Foucault's rather abstract principles and the detailed study of concrete policy processes, in line with the previous work developed by authors like Flyvbjerg, Hajer and Richardson. It resulted in the following 3-step procedure that allowed us to describe, assess and explain the emergence and ongoing reproduction (thus persistence) of policy discourses in a specific policy domain.

- 1. Localize events in the policy process.** Events are defined as those moments that variety is being produced. Events can be located on the level of the policy theme. Each policy theme has a policy space, which consists of several elements. Those elements refer to the discursive space (content and format of policy stories) and political space (roles, positions, actors, networks, arenas and coalitions), and these act as signifiers. Events serve as the points of departure for uncovering power relations, as they signify the moments that different rationalities or truths clash and struggle for dominance.
- 2. Tracing lines of descent of these events by detecting strategies and tactics.** By uncovering the strategies and tactics involved in the emergence, institutionalization or marginalization of events, while simultaneously accounting for the contextual factors that influence these strategies and tactics, we provide ourselves with the means to uncover the micro practices at work that regulate the discursive order.
- 3. Uncovering the interplay between micro-practices and the discursive order.** Finally, we need to uncover the mechanisms of power at work in the (re)production of a discursive order in a given policy domain. This can be done by enacting the following procedure:
 - Illuminating the discursive order in place and the level of change and continuity. How to uncover the meta narrative and discourse coalition? It involves basically nothing else than bringing the sum of the institutionalized policy spaces together on a higher level. Together, they make up for the totality of accepted ways of thinking, talking and acting within a policy domain, from which the researcher should derive the overarching meta narrative and

discourse coalition. Again, the meta narrative and discourse coalition cannot be directly read from the empirical data. It involves an interpretation of the researcher;

- Illuminating the micro-practices at work (which can be derived from the previous analysis of strategies and tactics, i.e. were regularities in strategies and tactics and their relatedness to specific conventions or obligations signified the existence of a particular practice);
- Clarifying the interplay between the discursive order and the micro practices. This allows us to understand how power works in the social domain under study.

Next, we discussed the data needs of this 3-step procedure and we presented the specific methodologies that we used for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the data. Here we pointed out that different methodologies for data gathering might be required, depending on the specific problem that is being studied. Thus, the methodologies that we used for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the data are not necessarily the only ones suitable when enacting the 3-step procedure. As long as the researcher makes sure that he can illuminate the interplay between the discursive order and micro-practices involved and as long as he attempts to let the story unfold from the many-sided, complex and sometimes conflicting interpretations that the specific case contains, in order to avoid simplified and one-sided readings of the past. With regard to the latter, at least three basic methodological guidelines need to be enacted:

- Focus on details, were the detail needs to be understood from the perspective of the genealogy. Genealogical histories tend to cover many years (e.g. often decades, but those of Foucault himself covered hundreds of years) and tend to describe extremely complex and fragmented social orders. It is impossible to provide a detailed account of all things said and done and all things concealed during those years (e.g. micro-linguistic analysis of language use or minute to minute observations). Instead, details refer to the need to devote attention to the marginalized knowledges, the ones that have not become institutionalized, next to the usual attention that is devoted to the main documents and decisions.
- Include a polyphony of voices. As there isn't one reading of specific events and as ambiguity is a strength of a genealogy, different interpretations are actively sought after. More specifically, one constantly seeks for disconfirming evidence in a deliberate attempt to falsify specific readings of events.
- Account for structure and agency at the same time, i.e. accounting simultaneously for the structural influences that shape individual actions, how those actions are constructed and what their structural consequences are.

Application of these guidelines holds the danger of a never ending quest for multiple beginnings, as the more closely we examine specific events, the more we are led to

correlative strategies and tactics. The main challenge is to bring the different events to light and to describe the strategies and tactics involved in their emergence and institutionalization or marginalization. This requires a vast accumulation of source material which both requires patience and knowledge of details. For this thesis, it meant to meticulously work through the many pages of a wide variety of (small and important) documents and large masses of interview material, while constantly looking for disconfirming evidence. The result was an extensive database that had been validated through and through.

The genealogical database is biased as the focus is on the various moments of resistance, and on the marginalization of the ideas that come to the fore during those moments of resistance. Thus, the genealogy is automatically biased towards the socially and economically disadvantaged in our society. However, this is not done because the marginalized ways of thinking and acting are believed to be more true and rational. This is merely necessary for uncovering the knowledge clashes involved and the mechanisms at work in the construction of dominant interpretations and ways of acting. This is related to the fact that a genealogy attempts to deliver a committed history, i.e. one that uncovers the rationalities at work in a specific social domain and that is meant to create the possibility for breaking through the existing discursive order that has become self-evident.

Next, the events are put in their right chronology and context and the contours of the history, including the plot, come to the fore. Writing the history is an important organizing strategy, as it allows for descriptively representing the process data in a systematic organized form. The (committed) history needs to become an effective history as well (which is something different than a complete or exhaustive history), for which it needs to be written and presented (choice of discursive format) in a way that it triggers recognition and reflection on behalf of the specific reference group (i.e. both the practitioners involved in the social domain and the scientists community involved). Together, the 3-step procedure and the methodologies for gathering, ordering, validating and presenting the data required resulted in an approach that can be used for describing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks, thus providing an answer to our first research question.

2. To what extent can reproduction in the Schiphol policy discourse be found and how can this reproductive tendency be explained?

Next, the three step procedure has been applied to the Schiphol case. Here we made a clear distinction between the description of the case and the analysis, although it must be noted that there is unavoidably analysis involved in the selection of the case material that is presented. By linking the description as little as possible to specific theoretical

ideas (which is secured by the type of Foucauldian sensitizing concepts that make up for the heuristic framework), or pushing the reader down the path of our interpretation, we have left scope for readers with different backgrounds to make their own interpretations and draw their own conclusions as regards the meanings of the case. Indeed, readers are invited to do so before even reading our analysis, as we assume that the most effective type of reflection will come into being when readers arrive at their own conclusions. The result was an extensive case description, based on the enactment of steps 1 and 2 of our 3-step procedure. The case description cannot be summarized, nor do we want to make an attempt to do so, as one of the main assumptions underlying this thesis is that it is exactly by delving into the minutiae of the case that readers can develop the kind of sophisticated understanding of the emergence of the Schiphol policy deadlock and its enduring, and sometimes perverse, effects on regular daily practices of the present that is needed for reflection.

We provided an extensive introduction to the Schiphol case in order to provide the reader with the necessary background information for an adequate understanding of the case, exactly by setting out some of the main characteristics of the context wherein the policy debate had to unravel and by defining the initial starting conditions. We qualified the Dutch policy context in terms of a democratic culture of consensualism, with hints of pragmatism and corporatism. We highlighted the different positions of the actors involved in the argumentative struggle for discursive hegemony, pointing out how policy decisions of national interest like large infrastructure developments are made in policy networks that consist of a wide diversity of mutually dependent actors (e.g. the national government with its specific positioning of departments vis-à-vis one another, other governmental authorities, citizens, grassroots organizations, environmental interest groups, corporations and knowledge institutes). We discussed some basic characteristics of the Dutch planning system and, in a nutshell, we presented the historical development of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol from 1916 onwards. Finally, we discussed how a new policy strategy as regards Schiphol emerged during the 1980s, as a consequence of several (partly coincidental) intermingling developments. The mainport concept formed the cornerstone of this new spatial-economic development strategy, which became firmly embedded on the national policy agenda from 1988 onwards. It was the coalescence of the simultaneous development strategies of the port authorities (corporate strategies), the Schiphol experts committees, the logistics lobby, the regional and local planning authorities and the spatial policy making arena of the national government (which spread towards interdepartmental level when Ministries of Transportation (*Verkeer & Waterstaat*) and Economic Affairs (*Economische Zaken*) supported the mainport strategy), coupled with a favourable political climate (with a cabinet that had adopted the motto work-work-work), that made the development of the mainport strategy possible.

In 1989 the quest to translate the dual objective of the mainport strategy into concrete policy measures began. The main issue was to make sure that traffic volumes at Schiphol could grow, as this was necessary for facilitating the hub-and-spoke system that formed the core of the mainport strategy, while simultaneously improving the quality of the living environment. During the next 20 years these dual objectives became operationalized and reframed in ways that time and again turned out to be infeasible at the same time. In the extensive case description, which is divided into three rounds (1989 – 1995; 1996 – 2003; 2003 – 2009), where each round is closed with an important political decision (except for the last round), we provide a chronological description of the events involved (the breaches of self-evidence, or the moments that variety is developed) and the strategies and tactics involved in their emergence, institutionalization or marginalization, while simultaneously accounting for the factors that have influenced these strategies and tactics employed. We have included different readings of events in order to let the story unfold from the many-sided, complex and sometimes conflicting stories involved in the case. This also implied that we demurred from the role of the omniscient narrator and summarizer. Instead, we tried to reproduce the different stories included as detailed and honestly as possible. The level of detail has been important for the case description, although it should be noted once again that it is impossible to develop an extremely detailed description when attempting to capture the dynamics of 20 years of an extremely fragmented and comprehensive policy debate. Finally, it should be emphasized that the case description is not intended to be complete and exhaustive, nor do we pretend that everything is correct. Indeed, the Schiphol debate has been very comprehensive and technically-complex and it is wrought with different numbers and calculation methods. However, we do argue that the case description is good enough to become an effective history, as it allows the reader to understand why it is so difficult to break through the impasse and as it allows us to develop a transparent analysis of the emergence and persistence of Schiphol's policy deadlock.

Assessing the Policy Deadlock

Next, we invited the reader to take our analysis of the extensive case description into account. With regard to the extent of reproduction we asserted that variety has been produced throughout the years, with increasing levels from 2007 onwards (during the Alders episode, i.e. the interactive policy debate that has been organized from 2007 onwards and that has been chaired by former Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment Hans Alders), but that the discursive order on the level of the policy domain has remained remarkably stable. When defining the stability of the discursive order we pointed out the regularities we found in the meta narrative (the dual objective or the mainport–environment discourse, where the mainport objective was hierarchically superior), the specific positions and positioning of actors that this meta narrative implicated (identifying the macro actors, i.e. the ones who could pass judgment on what

was true and valid and what was not) and the discourse coalition that sustained this meta narrative (the mainport–environment coalition, consisting of two subcoalitions, were the mainport coalition was hierarchically superior to the environmental coalition).

We are by no means arguing that nothing has changed at all, nor that no variety has been produced in ways of talking and acting throughout the years. On the contrary, the entire Schiphol case is built around the multiplicity of moments that variety comes into being (the events). Thus, although variety was constantly produced on the level of the policy theme it was the lack of institutionalization of this produced variety that caused the reproduction (e.g. new ideas easily became marginalized during the debate). Nonetheless, at some moments variety became institutionalized too; we for example discussed how the mainport concept has evolved and how the environmental coalition grew larger as positions changed, new actors entered the stage and more and more actors called for the need to restore the balance between the dual objectives. Indeed, especially from 2007 onwards during the Alders episode much of such variety has been produced, and some of this has become institutionalized. However, we concluded that the discursive order on the level of the policy domain has remained remarkably stable. This brought us to the conclusion that there was indeed a policy deadlock in 2005 (i.e. the assumption from which this study departed) that was still in place anno 2009. Here it is once again important to emphasize that the term policy deadlock refers to the level of the discursive order of the policy domain. The main point is that some new policy ideas, positions and relations have been developed, while the basic assumptions underlying the Schiphol policy debate about ways of talking and acting that are deemed meaningful and legitimate have changed very little during 1989 – 2009, although it remains to be seen whether or not the variety that has been created from 2007 onwards during the Alders debate will make an impact on the level of the discursive order in the years to come.

Next, we uncovered the micro-practices at work by discerning regularities in discursive and non-discursive strategies and tactics from the case, were the existence of such practices further indicates the stability of the discursive order. It resulted in 9 discursive and 14 non discursive micro practices that have worked to condition both the kind of stories that actors could meaningfully develop and the kind of strategies and tactics they could enact when mobilizing support for their preferred stories during the past 20 years. Possibilities for acting were very much related to the positions of actors that were derived from the meta narrative. The list of practices is presented in table 1.

Table 1 List of Discursive and Non-discursive practices at work in the discursive order of the Schiphol policy domain 1989 - 2009.

Discursive Practices	Non-Discursive Practices
1. Referring to the dual objective	1. Respect the positions of the Macro Actors

2. Winners: Using an optimistic discursive format	2. Heavy reliance on Aviation sector
3. Losers; using a negative discursive format	3. Heavy reliance on in-house researchers
4. Referring to the mainport objective	4. Defining policy objectives a priori in terms of quantified standards and fix these. Frame these standards in a way that makes it possible to realize the dual objectives.
5. Referring to the environmental objective in terms of noise, third party risk, local air pollution and stench	5. Selection of preferable scenarios
6. The dominance of the noise issue when discussing the environmental objective	6. Heavy reliance on calculation models and biased selection of models (that were themselves biased too)
7. Draw on technical engineering vocabulary: Quantification of the debate	7. Heavy reliance on research in general. Creating a bias in the production and utilization of information.
8. Acknowledge Hierarchy in objectives: Mainport objective structures environmental objective	8. Postponing difficult decisions
9. Develop spatial solutions based on technical-rational calculations	9. Sidelining Opponents
	10. Compensating losers
	11. Breaking Policy Promises, while arguing that promises are not broken at all.
	12. Engaging in juridical procedures
	13. Mobilizing the Media: Naming and Shaming
	14. Hierarchical decision making when political deadlines closed in

Explaining the Policy Deadlock

In order to explain the stability of the discursive order that has assumed the form of a policy deadlock we illuminated the interplay between the micro-practices at work and the reproduction of the discursive order, as this is how Foucauldian power works in any specific domain. Here we explained how the discursive order gave way to specific micro practices and a specific positioning and how these worked to reproduce the discursive order (i.e. the meta narrative with its hierarchy in dual objectives, the discourse coalition with its hierarchy in sub coalitions and the positioning it implicated). The reproduced discursive order, in turn, gave way to further enactment of existing positions and micro practices, resulting in an ongoing institutionalization of both the discursive order and the micro-practices that it implicated. Each time the discursive order became further institutionalized, underlying micro practices and positions became more self-evident, giving way to a strong self-reinforcing loop and further institutionalization of the discursive order.

We argued that this self-reinforcing loop was further strengthened as a consequence of one of the main perverse effects of this ongoing reproduction, i.e. the ever growing levels of distrust, both between actors involved and in the policy regulations. We illustrated how the existing discursive order did not allow different actors to realize their policy ambitions (related to mainport development or environmental improvement) at the same time, despite the promise of the dual objective that this would be possible. The

discursive order gave way to suboptimal solutions and fictive policy worlds, and leading macro actors failed to offer a way out. Note that we are not arguing that the dual objective itself was the main problem; it was the specific way wherein the dual objective was framed that eventually caused the need to create such policy fictions or castles in the air. At the same time, the increasing levels of distrust made actors cling to existing regulations and call for strong leadership on behalf of the national government, which both worked to reproduce the discursive order and hence worked to fuel distrust. The ever-increasing lack of trust hampered the kind of learning that was needed to create variety and develop new or modified ways of talking and acting that could be turned into new practices. Transaction costs were high, exchange of information was low and actors didn't dare to let go of their (fake) certainties and reflect upon their basic assumptions. Instead of developing new, potentially better storylines, actors automatically chose sides (for/against) and the dichotomy of the existing storylines that diametrically oppose one another (dual objectives) was reinforced. The hierarchy in storylines, the available positions and the positioning of actors vis-à-vis one another and the multiplicity of micro-practices that is constituted by the discursive order were also reproduced. The self-reinforcing loop and the lack of trust are intrinsically interrelated, and it is the specific way wherein they mutually reinforce one another that makes the reproductive power of Schiphol's policy discourse so strong.

3. How can the genealogy contribute to the transformation of the Schiphol policy discourse?

Our main point of departure for answering this third research question was that there is always a possibility for change, no matter how strong the reproductive tendency of the discursive order. Indeed, the entire Foucauldian methodology is based on this assumption, otherwise there would be no events that could be studied. We argued that a proper genealogy makes an important contribution to change, exactly by creating the right context for such change. People are made aware of the reproductive mechanisms involved, including the contribution of their own taken-for-granted everyday strategies and tactics, and the perverse and sometimes even dangerous consequences of this ongoing reproduction. People are also made aware of the 'boundaries' within which they develop their thoughts and formulate their ideas and actions. In essence, the approach brings to the surface the underlying politics and it exposes the self-evident practices at work that control access and appropriate knowledge, thus defining what counts to be true and rational within a given time-space context and what not. Awareness is created and the reproductive mechanisms at work are recognized and reflection is made possible. Ideally, instead of offering easy solutions, a genealogy tends to leave the reader behind in state of confusion, as the very basic assumptions and beliefs (the ontological securities) of people have been put to the question.

We asserted that the potential for change can be enhanced by developing recommendations for future action that are based on a detailed understanding of the specifics of the context studied, i.e. being grounded in the norms of the case and fit within the boundaries of ways of talking and acting that are deemed acceptable. That is, the specific context of the case sets boundaries to the kind of interventions that hold a chance of succeeding, for which an extremely sophisticated understanding of the case at hand is deemed necessary (the principle of contextualism). Interventions often necessarily imply minor modifications to existing practices, as large-scale institutional reforms are doomed to fail. For one, they tend to fall outside the boundaries of what is deemed acceptable within a discursive order. Moreover, real change implies a change of the inner Self of the people involved. People need to come to the conclusion that change is necessary, otherwise reforms that are implemented top down won't influence their actual conduct. In order to achieve this, interventions need to draw upon the situational ethics at work in the specific case.

When discussing the situational ethics of the Schiphol case we pointed out that things have already been changing somewhat since the Alders negotiations began in 2007. New room for negotiations has been developed, which has resulted in new relations and new policy solutions (e.g. the new regulative system for noise, the possibility to experiment with new flight routes and procedures). As we asserted throughout this thesis, this has not (yet) resulted in changes on the level of the discursive order of the policy domain. Thus, we are still very much drawing on the same assumptions underlying the meta narrative, we are still by and large dealing with the same discourse coalition that consists of two subcoalitions, policy themes on the agenda are the same, the policy stories that are developed around the policy themes are by and large the same, the research questions that are asked, the technocratic-discursive format, the methodologies used for calculating noise and other negative effects, all remained rather stable. However, within this very limited room for manoeuvre, and thus for triggering change, some steps have been set towards change. For one, several key players reached agreement about the further development of Schiphol until 2020, which would for example have been impossible in 1999. Thus, the new context that is slowly emerging offers a fruitful point of departure for actually transforming the discursive order. Drawing on the situational ethics of the Schiphol case we should therefore build upon the small changes that have been set in motion during the past few years (2007 – 2009), gradually expanding the 'boundaries' of what is deemed meaningful and acceptable within the discursive order of the Schiphol policy domain.

Drawing on our understanding of the past (1989 – 2009) and on the strengths of the existing situation (anno 2009) we presented a five step procedure that might further contribute to breaking through the reproductive tendency of Schiphol's policy discourse: (1) political recognition of the need to get rid of dual objective thus framed;

(2) support for this by all actors involved; (3) production of state of the art information about the real costs and benefits that is perceived to be valid; (4) installing an independent committee with strong political leaders that can span boundaries and that can count on legitimacy; (5) transparent political decision making with honest statements about winners and losers and adequate compensatory measures. We argued that this process can only become successful when actors avoid acting in ways that undermine relations of trust. This implies that actors refrain from prevailing practices that undermine such relations of trust (and that simultaneously work to reproduce the discursive order, including its perverse effects).

We pointed out that to some extent several of these steps have already been set in motion, but we discussed how their actual impact has been hampered by the little room for manoeuvre that the existing discursive order implicates as the existing micro-practices continued to regulate regular daily conduct, thus contributing to an ongoing reproduction. Our current understanding of these micro-practices at work (and the perverse effects that they give rise to) allows for the creation of more room for developing new alternatives that draw on different assumptions, scenarios, norms, methodologies and for the use of different discursive formats, which could give rise to new problem definitions, ideas/policy alternatives, roles and relationships (e.g. full closure of Schiphol, an entirely new airport in the North Sea, noise policy based on non-acoustical measures, compensation in terms of money, isolation, sustainable/climate neutral aviation, design of theoretically most optimal flight routes, discussing optimization of the airport system on the European scale). The range of options to choose from will be far bigger and new ideas and relations are developed and explored that will automatically trigger the creation of more new ideas and relations as possibilities for crossovers increase. These new ways would no longer fall outside the boundaries of what is deemed meaningful, rational and legitimate within the discursive order of the Schiphol policy domain. Besides, it will be clear who wins and who loses. Such honesty will be appreciated, as all actors already know that the win-win promise of the dual objective thus framed resembles a sham. Moreover, actors can better understand how the final decisions have been developed. Such transparency will be appreciated too, as it does not work to fuel distrust; it is not sheer manipulation of data but the political game of decision making that has framed the final political decisions.

The five step procedure should not be understood as a blueprint for successful action. Indeed, the procedure is no guarantee for success, and there are possibly several other ways to induce change. Moreover, we also assumed a modest role, arguing that a truly deep understanding of the different rationalities and deep-rooted levels of distrust involved in the case of Schiphol can make one question whether it is really possible to get out of the impasse without help of serious changes in the external environment (like great natural disasters, economic crises, rising oil prices). Nonetheless, we asserted that

the five step procedure can work to give practitioners inspiration when thinking about possible ways of doing things differently.

4. What contribution has the study made to our understanding of Schiphol's policy deadlock in particular, and to the study of policy deadlocks in general?

We asserted that the study contributed to our current understanding of the Schiphol policy deadlock by:

1. Developing one overarching story wherein all earlier explanations have been included in some way or another, showing how it is exactly the interplay of the many different explanations (about process or content, structure or agency, micro or macro level phenomena) that allows one to develop a sophisticated understanding of the mechanisms at work in the emergence and persistence of Schiphol's policy deadlock. Thus we have verified most of the already existing explanations about Schiphol's policy deadlock, instead of falsifying them. The main difference lies in the understanding of the intricate interplay of all these different explanations, which shows that the whole is more than the sum of its separate parts;
2. Adding one more fundamental explanation to the existing repertoire, i.e. the discursive order at work that conditions the things actors can think, say and do in a meaningful and legitimate way, giving rise to specific argumentative structures, policy networks, winning and losing coalitions, policy agendas, roles and positions;
3. Furthermore, we argued that it is especially the kind of sophisticated understanding that is offered in this thesis that contributes to the creation of the right context for inducing change. It does not merely create the precondition for such change (i.e. allowing for reflecting on previously taken-for-granted practices and their perverse consequences), it also helps to discern intervening strategies that might contribute to inducing change (based on the situational ethics of the specific Schiphol situation).

Next, we discussed the contribution to the study of policy deadlocks in general. With regard to scientific method we argued that the 3-step procedure that we developed (1) contributed to the scientific toolkit for describing, assessing and explaining the emergence and persistence of policy deadlocks, and (2) contributed to the creation of a systematic and transparent approach of Foucault's method. The 3-step procedure can be applied to the study of other policy deadlocks as well (and even to less deadlocked situations) when aiming to describe, assess and explain their emergence and persistence. Of course, when considering the application of the 3-step procedure the researcher should check the sense of urgency involved, as a genealogy is most needed in situations where actors sense the need for change (i.e. there is need of a context wherein a case history can become an effective history). With regard to the specific methodologies that we used in order to gather, organize, validate and present the data we argued that the

researcher will have to find out which methodologies will allow him to develop a proper genealogy of his specific case. We also emphasized that the approach is not meant to serve as a blueprint; it reflects our interpretation of how to conduct a discourse analysis of a policy domain inspired by Foucault and many of his interpreters (most notably Flyvbjerg, Hajer and Richardson) in a rather systemized and transparent fashion, which allows the researcher to describe, assess and explain the emergence and persistence of specific policy discourses.

When discussing the contribution to scientific theory we stated that all our findings have been firmly grounded in the specifics of the Schiphol case. The specific way wherein micro practices and the discursive order worked to mutually reinforce one another is context dependent and should therefore be uncovered for each case separately. Thus, the micro practices at work in the case of Schiphol will not necessarily be found in the case of other policy deadlocks, nor does the existence of similar practices automatically gives way to an (undesirable) policy deadlock. There is no linear causal relationship between the mechanisms found and policy deadlocks, meaning that we have not developed explanatory and predictive theory that holds universal value. The same holds true for the recommendations that we developed for breaking through the reproductive tendency. They are based on the principle of contextualism, which automatically grounds them in the specific norms of the case (and even in the case of Schiphol their main function is to inspire practitioners instead of defining their course of action).

Nonetheless, we did point out that the study has contributed to the development of scientific theory in specific ways. The distinction between description and analysis has resulted in an empirically dense case study that holds great potential for (1) naturalistic and (2) analytic generalizations. With regard to the first, people are invited to draw on the experiences of the case when they encounter similar situations in real life. More specifically, we argued that to our knowledge there are only a few studies available that provide such an in depth description of the policy debates around airport development in western democracies. Therefore, the high potential for drawing naturalistic generalizations from the Schiphol case brought us to the assertion that the scientific value of our empirical findings should not be underestimated. With regard to the second (analytical generalizations), scientists are invited to use the empirical data for verification or falsification of their own theories. Finally, the normative approach we discussed also holds some general value. That is, the idea of contextualism can be applied to other cases, but the specific solutions it delivers are likely to be different.

Reflection on the Research Results

Finally, two disclaimers are worth mentioning in order to value the research results properly.

We don't claim to have uncovered some final truth, as such a thing is impossible and undesirable from a Foucauldian perspective. We merely claim to offer a thoroughly motivated and sophisticated understanding of what has been going on in the Schiphol case in such a way that it can make a meaningful contribution to societal debate about the future of Schiphol. As argued throughout this thesis, people are invited and challenged to develop their own interpretations of the case. In line with the social constructivist and interpretive principles that underlie this thesis, people will give different meanings to the case and develop different analyses. Thus, we already know that the case means different things to different people. For example, as part of our validation procedure we discussed the results with some of the people who have been participating in the Alders negotiations and they believed that the reproductive tendency was less strong than we discussed and that the policy deadlock had been loosened from 2007 onwards. The existence of such different interpretations is not a problem, as long as the case description itself is not rejected. It merely illustrates that the case triggers the same ambiguous reactions as can be found in real life. This is important as it relates to the different perceptions and rationalities involved, which is an important precondition for making a meaningful contribution to the societal debate about Schiphol, thus turning the thesis in an effective history.

The research results have been influenced by the discursive order of which they are themselves a part. In line with the critical and curious ethos that the genealogical researcher is expected to practice we reflected upon how our research findings have been influenced by the discursive order at work in the Schiphol policy domain. We argued that an adequate understanding of the interplay between research findings and the discursive order that is being studied (and that the researcher is part of) might help the researcher to avoid going native, to make his findings as transparent as possible and to increase the potential of actually developing an effective history. Nonetheless, the entire research process has been conditioned by the same micro-practices that we uncovered throughout this thesis. For example, interview questions had to be framed in a specific way in order to make sense to the actors involved and results had to be presented in a specific way. The trial balloon that we launched as part of our validation strategy and the resulting public debate also influenced the content of the case description, as we included additional interpretations about specific events. However, the main conclusions about the emergence and persistence of the policy deadlock and the potential for transforming the deadlock have not been changed, although we have further clarified how we came to this conclusion (e.g. by emphasizing our definition of policy deadlock time and again). Our main point is that the research has been both the result and the precursor of the discursive order that we have studied. However, we have attempted to position our contribution exactly on the boundaries of this discursive order, in order to create the proper context for changing them.

Samenvatting

Luchtkastelen rondom Schiphol

Naar een begrip van de Beleidsimpasse rondom Amsterdam Airport Schiphol gedurende 1989 - 2009

Het probleem: Een hardnekkige beleidsimpasse?

De ontwikkeling van de luchthaven Schiphol, de vijfde luchthaven van Europa in termen van passagiers (45,2 mln.) en vracht (1,5 mln. ton) in 2010, behoort tot de meest hardnekkige en moeilijke onderwerpen op de Nederlandse publieke beleidsagenda van de afgelopen decennia. De luchthaven ligt in één van de dichtstbevolkte gebieden van Nederland en de nationale overheid worstelt al sinds de jaren 50 van de vorige eeuw met het vinden van een adequate balans tussen verdere groei van de luchtvaart en het verminderen van de negatieve impact op de leefkwaliteit. In 2005 waren er verschillende aanwijzingen die erop duiden dat het beleidsdebat over Schiphol in een impasse was geraakt. Zo werd het bestaan van deze impasse in diverse wetenschappelijke onderzoeken geconstateerd. Daarnaast herkenden de respondenten diverse symptomen die kenmerkend zijn voor een beleidsimpasse (bijv. de aanwezigheid van taboes, vertraagde besluitvorming, escalerende conflicten, de constante herhaling van argumenten, rollen en posities; kortom het gevoel dat men in een vicieuze cirkel was aanbeland, werd breed gedeeld). Tegelijkertijd gaven de betrokkenen aan dat zij het weinig zinvol achtten om verder te gaan langs de gebaande paden, aangezien dit hen niet in staat zou stellen om de beoogde doelen te realiseren. Op basis van deze informatie was het legitiem om te stellen dat de actoren die waren betrokken bij het Schipholdebat anno 2005 verzeild waren geraakt in een soort impasse die nadelig was voor het bereiken van hun doelen. Tegelijkertijd waren deze actoren niet bij machte om een passende diagnose te maken van deze situatie, die hen in staat zou kunnen stellen om mogelijkheden te verkennen die de impasse zouden kunnen doorbreken.

Doelen, benadering en toegevoegde waarde

Blijkbaar waren manieren van denken, praten en handelen die een rol van betekenis speelden en die als legitiem werden gezien binnen het beleidsdomein Schiphol anno 2005 dus flink geïnstitutionaliseerd geraakt. Om de correctheid van deze hypothese te toetsen, en om vast te stellen in hoeverre er nog sprake was van een impasse gedurende de periode 2005 – 2009, was empirische studie nodig. Hoofddoel van dit proefschrift was om de opkomst van het Schiphol beleidsdiscours gedurende 1989 – 2009 te beschrijven en de mate van reproductie van dit discours te bepalen en te verklaren. Gegeven de aanname dat de beschrijving van de ontwikkeling van een bepaalde situatie kan aantonen dat deze ontwikkeling niet wordt gedreven door één of andere historische

noodzakelijkheid, kan een dergelijke beschrijving de juiste context creëren voor het doorbreken van de sterke reproductieve tendens die bijvoorbeeld aan het werk lijkt te zijn in het geval van de beleidsontwikkeling omtrent Schiphol.

De genealogische benadering van de Franse filosoof/historicus Michel Foucault is als uitgangspunt genomen voor de ontwikkeling van een dergelijke beschrijving. Kort door de bocht betreft de genealogie een geschiedkundige benadering die blootlegt hoe vanzelfsprekende rationaliteiten en waarheden in een specifiek sociaal domein tot stand zijn gekomen en hoe deze doorwerken in de hedendaagse praktijk (dit is namelijk hoe macht volgens Foucault werkt). Juist deze benadering houdt een grote belofte in voor de studie van beleidsimpasses, omdat Foucault de genealogie heeft ontwikkeld voor de specifieke gevallen waarin het onmogelijk lijkt, maar desalniettemin uitermate wenselijk is, om tot verandering te komen. De benadering die in het proefschrift is ontwikkeld om de reproductieve tendens van een discursieve orde in een gegeven beleidsdomein te bepalen en te verklaren, is naast het werk van Foucault ook gebaseerd op het werk van de paar auteurs die hebben getracht om zijn benadering toe te passen binnen de beleidswetenschappen.

De ontwikkelde benadering bestaat uit een procedure met 3 stappen en een aantal methodologische richtlijnen voor het verzamelen, ordenen, valideren, analyseren en presenteren van de benodigde data. De benadering kan op een systematische en transparante wijze worden toegepast, zonder dat er teveel *a-priori* commitment is voor specifieke theoretische verklaringen en nauwkeurig gedefinieerde hypothesen die de data in vooraf vastgestelde categorieën perst. De ontwikkeling van deze benadering vormde het eerste doel van dit proefschrift (1). De ontwikkeling van een dergelijke systematische benadering voor de beschrijving en de verklaring van de opkomst en continuïteit van beleidsimpasses was belangrijk, omdat dergelijke benaderingen grotendeels ontbreken in de huidige gereedschapskist van de beleidswetenschappen. Daarnaast was het waardevol, omdat een op Foucauldiaanse leest geschoeide discours analyse, en meer specifiek, de systematische toepassing van deze benadering op het beleidsdomein, tot dusver nog weinig aandacht heeft gehad in de wetenschappelijke literatuur. Het tweede doel was om deze benadering toe te passen op de Schiphol casus, om de opkomst van het Schiphol beleidsdiscours gedurende 1989 - 2009 te beschrijven en de continuïteit en de conditionerende invloed van dit discours vast te stellen en te verklaren (2). Het derde doel was om de mogelijkheden van een genealogie voor het initiëren van veranderingen in het beleidsdiscours in het algemeen te verkennen, en meer specifiek, de mogelijkheden van de genealogie van Schiphol voor het doorbreken van de reproductieve tendens van het Schipholdiscours (3). Om deze 3 doelstellingen te kunnen realiseren, zijn er 4 onderzoeksvragen beantwoord.

1. Hoe kan de genealogische benadering worden gebruikt voor het beschrijven en analyseren van de reproductieve tendens van beleidsdiscoursen?

Op basis van een diepgaande discussie van het denken en werk van Foucault is een heuristisch raamwerk ontwikkeld dat bestaat uit vier 'sensitizing' concepten (macht, discours, praktijken en 'events' (gebeurtenissen)). Het raamwerk levert een conceptueel begrip op van de opkomst en reproductie van de discursieve orde in een bepaald domein. Een dergelijke discursieve orde verwijst naar de manieren van denken, praten en handelen die een bepaalde actor op een betekenisvolle en legitieme manier binnen een specifieke tijd-ruimte context kan bezigen. In lijn met het werk van Foucault is aangenomen dat de uitdaging ligt in het blootleggen van de mechanismen die aan het werk zijn om deze discursieve orde te (re)produceren. Deze reproducerende mechanismen, die zowel oorzaak als gevolg zijn van de discursieve orde, belichamen hoe macht werkt in het sociale domein dat wordt bestudeerd. Het blootleggen van hoe deze macht werkt is het hoofddoel van de genealogie. Het is onmogelijk om a-priori vast te stellen hoe macht werkt, aangezien dit contextafhankelijk is en dus voor elk domein opnieuw moet worden onderzocht. De werking van macht is dus de uitkomst van de genealogische studie. Het heuristische raamwerk dat is gebaseerd op onze interpretatie van Foucaults benadering stelt ons in staat om deze contextafhankelijke werking van de macht bloot te leggen.

Voortbordurend op Foucault hebben we beargumenteerd dat het blootleggen van de interactie tussen de discursieve orde en de micro-praktijken (die zowel het resultaat als de oorzaak zijn van de discursieve orde, en daarmee inherent onderdeel van de discursieve orde zijn) ons in staat stelt om te bepalen hoe macht werkt in het specifieke sociale domein dat wordt bestudeerd. De interactie tussen de discursieve orde en de micro-praktijken beïnvloedt het gedrag van mensen binnen het sociale domein: ze stelt grenzen aan de dingen die op een betekenisvolle en legitieme manier door een bepaalde actor op een bepaald moment binnen het domein kunnen worden gezegd en gedaan. Macht werkt door het beïnvloeden van dit gedrag door het beïnvloeden van hoe actoren op elkaar reageren, want als een bepaalde actor binnen een domein handelt, beïnvloedt dit de mogelijke toekomstige acties (manieren van praten en handelen) van andere actoren binnen dit domein. Dit gebeurt zowel in directe zin (door een respons uit te lokken) als in indirecte zin (door het reproduceren en daarmee verder institutionaliseren van de discursieve orde en haar micro-praktijken).

Op basis van dit op Foucault gebaseerde begrip van macht hebben we onderscheid gemaakt tussen 3 verschillende stappen die doorlopen moeten worden voor het beschrijven, bepalen en verklaren van de opkomst en constante reproductie van een discursieve orde. Vervolgens hebben we deze 3 stappen toegepast op het beleidsdomein, waarmee we hebben getracht om het gat te dichten tussen de abstracte principes van

Foucault en de gedetailleerde studie van concrete beleidsprocessen. Hierbij is nadrukkelijk voortgebouwd op het werk van andere auteurs die dit in het verleden ook hebben getracht te doen, zoals Flyvbjerg, Hajer en Richardson. Het resultaat is de volgende 3-stappen procedure die moet worden doorlopen voor het beschrijven, bepalen en verklaren van de opkomst en constante reproductie van beleidsdiscoursen in een specifiek beleidsdomein:

- 1. Lokaliseren van ‘events’ (gebeurtenissen) in het beleidsproces.** Foucault geeft een andere definitie van gebeurtenissen dan de meeste wetenschappers doen. Voor Foucault verwijzen de gebeurtenissen niet persé naar belangrijke zaken (zoals grote besluiten, het tekenen van contracten, het uitroepen van een oorlog), maar naar momenten dat variëteit wordt geproduceerd. Het gaat juist vaak om minuscule veranderingen in manieren van praten en handelen, die in conventionele studies onopgemerkt blijven. Dergelijke gebeurtenissen kunnen in het beleidsdomein op het niveau van beleidsthema’s worden gelokaliseerd. Een beleidsdomein bestaat uit verschillende beleidsthema’s, veelal de onderwerpen die op de agenda staan binnen dat domein. Een beleidsthema heeft een bepaalde ‘policy space’ (beleidsruimte), die bestaat uit de manieren van praten en handelen die betekenisvol en legitiem zijn m.b.t. dat thema. Wanneer we dit operationaliseren, dan krijgen we een overzicht van de elementen van de ‘policy space’. Deze elementen hebben betrekking op manieren van praten (de discursieve ruimte op het niveau van het beleidsthema), betreffende de inhoud van de beleidsverhalen en het discursieve format dat wordt gebruikt (bijv. veel technisch-wetenschappelijk jargon). En ze hebben betrekking op manieren van handelen (de politieke ruimte op het niveau van het beleidsthema), betreffende de rollen, posities, actoren, netwerken, arena’s en coalities. Een verandering in één van deze elementen duidt op het bestaan van een ‘event’. De ‘events’ vormen het uitgangspunt voor het blootleggen van de werking van macht in het beleidsdomein, aangezien zij de momenten belichamen waarop verschillende rationaliteiten en/of waarheden elkaar raken en verweekeld raken in een strijd om de dominante interpretatie.
- 2. Het analyseren van de opkomst van de ‘events’ door de strategieën en tactieken te bestuderen die hieraan ten grondslag hebben gelegen.** Door de strategieën en tactieken bloot te leggen die actoren hebben gebruikt in hun pogingen om ‘events’ te produceren en te institutionaliseren, dan wel te marginaliseren, en door hierbij tegelijkertijd rekening te houden met de contextuele factoren die deze specifieke strategieën en tactieken hebben beïnvloedt, krijgen we zicht op de micro-praktijken die aan het werk zijn in de (re)productie van de discursieve orde in het beleidsdomein (zie volgende stap).
- 3. Blootleggen van de interactie tussen de micro-praktijken en de discursieve orde.** Door deze interactie bloot te leggen kunnen we een beeld schetsen van de machtsmechanismen die aan het werk zijn in de (re)productie van de discursieve

orde in het beleidsdomein dat we bestuderen. Hiervoor moet de volgende procedure worden doorlopen:

- Het analyseren van de discursieve orde en de mate van verandering/continuïteit die kan worden waargenomen in deze orde. Dit betreft het vaststellen van de mate waarin verandering is opgetreden in het metanarratief, de discourscoalitie en de beleidsthema's op de agenda. Het metanarratief en de discourscoalitie kunnen niet rechtstreeks worden afgelezen uit de empirische data. Beiden kunnen door de onderzoeker worden afgeleid uit de geïnstitutionaliseerde beleidsruimten rondom de beleidsthema's die onderdeel zijn van het beleidsdomein. Deze geïnstitutionaliseerde beleidsruimten representeren gezamenlijk het totaal van geaccepteerde manieren van denken, praten en handelen binnen een beleidsdomein.
- Het blootleggen van de micro-praktijken die aan het werk zijn in het beleidsdomein. Deze micro-praktijken kunnen worden afgeleid uit regelmatigheden in strategieën en tactieken die kunnen worden waargenomen op het niveau van de beleidsthema's. Wanneer deze regelmatigheden zijn gerelateerd aan specifieke conventies of verplichtingen, dan duiden ze op een bepaalde praktijk.
- Het analyseren van de interactie tussen de discursieve orde en de micro-praktijken. Deze interactie belichaamt de manier waarop macht werkt in het beleidsdomein dat wordt bestudeerd.

Vervolgens zijn de databenodigheden voor het adequaat uitvoeren van de bovenstaande 3-stappen procedure besproken, en is uitvoerig ingegaan op de in dit proefschrift gebruikte methoden voor data verzameling, ordening, validatie en presentatie. Er bestaat geen blauwdruk voor het verzamelen, ordenen, valideren en presenteren van data. Genealogie is probleem gedreven en niet methode gedreven. De methoden die worden gebruikt, zijn afhankelijk van het specifieke probleem dat wordt bestudeerd; de onderzoeker selecteert juist die methoden die hem in staat stellen om te analyseren hoe macht werkt in het specifieke domein dat hij bestudeert. Het gaat er uiteindelijk om dat de onderzoeker voldoende materiaal heeft om de interactie tussen de discursieve orde en de micro-praktijken bloot te leggen, met oog voor de multidimensionale, complexe en soms zelfs conflicterende interpretaties binnen de case. Dit voorkomt gesimplificeerde en eenzijdige lezingen van het verleden, wat funest is voor de ontwikkeling van een effectieve geschiedenis van de problematiek die is bestudeerd. Voor wat betreft het voorkomen van eenzijdige en gesimplificeerde geschiedenissen kunnen tenminste 3 methodologische richtlijnen worden onderscheiden die in elke genealogie van belang zijn (ongeacht de keuze van de specifieke methoden voor het verzamelen, ordenen, valideren en presenteren van de benodigde data).

- **Oog voor details.** Details moeten worden begrepen vanuit het perspectief van de genealogie. De genealogische geschiedenissen omvatten vaak vele jaren (vaak decennia, en in sommige gevallen, zoals bij Foucault, zelfs honderden jaren) en beschrijven over het algemeen extreem complexe en gefragmenteerde sociale ordes. Het zal duidelijk zijn dat het binnen een dergelijke context onmogelijk is om gedetailleerde opsommingen te geven van alle dingen die zijn gezegd en gedaan, (zoals wel wordt beoogd in de microlinguïstische analyse van taal of in de nauwgezette observatie van gesprekken) en alle dingen waarvan is voorkomen dat ze zijn gezegd en gedaan. In de genealogie verwijzen details naar de gemarginaliseerde kennis, de argumenten en acties die niet zijn geïnstitutionaliseerd. Tegelijkertijd wordt ook aandacht besteed aan de belangrijke documenten en besluiten (waaraan in conventionele geschiedkundige beschrijvingen doorgaans het meeste aandacht wordt besteed).
- **Betrekken van een veelheid aan stemmen en interpretaties.** Aangezien er meestal geen eenduidige interpretaties van de beschreven gebeurtenissen zijn, en aangezien het blootleggen van de aanwezige ambiguïteit als een kracht van de genealogische beschrijving wordt gezien, wordt er actief naar verschillende interpretaties gezocht. Het gaat hierbij ook om het doelbewust falsifiëren van bestaande interpretaties, dan wel het opnemen van conflicterende bewijslast.
- **Oog hebben voor de wisselwerking tussen structurele factoren en concrete handelingen.** Het gaat erom tegelijkertijd te beschrijven hoe structurele factoren individueel gedrag beïnvloeden en hoe dit dagelijkse gedrag tot structurele consequenties leidt.

Het toepassen van deze richtlijnen brengt het gevaar met zich mee dat de onderzoeker verzandt in een eindeloze zoektocht naar nieuwe oorsprongen en oorzaken, want de gedetailleerde analyse van specifieke 'events' leidt bijna automatisch naar gerelateerde strategieën, tactieken en oorzaken en oorsprongen. Het is daarom de uitdaging om de verschillende 'events' en de strategieën en tactieken die hebben geleid tot hun opkomst, institutionalisering, dan wel marginalisering bloot te leggen, zonder te verzanden in een dergelijke eindeloze zoektocht naar definitieve oorsprongen en oorzaken (want die zijn er niet; elke oorsprong kent immers een oorsprong en elke oorsprong heeft meerdere oorzaken). Het vraagt in elk geval om het geleidelijk opbouwen van een enorm databestand, wat zowel om geduld als om kennis van details van de specifieke casus vraagt. In het geval van dit proefschrift is dit databestand ontwikkeld door vele pagina's van belangrijke en minder belangrijke documenten nauwgezet door te nemen en door een groot aantal narratieve en semi-gestructureerde interviews af te nemen en te analyseren. Bij de opbouw van het databestand zijn de drie methodologische richtlijnen ter harte genomen. Zo is er constant gezocht naar conflicterende bewijslast van beschreven interpretaties. En zo is er getracht om zowel aandacht te besteden aan structurele factoren als concrete handelingen. De verzamelde data is vanzelfsprekend

d.m.v. een uitgebreide procedure gevalideerd (waarbij o.a. triangulatie tussen bronnen en onderzoekers en het instrument van hoor en wederhoor belangrijke rollen hebben gespeeld).

De genealogische database is *gebiased*, omdat de focus ligt op juist die momenten waarop verzet ontstaat tegen de dominerende rationaliteiten en waarheden binnen een bepaald domein (door het inbrengen van ideeën en acties die hiervan afwijken), en op de marginalisering van deze nieuwe ideeën en activiteiten. Dit betekent dat de genealogie automatisch is *gebiased* in de richting van de sociaal en economisch benadeelden binnen de maatschappij. Het betekent echter niet dat deze gemarginaliseerde manieren van denken en handelen als meer rationeel en waar, of als beter worden gezien. De onderzoeker moet zich op deze momenten focussen, omdat dit hem in staat stelt om de mechanismen bloot te leggen die aan het werk zijn in de strijd tussen verschillende rationaliteiten in een bepaald beleidsdomein, en die resulteren in de hegemonie van een bepaalde rationaliteit. Een genealogie moet immers bovenal een geschiedenis opleveren die mogelijkheden creëert om door de reproducerende tendens van een bestaande, vanzelfsprekend geworden discursieve orde, te breken (zonder richting te geven aan de invulling van een andere discursieve orde).

Om tot een genealogische beschrijving van de bestudeerde casus te komen, zet de onderzoeker de ‘events’ in chronologische volgorde en plaatst ze in de juiste context. Hierdoor beginnen de contouren van de geschiedenis, inclusief het plot, zich al automatisch af te tekenen. Het daadwerkelijke schrijven van de geschiedenis zelf dat daarop volgt, is een belangrijke organiserende strategie, omdat het de onderzoeker dwingt om de procesdata op een systematische en logische wijze te verwerken. Uiteindelijk moet de geschiedenis bovenal kunnen uitgroeien tot een effectieve geschiedenis, wat iets anders is dan een complete en uitputtende geschiedsbeschrijving. Om dit te kunnen bereiken moet de geschiedenis op een bepaalde manier worden geschreven en gepresenteerd (keuze van discursief format), namelijk op die manier die het mogelijk maakt om herkenning en reflectie los te maken bij de referentiegroep voor wie de geschiedenis is bedoeld (vaak zowel de wetenschappelijke gemeenschap als de mensen die zijn betrokken bij de alledaagse praktijk van de beschreven case). Ook hier hangt de uiteindelijke keuze voor de presentatie weer af van de specifieke situatie waarin de onderzoeker zich bevindt; er is dus ook geen blauwdruk voor het schrijven en presenteren van een effectieve geschiedenis.

De 3-stappen procedure en de methoden voor het verzamelen, ordenen, valideren en presenteren van de data, zoals uiteengezet in dit proefschrift, vormen samen een waardevolle benadering voor het beschrijven en verklaren van de opkomst en de constante reproductie (persistentie) van beleidsimpasses. Als zodanig levert deze benadering een antwoord op de eerste onderzoeksvraag op. Vervolgens is de benadering

toegepast op de Schiphol casus, wat heeft geresulteerd in een antwoord op de tweede onderzoeksvraag.

2. In hoeverre is er sprake van reproductie in het beleidsdiscours over Schiphol en hoe kunnen we deze mate van reproductie verklaren?

Bij het beantwoorden van deze onderzoeksvraag is doelbewust een expliciet onderscheid gemaakt tussen de beschrijving van de Schiphol case en de analyse van de case (ook al is het uiteraard onvermijdelijk dat analyse een rol speelt bij de selectie van data en de presentatie van de casus). Juist door de beschrijving zo weinig mogelijk te relateren aan specifieke theoretische ideeën en aannames (wat mogelijk is m.b.v. de concepten die het heuristische raamwerk vormen), en door de beschrijving zoveel mogelijk los te koppelen van onze interpretatie van de betekenis van hetgeen dat is beschreven (waarmee wordt vermeden dat de lezer in de richting van bepaalde interpretaties wordt geduwd), is getracht om zoveel mogelijk ruimte te bieden aan lezers met verschillende (theoretische en praktische) achtergronden om hun eigen betekenis aan de case toe te kennen en hun eigen conclusies te trekken. Dus in plaats van op te treden als een alwetende verteller die een samenvatting geeft van wat volgens hem/haar de belangrijkste interpretaties zouden zijn, en die het beste de argumentatielijn van de onderzoeker ondersteunen, is getracht om de verschillende interpretaties die in omloop zijn op een gedetailleerde en eerlijke manier weer te geven. Lezers worden vervolgens aangemoedigd om vooral voor zichzelf te bepalen wat de casus te betekenen heeft alvorens kennis te nemen van de analyse van de onderzoeker, omdat is aangenomen dat de meest zinvolle vorm van reflectie ontstaat als lezers zelf tot conclusies komen (en dus daadwerkelijk zelf hebben nagedacht over wat er precies aan de hand is in de Schiphol case).

Het resultaat was een uitgebreide beschrijving van 20 jaar Schipholbeleid, gebaseerd op de informatie die is verkregen bij het uitvoeren van stap 1 en stap 2 van de 3-stappen procedure. De beschrijving kan niet worden samengevat zonder verlies van waardevolle informatie, en we zullen dit in deze samenvatting dan ook niet doen. Een belangrijke aanname in dit proefschrift is namelijk dat lezers de opkomst van de Schiphol beleidsimpasse en de persistente, en soms perverse, effecten van deze impasse op de dagelijkse praktijken in het beleidsdomein Schiphol het beste kunnen begrijpen door de casus tot in detail te doorgronden. Juist dit verfijnde begrip van de specifieke casus stelt de lezer uiteindelijk in staat om te reflecteren op zijn/haar basisassumpties en voorheen vanzelfsprekende alledaagse praktijken.

Voorafgaand aan de casus is een uitgebreide introductie op de Schiphol casus gegeven, zodat de lezer op de hoogte was van de specifieke (beleids)context waarbinnen de Schipholdiscussie zich vanaf 1989 ontrafelde. De Nederlandse beleidscontext is

gekaracteriseerd als een consensus democratie, met een sterke pragmatische en corporatistische inslag. Daarnaast zijn de belangrijkste actoren en hun positionering t.o.v. elkaar in het Schiphol beleidsdomein besproken en is uiteengezet hoe Nederlandse beleidsbesluiten over grootschalige infrastructurele projecten vorm krijgen in beleidsnetwerken die bestaan uit een grote variatie aan wederzijds afhankelijke actoren (bijv. de nationale overheid met haar verschillende departementen die elk hun eigen rol hebben, andere lagere overheden, burgers, maatschappelijke organisaties, milieugroeperingen, het bedrijfsleven en kennisinstellingen). Tevens is het Nederlandse planningsstelsel besproken en is de historische ontwikkeling van de luchthaven Schiphol sinds 1916 beschreven. Tot slot is beschreven hoe gedurende de jaren 80 van de 20^{ste} eeuw een nieuwe beleidsstrategie m.b.t. Schiphol opkwam in het Schiphol beleidsdomein, die vanaf 1988 sterk richting heeft gegeven aan het nationale ruimtelijk-economische beleid m.b.t. Schiphol. Het mainportconcept vormde de hoeksteen van deze nieuwe ruimtelijk-economische beleidsstrategie. De opkomst van deze zgn. mainport strategie was het resultaat van het in elkaar grijpen en versterken van verschillende strategieën van de havenautoriteiten, expertcomités, de logistieke lobby, de regionale en lokale overheden, de ministeries van VROM, V&W en EZ en de aanwezigheid van een vruchtbaar politieke klimaat (met een kabinet dat de nadruk legde op het creëren van werkgelegenheid, wat een direct gevolg was van de economische recessie van begin jaren 80). Anno 1988 stond deze mainportstrategie dan ook stevig op de nationale beleidsagenda en vanaf 1989 begon de zoektocht naar de (beleids)maatregelen die nodig zouden zijn om Schiphol te kunnen laten uitgroeien tot een mainport (wat betekende dat Schiphol een hub zou moeten worden binnen de in ontwikkeling zijnde intercontinentale hub-and-spoke netwerken, wat gepaard zou gaan met een flinke groei van het vliegverkeer), zonder dat dit ten kosten zou gaan van de kwaliteit van de leefomgeving. De zogenaamde dubbeldoelstelling voor Schiphol was geboren en de discussie over adequate invulling en de haalbaarheid van de dubbeldoelstelling zou het nationale beleidsdebat over Schiphol gedurende de daaropvolgende 20 jaar domineren (1989 – 2009).

In de casus worden deze 20 jaar van beleidsdiscussie uitvoerig beschreven. De beschrijving is onderverdeeld in 3 tijdsperiodes (1989 – 1995; 1996 – 2003; 2003 – 2009). Elke periode valt samen met een specifieke beleidsronde die wordt afgesloten met een belangrijk politiek besluit (behalve de laatste ronde, want die heeft een open einde). Voor elke beleidsronde wordt een chronologische beschrijving van de gelokaliseerde ‘events’ gegeven en worden de strategieën en tactieken besproken die ten grondslag liggen aan het ontstaan van deze ‘events’ en aan de uiteindelijke impact die deze ‘events’ hebben gehad op het beleidsdebat. Tegelijkertijd worden de factoren beschreven die invloed hebben gehad op de selectie van deze strategieën en tactieken. Tijdens de eerste beleidsronde (1989 – 1995) is er voor het eerst invulling gegeven aan

de dubbele doelstelling. Deze beleidsronde vormt dan ook het referentiekader voor het lokaliseren van variëteit gedurende de twee daaropvolgende beleidsronden.

Vaak worden er verschillende betekenissen toegekend aan de rol die de beschreven ‘events’ in het beleidsdebat hebben gespeeld, en worden er verschillende verklaringen gegeven voor deze rol. In de case beschrijving is zoveel mogelijk recht gedaan aan deze verschillende, complexe en soms zelfs conflicterende verhalen van betrokkenen. Het begrijpen van de verschillende rationaliteiten die aan het werk zijn, en de manier waarop deze rationaliteiten op elkaar ingrijpen, is cruciaal voor een verfijnd begrip van de ambiguïteit en de spanningen binnen het beleidsdomein Schiphol. De aanpak leidt onvermijdelijk tot een uitgebreide geschiedenis. Ondanks dat de case beschrijving doelbewust gedetailleerd is, moet worden opgemerkt dat het zeker niet de bedoeling van de genealogie is om een complete en uitputtende geschiedenis te maken. Daarnaast pretenderen we ook niet dat alle opgenomen feiten precies kloppen (het technisch complexe Schiphol debat staat immers bol van de statistieken en getallen die in de praktijk vaak lukraak door elkaar worden gebruikt). Hoofddoel is immers de ontwikkeling van een effectieve geschiedenis. In het geval van Schiphol zou een dergelijke geschiedenis de potentie moeten hebben om de lezer te laten begrijpen waarom het zo moeilijk is om door de beleidsimpasse te breken. Dit vraagt zowel om een overtuigende beschrijving van de opkomst en constante reproductie van de beleidsimpasse, als om een transparante analyse hiervan, wat iets anders is dan het ontwikkelen van een uitputtende en feitelijk volledig correcte beschrijving.

Vaststellen van de Beleidsimpasse

Na de beschrijving wordt de lezer uitgenodigd om kennis te nemen van onze analyse (wat de uitvoering van de 3^{de} stap van de 3-stappen procedure betekent), waarbij de lezer dus eerst wordt aangemoedigd om voor zichzelf te bepalen wat de case eigenlijk betekent. In de analyse is in eerste instantie de mate van reproductie vastgesteld. Op basis van de case is geconcludeerd dat de discursieve orde van het Schiphol beleidsdomein vrij stabiel is gebleven. Door de jaren heen is er wel degelijk de nodige variëteit gecreëerd (de ‘events’), waarbij met name na 2007 een toename is geconstateerd (met de intrede van de Alders-tafels). De stabiliteit van de discursieve orde betekent dus dat weinig van de geproduceerde variëteit, zoals waargenomen rondom de beleidsthema’s, geïnstitutionaliseerd is geraakt en heeft doorgewerkt op het niveau van de discursieve orde van het beleidsdomein als geheel. Op het niveau van de discursieve orde van het beleidsdomein zijn grote regulariteiten gevonden in het metanarratief (de dubbeldoelstelling, oftewel het mainport-milieu debat, waarbij de mainport doelstelling hiërarchisch superieur was; een direct gevolg van de stabiliteit van de beleidsthema’s op de agenda en de regulariteiten in de verhalen die rondom deze thema’s zijn ontwikkeld en de positie van deze verhalen t.o.v. elkaar), de specifieke posities in het debat en de manier waarop actoren t.o.v. elkaar zijn gepositioneerd op

basis van het metanarratief (met onveranderde macro-actoren, dus de actoren die het meeste invloed konden uitoefenen op de definiëring van wat waar en valide was binnen het beleidsdomein en wat niet), en de discourscoalitie die het metanarratief reproduceert (de mainport–milieu coalitie, bestaande uit een mainport coalitie en een milieu coalitie, waarbij de mainport coalitie meer invloed had, omdat de macro actoren allen deel uitmaakten van deze coalitie).

Het is van belang om nogmaals te onderstrepen dat de onderkenning van deze regulariteiten niet betekent dat er gedurende 1989 – 2009 helemaal geen veranderingen in manieren van praten en handelen zijn geweest. Zoals gesteld is de hele case beschrijving opgebouwd rondom de veelheid aan momenten dat er variëteit wordt geproduceerd (de ‘events’). Op het niveau van de beleidsthema’s is in toenemende mate variëteit geconstateerd, maar slechts weinig van deze variëteit is uiteindelijk geïnstitutionaliseerd geraakt (bijv. vertaald in beleidsbesluiten en concrete investeringen). Nieuwe ideeën werden bijvoorbeeld vaak gemarginaliseerd in de strijd met bestaande opvattingen. Maar ook hier is het beeld niet zwart-wit. Er is wel degelijk ook variëteit geïnstitutionaliseerd geraakt, met name vanaf 2007: denk bijvoorbeeld aan de steeds veranderende invulling van de mainport doelstelling en de milieudoelstellingen, de groeiende milieu coalitie en de intrede van nieuwe spelers in het debat.

Ondanks deze veranderingen is het toch mogelijk om te constateren dat de discursieve orde op het niveau van het beleidsdomein gedurende 1989 – 2009 verrassend stabiel is gebleven. In antwoord op de tweede onderzoeksvraag hebben we dan ook betoogd dat er in 2005 wel degelijk sprake was van een beleidsimpasse (wat het uitgangspunt van deze studie was) en dat er in 2009 nog steeds sprake was van een impasse. Let wel, de impasse verwijst naar de discursieve orde op het niveau van het beleidsdomein (en dus niet naar het niveau van de beleidsthema’s). Hoofconclusie is dat er wel degelijk nieuwe beleidsideeën, posities en relaties zijn ontwikkeld, maar dat de basisassumpties die onder het Schiphol beleidsdebat liggen over wat legitieme en betekenisvolle manieren van praten en handelen zijn, weinig zijn veranderd gedurende 1989 – 2009. Hier moet worden opgemerkt dat anno 2009 nog weinig kon worden gezegd over de impact die de vanaf 2007 aan de Alders-tafel geproduceerde variëteit zou kunnen gaan maken op de discursieve orde.

Vervolgens zijn de micro-praktijken blootgelegd die zowel gevolg als oorzaak zijn van de reproductie van de discursieve orde (conform de 2^{de} fase van de 3^{de} stap van de 3-stappen procedure). De micro praktijken zijn afgeleid van de regulariteiten in discursieve en non-discursieve handelingsstrategieën en tactieken, zoals beschreven in de case (waarbij deze regelmatigheden zijn gerelateerd aan specifieke conventies of verplichtingen). Het bestaan van deze praktijken illustreert dus automatisch ook de

stabiliteit van de discursieve orde. We hebben uiteindelijk 9 discursieve en 14 non-discursieve micro-praktijken gedefinieerd, die gezamenlijk conditioneerden welke verhalen en welke handelingen bepaalde actoren op een betekenisvolle en legitieme manier konden bezigen in de pogingen om hun doelstellingen te behalen binnen de context van het Schipholdebat. De micro-praktijken geven daarom min of meer de regels van het spel aan, die het resultaat zijn van de institutionalisering van de discursieve orde en die automatisch deze orde reproduceren indien ze worden nageleefd, en dus in de praktijk worden gebracht (en naleving is geborgd door de legitimiteit en vanzelfsprekendheid van deze regels). De mogelijkheden voor handelen van actoren waren sterk gerelateerd aan de posities die de actoren innamen in het speelveld, wat weer sterk was gerelateerd aan het metanarratief dat actoren t.o.v. elkaar positioneerde. In tabel 1 staat de lijst met praktijken weergegeven.

Tabel 1. Lijst met discursieve en non-discursieve micro-praktijken aan het werk in de discursieve orde van het Schiphol beleidsdomein gedurende 1989 – 2009.

Discursieve Praktijken	Non-Discursieve Praktijken
1. Noodzaak om te verwijzen naar de dubbel-doelstelling.	1. Noodzaak om de posities van de macro actoren te respecteren.
2. Winnaars: Gebruik van een optimistisch discursief format, dus positief jargon (win-win situaties etc.).	2. Noodzaak van belangrijke rol van de luchtvaartsector in het beleidsdebat.
3. Verliezers: Gebruik van een negatief discursief format, dus negatief jargon.	3. Grote afhankelijkheid van ingehuurd onderzoekers.
4. Noodzaak om te verwijzen naar de mainport doelstelling.	4. Noodzaak om beleidsdoelstellingen a-priori in termen van gekwantificeerde normen vast te stellen en te fixeren. Noodzaak om calculatiemethoden op een zodanige manier vorm te geven dat het mogelijk was om de normen te behalen (en dus te kunnen beargumenteren dat de dubbeldoelstellingen kunnen worden behaald).
5. Noodzaak om naar de milieudoelstelling te verwijzen in termen van geluid, externe veiligheid, en in mindere mate in termen van luchtvervuiling en stank.	5. Noodzaak om handige scenario's te ontwikkelen, selecteren en te gebruiken.
6. Noodzaak om het geluidsprobleem centraal te stellen binnen de milieudoelstelling.	6. Grote afhankelijkheid van calculatiemodellen en bewuste selectie van modellen (die zelf ook gebiast zijn).
7. Noodzaak om technisch-wetenschappelijk jargon te gebruiken in het debat: Sterke kwantificering van het debat.	7. Grote afhankelijkheid van onderzoek in het algemeen. Noodzaak om een bias in de productie en het gebruik van informatie te creëren.
8. Noodzaak om de hiërarchie in de dubbeldoelstellingen serieus te nemen, waarbij de mainportdoelstelling de milieudoelstelling meer conditioneert dan vice versa.	8. Constant uitstellen van besluiten over lastige problemen.
9. Noodzaak van ruimtelijke oplossingen gebaseerd op technisch-rationele berekeningen.	9. Het buitenspel zetten van opponenten.
	10. De verliezers compenseren.
	11. Beleidsbeloften breken, terwijl wordt

	beargumenteerd dat beloften helemaal niet zijn verbroken.
	12. Rechtszaken aanspannen.
	13. De media mobiliseren: Naming en shaming.
	14. Inzetten van hiërarchische manieren van besluitvorming (en dus het loslaten van de meer interactieve arrangementen) wanneer politieke deadlines dichterbij komen.

Verklaringen voor de Beleidsimpasse

Conform de aannames die onder de 3-stappen procedure liggen, kan de reproductie van een discursieve orde (die in het geval van Schiphol is uitgemond in een beleidsimpasse) verklaard worden door de interactie tussen de discursieve orde en de micro-praktijken (die in feite inherent onderdeel zijn van de discursieve orde) bloot te leggen (de 3^{de} fase van de 3^{de} stap). Het resultaat beschrijft hoe macht in een specifiek sociaal domein werkt (conform de interpretatie van Foucault). Het mechanisme is simpel. De discursieve orde vertaalt zich in een serie micro-praktijken en een specifieke positionering van actoren en verhalen t.o.v. elkaar die vervolgens het spreken en handelen van de betrokkenen zodanig conditioneren dat zij automatisch deze discursieve orde weer reproduceren (het metanarratief van de dubbele doelstelling en de hiërarchie tussen deze doelstellingen, de discourscoalitie met haar hiërarchie in subcoalities en de resulterende posities en positionering van actoren en de thema's op de beleidsagenda). De reproductie van de discursieve orde resulteert in een verdere institutionalisering van deze orde, en dus van de manieren van praten en handelen die als legitiem en betekenisvol worden gekwalificeerd, en die zich weer vertalen in micro-praktijken en bepaalde positioneringen. Hoe vaker dit mechanisme zich herhaalt, des te vanzelfsprekender de discursieve orde en de micro-praktijken worden, en des te lastiger het wordt om deze zichzelf versterkende spiraal te doorbreken (want er wordt niet gereflecteerd op vanzelfsprekende alledaagse activiteiten: ze nestelen zich in de natuur van de mensen en ze resulteren in onbewuste en spontane manieren van praten en handelen).

Deze zichzelf versterkende spiraal werd als gevolg van één van de belangrijkste perverse effecten van de constante reproductie verder versterkt, namelijk het groeiende wantrouwen tussen de betrokken actoren onderling en in de beleidsoplossingen. In weerwil van de win-win retoriek die samenhang met de dubbeldoelstelling, maakte de bestaande discursieve orde het namelijk onmogelijk voor de betrokken actoren om tegelijkertijd hun respectievelijke beleidsambities te verwezenlijken (op het vlak van mainportontwikkeling en verbetering van de kwaliteit van de leefomgeving). De discursieve orde resulteerde in suboptimale beleidsoplossingen (namelijk oplossingen die voor sommigen een beetje en voor anderen weinig praktische waarde hadden) en fictieve beleidswerelden, en de leidende macro-actoren slaagden er keer op keer niet in

om een uitweg te forceren. Het probleem lag niet zozeer in de idee van de dubbeldoelstelling, als wel in de specifieke (onrealistische en beperkte) manier waarop deze dubbeldoelstelling werd ingevuld. Keer op keer bleek de dubbeldoelstelling onhaalbaar, maar dit was een politieke boodschap die niet kon worden verkocht. In plaats daarvan werden beleidsficties ontwikkeld (de luchtkastelen waar de titel van dit proefschrift naar verwijst) die de mythe van de win-win oplossingen onaangetast liet.

Paradoxaal genoeg zorgde het toenemende wantrouwen ervoor dat de betrokken (en teleurgestelde) actoren zich steviger vast gingen klampen aan de bestaande reguleringen, terwijl hun roep om sterk leiderschap van de nationale overheid ook toenam. Dit werkte verdere reproductie van de discursieve orde in de hand, incl. het wantrouwen dat hier automatisch uit voortkwam. Het almaar groeiende wantrouwen had weer een negatieve uitwerking op de ontwikkeling van het type lerende vermogen dat nodig was om variëteit te ontwikkelen en te institutionaliseren en dus om te komen tot nieuwe of aangepaste manieren van denken, praten en handelen die uiteindelijk zouden kunnen uitgroeien tot beleidsoplossingen met meer praktische waarde en die zouden kunnen leiden tot minder teleurstellingen. Het aanwezige (en groeiende) wantrouwen zorgde echter voor hoge transactiekosten, een magere uitwisseling van informatie en een onwil van betrokken actoren om hun (schijn)zekerheden los te laten (zoals vervat in de beleidsnormen die een fictieve wereld belichaamden en die nauwelijks werden gehandhaafd). Reflectie op de basisaannames onder bestaande praktijken was helemaal uit den boze in een dergelijke situatie. In plaats van nieuwe, en in potentie betere beleidsverhalen (incl. oplossingen) te ontwikkelen, hielden actoren automatisch vast aan hun bestaande posities in het debat (voor of tegen verdere groei ten koste van het milieu) en de dichotomie van bestaande verhaallijnen die de actoren diametraal tegenover elkaar zette, werd daarmee gereproduceerd en zelfs versterkt. De hiërarchie van de verschillende verhalen (dominant versus minder dominant), de aanwezige posities, de positionering van de actoren t.o.v. elkaar en de veelheid aan micro-praktijken die aan het werk waren, werden ook gereproduceerd, wat uiteindelijk resulteerde in een verdere institutionalisering van de discursieve orde. De zichzelf versterkende spiraal van reproductie en het wantrouwen zijn elkaars oorzaak en gevolg en juist door de specifieke manier waarop beiden elkaar versterken (reproductie van de discursieve orde leidde in het specifieke geval van Schiphol tot groeiend wantrouwen, wat weer leidde tot verdere reproductie – en dus institutionalisering – van de discursieve orde) heeft ervoor gezorgd dat de reproductieve tendens van het Schiphol beleidsdiscours zo sterk is gebleken.

3. Hoe kan de genealogie bijdragen aan de transformatie van Schiphols beleidsdiscours?

Conform de aannames onder de genealogie is er altijd een mogelijkheid om tot verandering te komen in een bestaande discursieve orde, ongeacht de kracht van de reproducerende mechanismen. Anders zouden er immers ook geen ‘events’ zijn (die momenten waarop variëteit wordt geproduceerd), die de basis vormen van de genealogische beschrijving. De genealogische beschrijving zelf is in principe bedoeld om bij te dragen aan het proces van verandering, doordat de beschrijving de juiste context voor dergelijke verandering in een bepaald sociaal (beleids)domein tracht te creëren. De genealogie maakt de betrokkenen immers bewust van de manier waarop hun alledaagse en vanzelfsprekende manieren van denken, praten en handelen bijdragen aan het reproduceren van de discursieve orde, inclusief de perverse en soms zelfs gevaarlijke effecten die hier het gevolg van zijn. De betrokkenen worden dus bewust gemaakt van de ‘grenzen’ waarbinnen ze hun gedachten vormen en betekenis toekennen aan specifieke onderwerpen/gebeurtenissen, en waarbinnen ze hun ideeën en acties vorm geven. Een goede genealogie maakt de onderliggende (politieke) rationaliteiten die aan het werk zijn inzichtelijk en legt de vanzelfsprekende (en neutraal geachte) alledaagse praktijken bloot die conditioneren wat ware, rationele en valide kennis en handelingen zijn binnen een bepaald sociaal domein, en wat niet. Betrokkenen worden bewust gemaakt van de reproductieve mechanismen, wat hen in staat stelt om te reflecteren op de wenselijkheid ervan. Idealiter laat de genealogie de lezer achter in een staat van verwarring, omdat de beschrijving hun basisaannames (en hun vermeende ontologische zekerheden) kritisch ter discussie stelt. Normaal gesproken worden er geen pasklare oplossingen aangedragen, juist omdat deze voort moeten komen uit de reflectie van de betrokkenen zelf op de casus (om een maximale kans op daadwerkelijke verandering te bewerkstelligen en om zo weinig mogelijk richting te geven aan de mogelijke manieren om verandering te bewerkstelligen). Het zijn de betrokkenen binnen een bepaald domein zelf die m.b.v. het nieuwe begrip het beste kunnen inschatten welke mogelijkheden er liggen voor verandering.

Echter, een onderzoeker die zich jarenlang zodanig heeft verdiept in een specifieke casus als nodig is om te komen tot een genealogische beschrijving kan zichzelf beschouwen als onderdeel van het domein. In dit proefschrift is daarom aangenomen dat het veranderingspotentieel toeneemt wanneer de onderzoeker aanbevelingen ontwikkelt voor toekomstige actie, die zijn gebaseerd op een gedetailleerd besef van de specifieke context van de casus. Dit betekent dat de aanbevelingen zijn gebaseerd op de normen en waarden die prevaleren in de casus, want alleen nieuwe manieren van praten en handelen die vallen binnen de grenzen van hetgeen als legitiem en betekenisvol wordt gezien, kunnen serieus worden genomen. Kortom, de heersende discursieve orde stelt grenzen aan het type interventies dat kans van slagen heeft en daarom is een verfijnd begrip van de specifieke context noodzakelijk om tot mogelijke interventies te komen (het principe van contextualisme). De gedetailleerde genealogische beschrijving levert

als het goed is juist dit soort begrip op en levert daarmee een vruchtbare uitgangspositie voor de ontwikkeling van in potentie kansrijke interventies.

Kansrijke interventies in stevig geïnstitutionaliseerde discursieve ordes betreffen vaak noodzakelijkerwijs kleine aanpassingen aan bestaande praktijken; voorstellen voor grootschalige institutionele hervormingen zullen weinig kans van slagen hebben binnen een stevig geïnstitutionaliseerde discursieve orde, omdat ze vallen buiten de grenzen van wat nog als legitiem en betekenisvol wordt gezien binnen het sociale domein. Daarnaast vraagt echte verandering om verandering van binnenuit van de mensen die betrokken zijn. Immers, als de betrokkenen zelf tot de conclusie komen dat verandering noodzakelijk en wenselijk is, zal dit meer effect hebben op hun dagelijkse handelingen dan wanneer veranderingen van bovenaf worden opgelegd. Het vraagt al met al om interventies die aansluiten bij de specifieke ethische codes die aan het werk zijn binnen het sociale domein en die mensen binnen dit domein hanteren om te definiëren wat goed is en wat fout is. Kortom, een goed begrip van de ethische principes die aan het werk zijn binnen het Schiphol beleidsdomein is cruciaal om te komen tot interventies die kans van slagen hebben (de zgn. situationele ethiek).

Bij het vaststellen van de situationele ethiek van het Schiphol beleidsdomein is met name de periode na 2007 als startpunt genomen. Vanaf 2007 zijn met de intrede van de Alders-tafel nieuwe mogelijkheden voor onderhandelingen gecreëerd. Dit heeft tussen 2007 en 2009 onder meer geresulteerd in nieuwe relaties en nieuwe beleidsoplossingen (zoals een nieuwe reguleringssystematiek voor geluid, de mogelijkheid om te experimenteren met vliegroutes en procedures, een nieuwe rol voor de omwonenden en nieuwe coalities tussen partijen). Zoals beargumenteerd hadden deze veranderingen anno 2009 nog geen waarneembaar effect op de discursieve orde van het beleidsdomein; er werd nog steeds uitgegaan van dezelfde basisaannames die onder het metanarratief lagen, er was nog steeds sprake van een sterke discourscoalitie die bestond uit twee deelcoalities die nog in dezelfde hiërarchische verhouding tot elkaar stonden, er was nog steeds sprake van dezelfde beleidsthema's op de agenda, de beleidsverhalen die werden ontwikkeld rondom deze beleidsthema's en de onderzoeksvragen waren grotendeels dezelfde als voor 2007, evenals het gebruikte technische jargon en de gebruikte methoden en procedures voor het berekenen van geluidseffecten en andere milieueffecten. Desondanks moeten de genoemde kleine stappen die duiden op verandering niet worden ondergewaardeerd, gegeven de beperkte ruimte die er was om te komen tot verandering en vernieuwing. Het belangrijkste signaal voor veranderende tijden is wellicht dat de belangrijkste actoren erin geslaagd zijn om tot overeenstemming te komen over de manier waarop Schiphol zich tot 2020 mag ontwikkelen, iets wat in 1999 bijvoorbeeld niet zou zijn gelukt. De veranderende context die zich vanaf 2007 geleidelijk aan ontwikkelt, lijkt dan ook een vruchtbaar uitgangspunt te bieden voor het daadwerkelijk transformeren van de discursieve orde die de actoren binnen het Schiphol

domein al zolang beperkingen oplegt bij het zoeken naar praktisch relevante en legitieme beleidsbesluiten en acties.

De aanbevelingen die in dit proefschrift zijn gedaan, sluiten daarom aan op de kleine veranderingen in de context die gedurende de laatste paar jaar (2007 – 2009) zijn waargenomen, en die met horten en stoten bijdragen aan het oprekken van de grenzen van wat als betekenisvol en legitiem wordt ervaren binnen het Schiphol beleidsdomein. Daarnaast zijn de aanbevelingen gebaseerd op een gedetailleerd begrip van het verleden (1989 – 2009) en met name van de micro-praktijken die gedurende deze periode aan het werk zijn geweest in het beleidsdomein. Dit begrip heeft geresulteerd in een procedure met vijf stappen die het doorbreken van de reproductieve tendens van de discursieve orde in het Schiphol beleidsdomein een verdere impuls kan geven: (1) politieke erkenning van de noodzaak om de manier waarop de dubbeldoelstelling is geformuleerd los te laten; (2) het openlijk onderschrijven van deze noodzaak door alle betrokken actoren; (3) het ontwikkelen van ‘state-of-the-art’ informatie m.b.t. de echte kosten en baten van een groeiend Schiphol, c.q. een groeiende luchtvaart in Nederland, en van de vele maatregelen die er bestaan, c.q. worden voorgesteld; (4) het installeren van een onafhankelijke Schipholcommissie, bestaande uit een aantal sterke politieke leiders die bruggen kunnen bouwen tussen verschillende rationaliteiten en die kunnen rekenen op vertrouwen van de betrokkenen; (5) transparante politieke besluitvorming op basis van zo eerlijk en compleet mogelijk aangeleverde informatie, met duidelijkheid over wie er wint en verliest en adequate compensatie voor de verliezers. Een dergelijk ideaaltypisch proces heeft alleen kans van slagen als de betrokken actoren handelen in de geest van de afspraken en dus voorkomen dat ze de broze vertrouwensrelaties ondermijnen. Dit betekent o.a. dat de betrokken actoren nut en noodzaak inzien van het afzien van de bestaande praktijken die het onderlinge wantrouwen aanwakkeren (en die tegelijkertijd de discursieve orde reproduceren, incl. de onwenselijke effecten die hiervan weer het gevolg zijn; dus geen gebroken beloften meer, geen *naming en shaming* in de media, niet meteen vervallen in juridische procedures etc.).

Aangezien deze stappen (noodzakelijkerwijs) voortbouwen op de stappen die de afgelopen jaren al zijn gezet, omdat ze goed moeten aansluiten bij bestaande praktijk om betekenisvol en legitiem te zijn, is het niet verwonderlijk dat ze in feite een marginale verandering t.o.v. de situatie in 2009 betekenen. Tegelijkertijd is gesteld dat de stappen die vanaf 2007 in gang zijn gezet nog maar een beperkte impact hebben gehad op de discursieve orde, wat een logisch gevolg is van de beperkte ruimte die er was voor verandering en vernieuwing, als ook van de vanzelfsprekendheid van de alledaagse praktijken die aan het werk waren en die al het denken en handelen conditioneerden en daarmee automatisch bijdroegen aan een voortdurende reproductie van de discursieve orde. Het grote verschil is dat we nu dankzij de genealogie zicht hebben op deze voorheen onzichtbare micro-praktijken en de perverse effecten die

hieruit voortkwamen. Dit begrip zorgt ervoor dat deze micro-praktijken niet meer vanzelfsprekend zijn en de betrokkenen kunnen nu bewust inschatten hoe deze alledaagse praktijken het realiseren van verandering teniet doen. Idealiter leidt dit begrip ertoe dat het daadwerkelijk in de praktijk brengen van de 5 stappen tot meer ruimte voor het ontwikkelen van nieuwe alternatieven leidt, die voortbouwen op nieuwe aannames, scenario's, normen en methoden, die gebruik maken van nieuwe discursieve formats/jargon, en die uiteindelijk kunnen leiden tot nieuwe, voorheen al bij voorbaat uitgesloten probleemdefinities, rollen, relaties en ideeën (zoals het sluiten van Schiphol, het bouwen van een volledig nieuwe luchthaven in de Noordzee, geluidsbeleid gebaseerd op niet-akoestische maatregelen, compensatiemaatregelen in termen van geld en verdergaande isolatie, duurzame/ klimaatneutrale luchtvaart, de ontwikkeling van theoretisch optimale vliegroutes, de ontwikkeling van een efficiënt luchtvaartstelsel op het schaalniveau van de EU). Uiteindelijk kan er uit een veel groter aantal beleidsalternatieven worden gekozen. Er ontstaan nieuwe ideeën en relaties die automatisch leiden tot de ontwikkeling van meer nieuwe ideeën en relaties, aangezien mogelijkheden voor kruisbestuivingen toenemen. De nieuwe manieren van denken, praten en handelen, zullen daarnaast serieus worden genomen, omdat ze niet langer buiten de grenzen vallen van hetgeen als betekenisvol, rationeel en legitiem wordt gezien binnen het beleidsdomein Schiphol. Het leidt tevens tot meer duidelijkheid over wie er wint en wie er verliest bij een geselecteerde ontwikkelingsrichting. Een dergelijke eerlijkheid zal hoog gewaardeerd worden, aangezien de meeste betrokkenen weinig vertrouwen hechten aan de win-win belofte van de dubbeldoelstelling. Tot slot zorgt de verbeterde transparantie ervoor dat actoren daadwerkelijk kunnen volgen hoe tot bepaalde politieke besluiten wordt gekomen. Een dergelijke transparantie is een cruciale voorwaarde voor het verder wegnemen van het wantrouwen dat anno 2009 nog volop aanwezig was.

De beschreven 5-stappen procedure moet niet worden opgevat als een blauwdruk voor succesvolle actie. De procedure is zeker geen garantie voor succes en er zijn mogelijk nog vele andere manieren om verandering te bewerkstelligen in de discursieve orde van het Schiphol beleidsdomein. Daarnaast moet duidelijk worden gesteld dat er geen wonderen mogen worden verwacht van welke procedure of interventie dan ook. Een diepgaand begrip van de verschillende rationaliteiten aan het werk en het diepgewortelde wantrouwen in het Schiphol beleidsdomein roepen zelfs de vraag op of het überhaupt nog mogelijk is om uit de impasse te geraken zonder de hulp van grote veranderingen in de externe context (het type interventies dat niet bewust door betrokkenen van binnenuit kan worden opgelegd, zoals grote natuurrampen, economische crises, stijgende olieprijs). Zoals gesteld gaat de genealoog er vanuit dat de mogelijkheid tot verandering altijd aanwezig is, waarbij de meerwaarde van de 5-stappen procedure er met name in zit dat ze betrokkenen kan inspireren bij het zoeken naar mogelijkheden om de gebaande paden te verlaten en nieuwe wegen te verkennen.

4. Welke bijdrage heeft dit onderzoek geleverd aan het begrijpen van de beleidsimpasse rondom Schiphol en aan de studie van beleidsimpasses in het algemeen?

Samenvattend heeft dit onderzoek op ten minste 3 manieren bijgedragen aan het begrijpen van de beleidsimpasse in het Schiphol beleidsdomein:

1. Er is één overkoepelend verhaal ontwikkeld, waarin bestaande verklaringen omtrent de Schiphol impasse zijn geïntegreerd. Het overkoepelende verhaal laat zien hoe de bestaande verklaringen (over proces en inhoud, over structuren en gedrag, over ontwikkelingen op micro en macro niveau) aan elkaar zijn gerelateerd en elkaar versterken. Dit levert een verfijnd inzicht op in de mechanismen die ten grondslag liggen aan de opkomst en de reproductie van de beleidsimpasse in het Schiphol beleidsdomein. Daarmee heeft dit onderzoek de bestaande verklaringen veelal geverifieerd, en dus niet gefalsifieerd. Het verschil met de bestaande verklaringen is dat zij maar een klein deel van het verhaal vertellen, terwijl in dit proefschrift wordt getoond dat de impasse vooral het resultaat is van de interactie tussen al deze verklaringen, conform het idee dat het geheel meer is dan de som der delen.
2. Er is een meer fundamentele verklaring toegevoegd aan de bestaande verklaringen, namelijk de manier waarop macht, zoals begrepen door Foucault, werkt in het Schiphol beleidsdomein (door de interactie tussen de discursieve orde en de micro-praktijken bloot te leggen). Deze macht conditioneert wat actoren op een betekenisvolle en legitieme manier kunnen denken en doen binnen het beleidsdomein Schiphol en resulteert in specifieke argumentatieve structuren, beleidsnetwerken, winnende en verliezende coalities, beleidsagenda's, rollen en posities.
3. Tot slot is beargumenteerd dat het verfijnde begrip van de mechanismen die aan het werk zijn in de constante reproductie er voor zorgt dat de juiste context voor het induceren van verandering ontstaat. Dit begrip vormt de basisvoorwaarde voor het aanwakken van verandering, aangezien ze het mogelijk maakt om te reflecteren op voorheen vanzelfsprekende (en soms neutraal veronderstelde) praktijken en hun perverse consequenties. Daarnaast zorgt het begrip ervoor dat er interventiestrategieën kunnen worden ontwikkeld die daadwerkelijk kunnen bijdragen aan het doorbreken van de reproductieve tendens van de discursieve orde van het Schiphol beleidsdomein. Het verfijnde begrip maakt het immers mogelijk om deze interventiestrategieën in te bedden in de heersende situationele ethiek (waarmee er voor wordt gezorgd dat interventies nog binnen de grenzen vallen van wat als acceptabel en rationeel wordt gezien).

Dit onderzoek heeft daarnaast een bijdrage geleverd aan het bestuderen van beleidsimpasses in het algemeen. Er ligt een belangrijke bijdrage op methodologisch

vlak. De ontwikkelde 3-stappen procedure vormt een welkome aanvulling op de wetenschappelijke gereedschapskist voor wat betreft het beschrijven, bepalen en verklaren van de opkomst en hardnekkigheid van beleidsimpasses. Daarnaast draagt de 3-stappen procedure bij aan het ontwikkelen van een systematische en transparante toepassing van Foucaults gedachtegoed binnen de beleidsstudies. Er zijn nog (te) weinig van zulke meer systematische toepassingen en dit onderzoek draagt in elk geval bij aan het dichten van het gat tussen Foucaults inspirerende, maar vaak nogal abstracte en soms ambigue ideeën, en de pragmatische toepassing van sommige van deze ideeën op de meer concrete studie van beleidsprocessen. Het is overigens zeker niet zo dat de gepresenteerde 3-stappen procedure de enige manier is om Foucaults ideeën toe te passen op het beleidsdomein; het betreft onze interpretatie van hoe zijn werk op een systematische en transparante manier toe te passen op het beleidsdomein (in lijn met de ideeën die auteurs als Hajer, Flyvbjerg en Richardson op dit vlak hebben ontwikkeld).

De 3-stappen procedure kan in elk geval ook worden toegepast op de studie van andere beleidsimpasses (en zelfs op beleidssituaties die niet in een impasse verkeren, maar die wel stevig geïstitutionaliseerd zijn), wanneer het doel is om de opkomst en de reproducerende tendens van deze impasses te beschrijven, bepalen en verklaren. Hierbij moet wel worden opgemerkt dat het pas zinvol is om de procedure toe te passen wanneer duidelijk is dat de betrokkenen een zekere mate van urgentie voelen om tot verandering en vernieuwing te komen. Alleen dan is er namelijk sprake van een context waarbinnen de geschiedenis kan uitgroeien tot een effectieve geschiedenis, wat het uiteindelijke hoofddoel is van de genealogische benadering.

De 3-stappen procedure laat de onderzoeker de ruimte om zelf te bepalen welke methoden hij gaat gebruiken bij het verzamelen, organiseren, valideren en presenteren van de data. Selectie van deze methoden is afhankelijk van de data die de onderzoeker nodig heeft om in het geval van zijn specifieke casus te komen tot een effectieve geschiedenis. Selectie is daarmee probleem gedreven en er is geen blauwdruk procedure voor het verzamelen, organiseren, valideren en presenteren van data. Desondanks zullen de methoden en strategieën die in dit proefschrift zijn gebruikt, en die welbekend en veel gebruikt zijn binnen de sociale wetenschappen, ook vaak in andere genealogieën een belangrijke rol spelen.

Het onderzoek heeft ook een bijdrage geleverd aan wetenschappelijke theorievorming, ook al moet worden benadrukt dat al onze conclusies zijn gebaseerd op het specifieke geval van het Schiphol beleidsdomein. De unieke manier waarop de micro-praktijken en de discursieve orde interacteren en elkaar versterken is altijd contextafhankelijk en zal voor elke casus afzonderlijk moeten worden uitgewerkt. Kortom, de micro-praktijken die aan het werk zijn in het beleidsdomein Schiphol zullen niet automatisch worden gevonden in andere beleidsdomeinen die ook te maken hebben met een impasse. En de

aanwezigheid van soortgelijke praktijken resulteert ook niet automatisch in een (onwenselijke) beleidsimpasse. Er is geen lineaire causale relatie te leggen tussen de gevonden mechanismen en beleidsimpasses, en dit onderzoek levert dus geen verklarende en voorspellende theorieën op met universele waarde. Hetzelfde geldt voor de aanbevelingen die zijn ontwikkeld voor het doorbreken van de beleidsimpasse in het Schiphol beleidsdomein. Deze aanbevelingen zijn gebaseerd op de specifieke situatie (normen en waarden en regels) binnen het beleidsdomein Schiphol (en daarnaast zijn deze aanbevelingen vooral bedoeld om de betrokkenen te inspireren om nieuwe manieren van denken en handelen te ontwikkelen, i.p.v. dat de aanbevelingen moeten worden opgevat als een blauwdruk voor toekomstig handelen).

Ondanks deze kanttekeningen heeft het onderzoek wel degelijk op verschillende manieren bijgedragen aan de verdere ontwikkeling van wetenschappelijke theorie. Het onderscheid tussen beschrijving en analyse heeft namelijk geresulteerd in een empirisch rijke casestudie die volop mogelijkheden biedt voor (1) naturalistische en (2) analytische generalisaties. Naturalistische generalisaties ontstaan wanneer situaties die zijn beschreven in de Schiphol case overeenkomen met situaties waar mensen in hun eigen praktijk tegenaan lopen. Lezers die zich bezighouden met soortgelijke beleidsproblemen als de Schiphol kwestie, zullen waarschijnlijk diverse in de case beschreven situaties herkennen. Of lezers kunnen in de toekomst gemakkelijk in soortgelijke situaties terechtkomen. Begrip van de Schiphol case kan in dat geval leiden tot déjà vu ervaringen, wat de lezer in staat stelt om de situatie adequaat te beoordelen en erop te reflecteren i.p.v. te worden meegezogen in vanzelfsprekende praktijken die negatieve consequenties kunnen hebben. Omdat er weinig gedetailleerde beschrijvingen van beleidsprocessen over luchtvaartontwikkeling in westerse landen beschikbaar zijn (wat in iets mindere mate geldt voor gedetailleerde beschrijvingen van beleidsprocessen over grootschalige infrastructuurprojecten in westerse landen), moet het potentieel voor het ontwikkelen van naturalistische generalisaties van dit onderzoek, en daarmee dus de wetenschappelijke waarde van de empirische beschrijving, niet worden onderschat.

Bij analytische generalisaties worden wetenschappers uitgenodigd om de empirische data te gebruiken om hun eigen theorieën te verifiëren of te falsifiëren. Het feit dat de empirische beschrijving niet is gebaseerd op het toetsen van een specifieke theorie, wat een sterke stempel zou drukken op het type data dat zou worden verzameld (we hebben immers gebruik gemaakt van brede, empirisch lege concepten bij de ontwikkeling van het heuristische raamwerk), maakt het voor wetenschappers uit verschillende disciplines mogelijk om hun eigen theorieën te verifiëren of te falsifiëren. De benodigde data zijn immers (deels) aanwezig. Tot slot wordt opgemerkt dat de normatieve benadering die in dit proefschrift is gehanteerd ook generieke waarde heeft. Hiermee wordt bedoeld dat het idee van contextualisme kan worden toegepast op andere casus, maar dat dit wel zal

resulteren in specifieke oplossingen die hoogstwaarschijnlijk anders zijn dan de oplossingen die zijn voorgesteld voor Schiphol.

Reflectie op de onderzoeksresultaten

Dit onderzoek pretendeert niet een of andere definitieve waarheid te hebben geopenbaard, simpelweg omdat zoiets onmogelijk en onwenselijk is vanuit een Foucauldiaans perspectief. Het onderzoek levert wel een goed onderbouwd en gedetailleerd begrip op van wat er in het Schiphol beleidsdomein aan de hand was anno 2009, en kan als zodanig een constructieve bijdrage leveren aan een betekenisvolle maatschappelijke discussie over Schiphol. Lezers worden met klem aangemoedigd om in de eerste plaats voor zichzelf te bepalen wat de beschreven casus eigenlijk betekent. Conform de sociaal constructivistische en interpretatieve principes waarop de benadering in dit proefschrift is gebaseerd, zullen verschillende mensen tot verschillende analyses komen en dus verschillende betekenissen toekennen aan de casus. Tijdens de validatieprocedure kwam dit al naar voren. Sommige betrokkenen bij de Alders-tafels (2007 -) vonden bijvoorbeeld dat de reproductieve tendens vanaf 2007 minder sterk was dan wij hebben geconstateerd. Het bestaan van dergelijke verschillende interpretaties is geen probleem, zolang de casusbeschrijving zelf niet wordt afgewezen. De verschillende interpretaties illustreren juist dat we te maken hebben met een beschrijving die dezelfde ambigue reacties oproept als die de alledaagse beleidspraktijk karakteriseren. Daarmee heeft de casus dus wel degelijk betekenis en waarde voor mensen die er verschillende percepties en rationaliteiten op na houden, wat een belangrijke basisvoorwaarde is voor het überhaupt beïnvloeden van het maatschappelijke debat over Schiphol, en dus voor het ontwikkelen van een effectieve geschiedenis.

De onderzoeksresultaten zijn uiteraard ook beïnvloedt door de discursieve orde van het beleidsdomein Schiphol, aangezien het onderzoek binnen de context van deze discursieve orde is uitgevoerd (dus de onderzoeker staat niet buiten, maar is integraal onderdeel van de bestudeerde problematiek). Overeenkomstig het kritische en nieuwsgierige ethos dat de genealoog in de praktijk tracht te brengen, is het van belang om te reflecteren op de manier waarop de onderzoeksresultaten zijn beïnvloed door de bestudeerde discursieve orde. Een goed begrip van de manier waarop de onderzoeksresultaten en de bestudeerde discursieve orde (waar de onderzoeker dus deel vanuit maakt) met elkaar interacteren, helpt de onderzoeker voorkomen dat hij onbewust teveel partij kiest. Daarnaast helpt het de onderzoeker om zo transparant mogelijk te laten zien hoe de uiteindelijke resultaten tot stand zijn gekomen. Beide zijn belangrijk voor het ontwikkelen van een effectieve geschiedenis.

Het onderzoeksproces is dus geconditioneerd door de micro-praktijken die aan het werk zijn in het Schiphol beleidsdomein en die zijn blootgelegd in dit proefschrift. Zo

moesten interviewvragen worden ontwikkeld die betekenis hadden voor de betrokkenen en zo moesten de resultaten op een manier worden gepresenteerd die betekenis had voor de betrokkenen. Dit vraagt om het gebruik van bepaald jargon, namelijk het jargon dat aansluit bij de vanzelfsprekende manieren van praten. Daarnaast heeft de proefballon die is ontwikkeld als onderdeel van de validatiestrategie geresulteerd in een geanimeerd publiek debat dat uiteindelijk invloed heeft gehad op de inhoud van de casusbeschrijving. N.a.v. het publieke debat zijn bijvoorbeeld aanvullende interpretaties van specifieke 'events' ingevoegd. De conclusies m.b.t. de opkomst en de persistentie van de beleidsimpasse en m.b.t. mogelijkheden om door de impasse heen te breken, zijn echter niet veranderd. Er is wel verder verduidelijkt hoe we tot onze conclusies zijn gekomen (bijvoorbeeld door duidelijker te maken hoe we het bestaan en voortbestaan van een beleidsimpasse hebben vastgesteld). Het belangrijkste is dat zowel de lezer als de genealoog begrijpen dat het onderzoek zowel het resultaat als de oorzaak is van de discursieve orde die is bestudeerd. Het gaat er uiteindelijk om het onderzoek precies op de 'grenzen' van de discursieve orde te positioneren (want dan is hetgeen wat wordt beweerd nog betekenisvol en legitiem), om de juiste context voor het veranderen van deze grenzen te creëren. Dit is precies wat we met dit onderzoek hebben beoogd te bereiken.

About the Author

Menno Huijs was born in Utrecht, the Netherlands, in 1980. After graduating from the Revis Lyceum in Doorn he studied Spatial Planning at the University of Utrecht. In 2003 he finished his thesis which was about the spatial-economic development of Brussels Airport Zaventem. From 2004 to 2009 he worked as a PhD student at the Delft University of Technology's Section of Transport & Logistics. In 2010 he started to work for the municipality of Rotterdam, as policy advisor about spatial-economic port-city developments.