

# SPECULATIVE LOOPHOLING

OPENING LIMITATIONS IN IJBURG BLOCK 44a's ARCHITECTURAL  
POWER PROCESSES



*Figure 1: Left, the extended livingroom of Maurits Bingerplantsoen #11: Illegal but tolerated. Right, the patio of Maurits Bingerplantsoen #9: Legal but unwanted.*

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## **KEYWORDS**

*Deleuze, Power, Fixation, Speculative design, Architecture, Delimitation*

## **ABSTRACT**

*The problem adressed in this text is the fixation of capacities to interact by laws, which limits the realization of valuable transformative potential in the built environment. The purpose of this text is twofold: First to uncover the processes behind such fixation-through-laws for the built environment and; Second, to propose a different (Deleuzean) attitude towards power which argues for a release of this fixation and urges the limitations of such laws to be opened up. To this end, Chapter 1 elaborates how a prioritisation of interests constructs a dominant collective mode that excludes alternative tendencies. Chapter 2 elaborates on the fallacies incorporated in the process of abstraction to come to such a priority of interests for a collective. Chapter 3 suggests an alternative, Deleuzean, attitude towards power which promotes differences over their abstraction. Chapter 4 then applies this Deleuzean understanding of power to a housing block in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The advice is to start with opening up the most blatant fixation of use and form in the municipality's place-specific 'Bestemmingsplan' law. Afterwards, chapter 5 concludes that by steering away from fixated hierarchies constructed through abstraction, we arrive at a post-humanist, flat ontology. Using it, we can apply a strategy of promoting new understandings constructed by experimentally opening up, or 'speculative loopholing', and thereby delimit transformative potential in our built environment.*

# INTRODUCTION

The problem addressed in this text is the fixation of capacities to interact by laws, which limits the realization of valuable transformative potential in the built environment. The first written laws as regulation emerged in the Netherlands during the blooming emergence of cities from 1200 AC on. Many principles behind these regulations still apply today. But their application has increased radically as part of processes that attempt to control the built environment through normalization. With these laws we can observe an increased fixation of the transformative potential that could delimit the minoritarian tendencies excluded by these dominant modes. Such fixation thereby limits the richness of different expressions in the built environment. In short, creative processes are hindered in their attempts to adapt to changes that influence the built environment. The purpose of this text is twofold: First to uncover the processes behind such fixation-through-laws for the built environment and; Second, to propose a different (Deleuzian) attitude towards power which argues for a release of this fixation and urges the limitations of such laws to be opened up. To achieve this, this text is structured into five chapters.

In chapter 1, paragraph 1 will elaborate on the historical emergence of codes and regulations for the built environment. Paragraph 2 will uncover how such regulations construct a process of normalization, always defining that which best resembles the norm and that which falls outside it. In turn, paragraph 3 will argue that such processes of normalization favor a dominant mode of existence that excludes what is defined as the 'unwanted'.

Chapter 2, paragraph 1 will explain that the cause of the problem are fallacious abstractions that are made in the establishment of such a collective dominant mode. Paragraph 2 will introduce the philosophical framework called Correlationism on which these fallacious abstractions are bred. Afterwards, paragraph 3 will elaborate on a logic fallacy that is often wrongly inserted into this framework. Last, paragraph 4 will pinpoint another logic fallacy often coupled with the former, which is at the core of our problem.

Chapter 3, paragraph 1 then will remind that if the application of a Deleuzian attitude is to succeed in addressing the problem, we will have to incorporate the political charge it carries. Paragraph 2 therefore will present a summary of

Deleuze's core philosophical argument. Paragraph 3 in turn, will elaborate which conclusions Deleuze derives from this argument. In paragraph 4 then, will explain the political consequences this has, which comes down to the promotion of power to interact. Paragraph 5 in turn will present a Deleuzian framework and vocabulary through which one investigate processes of power. Paragraph 6 then, concludes that it is the process of remaining inclusive and opening up to otherness that allows promotion of power to interact to result in delimiting transformative potential.

Chapter 4, paragraph 1 then introduces the general regulatory framework for the built environment, and housing more specifically, in the Netherlands. Paragraph 2 afterwards will elaborate on the power framework applicable to the concrete case-study; IJburg Block 44a, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Paragraph 3 then will attempt to develop the case-study with the Deleuzian attitude towards power in mind.

Chapter 5 will then conclude this text. Paragraph 1 will explain that Correlationism without the logic fallacies often coupled with it may lead to a post-humanist ontology. Paragraph 2 will elaborate how the Deleuzian core argument supports the flattening of ontology presented by post-humanism. Paragraph 3 then will suggest that a Deleuzian attitude towards power and the flattening of ontology favours an understanding of design as speculation. Last, paragraph 4 will conclude that a very specific strategy of speculation which focusses on collective inclusiveness and opening up, can provide a way out of the fixation of capacities to interact through laws and can delimit the realization of valuable transformative potential in the built environment. For future reference, this tactic can be called speculative loopholing.

# 1. REGULATED EXCLUSION

## 1.1 Western cities increasingly regulate the built environment

*This paragraph will elaborate on the historical emergence of codes and regulations for the built environment.*

Space for architecture is not merely that which passively contains the relations of society. Rather it is an active ingredient that co-shapes these relations into their concrete manifestations. As such, the spatiality of the built environment is an important political aspect of societies.<sup>1</sup> Drawing upon a number of resources, Tim Edensor explains how most Western cities increasingly regulate space through codes and rules.<sup>2</sup> Urban regulation in the Netherlands specifically can be traced back to at least the founding of cities. As in many other parts of Europe, this practice increased radically from 1200 AC on. The ability to trace these regulations back to that time is largely dependant on the fact that from this period on one can discover the bloom of first of all: written law in place of unwritten habitual law; and second: written law as regulation in place of written law as judgement. These two developments in turn seem to be closely related to the transition from a system of feudal law to a system of public law at that time.<sup>3</sup> The core principles behind the buildingregulations written down in these laws can already be distinguished at the moment of the first written regulatory laws during this late medieval-period.

One of the core principles behind buildingregulations has been a prioritisation of interests<sup>4</sup> by all parties involved. Departing from a complete liberty to inter-

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1 Stavros Stavrides, *Common Space: The City as Commons* (London: Zed Books, 2016), 4, 237, 259-260.

2 Tim Edensor, *Industrial Ruins: Space Aesthetics and Materiality* (Oxford/New York: Berg, 2005), 54, 58-59.

3 E.H.A. Kocken, *Van bouwen, breken en randen in de lage landen: Oorsprong en ontwikkeling van het middeleeuws stedelijk bouwrecht tussen ±1200 en ±1500, Een terreinverkennd onderzoek*, (Deventer: Kluwer, 2004), 35-36.

4 Prioritisation of interests is explained as one of the fundamental principles of buildingregulation in the Netherlands during the late-medieval period at the moment these regulations were developed. See: Kocken, *Van bouwen, breken en branden in de lage landen*.

act, individuals within a collective can of course refrain from certain interactions. In order to prevent conflict, a prioritization of interests can help in negotiations about these interactions to optimize the outcome. After all, it can very well occur that individuals also have overlapping interests. Interest that can -generally speaking- be found at play during the rise of written law in late-medieval times, have almost without exception not lost their importance: Defense, Fire, Construction, Appearance; Housing availability; Domestic imperturbability (annoyance-protection); and Traffic. Within these, there seem to have been four underlying motives. The first was safety: safety with regard to invading enemies, fire, buildingcollapse, and traffic-safety in the often narrow streets of the Dutch medieval cities. The second was health: for instance health ensured by having domestic imperturbability - the excrements of pigs seems to have been a recurring problem to name one issue. The third was utility: it was deemed important to a city to have enough houses available for its citizens, and traffic-jams could impede the pace of business. Finally fourth there was the notion of appearance: already in the late-medieval period the view from the main streets was carefully orchestrated in order to be able to properly represent the glory of the city.<sup>5</sup> Today, due to the increase of regulation, many more subjects are being regulated in the Netherlands. However, it is possible to distinguish only one additional motive: that of environmental protection.<sup>6</sup>

If an agreement is achieved, this gives birth to a emergent collective legal entity with its own prioritisation of interests irreducible to those of the individuals.<sup>7</sup> Shifts in the interests of the collectives results in shifts in the agreements. The result of the agreements, therefore, are legal entities comprised of an ever changing complex of property, privileges, rights and duties in relation to the other legal entities present. In the name of these collective legal entities, by power of the

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5 The medieval subjects of regulation can be found in: Kocken, *Van bouwen, breken en branden in de lage landen*, 69-101.

6 This motive can for instance be found in Ministerie van Binnenlandse zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties' Bouwbesluit 2012, BWBR0030461 (2012), Chapter 5: "Technische bouwvoorschriften uit het oogpunt van energiezuinigheid en milieu, nieuwbouw", <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0030461/2017-01-01#Opschrift> (accessed 05-01-2017).

7 See paragraph 3.5 for an explanation of why the focus of emergence should shift to emergent behaviour rather than emergent entities. For now however, emergent entity will suffice to explain.

agreement, in order to protect the interests at play, the built environment is getting regulated to ensure that certain rhythms could consistently be found in the built environment.

## 1.2 Regulations as normalization relate to exceptions

*This paragraph will uncover how regulations (as explained in paragraph 1.1) construct a process of normalization, always defining that which best resembles the norm and that which falls outside it.*

In addition to his observation that western cities increasingly regulate space, Edensor notes the continual existence of spaces uncontained by rules and codes.<sup>8</sup> It remains impossible for the codes, rules and such to impose a total order upon urban space,<sup>9</sup> due to the impossibility of completely capturing concrete matter in the abstractions that the rules and codes operate with.<sup>10</sup> Far from being imposed out of nowhere, order can only be produced from that which it seeks to take over. As a result, any achieved order needs to be constantly reproduced. Even more so because threats to such order employ practices that attempt to take over.<sup>11</sup> So rather than being an accomplished state, order must be understood as a contested process of practices that are employed.<sup>12</sup> For clarity's sake, to distinguish from the unattainable goal that 'order' presents, we can use the term 'normalization' with regard to the practices involved in its creation. In short, normalization with regard to the urban "[...] includes attempts to establish spatial relations that will encourage social relations and forms of behaviour which will be repeatable, predictable and compatible with the taxonomy of the necessary social roles."<sup>13</sup> This is not a process of simple homogenization, but practices that have to engage with that which is to

be normalized.<sup>14</sup> In the attempt of establishing its spatial relations, normalization has to deal with all that is an exception to the norm, that which lies outside its abstraction. Moreover, it can use the exceptions to strengthen its hold on relations.<sup>15</sup>

The relation between normalization and their exceptions have been studied by Foucault. He distinguishes three coexisting models of normalization in western societies: Sovereignty, discipline and security.<sup>16</sup> First, the sovereignty model works by way of creating a boundary and excluding the exception. The entity that decides on what is exceptional is called sovereign.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, in order to keep excluding the exceptions, normalization can be suspended by the sovereign in order to deal with these exceptions. Inherent in this is a focus on continuity of the normalizing procedures rather than on its rigid execution. In this way, any exceptional departure from normalization may become a new localized normalization.<sup>18</sup> Thus, sovereignty in Foucault's terms is a negotiated construction in process, not a natural condition for individuals as some would have it. Second, the discipline model, rather than excluding, creates a boundary around the exceptions and prescribes their relation to the normalization. For these exceptions, normalization is achieved through concrete situated rights whereas universal rights that link them to the general framework of normalization become abstract.<sup>19</sup> In this way, rhythms become part of regulatory classifications that produce articulations of order<sup>20</sup> and multiple states of normalized exceptions can exist next to each other circumscribed in spatial form of normalized exceptions which may be called 'enclaves'.<sup>21</sup> To achieve this, sovereign power becomes a site-specific governance.<sup>22</sup> Still, too many exceptions may escape the discipline model. So third, the security model, rather than creating a boundary, aims to predict urban rhythms and events and uses temporary interventions as its

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8 Edensor, *Industrial Ruins*, 59.

9 Edensor, *Industrial Ruins*, 60, 61, but also Stavrides, *Common Space*, 14-15.

10 Edensor, *Industrial Ruins*, 62.

11 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 28.

12 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 13-15.

13 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 14-15

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14 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 75.

15 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 14-15.

16 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 17-18.

17 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 20.

18 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 21.

19 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 21.

20 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 22.

21 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 20.

22 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 18, 19.

practice of normalization.<sup>23</sup> In order to gain information, the security model samples the urban environment. Moreover, the security model's relation to exceptions is flexible and open to readjustment of its practices of normalization by these exceptions.<sup>24</sup> In this way, the continuous processes of normalization may be in conflict with the codes and regulations formerly produced.<sup>25</sup> In all three models, exception is in some way included in the practice of normalization. It is important to note that the exceptions are part of the practices of normalization.<sup>26</sup> Because without these practices of normalization, the regulations, there would be no exceptions.

### 1.3 Regulations create dominant modes by constraining liberties

*This paragraph will argue that processes of normalization (as explained in paragraph 1.2) favor a dominant mode of existence that excludes what is defined as the 'unwanted'.*

Despite the effort that goes into the attempt to regulate space, there remains a longing for space that remains largely unregulated.<sup>27</sup> The question arises why there is such a longing for unregulated space.

In order to protect the emergent collective's interests, by power of agreements, while making use of regulation, a hierarchical order of interests is created. And therefore we can notice a split in power between that which best resembles the standard, called the 'majority', and the group that is separated from the standard by a lack in resemblance, called the 'minority'.<sup>28</sup> There is no guarantee that the difference in power between the majority and the minority is acquired by a difference in quantity.<sup>29</sup> Majority, does not acquire power by being the standard, it forms the

standard because it is in power.<sup>30</sup> So importantly, these aspects are able to create a situation that favours a dominant mode of existence. Because "Power is first and foremost the power to decide."<sup>31</sup>

For those asking themselves what the problem is with this dominant mode (or another dominant mode that might follow), Parr suggests an exercise to uncover the harm that might be done by it: "I prefer to start not by asking what architecture has built but to investigate what architecture has taken away. Who has been denied a place?"<sup>32</sup> In this way we will likely uncover that the regulation of the built environment limits all sorts of assemblages of people and matter. And indeed alternative tendencies are impeded by the dominant mode.<sup>33</sup> Regulations, as Edensor writes, impose onto the spaces 'what they are meant for', whereby they implicitly define that which falls outside that category as being in the wrong place and unwanted.<sup>34</sup> In short, any such hierarchy starts to exclude alternative tendencies. This exclusion practiced by codes and regulations would not be a problem of significance if these codes and rules were small in power compared to the alternative tendencies. But unfortunately, they are part of a larger assemblage of '...policing, planning regulations, zoning policies, place-promotion, preferred forms of capital investment, the bounding of discrete spaces, the regulation of flows of traffic, people and money...'<sup>35</sup> Through these, an ability to control and displace the 'unwanted' arises.<sup>36</sup>

Through mechanisms of control, the spawning of a controlled diversity and continual change are able to incorporate and satisfy the need for unregulated space to some extent by making the space seemingly unregulated.<sup>37</sup> However, as you may note, spaces of controlled diversity or continual change can hardly substitute unregulated space. Although these partially mimic this desired space, it only does

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23 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 18, 21-22, 27.

24 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 27, 28, 29.

25 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 14.

26 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 24-25.

27 Edensor, *Industrial Ruins*, 55, 59.

28 Paul Patton, "Difference + Politics", in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 77.

29 Patton, *Difference + Politics*, 76.

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30 Patton, *Difference + Politics*, 77.

31 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 44.

32 Adrian Parr, "Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture" in: *Deleuze and architecture*, eds. Hélène Frichot and Stephen Loo (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 205.

33 Edensor, *Industrial Ruins*, 54, 58-59.

34 Edensor, *Industrial Ruins*, 54, 55, 56.

35 Edensor, *Industrial Ruins*, 54.

36 Edensor, *Industrial Ruins*, 55, 58.

37 Edensor, *Industrial Ruins*, 59, 61.

so still within the constraints of the regulations. Two examples of this are what have been called 'gentrification' and 'shared space'.<sup>38</sup> Gentrification, first, happens when normalization shapes the urban in such a way that public space can effectively be used for preferred private interests.<sup>39</sup> In such a normalized relation between the public and private, although a diversity of private interests can bloom, space becomes a part of the production of normalized identities.<sup>40</sup> Shared space, second, is a more egalitarian use of public space in which no private interest has priority, but are in constant negotiation.<sup>41</sup> However, these private entities may still only use a distinct portion of public space in this way as defined by urban planners. Participants in shared spaces have no way to debate on the situatedness of such space itself.<sup>42</sup>

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38 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 138.

39 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 138.

40 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 141, 142.

41 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 144.

42 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 145.

## 2. EVAPORATED DIFFERENCE

### 2.1 Dominant modes caused by fallacious abstraction

*This paragraph will explain that the cause of the problem (as explained in the introduction and paragraph 1.3) are fallacious abstractions that are made in the establishment of collective dominant modes (as explained in paragraph 1.3).*

One can easily argue that any resulting agreement arises only after (hopefully) careful consideration of the priority of interests that make up the collective. After all, the regulations are supposed to ensure a structuring of the built environment that benefits the combined interests of all members of the collective. Then why is there such a longing for unregulated space? The cause of the problem is that these regulations are often presented as logical, efficient procedures<sup>43</sup> supposedly in the best interest of all within the collective. As was noted in paragraph 1.1 however, the interests of any emergent collective are irreducible to those of the individuals involved. There is an internal tension between the interests of individuals and those of emergent collectives, because is in no way assured that these interests overlap completely. The best interest of any collective, therefore, is an abstraction that ignores any such internal tension.

The problem at hand therefore, is the fact that the alternative tendencies of the minority within the collective are impeded due to the hierarchical order that is created. The establishment of such an order of priority is the result of a fallacious abstraction needed to come to that which can be called 'the interests of the collective' at all. The first abstraction that can be fallacious is that of the interest of many individuals into those of one collective. In Dutch law, this is reflected very literally by the division of types of stakeholders. Legal entities can either represent individual or collective interests. Sometimes these collective interests are called 'general' interests.<sup>44</sup> And this is exactly where the fallacious abstraction occurs. Because

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43 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 19, 47, 249.

44 L.J.A. Damen, H.E. Broring, Bert Marseille, *Bestuursrecht: Rechtsbescherming tegen de overheid, bestuursprocesrecht* (Den Haag: Boom, 2006).



at that point the collective legal entities seem to be forgetting that the collectives are a careful negotiation between individuals. To assume then, however, that the interests of the collective are thereby equal to those of the individuals is a logic fallacy. The second abstraction is a lack in flexibility and happens when collective legal entities adjust too slow to the changing interests of the individuals that make up the collective. The interests of the collective at one moment are then unjustifiably spread out over time to fallaciously represent them in the future too.

Through these abstractions, the differences and thereby the political and transformative charges within the collective that influence architecture are evaporated.<sup>45</sup> This is an important realisation because this results in the self-referential, formalist attitude within architecture, which has occupied and still does occupy architecture and perhaps has even strengthened.<sup>46</sup> Namely, at the moment architecture is reduced to a form-finding procedure without a focus on values that lie 'outside' architecture, the result will be no other than the production of more architectural codings.<sup>47</sup> Additionally, speaking more broadly than these Deleuzian encounters, political engagement unfortunately remains underdeveloped in architecture as has been made clear by Parr.<sup>48</sup> And, as was explained in paragraph 1.2, 'choosing a depoliticised use [...] is not a value-free exercise'.<sup>49</sup> In what follows in paragraphs 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 I therefore intend to elaborate on two fallacies in abstraction that can lead to such evaporation. These are the epistemic fallacy and the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. In this way it hopefully becomes clear what should be avoided and allows us to steer even stronger away from practices of abstraction within architecture, in order to regain the political charge for architecture.

## 2.2 Correlationism limits access to reality to thought

*This paragraph will introduce the philosophical framework called 'correlationism' on which the fallacious abstractions (as introduced in paragraph 2.1) are bred.*

45 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 207.

46 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 197, 206.

47 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 204.

48 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 204.

49 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 204.

In 1640 René Descartes published a much debated script about his search for a foundation of all his knowledge. To do this, he made use of a maximum doubt about all he knew. His argument was that in order to come to solely legitimate knowledge, he could not longer rely on anything he formerly believed in. After all, so his strain of thought ran, it could be that there was an evil spirit that did its utmost best to make him falsely accept all sorts of things to be existent and true. His question then became: how can I know for sure I even exist? And this is where he finds his foundation. Because, he argues, if some entity outside him – a supreme power (be it evil or good)- convinced him of the things he formerly believed to be true but which are now in doubt, then this would mean he (or 'I' in the case of anyone applying the thought experiment themselves) certainly had to exist in order to be convinced of or to doubt the existence of those things.<sup>50</sup> His conclusion becomes: '... this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived by my mind.'<sup>51</sup>

Descartes search for legitimate knowledge illustrates the central argument for 'correlationism', and shows why that is such a difficult thesis to get away from. It is the argument that explains why it is so that all we are ever going to know about things-other-than-us is necessarily mediated by our thought. Correlationism is 'the doctrine according to which 'we never grasp an object 'in itself' in isolation from its relation to the subject.'<sup>52</sup> or in Meillassoux's words: 'By 'correlation' we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never either term considered apart from the other.'<sup>53</sup> So, 'the correlationist holds that we cannot think of humans without world, nor world without humans, but only of a primal rapport or correlation between the two.'<sup>54</sup>

As Descartes quest illustrates, the main argument in favor of correlation-

50 René Descartes, "Mediations on first philosophy" in: *The philosophical writings of Descartes vol. II*, trans: Cottingham, Stoothoff, Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1984 (1640)), 12-17.

51 Descartes, *Mediations on first philosophy*, 17.

52 Quentin Meillassoux, *After finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, trans. Ray Brassier (New York: Continuum, 2008), 5.

53 Meillassoux, *After finitude*, 5.

54 Graham Harman, *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics* (Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 122.

ism is as follows: ‘‘To know something, [...] we must have access to that thing.’’<sup>55</sup> Indeed, in case we do come to know anything about being beyond our access, this has proven itself to actually be within our access and thus reducing the knowledge to knowlegde for-us again:<sup>56</sup> ‘‘The very fact that we are thinking of such a reality means that it is not mind-independent after all.’’<sup>57</sup> The argument ‘‘is designed to ensure that, in the words of Meillassoux, ‘‘one cannot think the in-itself without entering into a viscous circle, thereby immediately contradicting oneself.’’<sup>58</sup> The basis of this argument is therefore the assumption that ‘‘our very experience of the world can take place only under the conditions of our own making.’’<sup>59</sup> This makes the correlationist argument not empirical but trancedental.<sup>60</sup>

As a consequence of correlationism, ‘‘thought cannot get outside itself in order to compare the world as it is ‘in itself’ to the world as it is ‘for us’, and thereby distinguish what is a function of our relation to the world from what belongs to the world alone.’’<sup>61</sup> Thus for the correlationist we can ‘‘...have no access to these beings that are apart from thought and can therefore only speak of being as it is for-us.’’<sup>62</sup> For instance: ‘‘For the correlationist, it is impossible to speak of a world that pre-existed humans in itself, but only of a world pre-existing humans for humans.’’<sup>63</sup> The second consequence, derived from the first, is that ‘‘What is thought is thereby converted entirely into thought, and what lies outside thought must always remain unthinkable.’’<sup>64</sup> Bryant goes on: ‘‘[...] being beyond our access to it is precisely a form of being to which we have no access.’’<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, in the words of Brassier: ‘‘Since it is impossible to separate the subjective from the objective, or the human

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55 Levi R. Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects* (London: Open Humanities Press, 2011), 36.

56 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 35.

57 Steven Shaviro, *The universe of things: on Speculative Realism* (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 6.

58 Meillassoux, *After finitude*, 5.

59 Shaviro, *The universe of things*, 6.

60 Shaviro, *The universe of things*, 6.

61 Meillassoux, *After finitude*, 3.

62 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 37.

63 Harman, *Prince of Networks*, 122.

64 Graham Harman, ‘‘I Am Also of the Opinion that Materialism Must Be Destroyed’’, *Environment and planning D: Society and space* 28, no. 5 (2010), 789.

65 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 36.

from the non-human, it makes no sense to ask what anything is in itself, independently of our relating to it.’’<sup>66</sup> It thereby follows that, strictly speaking, ‘‘[...] what being might be apart from our access to being now becomes an entirely meaningless question.’’<sup>67</sup> As a third consequence, following via the first from the second, is that ‘‘Philosophy must abandon the question of whether being as it is given to us is like being as it is in-itself because we are unable to ‘‘get out of ourselves’’ to compare being as it manifests itself to us with being as it is in-itself apart from us.’’<sup>68</sup> Or, in a milder version, there can only be speculation while still affirming the correlation.

### 2.3 Epistemic fallacy mistakes thought for reality

*This paragraph will elaborate on a logic fallacy that is often wrongly inserted into the correlationist framework (as it was explained in paragraph 2.2).*

Correlationism itself, as could be noted in the previous paragraph, is not necessarily to blame for drawing ontological conclusions from epistemological observations. The factor to blame is the epistemic fallacy, an argument that is often (unwittingly) coupled with correlationism. The epistemic fallacy is the reversal of ontological claims by epistemological claims posited as if they were ontological:<sup>69</sup> ‘‘What the epistemic fallacy identifies is the fallacy of reducing ontological questions to epistemological questions [...]. In short, the epistemic fallacy occurs wherever being is reduced to our access to being.’’<sup>70</sup> Or again: ‘‘The epistemic fallacy consists in the thesis that properly ontological questions can be fully transposed into epistemological questions.’’<sup>71</sup> To be clear: ‘‘a critique of the epistemic fallacy and how it operates in philosophy does not amount to the claim that epistemology or questions of

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66 Ray Brassier, ‘‘Concepts and Objects’’ in: *The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism*, Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman, eds. (Melbourne: re.press, 2010), 53-54.

67 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 35.

68 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 36.

69 Roy Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 36.

70 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 60.

71 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 64.

the nature of inquiry and knowledge are a fallacy.<sup>72</sup> The fallacy is only constituted in case of a blunt reduction of ontology to epistemology. Again, the basis for the creation of an epistemic fallacy therefore seems again to be a alarming case of anthropocentrism.

The epistemic fallacy even seems to be so tightly and unknowingly connected to correlationism, that correlationism alone is accused of doing all sorts of things which it strictly speaking can only do when indeed coupled with the epistemic fallacy. For instance, when Bryant introduces correlationism he writes that as a consequence, "ontology becomes transcendental anthropology"<sup>73</sup>. However, correlationism alone never tries to reduce ontology to epistemology. That only happens when the fallacy sets in. A thing similar happens when Meillassoux claims that, as a consequence of correlationism, we have lost "that outside which was not relative to us... existing in itself regardless of whether we are thinking of it or not; that outside which thought could explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory – of being entirely elsewhere."<sup>74</sup> You may now note that correlationism as such without the epistemic fallacy does not necessarily lose this 'outside', it only argues we cannot state anything positive about it as long as it remains outside. When Shaviri writes that "For correlationism, a mind-independent reality cannot exist",<sup>75</sup> or again that it subordinates "what is known to our way of knowing",<sup>76</sup> we can again notice the same happening. In an effort to rid correlationism of the epistemic fallacy in the above couplings of the two and their alledged consequences, it would seem more accurate to note that: "because we do not have access to "things in themselves", we cannot know anything about them – aside from the sheer fact that they must exist."<sup>77</sup>

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72 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 60.

73 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 36.

74 Meillassoux, *After finitude*, 7.

75 Shaviri, *The universe of things*, 6.

76 Shaviri, *The universe of things*, 3.

77 Shaviri, *The universe of things*, 7.

## 2.4 Reification mistakes concrete abstraction for reality

*This paragraph will pinpoint another logic fallacy often coupled with the former (as it was explained in paragraph 2.3), which is at the core of our problem (as explained in paragraph 1.3).*

Furthermore, after committing an epistemic fallacy, the way is paved for a fallacy of misplaced concreteness (or called reification in short). "[...] the fallacy of misplaced concreteness is committed when an abstract belief, opinion, or concept about the way things are, is mistaken for a physical or 'concrete' reality."<sup>78</sup> Or again: "reification is precisely the reduction of a real object to its sensual appearance-for another object. Reification is the reduction of one entity to another's fantasy about it."<sup>79</sup> So reification goes one step further than the epistemic fallacy. Where the epistemic fallacy in itself only elevates a person's cognition of reality as such to that of reality, reification elevates a particular cognition of reality to that of reality. The danger of reification is that the abstractions it uses start to pose reality as a system of categories. By doing this, one pretends to know how the 'something' that Descartes discovered is structured. However, the "... possibility of analysis does not entail reduction..."<sup>80</sup> In this way, every representation suppresses a richness of expression not fully present in the representation.<sup>81</sup> Because of this, these abstractions "... do not refer to anything in the real world..."<sup>82</sup> By way of reification, abstractions of the real are confused with the real itself. And it is for this reason that Deleuze opposes identity as a principle.<sup>83</sup> At any time when we consider an object, the distinc-

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78 Andrej Radmann, "Gibsonism: Ecologies of architecture", (PhD diss., Delft University of Technology, 2012), 57.

79 Timothy Morton, *Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World* (Minneapolis/London: Minnesota University Press: 2013) 119, emphasis erased.

80 Manuel DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society: Assemblage theory and social complexity* (London/New Delhi/New York/Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2002), 10

81 Patton, *Difference + Politics*, 76

82 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 45. A similar conclusion can be found in:

James Williams, "Identity" in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 127.

83 Williams, *Identity*, 126-127.

tion that forms that object is a transcendental condition for the identification of the object.<sup>84</sup> Deleuze therefore argues: "the abstract does not explain, but needs to be explained."<sup>85</sup> In short: "Every reductionist who claims to deduce that which this or that thing is from that which composes this or that thing only succeeds in dissolving the very thing that they claim to account for."<sup>86</sup>

*"The question What is? Prejudices the Idea as the simplicity of essence; it then becomes obligatory that the simple essence comprehends the inessential, and comprehends it in essence, thus contradicting itself."<sup>87</sup>*

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84 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 138.

85 Bruce Baugh, "Transcendental Empiricism + Politics" in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 289.

86 Tristan Garcia, *Form and Object: A Treatise on Things*, trans. Mark Allan Ohm and Jon Cogburn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 13.

87 Gilles Deleuze, "The Method of Dramatisation", *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie* vol. LXII, (1967): 92.

## 3. EMPOWERED POTENTIAL

### 3.1 Deleuzian transformative potential underdeveloped

*This paragraph will remind that if the application of a Deleuzian attitude is to succeed in addressing the problem (as it was explained in paragraph 1.3), we will have to incorporate the political charge it carries.*

As was explained in paragraph 2.1, abstraction causes differences to be evaporated and thereby dominates political and transformative charges that could otherwise influence architecture. The important question therefore becomes: "How might design thinking and practice dust off the cobwebs of a formalist attitude in all its interiority and engage with the outside energies and forces shaping life in the contemporary world?"<sup>88</sup> The answer lies exactly in becoming less abstract and more affective.<sup>89</sup> In order to counter the problem of this evaporation, this thesis proposes a set of concepts as a solution that can help attune the architectural practitioner to difference. In doing this, this thesis relies heavily on the philosophical work that has been developed by, with, and in response to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. The choice to use Deleuze and Guattari for this task is motivated by the fact that they have developed a very thorough understanding of difference and additionally several concepts that allow us to make this understanding applicable.

There have certainly been encounters between architecture and the philosophical work of Deleuze and Guattari. Concepts brought into relation with architecture during the first encounters include the 'rhizome', the 'smooth' and 'striated', and for instance 'territorialisation' and 'deterritorialisation' which will be used in this thesis as well. However, these first encounters allegedly lack the incorporation of the broader philosophical context of these concepts within the theory of Deleuze and Guattari.<sup>90</sup> This lack specifically concerns the political commitment and trans-

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88 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 208.

89 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 208.

90 Marko Jobsts, "Why Deleuze, Why Architecture", in: *Deleuze and architecture*, eds. Hélène Frichot and Stephen Loo (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 65-66.

formative potential of their philosophy.<sup>91</sup> Kim Dovey acknowledges that this in particular is a gap to be filled in 'research applying Deleuzian theory to built form...'<sup>92</sup> And this is a crucial mistake architects cannot afford to make when engaging Deleuze and Guattari, because if their philosophy meant to empower something, then it would be the differences within abstractions. As Parr explains, encounters with Deleuze have indeed lacked engagement with the phenomena outside the codings, despite the fact that these are what make up modern society.<sup>93</sup> It can even be said that the use of these kinds of concepts by Deleuze and Guattari, when in combination with a formalist attitude and the procedure of abstraction, have developed themselves as 'un-Deleuzian' exercises, precisely because of the neglect of the political commitment and transformative potential.<sup>94</sup> So, if the investigation and development of the location used in this graduation (see chapter 4. Execution) is to be truly Deleuzian in the political sense as Parr describes, it should try at all times to be more than yet another formalist exercise by engaging with the political side of Deleuze's theories. Because of this, we should investigate what kind of politics Deleuze and Guattari advocated.

### 3.2 Time is synthetic process

*This paragraph will present a summary of Deleuze's core philosophical argument.*

Because Deleuze was of mind that any abstract does not explain but needs to be explained, he set out to 'search for the real conditions of actual experience rather than for the abstract conditions of any possible experience...'<sup>95</sup> To do this he inquires into the experience of linear time, and discovers a single condition for us to experience it that way. By uncovering three major syntheses that make up any

experience linear time, Deleuze discovers that the transcendental condition for linear time to exist is the eternal return of difference. In the end, Deleuze's three syntheses do not deny linear time, but completes it with a non-linear one.<sup>96</sup>

The first major synthesis necessary for linear time to be produced is the contraction of past events in the now, to form an expectancy towards behaviour in the future: The previous ticking of a clock causes us -in the now- to expect it to tick also in the future. Note that all three synthesis are on the condition of there being a case of expectancy in the experienter.<sup>97</sup> Of course, despite our expectancy, the clock might stop ticking. James Williams formulates this as follows: 'repetition is not a property of the repeated things since there is no causal relationship between different members of the series. [...] repetition is, therefore, not an objective property – it is something in the experienter.'<sup>98</sup> Deleuze's argument on the first synthesis is that this synthesis is a precondition for expectancy. However, this presupposes the possibility to have three minor syntheses. First the one that binds different unconnected sensations into a sense, second the combination of different senses into the sense of a thing and third the possibility to contract different events in the past in the now to make a pattern.<sup>99</sup>

The second major synthesis focusses not on the forward looking aspect of the now, but on its inescapable passing into the past. Deleuze claims that there is a pure past in which all events -including those not experienced or experienced differently must be 'stored'.<sup>100</sup> Additionally, he claims that this pure past must be subject to change.<sup>101</sup> Again, this thesis is based on three minor theses. First: If nothing can be found to account for a sudden jump from now to past, every now must already 'have a past aspect in it in order for it to pass away.'<sup>102</sup> Secondly, If such a now passes, 'it becomes a past event for any future present'<sup>103</sup>. This conversily

91 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 203 and Marko, *Why Deleuze, Why Architecture*, 66.

92 Kim Dovey, "Assembling architecture", in: *Deleuze and architecture*, eds. Hélène Frichot and Stephen Loo (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013),137.

93 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 203.

94 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 197, 203, 204 And Marko, *Why Deleuze, Why Architecture*, 66.

95 Baugh, *Trancedental Empericism + Politics*, 289.

96 James Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: a Critical Introduction and Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 104.

97 Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, 86.

98 *Ibid.*, 87

99 *Ibid.*, 89

100 *Ibid.*, 94

101 *Ibid.*, 96

102 *Ibid.*, 94

103 *Ibid.*, 95

also means that all the past must be in any new present so that third, all the past must be related (as a pure past). The synthesis of all the past is a condition for the now to pass away into the past. So while the first major synthesis focuses on the contraction of distinct elements, the second turns towards a contraction of all previous contractions (experienced or inexperienced): the pure past. Consequently, if the now requires the past to be contracted completely, the addition (passing away) of a new now to the past means that the pure past 'must be amenable to change through the occurrence of any new present.'<sup>104</sup>

Third, if linear time prevents us from going back to the past or forward to future, we are eternally trapped in the now. The now may therefore be called to 'cut' linear time.<sup>105</sup> If the past is in this way cut off forever, never to return again, the whole of what is past may in no way be present in the future.<sup>106</sup> Which leads to the conclusion that for the third synthesis both past and future (together the whole of time) are contracted in two minor syntheses so that the future can always be different from everything that has been the past.<sup>107</sup> This brings Deleuze to his core principle, that fixed identities are an illusion and only difference returns eternally.<sup>108</sup>

### 3.3 Difference-in-itself is first principle

*This paragraph will elaborate which conclusions Deleuze derives from his core argument (as it was explained in paragraph 3.2).*

Difference is traditionally understood as a difference in degree from something or difference in degree from something over time. In these cases, difference is subordinated to identity through the assumption that one can make comparisons between these. This happens for instance when difference plays a part in resemblance, analogy, and opposition.<sup>109</sup> But also in certain views on transformation,

104 Ibid., 96

105 Ibid., 102

106 Ibid., 102

107 Ibid., 103

108 Ibid., 13

109 Cliff Stagoll, "Difference" in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 74-75.

change and emergence when the new is investigated.<sup>110</sup> However, this understanding commits a fallacy of misplaced concreteness, described in paragraph 2.4. These can then be used to the benefit of dominant modes, as described in paragraph 1.2. However, identity is unable to express difference-in-itself.<sup>111</sup> The process that difference is, is not to be understood as a transformation or change from one fixed identity towards another. Rather, this real-as-process is to be thought of as happening fully in the now,<sup>112</sup> without reference to a transcendent state of the past. It simply does not suffice to keep using the same framework of identities and call the discrepancies between states over time difference. Difference in Deleuze's version does not rely on a relation with sameness. Instead, he discovers difference-in-itself, not grounded in anything else,<sup>113</sup> and thereby releases difference from its dependence on identity and sameness.<sup>114</sup> This allows Deleuze to promote difference-in-itself despite apparent relations to identity that can misleadingly be discovered in things.<sup>115</sup>

By uncovering difference-in-itself as the condition for real experiences, Deleuze accepts difference as his philosophical substance.<sup>116</sup> Two understandings

110 Daniel Smith, *Essays on Deleuze* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 235.

The 'new', Smith explains, is easily connected to or confused with other related issues such as: transformation, change, causality, determinism, and emergence. There is however a crucial distinction between these terms and the 'new' in the Deleuzian sense. The distinction lies in the fact that these five terms regard difference as the absence of identity 'resulting from the limitation of the subject.' The 'new' in the Deleuzian sense however, understands difference as a first principle like identity traditionally is.

111 John Marks, "Representation" in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 228 and for instance:

Williams, *Identity*, 126-127.

112 Constantin V. Boundas, "Ontology" in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 196.

113 Stagoll, *Difference*, 74-75.

114 Stagoll, *Difference*, 75.

115 Stagoll, *Difference*, 75.

116 Although Deleuze's analysis may be one of a kind, his conclusion shares aspects with philosophers going back to at least the Greek Anaximander (~610 BC - ~546 BC). Where Anaximander's tutor, Thales, held the view that everything was made of water, Anaximander proposed that there was a single fundamental substance, but one that he called 'unlimited', 'boundless' and 'infinite' and is to be understood as in motion, called the apeiron: "and the things from which is the coming into being for the things that exists are also those into which their destruction comes about, in accordance with what must be. For they give justice and reparation to one another for their offence in accordance with the ordinance of time-". And these views did not remain lim-

of substance can be separated within philosophy, one generic and one specific: First, substance can mean that which is the fundamental entity for a metaphysical system<sup>117</sup>: ‘what exists in itself before all relations’.<sup>118</sup> Such a version can only allow one thing to be substance, because if there were more, then there would have to be a relation between the two.<sup>119</sup> Second, substance can specifically point to things or objects regarded as the basic unit of a metaphysics.<sup>120</sup> Deleuze’s concern with both versions of substance is that it establishes ‘... an ultimate reality or ground – what really is – before its different expressions or perceptions.’<sup>121</sup> As will hopefully have become clear in paragraph 1.2.1, this would assume that there is no correlation at all between reality and our perceptions of it. For Deleuze, difference-in-itself as his substance is not some ultimate buildingblock like in the second sense but that which allows different things to be expressed and created.<sup>122</sup> Deleuze’s substance is not numerically several like in the second sense,<sup>123</sup> nor is it even one original thing like in the first sense, because it should not be thought of as something that is, but as a power that expresses itself differentiated through process. As such, he does not accept the object of substance but only the function.<sup>124</sup>

Two things are important to note here with regard to the expressions of difference-in-itself. First that, as a consequence, difference-in-itself as his substance ‘cannot be reduced to any of its expressions, effects or accidents.’<sup>125</sup> If we

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ited to the ancient Greeks. Also a text called ‘Tao Te Ching’ survives that presents the very influential ideas of the Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu (~604-507BC) which describes a similar power as being ‘the way’. This is only meant to establish the beginnings of a misleading argumentum ad populum so it is perhaps best not to dwell on it any longer.

117 Howard Robinson, “Substance”, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2014, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/substance/> (Accessed 05-03-2016).

118 Claire Colebrook, “Substance” in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 278, but a similar thing can be found on page 279.

119 279.

120 Robinson, *Substance*, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/substance/> (Accessed 05-03-2016).

121 Colebrook, *Substance*, 279.

122 Colebrook, *Substance*, 278-279.

123 Colebrook, *Substance*, 278.

124 Colebrook, *Substance*, 278, 279.

125 Colebrook, *Substance*, 279.

rid ourselves of the epistemic fallacy, we do not make the mistake of thinking that such apprehensions deplete ‘difference-in-itself’ fully of its expressions. Such reduction only moves in the opposite direction from difference-in-itself: towards fixation resulting in something that is rather than process resulting in a function. Second, none of the expressions of difference-in-itself can provide a definitive format for any of the others. Deleuze and Guattari insist that ‘... the limits of the potential for transformation are not determined by the normalising power of the majority’<sup>126</sup>, but by ‘a prior process of differentiation.’<sup>127</sup> Therefore, all categories posed as ontological truth have to be revised.<sup>128</sup> Any fixed identity will ultimately be governed by difference-in-itself as a condition for and part of its existence.<sup>129</sup> In an ontology of difference-in-itself, static beings thus give way to the power that difference-in-itself is.<sup>130</sup> Conceptions of expressions as identities confuse a fixed abstraction with that which is necessarily in becoming. However, in an unbifurcated experience, there are no fixed noumena to begin with which then express themselves as we come in contact with them.<sup>131</sup> Rather ‘A being just is its expression, its power to act.’<sup>132</sup> Underlying the identity of any object are ‘a thousand tensions that pull it in every direction’.<sup>133</sup> The solution that Deleuze poses to the correlationist impasse described in paragraph 1.2.4 is that anything that exists is just an expression of the unfolding process that ‘difference-in-itself’ is. As a consequence, any apprehension of such an expression (perhaps itself being a new expression) is fully connected to the real.

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126 Patton, *Difference + Politics*, 78.

127 Patton, *Difference + Politics*, 77.

128 Colebrook, *Substance*, 279

129 Williams, *Identity*, 128

130 Boundas, *Ontology*, 197.

131 Claire Colebrook, “Expression” in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 95-96.

132 Colebrook, *Expression*, 97.

133 Félix Guattari, “Architectural Enunciation”, in: *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, trans. Anrew Goffey (London: Bloomsbury, 1989), 237.

### 3.4 Deleuzian ethics substitutes progress for process

*This paragraph will explain the political consequences these conclusions (as were explained in paragraph 3.3) have, which comes down to the promotion of power to interact.*

The observations in paragraph 3.3 that no expression can provide a definitive format for any of the other expressions may not lead us to conclude that Deleuze and Guattari's politics is a politics of indifference. It leaves us the question: '... how might the concept of 'better' be used without creating a value judgement, or fabricating a universal condition that dominates difference?'<sup>134</sup> One way to empower minor tendencies is to "broaden the standard" and include the minority in the majority.<sup>135</sup> However, the simple promotion of the differences within the standard to such an extent that they become dominant modes themselves would be to keep operating within the same register. So, in addition to the dualism of majority/minority, they add a third term called 'minoritarian' that signifies a becoming-minor or diverging from the majority in order to draw attention to this.<sup>136</sup> Paul Patton claims that this is Deleuze and Guattari's real political focus.<sup>137</sup> The solution can therefore be found in substituting a concern with identities for a concern with forces.<sup>138</sup> Focussing on the tensions within, and figuring out what they are doing is according to Parr the ultimate political architectural problem.<sup>139</sup> Foucault advises that in order to figure out what these tensions are doing, one has to focus precisely on how these relations are pulled into all directions.<sup>140</sup> So, if we are to judge things on their increase in transformative capacities, we should focus first of all not on what things are, but on how things are, so we can figure out what they are doing.

By focussing on the processes within the expressions of difference-in-itself,

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134 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 205.

135 Patton, *Difference + Politics*, p 77.

136 Patton, *Difference + Politics*, p 77.

137 Patton, *Difference + Politics*, p 77.

138 Boundas, *Ontology*, 196-197.

139 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 207.

140 Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", *Critical Inquiry*, Summer (1982): 780.

judgements can be made based on transcendental values instead of transcendent ones. These two types of conditions are not to be confused as Deleuze explains.<sup>141</sup> Anything transcendental is a condition to exist for the thing it is transcendental to.<sup>142</sup> In contrast, that which is transcendent is always outside the thing it is transcendent to:<sup>143</sup> it "Refers to that which is a condition for some other practice, form of cognition, or activity."<sup>144</sup> Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari are able to move from a morality to one of ethics. The difference is that a morality is universal and absolute whereas an ethics is partial and relative.<sup>145</sup> As Deleuze writes: "There is no Good or Evil, but there is only good and bad."<sup>146</sup> In order for anything to be called good, it must be combining current relations with compatible relations in order to increase its power.<sup>147</sup> An increase in the capacity to interact, or agency thus becomes the criterium in Deleuzian ethics.<sup>148</sup> It aims to interact with that which is around us again, not with abstracted versions of it.<sup>149</sup> As such, Deleuze and Guattari propose not to promote any 'thing' but the process of change within them. They propose to only make value judgements with regard to processes. For Deleuze and Guattari, things and their forces within remain neutral until they prove to either obstruct (negative) or facilitate (positive) transformation.<sup>150</sup> Such a politics employs an ethics promoting potential to express everywhere it goes.<sup>151</sup> The goal therefore becomes to uncover transcendent relations (potestas) that impede immanent relations (potentia) on the basis of fallacious abstraction.

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141 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 42.

142 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 42.

143 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 42.

144 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 42.

145 Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 22.

146 Deleuze, *Spinoza: practical philosophy*, 22.

147 Deleuze, *Spinoza: practical philosophy*, 22-23

148 Baugh, *Transcendental Empiricism + Politics*, 290-291

149 Jonathan Roffe, "Exteriority/Interiority" in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 98.

150 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 206 and Rosi Braidotti, "The ethics of Becoming Imperceptible" in *Deleuze and Philosophy*, ed. Constantin Boundas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 137.

151 Braidotti, *The ethics of Becoming Imperceptible*, 134.



‘... power or agency is the prime concern of Deleuzian politics. Rather than universal principles being the criteria by which practices are evaluated, practices are judged entirely with respect to whether their effects increase or decrease someone’s or something’s power of acting.’<sup>152</sup>

### 3.5 Power is able to form a coherent structure

This paragraph will present a Deleuzian framework and vocabulary through which one can investigate processes of power.

The need to focus on diverging forces within things leads us to the question which concepts do not cover up the capacities to interact and are suited to speak about expressions in an open-ended way. With expressions and forces at the core of our conception one can start already from relations that remain open to the production or expression of new differences without determining capacities in advance.<sup>153</sup> In this case however, the question becomes how things take on coherence and consistency over time?<sup>154</sup> It becomes important to investigate how this power called ‘difference’ differentiates itself into its expressions without returning to relations of sameness.<sup>155</sup> This is because difference-in-itself as substance exists before all relations but has to account for its differentiated expressions we encounter in day to day life at the same time.<sup>156</sup> Such a view on the problem of coherence and consistency can be supported by understanding objects as multiplicities.<sup>157</sup>

Deleuze is provided with an alternative to relations of sameness by multiplicity theory. The explanation of multiplicities by Delanda starts with the world of differential geometries. Before the differential geometry, geometrical surfaces would be described according to arbitrary positioned fixed axes. However, using the

calculus, which describes the change in infinitesimal points of the surface, Gauss discovered that he was able to transfer the axes onto the surfaces themselves. In this way, no fixed referential space was required anymore. In this way Gauss discovered that a surface can be a space in itself. His disciple Riemann did the unexpected discovery of doing the same thing for not just three-dimensional surfaces, but for N-dimensional surfaces<sup>158</sup>. After that moment, anything -things with infinite differing dimensions- could mathematically be described while only referring to their own existence, without needing an extrinsic space as a reference.<sup>159</sup> Indeed the first two characteristics of a multiplicity are: 1. ‘its variable number of dimensions and’; 2. ‘the absence of a supplementary (higher)dimension imposing an extrinsic coordinatisation.’<sup>160</sup>

With the calculus and its focus on the infinitesimal points, the N-dimensional geometry was seen as only the space of possible states which the system can have, and the single points as actual states or ‘state spaces’. To account for similarities or predictability in the trajectories of the state spaces or for that matter of physical systems, Poincare studied the influence a two-dimensional ‘singularity’ might have. Such singularities, having only two degrees of freedom, will act as ‘attractors’ -which can also be steady state or periodic- for systems. In any case, they tend to force systems towards certain state spaces and this in turn can account for any similarities or predictabilities among different systems. In contrast to individual singularities special to a certain system, such shared singularities are called universal singularities.<sup>161</sup> For example, surface tension in soap bubbles is such an attractor which will move the ‘three-dimensional’ form of a soap-bubble towards a minimum point.

In order to avoid trading any essence of form for attracting singularities, we need to move away from a focus on the actual state of any thing studied. This can be done by studying the transformations it undergoes and the effects this has on its properties. Some transformations may leave some of the properties un-

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152 Baugh, *Trancedental Empericism + Politics*, 290-291

153 Colebrook, *Expression*, 96.

154 Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995*, ed. D Lapoujade (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2006), 179. Or alternatively: Braidotti, *The ethics of Becoming Imperceptible*, 137.

155 Adrian Parr, “Differentiation/Differenciación”, in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 78.

156 Colebrook, *Substance*, 279.

157 Boundas, *Ontology*, 197.

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158 N-dimensional surfaces are also called ‘manifolds’.

159 Manuel Delanda, *Intensive science and Virtual Philosophy* (London, New York: Bloomsbury, 2002), 3-4.

160 Ibid., 5

161 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 29.

changed, as can be imagined by rotating a sphere and a cube. A sphere however can be said to have more symmetry than a cube, in the sense that it remains unaltered by more transformations than the cube. For a sphere to become a cube, it has to go into a 'symmetry breaking transition'. An additional example might be the one of phase transitions of for instance water: at a critical value it's attractors are exchanged for other attractors. The full definition (adapted to the terminology of this thesis) Delanda gives for multiplicities is as follows: a nested set of trajectory fields related to each other by symmetry breaks, together with the distributions of attractors which define each of its embedded dimensions.<sup>162</sup> In this way, things can cohere according to 'their response to events that occur on them'.<sup>163</sup> What evolves from this is a structure of capacities to interact which represents the degrees of freedom and the individual and universal singularities.<sup>164</sup>

However, it has to be realised that a new relation of sameness would develop and start evaporating difference if any multiplicity's dimensions were allowed to format that which is outside it. So that which is outside the multiplicity has to retain its own existence. Thus, in Garcia's proposed model of being, what constitutes a thing is 'the difference between that which is in the thing and that in which thing is.'<sup>165</sup> In this way an object is an start-point, but it does not exclude all else from being: 'Being comes inside a thing and being goes outside it. A thing is nothing other than the difference between being inside and being-outside. Accordingly, the channel is never blocked.'<sup>166</sup> By not allowing either the inside or the outside of any multiplicity to format the other side, a difference is consituted. And it is differences which fuel the forces of process.<sup>167</sup> Therefore, keeping in mind that both the inside and the outside of a multiplicity are required to constitute a differ-

162 Manuel Delanda, *Intensive science and Virtual Philosophy*, 23. The original definition is as follows: 'a nested set of vector fields related to each other by symmetry breaking bifurcations, together with the distributions of attractors which define each of its embedded levels'.

163 Ibid., 11.

164 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 30.

165 Garcia, *Form and object*, 13.

166 Garcia, *Form and objects*, 11.

167 Manuel DeLanda, "Intensive & Topological Thinking" (Lecture given at the European Graduate School), Youtube.com, October 17, 2012, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wW2l-nBIDg> (Accessed April 29th 2016).

ence, any multiplicity can be understood to be influenced by two corresponding forces or powers. The first is called potentia, the second potestas. Potentia refers to a structuring of the capacities to interact that is an immanent relation 'in' things, while potestas refers to a structuring of the capacities to interact that is an transcendent relation 'to' things. The difference is therefore between constitutive power (potentia) and constituted power (potestas).<sup>168</sup> This field of powers is called the virtual by Deleuze.<sup>169</sup> For any given abstraction, the two powers potentia and potestas shape its agency. As such '... the capacity of a body is never defined by a body alone but is always aided and abetted by, and dovetails with, the field or context of its force-relations...'<sup>170</sup>

The capacity of the inside to interact, combined with the capacity of the outside to interact, creates an intersection of capacity. When a different synthesis of parts opens up a different relation between them this therefore changes the behaviour of the parts accordingly. As such, an emergent behaviour is formed that only depends on parts that have the same ontological status.<sup>171</sup> This involves no higher order of complexity, only a difference in behaviour through an opening up of different relations. In this view, no single identity (the inside or the outside) dictates the behaviour that emerges. Rather, this emergent behaviour is the '...

168 Antonio Negri, *Subversive Spinoza*, eds. Timothy S. Murphy, Michael Hardt, Edward Stolze and Charles T. Wolfe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), xv, for the distinction between constitutive and constituted power. Also:

Peter D. Thomas "Philosophical strategies: Althusser and Spinoza", in: *Historical Materialism*, 10, 3 (2002), 94. Or:

James Williams, "Immanence", in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 128 for the distinction between immanent relation 'in' and transcendent relation 'to'.

169 See: DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 29. Although DeLanda also uses the term 'possibilities' instead of 'capacities' to describe the virtual, I keep to 'capacities' because of its lack of conflict with Deleuze and Guattarian thought, who explicitly argue that the virtual is something other than the possible. The difference being that the first is real but not (yet) actual, and the second is not (yet) real. Also DeLanda seems to only use the terms as if they are interchangeable by lack of precision, not because he proposes a different understanding.

170 Gregory J. Seigworth & Melissa Gregg, "An inventory of shimmers" in: *The Affect theory Reader*, eds. Gregory J. Seigworth & Melissa Gregg (Durham/London, Duke University Press, 2010), 3.

171 Manuel Delanda, *Intensive science and Virtual Philosophy*, 51.

collective unintended consequence of intentional action, ..."<sup>172</sup> In this way, this new behaviour has in no way a relation of resemblance to the structure of virtual. It must be understood a creative act of differentiation.<sup>173</sup> The intersection of the virtual potentia and potestas defines the next event occurring to the multiplicity, transforming it and thereby creating a new multiplicity with capacities to interact, which can then again enter into relation with its outside, thus constituting a process. Therefore, the resultant new can renew itself everytime.<sup>174</sup> The resultant new from such intersection is called the 'actual' by Deleuze.

The virtual has been accused of being a transcendent realm to what is actual,<sup>175</sup> it is however important to understand that these are two linked processes that cannot do without each other.<sup>176</sup> In short, the actual is part of and prerequisite for the virtual to form its relation of difference. In terms of power, the actual refers to the structure of what it can do, while the virtual refers to the structure of how this will be transformed. By focussing not on the properties, but on behaviour, Deleuze's proposal to think of reality in terms of the virtual and the actual, allows us to explain the 'new' as emerging expressions of behaviour generated by the power of difference-in-itself. And while the properties of an object are finite, the capacities of a multiplicity to interact are never fully disclosed. Delanda writes that this is due to the absence of the significant presence of other objects that would, through their relation with the object, let the object exercise its capacities.<sup>177</sup> I however would propose such capacities remain undisclosed because they are dependent on the structured process of transformation of the multiplicity. This does in no way mean such capacities to interact are amorphous, just open-ended.<sup>178</sup> Due to this dynamic aspect, the virtuality of any multiplicity can be diagrammed only temporarily. This does not mean however that it cannot be described in a certain moment. Such a diagram therefore represents the degrees of freedom of an

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172 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 24.  
 173 Parr, *Differentiation/Differenciacion*, 79.  
 174 Marks, *Representation*, 229.  
 175 Williams, *Immanence*, 129-130.  
 176 Boundas, *Ontology*, 197.  
 177 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 10.  
 178 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 29.

assemblage and its individual and universal singularities.<sup>179</sup> According to Braidotti, coherence is therefore about a 'portion of forces that is stable enough - spatio-temporally speaking - to sustain and to undergo constant fluxes of transformation.'<sup>180</sup> As Delanda points out, this is exactly why it is of equal importance to pay attention to how these portions of forces maintain stability.<sup>181</sup> Investigating limits is thereby crucial to understanding how expressions can undergo sustained transformation to beyond these limits.<sup>182</sup> The subsequent elaboration of these sets of concepts will therefore not only elaborate on the instantaneous (the assemblage), and the stabilized (the territory), but also the constant (the code).

### 3.5.1 Assembling differences

The concept of assemblage is one concept that can help focus not on the 'what' but on the 'how'. The question: 'What is an assemblage?' points us immediately to the most crucial aspect of assemblage-theory. 'What is at stake is not truth but usefulness - how does it enable us to think?'"<sup>183</sup> Assemblage-theory bypasses reductionism and essentialism by not focussing on what they are but what they do.<sup>184</sup> Suitable to a necessary focus on power (see paragraph 3.4), the assemblage is not defined by the elements that make up the assemblage, but rather by the relations that are formed between elements.<sup>185</sup> An assemblage is not defined by its properties, but described by its 'capacities to interact'"<sup>186</sup>. An assemblage is an emerging power to do, not a thing. It is an expression of difference-in-itself (as described in paragraph 3.3), a behaviour.<sup>187</sup> Such an assembled power emerges

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179 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 30.  
 180 Braidotti, *The ethics of Becoming Imperceptible*, 137.  
 181 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 38.  
 182 Braidotti, *The ethics of Becoming Imperceptible*, 139,141.  
 183 Dovey, *Assembling architecture*, 132.  
 184 Dovey, *Assembling architecture*, 132, 133.  
 185 Dovey, *Assembling architecture*, 131, 134. But also for instance: Marc Schuilenburg, "Assemblages" in: *Deleuze Compendium*, eds. Ed Romein, Marc Schuilenburg, and Sjoerd van Tuinen (Amsterdam: Boom, 2009), 206.  
 186 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 10.  
 187 Graham Livesey, "Assemblage" in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 19.

when forces come together.<sup>188</sup> Assemblages can therefore be discovered in every structure.<sup>189</sup> In short, an assemblage is the Deleuze-Guattarian way of naming 'emergent combination of forces'.

Like other emergent behaviour, an assemblage does not work as a closed system but an open system of heterogeneous elements.<sup>190</sup> Through the framework of multiplicities, it becomes apparent that any assemblage can influence and be influenced by multiple dimensions.<sup>191</sup> Indeed, the elements that contribute to the assemblage always eligible to attach and disconnect,<sup>192</sup> precisely because an assemblage is a process.<sup>193</sup> This allows the dynamic of an assemblage to change continuously. If the connections of forces in the act of assemblage are made in unexpected ways, the assemblage is productive of new functions.<sup>194</sup> Because of this changing dynamic a concrete assemblage rejects definition,<sup>195</sup> because any definition would arrest the process that it is. An assemblage merely points to the coming together of any multiplicity and its outside, the process actualisation. Due to this dynamic aspect the virtuality of assemblages can at best be diagrammed temporarily.<sup>196</sup>

### 3.5.2 Territorialisation, deterritorialisation, reterritorialisation

The three concepts territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation all work on the concept 'territory'. A territory, in the sense that Deleuze and Guattari use it, is a construction of elements that by way of that particular construction expresses a certain rhythm. In animal behaviour, such a territory is often established or seized for the purpose of utilising the predictability of the rhythm.<sup>197</sup> As such, 'The

territory is the first assemblage, the first thing to constitute an assemblage...'<sup>198</sup> Territorialisation then, is the process that increases the stability<sup>199</sup> and thereby internal homogeneity<sup>200</sup> of the assemblage. It refers to the act of seizing forces from the milieu and incorporating them into the rhythmic territory.<sup>201</sup> Instead of regarding things to be drawn into hierarchical relations, making a territory involves what the ancient Greeks called 'metis': the expression of intelligence found in constructions that exploit the behaviour of materials.<sup>202</sup> Thus the function is a product of the territory instead of the other way around.<sup>203</sup> In this way, a territory can be viewed not as a functioning thing in the mechanistic sense, but as an expressive one.<sup>204</sup> The role of territorialisation is that of synthesis.<sup>205</sup>

Where territorialisation as a concept is only able to describe the process of elements from an abstract milieu entering a territory, the twin-concepts deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are necessary when two territories that work upon each other are considered. Where at first we were still dealing with one and the same territory that simply adds more and more to its rhythmic by territorialising processes, deterritorialisation is the process that accounts for the creation of a truly new territory when it encounters another element. Deterritorialisation always involves a deterritorialising element and the territory upon which it works.<sup>206</sup> It can be understood as what happens to the territory when it is itself territorialised by the deterritorialising element. The difference between territorialisation and deter-

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188 Livesey, *Assemblage*, 18, 19.  
 189 Livesey, *Assemblage*, 18.  
 190 Schuilenburg, *Assemblages*, 208. Also: Dovey, *Assembling architecture*, 134  
 191 Livesey, *Assemblage*, 18.  
 192 Schuilenburg, *Assemblages*, 209  
 193 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 28.  
 194 Livesey, *Assemblage*, 18, 19.  
 195 Schuilenburg, *Assemblages*, 207  
 196 Livesey, *Assemblage*, 18.  
 197 Eugene B. Young, "Territory; Territorialization", in *The Deleuze & Guattari Dictionary*, eds. Eugene

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B. Young, Gary Genosko and Janell Watson (London/New York: Bloomsbury 2013), 307-308.  
 198 Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, *A Thousand plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (London/New York: Continuum, 1987) 356, 323.  
 199 Dovey, *Assembling architecture*, 134. Also: DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 12.  
 200 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 12, 13  
 201 Young, *Territory; Territorialization*, 307. Also: Deleuze & Guattari, *A Thousand plateaus*, 347, 314  
 202 Benedict Singleton, "Speculative design", in *Speculative Aesthetics*, eds. Robin Mackay, James Trafford and Luke Pendrell (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2014), 24.  
 203 Livesey, *Assemblage*, 18-19.  
 204 Adrian Parr, "Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation" in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 70. Also: Young, *Territory; Territorialization*, 307-308.  
 205 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 14.  
 206 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 72.

ritorialisation is therefore subtle. Deterritorialisation is merely a territorialisation of an element regarded from the perspective of one territory that is being left in order for it to be incorporated into another territory. In this way the deterritorialised parts of the territory leave their solely territorial function and start making connection with the deterritorialising element.<sup>207</sup> ‘Perhaps deterritorialisation can best be understood as a movement producing change. [...] So, to deterritorialise is to free up the fixed relations that contain a body all the while exposing it to new organisations.’<sup>208</sup> In this way, ‘...deterritorialisation indicates the creative potential of an assemblage.’<sup>209</sup> And it is therefore that within an ontology of relations and process, deterritorialisations become the defining aspect of a territory.<sup>210</sup> In addition, the territorialisation of deterritorialised elements that occurs at the moment of deterritorialisation is called reterritorialisation.<sup>211</sup> These twin-concepts should not be viewed as opposites but as correlatives:<sup>212</sup> part of the same movement but from different perspectives.

However, for the sake of clarity, it should be noted that Deleuze and Guattari developed four types of deterritorialisation along two axis: the first axis is that of absolute and relative; the second that of positive and negative.<sup>213</sup> Keeping in mind the elaboration on the virtual and actual in paragraph 3.5 above, absolute deterritorialisation is a deterritorialisation in the virtual, while relative deterritorialisation is a deterritorialisation in the actual.<sup>214</sup> Virtual deterritorialization is absolute because the virtual includes the full range of capacities to interact of both the multiplicity and its outside, thus a deterritorialisation of the full range of becoming. Actual deterritorialization is relative because the actual is solely the interaction itself, thus deterritorialisation of only one part of becoming. Like the becoming in the virtual presupposes becoming in the actual and the other way around, absolute

deterritorialisation presupposes relative deterritorialisation and vice versa.<sup>215</sup> They cannot do without the other. Additionally, when different deterritorialising movements ‘connect’ to each other, accelerating their deterritorialising movement, they are called positive. When however a deterritorialisation ‘conjugates’ another, when it seizes and thereby obstructs another deterritorialisation, the deterritorialisation is called negative.<sup>216</sup>

Due to the acts of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, the territory never actually becomes a set of fixed relations. That is why any territory evades definition, like what could be noted for the assemblage in paragraph 3.5.1. Although being the result of a synthesis, the territory always point to nothing more than a moment in a process. As such, a territory can best be described as ‘... a series of constantly changing heterogeneous element and circumstances that come together for various reasons at particular times.’<sup>217</sup> From a political point of view, we should focus on transformative potentials, as hopefully became clear in paragraph ????. It is therefore that the deterritorialisations become the most important aspect of a territory.<sup>218</sup> More specifically, positive or connecting deterritorialisation is the most vital aspect because of its supportive character in relation to other deterritorialisations and therefore process at large.<sup>219</sup>

### 3.5.3 Coding, decoding, recoding

In addition to the first articulation of elements through territorialisation, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish a second articulation called ‘coding’. Where the territory is merely an articulation of expression, the code is an articulation that has become functional. As such it fixates the effects of territorialisation and further stabilizes an assemblage.<sup>220</sup> The difference between the territory and the code is therefore that

207 Eugene B. Young, *Territory; Territorialization*, 309. Also: Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 72, 73.  
 208 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 69  
 209 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 69  
 210 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 72  
 211 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 73  
 212 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 69, 73  
 213 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 73-74  
 214 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 70, 73-74

215 Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson (London/New York: Verso, 1994), 88.  
 216 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 73-74.  
 217 Kylie Message, ‘‘Territory’’, in: *The Deleuze dictionary revised edition*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 280-281.  
 218 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 69, 72.  
 219 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 74.  
 220 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 14-15.

it, by its fixating effect, performs a role of exclusion from the processes at work.<sup>221</sup> Therefore codes help the assemblage form not only stability but an identity.<sup>222</sup> In this way, coding 'not a matter of the production of production but rather the production of recording.'<sup>223</sup> However, as with the territory, the code is accompanied by processes of decoding and recoding. To decode is to erode the rigid identity and to recode is to form such identity anew from this process. And again, as with deterritorialisation, decoding forms the assemblage's transformative potential.<sup>224</sup>

### 3.6 Transformative potential unleashed by positive deterritorialization

*This paragraph concludes that it is the process of remaining inclusive and opening up to otherness that allows promotion of power to interact to result in delimiting transformative potential.*

With a focus on power as was described in the paragraphs above, it has hopefully become clear that the political in the built environment is in no way necessarily a homogenizing force as it is in normalization explained in paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3. Rather, a focus on power in the Deleuzian sense directs us to a focus on the transformative potential inherent in spatial relations. With regard to this, Stavrides elaborates on a spatial vocabulary for practices of positive deterritorialization which he calls 'expanding commoning' as an alternative to practices of homogenizing normalization.<sup>225</sup>

Spaces of expanding commoning operate in a register different from private, regular communal and public spaces. This is because common spaces are not controlled by any authoritative group.<sup>226</sup> Rather than simply having a different ownership status, spaces of expanding commoning reject the system of property

and ownership<sup>227</sup> that blocks the transformative potential of their spatial rhythms. Not having their transformative potential blocked by any group of owners, spaces of expanding commoning keep making use of their transformative potential. Spaces of expanding commoning are therefore best understood as spatial relations that are created and practiced.<sup>228</sup> Such practices at any time aim to destroy the boundaries of public and private in order to be able to keep promoting transformative potential.<sup>229</sup> Practices of expanding commoning, like those of positive deterritorialization aim for an opening towards that which is outside relational boundaries of normalization.<sup>230</sup> Practices that lead to the creation of spaces of expanding commoning are practices that promote encounters and negotiations. They aim to reveal potential inherent in the urban environment.<sup>231</sup> As such, "Spaces and actions are redefined by being connected in new ways [...]"<sup>232</sup> and aims to keep being inclusive.<sup>233</sup> In its attempts to remain inclusive, expanding commoning opens up to otherness.<sup>234</sup>

If the goal is to remain inclusive, this raises the question how already established power relations are to do so. Three practices together are able to ensure this. First there is a need for comparison between different practices. In order to be compared, differences between practices are encouraged to be exposed instead of necessarily staying under the radar when threatened by practices of normalization. Second, there is a need for translation between different practices. In Deleuzian vocabulary this means the creation of a reterritorialization not trapped in the patterns of the original territories. Third then, comparability and translation enable potential relations between practices and thereby enable forms of sharing by opening up that defy the hierarchical majority/minority division of power.<sup>235</sup> Practices of expanding commoning are in this way not directed at spatial dis-articulation, additions or simply the result of contingent events. Expanding commoning aims

221 Deborah Hauptmann & Andrej Radman, "Northern Line", in: *Deleuze and architecture*, eds. H  l  ne Fricot and Stephen Loo (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 48.

222 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 14-15.

223 Hauptmann & Radman, *Northern Line*, 48.

224 Parr, *Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation*, 71

225 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 33, 38, 222.

226 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 2, 41, 168.

227 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 261.

228 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 2-3.

229 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 261.

230 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 3.

231 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 6.

232 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 163.

233 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 38-39.

234 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 155, 168-169, 251.

235 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 41-48.

towards transformations of qualities. Expanding commoning, like Deleuzian positive deterritorialisation, takes as a startingpoint concrete hierarchical powerrelations and struggles “against dominant practices of enclosure” and exclusion embedded in these in order to arrive at new powerrelations that aim towards inclusiveness.<sup>236</sup> Spaces of expanding commoning are therefore projective of possible spatial rhythms, expressive of the shared values of those who are creating it, and exemplary of the possibility to exceed the dominant modes that control its transformative potential.<sup>237</sup>

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236 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 262, 266-267.

237 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 2.

## 4. CASE STUDY: PRACTICED OPENING

The previous chapters have made a case for an understanding of architecture as power practices. Moreover, paragraph 3.5 explained how structure can be uncovered within these these power practices. Transformative potential, according to paragraph 3.5, originates from acts of assemblage and, if all goes well, results in positive deterritorializations of rhythms present in the urban environment. Of course, architectural space is full of rhythms. So in order to be applied practically in architecture, these important steps need to be related to spatial rhythms.

In the following paragraphs a concrete example of an housingproject in the Netherlands that is subject to these regulatory influences will be developed. The chosen housingproject is IJburg block 44a, city of Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and will be elaborated on in the following paragraph. It is important we investigate the concrete normalisation processes influencing IJburg block 44a in order to be able to uncover what transformative potential they impede.<sup>238</sup> For that purpose the curious case of Maurits Bingerplantsoen #9 will be used as an illustration of our problem, as described in Chapters 1 and 2, in the built environment. Afterwards, the problem will be expanded to take block 44a into consideration entirely.

### 4.1 Negotiated normalization leads to Dutch housing codes

As was explained in paragraph 1.1, theoretically sovereign individuals negotiate on the interactions they and other individuals have with their environment in order to protect their individual and collective interests. Like in the late-medieval Dutch society, the result of the many agreements today are many different legal entities comprised of an ever changing complex of property, privileges, rights and duties in relation to the other legal entities present.

Fundamental to dealing with the issues of conflicting interest internal to collectives, has been the uniformisation of the distinction between private and public domains.<sup>239</sup> In this regard, the ‘public’ domain expresses the egalitarian view in

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238 Stavrides, *Common Space*, 13-14.

239 Han Meyer, Introduction to *Stedebouwkundige Regels voor het Bouwen*, by Han Meyer, John Westrik and MaartenJan Hoekstra, vol.3 of *De Kern van de Stedebouw in het Perspectief van de Eenentwintigste Eeuw*,

which all citizens within the collective are equal, the 'private' domain the libertarian view in which all citizens are able to express themselves freely as individuals. This relation between private and public interests is an important question within building regulation.<sup>240</sup> This is mainly because, due to their adjacency, these domains influence each other. Therefore the question arose to what point the private domain should be allowed to influence the public domain. Multiple answers were developed in response to this question, which either leaned more to the egalitarian or the libertarian view with a prioritisation of the interests of the collective as a total or those of the individuals within the collective respectively.

Generally speaking, despite the internal tensions, the egalitarian view bloomed in the Netherlands from the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and the start of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>241</sup> Edensor's observation about the increase of regulations seems also applicable to housing in particular. The application of increasingly more rules and regulations with regard to houses is a phenomena that can be largely led back to the influence of industrialisation on the production of houses.<sup>242</sup> In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the population of cities in Europe expanded rapidly under the influence of industrialisation. As a consequence, three concerns gained influence in relation to the regulations. First of all optimal economic development, second, issues related to the health of the population, and third the question of the formation of a new urban society.<sup>243</sup> Mass construction of cheap homes since the mid-eighteenth century by businessmen left inhabitants with prefabricated shells to occupy or to appropriate to their individual needs at best. Since the mid-nineteenth century state authorities began to apply increasingly elaborate health and safety requirements to these homes to as it were protect the inhabitants from the power these businessmen exerted on the housingmarket. This provided inhabitants with substantially improved housing-conditions. However, exactly this trade-off of regulations for improved conditions was when, from the perspective of the inhabitant, the biggest normaliza-

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240 Meyer, Introduction to *Stedebouwkundige Regels voor het Bouwen*, 13.

241 Meyer, Introduction to *Stedebouwkundige Regels voor het Bouwen*, 13.

242 Pavlos Lefas, *Dwelling and Architecture: From Heidegger to Koolhaas* (Berlin: Jovis Verlag GmbH, 2009), 110.

243 Meyer, Introduction to *Stedebouwkundige Regels voor het Bouwen*, 12.

tion took place.<sup>244</sup>

The above observation more specifically also applies to Dutch Housing. For instance, the law on dwelling (*Woningwet*) enabled the development of housing corporations leading to prefabricated construction on a large scale.<sup>245</sup> And there were two important influences on the development of a highly regulated urbanism that matched the blooming egalitarian relation. The first was the introduction of the property leasehold system in large cities (like for instance Amsterdam) in 1896 and the constitution of the law on dwelling (*Woningwet*) in 1901. With these, the government had two important tools to regulate the relation between public and private in urban developments. One of private law, the other of public law respectively.

## 4.2 IJburg Block 44a introduced

In figure 1 you can see a satellite photo of the Amsterdam region. I hope you recognize the city-centre (figure 2), the airport (figure 3) and the Markermeer (figure 4). Right at the border of the city at the Markermeer is IJburg (figure 5). IJburg itself follows the Dutch delta-tradition of creating land out of the water. In this case in the IJmeer (IJ-lake) next to Amsterdam. Already in 1965, the architects Van den Broek and Bakema envisioned a city in this lake, housing about 350.000 residents. The actual decision to develop a neighbourhood in this lake was taken as recent as 1996. Due to the financial crisis and environmental concerns with regard to the development, currently about half of IJburg's total plan has been executed. Among the housing projects already completed is Block 44a (figure 6). And this is the housing-block we will be dealing with as a case study.

IJburg block 44a is designed by Holvast and Van Woerden Architects. It contains 28 single family rowhouses shaped in six main types. On two sides it is surrounded by a regular street-pattern that can be found in any Vinex area. But the other two sides are a bit more special. One side borders a park that is waiting to be transformed into a public transport artery, the other side even borders a small lake and looks out onto the Diemerpark. All in all, we are dealing with a bit of an exotic

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244 Lefas, *Dwelling and Architecture*, 110-111.

245 Meyer, Introduction to *Stedebouwkundige Regels voor het Bouwen*, 14.



housingblock.

But in order to explain the problem that I investigated in IJburg block 44a, it is of no use to tell you what IJburg block 44a is. Instead I intend to shift the focus to what block 44a can do. Because this project is about problems regarding potential and capacities. So next, I intend to explain to you the power processes that are giving shape to IJburg block 44a.

### 4.3 Block 44a's capacities to interact structured

*This paragraph will elaborate on the power framework applicable to the concrete case-study; IJburg Block 44a, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.*

This thesis limited its problem in chapter 1 to the exertion of power by regulations. For the sake of clarity it is good to mention that this explanation benefits in clarity from the assumption that these regulations find themselves in a stable situation. As such it already permits itself a fair amount of abstraction. It is important to keep in mind however that the point is precisely to promote the processes of change within this situation as was explained in paragraph 3.4. Additionally, as this thesis subject is *architecture* in relation to power process, this promotion of process is developed from a structuring of the power taking the architecture itself as the point of reference. In other words what will follow is a structuring of IJburg block 44a's capacities to interact by regulations.

#### 4.3.1 Regulations / Building codes

##### Dutch Sovereignty

As a startingpoint it is important to note that only the Dutch state has formal sovereignty with regard to IJburg block 44a. The structuring of IJburg block 44a starts with the border of the Dutch State (figure 7). It seems silly to show you this but I insist this is important. Because although it is a very large collective, the Dutch State is the smallest collective that holds sovereign power over this housingblock. Sovereignty simply put, is an agreed upon state of ultimate say in affairs. This means that no matter how they developed in history, today all regulations applicable to this housingblock are empowered by the Dutch state. However, it is im-

portant to realise that this situation only exists as a practice that needs to sustain itself while being contested. As long as it lasts, sovereignty is nothing more than an exclusive privilege agreed upon indefinitely.

##### Algemene bepalingen omgevingsrecht

One important way of regulating the built environment is admittance by way of legality, which comes down to a restriction of the liberty to build.<sup>246</sup> The Dutch general law on the environment explicitly states that it is prohibited to execute a project that is entirely or partially comprised of the act of building construction without a permit.<sup>247</sup>

##### Ownership is exclusive right to interaction

Luckily there isn't just pure sovereignty. Individuals and smaller collectives can forms of authority too. A popular way of managing this is cutting things up into property and ownership-status. This system is simple: you can decide what happens to your property, I can decide what happens with mine, and so on.

Perhaps the simplest way of admittance by way of legality is therefore the principle of property and ownership. Ownership in the Netherlands is today described in the very first article of the respective law as 'the most encompassing right a person can have to a matter'.<sup>248</sup> Ownership in this way is a claim to exclusivity with regard to the capacity to interact with the property. It forms a simple yet highly effective system to structure events in the built environment. Ownership and

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246 See: Kocken, *Van bouwen, breken en randen in de lage landen*, Chapter 5. The instruments of urban regulation that are used to protect these interest can typically take three forms: First, that of admittance by way of legality, which comes down to a restriction of the liberty to build; Second, that of conditioning and stimulation of preferred outcomes if these are not enforceable; Third, that of competition and selection, often with regard to a lack of preference. Of course, combinations of more than one of these are very well possible. Already with regard to form many relations can be regulated, such as: Issue limit; Alignment; Allotment; Positioning of the building; Procession of the border between public and private; Density; Quality of the urban appearance.

247 Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, Wet algemene bepalingen omgevingsrecht, BWBR0024779 (2008), Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.1, artikel 2.1, lid 1a, as further specified by this law's Chapter 1, artikel 1.1 under 'bouwen', <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0024779/2016-07-01> (accessed 08-27-2016).

248 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 5 Zakelijke rechten, BWBR0005288 (2014), Titel 1, Artikel 1, <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0005288/2014-01-01/0> (accessed 08-09-2016).

property indeed occupy a prominent place in the Dutch state. Ownership in the Netherlands is today described in the very first article of the respective law as 'the most encompassing right a person can have to a matter'. The owner has the exclusive right to use the property insofar this takes into account limitations of this right by other law.<sup>249</sup> In relation to real estate this right is attached to the land upon which buildings exist. Ownership of the land encompasses ownership of all buildings that are fixed to the land as far as they are not part of someone else's real estate ownership.<sup>250</sup>

The law on ownership prescribes the use of architecture by submitting itself in favor of the dominant neo-liberalist mode of production.<sup>251</sup> This mode includes for instance 'forces of privatisation, consumption, competition and commodification'<sup>252</sup>, or what can perhaps in short be called the 'forces of capital accumulation'<sup>253</sup>

### Land registry administrates ownership

Logically, such a division of this calls for a neat registration of these rights. To this end, the Dutch 'Kadasterwet' provides structure. It prescribes 'administrative data with regard to real estate' and an accompanying map. This law explicitly states it serves to promote legal security in relation to real estate with regard to justicial relations, economic relations and governmental relations.<sup>254</sup> The part of this accompanying map relevant for IJburg Block 44a is shown in figure 8. As can be seen, the land on which IJburg block 44a rests is divided into 28 plots and is surrounded by two larger plots: #1937 and #1938.

It can be noted that the municipality of Amsterdam exercises great power in the form of ownership over the entire land on which IJburg block 44a rests. The fact that the land is owned by the municipality of Amsterdam means this municipal-

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249 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 5 Zakelijke rechten, Titel 1

250 Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, Burgerlijk Wetboek Boek 5 Zakelijke rechten, Titel 3, artikel 20:1 and 20:1f in specific.

251 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 204, 207.

252 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 203.

253 Parr, *Politics + Deleuze + Guattari + Architecture*, 206.

254 Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, Kadasterwet, BWBR0004541 (2017), artikel 1a and 2a, <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0004541/2017-03-10#Hoofdstuk1> (accessed 04-02-2017)

ity can exercise additional power besides its governmental power. Amsterdam is different from other municipalities in that after new parts of the city have been developed, like IJburg block 44a, it most often refrains from selling the land to the inhabitants. Instead, Amsterdam leaseholds the land to inhabitants or users.

Additionally, from this registry we can observe that currently, the ownership of the housingblock itself is again divided into 29 parts. This division corresponds neatly with the division of the land into 28 plots. 27 parts are houses and placed on 27 of the 28 plots. The last two parts are a house located on top of a public utility sharing plot #1918.

### Dutch governance delegated to municipalities

The biggest issue however, roots in another collective. The Dutch constitution determines the division of government of the land into municipalities.<sup>255</sup> Within the Dutch state, you can thus find smaller municipalities. IJburg block 44a is located in the municipality of Amsterdam (figure 9). So besides falling under the sovereign governance of the Dutch state, block 44a falls under the additional government of the municipality of Amsterdam.

### Woningwet

The Dutch law on dwelling dictates the existence of technical prescriptions with regard to the construction, condition and use of any building. To this end, these prescriptions may refer to standards and quality statements. It is explicitly prohibited to construct or preserve a building in a state that does not meet these prescriptions, unless a permit does explicitly allow it.

Additionally, every municipality council is required to create an aesthetic code that states the criteria for the aesthetic quality of buildings. Every municipality is required to create a buildingcode that among other regulates the existence of an aesthetic review committee. This committee advises on the extent to which buildings meet these aesthetic criteria.

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255 Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Grondwet, BWBR0001840 (2008), Chapter 7, artikel 123, <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0001840/2008-07-15#Hoofdstuk7> (accessed 08-09-2016).

## Bouwverordening Amsterdam

The buildingcode that Amsterdam has created on the basis of the Dutch law on dwelling, does indeed prescribe the composition of the aesthetic review committee. Its decision dynamics are for our purposes however not that relevant. What is more interesting is that this buildingcode also prescribes general criteria on the level of urbanism. These criteria for instance describe the relation of buildings to the frontside and backside alignment and open spaces between and around buildings.

## Welstand Amsterdam

The aesthetic code that Amsterdam has created, states the guidelines on which the aesthetic review committee bases its advice. These guidelines are ordered by the character of the proposal under consideration. Plans involving cultural-historic important values like monuments have particular requirements. Small adjustments like facade-adjustments, building additions, dormers, roof terraces, solar panels et cetera have their general set of guidelines. Larger projects are considered on the basis of guidelines for specific areas or spatial systems. For block 44a, this involves the criteria specific to IJburg. These criteria describe such relations as: situation; building mass; architectural explication; materialisation and colour. Plans that do not fit in either of the above guidelines can be considered on the basis of six general criteria for aesthetic quality that Amsterdam employs. These six criteria are created with some explicated purposes in mind. Most important for our purposes will prove to be the use of these criteria for plans of exceptional aesthetic quality that do not follow the criteria specific to a specific area. The six criteria concern: First, the relation between form, use and construction; Second, the relation between building and surroundings; Third, the meaning of forms in social-cultural context; Fourth, balance between clarity and complexity; Fifth, relations of scale and proportions; Sixth, relations of material, texture, colour and light.<sup>256</sup>

## Wet ruimtelijke ordening

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256 Gemeente Amsterdam, De Schoonheid van Amsterdam (2016), Chapter 3, [http://zoeken.amsterdam.raadsinformatie.nl/cgi-bin/showdoc.cgi?action=view/id=295713/type=pdf/Bijlage\\_7\\_De\\_schoonheid\\_van\\_Amsterdam\\_2016\\_25\\_mei.pdf](http://zoeken.amsterdam.raadsinformatie.nl/cgi-bin/showdoc.cgi?action=view/id=295713/type=pdf/Bijlage_7_De_schoonheid_van_Amsterdam_2016_25_mei.pdf) (accessed 08-27-2016).

The Dutch law on spatial ordering dictates that all municipalities, which in the case of block 44a means the municipality of Amsterdam, are required to create a development plan for all the land it governs. In this development plan municipalities are required to create regulations for the use of the land and buildings in relation to these developments.<sup>257</sup>

## Bestemmingsplan Amsterdam

Amsterdam's development plan relevant for IJburg block 44a<sup>258</sup> is a document containing an explanation, rules and a map (figure 10). In relation to block 44a and its immediate surroundings we can distinguish five important categories of intended future development: 'dwelling 1'; 'Garden'; 'Traffic 1'; 'Greenery 1'; and 'Reservation future connection public transport'.

These categories are all made up of different regulations and are related to different ground surfaces explicated on the accompanying map.

The surface related to the category of regulations titled 'Dwelling 1' is intended for dwelling, home-business and/or short-stay. This includes accompanying driveways, gardens and yards, secondary buildings, public utilities, greenery and water. Home-businesses are however limited to 30% of a building and its secondary buildings, with a maximum of 50m<sup>2</sup>. Additionally, home-businesses are limited to a certain category of activities. Short-stay has been defined and thereby limited to temporary living in an independent home for a minimum of 5 nights and a maximum of 6 months. Moreover it is explicitly stated that this surface can only be used for the intended purposes. It is lastly also stated that: any buildings have to be erected within the limits of the surface; the specified maximum gutter- and construction heights (6 and 9 meters respectively) may not be exceeded; the surface may in its entirety be build upon; only existing cellars and basements are allowed.

The surface related to the category of regulations titled 'Garden' is

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257 Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, Wet Ruimtelijke Ordening, BWBR0020449 (2006), Chapter 3, Artikel 3.1, lid 1. <http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0020449/2016-04-14> (accessed 08-27-2016).

258 Gemeente Amsterdam, Bestemmingsplan IJburg, NL.IMRO.0363.M1107BPSTD-OH02 (2014), [http://www.ruimtelijkeplannen.nl/documents/NL.IMRO.0363.M1107BPSTD-OH02/r\\_NL.IMRO.0363.M1107BPSTD-OH02\\_index.html](http://www.ruimtelijkeplannen.nl/documents/NL.IMRO.0363.M1107BPSTD-OH02/r_NL.IMRO.0363.M1107BPSTD-OH02_index.html) (accessed 08-26-2016).

intended for gardens (including walkways), greenery, squares, playgrounds, parking where 'parking' is explicated on the map, water and use in accordance with the adjacent buildings. It is explicitly stated that on this surface, only parking facilities and intention-related constructions -not being buildings- can be erected. Such parking facilities can be maximum 1m high and have an entrance of maximum 3m high. Additionally, parking places that are already erected have to be sustained. Building extensions are allowed solely at the back-facade, their area can occupy maximum of 50% of the intended surface, can extend no more than 3 meters horizontally and, can be maximum 4 meters high. Any intention-related constructions can be maximum 2m high, unless these are used as plot separation in which case they can only be 1m high. Again, only existing cellars and basements are allowed.

The surfaces intended for 'Traffic 1' are intended for roads, streets, squares, bicycle lanes, pedestrian zones, parking facilities and driveways. This includes accompanying public facilities, greenery, water, terraces, delivery facilities and playgrounds. Again, it is explicitly stated that on this surface, only intention-related constructions -not being buildings- can be erected and only existing cellars and basements are allowed.

The surfaces intended for 'Greenery 1' are intended for greenery, bicycle lanes, pedestrian zones, playgrounds, water, public facilities and artworks. Again, it is explicitly stated that on this surface, only intention-related constructions -not being buildings- can be erected, which can be maximum 6m high.

Last, the surface intended for 'Reservation future connection public transport' is intended to counter any developments that might obstruct such a connection.

Apart from this, Amsterdam's development plan allows the exceeding of the explicated building limits under certain conditions. For subsidiary parts of buildings like gutters etc. the allowance is 0,2m. For secondary parts like architraves etc. the allowance is 1m. Also, the maximum building heights may be exceeded by maximum 1m. Moreover, by way of a permit, the municipality may allow the exceeding of building limits if it involves less than 1m height, or less than 3m height for a rooftop addition in case this fits the surrounding urbanism, or less than 2m height

for a rooftop terrace, or less than 3m for balconies, stairways, galleries and other secondary elements.

### **4.3.2 Power structures lead to structured buildings**

As could be seen in figure 8, the housing block is cut up in neat little territories that have all been ordered with a number in the kadaster. And if we put the building plans in figure 11 over these territories, you can see in figure 12 that the row houses indeed carefully follow these plotlines.

Let's take a look again at figure 10, representing the bestemmingsplan. We can for instance see a little form that should contain 'Dwelling 1', a form that should contain 'Garden 1', shapes intended for transport, and so on. And again if we put the building plans over these codelines in figure 13, you can see that they never do anything illegal.

So these building codes have quite a bit of impact on what the architecture of Block 44a can do. These regulations together results in a complex and dynamic process of rights and duties connected to different collectives.

And it is not just laws and plans as wishful intentions. This actually happens in reality. If we take a walk around the block you can see in figures 14-22 all the buildings neatly lined up, and all the outside furniture exactly within the borders of the private plots. And next to that, a sidewalk kept empty. And again... And again...

But with figure 23-24 we arrive at the Maurits Bingerplantsoen. There something strange occurs. The buildings are neatly lined up as they should. But this side of the block does not have any private outside space, and yet it looks like the outside space is used at least semi-privately. In the next paragraph we will investigate this out-of-order phenomenon by way of the curious case of Maurits Bingerplantsoen #9.

## **4.4 Maurits Bingerplantsoen #9 capacity to interact limited**

The Bouwbesluit dictates that every house should have 6m<sup>2</sup> of private outside space, which is achieved at Maurits Bingerplantsoen #9 by a terrace on the

second floor, bordering the livingroom. A seemingly great solution. Who would not want to be able to walk right onto their terrace from their livingroom. I will tell you who: the residents of Maurits Bingerplantsoen #9. The simple reason is that their house borders directly on a quiet park filled with sunshine, trees, and more space than the terrace could ever provide. It is even in the streetname: Maurits Binger 'Plantsoen'. The residents simply have no desire for such a terrace (figure 25). In absence of imagined usefulness they contemplated on alternative uses for the terrace space before moving in.

Residents of houses almost identical to theirs also bordering the plantsoen had been allowed to transform their terraces into livingroom-extensions (figure 26). This was allowed for the simple reason that in case the plantsoen would ever be transformed into the public transport passageway it had always been reserved for, the residents could always obey the bouwbesluit by transforming their roof into a terrace. So the residents of #9 bought their house on the assumption that they were allowed to transform their terrace into a livingroom extension, making the latter almost twice as big (figure 1). However, municipality decided this had to be considered illegal after all because the park is not their private property, and responded with: 'no, not allowed anymore'.

So the residents of Maurits Bingerplantsoen #9 are now left with a house that they perhaps would not have bought knowing all this. One could simply say it's their own fault, they should have investigated more thoroughly, but I insist this is too simplistic. After all, there still is a valid alternative. I can see it, I hope you can now see it, the neighbours saw it, and even the municipality formerly acknowledged it. The situation becomes even more strange however.

Officially, the plotlimit of the houses we are talking about follows the facade line exactly (figures 27-28). This means residents officially cannot have benches, picnic-tables and such outside. Even though there is plenty of space left, and almost no-body to use it. I'm serious, this part of IJburg public spaces are dimensioned like they should be able to host a parade sometime soon. There is however no such activities penetrating this deep into this part of IJburg, for the simple reason that such activities are not allowed there by way of the Bestemmingsplan. So the only ones going to use it are residents and the neighbours. Those quickly

decided it would be no problem at all if the residents put their benches and picnic tables in front of their door. And they therefore started a union called 'Friends of the Maurits Bingerplantsoen' and wrote the municipality to ask if this could officially be tolerated. In contrast to what could be expected from the case of #9, the municipality responded 'Yes', and the Friends in the union are now happily enjoying the park including benches and picnic-tables, plants, sandpits barbecues and the like, as you can see in figure 25 & 26.

Getting back to the curious case of #9: The municipality does actually acknowledge the possibility to use the park as an outside space, but it keeps limiting the alternatives for their terraces to what is legally allowed, though the interests behind these regulations are in fact met by an officially tolerated illegal alternative. I understand why, I really do. I just think there could be another valid alternative for #9 if all parties would be open to a renegotiation of the regulations. Now this is just one example. I did not know it existed before I decided that IJburg block 44a would be my case-study. My gut-feeling is that such situations can be found all over IJburg; Amsterdam; and I dare say the Netherlands because in a moment we will also investigate national regulations. But perhaps simply everywhere you go looking. Because everywhere you go looking you can find a powerstructure. The type of urban development that IJburg presents is even named after a governmental document: it is a VINEX-location, named after "De VIerde Nota EXtra." And if this is the case, we encounter an interesting problem. We need to realize ourselves that this is happening on a large scale. And I believe we should adjust our behavior as a consequence of this realization.

### False abstractions in the power process

At this point I would like to highlight the problematic aspect at play in the regulation that shapes the curious case of Maurits bingerplantsoen #9. In the legal process that caused, and still maintains the situation explained, I uncovered two false abstractions.

For instance: Lets say we have a bunch of houses and everybody gets to pick their favorite colour for the facade. The first pick red, the second yellow, the third green, and so on (figures 29-33). But if regulation kicks in, it evaporates all

the different opinions (figure 34) and decides on one solution: red (figure 35).

The first false abstraction that can occur is that of many individuals interests into one collective interest. At this point lawmakers seem to think that such a collective interest is able to present a fitting solution to everyone's satisfaction. This is however not the case. Such a collective interest starts to exclude architectural potential. In this case: green, yellow and blue facades.

Moreover, on the next moment of polling everyone's favorite colour, opinions prove to have shifted (figure 36). Perhaps at some point red is not the majority vote anymore (figure 37). Or at some point there is nobody left at all who likes a red facade (figure 38). But if legislation keeps kicking in, it just evaporates all opinions (figure 34) and decides the facades should be red, red and some more red (figure 35).

The second false abstraction is a thereby lack in flexibility, which happens when collectives adjust too slow to the changing interests of the individuals in it. So that even when nobody likes red anymore, the facades still have to be red.

In a nutshell, this aspect of the regulations presents a fixation of expressions, which excludes architectural potential. It, let's say, narrows the bandwidth.

### Legal advice

This thesis deals with issues of law in the built environment, it is however not meant as an advice on law-making. The legal aspects are used only as context for the designstrategy developed. I would however like to take the opportunity this thesis provides to also give an advice on how the system of laws could be adjusted in light of the issues this thesis addresses. Because one important legal construction that could be used as an antidote to fixation already exists. It is called the union, and has already helped to express an alternative in the Maurits Bingerplantsoen in a more nuanced way.

I would advise the municipality to delegate more of its decisions to local unions in that manner. Anyone who feels connected to the responsibilities of such a union should be able to enter this union freely and participate in the process of decision making. In this way additionally, anyone who does not feel connected to the responsibilities of the local union can refrain from participation and give people

that do the freedom to express themselves. Simply because you vote for a certain political party on the level of the municipality, primarily on the topic of lets say taxes for instance, does not mean you should be satisfied that this party uses your vote to also spread an opinion about architecture that is not yours all over Maurits Bingerplantsoen #9 for instance.

## **4.5 Spatial practices of positive deterritorialization**

*This paragraph will attempt to develop the case-study (as introduced in paragraph 4.1 and 4.3) with the Deleuzean attitude towards power (as it was explained in chapter 3) in mind.*

### **4.5.1 What can design do?**

This project investigates a housing-block which has its capacity to interact limited by rules and regulations. As was explained directly above, this thesis is not an advice on law-making. I cannot help in this regard. It is not my intention to have the system of laws changed. I simply want to offer architects a designstrategy that inserts itself in the current system of laws. If faced with problems of illegality, this strategy could prove to open up limitations on potential designs.

My proposal is to intentionally disregard specific rules to be able to get to an alternative that lies outside these rules. Hereby it illustrates an alternative that might be considered as valid as the alternatives that are allowed within the rules, although it is currently illegal. Hopefully this illustration encourages a reconsideration of the rules and regulations relevant to this block. By way of opening up the regulations through renegotiation, such an excluded potential transformation can be included again to the benefit of all involved. It simply aims to show that there might be valuable solutions that do not have to be illegal at all. I believe that we could benefit from entering into previously silent discussions about the built environment. To open ourselves to alternatives instead of keeping to the rigorously abstracted, fixating regulations. We have to embrace constant renegotiations.

The project developed presents a design for what could be the result of such a renegotiation. But keep in mind that this is only one set of alternatives. The

point is to keep opening up to new alternatives if one notices that interests have shifted or if I was wrong in my assumptions. I sincerely believe we have fixated too much. Through such fixation, alternatives that are excluded at a certain point keep being excluded even if they prove to be a valuable alternative outside the regulations after some reconsideration. And this is simply an obstruction of the creative flow. We should stop thinking that rules can manage things appropriately. By way of illustrating a valuable alternative, I intend to make clear that regulations have a side to them that is obstructive to creative potential.

#### 4.5.2 Design Brief

The designbrief for IJburg block 44a, on basis of all written before, will be the following:

1) Promote

*Illustrate speculations on architectural potential,*

2) the interaction

*regarding voluntary transformations,*

3) of all those

*of different legal territories,*

4) confined

*by testing and opening up their limitations.*

As a cautionary remark here, I would remind you of paragraph 3.6's conclusions. As was explained there, transformative potential is unleashed by positive deterritorialization. This means our interest should be with a continued opening of capacity to interact. When asked, most residents of block 44a would prefer to have two things. First more inside space and second, more outside space.

In a process of privatisation, taking such desires to the extreme would result in everyone owning a villa in the middle of a Vondel-size park. This is however no way to house 17 million Dutch inhabitants. It simply does not fit within the Dutch territory. Applying process of privatization to that end, which open up the limitations only to close them off again (in Dutch called 'landje-pik') would be

simply producing more in the same register. Such processes are in the light of this project uninteresting. In a process of opening up regulations to remain open however, indoor and outdoor spaces may very well achieve those sizes.

As soon as collectives start opening up their territory to other collectives in a process of expanding commoning however, the process results in more liberty for all parties involved. This is precisely what can kickstart the process. This means our interest should be with a continued opening of capacity to interact. And this involves lets say little 'gifts' of territory. So my proposal is to disregard specific rules to be able to get to alternatives for the housingblock that lie outside these rules. Ideally the design would be considered a valid alternative, and encourage a renegotiation of the regulations relevant to this block. By way of opening up the regulations, excluded architectural potential can then be included again to the benefit of those involved.

#### 4.5.3 Intended territorial interactions

I propose 3 series of operations. Taking the household as the startingpoint, my design illustrates what can happen when the limitations between the household and three surrounding territories are opened up. The first operation presents an opening between the household and municipality territory at the streetside (figure 39). The second an opening between the household and V.v.E. territory at the courtyard (figure 40). The third an opening up between the household and other household territories at their gardens (figure 41).

These operations are composed of steps. There is no obligation to execute all steps within an operation, or to execute an operation at all. They present opportunities you can either explore or decide not to act upon. Therefore, for every operation and the corresponding steps, the design presents households that realized the operation, and those who refused to do so. In this way, both situations are illustrated. Plus, perhaps most importantly, the relation that arises between them.

So for the first operation that connects the frontside of houses to the municipality street, let's just say the household in figure 42 are willing to participate. For the second operation that connects the household garden to the VvE courtyard, lets say the households in figure 43 wanted to participate. Finally, for the third op-

eration that connects household gardens with each other, I chose the households in figure 44.

#### **4.5.4 The design**

As you might notice, the construction of the 3 operations consists of nothing more than a platform and a roofconstruction applied throughout. See figures 99-104.

##### Opening up the private - public territories (Street)

Lets start with the first operation. Opening the territories of the household and the municipality at the streetside. See figures 45-51.

The first step in this operation is to allow the residents to, let's say, 'occupy' the street some more. Just like what they did at the Maurits Bingerplantsoen. It might sound like the privatization or 'landje-pik' I wanted to prevent. However, I sincerely believe that the creation of such an intermediate zone between the street and the house contributes to the liveliness of the street for all those involved. My proposal is to let this happen up to 3 meters. This significantly enlarges the quality of social settings that can be created while still leaving space for people to pass by. As you may note, not much more than some reshuffling of the furniture is needed for this step. Perhaps the paving can be adjusted to indicate the new order. See figures 52-54.

The second step in this operation is the creation of a roof that extends from the house over the full extent of the 3 meters occupied and the zone for passers-by. This roof construction intends to increase the time people can make use of the social settings that were created in the first step, by sheltering these spaces from tricky weather (figures 55-56). Additionally, should such tricky weather turn into actual rain, passers-by can take shelter underneath the roof as well. Now who knows what can happen if these two users of the space say hi to each other at such a moment... See figures 57-65.

##### Opening up the private - semi-public territories (Gardenplatform)

The second operation then. Opening the territories of the household and the VvE at the courtyard. At the moment, the courtyard is nothing more than a parking lot

(figure 66-68). However I do not believe it is smart to relocate the cars to another location however.

The first step in this operation is therefore to create an elevated platform. Such an elevated platform can support a miniature park for all the residents. By placing the columns strategically, all the cars can still drive in and out of the parkinglots underneath. See figures 69-70.

The second step is where the real fun comes in. This step proposes that the households start attaching additional platforms to the main one. In this way, a household's garden can become twice as big. And the main platform from the first step starts to grow in size by these contributions. In this way, a leisure space is created that allows for loose social interaction as an addition to the privacy of your garden. Note that all houses on one size already possess a construction to support such an addition. All they would need is some tiling. See figure 71.

The third step adds quality to the previous two, again by creating a roof-construction that increases the time people can make use of the newly created courtyard-platform. See figures 72-73.

Spatially, this operation differs from the operation at the streetside. The streetside operation was an interaction between residents and passers-by. This operation, although I propose we also welcome the passers-by, has more of a community-feel to it. I envision that several communal things can happen here. Perhaps they have a barbecue in summer, perhaps one of the households lets all the kids play in their inflatable swimmingpool. They might install a small bar for warm evenings, or simply grab some chairs and listen to a chamber music concert. Who knows... See figure 74-87.

##### Opening up the private - private territories (Commonroom)

The third operation, last, is at the same time the most difficult and the easiest. Opening the territories of the household and its neighbouring households at their backyard. See figures 88-89. The most difficult because you probably really have to get along with your neighbours to give up a private garden like that. But also the easiest because this operation would not have to involve the municipality or the VvE at all.. you can just take out the wooden fences and enjoy your gardens together.



The first step in this operation proposes to do just that. But it also proposes that this is combined with a redesign of the garden. In this step, I propose to create three zones in the garden. The zone closest to the house, extending 3 meters from it again, stays private by an elevation with steps. And if desired a wooden fence as a separation in case things become a little too personal. After some steps down however, you would arrive at the zone intended for movement between the gardens. Like a little alley. The third zone, the space that is left, can have any filling the household desires. Whether this is a large table for dinner in summer, a hammock, sandpit, or simply some plants is entirely up to them. But again, anyone present in this zone might have some social interaction with their neighbours. See figures 90-91.

The second step, and the last step of my proposals, again creates a roof-construction. See figures 92 This turns the gardens into something like an orangery slash common-room. See figure 93-98.

## 5. SPECULATIVE LOOPHOLING

### 5.1 Towards Post-humanism

*This paragraph will explain that Correlationism (as explained in paragraph 2.2) without the logic fallacies often coupled with it (as was explained in paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4) may lead to a post-humanist ontology.*

As was explained in paragraph 2.2, it is difficult to get away from a correlationist assumption about the relation between our thought and that which is thought. Correlationism provides a foundation on which one can construct an epistemic fallacy and ultimately construct one or more fallacies of misplaced concreteness. This combination, when taken to the extreme, leads towards a road of anthropocentrism, a doctrine in which the dominant human form of existence formats all of ontological reality. The question therefore becomes: 'Is there a way to twist free from the correlationist deadlock as to convincingly defend a genuinely post-humanist, realist ontology?'<sup>259</sup> The answer lies exactly in getting rid of the epistemic fallacy within a correlationist view. This is because acceptance of correlationism does not also have to accept that our thoughts in any way can account for what reality is, as the epistemic fallacy would lead us to believe as was explained in paragraph 1.2.2. Neither can it be concluded that any specific thought can fully account for something real, as this would constitute a fallacy of misplaced concreteness explained in paragraph 1.2.3. This might lead to the belief that there is a fundamental barrier between an apprehension itself (phenomenon) and that which is apprehended (noumenon). Such a barrier assumes thought is completely delusional and unable to connect to the real world at all. Such an understanding of a barrier between thought and reality has been called 'the bifurcation of nature':<sup>260</sup> the 'premise of a world apart from and independent of human beings'.<sup>261</sup> Most parts of Western philosophy and thereby much modern thought indeed assumes that there can be such a split.<sup>262</sup> However, as you may notice, correlationism itself does not necessarily constitute a

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259 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 40.

260 Shaviro, *The Universe of Things*, 2,3.

261 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 44.

262 Shaviro, *The Universe of Things*, 2

'bifurcation of nature'.

Although the correlationist argument ensures that we cannot get away from the influence of ourselves on our knowledge of things, this does not necessarily mean that this provides ground for the ontological inexistence of noumena outside phenomena, like in Descartes initial doubt. Science for instance is only possible under the condition that such things as noumena exist, and that intransitive knowledge is possible. Any experiment to obtain more knowledge only makes sense if there is knowledge yet to be obtained. So for the scientific method 'The world itself must be a particular way [...] to be possible, not the mind.'<sup>263</sup> So, as was also explained in paragraph 1.2.2, the acceptance of correlationism without an epistemic fallacy does not at all mean that some 'outside' to our thought is lost. Instead any criticism against correlationism and simultaneously against the bifurcation of nature can only be that the correlation should be the other way around – i.e. that our way of apprehension should be subordinated to what is apprehended. The solution is indeed as Whitehead proposes: 'So far as there is dependence, the things pave the way for the cognition, rather than vice versa...'<sup>264</sup> Our relation with things is simply too one-sided if we assume they will neatly fit the thoughts we have about them.<sup>265</sup>

*"Reason is always a region cut out of the irrational - not sheltered from the irrational at all, but a region traversed by the irrational and defined by only a certain type of relation between irrational factors."*<sup>266</sup>

## 5.2 The rise of a flat ontology

*This paragraph will elaborate how the Deleuzian core argument (as explained in paragraph 3.2) supports the flattening of ontology presented by post-humanism (explained in paragraph 5.1).*

As was elaborated in paragraph 3.2 and 3.3, according to Deleuze's analysis, all

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263 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 43

264 Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Free Press, 1925/1967), 88-89.

265 Steven Shaviro, *Fictions and Fabulations of Sentience* (London: Repeater Books, 2015), 11.

266 Capitalism: a very special delirium, 35.

expressions in real experience originate from the same power to express: difference-in-itself. Because of this, that which appears as distinct and several formally is in reality univocal and numerically one.<sup>267</sup> For this reason, all expressions of difference-in-itself have to be equally real. In this way, Deleuze's difference-in-itself forms a powerful argument in favour of a 'flat ontology'. At its first use in Roy Bhaskar's book called 'A realist theory of science', the term flat ontology was used to refer to ontologies that flattened the universe into that which can be accessed by humans,<sup>268</sup> thus bundling those theories committing the epistemologic fallacy as described in paragraph 1.2.2. However, the use of the term shifted when DeLanda used it in 2002 to describe an ontology that assumes things are singular, perhaps different in scale [size?], but always on the same footing, absent ontological hierarchy.<sup>269</sup> Aspects of this proposition have been around since at least Meinong<sup>270</sup> and the term used in this way has been used more often in the years since DeLanda. Ian Bogost nicely summarised the position in 2012 when he writes that: 'In short, all things equally exist, yet they do not exist equally.'<sup>271</sup> Additionally, Bryant describes flat ontology as a bundle that includes four philosophical theses: First, a flat ontology rejects the possibility of an object that encompasses all other objects. Second and related, a flat ontology denies that there is one type of entity as the origin of the others. Third, flat ontology considers all objects to exist on the same ontological level, absent hierarchy. Fourth, stemming from the third thesis, flat ontology regards the human-object relationship just another relationship in all the object-object relations that exist.<sup>272</sup>

Any time design works on material relations to fit an a priori imposed composition, matter is transcended by abstracted ideas about how such relations should be. This mode of operation fixates, limits and therefore decreases capacities

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267 Colebrook, *Substance*, 279.

268 Graham Harman, "The road to objects" in: *Continent*. Issue 1.3 (2011), 171-179.

269 Manuel Delanda, *Intensive science and Virtual Philosophy*, 51. And for instance: Garcia, *Form and Object*, 4.

270 Graham Harman, Series editor's preface in: Garcia, *Form and Object*, xxiv.

271 Ian Bogost, *Alien Phenomenology, or What its Like to Be a Thing* (Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), 11.

272 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 245-246.

to interact and the formation of potential new relations from the start. Disregarding how the construction of specific material relations might open up such construction to form other potential relations, the material potential is reduced to fit a priori universal and absolute concepts. Such construction follows what is called a hylomorphic relation between matter and concepts. In it, objects are the result of a translation of matter (*hule*) by a form (*morphe*). The material relations constructed during such design are thereby regarded to be secondary servants to such preceding primary relations, thereby constructing a hierarchical relationship.<sup>273</sup> Design is however not the human mastery of the world around us, it has not necessarily anything to do with hierarchy. Given a flat ontology, in the absence of one or more objects that would be ontologically more special, any object can be as interesting as the next. Following Deleuze and Guattari, all matter should be regarded as living and creative.<sup>274</sup> For instance, Jane Bennett argues that even epistemologically matter should not have to appear dead to us. According to her not only humans but all instances of matter have 'vibrant' lives. When we attune to them, all objects and forms of matter are alive in a broader sense.<sup>275</sup> Such a position is for instance defended by supporters of 'vital materialism'. A flat ontology thus decentres all sorts of privileged categories of beings, as for instance those that are assumed to be 'natural' or 'alive' in the strict sense, to a existence among other equal beings.<sup>276</sup> Any flat ontology has to let go of the notion that any particular sort of objects can be per se 'better suited' than others. In this way, it becomes possible to level the design with that which falls outside the design.<sup>277</sup> Because the necessity to account for a change in hierarchy is erased, the design as an object gets one step closer to becoming a process in full contact with its outside. Flat ontologies therefore provide the perfect breedingground for the replacement of prevalent moral attitudes aiming towards progress with ethical attitudes acting as process.

273 Mike Hale, "The architect as metallurgist", in: *Deleuze and architecture*, eds. H el ene Frichot and

Stephen Loo (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 111-112.

274 Hale, *The architect as metallurgist*, 112.

275 Jane Bennett, *Vibrant Matter: A political Ecology of Things* (Durham/London/ Duke University Press, 2010).

276 Bryant, *The Democracy of Objects*, 41, emphases erased.

277 Robin Mackay, Luke Pendrell, James Trafford, Introduction to *Speculative Aesthetics*, eds. Robin Mackay, James Trafford and Luke Pendrell (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2014), 2.

### 5.3 Speculation and experimentation

*This paragraph will suggest that a Deleuzian attitude towards power (as explained in chapter 3) and the flattening of ontology (as explained in paragraph 5.2) favours an understanding of design as speculation.*

The question now becomes how the vitality of all things can shift the way in which design is practiced.<sup>278</sup> The answer is that design should allow itself to open up to events in its process in order to promote new potential interactions.<sup>279</sup> Because difference-in-itself ultimately governs fixed identities as was explained in ???, Deleuze's politics emphasises singularity rather than universality.<sup>280</sup> Therefore, what is needed is an investigation that does not try to make universal and absolute claims, but singular and relative ones. The danger of reification and reduction by analysis is the employment of ontological categories that are not flat. Even if interactions fit a causal concept, they may still very well be the result of a nonlinear causal relationship and therefore present only one solution in a more complex field.<sup>281</sup> Without denying that we are wired into having a familiarity with certain objects more than others, this does not mean that those familiar to us are per se most appropriate. Instead, in a flat ontology, we can start any investigation into things from things following whatever format. This is because the formatted thing is never the end-station of the investigation, but only the starting-point. Any engagement with objects should therefore first question the distinction that has formed the identity of the object. And instead we need to investigate the object in terms of its relations/interactions.

Due to assemblage theory's focus on open-ended behaviour, analytical techniques used to utilise them '...must go beyond [conceptual] logic and involve causal interventions in reality ...'<sup>282</sup> This in order to evade the reification of such abstracted conceptual relations described in paragraph 2.4 in place of actual dynamic structures of capacities to interact called the virtual described in paragraph

278 Hale, *The architect as metallurgist*, 112.

279 Hale, *The architect as metallurgist*, note 6, 129.

280 Baugh, *Trancedental Empericism + Politics*, 290.

281 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 31.

282 DeLanda, *A new philosophy of society*, 31, brackets not original.

4.1. Therefore any coming together of forces, any assemblage must be experimented with in order to discover the dynamic structure of capacities to interact that fuels it. Starting with experimentations, the key is to open up, to follow suggested potential, to make connections, to discover, to reinvent in the process rather than to close it back up again and enforce prefigured solutions on the site.<sup>283</sup> The ‘intelligence implied when extraordinary effects are elicited from unpromising materials’<sup>284</sup> was called *mêtis* by the ancient Greeks, which means something like ‘the logic of means’.<sup>285</sup> Speculative design, making use of *mêtis*, ‘sees the world as an obscure environment, and applies some kind of abductive logic [...] into a process not of reconstructing plots but of constructing them.’<sup>286</sup> It is simply ‘about finding ingenious ways of exploiting the behaviour of materials, and that can include human beings. In fact it includes an awful lot of very interesting things.’<sup>287</sup> Architects can turn themselves into agents and provide this process of altering relations with speculative thoughts and actions to be tested in practice.<sup>288</sup>

## 5.4 Renegotiation

*This paragraph will conclude that a very specific strategy of speculation which focusses on collective inclusiveness and opening up (as developed in paragraph 4.3), can provide a way out of the fixation of capacities to interact through laws and can delimit the realization of valuable transformative potential in the built environment. For future reference, this tactic can be called speculative loopholing.*

As was made clear in the investigation in chapter 1 and the casestudy in chapter 4, architecture is a negotiation of power in constant process. By paying attention to and cultivating the differences within the abstraction, a way out of the dominant modes is provided. From the concrete case of IJburg block 44a in Amsterdam we can observe that the most blatant fallacious abstractions are made on the level of

283 Hale, *The architect as metallurgist*, 113-116, 120, 127-128.

284 Singleton, *Speculative design*, 24.

285 Singleton, *Speculative design*, 24-25.

286 Singleton, *Speculative design*, 25.

287 Singleton, *Speculative design*, 24.

288 Hale, *The architect as metallurgist*, 128.

it’s municipality. Whereas the state allows for still a fairly broad spectrum of interactions in its laws, the municipality narrows this down to a very strict spectrum of interactions by way of specifications in its ‘Bestemmingsplan’. Chapter 4 illustrated that this law could provide a realistic starting-point in the process of opening up the fixation. Speculative designs provide the first important step of uncovering the potential. Finding this valuable potential and constructing such speculative loopholes-to-be is the gift of any architect in the process of transforming the built environment. Crucial to catalysing this process seems to be to suggest the sharing of any property’s capacity to interact with those who are not its owners, in the hope it persuades others involved to do the same. This is not to suggest complete unrestricted behaviour, rather a process of constant renegotiation about those practices that are off limits in the attempt to create circumstances that may include them again.

Because the municipality of Amsterdam provides a dominant mode to which its residents (by and large) yield, it will definitely have a role in realizing the shift in attitude regarding transformative potential. Collectives of individuals of whatever shape or size will necessarily be involved because the attitude of positive deterritorialisation, of inclusion and opening up to otherness requires private interests to be plugged into and transformed by other interests in the collective in order to release their transformative potential from limitation by the collective. However, it would be unwise to mistake this with relying on the municipality with regard to this shift.<sup>289</sup> Rather, the change in attitude depends on all individuals and collectives involved to participate in the process of uncovering, discussing, legalizing and realizing transformative potential in their built environment.<sup>290</sup> Put simply a Deleuzian ethics involves practicing to open up your own potential rather than limiting others’.<sup>291</sup>

The development along these lines of IJburg block 44a in chapter 4 serves

289 Félix Guattari, ‘Capitalism: a very special delerium’ in: *Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972-1977*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. David L. Sweet, Jarred Becker, and Taylor Adkins (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), 43.

290 Félix Guattari, ‘Psychoanalysis should get a grip on life’ in: *The Guattari Reader*, ed. Gary Genosko (Oxford/Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996), 72.

291 Braidotti, *The ethics of Becoming Imperceptible*, 144, 150.

as a humble reminder that opening up limitations in law, materialization and thereby capacities to interact, really can liberate such desired potential.

Of course the limitations exerted by the regulations serve a purpose. All sorts of interests are carefully mediated through their construction. But I sincerely believe we have fixated too much. Through such fixation, alternatives that are excluded at a certain point keep being excluded even after reconsideration. This being the case, it seems that legislation is being misunderstood for control. And this is simply an obstruction of the creative flow. We should stop thinking that rules can manage these issues appropriately. With this design I intended to make clear that regulations have a side to them that is obstructive to creative potential.

I believe that we could benefit from entering into previously silent discussions about the built environment. To open ourselves to alternatives instead of keeping to the rigorously abstracted, fixating regulations. We have to embrace constant renegotiations. The project developed presents a design for what could be the result of such a renegotiation. But keep in mind that this is only one set of alternatives out of many possibilities.

This project is not an advice on law-making. I cannot help in this regard. It is not my intention to have the system of laws changed. And please do not think I want to do away with regulations altogether. I simply want to offer architects a design-strategy that inserts itself in the current system of laws. So that when faced with problems of illegality, this strategy called speculative loopholing could prove to open up limitations on potential designs. This process, I hope to have showed, can be started by territorial gifting. The trick is to exert power as a dynamic territory instead of a static one. To tap into the creative flows and work with them in order to speculate about new alternatives that include the interests previously excluded. As Deleuze would say: start the assemblage. A continuous stream of new proposals that are up for renegotiation, instead of a solution that is applied everywhere by lack of creative effort.

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Figure 2: Satellite image of the Amsterdam region.




Figure 4: Amsterdam Schiphol airport highlighted.



Figure 3: The Amsterdam old city centre highlighted.



Figure 5: The Markermeer (lake) highlighted.




Figure 5: IJburg neighbourhood highlighted.




Figure 6: IJburg block 44a highlighted



Figure 7: The Dutch (Netherlands') border in red, situated within the other European nations.



Figure 8: The part of the map accompanying the Kadasterwetthat is relevant for IJburg Block 44a. As can be seen, the land on which IJburg block 44a rests is divided into 28 plots and is surrounded by two larger plots: #1937 and #1938. Amsterdam leaseholds this land to its inhabitants.



Figure 9: The border of the Amsterdam municipality within the Netherlands.





Figure 10: The 'bestemmingsplan' for IJburg block 44a: Territories coded with their allowed functionalities.






Figure 12: The buildingplans (ground floor) for IJburg block 44a laid over the 'Kadasterwet' property map. The buildingplan follows the plots neatly.




Figure 13: The buildingplans (ground floor) for IJburg block 44a laid over the 'Bestemmingsplan' map. The buildingplan follows the plots neatly.



Figure 14: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's North-East side.



Figure 15: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's North-East side with the facade surface marked.



Figure 16: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's North-East side with the private outside space marked.



Figure 17: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's North-West side.



Figure 18: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's North-West side with the facade surface marked.



Figure 19: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's North-West side with the private outside space marked.





Figure 20: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's South-West side.



Figure 21: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's South-West side with the facade surface marked.



Figure 22: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's South-West side with the private outside space marked.



Figure 23: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's South-East side.



Figure 24: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's South-East side with the facade surface marked.



Figure 25: Facade view of IJburg block 44a's Maurits Bingerplantsoen #9.



Figure 26: Facade view of IJburg block 44a's Maurits Bingerplantsoen #11.



Figure 27: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's South-East sides, shot in line with the facade surface.



Figure 28: Streetvista of IJburg block 44a's South-East sides, shot in line with the facade surface. The property plotline is marked.




Figure 29: Drawing of a facade (IJburg block 44a's).




Figure 30: Drawing of a facade (IJburg block 44a's). Residents' choice for red.




Figure 31: Drawing of a facade (IJburg block 44a's). Residents' choice for red and green.




Figure 32: Drawing of a facade (IJburg block 44a's). Residents' choice for red, green and yellow.




Figure 33: Drawing of a facade (IJburg block 44a's). Residents' initial choices for colour.




Figure 34: Drawing of a facade (IJburg block 44a's). Regulation evaporates all differences.




Figure 35: Drawing of a facade (IJburg block 44a's). Regulation decides on the majority vote: red.





Figure 36: Drawing of a facade (IJburg block 44a's). Opinions about preferred colour have shifted.




Figure 37: Drawing of a facade (IJburg block 44a's). A different majority vote emerges.




Figure 38: Drawing of a facade (IJburg block 44a's). Nobody likes red anymore.




Figure 39: Opening up the private and public territories at the streetside.




Figure 40: Opening up the private and VvE territories at the courtyard.




Figure 41: Opening up the private and private territories at the gardens.




Figure 42: Opening up the private and public territories at the streetside: chosen participating households.




Figure 43: Opening up the private and VvE territories at the courtyard: chosen participating households.




Figure 44: Opening up the private and private territories at the gardens: chosen participating households.



Figure 45: House facade on the North-East side of Block 44a, current situation.



Figure 46: House facade on the North-East side of Block 44a, current situation.



Figure 47: House facade on the North-West side of Block 44a, current situation.



Figure 48: House facade across the street on the North-West side of Block 44a, current situation.



Figure 49: Private outside area on the South-West side of Block 44a, current situation. Exemplary of the intended quality to promote.




Figure 50: Street operation, original plan.




Figure 52: Street operation step 1, new plan.




Figure 51: Street operation, original section.



Figure 53: Street operation step 1, new section.






Figure 54: Street operation step 2, new section.



Figure 55: Illustration (from model), new situation at South-East side.



Figure 56: Illustration (from model), new situation at South-West side.



Figure 57: Illustration (from model), new situation at North-East side.



Figure 59: Illustration (from model), new situation at South-West side.



Figure 58: Illustration (from model), new situation at North-West side.



Figure 60: Illustration (from model), new situation at North-West side.




Figure 61: Illustration (from model), new situation at North-East side.




Figure 63: Illustration (from model), new situation at South-West side.




Figure 62: Illustration (from model), new situation at North-West side.



Figure 64: Illustration (from model), new situation at South-West side.



Figure 65: Illustration (from model), new situation at North-East side.



Figure 66: VvE courtyard (parkinglot), current situation.




Figure 67: VVE Courtyard section 'AA, original plan.




Figure 69: Gardenplatform operation step 1, new section 'AA.



Figure 68: VVE Courtyard section 'BB, original plan.




Figure 70: Gardenplatform operation step 1, new section 'BB.




Figure 71: Gardenplatform operation step 2, new section 'AA.




Figure 72: Gardenplatform operation step 3, new section 'AA.



Figure 73: Gardenplatform operation step 3, new section 'BB.



Figure 74: Illustration (from model), new situation at North-West side. Entrance to Gardenplatform and parkinglot.



Figure 76: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.



Figure 75: Illustration (from model), new situation at courtyard. Parkinglot with gardenplatform on top.



Figure 77: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.



Figure 78: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.



Figure 80: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.



Figure 79: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.



Figure 81: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.





Figure 82: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.



Figure 84: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.



Figure 83: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.



Figure 85: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.



Figure 86: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.



Figure 87: Illustration (from model), new situation, Gardenplatform.




Figure 88: Commonroom operation, original plan.




Figure 89: Commonroom operation, original section.




Figure 90: Commonroom operation step 1, new plan.




Figure 91: Commonroom operation step 1, new section.




Figure 92: Commonroom operation step 2, new section.



Figure 93: Illustration (from model), new situation, Commonroom.



Figure 95: Illustration (from model), new situation, Commonroom.



Figure 94: Illustration (from model), new situation, Commonroom.



Figure 96: Illustration (from model), new situation, Commonroom.



Figure 97: Illustration (from model), new situation, Commonroom.



Figure 98: Illustration (from model), new situation, Commonroom.



Figure 99: all operations together, new plan ground floor.




Figure 100: all operations together, new section 'AA (continues on next page -->)





Figure 101: all operations together, new detail Gardenplatform construction 'AA. Connection platforms step 1 and 2.




Figure 102: all operations together, new detail Gardenplatform construction 'BB.




Figure 103: all operations together, new detail Gardenplatform construction 'BB. Roofconstruction step 3.




Figure 104: All opened territories.