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PERSPECTIVES ON THE EUROPEANISATION AND EUROPEANISATION OF PLANNING

1. *Introduction*

The exemplary case study by Evers and Tennekes documents the impact of European spatial or territorial policies in the Netherlands. The authors show that there is practically not an inch of Dutch soil unaffected. This type of Europeanisation, also called the 'downloading' of European policies, they distinguish from two other meanings of the term: the 'uploading' of policies from the national to the European level and what one might call 'horizontal' Europeanisation – my words. This refers to mutual learning taking place thanks to increasingly frequent contacts between experts and policy makers leading to the «shared understanding between planners and like-minded professionals in Europe» (Evers, Tennekes, 2016, p. 2). The latter two meanings I discuss as the EUropeanisation, respectively the Europeanisation of planning (Faludi, 2014). In so doing, I take a leaf out of the book of Clark and Jones (2008) distinguishing between 'EUrope' – the European Union construct – and 'Europe,' being a longstanding, historical and cultural process and its outcome. EUropeanisation of planning stands for its becoming part of the EU 'policy-making state' (Richardson, 2012) and its Europeanisation for mutual learning about ideas and practices.

In these terms, much of my past work has been on the EUropeanisation of planning. Saying that this has not been particularly successful is an understatement. But the Lisbon Treaty would at least allow the EU to pursue a territorial cohesion policy, in practice strategic spatial planning. Nonetheless, the Commission takes no relevant initiatives. My 2014 paper expressed at least modest faith, though, in the Europeanisation of planning. In the fullness of time, this might prepare the ground for its EUropeanisation, was my hope. Unfortunately, present prospects are poor. European integration as such is under threat, making the EUropeanisation of planning seem less urgent. Securing the Union takes centre stage.

The paper starts with Evers and Tennekes on Europeanisation. Then it explains the distinction between the EUropeanisation and Europeanisation of planning, followed by a discussion of the persistent failure of the former. The root cause is the insistence of EU member states on their sovereign control over their territories. The conclusions point out the dark sides of this, what I call territorialism.

2. *Mapping the Impacts of EU Policies*

Evers and Tennekes document the disparate impacts of EU policies on Dutch planning. Inconsistencies between such policies were one reason for the making of the European Spatial Development Perspective, or ESDP. That document stated that the «spatial effects of Community policies do not automatically complement each other... Nor do they automatically correspond to the development concepts of regions and cities. Without a reciprocal fine-tuning process, they can unintentionally aggra-

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vate disparities in regional development if they are exclusively geared towards specific sectoral objectives» (ESDP, 1999, p. 19). Which the, initially twelve and later fifteen member states represented on the intergovernmental Committee on Spatial Development preparing the ESDP gave as one rationale for their research.

This is a case of what Evers and Tennekes call the downloading EU policies to member states leading to the demand for the EU itself to consider their cross-impacts. The literature discusses bottom-up initiatives for the EU to become active as uploading. But their own study, which can easily serve – in fact is intended to serve – as a model for other member states to follow, is about the impacts of downloading EU policies on spatial planning in the member states.

Our authors identify downloading as the first of three Europeanisation strands in the literature where it examines «how policies at the European level affect policies and practices within member states (top-down impact)». There is a second strand which, much as most of my writings on European planning, relates to «the emergence of autonomous governance structures at the European level». Lastly, horizontal Europeanisation «concerns the institutionalization of transnational learning and co-operation Europe» (Evers, Tennekes, 2016, p. 2).

Focusing on downloading, Evers and Tennekes find that practically the entire surface area of the Netherlands is affected by multiple, overlapping EU policies so that «spatial planning in the member states and EU policy-making are much more intimately intertwined than their formal status suggests». Legal opinion has it that the Union has no competence in the matter but there is now, of course, a competence for territorial cohesion. Still, there has never been – and there is little prospect of there to be – a relevant initiative to instigate the ‘ordinary legislative process’ in the matter. This being so, maybe over-optimistically, our two authors hope that their evidence might «inform the ongoing European policy debate on policy coordination and fragmentation (e.g. the Better Regulation Agenda. The European Urban Agenda and the Territorial Agenda)» (Evers, Tennekes 2016, p. 2).

One could add that, under the EU treaties, the Union even seems under an obligation to ensure what the French text of Article 13(1) of the Treaty of Lisbon calls the coherence – the English text uses the less passionate term consistency – of the institutional framework of the EU. This quite apart from the shared competence under the Lisbon Treaty for territorial cohesion where the English and the French texts invoke the same term. Arguing for the Commission being given a role in spatial planning, the then Commissioner of Regional Policy Monika Wulf-Mathies said essentially the same argument in 1995: Since the Union has various competences with spatial impacts, why not allowing it to plan for their coordinated use? So, Wulf-Mathies was for uploading spatial planning.

But member states working on the ESDP kept this task to themselves, which is why subsequently the Commission put its case in terms the pursuit of territorial cohesion. To repeat though, as far as this is concerned, the Treaty of Lisbon remains a dead letter. Not only does the Commission abstain from taking an initiative, one of the initiators of, and a leading light during the making of the ESDP, the Netherlands, has abandoned national spatial planning, let alone that there is an appetite for promoting it on European level. Which forms the unspoken backdrop to Evers and Tennekes’ study. Having demonstrated that «the geographical footprint of EU policies is fragmented, multifarious and complex and thus presents a clear challenge for coherent spatial strategy» (Evers, Tennekes, 2016, p. 15) they point out that the Dutch 2012 National Spatial Strategy Framework gives no overall guidance on urban development. Instead, the current philosophy «is that national government should be responsible for ensuring that a well-functioning spatial planning system exists, but not necessarily what the system does. Provinces and municipalities have been cut free... European policies complicate this aim to decentralize and deregulate» (Evers, Tennekes, 2016, p. 15).

National government remains after all accountable to the EU. Which would seem to imply one of two things. Either lower-tier governments should be more involved in the EU’s policy-making process, or national government should once more take an active role in spatial planning. The more gen-

eral conclusion is that Europeanisation «poses a direct challenge to the ways in which spatial planning is organized in member states» (Evers, Tennekes, 2016, p. 16). If this challenge were addressed in earnest, and if, furthermore, the Better Regulation Agenda were to lead to the Union pursuing the coherence of its policies with a spatial impact, then this would require the same reciprocal fine-tuning between national and EU policies which the ESDP has been quoted as advocating. If done successfully, this would amount to – but the name given to the exercise is not important – some form of strategic spatial planning. And it would require member states engaging in some form of national spatial planning. Otherwise there could be no meaningful participations. With meaningful national participation, the two levels would come closer, such as is the case with other EU policies, not in the last place cohesion policy, the seedbed of so-called multi-level governance.

In this joint operation, a condition of success would be mutual learning, which is the third meaning attached to Europeanisation. Mutual learning is what my 2014 paper discusses. The section that follows elaborates on it.

3. *EUropeanisation or Europeanisation of spatial planning?*

Here I revisit my distinction between the two concepts in the title of my paper. Before doing so, the article on which I draw exuded disappointment with the poor showing of European spatial planning. Indeed, the ESDP had been less than could have been expected. Member states had failed to follow through on their own convictions. In lieu of a veritable spatial framework for EU policies, they kept to general propositions. With each member state pursuing its own style of planning and making its own assessment of what would be in its own best interest, there was no other way.

The Commission's subsequent initiative for an EU territorial cohesion policy had been stifled by the failure of getting the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe ratified. Referenda in France and the Netherlands had put spanners into the works. Ironically, these had been the two countries whose national planning establishments, each for its own good reasons, had been the most proactive in initiating the ESDP process. By the time the Treaty of Lisbon, coming as it did in lieu of the ill-fortuned Constitution, was finally on the books, momentum had been lost. The member states' own follow-ups in between the Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty – the Territorial Agenda of the European Union (2007) and the Territorial Agenda 2020 (2011) – both lacked conviction. Polish efforts to resuscitate the initiative by identifying 'spatial keys' (Zaucha *et al.*, 2014) as the entry points for planning into the evolving mainstream dissipated. The Commission prioritised defending EU Cohesion policy as such. With the next programming period looming, this is once more the case.

Making sense of the situation, in Faludi (2014) I drew on Clark and Jones (2008) differentiating between EUrope and Europe. They make it based on their conviction that, «while the integration narrative and Europeanisations's underlying processes have tended to be conflated they are not the same». They identify «a unique geographic suit of processes springing from territorial propinquity, comprising myriad socialisation and learning processes» (Clark, Jones, 2008, p. 303). Elsewhere they say EUrope and Europeanisation «have been configured over centuries by distinct patterns of European government and power. Suppression and/or control of these continent-wide processes has been integral to nation state building, and the inherent tension between states and the supranational political project of building 'EUrope' arises precisely because Europeanisation processes are both supportive of yet transcend national territory-government power bases» (Clark, Jones, 2008, p. 313).

To the extent that it regards planning, European integration has been my topic of research for years, but I am turning critical. The prevailing, what I call territorialism negatively affects the European construct (Faludi, 2016a, b). This will be discussed below. In the 2014 paper giving an account of the decade-long, but unsuccessful campaign for the EUropeanisation of planning, I only refer to terri-

torialism in the margin, yet express my hope that mutual learning, for instance in the framework of INTERREG and through joint research under the ESPON programme will be the seedbed for new initiatives in future. So, the «Europeanisation of planning may have stalled, but, through continued support for “European Territorial Cooperation” under cohesion policy, its Europeanisation continues» (Faludi, 2014, p. 164). In support I invoked Richardson (2012, p. 350) writing on what he calls the EU policy-making state. About that state, he says that, «like an iceberg which has nine-tenths of its ice below the waterline, EU public policy-making generally takes place in a rather closed world of experts and interests far away from the public glare». The metaphor also conjures up an inexorable movement leading to change. Richardson coins the term ‘tectonic movement.’ So, I ventured to suggest that there was, albeit hidden, progress towards European planning.

But there is increasing opposition against this, apparently unstoppable dynamics. Populists and nationalists are driving member states to reassert their positions as defenders of the national interest, including their sovereign control over their territory which of course militates against Europeanisation, also and in particular of planning. Clearly, this is not the moment to expect more of it.

This having been said, there may also be what Richardson calls a ‘seismic event’ – Brexit perhaps – jolting the Union into resuming its path towards more integration. Less dramatically, the way forward could be the idea of a ‘multispeed Europe’ with groups of member states making use of a facilities in the EU treaties called ‘enhanced cooperation’. In fact, patchwork Europeanisation takes place all around us on with multiple, overlapping sites.

Indeed, it is important to realise that opposition to this notion notwithstanding, a multi-speed Europe, being one of the scenarios which the Commission outlined for the future of Europe (European Union, 2017) is lived reality. There are opt-outs and, less well-known, opt-ins. Iconic though it may be, Schengen, is a patchwork: Non-members Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Lichtenstein participate, but some members have negotiated opt-outs, with others so far excluded. The Eurozone, too, is patchier than one might think. There are member states due to join. Others have negotiated opt-outs – or are simply refusing, like Sweden, to join, but without ever having negotiated an opt-out. Curiously, there are also opt-ins: Montenegro and Kosovo using the Euro. So with the mini-states Monaco, San Marino and Andorra and, under yet different arrangements, the Vatican: patchwork. So with other forms of cooperation, like the ‘Visegrád 4,’ together with Romania and Bulgaria, member states otherwise opposed to a multi-speed Europe for fear of being demoted to a lower tier working on a joint planning perspective. In so doing, they follow procedures as in the ESDP process, with the successive Presidencies taking the lead. Patchwork once again.

My 2014 paper ended with sketching out a ‘deep change’ scenario under which, perhaps in response to some seismic event, «the incessant Europeanisation of planning will make planners rise to the occasion, whatever it is, and partake in redefining European integration as such. The point is, this would indeed mean a deep change, also in thinking about the EU» (Faludi, 2014, p. 165). I added that this deep change would imply «the Europeanisation of planning, but in a form relating to a fundamentally different notion of the EU and of space and territory and thus of the nation state» (Faludi, 2014, p. 166). This, then, is what I am working on now in ways outlined in Faludi (2016a) where, taking a leaf out of Zielonka (2006; 2014) and other authors, I speculate about ‘neo-medieval’ European spatial planning (Faludi, forthcoming).

4. *Territorialism*

Neo-medievalism draws inspiration from the situation before the Peace of Westphalia has led to states claiming sovereign control over their territories: territorialism. So, Europeanisation is taken to mean member states fusing into one EU state and their territories into one EU territory. But, this poses

a challenge to existing identities, feelings of belonging, cultures and languages. Not the cosiest of institutions, existing states seem at least closer than yet another, yet more distant level of government with bureaucrats having outlandish names and speaking foreign languages.

It is difficult to convince people that the states and the language they are used to and the cultures and identities they are attached to are themselves constructs forged during the last couple of centuries. And it is even more difficult to argue that the future is open, and that we should explore new avenues and in so doing be prepared to modify assumptions and habits and institutions. So, EUropeanisation is a hard sell. But I have already referred to patchwork EUropeanisation. So, maybe it need not mean one large, more distant state.

Before pursuing what else it might mean, it is important to realise that there are massive interests in keeping the situation as is. These are the vested interests of what I call the 'Territorial-Administrative Complex' (Faludi, 2016b). The *raison d'être* of each such complex – from the administration of a municipality, a district, a region to that of any state – is to defend its territory and the people in it. Now, if that were all, this would be fine, but politicians want to be re-elected, and maybe their livelihood depends on the Territorial-Administrative Complex thriving. So, in their own best interest, politicians magnify real or imagined threats to their territory and people.

The incentive seems the greater, the more recently states emerging from under Soviet domination have joined the EU. (Butler, 2017) For them EUropeanisation in the sense as discussed is a non-starter. But populists generally perceive the Union, like national movements before the Great War have perceived the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, the Russian and the Ottoman Empire, as a 'prison of nations'. In fact, many new EU members are successor states of those empires. They have seen purges of minorities, and in places they continue. So, rather than integration, we witness nation-building before our eyes, making EUropeanisation seem anathema.

The same is true for Europeanisation – the learning involved in the incessant work of implementing regulations and directives, in cross-border and transnational cooperation and in building up civil society: Anything that distracts from the power and the glory of the state is looked upon with suspicion. If they have to, state administrations go through the hoops to satisfy the givers of grants, but without the intention of entertaining real change.

Is the answer insisting on rules to be observed, and on EUropeanisation to be pursued against the odds? The alternative is to abandon the path leading to Richardson's European 'policy-making state.' Maybe, rather than the way to prepare the ground for EUropeanisation, actors growing together through learning and open-ended mutual recognition is what European integration is all about? Maybe we should forget about EUrope shining at the end of the road!

States as we know them will not disappear. Together with international companies, action groups and functional organisations, they will remain operators in a network society. But the scenario sketched implies states giving up their monopoly on power, in fact an illusion anyhow. Giving it up should encourage them to pay more than lip service to the interests of other states, international organisations, and so forth. Anyhow, purely national sovereignty «has been gradually replaced by a differentiated and overlapping functional form... [So-AF] the exercise of sovereignty becomes reflexive and dynamic as it implies a search for the best allocation of power in each case» (Besson, 2005, p. 196).

To invoke a metaphor which I like, it would mean states seeing themselves as islands in a sea of relations, functional or otherwise. It would mean recognising that pulling up the drawbridges is not the way. Islands are served best by interacting with the seas which lap their shores.

The metaphor of states as islands in a sea of relations is the antithesis of EUropeanisation. The sea is not like a territory. Rather than sovereignty, the Freedom of the Seas reigns. It grants any one island access to a myriad of opportunities. The opposite to the metaphor of Europeanisation creating a sea of opportunities is EUropeanisation: member states coalescing into a super state, with their territories merging and citizens roam freely, albeit within external borders.

Conclusions

EUropeanisation implies dissolution of nation states, a fiction we see unravelling before our eyes. Arguably the most fundamental reason for their resilience is that the production of democratic legitimacy is framed by elections per member state. So, it is to their own voters that governments are responsible. The upshot is that territorialism reigns, also in democratic decision-making. This means that democracy is inherently nationalistic. Historically, nationalism has created the people it was meant to serve, not the other way around. That most nation states exhibit linguistic and ethnic homogeneity is, however, the outcome, and not the reason for their formation. Where they exhibit ethnic diversity, nation states tend towards what Oren Yiftachel (2006) calls ethnocracy. Anderson (2016, p. 1) defines it as government or rule «by a particular ethnos in a multi-ethnic situation where there is at least one other significant ethnic group».

Dreaming the dream of EUropeanisation, its enthusiasts are in danger of becoming ethnocrats, too: Turkey should not join because it is a Moslem country. There may be reasons for Turkey not joining, but this is not one. But ethnocracy is a potent force. Witness the posture, already referred to, of new member states. They pursue French President Charles de Gaulle's 'Europe of Fatherlands' concept, defining themselves as ethnocracies and giving preference to the nations that lend them their names. So, unless they assume new identities Estonia and Latvia do not grant Russian speakers having migrated to what were once Soviet Republics and their descendants citizenship (Agarin, 2016).

Nor are old member states immune to the virus. So, EUropeanisation is not going to happen, not even, as I once surmised, through persistent Europeanisation. A policy-making state Europe is no longer realistic. Being about, following Clarke and Jones quoted above, «a unique geographic suit of processes springing from territorial propinquity, comprising myriad socialisation and learning processes», Europeanisation is, however, open-ended. So, we might imagine us growing together into a new formation, a leap into the unknown shaped by, and fitting for, a network society. I am reminded of Marshall McLuhan (1964) writing on 'The Media is the Message.' Maybe, Europeanisation is not only the medium of EUropeanisation but the message itself.

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