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# Data driven design for online industrial auctions

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## Abstract

Designing auction parameters for online industrial auctions is a complex problem due to highly heterogeneous items. Currently, online auctioneers rely heavily on their experts in auction design. The ability of predicting how well an auction will perform prior to the start comes in handy for auctioneers. If an item is expected to be a low-performing item, the auctioneer can take certain actions to influence the auction outcome. For instance, the starting selling price of the item can be modified, or the location where the item is displayed on the website can be changed to attract more attention. In this paper, we take a real-world industrial auction data set and investigate how we can improve upon the expert's design using insights learned from data. More specifically, we first construct a classification model that predicts the expected performance of auctions. We propose a data driven auction design framework (called DDAD) that combines the expert's knowledge with the learned prediction model, in order to find the best parameter values, i.e., starting price and display positions of the items, for a given new auction. The prediction model is evaluated, and the new design for several auctions is discussed and validated with the auction experts.

**Keywords** Machine learning · Optimization · Auction design

**Mathematics Subject Classification (2010)** 68T05 · 90C11 · 91B26

## 1 Introduction

Internet auctions have been upcoming since the early 2000s and most traditional auctions have also been converted into internet auctions due to the growth and widespread use of the internet, and the ease of bidding from the comfort of your own home. Industrial auctions are a means for companies to sell their assets and inventories. Online auctioneers try to set up the best possible auctions using several auction parameters, such as presentation of the lots, timing of the auctions and the starting prices.

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Classical economic theory such as [20, 21] provide some guideline on auction mechanism frameworks. However, they work under strong assumptions about rationality and valuation function of bidders. As many studies showed, bidders often behave irrationally due to several psychological phenomena. In practice, auctioneers rely on their experience and empirical analysis in the auction literature to tune auction parameters for daily operations. For example, they often define starting prices low to make the auctioned items attractive to a wide audience, but for items that are harder to sell, the starting prices are set relatively high. This pricing strategy is supported by [16] which states that lower starting prices reduce the barrier to bid, but lead to lower end prices when the market entry and participation are reduced.

As many auctions are conducted throughout the years, data is collected on the characteristics of auctions and the bids that are received. This historical data can give insights into how the auctions are performing, and machine learning methods could help in learning relations between characteristics of auctions, auction parameters, and auction outcomes. Existing research has typically focused on one specific kind of item with very similar specifications (e.g., [24]), on predicting outcome for an on-going auction (e.g., [31]), on predicting revenue with simulated auction data (e.g., [25]), or on using reinforcement learning for auction mechanism design (e.g., [23]). There is a lack of work on predicting auction outcomes and optimizing auction parameters for online industrial auctions.

The ability of predicting how well an auction will perform prior to the start comes in handy for auctioneers. If an item is expected to be a low-performing item, the auctioneer can take certain actions to influence the auction outcome. For instance, the starting selling price of the item can be modified, or the location where the item is displayed on the website can be changed to attract more attention. In this paper, we take a real-world industrial auction data set and investigate how we can improve upon the expert's design using insights learned from data. More specifically, we first construct a classification model that predicts the expected performance of auctions. We propose a data-driven auction design framework (called DDAD) that combines the expert's knowledge with the learned prediction model, in order to find the best parameter values, i.e., starting price and display positions of the items, for a given new auction. The prediction model is evaluated, and the new design for several auctions is discussed and validated with the auction experts.

Our contributions are as follows:

- We propose an optimization framework that seamlessly integrates prediction model components, i.e., constructed constraints between features and their relation to the predictions, with expert knowledge and domain constraints in a mathematical optimization model.
- Interestingly, our results demonstrate that despite the high variety of items and prices in industrial online auctions, simple classification models such as decision trees are able to predict the auction outcomes quite accurately, using expert knowledge and popularity of items as features.
- We show that the new design, which was validated by the auction experts, improves the expected revenue of the online auctioneer, evaluated by the classification model.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the related literature. Section 3 describes the auction setting and the auction optimization problem we aim to solve. In Section 4 we discuss the real-life data set that we use. In Section 5 we discuss our optimization framework (DDAD) that integrates the prediction model components with expert knowledge and domain constraints in a mathematical optimization model.

In Section 6 we apply our proposed method on a number of auctions in our data set and investigate the properties of the resulting new design. Section 7 concludes our work.

## 2 Literature review and background

Auction design is very important to the way an auction will eventually play out [14]. A different design for an auction with the exact same items and participating agents may result in a completely different outcome. Not only does the design influence the final allocation, but it can also influence the behaviors of the bidders. An example of an aspect the auctioneer needs to take into account is whether the bids are made public, i.e., all bidders may know the bids of other bidders (open bid), or whether the bids will be secret (sealed bid). Another example would be whether bidders should submit bids that exceed other bids until no participant would like to make a better bid (English auction), or whether the auctioneer should set a price no one is willing to pay for it, and lower it until there is a participant who is prepared to accept the proposed price (Dutch auction). The starting price of an item, and the order of items being shown in the auction, can have an impact on the performance of the auction as well.

Traditionally, analysis of auction design focuses on the mechanism itself [21]. It has been pointed out in the literature that a number of assumptions in the traditional game theoretical approaches to auction design, for instance, bidder symmetry, common knowledge of private valuation distributions, fixed numbers of bidders, result in auctions with limited usefulness in practice, especially for Internet auctions [22].

For example, as many studies showed, bidders often behave irrationally due to several psychological phenomena. The authors of [15] call the phenomenon of irrational and frantic behavior of bidders which lead to overbidding “auction fever”. Participants at auctions enjoy the thrill of winning [3]. The authors of [10] describe the opponent effect that is “an increase in the subjective value of winning the auction when the behavior of other bidders in the auctions is perceived to be competitive.” Another phenomenon is that bidders experience a feeling of ownership when they have the highest bid during an auction. This feeling of temporally ownership during an auction is named “pseudo-endowment effect” in [1] and “quasi-endowment” in [10], which leads to a higher end price.

Due to the above mentioned limitation and the fact that Internet auctions have generated a lot of data, many work have appeared that analyze and design auctions by data-driven approaches.

In the statistics literature, [29] develop a forecasting system to predict the price of an ongoing auction. They use the functional data analysis (FDA), where the relation between price and time is modelled by a smooth curve. The authors argue that FDA is able to account for the unequal spacing of bids and the changing dynamics of price throughout the auction. They test their method to auction data of a novel set of Harry Potter and Microsoft Xbox.

In [2] a semiparametric regression model is used to model the online auction process. The model is then used to forecast the price of an online auction, which can take into account changing arrival rates in the bidding process and changing dynamics of prices. They apply the model on a data set consisting of the bid history in auctions of the Microsoft Xbox gaming system. Using the same data set, the authors of [17] use stochastic differential equations (SDE) to model online auction price curves, in order to account for randomness of external and internal factors. They also argue that bidder behaviors are crucial to determine the price process, which they incorporate in their SDE approach.

Several machine learning models have been applied in predicting auction price. The authors of [7] use historical data in classification algorithms to predict the end prices of online auction items. The item in question is an item with “hard” features, which define the item objectively, e.g. specifications of an electronic device. They use data from auctions regarding a specific model of an electronic device. In [30], the authors also use the abundance of data from the online auction market to predict the final price of items to help sellers optimize the selling price of their items and auction attributes. They compare several machine learning algorithms and traditional statistical methods for forecasting the end prices and demonstrate that machine-learning algorithms outperform traditional statistical models. Again, the data set is restricted to a specific item type with hard features. In [4] machine learning is used in a different way to predict prices in an auction. The task of predicting the prices of license plates that are sold in auctions is viewed as a natural language processing (NLP) task. A deep recurrent neural network (RNN) is used to predict the prices of license plates based on the characters on the plate, using 13 years of historical auction prices. The deep RNN can explain over 80 percent of price variations. The authors of [13] use machine learning methods to forecast project bids in highway procurement auctions. They use random forest variable selection to select key tasks used for highway construction, after which regularized linear regression methods, like Ridge and Lasso, are used to predict the intervals of winning bids. Their approach can be useful for bidders as bid guidance, and it may help state agencies to predict their construction budgets. In [25, 28], the authors study the auction prediction and design problem for sequential auctions, however, they use simulated data with the limited item types.

The above-mentioned research has proven that machine learning methods can help in learning relations between characteristics of auctions, auction parameters, and auction outcomes. However, existing research has only focused on one specific kind of item with very similar specifications (e.g., [4, 7, 24, 30]), on predicting outcome for an on-going auction (e.g., [31]), or on predicting revenue with simulated auction data (e.g., [25]). There lacks studies on predicting auction outcomes for industrial auctions with much more diverse items of various categories.

In terms of research in designing auctions, the authors of [23] use reinforcement learning for solving an auction mechanism design problem. There is a lack of research in helping auctioneers to optimize their daily operations by designing auction parameters for sales, such as starting prices of different items and online display positions of items.

### 3 Auction setting and problem formulation

The online auction company conducts many auctions throughout the year, selling many different kinds of items. The items that are auctioned cover a wide range, from kitchenware to farming equipment and building contractors equipment. Each item that is being sold through the auction is called a lot. A collection of lots from one or more sellers is called a sale. A sale can be categorized in one of four categories: bank, dealer, liquidator, or volunteer. The items get appraised by experts and receive an estimated value (*EstValue*), along with a starting price for the lot, and they are assigned to a main and subcategory within the sale. A lot can also be put on allocate, which means that the seller has set a reserve price, and the lot will not be sold when the winning bid is lower than the reserve price. Lots are assigned a lot number, which is a unique number within the sale and indicates where the lot will be shown in the sale on the website, as the lots are automatically sorted on lot number. The lower the

lot number, the higher the lot will appear on the website. Sales are announced through their website well in time. Once an auction starts, bidders typically have a few weeks to bid on the lots. The auction is a form of online *English auction*, where the auctioneer opens the auction of a lot with a starting price, and buyers place increasingly higher bids. It uses a five-minute soft close policy on each lot, i.e., if a buyer enters a bid within five minutes of the lot's initial closing time, a five-minute extension would be added on. The lot will not close until bidding is static for five minutes. The item is sold to the highest bidder at a price equal to his or her bid. The English auction form is the dominant form for industrial auctions, such as Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers (RBA) and Troostwijk, and art auctions such as Christie's and Sotheby's.

The highest bid, or *EndPrice*, on its own does not say much about the success of a lot in an auction, if one does not know what kind of lot it was. Two lots might have the same *EndPrice*, but one could be considered a cheap item, whereas the other could be considered expensive. Therefore, the *multiplier* is used by the auctioneer as an auction performance indicator. The multiplier ties the *EndPrice* and the *EstValue* (see Table 1) together by taking the ratio between the two, i.e.,

$$\text{multiplier} = \frac{\text{EndPrice}}{\text{EstValue}}.$$

The multiplier therefore indicates how well an item has performed in the auction compared to the expectations of the expert. Based on expert opinion (and business needs), we choose to split the lots into three classes: (1) a multiplier equal to 0 is in the unsold class 0, or simply *unsold*; (2) a multiplier higher than 0 and lower than 0.8 denotes the low-performing class (*low*); (3) a multiplier of 0.8 or higher denotes the class with expected performance (*high*).

The auctioneer is particularly interested in items that may not be sold or may be sold for a lower price than expected. If an item is expected to not perform well, the auctioneer can take certain actions to update the auction parameters before the auction starts to influence the auction outcome. The important auction parameters include for example the starting prices of items and their display positions.

The auction optimization problem is defined as follows. Given a sale of  $N$  items or lots, determine the starting price and the lot number (i.e., display position) for each item, such that the expected outcome is maximized.

## 4 Auction data and feature engineering


We are provided with data collected over ten months. From this data, we select a subset of the data from the following branches: construction, agricultural industry and consumer. The main motivation for this subset is the fact that these branches make up about 75% of total revenue. In summary, Table 1 shows an overview of the available variables in the database of the auction company.

The data set consists of a total of 24,451 lots. There are 18,528 lots in the *EstValue* range of  $[0, 200)$ . This means that there are many lots consisting of small items with a low estimated value. The multiplier is very sensitive to small variations in the end price when the estimated value is small. We would also like to focus on predicting the larger lots, as these are more important to predict correctly. Therefore, we filter out lots with an estimated value of lower than 200. Furthermore, there are 80 lots with an estimated value of 20,000 and higher. As these lots are rare and should be treated by experts as special cases, we filter out these lots as well. We end up with a total of 5,843 lots. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the

**Table 1** Description of the variables in the data and their respective types

Variable	Type	Description
LotNr	Ordinal	Unique ID and position of a lot within a sale
Allocate	Binary	Lot has a reserve price
EstValue	Numeric	Estimated value of the lot
StartPrice	Numeric	Starting price of the lot
EndPrice	Numeric	Price at which the lot is sold
Seller	Ordinal	Type of seller
CloseTime	Ordinal	Time of day the sale closes
Weekday	Ordinal	Day of the week the sale closes

distribution of the filtered lots over different ranges of estimated value, starting price and end price, respectively. Figure 2 shows that the starting price of lots is lower in general than its estimated value, as the graph shows a shift to the left compared to Fig. 1. The lots with an estimated value of in between 200 and 300 mostly have a starting price of in between 100 and 200, although there are 146 lots that have an even lower starting price of lower than 100. In general, lots have starting prices approximately 0.5 or 0.67 times their estimated value. In Fig. 3 we can see that about half of the lots have an end price lower than 500. This coincides with Fig. 1, which has roughly half of the lots with an estimated value of lower than 500. This would indicate that the experts' estimates are generally quite okay. However, the end price of about a quarter of these lots are lower than 200, whereas the estimated value is 200 or higher. This shows that experts are overestimating the value on relatively cheaper lots. For the other lots, the end price coincides roughly with the estimated value. This of course does not mean that the experts are correct with their estimates all the time, but they are performing quite well on average. For all these features we can say that there are many lots in the lower regions, whereas the feature values get higher, the number of lots decreases, creating a long tail. This means that the models will be trained more heavily on the lots with lower values, whereas they will be more susceptible to variance once the feature values get higher. This again shows that we are dealing with a large variety of items, and it will therefore be difficult to construct a model that will perform well on every item in the auction.



**Fig. 1** Data distribution over various ranges of estimated value




Fig. 2 Data distribution over various ranges of starting price

**Feature construction and selection** In a similar vein as defining the multiplier, the starting price of a lot can be tied to its estimated value. Therefore, we introduce the variable *SPEV*, defined as

$$SPEV = \frac{Start\ Price}{Est\ Value},$$

which indicates how far the starting price is from the estimated value of the lot initially. In addition, auctioneers deem to believe that scarcity is important. The simple economic rule of supply and demand is valid. If supply is lower, the price gets higher. If an auctioneer offers one unique item, all attention and demand are focused on this specific item. When the auctioneer offers two similar items, the attention and the number of bidders are spread out, which results in less bidding activity and therefore lower prices. Hence, we create additional features *LotsSale*, *LotsSaleMain*, and *LotsSaleSub*. *LotsSale* indicates the total number of lots within the same sale. *LotsSaleMain* and *LotsSaleSub* present an even deeper level of scarcity, where *LotsSaleMain* shows the number of lots within the same main category within the same sale, whereas *LotsSaleSub* shows the number of lots within the same subcategory of that main category. We use all these constructed features together with the variables described in Table 1, with the exception of *EndPrice* and multiplier, as *feature variables*.

In order to find out the relation between the multiplier and the feature variables, we conduct a correlation test on the data set. We make use of Spearman’s rank correlation. The




Fig. 3 Data distribution over various ranges of end price



correlation between the multiplier and the feature variables in the data set with all lots, in which unsold lots are assigned a multiplier of 0, and with just the sold lots can be found in Table 2.

In both sets, the feature variable that stands out with a positive correlation with the multiplier is SPEV (0.37/0.33). The positive correlations between the multiplier and the StartPrice and SPEV indicate that higher starting prices result in higher multipliers, with SPEV being a better indicator. This is in line with the findings of [1], who remarks that a low starting price may be used to attract more bidders, but will not necessarily result in a higher end price. As the correlations between the multiplier and EstValue ( $-0.07/0.03$ ) seem to be rather low and not consistent, higher valued lots will not necessarily result in higher multipliers, but there are cases in which the starting price is relatively high compared to the estimated value, which will result in a higher multiplier. In addition, LotsSaleMain ( $-0.06/-0.07$ ) and LotsSaleSub ( $-0.08/-0.12$ ) stand out with negative correlations. This indicates that the fewer lots there are of the same main and subcategory within the same sale, the higher the multiplier will be. This coincides with the intuition that scarcity will make the lot more wanted, and therefore will generate a higher multiplier. LotsSale (0.03/ $-0.03$ ) does not seem to have the same effect, as it might be too generic, as there are items within the same sale that can be very different from each other. Furthermore, the negative correlations of LotNr ( $-0.08/-0.12$ ) indicate that the lower the LotNr, which means that it is higher on the page, the higher the multiplier will be. This is also as expected, as more bidders will see the lot when it is higher up on the page. With Seller ( $-0.11/-0.08$ ) we see that sales from banks and liquidators result in slightly higher multipliers than sales from dealers and volunteers, which also matches the auctioneer's expectations. CloseTime ( $-0.05/-0.08$ ) and Weekday ( $-0.02/-0.05$ ) seem to indicate that sales ending earlier on a day and in the week have a slightly higher multiplier, but the effect is small. Allocate ( $-0.34/-0.03$ ) has a significant difference in correlation between all lots and just the sold lots. This is because lots on allocate have a reserve price, which result in unsold lots with a multiplier of 0. When only considering sold lots, there seems to be barely any difference between lots being on allocate and not.

We include the following features in our prediction models: SPEV, StartPrice, EstValue, LotsSale, LotsSaleMain, LotsSaleSub, LotNr, Weekday and Allocate. The features SPEV, StartPrice, EstValue are included because relationship between the starting price relative to

**Table 2** Spearman's rank correlation between the multiplier and feature variables over the entire data set, and over only the sold lots

Feature	Multiplier (all)	Multiplier (sold)
LotNr	-0.08	-0.12
Allocate	-0.34	-0.03
EstValue	-0.07	0.03
StartPrice	0.06	0.16
Seller	-0.11	-0.08
CloseTime	-0.05	-0.08
Weekday	-0.02	-0.05
SPEV	0.37	0.33
LotsSale	0.03	-0.03
LotsSaleMain	-0.06	-0.07
LotsSaleSub	-0.08	-0.12

the estimated value is important when auctioneers optimize the auction design. LotsSale, LotsSaleMain, LotsSaleSub are selected since they jointly capture the effect of scarcity. LotNr is selected because it is related to the visibility of a lot. Weekday is selected in consultation with auction experts in order to capture potential time-effects. Allocate is selected since it can potentially predict when a lot will be sold or not. Finally, note that SPEV, StartPrice, and LotNr are design parameters that are directly controlled by the auctioneer.

The selected features were thus chosen based on the following approach. First, we start with all of the features that the company provided. Next, we then selected a subset of these features based on: (1) the expert opinion from auction experts on what features could be relevant, and (2) additional insights obtained from a correlation analysis. Other feature selection methods such as recursive feature selection yielded similar results. As some features are auction design variables that we will optimize after building predictive model (see Section 5), feature selection methods based on for example Principal Component Analysis (PCA) are not preferred. Furthermore, we would like to point out that our proposed framework (see Section 5) also works for alternative feature selection methods. Finally, we note that the inclusion of additional features, such as the condition of the auction item (new or used) and color of the item, could potentially also lead to improved performance. However, these features were not recorded in the data that was provided by the auction company, and as a consequence they could not be used.

## 5 Auction design optimization model

We treat the problem of evaluating the expected performance of auctioning items in the new sale as a classification problem. In the literature, there are various ways of utilizing the prediction models for optimizing new designs. For example, in [6] and [11], predictions are used as fitness functions to evaluate the quality of a solution. Another line of research, called Empirical Model Learning [19], investigates embedding of the components of prediction models into combinatorial models. See [18] for an overview. In [28], the authors encode the prediction model using Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) language to find optimal auction sequence in a sequential auction using simulated action data. We extend the encoding of [28] to combine with the expert and domain knowledge in the MILP model. Our proposed auction design optimization framework DDAD is illustrated in Fig. 4, where historical auction data is used to build a prediction model. A mathematical optimization model, i.e., integer linear programming (ILP) model, is defined to solve the given auction optimization problem. This ILP model takes into account both (1) the domain and expert knowledge on variables and objectives, and (2) the internal structure of the prediction model, i.e., the learned relations of different variables to predictions. In this paper we use classification trees as prediction models, as this provides us with a framework to exploit and extend the translation from the learned classification tree to a set of linear constraints from [28]. Furthermore, the choice for classification trees as prediction models is reasonable, since the performance of decision trees is comparable to other more complex tree-based models (random forests and AdaBoost), see Table 4. Therefore, the choice for classification trees as prediction models does not lead to a significant loss in terms of performance.

**Decision variables** Given a set  $I$  of  $N$  lots, we use a decision variable  $s_r$  to denote the starting price of lot  $r \in I$ , and the following variables to encode any possible index of lots:  $x_{i,r} \in \{0, 1\}$ . Lot  $r$  is given an index of  $i$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq N$ , if and only if  $x_{i,r} = 1$ . Thus, if  $x_{3,1}$




Fig. 4 Components of the data driven auction design model

is equal to 1, it means that the first lot is assigned 3 as its lot id. Each lot has one lot id, and every lot is required to have a unique lot id. Hence,

$$\sum_{1 \leq r \leq N} x_{i,r} = 1 \quad \text{for all } 1 \leq i \leq N$$

$$\sum_{1 \leq i \leq N} x_{i,r} = 1 \quad \text{for all } 1 \leq r \leq N$$

Any assignment of ones and zeros to the  $x$  variables that satisfies these two types of constraints corresponds to a valid lot id assignments of all lots. The starting prices  $s_r$  have the following bounds, based on the advice from auction experts:  $0.4 \times EV_r \leq s_r \leq 1.0 \times EV_r$ , for all  $r \in I$ .

**Computing feature values** Let  $Feat$  be the set of features that are used to build the classification tree, i.e., LotNrRel, Allocate, EstValue, StartPrice, LotsSale, LotsSaleMain, LotsSaleSub, Weekday, SPEV. We use  $F$  ( $F \subseteq Feat$ ) to denote the features that are used in the tree. The features LotNrRel, StartPrice, SPEV are related to our decision variables, and hence if they are in  $F$ , their values need to be translated as follow.

$$\text{StartPrice}_r = s_r \quad \text{for } r \in I$$

$$\text{LotNrRel}_r = \frac{\{i | x_{i,r} = 1\}}{N} \quad \text{for } r \in I$$

$$\text{SPEV}_r = \frac{s_r}{EV_r} \quad \text{for } r \in I$$

**Objective function** We denote the predicted class of lot  $r$  by binary variables  $p_{r,c}$ , where  $c \in C = \{0, 1, 2\}$  is the class label.  $p_{r,0} = 1$  indicates that lot  $r$  is predicted to be in the lowest performing class 0. The objective of the auction design is to maximize the expected performance of all lots in the sale, i.e.,

$$\max \sum_{1 \leq r \leq N} \sum_{c \in C} C \cdot p_{r,c}$$

Every lot  $r$  can only end up in one class, i.e.,

$$\sum_{c \in C} p_{r,c} = 1 \quad \text{for all } r \in I$$

**Encoding classification tree** We translate the classification tree models into ILP using linear constraints based on the encoding in [28]. We introduce a set of binary variables  $z_{l,r}$ ,

representing whether a leaf node  $l$  is reached for lot  $r$ . The internal (decision) nodes of the trees can be represented implicitly by the constraints on these new  $z$  variables. Intuitively, we encode that a  $z$  variable has to be false when the binary test of any of its parent nodes fails. By additionally requiring that exactly one  $z$  variable is true at every index, we fully encode the learned trees.

Let  $D$  be the set of all decision nodes in the classification tree. Every decision node in  $D$  contains a Boolean constraint  $f \leq t$ , which is true if and only if feature  $f$  has a value less than or equal to a constant  $t$ . A key insight of our encoding is that every such Boolean constraint directly influences the value of several  $z$  variables: if it is true, then all  $z$  variables representing leaves in the right subtree are false; if it is false, then all that represent leaves in the left subtree are false. In this way, we require only two constraints per Boolean constraint in order to represent all possible paths to leaf nodes.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{fv}_f + (M_f - c) \cdot \sum_{l \in L} z_{l,r} &\leq M_f && \text{for all } r \in I, (f \leq t) \in D \\ \text{fv}_f + (m_f - c) \cdot \sum_{l \in L'} z_{l,r} &\geq m_f && \text{for all } r \in I, (f \leq t) \in D \end{aligned}$$

where  $\text{fv}_f$  is a calculation of feature  $f$ 's value,  $L$  and  $L'$  are the leaf nodes in the left and right subtrees of the decision node with constraint  $(f \leq t)$  in the tree, and  $M_f$  and  $m_f$  are the maximum and minimum values of feature  $f$ . For the feature calculation we simply replace  $\text{fv}_f$  with the right-hand sides of the corresponding feature definitions.

The above constraints ensure that when  $z_{l,r}$  obtains a value of 1, all of the binary test in the parent nodes on the path to  $l$  in the tree for lot  $r$  return true. By construction of the trees, this ensures that at most one  $z$  variable is true for every  $r$ .

$$\sum_l z_{l,r} = 1 \quad \text{for all } r \in I$$

The predictions of the trees are given by the  $z$  variable that is true. We multiply this  $z$  variable with the class prediction in the leaf node it represents to obtain the prediction, and store it in the  $p$  variables used to compute the objective value.

$$p_{r,c} = \sum_{l \in L_r} v_l \cdot z_{l,r} \quad \text{for all } r \in I$$

where  $v_l$  is the constant prediction of leaf  $l$  in the tree.

In this way, we build a mathematical optimization model DDAD based on data and domain knowledge. This model can be solved by any off-the-shelf optimization solvers like CPLEX [12] and GUROBI [8], and guarantees to find the optimal decision variables, i.e., starting prices and lot numbers, for items in the new sale, such that the expected performance is maximized.

## 6 Results

We use the provided data to investigate how the DDAD performs. First, we select the data that we will use in our models, and we construct a training and test set. Then we use existing tree based classifiers to predict the multiplier of lots using the feature variables. A variety of different classification models with different parameters are used to observe the performance on our data. Thereafter, one classification model will be chosen to be used with DDAD. We use Scikit-learn in Python for the classification models, and we use CPLEX to solve DDAD. The dataset and code used will be made available here: <https://github.com/yingqianzhang/online-auction-data>.

## 6.1 Classification model

We first randomize the data set in order to obtain representative training and test data sets. Because the data set consists of multiple sales made up of numerous lots, we have to make sure that the sales stay intact. We randomly shuffle the sales and then use the first 70% of the 5,843 lots as our training data set, and the remaining 30% as our test data set. As the sales within the training and test data sets also have to remain intact, we do not cut off the training data set at exactly 70% of the total data, but we also include all the lots in the last sale of the training data set. Finally, we balance the training data set by undersampling lots with class label 2 such that the total number of lots in class 1 and 2 are equal. This results in a training data set of 3,087 lots (45 sales, 58.4%), and a test data set of 1,747 lots (32 sales, 41.5%). Table 3 shows the number of lots in each class. We also used other sampling alternatives for class balancing, but these did not give very different results.

We perform k-fold cross validation on the training data for different classification models with varying parameters in order to find the best classification model. We need to account for the fact that the data is ordered in sales and time. Therefore, we shuffle the training data set before applying k-fold cross validation. This ensures that the obtained accuracy from the model will be representative of the performance of the model with arbitrary data. For our classification models, we use ones that are readily available in Scikit-learn.

First of all, we use CART decision trees with maximum depths of 3, 5, 7 and 10. The Gini impurity is used to measure the quality of a split. We also use random forest classifiers (RFC), which are bootstrap aggregated decision trees, with the same maximum depths as the CART decision trees and the same Gini impurity criterion. The number of trees in a forest is set to 100. Next, we use AdaBoost classifiers, using both the SAMME.R real boosting algorithm (AdaCR), and the SAMME discrete boosting algorithm (AdaC) [9]. A decision tree classifier is set as the base estimator, and we use a maximum of 50 estimators with a learning rate of 1.0. Finally, a bagging classifier (BagC) is used, which is an ensemble meta-estimator. Again, we use a decision tree classifier as the base estimator, and we use a maximum of 50 estimators.

Table 4 shows the results of the different classification models on the data based on the selected features. The second and third columns show the mean and 95% confidence interval of the accuracy in a 10-fold cross validation on the training data. The next four columns show the overall accuracy and accuracy for each class, for the training set, while the last four columns show the same for the test set. The results show that simple CART classifiers are competitive with the ensemble classifiers. Among the CART models, CART with depth 10 (CART10) shows the best performance as it has the highest accuracy in 10-fold cross-validation, on training, and on testing data sets. Note that CART10 has a reasonably high accuracy across the different classes, whereas the smaller CART models tend to perform poorly for a particular class. The random forest classifiers generally outperform CART10 but the differences are not that large. We use CART10 as input for the auction design

**Table 3** Number of lots in the low-, medium-, and high-performing classes in the training and test set

Multiplier	Category	#Lots train	#Lots test
0	Low	237	46
(0, 0.80)	Med	1425	690
[0.80, $\infty$ )	High	1425	1011
Total lots		3087	1747

**Table 4** Mean and variance of the accuracy in 10-fold cross-validation for the shuffled training data, and the accuracy for each class, and Cohen's kappa, for the training and test data set

	Accuracy		Train			Accuracy per class			Test			Accuracy per class			Kappa
	Mean	Var (+/-)	Accuracy	Low	Med	High	Accuracy	Low	Med	High	Accuracy	Low	Med	High	
CART3	0.64	0.05	0.64	0.94	1.00	0.23	0.56	1.00	0.99	0.25	0.36	1.00	0.99	0.25	0.26
CART5	0.67	0.04	0.69	0.97	0.64	0.69	0.66	0.61	0.36	0.87	0.45	0.61	0.36	0.87	0.28
CART7	0.69	0.06	0.73	0.97	0.76	0.66	0.59	0.63	0.70	0.52	0.53	0.63	0.70	0.52	0.24
CART10	0.72	0.05	0.81	1.00	0.76	0.84	0.67	0.63	0.58	0.73	0.67	0.63	0.58	0.73	0.35
rfe3	0.66	0.05	0.67	1.00	0.86	0.42	0.65	1.00	0.72	0.58	0.42	1.00	0.72	0.58	0.34
rfe5	0.69	0.03	0.73	1.00	0.85	0.56	0.67	0.89	0.63	0.68	0.52	0.89	0.63	0.68	0.35
rfe7	0.72	0.03	0.79	1.00	0.88	0.66	0.67	0.78	0.64	0.68	0.63	0.78	0.64	0.68	0.36
rfe10	0.75	0.04	0.89	1.00	0.93	0.84	0.68	0.87	0.65	0.70	0.81	0.87	0.65	0.70	0.39
adacR	0.55	0.06	0.56	0.97	0.82	0.22	0.42	0.65	0.80	0.16	0.22	0.65	0.80	0.16	0.01
adac	0.61	0.07	0.62	1.00	0.59	0.58	0.65	1.00	0.58	0.68	0.34	1.00	0.58	0.68	0.32
bagc	0.75	0.02	0.98	1.00	0.99	0.97	0.61	0.65	0.59	0.63	0.97	0.65	0.59	0.63	0.25

optimization model since: (i) the performance on testing data is similar to the best random forest classifier; and more importantly, (ii) we can leverage the translation from the learned classification tree to a set of linear constraints as described in Section 5.

## 6.2 New auction design

In this section we conduct numerical experiments in order to investigate the new auction designs that our approach would recommend. We randomly take five sales from the test set and construct the optimization model from the learned classification tree to determine the starting price and lot number of the lots.

**Combining expert knowledge with optimization** Note that there is some expert knowledge that the optimization model does not take into account. In practice, the expert would (everything else equal) assign lots with higher estimated values to lower lot numbers, so that these items appear higher on the list that is shown to bidders. The primary objective of the optimization model is to change the design parameters so that more lots will have a higher multiplier. However, given that a set of lots have the same predicted class, the ordering of the lots may not exhibit an easily distinguishable pattern. In order to avoid such situations, we apply a re-ordering procedure after applying the auction design optimization model from Section 5. The re-ordering procedure exploits the structure of the decision tree prediction model. More specifically, after we apply the optimization model, we feed each lot (in the sale) into the decision tree and keep track of the leaf node that each lot ends up in. Next, for all lots within a particular leaf node, we re-assign the values of LotNrRel such that lots with higher estimated values receive lower values of LotNrRel. Note that, due to the structure of the decision tree, this swapping of the values of LotNrRel does not change the classification of the swapped lots (their predicted class remains the same).

**Results of new design** Table 5 reports various metrics related to the redesign of the auction. The second column of Table 5 shows the accuracy of the prediction model for each sale. Overall the prediction model shows a relatively good performance in the test sets, with an accuracy of at least 0.50 the cases considered. Since the composition of the type of lots can vary considerably across different sales, these results are encouraging. The third column shows the fraction of lots that is being classified as high according to the optimization model by tweaking the starting price and lot number. We observe that the model is able to change the starting price and lot number in such a way that the learned classification tree classifies most lots, and in four sales even all lots, as high. Upon closer inspection, we notice that overall the model assigns a higher starting price to lots compared to the expert. This can be seen in the fourth column of Table 5 which shows the fraction of lots that receive a higher starting price. Many lots are assigned a slightly different SPEV. The final column shows the average change in SPEV for cases when it is adjusted upwards and in cases when it is adjusted downwards. In general, these quantities tend to be of similar order but they depend on the specific sale. Furthermore, we see that the relatively few times that the model assigns a lower starting price to a lot, the lot in question tends to be relatively more expensive. The model typically does this when the initial predicted class is medium and the model changes the starting price so that the predicted class (after optimization) becomes high. Experts usually deem these lots to be potentially more popular and will set the starting price high, whereas the model does not take into account these properties as strictly. It is harder to find a clear pattern in the new design for lots that have a relatively low estimated value. The multiplier is more volatile for these lots because it is more sensitive with respect to the

**Table 5** New design results for sales from test set using DDAD

Sale (lots)	Acc	DDAD High	Higher SPEV	Avg Diff SPEV (+/-)
1 (16)	0.56	1.00	0.75	+0.21/-0.25
2 (31)	0.58	0.81	0.65	+0.38/-0.13
3 (16)	0.50	1.00	0.44	+0.17/-0.31
4 (113)	0.55	1.00	0.59	+0.16/-0.21
5 (43)	0.53	1.00	0.65	+0.20/-0.16

starting price: small changes in starting price have a higher impact on the multiplier if lots with low estimated value are sold. Furthermore, the values for the starting price are set in a more subjective manner that varies across auction experts.

**Validation from auction experts** The differences compared to experts' design strategies are interesting. As the proposed data driven model demonstrates higher expected outcomes of auctions with new designs, it may indicate that the auction experts' belief on how starting prices and lot numbers influence auctions is biased. Having said that, the learned classification model used in DDAD might also be biased due to high variety of items in different sales. The auction experts analyzed the results and were intrigued by it because the automated auction design has to potential to improve the revenue and reduces the manual labor involved. In general, the experts find that the assignment of lot numbers and starting prices are plausible and logical. They would consider using the new design as a baseline and adjust it further based on their expert knowledge.

## 7 Conclusion and discussion

We propose an auction parameter design framework that integrates a classification tree that predicts the expected performance of auctions into an auction design optimization model. Currently, the starting prices and lot numbers are defined by experts. With the implementation of our proposed approach, the experts would only have to determine the expected value but leave the design of starting prices and lot numbers to the model. We have shown that the proposed approach is effective as it improves upon the design from the auction experts.

The quality of the model can be improved by including additional information about the auctions. In particular, the auction experts suggest to also include information that measure the expected value according the seller, the expected value according valuation reports, and revenue performance of similar lots. This information was unfortunately not available when data was shared with the researchers, but incorporating this information in a future model could improve performance. Another variable that could be added to the model is the individual closing time of the lots, currently only the closing time of the complete auction is taken into account.

Auctioneers are in particular interested in predicting low-performing high-value items well. In the future, we will take into account different costs for different classes, using cost-sensitive learning [5]. We will extend the work of [26, 27] to learn classification models as a multi-objective optimization problem to incorporate different costs and learning objectives into learning algorithms.



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