

Pings and Hups

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Architectures of Life and Death

The Eco-Aesthetics of the Built Environment

Edited by
Andrej Radman and Stavros Kousoulas

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Part One

METAMODELLING

Chapter 1

Introduction

Pings and Hups

Andrej Radman and Stavros Kousoulas

The universe was not built only despite disorder, it was also built in and by disorder, that is to say in and by the originary catastrophe and the ruptures which followed, in and by the disordered spread of heat, in and by turbulence, in and by the inequalities of the process which prescribed all materialization, all diversification, all interaction, all organization.

Edgar Morin, *Method: Towards
a Study of Humankind*¹

The town is the correlate of the road. The town exists only as a function of circulation, and of circuits; it is a remarkable point [a singularity] on the circuits that create it, and that it creates. It is defined by entries and exits; something must enter it and exit from it. It imposes a frequency. It effects a polarization of matter, inert, living or human; it causes the *phylum*, the flow, to pass through specific places, along horizontal lines.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari,
*A Thousand Plateaus*²

Etymologically unattested yet artistically long praised, there is a profound relation between life and light; next to both, the almost self-evident (and scientifically undisputed) relation between light and flow, *lux* and *flux*.³ Would it be correct then to understand life as an issue of perception and manipulation of flows?⁴ Surprisingly, this is a question that can only be answered by addressing death. As any lensmaker would claim (and philosophy has always had an affinity with this profession), perception is not a synthesis but an ascensis: it does not connect, it disconnects; or, better said, in order to connect, it

needs to disconnect. However, following the radical empiricist dictum, one should never speak of perception alone; ever since William James, perception equals action. In other words, perception is not something that happens to us, it is something we do.⁵ Strange as it may seem therefore, to live one needs to practice death. This book will examine how styling life means styling death and how architecture (in the broadest possible sense) is involved in this continuous process of stylisation. To do so, architecture and perception, duration and individuation, will all converge in practising how one can die without dying in order to enunciate a life.

As soon as we have introduced the ‘inclusive disjunction’ (disconnect in order to connect), it is time to follow it up with yet another aberrant nuptial – the ‘unlimited finity’.⁶ A (life)style is concerned with the question of ‘how’ (*maniera*). While matter/energy remains finite, manners of existence are theoretically unlimited.⁷ Not only do forms of life passively conform to the given circumstances, they also actively transform their associated milieu. Strike that. What really determines the style is not the inter-action between the former and the latter (crypto-subject and crypto-object slipping through the back door). It is style that is primary. This ontogenetic relation is external to its so-called terms that, according to Gilbert Simondon, never get fully individuated anyway.⁸ The content is just too big for the expression and some of it remains in standing reserve. Thanks to the disparation between the virtual and the actual, things may turn out differently, subject to modulation, against the hylomorphic attitude with its preference for the all-too-predictable moulding. Enjoying warmth on a sunny day, and speculating about the source of warmth, pertains to the knowledge of effect and the knowledge of cause – ‘shadow and colour’.⁹ Spinoza identified the ‘third kind of knowledge’ and set the path for what his disciple Félix Guattari named ‘ethico-aesthetics’ (act in order to perceive) (fig. 1.1).¹⁰ The neologism scrambled the cause-and-effect sequence and gave us precious insight into the bootstrapping capacity of auto-affectivity and transversality of heteropoiesis – ‘light/life’.¹¹

Freed from both imagination and concepts, the third kind of knowledge proceeds from the singular to the universal without compromising, awaiting its constant re-singularisation via the univocity of the sensible. It operates beyond the subjective ‘a priori’ and the objective ‘a posteriori’, committed only to the ‘a praesenti’ of its own individuation, demanding a mode of existence that is either immanent or nothing at all. It is for this reason that the third, intuitive, mode of knowledge is the most precise; any other transcendental account of sense can easily be replaced with another since, in any case, it does not correspond to the real experience but to an ideal moulding of experience. After all, this is the great lesson that Henri Bergson has taught us: transcendental thought is simply too wide for reality, making propositions and advancing statements that can also ‘hold as true for a world or universe

First knowledge Signs or Affects	Second knowledge Notions or Concepts	Third knowledge Essences or Percepts
Shadow	Colour	Light
Signs do not have objects as their direct referents, they are effects or consequences separated from their premises: states of bodies (affections / instantaneity) and continuous variations of power (affects / duration).	Knowledge by causes: common notions are concepts of objects, and objects are causes. They are formed by at least two bodies (contrast or complementarity).	No longer the effect of shadow, or the colouring cause, but pure 'figure of light'. Radical auto-affectation (education of intuition): singularity that surveys (at absolute speed) its affects and affections in eternity (Aion, non-local causation).
E.g. 'I feel the sun on me'.	E.g. <i>joy</i> : 'The sun, I am something of it.' E.g. <i>sadness</i> : 'The "disagreement" between the human body and the body of Covid-19.'	E.g. 'The rays by which the sun affects me are the rays by which I affect myself, and the rays by which I affect myself are the rays of the sun that affect me.'

Figure 1.1 Spinoza (according to Deleuze) Distinguishes between the Three Irreducible Kinds of Knowledge, That Is, Modes of Existence. 'Essence' here means singular determination (not logical possibilities, but existences). 'Absolute survey' is a reference to Raymond Ruyer, *Neofinalism* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2016). *Source*: Table by authors based on Deleuze's 'Spinoza and the Three "Ethics"'.

that is radically different than the one we do occupy'.¹² To speak of this reality and of this life – and this death – one must intuit how they change. Once again, it is an issue of style. We need to be cautious though: as Deleuze puts it, 'if philosophy has a positive and direct relationship with things, it is only to the extent that it claims to grasp the thing itself on the basis of what it is, of its difference with all that it is not, that is, in its internal difference'.¹³ For Deleuze, as well as for Bergson, the greatest change of all, the greatest difference of all, is the difference of something from itself. In this sense, internal difference can only be approached in terms of duration.

Consider the famous Bergsonian cone of pure memory.¹⁴ Its tapering geometry is meant to convey the variability of rhythms and frequencies of duration converging on its point. The apex is the place of the most condensed contraction of the whole of memory (time) into the ever-receding present of understanding. This is the point of intersection with the most relaxed level of duration, that is, the actual matter (space). The attribute 'pure' underscores a leap into a virtual, not a psychological, past. In other words, this is an ontological and not a chronological move. It is worth repeating that duration is what differs from itself and, as such, a concept that dispenses once and for all with the totalising actuality or actual totality. In the words of Deleuze,

According to the Bergsonian formula, time signifies that everything is *not* given; the whole is *not* givable. . . It has the strange power to affirm simultaneously fragments that do not constitute a whole in space, any more than they form a

whole by succession within time. Time is precisely that transversal of all possible spaces, including the space of time.¹⁵

It is for this reason that deriving the possible from the actual constitutes a fundamental fallacy, a cliché of reductionism. If entropy (aka heat death) is the most generalisable concept ever¹⁶ – an inescapable tendency towards the ultimate sameness – then virtuality as pure memory could be seen as its temporary co-option for the sake of a more creative dissipation. Linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways (styles) through negentropic relays.¹⁷ Quentin Meillassoux draws a clear parallelism between the active/reactive becoming on the one hand and the active/reactive death on the other (fig 1.2).¹⁸ To adopt a reactive disposition, in either case, is to shield off from the non-linear and non-chronological duration that is open at all times to an indeterminate future. Conversely, active in ‘active becoming’ stands for what Nick Land calls ‘making it with death’:

The reality of identity is death, which is why the organism cannot coexist with what it is. On the smooth surface of the body without organs ‘what’ and ‘is’ recoil allergically from each other, opening an inclusive disjunction at the heart of essence. This disjunction separates the identity pole of the body without organs from the unfettered difference of the deterritorialised organs, splitting apart the objectivism which implants an empirical identity into rigidified configuration of difference [reactivity].¹⁹




Figure 1.2 Living and Dying as a Function of Narrowing and Broadening of Discontinuities. The former increases the power of disinterest of the living being; the latter signals itself through an increased openness to a part of the fluxes. *Source:* Diagram redrawn from Quentin Meillassoux, ‘Subtraction and Contraction’, *Collapse III* (November 2007): 99, 103.

In other words, death is at once a pure memory and a pure event, a leap to the virtual past, ‘not the end but the unending’.²⁰ This is what Deleuze had in mind when he argued that,

death does not appear in the objective model of an indifferent inanimate matter to which the living would ‘return’; it is present in the living in the form of a subjective and differentiated experience endowed with its prototype. It is not a material state; on the contrary, having renounced all matter, it corresponds to a pure form – the empty form of time . . . Death is, rather, the last form of the problematic, the source of problems and questions, the sign of their persistence over and above any response, the ‘Where?’ and ‘When?’ which designate this (non)-being where every affirmation is nourished.²¹

It is the virtuality of death as a pure event that affirms life in its endurance: life endures by differing from itself based on the expressive rhythms of its relation with an absolute and pure virtuality. The more it endures, the more it differs from itself, the more it constrains itself. As such, life is not a response to the question ‘Why something rather than nothing?’; it is an affirmative response to the question ‘Why this rather than that?’. Emergence is an intimate dance of life and death. In the very act of dancing, novel constraints are introduced, new zigs that respond to new zags, new *pings* to new *hups*, new flows to new breaks and vice versa.²² As neuroanthropologist Terrence Deacon suggests, the most common mistake regarding constraints is that we consider them as something external, assuming that there is always an $n+1$ dimension that imposes them.²³ On the contrary, constraints are immanent: coming from the Latin *constrictus*, past participle of *constringere*, they stand for the inclusive disjunction of ‘that which binds together’.²⁴ Consequently, one way to understand constraints is as a reduced variety, as a gradual delimitation of the actual that nonetheless reinforces the virtual (fig. 1.3). This might seem contradictory, since reduction in variety implies a redundancy in attributes. However, Deacon underlines that ‘when some process is more constrained in some finite variety of values of its parameters or in the number of dimensions in which it can vary, its configurations, states, and paths of change will more often be “near” previous ones in the space of possibilities, even if there is never exact repetition’.²⁵ This is vital to understanding constraints: they allow for a difference to repeat itself, forcing itself to differ so as to cross through. Consequently, by forcing itself to differ, difference generates the capacity to endure, precisely because it generates the need for creating new constraints that will regulate its intensive passages.

Some may wonder what all of this has to do with ‘architecture proper’ but it would be a problem badly posed. Instead we should ask ourselves, ‘Now that architects are not to be regarded as glorified artists of built forms, what is

Homeodynamics	Morphodynamics	Teleodynamics
Thermodynamics	Autopoiesis	Life, evolution, semiosis
Spontaneous constraint dissipation, reduction of correlation, loss of symmetries, equilibration.	Generation of constraints/regularities arising endogenously in response to constant perturbation.	Self-reproducing/maintaining constraints due to the synergistic interdependent coupling of morphodynamics.
- Isolated from environment;	- Constantly perturbed from environment;	- Preserves fitness to environment;
- Spontaneously destroys internal constraints;	- Spontaneously generates internal constraints;	- Spontaneously preserves internal constraints;
- Entropy export develops toward a minimum.	- Entropy export develops toward a maximum.	- Entropy export develops toward an optimum.

Figure 1.3 Terrence Deacon's 'Ratcheting' Constraint Production Where the Larval Subject (as Information-Based Life) Becomes a Higher-Order Constraint on Reciprocally Synergistic Constraint-Generating Processes. *Source:* Table by authors based on Deacon's *Incomplete Nature*.

it exactly that they (ought to) do?' Guattari's pragmatist advice is unequivocal: architects are to offer their services in 'revealing the *virtual desires* of spaces, places, trajectories and territories'. They will have to become 'artisans of sensible and relational lived experience'.²⁶ 'Architectural enunciation' is to be devoted to the ethico-aesthetic processes of subjectivation. Its primary radical perspectivist goal is to produce points of view, which in turn engender (axiological) subjects.²⁷ Style is never a matter of the man.²⁸ As counterintuitive as it may sound, the subject is secondary in relation to the point of view. According to Deleuze it was Leibniz who realised that the point of view is deeper than whoever places themselves there.²⁹ Perspectivism of drives should not be confused with relativism. To paraphrase the anthropologist Viveiros de Castro, different life forms do not see the same world in different ways (cultural relativism), but rather see different worlds – different enabling constraints – in the same way.³⁰ The eco-aesthetics of the built environment thus becomes a matter of styles to live and styles to die, beyond any Manichean opposition. The only viable distinction is the one between active and reactive points of view and derivative subjects, those who foster a becoming that connects them to the becoming of a world, and those who constantly retreat to segmentarity, to the reassurance of established givens and limits.³¹ Consequently, there are two types of subjects precisely because there are two types of deaths (fig. 1.2). A subject can nest itself into its idiocy and become more and more rigid and progressively smaller, or it can let itself dissipate until its disappearance. The way that one styles one's dissolution is not merely determined by the inevitability of entropy but also by the expressionism of becoming, subject to the teleodynamic proliferation of constraints.

As such, architecture does not attempt to bring forth (or even worse, to represent) an object that is not present, as many architectural theorists have claimed.³² Rather, architecture is 'acting counter to the past, and therefore on the present, for the benefit, let us hope, of a future – but the future is

not a historical future, not even a utopian history, it is the infinite Now, the *Nun* that Plato already distinguished from every present: the Intensive or Untimely, not an instant but a becoming'.³³ Put succinctly, architecture catalyses processes of subjectivation by introducing novel points of view by manipulating constraints. It does so however by removing itself from the present: a little death for each constraint, a dose of the virtual for each point of view. To grasp that, one needs to understand that the crucial difference between the present and the actual is that between being and becoming. The present is always what we are, and, in this sense, it is always what we are already ceasing to be. Death, in its colloquial sense, is always in the present; in the actual, death is nothing but a creative leap to the virtual. This is so because the actual does not divide time into chunks of past, present and future, but deals with a process of becoming. Deleuze and Guattari write that 'we must distinguish not only the share that belongs to the past and the one that belongs to the present, but, more profoundly, the share that belongs to the present and that belonging to the actual. It is not that the actual is the utopian prefiguration of a future that is still part of our history. Rather, it is the now of our becoming'.³⁴ Architects have both the privilege and the obligation to continuously make a diagnosis of the actual (and its constraints) in every single present that passes. They necessarily do so by opening themselves to the virtuality of death as a pure event. In other words, an architect is close to what Nietzsche had in mind when he assigned to the philosopher the role of a physician, or more precisely, a 'physician of civilisation'.³⁵ An architect is a 'physician of subjectivation', enunciating modes where *conatus* thrives – a striving to individuate, the desire to become what one can by virtually ceasing to be what one is; pings and hups between the actual now and the virtual not-yet.³⁶

A liveable habitat is not a ready-made condition to which the inhabitant will simply have to passively adapt. Habitats and inhabitants actively co-evolve. The goal of this book is to invigorate a radical perspectivism as a means of tapping, not into the solipsistic 'world of design', but into the relations of exteriority or 'the design of the world'.³⁷ Such an anti-representational disposition resonates strongly with Guattari's ethico-aesthetics, or what-if experimentation, which seeks to circumvent obstacles in the formal if-then structure of power.³⁸ Le Corbusier's century-old notorious challenge of 'architecture *or* revolution?' is met with a new maxim: 'architecture *and* molecular revolution!'³⁹ Eco-aesthetics does not work around the system in the messianic mode but through it, *par le milieu*.⁴⁰

Architectures of Life and Death: The Eco-Aesthetics of the Built Environment has a symmetrical structure (fig. 1.4). It spans the material-discursive spectrum. The first discursive third of the book folds upon the last – material – third around the more hybrid core.⁴¹ The major keys (the three parts), which consist of three contributions each, are (dis)connected by

Architectures of Life and Death	<i>discursive</i>			
	Part One	Metamodelling	1.1	
			1.2	
			1.3	
	<i>Intermezzo I</i> Priming			
	Part Two	Asignifying Semiotics	2.1	
			2.2	
			2.3	
	<i>intermezzo II</i> Primacy of Action			
	Part Three	Pedagogy of Senses	3.1	
			3.2	
			3.3	
<i>material</i>				

Figure 1.4 Tripartite Structure of *Architectures of Life and Death*.

two minor keys (intermezzi).⁴² In contrast to the mainstream approach, the book embraces transdisciplinarity where architecture is not representative of culture but is the very mechanism of culture, the collective equipment resting on the reciprocal determination of social habits and technological habitats. Given that the animate is always utterly dependent on the inanimate, the neo-Lamarckian quote ‘we shape our environments; thereafter they shape us’ is not to be taken lightly.⁴³ Nothing is given, everything is produced. It was never the ambition of these editors to convince the reader. We can only hope that the eleven chapters (including this introduction) offer a compelling insight into the ongoing de-re-territorialisation expressed in the breaking and making of habits. The process has been nothing short of a radical auto-affective ratcheting operation producing new modes of existence and forms of life. It is more than likely that we haven’t seen anything yet.⁴⁴

NOTES

1. Edgar Morin, *Method: Towards a Study of Humankind, Volume 1: The Nature of Nature*, trans. J. L. Roland Bélanger (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1992), 71.

2. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (London and New York: Continuum, 2004 [1980]), 432.

3. As quoted in Hanjo Berressem:

When Lynn Margulis talks about the beginnings of life, she notes, in reference to Vladimir Vernadsky’s notion that life is ‘a global phenomenon that transforms solar energy’ (Margulis and Sagan 1995: 45), that ‘living matter can ascend over common matter only by constant sun-bathing’ (41). Not only are bacteria already ‘light-sensitive’ (136), even

more, 'light sensitivity, in the rudimentary sense, even antedates life itself: colored compounds react in highly specific ways to visible solar radiation' (136).

Berressem, *Gilles Deleuze's Luminous Philosophy* (Edinburgh: University Press, 2020), 182.

4. A view of the organism as 'that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself'. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 503.

5. Alva Nöe, *Action in Perception* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), 1.

6. Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, trans. Sean Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 131.

What would be the forces in play, with which the forces within man would then enter into a relation? It would no longer involve raising to infinity or finitude but an unlimited finity, thereby evoking every situation of force *in which a finite number of components yields a practically unlimited diversity of combinations*. It would be neither the fold nor the unfold that would constitute the active mechanism, but something like the *Superfold*.

Ibid., emphasis added.

7. Terrence Deacon, *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), 368. 'Such phenomena as life and cognition might be changing or adding to the fundamental physical laws and constants, or at least be capable of modifying them', *ibid.*

8. In the words of Simondon:

The individuated being is neither the whole being nor the primary being. *Instead of grasping individuation using the individuated being as a starting point, we must grasp the individuated being from the viewpoint of individuation, and individuation from the viewpoint of preindividual being*, each operating at many different orders of magnitude.

Gilbert Simondon, 'Genesis of the Individual', in *Incorporations*, trans. Mark Cohen and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 311 (original emphasis).

9. Gilles Deleuze, 'Spinoza and the Three "Ethics"', in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997); see also: Gilles Deleuze, transcripts 'On Spinoza's Concept of Affect', *Cours Vincennes* (1978–81), trans. Timothy S. Murphy and Simon Duffy, <https://www.webdeleuze.com/cours/spinoza> (accessed 10 May 2020).

10. Félix Guattari, *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

11. The irreducible triad – Spinozian modes of existence and expression – may be parsed in the three syntheses from *Anti-Oedipus*:

Conforming to the meaning of the word 'process', recording falls back on (*se rabat sur*) production, but the production of recording [disjunctive /notions or concepts] itself is produced by the production of production [connective/signs or affects]. Similarly, recording is followed by consumption, but the production of consumption [conjunctive/essences or percepts] is produced in and through the production of recording. This is because something on the order of a subject can be discerned on the recording surface. It is a strange subject, however, with no fixed identity, wandering about over the body without organs,

but always remaining peripheral to the desiring-machines, being defined by the share of the product it takes for itself, garnering here, there, and everywhere a reward in the form of a becoming or an avatar, *being born of the states that it consumes and being reborn with each new state*. ‘It’s me, and so it’s mine’.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (New York: Penguin, 2008), 16 (emphasis added).

12. Henri Bergson, *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1998 [1934]), 1.

13. Gilles Deleuze, *Desert Islands and Other Texts*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), [2002] 2004), 32.

14. Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Dover Publications, 2004 [1896]), 197.

15. Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs: the Complete Text*, trans. Richard Howard (London: The Athlone Press, 2007), 85.

16. Deacon, *Incomplete Nature*, 107–8.

17. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (London: The Athlone Press, [1983] 1986), 109. Deleuze elucidates:

Just as physics related movement to privileged moments and positions, metaphysics constituted transcendent, eternal forms as the source of these positions. But so-called modern science begins, on the contrary, when movement is related to ‘any instant’: it calls for a new metaphysics that only considers immanent and constantly varying durations.

Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript to the American Edition: A Return to Bergson’, in *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2006), 336.

18. Quentin Meillassoux, ‘Subtraction and Contraction: Deleuze, Immanence, and *Matter and Memory*’, *Collapse III: Unknown Deleuze [+ Speculative Realism]* (November 2007): 63–107.

19. Nick Land, ‘Making It with Death: Remarks on Thanatos and Desiring-Production’, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 24, no. 1 (1993): 71. ‘The death drive is not a desire for death, but rather a hydraulic tendency to the dissipation of intensities. In its primary dynamics it is utterly alien to everything human, not least the three great pettinesses of representation, egoism, and hatred’, *ibid.*, 74.

20. Maurice Blanchot, *The Space of Literature*, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln, NE and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 155.

21. Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul R. Patton (London: Continuum, 2001), 112.

22. A ping is literally a short, high-pitched sound, while a hup is the sound of an exclamation, much like the ones that encourage a marching rhythm. Deleuze refers to pings and hups in ‘The Exhausted’, a brief yet complex essay from his *Essays Critical and Clinical*: while on the surface it focuses on the work of Samuel Beckett, it is essentially an essay on inclusive disjunction and the production of novelty.

Just as the image appears as a visual or aural ritornello to the one who makes it, space appears as a motor ritornello – posture, positions and gaits – to the one who travels through it. All these images compose and decompose themselves. The ‘Pings’, which activate the images, are mixed together with the ‘Hups’ which activate strange movements within the spatial directions.

Gilles Deleuze, ‘The Exhausted’ in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997), 160.

23. Deacon, *Incomplete Nature*, 192.

24. *Ibid.*, 193.

25. *Ibid.*, 195.

26. Thesis from Guattari’s essay ‘Architectural Enunciation’, where he directly addresses the role of the architect. Félix Guattari, *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, trans. Andrew Goffey (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 39 (emphasis added).

27. ‘Axiological cogito’ is Ruyer’s term, displacing the Cartesian epistemological cogito (solipsism, dualism and mechanismism). It designates the impersonal entanglement of sense and finality; see: Ruyer, *Neofinalism*, 1–7. Elizabeth Grosz explains:

Life cannot be understood mechanistically; instead it must be understood axiologically. The axiological cogito, the cogito that values rather than knows, is foundational for Ruyer; this cogito is fundamentally free insofar as it searches for values, even in arguing, as the determinist does, that we are entirely caused.

Elizabeth Grosz, *The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics, and the Limits of Materialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 214. Canguilhem, too, advanced a trenchant critique of the dominant normativity that classified the pathological based on a deviation from a pre-established norm defined by the average of a measured value. He developed a notion of health centred on the capacity of the living organism to establish its own ethological norms. Georges Canguilhem, *The Normal and the Pathological*, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett in collaboration with Robert S. Cohen (New York: Zone Books, 1991).

28. Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, 108.

29. Deleuze can be considered post-phenomenologist insofar as he decentres and dissolves the subject as the privileged locus of consciousness. Gilles Deleuze, ‘Sur Leibniz,’ *Cours Vincennes* (15 April 1980), trans. Charles J. Stivale, <https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/50> (accessed 24 May 2020).

30. Relativity of truth \neq truth of the relative. See: Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, ‘Cosmological Aeiuis and Amerindian Perspectivism,’ *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 4, no. 3 (1998): 469–88 (478).

31. For Deleuze conscious will and preconscious interest are both subsequent to our unconscious drives and it is at the level of the drives that we have to pitch our schizo-analysis. In the words of Smith: ‘Kant liked to say that we can never get beyond our representations of the world; Nietzsche surmises that what we can never get beyond is in fact the reality of the drives.’ See: Daniel W. Smith, ‘Deleuze and the Question of Desire: Toward an Immanent Theory of Ethics,’ *Parrhesia* 2 (2007): 69, 71.

32. Stan Allen, *Practice: Architecture, Technique and Representation* (London: Routledge, 2000), 4.

33. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 112.

34. *Ibid.*, 112.

35. *Ibid.*, 113. According to Deleuze, illness is not an enemy, not something that gives the feeling of death, but rather, something that gives a feeling of life, not in the sense of ‘once I’m cured, I’ll start living’, but in the sense that ‘illness sharpens a kind of vision of life or a sense of life’. One is not tuned to one’s own life, but to a life (impersonal life). Drawing on the examples of D.H. Lawrence and Spinoza, ‘who have seen something so enormous, so overwhelming that it was too much for them’, Deleuze concludes that a degree of fragility might be what forces genuinely creative thought upon us. He argues: ‘One cannot think if one isn’t already in a domain that exceeds one’s strength to some extent, that makes one fragile’. That is, while there are clearly degrees of fragility and ill health that have a disabling effect, there are others that can enable. Gilles Deleuze, ‘M as in Malady/Illness’, in *Gilles Deleuze’s ABC Primer, with Claire Parnet* (directed by Pierre-André Boutang, 1996), overview by Charles J. Stivale, <http://www.langlab.wayne.edu/Cstivale/D-G/ABC1.html> (accessed 28 May 2020; emphasis added).

36. Conatus, as we read it, does not belong to the first column of Figure 3 under ‘homeostasis’, but to the third column of teleodynamics: self-reproducing/maintaining constraints due to the synergistic interdependent coupling of morphodynamics.

37. The maxim is borrowed from the subtitle of the book by Bruce Mau and the Institute Without Boundaries: *Massive Change: It’s Not about the World of Design. It’s about the Design of the World* (London: Phaidon, 2004). As the author of *Terraforming* explains: ‘the Copernican shift in the philosophy of design includes a rotation away from human-centred design and toward a fuller understanding of designing the human and the world.’ Benjamin Bratton, *The Terraforming* (Moscow: Strelka Press, 2019), 23.

38. A fallacy of choice between the ‘if-then’ logics of induction and deduction led the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce to propose for the ‘what-if’ logic of abduction (retroduction): ‘The truth is that the whole fabric of our knowledge is one matted felt of pure hypothesis [ping] confirmed and refined by induction [hup]. Not the smallest advance can be made in knowledge beyond the stage of vacant staring, without making an abduction [ping-hup] at every step.’ Quoted in Thomas A. Sebeok and Jean Umiker-Sebeok, ‘You Know My Method: A Juxtaposition of Charles S. Peirce and Sherlock Holmes’, in *The Play of Musement*, ed. Thomas Sebeok (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 16.

39. Political economy and libidinal economy are one and the same. See: Félix Guattari, ‘Towards a Micro-Politics of Desire,’ in *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (London: Penguin, 1984), 87. Cf. Simone Brott, ‘Architecture et révolution: Le Corbusier and the Fascist Revolution,’ *Thresholds* 41 (Spring 2013): 146–57.

40. As explained by Stengers, Deleuze deliberately plays on the double meaning of the French term *milieu* which stands for the middle and the surrounding. Isabelle

Stengers, 'Introductory notes on an ecology of practices', *Cultural Studies Review* 11, no. 1 (March 2005): 187.

41. Part I: 1.1 Andrej Radman and Stavros Kousoulas, 1.2 Andrew Ballantyne, 1.3 Gökhan Kodlak; Part II: 2.1 Renske van Dam, 2.2 Robert A. Gorny, 2.3 Antonio Paoletti; Part III: 3.1 Stavros Mouzakitis, 3.2 Dulmini Perera, 3.3 Karin Reisinger.

42. Intermezzi: Yota Passia and Panagiotis Roupas, Renske van Dam, Cocky Eek, et al.

43. We may have too easily dismissed an early naturalist who anticipated modern epigenetics and whom Darwinists have long disparaged. According to Philip Steadman, the theory of Darwin is an 'elective' theory of evolution, where the environment chooses appropriate changes in organism from the range offered by variation. By contrast, Lamarckism is an 'instructive' theory where the environment is imagined to be able to exercise a direct effect on organisms and 'teach' them to change themselves in appropriate ways. Philip Steadman, 'The Consequences of the Biological Fallacy: Functional Determinism', in *The Evolution of Designs: Biological Analogy in Architecture and the Applied Arts* (London: Routledge, 2008), 180.

44. Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 240.

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