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Sweet Memory

A metaphysical re-membraning of the limit

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
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A metaphysical re-membraning of the limit

of
Pomegranates
Prisons

as
Method
Relation
Affect

in
Technology
Design
Science
Timespace



Prolegomenon

To open the fruit is not to force it apart, but to engage in a delicate negotiation with its surface. One hand steadies the knife, the other turns the fruit slowly around its axis – an overall gesture of rotation rather than incision. The blade must not penetrate too deeply; it is not the interior to be cut, causing a blood bath, but only the peel – the outer limit that holds the interior in place. The seeds, untouched, remain suspended in their individuating structure. Once the movement completes its circle, the fruit yields: already a halved pomegranate.

Pomegranates, the apples full of grains, the blood, the rust,¹ they become my object of fascination because of the work and engagement that is needed to open them, separate the grains and eat them – grain by grain, sometimes in a couple at a time if opened strategically. So, I have had a lot of time – since my recent first encounter with a pomegranate – to attune myself with them. There cannot be attunement and an enhanced sensibility without an investment of time, energy, and attention. First and foremost is this work, therefore, a call for attunement and sensibilization.

Must the popularity of the pomegranate not go unnoticed. As its colour and structure attract attention, the pomegranate has, of course, been the subject of myths, films, books, religion and superstition.² These fixed symbols and identities of the pomegranate, however, become crystallised, institutionalised, isolating the pomegranate as a static object – a whole with an inherent meaning – there is an object that is pomegranate and an object that is non-pomegranate. It is then a second attempt in this work to call for the dissolution of fixed boundaries, to research and continue to problematize binary dialectics, and to challenge taxonomies based on othering that found colonial and rational logics.

With that on paper, it weighs on me to note that this work would be impossible without its own ecology that, although – and making proper justice to the present one – should be traced back more than what is for me possible, meets me four years ago. A problematization that has come from concerns for the colonial and how technical objects, such as architectures, colonially – meaning, statically, exclusionary – code others to be autopoietically³ understood; possessed; and controlled, has taken the form of a ecosystemic genealogy that first finds house in the pomegranate and later in a building, both here being, for the author, operationally architectures.

Design is a field of operations that concern themselves with the manipulation of limits and constraints. It is perhaps that the reason why it has been understood as a friend of settler

1 Like potatoes and cucumbers, many fruits that Europe saw for the first time were called apples. There were apples of different kinds: apples from the ground, apples of love, apples with grains – those being the subject of fascination of this writing, the pomegranates.

For the Persians the pomegranate is rust, blood – anaar, zang.

2 The Sergei Parajanov, “The Color of Pomegranates,” Armenfilm, 1969, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NtuEVEbsDmk&t=1978s> Tells the story of an Armenian poet in times of the soviet UUSR and uses the pomegranate as symbol of strength and resilience to refract the Armenian population.

Oscar Wilde and Jessie M King, *A House of Pomegranates* (Mineola, N.Y.: Calla Editions, 2011) also chooses the pomegranate as a Judo-Christian symbol of fertility and prosperity, theme not only present in the title of the book but with symbolism that appears tying together the tales in the book.

3 Donna J Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Duke University Press, 2016), 58–98 talks of sympoiesis as a situated, historical, dynamic and complex process of ‘making-with’, an understanding literate of ecosystemic inter and intra dependencies. Not exactly opposite to sympoiesis, autopoiesis also produces – historically and situatedly – but self-sufficient, self-making and self-bounding organisms.

colonialism.⁴ But as colonising might look beyond territorial gains and be understood as an epistēmē within a larger apparatus⁵, making architecture might operate beyond the concrete: feel, think, remember, foresee, matter, augment, care, shelter, relate, and live.⁶ To think architecture otherwise is to make architecture otherwise and, as much as the trained architect is capable of finding a convergence in complex systems of relations toward a singular composition, the trained architect is also response-able of disentangling these systems, attuning to them and imaging other compossibilities⁷ that are not divergent but multivergent.

Remembering Waddington's Epigenetic Landscape⁸ – asiding perhaps its tendency to autopoiesis – serves as an illustration to understand compossibilities as the converging of singularities. Deleuze describes a process of convergence within a system of compossibilities that are virtually distancing, as the organism actually converges to a singularity, there is a virtual divergence – multivergence – in the landscape. A divergence that is intrinsic to the passing of time and complexifying systems. Whether this is a tendency of entropy, negentropy or both will be discussed later – as far as it implications to the response-ability of the trained architect go, Deleuze suggest the possibility for 'angling the inflections', manipulating the landscape or – I would say, rather – mattering intensities; this can be transpolated to the pomegranate, the architect and the technical object in general.


4 Léopold Lambert, "Teach-In: The Architecture of Settler Colonialism in Palestine," THE FUNAMBULIST MAGAZINE, October 31, 2023, <https://thefunambulist.net/editorials/teach-in-palestine> talks of architectural i.e. spatial; technologies employed in Palestinian territories as friends of controlling, coding, delimiting with fine resolution an appropriation of territories.

5 It is of course Michel Foucault, read through *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (1972; repr., New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 78–108 that often refers to the ensemble of technical and institutional machines as conjuncts of operations under a same epistemological rationale. Although as blurred as a pomegranate, an apparatus is more than the science or technics but encompasses its theorization as well, discourses, its institutes, its archives to conform the praxis that goes beyond the practice-theory divide.

6 What a praxis that is activated and active by relational engagement is beautifully laid out by Heidi Sohn, in "Architecture Feels, Architecture Thinks, Architecture Remembers, Architecture Foresees, Architecture Matters, Architecture Augments, Architecture Cares, Architecture Shelters, Architecture Relates, Architecture Lives," in *Bnieuws* 58, no. 02 (January 2025): 12–15, <https://www.bnieuws.nl> – last edition of the student-run academic journal that has been unfortunately suspended due to budget reallocation.

7 Compossibilities is understood from Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, 6th ed. (1988; repr., London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 59-75.

8 Conrad Hal Waddington, *The Strategy of the Genes : A Discussion of Some Aspects of Theoretical Biology*, vol. 20 (London ; New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2014).



Differencing from a point of view (dy/dx)

Gilbert Simondon discusses a process he calls individuation that I take as key lense to the understanding of my fascinations. In his theories, an individual individuates from a series of concretisations and transductions – for Deleuze, Repetitions and Differences⁹. When concretisation tends to one point, where the individual becomes more and more specific in one direction, transduction is a disparate between the individual and its associated milieu. Suddenly, it makes no sense – relative to the individual's values – to continue in that same direction, so the individual will be resolved differently.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze reads:

‘Individuation emerges like the act of solving such a problem, or – what amounts to the same thing – like the actualisation of a potential and establishing of communication between dispartes.’¹⁰

Disparation is the two-way becoming via a common problematic. It is a two-way process, similar to what for me has been its contemporary affordance theory:¹¹ an object-subject that act no different to each other, in their relating, an event, and in the event, a disparate, a difference. An object that is not itself but with its subject and a subject that is not itself but with its object might as well be called subjectile and objectile¹² – not in cause but in relation.

In the repetitions, there are differences, but context changes everything,¹³ and any point of view will never be exhaustive. An event, then, in its relational or temporal concerns, is relative to this point of view and its problematic field; any kind of scalar or temporal parameters that standardise a concern are reductive.¹⁴ This is why, in this project and research, as soon as I engaged with modulation, I engaged with duration.

It seems ridiculous now that every ring of a trunk comes with each year, as a child, I, like many of us, was told.

9 Difference and Repetition is Deleuze dissertation thesis. In the text the title is inverted to respect to concretization – i.e. repetition – and transduction – i.e. difference.

10 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (1968; repr., London: Athlone Press, 1994), 246.

11 James J Gibson, *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception* (Psychology Press, 2013), 127–43.

12 Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, 6th ed. (1988; repr., London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 23.

13 Alicia Juarrero, *Context Changes Everything* (MIT Press, 2023).

14 Ibid, 21-32

A brick wants to be an arch?

Concretisation is not as informative as transduction; there is no disparate, it is a repetition of a productive driver –desire¹⁵– that leads in one direction. Becoming more efficient. Accumulating money. Reaching for the sun. In these cases, there is an infinitely distant point to be reached, and concretisation leads to it.

When the information that results from the heterogeneous realm of a disparate does not exist, there is only a knowing more¹⁶ with each affectual interaction of the object-subject. And with each knowing more comes more specialisation. Simondon gives us the image of the concretisation process of the electron tube.¹⁷ I am not an electron-tube engineer, but the image illustrates how technical specialisation occurs through concretisation. Then – I argue – we are looking at a homogenising entropic process that, by feeding the individual monotonous information, pushes him to grow schizophrenically.

Simondon described the concretisation process as the “life” of the technical object; what the object wants.¹⁸ The object might or might not want anything in the first place. But by its affective relating with the subject it individuates, it becomes more of itself. I cannot remember when I first opened a door, but I hope I am better now than when I was 3. This not only reflects in my own perceiving, motion and understanding (thus becoming) but also in the door as a universal that becomes better at what it does. Although the door as a technology has not changed much beyond some safety and material concerns, it now looks and, especially, works with less variation. Not because Sofia grew up, but because all of us collectively know more and concretise the door.

What does the brick want? Louis Kahn would say it wants to be an arch. Common sense, he might think, write, and preach, paranoically singularizing the brick in one way. But in doing so, it prevents the brick from emerging with new senses, becoming monological and, eventually, when viewed from a single point, as stable as the arch itself.

This entropic, homogenising process is needed by its creative counterpart, but when alone, can only, in a paranoid fashion, lead to the loss of everything but one.

15 As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari discuss in *Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia* Preface by Michel Foucault, 1st ed. (1972; repr., New York: Penguin, 2009), 1-50.

16 Andrew Iliadis, “Informational Ontology: The Meaning of Gilbert Simondon’s Concept of Individuation,” *Communication+1* 2, no. 1 (September 2013), 14, <https://scholarworks.umass.edu/home>.

17 Gilbert Simondon, *Du Mode d’Existence Des Objets Techniques* (1958; repr., Ontario: University of Western Ontario, 1980), p 108.

18 Andrew Iliadis, “Informational Ontology: The Meaning of Gilbert Simondon’s Concept of Individuation,” *Communication+1* 2, no. 1 (September 2013), 15.



intectural configuration

Salt and spiders

It was a(n ir)regular Monday noon, when I decided to work from home – empty house: a housemate at work, the other one gone. I was making rice and, in the very necessary step of taking and pouring a bit of salt into the boiling water, I encountered a spider. It was there, at the exact point that I needed to be spider-less. Had it been anywhere else, I might have proceeded to reinvent my manner of grabbing, my manner of pouring – even perhaps. But no, it was exactly where the perforation of the container was, for the salt to come out.

What a coincidence, I thought, but immediately considered that the spider might as well like salt, and the semi-open plastic lid covering the perforation offers the best salty, hidden nook. A coincidence indeed of what for both the spider and me is the singularity of my kitchen.

I could have met the spider on other occasions, as our zones of interest¹⁹ partially overlap in the virtual space and time. But a shared actualised singularity that belongs to diverse umwelts²⁰ renders the picture of non-scalability that I wish to convey along this research. For the spider and for myself, the kitchen is fundamentally different, not only in scale but also in operation: the virtuality of the kitchen, in manners and possibilities, is different for the spider and for me. When the how is different, then we can no longer think of homogeneous scalability – for the spider, my kitchen is not the same but bigger, it is an entirely different environment: not only from a different point of view but also with different problematic fields and operability.

The disparate between the spider and me could have led me to make a new perforation in the container; it could have led to the prosecution of the poor spider, but in this case, it led only to unsalted rice.

19 Referencing to film by Jonathan Glazer, “The Zone of Interest,” JW Films, Extreme Emotions, 2023.

20 Understood as Jacob von Uexkuell, *A Stroll through the Worlds of Animals and Men: In Instinctive Behavior: The Development of a Modern Concept*, ed. Claire Schiller (New York: International Universities Press, 1957).

Eventful unevent

The modulation of a membrane, the re-membraning, renders the event that crosses its threshold. But the event itself becomes a central question, especially when considering its unlocalizability within a linear timeline. Michel Foucault problematizes exactly this by taking dying as an event in *Theatrum Philosophicum*:

‘To die is never localised in the density of a given moment, but from its flux it infinitely divides the shortest moment.’²¹

Problematizing the event as an unlocalizable transductive limit can help problematise time. Deleuze often referred to the past being inside and the future being outside. Bodies as mnemonic devices are within their associated milieu always in affective relation. He placed what is outside the body as *potentia* and what is inside the body as an embodied, became, individual. The “inside” as a past and the “outside” as a future leaves us with the almost inexistence of the limit between these two, as the near inexistence of the present.

To understand the event as the limit is to not only Derrideanly deconstruct the isolated bodies of a taxonomical order, but also to re-understand them as metastable, affecting and affected. An event that goes through the limit of a body to be forever affecting and thus embodied produces the body and the limit as an objectile that produces its subject. In the almost inexistence of the limit, the event: not the difference but the differentiating, becomes the limit.

When thinking in these terms, we might as well state the limit not as the boundary of an object – or a subject – but the reaching of its operability and affectivity, therefore merging it with its milieu in an inseparable becoming, not only space-wise but time-wise. Karen Barad discusses the explosion of the atomic bomb in an article that articulates a similar engagement with the event, especially how this one changes possible perceptions of time. She asks:

‘What would constitute an event when an atomic bomb that exploded at one moment in time continues to go off?’²²

In her text, she discusses how the effects (affects) of the atomic bomb continue to be felt by the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not only as an aftermath that follows an immediate event, but as the event itself and its affective remembrance. When the event is understood as a threshold crossing, modulating affect – not as a thing that crosses a limit nor a point in a linear decay – this event turns forever alive in its affected continuous modulation.

21 Michel Foucault, “*Theatrum Philosophicum*,” *Critique* 282, no. 1 (1970), 885–908.

22 Karen Barad, “*Troubling Time/S and Ecologies of Nothingness: Re-Turning, Re-Membering, and Facing the Incalculable*,” *New Formations* 92, no. 92 (September 1, 2017), 63



First things second

To read is a linear procedure – how amazing it would be if not. If I want my words to be read, then I must write them linearly, but it is with the unsettledness I felt toward the linearity of writing that I decided this paper to be readable in any order. Unlike a causoeffectual concatenation, each section can be read as a notable point that decentres from an anecdote or a reading, sometimes assembling, sometimes dismantling, but always through myself and to the paper.

By doing so, I don't wave goodbye to all worries of imposing the order of a culture, a moment, a time – as Foucault seems to want to do but simultaneously undoes in *The Order of Things*²³; since I am always refracting with my own readings. I do so secondly in an attempt to allow for different weavings and firstly to, as I honestly believe that none of these sections should precede the other, delinearise order.

Second things first. I encourage the reader to read and to make from the sections whatever it is that relates to them, their problematics within their geotemporal context. Schizophrenizing a set of knowledge, allowing it to be taken apart, dismantled, decomposed, is perhaps the only manner to reach ~~new~~ different configurations, ~~new~~ different weavings, ~~new~~ different orders.

First things second. To delinearise order in terms of this research is to go from the circle that grows outwards in all directions to a folding where the limit is never crossed but modulated, folding around and within. From moments that pass and accumulate to affections that obliquely durate, making for an understanding of time that is ryzhomatically multivergent.

23 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (London: Routledge, 1966), xv–xxiv.

Chiaroscuro

There is an Adam that sinned and got expelled from the Garden of Eden, as much as there is an Adam that didn't sin.²⁴ The Adam that sinned, compossible to its own world, a convergence of several previous events that led there, is an impossibility with the world of the Adam that did not sin. Is it?

Deleuze speaks of compossibility, which he relates to artistic composition, as he discusses his fold ontology in terms of a baroque of divides and harmonies that are contradicting in liminal encounters but also resolving. A play of chiaroscuro – as his writing – is reciprocally becoming: folding, texturising, subjectivising, 'moving from inflexion to inclusion in a subject, as if from the virtual to the real.'²⁵ He sets out in *The Fold* an ontology that resolves the infinitude of limits of Leibniz – a world of separate worlds – with the Spinozian single-substance one; reaching for a virtuality that reconciles them in operations of folding and differentiation that do not only world worlds but also world subjects.


In such a manner, it becomes clear that there is no clarity. As I do not see anything of the chiaro when I am in the scuro, and I definitely do not see anything of the scuro when I am in the chiaro; the world cannot be – perhaps – represented and understood from all points of view simultaneously 'for every frame marks a direction of space that coexists with the others, and each form is linked to unlimited space in all directions at once'.²⁶

The Adam that sinned, composed by apprehended folds, can be taken as a compossibility out of an infinitude of compossibilities, each with a slightly different inflexion. As much as this one might be a convergence, it is also a multivergent – a multiplicity of worlds can be composed and compose it; and as such, the Adam that sinned as the Adam that didn't sin can be both virtual compossibilities of the same world.

24 The example is given by Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, 6th ed. (1988; repr., London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 59.

25 Ibid, 23

26 Ibid, 124



Enduring memory

Pomegranates tell stories of their pomegranating. Attached to its plant, it grows downwards. The flower falls by the weight of its accumulating juice. The juice that comes and stocks around the maturing seeds, expanding in all directions from the pulp, remembering the flower. Remembering. Remembering. Remembering. A collection, condensation²⁷ – rather – of images, perceptions, reactions.

The challenge of the homogenous, space-like conception of time is one of Henri Bergson's most discussed theses.²⁸ He speaks of an experience's thickness of duration rather than its understanding as placed along a spatialized line running from past to future, as if past, present, and future were made into a continuous cartographical space, like a hallway. Instead, a thickness of duration might already hint at an experiential conception that needs the dissolution of the limit.

The pomegranate not only remembers or embodies its memory, but is memory. It is remembering, it rememberings – it does not only remember as an ideal present simple, but it continuously remembers, existing/becoming only through and while it is remembering. Its skin, juices, structure, colour: stock flow²⁹, stock perception, stock experience.

Let us forget the understanding of time as a line or as consisting of the past, the present, and the to-come, and instead consider durational events, their affectability, and their remembrance. The Bergsonian cone³⁰ illustrates the plane of the world of objects meeting subjective, incomplete perception at a point. Projected and projecting from and to this point is pure memory that not only condenses perceptions but also becomes a pre-individual state, which virtually potentiates them. Thus, the cone could be multiplied several times, displacing the world of objects to the base of the cone or inverting it in a process of continuous up-and-down: percept and object; affected, affecting. The encounter of the cone with the world – the event – infinitely small when completely differentiated but always carrying a thickness of duration that condensates in the recent memory, reminds of the need for a problematic field and its point of view to understand, to make a sense of duration.

Looking at the cone from above yields the unperceived world infinitely extensive and a body of memory that becomes denser and denser in the centre, where it encounters the world, while actually accumulating most of its memory toward the outward, meeting – rather blending – with the world again; mattering it. As a multiplicity of points of view, the point of encounter must not be one; thus, imaging a collective rippling where events and their memory become the world of objects like a collective monadology³¹ where every ripple interaction is an event and becomes a new point of view.


27 As Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (1988; repr., New York: Zone Books, 2005).

28 Ibid, 17-76

29 As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari discuss in *Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia* Preface by Michel Foucault, 1st ed. (1972; repr., New York: Penguin, 2009), 1-50. Codes left out for clarity at this point.

30 Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (1988; repr., New York: Zone Books, 2005), 152, 162.

31 Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, 6th ed. (1988; repr., London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 108



Dead or alive?

Since the outset of this project, I have juxtaposed design (of architectures) and pomegranates (and other fruits and animals); so, the questions on life and its sympoietic processes came naturally. An understanding of life is beautifully articulated by Lynn Margulis in an interview that I encourage readers to watch. She says:

‘What is life? Life is not a thing. Life is a process. It’s a process that makes itself. [...] And intrinsic to life is the propensity to grow, to grow, to excrete, to exchange material and to grow and to grow and to grow. And this is life. Life is a way of behaving. Yes, it’s material. Yes, there’s DNA, there’s RNA and many other chemicals. Yes, it’s carbon-based. But dead life has got the same material as live life. What do I mean? If you have a bull and he’s fighting the bullfighter, this is life. Five minutes later, the bull is dead. There’s no life there. The DNA is there, the carbon is there, the water is there, but the bull is dead. And what has been lost? What has been lost is the process. And what is the process? It is the self-making process, where components from the environment are taken in and moved around and changed chemically to do what? To make more. Why? To make more. Why? To make more.’³²

More and more and more and more like a surplus value in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s body without organs that reproduces itself continuously.³³ An alive thing as an ever-incomplete individuating state, not stable nor unstable but meta-stable; always reaching for more by perceiving and discerning from its milieu and by a manneristic expressing of these processes.

Informatically, life then encounters times of one-directed growth, a monological speed road of good times but, sometimes a disparate, an event, which redirects life to new modes, new manners of perceiving, of discerning and expressing – as Frank Sinatra would say ‘That’s Life’. And whether we like it or not, to that we owe bio- and technodiversity; otherwise, we would really have the body without organs as a world. Deterritorializing and reterritorializing life invents and reinvents itself sympoietically to overcome these moments, like an orchid ‘deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp’ which ‘becomes a piece of the orchid’s reproductive apparatus’.³⁴

For us, humans, it seems that we have come to externalise our specialities³⁵ into our technologies, and them becoming part of our humanness. In doing so, we could speak of the mnemonic capacity of technology as it, as well, is product of an alive process of de- and reterritorializations; inventions and reinventions; concretisations and transductions.

32 Lynn Margulis, Lynn Margulis Interviewed in Barcelona, [Www.youtube.com](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtnEQZrH3Hw&t=113s), 2000, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtnEQZrH3Hw&t=113s>.

33 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia* Preface by Michel Foucault, 1st ed. (1972; repr., New York: Penguin, 2009), 10.

34 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, 11th ed., vol. 2 (1980; repr., London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 11.

35 Beatriz Colomina and Mark Wigley, *Are We Human? : Notes on an Archaeology of Design* (Zürich, Switzerland: Lars Müller, 2016), 51-57.

Contaminated methodology

A methodology is not preexisting to the research nor this research output; instead, I allowed myself to switch methodologies, and I encouraged contamination, engaging in a process of complexity that I now understand as not only responding to my motivating concerns but also as an approach to design.

As a response against scientification, binary distinctions and taxonomies of othering that dominate and reinforce colonial impositions, my methods insisted on an engagement with complexity, disorder and contamination – always considering very seriously their durational and relational nature. Recognising the potential of schizoanalysis as presented by Deleuze and Guattari, I sought to analyse and synthesise looped understandings of my project site and research topic by viewing them through different organisational lenses. I have not only taken, interpreted and utilised the Schizoanalytic cartography³⁶ but also combined it with understandings of ecological systems that deconstruct it and reconstruct it under different operations of the code, stock and flow. In all these modellings, the object of study varied between the limit, the site, the programme, a part of the programme, a calendar year, an event or an encounter, permitting the complexification of the method or the limit itself.

Understanding the limit as the manner of relating is understanding it as a methodology. How to relate organism and environment is the gist of technological differentiation. Then the question of the limit becomes, by definition, the question of the method. We can in-depth this to a reproach of the classic scientific disciplines – to which I have always felt a coexisting fascination and rejection, biology, physics, chemistry. Noting on their relevance throughout this body of research and questioning, these are the classic disciplines of a dismembering science that lead from a generic wholistic type of inquiry to an elite culture of separation, not only of the objects of a study but also in the fields themselves.


As a child, when I was taught of the scientific method, I became obsessed with it: this somewhat magical procedure that would ensure that nothing untrue will be taken as truth, that no single-man belief will englobe everyone and everything for its own benefit; but it is also the scientific method that made my fascinated child-self into a critical rationalist at the age of 10. A scientific culture of specialisation, separation and hyper-controlled experimental conditions was the byproduct of the scientific method³⁷. But what happened with the fascinating worlds that were of our interest in the first place? This is also what quickly drove me away from the classical sciences as a child: them, with such obsession for what's "true" and what's not, disposed of the ecological ensembles that they quickly labelled as pseudoscience.

To take the experiment as the technique and unpack these device-machines of measurement to question them as the method for the understanding of our world became the approach to design. Along the process of design, in each and every moment when the site and the values were at a disparate, I have sought a resolution with simple means, in straightforward and simultaneously intricate ways – almost child-like – that re-engages the users with the dispartes themselves.

A contaminated methodology, in research and design, is thus not a metaphor but an actual letting go of the obsession with procedure and control to allow the difference to creep in, and, with it, allow new and fascinating encounters.

36 Methodology proposed by Felix Guattari after the death of Deleuze in *Schizoanalytic Cartographies* (A&C Black, 2012). Within which I have mainly referred myself to the construction in page 27.

37 I was recently inspired by Robert M Pirsig in *Lila : An Inquiry into Morals* (Richmond: Alma Books, 2011), 56–57; where the imposition of the scientific method, in this case, in the discipline of anthropology, is questioned to be the culpable of the destruction of the discipline's fascinations.



Split pomegranate

It amazes me every time that I open a pomegranate that looks very ugly on the outside, to find it quite fine on the inside. It is as if each red bubble isolates itself from decomposition – up to a point, of course, but a point that comes much later than a tomato, where a tiny intrusion in its skin is the end of its existence.

Before that point, however, the red pulp is a great protector of the seed throughout its whole life. It builds around the seed while this one is still attached to its mother, separating it from everything but her, compartmentalising it from any decaying mold-growing brother. Perhaps that's what makes it so popular throughout the Mediterranean as a symbol for fertility. The whole fruit is its million seeds, like a being only, in being more.

But it is also deceiving, showing itself as a sweet promise and hiding the pain of its working it. In a long process of maximum effort for minimum result, eating a pomegranate will take space and, especially, time. It is then understandable – for all one knows, recognising at this point its bloody redness – if along that time the promise of fertility starts to resemble a deadly one.

The mother pomegranate connects with the seed within its pulp so that, when these two separate, the seed remains unexposed, protected by the pulp that cushions its fall, preserves its structure, and which also decomposes in just enough time to allow the seed through the digestive systems of other beings. However, this connection point renders itself the weakest part of the ensemble, in its evident differentiation from its aparting greater precious top.

Persephone alike, a goddess of crops but queen of the underworld – that shares herself above and below; the pomegranate is one but is many, is organised but is not, is life and is death. Its red pulp, remembering its operations³⁸, promises a relating that, like a *pharmakon*, can be remedy or can be poison.³⁹

38 D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, *On Growth and Form*, ed. John Tyler Bonner, 5th ed. (1917; repr., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961) 14.

39 As any technology as referred to by Bernard Stiegler, in *Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, 1st ed., vol. 1 (Stanford, California: Stanford, Ca. Stanford Univ. Press, 1998) 117-8.



Meaningful toilets

If the emergence of sense is material and energetic, it is informatic. Sense is then not inert to something but relational; dependent on perhaps not only the something and something else, but on the complex ecology of each of these somethings, or more. When Derrida says ‘there is no outside-text’⁴⁰, he refers to the inexistence of an ideal single meaning of the written word, but this one being relational instead – giving also an understanding to his intricate prose that can be diversely interpreted.


This rejection of monologics can be brought to a discussion on technologies where both the redness of the pomegranate – as its technology⁴¹ – and a chair, can be diversely informing. A metastable sense then emerges, is maintained, and is destroyed energetically in accordance with a broader network of informing and affecting constraints that I refer to as ecology. However, matter does not necessarily need to change to change, making ‘transduction thought itself.’⁴²

In a prison building, where ecological constraints on prisoners’ living conditions are extreme, a toilet hole is a telephone. But when the external constraining order dissolves, the toilet is left like an archaeological reminder of prison communication assemblages. A telephone for the squatter – pun intended – who lost his house is definitely not a landline but a prepaid cellular connection that does not require a permanent address. The geofixed prison telephone, even more fixed than the landline with the spaghetti wire, is deterritorialized and reterritorialized into the infrastructurally coded cellular network. The metallic voice of friendship becomes detached from the place to shit. The place to shit now needs to run under different organisations. When water is cut in the building, how do you flush a Turkish toilet? A water collection initiative needs to be initiated to address consumption and sanitation. So, the Turkish toilet becomes entangled with meal preparations and the collective.

40 Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 3rd ed. (1967; repr., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 158.

41 Understanding technology in a Stiglerian sense: as the pursuit of life by means other than life, technology being our body prosthesis and part of our humanness and understanding life not as dependent of its material composition, as Lynn Margulis describes, but as a process of a collective individuation; technology might be no longer considered within the nature-culture divide but as a relational how, that can apply to us humans with our machines as a manner and pomegranates and their redness as a manner.

42 School of Materialist Research, “Joel White ‘on Logomachy: A Conceptual Recovery,’” YouTube, November 22, 2024, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvEbk34SuBg>.



Virtually informative

There is a virtual persistence of the divergent multiverses in the remembering bodies. As the body remembers what happens, it also remembers what does not happen, as much as it also keeps alive what is apprehended and what is not.

In the creases, the folds, the body bodying, events are forever recorded, but in this recording, what isn't recorded is also recorded and thus virtually present – in the anticreases, the antifolds, the antibody antibodying. Not of a single opposite parallel universe – as told by many stories, but of a multiplicity of oblique multiverses. It is the setup for the what-if questions that Derrida discusses as the 'lost futures' in his hauntology.⁴³

Traces disjunct temporal continuity with ghosts that inhabit a space without occupying it, ridding also of the spatialized linear time – virtuality, actuality, reality and possibility coexist in a compositional chaos of smooth multiverses. These are ghosts of virtual memories and of potential ones, but they are nonetheless remembered in the bodies that they disembody and in the apprehended material conditions. Perhaps – letting us get lost in the ghostly ideas – we could imagine that the reason why ghosts go through walls is not because of their immateriality, but because of a wall that, for the ghost (thus, somehow, the ghost's time), is not there.

Therefore, is it relevant to the understanding of design and technologies to consider these not as static objects but as being only(!) genealogically and ecologically, accounting not only for informational convergence but especially for multivergence.

43 Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx* (1993; repr., Routledge, 2012) 146-7.



Prosthetic memory

Since the first technological invention – probably some blade in the Stone Ages – we have been exteriorising ourselves; we no longer are, from that moment, without our tools. Since then, our individuating has been characterised by the movement from our organic bodies to our inorganic prosthesis – or technical objects – in terms of our ability and specialisations. Bernard Stiegler refers to this technical differentiation – technical becoming, we could say – as showcasing a dynamic that is neither one belonging to the inorganic beings of the physical sciences nor one belonging to the organised beings of biology; instead, he describes technology as an inorganic organised being⁴⁴ – as inorganic as a rock but exhibiting a differentiating dynamic proper to an organised being.

The human is the being that must exteriorise its own becoming, making technologies our very needed prosthesis – our ‘pursuit of life by means other than life’⁴⁵, through which we condition our temporalization, memory and our subjectivity.⁴⁶ Not only when imprinting our memories in a piece of paper or remembering an appointment on our calendars, but if becoming is remembering, it follows that also the rest of our technologies – no matter which – technologizing are remembering; and that thus our human condition is to externalise (at least part of) our memory. It follows as well that if becoming is constitutive of time, as actualisation of potentials, then technological differentiation is not only constitutive of spatiality but also temporality.

So as the redness of the pomegranate is a meta-result of centuries of differentiation, of a change in the manner of relating between the flower and the bee, the leaves and the soil, the inside and the outside; a technical object is as well, not a sum or product, but a disparate resolved of the human and its associated milieu, a mediated relationship between the organism and its environment, the prehended and apprehended.

However, as Simondon expresses, there is a loss of the ‘true’ general character of our culture with the loss of the understanding of the technical object.⁴⁷ Perhaps as a result of the mnemonic capacity of the technical object, it is that we, as organisms, forget the precondition of its existence and the ecological disparate encapsulated in the object. By differentiating, the technical object resolves dispartes, changing the manner of relation between the organism and its environment. But by erasing dispartes for a disengaged comfort or – perhaps currently with AI technologies – by preventing dispartes from appearing in the first place, we are worlding a world of fascists, idiots, aliens and stupids.

When is a disparate and how is resolving are perhaps the biggest questions we should ask ourselves as designers.

44 Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, 1st ed., vol. 1 (Stanford, California: Stanford, Ca. Stanford Univ. Press, 1998), 17

45 Ibid, 137-144

46 Bernard Stiegler, *Memory*, ed. Mark Hansen and W. Mitchell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 67.

47 Gilbert Simondon, *Du Mode d’Existence Des Objets Techniques* (1958; repr., Ontario: University of Western Ontario, 1980), 13-15.

An understanding of the technical object that refers to an understanding of situated – in timespace – ecological constraints and they transductive affect in a disparate encounter.

Carceri d'invenzione

Piranesi realised, and we see it in his drawings, that the prison is not in its form – i.e. the building or elements, but in the constraintment. By rendering an architectural impossibility – and, so, being heavily criticised, his etchings leave to the beholder's imagination the psychological influence of the institution of the prison. The inability to go up stairs, to cross a bridge, to go through a door, look out a window comes to question the essentials of the architectural discipline via a somewhat disaffording of the architected space. This reflects on the 'prisoner's soul in torment'⁴⁸ that sees only what they cannot, only through impossibility and that, like the viewer of the drawing, cannot manage to take steps back to understand the whole picture.

Having an image of the prison and its affects – Michel Foucault extensively discusses its workings as a machine of both disciplining and punishing,⁴⁹ criticising in its unclarity of function, a deficiency. Even perhaps not only a machine of disciplining and punishing, the prison excludes and marginalizes, externalizing from the common those deemed non-compliant, paranoically monadizing them. Unlike Foucault deemed necessary, the penitentiary system does not question itself: 'what should be punished, and how, and whether punishing has a meaning and whether punishing is possible'⁵⁰; but instead expects to 'rehabilitate a prisoner by debilitating them'⁵¹ and excluding them.

The loss of environmental control, together with its accompanying loss of friendship and derresponsabilization of the institutionalised subject, has been accounted for the observed pathological effects in the institutionalised subject, be it in a prison, a hospital or other formal institutions. In a prison – as is especially known – this results not always in a 'corrected' behaviour, but in a need felt by the subject to transgress the codes with often creative solutions to communicate, move around and nurture themselves.

The creative prison inventions – talking thought pipes, intricate passing of packages, using electricity to heat up water, cooking with aluminium and toilet paper⁵² – are a manner for the prisoner to take control of the dehumanising institution by literally taking it apart and reinventing it. It is there and only that these inventions are possible, not solely by the dehumanising conditions that apprehend it, but also through a scarcity of resources from an environment of heavy ecological constraint.

That is to say that the prisoner that seeks to earn some control of his relating with his environment – be it through knives or chess pieces – does so in the most human way possible, through the invention of tools.


48 Philip Hofer, *The Prisons by Giovanni Battista Piranesi : The Complete First and Second States = Le Carceri* (New York: Dover, Cop, 1973), xii–i.

49 Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 9.

50 Ibid, 434

51 Michel Foucault, James D Faubion, and Robert Hurley, *Power Essential Works 1954-84*, 9th ed. (2020; repr., London: Penguin Books, 2002), 463.

52 All examples from life stories of Alejandro Ghigliani, interview by author, consult author for recording, August 26, 2025.



Concluding I - Ecologies

Throughout this rhizome-text, the call for an ecological and genealogical sensibility reads with considerable weight. The metaphysical problematizations that I posed to myself and the serious questions these brought about space and time as relational fields serve as tools to dismantle the objectivity that not only forms a base for colonial logics and othering techniques, but also constrains curiosity and madness that feed from contamination and metastability.

Only by taking time seriously – not as a spatialized homogeneity, can we acknowledge compossibilities not as abstract futures that might or might not come true, but as affectual multivergencies of a world we are continuously worlding. And only taking time seriously can we think of memory not only as a remembering of a past event but as a re-membraning that – yes – remembers events but also mediates relationships and actualises potentials. To become genealogically sensible is, for me, to be conscious of a time that is not separated from space but that is mnemonically active.

A genealogical exercise cannot be if not ecological; it must be recognised within a complex and irreducible set of relationships that are affective of such re-membraning. A situated attitude of attuned sensibility to the one and the many, the organism and its milieu, and the problems and constraints emerging from the encountering of disparate flows – in contrast to an attitude of generalisation, erasure of problems or massively applied solutions – is the uncomfortable but necessary one for the production of a metastable diverse world.

These two can't be understood exhaustively or conclusively: there is no perfect map of the ecology and genealogy of a pomegranate, but a mapping that renders a point of view and a problematic field. In the claim of an irreducible reality, there is the irony of making such a claim, but as it has been spoken before, relations mattering means that relation matters and, as one cannot map exhaustively from one's point of view, a genealogical and ecological attunement is always relative to one's manner of relating. As in exact academic fields, a methodology is stated – a mode of measuring, a means of rendering – in any understanding of the world; there is a mode of worlding. It is therefore that I find value in a contaminated methodology that encounters the diversely behaving, the diversely perceiving, the diversely understanding.

The understanding differently and living differently – via bio- and technodiversity – is not about diversifying for the sake of the infinitely diverse that leads to a homogenised bundle of individualistics, but for the creative and imaginative embracing of constraints with which we can individuate collectively. It is not a matter of differentiating solely, of a negentropic attitude or of a paranoia that will separate everything as much as it is not a matter of its opposite repetition, of entropy or schizophrenic taking in of everything. It is not in the stability nor in the instability, but in the metastable movement between one and the other that information is produced, sense can emerge, and curiosity, fascination and madness matter.

It is so that I understand and wish to convey the limit: not as an extensive boundary but as an intensive affect. When the encounter is modulating of the limit and the limit potentiating of the encounter, then the limit is not separating of an inside from an outside or of a past from a future but rather a relation between these. The limit re-membranes manneristically. It manners an actualizing of potentials that are spatiotemporally relative. As such are the re-membraning of the pomegranate – in its red, in its structure, in its many – and the re-membraning of technology, manners of relating to the environment as a pursuit of life; a manner of living.

Concluding II - Resignifying

The design of technologies as a design of manners is of extreme relevance to the producing of new worlding understandings. In the architectural discipline, typologies – that are so dear to architectural schools – efficiently aim to solve a problem on the basis of a generalised and unsituated essential. Additionally, the embedded nature of the architectural discipline within a capitalist proletarianised system further pushes an approach to design that is general and alien to its site.

Instead, for a situated and genetic manner of living, design feeds from scarcity and contamination. Scarcity – that is extensively romanticised in the academic discourses as indigenous knowledge – fuels a creativity of resolution with a high intensity of environment reinterpretation. Schizophrenic in nature, the scarce resolution of a problem will work with what is there, needing to resignify objects, leaving aside typologies to think affectively. A resolution of a disparate by intensifying conditions that crystallise the problem permits an embodied, situated, productive encounter of flows.

However, the scarce resolution is also imprecise and thus feeds from the contamination that it also produces. The child-like solving of a problem: inventing something new without erasing the problem, but intensifying the encounter, benefits from a chaotic field of opportunities from which one can extract sense. By having all his toys spread on the floor, instead of in “their” place, a child can make new senses from contaminated perceptions. A resolution of a disparate with simple “improvised” means by the reinventing and redesigning of constraints, can be said to be less efficient and accurate than its commercialised counterpart – a humidity level measurement electronic device is much more precise than a self made dew point experiment. The electronic device will better show an abstract number that represents a certain intensity, but this one is dissociated from the situated conditions by a numeric abstraction of a complex ecosystemic relation. A self made dew point experiment, engaging with the durational processes it renders, understands humidity not as an isolated intensity but as a situated event.

My proposal is an architecture embedded in complexity that rejects spatiotemporal scalar-homogeneous conventions in favour of a richness of points of view and their resulting fielded relations. I present a resignification of typologies (prisons, dwellings, hospitals, laboratories) by reunderstanding them through their liminal aspect – that is to say, as their transductive method of design. Finally, by embracing scarcity and contamination – scarcity given by the Argentinian context of crises in the site and contamination given by my own methodology and constraints, I aim for a situated and genetic architecture that makes senses from the chaos, like a therapy to the sciences and the fascinated child.

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