

# Mapping Ideologies: A Comparative Study of Political Responses to the Housing Crisis in Europe

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**Abstract** – This thesis investigates how political ideologies structure housing policy proposals across five European regions: the Netherlands, Flanders, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Spain. Through a qualitative content analysis of 19 national-level election programmes, the study codes each housing proposal using ten indicators grouped into four tiers (core responsibility mix, regime logics, policy levers, and outcome patterns). These indicators are then mapped onto welfare-regime logics — social-democratic, corporatist, liberal, and Mediterranean — and visualised in a welfare triangle that locates parties by how they assign housing responsibility to the state, market, and family. The analysis compares results both across ideological party families (social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, populist) and within them, to assess convergence, divergence, and the influence of national context.

The findings show that party ideology remains a meaningful organising force in housing: social-democratic parties are highly coherent and consistently state-led; Christian-democratic parties cluster around a corporatist, partnership-based logic; liberal parties share a deregulatory focus but diverge sharply in their wider toolkits; and populist parties are thematically consistent in nativist allocation and family protection but instrumentally eclectic. National context shapes these patterns without fully determining them, with a visible familial pull in Spanish cases. The study contributes a replicable framework for reading housing proposals as ideological repertoires rather than technical measures, and shows that housing policy is used not only to address affordability and supply, but to define who is protected, on what terms, and by whom.

**Keywords** - Political ideology, housing policy, welfare regimes, electoral programs, cross-national comparative analysis

## Preface

When I started my master's programme *Management in the Built Environment* at TU Delft, I was elected to the Delft City Council shortly afterwards. Since then, politics and architecture have become closely intertwined in my professional and personal development. At the university, I learned how to manage teams effectively; after one year in politics, I became the chairman of my party's group and could immediately apply that knowledge in practice. During my studies, I took the elective *Social Sustainability in Human Habits*, while at the same time, we were discussing the new housing vision in the council. We succeeded in anchoring collective housing more prominently in Delft's housing policy and in providing better support for new housing collectives – including *Het Knarrehof*, from whom we had received a guest lecture during that very course.

The influence also worked the other way around: my political experience shaped my academic choices. I took courses such as *Ethics and Engineering* and *Persuasive Debating* because I wanted to learn how to use my knowledge from the Bachelor of Architecture and the MBE master's programme in public debate. For several courses, I wrote essays and blogs on political discourse, management styles, and the built environment. Whereas during my bachelor's I enjoyed designing almost utopian projects aimed at solving social problems, MBE taught me to reflect on how we can actually make such ideas a reality.

This interplay between theory and practice came together very naturally in this graduation research. Under the supervision of Joris Hoekstra and Peter Boelhouwer, I was given the freedom to follow my interests, while keeping the approach of international comparison. I could not have imagined a more fitting way to conclude my master's – with a thesis that explores exactly the intersection between politics and the built environment. I am deeply grateful for your flexibility, both in planning and in the direction of my research. Our meetings were always inspiring – not only when discussing my work, but also when exchanging views on national and local politics. Thank you for your critical questions, patience, and enthusiasm.

I would also like to thank Lien, who kept motivating me; Marion, for her support from afar; Gitta, for offering me a steady study spot during weekends; Merijn, for his help with the layout and his company during coffee breaks; and Iris, for her insights into political ideologies and how to study them.

This research is deliberately descriptive in nature: my challenge was to separate my personal views from the results and to describe what political parties propose, rather than whether these are the right choices. At the same time, I hope that readers gain new insights into the ethical considerations that underlie the political debate on housing. In my view, political choices are almost always ethical choices – especially in the context of the built environment, where the effects of policy are directly felt in people's daily lives.

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# 1. Introduction

The housing crisis is a pervasive challenge impacting diverse populations across many countries (Flynn, 2019; Fuller et al., 2019; Johnston & Kurzer, 2019). Rising housing costs, limited access to affordable homes, and increasing precarity in rental markets have created substantial barriers for individuals seeking stable housing. This situation demands a broader, ideologically driven debate to address fundamental questions about the acceptable outcomes of housing systems in society.

White and Nandedkar (2019) examined the ideological framing of New Zealand's housing crisis, revealing that political narratives often simplify the issue to planning inefficiencies and land shortages. This framing, shaped by ideological biases, obscures broader structural factors, emphasizing the need for evidence-based debates that address the complexity of housing systems. This brings to mind a commonly repeated phrase in Dutch politics: "If we want to fix the housing crisis, we need to build, build, build."

I believe this lack of ideological debate is also evident in Dutch politics. For example, housing minister Mona Keijzer, despite representing a different administration than her predecessor, stated in an interview that she would largely continue the same path set by Hugo de Jonge (Van der Ploeg, 2024). Keijzer's focus on improving efficiency aligns with White and Nandedkar findings—the narrative shifts toward planning inefficiencies while deeper ideological debates remain absent.

While Barr (1994) emphasizes the importance of ideological choices, White and Nandedkar highlight their apparent absence, at least in New Zealand's context. I do see that similar patterns exist in the Netherlands, where ideological debates about housing are often sidelined. However, Van Gent (2010) shows that ideological shifts are indeed occurring, albeit implicitly. Across Western Europe, housing policies increasingly reflect asset-based welfare strategies, promoting owner-occupancy and market dependence—a clear shift from traditional welfare principles to neoliberal motivations. This raises an important question: Are we implicitly accepting this neoliberal shift without a robust ideological debate? Housing's growing impact on various demographics has sparked significant academic debate on the theoretical frameworks linking housing policies to political ideologies and welfare systems. However, much of this discourse focuses on the outcomes of political processes rather than the intentions behind them—the ideologies driving political parties.

This research seeks to uncover the ideological frameworks within the electoral programs of national parties from different political families—social democrats, conservatives, liberals, and populists—across five European regions. It further examines whether these ideological frameworks exhibit consistency or divergence in their proposed housing policies when applied to varying regional contexts, shedding light on how political ideologies adapt to national differences.

Because the analysis is theory-driven, the literature is discussed in depth before the research questions are introduced. Chapter 2 lays the conceptual foundation by outlining political ideologies, welfare regimes, and their proposed relationship to housing, and by developing the analytical framework of indicators and the welfare triangle used throughout the study. Chapter 3 then formulates the main research question and three subquestions, and defines the scope of the analysis. Chapter 4 explains the methodology: how election

programmes were collected, how individual housing proposals were coded into indicators and linked to welfare-regime logics, and how party positions were visualised. Chapter 5 presents the results for each party, showing how their housing proposals map onto different welfare logics. Chapter 6 compares parties within and across ideological families (social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, populist), and examines the influence of national context. Chapter 7 discusses what these findings mean for understanding housing as part of welfare-state politics, including the role of nativism and the limits of the approach. Chapter 8 concludes by answering the research questions, reflecting on the contribution of the study, and outlining directions for future research.

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## 2. Literature overview and research gap

This chapter outlines the theoretical foundations of the research. It introduces key concepts such as political ideology, welfare regimes, and housing systems, and explains how these are connected. Special attention is given to the relationship between ideology and policy instruments, and to the use of regime typologies as a tool for comparative analysis. Together, these theories provide the basis for the analytical model used in this study.

### 2.1 Political Ideologies and housing systems

Political ideologies structure how actors perceive problems, justify solutions, and mobilize support: they are coherent idea-systems that orient action and set normative visions of how society ought to be (Heywood, 2017). Policies, in turn, are never neutral tools but objectifications of politics—they define problems, privilege interests, and feed back into socio-economic orders (Shore & Wright, 1997; Harvey, 2003). Beyond worldviews, not only how the world is but also how it ought to be (Heywood, 2017), ideologies are processes that construct realities and subjects, operating through hegemony as dominant groups secure consent as well as compliance (Gramsci, 1971).

This section explores four dominant ideologies within the European Union: liberalism, social democracy, christian democracy, and populism, laying the groundwork for understanding their influence on policy making and societal organization, and their historic influence on housing systems. It also provides some examples of how ideology and housing systems interact in a reciprocal manner, with each informing and interacting with the other.

#### 2.1.1 Liberalism

Liberalism is an ideology that places individual freedom and autonomy at its center. Liberals believe individuals have the right to make their own choices without unnecessary government interference. They support the free market and believe competition leads to economic growth and prosperity. Liberals advocate for democracy and the rule of law. Within liberalism, different strands exist, such as classical liberalism, which favors a minimal state, and modern liberalism, which calls for a more active role of the government when needed (Heywood, 2017). Liberal parties in the European Parliament are part of the 'RENEW' fraction.

Liberal reforms in housing typically reduce regulation, promote private ownership, and expand the role of market forces in housing (Beer, Kearins & Pieters, 2007; Wang et. al., 2012). Housing can also be a primary pathway of ideological change toward liberalism. Romania's post-1990 transition shows how the state withdraws from direct construction yet actively constitutes a housing market through new laws and institutions (Vincze, 2017). Large-scale privatization of the dwelling stock translates liberal ideas into material form, yielding accumulation for some (ownership gains) and dispossession for others (exclusion and loss of claims). In the case of Romania, Vincze (2017) concludes that the transformation from state socialism to neoliberal capitalism occurred largely through housing policy. The privatization of housing served as the core mechanism through which the ideology of economic liberalism took material form.

### 2.1.2 Social Democracy

Social democracy seeks a more egalitarian society. Social democrats believe in redistributing wealth and power to reduce social inequality. They support a strong role for the government in providing social services such as education, healthcare, and social security. Social democrats advocate for democracy and believe political change should be achieved through peaceful and democratic means (Heywood, 2017; Huber, Ragin & Stephens, 1993). Social Democratic parties in the European Parliament are part of the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, or Socialists and Democrats for short.

Social democracy policies in housing typically promote universal, regulated, and inclusive housing (Grander, 2017; Kohl & Sørvoll, 2021; Stamsø, 2009). In certain countries (e.g., Switzerland, Germany, UK), Social Democratic parties put more emphasis on the social rent sector than other parties would do (Hadziabdić & Kohl, 2021).

However, although the goals are similar, historical trajectories and party traditions in social democratic parties produce distinct instrument choices. Based on historical case studies of Germany and Norway, Kohl and Sørvoll (2021) show that from the 1920s onward social democracy backed different cooperative answers to the “urban housing question”: in Norway, a pro-ownership social democracy promoted owner cooperatives, while in Germany social democratic parties favored tenant cooperatives. The differential growth of these models—together with disparities in party ideology—has produced enduring divergence in urban housing systems, shaping tenure mixes and the social scope of non-profit housing. In short, social democracy is not monolithic: similar egalitarian aims can be pursued through ownership-oriented or tenant-oriented cooperative institutions, with path-dependent consequences (Kohl & Sørvoll, 2021).

### 2.1.3 Christian Democracy

Christian democracy is based on christian values and principles. Christian democrats strive for a society based on solidarity and charity, aimed at the moderation of social conflicts especially between social classes.. They support a moderate form of capitalism, the 'social market economy,' which combines free market principles with social justice. Christian democrats are advocates of democracy and believe the government has an active role in promoting the common good. Often, christian democrats emphasize the traditional family and community. (Hanley, 1996; Heywood, 2017; Huber, Ragin et al., 1993). Christian democracy was also a key driver of international cooperation and integration, and particularly influential in the formation of the European Union (Van Kersbergen, 2021). Christian democratic parties in the European Parliament are part of the Group of the European People's Party.

The housing proposals of christian democratic parties have been reviewed less extensively in literature, compared with liberalism and social democracy. However, Van Kersbergen (1995) does give some clues towards christian democratic reasoning in housing systems. In this tradition, the state is understood to have broad competence—including housing and

town planning—and a responsibility to set the framework and guide operations of the economic system, rather than leave outcomes to unfettered markets (Fogarty, 1974; as cited in Van Kersbergen, 1995). At the same time, christian democratic doctrine links social policy to a normative commitment to dignity and order rather than to radical equalization: justice requires that workers and families are decently housed and supported, but redistribution should not be pushed so far as to erase class differences (Van Kersbergen, 1995). In practice, this points to a social market approach to housing: targeted (not universalistic) provision for vulnerable and dependent groups, protection of the family as a core social institution, and partnership-based delivery through municipalities and non-profit actors (e.g., social housing programs for displaced persons and refugees), combined with framework-setting regulation and planning (Van Kersbergen, 1995). Consistent with this middle course, christian democratic parties often back incremental reform and comprehensive—but selective—support, while resisting more radical projects of income redistribution or sweeping housing overhauls proposed by social democrats (Van Kersbergen, 1995).

#### 2.1.4 Populism

The fourth political major movement in Europe, are populist parties. The group is often linked to far-right ideologies, but it isn't easy to characterize these parties within an ideology, as populists parties also show leftist idea's, for example on the welfare state. Populism is an ideology that claims to speak on behalf of 'the people' while opposing 'the elite' (Zulianello & Larsen, 2021; Mudde, 2004). In a populist democracy, nothing is more important than the general will of the people—not even human rights or constitutional guarantees (Mudde, 2004; Mény & Surel, 2002; Canovan, 1999). This leads to an extreme form of majoritarian democracy (Mudde, 2004). Mudde shows that most populist parties show some form of nationalism, exclusionism, xenophobia, 'strong state' thinking (e.g. law and order), welfare chauvinism, traditional ethics and revisionism (2004, based on Mudde, 2000). In the European parliament populists are in the two fractions: the Patriots for Europe and ECR.

Populist parties display divergent and often instrumental housing stances that mix anti-elite market rhetoric with welfare chauvinism. Mudde writes (2007, p. 132): “In this nativist interpretation of the welfare state, fairly generous social benefits are to be guaranteed for the native needy (mainly pensioners and the sick), while “aliens” are to be excluded.”

Some, like Austria's FPÖ, attack “politicized” housing cooperatives and demand more competition, casting housing as captured by a corrupt establishment. Others, such as the Czech SPR-RSČ, call for building social housing alongside broader social benefits, even while advocating tax cuts and a slimmer state. The resulting programmatic blend—part market liberalization, part selective solidarity for “our own people”—serves vote-maximizing strategies rather than a consistent economic doctrine, which explains the variation observed across cases (Mudde, 2007).

The article “Housing and Populism” by Adler and Ansell (2019) examines the relationship between the housing market and the rise of populist movements in Western Europe. The authors argue that local differences in house prices are a key factor in explaining support for populist candidates, such as the Brexit vote and Marine Le Pen in France. They bridge the gap between economic and cultural explanations of populism by showing that the geography of wealth inequality—especially that related to housing—underpins discontent and populist

appeal. The findings suggest that housing not only shapes economic preferences but also group identity and perceptions of the political establishment. This research contributes to understanding populism as a politics of place, strongly influenced by housing-market dynamics.

## 2.2 Welfare and Housing

The debate surrounding the relationship between welfare states, political ideologies, and housing systems has evolved significantly, with each decade bringing new insights into how political structures influence housing outcomes.

### 2.2.1 Welfare regimes by Esping-Andersen

Esping-Andersen is a prominent theorist whose work on the welfare state has attained a dominant position in international comparative research. His theory and typology, formulated in the 1990s, constitute a divergence theory, meaning he argues that different welfare states differ fundamentally from one another. Esping-Andersen maintains that we should not speak of “the” welfare state, but of different types. (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hoekstra, 2010)

Esping-Andersen (1990) defined three crucial dimensions along which modern (capitalist) welfare states differ:

1. **Decommodification:** This refers to the extent to which an acceptable standard of living is promoted independently of a person’s market value. It concerns government interventions that reduce citizens’ dependence on the market. Through decommodifying policies, citizens obtain an unconditional right to certain services and facilities, regardless of their participation in the labour market. A higher degree of decommodification indicates a larger welfare state.
2. **Stratification:** This concerns the extent to which the welfare state promotes or reduces differences between groups of citizens. The way the welfare state distributes welfare services has consequences for social hierarchies. This has both an economic effect (who gets what?) and a social effect (status).
3. **Relation between state, market, and family:** This dimension describes how state activities are linked to the roles of the market and the family in the provision of welfare services. Welfare services can be provided not only by the state, but also by commercial actors (market) or by family, friends, or non-profit organisations (family/household sector). The specific configuration of these three aspects determines the nature of the welfare state.

On the basis of these three dimensions and differences between countries’ empirical data on social security and pension systems, Esping-Andersen (1990) defines three welfare-state regimes. It should be noted that these are ‘ideal types’. There is no single pure case, and elements of all three regimes can be found in most countries.

1. **Liberal welfare-state regime:**  
This regime is marked by limited state intervention and a strong market orientation. The state provides only a “safety net” for a limited group of people with very low

incomes. This leads to dualism in society, with equality (but also poverty) among recipients of state welfare and income differentiation in the rest of society. Decommodification is low.

2. **Conservative–corporatist welfare-state regime:**

This regime features an important role for the family and significant influence of private non-profit organisations. The welfare state reproduces existing status differences, and policy often aims to maintain the traditional family and occupational status. The level of decommodification is medium.

3. **social democratic welfare-state regime:**

In this regime the state dominates the provision of welfare services. There are universal, high-standard welfare services to which a large share of the population has access. This has redistributive effects, resulting in relatively low income differences. Decommodification is high.

In response to the fact that Southern European countries were largely omitted from Esping-Andersen's original typology (with the exception of Italy), several scholars proposed a "new" welfare regime: the Mediterranean welfare-state regime (Barlow & Duncan, 1994; Ferrara, 1996; Leibfried, 1992 ). Esping-Andersen himself referred to this type in later work (1999).

This regime is characterised by a low degree of decommodification (Barlow & Duncan, 1994) and a strong degree of familialism. Familialism means that a disproportionate share of welfare tasks is carried out within the family, with little involvement from the market or the state. The family functions as a crucial network for access to resources such as childcare, eldercare, financial support, and coping with economic crises. Allen et al. (2004) note that the Mediterranean regime shares many features with the conservative–corporatist regime. The important difference is that the welfare state is less developed and the role of the family is even greater.

### 2.2.2 Welfare regimes and housing

Although Esping-Andersen's original work did not focus on housing—concentrating mainly on social security and pension systems—his theory and typology have nonetheless exerted considerable influence on international comparative housing research (Hoekstra, 2010), and the relationship between the welfare state and housing has been discussed widely, with seemingly contradictory conclusions.

The connection between housing and the welfare state and the importance of housing for welfare provision are much discussed. It addresses the role of housing in contradicting ways – from the wobbly pillar under the welfare state (Torgersen, 1987) to the hidden foundation of welfare (Kemeny, 2001).

Kemeny (1992, 1995, 2006) explains internationally divergent housing developments primarily by referring to differences in social and political structures between countries. He assumes these differences are associated with differences in ideology, and more specifically with the degree of privatism versus collectivism. Kemeny links advanced industrial societies

dominated by owner-occupation to an ideology of privatism and a residualization of welfare. By contrast, societies with a sizable rental sector are associated with an ideology of collectivism and a commitment to welfare provision. Kemeny concludes his ideas by distinguishing two types of rental systems on the basis of the collectivist–privatist ideology:

1. **Dualist rental system:**

Found in countries with an ideology of privatism and economic liberalism, and a hegemonic position for right-wing political parties. These societies have a non-corporatist political structure. The state seeks to keep its distance from markets, on the belief that government intervention undermines fair competition.

2. **Unitary (Integrated) rental system:**

Emerges from the social market model, which aims to balance economic and social priorities. This model is based on the principle that intervention in markets is necessary and desirable, and that markets should be constructed to encompass important social goals. These societies are characterised by a corporatist political structure and an ideology of collectivism.

There are many similarities between the frameworks of Esping-Andersen and Kemeny. Both explain how differences in power structures and class coalitions lead to different welfare-state arrangements. Esping-Andersen's work even served as a starting point for Kemeny's thinking on rental systems (Hoekstra, 2010). One important difference concerns the concept of corporatism (Hoekstra, 2010). Esping-Andersen defines corporatism in relation to conservative elements, such as preserving status differences and the preferential treatment of the traditional family. Kemeny finds this definition unusual. In political science, corporatism is more neutrally defined as a system of cooperation and compromise between capital and labour, coordinated by the state (Kemeny, 1995; Hoekstra, 2010).

Kemeny's work demonstrated that political ideologies shape rental structures, influencing housing accessibility and affordability across income groups (Kemeny, 1992).

Boelhouwer and Van der Heijden (1992) added to this discourse by investigating how welfare regimes interact specifically with housing policies. Their work identified distinct outcomes based on levels of government intervention and market influence, observing that social democratic and conservative regimes tend to prioritize social renting, while liberal regimes favor homeownership. This nuanced understanding of welfare frameworks illustrated how housing policies reflect underlying ideological principles, further supporting the idea that housing systems are shaped by broader political structures (Boelhouwer & Van der Heijden, 1992).

Lundqvist (1992) brought another dimension to the debate, emphasizing the fluid nature of housing policies in response to shifting political ideologies. His "rolling stones" model captures the evolving landscape of housing policies, showing how these policies adapt to balance social and economic needs over time. This perspective added a dynamic element to the analysis, illustrating that housing policies are not static but evolve as political and economic conditions change (Lundqvist, 1992).

However, the link between ideology, welfare states, and housing is not without its critics. Wilensky, in *The Welfare State and Equality* (1975), argued that welfare policies are shaped more by socio-economic factors than by ideological principles, finding no consistent relationship between political ideology and welfare spending across countries. Bengtsson (2001) further critiques the assumption that welfare ideologies consistently dictate housing policy, arguing that housing rights and policies are often determined by national context rather than by ideological alignment (Bengtsson, 2001).

An interesting perspective from Krapp et. al. (2022, p. 191) reads as follows: “Our results show that housing systems cannot be neatly organised into existing welfare state typologies, i. e. liberal, conservative, and social democratic types. ... Rather, apparently similar housing system outcomes can be attributed to different welfare systems. This is especially true for more diversified housing systems. Thus, a connection between welfare systems and housing is better based on secondary features of the housing systems, such as social scope of tenure and the role of housing assets in household wealth and private welfare.”

Recent studies highlight new pressures on housing systems. Elsinga’s (2020) paper, *About Housing Systems and Underlying Ideologies*, emphasizes the impact of ideological shifts in response to populism and economic challenges like COVID-19. She argues that housing policy is shaped not only by formal regulations but also by prevailing societal beliefs. Her findings suggest that ideological shifts, whether influenced by populist sentiments or responses to global crises, can redefine housing practices over time. This perspective underscores the deeply embedded nature of ideology in housing policy, suggesting that social values play a critical role in housing system transformations. She writes: “It is about the underlying ideology of whether non-profit housing should be open to large parts of society, of whether home ownership is the best housing tenure, and whether housing is meant for making money or for supporting people’s wellbeing.” (p. 560)

Lundqvist’s (1990; as described in Boelhouwer and Van der Heijden, 1992) perspective on housing policy highlights the interplay between institutional structures, power dynamics, and political agency, emphasizing that policy is shaped by a complex “power game” involving politicians, policymakers, and interest groups. This aligns with Elsinga’s argument that housing policy is not only defined by formal regulations but also deeply influenced by prevailing societal beliefs and ideologies. Together, these perspectives suggest that housing policy is shaped by both structural factors and evolving societal values, including political ideologies. While much has been written about the structural and systemic dimensions of housing systems, there remains a critical gap in understanding how ideological frameworks—particularly those expressed by political parties—actively try to shape housing policies and their outcomes.

Hoekstra (2009) conducted empirical studies that tested and supported Kemeny’s rental typology (1992), confirming significant distinctions between dualist and integrated rental systems. Hoekstra’s work highlighted clear differences in housing quality, rent levels, and owner-occupancy rates between these systems, reinforcing the role of political ideologies in shaping rental structures. In another study, *Is there a Connection between Welfare State Regime and Dwelling Type?* (2005), Hoekstra explored Esping-Andersen’s typology, finding limited evidence of its relevance to housing systems. He concluded that housing characteristics across social democratic, corporatist, and liberal regimes showed minimal

differences. The Mediterranean regime, however, stood out, with a strong familialistic approach that led to higher owner-occupancy rates and a unique reliance on family support structures.

Although Hoekstra (2005) does not find conclusive empirical support for Esping-Andersen's (1990) welfare-regime typology in housing, and does find stronger evidence for Kemeny's rental-system distinction (Hoekstra, 2003; Hoekstra, 2009; Hoekstra, 2010), each framework offers different advantages when the goal is to code proposals by the ideology of the housing system. Kemeny's approach speaks directly to housing and places ideology at the centre of explanation—clear strengths for our purposes—yet it collapses politics into only two camps and overlooks Mediterranean patterns, which makes it misaligned with contemporary party families and cross-national variation. By contrast, while Esping-Andersen's model was not designed exclusively for housing, Hoekstra's work shows how welfare-regime logics can be applied to housing in a way that is operational for coding proposals—linking them to state/market/family roles and to dimensions such as (de)commodification and stratification (Hoekstra, 2010, Hoekstra, 2003). On balance, this thesis therefore adopts Esping-Andersen's framework as the primary lens for classifying proposals.


In Figure 1, we see how Hoekstra sees the relations between the three dimensions of the welfare regime by Esping-Andersen (1990), related to housing. Hoekstra sees the arrangement between state, market and family as the core of the welfare regime; the focus which defines the welfare regime. Consequently, decommodification and stratification are results from the arrangement between the state, market and family.

Hoekstra (2010) theorises that the arrangement between state, market and family translates into the organisation and production of newly built houses. De-commodification translates into Subsidisation and price fixing/regulation. Stratification translates into housing allocation. He further hypothesises the outcomes of these concepts in Hoekstra (2003), as shown in Figure 2. These outcomes are of great help when operationalising possible proposals, as they paint some sort of 'ideal type' of housing system that corresponds with the ideal type welfare regime as proposed by Esping-Andersen. Unfortunately, Hoekstra did not take the Mediterranean welfare regime into account in 2003. However, he did describe the outcomes of mediterranean systems in Hoekstra (2010), as shown in figures 3 and 4.

All concepts in Figure 1, and the used outcomes from figures 2-4 are discussed in more detail in the next paragraph 2.3.

**Figure 1**

*The three dimensions of the welfare state applied to housing*



Source: Hoekstra, 2003, p. 62

**Figure 2**  
*Differences between the housing systems of the three welfare state regimes*

Criterion	Social-democratic	Corporatist	Liberal
<b>De-commodification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Large</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Quite large</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low</li> </ul>
<b>Stratification</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relatively low</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High, mainly based on social status</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• High, mainly based on income</li> </ul>
<b>Mix of State, market and family</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dominant position of the State</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Important position for the family</li> <li>• Considerable influence for private non-profit organizations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dominant position of market parties</li> </ul>
<b>State regulation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong central government influence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Functional decentralisation, incremental, problem-solving policies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relatively little State regulation (at both central and local levels)</li> </ul>
<b>General housing policy objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Guaranteed universal high level of housing quality</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preservation of the social stratification in society</li> <li>• Preferential treatment of the traditional family</li> <li>• Stimulation of households and other private actors to take initiatives on the housing market</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dominant position for the market</li> <li>• State only supports marginal groups</li> </ul>
<b>Subsidisation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Large-scale production subsidies</li> <li>• Subject subsidies for large target groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Segmented subsidies; specific arrangements for specific groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Means-tested subject subsidies</li> <li>• Few production subsidies</li> </ul>
<b>Price setting and price regulation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strong State influence on price setting and price regulation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moderate State influence</li> <li>• State regulation of prices to correct negative effects of the market</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Market determination of house prices</li> </ul>
<b>Housing allocation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Allocation on the basis of need</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• State intervention to correct the market</li> <li>• Certain groups may be favoured in the allocation process</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Market determination of housing allocation in a large part of the housing stock</li> <li>• Regulated allocation in a small part of the housing stock. (reserved for low-income groups)</li> </ul>
<b>Organisation housing provision</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strict spatial planning</li> <li>• State takes initiative for the production of newly built houses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moderately strict spatial planning</li> <li>• Private actors (households, small companies) take the initiative for the production newly built houses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No strict spatial planning</li> <li>• Private actors (mainly big companies) take the initiative for the production newly built houses</li> </ul>

Source: Hoekstra, 2003, p.65

**Figure 3**  
*Typology of welfare state regimes*

	Liberal welfare state regime	Social-democratic welfare state regime	Conservative-corporatist welfare state regime	Mediterranean welfare state regime
<b>Decommodification:</b> extent to which a regime promotes an acceptable standard of living independent of one's market value	Low	High	Medium	Low
<b>Stratification:</b> differences between groups of citizens which are promoted by the regime	Reinforcing distinctions	None, universalist policies	Reproduction of existing stratification	Reproduction of existing stratification
<b>Income distribution and poverty</b>	Large income differences, relatively high incidence of poverty	Small income differences, relatively low incidence of poverty	Medium income differences, medium incidence of poverty	Large income differences, relatively high incidence of poverty
<b>Unemployment</b>	Relatively low	Relatively low	Relatively high	Relatively high
<b>Arrangement between state, market, and family</b>	Dominant position of market parties	Dominant position of the state	Important position for the family, considerable influence of private non-profit organizations	Dominant position of the family
<b>Countries (EU countries only)</b>	United Kingdom, Ireland	Denmark, Sweden, Finland	Belgium, Germany, France, Austria, Netherlands*	Italy**; Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta

\* It should be noted that the Dutch welfare regime is a hybrid case that has both corporatist and social-democratic characteristics.  
 \*\* Italy is often seen as straddling the Mediterranean and conservative-corporatist regimes, both socially and geographically. While the north of Italy is part of the central conservative-corporatist core of the European Union, the south retains many features of Mediterranean welfare states (Barlow & Duncan, 1994, p. 30).

Source: Hoekstra, 2010, p. 10

**Figure 4**  
*Housing outcomes according to the typologies of Kemeny and Esping-Andersen*

Welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen)	Social-democratic	(Conservative) Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean
<b>Ideology, political structure and type of rental system (Kemeny)</b>	Collectivist ideology, corporatist political structure and unitary rental system	Collectivist ideology, corporatist political structure and unitary rental system	Privatist ideology, non-corporatist political structure and dualist rental system	Not included in Kemeny's theory and typology
<b>Share of homeownership sector</b>	Mixed	Mixed	High	High
<b>Quality and appreciation of apartments compared to single-family dwellings</b>	Low	Low	Low	High
<b>Housing outcomes with regard to the rental market</b>	Typical of a unitary rental system	Typical of a unitary rental system	Typical for a dualist rental system	Not included in the analysis
<b>Housing satisfaction of homeowners compared to tenants</b>	High	Mixed	High	High

Source: Hoekstra, 2010, p. 177

In order to test how these welfare logics travel into contemporary housing politics, this thesis focuses on five regions that each sit in a different corner of the classic European welfare

map. Sweden is used here as a stylised social-democratic/Nordic case, characterised by high decommodification and a long tradition of state-led steering. The Netherlands and Flanders approximate a conservative–corporatist configuration, where housing is mediated through organised intermediaries and negotiated allocation rules, often justified in terms of responsibility to specific groups. The United Kingdom represents a liberal configuration, historically prioritising homeownership, deregulation, and market facilitation. Spain represents the Mediterranean configuration, where familial and intergenerational support partially substitutes for state provision, and where ownership plays a central role in social protection.

These cases were not chosen to be statistically representative of “Europe,” but to maximise theoretical contrast across regime logics. By including one case for each of the main welfare traditions — Nordic social democracy, continental corporatism, Anglo-Saxon liberalism, and Mediterranean familialism — the analysis can observe how the same party family (for example, social democrats or liberals) positions itself when operating under very different institutional expectations about who carries housing responsibility: the state, the market, intermediary bodies, or the extended family. This design makes visible whether ideological families export a consistent housing worldview across systems, or whether they adapt (or resist) the dominant welfare-housing logic of the country in which they campaign.

## 2.3 Indicators

To systematically compare the electoral programs across the five regions, this research applies a qualitative, indicator-based assessment of each housing system. Ten indicators were used to analyse the behaviour of different ideologies underlying their proposals to adjust different housing systems. This section sets out the ten indicators that are used to interpret electoral programs. In this selection, a broad approach was chosen, looking at the core mix and regime logics as first described by Esping-Andersen (1990), as well as the housing policy levers and outcome patterns as described by Hoekstra (2003, 2010). An overview of the indicators is shown in Table 1.

For each indicator, a short literature background and expected behaviours by regime are shown and translated into the expected proposals by political parties that align with the expected behaviour of welfare regimes. The expected proposals were mostly drawn deductively from existing literature. However, to be transparent and clear about the lines between the different proposals within each regime, specific policy examples are shown within the expected behaviours. These examples are inductive, meaning they were retrieved from the electoral programs and aligned with the indicative code. The inductive coding is placed between parentheses.

As shown in Figure 2, Hoekstra (2003) hypothesised the policy levers for housing for the different regimes. However, in this research the Mediterranean type remains implicit, and although there is literature on housing systems in Mediterranean regimes, it does not align with the methodology and categorical reasoning from Hoekstra. Therefore, the analysis excludes the Mediterranean regime from those specific policy levers expectation grids to avoid misrepresentation of the Mediterranean welfare state. Mediterranean placements in the results therefore, rely more on the indicators arrangement between state, market and family, decommodification, stratification, and share of homeownership sector, as these

expected behaviours are more apparent in literature. This is also shown in Table 1. An overview of all indicators operationalised is shown in Appendix 1.

**Table 1**  
*Overview of indicators*

Category:	Core mix -->	Regime logics -->			Policy levers -->					Outcome patterns
Indicator:	1: Arrangement between state, market and family	2: Decommodification	3: Stratification	4: Regulation	5: Objectives	6: Subsidiation	7: Price regulation	8: Allocation	9: Provision	10: Share of homeownership sector
Included mediterranean regime?	Yes	Yes		No						Yes

*Own work, based on Esping-Andersen (1990) and Hoekstra (2003, 2010)*

### 2.3.1 Arrangement between state, market and family

The relationship between state, market, and family is one of the three defining characteristics of the welfare state as described by Esping-Andersen (1990). He defines this as the specific configuration of these three actors that delivers welfare services to households and individuals. Esping-Andersen argues that this division of welfare functions determines the nature of the welfare state. Ideally, he distinguishes three configurations: the social democratic, the conservative–corporatist, and the liberal welfare state regime. Allen et. al. (2004) calls for a broader approach by speaking of a “welfare system” rather than a “welfare state,” in order to encompass the roles of market actors and the family in welfare provision. Hoekstra applies these concepts to housing and argues that the mix between state, market, and family determines both the degree of decommodification and the degree of stratification within a country. He emphasizes that this configuration forms the essence of the welfare state and that its most direct influence is visible in how the production of new-build housing is organized and in the ways in which actors from the public, market, and household sectors participate in this process. Hoekstra also acknowledges that this tripartite division between state, market, and family is an ideal type, and that in reality there are many nuances and hybrid forms (2010).

In the literature (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hoekstra, 2010), the social democratic welfare regime places the greatest emphasis on the state in providing and distributing welfare. In liberal welfare regimes, the market plays that role. The corporatist welfare regime balances between market and state, with the state often intervening to curb the market. The traditional family also has a role in providing welfare. In the Mediterranean regime, the role of the family is larger—and the group considered part of the family is broader—while the state’s influence is smaller than in corporatist countries (Barlow & Duncan, 1994; Ferrara, 1996; Leibfried, 1992).

Table 1 shows the expected behaviours of the welfare states on *the arrangement between state, market and family* in the housing system (as shown in Figure 3; Hoekstra, 2010).

**Table 1**

*Expected behaviours of welfare states on the arrangement between state, market and family*

Welfare state	Expected behaviour
Social Democratic	Dominant position of the state
Corporatist	Dominant position for the (traditional) family, considerable influence of private non-profit organizations and the community
Liberal	Dominant position of market parties
Mediterranean	Dominant position of the (extended) family

Source: Hoekstra, 2010

For the state–market–family mix, proposals are coded by who is assigned primary responsibility and control rights (and by the implied governance form). Proposals that include a public mission, central steering, or public/non-profit ownership and oversight map to the social democratic welfare regime (state dominance). Proposals that formalise multi-actor compacts under subsidiarity—municipalities, associations, co-ops, employers—with the state coordinating rather than directing map to corporatism (balanced roles). Proposals that streamline property/contract frameworks, reduce administrative frictions, and rely on voluntary standards and private dispute resolution map to the liberal regime (market primacy). Proposals that regularise titles, facilitate intergenerational transfer/co-residence, and rely on family/community provision with light municipal facilitation map to the Mediterranean regime (familial primacy). Table 2 summarises the mapping of proposal types to welfare regimes for the arrangement between state, market and family.

**Table 2**

*Operationalisation of proposals on the arrangement between state, market and family*

<b>Welfare regime</b>	<b>Expected proposals</b>
<b>social democratic</b>	<b>Propose to</b> codify a public mission for housing providers and long-horizon stewardship (public/non-profit ownership models); require resident representation in governance; set a unified national governance framework clarifying roles across public, private, and community actors; and publish transparent performance/audit dashboards under strong state coordination.
<b>Corporatist</b>	<b>Propose to</b> formalise multi-actor compacts under subsidiarity (municipalities, associations, co-ops, employers); create standing partnership boards and standard agreements with accessible mediation; and enact enabling statutes for co-operatives and community providers, with the state coordinating roles and resolving conflicts rather than directing volumes or prices.
<b>Liberal</b>	<b>Propose to</b> streamline property/contract frameworks and administrative processes; provide independent ombuds/redress; require basic transparency (e.g., beneficial-ownership/landlord registers); and promote voluntary standards/certification and rapid private dispute resolution—light state steering that lowers transaction costs without directive control.
<b>Mediterranean</b>	<b>Propose to</b> regularise titles and occupancy (cadastre/registration upgrades); provide legal tools for intergenerational transfer and co-residence (e.g., usufruct/co-ownership templates); set simple registration/compliance paths for small landlords and self-builders; and let municipalities facilitate family/community solutions within a light national frame.

Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2010

### 2.3.2 Decommodification

Decommodification is one of three defining characteristics of the welfare state as described by Esping-Andersen's (1990). He defines decommodifications as the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of

market participation. However, to operationalise he looked into independence of market participation in terms of income during illness, unemployment, and old age. Vail takes a broader perspective and defines decommodification as the extent to which individuals' dependence on the market is reduced through political, social, or cultural processes (2010). This definition helps us better understand how it can be applied in housing, and also shows the relation with political processes as an input towards affecting the individual's dependence on the market.

Hoekstra applies these concepts in housing and defines de-commodification as the extent to which households can provide their own housing, independent of the income they acquire on the labour market (2003). The welfare state can decommodify housing not only by affecting the price of housing, but also via the household income (Lundqvist, 1990). Of course, this interdependence between housing, household income is strong. However, for this thesis the influence of the state on income is not taken into account, except when directly proposed as a housing subsidy.

Table 3 shows the expected behaviours of the welfare states on decommodification in the housing system (as shown in Figure 3; Hoekstra, 2010).

**Table 3**  
*Expected behaviours of welfare states on decommodification*

Welfare state	Expected behaviour
Social Democratic	High
Corporatist	Medium
Liberal	Low
Mediterranean	Low

*Source:* Hoekstra, 2010

For decommodification, proposals are coded by the scope and universality of the state's duty to buffer households from market dependence in housing—that is, whether affordability and housing security are framed as public responsibilities independent of labour-market income. Importantly, instrument-specific proposals on subsidisation and price regulation are not coded here: measures that directly introduce, expand, or restrict subsidies or rent/price rules are classified under their own, more specific indicators (see par. 2.3.5 Subsidisation; 2.3.6 Price regulation). Within the decommodification indicator, we therefore code principle- and governance-level proposals: those that establish/expand rights and duties (e.g., right to housing, duty to house, universal prevention obligations) and that assign institutional responsibility for preventing homelessness and shielding households from market risks. Proposals that assert universal entitlements and public obligations map to the social democratic regime; targeted, institution-mediated duties and selective entitlements map to corporatism; opposition to universal rights/duties, with reliance on narrow safety nets and individual responsibility, maps to the liberal regime; and discretionary, locally administered aid with reliance on family/charitable support maps to the Mediterranean regime. Table 4 summarises the mapping of proposal types to welfare regimes for decommodification.

**Table 4**  
*Operationalisation of proposals about decommodification*

Welfare regime	Proposal types that code as decommodification
<b>Social democratic</b>	<p><b>Rights &amp; duties:</b> proposals on a legal right to housing, duty to house, Housing First/led, zero-homelessness targets.</p> <p><b>Provision &amp; finance:</b> scale up social/affordable supply; strong inclusionary obligations; protect/retain social stock.</p> <p><b>Governance &amp; risk:</b> broad rent rules + tenant protections; income-related supports; deposit caps/eviction prevention; stronger enforcement.</p>
<b>Corporatist</b>	<p><b>Institution-led prevention:</b> proposals about targeted/early-intervention services via existing bodies.</p> <p><b>Intermediary provision:</b> incremental expansion through associations/PPPs; negotiated inclusion of affordable units.</p> <p><b>Selective protections:</b> pilot/segment-specific adjustments within current frameworks.</p>
<b>Liberal</b>	<p><b>Rights stance:</b> opposing universal rights/duties; emphasising freedom of contract; narrow safety-nets.</p> <p><b>Market delivery:</b> market-led provision; minimal non-market obligations; streamlined/relaxed planning.</p> <p><b>Light regulation:</b> lighten rules; limit/repeal rent controls; supports framed as temporary/tightly means-tested.</p>
<b>Mediterranean</b>	<p><b>Local/ familial:</b> proposals about decentralising with broad local discretion; encouraging family/charity solutions.</p> <p><b>Limited expansion:</b> keep public/non-profit growth limited; ad-hoc regularisation/self-build; weak/uneven enforcement.</p> <p><b>Selective standards:</b> uneven application of rules; reliance on informal/familial risk-buffering.</p>

Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2010

### 2.3.3 Stratification

Stratification is the last of three defining characteristics of the welfare state as described by Esping-Andersen’s (1990). Stratification refers to differences between groups of citizens that are promoted by the regime. In housing, stratification appears most clearly in allocation: without state rules, allocation mirrors the economic hierarchy (households with more resources get the best—and most expensive—homes). With state regulation, specific groups can be favoured, either to increase choice for low-income households or to preserve status differentials (Hoekstra, 2010).

Muftakhova & Kozyreva (2018) explain housing stratification concerns social inequalities in housing needs— and define stratifications as a form of socioeconomic segregation in access to dwelling types and qualities and in living conditions. Within her definition, she uses signals such as housing type and location (e.g., single-family vs apartments; urban vs rural), tenure status, housing availability (space per household), severe housing deprivation (overcrowding, poor conditions, lack of amenities), and housing satisfaction to determine how stratificatized a country is. These dimensions show how access and conditions are unequally distributed within society.

Table 5 shows the expected behaviours of the welfare states on stratification in the housing system (as already shown in Figure 3; Hoekstra, 2010).

**Table 5**  
*Expected behaviours of welfare states on stratification*

Welfare state	Expected behaviour
Social Democratic	No stratification, universalist policies
Corporatist	Reproduction of existing stratification
Liberal	Reinforcing distinctions
Mediterranean	Reproduction of existing stratification

*Source:* Hoekstra, 2010

For stratification, proposals are coded by the stance toward social differentiation in housing—i.e., whether policy frames inequalities in access, status, and conditions as something to equalise (universalism/mixing) or to preserve/tolerate (segmentation/status maintenance), following Hoekstra’s reading of stratification in housing (2003). Importantly, instrument-specific proposals on housing allocation are not coded here: changes to eligibility rules, waiting lists, lotteries, local-connection tests, or choice-based letting are classified under the separate Housing allocation indicator (par. 2.3.7). Within the stratification indicator, we code principle- and governance-level proposals: commitments to universalist equal-opportunity norms, desegregation/mixing objectives, anti-discrimination enforcement, and parity of esteem between tenures map to the social democratic regime; proposals for segment-specific improvements via established intermediaries that ameliorate but do not

flatten status differences map to corporatism; proposals that accept market sorting, emphasise individual responsibility, and oppose universal equalising mandates map to the liberal regime; and proposals that rely on local/familial discretion with limited universal guarantees and uneven enforcement map to the Mediterranean regime. Table 6 summarises the mapping of proposal types to welfare regimes for stratification.

**Table 6**  
*Operationalisation of proposals about stratification*

Welfare regime	Proposal types that code as stratification
<b>social democratic</b>	<p><b>Access rules:</b> proposals on universal/broad eligibility, mixing (avoid residualisation), anti-discrimination testing/enforcement.</p> <p><b>Land/stock governance:</b> proposals on inclusionary planning/set-asides, protecting social stock, managing short-term rentals to preserve access across groups.</p> <p><b>Conditions &amp; tenure:</b> proposals on universal minimum standards, reducing deprivation/overcrowding, and levelling tenure opportunities (renting not inferior).</p>
<b>Corporatist</b>	<p><b>Access rules:</b> proposals about targeted eligibility/priority via existing institutions; negotiated access.</p> <p><b>Land/stock governance:</b> proposals about incremental inclusion via partnerships; planning that preserves existing composition.</p> <p><b>Conditions &amp; tenure:</b> proposals about segment-specific upgrades/relief that improve conditions without flattening hierarchies.</p>
<b>Liberal</b>	<p><b>Access rules:</b> proposals about market-led allocation, landlord discretion, opposing universal equal-opportunity mandates.</p> <p><b>Land/stock governance:</b> proposals about deregulating/streamlining planning, minimal obligations for social/affordable units, permissive toward sorting uses.</p> <p><b>Conditions &amp; tenure:</b> proposals about leaving conditions to the market, few universal standards, individual/charitable responsibility; accept status/tenure segmentation.</p>
<b>Mediterranean</b>	<p><b>Access rules:</b> proposals about local discretion/ad-hoc rules, reliance on family/community networks over universal enforcement.</p> <p><b>Land/stock governance:</b> proposals about limited inclusionary duties, weak/uneven enforcement, self-help/regularisation paths.</p>

**Conditions & tenure:** proposals about selective standards with uneven implementation, reliance on family support rather than universal equalisation.

Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2010

#### 2.3.4 Regulation

The way in which technical building regulations are organised and formulated varies significantly across the European Union. In most EU countries, central governments are involved in setting these regulations, but the degree of involvement by regional and local authorities differs widely (Krapp et al., 2022). These building regulations may be laid down in a single central document, a coordinated set of documents, or in separate legal texts. The formulation of the requirements can range from functional (objectives without specific solutions), to performance-based (quantitative standards with measurement methods), to prescriptive (specific design or construction solutions). The diversity in responsibility for drafting the regulations and in the structure of the documents in which they are codified leads to different regulatory models across the EU.

Regulation captures the rules that govern how dwellings are built, used, and let—excluding any direct control of rent levels (that belongs under *price regulation*). On the building side, it covers minimum requirements for safety, health, usability/accessibility, and energy, plus the building control system that enforces them; across the EU these rules are typically set by central authorities, increasingly formulated in performance-based terms with references to technical standards, while application to existing buildings varies from relaxed provisions during renovations to powers to compel upgrades (Pedro, Meijer & Visscher, 2009).

On the rental law side, regulation defines how contracts are concluded and what they must contain; rights and duties during the tenancy (e.g., repairs, alterations, use restrictions, landlord access); how tenancies end (grounds, procedures, eviction safeguards); how deposits, utilities and charges are handled; and how disputes are resolved. These shape security of tenure, housing quality, and the tenant–landlord power balance without steering prices (Schmid & Dinse et. al., 2014) .

Table 7 shows the expected behaviours of the welfare states on regulation in the housing system (as already shown in Figure 2; Hoekstra, 2003).

**Table 7**  
*Expected behaviours of welfare states on regulation*

Welfare state	Expected behaviour
Social Democratic	Strong central government influence
Corporatist	Functional decentralisation, incremental, problem-solving policies
Liberal	Relatively little state regulation (at both central and local levels)
Mediterranean	-

*Source:* Hoekstra, 2003

For regulation, proposals are coded by the regulatory posture toward housing quality, information, and enforcement—that is, how the “rules of the game” are defined and policed. Importantly, instrument-specific proposals on price regulation and subsidisation are not coded here (they are classified under the separate price regulation and subsidisation indicators). Likewise, spatial planning/land-release and build-obligation instruments belong under provision, and eligibility/waiting-list rules under Housing allocation. Within this indicator we therefore code principle- and governance-level regulatory proposals. Proposals for universal minimum standards, licensing/registration, proactive inspection capacity, due-process tenant protections (non-price), and national data/transparency systems map to the social democratic regime. Proposals for co-regulation via intermediaries (associations/co-ops/municipal bodies), baseline national rules with local implementation, and graduated, segment-specific enforcement map to corporatism. Proposals to streamline or roll back prescriptive rules, emphasise self-/co-regulation, disclosure over prescription, and low administrative burdens map to the liberal regime. Table 8 summarises the mapping of proposal types to welfare regimes for regulation.

**Table 8***Operationalisation of proposals on regulation*

<b>Welfare regime</b>	<b>Proposal types that code as regulation</b>
<b>Social Democratic</b>	Strong central steering with uniform tenant protections and proactive enforcement: fixed/longer default tenancies; bans on no-fault evictions; landlord (and broker) registers/licences; curbs on vacancy and speculative buy-to-let (self-occupancy/buy-out protections; right of first refusal to public/co-ops); preservation of social stock (strict sale rules); quality-by-design governance (architect role, design competitions, institute); mandatory accessibility/quality certification and more inspections; sustainability baked into regulation (biobased standards; energy-performance-linked tenancy/enforcement).
<b>Corporatist</b>	Functional decentralisation and incremental, problem-solving rules co-produced with municipalities and organised actors: nationwide landlord/broker licensing with local dispute resolution (rent commissions, rental teams); municipal instruments (neighbourhood permits, vacancy taxes, targeted self-occupancy zones, local property-tax differentiation); planning/land tools (affordable-rental quotas in large projects, brownfield-style covenants, last-resort expropriation at defined thresholds); safety/quality upgrades (cladding remediation, energy-label improvement deadlines) with neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood delivery; tenure security in social renting (end temporary contracts) while maintaining administrative checks;
<b>Liberal</b>	Light-touch, pro-development deregulation: simplify/shorten permits and appeals; make advisory opinions non-binding; reduce certification burdens and harmonise local rules; relax spatial/environmental constraints (e.g., shoreline/nitrogen reforms) to speed building; maximise owner autonomy (no mandatory retrofits/heat pumps; voluntary sustainability); enable flexible housing forms (micro-homes, modular, tiny/co-housing); targeted law-and-order enforcement on nuisance/rogue actors and transparency for leaseholders, without expanding substantive controls.

Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2003

### 2.3.5 Housing policy objectives

Barr (1994) divides the objectives of the welfare state into the categories equity, efficiency and administrative feasibility. On the equity side, the welfare state guarantees a minimum income floor and poverty relief, and undertakes redistribution both vertically (from richer to poorer) and horizontally (consumption smoothing across the life course and against risks such as unemployment, sickness, disability, and longevity). Barr also makes a distinction within equity, between supporting living standards (which aligns with decommodification) the reduction of inequality, and social integration (which aligns with stratification)

On the efficiency side, it corrects market failures—notably incomplete insurance markets (adverse selection, information problems), capital-market imperfections that hinder investment in human capital, and externalities in health and education—while ensuring access to merit goods that societies deem essential.

In regards to his third objective, administrative feasibility, Barr writes that a system should be “simple, easy to understand and as cheap as administer as possible” and “as little as possible open to abuse” (1994, p.11).

Barr stresses that objectives are distinct from instruments: different mixes of social insurance, means-tested benefits, and publicly provided services involve trade-offs between targeting, incentives, and administrative costs in pursuit of these goals (1994).

Housing policy objectives define the main priorities that guide government intervention in housing markets. While ensuring efficient market functioning and affordability are widely acknowledged as fundamental goals, national housing policies diverge based on institutional settings, economic structures, and welfare state traditions (Krapp et al., 2022). Other possible objectives named are quality of housing, energy efficiency, homeownership or rental housing promotion, combatting housing discrimination (Krapp et al., 2022; Landis & McClure, 2010)

Table 9 shows the expected behaviours of the welfare states on housing policy objectives in the housing system (as already shown in Figure 2; Hoekstra, 2003).

**Table 9**

*Expected behaviours of welfare states on housing policy objectives*

Welfare state	Expected behaviour
Social Democratic	Guaranteed universal high level of housing quality
Corporatist	Preservation of the social stratification in society Preferential treatment of the traditional family Stimulation of households and other actors to take initiatives on the housing market
Liberal	Dominant position for market State only supports marginal groups
Mediterranean	-

Source: Hoekstra, 2003

For housing policy objectives, proposals are coded by the ends they prioritise and the trade-offs they endorse, following Barr’s triad of equity, efficiency, and administrative feasibility (Barr, 1994). Crucially, instrument-specific measures are not coded here: proposals that directly introduce or modify subsidies (→ *subsidisation*), rent/price rules (→ *price regulation*), eligibility/allocation (→ *housing allocation*), or land/build delivery (→ *provision*) are classified under their own indicators. Within this indicator, I code objective-level commitments—e.g., equity aims (poverty relief/minimum income floor, redistribution, social integration), efficiency aims (market functioning, correcting failures, ensuring access to merit goods), and feasibility aims (simplicity, low admin burden, cost control, fraud resistance).

Mapping to regimes follows the welfare logics applied to housing (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hoekstra, 2010): proposals that frame housing as a social right, emphasise universal equity goals and integration, and accept state responsibility for securing them map to the social democratic regime; proposals that pursue calibrated, segment-specific objectives via established intermediaries and incremental problem-solving map to corporatism; proposals that prioritise efficiency first, use targeted (narrow) equity goals, and stress administrative feasibility and fiscal restraint map to the liberal regime. Table 10 summarises the mapping of objective types to welfare regimes for this indicator.

**Table 10**  
*Operationalisation of proposals on housing policy objectives*

<b>Welfare regime</b>	<b>Proposal types that code as Objectives</b>
<b>social democratic</b>	<p><b>Equity:</b> housing as a basic right; expand high-quality, broadly accessible public/social housing; broaden access (e.g., higher income limits); protect tenants via redress when quality is poor; ensure affordable, sufficient-quality housing.</p> <p><b>Efficiency:</b> —</p> <p><b>Administrative feasibility:</b> —</p>
<b>Corporatist</b>	<p><b>Equity:</b> support first-time/middle income groups into ownership (retain mortgage-interest deduction; reduce transaction taxes/fees; guarantees, 100% loans, Help to Buy/shared ownership/rent-to-own; stamp-duty relief; CGT relief to tenants; restore deductions; ICO guarantees; tax-advantaged first-home savings; eliminate VAT on first home).</p> <p><b>Efficiency:</b> binding/realistic building agreements with municipalities; revamp housing deals to match economic activity and buyer preferences; regulatory frameworks for new models.</p>

**Administrative feasibility:** structure payments (e.g., VAT in instalments); predictable, easy-to-use schemes.

**Liberal**

**Equity:** build smaller/appropriate homes for first-time buyers and small households.

**Efficiency:** remove binding constraints to speed supply (scrap nitrogen/nutrient neutrality obstacles with mitigation; release non-protected land); streamline permitting; close regulatory loopholes; enable data access (EPC); use tech/AI to accelerate processing.

**Administrative feasibility:** limit admin burden; one-stop/site visit for certificates; extend validities where safe; simplify mobile care-home rules; unified “housing pass.”

Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2003

### 2.3.6 Subsidization

Housing subsidisation in the EU spans two main instrument families: demand-side (subject-oriented) transfers to households (e.g., housing allowances, support for buyers) and supply-side (object-oriented) supports to produce or improve dwellings (Krapp, 2022). Since the 1970s, many systems shift from producer to consumer orientation as the “housing problem” is reframed from absolute shortages to affordability (rent-to-income) risks, welfare budgets tighten, and confidence in market allocation rises (Clapham, Kemp & Smith, 1990). Still, the literature documents enduring diversity in how states combine these instruments and the intensity with which they are used (Donner, 2000, 2006; Andrews et al., 2011; Scanlon & Elsinga, 2013). After the global financial crisis, fiscal consolidation further pressures housing support, with adjustments occurring across both demand- and supply-side programmes (Van der Heijden, Dol, & Oxley, 2011; Scanlon & Elsinga, 2013).

A consistent finding is that official budgets understate total state support because they omit or only partially record tax expenditures: relief on imputed rents, reduced VAT in the housing sector, and exemptions or preferences in real-estate and capital-gains taxation (Haffner, 1994; Figari et al., 2012; Wieser & Mundt, 2014). The European Commission treats reduced VAT as a subsidy, reinforcing the case for counting such advantages (European Commission, 2013; as described in Wieser & Mundt, 2014). In short, while demand- vs supply-side is a useful organising lens (Krapp et al., 2022), assessing magnitude and trends requires a broad definition of support and careful accounting for indirect measures. Therefore, proposals about tax reductions are treated as subsidies.

Table 11 shows the expected behaviours of the welfare states on regulation in the housing system (as already shown in Figure 2; Hoekstra, 2003).

**Table 11**

*Expected behaviours of welfare states on subsidization*

Welfare state	Expected behaviour
Social Democratic	Large-scale production subsidies Subject subsidies for large target groups
Corporatist	Segmented subsidies: specific arrangements for specific groups
Liberal	Means-tested subject subsidies Few production subsidies
Mediterranean	-

Source: Hoekstra, 2003

For subsidization, proposals are coded by the instrument they deploy to lower housing costs for households or to support production—i.e., demand-side (subject) transfers and supply-side (object) supports in the sense used by the literature (Krapp et al., 2022). Following Hoekstra’s translation of decommodification to housing, this indicator captures subsidy instruments only; price-setting measures (e.g., rent caps, indexation rules) are excluded here and coded under price regulation. Within Subsidization, I include cash transfers/allowances, grants/loans/guarantees, and tax expenditures explicitly targeted at housing (e.g., reduced VAT, deductions)—treating these tax advantages as subsidies in line with EU guidance and comparative work (European Commission, 2013; Wieser & Mundt, 2014). Proposals that extend broad entitlements or large-scale object and subject subsidies map to the social democratic regime; segment-specific, institution-mediated supports (funds, guarantees via associations/municipalities; conditional landlord incentives) map to corporatism; tightly means-tested, time-limited supports with minimal or sunsetted production aid and a preference for tax neutrality map to the liberal regime (Hoekstra, 2003, 2010). Table 12 summarises the mapping of subsidy proposal types to welfare regimes.

**Table 12**

*Operationalisation of proposals on subsidization*

**Welfare regime**

**Proposal types that code as Subsidization**

**Social democratic**

**Demand-side subsidies:** widen rental subsidies (shorter waiting periods; extend to the private market; taper support to avoid cliffs; include people in or seeking work; extend for the most precarious); extend guaranteed housing insurance to private renting.

**Supply-side subsidies:** subsidising social/affordable rental for wide groups; expand budget/convened rentals; set minimum shares for subsidised rental in new developments.

**Corporatis t** **Demand-side subsidies:** segment-specific aids (youth rental support; adjustment premiums for elderly/care needs; interest-free emergency renovation loans; 0% energy-savings loans for low/middle incomes); buyer-side support (public guarantees for deposits/loan-to-value, tax-advantaged first-home saving, VAT/fee relief on first home).  
**Supply-side subsidies:** fund/intermediary finance (affordable-housing funds; facilitation where market value < build cost); landlord investment deductions tied to energy upgrades with temporary rent-rise caps; replace recurring energy tariffs with one-off retrofit support in long-term rentals; develop residential resources for elderly/assisted living. Help non-profit organisations to develop affordable housing

**Liberal** **Demand-side subsidies:** tightly means-tested, time-limited supports; narrow safety nets rather than broad entitlements.  
**Supply-side subsidies:** minimize or phase down production grants; rely on market delivery; if used, apply small, time-limited, cost-controlled incentives like tax deductions.

Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2003

### 2.3.7 Price regulation

Pricing and price regulation are key instruments shaping housing affordability within the European Union. Governments implement various regulatory measures to stabilize housing costs, improve accessibility, and prevent excessive price increases. The degree, scope, and design of these regulatory frameworks differ widely, depending on national housing market structures, legal traditions, and policy orientations (Kettunen & Ruonavaara, 2021; Krapp et al., 2022).

Price regulation can apply to both rental and owner-occupied sectors, targeting two main dimensions (Kettunen & Ruonavaara, 2021):

1. Regulation of initial housing prices, which places limits on the starting price of a rental contract or property sale, often within specific market segments. This can be used for rental as well as owner-occupied housing, although the latter is less common.
2. Regulation of rent increases, which restricts the magnitude and frequency of rent or housing price adjustments over time.

Allocation of regulatory intensity along these dimensions allows for a typology of housing systems ranging from fully market-driven to strongly regulated. In market-oriented systems, housing prices are largely determined by supply and demand, with limited state intervention. In contrast, regulatory approaches may involve price caps, adjustment formulas, or reference rent systems, often varying by region or dwelling type.

Regardless of the regulatory model, housing affordability remains a persistent challenge, especially in urban areas where demand outpaces supply. This has spurred ongoing debates around how to strike a balance between market incentives and affordability guarantees.

The tension between price regulation and market liberalization is central to contemporary housing debates. One reason might be that studies find different results for the effects of price regulation (Soon, 2019; De Jorge-Huertas & De Jorge-Moreno, 2020; Li et. al., 2020; Zhang & Wang, 2015). Understanding the range and depth of national regulatory practices is essential for assessing how housing systems respond to affordability pressures within different welfare state contexts.

Table 13 shows the expected behaviours of the welfare states on price regulation in the housing system (as already shown in Figure 2; Hoekstra, 2003).

**Table 13**  
*Expected behaviours of welfare states on price regulation*

Welfare state	Expected behaviour
Social Democratic	Strong state influence on price setting and price regulation
Corporatist	Moderate state influence - state regulation of prices to correct negative effects of the housing market
Liberal	Market determination of house prices
Mediterranean	-

*Source:* Hoekstra, 2003

For price regulation, proposals are coded by whether they directly set or constrain housing prices over time—principally initial rent setting and rules for rent increases (owner-occupied price setting is rarer but included).

Mapping to regimes follows Hoekstra’s expected behaviours and the rent-regulation literature. Proposals for comprehensive national frameworks—reference-rent systems or rent brakes/caps with indexation formulas and limited room for local deviation—map to the social democratic regime (state primacy). Proposals for a differentiated approach—a national baseline with regional/local implementation, designated zones, and limits on excessive increases while safeguarding provider viability—map to corporatism (balanced roles). Proposals to leave prices to the market, end/avoid rent control, or confine intervention to narrow anti-gouging/emergency measures map to the liberal regime (market primacy). Table 14 summarises the mapping of proposal types to welfare regimes for price regulation.

**Table 14**

*Operationalisation of proposals on price regulation*

**Welfare regime**

**Proposal types that code as price regulation**

**social  
democratic**

**Rent level rules:** proposals on a national rent brake / cap for new contracts (e.g., target rent via a reference estimator with a limited margin); proposals to contain housing prices.

**Governance & design:** proposals on a comprehensive, uniform national system with national criteria and limited regional variation; directive, national-level steering.

**Corporatist**

**Rent level rules:** proposals to limit rent increases (cap largest rises; keep rents “reasonable”); simplify complex rent-calculation rules while keeping renting attractive (esp. for small landlords).

**Governance & design:** proposals for a differentiated approach with a national baseline and regional/local implementation; use of designated zones; incremental, problem-solving adjustments.

**Liberal**

**Rent level rules:** proposals to end rent control in lease contracts; proposals to remove temporary expropriation measures.

**Governance & design:** proposals for market determination of prices with relatively little state regulation at both central and local levels.

Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2003

### 2.3.8 Housing allocation

As discussed in paragraph 2.2.2, Hoekstra names housing allocation as the housing indicator to show stratification in the housing system. He writes: “In the field of housing, stratification is reflected in the process of housing allocation. Without State interference, housing allocation could be expected to be a direct reflection of the economic stratification in a society; households with the most resources would obtain the best and most expensive houses. However, the State is able to regulate the housing allocation process. Certain groups can be favoured by applying allocation rules. These State interventions can have different objectives. They can aim at increasing choice for low-income groups, but also at the preservation of status differentials.” (2003, p. 63)

In practice, as Haffner and Boelhouwer (2006) detail, “housing allocation” refers to regulated assignment in the social/subsidised sectors, while non-subsidised rental and

owner-occupied housing usually follows market principles. European systems commonly take needs-based forms (waiting lists ranked by points such as overcrowding, finances, or dwelling condition) or choice-based letting models that emphasise applicant choice and transparent bidding, often to reduce vacancies and turnaround times; criteria typically include housing need, income limits, and local connection. The goals of allocation thus range from guaranteeing basic security for vulnerable groups to promoting affordability and, in some cases, steering neighbourhood composition (Haffner & Boelhouwer, 2006).

Table 15 shows the expected behaviours of the welfare states on housing allocation in the housing system (as already shown in Figure 2; Hoekstra, 2003).

**Table 15**

*Expected behaviours of welfare states on housing allocation*

Welfare state	Expected behaviour
Social Democratic	Allocation on the basis of need
Corporatist	State intervention to correct the market Certain groups may be favoured in the allocation process
Liberal	Market determination of housing allocation in a large part of the housing stock Regulated allocation in a small part of the housing stock (reserved for low income groups)
Mediterranean	-

*Source:* Hoekstra, 2003

For housing allocation, proposals are coded by how they determine access—who is eligible for which dwellings, in what order or priority, and under what selection mechanism (e.g., needs-based points, choice-based letting/CBL, local-connection tests, lotteries, quotas/set-asides, mixing/anti-segregation rules, transparency and appeals).

Mapping follows Hoekstra’s stratification logic in housing: proposals for universalist access norms, anti-discrimination enforcement, nationally transparent rules (needs/CBL) and mixing map to the social democratic regime; proposals for calibrated, group-specific priorities delivered through intermediaries with local discretion inside national baselines map to corporatism; proposals favouring market-led allocation with minimal universal mandates (e.g., preference for vouchers over detailed allocation rules) map to the liberal regime. Table 16 summarises the mapping of allocation proposal types to welfare regimes.

**Table 16**  
*Operationalisation of proposals on housing allocation*

<b>Welfare regime</b>	<b>Proposal types that code as Housing allocation</b>
<b>Social democratic</b>	<p><b>Access rules:</b> proposals on national, transparent needs-based/CBL systems; broad eligibility; anti-discrimination testing/enforcement; restrict status-preserving rules (e.g., strong limits on local-connection barriers).</p> <p><b>Priorities:</b> proposals on guaranteed access for vulnerable groups (e.g., homeless minors, people with disabilities), but within a universalist framework; time-bound priority to reduce waiting times without residualising groups.</p> <p><b>Governance:</b> proposals on uniform national criteria, clear appeal processes.</p>
<b>Corporatist</b>	<p><b>Access rules:</b> proposals about local discretion within national baselines; experiments with lottery on waiting lists to improve youth chances; maintain local/vital-occupation tests (e.g., reserving a share of new units for local residents and key workers).</p> <p><b>Priorities:</b> proposals about target-group priorities (youth, students, elderly, people with disabilities, key workers, immigrant workers); integrated housing-care pathways; measures for homeless minors and early detection for at-risk young adults.</p> <p><b>Governance:</b> proposals about municipal plans with binding targets for suitable senior housing; moving support (allowances/rent retention); standards/certification for inclusive senior care; resource local allocation capacity (e.g., more planning/allocation staff).</p>
<b>Liberal</b>	<p><b>Access rules:</b> proposals about market-led allocation with greater provider/landlord discretion; oppose new universal allocation mandates; rely on narrow eligibility for limited social stock.</p> <p><b>Priorities:</b> proposals about limiting quotas and lotteries; prefer vouchers/allowances over detailed allocation rules; avoid permanent priority lists beyond minimal safeguards.</p> <p><b>Governance &amp; transparency:</b> proposals about devolving decisions to providers/localities; simplify rules; minimise administrative burdens in allocation procedures.</p>

Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2003

### 2.3.9 Provision

'Housing provision' refers to the way housing is supplied within a region, involving public, private, and non-profit actors. Provision structures are influenced by varying degrees of state intervention, market dynamics, and intermediary institutions, while in some contexts, familial support systems also play a key role. The way governments steer housing provision differs considerably between systems (Krapp et al., 2022; Ball, 2015).

Housing production in Europe is carried out by a diverse set of actors. In many countries, private developers and the construction sector are key providers, building homes for both owner-occupation and (increasingly) the market-oriented rental sector (Krapp et al., 2022). In addition, social housing institutions—such as municipal housing associations, non-profit organisations, and publicly controlled companies—play a crucial role in constructing subsidised dwellings. Since the financial crises, international and institutional investors have also become more active in developing new-build rental housing, often targeting specific segments such as students and young professionals. Foundations are sometimes involved in the construction of affordable housing, and there is also self-build by individuals or families (Krapp et al., 2022). These organisations operate within a complex framework of regulation, finance, and market conditions, in which the availability of building land and slow planning processes often form bottlenecks (Ball, 2015).

For analytical clarity, four groups of providers can be distinguished:

#### 1. State and state-led Social Housing Providers

Governments and local authorities have historically played a major role, especially in social housing, offering affordable homes to low- and middle-income groups. However, since the 1980s, public sector involvement has declined in many countries due to liberalization and privatization trends (Scanlon et al., 2007; Kucharska-Stasiak, 2021).

#### 2. Private Market Providers

Private landlords and developers dominate the provision of market rental and owner-occupied housing, especially in countries with less state intervention (Haffner et. al., 2009; Balchin, 2010). Often, real estate agents and property managers facilitate transactions and management, with regulation of these professions varying by country (Fabra, 2025).

#### 3. Public or on-profit market providers, collaborative and cooperative Housing

In some countries, social housing organizations (public or non-profit) remain significant, where they manage large housing stocks and focus on affordability and social inclusion (Scanlon et al., 2007; Borg, 2014).

Cooperatives, cohousing, and community-led initiatives have grown, offering alternatives to both state and market provision. These models emphasize resident participation, affordability, and social values (Griffith, Jepma & Savini, 2022; Czischke, Carriou & Lang, 2020).

#### 4. Households and Families

In post-socialist and Southern European countries, families and self-builders play a crucial role, often compensating for limited state or market provision through intergenerational support and informal construction (Stephens, Lux & Sunega, 2015; Allen et. al., 2004)

Because the availability of building land is limited (Ball, 2015), land allocation is another important aspect of provision. There is much variety in how strict the spatial planning is being done, often by municipalities, from having very detailed planning on spatial dimensions

and use in state oriented systems, to no planning at all in more liberal systems (Nadin, Cotella & Schmitt, 2024). Spatial planning systems are deeply embedded in their socio-economic, political and cultural context (Nadin & Stead, 2008). In Europe, the scope of spatial planning has generally widened to become more strategic (Nadin et. al., 2020).

Table 17 shows the expected behaviours of the welfare states on provision in the housing system (as already shown in Figure 2; Hoekstra, 2003).

**Table 17**  
*Expected behaviours of welfare states on provision*

Welfare state	Expected behaviour
Social Democratic	Strict spatial planning State takes initiative for the production of newly built houses
Corporatist	Moderately strict spatial planning Private actors (households, small companies, non-profit organisations) take the initiative for the production newly built houses
Liberal	No strict spatial planning Private actors (mainly big companies) take the initiative for the production newly built houses
Mediterranean	The state provides few welfare services and there is no history of full employment policies. The provision of welfare services is dominated by the family.

*Source:* Hoekstra, 2003

For provision, I code proposals by how they organise and deliver new housing—i.e., who initiates and builds, how land and planning are governed, and what delivery coalitions are put in place (public, private, non-profit, community). Within provision, I include proposals on public or market leadership, active land policy (e.g., public land banks, site designation, build obligations, anti-land-hoarding), planning posture (central steering vs. local discretion; simplification/streamlining), and partnership architectures (associations, co-ops, PPPs) (Hoekstra, 2010; Krapp et al., 2022; Ball, 2015). Mapping to regimes follows welfare logics in housing: proposals for strong public steering with public/non-profit-anchored delivery and assertive land stewardship map to the social democratic regime; subsidiarity-based partnership delivery (municipalities/associations/co-ops/private) with national frames and local execution maps to corporatism; market-led delivery with streamlined planning, light universal obligations, and enabling frameworks maps to the liberal regime; and locally discretionary facilitation of family/self-provision, regularisation of existing stock, and light national coordination maps to the Mediterranean regime. Table 18 summarises the mapping of provision proposal types to welfare regimes.

**Table 18**

*Operationalisation of proposals about provision*

<b>Welfare regime</b>	<b>Proposal types that code as provision</b>
<b>social democratic</b>	<p><b>Steering &amp; land/planning:</b> proposals on national steering (minister/fund, enforceable targets), active land policy (public land bank, site designation), building obligation (penalties/expropriation), clear master plans, strategic densification.</p> <p><b>Delivery &amp; financing:</b> proposals on public-led build programmes (large social/mid segments), build-through guarantees in downturns, enforceable social-share in new projects, public acquisition + renovate-to-rent, stable programme funding and pooled technical capacity.</p>
<b>Corporatist</b>	<p><b>Steering &amp; land/planning:</b> proposals about local steering within national frames, brownfield-first and targeted densification, simple zoning families, vacant-land taxes, frameworks for temporary uses.</p> <p><b>Delivery &amp; financing:</b> proposals about partnership delivery (municipalities/associations/co-ops/private), co-op support (guarantee funds, first-refusal), associations/co-ops acquiring/renovating/(re)letting, targeted affordable-housing funds, small-landlord incentives tied to quality/energy upgrades, one-stop municipal support, credit/guarantee schemes for limited-access groups.</p>
<b>Liberal</b>	<p><b>Steering &amp; land/planning:</b> proposals about simplifying/streamlining planning (replace detailed plans; cut layers/mandates), relaxing siting/environment constraints where proportionate to unlock supply.</p> <p><b>Delivery &amp; financing:</b> proposals about market-led delivery (developer/investor agreements for mid-rent), encouraging private landlords, converting vacant commercial to housing, time-limited tax incentives for (re)builds, removing cost bottlenecks.</p>

Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2003

### 2.3.10 Share of homeownership sector

Drawing on Elsinga & Hoekstra (2005), tenure patterns align with welfare-state logics, when it comes to the share of homeownership in welfare systems. Mediterranean regimes display high homeownership, rooted in family-based strategies and a relative scarcity of rental alternatives; even apartments are predominantly owner-occupied. Liberal regimes also

record high ownership, reinforced by policies that actively promote buying and by higher reported satisfaction among owners than renters. By contrast, corporatist and social democratic regimes show mixed profiles: some feature sizable (often unitary) rental sectors that temper ownership shares, while others lean more toward ownership. This regime pattern strengthens the case for using the share of homeownership as an indicator, since it signals how housing systems allocate welfare, wealth, and risk and dovetails with broader findings on homeownership-based welfare, tenure clustering, and inequality in housing wealth distribution (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2005; Ronald, Lennartz, & Kadi, 2015; Krapp et al., 2022; Wind, Lersch, & Dewilde, 2016). In sum, the specific distribution of housing tenures across EU member states is a clear indicator of the underlying priorities and historical development of each national housing system. The emphasis on homeownership versus rental housing, and a difference between on one hand the liberal and Mediterranean regime aiming for high rates of homeownership, and on the other hand social democracy and christian democracy especially aiming for a mixed system.

When looking at Figure 4, the expected behaviours of the welfare states are:

**Table 19**

*Expected behaviours of welfare states on Share of homeownership sector*

Welfare state	Expected behaviour
Social Democratic	Mixed
Corporatist	Mixed
Liberal	High
Mediterranean	High

*Source:* Hoekstra, 2010; based on Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2005

For the share of the homeownership sector, proposals are coded by their tenure orientation—how parties define the desired balance between owning and renting and the status each tenure should hold in the system.

Within this indicator I therefore capture principle-level commitments and structural objectives: e.g., pledging a mixed-tenure system with renting as a credible, high-quality option (parity of esteem; avoidance of residualisation) versus advocating ownership primacy as the default pathway and welfare regime. Proposals that affirm mixed tenure and rental parity map to the social democratic and corporatist regimes (mixed systems with either universalist or intermediary-led logics); proposals that elevate ownership as the primary goal and treat renting as secondary or transitional map to the liberal and Mediterranean regimes. Table 20 summarises the mapping of tenure-orientation proposal types to welfare regimes for this indicator.

**Table 20**

*Operationalisation of proposals on the share of homeownership*

**Welfare regime  
(grouped)**

**Proposal types that code as Share of homeownership**

**Social democratic & christian democratic (mixed tenure)** **Tenure vision:** promote choice across renting and owning; keep renting a credible, quality path.  
**Finance/tax stance:** balanced support across tenures to maintain a mixed structure.  
**Governance:** embed mix targets and general safeguards for tenure diversity.


**Liberal & Mediterranean (high ownership)** **Tenure vision:** emphasise homeownership as the primary pathway.  
**Supply strategy:** expand owner-occupied options (including in high-demand areas); rental growth is secondary.  
**Finance/tax stance:** lower barriers to purchase (easier mortgages; lighter transaction/ownership taxes/fees). **Governance:** enable pathways from renting to owning and frameworks that favour ownership uptake.

Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2003

## 2.4 Conceptual model

Understanding how ideology shapes housing is essential because policies rarely proceed from a single, agreed set of goals, and their stated objectives are often partial, contested, or silent on trade-offs. A purely rational lens—judging “good policy” by whether it meets declared aims—misses both unintended effects and the fact that different groups hold different objectives, embedded in competing discourses (Clapham, 2017). Housing is especially prone to this: core aims—affordability, distribution, and condition—are mediated by regime logics about the state–market–family mix (Hoekstra, 2010; Allen et al., 2006), and expressed through instruments such as subsidisation, price regulation, allocation, and provision (Elsinga & Hoekstra, 2005; Krapp et al., 2022). Political proposals therefore matter analytically: they are observable artefacts of ideology that signal the expected direction of (de)commodification and (de)stratification, and they anticipate how systems will allocate welfare, wealth, and risk—for example through ownership-first versus mixed-tenure orientations and through different roles for public, market, and familial providers (Ronald et al., 2015; Wind et al., 2016). Investigating the link between ideology and proposals thus complements outcome evaluation: it clarifies what is being pursued, for whom, and by which mechanisms, before—and alongside—measuring impacts on households.

**Figure 5**  
*A proposed new conceptual model for the welfare state*



Source: Hoekstra 2010, adapted from Hoekstra, 2003, p. 166


The conceptual model starts from the idea that political ideologies (liberal, social democratic, christian democratic, and—where relevant—Mediterranean/familialist logics) materialise, via welfare-regime logics, in the housing sector (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hoekstra, 2010), as also shown in Figure 5 (Hoekstra, 2010). At the centre is the configuration of state, market, and family: that core configuration determines the extent to which systems decommodify (reduce market dependence) and stratify (reproduce or equalise status and access hierarchies). These three abstract dimensions work through concrete policy levers in housing—rules, resources, and distribution mechanisms—and culminate in observable system outcomes such as tenure composition (e.g., the share of homeownership) and the organisation of production and allocation. In the conceptual model as shown in Figure 6, the state and market corners are mirrored from Hoekstra’s model, as this is more intuitively while working with political parties and ideologies.

We translate this logic into ten indicators, each representing a link in this chain and, together, closing the model. Conceptually, we read it as: Ideology → (1) core mix → (2-3) regime logics → (4–9) policy levers → (10) outcome patterns. The indicator subsections in paragraph 2.3 set out, for each indicator, the literature base, the expected behaviours by regime (as stated by Hoekstra, 2003; 2010), and the corresponding proposal types, so that the link between theory and the observed party proposals remains transparent and consistent.

The triangle is a tool to show the ideological positioning of a set of proposals, like an election program. Using indicators to ideological positioning: the measurement comes from the indicator set as shown in paragraph 2.3. In the results chapters, coded indicators convert

shares into barycentric coordinates (Liberal–social democratic–Corporatist–Mediterranean) to position parties in the triangle. Details of this mapping are given in chapter 4 (Methods).

**Figure 6**  
*An updated conceptual model for welfare regimes*



*Source:* Own work, based on Hoekstra, 2010

By mapping the positions of selected electoral programs within this conceptual model, this study will illustrate the ideological orientation of proposals as done by political parties in these regions. This approach not only reveals the alignment or divergence between political ideology and housing outcomes but also identifies patterns of convergence and divergence among political parties. Through this analysis, the research aims to enhance our understanding of how political ideologies aim to shape housing systems by proposing policy.

### 3. Research questions

This research addresses a specific gap in comparative housing and welfare-state analysis: we know how housing systems differ across welfare regimes, and we know which party families sit where in ideological space, but we lack a systematic account of how parties translate those ideologies into concrete housing proposals in their national election programmes. This thesis uses that gap as its starting point. The analysis uses a conceptual model that links housing policy proposals to welfare-regime logics. By placing political parties in this model and comparing them to each other, the study examines whether parties with comparable ideological backgrounds behave similarly across different national contexts, or whether they diverge.

#### 3.1 Aim and framing

The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, it examines how party ideology structures electoral housing proposals. Second, it compares those proposals across parties that belong to the same political family (social democratic, christian democratic, liberal, populist) but operate in different national welfare–housing contexts.

The analysis is theoretically anchored in Esping-Andersen’s welfare-regime framework and its housing extensions (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hoekstra, 2010). Welfare regimes are understood here as ideal-typical logics about who should provide welfare, on what terms, and for whom: the state, the market, intermediary institutions, or the family. In housing terms, these logics become visible in proposals about who should build, who should regulate, who should pay, who should benefit first, and who should be protected or excluded.

The study operationalises ideology through a set of indicators grouped into four tiers that capture how these welfare logics are expressed in housing policy language. Reading manifestos through these indicators makes it possible to (1) reconstruct the ideological content of proposals, (2) compare parties within and across political families, and (3) assess how national context nudges these patterns. The broader purpose is to clarify how parties attempt to shape housing systems through the levers they foreground and the outcomes they privilege.

#### 3.2 Research questions

The central research question of this thesis is:

**To what extent do political parties with similar ideological profiles (social democratic, christian democratic, liberal, populist) advance similar housing policy proposals across different national contexts, and how do these proposals align with welfare-regime logics?**

To operationalise this main question, the thesis is structured around three subquestions. Each subquestion corresponds to a different layer of the analysis developed in chapters 5 (RQ1) and 6 (RQ2 and RQ3).

### **RQ1. How are electoral housing proposals ideologically structured when read through welfare–housing regime theory?**

This question asks: what are parties actually proposing on housing, and how can those proposals be classified in terms of welfare-regime logic? Each manifesto statement is coded along a set of indicators. These indicators are then mapped to regime logics — social democratic (state-led and universalist), corporatist (partnership- and group-based), liberal (market-led and competition-oriented), and Mediterranean (familialist). The analysis also notes whether nativist welfare logic is used. RQ1 therefore reconstructs the “ideological grammar” of housing proposals: who is made responsible, who is protected, how redistribution is justified, and which tools are preferred.

### **RQ2. Where do parties converge and diverge across indicators and political families?**

This question moves from description to comparison. It examines patterned similarities and differences both within and across party families. It compares, for each family, which indicators receive most attention (such as regulation, provision, subsidisation, allocation, price regulation, policy objectives), how these indicators are used, and which welfare-regime logics they are associated with (social democratic, corporatist, liberal, Mediterranean).

In addition, RQ2 examines how focused or diffuse each party is. Using a focus score (based on normalised Shannon entropy), it measures whether a programme speaks mostly in one regime language or mixes multiple logics. This makes it possible to identify which party families are most internally coherent and which are most internally fragmented.

### **RQ3. To what extent do parties within the same political family converge or diverge across countries, and what is the role of national context?**

This question asks how far ideology travels. Do parties in the same family end up in the same ideological space, even when they operate in very different housing systems — or does national context “tilt” them?

The analysis tests two possible mechanisms:

- **Alignment:** parties echo the dominant welfare–housing logic of their country (for example, Spanish parties leaning more strongly on family responsibility; Swedish parties affirming a strong state role).
- **Opposition:** parties position themselves against the national status quo (for example, a Swedish party proposing a more market-led housing model than Sweden’s traditionally state-led housing system).

By placing parties in a welfare triangle — with state-led, market-led, and family-/partnership-led logics at the corners — and comparing parties both within the same family (across countries) and within the same country (across families), RQ3 tests whether national housing regimes systematically pull parties toward or away from certain welfare logics, or whether party ideology remains the stronger organising force.

Taken together, these questions connect theoretical regime expectations to observable programmatic choices. RQ1 establishes the ideological structure of housing proposals. RQ2 identifies convergence, divergence, and internal focus across party families. RQ3 analyses how national context mediates these patterns. In this way, the research links welfare-regime

theory to comparative housing politics by showing how parties “speak ideology” through concrete proposals, not only through stated goals (Barr, 1994, 2012; Hoekstra, 2010).

### 3.3 Key concepts and scope

**Welfare regimes and housing.** Regimes encode expectations about who provides and governs housing welfare: social democratic (state primacy), conservative–corporatist (co-ordination under subsidiarity), liberal (market primacy), and Mediterranean (familial primacy) (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrara, 1996; Hoekstra, 2010).

**Indicators used to read ideological content.** Proposals are coded on ten indicators, grouped into four tiers:

- **Core mix:**
  - (1) Arrangement between state, market, and family (who carries responsibility and control).
- **Regime logics:**
  - (2) Decommodification (the extent to which access and affordability are protected from market exposure),
  - (3) Stratification (how housing policy reproduces or mitigates status hierarchies and distributional inequalities)
- **Policy levers:**
  - (4) Regulation (rules, standards, permissions),
  - (5) Policy objectives as stated (equity, efficiency, feasibility, rights),
  - (6) Subsidisation (grants, guarantees, tax expenditures, support for purchase or rent),
  - (7) Price regulation (rent caps, affordability rules, limits on profit extraction),
  - (8) Allocation (priority rules, eligibility conditions, gatekeeping or exclusion),
  - (9) Provision (who builds, finances, or steers supply — state, market, or partnership).
- **Outcome patterns:**
  - (10) Share of homeownership sector (the preferred tenure structure: mixed systems vs. owner-occupation dominance).

Each indicator is mapped to a welfare-regime logic (social democratic, corporatist, liberal, Mediterranean) using coding rules derived from the literature (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hoekstra, 2010; Ferrara, 1996).

**Delimitations.** Housing-adjacent proposals (e.g. spatial planning changes, energy retrofits, welfare transfers) are included only when they explicitly target housing aims such as affordability, access, allocation, or quality. Broader social or economic positions that do not explicitly reference housing are excluded.

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## 4. Methodology

This research uses a comparative qualitative content analysis to investigate how political ideologies shape housing policy proposals across five European regions. The methodological approach combines a deductive coding scheme based on welfare regime theory with a visual welfare triangle model to analyse and compare party positions and housing systems.

### 4.1 Research Design

The study analyses 19 national-level electoral programs from political parties in the Netherlands, Flanders, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Spain. These regions were selected for their diversity in welfare regimes and housing systems. The aim of the study is not to describe “Europe as a whole,” but to construct a contrasting set of cases that together span the main welfare-housing traditions identified in comparative literature. Sweden represents the social-democratic/Nordic model, in which the state historically assumes a strong universal role in provision and regulation. The Netherlands and Flanders represent continental corporatist logics, where provision and allocation are strongly mediated by intermediary actors such as housing associations, municipalities, or social partners under state coordination. The United Kingdom represents the liberal tradition, with a long-standing emphasis on market facilitation, deregulation, and homeownership. Spain represents the Mediterranean/familialist tradition, where intergenerational support and private ownership play a central role in access to housing and where the state’s redistributive reach is more limited.

Taken together, these five contexts allow the thesis to observe how similar party families speak about housing under very different institutional expectations about who should provide, finance, regulate, and receive housing. In other words, the case set is designed to maximise ideological contrast in welfare regime baselines: high-state (Sweden), partnership-centred (Netherlands/Flanders), market-led (UK), and family-reliant (Spain). This makes it possible to test whether parties “sound like themselves” across countries, or whether they adapt their language to match (or resist) the dominant welfare logic of their national housing system.

Within each region, parties were chosen to represent four broad European political families: social democratic (S&D), christian-democratic (EPP), liberal (RENEW), and populist (Patriots & ECR). In Spain, no liberal party was identified, resulting in a total of 19 programs. The research design focuses on comparing the ideological content of these party programs and relating them to the institutional logic of the corresponding national housing systems.

The analysis is structured around three core steps:

1. Operationalise ideology into a theory-led indicator set and regime anchors (literature-based codebook) (chapter 2).
2. Code and visualise each programme’s proposals using the indicators and classify them to welfare-regime logics (chapter 5).

3. Compare and visualise parties by projecting their weighted regime mix into a welfare triangle, then assess convergence/divergence within and across political families (chapter 6).

## 4.2 Data Collection

Electoral programs were collected from party websites or official archives. In one case (Open VLD), the program was obtained through direct contact with the party, as the website was under construction at the time of writing. All programs were published between 2021 and 2024 and represent each party's most recent national election campaign. Programs were collected in their original languages and translated into English where necessary.

DeepL was used for AI-assisted translation of non-English programs. The translations were reviewed for clarity and consistency, and statements were only included in the analysis when their meaning was linguistically logical. While minor nuances may have been lost in translation, the overall quality of the language was sufficient for reliable coding.

## 4.3 Coding Approach

Each program was analysed using a deductive coding scheme based on ten indicators derived from welfare regime theory: ideological focus, decommodification, stratification, regulation, objectives, subsidisation, price regulation, allocation, provision, housing types, and quality of apartments. The indicators and their theoretical background are explained in detail in paragraph 2.3.

Statements in the programs were assigned to one indicator and subsequently classified under one of four welfare regimes: social democratic, corporatist, liberal, or mediterranean. In some cases, statements were coded as non-ideological, when they did not relate clearly to the ideological spectrum or nativist, when focused on exclusion (e.g. restricting housing access for immigrants).

Each statement was entered into a spreadsheet for analysis. While exact word counts were not used, the relative weight of each statement was estimated based on its prominence, specificity, and emphasis within the program. Statements were then aggregated to calculate the relative presence of each ideological logic within each party's housing proposals. This method is further explained in paragraph 5.2.

The full coded dataset — including all labelled manifesto statements, their indicator assignments, and their regime classifications — is provided in Appendix 2, together with additional notes on coding decisions. Appendix 2 also includes the extended cross party analyses that underlie the aggregated results presented in Chapters 5 and 6.

## 4.4 Analytical Framework

The results are visualised within a Welfare triangle model that positions each region in relation to the four welfare regime types: social democratic, corporatist, liberal, and mediterranean. This comparative framework allows for a structured, theory-informed understanding of how different institutional arrangements reflect broader ideological orientations

## 4.5 Tools and Ethics

All coding and analysis were performed using spreadsheets. DeepL was used for program translation. Grammarly and ChatGPT were used for writing support, mainly to help structure and clarify text. All conceptual work, analysis, interpretation, and conclusions are the author's own.

The research adheres to ethical standards in terms of transparency, source attribution, and respectful representation of all political content. Particular care was taken when coding exclusionary or discriminatory statements, ensuring they were objectively classified without endorsing or amplifying their content.

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## 5. Political Ideologies in Electoral Programs

This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the ideological positioning of housing policy proposals as articulated in the electoral programs of major political parties in five European regions: the Netherlands, Flanders (Belgium), the United Kingdom, Spain, and Sweden. The objective is to identify the ideological characteristics of housing proposals and to locate them within a conceptual welfare triangle model of welfare regime theory based on expected behaviours.

The research question guiding this analysis is: **How are electoral housing proposals ideologically structured when read through welfare–housing regime theory?**

To address this question, the chapter is structured as follows. First, a hypothesis is formulated regarding the expected placement of each region within the conceptual model, based on existing literature on the 4 ideologies. Subsequently, the chapter presents the methodological framework used to identify and code housing proposals, classify them into the welfare regimes, and assess their significance. Finally, the results are visualised using a welfare triangle model to compare the ideological orientations of the analyzed political parties.

### 5.1 Hypothesis

Our coding model classifies party proposals by the welfare-regime logic they presuppose—i.e., which actor is given primacy in providing housing welfare (state, market, or family/community). On that basis, it is reasonable to expect party families to gravitate toward “their” regime anchors: social democrats toward state primacy and universal steering; liberals toward market primacy and streamlined contract/property frameworks; christian democrats toward partnership and subsidiarity (multi-actor delivery with state framework-setting); and populist parties to address nativist ideas, combined with eclectic welfare ideas. This expectation follows directly from the ideology sketches in 2.1 and Hoekstra’s translation of Esping-Andersen’s regime logics into housing (state–market–family mixes) in 2.2, which we operationalise as observable proposal types in the electoral programs.

At the same time, the review suggests we should not assume rigid alignment. Liberalism itself contains distinct strands—from classical minimal-state variants to modern, more intervention-tolerant liberalism—so liberal parties may diverge on how far the state should go even when they share market-first premises. That internal variety should show up as differences in the tools they are willing to endorse (e.g., deregulatory vs. framework-setting proposals). Populist parties are even less “locked in”: their programmes often blend anti-elite, pro-market rhetoric with welfare chauvinism, adapting positions to perceived public sentiment rather than a consistent doctrine, so we should expect cross-case variability and selective solidarity rather than a single stable regime signature. These expectations about convergence (within families) and patterned divergence (within liberalism; across populists) follow from the ideological mappings in paragraph 2.1 and the welfare-housing regime lens in paragraph 2.2, which together justify our hypothesis that proposal coding will reveal both alignment to regime anchors and meaningful within-family dispersion.

## 5.2 Methodology

**Party Selection** To conduct this analysis, one political party per European party family was selected in each region. Selection was based on the results of the most recent national (or in the case of Flanders, regional) elections. The largest party within each family was chosen. For instance, between VVD and D66 (both affiliated with RENEW in the Netherlands), the VVD was selected due to its larger electoral support. A similar process was followed in Sweden, Flanders and Spain.

The United Kingdom, no longer an EU member, does not participate in the European Parliament and thus lacks formal membership in EU political families. For this reason, historical affiliations were used to assign UK parties to their closest European equivalents. In Spain, no liberal (RENEW-affiliated) party had participated in the latest national election, and therefore no liberal party was analyzed for that country.

**Statement Collection and Translation** Electoral programs were retrieved in their original language. Except for the UK, all documents were translated into English using DeepL to ensure uniformity in interpretation. All statements relating to housing were extracted and included in the analysis. Repetitive statements within a single program were removed to avoid redundancy.

Statements qualified for inclusion if they directly addressed the dwelling itself, including references to construction, affordability, quality, sustainability, allocation, regulation, or homeownership. Statements about homelessness, social exclusion, or poverty were included only if they related directly to housing provision. Broader policy areas such as energy or mobility were excluded unless they directly affected the dwelling (e.g., subsidies for solar panels on roofs were included, but subsidies for replacing appliances were excluded).

**Indicator Coding and Ideological Classification** Each housing statement was coded using the same indicators and expected ideological behaviours described in paragraph 2.3

Each statement was analyzed to determine which indicator is most directly addressed and was then classified according to the welfare regime behaviour it most closely resembled:

A clear example helps to clarify this logic:

- If a party writes: "In our country, too many people live in housing that is in bad quality and also unsustainable. Therefore, we want to strengthen regulations for existing and new buildings, to ensure everybody lives in a house of good quality," the indicator is regulation. The expected behaviour "Strong central government influence" fits best, so the statement is labelled Social Democratic.
- If the proposal were instead: "We want to give municipalities the power to strengthen regulations for existing social housing," the decentralised and problem-solving nature fits the Corporatist welfare regime.
- If the statement was: "Too many sustainability regulations are keeping developers from building affordable housing. Therefore, we loosen regulations on sustainability," the behaviour "Relatively little state regulation (at both central and local levels)" fits best, and the statement is labelled Liberal.

**Weighting of Statements** To account for variation in the ideological depth and policy significance of statements, each was assigned a weight:

- **1 point:** Ideological statement or general observation without a policy proposal.
- **2 points:** Proposal with limited scope or affecting a small population.
- **3 points:** Broad policy proposal with high expected impact.

Examples:

- "Too many people live in poor-quality housing" = 1 (ideological observation).
- "We want to regulate sustainability in existing social housing" = 2 (small scope).
- "We want stricter national building codes for all dwellings" = 3 (broad impact).

In some cases, statements touched on multiple indicators or ideological regimes. To ensure consistency, statements were always coded based on the indicator that was most impacted by the proposed policy. For instance, a proposal to phase out the mortgage interest deduction may be ideological in terms of inequality (stratification) but was ultimately coded under subsidies, as that was the primary mechanism targeted.

#### **Non-ideological and nativist proposals.**

When coding, not all proposals were aligned within the expected behaviours as operationalised in par. 2.3. For most proposals which did not fall under a code, the code non-ideological was used. These proposals were not taken into account when placing the electoral program in the welfare triangle, but were taken into account when further analysing the program.

An example of a statement labelled as non-ideological would be: "Allow permanent occupancy of vacation homes". As this statement does not fall within the expected proposals of the indicators, it is not possible to take it into account, and therefore it is reported separately.

One group of 'non-ideological' stood out in the analyses: proposals about strengthening regulation on (positive discrimination of) immigrants/newcomers housing. These statements do not logically align with one of the welfare regimes, and thus are not taken into account while placing the electoral program in the conceptual model. However, Mudde describes the exclusion of newcomers as the basis of the "nativist interpretation of the welfare state" (2007, p. 132). As this is an important aspect of understanding populist parties and showing the differences and similarities with other parties, nativist proposals are coded as such and addressed throughout the analysis.

Non-ideological and nativist proposals do not influence the positioning of the electoral program in the welfare triangle, as the proposals do not align with the welfare regimes as described by Esping Andersen (1990) and Hoekstra (2003, 2010). Therefore, the report reports these indicators separately in the paragraphs.

#### **Mapping to the welfare triangle Model**

Once all statements were coded, the total weighted share of statements corresponding to each welfare regime was calculated per party. Statements labelled as *non-ideological* or *nativist* were excluded from this calculation, as they do not align with the theoretical welfare

regime framework by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Hoekstra (2003, 2010). This produced four proportional values per party, corresponding to the relative influence of the social democratic, corporatist, liberal and Mediterranean regimes within each electoral program.

To visualise these ideological compositions, each party's percentages were translated into a spatial position within the welfare triangle using the Barycentric Coordinate Mapping method. This geometric approach positions each welfare regime at a fixed coordinate in the two-dimensional, equilateral (welfare) triangle, with equal distances between the three corner regimes and corporatism positioned centrally as a balancing type, as shown in Figure 6. The coordinates that were used to study are shown in Table 21.

**Table 21:**  
*Positions of (ideal) welfare regimes in the welfare triangle.*

Welfare Model	Position	X	Y
Social Democratic	Left-lower corner	0	0
Corporatism	Centre	0,5	0,29
Liberal	Right-lower corner	1	0
Mediterranean	Upper corner	0,5	0,87

Each party's position within the triangle was computed by multiplying the proportion (percentage) associated with each welfare regime by its respective X and Y coordinates, then summing these values to determine the party's weighted average position. This results in a single coordinate point for each electoral program, representing the ideological position of its housing policy agenda.

This barycentric approach offers a nuanced way to visualise ideological relationships. Parties positioned closer to one corner exhibit a stronger alignment with that welfare regime, while those near the centre reflect mixed characteristics or a corporatist orientation. The spatial arrangement thus allows direct visual comparison across parties and regions.

### 5.3 Analysis of Electoral Programs

This section provides a detailed analysis of the electoral programs from the selected political parties in Sweden, the Netherlands, Flanders, the United Kingdom, and Spain. For each region, this section discusses how housing policy is framed by parties from different ideological families and how these proposals align with the expected behaviours of welfare regimes. The analysis is structured by region, allowing for comparison across national contexts while acknowledging country-specific political dynamics. For each party, key housing proposals are summarised and interpreted in terms of ideological orientation using the framework established in the methodology. The section also identifies which indicators were most frequently addressed and evaluates the overall ideological positioning of each program based on the distribution and weighting of proposals. This step-by-step approach provides the foundation for placing each party within the welfare triangle model presented.

Sweden held its most recent national elections in 2022. For this analysis, four political parties were selected based on their electoral performance and affiliation with the main European political families. These are the Socialdemokraterna (S&D), Sweden's historically dominant centre-left party with deep roots in the social democratic tradition; the Moderaterna (EPP), a centre-right party known for its market-oriented and fiscally conservative policies; the Centerpartiet (RENEW), a liberal agrarian party that has embraced progressive economic and environmental policies in recent decades; and the Sverigedemokraterna (SD), a nationalist right-wing party aligned with the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the European Parliament, but here categorised as part of the Patriots group due to its populist and exclusionary stance on housing and migration. These parties reflect a broad ideological spectrum, providing a rich basis for analyzing how housing policies are shaped by differing welfare regime logics in the Swedish political landscape.

The Netherlands held its most recent national parliamentary elections in 2024. For this analysis, four parties were selected: Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA, S&D), Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD, RENEW), Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA, EPP), and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Patriots). These parties represent the largest or most relevant representatives of the four major European political families in the Dutch context. Together, they reflect a broad ideological spectrum in Dutch housing politics.

The most recent regional elections in Flanders took place in 2024. Four parties were selected for this study: Vooruit (S&D), Open VLD (RENEW), Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V, EPP), and Vlaams Belang (Patriots). As Belgium's federal structure delegates housing policy to the regions, the Flemish electoral programs were used for analysis. These parties were chosen based on their electoral performance and alignment with European political families, offering a representative overview of the ideological landscape in Flemish housing policy debates.

The United Kingdom held its last general election in 2024. Although the UK is no longer a member of the European Union, parties were assigned to European political families based on historic affiliations. For this reason, the Labour Party (S&D), Liberal Democrats (RENEW), Conservative Party (EPP), and Reform UK (Patriots) were selected. These parties encompass a wide ideological spectrum and offer insight into how housing policies are shaped in a post-Brexit context, through the lens of European welfare regime theory.

Spain held national elections in 2023. Due to the absence of a RENEW-aligned party participating in that election, only three parties were selected: Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE, S&D), Partido Popular (PP, EPP), and Vox (Patriots). Despite the lack of a liberal party in this case, these three parties still allow for a meaningful comparison across ideological lines, also because the lack of a liberal party is also a meaningful observation. The selected parties' positions therefore reflect the range of views on housing policy within the framework of the Mediterranean welfare regime in Spain.

### 5.3.1 Sweden – Social Democratic - Socialdemokraterna


The election program of the Socialdemokraterna (2022) placed relatively little emphasis on housing, with only five relevant statements and a total ideological weight of 10. The housing narrative remained pragmatic and limited, lacking an overarching ideological framing. One

statement promoted the development of mixed housing, while another called for the construction of more rental apartments for ordinary people. These proposals align with typical social democratic goals of inclusive urban development and access to affordable housing.

Notably, one proposal coded as nativist as it focused on limiting access to housing for asylum seekers.

The most relevant indicators were stratification and provision, and 67% of the weighted content aligning with social democratic expectations. When excluding non-ideological and nativist statements, the distribution shifts to social democratic: 86%, corporatist: 14%, and 0% for both liberal and Mediterranean, indicating a stronger alignment with social democratic ideology within the ideological content that was present. The position of the party in the welfare triangle is shown in Figure 7. The position of the party is correspondent to where we would expect it to be based on ideology.

**Figure 7**  
*Socialdemokraterna placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.2 Sweden – Christian Democratic – Moderaterna


The election program of the Moderaterna (2022) presented a moderate level of attention to housing, with ten relevant statements and a total ideological weight of 23. Housing was discussed under the broader chapter “How to unlock the potential of the whole of Sweden,” where it was framed primarily through economic and ownership-oriented lenses. The overall narrative emphasised stimulating construction and promoting access to homeownership as a means to drive national growth.

One proposal highlighted the economic function of housing by stating: “A functioning housing market is a prerequisite for increased growth” (Moderaterna, 2022, p. 37), which aligns with liberal expectations of market facilitation. A more social democratic tone was found in a proposal to “introduce a vision of zero homelessness among pensioners and increase government funding for housing support” (Moderaterna, 2022, p. 37). The only corporatist policy identified was the proposal to maintain the mortgage interest deduction, reflecting an incremental and institutional preference to preserve existing frameworks.

Only one non-ideological statement was identified, focusing on citizens' influence over architecture, which did not fit within the established ideological indicators. Among the ideological content, the most addressed indicator was provision, the only indicator appearing in more than one proposal.

The ideological distribution of the weighted statements (excluding was as follows: Social Democratic 33%, Corporatist 14%, Liberal 48%, and Mediterranean 5%. The position of Moderaterna in the welfare triangle is shown in Figure 8. It is notable that their final position within the welfare triangle does not stem from a strong corporatist focus, but rather from a balanced mix of liberal and social democratic proposals, placing the party near the center of the model.

**Figure 8**  
*Moderaterna placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.3 Sweden – Liberal – Centerpartiet


The election program of the Centerpartiet (2022) included five statements related to housing, with a total ideological weight of 12. Housing was addressed in the broader contexts of “The Economy of Sweden and the Household Must Be Strengthened” and “All of Sweden Is Needed.” The general tone was consistently liberal, focused on reducing state intervention, promoting deregulation, and enhancing individual financial autonomy.

A central policy proposal stated that “Housing is the biggest investment many people make. The enhanced mortgage repayment requirement – a forced savings scheme for those on the lowest incomes – should be abolished now that interest rates are normalizing” (Centerpartiet, 2022, p. 18). Another notable proposal emphasized deregulation in rural areas: “Expensive, complicated and innovation-inhibiting regulations lie like a wet blanket over parts of the countryside. We will clean up redundant rules and bureaucracy” (Centerpartiet, 2022, p. 11). The only statement classified as Social Democratic referred to the need to strengthen shelters for women and girls, reflecting a targeted provision policy.

No statements were classified as non-ideological, making the ideological categorization straightforward. The dominant indicator in the program was regulation (or actually deregulation), which aligns with liberal welfare logic.

The ideological distribution was overwhelmingly liberal, with 83% of the weighted content classified as Liberal, and the remaining 17% classified as Social Democratic. Corporatist and Mediterranean ideologies were absent. The position of Centerpartiet in the welfare triangle is shown in Figure 9, which reflects a clear liberal orientation in line with expectations.

**Figure 9**  
*Centerpartiet placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.4 Sweden – Populist – Sverigedemokraterna

The election program of Sverigedemokraterna (2022) included fifteen housing-related statements, with a total ideological weight of 27. Housing was addressed as one of the 47 thematic sections, indicating moderate thematic prominence. The narrative was framed around ensuring that “everyone should have access to a good standard of housing and be able to live in a safe, secure and pleasant environment,” with an emphasis on stronger government involvement in housing provision. However, elements of deregulation were also introduced as part of the solution.

Key proposals included: “The Sweden Democrats want to stop plans to reintroduce property tax” (Sverigedemokraterna, 2022, p. 35), illustrating a liberal stance on tax policy; “A review should also be carried out of the possibilities for building in areas of national interest” (Sverigedemokraterna, 2022, p. 35), which signals national-level planning involvement; and “Enable more forms of financing for young people and first-time home buyers”


(Sverigedemokraterna, 2022, p. 35), reflecting corporatist tendencies in supporting access to ownership.

One statement was classified as nativist, advocating the cessation of preferential housing access for newcomers. The party also had one non-ideological proposal about the aesthetics of new buildings.

The most dominant indicators are provision and decommodification, suggesting a focus on enabling housing supply through various mechanisms. However, a larger amount of indicators was touched in the program, in comparison with the other Swedish programs.

The ideological distribution was relatively mixed: 48% Liberal, 26% Social Democratic, and 26% Corporatist. No statements aligned with the Mediterranean welfare logic. The distribution reflects the party’s ideological ambiguity, combining calls for greater government control with market-friendly tax policies and targeted financial support. The position of Sverigedemokraterna in the welfare triangle is shown in Figure 10.

**Figure 10**  
*Sverigedemokraterna placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.5 The Netherlands – Social Democratic – PvdA

The election program of the PvdA (2023) placed strong emphasis on housing, with 48 relevant statements and a total ideological weight of 112. Most of the housing proposals

appeared in a dedicated section titled “Public housing as a public utility,” reflecting the party’s framing of housing as a fundamental right and a public good. The general narrative was rooted in social democratic values, advocating universal access to high-quality housing, while also addressing the needs of specific target groups such as young people and low-income households.


Key policy proposals included: “Everyone has the right to a good and sustainable home. We are going to see housing again as a basic amenity rather than a revenue model for pawnbrokers and overseas investors. The government will take the reins and provide large numbers of affordable housing” (PvdA, 2023, p. 14), and “We make housing corporations social institutions of and for the community again: we give tenants and resident committees more say in the policy and composition of the board” (PvdA, 2023, p. 55). These statements exemplify the party’s emphasis on public responsibility, affordability, and democratic control over housing provision.

Three statements were classified as non-ideological, mostly focusing on technical or efficiency measures such as better use of existing housing stock.

The most prominent indicator was provision, followed by regulation and allocation. These reflect a housing strategy centred on expanding affordable supply, strengthening oversight, and ensuring fair distribution.

The ideological distribution of the program was overwhelmingly social democratic at 71%, with 29% of the weight coded as corporatist, and no statements were identified as liberal or Mediterranean. When visualised in the welfare triangle model, PvdA lands firmly in the social democratic corner. The party’s reasoning was notably ideological, with many proposals guided by systemic critique and a vision of public housing as a collective responsibility. While a small portion of proposals supported corporatist logic—such as empowering local governments and institutional actors—these served to complement rather than dilute the party’s broader vision. The position of PvdA in the welfare triangle is shown in Figure 11.

**Figure 11**  
*PvdA placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.6 The Netherlands – Christian Democratic – CDA

The election program of the CDA (2023) placed considerable emphasis on housing, with 24 relevant statements and a total ideological weight of 52. Housing is listed as one of the party’s ten core priorities, and the program includes extensive proposals to reform and strengthen the Dutch housing system. The overarching narrative is centred on the idea of a “Liveable home,” presenting housing as a human right while also stressing the importance of community and care for vulnerable groups.


Key proposals include: “The new law allowing half of new construction and rental housing to be allocated by municipalities to their own residents and people with a vital occupation is carried on” (CDA, 2023, p. 49), and “We are putting more effort into cooperative initiatives where community members work together” (CDA, 2023, p. 50). However, the CDA also ventures into other ideological domains, such as a Social Democratic proposal to strengthen national coordination through “an independent Ministry of Housing and Planning” (3, SD, 0), and a Liberal policy aimed at deregulation: “Building a home, from plan to completion, takes an average of 10 to 15 years. This should and can be shorter. For this, objection and appeal procedures should be greatly shortened” (CDA, 2023, p. 49).

Five statements were labelled non-ideological, mostly focused on technical solutions to increase supply and the use of rural land.

The most prominent indicators were ideological focus and regulation. Interestingly, ideological statements were quite evenly spread: one social semocratic, two corporatist, and two liberal. However, in terms of total weight, corporatist proposals dominated at 54%, followed by social democratic (29%) and liberal (17%). No Mediterranean elements were identified.

The CDA's position in the welfare triangle aligns with expectations for a christian democratic party, but it is worth noting the presence of both social democratic and liberal elements alongside a dominant corporatist core. The position of CDA in the welfare triangle is shown in Figure 12.

**Figure 12**  
*CDA placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.7 The Netherlands – Liberal – VVD

The election program of the VVD (2023) placed significant emphasis on housing, with 43 relevant statements and a total ideological weight of 101. Housing is explicitly named as one of the party's thirteen policy priorities. The VVD acknowledges the seriousness of the housing crisis and proposes several high-impact measures to address it. The narrative

combines a clear preference for homeownership and market freedom with attention to 'reasonable' rents, sustainability, and accessibility. There is a strong focus on stimulating construction across all housing types.


Key proposals include typical liberal statements such as: "We do not tamper with the freedom to sell your home. We believe you have the freedom to sell your home to whomever you want. It is your home. We will continue to protect this right" (VVD, 2023, p. 53). However, high-impact corporatist proposals are also present, such as: "We conclude a Building Accord. There will be a plan for the layout of the Netherlands. Based on this plan, we will conclude a Building Agreement with builders, housing corporations and provinces" (VVD, 2023 p. 54). Surprisingly, even Social Democratic reasoning appears in proposals like: "We are going to build. The VVD wants more housing everywhere... We want the government to help build as much as possible. Therefore, we want the government to take more control of the housing market... The central government, in consultation with the provinces, will designate sites to build more quickly, if that does not happen municipally" (VVD, 2023, p. 54).

Three statements were labelled non-ideological, mostly technical suggestions similar to those made by the CDA regarding infill development.

The most dominant indicators were provision and (de)regulation. Notably, all statements coded under provision were labelled social democratic or corporatist, whereas statements about regulation were split between corporatist and liberal.

In terms of ideological distribution, the VVD's housing agenda was weighted as follows: social democratic: 18%, corporatist: 47%, liberal: 29%, and Mediterranean: 5%. The VVD might typically be expected to fall in the lower-right corner of the welfare triangle, reflecting its liberal roots. However, the significant presence of corporatist proposals and a substantial share of social democratic ideas push the party's position closer to the corporatist axis. All liberal proposals were centred on deregulation or enhancing market efficiency. The position of the VVD in the welfare triangle is shown in Figure 13.

**Figure 13**  
*VVD placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.8 The Netherlands – Populist – PVV

The election program of the Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV, 2023) placed moderate emphasis on housing, with 10 housing-related statements and a total ideological weight of 25. Housing was addressed as one of the program's thirteen themes. However, the content of the proposals reflects limited structural ambition, instead emphasizing urgent issues related to the housing shortage and proposing short-term regulatory adjustments.


The program's narrative focuses on protecting the interests of Dutch nationals and responding to the visible consequences of the housing crisis. Central to the proposals are efforts to reduce rents and increase affordability, such as "Reduce social rents" (PVV, 2023, p. 20) and "Increase rent allowance" (PVV, 2023, p. 20). At the same time, liberal views are evident in the rejection of climate policy-related housing reforms, including "Stop creating gas-free homes" (PVV, 2023, p. 20) and "No mandatory heat pump" (PVV, 2023, p. 20). These illustrate a focus on deregulation and limiting governmental interference in home sustainability standards.

Three statements were labelled non-ideological, including two technical solutions and one proposal to exclude status holders from priority access to social housing, which could not be coded under existing indicators.

The most dominant indicator was (de)regulation, with four out of seven ideological proposals addressing it—particularly through efforts to loosen or oppose environmental regulations and streamline procedures.

In terms of ideological distribution, the PVV’s proposals were 44% Social Democratic and 56% Liberal, with no proposals aligning with Corporatist or Mediterranean welfare regimes. Despite ending up in the corporatist region of the welfare triangle, this positioning results from the ideological balance between SD and Liberal statements, rather than any actual corporatist proposals. The position of the PVV in the welfare triangle is shown in Figure 14.

**Figure 14**  
*PVV placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.9 Belgium – Social Democratic – Vooruit

The election program of Vooruit (2024) places moderate attention on housing, with 30 housing-related statements and a total ideological weight of 70. While housing is not positioned as a central theme—being just one of seven components within the broader chapter “Moving forward with our prosperity and purchasing power”—the party presents several proposals that would significantly alter the housing system.

The program emphasizes the right of every household to affordable housing, with a strong focus on fair distribution and social justice. Vooruit presents housing as a structural issue that requires regional coordination and public planning. One proposal aims to close tax


loopholes in real estate transactions: “Those who buy an ordinary house pay registration tax on it, while large villas and land are often in companies. These are transferred through a sale of shares that is not subject to registration tax. We are taking steps to treat real estate share transactions the same for tax purposes as a sale of a property” (Vooruit, 2024, p. 51). Another proposal aims to lower access barriers to rental housing: “The higher the rent deposit, the higher the barrier to renting. We are reducing the rent deposit from 3 months to 2 months of rent. This is how we make renting more accessible” (Vooruit, 2024, p. 52).

Only one statement was labelled non-ideological, regarding the costs banks charge for assessing eligibility for social renting.

The most dominant indicators were regulation and subsidization, reflecting the party’s focus on redistributive and protective state policies.

Excluding the non-ideological statement, 78% of the ideological weight was classified as Social Democratic, and 22% as Corporatist. Liberal and Mediterranean perspectives were not present. Vooruit’s position strongly reflects a social democratic approach, with corporatist elements focusing on tailored support for specific groups. The position of Vooruit in the welfare triangle is shown in Figure 15.

**Figure 15**  
*Vooruit placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.10 Belgium – Corporatist – CD&V

CD&V's electoral program (2024) includes a substantial focus on housing, with 76 relevant statements and a total ideological weight of 156. Although housing is not singled out as a distinct thematic priority, it is addressed extensively within broader chapters on social cohesion and prosperity. The party frames housing as both a human right and a cornerstone of the Flemish dream of homeownership, while simultaneously promoting community involvement and practical support systems.


The proposals cover a wide ideological range. Liberal policies appear in technical proposals aimed at improving market efficiency, such as "Screening permit procedures for efficiency." (CD&V, 2024, p. 268). social democratic ideas are visible in measures like the "Extension of insurance guaranteed housing to the private rental market." (p. 271), while the most dominant theme is a corporatist approach to provision and support, exemplified by statements like "Reinstate a government guarantee for licensed credit unions. Introduce a guarantee scheme through private banks. Target audience: people with limited self-efficacy."

Of the 76 housing-related statements, 11 were labelled non-ideological—mostly because they were highly technical or focused on practical support and coaching, such as help with sustainability measures or guidance in finding housing.

The most dominant indicators were provision (mostly corporatist), objectives (mostly liberal), and decommodification (mostly social democratic). In terms of ideological distribution, 49% of the ideological weight was corporatist, 31% social democratic, 18% liberal, and 2% Mediterranean.

CD&V presents a strong case for a corporatist approach to housing, though it blends this with clear liberal objectives and social democratic values. The party is a good example of how ideologically diverse programs can still result in a clear, balanced position within the welfare triangle—centrally placed but deeply reasoned. The party's position is shown in Figure 16.

**Figure 16**  
*CD&V placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.11 Belgium – Liberal – Open VLD

Open VLD’s 2024 electoral program includes 26 housing-related statements, with a total ideological weight of 60. Housing is presented as one of seven chapters within the broader theme of “growing welfare,” reflecting a clear but not overwhelming prioritisation. The program strongly emphasises homeownership and individual freedom of choice, combined with strategies to make housing more affordable by increasing supply and promoting sustainability through deregulation.

Many proposals focus on liberal principles. A typical example is: “We want everyone who works or has worked, including young people and single people, to be able to acquire their own affordable housing. This is only possible if the supply increases. This will only succeed if we relax the rules.” (Open VLD, 2024, p. 37). However, corporatist themes are also present, particularly in spatial planning reforms. For example: “We propose to replace the current complex zoning plans with two clear categories... Local governments are given the freedom to grant permits within these two categories.” (Open VLD, 2024, p. 38).


Most non-ideological statements were technical or minor policy fixes, such as removing specific taxes for small target groups like divorced households.

The dominant indicator used is regulation, which featured both liberal and corporatist proposals, though the emphasis was consistently on market efficiency. Ideologically, 33% of the weighted content was liberal, 48% corporatist, 11% social democratic, and 8% Mediterranean.

Although the program reads unmistakably as liberal in tone, its content reveals a greater number of corporatist proposals when analysed through the welfare regime framework. Open VLD's position in the welfare triangle is shown in Figure 17.

**Figure 17**

*Open VLD placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.12 Belgium – Populist – Vlaams Belang

The election program of Vlaams Belang (2024) includes 19 housing-related statements with a total ideological weight of 43. While housing constitutes one of forty themes in the program, the party emphasizes its importance by stating: "Vlaams Belang is concerned about the housing needs of our Flemish families. Enabling our families to own affordable housing is a top priority, both on the buy and rent market." (Vlaams Belang, 2024, p. 42).

The general narrative revolves around prioritizing Flemish citizens in housing allocation and strengthening ownership opportunities for native families. While some proposals align with exclusionary populist rhetoric, others reflect clear ideological positions. Notable examples


include: a social democratic proposal to enforce rental quality standards—"require the certificate of conformity for rental housing throughout Flanders to guarantee quality housing and eliminate slum landlords" (Vlaams Belang, 2024, p. 43); a liberal proposal to simplify licensing and reduce administrative delays—"The licensing policy should be simplified and deadlines shortened. [...] the housing crisis is here now and must be solved as soon as possible" (Vlaams Belang, 2024, p. 42).

One nativist statement is identified, which centers on shielding the Flemish rental market from immigrants (Vlaams Belang, 2024, p. 43).

The most dominant indicator is regulation, spanning both social democratic measures focused on quality enforcement and liberal proposals aimed at deregulation.

Ideologically, the distribution of statements (excluding non-ideological ones) is as follows: Social Democratic: 29%, Corporatist: 29%, Liberal: 39%, Mediterranean: 3%. This even distribution across categories results in Vlaams Belang being positioned near the center of the welfare triangle.

**Figure 18**  
*Vlaams Belang placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.13 The United Kingdom – Social Democratic - Labour Party

Labour's 2024 electoral program includes a moderate emphasis on housing, with 14 relevant statements and a total ideological weight of 33. Housing is discussed as one of six paragraphs within the chapter *Kickstart Economic Growth*, itself one of eleven overarching themes. However, housing is not included in the party's list of six immediate policy priorities, suggesting that while it is important, it is not central to Labour's immediate reform agenda.


The housing narrative emphasises national government steering of housing provision, often in collaboration with local authorities. Labour stresses the importance of affordable and social housing and positions housing as a key instrument of economic recovery and social justice. This is visible in proposals like "In partnership with local leaders and communities, a Labour government will build a new generation of new towns..." (Labour Party, 2024, p. 38), and commitments to sustainable housing: "We will take steps to ensure we are building more high-quality, well-designed, and sustainable homes..." (Labour Party, 2024, p. 38).

A corporatist note is struck in proposals that involve mixed-level cooperation and targeted financial instruments, such as: "We will introduce a permanent, comprehensive mortgage guarantee scheme..." (Labour, Party, 2024, p. 39)

There were no non-ideological statements identified. Most proposals relate to the indicator provision, with additional statements addressing regulation and subsidy. In terms of ideological distribution, 82% of the ideological weight was social democratic and 18% corporatist, with no liberal or Mediterranean content.

Labour presents a strong, ideologically consistent focus on public-led housing provision and affordability. The party is positioned firmly in the top left of the welfare triangle. Its position is shown in Figure 19.

**Figure 19**  
*Labour Party placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.14 The United Kingdom – Christian Democratic – Conservative Party

The 2024 election program of the UK Conservative Party contains 22 housing-related statements with a total ideological weight of 49. Housing is addressed as one of the seventeen main themes, with a strong narrative focus on homeownership and helping first-time buyers access the market. The party emphasizes practical solutions to increase housing provision and promote property acquisition, presenting housing as a pathway to upward mobility.


Several key proposals reflect this focus. Corporatist ideas dominate, including “We will also continue our Mortgage Guarantee Scheme, which has already helped over 40,000 households buy a home, while supporting more families to buy through shared ownership.” (Conservative Party, 2024, p. 53) and “We will also launch a new and improved Help to Buy scheme to provide first-time buyers with an equity loan of up to 20% towards the cost of a new build home.” (Conservative Party, 2024, p. 53). Some social democratic influence is also present, as seen in “Renewing the Affordable Homes Programme that will deliver homes of all tenures and focus on regenerating and improving housing estates.” (Conservative Party, 2024, p. 52).

Three statements were labelled non-ideological, mostly due to their technical or infrastructural nature—such as densification plans for London and expanding the power of police regarding illegal traveller sites.

The most addressed indicators were objectives (especially homeownership) and provision (mainly corporatist). In terms of ideological weight, 65% of proposals were corporatist, 19% liberal and 16% social democratic.

The Conservative Party ends up in the corporatist centre of the welfare triangle, as expected, due to its emphasis on supporting homeownership through state-backed schemes while maintaining a pragmatic and institutional approach. The party's position is shown in Figure 20.

**Figure 20**  
*Conservative Party placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.15 The United Kingdom – Liberal – Liberal Democrats

The 2024 electoral program of the Liberal Democrats includes 26 housing-related statements, with a total ideological weight of 55. Housing is addressed as one of the seventeen main themes, with a particular emphasis on quality housing, building standards, and ending rough sleeping. Although the party presents itself as liberal, the tone of the housing chapter leans strongly toward social regulation and state-led intervention.


Many of the proposals reflect a corporatist orientation, such as “Giving local authorities, including National Park Authorities, the powers to end Right to Buy in their areas.” (Liberal, 2024, p. 71), “Encouraging development of existing brownfield sites with financial incentives and ensuring that affordable and social housing is included in these projects.” (Liberal, 2024, p. 72), and “Introducing ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ planning permission for developers who refuse to build.” (Liberal, 2024, p. 72). social democratic themes also feature, particularly in tackling homelessness: “Introducing a ‘somewhere safe to stay’ legal duty to ensure that everyone who is at risk of sleeping rough is provided with emergency accommodation and an assessment of their needs.” (Liberal, 2024, p. 73).

Four statements were labelled non-ideological, mainly covering technical measures, infrastructure, and tenant participation panels.

The most frequently addressed indicators were regulation and decommodification. Of the total ideological weight, 55% of statements were social democratic and 45% corporatist—surprisingly, none were coded as liberal.

Although the Liberal Democrats are typically seen as a progressive liberal party, their housing proposals contain no identifiable liberal welfare-state characteristics. Instead, the emphasis on government intervention and social protection positions them clearly within the social democratic quadrant of the welfare triangle. The party’s position is shown in Figure 21.

**Figure 21**  
*Liberal Democrats placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.16 The United Kingdom – Populist – Reform UK

Reform UK’s 2024 electoral program includes 7 housing-related statements, with a total ideological weight of 15. Housing is presented as one of 22 themes in the program. The party’s housing agenda is framed by a combination of strong anti-immigration rhetoric and proposals aimed at deregulating planning laws to boost construction.

The most prominent narrative appears in a combined proposal: “Reform UK will ensure that people can own their own home by unleashing house building across the country and cutting immigration.” (Reform UK, 2024, p. 15). Although the statement references homeownership, it is classified as Nativist due to its focus on immigration rather than policy mechanisms.


Some ideological proposals reflect corporatist and liberal influences. For example, “Scrap section 24 for Landlords. The tax system should encourage smaller landlords into the rental markets. Not penalise them. We will restore landlords’ rights to deduct finance costs and mortgage interest from tax on rental income.” (Reform UK, 2024, p. 15), and “Abolish the Renters’ (Reform) Bill. Existing legislation was inadequate to address bad practices. Instead,

we will boost the monitoring, appeals and enforcement process for renters with grievances.” (Reform UK, 2024, p. 15).

Two statements were labelled as nativist, as they focused on excluding immigrants from housing access and limiting migration as a solution for the housing shortage, and one non-ideological and technical proposal on building innovation.

The most relevant indicators were regulation and provision. The ideological distribution shows 55% liberal and 45% corporatist, with no social democratic or Mediterranean statements. This positions Reform UK firmly on the right side of the welfare triangle. The party’s position is shown in Figure 22.

**Figure 22**  
*Reform UK placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.17 Spain – Social Democratic – PSOE

PSOE’s electoral program (2023) presents a comprehensive focus on housing, with 53 relevant statements and a total ideological weight of 110. Housing is addressed as one of nine subjects within the theme *The Spain of cohesion and welfare*. The program strongly emphasizes the need for state intervention in addressing the housing crisis, with particular attention to rental regulation and the expansion of public housing initiatives.


The overarching narrative frames housing as a fundamental component of the welfare state: “For the socialists, housing must constitute the fifth pillar of the welfare state, and currently requires strong measures that allow millions of people to develop a private and family life, and especially a new life project among the youngest and most economically vulnerable people.” (PSOE, 2023, p. 215). The party also outlines clear measures for financial and institutional support, such as “We will strengthen the programs of the State Housing Plans.” (PSOE, 2023, p. 218), and proposes cooperation between public and private actors: “We will establish agile mechanisms and models of agreement between banking entities and administrations (state, regional and local) to mobilize vacant housing and allocate it to social use.” (PSOE, 2023, p. 217).

Four statements were classified as non-ideological due to their focus on technical infrastructure, sustainability, or social integration, such as policies targeting Roma settlements.

The most dominant indicators were provision, followed by regulation, subsidisation, and decommodification. In terms of ideological distribution, 53% of the total ideological weight was coded as social democratic, 45% as corporatist, 2% as liberal, and none as Mediterranean.

PSOE’s proposals reflect a strong alignment with social democratic ideals while incorporating corporatist elements of cooperation and targeted support. The party is placed in the Social Democratic area of the welfare triangle.

**Figure 23**  
*PSOE placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.18 Spain – Christian Democratic – PP


The 2023 electoral program of the Partido Popular (PP) includes only a limited number of housing-related statements—seven in total—amounting to an ideological weight of 15. Housing is not presented as a standalone theme in the program but is discussed within the broader context of infrastructure. The program offers modest proposals with a focus on affordable housing, physical accessibility, and the specific needs of families and elderly populations.

Although the program contains relatively few proposals, its ideological spread is noteworthy. A Mediterranean-style focus on family care and intergenerational support appears in: “We will promote the reconciliation of families that choose to live in the rural, facilitating the care of children and the elderly by opening ‘nest houses’ or homes for the elderly in municipalities with smaller populations.” (PP, 2023, p. 30). A more social democratic approach is seen in the proposal to increase public involvement in affordable housing: “We will mobilize the floor of public ownership for public housing networks, both patrimonial and demanial, for the promotion of affordable rental housing.” (PP, 2023, p. 32). Several corporatist proposals target specific social groups, such as the elderly or disabled, through tailored housing measures.

No statements were labelled non-ideological. Regulation and decommodification were the most commonly addressed indicators.

In terms of ideological distribution, 47% of the total ideological weight is social democratic, 40% corporatist, and 13% Mediterranean. The party places particular emphasis on family-oriented housing policies and quality standards for vulnerable groups. PP’s program reflects a blend of christian-democratic and welfare-state traditions, placing the party in a mixed position within the welfare triangle.

**Figure 23**  
*PP placed in the welfare triangle*



### 5.3.19 Spain – Populist – Vox

The 2023 electoral program of Vox includes 17 housing-related statements with a total ideological weight of 38. Housing is framed as one of the party’s 12 main themes under the title "Access to Housing," signaling its relevance within the overall program. The narrative calls for a strong government response to the housing crisis, while simultaneously advocating for deregulation and traditional family values.

Mediterranean themes are evident in statements such as: “The home is the main space of intimacy and personal development of families, so ensuring affordable access, decent conditions and security for all Spaniards in their homes must be a fundamental priority of any government.” (Vox, 2023, p. 39), and “We will promote family-friendly urban planning, rooted


in and harmonious with the environment, encouraging the rehabilitation of regional styles and the protection of traditional facades.” (Vox, 2023, p. 43). At the same time, liberal deregulation is apparent in proposals like: “We will release all land that is not or should not be specifically protected... and ensure a correct, agile and harmonious urban development throughout Spain.” (Vox, 2023, p. 40).

Five statements were labelled non-ideological, mostly concerning technical or planning-related solutions.

The dominant indicators were arrangement between state, market and family (mostly Mediterranean), objectives (corporatist and liberal), and provision (mostly corporatist). In terms of ideological distribution, 39% of the weight was liberal, 29% corporatist, 22% Mediterranean, and 10% social democratic.

Vox is the party in Spain with the most liberal positioning on housing, while also scoring highest on Mediterranean characteristics, reflecting its blend of traditionalist and market-oriented housing perspectives. This is also reflected in the welfare triangle as shown in Figure 25.

**Figure 25**  
*Vox placed in the welfare triangle*



## 5.4 Conclusion

Chapter 5 develops the analytical and visual machinery that the rest of the thesis uses to interpret party housing proposals.

First, it translates welfare-regime theory into a concrete coding framework. Ten indicators are defined and grouped into four tiers:

- **Core mix:** who is positioned as primarily responsible for delivering housing welfare (state, market, partnership/associational forms, family).
- **Regime logics:** the degree of decommodification (how far people are protected from market exposure in housing) and stratification (how access is distributed and justified).
- **Policy levers:** the specific tools parties propose to act on housing systems — regulation, stated policy objectives, subsidisation, price regulation, allocation rules, and provision.
- **Outcome patterns:** the tenure structure parties work toward (for example, mixed-tenure systems versus strong ownership dominance).

Each manifesto statement is linked to one or more indicators, and each indicator is then mapped onto one of the ideal-typical welfare regime logics (social-democratic, corporatist, liberal, Mediterranean). This makes it possible to read proposals not just as technical measures (“build more,” “streamline permitting,” “cap rents”) but as expressions of a broader theory of who should carry housing risk, who should be protected first, and through what kind of intervention. The results in chapter 5 are a first indication of that the conceptual regime model works, as most election programs behave in a logical way when placed in the model.

Second, Chapter 5 specifies how these coded statements are aggregated. Within each party, the relative weight of different proposals is used to construct an ideological profile across regime logics. These profiles are then positioned in a welfare triangle model. In this triangle, the corners represent distinct responsibility assignments in housing welfare (state-led, market-led, and family-/partnership-led). Parties can then be compared spatially: both within a single country (to see how they relate to each other) and across countries within the same ideological family (to see how consistent that family is).

Third, the chapter formulates explicit expectations that guide the interpretation of these placements. The hypothesis is that parties from the same political family will tend to adopt recognisable regime logics in their housing proposals — for example, social democrats using state-centred, universalist language; Christian democrats using partnership and targeted support; liberals emphasising market facilitation and deregulation; and populists combining insider protection with selective exclusion. At the same time, the framework anticipates internal variation, especially among liberals and populists, where ideology is either internally plural or strategically adaptive.

In doing so, Chapter 5 sets the stage for the analysis that follows. It provides:

- A structured way of turning manifesto language into comparable ideological content.

- A data set with coded proposals, to substantiate further analysis in chapter 6.
- A visual method (the welfare triangle) for comparing parties across countries and within families.

The remainder of the thesis builds directly on this foundation. Chapter 6 uses these coded positions to examine convergence and divergence within and across party families, and to explore how national context shapes, bends, or fails to bend the ideological language of housing.

## 6. Convergence and Divergence in Political Families

This chapter addresses the third subquestion of this research: *To what extent do political parties within the same political families converge or diverge in their ideological goals and policy solutions for the housing crisis across different regions?* The analysis builds directly on the results presented in Chapter 6, and uses the coded policy proposals to examine whether parties with similar ideological backgrounds propose similar solutions—despite operating in different national and institutional contexts.

This comparison is relevant because it can show whether political families speak with a shared ideological voice across Europe, or whether the national context has a stronger influence on housing proposals. In an increasingly fragmented political landscape, it is important to understand whether party ideology still offers meaningful guidance, or whether parties adapt their housing policy entirely to local conditions.

The comparison is based on the coded dataset of electoral programs. Each housing proposal was linked to one of the welfare regimes based on its ideological characteristics and policy content, using the indicators introduced in paragraph 2.3. These results were then visually presented in the conceptual welfare triangle model. Together, this method allows for a structured comparison of ideological positions within each political family.

One of the goals of this analysis is to look for the influence of the national context on ideological positioning of political parties. The national context could influence electoral programs within families in two types of ways:

The first possibility is that parties are more drawn to ideological regime reasoning, to match their proposals with the national context and therefore propose small changes to the housing regime. If this would be true for all parties, this would be visible in the results by a more ‘crowded’ part of the welfare triangle around the position of its national housing regime.

If this pattern would be true within one ideological family, it would show when looking at the family triangles as shown in figures 26-29, by having the Swedish party relatively towards the state corner, followed by the Dutch party, than the Flemish party, followed by the party from the UK as the most market-centred, and with the Spanish party being positioned more towards the family corner of the welfare triangle than the other parties.

The opposite could also be true: electoral programs could also be influenced by the national context, by wanting to oppose the current state of the housing regime and therefore be more extreme in their views. If this would be true for all electoral programs, this would show in the welfare triangle by having a less populated part of the welfare triangle around the position of its national housing regime.

If this pattern would be true within one ideological family, it would show when looking at the family triangles as shown in figures 26-29, by having the Swedish party relatively towards the market corner, followed by the Dutch party, than the Flemish party, followed by the party from the UK as the most state-centred, and with the Spanish party being positioned less towards the family corner of the welfare triangle.

This chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.1 discusses the social democratic parties, followed by Christian-democratic (6.2), liberal (6.3), and populist parties (6.4). Section 6.5 reflects on broader patterns across families, and Section 6.6 provides a preliminary conclusion.

## 6.1 Social Democratic Parties (S&D)

The five social democratic parties included in this research—PvdA (Netherlands), Vooruit (Flanders), Labour (United Kingdom), PSOE (Spain), and Socialdemokraterna (Sweden)—demonstrate a high degree of ideological consistency. Across all five cases, the housing proposals align closely with the expected characteristics of the social democratic welfare regime: strong state involvement, universal access to affordable housing, and policy aimed at reducing inequality. This consistency is visible both in the ideological distribution of proposals and in the position of the parties within the conceptual welfare triangle (Figure 26).

Provision and regulation are the two most frequently addressed indicators, each appearing as a dominant theme in four of the five programs. Subsidisation is also addressed in three programs. Together, these three indicators form the core of the social democratic housing narrative: the state plays a central role in enabling access to housing, setting the conditions for affordability and quality, and ensuring support through financial mechanisms. Saliency thus clusters around provision and regulation, followed by frequent—though somewhat more uneven—use of subsidisation. This bundle is consistent with a state-led approach: expand and steer supply (provision), set clear and enforceable rules (regulation), and underpin access/affordability via transfers (subsidisation). Some additional indicators—such as allocation (PvdA), stratification (Socialdemokraterna), and decommodification (PSOE)—appear in a single program each, suggesting thematic variation but not ideological divergence. Allocation shows up selectively (e.g., universalist mixing or safeguards in access rules), while price regulation is present but typically embedded within broader affordability packages rather than as a stand-alone plank. Objectives are invoked to frame housing as a social good (equity, rights, public value), though S&D parties tend to operationalise these aims through the other, more concrete levers. Tenure outcomes (share of homeownership) are referenced, but less than the above—S&D texts prioritise the instrument set over a single tenure end-state.

The level of ideological alignment within this political family is further illustrated by the high proportion of social democratic proposals in each program. Four out of five parties have between 70% and 82% of their weighted proposals classified as social democratic. In addition, liberal or Mediterranean policy logics are virtually absent. On the rare occasions when a party does make a proposal that aligns with a liberal welfare regime, it is still reasoned from a social democratic perspective—for example, a deregulation measure aimed at enabling inclusive housing development. No party proposes measures that align with Mediterranean welfare characteristics.


When testing the possible influence of national context, the left-to-right (state→market) ordering is Socialdemokraterna (Sweden) → Labour (UK) → Vooruit (Flanders) → PvdA (Netherlands) → PSOE (Spain). On the alignment test (gravitating toward the national regime), the pattern is largely consistent with a state-led anchor. Socialdemokraterna sit most firmly toward the state corner, matching Sweden's state-centred tradition. PSOE is the most family-ward of the S&D set—closer to the Mediterranean corner than its peers—reflecting Spain's familialist context. Labour, Vooruit, and PvdA also remain clearly state-oriented; the small positional differences among them are best read as within-family nuances—driven by indicator saliency (provision, regulation, subsidisation), program scope, and emphasis—rather than as any substantive pivot toward market primacy.

On the opposition test (positioning away from the national regime), there is little evidence of deliberate counter-placement. Socialdemokraterna embody Sweden's state anchor; PSOE echoes Spain's familial imprint; and Labour, Vooruit, and PvdA maintain a state-led mix without meaningful movement toward market logics. Substantively, all five programs share the same core: public steering of provision, stronger rule-setting, and broad access, with subsidisation used to support affordability.

Taken together, the social democratic family shows no single national-context rule beyond a robust state-led centre of gravity. Sweden anchors the state pole; Spain combines a state tilt with the strongest familial imprint; and the UK, Flanders, and the Netherlands sit tightly within the social democratic quadrant. Overall, S&D parties are ideologically coherent and the most convergent of the four families; their precise placement reflects emphasis choices within a consistently state-oriented repertoire rather than any systematic drift toward market logics.

Overall, the social democratic parties offer a remarkably coherent ideological response to the housing crisis, with a clear preference for state-led solutions and a limited presence of market-based or familial welfare mechanisms. This is also represented in the outcome of the 2d standard deviation performed on the ideological positions which was 0.06, meaning the parties on average were 0.06 on a scale of 1 away from their average position in the welfare triangle. When comparing with the other ideologies, this is the lowest standard deviation, meaning the social democratic parties were most convergent compared with the other ideologies.

**Figure 26**  
*Social democratic parties in the welfare triangle*



## 6.2 Christian Democratic Parties (EPP)

The christian democratic parties included in this research—CDA (Netherlands), CD&V (Flanders), Moderaterna (Sweden), Conservative Party (United Kingdom), and Partido Popular (Spain)—show a relatively cohesive but more ideologically diverse ideological profile compared to the social democratic group: All five parties place themselves within the corporatist tradition, favouring policies that rely on cooperation between the state, private actors, and civil society, as well as targeted support for specific groups. While the ideological centre of gravity remains within the corporatist logic, the distribution of proposals is more evenly spread across welfare regime types.

The most frequently addressed indicator is provision, which appears in three of the five programs—typically via partnership delivery (municipalities, associations, developers) rather than direct state production. Other indicators that feature in multiple programs include regulation, objectives, and decommodification (each in two programs), as well as general ideological framing (CDA). Saliency is broader and more evenly spread across indicators: regulation is common, but the emphasis is on calibration (simplifying procedures, enabling local tailoring) rather than centralisation. Objectives are used frequently to justify targeted support (first-time buyers, middle-income households, seniors), and allocation appears often

in the form of priority rules for specific groups. Subsidisation is present but tends to be segment-specific (e.g., entry pathways, renovation supports) rather than universal. Price regulation features selectively and usually as part of a negotiated framework rather than comprehensive national controls. At the same time, there is less overlap between parties in which indicators receive emphasis; instead, all five touch a wide range of indicators, indicating programs that are ideologically broad in scope yet coherent. Across the board, proposals focus on reducing lengthy procedures, facilitating provision through coordination between public and private actors, allowing for local variation, and supporting specific groups.

While there are no contradictory proposals among the christian democratic parties, there are a few notable differences in emphasis. Partido Popular (Spain) proposes more social democratic than corporatist policies and is therefore positioned in the social democratic quadrant of the welfare triangle (Figure 27). This reflects a stronger orientation toward public intervention than is typical for christian democratic parties. Moderaterna (Sweden) also presents an ideologically mixed profile, with more liberal (48%) and social democratic (33%) proposals than corporatist ones (14%). However, this is not necessarily unexpected: the corporatist tradition often involves balancing market-based and state-led approaches. This is also visible in the other three christian democratic parties, which show a relatively even distribution across the ideological spectrum. The only exception is Partido Popular, which includes no liberal proposals at all.

When testing the possible influence of national context, the left-to-right (state→market) ordering is PP (Spain) → CD&V (Flanders) → CDA (Netherlands) → Conservatives (UK) → Moderaterna (Sweden), with PP also the most family-oriented of the five. Tested against the “alignment” pattern (parties gravitate toward their national regime), the picture is mixed. Two placements fit expectations: CD&V sits to the left of CDA (Belgium’s corporatist tradition vs. the Netherlands’ more market-oriented mix), and the Conservatives are to the market side of both Benelux parties (consistent with the UK’s liberal regime). But two placements contradict the pattern: Moderaterna are the most market-centred in the family (we would have expected the UK party to anchor that pole), and PP are the most state-centred (despite Spain’s Mediterranean/familial context)—even though PP’s strong family pull does fit Spain’s regime logic.


Against the “opposition” pattern (parties positioning away from their national regime), we again see only a partial match. Moderaterna’s market-forward placement is consistent with pushing against Sweden’s state-centred baseline, but the UK Conservatives are not the least state-centred case, and PP are not less familial than their peers.

Taken together, the christian democratic set shows no single national-context rule. Instead, it exhibits a corporatist centre of gravity with case-specific tilts: Belgium and the Netherlands align with a calibrated partnership model; the UK leans further market; Sweden pushes most toward market (oppositional to its context); and Spain combines a state-tilt with the strongest familial emphasis. This pattern supports the broader finding that EPP parties remain corporatist in orientation but mediate that anchor through national opportunity structures rather than converge uniformly on their country’s regime position.

In summary, the christian democratic parties demonstrate a consistent corporatist orientation while allowing for a broader ideological mix. Although individual parties vary in their

emphasis, the general pattern remains one of pragmatic coordination, incremental reform, and support for traditional social structures. This is also represented in the outcome of the 2d standard deviation performed on the ideological positions which was 0,11, meaning the parties on average were 0.11 on a scale of 1 away from their average position in the welfare triangle. When compared with the other ideologies, this is an average standard deviation.

**Figure 27**  
*Christian democratic parties in the welfare triangle*



### 6.3 Liberal Parties (RENEW)

The liberal parties selected for this research—VVD (Netherlands), Open VLD (Flanders), Centerpartiet (Sweden), and the Liberal Democrats (United Kingdom)—show a significantly more varied ideological profile than the other political families. While all four parties share a liberal background and show some overlap in prioritising market facilitation and deregulation, their housing proposals reflect a broader range of welfare regime logics. This divergence is also clearly visible in the ideological distribution of their statements and in their positioning within the conceptual welfare triangle (Figure 28).

A common thread across all four programs is the focus on (de)regulation—specifically streamlining rules, deregulatory fixes, and administrative acceleration. Every liberal party treats this indicator as a core housing strategy, consistent with a preference for reducing barriers for market actors, increasing supply, and minimising state intervention. Beyond this

shared core, salience diverges sharply across parties. Some programmes give meaningful space to provision (often in an enabling role: land release, planning reforms, finance facilitation), while others give it minimal attention. Likewise, decommodification is central to one case (Liberal Democrats), yet the relevant proposals were coded social democratic rather than liberal; similarly, VVD's provision measures were often coded corporatist—suggesting that while liberal parties recognise these themes, they operationalise them through pragmatic or institutionally mixed strategies rather than a purely liberal instrument set. Subsidisation appears least among liberals, and when present is narrowly framed (targeted, temporary, or designed to unlock private investment). Allocation is infrequent (liberal texts rarely expand priority lists), and price regulation is the least emphasised lever—when mentioned, it is typically to question expansion rather than strengthen controls. Objectives language tends to foreground market efficiency and administrative feasibility rather than rights-based claims. In short, liberals talk most about changing the regulatory environment; other indicators are selectively mobilised and vary by national context.

There are substantial differences between the liberal parties in terms of ideological consistency. Centerpartiet in Sweden stands out as the most ideologically aligned with the liberal tradition, with 83% of its housing proposals coded as liberal. In contrast, the other parties show a more hybrid profile: VVD (Netherlands) presents a mix of corporatist (46%), liberal (30%), and social democratic (19%) proposals; Open VLD (Flanders) follows a similar pattern with 48% corporatist, 33% liberal, and 11% social democratic; and the Liberal Democrats (UK) deviate most strongly from expectations, with 55% of proposals coded as social democratic and non coded as liberal. These differences result in markedly different positions within the welfare triangle. While Centerpartiet ends up firmly in the liberal corner, VVD and Open VLD are positioned in the corporatist centre, and the Liberal Democrats fall within the social democratic quadrant.

When testing the possible influence of national context, the left-to-right (state→market) ordering is Liberal Democrats (UK) → VVD (Netherlands) → Open Vld (Flanders) → Centerpartiet (Sweden). Tested against the alignment expectation (parties gravitate toward their national regime), the pattern largely fails. If alignment held, the UK party in a liberal system would anchor the market pole and the Swedish party in a social democratic system would sit closer to the state. Instead, the Liberal Democrats are the most state-centred, and Centerpartiet is the most market-centred. The Benelux placements are somewhat more intuitive—Open Vld marginally to the market side of VVD, consistent with Belgium's corporatist tradition vs. the Netherlands' tighter, state-steered planning—but even here neither sits at a clear “corporatist” anchor.


Against the opposition expectation (parties positioning away from their national regime), we see a partial fit. Centerpartiet's market-forward position contrasts Sweden's state-leaning baseline, and the Liberal Democrats' state-oriented stance runs against the UK's liberal baseline. By contrast, VVD and Open Vld occupy intermediate, partnership-heavy spaces rather than clearly “pushing off” their national contexts.

Overall, the liberal family exhibits the strongest within-family dispersion: a shared rhetorical focus on deregulation coexists with divergent end-state mixes—from the UK party's state-leaning bundle to Sweden's market-centred stance, with the Dutch and Flemish cases

in between. This supports the broader finding that liberal parties are highly context-adaptive, mediating liberal ideas through national opportunity structures rather than converging on a common placement.

In conclusion, the liberal parties present the most ideologically diverse set of housing proposals among the four political families. While all maintain a rhetorical commitment to liberal principles (except for the liberal democrats), the actual content of their programs is possibly shaped by institutional context and housing system pressures, resulting in a wide range of ideological positions as seen in Figure 28. This is also represented in the outcome of the 2d standard deviation performed on the ideological positions which was 0.23, meaning the parties on average were 0.23 on a scale of 1 away from their average position in the welfare triangle. When compared with the other ideologies, this is a high SD, which shows that liberal parties diverge more than other parties within their own ideology.

**Figure 28**  
*Liberal parties in the welfare triangle*



## 6.4 Populist Parties (Patriots&ECR)

The populist parties in this research—PVV (Netherlands), Vlaams Belang (Flanders), Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden), Reform UK, and Vox (Spain)—present a unique case when comparing ideological convergence. Unlike the other political families, populist parties do not share a long-standing or well-developed ideological tradition regarding the role of the state,

the market, or the family. Despite this, their housing proposals reveal a number of consistent themes. Most parties combine restrictive migration proposals with targeted deregulation and a focus on provision, and they frequently invoke the importance of protecting the traditional family.

Salience concentrates in provision and regulation—three of five parties emphasise each—often paired as “build/enable more” plus “remove barriers/mandates.” Provision proposals are mostly operationalised through corporatist or social democratic logics (e.g., state–market partnering or direct public roles), while regulation is typically framed in liberal terms, calling to streamline permits, relax environmental mandates, or otherwise cut red tape. Decommodification is less common overall but features prominently in Sverigedemokraterna’s programme. Allocation appears in a distinctive, exclusionary register—less universal criteria and more gatekeeping (priority for “natives,” essential workers, or locally rooted households); where these produce access rules, they were coded under allocation. Objectives language foregrounds protection of the (traditional/extended) family and “fairness for our own,” with Vox standing out for proposals explicitly tied to regional identity and extended-family support (coded Mediterranean). Subsidisation is inconsistent—sometimes endorsed for select groups, sometimes avoided—and price regulation appears sporadically, as likely to be resisted as expanded.

Despite their ideological ambiguity, the populist parties show surprising consistency in both tone and thematic focus. Four out of five programs include proposals to restrict access to housing for immigrants or newcomers, and all show a preference for protecting the traditional family. In several cases, this is framed as a form of competition over access to housing, particularly social housing. In addition, deregulation and provision appear in most programs, sometimes justified as ways to enable ‘native’ traditional families to access homes more easily. These narratives show how ideological reasoning is often combined with exclusionary identity politics.


When testing the possible influence of national context, the left-to-right (state→market) ordering is Vlaams Belang (Flanders) → PVV (Netherlands) → Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden) → Vox (Spain) → Reform UK. On the alignment test (gravitating toward the national regime), results are mixed: Reform UK anchors the market pole, matching the UK’s liberal baseline; Vlaams Belang and PVV sit within a state/corporatist orbit consistent with Belgian/Dutch traditions. Sverigedemokraterna are more market-oriented than Sweden’s state-leaning system would predict (a deviation), while Vox—crucially—lands furthest into the family corner of all parties, making it the clearest empirical trace of Mediterranean familialism in the dataset. That placement, together with its familialist rhetoric, is strong evidence of national-regime influence on Vox’s housing proposals.

On the opposition test (positioning away from the national regime), evidence is partial: Sverigedemokraterna’s marketward stance fits an oppositional move in a social democratic context; Vox does not oppose but rather embodies Spain’s familialist logic; Reform UK aligns (not opposes) the liberal baseline; Vlaams Belang and PVV do not clearly push away from corporatist surroundings.

Overall, the populist parties are marked by thematic consistency, limited ideological depth, and selective incorporation of liberal, corporatist, and social democratic elements. Their positioning in the welfare triangle reflects this ambiguity: while all remain relatively close to

the centre-right, the positions are divided between the corporatist and liberal part of the welfare triangle. However, when looking at the 2d SD performed on the outcome of the 2d standard Deviation, of 0.12, meaning the parties on average were 0.12 away from their average position in the welfare triangle. When comparing with the other ideologies, this is an average SD., and thus you cannot state that populist parties diverge more from each other than other parties within their ideology.

**Figure 29**  
*Populist parties in the welfare triangle*



## 6.5 Cross-Family Observations

This section reflects on broader patterns that emerge across political families. By comparing the use of indicators across families, the distribution of welfare ideologies within indicators, ideological focus, focus on nativism and the influence of national context, it becomes possible to identify trends that cut across the party groups analysed in this chapter.

### 6.5.1 Use of Indicators Across Families

Table 22 (“Percentage weight of indicators used by ideological families”) shows, for each party family, how their housing proposals are distributed across the ten indicators in this study. Each manifesto statement was first coded to an indicator; within each family, these statements were then aggregated and normalised to percentages, yielding a salience profile of which levers each family talks about most. The table does not show which welfare-regime

logic statements map to (that is shown in par. 6.5.2), nor does it re-rank which topics each individual party emphasises (covered in par. 6.1–6.4). Instead, it provides a family-level composition of attention across indicators. Higher percentages mark greater emphasis (more statements) on that lever within the family’s programmes; lower percentages mark relative neglect. Read horizontally to see a family’s internal mix; read vertically to compare how different families weigh the same indicator.

**Table 22**  
*Percentage weight of indicators used by ideological families*

Percentage weight of indicators used by ideological families				
Indicator	Social Democrats	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Populists
1: Arrangement between state, market and family	4,4%	9,2%	9,3%	14,5%
2: Decommodification	8,5%	9,6%	9,8%	4,3%
3: Stratification	9,5%	6,4%	3,6%	6,0%
4: Regulation	17,4%	20,1%	30,9%	34,2%
5: Policy objectives	5,4%	15,7%	7,7%	7,7%
6: Subsidiation	10,8%	6,8%	4,1%	8,5%
7: Price regulation	1,9%	0,8%	1,5%	2,6%
8: Allocation	6,0%	2,8%	2,1%	0,9%
9: Provision	35,8%	24,5%	25,8%	18,8%
10: Share of homeownership sector	0,3%	4,0%	5,2%	2,6%
Total sum:	100%	100%	100%	100%

Reading Table 22, two patterns surface immediately. Regulation and provision carry the largest shares across all families, but other indicators are used more family-associated. For the Social Democratic family, regulation and provision take the top slots—17.4% and 35.8%—and are paired with a comparatively large share for subsidiation (10.8%) and larger than average share on allocation (6.0%): a state-led bundle. The christian democratic family also devote substantial shares to regulation (20.1%) and provision (24.5%), and the co-occurring weight on objectives (15.7%), which focus mostly on helping certain groups, shows a corporatist calibration: targeted support and partnership delivery rather than blanket expansion. Among the Liberal family, the highest percentage sits with regulation (30.9%),

while provision appears in a smaller, enabling role (25.8%) and subsidisation is the lowest share of all families (4.1%)—consistent with a streamlining-first repertoire. Populists concentrate indicator use in a narrower set: regulation (33.3%) and provision (18.3%) hold their largest percentages. Interestingly, they show the same focus on subsidisation as the social democratic family does.

The cross-family contrasts are clearest where the table’s percentages diverge most: Subsidisation and price regulation are family-sensitive: subsidisation is highest in Social democrat (10.8%) and populist family (10.%), mid-range and segment-specific in the christian democratic family (6.8%), and minimal in the liberal family (4.1%), showing their preference for little state involvement;

Price regulation remains lightly used overall but peaks for populists (2.5%) and S&D (1.9%), while EPP (0.8%) and Renew (1.5%) reference it least. By contrast, allocation splits ideologically: S&D’s share (6.0%) reflects universalist safeguards/mixing; EPP’s higher share relative to liberals (2.8% vs. 2.1%) captures priority rules for youth, seniors, or key workers; Renew post the lowest among the three main families (2.1%); and populists mention allocation least (0.8%), but when they do, it is commonly tied to exclusionary tests. Finally, while all families dedicate meaningful weight to regulation, the direction differs in line with these percentages: S&D’s 17.4% is tied to central standards; EPP’s 20.1% to simplification with local tailoring; Renew’s 30.9% to fast-tracking and administrative acceleration; and populists’ 33.3% to rolling back perceived constraints.

In short, the percentages in Table 21 show that everyone talks about regulation and provision, but the indicators subsidisation, price rules, and allocation is more dependent on ideological family.

### 6.5.2 Distribution of welfare ideologies within indicators

Table 22 reports an aggregation of all coded statements by indicator and the welfare-regime logic they imply. Each manifesto statement was first assigned to an indicator (e.g., regulation, subsidisation) and then mapped to the closest regime anchor (social democratic, corporatist, liberal, or Mediterranean) using the coding rules developed in Chapter 2–3. The counts in the table therefore do not indicate which topics each party emphasises overall (which is covered in par. 6.1–6.4), or the family wide focus, as discussed in the previous paragraph.. Instead, the table shows an overview toward which welfare-regime logics all proposals within that indicator point.

**Figure 24**

*Total weight of indicators towards welfare regime*

total weight of indicators towards welfare regimes						
Category	indicator	Social Democratic	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Total
Core mix	1: Arrangement between state, market and family	22%	24%	44%	10%	100%

Regime Logics	2: Decommodification	89%	11%	0%	0%	100%
	3: Stratification	80%	10%	10%	0%	100%
Policy levers	4: Regulation	30%	38%	32%	-	100%
	5: Policy objectives	11%	54%	35%	-	100%
	6: Subsidiation	58%	42%	0%	-	100%
	7: Price regulation	57%	21%	21%	-	100%
	8: Allocation	13%	87%	0%	-	100%
	9: Provision	45%	47%	8%	-	100%
Outcome patterns	10: Share of homeownership sector		46%		54%	100%
	Total sum:	42%	38%	19%	2%	100%

For indicator 1, the arrangement between state, market and family, parties most often use liberal logic— where market-oriented responsibility is the plurality mapping. Second, for the two regime logics derived from the core mix—Indicators decommodification and stratification—statements are overwhelmingly within social democratic welfare regime logic, advocating higher decommodification and less stratification. In short, most tend to frame ultimate responsibility in market terms more than elsewhere, but when they speak directly to decommodification or stratification, they mostly favour state-centred solutions. This pattern is further explained in paragraph 6.5.4.

Across the policy levers, the distribution of welfare regime logics within indicators is more diffuse: regulation is the most evenly distributed lever across regime logics. Parties from different families use regulatory language in different ideological directions, producing a relatively balanced spread across social democratic, corporatist, and liberal mappings.

Policy objectives skew corporatist: over half of all objective-statements map to corporatist logic (typically: supporting first-time and middle-income groups into ownership), while about 35% map to liberal logics (market efficiency and facilitation). Only ~11% of objective-statements map to social democratic logics (typically: qualitative housing as a right).

Subsidisation splits between social democratic (58%) and corporatist (42%) mappings—none map to liberal (i.e., no proposals to oppose subsidies outright or to constrict them to minimal, means-tested supplements). In practice, this is a contrast between broad (SD) versus segment-specific/conditional (corporatist) subsidy designs.

Price regulation again clusters in social democratic logic, with just one corporatist and one liberal instance across all programmes. The only explicit liberal-type proposal here is VOX's

call to abolish rent control rather than strengthen it.

Allocation is predominantly corporatist: statements that favour priority rules for specific groups (e.g., elderly, youth, essential workers), i.e., targeted access rather than universalist rules or pure market allocation.

Provision splits between social democratic and corporatist mappings. SD-mapped statements emphasise the state as provider (direct public/social construction); corporatist-mapped statements emphasise state–market partnerships and intermediary delivery. The single liberal-mapped instance concerns facilitating market provision via loans.

Finally, in the outcome patterns, parties are almost evenly divided on tenure orientation: 46% of statements promote a mixed tenure structure, while 54% steer toward owner-occupation dominance. This near split shows that—even when parties differ on instruments—the end-state vision of tenure is not unanimously social rental expansion; a slight majority still argues toward ownership-centred outcomes, with a substantial minority advocating a balanced mix.

### 6.5.3 Patterns of Ideological focus across families.

Looking at broader ideological balance as show in tables 24-27, the results show that parties do not fully focus on one welfare regime logic, nor do they equally mix social democratic, corporatist, liberal and Mediterranean proposals. To convert each party's four percentages into a single focus score, normalized Shannon entropy is applied. Entropy captures how spread out a distribution is: it is highest when the four shares are equal and lowest when one category dominates. First, the normalized entropy is computed (ranging from 0 to 1 in the four-category setting). The focus score is then defined as  $1 - \text{normalized entropy}$ . Consequently, the score approaches 1 when proposals concentrate in one category (very focused) and approaches 0 when proposals are evenly distributed (diffuse). This measure reflects ideological focus because it increases as a program concentrates its proposals in one direction and decreases as it mixes multiple directions. The tables below report, for each party, the ideological distribution across the four categories and the resulting focus score, enabling direct comparison of how clearly each program prioritizes a particular ideological direction.

All five Social Democratic programmes concentrate proposals in the social democratic welfare regime, and they do so with striking clarity. Focus scores are consistently high—0.70 (Socialdemokraterna), 0.66 (Labour), 0.62 (Vooruit), 0.56 (PvdA)—with PSOE 0.44 the only comparatively diffuse case. Where diffusion occurs, it is almost entirely toward corporatist complements rather than liberal ones (e.g., PSOE's sizable corporatist share). Substantively, this confirms a stable state-centred toolkit with only limited, pragmatic nods to partnership delivery. This is also reflected in the focus score of the average distribution of welfare regime logics: on average, 74% percent of all proposals within the election programs are towards the social democratic regime logic, which reflects in a high focus score of 0,57, as shown in Table 24.

**Table 24***Ideological distribution and focus score of Social Democratic electoral programs*

Ideological distribution and focus score of Social Democratic electoral programs							
Ideology	Region	Party	Social Democratic %	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	Focus score
Social Democrats	Sweden	Socialdemokraterna	86%	14%	0%	0%	0,70
Social Democrats	The Netherlands	PvdA	71%	29%	0%	0%	0,56
Social Democrats	Flanders	Vooruit	78%	22%	0%	0%	0,62
Social Democrats	UK	Labour	82%	18%	0%	0%	0,66
Social Democrats	Spain	PSOE	53%	45%	2%	0%	0,44
Social Democrats		Average	74%	26%	0%	0%	0,57

Christian democratic parties cluster around corporatist mixes but with wider internal variance than Social democratic parties. Focus ranges from 0.36 (Conservatives)—the most concentrated corporatist case—to 0.20 (CD&V) and 0.18 (Moderaterna), both notably diffuse. Two instructive deviations: PP (0.29) tilts unusually social democratic for this family (large SD share alongside corporatist), while Moderaterna exhibits a liberal plurality within a mixed profile. Overall, the family's centre of gravity remains targeted support and partnership-based delivery, but parties clearly choose a mix of welfare regime logics over a corporatist toolkit. This is also reflected in the low focus score of the average ideological distribution, which is low as a result of the wide profile and differences in ideological focus (Table 25). However, it is important to note that three out of five christian democratic parties still have corporatist proposals as the most dominant regime ideology.

**Table 25***Ideological distribution and focus score of christian democratic electoral programs*

Ideological distribution and focus score of christian democratic electoral programs							
Ideology	Region	Party	Social Democratic %	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	Focus score
Christian Democrats	Sweden	Moderaternas	33%	14%	48%	5%	0,18

Christian Democrats	The Netherlands	CDA	29%	54%	17%	0%	0,28
Christian Democrats	Flanders	CD&V	31%	49%	18%	2%	0,20
Christian Democrats	UK	Concervatives	16%	65%	19%	0%	0,36
Christian Democrats	Spain	PP	47%	40%	0%	13%	0,29
Christian Democrats		Average	31%	44%	20%	4%	0,15

Liberal parties show the widest dispersion of any family. At one pole, Centerpartiet (0.67) is the archetypal liberal profile. At the other, VVD (0.15) and Open VLD (0.16) are highly diffuse and corporatist-leaning, signalling a strategy of enabling markets through calibrated partnerships rather than pure laissez-faire. The Liberal Democrats 0.50 invert expectations with a social democratic/corporatist bundle (and virtually no liberal share). The lesson is that “liberal” proposals frequently travel through different institutional toolkits; where baseline regulation is already light and/or affordability pressures acute, proposals shift toward SD or corporatist instruments. Although the Liberal Democrats and the Centrumpartiet have a relatively high focus score, the focus score of the average distribution is low. This is because, although the programs are focussed in 2/4 cases, they focus on different regime toolkits and therefore show up as divergent in the average distribution.

**Table 26**

*Ideological distribution and focus score of liberal electoral programs*

Ideological distribution and focus score of Liberal electoral programs							
Ideology	Region	Party	Social Democratic %	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	Focus score
Liberals	Sweden	Centrumpartiet	17%	0%	83%	0%	0,67
Liberals	The Netherlands	VVD	18%	47%	29%	5%	0,15
Liberals	Flanders	Open vld.	12%	48%	33%	8%	0,16
Liberals	UK	Liberal Democrats	55%	45%	0%	0%	0,50
Liberals		Average	25%	35%	36%	3%	0,14

Populist programmes are consistent on the theme of nativist family protection and gatekeeping, but furthermore ideologically eclectic. Two cases—PVV (0.50) and Reform UK

(0.50)—split between liberal, and corporatist or social democratic mixes, reflecting deregulatory instincts tied to insider-protection goals. Sverigedemokraterna (0.24) retains a liberal plurality within a broad blend. Vlaams Belang (0.15) is very diffuse. VOX (0.07) is the most diffuse case in the entire sample and uniquely adds a Mediterranean familial component (a substantial Mediterranean share alongside liberal and corporatist elements). When looking at the average distribution, we see more focus on a liberal toolkit, even more than the liberal parties. However, the focus score is still low, as the populist party Vox has a broader focus which includes Mediterranean proposals and therefore increases the entropy and thus decreases the focus score.

**Table 27**

Ideological distribution and focus score of Populist electoral programs

Ideological distribution and focus score of Populist electoral programs							
Ideology	Region	Party	Social Democratic %	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	Focus score
Populists	Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna	26%	26%	48%	0%	0,24
Populists	The Netherlands	PVV	44%	0%	56%	0%	0,50
Populists	Flanders	Vlaams Belang	29%	29%	39%	2%	0,15
Populists	UK	REFORM	0%	45%	55%	0%	0,50
Populists	Spain	VOX	10%	29%	39%	23%	0,07
Populists		Average	22%	26%	47%	5%	0,14

Overall, ideological clarity is highest among social democrats, reflected in high focus scores and convergent focus on social democratic regime logics, moderate among christian democrats which has relatively low focus scores (0.18–0.36), but are consistent in their broad approach of using logics and tools from different ideological welfare regimes. and most fragmented among liberals (0.15–0.67), which show as well relatively focussed as well as very distributed programs. However, when focussed, the focus within the liberal family differs greatly, resulting in an overall picture of diversion. The populist family (0.07–0.50) show on average more liberal welfare regime ideology than other parties, also than liberal parties.

#### 6.5.4 Core mix and regime logics

As already noted in par. 6.5.2, an interesting pattern emerges when comparing ideological distribution of the core mix (arrangement of state, market and family) and the regime logics (decommodification and stratification).

When looking into the distribution of welfare ideology, by further distinguishing the ideological families behaviour, we see the following results: Table 28 shows how parties think about the core mix, and results are similar to what you would expect ideologically: Social Democrats almost exclusively make statements towards the social democratic welfare regime, emphasising a strong state to provide welfare. The christian democratic family shows a comparatively even distribution, with some emphasis on corporatist welfare regime reasoning of state-market cooperation. Liberal parties are very explicit in their ideas on market provision of welfare, similarly as populist parties. However, the populist family also shows Mediterranean welfare logic, although mostly found in the VOX program.

**Table 28**

*Distribution of core mix (indicator 1) in ideological families*

Distribution of core mix (indicator 1) in ideological families				
	Social Democrats	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Populists
Social Democratic	11	5	0	0
Corporatist	3	9	2	3
Liberal	0	7	16	9
Mediterranean	0	2	0	5

As already shown in Table 23, when looking at the welfare regime logics, decommodification and stratification show a widespread focus on Social Democratic welfare regime logics, thus advocating for higher decommodification and less stratification. When further looking into the behaviour of the different ideological families, this pattern shows to be widespread, as shown in Table 29: Social democratic parties behave as expected, advocating for higher decommodification and less stratification. However, four out of christian democratic parties and three out of four liberal parties advocate for higher decommodification and/or less stratification as well, which is contradictory with the statements done within the core mix, especially for the liberal parties. As shown in Table 28, they have a strong focus on the market as a welfare provider, which normally is connected with lower decommodification and more stratification. A similar, but less clear effect is also seen within the populist family, although they seem to prioritise especially decommodification less than other parties (as shown in Table 23).

**Table 29**

*Distribution of regime logics (indicators 2-3) in ideological families*

Distribution of regime logics (indicators 2-3) in ideological families				
	Social Democrats	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Populists
Social	57	30	22	4

Democratic				
Corporatist	0	7	4	3
Liberal	0	3	0	3
Mediterranean	0	0	0	0

### 6.5.5 Nativism

As described in par. 2.1.4, Mudde (2007) describes nativist welfare regime, wherein welfare is reserved for natives and in which asylum seekers/newcomers are excluded, as a characteristic of populist housing policy. In the electoral programs this claim is supported, as 4 out of 5 populist parties made nativist statements in their housing policy proposals, proposing to stop positive discrimination of newcomers (explicit in Sverige Demokraternas, PVV, and REFORM) and/or proposing to exclude newcomers from subsidised forms of housing (PVV, Vlaams Belang and REFORM).

When looking at Table 30, two parties stand out: the Swedish social democratic party Socialdemokraterna did a nativist proposal as the only non-populist party, and proposed to exclude asylum seekers from the right to choose where they live. Interestingly, although the Spanish populist party VOX does make a big electoral point in their electoral program about immigration, the party does not link the housing system to the nativist welfare idea.

**Table 30**

*Nativism in the housing section of electoral programs*

Nativism present in the Housing section of the electoral program					
	Sweden	The Netherlands	Flanders	UK	Spain
Social Democrats	Yes	No	No	No	No
Christian Democrats	No	No	No	No	No
Liberals	No	No	No	No	No
Populists	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No

Another pattern is visible when analysing parties' root causes of the housing crisis: All populist parties, but also Socialdemokraterna, VVD and CDA. When looking at VVD and CDA, immigration is linked to the growth of households. The VVD, Socialdemokraterna and populist parties except VOX, name reducing immigration as a proposal which is linked to solving the housing crisis (in other chapters than the housing chapter). CDA, merely names immigration as a cause, but does not state reducing immigration as a solution for the housing shortage.


### 6.5.6 The Role of National Context

Synthesising the family-by-family analyses in §§6.1–6.4, the national context acts more as a channel than a driver of ideological placement. Across families, there is no uniform “alignment” effect (parties clustering tightly around their country’s welfare–housing position) nor a systematic “opposition” effect (parties positioning away from it). Instead, parties retain their family-specific centres of gravity—state-led for S&D, corporatist for EPP, regulatory streamlining for Renew, identity-inflected provision/regulation for populists—while showing context-sensitive tilts that remain secondary to ideological repertoire.


One clear and consistent pattern does appear: within each family that is present in Spain, the Spanish party sits closest to the family-centred corner of the welfare triangle. This is visible for PSOE (S&D), PP (EPP), and Vox (populists); the liberal family has no Spanish case. The margins are modest—especially among the christian democrats—yet the direction is uniform, consistent with the broader familial imprint of Mediterranean contexts. A plausible explanation for the smaller gap in the EPP set is that corporatist logics already carry a familial component, so the step from corporatist to Mediterranean is less pronounced than from, say, liberal to Mediterranean.

We also tested two cross-national patterns at the country level using the regional overlays in figures 30-34. If alignment dominated, we would expect visible clustering around the national regime zone; if opposition dominated, we would expect avoidance of that zone. Neither pattern materialises when all parties in a country are viewed together. Consequently, the national regime position does not deterministically “pull” or “push” party placements in aggregate; rather, parties occupy a spread consistent with their family anchors.


**Figure 30**  
*All parties from Sweden, shown in the welfare triangle*




**Figure 31**  
*All parties from The Netherlands, shown in the welfare triangle*



**Figure 32**  
*All parties from Flanders, shown in the welfare triangle*




**Figure 33**  
*All parties from The United Kingdom, shown in the welfare triangle*



**Figure 34**

*All parties from Spain, shown in the welfare triangle*



A third lens is the left–right ordering within each country. The observed sequences in figures 30-34 from state-ward to market-ward are:

- Sweden (Figure 30): Socialdemokraterna (social democratic) → Moderaterna (christian democratic) → Sverigedemokraterna (populist) → Centerpartiet (liberal)
- Netherlands (Figure 31): PvdA (social democratic) → CDA (christian democratic/EPP) → VVD (liberal) → PVV (populist)
- Flanders (Figure 32): Vooruit (social democratic) → CD&V (christian democratic/EPP) → Vlaams Belang (populist) → Open VLD (liberal)
- United Kingdom (Figure 33): Labour (social democratic) → Liberal Democrats (liberal) → Conservatives (christian democratic) → Reform UK (populist)
- Spain (Figure 34): PSOE (social democratic) → PP (christian democratic) → VOX (populist)

This pattern may indicate a party-system influence on placements; however, it can equally be read as the straightforward consequence of parties' ideological positioning, because the ordering closely matches what the literature would predict (see §2.1): social democrats most state-centred, christian democrats corporatist/centrist, liberals most market-centred, and populists varying but generally to the right with identity-inflected proposals. In short, ideology remains the primary organiser, with national context adding modest, directional nudges (clearest in Spain) rather than producing a generalisable alignment or opposition rule.

## 6.6 Conclusions

Across the four political families, the analysis shows clear convergence in expected directions, but with family-specific patterns of dispersion. Social democratic parties are the most ideologically coherent: their programmes cluster tightly in the state-led corner of the welfare triangle (Figure 26), with high focus scores (0.56–0.70; Table 24) and proposal bundles dominated by provision, regulation, and subsidisation. Christian democratic parties converge on a corporatist centre of gravity (Figure 27) while mixing tools more broadly (focus 0.18–0.36; Table 25), consistent with targeted support, partnership delivery, and procedural calibration. Liberal parties display the widest within-family dispersion (Figure 28): all emphasise (de)regulation, but end-state mixes range from strongly liberal (Centerpartiet, focus 0.67) to corporatist or social democratic blends (VVD, Open VLD, Liberal Democrats; Table 26). Populist parties, lacking a unified welfare doctrine, are thematically consistent—provision + deregulation paired with allocation gatekeeping/nativism—yet instrumentally eclectic (focus 0.07–0.50; Figure 29; Table 27).

At the level of policy levers, families talk most about regulation and provision, albeit in different keys (Table 22): S&D to strengthen and centralise; EPP to simplify and negotiate; Renew to streamline/fast-track; populists to cut perceived constraints, often linked to identity. By contrast, subsidisation, price regulation, and allocation are the most family-sensitive indicators: subsidisation is common in S&D and, to a lesser extent, EPP (rare in Renew); price regulation is concentrated in S&D (and sporadic elsewhere); allocation is universalist/mixing for S&D, priority-targeted for EPP, minimal for Renew, and gatekeeping-oriented for populists (§6.5.1). When proposals are regrouped by regime logics rather than families, a striking pattern appears (§6.5.2): even parties that favour market responsibility in the core mix (indicator 1) nonetheless tend to support higher decommodification and lower stratification when they speak directly to those logics (indicators 2–3). In short, parties may narrate responsibility in market terms, but they often endorse state-centred protections on prices, access, and distribution.

On ideological focus, entropy scores confirm these qualitative readings (§6.5.3): S&D are most focused and convergent; EPP moderately convergent but deliberately mixed; Renew most dispersed as a family (with one archetypal liberal case); and populists split between liberal–corporatist blends and a unique Mediterranean inflection in Vox. The nativism scan (§6.5.5) shows that four of five populist parties embed exclusionary allocation claims in their housing sections; notably, Socialdemokraterna include a single nativist proposal, while Vox—despite strong immigration rhetoric—does not tie nativism directly to housing access rules in its housing section.

Finally, national context channels but does not determine placements (§6.5.6). There is no general “alignment” (clustering around a country’s regime position) nor “opposition” (avoidance of it). The one consistent contextual imprint is Spain: within every family present, the Spanish party sits closest to the family corner of the triangle (PSOE, PP, Vox), indicating a Mediterranean tilt. Within countries, the left-to-right ordering of parties from state-ward to market-ward generally mirrors baseline ideology rather than a distinct contextual mechanism. Overall, ideology organizes, context nudges.

In sum, chapter 6 shows that European party families still “speak ideology” in housing:

- Social democrats articulate a stable, state-led toolkit;
- Christian democrats operate a corporatist, partnership-oriented repertoire with selective targeting;
- Liberals converge rhetorically on deregulation but diverge substantively in end-state mixes;
- Populists combine provision/deregulation with identity-based allocation.

Cross-cutting these family profiles, parties often favour stronger decommodification and reduced stratification, even when their expressed core mix assigns more room to markets. The national setting matters—most visibly in Spain’s familial pull—but does not overturn family anchors. These findings set up the discussion (Chapter 7) and the wider implications for theory and future research: ideological templates remain robust guides to party proposals, yet instrument choices show pragmatic adaptation to institutional opportunity structures.

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## 7. Discussion

This chapter reflects on what the results in Chapters 5 and 6 mean for how party ideology shows up in housing policy. It links the findings back to the literature on welfare regimes, housing systems, and political ideology (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hoekstra, 2010; Ferrara, 1996; Barr, 1994, 2012; Mudde, 2007), and it considers what this study contributes to that debate. It also outlines the main limitations of the work and points toward future research.

### 7.1 Housing policy as an ideological field

A core contribution of this thesis is that it shows that housing policy in national election programmes is ideologically structured — in a way that can be measured.

In Chapter 5, each proposal in the manifestos was coded along ten indicators, grouped into four tiers:

- (1) Core mix: who is responsible for housing (state, market, family/intermediary);
- (2) Regime logics: decommodification and stratification.
- (3) Policy levers: concrete tools such as regulation, subsidisation, allocation, provision, and stated policy objectives;
- (4) Outcome patterns: the tenure structure parties work toward (mixed-tenure model or homeownership dominance).

Each coded statement was then mapped to one of four welfare-regime logics, based on Esping-Andersen (1990) and Hoekstra (2003; 2010):

- social democratic: universalist, state-led, redistributive;
- Corporatist/conservative: partnership-based, selective, group-targeted;
- Liberal: market-led, competition- and efficiency-oriented;
- Mediterranean: familialist, with responsibility placed in the (extended) family.

The result of this coding is that manifesto proposals do not look like loose wish lists. They consistently express positions on:

- Who should provide housing (the state, a state–market partnership, private actors, or the family),
- Who deserves priority (the general public, socially defined groups like first-time buyers or “key workers,” or “our people” versus outsiders),
- How affordability and access should be secured (through regulation, subsidisation, targeted allocation, or through family/household support).

This confirms that housing is not just about bricks, numbers of dwellings, or planning capacity. Housing is being used by parties as a welfare-state claim: a way to define responsibility, entitlement, and social order (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hoekstra, 2010; Barr, 1994, 2012). Parties are using housing to answer questions like: Who should be protected? Who should carry the burden? Who should be helped first?

This also speaks directly to a long-running tension in the literature. Classic welfare-state theory treated housing as slightly awkward: either a “wobbly pillar” sitting uneasily next to

pensions and health (Torgersen, 1987), or a field so shaped by asset ownership and tenure politics that it operates on its own logic (Kemeny, 1995; Hoekstra, 2005). Others have argued the opposite — that housing is foundational to welfare because it anchors security, stratifies opportunity, and structures intergenerational transfer (Ferrara, 1996; Allen et al., 2004; Wind et al., 2016). The findings in this thesis align with that second view. Across parties and countries, housing is used to argue not only about affordability, but about welfare order itself: who counts, who contributes, and who is entitled to care.

In other words: ideology is not just “around” housing. It is baked into housing.

## 7.2 Distinct ideological signatures by party family

Chapters 5 and 6 show that the four political families behave in patterned and recognisable ways.

social democratic parties are the most internally consistent. They converge around a state-led toolkit: regulation, provision, and subsidisation carry the most weight in their programmes, and are framed as instruments to guarantee universal affordability, adequate quality, and fair access. Allocation, when it appears, tends to be framed in universalist or integrative terms rather than exclusivity. Most of their proposals map to social democratic welfare logic, with very limited borrowing from liberal or familial framings. This matches the classic view of social democracy: strong public steering of housing supply, strong regulation (including rent regulation), and redistributive support to keep housing accessible (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Barr, 1994, 2012; Hoekstra, 2010). In the welfare triangle, these parties sit consistently toward the “state” pole.

Christian democratic parties (EPP) have a corporatist centre of gravity. Their programs lean on partnership delivery (municipalities, associations, developers), targeted forms of support (priority access for first-time buyers, seniors, essential workers, young families), calibrated regulation (streamlining procedures, allowing for local differentiation rather than centralised imposition), and allocation rules that legitimise selective priority instead of universal entitlement. Subsidisation is present, but often tied to specific entry points or defined groups rather than broad redistribution. This matches corporatist/conservative welfare logic: the state coordinates and protects social order, but it does not promise blanket universalism, and it does not aim to erase status distinctions (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Van Kersbergen, 1995; Hoekstra, 2010). The emphasis is on incremental problem-solving, subsidiarity, and social stability.

Liberal parties (Renew) are the most fragmented in terms of welfare mapping. Every liberal party in the dataset heavily emphasises regulation and permitting — typically framed as deregulation, streamlining, or accelerating delivery. But beyond that shared core, they diverge sharply.

- In some cases (e.g. Centerpartiet in Sweden), liberal parties lean hard into a market-led interpretation: cut red tape, free up land, accelerate approvals, reduce procedural drag.

- In others (e.g. VVD in the Netherlands, Open VLD in Flanders), they borrow corporatist language: state–market coordination, targeted support for defined categories, calibrated partnership rather than pure laissez-faire.
- In others still (e.g. Liberal Democrats in the UK), they move into social democratic framing: stronger state steering, affordability guarantees, and public responsibility for ensuring access.

This shows two things. First, “liberal” is not one housing recipe. Second, liberal parties actively adapt to their domestic context. In a system that is already highly liberalised and where affordability pressure is politically explosive (like the UK), it is not electorally credible to argue for “even less state.” So the liberal party there takes up interventionist tools traditionally associated with social democracy and justifies them as necessary repairs. By contrast, in a system with strong state steering and heavy planning (like Sweden), it is both ideologically coherent and electorally credible for a liberal party to argue for deregulation and market release. This supports earlier observations that liberal housing politics often works “against the baseline”: if the baseline is highly regulated, liberals sell deregulation; if the baseline is already liberalised and visibly failing, liberals sell competent intervention (Beer, et al., 2007).

Populist parties behave differently. They do not converge on a shared welfare regime logic (they are not all “liberal,” or all “corporatist,” etc.). Instead, they converge thematically. Across the populist cases, housing is framed as a scarce good that is unfairly allocated to “outsiders,” and should be reclaimed for “our own.” Populist parties consistently fuse provision (“build more / free up supply”) with boundary-making in allocation (“but for our people first”). They often call to roll back perceived barriers — environmental requirements, planning delays, “bureaucracy” — and to tighten eligibility for access to social or subsidised housing. This logic lines up with what Mudde (2007) describes as welfare chauvinism: welfare is legitimate, but only for the native in-group. In Spain, Vox adds something distinctive: instead of leaning mainly on exclusionary allocation in the social rental sector (which is relatively small), it elevates the family — in particular the extended family — as the proper guarantor of housing security. That reflects Mediterranean familialism (Ferrara, 1996; Allen et al., 2004): housing is not first a state duty, but a family obligation and intergenerational asset.

Put together, these signatures suggest that party families *still matter*. Social democrats still speak the language of state-led universalism. Christian democrats still speak the language of corporatist coordination and selective support. Liberals still speak the language of regulatory efficiency and facilitation — but increasingly modify that language depending on national conditions. Populists speak the language of belonging, identity, and insider protection. Even as the housing crisis is widely described as “everyone’s problem,” parties are clearly not talking about the same kind of “solution.”

### 7.3 Shared levers, contested levers

Not all indicators behave the same way politically. Some are broadly shared across families; others are strongly “owned” by certain ideologies.

Regulation and provision are almost universal. All four families devote significant attention to these levers (Table 22). But they do so in ways that reflect their welfare logic:

- Social democratic parties pair regulation with rights-based language (quality, affordability, fairness) and with public steering of provision.
- Christian democratic parties frame regulation as something that should be streamlined and made workable for municipalities, associations, and developers, and frame provision as partnership delivery rather than direct state build-out.
- Liberal parties frame regulation as an obstacle to speed and investment; “fixing housing” means cutting red tape, accelerating approvals, and unblocking private delivery.
- Populist parties combine deregulation (“stop blocking building”) with insider entitlement (“we must prioritise our people first”), turning provision and regulation into instruments of belonging.

At first glance these all sound like “just build more/faster,” but underneath they are quite different welfare arguments: state guarantee (social democratic), coordinated partnership (christian democratic), market release (liberal), and insider entitlement (populist).

Other indicators are not so universal.

Subsidisation and price regulation are clearly family-sensitive. social democratic parties are comfortable proposing broad subsidisation, affordability guarantees, and rent/price intervention. Christian democratic parties use subsidisation, but often in selective or conditional form — entry assistance for first-time buyers, renovation supports for seniors, tailored help for “deserving” middle-income households. Liberal parties mostly minimise subsidisation or frame it as narrowly targeted, temporary, or designed to “unlock” private investment, not as structural redistribution. Populist parties speak about support mechanisms, but typically tie them to insider claims (“our families,” “our workers”), not to universal entitlement. In short: redistribution via money is politicised very differently across families.

Allocation is even more ideologically revealing.

- Social democratic parties sometimes reference allocation to protect inclusion, fairness and mixing.
- Christian democratic parties use allocation to justify priority for socially recognised groups (starters, essential workers, elderly), consistent with a corporatist tradition of morally legitimated selectivity.
- Liberal parties barely touch allocation rules at all, which fits a preference for access via market channels rather than explicit political rationing.
- Populist parties use allocation to police belonging: access first for “our people,” restrict access for migrants or “outsiders,” link eligibility to identity and contribution. This is where housing becomes a vehicle for welfare chauvinism (Mudde, 2007).

So even when two parties both say “we will prioritise people who deserve it,” they are not saying the same thing. One is talking about first-time buyers and nurses. One is talking about long-term residents vs. newcomers. One is saying “no priority lists at all — let the

market work.” Allocation is therefore not just an implementation detail. It is a site where ideology becomes explicit.

A crucial tension appears when we compare the “core mix” indicator (who should carry housing responsibility) with the regime logic indicators (decommodification and stratification). Many parties, including Christian democratic, liberal and even some populist parties, speak in market-first terms when assigning responsibility for producing housing (a liberal mapping). Yet the same parties then support high decommodification and low stratification — positions that map to social democratic protection logics. In other words, parties promise outcomes associated with state-oriented systems, but explicitly name market-led delivery as a core mix. That means parties do not always decide about choosing “state versus market”; it is also about deciding where the market is allowed to act freely and where it will be politically contained. This mix — “the market builds, but people are still protected” — appears across multiple families and is one of the clearest cross-party adaptations in contemporary housing politics. On the other hand: the behaviour could also be interpreted as ideological inconsistency: to call for the outcomes of the social democratic welfare regime, but with the core mix of the liberal welfare regime. It is difficult to determine which hypothesis is right with

The takeaway is that some levers (regulation, provision) are common currency — everyone uses them, but frames them differently. Other levers (subsidisation, price regulation, allocation) are more identity-defining and produce much clearer separation between party families.

## 7.4 National context as a nudge

A major aim of the thesis was to see whether national context determines how parties talk about housing. Chapter 6 tested two simple stories:

- Alignment: parties lean toward the dominant welfare–housing logic of their national system (for example, a Swedish party taking an explicitly state-led position; a Spanish party leaning into familial responsibility).
- Opposition: parties position themselves against that national baseline (for example, a Swedish party pushing for more market logic than Sweden traditionally allows; a UK party arguing for more state steering in a liberal regime).

The results show that neither alignment nor opposition alone explains party positioning in the welfare triangle. Instead, the picture is more subtle.

Within each party family, there is variation — but it is patterned.

Social democratic parties all cluster in the state-led corner. Swedish Socialdemokraterna lean strongly into state responsibility and universal access, which is consistent with Sweden’s social democratic housing tradition. PSOE in Spain also argues for public steering and affordability as a right, but with a noticeably stronger familial imprint than its northern counterparts. This suggests that even social democratic parties in Mediterranean contexts absorb some of the local expectation that families play a central role in housing security.

Christian democratic parties all sit in the corporatist space defined by partnership delivery, targeted support, and calibrated regulation. But they are not identical. Partido Popular in Spain adopts more state-steering language than the “textbook” corporatist model would predict. One possible explanation is that Spain’s affordability and access pressures have become so acute that even a centre-right party has electoral incentives to present the state as an active guarantor — not as a universal welfare state, but as a protector of “ordinary families.” This goes beyond simple alignment with the Mediterranean context. It suggests that Christian democratic parties can stretch corporatist reasoning toward a more interventionist stance when the housing system is perceived to be failing.

Liberal parties are where national context shows up most clearly. In Sweden — a system with historically strong state steering — Centerpartiet can plausibly call for deregulation and faster, more market-driven delivery. In the Netherlands and Flanders, VVD and Open VLD adopt more corporatist language: partnership, coordination, enabling delivery actors. In the UK — a strongly liberal system with deep affordability problems — the Liberal Democrats lean into proposals that were coded overwhelmingly as social democratic and corporatist: stronger public steering, explicit affordability guarantees, and intervention into outcomes. In other words, liberal parties tend to pitch what the domestic baseline is *not* delivering. Where the system is heavily planned and permission-driven, liberals say “cut the red tape.” Where the system is already market-dominated and unpopular, liberals say “the state must step in and fix this mess.” This supports the view that liberal housing politics is oppositional to context, but in different directions depending on that context (Beer, et al., 2007).

Populist parties adapt their messages to domestic structures while holding onto an exclusionary core. Vlaams Belang and PVV talk in state- or corporatist-tinged terms — “use state leverage to prioritise our own people.” Reform UK takes a more openly market-liberal stance in a liberal system. Sverigedemokraterna push Sweden somewhat toward market logic in a traditionally state-led field. Vox in Spain is the important outlier: instead of emphasising nativist allocation of social housing (which is less electorally salient where social housing is limited), it elevates the (extended) family as the key welfare unit and argues for supporting that structure. Vox ends up furthest toward the “family” corner of the triangle of any party in the dataset. This is very strong evidence that Mediterranean familialism actually travels into party housing proposals, not just into social policy more broadly (Ferrara, 1996; Allen et al., 2004).

Across families, then, national context does not mechanically fix party positions, but it nudges the repertoire. Parties mostly “speak in their family accent” — social democrats sound social democratic, Christian democrats sound corporatist, liberals sound market/efficiency-oriented, populists sound nativist and protective — yet they adjust which tools they emphasise to fit what is electorally credible in their country.

Finally, Chapter 6 also arranged the parties within each country from the most state-centred to the most market-centred. In Sweden, the Netherlands, Flanders, and the UK, the ordering basically mirrors what political theory would predict: social democrats on the state side, Christian democrats in the corporatist/middle space, liberals toward the market, and populists toward the nationalist-right end. This could be read as a “national landscape effect,” but it can just as easily be read as what the literature already tells us to expect about

these party families (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Mudde, 2007). In other words: national context matters because it shapes what sounds plausible, but ideology still organises the field.

## 7.5 Nativism

A further finding is the way populist parties frame housing as a boundary good. Populist programmes consistently describe housing scarcity as the consequence of outsiders (migrants, newcomers, “queue jumpers”) and propose to restore fairness by giving priority to “our people.” This takes two forms:

- restricting or rescinding access for migrants and newcomers to subsidised or social housing,
- reserving scarce housing opportunities for natives, long-term residents, or culturally defined insiders.

In several cases, these proposals are explicit. They are framed not in technical terms (“we need to rebalance eligibility criteria”) but in moral terms (“our people have been pushed aside”). This matches Mudde’s account of welfare chauvinism: welfare is not delegitimised — in fact, it is defended — but it is re-nationalised and racialised (Mudde, 2007).

Two additional nuances emerged. First, this exclusionary allocation logic also appears, in weaker form, outside the populist family. At least one social democratic party echoes “natives first” language in the context of local housing access. This does not mean the party becomes populist. It shows that the populist frame — that fairness in housing is fundamentally about protecting insiders from outsiders — is politically contagious. Second, Vox is instructive because it does not frame housing mainly through nativist allocation. Instead, it leans on extended family responsibility and Mediterranean familialism. A plausible explanation is structural: where publicly allocated social rental housing is less extensive, “natives first in social housing” is less electorally potent. Instead, the boundary line is drawn around the traditional (Spanish) family as the moral unit of the housing system. In both cases, belonging does the work.

What this implies is that housing is becoming a frontline for drawing the boundary of the welfare state itself. Allocation rules are not just bureaucratic filters. They are increasingly framed as decisions about who *deserves* to be protected.

## 7.6 Methodological limitations

This thesis combines deductive qualitative coding with a visual comparative model to examine how political parties articulate housing policy in ideological terms across five European regions. That design makes the comparison possible — but it also shapes, and constrains, the results.

First, programme genre and length differ across countries. Election manifestos do not all behave the same way across contexts. Swedish programmes tend to be concise and directive; Dutch and Belgian programmes are often long and detailed; British and Spanish

programmes are more discursive and narrative. This affects how much extractable material each document contains per indicator. A Swedish party may state a firm position in one line (“we will cap rents in older stock”), while a Dutch party may spend two paragraphs on procedural detail. In the coding framework, both become one statement on “price regulation,” but the longer text naturally produces more codable statements overall. To limit this bias, statements were weighted by salience and distinctiveness rather than raw word count, but some structural imbalance is unavoidable. This means that cross-country differences in “volume” should not be overread as differences in ideological intensity.

Second, language and translation create interpretive risk. Most manifestos were not written in English. AI translation (DeepL) was used to generate working texts; only statements whose meaning remained semantically clear and consistent after translation were coded. This approach makes cross-country comparison possible, but tone can flatten in translation — especially affective language around exclusion, urgency, or moral entitlement. This matters in two areas:

- populist rhetoric, which often works through emotional register (“our people first,” “queue jumpers,” “taking back control”),
  - and rights-based social democratic language, which sometimes distinguishes between “need” and “right” in ways that do not always survive machine translation.
- As a result, nuance in framing may be partially undercaptured even if the functional content of a proposal is accurately coded.

Third, the indicators both enable and limit what can be seen. The study uses ten indicators, grouped into four tiers (core mix → regime logics → policy levers → outcome patterns). These indicators were built from welfare-regime theory and housing literature, and they work well for capturing responsibility (state/market/family), decommodification, allocation, and delivery instruments (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Barr, 1994, 2012; Hoekstra, 2010). But they also define the boundaries of the analysis.

- Proposals on spatial planning, infrastructure, or energy retrofits were only included when they explicitly targeted housing aims (affordability, access, allocation).
  - Broader welfare instruments that strongly shape housing affordability — e.g. minimum wage policy, social benefit levels, utility compensation — were generally not coded unless they were explicitly framed as housing policy.
  - Conversely, some tools that matter for housing politics (e.g. land-use governance, climate renovation mandates, demolition/renewal strategies) sit partially outside traditional housing categories and therefore entered the coding only where parties themselves tied them to housing access or affordability.
- In short, the coding system catches what parties name as “housing,” but some structurally important levers are likely underrepresented if parties frame them as something else (energy policy, labour market policy, spatial planning).

Fourth, the welfare triangle model is powerful but stylised. Plotting parties in the welfare triangle — with poles for state-led responsibility, market-led responsibility, and family/partnership-led responsibility — makes visible how parties position themselves relative to welfare-regime logics. It allows us to compare families across countries and to ask how national context nudges them.

But the triangle also simplifies in ways that introduce bias:

- Its geometry implies that corporatist logic sits between state and family, which can suggest a stronger “familial” tilt than some christian democratic texts actually contained. In many christian democratic programmes, the emphasis was less “families should provide welfare” and more “municipalities and intermediary organisations should coordinate provision for specific groups.” That is a corporatist/subsidiarity logic, but not always a familialist one in the Mediterranean sense (Ferrara, 1996; Van Kersbergen, 1995; Hoekstra, 2010).
- The triangle rewards visible state intervention. It is much easier to code “introduce rent control” (state-led action) than “do not extend rent control,” because non-intervention is an absence. Liberal logics — which often operate by *not* intervening — are therefore harder to locate spatially, and may be visually “pulled” toward the centre-left of the triangle simply because silence cannot be plotted. This helps explain why few parties end up in the far market-led corner, even though several liberal and populist texts clearly argued against stronger regulation.
- A related constraint concerns the Mediterranean welfare logic. In Esping-Andersen’s later extensions and in Southern European scholarship, Mediterranean regimes are characterised by strong familialism and comparatively weak universal state guarantees: welfare is informally absorbed by the (extended) family rather than by the state or regulated partnership structures (Ferrara, 1996; Allen et al., 2004). This logic is present in the coding scheme as “Mediterranean,” but it has fewer observable ‘hooks’ in Northern and Western European manifestos. Parties in Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the UK rarely frame housing explicitly as an intergenerational family obligation; instead, they refer to municipalities, housing associations, or developer partnerships, which were coded as corporatist rather than Mediterranean. As a result, Mediterranean logic becomes visible primarily in the Spanish programmes (e.g. Vox foregrounding the extended family) and is structurally underrepresented elsewhere. This means the share of “Mediterranean” mappings in the results partly reflects differences in *how* parties narrate responsibility, not only differences in the actual underlying reliance on family or informal support.

So the triangle is analytically useful for comparing positions, but it cannot by itself explain why a party is where it is. It needs interpretation. The thesis addressed this by reading the plotted positions back against indicator salience and content, but the visual model itself remains descriptive, not causal.

Fifth, temporal mismatch and stability. All party manifestos coded were from 2021–2024 election cycles. Housing systems, however, evolve more slowly. Institutional characteristics — tenure structure, subsidy architecture, allocation rules, planning culture — tend to be sticky. That institutional stability makes the cross-sectional comparison meaningful, but it also means that some of what parties describe as “new” is really an intervention into a system that predates the manifesto. The analysis treats the programmes as snapshots of ideological intent; it does not claim that systems have already moved to match those proposals.

Sixth, scale and salience were not quantified in budgetary terms. When two parties both propose “more provision,” they are coded as using the same lever — even if one is calling

for large-scale public construction and the other for a modest guarantee facility for first-time buyers. Likewise for subsidisation: a universal housing allowance and a narrowly targeted tax credit both fall under “subsidy” in the indicator logic, but they are not the same fiscal commitment. Budgets and expected fiscal weight were not coded. That means this study measures *direction* (which logic, which lever), not *magnitude*.

In combination, these methodological limits mean that the analysis is strongest at identifying patterned ideological language — who is made responsible, who is prioritised, which levers are legitimised — and weaker at capturing implied fiscal scale, the emotional force of rhetoric, or the quiet politics of inaction.

## 7.7 Scope and generalisability

Beyond method, there are limits to how far the findings can be generalised.

Geographic and party coverage is deliberately selective, not exhaustive.

The study covers five regions (Sweden, the Netherlands, Flanders, the UK, Spain) and four party families (social democratic, christian democratic, liberal, populist). These cases were chosen because they span different welfare traditions: social democratic/Nordic, corporatist/continental, liberal/Anglo-Saxon, and Mediterranean/familialist (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Ferrara, 1996; Hoekstra, 2010). But they are not “Europe as a whole.” Central and Eastern European parties are not represented, nor are green parties or radical left parties, which may use different housing logics (for example, eco-renovation mandates framed as social rights). The point of the sample is depth and contrast, not representativeness. The conclusions should therefore be read as illustrative of patterns, not as a full map of European party competition on housing.

Within each country, only one party per ideological family was analysed — the largest relevant party. This design choice makes cross-country comparison tractable, but it also introduces bias. It assumes that the leading party in each family is broadly representative of that family’s stance in that country. Sometimes that is true (for example, the main social democratic party tends to be stable across cycles). But in other cases, a different selection would likely have shifted the results. For instance, in the Netherlands the liberal party included in the analysis is the VVD; if instead a social-liberal party such as D66 had been the largest liberal force at the last election, the “liberal” position in the Dutch triangle could plausibly have moved closer to state-led steering and public norms, because D66 frames itself as social-liberal on housing rather than market-liberal. The same applies within other families: a more interventionist Christian democratic party or a more hardline populist party could have produced different emphasis on, for example, subsidisation or nativist allocation. In short, what is reported here is not “all liberals in the Netherlands,” but “the dominant liberal party in the Netherlands at that election.” The placements should therefore be read as anchored in electoral strength, not as definitive for every party under that label.

Only national-level programmes were analysed. In many housing systems — especially those with decentralised planning, municipal allocation powers, and regional subsidy schemes — the decisive fights happen below the national level. The Netherlands, Belgium (Flanders), and Spain are all examples where municipalities or regions have strong operational roles in provision, allocation, or regulation. National manifestos capture

ideological positioning (“what we believe housing should be”), but they do not necessarily capture the pragmatic deals parties strike in municipal coalitions or regional governments. That means some corporatist practical compromises, or some very hard-edged exclusionary allocation rules, may be under the radar here simply because they are negotiated locally rather than promised nationally.

Manifestos express intent, not delivered policy. The analysis treats programmes as meaningful ideological artefacts — and they are. They tell us what parties publicly claim to want before entering coalition bargaining. But manifestos are not the same thing as enacted policy. After elections, coalition negotiations, fiscal constraints, and administrative capacity all shape what actually gets implemented. A party can promise rent caps and then accept a watered-down “pilot.” A party can denounce “bureaucracy” and then quietly accept environmental standards because its coalition partners insist. This thesis does not track proposals into coalition agreements, budgets, or legislation. It therefore captures ideological direction and problem diagnosis, not institutional outcome.

That said, there is also a positive side to working with manifestos. Precisely because programmes are not yet constrained by coalition trade-offs, they offer a relatively clean view of how parties imagine the housing system ought to work. In that sense, they surface ideological intent more directly than ex post policy compromises do.

Hybrid and layered systems resist neat categorisation.

Finally, the welfare triangle and regime logics are ideal types. Real housing systems are hybrid, path-dependent, and layered. Spain is not “pure Mediterranean,” Sweden is not “pure social democratic,” the UK is not perfectly liberal, and Belgium is not perfectly corporatist. Parties speak into those hybrids — sometimes defending elements of the existing system, sometimes trying to bend it. The comparative figures in Chapter 6 show that parties within the same country do not all sit in the same corner of the triangle, and parties within the same family do not all sit in the same place across countries. That hybridity is not an error in the method; it is an empirical feature of contemporary housing politics. But it also means that the triangle should be read as a comparative heuristic, not as a claim that any country or party “is” a pure regime.

## 7.8 Implications for future research

Three main directions follow from this work.

(1) Track ideological drift over time.

The framework used here — ten indicators grouped into four tiers, mapped to welfare-regime logics — can be replicated over multiple electoral cycles. That would allow longitudinal analysis to answer questions like:

- Do social democratic parties remain as convergent and state-led if fiscal pressure tightens?
- Do christian democratic parties in high-pressure housing systems (like Spain) keep moving toward more interventionist language, and does that signal a structural shift in christian democratic housing doctrine?

- Do liberal parties in highly liberalised systems continue to “borrow” social democratic or corporatist tools when market delivery is seen as failing?
- Do populist parties increasingly normalise familialism and insider allocation rules in mainstream housing debates?

This would turn the welfare triangle from a snapshot into a way to measure ideological movement.

(2) Link proposals to implementation, budgets, and outcomes.

This thesis analysed what parties say. A next step is to connect that to what they *do*. That means following proposals into coalition agreements, budget allocations, legislation, and actual delivery. It also means linking each party family’s toolkit (strong rent regulation, targeted allocation, deregulation, family obligation, etc.) to outcomes such as affordability, rent burdens, waiting lists, wealth accumulation through ownership, and segregation patterns (Wind et al., 2016; Krapp et al., 2022). This would allow a shift from descriptive comparison — who talks like what — to evaluative inference: which ideological toolkits actually change housing outcomes, and for whom?

(3) Theorise familialism and belonging as structural welfare positions.

Two findings argue for extending welfare-regime theory.

- First, Spanish parties across all families (social democratic PSOE, christian democratic PP, populist Vox) sit closest to the “family” corner of the welfare triangle. That is not accidental. It reflects Mediterranean familialism as an active political resource, not just a residual condition of weak welfare states (Ferrara, 1996; Allen et al., 2004).
- Second, populist parties use allocation to draw moral boundaries around who counts as an insider to the housing system. In high-migration, high-pressure systems, that often takes the form of explicit nativist rationing. Where public rental allocation is less central, as in Spain, the same insider logic is reframed as defence of the traditional family.

Both of these suggest that the classic state–market–family triangle (Esping-Andersen, 1990) still works — but the “family” corner, and the question of “who belongs,” have become much more politically explicit than in earlier welfare-regime debates. Housing may now be one of the main arenas in which that politics of belonging is worked out.

Taken together, these implications move the project from structured description to explanation. By scaling the framework across time and space, attaching fiscal and legislative weight, connecting proposals to outcomes, and explicitly theorising familialism and nativist belonging, future work can move beyond “how parties talk about housing” toward “how those ideological toolkits reshape — and are reshaped by — housing systems.”

## 8. Conclusions

This thesis examines how party ideology shapes electoral housing proposals across five European contexts and whether those proposals converge within political families or diverge under national institutional pressures. Using a welfare–housing framework operationalised through ten indicators and a welfare triangle, the study maps proposal content to regime logics (state–market–family mix, decommodification, stratification/allocation, objectives, regulation, provision, and tenure structure). This chapter concludes this with the answers of the research questions, and a summary of the contribution, implications and limitations.

### 8.1 Answering the research questions

#### **Main research question**

To what extent do political parties with similar ideological profiles (social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, populist) advance similar housing policy proposals across different national contexts, and how do these proposals align with welfare-regime logics?

This question can be answered in three steps: how proposals are structured ideologically (RQ1), how parties converge and diverge across families and indicators (RQ2), and how national context shapes similarities and differences within families (RQ3).

#### 8.1.1 Answering RQ1.

#### **How are electoral housing proposals ideologically structured when read through welfare–housing regime theory?**

This thesis shows that housing proposals in electoral programmes can be read as structured ideological repertoires. They are not random lists of promises. Parties repeatedly take positions on four things:

- who should be responsible for delivering housing security (state, market, partnership actors, or family);
- how people should be protected from market pressure (through subsidisation, price control, or not);
- who should be prioritised or excluded (allocation rules, access rules);
- what kind of system they are ultimately working toward (for example, a mixed-tenure model or an owner-occupation dominated model).

To make this visible, each statement in the manifestos was coded across ten indicators. These indicators were grouped into four tiers:

1. Core mix
  - Who is primarily responsible for housing provision and security: the state, the market, intermediary actors (municipalities, associations, employers), or the family.
2. Regime logics
  - How far parties want to go in decommodification (protection from market exposure through subsidies and price rules).

- How they position stratification (whether access should reduce social hierarchy or reinforce it).
3. Policy levers
- Regulation (rules, standards, permitting, enforcement).
  - Objectives (what is presented as the main purpose: fairness, efficiency, order, access to ownership, stability).
  - Subsidisation (financial support, grants, guarantees, tax expenditure).
  - Price regulation (rent caps, rent freezes, affordability requirements).
  - Allocation (wide spread allocation rules, priority access for certain groups).
  - Provision (who builds and with what partnership model).
4. Outcome patterns
- Tenure orientation (toward mixed tenure or toward owner-occupation dominance).

Each coded statement was then mapped to one of four welfare-regime logics:

- social-democratic (state-led, universalist, redistributive),
- corporatist (partnership- and group-based, coordinated by the state but not fully run by it),
- liberal (market-led, competition-oriented, minimal intervention),
- Mediterranean (familialist, with responsibility routed through kin, intergenerational transfers, and local belonging).

Across parties, the pattern is clear: electoral housing proposals can be interpreted as claims about the shape of the housing welfare state. They express who should build, who should intervene, who should get help first, and who should be excluded. Put differently: parties “speak welfare” through housing. The visual results of chapter 5 are summarised in paragraph 8.2.

### 8.1.2 Answering RQ2

#### **Where do parties converge and diverge across indicators and political families?**

Across the four political families — social democratic, Christian democratic, liberal, populist — there are recognisable ideological signatures.

- Social-democratic parties are the most internally consistent. Their programmes cluster around strong state responsibility, extensive public steering of provision, tighter regulation, and broad subsidisation. They frame housing as a social right and emphasise universal access and affordability. Their proposals overwhelmingly map to social-democratic welfare logic, with only minor borrowing from other regimes. This indicates a coherent state-led project.
- Christian-democratic parties sit around a corporatist centre. They stress partnership delivery (municipalities, associations, developers), calibrated regulation (simplifying processes rather than centralising control), targeted support for defined groups (starters, key workers, seniors), and allocation rules that prioritise “deserving”

categories rather than universalist access. They generally do not call for sweeping redistribution, but neither do they defer fully to the market. They defend a coordinated, selective, ordered system.

- Liberal parties are the most fragmented. All liberal parties emphasise regulatory acceleration — cutting “red tape”, speeding up permitting, enabling supply — but diverge sharply on everything else. Some present a recognisably liberal package that leans on market provision and competition. Others make corporatist-style arguments about partnership and targeted entry support. One leans strongly on social-democratic instruments (public provision, public steering). In other words, “liberal” as a label no longer guarantees a single set of housing tools; in practice, liberal parties work through different welfare logics depending on context.
- Populist parties do not converge on one economic logic (state vs market). Instead, they converge on a distributive story. They frame housing as something that should protect “our own,” often by restricting access for newcomers or immigrants, and they defend the traditional (or extended) family as the proper unit of entitlement. They pair deregulation (“build faster, remove constraints”) with exclusionary allocation (“not for them, for us”). In Spain in particular, this takes the form of a familialist, Mediterranean logic: housing is something the family should secure and transmit.

Looking across indicators adds another layer. Some indicators are widely used by all families:

Regulation and provision are the most universal. All parties talk about building more homes and about changing the rules to make that possible. But “regulation” means different things depending on the family.

- For social democrats: strengthen and enforce standards.
- For Christian democrats: streamline and coordinate.
- For liberals: cut delays and administrative burdens.
- For populists: “free up” supply and strip out perceived restrictive rules.

Other indicators are much more family-specific:

Subsidisation and price regulation are strongly concentrated in social-democratic language and, to a lesser extent, in parts of the Christian-democratic and populist programmes. Liberal parties barely use them, and when they do, they frame them narrowly as temporary enablers rather than structural guarantees.

Allocation is ideologically charged.

- Social-democratic parties sometimes use it to guarantee fair or universal access.
- Christian-democratic parties use it to prioritise socially defined groups (starters, elderly, essential workers).
- Populist parties use it to exclude outsiders and explicitly reserve housing for “our own.”
- Liberal parties largely avoid allocation language altogether.

A final cross-family observation concerns focus. When we calculate a focus score (a measure of how concentrated a party's proposals are in one regime logic rather than mixing several), social-democratic parties score highest and are the most convergent. Christian-democratic parties are moderately convergent around a corporatist core, but draw from multiple logics. Liberal parties are the most internally divided: some are tightly liberal, others are almost entirely corporatist or even social-democratic. Populist parties are thematically consistent (protection of insiders, restriction of outsiders, family as the deserving unit), but ideologically eclectic: their economic stance can lean state, market, or partnership, depending on national context.

In short: party families still exist in practice. They each carry a recognisable housing “toolkit.” But those toolkits vary in how disciplined they are. Social democrats are disciplined and coherent; liberals are structurally divided; Christian democrats are coordinated but selective; populists are boundary-setting rather than economically uniform.

### 8.1.3 Answering RQ3

#### **RQ3. To what extent do parties within the same political family converge or diverge across countries, and what is the role of national context?**

The final question asked whether national context pulls parties toward or away from specific welfare logics — in other words, whether a Swedish party “sounds Swedish,” a Spanish party “sounds Spanish,” and so on — or whether ideological family identity dominates regardless of where the party operates.

Two possible mechanisms were tested:

- **Alignment:** parties echo the dominant logic of their national housing/welfare system.
- **Opposition:** parties position themselves against it.

The results show no simple rule. Within every family, there is variation, and neither pure alignment nor pure opposition explains all placements.

However, two clear patterns do emerge.

#### **First: national context nudges, but does not overwrite, family identity.**

Social-democratic parties, across countries, remain firmly state-led. Christian-democratic parties remain partnership-oriented and selective. Liberal parties all stress deregulation but differ dramatically in how far they are willing to go beyond that. Populist parties remain focused on insider protection and exclusion. In other words, parties behave recognisably “like themselves,” even in different systems. Family identity still matters.

#### **Second: the Mediterranean / familial pull is visible and consistent.**

Across all families represented in Spain, the Spanish party is the one that sits closest to the “family” corner of the welfare triangle. This is true for PSOE, Partido Popular, and Vox. That suggests that the Mediterranean familial logic — housing responsibility routed through kin, inheritance, intergenerational transfers, regional belonging — leaves a systematic imprint on how parties in Spain frame housing. This is the clearest cross-national nudge in the dataset.

Within countries, when parties are ordered from “most state-led” to “most market-led,” the ranking largely mirrors the classic ideological spectrum: social democrats on the state side, Christian democrats in a corporatist middle, liberals to the market side, and populists typically to the right, often pairing market language with insider protection. This pattern holds in Sweden, the Netherlands, Flanders and the UK. That suggests that, even after decades of reform and hybridisation, the familiar ideological gradient is still recognisable in housing.

So, to answer the main research question directly:

- Parties with similar ideological profiles do often advance comparable housing logics across countries — especially social-democratic and Christian-democratic parties.
- Liberal and populist parties are less uniform, but even there, recurring themes appear: deregulation in the liberal family; belonging, exclusion and familial responsibility in the populist family.
- National context does shape the way those logics are expressed, but mostly as a tilt, not as a rewrite. The strongest and most systematic national tilt observed is the familial / Mediterranean pattern in Spain.

## 8.2 Visual summary of ideological structuring


Figure 35 synthesises the core finding of this thesis in one view and directly supports the answer to RQ1. Each point represents one party’s housing programme, positioned in a welfare triangle with three poles: state-led responsibility, market-led responsibility, and family/partnership-led responsibility. The positions are derived from the coded proposals (Appendix 2), using the indicator framework that traced who is made responsible for building, funding, allocating, regulating and guaranteeing access to housing.

Reading the figure shows that electoral housing proposals are ideologically structured rather than ad hoc.

- Social-democratic parties cluster toward the state pole, reflecting programmes built around public steering, regulation, subsidisation, and universal access.
- Christian-democratic parties sit in a coordinated middle zone, consistent with corporatist logic: partnership delivery (municipalities, associations, developers), targeted support for specific groups, and calibrated regulation.
- Liberal and populist parties extend further toward the market pole, but in different ways. Most liberal parties emphasise deregulation and market facilitation. Populist parties combine deregulation with allocation framed in exclusionary or nativist terms (“for our own first”).
- In Spain, parties across families sit closer to the family/household corner, reflecting the Mediterranean expectation that families — rather than the state — carry core housing responsibility.

In other words, Figure X shows that parties position themselves in housing by answering three welfare-state questions: Who should provide? Who should be prioritised? On what terms? That is the ideological structure RQ1 asked about.

**Figure 35. Position of all parties in the welfare triangle**



*Note: Each point shows one party's housing proposals, located according to the stated or implied balance of responsibility between state provision/guarantee, market provision/competition, and family-/partnership-based provision. Clustering near the state pole corresponds to a social-democratic logic; central clustering corresponds to corporatist partnership; movement toward the market pole corresponds to liberal facilitation/deregulation; movement toward the family pole reflects familialist responsibility. Positions reproduce the results discussed in Chapters 5–6.*

### 8.3 Substantive contribution

This thesis shows that electoral housing proposals are not just technical fixes. They are political statements about welfare order.

By coding proposals along ten indicators — responsibility for provision, decommodification, stratification, regulation, subsidisation, allocation, provision, and tenure outcomes, among others — the analysis reveals that parties consistently express answers to core distributional questions: Who should build? Who should regulate? Who should pay? Who should benefit first? Who should be protected? Who should be excluded?

Three substantive advances follow.

1. Housing proposals can be systematically read as welfare-state claims. Parties are not just promising “more homes.” They are defining who owes housing security to whom, and under what terms. Reading housing proposals through welfare regime theory helps ordering the housing programs, that sometimes all together seem like rather technical proposals/ However, this studie show that they ‘speak’ ideology, and that a parties ideology is the most determining factor in the position in the welfare triangle.
2. Party families still matter. Social democrats defend a universalist, state-steered housing model. Christian democrats defend a corporatist, selective model built around partnership and prioritisation of specific groups, but also borrow from social democratic and liberal welfare regime thinking. Liberal parties defend deregulation rhetorically but split over how far to trust the market alone, often borrowing corporatist or social-democratic instruments. Populist parties defend protection for insiders and tighten belonging boundaries, often linking housing access to identity and “deservingness.”
3. Two logics that are often treated as side issues — familialism and nativist allocation — are in fact central for some actors. In Spain, parties across families normalise family-based responsibility and intergenerational support. Among populist parties, proposals openly connect housing allocation to national belonging and immigration status. This shows that housing is being used not just to deliver welfare, but to draw the line around who counts as part of the welfare community.

### 8.4 Methodological contribution

The thesis also develops an approach that can travel.

- It builds and applies a ten-indicator codebook that groups proposals into four tiers (core mix, regime logics, policy levers, outcome patterns).
- It maps each coded statement to a welfare-regime logic (social-democratic, corporatist, liberal, Mediterranean), with additional attention to nativist allocation and insider protection.
- It aggregates those mappings at the party level and at the family level, allowing comparison both within and across ideological families.
- It locates each party in a welfare triangle, positioning it in relation to state responsibility, market responsibility, and family/partnership responsibility.

- It introduces a focus score to capture whether a party is ideologically concentrated (mostly speaking one welfare language) or ideologically diffuse (strategically mixing multiple welfare languages).

This combination — structured coding, regime mapping, geometric placement and analysis, and focus scoring — offers a reusable way to compare parties' housing visions across countries and over time. It turns manifesto language into something that can be analysed, compared, and tracked.

## 8.5 Implications

There are three main implications.

### **For comparative housing politics:**

The framework can now be scaled outward and forward. Adding more countries (especially Central and Eastern Europe), more party families (e.g. Greens, radical left), and more elections would allow us to trace ideological drift: whether, for example, liberal parties continue to borrow corporatist tools, or social-democratic parties start narrowing toward targeted allocation under fiscal pressure.

### **For policy expectations:**

The mapping of typical “toolkits” by family helps anticipate negotiation lines. Social-democratic parties are likely to push for direct public steering, rent protection, and subsidisation. Christian-democratic parties are likely to defend targeted access rules and partnership delivery with intermediaries. Liberal parties are likely to push regulatory acceleration. Populist parties are likely to push insider-first allocation and link housing scarcity to belonging. These are predictable fault lines in future housing debates.

### **For policy evaluation:**

Because the coding is explicit, the next step is to connect proposal bundles to housing outcomes. Do parties that emphasise public provision and rent control produce different tenure mixes, affordability outcomes, or segregation patterns than parties that emphasise deregulation and private delivery? Do parties that frame allocation in nativist terms translate that into exclusionary governance? The framework here makes those questions empirically testable.

## 8.6 Limitations and scope conditions

Several limitations shape how these findings should be interpreted.

- The analysis is based on national election programmes from five regions, over one electoral moment. National manifestos are important statements of intent, but they are also strategic documents. In decentralised systems, much of housing delivery is negotiated locally, and that layer is not captured here.
- The programmes differ structurally. Some are long and technocratic; others are short and slogan-driven. Weighting by statement count reduces, but does not eliminate, those differences. Translations add another layer of interpretation, especially for emotionally charged or identity-based language.

- The study analyses proposals, not implementation. Parties may compromise in coalition, run into fiscal limits, or inherit constraints from existing law. A party that promises “public construction at scale” and a party that promises “faster approvals for private developers” are not equally exposed to budgetary risk. The method does not yet attach spending magnitude or feasibility to each proposal.
- The welfare triangle is necessarily a simplification. It compresses complex, sometimes hybrid positions into a single spatial placement. In particular, it assumes that “family responsibility” is always visible in explicit proposals. In practice, the Mediterranean logic is partly cultural and informal. That means it may be undercounted quantitatively, even where it is qualitatively clear.
- Finally, some levers are easier to promise than others. Deregulation is easy to write in a manifesto (“cut red tape”). Broad non-means-tested subsidisation is expensive. In that sense, some proposals may reflect signalling more than executable policy.

These limits do not weaken the main findings, but they do mark out the scope: the thesis captures ideological intent in national party housing proposals. It does not claim that all intent will, or can, survive into policy.

## 8.7 Closing remark

The core message of this thesis is that housing policy is one of the main stages on which welfare politics is being played out.

Parties do not just argue about how many homes should be built. They argue about who should build them, who should pay for them, who should be protected from the market, who should get access first, and — in the clearest cases — who belongs inside the housing system at all.

Social-democratic parties still defend a state-led housing project. Christian-democratic parties still defend a selective, partnership-led model. Liberal parties still talk about deregulation, even if what they actually propose beyond that varies widely. Populist parties have made housing explicitly about insiders and outsiders. National context bends these logics, especially in Spain, where familial responsibility is embedded in housing proposals across parties. But context does not erase ideological identity.

In that sense, housing is not just a policy problem. It is a way parties define the kind of welfare state they are trying to build — and the kind of society they say it is for.

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## Election programs

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## **Appendix**

Appendix 1: Operationalisation of housing proposals within the welfare state

Appendix 2: Housing statements - labeled and analysis


## Appendix 1: Operationalisation of housing proposals within the welfare state

Indicor: / welfare regime	Social Democratic	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean
1: Arrangement between state, market and family	Propose to codify a public mission for housing providers and long-horizon stewardship (public/non-profit ownership models); require resident representation in governance; set a unified national governance framework clarifying roles across public, private, and community actors; and publish transparent performance/audit dashboards under strong state coordination.	Propose to formalise multi-actor compacts under subsidiarity (municipalities, associations, co-ops, employers); create standing partnership boards and standard agreements with accessible mediation; and enact enabling statutes for co-operatives and community providers, with the state coordinating roles and resolving conflicts rather than directing volumes or prices.	Propose to streamline property/contract frameworks and administrative processes; provide independent ombuds/redress; require basic transparency (e.g., beneficial-ownership/landlord registers); and promote voluntary standards/certification and rapid private dispute resolution—light state steering that lowers transaction costs without directive control.	Propose to regularise titles and occupancy (cadastre/registration upgrades); provide legal tools for intergenerational transfer and co-residence (e.g., usufruct/co-ownership templates); set simple registration/compliance paths for small landlords and self-builders; and let municipalities facilitate family/community solutions within a light national frame.
2: Decommodification	Rights & duties: proposals on a legal right to housing, duty to house, Housing First/led, zero-homelessness targets. Provision & finance: scale up social/affordable supply; strong inclusionary obligations; protect/retain social stock. Governance & risk: broad rent rules + tenant protections; income-related supports; deposit caps/eviction prevention; stronger enforcement.	Institution-led prevention: proposals about targeted/ early-intervention services via existing bodies. Intermediary provision: incremental expansion through associations/PPPs; negotiated inclusion of affordable units. Selective protections: pilot/segment-specific adjustments within current frameworks.	Rights stance: opposing universal rights/duties; emphasising freedom of contract; narrow safety-nets. Market delivery: market-led provision; minimal non-market obligations; streamlined/relaxed planning. Light regulation: lighten rules; limit/repeal rent controls; supports framed as temporary/tightly means-tested.	Local/ familial: proposals about decentralising with broad local discretion; encouraging family/charity solutions. Limited expansion: keep public/non-profit growth limited; ad-hoc regularisation/self-build; weak/uneven enforcement. Selective standards: uneven application of rules; reliance on informal/familial risk-buffering.
3: Stratification	Access rules: proposals on universal/broad eligibility, mixing (avoid residualisation), anti-discrimination testing/enforcement. Land/stock governance: proposals on inclusionary planning/set-asides, protecting social stock, managing short-term rentals to preserve access across groups. Conditions & tenure: proposals on universal minimum standards, reducing deprivation/overcrowding, and levelling tenure opportunities (renting not inferior).	Access rules: proposals about targeted eligibility/priority via existing institutions; negotiated access. Land/stock governance: proposals about incremental inclusion via partnerships; planning that preserves existing composition. Conditions & tenure: proposals about segment-specific upgrades/relief that improve conditions without flattening hierarchies.	Access rules: proposals about market-led allocation, landlord discretion, opposing universal equal-opportunity mandates. Land/stock governance: proposals about deregulating/streamlining planning, minimal obligations for social/affordable units, permissive toward sorting uses. Conditions & tenure: proposals about leaving conditions to the market, few universal standards, individual/charitable responsibility; accept status/tenure segmentation.	Access rules: proposals about local discretion/ad-hoc rules, reliance on family/community networks over universal enforcement. Land/stock governance: proposals about limited inclusionary duties, weak/uneven enforcement, self-help/regularisation paths. Conditions & tenure: proposals about selective standards with uneven implementation, reliance on family support rather than universal equalisation.
4: Regulation	Strong central steering with uniform tenant protections and proactive enforcement: fixed/longer default tenancies; bans on no-fault evictions; landlord (and broker) registers/licences; curbs on vacancy and speculative buy-to-let (self-occupancy/buy-out protections; right of first refusal to public/co-ops); preservation of social stock (strict sale rules); quality-by-design governance (architect role, design competitions, institute); mandatory accessibility/quality certification and more inspections; sustainability baked into regulation (biobased standards; energy-performance—linked tenancy/enforcement).	Functional decentralisation, incremental, problem-solving policiesFunctional decentralisation and incremental, problem-solving rules co-produced with municipalities and organised actors: nationwide landlord/broker licensing with local dispute resolution (rent commissions, rental teams); municipal instruments (neighbourhood permits, vacancy taxes, targeted self-occupancy zones, local property-tax differentiation); planning/land tools (affordable-rental quotas in large projects, brownfield-style covenants, last-resort expropriation at defined thresholds); safety/quality upgrades (cladding remediation, energy-label improvement deadlines) with neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood delivery; tenure security in social renting (end temporary contracts) while maintaining administrative checks;	Light-touch, pro-development deregulation: simplify/shorten permits and appeals; make advisory opinions non-binding; reduce certification burdens and harmonise local rules; relax spatial/environmental constraints (e.g., shoreline/nitrogen reforms) to speed building; maximise owner autonomy (no mandatory retrofits/heat pumps; voluntary sustainability); enable flexible housing forms (micro-homes, modular, tiny/co-housing); targeted law-and-order enforcement on nuisance/rogue actors and transparency for leaseholders, without expanding substantive controls.	-
5: Objectives	Equity: housing as a basic right; expand high-quality, broadly accessible public/social housing; broaden access (e.g., higher income limits); protect tenants via redress when quality is poor; ensure affordable, quality housing. Efficiency: — Administrative feasibility: —	Equity: support first-time/middle groups into ownership (retain mortgage-interest deduction; reduce transaction taxes/fees; guarantees, 100% loans, Help to Buy/shared ownership/rent-to-own; stamp-duty relief; CGT relief to tenants; restore deductions; ICO guarantees; tax-advantaged first-home savings; eliminate VAT on first home). Efficiency: binding/realistic building agreements with municipalities; revamp housing deals to match economic activity and buyer preferences; regulatory frameworks for new models. Administrative feasibility: structure payments (e.g., VAT in instalments); predictable, easy-to-use schemes.	Equity: build smaller/appropriate homes for first-time buyers and small households. Efficiency: remove binding constraints to speed supply (scrap nitrogen/nutrient neutrality obstacles with mitigation; release non-protected land); streamline permitting; close regulatory loopholes; enable data access (EPC); use tech/AI to accelerate processing. Administrative feasibility: limit admin burden; one-stop/site visit for certificates; extend validities where safe; simplify mobile care-home rules; unified “housing pass.”	-
6: Subsidiation	Demand-side subsidies: widen rental subsidies (shorter waiting periods; extend to the private market; taper support to avoid cliffs; include people in or seeking work; extend for the most precarious); extend guaranteed housing insurance to private renting. Supply-side subsidies: subsidising social/affordable rental for wide groups; expand budget/convened rentals; set minimum shares for subsidised rental in new developments.	Demand-side subsidies: segment-specific aids (youth rental support; adjustment premiums for elderly/care needs; interest-free emergency renovation loans; 0% energy-savings loans for low/middle incomes); buyer-side support (public guarantees for deposits/loan-to-value, tax-advantaged first-home saving, VAT/fee relief on first home). Supply-side subsidies: fund/intermediary finance (affordable-housing funds; facilitation where market value < build cost); landlord investment deductions tied to energy upgrades with temporary rent-rise caps; replace recurring energy tariffs with one-off retrofit support in long-term rentals; develop residential resources for elderly/assisted living. Help non-profit organisations to develop affordable housing	Demand-side subsidies: tightly means-tested, time-limited supports; narrow safety nets rather than broad entitlements. Supply-side subsidies: minimise or phase down production grants; rely on market delivery; if used, apply small, time-limited, cost-controlled incentives like tax deductions.	-
7: Price regulation	Rent level rules: proposals on a national rent brake / cap for new contracts (e.g., target rent via a reference estimator with a limited margin); proposals to contain housing prices. Governance & design: proposals on a comprehensive, uniform national system with national criteria and limited regional variation; directive, national-level steering.	Rent level rules: proposals to limit rent increases (cap largest rises; keep rents “reasonable”); simplify complex rent-calculation rules while keeping renting attractive (esp. for small landlords). Governance & design: proposals for a differentiated approach with a national baseline and regional/local implementation; use of designated zones; incremental, problem-solving adjustments.	Rent level rules: proposals to end rent control in lease contracts; proposals to remove temporary expropriation measures. Governance & design: proposals for market determination of prices with relatively little state regulation at both central and local levels.	-


8: Allocation	<p>Access rules: proposals on national, transparent needs-based/CBL systems; broad eligibility; anti-discrimination testing/enforcement; restrict status-preserving rules (e.g., strong limits on local-connection barriers). Priorities: proposals on guaranteed access for vulnerable groups (e.g., homeless minors, people with disabilities), but within a universalist framework; time-bound priority to reduce waiting times without residualising groups.</p> <p>Governance: proposals on uniform national criteria, clear appeal processes.</p>	<p>Access rules: proposals about local discretion within national baselines; experiments with lottery on waiting lists to improve youth chances; maintain local/vital-occupation tests (e.g., reserving a share of new units for local residents and key workers).</p> <p>Priorities: proposals about target-group priorities (youth, students, elderly, people with disabilities, key workers, immigrant workers); integrated housing-care pathways; measures for homeless minors and early detection for at-risk young adults.</p> <p>Governance: proposals about municipal plans with binding targets for suitable senior housing; moving support (allowances/rent retention); standards/certification for inclusive senior care; resource local allocation capacity (e.g., more planning/allocation staff).</p>	<p>Access rules: proposals about market-led allocation with greater provider/landlord discretion; oppose new universal allocation mandates; rely on narrow eligibility for limited social stock.</p> <p>Priorities: proposals about limiting quotas and lotteries; prefer vouchers/allowances over detailed allocation rules; avoid permanent priority lists beyond minimal safeguards.</p> <p>Governance &amp; transparency: proposals about devolving decisions to providers/localities; simplify rules; minimise administrative burdens in allocation procedures.</p>	-
9: Provision	<p>Steering &amp; land/planning: proposals on national steering (minister/fund, enforceable targets), active land policy (public land bank, site designation), building obligation (penalties/expropriation), clear master plans, strategic densification. Delivery &amp; financing: proposals on public-led build programmes (large social/mid segments), build-through guarantees in downturns, enforceable social-share in new projects, public acquisition + renovate-to-rent, stable programme funding and pooled technical capacity.</p>	<p>Steering &amp; land/planning: proposals about local steering within national frames, brownfield-first and targeted densification, simple zoning families, vacant-land taxes, frameworks for temporary uses. Delivery &amp; financing: proposals about partnership delivery (municipalities/associations/co-ops/private), co-op support (guarantee funds, first-refusal), associations/co-ops acquiring/renovating/(re)letting, targeted affordable-housing funds, small-landlord incentives tied to quality/energy upgrades, one-stop municipal support, credit/guarantee schemes for limited-access groups.</p>	<p>Steering &amp; land/planning: proposals about simplifying/streamlining planning (replace detailed plans; cut layers/mandates), relaxing siting/environment constraints where proportionate to unlock supply. Delivery &amp; financing: proposals about market-led delivery (developer/investor agreements for mid-rent), encouraging private landlords, converting vacant commercial to housing, time-limited tax incentives for (re)builds, removing cost bottlenecks.</p>	<p>Steering &amp; land/planning: proposals about discretionary/local permitting, regularisation/titling to mobilise existing stock, selective public-land use for targeted schemes. Delivery &amp; financing: proposals about facilitating family/self-provision and incremental/self-build, small ad-hoc grants/agreements, community/charitable partnerships, limited locally administered programmes.</p>
10: Share of homeownership sector	<p>Tenure vision: promote choice across renting and owning; keep renting a credible, quality path.</p> <p>Finance/tax stance: balanced support across tenures to maintain a mixed structure.</p> <p>Governance: embed mix targets and general safeguards for tenure diversity.</p>		<p>Tenure vision: emphasise homeownership as the primary pathway. Supply strategy: expand owner-occupied options (including in high-demand areas); rental growth is secondary.</p> <p>Finance/tax stance: lower barriers to purchase (easier mortgages; lighter transaction/ownership taxes/fees). Governance: enable pathways from renting to owning and frameworks that favour ownership uptake.</p>	

## Appendix 2: Housing statements - labeled and analysis


Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis							
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemokraterna	All municipalities, including the wealthy ones, should take their share of responsibility when housing asylumseekers.	2	Social Democratic	8		Housing state typology	Social Democrat	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological	c sum	
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemokraterna	Asylum seekers should no longer be able to choose where they live.	2	Nativist			Weight:	6	1	0	0	2	9	
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemokraterna	Housing and tenure forms must be mixed.	1	SD&C	10		Percentage (incl. non ideological/nati	66,6666667	11,1111111	0	0	22,2222222	100	
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemokraterna	Overcrowding must be combated.	1	Social Democratic	3		Percentage (excl. non ideological/nati	85,7142857	14,28571429	0	0	-	100	
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemokraterna	We will continue to build rental apartments that ordinary people can afford to live in.	2	Social Democratic	9									
									<b>Party - Region</b>	Social Democrat	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate
										0,857142857	0,1428571429	0	0	0,07142857143	0,04123930494
									<b>Welfare Model</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>Y</b>				
									Social Democratic	0	0				
									Liberal	1	0				
									Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038				
									Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346				
									indicator	amount					
									1	0					
									2	0					
									3	1					
									4	0					
									5	0					
									6	0					
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
Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator	Analysis										
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Introduce a vision of zero homelessness among pensioners and increase government funding for housing support	3	Social Democratic	2	3	Housing state ty	Social Democrati	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranian	Non ideological c sum				
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	A functioning housing market is a prerequisite for increased growth	1	Liberal	5	Weight:	7	3	10	1	2	23				
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	everyone should dare to dream of to own their own home	1	L&M	10	Percentage (incl.	30,43478261	13,04347826	43,47826087	4,347826087	8,695652174	100				
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	We want to implement reforms that increase the construction of both rental as condominiums.	2	Social Democratic	9	Percentage (excl	33,33333333	14,28571429	47,61904762	4,761904762	-	100				
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	To achieve greater acceptance,with the public, we want to give citizens greater influence over architecture.	2	Non-ideological												
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Abolish current shore protection to enable increased construction	2	Liberal	4											
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Replace advanced detailed plans with simpler building plans	3	Liberal	9	<b>Party - Region</b>	<b>ocial Democratic</b>	<b>Corporatist %</b>	<b>Liberal %</b>	<b>Mediterranean %</b>	<b>X-Coordinate</b>	<b>Y-Coordinate</b>				
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Stop the left from reintroducing property tax	3	Liberal	3		0,3333333333	0,1428571429	0,4761904762	0,04761904762	0,5714285714	0,08247860988				
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Keeping the mortgage interest deduction	3	Corporatist	5											
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Enabling fairer rents by potential tenants' valuation of the housing is given more importance	2	Social Democratic	7	<b>Welfare Model</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>Y</b>								
								Social Democrati	0	0							
								Liberal	1	0							
								Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038							
								Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346							
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
Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis									
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Expensive, complicated and innovation-inhibiting regulations lie like a wet blanket over parts of the countryside. We will clean up redundant rules and bureaucracy.	3	Liberal	4		Housing state typ	Social Democrati	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological c sum				
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Shoreline protection will be reformed to make it easier to build and live in rural areas. It is time to give rural dwellers more autonomy over their own land and simplify the rules to make it easier to build and live in rural areas.	2	Liberal	4		Weight:	2	0	10	0	0	12			
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Women's shelters, girls' shelters and shelters need more and permanent funding to continue their important work.	2	Social Democratic	2		Percentage (incl.	16,66666667	0	83,33333333	0	0	100			
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Housing is the biggest investment many people make. The enhanced mortgage repayment requirement - a forced savings scheme for those on the lowest incomes - should be abolished now that interest rates are normalizing.	2	Liberal	4		Percentage (excl.	16,66666667	0	83,33333333	0	-	100			
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	We will not contribute to any tax increases that ... make it more expensive to live.	3	Liberal	1											
									<b>Party - Region</b>	<b>Social Democratic</b>	<b>Corporatist %</b>	<b>Liberal %</b>	<b>Mediterranean %</b>	<b>X-Coordinate</b>	<b>Y-Coordinate</b>		
										0,1666666667	0	0,8333333333	0	0,8333333333	0		
									<b>Welfare Model</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>Y</b>						
									Social Democrati	0	0						
									Liberal	1	0						
									Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038						
									Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346						
									indicator	amount							
									1	1							
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									3	0							
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									7	0							
									8	0							
									9	0							
									10	0							



Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis									
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	There are many challenges today, where rigid rules for construction and business development lie like a wet blanket.	1	Liberal	4		Housing state typ	Social Democratic	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological c	sum			
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Everyone should have access to a good standard of housing and be able to live in a safe, secure and pleasant environment.	1	Social Democratic	2		Weight:	6	6	11	0	4	27			
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	It should be easier to move or change housing if necessary. There should be more freedom of choice between different types of housing.	1	SD&C	10		Percentage (incl.	22,22222222	22,22222222	40,74074074	0	14,81481481	100			
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	We will take greater account of the different conditions for housing construction around Sweden.	1	Social Democratic	9		Percentage (excl	26,08695652	26,08695652	47,82608696	0	-	100			
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	The Sweden Democrats want to facilitate housing construction by simplifying and speeding up decision-making processes and reviewing the extensive regulations and requirements governing housing construction.	2	Liberal	4											
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Measures also need to be taken to curb the soaring cost of housing so that more people can afford a home.	1	Corporatist	2											
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	The Sweden Democrats want to stop plans to reintroduce property tax,	3	Liberal	3		<b>Party - Region</b>	<b>Social Democratic</b>	<b>Corporatist %</b>	<b>Liberal %</b>	<b>Mediterranean %</b>	<b>X-Coordinate</b>	<b>Y-Coordinate</b>			
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	enable more forms of financing for young people and first-time home buyers.	2	Corporatist	9			0,2608695652	0,2608695652	0,4782608696	0	0,6086956522	0,07530655685			
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	New construction can be facilitated by reviewing building codes and increasing competition in the construction market.	3	Liberal	1											
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	when new residential areas are established, it is important that mistakes made during the Million Homes Program are not repeated. The Sweden Democrats want to promote pleasant and safe areas with classic architecture. Aesthetics and design are important factors for how an environment is perceived and for safety.	2	Non-ideological			<b>Welfare Model</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>Y</b>							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	The possibility of affordable housing or holiday homes in attractive locations could be an important competitive advantage and thus help rural areas to develop. For this to become a reality, beach protection rules need to be relaxed	2	Liberal	9		Social Democrati	0	0							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	A review should also be carried out of the possibilities for building in areas of national interest.	1	Social Democratic	9		Liberal	1	0							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Financing of housing in rural areas should be facilitated. It is not uncommon for the value of a newly built property in rural areas to be less than the construction cost.	2	Corporatist	6		Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Combating homelessness is a priority social issue for the Sweden Democrats.	2	Social Democratic	2		Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Stop the positive discrimination of newcomers in terms of ... housing	2	Nativist												
								indicator	amount								
									1	1							
									2	3							
									3	1							
									4	2							
									5	0							
									6	1							
									7	0							
									8	0							
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									10	1							



Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis										
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Everyone has the right to a good and sustainable home. We are going to see housing again as a basic amenity rather than a revenue model for pawnbrokers and overseas investors. The government will take the reins and provide large numbers of affordable housing.	3	Social Democratic	1		Housing state type	Social Democrat	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological	c sum				
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	by having housing built for low and middle incomes,	1	Social Democratic	9		Weight:	75	31	0	0	6	112				
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	providing more social housing and getting land back into our hands	2	Social Democratic	9		Percentage (incl.	66,96428571	27,67857143	0	0	5,357142857	100				
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Special attention will be paid to housing for young people, the elderly and people with necessary occupations such as caregivers and teachers	1	Corporatist	8		Percentage (excl.	70,75471698	29,24528302	0	0	-	100				
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We also see homelessness as a housing rather than just a care issue.	1	Social Democratic	2												
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	The construction of new housing is stagnating in many places. In response, we are putting our efforts into splitting up large homes and converting vacant properties.	2	Non-ideological													
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We also encourage building layers on top of existing homes in densely populated areas.	2	Non-ideological			<b>Party - Region</b>	Social Democratic	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate				
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Through a newly established Housing Fund, we will ensure a substantial increase in the construction of affordable and sustainable rental and owner-occupied housing. The ambition is that 100,000 homes will be added annually, of which at least 40,000 will be social rental homes and 40,000 homes in the middle segment (rental and owner-occupied).	3	Social Democratic	9												
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	That is why we want a Minister of Housing and Spatial Planning with go-ahead power. Adapting permit and objection procedures that take more account of the interests of house seekers is a priority	3	Social Democratic	9												
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We encourage densification in our villages and towns, where there is often still plenty of room to build new homes.	2	Social Democratic	9		<b>Welfare Model</b>	X	Y								
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	In this regard, we are committed to the development of new communal housing for singles, composite families, the elderly and people with disabilities who need care.	3	Corporatist	8		Social Democrat	0	0								
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	To prevent construction from collapsing during economic bad times, we are introducing a build-through guarantee. This will allow construction projects to continue even if the pre-sale percentage of 70% is not achieved	3	Social Democratic	9		Liberal	1	0								
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Active land policy for more housing. We accelerate construction by returning to active land policy. With the new National Land Bank, we bring more land into public hands and help governments build affordable new construction (see more detailed proposal under "The community at the helm"). With this new construction, we ensure that the land remains in community hands.	3	Social Democratic	9		Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038								
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	In addition, we ensure that the increase in value of land through public investment also benefits society through a plan income tax.	3	Social Democratic	3		Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346								
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We encourage owners of land with a building destination to build by means of a building obligation: within a fixed period they must proceed to build a house. If they fail to do so, a fine and eventually expropriation will follow.	2	Social Democratic	9												
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Local governments are also given the option of taxing vacant land so that owners are encouraged to build on it.	2	Corporatist	9		indicator	amount									



Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Housing associations of and for society. We build public housing we can be proud of: high-quality broadly accessible housing after the Viennese example.	3	Social Democratic	5	1	4							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Housing corporations regain the ability to build affordable rental housing for middle-income households as well.	1	Corporatist	9	2	5							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	we raise the income limits for the social rental sector so that more people can use it.	2	Social Democratic	5	3	3							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	We give housing corporations and housing cooperatives the means to actively buy homes from private parties, renovate them, make them more sustainable, and build social housing in them.	3	Corporatist	9	4	6							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	We make housing corporations social institutions of and for the community again: we give tenants and resident committees more say in the policy and composition of the board.	3	Social Democratic	1	5	2							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	The legal requirements for performance agreements between municipalities, housing corporations and tenants are renewed, municipalities can enforce them, non-compliance has consequences for the housing corporations.	2	Social Democratic	1	6	5							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Because they represent a public task, housing corporations will no longer have to pay profit tax with immediate effect. There will be a quick financial solution for regions with destitute housing corporations, so that they can also invest in the coming years in what is needed: new construction, sustainability and keeping the housing stock affordable.	3	Corporatist	1	7	0							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	End homelessness. It is unacceptable for people to be involuntarily homeless. The right to housing becomes the basis of our policy. We remain committed to the goal of ending involuntary homelessness by 2030, as agreed in the Lisbon Declaration. In the meantime, we ensure that quality and accessible shelter and care are guaranteed, also for migrants (whether they are EU citizens, asylum seekers or undocumented). We are committed to housing first to prevent and remedy homelessness. We invest heavily in building basic housing. Everyone who becomes homeless is immediately assigned such basic housing. Then they will receive help to find a new home and rebuild their lives. We want all municipalities to contribute proportionally to the housing of people leaving sheltered housing and social care.	2	Social Democratic	2	8	6							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Every municipality ensures that at least 30% of its housing stock consists of social rental housing. We are therefore committed to at least 40% social rental housing in new construction. These are affordable and quality housing, in principle from housing corporations or housing cooperatives. Municipalities with a large shortage of social rental housing are instructed to build additional housing in this segment. The Minister of Housing and Spatial Planning is given the ability to enforce the construction of sufficient social rental housing.	3	Social Democratic	9	9	13							








Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	<p>Housing and quality of life. Migrant workers are often housed in appalling conditions. This is bad for the migrant workers and undesirable for the vulnerable neighborhoods where this happens. Moreover, labor migration puts additional pressure on the shortage of affordable housing. We are introducing a licensing requirement for landlords. Municipalities will carry out a quality of life assessment when approving new businesses, which will also look at the impact on housing in surrounding municipalities. The option for employers to deduct housing costs from wages will be removed. This will also remove the opportunity for employers to make money from this. Regular rental law will also apply to migrant workers. We will introduce an approach to combat homelessness among migrant workers and will also make agreements on this within the EU and countries of origin.</p>	2	Social Democratic	2									
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Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator	Analysis										
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We therefore say: no longer build for the market, but build to communities.	1	Corporatist	1	Housing state typ	Social Democrati	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological c sum					
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The CDA clearly chooses to build enough homes for all housing seekers.	1	Social Democratic	2	Weight:	12	22	7	0	11	52				
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	we have been working on tighter government direction, abolishing the landlord levy, regulation of rents and strengthening the position of first-time buyers against slumlords and investors. The CDA was the driving force behind this restoration of public housing as a public service. We are going to continue with that.	1	Social Democratic	1	Percentage (incl.	23,07692308	42,30769231	13,46153846	0	21,15384615	100				
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We are committed to an affordable, livable and accessible home for all.	1	Social Democratic	2	Percentage (excl	29,26829268	53,65853659	17,07317073	0	-	100				
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We will continue unabated with the commitments made to build nearly one million homes through 2030, two-thirds of which will be affordable and with focus on starters, families and the elderly. In doing so, each municipality is building 40% for the middle groups and municipalities with little social housing should work on that.	2	Corporatist	4											
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The housing shortage is a social crisis. Prevent should be that nitrogen rules shut down major housing projects.	3	Non-ideological												
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The housing issue requires an independent Ministry of Housing and Planning	2	Social Democratic	1	<b>Party - Region</b>	<b>Social Democratic</b>	<b>Corporatist %</b>	<b>Liberal %</b>	<b>Mediterranean %</b>	<b>X-Coordinate</b>	<b>Y-Coordinate</b>				
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The new law allowing half of new construction and rental housing to be allocated by municipalities to their own residents and people with avital occupation is carried on.	3	Corporatist	8		0,2926829268	0,5365853659	0,1707317073	0	0,4390243902	0,1548988527				
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	Building a home, from plan to completion, takes an average of 10 to 15 years. This should and can be shorter. For this, objection and appeal procedures should be greatly shortened	3	Liberal	4	<b>Welfare Model</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>Y</b>								
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	Cooperatives are given the space to build for the middle class on a non-profit basis. For this, it is important that cooperatives have strategic land positions can take. We are abolishing the market test.	3	Corporatist	9											
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	Corporation tenants are given more opportunity to buy their homes. Housing associations then invest the financial proceeds in new construction and sustainability.	2	Liberal	1	Social Democrati	0	0								
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	In every village, a street may be added. Provinces should no longer put obstacles in the way of villages to build on to their own needs. By cities and villages to grow in a controlled way, to address "rotten spots" and to address the edges while respecting the environment, we are building vital villages and towns and strong communities with more space for young and old.	3	Corporatist	9	Liberal	1	0								
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We make a new Nota Ruimte that does justice to all regions and utilizes all regions. Growth has been skewed in recent decades: national housing policy is too focused on "build, build, build" in the already crowded Randstad. In the north, east and south of our country, there are also plenty of opportunities and is great need for housing.	2	Non-ideological		Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038								





Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	The housing shortage is a major problem. Hundreds of thousands of Dutch people, despite complying with all the rules of the game, have no sight of a home of their own. Certainly an affordable owner-occupied home is the way to build up a savings and face the future with optimism. That should be within reach for many more people again. The Netherlands must get off the nitrogen lock as soon as possible and the government must not thwart housing construction but rather push it forward, so that every Dutchman has the prospect of his own home.	1	L&M	10		Housing state typ	Social Democrati	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological c	sum		
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are working on a Right to Buy Act. Tenants of social housing will have a legal right to buy their own rental property, at a market price. We do an income test beforehand. This law will first apply to small apartment complexes and row houses. We will combat large-scale fragmentation of apartment complexes.	2	L&M	10		Weight:	17	44	27	5	8	101		
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We do not tamper with the freedom to sell your home. We believe you have the freedom to sell your home to whomever you want. It is your home. We will continue to protect this right.	2	Liberal	1		Percentage (incl.	16,83168317	43,56435644	26,73267327	4,95049505	7,920792079	100		
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	The mortgage interest deduction helps people keep their homes affordable. The scheme has been made more austere in recent years. As far as the VVD is concerned, the scheme will not be made more austere, in order to provide security for middle groups.	3	Corporatist	5		Percentage (excl	18,27956989	47,31182796	29,03225806	5,376344086	-	100		
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We also want to limit the local burden increase for homeowners and SMEs. To this end, it is important to strengthen the position of local councils. We will do this by introducing a national maximum percentage for the OZB increase on which city councils can then steer. This will prevent large OZB increases.	3	Liberal	1		100								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	To help more first-time buyers find a home, we will continue to develop a National Affordable Housing Fund and see if this Fund should be expanded.	3	Corporatist	6										
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are working on appropriate mortgages. To help young people buy a home and bring the monthly costs down, we encourage more first-time buyers to take advantage of a starter mortgage. We increase the opportunities to get a mortgage by making student debt count less when taking out a mortgage. Also, actual monthly costs can be taken into account more often. For the self-employed, there will be more opportunities to take out a mortgage more easily.	3	Liberal	1		Party - Region	Social Democratic	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate		



Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We ensure that rental housing becomes accessible to more people. We also want the nurse, defense employee or police officer to be able to live in the city or village where he or she works. For various social professions there will be a national priority for rental housing.	2	Corporatist	8	Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build sustainable rental housing. We ask corporations and landlords to make homes more sustainable. Anyone living in a poorly-insulated rental home can report this to the municipality. The municipality requires landlords to give a monthly rent reduction until measures are taken to insulate the house.	2	Corporatist	4									
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	On the other hand, we must address as many bumps as possible that make it difficult for landlords to make homes more sustainable.	1	Non-ideological	1		indicator	amount						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are addressing skewed rent. In recent years, we have tackled skewed rent. In order to make social housing available to the people who need it most, an annual income test for social housing will be introduced to see if the social rent requested is still appropriate. People whose income is too high will pay a higher rent.	2	Corporatist	4		1	9						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We protect orphans. Orphans are given the right to remain in rental housing after the death of their parents. It will be prohibited for corporations to place orphans out of social housing	2	Social Democratic	2		2	2						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We tackle rogue landlords. The Good Landlord Act allows municipalities to tackle rogue landlords. We help municipalities put this law into practice and provide support where necessary. We punish landlords who intimidate tenants or deliberately facilitate overcrowding more harshly	2	Corporatist	4		3	0						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We address residential nuisance and illegal subletting. We give landlords more opportunities to combat illegal subletting.	1	Corporatist	4		4	9						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We want to build hundreds of thousands of new houses, so that fine and affordable living becomes accessible to everyone again. That means adding dozens of neighborhoods to the Netherlands.	1	Social Democratic	9		5	3						


Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are going to build. The VVD wants more housing everywhere. Purchase homes, mid-rent homes and social housing. We are looking specifically at places around already existing infrastructure to match the ambition. We want the government to help build as much as possible. We therefore want the government to take more control of the housing market and ensure that as many houses as possible are built. The central government, in consultation with the provinces, will designate sites to build more quickly, if that does not happen municipally.	2	Social Democratic	9	6	2						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Finally, we ensure that high-quality flex housing is also taken by municipalities.	2	Social Democratic	9	7	1						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We conclude a Building Accord. There will be a plan for the layout of the Netherlands. Based on this plan, we will conclude a Building Agreement with builders, housing corporations and provinces. As a result, at least dozens of new large-scale neighborhoods will be built. These agreements will be enforceable. We draw lessons from the time when Vinex neighborhoods were built. At the local level, so-called combi-deals are concluded with municipalities on smart use of space. This also includes economic activities.	3	Corporatist	9	8	2						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	In the Building Agreement we give the housing of target groups a place, such as the housing of immigrant workers.	2	Corporatist	8	9	11						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build suburban and inner-city. We will continue to build houses within the boundaries of cities and towns. We will also build on the edges of cities and towns to provide more housing cheaper and faster. These can also be larger building sites. Nature and housing should not be opposites. We ensure that nature gets a place in the neighborhoods.	2	Non-ideological	1	10	3						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are building more affordable owner-occupied housing in major cities and in the region. The big cities have historically focused on building social rental housing. To give families and middle-income earners a chance to continue living the cities, we will build more affordable owner-occupied housing in the big cities. We will also build enough affordable owner-occupied housing in the region.	2	L&M	10								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Money for building houses. The housing impulse is transformed so that the construction of these neighborhoods gets off the ground and the construction of enough affordable houses becomes profitable. By reforming the housing impulse, we give first-time buyers the opportunity to buy their own homes.	3	Social Democratic	9								








Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator	Analysis								
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Reduce social rents	2	Social Democratic	3	Housing state typ	Social Democrati	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological c sum			
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Increase rent allowance	3	Social Democratic	6	Weight:	8	0	10	0	7	25		
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	More housing for the Dutch: build more social rental housing, more middle rental housing and more owner-occupied housing	3	Social Democratic	9	Percentage (incl.	32	0	40	0	28	100		
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Building not only inner-city, but also definitely outer-city - In cities and towns 'adding a street'	2	Non-ideological		Percentage (excl.	44,44444444	0	55,55555556	0	-	100		
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Municipalities must issue building permits faster; shorten procedures	3	Liberal	4									
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Hindering nitrogen rules off the table	3	Liberal	4									
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	No priority for status holders in allocation of social housing, but priority for Dutch nationals	3	Nativist		<b>Party - Region</b>	Social Democratic	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate		
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Stop creating gas-free homes	2	Liberal	4		0,4444444444	0	0,5555555556	0	0,5555555556	0		
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	No mandatory heat pump	2	Liberal	4									
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Allow permanent occupancy of vacation homes	2	Non-ideological		<b>Welfare Model</b>	X	Y						
							Social Democrati	0	0						
							Liberal	1	0						
							Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038						
							Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346						
							indicator	amount							
							1	0							
							2	0							
							3	1							
							4	4							
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							7	0							
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							9	1							
							10	0							



Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis									
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	We remove the registration tax on the purchase of the sole, own home at the first bracket of 250,000 euros. The portion of the purchase price above this exempt amount is taxed progressively. Thus, we make the purchase of the sole, own home cheaper.	3	Social Democratic	3		Housing state typ	Social Democrat	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological	c	sum		
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	The registration tax for outside residences and rental properties without a certificate of conformity rises from 12% to 21%. This is how we inhibit the purchase of housing by second stayers and slumlords. The rates for conforming rental housing (12%) and rental housing intended for social rental (7%) are maintained.	3	Social Democratic	3		Weight:	53	15	0	0	2	70			
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Those who buy an ordinary house pay registration tax on it, while large villas and land are often in companies. These are transferred through a sale of shares that is not subject to registration tax. We are taking steps to treat real estate share transactions the same for tax purposes as a sale of a property.	3	Social Democratic	3		Percentage (incl.	75,71428571	21,42857143	0	0	2,857142857	100			
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	By clearly defining where building is still allowed and where not, we put an end to spatial indecision and greatly expand the housing supply. A clear Flemish spatial plan in combination with an increased commitment to modular housing increases the housing supply in the coming years	3	Social Democratic	9		Percentage (excl.	77,94117647	22,05882353	0	0	-	100			
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Certain neighborhoods in our major cities are unaffordable. We give local governments the ability to prevent investor buyouts in neighborhoods where there is a scarcity of affordable housing. This buyout protection means that the buyer must either live in the home himself or rent the home at a reduced rent.	3	Social Democratic	4											
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Public buildings and public land with a residential function will no longer be sold to private actors, but given on a long lease. Also, rezoning of public land and properties to a residential function, in the context of a sale to private actors, will only be possible through ground lease. Ground lease makes it possible for prospective buyers to acquire a home without paying for the land. This then remains in government ownership. By removing the land price from the purchase price, the purchase of a house becomes up to 35% cheaper.	3	Social Democratic	1											
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	For people with modest incomes, poorly insulated homes are often the only ones they can afford. To support these buyers, we are putting extra effort into renovation within the Flemish Housing Loan. We do this with an attractive interest rate that does not increase with a longer term. And through faster processing of applications. We also ensure that every citizen gets a clear overview of the various support measures for renovation. Today, the government offers its support in a very fragmented way, so that it is often not taken up despite the high level of need.	2	Social Democratic	2		Party - Region	Social Democratic	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate			

Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	Due to the high demand for rental housing, rents often swing wildly. With the introduction of a "rent brake," landlords will be required in new contracts to follow at most the target rent according to the Rent Estimator, subject to a limited margin. By capping excessive rents, we put a brake on rising rents.	3	Social Democratic	7				0,7794117647	0,2205882353	0	0	0,1102941176	0,06367833851
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	The higher the rent deposit, the higher the barrier to renting. We are reducing the rent deposit from 3 months to 2 months of rent. This is how we make renting more accessible.	2	Social Democratic	2									
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	If the landlord does not want to renovate his energy-guzzling home, the tenant is left with a high energy bill. We again prohibit indexing rents of homes with an EPC label E or F and homes without an EPC certificate. In time, we will add homes with EPC label D, in line with energy targets.	2	Social Democratic	4									
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	By taxing the actual rental income, we give landlords the ability to deduct the investments they make in their rental housing from their taxes. Thus, we provide an important incentive to invest in the maintenance of rental housing. To also encourage major investments in quality improvement, we temporarily provide an increased tax deduction for investments that make a rental property more energy efficient. In this way, we encourage landlords to renovate their properties sustainably and at the same time combat undeclared work. To benefit from the deduction, the rent may only increase slightly during the first four years after renovation, so that the energy savings for the tenant are not completely undone. We do this for houses in all rental markets, including student rooms.	2	Corporatist	6									
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	To support low-income private tenants, we are building more social rental housing. In order not to leave the waiting private tenants out in the cold, we provide a rent premium for all tenants who are on the waiting list for 2 years for social housing (instead of after 4 years as is the case today). The more that is built, the less budget is needed for the rent premium and vice versa. This is why the two budgets are linked. We simultaneously address the high non-take-up of rent premium and rent subsidy and review the maximum rents to qualify for these allowances.	3	Social Democratic	6									
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	We envision an emergency program leading to 115,000 additional social housing units by 2050. Substantial investment is envisioned to achieve this goal. In addition, a central pool of architects, engineers, spatial planners and project supervisors will be created to which housing companies can freely call for support for their construction plans. In addition to construction and renovation, we ensure that housing companies can invest sufficiently in the upkeep of their social housing and provide proper guidance to social tenants. We also ensure that housing companies can concentrate on their core tasks, namely providing good and affordable housing for those in need of housing.	3	Social Democratic	9				0,5	0,8660254038				
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	We require private developers to provide a minimum share of 25% affordable rental housing in new projects of a certain size.	3	Corporatist	4				0,5	0,2886751346				

Welfare Model	X	Y
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






Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis										
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	For cd&v, good and affordable housing is more than a dream that may or may not be . It is abasic right that we must guarantee to every Fleming.	1	Social Democratic	5		Housing state typ	Social Democrati	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological c	sum				
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Where supply and demand insufficiently matched, the government can help, facilitate and create framework conditions. More so, the local government can take an active role in housing policy. Based on consultation, all housing actors can join hands to create an additional offer realize.	1	Corporatist	9		Weight:	42	66	24	3	21	156				
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	The priority for cd&v is that people have access to a regular mortgage loan. In the case of a temporary reduction in repayment capacity, the borrower may ask his or her bank to extend the credit period extend, in order to the monthly fee feasible. Moreover, this way the citizen avoids the high cost of additional mortgage registration. The total cost of credit increases, yet a (temporary) extension can mean the difference for many citizens in a number of situations.	3	L&M	10		Percentage (incl.	26,92307692	42,30769231	15,38461538	1,923076923	13,46153846	100				
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	That this accordion formula, based on a regulatory yet to be established, should be a basic right be for each borrower. We do ensure that this system is only possible in delineated cases, so that we do not create price driving effects of universally increased borrowing capacity. • Accordion formula as right to avoid financial noose in delineated cases.	3	Non-ideological			Percentage (excl	31,11111111	48,88888889	17,77777778	2,222222222	-	100				
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Reinstate a government guarantee for licensed credit unions. Introduce a guarantee scheme through private banks. Target audience: people with limited self-efficacy.	3	Corporatist	9												
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Families and singles with modest incomes should be able to take maximum advantage of the Flemish Housing Loan with an income-related interest rate. This is a social measure that we fully endorse.	2	Social Democratic	2												
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	A reasonable processing time for the file shows respect from the government the citizen. Additional investment is needed in the administrative teams of the Flemish Housing Fund to improve accessibility, customer service and turnaround time of files. improve. In some cases, it takes three to four months for a file to be fully approved and . That time is not available to less wealthy prospective buyers. Additional investment in the administrative teams of the Flemish Housing Fund for a reasonable processing time of files.	2	Non-ideological			Party - Region	Social Democratic	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate				
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Local differentiation in property tax as a guiding element in housing policy.	3	Corporatist	4				0,3111111111	0,4888888889	0,1777777778	0,02222222222	0,4333333333	0,1603750748			

Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Rising interest rates and declining home equity are pushing mortgage loan amounts. Those who over the least financial resources, should take out the largest loan. Therefore, we advocate Abolish the right to mortgage establishment. People today pay a 1% registration fee on the amount of the loan for which a mortgage registration is taken. This is unfair to people who need to borrow proportionately more money, than those who have more equity possess. Moreover, every buyer already pays registration tax on the purchase of his or her home, the so-called right to sell.	2	Corporatist	5											
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Update amounts of insurance guaranteed living.	2	Social Democratic	2			<b>Welfare Model</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>Y</b>						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Make award and monthly support income-related.	2	Social Democratic	2			Social Democrati	0	0						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Income-related premiums for energy renovations. Higher support for lowest incomes.	2	Social Democratic	3			Liberal	1	0						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Guaranteed indexing aid and limit amounts My Rebuilding Premium and My Rebuilding Loan.	2	Corporatist	3			Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Interest-free My Rebuilding Loan for the lowest incomes.	2	Social Democratic	3			Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Every Fleming should have access to a renovation coach at an energy house. Free of charge for lower-income and ex-social security tenants.	2	Non-ideological												
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Collaboration with private construction and renovation partners is essential.	1	Corporatist	9			indicator								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Simple majority rather than absolute majority in decree-mandated renovations to residential units with building impact in multifamily housing.	2	Liberal	4				1	3						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	For cd&v, what works counts. Private and government hands.	1	Corporatist	1				2	8						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Local plans inventory land and properties for development or renovation, account taking into account local demographics, opportunities and needs.	3	Corporatist	4				3	6						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Expansion of the VLABINVEST model to all of Flanders. Through commitment to conventional leasing, housing companies, together with developers, can also Provide additional private, affordable and social supply, at a market rate of return. Focus of the housing companies, of course, remains the construction of social housing. In addition, cd&v advocates for an extension of the VLABINVEST model (Flemish Brabant) to all of Flanders. Under provincial direction, supported by the Flemish Government, VLABINVEST conducts an active land and housing policy, in partnership with local governments and initiators. In doing so, VLABINVEST provides affordable rental and owner-occupied housing in the middle segment, for people who have a connection to the region, for example because they have lived or worked there for a long time. The focus should be Flanders-wide on affordable housing for as many Flemings as possible, in continuous cooperation and in consultation between the investment company, housing companies, municipalities and provinces, intermunicipalities, ocmw's and the Flemish Housing Fund. Prices of purchase and rental housing in this scenario are up to 20% below market price, with the purchase or rental price being income-related.	3	Corporatist	1				4	9						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Local governments at the steeringwheel. Provinces and Flanders facilitate.	1	Corporatist	9				5	12						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Vacancy taxes help homes on the market.	2	Corporatist	4				6	6						










Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis										
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	For liberals, property is a crucial factor in getting higher in life. Indeed, owning your own home is a strong protection in down times and allows you build something for yourself and for future generations.	1	L&M	10		Housing state type	Social Democrat	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological	c	sum			
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Being able to rent is also important to stand on your own two feet. Those who work should be able to rent quality housing in our country.	1	SD&C	10		Weight:	6	25	17	4	8	60				
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We therefore want everyone who works or has worked, including young people and single people, to be able to acquire their own affordable housing. This is only possible if the supply increases. This will only succeed if we relax the rules.	1	Liberal	4		Percentage (incl.	10	41,66666667	28,33333333	6,66666667	13,33333333	100				
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We propose to replace the current complex zoning plans with two clear categories: "Dynamic Space" and "Open Space. There are more than 200 existing zoning regulations, each with its own rules. We will replace these with a simpler, more streamlined system. Local governments are given the freedom to grant permits within these two categories. The emphasis here is on what cannot be done rather than an extensive list of restrictive conditions. This provides more flexibility and clarity within permitting.	3	Corporatist	9		Percentage (excl.	11,54	48,08	32,69	7,69	-	100				
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	All permits are tested against core qualities. These include matters such as green-blue veining, climate resistance and accessibility, as described in the Flanders Spatial Policy Plan BRV). These core qualities are dynamic and can evolve to remain relevant.	2	Corporatist	4		100,00										
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Smoothen permitting and more reporting thanks to a neighborhood permit. Obtaining a permit should be easier and it should be possible to more through notification. In some areas or for specific, simple building projects (which the local government demarcates), a very specific additional permit framework can be developed: as soon as these are met, it is almost certain that a permit will be obtained. We call this a district permit. Consider simple subdivisions or an area that allows limited alternative possibilities. Basic criteria (based on core qualities) such as image, depth and number of floors are determined a priori. In these areas, a notification is sufficient. Within this district permit, consideration is always given to how additional qualitative housing units can be created.	3	Corporatist	4												
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We focus on smart and future-oriented core densification. We recognize the need to make more efficient use of existing space, while anticipating future developments and needs. densification through more building on the same area, smart and multifunctional buildings and future-proof infrastructure.	2	Non-ideological	1		Party - Region	Social Democratic	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate				
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We are committed to encouraging densification in the right locations and discouraging scattered development. Too much open space is being lost due to building just about everywhere in the past. We need to densify more in the right places and counter further dispersed development. This can be done through a strategic policy that compensates owners of poorly located land and concentrates development in appropriate locations. We introduce a system in which development rights are tradable. Owners can buy these rights to build higher, for example, and apply a reverse logic when an urban development charge for building at too low a density.	3	Corporatist	9				0,1153846154	0,4807692308	0,3269230769	0,07692307692	0,6057692308	0,2054034612			







Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis									
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Vlaams Belang is concerned about the housing needs of our Flemish families. Enabling our families to own affordable housing is a top priority, both on the buy and rent market.	1	SD&C	10		Housing state typ	Social Democratic	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological c	sum			
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	In the first place to be able to own, because the own home is still the best guarantee against poverty. The rental market must also be expanded sensitively for both those who prefer to rent and those who do not have sufficient resources to invest in a home of their own.	1	SD&C	10		Weight:	12	12	16	1	2	43			
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Young people should be able to thrive without worrying about their housing needs.	1	Corporatist	8		Percentage (incl.	27,90697674	27,90697674	37,20930233	2,325581395	4,651162791	100			
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	The licensing policy should be simplified and deadlines shortened. The administration for building and purchasing housing is so complex that it takes a lot of time and effort. Time we no longer have, the housing crisis is here now and must be solved as soon as possible.	3	Liberal	4		Percentage (excl	29,26829268	29,26829268	39,02439024	2,43902439	-	100			
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Vlaams Belang recognizes that sustainable and energy-efficient living is important and that we must provide the necessary means and opportunities for this. Introducing compulsory renovation is the wrong choice, because it reduces the supply on the rental market and increases unaffordability on the purchase market. We believe in the common sense of the individual, of the Fleming, to choose to renovate his/her home when the no dige financial means are available.	2	Liberal	4											
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Our housing market in Flanders must first and foremost be at the disposal of our own people, the hard-working Flemish people. The Flemish housing and rental market should be shielded as much as possible and kept primarily for the Flemish.	2	Nativist												
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a further reduction in registration fees for the first home purchased as a financial incentive to make up for the disappearance of the housing bonus	2	Corporatist	3		<b>Party - Region</b>	<b>Social Democratic</b>	<b>Corporatist %</b>	<b>Liberal %</b>	<b>Mediterranean %</b>	<b>X-Coordinate</b>	<b>Y-Coordinate</b>			
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	A simplification of permit procedures;	3	Liberal	4			0,2926829268	0,2926829268	0,3902439024	0,0243902439	0,5487804878	0,1056128541			
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	an extension of the convened hu ren/budget rentals and an extension of the coupled terms;	3	Social Democratic	6											
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	The elimination of mandatory renovation, allowing owners to renovate at their own pace;	3	Liberal	4		<b>Welfare Model</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>Y</b>							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	an expansion of the Flemish Housing Loan so that more people can realize their own homes;	2	Corporatist	5		Social Democratic	0	0							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a 6% VAT for demolition and reconstruction, for everyone (including construction promoters). This is the best guarantee of providing enough affordable and energy efficient housing	3	Liberal	9		Liberal	1	0							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	extending rent subsidies and rent subsidies for people in the most precarious situations	2	Social Democratic	6		Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	require the certificate of conformity for rental housing throughout Flanders to guarantee quality housing and eliminate slum landlords	3	Social Democratic	4		Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	more housing inspections in properties that are far encouraged not to meet the minimum standards of the Flemish housing code.	2	Social Democratic	4											
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a strict approach to nuisance with notice went as a tenant for whom structural nuisance is caused;	2	Liberal	4		indicator		amount							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	more financial incentives for local governments from the Flemish government to build affordable housing on their land areas;	2	Corporatist	4			1	2							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a guarantee from the Flemish government for the equity in mortgage loans with private banks and recognized kre diet companies;	3	Corporatist	1			2	0							




Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Making our own affordable housing possible for our families is a top priority	1	Mediterranean	1					3	1					
											4	8					
											5	1					
											6	2					
											7	0					
											8	1					
											9	1					
											10	2					

Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis								
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will get Britain building again, creating jobs across England, with 1.5 million new homes over the next parliament.	1	Social Democratic	9		Housing state typ	Social Democrat	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological c	sum		
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	We will immediately update the National Policy Planning Framework to undo damaging Conservative changes, including restoring mandatory housing targets.	3	Social Democratic	9		Weight:	27	6	0	0	0	33		
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	We will take tough action to ensure that planning authorities have up-to-date Local Plans and reform and strengthen the presumption in favour of sustainable development.	3	Social Democratic	9		Percentage (incl.	81,81818182	18,18181818	0	0	0	100		
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will support local authorities by funding additional planning officers, through increasing the rate of the stamp duty surcharge paid by non-UK residents.	2	Corporatist	8		Percentage (excl.	81,81818182	18,18181818	0	0	-	100		
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	We will ensure local communities continue to shape housebuilding in their area, but where necessary Labour will not be afraid to make full use of intervention powers to build the houses we need.	3	Social Democratic	9										
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will take a brownfield first approach, prioritising the development of previously used land wherever possible, and fast-tracking approval of urban brownfield sites.	2	Corporatist	9										
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour is committed to preserving the green belt which has served England's towns and cities well over many decades. Under the Conservatives, greenbelt land is regularly released for development but haphazardly and often for speculative housebuilding. Without changing its purpose or general extent, Labour will take a more strategic approach to greenbelt land designation and release to build more homes in the right places. The release of lower quality 'grey belt' land will be prioritised and we will introduce 'golden rules' to ensure development benefits communities and nature.	2	Social Democratic	9		Party - Region	Social Democratic	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate		
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	In partnership with local leaders and communities, a Labour government will build a new generation of new towns, inspired by the proud legacy of the 1945 Labour government. Alongside urban extensions and regeneration projects, these will form part of a series of large-scale new communities across England.	3	Social Democratic	9							0,09090909091	0,05248638811		

UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Housing need in England cannot be met without planning for growth on a larger than local scale so we will introduce effective new mechanisms for cross-boundary strategic planning. Labour will require all Combined and Mayoral Authorities to strategically plan for housing growth in their areas. We will give Combined Authorities new planning powers along with new freedoms and flexibilities to make better use of grant funding.	3	Social Democratic	9														
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will further reform compulsory purchase compensation rules to improve land assembly, speed up site delivery, and deliver housing, infrastructure, amenity, and transport benefits in the public interest. We will take steps to ensure that for specific types of development schemes, landowners are awarded fair compensation rather than inflated prices based on the prospect of planning permission.	3	Social Democratic	9														
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will deliver the biggest increase in social and affordable housebuilding in a generation. We will strengthen planning obligations to ensure new developments provide more affordable homes; make changes to the Affordable Homes Programme to ensure that it delivers more homes from existing funding; and support councils and housing associations to build their capacity and make a greater contribution to affordable housing supply. Labour will prioritise the building of new social rented homes and better protect our existing stock by reviewing the increased right to buy discounts introduced in 2012 and increasing protections on newly-built social housing.	3	Social Democratic	2	Social Democrat	0	0											
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour wants exemplary development to be the norm not the exception. We will take steps to ensure we are building more high-quality, well-designed, and sustainable homes and creating places that increase climate resilience and promote nature recovery. We will implement solutions to unlock the building of homes affected by nutrient neutrality without weakening environmental protections.	3	Social Democratic	4	Liberal	1	0											
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will work with local authorities to give first-time buyers the first chance to buy homes and end the farce of entire developments being sold off to international investors before houses are even built. And we will introduce a permanent, comprehensive mortgage guarantee scheme, to support first-time buyers who struggle to save for a large deposit, with lower mortgage costs.	2	Corporatist	5	Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038											
							Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346											

Welfare Model	X	Y



									indicator	amount					
									1	0					
									2	1					
									3	0					
									4	1					
									5	1					
									6	0					
									7	0					
									8	1					
									9	9					
									10	0					


Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis										
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Abolishing the legacy EU 'nutrient neutrality' rules to immediately unlock the building of 100,000 new homes with local consent, with developers required in law to pay a one-of mitigation fee so there is no net additional pollution.	3	Liberal	5		Housing state typ	Social Democrati	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological c	sum				
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Delivering a record number of homes each year on brownfield land in urban areas. We will do this by providing a fast-track route through the planning system for new homes on previously developed land in the 20 largest cities. Strong design codes will ensure this enables the gentle densification of urban areas, with new family homes and mansion-blocks on tree-lined streets built in the local character. We will look at extending 'full expensing' to the delivery of brownfield housing.	2	Corporatist	9		Weight:	7	28	8	0	6	49				
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Raising density levels in inner London to those of European cities like Paris and Barcelona. We will ensure the London Plan delivers more family homes a year, forcing the Mayor to plan for more homes on brownfield sites, like underused industrial land. We will regenerate major sites like Euston, Old Oak Common and Thamesmead.	2	Non-ideological			Percentage (incl.	14,28571429	57,14285714	16,32653061	0	12,24489796	100				
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Unlocking new urban regeneration schemes, by creating locally-led urban development corporations in partnership with the private sector and institutional investors. We will support the delivery of new quarters in Leeds, Liverpool and York alongside working with local leaders and the community to seize the opportunity of our ambitious Cambridge 2050 plan.	3	Corporatist	9		Percentage (excl.	16,27906977	65,11627907	18,60465116	0	-	100				
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Supporting local and smaller builders by requiring councils to set land aside for them and lifting Section 106 burdens on more smaller sites, while ruling out Labour's proposed 'community right to appeal' which would bring the planning system to its knees.	3	Corporatist	9												
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Making sure local authorities use the new Infrastructure Levy to deliver the GP surgeries, roads and other local infrastructure needed to support homes. We will not allow these funds to be spent on community projects that bear no relation to support for new homes.	2	Non-ideological													
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Renewing the Affordable Homes Programme that will deliver homes of all tenures and focus on regenerating and improving housing estates.	3	Social Democratic	9		Party - Region	Social Democratic	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate				






UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Building on our new powers for the police, we will further speed up the use and enforcement of powers to remove illegal traveller sites, while giving councils greater planning powers to prevent unauthorised development by travellers.	2	Non-ideological					6	0						
										7	0						
										8	0						
										9	6						
										10	0						

Liberal	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis										
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Liberal Democrats know that a home is a necessity and the base on which people build their lives. So we will ensure that everyone can access housing that meets their needs.	1	Social Democratic	2		Housing state typ	Social Democratic	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological	c sum				
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Increasing building of new homes to 380,000 a year across the UK, including 150,000 social homes a year, through new garden cities and community-led development of cities and towns.	3	Corporatist	9		Weight:	24	23	0	0	8	55				
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Delivering a fair deal for renters by immediately banning no-fault evictions, making three-year tenancies the default, and creating a national register of licensed landlords.	2	Social Democratic	4		Percentage (incl.	43,63636364	41,81818182	0	0	14,54545455	100				
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Giving local authorities, including National Park Authorities, the powers to end Right to Buy in their areas.	2	Corporatist	4		Percentage (excl.	51,06382979	48,93617021	0	0	-	100				
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Ending rough sleeping within the next Parliament and immediately scrapping the archaic Vagrancy Act.	2	Social Democratic	2												
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Abolishing residential leaseholds and capping ground rents to a nominal fee, so that everyone has control over their property.	2	Corporatist	2												
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Expanding Neighbourhood Planning across England.	2	Corporatist	9		Party - Region	Social Democratic	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate				
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Building ten new garden cities.	3	Social Democratic	9			0,5106382979	0,4893617021	0	0	0,2446808511	0,1412665552				
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Allowing councils to buy land for housing based on current use value rather than on a hope-value basis by reforming the Land Compensation Act 1961.	2	Corporatist	4												
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Properly funding local planning departments to improve planning outcomes and ensure housing is not built in areas of high flood risk without adequate mitigation, by allowing local authorities to set their own fees.	2	Corporatist	4		Welfare Model	X	Y								
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Encouraging the use of rural exception sites to expand rural housing.	2	Non-ideological			Social Democratic	0	0								
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Trialling Community Land Auctions to ensure that local communities receive a fair share of the benefits of new development in their areas and to help fund vital local services.	2	Corporatist	1		Liberal	1	0								
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Encouraging development of existing brownfield sites with financial incentives and ensuring that affordable and social housing is included in these projects.	2	Corporatist	9		Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038								
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Introducing 'use-it-or-lose-it' planning permission for developers who refuse to build.	3	Social Democratic	4		Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346								
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Putting the construction sector on a sustainable footing by investing in skills, training and new technologies such as modern methods of construction.	1	Non-ideological													
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Ensure that all development has appropriate infrastructure, services and amenities in place, integrating infrastructure and public service delivery into the planning process.	3	Non-ideological			indicator	amount									
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Make homes warmer and cheaper to heat with a ten-year emergency upgrade programme, and ensure that all new homes are zero-carbon	3	Social Democratic	3			1	1								
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Remove dangerous cladding from all buildings, while ensuring that leaseholders do not have to pay a penny towards it.	2	Corporatist	4			2	7								
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Help people who cannot afford a deposit to own their own homes by introducing a new Rent to Own model for social housing where rent payments give tenants an increasing stake in the property, owning it outright after 30 years.	2	Corporatist	5			3	1								
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Urgently publishing a cross-Whitehall plan to end all forms of homelessness.	2	Social Democratic	2			4	8								
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Exempting groups of homeless people, and those at risk of homelessness, from the Shared Accommodation Rate.	2	Social Democratic	2			5	1								



UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Introducing a 'somewhere safe to stay' legal duty to ensure that everyone who is at risk of sleeping rough is provided with emergency accommodation and an assessment of their needs.	2	Social Democratic	2				6	0						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Ensuring sufficient financial resources for local authorities to deliver the Homelessness Reduction Act and provide accommodation for survivors of domestic abuse.	2	Social Democratic	2				7	0						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Give local authorities new powers to control second homes and short-term lets in their areas,	2	Corporatist	4				8	0						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Proactively enforcing clear standards for homes that are socially rented, including strict time limits for repairs.	2	Social Democratic	4				9	4						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Fully recognising tenant panels so that renters have a voice in landlord governance.	2	Non-ideological					10	0						

Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator	Analysis													
UK	Populists	REFORM	Reform UK will ensure that people can own their own home by unleashing housebuilding across the country and cutting immigration.	1	Nativist		Housing state typ	Social Democrat	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological	c sum							
UK	Populists	REFORM	Review the Planning System Fast-track planning and tax incentives for development of brownfield sites. 'Loose fit planning'  policy for large residential developments with pre-approved guidelines and developer requirements.	2	Corporatist	9	Weight:	0	5	6	0	4	15							
UK	Populists	REFORM	Reform Social Housing Law Prioritise local people and those who have paid into the system. Foreign nationals must go to the back of the queue. Not the front.	2	Nativist		Percentage (incl.	0	33,33333333	40	0	26,66666667	100							
UK	Populists	REFORM	Scrap section 24 for Landlords The tax system should encourage smaller landlords into the rental markets. Not penalise them. We will restore landlords' rights to deduct finance costs and mortgage interest from tax on rental income.	3	Corporatist	9	Percentage (excl	0	45,45454545	54,54545455	0	-	100							
UK	Populists	REFORM	Abolish the Renters' (Reform) Bill Existing legislation was inadequate to address bad practices. Instead, we will boost the monitoring, appeals and enforcement process for renters with grievances.	3	Liberal	4														
UK	Populists	REFORM	Protection for Leaseholders All potential charges for leasehold or freehold residents must be clearly stated and consented to. Enforce Section 106 agreements. Ensure it is cheaper and easier to extend leases to 990 years and buy freeholds.	3	Liberal	4														
UK	Populists	REFORM	Incentivise Use of New Construction Technology We will incentivise innovation to speed up building: modular construction, digital technology and building sites that improve efficiency and cut waste.	1	Non-ideological															
								<b>Party - Region</b>	<b>Social Democratic %</b>	<b>Corporatist %</b>	<b>Liberal %</b>	<b>Mediterranean %</b>	<b>X-Coordinate</b>	<b>Y-Coordinate</b>						
									0	0,4545454545	0,5454545455	0	0,7727272727	0,1312159703						
								<b>Welfare Model</b>	<b>X</b>	<b>Y</b>										
								Social Democrat	0	0										
								Liberal	1	0										
								Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038										
								Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346										
								indicator	amount											
								1	0											
								2	0											
								3	0											
								4	2											
								5	0											
								6	0											
								7	0											
								8	0											
								9	2											
								10	0											



Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator		Analysis								
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	For the socialists, housing must constitute the fifth pillar of the welfare state, and currently requires strong measures that allow millions of people to develop a private and family life, and especially a new life project among the youngest and most economically vulnerable people.	1	Social Democratic	3		Housing state ty	Social Democrat	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological	c	sum	
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	In 2018 we find ourselves with a legacy of corruption, social exclusion and speculation in housing both for sale and for rent, where public aid was cut, the tenant was unprotected and the public housing stock was abandoned and even privatized. From the government we have given priority to the implementation of a real housing policy where there was none before.	1	Social Democratic	1		Weight:	54	45	2	0	7	108		
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We have approved the first Housing Law of our democracy, underpinning the fifth pillar of the welfare state. A law that complies with the social function of property, based on the cooperation between Administrations and the fight against urban and housing speculation. This is the first law democracy that develops the constitutional right to decent housing, and aims to guarantee access to housing and impose its achievement as an obligation on public authorities, who will not be able to look the other way in the face of unjust situations.	1	Social Democratic	2		Percentage (incl.	50	41,66666667	1,851851852	0	6,481481481	100		
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	It also addresses the housing problem in its full dimension. It implies a commitment to the citizens and especially to the young people of our country, so that they can carry out their life projects by having access to housing at reasonable prices, leaving behind the real estate bubbles caused by the failed policies of the Popular Party.	1	Social Democratic	2		Percentage (excl	53,46534653	44,55445545	1,98019802	0	-	100		
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	The law provides us with the necessary instruments to address the priorities of the social majority of this country: to control abusive price increases, to put empty housing on the market, to establish tax incentives for price control, and, most importantly, to guarantee and protect the public housing stock. Therefore, we are committed to activate and develop the instruments provided for in the law:	3	Social Democratic	4										
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will develop the measures contemplated for the containment of housing prices.	3	Social Democratic	7										
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will regulate and diversify leasing contracts to reflect the peculiarities of each situation, so as to take into account the lessor and the lessee and the specific situation to be regulated, especially in the case of temporary leases for use as a first home.	2	Corporatist	4		<b>Party - Region</b>	<b>Social Democratic</b>	<b>Corporatist %</b>	<b>Liberal %</b>	<b>Mediterranean %</b>	<b>X-Coordinate</b>	<b>Y-Coordinate</b>		














Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator	Analysis										
Spain	Populists	VOX	The home is the main space of intimacy and personal development of families, so ensuring affordable access, decent conditions and security for all Spaniards in their homes must be a fundamental priority of any government.	1	Mediterranean	1	Housing state typology	Social Democrat	Corporatist	Liberal	Mediterranean	Non ideological c sum					
Spain	Populists	VOX	One of the great urgent needs of Spaniards is to have a government that courageously tackles the housing problem. Access to housing cannot become a luxury that only a few can afford. It is essential to guarantee access to affordable housing, especially for those Spaniards who need it most, to protect the right to property and to ensure that housing has decent space and conditions of health and supplies.	1	Social Democratic	2	Weight:	3	9	12	7	7	38				
Spain	Populists	VOX	Zero tolerance for squatting. We will reform both the Penal Code and the Criminal and Civil Procedure Laws to really and effectively protect homeowners who suffer the action of squatting mafias or the illegal entry of a squatter into their home. Every Spaniard should be able to defend himself and his family against an aggression in his own home. We will create a registry of historical data of areas affected by occupation and we will promote the detailed monitoring of all cases that occur, as well as comprehensive assistance to the victims of occupation. We will exempt the owners of illegally squatted properties from the payment of IBI during the period of illegal occupation of the property.	2	Non-ideological		Percentage (incl. non ideological)	7,894736842	23,68421053	31,57894737	18,42105263	18,42105263	100				
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will release all land that is not or should not be specifically protected for reasons of environmental, landscape, productive or national defense interest. We will promote a new Land Law that provides for the release of land that is not or should not be specifically protected for reasons of environmental, landscape, productive or national defense interest. Land sequestered by city councils and autonomous communities for the benefit of parties and corrupt politicians, and to ensure a correct, agile and harmonious urban development throughout Spain.	3	Liberal	5	Percentage (excl. non ideological)	9,677419355	29,03225806	38,70967742	22,58064516	-	100				
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will amend the Value Added Tax Law in order to eliminate VAT on the purchase of the first habitual residence	2	Corporatist	5											
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will recover the deduction for habitual residence in the income tax return. At the same time, we will encourage the acquisition of new homes.	2	Corporatist	5											
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will review and reduce taxes and charges in the building process. The entire construction process, from the acquisition of a plot of land to the sale or rental of the property, has become a way of obtaining income. The tax burden for the State, regions and municipalities, which produces an artificial increase in prices.	3	Liberal	1											
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will promote collaboration between the Public Administration and private entities in order to increase the number of subsidized housing units. We will mobilize the public land belonging to the General State Administration and its dependent agencies for the provision of social rental housing. We will set up an audited platform for requests so that, while SAREB retains ownership of the assets, the City Councils will be the ones to request SAREB, depending on the demand and housing needs, the temporary transfer of the assets and land for social rental.	3	Corporatist	9											
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will amend the Ley Reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local (Law Regulating the Bases of the Local Regime) and we will draft a new resolution issuing technical instructions to City Councils on the management of the Municipal Register to prevent a squatter from being able to use the municipal register in the event of a squatter being able to use it. The person must be registered in the illegally occupied dwelling.	2	Non-ideological												
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will put an end to the temporary expropriation of real estate and rent control in the lease contract, as it has been implemented in recent years by different regions.	3	Liberal	7											
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will promote the standardization of tourism regulations for tourist housing throughout Spain. This standardization of regulations will guarantee competition on equal terms with other tourist accommodations, such as hotels or campsites; it will ensure the preservation of the rights of resident neighbors and the life of neighborhoods; and it will put a limit to the increase in the price of housing caused by the massive proliferation of tourist apartments.	2	Social Democratic	4	Social Democratic	0	0								
Spain	Populists	VOX	The saturation and overcrowding of the historic centers with tourist apartments has dynamited the harmony between residents and tourists. We will preserve the rights of residents and put an end to a disrespectful tourism model that is contributing to the degradation of our neighborhoods and the expulsion of residents from their homes. Our neighborhoods cannot become theme parks.	1	Non-ideological		Liberal	1	0								
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will promote an increase in the technical and personnel resources of the City Councils in charge of drafting the pertinent technical reports for the granting of licenses, as well as streamlining the bureaucratic process. We will promote among the regions and Local Entities the implementation of systems for the digitalization of the licensing process.	1	Non-ideological		Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038								
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will encourage landlords to put their vacant homes up for rent by increasing rental income tax benefits for landlords.	2	Corporatist	9	Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346								
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will repeal the Law for the Right to Housing approved by the government of Sánchez, which will not contribute to the creation of more affordable housing, will sink the rental market, alters the essential content of the right to property enshrined in Article 33 of the Constitution and protects illegal occupation.	3	Liberal	1											
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will promote family-friendly urban planning, rooted in and harmonious with the environment, encouraging the rehabilitation of regional styles and the protection of traditional facades, including them in the catalogs of assets of cultural interest.	3	Mediterranean	1											
Spain	Populists	VOX	We therefore reject globalist projects such as the so-called New European Bauhaus promoted by Brussels bureaucrats, which, with the alibi of climate fanaticism and the energy efficiency of buildings, seeks to standardize the reality of our cities.	2	Non-ideological												

Party - Region	Social Democratic	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate

	0,09677419355	0,2903225806	0,3870967742	0,2258064516	0,6451612903	0,2793630335
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Welfare Model	X	Y



indicator	amount
1	4
2	1
3	0
4	1
5	3
6	0
7	1
8	0
9	2
10	0

Weight of electoral programs								
	Sweden	The Netherlands	Flanders	UK	Spain	Average weight within ideological family		
Social Democrats	9	112	70	33	108	66		
Christian Democrats	23	52	156	49	15	59		
Liberals	12	101	60	55	-	57		
Populists	27	25	43	15	38	30		

Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator						
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemokraten	All municipalities, including the wealthy ones, should take their share of responsibility -when housing asylumseekers-	2	Non-ideological			Sweden	indicator	amount		Country
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemokraten	Asylum seekers should no longer be able to choose where they live.	2	Non-ideological					0	3	
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemokraten	Housing and tenure forms must be mixed.	1	SD&C	9				1	5	:
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemokraten	Overcrowding must be combated.	1	Social Democratic	2				2	3	1
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemokraten	We will continue to build rental apartments that ordinary people can afford to live in.	3	Social Democratic	8				3	6	2
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Introduce a vision of zero homelessness among pensioners and increase government funding for housing support	3	Social Democratic	1				4	2	3
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	A functioning housing market is a prerequisite for increased growth	1	Liberal	4				5	1	4
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	everyone should dare to dream of to own their own home	1	L&M	9				6	1	5
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	We want to implement reforms that increase the construction of both rental as condominiums.	2	Social Democratic	8				7	0	6
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	To achieve greater acceptance,with the public, we want to give citizens greater influence over architecture.	2	Non-ideological					8	6	7
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Abolish current shore protection to enable increased construction	2	Liberal	3				9	3	8
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Replace advanced detailed plans with simpler building plans	3	Liberal	8				10	0	9
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Stop the left from reintroducing property tax	3	Liberal	2						10
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Keeping the mortgage interest deduction	3	Corporatist	4						
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Enabling fairer rents by potential tenants' valuation of the housing is given more importance	2	Social Democratic	6						
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Expensive, complicated and innovation-inhibiting regulations lie like a wet blanket over parts of the countryside. We will clean up redundant rules and bureaucracy.	3	Liberal	3						
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Shoreline protection will be reformed to make it easier to build and live in rural areas. It is time to give rural dwellers more autonomy over their own land and simplify the rules to make it easier to build and live in rural areas.	2	Liberal	3						
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Women's shelters, girls' shelters and shelters need more and permanent funding to continue their important work.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Housing is the biggest investment many people make. The enhanced mortgage repayment requirement - a forced savings scheme for those on the lowest incomes - should be abolished now that interest rates are normalizing.	2	Liberal	3						
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	We will not contribute to any tax increases that ... make it more expensive to live.	3	Liberal	0						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	There are many challenges today, where rigid rules for construction and business development lie like a wet blanket.	1	Liberal	3						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Everyone should have access to a good standard of housing and be able to live in a safe, secure and pleasant environment.	1	Social Democratic	1						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	It should be easier to move or change housing if necessary. There should be more freedom of choice between different types of housing.	1	SD&C	9						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	We will take greater account of the different conditions for housing construction around Sweden.	1	Social Democratic	0						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	The Sweden Democrats want to facilitate housing construction by simplifying and speeding up decision-making processes and reviewing the extensive regulations and requirements governing housing construction.	2	Liberal	3						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Measures also need to be taken to curb the soaring cost of housing so that more people can afford a home.	1	Corporatist	1						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	The Sweden Democrats want to stop plans to reintroduce property tax,	3	Liberal	2						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	enable more forms of financing for young people and first-time home buyers.	2	Corporatist	8						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	New construction can be facilitated by reviewing building codes and increasing competition in the construction market.	3	Liberal	0						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	when new residential areas are established, it is important that mistakes made during the Million Homes Program are not repeated. The Sweden Democrats want to promote pleasant and safe areas with classic architecture. Aesthetics and design are important factors for how an environment is perceived and for safety.	2	Non-ideological							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	The possibility of affordable housing or holiday homes in attractive locations could be an important competitive advantage and thus help rural areas to develop. For this to become a reality, beach protection rules need to be relaxed	2	Liberal	8						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	A review should also be carried out of the possibilities for building in areas of national interest.	1	Social Democratic	8						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Financing of housing in rural areas should be facilitated. It is not uncommon for the value of a newly built property in rural areas to be less than the construction cost.	2	Corporatist	5						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Combating homelessness is a priority social issue for the Sweden Democrats.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Stop the positive discrimination of newcomers in terms of ... housing	2	Non-ideological							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Everyone has the right to a good and sustainable home. We are going to see housing again as a basic amenity rather than a revenue model for pawnbrokers and overseas investors. The government will take the reins and provide large numbers of affordable housing.	2	Social Democratic	0		Netherlands	indicator	amount		
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	by having housing built for low and middle incomes,	1	Corporatist	8				0	15	
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	providing more social housing and getting land back into our hands	2	Social Democratic	8				1	8	
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Special attention will be paid to housing for young people, the elderly and people with necessary occupations such as caregivers and teachers	1	Corporatist	7				2	4	
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We also see homelessness as a housing rather than just a care issue.	1	Social Democratic	1				3	20	
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	The construction of new housing is stagnating in many places. In response, we are putting our efforts into splitting up large homes and converting vacant properties.	2	Non-ideological					4	5	
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We also encourage building layers on top of existing homes in densely populated areas.	2	Non-ideological					5	9	
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Through a newly established Housing Fund, we will ensure a substantial increase in the construction of affordable and sustainable rental and owner-occupied housing. The ambition is that 100,000 homes will be added annually, of which at least 40,000 will be social rental homes and 40,000 homes in the middle segment (rental and owner-occupied).	3	Social Democratic	8				6	1	
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	That is why we want a Minister of Housing and Spatial Planning with go-ahead power. Adapting permit and objection procedures that take more account of the interests of house seekers is a priority	3	Social Democratic	8				7	10	
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We encourage densification in our villages and towns, where there is often still plenty of room to build new homes.	2	Social Democratic	8				8	27	
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	In this regard, we are committed to the development of new communal housing for singles, composite families, the elderly and people with disabilities who need care.	3	Corporatist	7				9	3	

Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	To prevent construction from collapsing during economic bad times, we are introducing a build-through guarantee. This will allow construction projects to continue even if the pre-sale percentage of 70% is not achieved	3	Social Democratic	8				10	0		
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Active land policy for more housing. We accelerate construction by returning to active land policy. With the new National Land Bank, we bring more land into public hands and help governments build affordable new construction (see more detailed proposal under "The community at the helm"). With this new construction, we ensure that the land remains in community hands.	3	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	In addition, we ensure that the increase in value of land through public investment also benefits society through a plan income tax.	3	Social Democratic	2							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	We encourage owners of land with a building destination to build by means of a building obligation: within a fixed period they must proceed to build a house. If they fail to do so, a fine and eventually expropriation will follow.	2	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Local governments are also given the option of taxing vacant land so that owners are encouraged to build on it.	2	Corporatist	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Housing associations of and for society. We build public housing we can be proud of: high-quality broadly accessible housing after the Viennese example.	3	Social Democratic	4							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Housing corporations regain the ability to build affordable rental housing for middle-income households as well.	1	Corporatist	0							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	we raise the income limits for the social rental sector so that more people can use it.	2	Social Democratic	4							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	We give housing corporations and housing cooperatives the means to actively buy homes from private parties, renovate them, make them more sustainable, and build social housing in them.	3	Corporatist	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	We make housing corporations social institutions of and for the community again: we give tenants and resident committees more say in the policy and composition of the board.	3	Social Democratic	0							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	The legal requirements for performance agreements between municipalities, housing corporations and tenants are renewed, municipalities can enforce them, non-compliance has consequences for the housing corporations.	2	Social Democratic	0							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Because they represent a public task, housing corporations will no longer have to pay profit tax with immediate effect. There will be a quick financial solution for regions with destitute housing corporations, so that they can also invest in the coming years in what is needed: new construction, sustainability and keeping the housing stock affordable.	3	Corporatist	0							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	End homelessness. It is unacceptable for people to be involuntarily homeless. The right to housing becomes the basis of our policy. We remain committed to the goal of ending involuntary homelessness by 2030, as agreed in the Lisbon Declaration. In the meantime, we ensure that quality and accessible shelter and care are guaranteed, also for migrants (whether they are EU citizens, asylum seekers or undocumented). We are committed to housing first to prevent and remedy homelessness. We invest heavily in building basic housing. Everyone who becomes homeless is immediately assigned such basic housing. Then they will receive help to find a new home and rebuild their lives. We want all municipalities to contribute proportionally to the housing of people leaving sheltered housing and social care.	2	Social Democratic	1							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Every municipality ensures that at least 30% of its housing stock consists of social rental housing. We are therefore committed to at least 40% social rental housing in new construction. These are affordable and quality housing, in principle from housing corporations or housing cooperatives. Municipalities with a large shortage of social rental housing are instructed to build additional housing in this segment. The Minister of Housing and Spatial Planning is given the ability to enforce the construction of sufficient social rental housing.	3	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	We restrict the sale of social rental housing: corporations may only sell if the share of social rental housing in the neighborhood, or in the case of smaller municipalities in the core, is maintained. Corporation housing will only be sold to housing cooperatives, governments or other corporations. Corporation housing may also be sold to private individuals, but only with an obligation of self occupancy. If private individuals then wish to resell these homes, housing corporations or housing cooperatives are given the right of first sale.	2	Social Democratic	3							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Better utilization of existing housing. We encourage transformation, topping up and splitting of existing housing. With more modular construction, homes can be more quickly adapted to changing circumstances.	2	Non-ideological								
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	We actively encourage people to share their homes with others, including by scrapping the cost-sharing norm.	2	Social Democratic	2							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	We also ensure that every municipality drafts a vacancy ordinance and give municipalities the option of taxing owners of vacant properties.	2	Social Democratic	3							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	In order to make better use of existing housing and increase the livability of a neighborhood, Airbnb should no longer lead to permanent housing deprivation. In order to make better use of existing housing and increase the livability of a neighborhood, homes may not be rented out through platforms such as Airbnb for more than 90 days per year. Platforms will from now on provide openness about the rentals that take place through them so that municipalities can properly enforce.	2	Social Democratic	1							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	High quality buildings. The Netherlands faces a huge construction challenge. Buildings can remain standing for hundreds of years. In fact, a building that is not demolished is the most sustainable. It is therefore essential that what we build is of high quality. To ensure this, we adopt the advice of the Board of Government Advisors: we anchor the role of architects in the law, we introduce the Open Call on the Flemish model to offer opportunities for design talent and we give municipalities and provinces the possibility to appoint a (city) architect. We also ensure the return of a Dutch architecture institute.	2	Social Democratic	3							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Diversity of housing forms. We ensure that municipalities and provinces actively manage the supply and diversity of housing forms, such as trailer parks. We ensure that this housing form is anchored in municipal housing visions	2	Social Democratic	1							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Equal housing opportunities for young people. We build enough additional housing to fill both the housing shortage for first-time buyers and the room shortage for students. To give young people equal opportunities on the waiting list for social housing, we want to experiment more with allocating housing by drawing lots.	2	Corporatist	7							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Invest more in housing for the elderly. We work on an integrated approach for the elderly, where housing, welfare and care come together. Through a senior housing action program, the elderly will be given extra space in the development of new housing developments and large-scale renovation: all new housing will be easily accessible and built to last a lifetime. In the construction of new senior housing, the provision of care and contact with the environment are central to the design.	2	Corporatist	7							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Municipalities are given the responsibility to develop a housing-care vision together with tenants, senior citizen organizations, housing corporations and resident initiatives in which they make binding agreements on the number of suitable homes for the elderly. Elderly people who want to move on from a large home to a smaller (senior) home will receive support from the municipality, which we will help to offer these people a moving allowance, rent retention or further rent adjustment.	2	Social Democratic	7							
Netherlands	Social Democrat: PvdA	Certification for inclusive senior care, such as the Pink Carpet, becomes the standard for facilities.	2	Corporatist	7							



Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We make a new Nota Ruimte that does justice to all regions and utilizes all regions. Growth has been skewed in recent decades: national housing policy is too focused on "build, build, build" in the already crowded Randstad. In the north, east and south of our country, there are also plenty of opportunities and is great need for housing.	2	Non-ideological									
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We are also committed to making better use of existing housing through splitting and topping up, transformation, housing sharing and flow-through. We will keep thereby paying attention to livability in residential neighborhoods.	2	Non-ideological									
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The transformation of non-vital vacation parks into residential neighborhoods may be necessary for municipalities are a welcome addition to the housing stock.	2	Non-ideological									
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The separation of living and care has brought much independence, but sometimes also loneliness and high (home) care costs. We invest in a warm home for our elderly and people with disabilities through more combinations of housing and care that are accessible to all. There will be A national plan for building courtyards for the elderly, home care homes and a new form of the familiar retirement home and innovative living arrangements for people with disabilities.	2	Corporatist	7								
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We are also committed to more mixed housing concepts for people exiting from social shelter and sheltered housing and need a "good neighbor.	2	SD&C	9								
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We encourage young people to save for the purchase of a home. For this purpose, agreements are made with banks and a contribution is granted to be able to save for the purchase of a home at a higher and more attractive interest rate.	2	Liberal	0								
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	For first-time buyers, the current state of the student debt determinant.	2	Non-ideological									
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	An affordable home is a sustainable home. The interest rate on a low- and middle-income energy savings loan from the National Heat Fund remains at 0%, so that people without savings can also get started.	2	Corporatist	5								
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	All corporation housing with a poor energy label must be completed by 2030 improved. Municipalities are given a role in neighborhood-by-neighborhood approaches to insulation and sustainability of private housing. We give priority to vulnerable neighborhoods, so that those residents don't have to figure out all sorts of things themselves and are more likely to benefit from lower energy bills.	3	Corporatist	3								
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We are putting more effort into cooperative initiatives where community members work together.	1	Corporatist	0								
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	A sustainable home also means sustainable construction and insulation. We introduce a standard for a minimum proportion of building with biobased materials (as hemp, flax and bulrush) and increase the proportion of biobased insulation of dwellings.	3	Social Democratic	3								
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We introduce nationwide consumer protection against unfair leasehold structures.	2	Social Democratic	3								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	The housing shortage is a major problem. Hundreds of thousands of Dutch people, despite complying with all the rules of the game, have no sight of a home of their own. Certainly an affordable owner-occupied home is the way to build up a savings and face the future with optimism. That should be within reach for many more people again. The Netherlands must get off the nitrogen lock as soon as possible and the government must not thwart housing construction but rather push it forward, so that every Dutchman has the prospect of his own home.	1	L&M	8								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are working on a Right to Buy Act. Tenants of social housing will have a legal right to buy their own rental property, at a market price. We do an income test beforehand. This law will first apply to small apartment complexes and row houses. We will combat large-scale fragmentation of apartment complexes.	2	L&M	9								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We do not tamper with the freedom to sell your home. We believe you have the freedom to sell your home to whomever you want. It is your home. We will continue to protect this right.	2	Liberal	0								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	The mortgage interest deduction helps people keep their homes affordable. The scheme has been made more austere in recent years. As far as the VVD is concerned, the scheme will not be made more austere, in order to provide security for middle groups.	3	Corporatist	4								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We also want to limit the local burden increase for homeowners and SMEs. To this end, it is important to strengthen the position of local councils. We will do this by introducing a national maximum percentage for the OZB increase on which city councils can then steer. This will prevent large OZB increases.	3	Liberal	0								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	To help more first-time buyers find a home, we will continue to develop a National Affordable Housing Fund and see if this Fund should be expanded.	3	Corporatist	5								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are working on appropriate mortgages. To help young people buy a home and bring the monthly costs down, we encourage more first-time buyers to take advantage of a starter mortgage. We increase the opportunities to get a mortgage by making student debt count less when taking out a mortgage. Also, actual monthly costs can be taken into account more often. For the self-employed, there will be more opportunities to take out a mortgage more easily.	3	Liberal	0								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We believe that a house for sale belongs to you, and not to the municipality. Therefore, in principle, we no longer choose the ground lease system for new homes. Leasehold contracts for new homes should only be allowed if they improve affordability and should not be used as a cash cow for municipalities. We focus on consumer protection and transparency in current ground lease arrangements. This is to strengthen the position of the homeowner in relation to the government. The maximum indexation of the canon payable follows the maximum rent increase for free sector housing.	2	Liberal	0								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Renting a home is getting more and more expensive. For that high rent, you don't always get a nice home in return. That's why we need to add a lot of rental housing, improve rental housing and continue to put the brakes on rent increases.	1	Social Democratic	8								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	The VVD wants to help people with their own homes, help as many people as possible get a new home and reduce the monthly costs.	3	Non-ideological	8								

Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are building more new rental housing. By abolishing the landlord levy, housing associations have sufficient financial room to build. This has not been optional. We enforce that more social rent is actually built.	3	Corporatist	8								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We make an agreement with developers and market parties to build more middle rental housing. We make it attractive for private individuals, investors and builders to invest in medium rental, by examining bottlenecks that hinder the construction of medium rental. We also ensure that there is sufficient student housing, for example by converting existing vacant office buildings.	3	Liberal	8								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We slow down rent increases. We limit the largest increases in rents and work toward reasonable rents. In addition, complex rules have been proposed to calculate rents. We want to change those. We opt for a simple system. By doing so, we ensure reasonable rents. These restrictions must not lead to renting no longer being worthwhile. We keep an eye on small landlords, such as SMEs. Renting out houses and investing by all parties in new rental housing must remain attractive.	3	Corporatist	6								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We ensure that rental housing becomes accessible to more people. We also want the nurse, defense employee or police officer to be able to live in the city or village where he or she works. For various social professions there will be a national priority for rental housing.	2	Corporatist	7								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build sustainable rental housing. We ask corporations and landlords to make homes more sustainable. Anyone living in a poorly-insulated rental home can report this to the municipality. The municipality requires landlords to give a monthly rent reduction until measures are taken to insulate the house.	2	Corporatist	3								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	On the other hand, we must address as many bumps as possible that make it difficult for landlords to make homes more sustainable.	1	Non-ideological									
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are addressing skewed rent. In recent years, we have tackled skewed rent. In order to make social housing available to the people who need it most, an annual income test for social housing will be introduced to see if the social rent requested is still appropriate. People whose income is too high will pay a higher rent.	2	Corporatist	3								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We protect orphans. Orphans are given the right to remain in rental housing after the death of their parents. It will be prohibited for corporations to place orphans out of social housing	2	Social Democratic	1								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We tackle rogue landlords. The Good Landlord Act allows municipalities to tackle rogue landlords. We help municipalities put this law into practice and provide support where necessary. We punish landlords who intimidate tenants or deliberately facilitate overcrowding more harshly	2	Corporatist	3								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We address residential nuisance and illegal subletting. We give landlords more opportunities to combat illegal subletting.	1	Corporatist	3								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We want to build hundreds of thousands of new houses, so that fine and affordable living becomes accessible to everyone again. That means adding dozens of neighborhoods to the Netherlands.	1	Social Democratic	8								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are going to build. The VVD wants more housing everywhere. Purchase homes, mid-rent homes and social housing. We are looking specifically at places around already existing infrastructure to match the ambition. We want the government to help build as much as possible. We therefore want the government to take more control of the housing market and ensure that as many houses as possible are built. The central government, in consultation with the provinces, will designate sites to build more quickly, if that does not happen municipally.	2	Social Democratic	8								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Finally, we ensure that high-quality flex housing is also taken by municipalities.	2	Social Democratic	8								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We conclude a Building Accord. There will be a plan for the layout of the Netherlands. Based on this plan, we will conclude a Building Agreement with builders, housing corporations and provinces. As a result, at least dozens of new large-scale neighborhoods will be built. These agreements will be enforceable. We draw lessons from the time when Vinex neighborhoods were built. At the local level, so-called combi-deals are concluded with municipalities on smart use of space. This also includes economic activities.	3	Corporatist	7, 8								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	In the Building Agreement we give the housing of target groups a place, such as the housing of immigrant workers.	2	Corporatist	7								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build suburban and inner-city. We will continue to build houses within the boundaries of cities and towns. We will also build on the edges of cities and towns to provide more housing cheaper and faster. These can also be larger building sites. Nature and housing should not be opposites. We ensure that nature gets a place in the neighborhoods.	2	Non-ideological									
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are building more affordable owner-occupied housing in major cities and in the region. The big cities have historically focused on building social rental housing. To give families and middle-income earners a chance to continue living the cities, we will build more affordable owner-occupied housing in the big cities. We will also build enough affordable owner-occupied housing in the region.	2	L&M									
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Money for building houses. The housing impulse is transformed so that the construction of these neighborhoods gets off the ground and the construction of enough affordable houses becomes profitable. By reforming the housing impulse, we give first-time buyers the opportunity to buy their own homes.	3	Social Democratic	8								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	To advance housing construction on vacant land, we give municipalities the option of a new OZB rate for avoidable vacant land.	2	Social Democratic	3								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are cutting procedures and regulations. We simplify legal procedures so that housing construction gets off the ground faster. Furthermore, we support research into how interest groups can be better assessed for representativeness. In addition, for example, it must become easier to build micro-homes in your backyard. Rules that can be set by municipalities should be as similar as possible. Small construction projects release very little nitrogen. We want to help small construction projects get permits. We reduce the administrative burden.	3	Liberal	3								

Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are building cleaner and faster. The houses we build must be built in a fast and clean way. Therefore, we are going to produce more homes factory-built. This will also reduce the amount of nitrogen released when we build houses. Moreover, this will make building houses cheaper. We also encourage the use of bio-based building materials. This also offers new opportunities for farmers.	3	Non-ideological								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build houses where seniors want to live and ensure circulation. Seniors must be enticed to move to attractive senior apartments or (semi) collective housing in neighborhoods with sufficient accessible facilities, if necessary with financial, practical or organizational support. A sixty-, seventy- or eighty-year-old moving from a large single-family home triggers more relocation movements as a result of his move, freeing up houses for families and first-time buyers.	2	Corporatist								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	To give people more freedom and free up even more homes, we allow permanent occupancy in vacation parks. However, these homes must comply with the building code. There must also be sufficient municipal facilities for permanent living in a vacation home at all, such as garbage collection. We will come up with an approach to the shadow side of vacation park occupancy.	2	Non-ideological								
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We will make it easier to split homes, but keep an eye on the livability of residential neighborhoods.	2	Corporatist	3							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build appropriate homes for first-time buyers and small householders. The existing housing supply does not match the growth in the number of smaller households. Consider singles or first-time buyers who do not want to live too large. Homes for small households are, because of their size, more affordable. Moreover, this allows many more homes to be built on the building site. It is therefore important to also build smaller homes for anyone who needs them.	3	Liberal	4							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Sustainable neighborhoods. Homeowners remain free to make their homes sustainable or not. We avoid new obligations.	3	Liberal	3							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Making homes more sustainable must be affordable for everyone. Together with the National Mortgage Guarantee (NHG) and the financial sector, we are developing a new sustainability loan. Together with residents, plans are made to make homes more sustainable. We make some investments in making homes more sustainable deductible from the owner-occupied home tax credit. We keep an eye on the sustainability of monuments and the impact of climate change on parks and surrounding landscapes.	3	Liberal	0							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are making a new Master Plan to organize our country. A new Master Plan for the Netherlands is needed to deal properly with all claims to scarce space and to make choices in cases of conflict. In this plan we map out where to build housing, where to give nature more space and where to let our companies grow. Infrastructure, water and energy will be taken into account. We will look emphatically at all development opportunities outside the Randstad.	2	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are drawing in dozens of new neighborhoods. In this plan, we designate major inner-city and outer-city construction sites. To ensure that these neighborhoods are actually built, we enter into a Construction Agreement.	3	Corporatist	8							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We simplify and eliminate spatial rules. We remove, where possible, as many possible unnecessary spatial rules. For example, we completely abolish the ladder of sustainable urbanization. We also scrap the distinction between Novex areas. In this way we avoid unnecessary stacking of policies.	3	Liberal	8							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	The state makes realistic building agreements with municipalities. We make binding agreements with all municipalities about building plans. The current housing deals will be revamped and we will take more account of economic activities. We also make these housing deals more compatible with the wishes of house seekers.	2	Corporatist	4							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We fight homelessness. You need a home to build your life. We want homeless people to be able to get flex housing and maintain the goal of zero homelessness by 2030. We offer them appropriate help and support.	2	Social Democratic	1							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Reduce social rents	2	Social Democratic	2							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Increase rent allowance	3	Social Democratic	5							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	More housing for the Dutch: build more social rental housing, more middle rental housing and more owner-occupied housing	3	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Building not only inner-city, but also definitely outer-city - In cities and towns 'adding a street'	2	Non-ideological								
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Municipalities must issue building permits faster; shorten procedures	3	Liberal	5							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Hindering nitrogen rules off the table	3	Liberal								
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	No priority for status holders in allocation of social housing, but priority for Dutch nationals	3	Non-ideological								
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Stop creating gas-free homes	3	Liberal	3							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	No mandatory heat pump	3	Liberal	3							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Allow permanent occupancy of vacation homes	2	Non-ideological								
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		We remove the registration tax on the purchase of the sole, own home at the first bracket of 250,000 euros. The portion of the purchase price above this exempt amount is taxed progressively. Thus, we make the purchase of the sole, own home cheaper.	3	Social Democratic	2	Flanders	indicator	amount				
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		The registration tax for outside residences and rental properties without a certificate of conformity rises from 12% to 21%. This is how we inhibit the purchase of housing by second stayers and slumlords. The rates for conforming rental housing (12%) and rental housing intended for social rental (7%) are maintained.	3	Social Democratic	2			0	6			
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		Those who buy an ordinary house pay registration tax on it, while large villas and land are often in companies. These are transferred through a sale of shares that is not subject to registration tax. We are taking steps to treat real estate share transactions the same for tax purposes as a sale of a property.	3	Social Democratic	2			1	12			
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		By clearly defining where building is still allowed and where not, we put an end to spatial indecision and greatly expand the housing supply. A clear Flemish spatial plan in combination with an increased commitment to modular housing increases the housing supply in the coming years	3	Social Democratic	8			2	14			

Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	Certain neighborhoods in our major cities are unaffordable. We give local governments the ability to prevent investor buyouts in neighborhoods where there is a scarcity of affordable housing. This buyout protection means that the buyer must either live in the home himself or rent the home at a reduced rent.	3	Social Democratic	3				3	31		
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	Public buildings and public land with a residential function will no longer be sold to private actors, but given on a long lease. Also, rezoning of public land and properties to a residential function, in the context of a sale to private actors, will only be possible through ground lease. Ground lease makes it possible for prospective buyers to acquire a home without paying for the land. This then remains in government ownership. By removing the land price from the purchase price, the purchase of a house becomes up to 35% cheaper.	3	Social Democratic	0				4	16		
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	For people with modest incomes, poorly insulated homes are often the only ones they can afford. To support these buyers, we are putting extra effort into renovation within the Flemish Housing Loan. We do this with an attractive interest rate that does not increase with a longer term. And through faster processing of applications. We also ensure that every citizen gets a clear overview of the various support measures for renovation. Today, the government offers its support in a very fragmented way, so that it is often not taken up despite the high level of need.	2	Social Democratic	1				5	13		
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	Due to the high demand for rental housing, rents often swing wildly. With the introduction of a "rent brake," landlords will be required in new contracts to follow at most the target rent according to the Rent Estimator, subject to a limited margin. By capping excessive rents, we put a brake on rising rents.	3	Social Democratic	6				6	1		
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	The higher the rent deposit, the higher the barrier to renting. We are reducing the rent deposit from 3 months to 2 months of rent. This is how we make renting more accessible.	2	Social Democratic	1				7	3		
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	If the landlord does not want to renovate his energy-guzzling home, the tenant is left with a high energy bill. We again prohibit indexing rents of homes with an EPC label E or F and homes without an EPC certificate. In time, we will add homes with EPC label D, in line with energy targets.	2	Social Democratic	3				8	26		
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	By taxing the actual rental income, we give landlords the ability to deduct the investments they make in their rental housing from their taxes. Thus, we provide an important incentive to invest in the maintenance of rental housing. To also encourage major investments in quality improvement, we temporarily provide an increased tax deduction for investments that make a rental property more energy efficient. In this way, we encourage landlords to renovate their properties sustainably and at the same time combat undeclared work. To benefit from the deduction, the rent may only increase slightly during the first four years after renovation, so that the energy savings for the tenant are not completely undone. We do this for houses in all rental markets, including student rooms.	2	Corporatist	5				9	8		
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	To support low-income private tenants, we are building more social rental housing. In order not to leave the waiting private tenants out in the cold, we provide a rent premium for all tenants who are on the waiting list for 2 years for social housing (instead of after 4 years as is the case today). The more that is built, the less budget is needed for the rent premium and vice versa. This is why the two budgets are linked. We simultaneously address the high non-take-up of rent premium and rent subsidy and review the maximum rents to qualify for these allowances.	3	Social Democratic	5				10	0		
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	We envision an emergency program leading to 115,000 additional social housing units by 2050. Substantial investment is envisioned to achieve this goal. In addition, a central pool of architects, engineers, spatial planners and project supervisors will be created to which housing companies can freely call for support for their construction plans. In addition to construction and renovation, we ensure that housing companies can invest sufficiently in the upkeep of their social housing and provide proper guidance to social tenants. We also ensure that housing companies can concentrate on their core tasks, namely providing good and affordable housing for those in need of housing.	3	Social Democratic	8							
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	We require private developers to provide a minimum share of 25% affordable rental housing in new projects of a certain size.	3	Corporatist	3							
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	We are transforming poor, energy-wasting owner-occupied housing into energy-efficient and affordable rental housing. How? By actively buying up poorly insulated private homes (EPC E or F) that come on the market, renovating them and renting them affordably. In addition, the priority for housing companies to purchase vacant, unfit and uninhabitable housing will be reinstated and more actively applied.	2	Social Democratic	8							
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	Social management law allows municipalities to take vacant housing under temporary management, renovate it and rent it out affordably. The owner gets his renovated property back in management once the cost of renovation, through rental income, is repaid. For many municipalities, social management law is too complex due to a lack of resources and renovation expertise. We provide Flemish resources to put this system and the implementation of social management law in the hands of the housing companies.	2	Corporatist	8							
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	Municipalities that do not have their target for quality social housing are monitored and, if necessary, sanctioned. Municipalities that get it right are rewarded.	2	Social Democratic	3							
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	We put an end to arbitrariness regarding local bonding. In the allocation of social housing, the same criteria regarding local residential bonding are applied across Flanders.	2	Social Democratic	3							
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	Developers are building more and more expensive luxury lots that are unaffordable for most students. Therefore, we oblige these developers to provide a proportion of affordable basic lots in every new project. In addition, we as a government provide more affordable student housing.	2	Social Democratic	8							
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	The existing housing cooperative projects in Flanders are being evaluated and developed further by eliminating any bottlenecks.	3	Corporatist	3							
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	Every tenant has the right to quality housing. Therefore, we are phasing in a mandatory certificate of conformity for all private rental housing. To carry out more quality checks, we are increasing the number of housing inspectors so that better and faster action can be taken against slumlords.	2	Social Democratic	1							
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit	When a rental property is declared uninhabitable or unsuitable and this property was of poor quality from the start, the rental charges paid must be refunded to the tenant subject to deduction of an occupancy allowance. This occupancy allowance is currently determined based on the market value of the property. We are adjusting this so that the occupancy allowance takes more account of the severity of the quality defects.	2	Social Democratic	4							

Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		Within the social housing sector, housing companies are working together to install solar panels on as many social housing units as possible. Unfortunately, not every roof is suitable for solar panels. Therefore, we are establishing a social energy community. We sell the surplus power from the existing solar panels to an energy supplier, who in return offers this energy at a reduced price to the social tenants who do not have solar panels. Thus, every social tenant can benefit from the solar energy produced.	2	Social Democratic	2								
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		Social housing must be in order. We increase the number of annual renovations of social housing.	2	Social Democratic	5								
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		The need for adapted or easily adaptable housing for people with care needs will increase significantly in the coming decades. We are therefore reviewing the Flemish adjustment premium so that elderly people with more severe care needs and a limited income can make radical adjustments.	2	Corporatist	5								
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		Every prospective tenant who has sufficient income and the appropriate family size should be given a fair chance to view a rental property. Therefore, we are introducing practical tests that will make it possible to individually sensitize the discriminating landlord and punish him in case of repeated violations. In addition, we are working on an instrument that assesses the tenant based on objective parameters.	2	Social Democratic	2								
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		The Fund for Combating Evictions (FBU), which finances repayment plans for rent arrears, is not very successful. We make the system better known, provide more opportunities for tenants and landlords to report rent arrears, and better support the PCSW to fulfill its role in this.	2	Social Democratic	1								
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		Temporary contracts in social renting should be ended. The threat of being evicted when income increases is hugely demotivating for social tenants who are looking for a job or want to work more hours. Those who work hard and start earning more pay more rent, and that's the way it should be. Not only does this increase tenant motivation to work, it also creates a good social mix in neighborhoods and more rental income for housing companies that can therefore put more effort into counseling and maintenance.	3	Corporatist	3								
Flanders	Social Democrat: Vooruit		Under the asset test in social renting, banks may not charge for the evidence that prospective tenants are required to request.	2	Non-ideological									
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	For cd&v, good and affordable housing is more than a dream that may or may not be. It is a basic right that we must guarantee to every Fleming.	1	Social Democratic	4								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Where supply and demand insufficiently matched, the government can help, facilitate and create framework conditions. More so, the local government can take an active role in housing policy. Based on consultation, all housing actors can join hands to create an additional offer realize.	1	Corporatist	8								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	The priority for cd&v is that people have access to a regular mortgage loan. In the case of a temporary reduction in repayment capacity, the borrower may ask his or her bank to extend the credit period extend, in order to the monthly fee feasible. Moreover, this way the citizen avoids the high cost of additional mortgage registration. The total cost of credit increases, yet a (temporary) extension can mean the difference for many citizens in a number of situations.	3	L&M	9								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	That this accordion formula, based on a regulatory yet to be established, should be a basic right be for each borrower. We do ensure that this system is only possible in delineated cases, so that we do not create price driving effects of universally increased borrowing capacity. • Accordion formula as right to avoid financial noose in delineated cases.	3	Non-ideological									
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Reinstate a government guarantee for licensed credit unions. Introduce a guarantee scheme through private banks. Target audience: people with limited self-efficacy.	3	Corporatist	8								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Families and singles with modest incomes should be able to take maximum advantage of the Flemish Housing Loan with an income-related interest rate. This is a social measure that we fully endorse.	2	Social Democratic	1								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	A reasonable processing time for the file shows respect from the government the citizen. Additional investment is needed in the administrative teams of the Flemish Housing Fund to improve accessibility, customer service and turnaround time of files. improve. In some cases, it takes three to four months for a file to be fully approved and. That time is not available to less wealthy prospective buyers. Additional investment in the administrative teams of the Flemish Housing Fund for a reasonable processing time of files.	2	Non-ideological									
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Local differentiation in property tax as a guiding element in housing policy.	3	Corporatist	3								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Rising interest rates and declining home equity are pushing mortgage loan amounts. Those who over the least financial resources, should take out the largest loan. Therefore, we advocate Abolish the right to mortgage establishment. People today pay a 1% registration fee on the amount of the loan for which a mortgage registration is taken. This is unfair to people who need to borrow proportionately more money, than those who have more equity possess. Moreover, every buyer already pays registration tax on the purchase of his or her home, the so-called right to sell.	2	Corporatist	4								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Update amounts of insurance guaranteed living.	2	Social Democratic	1								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Make award and monthly support income-related.	2	Social Democratic	1								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Income-related premiums for energy renovations. Higher support for lowest incomes.	2	Social Democratic	2								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Guaranteed indexing aid and limit amounts My Rebuilding Premium and My Rebuilding Loan.	2	Corporatist	2								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Interest-free My Rebuilding Loan for the lowest incomes.	2	Social Democratic	2								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Every Fleming should have access to a renovation coach at an energy house. Free of charge for lower-income and ex-social security tenants.	2	Non-ideological									
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Collaboration with private construction and renovation partners is essential.	1	Corporatist	8								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Simple majority rather than absolute majority in decree-mandated renovations to residential units with building impact in multifamily housing.	2	Liberal	3								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	For cd&v, what works counts. Private and government hands.	1	Corporatist	0								
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Local plans inventory land and properties for development or renovation, account taking into account local demographics, opportunities and needs.	3	Corporatist	3								





Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Advice on environmental permit applications must only be directional. Applications are subject to a great deal of advice from various advisory bodies, which develop activities in the fields of energy, the environment, water policy, agriculture, land use planning, nature conservation, spatial planning, safety or mobility. A negative advice -meaning that the application must be refused on the basis of this advice- from an advisory body makes it difficult for licensing authorities to up interests, among other things because, although non-binding, such negative advice is often drafted in such a way that it is almost impossible to deviate from it, even with justification.	3 Liberal	3								
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We address stagnation in the development of larger projects, especially in the case of vacant or obsolete sites and so-called "urban cancers. Project development is hampered by owners unwilling to sell or renovate. To address this problem, we propose specific regulation within defined core areas, broadly analogous to the brownfield covenant instrument. We will lay down the conditions and procedure for this in a decree. It must deal with urban blight or dilapidation in core areas. We first try to bring all stakeholders (owners, developers, local government) to the table with an intent to look for solutions such as sale, change of ownership, ... If everything else has been tried, we make it possible for developers, after the agreement of the local government, to proceed with development via expropriation anyway, if they own at least 80% of the site. Owners are compensated at 100%.	3 Corporatist	3								
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We are addressing dilatory proceedings before the Permit Disputes Board by introducing the plea of manifestly reckless litigation. Parties initiating manifestly unfounded appeals may be held liable for the other party's damages.	2 Non-ideological									
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	The proliferation of certificates in real estate transactions must be stopped. Certificates and attestations must be optimized and centralized. In addition, the legal deadlines in the preparation phase of a real estate transaction must be shorter.	2 Liberal	3								
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We are waging a battle against wasted space by focusing on multifunctional use of space. Today, far too much of the space above or below a building is wasted. We use all possibilities for densification tailored to an area or neighborhood: allowing more building on the same surface, smart use of the same space.	2 Non-ideological									
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Nature protection and nature restoration must take into account the Flemish context. Within the spatially fragmented Flanders there is a need for a more flexible framework to be able to do nature protection and nature restoration, taking into account socio-economic considerations and climate change: It is essential that Europe takes into account densely populated, economically prosperous and spatially and functionally dense regions such as Flanders, for example in the Nature Restoration Act.	2 Liberal	3								
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We reform and reduce housing taxes. Owning your own home is still a dream of many Flemings. However, taxes make buying and owning a home a lot more expensive. We must therefore reform and reduce those taxes. In consultation with the sector, we are looking to further reduce notary fees. We will abolish the registration duties when you buy a home you will be living in yourself. And if you take out a loan to purchase that home, you will no longer pay the federal mortgage duty of 0.3% or the regional mortgage duty of 1%.	3 L&M	9								
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Eliminate the misery tax on relationship breakups and eliminate discrimination. Not every relationship is for eternity. If you own a house together, the partner who takes over the house must pay a division tax of 1% or 2.5%, depending on whether you married, legally or de facto cohabiting. A tax on divorce that makes one suffer even more, that we cannot actually justify and does not reflect today's reality. We abolish the apportionment tax: we want equal tax treatment for couples, both married and cohabiting. By abolishing the apportionment law, we also make it easier for heirs who inherit property together and who want to put an end to forced undividedness. We put an end to discriminations such as some contributions to a joint estate, where spouses have to pay 50 euros, while cohabitants can expect an assessment bill of thousands of euros.	Non-ideological									
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We make rents more affordable, specifically targeting people who are working or actively seeking work. We recognize that the rental market is a major financial challenge for many people. Our goal is to support them by improving access to rent incentives or rental subsidies.	3 Social Democratic	5								
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We increase access to the purchase and rental market, especially for young people and singles. We do this by lowering additional costs and taxes, facilitating 100% Housing Loans, engaging in smart forms of financing such as hamster rentals and the capacity of the Flemish Housing Fund. We will ensure that new construction buyers can pay off VAT over 10 years instead of once.	3 Corporatist	4								
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Everyone has an equal opportunity in the rental market. To ensure equal opportunities for all, we are committed to practical testing in the rental market. Any discrimination can thus be objectively identified. It will not only ensure to address this in individual cases, but also create awareness about the impact of discrimination on our society.	2 Social Democratic	2								
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We strive for an inclusive approach that supports different lifestyles by facilitating flexible living arrangements. Children who want to take care of their parents, grandparents who take in grandchildren, young people who want to live together, people who want to share homes, a group of retirees who want to live together instead of going to an assisted living facility... They face tax disadvantages or run into problems when someone becomes benefit-driven. We are removing the regulatory barriers around this.	2 Corporatist	2								

Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We relax spatial regulations to new types of housing. In a highly urbanized Flanders, more and more (diversely composed and single-person) households are looking for affordable housing of their . We create more housing entities within the existing land use by relaxing building regulations and thus allowing more. We facilitate modular housing units so that homes can be expanded or reduced in size according to family composition and so that they can be adapted to continue living in later in life. Specifically, we also make it easier to build in height, subdivide existing buildings and share housing. Spatial policies should also facilitate smaller housing units. We ensure that unused spaces can be used as much and as easily as possible (living above commercial properties, etc.). Just as we have done for care housing, we also provide an accessible regulatory framework for co-housing, tiny houses, temporary housing containers, etc. We offer local governments more policy space and the corresponding resources for this. There is also a need to be able to deal creatively with land ownership. E.g. alternative forms of building rights, where you can build without owning the land.	3	Liberal	3							
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	The government must provide support for the realization of a sustainable and energy-efficient residential patrimony. Mandating energy efficiency without appropriate support for citizens is unrealistic. Therefore, we propose to actively support citizens in achieving an energy label A by 2050. We do this by making the MijnVerbouwLening interest-free again, perpetuating the increased MijnVerbouw premiums and employing the model of Energy Service Companies (ESCO), in which citizens can cover the renovation costs through the energy savings that come from the investments.	3	Corporatist	8							
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We propose to relieve citizens in renovation projects by encouraging innovative business models such as the Pawnshop. This way we help citizens who do not have time and/or expertise within renovation. We encourage neighborhood renovations, where renovation managers take care of entire neighborhoods through framework contracts. Energy Houses, which have received extra money under our impulse this legislature, are the one-stop shop for citizens who want to renovate in terms advice, relief and guidance.	2	Corporatist	8							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Vlaams Belang is concerned about the housing needs of our Flemish families. Enabling our families to own affordable housing is a top priority, both on the buy and rent market.	1	SD&C	9							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	In the first place to be able to own, because the own home is still the best guarantee against poverty. The rental market must also be expanded sensitively for both those who prefer to rent and those who do not have sufficient resources to invest in a home of their own.	1	SD&C	9							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Young people should be able to thrive without worrying about their housing needs.	1	Corporatist	7							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	The licensing policy should be simplified and deadlines shortened. The administration for building and purchasing housing is so complex that it takes a lot of time and effort. Time we no longer have, the housing crisis is here now and must be solved as soon as possible.	3	Liberal	3							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Vlaams Belang recognizes that sustainable and energy-efficient living is important and that we must provide the necessary means and opportunities for this. Introducing compulsory renovation is the wrong choice, because it reduces the supply on the rental market and increases unaffordability on the purchase market. We believe in the common sense of the individual, of the Fleming, to choose to renovate his/her home when the no dige financial means are available.	2	Liberal	3							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Our housing market in Flanders must first and foremost be at the disposal of our own people, the hard-working Flemish people. The Flemish housing and rental market should be shielded as much as possible and kept primarily for the Flemish.	2	Non-ideological								
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a further reduction in registration fees for the first home purchased as a financial incentive to make up for the disappearance of the housing bonus	2	Corporatist	2							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	A simplification of permit pro cedures;	3	Liberal	3							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	an extension of the convened hu ren/budget rentals and an extension of the coupled terms;	3	Social Democratic	5							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	The elimination of mandatory renovation, allowing owners to renovate at their own pace;	3	Liberal								
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	an expansion of the Flemish Housing Loan so that more people can realize their own homes;	2	Corporatist	4							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a 6% VAT for demolition and reconstruction, for everyone (including construction promoters). This is the best guarantee of providing enough affordable and energy efficient housing	3	Liberal	8							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	extending rent subsidies and rent subsidies for people in the most precarious situations	2	Social Democratic	5							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	require the certificate of conformity for rental housing throughout Flanders to guarantee quality housing and eliminate slum landlords	3	Social Democratic	3							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	more housing inspections in properties that are far encouraged not to meet the minimum standards of the Flemish housing code.	2	Social Democratic	3							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a strict approach to nuisance with notice went as a tenant for whom structural nuisance is caused;	2	Liberal	3							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	more financial incentives for local governments from the Flemish government to build affordable housing on their land areas;	2	Corporatist	3							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a guarantee from the Flemish government for the equity in mortgage loans with private banks and recognized kre diet companies;	3	Corporatist	0							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Making our own affordable housing possible for our families is a top priority	1	Mediterranean	0							
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will get Britain building again, creating jobs across England, with 1.5 million new homes over the next parliament.	1	Social Democratic	8		UK	indicator	amount			
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	We will immediately update the National Policy Planning Framework to undo damaging Conservative changes, including restoring mandatory housing targets.	3	Social Democratic	8			0	2			
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	We will take tough action to ensure that planning authorities have up-to-date Local Plans and reform and strengthen the presumption in favour of sustainable development.	3	Social Democratic	8			1	10			

UK	Social Democrat: Labour	Labour will support local authorities by funding additional planning officers, through increasing the rate of the stamp duty surcharge paid by non-UK residents.	2	Corporatist	7	2	1
UK	Social Democrat: Labour	We will ensure local communities continue to shape housebuilding in their area, but where necessary Labour will not be afraid to make full use of intervention powers to build the houses we need.	3	Social Democratic	8	3	15
UK	Social Democrat: Labour	Labour will take a brownfield first approach, prioritising the development of previously used land wherever possible, and fast-tracking approval of urban brownfield sites.	2	Corporatist	8	4	8
UK	Social Democrat: Labour	Labour is committed to preserving the green belt which has served England's towns and cities well over many decades. Under the Conservatives, greenbelt land is regularly released for development but haphazardly and often for speculative housebuilding. Without changing its purpose or general extent, Labour will take a more strategic approach to greenbelt land designation and release to build more homes in the right places. The release of lower quality 'grey belt' land will be prioritised and we will introduce 'golden rules' to ensure development benefits communities and nature.	2	Social Democratic	8	5	0
UK	Social Democrat: Labour	In partnership with local leaders and communities, a Labour government will build a new generation of new towns, inspired by the proud legacy of the 1945 Labour government. Alongside urban extensions and regeneration projects, these will form part of a series of large-scale new communities across England.	3	Social Democratic	8	6	0
UK	Social Democrat: Labour	Housing need in England cannot be met without planning for growth on a larger than local scale so we will introduce effective new mechanisms for cross-boundary strategic planning. Labour will require all Combined and Mayoral Authorities to strategically plan for housing growth in their areas. We will give Combined Authorities new planning powers along with new freedoms and flexibilities to make better use of grant funding.	3	Social Democratic	8	7	1
UK	Social Democrat: Labour	Labour will further reform compulsory purchase compensation rules to improve land assembly, speed up site delivery, and deliver housing, infrastructure, amenity, and transport benefits in the public interest. We will take steps to ensure that for specific types of development schemes, landowners are awarded fair compensation rather than inflated prices based on the prospect of planning permission.	3	Social Democratic	8	8	21

UK	Social Democrat: Labour	Labour will deliver the biggest increase in social and affordable housebuilding in a generation. We will strengthen planning obligations to ensure new developments provide more affordable homes; make changes to the Affordable Homes Programme to ensure that it delivers more homes from existing funding; and support councils and housing associations to build their capacity and make a greater contribution to affordable housing supply. Labour will prioritise the building of new social rented homes and better protect our existing stock by reviewing the increased right to buy discounts introduced in 2012 and increasing protections on newly-built social housing.	3	Social Democratic	1			9	0		
UK	Social Democrat: Labour	Labour wants exemplary development to be the norm not the exception. We will take steps to ensure we are building more high-quality, well-designed, and sustainable homes and creating places that increase climate resilience and promote nature recovery. We will implement solutions to unlock the building of homes affected by nutrient neutrality without weakening environmental protections.	3	Social Democratic	3			10	0		
UK	Social Democrat: Labour	Labour will work with local authorities to give first-time buyers the first chance to buy homes and end the farce of entire developments being sold off to international investors before houses are even built. And we will introduce a permanent, comprehensive mortgage guarantee scheme, to support first-time buyers who struggle to save for a large deposit, with lower mortgage costs.	2	Corporatist	4						
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Abolishing the legacy EU 'nutrient neutrality' rules to immediately unlock the building of 100,000 new homes with local consent, with developers required in law to pay a one-of mitigation fee so there is no net additional pollution.	3	Liberal	4					
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Delivering a record number of homes each year on brownfield land in urban areas. We will do this by providing a fast-track route through the planning system for new homes on previously developed land in the 20 largest cities. Strong design codes will ensure this enables the gentle densification of urban areas, with new family homes and mansion-blocks on tree-lined streets built in the local character. We will look at extending 'full expensing' to the delivery of brownfield housing.	2	Corporatist	8					
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Raising density levels in inner London to those of European cities like Paris and Barcelona. We will ensure the London Plan delivers more family homes a year, forcing the Mayor to plan for more homes on brownfield sites, like underused industrial land. We will regenerate major sites like Euston, Old Oak Common and Thamesmead.	2	Non-ideological						















Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator						
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Introduce a vision of zero homelessness among pensioners and increase government funding for housing support	3	Social Democratic	2		CD non ideology	38	289	13,1	
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	A functioning housing market is a prerequisite for increased growth	1	Liberal	5						
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	everyone should dare to dream of to own their own home	1	L&M	10						
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	We want to implement reforms that increase the construction of both rental as condominiums.	2	Social Democratic	9						
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	To achieve greater acceptance,with the public, we want to give citizens greater influence over architecture.	2	Non-ideological							
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Abolish current shore protection to enable increased construction	2	Liberal	4						
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Replace advanced detailed plans with simpler building plans	3	Liberal	9						
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Stop the left from reintroducing property tax	3	Liberal	3						
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Keeping the mortgage interest deduction	3	Corporatist	5						
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaternas	Enabling fairer rents by potential tenants' valuation of the housing is given more importance	2	Social Democratic	7						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We therefore say: no longer build for the market, but build to communities.	1	Corporatist	1						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The CDA clearly chooses to build enough homes for all housing seekers.	1	Social Democratic	2						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	we have been working on tighter government direction, abolishing the landlord levy, regulation of rents and strengthening the position of first-time buyers against slumlords and investors. The CDA was the driving force behind this restoration of public housing as a public service. We are going to continue with that.	1	Social Democratic	1						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We are committed to an affordable, livable and accessible home for all.	1	Social Democratic	1						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We will continue unabated with the commitments made to build nearly one million homes through 2030, two-thirds of which will be affordable and with focus on starters, families and the elderly. In doing so, each municipality is building 40% for the middle groups and municipalities with little social housing should work on that.	2	Corporatist	1						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The housing shortage is a social crisis. Prevent should be that nitrogen rules shut down major housing projects.	3	Non-ideological							
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The housing issue requires an independent Ministry of Housing and Planning	2	Social Democratic	1						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The new law allowing half of new construction and rental housing to be allocated by municipalities to their own residents and people with avital occupation is carried on.	3	Corporatist	8						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	Building a home, from plan to completion, takes an average of 10 to 15 years. This should and can be shorter. For this, objection and appeal procedures should be be greatly shortened	3	Liberal	4						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	Cooperatives are given the space to build for the middle class on a non-profit basis. For this, it is important that cooperatives have strategic land positions can take. We are abolishing the market test.	3	Corporatist	9						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	Corporation tenants are given more opportunity to buy their homes. Housing associations then invest the financial proceeds in new construction and sustainability.	2	Liberal	1						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	In every village, a street may be added. Provinces should no longer put obstacles in the way of villages to build on to their own needs. By cities and villages to grow in a controlled way, to address "rotten spots" and to address the edges while respecting the environment, we are building vital villages and towns and strong communities with more space for young and old.	3	Corporatist	9						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We make a new Nota Ruimte that does justice to all regions and utilizes all regions. Growth has been skewed in recent decades: national housing policy is too focused on "build, build, build" in the already crowded Randstad. In the north, east and south of our country, there are also plenty of opportunities and is great need for housing.	2	Non-ideological							
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We are also committed to making better use of existing housing through splitting and topping up, transformation, housing sharing and flow-through. We will keep thereby paying attention to livability in residential neighborhoods.	2	Non-ideological							
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The transformation of non-vital vacation parks into residential neighborhoods may be necessary for municipalities are a welcome addition to the housing stock.	2	Non-ideological							
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The separation of living and care has brought much independence, but sometimes also loneliness and high (home) care costs. We invest in a warm home for our elderly and people with disabilities through more combinations of housing and care that are accessible to all. There will be A national plan for building courtyards for the elderly, home care homes and a new form of the familiar retirement home and innovative living arrangements for people with disabilities.	2	Corporatist	8						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We are also committed to more mixed housing concepts for people exiting from social shelter and sheltered housing and need a "good neighbor.	2	SD&C	10						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We encourage young people to save for the purchase of a home. For this purpose, agreements are made with banks and a contribution is granted to be able to save for the purchase of a home at a higher and more attractive interest rate.	2	Liberal	1						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	For first-time buyers, the current state of the student debt determinant.	2	Non-ideological							
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	An affordable home is a sustainable home. The interest rate on a low- and middle-income energy savings loan from the National Heat Fund remains at 0%, so thatpeople without savings can also get started.	2	Corporatist	6						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	All corporation housing with a poor energy label must be completed by 2030 improved. Municipalities are given a role in neighborhood-by-neighborhood approaches to insulation and sustainability of private housing. We give priority to vulnerable neighborhoods, so that those residents don't have to figure out all sorts of things themselves and are more likely to benefit from lower energy bills.	3	Corporatist	4						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We are putting more effort into cooperative initiatives where community members work together.	1	Corporatist	1						

Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	A sustainable home also means sustainable construction and insulation. We introduce a standard for a minimum proportion of building with biobased materials (as hemp, flax and bulrush) and increase the proportion of biobased insulation of dwellings.	3	Social Democratic	4						
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We introduce nationwide consumer protection against unfair leasehold structures.	2	Social Democratic	4						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	For cd&v, good and affordable housing is more than a dream that may or may not be . It is abasic right that we must guarantee to every Fleming.	1	Social Democratic	5						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Where supply and demand insufficiently matched, the government can help, facilitate and create framework conditions. More so, the local government can take an active role in housing policy. Based on consultation, all housing actors can join hands to create an additional offer realize.	1	Corporatist	9						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	The priority for cd&v is that people have access to a regular mortgage loan. In the case of a temporary reduction in repayment capacity, the borrower may ask his or her bank to extend the credit period extend, in order to the monthly fee feasible. Moreover, this way the citizen avoids the high cost of additional mortgage registration. The total cost of credit increases, yet a (temporary) extension can mean the difference for many citizens in a number of situations.	3	L&M	10						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	That this accordion formula, based on a regulatory yet to be established, should be a basic right be for each borrower. We do ensure that this system is only possible in delineated cases, so that we do not create price driving effects of universally increased borrowing capacity. • Accordion formula as right to avoid financial noose in delineated cases.	3	Non-ideological							
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Reinstate a government guarantee for licensed credit unions. Introduce a guarantee scheme through private banks. Target audience: people with limited self-efficacy.	3	Corporatist	9						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Families and singles with modest incomes should be able to take maximum advantage of the Flemish Housing Loan with an income-related interest rate. This is a social measure that we fully endorse.	2	Social Democratic	2						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	A reasonable processing time for the file shows respect from the government the citizen. Additional investment is needed in the administrative teams of the Flemish Housing Fund to improve accessibility, customer service and turnaround time of files. improve. In some cases, it takes three to four months for a file to be fully approved and . That time is not available to less wealthy prospective buyers. Additional investment in the administrative teams of the Flemish Housing Fund for a reasonable processing time of files.	2	Non-ideological							
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Local differentiation in property tax as a guiding element in housing policy.	3	Corporatist	4						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Rising interest rates and declining home equity are pushing mortgage loan amounts. Those who over the least financial resources, should take out the largest loan. Therefore, we advocate Abolish the right to mortgage establishment. People today pay a 1% registration fee on the amount of the loan for which a mortgage registration is taken. This is unfair to people who need to borrow proportionately more money, than those who have more equity possess. Moreover, every buyer already pays registration tax on the purchase of his or her home, the so-called right to sell.	2	Corporatist	5						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Update amounts of insurance guaranteed living.	2	Social Democratic	2						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Make award and monthly support income-related.	2	Social Democratic	2						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Income-related premiums for energy renovations. Higher support for lowest incomes.	2	Social Democratic	3						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Guaranteed indexing aid and limit amounts My Rebuilding Premium and My Rebuilding Loan.	2	Corporatist	3						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Interest-free My Rebuilding Loan for the lowest incomes.	2	Social Democratic	3						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Every Fleming should have access to a renovation coach at an energy house. Free of charge for lower-income and ex-social security tenants.	2	Non-ideological							
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Collaboration with private construction and renovation partners is essential.	1	Corporatist	9						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Simple majority rather than absolute majority in decree-mandated renovations to residential units with building impact in multifamily housing.	2	Liberal	4						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	For cd&v, what works counts. Private and government hands.	1	Corporatist	1						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Local plans inventory land and properties for development or renovation, account taking into account local demographics, opportunities and needs.	3	Corporatist	4						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Expansion of the VLABINVEST model to all of Flanders. Through commitment to conventional leasing, housing companies, together with developers, can also Provide additional private, affordable and social supply, at a market rate of return. Focus of the housing companies, of course, remains the construction of social housing. In addition, cd&v advocates for an extension of the VLABINVEST model (Flemish Brabant) to all of Flanders. Under provincial direction, supported by the Flemish Government, VLABINVEST conducts an active land and housing policy, in partnership with local governments and initiators. In doing so, VLABINVEST provides affordable rental and owner-occupied housing in the middle segment, for people who have a connection to the region, for example because they have lived or worked there for a long time. The focus should be Flanders-wide on affordable housing for as many Flemings as possible, in continuous cooperation and in consultation between the investment company, housing companies, municipalities and provinces, intermunicipalities, ocmw's and the Flemish Housing Fund. Prices of purchase and rental housing in this scenario are up to 20% below market price, with the purchase or rental price being income-related.	3	Corporatist	0						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Local governments at the steeringwheel. Provinces and Flanders facilitate.	1	Corporatist	8						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Vacancy taxes help homes on the market.	2	Corporatist	3						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Core densification with respect for the individuality of our villages and towns.	2	Non-ideological							
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Maximum preservation of open and green space.	2	Non-ideological							
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Reduced VAT on demolition and reconstruction for the first home. Limited in area.	2	Corporatist	4						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Screening permit procedures for efficiency.	2	Liberal	4						

Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Work on regulatory loopholes in land use planning and housing.	2	Liberal	4					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Creation of new "acceleration" committee in the Flemish Parliament.	2	Social Democratic	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Trust and support for municipalities in drafting RUP.	2	Corporatist	3					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Give lenders access to the EPC database.	2	Liberal	4					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Review of each new measure for limiting administrative burden on borrower and lender.	2	Liberal	4					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Strengthening the housing pass that all legally required certificates.	2	Liberal	4					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Single site visit for all certificates.	2	Liberal	4					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Fixed price per square meter for preparation of EPC certificates. Control by government. Implementation of a number of areas for improvement.	2	Non-ideological						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Extension of validity period asbestos certificate when no asbestos was in the home.	2	Liberal	4					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Build more and faster social housing.	2	Social Democratic	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Halving the waiting period of the rental premium from four to two years.	2	Social Democratic	5					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	A new Binding Social Objective linked to Mixed Housing.	3	SD&C	9					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	re-notice the value of local housing consultation.	2	Corporatist	3					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Additional commitment to consulting with and informing citizens.	2	Non-ideological						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Remain committed to sufficient supply through private private landlords.	3	Liberal	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Property tax rebate for small-scale private landlords (maximum one dwelling).	2	Corporatist	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Where possible replace social energy tariff with installation of solar panels at long term rental.	2	Corporatist	5					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Extension of insurance guaranteed housing to private rental market.	2	Social Democratic	5					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Thanks to cd&v, the social student housing coming.	1	Corporatist	7					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Strive for maximum diversity in supply: private rooms, social, hospice living, kotmadam rooms.		Non-ideological						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Rental of limited number of rooms should be made permit-free under certain conditions.	2	Corporatist	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Remove administrative and legal hurdles.	1	Corporatist	3					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Invest in intergenerational neighborhoods with shared indoor and outdoor space.	2	Non-ideological						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Conversion of vacant offices into temporary housing via modular units.	2	Non-ideological						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	More ground lease agreements by local boards with prospective buyers.	1	Corporatist	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	More hamster rent.	2	Corporatist	1					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	A Flemish town planning ordinance should ensure mandatory accessibility of apartments in new construction or major renovations, both for the common parts as the individual housing units.	3	Social Democratic	3					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Support on private market (adaptation premium), but also realization of adapted housing by residential companies.	2	Corporatist	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Adjustment premium elderly also open to social tenants.	2	Social Democratic	2					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Support independence and care needs through assisted living or (mobile) care homes.	2	Corporatist	5					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Simplifying regulations mobile care homes.	2	Liberal	4					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Allow temporary zoning changes in the case of vacant assisted housing.	2	Corporatist	3					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	We want to make sure that people affordable and sufficient quality housing. Unfortunately, the social housing market today offers for many not a solution, as the average waiting time is several years.	1	Social Democratic	4					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	creating an additional qualitative and affordable supply, both in the private as well as social housing market, a priority.	2	Corporatist	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	In addition, less wealthy tenants should also be able to count on support on the private market. We do this, for example, by already awarding the rent subsidy from the moment people are two years on the waiting list for social, instead of the current four years. The rent subsidy should be available to people waiting at least two years for a social home, instead of the current four years. We examine the degressive calculation of the rent premium, so it is no longer all or nothing if you earn slightly more than the limit amount.	3	Social Democratic	5					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	There needs to be a new Binding Social Objective that determines how much additional social rental housing a municipality must build in its territory. This must be enforceable.	3	Social Democratic	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	For private developers, there should be a new framework for enforcing the construction of social housing and affordable housing in new construction projects of a certain .	3	Corporatist	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Local governments should be given pre-emption rights to purchase public lands.	3	Corporatist	0					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	There needs to be a stronger social safety net for people in poverty who rent on the private rental market, by introducing guaranteed housing insurance for the rental market. Thus we avoid them losing their homes at the slightest setback and falling into a negative spiral poverty. This can be done by expanding the insurance guaranteed housing to the rental market	3	Social Democratic	2					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Social housing should be more integrated into the private housing market. We need the concentration of social housing in neighborhoods and residential blocks countered.	1	SD&C	9					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	The existing interest-free loan for emergency purchasers - families who, out of necessity, buy an inferior buy home - ensures that these families will receive up to 50 000 through the PCSW over an extended period of time. Euros can borrow interest-free for renovation works. To make it an effective rolling fund make, this system must be continued and expanded.	2	Corporatist	5					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	In order to make solar panels accessible to more people, they should be able to be paid off on installments be purchased. Because after installing solar panels, people have a lower electricity bill, this installment has no impact on the monthly budget.	2	Social Democratic	2					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	There should be a regulatory framework in terms of land use planning, for the design of temporary housing projects and the temporary filling of vacant (office) buildings.	3	Corporatist	8					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Targeted and sufficiently accosting preventive housing and rental assistance should help to prevent rent arrears or conflict situations with the landlord or other tenants, to avoid evictions resulting in homelessness.	2	Social Democratic	1					
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Early detection, information campaigns, training and programs aimed at the financial literacy, the stigma surrounding homelessness, and providing access to education and employment, can help prevent homelessness.	1	Corporatist	1					

Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	The "housing first" projects for the most vulnerable homeless (where housing is the first step is, after which the tenant is guided in all aspects of their life) should be rolled out in all of Flanders and Brussels.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	The reference address scheme should be reformed and simplified to include the broader group of homeless people may on it. Pending reform, establish a hotline for problems with the reference address to facilitate access to it. guarantee.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	In order to tailored counseling to the homeless, efforts must be made to further developing the competencies of social workers and municipal officials to working around this.	2	Non-ideological							
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Within homelessness policy, additional measures must be taken to provide homeless minors with a home. Young adults at risk of becoming homeless or be detected and supported in time.	1	Corporatist	7						
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	The installation bonus, which homeless people receive when they first find housing, should again become an individual right. We also knew the installation premium in the past (before the purchase) so that (formerly) homeless people can use it effectively.	2	Corporatist	8						
Spain	Christian Democ	PP	WE WILL PROMOTE THE RECONCILIATION OF FAMILIES THAT CHOOSE TO LIVE IN THE RURAL, facilitating the care of children and the elderly by opening "nest houses" or homes for the elderly in municipalities with smaller populations.	2	Mediterranean	0						
Spain	Christian Democ	PP	WE WILL PROPOSE A STATE PACT ON HOUSING (that counts) with the participation and involvement of the Autonomous Communities and local entities. We will jointly explore solutions to guarantee a rational use of water. We will build housing at more affordable prices, mobilize rental housing and deepen the rehabilitation of the existing housing stock. We will repeal the housing law, which has generated legal uncertainty and does not solve any of the underlying problems of the housing market.	3	Social Democratic	3						
Spain	Christian Democ	PP	93 (WE WILL MOBILIZE THE FLOOR OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP for public housing networks, both patrimonial and demanial, for the promotion of affordable rental housing.	2	Social Democratic	0						
Spain	Christian Democ	PP	94(WE WILL PROMOTE HOUSING SOCIAL, with coherent and realistic objectives, as a fundamental element to face the housing problem in Spain.	2	Social Democratic	8						
Spain	Christian Democ	PP	WE WILL ENCOURAGE THE CREATION OF MORE RESIDENTIAL RESOURCES FOR THE ELDERLY, such as shared housing, housing with common services and other living arrangements that incorporate support and care services for those in need.	2	Corporatist	5						
Spain	Christian Democ	PP	WE WILL SUPPORT HOUSING REHABILITATION AND ADAPTATION. to promote total accessibility, both at home and in the environment. We will promote reinforcements in home care systems so that people who wish to continue living in their own homes for as long as possible.	2	Corporatist	3						
Spain	Christian Democ	PP	(WE WILL PROMOTE THE CREATION OF MORE ASSISTANCE RESOURCES FOR THAT PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES CAN LIVE WITH THE PERSONAL SUPPORT THEY NEED, in line with the European Care Strategy.	2	Corporatist	3						
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Abolishing the legacy EU 'nutrient neutrality' rules to immediately unlock the building of 100,000 new homes with local consent, with developers required in law to pay a one-of mitigation fee so there is no net additional pollution.	3	Liberal	4						
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Delivering a record number of homes each year on brownfield land in urban areas. We will do this by providing a fast-track route through the planning system for new homes on previously developed land in the 20 largest cities. Strong design codes will ensure this enables the gentle densification of urban areas, with new family homes and mansion-blocks on tree-lined streets built in the local character. We will look at extending 'full expensing' to the delivery of brownfield housing.	2	Corporatist	8						

UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	Raising density levels in inner London to those of European cities like Paris and Barcelona. We will ensure the London Plan delivers more family homes a year, forcing the Mayor to plan for more homes on brownfield sites, like underused industrial land. We will regenerate major sites like Euston, Old Oak Common and Thamesmead.		2 Non-ideological								
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	Unlocking new urban regeneration schemes, by creating locally-led urban development corporations in partnership with the private sector and institutional investors. We will support the delivery of new quarters in Leeds, Liverpool and York alongside working with local leaders and the community to seize the opportunity of our ambitious Cambridge 2050 plan.		3 Corporatist	8							
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	Supporting local and smaller builders by requiring councils to set land aside for them and lifting Section 106 burdens on more smaller sites, while ruling out Labour's proposed 'community right to appeal' which would bring the planning system to its knees.		3 Corporatist	8							
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	Making sure local authorities use the new Infrastructure Levy to deliver the GP surgeries, roads and other local infrastructure needed to support homes. We will not allow these funds to be spent on community projects that bear no relation to support for new homes.		2 Non-ideological								
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	Renewing the Affordable Homes Programme that will deliver homes of all tenures and focus on regenerating and improving housing estates.		3 Social Democratic	8							
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	Retaining our cast-iron commitment to protect the Green Belt from uncontrolled development, while ensuring more homes get built where it makes sense, like in inner cities. Our national planning protections mean there is never any top-down requirement for councils to remove Green Belt protection and these will remain in place.		2 Social Democratic	8							
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	As well as building the homes we need, we will also take immediate steps to support more people onto the housing ladder. We will ensure the majority of first-time buyers pay no Stamp Duty at all, lowering the upfront costs of buying a first home. We will make permanent the increase to the threshold at which first-time buyers pay Stamp Duty to £425,000 from £300,000, which we introduced in 2022.		2 Corporatist	4							
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	We will also launch a new and improved Help to Buy scheme to provide first-time buyers with an equity loan of up to 20% towards the cost of a new build home. First-time buyers will be able to get onto the housing ladder with a 5% deposit on interest terms they can afford. The scheme will be part funded by contributions from house builders.		2 Corporatist	4							
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	We will also continue our Mortgage Guarantee Scheme, which has already helped over 40,000 households buy a home, while supporting more families to buy through shared ownership.		2 Corporatist	4							

UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	We will always prioritise giving those who work hard and contribute to our country a leg up in the housing market. We will legislate for new 'Local Connection' and 'UK Connection' tests for social housing in England, to ensure this valuable but limited resource is allocated fairly.	2	Corporatist	4						
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	we will implement a 'three strikes and you're out' expectation of social housing landlords for anti-social behaviour. They will be expected to evict tenants whose behaviour is disruptive to neighbours and the local community.	2	Liberal	3						
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	We will protect family homes from higher tax. Under the Family Home Tax Guarantee, we will not increase the number of council tax bands, undertake an expensive council tax revaluation or cut council tax discounts, as Labour is currently doing in Wales. We will maintain Private Residence Relief so that people's homes are protected from Capital Gains Tax and we will not increase the rate or level of Stamp Duty to support homeowners.	3	Liberal	0						
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	To further support homeowners, we will introduce a two-year temporary Capital Gains Tax relief for landlords who sell to their existing tenants. We rule out Labour's anti-aspiration move to drastically reduce Right to Buy discounts to levels seen under the last Labour Government. We will protect the laws that ensure the discounts rise with infation and fght any plan by local authorities to abolish the Right to Buy altogether.	2	Corporatist	4						
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	We will complete the process of leasehold reform, to improve the lives of over four million leaseholders. We will cap ground rents at £250, reducing them to peppercorn over time. We will end the misuse of forfeiture so leaseholders don't lose their property and capital unfairly and make it easier to take up commonhold.	2	Corporatist	1						
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	We will pass a Renters Reform Bill that will deliver fairness in the rental market for landlords and renters alike. We will deliver the court reforms necessary to fully abolish Section 21 and strengthen other grounds for landlords to evict private tenants guilty of anti-social behaviour.	2	Corporatist	3						
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	We will continue with our plans to end rough sleeping and prevent people from ending up on the streets in the frst place, after making signifcant progress over the last few years. We will deliver our commitments under the Local Authority Housing Fund and review the quality of temporary accommodation.	2	Social Democratic	1						
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	After delivering landmark new laws that freed leaseholders from cladding bills following on from the awful tragedy of Grenfell Tower, we will continue our support for leaseholders affected by historic building safety problems  by requiring the continuation of developer-funded remediation programmes for mid- and high-rise buildings.	2	Corporatist	3						
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	We will ensure councils have the powers they need to manage the uncontrolled growth of holiday lets, which can cause nuisance to local residents and a hollowing out of communities.	2	Corporatist	3						
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	We will support those who want to build or commission their own home by making the planning process simpler, while also supporting more community housing schemes. We will encourage the building of diferent forms of housing, particularly housing for older people.	2	Corporatist	8						
UK	Christian Democ	Concervatives	Building on our new powers for the police, we will further speed up the use and enforcement of powers to remove illegal traveller sites, while giving councils greater planning powers to prevent unauthorised development by travellers.	2	Non-ideological							
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Expensive, complicated and innovation-inhibiting regulations lie like a wet blanket over parts of the countryside. We will clean up redundant rules and bureaucracy.	3	Liberal	3						

Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Shoreline protection will be reformed to make it easier to build and live in rural areas. It is time to give rural dwellers more autonomy over their own land and simplify the rules to make it easier to build and live in rural areas.	2	Liberal	3						
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Women's shelters, girls' shelters and shelters need more and permanent funding to continue their important work.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Housing is the biggest investment many people make. The enhanced mortgage repayment requirement - a forced savings scheme for those on the lowest incomes - should be abolished now that interest rates are normalizing.	2	Liberal	3						
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	We will not contribute to any tax increases that ... make it more expensive to live.	3	Liberal	0						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	The housing shortage is a major problem. Hundreds of thousands of Dutch people, despite complying with all the rules of the game, have no sight of a home of their own. Certainly an affordable owner-occupied home is the way to build up a savings and face the future with optimism. That should be within reach for many more people again. The Netherlands must get off the nitrogen lock as soon as possible and the government must not thwart housing construction but rather push it forward, so that every Dutchman has the prospect of his own home.	1	L&M	8	Liberal non ideol	27	206	13,1		
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are working on a Right to Buy Act. Tenants of social housing will have a legal right to buy their own rental property, at a market price. We do an income test beforehand. This law will first apply to small apartment complexes and row houses. We will combat large-scale fragmentation of apartment complexes.	2	L&M	9						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We do not tamper with the freedom to sell your home. We believe you have the freedom to sell your home to whomever you want. It is your home. We will continue to protect this right.	2	Liberal	0						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	The mortgage interest deduction helps people keep their homes affordable. The scheme has been made more austere in recent years. As far as the VVD is concerned, the scheme will not be made more austere, in order to provide security for middle groups.	3	Corporatist	4						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We also want to limit the local burden increase for homeowners and SMEs. To this end, it is important to strengthen the position of local councils. We will do this by introducing a national maximum percentage for the OZB increase on which city councils can then steer. This will prevent large OZB increases.	3	Liberal	0						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	To help more first-time buyers find a home, we will continue to develop a National Affordable Housing Fund and see if this Fund should be expanded.	3	Corporatist	5						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are working on appropriate mortgages. To help young people buy a home and bring the monthly costs down, we encourage more first-time buyers to take advantage of a starter mortgage. We increase the opportunities to get a mortgage by making student debt count less when taking out a mortgage. Also, actual monthly costs can be taken into account more often. For the self-employed, there will be more opportunities to take out a mortgage more easily.	3	Liberal	0						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We believe that a house for sale belongs to you, and not to the municipality. Therefore, in principle, we no longer choose the ground lease system for new homes. Leasehold contracts for new homes should only be allowed if they improve affordability and should not be used as a cash cow for municipalities. We focus on consumer protection and transparency in current ground lease arrangements. This is to strengthen the position of the homeowner in relation to the government. The maximum indexation of the canon payable follows the maximum rent increase for free sector housing.	2	Liberal	0						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Renting a home is getting more and more expensive. For that high rent, you don't always get a nice home in return. That's why we need to add a lot of rental housing, improve rental housing and continue to put the brakes on rent increases.	1	Social Democratic	8						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	The VVD wants to help people with their own homes, help as many people as possible get a new home and reduce the monthly costs.	3	Non-ideological	8						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are building more new rental housing. By abolishing the landlord levy, housing associations have sufficient financial room to build. This has not been optional. We enforce that more social rent is actually built.	3	Corporatist	8						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We make an agreement with developers and market parties to build more middle rental housing. We make it attractive for private individuals, investors and builders to invest in medium rental, by examining bottlenecks that hinder the construction of medium rental. We also ensure that there is sufficient student housing, for example by converting existing vacant office buildings.	3	Liberal	8						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We slow down rent increases. We limit the largest increases in rents and work toward reasonable rents. In addition, complex rules have been proposed to calculate rents. We want to change those. We opt for a simple system. By doing so, we ensure reasonable rents. These restrictions must not lead to renting no longer being worthwhile. We keep an eye on small landlords, such as SMEs. Renting out houses and investing by all parties in new rental housing must remain attractive.	3	Corporatist	6						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We ensure that rental housing becomes accessible to more people. We also want the nurse, defense employee or police officer to be able to live in the city or village where he or she works. For various social professions there will be a national priority for rental housing.	2	Corporatist	7						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build sustainable rental housing. We ask corporations and landlords to make homes more sustainable. Anyone living in a poorly-insulated rental home can report this to the municipality. The municipality requires landlords to give a monthly rent reduction until measures are taken to insulate the house.	2	Corporatist	3						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	On the other hand, we must address as many bumps as possible that make it difficult for landlords to make homes more sustainable.	1	Non-ideological							

Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are addressing skewed rent. In recent years, we have tackled skewed rent. In order to make social housing available to the people who need it most, an annual income test for social housing will be introduced to see if the social rent requested is still appropriate. People whose income is too high will pay a higher rent.	2	Corporatist	3						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We protect orphans. Orphans are given the right to remain in rental housing after the death of their parents. It will be prohibited for corporations to place orphans out of social housing	2	Social Democratic	1						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We tackle rogue landlords. The Good Landlord Act allows municipalities to tackle rogue landlords. We help municipalities put this law into practice and provide support where necessary. We punish landlords who intimidate tenants or deliberately facilitate overcrowding more harshly	2	Corporatist	3						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We address residential nuisance and illegal subletting. We give landlords more opportunities to combat illegal subletting.	1	Corporatist	3						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We want to build hundreds of thousands of new houses, so that fine and affordable living becomes accessible to everyone again. That means adding dozens of neighborhoods to the Netherlands.	1	Social Democratic	8						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are going to build. The VVD wants more housing everywhere. Purchase homes, mid-rent homes and social housing. We are looking specifically at places around already existing infrastructure to match the ambition. We want the government to help build as much as possible. We therefore want the government to take more control of the housing market and ensure that as many houses as possible are built. The central government, in consultation with the provinces, will designate sites to build more quickly, if that does not happen municipally.	2	Social Democratic	8						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Finally, we ensure that high-quality flex housing is also taken by municipalities.	2	Social Democratic	8						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We conclude a Building Accord. There will be a plan for the layout of the Netherlands. Based on this plan, we will conclude a Building Agreement with builders, housing corporations and provinces. As a result, at least dozens of new large-scale neighborhoods will be built. These agreements will be enforceable. We draw lessons from the time when Vinex neighborhoods were built. At the local level, so-called combi-deals are concluded with municipalities on smart use of space. This also includes economic activities.	3	Corporatist	7, 8						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	In the Building Agreement we give the housing of target groups a place, such as the housing of immigrant workers.	2	Corporatist	7						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build suburban and inner-city. We will continue to build houses within the boundaries of cities and towns. We will also build on the edges of cities and towns to provide more housing cheaper and faster. These can also be larger building sites. Nature and housing should not be opposites. We ensure that nature gets a place in the neighborhoods.	2	Non-ideological							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are building more affordable owner-occupied housing in major cities and in the region. The big cities have historically focused on building social rental housing. To give families and middle-income earners a chance to continue living the cities, we will build more affordable owner-occupied housing in the big cities. We will also build enough affordable owner-occupied housing in the region.	2	L&M							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Money for building houses. The housing impulse is transformed so that the construction of these neighborhoods gets off the ground and the construction of enough affordable houses becomes profitable. By reforming the housing impulse, we give first-time buyers the opportunity to buy their own homes.	3	Social Democratic	8						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	To advance housing construction on vacant land, we give municipalities the option of a new OZB rate for avoidable vacant land.	2	Social Democratic	3						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are cutting procedures and regulations. We simplify legal procedures so that housing construction gets off the ground faster. Furthermore, we support research into how interest groups can be better assessed for representativeness. In addition, for example, it must become easier to build micro-homes in your backyard. Rules that can be set by municipalities should be as similar as possible. Small construction projects release very little nitrogen. We want to help small construction projects get permits. We reduce the administrative burden.	3	Liberal	3						
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are building cleaner and faster. The houses we build must be built in a fast and clean way. Therefore, we are going to produce more homes factory-built. This will also reduce the amount of nitrogen released when we build houses. Moreover, this will make building houses cheaper. We also encourage the use of bio-based building materials. This also offers new opportunities for farmers.	3	Non-ideological							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build houses where seniors want to live and ensure circulation. Seniors must be enticed to move to attractive senior apartments or (semi) collective housing in neighborhoods with sufficient accessible facilities, if necessary with financial, practical or organizational support. A sixty-, seventy- or eighty-year-old moving from a large single-family home triggers more relocation movements as a result of his move, freeing up houses for families and first-time buyers.	2	Corporatist							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	To give people more freedom and free up even more homes, we allow permanent occupancy in vacation parks. However, these homes must comply with the building code. There must also be sufficient municipal facilities for permanent living in a vacation home at all, such as garbage collection. We will come up with an approach to the shadow side of vacation park occupancy.	2	Non-ideological							
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We will make it easier to split homes, but keep an eye on the livability of residential neighborhoods.	2	Corporatist	3						

Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build appropriate homes for first-time buyers and small householders. The existing housing supply does not match the growth in the number of smaller households. Consider singles or first-time buyers who do not want to live too large. Homes for small households are, because of their size, more affordable. Moreover, this allows many more homes to be built on the building site. It is therefore important to also build smaller homes for anyone who needs them.	3	Liberal	4					
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Sustainable neighborhoods. Homeowners remain free to make their homes sustainable or not. We avoid new obligations.	3	Liberal	3					
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Making homes more sustainable must be affordable for everyone. Together with the National Mortgage Guarantee (NHG) and the financial sector, we are developing a new sustainability loan. Together with residents, plans are made to make homes more sustainable. We make some investments in making homes more sustainable deductible from the owner-occupied home tax credit. We keep an eye on the sustainability of monuments and the impact of climate change on parks and surrounding landscapes.	3	Liberal	0					
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are making a new Master Plan to organize our country. A new Master Plan for the Netherlands is needed to deal properly with all claims to scarce space and to make choices in cases of conflict. In this plan we map out where to build housing, where to give nature more space and where to let our companies grow. Infrastructure, water and energy will be taken into account. We will look emphatically at all development opportunities outside the Randstad.	2	Social Democratic	8					
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are drawing in dozens of new neighborhoods. In this plan, we designate major inner-city and outer-city construction sites. To ensure that these neighborhoods are actually built, we enter into a Construction Agreement.	3	Corporatist	8					
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We simplify and eliminate spatial rules. We remove, where possible, as many possible unnecessary spatial rules. For example, we completely abolish the ladder of sustainable urbanization. We also scrap the distinction between Novex areas. In this way we avoid unnecessary stacking of policies.	3	Liberal	8					
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	The state makes realistic building agreements with municipalities. We make binding agreements with all municipalities about building plans. The current housing deals will be revamped and we will take more account of economic activities. We also make these housing deals more compatible with the wishes of house seekers.	2	Corporatist	4					
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We fight homelessness. You need a home to build your life. We want homeless people to be able to get flex housing and maintain the goal of zero homelessness by 2030. We offer them appropriate help and support.	2	Social Democratic	1					
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	For liberals, property is a crucial factor in getting higher in life. Indeed, owning your own home is a strong protection in down times and allows you build something for yourself and for future generations.	1	L&M	9					
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Being able to rent is also important to stand on your own two feet. Those who work should be able to rent quality housing in our country.	1	SD&C	9					
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We therefore want everyone who works or has worked, including young people and single people, to be able to acquire their own affordable housing. This is only possible if the supply increases. This will only succeed if we relax the rules.	1	Liberal	3					
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We propose to replace the current complex zoning plans with two clear categories: "Dynamic Space" and "Open Space. There are more than 200 existing zoning regulations, each with its own rules. We will replace these with a simpler, more streamlined system. Local governments are given the freedom to grant permits within these two categories. The emphasis here is on what cannot be done rather than an extensive list of restrictive conditions. This provides more flexibility and clarity within permitting.	3	Corporatist	8					
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	All permits are tested against core qualities. These include matters such as green-blue veining, climate resistance and accessibility, as described in the Flanders Spatial Policy Plan BRV). These core qualities are dynamic and can evolve to remain relevant.	2	Corporatist	3					
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Smother permitting and more reporting thanks to a neighborhood permit. Obtaining a permit should be easier and it should be possible to more through notification. In some areas or for specific, simple building projects (which the local government demarcates), a very specific additional permit framework can be developed: as soon as these are met, it is almost certain that a permit will be obtained. We call this a district permit. Consider simple subdivisions or an area that allows limited alternative possibilities. Basic criteria (based on core qualities) such as image, depth and number of floors are determined a priori. In these areas, a notification is sufficient. Within this district permit, consideration is always given to how additional qualitative housing units can be created.	3	Corporatist	3					
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We focus on smart and future-oriented core densification. We recognize the need to make more efficient use of existing space, while anticipating future developments and needs. densification through more building on the same area, smart and multifunctional buildings and future-proof infrastructure.	2	Non-ideological						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We are committed to encouraging densification in the right locations and discouraging scattered development. Too much open space is being lost due to building just about everywhere in the past. We need to densify more in the right places and counter further dispersed development. This can be done through a strategic policy that compensates owners of poorly located land and concentrates development in appropriate locations. We introduce a system in which development rights are tradable. Owners can buy these rights to build higher, for example, and apply a reverse logic when an urban development charge for building at too low a density.	3	Corporatist	8					

Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Commit to technological innovation to speed up permitting. Today it takes too long to get a permit. There is also often a staff shortage to the volume of work. AI can be used to streamline the permitting process, analyze data and improve decision-making. It can help speed up reviews, identify patterns and improve accuracy in permitting decisions.	2	Liberal	4						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Work with preliminary decision before start of public inquiry. The basic principle is that the licensing authority makes a preliminary decision based on all available information (application, opinions bodies and environmental officer). Based on this preliminary decision, the public concerned can decide in a more informed manner whether or not to file an objection.	2	Non-ideological							
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Advice on environmental permit applications must only directional. Applications are subject to a great deal of advice from various advisory bodies, which develop activities in the fields of energy, the environment, water policy, agriculture, land use planning, nature conservation, spatial planning, safety or mobility. A negative advice -meaning that the application must be refused on the basis of this advice- from an advisory body makes it difficult for licensing authorities to up interests, among other things because, although non-binding, such negative advice is often drafted in such a way that it is almost impossible to deviate from it, even with justification.	3	Liberal	3						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We address stagnation in the development of larger projects, especially in the case of vacant or obsolete sites and so-called "urban cancers. Project development is hampered by owners unwilling to sell or renovate. To address this problem, we propose specific regulation within defined core areas, broadly analogous to the brownfield covenant instrument. We will lay down the conditions and procedure for this in a decree. It must deal with urban blight or dilapidation in core areas. We first try to bring all stakeholders (owners, developers, local government) to the table with an intendand to look for solutions such as sale, change of ownership, ... If everything else has been tried, we make it possible for developers, after the agreement of the local government, to proceed with development via expropriation anyway, if they own at least 80% of the site. Owners are compensated at 100%.	3	Corporatist	3						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We are addressing dilatory proceedings before the Permit Disputes Board by introducing the plea of manifestly reckless litigation. Parties initiating manifestly unfounded appeals may be held liable for the other party's damages.	2	Non-ideological							
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	The proliferation of certificates in real estate transactions must be stopped. Certificates and attestations must be optimized and centralized. In addition, the legal deadlines in the preparation phase of a real estate transaction must be shorter.	2	Liberal	3						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We are waging a battle against wasted space by focusing on multifunctional use of space. Today, far too much of the space above or below a building is wasted. We use all possibilities for densification tailored to an area or neighborhood: allowing more building on the same surface, smart use of the same space.	2	Non-ideological							
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Nature protection and nature restoration must take into account the Flemish context. Within the spatially fragmented Flanders there is a need for a more flexible framework to be able to do nature protection and nature restoration, taking into account socio-economic considerations and climate change: It is essential that Europe takes into account densely populated, economically prosperous and spatially and functionally dense regions such as Flanders, for example in the Nature Restoration Act.	2	Liberal	3						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We reform and reduce housing taxes. Owning your own home is still a dream of many Flemings. However, taxes make buying and owning a home a lot more expensive. We must therefore reform and reduce those taxes. In consultation with the sector, we are looking to further reduce notary fees. We will abolish the registration duties when you buy a home you will be living in yourself. And if you take out a loan to purchase that home, you will no longer pay the federal mortgage duty of 0.3% or the regional mortgage duty of 1%.	3	L&M	9						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Eliminate the misery tax on relationship breakups and eliminate discrimination. Not every relationship is for eternity. If you own a house together, the partner who takes over the house must pay a division tax of 1% or 2.5%, depending on whether you married, legally or de facto cohabiting. A tax on divorce that makes one suffer even more, that we cannot actually justify and does not reflect today's reality. We abolish the apportionment tax: we want equal tax treatment for couples, both married and cohabiting. By abolishing the apportionment law, we also make it easier for heirs who inherit property together and who want to put an end to forced undividedness. We put an end to discriminations such as some contributions to a joint estate, where spouses have to pay 50 euros, while cohabitants can expect an assessment bill of thousands of euros.		Non-ideological							
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We make rents more affordable, specifically targeting people who are working or actively seeking work. We recognize that the rental market a major financial challenge for many people. Our goal is to support them by improving access to rent incentives or rental subsidies.	3	Social Democratic	5						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We increase access to the purchase and rental market, especially for young people and singles. We do this by lowering additional costs and taxes, facilitating 100% Housing Loans, engaging in smart forms of financing such as hamster rentals and the capacity of the Flemish Housing Fund. We will ensure that new construction buyers can pay off VAT over 10 years instead of once.	3	Corporatist	4						

Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Everyone has an equal opportunity in the rental market. To ensure equal opportunities for all, we are committed to practical testing in the rental market. Any discrimination can thus be objectively identified. It will not only ensure to address this in individual cases, but also create awareness about the impact of discrimination on our society.	2	Social Democratic	2						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We strive for an inclusive approach that supports different lifestyles by facilitating flexible living arrangements. Children who want to take care of their parents, grandparents who take in grandchildren, young people who want to live together, people who want to share homes, a group of retirees who want to live together instead of going to an assisted living facility... They face tax disadvantages or run into problems when someone becomes benefit-driven. We are removing the regulatory barriers around this.	2	Corporatist	2						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We relax spatial regulations to new types of housing. In a highly urbanized Flanders, more and more (diversely composed and single-person) households are looking for affordable housing of their . We create more housing entities within the existing land use by relaxing building regulations and thus allowing more. We facilitate modular housing units so that homes can be expanded or reduced in size according to family composition and so that they can be adapted to continue living in later in life. Specifically, we also make it easier to build in height, subdivide existing buildings and share housing. Spatial policies should also facilitate smaller housing units. We ensure that unused spaces can be used as much and as easily as possible (living above commercial properties, etc.). Just as we have done for care housing, we also provide an accessible regulatory framework for co-housing, tiny houses, temporary housing containers, etc. We offer local governments more policy space and the corresponding resources for this. There is also a need to be able to deal creatively with land ownership. E.g. alternative forms of building rights, where you can build without owning the land.	3	Liberal	3						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	The government must provide support for the realization of a sustainable and energy-efficient residential patrimony. Mandating energy efficiency without appropriate support for citizens is unrealistic. Therefore, we propose to actively support citizens in achieving an energy label A by 2050. We do this by making the MijnVerbouwLening interest-free again, perpetuating the increased MijnVerbouw premiums and employing the model of Energy Service Companies (ESCO), in which citizens can cover the renovation costs through the energy savings that come from the investments.	3	Corporatist	8						
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We propose to relieve citizens in renovation projects by encouraging innovative business models such as the Pawnshop. This way we help citizens who do not have time and/or expertise within renovation. We encourage neighborhood renovations, where renovation managers take care of entire neighborhoods through framework contracts. Energy Houses, which have received extra money under our impulse this legislature, are the one-stop shop for citizens who want to renovate in terms advice, relief and guidance.	2	Corporatist	8						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Liberal Democrats know that a home is a necessity and the base on which people build their lives. So we will ensure that everyone can access housing that meets their needs.	1	Social Democratic	1						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Increasing building of new homes to 380,000 a year across the UK, including 150,000 social homes a year, through new garden cities and community-led development of cities and towns.	3	Corporatist	8						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Delivering a fair deal for renters by immediately banning no-fault evictions, making three-year tenancies the default, and creating a national register of licensed landlords.	2	Social Democratic	3						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Giving local authorities, including National Park Authorities, the powers to end Right to Buy in their areas.	2	Corporatist	3						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Ending rough sleeping within the next Parliament and immediately scrapping the archaic Vagrancy Act.	2	Social Democratic	1						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Abolishing residential leaseholds and capping ground rents to a nominal fee, so that everyone has control over their property.	2	Corporatist	1						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Expanding Neighbourhood Planning across England.	2	Corporatist	8						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Building ten new garden cities.	3	Social Democratic	8						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Allowing councils to buy land for housing based on current use value rather than on a hope-value basis by reforming the Land Compensation Act 1961.	2	Corporatist	3						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Properly funding local planning departments to improve planning outcomes and ensure housing is not built in areas of high flood risk without adequate mitigation, by allowing local authorities to set their own fees.	2	Corporatist	3						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Encouraging the use of rural exception sites to expand rural housing.	2	Non-ideological							
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Trialling Community Land Auctions to ensure that local communities receive a fair share of the benefits of new development in their areas and to help fund vital local services.	2	Social Democratic	0						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Encouraging development of existing brownfield sites with financial incentives and ensuring that affordable and social housing is included in these projects.	2	Corporatist	8						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Introducing 'use-it-or-lose-it' planning permission for developers who refuse to build.	3	Social Democratic	3						
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Putting the construction sector on a sustainable footing by investing in skills, training and new technologies such as modern methods of construction.	1	Non-ideological							

UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Ensure that all development has appropriate infrastructure, services and amenities in place, integrating infrastructure and public service delivery into the planning process.	3	Non-ideological								
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Make homes warmer and cheaper to heat with a ten-year emergency upgrade programme, and ensure that all new homes are zero-carbon	3	Social Democratic	2							
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Remove dangerous cladding from all buildings, while ensuring that leaseholders do not have to pay a penny towards it.	2	Corporatist	3							
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Help people who cannot afford a deposit to own their own homes by introducing a new Rent to Own model for social housing where rent payments give tenants an increasing stake in the property, owning it outright after 30 years.	2	Corporatist	4							
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Urgently publishing a cross-Whitehall plan to end all forms of homelessness.	2	Social Democratic	1							
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Exempting groups of homeless people, and those at risk of homelessness, from the Shared Accommodation Rate.	2	Social Democratic	1							
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Introducing a 'somewhere safe to stay' legal duty to ensure that everyone who is at risk of sleeping rough is provided with emergency accommodation and an assessment of their needs.	2	Social Democratic	1							
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Ensuring sufficient financial resources for local authorities to deliver the Homelessness Reduction Act and provide accommodation for survivors of domestic abuse.	2	Social Democratic	1							
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Give local authorities new powers to control second homes and short-term lets in their areas,	2	Corporatist	3							
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Proactively enforcing clear standards for homes that are socially rented, including strict time limits for repairs.	2	Social Democratic	3							
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Fully recognising tenant panels so that renters have a voice in landlord governance.	2	Non-ideological								
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	There are many challenges today, where rigid rules for construction and business development lie like a wet blanket.	1	Liberal	3	populist non ideo	23	145	15,9			
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Everyone should have access to a good standard of housing and be able to live in a safe, secure and pleasant environment.	1	Social Democratic	1							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	It should be easier to move or change housing if necessary. There should be more freedom of choice between different types of housing.	1	SD&C	9							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	We will take greater account of the different conditions for housing construction around Sweden.	1	Social Democratic	0							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	The Sweden Democrats want to facilitate housing construction by simplifying and speeding up decision-making processes and reviewing the extensive regulations and requirements governing housing construction.	2	Liberal	3							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Measures also need to be taken to curb the soaring cost of housing so that more people can afford a home.	1	Corporatist	1							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	The Sweden Democrats want to stop plans to reintroduce property tax,	3	Liberal	2							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	enable more forms of financing for young people and first-time home buyers.	2	Corporatist	8							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	New construction can be facilitated by reviewing building codes and increasing competition in the construction market.	3	Liberal	0							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	when new residential areas are established, it is important that mistakes made during the Million Homes Program are not repeated. The Sweden Democrats want to promote pleasant and safe areas with classic architecture. Aesthetics and design are important factors for how an environment is perceived and for safety.	2	Non-ideological								
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	The possibility of affordable housing or holiday homes in attractive locations could be an important competitive advantage and thus help rural areas to develop. For this to become a reality, beach protection rules need to be relaxed	2	Liberal	8							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	A review should also be carried out of the possibilities for building in areas of national interest.	1	Social Democratic	8							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Financing of housing in rural areas should be facilitated. It is not uncommon for the value of a newly built property in rural areas to be less than the construction cost.	2	Corporatist	5							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Combating homelessness is a priority social issue for the Sweden Democrats.	2	Social Democratic	1							
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Stop the positive discrimination of newcomers in terms of ... housing	2	Non-ideological								
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Reduce social rents	2	Social Democratic	2							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Increase rent allowance	3	Social Democratic	5							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	More housing for the Dutch: build more social rental housing, more middle rental housing and more owner-occupied housing	3	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Building not only inner-city, but also definitely outer-city - In cities and towns 'adding a street'	2	Non-ideological								
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Municipalities must issue building permits faster; shorten procedures	3	Liberal	5							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Hindering nitrogen rules off the table	3	Liberal								
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	No priority for status holders in allocation of social housing, but priority for Dutch nationals	3	Non-ideological								
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Stop creating gas-free homes	3	Liberal	3							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	No mandatory heat pump	3	Liberal	3							
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Allow permanent occupancy of vacation homes	2	Non-ideological								
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Vlaams Belang is concerned about the housing needs of our Flemish families. Enabling our families to own affordable housing is a top priority, both on the buy and rent market.	1	SD&C	9							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	In the first place to be able to own, because the own home is still the best guarantee against poverty. The rental market must also be expanded sensitively for both those who prefer to rent and those who do not have sufficient resources to invest in a home of their own.	1	SD&C	9							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Young people should be able to thrive without worrying about their housing needs.	1	Corporatist	7							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	The licensing policy should be simplified and deadlines shortened. The administration for building and purchasing housing is so complex that it takes a lot of time and effort. Time we no longer have, the housing crisis is here now and must be solved as soon as possible.	3	Liberal	3							

Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Vlaams Belang recognizes that sustainable and energy-efficient living is important and that we must provide the necessary means and opportunities for this. Introducing compulsory renovation is the wrong choice, because it reduces the supply on the rental market and increases unaffordability on the purchase market. We believe in the common sense of the individual, of the Fleming, to choose to renovate his/her home when the no dige financial means are available.	2	Liberal	3						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Our housing market in Flanders must first and foremost be at the disposal of our own people, the hard-working Flemish people. The Flemish housing and rental market should be shielded as much as possible and kept primarily for the Flemish.	2	Non-ideological							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a further reduction in registration fees for the first home purchased as a financial incentive to make up for the disappearance of the housing bonus	2	Corporatist	2						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	A simplification of permit pro cedures;	3	Liberal	3						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	an extension of the convened hu ren/budget rentals and an extension of the coupled terms;	3	Social Democratic	5						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	The elimination of mandatory renovation, allowing owners to renovate at their own pace;	3	Liberal							
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	an expansion of the Flemish Housing Loan so that more people can realize their own homes;	2	Corporatist	4						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a 6% VAT for demolition and reconstruction, for everyone (including construction promoters). This is the best guarantee of providing enough affordable and energy efficient housing	3	Liberal	8						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	extending rent subsidies and rent subsidies for people in the most precarious situations	2	Social Democratic	5						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	require the certificate of conformity for rental housing throughout Flanders to guarantee quality housing and eliminate slum landlords	3	Social Democratic	3						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	more housing inspections in properties that are far encouraged not to meet the minimum standards of the Flemish housing code.	2	Social Democratic	3						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a strict approach to nuisance with notice went as a tenant for whom structural nuisance is caused;	2	Liberal	3						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	more financial incentives for local governments from the Flemish government to build affordable housing on their land areas;	2	Corporatist	3						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a guarantee from the Flemish government for the equity in mortgage loans with private banks and recognized kre diet companies;	3	Corporatist	0						
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Making our own affordable housing possible for our families is a top priority	1	Mediterranean	0						
UK	Populists	REFORM	Reform UK will ensure that people can own their own home by unleashing housebuilding across the country and cutting immigration.	1	Non-ideological							
UK	Populists	REFORM	Review the Planning System Fast-track planning and tax incentives for development of brownfield sites. 'Loose fit planning' policy for large residential developments with pre-approved guidelines and developer requirements.	2	Corporatist	8						
UK	Populists	REFORM	Reform Social Housing Law Prioritise local people and those who have paid into the system. Foreign nationals must go to the back of the queue. Not the front.	2	Non-ideological							
UK	Populists	REFORM	Scrap section 24 for Landlords The tax system should encourage smaller landlords into the rental markets. Not penalise them. We will restore landlords' rights to deduct finance costs and mortgage interest from tax on rental income.	3	Corporatist	8						
UK	Populists	REFORM	Abolish the Renters' (Reform) Bill Existing legislation was inadequate to address bad practices. Instead, we will boost the monitoring, appeals and enforcement process for renters with grievances.	3	Liberal	3						
UK	Populists	REFORM	Protection for Leaseholders All potential charges for leasehold or freehold residents must be clearly stated and consented to. Enforce Section 106 agreements. Ensure it is cheaper and easier to extend leases to 990 years and buy freeholds.	3	Liberal	3						
UK	Populists	REFORM	Incentivise Use of New Construction Technology We will incentivise innovation to speed up building: modular construction, digital technology and building sites that improve efficiency and cut waste.	1	Non-ideological							
Spain	Populists	VOX	The home is the main space of intimacy and personal development of families, so ensuring affordable access, decent conditions and security for all Spaniards in their homes must be a fundamental priority of any government.	1	Mediterranean	0						
Spain	Populists	VOX	One of the great urgent needs of Spaniards is to have a government that courageously tackles the housing problem. Access to housing cannot become a luxury that only a few can afford. It is essential to guarantee access to affordable housing, especially for those Spaniards who need it most, to protect the right to property and to ensure that housing has decent space and conditions of health and supplies.	1	Social Democratic	1						
Spain	Populists	VOX	Zero tolerance for squatting. We will reform both the Penal Code and the Criminal and Civil Procedure Laws to really and effectively protect homeowners who suffer the action of squatting mafias or the illegal entry of a squatter into their home. Every Spaniard should be able to defend himself and his family against an aggression in his own home. We will create a registry of historical data of areas affected by occupation and we will promote the detailed monitoring of all cases that occur, as well as comprehensive assistance to the victims of occupation. We will exempt the owners of illegally squatted properties from the payment of IBI during the period of illegal occupation of the property.	2	Non-ideological							

Spain	Populists	VOX	We will release all land that is not or should not be specifically protected for reasons of environmental, landscape, productive or national defense interest. We will promote a new Land Law that provides for the release of land that is not or should not be specifically protected for reasons of environmental, landscape, productive or national defense interest. land sequestered by city councils and autonomous communities for the benefit of parties and corrupt politicians, and to ensure a correct, agile and harmonious urban development throughout Spain.	3	Liberal	4							
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will amend the Value Added Tax Law in order to eliminate VAT on the purchase of the first habitual residence	2	Corporatist	4							
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will recover the deduction for habitual residence in the income tax return. At the same time, we will encourage the acquisition of new homes.	2	Corporatist	4							
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will review and reduce taxes and charges in the building process. The entire construction process, from the acquisition of a plot of land to the sale or rental of the property, has become a way of obtaining income. The tax burden for the State, regions and municipalities, which produces an artificial increase in prices.	3	Liberal	0							
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will promote collaboration between the Public Administration and private entities in order to increase the number of subsidized housing units. We will mobilize the public land belonging to the General State Administration and its dependent agencies for the provision of social rental housing. We will set up an audited platform for requests so that, while SAREB retains ownership of the assets, the City Councils will be the ones to request SAREB, depending on the demand and housing needs, the temporary transfer of the assets and land for social rental.	3	Corporatist	8							
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will amend the Ley Reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local (Law Regulating the Bases of the Local Regime) and we will draft a new resolution issuing technical instructions to City Councils on the management of the Municipal Register to prevent a squatter from being able to use the municipal register in the event of a squatter being able to use it. The person must be registered in the illegally occupied dwelling.	2	Non-ideological								
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will put an end to the temporary expropriation of real estate and rent control in the lease contract, as it has been implemented in recent years by different regions.	3	Liberal	6							
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will promote the standardization of tourism regulations for tourist housing throughout Spain. This standardization of regulations will guarantee competition on equal terms with other tourist accommodations, such as hotels or campsites; it will ensure the preservation of the rights of resident neighbors and the life of neighborhoods; and it will put a limit to the increase in the price of housing caused by the massive proliferation of tourist apartments.	2	Social Democratic	3							
Spain	Populists	VOX	The saturation and overcrowding of the historic centers with tourist apartments has dynamited the harmony between residents and tourists. We will preserve the rights of residents and put an end to a disrespectful tourism model that is contributing to the degradation of our neighborhoods and the expulsion of residents from their homes. Our neighborhoods cannot become theme parks.	1	Non-ideological								
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will promote an increase in the technical and personnel resources of the City Councils in charge of drafting the pertinent technical reports for the granting of licenses, as well as streamlining the bureaucratic process. We will promote among the regions and Local Entities the implementation of systems for the digitalization of the licensing process.	1	Non-ideological								
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will encourage landlords to put their vacant homes up for rent by increasing rental income tax benefits for landlords.	2	Corporatist	8							
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will repeal the Law for the Right to Housing approved by the government of Sánchez, which will not contribute to the creation of more affordable housing, will sink the rental market, alters the essential content of the right to property enshrined in Article 33 of the Constitution and protects illegal occupation.	3	L&M	8							
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will promote family-friendly urban planning, rooted in and harmonious with the environment, encouraging the rehabilitation of regional styles and the protection of traditional facades, including them in the catalogs of assets of cultural interest.	3	Mediterranean	0							
Spain	Populists	VOX	We therefore reject globalist projects such as the so-called New European Bauhaus promoted by Brussels bureaucrats, which, with the alibi of climate fanaticism and the energy efficiency of buildings, seeks to standardize the reality of our cities.	2	Non-ideological								
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemocraten	All municipalities, including the wealthy ones, should take their share of responsibility -when housing asylumseekers-.	2	Social Democratic	8		SD Non ideology	17		333		5,1
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemocraten	Asylum seekers should no longer be able to choose where they live.	2	Non-ideological								
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemocraten	Housing and tenure forms must be mixed.	1	SD&C	9							
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemocraten	Overcrowding must be combated.	1	Social Democratic	2							
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemocraten	We will continue to build rental apartments that ordinary people can afford to live in.	3	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Everyone has the right to a good and sustainable home. We are going to see housing again as a basic amenity rather than a revenue model for pawnbrokers and overseas investors. The government will take the reins and provide large numbers of affordable housing.	2	Social Democratic	0							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	by having housing built for low and middle incomes,	1	Corporatist	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	providing more social housing and getting land back into our hands	2	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Special attention will be paid to housing for young people, the elderly and people with necessary occupations such as caregivers and teachers	1	Corporatist	7							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We also see homelessness as a housing rather than just a care issue.	1	Social Democratic	1							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	The construction of new housing is stagnating in many places. In response, we are putting our efforts into splitting up large homes and converting vacant properties.	2	Non-ideological								
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We also encourage building layers on top of existing homes in densely populated areas.	2	Non-ideological								
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Through a newly established Housing Fund, we will ensure a substantial increase in the construction of affordable and sustainable rental and owner-occupied housing. The ambition is that 100,000 homes will be added annually, of which at least 40,000 will be social rental homes and 40,000 homes in the middle segment (rental and owner-occupied).	3	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	That is why we want a Minister of Housing and Spatial Planning with go-ahead power. Adapting permit and objection procedures that take more account of the interests of house seekers is a priority	3	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We encourage densification in our villages and towns, where there is often still plenty of room to build new homes.	2	Social Democratic	8							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	In this regard, we are committed to the development of new communal housing for singles, composite families, the elderly and people with disabilities who need care.	3	Corporatist	7							

Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	To prevent construction from collapsing during economic bad times, we are introducing a build-through guarantee. This will allow construction projects to continue even if the pre-sale percentage of 70% is not achieved	3	Social Democratic	8						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Active land policy for more housing. We accelerate construction by returning to active land policy. With the new National Land Bank, we bring more land into public hands and help governments build affordable new construction (see more detailed proposal under "The community at the helm"). With this new construction, we ensure that the land remains in community hands.	3	Social Democratic	8						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	In addition, we ensure that the increase in value of land through public investment also benefits society through a plan income tax.	3	Social Democratic	2						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We encourage owners of land with a building destination to build by means of a building obligation: within a fixed period they must proceed to build a house. If they fail to do so, a fine and eventually expropriation will follow.	2	Social Democratic	8						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Local governments are also given the option of taxing vacant land so that owners are encouraged to build on it.	2	Corporatist	8						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Housing associations of and for society. We build public housing we can be proud of: high-quality broadly accessible housing after the Viennese example.	3	Social Democratic	4						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Housing corporations regain the ability to build affordable rental housing for middle-income households as well.	1	Corporatist	0						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	we raise the income limits for the social rental sector so that more people can use it.	2	Social Democratic	4						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We give housing corporations and housing cooperatives the means to actively buy homes from private parties, renovate them, make them more sustainable, and build social housing in them.	3	Corporatist	8						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We make housing corporations social institutions of and for the community again: we give tenants and resident committees more say in the policy and composition of the board.	3	Social Democratic	0						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	The legal requirements for performance agreements between municipalities, housing corporations and tenants are renewed, municipalities can enforce them, non-compliance has consequences for the housing corporations.	2	Social Democratic	0						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Because they represent a public task, housing corporations will no longer have to pay profit tax with immediate effect. There will be a quick financial solution for regions with destitute housing corporations, so that they can also invest in the coming years in what is needed: new construction, sustainability and keeping the housing stock affordable.	3	Corporatist	0						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	End homelessness. It is unacceptable for people to be involuntarily homeless. The right to housing becomes the basis of our policy. We remain committed to the goal of ending involuntary homelessness by 2030, as agreed in the Lisbon Declaration. In the meantime, we ensure that quality and accessible shelter and care are guaranteed, also for migrants (whether they are EU citizens, asylum seekers or undocumented). We are committed to housing first to prevent and remedy homelessness. We invest heavily in building basic housing. Everyone who becomes homeless is immediately assigned such basic housing. Then they will receive help to find a new home and rebuild their lives. We want all municipalities to contribute proportionally to the housing of people leaving sheltered housing and social care.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Every municipality ensures that at least 30% of its housing stock consists of social rental housing. We are therefore committed to at least 40% social rental housing in new construction. These are affordable and quality housing, in principle from housing corporations or housing cooperatives. Municipalities with a large shortage of social rental housing are instructed to build additional housing in this segment. The Minister of Housing and Spatial Planning is given the ability to enforce the construction of sufficient social rental housing.	3	Social Democratic	8						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We restrict the sale of social rental housing: corporations may only sell if the share of social rental housing in the neighborhood, or in the case of smaller municipalities in the core, is maintained. Corporation housing will only be sold to housing cooperatives, governments or other corporations. Corporation housing may also be sold to private individuals, but only with an obligation of self occupancy. If private individuals then wish to resell these homes, housing corporations or housing cooperatives are given the right of first sale.	2	Social Democratic	3						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Better utilization of existing housing. We encourage transformation, topping up and splitting of existing housing. With more modular construction, homes can be more quickly adapted to changing circumstances.	2	Non-ideological							
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We actively encourage people to share their homes with others, including by scrapping the cost-sharing norm.	2	Social Democratic	2						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We also ensure that every municipality drafts a vacancy ordinance and give municipalities the option of taxing owners of vacant properties.	2	Social Democratic	3						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	In order to make better use of existing housing and increase the livability of a neighborhood, Airbnb should no longer lead to permanent housing deprivation. In order to make better use of existing housing and increase the livability of a neighborhood, homes may not be rented out through platforms such as Airbnb for more than 90 days per year. Platforms will from now on provide openness about the rentals that take place through them so that municipalities can properly enforce.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	High quality buildings. The Netherlands faces a huge construction challenge. Buildings can remain standing for hundreds of years. In fact, a building that is not demolished is the most sustainable. It is therefore essential that what we build is of high quality. To ensure this, we adopt the advice of the Board of Government Advisors: we anchor the role of architects in the law, we introduce the Open Call on the Flemish model to offer opportunities for design talent and we give municipalities and provinces the possibility to appoint a (city) architect. We also ensure the return of a Dutch architecture institute.	2	Social Democratic	3						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Diversity of housing forms. We ensure that municipalities and provinces actively manage the supply and diversity of housing forms, such as trailer parks. We ensure that this housing form is anchored in municipal housing visions	2	Social Democratic	1						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Equal housing opportunities for young people. We build enough additional housing to fill both the housing shortage for first-time buyers and the room shortage for students. To give young people equal opportunities on the waiting list for social housing, we want to experiment more with allocating housing by drawing lots.	2	Corporatist	7						
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Invest more in housing for the elderly. We work on an integrated approach for the elderly, where housing, welfare and care come together. Through a senior housing action program, the elderly will be given extra space in the development of new housing developments and large-scale renovation: all new housing will be easily accessible and built to last a lifetime. In the construction of new senior housing, the provision of care and contact with the environment are central to the design.	2	Corporatist	7						

Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Municipalities are given the responsibility to develop a housing-care vision together with tenants, senior citizen organizations, housing corporations and resident initiatives in which they make binding agreements on the number of suitable homes for the elderly. Elderly people who want to move on from a large home to a smaller (senior) home will receive support from the municipality, which we will help to offer these people a moving allowance, rent retention or further rent adjustment.	2	Social Democratic	7					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Certification for inclusive senior care, such as the Pink Carpet, becomes the standard for facilities.	2	Corporatist	7					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Extra attention for vulnerable neighborhoods. With the Public Housing Fund we structurally invest extra in neighborhoods and regions with poor housing: renovation of outdated housing and investments in sustainability. We unburden and guide residents to realize this.	3	Social Democratic	2					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	More certainty on rent subsidy and lease. The proposed cut in rent allowance will not go through.	3	Social Democratic	5					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Young people and tenants with rents above the liberalization threshold will be entitled to rent allowance. This also means that we will lower the age limit for the full rent allowance from 23 to 18.	3	Social Democratic	5					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We will introduce the Fixed Rental Contracts Act as soon as possible so that the fixed rental contract becomes the norm again. Rental allowance will also become available for non-self-contained housing without its own house number.	2	Social Democratic	3					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Rental allowance will also become available for non-self-contained housing without its own house number.	2	Social Democratic	5					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	further capping rents .... For many people renting a house in the free sector, the high rent feels like a millstone around the neck. For all rental housing in the Netherlands we introduce a maximum rent that is calculated on the basis of the point system. This will reduce the role of the WOZ value. There will be a fine for landlords who charge too high rents. Municipalities can enforce rents that are too high and may revoke permits in case of repeated punishment for excessive rents. All rents will rise at most in line with inflation, except if inflation is higher than wage growth: then we will follow collective bargaining wages. If this causes the desired investments in new construction and sustainability by housing corporations to be compromised, we will make agreements for additional support.	3	Social Democratic	5					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Decent rentals. We are introducing a nationwide landlord license that will be revoked if landlords misbehave, such as if they intimidate or discriminate against tenants or do not follow the rules of good landlordism. Fines will follow if landlords fail to comply, with the ultimate sanction being a rental ban. All tenants can appeal to the Rent Commission. Municipalities will have a role in settling rental disputes. There will also be a licensing system for brokers and rental intermediaries, to combat undermining, exploitation and discrimination. We encourage rental teams in municipalities where necessary, so that tenants get the help they need.	3	Corporatist	3					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Steering for owner-occupied housing. Through the Housing Fund, we encourage the realization of new affordable owner-occupied housing, but with the condition that the land under the owner-occupied home remains in the hands of a common party and people sell their owner-occupied home back to that party when they move (so-called Community Land Trusts).	2	Social Democratic	9					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We give municipalities the opportunity to designate areas where low- and middle-income people are given priority for owner-occupied housing. To prevent investors from buying cheap homes to re-let them expensively, municipalities will be given the option to introduce a self occupancy obligation for the entire housing stock for an indefinite period.	3	Corporatist	3					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We phase out the mortgage interest deduction. This drives up prices and increases inequality. People with the highest incomes and the most expensive homes benefit the most from this billion-dollar subsidy, while first-time buyers are left out.	3	Liberal	5					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Supporting housing cooperatives. We start a long-term housing cooperatives action program, which helps people start housing cooperatives and supports municipalities to facilitate these cooperatives. There will be a national guarantee fund for housing cooperatives so that housing cooperatives can get easier financing from the bank. We extend the existing right of residents' collectives to start a housing cooperative in housing cooperatives owned by a housing corporation: from now on, corporations are obliged to accept proposals for acquisition if they meet the current criteria. There will be an independent authority to settle disputes about this. Housing cooperatives will also have a priority right in the sale of social housing.	3	Corporatist	8					
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Housing and quality of life. Migrant workers are often housed in appalling conditions. This is bad for the migrant workers and undesirable for the vulnerable neighborhoods where this happens. Moreover, labor migration puts additional pressure on the shortage of affordable housing. We are introducing a licensing requirement for landlords. Municipalities will carry out a quality of life assessment when approving new businesses, which will also look at the impact on housing in surrounding municipalities. The option for employers to deduct housing costs from wages will be removed. This will also remove the opportunity for employers to make money from this. Regular rental law will also apply to migrant workers. We will introduce an approach to combat homelessness among migrant workers and will also make agreements on this within the EU and countries of origin.	2	Social Democratic	1					
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	We remove the registration tax on the purchase of the sole, own home at the first bracket of 250,000 euros. The portion of the purchase price above this exempt amount is taxed progressively. Thus, we make the purchase of the sole, own home cheaper.	3	Social Democratic	2			Flanders		
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	The registration tax for outside residences and rental properties without a certificate of conformity rises from 12% to 21%. This is how we inhibit the purchase of housing by second stayers and slumlords. The rates for conforming rental housing (12%) and rental housing intended for social rental (7%) are maintained.	3	Social Democratic	2					
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Those who buy an ordinary house pay registration tax on it, while large villas and land are often in companies. These are transferred through a sale of shares that is not subject to registration tax. We are taking steps to treat real estate share transactions the same for tax purposes as a sale of a property.	3	Social Democratic	2					
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	By clearly defining where building is still allowed and where not, we put an end to spatial indecision and greatly expand the housing supply. A clear Flemish spatial plan in combination with an increased commitment to modular housing increases the housing supply in the coming years	3	Social Democratic	8					
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Certain neighborhoods in our major cities are unaffordable. We give local governments the ability to prevent investor buyouts in neighborhoods where there is a scarcity of affordable housing. This buyout protection means that the buyer must either live in the home himself or rent the home at a reduced rent.	3	Social Democratic	3					

Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Public buildings and public land with a residential function will no longer be sold to private actors, but given on a long lease. Also, rezoning of public land and properties to a residential function, in the context of a sale to private actors, will only be possible through ground lease. Ground lease makes it possible for prospective buyers to acquire a home without paying for the land. This then remains in government ownership. By removing the land price from the purchase price, the purchase of a house becomes up to 35% cheaper.	3	Social Democratic	0						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	For people with modest incomes, poorly insulated homes are often the only ones they can afford. To support these buyers, we are putting extra effort into renovation within the Flemish Housing Loan. We do this with an attractive interest rate that does not increase with a longer term. And through faster processing of applications. We also ensure that every citizen gets a clear overview of the various support measures for renovation. Today, the government offers its support in a very fragmented way, so that it is often not taken up despite the high level of need.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Due to the high demand for rental housing, rents often swing wildly. With the introduction of a "rent brake," landlords will be required in new contracts to follow at most the target rent according to the Rent Estimator, subject to a limited margin. By capping excessive rents, we put a brake on rising rents.	3	Social Democratic	6						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	The higher the rent deposit, the higher the barrier to renting. We are reducing the rent deposit from 3 months to 2 months of rent. This is how we make renting more accessible.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	If the landlord does not want to renovate his energy-guzzling home, the tenant is left with a high energy bill. We again prohibit indexing rents of homes with an EPC label E or F and homes without an EPC certificate. In time, we will add homes with EPC label D, in line with energy targets.	2	Social Democratic	3						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	By taxing the actual rental income, we give landlords the ability to deduct the investments they make in their rental housing from their taxes. Thus, we provide an important incentive to invest in the maintenance of rental housing. To also encourage major investments in quality improvement, we temporarily provide an increased tax deduction for investments that make a rental property more energy efficient. In this way, we encourage landlords to renovate their properties sustainably and at the same time combat undeclared work. To benefit from the deduction, the rent may only increase slightly during the first four years after renovation, so that the energy savings for the tenant are not completely undone. We do this for houses in all rental markets, including student rooms.	2	Corporatist	5						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	To support low-income private tenants, we are building more social rental housing. In order not to leave the waiting private tenants out in the cold, we provide a rent premium for all tenants who are on the waiting list for 2 years for social housing (instead of after 4 years as is the case today). The more that is built, the less budget is needed for the rent premium and vice versa. This is why the two budgets are linked. We simultaneously address the high non-take-up of rent premium and rent subsidy and review the maximum rents to qualify for these allowances.	3	Social Democratic	5						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	We envision an emergency program leading to 115,000 additional social housing units by 2050. Substantial investment is envisioned to achieve this goal. In addition, a central pool of architects, engineers, spatial planners and project supervisors will be created to which housing companies can freely call for support for their construction plans. In addition to construction and renovation, we ensure that housing companies can invest sufficiently in the upkeep of their social housing and provide proper guidance to social tenants. We also ensure that housing companies can concentrate on their core tasks, namely providing good and affordable housing for those in need of housing.	3	Social Democratic	8						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	We require private developers to provide a minimum share of 25% affordable rental housing in new projects of a certain size.	3	Corporatist	3						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	We are transforming poor, energy-wasting owner-occupied housing into energy-efficient and affordable rental housing. How? By actively buying up poorly insulated private homes (EPC E or F) that come on the market, renovating them and renting them affordably. In addition, the priority for housing companies to purchase vacant, unfit and uninhabitable housing will be reinstated and more actively applied.	2	Social Democratic	8						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Social management law allows municipalities to take vacant housing under temporary management, renovate it and rent it out affordably. The owner gets his renovated property back in management once the cost of renovation, through rental income, is repaid. For many municipalities, social management law is too complex due to a lack of resources and renovation expertise. We provide Flemish resources to put this system and the implementation of social management law in the hands of the housing companies.	2	Corporatist	8						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Municipalities that do not have their target for quality social housing are monitored and, if necessary, sanctioned. Municipalities that get it right are rewarded.	2	Social Democratic	3						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	We put an end to arbitrariness regarding local bonding. In the allocation of social housing, the same criteria regarding local residential bonding are applied across Flanders.	2	Social Democratic	3						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Developers are building more and more expensive luxury lots that are unaffordable for most students. Therefore, we oblige these developers to provide a proportion of affordable basic lots in every new project. In addition, we as a government provide more affordable student housing.	2	Social Democratic	8						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	The existing housing cooperative projects in Flanders are being evaluated and developed further by eliminating any bottlenecks.	3	Corporatist	3						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Every tenant has the right to quality housing. Therefore, we are phasing in a mandatory certificate of conformity for all private rental housing. To carry out more quality checks, we are increasing the number of housing inspectors so that better and faster action can be taken against slumlords.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	When a rental property is declared uninhabitable or unsuitable and this property was of poor quality from the start, the rental charges paid must be refunded to the tenant subject to deduction of an occupancy allowance. This occupancy allowance is currently determined based on the market value of the property. We are adjusting this so that the occupancy allowance takes more account of the severity of the quality defects.	2	Social Democratic	4						

Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Within the social housing sector, housing companies are working together to install solar panels on as many social housing units as possible. Unfortunately, not every roof is suitable for solar panels. Therefore, we are establishing a social energy community. We sell the surplus power from the existing solar panels to an energy supplier, who in return offers this energy at a reduced price to the social tenants who do not have solar panels. Thus, every social tenant can benefit from the solar energy produced.	2	Social Democratic	2				
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Social housing must be in order. We increase the number of annual renovations of social housing.	2	Social Democratic	5				
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	The need for adapted or easily adaptable housing for people with care needs will increase significantly in the coming decades. We are therefore reviewing the Flemish adjustment premium so that elderly people with more severe care needs and a limited income can make radical adjustments.	2	Corporatist	5				
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Every prospective tenant who has sufficient income and the appropriate family size should be given a fair chance to view a rental property. Therefore, we are introducing practical tests that will make it possible to individually sensitize the discriminating landlord and punish him in case of repeated violations. In addition, we are working on an instrument that assesses the tenant based on objective parameters.	2	Social Democratic	2				
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	The Fund for Combating Evictions (FBU), which finances repayment plans for rent arrears, is not very successful. We make the system better known, provide more opportunities for tenants and landlords to report rent arrears, and better support the PCSW to fulfill its role in this.	2	Social Democratic	1				
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Temporary contracts in social renting should be ended. The threat of being evicted when income increases is hugely demotivating for social tenants who are looking for a job or want to work more hours. Those who work hard and start earning more pay more rent, and that's the way it should be. Not only does this increase tenant motivation to work, it also creates a good social mix in neighborhoods and more rental income for housing companies that can therefore put more effort into counseling and maintenance.	3	Corporatist	3				
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Under the asset test in social renting, banks may not charge for the evidence that prospective tenants are required to request.	2	Non-ideological					
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will get Britain building again, creating jobs across England, with 1.5 million new homes over the next parliament.	1	Social Democratic	8			UK	
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	We will immediately update the National Policy Planning Framework to undo damaging Conservative changes, including restoring mandatory housing targets.	3	Social Democratic	8				
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	We will take tough action to ensure that planning authorities have up-to-date Local Plans and reform and strengthen the presumption in favour of sustainable development.	3	Social Democratic	8				
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will support local authorities by funding additional planning officers, through increasing the rate of the stamp duty surcharge paid by non-UK residents.	2	Corporatist	7				
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	We will ensure local communities continue to shape housebuilding in their area, but where necessary Labour will not be afraid to make full use of intervention powers to build the houses we need.	3	Social Democratic	8				
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will take a brownfield first approach, prioritising the development of previously used land wherever possible, and fast-tracking approval of urban brownfield sites.	2	Corporatist	8				
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour is committed to preserving the green belt which has served England's towns and cities well over many decades. Under the Conservatives, greenbelt land is regularly released for development but haphazardly and often for speculative housebuilding. Without changing its purpose or general extent, Labour will take a more strategic approach to greenbelt land designation and release to build more homes in the right places. The release of lower quality 'grey belt' land will be prioritised and we will introduce 'golden rules' to ensure development benefits communities and nature.	2	Social Democratic	8				

UK	Social Democrat	Labour	In partnership with local leaders and communities, a Labour government will build a new generation of new towns, inspired by the proud legacy of the 1945 Labour government. Alongside urban extensions and regeneration projects, these will form part of a series of large-scale new communities across England.		3	Social Democratic	8						
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Housing need in England cannot be met without planning for growth on a larger than local scale so we will introduce effective new mechanisms for cross-boundary strategic planning. Labour will require all Combined and Mayoral Authorities to strategically plan for housing growth in their areas. We will give Combined Authorities new planning powers along with new freedoms and flexibilities to make better use of grant funding.		3	Social Democratic	8						
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will further reform compulsory purchase compensation rules to improve land assembly, speed up site delivery, and deliver housing, infrastructure, amenity, and transport benefits in the public interest. We will take steps to ensure that for specific types of development schemes, landowners are awarded fair compensation rather than inflated prices based on the prospect of planning permission.		3	Social Democratic	8						
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will deliver the biggest increase in social and affordable housebuilding in a generation. We will strengthen planning obligations to ensure new developments provide more affordable homes; make changes to the Affordable Homes Programme to ensure that it delivers more homes from existing funding; and support councils and housing associations to build their capacity and make a greater contribution to affordable housing supply. Labour will prioritise the building of new social rented homes and better protect our existing stock by reviewing the increased right to buy discounts introduced in 2012 and increasing protections on newly-built social housing.		3	Social Democratic	1						
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour wants exemplary development to be the norm not the exception. We will take steps to ensure we are building more high-quality, well-designed, and sustainable homes and creating places that increase climate resilience and promote nature recovery. We will implement solutions to unlock the building of homes affected by nutrient neutrality without weakening environmental protections.		3	Social Democratic	3						

UK	Social Democrat	Labour	Labour will work with local authorities to give first-time buyers the first chance to buy homes and end the farce of entire developments being sold off to international investors before houses are even built. And we will introduce a permanent, comprehensive mortgage guarantee scheme, to support first-time buyers who struggle to save for a large deposit, with lower mortgage costs.	2	Corporatist	4					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	For the socialists, housing must constitute the fifth pillar of the welfare state, and currently requires strong measures that allow millions of people to develop a private and family life, and especially a new life project among the youngest and most economically vulnerable people.	1	Social Democratic	2	Spain				
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	In 2018 we find ourselves with a legacy of corruption, social exclusion and speculation in housing both for sale and for rent, where public aid was cut, the tenant was unprotected and the public housing stock was abandoned and even privatized. From the government we have given priority to the implementation of a real housing policy where there was none before.	1	Social Democratic	0					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We have approved the first Housing Law of our democracy, underpinning the fifth pillar of the welfare state. A law that complies with the social function of property, based on the cooperation between Administrations and the fight against urban and housing speculation. This is the first law democracy that develops the constitutional right to decent housing, and aims to guarantee access to housing and impose its achievement as an obligation on public authorities, who will not be able to look the other way in the face of unjust situations.	1	Social Democratic	1					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	It also addresses the housing problem in its full dimension. It implies a commitment to the citizens and especially to the young people of our country, so that they can carry out their life projects by having access to housing at reasonable prices, leaving behind the real estate bubbles caused by the failed policies of the Popular Party.	1	Social Democratic	1					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	The law provides us with the necessary instruments to address the priorities of the social majority of this country: to control abusive price increases, to put empty housing on the market, to establish tax incentives for price control, and, most importantly, to guarantee and protect the public housing stock. Therefore, we are committed to activate and develop the instruments provided for in the law:	3	Social Democratic	3					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will develop the measures contemplated for the containment of housing prices.	3	Social Democratic	6					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will regulate and diversify leasing contracts to reflect the peculiarities of each situation, so as to take into account the lessor and the lessee and the specific situation to be regulated, especially in the case of temporary leases for use as a first home.	2	Corporatist	3					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will promote measures that encourage the supply of adequate, affordable, sustainable and decent housing.	1	Social Democratic	8					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will ensure that the mandatory reserves of land for subsidized housing in new urban developments will allocate at least 50% to the construction of social rental housing and affordable rental housing.	3	Social Democratic	5					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will mainly benefit those who have more difficulty in accessing housing, especially young people in their emancipation process.	1	Corporatist	7					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	This increase in the stock of public rental housing will be possible either through broad mechanisms for the purchase or rental of existing housing, or with newly constructed housing. We are talking about public housing and promotion of private housing, counting in the case of protected housing with a permanent and irreversible protection of its social use.	2	Corporatist	8					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	Promotion and completion of 15,000 housing units through agreements between the State and autonomous communities and local authorities.	2	Corporatist	8					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	Promotion of 10,000 housing units through agreements made directly with Local Entities.	2	Corporatist	8					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	50,000 housing units promoted directly by the State through Entidad Pública Estatal de Suelo (Sepes), of which 30,000 belong to actions in different developments, and 20,000 correspond to land from 50 former military installations.	2	Corporatist	8					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	63,000 housing units with resources from European funds under the Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan	2	Social Democratic	8					
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	20,000 housing units through direct aid to autonomous communities and local authorities.	2	Corporatist	8					

Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	43,000 with loans, in order to finance housing on both public and private land.	2	Liberal	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	50,000 homes from Sareb:	2	Corporatist	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will establish, in collaboration with the municipalities, formulas for the promotion of housing that can be located on public use and public domain land, in those situations where it is considered a reinforcement and a response to housing needs in certain geographic environments.	3	Social Democratic	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will protect the social housing stock and affordable rents:	1	Social Democratic	2						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will increase land reserves for social housing and, of course, we will ensure that a large part of the surplus value generated by urban development activity will be used to finance housing policy.	3	Social Democratic	2						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will use formulas such as surface rights for the promotion of affordable rental housing through public-private partnerships.	2	Corporatist	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will prevent any possibility of joining the free market through processes of disqualification and/or privatization of housing for social use, guaranteeing that it cannot be sold to any investment fund.	3	Social Democratic	3						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will establish agile mechanisms and models of agreement between banking entities and administrations (state, regional and local) to mobilize vacant housing and allocate it to social use.	3	Corporatist	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will establish rehabilitation incentive programs, among other purposes, so that homeowners can put homes on the affordable rental market, thereby eliminating the problem of habitability that many of them have.	2	Corporatist	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	In addition to the development and expansion of the public housing stock, the socialists will promote an ambitious policy towards tenants with fewer resources and vulnerable groups, with the dual objective of preventing the loss of housing for those who have it precariously, and to facilitate access to those citizens who cannot reach market prices, without forgetting those economically vulnerable families, dependents, victims of gender violence or with dependent children and without housing alternatives, so that they are not left without housing.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will strengthen the programs of the State Housing Plans.	3	Social Democratic	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will reinforce the measures adopted in social matters, in the articulation of housing solutions and the procedural measures provided for in the Civil Procedure Law and in the Urban Leasing Law.	3	Social Democratic	3						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will pay special attention to homeless people: an extreme reality that represents one of the most acute expressions of social exclusion. And we will promote the creation of a network of residential resources in the form of normalized housing in neighborhood environments, using methodologies such as housing first or housing led, or No Second Night Out programs, for people living in the constant threat of homelessness, enabling them to become active members of their community.	2	Social Democratic	1						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will promote the design of an Action Plan by the competent Public Administrations, with sufficient economic resources, for the eradication of shantytowns and segregated settlements, including the participation of the gypsy population in its design.	2	Non-ideological							
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	There are around 9.7 million primary homes in Spain that need rehabilitation to address problems of accessibility, energy inefficiency, and to promote the introduction of renewable energies in homes. Universal accessibility is an inherent condition for the inclusive coexistence that we socialists defend. We want environments that favor citizen safety, cohesion and the articulation of a fabric of community relations, where everyone can feel integrated.	1	Social Democratic	1						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will promote the coordinated work of the autonomous and local administrations to ensure the provision of adequate physical infrastructure, basic services and the access of neighbors to all the supplies they need.	2	Non-ideological							
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will promote the development of Law 9/2022, of June 14, on the Quality of Architecture, aligned with the government's long-term strategy and the proposed (new Bauhaus) for energy rehabilitation in the building sector in Spain, promoting its adaptation of standards to the Mediterranean context.	3	Social Democratic	3						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will strengthen the promotion of actions for the rehabilitation and improvement of the building stock in Spain, both in urban and rural areas, within the strategic framework of the Spanish Urban Agenda.	2	Social Democratic	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will develop regulations that allow for changes in the use of buildings according to housing needs, in coordination with municipalities, to reconvert unused public and private buildings.	3	Corporatist	3						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will ensure effective sustainability, energy efficiency and accessibility policies that also promote comprehensive actions that contribute to improving the quality, state of conservation and digitalization of buildings.	1	Non-ideological							
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will adapt housing to the specific needs of vulnerable groups, such as the elderly or people with disabilities.	2	Corporatist	7						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	The objective is to rehabilitate more than 500,000 homes during this term of office.	2	Social Democratic	8						

Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will generate an administrative and technical regulatory framework that responds to these new realities, allowing quality housing with other standards, providing legal security for management and ownership in different models.	3	Corporatist	4						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will promote an industrialization and prefabrication cluster with the sector to position ourselves competitively, produce faster and with better quality and sustainability standards, helping to connect the entire value chain of the sector, and create public housing and housing in line with today's requirements in terms of resilience, safety and energy efficiency.	2	Social Democratic	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	Innovation should be a hallmark of all housing policy initiatives. We make a general approach of diversification of housing formats and trends to respond to different family, individual and collective needs that take into account changing life circumstances.	2	Non-ideological							
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will develop a regulation on new residential modalities such as temporary housing, cohousing, apartments, intergenerational housing and cooperatives for the transfer of use, in order to provide their users with legal security and so that private development can collaborate in their development.	3	Social Democratic	3						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will promote tools for public-private collaboration, through ICO credits, public land leasing and subsidies, among others, to promote these new models.	2	Corporatist	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	Youth and their specific difficulties in accessing housing, both in renting and buying, occupy an important part of the policies of the government and the socialists.	2	Corporatist	5						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will consolidate the Bono Alquiler Joven as an essential element to access to affordable rentals.	2	Corporatist	5						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will reinforce the direct aid for the rental of permanent housing contemplated in the State Housing Plans.	2	Social Democratic	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will develop and apply the new line of guarantees of the Official Credit Institute (ICO) of 2,500 million euros to help young people under 35 years of age. The system of guarantees of 20% of the mortgage for the purchase of the first habitual residence for young people aims to make possible the acquisition of some 50,000 homes.	2	Corporatist	4						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	30% of the housing promoted through any of the lines of the Affordable Rental Housing Plan will be for young people between 18 and 35 years of age.	2	Corporatist	5						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will support young people in accessing home ownership in municipalities or population centers with less than 10,000 inhabitants.	2	Corporatist	5						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will provide direct aid for access to regular housing in cooperative or cohousing developments.	2	Social Democratic	8						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will develop an affordable housing plan tailored to the unmet demand of young and vulnerable people, through the acquisition of land for the construction of social rental housing, with the aim of further increasing the supply of land and lowering prices effectively, improving conditions not only for young people, but for all tenants.	3	Social Democratic	2						
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will create, in coordination with the banks, a subsidized savings account for the purchase of a first home. It may be opened by young people up to 39 years of age, and both the income generated and the annual contributions will be exempt from personal income tax, with an annual limit of 2,000 euros and a total of 30,000 euros.	3	Corporatist	4						

Country	Political ideology	Name of Party	Statement/Proposal about housing	Weight (+, ++ or +++)	Ideological focus	Indicator	total weight of indicators used by ideological families	Percentage weight of indicators used by ideological families	Distribution of core mix in ideological families
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	We will not contribute to any tax increases that ... make it more expensive to live.	3	Liberal	1	Social Democrat Christian Democ Liberals Populists Total:	Social Democrat Christian Democ Liberals Populists	Social Democrat Christian Democ Liberals Populists
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	New construction can be facilitated by reviewing building codes and increasing competition in the construction market. Everyone has the right to a good and sustainable home. We are going to see housing again as a basic amenity rather than a revenue model for pawnbrokers and overseas investors. The government will take the reins and provide large numbers of affordable housing.	3	Liberal	1	1: Arrangement between state, market and family 14 23 18 17 72	1: Arrangement between state, market and family 4.4% 9.2% 9.3% 14.5%	Social Democrat 11 5 0 0
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We make housing corporations social institutions of and for the community again: we give tenants and resident committees more say in the policy and composition of the board.	2	Social Democratic	1	2: Decommmodification 27 24 19 5 75	2: Decommmodification 8.5% 9.6% 9.8% 4.3%	Corporatist 3 9 2 3
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	The legal requirements for performance agreements between municipalities, housing corporations and tenants are renewed, municipalities can enforce them, non-compliance has consequences for the housing corporations.	3	Social Democratic	1	3: Stratification 30 16 7 7 60	3: Stratification 9.5% 6.4% 3.6% 6.0%	Liberal 0 7 16 9
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Because they represent a public task, housing corporations will no longer have to pay profit tax with immediate effect. There will be a quick financial solution for regions with destitute housing corporations, so that they can also invest in the coming years in what is needed: new construction, sustainability and keeping the housing stock affordable.	2	Social Democratic	1	4: Regulation 55 50 60 40 205	4: Regulation 17.4% 20.1% 30.9% 34.2%	Mediterranean 0 2 0 5
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We therefore say: no longer build for the market, but build to communities.	3	Corporatist	1	5: Policy objectives 17 39 15 9 80	5: Policy objectives 5.4% 15.7% 7.7% 7.7%	
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We have been working on tighter government direction, abolishing the landlord levy, regulation of rents and strengthening the position of first-time buyers against slumlords and investors. The CDA was the driving force behind this restoration of public housing as a public service. We are going to continue with that.	1	Social Democratic	1	6: Subsidiation 34 17 8 10 69	6: Subsidiation 10.8% 6.8% 4.1% 8.5%	Distribution of regime logics in ideological families
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The housing issue requires an independent Ministry of Housing and Planning	2	Social Democratic	1	7: Price regulation 6 2 3 3 14	7: Price regulation 1.9% 0.8% 1.5% 2.6%	Social Democrat Christian Democ Liberals Populists
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We encourage young people to save for the purchase of a home. For this purpose, agreements are made with banks and a contribution is granted to be able to save for the purchase of a home at a higher and more attractive interest rate.	2	Social Democratic	1	8: Allocation 19 7 4 1 31	8: Allocation 6.0% 2.8% 2.1% 0.9%	Social Democrat 57 30 22 4
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	Corporation tenants are given more opportunity to buy their homes. Housing associations then invest the financial proceeds in new construction and sustainability.	2	Liberal	1	9: Provision 113 61 50 22 246	9: Provision 35.8% 24.5% 25.8% 18.8%	Corporatist 0 7 4 3
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We are putting more effort into cooperative initiatives where community members work together.	2	Liberal	1	10: Share of homeownership sector 1 10 10 3 24	10: Share of homeownership sector 0.3% 4.0% 5.2% 2.6%	Liberal 0 3 0 3
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We do not lamper with the freedom to sell your home. We believe you have the freedom to sell your home to whomever you want. It is your home. We will continue to protect this right.	1	Corporatist	1	0		Mediterranean 0 0 0 0
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We also want to limit the local burden increase for homeowners and SMEs. To this end, it is important to strengthen the position of local councils. We will do this by introducing a national maximum percentage for the OZB increase on which city councils can then steer. This will prevent large OZB increases.	2	Liberal	1	Total sum: 316 249 194 117 876	Total sum: 100% 100% 100% 100%	
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are working on appropriate mortgages. To help young people buy a home and bring the monthly costs down, we encourage more first-time buyers to take advantage of a starter mortgage. We increase the opportunities to get a mortgage by making student debt count less when taking out a mortgage. Also, actual monthly costs can be taken into account more often. For the self-employed, there will be more opportunities to take out a mortgage more easily.	3	Liberal	1	total weight of indicators towards welfare regimes	total weight of indicators towards welfare regimes	
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We believe that a house for sale belongs to you, and not to the municipality. Therefore, in principle, we no longer choose the ground lease system for new homes. Leasehold contracts for new homes should only be allowed if they improve affordability and should not be used as a cash cow for municipalities. We focus on consumer protection and transparency in current ground lease arrangements. This is to strengthen the position of the homeowner in relation to the government. The maximum indexation of the canon payable follows the maximum rent increase for free sector housing.	2	Liberal	1	indicator Social Democrat Corporatist Liberal Mediterranean	Category indicator Social Democrat Corporatist Liberal Mediterranean Total	
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	Making homes more sustainable must be affordable for everyone. Together with the National Mortgage Guarantee (NHG) and the financial sector, we are developing a new sustainability loan. Together with residents, plans are made to make homes more sustainable. We make some investments in making homes more sustainable deductible from the owner-occupied home tax credit. We keep an eye on the sustainability of monuments and the impact of climate change on parks and surrounding landscapes.	3	Liberal	1	1: Arrangement between state, market and family 16 17 32 7 72	Core mix 1: Arrangement t 22% 24% 44% 10% 100%	
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Public buildings and public land with a residential function will no longer be sold to private actors, but given on a long lease. Also, rezoning of public land and properties to a residential function, in the context of a sale to private actors, will only be possible through ground lease. Ground lease makes it possible for prospective buyers to acquire a home without paying for the land. This then remains in government ownership. By removing the land price from the purchase price, the purchase of a house becomes up to 35% cheaper.	3	Social Democratic	1	2: Decommmodification 67 8 0 0 75	2: Decommmodification 89% 11% 0% 0% 100%	
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	For cd&v, what works counts. Private and government hands.	1	Corporatist	1	3: Stratification 48 6 6 0 60	3: Stratification 80% 10% 10% 0% 100%	
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Expansion of the VLABINVEST model to all of Flanders. Through commitment to conventional leasing, housing companies, together with developers, can also provide additional private, affordable and social supply, at a market rate of return. Focus of the housing companies, of course, remains the construction of social housing. In addition, cd&v advocates for an extension of the VLABINVEST model (Flemish Brabant) to all of Flanders. Under provincial direction, supported by the Flemish Government, VLABINVEST conducts an active land and housing policy, in partnership with local governments and initiators. In doing so, VLABINVEST provides affordable rental and owner-occupied housing in the middle segment, for people who have a connection to the region, for example because they have lived or worked there for a long time. The focus should be Flanders-wide on affordable housing for as many Flemings as possible, in continuous cooperation and in consultation between the investment company, housing companies, municipalities and provinces, intermunicipalities, cd&v's and the Flemish Housing Fund. Prices of purchase and rental housing in this scenario are up to 20% below market price, with the purchase or rental price being income-related.	3	Corporatist	1	4: Regulation 62 79 67 - 208	4: Regulation 30% 38% 32% - 100%	
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Local governments should be given pre-emption rights to purchase public lands.	3	Corporatist	1	5: Policy objectives 9 43 28 - 80	5: Policy objective 11% 54% 35% - 100%	
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	a guarantee from the Flemish government for the equity in mortgage loans with private banks and recognized krediet companies.	3	Corporatist	1	6: Subsidiation 40 29 0 - 69	6: Subsidiation 58% 42% 0% - 100%	
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	Making our own affordable housing possible for our families is a top priority	1	Mediterranean	1	7: Price regulation 8 3 3 - 14	7: Price regulatio 57% 21% 21% - 100%	
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	We will protect family homes from higher tax. Under the Family Home Tax Guarantee, we will not increase the number of council tax bands, undertake an expensive council tax revaluation or cut council tax discounts, as Labour is currently doing in Wales. We will maintain Private Residence Relief so that people's homes are protected from Capital Gains Tax and we will not increase the rate or level of Stamp Duty to support homeowners.	3	Liberal	1	8: Allocation 4 27 0 - 31	8: Allocation 13% 87% 0% - 100%	
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Trialling Community Land Auctions to ensure that local communities receive a fair share of the benefits of new development in their areas and to help fund vital local services.	2	Corporatist	1	9: Provision 111 116 19 - 246	Policy levers 9: Provision 45% 47% 8% - 100%	
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	In 2018 we find ourselves with a legacy of corruption, social exclusion and speculation in housing both for sale and for rent, where public aid was cut, the tenant was unprotected and the public housing stock was abandoned and even privatized. From the government we have given priority to the implementation of a real housing policy where there was none before.	1	Social Democratic	1	10: Share of homeownership sector 11 13 24	Outcome pattern 10: Share of horr 46% 54% 100%	
Spain	Christian Democ	PP	WE WILL PROMOTE THE RECONCILIATION OF FAMILIES THAT CHOOSE TO LIVE IN THE RURAL, facilitating the care of children and the elderly by opening "nest houses" or homes for the elderly in municipalities with smaller populations.	2	Mediterranean	1			
Spain	Christian Democ	PP	93 (WE WILL MOBILIZE THE FLOOR OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP for public housing networks, both patrimonial and demanial, for the promotion of affordable rental housing.	2	Social Democratic	1	Total sum: 376 339 168 20 903	Total sum: 42% 38% 19% 2% 100%	
Spain	Populists	VOX	The home is the main space of intimacy and personal development of families, so ensuring affordable access, decent conditions and security for all Spaniards in their homes must be a fundamental priority of any government.	1	Mediterranean	1			
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will review and reduce taxes and charges in the building process. The entire construction process, from the acquisition of a plot of land to the sale or rental of the property, has become a way of obtaining income. The tax burden for the State, regions and municipalities, which produces an artificial increase in prices.	3	Liberal	1			
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will promote family-friendly urban planning, rooted in and harmonious with the environment, encouraging the rehabilitation of regional styles and the protection of traditional facades, including them in the catalogs of assets of cultural interest.	3	Mediterranean	1	Nativism present in the Housing section of the electoral program		
Spain	Populists	VOX	We will repeal the Law for the Right to Housing approved by the government of Sánchez, which will not contribute to the creation of more affordable housing, will sink the rental market, alters the essential content of the right to property enshrined in Article 33 of the Constitution and protects illegal occupation.	3	Liberal	1	Sweden The Netherlands Flanders UK		
Sweden	Christian Democ	Moderaterna	Introduce a vision of zero homelessness among pensioners and increase government funding for housing support	3	Social Democratic	2	Social Democrat: Yes No No No		
Sweden	liberals	Centrumpartiet	Women's shelters, girls' shelters and shelters need more and permanent funding to continue their important work.	2	Social Democratic	2	Christian Democ No No No No		
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Everyone should have access to a good standard of housing and be able to live in a safe, secure and pleasant environment.	1	Social Democratic	2	Liberals No No No No		
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Measures also need to be taken to curb the soaring cost of housing so that more people can afford a home.	1	Corporatist	2	Populists Yes Yes Yes Yes		
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokratern	Combating homelessness is a priority social issue for the Sweden Democrats.	2	Social Democratic	2			
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We also see homelessness as a housing rather than just a care issue.	1	Social Democratic	2			
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	End homelessness. It is unacceptable for people to be involuntarily homeless. The right to housing becomes the basis of our policy. We remain committed to the goal of ending involuntary homelessness by 2030, as agreed in the Lisbon Declaration. In the meantime, we ensure that quality and accessible shelter and care are guaranteed, also for migrants (whether they are EU citizens, asylum seekers or undocumented). We are committed to housing first to prevent and remedy homelessness. We invest heavily in building basic housing. Everyone who becomes homeless is immediately assigned such basic housing. Then they will receive help to find a new home and rebuild their lives. We want all municipalities to contribute proportionally to the housing of people leaving sheltered housing and social care.	2	Social Democratic	2			
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	In order to make better use of existing housing and increase the livability of a neighborhood, Airbnb should no longer lead to permanent housing deprivation. In order to make better use of existing housing and increase the livability of a neighborhood, homes may not be rented out through platforms such as Airbnb for more than 90 days per year. Platforms will from now on provide openness about the rentals that take place through them so that municipalities can properly enforce.	2	Social Democratic	2			























Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	The construction of new housing is stagnating in many places. In response, we are putting our efforts into splitting up large homes and converting vacant properties.	2	Non-ideological
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	We also encourage building layers on top of existing homes in densely populated areas.	2	Non-ideological
Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	Better utilization of existing housing. We encourage transformation, topping up and splitting of existing housing. With more modular construction, homes can be more quickly adapted to changing circumstances.	2	Non-ideological
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The housing shortage is a social crisis. Prevent should be that nitrogen rules shut down major housing projects.	3	Non-ideological
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We make a new Nota Ruimte that does justice to all regions and utilizes all regions. Growth has been skewed in recent decades: national housing policy is too focused on "build, build, build" in the already crowded Randstad. In the north, east and south of our country, there are also plenty of opportunities and is great need for housing.	2	Non-ideological
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	We are also committed to making better use of existing housing through splitting and topping up, transformation, housing sharing and flow-through. We will keep thereby paying attention to livability in residential neighborhoods.	2	Non-ideological
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	The transformation of non-vital vacation parks into residential neighborhoods may be necessary for municipalities are a welcome addition to the housing stock.	2	Non-ideological
Netherlands	Christian Democ	CDA	For first-time buyers, the current state of the student debt determinant.	2	Non-ideological
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	On the other hand, we must address as many bumps as possible that make it difficult for landlords to make homes more sustainable.	1	Non-ideological
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We build suburban and inner-city. We will continue to build houses within the boundaries of cities and towns. We will also build on the edges of cities and towns to provide more housing cheaper and faster. These can also be larger building sites. Nature and housing should not be opposites. We ensure that nature gets a place in the neighborhoods.	2	Non-ideological
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	We are building cleaner and faster. The houses we build must be built in a fast and clean way. Therefore, we are going to produce more homes factory-built. This will also reduce the amount of nitrogen released when we build houses. Moreover, this will make building houses cheaper. We also encourage the use of bio-based building materials. This also offers new opportunities for farmers.	3	Non-ideological
Netherlands	liberals	VVD	To give people more freedom and free up even more homes, we allow permanent occupancy in vacation parks. However, these homes must comply with the building code. There must also be sufficient municipal facilities for permanent living in a vacation home at all, such as garbage collection. We will come up with an approach to the shadow side of vacation park occupancy.	2	Non-ideological
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Building not only inner-city, but also definitely outer-city - In cities and towns 'adding a street'	2	Non-ideological
Netherlands	Populists	PVV	Allow permanent occupancy of vacation homes	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	Under the asset test in social renting, banks may not charge for the evidence that prospective tenants are required to request.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	That this accordion formula, based on a regulatory yet to be established, should be a basic right be for each borrower. We do ensure that this system is only possible in delineated cases, so that we do not create price driving effects of universally increased borrowing capacity. • Accordion formula as right to avoid financial noise in delineated cases.	3	Non-ideological
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	A reasonable processing time for the file shows respect from the government the citizen. Additional investment is needed in the administrative teams of the Flemish Housing Fund to improve accessibility, customer service and turnaround time of files. improve. In some cases, it takes three to four months for a file to be fully approved and . That time is not available to less wealthy prospective buyers. Additional investment in the administrative teams of the Flemish Housing Fund for a reasonable processing time of files.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Every Fleming should have access to a renovation coach at an energy house. Free of charge for lower-income and ex-social security tenants.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Core densification with respect for the individuality of our villages and towns.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Maximum preservation of open and green space.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Fixed price per square meter for preparation of EPC certificates. Control by government. Implementation of a number of areas for improvement.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Additional commitment to consulting with and informing citizens.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Strive for maximum diversity in supply: private rooms, social, hospice living, kotmadam rooms.	Non-ideological	
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Invest in intergenerational neighborhoods with shared indoor and outdoor space.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	Conversion of vacant offices into temporary housing via modular units.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	Christian Democ	CD&V	In order to tailored counseling to the homeless, efforts must be made to further developing the competencies of social workers and municipal officials to working around this.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We focus on smart and future-oriented core densification. We recognize the need to make more efficient use of existing space, while anticipating future developments and needs: densification through more building on the same area, smart and multifunctional buildings and future-proof infrastructure.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Work with preliminary decision before start of public inquiry. The basic principle is that the licensing authority makes a preliminary decision based on all available information (application, opinions bodies and environmental officer). Based on this preliminary decision, the public concerned can decide in a more informed manner whether or not to file an objection.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We are addressing dilatory proceedings before the Permit Disputes Board by introducing the plea of manifestly reckless litigation. Parties initiating manifestly unfounded appeals may be held liable for the other party's damages.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	We are waging a battle against wasted space by focusing on multifunctional use of space. Today, far too much of the space above or below a building is wasted. We use all possibilities for densification tailored to an area or neighborhood: allowing more building on the same surface, smart use of the same space.	2	Non-ideological
Flanders	liberals	Open vld	Eliminate the misery tax on relationship breakups and eliminate discrimination. Not every relationship is for eternity. If you own a house together, the partner who takes over the house must pay a division tax of 1% or 2.5%, depending on whether you married, legally or de facto cohabiting. A tax on divorce that makes one suffer even more, that we cannot actually justify and does not reflect today's reality. We abolish the apportionment tax: we want equal tax treatment for couples, both married and cohabiting. By abolishing the apportionment law, we also make it easier for heirs who inherit property together and who want to put an end to forced unwidowedness. We put an end to discriminations such as some contributions to a joint estate, where spouses have to pay 50 euros, while cohabitants can expect an assessment bill of thousands of euros.	Non-ideological	
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Raising density levels in inner London to those of European cities like Paris and Barcelona. We will ensure the London Plan delivers more family homes a year, forcing the Mayor to plan for more homes on brownfield sites, like underused industrial land. We will regenerate major sites like Euston, Old Oak Common and Thamesmead.	2	Non-ideological
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Making sure local authorities use the new Infrastructure Levy to deliver the GP surgeries, roads and other local infrastructure needed to support homes. We will not allow these funds to be spent on community projects that bear no relation to support for new homes.	2	Non-ideological
UK	Christian Democ	Conservatives	Building on our new powers for the police, we will further speed up the use and enforcement of powers to remove illegal traveller sites, while giving councils greater planning powers to prevent unauthorised development by travellers.	2	Non-ideological
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Encouraging the use of rural exception sites to expand rural housing.	2	Non-ideological
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Putting the construction sector on a sustainable footing by investing in skills, training and new technologies such as modern methods of construction.	1	Non-ideological
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Ensure that all development has appropriate infrastructure, services and amenities in place, integrating infrastructure and public service delivery into the planning process.	3	Non-ideological
UK	liberals	Liberal Democrats	Fully recognising tenant panels so that renters have a voice in landlord governance.	2	Non-ideological
UK	Populists	REFORM	Incentivise Use of New Construction Technology We will incentivise innovation to speed up building: modular construction, digital technology and building sites that improve efficiency and cut waste.	1	Non-ideological
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will promote the design of an Action Plan by the competent Public Administrations, with sufficient economic resources, for the eradication of shantytowns and segregated settlements, including the participation of the gypsy population in its design.	2	Non-ideological
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will promote the coordinated work of the autonomous and local administrations to ensure the provision of adequate physical infrastructure, basic services and the access of neighbors to all the supplies they need.	2	Non-ideological
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	We will ensure effective sustainability, energy efficiency and accessibility policies that also promote comprehensive actions that contribute to improving the quality, state of conservation and digitalization of buildings.	1	Non-ideological
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	Innovation should be a hallmark of all housing policy initiatives. We make a general approach of diversification of housing formats and trends to respond to different family, individual and collective needs that take into account changing life circumstances.	2	Non-ideological



Region	Ideology	Party	Social Democratic %	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate	Deviation from average
Sweden	Christian Democr	Moderaternas	0,33	0,14	0,48	0,05	0,57	0,08	0,02
The Netherlands	Christian Democr	CDA	0,29	0,54	0,17	0,00	0,44	0,15	0,00
Flanders	Christian Democr	CD&V	0,31	0,49	0,18	0,02	0,43	0,16	0,00
UK	Christian Democr	Concervatives	0,16	0,65	0,19	0,00	0,51	0,19	0,01
Spain	Christian Democr	PP	0,47	0,40	0,00	0,13	0,27	0,23	0,04
						Average:	0,44	0,16	
						Standard deviat	0,11		
Sweden	Liberals	Centrumpartiet	0,17	0,00	0,83	0,00	0,83	0,00	0,09
The Netherlands	Liberals	VVD	0,18	0,47	0,29	0,05	0,55	0,18	0,00
Flanders	Liberals	Open vld.	0,12	0,48	0,33	0,08	0,61	0,21	0,01
UK	Liberals	Liberal Democrat	0,51	0,49	0,00	0,00	0,24	0,14	0,10
						Average:	0,56	0,13	
						Standard deviat	0,22		
Sweden	Populists	Sverige democra	0,26	0,26	0,48	0,00	0,61	0,08	0,00
The Netherlands	Populists	PVV	0,44	0,00	0,56	0,00	0,56	0,00	0,02
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	0,29	0,29	0,39	0,02	0,55	0,11	0,01
UK	Populists	REFORM	0,00	0,45	0,55	0,00	0,77	0,13	0,02
Spain	Populists	VOX	0,10	0,29	0,39	0,23	0,65	0,28	0,03
						Average:	0,63	0,12	
						Standard deviat	0,12		
Sweden	Social Democrat	Socialdemocrate	0,86	0,14	0,00	0,00	0,07	0,04	0,00
The Netherlands	Social Democrat	PvdA	0,71	0,29	0,00	0,00	0,15	0,08	0,00
Flanders	Social Democrat	Vooruit	0,78	0,22	0,00	0,00	0,11	0,06	0,00
UK	Social Democrat	Labour	0,82	0,18	0,00	0,00	0,09	0,05	0,00
Spain	Social Democrat	PSOE	0,53	0,45	0,02	0,00	0,24	0,13	0,02
						Average:	0,13	0,07	
						Standard deviat	0,07		



Ideological distribution and focus score of Social Democratic electoral programs

Ideology	Region	Party	Social Democra	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	Focus score
Social Democrat	Sweden	Socialdemocrate	86%	14%	0%	0%	0,70
Social Democrat	The Netherlands	PvdA	71%	29%	0%	0%	0,56
Social Democrat	Flanders	Vooruit	78%	22%	0%	0%	0,62
Social Democrat	UK	Labour	82%	18%	0%	0%	0,66
Social Democrat	Spain	PSOE	53%	45%	2%	0%	0,44
Social Democrats		Average	74%	26%	0%	0%	0,57

Welfare Model	X	Y
Social Democrati	0	0
Liberal	1	0
Mediterranean	0,5	0,8660254038
Corporatism	0,5	0,2886751346

Ideological distribution and focus score of Christian Democratic electoral programs

Ideology	Region	Party	Social Democra	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	Focus score
Christian Democr	Sweden	Moderaternas	33%	14%	48%	5%	0,18
Christian Democr	The Netherlands	CDA	29%	54%	17%	0%	0,28
Christian Democr	Flanders	CD&V	31%	49%	18%	2%	0,20
Christian Democr	UK	Concervatives	16%	65%	19%	0%	0,36
Christian Democr	Spain	PP	47%	40%	0%	13%	0,29
Christian Democrats		Average	31%	44%	20%	4%	0,15

Ideological distribution and focus score of Liberal electoral programs

Ideology	Region	Party	Social Democra	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	Focus score
Liberals	Sweden	Centrumpartiet	17%	0%	83%	0%	0,67
Liberals	The Netherlands	VVD	18%	47%	29%	5%	0,15
Liberals	Flanders	Open vld.	12%	48%	33%	8%	0,16
Liberals	UK	Liberal Democrat	55%	45%	0%	0%	0,50
Liberals		Average	25%	35%	36%	3%	0,14

Ideological distribution and focus score of Populist electoral programs

Ideology	Region	Party	Social Democra	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	Focus score
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Region	Ideology	Party	Social Democratic %	Corporatist %	Liberal %	Mediterranean %	X-Coordinate	Y-Coordinate
Flanders			25%	56%	19%	0%	0,47	0,1616580754
Flanders	Christian Democrats	CD&V	31%	49%	18%	31%	0,4333333333	0,1603750748
Flanders	Liberals	Open vld.	12%	48%	33%	8%	0,6057692308	0,2054034612
Flanders	Populists	Vlaams Belang	29%	29%	39%	2%	0,5487804878	0,1056128541
Flanders	Social Democrats	Vooruit	78%	22%	0%	0%	0,1102941176	0,06367833851
Spain			0%	12%	29%	59%	0,645	0,5455960044
Spain	Christian Democrats	PP	47%	40%	0%	13%	0,2666666667	0,2309401077
Spain	Populists	VOX	10%	29%	39%	23%	0,6451612903	0,2793630335
Spain	Social Democrats	PSOE	53%	45%	2%	0%	0,2425742574	0,1286176342
Sweden			73%	18%	9%	0%	0,18	0,05196152423
Sweden	Christian Democrats	Moderaternas	33%	14%	48%	5%	0,5714285714	0,08247860988
Sweden	Liberals	Centrumpartiet	17%	0%	83%	0%	0,8333333333	0
Sweden	Populists	Sverige demokraternas	26%	26%	48%	0%	0,6086956522	0,07530655685
Sweden	Social Democrats	Socialdemokraten	86%	14%	0%	0%	0,07142857143	0,04123930494
The Netherlands			43%	43%	14%	0%	0,355	0,1241303079
The Netherlands	Christian Democrats	CDA	29%	54%	17%	0%	0,4390243902	0,1548988527
The Netherlands	Liberals	VVD	18%	47%	29%	5%	0,5537634409	0,1831379886
The Netherlands	Populists	PVV	44%	0%	56%	0%	0,5555555556	0
The Netherlands	Social Democrats	PvdA	71%	29%	0%	0%	0,1462264151	0,08442386012
UK			0%	27%	40%	13%	0,6	0,1905255888
UK	Christian Democrats	Conservatives	16%	65%	19%	0%	0,511627907	0,1879745062
UK	Liberals	Liberal Democrats	51%	49%	0%	0%	0,2446808511	0,1412665552
UK	Populists	REFORM	0%	45%	55%	0%	0,7727272727	0,1312159703
UK	Social Democrats	Labour	82%	18%	0%	0%	0,09090909091	0,05248638811

Welfare Model	Position	X	Y
Social Democratic	Left-lower corner	0	0
Corporatism	Centre	0,5	0,29
Liberal	Right-lower corner	1	0
Mediterranean	Upper corner	0,5	0,87

