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DOI

[10.1007/978-3-031-71162-6_1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71162-6_1)

Publication date

2025

Document Version

Final published version

Published in

Formal Methods

Citation (APA)

Wicker, M., Patane, A., Laurenti, L., & Kwiatkowska, M. (2025). Adversarial Robustness Certification for Bayesian Neural Networks. In A. Platzer, K. Y. Rozier, M. Pradella, & M. Rossi (Eds.), *Formal Methods : Proceedings of the 26th International Symposium, FM 2024* (pp. 3-28). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 14933 LNCS). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71162-6_1

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Adversarial Robustness Certification for Bayesian Neural Networks

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Abstract. We study the problem of certifying the robustness of Bayesian neural networks (BNNs) to adversarial input perturbations. Specifically, we define two notions of robustness for BNNs in an adversarial setting: probabilistic robustness and decision robustness. The former deals with the probabilistic behaviour of the network, that is, it ensures robustness across different stochastic realisations of the network, while the latter provides guarantees for the overall (output) decision of the BNN. Although these robustness properties cannot be computed analytically, we present a unified computational framework for efficiently and formally bounding them. Our approach is based on weight interval sampling, integration and bound propagation techniques, and can be applied to BNNs with a large number of parameters independently of the (approximate) inference method employed to train the BNN. We evaluate the effectiveness of our method on tasks including airborne collision avoidance, medical imaging and autonomous driving, demonstrating that it can compute non-trivial guarantees on medium size images (i.e., over 16 thousand input parameters).

Keywords: Certification · Bayesian Neural Networks · Adversarial Robustness · Classification · Regression · Uncertainty

1 Introduction

While neural networks (NNs) regularly obtain state-of-the-art performance in many supervised machine learning problems [2, 15], they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, i.e., imperceptible modifications of their inputs that result in an incorrect prediction [42]. Along with several other vulnerabilities [8], the discovery of adversarial examples has made the deployment of NNs in real-world, safety-critical applications increasingly challenging. The design and analysis of

methods that can mitigate such vulnerabilities, or compute provable guarantees on their worst-case behaviour in adversarial conditions, is therefore of utmost importance [44].

While retaining the advantages intrinsic to deep learning, Bayesian neural networks (BNNs), i.e., NNs with a probability distribution placed over their weights and biases [33], enable probabilistically principled evaluation of *model uncertainty*. Because of their ability to model uncertainty [27], the application of BNNs is particularly appealing in safety-critical scenarios, where uncertainty could be taken into account at prediction time to enable safe decision-making [4, 11, 32, 57]. To this end, various techniques have been proposed for the evaluation of BNNs’ robustness, including generalisation of gradient-based adversarial attacks [31], statistical verification techniques [12], and formal verification approaches aimed at verifying that the decisions made by a BNN are safe [1, 7] or checking the robustness of the neural networks sampled from the BNN posterior [7, 12, 29]. The increasingly diverse techniques for analysing robustness of Bayesian neural networks have resulted in divergent robustness properties, some directly analysing the stochasticity of the system [12] and others directly adapting robustness specifications from deterministic systems [7]. To the best of our knowledge, there is a lack of systematic, unified approaches for computing formal (i.e., with certified bounds) guarantees on the range of emergent quantitative robustness properties against adversarial input perturbations for BNNs.

In this work, we develop a probabilistic verification framework to quantify the adversarial robustness of BNNs. In particular, we model adversarial robustness as an *input-output specification* defined by a given compact set of input points, $T \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$, and a given convex polytope output set, $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ (called a safe set). A neural network satisfies this specification if all points in T are mapped into S . For a particular specification, we focus on two main properties of a BNN of interest for adversarial prediction settings: *probabilistic robustness* [12, 50] and *decision robustness* [7, 23]. The former is defined as the probability that a network sampled from the posterior distribution is robust, which thus provides a general measure of the robustness of a BNN. In contrast, *decision robustness* focuses on the decision step, and evaluates the robustness of the optimal decision of a BNN. That is, a BNN satisfies decision robustness if, for all points in T , the expectation of the output of the BNN in the case of regression, or the argmax of the expectation of the softmax for classification, are contained in S .

Unfortunately, evaluating probabilistic and decision robustness for a BNN is not trivial, as it involves computing distributions and expectations of high-dimensional random variables passed through a non-convex function. Nevertheless, we derive a unified algorithmic framework based on computations over the BNN weight space that yields *certified lower* and *upper bounds* for both properties. Specifically, we show that probabilistic robustness is equivalent to the measure, w.r.t. the BNN posterior, of the set of weights for which the resulting deterministic NN is robust. Computing upper and lower bounds for the probability involves sampling compact sets of weights according to the BNN posterior, and propagating each of these weight sets, H , through the neural network

architecture, jointly with the input region T , to check whether all the networks instantiated by weights in H are safe. To do so, we generalise bound propagation techniques developed for deterministic neural networks to the Bayesian setting and instantiate explicit schemes for Interval Bound Propagation (IBP) and Linear Bound Propagation (LBP) [20]. Similarly, in the case of decision robustness, we show that formal bounds can be obtained by partitioning the weight space into different weight sets, and for each weight set J we employ bound propagation techniques to compute the maximum and minimum of the decision of the NN for any input point in T and any weight in the set J . The resulting extrema are then averaged w.r.t. posterior measure to obtain sound lower and upper bounds on decision robustness.

We empirically validate our framework using case studies from airborne collision avoidance [25], medical image recognition [56], and autonomous driving [40]. We demonstrate that our framework is able to compute sound upper and lower bounds for both notions of robustness for Bayesian neural networks. Moreover, we study the effect of approximate inference, as well as depth and width of the neural network classifier, on our guarantees. We find that our approach, even when using simple interval bound propagation, is able to provide non-trivial certificates of adversarial robustness and predictive uncertainty properties for Bayesian neural networks with four hidden layers and more than 16,000 input dimensions. We additionally use our approach to show how approximate Bayesian posteriors may provide provably robust uncertainty estimation for random noise inputs while failing to provide the same guarantees for more structured classes of out-of-distribution inputs¹.

In summary, this paper makes the following contributions²

- We present an algorithmic framework based on convex relaxation techniques for the robustness analysis of BNNs in adversarial settings.
- We derive explicit lower- and upper-bounding procedures based on IBP and LBP for the propagation of input and weight intervals through the BNN posterior function.
- We empirically show that our method can be used to certify BNNs consisting of multiple hidden layers and with hundreds of neurons per layer.

Probabilistic robustness was introduced in [50]. This work extends [50] in several aspects. In contrast to [50], which focused only on probabilistic robustness, here we also tackle decision robustness and embed the calculations for the two properties in a common computational framework. Furthermore, while the method in [50] only computes lower bounds, in this paper we also develop a technique for upper bound computation. Finally, we extend the empirical analysis to include additional datasets, evaluation of convolutional architectures, scalability analysis, as well as certification of out-of-distribution (OOD) uncertainty.

¹ An implementation to reproduce all the experiments can be found at: <https://github.com/matthewwicker/AdversarialRobustnessCertificationForBNNs>.

² In view of space constraints, additional details are available in Appendix at <https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.13614>.

Related Works. The vast majority of existing NN verification methods have been developed specifically for deterministic NNs, with approaches including abstract interpretation [20], mixed integer linear programming [19, 36, 43, 54, 60], Monte Carlo search-based frameworks [24, 48, 55], convex relaxation [23, 45, 59] and SAT/SMT [25, 26]. However, these methods cannot be directly applied to BNNs because they all assume that the weights of the network are deterministic, i.e., fixed to a given value, while in the Bayesian setting weights are not fixed, but distributed according to the BNN posterior. Statistical approaches to quantify the robustness of BNNs that are ϵ approximately correct up to a confidence/probability of error bounded by $1 - \delta$, for $\delta > 0$, have been developed in [12, 32]. In contrast, the methods in this paper do not rely on confidence intervals and return guaranteed upper and lower bounds on the true probability that a BNN satisfies a specific property.

Since the publication of our preliminary work [50], other papers have studied the problem of verifying BNN robustness [1, 3, 7, 29, 51, 52]. However, [7] only considers verification of BNNs with weight distributions of bounded support, and consequently does not include Gaussian posterior distributions, which are commonly employed in practice. [1] develops an approach based on dynamic programming to certify decision robustness for BNNs, which improves the precision of BNN verification by performing bound propagation in the latent space of BNNs, rather than working on the space of weights. However, this approach is restricted to decision robustness. Further, [3] develops an approach based on mixed integer linear programming (MILP), which is specific for probabilistic robustness. It is unclear how these approaches could be extended to encompass both probabilistic and decision robustness. In contrast, in this paper we propose a simple and general framework that encompasses both decision and probabilistic robustness, and can be applied to both fully-connected and convolutional neural network architectures. Another related method is [29], which takes a distribution-free approach and considers a dynamical system whose one-step dynamics includes a neural network, and computes the set of weights that satisfy an infinite-horizon safety property. Note that, as the support of a Gaussian distribution is unbounded, similarly to [7], this approach does not support Gaussian posterior distributions over the weights. We also mention [52], which builds on the results of [51] to develop certification for reach-avoid properties of dynamical systems described by BNNs. Finally, [49] considers certifiable robust training and introduces the concept of robust likelihood that we employ in our experimental evaluation.

In the context of Bayesian learning, methods to compute adversarial robustness measures have been explored for Gaussian processes (GPs), both for regression [13] and classification tasks [35, 38]. However, because of the non-linearity in NN architectures, GP-based approaches cannot be directly employed for BNNs. Furthermore, the vast majority of approximate Bayesian inference methods for BNNs do not utilise Gaussian approximations over the latent space [10]. In contrast, our method is specifically tailored to take into account the non-linear

nature of BNNs and can be directly applied to a range of approximate Bayesian inference techniques used in the literature.

2 Background on Bayesian Deep Learning

We consider a dataset of $n_{\mathcal{D}}$ independent pairs of inputs and labels, $\mathcal{D} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^{n_{\mathcal{D}}}$, with $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^m$, where each output $y \in \mathbb{R}^n$ is either a one-hot class vector for classification or a real-valued vector for regression. The aim of Bayesian learning is to learn the function generating $\mathcal{D}$ via a feed forward-neural network $f^w : \mathbb{R}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n$, parameterised by a vector $w \in \mathbb{R}^{n_w}$ containing all its weights and biases. We denote with $f^{w,1}, \dots, f^{w,K}$ the K layers of f^w and take the activation function of the i th layer to be $\sigma^{(i)}$, abbreviated to just σ in the case of the output activation.³ Throughout this paper, we will use $f^w(x)$ to represent pre-activation of the last layer.

Bayesian deep learning starts with a prior distribution, $p(w)$, over the vector $\mathbf{w}$ of random variables associated to the weights. Placing a distribution over the weights defines a stochastic process indexed by the input space, which we denote as $f^{\mathbf{w}}$. Note that we use bold to distinguish the stochastic process parameterised by a random variable, $f^{\mathbf{w}}$, and the deterministic function that results from sampling a single parameter value, f^w . To obtain the posterior distribution, the BNN prior is updated according to the likelihood, $p(\mathcal{D}|w)$, via the Bayes rule, i.e., $p(w|\mathcal{D}) \propto p(\mathcal{D}|w)p(w)$ [9]. The cumulative distribution of $p(w|\mathcal{D})$, which we denote as $P(\cdot)$, is such that for $R \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n_w}$ we have:

$$P(R) := \int_R p(w|\mathcal{D})dw. \quad (1)$$

The posterior $p(w|\mathcal{D})$ is in turn used to calculate the output of a BNN on an unseen point, x^* . The distribution over outputs is called the posterior predictive distribution and is defined as:

$$p(y^*|x^*, \mathcal{D}) = \int p(y^*|x^*, w)p(w|\mathcal{D})dw. \quad (2)$$

When employing a Bayesian model, the overall final prediction is taken to be a single value, $\hat{y}$, that minimizes the Bayesian risk of an incorrect prediction according to the posterior predictive distribution and a loss function $\mathcal{L}$. Formally, the final decision of a BNN is computed as

$$\hat{y} = \arg \min_{y^*} \int_{\mathbb{R}^n} \mathcal{L}(y, y^*)p(y^*|x^*, \mathcal{D})dy^*. \quad (3)$$

This minimization is the subject of Bayesian decision theory [6], and the final form of $\hat{y}$ depends on the specific loss function $\mathcal{L}$ employed in practice. In this

³ We assume, for the purposes of linear bound propagation in Appendix D.4, that the activation functions have a finite number of inflection points, which holds for activation functions commonly used in practice [21].

paper, we focus on two standard loss functions widely employed for classification and regression problems⁴, described in more detail below.

Classification. For classification problems, the 0–1 loss, denoted ℓ_{0-1} , is commonly employed. ℓ_{0-1} assigns a penalty of 0 to the correct prediction, and 1 otherwise. It can be shown that the optimal decision in this case is given by the class for which the predictive distribution obtains its maximum, i.e.:

$$\hat{y} = \arg \max_{i=1,\dots,n} p_i(y^*|x^*, \mathcal{D}) = \arg \max_{i=1,\dots,n} \mathbb{E}_{w \sim p(w|\mathcal{D})} [\sigma_i(f^w(x))],$$

where σ_i represents the i th output component of the softmax function.

Regression. For regression problems, the ℓ_2 loss is generally employed. ℓ_2 assigns a penalty to a prediction according to its ℓ_2 distance from the ground truth. It can be shown that the optimal decision in this case is given by the expected value of the BNN output over the posterior distribution, i.e., $\hat{y} = \mathbb{E}_{w \sim p(w|\mathcal{D})} [f^w(x)]$. Unfortunately, because of the non-linearity of neural network architectures, the computation of the posterior distribution over the weights, $p(w|\mathcal{D})$, is generally intractable [33]. Hence, various approximation methods have been studied to perform inference with BNNs in practice. Among these, we will consider Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) [33] and Variational Inference (VI) [10]. While HMC is a sample-based method that involves defining a Markov chain whose invariant distribution is $p_{\mathbf{w}}(w|\mathcal{D})$ [33], VI proceeds by finding a Gaussian approximating distribution over the weight space $q(w) \sim p_{\mathbf{w}}(w|\mathcal{D})$ in a trade-off between approximation accuracy and scalability. For simplicity of notation, in the rest of the paper we will indicate with $p(w|\mathcal{D})$ the posterior distribution estimated by either of the two methods, and clarify the methodological differences when they arise.

3 Problem Statement

We focus on local specifications defined over an input compact set $T \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$, which we assume to be a box (axis-aligned linear constraints), and output set $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ in the form of a convex polytope:

$$S = \{y \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid C_S y + d_S \geq 0\}, \quad (4)$$

where $C_S \in \mathbb{R}^{n_S \times n}$ and $d_S \in \mathbb{R}^{n_S}$ are the matrix and vector encoding the polytope constraints, with n_S being the number of output constraints. Throughout the paper we will refer to an input-output set pair, T and S , as defined above, as a *robustness specification*. We note that our formulation of robustness specification captures various important properties used in practice, such as classifier

⁴ In Appendix B we discuss how our method can be generalised to other losses commonly employed in practice.

monotonicity [41], adversarial robustness [22, 24], and individual fairness [5]. For instance, targeted adversarial robustness for classification, which aims to find an adversarial example belonging to a specified class, can be captured by setting C_S to an $n_S \times n$ matrix of all zeros with a -1 in the diagonal entry corresponding to the true class and a 1 on the diagonal entry corresponding to the target class. Similarly, for regression, one uses C_S to encode the absolute deviation from the target value and d_S to encode the maximum tolerable deviation.

Probabilistic robustness accounts for the probabilistic behaviour of a BNN with respect to a robustness specification.

Definition 1 (Probabilistic robustness). *Given a Bayesian neural network $f^{\mathbf{w}}$, an input set $T \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ and an output set $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$, also called safe set of outputs, define probabilistic robustness as*

$$P_{\text{safe}}(T, S) := \text{Prob}_{w \sim p(w|\mathcal{D})}(\forall x \in T, f^w(x) \in S). \quad (5)$$

Given $\eta \in [0, 1]$, we then say that $f^{\mathbf{w}}$ is probabilistically robust, or safe, for robustness specifications (T, S) with probability at least η iff $P_{\text{safe}}(T, S) \geq \eta$.

Probabilistic robustness considers the adversarial behaviour of the model while accounting for the uncertainty arising from the posterior distribution. In particular, $P_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$ quantifies *the proportion* of networks sampled from $f^{\mathbf{w}}$ that satisfy a given input-output specification, and can be used directly as a measure of compliance for Bayesian neural networks [7, 16, 32]. Exact computation of $P_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$ is hindered by the size and non-linearity of neural networks. Therefore, in this work, we aim to compute provable bounds on probabilistic robustness.

Problem 1 (Bounding probabilistic robustness). Given a Bayesian neural network $f^{\mathbf{w}}$, an input set $T \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ and a set $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ of safe outputs, compute (non-trivial) lower and upper bounds P_{safe}^L and P_{safe}^U such that

$$P_{\text{safe}}^L \leq P_{\text{safe}}(T, S) \leq P_{\text{safe}}^U. \quad (6)$$

3.1 Decision Robustness

While P_{safe} attempts to measure the probability of robustness of neural networks sampled from the BNN posterior, we are often interested in evaluating robustness w.r.t. a specific decision. In order to do so, we consider *decision robustness*, which is computed over the final decision of the BNN. In particular, given a loss function and a decision $\hat{y}$ we have the following.

Definition 2 (Decision robustness). *Consider a Bayesian neural network $f^{\mathbf{w}}$, an input set $T \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$ and an output set $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$. Assume that the decision for a loss $\mathcal{L}$ for $x \in \mathbb{R}^m$ is given by $\hat{y}(x)$ (Eq. 3). Then, the Bayesian decision is considered to be robust if $\forall x \in T, \hat{y}(x) \in S$.*




Fig. 1. A diagram illustrating a single iteration of the computational flow for the certification process of a BNN w.r.t. decision robustness (green) and probabilistic robustness (purple). This process is summarised in Algorithm 1 (Color figure online).

As discussed in Sect. 2, since the specific form of the decision depends on the loss function, the definition of decision robustness takes different form depending on whether the BNN is used for classification or for regression. We thus arrive at the following problem.

Problem 2 (Bounding decision robustness). Let f^w be a BNN with posterior distribution $p(w|\mathcal{D})$. Consider a robustness specification (T, S) and assume $\mathcal{L} = \ell_{0-1}$ for classification or $\mathcal{L} = \ell_2$ for regression. We aim at computing (non-trivial) lower and upper bounds D_{safe}^L and D_{safe}^U such that:

$$D_{\text{safe}}^L \leq \mathbb{E}[s(f^w(x))] \leq D_{\text{safe}}^U \quad \forall x \in T,$$

where s corresponds to the likelihood function σ in the case of classification (e.g., the softmax) and simply denotes the identity function in the case of regression.

Problem 2 suggests that, while for regression we can simply bound the expected output of the BNN, for classification we need to bound the predictive posterior to compute bounds on the final decision, i.e., we need to propagate these inside the softmax. This is similar to what is done for deterministic neural networks, where, in the case of classification, the bounds are often computed over the logits, and then used to provide guarantees for the final decision [23].

3.2 Approach Outline

We design an algorithmic framework for computing worst- and best-case bounds (lower and upper bounds, respectively) on local robustness properties for Bayesian neural networks, taking account of both the posterior distribution (P_{safe}^L and P_{safe}^U) and the overall model decision (D_{safe}^L and D_{safe}^U). First, we show how the two robustness properties of Definitions 1 and 2 can be reformulated in terms of computation over weight intervals. This allows us to derive a unified approach,

which enables bounding of the robustness of the BNN posterior (i.e., probabilistic robustness) and that of the overall model decision (i.e., decision robustness) by means of *bound propagation* and *posterior integral* computation over hyper-rectangles. For a discussion of when each bound may be useful see Appendix A.

A visual outline for our framework is presented in Fig. 1. The presentation of the framework is organised as follows. We first introduce a general theoretical schema for bounding the robustness quantities of interest (Sect. 4). We then show how the required integral computations can be achieved for practical Bayesian posterior inference techniques (Sect. 5.1). This allows us to extend bound propagation techniques to deal with both input variable intervals and intervals over the weight space, which we rely on to instantiate approaches respectively based on Interval Bound Propagation (Sect. 5.2) and Linear Bound Propagation techniques (Appendix C.). Finally, in Sect. 6, we present an overall algorithm that produces the desired bounds.

4 BNN Adversarial Robustness via Weight Sets

We show how a single computational framework can be leveraged to compute bounds on both definitions of BNN robustness. We start by converting the computation of robustness into the weight space and then define a family of weight intervals that we utilise to bound the integrations required by both definitions. Proofs for the main results in this section are presented in Appendix D.

4.1 Bounding Probabilistic Robustness

We first show that the computation of $P_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$ is equivalent to computing a *maximal* set of safe weights H such that each network associated to weights in H is safe w.r.t. the robustness specification at hand.

Definition 3 (Maximal safe and unsafe sets). *We say that $H \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n_w}$ is the maximal safe set of weights from T to S , or simply the maximal safe set of weights, iff $H = \{w \in \mathbb{R}^{n_w} \mid \forall x \in T, f^w(x) \in S\}$. Similarly, we say that $K \subseteq \mathbb{R}^{n_w}$ is the maximal unsafe set of weights from T to S , or simply the maximal unsafe set of weights, iff $K = \{w \in \mathbb{R}^{n_w} \mid \exists x \in T, f^w(x) \notin S\}$.*

Intuitively, H and K simply encode the input-output specifications S and T in the BNN weight space. The following lemma, which follows from Eq. 5, allows us to relate the maximal sets of weights to probabilistic robustness.

Lemma 1. *Let H and K be the maximal safe and unsafe sets of weights from T to S . Assume that $w \sim p(w|\mathcal{D})$. Then, it holds that*

$$P(H) = \int_H p(w|\mathcal{D})dw = P_{\text{safe}}(T, S) = 1 - \int_K p(w|\mathcal{D})dw = 1 - P(K). \quad (7)$$

Unfortunately, an exact computation of sets H and K is infeasible in general and may not be possible to capture using any finite number of sets. However, we can compute subsets of H and K . Such subsets can then be used to compute upper and lower bounds on the value of $P_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$ by considering subsets of the maximal safe and unsafe weights.

Definition 4 (Safe and unsafe sets). *Given a maximal safe set H or a maximal unsafe set K of weights, we say that $\hat{H}$ and $\hat{K}$ are a safe and unsafe set of weights from T to S iff $\hat{H} \subseteq H$ and $\hat{K} \subseteq K$, respectively.*

Without maximality, we no longer have strict equality in Lemma 1, but we can use $\hat{H}$ and $\hat{K}$ to arrive at bounds on the value of probabilistic robustness. Specifically, we proceed by defining $\hat{H}$ and $\hat{K}$ as the union of a family of disjoint weight intervals, as these can provide flexible approximations of H and K . That is, we consider $\mathcal{H} = \{H_i\}_{i=1}^{n_H}$, with $H_i = [w_i^{L,H}, w_i^{U,H}]$ and $\mathcal{K} = \{K_i\}_{i=1}^{n_K}$, with $K_i = [w_i^{L,K}, w_i^{U,K}]$, such that $H_i \subseteq H$ and $K_i \subseteq K$, $\hat{H} = \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_H} H_i$, $\hat{K} = \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_K} K_i$, and $H_i \cap H_j = \emptyset$ and $K_i \cap K_j = \emptyset$, for any $i \neq j$. Hence, as a consequence of Lemma 1, and by the fact that $\hat{H} \subseteq H$ and $\hat{K} \subseteq K$, we obtain the following.

Proposition 1 (Bounds on probabilistic robustness). *Let H and K be the maximal safe and unsafe sets of weights from T to S . Consider two families of pairwise disjoint weight intervals $\mathcal{H} = \{H_i\}_{i=1}^{n_H}$, $\mathcal{K} = \{K_i\}_{i=1}^{n_K}$, where for all i it holds that $H_i \subseteq H$ and $K_i \subseteq K$. Let $\hat{H} \subseteq H$ and $\hat{K} \subseteq K$ be non-maximal safe and unsafe sets of weights, with $\hat{H} = \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_H} H_i$ and $\hat{K} = \bigcup_{i=1}^{n_K} K_i$. Assume that $w \sim p(w|\mathcal{D})$. Then, it holds that*

$$P_{\text{safe}}^L := \sum_{i=1}^{n_H} P(H_i) \leq P_{\text{safe}}(T, S) \leq 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n_K} P(K_i) =: P_{\text{safe}}^U, \quad (8)$$

that is, P_{safe}^L and P_{safe}^U are lower and upper bounds on probabilistic robustness.

Through the use of Proposition 1, we can thus bound probabilistic robustness by performing computation over sets of safe and unsafe intervals.⁵ Before explaining in detail how such bounds can be explicitly computed, we first show, in the next section, how a similar derivation leads us to analogous bounds and computations for decision robustness.

4.2 Bounding Decision Robustness

The key difference between our formulation of probabilistic robustness and that of decision robustness is that, for the former, we are only interested in the behaviour of neural networks extracted from the BNN posterior that satisfy the robustness requirements (hence the distinction between H - and K -weight intervals), whereas to compute sound bounds on decision robustness we need to

⁵ In Appendix E.4. we extend the results to general hyper-rectangles by using the Bonferroni bound.

take into account the overall worst-case behaviour of an expected value computed for the BNN predictive distribution. As such, rather than computing safe and unsafe sets, we only need a family of weight sets, $\mathcal{J} = \{J_i\}_{i=1}^{n_J}$, which we can rely on for bounding $D_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$. In the following, we explicitly show how to do this for classification with likelihood σ . The bound for regression follows similarly by using the identity function as σ .

Proposition 2 (Bounding decision robustness). *Let $\mathcal{J} = \{J_i\}_{i=1}^{n_J}$, with $J_i \subset \mathbb{R}^{n_w}$, be a family of disjoint weight intervals. Let σ^L and σ^U be vectors that lower- and upper-bound the co-domain of the final activation function, and $c \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ an index spanning the BNN output dimension. Define:*

$$D_{\text{safe},c}^L := \sum_{i=1}^{n_J} P(J_i) \min_{\substack{x \in T \\ w \in J_i}} \sigma_c(f^w(x)) + \sigma^L \left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n_J} P(J_i) \right) \quad (9)$$

$$D_{\text{safe},c}^U := \sum_{i=1}^{n_J} P(J_i) \max_{\substack{x \in T \\ w \in J_i}} \sigma_c(f^w(x)) + \sigma^U \left(1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n_J} P(J_i) \right). \quad (10)$$

Consider $D_{\text{safe}}^L = [D_{\text{safe},1}^L, \dots, D_{\text{safe},m}^L]$ and $D_{\text{safe}}^U = [D_{\text{safe},1}^U, \dots, D_{\text{safe},m}^U]$, then:

$$D_{\text{safe}}^L \leq \mathbb{E}_{p(w|\mathcal{D})}[\sigma(f^w(x))] \leq D_{\text{safe}}^U \quad \forall x \in T,$$

that is, D_{safe}^L and D_{safe}^U bound the predictive posterior in T .

Intuitively, the first term in the bounds of Eqs. (9) (and similarly (10)) considers the worst-case output for the input set T and each interval J_i , while the second term accounts for the worst-case value of the posterior mass not captured by the family of intervals $\mathcal{J}$. The bound is valid for any family of intervals $\mathcal{J}$. Ideally, however, the partition should be finer around regions of high probability mass of the posterior distribution, as these make up the dominant term in the computation of the posterior predictive. We discuss in Sect. 5 how we select these intervals in practice so as to empirically obtain non-vacuous bounds.

4.3 Computation of the Lower and Upper Bounds

We now propose a unified approach to computing the lower and upper bounds. We observe that Eqs. (8), (9) and (10) require the integration of the posterior distribution over weight intervals. While this is in general intractable, we have built the bounds so that H_i , K_i and J_i are axis-aligned hyper-rectangles, and so the computation can be done exactly for commonly used approximate Bayesian inference methods (discussed in detail in Sect. 5.1).

For the explicit computation of decision robustness, the only missing ingredient is then the computation of the minimum and maximum of $\sigma(f^w(x))$ for $x \in T$ and $w \in J_i$. We do this by bounding the BNN output for any given rectangle, R , in the weight space. That is, we will compute upper and lower bounds

y^L and y^U such that:

$$y^L \leq \min_{\substack{x \in T \\ w \in R}} f^w(x) \quad y^U \geq \max_{\substack{x \in T \\ w \in R}} f^w(x), \quad (11)$$

which can then be used to bound $\sigma(f^w(x))$ by simple propagation over the softmax. The derivation of such bounds will be the subject of Sect. 5.2.

Finally, observe that, whereas for decision robustness we can simply select any weight interval J_i , for probabilistic robustness one needs to make a distinction between safe sets (H_i) and unsafe sets (K_i). It turns out that this can be done by bounding the output of the BNN in each of these intervals. For example, in the case of the safe sets, by definition we have that $\forall w \in H_i, \forall x' \in T$ it follows that $f^w(x') \in S$. By defining y^L and y^U as in Eq. (11), we can see that it suffices to check whether $[y^L, y^U] \subseteq S$. Hence, the computation of probabilistic robustness also depends on the computation of such bounds.

Therefore, once we have shown how to compute $P(R)$ for any weight interval and y^L and y^U , the bounds in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 can be computed explicitly, and we can thus bound probabilistic and decision robustness.

5 Explicit Bound Computation

In this section, we provide details of the computational schema needed to calculate the theoretical bounds presented in Sect. 4.

5.1 Integral Computation over Weight Intervals

Key to the bound computation is the ability to compute the integral of the posterior distribution over a combined set of weight intervals. Crucially, the shape of the weight sets $\mathcal{H} = \{H_i\}_{i=1}^{n_H}$, $\mathcal{K} = \{K_i\}_{i=1}^{n_K}$ and $\mathcal{J} = \{J_i\}_{i=1}^{n_J}$ is a parameter of the method, which can be leveraged to simplify the integral computation depending on the particular form of the approximate posterior distribution. We build each weight interval as an axis-aligned hyper-rectangle of the form $R = [w^L, w^U]$ for w^L and $w^U \in \mathbb{R}^{n_w}$.

Weight Intervals for Decision Robustness. In the case of decision robustness, it suffices to sample any weight interval J_i to compute the bounds we derived in Proposition 2. Clearly, the bound is tighter if the $\mathcal{J}$ family is finer around the area of high probability mass for $p(w|\mathcal{D})$. In order to obtain such a family we proceed as follows. First, we define a *weight margin* $\gamma > 0$, whose role is to parameterise the radius of the weight intervals. We then iteratively sample weight vectors w_i from $p(w|\mathcal{D})$, for $i = 1, \dots, n_J$, and define $J_i = [w_i^L, w_i^U] = [w_i - \gamma, w_i + \gamma]$. Thus defined weight intervals naturally concentrate around the area of greater density for $p(w|\mathcal{D})$, while asymptotically covering the whole support of the distribution.

Weight Intervals for Probabilistic Robustness. On the other hand, for the computation of probabilistic robustness one has to make a distinction between safe and unsafe weight intervals, H_i and K_i . As explained in Sect. 4.3, this can be done by bounding the output of the BNN in each of these intervals. For example, in the case of the safe sets, by definition, H_i is safe if and only if $\forall w \in H_i, \forall x' \in T$ we have that $f^w(x') \in S$. Thus, in order to build a family of safe (respectively unsafe) weight intervals H_i (resp. K_i), we proceed as follows. As for decision robustness, we iteratively sample weights w_i from the posterior used to build hyper-rectangles of the form $R_i = [w_i - \gamma, w_i + \gamma]$. We then propagate R_i through the BNN and check whether the output is (resp. is not) a subset of S . The derivation of such bounds on propagation will be the subject of Sect. 5.2.

Once the family of weights is computed, it remains to compute the cumulative distribution over such sets. The specific computations depend on the particular form of Bayesian approximate inference that is employed. We discuss explicitly the case of Gaussian variational approaches, and of sample-based posterior approximation (e.g., HMC).

Variational Inference. For variational approximations, $p(w|\mathcal{D})$ takes the form of a multi-variate Gaussian distribution over the weight space. The resulting computations reduce to the integral of a multi-variate Gaussian distribution over a finite-sized axis-aligned rectangle, which can be computed using standard methods from statistics [14]. In particular, under the common assumption of variational inference with a Gaussian distribution with diagonal covariance matrix [28], i.e., $p(w|\mathcal{D}) = \mathcal{N}(\mu, \Sigma)$, with $\Sigma = \text{diag}(\Sigma_1, \dots, \Sigma_{n_w})$, we obtain the following result for the posterior integration:

$$P(R) = \int_R p(w|\mathcal{D}) dw = \prod_{j=1}^{n_w} \frac{1}{2} \left(\text{erf} \left(\frac{\mu_j - w_j^L}{\sqrt{2\Sigma_j}} \right) - \text{erf} \left(\frac{\mu_j - w_j^u}{\sqrt{2\Sigma_j}} \right) \right). \quad (12)$$

By plugging this into the bound equations for probabilistic robustness and for decision robustness, one obtains a closed-form formula for the bounds given weight set interval families $\mathcal{H}$, $\mathcal{K}$ and $\mathcal{J}$.

Sample-Based Approximations. In the case of sample-based posterior approximation (e.g., HMC), we have that $p(w|\mathcal{D})$ defines a distribution over a finite set of weights. In this case we can simplify the computations by selecting the weight margin $\gamma = 0$, so that each sampled interval is of the form $R = [w_i, w_i]$ and its probability under the discrete posterior will trivially be:

$$P(R_i) = p(w_i|\mathcal{D}). \quad (13)$$

5.2 Bounding Bayesian Neural Network Output

Given an input set, T , and a weight interval, $R = [w^L, w^U]$, the second key step in computing probabilistic and decision robustness is the bounding of the output

of the BNN over R given T . That is, we need to derive methods to compute $[y^L, y^U]$ such that $\forall w \in [w^L, w^U], \forall x' \in T$ it follows that $f^w(x') \in [y^L, y^U]$.

In this section, we consider Interval Bound Propagation (IBP) as a method for computing the desired output set over-approximations, and defer the discussion of Linear Bound Propagation (LBP) to Appendix C. Before discussing IBP in more detail, we first introduce common notation for the rest of the section. We consider feed-forward neural networks of the form:

$$z^{(0)} = x, \quad \zeta_i^{(k+1)} = \sum_{j=1}^{n_k} W_{ij}^{(k)} z_j^{(k)} + b_i^{(k)}, \quad z_i^{(k)} = \sigma(\zeta_i^{(k)}) \quad (14)$$

for $k = 1, \dots, K$ and $i = 0, \dots, n_k$, where K is the number of hidden layers, $\sigma(\cdot)$ is a pointwise activation function, $W^{(k)} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_k \times n_{k-1}}$ and $b^{(k)} \in \mathbb{R}^{n_k}$ are the matrix of weights and vector of biases that correspond to the k th layer of the network, and n_k is the number of neurons in the k th hidden layer. Note that, while Eq. (14) is written explicitly for fully-connected layers, convolutional layers can be accounted for by embedding them in fully-connected form [59].

We write $W_{i:}^{(k)}$ for the vector comprising the elements from the i th row of $W^{(k)}$, and similarly $W_{:j}^{(k)}$ for that comprising the elements from the j th column. $\zeta^{(K+1)}$ represents the final output of the network (or the logit in the case of classification networks), that is, $\zeta^{(K+1)} = f^w(x)$. We write $W^{(k),L}$ and $W^{(k),U}$ for the lower and upper bound induced by R for $W^{(k)}$, and $b^{(k),L}$ and $b^{(k),U}$ for the bounds of $b^{(k)}$, for $k = 0, \dots, K$. Observe that $z^{(0)}$, $\zeta_i^{(k+1)}$ and $z_i^{(k)}$ are all functions of the input point x and of the combined vector of weights $w = [W^{(0)}, b^{(0)}, \dots, W^{(K)}, b^{(K)}]$. We omit the explicit dependency for simplicity of notation. Finally, we remark that, as both the weights and the input vary in a given set, the middle expression of Eq. (14) defines a quadratic form.

Interval Bound Propagation (IBP). IBP has already been employed for fast certification of deterministic neural networks [23]. The only adjustment needed in our setting is that, at each layer, we also need to propagate the interval of the weight matrix $[W^{(k),L}, W^{(k),U}]$ and that of the bias vector $[b^{(k),L}, b^{(k),U}]$. This can be done by noticing that the minimum and maximum of each term of the bi-linear form of Eq. (14), that is, of each monomial $W_{ij}^{(k)} z_j^{(k)}$, lies in one of the four corners of the interval $[W_{ij}^{(k),L}, W_{ij}^{(k),U}] \times [z_j^{(k),L}, z_j^{(k),U}]$, and by adding the minimum and maximum values respectively attained by $b_i^{(k)}$. As in the deterministic case, interval propagation through the activation function proceeds by observing that generally employed activation functions are monotonic. This is summarised in the following proposition.

Proposition 3. *Let $f^w(x)$ be the network defined by Eq. (14), let for $k = 0, \dots, K$:*

$$t_{ij}^{(k),L} = \min\{W_{ij}^{(k),L} z_j^{(k),L}, W_{ij}^{(k),U} z_j^{(k),L}, W_{ij}^{(k),L} z_j^{(k),U}, W_{ij}^{(k),U} z_j^{(k),U}\} \quad (15)$$

$$t_{ij}^{(k),U} = \max\{W_{ij}^{(k),L} z_j^{(k),L}, W_{ij}^{(k),U} z_j^{(k),L}, W_{ij}^{(k),L} z_j^{(k),U}, W_{ij}^{(k),U} z_j^{(k),U}\} \quad (16)$$

where $i = 1, \dots, n_{k+1}$, $j = 1, \dots, n_k$, $z^{(k),L} = \sigma(\zeta^{(k),L})$, $z^{(k),U} = \sigma(\zeta^{(k),U})$ and

$$\zeta^{(k+1),L} = \sum_j t_{:,j}^{(k),L} + b^{(k),L}, \quad \zeta^{(k+1),U} = \sum_j t_{:,j}^{(k),U} + b^{(k),U}. \quad (17)$$

Then we have that $\forall x \in T$ and $\forall w \in R$: $f^w(x) = \zeta^{(K+1)} \in [\zeta^{(K+1),L}, \zeta^{(K+1),U}]$.

The minima and maxima in Proposition 3 are the tightest possible bounds one can compute on matrix multiplication. A more efficient scheme for this propagation is detailed in [46], which can be seen as an adaptation of [37] to NN operations. Additionally, our approach can be linked to abstract interpretation with simultaneous abstract sets (in our case from the orthotope domain) over inputs and weights [20]. Regardless, [34] shows that both have an over-approximation factor of 1.5. Similar bound formulations have been employed across the deterministic NN certification literature [18, 39, 47, 53]. In Appendix C, we employ linear bounds on Eq. 17, which can tighten the bounds computed by our method as shown initially in [50]. In [1] dynamic programming is used to tighten these bounds further, and in [39], outside the context of BNNs, an extension of CROWN is developed for the same problem. We emphasise that, regardless of the propagation or tightening employed, each of these approaches can be seen as an instantiation of the framework provided in this work.

Algorithm 1. Lower Bounds for BNN Probabilistic Robustness

Input: T – Input Region, f^w – Bayesian Neural Network, $p(w|\mathcal{D})$ – Posterior Distribution with variance Σ , N – Number of Samples, γ – Weight margin.

Output: A sound lower bound on $P_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$.

```

1:  $\mathcal{H} \leftarrow \emptyset$  #  $\mathcal{H}$  is a set of known safe weight intervals
2:  $v \leftarrow \gamma \cdot I \cdot \Sigma$  # Elementwise product to obtain width of weight margin
3: for  $i \leftarrow 0$  to  $N$  do
4:    $w^{(i)} \sim p(w|\mathcal{D})$ 
5:   # Assume weight intervals are built to be disjoint
6:    $[w^{(i),L}, w^{(i),U}] \leftarrow [w_i - v, w_i + v]$ 
7:   # Interval/Linear Bound Propagation, Section 5.2
8:    $y^L, y^U \leftarrow \text{Propagate}(f, T, [w^{(i),L}, w^{(i),U}])$ 
9:   if  $[y^L, y^U] \subset S$  then
10:     $\mathcal{H} \leftarrow \mathcal{H} \cup \{[w^{(i),L}, w^{(i),U}]\}$ 
11:   end if
12: end for
13:  $P_{\text{safe}}^L \leftarrow 0.0$ 
14: for  $[w^{(i),L}, w^{(i),U}] \in \mathcal{H}$  do
15:    $P_{\text{safe}}^L = P_{\text{safe}}^L + P([w^{(i),L}, w^{(i),U}])$  # Compute safe weight probs, Section 5.1
16: end for
17: return  $P_{\text{safe}}^L$ 

```

6 Complete Bounding Algorithm

In this section, we assemble complete algorithms for the computation of bounds on $P_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$ and $D_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$ based on the results discussed so far, leaving the detailed algorithms to Appendix D. Appendix A discusses further use cases for the bounds. The computational complexity of the algorithm is discussed in Appendix F.

6.1 Lower-Bounding Algorithm

We provide a step-by-step outline for how to compute lower bounds on $P_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$ in Algorithm 1. We start (line 1) by initialising the family of safe weight sets $\mathcal{H}$ to be the empty set and by scaling the weight margin with the posterior weight scale (line 2). We then iteratively (line 3) proceed by sampling weights from the posterior distribution (line 4), building candidate weight boxes (line 6), and propagating the input and weight box through the BNN (line 8). We next check whether the propagated output set is inside the safe output region S , and, if so, update the family of weights $\mathcal{H}$ to include the weight box currently under consideration (lines 9 and 10). Finally, we rely on the results in Sect. 5.1 to compute the overall probabilities over all the weight sets in $\mathcal{H}$, yielding a valid lower bound for $P_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$. For clarity of presentation, we assume that all the weight boxes that we sample in lines 4–6 are pairwise disjoint, as this simplifies the probability computation. The general case with overlapping weight boxes relies on the Bonferroni bound and is given in Appendix E.4.

The algorithm for the computation of a lower bound on $D_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$ (listed in the Appendix E as Algorithm 2) proceeds in an analogous way, but without the need to perform the check in line 9, and by adjusting line 15 to the formula from Proposition 2.

6.2 Upper-Bounding Algorithm

Upper-bounding $P_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$ and $D_{\text{safe}}(T, S)$ follows the same computational flow as Algorithm 1. The algorithms for the computation of upper bounds on probabilistic and decision robustness are listed respectively as Algorithm 3 and 4 in Appendix E. We again proceed by sampling a rectangle around the weights, propagate bounds through the NN, and compute the probabilities of weight intervals. The key change to the algorithm to allow upper bound computation involves computing the best case, rather than the worst case, for y for decision robustness (line 12 in Algorithm 3) and ensuring that the entire interval $[y^L, y^U] \notin S$ (line 18) for probabilistic robustness.

7 Experiments

In this section we experimentally validate our framework on a variety of tasks, including airborne collision avoidance, medical imaging, and autonomous driving applications. We mainly focus on verifying the adversarial robustness and




Fig. 2. Top Row: Lower bounds on P_{safe} . **Bottom Row:** Lower bounds on D_{safe} . **Left Two Columns:** Bound values for VI-inferred BNN averaged over 1000 test-set examples using various likelihoods, number of samples, and weight-margin values. **Right Two Columns:** Bound values for HMC-inferred BNN averaged over 1000 test-set examples using various likelihoods, number of samples, and values of ϵ .

uncertainty of classification problems that use the 0–1 loss. For a discussion of how our framework applies to a wider class of specifications see Appendix A, and Appendix B for an extension to other decision rules. In each case study, we take the input set to be the interval $T_\epsilon(x) := [x - \epsilon, x + \epsilon]$, where $\epsilon \geq 0$ is a parameter that we vary in our experiments. For all experiments, S is the set of all vectors where the true class is returned. Experiments are run on a server equipped with 2x AMD EPYC 9334 CPUs and 2x NVIDIA L40 GPUs. Details on training hyper-parameters can be found in Appendix G.

7.1 Airborne Collision Avoidance

We start with the airborne collision avoidance benchmark, which is commonly used to evaluate the robustness of neural network controllers in a safety-critical scenario [25, 26]. In particular, we consider the horizontal collision avoidance scenario (HCAS) from [25], and work with a single hidden layer neural network with 125 hidden neurons trained both using Variational Online Gauss Newton (VOGN) [28] and Hamiltonian Monte Carlo (HMC) [33]. We infer posteriors using both the standard likelihood and the robust likelihood proposed in [49]. In Fig. 2 we study the guarantees that our method is able to provide for each combination of the inference method and likelihood. We plot the lower bound on P_{safe} and D_{safe} resulting from Algorithm 1 averaged over 1000 test-set samples. In

each plot we show the effect of varying the critical parameters of our algorithm, including the number of samples and, for VOGN, the width of the weight margin γ , as defined in Sect. 5. As expected, in all cases, we find that taking more samples and using a higher weight margin consistently yields a higher lower bound. HMC requires significantly more samples to cover the probability mass as there is no margin parameter when certifying probability mass functions, i.e., probability distributions with discrete support. Thus, each sample covers a fixed, small amount of mass, while even one sample from the VOGN posterior, with a suitable weight margin, is able to give non-trivial lower bounds, e.g., 0.8 in the case of a P_{safe} lower bound for the robust likelihood BNN in Fig. 2. The fact that higher ϵ values lead to smaller values of the lower bound is also expected, as larger ϵ implies a greater radius for the initial set T .




Fig. 3. Top Row: Computed lower bound values on P_{safe} for robust-likelihood VOGN posterior (right) and standard VOGN posterior (left). **Bottom Row:** Computed lower bound P_{safe} values for the VOGN posterior while varying depth and width parameters of the BNN architecture.

7.2 Image Classification

We now turn our attention to image classification, considering first the widely used MNIST benchmark with 28 by 28 pixel grey-scale images [30] and then two safety-critical tasks from medical image classification and autonomous driving.




Fig. 4. Left: Different training image resolutions on a training image sample from PneumoniaMNIST. **Right:** Our computed lower bounds on D_{safe} , which correspond to adversarial robustness certificates as we vary the resolution fed into a VOGN-inferred BNN.

MNIST Digit Recognition. In Fig. 3, we present two plots certifying (via lower bounds on P_{safe}) a single hidden layer neural network with 100 hidden neurons with parameters inferred using VOGN [28], BayesByBackprop [10] and NoisyAdam [58], using both robust and standard likelihoods as for the airborne collision avoidance case study. In the top row of Fig. 3, we plot the computed lower bounds as we increase the value of ϵ . For the posterior inferred by each inference method using the standard likelihood, we observe that our method is only able to certify low values of P_{safe} , even for small values of ϵ , e.g., 0.001. However, for the robust likelihood posteriors, we are able to certify non-trivial robustness guarantees even at $\epsilon = 0.1$. Additionally, we observe that Bayes-ByBackprop [10] has consistently lower certified values of P_{safe} . We hypothesize that this is due to BayesByBackprop having a higher variance posterior, which in turn results in the propagation of wider weight intervals that can introduce significant approximation.

In the bottom half of Fig. 3, we study how our lower bounds on P_{safe} change as we increase the depth and width of the neural network architecture. For this study we exclusively employ VOGN, but, as previously, still utilise the standard (left) and robust (right) likelihoods. We find that, for the standard likelihood, we are able to obtain high lower bounds (greater than 0.7) for all one-layer networks regardless of width, but struggle with increasing depths. For the

posteriors inferred using the robust likelihood, we observe that the lower bounds produced by our approach only begin to decrease when the depth reaches three layers with significant width. We additionally highlight that, for the posteriors inferred using the robust likelihood, we use a much larger ϵ ($=0.03$) compared to what is used to get non-trivial bounds in the standard training case ($\epsilon = 0.001$).




Fig. 5. Computing upper bounds on D_{safe} to certify robust uncertainty estimates from posteriors inferred on PneumoniaMNIST. **Left:** Uncertainty certificates for PneumoniaMNIST posterior on MNIST dataset. **Right:** Uncertainty certificates for PneumoniaMNIST posterior on FashionMNIST dataset.

Medical Image Classification. We now turn our attention to a more realistic safety-critical application from the medical image classification domain. In particular, we study the PneumoniaMNIST dataset from the MedMNIST suite of benchmarks [56]. PneumoniaMNIST is a dataset of greyscale images of chest X-rays that pose a binary classification problem, with one class representing normal chest X-rays and the other class presenting with pneumonia. In the most recent iteration of the MedMNIST benchmark, an option for different resolutions is provided ranging from 28 by 28, the same resolution as MNIST, up to 224 by 224, the same resolution as the popular, large-scale ImageNet dataset [17]. In the left-hand-side plot of Fig. 4, we visualize the significant differences between these input dimensionalities. We use these datasets to study how well our certification approaches scale with increasing input dimensionality. We work with a four-layer convolutional architecture with two 2D convolution layers, an average pooling layer, and a final fully-connected layer consisting of 50 neurons. For each network studied in this section, we use the robust likelihood of [49] in order to obtain non-trivial certifications. Additionally, we turn our attention to bounding decision robustness, D_{safe} , rather than probabilistic robustness, P_{safe} , employed for MNIST evaluation. Decision robustness is more appropriate here due to the safety-critical nature of pneumonia classification, compared to handwritten digit classification. In particular, we begin by computing lower bounds

on D_{safe} , which in turn allows us to compute adversarial robustness certificates commensurate with those computed for deterministic neural networks. We find (see the right-hand-side plot of Fig. 4) that an increase in resolution corresponds to a significant decrease in the lower bounds computed by our approach, which is a result of greater approximation introduced by bound propagation techniques. Nevertheless, on images with 128 by 128 resolution, our guarantees continue to provide non-trivial bounds.

In addition to computing lower bounds on D_{safe} to certify the adversarial robustness of our trained posteriors, we also compute upper bounds on D_{safe} to provide certificates that our posterior is provably, robustly uncertain on given out-of-distribution inputs. To study this, we use the MNIST dataset as well as the FashionMNIST dataset (consisting of greyscale, 28 by 28, images of clothing items) as out-of-distribution examples for pneumonia classification. We then consider an example *uncertain* if the maximum value of the posterior predictive distribution is less than 0.8 (an arbitrary, user-definable threshold, which may require calibration to the specific setting). In Fig. 5 we plot the proportion of test-set inputs for which the inferred posterior is robustly uncertain on MNIST (left plot) and FashionMNIST (right plot). For very small values of ϵ , we notice that the network is much more robustly uncertain on MNIST examples than on FashionMNIST examples. Further, we find that, similarly to robustness certification, we are unable to certify any non-trivial uncertainty properties for images with 224 by 224 resolution.




Fig. 6. Analysis of BNN inferred on GTSRB dataset. **Left:** Example in-distribution image (top left) and out-of-distribution images. **Right:** Adversarial robustness certificates (red) and uncertainty certificates (shades of green) using lower and upper bounds on D_{safe} respectively for different levels of ϵ . (Color figure online)

Traffic Sign Recognition Classification. Our final safety-critical case study comes from autonomous navigation using the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) [40]. In particular, we study a three-class subset of the

GTSRB dataset with a three-layer CNN model with parameters inferred using the robust likelihood and VOGN. In Fig. 6 we plot an example of the 50 km/h sign (an in-distribution image) and different examples from three different out-of-distribution datasets: United States Traffic Signs, Nonsense Traffic Signs, and random noise. The first two are small sets of images curated from royalty free image databases online and the third is sampled from a unit normal distribution. Using each of these datasets, we study both adversarial robustness (ensuring a sufficiently high D_{safe} lower bound) and uncertainty properties (ensuring sufficiently low D_{safe} upper bound) of the trained network that achieves 96% test-set accuracy. In the right-hand-side plot of Fig. 6 (in red), we show that our method is able to compute non-trivial adversarial robustness guarantees up to $\epsilon = 0.001$. In various shades of green, we show that the uncertainty guarantees we compute are also non-trivial for similar values of ϵ .

8 Conclusion

In this work, we introduced a computational framework for evaluating robustness properties of BNNs operating under adversarial settings. In particular, we have discussed how probabilistic robustness and decision robustness can be upper- and lower-bounded via a combination of posterior sampling, integral computation over boxes and bound propagation techniques. We have detailed how to compute these properties for the case of HMC and VI posterior approximation, and how to instantiate the bounds for interval and linear bound propagation techniques. We emphasise that the framework presented is general and can be adapted to different inference techniques, and to most of the verification techniques employed for deterministic neural networks. The main limitation of the approach presented here arises directly from the Bayesian nature of the underlying model, i.e., the need to bound and partition at the weight space level (which is not needed for deterministic neural networks, with the weight fixed to a specific value). Nevertheless, the methods presented here provide the first general-purpose, formal technique for the verification of probabilistic and decision robustness, as well as uncertainty quantification, in Bayesian neural networks, systematically evaluated on a range of tasks and network architectures. We hope this can serve as a sound basis for future practical applications in safety-critical scenarios.

Acknowledgments. This project received funding from the ERC under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (FUN2MODEL, grant agreement No. 834115). MK further acknowledges funding from ELSA: European Lighthouse on Secure and Safe AI project (grant agreement No. 101070617 under UK guarantee). Preliminary work on this paper was done while Matthew Wicker, Andrea Patane and Luca Laurenti were at the University of Oxford funded by FUN2MODEL.

Disclosure of Interests. The authors have no competing interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this article.

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