

# 'A New City in the Port'

*An actor-centered institutional analysis of the strategic governance and planning process around Amsterdam Haven-Stad*



MSc thesis Filip Pliakis

Architecture, Urbanism and Building Sciences

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# 1 Preface

*In the evening of 21 December 2017, loud applause sounds from the council room in Amsterdam. The alderman for Spatial Planning laughingly walks towards the microphone and says: "In just a few minutes, we have approved 86.000 dwellings!" Just in time for the Christmas drinks. And the elections.*

*The next morning, in the office of the Port Authority, the phone lines are lighting up: Port companies call to request for plots further west in the port. Further away from the city.*

*This is the start of the story of the strategic transformation of Haven-Stad.*

This thesis is the result of a 1 year in-depth case study of the governance process of Amsterdam Haven-Stad and part of the graduation process from the Master of Architecture, Urbanism and Building Sciences.

The structure of the report is as follows: the first part will introduce the problem and subject that will be investigated, completed with a research design and methodology. The second part will explore existing literature about the subject and propose an analytical framework to analyse the case. The third part presents the empirical data of the case study, after which conclusions about the case are drawn and recommendations are formulated. These findings will be discussed in relation to existing literature and their broader meaning for urban planning research. The thesis will conclude with a reflection on the process.

I would like to thank Tom Daamen and Erik Louw for their role as mentors. Their personal feedback as well as their research proved to be a great source of information for this thesis. Secondly, I would like to thank ORAM and Jurriaan van den Eijkhof for the opportunity to study the development of Haven-Stad on the top floor of the Port Authority office, with a symbolic panoramic view over both port and city. The often lively conversations while discussing various events in the plan making process proved to be a great source of motivation.

Also I would like to thank Mariette Overschie for her feedback and tips for the proper presentation of the data, and Karel Van den Berghe for all informal but valuable talks and personal advice. Finally, I want to thank all my friends and colleagues from 'BK' and study associations Stylos and BOSS for making my student time so much more than just earning a degree, and especially Bente for her personal participation in my graduation process.

Enjoy reading!

Filip Pliakis  
Delft, 14 April 2019



## 2 Summary

### 1. Introduction and problem statement

Currently, due to compact city policies and an increasing market pressure in Dutch cities, urban policy makers are looking for ways to intensify land use in cities. In the Netherlands, brownfields and areas with light industry are targeted to transform to sustainable and mixed urban environments. However, such transformations are a challenge.

Urban planners around the world are also redeveloping former port areas towards new waterfronts for the benefit of the competitiveness of their cities. However, successfully delivering waterfront redevelopment projects is no easy task and often lacks sustainable outcomes.

When the development strategy for Haven-Stad was presented, it led to a public conflict between the city and port companies. This leaves us with the question whether contemporary governance of the port-city interface actually shows signs of institutional, economic and physical reconnection, or can be distinguished as 'blunt' traditional urban development.

### 2. Research design and questions

To analyse the conflict between port and city, the following research question is formulated: How can we understand the reason of conflict between port and city in the strategic transformation of Amsterdam Haven-Stad and what can we learn from that to achieve integrated planning in the port-city interface?

The question will be answered with three sub-questions:

- 1: How can we understand spatial planning in the port-city interface?
- 2: What do we see in practice in the strategic transformation of Amsterdam Haven-Stad?
- 3: What is the reason of conflict and what can we learn from that?

### 3. Literature review

Urban development management is about transforming land for the good of society, economy and environment. It is concerned with designing strategic spatial interventions to achieve certain public and private goals. Port development is concerned with the systematic exploitation of port lands and infrastructure. Institutions have been established to govern the relation between port and city. By analysing spatial projects in the port-city interface as stated outcomes of governance processes, we can understand the forces at work.

In this decision making process, actors interact with institutions. These institutions shape actors' orientations and their capacities. By analysing the plan making process and policy formalization process, we can determine which interests are integrated in plan making and which are not. This integration is evaluated to the extent of the most important stakeholders in port-city governance along the lines of the integration of scales, sectors and agencies (Table 1). The process reconstruction will define key moments in policy implementation to see how, why and when certain policy was adopted through the policy window theory.

	1. Scale	2. Sectors	3. Agencies
<b>Definition</b>	Integration of (supra-)national, regional and local spatial policies	Integration of work of departments	Integration of public, private and non-profit organizations
<b>In port-city context</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Municipal</li> <li>• Metropolitan</li> <li>• Provincial</li> <li>• National</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spatial Planning Dept.</li> <li>• Economic Affairs</li> <li>• Mobility &amp; Transport</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Port Authority</li> <li>• Port companies</li> <li>• Entrepreneurial associations</li> <li>• Real estate investors/ developers</li> </ul>

Table 1: Summarized aspects of integrated development in the port-city context (own illustration, based on Adams & Tiesdell (2013); ECE (1997))

#### 4. Analytical framework

The proposed analytical framework for understanding spatial development between port and city and their relationship is visible in Figure 1. The analytical framework is based on the idea that there are several episodes of discussion with a certain outcome. The policy is formalized when a policy window opens. Actors in this process have certain orientations and a bounded rationality while striving to achieve goals in their interest. These are not always rational. After each episode of policy making, we will

measure the integration of scales, sectors and agencies in the revealed outcome (the plan) to understand whether the governance process enabled or prevented integration between port and city. The institutional setting defines the norms, rules and structures that actors have to play with. The interrelatedness of the concepts is presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Analytical framework for process reconstruction



## **5. Case study: Haven-Stad**

A document and media analysis revealed four governance outcomes where policy for Haven-Stad was formalized. These formed the basis for describing the governance process leading up to them.

### **Episode 1 (1985-2006): Rediscovering the waterfront**

In the first episode of waterfront regeneration (1985-2006), the process can be characterized by top-down plan making and formal-judicial negotiation between port and city. Integration of scales is present due to the Regional Plan of the Province, which also coordinated spatial plans between the municipality and the National Government at the time. However, due to experiments with giving Amsterdam more control to govern its 'metropolitan challenges', consistency between scales diverged on some crucial points. These inconsistencies in the end prevent urban development in the port (Houthavens) in legal battles. Also, environmental regulation separates port and city. After mediation, a Covenant between municipality, Province and port companies is created to stop legal battles, give certainty to port companies and continue with development of the Houthaven and Sloterdijk. Urban takeover in the Coenhaven is blocked definitively after intervention of the Province, removing the option from the Regional Plan.

### **Episode 2 (2006-2011): Structure Vision 2040**

The change of political power leads to a new study towards the transformation of the Coenhaven. Plan making is integrated: Spatial Planning and Port Authority are jointly investigating the desirability of transformation of all port lands within the Ring A10. This research is used as input for the Structure Vision 2040. While the research showed that transformation would be too costly, politicians either way included it in the Structure Vision because they prefer urban takeover anyway. Additionally, an Olympic Stadium was proposed in the Coenhaven to speed up development. After severe protests from the port, the stadium was moved just outside the area of the Covenant agreement. This phase is characterised by integrated plan making, but with conflict due to political decisions.

### **Episode 3 (2011-2013): Proposed strategies**

Research for transformation continues. The aim is to develop a strategy that would be most effective in transforming port lands. With new environmental regulations in hand, urban planners and port representatives try to establish a strategy with the most effective urban takeover at the lowest cost. Port companies are interviewed and experts are heard. The conclusion is to start a slow and phased the development. While port companies requested certainty for investments, the decision to transform the Coenhaven is postponed to 2025. Also, the plan creates inconsistency with port investments and port growth projections. The plan-making here is integrated, but the political decision, again, creates conflict.

### **Episode 4 (2015-2017): Development Strategy**

The last episode (2015-2017) is the creation of the Development Strategy. Politicians are eagerly looking for housing development, and urban planners have found a way to increase the development volume of Haven-Stad due to the mix of housing and industry. This is possible due to new environmental legislation. While port companies were promised that they can stay until 2040, their environmental zones will be reduced before that time. Plan makers did not inform port companies about the plan, nor did they consult market parties. The strategy was rushed through the

council due to elections. The plan is designed to strongly integrate sectors within the municipality, but it creates conflict with the region and port companies.

## 6. Conclusion

While a clear policy window was identified during the last episode, the study shows that most plan making and formalization of plan making happened without a clear problem stream. It was mainly strategic coupling and coordination between professionals and key politicians that slowly paved the way for future implementation of the Haven-Stad development strategy. While this has proven to be an effective political strategy, it disintegrated the plans for Haven-Stad and reduced the chances for its successful development. The exclusion of port interests in the plan (making) led to conflict. On the other hand, market parties were excluded.

Next to that, several conflicts between port and city were created because the interests of the port were deliberately not integrated in plans in order to promote urban takeover. This was possible due to the several institutions at work. If we want to promote integrated plan making in the port-city interface, we should look at improving these institutions. These new institutions should restore the balance between port and city in strategic port-city planning. Not for the benefit of the port alone, but mainly to increase changes for sustainable and successful urban development. The following institutions proved to be most decisive in the process in hampering integrated development:

- **Socio-cultural**

Within the municipality, there is a culture of strategic top-down planning focused on housing development. Policy makers anticipate ongoing port migration, making their policies self-fulfilling. Society and politicians believe that port lands should not be exploited at the benefit of private, fossil based multinationals and the notion that the water (IJ) is urban territory.

- **Legal-economic**

The process of decentralization of spatial planning caused conflict with the region. Relaxed environmental regulations promote the introduction of housing near port facilities, which is used as pressure tool. The port has no strategic influence over its lands anymore and the municipality controls the right to restrict port company growth through the leasehold system.

- **Governance**

The Port Authority has lost its leading role in the project team of Haven-Stad after corporatization. The plan making process does not allow for participation and leaves third parties unsatisfied. The governance of plan-making is used to pressure companies instead of integrating them. Strong influence by the Aldermen through administrative assignments and agenda setting to formalize visions and ambitions.

It was unexpected how politicians in favour of transformation often acted **strategic**, deliberately making plans and carrying out research to weaken the position of the port. The effect of unintegrated plan making is observable in practice, with speculation weakening the position of port companies.

## 7. Discussion

The application of policy theory to urban development projects was only partially effective. The main reason is that a lot of the plan making is tightly embedded between experts (urban planners) and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen. The policy is not black-and-white, neither is the moment where it is implemented per se. Practice shows that a lot of smaller steps and decisions are made prior to 'real' policy implementation. The policy window theory was helpful in the final part of the analysis, where politicians and urban planners pushed the development strategy through council during a housing crisis. However, the research shows that important decisions had been made before, also in times where 'problems' were lacking. Strategic urban planning responds more to mega trends (urbanization, sustainability) and strategic behaviour of politicians.

Next to that, the measurement of 'integrated planning' by looking at the characteristics of revealed outcomes of planning episodes, proved to be sometimes difficult. Outcomes are documents like studies, visions and strategies, but these are always prone to political formulation and framing. While seemingly the process and plans can be integrated, these documents sometimes conflict with their real reason of existence. To understand the bigger picture, in depth interviews with key policy entrepreneurs is essential. During the research, different definitions of 'integrated development' were given by various stakeholders.

The development process resembles to what we know from literature about port-city development. However, it does not show signs of reconnection. Haven-Stad can be better described as an urban transformation project, than a waterfront redevelopment. The existence of port companies is something that has to be *overcome* instead of having to integrate in the process.

This was possible due to a few institutions we have seen in literature as well, as sustainability measures and the anticipation of ongoing port migration. Due to its profile and the identical challenges other European port-cities have to cope with (service based economy, housing demand, energy transition) the findings may be generalizable on an abstract level. The lessons mostly would apply to ports with a reliance on fossil fuels, since the space claim of these industry is likely to be challenged or at least questioned. Lessons would also apply for state owned but corporatized Port Authorities (certainly with one single shareholder). Amsterdam is unique due to the fact that strategic land use decisions have also been transferred to the municipality during corporatization, in addition to the leasehold system and a specific long history of government-led spatial planning.

For Dutch planning this case study shows the influence a strategic 'tandem' of Alderman and public servants can have. This becomes increasingly important after the introduction of the Crisis and Recovery Act and the upcoming Environment and Planning Act. The new Environment and Planning Act heavily promotes participation as a way to integrate stakeholder interests upfront. However, with no legal conditions to how that should take place, the first phases of plan-making remain vulnerable for strategic municipal actors.

In terms of reliability, we have to take into account that the process took already 20 years. Actors memories may therefore be selective. Especially 'bold statements' of actors from long time ago had to be triangulated with data in documents. This was possible due to the municipal archives.

Further research could go into a narrative analysis in waterfront redevelopment projects, the effects on relative economic competitiveness of industry when mixed with housing, a comparative case study between the institutional arrangements of Schiphol and the Port of Amsterdam and an evaluation of

the effect of the Crisis and Recovery Act and the upcoming Environment and Planning Act on the behaviour of municipal policy makers.

## 8. Recommendations

The recommendations are defined to resemble current institutions to make them more adoptable. Mostly, urban actors have to become aware of their increased power and the risks of integrating interests. This is already visible in the Java bridge for example. These events can be used to promote new institutional arrangements. Namely:

- **Develop a joint port-urban vision in relation to Haven-Stad**  
To realign growth perspectives and spatial implications of the energy transition and circular economy.
- **Make the Port Authority part of the project (team) or co-leader**  
This has proved to work in the past. Real reconnection through a restored power position in the Haven-Stad project team. Financial incentives for port cooperation, like combined investments with housing development. Also, supra-national effects of transformation (on international arrangements and trade) can in this way be effectively incorporated.
- **Carry out a societal cost-benefit analysis (MKBA)**  
Socio-economic effects are currently unknown, and the damage on port growth and jobs is not accounted for.
- **Enhance regional support, coordination and cooperation**  
An institutional framework for regional cooperation is missing after the diminishing role of the Province. Current platforms, like the MRA, Plabeka and North Sea Canal Zone can be a first step.
- **Rebuild trust by respecting agreements**  
The municipality has broken various agreements. While this is legally perhaps not true, it is true for the intention by which the agreements were made. The municipality has given mixed promises. Give certainty by taking a step back until a feasible strategy is available.
- **Create a transparent and accountable decision making process**  
The current plan making process is based on a lot of strategic behaviour. Politicians have announced a €30 billion real estate development on vital port lands after 3 hours of (mediocre) debate. Our institutions currently do not provide a proper check and balance to legally object to this: the impact of unaccountable plan-making is too big.
- **Participation of (port) companies**  
Currently port companies have not even been informed yet. Setup a participation process with all affected port companies.
- **Experiment with 'the productive city' first**  
The entire premise of Haven-Stad is based on the mix of housing with light industry, otherwise the plan is not possible. However, there is no proof of concept yet. Experiment

with this physical form first and monitor experiences of entrepreneurs.

- **Open up to private initiatives**

Use the creativity and knowledge of private actors to your advantage. The current research to new financing forms for Haven-Stad is a first, but important step.

- **Reconsideration of (national) legal framework**

Local planning institutions have become powerful through decentralization and environmental planning, and they show they use this power to maximum extend instead of the tailored solutions they are designed for.

## **9. Reflection**

Urban development management is about creating durable and sustainable places for the benefit of society. However, in increasingly complex governance environments, it is valuable to understand how to integrate opposing interests. Due to their nature, waterfront redevelopment projects can be a rich source of information. The Haven-Stad case proved to be so as well.

At first, it was difficult to come up with an approach that acknowledged both the institutions at work that shape the port-city environment as well as the strategic behaviour of actors to change these institutions. The analysis was too static at first. The main issue in the development of Haven-Stad is the deliberate cause of interest. Institutions give actors the capacity to do so.

Hopefully this research provides insights in how to come up with better approaches towards waterfront redevelopment and integrated urban development in general. In the end, it is all about either constructive or destructive cooperation of human beings. Being aware of the institutions that either hamper or enable human interaction is an important first step.



# I. Concepts and abbreviations

## Urban development concepts

### Plan

Document, often supported by maps and drawings, that explains the intended spatial development of a place. Includes argumentation (why), a proposed process (how) and a product (what)

### Plan making process

The governance process of defining spatial plans

### Product

The physical design of a spatial development, often including a development volume, infrastructure and character

### Urban economy

Knowledge and interaction based economic sector concerned with (digital) service, innovation and creativity

### Urban takeover

Process of introducing urban functions on existing industrial lands

### Greenfield development

Urban development in green areas, like agriculture and nature

### Transformation

The process of changing land use from one function to another. Also possible on building level, for example from office to residential

### Strategy

Course of actions with an intended result in mind. Can be a series of proposed (spatial) interventions, but also refer to the behaviour of actors.

## Organisations and actors

### Spatial Planning Department

The municipal department concerned with developing spatial plans. Dutch: Dienst Ruimtelijke Ordening (DRO) and later Ruimte & Duurzaamheid (R&D)

### The Board of Mayor and Aldermen

Board for daily governance of the municipality. In charge of administrative assignments and policy implementation. Dutch: College van Burgermeester en Wethouders (College van B&W)

### Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management

Dutch: Rijkswaterstaat

### ORAM

Association for entrepreneurs in Amsterdam, originated from an association for port companies

**Port Authority**

Former municipal department responsible for port exploitation. Dutch: Havenbedrijf Amsterdam. Privatized in 2013. In this thesis the same name is used before and after privatization.

**Commission for Spatial Planning**

Municipal committee that discusses spatial planning issues in depth prior to the council meetings.

**Geography****Port of Amsterdam**

Name for all port lands and industry within the jurisdiction of Amsterdam, however in various documents also often used to refer to all port areas in the North Sea Canal Area (Velsen, IJmuiden, Beverwijk, Zaanstad).

**MRA**

Metropolitan Region of Amsterdam, also referring to the (informal) institution intending to promote cooperation between the 32 affiliated municipalities and the Province of North Holland and Flevoland

**Ring road or Ring A10**

Highway A10 surrounding the city centre of Amsterdam

**Westpoort**

Western docklands in Amsterdam around the North Sea Canal, including planning areas of Havenstad (Coenhaven, Vlothaven)

**Eastern Docklands**

Former port areas in the eastern side of Amsterdam (Java Island, KNSM, Borneo-Sporenburg)

**The IJ**

Lake in the heart of Amsterdam, due to the North Sea Canal and Rhine Canal also important maritime transport corridor for North-western Europe

**Legal terms****Leasehold**

Land distribution system in which the government owns the land but leases it for a predefined period. Dutch: Erfpacht

**Zoning plan**

Formal document produced by the municipality that describes permitted spatial characteristics of a certain bounded geographical area

**Spatial Planning Act**

National act introduced in 2008 that encompasses legislation regarding spatial planning and management. Dutch: Wet Ruimtelijke Ordening (Wro)

**Crisis and Recovery Act**

Act introduced in 2010 to reduce legal obstructions and bureaucracy in order to boost construction. Dutch: Crisis- en Herstelwet



**Environment and Planning Act**

Upcoming act that intends to combine, structure and simplify all legislation for physical interventions in the built environment. Dutch: Omgevingswet

**Regional Plan**

Provincial Structure Vision, document that shows main directions for spatial development on a regional level. Legal status transferred to municipalities with the introduction of the Spatial Planning Act in 2008. Dutch: Streekplan

**Political parties** (generalized to international standards)**Democratic Party**

Democraten 66 (D66)

**Green Party**

GroenLinks (GL)

**Christian Democratic Party**

Christelijk Democratisch Appèl (CDA)

**Liberal Party**

Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD)

**Socialistic Party**

Socialistische Partij (SP)

**Elderly Party**

Ouderenpartij (local party)



## II. List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Analytical framework for process reconstruction .....	8
Figure 2: Alderman of Amsterdam states that companies have to move for housing (AT5, 2017) .....	29
Figure 3: Birds five spatial-functional era's in the Anyport Model (1971), adjusted by Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack (2006). This model offers the rational spatial-economic explanation for the development of port-cities. ....	38
Figure 4: Stages of port-city development (Hoyle, 1989, adjusted by Hoyle, 2000) .....	41
Figure 5: Proposed new spatial model for the port-city interface by Wiegmans & Louw (2010), inspired by Norcliffe et al. (1996).....	42
Figure 6: The three different aspects of integration (own illustration, based on Adams & Tiesdell, 2013) .....	43
Figure 7: Conceptual approach between institutions and actors in the port-city interface (Daamen & Vries, 2013) .....	47
Figure 8: Analytical framework for understanding the plan making process in the port-city interface (own illustration, 2019).....	57
Figure 9: Spatial development of port (red) versus city (grey) (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017, p.14) .....	60
Figure 10: Location of Haven-Stad within Amsterdam (adjusted, Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017)	61
Figure 11: Urban transformation and environmental zones of the port (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2016) .....	64
Figure 12: Analysis of land ownership and planning areas Sloterdijk I South and Coenhaven-Vlothaven in Haven-Stad. Complete version in Appendix. (Own illustration, 2018, based on data from Port of Amsterdam, 2018; Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017) .....	64
Figure 13: Waterfront redevelopment plan near the Central Station (OMA, 1992) .....	75
Figure 14: Wiegmans & Louw (2010) describe the spatial conflict between port and city due to restrictions in environmental zones, during this episode in Amsterdam.....	80
Figure 15: Discourse of 'transformation through relocation' of maritime industry. Transformation is presented as historically ongoing and natural. (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009) .....	88
Figure 16: Supposed reservation on the Houtrakpolder .....	93
Figure 17: Structure Vision Amsterdam 2040 (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2011) .....	96
Figure 18: Plan for the Olympic Stadium 2028 in the Coenhaven, Draft Structure Vision (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010) .....	97
Figure 19: Estimated port growth figures and availability of land shows the transformation of Haven-Stad is incompatible with autonomous port growth and current port growth projections. The red lines are the estimated transshipment volumes of Decisio in relation to the 3 scenarios for Haven-Stad (own illustration, based on Port of Amsterdam, 2009, 2011; Decisio, 2013; Havenmonitor, 2016, 2018) .....	110
Figure 20: Research of Decisio showing Haven-Stad is incompatible with port growth (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013) .....	111
Figure 21: Zaan IJ connection, urban takeover of IJ (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009) .....	112
Figure 22: Passage from letter Programme Haven-Stad 2013-2015 show the active lobby to relax pollutions norms, stating this would 'considerably improve opportunity for housing development in Haven-Stad' (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013) .....	116
Figure 23: Placemaking Sloterdijk (NUL20, 2016).....	120

Figure 24: Ring Zone development policy, as visible in the Economic Ring Zone Development Strategy (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013) and the Structure Vision 2040 (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2011) .....	121
Figure 25: Skyscrapers on port lands: a model of Haven-Stad at a creative Haven-Stad session (own photo, 2018).....	124
Figure 26: Phasing of Haven-Stad based on housing production and infrastructure investment thresholds (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017) .....	126
Figure 27: Auction flyer of Shipdock showing data of Concept Development Strategy (Cushman & Wakefield, 2017).....	133
Figure 28: Highway A10 as hard border between port and city, as proposed by the Province (Province of North Holland, 2018) .....	135

Table 1: Summarized aspects of integrated development in the port-city context (own illustration, based on Adams & Tiesdell (2013); ECE (1997) .....	8
Table 2: Summarized aspects of integrated development in the port-city context (own illustration, based on Adams & Tiesdell (2013); ECE (1997) .....	44
Table 3: Various levels of institutional analysis and sources. Personally adjusted, derived from: Inam (2002, based on: Eggertsson, 1990; Lane, 1993; Scott, 1995; North, 1990) .....	48
Table 4: Institutions affecting actors and plan making in the port-city interface, personally adjusted, based on Van Wijk (2007) Notteboom et al (2013, based on Scott (2001, p. 52), Daamen & Vries (2013), Baycheva-Merger et al. (2018) .....	49
Table 5: Stakeholders per scale, sector and agency in the Haven-Stad development (own illustration, based on Adams & Tiesdell, 2013).....	67
Table 6: Integration of various stakeholders in adopted policy in episode 1 .....	83
Table 7: Institutions affecting port-city actors in plan making during episode 1 .....	85
Table 8: Estimated development volume (units) in Haven-Stad (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009)..	88
Table 9: Estimated costs and profit in the 3 Scenarios, in € x million (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009) .....	90
Table 10: Integration of stakeholders in the Structure Vision 2040, regarding port development ...	100
Table 11: Institutions that affected plan making in episode 2 .....	102
Table 12: The different strategies regarding environmental zoning (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 22) .....	104
Table 13: Financial effect of strategy A, B and C (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 48) .....	104
Table 14: Integration of scales, sectors and agencies in episode 3 (Transformation Strategy) .....	117
Table 15: Institutions affecting the governance process during episode 3 (Transformation Strategy) .....	118
Table 16: Leasehold contracts of several companies in the Coenhaven and Vlothaven, including the Covenant partners (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2015).....	120
Table 17: Integrated aspects in the Development Strategy of Haven-Stad (episode 4) .....	136
Table 18: Institutions affecting port-city development in episode 4 (Development Strategy).....	138

# III. Index

- I. Concepts and abbreviations.....15
- II. List of Figures and Tables..... 19
- III. Index..... 22
- IV. List of Interviews and meetings..... 178
  
- 1 Preface..... 5**
- 2 Summary..... 7**
- 3 Introduction ..... 25**
  - 3.1 Problem statement ..... 26
    - 3.1.1 Pressure on cities ..... 26
    - 3.1.2 Integrated planning..... 27
    - 3.1.3 Waterfront redevelopment ..... 29
    - 3.1.4 Problem definition ..... 30
    - 3.1.5 Societal and scientific relevance ..... 30
- 4 Research Design ..... 33**
  - 4.1 Research questions ..... 34
    - 4.1.1 Research goal ..... 34
    - 4.1.2 Research questions ..... 34
  - 4.2 Methods ..... 35
    - 4.2.1 Case selection ..... 36
    - 4.2.1 Research scope ..... 36
- 5 Literature Review ..... 37**
  - 5.1 Development of port cities ..... 38
    - 5.1.1 Emergence of port cities ..... 38
    - 5.1.2 Waterfront redevelopment and the port-city interface..... 39
    - 5.1.3 Integrated port-city development ..... 42
  - 5.2 Institutional analysis ..... 45
    - 5.2.1 Institutions ..... 45
    - 5.2.2 Actor-centered institutionalism ..... 46
    - 5.2.3 Institutional analysis ..... 48
    - 5.2.4 Institutional change ..... 49
  - 5.3 Spatial planning as policy making ..... 52
    - 5.3.1 Planning organizations..... 52
    - 5.3.2 Strategic transformation..... 53
    - 5.3.3 Political decision making process..... 54

5.3.4	Strategic action and coupling.....	55
5.4	Conclusion.....	57
<b>6</b>	<b>Context .....</b>	<b>59</b>
6.1	The Case: Amsterdam Haven-Stad.....	60
6.1.1	Introduction .....	60
6.1.2	Haven-Stad.....	61
6.1.3	Port of Amsterdam.....	62
6.1.4	Environmental zones.....	63
6.1.5	Stakeholders.....	67
6.2	Institutional context.....	68
6.2.1	National planning system.....	68
6.2.2	Planning institutions in Amsterdam.....	68
6.2.3	Governance of plan-making.....	70
<b>7</b>	<b>Empirical Research .....</b>	<b>73</b>
7.1	Introduction .....	74
7.2	Rediscovering the waterfront (1985-2009) .....	75
7.2.1	Port Development.....	77
7.2.2	Urban development near port areas .....	78
7.2.3	The making of the Covenant Agreement.....	81
7.2.4	Political rationality .....	82
7.2.5	Integration .....	83
7.2.6	Institutions .....	84
7.3	Future perspectives on Haven-Stad (2006 – 2011).....	86
7.3.1	The document: Haven-Stad 3 Future Perspectives at a glance .....	88
7.3.2	Financial impact .....	89
7.3.3	Relation to port development .....	90
7.3.4	Structure Vision 2040: Economically Strong & Sustainable (2011) .....	96
7.3.5	Political rationality .....	100
7.3.6	Integration .....	100
7.3.7	Institutions .....	101
7.4	Haven-Stad: Strong City – Smart Port (2011-2013) .....	103
7.4.1	Transformation Strategy.....	104
7.4.2	Risk mitigation through phasing .....	105
7.4.3	Response of port companies.....	106
7.4.4	Expert panel as input for Transformation Strategy .....	108
7.4.5	Assessed financial impact .....	109

7.4.6	Estimated effects on port development .....	109
7.4.7	New strategies for urban development.....	113
7.4.8	New lock and corporatization of the Port Authority .....	113
7.4.1	Political rationality .....	114
7.4.2	Integration .....	116
7.4.3	Institutions .....	118
7.5	Haven-Stad: Development Strategy (2014-2017).....	119
7.5.1	Acceleration and intensification .....	122
7.5.2	Plan making process.....	123
7.5.3	The Development Strategy .....	124
7.5.4	Decision making process.....	127
7.5.5	Formalization .....	130
7.5.6	Current situation.....	134
7.5.1	Political rationality .....	135
7.5.2	Integration .....	136
7.5.3	Institutions .....	138
<b>8</b>	<b>Conclusions .....</b>	<b>139</b>
8.1	Findings .....	140
8.1.1	Reasons of conflict .....	140
8.1.2	Integration of plans.....	141
8.1.3	Policy windows.....	142
8.1.4	Institutions at work.....	143
8.1.5	Lessons for integrated development .....	147
8.2	Recommendations .....	149
8.3	Discussion.....	154
8.3.1	Introduction .....	154
8.3.2	Port-city development .....	154
8.3.3	Policy window theory in relation to urban planning .....	156
8.3.4	Integration of scales, sectors and agencies .....	159
8.3.5	Implications for Dutch spatial planning .....	160
8.3.6	Validity, reliability and limitations .....	161
8.3.7	Generalizability .....	162
8.3.8	Further research.....	163
8.4	Reflection .....	165

**Appendix** (separate document)





# 3 Introduction

## 3.1 Problem statement

### 3.1.1 Pressure on cities

In 2018, there is a great perceived pressure on the housing market in the large Dutch cities. There is discussion about the exact demand for housing, and how much of that demand should be realized within existing cities. Numbers vary between 300.000 to 1 million dwellings until 2030. What is clear is that after years of economic downturn and building stops, local governments cope with a construction challenge. This is especially true in Amsterdam. In 2015, the Land Department of the municipality of Amsterdam stated that if the market pressure would continue this way, no more land would be available for development in 2018<sup>1</sup>.

The focus on inner cities for development is not new. Following compact city philosophies and the increasing demand for inner city housing, spatial planning has become more concerned with inner city development. The development of inner city locations offers opportunity to connect to existing infrastructure and achieve agglomeration benefits (Verheul et al, 2017). Next to a series of projects around train stations, a new form of inner city transformation is put on the agenda. That of 'underused' industrial areas near city centres. Strategic transformation policies are born.

In the Netherlands, municipalities are starting to target underused industrial areas near city centres for the accommodation of housing. De Zeeuw (2017, p. 178) lists a few theoretical advantages of these type of developments:

- Old industrial areas and other underused areas get a new life
- Addition of (affordable) housing
- Companies in the 'new economy' can establish themselves
- Existing amenities get a bigger support
- Less commuting
- Densification, clustering and mixing of functions strengthens the economic agglomeration power
- Green areas are preserved

With a mixed use planning policy planners try to increase the use of space in areas near the city centre. However, there are considerable downsides of developing on existing or former industrial areas. These complicating factors are sometimes even prohibiting any development in an area. Inner city transformation is complicated and expensive. It needs extensive, long term cooperation and commitment to be successful (De Zeeuw, 2017). An 'all hands on deck'-approach is therefore needed.

A study by Brink Groep in 2017 for example shows that only 9% of the housing demand (1 million before 2030) can be solved with inner city developments in the Netherlands. The number increases to 35% when areas are more densified, but an average subsidy of €25.000 per dwelling is needed and legal procedure have to be reduced. Issues with ground pollution, financing and regulation severely damage the transformation potential in existing urban areas.

In the last couple of years municipalities, universities, developers and constructors have tried to solve these issues by making agreements and performing research. The intention is to make more

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<sup>1</sup> Pierre van Rossum, cited by Jos Feijtel in 'Genadeklap van CBS en PBL voor veel provinciaal woningbouwbeleid' (27-9-2016)

room for housing and speed up developments (Agenda Stad, 2013). With City Deals, public and private companies work together to find solutions for urban issues. Due to “*increased demand for urban living*” one City Deal in 2013 was about inner development and transformations (Agenda Stad, 2013). Through experiments, pilot projects and agreements, participating actors try to speed up inner city developments. The same goes for more recent agreements in the ‘Intensification Programme Inner City Transformation Projects of the G32, NEPROM and TU Delft in 2017.

Verheul et al (2017) identified the main complicating factors to be overcome in inner city development:

### **1. Legal barriers**

Change of zoning plans, expropriation of current owners. Environmental rules, pollution, parking norms. Loosening and experimenting with environmental rules leads to the option to build closer to industrial port areas and to mix housing with (light) industry on neighbourhood or even plot level.

### **2. Governmental-organisational barriers**

Unclear visions and guidelines. Political insecurity and changing powers.

### **3. Financial barriers**

Unfeasible developments because of high costs for removing or moving existing companies and other users, cleaning of the soil advice, land speculation, legal costs.

## **3.1.2 Integrated planning**

In recent decades, urban development has shifted towards integrated ‘area development’ instead of traditional, project based development. This approach seeks to develop places while stressing the interrelatedness of its subparts (infrastructure, housing, work, leisure), carried by both public and private investors and stakeholders. Function mix is one of the key elements of area development, in contrast to modernistic philosophies.

Modernist planning promised healthy, clean and green neighbourhoods, developed on an industrial scale. Pollution impact studies -and forthcoming policies- led to the situation that the interests of urban stakeholders were clearly separated (Angelotti, 1992). The availability of - seemingly - unlimited free fossil energy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century fuelled urban separatism policies. Highways and cars formed a transport system that offered cheap connections.

In contrast, the spatial model for mixed-use areas is based on the Old European City, stressing density, multiple use, social and cultural diversity (Commission of the European Communities, 1990, p. 43). The Compact City model is mainly a revival of the European old city. The New Urbanity movement is mainly targeting urban sprawl in the United States and Canada. The latter is based on the works of Jane Jacobs (1961) with her influential book ‘The Life and Death of Great American Cities’, promoting a fine grain mix of functions on a human scale instead of monofunctional areas connected by heavy transport. Both theories advocate dense, mixed use neighbourhoods.

The promises of mixed-use areas often include more diversity, affordability, efficiency, sustainability, resiliency, vibrancy and health (Jacobs, 1961; Jabareen 2006). One of the main characteristics of New Urbanity (or Neotraditionalism) and the Compact City is the mix of functions (Jabareen, 2006). However, not all functions can be mixed as easily, and some functions need space to exist. Mixing

and separating functions therefore have advantages and disadvantages. Jabareen (2006) names the theoretical advantages of mixing functions:

- Greater housing variety and density, more affordable housing (smaller units), life-cycle housing (starter homes to larger homes to senior housing)
- Reduced distances between housing, workplaces, retail businesses, and other amenities and destinations
- Better access to fresh, healthy foods (as food retail and farmers markets can be accessed on foot/bike or by transit)
- More compact development, land-use synergy (e.g. residents provide customers for retail which provide amenities for residents)
- Stronger neighbourhood character, sense of place  
Walkable, bike-able neighbourhoods, increased accessibility via transit, both resulting in reduced transportation costs

Although there are now many examples of projects with mixed or even multiple (Louw and Bruinsma, 2006) land uses, planners have gained less experience in the mixing of industry and housing in the same development (Korthals Altes, 2008).

In literature, mixed use developments are often praised for their potential theoretical advantages, but the concept itself is multi-interpretable and often ambiguous (Hoppenbrouwer & Louw, 2005, Korthals-Altes, 2010, Grant, 2002). Hoppenbrouwer & Louw (2005) cite three different conceptual levels of mixed use from the work of Grant (2002):

### **1. Increasing the intensity of land use**

By encouraging a mix of forms and tenures in often a higher density of housing

### **2. Increasing the social mix**

By mixing different socio-ethnic backgrounds and income levels

### **3. Overcoming regulatory barriers**

Integrating uses that are segregated because of environmental policies

The three conceptual levels “*reveal the ambiguity of mixed-use in that they refer to various contexts in which mixed-use is used: environmental, social, design and institutional*” (Hoppenbrouwer & Louw, 2005). The theoretical positive effects of mixed use are sometimes criticized. In some cases in practice, it is by no means a “*magical solution for social problems*” (Moos et al., 2018). Mainly the affordability of housing seems to be a problem, as wealthier upper class people tend to move into these areas and making them more difficult to access for other income groups. This has directly affect the connected cultural or socio-ethnic diversity. Lastly the effect of more efficient transportation is limited or unproven, since the increased densities form a mobility challenge with themselves.

Convinced with the benefits of compact and mixed cities, urban planners and market parties needed to challenge two ‘habits’: modernist urban planning and modernist real estate development (Leinberger, 2009, as cited by Adams & Tiesdell, 2013, p.22). For an urban planner this results in careful attention to the precise mix of functions as to “*maximize synergy and minimize conflict.*” (English Partnerships, 2007a, as cited by Adams & Tiesdell, 2013, p. 22).

### 3.1.3 Waterfront redevelopment

One of the more profound examples of inner city transformation, is what we know from the waterfront redevelopment projects since the 1970s. Following a trend of decay of former port sites, urban planners saw a way to redevelop them and represent their city to the world (Hoyle, 1989).

Due to the previously mentioned housing crisis, the focus on inner city developments and the popularity of waterfront redevelopment, a battle for space is occurring in Amsterdam. Due to the political desire to build within existing urban areas, housing is increasingly planned near or on industrial lands. One of these areas are the abandoned waterfronts of former port areas.

In the summer of 2017, Amsterdam therefore announced the plan to construct a complete new city in its western port lands: Amsterdam Haven-Stad. The new city would allow over 100.000 new inhabitants and would offer up to 58.000 jobs. However, the area is currently still in use by heavy maritime industry. While port expansion is limited, companies feel that their operations are at risk. The municipality seems to push its transformation agenda through one-sided (Figure 2). This leads to a conflict between the municipality, the Port Authority and the port companies.



Figure 2: Alderman of Amsterdam states that companies have to move for housing (AT5, 2017)

While the city pushes to solve the perceived housing problem with transforming port lands, it risks affecting existing port businesses. These economic partners are sometimes hubs in large ecosystems that provide a lot of jobs for the Amsterdam metropolitan area (Jacobs & Van Dongen, 2012).

With the way Amsterdam presented Haven-Stad, it seems to be the opposite of the incremental and facilitative process that the city defined for its 'complex transformation projects along the IJ' (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013). The municipality stated that this approach since land ownership is fragmented, environmental pollution is high and companies are capital intensive and hard to remove. Haven-Stad seems to take another direction, stating the large scale removal of port companies to build a new city in the port.

This leaves us with the question whether contemporary governance of the port-city interface actually shows signs of institutional, economic and physical reconnection, or can be distinguished as 'blunt' urban takeover designed for the benefit of the 21st century urban economy. The irony of a port-city conflict in an urban development called Port-City (Haven-Stad) should not go by unnoticed.

### 3.1.4 Problem definition

Urban planners around the world are also redeveloping former port areas towards new waterfront for the benefit of the competitiveness of their cities. However, successfully delivering waterfront redevelopment projects is no easy task and often lacks sustainable outcomes (Desfor & Laidly, 2011). Currently, due to compact city policies and an increasing market pressure in Dutch cities, urban policy makers are looking for ways to intensify land use in cities. In the Netherlands, brownfields and areas with light industry are targeted to transform to sustainable and mixed urban environmental. However, such transformations are already a challenge (Verheul et al, 2017).

In the case of waterfront redevelopment near ports, another factor comes into the equation: the port. Due to long evolving historic port-city relationships, heavy and capital intensive industry and complex institutional arrangements, waterfront redevelopment is a governance challenge (Daamen et al, 2017). Due to its nature, waterfront redevelopment sites are amongst the most complex to develop (Daamen, 2007). However, often policy makers seem to ignore these challenges and follow a 'business as usual' approach in their attitude towards waterfront redevelopment. In the case of Haven-Stad, an entire city is planned on a vital port area, seemingly without concern for the port. This results in conflict between port and city.

Following the events of the Haven-Stad announcement, several entrepreneurial organisations and companies have complained about the approach of the municipality. Companies feel that their interests are being neglected. Therefore, the development process has moved into an area of conflict and stalemate. Before the end of this research, all negotiations between port and city were ended.

Sustainable urban development in port areas is therefore about bringing both an urban perspective as well as a port perspective together. This is no easy task, and sets us for the question how we can understand conflicts between these both worlds in order to come to sustainable outcomes.

**This leaves us with the following main research question:**

*How can we understand the reason of conflict between port and city in the strategic transformation of Amsterdam Haven-Stad and what can we learn from that to achieve integrated planning in the port-city interface?*

### 3.1.5 Societal and scientific relevance

Due to its complex nature and its connection between economic geography, politics, spatial planning and culture, waterfront redevelopment is researched by various scientific fields. Also, the interconnectedness between these fields is prone to this research. Researching waterfront redevelopment and the way actors interact offers the ability to expose and research various concepts in social science.

When ports and city move closer together spatially, and cities become more compact, better processes are needed to achieve good outcomes. The demand for qualitative developments is high but the development arena has become more crowded and complex. With increasing pressure on space in and near cities, more knowledge is needed to improve processes and understand why processes currently do not move towards integrated outcomes.

However, the potential of such complex developments is also great. Integrated solutions in the built environment can offer great societal value in times when demand for such solutions is high. Unintegrated solutions however, are at the cost of society, economy and environment.





## **4 Research Design**

## 4.1 Research questions

### 4.1.1 Research goal

The goal of this research is to understand the reason of conflict in the development of Haven-Stad. By understanding the conflict, lessons can be derived for the integration of port and city interests in waterfront redevelopment projects, but also teach us more about plan making and spatial planning in port cities and the Netherlands in particular.

### 4.1.2 Research questions

The goal of this research is to come up with an approach to integrate port and city in waterfront redevelopment projects. This can be done by understanding the reason of conflict between port and city in Haven-Stad. Therefore we need to know what processes and approaches lead to sustainable outcomes in waterfront redevelopment projects. That will lead to the following sub-questions and research design:

#### **Main research question:**

How can we understand the reason of conflict between port and city in the strategic transformation of Amsterdam Haven-Stad and what can we learn from that to achieve integrated planning in the port-city interface?

The research will be divided in three parts, each answering a sub-question. Together they answer the main research question.

#### **Part I: Knowledge (Literature study)**

Sub-question: How can we understand spatial planning in the port-city interface?

A theoretical and analytical framework for analysing the plan making process for spatial projects in the port-city interface.

#### **Part II: Empirical data (In-depth case analysis)**

Sub-question: What do we see in practice in the strategic transformation of Amsterdam Haven-Stad?

A process reconstruction based on the established analytical framework.

#### **Part III: Synthesis**

Sub-question: What is the reason of conflict and what can we learn from that?

Consists of a discussion of empirical data in connection to literature. Identification of main reason(s) for conflict. Formulation of recommendations for integrated development of port and city in waterfront redevelopment projects.

## 4.2 Methods

Plan making processes revolve around the interaction of human beings. Therefore, it seems most effective to focus on a single in-depth case study, to understand the conflict of Haven-Stad. This will be done to understand the specific history of events, the dynamic and stakeholders that led to this specific outcome. This means there is no comparison with a 'successful' case. In order to generalize the findings, specific abstractions and limitations of the Amsterdam context will be identified.

Within the case study, two different sub-areas will be researched to determine whether the municipality has a different attitude towards different areas. These first area is already in transformation, the latter is a vital port area.

The following ways of data gathering will be used:

### **Literature review**

In order to present an overview of what is already known in this field of research and to provide a theoretical and analytical framework for understanding waterfront redevelopment processes.

### **Document study and media analysis**

This entails an analysis of all formal policy documents in the planning process. These are both the planning documents, as well as reports, researches, visions, maps and feasibility studies. Historic, formal documents are studied in the digitalized municipal archives.

With a subscription to a local newspaper *Het Parool*, the local media archives can be researched. Together, this will create an overview of the most important events in the planning process.

### **Semi-structured interviews**

These are interviews with stakeholders and policy makers from both port and city, but also with a local academic in the field of Amsterdam planning. Also, current and former employees of the Spatial Planning Department and project team members of the Haven-Stad project team will be interviewed. The interviews will be recorded and transcribed, either in the form of a summary or a discourse analysis, depending on the interviewee and value and density of information. The interviews of key stakeholders will be transcribed completely (see Appendix). The interviews will be used to connect otherwise independent events in the process, and will therefore be taken after the media and document study.

The interviews will be held with representatives of the selected stakeholders. These representatives all have actively contributed to the plan making or decision making process.

### **Political decision making process**

This entails the analysis of the formalization of plans in the political arena and includes council meetings, commission meetings, motions, amendments and the agenda. All relevant council meeting will be transcribed and put into one timeline, including an analysis of supporting documents like letters of the Board of Mayor and Alderman.

### **Creative sessions**

Participation in two plan-making sessions with stakeholders, organized by the project team of Haven-Stad together with the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management.

### **Meetings**

By attending meetings within the graduation organization ORAM and at external Haven-Stad meetings. Regular updates and discussions about the research will be done as well.

#### **4.2.1 Case selection**

For this research, the case of Amsterdam Haven-Stad is investigated. Haven-Stad is a recently announced and ongoing spatial planning project in the port of Amsterdam.

Following various comments in the media, a conflict is perceived by port companies. It describes a (spatial) conflict between urban development and port exploitation. The municipality of Amsterdam has a rich and well documented urban planning history and has been subject to various researches regarding urban development and port economics.

#### **4.2.1 Research scope**

The thesis will focus on the planning process of Amsterdam Haven-Stad between 1985 and 2017. The interaction between municipality, port authority and port companies is put central here, although a lot more stakeholders will likely play a role in this process. The research will evaluate the governance of the plan-makers towards this specific geographical area. However, since the size and scale of the project, several stakeholders interact with the project from far beyond its geographical boundaries. This will be included in an analytical framework. Other stakeholders, like citizen groups are excluded from this research.

## **5 Literature Review**

## 5.1 Development of port cities

In order to understand spatial conflicts between port and city, we need to understand both the urban perspective as well as the port perspective on spatial development. This chapter will elaborate on both perspectives and show that they used to be tightly connected. The evolution of their relationship will be explained, as well as current governance challenges. The second part of this literature review will propose an approach for understanding and evaluating spatial development in port areas by connecting the concept to institutions and the process of policy making. This chapter will answer the first sub-question: how can we understand urban development in the port-city interface?

### 5.1.1 Emergence of port cities

The coastlines, rivers and deltas around the world have proven to be places that were conducive for urban development (Hein, 2013; Hayuth, 1982). These strategic locations offered the opportunity to exploit the trade of goods, and therefore later became hubs in the regional and global flow of information and people. Historically, ports and cities developed hand-in-hand on a basis of mutual benefit.

Ports are the nodes in large global networks that provide societies with goods, like food, materials and energy (Jacobs & Van Dongen, 2007). In ports, industry has developed to ship, transfer and process these goods, including transshipment and storage facilities. Around these activities, other industries have emerged, such as docks and wharfs for ship construction and repairs, stevedoring and towing companies. But also finance and insurance companies are established to secure and fund trade, as well as knowledge clusters connected to the type of cargo and industry and maritime services and engineering (Jacobs & Van Dongen, 2007). This efficient exploitation of trade flows is described as a steering factor in the spatial development of ports (Bird, 1963). The model of Bird (1963, 1971), seen in Figure 3, elaborates on the spatial development of ports following technological developments.




Figure 3: Bird's five spatial-functional era's in the Anyport Model (1971), adjusted by Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack (2006). This model offers the rational spatial-economic explanation for the development of port-cities.

In Bird's model (1971), the initial setting of a port is strongly dependent on geographical considerations. Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack (2006) describe how the port was located on strategic points, for example the furthest that a sailing ship could sail inland. This is the port as most civilizations have known them since ancient and medieval times. This was also the starting point for most ports in the Netherlands, placed near or on dams in rivers between the sea and the hinterland (for example, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam). In the figure above, this can be seen in phase 1. Until the industrial revolution, not much has changed.

The industrial revolution triggered expansion of the ports (phase 2). Several changes impacted on port activities. Quays were expanded, and jetties were constructed to handle the growing amounts of freight and passengers as well as larger ships. The larger ships also required deeper waters and solid quays, leading to the development of docks (phase 3). Development of the port continued until after the Second World War, and ports became increasingly specialized (phase 4). Piers were constructed to handle container freight, as well as ores, grain, petroleum and coal. Bigger ships required even greater depths, and port industry moved to undeveloped land downstream. Several infrastructure works like railways connected the new port areas, but they were geographically disconnected from the original city (Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2006).

After governments introduced health and environmental regulations for the urban environment, industry and urban areas moved apart definitively. Policies in European cities in the 70s and 80s have aimed to concentrate all industrial production facilities from within the city towards outer city industrial areas (De Roo, 2003). This disconnected urban areas from port functions even further. As a result, older port sites became obsolete and were abandoned.

### **5.1.2 Waterfront redevelopment and the port-city interface**

Waterfronts are places where the flow of people, nature, goods, and capital make their entrance to and exists form a city, leaving marks on it (Desfor & Laidly, 2011, p. 5). The flows of people, information and products are physically fixed: They take place by capital intensive physical infrastructure, like port basins, waterways, railroads, terminals and factories and therefore shape the built environment. These flows are embodied in historical relationships of that greatly influences the power relations throughout their network.

After technological development, rationalization and environmental regulation moved the port out of the city physically (Bird, 1963, 1971; Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2006), a once symbiotic spatial and economic relationship is contested (Hoyle, 1989). Though, it has been disputed that ports and cities have grown completely apart economically (Van den Berghe, Jacobs & Boelens, 2018; Jacobs & Van Dongen, 2012). Port-cities can still be described as an ecosystem of economic activity that forms around a flow of goods, services and information. In economic theory, the importance of clusters for regional competitiveness is stressed. This is especially true in the often globally connected port industry, where specialization and efficient transactions in local production chains define the economic competitiveness of the cluster. These clusters can be connected with other sectors and profit from local knowledge and services. The ability to connect port and city defines the strengths of such ecosystems (Jacobs & Van Dongen, 2012). Different port cities around the world have different profiles due to what extend they connect port and urban functions.

Discussions about the relationship between port and city have introduced the concept of the port-city interface (Hayuth, 1982). The concept describes the interactions between port and city. The port-city interface can be both described as a geographical boundary between port and city, but also as an interactive economic system where conflict in policy implementation may take place (Hayuth, 1982; Hoyle, 1989). Hayuth (1982) describes the port-city interface as a 'zone of transition'. Waterfronts are therefore areas of transition between the services and amenities-based urban economy, and the production and distribution-based business of the port (Daamen, Heinz & Schelwald 2016).

What is certain, is that the downstream movement of port functions left port cities with brownfields close to their historic city centre. Hoyle (1989) describes these places as a vacuum or an 'abandoned doorstep'. Cities have experienced that these areas are prone to social-economic decay. Urban policy makers therefore saw an opportunity to solve socio-economic problems while also providing an opportunity to re-represent their cities to the world (Desfor & Laidly, 2011).

Starting in the United States in the 1970's, this led to a series of waterfront redevelopment schemes in almost every port-city in the world. These waterfront transformation projects were stimulated by the economic crises of the 1970's. Due to de-industrialization, the emergence of the service based and creative economy and a renewed public appreciation for waterfronts (Hayuth, 1982; Daamen, 2007), port cities were looking for new ways to attract foreign investment and skilled (creative) workers to secure their cities' competitiveness in an increasing globalizing world (Desfor & Laidly, 2011). This is exactly what waterfront redevelopment could offer. Transformation of specifically maritime industrial areas also gave the opportunity to preserve a part of the cultural heritage of the city and reuse this in order to give identity to the new neighbourhood (Savini, 2016). While Bird predicted the re-use of former port areas, he might have not have predicted that this new use would be for urban purposes (Daamen, 2007, p.58).

The port-city interface is a potential problematic planning zone due to conflicting interests and stakes of port and city (Hoyle, 1989). Ports as places are physical nodes in global trade routes, while spatial planning takes place on national, regional and local level. This sets urban planners and policy makers for the task to cope, interact and balance interests from far beyond their drawing boards (Desfor & Laidly, 2011).

At first, mainly abandoned industrial areas and waterfronts were redeveloped. After these lands were redeveloped, urban planners sought lands even closer to the port. Governance of this process has proved to be no easy task, as few places are more complex to redevelop than seaport structures into high-end urban environments (Daamen, 2007; Daamen & Louw, 2016). The port-city interface has therefore increasingly become a subject of research and interest, both from the field of urbanism as from economic geography.

The spatial connection between port and city has been described by Hall (2007) as a process where the once tightly connected physical, economic and institutional relationships have changed due to the rationalization of ports. The interests that represented the flows of goods dominated the built environment that surrounded them as well as the institutional relationships that governed them (Hall & Clark, 2010). These institutions govern the division and exploitation of 'space', whether it is for the benefit of private, maritime companies or for the benefit of the local community. This resulted in increased but also more globally dispersed private benefits, while (social) costs were concentrated locally (Hesse, 2006, as cited by Hall & Clark, 2010). Due to this, in recent years, politics of reconnection emerged (Hall & Clark 2010).



This is also described by Hoyle (2000) (Figure 4). After describing the different stages of port-city development in 1989, he added a new stage: the renewal of port-city links. Here he states that, after a series of waterfront redevelopment projects, new relationships between port and city have arisen which will integrate further development. As globalization and de-industrialization continue, he argues these trends will allow for further reconnection in the future.







STAGE	SYMBOL	PERIOD	CHARACTERISTICS
	○ City ● Port		
I Primitive port/city		Ancient/medieval to 19th century	Close spatial and functional association between city and port.
II Expanding port/city		19th–early 20th century	Rapid commercial/industrial growth forces port to develop beyond city confines, with linear quays and break-bulk industries.
III Modern industrial port/city		Mid–20th century	Industrial growth (especially oil refining) and introduction of containers/ro-ro (roll-on, roll-off) require separation/space.
IV Retreat from the waterfront		1960s–1980s	Changes in maritime technology induce growth of separate maritime industrial development areas.
V Redevelopment of waterfront		1970s–1990s	Large-scale modern port consumes large areas of land/water space; urban renewal of original core.
VI Renewal of port/city links		1980s–2000+	Globalization and intermodalism transform port roles; port-city associations renewed; urban redevelopment enhances port-city integration.

Figure 4: Stages of port-city development (Hoyle, 1989, adjusted by Hoyle, 2000)

However, as ports struggle to expand further and claim new areas for industrial use, businesses may not have enough space to accommodate autonomous growth. At the same time, cities continue with transforming (older) port areas. Mainly quays with deep water access will increasingly become short in supply (Wiegmans & Louw, 2011). Following sustainability policies, (national) governments are not too generous in allocating new land for port use further downstream. Therefore port companies are ‘sandwiched’ in their current physical location. Daamen (2007) describes that cities like Rotterdam and Hamburg are actually planning new urban areas on existing port lands in a process of urban-takeover. The development of new urban areas very close to (or even on) current port lands, is causing conflicts of interests (Daamen, 2007; Daamen & Louw, 2013).

In recent years, urban planners have sought ways to stretch environmental rules to allow for development on the potentially valuable lands close to industrial port lands (De Roo, 2003). This policy trend is aiming to allow housing development near industry. Port companies have resisted to this trend, fearing nuisance complaints of future residents, and a decrease operational freedom and growth opportunities.

Following events in the early 2000’s in the Amsterdam port-city interface Wiegmans & Louw (2011) debate whether we now have entered a next phase in the port-city interface. They propose a new phase that is characterized by a ‘battle for space’ between port and city. From a planning point-of-view, it is worth exploring the spatial development of the port-city interface with the focus on actors with competing interests and resources (Daamen, 2007). Wiegmans & Louw (2010) proposed to define the next phase as an addition to the model of Hoyle (1987) and Norcliffe et al. (1996). This can be seen in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Proposed new spatial model for the port-city interface by Wiegmans & Louw (2010), inspired by Norcliffe et al. (1996)

### 5.1.3 Integrated port-city development

This leaves us with the question how to manage urban development projects in the port-city interface, that do right to the port-city relationship. In their paper regarding challenges for the Dutch port-city interface, Daamen & Louw (2016) conclude that the integration of existing port community interests into interface development schemes will “play a crucial role in the evolution of the port-city interface”. They quote Hoyle (2000, p. 415) to explain the importance of integration: “The relative success of [waterfront redevelopment] will depend essentially on three things: integration, integration, and integration.”

Hoyle (2000, p.415) states that integration should take place on three different aspects: integration of past and present, integration of contrasting aims and objectives and integration of communities and localities involved. He states: “All of this demands a sense of scale, an appreciation of interdependence, and, above all, a geographer’s sense of place.” In regard to port-city development, he therefore advises to take into account the historical events that have led toward the current situation, to actively seek to include opposing interests in the development process and to open up to different stakeholders.

Integrated development processes are derived from the chemical processing industry (El-Halwagi, 2006, p.5). It is a holistic design approach which seeks to exploit the benefit from interactions of different parts. For the design of a chemical plant for example, a normal approach would be to analyse and optimize all subparts of a production line. However, improving the system as a whole,

there may be benefits in an approach that puts the quality of the whole production line in relation to each other and its outcomes (El-Halwagi, 2006, p. 6).

It is mainly the responsibility of governments to shape institutional frameworks in such a way that they promote integration of real estate development (Adams & Tiesdell, p.136). In theory, urban development management is defined as a set of collaborative actions of institutions to achieve integrated outcomes for the good of society, economy and environment. Franzen, 't Verlaat & Wigmans (2011, p. 18, 142) define the practice as aimed at improving the living environment, social equilibrium, durable economic growth and environmental quality. Governments cannot achieve this on their own. Therefore urban development managers have to adopt integrated and durable approaches. However, integrated planning is usually much harder to deliver in practice than to advocate in theory (Adams & Tiesdell, 2013, p. 120).

Urban area development plans can be created 'integrally' within the organization of the plan-maker. It may connect multiple departments, work together and see if there are more gains achievable for an area than just the development. Urban area developments can therefore help to achieve other goals of the initiator. Increasing concern on the integration of policy has resulted in the reorganization of policy making bodies (CEC, 1997, p.112). The desire has led to 'policy packages' where spatial planning is combined with economic development, health and transport for example. Due to the institutional system in the European planning context these sectors are mainly public sectors: often departments in various levels of government.

To evaluate whether the plan-making process has resulted in integrated outcomes, a framework for assessment is needed. Adams & Tiesdell (2013, p. 120), pointed to three main elements of integrated development for urban development in general: the integration of scales, sectors and agencies. Next to that, they stress the inclusive plan making process as being essential to good outcomes. For the planning process this means a widespread involvement of stakeholders in collaborative decision making. The authors state that 'innovative methods' need to be explored for community engagement. The aspect of stakeholder engagement also applies to the participation of existing businesses in industrial areas (Adams & Tiesdell, 2013; Bast, 2019). The three aspects of integrated development are explained below:

### 1. Integration of scales

Spatial planning seeks to co-ordinate and link what is intended to happen at different geographical scales (neighbourhood, urban, regional, national or even transnational). This is the consensus between and consistency of plans from higher and lower bodies of government. Within the port-city context the integration of scales is relevant due to the effect of policies on various scale levels of economy, transport and government.




Figure 6: The three different aspects of integration (own illustration, based on Adams & Tiesdell, 2013)

### 2. Integration of sectors

These are the broader social and economic requirements of a place, aside from just the physical

environment. This includes the integration of physical planning with other sectors like economic development, education, health and transport.

### 3. Integration of agencies

The co-ordination of the work of all agencies across the public, private and voluntary sectors, whose otherwise independent plans might be impacted by the prospect of place development. In the port-city context this can be the port companies and Port Authority, but also entrepreneurial organisations and real estate investors.

The extent to which the aspects are integrated are visualized in Figure 6 (p. 39). In Table 3, the aspects are summarized in relation to the port-city context. The stakeholders in port-city context are derived from planning documents and a media analysis regarding Haven-Stad.

<b>Aspect</b>	<b>1. Scale</b>	<b>2. Sectors</b>	<b>3. Agencies</b>
<b>Definition</b>	Integration of (supra-)national, regional and local spatial policies	Integration of work of departments	Integration of public, private and non-profit organizations
<b>In port-city context</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Municipal</li> <li>• Metropolitan</li> <li>• Provincial</li> <li>• National</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spatial Planning Dept.</li> <li>• Economic Affairs</li> <li>• Mobility &amp; Transport</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Port Authority</li> <li>• Port companies</li> <li>• Entrepreneurial associations</li> <li>• Real estate investors/ developers</li> </ul>

Table 2: Summarized aspects of integrated development in the port-city context (own illustration, based on Adams & Tiesdell (2013); ECE (1997))

### Measurement

In order to measure the integrated character of the formalized policy, after each planning episode the integrated aspects per stakeholder will be evaluated (see Table 3 above). This means for example that if policy is conflicting with neighbouring municipalities' policies or national planning policies, the plan is unintegrated in terms of scale. Also, when the plan heavily conflicts with interests of stakeholders or when the policy acknowledges potential conflicts but does not propose ways to mitigate risks or overcome the conflict, this will be noted with a minus (-). When the policy incorporates, is consistent or acknowledges interests from the three different aspects, this will be noted with a plus (+). When policy potentially conflicts but acknowledges certain interests this is noted with (+/-).

## 5.2 Institutional analysis

As described in the previous section, scholars have offered various approaches towards understanding the development of ports, cities and the description of the governance of the port-city interface. Currently, the outcome of spatial plans for the port-city interface have increasingly become complex and cannot (only) be described as a 'rational' economic result of the capacity of technology and availability of land (Daamen & Louw, 2016). This is also described in the research of Van Wijk (2007, p.131) regarding the development of airports as city ports: "*Economic rationalities alone do not suffice in explaining the differences in airport development*". Therefore, the question is what determines the outcome of decision making processes in the port-city interface.

To solve this question, several authors have pointed to the role of institutions in the governance and policy making process in spatial development. Institutions might explain the forces that shape the development of the port-city interface. The outcome of a process in the port-city environment "*depends on the capacity of the port authority to enforce its spatial development decisions onto the other actors*" (Daamen & Vries, 2013).

An analysis of these institutions can help to identify the effective institutions and non-effective institutions (Van Wijk, 2007). Therefore, in this chapter an approach is elaborated to analyse the actions of port and urban actors that, together with institutions, codetermine the outcome of spatial and economic development. Also, this chapter provides insight in how actors respond to new challenges. This is done with the concepts of institutional plasticity and institutional learning.

### 5.2.1 Institutions

Institutions are essentially the rules that steer the (patterns of) behaviour of individuals or organizations. According to Ostrom (2009) an institution can be explained as a set of rules or norms that individuals follow in organizations or groups. Economic institutions have been used since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to explain the processes that shape the economic behaviour of individuals and firms (Rutherford, 2001). In a way, this is about how actors interact with each other in order to make transactions and ultimately 'good' deals. Institutions can enable or constrain (efficient) human interactions (North, 1990). For example, economics institutions may affect the accessibility of markets by creating obstacles for newcomers or restrict the implementation of a more efficient innovation (Van Wijk, 2007). Acemoğlu & Robinson (2012) describe institutions as creating either positive or negative economic incentives to citizens. They state that it are these institutions that are the origin to wealth and poverty. The world view of actors within a certain institutional context is shaped by those same institutions.

'Old institutionalism' focusses merely on the legal and formal rules and structures that would affect individual actions, while 'New Institutionalism' shifted towards the creation, development and character of institutions and the role of actors (Van Wijk, 2007). New institutionalists agree that institutions are the 'rules of the game' (North, 1990; Olstrom, 2009), but make several nuances in the different respective schools.

Hall and Taylor (1996) describe three schools of institutionalism. First, social institutionalism focuses on the understanding of institutions as shaped by norms and culture. With this approach, norms and culture slowly become embedded in policies. Secondly, rational choice institutionalism focuses on the assumption that actors are rational and make strategic decisions based on their historically

developed and fixed preferences. Also, they act based on the expectation of the strategic behaviour of other actors. This means that they view politics and policy making as a collective action dilemma to change or shape institutions to their own (rational) benefit (Van Wijk, 2007, Hall & Taylor, 1996). Thirdly, historic institutionalism emphasizes path dependency. Among other aspects, this school focuses on the historic establishment of institutions and describes the persistent patterns of development within them (North, 1990).

Scott (2001, as cited by Notteboom, De Langen & Jacobs, 2013), provides an overview of institutions and distinguishes three pillars: the regulative, the normative and the cultural-cognitive. Each pillar has its own unique sets of logic and mechanisms. Together they include both the formal and informal rules that shape human behaviour. All institutionalisms rest on the assumption that “rules and systems in any historically given society not only organize and regulate social behaviour but make it understandable – and in limited conditional sense – predictable for those sharing the rule knowledge” (Burns, Baumgarnter & Deville, 1985, as cited by Van Wijk, 2007).

With the institutional framework in mind, we can understand governance processes that shape the development of ports and the port-city interface. Notteboom, De Langen & Jacobs (2013) describe the research stream of economic geography and institutional economics to explain port development. They quote Hall (2003) that emphasised ports resemble ‘local communities of practice’ that are deeply rooted within a particular place. Moreover, Jacobs (2007) argued that institutions resemble ‘territorially rooted structures of power’ and that “ports are subject to ‘regime politics’ in which a variety of actors and interests from various territorial scales interact, conflict and form coalitions.”

### **5.2.2 Actor-centered institutionalism**

There are several elements of all schools that can help us understand the governance processes that shape the port-city interface (Van Wijk, 2007; Notteboom et al., 2013). Actually, from these schools, a fourth school emerged that combines several elements and puts the interaction of actors with institutions central. These are ‘players of the game’. Scharpf (1997) offered a framework called ‘actor-centered institutionalism’. He describes the effect of institutions on the behaviour and capacity of actors in the governance process of policy reform.

This is a more nuanced approach towards the rationality of actors in policy making processes. Actors are assumed to be capable of making purposeful choices to their understanding of a set of alternative actions (Scharpf, 1997), in the sense that they will attempt to maximize their own self-interest with certain set of actions (strategies). However, they only do so to their capacity and with a certain amount of knowledge that they have in a certain governance situation (Daamen & Vries, 2013). They do not necessary act on their prescribed positions and their decisions do not always lead to the most (personal) efficient outcome (Scharpf, 1997; Notteboom, De Langen & Jacobs, 2013). It is important to note that institutions shape actors behaviour, but actors, whether or not combined in alliances, are also capable of changing institutions. There are feedback loops in governance that influence the creation of new rules.

Departing from this notion, the institutional framework can be seen as an array of activities performed by actors involved in the on-going spatial changes inside today’s port–city interface. To study governance processes in the port-city interface, we need a framework that “*recognizes that*

*human knowledge and rationality is bounded, and accepts the context-dependent nature of collective human action” (Daamen & Vries, 2013, p. 6).*

In state-related governance research we often look at composite actors instead of individual actors (Van Wijk, 2007). These are organisations that influence the governance process. However, since only individuals can act intentionally, the capacity to act at this higher level must be produced by internal interactions between individuals (Van Wijk, 2007). Examples are political parties or a port employers association. As individual actors, composite actors have capabilities and actor-orientations.

These actors have preferences, but also give variable importance to phenomena (Maggi, 2015). Institutionalized expectations can create a ‘common knowledge’ on which actors act. Therefore, institutional analysis can identify common knowledge of actors on which they base their actions. For example, Daamen & Vries (2013) discovered that urban planners were anticipating port migration while making plans.

To determine how institutions affect the governance process in the port-city interface, we can follow the approach of actor-centered institutionalism. Since port development then does not necessary solely follow the rationality of economics, nor it is solely based on the ability of clusters to shape port development, the forces that determine port development are derived from the institutional setting. This ‘setting’ shapes actor orientations and their capacity to act strategically. The (political) agenda setting and the governance of strategic transformation will be defined by these institutions. When defined as a force, spatial planning in the port-city can be defined as the ability of actors to shape the port-city interface, as well as their choice to do so. state that for analysing governance processes in the port-city interface, spatial strategies and projects can be considered as the revealed outcomes and therefore are the “*tangible result of the forces at work between city and port*” (Daamen & Vries (2013, p. 6).




Figure 7: Conceptual approach between institutions and actors in the port-city interface (Daamen & Vries, 2013)

### 5.2.3 Institutional analysis

For analyzing institutions, Inam (2002) provides an approach for understanding various levels of institutions in urban planning based on a review of literature in institutional economics and policy making (Table 3). The first level of analysis is the institutional system where all plan making is embedded in, for example the legal framework. Secondly, there are institutions that affect the policy making process. This is where actor interactions come into play: how does the organizational structure affect the way stakeholders interact with each other? The third level is the stated output of a process: the formalized plan. This will reveal the institutions at work and the established power relations: how do actors persuade their interests? (Inam, 2002)

	<b>1. System</b>	<b>2. Structure</b>	<b>3. Output</b>
<b>Description</b>	<b>Political, economic, and legal institutions</b>	<b>Organization of interactions</b>	<b>Stated decision, policy or project</b>
<b>Elements</b>	Legal framework (political rules, agenda control, authority), economic rules (property rights)	Nature of interaction between different groups, nature of legal and political rules	Institutional arrangements, institutional rules and policies, norms and values
<b>Sources of analysis</b>	Analysis of official documents, secondary sources such as similar studies, study of historical archives	Questionnaires, interviews with officials, analysis of official document, secondary sources, study of historical archives	Interviews with officials, first-hand observations of institutional behaviour, analysis of institutional documents (policy documents, official documents), secondary sources (e.g. newspaper accounts, journal articles)

*Table 3: Various levels of institutional analysis and sources. Personally adjusted, derived from: Inam (2002, based on: Eggertsson, 1990; Lane, 1993; Scott, 1995; North, 1990)*

Secondly, in Table 4, the various institutions that are likely to affect plan making in the port-city interface have been described. This is based on a blend of studies focusing on institutional analysis of spatial planning and port-city interface research. While these institutions affect various levels of governance and actors, this research will focus on their influence on port and urban actors in the spatial planning process in the port-city interface. In this thesis, these institutions will be used to see how actors respond to them. Other institutions may be discovered as well during the research.



<b>Institution</b>	<b>Affects</b>	<b>Examples in port-city context (various levels)</b>
<b>Socio-cultural</b>	Ideas Expectations Interpretations Visions Norms Ideology	Shared development orientations Political landscape Planning culture Attitude towards the port Image and reputation Narratives Historic relationship Emotional connection with city/port Trust
<b>Financial</b>	Tax Income Subsidies Price	Harbour fees Incentives Subsidies Price setting
<b>Economic</b>	Land supply Infrastructure access	Lease hold system Land distribution rules Interface land ownership Waterway access rights Site selection
<b>Governance</b>	Structure Planning Political decision making process	Port Authority control Project management Planning style Horizontal and vertical integration Participation
<b>Legal</b>	Laws Regulations	Environmental Law Spatial Planning Act Environmental regulations Permits and licences Legal agreements Ownership rights

*Table 4: Institutions affecting actors and plan making in the port-city interface, personally adjusted, based on Van Wijk (2007) Notteboom et al (2013, based on Scott (2001, p. 52), Daamen & Vries (2013), Baycheva-Merger et al. (2018)*

#### **5.2.4 Institutional change**

In their research regarding sustainable port-city development of European port-cities Daamen & Vries (2013) indicate the differences between ‘business as usual’ and ‘institutional change’. Here, it is evaluated to which extent port cities have adopted new ways of working that indicate a paradigm shift in the governance in the port-city interface in order to foster a sustainable relationship. With understanding institutional change, it can be determined whether actors are aware of the impact

their institutions make. This may affect the process in the reconstruction of this research. Also, an understanding of how institutions change may help to understand how to reform them (Inam, 2002).

Once institutions are established, it is rather difficult to change them. However, institutions are not carved in stone and history has shown that they can be changed. Some institutions may be very persistent due to the fact that they reinforce themselves (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2012). North (1990) argues that historic decisions of actors shape expectations of the future. Also, the ones in power may keep historically developed (but inefficient) institutions alive due to their own self-interests (Hodgson, 1993 as cited by Notteboom, De Langen & Jacobs, 2013). Also, once established in economic structures, dominating through scale or a certain type of standardized technology, may prevent other, more efficient solutions from entering the market. This concept is called institutional lock-in and is important for governance processes in the port environment (Notteboom et al., 2013).

As described in the previous section, due to the bounded rationality of actors, there is no institutional development path towards some sort of optimal, economic rational equilibrium (Notteboom et al., 2013). Therefore, institutional change may be less predictable and change rather abruptly. This can happen through external factors, incremental adaptation and/or deliberate design. In this deliberate (re)design of institutions, actors are, again, subject to their bounded rationality (Boschma and Frenken, 2006, as cited by Notteboom et al., 2013).

Notteboom, De Langen & Jacobs (2013) connect institutional change to (historic) governance routines and path-dependency. Here, they make a distinction between the institutional *setting*, which is the broader set of rules and norms, and the institutional *arrangement*, which focuses on the institutions within organizations. The latter one can be described as 'organisational routines'. In that case, the main driver for institutional changes is stated to be the 'logic of instrumentality', where existing institutional arrangements do not correspond well with the demands of the external environment and act as a barrier to develop or accommodate new routines. Their research to port governance reforms show that when port actors are faced with challenges that cannot be solved with current institutions, they respond with the 'layering and stretching' of those same institutions, without breaking with their fundamental cores and main development path. This phenomenon is called institutional plasticity and proves that institutional change is possible without disruptive breakdown of institutions. However, it also proves that completely breaking with a certain development path is difficult as institutions are persistent. Institutional change can also be achieved as a result of strategic coupling, if actors strategically couple elements from the three institutional pillars (Scott, 2001) to institutionalize certain behaviour or arrangements (Van der Berghe, Jacobs & Boelens, 2018).

Improving port-city governance routines implies that actors must first understand that their current routines do not match with the new situation, or that these routines stand in the way for better solutions. So, whereas institutional change might be unpredictable, institutional learning contributes to the 'intelligence' of planning institutions (Van Wijk, 2007, p. 135). This is beyond exploring new solutions within the given institutional framework. Argyris & Schön (1978) call this 'single loop learning', while institutional learning is about changing the given framework (double loop learning). This is the ability of actors to actively evaluate and redesign institutions that lead to inefficient processes.

There can be two ways of doing this. Internal institutional learning is the way actors and actor coalitions are able to learn from their own institutional problems on the regional and local level, and the ability to change institutional lock-ins and path dependencies. This can be problematic since strategic actors have to evaluate and change their own position and situation. However, on the

other hand these actors are most aware of the specific context they work in (Van Wijk, 2007, p. 136). External learning is based on the ability to learn from other places and organizations. In a globalizing world, more actors face similar problems. However, seen the specific space-dependencies in port-city regions, as described by Notteboom et al. (2013), external learning seems difficult to achieve in a specific port-city context. Such learning processes would at least require policy makers to strongly respect place dependent factors and include all levels of a given institutional context.

In any case, the decision making actors -or the active agency- that create new institutions at the same time interact with the constraining structuring dynamics of the existing institutional arrangement (Inam, 2002). The product 'acts back on the producer'. For this research it is therefore interesting to see *whether* decision makers actually change their course of behaviour after they see that their current routines are not leading to the desired results and why, or that these actors are unaware of any need for institutional change.

## 5.3 Spatial planning as policy making

### 5.3.1 Planning organizations

Effective planning organizations are a major means for providing a city the sustainable capacity to solve critical urban problems (Inam, 2002). *“Policies initiated by planning institutions are likely to depend on issues such as how institutions<sup>2</sup> can organize their policy formulation and implementation to cope with the growing complexity, uncertainty and change of urban development problems”* (Rondinelli, 1993, as cited by Inam, 2002, p. 44). This idea resembles the challenge that governments are faced with in governing the port-city interface.

This means that urban planning is connected to political institutions. Since the Garden City of in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, governments and urban planners are trying to shape cities based on their ideologies (Provoost, 2018). This happened as a response to the challenges of the industrial revolution and rapid urbanization. Spatial planning developed towards a practice ‘for the good of the people’. Before that time, urban development was informal, or guided by the likes of industry, transport and the ruling class.

During the 20<sup>th</sup> century the ‘masterplan’ was commissioned. New cities and urban areas were now carefully planned by professionals. This was needed to cope with the problems of rapid urbanisation. Organic development led to too much chaos and hazardous conditions. Governments around the world also used urban planning as a tool for the ‘makeable society’ (Provoost, 2018). Since that time architects, urbanists and politicians have argued whether the built environment should be a physical distillation of the flows of market and society or as a way to shape markets and societies themselves. The rapid urbanisation challenge allowed to experiment with, and research socially engineered cities. At the end, the built environment is a mix and balance of market and government forces. Societies have regulated the amount of influence of both. These have formed institutionalised national systems. In Western and European democracies, these can be distinguished as the following (derived from Winch, p.21):

1. **The Anglo-Saxon type:** Reliance on liberal market values with low levels of state regulation.
2. **Corporatist type:** More willingness to intervene in the market to protect social values
3. **State-led:** More coordination of the economy by the state

Urban planning is therefore political: either it promotes the values of the dominant social class in democracies, or it influences the allocation of public resources while regulating market forces. Therefore, “the actions of governmental organizations must be examined in the context of the broader pattern of human relationships concerned with the authoritative allocation of values: the political system” (Dahl, 1976, as cited by Danielson & Jameson, 1982).

In the last couple of decades, politicians, architects and urbanists have argued which urban form suits ‘best’ to promote a set of predefined qualities and values. Famous example are the discussions between modernists and traditionalists. At the faculty of Architecture in Delft there was a long and ongoing debate between the 1930’s until the 1960’s between the traditionalist school like Granpré Molière that valued the human scale and interaction and architectural beauty, and on the other

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<sup>2</sup> Institutions referred to as planning organizations, not norms and rules as described in the previous chapter

hand there are the modernist and functionalist professors that embraced new technologies and valued functionality<sup>3</sup>. In 1963, Jane Jacobs promoted much more integrated 'human scale' urbanity as a response to modernism<sup>4</sup>. Logically, the urban form defines the complexity of the challenges where planning institutions have to cope with.

### 5.3.2 Strategic transformation

Governments are concerned and intervene in spatial planning and urban development to promote efficient use of land, economic development and environmental protection. Wong & Watkins (2009) describe it as "*making land available, and its efficient use for development in line with economic, social and environmental objectives to improve people's quality of life*". Policy makers have three ways of shaping markets to achieve (public) goals. The first one is by producing and communicating plans and visions, the second one is by changing the institutional environment and the third one is by strategic market transformation (Adams & Tiesdell, 2013, p. 135, 204).

Governmental bodies, like provinces and municipalities, often produce documents to show how certain places should develop (Adams & Tiesdell, 2013, p. 209). Strategic transformation is one step further than plan making. It describes an urban development project of a scale "beyond attainable by a single market actor, or by an informal combination of actors" by shaping the right circumstances that promote development (Adams & Tiesdell, 2013, p. 209, 222). The intervention here is to shape institutional arrangements in such a way that place development delivers 'collective goods' that cannot be achieved by informal and separate market transactions.

In the case of Haven-Stad, the intention of the municipality to transform port lands to urban areas to "*offer an environment unique to the Metropolitan Region that will improve the position of the city and the region as a whole*" (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017, p. 12). The transformation itself is strategic, and the municipality needs to form institutional arrangements to achieve that. The provision of land for development and management of collective action is key here. Therefore, in the port-city interface this does not only imply the coordination of action and investment between plan makers and real estate developers, it also implies a renewed arrangement between port and city. The provision of land, either for port exploitation or urban development, is an economic institution. The process to decide how it is divided is embedded in legal and governance institutions.

In order to develop or regenerate an area that is not well known to the public yet or has a bad reputation, a person or governmental body is needed to guide a 'place' to a new future. Effective leadership is important because it "drives forward action, breeds confidence and widens participation (Adams & Tiesdall, 2013, p. 234). The municipality, by being a powerful and public actor, has the responsibility to achieve results for the benefit of the people and simultaneously be transparent about its agenda, rationality and decisions. Its actions (its statements, decisions, policies) can influence the development process as a whole.

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<sup>3</sup> Personal interviews from '*Fin de Siècle*' by study association Stylos TU Delft (1991)

<sup>4</sup> Her book 'The Death and Life of Great American Cities (1963)

### 5.3.3 Political decision making process

Unlike other political decision making processes, strategic spatial planning has the capacity to shape institutions by creating visions, plans and seduce actors (Inam, 2002). Spatial development in the port-city interface can be seen as economic policy reform, since the land use of port lands is changed to achieve political goals. Some institutions (or rules of the game) will enable interaction between actors in this process, some rules of the game will hamper these. Some institutions create arenas where various actors could interact, as well as occasions or reasons to do so (Mayntz & Scharpf, 1995, as cited by Van Wijk, p. 132, 2007). It is the political decision making process that creates and simultaneously interacts with institutions, either promoting or obstructing effective planning.

Van Wijk (2007, p. 138) describes three ways in which the institutional setting affects the political decision making process:

1. It co-determines the relationship of power and influence between actors
2. It influences the nature and style of decision making, which is sensitive to preferences of actors
3. It determines the intensity and scale of policy problems and the political agenda (Visser & Hemereijck, 1998)

As means to analyse political decision making process, we need an approach to define when and how certain policy is pushed through (i.e.: *formalized*). This process entails the way new policy is discussed, debated and formulated before a formal vote in a democratic institution, such as a municipality. As stated before, spatial plans can be considered as policies for strategic land use reform in order to create both private and socio-economic benefits. This research will focus on the quality of the process and output of such a decision making process.

For analytical purposes, we need to understand when and how (certain parts of) policy is pushed through. Therefore, the planning process is divided in several planning 'episodes'. These are the 'key moments' in the decision making process that shapes the development process. In order to determine how policy entrepreneurs were able to push reform agendas through time, we can look at policy window theory of Kingdon (1984). Although in the work of Kingdon, the 'policy entrepreneur' was vaguely described (Rawat & Morris, 2016) and is based on research in mainly the American health care sector, it can offer a framework to understand policy change initiated by municipalities.

Kingdon (1984, p.21) states that: "*The separate streams of problems, policies, and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favourable political forces*". In the case of urban transformation in port areas, policy change entails the set of the formalized idea to change land use. This idea is pushed by spatial planners or politicians. The three 'streams' are explained below:

#### 1. Problems

This is a perceived problem by policy entrepreneurs. According to Kingdon, the problem stream is essential for agenda setting. In case of a crisis, extensive news coverage and public attention attributes to the opening of policy window. Policy entrepreneurs perceive the problem to be solvable with government intervention (Béland & Howlett, 2016). Problems are implicit: they are

based on the perception of an 'ideal situation'. Spatial plans developed by governments are, due to their nature, tightly connected to a perception of an ideal situation, as will be described later. Problems and policy makers find each other through public attention, for example through action groups. These groups try to convince other actors of the same problem in order to gain attention and broaden support for change. Concerning the case in this thesis, such problems could be a shortage of (affordable) housing and pollution.

## **2. Politics**

The colour of the political landscape should be determined in order to see if there is support for certain policies. A change in power could increase the chances for policy reform. Also, politicians are capable of addressing and defining problems and challenges.

## **3. Policy + Technology (Solution)**

This can be explained as a set of options where policy makers can choose from to solve a certain problem. These 'solutions' can be described as feasible outcomes of analysis by experts (Béland & Howlett, 2016). Policy entrepreneurs will seek ways to solve problems that make certain solutions possible, think about innovative and creative (technical) solutions.

A redevelopment strategy is therefore a promise to solve a predefined problem. When we view urban area redevelopment in the port-city interface as the strategic reform of institutions, it can be explained as policy reform. We can use the policy window approach to determine how and when policy entrepreneurs are able to push certain transformation agendas through. When we understand this, it can help us to understand why other, maybe better, solutions are not formalized. In other words: to understand what the political rationality is to push certain policy reform, when that happens and based on what assumptions.

### **5.3.4 Strategic action and coupling**

Institutions and political decision making do not automatically facilitate strategic transformation. In order to formalize stated goals, actors may use strategic coupling to strengthen their agenda and shape the development of the port-city interface. The political decision making process therefore has to be seen in relation to strategic behaviour of powerful actors.

Strategic transformation can be seen as a result of strategic coupling. Strategic coupling is a concept from economic geography, that describes the process of matching local assets with global network demands. While especially true for port development, like in the case for establishing port infrastructure, this approach can also be used to explain spatial development in the port-city interface. This is explained by Van den Berghe, Jacobs & Boelens (2018):

In physical form, strategic coupling is about the provision of land use. Understanding port transformation as a way to provide highly demanded land for urban functions can therefore be understood as strategic coupling. Next to this, discourse and narratives are known to align various actors around one agenda. The importance of story-telling has grown in the past decades, especially in port transformation projects (Ameel, 2017). This can be done by producing future visions, images, models and by telling stories by framing past, present and future (Van Hulst, 2012). Lastly, the

institutional form is by stretching and layering institutional arrangements, or by formalizing strategic connections between different spatial policies Van den Berghe et al (2018). All three forms have their 'tactical' variant: temporary use, endorsements and temporary coalitions for example. This may in the end lead to the formalization and establishment of structural couplings. The understanding of these couplings may attribute to the understanding how urban and port actors are performing strategic actions to formalize their preferred development path.

However, due to the existing institutional arrangement, some actors have more capacity to behave strategically. For example, a municipality has the right and resources to set the political agenda, produce plans, define visions and even formalize them. In this research we will call this this the capacity for strategic action. This has to be seen in relation to institutions, where power is derived from, and the political decision making process.



## 5.4 Conclusion

### How can we understand urban development in the port-city interface?

Urban development management is about transforming land for the good of society, economy and environment. It is concerned with designing strategic spatial interventions to achieve certain public and private goals. Port development is concerned with the systematic exploitation of port lands and infrastructure. Institutions have been established to govern the relation between port and city. However, this relationship is contested.

As Hoyle (1989) concludes: *“Waterfront redevelopment is here to stay as a reflection of maritime technology and transport and as a feature of urban development.”* This emphasizes the two different ‘worlds’ that need to be (re)connected in port cities globally. Both worlds have different capacities, orientations and objectives. The question therefore is which institutions are affecting the process of plan making in the port-city interface. These can be revealed by analysing spatial projects within it.

The analytical model in Figure 8 below, conceptualizes the planning process as a stream of various planning episodes. These episodes end with formalized policy (revealed outcome). This outcome can be evaluated through a measurement of its integrated aspects regarding scale, sectors and agencies. Spatial projects in the port-city interface reveal the relationship between port and city and their institutional arrangements. Integrated project will lead to converging development paths, disintegrated projects lead to conflict.




Figure 8: Analytical framework for understanding the plan making process in the port-city interface (own illustration, 2019)

Conflicts between port and city can occur if policies are adopted with conflicting interests. Non-integrated and not inclusive plans inherently carry the potential of conflicting interests, certainly in places with increased complexity. Integrated development is therefore key to achieve successful waterfront redevelopment projects. This is about integration of *scales, sectors and agencies*. With this perspective, it can be understood on which aspect conflicts may arise. Therefore, plans can converge or diverge port-city actors.

The port-city interface is spatially shaped along the lines of the existing institutional arrangement. This arrangement evolves through time. It is impacted and balanced through an interaction between active policy reform and emergent evolution of society and economy. Some urban actors seek to transform port lands towards urban use. Understanding the ability to push those decisions towards transformational politics is vital in understanding how land use in the port city interface changes.

Formal rules shape institutions, but in a plan-making process, actions are not solely derived from them. Actors often follow other rules, like social norms, culture or ideas about a general development orientation. While actors try to achieve outcomes that suits their interests best, their rationality is bounded. Institutions therefore interact with actors and this co-defines the outcomes of governance processes in the port-city interface. Spatial planning in the port-city interface is both about the capacity of actors to act strategically and form (new) institutional arrangements, as well as about the institutional setting they operate in.

Politicians have their own beliefs and goals about what is good for the city, and will strive to achieve those goals. Therefore the municipality is not a neutral player. The Board of Aldermen and the council can strategically assign tasks to public servants. In the political decision making arena, certain solutions are formalized. A certain -bounded- political rationality drives formalization of policy. The municipality is a powerful actor, since it has the ability to strategically shape markets and set the political agenda. The policy window theory helps to understand the political decision making process: when, how and why policy is formalized.

In this research we analyse the actors with shared development orientations and the capacity to act strategically: This is either the 'port', which orientation is based on economic exploitation of port lands, or the 'city', following a political and urban rationality. We will look at the way these two actors interact with each other and what decisions and policies result from that.

## 6 Context

## 6.1 The Case: Amsterdam Haven-Stad

### 6.1.1 Introduction

Developed around a dam in the river Amstel since the 11<sup>th</sup> century, Amsterdam is the capital of the Netherlands with a population of approximately 860.000 (metropolitan area 1,4 million)<sup>5</sup>. The city is culturally one of the most diverse in the world and has a long history of trade<sup>6</sup>. It has developed a strong creative and financial sector. Amsterdam is located in the Hamburg-Le-Havre range of north western European port-cities and takes the 4<sup>th</sup> place in terms of cargo throughput<sup>7</sup>.

The port has historically been intertwined with the city. After the North Sea Canal in 1876, spatial port development shifted to the west of the city (Wiegmans & Louw, 2010). With the development of new deep water harbours closer to the North Sea, the older ports were abandoned. The municipality decided to redevelop these areas to waterfront neighbourhoods with housing and commercial developments in the late 1970's in a first wave of modern waterfront revitalization.

The municipality of Amsterdam has a long history of urban planning. Its canals and housing projects are marked as UNESCO World Heritage. In the last decennia, the municipality has experimented with new models of urban planning in IJburg (Adams & Tiesdell, 2013) and the South Axis (Zuidas). Majoor (2009) describes a long lasting dynamic process of strategy making and negotiation in urban planning in Amsterdam. The city's urban planning culture is also characterized by its leasehold system and its relatively progressive left-wing politics. The city focuses on sustainability, diversity and affordability policies (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2006, 2010, 2014, 2016, 2018).

As a solution for a currently perceived housing crisis, the city is increasingly looking to intensify land use in the city. One of the biggest of these projects is Haven-Stad: a new city in the port.




Figure 9: Spatial development of port (red) versus city (grey) (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017, p.14)

<sup>5</sup> CBS (2018)

<sup>6</sup> De Haven van Amsterdam – Zeven Eeuwen van Ontwikkeling (2009)

<sup>7</sup> Port of Amsterdam (2018)

### 6.1.2 Haven-Stad

Amsterdam Haven-Stad is a spatial development in the Western part of Amsterdam. The complete project describes the transformation of the industrial area between transportation hub Sloterdijk, the city centre and Zaandam. The ambition is to develop the whole area within the highway A10 into a mixed use area. This would allow for a higher density and more (social) sustainability (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017). The total development volume until 2040 includes (2018):

- 40.000 to 70.000 dwellings for up to 150.000 residents
- 45.000 58.000 jobs
- 40 new schools and cultural amenities

The proposed neighbourhood is characterized by a mix of light production and housing and short travel distances. The urban planners of the municipality stress that this will be a neighbourhood with real creative manufacturing jobs. “*Work in the same street where you live*” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017). The entire neighbourhood would preserve industrial maritime artefacts to give it a ‘raw’ and authentic identity.




Figure 10: Location of Haven-Stad within Amsterdam (adjusted, Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017)

Development and transformation has already started in the light industry and business areas around Sloterdijk. The municipality expects that from 2029 onwards development can start around or in the Coenhaven and Vlothaven. It tries to make deals and arrangements with existing companies to preserve them for the city (AT5, 2017).

The Minervahaven between Houthavens and the Coenhaven, is already developed. An incremental transformation from industry to creative industries (examples Theatre of Amsterdam and the

headquarters of Tommy Hilfiger) has taken place. According to developers, some of the office buildings can easily be transformed to housing when industry across the water move away (AT5, 2017).

### **6.1.3 Port of Amsterdam**

The Port of Amsterdam is located in the Hamburg – Le Havre range of North-western European seaport. These seaports compete with each other, because they serve the same hinterland and have access to the densely populated and economic strong European regions.

The Port Authority of Amsterdam has three main tasks (Port of Amsterdam, 2017):

1. Provide optimal service and business climate for companies in the port region
2. The construction and maintenance of port infrastructure, the renewal of the port and the exploitation of the harbour area
3. Improve safety, speed and sustainability in the North Sea Canal

#### **Economic profile**

The area where Haven-Stad is planned contributes for 23% of added value of the port of Amsterdam and 7% (€2,7 billion) to the total economic added value of Amsterdam. It houses 1400 companies that offer 34.000 jobs (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013). Current revenues for the Port of Amsterdam from the planning area of Haven-Stad (Coenhaven, Vlothaven, Minervahaven, Hempoint) is €12,7 million (2013) and 12% of total revenues. The municipality of Amsterdam is the only stakeholder of the Port of Amsterdam. Any developments in the area will impact these revenues. Due to transformation, in 2040 the total loss of revenues could be between €128 to €293 million (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017).

Almost 80% of the transshipments in metric tonnes is concerned with the processing or shipment of fossil fuels (Port of Amsterdam, 2017, p. 24). Since the Paris Agreement in 2015, counties worldwide have committed to heavily decrease their dependency on fossil fuels in the coming decades. The strategy of the Port Authority is now striving for a coal-free harbour in 2030 (Port of Amsterdam, 2015). The Port Authority wants to invest in circularity, biofuels, wind energy and lastly smart-grids, to become the 'battery of Amsterdam' (Port of Amsterdam, 2017). This is stated in their Strategic Plan for 2024. Simultaneously, it wants to attract more cruise passengers, important for the tourism industry in the region. Therefore a new Passenger Terminal needs to be constructed somewhere along the banks of the IJ. The exact position is still undetermined, but the Coenhaven (an industrial area) is also an option. Lastly, a new lock will be opened in IJmuiden in 2019 to allow for the largest vessels in the world (Rijkswaterstaat, 2018). Due to tunnels underneath the North Sea Canal like the Velsertunnel, the maximum depth for ships is 13,25 meters.

#### **Clusters**

The paper of Jansen & Van Dongen (2012) describes the importance of certain clusters for the economic power in the region. The clusters agriculture & food, wood & paper, metal, and energy are closely tied to the service industry in the city. To develop further to an important 'smart port', the

city needs to further tie the knowledge economy with the physical harbour industry. In other words, it needs to connect the city with the port.

Altogether, this means that big parts of the western harbour area will need to transform (as well) to cope with the changing type of cargo and industries. This applies mostly for the industrial activity: the 59 page strategic document of the Port Authority (Strategisch Plan 2019-2024) does not mention anything about future residential developments yet.

#### **6.1.4 Environmental zones**

The companies in Haven-Stad can be categorized through their environmental 'zone'. This is important because of the implementation urban functions: only companies that are suitable with housing can remain or return. In general the companies in the area can be divided in three types, that fall in five environmental categories:

##### **1. Heavy maritime industry (VNG Category 5<sup>8</sup>)**

Big industrial companies. These companies have large facilities, work 365 days a year and 24 hours a day. They produce a lot of noise, odour and dust. Very capital intensive and have expensive machinery. Other examples is a concrete factory.

##### **2. Moderate industry (VNG Category 3-4)**

Warehouses, production and logistic services.

##### **3. Light and service industry (VNG Category 1-2)**

Service, commercial activities, offices (theatre, Tommy Hilfiger)

Haven-Stad is big planning area, and the context is different in its different subparts. To assess if the plan makers have a different approach towards different areas, we look at 2 different sub-areas in Haven-Stad: Sloterdijk I South (small businesses, light industry) and the Coenhaven and Vlothaven (multinationals, heavy maritime industry). Also, the process of Sloterdijk is further advanced and can therefore be informative regarding the municipalities' findings and experiences with transformation in the area thus far. The challenges for the Coenhaven and Vlothaven are more complex but currently the plans for these areas are currently just ambitions.

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<sup>8</sup> VNG Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten, association of Dutch municipalities. Has published guidelines for environmental norms in urban planning




Figure 11: Urban transformation and environmental zones of the port (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2016)




Figure 12: Analysis of land ownership and planning areas Sloterdijk I South and Coenhaven-Vlothaven in Haven-Stad. Complete version in Appendix. (Own illustration, 2018, based on data from Port of Amsterdam, 2018; Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017)



## 1. Sloterdijk I – South

Preparation for development has begun since 2015. The area is dominated by light industry and offices, but is more or less mixable with new functions like housing. The area is just outside the exploitation area of the Port Authority. The area is predominantly in leasehold, but some private owners do exist as well. See Figure 11 and 12 for its location within the Haven-Stad planning area.

**Ownership:** Mostly land lease, but fragmented among private owners and companies  
**Function mix:** Light industry and services, mixing with housing is mostly possible  
**Municipal strategy:** Change zoning plan, invest in public space and infrastructure. Owners and developers are initiators for actual development and transformation. Gradual change.

The Sloterdijk I South development is a remnant of an older version of the Haven-Stad Transformation Strategy (Moons, Personal Interview, 9-11-2018). In the light of this Transformation Strategy, a Strategy is presented on 17 May 2016. Since 2015 market parties have actively approached the municipality to develop and invest in this area. In April and May 2015 there were workshops with existing companies and interested developers to see their response to the plans.

The approach for Sloterdijk is facilitative: it sets out rules of the game and facilitates the process. The development strategy is based on a grid with blocks. These blocks are currently in possession by a variety of owners. They have leasehold contracts ending in 2018 up to 2050 (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2016, p. 15). Transformation will be phased per block. The Municipality estimates that there can be between 1.000 to 2.600 can be added to the area. In 2015, there are still a few Category 3 and 4 companies present. Research is conducted to see how to deal with them. The Strategy states that the market will decide how quickly and with what volume the area will transform. The estimated GREX is between € –20 million and € 7 million (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2016, p. 23).

## 2. Coenhaven and Vlothaven

This area is characterized by heavy maritime industry. Housing and mixed use is not possible with current owners, so future development would go hand in hand with serious implications for existing businesses. This area is managed by the Port Authority that rents and subleases the land. After previous legal battles a buffer is installed between the Coenhaven and the rest of the city, preventing urban development before 2029. This is described in the Covenant Agreement between 3 big companies in the area, the municipality and the Province of North Holland. See Figure 11 and 12 for its location in the Haven-Stad planning area.

**Ownership:** Leasehold, and rented through Port Authority (economic owner of lands) Waterways by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management  
**Environmental category:** Heavy maritime industry, mixing with housing not possible

The development of Haven-Stad, a very large area, is defined by the triangle of three main players that influence the process: the municipality of Amsterdam, the Port Authority and the existing users/owners of the area.

The most environmentally intrusive companies in the area are not publicly traded so not all information is available. However, based on their own websites and reports, a brief company profile

can be made:

**Amfert (ICL Fertilizers)** (Amports.nl, 2017)

*Israeli company*

Concerned with: Production and distribution of fertilizer  
Headquarters: Amsterdam (since 2015, 300 jobs)  
Located since: 1906  
Revenue (2015): \$6,7 billion (€7,7 billion [2018])  
Number of jobs: 180  
End of leasehold: 2034, possibly up to 2044

**Cargill/IGMA Bulk Terminal/Bunge** (Cargill B.V. Netherlands) (IGMA, 2018)

*American family business*

Concerned with: Agro-industrial company, innovation in food. Grain, oil and cocoa (Amsterdam, Zaandam). Partly sold to Bunge.  
Employees: 300 in port, 500 at HQ, Schiphol  
Headquarters: Amsterdam  
Located since: 1934  
Revenue (2014): \$109,7 billion (€120 billion) (all businesses combined worldwide)  
End of leasehold: 2017, option to 2042 (combined with several smaller leasehold contracts without options)

**Eggerding Industrial Minerals BV** (Eggerding, 2018)

*Part of concern Eggerding Holding B.V*

Concerned with: Transshipment of minerals, fuels, chemical products  
Headquarters: Amsterdam (since start), 5 other companies part of the holding  
Located since: Early 20<sup>th</sup> century  
Revenue: Unknown  
Employees: Unknown  
End of leasehold: 2035 with option until 2085

The Coenhaven and Vlothaven are important harbours for internationally operating industrial conglomerates (Port of Amsterdam, 2016). The deep sea water harbour allows for big bulk cargo ships. This has allowed a few companies to grow to important junctions in the worldwide trade of minerals, organic products and oil. These companies have a long history in Amsterdam, dating back to the early 1900's. They have a strong connection with the city, as shows the presence of their (regional) headquarters in the city. The companies are part of worldwide networks and play an important role in the production and distribution of mainly food and energy.

In contrast to more 'flexible' economic activities in the planning area of Amsterdam Haven-Stad, beforementioned companies have stated they are heavily invested in their current location due to capital intensive facilities like machinery, silos and cranes are other fixed long-term investments<sup>9</sup>.

In short, this means that these companies are not likely to move (soon) on their own. The companies stated that a move would dramatically disturb their daily workflow, and heavy investments in a new location may not be viable while the current plants are still returning on previous investment (Amports.nl, 2015).

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<sup>9</sup> Statement of spokesperson of companies in local news programme AT5 (20-6-2017)

### 6.1.5 Stakeholders

According to the division of integration in scale, sectors and agencies, the following key stakeholders in the development process have been identified as subject for study (see Table 5 below). It will be evaluated whether their interests are integrated in the policy or not.

	<b>1. Scale</b>	<b>2. Sectors</b>	<b>3. Agencies</b>
<b>Definition</b>	Supra-national, national, regional and local spatial policies	Economy, Mobility, Environment	Public, private, non-profit organizations
<b>Applies to</b>	Consistency of spatial policies of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Municipality of Amsterdam</li> <li>• Metropolitan Region and members (MRA/VRA + North Sea Canal Area (NZKG))</li> <li>• Province of North Holland</li> <li>• National Government</li> </ul>	The coherency of policy with the departments of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spatial Planning</li> <li>• Economic Affairs</li> <li>• Mobility Department</li> <li>• Land Department</li> <li>• Engineering Office</li> <li>• Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management (RWS)</li> </ul>	Plans including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Port Authority</li> <li>• Port users (companies)</li> <li>• Company associations (ORAM)</li> <li>• Investors and real estate developers</li> </ul>

*Table 5: Stakeholders per scale, sector and agency in the Haven-Stad development (own illustration, based on Adams & Tiesdell, 2013)*

There are several advisory boards, experts, citizen groups and other stakeholders involved in the development process of Haven-Stad. Due to the scope of this research, focusing on the interactions between port and city. Therefore, these groups are not included. Their impact on the planning process will however be mentioned if this is relevant to the outcome.

## 6.2 Institutional context

### 6.2.1 National planning system

The Netherlands has a national framework that can be described as the 'Corporatist type' (Winch, 2010). This means that there is generally willingness to intervene in the market to protect social values.

In the Netherlands, spatial planning is a governmental task. Through the Spatial Planning Act governmental bodies decide how land is used on a certain location. However, since the late seventies market parties become increasingly important (Reiswijzer Gebiedsontwikkeling, 2011, p.14). In a liberalising economy, market parties were increasingly approached for their experience in complex area developments and the realisation of a more diverse real estate programme. However, until the economic crisis of 2008, municipalities were most of the time still active as risk bearing stakeholders in an urban area (re)development process (De Zeeuw, 2017). Due to losses on the ground exploitation in the economic crisis, municipalities started shifting their role from a planning and entrepreneurial role towards a visionary and facilitating one (Wicherson, 2011).

Altogether the trend towards a more organic and incremental urban development and the new, more passive role of the municipality leads to a less structured development process. However, in large scale, very complex projects with a long development horizon, leadership is needed (De Zeeuw, 2017).

After the economic crisis in the 1980s cities realised that internationalisation of the economy and the government structure would increase interregional competition in Europe (Commissie Grote Steden (Montijn, 1989, cited in Salet, 2003). Close collaboration within the region was necessary to ensure an edge in the external competition. Regional partnerships were the key here (Salet, 2003, p. 180). This led to the elaboration of a powerful strategy for combining spatial planning and government structure.

On a national level, urbanisation is currently seen as a way to strengthen the Dutch economy through competitive advantages of agglomerations and metropolises (Vereniging Deltametropool, 2015). The College for Governmental Advisory (College van Rijksadviseurs, Cra) and think tanks like Delta Metropolis Netherlands (Vereniging Deltametropool) advocate in different publications and letters to densify our villages in cities. This is needed for *"sustainable urbanisation"* and *"to capture agglomeration advantages that we simply lack because of the competition of bigger European metropolises like Berlin, London and Paris"* (Van der Pol, 2010). Another major concern is the protection of the 'green cultural heritage' around the cities.

### 6.2.2 Planning institutions in Amsterdam

The municipality of Amsterdam has several legal tools to steer land-use and urban development:

- Define land use in zoning plans and set conditions
- Make plans and define future ambitions  
A municipality is free to set ambitions and project future developments, in order to channel

resources towards developing and realising them

- Leasehold system  
This is a strong urban development tool (Hobma, Personal Interview, 10-11-2018): For urban area development it is very important to be in line with the end dates of leasehold contract: “accelerating and buying out is very expensive”.
- It is strategic owner of port lands and has the right to reclaim land when needed for transformation (Port of Amsterdam, 2018)
- Environmental law (creative and innovative interpretations can lead to a greater solution space, De Roo, 2003)
- Pre-emption rights  
The pre-emption right is applicable when plan is put in a structure vision or zoning plan first (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, Appendix 3, p. 69).
- Expropriation rights

The municipalities’ influence in urban land policy is relatively large because of the system of leasehold. This means the city always owns the land, but leases it to the party using it. Based on the function of the use, a residual land value is determined. In the leasehold contract, various agreements can be made (private law), adding to more general zoning plans (public law)<sup>10</sup>.

In some transformation areas, the municipality of Amsterdam cannot bring new lands to the market since they are already sold or leased under the land lease system. Therefore, in the transformation project Hamerkwartier for example, the municipality choose for a combined strategy of ‘seduction and guidance’ through private and public law (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2016). For example, an exception is made from the 40-40-20 rule to a maximum of 30 percent social housing. All developers that want to build need to negotiate with the municipality. The current zoning plan is deliberately not changed. 70% of the area consists of land lease contracts, these contracts need to be re-negotiated when the use of the land changes. “Market parties should be free to respond to market dynamics, but every project is evaluated along the current policies for the area”, states an urban planner of the municipality<sup>11</sup>.

In the NDSM area, the general and flexible urban vision may have been a bit too loose. Project manager Harder is interviewed by Zonneveld (2017), stating that she would have liked “more control” in the area. “*Mix of functions is very important in this developments, we are afraid the ratio will be too much housing. Also, social housing may end up as a leftover category and an additional school is needed.*” The municipality is currently negotiating additional terms with developers in their land lease contracts. Harder finally states she would have liked more influence in the way high rise buildings are planned to achieve a better urban design (Zonneveld, 2017).

One of the other tools the municipality can steer with, is different legislation regarding ‘use space’ of functions. This regulates the intrusive effects of environmental pollution (Borgers & Fikke, 2016).

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<sup>10</sup> Explanation from Fred Hobma, Personal Interview (10-11-2018)

<sup>11</sup> Interview with NUL20 magazine (Boer, 2017)

There exists different rules regarding environmental and building quality, but the system is set to be simplified. In the current legislation of the Crisis and Recovery Act already more flexibility is possible because it assesses 'perceived pollution' instead of the source of pollution. This means that it is not necessary to draw strict borders around potentially harmful activities. The Act allows for tailor made solutions like a 'deaf' façade to cope with noise. Of course, standards for environmental pollution do still exist: residents cannot experience noise levels above 55-60 dB. In the new Environmental Law this way of working is implanted even further. Municipalities can be creative with solutions for pollution when mixing functions. The new Environmental Law aims at the protection and effective use of space (Borgers & Fikke, 2016), thus an important tool for mixed use developments and the transformation of industrial areas where companies are still active.

Juridically, a company needs to be fairly compensated when its land and its property is expropriated. The leasehold and rental contracts in the port of Amsterdam however are governed by private law. The High Council (2014) concluded that expropriation 'for the common benefit' through the expropriation law, which is governed by public law, can be applied on a private contract. Lease holders and tenants are therefore less compensated and have a weaker position. However, in this case of transformation, it can be expected that the municipality would make an effort to relocate companies towards a comparable situation. Firstly to protect economic functions and jobs, but secondly to keep transformation costs lower while also filling issuable land in the municipality.

Environmental zones will be updated and simplified in the new Environment and Planning Act: Therefore the current categorization made by the Dutch Association of Municipalities (Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeente, VNG) is not updated after 2009 (VNG, 2009). The guideline system for the perimeter around industrial activity is a so called 'motivated guideline'. This means that municipalities can deviate from the ranges set for different types of industrial activity, but they always need to motivate this decision with thorough investigation that proves that the living quality is guaranteed.

### **6.2.3 Governance of plan-making**

In 2006, the 'Plaberum 2.0' working method was introduced in Amsterdam (NUL20, 2005). The amount of phases was reduced and participation was streamlined. New is the Development Strategy to assess the risks and feasibility of a plan. Following the description on NUL20 (2005), the usual planning process is as follows:

#### **Phase 1: Strategy**

Will lead to a strategy decision which entails check and decision moments, public clients and approval of the project.

#### **Phase 2: Research**

Leads to a project decision that states the financial framework, design, ground exploitation, public client, and approval of the project by the council.

#### **Phase 3: Programme and design**

Leads to an investment decision in the council. Here, the desired programme is stated with the projected costs and benefits. Followed by a selection of a market party.

#### **Phase 4: Execution**

Lead to execution decisions in the council. Contracts with developers and investing in public space and infrastructure.

According to the municipality of Amsterdam, these are the ways stakeholders can engage in the plan making process<sup>12</sup>:

- Get in touch with a council member
- Speech at the Commission for Spatial Planning (2 minutes)
- Write a letter to the council
- Start a citizen initiative or organize a referendum
- Public hearing
- Object or advise during their inspection period (usually 6 weeks)

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<sup>12</sup> Ways to influence decision making processes (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2018)  
<https://www.amsterdam.nl/bestuur-organisatie/gemeenteraad/werkt-raad/invloed-uitoefenen/>





# 7 Empirical Research

## 7.1 Introduction

This chapter will explore the plan making and political decision making process surrounding Haven-Stad. There is plan making, negotiation, political discussion and formalization of policy that eventually led to the Development Strategy of Haven-Stad. The process is divided in four separate planning 'episodes', that were determined in retrospect as key moments in the process. These were the moments where policy is formalized that affected the development process. The previously mentioned policy window theory has helped to identify these moments. Analysing the outcomes of such processes we will be able to identify the forces that shape them. Also, the rationality of decisions will be uncovered.

The reconstruction will at first describe the historical context wherein the development of Haven-Stad is embedded. This refers to the general development lines of city and port up to the point where plan making for Haven-Stad commences: a series of events that lead to thinking about urban development in the western port areas. Secondly, the primary planning process of Haven-Stad is described. This is the process of the creation and formalization of the main spatial planning policy documents of the municipality and the Port Authority. These are:

- 1) Rediscovering the Waterfront (1985-2009)
- 2) Haven-Stad: 3 Future Perspectives (2006-2011)
- 3) Haven-Stad: Transformation Strategy (2011-2013) and;
- 4) Haven-Stad: Development Strategy (2016-2017)

Aside from a historical reconstruction, the flow of events is put into critical perspective of integrated plan making for waterfront redevelopment.

What will be put under attention is who is working on plans and how much the interest of several stakeholders are integrated in the plan. Even more important is which stakeholders are not participating in plan making, who is not invited to join plan making or whose interests are put aside or are subordinated. The effect that that external feedback has on plans is described as well as the structure of the participation process.

After the formalization of each planning document the planning process is evaluated: when do actors come to integrated plan-making, and when do they diverge. The divergence is visible both as a result of an unintegrated process which leads to an unintegrated plan, as well as the consistency of its physical characteristics and the lines of reasoning.

Information in this chapter is derived from personal interviews with urban planners, public servants, former politicians of the council and Board of Mayor and Aldermen, developers, members and leaders of the Haven-Stad project team and the Port of Amsterdam. Central is also the documentation of all council meetings and commission meetings for Spatial Planning of 2016 and 2017 discussing the subject of Haven-Stad, as well as the Municipal Archives, legal judgements, a media analysis, company data and transaction reconstruction. Lastly, attendance in several meetings with the professionals and creative sessions is included as well.

## 7.2 Rediscovering the waterfront (1985-2009)

The city of Amsterdam started in 1985 with its compact city policy. Around 1979 the first plans emerge within the municipality to revitalize abandoned port areas along the IJ banks (Archive DRO, 2016). The desire to construct an international appealing environment failed due to its large size, the withdrawal of companies and public protest in 1992, but the idea for redevelopment along the IJ for the sake of unique urban environments that could help Amsterdam position itself as an international city was born (Figure 13).




Figure 13: Waterfront redevelopment plan near the Central Station (OMA, 1992)

However, the plan for Amsterdam Waterfront, the first public-private area development in the city, fails in 1994 and the city re-visions its Structure Plan. This leads to the updated Structure Plan 'Amsterdam Open Stad' (1996). The name of the Structure Plan is the same as the protest group that was against the Amsterdam Waterfront. One of the most important interventions in the Structure Plan is the Waterfront project was cut into pieces and that there was a new large housing location added to the western side of the city: IJburg. However, the main east-west axis of development around the IJ remained intact.

When protests emerged around 1996 against the development of IJburg, the protesters state that *"there is more than enough space along the IJ banks and in the western part of the city."* The Spatial Planning department response is that *"all alternatives have been researched"* and that there is *"no comparable alternative for this amount of housing. All available areas within the city are already being utilized to their full potential. That even that is no easy task is proven by the discussions about the Zeeburgereiland, N(D)SM wharf and the Houthavens. [...] The western part of Amsterdam is not*

*an option because of noise pollution from Schiphol and port interests.<sup>13</sup>* So the arguments in favour of IJburg is that the city has used all other locations to their maximal potential, which is stated to be already a challenge, and further westward expansion is impossible due to port interests.

On 5 September 1996 the Structure Plan 'Open City' is determined<sup>14</sup> by the council. After that, a public inspection period<sup>15</sup> between 20 August and 30 September 1997 took place. On 29 September, Cargill BV and IGMA BV send a letter of objection<sup>16</sup> to the municipality. However, the date stamp of arrival at the municipal office is 9 October, 9 days after the deadline. Therefore the objection was declared inadmissible by the Council through the General Administrative Law on 5 February 1998. Because the Structure Plan does "*not contain specific policy changes*" the objection is not valid through the Act of Spatial Planning (Commission for Challenges and Appeal, 1998).

The objections were mainly targeted at the western expansion towards the Houthavens and the NDSM wharf. It is good to note that at the time the Minervahaven between the Coenhaven and Vlothaven was also still an industrial area. Plans for the Houthavens began with 900 dwellings in 1996, but were increased step-by-step to 2400 in 2006. The first skirmishes about this western development took place between 1988 at the time of the first plan making for the East-West corridor and 2003 at the time of the approval for the Structure Plan 'Choose for Urbanity' (2003). De Roo (2003) reconstructed these first legal battles on port areas.

De Roo (2003) described the environmental conflict in the development of the Houthavens extensively. The port had lost its function and urban planners started to look at the area for potential redevelopment. Unlike the developments in the Eastern Docklands, the Houthavens were next to an industrial area that was still, and would remain, in use: Westpoort. The planning dilemma for the municipality was about how to create a highly desirable residential area "without imposing constraints on nearby industry" (De Roo, 2003).

Mainly sound pollution was a topic of discussion. Problems with the heavily polluted soil played an important role in the development process, but was not part of the spatial conflict between port and city and will not be discussed. A new industrial zone for medium sized businesses was planned between the Houthavens and Westpoort. This area in the Minervahaven, would literally act as a sound barrier with buildings of up to 12 meters high (De Roo, 2003).

However, discussions between the municipality and the business community – especially Cargill BV – lead to a deadlock in the project. The exact consequences of a new Environmental Permit issued by the Province of North Holland for the company, were unclear, making it difficult to assess the exact impact on liveability in the future Houthavens. When the environmental permit was reviewed, the municipality did not believe the Council of State would approve the change of the land use plan for the Houthavens (De Roo, 2003). Several changes needed to be made in order to pass the plan, mainly legal exceptions for noise pollution in seaport areas (from 55dB to 60db).

Companies in Westpoort on the other hand, were increasingly fearing negative publicity due to their proximity to future citizens that not "may be used to the noise and smell of the harbour". The

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<sup>13</sup> Quote from a letter to the municipal council (Raadsvoordacht, 1996).

<sup>14</sup> Dutch: 'Vastgesteld'

<sup>15</sup> Dutch: 'Inzage'

<sup>16</sup> Dutch: 'Bezwaarschrift'

Municipality of Amsterdam promised it would inform future buyers under the motto: “*You are moving to a dynamic portside environment, with all the advantages and disadvantages that brings*” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 1995, as cited by De Roo, 2003). The business community demanded further that no additional environmental requirements would be imposed on them for the next 10 years. The municipality was in favour of a ‘boundary agreement’ in the land-use plan: “Further residential development towards the west [of the Houthavens] is prohibited for the next 50 years [2045]”. De Roo (2003) states that it is clear that - without discussing the legal consequences of such promises – industry required a large degree of certainty in the agreements.

While the municipality proposed a lot of compensation measures in the Houthavens area, including reducing other forms of noise in the area itself, like cars. Combined with exemptions for the level of noise pollution from the national government and a proposed compensation for companies that wanted to expand in Westpoort, most counter-arguments of Cargill were defeated. However, dust and smell were still important factors. In the end the Province of North Holland delegated responsibility towards the municipal authority of Amsterdam, since it did not want to block the construction plans itself. Some studies around the time showed that serious nuisance of odour could be prevented with some measures at the companies in the future.

What can be derived from this phase is that the conflict between port and city is mainly focused on the entering of sensitive functions to the environmental impact area of companies. The spatial debate is constrained to how the interaction in the port-city interface would take shape. The integral element of the debate is a search to how both housing and industry can co-exist in the western port areas. However, it is clear that this search is conducted by the municipality as a research to achieve (legal) liveability in areas that are influenced with port nuisance. Urban planners are therefore creatively looking for new solutions within legal regulations and develop approaches towards the concept of ‘liveability’. The concept is increasingly explained as something that is not derived from strict set pre-defined requirements, but a set of variables that altogether form a certain quality of environment. This is where ideas for compensation occur within the municipalities’ interpretations of environmental policies (De Roo, 2003, p. 308). In that sense this change in perspective, followed from the problem to find solutions for developing housing near industrial sites, can be seen as an announcement for future changes in the environmental law. The concept of environmental quality in the Crisis and Recovery Act (2010) and the Environment and Planning Act (2021) is based on this line of reasoning<sup>17</sup>.

It may be clear however, that there is limited proof of an integral process. The municipality has a goal and the port is against it. Port companies claim that introducing housing near their activities is an infringement on their license to operate. The growth of companies would be limited and bad publicity and legal prosecution are predicted due to complaining residents.

### **7.2.1 Port Development**

From 1987 up to 1992 several lease hold agreements are signed for the Coenhaven. Polak & Van der Berg, a big paper factory was being relocated to the Coenhaven because of the transformation of the Eastern Docks. A rental agreement signed 21 December 1989 states that “*The relocation affects*

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<sup>17</sup> Hobma (Personal Interview, 10-11-2018)

*several companies in the Coenhaven*”, including North Sea Atlantic. These companies have to be moved in order to make room. The council states that it has agreed upon temporary alternative location with the affected companies in several announcements for new leasehold contracts (Municipality of Amsterdam, 1989).

Key players in the transformation of Haven-Stad emerge in these documents: Amsterdam Fertilizers BV (later Amfert/ICL Fertilizers) requests a new portion of land in the northern part of the Coenhaven (lease from 1989 until 2007) and Eggerding BV requests several expansions of its lands. In 1989 it renews a leasehold contract, 1992 it requests to expand and double its surface. It receives another portion. Both agreements are combined in one rent contract in 1995 until 1 October 2035 (42 years).

Also in the Vlothaven, several companies sign or renew leasehold contracts. The Waterlandse Havenbedrijven BV signs a contract on 15 June 1988 until 30 June 2035. The irregular lease term of 47 years was chosen to match its current leasehold contracts in the area. After the relocation of Scheuer Stevedoring BV “in the trend of east to westward move of companies” the Vlothaven becomes crowded. The company combines its activities with VCK Stevedoring (since 1964 located in the Vlothaven). When AMCO Shipping also requests more land in 1992 the municipality started talks to restructuring the Vlothaven in order “to accommodate an optimal lay-out for the growth of all companies” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 1992). This was agreed upon in 1993.

The municipality signals a problem for the port early 1990. Due to zoning plan changes in the Eastern Port Lands, the remaining companies have to be relocated. Land for this specific type of port activity is limited, even with the construction of several new port lands in the west. Therefore the municipality starts talks with companies in the Coenhaven to restructure the port basins to accommodate companies from the eastern docklands. It decides to do so and reserves f5.214.000. The last transformation dated from 1973, but the current lay-out had to be updated for scaled up industry processes.

Altogether, the Coenhaven and Vlothaven become a ‘safe harbour’ for companies that have had to move due to transformation of the eastern docklands. Secondly the area gets intensified and becomes a very efficient port area due to several restructuring investments. Upon today the Coenhaven is still “one of the most intensively used and most efficient areas in the Port of Amsterdam, seen its throughput and nautical space.” (Van den Beuken, 2018).

### **7.2.2 Urban development near port areas**

*“The Amsterdam housing market is in crisis. First time buyers have to wait years for their first house, grown-up children cannot leave their parents’ home, students cannot find a student room, there is no place for families, owner occupied housing has become unaffordable and urban redevelopment projects face stagnation because of lack of flow. The housing market is locked because of the stagnated building production.”* (Van Heel & Van der Molen, 2002)

The quote above from two journalists of Amsterdam urban planning magazine NUL20 in an interview with alderman Stadig shows that also in the beginning of the millennium, the housing demand was high and the municipality was struggling to approve enough construction plans for the growing city. Back then, slow and complex plan-approval processes in the municipality were blamed

for the small housing production and a set of process measures was implemented. Next to that, financial stimulation and incentives were introduced to increase the development volume. One of them was the release of the 30% norm of social housing per single project.

In another interview (NUL2020, 2003) Stadig states that there are no cheap and easy development locations left in the city. After the acquisition of the Shell terrain in Amsterdam North, the municipality subsidised the redevelopment with €30 million. Stadig explains that other developments locations will be similar. *“In North and other inner city locations, with no exception, it is about expensive and complex locations.”* He foresees lower revenues from ground exploitations and says that the municipality will need subsidies from the National government to develop these difficult locations after 2010.

Around that time in 2002 there was a new structure plan in the making, and for the first time, urban planners and council members proposed to transform *all* port areas within the highway A10. This was in big contrast to earlier, and still ongoing, negotiations that were aiming to establish a new spatial buffer around the Coenhaven to make housing development possible in the Houthavens and NDSM wharf. In 2000, active replacement of port companies was put on the table. Alderman Duco Stadig (Labour Party) tried to discuss a move of the companies towards these new port lands in the west. With moving all port companies altogether to the west, environmental problems concerning development of the Houthavens would be resolved and even more land would become available for transformation in the future.

During these political debates for the new structure plan, the Port of Amsterdam was assigned to draw up a theoretical plan to relocate all port companies from within the Ring A10. This was done to assess the impact of such a development. In 2002, the Afrikahaven was just constructed and had plenty of space to accommodate all port companies from the Coenhaven and Vlothaven (Transformation Strategy, 2009). In total, an area of 70 to 90 hectares was calculated to be needed to relocate all port companies. At the end, the port estimated that the construction costs of all rebuild facilities will be around €650 million in the existing Afrikahaven (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009). This amount excludes costs for acquisition, demolition and the compensation for termination of leasehold and rental contracts.

Around that time, Alderman Duco Stadig (Spatial Planning) would have concluded that replacement was impossible<sup>18</sup>. This was due to the fact that it would be too costly and that companies were also not cooperating. However, the idea for a westward move of the port was actively debated in the Commission for Spatial Planning in the years around the turn of the millennium. As far as this research goes, this seems to be the first evidence of urban expansion on western port lands, with a ‘westward discourse’ employed by policy makers.

The previous events are confirmed by the Province of North Holland in their Streekplan (Regional Plan) of 2003.

It is important to note that since 1990 the municipality of Amsterdam was given a larger amount of policy freedom in order *“to deal with its metropolitan issues”* (Province of North Holland, 2003). This is an indication of decentralization of spatial planning. Before that time, long-term spatial planning, was solely developed in the provincial Regional Plan. The provincial Regional Plan remained until

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<sup>18</sup> According to his successor Maarten van Poelgeest (Personal Interview, 28-11-2018)

2006, when the Spatial Planning Act (Wro) was introduced. Up until then, the Structure Plans in Amsterdam (like 'Stad aan het IJ (1991), Amsterdam Open Stad (1996) and Amsterdam Choosing for Urbanity (2003)) all formed 'partial revisions' on the provincial Streekplan. Cargill noticed that the Regional Plan became inconsistent with the updated Amsterdam Structure Plans that described transformation nearby or in the western port areas.

Therefore in 1996 Cargill went to court against the plans in the Houthavens. Spokesman of Cargill, Van Zelm van Eldik stated that *"it could become a precedent and the beginning of a downward spiral, (...) who knows that there will not be even more housing plans in 10 years"* (as cited by Van Haastrecht, 1996). Industry Board Amsterdam (later ORAM) supports Cargill. Building Aesthetic Committee member Westerpark, Mattie summarizes the development of the Houthavens as 'an experiment' of flexible environmental criteria (Van Haastrecht, 1996). The Council of State agreed with Cargill twice: once on 9 June 1998 on a lawsuit about the general zoning plan 'IJ-Oevers' where the Houthavens development was described due to 'too much vagueness in the execution of the plan' and once on 23 July 2003 when because of inconsistency with other municipal zoning plans, uncertainty about the development of a sound proofing office building and the risk of exceedance of 1 decibels of noise at the top floor of some houses (PBL, 2011, p. 82; Council of State, 2003). The cases were surrounded by back-and-forth researches from Cargill and the Municipality that would respectively prove and dismiss future environmental nuisance (noise, odour, dust).

On 28 January 2003 the Province of North Holland already acknowledges that the Regional Plan has become inconsistent with the Amsterdam Structure plan. They state that companies have pointed to them that this had happened. *"Companies expect from us that they get clarity on where heavy industry can exist and what the financial consequences will be in case of transformation. Uncertainty for several years is unacceptable. (...) Specific concerns have been outed towards the transformation of the Coenhaven and Vlothaven (including Cargill). Seen the existing uncertainties for the companies and the spatial and financial consequences of transformation, in accordance with the Municipality of Amsterdam, we cancel the transformation of this area for now and for the long term. (...) Mixing with housing on adjacent terrains is therefore also not foreseeable."* (Province of North Holland, 2003, p. 34). The addressed spatial problem refers to the lack of space for heavy industrial activity in the Province. Financial reasons being the high costs of relocation.




Figure 14: Wiegmans & Louw (2010) describe the spatial conflict between port and city due to restrictions in environmental zones, during this episode in Amsterdam



However, urban planners went back to the drawing table to make the Houthavens 'Council of State'-proof (PBL, 2011). Combined with 2 new noise pollution researches from TNO in 2004 and 2005, the district Westerpark presented a new urban plan in 2006. The city district actively sought for consultation from the Coenhaven companies and started a mediation process parallel to the formalization of the new zoning plan. In Figure 14, the zones of prohibited and restricted housing is illustrated by Wiegman & Louw (2010).

To increase housing production in 2003, regulations are relaxed and processes are streamlined and shortened. The result of this is Plaberum 2.0 (2006).

### **7.2.3 The making of the Covenant Agreement**

Mediation started on 25 September 2006 with the municipality, companies from the Coenhaven and the Province of North Holland. In 2008 they came to an agreement: in return for the giving up the fight against development of the Houthavens, the municipality would stop with making plans within the sphere of influence of the Coenhaven for the next 15 years (January 2024) and not bring them into procedure for the next 20 years (January 2029). Also, inhabitants of the Houthavens would receive a chain clause in their buyers contract stating that they are aware that they will live close to industrial companies. Lastly, the municipality invests €9 million in measures to reduce environmental pollution (mainly odour) from the companies. As a last sign of good will, the municipality agrees to pay another €225.000 for "all the costs Cargill has made in the last 20 years". The covenant is signed on 22 January 2009 and the companies cease their residence to further plan making. On 13 April 2010 the zoning plan for the Houthavens becomes irrevocable.

Salient detail in this procedure is introduction of the Spatial Planning Act in 2008. The Act was voted in favour for in the Parliament in February 2006 and was confirmed by the Senate on 17 October 2006. Only 4 weeks before that vote, mediation started between the companies and the municipality. It is important to note the consequences for the protection of the companies, since with the introduction of this Act, all rights for spatial planning are transferred to municipalities. From the moment of its introduction in January 2008, the existing 'Region Plan' of the Province is reduced to an 'only internally binding function' (Province of North Holland, 2006). Hereafter, the municipality of Amsterdam is not bound with the Region Plan that prevented 'any port transformation in the Coenhaven and Vlothaven.' The companies had focused on the protection from the Province for some time, considering their letters and lawsuit about the Region Plan in 2003. On 20 October 2006, 3 days after the vote for the Spatial Planning Act, the deputy of the Province visited Cargill 'to reassure their important value for the port and the economy of Amsterdam', stating that he thinks that 'here, the economic value outweighs the development of housing' (Province of North Holland, 2008).

What this means is that from that moment, the municipality has no legal constraints on what it sees fit for the Coenhaven and Vlothaven. Urban planners and policy makers from the municipality in interviews and plan documents all state that 'Haven-Stad is locked until 2029'. However, this is technically an implicit 'expiry date'. The date was put into the covenant by policy makers in favour of Haven-Stad consciously, to make sure development opportunities would not be made impossible indefinitely. It is good to remember that the covenant was made in the light of creating a new spatial buffer between port and city, not set a starting date for transformation of the port area itself. It has

been turned this way however.

This research points in the direction that at the time of the Houthaven settlement with the covenant, the companies were not aware of this implicit interpretation of this agreement. In the minutes of an expert meeting on the transformation strategy for Haven-Stad, the following is stated: “The agreement [of the covenant] was initially made from another principle.” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, Appendix 5, p. 177). In 2009, after signing the covenant, the renewal of the leasehold contract of ICL Fertilizers was capped to 25 years until 2034 (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 160) instead of the regular contract extension of 50 years until 2049. Here, the municipality deliberately strengthens its position for future transformation at the cost of investment security of a port company.

#### **7.2.4 Political rationality**

Although not really part of any formal documents about transformation in Haven-Stad yet, this phase is attempting first development and can therefore be roughly analysed to evaluate the first steps towards development in the western port areas. It is mainly to give an impression about the historical context before development for Haven-Stad started. Several conflicts in this phase will impact future development.

In this phase, several investments are made by the municipality to intensify and restructure the Coenhaven and Vlothaven for the good of the companies. The fast growth and intensification of the Coenhaven and Vlothaven is due to transformation process of the Eastern Docklands. All the companies that moved to Westpoort got leasehold contracts to around 2035-2040 (50 years from 1985-1990).

First attempts to discuss relocation of companies in the Coenhaven and Vlothaven fail. These discussions were started in the time of a new structure plan was developed, parallel to the completion of the new Afrikahaven. In that part of the port there was plenty of space available. Relocation costs were estimated to be around €850 million for all port companies within the Ring A10.

##### **Policies adopted:**

- Urban redevelopment of the brownfields along the IJ near the city centre, relocation of last port companies to Coenhaven (Eastern Docklands, Houthavens)
- Further urban development of the East-West axis along the IJ (Teleport Sloterdijk – IJburg)
- No urban development in Westpoort (Sloterdijk, Coenhaven and Vlothaven).
- Development in Houthaven accepted in return for making the Minervahaven a buffer zone and halting new plan making towards Westpoort for at least 15 years.

##### **Problem**

After the recession in the 1970's, economic development is needed. Towards the end of the 1990's a housing crisis is perceived by politicians and public servants.

## Solution (Policy + Technology)

Economic and urban development possible through waterfront regeneration. Port development in western port areas is too expensive due to relocation costs and costs of disinvestments. Environmental rules prevent development of the Houhavens in the first place.

## Politics

During the 1990's, the 'purple' coloured councils are dominating the political landscape. Some sources mention that port development is mainly frustrated by the Liberal Party, protecting the interests of port companies, as well as a fraction of the Labour Party. From 1990 up to 2006, both parties are part of every coalition. This apparently did not stop plan-making, but internally it is said that this has offered counterweight to urban expansion in port areas.

### 7.2.5 Integration

In the table below, the formalized policy is evaluated by the three different aspects of integration.

Scale		Sectors		Agencies	
Municipality	+	Spatial Planning	+	Port Authority	+
MRA/NZKG	+/-	Economic Affairs	-	Port companies	-
Province	+/-	Mobility	N.A.	Covenant partners	-
National	+	Land Department	+	Company associations	-
		Engineering	+	Investors, developers	N.A.
		RWS	N.A.		

Table 6: Integration of various stakeholders in adopted policy in episode 1

+: Integrated in plan, -: not integrated in plan, +/- partially integrated

## Integration of scales

Municipal policy makers were confronted with the legal status of provincial spatial plans. These were not consistent with municipal plans. A legal procedure initiated by port companies forced actors to realign. The plans for waterfront redevelopment are consistent with the national policies for 'key projects' in the regeneration of inner cities.

Spatial planning power is decentralized towards the municipality. This is done to make the municipality more effective in solving its metropolitan challenges. However, spatial plans still need to be implemented in provincial policy documents through amendments. The municipal Structure Plans starts working as a testing framework for future developments, but does not hold any official status. Therefore companies can only object to it, but cannot fight it.

The Province slowly loses influence over the Amsterdam metropolitan area, but the Regional Plan still has a legal status. This functions as a backstop: plans of Amsterdam have to be included in the Region Plan first.

## Integration of sectors

The Land/Engineering department cooperated with the Port Authority regarding research for urban development in western port areas. However, they concluded this was not feasible. During the making of the Covenant Agreement, Economic Affairs made an administrative 'turn' favouring urban development on port lands. Based on conversations with a former employee<sup>19</sup> of the spatial planning department, there was only very limited influence of Economic Affairs in spatial plans during that time.

Interestingly enough, the municipality seems not aware of its own inconsistency. The feasibility study for the dismantling of the Coenhaven after relocation of all port activity towards te Afrikahaven comes only a few years after the complete restructuring and intensification of the Coenhaven. Aside from the primary costs, this would also mean a huge disinvestment of port infrastructure.

## Integration of agencies

The Port Authority contributed to the feasibility studies of transformation in the Vlothaven and Coenhaven. Port companies (covenant partners) were included through a mediation process after a series of battles. The attitude towards plan-making from companies is formal-juridical. Plans are received with scepticism and literally every urban expansion plan between 1996 and 2003 is objected against or put up for court. The companies win every case thus far.

The conflicts in this phase arise from the ambition to develop housing in the Houthavens, close to the environmental sphere of influence of the port. The municipality investigates ways to legally develop housing near port areas. A new approach of 'liveability' for determining environmental quality is developed to make this happen. Relocation of port companies is not the cause of conflict, these are just internal feasibility studies.

There is experimental cooperation with several private investors for waterfront redevelopment during this episode. However, this is not traceable regarding the specific Haven-Stad planning area.

### 7.2.6 Institutions

In the table below, the institutions that played a role in the governance of plan making are listed according to the five categories defined in the literature study.

Institutions	In port-city development planning (episode 1)
Socio-cultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Culture in spatial planning department, mostly focused on state-led housing development, neglecting economic functions</li><li>• The idea that waterfront development is key for the economic development of the city</li></ul>

<sup>19</sup> Gert Urhahn (Personal Interview, November 2018)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The narrative ‘Amsterdam along the IJ’: Reconnect with the water (not the port)</li> </ul>
<b>Financial</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The municipality restructures the Coenhaven to promote relocation of port companies from the Eastern Docklands</li> <li>• The municipality co-finances new port infrastructure with companies in the Coenhaven</li> <li>• The municipality is set to be the financier of port redevelopment costs in a case of port transformation</li> <li>• To make housing in the Houthavens possible, a sustainability fund is established to co-finance anti-pollution measures in the Coenhaven and Vlohaven</li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All companies that arrive in the Coenhaven and Vlohaven receive leasehold contracts for 50 years. Since the restructuring takes place in the late 1980’s, these contracts last until around 2035-2040.</li> </ul>
<b>Governance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PPS experiment with Amsterdam Waterfront fails</li> <li>• Formal-judicial attitude in planning between municipality and port companies</li> </ul>
<b>Legal</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Region Plan connects local with regional planning but is decentralized in an experiment, later definitive in the Spatial Planning Act</li> <li>• Experiments with the decentralisation of spatial planning power lead to inconsistencies between scales</li> <li>• New municipal structure visions are checking frameworks. Unlike</li> <li>• Strict environmental rules prevent urban expansion towards the port</li> <li>• First experiments with environmental regulations</li> <li>• Renewed and streamlined procedures for objection to plans and shorter participation processes to achieve larger development volumes</li> </ul>

Table 7: Institutions affecting port-city actors in plan making during episode 1

### 7.3 Future perspectives on Haven-Stad (2006 – 2011)

Not even 9 months after the settlement of the 20 year long legal battle over development in the Houthavens, the Municipality of Amsterdam presents the document 'Haven-Stad: 3 Future Perspectives for the Western IJ-banks'. This document explores the desirability and feasibility of transformation of all port lands within the Ring A10. To explain how this happened, it is needed to go back a few years backward, when a parallel planning line emerged.

On 7 March 2006 the municipal elections take place. In Amsterdam, the Labour Party unexpectedly significantly grows to 40% of the votes (up from 29% in 2002). This meant that for the first time the party could form a majority coalition solely with its natural partner in the council: the Green Party, which remained stable with around 13% of the votes. This resulted in the first 'Red-Green' coalition which would define the urban planning agenda for the coming years. In the programme agreement the following is mentioned about spatial development:

*"There will be researched which possibilities there are to accelerate the development of current and new development locations. There will be a research that investigates the opportunity and feasibility for mixed work and living in the western part of the city, south and north of the IJ, within the Ring. A bikeway connection between North and Westerpark will be included."*

Coalition Agreement between Labour Party and Green Party (2006, p. 18)

This sentence was deliberately vaguely formulated by writer Maarten van Poelgeest. It describes the exact geographical boundaries of Haven-Stad, without mentioning the word 'port'. Urban development in the port was a sensitive topic within the Labour Party according to him. The Labour Party had historically been a partner of the port, seen the provision of jobs for port workers which is its natural electorate. That is not to say that the party was unanimous about this topic. The negotiator of the Labour Party cooperated with the Green Party in earlier attempts to transform the western port areas in the Spatial Development Commission between 2002 and 2003 when debate was going on about the Structure Plan 2003. The negotiators on the topic of Spatial Planning were both in favour of development of this area, hence the formulation. This created a mandate to explore and research this terrain for urban development without creating internal discussions. They created future political 'back support' when putting this topic on the agenda.

What followed from this Programme Agreement, was the Administrative Assignment on 5 September 2006 called '*Westward*' to explore the transformation of western port lands into 'mixed environments'. The project groups name seems to be inspired by the heavily debated exploration of the Northern IJ banks a few years earlier<sup>20</sup>. It is good to remember the start of the mediation between the Coenhaven companies and the municipality to settle the dispute on the Houthavens. These commenced only 20 days later. Eberhard van der Laan, lawyer at the time, was looking to settle the juridical dispute by granting the end of urban expansion with the Houthavens. He came to Van Poelgeest and Asscher to determine what the municipality could offer. Van der Laan is said to have proposed to make the Minervahaven the definitive buffer between port and city., Alderman Van Poelgeest stated that "this was of course not possible, seen the Programme Agreement and the

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<sup>20</sup> Project team 'Noordwaarts!' (2003)

Administrative Assignment 20 days earlier” (Van Poelgeest, Personal Interview, 19-11-2018). The municipality proposed to limit the agreement to a period of 20 years. A date that later would be implied as a starting date for development.

The result from project team ‘Westwards’ was the document ‘Haven-Stad - 3 Future Perspectives’ that was released 3 years later to the public on 10 September 2009. A presentation about the results and speeches about the feasibility of the scenario’s took place on 17 September 2009, with speakers from the municipality, the port and ORAM participating. The meeting took around 2 hours and was framed as a *‘starting point for debate about changes in the area’* in the invitation written by the two project leaders Cees Geldof (Spatial Planning) and Pito Dingemanse (Port of Amsterdam). Speakers were mixed: aldermen from both the Port and Spatial Development department spoke, as well as architect Pi de Bruijn on the benefits of scenario planning and ORAM about the feasibility of the different scenarios.

Thus far, to the naked eye, the plan making process seems rather integrated and balanced. Even more, the name ‘Haven-Stad’ seems to be chosen to underline the *cooperation and co-existence* of the two entities. “The name was derived from the idea that port and city since the emergence of Amsterdam both functionally and spatially have formed an integrated piece. (...) While port and city have grown apart in the last decennia, the increasing pressure on space has asked for a re-orientation for the port-city relationship” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009). This is a clear frame for the meaning of the document: an exploration on how port and city can co-exist and come together again. The document underlines the need for certainty for both companies that plan investments and city districts than plan housing: “One is not more important than the other (...) and that is why this exploration is a joint effort between the Port of Amsterdam and the Department for Spatial Planning.”

The Transformation Strategy is actually an impact analysis with 3 different scenarios. With 3 scenarios are meant to “*explore the desirability and feasibility of transformation*” of the port area. The document states that it is meant as input for future debate: “we clearly make no choice.” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009).

### **Trojan Horse**

There was however a strategic reason behind the creation of this document. The assignment to produce this document was deliberately given to *both* the Port Authority and the department of Spatial Planning by their respective aldermen Lodewijk Asscher and Maarten van Poelgeest. From the perspective of the department of Spatial Planning, this is said to have been “*awesome*”. It meant that the always so ‘closed’ Port of Amsterdam had to “*open up and share information that they previously wanted to keep to themselves.*”<sup>21</sup> For urban planners and policy makers ‘hunting’ for transformation of the area, this was a breakthrough. Before that time, development in vital port areas was always dismissed as unwanted or impossible due to environmental legislation. Now it was possible to examine those arguments and see what interventions were needed to make transformation possible.

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<sup>21</sup> Maarten van Poelgeest (Personal Interview, 19-11-2018)

### 7.3.1 The document: Haven-Stad 3 Future Perspectives at a glance

To assess the impact of transformation of Haven-Stad, 3 scenarios were drafted. These 3 scenarios were based on the 'border between port and city'. This border was marked as the 55 decibels noise contour (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009, p. 51). However, an option is included to see what would happen with a 60 decibels contour, since it "would be imaginable that changed regulations will have been imposed in 2020". Pollution from odour and dust is not accounted for. The 3 scenarios therefore vary in their potential for developable programme:

Scenarios	Housing	Work	Public services
Scenario 1	4.180	8.584	75.900
Scenario 2	13.150	13.997	224.000
Scenario 3	19.350	16.500	370.100

Table 8: Estimated development volume (units) in Haven-Stad (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009)




Figure 15: Discourse of 'transformation through relocation' of maritime industry. Transformation is presented as historically ongoing and natural. (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009)

#### Scenario 1: 'The Port within the City' (Current situation, autonomous growth)

This scenario is based on the current noise contours. The idea is to intensify as much as possible around the Coenhaven and Vlothaven, but not nearby them. The central port areas are still used for heavy industry. Even more: other companies from within the city can be moved to Haven-Stad to



make room for housing elsewhere. In this scenario there is even room for port development: a new terminal can be constructed in the Coenhaven.

### **Scenario 2: 'The Port and the City'**

This is the 'balanced' scenario for port and city in the area. Heavy maritime industry is removed from the Coenhaven and Vlothaven and replaced for light industry. Therefore more housing is possible in the area. An option is to invest heavily in pollution reduction, so that the companies can stay, although it is stated that such solutions do not exist yet.

### **Scenario 3: 'The City in the Port'**

This scenario is based on the complete removal of industry in the area. All lands are used for 'urban living and working'. The increased programme allows for larger infrastructure interventions, and certainly the potential mobility value for the region is highlighted. This is presented as an opportunity rather than a threat. The Ring road A10 forms the new border between port and city. That means that housing would be directly situated next to the highway, exceeding noise and air quality norms. "Even a 30 meter high noise shielding building will not be enough to reach environmental standards." Eurotank Gas Terminals is their direct neighbour across the street, which seen the dense urban plan, forms an increased 'group risk' with "questionable acceptability". A considerable amount of housing is planned within the VNG perimeter of 500 meters for storage of explosive liquids. Relocation of companies beyond the A10 is said to be irrelevant.

## **7.3.2 Financial impact**

To assess the financial impact of the scenarios, the Land Department did a financial exercise for development of Haven-Stad after 2029. This was done to compare the scenarios, and to get a grasp on the costs of the area. For this exercise, the municipality would use "extremely active land policy" where it would acquire all lands and buildings, would relocate all industrial companies and clearing the site for construction. On the other hand, the municipality would also receive all profits. The balance is extremely negative in all scenarios.

To put things into perspective: at the time when this document was in the making (at the height of the housing market) the land exploitation of the Houthavens was €30 million negative, which was just an abandoned port area without any companies. The municipality also subsidized the development of the Shell terrain in North with €30 million.

The exercise also includes a 'rough estimation' of replacement costs of port companies in the Coenhaven and Vlothaven. This estimation is based on the earlier research in 2002 and is again drafted by the Port Authority. It is important to note that between 2002 and 2009, the plots of the Afrikahaven were filled up. Therefore in 2009, "*the development of new port land is necessary to move port companies*" (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009). The Houtrakpolder is appointed as potential new port area to do so. Political permission was given by the Green Party to explore this option. In return, the reservation for the Wijkermeerpolder was scrapped.

	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3
<b>Transformation (acquisition)</b>	-1.162	-2.033	-3.098
<b>Infrastructure</b>	-39	-128	-262
<b>Replacement port companies</b>		-743	-850
<i>Development terrain</i>		-61	-74
<i>Terminal establishment</i>		-43	-60
<i>Nautical establishment</i>		-93	-101
<i>Buildings and installations</i>		-546	-615
<b>Profits</b>	522	1.235	1.989
<b>Balance</b>	<b>-679</b>	<b>-1.669</b>	<b>-2.221</b>

Table 9: Estimated costs and profit in the 3 Scenarios, in € x million (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009)

The costs summarized in Table 5 exclude infrastructure investments that go beyond the planning area, although Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 include a new metro line.

### 7.3.3 Relation to port development

The document states that especially scenario 2 and 3 are at the cost of “the autonomous growth of the port”. This means that even with intensification and restructuring *through* expansive relocation of companies, targets for 2040 (170 million tonnes) will become “very difficult to achieve”. This is because of the specific need for ‘wet terrains’ to accommodate transshipment. This statement is even assuming that newly developed Houtrakhaven and other potential locations in the North Sea Canal Area will be developed (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009, p. 83). Therefore Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 are in direct conflict with growth projections of the port.

Unmentioned so far is the impact on nautical space. The Coenhaven and Vlothaven basins are important nautical logistical spaces for waterway traffic. It is the busiest waterway of the port and includes waiting spots for inland shipping and berths. So far, in all scenarios is enough nautical space, but there is an effect to consider when this is placed in a residential and urban environment.

#### Port Policy Development: Smart Port (2008)

In 2008, the Coenhaven and Vlothaven are “among the best performing parts” of the Port of Amsterdam (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009, p.31). Transshipment of mainly bio based and dry bulk and increased to 10,5 million tonnes. This employs 2.500 people directly, and another 1.800 people indirectly, which is 20% of the total port-related employment in Amsterdam. The direct and indirect added value of the area is €481,1 million, roughly 25% of the total added value of the Port of Amsterdam. In the total Haven-Stad planning area, in 2008 yearly income from rent and leasehold is €11,5 million as well as €4,4 million on sea port charges (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2008).

The port was aware that it had to change its position and attitude towards the city. “Unknown makes unloved” was stated by port representatives at the time (Dingemanse as cited by Van Wijk, 2007). The port knew it had to make shift to obtain support for future growth. They call it a license to operate versus a licence to grow. The port vision of 2008 was created to that vision: if we show that we increase efficiency and value, be sustainable and smart, and interact with the city, the municipality will assist to achieve growth ambitions. Sustainability and efficiency became conditions

for port growth. Asscher decided that spatial expansion will be evaluated after 2020. The municipality would help to lobby for a new and larger lock at IJmuiden though, and financially assist with the investment.

Discussions about transformation of the western docks within the A10 took place for several years and from secondary sources it can be derived that the port was also looking for new, functioning balance of agreements in the port-city interface. However, to understand this process it is good to note that the Port was busy with more important things: strategies for expansion. During the time of the production of the 'Future Perspectives on Haven-Stad'-document, the port was working on its own policy document: 'Port Vision 2008-2020'. Discussions about the way that growth should take place were a discussion line on their own (regarding actors and people involved), but cannot be seen independently from the Haven-Stad discussions at the time.

The Port envisioned that sustainable growth had to come from fossil fuels and container transshipment. To make this possible, a lobby was going on for several years for a new container terminal and a new lock that could accommodate bigger ships (NewPanamax) in IJmuiden. For their contribution to the Haven-Stad scenario explorations, the Port got something in return: a political promise from coalition partner the Green Party to not "a priori" be against port expansion in the Houtrakpolder. The alderman states that he made this decision deliberately. According to him, the deal was as follows: when allowing a port expansion *reservation* to be made in the Houtrakpolder for after 2020 the port, Alderman Asscher, would cooperate with the research for westward urban expansion in port areas.

This is visible in the memorandums and motions that were introduced during Port Development debates at the time. While a new Port Vision was in the making, In October 2007, the party of Maarten van Poelgeest, the Green Party, presented their Memorandum 'Change Course' (Dutch: 'Het Roer Om'). This Memorandum urged the Executive Board of the Municipality to radically change the city's position towards the Port. The Port Vision itself states that it "used the general idea" of this Memorandum (Port Vision, 2008). Several ideas were included in the new Port Vision, like an urge for attention for intensification, efficient land use and sustainable development.

The growth of the port is connected to the ambition to realize a new sea lock at IJmuiden. This is due industrial scale up of the maritime industry and "to keep up with the competition" (Smart Port, 2008). The Municipality of Amsterdam has lobbied since the turn of the millennium for a new, bigger lock that will be ready before 2016. That year is said to be the year when growth is limited due to the older, smaller lock. The new lock is needed to accommodate bigger ships, but it will also lead to more speed and efficiency since the deeper lock will be 'tide independent'.

The study 'Optimal Usage of Existing Port Areas' (Province of North Holland, 2011) shows that the maximum potential for transshipment in current port areas (including the Coenhaven and Vlothaven) is 125 million tonnes). Without a new lock this value is reduced to 95 million tonnes. "A maximum effort for intensification and innovative solutions is needed to reach these growth values on current port lands (Port of Amsterdam, 2013). Development of 180 hectares of new port areas in the Houtrakpolder is necessary to reach the 125 million tonnes target. "Transformation of the Coenhaven and Vlothaven means that the targeted 125 million tonnes is not realisable without new port lands."

This connects two very sensitive spatial planning debates and infrastructure investment to the development of Haven-Stad. This is where the schism between urban rationality and port

development seems to occur quite clearly. The new lock is constructed in order to grow from 95 to 125 million tonnes. With transformation of Haven-Stad and without the development of the Houtrakpolder as compensation, there is not enough space to accommodate this growth completely.

Growth of the port is coupled to two things: development of the Houtrakpolder and the development of the new lock. Both are needed to reach the 125 million tonnes throughput target. According to Alderman Van Poelgeest (Personal Interview, 18-11-2018) the development of Haven-Stad was exchanged for a reservation of the Houtrakpolder to make this possible. In reality the Port gave up all port areas within the A10 highway by marking the land use as 'potential transformation area' (agreed upon in the corporatization of the port in 2013). In return, a political promise is made in the Amsterdam municipal organization to not be '*principally against development of the Houtrakpolder*'. Therefore this reservation is afterwards included in the structure visions of Amsterdam 2040 (2011), North Sea Canal Area 2040 (2013) and North Holland 2040 (2015). Interestingly enough, the Houtrakpolder is not even located in Amsterdam. The undeveloped part of the polder is located in the neighbouring municipality Spaarndam-Haarlemmerliede. It is an understatement that westward expansion of the Amsterdam port lands is a sensitive and emotional subject in this municipality (see cadre 'Houtrakpolder').

### Houtrakpolder

The Houtrakpolder was created during the time of the construction of the North Sea Canal (1873). A small village, Ruigoord, that was built on a small island in the IJ lake was encapsulated by this new polder. The village was put under the jurisdiction of the municipality of Haarlemmerliede. In 1965 things started to change. The port of Amsterdam was looking for new areas to develop new port lands for the petrochemical industry and alderman of Economic Affairs Joop den Uyl buys part of the Houtrakpolder to develop the Afrikahaven. The residents are removed from Ruigoord, but in 1972 a group of artists discovers the abandoned village and occupies it to live in a small commune. When port expansion neared the village in 1973, the newly appointed mayor of Haarlemmerliede, Frank IJsselmuide (KVP, later CDA), sympathised with the artists and discovered that Amsterdam had no right to demolish the village. He started a juridical fight with the municipality that would last for several years. The oil crises of the 1970s gave the final push and port development was put on hold. In 1984 the municipality of Haarlemmerliede proposes to surround Ruigoord with a green zone, but this zoning plan is denied. In 1991 the municipality of Amsterdam appoints the area for industrial development and in 1997, after ending the juridical fight, annexed the Houtrakpolder largely in 1997 and started with the construction of the Afrikahaven.

After several last fights against the authorities in 2000, it is decided that Ruigoord can stay as a cultural hub, but living there is prohibited. In 2008 the Port of Amsterdam appoints the remaining part of the Houtrakpolder as area for future development. This reservation is included in several structure visions in the area, except for the one of Spaarndam-Haarlemmerliede 2035 (2012) where the polder is located.

Up until 2012 the Houtrakpolder was protected by national landscape regulation: the State Buffer Zone (Rijksbufferzone) Amsterdam-Haarlem (CLO, 2017). After that time, responsibility for this policy was transferred to the Province of North Holland. In cooperation with municipalities, a 'Metropolitan Landscape Vision' was developed, where both its green value as the introduction of

urban functions would be regulated (PBL, 2012). The municipality of Spaarndam-Haarlemmerliede has appointed itself as 'guardian of the green buffer zone'

To do so, the municipality states that it will protect the Houtrakpolder from port development. In cooperation with the National Forest Administration (Staatsbosbeheer) it has developed a plan for the 'Green Ship', a nature development project on a 30 metre high hill of waste material of a Waste Energy Power Plant (AEC). The project is framed as "the natural border between the port and Recreational Area Spaarnwoude". Plans were deliberately developed without Amsterdam, according to journalist Van der Berg (2014). At the time when all plans were formally approved and construction had begun in 2012, the municipality of Amsterdam objected to the plans and reminded the National Forest Administration about a clause in the contract that stated that 'all lands should be returned in their original state' when the municipality would decide for port development. This would mean a huge claim for removal of the hill, which Amsterdam estimated to be around €100 million. In order to prevent bigger issues in the future a new agreement was made between Haarlemmerliede-Spaarnwoude and Amsterdam: a part of the hill would be moved southwards to make space for a future basin. However, construction of the northern hill would continue. In 2007 the National Forest Administration was aware that Amsterdam had to be involved in the decision making process. Since 2011 the municipality put a pre-emptive right on the Houtrakpolder, after the central government decided that the National Forest Administration had to sell all their lands outside the main ecological structure. This makes it juridically complex, since the central government is not bound to the pre-emptive right of municipalities if it has made an agreement with a buyer before. It is unclear whether this applies to the clause in the selling contract of the Houtrakpolder to the National Forest Administration. Project manager of the Green Ship estimates the costs for removal will be much lower, at around €10 million. The lands can be bought back cheaply as agricultural lands.



Figure 16: Supposed reservation on the Houtrakpolder (red line). White blocks are the 'protection wall' the municipality of Spaarnwoude has built (Green Ship). It was cut in 3 pieces after pressure of Amsterdam to keep room for a port basin (red dotted line). (Own illustration, 2018) Map: Google (2018)

The profit from the increased land value could be used to compensate in the costs for removing the 'Green Ship'. However, therefore the lands would also need to be annexed as well to be able to change the zoning plan. This would be nearly impossible to realize within the municipality of Spaarndam-Haarlemmerliede. Port development is still a sensitive topic. In the municipal election of November 2018, it was an important topic (Kieskompas, 2018) and 82% of the elected council

members is against port development in the Houtrakpolder. Also in the other neighbouring municipality Velsen repetitive signals are given by the council and aldermen that port development in the Houtrakpolder is “out of the question” with the Machineweg as “hard border” of the port (Josemans, 2012). The alderman of Spaarndam-Haarlemmerliede goes as far as the following in 2015: “The nature in the Houtrakpolder needs to be developed in such a way that a ‘moral revolt’ will ignite when talks about port development start after 2020. Therefore, nature development should commence quickly” (Westerman, 2015). One day after the Development Strategy for Haven-Stad is announced (22 June 2017) the Province of North Holland announced that it will invest €900.000 in nature development for the Houtrakpolder (Van Zoelen, 2017).

An important addition was the deal to not expand port lands until at least 2020. However, it was agreed that a reservation on the Wijkermeerpolder and Houtrakpolder remained an option for the Structure Vision of Amsterdam for 2040, the North Sea Canal Area 2040 vision and the renewed Structure Plan of the Province of North Holland. The Wijkermeerpolder was never included in the Structure Vision North Sea Canal Area 2040 (2013) nor in the Structure Vision 2040 of the Province of North Holland (2015). According to several sources, public servants had already concluded that this area was “not really suitable anyway” for port development because of mobility and infrastructural issues.

The political deal for future expansion options of the port (reservation Houtrakpolder) was made with a crucial idea in mind: the port will not need these lands anyway. The idea was that there would have to come a time in the foreseeable future where coal would be banned from the port. The Afrikahaven, the largest fossil basin of Amsterdam, is dominated by coal transshipment. Coal arrives from Columbia and South Africa and is transported to mainly Germany (70%) (Manshanden, 2016). Only a small portion is used to fuel the Hemweg Energy Plant to power the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area. Tata Steel (at the time Corus) has its own coal port. However, it was expected that coal would be ‘untenable’. Also, the benefit is stated that the removal of a pile of coal is relatively easy: you only need to sweep it up. There are of course a few facilities needed for coal transshipment, but compared to other capital intensive facilities, they are relatively cheap. As soon coal was “out of the way” there would be more than enough space to relocate all companies from the Coenhaven and Vlothaven. Especially since ‘storing coal on the quays’ does not provide a lot of economic value nor job. There are vast amount of lands needed for only a few jobs and some harbour fees. “*It just lays there*” (Van Poelgeest, Personal Interview, 19-11-2018).

A second argument is the surface area used for storage of gasoline and oil transshipment. The Port of Amsterdam brands itself from that time as the ‘number 1 gasoline port of the world’ (Stil, 2011; Port of Amsterdam, 2016). “*Half of America drives on gasoline from Amsterdam. The port is key in the worldwide distribution and balancing of gasoline and oil supplies*” says Van Straalen, responsible for the oil sector of the Port of Amsterdam (cited by Stil, 2011). The distribution of oil products is more vital for the Metropolitan Area of Amsterdam than coal. There is an underground kerosene pipeline from Oiltanking BV in the Amerikahaven towards Schiphol. “*Half of the kerosene supply of Schiphol comes from our tanks*”, states director Van Wessel (Port of Amsterdam, 2018). The pipeline was constructed in 1997, after a pipeline was constructed from Rotterdam as well. In 2016, roughly 20% of all shipped oil products are destined for the Netherlands, compared to 12% of the coal products (Manshanden et al., 2016).

Although it is expected by urban policy makers at that time and now that the removal of the oil

industry is way more complex than the coal industry due to the dependence of Schiphol and the more expensive facilities, the activities that are employed in that sector are framed as “insane”. The industry is explained as a market place for gasoline, where they only follow the prices of all sorts of oil products and start mixing the most expensive ones. To do this, you need a large amount of storage space, which takes up a lot of port lands. There are almost no jobs involved in this process. Explained like this, the added value of the gasoline trade is created through the occupation of large amounts of port lands (economies of scale). This value is at the benefit of the owners of the storage and mixing facilities, which are the stock owners of VOPAK, Eurotank and Oiltanking and not the people of Amsterdam. The amount of money the port of Amsterdam makes from this trade is only the leasehold contracts and the harbour fees, which is a small amount compared to the value of the product stream. However, due to its dependency on fossil fuels, this is also the largest part of the Port Authority’s income. In 2015, nearly 80% of all transshipment in the port in terms of tonnage was fossil based (Port of Amsterdam, 2015). Urban policy makers also do not like the fact that due to the explosion perimeter, this industry even takes up more space. Several incidents in Amsterdam and abroad, like the Bunclefield petroleum fire of 2005, urged reporter Van Zoelen ‘on behalf of the worried citizens of Amsterdam’ to interview Boers from Oiltanking on safety measures in the port. Boers stated that everything is organized to minimize risk. “Due to the fact that the port is far away from housing areas, the risk is mainly economic” (Boers, as cited by Van Zoelen, 2017). Half of the Coenhaven is located within the 500 meter risk perimeter of the Eurotank storage facilities.

It was this understanding of inefficient land use, compared to the added value and amount of related jobs, that apparently turned the opinion of Economic Affairs drastically. Upon this time, the department was in favour of the Mainport philosophy: a strong economy of Amsterdam needs the port and Schiphol. However, the port is geographically more connected to the city than Schiphol. The environmental buffer that Schiphol provides through noise pollution of airplanes. The port however, occupies valuable lands near the cities’ historic centre. The department of economic affairs made a turn towards increasing the added economic value of these lands through transformation in favour of the urban knowledge economy. “At this point, the port lost its natural partner in municipalities’ organisation”, said Van Poelgeest (Personal interview, 19-11-2018).

### 7.3.4 Structure Vision 2040: Economically Strong & Sustainable (2011)

The document '3 Future Perspectives on the development of the Western IJ-banks' was developed as input for the Structure Vision 2040 (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009). The Structure Vision is a political document and shows guidelines for future development (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010). It is produced by the Department for Spatial Planning. It contains 3 parts: the first defines the 'spirit of the city' and its vision for the future, the second determines what needs to be done to achieve that vision and the third part explains what tools the municipality has to implement these urban policies.

The document states that it is developed 'integrally' through the establishment of an 'Development Alliance' across several departments of the municipality. The goal is to work more intensively and more efficiently together on spatial development. The Alliance includes the departments of Infrastructure, Mobility, Spatial Planning, Economic Affairs, Land Department, Engineering Department and the Project Management Office. The development of the Structure Vision was led by 2 project leaders from the Spatial Planning department, and have 'steered the project group in an integral way'. The Alliance works together with smaller departments, including the Port of Amsterdam (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009, p. 324). One representative of the port contributed to the document.



Figure 17: Structure Vision Amsterdam 2040 (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2011)

The Memorandum from the Administrative Board of Mayor and Aldermen to develop the Structure Vision for Amsterdam dates from 24 April 2009, stating a list of 10 political ambitions for the development of Amsterdam (Het Parool, 2009). Development of the document had started in January 2008. The draft version of the Structure Vision is then presented on 14 October 2009, only one month after the presentation of the '3 Future Perspectives' for Haven-Stad, which was framed as a 'starting point for discussion'. The Structure Vision 2040 heavily invests on the growth of the metropolis Amsterdam, the preservation of green areas and the transformation of 'space extensive areas'. Chapter 3 describes the expansion of high end urban areas within the Ring Road A10: "the development of this area is the most direct proof of the incredible attraction that the heart of Amsterdam has" (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010, p. 33). To achieve this, the municipality proposes the "complete and total transformation of all areas within the Ring A10, including the Coenhaven and Vlothaven."

As a peak on the crown for urban development on port lands, or as an ultimate 'bite on the tail of the dragon', the Coenhaven is appointed as location for the Olympic Stadium for the Amsterdam



Olympic bid for 2028. Public servants were playing with the idea for several years of organizing the Olympics 100 years after the ones from 1928. Van Poelgeest made a deal: he would support the Olympic ambition, as long as it would be used to push urban reform policies in the Haven-Stad area. He states that the Olympics can act as a catalyst for urban development in Haven-Stad (Het Parool, 2010; Personal Interview, 19-11-2018). Just pro forma, a secondary location was studied, but that one was dropped soon after publication of the draft Structure Vision. The definitive Plan-MER of the Structure Vision only describes the Olympic ambition in relation with waterfront development alternatives along the IJ banks (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010, p. 316).

Of course, this sparked major protests from the port and port companies, stating that it was “a direct violation of the Covenant we agreed upon only months ago”. Van Poelgeests response was that these are not formal plans, but just ‘internally binding ideas and checking frameworks’ for future development. A Structure Vision does not hold any formal status. Van Poelgeest personally describes the reaction of the companies to that statement as ‘furious’.

The Olympic stadium plan was a direct violation of the Covenant, only signed 1 year earlier. The Olympics would be in 2028, the Covenant forbids any plan making before 2025. Van Poelgeest comments that the companies “only have to move 5 years earlier if the plans go through”. This quote shows something important. The year 2029 is framed as an expiry date for industrial activity in the Coenhaven. The Covenant is based on the agreement that companies can ‘stay until *at least* 2029’, not ‘until’.



Figure 18: Plan for the Olympic Stadium 2028 in the Coenhaven, Draft Structure Vision (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010)

One day before the political debate on the Draft Structure Plan before the Council in February 2010, ORAM ignites a public debate regarding the Olympic Ambitions. On 4 February 2010 president of

ORAM, Paul Wevers states that the plan is 'ridiculous'. They state that the Olympic Games are used as a Trojan Horse to push companies out of the harbour to make room for urban development. On behalf of the all entrepreneurs, ORAM, VNO-NCW, MKB and the Chambre of Commerce withdraw their support for the Olympic Games (Het Parool, 2010). The lobby seems to be effective. On 5 February, during discussions in the council, both the Liberal Party from the opposition as coalition partner the Labour Party revoke their support for the Olympic location in the Port. Michiel Mulder (Labour Party) states: "The port is important for employment and the economic development of Amsterdam. There is no place for an Olympic Village, only for companies" (cited by Het Parool, 2010). This illustrates that transformation of western port areas is still a sensitive topic within the Labour Party, and it is mainly pushed by the Greens.

Salient detail is that opposition member and leading candidate Erik van der Burg (Liberal Party) states: "We should not kill the economy, there is plenty of room elsewhere in the city" (as cited by Het Parool, 2010). He would 7 years later become the alderman that developed the Development Strategy for Haven-Stad. These discussions take place a few weeks before the municipal election of 3 March 2010. The Democrats double in size at the loss of the Red-Green coalition parties, but, due to a series of unrelated events, fail to form a coalition themselves. Therefore the Red-Green coalition joins forces with the Liberal Party that also had lost but together form a new majority in the council. As a result, Van Poelgeest maintains its position as alderman for Spatial Planning. Van der Burg becomes alderman for Public Health (Het Parool, 2010).

In the viewing period, that took from February to May 2010, the companies ICL Fertilizers, Eggerding Holding BV, the Chamber of Commerce North Holland West and ORAM send letters of objection about the Draft Structure Plan. In October 2010, the municipality summarizes the objections they have as follows: "*They strongly urge the municipality to reintroduce Scenario 1. Dropping of scenario 1 is not motivated: the port functions are vital and realistic relocation options have not been offered. (...) The choice for the Olympic location is in violation with the Covenant. This is unacceptable. To make development possible, new locations will have to be ready in 2018.*" (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010, p. 66, 67, 135)

One week before municipal elections (3 March 2010), on 24 February 2010 the draft Structure Vision is discussed in the committee for Spatial Planning. A speaker of the Chambre of Commerce states on behalf of the port companies and associations: "*Scenario 1 should be reincluded in the plans*". Also the Labour Party opposes development in the port, to surprise of Alderman Van Poelgeest this is conflicting with the 'unanimous' Board of Mayor and Alderman, including Labour Alderman of the Port Ossel.

The Board of Mayor and Aldermen responds with: "*In Amsterdam there is a high demand for housing in the central part of the city. The m<sup>2</sup> prices are higher than anywhere in the Netherlands. Amsterdam must do whatever it can to comply to this specific, urban demand. Haven-Stad scenario 2 and 3 offer the opportunity to develop attractive, water rich living-working environments. It is exactly these qualitative factors (central location and situated long the IJ) that make Haven-Stad relatively favourable. From eminent importance is the increasingly knowledge based economy. Due to the long preparation period that Haven-Stad asks for, discussions have to start now. (...) In 2011 there will be made a decision for the Olympic ambition, this will be in accordance with the interests of existing companies*" (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010, p. 66, 136).

The textual adjustment in the Structure Vision in response to the objections is even more determined for transformation: "*Haven-Stad is one of the last opportunities to develop on large scale*

*urban work/living environments. That is a necessity for the city. That is why the council chooses to go through with scenario 2 and 3.*" (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010, p. 66).

The municipality however confirms that additional research is needed to examine the spatial effects of transformation on the availability of industrial locations in Amsterdam. In accordance with surrounding municipalities it states that this needs a regional approach to "put the right company, on the right place, on all scale levels." It promises a research, that will be ready in 2014, which is connected to regional platform PlaBeKa.

Interestingly enough, the project team proposes to rename Haven-Stad to 'Amsterdam Waterfront'. (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2010, p. 135). There is no reason given, other than that Waterfront was the name used in the MER-alternatives to describe a scenario with more urban development along the IJ. The municipality seems to emphasize the goal of urban development instead of the line based on integral plan-making and physical co-existence (remember: the reason to give Haven-Stad its name in the first place).

A few months later, on 17 February 2011, the Structure Plan is made definitive. In the final document the Olympic stadium is moved slightly eastwards. An Olympic stadium directly on the Coenhaven is removed, although the Olympic facilities are still located within the environmental sphere of influence of the port. Besides that, urban development in the port is still put central in the vision. The final Structure Vision is voted for unanimously by the council deep in the night, after dozens of amendments (Het Parool, 2011). One of these amendments is from the Labour Party, the Liberal Party and the Democrats. They want the council to offers existing companies in the transformation areas in the western port areas certainty about their future and alternative locations in 2014 latest (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p.12).

The Olympic ambition stranded officially in October 2012 because of the withdrawal of support of the national government in the newly formed cabinet Rutte II. That made the relocation task less urgent in Amsterdam.

All these previous events took place in a time of austerity, and the municipality was busier with budget cuts than creating new urban projects. After the municipality lost over €1 billion between 2006 and 2010 on undeveloped office locations, alderman Van Poelgeest decided to cancel all building projects in the city (Het Parool, 2010). It is not strange that there was criticism on the financial feasibility of the increased ambitions of the council that were included in the Structure Vision. Two months after the approval of the Structure Vision, Lodewijk Asscher, now alderman of Finance, announced that budget cuts of €43 million on spatial development and the port were on scheme (Het Parool, 2011). However, he states that *"the costly and increased spatial ambitions that were added to the Structure Vision 2040 by the council do not match the financial position of the municipality"*.

The Structure Vision is pushed through, but due to the economic crisis, some ambitions in the Structure Vision are made relative. The Labour Party fears that there will not be enough demand for 70.000 dwelling in the complete city by 2040. Also, further research about the feasibility of port research is demanded. The rest of the document is voted for unadjusted: the lines for future development are definitively drawn.

The motion in the debate for the Structure Vision 2040 led to the development of a Transformation Strategy. The development of this strategy is discussed in the next chapter.

### 7.3.5 Political rationality

**Adopted policy: The ambition to develop all port areas within the highway A10 before 2040. A feasibility study will determine how.**

#### Problem

From 2006 to 2008 when the first plans for Haven-Stad are drawn up, the housing market is at its peak in Amsterdam, reaching historical high values in Q3 2008. However, in 2009 the economic crisis starts. All building projects in the city are cancelled in 2010. The Structure Plan, including proposed port transformation, is formalized during the crisis and with no need for housing.

#### Political

Serious intervention from politics toward port vision (Memorandum the Green Party). First council of a Red-Green coalitions opens the door towards renewed westward explorations.

#### Solution (Policy + Technical)

The assignment of all port lands within the A10 for urban development, including a reservation for an Olympic Stadium.

### 7.3.6 Integration

Scales		Sectors		Agencies	
Municipality	+	Spatial planning dep.	+	Port Authority	-
MRA/NZKG	+/-	Economic Affairs	+	Port companies	-
Province	-	Mobility	+	Covenant partners	-
National	N.A.	Land Department	+	Company associations	-
		Engineering	+	Investors, developers	-
		RWS	-		

+: Integrated in plan, -: not integrated in plan, +/- partially integrated

*Table 10: Integration of stakeholders in the Structure Vision 2040, regarding port development*

#### Integration of scales

National spatial policies have been decentralized. The municipality has more spatial planning powers and uses this to define its own Structure Vision. The new Vision is not aligned with the Provincial Streekplan anymore.

Amsterdam policy makers use the term 'Amsterdam is bigger than its municipal borders' and regional cooperation only when Amsterdam problems need to be solved: like relocation of companies and or port growth. The only thing that Amsterdam solves for the region is the high end urban housing demand, but does that on its own with no cooperation with surrounding

municipalities.

### Integration of sectors

Joint effort to explore effects and opportunities in the Haven-Stad planning area. Cooperation based on equal input delivers a balanced documents that clearly underlines the opportunities, but also the risks and impacts of transformation.

The port loses its natural partner in the municipalities' organisation. Economic Affairs shifts from the policy to protect the 2 big Mainports towards idea of economic development through support of the urban knowledge economy and the creation urban environments that support interaction between individuals.

### Integration of agencies

The Port Authority cooperated with the explorations towards urban development in the Coenhaven and Vlohaven. There was another (hidden) reason to create this document: to create openness of business from the port.

Creating the three different perspectives was integrated, the decision to formalize only 2 of these scenarios was political. The administrative assignment to research possible transformation was strategic: the intention was that the Port Authority would share information.

The phase ends with conflict: port companies are unsatisfied because they feel unincluded after the mediation should have enhanced the relationship. The Structure Vision 2040 includes scenarios that are in direct violation of the Covenant, for example by proposing to host the Olympic Games in 2028 in the Coenhaven. Also, the plan does not match with port policy and growth projections of the port.

## 7.3.7 Institutions

The following institutions have been identified as having affected actors and the (strategic) capacity of actors in the plan-making and formalization process.

Institutions	In port-city planning (episode 2)
<b>Socio-cultural</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Idea at public servants that Ring Zone and waterfront redevelopment are necessary for economic development. Belief in the benefits of the knowledge and creative 'urban' economy over protection of the port at Economic Affairs.</li><li>• Urban planners and politicians anticipate ongoing westward port migration</li><li>• Urban planners expect a smaller and less polluting port in the future due to sustainability measures.</li><li>• Anticipation of more flexible environmental legislation and the belief that the energy transition will create a lot of space legitimize plan-making in port areas</li></ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Several maritime-urban icons attribute to the narrative of urban transformation of the IJ, as they are being used to show an irreversible trend of urban take-over</li> </ul>
<b>Financial</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The sustainability fund will remain in place to decrease pollution from the Coenhaven and Vlothaven</li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• During plan-making, the municipality shortens the renewed leasehold contract of Covenant partner ICL, making it to expire in 2034 instead of 2059. This is against the will of ICL.</li> </ul>
<b>Governance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Administrative assignment forces the department of Spatial Planning and the Port Authority to work together. This was a strategic action to obtain information from the port.</li> <li>• The municipality uses the capacity of plan making to shape markets and to put pressure on port companies</li> <li>• Strategic choice to participate in a bid for the Olympics, in order to catalyse urban development in port areas</li> <li>• Expert advisory board for Amsterdam urban planning is terminated due to austerity measures (Amsterdamse Raad Stadsontwikkeling)</li> </ul>
<b>Legal</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decentralization of spatial planning power, no check-and-balance system with regional stakeholders anymore</li> </ul>

Table 11: Institutions that affected plan making in episode 2

## 7.4 Haven-Stad: Strong City – Smart Port (2011-2013)

The period that followed the decision for the Structure visions can be characterized by the times of austerity and focus on budget cuts at the municipality. The number of public servants is cut down from 15.000 in 2010 to 12.000 in 2016 (Boonstra, 2013) during a time when the central government decentralized and redirected several tasks to the municipalities. Mainly in the 'physical cluster', the amount of jobs take 'hard and direct hits', like the Land Department, Engineering Department and the Project Management Bureau. This is because the building production has stopped completely. (Van der Burg, as cited by Boonstra, 2013). At the end, almost half of the public servants in the departments for spatial planning are laid off (Ten Have, 2017). These are the departments that were most involved with plan-making for Haven-Stad.

Following the amendment in which the Labour Party, the Liberal Party and the Democrats expressed their concerns about the Haven-Stad development plan in the Structure Vision, it was agreed upon that an additional research was needed to assess the impact of the transformation on port companies. This research was an in-depth exploration of scenarios 2 and 3. The amendment states: "Haven-Stad offers an opportunity to realise on large scale an urban work-living environment that follow the key principles of the city and the undivided city. Aside from affordable housing it also allows for more high end housing. (...) An important condition is that that port companies can be replaced while maintaining them for the MRA. (...) A second condition is that there is enough demand for urban work-living environments at the time of transformation to justify the replacement of companies (...). In 2014 there will be decided by the council if these conditions reasonably can be achieved in 2029." (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 12).

The research 'Transformation Strategy Haven-Stad: Strong City – Smart Port is the document that assess the impact of several strategies to achieve the goal of transformation. The document is created from 2012 and its definitive version is formalized on 4 July 2013 by the Council. The Transformation Strategy was announced in April 2013, literally at what would be the weakest point of the Amsterdam housing market.

The project team consists of the departments for Spatial Planning, the Port Authority, Economic Affairs, Infrastructure and Land Development. The team is guided by 2 project leaders: Maurits Hoog (Spatial Planning) and Leonie van de Beuken (Port Authority). The setup is therefore the same as the first exploration, although with different project leaders. Due to the continuity of the coalition, the political responsibility still falls under alderman Maarten van Poelgeest and Freek Ossel. The research is done parallel and forms input to the North Sea Canal Area 2040 Vision. That vision is set to explore and guide the future spatial development in the North Sea Canal Area.

It is good to note that the Transformation Strategy is still not a legally binding document. It is meant to provide the council with information to make their decision for future development. The document is meant to describe the series of actions that will eventually lead to the development of Haven-Stad. The vote by the council is that it agrees with the intention to transform the area. Public servants can therefore continue working on subparts of the plan to prepare transformation projects.

### 7.4.1 Transformation Strategy

The strategy starts with the statement that following the scenarios from 2009, the transformation is impossible. “These scenarios are extremely costly. Expected benefits are not enough to be feasible”. The research therefore focuses on different strategies to make redevelopment possible. From these strategies, one preferred strategy is constructed and formalized.

The Transformation Strategy is built on 3 scenarios, based on the general ambition to develop the port areas within the ring road A10:

- A. Autonomous development of Haven-Stad following current policy
- B. Transformation of haven-Stad 2013-2040 excluding the Coenhaven and Vlothaven
- C. Transformation of Haven-Stad 2013-2040 including the Coenhaven and Vlothaven

In accordance with 4 different approaches towards moving the companies in the area, regarding replacement and environmental policies, 4 strategies are developed: Broaden, Move, Accelerate and Seduce. Broaden and Move are referring to the 55dB noise limit and environmental regulations, not the companies. The effects of these strategies are calculated and form the basis for the proposed Transformation Strategy. These are as follows for the period of 2013 until 2060:

	1. Broaden	2. Move	3. Accelerate
Housing (m <sup>2</sup> )	7.000	12.000	20.000
Jobs & Services (m <sup>2</sup> )	270.000	140.000	80.000
Jobs	6.000	6.000	6.000
Result (x €million)	-30 to +85	-415 to + 15	- 1.660 to -525
Less income port (x €million)	- 98	-364	-307

Table 12: The different strategies regarding environmental zoning (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 22)

The 4<sup>th</sup> scenario (Seduce) is based on cluster development in the port itself. It states that the Coenhaven companies are part of strong clusters that will develop in the future. In cooperation with the municipality they can look for relocation in the area when they are ready. This strategy is not calculate through since it is difficult to quantify (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 21).

These results are used as input for the Land Department to estimate the costs of development for the municipality. These estimations are unfortunately private because they can weaken the municipalities negotiation position. However, the projected end result are shared:

	A. Autonomous	B. Excluding Coenhaven-Vlothaven 2013-2040		C. Including Coenhaven-Vlothaven 2013-2040	
		Lowest	Highest	Lowest	Highest
GREX result	x	-254	22	-1.444	-294
Super-Area	x	-200	-119	-1.099	-218

Table 13: Financial effect of strategy A, B and C (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 48)

The Land Department states that this development is different than from other developments. It is gradual and therefore a mix of interventions is needed. “In some areas, a more active approach is



needed to achieve the proposed urban quality” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 48). The costs are mainly for remediation, infrastructure and acquisition and replacement costs. “The acquisition costs are estimated extremely conservatively: as much as possible is left to the market”. Scenario B, where the Coenhaven is not transformed until 2040, is closest to break even. To achieve that, funds from higher governments are needed for infrastructure and the land value has to become 6 times as high in the future, while planning costs are kept to a minimum (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 49).

What is clear from the other scenario’s is that the programme of housing increases when companies are actively replaced from the Coenhaven. It also shows that the amount of space used for work decreases, since the space-extensive companies leave the area. It is also clear that speeding up the transformation for the sake of housing is extremely costly: up to a negative balance of €1,6 billion. Waiting until leasehold contracts are expired and with increased housing prices will improve the balance up to € -525 million. In this exploitation, the development of the Houtrakhaven to move the companies to is excluded from the exploitation and are passed off onto the Port Authority. These costs were estimated to be around €200 million, based on the estimations in 2009. Combined with the loss of income due to transformation, the Port Authority is set for a loss of €0,5 billion (see table above). This is because the transformation of the Coenhaven can be considered a disinvestment: the port basin is already fully operational and new port basins are unnecessary without transformation (own interpretation).

#### **7.4.2 Risk mitigation through phasing**

Because the aforementioned feasibility issues, the Transformation Strategy described to change the transformation approach. First of all, it advises to not transform the Coenhaven and Vlothaven until after 2040, since several leasehold contracts will have ended by then and the balance can be improved. It is assumed they will have enough time to relocate, although “there is a risk that they might build off their investments” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 23). Following the current financial position of the municipality, active replacement is not an option. Therefore the Strategy is based on not replacing companies actively.

Following these considerations, the complete development is cut into different phases: Small developments within the current environmental zone can start sooner, like Sloterdijk I Zuid and the Minervahaven. Other developments will be postponed to 2030 and 2040. Considering the weak housing market and the agreements in the Covenant, decision about the complete transformation of the Coenhaven will be postponed until 2025. That is the year until when plan making is forbidden within the Covenant area.

The proposed phasing is as follows:

##### **Phase 1: 2013-2020**

Dezoning Sloterdijk and use policy freedom to start with the first interventions. Transform office locations first. Further develop plans and do more research and explore development perspectives together with the Coenhaven companies. Prepare impulses and execute them after 2015. This will add to 2.000 dwellings.

### **Phase 2: 2020-2030**

After infrastructural adjustments, an exploration starts to intensify the areas around Sloterdijk and Cornelis Douwes. Look together with owners and developers for experimental development frameworks to start a slow transition towards a more mixed work-living environment. This will add up to 3.300 dwellings.

### **Phase 3: 2030-2040**

Before 2025 there needs to be a decision about the development of the Coenhaven and Vlothaven. Depending on market pressure and the availability of alternative locations, the end of leasehold contracts can be coupled to relocation of companies. This adds 14.700 dwellings to Haven-Stad. Without the development of the Coenhaven, this will be 3.700.

## **7.4.3 Response of port companies**

What is noteworthy is that the 3 Covenant partners from the Coenhaven were interviewed in the framework of this feasibility research, to respond on the different scenarios. The draft version of the strategy was shared with them and the Chambre of Commerce. Also, an independent expert meeting was held to assess the different scenarios. The minutes from these meetings were retractable in the archives of the municipality. The following comments are made.

The Chambre of Commerce has quite some remarks on the Transformation Strategy. They state that, considering all limitations and negative effects due to transformation in the Coenhaven, there a better and more logical places to develop the planned amount to housing. The Houtrakpolder needs to be secured on a regional level. The Chambre is worried by the fact that Amsterdam policy makers are assuming a socially engineered city. It wonders what the impact will be in companies in the Coenhaven will respond negatively to the strategy: "How much is that really taken into account?" Even with postponing development in the Coenhaven, companies will still be unsure until 2025, which is a very short notice concerning their investment periods. Alternative locations are not available yet. The municipality does unfortunately not attribute to the replacement costs. (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, Appendix 5, p. 158).

The companies are interviewed by representatives of both the Port and the Spatial Planning Department, including Zef Hemel and Leonie van de Beuken. The company representatives are all Board members, either CEO's or directors. The talks take place between February and March 2013.

They all state that they are satisfied with their location right now. Business is going good, there is growth and if possible, they would like to expand. Their connection to Amsterdam is strong, some of their European headquarters are moved here. Below are the summaries (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, Appendix 5, p. 158-167).

### **Response ICL Fertilizers**

Summary based on the minutes of two meetings 11 February 2013 and 28 March 2013  
With: Mr. A. Zanelli (ICL), Mr. Z. Hemel (Spatial Planning), Mr. W. Vlemmix en Mrs. L. van den Beuken (Port Authority)

"The leasehold contracts of ICL last until 2034. If the municipality decides to continue with their strategy, that means that they will have to clean everything on their lands by then. This comes with a

huge investment. Rebuilding the same facility again will cost between €80-100 million. Amsterdam has several qualities, but the international board of directors will look at the most yielding location at the end. Clustering in Le Havre, Barcelona or Terneuzen is an option. The headquarters will move with the facility: they are closely connected. New buildings and facilities have writing off periods of 25 and 10 years respectively. That means that the discussions on transformation already cause uncertainty in some of the current business cases. Deciding on transformation in 2025 is way too late. The extension of the Covenant period with 10 to 20 years (2039 or 2049) would be perfect for now.”

#### **Response Eggerding BV**

Summary based on the minutes of a meeting on 18 March 2013

With: Mrs. R. van der Linde, Mr. W.A. van der Linde (Eggerding), Mr. Z. Hemel (Spatial Planning), Mr. W. Vlemmix en Mrs. L. van den Beuken (Port Authority)

“Eggerding BV is a family business and intends to grow. The Amsterdam port is their only location. The municipality does not give a lot of long term commitment. The Covenant is relatively a stable factor, but currently there are also zoning plan changes that cause uncertainty. [The Petroleumhaven zoning plan was underway to be changed to allow for a potential cruise Passenger Terminal, right next to Eggerding at the time.] Eggerding has an option to extend its leasehold contract to 2085, but does not want to stay as one of the last companies in the Coenhaven. It needs to be in a ‘fully functioning industrial environment’. It does not expect that resident will get used to dust their cars every time a ship is unloaded. The company is willing to explore option westward, but is expecting cooperation from the municipality. To delay the decision until 2025 adds nothing to certainty.”

#### **Response Cargill/IGMA**

Summary based on the minutes of a meeting on 23 March 2013

With: Mr. Randy MacNack (Cargill), Mr. W. Vlemmix and Mrs. L. van den Beuken (Port Authority)

“Cargill is the largest private family company in the world. It focuses on bio based dry bulk and food. It is tightly connected to the agricultural sector and with the food cluster in Zaandam. Cargill is one of the biggest employers in the port of Amsterdam, but even more people work in their European headquarters at Schiphol (500). Cargill is a company that needs to innovate in order to stay relevant in the highly competitive food market. It recently invested €30 million in its Amsterdam plant. Depending on how the market evolves, clustering of certain European activities is possible in Amsterdam, Barcelona or England. The Covenant is interpreted at the headquarters as ‘we can continue our business undisputedly until 2030’. The €30 million investment in the plant was based on that idea. Cargill expects a clear vision from the municipality. Urban development is understandable, but it needs clarity. If the city thinks transformation is desirable and feasible, they should act like it. If they want to keep the companies, make sure there is enough space elsewhere. All investments in a new facility are disinvestments. Because of the high costs it will not yield better than the current facility. Replacement within the current time horizon is not feasible. The company expects the municipality, as initiator of the plan, to pay for relocation. If relocation is on the table, it is the question whether it will be Amsterdam again. There is a minimum of 20 years stable outlook needed to do that. The legal status of the Transformation Strategy is disputed: it has no legal status and offer no more certainty than the Covenant.”

It is important to note that there are of course way more companies in the Coenhaven and

Vlothaven affected by the transformation plans. Their relocation options are also limited due to their port-related activities. The Transformation Strategy document confirms that only the Covenant companies were interviewed. The smaller companies are indirectly represented by ORAM, VEBAN and the Chambre of Commerce.

According to Van Poelgeest (Personal Interview, 19-11-2018), mainly ICL and Eggerding were opposed to transformation and relocation issue. “They thought everything was really complicated.” Randy MacNack, in the name of Cargill, seemed to approach the problem more as a business deal. “He was a good sports, he was just in it for a good deal. I could appreciate that. He knew internationally cities expand to old port areas. Of course the indignation and anger about the plans are part of the game”. Van Poelgeest also states that Randy MacNack has told him that the municipality “gives him more certainty than the international board of Cargill does. He states that around the time of the Covenant agreement he said that “If the international board decides that you are gone, you are gone within 5 years. The municipality gives certainty until 2025, so what are we talking about?” This statement may have influenced the weighing of company uncertainty into the equation. In this case it does not matter if the statement is true, if the alderman interprets it this way, and beliefs it and acts like it, it influences the process.

#### **7.4.4 Expert panel as input for Transformation Strategy**

An expert panel session, guided by Maurits Hoog (Spatial Planning) and Raymond Dubos and Leonie van den Beuken (Port Authority) took place on 4 April 2013. The panel consisted of Wouter Veldhuis (MUST), Isabelle Vries (CityPorts Rotterdam), Caroline Rovers (Urban Development Rotterdam), Walter Manshanden (TNO) and Caroline Rodenburg (Ernst & Young – Location Advisory). They comment on the different aspects of the plan that can be summarized as follows:

They appreciate the first phase of the strategy: “This is small scale and incremental development” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009, Appendix 5, p. 174). It is achievable, feasible and fits with the scale of Amsterdam. They strongly advise to cancel phase 3: development in the Coenhaven is costly due to the existing companies and the needed infrastructure. It is difficult to attach to the rest of the city and there are environmental issues due to the port. They advise to cut phase 2 in half, which will depend on environmental interventions and regulations after 2025.

The expert panel states that development of the Coenhaven and Vlothaven is “not sensible”: The economic position of the area is strong and companies function fine. Alternatives for companies are worse, following more pressure on transport systems. The Coenhaven is very efficient and a social cost-benefit analysis will prove that relocation is too costly. Give investors certainty. In Rotterdam, it shows that uncertainty leads to the degeneration of port areas.

They continue by stating that the message from the Transformation Strategy that companies will have to move on themselves “hit them hard”. The companies offer relatively a lot of jobs and are tightly connected to the region. This strategy will lead to uncertainty and less investments. There is a lot of difference between the local companies and the international companies regarding their relocation approach. “But all want clarity.” The project team responds that the port is full and the Houtrakhaven is the only option, while replacement is too expensive for the municipality. They conclude that companies are a vital part of the city. “Make them part of your strategy instead of

pushing them away” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009, Appendix 5, p. 178).

The expert panel consist of a serious delegation with experienced practitioners and academics in the field of port economics, urban redevelopment and port-city governance. Some have seen the same approach in Rotterdam and warn for the same mistakes. Their verdict is clear: do not develop the Coenhaven, include companies in the process and start small.

For example: when a business case to construct a new plant is assessed in 2015, the write off period is 25 years. This means that companies need certainty until 2040 at least. That is their input to the process. It also means that, counting backwards, if 2034 will really be the end date where everything is demolished and cleaned up, the last investment that fell within the companies investment horizon was in 2009. Everything after that time becomes a disinvestment. Postponing the decision for transformation to 2025, means that the companies cannot properly invest for 16 years. In highly competitive global markets, this can harm the competitiveness of a facility relative to other clusters in the world.

#### **7.4.5 Assessed financial impact**

A research done by Decisio (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, Appendix 4, p.114-130) to determine the financial effects of the transformation state that the realization of dwellings in this part of the city is worth €6,75 billion (20.000 dwellings of 120m<sup>2</sup> for €4.000/m<sup>2</sup>). Compared to developing the same amount in Almere, the value would be €3,5 billion less (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, Appendix 4, p. 145). They argue that this is additional development value that can be absorbed by the negative effects of transformation in this area: namely the replacement costs, infrastructure, economic damage. The calculation does not assume any social housing and is based on construction costs of €900/m<sup>2</sup> for dwellings and €1000/m<sup>2</sup> for offices. The programme is still based on a mix of housing and offices.

Secondary financial effects of course focus on the attraction of new residents that spend money and pay taxes. Of course, these people do not live and work somewhere else in the city or in the Netherlands anymore. Also, the typical environment can attract new international firms and foreign investment. The IJ-boulevard philosophy from 1991 is not dead yet, it seems.

#### **7.4.6 Estimated effects on port development**

The research from Decisio expects that the transshipment target of 125 million tonnes can be reached in 2026.

The Port Authority states that the Coenhaven and Vlothaven is the most profitable part of the port. Also, they operate in sustainable clusters that allow for growth. Transformation impacts autonomous growth and the profitability of the Port” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, p. 23). The transformation of the Coenhaven and Vlothaven directly impact the growth potential of the Port: In order to reach the 125 million tonnes, the Houtrakpolder needs to be developed. The Houtrakhaven would allow for some 180 hectares of new port lands. This estimation excludes the nautical space puzzle. As stated before, due to its shape, the Coenhaven is extremely efficient with its nautical

space.

Decisio developed 3 scenarios for spatial development of the port in relation to transformation of the Coenhaven and Vlothaven.

### 1. Port in the Metropolitan Region

Existing port companies can stay in the Coenhaven and Vlothaven. The port also expands towards the west in the Houtrakpolder and optionally in the Wijkermeerpolder. The port can accommodate a growth to 150 million tonnes in 2040.

### 2. Big Landscapes and Compact Port

No port expansion, but environmental contours from Coenhaven and Vlothaven are reduced in size. Therefore a little bit more housing is realisable: The port can grow up to between 100-120 million tonnes in 2040.

### 3. Urban Work-Living Landscape

The port expands towards the west in the Houtrakpolder and Wijkermeerpolder. Port companies from the Coenhaven are moved or removed. Because of loss of port lands in the east, total transshipment is 130 million in 2040. Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, Appendix 4 - p. 120).

This confirms and further underlines the connection between the lock, Houtrakpolder expansion and Haven-Stad transformation. Port expansion in the western periphery is practically impossible, but this assessment shows that the growth of the port is highly connected to the effects from the Transformation Strategy. At the time this document is written, negotiations are going on about the investment in a new lock. The Port Authority states that the port can only reach its target of 125 million ton with the new lock. In this projection, we see that is only possible in a scenario where the Coenhaven and Vlothaven remain in use for port activities. The most realistic scenario is now that 'the front door is enlarged', but the ports' capacity is reduced. These estimations point out that the Houtrakhaven is an absolute necessity to facilitate the growth it intends to achieve with the new enlarged lock.





Figure 19: Estimated port growth figures and availability of land shows the transformation of Haven-Stad is incompatible with autonomous port growth and current port growth projections. The red lines are the estimated transshipment volumes of Decisio in relation to the 3 scenarios for Haven-Stad (own illustration, based on Port of Amsterdam, 2009, 2011; Decisio, 2013; Havenmonitor, 2016, 2018)

Even more interesting is that this estimation is based on transformation of the Petroleumhaven as well. This is the port basin across the ring road A10. There were secondary sources that implied the research for transformation of this area as well, in order to complete the ZaanIJ-corridor completely.

The research further states that the location has two unique qualities: “It offers an international work and living experience close to the water and close to the city centre, but it also offers the ability to use it as port land”. The port companies “are already the international allure the city seeks (...), they offer great value for the region and are tied with other clusters. However, due to their space extensive nature and environmental sphere of influence, they offer a low number of jobs and they are not mixable with urban environments.” (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013, Appendix 3, p. 138). The combination of the ambition for port growth, the perseverance of companies in the Coenhaven and the complete transformation of Haven-Stad is explained as “*exceptionally complicated*”.



	Groots landschap en compacte haven		Hoogstedelijk woon-werklandschap A		Hoogstedelijk woon-werklandschap B	
	2040 GE	2040 RC	2040 GE	2040 RC	2040 GE	2040 RC
<b>Haven</b>						
Haventerreinen Netto ha / % verandering tov 2012	-7%	-7%	-2%	-2%	-6%	-6%
Fysieke veranderingen	Gedeeltelijke transformatie Coen- en Vlothaven	Gedeeltelijke transformatie Coen- en Vlothaven	Transf. Coen-, Vlot- en Petroleumhaven Uitbreiding Houtrakpolder	Transf. Coen-, Vlot- en Petroleumhaven Uitbreiding Houtrakpolder	Transf. Coen-, Vlot- en Petroleumhaven Uitbreiding Wijkermeerpolder	Transf. Coen-, Vlot- en Petroleumhaven Uitbreiding Wijkermeerpolder
Overslag (capaciteit in mln ton) achter de sluizen (abs)	100-120	80	120-130	80	100-120	80
<b>Wonen</b>						
Aantal woningen (x1000)	+30,8	+30,8	+52,7	+52,7	+52,7	+52,7
% van woningopgave MRA PRIMOS (GE/CE)	10% (6%)	10% (19%)	18% (10%)	18% (32%)	18% (10%)	18% (32%)
% van woningopgave MRA hoogstedelijk PRIMOS(CE/CE)	42% (25%)	42% (77%)	72% (42%)	72% (132%)	72% (42%)	72% (132%)
<b>Groen/recreatie</b>						
Ontwikkeld gebied (Ha)	3.500	3.500	3.830	3.830	3.470	3.470
<b>Economische kerncijfers</b>						
Werkgelegenheid MRA (banen x1000)	1667	1277	1679	1277	1670	1277
Werkgelegenheid NZKG (banen x1000)	>170	>129	>170	>129	>170	>129
Werkgelegenheid haven (banen x1000)	23	23	26	23	23	23
Toegevoegde waarde MRA (mld euro)	212,2	117,0	214,7	117,0	213,0	117,0
Toegevoegde waarde NZKG (mld euro)	>30	>15,5	>30	>15,5	>30	>15,5
Toegevoegde waarde haven (mld euro)	6,5	4,3	7,3	4,3	6,5	4,3
Netto ruimte voor nieuwe werkgelegenheid NZKG (potentieel aantal extra banen niet-haven)	97	97	111	111	111	111
% van totale toename MRA	35%	Nvt	40%	Nvt	40%	Nvt

Figure 20: Research of Decisio showing Haven-Stad is incompatible with port growth (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013)

### ZaanIJ-Corridor vs. Almere 2.0




Figure 21: Zaan IJ connection, urban takeover of IJ (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2009)

Parallel to the development of the plans for Haven-Stad, is the development of the ZaanIJ-corridor. This corridor is a series of urban developments from Zaanstad, through the port of Amsterdam towards the IJ Lake. The urban area developments include the transformation of the Hembrug terrain, Achtersluispolder. First drawn into the vision of Northward, the municipality of Amsterdam shows the potential of the 'Zaan Corridor' to connect Amsterdam North regionally (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2003). In 2010, the municipality of Zaandam explores opportunities along the IJ (Municipality of Zaandam, 2010, p. 36). The projects are meant to connect Zaandam spatially and economically with Amsterdam. The IJ-development used to focus more on Almere. In 2008, an large scale development was announced to connect Amsterdam with Almere in 2030, including a railway connection above the IJ lake and the construction of more than 60.000 dwellings on the western side of Almere. Together they would form a metropolis around the IJ. During the economic crisis, Almere lost hundreds of millions on its active land policies. Housing production came to a complete stop and in 2011 it was announced that the construction of the IJ-railway connection was cancelled and coupled to a threshold development volume. In 2016, the former director of the PBL states: *"People want to live in Amsterdam, not Almere. Building in Almere is a waste of money. The ambition for 100.000 dwelling in Amsterdam should be realised on the edges of the existing city"*. In 2016, the municipality of Zaanstad states: *"Zaanstad and Amsterdam form an integrated whole. In 2040, they will be connected seamlessly."* (Municipality of Zaanstad, 2016, p. 3).

The ambitions from Zaanstad, Amsterdam Noord and Haven-Stad are combined in a study in 2017 (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017). The urban study is performed by the same office as the Haven-Stad plan: MUST (2017)



### **7.4.7 New strategies for urban development**

Parallel to the events in 2013, the municipality of Amsterdam stated that it wants to move away from active land policy. Therefore instead it wants to focus on facilitating urban development. A discourse mainly derived from crisis times. In 2013, the Project Management Bureau of the municipality evaluated 15 recent urban development projects and identified a few important things. These include that new construction land where the municipality can employ active land policies is becoming increasingly scarce and more projects aim at the transformation of existing areas with low profits from land leases (City Development in Transition, 2013). Other aspects, like the fact that the municipality has less means to invest and cannot rely on big developers seem a bit outdated. The municipality is nowadays willing to lose money on certain developments (BNR Nieuwsradio, 2018) and all big developers have projects around the city.

The PMB sees three different new governmental development strategies for the municipality (Stadsontwikkeling in Transitie, 2013):

#### **1. Role of the municipality: from directing to facilitating**

The municipality is stepping back and should allow market parties to make their own plans. The municipality is facilitating in this process. It sets benchmarks and determines 'general societal frameworks' for projects.

#### **2. Urban plan: from straitjacket to tailored suit**

In more and more projects, the fixed urban final design is removed. In its place a 'starting image' is constructed together with stakeholders. Initiators, private parties, owners and users go through an organic process of plan making. At the end, a urban plan is established. Start with an overall programme with some 'game rules' and leave space for incremental development.

#### **3. From GREX to business case**

The classic GREX is an outdated instrument. In an increasing number of projects, the GREX is just one of the parts of the business case. This opens a lot of opportunities for other instruments like area funds. In the transformation of project '1012' a municipal fund kickstarted an area development that resulted in a manifold of private investments.

### **7.4.8 New lock and corporatization of the Port Authority**

The Transformation Strategy Haven-Stad is one of the last things the Port did as a department of the Municipality. Following severe budget cuts, but also with pressure of the National Government the port is corporatized. Corporatization does not mean complete independence from the municipality. The Municipality of Amsterdam remains 100% shareholder for the first 3 years. After that time, other governmental bodies may join, like the Province and the National Government.

It gets a 'departing gift': the largest lock in the world. The current lock is a bottleneck for further growth beyond 95 million tonnes. The National Government took a stake of 30% in the corporatized Rotterdam port, in return for the Tweede Maasvlakte. This was not needed in Amsterdam, since the old lock (Noordersluis) was set to be renovated in 2029 anyway. As part of the national infrastructure system that was a task for the national government.

The municipality, the Port Authority and the port companies had lobbied for a new lock for several years. On 15 January 2010 the municipality stated that it 'wants a bigger lock than the current one'. The Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management states 'there will be big risks due to the way the new lock needs to be designed'. Amsterdam needs to pay more: €120 million of the total amount of €690 million that is budgeted for the new lock. On 27 November 2014, Kajsa Ollongren, Alderwoman of the port, pushed the decision through the council to build the lock. Estimated costs are then €880 million, but are co-financed by the European Union. The support for the new lock comes from almost all political parties, but the lock investment is granted under the condition that the port will severely invest in sustainability. For example, the port needs to be coal free in 2040 (Het Parool, 2014).

While corporatized, the municipality has three ways to retain its grip on the port (Daamen & Louw, 2013): it retains ownership and legal status of all port lands, has public law instruments to decide over port land-uses and influence in strategic decision-making, as only stockholder. On the other hand, the Port Authority is 'Economic Owner' of all port-lands and can act as if it were their own on a daily basis. The Port Authority therefore sub-land leases and rents out lands. The absence of housing is seen as a 'license to grow', while stating that in the Coenhaven there is an exemption for transformation purposes (Port Authority, 2018). The Port Authority seems to be in an awkward position defending the ports competitiveness, while also having to oblige to the municipality's interests.

A port representative states that the port of Amsterdam would have preferred to have more shareholders, like the national government. Therefore its interests would be better protected concerning port development and transformation.

On 1 April 2013 the Port of Amsterdam is officially corporatized. Two weeks prior, a series of interviews appear in the media with several government officials. Minister of Infrastructure Melanie Schulz van Haegen states that the Port will be able to cooperate better and compete with other ports. Only good economic news follows from the Port after its corporatization. Not only does it break its own records for transshipment, revenue and profit (Port Authority, 2013, 2014, 2015; Het Parool, 2014, 2015), it also does this at the depth of the economic crisis.

#### **7.4.1 Political rationality**

The Transformation Strategy was developed after a political motion that requested the research for the desirability and feasibility of Haven-Stad in was 'to be able to determine in 2014 if the conditions could be met that would justify the transformation [housing demand versus economic value]'. This resulted in a document that explores various scenario's and strategies to determine a preferred road of action. A few things become clear:

- Transformation is in any scenario extremely expensive
- Active relocation of companies is too expensive
- Phasing can increase feasibility due to ending leasehold contracts
- Complete transformation of Haven-Stad is incompatible with port growth
- Port companies need clarity within their investment horizon

The definitive Transformation Strategy therefore cuts the development into different phases. It starts with an incremental development on places where this is possible, like in Sloterdijk South. Later, where environmental legislation allows it, further development will take place. In the last phase, after 2040, the Coenhaven and Vlothaven will be developed.

The Transformation Strategy is formalized on 4 July 2013 in the cities' council meeting, three months after the corporatization of the Port Authority. Considering all the feedback of port companies and experts, nothing much has changed in the final document. The concerns of the port companies are discussed in the meeting. However, a majority of the council states that the possible prospect of future urban development is more important. Because of sensitive financial information of the municipality, the port and port companies, part of this council meeting and documents are secret and not publicly available (these are Appendices 6 and 7 in the Transformation Strategy). These documents show the financial effects of port company relocation. These are not disclosed because it would harm the municipalities' negotiation position.

Although the Transformation Strategy is formalized, the concern for the port companies is also formalized in a motion. A majority of the council states to understand that the postponed decision for the development of the Coenhaven and Vlothaven creates uncertainty for companies. Especially for the companies ICL and Shipdock, that have relatively weak land positions in the area. Through this motion they oblige the Board of Aldermen and Mayor to further research the effects of transformation on these respective companies before the end of 2013.

In December 2013 the council comes with a response to the previously mentioned motion. The response is part of a larger, short term proposal for the setup of the Haven-Stad planning structure until 2015. In a letter, the Board of Mayor and Aldermen state that talks with the large companies in the area have been continued. In the case of ICL, the municipality wants to seek if it is possible to extend the leasehold term with a maximum of 10 years to 2044 to give the company room for investment. On the other hand, Alderman Van Poelgeest underlines the fact that no decisions have to be made that harm the freedom of policy makers when they will decide in 2025 what will happen with the area.

They also propose a new organization for the project. The Port Authority is now excluded as project leader, but remains part of a project group that is to meet once every month. Bart Vlaanderen (Spatial Planning Department) becomes project leader. The Spatial Planning Department and the Land Department become the 'core' of the project team.

Parallel to the process of giving ICL its' certainty are the efforts of the Netherlands Foreign Investment Agency (NFIA) to attract ICL's European headquarters to the Netherlands. This process was debated in 2017 in the National Parliament due to promised generous tax benefits<sup>22</sup> - the disputed *tax rulings* - that were publicized after Dutch newspaper NRC requested for all communication between ICL and the NFIA through the Freedom of Information Act<sup>23</sup>. These documents show that during a breakfast meeting of President Mark Rutte with the CEO of ICL in a hotel in Tel Aviv in December 2013, ICL got a call from Alderman Freek Ossel that their leasehold in the port of Amsterdam could be extended until 2044. An employee of the NFIA states that this was "probably coincidentally" but ICL "assumes this had to do with the talks between CEO Borgas and the Prime Minister" (see Appendix for the anonymized email).

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<sup>22</sup> Tweede Kamer: TK96 'Fiscaal gunstige tegemoetkoming aan chemieconcern ICL' (5-7-2017)

<sup>23</sup> Wet Openbaarheid Bestuur (WOB-verzoek)

**Policy adopted: Gradual transformation of Haven-Stad. The decision to transform the Coenhaven and Vlothaven is postponed to 2025.**

### **Problem**

In 2013, the housing market is at its lowest point and the future is stated to be uncertain by policy makers. However, there is still a political desire to eventually transform port areas close to the city centre due to long term strategic reasons.

### **Solution (Policy + Technology)**

The municipality seeks to use exceptions from the national environmental norms. The strategy expects more freedom in the future following from the draft Environment and Planning Act. This will result in more policy freedom for the municipality. Following the City and Environment approach, the norm of 'liveability' will be guiding. With the Area Development Plan, a period of 10 years can be 'bridged'. The Transformation Strategy keeps costs low for the municipality and certainty high by postponing several crucial decisions to 2025. This strengthens its position and weakens the position of the port companies. This is framed as a positive thing by policy makers: weaker companies are easier and cheaper to move.

#### *Lobby voor beleidsvrijheid tot 60 dB(A)*

- Voor industrielawaai geldt er een maximale ontheffingswaarde van 55 dB(A). De Wet geluidhinder biedt op dit moment slechts onder zeer beperkte voorwaarden mogelijkheid om hiervan af te wijken tot 60 dB(A). Inzet van Amsterdam is om de wettelijke mogelijkheden voor het gebruik van een norm van 60 dB(A) te versoepelen. Hiermee kunnen de woningbouwmogelijkheden in Haven-Stad aanzienlijk verbreed worden. Als invoering SWUNG-2 te lang duurt, dan is het handig om 60 dB(A) norm vervoegd in te laten voeren. De zeehavennorm zou in 2014 in AMvB's geregeld moeten zijn. Later volgt opname in de Omgevingswet.

*Figure 22: Passage from letter Programme Haven-Stad 2013-2015 show the active lobby to relax pollutions norms, stating this would 'considerably improve opportunity for housing development in Haven-Stad' (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013)*

### **Politics**

There is an essential continuation of the Red-Green coalition with the same aldermen on Port and Spatial Planning. The political majority that supported urban development in the port in the first place has remained in power.

#### **7.4.2 Integration**

The municipality conducted interviews with existing companies, but only the 3 big Covenant partners. Their feedback was not included in the plan. All financial risks are mitigated to the port and port companies and Port Authority, like the costs for development of Houtrakhaven when needed after transformation. A definitive decision about the development of the Coenhaven and Vlothaven is postponed to 2025, at the cost of the investment opportunities of port companies. Some companies have ending leasehold contracts in 2033.

Table 14: Integration of scales, sectors and agencies in episode 3 (Transformation Strategy)

Scales		Sectors		Agencies	
Municipality	+	Spatial planning dep.	+	Port Authority	-
MRA/NZKG	+/-	Economic Affairs	+	Port companies	-
Provincial	+/-	Mobility	+	Covenant partners	-
National	N.A.	Land Department	+	Company associations	-
		Engineering	+	Investors, developers	N.A.
		RWS	N.A.		

+: Integrated in plan, -: not integrated in plan, +/- partially integrate

### Integration of scales

The Structure Vision 2040 of Amsterdam is incorporated in the North Sea Canal Vision 2040. Here, the gradual transition of Haven-Stad is connected to the development of new port lands in the west. This, to keep the availability of port lands consistent with investments and autonomous growth. However, this is not consistent with spatial policies of the municipality. The municipality opposes port expansion, while making expansion inevitable if the Transformation Strategy is carried out completely.

### Integration of sectors

The Strategy was created by several departments of the municipality, with Spatial Planning and the Port Authority as project leaders. The plan making process was therefore horizontally integrated, however, the adopted policy is not.

### Integration of agencies

Although the concerns of various stakeholders, including the big 3 companies themselves, were heard, none of their requests ended up in the Transformation Strategy. They stated that only one thing is important: clarity. Either continuity of business or a plan for relocation. Postponing this decision also has a negative effect on replacement opportunities: The Afrikahaven has filled up in the meantime and the Houtrakpolder becomes necessary for relocation and autonomous growth of the port. While alternative locations were not available or realistically realisable within this time frame, the municipality agreed to the Strategy anyway. Also, none of the other formal objections changed something in the plan.

Next to that, the strategy does not seem to include the strong position of Eggerding BV, which holds an option in its leasehold contract to be extended until 2085 in 2035. At the same time costs of port redevelopment are passed off to the Port Authority, in a new financial arrangement. This leads to big disinvestments. Loss of income and impacts autonomous growth are expected but not mitigated. Other port investments continue undisrupted, like the development of the lock, which is inconsistent with the Transformation Strategy.

### 7.4.3 Institutions

Institutions	In port-city development planning
<b>Socio-cultural</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urban planners anticipate ongoing port migration</li> <li>• Political idea that Ring Zone and waterfront redevelopment are necessary for economic development</li> <li>• Anticipation of more flexible environmental legislation in the future (due to introduction Environment and Planning Act)</li> <li>• Zaandam and Amsterdam belong together and should be connected along the IJ-axis</li> </ul>
<b>Financial</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The sustainability fund will remain in place to decrease pollution from the Coenhaven and Vlothaven</li> <li>• Port redevelopment and relocation costs are transferred to the Port Authority</li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• While the Port Authority is corporatized, all (strategic) land remains in possession of the municipality</li> <li>• When needed for urban transformation, the municipality can reclaim land from the Port Authority</li> <li>• The Port Authority is not allowed to lease land to companies that can harm the opportunity for transformation</li> </ul>
<b>Governance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The municipality is 100% shareholder of the Port Authority. The Port Authority wished higher levels governments would have taken stakes to protect its interests</li> <li>• Transformation of Haven-Stad is embedded in regional spatial visions, however under preconditions</li> <li>• The ability to weigh alternatives leads to a decision in opposite direction of port and expert opinions</li> <li>• The power of decision making is used to strengthen the position of the municipality, by deliberately not giving certainty to port companies beyond their investment horizon</li> </ul>
<b>Legal</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The use of more flexible environmental regulation in plan-making, through the Crisis and Recovery Act, Swung II, City and Environment approach</li> <li>• Sloterdijk I South is dezoned by the Province to make housing possible</li> </ul>

Table 15: Institutions affecting the governance process during episode 3 (Transformation Strategy)

## 7.5 Haven-Stad: Development Strategy (2014-2017)

The making of the Development Strategy of Haven-Stad starts with revoking the most important decision in the Transformation Strategy. After new municipal elections on 19 March 2014, a new coalition is formed between the big winner the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the Socialistic Party. This unusual coalition was the only option left after extensive struggles to form one by the Democratic Party and the Green Party. These parties had drafted a 'reform agenda' within two weeks after the elections. These two progressive parties were in favour of urban development in the port. After fights about the interpretation of this 'reform agenda' between the two parties, negotiations to form a coalition fail. Therefore another coalition is formed. For the first time since 2006, the Green Party is not part of the coalition anymore. As will show, this will affect the political support for Haven-Stad. Also, for the first time in the history of Amsterdam the Labour Party is excluded from the coalition, marking the end of the socio-democratic hegemony.

The new Coalition Agreement lacks the regular chapter about Spatial Development. Mainly housing system reforms are announced, like the introduction of the eternal leasehold system, and measures to make housing more affordable. The ambition is also to increase housing production to 5.000 dwellings per year in 2018, without mentioning specific areas.

However, in the new Coalition Agreement one very important statement is added: Plans for transformation of the western port areas are 'put on hold'. The Coalition Agreements states: *"Companies within the port can remain where they are until 2040 – the end of the current Structure Vision"* (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2014, p. 21). Essentially this completely strikes out one of the most important elements of the Structure Vision, since in this way no development can take place in the Coenhaven and Vlothaven before 2040. It seems that the big transformation plans for Haven-Stad are put on hold, at least for the next 25 years. With leaving the coalition negotiations, it seems like the Green Party has lost its decisive vote for urban transformation.

This decision seems to follow the uncertainties that were stated in the motion that was approved during the vote in the council for the Transformation Strategy in July 2013. That motion states that *"A new round of discussions should take place with the companies to check the exact impact of the Transformation Strategy"*<sup>24</sup>.

In a letter for the municipal council, Aldermen Van der Burg and Ollongren clarify the statement in the Coalition Agreement. They state that due to the agreement, the Port Authority is now eligible to extend leasehold contracts in the Haven-Stad transformation area up to 2040 instead of 2028. This is a change in the conditions of the Transformation Agreement that limited the Port Authority's rights to assign and extend leasehold contracts in the Haven-Stat planning area. However, the municipality retains some direct control over the area: in the case of expansion of companies, the arrival of new companies and investment in port infrastructure the municipality still has to approve<sup>25</sup>.

The transformation area was defined during the privatization of the Port Authority in 2013. In the same letter they share the current leasehold terms for the most important companies in the

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<sup>24</sup> Motion: Afd. 1, nr. 595 Piek, Hoek, Visser, Jager (4-7-2013)

<sup>25</sup> Letter to council: 'Verheldering uitspraak coalitieakkoord in relatie tot Transformatiestrategie Haven-Stad en motie 595' shared in Raadscommissie Werk en Economie (28-1-2015)

Coenhaven and Vlothaven (Table below). This data shows that several companies have contracts beyond 2040.

Company	Leasehold contract until	Option until
ICL	2034	-
Cargill BV	2017	2042
IGMA (now part of Cargill)	2075	-
Eggerding BV	2035	2085
Alba Scrap Metal	2029	
Cotterel (Hemhaven)	2039	2089
Cotterel (Vlothaven)	<i>Own land</i>	
Vollers		
Van Gansewinkel	2047	-
Rotim	2021	2026

Table 16: Leasehold contracts of several companies in the Coenhaven and Vlothaven, including the Covenant partners (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2015)

This decision also seems to follow the advice of the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce and ORAM, building on researches they carried out in the light of the North Sea Canal Vision 2040. “For us, 3 things are important: Clarity, Clarity and Clarity”, said adjunct director from ORAM Rein Aarts in June 2013 (Amports, 2013). “Development of the Coenhaven after 2029 will create the most expensive plots of the city. Give companies certainty until at least 2039. The municipality has the capacity to lengthen leasehold contracts for a certain amount of time. Then, companies can then invest for the long term again.”



Figure 23: Placemaking Sloterdijk (NUL20, 2016)

And so, the uncertainty for companies in the port suddenly came to an end. Instead of making the decision about transformation in 2025, the council decided in May 2014 that all companies could stay until at least 2040. This was only 9 months after the approval of the Transformation Strategy. However, it is probably only a political promise: It is not plausible that the companies actually received an offer to lengthen their leasehold contracts until 2040.

Comments in a municipal election debate in 2017 suggests that it was just a political promise, since the coalition was accused of ‘governing beyond its own grave’ regarding the phasing for Haven-Stad (Het Parool, 2017).

While the transformation for the Coenhaven and Vlothaven was off the table, in 2014, Phases 1 and 2 of the Haven-Stad Transformation Strategy were still in preparation. These were the (relatively)



smaller and organic transformation activities just outside the Covenant zone in Sloterdijk and the Minervahaven. Several placemaking activities were set up in Sloterdijk. As promised, on 30 September 2015, the Province of North Holland makes the de-zoning of Sloterdijk I South irrevocable (Province of North Holland, 2015). From that moment it is possible for the municipality to assign the area for housing. A project team is set up to guide this process. In the light of the lessons from the economic crisis, the municipality takes on a facilitative role and starts conversations with owners and developers (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2015). This is the start of transformation of Sloterdijk I South.

### Ring Zone Policies

Aside from the perspective of waterfront redevelopment, Haven-Stad falls within another spatial policy of the municipality: the economic development of the Ring Zone. The Ring Zone is defined as an area with extremely good accessibility and urban qualities. Therefore policies are made to capitalize on that potential and spatial research is conducted to reform areas in the Ring Zone to serve that purpose. The Haven-Stad falls within the Ring Zone research area. The project team announced a Strategic Document in December 2013, stating that investments in the Ring Zone will yield by far the best in Amsterdam.

The document is created mainly by the Spatial Planning Department. One representative from Economic Affairs is present. Maurits Hoog is also part of the project team. These people are also connected to Haven-Stad research and spatial planning teams. Their philosophy for the area can be deduced from these strategic documents. The Ring Zone philosophy form the basis for the Course 2025 research locations.

Therefore Haven-Stad, is therefore a ‘targeted’ from two sides: as a waterfront redevelopment and as an Economic Ring Zone development. Urban planners strongly belief in the added value of both spatial developments, their attribution to the quality of the city and the opportunity they entail to create the metropolis they desire.



Figure 24: Ring Zone development policy, as visible in the Economic Ring Zone Development Strategy (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2013) and the Structure Vision 2040 (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2011)

### 7.5.1 Acceleration and intensification

The story of the creation of the Haven-Stad Development Strategy emerges around the time of quick recovery of the Amsterdam housing market in 2015. Because the building production had fallen to a complete stop, there is immediately a shortage of housing and plans for housing. In the same Coalition Agreement (2014) that cancelled transformation in the Coenhaven until 2040, an ambition is stated to increase the housing production to 5000 dwellings per year in 2018. Due to the quick recovery of the housing market, that *“already seems not enough now”* (Van der Burg, as cited by Boon, 2016). The council starts to look for acceleration and intensification of housing development. They fall back on the Structure Vision 2040 of 2011 to find locations for development. Alongside, several projects that had been put on hold are restarted or put into execution.

The result is Koers2025 ('course 2025'), a policy document that is meant to identify strategic locations in order to guide the intensification and acceleration process of housing production. This is needed to *“accommodate the growth of ‘11.000 new Amsterdammers’ every year”* (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2016, p. 3). The availability of housing is stated to be 'essential' for the city to grow economically. The council therefore decides to set a target to construct 50.000 houses before 2025. To put that into comparison: only 4 years earlier the council approved an amendment to make the amount of 70.000 houses in the Structure Plan 2040 'relative', due to being 'potentially unachievable'. Regarding Koers2025, the Alderman for Spatial Planning Erik van der Burg (Liberal Party) states: *“This is going to hurt. Every separate plan will face resistance”* (Boon, 2016).

On 1 January 2016 the document 'Space for the City – Course 2025' is presented. It describes 17 strategic building blocks for development. It are mostly locations around the Ring Zone: good accessibility makes development logical and relatively easy. There is 1 building block 'Haven-Stad' (number 15) that describes the development of the Minervahaven. Surrounding it there are building blocks Hemknoop (14)), Sloterdijk (13) and IJ-Oevers Oost-West (12). At that time these are all separate projects that still fit within the policy for the first phases of the Transformation Strategy.

Because of the clustering of projects around the Ring A10, they often take place on or near industrial lands. These industrial lands used to be the natural buffer between the A10 and residential areas. Course2025 brings housing closer to, or on locations that are meant for production, distribution, logistics and processing, but also necessary functions for the city like concrete factories and waste processing plants. ORAM starts with a lobby to protect these functions and launches the campaign 'Space for Work', while producing studies that explores the proper combination of housing and industry.

Another problem of the Course2025 document is the exploration for housing development in green areas. The Green Party therefore starts a political fight against exploration for development in green areas. In the Council meeting on 14 September 2016, where Course2025 is discussed, they hand in a motion that intends to preserve all green areas in the city, and instead redirect the complete housing programme towards 'grey' and 'red' areas. These are respectively existing industrial lands and urban areas. Nuijens from the Green Party states that *“We should cancel all exploration in green areas and focus on the existing urban areas”* (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2016). A follow-up motion from the Democrats states: *“Density can help to protect the green areas in the city. There are beautiful plans for the western port areas in the Structure Vision already. According to us, we can add more to that. Let's research the possibility for further intensification in the western port areas.”*

It was this motion that led to the Administrative Assignment to seek for maximum intensification of plans for Haven-Stad. This is the moment where the political plan for complete transformation of western port areas is reborn. The reason being that it was included as a possible transformation area in the Structure Vision of 2011. None of the politicians seem to reflect on the cancellation of these plans only 2 years earlier. Solving the housing crisis while preserving green areas has become the new discourse.

### 7.5.2 Plan making process

Public servants in the Spatial Planning department discovered the larger potential for Haven-Stad more than 1 year earlier than the motion that suggested looking for it. Bart Vlaanderen, one of the urban designers tested what a new 'urban form' would mean for the development potential of Haven-Stad. An intern showed that by mixing light industry with housing, the separation and 'zoning' of different functions would not be necessary. This would mean that the density could increase dramatically up to 70.000 dwellings (Vlaanderen, as cited by Van Wezel, 2017). Before that time, the project team was struggling internally and was looking for ways to solve mobility issues in the western port lands. With its size, the project was released from a certain deadlock. When he realised what the project could entail, Vlaanderen said: *"Now we're talking."* (Van Wezel, 2017).

With the increased density, a metro line was suddenly feasible and the land revenue in the costly transformation would be a lot higher. The metro line is described as 'the missing link' in the transport system of Amsterdam (the small ring, or 'Kleine Ring'). Closing this ring would allow for a more efficient exploitation of the metro system. The project team tried to increase the amount of passengers up to 8000 within 800 meters of a proposed metro station. With the new urban form, this was possible.

After the political motion to seek for the potential of Haven-Stad in 2016, the project team worked on a document to share the potential of the area.

The Development Strategy (2017) for Haven-Stad was created by several municipal bodies. The project team as listed in its colophon existed of 37 people. The Spatial Planning department delivered 2 project leaders and 17 urban planners to the project team. Other departments were Economic Affairs (3 members), Land Department (2 members) and the Project Management Bureau (3 members). Several external consultants completed the project group, including a lawyer, a mobility expert and a communication team. Lastly, there is 1 representative of the Port Authority listed. This is a considerable change compared to earlier planning documents for Haven-Stad and the first time in the development process that the Port Authority is not a project team member anymore and excluded from the steering group (Dubos, Personal Interview, 10-10-2018).

This is different than previous development strategies and plan documents like the Visions for Haven-Stad and Transformation Strategy Haven-Stad. The first and latter being a joint order from the Spatial Planning Department and the (not corporatized) Port Authority with representatives of both departments as project leaders. Illustratively, the first document was written in an office that was deliberately set up in the port itself at the Danzigerkade (Minervahaven) while the last document was created at the Weesperplein office, headquarters of the Spatial Planning Department.

On 6 September 2017 there were talks between ICL, Eggering BV, Bunge/Cargill based on their

invitation with alderman Van der Burg (Spatial Planning) to discuss the plan. The exact details of this meeting are unknown. A spokesman of the companies stated that the companies wanted to stay, but that they are open for negotiations. According to the Alderman and the project team leader, the 3 companies were willing to discuss an earlier move, only stating that they wanted to receive fair compensation. This corresponds with the official public statement of the companies and ORAM, stressing fair compensation and guarantees for continuity of business.

### 7.5.3 The Development Strategy

On 21 June 2017, the Draft Development Strategy Haven-Stad is presented to the public. The Development Strategy described the phased but complete transformation of all port areas within the A10 between now and 2055. It claims to abide to all the agreements in the Covenant and all environmental regulations.

*“Strength through scale”* is title of the chapter about sustainability in the Development Strategy, and this is true for more elements in the plan. Instead of multiple scenarios, the Development Strategy describes how to realize the stated ambition in the area, and which interventions need to be done and when. Therefore, the document is a statement of a vision and a study of its implications.



Figure 25: Skyscrapers on port lands: a model of Haven-Stad at a creative Haven-Stad session (own photo, 2018)

The Strategy describes a gradual transition from port to a unique and international urban area for the metropolis of Amsterdam. The new neighbourhood would still remind of the port, with a distinct maritime, rough and vibrant character. Various maritime artefacts would therefore be preserved. At completion, Haven-Stad will have 120.000 residents, living in 40.000-70.000 dwellings. Another 58.000 jobs will be created too (see Figure 25 for phasing).

The vision for Haven-Stad is to be characterized as a high density and sustainable and mixed city. 80% of the development volume will be for housing, 20% will be for working. The type of jobs are retracted from the perspectives in the study ‘Space for the Economy of Tomorrow’ (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2016). For Haven-Stad it borrows the typologies ‘creative neighbourhood’ and

‘productive neighbourhood’. This means that Haven-Stad will be designed to house jobs in the creative sector and light industry. Both ‘working environments’ require more space per employee than jobs in the service economy. The average space per job is projected to be 30 m<sup>2</sup>, compared to 12 m<sup>2</sup> for an office job, and 100 m<sup>2</sup> for the current companies.

Aside from that, 40 new schools are planned, as well as numerous sport facilities and health care centres.

### Flexibility through innovative environmental regulation

A spatial development with such scale, next to functioning port areas required an extensive Environmental Effect Report (MER). This is an important attribution to the strategy, since it describes the effect of environmental regulation on the development. The report concludes that development of Haven-Stad is possible, if several measures are taken.

First, Haven-Stad is appointed as ‘sustainable innovative experiment’ through the Crisis and Recovery Act. In this way, the first areas that need to be developed can experiment with principles from the new Environment and Planning Act. This entails a more flexible and area wide approach. It uses dashboards to evaluate different measures in relation to different ambitions. Also, it acknowledges the proximity of the port, highway and environmental zones, but seeks to compensate these factors in other places. For example, it states that highway noise can be compensated with more green areas. Also, with innovative regulation like the ‘sea port norm’ and ‘City and Environment’ approach, flexible and tailor made solutions are possible. The option of installing smell reduction filters in houses is also discussed.

Haven-Stad is appointed as ‘Development Area’ within the Crisis and Recovery Act. With this status, a 10 year during deviation from noise pollution is possible if after that time the area abides to the norms again. An interactive ‘living environment photo’ (Dutch: Leefomgevingsfoto) is established so developers can see which guidelines they need to abide to. These guidelines are actually ‘cadres’ and flexible: every part of the area has its own restrictions and game rules but also a set of compensation options. In several cases, advice from external parties is needed. Primarily from the Environmental Service North Sea Canal Zone, an administration that carries out environmental inspections in the Port. This is for example mentioned to determine ‘collective risk’ in the case of the development of 15.000 dwellings in the Coenhaven next to the Eurotank Terminal.

Often, the MER does not specify what is possible and what not: it states that it is ‘vague’ on purpose.: Since future developments are unknowns, the MER is designed to be flexible. This gives the public administration the power to steer and control during the transformation process.

1. Standard Law	2. Area tailored flexible	3. Maximum flexible
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- VNG rules</li> <li>- Amsterdam policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sea Port Norm</li> <li>- 10 year deviation/exception</li> <li>- Compensation</li> <li>- Deviation of Amsterdam policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Hamburg rules</li> <li>- Inside noise (&lt;35 dB)</li> </ul>
< 50 dB	<55 dB	<60dB

Table 9: Assessment of possible (flexible) noise regulations (MER Haven-Stad, 2017)

Also, a completely new approach towards mobility is required. The MER shows that the project would only be realizable with a parking norm of 0,2. Once connected with sustainability ambitions, this became a key element for the proposed character of Haven-Stad: a city for pedestrians and cyclists. Public transport would connect the area with other parts of Amsterdam and beyond.

Through a chain clause in buyers contracts, future residents would be made aware that they are moving to a vibrant area with potential for noise or smell pollution. The planners say that this approach has worked in Hamburg and with Schiphol.

In order to start the development of housing, the environmental space needs to be 'optimized'. The strategy lists several tools to do so: shrink the zoned industry terrains step by step, claim unused environmental space from companies, reduce pollution at the source or remove companies completely. The arrival of new polluting companies should be stopped immediately.

According to policy makers, the document is meant as a 'stated ambition' and 'checking framework' for development in western port lands. Policy makers repeatedly state that this document is 'not a plan'. They state that it is an 'internal checking framework'. All subparts of the plan will be developed separately, is the idea. The 'stamp' Haven-Stad is just needed to justify super-area investments and the 'consistent development of all areas'. All the real estate developments within Haven-Stad need to follow the same parking norms for example.




Figure 26: Phasing of Haven-Stad based on housing production and infrastructure investment thresholds (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017)

## **Financial strategy**

The Development Strategy is the second Haven-Stad plan without a transparent feasibility study. However, in a political motion, an estimated financial bandwidth of -€1.1 billion to +€200 million is mentioned. This is without the costs of €1.6 billion for a new metro line. The strategy is to look for supra-regional and national funds to solve the deficits.

The Port Authority exploits most of the land in the area through rent and the leasehold system. In an agreement that was established during the corporatization of the Port Authority, these lands have to be transferred to the municipality when it demands them for transformation. The municipality makes land revenues through conversion of leasehold (different function, different volume requires new contracts). The revenue is calculated per sub area and agreed upon by the council.

Alderman Van der Burg stated that this revenue can be negative if council members in the future choose to abide to the 40-40-20 rule. The current Development Strategy is based on that division, but this also means that if prices or costs change, this heavily impacts the proposed quality of the plan in terms of affordability. For investments that go beyond the scale of Haven-Stad, the municipality stated that it will apply for regional or national funds, mainly in the field of mobility.

While little is known about the financial strategy, based on the previous feasibility studies, interviews and current market information however, an educated guess can be made. Looking at the costs and benefits for developing the Coenhaven and Vlothaven, land exploitation shows a negative result of almost €1 billion (Appendix). This is mainly due to the relocation of existing businesses, demolition of factories and mobility. This shows that either more development value is needed, for example by eliminating social housing, or costs need to be reduced. One of the most effective ways to do this is by waiting for port companies for their lease terms to end. This means they have to return the land in original state to the municipality. Therefore, in the Development Strategy, the Coenhaven and Vlothaven are only developed after 2040.

## **Role of the municipality**

The intended role of the municipality is facilitative. By shaping the right circumstances for development and co-investing with developers, the transition should take place. Main tasks for the municipality is therefore the guarding the ambitions, the coherence of subparts, the provision of land, the attraction of funds for mobility investments and communication and negotiation with current companies (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2017). The municipality also created a model of the Haven-Stad plan to support the narrative.

### **7.5.4 Decision making process**

The origin of the idea and administrative assignment for Haven-Stad is explained earlier in this thesis, but the process that formalized it is topic of investigation. Because the governance of policy making can influence the outcome, the entire political decision making process of the Development Strategy was analysed. This was possible due to the availability of recorded spatial planning commission meetings, council meetings, minutes and (draft) policy documents, as well as motions and amendments.

## **Announcement of Haven-Stad**

After the administrative assignment to research the maximum densification of Haven-Stad on 11 November 2016, the project did not get much attention. Even the meetings of the spatial planning commission prior to the release of the Concept Development Strategy on 21 June 2017, the topic was not discussed. These meetings sometimes took two entire days and were already full of postponed agenda points from previous meetings. The publication of the Strategy was mostly through media outlets, like newspaper Het Parool and local news channel AT5.

On 22 June 2017, one day after the municipality announced its Development Strategy for Haven-Stad, the Province of North Holland releases a statement that it will invest €900.000 in nature development in the Houtrakpolder. This polder is the highly disputed expansion space for the port of Amsterdam. The reservation of the Houtrakpolder is essential for matching port growth projections in relation to the development of Haven-Stad, and the municipality of Spaarnwoude where the polder is located tries to protect it from port expansion by developing nature (see cadre 'Houtrakpolder').

On 23 June 2017 port companies respond surprised to the plans. In an interview with AT5, entrepreneurial organization ORAM states some port companies had to read in the newspaper that they had need to leave before 2040. While the municipality had several meetings with the 3 covenant partners, this is not true for the smaller companies. The fact that the Haven-Stad project team asked ORAM for the contact details of port companies in October 2018 supports the idea that there was no contact before. Also, the municipality of Almere, until recently growth partner of Amsterdam in the development of the 'double city' Amsterdam-Almere, was surprised by the Strategy. The amount of housing would possibly harm the growth potential of Almere, that was promised the construction of a metro line towards Amsterdam after a certain threshold of housing on the west side of the city was developed (see Cadre 'ZaanIJ corridor vs. Almere 2.0'). The municipality of Amsterdam later promised to inform the region better.

The publication of the Concept Development Strategy is important, since it marks the beginning of a viewing period of 6 weeks. Due to the summer holidays, Alderman Van den Burg extended the viewing period with 1,5 week to 13 August 2017. During this time, there is also summer recess within the municipality: there are no political meetings. Haven-Stad is also not on the agenda in the final commission meeting before the summer recess on 12 July 2017. Important port stakeholders and regional partners will use the summer to formulate comments and objections regarding the Concept Development Strategy.

## **Lack of political debate and accountability**

In the first commission meeting after the summer holiday, on 19 and 20 September 2017, Haven-Stad is put on the agenda<sup>26</sup>. During these meetings, citizens have the right to comment on agenda topics. Because the same meeting is used for the development of the Sluisbuurt, another controversial development, 17 concerned citizens may tell their story. This topic therefore takes up more than 3 hours of the meeting. After the meeting is 6 hours underway, Alderman Van den Burg says: *"Well, Haven-Stad will not make it today, I suppose.."*. The chairman responds that they will have to, since Kees Noorman from ORAM is present to speak about Haven-Stad. 7 minutes later, Haven-Stad is discussed as agenda item 31. Noorman shares his concerns over the plan regarding

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<sup>26</sup> Dutch: Vaststellen concept ontwikkelingsstrategie



mobility issues and the insecurity it causes for port companies. This sparks a small debate, where politicians of the Labour Party and the Green Party ask him if he knows better locations to build 70.000 houses and why he is against compact city policies. In response to questions why port companies are insecure about their position, he responds that the Development Strategy aims to reduce environmental space well before the agreed dates in the Covenant, which affects their operations and their willingness to invest.

At this point, the meeting has already taken so long that various politicians do not have any speaking time left. The chairman proposes to discuss the subject anyway. The Liberal Party has prepared a statement to endorse experiments with environmental space in the light of the upcoming Environment and Planning Act. The Green Party interrupts him by requesting to move the subject to the next meeting, due to the fact that there is *“so much more to discuss with so little time”*. The Alderman, who sets the agenda, agrees that this is possible. After a small fight about speaking time, too full agendas, chaotic meetings and hungry council members, the debate on Haven-Stad is ended. In total, the strategy for developing Haven-Stad is discussed for 5 minutes.

The next meeting would be on 10 October 2017. However, 5 days before that meeting, Mayor Eberhard van der Laan passes away. Therefore, all council and commission meetings are cancelled for a few weeks. The next meeting is moved to 18 October 2017. The day before, ORAM notices the subject is missing on the agenda. They contact the commission registrar (Dutch: griffier), which says an error has been made while drawing up the agenda, and they will move the subject to the next meeting. The next day, the chairman opens the meeting with the statement that the registrar is ill and is temporarily replaced. The result of these chaotic weeks is that Haven-Stad is not discussed at all.

### **Definitive Strategy overtakes political debate**

The discussion about Haven-Stad is then pushed forward to the meeting 22 November 2017. However, one day before, the municipality releases the Definitive Development Strategy. This is the adjusted version based on all comment in the viewing period and comments from politicians and public servants. The comments and reactions are bundled in a memorandum. There were 68 reactions, of which 24 were from organizations like the National Infrastructure Authority (RWS), the Province of North Holland, surrounding municipalities, ORAM and various port companies. The advises mostly focus on the lack regional coordination, the concerns for mobility and infrastructure, effect on port expansion and securities for port companies. The most fundamental question is *why* this amount of housing is legitimised on such a complex and difficult location. The response is that the demand for specifically inner city housing in Amsterdam is extremely high and that Haven-Stad serves as a provision of just that.

In the memorandum<sup>27</sup> in which the municipality responds to feedback and concerns, it repeatedly uses the argument that *“the terrains have been appointed for transformation in 2013”* in response to *why* redevelopment is necessary here. It gets its mandate from a long term vision. They call the Development Strategy an ‘elaboration’ of the earlier strategies that simply ‘builds on to earlier plans’.

The feedback from concerned citizens and stakeholders does not fundamentally impact the plan. The responses of the municipality are mostly defending the current plan, or proposing new formulations. In total, the sent-in feedback led to 31 alterations in the Development Strategy. However, 19 of them are adjusted internally by public servants or due feedback from the political

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<sup>27</sup> Dutch: Nota van Beantwoording

commissions. Only 12 alterations are derived from external comments, and these mostly entail reformulations and promises like the additions: “Regional coordination is needed”. Aside from these changes, nothing fundamental changes about *why* and *how* Haven-Stad will be developed.

The release of the Definitive Development Strategy also leads to the awkward situation that this document has surpassed the agenda point of discussing the Concept Development Strategy. In the commission meeting of 22 November 2017, this situation is mentioned, and the Concept version is only recognized as available for viewing<sup>28</sup>. The debate that started on 20 September is not completed.

### 7.5.5 Formalization

On 13 December 2017, the Definitive Strategy is discussed in the commission for spatial planning. This is the first and only meeting where the Development Strategy will be discussed. Two port companies, Damen Shipdock and Braspenning BV have requested to speak to the committee. It is good to note that Damen Shipdock has become victim of real estate speculation on its port lands due to the release of the Concept Development Strategy (see cadre ‘Speculation impacts Damen Shipdock’). Both companies state that Haven-Stad means the end of their business and wonder if the municipality wants to reassure their position in Amsterdam, or help with relocation. Their statements are not further discussed, other than when the option is discussed to open up the ADM terrain for moving port companies. However, they both stated that the ADM terrain is not really suitable and digging new docks is extremely expensive.

On a side note: the ADM terrain is a port area that was claimed by squatters and artists in the 1990s. On 7 January 2019, they were forced to move for the sake of port exploitation. On behalf of the municipality, the project leader of Haven-Stad was also responsible for clearing the ADM terrain.

The commission and council meetings of 13 December and 21 December reveal various aspects of how politicians interpret and criticize the plan. This is the only moment where the Development Strategy is evaluated and critically debated in the democratic process. A few remarkable aspects are discussed. To be reminded: this is the strategy to develop a completely new city in the port of Amsterdam. The debate takes up for three hours in total. This is, including the 5 minutes in the meeting earlier, the total amount of time the Strategy is debated content-wise in the political arena.

First of all, the main question is what the Development Strategy exactly is. “What do we vote for” The fact that the document presents all sorts of interventions, numbers and maps, without being a plan officially, leads to confusion. Therefore politicians respond back-and-forth both about certain product elements (what), process elements (how) and the vision itself (why). Therefore discussion about the legitimacy of the project are mixed with statements about social housing and the amount of football fields. Alderman Van der Burg responds that the document is an ambition, and the question is whether they will be allowed by the council to further research this ambition. This puts the Strategy in a very grey area since ‘plan-making’ is forbidden due to the Covenant until 2024.

Almost all politicians agree that Haven-Stad is necessary because we need housing to give people their ‘right’ to live in Amsterdam. The location is stated to be logical due to the fact that it was appointed in the Structure Vision. Only a handful of one-man fractions (from the Christian Democratic Party, the Elderly Party and the Animal Party) raise serious concerns, mostly regarding

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<sup>28</sup> Dutch: Kennisneming van Tervisielegging

the effect of the plan on port companies, and why this Strategy is rushed without further consideration. However, these comments are most of the time put aside by both the Alderman and the other parties, accusing the critics to be 'scared' and 'not wanting new homes'.

Interestingly, during these meetings at the end of 2017, Alderman Van der Burg connects the negative land exploitation of u to €1 billion with the 40-40-20 rule. "If the council will choose to make a loss on a certain plot, this is their decision". However, a lot of politicians expect a serious amount of social housing with a certain floor area are therefore in favour of the plan, but the current expected financial result is not shared. "This many houses, and that many affordable houses, that is something to be proud of" said Bakker (Socialist Party). With the relocation costs that companies have requested afterwards in mind, these promises will be hard to achieve (see indicative land exploitation of Coenhaven, Appendix).

Discussion about the transformation process itself is often related to the areas with light industry like Sloterdijk and the Minervahaven. The process is over-simplified by the Alderman. Relocation of port companies is said to be preferred in the region, not Amsterdam per se. The Alderman states that relocation costs are to be carried by the municipality, that is 'logical'. But this can be financed through the conversion of leasehold afterwards.

The new urban 'form' is said to be 'interesting', without discussion the unproven and experimental mix of mixing housing with industry. A politician of the Liberal Party requests what more is possible with new environmental legislation. While the Alderman does not believe Amsterdam needs a 'Crisis and Recovery Act' he states: "*Rules from the Hague are often a burden, why don't let them work in your advantage for once?*"

The consequences of plan-making on companies without an idea of the impact it can make is raised by Boomsma (Christian Democratic Party). He states that the communication with companies is weak, the procedure of decision making is weak, there is 100's of millions of port infrastructure at stake and that we risk to irreversibly claim scarce industrial land. He requests to first create a new vision for what the port should mean, instead of rushing these plans. "Why not wait until we have more information about the effect of transformation on port companies?" A public hearing with experts is requested by the Liberal Party.

Despite the serious concerns of the smaller parties, and no obvious reason to delay the vote until more information is available, in the evening of 21 December -as agenda point 58 on the Agenda after 7 hours of meeting- the Haven-Stad Development Strategy is formalized.

According to the project team of Haven-Stad, this rush can be explained due to the upcoming elections. Every party wanted to claim in their election booklets that they had provided the city with a lot more housing development. These booklets would be printed before the next council meeting, and therefore more discussion was not possible. The Haven-Stad Development Strategy is therefore partly used as election stunt. However, the publication of the plan has very serious real life implications (see cadre 'Speculation Damen Shipdock').

## Real estate speculation impacts Damen Shipdock

Damen Shipdock is the last remaining large wharf that repairs ships that arrive in the Amsterdam port. The wharf therefore is tightly integrated in the port cluster and provides an important service for the rest of the port. However, times are uncertain.

The impact of 'transparent and open' plan making is clearly visible in the case of the land transaction concerning the wharf of Damen Shipdock. A reconstruction of the Financier Dagblad (Rooijers, De Groot & Lalkens, 2017), combined with the auction flyer of Cushman and Wakefield (2017) and a short valuation exercise provides some interesting insights on plan making and land speculation.

Damen Shipdock does not own the leasehold contract of the land where its wharf is located. That contract was in possession of real estate company called Fortress, owned by Roeland Voerman. The company had put mortgages on the leasehold contracts, but got into financial problems. When the banks that lent the mortgages became impatient, an execution auction of the leasehold rights of the Shipdock and Melissapier was planned on 12 October 2017. Cushman and Wakefield was responsible for the online auction that would last only 20 minutes. Damen Shipdock was ready to take possession over the lands itself, but also a dozen other parties had expressed their interest in the lands.

None of this happened however. Just shortly before the auction, a combination of VolkerWessels and Amsvest co-financed by Aegon took over the mortgages and prevented the auction. With the 'cession' they took over the €37 million of mortgages and in return got control over the property rights.

The leasehold contracts on the lands are valid from 1 April 1987 until 1 April 2037. Rental income from the lands was €1.299.302 per annum (2017) while leasehold costs were €188.982. The longest rental contract was in possession of Damen Shipdock: from 01-09-2009 until 31-05-2028. The other 10 tenants have shorter lease terms (Cushman & Wakefield, 2017).


One might wonder why Damen Shipdock did not simply do the same trick by itself. The reason is that it would have to speculate against its own position in the area. It is not to be expected that a company would get such deal financed. On the other hand, the banks that controlled the mortgages could also just claim the leasehold contract before the auction. The value of the mortgages should reflect *their* valuation of the leasehold rights anyway. But that would mean that the banks would have the leasehold right for speculative reasons, since the valuation of the contract is higher than what the lands currently yield. A quick scan with discounted cashflow (DCF) puts the valuation of current land use at around €16 million with a yield of 7%. Of course these deals are shady and transparent since it may have been part of a larger deal. So the question remains why the banks did not opt for the more transparent auction with potentially higher profit.

What is most striking in this transaction, is perhaps the auction flyer that Cushman and Wakefield published for it. The flyer was published just after the release of the Concept Development Strategy Haven-Stad in the summer of 2017 and uses some of its maps. According to the document, a part of the area (Melissapier) is already under a zoning plan that allows for "direct transformation". How this is possible is unclear since the area is within the noise pollution zone of the Shipdock. However, it is of course at the risk of an investor to speculate on future

development opportunities, but this case clearly shows what happens when potential programme volume, maps and numbers are communicated to the outside world.

### “Redevelopment opportunities

*Amsterdam will further develop as the core city of an internationally competitive European metropolis in the coming decades. To give these developments further shape the Municipality of Amsterdam has formulated four large movements for the coming years in the “Structural vision Amsterdam 2040” (Structuurvisie Amsterdam 2040).*



In de de de structuurvisie getiteld "Transformatiestrategie Haven-Stad 2010-2040", pagina 16, 17 en 18, beschrijft de Gemeente Amsterdam haar voorkeursstrategie voor onder meer het Shipdock-terrein en haar omgeving. Deze strategie omvat het voornemen om dit gebied te transformeren tot een stedelijk woon-werkgebied. Dit is recent nader uitgewerkt in de concept ontwikkelstrategie Haven-Stad, voor de locatie 'Cornelis Douwes 2-3' wordt ingezet op 960.000 m<sup>2</sup> bebouwing waar 9.600 woningen en 6.400 arbeidsplaatsen terug kunnen komen. Daarnaast komt er ruimte voor scholen, zorg en sportfuncties. De concept ontwikkelstrategie Haven-Stad ligt tot 13 augustus 2017 ter inzage.

De Concept Ontwikkelstrategie Haven-Stad en overige informatie met betrekking tot de ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden is opgenomen in de dataroom.

#### Shipdock

Het Shipdock-terrein is een van de binnenstedelijke locaties waar in de toekomst nieuwbouwwerkkeuringen kunnen worden gerealiseerd, waarbij de invulling 'stedelijk woon-werkgebied' de voorkeur van de Gemeente Amsterdam heeft.

Met een drietal grote in nabijgelegen havens gelegen bedrijven, te weten Cargill, Amfert en Eggerding, is in 2009 door de gemeente Amsterdam het Convenant Houthaven-NDGM gesloten. Dit Convenant betreft de voorwaarden waaronder herontwikkelingen in de Houthaven en op het NDGM-terrein mogelijk zijn. De Gemeente Amsterdam en bedrijven stelden het Innovatiefonds Convenant Houthaven-NDGM in voor het uitvoeren van bovenwettelijke milieuzonder beperkende maatregelen, zodat de leefbaarheid in de nieuwe woongebieden kan worden verbeterd. Ook voor de Shipdock locatie wordt een dergelijke samenwerking met de gemeente Amsterdam verwacht.

CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD

In the structural vision board "Transformation Strategy Port-City 2010-2040", page 16, 17 and 18, the City of Amsterdam describes her preference strategy for amongst others the Shipdock area and its surroundings. This strategy of the municipality includes the intention to transform this area into an urban residential area. Recently, this is further elaborated in the "Concept Development Strategy Haven-Stad". For the location 'Cornelis Douwes 2-3' there is 960.000 sq.m. intended, 9.600 residences and 6.400 jobs can be realized. There will also be space for schools, care and sports. The concept Development Strategy Haven-Stad is available for public inspection until august 13<sup>th</sup> 2017.

The Concept Development Strategy 'Haven-Stad' and other information regarding the possibilities for redevelopment are included in the dataroom.

#### Shipdock

The Shipdock area is one of the main urban locations where new developments can be realized in the future, with the preferred implementation by the City of Amsterdam of creation of an 'urban residential area'.

In 2009 the Municipality of Amsterdam closed the Covenant Houthaven-NDGM with three large companies located nearby the port, namely Cargill, Amfert and Eggerding. This covenant concerned the conditions for developments in the Houthaven area and the NDGM. The City of Amsterdam and companies presented the Innovation Fund Covenant Houthaven-NDGM to perform statutory environmental pollution reduction measures, so that the quality of life can be

Amsterdam | Shipdock | 6 | November 2017

Figure 27: Auction flyer of Shipdock showing data of Concept Development Strategy (Cushman & Wakefield, 2017)

*Recently, this is further elaborated in the ‘Concept Development Strategy Haven-Stad’. For the location ‘Cornelis Douwes 2-3’ there is 960,000 sq.m. intended. 9,600 residences and 6,400 jobs can be realized. There will also be space for schools, care and sports.” (Cushman & Wakefield, 2017)*

The auction was the last chance Damen Shipdock had to solidify its position in future negotiations with the municipality. With this transaction however, an expiry date seems to be set for the wharf on its current location. Estimated costs of constructing a new wharf in Amsterdam costs up to €150 million, but it is unsure if a location can be found. Investments in the current wharf seem a waste, which will in the meantime weaken its competitiveness compared to wharfs in other ports.

The Concept Development Strategy states that the wharf has “great cultural historical value” and proposes 2 scenario’s wherein the wharf will be replaced to another location or a compact wharf that allows housing nearby. In the latter scenario the wharf would be transformed to a “public experience” to become more attached to the surroundings. Daamen Shipdock responded to the Concept Development Strategy in August 2017, together with other companies on the Shipdock terrain. It stated that the transformation will have a big impact on its operations and that the wharf should be part of transformation instead of “getting in the way”. The municipality responded that scenarios have been discussed with Shipdock and research to the impact of transformation will be accelerated. “Active replacement is not on the table before a definitive decision about transformation is made in 2025.” (Nota van Beantwoording Haven-Stad, 2017). On 13 December 2017 Tjeerd Schulting (Managing Director Damen Shipdock) went to the Spatial Planning Commission of the municipality to talk about this issue, where he stated that “this is the beginning of the end for Shipdock”. Apparently a day before there were discussion about moving

to the ADM-terrain. He states that staying in Amsterdam has his preference, but that “the ADM terrain is too small and is unsuitable for dug docks”. The research on impact of the transformation on the company does not comfort him, since the effects of the strategy are already here.

In March 2019, director of Amvest Heleen Aarts stated that the Shipdock plot was not feasible for development. “We have no reason to start with transformation. With the current requirements of the municipality regarding the programma (40-40-20) and the increased construction costs, we will have a negative yield” (as cited by Paling, 2019). She states that in this way Amvest has no reason to not continue with current users. This bold statement seems to be intended to pressure the municipality to relax its quality requirements and increase development value. As the quick DCF calculation shows, current rent income does not justify the €37 million land deal.

In February 2019, after a short but intensive investigation, the Urban Land Institute (ULI) concluded that the lack of trust and cooperation between private parties and the municipality is the biggest threat to the development of Haven-Stad. This supports the statements of developer Maarten de Gruyter, who has taken several speculative positions in the port of Amsterdam, that feared no development will take place in Haven-Stad if the municipality does not cooperate with developers and investors (Personal Interview, 26-11-2018).

### 7.5.6 Current situation

After the Development Strategy was formalized, the public hearing with experts and port stakeholders was cancelled due to the fact that ‘this would make no point anymore’. The ambition document was already formalized anyway.

Talks with the Covenant partners continued. It soon became clear that their demands were incompatible with what the municipality wanted to provide. Apparently, the municipality found new locations for the Coenhaven companies to relocate within the Amsterdam port, and without the necessary development of the Houtrakpolder. However, the financial compensation for terminating the leasehold contracts early and the costs of relocation proved to be too high. The Land Department could not afford such a financial risk so early in the development process. The person in charge of the negotiations on behalf of the port resigned shortly after they failed. According to secondary sources, the covenant partners are now preparing for a legal battle.

Parallel to the Haven-Stad plan-making there are other port-city conflicts along the IJ, including the Java bicycle bridge and the Passenger Terminal. Both conflicts continue to show that the municipality puts a territorial claim on the water of the IJ. As of 2018, the conflict about the bridge has reached the highest levels of government, with minister Schulz of Infrastructure stating that the IJ is a maritime transport corridor. After having invested in the new IJmuiden lock, she does not want new obstructions further inland (Het Parool, 2017). The municipality continued with plan-making anyway, resulting in the fact that all designs were rejected by the National Transport Authority (RWS) in November 2018, which has the authority over the maritime infrastructure.

In a news article parallel to the political decision making process in Haven-Stad, a comment by Commissioner of the King of the Province of North Hollands, illustrated the quality of cooperation between the municipality of Amsterdam and the Province of North Holland. Up for debate was a plan for a new music festival terrain on port lands. He reminds the municipality of Amsterdam where

its jurisdictions are: “Do not forget that the Province is the authority (concerning environmental legislation) in the port” (Remkes 2017, as cited by Meershoek). “Unfortunately we have had to conclude that – yet again – the municipality acted soloistic and did not consult the Province in forming new policy” he continues, ‘in a grumpy tone’ according to the journalist. He states that with all parties in the region it was agreed to intensify port areas. Since lands for heavy industry are scarce in the region, he does not see other uses fit for the area.

Also, in October 2018, the municipality of Amsterdam objected to a regional plan of the Province to define the Highway A10 as a ‘hard border’ between port and city. The Province wants to draw this line to give certainty to companies in the port in its regional vision for 2050. However, the municipality claims that Haven-Stad will have impact beyond the A10, hinting at the removal of companies or the reduction of environmental space of port companies in for example the Petroleumhaven. This is probably needed for the development of housing in the Coenhaven. However, the definitive vision of the Province states that ‘port companies west of the highway will impact the options for urban development of the east side’. Also, the transition of Haven-Stad should be ‘gradual and on par with the perspectives of port companies’. Effectively, through controlling the environmental zoning plans in the port, the Province is trying to prevent urban development in the Coenhaven as long as it is in conflict with port interests. In 2019, the Haven-Stad team is looking for alternative forms of financing the development.



Figure 28: Highway A10 as hard border between port and city, as proposed by the Province (Province of North Holland, 2018)

### 7.5.1 Political rationality

**Policy adopted:** The ambition to develop all port lands within the Ring A10 between today and 2055.

#### **Problem**

There is a severe perceived housing crisis since 2015. Developing new housing is stated to be the ‘number one election issue’. Politicians claim that people have the ‘right’ to live in Amsterdam and

that the city needs to provide it for them. Also, new urban ‘interaction’ environments are needed close to the city centre to provide space for the new creative and service based economy. The fossil-based and space extensive port takes up valuable land within the highway A10.

### Solution (Policy + Technology)

A gradual but steady transformation of port lands towards a sustainable, metropolitan urban area. New environmental legislation is more flexible and allows to mix housing with industry, closer to the port. This result is an increased development volume of such a scale that it justifies big public investments, for example in infrastructure. Funds will become available from higher levels of government to finance this. The city’s attractiveness and competitiveness will profit from this unique development that serves the metropolitan region. By creating plans and visions for the area, the capacity to achieve this grows as port companies weaken. Transformation is easy through a facilitative approach and the instrument of leasehold conversion, real estate developers will respond to this incentive.

### Politics

While first opposing urban development in port lands, the increased potential of the ‘product’ Haven-Stad in combination with the housing crisis, has persuaded politicians to be favourable of urban development in the port. Illustratively is that 7 years earlier, Alderman Van der Burg protected the port during a debate about the Structure Vision: “The port is for work, not for living”.

## 7.5.2 Integration

The following interests of stakeholders were integrated in the Development Strategy:

+: Integrated in plan, -: not integrated in plan, +/- partially integrated

Scale		Sectors		Agencies	
Municipality	+	Spatial planning	+	Port Authority	-
MRA/NZKG	-	Economic Affairs	+	Port companies	-
Province	-	Mobility	+	Covenant partners	-
National	+/-	Land Department	+/-	Company associations	-
		Engineering Office	+	Investors, developers	-
		RWS	+/-		

Table 17: Integrated aspects in the Development Strategy of Haven-Stad (episode 4)

### Integration of scales

Various surrounding municipalities, the Province and (indirectly) national governmental bodies objected to the Development Strategy. While inner city transformation and densification is part of higher level planning policies, port transformation is not necessarily. The fact that the national government is investing in port infrastructure and that the province is controlling heavy industry zoning plans, leads to conflict with the municipality. The plan was not communicated up front with regional stakeholders.

### Integration of sectors



With appointing a programme manager to the project team, the municipality tried to integrate policies of various departments in the plan. While economic affairs raised concerns about current port users, the department is also in favour of creating new urban areas for the creative and service based economy. The National Infrastructure Agency is concerned with urban plans along its maritime infrastructure, and warns for possible conflicts.

### **Integration of agencies**

While there were talks with the covenant partners and the Port Authority, nothing of these comments made it to the plan. These parties wanted a relocation strategy and a research to how the port would be affected by Haven-Stad. None of this was included in the Development Strategy. Also, the strategy introduces housing within the current environmental zones of port companies earlier than 2040. This means companies can stay, but are affected in their operations. A solution for (earlier) relocation has not been found as financial costs are too high. Companies prepare for legal battle. Lastly, there was no market consultation. Developers with speculative positions in the port have stated they are not included in the plan making.

The Haven-Stad Development Strategy is therefore unintegrated and causes conflict. The project team was for the first time entirely guided by the Spatial Planning Department. The Port Authority took an advisory role and was unsatisfied with the outcome and the amount of influence. Only talks with the big Covenant companies took place if new relocation talks could start. That was an option, and supposedly even a location was found in the port. However, after launching the Development Strategy, no solution was found. The Land Department pulled the plug of relocation because of the high costs and risk. The smaller companies were not interviewed, as well as market parties.

### 7.5.3 Institutions

The following institutions were identified as having a role in the plan making process of the Development Strategy.

Institutions	Affects port-city development planning (episode 4)
<b>Socio-cultural</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Urban planners anticipate port migration and shrinking of the port due to the energy transition</li> <li>• Strong belief in government intervention for successful urban development in political decision making</li> <li>• The idea that the IJ belongs to the local community, not to private port companies (discourse of urban planners and key policy entrepreneurs)</li> <li>• The narrative of the quality of mixing housing with industry</li> <li>• The narrative of urban take-over and the 'logical' connection between Zaandam and Amsterdam</li> <li>• Believe that risk-taking and bold plans as necessary to solve the housing crisis</li> </ul>
<b>Financial</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Incentive of leasehold conversion to start transformation</li> <li>• Municipality requires a higher dividend from the Port, while not allowing it to establish financial reserves for the effects of port transformation</li> </ul>
<b>Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rules prevent the establishment of environmentally polluting companies in transformation areas</li> </ul>
<b>Governance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Politicians strategically influence the decision making process by agenda setting</li> <li>• Path dependency in spatial plans: once documented as potential transformation location</li> <li>• The Port Authority has lost its place in the Haven-Stad project team after corporatization</li> <li>• The power of plan-making is used to put pressure on port companies</li> </ul>
<b>Legal</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Haven-Stad is appointed as innovative and experimental development area. Urban planner actively use the new flexible environmental legislation to make urban development in the port possible.</li> <li>• Province uses its power to zone industrial areas in order to prevent transformation and protect port areas.</li> <li>• National Infrastructure Agency uses its power to protect its maritime infrastructure (investment in new lock and rejection of bridges across the IJ)</li> </ul>

Table 18: Institutions affecting port-city development in episode 4 (Development Strategy)

## **8 Conclusions**

## 8.1 Findings

This research is about the integration of port and city in urban development. In the first chapter an approach for understanding port and city development is established. The empirical chapters describe the process of Haven-Stad in the making: how did port and urban actors behave in the planning process, and what plans were formalized, and why?

Therefore the goal is to understand the reason of conflict in the port-city interface. In this way we can hopefully learn how we can come up with approaches to integrate port and city. An institutional analysis is done to show the institutions at work that either hamper or promote port-city integration. By studying the development process for the spatial project Haven-Stad in the port-city interface of Amsterdam, these institutions can be revealed.

This chapter will first reflect on the findings in the case study and formulate conclusions. This will answer the last sub-question: 'What is the reason of conflict in Haven-Stad and what can we learn from that' and afterwards reflect on the main research question: 'How can we understand the reason of conflict between port and city in the strategic transformation of Amsterdam Haven-Stad and what can we learn from that to achieve integrated planning in the port-city interface?'

Secondly, these discussion will be discussed in relation to existing literature and the usefulness of theory. Here, also the generalizability and limitations of the study are discussed. This chapter concludes with a reflection on the research process, the appropriateness of the chosen approach and a few final thoughts.

### 8.1.1 Reasons of conflict

Conflict happens if planning institutions are not able to peacefully and constructively integrate opposing interests in plan making. The main reasons for conflict in the case of Haven-Stad were the following:

#### 1. Perceived breach of the Covenant Agreement

- By planning an Olympic Stadium on port lands before the end of the agreement
- By planning Haven-Stad before 2024

#### 2. Inconsistent plans with growth policies and port expansion

- By conflicting investments and policies (lock and port growth)
- By promising unrealistic and unsupported port expansion plans (Houtrakpolder)

#### 3. Vagueness towards port companies about effects of transformation

- By not giving demanded certainty for continuation of operations
- By not assessing impact of transformation of port and not having a feasible strategy for relocation
- By controlling port investment and company expansion in the Transformation Area

#### 4. Perceived breach of political promises

- By reducing environmental space before 2040

As we have seen in the process reconstruction, these conflicts are however deliberate and therefore often strategic. Mainly governance institutions and the power of plan-making have allowed for these conflicts to happen.

For example, the Covenant was designed for ending juridical battles and define a border between port and city. The municipality deliberately added a clause for a pause on plan making for 15 years, since this could be interpreted implicitly: starting development after 15 years. While port companies saw the covenant as a definitive solution, after signing it, the renewed lease term of ICL was cut in half

The feasibility studies for Haven-Stad were a tool to retrieve information from the port. Secondly policy makers deliberately postponed decisions to create uncertainty and weaken the position of companies. Agenda setting and the 'right to state ambitions' lead to the rushed formalization of Haven-Stad during a housing crisis, which was mainly a purpose for elections. The Haven-Stad planning area was, in contrary to port advise, embedded in policy documents like the Structure Vision 2040.

### **8.1.2 Integration of plans**

In the first episode of waterfront regeneration (1985-2006), the process can be characterized by top-down plan making and formal-judicial negotiation between port and city. Integration of scales is present due to the Regional Plan of the Province, which also coordinated spatial plans between the municipality and the National Government at the time. However, due to experiments with giving Amsterdam more control to govern its 'metropolitan challenges', consistency between scales diverged on some crucial points. These inconsistencies in the end prevent urban development in the port (Houthavens) in legal battles. Also, environmental regulation separates port and city. After mediation, a Covenant between municipality, Province and port companies is created to stop legal battles, give certainty to port companies and continue with development of the Houthaven and Sloterdijk. Urban takeover in the Coenhaven is blocked definitively after intervention of the Province.

In the second episode (2006-2011), a change of political power leads to a new study towards the transformation of the Coenhaven. Plan making is integrated: Spatial Planning and Port Authority are jointly investigating the desirability of transformation of all port lands within the Ring A10. This research is used as input for the Structure Vision 2040. While the research showed that transformation would be too costly, politicians either way included it in the Structure Vision because they prefer urban takeover anyway. Additionally, an Olympic Stadium was proposed in the Coenhaven to speed up development. After severe protests from the port, the stadium was moved just outside the area of the Covenant agreement. This phase is characterised by integrated plan making, but with conflict due to political decisions.

The third episode (2011-2013) research for transformation continues. Aim is to develop a Strategy that would be most effective in transforming port lands. With new environmental regulations in hand, urban planners and port representatives try to establish a strategy with the most effective urban takeover at the lowest cost. Port companies are interviewed and experts are heard. The conclusion is to start a slow and phased the development. While port companies requested certainty for investments, the decision to transform the Coenhaven is postponed to 2025. Also, the plan

creates inconsistency with port investments and port growth projections. The plan-making here is integrated, but the political decision, again, creates conflict.

The last episode (2015-2017) is the creation of the Development Strategy. Politicians are eagerly looking for housing development, and urban planners have found a way to increase the development volume of Haven-Stad due to the mix of housing and industry. This is possible due to new environmental legislation. While port companies were promised that they can stay until 2040, their environmental zones will be reduced before that time. Plan makers did not inform port companies about the plan, nor did it consult market parties. The Strategy was rushed through the council due to elections. The plan is designed to strongly integrate sectors within the municipality, but creates conflict with the region and port companies.

The development process before the Development Strategy was formalized took almost 20 years. What we can see is that while plans were integrated at first, through internal cooperation and regional coordination of the Province, the agencies are almost never included. When the Port Authority was integrated in the process, it was for the purpose of gaining information. Politicians disregarded all concerns of the port and port companies. Towards the end of the period, Spatial Planning is strongly horizontally integrated within the municipality, but it fails to connect to regional plans. Haven-Stad is connected with the condition of port expansion, but chances for port expansion are deliberately blocked. Also there is no integration of the port in the plans, besides negotiations about what it would cost to remove them.

### **Approach of the municipality**

Haven-Stad is approached as an inner city redevelopment project in a maritime environment, not as a waterfront redevelopment project. The discourse of plan makers is mostly about 'unlocking' port lands by overcoming legal barriers. Nowhere in the plan the port is mentioned, aside from the fact that it should be removed to make transformation possible. The discourse is tightly connected to how researchers and politicians are trying currently trying to remove legal barriers, speed up processes and improve the business case of inner city transformations (Verheul et al, 2017). However, in the case of Amsterdam, this stands in the way of a sustainable relationship with the port. In the next chapter it is elaborated why.

### **8.1.3 Policy windows**

The municipality of Amsterdam acts strategically. This means solutions are sought for spatial problems that do not exist yet. These solutions take the form of formalized ambitions, visions and structure visions, but are not real plans yet. They have a reason for existence though. Structure visions do for example not require investments, which makes the formalization process relatively easy. At the depth of the economic crisis there was a unanimous vote in favour of the ambition to transform port lands, which was known to be completely unfeasible.

Events like this show that, with small steps and in various forms, strategic planning is able to continue even without a specific problem stream. The policy is mostly formalized due to slowly changing cultural ideas about cities and sustainability. The belief that land near the city centre is better utilized with urban functions than for port functions is key. The solution space grows while

urban planners continue to focus on unlocking port areas (higher densities, relaxation of environmental regulation, mobility funds, weaker port companies).

However, while the increased solution space certainly helped the potential of the plan, none of the plans for Haven-Stad were considered feasible (financially). Negative land exploitations of more than €1 billion excluding infrastructure did not affect the formalization of ambitions. Haven-Stad is currently a vivid but rather expensive and risky dream in the minds of policy makers. These dreams however have real life effect and the construction of these dreams by policy entrepreneurs continue rather undisrupted until they fulfil themselves. But at what cost?

Significant is how two comparable attempts to assign the Haven-Stad area for transformation differ: one around the 2003 and one in the year 2011. Both plans were considered too costly and were disputed by the port, port companies and the Province. However, in 2003 the plan was disregarded while in 2011 it was formalized. This cannot be explained using the policy window theory per se, but can be attributed to strong long term strategic planning (coupling, embedding and narrative building), cultural change (attitude towards the port and city) and an increase of solution space (institutional and physical).

What is notable therefore, is that the policy solution (the transformation of maritime areas) was ready for implementation before the housing crisis occurred. The plans were drawn, but due to pressure of the municipal council, while their implementation was made conditional. First, a set of predefined conditions had to be met before further decision making could take place. However, these conditions are largely freely interpretable: it is mostly about projected market pressure and efforts to maintain companies for the city.

This way, most of the political hurdles were already taken before the solution was needed. The lands within the ring A10 were already assigned for future development, long before the housing crisis (problem) occurred. This can be partly explained due to the long history of professional long term strategic urban planning in Amsterdam. The only problem now is that other important stakeholders are not part of that strategy.

One of the most striking examples of narrative construction is the framing the of the 'bufferzone' between port and city (the Minervahaven) as proof of unstoppable and ongoing westward transition of port lands. This is presented as a natural force, which justifies policy to support this 'logical' movement. However, the buffer zone was just part of an agreement to define a new border between port and city. The gradual transformation narrative came after Haven-Stad research commenced, which also used maritime artefacts around the IJ to support this claim.

#### **8.1.4 Institutions at work**

Institutions shape the capacity of actors, but actors can also form them. Rationality of actors is bounded, and their orientation is based on their knowledge in a particular governance situation (Daamen & Vries, 2013). We now have concluded when and how certain integrated or unintegrated policy was formalized. However these are still the 'static' observable outcomes of certain policy. Now, we will identify which institutions mostly affected policy makers in the plan making process, based on the observations made in the reconstruction.

## 1. Socio-cultural institutions

- **Belief in on-going port migration**

Among urban policy makers, there is a strong belief in ongoing port migration. They do not seem to be aware of the self-fulfilling prophecy this entails. In the discourse of politicians and urban planners, urban takeover is legitimized through the story of ongoing port migration (historic) and irreversible urban transformation of the IJ. They claim that Haven-Stad is a logical answer that 'only follows the trend', while Haven-Stad is effectively the result of the same belief. In their discourse, they prove their point by using several urban-maritime artefacts on former port sites. However, this is just the result of earlier policy, not some 'natural force' that cannot be stopped. By formalizing new urban takeover, politicians reconfirm institutions rather than questioning their appropriateness.

- **The image of the port**

Urban policy makers frame the port as a 'polluting' and 'space-extensive' use of land 'for the benefit of privately owned fossil industry'. Proud statements of the port, like 'half the USA drives on gasoline from Amsterdam' do probably not attribute to this image. Concerning the political landscape in Amsterdam, it is no surprise that its role for the city is questioned.

Savini (Personal Interview, 21-01-2019) said: The port is '*done*' in Amsterdam. The port represents a polluting industry at the benefit of a privately owned multinationals. The costs for the local community is perceived as high, due to the fact that the port takes up a lot of valuable land close to the city centre.

- **Anticipation of the energy transition and circular economy**

Efforts from the port to reconnect with the city though new sustainability policies have not yet resulted in the desired reconnection. Even, sustainability measures are used to 'clear up space' in the port for the relocation of companies of Haven-Stad. Amsterdam 'coal free' policies are an example. Policy makes anticipate that there will be 'more than enough space' in the port for companies affected by the transformation of Haven-Stad, 'as soon the fossil fuel industry is gone'. The effects of the energy transition are however disputed and not researched yet.

Port companies and Port Authority for example have adopted sustainability measures to transform the fossil profile. Oiltanking BV is experimenting with hydrogen storage and synthetic kerosene, while OBA is trying to change its transshipment from coals to minerals. A concrete factory is looking at circular use of construction material. Therefore, they state that the energy transition and circular economy might not diminish the port, but give it new growth perspective. It could even mean a larger space than now, as a clean port also causes environmental hazards, like explosion risk of hydrogen and heavy transport of materials. Port companies request certainty to invest in this transition, but urban planners are making plans with the idea that these companies will be removed. An example is the way urban planners talk about urban development in the Petroleumhaven to reconnect Amsterdam with Zaandam. The Port Authority states that the urban planners of the municipality are 'crossing lines all the time'.



- **Culture of state-led spatial planning**

Amsterdam has historically had a top-down structure in urban planning and urban policy makers believe in the socially engineered city. This is visible in the way politicians and urban planners describe spatial plans and their urge to control the outcome of certain plans.

- **Disputes over territory**

Urban policy makers put a strong territorial claim on the metropolitan area of Amsterdam. This is visible in the making of Structure Visions for the whole region. While this scale level is appropriate for integrally solving issues in the daily urban system, the support of surrounding municipalities is not always granted. This is true for the reservation of the Houtrakpolder for port expansion, while it is not located in Amsterdam.

Also, policy makers frame the IJ as a unique urban quality for the city, while the port frames it as an international transport corridor. This materializes in conflicts between port and city. Resistance to municipal space claims grows mainly on higher levels of government: the Province and the national government. This mostly happens when spatial plans conflict with their plans and direct interests. This is mainly visible in the debate over the supply of land for heavy industry and maritime infrastructure investments in the region.

In the past, Amsterdam has tried to closely integrate its Metropolitan region, through annexations and even proposing the split up the city itself. A city province was never established however. What the Haven-Stad project shows, is that the lack of such an institution causes conflicts over territory. The MRA, Plabeka and North Sea Canal Area platforms are used to coordinate regional spatial issues, but to not solve the challenges that Haven-Stad causes in terms of scalar integration.

## **2. The legal and economic framework**

- **Relaxation of environmental regulation**

One of the most evident institutions to have affected port-city planning is environmental regulation. To be more precise, the increasingly flexible environmental regulations, and the anticipation of more flexible environmental regulation were continually used as means for port-urban takeover. It is notable that policy makers often resort in using the maximum capacity of what is possible, through all sorts of innovative and experimental norms.

This slowly increased the pressure on the port companies, as more flexible regulation allowed for more urban development. Port companies fear impact on their license of operation. Environmental regulation is used as a pressure tool on port companies. The most important effect is the capacity to mix housing with light industry. This led to the densification of Haven-Stad itself, that put things in motion in the first place.

Urban policy makers also actively use the freedom and flexibilities in expected future regulations, as from the Environment and Planning Act and the Crisis and Recovery Act. They also anticipate on future increased flexibility while making plans. Examples are the fact that Haven-Stad is appointed as 'experimental and innovative urban development' and 'Development Area' to make use of these more flexible regulations. Also, the Sea Port Norm and the 'Hamburg-Standard' are used.

- **The decentralisation of Spatial Planning**

The Regional Plan (Streekplan) of the Province seemed to be a good way of integrating scales in spatial planning. However, in the 1990s, experiments with giving Amsterdam more responsibility to make its own plans emerged. This led to inconsistencies between spatial planning on a local and regional level. These inconsistencies were even the cause that the intended transformation of the Coenhaven and Vlothaven could not be formalized in 2003.

The Province had the legal power to stop this. However, the municipality used the introduction of the Spatial Planning Act in 2008 to rearticulate its ambitions, but now it has the mandate to do so. The province tries to integrate regional spatial planning through its Regional Plan and NZKG Visions, but they have to use other legal instruments to do so. These instruments include the regulation of heavy industry (zoning) and setting conditions for port expansion.

The stated ambitions of the municipality have become sources of real estate speculation, since it arranges a 'checking framework' for all future developments. The original reason to making these documents is to channel resources and guide spatial planning. In the port-city context however, they are used as pressure tool and smoking-out instrument. This would not have been possible if the Provincial plans would still hold a legal power and act as a 'backstop'.

### **3. Governance structure and plan making**

- **Position of the Port Authority**

During the development of Haven-Stad, urban policy has become detached from port policy. The port is said to have always been 'a different department', but is also lost its partners in the municipality when Economic Affairs started looking at added value and jobs per hectare. With its corporatisation, the port definitively lost its position at discussions within the municipality (role changed to advisor), while still being 100% owned by the municipality and not having strategic control over port land use.

- **Power of plans without status**

Although the current plans and strategies do not hold juridical status, they have real life impact on port companies. As can be seen at the speculation in port areas. The Development Strategy is a 'testing framework' for all future development in the area, yet its legitimacy cannot be debated. On the other hand, they cannot be fought in court. This seems to be a void in accountability.

- **Governance of integration in plan making**

The Haven-Stad project team describes integrated process management from the perspective of the municipality: it is focused on letting departments work together instead of integrating the plan with external stakeholders.

As for incorporating other stakeholders in the plan-making: Port companies are currently not informed even about plans, and feedback and concerns are not dealt with. The municipality holds the power to interpret participation and feedback, making it able to select and weigh its own preferences. The current participation process does not result in any real influence of third parties.

Attitude towards investors leads to weak integration with the market. Statements like 'real estate investors should make less profit' by leftist political parties, while, on the other hand stating that they hope prices to rise to make Haven-Stad possible. Facilitative planning should be about creating the right circumstances for developers, not simply demanding a product. Either way, this attitude has created friction between municipality and developers. A personally interviewed developer with speculative position in the Coenhaven pointed out the irony that one of these real estate investors is the pension fund of the public servants of Amsterdam.

- **Quality of the political decision making process**

Agenda setting and plan making gave the ruling parties the power to embed the transformation of port areas in the Structure Vision and rush the formalization of the Development Strategy in time before the elections without considerable debate and research about impact on port. Also, transformation is overly simplified and the proposed urban form has no proof of concept.

Risks and complexity of relocation of capital intensive port companies is neglected and overly simplified by politicians. They do not discuss the effect on the port ecosystem and the fact that port lands are limited.

### **8.1.5 Lessons for integrated development**

The conflict in the process for Amsterdam Haven-Stad was partly created because the interests of the port were deliberately not integrated in plans. The conflicts revolve around plan-making and ambition formulation: something port companies fear because it creates uncertainty, fuels speculation and limits their investment horizon. The municipality has powerful tools to steer port development and it has used these tools to put pressure on companies by remaining vague about the future and postponing important decisions. In the final Development Strategy, the conflict revolves around the reduction of environmental space before 2040. Existing companies were reassured they could remain in the area until at least that year, but fear they will be limited in their operations.

This was possible due to the institutions at work. If we want to improve integrated plan making in the port-city interface, we should look at improving these institutions. These new institutions should restore the transparency and power balance in port-city planning.

If we look at the overall process, we can identify two important forces. First, the 'tandem' between a group of politicians and the department of spatial planning that 'hunts' for the transformation of port areas within the highway A10. They do so based on informal rules and beliefs: they oppose the port due to its space-extensive occupation of valuable land for the benefit of private, fossil based

companies. This 'tandem' works in such a way that it continually sets the agenda and produces technical solutions (scenario's, designs) that justify urban takeover. Out of these scenarios, continually the plans formalized that weaken the position of the port or port companies the most.

Amsterdam has a culture of government intervention in spatial planning. Plan making happens in the department of Spatial Planning and is steered by the political arena. Urban takeover of port lands was carefully coordinated by a 'tandem' of urban planners and progressive politicians. The window of opportunity to actually formalize 'Haven-Stad' was the result of a housing crisis and upcoming elections, an increasingly progressive political landscape and new technological solutions (mixing housing with industry). However, the road for potential transformation was deliberately paved in advance with a series of strategic actions. The main idea for Haven-Stad was clear 1 year before politicians even asked for it.

However, the road to the formalization of the Development Strategy of Haven-Stad is much longer, and can only be explained if we take a series of strategic actions into account. Since the late 1990's a group of local politicians and urban planners have 'hunted'<sup>29</sup> on the port lands within the Ring A10 for urban takeover. Through tactical administrative assignments feasibility studies were performed and the ambition to transform port lands was included in the Structure Vision 2040.

Urban policy makers created opportunity for transformation by making plans. The rationality was that plan making would weaken the position of the port and create momentum for urban takeover. The fundamental belief that justifies this, is that valuable lands close to the city centre are better utilized for a sustainable urban economy, instead of polluting, space extensive heavy maritime industry.

This idea would not have much effect if it was not for the fact that the municipality slowly got increasingly powerful. It adopted (and created) new environmental regulations to promote urban development near port lands. Also, the decentralisation of spatial planning resulted in the fact that municipal spatial ambitions got increasingly powerful tools. The municipality actively uses these capacities.

In short, the process can be characterized as the combination of the *believe* the port should be transformed, combined with the slowly increasing capacity to actually do so. A series of strategic actions by policy entrepreneurs were powerful enough to formalize one-sided urban takeover.

But this process of strategic agenda setting, plan making and selective formalization cannot be solely the reason for the course of events. This actor coalition is helped by various institutions. They either created them themselves, or they are introduced by the national government. These institutions change the main obstruction for urban takeover: environmental rules and decentralization of spatial planning. Then, it was only a matter of time before the market pressure was strong enough to proceed with urban takeover.

Is the next phase in Amsterdam 'conflict' between port and city or *deliberate* conflict for port urban takeover? This would assume that policy makers are resorting in powerful tactics to reclaim port lands, instead of looking for new institutions that would foster cooperation.

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<sup>29</sup> Formulation used by Alderman Maarten van Poelgeest (Personal Interview, 19-11-2018)

## 8.2 Recommendations

It seems difficult to formulate recommendation for integrating port and city, if the sole reason for the project is urban takeover through conflict. The most powerful argument in this sense would be that the municipality is also undermining its own chances of success (e.g. achieving its stated goals), if it persists in its current approach. As politicians and port actors say: the damage is already done, Haven-Stad is now irreversible. It has become such statement that drawback is not possible anymore. The question therefore is: How do we move forward from this point?

It has become clear that the current institutional arrangements do not suffice in integrating port-city interests. The recommendations are therefore twofold: for making urban actors aware of the current 'negative spiral' and for specific interventions to produce better integrated outcomes. Hopefully, the conclusions from this research may attribute to the first element as well.

The following recommendations are provided overcome the institutions that led to disintegrated plans in the port-city environment, from the aspect of integration of scales, sectors and agencies. The recommendations have been formulated in such a manner that they are most easily adopted by institutions in place. We know from literature that institutional change is both realized through evaluation of current routines (understanding what does not work), external shocks and lessons from outside. These are the following:

### 1. Develop a joint port-urban vision

As was stated in political debates, it is clear what Haven-Stad means for the city, but it is unclear what it means for the port. Also academics and experts have commented on the issue: Amsterdam should choose how it sees its port, as a regional service hub or as an international gateway? The last decade, the port has branded itself as the 'metropolitan port' of Amsterdam. However, a definitive relationship and the implications on growth and investments are not stated. The huge impact of Haven-Stad on projected port growth (and lock investment) is currently not even mentioned in port visions. There is a serious risk in these diverging policies: a series of port-urban conflicts along the IJ (also in the case of the Java bridge and PTA for example) will continue without a shared perspective on what the port *means* for the city.

A jointly designed, debated and formalized vision will give clarity to the expectations of the role of both parties. The interpretations of the challenges regarding the energy transition and the circular economy seem a good starting point for debate.

### 2. Make the Port Authority part of the project team

With a project with the scale of Haven-Stad, the support of port companies and the Port Authority seems at least essential to achieve integrated results in plan making. Since the corporatization of the Port, the Port Authority is not part of the project team anymore and only has a guiding role. Formalizing a reconnection in the project team with the port could be the beginning of a renewed relationship. The original start of Haven-Stad, a product by Port and City, proved to work as well.

Currently, the municipality is not allowing the Port Authority to build financial reserves due to the effects of Haven-Stad, while it has to increase its dividend to the city. At the same time, a new tax on the cruise industry has resulted in a serious drawback of cruise companies from the city. The relationship

between port and city is only going further downhill in this situation, and restoring the power balance may be the start of gaining trust.

### **3. Carry out a societal cost-benefit analysis (MKBA)**

Port companies are already preparing for a long juridical battle. Also, real estate speculation has started in the area, damaging companies and driving up prices. While this happens, Haven-Stad was already extremely expensive to develop in the first place, due to the existing maritime infrastructure, (soil) pollution and necessary environmental and mobility investments. This may compromise on the projected quality, for example in terms of sustainability and affordable housing. In the end, the place may be developed as a non-integrated and expensive waterfront redevelopment while serious economic damage to the port and the regional economy has been done.

To make these impacts clear for urban policies makers, a societal cost-benefit analysis can be made. Current policies are only focused on the financial costs and benefits of the city of Amsterdam. A broader societal analysis may identify externalized effects of the development. This analysis would show the impact of the development on for example regional economic clusters and international supply chains.

### **4. Enhance regional support, coordination and cooperation**

As long as the effects on port companies and the availability of heavy maritime industrial lands and quays is unresolved, the Province will slow any further development. Currently, the Province has stated that the A10 is a hard border between port and city, and that influence of companies beyond that border will affect Haven-Stad, essentially blocking development in the Coenhaven.

Also, various concerns from the national government and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Waterway Management show that they are willing to stop development if it harms port investment, as was the case in the Java bridge.

Both phenomena show that, while the municipality is in charge of making plans, it is still dependent on higher levels of government to carry them out. Coordination with these stakeholders is key. Currently, efforts are made to increase cooperation within the MRA, but that body has no legal status and is entirely governed by the municipality of Amsterdam. A new institutional arrangement for fair coordination of spatial planning seems to be needed here, after spatial planning power was decentralized to municipalities.

To integrate scales and formalize interest in the port, the ownership structure of the Port Authority could be changed. As was intended at its corporatization, ownership should be shared with the region and the national government. In this way, more stakeholders are automatically connected to port-city negotiations. Strategic coupling of interests has proven to work in the case of the lock investment and the IJ bridges.

### **5. Rebuild trust by respecting agreements**

The conflict is mostly due to a perceived violation of agreements and lack of given certainty, not the plan itself. These conflicts are mainly about the environmental space of companies after 2029 due to redevelopment of the Minervahaven and lack of perspective for (feasible) relocation that can

guarantee the continuity of business. Also, the political 'reinterpretation' of the Covenant did harm the relationship. The agreement for a temporary stop of plan making until 2024 while realising a definitive buffer zone between port and city, was made implicit by urban policy makers, stating that the Covenant was an agreement that development could start after 2024.

Currently (2019), research is carried out to determine the relocation effect of Haven-Stad. A step-up from this could be an agreement where companies in the Coenhaven get the formal promise that they can continue their businesses undisrupted until at least 2040, as was suggested before. During that time, the sustainability fund can still work in reducing environmental pollution. The time can be used to design gradual relocation process: a port drawback as 'a peaceful transition of power', preventing disinvestment through phasing corresponding with the current facility write-off periods and leasehold contracts. A new development strategy supports this process, instead of forcing it.

## **6. Create a transparent and accountable decision making process**

And otherwise, as a democratic entity, state publicly that it is your intention to weaken port companies to allow for cheaper urban transformation. Accept the consequences and take the loss of economic power. Prove that it will hurt, but that the new situation will be better.

From a democratic point of view the impact the municipality makes on the built environment and the economy, that should be something to be held accountable for. So: transparency about this approach is the first step. If it really believes that this is the right approach: then state publicly: "the lock was a disinvestment, we are waiting until the companies are weak enough to buy them out and relocate them to port lands that will become available due to the energy transition. We take the risk and the economic hit because we believe the new land use will be of greater value for the city."

## **7. Participation of (port) companies**

As of this point, port companies are still not informed about the plans for Haven-Stad. Participation of existing businesses is key in the facilitative approach that the municipality has chosen. Current events in Sloterdijk show that even outside the port, participation of industrial companies is no easy task. Here, the municipality compromises on quality (urban design and affordability) and had to resort to a more active role, actively buying companies out.

In the ladder of participation, the least a municipality can do is informing port companies. This has not happened thus far, and seems a very obvious step towards integrated development. Most of the communication thus far has been through information meetings where companies were represented by entrepreneurial organisations like VEBAN and ORAM. In the upcoming Environment and Planning Act, participation is a very important element. However, if this happens with the current interpretation of participation of the municipality, this has no value. Currently, participation has not affected plan-making in any way. Let port companies become part of the plan instead of defence against their influence.

The is tightly connected with the next point:

## **8. Experiment with ‘the productive city’ first**

The entire premise of Haven-Stad is built around the notion that industry is mixable with housing. This allows for the enormous density that makes the plan feasible. However, this new ‘urban form’ is nowhere proved in practice yet on such a scale. Since this new type of urbanism is applied to increase the density of more projects in Amsterdam (tripled amount of housing in Hamerkwartier for example), this is a huge gamble without prove of concept.

While it was normal in times of the Industrial Revolution, there was a good reason to separate housing from industry. Decades of modernistic health and sanitation policies have regulated the clear spatial division of housing and industry. The contemporary promotion of more mixed and integrated cities is understandable considering the scarcity of space and the desire for more sustainable, compact and vibrant cities. However, the reconnection of housing with industry is not something that our current institutions, citizens and companies are used to. Currently, research is carried out to explore this new mix, but examples from practice are scarce (MUST, 2018).

For this new ‘productive city’ narrative, it is important to take the relative aspect here into account. Industrial areas can be affected through their relative competitiveness (Louw, 2011). This implies that a company that is situated on a monofunctional industrial area on cheap land without many environmental constrains. This company will be more flexible and competitive than the same production facility that is located within a high density urban environment, where costs for rent, safety measures, environmental permits are higher.

Also, light industry is relatively space extensive, which means that the amount of revenue per square meter is lower than other forms of business. In a functioning market, rent levels will be matched with the maximum added value a person or company is able to produce in a certain location. Therefore, only strongly location dependent companies will be able to persist. Others would have to create additional added value through connecting their operations with the urban economy (e.g. selling experiences as addition to production). Examples are already visible in the proximity of Haven-Stad, like the opening of a chocolate factory with its own rollercoaster in the Achteisluispolder (Zaandam) or the proposal to add a knowledge and experience centre to a ship repair dock in Amsterdam North (Parool, 2018). Therefore, aside from legal and physical limitations, this basic economic principle has to be proved as well.

## **9. Open up to private initiatives**

The subject of participation also applies for private parties. Good places are made with the inspiration, creativity and ingenuity of private actors. This can real estate developers and investors, but also people with innovative ideas. Utilizing the knowledge of private entities is key to developing good places, as Urhahn (2018) stated. This is especially true when the municipality wants to take on a facilitative role, as it states: the market needs to solve the issues.

In the process of Sloterdijk, developers that have taken speculative positions are now the driving forces of development. However, in the other parts of Haven-Stad, no talks with developers and investors have taken place yet. The integration, and therefore understanding, of the private perspective is key to successfully use the market to your advantage. Currently, simple matters like permit application and communication seem difficult and do not foster trust that Haven-Stad can be developed by the market without active intervention.



Alternative forms of infrastructure investment are currently being researched by the Urban Land Institute (February 2019), which was commissioned by the project team of Haven-Stad. Transport Oriented Development, financed by Dutch pension funds, is something ORAM promotes as well as a solution.

#### **10. Reconsideration of (national) legal framework**

It were new legal institutions that gave urban policy makers the capacity to develop plans for Haven-Stad. However, it is questionable whether it is fair that they are able to behave in such a strategic way, without democratic accountability. This (democratic) power asymmetry is something to reconsider for our society as a whole. A plan for a €30 billion waterfront redevelopment on port lands was released almost without political debate and without consideration of port companies. This was a deliberate action to weaken their position. The municipality got increasingly powerful due to all sorts of experiments with environmental rules and decentralization of spatial planning, but also the political governance structure allowed for almost no time and room for objection. Plan making directly impacts port investment, but holds no legal status and therefore cannot be held accountable nor be fought against democratically.

Considering the urbanization challenges in the Netherlands and the pressure on inner cities, it can be expected that municipalities will (continue to) use the same legal framework to pressure companies. As Hobma stated in a personal interview (19-10-2018), 'experiment has become the new normal, and all available flexibility is used'. As can be seen in Haven-Stad, urban policy makers will stretch environmental space as much as possible, while overlooking the real reason for introducing flexible legislation: better and tailor fit solutions.

Therefore, we can already identify the effect of the upcoming Environment and Planning Act. It can be valuable to evaluate the lessons of Haven-Stad while implementing this Act before 2021.

## 8.3 Discussion

### 8.3.1 Introduction

This research contributes to understanding the meaning of spatial projects in the port-city interface for port-city relations. To do so, the port-city interface is conceptualized as an interactive economic system (Hayuth, 1982; Hoyle, 1989). Spatial projects in the port-city interface can be described as the outcomes of a governance process (Daamen & Vries, 2013). The capacity of actors in this governance process is affected by institutions. However, actors also have the ability to shape institutions themselves. While port and city have grown apart spatially, economically they are still connected (Jacobs & Van Dongen, 2012; Van den Berghe et al, 2018). While space becomes increasingly scarce, institutions should therefore provide governance processes that foster a sustainable relationship between port and city. However, while Hoyle (2000) identified a renewal of port-city links through waterfront redevelopment project, Wiegmans & Louw (2012) question whether these waterfront redevelopment projects cause conflicts instead.

Development in inner city locations becomes increasingly important for cities, when growth is preferred and space is limited. Combined with the development of a creative and service based economy, cities try to provide sustainable urban environments where social interaction is key. This is also true in Amsterdam.

This discussion will consist of three parts. First, the meaning of the findings of the case study will be put into a wider context of port-city literature and port-city development. Secondly, the use of theory to analyse the case study will be discussed. Thirdly, the meaning of these findings for urban development and urban development research in a more general context will be discussed.

### 8.3.2 Port-city development

The case findings resemble literature about port-city development, waterfront redevelopment and challenges for governance. The case study does not show signs of (institutional) reconnection nor physical reconnection between port and city. Global trends like urbanization and sustainability affect port development, since the public questions the benefits of space extensive, polluting land use for the sake of global trade and multinationals.

The historical spatial development of the port-city Amsterdam resembles the Anyport model of Bird (1963). Main reason for downstream development was not containerization, but scale ups in bulk cargo and the oil industry. Environmental norms and modernist policies for separation of functions did their part in disconnecting the port and the city physically. Long before Haven-Stad was planned, the municipality actively concentrated port companies from inside the city towards the west in order to make room for housing. After the Eastern Docklands slowly deteriorated as maritime area, a first wave of waterfront redevelopment emerged as a response.

However, the reconstruction of Amsterdam Haven-Stad does not show signs of real reconnection between city and port as Hoyle (1988, 2000) suggested. The ambition for urban development near or on port sites creates conflict, and conflict is used as a pressurize port companies to relocate. Urban plans present the existing port infrastructure as something to be dealt with instead of something to integrate (aside from some cultural historic artefacts). In literature, the cruise industry

is often referred to as being capable of connecting port and city (Hoyle, 2000; Daamen & Vries, 2013; Hein, 2016). However, recent events show a complete withdrawal of the cruise industry in Amsterdam, due to the hostile attitude of the city. Proposed physical urban infrastructure around the IJ causes conflict with the national Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management. The opposite seems therefore true: projects that would perfectly allow for new cooperation fail because actors remain in their existing development path. This means: urban 'exploitation' of maritime infrastructure on the one hand and port exploitation on the other.

Sustainability here is twofold: the role and value of the port itself and the environmental pollution of its industry. The efforts of the Green Party to make the port more sustainable, compact and in service of the city are clearly embedded in port policies and visions. On the other hand sustainability measures and innovation, combined with more flexible environmental legislation reduce environmental space and are used a way to build closer to and on port areas. In short, sustainability measures lead to a more compact port that which sphere of influence is more easily 'penetrable' with sensitive functions like offices and housing. In order to understand an urban development like Haven-Stad, we need to put this in perspective of the debate on the role of the port for the city and the region.

### **Institutions affecting port-city development**

While the municipality proves to be extremely powerful and effective in implementing its strategic visions, it also seems to create disintegrated plans where the port is viewed as an industrial area instead of an economic ecosystem.

The cultural attitude of the public (and politics) towards the port have been discussed in literature since the emergence of the concept port-city interface (Hoyle, 1988, 1999). This was mostly referred to as the public re-appreciation of waterfronts. Haven-Stad shows that the public attitude has changed towards privately owned and polluting industry close to the city. This has been the driver to actively reduce space occupied by port companies in general, and the transformation of port areas close to the city centre.

In their paper, Daamen & Vries (2013) could not confirm the hypothesis that corporatization of the port had led to more distant interactions between city and port. However, in the case of Haven-Stad this is definitively observable. Since corporatization, the Port Authority lost its place as project leader in the project team of Haven-Stad, and has become an external consultant without decision making power. Also, due to clauses in the port corporatization, the port authority has lost all strategic rights over port lands where Haven-Stad is planned. Additionally, the lands for Haven-Stad had to be transferred back to the municipality. Next to that, the municipality is the sole shareholder. The decrease of interaction after corporatization can possibly be explained due to the fact that the Port Authority was already more distant before corporatization. The Port Authority is said to always have been 'an outsider' within the municipality.

Another institution that was proved by the case study of Daamen & Vries (2013) was the ongoing anticipation of port migration by urban policy makers. This was also true in Amsterdam. The mechanics were somewhat more strategic however, because the option for port expansion was deliberately included in plans to foster this idea. However, this option was never really possible and connected to several conditions.

Savini (2016) states that urban policy makers in Amsterdam use 'maritime artefacts' to create

support for port transformation projects: the transformation seems less intrusive and respects cultural heritage. This is also visible in the political discussion surrounding Haven-Stad. The project team constructs the story of a gradual but irreversible transformation towards a 'maritime industrial urban city'. Many politicians often state that they are in favour of Haven-Stad, since various port lands are already transforming: "*The Minervahaven is already 'un-ported' and full of creative companies, Haven-Stad simply follows this trend*" (Alderman Van der Burg, 2017)

Daamen, Heinz & Schelwald (2016) have identified a certain awareness for institutional change in the transformation of port lands in Schiedam. New approaches were developed to 'penetrate several governance arrangements'. This trend is not observable in the development of Haven-Stad. Lessons from that case study are sometimes clearly applicable to the development of Haven-Stad. However, in Schiedam, the municipality acts not as strategic as Amsterdam with plan-making. In the case of Schiedam, a synergy map was made to show the importance of the cluster. The development was later adjusted towards that synergy (Daamen, 2017).

It is the question whether the port of Amsterdam has any ties left with the political arena. There are almost no political parties left to protect the port on the municipal level, and Economic Affairs prefers the knowledge economy above the port close to the city centre. The ties are stronger on higher levels of government. The Province has proved to be the main guardian of port interests. Also Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management is keen in protecting maritime infrastructure and its investments in the port, such as the new IJmuiden lock. The emergence of the knowledge economy shifts the preference of urban policy makers to using centrally located port lands for urban interaction environments.

Political decision making in Amsterdam is not about creating new arrangements to foster a sustainable relation between port and city. The effects of transformation are simply externalized or disregarded. After complaints of surrounding municipalities, more cooperation between in the region is promised, through the MRA and the North Sea Canal Area. The Plabeka-platform, where the regional supply for offices and industrial locations is coordinated, has taken a role by monitoring the effect of various transformation projects.

Haven Stad is understandable as an *urban development project*, from an urban development perspective. It tightly connects to what we know from literature about sustainable development and brownfield transformation (Jacobs, 1961; Jabareen 2006). It seeks to overcome regulatory barriers to create density and mix functions in a sustainable way (Verheul et al, 2017). However, it does not resemble literature about port-city reconnection. The opposite is happening: the plan-making deliberately conflicts with port exploitation.

### **8.3.3 Policy window theory in relation to urban planning**

In this thesis, urban development management has been translated as policy making regarding land use. This was done because the conflict is about a geographical space claim and not the physical design (product). The governance of plan-making therefore becomes subject of research. In policy formulation theory, the policy window theory of Kingdon was used to identify the mechanisms that allowed the formalization of transformative land use policies. The idea was that understanding the mechanisms that lead to formalization of such policies will help to understand the way how actors are able to push certain policies.

It is only in the final part of the reconstruction that two policy streams clearly came together: when a housing crisis urged politicians to come up with plans to solve the problem, the already completed Haven-Stad proposal was presented. Considering the political stream, the plans were presented by an Alderman that strongly opposed development in the port a few years earlier. While the exact definition of 'policy' and the status of the Development Strategy can be debated, over the years the municipality has consistently adopted policies that further and further found its ambitions to transform the port lands within the Ring A10.

However, there was – and still is – no clear moment where the streams came together where after port lands were 'unlocked'. Instead, what becomes clear from the reconstruction, that a build-up of consecutive feasibility studies, (port) visions, motions, ambitions and political debates slowly but steadily paved the road for the formalization of strategic ambitions.

The theory proved to be partly insufficient in describing the mechanisms that allow the formalization of transformation policy. Partly due to the strategic nature of urban planning, partly because formalized policy is not as straightforward regarding transformation. The most important element is the lack of a clear problem stream, aside from the political ideological problem stream (cultural philosophy of how things should be compared to how they are now) and large socio-economic trends like urbanisation, sustainability, rise of network society, knowledge economy and regionalization. Policy entrepreneurs were able to couple these trends with urban development orientations without urgency, crisis or extensive media coverage, or sometimes even causing problems themselves (space for an Olympic Stadium).

Policy that describes 'urban ambitions' is also full of added amendments, motions, political assurances and small textual reformulations to push policy through the council, which is distracting from the main development orientation (urban takeover of port lands). It puts general ambitions for spatial development policy in a grey area, full of freely interpretable conditions and promises. Also, this puts a lot of emphasis on the solution stream, since this is the stream where ideas are developed. Institutional arrangements that exclude parties from the solutions stream therefore lead to unintegrated formulation of ambitions that form the basis for future plan making.

Remarkable is that in the first attempt of transforming all port lands within the Ring A10 to solve a housing crisis stranded in the early 2000's. It was concluded that the plan would not be feasible and it was not preferable by the Province. This is still true. However, 20 years later, the policy is formalized to solve a new housing crisis.

What is most notable is that certain politicians were able to connect strategic urban solutions on key moments in the development process. The decision to remove the 'autonomous development' option without active intervention was removed from the Structure Vision by a decision of the Board of Mayor and Alderman. The council members of the Labour Party, part of the Board, even opposed this decision shortly before the elections of 2010.

The policy window theory therefore only proved to be partially useful for understanding these mechanisms. It is able to signal moments of opportunity for certain political groups, but these groups do not only seize these moments when the window of opportunity opens. Often, they are able to implement smaller bits of policy to assign or reserve potential areas for development.

## Redefining the problem stream

One of the main reasons for this is probably the nature of strategic urban planning, as it intends to solve not-yet-existent problems. Problem formulation is especially vulnerable for political framing. Also, vision formulation is not really tangible in a political decision-making process. It comes from the minds of influential public servants, urban planners and is combined with political ideas or the other way around.

If we zoom out a bit, the problem stream can be 'filled' with bigger socio-cultural trends, like sustainability and belief in the knowledge economy. Then, the problem becomes 'a polluting port occupies valuable land for urban development'. Space alone is not really the issue: previous solutions for space have been the development of IJburg or greenfield development. That is why the increasingly stronger compact city philosophy has been so powerful in targeting port areas.

What proved to be way more important is the idea of sustainable development and the support for a knowledge economy. Politicians in favour of these aspects were able to anchor these elements in strategic documents about urban development. This did not happen in the council but mainly through administrative assignments of the Board of Mayor and Alderman. Through the development of the institutional setting, the municipality got more and more powers to control the process.

Policy entrepreneurs were able to formalize spatial development visions without urgent problems. One of the key policies was pushed through the council during a complete construction stop. At the time, politicians even added conditions to the *ambition* of constructing 70.000 dwellings before 2040 in Amsterdam at all, since they doubted the need for such an amount.

The most important lesson is that important policy was pushed through without a real problem stream. In strategic urban development, the problem is always framed politically, and therefore is prone to ideology. The reconstruction in this thesis shows the process of the formulation of a solution, which was heavily steered by political (and indirectly societal) desires. Once the road was paved for such a solution, smart timing during a crisis proved to be effective in pushing the Development Strategy through.

What is the problem? Some policy 'solutions' aim to solve the legal issues of the transformation, such as environmental norms. Other solutions solve physical issues, like land exploitation (terms of development volume), mobility (parking norm, less roads). These problems are solved with one goal in mind: create support and increase the feasibility of the bigger policy (transformation of port lands).

An advice for similar research in process reconstruction to approach the planning 'outcomes' less as formulated policy, but more as a step in a certain direction. The focus should be on institutions that increase the solution space and strategic capacity of some actors.

Due to the strategic nature of this type of planning, researchers should focus on actors that have the ability to couple urban solutions to other problems. To understand this, unstructured interviews in an informal setting with key actors seem to be essential to get a grasp of the real mechanisms behind policy formulation. Only documents do not show the meaning of such policy in a wider strategic context.

### 8.3.4 Integration of scales, sectors and agencies

Regarding the institutional analysis, we have looked at the tangible outcomes of governance processes in Haven-Stad. While this is an effective approach to measure effective policy, there are some flaws. The problem with 'revealed outcomes' is that it is always prone to the frame of the publisher. Hidden motives and strategic games are not always visible and can only be discovered with personal interviews, discourse analysis and connections between seemingly unconnected actions and events.

While policy entrepreneurs were able to push transformational policies through the council, this did not attribute to the content of the plan in terms of integrated aspects.

In this thesis, the concept of 'integrated development' is used to measure the quality of plans. However, in practice, actors give various meanings to the concept. Member of the Haven-Stad project team use it to describe interdisciplinary work and cooperation within the municipalities' organization. They refer to the development as a programme instead of a project. However, with the us the definition 'scale, sectors and agencies', a wider range of essential stakeholders was covered. Certainly the vertical integration of spatial plans and involvement of market parties seem key in successful integrated development in this context.

However, what became clear is that there is a plethora of smaller decisions and visions before 'real' planning even starts. Also, while planning documents often acknowledge the position of port companies, planning continues anyway. The question is whether we can really define this as integrated: Irreversible damage to stakeholders through the process of plan making can never be a sustainable outcome of planning.

Regarding the governance of integrated planning, Adams & Tiesdell (2013) state that integrated planning is about co-ordinating a network of different agencies in the public and private sector. This is also difficult seen the fact that strategic transformation projects are about the development of places beyond that what market parties consider achievable. From the perspective of the Dutch national government, integrated development is referred to as 'area development' itself, where several functions are developed in relation to each other<sup>30</sup>. This inevitably brings public and private parties close to each other.

For this research, a definition is given for integrated development in order to operationalize the variables: scale, sectors and agencies. This operationalization is simple and effective, but could be somewhat further developed. As stated, due to ambiguity, strategic behaviour or hidden motivations, policy regarding intended spatial development can be hard to analyse and reflect the true meaning of policy. The development of policy itself is an indicator as well, not only the outcome.

Integrated development is also a form of strategic coupling, since it connects to other policies, investments and plans. What can be observed in practice is that, due to the institutional arrangement and path dependency, the municipality puts a lot of effort in horizontal integration and solves vertical (scalar) integration afterwards.

Theory does not specify in which phase of plan making the plan *should* be integrated. Thus far, the municipality has been occupied to defining its own position and ambitions. That can be quite

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<sup>30</sup> Reijswijzer Gebiedsontwikkeling (2011)

important in order to streamline the rest of the process. However, these ambitions have been so much advanced that they have become disconnected from reality: the ULI called Haven-Stad an impressive fairy-tale<sup>31</sup> that has yet to become reality.

### **8.3.5 Implications for Dutch spatial planning**

Governance applies to “all the different visions, interests and opinions that come into play during the trajectory are streamlined into a collaborative whole” (Wigmans, 2011, p. 42). In the network society, governance has shifted from one central actor towards a network of actors. This has implications for the way municipalities govern urban development processes. In the case of Amsterdam Haven-Stad, the municipality acknowledges that a new approach is needed and states the ambition to take a facilitative role.

The increased influence of ‘the market’ here applies to dependency on private entities for an urban development project. This can take the form of cooperation with existing users, cooperation with private investors but also participation of citizens. We have seen that port development in the first place heavily depends on fruitful cooperation with existing businesses and effective market coordination.

#### **Overcoming barriers in inner city development, at what cost?**

Inner city development is complex and expensive, but the ambition to transform inner city industrial areas seems stronger than ever. Transforming inner city areas is about strong cooperation of people. Current developments in the institutional arrangements that structure these cooperation emphasize greater flexibility for plan makers, less regulation and more control towards the Board of Mayor and Aldermen. These changes in the national planning system are designed to improve chances of inner city development. However, this does not necessarily attribute to integrated planning.

What we learn from Haven-Stad is that urban planners and policy makers are quite opportunistic in using the policy freedoms given by various new legislation. The Board of Mayor and Alderman is influential in defining the first steps of a development process. Policy freedom is lobbied for or pro-actively used to increase feasibility of municipal ambitions. After the implementation of the Crisis and Recovery Act and the upcoming Environment and Planning Act, this seems ever more relevant. This fits with recent statements of the municipal council in The Hague which feels excluded from important decisions for spatial planning, after a series of real estate deals by Alderman Revis<sup>32</sup>.

#### **Open ended planning in transformation developments**

There is a paradox in open-ended, flexible planning in inner city development (Majoor & Hakvoort, 2010). The challenge is complex and requires open-ended processes, while stakeholders require certainty. However, in the case of Amsterdam Haven-Stad, process managers interpret this as keeping all options open. In maritime areas the uncertainties that come with planning can cause irreversible damage to existing companies. It is important to carefully and pro-actively reassure existing companies of their position, best with a legally binding agreement. The status quo itself is

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<sup>31</sup> Urban Land Institute president in Vastgoedmarkt (18-3-2019)

<sup>32</sup> De Gemeenteraad vindt dat Revis de stad passeert (22-3-2019)

)<https://www.denhaagcentraal.net/nieuws/politiek/revis-gaat-te-hard-en-te-hoog-voor-de-oppositie/>



damaging: areas need continuous flows of investment to remain healthy. Until transformation takes place, these flows of investment and development should be protected to avoid unnecessary economic damage.

Vision formulation or ambition setting becomes even more important, as the upcoming Environment and Planning Act puts more emphasis on the preparation phase. One of the key aspects to tackle problems is emphasis on the participation of stakeholders. However, since participation is open for interpretation,

The real challenge in project like Haven-Stad is to design governance processes that take into account the 'flow' of a place. This is a remarkable element of waterfront redevelopment, but becomes essential in various transformation projects. Louw, Van der Toorn & Vrijthoff (2002, as cited by Aan 't Verlaat & Wigmans, 2011) have defined integrated urban development in inner city locations as 'open heart surgery'. This approach acknowledges the intervention in the existing system, the flow of goods, people and information in the urban fabric. Intervening in such a system is delicate. If we further draw on this comparison, the Haven-Stad development is more of transplantation of perfectly healthy heart with a bigger heart. To make this work, a delicate governance process is needed to reduce the chances of socio-economic damage to a city.

The planning of 'flows' in port areas has however long time been a private matter. Multinationals that control the flow of goods and infrastructure have been able to obtain exclusive rights to use land and water. The Haven-Stad project is a clash between private objectives and social objectives. While large parts of plan-making for Haven-Stad can be defined as democratically unaccountable<sup>33</sup>, this is also true for port exploitation.

The current process approach by the municipality intends to achieve open-system planning, but its goal is to achieve the best programme (product) while avoiding uncertainties and remaining flexible. Integrated development is described as a physical issue: how to create consistency and interrelatedness in the development programme while remaining flexible. The plan making is focused on how the 'new heart' should function and look like, while it is unclear how 'the patient' will survive the operation.

The irony is that seen the current challenges cities face regarding the energy transition and the development of a circular economy, it may be especially lessons from port exploitation processes that can be helpful in achieving truly sustainable places. The ways of working of port companies and the process industry acknowledge a holistic ecosystem approach that could help urban planners to design not only physical cities, but living ecosystems. A crossover in plan-making could therefore be an interesting experiment for urban planners or spatial development research.

### **8.3.6 Validity, reliability and limitations**

In process reconstructions, it is good to note the 'institutional memories' actors can have on their roles (Van den Berghe et al, 2018). Certainly due to the fact that the process was marked with several emotional fights and conflict, it can be that the perceived events were different than the actual events. Also, certainly when going back further in time, memories may also be troubled, and people may be selective in the information they share. Therefore, in this research certainly the more bold statements from the past have been triangulated with either the statements from other actors,

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<sup>33</sup> Seen the influence urban planners and politicians have on land use without legal accountability.

or official documents. Certainly the easy access to recorded municipal council meetings including all relevant documentations proved to be very helpful. Amsterdam's long history of strategic spatial planning has also been extensively described and documented.

In terms of reliability, the perspective of port companies is now mostly derived from secondary sources like ORAM, public interviews and the transcripts of meetings with the port companies. However, their exact position in the process sometimes remains unclear. Also, the research is mostly focused on the big 3 companies of the Coenhaven. There is not much information available about the 32 other companies in that area.

The fact that this thesis is built around a single case study means that its conclusions are not immediately applicable to other port cities. Amsterdam is a unique city with its own unique cultural and institutional profile. The research used various concepts and theories to analyse spatial development and conflicts in the port-city interface. Due to the fact that there are many actors involved and the timeline was long, a lot of data seemed relevant. However helpful in many cases, the amount of data became very big.

While it was valuable to understand the 'complete scope' of the conflict, perhaps it could be more effective to analyse only the discourse in political decision making. Also, more extensive interviews with port companies could have been a valuable attribution.

### **8.3.7 Generalizability**

The case in Amsterdam is representable as such, that it is a metropolis and city with a historic relation to its port. However, as most cities worldwide try, it tries to find optimal use for the space of its economy. While the situation in Amsterdam is unique, it faces the same challenges as other (port) cities while dealing with mega trends: urbanization and sustainability. Several other trends like automatization, knowledge economy and regionalization. These trends cause conflicts between established and new interests in the built environment, with waterfront redevelopment of vital port lands as one of the most challenging arenas. This research is about how local communities organize the cooperation between various stakeholders to cope with these conflicts.

Due to the unique characteristics of every urban project, due to the spatial, institutional characteristics and its actors, generalization of the results of this research is to be handled with care. However, various authors have drawn lines between several comparative case studies regarding the general development of port cities and governance of the port-city interface in the past (Bird, 1963; Hoyle, 2000; Norcliffe et al, 1996). More recently, authors focusing on the European context and the Hamburg-Le Havre range have identified some distinct trends regarding port-city development, mainly concerning environmental regulation, port expansion and urban takeover (Daamen, 2007; Wiegmans & Louw, 2012; Daamen & Vries, 2013). Haven-Stad policy makers refer often to Hamburg Hafen-City to prove the potential of 'unlocking' port lands through relaxation of environmental norms. It is good to note however, that Hafen-City was a regeneration project, not a transformation of vital port areas. In terms of port-city context, Hafen-City resembles more of the Houthavens development.

Haven-Stad is designed to provoke certain development in the port. This was mainly possible due to the relaxation of environmental legislation. Other (regional) European ports might experience some of these forces as well, as European policies promote cleaner industry and compact, sustainable cities. The market pressure on inner city areas and the public appreciation of waterfronts seems to

be persistent as well. Combined with regionalization and decentralization of power, strategically acting municipalities have less checks and balances in the formulation of their spatial planning ambitions. It is exactly this process where port companies are most vulnerable, certainly if their interests are not properly embedded in various institutional arrangements or land positions. However, this is also a signal to urban planners in various European (port) cities that cope with inner city redevelopment challenges: carefully orchestrate the formulation of long term strategic planning with existing stakeholders, since otherwise actors may be overtaken in the process by speculation and irreversible damage to companies and the development potential of a place.

As space becomes increasingly scarce in most port-cities, port lands near the city centre may be targeted for urban expansion. What becomes clear is that these areas do not have to be deteriorated to start these processes. As visible in the case of Haven-Stad, this also depends on the anticipated spatial effects of the energy transition and the circular economy. Certainly for fossil based ports, the unclear effects of this transition can temporarily legitimize urban takeover without proper strategies for company relocation. This can be seen for example when tangible growth policies (like space claims for projected metric tons) of the port in the 2000s were replaced for sustainable 'smart' growth strategies based on the value for the city.

### **8.3.8 Further research**

Anyone interested in reconstructing planning processes should not underestimate the influence of key figures with strategic behaviour. More emphasis could be put on strategic coupling of policies and the solution space with mega trends. Through strategic planning, the ruling politicians are able to relatively easily embed ideas in strategic documents. Opponents of these ambitions have not a lot of influence in fighting these first phases of planning. This may be especially true in municipalities with a long tradition of government-led strategic spatial planning.

#### **Topics for further research**

An interesting element in the planning process of Haven-Stad was the creation of narratives of urban takeover in the port. Ameel (2016) has stated the importance of narratives in especially waterfront redevelopment projects. Also Savini (2016) mentioned the effect of maritime artefacts in the story of transformation. It was observed that many politicians resorted to this 'logic' of gradual port takeover, while they were essentially creating it themselves through transformative policies. An interesting research would be a discourse analysis and the role of story-building in port-city transformation, since it seems a powerful tool in rearranging institutions.

Also, an observed trend in waterfront redevelopment is the 'productive city' where high density housing is mixed with industry. It would be valuable to understand what how the relative economic competitiveness of such areas is affected by introducing housing. This would contribute a lot policy making and industrial land allocation, since urban planners almost automatically use this urban form without considering this effect. In practice, it has already led to subsidizing light industry in order for them to remain in such areas (Sloterdijk I South).

Furthermore, during this research, the other 'mainport' of Amsterdam came across quite often: Schiphol. This is also a fossil fuel based 'gateway', but causing even more environmental pollution in the region. Both NZKG and Schiphol attribute respectively 5% and 6,5% of total GDP of the MRA and sustaining 68.000 and 94.000 jobs (Decisio, 2015; Havenmonitor, 2017). However, the airports'

interests are apparently better protected than the ports'. Also seen current events in the media, where the National Government bought a stake in KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, and the willingness to let the airport grow at almost any cost seem to prove this. A comparative case between the two ports would be interesting to see the institutions at work here.

Lastly, it is also good to understand the impacts that environmental and spatial law reforms have. As this research indicates, dominant actors will use the policy freedom to such an extent that it does not abide the original goal of environmental policy reform: better tailored solutions and better integrated processes.

## 8.4 Reflection

### Motivation and connection to study

This research is part of the MBE laboratory 'Next Generation Waterfronts', focusing on the urban redevelopment of processes in waterfront arenas. This field of research takes place in a complex area where city and maritime industry meet, protected by the respective interests of port and urban politics. The place where spatial planning, urban development and a network of worldwide flows of information, goods, and capital meet, scrub and brush. This makes studying the processes in these areas a valuable source of information for economic and social sciences.

Several months before the start of this research, the announcement of the development of Haven-Stad dominated the media: A city as big as Leiden will be built in the Amsterdam harbour. The conflict with existing companies in the area was also noted in every media outlet, but was presented as an 'issue that had to be overcome' before development could start.

This research focusses on the development of Amsterdam Haven-Stad: a new city in the port. It is difficult not to be impressed by the sheer size of the plan and the stated ambitions. The pressure on inner cities is currently big. From the perspective of urban development management, it is about focusing on the right processes to achieve integrated and sustainable developments. And more importantly: create 'good places' while market pressure is high.

The Eastern Docklands are known for big inner city redevelopments close to the centre of Amsterdam, and home of big events like SAIL. The Haven-Stad plan therefore seemed a logical plan for urban development, as an extension of the transforming urban waterfront. Building 70.000 homes so close to the Central Station on some old industrial lands is an opportunity not to waste. A sustainable, compact, mixed-use and dense neighbourhoods. Haven-Stad, as a product, promised all that.

Following a personal interest in inner city developments, the opportunity to study the biggest inner city redevelopment of the Netherlands was appealing. The first perspective on the research was: how can we make such developments possible and successful? Creating quality while acting in a very complex and expensive location is difficult. In waterfront redevelopment projects in port areas something else plays a role: it is a port.

### Approach

The choice for an in-depth case study was done to be able to unravel the planning process intensively. Up until the last days of writing the thesis, more and more valuable information presented itself. The idea was first to reconstruct the planning process of Haven-Stad, and afterwards determine where stakeholders were able to find 'common ground', where not, and why that happened. The goal was to reveal the cause of the current conflict and come with recommendations to find a way towards integral spatial planning based on mutual understanding. Moving away from the zone of conflict. The societal relevance felt increasingly big: the stakes are high and there is a considerable amount of public funds and socio-economic and historical value at risk.

The chosen case offered a big amount of information. The case was subject of political debate and

extensively covered by local media. Also, due to transparency of political decision making a lot of policy documents were freely available. The Municipality of Amsterdam has a rich history of urban planning and is keen on sharing that information. The city archives as well as the cities political decision making process are rich and well organized. Several urban planners from the municipality of Amsterdam have published books with their work and policy documents are even available in the library of Bouwkunde.

All this helped to construct a rough timeline quite soon. Based on that timeline, qualitative interviews were carried out to discover the stories, intentions and action surrounding the key and decisive moments in the timeline. Those interviews led to a second round of document research. Ultimately all these sorts of qualitative data had to be brought together. It turned out that the planning timeline was traceable back to the 90s, where a process emerges where step-by-step the road was paved to give a final push for the transformation agenda in December 2017. It is also a road where the interests of the port are slowly diminished along the way, while municipal planning powers increased.

### **Appropriateness**

This approach tended to be insufficient at first, since the element of tactical behaviour and the capacity for strategic action was not captured adequately by a simple list of events. Also, an analysis of how actors responded to the institutions 'in effect' per planning episode does not reveal the undercurrent that drives plan-making. Only describing the capacity and orientations of actors did not seem enough to start plan making. A series of deliberate and tactful interventions seemed necessary to get plan making started. Understanding how this happened was key to understand how 'Haven-Stad' happened, and this only became clear after a series of qualitative interviews with strategic actors. This was unexpected. The research was trying to understand how actors integrate interests, but this revealed a layer of strategic behaviour or deliberate conflict.

As was visible in the case of Haven-Stad, the plan is the result of two decades of deliberate strategic action by a small group of urban planners and politicians. These actors were only constrained by the institutions in place, but they were able to gradually increase their grip on port lands. They did this by smart agenda setting, feasibility researches and the selection of plans and visions. In this way, it could be made clear that the road for urban takeover was paved long before the market pressure was big enough to justify it.

Surprised by the claims of certain key figures in the interviews, a new round of document research was necessary to back-up their claims. This round of research revealed more information which could connect separate events. The qualitative interviews were key to glue all the data together.

### **Structuring data**

The difficult part for me was to decide how to structure all the obtained data. There are several methods offered to evaluate a planning process. Also taken into account that I have Management of the Built Environment, and not Policy Management. This inevitably made me focus on the visible design, while for my research the mechanisms to formulate it were important.

Also, to understand exactly why something happened was not always relevant. The visible outcome shows the distillate of the process. I was struck by the power of narratives. The ideas and motivation that motivated certain decisions were vastly different. This made Haven-Stad a project of 'different

realities' where stakeholders kept making the same decisions within their rationality, logic and language. I found this very interesting and hoped to find a solution for the process in that direction. This was for example the statement for 'logical westward expansion' and the position of the port after the energy transition. However, this proved quite unpractical. It maybe is a good first step to recognize both realities as an urban development manager, but practical steps have to be taken as well to bring them together. Proving that both institution were acting with different ideas about future development in mind however, remained a valuable insight.

Secondly, the use of language, symbols, images and icons to push an urban transformation agenda was another sidestep. Policy makers use these items to solidify their narrative about urban transformation. Think about the urban icons using port artefacts along the IJ banks, but also the maps that show gradients instead of hard lines to show how 'gradual' transformation is. In reality transformation in this area is very hard and expensive. Another sidestep was the evaluation of the product Haven-Stad as well. The product is very expensive and cannot achieve the political promises it makes.

The difficulty encountered during this reconstruction is that I became very attached to the actual actions and data. I noticed this when watching council meetings felt like watching a soap opera, I was completely attached to the characters. I have spent almost a week 'binge watching' and transcribing council meetings. Therefore it was the risk that the research would turn out to be something more of a journalistic investigation or reconstruction for a book than something that is usable for science. Exact details matter maybe in an juridical processes, but do not matter that much in researching urban area development processes. These researches are done to increase knowledge on a more abstract level in order to make it usable outside one specific process arena. There will be an endless set of variables that make this case unique and different from others, and these variables may even not even be identifiable. They are bycatch of this case study, but should be not central to it. I hope however, that this bycatch offers munition to start an honest political debate about the effects of this transformation process.

After writing the complete story of the Haven-Stad development process down it had become clear that I had to come up with a position myself. Determine what a good process is and comparing that to what was visible in reality. The reasons why that happens, or not, would reveal the real problems. There are other, comparable port cities in western democracies that struggle with spatial issues and power relations in their respective ports.

## **Ethics**

Abstractedly the research is about democracy and power relations between institutions: how is power institutionalized for spatial planning. Who decides what happens with land? And should the land be used for the benefit of a group of people that accidently lives next to it, or an international community that is depending on it? Should institutions follow geographical borders or daily urban systems and worldwide trade flows?

This poses us also for an ethical dilemma in terms of power: Should a municipal organization influence a geographical area in such a way in order to push a political agenda? Does it have that democratic mandate? And if it has it, should it do it? Does it need to be transparent about the hidden agenda of plan-making?

Hopefully this research attributes to a discussion about the power of plan making. The current institutions offer a lot of power to the politicians in charge, without being held accountable for the real life effects on companies and citizens.

### **Biased perspective?**

The reconstruction was set up according to directions ORAM set out. This entailed the risk of being biased towards the municipality. ORAM, as port association, had a history of discussion and conflict with the municipality concerning spatial plans in the city. On the other hand: the research is about understanding conflict. The conflict is of course created through a *perception* of different stakes. It does not matter much if that conflict is legitimate: if it affects the process it is relevant. The companies and the port could also have chosen to just take their loss and stop with their activities, but that is not the case. Urban Development Management has the responsibility to create a better situation than that there was before. The focus is therefore on achieving that.

First it was about making the development possible, it ended with consternation and astonishment about the process. Therefore I started to sympathize with the port and port companies. Maybe that is a natural reaction, to sympathize with the underdog. More and more the municipality, as an organization, seemed like an unstoppable and powerful force, determined to impose its truth on the built environment. Pushing through a €30 billion development a few days before Christmas, cheering and applauding for a plan that is extremely costly, risky and damaging. I also was surprised by the gullibility of some mainly progressive parties, and my own political party, while often sympathizing with the Christian Democrats and the Elderly Party.

The political desire to solve the housing crisis is however, understandable. This does not mean that I agree with the actions and decisions politicians in Amsterdam make. I believe however, that their decisions and actions will only slow down the Haven-Stad development and making it more costly. At the end it is society that pays. I hope this research contributes to the understanding that their current approach will only move them further away from their goals. Let Haven-Stad not just be a political stunt, but a start of renewed relations between port and city, as the name suggested in the first place.

### **Final thoughts**

The Haven-Stad project team and the politicians must be praised with their efforts in solving the housing crisis in Amsterdam. The city has proven that it is able to produce big plans and shape markets effectively (IJburg, Zuidas). The real job starts now however.

What seems the most important lesson for transformation is finding a balance between pushing urban agendas for the momentum of the project and the ability to create widely supported and integrated plans. The housing market is extremely volatile and cyclical and in times of a perceived housing crisis, large political pressure is put on the city. The municipality is also a large organisation wherein it is a challenge to generate enough momentum while also creating support amongst stakeholders.

However, it is in the best interest of the municipality to reconsider Haven-Stad in its current form, take a small step back and deliver an integrated and broadly carried plan. The road of development of Haven-Stad may otherwise be full of conflict and become expensive, which in turn will mean a loss of quality.







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## V. Interviews and meetings

### Meetings

Date	Meeting	Topic
03/05/2018	Meeting ORAM	Introduction
09/07/2018	Meeting ORAM	Research topic and collaboration
13/09/2018	Meeting ORAM	Collaboration and schedule
15/10/2018	Meeting ORAM	Participation process, Tools
15/10/2018	Meeting Haven-Stad team and ORAM	Communication and collaboration with companies
21/02/2018	Presentation of research at ORAM	Discussion of results with port representatives

### Interviews

Date	Interviewee	Topic
02/10/2018	Jurriaan van Hellemond (Bouwcampus)	Participation of companies
09/10/2018	Raymond Dubos (Port Authority)	Role Port Authority
22/10/2018	Lubbert Hakvoort (Haven-Stad)	Development Strategy
23/10/2018	Gert Urhahn (Urbanist)	Urban planning along the IJ banks
25/10/2018	Fred Hobma (TU Delft)	Environmental Law
31/10/2018	Paul Moons (Land Department)	Land development Sloterdijk I Zuid
05/11/2018	Tjakko Dijk (former council member)	Political process
19/11/2018	Maarten van Poelgeest (former alderman)	Plan making process
22/11/2018	Michel van Wijk (Province North Holland)	Role Province
26/11/2018	Maarten de Gruyter (Developer)	Development in Haven-Stad
28/11/2018	Hans van Wijk (Economic Affairs)	Economic strategy
11/01/2019	Federico Savini (UvA)	Academic reflection of process
21/02/2019	Maarten Kievits (Fakton)	Developer Hembrugterrein

### Creative Sessions

Date	Session	Topic
27/09/2018	I&W Ateliersessie 2	Haven-Stad ZaanIJ (Development perspectives)
10/11/2018	I&W Ateliersessie 3	Haven-Stad ZaanIJ (Mobility)
19/11/2018	Rooilijn Pakhuis de Zwijger	Sustainable development of Haven-Stad