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A Flat Theory

Toward a Genealogy of Apartments, 1540–1752

Gorny, R.A.

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A Flat Theory

Toward a Genealogy of Apartments, 1540–1752

Robert A. Gorny

TU Delft

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“Beings can be known by means of the knowledge of the subject, but the individuation of beings can only be grasped by the individuation of the knowledge of the subject.”

Simondon, *L'individuation psychique et collective*, 30.

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Toward a Genealogy of Apartments, 1540–1752

Dissertation

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Prof. dr. ir. T. H. J. J. van der Hagen;
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Dr. ir. A. Radman (Delft University of Technology) has, as supervisor, contributed significantly to the preparation of this dissertation.

A summary of this body of work (in English and Dutch) is provided at the end of this book, on page lxxv, and lxxviii.

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Preface

Despite its title, *A Flat Theory* ought to be read on multiple levels. This work presents a first step in the direction of a yet-to-be-completed, larger project toward a genealogy of apartments drawn in several steps. Second, while concerned with and centering on the historical formation of apartments, the aim of this genealogical project is not to offer (and should therefore not be confused with) a comprehensive or straight-forward history of apartments or flats. Written instead as part of a wider history of the present, it operates on a more transversal level in drawing together a variety of disciplinary fields and their various theoretical planes. This is done by way of a specific historiographical methodology with a distinct theory or philosophy of history: genealogy. As such it foregrounds lineages or networks of relationships while problematizing the particular nature of these relations. The latter concerns precisely not just purely 'historical' or socio-spatial relations, but a variety of transdisciplinary aspects regarding the spatio-temporal relationality that defines the process through which apartments came to form a particular architectural arrangement, which my architecture-theoretical work investigates on a much more transversal level.

As the subject of so much scholarly debate and designerly ingenuity, apartments and flat housing constitute one of the most studied fields at the intersection of architecture, urban history, sociology,and theories of modernization. Its prominent historical figures and figurations were explored and described in a thousand publications and articles treating various sociological, art-historical, typological, and stylistic aspects. As such, it seems rather unlikely that there could be a major inattention in the history of apartments. And yet, this is precisely what the following will put forward in arguing that, despite all good intentions to do so, no history of apartments has ever been written. Specifically, in the sense that no single study has ever approached or offered an explicit historical or theoretical framework concerning their longer genesis. In this matter, I am not suggesting that apartments were not given enough attention as such; I like to point out a certain inattention regarding their emergence and longer evolution. While one could argue that the history of apartments is 'already there,' if in a more piecemeal way spread across all these abovementioned studies, from a critical distance we are left to wonder to what degree the study of residential buildings remains fragmented. Compared to the many attempts at outlining studies that in recent years have with an often rather universalizing tendency traced the emergence of several modern building types, when it comes to the architecture of apartments there is no comparable larger historico-theoretical framework concerning their evolution.

It is in this regard that I want to problematize a certain blind spot that has arisen at the intersection of different discourses, disciplinary concerns, and the specific modes in which apartments were variably thought of, framed, or represented in historico-theoretical discourse. My introduction will first address this point in its fuller discursive complexity, in mapping out where and how this blind spot arose, and illustrating how it is connected to a wider structural error in how scholars have looked at the built environment, and geneses and formtaking processes in general. Concerning this latter aspect, let me here just briefly touch on the fact that architects, historians and theorists commonly regard modern architectures such as apartment buildings as a mere outcome of urban density and speculation, and result of modernization processes. Alternatively, scholars see them more as products of new social practices or urban regulations responding to these phenomena. Seen as such a passive by-product, one may easily overlook the much greater effect of how the evolving architecture of apartments has actively contributed to the production of a particular form of co-existence and hence social formations, by spatially structuring and reconfiguring how we relate to one another. Yet, such an acknowledgment is no general, nor even widespread position throughout histories or theories of architecture, nor in the sociology of modernity. Would it be overstated to reconsider the longer historical formation of apartments—from earlier residential systems to modernized forms of cohabitation that have progressively become the globally dominant form of urban living throughout the last centuries—as having constituted the formation of our urbanized worlds with its present highly-differentiated forms of togetherness? And does this not mean that, in a sense, it was the formation of the former that brought the latter about?

It is in this constitutive sense that the longer historical formation of apartments has remained consistently under-described. This study started from the initial idea to offer a first synthetic survey, mapping the major moments of transformation in what my German thinking had conceived of as a formational or evolutionary history [*Entstehungsgeschichte*]; the history of 'the genesis of apartments,' as I initially called my project. Following here Michel Foucault's genealogical distinction between simple locations of original causes vis-à-vis mappings of where things historically 'come from' or how they 'come about,' I am strategizing the awkward Foucauldian term **HISTORICAL FORMATION** as it implies no history, and especially not the history of a type, or type of (trans)formation, but a historical **GENESIS** that is taking form within a certain **MILIEU**. This latter notion covers all sorts of (spatial, social, cultural, or technical) environments in which such formations came

about, as they come to be materially or discursively constructed and transformatively configured. It is from this 'point of view of genesis' that we are left to wonder if history books and especially typological studies—full of specimens of modern apartments and developments of residential building types that feature this dwelling type or "species of space" (as George Perec would say)—have ever told the story of their *speciation*. The employment of this term should not be understood as a simple biomorphic analogy; it problematizes that architectural systems evolve akin to other evolving systems through rather complex processes whose workings have only recently been better understood. In contrast to a longstanding but partly reductive notion of evolution as some sort of linear unfolding of differences, an understanding of **SPECIATION** processes requires an attention to more complex convergence processes or couplings in which various lineages of co-evolving and co-adapting forms and environmental factors are incrementally coming together in a non-linear process that gives rise to these differentiation processes.

Somewhat similar to the difference between genealogical trees and the couplings that underly them, understanding such convergence processes non-reductively requires avoiding the perks of essentialism and closely-related forms of typological thinking. In these modes individuation processes are reductively traced back by means of instituting classifications systems of formal criteria or categories, and defining characteristics or traits, according to which membership to certain species, types, or kinds is established generically. Having often proven misleading, this mode cannot substitute for an explanation of the complex (**MORPHO**)**GENESES** underlying differentiation and variation processes that gave rise to these historically constructed entities, and which actually define them. In this sense, my project initially started from the idea to offer a cartography that draws together the various (architectural, typological, organizational, technological, cultural, societal, behavioral, legal, economic, and so on) lineages within the convergence process that marks the morphogenesis of the modern built environment. Yet, as I quickly learned, this aim required that we first reconsider more closely what this complex historical (trans)formation (or modernization) process actually consisted in. This realization was immediately complicated by the particularity of a formational history to account for historical formations in architecture from the point of view of their genesis.

In its basic setup, my study thus took much inspiration from Foucault's well-known genealogies, and the way these histories of the present have approached built formations as a crucial substance of modernization. Since my first studies I had become increasingly fascinated by his productive read-

ing of architecture as apparatus of subjectivation. But I had also grown aware that apartments, as the perhaps most significant concretization of modernization processes of the built environment, had remained astoundingly absent in post-Foucauldian scholarship. In this view, we not only lack a systematic understanding of the form-taking architecture of apartments as a form of living together; we also miss a much more genetic theory of their emergence within metropolitan habitats and their milieus of modernization. The lack of a genetic approach to the historical formation of apartments, I want to suggest, symptomatizes a much broader structural error in how we look at the built environment and geneses and form-taking processes in general. Rather than giving an easy answer, this argument would imply that this morphogenesis can only be studied in much more ecosystemic terms than has previously been done. In fact, there is an entirely different story begging to be written here. Following Foucault's provocation to generally subsume the history of specific architectures under a wider history of environmental or organizational technics, the following therefore starts from the basic hypothesis that these two points can only be dealt with productively when problematized at once.

In aiming to account for the historical formation of apartments over the last centuries from this deliberately twofold perspective, my project, more than asking any particular research question, aims to pose and reposition this wider research aim by drawing these problematics newly together by way of a specific extension of the cartographies that Foucault started to make. As I want to argue in this introductory part, this entails a whole set of methodological meta-problems in the challenge to adopt and adapt the advances of (post-)Foucauldian studies by generalizing its generative reading of the built environment onto a much more eco-systemic scale of environmentally-directed thinking, while at the same time connecting it back onto a more profound machinic level of spatial organization and production techniques. Forming the foundational proposition of my study, I will put forward the argument that to study historical formations of the built environment from this generalized technological angle, we need no radically-new analytical methodology; we need first of all a different ontology in order to approach emergent architectural arrangements in their fully-fledged relationality, reciprocity, and irreducibility. Here the wider aim of my research is to contribute a step to a more MACHINIC understanding how architectural arrangements, taking form in complex environmental reconfigurings. These operate at the intersection of three distinct worlding dynamics through which becomings and subjectivities are co-constitutively produced. Selecting not

only specific bio-socio-environmental relations, but mutually-constitutive relations that select *for* certain machinic assemblages and technical ensembles, taking form in particular path-dependent and end-directed co-evolutions. And it is in this wider aim that the present study will approach the historical formation of apartments, as a great case for advancing this machinic reading.

Such an approach to the historical formation was not an obvious thing to do; nor was it a personal choice. The connection drew itself quite machinically through my own becoming, my professional and intellectual ambulation, and more specifically my long-term engagement with post-structuralist philosophies of difference (especially that of French philosopher Gilles Deleuze[1]), relational thinking, **ASSEMBLAGE**-theory, **NEW MATERIALISM** (or matter-realism), along with ecosystemic, decolonial, feminist, and queer theories come in quite handy. Taken together, they constitute a rich field of so-called **FLAT ONTOLOGIES** that have recently begun to reorient, revive and re-complexify many fields of research. To be able to keep up with these developments, architectural history and theory need to leave their symbolic-representationalist mind-set. Instead, it calls for a difference-theoretical, or **DIFFERENTIAL** and **NEW-MATERIALIST** conception of the built environment, its transformation, and social formations, as well as for new concepts of topologies of power, material agency, and architectural production to describe them. The highly relational perspective of such a differential-materialist ontology, however, challenges us to approach architecture as

1 Hoping that many readers share this fascination with post-Deleuzo-Guattarian thinking, I am careful to avoid any 'Deleuzist' view point. Especially from readers who have followed the digital turn, and may be well-acquainted with Deleuze's writings, I expect a certain reservation due to the ways in which Deleuzian concepts came to be mistaken for explanations in critical theory and performative design. By contrast, some of those of a generation of digital natives, whom I hope to address as well, may have engaged with post-structuralist theories to a lesser extent. This study will provide a comprehensive base to follow my approach without falling into jargon. But it will strategize a specialized vocabulary, a conceptual basis if you will, insisting on specific and precise (post-Deleuzian) concepts and conceptions, in which new words allow for making new connections. Along with these conceptions, I also import a specific agenda in which their partial abstractness and disruptiveness is tied to a minoritarian tactics of "defamiliarization" (Braidotti) or "disidentification" (Muñoz); small ruptures opening spaces for thinking, critique, and becomings. To make this endeavor a mutual becoming, I will be introducing these concepts in the running text. They are set in **BOLD SMALL CAPS** where defined on the occasion of their first discussion, while recurrences are set in **SMALL CAPS**, to serve as a reminder that they carry specific conceptions. Together, all small caps refer to re respective entry in the "Glossary for A Flat Theory" gathered at the appendix of this volume. Next to the "Lexicon for the Genealogy of Appartements" explaining foreign architecture-historical notions, it back-, cross- and interlinks these concepts to specific discourses on material form, formations, history, transformation, becomings, and subject-formation.

a complex socio-environmental technology which still needs much more attention in its constitutive function as an **ENABLING CONSTRAINT**.

This way, *A Flat Theory* must be understood more literally than being some sort of pun on flats. Instead, this title denominates my wider aim of helping foster an ontologically flatter conception, concerning which it invests much more conceptual work than necessary for simply writing any history of apartments. For it is in this greater theoretical aim of articulating an assemblage-theoretic extension of Foucault's genealogical approach in the direction of a so-called epiphylogenetic and onto-cartographic account, as I will argue, that the formation of apartments proves a great case for rendering visible the synergistic machinic interactions and emergent couplings within co-evolutive processes, and how architectural arrangements operate therein. It is here that my genealogical exercise and its historically-grounded scholarship hopes to make a theoretically more pertinent and 'untimely' contribution to an urgently needed counter-conception of the highly-reductive Western understanding of (built) environments, which is partly responsible for the impoverishing world it helped construct. Here it may contribute to help counter a wider technological illiteracy concerning how (built) environments in general (and Western ones in particular) work. It is in this matter that my study is written in the spirit of Deleuze's œuvre, which never stopped investigating how things actually work.

Summary and Structure of this Study

A Flat Theory presents a genealogical project concerned with the historical formation of apartments. As such, it draws together the first synthetic study of the complex processes through which apartments have become our globally dominant form of urban togetherness. Divided in three volumes, it will map the successive emergence of (I) apartments as a spatial arrangement throughout the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries; to (II) apartment houses in seventeenth to nineteenth-century Europe; to (III) apartment housing in the twentieth century. The present work constitutes the inaugural volume of this larger project,[2]

2 This project started with the ambition (and was structured accordingly) to initially cover this entire story. While this might have been possible within the time allocated for a PhD project, it would have meant to map this process closer to the surface. During the second year of research on the first part concerning the formation of the very concept of apartments, I quickly realized that this mapping is better conducted more slowly, as it required to work oneself deeply into a variety of topics;—not to provide more details, but to thus reach the **ENGINEERING STRATA** on which all these processes were being configured. This way, my original ambition was quickly telescoping out of proportion, and I had to accept that the aforementioned three "books" would actually have to become three different books to be written; three interrelated volumes of a Flat Trilogy, of which my doctoral study could cover but the starting point.

focusing on (and preparing an understanding of) what I will describe as a MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE formation of apartments during the 1540–1780s in western Europe, as an architectural concept, spatial phenomenon, and residential system in three distinct parts. These three parts constitute not any final history of the formation of apartments, in the sense that it conclusively reconstructs the causal chains that have led to our present forms of living together apart, but more genetic analyses—sometimes plainer, sometimes deeper; sometimes faster, sometimes slower—of convergent lineages underlying this history.

To situate the larger project, the first volume starts with a more general introduction "On the Historical Formation of Apartments." By critically reviewing the manifold discourses on apartments, it identifies this missing genetic approach to the formation of apartments. Not a simple research gap, this blind spot is seen as symptomatizing a more complex structural error in the theorization of built environments. Based on this research problematic, I advance a radicalization of some existing studies that approach the historical formation of apartments as a *topological* ordering that has transformed our reciprocal relationships within and with built environments. This transformation is more productively analyzed when studied on a more general, ecosystemic, and technological level. *A Flat Theory* combines historically grounded scholarship and discourse analyses, with a more assemblage-theoretic extension of genealogical methods into a so-called epiphylogenetic mapping. It maps the formation of apartments at the intersection of three intertwined socio-psycho-environmental worlding dynamics through which becomings and subjectivities are co-constituted.

The approach is further elaborated in a preliminary discussion that zeroes in on several theoretico-methodological aspects. Constituting a sort of minor thesis that forms a somewhat independent study (called BOOK 0), it initially expands on the chosen genealogical method and discusses the methodological requirements of approaching the architecture of apartments through an assemblage-theoretical reading. Through a close reading of (post-)Foucauldian and (post-)Deleuzo-Guattarian studies, BOOK 0 situates this investigation within a wider epistemological perspective calling for flattened ontologies. In debunking representationalistic approaches to architecture, it outlines a non-reductive analytic approach to the built environment. Therefore, it also distills an apparatus of pertinent theoretical concepts (compiled in an appended glossary) that help conceptualize, from a more process-ontological and genetic angle, how historical formations take form in (and through) architectural arrangements.

Following the preliminary discussion, VOLUME ONE "On the Genealogy of Appartements" then maps, in its three parts (PART I–III), three historical lineages coming together, in the more topically-focused discussions of the successive emergence of apartments as an architectural concept, space, and system. Opening this genealogy, PART I, on "The Crystallizing Conception of Appartamenti," recovers the largely-forgotten conceptual lineage of apartments as a diagrammatic design measure within Italian architectural treatises during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. The part starts in the year 1540, when Sebastiano Serlio introduced the notion of *appartamenti* into architectural discourse. To correct this little-known fact, the first chapter (1.1) problematizes its obscure abstract sense as an organizational concept and reconstructs its ignored conceptual origin within artistic practices and measures of (com)partition. As the central chapter (1.2) elaborates, these long remained the guiding image for instructing architectural composition at the intersection of geometric techniques and changing ordering conceptions like Alberti's notion of *partitione*, Filarete's *compartitione,* and Martini's *partimenti.* Through an analytic of concepts situating these changing conceptions as responses to changing problems, this part adumbrates how these partimenti evolved from an initially more representational, geometric measure into an abstract, diagrammatic matrix for architectural production, unleashing a new creative power. The last chapter of this part (1.3) draws several conclusions in reconsidering the particular pedagogical function of the matrix of appartamenti, and reclaims not only the vanguard position of Serlio's practical theory, but also derives some lessons for a non-representational approach to architecture in general.

Reeling back to a parallel process, PART II, on "The Form-Taking Architecture of Apartments," tackles a distinctly organized spatial framework that had evolved independently in several lines of transformation in the arrangements of palatial architectures in the Italian states, France, England and Spain. Starting from a critical review of changing analytic approaches to these linear suites of rooms as a framework for the reception of guests according to their rank, the first chapter (2.1) revisits the longer lineage of the segmentary spatial organization that characterize aristocratic residences as an apparatus facilitating the ruler's appearances by way of a spatial distinction between the rooms for reception and retreat. Therein, it investigates the CONNECTIVE SYNTHESIS of their segmentary organization through traditionally additive building practices (2.1.1). It then touches on some crucial differences in the organizations of apartments that underly different kinds of royal castles, papal, clerical, and communal palaces (2.1.2), *castelli* and *villas* (2.1.3)

as well as the progressive opening-up of these formerly defensive structures. The central chapter (2.2) then examines the DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS that distinguishes the internal modification of the French residences and the traditionally single room-range structure of their central *corps de logis*. Based on a closer understanding of an internal differentiation of the *Donjon* type (2.2.1), the French *logis* is revisited as a highly self-structuring spatial arrangement (2.2.2). The last section foregrounds the longstanding form of spatial self-organization within these structures, and locates a crucial transformation in the introduction of a central stair (2.2.3) that would drive the further evolution of these structures (and the differentiation of *appartements* therein) into formally symmetricized, yet organizationally-asymmetical arrangements, in a novel direction. The last chapter of this part centers on the CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS of *appartements* as a specific dispositif of power (2.3). After placing the genesis of this dispositif in the context of an increasing 'becoming-sedentary' of the French court throughout the sixteenth century (2.3.1), this chapter discusses the apparition of new spatial means (especially the *antichambre*) and their cross-cultural and origins. As I demonstrate, these then converge with new organizational schemes (like the *dégagement des heures*) in a systemic conjunction enacting a spatio-temporal framework for drawing distinctions (2.3.2), in which the architecture of *appartements* in their increasing delimitation of access facilitated the emergence of a new kind of royal power (2.3.3).

Bringing all these strands successively together, PART III, on "The Concretizing System of Appartements," examines how this form of organization concretizes into a distinctly organized and highly codified socio-spatial system, in the historical context of the planning of Parisian town houses during the late-sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Picking up the central strands from the previous part, the initial chapter builds a more synthetic perspective on the connected evolution of the serial spatiality of *appartements* and the *corps de logis* of the Parisian town house (3.1). Based on a brief revisiting of the early formation of the *hôtel* up to the early 1600s (3.1.1), and a central discussion of the slow systematization of residential planning techniques, particularly with Le Muet's problematization of the 'art of distribution' in the mid-1620s (3.1.2), this chapter sheds some new light on the evolving spatiality of apartments by exploring the distinct male and female agencies that contributed to a spatial differentiation into a *grand appartement* (centered around the *chambre de parade*) from the 1580s onwards, and which is increasingly coupled with a smaller apartment, in the beginning a doubling-up of the *corps de logis* during the 1630s–60s (3.1.3).

To reconsider this process in a more assemblage-theoretic manner, the second chapter places this crucial disjunction in a wider epistemological, sociological, and technological context of co-evolving systems of distinctions (3.2). After revisiting this quest for a new rationale or logic for planning technique (3.2.1), in light of the distinct relevance of spatial differentiation within the court aristocracy's form of social production through ranking (3.2.2), the final part elaborates how emerging technical rationales for ordering residential space, and more techno*logized* conception of ordering and distribution emerged. It entailed the twofold differentiation and integration of a *grand appartement de parade* and a smaller *appartement de commodité,* which became a central technical objective in the discourses of Perrault and D'Aviler (3.2.3).

The concluding chapter of PART III presents in detail how in more concrete architectural experimentation during the first half of the eighteenth century, these more abstract objectives came to be coupled into a new dispositif of conventional planning (3.3). Starting from a newly-emerging manner of distributing plans in the quest to establish distributions with *convenance* in the newly doubled-up structures of the *hôtel* (3.3.1), this analysis centers on the formation of a more complex serial dispositif. The central section shifts attention to emerging theory-practices of distributing with *convenance*, in discussing J.-F. Blondel's didactic works (3.3.2). This discussion marks out a particular technological lineage of converging social and planning techniques through which apartments started to form a highly differentiated and coded spatial system, composed now of three sorts of *appartements*, arranged according to two differing distinctions, which is to say, in more gridlike manner. The last section works out several conclusions as to how these lineages then compound into a complex organon of control (3.3.3).

The study concludes with an epilogue, appended to PART III, on the specific epiphylogenetic aspect in the convergence of the genealogical strands and technical lineages. Drawing these further together, it synthesizes in what way the system of planning *appartements* was going to be further transposed on a larger scale of urban planning. That technical ensemble, greatly derived from the planning of apartments, would continue to evolve through the now more developing architecture of apartment houses during the 1750–1900s, and the related form of apartment housing going global in the 1900s, but which would be the subject of the future volumes to complete *A Flat Theory*.

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Introduction:
On the Historical Formation of Apartments

The lack of a history of flatted forms of living had repeatedly been voiced from Viollet-le-Duc's *Histoire de L'habitation humaine* (1875) onwards. Scottish architect Sydney Perks was perhaps the first to explicitly articulate that "no history of flats has hitherto been written."[1] His *Residential Flats of all Classes* (1905), a practical treatise on the planning and arrangement of flats in a long tradition of nineteenth-century domestic planning literature, thus begins by challenging common knowledge: "A block of flats is usually considered a modern form of building. The average man has probably heard that there were flats in Scotland … and he knows that there are similar buildings in Paris. He is little aware that there were flats in Ancient Rome … as early as 455 BCE."[2] Perks starts with a brief comparison of Roman proto-apartments, the so-called *Insulae*, and early sixteenth-century tenements in Edinburgh, to draw a parallel to the great civilization of Rome. [5]

Thirty years later, Francis Yorke and Frederick Gibberd repeated Perks's historical excursus in their influential and repeatedly republished *The Modern Flat* (1937), although in a rather different manner. As their introduction expresses, the purpose of their progressive modernist publication was "to arrive at an appreciation and clear understanding of the value of the modern flat as a dwelling unit, and the importance of its place in the social scheme."[3] As the very first sentence announces: "the flat has produced a building type peculiar to its own era; without precedent in the architecture of the past."[4] What strikes us here is the fully antithetical historical argument between these works. The first assumes a relative continuity of apartments as a historical form of living, the other emphasizes a total discontinuity in their unprecedented novelty.

The problem is here not to determine which argument regarding the long-term historical formation of flats or apartment houses is historically correct. Certainly, neither of these works can be considered a scientific historical study that adequately analyses where and how they emerged or evolved. Yet taken together, they present two common notions and opposite diachronic conceptions that perfectly illustrate an antinomy that is quite symptomatic for a wider problematic concerning the conceptualization of

1 Sydney Perks, *Residential Flats of All Classes* (Huddersfield: JM Classic Editions, 2007; orig. pub. 1905), i.
2 Ibid.
3 F[rancis] R.S. Yorke, and Frederick Gibberd, *The Modern Flat*, 2nd edn. (London: The Architectural Press, 1948), 6–7.
4 Ibid., 7.

historical geneses and differences as such. It is this long-lacking **DIFFERENTIAL** and **GENETIC** conception, I want to argue, that has long inhibited the critical studies of the historical development of apartments, and precluded the desire to understand how they came to be what they are, how they actually *came about*. And as such it explains why until quite recently, historians such as Elizabeth Cromley could easily contend that the longer history of apartment living is not only a "story in need of telling," but also one to be told in much more affirmative terms.[5]

A Lacking Working Definition of Apartments

To start telling the story of the historical formation of apartment houses and flatted forms of living, a customary introductory definition of the terms would be in order. Yet, here, we already encounter a conceptual—even epistemological—problem, because there is not a single, specific definition of any such thing that we could agree on, and whose history could be easily traced. In this sense, we can only start from our current, common notions of apartments and flats. Today, and especially in Anglophone discourse, we are generally accustomed to understanding flats, tenements, apartments, apartment houses, flat buildings, or condos in a somewhat synonymous sense. Something I, too, purposefully employed in the first section. That means, as typologically highly ambiguous terms, most of these generic concepts like 'the flat' often denominate both the single unit and the entire building. Thus without any contextual and historical disambiguation, they at best refer to **REIFIED GENERALITIES** that among others like 'the house' or 'modernization' has been a constant source of over-generalization and false problems. Avoiding badly posed problems requires that we initially replace these common notions, inadequate for any historical analysis, with an adequate multiplicity of historical formations in the built environment, each with its own concepts, statements, particular problems, organizational complexes and material-discursive milieus concerning social fabrications that arrange our relations to one another.

To do so, let me start by drawing a few conceptual distinctions, to thereby define a specific object of analysis. Here, we may want to start from the fact that, among those concepts, the term 'apartment' still has the strongest connotation of that organizational element from which the entire building is composed, although this is certainly not always the case in the common use of the terms within different languages (and not even in the English-

5 Elizabeth C. Cromley, *Alone Together: A History of New York's Early Apartments* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1990), 8. Cromley's work is discussed further below.

speaking world), where this difference is not always drawn along the lines of the apartment or house. Moreover, in various historical contexts, the idea of apartment houses and flatted forms of living have also acquired many qualitative differences (especially as loan words) where local convention often determines their differing social or proprietary status. Compared to the notion of flats, the term 'tenement' often implies a substandard or lower-class form of housing. This, however, is not the case in Scotland, where 'tenements' remains the dominant umbrella-term for all multiple-occupancy buildings of any standard. One complex issue here concerns the specific class-attribution that these notions have acquired, and the varying degree in which they are considered 'architecture' or just 'buildings.' But also specific economic connotations, especially in the case of the tenement, with its etymological connection to a particular form of leasing.

By contrast, the English notion of apartments, as transferred also to many former colonized countries, still evokes a certain classy lifestyle. In the Anglophone world, it rather remains linked to a socio-political realm, due to the term's evident etymological relation to the extensive system of linear suites of rooms within the Ancien Régime's *châteaux* or *hôtels* of the powerful and rich. In the residential history of France, the term '*appartement*' thus underwent a relative "banalization"[6] as the notion became applied to the internal organization of Bourgeois interiors in the famous Parisian apartment houses (*immeubles*). Adding to the confusion, in America, the luxurious suites of rooms within early twentieth-century hotels built to accommodate rich European immigrants have come to be known a 'French flats' rather than apartments. In contemporary American English, the notion of the apartment usually implies an often smaller accommodation facilitating a highly metropolitan form of living (predominantly) alone within a residential complex (or condo), albeit distinct from a studio (or one-room apartment).[7] Either of these latter being rather a '*pièce*' in common French, where '*appartement*' has effectively become more of a historical concept (although not fully, of course) that more strongly invokes a lineage back to the older luxurious suites of rooms. These suites—far from being private spaces for single occupants, but devoted to them as gender-segregated, or functionally-differentiated spaces—were highly formal spatial apparatuses for the conduct of state business and reception of visitors. And while also used for the same sort of palatial architecture in Spanish or Italian, there this historicization is perhaps

6 Christian Topalov, *L'aventure des mots de la ville* (Paris: Laffont, 2010).

7 Cf. here also the similar distinction between マンション ('manshon') and アパルト ('aparto') in Japanese.

less pronounced, as the notion of *appartamento* remains widely used for any sort of flat.

Yet, all in all, the concept of apartments places a strong emphasis on this long lineage of a spatial organization that flatted building types came to carry, which is usually overshadowed, or at least differently conceived of by the other concepts. This different conception arises from the fact that in contrast to the more *horizontally segmented* structures of appartements, the Old English 'flat' foregrounds a *vertical stratification* of dwellings. Both these specific distinctions are largely absent from the German notion for the latter — *(Etagen-)wohnung* (meaning "(flat)dwelling"), which expresses more of an 'existential frame' for dwelling (*wohnen*). The *Etagenwohnung* is also conceptually independent from the rental forms of occupancy (*Mietwohnung, Mietshaus*) that typically characterize it, similarly to the French specification of an *immeuble à loyer* (literally "building to rent (out)"). Due to their etymology[8], this is not the case with 'tenements,' which became the ultimate concern of political economy and related reformist intentions prominent in debates during the Housing Question. English discourse on flats is thus multiply bifurcated from especially French studies of appartements, so that contemporary discourse "seems to discuss two different things."[9]

It goes without saying that this has hindered rather than furthered any systematic study across places, classes, and times. This bifurcated and ambiguous use of the terms 'apartments,' 'flats,' or 'tenements' in discourse yields difficulties to discern and then bring together — rather than lump together — particularly oriented and highly charged ideological distinctions. It is thus much more illuminating to initially pay attention to the histor(icit)y of these conceptions and their historiographic operativity within architectural discourse itself. The first way to draw these differenciations and their historical lineages together, lies then in acknowledging that in their connection to heterogeneous discourses, these concepts carry very particular 'archives.' This means acknowledging that all these conceptual bifurcations go far deeper than an ambiguous terminology; they result from specific historical differenciation and discursive sedimentation processes. And all those differ-

8 In a similar fashion, this also happened in Germany, where the discourse on the *Mietwohnungsbau* (literally: "rental dwelling construction") conjoins those two discourses in one larger socio-economic concern. Moreover, the option of renting represented only one side of a complex discourse. In German the *Wohnungsfrage*, is for example far less an economical housing-question, than a question of existential necessity, in which moreover the notion *Wohnung* has no direct typological implication to flatted living.

9 Donald Olsen, *City as a Work of Art: London, Paris, Vienna* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1986), 114.

enciations, flattened out by the common notion of apartment living, eventually also overshadow the complex historical process in which apartments, flats and rental forms of housing have three rather different historical lineages that—rather than being separate things—have eventually converged in the formation of modern apartment housing. And it is these three lineages and their convergence, that *A Flat Theory* hopes to draw together in three successive steps.

This volume will first look into the discursive and spatial formation of the very concept and planning systems of aristocratic appartements as they initially emerge in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries in western and southern Europe. Here we will already find a complex convergence in the particular formational history of the very concept of apartments, the problematique of (com)partitioning technics, and the compartitioned architectures that it took form in. In a second volume, I am planning to attend more to the parallel formation of flatted forms of living that then converged with this compartmented organization into a new residential type: the apartment house. And a third volume would map this convergence further in the globalization of apartment housing after the Second World War alongside the wider processes of global urbanization and metropolitan lifestyles, where the term as well as related residential building types were coming to be propagated.

Forms of Marking and Flattening Difference

A first step before doing so lies in arriving at a more critical understanding of existing operationalizations of the term 'apartment' within recent discourses through which these bifurcations emerged. A crucial part is the precise point of rupture where these lineages diverge. In a much too brief generalization, one could say that, French discourse has traditionally strategized apartments as a trope within a wider effort to stress a longer lineage of modern planning practices— an orchestrated effort at a powerful socio-environmental transformation of the built environment from the organization of residential space that was often equated with the multiple collapses of the Ancien régime and the modernization of Paris during the nineteenth century. In English historiography we find a later break, along with a stronger position of discontinuity, presupposing a fundamental rupture in our forms of living, which was used to frame a different socio-economic field. In its post-traumatic stress disorder to flatted living, it had placed the emergence of apartment housing in a context of pathological economic and demographic pressures in the growing and overcrowded industrial metropolises.

Modernist historiography ascribed a heroic role to architecture against this development, by employing terminological and typological discriminations. Twentieth-century modernist voices like Sigfried Giedion and Lewis Mumford have also long contributed to fostering a false *difference in kind* between flats and tenements when they celebrate modern flats as a remedy to, rather than an advancement of earlier forms of housing in London, New York, Paris, or Berlin.[10] ☒[1–4] This contributed much to a common notion that often connects the emergence of flat housing (but often too reductively) with the emerging project of the welfare state in the first half of the twentieth century. 'Too reductive,' because as Tom Avermaete has critically stressed, architectural planning here gained a new-fangled function (and architects a related cultural role) as the transformative production of the built environment into new forms of urban togetherness became a testbed positioned at a complex intersection between (competing) civilizing social bodies, political ideologies, and building industries.[11] Mid-century, this socio-politico-economic project —combining a *renovatio urbis* and nation-(re)building—would lead to a first internationalization (or "transnationalization"[12]) of these experimental modes of environmental planning and housing practices through colonial and capitalist expansion, along with predominant analytic ideas and images of thought across global cultures.

10 Sigfried Giedion demanded in 1929 that everybody should be freed "from the dark rental barracks, the unhygienic director's house, from the house with its high rents, from the house with its thick walls, from the house that enslaves us by its upkeep, from the house that devours the labor of women." Sigfried Giedion, *Befreites Wohnen* (Frankfurt: Syndikat, 1995; orig. pub. 1929), 3–5 (my trans.). Lewis Mumford continuously used the term 'tenements' in an entirely derogative sense when he portrayed how these "overcrowded," "sordid." and "monstrous" buildings "have come back today" from Roman and Scottish predecessors. As Mumford polemicizes, the only Roman thing returning with tenements, however, is the same greedy behavior of speculation that caused the "metropolitan elephantiasis" and an overgrowth of "pathological cells" that in his opinion lead to the decline of civilization. Here, tenements mean "those ramshackle … speculative enterprises" with no architectural quality, as different from the so-called 'French flats' in New York and their fancy, splendor, grandeur, and size, or the later modernist flats and their light, transparent and technologically equipped structures—both emblems of a novel urban lifestyle. Lewis Mumford, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, It's Prospects* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1961), here 211–23, 236–45, and 292.

11 See e.g. the contributions to Mark Swenarton, Tom Avermaete, and Dirk van den Heuvel, eds., *Architecture and the Welfare State* (London/New York: Routledge, 2015); esp. its part III. Here after Avermaete, "From Knoxville to Bidonville ATBAT and the Architecture of the French Welfare State," in ibid. 219–36. See also idem and Rajesh Heynickx, eds., *Making a New World: Architecture & Communities* (Leuven: Leuven UP, 2012). On this tripartite aspect of the built environment, see also further below.

12 I am borrowing the term from Avermaete's article "Crossing Cultures of Urbanism: The Transnational Planning Ventures of Michel Écochard," *OASE* 95 (2015), 22–23.

If this Western discourse rendered the modern flat as a "new kind of building," its true modernist construct is this reductive story itself. Of course, the problematic of an alleged rupture with tradition presents a well-discussed issue of modernism whose "decisive break with any concern about 'origins'" needs no further emphasis here.[13] But to find this accepted dialectic vision of modernity—quintessential for European and Western culture—at the very heart of the history of urban residential architecture, suggests why apartment buildings don't have their deserved share in the major hagiographies of modern architecture or the modern city.[14] This lacuna is remarkable. Yet, as I will argue, it must be identified initially as some structural mistake in how we look at apartments, concerning the fact that earlier forms of flatted living that surfaced well before the nineteenth century were ingenious, state-of-the-art buildings in prime locations with diverse cross-class inhabitants. Another ignorance concerns the clear etymological relation of apartment houses to earlier papal and royal appartements (understood as a suite of rooms) dating back to the Renaissance, despite their differing architectural arrangements. But as the modern rupture precisely prevents us from drawing any connection to these older forms of living, these suites are not part of our genealogies of modern architecture. Rather than explaining, such a view effectively 'explains away' both the typological emergence of apartment houses as well as the conceptual migration of apartments across classes by way of the very break that it presupposes.

Postmodern Relavitivism

Postmodern studies have partially corrected this highly ideological picture. Caused by the oft-discussed uprooting due to modernity and the increasing 'unhomeliness' of the urban cohabitation, a certain concern gained momentum as the imminent failure of the modern project became visible precisely in

13 This accepted vision of modernity so quintessential to European and Western culture, and its roots in the Enlightenment idea of linear progress is heavily debated, in various aspects. For my own work, I found helpful ideas in the arguments provided in Peter Wagner, *Theorizing Modernity: Understanding the Present* (London: SAGE, 2001), here 81.

14 See here, for example, the prominent studies by Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time, Architecture* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1970; orig. pub. 1941); Henry-Russell Hitchcock, *Architecture: Nineteenth and Twentieth Century* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1958); Nikolaus Pevsner, *An Outline of European Architecture* (Harmondsworth: Penguin: 1963); or Leonardo Benevolo, *History of Modern Architecture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966). Interestingly, the changing substance of the city is also highly neglected in all major compendiums and comprehensive modernist studies on the history of the city. Many histories of urbanism neglect this changing substance alike, in favor to highlight a novel, holistic conception regarding the city.

its attitude toward collective housing.[15] Postmodern scholarship thus regained a sense of historical accountability in looking back onto the causes of the ills of modernity. Some historians more critical of modernism have discussed flatted forms of living in the aim to discredit them as a poor alternative, by tying them back to the poor and promiscuous living conditions that had haunted flats during industrialization. In the 1970s, historians such as Anthony Sutcliffe still categorically condemned them as an "arguably inferior" and "alien[ienating]" form of cohabitation, whose emergence could and should have been prevented.[16]. This discrimination thus converged with the longstanding reformist preference and polemic for individual houses as the basic unit for inhabitation, and it was this that contributed to a certain *homologation* of the difference between earlier and modernist flatted forms of living, under the more general idea of the house.

In fact, reopening the historical continuum concerning forms of cohabitation in times of globalization did not permit a solely chronological, linear approach to progress. Requiring a more comparative perspective on different modes of living, other modernities, and simultaneous developments instead, such a pluralist position allowed (and asked) for erasing certain differences. Some more ethnography-inclined architectural historians then took a more embracing view on the global histories of the built environment, by tracing the continuity of certain architectural types in local variation. They set out to map the relative recurrence of varying 'species' of the same family or class of multi-occupancy buildings, from the *Insulae* in Rome and Ostia, the *barrios* in Teotihuacán, the Fujian *tulou*, the mud-brick towers in Shibam, the multi-story caravanserais in fourteenth-century Cairo, to the various forms of flatted living and tenement building types that emerge in sixteenth to eighteenth-century cities like Barcelona, Berlin, Copenhagen, Edinburgh, Florence, Glasgow, London, Lyon, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Turin, Trieste, Venice, or Vienna.[17] ☒5–8

15 Regarding the failure of mass housing, let me refer to how Jencks described the demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe project in 1977 as representing the death-blow to modern architecture. See Charles Jencks, *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture* (New York: Rizzoli, 1977), 9–10.

16 Anthony Sutcliffe, ed., *Multi-Storey Living: The British Working-Class Experience* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1974), ix–18.

17 For these histories of the built environment, see Spiro Kostof, *History of Architecture: Settings and Rituals* (New York/Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985); and Francis Ching, Mark Jarzombek, and Vikramaditya Prakash, *A Global History of Architecture* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2010). For the more archaeological studies on Roman *Insulae*, see e.g. Bruce W. Frier, *Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome* (New York: Princeton UP, 2014); Gustav Hermansen, "The Medianum and the Roman Apartment," *Phoenix* 24, no. 4 (1970): 342–47; id., *Ostia: Aspects of Roman City Life* (Edmonton: Univ. of Alberta Press, 1982);

1–4 THE MODERN FLAT
***Top*, Berlin tenement block, from around 1900. *Center*, Hilberseimer's scheme for a high-rise city (1924). *Bottom left*, Le Corbusier's proposal (1925) for replacing Paris's dense, medieval inner city fabric. *Bottom right*, Van Tijen's Bergpolder flat (Rotterdam, 1933–34); the first gallery flat built in the Netherlands.**











5–8 FLATTED FORMS OF LIVING
***Top*, Model of a Roman *Insulae* building, Ostia (c. second century CE). *Center left*, Medieval merchants housing, modeled after the Caravanserais along the silk route. Here the Fondaco dei Tedeschi in Venice (reb. 1505–08). *Center right*, Mud-brick towers of Shibam Hadramawt, Jemen (c. sixteenth century). *Bottom right*, High-rise tenement in Edinburgh (c. seventeenth century).**

In depicting many historical parallels between these forms of cohabitation, these comparative studies have not really addressed the evolution and speciations of these forms.[18] Instead, by depicting this global recurrence of flatted living in a historical continuum (as Perks already did), they questionably *naturalize* apartments as a type of cohabitation that could be (and often was) seen as old and coextensive with the cities in which they took form. The resulting *relativism* (so typical of postmodernist works) and its erasure of differences leads to a different, and perhaps more persistent problem. For such relativist approaches entail an extreme form of **OVER-CODING**. In contrast to the modern over-coding of flatted living as a distinctly unprecedented type of living whose prehistory is cut off by an ideological system of marking difference, postmodern discourse equally explains away the history of apartments in a typologically reductive conception of cohabitation that greatly erases all differences between them.[19] Thereby, it effectively *neutralizes any demand to explain the occurrence of these structures*. Had the modernist discontinuous stance, positing the modern flat as a cure to older forms of living, *prevented* historians from looking at the formation history of apartments, the postmodern assumption of a historical continuity fully *preempted* the very need to do so, as the comparison of types effectively erased the subject through indifference.

After the modernist universalist vision, subsuming difference under identity that renders flats as a new and unprecedented form of living, the postmodern alternative is a likewise universalistic, albeit more relativist vision that reduces difference to variety—local variations of what it renders otherwise as a typological constant within changing socio-environmental

James E. Packer, *The Insulae of Imperial Ostia* (Rome: American Academy in Rome, 1971); or Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "Domus and Insulae in Rome: Families and Housefuls," in *Early Christian Families in Context: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue*, eds. David Balch and Carolyn Osiek (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003): 3–18. For studies focusing on Mesoamerican metropolitan dwellings, see e.g. René Millon, "Teotihuacan: City, State, and Civilization," *Supplement to the Handbook of Middle American Indians* 1 (1981): 198–243; or Esther Pasztory, *Teotihuacan: An Experiment in Living* (Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1997). For studies of Scottish tenements, see Brian Edwards, and Paul Jenkins, *Edinburgh: The Making of a Capital City* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2005); and Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland (RCAHMS), *An Inventory of the Ancient and Historical Monuments of the City of Edinburgh* (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1951).

18 E.g. Sherban Cantacuzino's *European Domestic Architecture: Its Development from Early Times* (London: Studio Vista/Dutton, 1969) unfortunately stops precisely where it gets interesting; Ettore Camesasca's *History of the House* (New York: Harper Collins, 1971) practically sweeps over French apartments and early tenement housing only to discredit them; and Norbert Schoenauer's typifying synopsis *6,000 Years of Housing*, 3 vols. (New York: Garland STPM Press, 1981) mentions apartments/tenements but in passing.

19 I take this distinction from feminist philosopher Rosi Braidotti, who offers a different approach to the notion of difference, as discussed below.

conditions. Contending itself with mere typological classification, this way of thinking ends up retroactively applying the moniker 'apartments' onto any urban dwelling structure that evidences similar spatially segmented or stratified forms of co-residence. In such a vision, 'something *like* apartments' can already been found in Egyptian palaces. Any formation process is addresses is thus described in terms of provenance or propagation of certain building types. With no simple historical continuity — say, from Roman *Insulae* to Scottish flat buildings one and a half millennium later[20], or even across continents — we arrive at a factually flawed picture.

From Difference to Differentiation

Concerning this epistemological critique, I take inspiration from the political project of feminist-materialist philosopher Rosi Braidotti in her stance that we need navigational tools (and an ethical compass) to tell the difference *within* different historical formations and their mutations.[21] And in having tried to initially tell apart the various subsumptions of 'difference' that prevent and preempt us from approaching the historical formation of apartments, I am starting from an investment in constructing an alternative vision of difference, based on her call to "make difference operative at last." As she suggests, this is done by embracing an ontologically-operative notion of difference, by understanding it principally as a process[22] producing asymmetries capable of bringing about alternative values.[23] In this process-ontological conception, a differential-materialist approach becomes the antidote not only to post-modern relativism (erasing all differences as diversity), but also to modern universalization (marking difference under identity).[24] This way we can resist

20 There is no real connection linking modern flats with Roman *insulae*. The only lineage — to which volume two will come back — that could be drawn had been identified in the mediating late medieval Florentine town house type (late 1100s–1350s), of which the Palazzo d'Avanzanti represents a surviving example. Alex Boëthius and Walter Paatz identified as a specifically urban or even metropolitan product carrying on the structure of the Roman/Ostian *insula* buildings at least in its facade. See Walter Paatz: "Ein antikischer Stadthaustypus im Mittelalterlichen Italien," *Römisches Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte* 3 (1939), 127–40.

21 Rosi Braidotti, "Posthuman Relational Subjectivity and the Politics of Affirmation," in *Relational Architectural Ecologies: Architecture, Nature, Subjectivity*, ed. Peg Rawes (London/New York: Routledge, 2013), 21–39; here 23.

22 Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory* (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 144; and id., *Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Braidotti* (New York: Columbia UP, 2011), 172.

23 For the notion of "productive a-symmetry," see Braidotti, *Nomadic Theory*, esp. 25–80; here 40–1.

24 The formulation of an "antidote" is borrowed from Braidotti. See e.g. the video-recording of her lecture "Posthuman, All Too Human: Part 2: Aspirations of a Posthumanist," Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Yale University, Mar 2, 2017. Avail. online at https://

the assimilation of difference under hegemonic forms of thought, and problematize too-simple forms of binary difference and its 'legacy' of oppositional otherness (i.e. as "difference from"). Thus we debunk this oppositional logic as a false universalism through which conceptions of non-hegemonic forms are misconstrued from the onset.[25]

If, until here, I may have given the impression that the history of apartments is not represented yet in architectural discourse, my true concern is that their formation remains largely unrepresentable, or unthinkable under hegemonic modes of thinking.[26] It is thus not enough to critique this blind spot, as I tentatively named it at the start, to make it go away; instead, we have to **DIFFRACTIVELY** expose the discourses and mental models that sustain it.[27] Rather, calling for some fundamental category work (Haraway), the task is to elucidate the categories that render them representable adequately, that is, non-negatively.[28] Moreover, because this point turns out to coincide with a wider structural mistake in the perception of socio-environmental transformation processes such as modernization, the true task would be to invent at once a mode of thinking in which the formation of apartments can be accounted for truly on its own terms. The principle aim of such an approach is to rescue apartments from their unproductive position within the dominant systems of representation.

In this regard a non-negative notion of difference becomes doubly operational, for it is that *differentiating* factor that maintains systems of change.[29] First, in the following I will continue to use this differential notion

youtu.be/LNIYOKfRQks; see also below note 126. On the dangerously-reductive notion of difference, see also id., *Metamorphoses* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002) 12–4; and the chapter "Transposing Differences," in id., *Nomadic Theory*, esp. 25–54. On the double problem of overly marking or entirely erasing difference, see ibid., 52 and 17, 172. On the capacity of difference undermining dominant systems of representation, see ibid., 7.

25 In a similar vein, architectural discourse is based on equally hegemonic modes of thought. Here, especially the concept of the 'house'—the *domus*, and its domain of power-relations—may be said to presents a similarly false universalist vision, which, in our case, leads to the homologation of apartments under a domestic, or say 'domo-logo-centric' mode of our architectural language, that fails to account for different (and evolving) economies. In not ever questioning the social construction of what a house is, architectural discourse is characterized by a logocentric view that regards all forms of thought as a fundamental expression of an external reality that is held to exist and given a certain degree of authority and exclude non-linguistic factors, such as historical context from analytic methods. Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*, 146–67: here 147 and 160; id., *Nomadic Theory*, 40–1.

26 Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*, 160 and 230.

27 Ibid., 204. See also Nicholas Gane, "When We Have Never Been Human; What Is to Be Done? Interview with Donna Haraway," *Theory, Culture, Society* 23, no. 7–8 (2006): 135–58, here 137.

28 Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*, 204.

29 Félix Guattari, "Machine and Structure," in *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics*,

to draw a variety of transversal distinctions in order to incrementally define the problem I am trying to pose. I am suggesting that architectural history has still inadequately considered the *differentiating factor* that pertains to, and immanently drove, the historical formation of apartments as a continuous differentiation of the built environment; one that has progressively set us apart by way of complex **BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICES** that historically have both marked out and flattened out specific differences. In order to explain what this inadequacy consists in, and how to more adequately approach it, I will have to navigate us successively through several plateaus and levels of complexity in the remainder of this introduction and study.

Practices of Partitioning

With this structure I hope to draw closer the strands of several studies in the fields of urban history, planning theory, and more socially-inclined history, where—against the above relativizations and generalizations— this characteristic spatial differentiation in the formation of apartments and flatted forms of living started to gain more attention.[30] At least since the 1960s scholars have focused more on the spatial and functional differentiation of the types of residential architectures that contained them:such as palaces, *hôtels*, town houses, and flat buildings.

Yet, while there have been numerous studies on the substantial transformation of cities like Paris, the question how those notorious apartment houses, so characteristic for the city, appear within its transforming substance, long remained "obscure," as Sutcliffe once put it.[31] This obscurity was often attributed to the fact that especially French historians were hampered by two major restrictions: first, especially in Paris, they were considerably impeded by the lack of archival material that would allow them to propose typological reconstructions of the formation of multi-occupancy dwellings into apartment houses based on documented plans. But there was also a wider neglect by contemporaneous theorists, who ascribed —in comparison to the much-discussed grand residences—little theoretical

trans. Rosemary Sheed (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 111–9. And, on this particular point, esp. 116–7. See also my sections 0.2.1.

30 Yet as these studies are marked by often quite distant and dissonant approaches (perhaps still attributable to the larger rift sketched before?), drawing them closer requires a more **DIFFRACTIVE** reading that—based on a critical understanding of the distance that separate these fields and their resulting dissonances—would look for patters of resonance and mutual amplifications in understanding this differentiation process (see the appended glossary).

31 Sutcliffe, *Paris: An Architectural History* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1996), 64.

relevance to these evolving building types.[32] Scholarship had long been restricted to mainly style-historical studies of surviving buildings that have resisted modernization processes in terms of both extension or destruction. Only recently do we have book-length studies by architectural historians who resort to alternative archival sources in trying to reconstruct the typological emergence of apartment blocks as in the French *immeuble à loyer* or the German/Austrian *Mietshaus* (or *Zinshaus*). ☒[1] Among those studies, especially François Loyer's groundbreaking work on the Parisian apartment house, *Paris: Nineteenth Century* (1988), and two yet-to-be-translated studies stand out: Jean-François Cabestan's newer account of the emergence of the Parisian apartment house type (2004), Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm's history of the Berlin town house (2011).[33] To be discussed in more detail in a subse-

32 With this disclaimer Jacques-François Blondel had justified his neglect of the mass of urban residential buildings in his treatise on representative country houses, published at the very moment when urban dwellings should begin their transformation into apartment buildings. Jacques-François Blondel, *De la distribution des maisons de plaisance et de la décoration des édifices en général*, 2 vols (Paris: Jombert, 1737), Vol. I: 133. As historians know, the more impeding factor is, however, the desolate loss of archival material through the incineration of the Hôtel de Ville during the Paris Commune on May 24, 1871. The fire annihilated the central archive of Paris with its invaluable material including the plans and building permits that would have easily illuminated this history.

33 For related articles, see esp. Louis Hautecœur, "Immeubles à loyer,» in *Urbanisme et architecture: Études écrites et publiées en l'honneur de P. Lavedan* (Paris: Laurens, 1954); Sylvia Pressouyre, "Urbanisme et immeubles de rapport, rue de la Ferronnerie (1669)," *Bulletin Monumental* 123, no. 1 (1965): 71–77; Pierre Denis Boudriot, "La maison à loyer: études du bâtiment à paris sous Louis XV," *Histoire, économie et société* (1982): 227–36; Françoise Boudon, "La 'maison à loyer' de la ville haussmannienne," *Révue de l'art* 79 (1988): 63–72; and Jean-François Cabestan, "La naissance de l'immeuble d'appartements à Paris sous le règne de Louis XV," in *Paris: Capitale des arts sous Louis XV*, ed. Daniel Rabreau (Bordeaux: William Blake and co / Arts and Arts, 1997): 167–95. See esp. the recent book-length study by French historian Jean-François Cabestan, *La conquête du plain-pied: l'immeuble à Paris au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Picard, 2004) reconstructs and presents the early formation of *immeubles* as a typological convergence, by use of uncommon archival material documenting a real estate fever after the Seven Years War. Cabestan's study offers a critical revision, as it explores a time-frame entirely before the by-now canonical study of the Parisian apartment house type by the French art and architecture historian François Loyer, *Paris Nineteenth Century: Architecture and Urbanism* (New York: Abbeville Press, 1988), originally published in French in 1987. Loyer's study was conducted between 1974 and 1982 for the Parisian Atelier d'Urbanisme (APUR) to offer a comprehensive basis for the future evaluation of the cultural heritage value of the Parisian domestic cityscape and facilitate regarding decision-making, an initial report of which was published first as *Paris XIXe siècle: L'immeuble et l'espace urbain* (Paris: Atelier Parisien d'urbanisme, 1982). Criticizing the relative neglect of apartment houses in comparison to *hôtels* and mansions in Parisian urban history, Loyer studied their formation not simply as a typological transformation but reciprocally connected it to the changing cityscape in which they take form, in also outlining the changing demographics, the changing building regulations, and changing role and status of the bourgeoisie. Symptomatically, however, the study draws no closer connection to the multistory residences before the revolution, justified with the modernist argument that these "were shared houses rather than true apartments buildings" (Loyer, *Paris Nineteenth Century*, 48). Analogously, regarding German apartment houses, the recent

quent volume on the genealogy of apartment houses, especially the latter two studies have informed my wider approach, as they both reconsider the type-formation or typological evolution of apartment houses not as a simple spatial differentiation; rather, as they show, this differentiation is the result of a complex confluence and mutual co-evolution of different building types coming to be adapted to (and integrated with) one another, within the transforming and modernizing material cultures and technics of urban environments and social milieus.

Certainly, between the sixteenth and late nineteenth century, urban modes of living underwent radical changes. Many European cities saw a steady increase in urban population, passing a critical threshold. A greater re-organization of the space of possibility for living together proved necessary, along with wider technological changes in production, art, politics, law and economy. In focusing on different building types, urban scales, or geographic regions in these systemic changes, historians have provided many accounts in social or urban histories and histories of urbanism[34], tracing these transformations through changing local, socio-economic conditions and transforming lifestyles in more documentary approaches, illustrated with built specimens that represent these changing conditions, or are identified as the site of these changing conditions. Thereby they describe the social developments through transforming building types from aristocratic residences, to bourgeois houses, into increasingly flatted forms of urban living in the mod-

study by Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm, *Das Berliner Stadthaus: Geschichte und Typologie 1200 bis 2010* (Berlin: Dom, 2011) adds much to the above-mentioned three-volume documentary history of Berlin apartment houses, provided by Johann Friedrich Geist and Klaus Küvers's *Das Berliner Mietshaus*, 3 vols. (München: Prestel, 1980, 1984, and 1989).

34 Aside from the before-mentioned studies, see for Berlin, Werner Hegemann, *Das Steinerne Berlin: Geschichte Der Größten Mietskasernenstadt der Welt* (Berlin: Ullstein/Bauwelt, 1963; orig. pub. 1930). For Paris, see also the art-historical studies by Louis Bergeron, *Genèse d'un paysage* (Paris: Picard, 1989); André Chastel and Jean Guillaume, eds., *La maison de ville à la Renaissance: Recherches sur l'habitat urbain en Europe aux XVe et XVIe siècles*. Actes du colloque tenu à Tours du 10 au 14 mai 1977 (Paris: Picard, 1983); and the more urban-scale studies by Georges Duby, ed., *Histoire de la France urbaine*, 5 vols. (Paris: Seuil, 1981); Jean-Louis Harouel, *Histoire de l'urbanisme* (Paris: PUF, 1981), and id., *L'embellissement des villes: l'urbanisme français au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Picard, 1993); Pierre Lavedan, *Histoire de l'urbanisme*. 3 vols. (Paris: Éditions Laurens, Paris), and id., *Histoire de Paris* (Paris: PUF, 1960); for the modernization of Paris, see David H. Pinkney, *Napoleon III and the Rebuilding of Paris* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1958); Howard Saalman, *Haussmann: Paris Transformed* (New York: George Braziller, 1971). For Venice, see Jacques Bottin and Donatella Calabi, eds., *Les étrangers dans la ville: minorités et espace urbain du bas Moyen âge à l'époque moderne* (Paris: Les Editions de la MSH, 1999); Donatella Calabi and Paola Lanaro, eds., *La città italiana e i luoghi degli stranieri: XIV–XVIII secolo* (Rome: Laterza, 1998). For Vienna, see Elisabeth Lichtenberger, *Die Wiener Altstadt: Von der mittelalterlichen Bürgerstadt zur City* (Vienna: Deuticke, 1977); and John Philip Spielman, *The City and the Crown: Vienna and the Imperial Court, 1600–1740* (West Lafayette: Purdue UP, 1993).

ernization of cities. Here social historians like Mark Girouard and Donald Olsen merit full credit for having—at least implicitly—approached apartments through an immanently conceptual criterion, as they investigate the emergence of modern forms of living through the longstanding practice of subdividing houses.[35]

More than a mere result of demographic or economic pressure, this subdivision occurs along the long dissolution of medieval socio-economic structures of the so-called whole house ☒16–17. This dissolution, which already takes form during the late Middle Ages, involves a more complex process of changing lifestyles, conceptions of individuality, the family, and privacy within the physical structure of the medieval house, where all-purpose rooms had prevailed in dwellings of all classes, with no arrangement that could provide privacy or individuality as we understand it.[36] Social history has a long tradition of treating "the history of the dwelling from the Middle Ages onward as one of gradually enhanced provisions for personal comfort and privacy."[37] This history of dwelling here takes form in a history of private life foregrounding an emerging need for encapsulation, which necessitated new forms of spatial organization.[38] Rather than rendering any lineage, these socio-historical works portray the repeated occurrence of apartment-like forms of living, from subdivided or sublet houses in Venice to the purpose-built structures such as the Procuratie Vecchie (twelfth century, rebuilt in the sixteenth century), the Fondaco dei Tedesci (1508), or Serlio's project for purpose-built flats for merchants in Lyons (1540s). ☒6, 9–10

35 Mark Girouard, *Cities and People: A Social and Architectural History* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1985); and Olsen's afore-mentioned *The City as a Work of Art*. In looking at the longer formation of tenement buildings from this 'subdivision'-based perspective, Girouard notes that already "Medieval houses could be divided horizontally as well as vertically, to form tenements; such subdivision to make different residential units was distinct from the very common letting off of floors or cellars. … Tenements probably occurred fairly early in the Middle Ages, as a result of pressures on the central areas of successful towns, and the subdivision of properties between the heirs. One would expect the earliest tenements to result from subdivisions of houses originally built for single ownership. In Venice houses were being built by the fifteenth century, and possibly earlier, with a view to being subdivided floor by floor. … From the fifteenth century, if not earlier, houses of this plan were often divided floor by floor between brothers or relatives. Inevitably, families started to let out floors to outsiders and then, as they acquired more than one house, to let out whole houses floor by floor" (Girouard, *Cities and People*, 71 and 112).

36 Olsen, *The City as a Work of Art*, 101.

37 Ibid.

38 For these works, see the translated multi-volume compendiums by Philippe Ariès and Georges Duby, eds., *A History of Private Life*, 5 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1987); or the multi-authored German compendium published by the Wüstenrot-Stiftung, *Geschichte des Wohnens*, 5 vols. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1996–1999); and Lutz Niethammer, ed., *Wohnen im Wandel: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Alltags in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer, 1979).

Physically constrained or walled cities repeatedly fostered the formation of flattened living through the progressive rearrangement of earlier building types related to population growth. In this respect, it is rather self-evident that this subdivision is tied to the progressive reorganization of an increasingly dense urban habitat. Yet, as Olsen confesses, when or how exactly this distinction emerged still remains unclear.[39]

Studying the Differentiation of Living

This persistent obscurity may stem from a wider problem concerning the manner in which these spatial differentiation processes are generally looked at (and conceived) as a mere result of some sort of underlying socio-environmental transformation processes. This is no simple methodological issue, as similar impasses in explaining the historical process through which apartments come to appear within apartment houses in the long run, arise in different approaches, even where praxeological and typological approaches come to be combined. Here I am thinking especially of the two successive studies by sociologist Monique Eleb and architect Anne Debarre: *Architectures de vie privée* (1989) and *L'invention de l'habitation moderne* (1995). The first study portrays the formation of apartments alongside the ongoing innovation of post-medieval aristocratic and bourgeois architecture of palaces and *hôtels*, and the transforming internal organization of these traditionally semi-public buildings with the arising notion of privacy.[40] 16–17

As such these works are inscribed into the longer historiographical trajectory of a 'history of mentalities' that characterizes approaches to history of private life and evolving residential practices and planning. The second volume pictures the further internal modernization of apartment buildings (with plumbing, electricity, etc.) that happens along with their morphological reconfiguration from block to slab.[41] This later modernization of apartment buildings is well-studied. Yet, the fundamental transformation of residential structures *into* apartment blocks itself remains unstudied, or unexplained, explained away precisely by the typological division of Eleb and Debarre's two

39 Olsen, *The City as a Work of Art*, 101 (emphasis added). If partially by conjecture, the studies by Girouard and Olsen do outline several diachronic connections within the trans-European residential history of apartments. But the largely synoptic approach to, and focus on cities and urban living that characterizes both studies, resulting in more thematic organization frustrates an explicit engagement with these differentiation practices.

40 Monique Eleb-Vidal and Anne Debarre-Blanchard, *Architectures de la vie privée: maisons et mentalités: XVIIe–XIXe siècles* (Brussels: Archives d'architecture moderne, 1989).

41 Eleb and Debarre, *L'invention de l'habitation moderne: Paris 1880–1914* (Paris: Hazan, 1995). Regarding the latter, I allude to the French subtitle of Jean Castex, Philippe Panerai, and Jean-Charles Depaule, *Urban Forms: The Death and Life of the Urban Block* (London: Routledge, 2004).





9–10 ALLOGIAMENTI: ***Top*****, the Procuratie Vecchie containing the Procurators' lodgings, with their serialized facades at the St. Mark's square in Venice (reb. 1540s);** ***Bottom*****, an example of a building with merchants lodgings and shops in Lyon, from Serlio's** ***Settimo Libro.***



11 ***Top and bottom*: The Palais Bourbon (1727), Paris, with its differentiated spatial system of appartements, used for different kind of receptions, depending on their degree of (in)formality and grandeur; a scalar spatial differentiation that is clearly visible in the plan (from Blondel's *Architecture Françoise*, I: 267).**

volumes, between the residential types of apartments in *hôtels* and then in *immeubles*. Here, somewhat connected to the modernist fallacy of novelty in kind, the typological division entails a certain blind spot. Because, what falls in the gap is the question how apartments then 'migrate,' so to say, from one building type, and thus one social class, to another.[42] While Eleb and Debarre's studies have greatly contributed to our conception of evolving urban forms of living on the basis of changing socio-environmental conditions, technologies, and practices, concerning either typology, they may thus also be symptomatic of a recurrent problem and analytical dead-end in conceptualizing the emergence of this differentiation of living merely from a typological angle, as it does not offer a causal explanation *as to how* this socio-spatial distinction historically actually came about.

From Spatial Differentiation to Differentiating Spatialities

To answer this question, studying spatial differentiation as such does not hold the key. Architects usually conceive of form-taking processes and causation from a more materialistic angle, and thus quite different from how historians more widely understand them. Without too much generalization one can say that the latter, especially those interested in the social history of residential space, have sided with a conception that was perhaps most clearly articulated in the French Marxist philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre's idea that configuration and composition of (social) space is a product of (social) practices. This may come as no surprise, given the extent to which his writings greatly helped stimulate the study of spaces of everyday life since the 1970s and 80s [→ 0.1]. What may be more surprising (and as such I will be zeroing in on this point in much more detail in the theoretical preliminaries, Book O following this introduction) is that this notion implies a complex conceptual limitation, as a result of which related **PRAXEOLOGICAL** studies have too often limited themselves to describing changing social processes that take place in space or inside changing built structures. This

42 Since my first two volumes would be divided between *appartements* and apartment houses, I should like to note my awareness of a danger of repeating the same mistake that I am criticizing here. But *A Flat Theory's* more topological approach to spatial transformation processes, understanding — as explained below — apartments and apartment houses in terms of different levels of organizational complexity, allows approaching the further formation of apartments without the need of explaining their 'migration' between *a priori* separated and static forms, types of buildings. Rather, as I will argue, it concerns a technological *transposition* of a specific form of architectural differentiation that is becoming integrated into a wider **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLE** of modern planning.

doesn't sound particularly problematic. But it entails a particular container conception of space, dividing (built) structure from (human) agency. This view relegates physical environments to being a passive, non-causal background or 'setting' for social practices and human agency. This has far-reaching theoretical consequences on the way 'change' and thus historical processes are approached rather reductively by evacuating any possible historical agency of environmental factors *avant la lettre*. This then this precludes a sufficiently-complex approach as to how temporal dynamics are taking (not 'place in' but) *form in* specific environmental transformation processes.

A number of post-structuralist theorists have been invested in a concerted effort at critiquing such reductive accounts for fundamentally mistaking social structures for an explanation, by failing to recognize that these structures themselves (including social patterns, practices, or even mentalities) need explaining.[43] [→ 0.1–3] In this view, it is inversely differences and differentiations in spatial or environmental production that underlie (and therein drive) social production! Thus calling for approaches that systematically reconnect structure and agency, a great deal of post-structuralist and contemporary **NEO-MATERIALIST** theory is—especially in the social sciences but also in a wider transdisciplinary field of scholarship in the humanities—invested in challenging modes of thought which assume that physical environments are symbolic-representative structures or organizations expressing human relationship, rather than generating them in the first place.

Analyzing a Device for Drawing Distinctions

One central figure in this slow shift to acknowledging the causal agency of material structurations was German sociologist Norbert Elias (1897–1990), whose early work established a 'figurational' (or process) sociology. In contrast to other structuralist sociologists, he aimed at studying social change through the changing figurations of relations between human beings (such as they appear in architectural plans). Interestingly enough, the figurations-sociological analysis of Western court society centered on the architecture of appartements, which was reconsidered as a socio-spatial valence system, coded according to highly particular cultural techniques of spatializing differences.[44]

43 Bruno Latour, *Re-Assembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), 130–1.

44 Norbert Elias, *The Court Society*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon, 1983; orig. pub. 1967). This reading is of course characterized by a still structuralist approach so social (con)figurations. I will problematize this point below and throughout Book O and Part III.

The brief but groundbreaking socio-spatial analysis of the architecture of appartements in Elias's *Court Society* (1967) has, in turn, become a canonical reference in most historical studies that would advance his general observation in tracing back the formtaking architecture based on its *sociogenetic* function for the figuration of the court aristocracy. As such these scholars approached the formation of appartements in terms of a highly coded arrangement, whose internal socio-spatial differentiation had long served as a court ceremonial framework for the paying of calls and reception of visitors. Aside from some more or less comprehensive reconstructions of the typological lineages of courtly or palatial architecture and residential systems in thematic books or anthologies, and separate studies of changing court ceremonial as such[45], scholarship has thus begun to analyze this spatial system as a highly complex apparatus for **DRAWING DISTINCTIONS.** ☒[11]

As scholars including Hugh Baillie, Patricia Waddy, and Richard Etlin have successively emphasized (although usually in shorter essays), this differentiated spatial system allowed more differentiated forms of reception according to the visitor's social *rank*, or depending on the required formality.[46] Organized in highly differentiated socio-spatial systems of discrimination and protocoled forms of indexing access to power, this quite spatial framework —which had developed since the fourteenth century in the papal, episcopal, and then royal castles and palaces in the kingdoms of Majorca, Aragon,

45 See the introduction of my Part II for a detailed discussion of these works, including esp. the studies by Stanislaus von Moos's, *Turm und Bollwerk* (Zurich: Atlantis, 1974); Wolfram Prinz and Ronald G. Kecks, *Das Französische Schloß der Renaissance: Form und Bedeutung der Architektur; ihre geschichtlichen und gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen* (Berlin: Mann, 1985); Anthony Blunt and Richard Beresford, *Art and Architecture in France, 1500–1700* (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1999); Gottfried Kerscher, *Architektur als Repräsentation: Spätmittelalterliche Palastbaukunst zwischen Pracht und Zeremoniellen Voraussetzungen* (Tübingen: Wismut, 2000); Monique Chatenet, *La cour de France au XVIe siècle: Vie sociale et architecture* (Paris: Picard, 2002). See esp. Jean Guillaume, ed., *Architecture et la vie sociale: L'organisation intérieure des grandes demeures à la fin du moyen âge et à la renaissance*. Actes du colloque tenu à Tours du 6 au 10 juin 1988 (Paris: Picard, 1994); and Monique Chatenet and Krista de Jonge, eds., *Le prince, la princesse et leurs logis: Manières d'habiter dans l'élite aristocratique européenne (1400–1700).* Actes des septième rencontres d'architecture européenne (Paris: Picard, 2014). For literature on court ceremony, which my work will strongly de-emphasize, see my Part II.

46 Hugh Murray Baillie, "Etiquette and the Planning of the State Apartments in Baroque palaces," *Archaeologia Miscellaneous Tracts Relating to Antiquity* CI (1967), 169–99. See also Patricia Waddy, "The Roman Apartment from the Sixteenth to the Seventeenth Century," in *Architecture et vie sociale*, ed. Guillaume, 155–66; and its expanded version, the first chapter "The Apartment" in her *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces: Use and the Art of the Plan* (New York/Cambridge: Architectural History Foundation/MIT Press, 1990); and Richard Etlin, "'Les Dedans': Jacques-François Blondel and the System of the Home, c. 1740," *Gazette des Beaux-Arts* 91 (Apr 1978), 137–47, later developed as the chapter "The System of the Home" in his *Symbolic Space: French Enlightenment Architecture and its Legacy* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996), 127–34.

Naples, Burgundy, France, and England, the Vatican, and the Italian city states like Florence and Milan[47]—gained an increasing political importance, especially in court aristocratic forms of representation in the rise of absolutist monarchy in France. As a particular equipment of power, this differentiated form of organization also successively came to be transposed into the organization of a wider array of residential building types like palazzi, villas, or *hôtels*; and as we shall see, on a greater scale of modern planning practices.

Constituting the main focus of Part II and III of my study, this history has naturally received much scholarly attention. But strangely enough, only over the last decade has this system become reconceptualized through a more Foucauldian angle as a form-taking 'dispositif of power.'[48] For my own genealogy's attempt to make a larger step in this direction, Von Moos's and Kerscher's more synthetic formational histories of castles and papal palaces, Waddy's work on Roman palaces, and Prinz and Kecks's survey of French Renaissance châteaux[49] provided a general basis for my analysis (especially for the second part focusing on "The Form-Taking Architecture of Appartements" [→ Part II]), but it was especially Monique Chatenet's comprehensive monography and the multifaceted essays in her co-edited works[50] that have proven of central importance by providing a multi-layered analysis of a range of French royal palaces. My own genealogy will extend these analyses into a larger historical framework concerning some underlying cross-cultural connections in the formation of this apparatus for drawing distinctions, and I will theorize them from a more radical (Post-)Foucauldian angle in the last section of this introduction.

This radicalization, I argue, facilitates an understanding of the complexities concerning the successive transposition and concretization of this apparatus into a wider residential system (which I will start to investigate in the second part [→ 2.2], and further with a closer focus on the concretizing

47 See esp. the aforementioned works of Von Moos and Kerscher, and the many studies in the works cited and further discussed throughout my Part II.

48 See e.g. Marie-Françoise Auzépy and Joël Cornette, eds., *Palais et Pouvoir: De Constantinople à Versailles* (Saint-Denis: PU de Vincennes, 2003); Christy Anderson, "Architecture of Ascendancy: Buildings and Power," in *Renaissance Architecture* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013); Ronald G. Asch, "The Princely Court and Political Space in Early Modern Europe," in *Political Space in Pre-Industrial Europe*, ed. Beat Kümin (London/New York: Routledge, 2016); Silvia Beltramo, Flavia Cantatore, and Marco Folin, eds., *A Renaissance Architecture of Power: Princely Palaces in the Italian Quattrocento* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016); and Dries Raeymakers and Sebastiaan Derks, eds., *A Key to Power? The Culture of Access in Princely Courts, 1400–1750* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016). For a critical discussion of these more recent works, see also the introduction my Part II.

49 See above, note 45–46.

50 See above, note 45.

system of appartements within the Parisian *hôtel* [→ **Part III**]). Concerning this process, Michael Dennis's book *Court and Garden* (1986), in its singular attempt at a wider, synthetic study, may still present the most accessible account of the evolution of the French *hôtel* type, its basic disposition, and internal organization from the Renaissance to the Neo-classical period.[51] While, naturally, this work has, since its publication become partly outdated due to newer findings, the latter only exist in a fragmentary state of discourse scattered across often untranslated (and often quite specialized) discussions in more recent monographic books and essays on individual buildings or architects that range greatly in scope (depth and width), as much as they also diverge in aims and underlying theoretical notions that are too complex to be adequately discussed in this introduction.[52] In my ambition of drawing all these works together, my study has taken much critical inspiration from the innovating work and methodological stance of Sabine Frommel and Sara Galletti, who have further emphasized cross-cultural influences and female agency as crucial yet long-ignored factors in this wider transformation of forms and ways of living that cannot be analyzed in too isolated a manner.

51 Michael Dennis, *Court and Garden: From the French Hôtel to the City of Modern Architecture* (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 1986).

52 Part III will provide a deeper discussion of the various extensions in historical scholarship that I attempt to bring together by way of taking further the powerful reconsiderations on the Italian influences (also discussed in my Parts I and II), such as valuably elaborated in Sabine Frommel's "Gli Hotels particuliers a Parigi dal XV," *Bollettino d'arte, volume speciale* (2016), 392–418; and the emphatic defense of the long-neglected agency of female court members, in esp. Sara Galetti's "Female Agency and Early Modern Urbanism: The Paris of Maria de' Medici," *JSAH* 71, no. 2 (Jun 2012), 186–203, in terms of cultural techniques. Aside from Eleb and Debarre's (and other scholar's) psycho-social emphasis of the new forms and conception of privacy, intimacy, or individuality, and the wider transformation of sociability in the court-aristocratic sphere throughout the 1600–1800s, as outlined more recently in Antoine Lilti's *Le monde des salons: Sociabilité et mondanité à Paris au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 2005). As Part II will elaborate, those more sociological approaches are slowly becoming connected to more Foucauldian approaches to an 'architecture of power,' more strongly used in the study of royal palaces. Yet, they still remain quite disconnected from the further attempts at more stylistic and typological syntheses, as e.g. represented by Alexandre Gady, *Les hôtels particuliers de Paris du moyen âge à la belle époque* (Paris: Parigramme, 2011; orig pub. 2008); or renewed methodologies for reconstructing the internal distribution, as in Nicolas Courtin's *L'art d'habiter à Paris au XVIIe siècle: L'ameublement des hôtels particuliers* (Paris: Faton, 2011). The detailed focus on changing material construction techniques and legal aspects, in Youri Carbonnier's, "Le bâti et l'habitat dans le centre de paris à la fin de l'ancien régime," PhD diss., Univ. Paris 4 (2001); and id., *Maisons parisiennes des Lumières* (Paris: Presses Paris Sorbonne, 2006), proved not so relevant for this investigation.

The latter is then precisely the weak spot of Dennis's work, wherein notable gaps can be found from the particular point of view of a truly evolutive history, and even more specifically from the more technological perspective of an evolving residential planning system. These gaps concern not only the earlier formation, which David Thomson's complementary study dwelled on much more[53], and a deeper understanding of the underlying socio-political transformation that Jean Babelon noted concerning sixteenth-century architecture[54], but also the complex connection of planning practices to social practices pointed out in Eleb and Debarre's work; they all arise from Dennis's isolated approach to tracing the evolution into distinct successive morphological types. Historiographically speaking, this type-formation classification cannot itself be taken for an explanation of the transformations taking place. The work approaches the form-taking architecture of the *hôtel*, and the concretization of a complex residential system therein, not always in their close coupling to changing social logics and cultural technics, mentalities and inhabitation practices, but also those evolving conceptions and practices that were unfolding in the so-called **DISCOURSE ON THE ART OF DISTRIBUTION** from 1620s to the late eighteenth century, as well as a new conception of urban planning slowly taking place.

While French historians had long focused on the latter in leading to the urban renovation of Paris in the mid-nineteenth century[55], Bettina Köhler initially problematized the architecture of the Parisian town house in its connection to the former discourse on appropriate residential planning throughout the architectural treatises by Le Muet (*Manière de bien bastir*, 1647), D'Aviler (*Cours d'architecture*, 1691), Jombert (*L'architecture Moderne*, 1727) and Blondel (*De la distribution des maisons de plaisance*, 1737–8).[56] In this discourse, the spatiality of the appartements and the rooms comprised therein, not only came to be increasingly codified; it was also differentiated functionally into a more complex spatial system.

53 See David Thomson, *Renaissance Paris: Architecture and Growth 1475–1600* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1984).

54 Jean Babelon, *Demeures parisiennes sous Henri IV et Louis XIII* (Paris: Hazan, 1991).

55 I am referring to the works of Bergeron, Harouel, and Lavedan, already referenced in my note 33, above.

56 Bettina Maria Köhler, *Die Stadt Paris und das Wohnhaus: zum 'Bâtiment Particulier' in der französischen Architekturtheorie von 1600–1750* (Alfter: Verlag und Datenbank für Geisteswissenschaften, 1994). See also the more sociological work by Anne Röver-Kann, *Bienséance: zur ästhetischen Situation im Ancien Régime, dargestellt an Beispielen der Pariser Privatarchitektur* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1977).

By the 1750s, it constituted a tripartite system ☒[12], composed of a so-called *appartement de parade* (a suite of rooms used for formal receptions or state business, also called 'grand' or 'state apartment'), an *appartement de société* (an intermediary suite of rooms for less formal gatherings), and an *appartement de commodité* (a suite of smaller rooms used for everyday inhabitation, colder weather, and/or recreative activities, also known as *appartement privé*). Older studies like those of Middleton or Evans already emphasized how with this concretizing system, the apartment's initially linear organization of a single suite of rooms *en enfilade* changes into a more network-like spatial organization, accompanied by an emerging system of corridors, whose history has proven a complementary 'infrastructural' lens for analyzing this transformation.[57] Leading to a systematic restructuring of the internal circulation of aristocratic residences, the distribution of apartments, that is, their comfortable and appropriate planning, thereby became the main concern of the newly-emerging academically trained architect.

Dennis conceded that it is easy to regard this spatial system generally as a "symbol of a previous social order" and bygone era of the Ancien régime, and so to disregard its precursory function for modern forms of planning.[58] Because, as Etlin already underscored, in establishing specific social and cultural hierarchies, the form of spatial organization also constituted a particular power structure that became progressively extended to an urban scale. In this regard, distribution is a precursor to modern urban planning practices. Here, thanks to the tendency of different historical fields to focus on either the (supposedly distinct) residential or urban scale, scholarship has yet to close the gap concerning this systemic scale jump, which is itself a crucial phase change within socio-spatial and politico-governmental modernization processes. In trying to do this toward the end of this study, I want to suggest that the ability to make this connection may then lie in attending more closely to changing systems of organization and their increasing closure around technologies of control.

Recently, the question of the changing linear to network-like organizations received a renewed impulse through Julian Jachmann's habilitation. In

57 See Robin Middleton, "Enfilade: The Spatial Sequence of French Hotels of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *Daidalos* 42 (Dec 1991): 84–95; Robin, Evans, "Figures, Doors, Passages," in *Translations from Drawing to Building and Other Essays* (London: Architectural Association, 1997), 55–91. For more recent works, see also Vincent Droguet, "Le couloir central dans la distribution: son apparition et son developpement au XVIIIe siècle,» *Bulletin Monumental* 160, no. 4 (2002): 379–89, and Stephan Trüby's full book, *Geschichte des Korridors* (Paderborn: Fink, 2018).

58 Michael Dennis, *Court and Garden: From the French Hôtel to the City of Modern Architecture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 3–4.

it, he analyses, through the Deleuzian concept of difference and repetition, the specific SERIAL organization that characterizes the planning treatise from Serlio to Ledoux, and their increasingly complex forms of ordering.[59] As he draws several interesting connections between the serial format of these treatises and the serial form of organization typical of the spatiality of appartements, the following will take much inspiration in discussing and extending Jachmann's work. It will do so by further drawing together existing typological studies, not only with more sociologically-inflected approaches, but also connect both closer to the history of (technological) thought concerning evolving planning conceptions and techniques, in a genetic approach that will foreground the co-constitutive relationships between these three strands.

A Three-Stranded Approach

With this three-stranded approach, I am hoping to mitigate a recurrent, larger problem that I see in the longstanding predominance of these socially-inclined historical studies of residential space. For in having greatly advanced Elias's sociological focus through historical scholarship, what has not been taken up and advanced to an equal extent, is the base hypothesis and core provocation of Elias's sociogenetic approach to socio-spatial figurations as interdependent and co-constitutive. Indeed, in taking a first step toward a 'non-reductionist,'[60] hence 'non-representational' understanding of architectural form, Elias's work failed to fully overcome an 'expressive' approach to architectural form. It was the lacking critical engagement with Elias's theoretical basis that allowed this vestigial expressive reading, which permeates especially his own discussion of apartments, to be coupled with (and overcoded by) the Lefebvrian notion of the social production of space. With this coupling, the explicit container-conception falsely conflated the representative spatial framework of apartments with so-called representationalistic approaches of structuralist readings that saw architectural form as 'expressing' or 'mirroring' social structures or cultures. This conflation eventually

59 Julian Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux: 'Differenz und Wiederholung' in seriellen Publikationen zur französischen Wohn- und Residenzarchitektur*, 2 vols. (Cologne: Abteilung Architekturgeschichte des Kunsthistorisches Institut der Univ. Köln, 2016)

60 This also issue concerns his earlier critique of social categories and their prevalent conceptualization through process-reduction, "by which he means the pervasive tendency to reduce [continuous] processes to states." Elias locates this conceptual flaw in specialized and everyday (European) language that naturally distinguishes actors from actions: "We say, 'The wind is blowing,' as if the wind were separate from its blowing." Elias, *What is Sociology?,* trans. Grace Morrissey, et all. (Dublin: Univ. College Dublin Press, 2012), 112. See here the introduction to id., *On Civilization, Power, and Knowledge: Selected Writings*, trans. Stephen Mennell and Johan Goudsblom (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999), 37–8, and 45 n.88.



12 Project for an exemplary hôtel by J.–F. Blondel, included in the Plates of Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* (1762). It features the tripartite system of appartements: the juxtaposed receptions rooms of the *appartement de société* (*left*) and *appartement de parade* (*right*) in the main wing; two smaller *appartements de commodités* for the inhabitants in the lateral wings, and an *appartement de bains*.

generalized their highly exclusive conception of aristocratic architecture onto all sorts of architecture, instead of historicizing it in its peculiarity.

Thus re-amplified rather than de-emphasized, this expressive reading has conceptually slipped into many historical studies, yet in a manner exactly inverse to the sociogenetic reciprocity that Elias was suggesting between spatial production and social production. For in blinding out on a basic level that architectural arrangements are always agents within socio-environmental organization processes—to the extent that they both reproduce existing social orders while also producing marginal differences that allow for new ones to emerge—this reading often fails to theoretically account for the complex ways in which spatial territories and social codes mutually constitute one another.



13 Prisoner, kneeling in his cell, Frontispiece from N. Harou-Romain's *Projet de Pénitencier* (1840)

14 Gustave Caillebotte, "A Young Man on his Balcony" (1880).

Concerning this reciprocity, a much more radical reading of socio-spatial historical formations had been advanced through the post-structuralist works of Michel Foucault that I will be discussing hereafter. His renewed materialist approach problematized historical processes as no longer simply 'taking place' inside buildings. Rather, it foregrounded those processes as taking form through built arrangements. Inspired by these studies and some of their subsequent modifications, such a reading would no longer try to explain the 'distinction' involved in the wider historical formation of apartments. As I have just attempted in this introduction, it would start from problematizing, and thereby charting, how (and in what MILIEUS), specific differentiations have attained certain functions with regard to ongoing subjectivation and individuation processes. As I want to argue, based on my own combinatory reading of these post-structuralist theories of geneses and their neo-materialist extensions [→ 0.1–3], such historical formations must always be approached at the intersection of three mutually-transforming

systems of organization: environmental, social, and psychological relations. Each facilitated by their own constitutive technics and technologies, these systems co-evolve on a machinic level. And it is this more **ABSTRACT MACHINIC** interaction that may hold an explanation of the changing **CONCRETE ASSEMBLAGES.** ☒[22]

(Post-)Foucauldian Approaches to Cellular Architectures

Foucault's work is well-known for his multifaceted discourse analyses of the formation of modern systems of knowledge and power, and the related institutions and their emerging architectures—such as the seventeenth-century asylum, the eighteenth-century clinic and the nineteenth-century prison—with their characteristic "spaces of enclosure."[61] As I will discuss in the subsequent part,[62] in this study trajectory Foucault would progressively rid himself of the predominant representationalistic readings of earlier historical materialism and his structuralist contemporaries, an in parallel, identify that structures, including architectures, are themselves productive patterns of change that form the material conditions of possibility within historical geneses. With this 'productive' reading, Foucault completely reframed our understanding of modern space and architecture and its relation to subjectivation processes, in arguing that built forms are not simply the cause or effect of modernization, but its actual substance. Accordingly, modern societies have 'produced' the Western individual as a discrete self, through a likewise discretely-organized modern world.

61 See here esp. Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Random House, 1988; orig. pub. 1961), published in its unabridged version as *History of Madness* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006); id., *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, trans. Alan M. Sheridan (London/New York: Tavistock/Random House, 1973; orig. pub. 1963); and id., *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London: Penguin, 1977; orig. pub. 1975). A basic summary of these works would comprise that Foucault therein set out to study the formation of in modern institutional architectures and the way they enabled, like medical instruments, new "regimes of visibility," thanks to which architecture came to be an instrument for new epistemic practices of 'making see' (in the case of clinical practice and the emerging 'medical gaze'), and later of 'being seen' (in the case of the prison and its panoptic form of surveillance). By recognizing this instrumental function for new systems of knowledge to emerge, Foucault came to suggest that architecture became part of an emerging 'power formation,' what his later **GENEALOGICAL** work would call a **DISPOSITIF**, capable of conditioning complex practices of disciplinarization or normalization. Foucault thereby famously distinguished an emerging 'disciplinary society' from the older 'sovereign' constellation of power that it superseded. He also observed how these practices no longer focus on the correction of individual bodies, but a management that increasingly fostered and regulated life (conceptualized as "biopower") on a much larger scale of entire populations by means of a novel politics over life (called "biopolitics").

62 See the preliminary discussion, in Book O.

During the 'spatial turn,' this approach sparked an immense interest among architectural historians and theorists. Adding to an earlier study trajectory first embarked on by the English architecture historian Robin Evans, the reception of Foucault's discourse analyses inspired a major revision of the understanding of eighteenth-century architecture in the critical theory of the 1980–90s[63] that continues until today. Here, historians took up Foucault's reading of modern institutional architectures of asylums, hospitals, prisons, and their characteristic cellular arrangements in an illuminating, yet somewhat reductive and selective reading that, as geographer and political theorist Stuart Elden notes, disproportionately attended to rather exceptional essays within Foucault's oeuvre, such as "Of Other Spaces," and overemphasized marginal topics such as Bentham's Panopticon.[64] ☒13 This reading greatly contributed to exposing architecture's modern function as a specific ordering and classifying device, as these studies further highlighted instances in which architecture became complicit with practices that delimited freedom through institutional totalization.[65] To render visible the emerging form of control within cellular architecture, authors like Thomas A. Markus and Kim Dovey in particular have adopted the analytical diagrams of space-syntax theorists, which—in their own functionalist genealogy as tools for surveillance and control within scientific management in the 1930s, as Hyungmin Pai has pointed out—lend themselves particularly well to read architecture as control structures ☒24.[66] Besides this dispositivistic reading of architectural form as a

63 For these studies, see Robin Evans, "Bentham's Panopticon: An incident in the Social History of Architecture," *Architectural Association Quaterly* 3, no. 2 (Spring 1971): 21–37; and id., "Rookeries and Model Dwelling," in *Translations from Drawing to Building and Other Essays* (London: Architectural Association, 1997), 93–118. The revision of Enlightenment architecture was initially carried further in Joseph Rykwert's *The First Moderns: The Architects of the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980) and Allan Braham's *The Architecture of the French Enlightenment* (Stanford: Univ. of California Press, 1980). These seminal studies were followed by Anthony Vidler's *The Writing of the Walls: Architectural Theory in the Late Enlightenment* (Princeton Architectural Press, 1987); Antoine Picon's *French Architects and Engineers in the Age of Enlightenment*, trans. Martin Thom (Cambridge: MIT Press 1992), and—in another field—by Paul Rabinow*'s French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995).

64 Stuart Elden, *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Project of a Spatial History* (London: Continuum, 2001), 3–4.

65 Besides Etlin's *Symbolic Space*, see also Kevin Hetherington, *The Badlands of Modernity: Heterotopia and Social Ordering* (London: Routledge, 1997). For a critical discussion of this epistemological reading, see esp. Paul Hirst, "Foucault and Architecture," *AA Files* 26 (Fall 1993): 52–60.

66 See Thomas A. Markus, *Buildings and Power: Freedom and Control in the Origin of Modern Building Types* (London: Routledge, 1993); and id., "Buildings as Classifying Devices," *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design* 14, no. 4 (1987): 467–84; as well as Kim Dovey, *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form* (London/New York: Routledge, 1999). For the development of space syntax analysis, see esp. Bill Hillier, Julienne Hanson, *The Social Logic of Space* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1984); idem,

biopolitical **APPARATUS** (or **DISPOSITIF**), Foucault's call for a **HETEROTOPOLOGY**—the study of social formations through the systematic description of its **HETEROTOPIAS** (i.e. spaces of otherness, seclusion, or exclusion, that constitute worlds within worlds)—has since gained much influence in architectural discourse.[67]

Some Shortcomings

As these studies continued to analyze heterotopias and spaces of enclosure, they did not always analyze, Elden critically notes, the philosophical presuppositions or consequences of Foucault's historical ontology. This critique specifically concerns the methodological shift toward a **GENEALOGICAL** mode of discursively inquiring into historical formations, which established a quite challenging theoretico-methodological apparatus that was both contested and embraced, and often misunderstood in either case. As I will detail in the next part, these misunderstandings have led to an incomplete understanding of Foucault's project of a 'spatial history' as different from a 'history of spaces,'[68] to the extent that studies of spaces of enclosure generally fail to account for the

"Space Syntax," *Environment and Planning B* 3 (1986): 147–85. For the adapted versions in architecture theory, and more detailed critiques of the subsequent adaptation of space syntax into a theory of social behavior (e.g. via Hillier's *Space is the Machine*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), or the ways space-syntax analysis is unsuitable for understanding the fluid spatiality of contemporary buildings, see Markus, *Buildings and Power*, 8–26; and Dovey, *Framing Places*, 20–28. For the genealogy of such diagrammatic approaches, see esp. Hyungmin Pai, *The Portfolio and the Diagram: Architecture, Discourse, and Modernity in America* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).

67 The originally medical notion of **HETEROTOPIAS** is introduced by Foucault first in the introduction to *Les mots et les choses* (1966), and then in his 1967 lecture for architects "Des espaces autres: utopies et heterotopies,» translated as Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," *Diacritics* 16, no.1 (1986): 22–27. The notion then entered architectural discourse through Georges Teyssot's "Heterotopias and the History of Spaces," trans. David Steward in *A+U* 121 (Oct 1980; orig. pub. 1977); Demetri Porphyrios's *Sources of Modern Eclecticism: Studies on Alvar Aalto* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); Manfredo Tafuri's *Sphere and Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s*, trans. Pellegrino d'Acierno and Robert Conolly (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987). A highly influential critique of the notion of "otherness" that underlies this concept, was provided with the essay by Mary McLeod, "Everyday and 'Other' Spaces," *Architecture and Feminism*, ed. Debra Coleman, Elizabeth Danze, and Carol Henderson (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), 1–37. Henry Urbach's "Writing Architectural Heterotopia," *Journal of Architecture* 3, no.4 (1996): 347–54, further critiqued Jencks' book *Heteropolis* (1993) and its universalizing notion of a 'hetero-architecture.' In the field of geography, the notion was developed by Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989), and connected to his more Lefebvrian reading in id., *Thirdspace: Expanding the Geographical Imagination* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); and id., "Heterotopologies: A Remembrance of Other Spaces in the Citadel-LA," in *Postmodern Cities and Spaces*, ed. Sophie Watson and Katherine Gibson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 13–34. Foucault's article was newly re-translated in the greatly layered anthology by Michiel Dehaene and Lieven de Cauter, eds., *Heterotopia and the City: Public Space in a Postcivil Society* (London: Routledge, 2008), 13–29.

68 Elden, *Mapping the Present*, 28, and 3–6.

complex *critique of container concepts* corroborating Foucault's analyses of how knowledge and subject formations take form in specific architectural arrangements. [→ 0.1–2] As Foucault was from the mid-1970s onward increasingly probing into the question how knowledge and power became materialized and spatialized in urban and architectonic form, Sven-Olov Wallenstein points out, his work opened a new path to study how architecture "started to withdraw from the … representation of order, so as to itself become a tool for the ordering," by fundamentally rethinking it "as an essentially composite object, an assemblage that results from convergent technologies."[69] Yet this field remains "strangely uncharted," and architectural theorists hardly touched upon these questions, Wallenstein argues, because these studies usually stop at the point where building types, apparatuses, or spatial diagrams symbolize power formations.[70]

In their predominantly post-representationalist critique of modern power structures, these studies (similar to the advancement of Elias's work on courtly architecture by historians) greatly continued Foucault's initial focus on public building types. Yet, in this critique, residential architecture remained widely absent.[71] As a result, Post-Foucauldian discourse never explicitly problematized the fact that residential architecture took form in likewise cellular

69 Sven-Olov Wallenstein, *Biopolitics and the Emergence of Modern Architecture* (New York: Buell Center/Princeton Architectural Press), 20; 39; and id., "Foucault and the Genealogy of Modern Architecture," in *Essays, Lectures* (Stockholm: Axl, 2007), 384–5 n22. Wallenstein continues: "This polemic against a certain historiography of architecture only appears parenthetically in the text, but it no doubt opens for a different genealogy of the 'theories and history of architecture,' to use Manfredo Tafuri's phrase, than conventional historiography, and it goes beyond the choice between operative, reconstructive, and critical modes of writing. These insights however seem still to have exerted only a limited influence on a writing of history that remains predicated on formal and stylistic descriptions (which to a large degree also applies to Tafuri, who certainly probes into the ideology of forms at great depth, but rarely analyses their positive mode of production and functioning), and here a vast territory of research opens up, which has remained strangely uncharted despite the pious references to Foucault in much recent architectural theory: to describe the genealogy of modern architecture, as a dimension distinct from is theories and history" (ibid. 384–5) I come back to this point centrally in Book O.

70 Wallenstein, "Genealogy of Modern Architecture," 384. Wallenstein here points explicitly to Etlin's aforementioned reading of how the "system of the home," as establishing specific social and cultural hierarchies, constituted a power structure that became progressively extended to an urban scale, but without analyzing how so. The approach of Dennis' study is more anti-representationalistic due to its deliberate set-up as a 'history of the present (forms of urbanism),' and its implicitly-genealogical inquiry into modern planning practices.

71 Besides Dennis's above-mentioned study, another exception that proves the rule is the lesser-known study that Foucault conducted with his students (published as Jean-Marie Alliaume, et al., *Politiques de l'habitat, 1800–1850* (Paris: CORDA, 1977), which investigated disciplinary mechanisms in the regulation and management of the modern city. Here the notion of the habitat is seen on a territorial scale of the city as an inhabited and lived environment.

arrangements, and thus did not expose and explore the much more ubiquitous pattern of cellularization characterizing the emerging modern habitat… What is more, in failing to add apartments and apartment houses to the list of modern cellular architectures, theory failed on a more fundamental level at critically understanding that the architectural arrangements of aristocratic residences was initially formed through an anterior form of cellular differentiation. As such it never addressed the longer genealogical relation of these disciplinary building types to the edifices of older power formations. If not a public building type in the modern sense, aristocratic palaces and their suites of rooms were, as I have noted, formations functioning as highly political or institutional frameworks. Therein, as said above, the architecture of appartements worked as a complex device to draw distinctions, precisely to the degree they came to be opened to visits.

Here one finds a clear historical—and, as I will demonstrate, technological—lineage to later architectures of visibility. In this regard, appartements and later type of apartments are yet to be added to the list of cellular formations, and—given both chronology and their worldwide propagation—arguably at the top, as the prime assemblage of subjectivation in the longer genealogy of the modern urban environment.

Emancipatory Revisions

Here again, many components for such a genealogy are already there. In the late 1990s, Sharon Marcus had wondered why "the absence of residential spaces seems to go without saying in accounts of modernity," while by contrast "scholarship of the domestic architecture tends inversely to isolate the home from its wider spatial context, focusing almost exclusively on the evolution of room distribution and changing styles."[72]

In bringing the question of modernity and residential space together, her comparative literature analysis *Apartments Stories* (1999) looked, from a post-Foucauldian angle[73], at the crystallization of the internal organization of the Parisian *immeubles* during the Restoration and July Monarchy. ☒[15] It approaches apartment houses not simply as enclosed cells; she starts from

72 Sharon Marcus, *Apartment Stories: City and Home in Nineteenth-Century Paris and London* (Stanford: Univ. of California Press, 1999), 2.

73 Her discourse-analytical study—strategically using discourses "*about* apartment houses, not *on* apartment houses *themselves*"—avoids an explicit "Foucauldian approach," she argues, in order to avoid any environmental or **ARCHITECTURAL DETERMINIST** position that would posit architectural "spaces as agents of social control" (Marcus, *Apartment Stories*, 9 and 202–3 n.17–8). As I argue in the next chapter, this false problem is based on a long misreading, caused by a dichotomy assuming structure and agency as two different things, as already mentioned above.

the initially "fluid spatiality" that characterized earlier apartment houses as spaces that "ma[d]e urban and domestic space continuous"[74] in order to PROBLEMATIZE how during the 1830s, a reactionary, patriarchal urban ideology gradually turned these initially open structures *into* increasingly enclosed cells.[75] She thus maps a progressive enclosure that superseded this open spatiality, through socio-spatial practices of drawing newly-established boundaries between private and public spaces, or residential and collective areas.

This critical extension is situated in a tradition of 'minor' analyses by a great number of authors with a feminist or queer inclination have, from the 80s onwards, engaged with the more emancipatory aspects of modernization and interiors. They thereby invested in a pertinent critique of modernity and subjectivity with regard to domesticity and gender.[76] In recognizing residential space not only as a site of oppression and domination but also as a site of liberation and emancipation, these studies stressed the changing residential relation and their liberating effect on women. Here, a stream of authors started shifting attention to the way architecture structures inter-personal relations.[77] Such an emancipatory-feminist perspective analytically fore-

74 Ibid., 2–3.

75 Ibid.; see also id., "Haussmannization as Anti-Modernity: The Apartment House in Parisian Urban Discourse, 1850–1880," *Journal of Urban History* 27, no. 6 (2001): 723–45.

76 The term 'minor' is here of course meant in the non-derogative Deleuzian sense of 'minoritarian' and its ethical attention to uncovering non-hegemonic forms of thought, which would be presented by the mainly male-stream authored, Post-Foucauldian studies in the 'major revision' mentioned before. These studies include Dolores Hayden, *The Grand Domestic Revolution* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982); Gwendolyn Wright, *Building the Dream: A Social History of Housing in America* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983); Beatriz Colomina, ed., *Sexuality & Space* (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992); Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press: 1994); Aaron Betsky, *Building Sex: Men, Women, and the Construction of Sexuality* (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1995), and id., *Queer Space: Architecture and Same-Sex Desire* (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1997); Diana Agrest, "Architecture from Without: Body, Logic, and Sex," *Assemblage* 7 (1988): 29–41; Diana Agrest, Patricia Conway, and Leslie Kanes Weisman, eds., *The Sex of Architecture* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1996); Chandan Reddy's "Homes, Houses, Nonidentity: Paris is Burning," in *Burning Down the House: Recycling Domesticity*, ed. Rosemary Marangoly George (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 355–79; Janet Floyd and Inga Bryden, eds., *Domestic Space: Reading the Nineteenth-Century Interior* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1999); Hilde Heynen, *Architecture and Modernity: A Critique* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999); Elizabeth Grosz and Peter Eisenman, *Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001); Iain Borden, Barbara Penner, and Jane Rendell, eds., *Gender Space Architecture: An Interdisciplinary Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2002); Barbara Penner, and Charles Rice, "Constructing the Interior," *Journal of Architecture* 9, no. 3 (2004): 267–73; Heynen and Gülsüm Baydar, eds., *Negotiating Domesticity: Spatial Productions of Gender in Modern Architecture* (London: Routledge, 2005); Charles Rice, *The Emergence of the Interior: Architecture, Modernity, Domesticity* (London: Routledge, 2006); Julia Prewitt-Brown, *The Bourgeois Interior* (Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 2008).

77 Among many others, I refer here mainly to the trajectory from the post-Foucauldian atten-

grounds architecture's potential for transforming relationships, and the modalities in how exactly (in the name of what, in the intent of whom) this potential comes to be employed. It is here that the history of apartments remains, according to the aforementioned remark of Elizabeth Cromley, "a story *in need* of telling" in multiple regards.[78] First, this perspective renders obvious "why apartment houses have proven an unattractive subject to most historians" interested solely in artistic achievements, for whom the study of apartment buildings holds few insights.[79] Rather, as Elizabeth Hawes similarly suggested in her study of how apartments have transformed urban living in the American metropolis, the real virtues of apartments were disregarded as supposedly of less historical significance.[80] For contrary to the art-historical concern with periodic, geographic, or stylistic distinctions, the history of apartments calls for paying attention to the emancipating relationships that apartments enabled; a history of the differences apartments made for women. But more than being a female or feminist 'niche concern,' this minoritarian view also implies a more general understanding of the differences apartments made for our forms of living together; for how we relate to one another, and thereby help extend this dispositivistic notion to architectural arrangements in general.

Mentioned in the preface to Eleb and Debarre's *L'architectures de la vie privée* we find an interesting cross-connection of the little-investigated relation of Foucauldian thinking to Elias's earlier studies, where, in passing, aristocratic appartements are identified as a kind of "counter-panoptic" dispositif that takes shape in response to the regime of total display ruling court society.[81] ☒[17] This deliberately anachronistic notion overshadows, however, that this form of seclusion responds to an already extant dispositif that still needs recognition as a prior form (or proto-form) of modern architectures of visibility. As we shall see throughout PART II–III of my genealogy, contrary to panoptic forms of surveillance in the prison, this 'golden cage' of total self-display presented a self-imposed constraint for receiving visitors, facilitating a regime of *visi(ta)bility* according to differentiated access, which in turn enabled the

tion to "curing machines" to "architectures of care." For the first, see esp. the publication of research by the CERFI on collective equipments, that Foucault published with Blandine Barret Kriegel, Anne Thalamy, Francois Beguin, and Bruno Fortier, *Les machines à guérir: Aux origines de l'hôpital moderne* (Brussels: Mardaga, 1979). For the latter, see Rawes, "Architectural Ecologies of Care," in *Relational Architectural Ecologies*, ed. id., 40–55; and id., "Housing Biopolitics and Care," *Critical and Clinical Cartographies*, ed. Andrej Radman and Heidi Sohn (Edinburgh: EUP, 2017), 80–100.

78 Cromley, *Alone Together*, 8.

79 Ibid.

80 Elizabeth Hawes, *New York, New York: How the Apartment House Transformed the Life of the City, 1869–1930* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), xiii.

81 Eleb and Debarre-Blanchard, *Architectures de la vie privée*, 6.

aristocracy to set themselves apart, rank others by the same means, and thus exercise power. As I will argue, it was this enabling differentiation that drove the evolution of the multiple distinctions that were emerging within the room sequences of aristocratic palaces, and which as spatial systems attained an increasingly consolidating and conservative (more than 'anti-modern') function for social production, long before it entered the domain of bourgeois forms of living.[82] And as I will show, it was this consolidating form of **HETEROGENIZING** social production that would be transposed onto an urban scale, where this form of privation became more and more visible within the urban fabric. [→ PART II, III, X]

Recent Approaches to Cellular Spaces

Such a differentiating reading would both balance and critically extend recent trends of approach to cellular architectures and urban forms in some hyper-Foucauldian (and certainly more Agambenian) reading that has contributed to a major biopoliticization of architectural form.[83] Spearheaded perhaps by Pier-Vittorio Aureli's polemic that "the very condition of architectural form is to separate and to be separated,"[84] it envisions the modern city as an archipelago "where parts are separated yet united by the common ground of their juxtaposition."[85] As these readings explicitly engage with

82 Marcus, "Haussmannization as Anti-Modernity," passim.

83 In the wake of Lefebvre's conception of space as the fundamental category of politics, Frederick Jameson noted, architecture came to be critically investigated as a mechanism of dominant class interests. Here, Jameson grants also a positive role to architecture, and its altering capacity, if only as an enclave within a larger order. Frederik Jameson, "Architecture and the Critique of Ideology," in *Architecture, Criticism, Ideology*, ed. Joan Ockman, et al. (Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 1985), 51–87; here 53.

84 Pier-Vittorio Aureli, *The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), ix–x. Aureli here posits that "through its act of separation and being separated, architecture reveals at once the essence of the city and the essence of itself as political form: the city as the composition of (separate) parts" (ibid.).

85 Aureli, *Absolute Architecture*, xi. In its Agambenian reading of forms of enclosure and heterotopic spaces, such a view reclaims the autonomy of architecture through a post-iconic, and deliberately iconoclastic conception of architectural form as a specific boundary condition within and against the exclusiveness of neo-liberal spatial practices. In contrast to this "common ground," as perhaps the ultimate container concept against which architecture can be defined, misrepresenting its formation from the start, an even more radical take on these processes would do away with practices of 'grounding' difference in identity (see my chapter 0.1.2–3). For Aureli, this separatist vision is tied to the autonomy of architectural production (as both practice and theory), vis-à-vis neo-liberal metropolitan ideologies and urban discourses in advanced capitalism; against which it reclaims the work of architects as a counter-hegemonic and anti-representational work of abstraction. Id., "Form and Labor: Toward a History of Abstraction in Architecture," in *The Architect as Worker: Immaterial Labor, the Creative Class, and the Politics of Design*, ed. Peggy Deamer (London: Bloomsbury, 2015). What marks the relative distance of my queerly-(and not squarely-)related position, is that I am not engaging in a radical critique of domesticity as a bourgeois ideology, nor the underlying economic structure of the

Cinq étages du monde parisien

15 *Previous page*, cross-section through a mid-nineteenth century, apartment house in Paris.

16–17 *This page top*, late-medieval and early Renaissance forms of living in the 'whole house' structure of bourgeois households, in more multi-purpose rooms with few possibilities of being alone. *Bottom*, new forms of privacy, and intimate and emancipatory spaces emerging in the aristocratic and upper bourgeois domain of living during the 17th and eighteenth-century interiors.

existential conditions and forms of life, it would be tempting to read apartments similarly as a 'form of separation,' a form of living *separately*, grounded on the common notion of the apartment as some 'separate dwelling unit.' But in my aim to enlist apartments among modern cellular formations, I want to assertively resist and reject such a reading, as it only retroactively embodies the dialectic vision of a modern rupture within some generic spatial form, produced by some generic economic practice. Quite the contrary, my aim is to help promulgate a more assemblage-theoretic radicalization of Foucault's productive reading of what architecture does, in first selecting specific spatial relationships (as always twofold dis/connections), and thereby secondarily *selecting for* specific socio-psycho-environmental assemblages and technical ensembles to take form [→ 0.2.3]

A Call for Putting Apartments on the Agenda

A more nuanced reading of architecture's tendency toward "cell formation" was advanced by German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk in his well-known *Spheres* trilogy.[86] One larger aim of this philosophical inquiry lies in repositioning Heidegger's concept of 'enframing' as the essence of technology.[87]

house (as *oikos*). From a queer perspective this critique would entail a wholly different issue that first involves a wider critique of representationalistic modes of thought in general. Rather, as will become clear, by using apartments to creatively intervene on those constructs as 'the house,' my research aims to radically reconceptualize the built environment on a much more ecosystemic level, in its **ABSTRACT MACHINIC** dimension, for which an ecological vision of architecture helps move beyond images of thought that renders architectural forms as some sort of isolatable objects or domain housing, containing, embodying, or representing socio-economic relations, and power relations; a thinking that prevent us from arriving a more encompassing, difference- and assemblage-theoretical, relational vision of what it is that architecture actually does.

86 The *Spheres* trilogy offers a comprehensive phenomenological theory of modernity developed through the concept of soap bubbles, globes, and foams, which for him emblematize the part-to-whole-relations of modernity: i.e. the volatility, and oft-mentioned fragmentary experience and disconnectedness of modernity (I), the contemporaneous co-construction of new global unities (II), and the resulting 'foams' in this world (III). See Peter Sloterdijk, *Spheres*, trans. Wieland Hoban, 3 vols (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011, 2014, and 2016), here III: 476–564. Excerpts from Spheres III were previously published as "Cell Block, Egospheres, Self-Container: The Apartment as a Co-Isolated Existence," trans. Daniela Fabricius, *Log* 10 (Summer/Fall 2007): 89–108; and "Excerpts from Spheres III: Foams," *Harvard Design Magazine* 29 (2009): 38–52.

87 "In this way, then Sloterdijk is able not simply to rethink Heidegger's [notion of] being in-the-world, but also his conception of 'enframing.' … [A]ll technology is primordially 'space-originating-technology' [*Raumsschöpfungstechnik*]." Eduardo Mendieta, "A Letter on Überhumanismus: Beyond Posthumanism and Transhumanism," in *Sloterdijk Now!*, ed. Stuard Elden (Cambridge: Polity, 2012): 58–76, here 73. In the same anthology, Marie-Eve Morin continues, "What Sloterdijk uncovers is a more primitive *technē*, one that opens the pre-human in the direction of humanity. It is this *technē*, as that which produces the human in the first place, that will inform Sloterdijk's relation to technology, and especially to technologies of the human." On this point, see also Marie-Eve Morin, "The Coming-to-the-World of the Human Animal," in ibid.: 77–95: here 84. On this

Sloterdijk's phenomenological, atmospheric, and prosthetic understanding of the progressive technological encapsulation of human life converges with a well-studied theoretical trajectory of techno-mediated environments.[88] But in its discussion of the progressive technological encapsulation of human life, we also find an interesting reading of apartments and their cellularity. This reading often invokes (and is evidently inspired by) Foucault's analyses of modern cellular architecture with its heterotopic spaces and biopolitical technics,[89] and also their reading of power structures as **INTERNALIZED EXTERNALITIES**.[90] But there is no explicit discussion of the origin of some of these topoi[91] when his work advances a compelling **IMMUNOLOGICAL** reading in which apartments are presented as a sort of (self-)protective spheres or "anthropogenic islands," generated by spatial (anthropo)techniques of "co-isolation."[92]

technological point, Sloterdijk's spherology is recognized as a valuable alternative to recent dominance of network-centered approaches such as heralded by Latour, who both share a common enemy, namely the persistent divide between society and nature. See Bruno Latour, "Spheres and Networks: Two Ways to Reinterpret Globalization," *Harvard Design Magazine* 30 (2009): 138–44. Especially the below-mentioned notion of 'co-isolation' is introduced and in the explicit aim to offer a counter-concept to the "overused net[work] metaphor" (Sloterdijk, *Spheres*, III: 237).

88 These studies, here not further discussed, include but are not limited to: Siegfried Giedion, *Mechanization Takes Command* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1948); Rayner Banham, *The Architecture of the Well-Tempered Environment* (London: Architectural Press, 1969); Lieven De Cauter, "The Capsule and the Network: Preliminary Notes for a General Theory," *OASE* 51 (2001), and *The Capsular Civilization: On the City in the Age of Fear* (Rotterdam: NAi publishers, 2004); Georges Teyssot, *Topology of Everyday Constellations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013); or also Paul B. Preciado, "Architecture as Biopolitical Disobedience," *Log* 25 (2012), and *Testo Junkie: Sex, Drugs, and Biopolitics in the Pharmacopornographic Era* (New York: The Feminist Press at CUNY, 2013).

89 Foucault's spatial histories where also derived in part from a reworking of Heidegger. For a detailed elaboration, see Stuart Elden, *Mapping the Present*, passim.

90 Besides Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, see also his lectures at the Collège de France around 1974, published as Foucault, *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College de France, 1973–1974*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Macmillan, 2006). On the topological relation between interiors, exteriors, and difference in the work of Foucault and Deleuze, see moreover the German study by Ann-Cathrin Drews and Katharina D. Martin, *Topologien des Körpers im Werk von Gilles Deleuze und Michel Foucault* (Bielefeld: transcript, 2017).

91 In only generally referencing Foucault's "Of Other Spaces," Sloterdijk develops the idea of heterotopias into multiple "anthropogenic islands" (Sloterdijk, *Spheres* III: 333–456). On how these so-called chirotopes, phonotopes, thanatopes, erototopes, ergotopes, and alethotopes co-exist in apartments, see here id., "Cell Block, Egospheres, Self-Container." Also, the shared Heideggerian influence of this spatial history has hitherto remained largely unacknowledged in architectural discourse.

92 Sloterdijk, *Spheres*, III: 333–456. The notion of anthropogenic islands here still means 'man-made islands'; islands generated by anthropotechnics. Later on, I will counter-distinguish how spatial **BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICES** and **RETICULATIONS** are connected to **SOCIOGENETIC** and **ANTHROPOGENETIC** processes through related **TECHNICS** *that make us human to begin* with, and moreover, to different degrees. On the notion of co-isolation, see also below.

Contrasting with Aureli's archipelagic vision, this reading emphasizes that such **RETICULATIONS** are not only a fundamental *condition* for existence, but also a condition for *co*-existence (a point to which I will return shortly). Yet, this reading does not go far enough, and fails to arrive at a fully genetic explanation, as it starts from an already constituted individual and not from a process of **INDIVIDUATION**. This happens where Sloterdijk—following Doris Weigel's notion of the modern single-room apartment as the ultimate "manifestation of modernity"[93]—reconsiders apartments as a "topological analogue" to modern individualism, and urges us to put apartments, as the dominant form of urban cohabitation, on the historico-theoretical agenda to study modern subjectivity.[94] This discussion has sparked an urgent problematization of tendencies within the 'captivating' or 'disindividuating' forms of shared living.[95] Yet, especially from a historical perspective on the genesis of these technically-mediated subjectivation processes, this point is yet to be explored more deeply. For in Sloterdijk's work, apartments represent but a theoretical exemplification (or metonym) in his wider posthuman approach to spaces of coexistence. This is problematic given that, in contrast to Foucault's method, Sloterdijk skips the entire historical process through which architec-

93 Ibid., 529–42; here 529–30, citing Doris Weigel, *Die Einraumwohnung als Räumliches Manifest der Moderne: Untersuchungen zum Innenraum der dreißiger Jahre* (Schliengen: Argus, Schmitt, 1996). Cf. Robin Evans, who reads the atomization and individualization of the modern habitat as a result of "the stultifying oppressiveness of nineteenth century family life," against which modernists aimed at new forms of relation in which the "individual private cell [is] the building block for entire cities in which all other facilities would be collectivized." Evans, "Figures, Doors, Passages," in *Translations*, 84.

94 Sloterdijk, *Spheres*, III: 498–508: "Are not the dwellings of this time, then, the manifestos for a civilizatory project that puts the reformatting of immunity units and integrous spaces on the agenda?" (501).

95 Architectural scholars have recognized how Sloterdijk's reading opens toward future modes of inhabiting the world in problematizing how modernist debates on *Existenzminimum* spaces and collective forms of living resurface in the recent rise of micro- (and nano-) apartments and new forms of shared living. Understanding what kind of subject this form of living presupposes, and reproduces, several scholars have started exposing the largely differing (neoliberal) milieu of production in which these novel capsular spaces facilitate a newly capturing form of relationality that is at the verge of turning into a new kind of captivity. For these studies, see—aside from the above-mentioned studies by De Cauter—also Hélène Frichot and Helen Runting, "In Captivity: The Real Estate of Co-Living," in *Architecture and Feminism*, ed. Hélène Frichot, Catharina Gabrielsson, and Helen Runting (London/New York: Routledge, 2018), 140–9. See also Hélène Frichot, "Foaming Relations: The Ethico-Aesthetics of Relationality," in *Proceedings to the Conference "Occupation: Negotiations with Constructed Space,"* Brighton Univ. 2–4 Jul, 2009, accessed online at http://arts.brighton.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/44824/15_Helene-Frichot_Foaming-Relations.pdf; and id., "Foaming Relations: Urban Habitus of Affect," Paper manuscript (2008), accessed online at https://helenejuliafrichot.net/2012/04/22/foaming-relations-urban-habitus-of-affect. On this captivity, see also the earlier studies by Gilles Barbey, *L'évasion domestique: Essai sur les relations d'affectivité au logis* (S.l.: PPUR presses polytechniques, 1990); and id., *L'habitation captive: Essai sur la spatialité du logement de masse* (Saint-Saphorin: Georgi, 1980).

ture came to be involved in producing an increasingly cellular built environment. First, this formation process cannot be reduced to a twentieth-century phenomenon, because—as, among others, Marcus or Eleb and Debarre have shown—it was long in the making. And secondly, it is in this respect that it also fails to connect this formation to the cellular spatiality of earlier aristocratic appartements, as a linear sequence of progressively smaller and more private rooms, which as we saw acted as a socio-spatial system for drawing distinctions. In its precursory function for modern forms of planning, cannot be excluded from this genealogy, but which in the socio-spatial and functional differentiation are in fact the *opposite* of the multifunctional one-room apartment that Sloterdijk describes.

Avoiding the genealogical exercise of critically mapping *how we have become the subjects we are*, the resulting conception of apartments as a static product of a persistent anthropogenic technique (or anthropotechnics as he calls it) largely erases any *evolutive* aspect from this technological history. Such a reading falls short of identifying the historical formation of apartments (and not 'the apartment in itself' as the dominant assemblage of subjectivation) as one of the most significant spatial technologies CONCRETIZING alongside the modernization of the built environment.

A Genealogy of Collective Housing

This leaves us with a great opportunity—and greater task—to finally bring these disparate lines of inquiry together. George Teyssot's work has here already opened an interesting path by investigating "the complex beginning" of urban planning policies that would turn buildings into machines for living during the second half of the nineteenth century, through a lens that—complementary to social historical research on social housing—approaches collective housing not only from both a topological and technological angle, but also an explicitly genealogical stance, hoping to understand the genesis of these forms of housing in terms of an evolving technical ensemble employed by modern disciplinary dispositifs. His earlier study *Krankheit des Domicils* (*Disease of the Domicile*, 1988–89) and the more recent *Topology of Everyday Life* (2013) bracket his attempts at an initial genealogy of residential building complexes "that were conceived and built as 'collective equipments,'" such as the mid-eighteenth-century *cités* for workers' housing in France, and the specific habits and habitats such equipments have generated.[96]

96 See George Teyssot, *Die Krankheit des Domizils: Wohnen und Wohnbau 1800–1930*,

Not only in its central notion, but also in its deliberately genealogical setup, this project is modeled on the lesser-known works that Foucault conducted in collaboration with Deleuze and Guattari at the Centre d'Études, de Recherche et de Formation Institutionelle (CERFI) between 1971–73, which I will discuss in more detail in the second part of Book O [→ 0.2]. The first programmatic CERFI study, *Généalogie du capital, I: Les équipements du pouvoir—Villes, territoires et équipements collectifs* edited by François Fourquet and Lion Murard (1973), conceived cities as an environmental engine that, by TRANSVERSALLY intersecting matter flows, constitute and organize bodies and territories in a machinic manner.[97] From this MACHINIC angle, the CERFI researchers investigated the central function of 'collective equipments' (which in French generally implies public amenities or social infrastructures) against structuralist notions like "means of [social] production, or perhaps more accurately the means by which production can be achieved."[98] In this view, the editors argued in direct reference to Nietzsche's genealogical stance, that collective equipments ought to be approached as "instruments of coding, framing, enclosing, limiting, or excluding free social energy."[99] The CERFI researchers here identified a twofold task, as Wallenstein comments, to arrive on the one hand at "a [genetic] theory of territoriality that accounts for both its openness … and its closure," but to on the other hand do so by way of a genealogical "analysis that comes back to collective facilities, although no longer

trans. Ruth Föhn (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1989), 13. Unfortunately, Teyssot's full book supposedly to have been published by MIT Press, never appeared except in its German translation. Its chapter 4, however, was translated into English and published as "The Disease of the Domicile," *Assemblage* 6 (Jun 1988), 72–97; orig. pub. as "La casa per tutti: per un genealogia dei tipi," introduction to the Italian translation of Roger H. Guerrant, *Le origini della questione delle abitazioni in Francia, 1850–1894* (Rome: Officina, 1981; orig. pub. 1967). Despite multiple attempts, I have not been able to consult the latter work, in which some of my following comments may have been addressed. In his afore-mentioned, recent book *A Topology of Everyday Constellations,* Teyssot repeats his aim to contribute to a genealogy of collective equipments (2–6). See also id., "Habits/Habitus/Habitat" (1996), *Publicspace*, accessed online at http://www.publicspace.org/en/text-library/eng/a018-habits-habitus-habitat.

97 François Fourquet and Lion Murard, eds., "Généalogie du capital I: Les équipements du pouvoir — villes, territoires et équipements collectifs,» pub. as *Recherches* 13 (Dec 1973). Teyssot does not seem to refer to the CERFI research directly; cf. *Krankheit des Domizils*, 7–21; and *Topology of Everyday Constellations*, 2–6. Perhaps, the reason for his omitted reference, lies in the fact that the initial CERFI reports explicitly excluded housing as a collective equipment. Only within later publications, esp. *Les politiques de L'habitat* (a publication supervised by Foucault (and in fact not directly conducted under the auspices of CERFI), is housing investigated in this sense (and respectively also cited in *Krankheit des Domizils*, 150 n8). For a description of the CERFI, its publications, and secondary literature in architecture, see my discussion in Book O, esp. note 155.

98 Elden, *Foucault: Birth of Power* (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), 169; citing Fourquet and Murard, *Équipement du pouvoir*, 32.

99 Fourquet and Murard, *Équipements du pouvoir*, 109 (my trans.). See also ibid, 129–41.

in terms of physical architectonic objects, but as complex assemblages of power and desire."[100]

In taking up this idea, Teyssot's work, too, points out that "one might begin with the notion that a piece of equipment is first an economic device … that 'produces a production.'"[101] But, he stresses—in an argument that directly paraphrases a central point of discussion between Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari within the first CERFI publication concerning three distinct functions of equipments of power—that

> Equipment is not only an economic device. It is necessary to know … the induced effects. … A piece of equipment creates a sector of activity, new structures of control; it entails new administrative services, new institutions. Second, a piece of equipment also produces new 'needs' or demand, … in effect, a 'consumer' with his needs … Finally, a piece of equipment imposes a regime of normalization, adjusting the product of production to the production of demands, and balances these two levels by classifying, dividing, imposing regulations, and establishing limits and exclusions.[102]

In this tripartite conception, derived from Deleuze and Guattari's emerging **ASSEMBLAGE-THEORETIC APPROACH**, Foucault would become more interested in the third normalizing (or regulating) function of collective equipments, as instruments of social production, not merely as a social product [→ 0.2.1–3]. Based on it, Teyssot then approaches a rigorous re-reading of the interdependent formation of modern "Habits/Habitus/Habitat," in revising Bourdieu's concept of 'habitus' as a specific "structuring structure" toward a more Foucauldian "system of disposition."[103] This is the point where Teyssot falls back on the

100 See Wallenstein, "Genealogy of Capital and the City: CERFI, Deleuze and Guattari," in *Deleuze and the City*, ed. Hélène Frichot, Catharina Gabrielsson and Jonathan Metzger (Edinburgh: EUP, 2016), 111–27; here 120.

101 Teyssot, *Topology of Everyday Constellations*, 5; referring however only to Agamben's essay "What is an Apparatus?," in *What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 1–24.

102 Here after Teyssot, "Habits/Habitus/Habitat," n.p. (online): and id., *Topology of Everyday Constellations,* 5–6; in the essays' reworked version, the first part as well as some elements of this passage were partly omitted. Cf. Fourquet and Murard, *Équipment du pouvoir*, 183–6.

103 Teyssot, *Krankheit des Domizils*, 69. This is the point where I see the work drifting in an unproductive direction. I cannot fully elaborate this point here, but I have reworked this aspect throughout the entirety of this study, by not falling back onto a simple structuralist-symbolic notion of 'structuring structure,' but employ a more complex vision as to how 'acquired structures' *operate* as **TRANSDUCTIVE** interfaces for self-structuring processes unfolding through ongoing de- and re-structurings. Thereby we account how through earlier differentiations are passed on through constituted environmental (re)structurations

notion of types, in reminding us "that 'types' are not only determined by institutions, prescribed by ideology, or guided by circumstances, but have their own 'regularity,' logic, and strategy."[104] He traces this emerging regularity—similar to the way Sloterdijk does—back through technologically mediated processes of interiorization.

This analysis is conducted, however, in a more topically-organized discussion of various modern topoi involving interiorization and regularization processes, which characterize the formation (or typological specialization) of apartment housing during the long nineteenth century, as a formation occurring at the intersection of the three co-evolving regularities of habits, habitus, and habitats. This approach may easily be extended backwards in order to also problematize the specification of earlier aristocratic *appartements* as a socio-political equipment of power, that—as a device regulating the access of visitors—operated precisely by what Teyssot elsewhere calls "a topology of thresholds."[105] This seems both legitimate and pertinent, given that the CERFI research pointed to the palace as not only as "the first collective equipment," but also the one *with which the state fixes itself territorially*.[106] Approaching this **TERRITORIALIZATION** process from such an angle would allow a more assemblage-theoretical take precisely to the extent that this **NON-DISCURSIVE** process was accompanied by (and **ENCODED** in) the rise of **DISCURSIVIZED** forms of regulations, from those courtly regulations up to urban planning legislations. Yet in order to embark on this assemblage-theoretic angle, the greater problem may lie in radicalizing this approach into a fitting (hetero) topological interpretation that does not end up getting fixated on the production of types or processes of typification, but attends instead to the ongoing production of difference, a heterogeneity, that drives these processes—something that my study hopes to achieve by way of Guattari's later work.

[→ 0.2–3 & X]

With this driving difference in mind, let me first address some more abstract epistemological and ontological problems concerning this notion of topology itself, and how it possibly links these problems into a genetic theory of becoming. Then it will become evident in what way such a take might

and relations through which habitats, habits, and modes on inhabitation are dynamically formed, in predisposing self-regulating (or self-regularizing) systems to **PATH-DEPENDENT** evolutions and ends.
On this aspect, see my elaborations throughout chapter 0.3.1–3.

104 Teyssot, *Topology of Everyday Constellations*, 4.

105 See Teyssot, "Topology of Thresholds," *Home Culture* 2, no.1 (2005), which departs from a more Benjaminian reading of 'in-between spaces.'

106 Fourquet and Murard, eds., *Équipements du pouvoir*, 72 (emph. added).

constitute or set up a genealogical methodology for studying the system of appartements as a materially *and* discursively co-evolving equipment of power.

(Re)posing the Formation of Apartments in a Topological Manner

The cartography I have sketched above may have been somewhat simplistic in outlining how numerous studies have long developed innovative and fruitful research trajectories for investigating apartments from a variety of angles and aims. While this involved mapping out how especially in-between those fields of investigation that remained more disparate, some crucial questions remain unidentified, unresolved, or unposed (in particular concerning their longer genesis), my principle aim was to thereby render visible possible ways for finally bringing these disparate fields together by taking a genetic path. In this regard, I always follow Gilles Deleuze's philosophical formula that "a problem always merits the solution it deserves according to the way it is posed, and the way it thereby displaces an existing symbolic field."[107]

As he argued, new ideas emerge from the integration of a problematic field, not its reduction to some common denominator. This integration is achieved by intensifying or saturating a problematic field until it yields its own solution. In embracing the complex discursive constellation of the above-mentioned problems in their productive heterogeneity and with their unresolved differences, this integration requires an approach that reposes or displaces its particular constellation of the exiting field while preserving the particularity of each problematique, concerning the progressive differentiation of household structures: Elias's court-aristocratic sociology of mutual-distinction, Foucault's notion of apparatuses as heterogeneous ensembles, with Marcus's emancipatory notion of the potential of apartments to re-connect, with Sloterdijk's immunological notion of co-isolation, or Teyssot's genealogical take on the co-constitution of modern habitats and habits. This, I argue, can be done by attending precisely to the **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION** of parts within differentiating structures; thus not taking difference or differ-

107 Orig.: "Un problème a toujours la solution qu'il mérite suivant la manière dont il est posé, et le champ symbolique dont on dispose pour le poser." Gilles Deleuze, "How Do We Recognize Structuralism?" (1967), in *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953–1974*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 181 (modified).





18 *Top*, schematic diagram of the body as a 'local rarefaction of fluxes.' After Meillassoux, "Subtraction and Contraction," *Collapse* 3 (2007): 97.

19 *Bottom*, could this schema be transposed onto urban bodies, understood as an environmental formation of selective relationships constructed on the rarefaction and control of selected flows?



20 *Top*, the so-called Rayleigh-Bénard convection cells as a morphogenetic spatio-temporal pattern of reticulating flows within constrained yet open systems.

21 *Bottom*, a somewhat-analogous, if much more complex reticular structuration through intersecting flows, produced within the constraints of walled cities, like medieval Paris.

entiation as a given, but as a 'giving' factor connecting all these processes in which differences and differentiations arise from the reciprocal relation of parts within larger ensembles.

From Parthood Structures to Connection Structures

A Flat Theory thus approaches apartments in more radically topological terms in the sense that it adopts, as Andrej Radman suggests, a more e(thi)co-aesthetic stance: "To adopt a topological approach to architecture and urbanism is to think in terms of capacities (to affect and be affected), rather than mere (intrinsic) properties."[108] Given that **TOPOLOGY** is precisely the *study of connection structures*, or (non-)connectivity within part-to-part relations, it no longer seems counter-intuitive or contradictory to advance apartments (as forms of 'living *apart*') in such radically-relational terms.

Especially for displacing the problem (in Deleuze's formula), such an approach may hold most power. It helps emphasize that apartments—as opposed to apartment houses or buildings—are no type of buildings but rather a particular form of (spatial) organization that appears throughout many types of buildings. As such, they cannot be analyzed typologically (or only in a reductive manner) as they are literally but *a part* of a building type, or spatial set, from which, and within which, they are formed. This way, we can strategize the topos of apartments itself, as allowing to draw together what in other languages remains a set of quite heterogeneous notions, building types, and forms of living. Rather than constituting any closed, discrete, or geometric forms, apartments are implicit forms[109] concerning some specific internal structuring. Therein, they form a spatial system of organization, or a form of organization, that is not even readily reducible to some specific spatial configuration. And as spatial systems, apartments and appartements, or flats, constitute not even a single type of organization, but different and historically-changing ones.[110] Hence the only typological approach to apart-

108 Radman, "Figure, Discourse: To the Abstract Concretely," in *Cognitive Architecture: From Bio-Politics to Noo-Politics*, ed. Deborah Hauptmann, and Warren Neidich (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2010), 434; rep. in idem, *Ecologies of Architecture: Essays on Territorialization* (Edinburgh: EUP, forthcoming).

109 See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Vol. II*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1987), 408.

110 Armed with this more adequate conception of apartments as a topological formation, I will respectively not use the word 'apartment' based on any American/British convention over 'flats,' which—as one may well argue—seems more suited for a topological approach. Instead, I want to use 'apartments' as a conceptual tool to distinguish a specific production of *horizontally*-differentiated relationships that pertains to the formation of apartments that the first volume will investigate, and then re-strategize the

ments and appartements would be concerned with a characteristic internal organization emerging within larger spatial systems.

Such an approach would remain reductive, however, as long as it is driven by a *de facto* mereological (and not topological) conception that foregrounds part-to-whole-relations. By contrast, topology studies the production of certain constitutive and defining relationships or spatial properties that remain invariant under continuous transformation, and space and spatial formations are defined plainly by connectivity and proximity, without references to a system of coordinates in a higher, supplementary dimension of geometric space. In topology, external similarities or differences in three-dimensional forms are of no concern. Differences only concern the internal structure or organization of systems. Here, against geometric/mereological visions, topology starts plainly from mutually-constitutive **PART-TO-PART RELATIONS**. As we shall see, in this vision simple part-to-whole relations must be replaced by a more **NESTED** notion of **PART-TO-DIFFERENTLY-SCALED-PART** relationships, wherein the different scale is not just a geometrical factor, but one resulting from differing levels of organizational complexity within emergent systems.

It is precisely concerning this emergent dimension that, analytically, one must always start from relations, not constituted parts or ensembles, nor even intermediary sets. What ought to be analyzed is the system of relations within these transforming heterogeneous ensembles, and the **ASSEMBLAGES** they form, so as to investigate how they came to generate and drive the formation and evolution of apartments. This genetic view thus follows French philosopher of technology Gilbert Simondon, who long called for a paradigmatic shift to invert the predominant mode of investigating processes in the name of the individuated forms they generate.[111] In order to arrive at a **GENETIC** description of such emergent processes, one has to

notion of 'flats' in the second volume to counter-distinguish the specific establishment of a *vertically*-differentiated relationships within multi-occupancy dwellings, which drives the formation of apartments houses. In my Book II, I will use the Deleuzian terms 'segmentation' and 'stratification' for these two different modes of differentiation.

111 Simondon, "On the Position of the Problem of Ontogenesis," *Parrhesia* 7 (2009): 4–16; here 5. As he argued, in "taking the constituted individual [also individual object] as a given, we are then led to try to recreate the conditions that have made its existence possible. … Where this attitude prevails the principle of individuation is sought only insofar as it is able to account for the characteristics of the individual [object]. … [But in this process,] the idea of a principle of individuation has been derived from a genesis that works backward, an ontogenesis 'in reverse,' because in order to account for the genesis of the individual and its defining characteristics one must assume the existence of a first term, a principle, which would provide a sufficient explanation." Simondon, "The Genesis of the Individual," trans. Mark Cohen and Sanford Kwinter, in *Incorporations*, here 297–8.

reconstitute the individual from the point of view of the process of its **INDIVIDUATION,** meaning an actual process in which they take form and evolve in environmental recomposition processes through which they enter into new relations. Any parts and compositions formed thereby constantly transform and differ, rendering any notion of unity and identity useless. Instead, his studies advocate topological schemata as the basis to study the production of bodies and entities through the primordial production of mediating levels of relative interiority and exteriority. [112] He thus avoids any atomistic (i.e. mereologically reductive) view on already produced cells and their architectonic structure, by articulating interiority in terms of being first in contact with the exterior; that is, "by defining it as topological, relative, and differential."[113] Topological methods approach complexity on a local level, and with a more immanent vision. As Rob Shields notes, they thus avoid reducing complexity in terms of functions of larger systems, by "systematically and formally interrogat[ing] how an object is defined."[114] This, he suggests, presents not only the most adequate approach to studying becomings; it could be even reconsidered the study of becoming.

Concerning the constitutive production of bodies via relative levels of interiority (or "topologies of thresholds," to use Teyssot's term), Thomas Nail recently reminded us that **BOUNDARIES** are no secondary result of a spatial ordering, nor the derivative product of societies. They must be conceptualized inversely: "Society is … produced by a series of [spatial] divisions" and distributions whose "primarily productive process" generates social orderings through the way boundaries constitute specific flows of exchange, movements, and circulations.[115] In contrast to borders, boundaries namely have a

112 Simondon, *L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*, ed. Jérôme Millon (Grenoble: Millon, 1995), 222–7; here 224. See also his secondary thesis, published first in 1958 but only recently translated; id., *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, trans. Cécile Malaspina and John Rogove (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2017).

113 Simondon, *L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*, 225. The quotation is taken from Anne Sauvagnargue, "Crystals and Membranes: Individuation and Temporality," trans. Jon Roffe, in *Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology,* ed. Arne De Boever, et al. (EUP, 2012), 57–70; here 69. In this view, as Elizabeth Grosz adds, "Individuation is the process initiated by the disparation of 'material' forces; it is a mode of resolution of the disparity through the constitution of a relation which draws together these differences, this misalignment. Individuation has two complementary effects: it generates an internal resonance between forces, the condition under which an individual as such might emerge; and it generates information, a relation of communication or exchange between two disparate orders, in which one order brings in the forces from the outside, while the other provides from within itself a form." Elizabeth Grosz, "Identity and Individuation," in ibid., 37–56; here 46.

114 Rob Shields, *Spatial Questions: Cultural Topologies and Social Spatialisation* (London: SAGE, 2013), 158–59.

115 Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border* (New York: Oxford UP, 2016), 9 and 21.

binding function.[116] In this view, extending Foucault's approach to a history of limits,[117] boundaries are the prime site of production of socio-environmental organizations, and as such the critical study of their production becomes an urgent and relevant theoretical lens for contributing socially and politically relevant scholarship that makes a difference in the world.

Analyzing the differentiation in the formation of apartments in terms of boundaries and the **BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICES** involved in such socio-environmental organizations, requires a radically relational conception of bodies, things, or architectural formations that only become individual forms through the boundaries that set them apart and differentiate them, and in which boundaries are thus 'ontologically on par' with parts.[118] Here, formal topologies are not enough. In working out such conceptions for spatial representations (as I will in the subsequent chapters), the central task lies then not only in understanding and accepting that "mereology alone is too weak" and "topologically blind" in focusing on parts; but to at once accept that — by the same token — "topology alone is too strong" and "mereologically unsophisticated" in focusing on connected wholes.[119] In consolidating both, analytic philosophers Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi argue, topology must offer the basis for mereology. Where a 'weak mereotopology' would still conceptually (or logically) subsume connection under parthood structures, a 'strong mereotopology' would try to subsume parthood under connection.[120] Only the latter avoids reducing complex relations to functions of larger systems (i.e. 'superstructures' or 'power structures'), because one acknowledges the emergent properties of specific part-to-part relations.

116 Nail in fact discusses the notion of the border in his geopolitical concerns, distinguishing it primary marking, secondary limiting and tertiary boundary function (ibid., 35–40). The latter is defined precisely in its binding function (ibid., 40). In my aim, I will thus rely more on the notion of the boundary over the border. I here also follow Forman's earlier ecosystemic distinction between boundaries and borders, in Richard T. T. Forman, *Land Mosaics: The Ecology of Landscapes and Regions* (Cambridge UP, 1995), 85: "A border is the line separating the edges of adjacent landscape elements. The two edges combined compose the boundary or boundary zone" of adjacent ecosystems.

117 In the original preface to *Madness and Civilization*, Foucault expressed his desire Foucault expressed "write a history of limits — of these obscure gestures, necessarily forgotten as soon as they are made … this white space with which [a culture] isolates itself. … [I]n this region … it exercises its essential choices … [Thus] to interrogate a culture about its limit experiences is to question it at the confines of history about a rending that constitutes something like the very birth of its history." Michel Foucault, *Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (Paris: Plon, 1961), i–xi. This passage disappeared from later editions. The text cited here is from its full translation of the Preface into English, by Alberto Toscano, *Pli* 13 (2002): 1–10.

118 Here after Roberto Casati and Achille C. Varzi, *Parts and Places: The Structures of Spatial Representation* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 5.

119 See ibid., 21 and 28.

120 Ibid., 54–65.

Differentiating Part-to-Part Relations

A key to understanding form-taking processes in general, and differentiation processes in particular, is to accept that relations gain a primacy over the resulting parthood structures that historical formations bring about. In this regard a strong mereotopological vision would endorse a more **ASSEMBLAGE-THEORETIC** approach. A practical consequence entailed by this view is that we need to stop treating the historical formation of architectures like apartments in terms of an increasingly 'individual' form of living, addressed in terms of 'units' or 'interiors,' because such an understanding fails to adequately conceptualize the longer individuation process of apartments within emergent socio-environmental assemblages. One pervasive problem concerns the manner in which concepts like 'isolation' or 'separation' re-iterate a highly reductive conception of part-to-whole relations that erases the *constitutive* aspect of part-to-part relations and boundaries. Such conceptions, architecture theorist Kiel Moe would say, lacks the analytic depth to prevent us from approaching architecture as an open system, and thus from ever questioning architecture's defining production of boundaries, through walls and partitions.[121] To approach architecture as an open system requires that we carefully re-situate what Bernard Tschumi exposed as the inherent "disjunction that exists in the process of architectural production"[122] and revisit architecture as a **BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICE.** [→ 0.2.3–0.3.3]

From Protection to Production

In having started to analyze apartments precisely in terms of boundaries and the socio-environmental organizations they condition as a way of living together/apart, Sloterdijk has derived the notion of co-isolation from the notion of connected isolation, which architectural practice Morphosis has used to express "the simultaneity of adjacency and separation."[123] Implying a constitutive degree of disengagement,[124] the concept of "co(nnected) isolation" fruitfully combines parthood structures with connection structures in a first step. But its definition by isolation, stressing a movement of closure from which an immunity or resistance against what is outside is derived,[125]

121 Kiel Moe, *Insulating Modernism: Isolated and Non-Isolated Thermodynamics in Architecture* (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2014), 11–53.

122 Bernhard Tschumi, *Architecture and Disjunction* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996). See also Gordana Fontana-Giusti, *Foucault for Architects* (London/New York: Routledge, 2013), 39.

123 Sloterdijk, *Spheres,* III: 237.

124 Foucault, too, already pointed out that residential spaces are never closed sites, but rather semi-closed ones. See Foucault, "Of Other Spaces," in *Heterotopia and the City*, 21 and 27 n29.

125 On this point, see esp. Judith Wambacq and Sjoerd van Tuinen, "Interiority in Sloterdijk

remains limited to conceiving forms of living together and related forms of subjectivity in a way that still centers on parthood structures (spheres, foams), while erasing both the genetic relationships and the historical becoming that bring them about.

One important task then lies in avoiding any mereologically reductivist conceptions in which spatial structures and objects (parts, parthood structures, wholes) are just "a generalization of the basic theory of identity."[126] This is where Deleuze's philosophy of difference comes in, as it aims to undermine any reductive conception of identity in favor of irreducible **MULTIPLICITIES** or **ASSEMBLAGES**. These notions by contrast presuppose a movement of opening up, foregrounding the interactive production of (or 'selection for') an *Umwelt*. This view starts from the contrapuntal relationship produced in differentiating processes of **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION**. Approaching apartments as a such a reciprocal form of relationality generating multiplicities of entities set apart, we note that the concept 'apart' is itself already at once quantal and proximal;[127] while the suffix '-ment' already foregrounds the open process in which this relationality is produced, and with(in) which it takes form.[128]

If we respectively start from connection structures and relationships, we could generally say that all residential buildings and cohabitation spaces are characterized by some sort of connective relationships. The distinct historical formation of apartments is marked, however, by the formation a more specific socio-environmental organization: a spatial sequence of neighboring and partly connected and disengaged (hence strategically interconnected) rooms so as to produce hierarchical relationships. Therein it facilitated a certain form

and Deleuze," *Palgrave Communications* 3 (Jul 25, 2017), 2–3. The following distinction to Deleuze's notion based on their reading.

126 Casati, and Varzi, *Parts and Places*, 5.

127 The emphasis that the notion of 'apart' is at once quantal and proximal, adds very little if we articulate connection structures so that they remain subsumed under parthood structures. By approaching the notion 'apart' as a form of relationality, we inversely foreground a specifically differentiated connection structure (i.e. topology).

128 Doing something remarkable itself, the Latin suffix usually turns verbs unto nouns, indicating an often spatially mediated process or action, or denominates processes that create its own means. The Latin suffix *-mentum* ("instrument," "medium") often indicates a reciprocal formtaking process through the place of an action (e.g. 'embankment'); its concrete result, object, or outcome ('document,' 'sediment'); its concrete means, instrument or agent ('government,' 'enlargement'); or a state or condition resulting from it ('entanglement,' 'retirement'). The term 'apartment' here fits more or less all.) But to the extent that, in remarkable contrast to most English words ending with '*-ment,*' the notion 'apartment' has no proper verb, it is actually difficult to understand 'apartment' as an instrumental process. In Latin languages, the sense is generally more adverbial, and is understood differently due to the more reflexive sense of "parting" as a intrinsically motivated mode and act of withdrawal. What thus needs to be reintroduced into the discussion is the conceptual complexity and dynamic of this form-taking process and the way it produces spatial or power formations.

of power, operationalized within the aristocratic sociology of distinction and its politics of spatial distribution and proximity. As such it formed a specific system of social production by means of spatial technologies. Therein, this form of organization helped actualize a hierarchizing assemblage, that —as I suggest in my conclusion—still underlies present forms and techniques of planning.

The historical formation of apartments proves here a great case in point to advance a conception of built structures not simply as devices to draw distinctions, but also as an evolving environmental technique to draw bodies near. This vision, I suggest, allows us to go much further in connecting Sloterdijk's immunological approach to cellular structures with the Foucauldian reading of power structures as internalized externalities. To do so in the following, let me begin by displacing the common but reductive understanding of immune systems as defensive bodily war-machines, in favor of understanding immunization as what anthropologist Paul Rabinow has called a 'biosocial technique'[129] based on a system's ability to interiorize external complexity or heterogeneity. Thereby it not only enables encounters of heterogeneous lifeforms within existential territories, where—such as in the urban habitat—community is the condition, but it also fosters their 'becoming-different-together' precisely through mutual adaptation, resulting in a further production of differences. About this matter, the next part will elaborate an assemblage-theoretic reading that centrally reclaims, as I already indicated, the function of architectural arrangements for establishing selective relationships, as a wider cultural technology with which human and built environments co-evolve. [→ 0.2.3–0.3.2].

From Co-Isolation to Condividuations

Art theorist Gerald Raunig has commented on the extent to which the notions of community and immunity remain in an oppositional relation, highlighting either individual parts or totalizing wholes. To avoid being stuck between

129 Paul Rabinow, "From Sociobiology to Biosociality: Artificiality and Enlightenment," in *Incorporations*, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone, 1992), 234–52. Sociologist Nicholas Rose has elaborated further on how new forms of biosociality constitute recent regimes of control. In line with Rabinow, also Roberto Esposito noted that Foucauldian biopolitics lacks a larger paradigm, which he identifies in "immunity," as a mediating element by which bios and politics are brought together in juxtaposition so as to accommodate life; but therein necessarily also certain critical inequities, and differentiations as Achille Mbembe and Alexander Weheliye would warn us (see Book O). I expand on this point more in my essay "A Cartogrpahy of Discourses on Architectures of Life and/or Death," in *Architectures of Life and Death: The Eco-Aesthetics of the Built Environmment*, ed. Andrej Radman and Stavros Kousoulas (London/New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021), 103–29.

these options, Raunig calls "for a new terminology that takes both components into consideration as explicit conceptual components: the component of the singular, an affirmative mode of separation, and the component of composition, of concatenation, of the 'con-.'"[130] His work invokes a more radical notion of **CONDIVIDUATION.**[131] In contrast to the notion of 'co-isolation' (where the prefix 'co-' only rhetorically displaces the emphasis from the individual to ensembles) or 'co-housing' (stressing shared forms of living),[132] it emphasizes the *geneses* of such heterogeneous ensembles. It stresses a becoming through those constitutive differentiations, through which (in its Latin sense of '*con-*' as "with/through, by means of which, in which/as") this becoming is effectuated. Thus approaching heterogeneity from the point of view of its genesis, it answers to Deleuze and Guattari's assertion that a "system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must also be a true **HETEROGENESIS,**"[133] meaning a system operating by means of a production of difference that directly explains "the production of the new."[134]

Against any facile notion of disjunctive processes operating on already constituted and re-iterated spatial forms or subjectivities (like 'separation' or 'co-isolation'), condividuation invokes becomings with **PROGRESSIVE DIFFERENTIATION**, which necessarily involve or include the differentiating spatial arrangements, as well as social and technical systems 'in which' and 'with

130 Gerald Raunig, "After Community: Condividuality," in *Dance, Politics & Co-Immunity*, ed. Gerald Siegmund and Stefan Hölscher (Zurich/Berlin: Diaphanes, 2013), 271–80; here 271.

131 He does so in developing Deleuze's observation that the 'individual' as a unitary subject may no longer adequately represent the increasingly 'dividual' relationships of subjects in current control societies. See ibid.; Deleuze had used the term 'dividual' to explain the mechanisms of current control societies, which he opposed to Foucault's disciplinary societies that we have surpassed. Where disciplinary society produces the individual as the smallest unit of social reproduction, today people are increasingly no longer such self-contained "units" but can be further broken down (e.g. digital personal information). Gilles Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control," *October* 59 (Winter 1992), 3–7. For Raunig's elaborate reading, see esp. Raunig, *Dividuum: Machinic Capitalism and Molecular Revolution Vol.1*, trans. Aileen Derieg (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2016), esp. 182–92. Here, I am slightly over-stressing Raunig's reading here so that his notion of 'condividuality' no longer allows to be mistaken as some sort of shared 'co-individuality' or symbiotic 'co-individuation,' but literally a *con-dividuation* that consists in a 'becoming-dividual-together-with' and within heterogeneous ensembles.

132 I am referring here to the modern Italian notion for sharing '*condividere*,' as for instance Eduardo Narme and Simone Sfriso's *L'Abitare condiviso: Le residenze collettive dalle origini al cohousing* (Venezia: Marsilio, 2013), which in offering a history of co-housing, does unfortunately not advance in such a direction.

133 See Deleuze, "Lettre-préface de Gilles Deleuze," in *Variations: La Philosophie de Gilles Deleuze*, Jean-Clet Martin (Paris: Payot, 1993), 7; cited after Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze Kant and the Transcendental," in At The Edges of Thought, ed. Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (Edinburgh: EUP, 2015), 35–6. Guattari himself defined heterogenesis as a "processes of continuous singularization." Guattari, *The Three Ecologies* (London: Athlone Press, 2000), 69.

134 Smith, "Deleuze Kant and the Transcendental," 36.

which' subjectivation processes take form. Thus transgressing the fine conceptual line between forms of separation (addressed in terms of living 'alone together') and modes of non-relationality (like living 'together yet apart'), it concerns the co-constitutive production of modes and forms **CUTTING TOGETHER/APART**. This latter notion, borrowed from Karen Barad to understand configurations as involving condividuations [→ 0.3.1], foregrounds the **INCLUSIVE** modality of this kind of **DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** that holds heterogeneous elements together in metastable assemblages. The conceptual difference may seem marginal. Yet this inclusive notion is vital to arrive at a more affirmative, non-unitary conception concerning how, on the one hand, the historical formation of apartments helped establish those specific (non)relations that have made our urban togetherness (in its current form) possible, or that—in an immunological sense—historically enabled us to live together as a heterogenized ensemble, while it stresses, on the other hand, that the specific systems of differentiation it helped to create were produced in a historically contingent process that structures our present world.

It is this aspect concerning the formation of apartments that has remained insufficiently understood, while precisely this understanding would seem to present the most urgent prerequisite to critically and creatively engage with the ongoing dividualization of our current relationships. This volume will reposition apartments as a differentiating and condividuating formation and map the process of progressive differentiation in which they partake, starting from the distinct conceptual origin of the term 'apartment' within those diagrammatic techniques and pedagogies of compartitioning with which architectural ensembles were being drawn into reality. [→ Part I]

From Heterotopias to Heterogeneses

Concerning this mapping, I want to argue that the subsumption of (mereological) parthood structures under (topological) relationships also allows for advancing Foucault's suggestion about the subsumption of the history of architecture (as structure) under a general history of *technē* (as, in the widest sense, technics for the organization of life).[135] Thereby, one can render more apparent the co-constitutive relationships between spatial arrangements, knowledge systems, and power formations. This technical generalization would then constitute an excellent opportunity to critically engage with a hidden hypothesis that Foucault never explicitly engaged with, namely that the

135 See above note 4, and the further elaboration my chapter 0.3, and the end of my Book III and X.

built environment acts as a sort of morphogenetic field (similar to Waddington's epigenetic landscape) of self-organizing socio-historical formations through cellular differentiation.[136]

From this angle, the cellular organization of the built environment can be seen as a specific "RETICULATION of space and time" that, as Simondon argues, organizes the "world into privileged places and privileged moments," not just into heterotopic structures but by means of dynamically-differentiating and heterogenising structurations: concrete yet flexible, organized along specific points of contact and boundaries.[137] Concerning this differentiating mechanism, Foucault's pioneering steps simply did not yet reach far enough to fully reconfigure our conception of how historical geneses (like for example 'modernization') are to be understood in their fully-fledged relationally, reciprocity and irreducibility. In contrast to an archipelagic (or poly-heterotopic) view of the city, my interest lies closer to Aureli and Tattara's more recent attempt to rethink the built environment—via Simondon's work—as a pre-individual field and milieu of individuation (or condividuation). Not just a virtual site or background for juxtaposing preexisting forms, it constitutes an actual material force field that acts as what Claire Colebrook calls a "milieu of mutual self-distinction."[138] As she suggests, such milieus bring about and hold together co-constitutive and co-emergent multiplicities and subjectivities by continuously drawing new INTENSIVE DIFFERENCES. With this vision, we can approach a more radical understanding of the general workings of architecture and the built environment as a 'milieu machine' involved in MACHINICALLY organizing these differentiation processes.

To arrive at this engineering stratum, one would need a theory that interlinks the cellular organization ecosystemically with the techniques of disjunction that characterize architectural production. Here, the notion of condividuality urges us to approach the built environment not just in terms of spatial practices, but as (MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE) BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICES within environmental transformation processes that rearrange socio-

136 In this interest, I will thus touch on the biological genealogy of Foucault's thinking repeatedly throughout this study. Morphogenesis, being concerned with the evolution of biological forms, early twentieth century developmental biology, a morphogenetic field as an explanation of forming organs, limbs, etc. in which groups of cells are able to respond to discrete, localized biochemical signals leading to the development of specific morphological structures or organs.

137 See Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects,* trans. Cécile Malaspina and John Rogove (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2017), 178–79; and idem, *L'Individuation psychique et collective*, 175 (my trans.).

138 Claire Colebrook, "Sex and the (Anthropocene) City," *Theory, Culture & Society* 34, no. 2–3 (2017), 39–60; here 46.

22 EPIGENETIC LANDSCAPE
Waddington's known illustration of the path-dependency in the cellular differentiation within developmental histories (*top*), and his initial representation of the "complex system of interactions" that underlies the adaptive formation of this landscape itself, as anchored to certain genes (*bottom*).



23 *Overleaf*, modern urban landscapes, their channeling of flows and their machinic production of subjectivity.



economic relations and affect subjectivation processes. Thereby, we are not extending Foucault's heterotopological view of genesis in any hyper-foucauldian fashion. Rather, in exactly avoiding to generalize a 'weaker' heterotopological vision that remains limited to studying the resulting part-hood structures generated, this strengthened heterotopological view would foreground the genetic relationships and spatial organizations that effectuate them. This reading would come much closer to Foucault's original proposition of heterotopology as an analytic for describing the part-to-part relations that set certain places apart as worlds within worlds.

This technical generalization of the heterogenizing function of spatial organization, I argue, has to be approached by shifting the attention from enclosure and closed systems to open systems evolving through progressive differentiation. In this regard we would generalize Foucault's own cautious warning that (full) enclosure is a merely optional technique.[139] Not only is 'isolation,' 'confinement,' or 'separation,' a particularly simplistic form of enclosure which usually involves more complex mechanisms of exclusion[140] that are "neither constant nor indispensable, nor sufficient in disciplinary machinery. This machinery works … first of all on the principle of elementary location or partitioning [*quadrillage*]."[141] More than implying the production

139 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 135–70; here 141–3.

140 In a well-known comparison Foucault distinguished two forms of confinement: "If it is true that the leper gave rise to rituals of exclusion, which to a certain extent provided the model for and general form of the great Confinement, then the plague gave rise to disciplinary projects. Rather than the massive, binary division between one set of people and another, it called for multiple separations, individualizing distributions, an organization in depth of surveillance and control, an intensification and a ramification of power. The leper was caught up in a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure; he was left to his doom in a mass among which it was useless to differentiate; those sick of the plague were caught up in a meticulous tactical partitioning in which individual differentiations were the constricting effects of a power that multiplied, articulated and subdivided itself; the great confinement on the one hand; the correct training on the other. The leper and his separation; the plague and its segmentations" (Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 198).

141 See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 135–70; here 143. It centrally illustrated the formation of modern disciplinary arrangements (during the seventeenth to eighteenth century), based on four identifiable dispositifs: based on four identifiable dispositifs: first, "the *art of distributions*" (ibid., 141–9), that is, a distribution of individuals in space; second, "the *control of activity*" (ibid., 149–56), which concerns the regulation of life through time tables; third, "the *organization of geneses*" (ibid., 156–62) in which "the 'seriation' of successive activities makes possible a … detailed control, … of characterizing and therefore using individuals" (ibid., 160); and, fourth, "the *composition of forces*" (ibid., 162–7), arranging 'tactics' in which "the product of various forces is increased by their calculated combination" (ibid., 167). The first dispositif of distribution, is a particular relevance for architecture and concerns the ordering of placement of bodies in space, for which for Foucault identified four techniques: (a) the first optional technique is 'enclosure,' as "the specification of the place heterogeneous to all others in close on itself" (ibid., 141). Here monastic model becomes progressively imposed. As Foucault notes, enclosure "is neither constant nor indispensable non-sufficient and disciplinary machinery. It does so first

of real physical boundaries, segmentation or striation, the imperfectly translated term *quadrillage* also connotes a systematic form of control, a virtual 'gridding.'

To the extent that this operative dimension drives this machinery, it is entirely misleading to take Foucault as a thinker of enclosure.[142] Instead, the more Foucault's cartographies take architecture into account, Deleuze has pointed out, the more his work on biopolitics and dispositifs discovers something else that—in contrast to the distributed environments of enclosure—operates in open space, on multiplicities whose limits are not readily assignable.[143] Deleuze underscores (in a sense quite similar to the position of strong

of all on the principle of elementary location or *partitioning* [*quadrillage*]" (ibid., 143) by which it "organizes an analytical space, … divided into as many sections as their abilities all elements to be distributed … disciplinary space as always, basically, cellular" (ibid.). The third technique is *functional organization*, or "the rule of functional sites" involving a coding of space that entails a fourth technique of *ranking:* "in disciplines the elements are interchangeable, since each as defined by the place that occupies the series, and by the gap that separates it from the others. The unit is, therefore, neither of the territory (unit of domination), nor is it the place (unit of residence), but the *rank:* the place one occupies in a classification … the interval in a series of intervals" (ibid., 145–6). Taken together, distribution is thus concerned with the organization of the serial space (ibid., 147). See also Fontana-Giusti, *Foucault for Architects*, 52–96.

142 See Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986), 43 and 60. Compare also his lecture series on Foucault, "Les formations historiques" (1985–6) and "Le pouvoir" (1986–7), the audio files and transcripts of which are available online at http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/: "At first reading, many people have the impression that Foucault is above all a great thinker of the confinement. And one invokes two of his main books are invoked, one on the hospital, the asylum in the 17th century, the other on the prison. … [But] there is something much more important than enclosure, it is the *quadrillage* [gridding] and the *quadrillage* of free space. … It is very evident that enclosure in Foucault is not a function. And it has never been a function for Foucault. To enclose is not a social function. … Typically, environments of enclosure are at the service of a function of exteriority: … When the asylum encloses, … it is the 'exile' function that the hospital realizes in the 17th century … One encloses only for and by way of exile. In the 19th century, the prison … [however] assumes a new function. That is, in its environment of enclosure environment, the prison exercises a *quadrillage.* … That is another function than exiling. The prison is the place of *quadrilwlage*. This enables Foucault to say on some very brilliant pages that the asylum is the heir of leprosy, the prison is the heir of the plague. … 'Confinement' is a big generality that tells us nothing. Foucault has never been the thinker of confinement, and for a very simple reason it is that, for him, every form is a form of exteriority." After Deleuze's recorded lecture "Foucault: Les formations historiques," Seminar Dec 12, 1985 (Part 2): n.p. (online, my trans.). He later repeated: "With Foucault, the function of enclosure is always subordinated to a more profound topic of Foucault, that is, the invocation of an outside. Enclosure is always … in service of another function, which is a function of exteriority. Deleuze, "Foucault: Le pouvoir," Seminar Apr 08, 1986 (Part 3): n.p.

143 This is what Deleuze famously terms the 'society of control.' The related published works by Deleuze never discuss the relation between disciplinary society, biopolitics and control in much detail, leaving their precise relation slightly unclear; see Nail, "Biopolitics and Control," in *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, ed. Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail, and Daniel Smith (Edinburgh: EUP, 2016). Deleuze does discusses this relation however in much detail in his lecture series; see here especially the seminar on Apr 8, 1986, Part 3, n.p. A detailed discussion is provided in the following Book O.

mereotopology that parthood should be subsumed under connection structures) that "forms of enclosure are always in service of a 'function of exteriority,'" which not only operates on a much larger scale, namely the ecosystemic, but—to the extent that the latter constitutes a milieu of becoming—also on an ONTOGENETIC level.[144]

This FUNCTION OF EXTERIORITY lies at the heart of Deleuze and Guattari's concept of assemblages that, as I will detail [→ Book O], advances not so much Foucault's notion of the dispositif, but of historical formations. It offers possibilities to engage with architectural formations and historical (trans)formation processes in ways that promisingly transgress former typological analyses and classificatory approaches in favor of explanatory ones. In its emphatic rejection of any essentialist thinking, Deleuzian philosophy successfully bypasses the mereological essentialism that constrains typological thinking. Therein, formations are explained based on "the creation of classifications and of formal criteria for membership in those classifications."[145] Yet, rather than belonging to timeless categories, defined by essential traits, historical formations are defined by the morphogenetic field (or MACHINIC PHYLUM) that has given rise to them. In this materially embedded and process-ontological view, "topological or spatial fields are milieus of becoming."[146]

Mapping Evolving Arrangements

From this angle, a strong heterotopology foregrounding the (onto)genetic aspect of differentiating part-to-part relationships is not just 'onto-topological,' but in its radical relationality, immediately assemblage-theoretical. In thus continuing the CARTOGRAPHIES Foucault started to make, such a generalized history of limits would attend more to the progressive differentiation process of our built environment that pertains to the formation of apartments, not in terms of enclosure but in terms of partitioning. Calling for a paradigm shift in approaching architecture's technical function (or TECHNICITY) as a BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICE within a material milieu, this approach can map the genesis of apartments and their progressive growth through cellular differentiation (or EPIGENESIS) by situating it at once within the progressive environmental differentiation of the modern city and its own epigenesis, hence on a level of MACHINIC interactions between different differentiation processes.

144 Deleuze, "Les formations historiques," Seminar of Dec 12, 1985, and Apr 8, 1986 (my trans.)
145 Manuel DeLanda, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 32.
146 Levi R. Bryant, *Onto-Cartography: An Ontology of Machines and Media* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2014), 147.

Aiming to adumbrate the specific difference that apartments introduced within this milieu of cellular differentiation, this study is designed to provide what Levi R. Bryant—in distinguishing four kinds of historico-theoretical approaches to the machinic assemblages of socio-environmental formations—calls a "genetic map": a reworked form of genealogy, "genetic maps chart the genesis or history of how particular worlds came to be."[147] It does so by drawing together a map of emergent structural couplings between machines that discursively and non-discursively organize socio-environmental relations.[148] To the extent that this mapping will situates the specific formation process or 'speciation' of apartments (as a phylogenetic process) within an epigenetic process of progressive cellular differentiation of a particularly-constructed environment, this genealogy is actually geared at (and articulated through) an **EPIPHYLOGENETIC** approach.

This theory-led approach is based on a radical reconceptualization of technical co-evolutions, elaborated in my following preliminaries [→ BOOK 0], which will methodologically revisit both Foucault's and Deleuze's approaches to historical formations, and elaborate on the theoretical presuppositions and consequences that their genetic thinking entails. Therein, I initially introduce and discuss a set of relevant assemblage-theoretical, difference-theoretical, process-ontological, new-materialist, matter-realist, and agential realist approaches whose flat ontologies will allow us to further develop these approaches epiphylogenetically, toward a history of material transformation. Besides elaborating on some of the here already employed conceptual tools, this part also serves in setting up a theoretico-methodological apparatus, for reclaiming a new notion of architectural arrangements as enabling constraints within historical formations. To reclaim Foucault's heterotopological method from an epiphylogenetic angle, it ought to be advanced as a strong mereo-topolological, that is assemblage-theoretic approach, which understands heterogenesis as an emergent effect of differential processes, an emergent pattern operated by intensive differences, and processes operating themselves at differential speeds and slownesses.[149] This mapping thereby stresses—in line with Foucault's call to generalize the technical aspect of architectural **BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICES**—the twofold differentiation process through which a world of apartments came to be.[150]

147 Ibid., 263.

148 Ibid., 7, 35.

149 If for Foucault, the house is an arrangement of rest, such a view would reconsider it a 'metastable equilibrium.' See Foucault, "Of Other Spaces"; cf. McLeod "'Other' Spaces and 'Others,'" 19.

150 Deleuze's writings teach us to always account at once for a twofold differentiation process

In this regard, "A Genealogy of Apartments" in the subtitle of *A Flat Theory* must be understood not just as a shorthand for "genetic map of the historical formation of apartments," but more so for an epiphylogenetic mapping of a process of **APARTMENTALIZATION**, as an emergent pattern of urban self-organization that enabled our current forms of togetherness.[151] This, I want to generally suggest, happened in three very distinct phases in the successive formation of appartements, apartment houses, and apartment housing. But instead of constituting some sort of linear stages of development, this succession consists in a more non-linear process wherein very specific socio-environmental transformation processes lead to symmetry-breaking processes in the state of matter of our urban habitat, triggering a different condition of aggregation that results in new 'aggregate states' or 'phase spaces' with increasing organizational complexity. Within each of the three phases of apartmentalization, there is a systemic 'phase transition' that must be mapped in a sort of 'phase diagram' of the built environment. It will hence be necessary to approach this history as a complex qualitative transformation 'of' the built environment, contrary to a change that simply takes place 'in' urban space. This approach asks for an understanding that firmly embeds the historical formation of apartments within the changing social milieus of urban environments and their transformation and modernization. Since this requires making several methodological and especially conceptual steps, twists, and turns, I will take time in the next chapters to prepare this reading in more detail.

that he himself captured this in the concept of **DIFFERENT/CIATION**: a transformation *of* something existing, and an actualization *into* something different along multiple lines. Here, the twofold concept of differentiation does not explain anything, if one neglects the problem to which it responds, or if one does not go back to the problematic structure that gives rise to it. See my chapter 0.3.1.

151 As a clarification let me add that, in aiming at a recurrent pattern of urban self-organization, the notion of 'apartmentalization' is not meant to describe a unique event within Western modernity. On the contrary, this initially Eurocentric focus on apartmentalization — opening toward a more global perspective throughout the subsequent volumes — should thus be understood a somewhat *decolonial* attempt to free the notion of apartments from hegemonic macro-narrative of modernization (as linked to the Western world, and the Enlightenment), and open to various local modernization processes in e.g. ancient cities (as Rome or Teotihuacan) that too evidence specific forms of 'apartmentalization.' But what sets this last process apart from earlier local occurrences is that it took form on a global scale. To the extent, that mapping apartmentalization largely de-generalizes (and thus re-singularizes) the relation between apartments and modernization, the apparent exclusion of these 'older' forms through the relation to modernization drawn in this first volume is then fully strategic, to present the material-discursive genesis *appartements* as a historically- and geopolitically singular, central European, aristocratic form of organizing residential space into a particular equipment of power.

More practically speaking, the method for mapping this organizational transformation was an exercise in **DIAGRAMMATIZATION**, in countering representational modes of thinking by rendering visible the forms of organization inherent in spatial arrangements. To help mitigate the strong subsumption of connection structures under parthood structures (or constructive elements) typical of architectural plans, the plans included in this study were consistently redrawn to foreground spatial differentiations and configurative relations.[152] It is with this aim that this book is printed on a slightly grey background, so as to allow making all walls or outlines white.

With the same aim, the plans are consistently complemented by the aforementioned Space Syntax-inspired diagrams ⊠[24], which theorists like Markus and Dovey, but also historians such as Sara Galletti, have embraced as a complementary tool for analyzing residential space in its internal organization, and thereby foregrounding the social logic inherent in spatial connections and configurational relationships.[153] In interpreting spatial plans through

152 One basic methodological restriction, concerning archival material, came with the challenge of this study being conducted as an unfunded research. Firstly, I have not as heavily relied on archival material and plans, as would be customary and necessary in the format of historical monographies and more limited-scope architecture-historical studies, aiming to reconstruct the geneses of specific buildings or building types. In my synthetic work, with its differing ambition, I have relied instead on the examination of earlier scholarship, and have where possible and relevant consulted archival material that is available online (see the sources). The second aspect came with the *visual inclusion of archival material.* After starting, I realized that many of the plans and images included here would have been subject to not just copyrights and reproduction costs, which given the sheer amount of plans would have challenged this very enterprise, also in its aim to be open source. This was a contributing factor for my decision to redraw the plans. But the principal reason remains the opportunity to thereby render visible the internal spatial structure, as I explain hereafter. Here, I have resorted to making a certain general visual distinction in including 'ideal projects' as they appear in print, to stress their character as a 'paper architectures' and discursive aspect, and redrawing realized projects. The latter may be perceived as inviting historical inaccuracy and idealization, as I have been told by historically-trained peers. But I am confident to have put the best of my designedly knowledge in redrawing/reconstructing these plans based on several distinctions. On the one hand, I have structurally redrawn these plans as accurately as possible where crucial for historical analysis and understanding of spatial (and social) organization (e.g. concerning the position of chimneys, doors, or windows); on the other hand, the plans do strategize and embrace a certain degree of *graphic abstraction* or even *diagrammatization* (e.g. facade decoration, complex geometries, offsets, or negligible asymmetries and non-rectangularities) intended — in its figure-ground inversion — to render this organization more legible over structural elements. In fact, contrary to the suspicion of 'idealization,' especially the drawings illustrating Part III actually represent a substantial effort of *de-idealizing* many of the layouts, as previously sourced from and discussed in architecture-historical scholarship on the basis of their published plans within contemporary architectural collections. Therein, these plans had often already been geometrically simplified (e.g. made more perpendicular), or even wrongly measured, which becomes evident when trying to match them with the actual plot geometry, as recorded in older and contemporary cadastral maps. See also the 'Image Sources' at the end of Part III.

153 In *The Social Logic of Space*, Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson have proposed an analytical



24 DIAGRAMMING CONNECTIONS

***Top*, the three primary configurational relations, based on Hillier and Hanson's *Social Logic of Space* (1984) highlight three very distinct types of linear, looped, or branched organization through spatial connections within almost identically-looking plans. Adapted from Dovey, *Framing places* (1999). *Below*: Adaptation for more complex spatial configurations, where some difficulties in the diagrammatization are indicated. The left plan shows the differentiation of principal routes vs. shortcuts. The central plan shows that the placement can entail some implicit hierarchies. The plan on the very right shows a modern corridor-cell complex, with more multiply-branched diagrams.**





25 FOREGROUNDING ORGANIZATIONS
My own adaptation of the abovementioned plan by Blondel, foregrounding specific sequences within a plan (*top*). The complementary diagram (*bottom*) similarly reveals the intrinsic connections, and spatial chains within these structures. Here, the diagonal lines mark rooms *en enfilade*, as differentiated from their strategic junctions, and servicing cross-connections (dotted).

hierarchical access diagrams, they valuably direct attention to the changing TOPOLOGICAL ORDERINGS within these architectural arrangements. Strangely enough, these diagrams depict spatial relationships somewhat similar to genealogical trees, and — as we shall see — this similarity is not coincidental. Yet from the view of graph theory, they work somewhat differently, to the extent that the genealogical diagrams cannot have loops, and as such are 'acyclic graphs,' while topological orderings can include loops and are thus not necessarily 'directed graphs.' It is this aspect of (non)directionality that, as we shall see, is particularly relevant for the understanding of the formation and evolution of aristocratic appartements from hierarchically-configured and strictly programmed serial space into more differentiated tree-like and networked configurations.[154] 24–25

approach that aimed at redirecting the representational mode of critique within architectural discourse toward exposing the 'deeper social structuring' within spatial arrangements. In the sense that these structures are made up of spatial segments, like the genetic makeup of the DNA, they call these 'genotypes' (as opposed to the notion of 'phenotypes' based on observable, formal traits, which widely underlies the architectural idea of types). To render visible this makeup, they translated the spatial syntax, and specific sequencing and adjacency of spatial segmentation within architectural plans into analytical diagrams. Against Hillier and Hanson's heavily-linguistic reading as "syntactic structures," I prefer to read these more non-discursively as **TOPOLOGICAL ORDERINGS,** given that these spatial structures and diagrams are inherently topological. These analytical diagrams, mapping pathways from the main entrance onwards, expose more clearly the specific connection structures implied within architectural arrangements. Admittedly, a greater disadvantage of these diagram is that they cannot account for the *temporal* dynamics. I have (more unsuccessfully) tried to include this temporal dimension. But aside from the resulting visual complexity, it eventually appeared partly negligible as many of these dynamics did not happens simultaneously, but in smaller and larger diachronic temporal patters, as these spaces where in fact not yet really polyvalent and multi-fictional spaces where a more detailed analysis of synchronic dynamics would become important. For a critical reading, see Dovey, *Framing Places*, 20–22. See also above, note 66.

154 For the important distinction between simple 'spatial relations' and 'configurational' ones, see esp. Julienne Hanson, with contributions by Bill Hillier, Hillaire Graham, and David Rosenberg, *Decoding Homes and Houses* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), 22–23: "[Spatial relations] exist where there is any type of link between two spaces," whereas configurational relations arise when the spatial relations "between two spaces are changed according to how we relate each to a third, or … any number of spaces" and the specific arrangement they form." Here Hillier and Hanson had distinguished three rather different kind of configurative connection structures: a 'looped,' relatively open arrangement of spatial segments into a matrix of interconnected rooms, with multiple pathways; a much more linear arrangement of spatial segments into a specific sequence (if not necessarily in geometric alignment such as in the 'enfilade') leading to a highly constrained pathway; and a branched arrangement, in which access to rooms is enabled from a single highly connected spatial segment (typically a central transit space, like a corridor) into more distributed rooms clusters. Especially the latter two this present two variant forms of hierarchization and modes of access and control. In diagramming different buildings evolving tendencies, e.g. toward the sequentialization of spaces, or the inverse their 'corridorization' can be rendered visible. My mapping will be obviously more interested in the specific hybridization and transformations processes.

A similar attempt was made to construct the synthetic argument in a similarly diagrammatic, topological manner, and not just historically. Albeit based on historical scholarship, *A Flat Theory* is a work *more topologico demonstrata*, since—against the grain of traditional historiography—topology involves the virtual and embraces it as real. It thus implicitly reworks the geometric method employed in Spinoza's *Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata* and its analytic demonstration of synthetic powers, through post-Deleuzian rearticulations of **ETHOLOGICAL** approaches toward a deliberately differential and **DIFFRACTIVE** approach to (hetero)geneses. As such it proceeds not so much by analytically breaking down (or chunking up) the topic into finite chapters and sections presenting historical components chaining up into a more or less linear story. Instead, it starts from three basic plateaus that approach the topic not so much in terms of different phases within the evolution of apartments, but as three distinguishable synthetic processes (= **THREE SYNTHESES**) that operate on distinct levels of organizational complexity: a more detailed etymological layer concerning the crystallizing conception of *appartamenti*; a middling spatio-temporal, organizational layer concerning the form-taking architecture of aristocratic *appartements*; and a larger planning-theoretic layer concerning the concretizing residential system of appartements in the planning practices and discourses around the French *hôtels*.

Each plateau itself constituted by these three (increasingly complex) syntheses; as such each plateau already presents a thicker, and already multi-layered **EPISTRATIC** compound that must be analyzed on different historical, methodological, and theoretical levels. For this reason, these plateaus are successively intensified, split up into a *mille feuille*, assembled as nested pieces that incrementally determine one another reciprocally in several convergent series. (This multiply-tripartite structure becomes visible in the incrementally nested system of multiple numeration employed for the sake of navigation and cross-referencing between Part I with its three chapters, to Part II with its three larger chapters with three sub-chapters each, to Part III with three 'mega'-chapters, each with three sub-chapters containing three main sections). Therein, I will differentiate and intensify a problematic field until its spits off its own 'solution.' Rather than offering a complete, full picture, I often offer more local resolutions that communicate with another. The latter is often via what seems to be theoretical digressions that will offer some differentiating (meta)commentaries, which placed these levels transversally in contact with another.

This includes the part following hereafter, which—interspersed before the topical analysis [→ PART I–III]—constitutes a preliminary discussion of the methodico-theoretical arrangements necessary to embark on this epiphylogenetic mapping that underlies the genealogy of apartments. Deliberately taking up the notion of 'scholia' and 'corollaria' from Spinoza's *Ethics*, these interspersed parts must be understood as 'planes of consistency' within the argument, differentiating yet binding heterogeneous parts and related study trajectories, that otherwise remain disconnected across disciplinary divides within the discursive milieu that I am covering. The conceptual lenses employed therein also serve as binding hyperlinks, as they link to the appended 'Glossary for a Flat Theory.' Rather, in attempting to draw or weave a serial argument together into a more complex network, problematizing their degree of (non)relation, and in what way they are or can be related to one another, these **INTER-** and **METASTRATIC** passages are the formal condition for a recomposition of established knowledges toward a more transdisciplinary and transversal account, which more than anything else tries to establish a transdisciplinary discussion. Maybe raising more questions than offering answers, these connecting concepts and passages are never meant as any final causal explanation; they simply mark points and trajectories along which causal connection in a complex genesis is to be further investigated.

In many historical studies, such 'theoretical' considerations are customarily presented separately in prefatory 'methodological' discussions and perhaps brought back in later chapters with more theorizing discussions that—as a conclusion—do not disturb the flow of the historical analysis proper. In the case of my wider architecture-theoretical aim to understand the differentiating aspect of architectural arrangements by way of a historically-grounded analysis, I have found this structure to be counter-productive, as these *structuring* (*i.e. differentiating*) theorizations are actually the starting point to dynamically reconfigure traditional understandings of these processes into more process-ontological and assemblage-theoretical visions. They are thus integral to the argument made. As such, I have integrated them at crucial points in this analysis, which instead of 'staying the object of analysis,' always stays on the level of consistency where those machinic relations exist, and must thus be mapped and redrawn there.

IMAGE SOURCES
FOR INTRO

1 Bau von Mietskasernen in Berlin um 1875 (Friedrich Kaiser, Tempo der Gründerzeit). Via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

2 Hilberseimer, Schema einer Hochhausstadt (1924). Source: Unknown. Assumed to be in the public domain.

3 Photography of a model of Le Corbusier's "Plan voisin" (1925). Via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 4.0

4 Reproduction of a photo by Eva Besnyö of the Bergpolderflat in Rotterdam, during the building phase. Image source: Stadarchief Gemeente Amsterdam, 010164033321, via wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

5 Insulae Photo of a model of a Roman *insula*, Ostia, second century CE, by Tommaso Gismondi (1937) located in the Museo della Civilta Romana, Rome. Image source: unknown, via pinterest.

6 Engraving of the Domus Germanorum (Fondaco dei Tedesci) in Venice, by Raphael Custos (1616). Source: unknown.

7 Old Walled City of Shibam. Image source: UNESCO, via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY-SA 3.0 IGO.

8 Etching (pub. 1794), repub. in Grant's Old and New Edinburgh (1880) vol. I: 168. Image source: https://www.oldandnewedinburgh.co.uk/volume1/page180/pictures/105/zoom. CC BY-NC 2.5.

9 Detail from the Barbari Map (1500). Via Wikimedia commons. Public domain.

10 Spread from Serlio's *Settimo Libro*, 193/5. Image source: TU Delft Library, Trésor TR 540512. Photo: author's own.

11 Palais Bourbon. Detail from Turgot map. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan from Blondel's *Architecture françoise*, Vol. 1, via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain

12 "Plan au rez-de-chaussée d'un grand hôtel" in the *Encyclopédie*'s *Recueil de Planches* (1762), Vol. I; art. "Architecture," part V, pl. XXIII. Via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

13 Frontispiece from N. Harou-Romain's Projet de Pénitencier (1840). Image source: BnF Gallica. Public domain.

14 Detail of Gustave Caillebotte, "A Young Man on his Balcony" (1880). Via WIkimedia Commons. Public domains.

15 Section of a Parisian Immeuble from Edmond Texier's *Tableau de Paris*, Vol. I: 65. Image source: BnF gallica, département Réserve des livres rares, FOL-LK7-6328 (1), ark: 12148/bpt6k1520267s. Isolated and desaturated

16 "L'hyver" by Abraham Bosse. Image source: BnF gallica, département Estampes et photographie, RESERVE QB-201 (30)-FOL. ark: 12148/btv1b8403356d. Public domain.

17 "Le salon de Madame Récamier à l'Abbaye-aux-Bois" by François-Louis Dejuinne. Via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain

18 Diagram. Redrawn by the author, after the "Schema 4: The Body," in Q. Meillassoux, "Subtraction and Contraction," *Collapse* 3 (2007): 97.

19 Map of old Shanghai (1553). Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.



20 Bénard Convection cells. Image source: Milton van Dyke, *An Album of Fluid Motion* (1982), fig. 142, orig. from Koschmieder, "Bénard Convection" in Prigogine and Rice, eds., *Advances in Chemical Physics* (1974), 177–212.

21 Plan de Saint-Victor, c. 1552. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

22 "Part of an Epigenetic Landscape" and "The complex system of interactions…," from Conrad H. Waddington, *The Strategy of Genes* (1957), fig. 4/5.

23 Gustave Caillebotte, "Paris steet; rainy day" (1877). Via Wikimedia commons. Public domain.

24 Primary configurational relations, based on Hillier and Hanson's *Social Logic of Space* (1984). Adaped from Dovey, Framing places (1999), fig. 2.1

25 Diagram, author's own.

BOOK O

Preliminary Arrangements for Writing

A Flat Theory

78–265

“Genealogy does not oppose itself to history … It opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’.”

Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 139.

“The critic is not the one who debunks but the one who assembles.”

Bruno Latour, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” 246.

0.1
On Methodology: Genealogy and Becomings

My preface and introduction has identified the historical formation of apartments as a characteristic blind spot. As such, it may be evident that my approach to our present forms of togetherness is characterized by a not-merely-historical ambition, in aiming to use this historical investigation to arrive at a more machinic conception of the built formations within historical geneses. Arriving at such a machinic conception depends, however, on starting from a complex—namely genetic—and multi-directional point of view. Not to be confused with its biological synonym, genetic analysis is an attempt to explain things or the knowledge thereof through their development, construction, production[1]; or better, their geneses, because it includes and centers on what this development gives further rise to.

By relying on this genetic view in writing *A Flat Theory*, and within writing, discussing, and presenting its various chapters, there repeatedly occurred a need to explain this position or expose my reasoning about historical formation on a more meta-discursive level. For often, rather than offering an explanatory cause or solution, it exposes new problems to be explored, resulting in what seemed to become unending series of problems, which resisted to breaking down into nicely-divided topical chapters. Initially, I was wondering if this was a stylistic issue as to how to integrate theory in this historical analysis. I only slowly realized that this issue concerned a methodological problem in bringing together or recombining elements and chains of what had already been extensively analyzed in what is, in fact, a much more synthetic approach. At the same time, it is a specific synthetic approach that is not in turn analysis, in the sense that it does not aim to create a new totality (the history of apartments), but to draw together a line of thinking that starts from a more productive conception of architecture as material arrangements. The following preliminary discourse serves as a primer for embarking on a genealogy of apartments, as it aims to clarify my own approach in a book discussing the methodological implications as well as the historico-theoretical presuppositions of this genetic approach in its precise modality of problematizing historical formations. Based thereupon, I will extend Foucault's genealogical-cartographic approach to histori-

1 In 1968, for instance, Jean Piaget defined genetic epistemology as the attempt "to explain knowledge, and in particular scientific knowledge, on the basis of its history, its sociogenesis, and especially the psychological origins of the notions and operations upon which it is based" (Jean Piaget, "Genetic Epistemology," lecture series at Columbia Univ., trans. Eleanor Duckworth, avail. online at https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/piaget.htm). In the 1920 Edmund Husserl had started to advance a genetic phenomenology, which in contrast to a static one, is concerned with the emergence or constitution of meanings of meaningless things within corporeal experience.

cal formations in architecture toward what one could call an **EPIPHYLOGENETIC MAPPING**. Because this specific extension reworks existing dichotomies on a number of fronts, rendering this approach explicit amounted to nothing less than a minor thesis.

The purpose of this preparatory book is thus to set up the methodological arrangements for *A Flat Theory*, and outline its genealogical approach to the historical formation of apartments, by marking out some of the concepts that tie its genetic conception of architecture together. Since the 1980s, Western architecture history and theory became torn between two oppositional modes of thinking, two distinct styles of post-marxist discourse, and two diverging historiographical ethico-aesthetics. One had to be acquainted with the soci(ologic)al theories of Elias and Lefebvre, or the discourse-analyses of Foucault. And it treated spatial practices and discourses with the greatest respect. This respect was not immediately granted to the new-fangled philosophy of material, social and technological formations that especially architecture theory would come to advance. In this respect, the following will expand on the two favorite clichés that permeate architectural theory on the matter of socio-bio-techno-environmental formations: the Foucauldian *dispositif* (apparatus) and the Deleuzo-Guattarian *agencement* (assemblage or arrangement). Since the 1990s, critical theory has exploited the Foucauldian term for its diagrammatic clarity in pursuit of a critical re-theorization of architectural form.[2] By contrast, the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept has served avant-garde architects to broaden the conception of formal composition creatively in an age of increasingly digital design.[3]

2 In Foucault's work, the notion of the *dispositif* has variously been translated as "apparatus" and "deployment," but often kept as a neologism, as there seems to be no "satisfactory English equivalent for the particular way in which Foucault uses this term to designate a configuration or arrangement of elements and forces, practices and discourses, power and knowledge, that is both strategic and technical." See the translator's note, in Michel Foucault, *Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College de France, 1973–1974*, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Macmillan, 2006): xxiii–iv. For a general introduction, see Gordana Fontana-Giusti. *Foucault for Architects* (London/New York: Routledge, 2013); on the dispositif, esp. 83–7.

3 As Manual DeLanda points out, the English translation of *agencement* (from French *agencer*, "to organize, arrange, lay out, piece together, match") as 'assemblage' has the crucial disadvantage of making it seem that we are talking about a product, and not a process. In emphasizing the idea of "putting together," it moreover falsely invokes the idea of 'collage' or 'montage' techniques, as a facile sort of compositional technique. DeLanda, *Assemblage Theory* (EUP, 2016), 1. As Thomas Nail further remarks, "while an assemblage is a gathering of things together into unities, an *agencement* is an arrangement or layout of heterogeneous elements". Nail, "What is an Assemblage?," *SubStance* 46 no.1 (2017): 21–37; here 22. For this reason, several Deleuze scholars started preferring the translation as "arrangement" in its more processual connotation, if to the detriment of losing the fact that "it has 'agency' in it" (Braidotti); see also below, note 321. For a general introduction on the use of Deleuzo-Guattarian's philosophy for architects, see

Perhaps the shifting interest from dispositifs to assemblages toward the 2000s itself marks the increasingly post-critical condition of architectural theory.[4] Yet, this shift is also marked by a crucial indifference, leading to a conceptual impasse, considering how many texts have used both concepts more or less interchangeably. Surprisingly perhaps, even in the scholarship on Foucault and Deleuze, where much has been written on either philosophical concept, there has only recently been more attention to the fine differences in how they conceptualize historical formations as not simply historically produced entities, but as equally productive material becomings.[5]

Both the concepts of dispositif and assemblages appear amid Foucault's and Deleuze's parallel inquiries into emergent historical formations. As such, they cannot be understood in isolation from the formulation of each of their genealogical approaches and the defining genetic modality of inquiry in which these concepts attain their strategic ontological function, where they touch on the agency of material formations within historical geneses. As these differences concern precisely the architectural dimension within historical formations, I want to critically highlight these differences in mapping the mutual inspiration, and reciprocal determination, of Foucault's and Deleuze's differing historiographic methods and problematics to open

Andrew Ballantyne, *Deleuze and Guattari for Architects* (London/New York: Routledge, 2007); on machines rather than assemblages, see esp. 1–37. For a succinct discussion of the different waves of Deleuze scholarship in architecture, see Simone Brott, "Deleuze and the Intercessors," in *Architecture for a Free Subjectivity: Deleuze and Guattari at the Horizon of the Real* (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 15–35; orig. pub. in *Log* 18 (Winter 2010), 135–51. For discussions on the ongoing relevance, see also Hélène Frichot and Stephen Loo, eds., *Deleuze and Architecture* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2013), therein esp. the articles by Karen Burns, "Becomings," 15–39; and Marko Jobst, "Why Deleuze, Why Architecture?," 61–69. See furthermore Hélène Frichot, Catharina Gabrielsson and Jonathan Metzger, eds., *Deleuze and the City* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2016).

4 For a map of this form-taking condition, see Frichot, "On the Death of Architectural Theory and Other Specters," *Design Principles and Practices* 3, no. 2 (2009): 113–22; for a discussion of architecture's encounter with Deleuze therein, see Hélène Frichot and Stephen Loo, "The Exhaustive and the Exhausted: Deleuze AND Architecture," in *Deleuze and Architecture*, ed. Frichot and Loo (Edinburgh, EUP, 2013), 1–11; and Jobst, "Why Deleuze, Why Architecture."

5 For the critique of this neglect, see Nicolae Morar, Thomas Nail, and Daniel Smith's introduction to *Between Deleuze and Foucault* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2016), 4. As in his other monographic philosophical studies, Deleuze's work on Foucault directly appropriates his concepts without distinguishing even major differences between them. See Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986); id., "What is a Dispositif?" in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher*, trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 1992), 159–61; and "Michel Foucault's Main Concepts," in *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, ed. Morar, Nail, and Smith, 59–71. On the reductive architectural usage, see for example, Kim Dovey, "Assembling Architecture," in *Deleuze and Architecture*, ed. Hélène Frichot and Stephen Loo (Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2013): 131–48, here 133 and 143. This neglect also entails a wrong view of assemblages as a later advancement of dispositifs.

them toward a renewed conception of architecture as constitutive material arrangements. Given the decades of intense discussion of Foucault's and Deleuze's historico-theoretical legacies in the field of architecture,[6] I try to meet the reader halfway by constructing a new 'degree zero'[7] to reconsider the ongoing importance of both bodies of work when it comes to understanding the historical formation of architecture from this particular angle. Therein, this preliminary discussion complements earlier comparative analyses, not only by covering more terrain in order to present the work of Foucault and Deleuze, but also by focusing more closely on the constitutive function that material arrangements (not just 'space,' as geographers have often foregrounded) attain in their differing approaches to historical formations.

While its primary aim is to present and explain a greater extension of genealogical inquiries into historical formations in architecture, this explication can equally be understood as a more general conclusion in its wider implications for architectural history and theory. Having said so, the purpose of the following is not to offer any justifying discussion about a *theoretical* starting point, since genetic thinking is not a 'theory' but a methodological problem, to begin with, and genealogy is by now a relatively (maybe too)

6 Current approaches to their work are largely in danger of being torn apart between two extremes: being either appropriated by a too general manner in which jargonized concepts are used as a theoretical explanation; or being taken away in a too specific, too deep, and hermeneutic manner on a purely theoretical sphere, in which architectural examples serves as exemplifications. In this regard, I opted for a discussion that goes beyond a mere introduction to Foucault and Deleuze, but without presupposing a Foucauldian or Deleuzian reading. It is hopefully unnecessary to stress that there is no singular Foucauldian or Deleuzian approach to architecture, if by that we mean a unified or canonized theory or method. There is only a multiplicity of individual readings through which to discover new aspects of architectural formations, and engage with them in new ways. Hence, while my own understanding of architectural formations is informed by, related to, read through, yet also distinct from numerous approaches that would be impossible to discuss here, it also stands apart from incredibly complex and differently-targeted discussions in Foucauldian-Deleuzian terms of 'enclosure' vs. 'smooth space'; 'the virtual' in the digital turn, 'events,' diagrammatics, non-equilibrium structures, morphogenesis and digital fabrication, 'networks' and 'control societies,' power geometries, individuality and disciplinarity, critical theory vs. the post-critical, or the recent more Spinozist reading of bodies and affects in the relational ecologies of architecture.

7 Deleuze takes this concept from Roland Barthes's manifesto *Le degré zéro de l'écriture* (1953), in which Barthes reclaims writing [*l'écriture*] as the "zero degree" of literature. Pressing a sort of reset button for what was culturally determined as an art form, it helped Barthes rework the relation between language and literature, linguistics and semiology, and thus the perceived bourgeois idea of literature. Writing denominates a deliberately neutral aesthetic, situated in response to, yet outside of, a dominant cultural order. In Deleuze's reading, who would take on this notion so as to elaborate a degree zero of philosophy, writing is art in a **MINOR** key. The following respectively aims at developing a minor key for writing architecture history.

established (if still contested) method of inquiry after all. Hence the following exposition will concern not so much 'my theoretical position' as it will my position as a thinker and the intellectual lineage that I follow in working with genealogy in the field of architecture theory and history with this dissertation. As such, this genealogical exercise concerns a methodological stance as to how to go about working through historical formations in the built environment. Here, especially a more Deleuzian stance calls for rejecting prescriptive methods in favor of experimental ones. In this sense, this chapter 'takes the test,' less as a demonstration, but by trying out a new idea. The following is therefore primarily a methodological exercise concerning the fact that I am an autodidact when it comes to both the following philosophical positions, as much as when it comes to architecture history. In this respect, I follow Jacqui Alexander and Chandra T. Mohanty's call to not passively "inherit our intellectual neighborhoods … [but] consciously build them."[8] In this tactical aspect of *exercising genealogy*, the following parts and chapters will move onto a more resolute scale (moving far away from the object of apartments) that may seem to go well beyond the conventional scope of theoretical expositions that can conventionally be found in similar historico-theoretical works. I felt the impulse to suggest that some readers may want to skip this book, or read it at the end. But in the end, this is quite counterproductive as I assemble the (for me) most relevant theoretical and methodological distinctions with which to approach emergent phenomena non-reductively.

So while this discussion may seem like a long digression, its various points and concepts are important for my general notion of architectural arrangements and the resulting assemblage-theoretic approach to apartments. The basic ambition of the following is to put in place a methodological apparatus for approaching emergent architectural arrangements genealogically through transformative material geneses. Materially engaged disciplines like ecology, geology, pharmacology, neurology, and meteorology are largely aware that changes do not happen in an environment, but that it matters as a transformation of a material environment. For large parts of architecture, history, and sociology this is not the case. Especially the field of architecture seems to lack a reciprocal awareness of how its steady rearranging of the built environment matters.[9] As strange as it may sound, as a disci-

8 M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, eds., introduction to *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures* (New York/London: Routledge, 1997), ix.

9 See also Katie Lloyd Thomas, ed., *Material Matters: Architecture and Material Practice* (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2007), from whom the following borrows an expanded notion of 'material matters,' in the aim to further extend it from a **MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE**

pline uniquely engaged in the purposeful rearrangement of material matters and environments, architecture is astoundingly ignorant to its own transformative capacity on a basic level.[10] Up to now there is not even a rough outline of an **ETHOLOGY** of the built environment, if by this we mean a general understanding of built matters in terms of what it is that architecture actually does.[11] Modeled after the task outlined in Baruch Spinoza's *Ethics* to experimentally arrive at an understanding of what bodies can do, the question 'what architecture does' (rather than focusing on the question 'what architecture is' or 'what architects do') forces the discussion of architecture's agency back onto the ways it historically comes to matter as a transformation engine. As such, this attention to transforming material matters forces us into an intensive reworking of our understanding of the self-organizing capacity of matter itself, to arrive at an affirmative ethics and ethico-aesthetics of sustainable socio/bio/geo/techno/material arrangements.

0.1.1 Genetic Approaches to Historical Formations in Architecture

To ask "what architecture does" does not imply isolating architecture's material agency (architecture as a building) from either social practices or institutional structures (architecture as a practice and discipline); nor is it reducible to the question "how it works," since it includes the effects of its workings. It implies to comprehend—by avoiding to isolate material entities and social practices—the effects of the workings of the built environment in relation to other social machines. These two questions are systematically divided, how-

angle specified below.

10 This lacking understanding of architecture as physical entities, is just one aspect concerning a more comprehensive and differentiated understanding of architecture as a specific **MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE PRACTICE**, as I will argue. In addressing architecture this way, my aim is fundamentally not to neutralize the specific differences in the ways in which this purposeful transformation is carried out, or how buildings are being built and by whom. This point was wonderfully problematized, for instance by Laura Diamond Dixit, Kadambari Baxi, Jordan Carver, and Mabel O. Wilson, "Who Builds Your Architecture?," in *Asymmetric Labors: The Economy of Architecture in Theory and Practice*, ed. Aaron Cayer et al. (Brooklyn: The Architecture Lobby, 2016), 37–42; or Wilson, Carver, and Baxi, "Who Builds Your Architecture?—An Advocacy Project," in *The Gulf: High Culture/Hard Labor*, ed. Andrew Ross (New York/London: OR Books, 2015), 100–13). The following only aims to foreground a material perspective that hopefully helps stressing these differences.

11 I come back to and explain this ethological reading further below. On a possible ethology of architecture, see Elizabeth Grosz in conversation with Heather Davis and Etienne Turpin, "Time Matters: On Temporality in the Anthropocene," in *Architecture in the Anthropocene*, ed. Etienne Turpin (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2013), 129–38.

ever, by being investigated separately within studies pertaining either to architecture history or theory,[12] as fields that are not only mutually but also internally divided in their attention on the one hand to social, cultural, institutional, discursive and spatial *practices* (i.e. social histories and/or theories of architecture as an evolving discipline) and to architectural, economic, or temporal *structures* on the other hand (i.e. histories and/or (post-)critical theory of architecture as material entities or types). As such these studies tend to be divided along a line that is often congruent with those underlying the **STRUCTURE/AGENCY-DEBATE**.

It would be quite difficult to even adumbrate this debate in its full complexity, especially concerning the relation between historical structures and social change, which has long been a central point of contention and unsolvable dilemma in the social sciences.[13] We can suffice with Stanford Anderson's observation that the structure/agency divide has long excluded even "the possibility that the physical environment is an operative factor in human relations" and hence history.[14] Only in one regard has architecture's influence on historical developments been more accepted: Émile Durkheim early emphasized how a society's structural properties primarily exert **CONSTRAINING** influences (morally, legally, and normative) over individual or collective actions. Only in the 1980s would sociologist Anthony Giddens contest that "structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling" and that "these two aspects have to be studied together."[15] He thus approached structure and agency in their duality, as two logically co-implicated yet separately identifiable conditions. Yet, despite

12 Here, I am not talking about the history of architecture theory. In the distinction between architecture theory versus architectural theory, I follow K. Michael Hays's distinction that if architectural theory foregrounds the development of architectural discourse, architecture theory "aims to show how architecture enables certain ways of thinking that are irreducible to other modes of thought." As such, Richard Anderson adds, it "expands the scope and force of architectural discourse. It discloses relationships between categories of thought and practice that might have once appeared disparate: linguistics and architecture; deconstruction and architecture; psychoanalysis and architecture; and so forth." K. Michael Hays's introduction to *Architecture Theory since 1968*, ed. K. Michael Hays (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1998), xii; cited in Richard Anderson, "Possible Conjunctions," *e-flux architecture*, posted online Oct 30, 2017, at https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/history-theory/159240/possible-conjunctions.

13 For a comprehensive study, see Alex Callinicos, *Making History: Agency, Structure, and Social Change in Social Theory* (Leiden: Brill, 2004; orig. pub. 1987).

14 Stanford Anderson, "People in the Physical Environment: The Urban Ecology of Streets," *On Streets* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978): 2.

15 Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), esp. 162–206; here 25 and 175. See also id., *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis* (Berkeley/Los Angeles Univ. of California Press, 1979), 76–77.

Giddens's attempts to reconcile both in his structuration theory, the structure/agency divide has continued to haunt the social sciences, whichin this dual thinking subsequently attended more closely to enabling practices.[16]

By often excluding material practices (discarded as 'structure'), however, this latter vision greatly prevented scholars from accounting and reconceptualizing the enabling causality of material phenomena. Only recently has this vision gained more momentum in a growing stream of sociological and social/behavioral science scholarship that has started to re-embrace a critical neo-materialist and more affect-theoretical stance in how material environments affect and effectuate psycho-social systems.

Reconciling A Divided Debate

Starting to reconsider, re-embrace, and re-theorize these aspects would also help to innovate the field haunted maybe most severely by this divide: the history and theory or architecture. Especially socially-inclined architectural history seems to have ended up—in having followed the exclusion of any material causality—pursuing a predominantly discourse-analytical and object-biographical approach to changing social practices and its representative spaces shaped by power relations. This rigid methodological framework is characterized by a notable resistance to any sort of 'theory,' as has been criticized by the *#TheoryRevolt* movement.[17] This critique is not meant to further pit theory against history. On the contrary, it is meant to oppose a false division of scholarship into one mode of historicizing architectural form and knowledge that (using the historical method) finds legitimacy primarily in empirical documentary evidence, and another, supposedly different, mode of theorizing (using often more heterodox speculative epistemological, or ontological lenses) architectural discourse, practice, and production.[18] Historians base their observation on theoretical frameworks, as much as architecture theorists base their interpretations on historical facts. But asymmetrically, history may suffer from a certain anti-theoretical stance that restricts it to gathering evidence within a pre-established intellectual framework (i.e., a realist epistemology and empiricist methodology) that often excludes more speculative positions and alternative epistemologies.[19]

16 See Mark Bonta and John Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2004), 3–4.

17 See the provocative manifesto by Ethan Kleinberg, Joan Wallach Scott and Gary Wilder, "Thesis on Theory and History" (May 2015), http://theoryrevolt.com.

18 Here after Anderson, "Possible Conjunctions," n.p. (online).

19 See Kleinberg, Scott, and Wilder, "Thesis on Theory and History," §§1.4, 1.9, 2.1.

Beyond simply implementing Borden and Rendell's general call for intersecting architectural histories with critical theories,[20] the problem for any possible conjunction of history with theory, Anderson comments, lies not in a simple reconciliation; it lies in arriving at a more inclusive mode of inquiry that undoes this false divide, and the major disservice it caused in preventing us from inquiring into the causal relationship between material arrangements and historical geneses, and how the former — as I shall argue — affect historical geneses immanently; that is 'flat,' on the same ontological level. This means theory ought to be a re-inscibed formation at the heart of historiography, as a philosophy of history, to critically expose what exact "set of uninterrogated theoretical assumptions about time and place, intention and agency, proximity and causality, context and chronology" various histories rely on.[21] Only this way can the false distinction between history and theory be overcome in "producing theoretically grounded history and historically grounded theory."[22]

In calling for a more transversal approach, Bryan Norwood recently exposed a predominantly "vertical thinking" that architectural history is based on in working, as he writes,

> with hierarchies, typologies of fixed specific differences and other homogeneous, atemporal structures of organization. The vertical historian characterizes structural and disciplinary totalities (of a fixed period or all of history) by organizing different levels of analysis, from the general to the specific. In architectural history, in particular, this method manifests itself in attempts to order all the contingencies that are internal and external to the practice — to explain the structure of architecture (e.g., architecture is ordered form and space) that enables the contingent differences between various periods of production. But today this methodology has waned in popularity as history has limited itself to timid structuralisms, to the diachronically and spatially constrained.[23]

20 Iain Borden and Jane Rendell, *InterSections: Architectural Histories and Critical Theories* (London/New York: Routledge, 2000).

21 Kleinberg, Scott, and Wilder, "Thesis on Theory and History," §1.11.

22 Ibid., §1.7.

23 Bryan E. Norwood, "Working on a Diagonal: Towards a New Image of Architectural History," in *Intensities and Lines of Flight: Deleuze/Guattari and the Arts*, ed. Antonio Calcagno, Jim Vernon and Steve G. Lofts (London/New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 169–86; here 169.

On the other hand, one could contrast a more horizontal thinking in architecture theory, which gained much momentum as it dispersed itself in what we may call an exhaustive poststructuralism, to the synchronically and temporally open, and whose impending 'post-critical predicament' became most explicit in its tendency toward material performances and performative design. In my view, this explicitly materially-embedded conception of performativity is one of the key factors that has conceptually set (post-)critical theory a great distance apart from historical approaches, as they came to employ a very different, more neo-humanistic conception of performativity that centers on architectural praxes and social practices in space. Quite logically, this PRAXEOLOGICAL position is especially pronounced in the history of residential and domestic spaces, and many court studies in their attention to the display of power within aristocratic apartments.[24]

I would like to continue Norwood's argument: historical analysis may have waned into timid structuralism' due to how it conceives different spatial forms as generic products of different social practices. Those, classified into resulting types, are said to represent (and are thus explicatively equated with) various social groups, technical developments, or other essences such as cultural values. In this REPRESENTATIONALISTIC reading of architectural form, these studies often follow the theoretical framework outlined by French Philosopher and social theorist Henri Lefebvre (1901–1991), who is best known for his trilogy toward a critique of everyday life,[25] and his famous credo that "(social) space is a (social) product".[26] Having helped to open up a new notion of architecture's agency as a transformative and empowering practice,[27] this latter hypothesis was put forward in *La production d'espace* (*The Production of Space*, 1974), in which Lefebvre had innovatively *spatialized* history to oppose structuralist sociologists by means of a historical materialist approach.[28] It theorized the social production of space as consist-

24 Those works will be referenced and discussing in more detail in the introduction to Part II, below.

25 See Henri Lefebvre, *Critique of Everyday Life* (London: Verso, 2014; orig. pub. 1947, 1961, 1981).

26 Lefevbre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 26.

27 For studies that reclaim a new notion of architecture's agency as a practice, see esp. Isabelle Doucet and Kenny Cupers, eds., "Agency in Architecture: Reframing Criticality in Theory and Practice," *Footprint* 4 (Spring 2009), Florian Kossak et al., *Agency: Working with Uncertain Architectures* (London: Routledge, 2009); and Nishat Awan, Tatjana Schneider, and Jeremy Till, *Spatial Agency, Other Ways of Doing Architecture* (London: Routledge, 2011); here 29.

28 One of the earliest opponents of structuralist approaches to the built environment, and container conception of space, Lefebvre started critiquing the universal conception of space as a preexisting void to be filled by some content. He highlighted how space is instead produced by social interactions that trigger differing and multiple

ing of a triadic scheme, consisting of "spatial practices" (as the lived space —*espace vécu*— of everyday activities and urban reality), "representations of space" (as the conceived space—*espace conçu*—of architects, planners, geographers), and "representational spaces" (as the perceived space —*espace perçu*— of inhabitants and users).[29] This spatial trialectics, made a significant theoretical intervention into Marxism. But, as Rob Shields has recently highlighted, the predominantly Hegelian-Marxist theoretical framework of this theory becomes quite problematic where the presentation of different spatializations as some sort of progressive historical development follows a nineteenth-century historiography based on a succession of ideal types.[30] Here, the equation of spatializations to historical periods constitutes

spatializations, based on a relational conception of spacetime not dissimilar to that of the Situationists. In his heterodox contribution to the emancipatory project of Marxism, space became a new fundamental socio-political category. This informed an inquiry into the role of spatial architectonics in producing and maintaining political-economic organizations. And it challenged precisely the primacy of environmental determination that had dominated discourse. Lefebvre recognized a problem in how in the emerging structuralist thinking, spatial structures, and organizations, started to be read through linguistic systems in which signs were linked to corresponding referents. Lefebvre was in fact a vehement critic of these approaches. His humanist stance led him to reject such a cold classification, which does not account for any lived experience. In contrast to structuralist sociologists and anthropologist that took socio-spatial forms as icons of the deep structures (Levi-Strauss), or as indexes for different cultures (Bourdieu), Lefebvre understood social spatializations mainly in diachronic terms: "If space is produced, if there is a productive process, then we are dealing with *history*" (Lefebvre, *Production of Space*, 46). With this realization, he formulated a renewed understanding of the influence of changing material conditions and related transformations of social relations, e.g. in the transition from industrialization to the urban revolution.

29 As Gieseking et all. concisely summarize: "*Spatial practice* describes the cohesive patterns and places of social activity. It can be perceived in the everyday acts of buying, playing, traveling, and laboring, as much as in the everyday spaces of the home, office, school, and streets. *Representations of space* are how space is conceived by engineers, cartographers, architects, and bankers through plans, designs, drawings, and maps. It is a system of signs and codes that are used to organize and direct spatial relations. *Representational spaces* are those spaces that the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. Usually dominated by the other modes of spatial production, these are clandestine and underground spaces lived by artists and others who seek to describe alternative spaces" (Jen Jack Gieseking et all., *People, Place, and Space: A Reader* (New York/Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 285). Cf. Christian Schmid, "Lefebvre's Theory of the Production of Space," in *Space, Difference, Everyday Life,* ed. Kanishka Goonewaardena et al. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 27–45).

30 See Rob Shields, *Spatial Questions: Cultural Topologies and Social Spatialization* (London: Sage, 2013), xi, 24, 26, and 30; see also id., *Lefebvre, Love and Struggle* (New York, Routledge, 1999), 109–126. Gieseking summarizes Lefebvre's view that "up until the medieval period, space and time were largely experienced through local, lived conditions; times and distances were established by the capacity of the body. In the Renaissance, mathematical systems were developed that allowed space to be broken into fixed units which could be mapped over the land, establishing a system of abstraction allowing for exact measurement and location. Lefebvre contends that abstract space, produced and perpetuated through grids, plans, and schedules, is utilized and dominated by the capitalist system of production" (Gieseking et all., *People, Place, and Space*, 285).

a sort of soft-core materialism, a somewhat de-materialized historical 'spatialism' that replaces Marx's material conditions of production with spatial conditions for political (inter)action. In this respect, Lefebvre's work and many post-Lefebvrian readings remain rather universalistic, because this form of writing history is still rooted in a very particular epistemology, focusing on the performative aspect of an *external space*—the "key typological trope for organizing the history of architecture."[31]

Even if, since Lefebvre, space may no longer be a simple container concept, in history, architecture often still is. This is due to the fact that Lefebvre's notion of the production of space has partly overshadowed the practices shaping spaces are historical products themselves. This reductive focus on spatial practices is especially prevalent in the more praxeological studies of the past decades, that in studying the greater transformations of urban living during the many scientific, social, political, and technical changes of the last centuries, have methodologically limited themselves to describing transforming social or building practices that took place inside (and gave rise to transforming) architectural forms. In this modernist episteme, architecture is basically conceived as a passive container or framework 'in which' social interactions take place, or sometimes as an architectural apparatus that more actively 'stages' or 'displays,' especially when it comes to discussing forms of power. It is this seemingly harmless conception of architecture as some sort of 'theatre' on which many historical studies perniciously rest, that genetic thinking eventually puts into question by exposing it as a fundamental conceptual flaw in how we think and write about and in what terms we theorize emergent historical formations. [→ PART II]

It is from this angle that the following will repeatedly raise critiques concerning how praxeological approaches perpetuate a particular kind of materialist history, often with a Marxist inclination, that foregrounds the emancipatory aspect of human agency. This sort of writing history clearly resonates in France, as a country having come about in a series of revolutions. As such, we can say a focus on emancipatory practices is historically tied to and entangled with a certain methodological nationalism within French historiography. The problem is larger, however, insofar as any Marxist approach is restricted by its negative, Hegelian, dialectic framework within which matter— as material formations, objects and things—is deprived of the same agency, at least in affirmative terms. Instead, all material aspects have come to be reduced to limiting factors, constraints for human agency, and

31 Norwood, "Working on a Diagonal," 175.

liberating practices. This in turn is based on an ingrained anthropocentic identification of history with social processes, seeing individuals and social formations as the real historical actors. Thereby, it assumes that social reality and material environments exist on two ontologically separate planes. While emphasizing the agency of architecture (as praxis), praxeology implicitly assumes all causality-relevant processes to be grounded in human actors, social practices, or collective subjectivities, and ends up explaining away the very agency of architectural arrangements as enabling constraints for them to form. This all boils down to its separation of (human) practices from (environmental) processes — something that the following tries to avoid in an attempt to elaborate a more posthuman and neo-materialist approach to historical formations by way of a flattened ontology of those transformative material processes underlying changing environmental constellations. Thereby social and spatial practices are treated akin to many other environmental processes that operate on the same level, although to different rules.

Based on this view, any focus on social practices (as conceptually separated from environmental transformation processes) must be harshly critiqued for continuing to widen the artificial gap by which history (as an empirical enterprise) is distanced from theory (as — yes, as what exactly? Commentary or speculative conjecture?). Foucault and Deleuze have reclaimed theory as a practice. Theory-practice. They have stressed that the production of theory is always a re-production of a (given) history, the purpose of which lies in the fact that this reproduction — as a repetition — constitutes the possibility of alternative futures. Rather than reproducing the past, histories produce the future. How do they do so? Precisely by revealing regularities within historical processes. Theory-production, too, consists in recognizing certain regularities and the refinement of our knowledge of these regularities. As such, it involves finding the terms under which these regularities can be thought in their specificity. It involves the conceptualization of regularities. Regarding history then, we need a theoretically-grounded approach that is methodology catered to conceptualizing not so much ‘change’ as such (i.e., continuities and discontinuities, evolutions and revolutions, phases and breaks), but emergent regularities within ongoing transformative processes. A process-ontological one, which understands that social processes take form not only ‘in’ architecture but also ‘by means of’ it.

Michel Foucault's early "archaeologies of vision" followed the Nietzschean view of architecture as a theatrical stage; a vision-framing element.[32] *Naissance de la Clinique* (*The Birth of the Clinic*, 1963), for instance, had uncovered how new medical practices (the "medical gaze," the doctor's visit) appeared within the developing architectural setting of hospitals.[33] In *Surveillir et Punir* (*Discipline and Punish*, 1975), however, this gaze becomes embedded in an architectural space.[34] So rather than looking at epistemic processes that had taken place within buildings or spaces, he progressively shifted toward the question how power or knowledge materialize, or take form in (or 'through') architectural arrangements.

In revealing how built forms are not simply a cause or effect of modernization but also its actual substance, Foucault's genealogical work completely re-framed our understanding of architecture's relation to subjectivation processes.[35] By analyzing several emerging institutions and form-taking architectures, notably the asylum, the clinic, and the prison, Foucault progressively probed into the question how knowledge and power become materialized and spatialized in urban and architectural form. In doing so he mapped how Western societies have 'produced' the individual as a discrete self by arranging a likewise discretely organized modern world, in the sense that these apparatuses "and the 'grids' of power-knowledge they lay out, including the human sciences themselves, render the human knowledgeable and manageable as a [contingent] historical construct rather than as a[n absolute] biological or metaphysical [given]."[36] Contrary to the one-sided (post-)Lefebvrian notion of space as a product, this more co-productive

32 See Gary Shapiro, *Archaeologies of Vision* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2003), 140–42.

33 See Foucault, *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, trans. Alan M. Sheridan (London: Tavistock/New York: Random House, 1973); orig. pub. as *Naissance de la Clinique* (Paris: PUF, 1963).

34 Sven-Olov Wallenstein, "CERFI, Desire, and the Genealogy of Public Facilities," *SITE* 2 (2002), 12–14; here 13.

35 This is of course only one aspect in how "Foucault's account in *Discipline and Punish* of the mechanisms of discipline have transformed irrevocably the way scholars in the humanities and social sciences understand and think about how relations of power are exercised in modern and contemporary Western societies" (Alan D. Schrift, "Discipline and Punish," in *A Companion to Foucault*, ed. Christopher Falzon, Ted O'Leary, and Jana Sawicki (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2013), 151). For the ongoing relevance of Foucault's work for critical theory and cultural analysis, see e.g. Frieder Vogelmann and Jörg Bernardy, eds., introduction to the special issue "40 Years after Discipline and Punish," *Foucault Studies* 23 (Aug 2017), 4–9.

36 Adapted after Reinhold Martin, "Corporate Personhood," in *Architecture/Machine: Programs, Processes, and Performances*, ed. Moritz Gleich and Laurent Stalder (Zurich: GTA Verlag, 2017), 30.

approach to architectural form was aimed at understanding to what extent spatial configurations produce social one, to what degree space is a means of social production, and to what extent architecture—in its very materiality—facilitates particular social interactions, or power relations to form.

Discipline and Punish appeared less historically materialist regarding the linear sequence it drew when it famously described the historical formation of the modern socio-political order of disciplinary society' from earlier 'sovereign societies,' because this transition centered on a crucial 'hardware problem' as Foucault attended to the changing structuration of bodies and spaces in the emerging disciplinary architectures that facilitate the emergence of this social formation.[37] Foucault's attempts at a spatial history thus went radically further than just spatializing history into particular socio-spatial structures. By using spatial conceptions precisely to avoid setting universal conditions, geographer and political theorist Stuart Elden emphasizes, "[Foucault's] histories were not merely spatial in the language they used, or in the metaphors of knowledge they developed, but were also histories of spaces, and attendant to the spaces of history."[38] A genealogical approach to architecture thus analyzes how historical processes or certain power formations arise from or co-emerge with particular spatial configurations or architectural arrangements. Therein, a crucial point of distinction lies in the structuralist conception of buildings and the built environment as conditioned products, and their more post-structuralist conception as conditioned yet further conditioning. As produced yet further productive formations, the transformative capacity of architectural arrangements within historical formations cannot be isolated—from both a process-ontological and materialist angle—from spatial and material practices.[39]

37 See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London: Penguin, 1977).

38 The following will restrict itself to a more methodological discussion of this approach, and its conceptualization of architecture(s) rather than spaces. For a more hermeneutic analysis of the Heideggerian provenance of this 'project of a spatial history,' see esp. Stuart Elden, *Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault and the Project of a Spatial History* (London: Continuum, 2001), 95–102; here 101–2.

39 For Foucault, this productivity is intricately tied to the history of capitalism itself, to make bodies productive. See Elden, *Foucault: Birth of Power* (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), 97 and 147–50. "This is why Foucault suggests that his work should be situated rather differently from much work in the 'history of ideas, of knowledge, or simple history,' and in opposition to 'a certain … academic tradition of Marxism,' which takes the 'subject of knowledge' as an unproblematic starting point. Rather, he suggests that [historical analyses] should be initiated from … an inquiry which would 'show the historical construction of a subject through a discourse understood as consisting of a set of strategies which are part of social practices' … 'whose historical analysis enables one to locate the emergence of new forms of subjectivity" (Ibid., 39, citing Foucault, *Dits et Écrits* II, ed. Defert and Ewald (Paris: Gallimard, 1994): 540 and id., *Essential Works of Foucault: 1954–84,* ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1997), Vol. III: 3–4).

But this productive reading was often criticized for promoting a naive determinist stance latent in any Foucauldian approach to architecture (and any architecture-theoretical approaches to Foucault, perhaps). Especially psychologists and social scientists have long contested any form of so-called spatial or architectural determinism,by which we understand faulty causal thinking (vividly employed, for example, by nineteenth-century reformers who saw architecture as a means of social betterment). This view fails to account for socially mediated processes regarding the relationships between the built environment and the socius. It results in a fundamental overestimation of the influence of architecture on social reality. An anti-determinist stance, however, while rightly debunking the belief that architecture has a pre-planned effect, may risk throwing out the baby with the bathwater if it concludes that architecture has no effect on social reality at all. One would rarely dispute the social significance of architecture as a practice, but things are still complicated when it comes to its very materiality. Today there can be no denying that architecture's materiality *does* affect us, not only in our feelings but also in the way spaces regulate bodies and behaviors; architecture physically affects the quality of our lives, both individually and collectively. From this angle, the problem of spatial determinism lies not in its easily refutable view of intentionality (i.e., that architecture exerts a pre-planned effect); it resides instead in the intricately ingrained, anthropocentric assumption of a fundamental division between material structures and human agency, that was invigorated through structuralist thinking. Brought into the field of architecture via the structural anthropology of Claude Lévi-Strauss, a well-known weakness of these structuralist approaches is their retroactive hypostaticization of what is already known to have happened.[40] Its effect is criticized most harshly by sociologist Bruno Latour, who rejects any approaches that 'explain' developments in terms of those social structures whose historical formations require explanation (e.g. capitalist social relations, patriarchy, the neoliberal market).[41] Such social theories (such as also Pierre Bourdieu's sociological

40 On this point, see i.e. Georges Teyssot, *Topology of Everyday Constellations* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013): "There was peril present in structuralist method, residing in what Pierre Bourdieu defined as the 'realism of the structure' through which systems of relations could be rendered 'hypostatic,' [meaning that they become] transformed into an abstract totality already constituted outside of the history of the individual and the group [that forms them]" (ibid., 7). To avoid this hypostatization of everyday structures, Bourdieu proposed a 'theory of practice,' that — inspired by Durkheim and Lévi-Strauss's work — "reintroduced the Latin and medieval (especially Aquinian) philosophical notion of *Habitus* as an ensemble of unconscious patterns able to generate practices and representations … [a] dispositions that shape the actions" (7–8).

41 See Bruno Latour, *Re-Assembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005), 130–31; see also Nick J. Fox and Pam Alldred, *Sociology and*

theory of *habitus* as a 'structuring structure') merely reify historically produced socio-spatial structures as fundamental expressions of an external reality. This logocentrism problematically overcodes something that remains largely under-theorized, namely the degree to which historically produced bodies, powers, and forces came to exert a very real agency by creating the material conditions for something new to emerge. On this point historians have not yet enlightened us much.

Here the question to what degree established structures are genetic (i.e. generative) elements, has long been overshadowed, not only by foregrounding the negative dimension in constraining social practices. This negative vision (and the resulting critique of determinism) is rooted in a deeper misconception of constraints as some sort of externally-framing conditions limiting a space of action, while—in its very etymology—the term problematizes how complex chains of activity and the resulting space of possibilities are tied to (i.e., they emerge from as much as they are restricted by) binding circumstances.[42] Here, Foucault helped unearth the generative (i.e. enabling) dimension of architectural arrangements for certain discursive formations. Yet, he did so in studies that attended more to restrictive than empowering practices. We know that Lefebvre, for his part, remained largely skeptical about Foucault's work in two interrelated ways: he rejected the largely antihumanist stance of such a technocratic approach to these historical formations, criticizing its "move from an earlier philosophy of liberty … to a philosophy of constraints".[43] Critical theorists, architectural historians and geographers have, however, learned to embrace Foucault's topical focus on modern spaces of enclosure (asylums, hospitals, prisons…) in strangely foregrounding this constrictive function of disciplinary architectures in their critical revision of modernity. In this critical focus, they seem to have more relied on his more generic discourse-analytical historiographic method,

the New Materialism: Theory, Research, Action (London: Sage, 2017), 7 and 16.

42 On the possible structure/agency misreading involved in this point, I will later discuss Terrence Deacon's clarification that "Constraints don't *do* work, but they are the scaffolding upon which the capacity to do work depends". Deacon, *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter* (London/New York: Norton, 2012), 419.

43 Lefebvre, "Claude Lévi-Strauss et le nouvel éléatisme," *L'Homme et la société* 2 (1966): 81–103; 92; see also Shields, *Lefebvre, Love and Struggle*, 122–6. As Wallenstein comments: "For Foucault … Lefebvre is caught up in an illusory belief in the given, and is unable to see that this subjectivity and individuality is itself something produced, and thus is unable to function as a lever for resistance. Lefebvre would retort … that Foucault does not grasp the contradictory and open qualities of everyday spatiality. … Foucault only uses the abstract concept of *savoir*, and never speaks of knowledge as concrete, *connaissance*, … and thus fails to see the potential of the everyday as well as the decisive role played by totality and centrality" (Wallenstein, "CERFI, Desire, and the Genealogy of Public Facilities," 12).

instead of following his explicit transition from an archaeological to a genealogical approach within these studies.

Compared to those many feminist and queer theorists who have exploited Foucault's conjunction of architecture and power in much more performative and embodied terms, architectural historians have underappreciated Foucault's genealogical work: in spite of the critical inspiration that architectural historians such as Manfredo Tafuri have taken from Foucault's work—the supposedly 'operative' mode of critical inquiry—it exerted little influence, as Wallenstein notes, on the kind of architectural history and theory that restricts itself to describing stylistic or typological lines of descents.[44] The reason lies in a particular misconception, which results simply from the fact that not many of these studies have analyzed the philosophical presuppositions or consequences of this operativity within Foucault's historical ontology.[45] For Elden, this has led to an incomplete understanding of Foucault's "project of a spatial history" as rather different from a history of spaces.[46] While it maps processes that take form through—and not simply in—architectural arrangements, it never takes structures as any sort of facile 'explanation' (as Latour warns us), nor does it offer any 'theory' of them. Neither does Foucault suggest a general analytical method to analyze these architectures: as we shall see, they only form a crucial part of the problem to begin with.

44 See Manfredo Tafuri, *Theory and Histories of Architecture* (Cambridge: Harper & Row) 141–71; see also the introduction "The Historical Project" to Tafuri's *The Sphere and the Labyrinth: Avant-Gardes and Architecture from Piranesi to the 1970s* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 8–11). For a discussion, see e.g. Andrew Leach, "Criticality and Operativity," in *Critical Architecture*, ed. Jane Rendell et al. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 14–21. I come back to this point below, note 107. Here, Wallenstein, "CERFI, Desire and the Genealogy of Public Facilities," 13.

45 Elden emphasizes that in this Heideggerian view "ontology is no longer universal in relation to the region of history, but is itself historicized as a historical ontology. This is a history of ontology and an ontological history rather than an ontology of history" (Elden, *Mapping the Present*, 28).

46 See ibid., 3–6 and 93–119. If "Foucault was never keen for his work to be analyzed as a [fixed] method, a theory, or worse, as a system" (Ibid., 93), it was precisely for it was developing with and in response to the specific problem posed, hence no mere recipe. Wallenstein pointed out how i.e. in "*Il dispositivo Foucault* … Foucault's conception of power was scrutinized in a highly critical but … ultimately misleading fashion. … In Rella's interpretation power becomes a 'non-place,'" a virtual void transforming concrete spatial arrangements. Against Foucault's intentions, he thus disembeds power from the spatial configurations through which power comes to be exercised. Space thus remains a container for power. This notion, Wallenstein argues, comes from Foucault's "discussion of linguistic systems of classification in the introduction to … *Les mots et les choses*, [which has] little or nothing to do with the kind of spatial analysis that he developed later in the 1970s." See Sven-Olov Wallenstein, "Foucault and the Genealogy of Modern Architecture," in *Essays, Lectures* (Stockholm: Axl, 2007), 397–99; citing Franco Rella, *Il dispositivo Foucault* (Venice: Cluva, 1977), 10–13.

Yet, many of those Post-Foucauldian studies in the history of modern architecture[47] have maintained a safe distance from this supposedly determinist dimension latent in a genetic understanding of architectural form, seemingly trying to shy away from an explicit engagement with it, by often discarding it as a speculative, and supposedly theoretical aspect.[48] Thereby they effectively ignore the operative framework of the approach they otherwise selectively embrace. In this regard, historians have too long ignored Foucault's vanguard position in a wider methodological problematique of "theory-practice," as they have widely resisted or rejected adopting his more genealogical approach and genetic thinking in its capacity to put into question the traditional structure/agency divide. Today, there is a general agreement that Foucault's work has made it "impossible to regard architecture as a neutral aesthetic or functional container".[49] This is precisely why we must also move beyond generic architectural forms of 'containment.' It is completely misleading to reduce Foucault to a historian of modern spaces of enclosure, as Gilles Deleuze warned long ago, because in Foucault's historical ontology enclosure is not only optional, but also "in service of another function, which is a function of exteriority."[50] Working on a much larger

47 I am referring here back to several works cited in my introduction.

48 For an example, see e.g. the longer comment in Sharon Marcus, *Apartment Stories*, who avoids an explicit "Foucauldian approach," as she argues, in order to avoid positing architects, architectural arrangements, or "spaces as agents of social control" (Marcus, *Apartment Stories*, 9 and 202–3 n17–8). For a longer discussion of this theoretical disclaimer, see Colin Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2013), 1–86. Foucault, partly undermined his own efforts when he himself confused architectural plans with the architect's intentionality in his oft-cited 1982 interview with Paul Rabinow. See Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, Power," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 239–56; repub. in *Essential Works, Volume 3: Power*, ed. James Faubion and Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 2000), 349–64. See also Leopold Lambert, "Michel Foucault's Architectural Underestimation," in *The Funambulist Pamphlet, Vol. 2: Foucault* (Brooklyn: Punctum books, 2013).

49 Fontana-Giusti, *Foucault for Architects,* 93.

50 See my introduction. Deleuze stresses this repeatedly, see Deleuze, *Foucault*, 43 and 60; as well as his 1985–86 lectures on Foucault, of which the audio files and transcripts avail. online at http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze): "At first reading, many people have the impression that Foucault is above all a great thinker of the confinement. And one invokes two of his main books are invoked, one on the hospital, the asylum in the 17th century, the other on the prison. … [But] there is something much more important than enclosure, it is the *quadrillage* [gridding] and the *quadrillage* of free space … It is very evident that enclosure in Foucault is not a function. And it has never been a function for Foucault. To enclose is not a social function.… . Typically, environments of enclosure are at the service of a function of exteriority: … When the asylum encloses, … it is the 'exile' function that the hospital realizes in the 17th century … One encloses only for and by way of exile. In the 19th century, the prison … [however] assumes a new function. That is, in its environment of enclosure environment, the prison exercises a *quadrillage* …

scale, and at—as I will show—an also decidedly ontological level, it is the function of exteriority through which we have an opportunity to reconsider what architectural arrangements do within historical formations from a more machinic angle. It is in this machinic approach that I see a great "chance to refashion architectural history into a vehicle for the field's most innovative thoughts and aspirations. To do this, history must be understood as a form of architectural thinking," while historical forms are the material to generate a new critical power.[51]

From this angle, the first two chapters of this preliminary discussion will explore Foucault's methodological transition regarding the study of architectural formations through Deleuze's reading of this shift toward a generalized theory of production, and the way it informed his concept of assemblages as emergent wholes characterized by relations of exteriority. However, it is crucial to not simply swing from enclosure and containment to the all-open, borderless space, because the task is to focus on the urgent problem of understanding immanent limits. Based on this view, this preliminary discussion will employ the concept of **ARRANGEMENT**—as an almost instinctive entry point for architectural thinking—as a genetic lens to advance a more assemblage-theoretic conception of architecture's function as a **BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICE** within the complex process of the **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION** of material and discursive elements within the **DOUBLE ARTICULATION** of all historical formations. This discussion will demonstrate that genetic thinking, as a practice, eventually amounts to nothing more (and nothing less) than a specialized technique of history. One that—in centering not on a theoretical but methodological/historiographical problem, not as a

That is another function than exiling. The prison is the place of *quadrillage*. This enables Foucault to say on some very brilliant pages that the asylum is the heir of leprosy, the prison is the heir of the plague.… 'Confinement' is a big generality that tells us nothing. Foucault has never been the thinker of confinement, and for a very simple reason it is that, for him, every form is a form of exteriority." Deleuze, "Foucault: Les formations historiques," Seminar Dec 12, 1985 (Part 2): n.p. (my trans). He later repeated: "With Foucault, the function of enclosure is always subordinated to a more profound topic of Foucault, that is, the invocation of an outside. Enclosure is always … in service of another function, which is a function of exteriority." Deleuze, "Foucault: Le pouvoir," Seminar Apr 08, 1986 (Part 3): n.p. (my trans). Cf. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 141–43).

51 See Vittoria Di Palma, "Radical Thought," *e-flux architecture*, posted online Dec 5, 2017 at https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/history-theory/159243/radical-thought: "History is thus by definition a radical practice, and I would argue that the further it strays from a familiar present, the more radical it becomes. When we seek to analyze large swaths of time, or bridge the gap between a remote age and our own, we are forced out of our zones of intellectual comfort, encouraged to imagine other modes of thinking, being, feeling, and acting, and led to ask the most far-reaching of questions. When framed in this way as a radical form of thought, history can fulfill its potential to be a powerful engine of change" (n.p. (online)).

way of looking at history, but as a way of putting this vision into historical analysis—calls for methodically reconnecting history and theory at the point of their differing conceptualization of material structures, in order to transversally understand how the architecture has come to be what it is and how it can become otherwise.[52] This way, history/theory are inherently coupled, Joan Ockman notes, in their distinct yet overlapping strengths as "potential transformers of consciousness."[53] In this regard, the third chapter of this preliminary discussion will illustrate this point by way of a stream of new materialist approaches. These approaches call for critiquing (and ultimately debunking) an unproductive container-conception of architecture that has hindered historians from coming to terms with the fact that the built environment has a productive agency within historical geneses. To rigorously abandon representationalistic theoretical frameworks in favor of radically productive ones, is then crucial to foreground, re-conceptualize, and rewrite what architecture does when it comes to history.

Therein, I will advance this genetic reading of historical formations through architectural arrangements incrementally onto an eco-systemic and machinic scale by drawing on of the work of Karen Barad, Rosi Braidotti, Levi Bryant, Manuel DeLanda, and Bernard Stiegler. As these sections will centrally demonstrate, here the methodological problem lies in avoiding to fall back on any dualistic mode of thinking, but establishing a true synthesis between the two aspects of enabling and constraining components.[54] In this regard, they must be studied not just together, as Giddens suggested, but

52 Cf. Anderson, "Possible Conjunctions," n.p. (online), last paragraph.

53 See Joan Ockman, "Slashed," *e-flux architecture*, posted online Oct 27, 2017, at https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/history-theory/159236/slashed.

54 Awan et al., identify that "neither side of the agency/structure dialectic is appropriate [in itself]. The primacy of the freedom of the individual to act suggests a lack of engagement with both the limits and opportunities of wider spatial and societal structures, and sanctions the retreat into an autonomous world of form-making and crafting, undisturbed by external factors. On the other hand, the primacy of structure would lead us to believe that individual action in the spatial field is always at best constrained by, at worst completely determined by, the overarching societal structures. … For architecture this [dualist vision] means that buildings are not seen as determinants of society (the primacy of the individual) nor as determined by society (the primacy of structure) but rather as in society." (Awan et all., *Spatial Agency*, 29). But the argument remains quite unclear, regarding whether they simply situate architecture 'in' (i.e. within) the world 'as part' of society, or whether they position architecture as determined within society (i.e. diverse social practices). As Doucet and Cupers have argued, "Architecture is, by its very nature, 'in the world,' in both spatial and temporal terms: buildings are concrete and tangible elements of our everyday life-world" (Doucet and Cupers, "Agency in Architecture," 1). Yet, often forgotten, architecture is also "of the world" in its tangible transformation of material environments. The following will, in arguing against any container notion of space, also expose a crucial fallacy within readings excluding or divorcing this material dimension.

together *at once*; meaning not dualistically but difference-theoretically.[55] It will be here that flattened ontologies will allow a fuller understanding how established structures constitute productive **ENABLING CONSTRAINTS** for transformations, precisely by conditioning, at the same time, anti-productive 'constraining enablings' necessary to stabilize of historical assemblages. It is here that new materialist approaches help us move from a discourse-analytic approach to historical formations to a so-called **MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE** one.

0.1.2 Genealogy: Becoming versus History

To avoid any further misunderstandings of the genealogical approach to architecture history and extend it material-discursively, one needs to initially identify the problem that the productive understanding of architecture posed within Foucault's changing methodological approach to the relation between power and knowledge (instead of understanding it as any answer). In aiming to study the conditions for something new to emerge, Foucault's early work mapped the appearance of new forms of knowledge and ways of seeing that emerge along with novel techniques of (e.g. medical) observation. Whereas historians of ideas traced certain continuities across time, Foucault's 'history of thought' followed what I have called an archaeological method, which was marked by a supposedly 'discontinuist' approach to historical formations.[56] Therein, Foucault's attempt to write a "history of limits" was closer to the French Annales school of historical analysis and its figures like Philippe Ariès

55 Norwood also captures this fine line when he argues: "In any attempt to navigate between the genetic and structural, we run the risk of thinking of the structure as the genetic point (or, said another way, thinking that the structure is present in the genetic point) by collapsing the distinction between the two. That is, we run the risk of thinking the being of beings as the most beingful being, of conflating the projects of vertical, structural ontology and horizontal, genetic theology — of committing to metaphysics as what Heidegger dubbed ontotheology. The Foucauldian archivist is always in danger of trying to be both a transcendental articulator and an empirical encyclopedist. And the grand narrative of architecture as a series of developments in spatial organization, a sweeping narrative that arose with architectural modernism's development of a self-reinforcing form of historiography, is a quintessential version of this sort of collapse" (Norwood, "Working on a Diagonal," 173).

56 François Dosse, "Deleuze and Foucault," in Morar, Nail, and Smith, *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, 25. On this archaeological method, see Gary Gutting, "Archaeology," in Leonard Lawlor and John Nale, *The Cambridge Foucault Lexicon* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014), and Elden, *Mapping the Present*, 95–102. On the discontinuist stance, see also Foucault, "History, Discourse, and Discontinuity," *in Foucault Live: Collected Interviews 1961–1984*, 2nd edn., ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Lysa Hochroth and John Johnston (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), 19–32.

and Paul Veyne, but specifically Fernand Braudel's materialist approach to the structures of everyday life as a history of "the limits of what was possible in the preindustrial world". From the Annales tradition, Foucault's work retained an outlook on the long term (*longue durée*) and thus on predominantly impersonal processes and crucial changes within economic and social transformations.[57] Yet it is no longer a history of material life in Braudel's sense, where "material life is made up of people and things";[58] rather it is a materialist mapping of how these historical formations came to be made up and have changed. The problem of historiography was thereby no longer "the trail of the identical" but the relations and changes between "different discursive formations, and their differing structured forms."[59]

Foucault's Changing Approach

Akin to Bachelard's and Canguilhem's work, Foucault's historiographic method aimed at exposing constitutive breaks in the epistemic fabric of historical discourses, epistemological breaks that are brought about by conceptual displacements or reorganizations in how certain objects of knowledge are conceived.[60] Concerning the question of epistemological ruptures and discontinuity, Foucault would highlight, in a response to a questionnaire by the *Cahiers pour l'analyse* (written in 1968, this text was adapted as the introduction to the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 1969), how in accounting for those "epistemological thresholds that interrupt the indefinite accumulation of knowledges … historical disciplines have ceased to be the reconstitution of the concatenations behind the apparent sequences; they now practice the systematic introduction of discontinuity."[61] It is here that Foucault called for a

57 See Paul Rabinow's introduction to *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954–1984, Vol. I: Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth* (New York: The New York Press, 1994), xii.

58 Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism,* I: 31.

59 Wim Nijenhuis, *Riddle of the Real City: Or the Dark Knowledge of Urbanism* (Amsterdam: 1001, 2017), 35.

60 On this methodological aspect, see e.g. Foucault's introduction to Georges Canguilhem's *On the Normal and the Pathological*, trans. Carolyn R. Fawcett (Doordrecht: Reidel, 1978), xiii–xx.

61 See Foucault, "On the Archaeology of the Sciences: Response to the Epistemology Circle," text no. 59, in *Essential Works* II, ed. Rabinow, 297–333; here 289–300; orig. pub. in *Cahiers pour l'analyse* 9: "Généalogy des sciences" (Summer 1968), 9–40. This issue (to which, I will later come back to in its genealogical dimension and possible influence Foucault's own genealogical approach) was published in 1968 by the Paris Epistemology Circle of the École normale supérieur. The Cahiers are avail. online at http://cahiers.kingston.ac.uk (as part of a research project under the direction of Peter Hallward), including the translation of foreword of issue no. 9, http://cahiers.kingston.ac.uk/pdf/cpa9.introduction.translation.pdf . As the introduction argues, the authors were hoping to claim a "forgotten lineage" in the history of sciences by aiming to arrive at a neutral form "annul[ing] the difference between the archaeologist and the historian" that could

more careful understanding of this "controlled use of discontinuity" within historical analyses, in calling out a certain ignorance toward it.[62] In applying it systematically to the historical description of the discourse, for instance, "the material to be handled in its initial neutrality is a population of events in the space of discourse in general," which is why "the description of discourse asks a different question: How is it that this statement appeared, rather than some other one in its place?"[63]

One early focus of his critique was thus the conception of history as an abstract temporal container in which change happens, against which Foucault advocated an alternative approach to historical transformation. Foucault first 'materialized' history through the archives in which time unfolds, as a physical environment in which discursive formations and statements take form and become disseminated.[64] Reminiscent of archaeological excavations,

help untie "a knot of misunderstanding and of knowledge" regarding the epistemological "continuities" and "ruptures" science implies. The authors respectively argue that a genealogical analysis of science "must turn itself into the [Lacanian] doctrine of foreclosure, even if this requires pursuing it not only in the subjective position it establishes, but also in the politics that insinuates itself there" (ibid., n.p.), to investigate whether it is science itself "as a closed system … is foreclosive," or whether it is the "epistemological breaks in science … [that] involve a kind of foreclosure?" (cited from the description available at http://cahiers.kingston.ac.uk/concepts/foreclosure.html). Regarding this older modality Foucault remarks—in a passage that would be reused in the introduction to his *Archaeology of Knowledge*—that "For decades now historians have preferred to devote their attention to long periods of time. As if, beneath the political peripeties and their episodes, historians undertook to bring to light the stable … processes … that culminate, … the movements of accumulation and slow saturations.… . To conduct this analysis, historians deploy the instruments they have partly fashioned and partly received: models of economic growth, quantitative analysis of the flows of exchange, profiles of demographic growth and regression, and the study of climatic fluctuations. These tools have enabled them to distinguish, in the field of history, various sedimentary strata; the linear successions, which until then had been the object of research, were replaced by a set of deeper uncouplings. … The levels of analysis have multiplied; each level has its specific ruptures; each contains a periodicity that belongs only to itself. And the units become broader the further one descends toward the deeper strata. The old historical question (what link to establish between discontinuous events) is replaced, from now on, by a series of difficult interrogations: Which layers should be isolated from each other? What type and criteria of periodization need to be adopted for each of them? What system of relations, (hierarchy, dominance, tier-arrangement, univocal determination, circular causality), can be established between them?" (Foucault, "On the Archaeology of the Sciences," 288). See also Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, and *The Discourse on Language*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Random House, 1972), 3; orig. pub. as *L'Archéologie du savoir* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969).

62 Foucault, "On the Archaeology of the Sciences," 300; *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 5.

63 Foucault, "On the Archaeology of the Sciences," 306–7.

64 I am here not discussing to second aspect of the institutionalization of discourses, which in Foucault is the 'archive': "I shall call an archive, not the totality of texts that have been preserved by a civilization or the set of traces that could be salvaged from its downfall, but the series of rules which determine in a culture the appearance and disappearance of statements, their retention and their destruction, their paradoxical existence as events and things" (ibid., 309).

the historian's task is seen in digging through historical documentations in search for visible breaks that would uncover structural differences within the pattern of statements, and distinct layers in the order of discourse.[65] He then subjected history to a form of Kantian analysis into the historical conditions of possibility upon which these discourses were based. In his discourse analyses, each 'archaeological stratum' represents a different era in the history of thought, for which Foucault identified the characteristic epistemological structures of this age, its system of knowledge that Foucault famously called its 'episteme [*épistèmè*]'.[66] This allowed the periodization of the classical and modern age based on its distinct forms of knowledge, understood as the different things these epochs could see and thus say. Archaeology therefore has a clear concern with the distinction between the visible and the sayable. But Foucault was acutely aware of the restrictions of this approach, in being limited to "describing the transformations themselves" between one episteme and another, but that it was not capable of explaining the occurrence of these epistemological breaks in terms of causality.[67]

To address causality, Foucault's discourse analyses had to initially establish a "system of transformations that constitute 'change'" in the first place.[68] Concerning this point, many scholars have rightly attended to the crucial methodological transition announced in Foucault's conclusion to *L'Archéologie du savoir* (*Archaeology of Knowledge*, 1969), as it acknowledges the need to move beyond archaeological approaches.[69] For instance,

65 See David Garland, "What is a 'History of the Present'? On Foucault's Genealogies and their Critical Preconditions," *Punishment & Society* 16, no. 4 (2014): 365–84.

66 From Greek ἐπιστήμη [epistēmē], meaning variably "knowledge, science, or understanding"; see Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1970), xxii.

67 Ibid., xiii and 217.

68 Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 166–77. "In order to analyze such events, it is not enough simply to indicate changes, and to relate them immediately to the theological, aesthetic model of creation …, or to the psychological model of the act of consciousness, … or to the biological model of evolution. We must define precisely what these changes consist of: that is, substitute for an undifferentiated reference to change — which is both a container for all events and the abstract principle of their succession — the analysis of transformations. The disappearance of one type of positivity and the emergence of another implies several types of transformation … one can and must describe: (a) how the different elements of a system of formation were transformed; (b) how the characteristic relations of a system of formation were transformed; (c) how the relations between different rules of formation were transformed; lastly (d), how the relations between different positivities were transformed" (ibid., 172).

69 See ibid., 178–211 / *L'Archéologie du savoir*, 232–75. As Elden recently re-emphasized against the prevailing (but simplistic) view of Foucault's changing methodology, this transition constitutes "no shift from archaeology to genealogy," but a progressive transition in focus between these "different yet complementary" approaches. See Elden, *Birth of Power*, 21–23, and 186; see also ibid., 101–6, and id., *Foucault's Last Decade* (Cambridge: Polity, 2016).

Elden's recent studies have described this methodological transition in covering much territory as to how this transition was fostered by Foucault's political and activist work, and how it informed his notion of space. In the following, however, I would like to focus more closely on the notable methodological implications as relevant to reconsidering historical formations from a more material (and thereby material-discursive) and more configurative rather than simply spatial angle. Specifically these implications, I will argue in the following, were the result of Foucault's engagement with the early work of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995), in a thought-provoking process of mutual intellectual influence and cross-fertilization.[70]

Their crossing point initially lies in the notion of **PROBLEMS**. In his interviews, Foucault often asserted that he was implicitly trying to determine problems while carefully avoiding simple prescription (or even the offer) of potential solutions.[71] This approach carries, as Koopman has identified, an explicit —but not often discussed—Deleuzian inspiration,[72] in its characteristic conception of problems. After his initial monographic studies on *Nietzsche*, *Kant*,

70 Much has been written on their complicated relationship and incompossible aims, to the detriment of understanding the degree of their mutual inspiration, which only recently gains more attention; see Morar, Nail, and Smith, *Between Deleuze and Foucault*. For a discussion of Deleuze and Foucault private relation and philosophical friendship, I refer to this study and the symbiographic work by François Dosse, *Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives* (New York: Columbia UP, 2010). Among many studies, also Garland's above-mentioned study, for example, focuses too much on a hermeneutic reading of Foucault's methodological development from archaeology to genealogy, out of his own. I will foreground much more the diverse and multi-linear intellectual influences.

71 On this avoidance, see Clive Barnet who addresses that "Foucault invoked the analysis of problems to support his careful avoidance of prescribing political positions or visions: 'I concern myself with determining problems, unleashing them, revealing them within the framework of such complexity as to shut the mouths of prophets and legislators: all those who speak for others and above others.'" Foucault, "Considerations on Marxism, Phenomenology and Power," interview (1978) with Colin Gordon and Paul Patton, *Foucault Studies* 14 (Sep 2012): 98–114; cited after Clive Barnett, "On Problematization: Elaborations on a Theme in 'Late Foucault,'" *nonsite.org*, no.1 (2015), avail. online at http://nonsite.org/article/on-problematization#foot_src_7-8843. Barnett respectively highlights that the "operationalization of the notion of problematization in his work was oriented to providing an understanding of how practices of subject-formation … are best understood not in terms of a logic of reproduction through subjection, but in terms of the reflexive, focused, situated transformation of selves" (Ibid.). Cf. Foucault, "Polemics, Politics and Problematizations," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 381–90.

72 With their hermeneutic focus on the work of Foucault alone, even more recent studies do not always discuss the mutual influence of Foucault and Deleuze, as e.g. Fabrice de Salles, "Statut et fonction de la notion de 'problématisation' dans le corpus Foucauldian tardif," *Le Philosophoire* 40 (2013): 235–58. On this influence, see esp. Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 133–40. As he notes: "Although it is difficult to deny the importance of Deleuze's work for Foucault's conception of philosophy as the work of problematizations, this is a connection that has not been emphasized enough in existing accounts on the Foucault-Deleuze relationship. … I suggest that we understand Deleuze's concept of problematizations as a source not only of Foucault's concept of the same but also of Foucault's entire genealogical and archaeological ensemble" (ibid., 133–6). This is what I take up here.

and *Bergson* (1962/63/66), Deleuze started to advance a new conception of problems that came to characterize his later work, which persistently problematizes how a text, a concept, a body, an assemblage, a machine works, and what is going on in these workings. In this manner of posing problems, problems are always productive to the extent that they trigger thought; problems make us to think. In this 'problematic' epistemology, *Différence et Répétition* (*Difference and Repetition,* 1968) discusses the integration of a differential field as a genesis, as the condition of the new, where it proposes a renewed understanding of historical emergence, generative processes, or geneses.[73] Thus calling for a genetic approach, Deleuze powerfully contends that historical formation processes could never be accessed through critique or critical thinking, and especially not through a Kantian metaphysics and its view of causation through an "extrinsic conditioning." In Deleuze's transformative appropriation of Kantian critique, Foucault found a crucial model for a renewed critical practice.

In a progressively developed idea, Deleuze notoriously insisted that a problem fundamentally depends on the manner in which it is posed, thereby highlighting the internal structure of problems.[74] Through this internally-

73 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia UP, 1994); see also Daniel W. Smith "The Conditions of the New," *Deleuze Studies* 1, no.1 (2008): 1–21. Daniela Voss has recently discussed the initially Simondonian inspiration of this conception. See Voss, "Simondon on the Notion of the Problem: A Genetic Schema of Individuation," *Angelaki* 23, no. 2 (Apr 2018), 94–112.

74 Orig.: "Un problème a toujours la solution qu'il mérite suivant la manière dont il est posé, et le champ symbolique dont on dispose pour le poser." Deleuze, "How do we Recognize Structuralism?," in *Desert islands and other texts 1953–1974*, ed. David Lapoujade (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), 170–192; here 181 (trans. mod.). Written in 1968, the article was first published in 1972. This 'credo' is already prefigured in the amazingly dense and debunking chapter "The Image of Thought" in Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, 129–67. It argued that "a solution always has the truth it deserves according to the problem to which it is a response, and the problem always has the solution it deserves in proportion to its own truth or falsity … because the solution necessarily follows from the complete conditions under which the problem is determined as a problem, from the means and the terms which are employed in order to pose it" (ibid., 159). Hereafter Deleuze discusses the problem of dialectics, where — since Aristotle's quest for the legitimacy of posing problems — the "form of problems is modeled upon the form of possibility of the proposition" (159–60). According to Deleuze "this is how we pursue the hard work of reducing problems to the form of propositions capable of serving as cases of solution. We see this clearly in Descartes. The Cartesian method … is a method for solving supposedly given problems, not a method of invention appropriate to the constitution of [new] problems or the understanding of [new] questions" (161). Similarly, for Deleuze, this is also not a matter of Kant's search for the transcendental conditions of possibility; a test that defined the very task of critique: Here, the "philosophical illusion … involves evaluating problems according to their 'solvability' — in other words, according to the extrinsic and variable form of the possibility of their finding a solution… . What is missed is the internal character of the problem as such" (162). Instead, for Deleuze, "a problem does not exist apart from its solutions." (163). For Deleuze's productive definition of the problem, in terms of his differential reading, see here esp. 63–4 and

determined (or **DIFFERENTIAL**) conception of problems, Foucault started to reconsider surfacing problems as an effect of historical processes, social practices, and political strategies. Whenever we avoid taking (historical) problems as representations (or products) of preexisting (social, economic, spatial, etc.) conditions, they thus allow investigations into how these problematic conditions occur; how existing phenomena come to be seen *as* problems. In a review of Deleuze's first autographic works, Foucault celebrated this 'problematizing' modality of thought as a productive alternative to negative dialectical thought.[75] He concludes: "What is the answer to the question? The problem. How is the problem resolved? By displacing the question. The problem escapes the logic of the excluded third, because it is a dispersed multiplicity … We must think problematically rather than question and answer dialectically."[76]

This renewed practice consisted in suspending judgment of the world according to common notions, by **PROBLEMATIZING** instead the very terms based on which we conceptualize and evaluate the world;[77] a practice that also helped open up alternative values. It is here that Foucault—under the direct influence of Deleuze's work—began to problematize the geneses of historical formations and to then trace them back from a genealogical angle.[78]

106–7. For Deleuze's differential reading of the 'problematique,' see here also 168–221; and moreover id., *Logic of Sense*, trans. Mark Lester (New York: Columbia UP, 1990), 52–7. As the latter work describes: "The mode of the event is the problematic. … The event by itself is problematic and problematizing. A problem is determined only by the singular points which express its conditions. We do not say that the problem is thereby resolved; on the contrary, it is determined as a problem. For example, in the theory of differential equations, the existence and distribution of singularities are relative to a problematic field defined by the equation as such. As for the solution, it appears only with the integral curves and the form they take in the vicinity of singularities inside the field of vectors. It seems, therefore, that a problem always finds the solution it merits, according to the conditions which determine it as a problem" (ibid., 54). Deleuze takes the idea of not simply denouncing false problems in favor of correcting "badly stated" ones from Henri Bergson's acknowledgment that posing a question always depends on the quality of the question being asked. Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Urzone, 1988), 15–21.

75 See Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in *Essential Works*, ed. Rabinow, Vol. II: 343–68. On this point, see also Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, esp. 137.

76 Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," 359.

77 Antoinette Rouvroy, "The End(s) of Critique," in *Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn*, ed. Mireille Hildebrandt and Ekatarina De Vries (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2013), 143–68.

78 For a discussion of this influence, see John Protevi, "Foucault's Deleuzian Methodology," in *Between Deleuze and Foucault,* ed. Morar, Nail, and Smith, 156–60. Foucault's own acknowledgment is noted in *Discipline and Punish*, 309.

This genealogical angle arose from Deleuze's and Foucault's forceful recuperation of Nietzschean thinking into French philosophy during the 1960s, which had contributed much to a new reading of Nietzsche's work.[79] A reading that should serve as 'an introduction to non-fascist life' as Foucault would summarize *L'Anti-Œdipe* (*Anti-Oedipus*, 1969), Deleuze and Guattari's collaborative work within which a Nietzschean approach had been powerfully reactivated in calling for a genealogical inquiry into the production of modern subjectivity, and the subjects we have become.[80]

In this vein, especially Deleuze and Guattari's book promoted genealogy as a wider emancipatory exercise: albeit a form of history, genealogical studies strongly contrast with historiographic conventions, as they emphatically debunk the assumption that there are simple historical givens to be interpreted.[81] In this sense, authors from Nietzsche onwards have set off genealogy against Hegelian (and later Marxist) philosophies of history in their often highly teleological predisposition. Therein they strongly differ from the grand form of 'History' that long consisted in a contextualizing ordering of events into (often a single) temporal series. Such approaches to history repeatedly explain the unfolding of this series as some solution to a political, social or economic, and so on problem, often by simply reducing the problematic structures and circumstances that had generated these events in the first place, and then re-ascribing their resolution instead to certain historical (human, political, etc.) conditions, or agents.

Deleuze and Foucault both strongly rejected such approaches to historiography, calling out a fatal reductionism in the attempt to "translate a coexistence of becomings into a [linear] succession" of events.[82] For thereby, two aspects concerning historical formations entirely escape our comprehension. Within Foucault's essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (1971), long

79 In 1964, Deleuze organized a conference on Nietzsche, to which Foucault contributed a paper (See Dosse, *Intersecting Lives*, 132). In 1965, he publishe a second book: Deleuze, *Nietzsche* (Paris: PUF, 1965). And in 1967, he wrote an introduction, together with Foucault, to the *Oeuvres philosophique complètes de Nietzsche* (Paris: Gallimard, 1967). For the Nietzsche reception in the 70's, and the 1972 Nietzsche colloquium in Cerisy, and Deleuze's related connections to Pierre Klossowski and Jean-François Lyotard, see Dosse, *Intersecting Lives*, 307, 353.

80 See Foucault's preface to Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* Vol. I, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1983); here xiii. Orig. pub. as *Capitalisme et schizophrénie: L'Anti-œdipe* (Paris: Edition de minuit, 1972/73).

81 See Charles E. Scott "Genealogy," §31, in *Cambridge Foucault Lexicon*, ed. Lawlor and Nale

82 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia Vol. II*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1987), 430.

recognized as a text fundamental to his changing relation to history, this problem came to be located where historical formations are reduced to their "lowest common denominator,"[83]often in the form of an origin. As the text then argues, in its attempt to understand historical transformations from the point of view of the emergent and the conditions of emergence, genealogy does not necessarily oppose history, but two historical viewpoints: on one hand, it rigorously refuses history's quest for origins in favor of investigating 'where things come from' or 'how they came about' (i.e. their conditions), as well as 'where they are already in the process of heading toward' their ongoing mutations; and on the other hand, it thus also dismisses false historical continuities by at once remaining suspicious of especially those things we believe have no history.[84] Within Deleuze's oeuvre, this problematic reduction comes to be located within a majoritarian conception of History, against which he proposed an alternative, 'minor' approach to historical processes. Deleuze found it "stupid to be interested in the beginning or end of something"; for him "the interesting thing is … what happens on the way … the becoming."[85] This **BECOMING**, an adaptation of the Nietzschean concept of '*werden*' (that which is in the act of coming about), would be the prime focus in his own critical extensions of genealogy, conceived indeed more as "an opposite to History" to the extent that it refuses to trace historical formations back to a final origin.[86] He instead advocated to approach them through "a more precise operation … subtracting … everything that comprises an element of power, in language and in gestures, in representation and in the represented. … You will subtract the constants, the stable or stabilized elements, because they belong to the major use," which eventually requires a 'becoming-minoritarian' of researchers themselves.[87]

83 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977), 139–64; here 157. The text was written as (and appeared first in the context of) an *Hommage á Jean Hyppolite* (Paris: PUF, 1971), 145–72. For a discussion, see also Elden, *Birth of Power*, 31–40.

84 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 139–42. He here distinguishes, with Nietzsche, a history in terms of origins [*Urspung*] from the historical question of provenance (i.e. 'where things came from') [*Herkunft*], and more specifically how things come about [*Entstehung*].

85 Deleuze, "One Manifesto Less," trans. Alan Orenstein, in *The Deleuze Reader,* ed. Constantin V. Boundas (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 204–27; here 207.

86 Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, "On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature" in *Dialogues* (New York: Columbia UP, 1987; orig. pub. 1977), 23. See here also Paul Patton, "Events, Becoming, and History," in *Deleuze and History*, ed. Jeffrey A. Bell and Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh: EUP, 2009), 33–53. On this relation, see also Rosi Braidotti, *Metamorphoses* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), esp. 70–73.

87 Braidotti, *Metamorphoses,* 211 and 221. For a discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's minor mode of history of art versus the majoritarian Neo-Kantian form of Art History, see also the introduction to Sjoerd van Tuinen and Stephen Zepke, eds., *Art History After Deleuze and*

The resulting far-reaching philosophical distinctions of this alternative approach to historical formations, and the ways in which it challenges dominant conceptions of history, had first been adumbrated in Deleuze's monographic study on Nietzsche.[88] Therein, he had started to reposition genealogy as a critical-creative tool to inquire into those power relations that take form in specific bodies.[89] This notion helped Foucault, for instance, in revisiting how relations between seeing and knowing are necessarily mediated by power structures and the material relations that generate them, and realize how the discursive changes he was tracing were also embodied in distinct historically-constructed subject formations, knowledge systems, and beliefs. This way, genealogy enables "a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects etc., without having to refer to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history."[90] As such it can more adequately respond to the problem, as Anne Sauvagnargues and Paul Patton understand, that "history is the necessary dimension of becoming's actualization; … a milieu of actualization that becoming needs in order to take form," yet to the extent that "history only refers to the event as actualized, the study of history can never really come to grips with the condition . . . of newness in the world."[91] At least, it has a hard time in coming to terms with emergence; in arriving at an emergent notion of historical formations.

Concerning this point, Nietzsche's *Zur Genealogie der Moral* (*Genealogy of Morals,* 1887) had already provided a trenchant critique of the historical method, warning us to never confuse the origins of things with their later purpose. Concepts with a history, and especially where it is contested and ideological, escape any definition. Instead, they can only be

Guattari (Leuven; Leuven UP, 2017), esp. 13–15.

88 See esp. the introductory chapter "The Concept of Genealogy," in Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia UP, 2006), 1–3. Therein Deleuze argues that "the problem of critique is that of the value of values, of the evaluation [*Umwertung*, 'transvaluation'] from which their value arises, thus the problem of their creation. Evaluation is defined as the differential element of corresponding values, an element which is both critical and creative" (ibid., 1).

89 Noteworthy, Deleuze does so in explicit reference to Spinoza, while his later work on Spinoza begins with Nietzsche's name in return. See Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Lights, 1988), 3.

90 Foucault, "Truth and Power," in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, 1972–1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 109–133; here 117.

91 Paul Patton, "Deleuze and Foucault: Political Activism, History and Actuality"; and Anne Sauvagnargues, "Becoming and History: Deleuze's Reading of Foucault," trans. Alex Feldman, both in *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, ed. Morar, Nail, and Smith, 160–73, and 174–99; here 174, 176, and 165. See also Smith, "Conditions of the New".

approached through the development of the concept itself. Using the notion of punishment as an example, worth quoting at length, he cautioned:

> Now another word on the origin and purpose of punishment; two problems which are separate, or ought to be: unfortunately people usually throw them together. How have the moral genealogists reacted so far in this matter? Naively, … they highlight some 'purpose' in punishment, [and] then innocently place the purpose at the start, as [its *cause of production*]. … But … the origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate [utility], its practical application and incorporation into a system of purposes, lie worlds apart. … Anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it. Everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former 'meaning' and 'purpose' must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated. *No matter how perfectly one has understood the utility of any* [*'thing,'* like a] physiological organ[,] legal institution, social custom, political usage, …—, *one has thereby not yet grasped how it emerged*: … Every purpose and use is just a sign that the will to power has achieved mastery over something less powerful, and has impressed upon it its own idea of a use function; and the whole history of a 'thing' … can to this extent be a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations, the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, but rather sometimes just follow and replace one another at random. The 'evolution' of a thing, a tradition, an organ is therefore certainly not its *progressus* toward a goal. … Instead, it is a succession of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent [catalytic] processes of subjugation exacted on the thing and —added to this—the resistances encountered every time, the attempted transformations for the purpose of defense and reaction, and the results, too, of successful countermeasures. The form is fluid, the 'meaning' even more so.[92]

92 Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 50–1 (trans. mod.; in some parts, I have resorted to the older translation *On The Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1967). For legibility's sake, I have here modernized the

Reconstructing these subjugation processes requires diligent work, as it involves a critical re-examination of the historical conditions that shape our very present through an analysis of where things, notions, or values come from, and in doing so, attempting to formulate a special sort of history, namely a *history of the present*.[93] As such, genealogical research often touches on "problems found below the surface of our lives" as Colin Koopman stresses; "they are depth problems in that they are lodged deep inside of us all as the historical condition of possibility of our present ways of doing, being, and thinking. Yet, despite their depth, these problems are also right at the surface insofar as they condition us in our very action, our every quality, our every thought."[94] If genealogical research destabilizes or renders contingent what was thought to be necessary, normal, or natural, and reconstruct how these things became what they now are, Koopman argues, this feature ought not be dismissed as a sort of 'theory' of these things.[95]

Genealogical research only aims to reactivate a multiplicity of minoritarian knowledges tactically against this effect of the centralization of power that comes with institutionalized, or majoritarian forms of knowledge.[96] It

punctuation. I also re-included the omitted, rather complex, yet highly important reflexive formulation "an ihm sich abspielenden" found in the original, which inexactly meaning "catalytized," implies that processes play out *(up)on/by things* in some sort of co-constitutive and auto-catalytic fashion; see also below on Haraway's notion of **SYMPOIESIS**).

93 See Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 1–7; Garland, "What is a 'History of the Present'?"

94 Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 1.

95 Foucault's writings were often denounced for his theories of sexuality, power, or modernity. But, "take, for example Foucault on power: … Foucault does not even have a 'theory' of power but rather conducted rigorous inquiries, part philosophical, part social-scientific, into diverse and dynamic forms of power constitutive of who we are today.… . Foucault in fact made the point that power is not the kind of thing that is valuably theorized, if by that we mean creating conceptions of power without empirically inquiring into the actual functionings of power in carefully delineated contexts. The context of empirical-analytical inquiry was, for Foucault, the space where the work of thought is at its most urgent. As he stated: 'The analyses of these mechanisms of power … is not in any way a general theory of what power is. It is not a part or even the start of such a theory…,' but an investigative inquiry into how power works." Ibid., 8–9, citing Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1–2.

96 In two 1976-lectures in which Foucault more explicitly discusses his genealogical research, he offers "provisional definition" of genealogy as "the union of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today" (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge,* 83). He then distinguishes that genealogy "has nothing at all to do with an opposition between the abstract unity of theory and the concrete multiplicity of facts. It has nothing at all to do with a disqualification of the speculative dimension which opposes to it, in the name of some kind of scientism, the rigor of well established knowledges. It is not therefore via an empiricism that the genealogical project unfolds, nor even via a positivism in the ordinary sense of that term. What it really does is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchize and order them in the name of

therefore assumes the form of a history written with a question mark. Consisting of the same historical components, yet re-arranged so as to open questions to which we know no easy answers, genealogies attempt to re-serialize historical events and formations.[97] As an analysis of 'where things come from' [*Herkunft*], Foucault understands, genealogy ought to disturb "what was previously considered immobile."[98] Genealogies thus counter or upset histories we have come to accept, and generate alternative values.[99] What has been recognized as the distinguishing feature of genealogies then, is precisely their capacity to approach these series and events "in such a way as to preclude a singular and specific solution."[100] By thus opening possibilities for critique, they instead serve as a methodological, analytical or diagnostic toolkit for what is much more a sort of cultural critique.

From Critique to Problematization

In this regard, one should initially distinguish how such cultural critiques have been used in diametrically opposed yet equally normative ways. Such deployments of genealogy were restricted to either a "subversive history" (Nietzsche), or the "vindicatory history" (Williams) of modern value systems. Numerous scholars and theorists have long and critically confronted this normative (or crypto-normative) dimension of genealogical studies. Koopman's *Genealogy as Critique* (2012) has highlighted the degree to which Foucault's own employ-

> some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects. Genealogies are therefore not positivistic returns to a more careful or exact form of science. They are precisely anti-sciences. … [Genealogies] are concerned, rather, with the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to the effects of the centralizing powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse within a society such as ours. … [I]t is really against the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific that the genealogy must wage its struggle. … A genealogy should be seen as a kind of attempt to emancipate historical knowledges from that subjection, to render them, that is, capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of a theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse. It is based on a reactivation of local knowledges—of minor knowledges, as Deleuze might call them—in opposition to the scientific hierarchization of knowledges and the effects intrinsic to their power: this, then, is the project of these disordered and fragmentary genealogies" (Ibid., 83–85).

97 See Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 143.

98 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 147.

99 More than a method of 'deconstruction,' genealogy involves then also a 'decolonial' strategy in involving to teach oneself about available counter-narratives resisting hegemonic discourses and the normative judgments carried out in their terms (Chandra Talpade Mohanty, *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity* (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2003)). Similarly, for Rosi Braidotti, "Genealogies are politically informed countermemories" (Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory* (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 207).

100 C[hauncey] Colwell, "Deleuze and Foucault: Series, Event, Genealogy," *Theory and Event* 1, no. 2 (1997); here 9.

ment of genealogy constitutes a third form that is yet to be widely appreciated precisely in its capacity to withstand normative conclusions.[101]

This capacity, he illustrates, derives instead from the way Foucault deployed genealogy in the problematizing modality.[102] As Foucault clarified, **PROBLEMATIZATION** refers to neither the "representation of a preexisting object, nor the creation by discourse of an object that doesn't exist," but to an ensemble of "discursive or non-discursive practices" that, in raising a previously unacknowledged issue or posing a different question, introduces something new into the field of thought, thereby "constitut[ing] it as an object for thought."[103] In critically looking at this constitutive dimension, problematization needs to analyze how these problems are being posed within different discourses. Deacon emphasizes that "the genealogical concept of problematization thus alerts one to the violence of representation" entailed in the ways in which these problems come to be constituted and institutionalized in the real.[104] Problematizations here become both object and means of analysis, since they can be used as a kind of hinge or pathway by way of which emergent processes can be studied without ever resorting to any final, explanatory unit.[105] As Koopman stresses, in this problematic modality, genealogy is no longer deployed as final assessment, nor as judgment; rather, it works in a fully non-normative fashion.[106] It allows the study of historical formations in terms more adequate to the emergent (that which is in the process of coming about), while at once accounting for the contradictory responses emerging from them. Problematization is then not only a special form of critique; the doubling of problematization as verb and noun has been made central to accounts of how Foucault transforms the idea of critique.[107] In fact, it fully transgresses the classical sense of critique.[108]

101 See Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 61 and 64.

102 See ibid., 83.

103 Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and Other Writings, 1977–1984*, ed. Kritzman (London, Routledge, 1988), 257; cited in Roger A. Deacon, *Fabricating Foucault* (Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 2003), 69ff. For Foucault's own remarks on problematization, see id., "Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations"; and id., *Fearless Speech*, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles. Semiotext(e), 2001), 71–74. See also Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, passim.

104 See Deacon, *Fabricating Foucault*, 76–8.

105 Foucault, "Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations," 389.

106 Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 58–86.

107 Ibid., 19. As Koopman notes, "the call for a 'critique' by means of into 'conditions' has undeniably Kantian resonances, even if for Nietzsche (as for Foucault) these 'conditions were historical 'circumstances' while for Kant they simply had to be transcendental 'categories'" (ibid., 33–35).

108 See Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2–3.

So, rather than deserving to be met critically for a supposedly normative, or still crypto-normative exercise of presenting problems we must work on, genealogy deserves our appreciation for opening a complex and multi-layered field of problems that we can work with, work through, and move on with, as we become different with this reworking. Braidotti's powerful post-Deleuzo-Foucauldian work therefore explicitly counsels against too much critique with too little creativity.[109] In this way genealogies involve a mode of constructive critique involved in the act of 'thinking-through,' rooted in a pedagogical more than historical project, in which problematization leads to a second (yet primary) creative moment of experimenting with the limits of what constrains us.[110] As an acquisition of self-knowledge, genealogical studies are thus aimed at transgressive acts. In this creative mode genealogy yields new conceptions, and thus new possibilities of engagement. Making maps that chart how our present world came to be, such cartographic accounts are a way to arrive at new conceptions of "what was going on (=genealogy) in what happened (=archaeology)".[111] Such genetic mappings are "undertaken for the sake of intervening in worlds in ways that might render other … more sustainable assemblages possible."[112] And I am prepared to admit that this is no different in my case. In this form of inquiry, problematization is the primary mode of experimental, immanent critique in the realities we find ourselves in, doing work in a "productive albeit oppositional and affirmative manner"[113]; there is simply no other way than "to take it from here."[114] Inquiries into mapping the present, such as Foucault's, are

109 For the creative aspect, see ibid.; for Braidotti's position, see below.

110 Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 195. I part with Koopman at the point where he tries to bring together the aspectival differences of genealogy's backward-looking mode of problematization with the forward-looking aspect pragmatist mode of (self-)reconstruction. I simply embrace its creative capacity of transformation in terms of becoming different. It is for this reason, that for Foucault, genealogy becomes a "work of theoretical transformation [that] detaches itself from the ideology of its past … by revealing this past as ideological." (Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 5). Regarding this ideological dimension, I believe that Tafuri never understood the operative character of genealogy in terms of this 'creative' mode of engagement, when he rightfully opposed the operationalization of history. See Tafuri, *Theory and Histories of Architecture*, 141–71; see also Marco Biraghi, *Project of Crisis: Manfredo Tafuri and Contemporary Architecture* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013), esp. 15–18 and 180–83: and moreover Andrew Leach, "Choosing History: A Study of Manfredo Tafuri's Theorization of Architectural History and Architectural History Research," PhD diss., Ghent Univ. (2005), esp. 67–100, 206–15, and 285–87.

111 Andrej Radman and Deborah Hauptmann, "Northern Line," in *Deleuze and Architecture*, ed. Frichot and Loo, 40–60; here 49.

112 Levy R. Bryant, *Onto-Cartography,* 211.

113 Rosi Braidotti, "Posthuman Relational Subjectivity and the Politics of Affirmation," in *Relational Architectural Ecologies: Architecture, Nature, Subjectivity*, ed. Peg Rawes (London/New York: Routledge, 2013), 21–39; here 31.

114 Yet, in such an affirmative-transformative ethics, "taking it from here" makes it also

always tied to these authors' attempt to understand the world around them. Because to provide tools that might help transform and creatively intervene on this world by bringing about an alternative value, helps liberate us from the suffocating sense of impotence generated by present values. It thus implies an *ethical position*; to problematize is an ethical act.

To appreciate how Deleuze's problematic epistemology offers a model for a renewed critical practice, one has to first better understand what precisely this creative transformation consist in, and how this creative modality is specifically tied to a renewed theoretical understanding of generative processes, or geneses.[115] If the aim to explain geneses non-reductively is what ties Foucault's and Deleuze's approaches together, then a partly overlooked earlier step in the reciprocal theoretical development between the two thinkers must be pointed out. One largely forgotten component in this theoretical development certainly concerns the unique semiological structure of *clinical* methods and their differential diagnostics, in which Deleuze initially identified an alternative to the critical. As François Zourabichvili writes: "the thinker is first of all a clinician, a sensitive decipherer and a patient of the regimes of signs that existence produces, and according to which it is itself produced. [The] task is to construct logical objects capable of accounting for this production."[116]

After the short monograph on *Kant's Critical Philosophy* (1963), Deleuze's *Coldness and Cruelty* (1967) further distinguished three activities in medical practice: 'symptomatology,' the study of signs, a creative activity; 'etiology,' as the search for causes, an experimental activity; and 'therapy,' the treatment, a normalizing activity.[117] As the study of causation, etiology has

crucial to account a politics of location. This politics of location (to account for where you speak from), entails a "materially embedded, multi-layered, relational approach to human and nonhuman accounts for location in both spatial (geopolitical, ecological, ecosophical) and temporal (historical memories, genealogical forms of belonging) terms in which relations do matter." Braidotti, "Human, All Too Human, Part 1: Memoirs of a Posthumanist," video recording of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Mar 1, 2017, avail. online at https://youtu.be/OjxelMWLGCo, 00:16:25–17:35.

115 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia UP, 1994); see also Smith "Conditions of the New".

116 François Zourabichvili, *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event* together with *the Vocabulary of Deleuze*, ed. Gregg Lambert and Daniel W. Smith, trans. Kieran Aarons (Edinburgh: EUP, 2012), 170.

117 Deleuze, "Coldness and Cruelty," extended introduction to Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, "Venus in Furs," pub. as *Masochism* (New York: Zone Books, 1991). Daniel W. Smith, introduction to Gilles Deleuze, *Essays Critical and Clinical* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1997), xvi–ii. Here, also the architectural theorist Chris L. Smith notes that "Symptomatology is not concerned with the play of signifiers and signifieds, it is not concerned with origination, nor with 'giving a reason,' nor with causation. … It is the study of signs." Chris L. Smith, "Amorphous Continua," in *Critical and Clinical*

often led authors, especially genealogists, to propose a normative therapy.[118] As I have just described, problematization had helped Foucault to avoid proposing a normative therapy. Yet his archaeologies remained relatively closer to Kantian criticism, by posing the question of historical formations in terms of the conditions of possibility (i.e. cause/origin) of experience. Kant, in his philosophical inquiries into the anomaly of natural self-organization processes had problematized that we can only understand how things appear for us, what they are for us through their phenomenal form, while the causal structure that conditions their appearances escapes apperception.[119] Kantian transcendental philosophy thus made experience an object of inquiry, yet treated it not purely epistemologically in its focus on the condition of the possibility of objects as appearances. By distinguishing 'appearance' from 'appearing' or 'apparition,'[120] Deleuze had repeatedly criticized Kantian think-

Cartographies, ed. Andrej Radman and Heidi Sohn (Edinburgh: EUP, 2017), 101–19; here 109. In his approach to literature, Deleuze respectively suggests that writers, including historians and theorists, "do not account for, or necessarily represent, the world, but rather construct or compose worlds from indeterminate symptoms" (Ibid., 110). On this point, Smith identifies that architecture, and architectural history and theory, might also constitute a form of symptomatology. Yet, he argues, "distilling a history for architecture that posits itself symptomatologically is … far more difficult than isolating the therapeutic and diagnostic positioning of architecture. Such an [approach] would concern itself neither with uncovering underlying or foundational logical structures nor with posing solutions to commonly stated problems … [Instead it] might engage with the immediacy of the present by exploring and experimenting within the world … This architecture would express new ways of thinking about life and experiment with novel ways of living." To avoid such diagnoses that lead one to proposing any normative treatment, architecture history must search for the genetic element of real thought. Smith, "Architectures, Critical and Clinical," in *Deleuze and Architecture*, ed. Frichot and Loo, 230–44, here 232–34. Cf. the recent self-declared symptomatological article by K. Michael Hays, "Some thoughts on the pathology of Architecture," in *Architecture Is All Over*, ed. Esther Choi and Marrikka Trotter (New York: Columbia UP, 2017), 30–39.

118 That is, in the sense that genealogy was used by Nietzsche to detect and propose a cure for the cultural pathologies he analyzed. Here 'a' means a single, normalizing treatment by a universal "transmutation of all values".

119 For this anomalous reading, see Alberto Toscano, *Theater of Production: Philosophy and Individuation between Kant and Deleuze* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 19–106; where Toscano elaborates the central problem posed in the second half of the *Critique,* that: "in order for us to judge a body as being, in itself and in its inner possibility, a natural purpose, what is needed is that all parts through their own causality, produce one another as regards both their form and combination, and that in this way they produce a whole whose concept (in a being and possessing the causality in terms of concepts that would be adequate for such product) could, conversely, be the cause of this body according to a principle, so that the connection of efficient causes could at the same time the judged to be a causation through final causes." Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 373; cited after Toscano, *Theater of Production*, 34.

120 Deleuze, "On Leibniz," Lecture, Univ. of Vincennes, May 20, 1980, avail. online at https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/130), n.p.: "[Kant] ripped space and time from the order of the concept because he gave two absolutely new determinations of space and time: the form of exteriority and the form of interiority. … The phenomenon in Kant's work is not appearance, but apparition. Apparition is the manifestation of that which appears

ing precisely for remaining in the realm of *possible* experience, without ever approaching the problem of *real* experience.[121]

To do so, he advanced the argument that in conditions of real experience, conditions cannot be broader than what they condition: it must form "an intrinsic genesis [as a sufficient reason], not an extrinsic conditioning [as a necessary cause]" that had served as the foundation in Kant's metaphysics of causation.[122] In Deleuze's view this extrinsic conditioning presents the biggest obstacle for "reach[ing] a true viewpoint of genesis." This, he argues, "would require showing how conditions of apparition are at the same time genetic elements of what appears."[123] In calling for a **GENETIC** approach, Deleuze powerfully contents that historical formation processes could ever be accessed through (negative, critical) thinking, because "the important thing … is not discovering new depths, but producing new surfaces."[124] And this production of surfaces is precisely what Deleuze finds accomplished in the cartographies that Foucault started to make and which provides new coordinates for engagement.[125]

insofar as it appears. … Conditions are the making-appear of apparition. … Apparition refers to the conditions of the apparition, just as appearance refers to essence". See also the earliest work by Deleuze, *What is Grounding?,* trans. Arjen Kleinherenbrink (Grand Rapids: &&& Publishing: 2015; orig. pub. 1956), 121 and 171. Ebook, avail. online at http://tripleampersand.org/books/what-is-grounding; and id., *Kant's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlon Press, 1984), 8.

121 See Deleuze, *Kant's Critical Philosophy,* 8, 19, 24, 39–43, 62, and 73–75; id. *Bergsonism*, 21–28; here esp. 23; and id. *Difference and Repetition*, 154.

122 Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 27; and id., *Difference and Repetition*, 154. See also Smith, "Conditions of the New," 6. The bracketed additions are taken from a lecture series "On Leibniz" that Deleuze gave at Vincennes on Apr 15, and May 6, 1980 (translated transcripts avail. online at https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/50 and https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/128). He therein argues that "Cause is never sufficient. One must say that the causality principle poses a necessary cause, but never a sufficient one. We must distinguish between necessary cause and sufficient reason. What distinguishes them evidently is that the cause of a thing is always something else. … [S]ufficient reason expresses the relation of the thing with its own notion whereas cause expresses the relations of the thing with something else." This point was highlighted recently by Gil Morejón, "Differentiation and Distinction," *Deleuze and Guattari Studies* 12.3 (2018): 353–73.

123 Deleuze "On Leibniz," n.p. (online). Deleuze here continues: "One has to take seriously one of the Kantian revolutions that Kant left aside, notably that the infinite is truly the act of finitude insofar as it overcomes itself. … This is to substitute the viewpoint of genesis for the viewpoint of the condition."

124 David Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, trans. Joshua David Jordan (South Passadena: Semiotext(e), 2017), 39–78, here 50. See also Deleuze, *What is Grounding?*

125 See Deleuze, *Foucault*, 30.

0.1.3 Geneses: From Structures to Machines

Deleuze identified a crucial limitation in Foucault's pioneering approach, by noting how the epistemological distinction between the 'visible' and the 'sayable'—with its focus on their conditions—constituted "a sort of neo-Kantianism unique to Foucault."[126] It did differ from Kant in two fundamental aspects, to the extent that "1) the conditions are those of real experience and not of possible experience, thus being on the side of the 'object,' not on the side of a universal 'subject'; and 2) they have to do with historical formations or strata as a posteriori syntheses, and not with the a priori syntheses of all possible experience."[127] But still, as Foucault himself noted, it could not *explain* their geneses in the first place. Deleuze placed this failure in the ambition to subject history to an inquiry into the conditions of possibility of certain knowledge formations, due to which Foucault's archaeologies could not overcome the Kantian principle of non-contradiction. This problem was even enforced by Foucault's analytic approach through discursive practices, a level still overvalued in his genealogical program.[128] Here, its heavily logo-centric approach to structure (to which I return later) entailed a rather teleological perspective on historical developments, needed to avoid taking into account contradictory responses to problematizations. Therein, however, this distinction prevented him from initially accounting for the experimental nature or contingency of those forms that came to exist.

David Lapoujade helpfully reminds us that critique remains Kantian, as long as claims are evaluated according to an attempt at 'grounding,' which basically concerns a fine line between describing causes and searching for their reasons [*Gründe*].[129] This grounding comprises any mode of reasoning in which judgments are carried out on the basis of a scheme of representation in which things or entities are distributed, classified, sorted, hierarchized and evaluated in reference to pre-established normative notions, criteria or categories such as 'species' or 'types.'[130] It it due to working with such cate-

126 See ibid., 60; and "Les formations historiques," Seminar Nov 19, 1985 (Part 4): n.p.

127 Deleuze, "Foucault's Main Concepts," in *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, ed. Morar, Nail, and Smith, 62). For longer discussions of this neo-Kantian side, see also the articles by Frédéric Gros, "Deleuze's Foucault: A Metaphysical Fiction," trans. Samantha Bankston, and Anne Sauvagnagues, "Becoming and History," in ibid., 123–38 and 174–99; here 131 and 187.

128 See Dosse, "Deleuze and Foucault: A Philosophical Friendship," in *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, ed. Morar, Nail and Smith, 11–37; here 26.

129 See Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 39–110, here 40. See also Toscano, *Theater of Production*, 19–34.

130 Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 73.

gories, Daniel Smith comments, that any critical historical analysis restricting itself to such reasoning "fails to apprehend the conditions of emergence of anything new."[131] Deleuze, on his own behalf, fervently advocated that one "cannot think the condition in the image of the conditioned."[132] This representational way of thinking is what *Difference and Repetition* denounces as the so-called **IMAGE OF THOUGHT**, which, in its dogmatic form, obscures the point of view of genesis. For this reason, grounding is the central point of departure—and point to finally depart from—in Deleuze's search for a way of thinking without grounding.[133]

Deleuze's Difference-Theoretic Approach

A key move in Deleuze's philosophy, as Ray Brassier writes, lies thus in his thoroughgoing rejection of any form of representational thinking. Regarding this rejection, Joe Hughes clarifies that "Deleuze never criticizes representation because it is inherently bad … Representation poses a problem because it … allows us to forget that it is only an epiphenomenon whose genesis we need to explain."[134] Here, as Lapoujade adds, Deleuze's primary problem with grounding concerns the way its mode of representation involves "a denaturation of difference, an active eviction of its powers."[135] In moving "beyond the world of representation," into the "groundlessness of Being," Deleuze leaps into an ontology of difference. The latter was developed in the first book Deleuze authored in his own voice: *Difference and Repetition*. The book is a somewhat parodic reworking of the architectonic argumentation in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.[136] It was divided into three main parts: "an aesthetic (theory of sensibility), an analytic (theory of the object), and a dialectic (theory of the idea)."[137] This tripartition is itself re-affirmed but not without being radically altered by Deleuze's removal of both the intermediary analytic (as constituting a theory of the object), and its coordinates (i.e. subjects and

131 Smith, introduction to Deleuze, *Essays: Critical and Clinical,* liii,

132 Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 141. See also Smith, "Conditions of the New," 6.

133 "In the absence of a ground," summarizes Lapoujade, "beings distribute themselves freely … in an open, unlimited space, without [pre-established] hierarch[ies] …. Claims can no longer be judged with a superior principle because everything now proceeds from the equality proper to univocity. … When the question of the ground … opens onto the groundlessness of Being, the whole system of judgment is thus overturned" (Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 75–77). For the relation to Heidegger, see for instance Arun Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze* (London/New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 8–12.

134 Joe Hughes, *Deleuze and the Genesis of Representation* (London: Continuum, 2008), 53.

135 Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 62.

136 See ibid., 111; Edward Willatt, *Kant, Deleuze, and Architectonics* (London/New York: Continuum, 2010), 1–21.

137 Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 111. Following ibid.

objects). Through this move, the principle of non-contradiction would come to be rigorously subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason.[138] Of course, he does so in a fundamentally anti-Hegelian fashion, which avoids confusing this immanent view for an intrinsic determination, such as Hegel had done in overthrowing the Kantian system.[139]

The resulting difference-theoretic view is what fuels Deleuze's thinking, and also lies at the core of my own approach. In this regard, this section aims to confront any views that this difference-theoretical approach was somewhat reductive (or too complicated), by stressing how his differential viewpoint prevents the two truly reductionist subsumptions of difference under either the transcendental unity of 'the same' or the empirical diversity of 'the other'. Deleuze provocatively proposed that we need to start relating difference to difference, and difference only. Famously, Deleuze made clear that

> Difference is not diversity. Diversity is given, but difference is that by which the given is given. … Every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned. *Every diversity and every change refers to a difference which is its sufficient reason*. Everything which happens and everything which appears is correlated with orders of differences: differences of level, temperature, pressure, tension, potential, difference of intensity.[140]

In this way difference, as a pure difference or difference 'in itself,' is always *productive*, and cannot be accounted for in negative terms of 'differences between' or 'difference from.'

Difference is then best understood in terms of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's concept of differentials (dx, dy), as they make it possible to describe relations and change in themselves. Making it more difficult to understand difference in terms of 'a difference between' preexisting things, it is at the differential level that everything substantially changes: every space, every entity is made up by a genetic field of 'material' qualitative differences.[141] Deleuze's *Nietzsche*-book (1962) already identified the genetic and genea-

138 For Deleuze's subordination, see also the related discussion of Freud's pleasure principle in "Coldness and Cruelty," 111–21.

139 See Pierre Macherey, *Hegel or Spinoza*, trans. Susan M. Ruddick (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2011).

140 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 222 (emph. added).

141 Ibid., 46–47; Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 97. See also Hughes, *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Reader's Guide* (London/New York: Continuum,. 2009), 39–65. I also use the "Outline of Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et Répétition*" by John Protevi (2006), avail. online www.protevi.com/john/DG/DR.pdf, as a helpful tool to navigate the book.

logical element in a differential relationship of forces, from which power derives.[142] In *Bergsonism* (1966), Deleuze had adopted Henri Bergson's notion of **MULTIPLICITY** as the name for this purely differential field: a genetic condition that, understood through Bergson's notion of the **VIRTUAL**, makes it possible to move beyond a mode of thinking based on conditions of possibility and their realization. In summarizing Deleuze's critique of the concept of 'realization,' Daniel W. Smith writes that we usually "think of the possible as somehow 'preexisting' the real … everything is already given."[143] As a result, "the idea of the possible appears," Deleuze writes, every time "when, instead of grasping each existent in its novelty, the whole of existence is related to a preformed element, from which everything is supposed to emerge by simple 'realization.'"[144] As often discussed, Deleuze then suggests that we substitute the Bergsonian conception of the **VIRTUAL** for the concept of the 'possible,' to do away with the representational 'possible-real' distinction. Always worth re-emphasizing, for Deleuze "the virtual is opposed not to the real but to the **ACTUAL**. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual. … Indeed, the virtual must be defined as strictly a part of the real object."[145]

In fact, Deleuze argues, "the reality of the virtual is structure."[146] He is thus not opposed to structuralism per se, but rather to its too static and ahistorical theory of proximity and relations.[147] Structures are always differential ones, which—as Jon Roffe stressed—cannot involve any "recourse to identity or given terms between which relations hold."[148] This does not mean that for Deleuze matter is not formless. Instead, Lapoujade comments, "it is differentiated in itself, animated by the logic of virtual differentiation … Matter [is] nothing but quantity … [It] does not exist, *and yet it is real*; it has physical reality."[149] This ontological distinction thus yields a radical reposi-

142 Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 2–6, and 50–55.

143 "The process of realization, Deleuze suggests, is subject to two rules: a rule of resemblance and a rule of limitation. One the one hand, the real is supposed to resemble the possible that it realizes, which means that everything is already given in the identity of the concept, and simply has existence or reality added to it when it is 'realized'. On the other hand, since not every possible is realized, the process of realization involves a limitation or exclusion by which some possibilities are thwarted, while others 'pass' into the real." Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze and the Production of the New," in *The Production of the New*, ed. Simon O'Sullivan and Stephen Zepke (London: Continuum 2008): 151–61; here 159, citing Deleuze, *Bergonism*, 20.

144 Deleuze, *Bergonism*, 20.

145 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 208–9.

146 Ibid., 209.

147 See Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze,* 189–90.

148 Jon Roffe, Lecture Notes on the "Quasi-cause, the virtual, the intensive," Virtual/Actual workshop, Deakin Univ. (Nov 13, 2015), 1, avail. online at https://www.academia.edu/18910163/Quasi-causality_intensity_and_the_virtual.

149 Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 123.

tioning of the modal status of structure (and as we shall see, architecture) neither as actual nor merely possible, but as *virtually real*. Instead, "the reality of the virtual consists of the differential elements and relations along with the singular points which correspond to them. The reality of the virtual is [thus] structure. We must avoid giving the elements and relations which form a structure an actuality which they do not have, and withdrawing from them a reality which they have."[150] Because if it is already real, the virtual needs no further realization. Instead, it must be **ACTUALIZED**. But in contrast to the process of realization, "the virtual actualizes itself not through resemblance, but through divergence and differentiation. Differentiation or actualization is always creative with respect to what it actualizes."[151] The most important factor in Deleuze's new conception can be summarized as: "When the virtual is actualized, it differentiates itself, it produces the new."[152]

"Structure Does Not Explain; It Must be Explained"

It is here that we touch on a crucial methodological component as to how to approach such differentiation processes, geneses, and historical formations analytically, and how to conceptualize them historically. While "history is not a primary concern in *Difference and Repetition*," it nonetheless "provides the barest outlines of a conception of history," as Paul Patton argues, where Deleuze observes that "the real social relations of a given society might be said to actualize the differential relations of production."[153] As Patton points out, "there is no difficulty in reconciling structure and genesis, as long as we understand that genesis does not happen between actual things but between the virtual and its actualization."[154]

150 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 208–9.

151 Deleuze, "The Method of Dramatization," in *Desert Islands and Other Texts*, 1953–1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004): 94–116; here 101. Just before he explained: "The possible is just the concept as principle of the representation of the thing, under the following categories: the identity of what is representing, and the resemblance of what is being represented. On the other hand, the virtual belongs to the Idea and does not resemble the actual, no more than the actual resembles the virtual. The Idea is an image without resemblance; the virtual actualizes itself not through resemblance, but through divergence and differentiation. Differentiation or actualization is always creative with respect to what it actualizes, whereas realization is always reproductive or limiting. The difference between the virtual and the actual is no longer the difference of the Same insofar as the Same is posited once in representation, and once again outside representation" (ibid.).

152 Smith, "Production of the New," 160.

153 Patton, "Events, Becoming, History," 44; paraphrasing Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 184–6. Patton here points out the influence of Louis Althusser.

154 Ibid., paraphrasing Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 184.

This understanding of geneses allows Deleuze to avoid any **PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION** in the constitution of things: As Joe Hughes describes this challenge in an example, "the constituted does not resemble its process of production, its constitution, in the same way a car does not resemble the production line which built it. … By emphasizing the product rather than the process of production [i.e. a genesis] we end up completely misunderstanding both."[155] As Andrej Radman comments, this "fallacy of conflating the process with the product is known as 'tracing,'"[156] and it often happened where scholars traced historical processes and social production through spatial organizations. A genetic approach to historical formations avoids tracing (i.e. deducing) the transcendental from the empirical, because in the position of radical empiricism, sense is not given; it must be made. Still, everything starts from the sensible.[157] The pragmatist theory of the sensible is directly connected to the synthesis of ideas.[158] This means, as Brain Massumi writes, that "the truth is not 'out there'. It is in the making."[159] This again doesn't mean that truth is 'constructed,' but that it rather arises only in an effort of *making sense* by pragmatically reconstructing the sensible. Deleuze's philosophical response—his transcendental empiricism as a way of thinking "transcendental[ly] in its refusal of any 'image of thought,' and … empirical[ly] in its openness to affective encounters"[160])—"opens onto the differential groundlessness

155 Hughes, *Genesis of Representation*, 4–8, and 53

156 Andrej Radman, "Sensibility is Ground Zero: On Inclusive Disjunction and Politics of Defatalization," in *This Deleuzian Century: Art, Activism, Life* (Leiden/Boston: Brill/Rodofi, 2014), 57–86; here 59–60.

157 Radman, "Sensibility is Ground Zero," 58.

158 Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 114. He here clarifies further that it "would be wrong to maintain that Deleuze's project is anti-dialectical on the grounds that he rejects every mediation; on the contrary, it is because he short-circuits all mediation between the sensible and the Idea that his project is properly dialectical" (ibid.).

159 Brian Massumi, *Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts* (Cambridge/London, MIT Press, 2011), 37.

160 Radman, "Sensibility is Ground Zero," 58. For Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, see—among many other studies—Bryant, *Difference and Givenness: Deleuze's Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of Immanence* (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2008), who writes that "Deleuze's definition of transcendental empiricism is very simple: transcendental empiricism is that philosophical position which determines the conditions of real rather than possible experience. … Kant described his position as a 'transcendental idealism' … which holds that certain ideal and universal structures of mind must be at work in order for there to be something like experience at all. It seems that transcendental empiricism turns out to be something very different." Instead, "Deleuze's transcendental empiricism is an attempt to formulate an ontology … that locates intelligibility at the level of the aesthetic or sensible itself and to determine what consequences follow from this position" (Ibid., 12). Other relevant monothematic studies include Anne Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze: L'Empirisme transcendantal* (Paris: PUF, 2010) and Daniela Voss, *Conditions of Thought: Deleuze and Transcendental Ideas* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2013).

of Being, the whole system of judgment is thus overturned."[161] Representation is substituted for problematization: against any representational mode of thinking that engages only "with a ready-made world," the genetic task is to reconstruct or identify "the real, yet virtual *problem structure* … that conditions the structure of actuality."[162]

As becomes quickly apparent, this proposition ultimately entails a greater methodological challenge for the study of any given formation or condition because—as Radman phrases it—"the given needs to be set aside until the issue how the given is given has been addressed"[163], that is, *the series of geneses* giving and conditioning them in the first place. This, he highlights, cannot be revealed by tracing what happened, but requires making cartographies in the aim to render visible "*what is going on* (genealogy) in what was happening (archaeology)."[164] In thus establishing the real conditions of the given, the evident problem of this approach lies, as Lapoujade namely notes, "in determining 'that by which the given is given'. We could also say it concerns the genesis or constitution of bodies, whatever they may be: organic, … geometrical, … social, … geological, … political."[165]

Since his early reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze persistently foregrounded that bodies arise every time that two unequal forces enter into a relation.[166] Ideas, bodies, and real objects thus form, *Difference and Repetition* argues, when (and only when) differential elements enter into a relation of **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION** (dx/dy). Drawing from Leibniz, Salomon Maïmon had demonstrated in his reformulation of Kant's *Critique* that this principle of reciprocal relation provides the modes in which individual forms are generated.[167] Therein, "the reciprocal synthesis of differential

161 Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 77. He also clarifies; "Groundlessness is not the formless or the undifferentiated but that which … constitute[s] each time … a difference which continuously differs form itself in the relation of reciprocal determination it maintains with other differences [i.e. *dx/dy*]. In other words, difference constitutes the ultimate principle [against facile representation] insofar as it acts already on the level of differential relations between elements that are themselves differential" (ibid., 70).

162 Ray Brassier, "Deleveling: Against Flat Ontologies," in *Under Influence - Philosophical Festival Drift (2014)*, ed. Channa van Dijk et al. (Amsterdam: Omnia, 2015): 64–80; here 70–71 (emph. added).

163 Radman, "Involutionary Architecture: Unyoking Coherence from Congruence," in *Posthuman Ecologies: Complexity and Process after Deleuze*, ed. Simone Bignall and Rosi Braidotti (New York/London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 61–85.

164 Radman, "The Libidinal Field: Street Photography and Urban Cartography," *Ecologies of Architecture*, n.p. (forthcoming); Radman and Hauptmann, "Northern Line," 49 (emph. added).

165 Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 117–8.

166 See Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 40; and *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 19.

167 Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 121. Deleuze claims concern that "A great deal of heart and a great deal of truly philosophical naivety is needed in order to take the symbol dx

relations [becomes] the source of the production of real objects. … [They appear in] a system of differential relations between reciprocally-determined genetic elements."[168] For Deleuze, this genetic relation is

> established between elements which have no determined value themselves, and which nevertheless determine each other reciprocally in the relation: … Such relationships are symbolic, and the corresponding elements are held in a differential relationship. Dy is totally undetermined in relation to y, and dx is totally undetermined in relation to x: each one has neither existence, nor value, nor signification. And yet the relation dy/dx is totally determined, the two elements determining each other reciprocally in the relation.[169]

This is where reciprocal determination becomes a "new figure of sufficient reason" that, as Lapoujade comments, is "new insofar as it accounts for all that classical sufficient reason excluded in this disjunction."[170] As Sjoerd van Tuinen remarks, *Difference and Repetition* thereby completely reinvents the principle of sufficient reason, "for an immanent belief in the world … that integrates difference qua contingency."[171]

In this view, all individual forms are only actual effects of virtual relations of intensity. In putting aside ontology by focusing on *ontogenesis* by studying processes that involve an individuation of **INTENSIVE DIFFERENCES**, those intrinsic differences between beings come to be fully de-ontologized, and we replace the negative vision of difference with a fully productive,

seriously. … The principle of a general differential philosophy must be the object of a rigorous exposition, and must in no way depend upon the infinitely small. The symbol dx appears as simultaneously undetermined, determinable and determination. Three principles which together form a sufficient reason correspond to these three aspects: a principle of determinability corresponds to the undetermined as such (dx, dy); a principle of reciprocal determination corresponds to the really determinable (dy/dx); a principle of complete determination corresponds to the effectively determined (values of dy/dx). In short, dx is the Idea – the Platonic, Leibnizian or Kantian Idea, the 'problem' and its being. … In relation to x, dx is completely undetermined, as dy is to y, but they are perfectly determinable in relation to one another" (Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 171–4).

168 Ibid., 173–4. For the sake of brevity, I may have over-simplified here the conceptual precision of Deleuze, in distinguishing what he calls the 'Idea' as matter, and the body or real object that embodies this Idea. For this point, see Hughes, *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, 134–49; and esp. Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze, Kant, and the Theory of Immanent Ideas," in *Deleuze and Philosophy*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (Edinburgh: EUP, 2006) 43–61.

169 Deleuze, "How Do We Recognize Structuralism," 176.

170 Lapoujade, *Aberrrant Movements*, 122.

171 Sjoerd van Tuinen, "Deleuze: Speculative and Practical Philosophy," in *Genealogies of Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity Since Structuralism*, ed. Armen Avanessian and Suhail Malik (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 93–114; here 97 and 109.

immanent one.[172] On this point, Deleuze initially fell back on Spinoza's specifically 'physical' conception of reality, if by this we mean, as Macherey argued, an understanding of physics as the study of the coexistence of things.[173] Kant had eliminated any mechanistic conception of nature by introducing a metaphysics of forces, in which space no longer contains anything but "the necessary conditions of external relations of possible objects."[174] But *Difference and Repetition* reworks Kant's 'constructive' metaphysics of matter in which there exists only a synthetic relation of exteriority in such a way that it is no longer formulated on the basis of forces 'between' possible things, but in terms of how differential force fields come to matter in bodies.[175] This notion would result in the concept of the 'body without organs,' a concept borrowed from Antonin Artaud, by which Deleuze conceptualizes a virtual body, that "is not 'without organs' per se, but without organs that would be organized by and in the name of [an] *organism*, [as something] that is usually maintained in a very well-specified equilibrium by exterior conditionings"; rather, it is an intensive *spatium*, crisscrossed by intensive thresholds, gradients, and potentialities, that as a virtual field has no direct resemblance to actual bodies.[176]

An Ethology of Differentiating Forces

In parallel to writing *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze had started to identify a new model for philosophy in Spinoza's radical re-conceptualization of bodies as material entities composed of differential relations, which ought to be thought through their immanent capacity to affect and be affected, hence within affective relations.[177] In placing Spinoza's ethical distinction between

172 My introduction already alluded to this view through Braidotti's operative notion of difference, to which we will return below. Here, I refer to Deleuze's Simondonian notion that as being is no longer tied to an already individuated being, "individuation ceases to be co-extensive with being" (Deleuze's "Review of Gilbert Simondon's '*L'individu et sa genèse physico–biologique*' (1966)," trans. Ivan Ramirez, pub. in *Pli* 12 (2001): 43–49; here 44.

173 Macherey, *Hegel or Spinoza*, 175.

174 See Immanuel Kant, *Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen* (Königsberg: Kanter, 1763); and id., "Zweytes Hauptstück … der Dynamik.," Erkl.1 and Erkl.5, Anm., in *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* (Riga: Hartknoch, 1786), avail. online at http://www.philosophiebuch.de/metannat.htm; translation cited after Macherey, *Hegel or Spinoza*, 191–2, and after Kant and Ernest Belfort Bax, *Kant's Prolegomena, and Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (London: G. Bell, 1883), 176.

175 *Difference and Repetition* called this relation "vice-diction," thus changing condition (from *condicere*, "to speak with, talk together," from *com-* "together" + *dicere* "to speak") to *vicediction* (from Latin *vice* "in place of," ablative of *vicis* "a change, a turn, interchange alternation"), not to understand structure in terms of status, but change.

176 Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 132–9; here 135 (modified). See here also Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 19; and id., *A Thousand Plateaus*, 153.

177 See Deleuze, "The Difference between an *Ethics* and a Morality," in *Spinoza: Practical*

'power to' (*potentia*, the ability of a body to act) and 'power over' (*potestas,* the ability to act upon bodies) at the very heart of his philosophy, Deleuze understood that this affective capacity is initially a 'power to' (*puissance*), before it can become a 'power over' (*pouvoir*), which is primarily what Foucault problematizes.[178] Deleuze is more interested in those differences in potential, or potentialities or capacities. Here, Deleuze's differential epistemology of how problems are *posed* resonates with the central problem of Spinoza's *Ethics*, concerning his claim that "no one has yet determined what a body can do [*quid corpus possit*]".[179] Here, 'bodies,' as those entities of classical physics, serve as a starting point and new model for understanding entities resolutely as particular solutions to problematic fields. What bodies 'do' in posing a solution is—rather than an answer—resolving particular problems. As Daniela Voss understands, problems therefore "designate a structural moment in the dynamic process of individuation".[180]

By attending to the question of what bodies *can do* to a much greater degree than Lefebvre and Foucault in their reading of Spinoza, Deleuze embraces that one cannot know in advance how material formations work until one acts upon them.[181] In his rather synoptic *Spinoza: Philosophie Pratique* (*Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 1970), Deleuze would re-pose the problem of transforming bodies in terms of the genesis (=production) of real experience, or conditions of reality.[182] It is hence a real condition of individua-

Philosophy, 17–29; and 30–34; see also id., *Expressionism in Philosophy*, 93–95, and 217–34.

178 See Deleuze, "Foucault's Main Concepts," 255. For the since widely taken up distinction between a "power over/to," see—besides the passages stated in the previous note—esp. the lemma "Power," in Deleuze's *Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy*, trans. Martin Joughin (Brooklyn: Zone Books, 1990), 97–104; and the eponymous entry by Claire Colebrook plus its connectives, in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: EUP, 2010), 215–6.

179 Book III, Prop. 2, Note, cited after Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. Edwin Curley (London: Penguin, 1996), 71. A first shift away from the question "What it is?" stated in a 1967 discussion, published as "Method of Dramatization," in favor of investigating spatio-temporal dynamisms, in which "We would have to distinguish what belongs to space and what to time in these dynamisms, and in each case, the particular space-time combination. Whenever an Idea is actualized, there is a space and a time of actualization. … We see very well in biology how differential rhythms determine the organization of the body and its temporal specification" (ibid., 111).

180 Voss, "Simondon on the Notion of the Problem," 94.

181 See esp. Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, 217–302.

182 See Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 18–19: Here he asks: "What does Spinoza mean when he invites us to take the body as a model? … In short, the model of the body, according to Spinoza, does not imply any devaluation of thought in relation to extension, but, much more important, a devaluation of consciousness in relation to thought: a discovery of the unconscious, of an unconscious of thought just as profound as the unknown of the body. The fact is that consciousness is by nature the locus of an illusion. Its nature is such that it registers effects, but it knows nothing of causes. The order of

tion.[183] As Smith comments: "The properly Deleuzian question would therefore be: what are the ontological conditions under which something new can appear in the world?"[184] He thereby opted for an approach that treats experience very differently, namely as experimentation.[185] This experimental mode shifts the question from an interpretative concern ("What does it mean?"), in aiming to reveal the workings behind phenomena ("How does it work?").

The underlying transvaluation 'to have done with judgment' is inextricably tied to a call for radical experimentation and an agenda of transformative ethics that Deleuze directly derives from Spinoza's practical philosophy. In this transvaluation, Deleuze progressively embraces the *Ethics* as an **ETHOLOGY**—as a relational ontology that accounts for the exteriority of relations based on the Spinoza's ethological conception of *ratio* as the cause for finite individual things to exist.[186] In contrast to an etiological study of causation, an ethological approach calls for an experimental study of the composition of relations and capabilities of bodies:

> Ethology is first of all the study of [those differential] relations of speed and slownesses, of the capacities for affecting and being affected that characterize each thing. … The speed or slowness of metabolisms, perceptions, actions, and reactions link together to constitute a particular individual in the world. Further there is also a

causes is defined by this: each body in extension, each idea or each mind in thought are constituted by the characteristic relations that subsume the parts of that body, the parts of that idea. When a body 'encounters' another body, or an idea another idea, it happens that the two relations sometimes combine to form a more powerful whole, and sometimes one decomposes the other, destroying the cohesion of its parts. The order of causes is therefore an order of composition and decomposition of relations, which infinitely affects all of nature. But as conscious beings, we never apprehend anything but the *effects* of these compositions and decompositions: … In short, the conditions under which we know things and are conscious of ourselves condemn us *to have only inadequate ideas*, ideas that are confused and mutilated, effects separated from their real causes" (ibid.).

183 See Toscano, *Theater of Production*, 151, and Voss, "Simondon on the Notion of the Problem," 100.

184 Smith, "Conditions of the New," 3.

185 See Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 125. Note that in French, *expérience* means equally 'experience' and 'experiment'. Already in the 50s, Deleuze's made this connection in his *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (New York: Columbia UP, 1991), 62–67. On this relation see also id, *Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical*, incl. Smith's introduction.

186 See Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, 27, and the chapter "Ethology: Spinoza and Us," in ibid., 112–130; here 125. Conceptually, the notion of Ethology is not imparted from Spinoza's work but from biologist Jacob von Uexküll, for whom ethology is the study of animal behavior with a focus on adaptive traits. Note that the notion does not feature in Deleuze's 1968 study of Spinoza (Deleuze's *Expressionism in Philosophy*, 125–6). On Spinoza's philosophy of *ratio*, see also Beth Lord, ed., *Spinoza's Philosophy of Ratio* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2018).

> way in which these relations of speed and slowness are realized according to circumstances … . Lastly, ethology studies the composition of relations or capacities [emerging] between different things. … How do individuals enter into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad infinitum?"[187]

In understanding this actual composition of particular bodies as a result of and response to a virtual problematic structure, an ethological view is then highly attentive to the historical process by which bodies come to be 'individuated' as actual entities.[188]

Informed by not only Bergson's work, but also Gilbert Simondon's genetic approach to subjectivity and its thesis that "the individual is not only the result but the *milieu* of individuation," understood as a process operated by an intensive differentiation, Deleuze avoids taking individuals as fully formed givens by accounting instead for each individual as a process of individuation.[189] Manuel DeLanda has brilliantly reconstructed Deleuze's view on this process. Therein everything begins from "a materialist 'plane of immanence,' a pre-individual continuum of matter-energy flows in various stages of individuation" that are expressed in the powerful processes of a living world.[190]

> The primary commitment of Deleuze's ontology is to individuals; i.e., to actual individuals in space-time. Within this continuum of immanence, only concrete individuals exist, but they exist at various nested spatio-temporal scales, as well as at various stages of individuation. The remit of Deleuzian ontology is to identify the pre-

187 Deleuze, *Spinoza Practical Philosophy*, 125.

188 See Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 123. As Manuel DeLanda explain, one reason for this conception is that, in French, *l'individu* does not have the same essentialist connotation as 'the individual' with its nominalized adjective form. It s a nominalized past participle and thus simply a product of an (individualizing) process. Manuel DeLanda, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013; orig. pub. 2002), 31.

189 Here after, Deleuze's "Review of Gilbert Simondon's '*L'Individu*,'" 43–44. Gilbert Simondon's complementary thesis *Du mode d' existence des objets techniques, nouv. éd.* (Paris: Aubier, 1958; repub. 2012), translated as *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, trans. Cécile Malaspina and John Rogove (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2017); Simondon's main thesis "L'individuation à la lumière des notions de formes et d'information," PhD diss., Univ. of Paris (1958), was published in two parts: *L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique* (Paris: PUF, 1964; repub. and ed. Jérôme Millon (Grenoble: Millon, 1995); and *L'individuation psychique et collective: à la lumière des notions de forme, information, potentiel et métastabilité* (Paris: Aubier 1987; repub. 2007).

190 Manuel DeLanda, *Intensive Science and Virtual*, 31.

> individual continuum of processes of individuation. Deleuze does not begin by taking individuals as ready-made or pre-constituted entities (i.e. objects). Instead, the task proper to Deleuzian metaphysics is to identify the processes of individuation through which individuals are constituted.[191]

By thus working through the problem of individuation as an inquiry into the workings of ontogenesis, Deleuze dramatizes individuation as "the organization of a solution, of a 'resolution' for an objectively problematic system" or pre-individual field from which any individual formation (a body, an assemblages, a building, a city, etc.) arises with its singular characteristics.[192]

Deleuze's differential ontology then re-conceptualizes individuation as an 'integration of a multiplicity,' of a problematic of differential field that presents the emergent condition of the new.[193] He argues that "integration is by no means the inverse of differentiation but, rather, forms an original process of differenciation."[194] Through this typographic distinction, the twofold concept of **DIFFERENT/CIATION** repositions the genetic relation between problems and solutions as it "names the cusp where actual space emerges from virtual reality":[195] differentiation is the process in which a problem becomes fully determined through reciprocal determination; by contrast, differenciation is the process by which particular solutions are constituted, meaning that process through which virtual matters become actual objects. DeLanda remarks that Deleuze thus "distinguishes the progressive unfolding of a multiplicity through broken symmetries (differentiation), from the progressive specification of the continuous space formed by multiplicities as it gives rise to our world of discontinuous spatial structures (differenciation)."[196] Regarding this 'specification of the continuous space,' I should stress that it

191 Ibid.

192 Deleuze, "Review of Gilbert Simondon's '*L'Individu*,'" 46. On the Simondonian influence on Deleuze's ontology, see especially Toscano, *Theater of Production*, 1–16; here also 13–14

193 See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 47 and 208–11.

194 Ibid., 209: "Whereas differentiation determines the virtual content of the Idea as problem, differenciation expresses the actualization of this virtual and the constitution of solutions (by local integrations). Differenciation is like the second part of difference, and in order to designate the integrity or the integrality of the object we require the complex notion of different/ciation" (ibid.).

195 Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 184. See Constantin V. Boundas, "What Difference does Deleuze Difference make?," in *Deleuze and Philosophy*, 3–28. For this distinction, see the respective entries on "Different/ciation," in Adrian Parr, ed., *The Deleuze Dictionary,* rev. edn. (Edinburgh: EUP, 2010), 72–73; and Eugene B. Young, ed., *The Deleuze and Guattari Dictionary* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 94–96.

196 DeLanda, *Intensive Science*, 14–5.

is not space itself that is said to be continuous; it is inherently heterogeneous and thus specified within its continuous variation. It is in this reading that Deleuze presents emerging multiplicities as "a system of connections between differential elements, a system of differential relations" constituted by genetic elements, and singularities corresponding to those relations, "reciprocally determined by these relations."[197]

This is why, for Deleuze, structure thus cannot be the last word, because structure never explains; it must be explained! The task of a philosophy of becoming, Saldanha comments, is therefore to render visible the virtual differentiations hiding within actual differenciations.[198] Deleuze's paper "How do we Recognize Structuralism," published in parallel to *Difference and Repetition*, succinctly stressed that, moreover, "structure is not actualized without being differentiated in space and time, hence without differentiating the species and the parts which carry it out, we must say in this sense that structure produces these species and these parts themselves. It *produces* them as differentiated species and parts, such that one can no more oppose the genetic to the structural than time to structure. Genesis, like time, goes from the virtual to the actual, from the structure to its actualization … . [For this reason,] we must insist on this differenciating role. Structure is in itself a system of elements and of differential relations, but it also differentiates the species and parts, the beings and functions in which the structure is actualized. It is differential in itself, and differentiating in its effect."[199]

Due to this function as a differentiator, "every structure is [and ought to be understood as] an infrastructure."[200] In this infrastructural reading of structures, there is no more opposition between structure and genesis; for Deleuze, "the true opposition lies elsewhere: between Idea … and representation."[201] He criticizes those structuralist thinkers who take structure for a "theater of representation".[202] Against this conception—to which I come back

197 Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, 181–94, 278.

198 Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 129–30.

199 Deleuze, "How Do We Recognize Structuralism," 180.

200 Ibid., 178. It is in this infrastructural reading that Deleuze penned the oft-cited remark: "We will say of structure [that it is] *real without being actual, ideal without being abstract*" (ibid., 179).

201 Ibid., 191

202 Ibid., 192. Deleuze here argues that "It is not surprising that, among many of the authors who promote it, structuralism is so often accompanied by calls for a new theatre or a new (non-Aristotelian) interpretation of the theatre: a theatre of multiplicities opposed in every respect to the theatre of representation, which leaves intact neither the identity of the thing represented, nor author, nor spectator, nor character, nor representation which, through the vicissitudes of the play, can become the object of a production of knowledge or final recognition. Instead, a theatre of problems and always open questions which draws spectator, setting and characters into the real movement of an apprenticeship of

in the next section—Deleuze seeks a machine within structure, as something that engineers or drives structure-generating processes.[203] He argues in direct reference to Foucault's spatial histories that "structuralism cannot be separated from a new transcendental philosophy, in which the sites prevail over whatever occupies them."[204]

the entire unconscious, the final elements of which remain the problems themselves.

203 Already Deleuze's Nietzsche book understood that "This is what the will to power is; the genealogical element of force, both differential and genetic" (Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 50).

204 Deleuze, "How Do We Recognize Structuralism," 174.

0.2
Genealogical Concepts: Dispositifs and Assemblages

Deleuze would establish the new transcendental philosophy hinted at above together with psychotherapist Félix Guattari, in their mutual move from structuralism to machinism—which always requires a body.[205] To trace this machinic assemblage, the following section will(while we have attended until here more to the question how Deleuze and Foucault reciprocally contributed to a mutual differentiation of their differentially developing post-structuralist thinking), look more closely into how Deleuze's collaboration with Guattari entailed a line of differenciation in the relationship and development of Foucault's and Deleuze's diverging theoretical work. As François Dosse notes with Judith Revel, Foucault was initially "delighted to find a foundation for a politics of difference in Deleuze's work" that "allowed [Foucault] a way out of structuralism."[206] This view initially proved a shared point of departure, as to how (Left) intellectuals could politically engage within the contemporary struggles after 1968, and redefine the relation between theory and practice by problematizing established power structures.[207]

Whereas Foucault had taken up Deleuze's problematic epistemology as a productive alternative to negative dialectical thought, the latter was greatly inspired by the turn Foucault's thought took in his methodological treatise: the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969). In its conclusion, Foucault had used the notion of 'positivities' in proposing to substitute any transcendental foundation through a description of "relations of exteriority."[208] The year before, Foucault had still conceived these as "relations of *co-existence* between statements," to not fall back on "any unities that could be presumed of them."[209] They served instead as an "outside in which … in their deployed space, enunciative events are distributed."[210] As a result, this positivity presents a "*condition of reality* of

205 See Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 139.

206 Dosse, *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, 321; citing Judith Revel, "Foucault lecteur de Deleuze: De l'écart à la difference," *Critique* 591–2 (Aug/Sep 1996), 734.

207 On this point, see esp. the conversation between Deleuze and Foucault, published as "Intellectuals and Power," in Foucault, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, 205–17, orig. pub. in *L'arc* 49, 3–10.

208 The principle of exteriority is specifically addressed by Foucault himself in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 118–25; and his "Discourse on Language," in ibid., 229.

209 Foucault, "Archaeology of Science," 311 (emph. added): "It is easy to see that the unity of the object does not allow the individualization of a set of statements and the establishment of a descriptive and constant relation between them. This for two reasons. First, the object, far from being that in relation to which it is possible to define a set of statements is, rather, constituted by the set of those formulations; … But there is more: That ensemble of statements which concern madness, and in truth constitute it, is far from being related only to a single object, from having formed it once and for all and conserved it indefinitely as its inexhaustible horizon of ideality." For the notion of relations of co-existence," see id., *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 32, 37, and 80–2.

210 Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 125. "To describe a group of statements as a fragmented figure [—] not with the interiority of an intention, a thought, or a subject, but in

statements" and a "condition of emergence of statements."[211] Describing this characteristic relation that allowed the individualization of this particular set of statements "does not consist of individualizing its object, fixing its identity, or describing the characteristics that it permanently retains; on the contrary, it is to describe the dispersion of these objects, to grasp all the interstices that separate them, to measure the distances reigning between them—in other words, to formulate their law of distribution."[212]

Instead, as Foucault would come to identify in the course of the year, besides the problem to constitute chance series of events, and "to define the elements proper to each series, to fix its boundaries, to reveal its own specific type of relation," the problem is to adequately "describe the *relations between different series*, thus constituting series of series."[213] This is point where historical analysis methodologically mutates from constituting continuities or divisions toward mapping developments and becomings (*devenir*) in the "description of specific series; the uncovering of the whole interplay of differences."[214] As Foucault stressed in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France (December 1971), we should look for "external conditions of existence that give rise to [and fix] these change series," critically, in terms of certain systems of constraint, but also genealogically based on three principles regarding how "series of discourses are formed through, in spite of, or with the aid of these systems of constraint."[215]

0.2.1 From Three Syntheses to a Tripartite Theory of Production

Deleuze read Nietzsche as a manual against letting negativity get in the way. In his own attempts to arrive at a non-negative notion of difference, he started reading especially the *Archaeology*'s conclusion as "an appeal to a general theory of production."[216] He not only takes up this conception itself,

> accordance with the dispersion of an exteriority … in order to rediscover not … their origin, but the specific accumulation [—] is certainly not to uncover an interpretation, to discover a foundation. It is to establish what I am quite willing to call a *positivity*. … If by substituting the analysis or rarity for the search for totalities, the description of relations of exteriority for the theme of transcendental foundation, the analysis of accumulations for the quest for origin, one is a positivist, then I am quite happy to be one" (ibid.).

211 Ibid., 127. Compare Deleuze's argument that the problem has "a positivity that corresponds to its position as a problem" (Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 140).

212 Foucault, "Archaeology of Science," 313.

213 Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 7–8 (emph. added).

214 Ibid., 10–14

215 Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," 229 and 231–32.

216 Deleuze, *Foucault*, 13.

but he would later also explicitly accredit Foucault's aim to substitute a transcendental foundation through a description of relations of exteriority as "the most decisive step yet in the theory-practice of multiplicities."[217]

After the thoroughgoing critique of grounding in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze had started to advance this non-negative theory of production, when his further work touched on the question of causal relations between historical events as three different sorts of temporal series. This tripartite scheme was originally advanced in *Difference and Repetition*, which rewrites the theory of THREE SYNTHESES provided in the deduction of Kant's first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason.*[218] Thereby Deleuze would progressively advance a theory of the production of subjectivity in which—contrary to Kant—there is no longer a synthesizing transcendent subject; instead subjects are produced immanently along three syntheses .[219] Therein, "the

217 Ibid., 13–4 and 43.

218 See esp. the second chapter of Deleuze's *Difference and Repetition*, 70–128. For a thematic analysis of the three syntheses, see also Keith W. Faulkner, *Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time* (New York: Peter Lang, 2006); the following citations are from Faulkner's original dissertation, "Deleuze and the Three Syntheses of Time," PhD diss., Univ. of Warwick (2004), avail. online at http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/2991. See moreover Hughes's exposition on the three syntheses offered, who highlights the tripartite division of Deleuze's second chapter, which revisits the syntheses in each philosophical, psychoanalytical, and physical terms (Hughes, *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, 86–125; esp. 99). See also Hughes, *Genesis of Representation*, 11; and Colebrook's, "Disjunctive Synthesis," in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. Parr, 79–80. For the original passage "Deduktion der Reinen Verstandesbegriffe [The deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding]," initially presented in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* but replaced in its later editions by the section "Transzendentale Deduktion der Reinen Verstandesbegriffe [Transcendental deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding]," see Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft* [1781/1787], Studienausgabe ed. Ingeborg Heidemann (Ditzingen: Reclam, 2016 [1966]); and id., *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998)], A95–130 vs. B129–B169. A critical analysis of Kant's own revision is provided, for instance, by Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015), 146–432; and Wolfgang Carl, *Die Transzendentale Deduktion der Kategorien in der ersten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft: Ein Kommentar* (Frankfurt/M.: Klostermann, 1992).

219 As Smith and Protevi have pointed out: "Already in his Hume book, *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (1953), Deleuze had pointed to an empiricist reversal of Kant. Where Kant's question had been 'How can the given be given to a subject?' Hume's question had been 'How is the subject (human nature) constituted within the given?'" Daniel W. Smith and John Protevi, entry on "Gilles Deleuze," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., avail. online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/deleuze/. For Deleuze's initial discussion of Kant's three syntheses of apprehension in the intuition; of reproduction in the imagination, and of recognition in the concept (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A97), which measure the respective contributions of the thinking faculties, see Deleuze, *What is Grounding?*, 29–32, and id., *Difference and Repetition*, 135. See also the chapter "Three Syntheses (or 'What Happened?')," in Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 79–110. Faulkner pointed out that "it is very important that the reader does not confuse these three 'repetitions' with the three syntheses of time" (Faulkner, "Three Syntheses," 11; see also Hughes, *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*,

originary synthesis of time," which constitutes "time as a living present" is *habit*, which is what is "contracted" through repetitions but also always "draws something new from repetition—namely difference."[220] For Deleuze, however, *memory* is a more "fundamental synthesis of time which constitutes the being of the past" in which the [former] synthesis can occur.[221] The third synthesis of time constitutes an "empty form of time" that is "no longer subordinated to movement," but one "in which the future appears" as a future that "affirms at once both the unconditioned character of the product in relation to the conditions of its production."[222] In short, as Voss writes, time is thus turned from an a priori given into "a productive power of synthesis";[223] that is, *thought*, the condition of the new, emergence, which for Deleuze lies in repetition itself. Countering Marx's comical notion of historical repetition with Nietzsche's dramatic one, Deleuze contends that "Repetition is never a historical fact, but rather the historical condition under which something new is effectively produced. … We produce something new only on condition that we repeat."[224] This genesis, however, newer unifies; it never produces a unified subject, nor any synthetic unity; "the third synthesis is a failed synthesis," as Hughes writes: it fails to be closed.[225] Rather it is a play of differences, of conjunctions and disjunctions;[226] a caesura that forces us to truly think.

Problematizing Disjunctive Syntheses

In his *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze reconceptualized these three syntheses as different kinds of series, in isolating "the connective synthesis (if … , then), which bears upon the construction of a single series; the conjunctive series (and), as a method of constructing convergent series; and the disjunctive

86–125). Hughes and Faulkner pointed to the prototypal theory of three syntheses with the theory of the three sign in Deleuze's book on Proust.

220 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 80, 76, and 73.

221 Ibid., 80 and 79.

222 Ibid., 88–9 and 94.

223 Daniela Voss, "Deleuze's Third Synthesis of Time," *Deleuze Studies* 7.2 (2013): 194–216. As she summarizes: "Deleuze's account of the third synthesis of time deviates from the Kantian definition of time as an a priori given. … Instead, Deleuze conceives of time as a productive power of synthesis – in his words, a 'static synthesis' which is constituted by a 'caesura' or cut. … Deleuze's third synthesis of time has to be understood as an *a priori ordered series* that is produced by a caesura. The caesura is the formal element which distributes on both sides the before and the after which no longer rhyme together" (ibid., 197–99).

224 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 90. See also Smith, "Conditions of the New"; and id., "Deleuze and the Production of the New,' in *Production of the New,* ed. O'Sullivan and Zepke, 151–61.

225 Hughes, *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, 115.

226 See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 238.

series (or), which distributes the divergent series."[227] Through this distinction, Deleuze came to the conclusion that

> the whole question [concerning causality] … is to know *under what conditions disjunction is a veritable synthesis*, instead of being a procedure of analysis which is satisfied with the exclusion of predicates from a thing by virtue of the identity of its concept (the negative, limitative, or exclusive use of disjunction [that is, as in the disjunctive syllogism of Kantian critique]). The answer is given insofar as the divergence or the decentering determined by the disjunction become objects of affirmation as such.[228]

From this point on, Deleuze would come to re-conceptualize this divergence in much more affirmative, non-restrictive, inclusive terms, to arrive at a genetic view, namely as "an *inclusive* disjunction that carries out the synthesis itself by drifting from one term to another and following the distance between terms."[229] This concept of **INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION** then became, as Zourabichvili has stressed, "the principal operator of Deleuze's philosophy, his signature concept above all others."[230]

The theory of the three syntheses and its notion of inclusive disjunction would come to be extended in political terms in *L'Anti-œdipe* (*Anti-Oedipus*, March 1972), which Deleuze co-authored with Félix Guattari.[231] In the late 1960s, Deleuze's anti-representationalism had triggered Guattari to distin-

227 Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 174.

228 Ibid. (emph. added). The part continues: "The disjunction is not at all reduced to a conjunction; it is left as a disjunction, since it bears, and continues to bear, upon a divergence as such. But this divergence is affirmed in such a way that the either … or itself becomes a pure affirmation" (ibid.).

229 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 76–9; here 77. The exact concept "inclusive disjunction" is not yet mentioned in *Logic of Sense* but latently stated: "Between these basic series, a sort of internal resonance is produced; and this resonance induces a forced movement, which goes beyond the series themselves. These are the characteristics of the *simulacrum*. … By the same token, the conditions of their reproduction remain external to phenomena. In order to speak of simulacra, it is necessary for the heterogeneous series to be really internalized in the system, comprised or complicated in the chaos. Their differences must be *inclusive*" (Deleuze, Appendix I: "The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy," to *The Logic of Sense*, 261). It is here that Deleuze in moving from representation to simulacra, understands emergent phenomena as signaletic systems, that ought to be studied clinically.

230 For an explanation of the term see Zourabichvili "Disjunctive Synthesis (or Inclusive disjunction)," in *A Philosophy of the Event*, 167–71; here 170. See also Claire Colebrook's' entry "Disjunctive Synthesis," in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. Parr, 79–80; and the entries in *The Deleuze and Guattari Dictionary*, ed. Young, 96–97 and 233–34.

231 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus.* For the point concerning the political extension of the term, see also Daniel W. Smith, *Essays on Deleuze* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2012), 118.

guish between "Machine and Structure" in an eponymous paper.[232] Starting from the ideas that Deleuze had developed in *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense* concerning the three minimum conditions determining structure, Guattari argues that only the first two belong to the order of structure, namely that "there must be at least two heterogeneous series, one of which is defined as the signifier and the other as the signified"; and "each of these series is made up of terms that exist only through their relationship with one another."[233] Guattari then distinguishes the third, positing that Deleuze's "third condition of 'two heterogeneous series converging upon a paradoxical element that acts so as to differentiate them,' relates, on the contrary, exclusively to the order of the machine."[234] Guattari's paper thus claims—and this the problem he exposes in structuralist thinking—that structures "lack the differentiating factor" that characterizes machines.[235] This differentiating factor, Dosse adds, "reintroduces movements and events," which is precisely why there is no more opposition between structure and genesis.[236] In reconciling structure and genesis in the reciprocal determination between differential elements, structure no longer explains, nor represents geneses; structure *is* genesis.[237] Or more precisely, for Deleuze structure is a 'static

232 See Félix Guattari, "Machine and Structure," in *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 111–19. Orig. pub. as "Machine et structure," *Changé* 12 (1971), and written as a paper for the Freudian School of Paris in 1969 (Dosse, *Intersecting Lives*, 223). For a contextualization of this paper, see also ibid., 223–40; and Simone Aurora, "From Structure to Machine: Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy of Linguistic," *Deleuze Studies* 11.3 (2017): 405–28. Anne Sauvagnarges has highlighted that Guattari derived this machinic reading "by drawing on the work of Leroi-Gourhan and especially Lewis Mumford, who inaugurated the term 'social machine' in an article that appeared in a French translation in the journal *Diogenes* in 1966." Sauvagnargues, *Artmachines: Deleuze, Guattari, Simondon*, trans. Suzanne Verderber with Eugene Holland. Edinburgh: EUP, 2016), 195ff.

233 Guattari, "Machine and Structure," 111.

234 Ibid.; citing Deleuze, *Logique du sens* (Paris: Édn. de Minuit, 1969), 63.

235 Ibid., 116. "In contrast to 'machines,'" Guattari here argues, "structures have no specific identifying marks mean[ing] that they become 'translatable into one another, thus developing a kind of indefinite logical continuum that is peculiarly satisfying to obsessionals. The identification of the similar and the discovery of difference at the group level … will act as the locating machine. In a sense, it is the excess of logic that leads to an impasse" (ibid). Cf. the "Third Criterion: The Differential and the Singular," in Deleuze, "How do we Recognize Structuralism." On this, see Dosse, *Intersecting Lives,* 226–7.

236 Dosse, *Intersecting Lives*, 224–5.

237 See ibid., "In this sense, we see no difficulty in reconciling genesis and structure. Following Lautman and Vuillemin's work on mathematics, 'structuralism' seems to us the only means by which a genetic method can achieve its ambitions. It is sufficient to understand that the genesis takes place in time not between one actual term, however small, and another actual term, but between the virtual and its actualization - in other words, it goes from the structure to its incarnation, from the conditions of a problem to the cases of solution, from the differential elements and their ideal connections to actual terms and diverse real relations which constitute at each moment the actuality of time. … Was not the mistake of the modern interpretation of calculus to condemn its genetic

genesis.'[238] It reposes, as Toscano and Smith note, "the question of production *as* heterogenesis—of production *of* and *from* the different—" understood as the genetic condition under which something new is produced when two forces enter into a relation of reciprocal determination.[239]

With *Anti-Oedipus,* Deleuze and Guattari implemented their infrastructural-machinic critique and counter-structuralist reading by exploring the unconscious through Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals* as a theory of desire, whose major point was to debunk the Freudian conception of the unconscious as a 'theater of representation.' Calling instead for an understanding of the unconscious as a veritable factory, they offered a purely immanent conception of desiring-production: "The unconscious poses no problem of meaning, solely problems of use. The question posed by desire is not 'What does it mean?' but rather 'How does it work?'"[240] Therefore, as Faulkner stresses, "The three syntheses have no meaning, … they are about 'functioning.'"[241] At the beginning, there is a **CONNECTIVE SYNTHESIS** of partial objects and flows; a 'production of production' establishing productive connections (physiological register). This synthesis precedes the central **DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** of singularities and chains; a 'production of a recording' in which desire is inscribed on a social plane (the 'body without organs'), through which partial objects and flows become included within but also detached from connective, productive processes (semiotic register). It is always followed by a **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** of intensities and becomings; a production of 'consumption' through which "something on the order of a subject can be discerned on the recording surface" in its productive conjunctions (psychological register).[242] In this reading, it is of course the second, disjunctive synthesis that gains the machinic differentiating function between the first

ambitions under the pretext of having discovered a 'structure.'…?"

238 See Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, 124. See also Claire Colebrook, *Sex after Life: Essays on Extinction, Vol. 2* (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2014), 192.

239 Here after Toscano, *Theater of Production*, 9. See also Daniel W. Smith, "Deleuze, Kant and the Transcendental Field," in *At The Edges of Thought*, ed. Craig Lundy and Daniela Voss (Edinburgh: EUP, 2015), 25–43; and id., "Conditions of the New," passim.

240 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 109.

241 Faulkner, *Three Syntheses*, 8. Concerning the three syntheses, Faulkner has stressed the influence of the oedipal periods in Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*.

242 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 1–22, 68–113. For an excellent explanation, I refer to Colebrook's aforementioned dictionary entry on the "Disjunctive Synthesis." A summarizing discussion is provided by Steven Shaviro, in his blog entries "The Connective and Disjunctive Syntheses" (Jul 7, 2008), avail. online at http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=646, and "The Third (Conjunctive) Synthesis" (Jul 14, 2008), avail. online at http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=648. See also Zourabichvili's lemma "Disjunctive Synthesis (or inclusive disjunction)," in id., *The Vocabulary of Deleuze*, 167–71. Here, I also rely on Smith and Protevi's SEP entry, "Gilles Deleuze," §4.2 (online).

connective synthesis/series of differentiations, and the third conjunctive synthesis/series of differenciation. ⊠[1–2]

On CERFI and 'Collective Equipments of Power'

Not only because my study will be relying heavily on these three syntheses, I have devoted some time to sketching the development of this tripartite theory, in detail, because it would also gain a greater function in the research project that Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari collaborated on at the Centre d'Études, de Recherche et de Formation Institutionelle (CERFI). Established in 1967 and directed by Guattari, this project aimed at outlining a "Genealogy of Collective Equipments" in a series of collaborative publications that assessed the role of public facilities and infrastructures (called *équipement collectifs* in French) as **EQUIPMENTS OF POWER**.[243] This notion, whichserved as the subtitle to the initial

243 As Elden has summarized, this research project, funded by the Ministere de l'aménagement du territoire, de l'équipment, du logement et du tourisme, included five interrelated themes, including the "Emergence of 'Collective Equipments" (Deleuze), "Urban 'Equipments' in Urban Planning" (Foucault), and "A Genealogy of 'Equipments of Normalisation'" (Foucault). It led to several publications, that as Elden lists included: François Fourquet and Lion Murard, eds., "Généalogie du capital I: Les équipements du pouvoir: villes, territoires et équipements collectifs," pub. as *Recherches* 13 (Dec 1973); repr. as *Les équipements du pouvoir* (Paris: Union Générales d'Éditions 10/18, 1976); Fourquet, ed., "Généalogie du capital II: L'idéal historique," pub. as. *Recherches* 14 (Jan 1974); repr. as *L'idéal historique* (Paris: Union Générales d'Éditions 10/18, 1976). The last theme resulted in three more books: Anne Querrien, *Génealogie des équipements de normalisation: L'école primaire* (Fontenay-sous-Bois, CERFI, 1975); Foucault, ed., *Génealogie des équipements de normalisation: Les équipement sanitaires* (Fontenay-sous-Bois: CERFI, 1976); and Fourquet, *Génealogie des équipements collectifs dans la compatibilitê nationale* (Fontenay-sous-Bois: CERFI, 1976). Also the collaborative studies Foucault, ed., *Les machines à guerir: aux origins de l'hôpitale moderne* (Paris: Institut de l'environnement, 1976 [repub. Brussels, Madaga, 1979]), and Jean-Marie Aillaume, ed., *Politiques de l'habitat, 1800–1850* (Paris: CORDA, 1977) developed from this research. For a general discussion of the series, see Elden's blog entry "Généalogie des équipements de normalisation: Les équipements sanitaires – one of Foucault's collaborative projects," Aug 22, 2014, accessed online at https://progressivegeographies.com/2014/08/22/genealogie-des-equipements-de-normalisation-les-equipements-sanitaires-one-of-foucaults-collaborative-projects; and "Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault and Fourquet's discussions of 'Les équipements du pouvoir,'" Jul 6, 2015, accessed online at https://progressivegeographies.com/2015/07/06/deleuze-guattari-foucault-and-fourquets-discussions-of-les-equipements-du-pouvoir/; and the recent studies by Elden, *Birth of Power*, 158–84; and id., *Foucault's Last Decade*, 82–111 and 206. See also Elden and Jeremy Crampton, *Space, Knowledge, and Power: Foucault and Geography* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 71–3. A survey of the CERFI research is provided by Anne Querrien, "CERFI 1965–1987," *Critical Secret* 8–9 (2002), avail. online at https://www.criticalsecret.com/n8/quer/1fr/; see also her critical reflection on her membership in the group, cited in the next note, and id., "Maps and Refrains of a Rainbow Panther," in *The Guattari Effect*, ed. Éric Alliez and Andrew Goffey (London/New York: Continuum, 2011), 87–9. For a discussion of the group's research from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, see Dosse, *Intersecting Lives*, 267–83. For Foucault's influence on these collaborative studies, see esp. Elden, *Birth of Power*, 168–77; and Liane Mozère, "Foucault et le CERFI: instantanés et actualité," *Le Portique* 13/14 (2004), avail. online at http://journals.openedition.org/

research project that began in 1972, titled *Généalogie du capital I: Les équipements du pouvoir: villes, territoires et équipements collectifs*, and for which Foucault assumed the scientific leadership. Under this title the research literally refracted Marxist analysis of institutional structures from a Nietschean angle. It was published in December 1973 in an edited report by François Fourquet and Lion Murard, which included several contributions by Guattari, Deleuze, and Foucault, and in which we see the traditional categories used to conceptualize the city thoroughly dismantled and reworked.[244]

Aside from Georges Teyssot's early and somewhat prescient attention, this research has only recently begun to be more closely examined in the field of architecture.[245] As such, it has remained much overlooked in its decisive

leportique/642. For another reading on the necessity to approach a genealogy of capital, as a capitalist genealogy of history, with capital as the "cause of everything that happens in the world," see esp. Pasquale Pasquino, "Theatrum Politicum: The Genealogy of Capital," written as a paper to Foucault's 1978 seminar, and pub. in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicargo: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991), 105–18.

244 As Liane Mozère points out, Fernand Braudel had invited Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari, and Pierre Bourdieu to a group discussion in the early 1970s. Both Deleuze and Foucault aimed to not be involved to much, for different reasons: Deleuze mainly for his hatred for debates; Foucault "despite his reticence with respect to Guattari and his desire to remain at a distance from his groups, … let himself be persuaded by Deleuze to [instead] be involved in several issues of the CERFI's publications." Dosse, "Deleuze and Foucault: A Philosophical Friendship," in *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, ed. Morar, Nail, Smith, 11–37; here 17. For an introductory discussion, see Elden, *Birth of Power*, 168–73; and Mozère, "Foucault et le CERFI." In May/Sep 1972, several crucial discussions took place. These were published as "'Premières discussions, premiers balbutiements: la ville est-elle une force productive ou d'antiproduction?," a discussion between Fourquet, Foucault, and Guattari, in *Équipements du pouvoir*, 27–31; "Formation des équipement collectifs," in ibid., 129–45; and "Arrachés par d'énergiques interventions à notre euphorique séjour dans l'histoire, nous mettons laborieusement en chantier des 'catégories logiques,'" in ibid., 183–6. The first and last one, were reprinted as texts nos. 129–30 in Michel Foucault, *Dits et Ecrits III*: 447–51 and 452–6 respectively. The last one was translated as "Discussion between Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Michel Foucault, and François Fourquet on 'Equipments of power: town, territories, and collective equipments,'" in *Foucault Live: Collected Interviews 1961–1984*, 2nd edn., 105–12; the first one was only partly translated by Wallenstein as "The First Discussions, First Tentative Efforts: Is the City a Force of Production, or a Force of Antiproduction," *SITE* 2 (2002): 19–20. This issue also contains a set of related articles, cited in the next footnote.

245 For the work of Teyssot, see my introduction, page 46ff. SITE magazine has dedicated a portion of its issue no. 2 (2002) to the CERFI research, with several articles by Anne Querrien, "Four Remarks," 10–11; François Fourquet on "The History of the CERFI," 11–12; Wallenstein, "CERFI, Desire and the Genealogy of Public Facilities," 12–14; Helena Mattsson, "Schizoanalysis and City," 14–15; Meike Schalk, "The Urban Mental Hospital and the State of Research" 15–17, and Brian Manning Delaney, "Nietzsche, Foucault, and Genealogy," 17–19; and two excerpts available at http://www.sitemagazine.net/content/02-issues/2-2_2002/2_2002.pdf. Besides the work of Elden, see also Simone Brott, "Collective Equipments of Power: The Road and the City," *Thresholds* 40 (Winter 2011/2012), 47–54; and Wallenstein, "Genealogy of Capital and the City: CERFI, Deleuze and Guattari," in *Deleuze and the City,* ed. Hélène Frichot, Catharina Gabrielsson and Jonathan Metzger (Edinburgh: EUP, 2016), 111–27.

influence on Foucault's later work, especially concerning to this work's explicitly 'machinic' approach to built formations. Inspired by Foucault's earlier work,[246] the particular aim of the CERFI was to reconsider the city within the ongoing debates on urbanism in the 1970s through *Anti-Oedipus's* approach to the unconscious as a desiring machine, as a kind of 'factory,' purely "as *production*, and the collective facilities as the means of production … a machine that produces itself," by gathering and redistibuting productive chains.[247] With Lewis Mumford's famous notion of the city as a 'megamachine' that helped catalyze a machinic ontology of material arrangements, the city is approached or understood as a "stabilizing machine" that, as Fourquet and Murard claim, "hold[s] together something that by definition cannot hold together."[248] In this sense, they argue, "we used the word 'city' for what is really relations of social production, forces of production."[249] It is for this reason that collective equipments are always already equipments of power, which ought to be understood as an instrument, means, and driver of social production.[250] In this view, a 'means of (social) production' is always a 'means of (social) control.' Calling for a genealogical view, Fourquet and Murard argue, in direct reference to Nietzsche's critique of origins, that "one will never account for a collective equipment by its 'utility' within a system of needs. … It's not that we are disinterested in usages. We are simply saying that, following Nietzsche, that [use] is an effect … of a mechanism … of inscription that produces collective equipments as instruments of coding, framing, enclosing, limiting, or excluding free social energy."[251]

It thus targeted the too-structuralist and symbolic Lefebvrian reading of the city as a result or mere container of forces of production. If Lefebvre's spatial analysis had greatly helped undermine contemporary discourses on planning, by replacing the predominant Marxist notion of 'needs' with that of 'desire';[252] for the *cerfists*, this replacement did not go far enough. Instead they

246 Elden, *Birth of Power*, 169.

247 Wallenstein, "Genealogy of Capital" 111–27; citing Fourquet and Murard, eds., *Équipements de pouvoir*, 18.

248 Fourquet and Murard, eds., *Équipements de pouvoir*, 29 [trans. after Wallenstein, "Genealogy of Capital," 119]. Following translation from here.

249 Ibid., 35 [119].

250 See ibid., 15–18, 46–4; see also Wallenstein, "Genealogy of Capital," 114–7.

251 Fourquet and Murard, eds., *Équipements de pouvoir*, 109 (my trans), see also ibid, 129–41.

252 Łukasz Stanek has investigated the distinct position of the CERFI research and their rejection of 'needs' in his article, "Who Needs 'Needs': French Postwar Architecture and its Critics," in *Architecture and the Welfare State*, ed. Mark Swinarton, Tom Avermaete, and Dirk van den Heuvel (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2015), 113–32; here 119–20, 127; in reference to Lefebvre, "Psycho-sociologue de la vie quotidienne," *Du rural à l'urbain* (Paris: Anthropos, 1970), 90. See also Deleuze's Seminar "Anti-Oedipus II" (1972–73), Lecture 04, May 28, 1973: "Dès que les problèmes sont posés en termes de besoin, ce qui est invoqué,

advocated to not reduce the city to "an inert space exterior to the process of production," but to understand the city *as* production. Following Anne Querrien, the methodological problem was how precisely to analyze this production without falling into the trap of merely representing this production,[253] but to reconsider it more generally "as an engine of transformation … [that] brings together and metabolizes all sorts of heterogeneous productive chains. … [The city] is not simply a thermodynamic machine, it is first of all an informational machine, coding and decoding energy fluxes, decoupling productive powers … by operations of cutting, mixing, and intersecting. … In its essential function to produce information, cut and cut across heterogeneous productive series, the city has thus as its principle condition circulation."[254] Therefore we have to go much further in understanding that the city as a space is produced, as the question becomes how it is produced as the result of intersecting matter flows that constitute and organize bodies and territories transversally.[255] In identifying that basically "there just is no such thing as the city," the CERFI research identifies, Wallenstein points out, a twofold task to offer "on the one hand, a theory of territoriality that accounts for both its openness … and its closure …, and on the other hand, an analysis that comes back to collective facilities, although no longer in terms of physical architectonic objects, but as complex assemblages of power and desire" (i.e., as objects of what we, following Nietzsche, could call a genealogy).[256]

Concerning the relationship between power and desire, it is important to note to what degree the CERFI research was modeled on *Anti-Oedipus*'s tripartite theory of 'desiring-machines' (with its anti-Lacanian distinction

c'est finalement une instance supposée être juge, et de la nature de ces besoins, et de leur répartition, et de la mesure de leur satisfaction" (n.p.)

253 In her contribution to the volume, Querrien wonders, which methodology to use to analyze how "collective equipments form an integral part of the machinic phylum, machines to produce social relations. But Collective Equipments also form the wheelwork the State apparatus. … I'm proposing to write the *Genealogy of Collective Equipments* we have tried to develop [*mettre en valeur*] how the position of collective equipments as the unified production of the State made the moments of reterritorialization, instruments of cutting upon the social body the fixation of the products of these cuts" (Anne Querrien, in *Équipements du pouvoir*, 23).

254 Fourquet and Murard, eds., *Équipements de pouvoir*, 18–20 (my trans).

255 This is why Deleuze and Guattari would later write that "The town is the correlate of the road. The town exists only as a function of circulation, and of circuits… It effects a polarization of matter, inert, living or human; it causes the phylum, the flow, to pass through specific places, along horizontal lines" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 432). Quentin Meillassoux will later understand bodies similarly as "a place where [locally rarefied] fluxes can no longer pass through indiscriminately." Quentin Meillassoux, "Subtraction and Contraction: Deleuze, Immanence, and Matter and Memory," in *Collapse* 3, ed. Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2007), 63–107; here 97. See below.

256 Wallenstein, "Genealogy of Capital and the City," 120. Last addition from Wallenstein, "CERFI, Desire and the Genealogy of Public Facilities," 13.

between 'demand' and 'desire').[257] Foucault seems to have taken up this tripartite scheme from his close reading of Deleuze's work, when he proposes that collective equipments, like roads, have three identifiable functions (although he still frames it in Lacanian terms of 'demand'). Those are (1) "a production of production," (2) "a production of demand," and (3) "a normalization of this production in order to control production and demand," which is to "normalize subjects."[258] Foucault had the become increasingly interested in this third aspect, and Canguilhem's notion of *normalization*, and the regulating function of spatial arrangements as instruments of social production.[259] A focus on "equipments of normalization" within the CERFI research, and the function that new forms of spatial production attain in the management of populations and government of society, would then—after the publication of *Discipline and Punish*—also characterize his progressive theorization of biopolitics.

From 1977 onwards, Foucault started to differentiate the dispositif of discipline from those of security, in uncovering the differences in how the treat and set up spatial distributions, and the different way they regulate behaviors. Here, Foucault's analysis identifies an emergent political strategy and technology of power, where the state starts to aim at governing the biological aspects of human life and thus regulate (and stabilize) its material conditions of coexistence.[260] In this latter aspect, *bios* is governed by what 'kind of life' it

257 On this tripartite model, see Fourquet and Murard, *Équipements de pouvoir*, 16–18, 28. As Wallenstein comments: The "CERFI proceeded from a central distinction in Jacques Lacan between 'demand' [*demande*, a verbalized expression determined by supply), and 'desire' [*désir*, a phantasmatic projection), and quickly conferred on the questions a more general and, to the commissioners presumably unexpected, dimension: What is the desire that circulates in our institutions, how is it connected to the 'axioms' of capitalism, to the city as metaphor and to a concept such as territory?" (Wallenstein, "Genealogy of Capital," 112).

258 Even if Foucault's inspiration is not clearly mentioned in either this discussion, nor his contemporaneous receptions in "Theatrum Philosophicum," or his preface to *Anti-Oedipus*, there seems to be an implicit discussion between Foucault and Deleuze. Cf. Foucault's three consequences/criteria in the "Archaeology of Science"/*Archaeology of Knowledge*. Here, "Arrachés par d'énergiques interventions…," in *Équipements de pouvoir*, 183–86. See also Brott, who argues that "equipment divides subjects … instituting the line separating the human and the nonhuman, which for Foucault is the real purpose of equipments of power. … By their very discursive mechanism, they project what might be called a post-human architectural subject" (Brott, "Collective Equipments of Power," 51).

259 See the round-table discussion of Apr/May 1972, pub. as "Normalisation et contrôle social (Pourquoi le travail social?)," repub. in Foucault, *Dits et Écrits* II: 316–39.

260 Thereby, the earlier forms of normalization by means of an "anatomo-politics of the human body" that pertain to disciplinary dispositifs, come to be replaced by what Foucault calls a "regulatory control," now exercised through a "'biopolitics' of the human race." Foucault, *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–76*, ed. Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003), 239–48. As he here describes, "Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and as power's problem" (ibid., 245). See also, *History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978), 184; and id., *Security, Territory, Population*, 1 and 56.

implies[261] and, therefore, by what modes of existence and subjectivation it involves. Foucault's later work would attend successively to the notion of *technai peri ton bion*,[262] by which we understand techniques of life, an art of how to live, consisting of a set of practices by which we become human subjects.[263] Foucault starts problematizing how *bios* became the object of *technē*, as a practice to lead a life, so as to fashion and modify life and transform ourselves.[264]

261 Mohammad-Ali Rahebi, "Biopolitical Immanence," *La Deleuziana* 1 (2015), 73–90; here 78.

262 John Sellars has pointed out that the phrasing which Foucault used does not appear in the ancient literature, but rather τέχνη περὶ τον βίον (*technē peri ton bion*): meaning not so much an 'art of living' but 'art concerned with one's way of life,' whose acquisition necessarily involves training. See Sellars, *The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature and Function of Philosophy*, 2nd edn. (London: Bloomsbury: 2009 [orig. 2003]); here 5.

263 See esp. the emergent discussion of the problem of 'government' in Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*; but also his preparatory analysis of neo-liberalism in *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978–79*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); as well as his subsequent explorations *On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the College de France 1979–80* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), with its remarkable return to the relation between power and truth in *Subjectivity and Truth: Lectures at the Collège de France 1980–81*, ed. Frédérick Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); *Hermeneutics of the Self: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981–82*, ed. Frédérick Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); and finally *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982–83*, ed. Frédérick Gros, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). Foucault therein starts to distinguish the two Greek senses covering the meaning of 'the living': ζῆν [*zēn*] (significantly, Foucault foregrounds the processes, in contrast to Agamben who will discuss nominalized life, ζωή [*zoē*]) which expresses the property of being alive; and βιοῦν [*bioūn*] or βιός [*bios*], which expresses the passing on of one's life, as related to various forms of living a life. See Foucault, *Subjectivity and Truth*, esp. 34. "It is not very difficult to define *tekhnē*. The notion of *bios* (life), however, is much more difficult to pinpoint for us. When the Greeks speak of bios, when they speak of that bios (that life) that must be the object of a *tekhnē*, it is understood that they do not mean 'life' in the biological sense of the term" (ibid., 251).

264 This ethical reflection on techniques of leading a life that emerges from his earlier work, is quite different from the post-Foucauldian attention to bios by authors as Rabinow, Mbembe, Agamben, or Esposito, who have looked more at the technological management of the living. See Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995); Achille Mbembe, "Necropolitics," trans. Libby Meintjes, *Public Culture* 15 (1): 11–40, and id., *Necropolitics*, trans. Steven Corcoran (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2019); Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998); Roberto Esposito, *Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, trans. Timothy Campbell (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2008). Rosi Braidotti has harshly rejected how, for instance, "Agamben plays different variations on the theme of bios/zoē by assimilating zoē to the economy of non-life in the sense of a failure of humaneness"; zoē thus becomes "the result of the lethal intervention of sovereign power onto the embodied subject, who is reduced to 'bare life.'" Braidotti, *Transpositions*, 39; *Posthuman*, 120. See also her essay "The Politics of 'Life Itself' and New Ways of Dying," in *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics*, ed Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2013), 201–18. By presenting thanatopolitics ultimately as the first principle of modern biopolitics, Agamben's indictment of the project of modernity fully eradicates any possibility for a positive approach to biopower. The reason being its false equation with thanatopolitics (ibid., 206). Against this overemphasis on negativity, Braidotti turns—through a Spinozist/Deleuzo-Guattarian vision—to an ethics of sustainability

Eventually, Foucault also recognizes modern spatial planning as a crucial case of these emerging biopolitical techniques. He come back at length to the question of circulation in his 1977–78 lectures, where he questions how territories or milieus can be marked or fixed in such a way that they allow circulation to take place in a way while controlling or canceling out the dangers related to it—a question not only relevant for the research on emerging urban planning discourses conducted by Foucault's students for *Politiques de l'habitat* (1977), but also apparent in the renewed attention to hospital architectures in *Machines à guérir* (1979).[265] After this, he focused on the biopolitical function

that stresses the powers of zoē as a non-human yet relentlessly generative life force (see id., *Transpositions*, 39–40; *Posthuman*, 121; "Politics of 'Life Itself,'" 204–09). Also Penelope Deutscher has sharply critiqued the wider mistake of approaching biopolitics in repressive terms, because it ought to understood as first of all an affirmative, productive power to foster life in the view of proliferating collective interests and futurities. See Deutscher, *Foucault's Futures: A Critique of Reproductive Reason* (New York: Columbia UP, 2017), 95. Her observation helps clarify a wider misunderstanding underlying many discussions of biopolitics (and esp. in architecture), wherein it often happens to generally denominate the more negative side of biopower (as if equating 'politics,' vis-à-vis 'power,' with a the more negative 'power over' [*potesta*] in contrast to a 'power to' [*potentia*] according to Deleuze's distinction; whereas this negative side of biopolitics/-power can be more properly understood in apposite terms of the concurrent necro- or thanatopolitical dimension immanent in the administration of life that post-Foucauldian scholars (as Mbembe, or Agamben, and Esposito) have coined (ibid., 103–4ff.). As such biopower is principally a force that operates directly on life processes, and real material conditions that enable the stable (co-)existence and emergence of new forms inhabiting the world. Mika Ojakangas, "The Ethics of Singularity," in *Foucault: The Legacy*, ed. Clare O'Farell (Kelvin Grove: Queensland Univ. of Technology, 1997), 176–84; here 178. See moreover Alexander Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2014), passim.

265 See Foucault, ed., *Machines à guerir;* and *Aillaume, ed., Politiques de l'habitat*. For a closer discussion of these studies, see Elden, "Strategy, Medicine and Habitat: Foucault in 1976," in *Space, Knowledge, and Power: Foucault and Geography*, ed. Elden and Crampton (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 67–82. Note that Foucault's tripartite scheme is repeated in the preface to *Machines à guérir*: "Aux limites d'une histoire des équipements collectifs et de l'histoire des distributions architecturales et urbaines, trois caractéristiques sont alors remarquables dans cette remise en cause de l'hôpital classique./D'abord la procédure utilisée pour provoquer puis guider l'affrontement, susciter une opinion publique, introduire—avec l'Académie des Sciences—une instance de validation des choix opérés par l'Etat: le cas de l'hôpital préfigure ici l'instruction
—plus secrète par la suite, mais souvent similaire—des problèmes architecturaux poses par d'autres équipements. La seconde caractéristique tient à ce terme d'équipement: non que le mot soit jamais prononce à l'époque, mais plutôt un réseau de questions qui fait de l'hôpital bien plus qu'un simple bâtiment, autre chose qu'une institution d' éloignement et de mise à l'écart. A quelle population s'adressera-t-il? Comment le localisera-t-on? Faudra-t-il le spécialiser? Quels objectifs précis lui assigner? Quelles statistiques produire sur l'état sanitaire de la ville qui permettent d'en contrôler les effets au longue terme: l'idée naît—et c'est le troisième aspect remarquable—d'une architecture si précise et si 'juste' qu'aucune distribution alternative ne puisse en améliorer le rendement. On en fixerait le modèle … après que le maximum de projets ait été critique et teste, pour aboutir enfin a un espace médicalement utile: c'est le triomphe, à l'intérieur du type pavillonnaire, des multiples dispositifs, climatiques et disciplinaires, produits a l'occasion de cette affaire des hôpitaux" (ibid., 5).

of collective equipments in the mutual conditioning of spatial, epistemic, and power formations.[266]

Quadrillage and Inclusive Disjunction

Deleuze and Guattari would focus more on the *constitutive* role of power relations for subjectivation processes, an understanding based on which, as Simone Brott stresses, equipments of power are "irreducible to spatialized form. What determines an equipment of power is the production of subjectivity obtained."[267] In a response to Foucault's thoughts, Deleuze repeats a caution he made at the beginning of the discussion that "one could have considered three types of structures within collective equipments … The method of the text, by contrast, took historical sequences, but not logical categories: that is why there is no plan being carried out [*qui s'en degage*]."[268] He points again to a certain categorical error when he argues: "what Michel was going to say is a typical case of *categories* of collective equipments that are not to be confused [*ne se confondent pas*] with kinds [*espèces*] … We need to play with variable categories, whose relationships [*rapports*] should be variable."[269]

In rephrasing Foucault's ideas, Deleuze suggests that there are, rather, three aspects: "'investments' treating someone as a producer in potential or actuality; 'control,' treating someone as a consumer; and 'public service,' treating the citizen as a user."[270] Deleuze thus centrally foregrounds the form

266 Foucault falls back on the notion of collective equipments in 1982–1983. In his famous 1982 interview, published as "Space, Knowledge, and Power," he stresses that "in the eighteenth century one sees the development of reflection upon architecture as a function of the aims and techniques of the government of societies. … [F]rom the eighteenth century on, every discussion of politics as the art of the government of men necessarily includes a chapter or a series of chapters on urbanism, on *collective facilities*, on hygiene, and on private architecture. Such chapters are not found in the discussions of the art of government of the sixteenth century. … It was not necessarily a change in the minds of architects, or in their techniques—although that remains to be seen—but in the minds of political men. … Architecture became one of these [points of concern] during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries" (Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, and Power," 350).

267 Brott, "Collective Equipments of Power," 51; referring to "Arrachés par d'énergiques interventions…," in *Équipements de pouvoir*, 183–4. For the constitutive function, see also Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure," in *Two Regimes of Madness*, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007), 122–134; here 123.

268 Deleuze in "Arrachés par d'énergiques interventions," *Équipements de pouvoir*, 184–5 (my trans).

269 Ibid. (my trans., emph. orig.).

270 Elden, *Birth of Power*, 171 (modified) ; paraphrasing Deleuze in *Équipements du pouvoir*, 185–6. Notably, Foucault comes back to some of these observation in the first lectures of the following year, esp. Lecture of Jan 3, and 17, 1973 where he traces the appearance of the criminal as social enemy in vagabondage. Foucault, *The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collége de France, 1972–1973,* ed. Barnard Harcourt, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Pallgrave Macmillan, 2015), 43–60; orig. pub. as *Théories et institutions pénales* (Paris: EHESS/Gallimard/Seuil, 2015). He here takes up the notion of "means of assistance,"

of control that comes into play in the production of *desire,* concerning the specific canalization entailed in such structures: whereas, for instance, "the highways today channel nomadism of positioning into a grid, … public service implies a generalized nomadism."[271] In this respect, Deleuze's injunction directly refers this form of control back to the concept of a "*quadrillage* (gridding, layout)" of perceptual fields, which *Anti-Oedipus* borrowed from Foucault's discussion of discursive formations in the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, to stress the **INCLUSIVE** modality in this such disjunctive syntheses ⊠[2].[272] Obviously, this crucial point needs some explication to disentangle the mutual influences and reciprocal determination and lines of differenciation of the two thinkers' crossing thoughts. But in sufficiently simple terms, Deleuze's remark first faults any attempt to account for emerging formations in terms of already produced types, kinds, or classes. For him, this confusion happens every time when critique is carried out on the basis of a negative dialectics, and its underlying principles of non-contradiction.[273] Avoiding this

and Deleuze's distinction between relations of consumption and production (ibid., 3 and 45). Foucault had already discussed the aspect of control extensively in the previous year, for instance in the Lecture of Jan 26, 1972, as well as in his discussion with Deleuze on "Intellectuals and Power" on Mar 4, 1972 (see also id., *Dits et ecrits*, II: 306–16); and "Normalisation et contrôle social" (in ibid., 316–39). Yet, in the lecture series following these interviews, he would attend to a "different way of controlling populations … The problem is one of the moral training [*encadrement*] of populations" (see the Lectures of Feb 7 and 14, 1973, in Foucault, *Punitive Society*, 99ff; here 104–5 [108]). He then problematizes how "power provided itself with two apparatuses that were to be the instruments of this [*quadrillage*] and control; on the one hand, an apparatus that is both administrative and parajudicial…; on the other hand, a police apparatus. … Thus social control is exercised both from outside, since it is a marginalized stratum that receives certain functions delegated to it by the State apparatus, and from inside, inasmuch as this control is exercised by a supposedly common ideology" (ibid., 124–5 [127–8]). The aspect of the control of time, Ewald and Fontana point out, appears in the lecture of Jan 26, 1973 (ibid., 72), before being progressively developed in *Discipline and Punish;* see esp. the related note, ibid., 81.

271 Deleuze in "Arrachés par d'énergiques interventions…," in *Équipements du pouvoir*, 185–6 (trans. after Elden, *Birth of Power*, 171; mod.). At the beginning of the discussion, Deleuze had used the highway as an example of controlling flows. He would come back to this example in his lecture "Qu'est-ce que l'acte de création?" (Mar 17, 1987), in which he distinguishes that "Control is not discipline. You do not confine people with a highway. But by making highways, you multiply the means of control. I am not saying this is the only aim of highways, but people can travel infinitely and 'freely' without being confined while being perfectly controlled. That is our future" (Deleuze, "What is a Creative Act," in *Two Regimes of Madness*, 327ff). Of course, the clearest outline of this distinction is formulated in his essay "Postscript on the Societies of Control," *October* 59 (Winter 1992): 3–7.

272 For Foucault's original use of the notion of *quadrillage*, see esp. *L'Archéologie du savoir*, 47, 54, 134, and 222. For Deleuze and Guattari's appropriation of the term, cf. *Anti-Œdipe*, 18, 22, 46, 92, 180, 220, 287, 306, and 344.

273 As has been pointed out by multiple Deleuze scholars, this notion is originally inspired by Spinoza's inclusive disjunction of "Deus *sive* natura," in which the 'or' in "God *or* Nature" expresses identity and equivalence between two aspects of the same thing. On this see, e.g. the preface to Macherey, *Hegel or Spinoza*, 4–6. See also the chapter "Schizo sive

typological thinking is key to fully understanding historical geneses in productive, that is, non-negative terms. As Simondon remarks: "the point of using a genetic method is precisely to avoid using classification as a way of thinking that occurs after genesis only to distribute the totality of objects in genera and species suitable for discussion."[274]

In its self-declared task to "denounce th[is] illegitimate use of the [three] syntheses," *Anti-Oedipus* further problematizes this "exclusive, restrictive, and negative use of the disjunctive synthesis" (in terms of 'either/or'), putting forth a "fully affirmative, non-restrictive, inclusive" one (in terms of 'either … or … or') to account for a genetic perspective.[275] Genealogy can avoid an illegitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis by employing an analytic that "does not closet itself inside its own terms."[276] In our case, this means, as we shall see, to not trace the apartment in terms of what it is, or not yet is. This methodological stance, Zourabichvilii comments, entails a wider "complication" because genetic thinking must account for the state of "co-implication, reciprocal implication," or multiplicity that "is characteristic for the virtual, where disjunctions are 'included' or 'inclusive,' [as] opposed to the regime of the actual that is characterized by the separat[eness] of things.[277] An inclusive understanding of disjunction, in terms of an 'integration of a multiplicity' or 'reciprocal determination' of coexisting, compossible elements that "without restricting one by the other or excluding the other from the one" is, as Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge, "the greatest paradox."[278] Claire Colebrook helps clarify it in distinguishing that "an exclusive disjunction 'either or, not both' is a diffenciation … of a divergent series; an inclusive disjunction ['and …, and …,

Nature," in Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 155–197.

274 Simondon, *Mode of Existence*, 26n1.

275 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 76–79.

276 Ibid., 77. Concerning this categorical error, see esp. Deleuze's remark that: "Ce que vient de dire Michel est un cas typique de catégories d'équipements collectifs qui ne se confondent pas avec les espèces" (in Fourquet and Murard, eds., *Équipements de pouvoir*, 185).

277 Zourabichvili "Complication," in *Philosophy of the Event*, 155; paraphrasing Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 57, 124–5, 280; and *Logic of Sense*, 297–80. The term **CO-IMPLICATION** was introduced by Polish Logician and mathematician Cecylia Rauszer as an extension to the idea of conditions of possibility in intuitionistic logic. As the *Oxford Dictionary of Logic* explains: The truth condition for conditionals (→) at a world is: "*φ → ψ is true at w if and only if all worlds w' accessible from w at which φ is true, ψ is also true*." Rauszer introduced a corresponding truth condition for co-implication as a binary connective (←), also known as difference or subtraction): "*φ ← ψ is true at w if and only if there is a world w' from which w is accessible at which φ is true but ψ fails*." This connective, Ferguson and Priest write, has no "reasonable analogue in natural language. The most salient involves understanding the accessibility relation as describing succeeding stages in a scientific investigation." See the *Oxford Dictionary of Logic*, ed. Thomas Macaulay Ferguson and Graham Priest (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2016), n.p. (online)).

278 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 76.

and …'] enables in contrast the coexistence of compossibles as a differen*t*iation without division."[279] Therein, too, "everything divides, but into itself."[280] This distinction can fill and has filled several books, but the central point it entails is captured in Radman's mantra that "synthesis is not analysis in reverse"[281]: because synthesis entails no unity, no identity, no 'One,' but only, as Anne Sauvagnargues reminds us, "a disjunctive differentiation that proceeds by bifurcations and transformations."[282] It thus has a crucial practical application[283] in the sense that geneses cannot be analyzed but by recapitulating them.

Therein precisely lies the specific emancipatory potential of putting into use inclusive modes of thinking. *Anti-Oedipus* thus strategically employs it when it calls for a new (i.e. schizo)analytic agenda, based on how "the schizo liberates a raw genealogical material … where he can situate himself, record himself, and take his bearings in all the branches at once, on all sides. He explodes the Oedipal genealogy. Through graduated relationships he performs absolute overflights spanning indivisible distances. The genealogist-madman lays out [*quadrille*] a disjunctive network on the body without organs," as opposed to organizing "fragments in relation to a lost unity."[284] In this 'maddening' act, the logic of inclusive disjunction is placed at the heart of genetic thinking about and genealogical research into the subjects we have become, because it exposes, reworks and liberates us from those "inadequate ideas" (as criticized by Spinoza) that we have attained from making facile exclusive disjunctions. By inadequate ideas we ought to understand "an idea that involves, both formally and materially, the privation of knowledge of its own cause."[285] In this regard, we learn from Deleuze that "an image … makes an object known to us only by its effect. But such knowledge is not knowledge at all, it is at best recognition; … an appearance that only allows us to recognize a thing by its effect."[286] This way, one is fundamentally confusing effects

279 Colebrook's, "Disjunctive Synthesis," in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. Parr, 79–80.

280 Deleuze, "The Exhausted," in *Essays, Critical and Clinical*, 152–74; here 153.

281 Andrej Radman, "Double Bind: On Material Ethics" in *Schizoanalysis and Ecosophy*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 241–56; here 251; and id. and Heidi Sohn, "Four Domains of the Plane of Consistency," in *Critical and Clinical Cartographies: Architecture, Robotics, Medicine, Philosophy* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2017), 1–19; here 2.

282 Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, trans. Samantha Bankston (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 57; cited in Radman and Sohn, "Four Domains of the Plane of Consistency," 2.

283 Sauvagnargues, *Deleuze and Art*, 6.

284 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 76–78 [cf. orig. 92]. See also id., *A Thousand Plateaus*, 164–5. On the notion of the 'Body without Organs' see, e.g. the related entry in Young, ed., *The Deleuze and Guattari Dictionary*, 50–56.

285 Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, 148.

286 Ibid., 140.

	1	2	3
Kantian scheme	Apprehension in the intuition	Reproduction in the imagination	Recognition in the concept
Difference and Repetition, 1968	Synthesis of memory = pure past	Synthesis of habit = living present	Synthesis of the new = future
Logic of Sense, 1969	Connective Series = single series	Disjunctive Series = divergent series	Conjunctive Series = convergent series
"How Do We Recogn. Structuralism," & "Machine and Struct."	Differentiated	Differentiat*ing factor*	Differenciated
Anti-Oedipus, 1972	Conjunctive synthesis of partial objects and flows	Disjunctive synthesis singularities and chains	Conjunctive synthesis of intensities and becomings

1–2 TRIPARTITE SCHEMES

***Top*, a comparative table of the different terms used throughout Deleuze's developing theorization of the "three syntheses of time," before and with Guattari.**

***Bottom*, a comparative table of the tripartite schemes used by Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault.**

	1	2	3
Anti-Oedipus's theory of desiring production	Production of production (physiological)	Production of recording (semiotic)	Production of consumption (psychological)
Foucault's three functions	Production of production	Production of demand	Production of consumption
Deleuze's response	Investment, potential	Service, use	Control, channeling of consumption
Guattari's three ecological registers	Environmental	Social relations	Human subjectivity

with causes. Adequate knowledge "is not a matter … of knowing a cause from its effect. Rather is it a matter of understanding the knowledge we have of the effect through a knowledge, itself more perfect, of its cause."[287]

Only this way can a genetic definition be given of historical formations. But this is precisely what drives historians mad, because in this logic, any use of logical categories like historical periods, art-historical concepts, social organizations, or architectural types, is disqualified from *explaining* emergent formation, because they are only an effect and must themselves be explained as responses to the problematic structures that brought them about.

0.2.2 From Dispositifs to Assemblages

As Dosse and Elden describe, Deleuze's collaboration with Guattari and especially their publication of *Anti-Oedipus* seems to have disturbed Foucault a great deal, despite Foucault's celebratory remarks about the book.[288] It not only coincided explicitly with his own preoccupation with the figure of Oedipus in the first years of his new appointment at the Collège de France in the early 1970s; implicitly, it also pointed out a greater flaw within Foucault's otherwise groundbreaking archaeologies of modern psychology, when Deleuze and Guattari in their violent critique of representation call "to overturn the theater of representation into the order of desiring-production."[289]

During his activist period in the early '70s, Foucault had already started to self-critically shift his attention from questions of representation to those of production. In the 1970/71 lectures, he began to replace his earlier structuralist-semiological approaches with a genealogical analysis of knowledge/power relations that take form in the body.[290] This position becomes more explicit in the article resulting from his various Nietzsche lectures between 1967–1971: "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (1971).[291] Therein, Foucault "rewrites in his own vocabulary, on the basis of considerable work of historical inquiry, the intensi-

287 Ibid. 134–5.

288 See the work of Dosse and Elden, cited above.

289 See esp. the reference to Foucault in Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 50, 82–3; here 271.

290 See Foucault, *The Will to Know, Lectures at the Collège de France, 1970–1971; with Oedipal Knowledge*, ed. Daniel Defert, trans Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); orig. pub. as *Leçons sur la volonté de savoir. Cours au Collège de France, 1970–1971, suivi de Le savoir d'Œdipe*, ed. François Ewald and Alessandro Fontana (Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2011). See here, Defert's course summary, 264–74. The connection of this shifting approach to his political activism, I already argued above, was greatly studied by Elden, *Birth of Power*, here 53.

291 Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, ed. Bouchard, 139–64.

ties, material, and stake of *Difference and Repetition*," as Defert points out, by presenting its differential ontology as genealogy.[292] In his 1971/72 lecture on "Penal Theories and Institutions" (finally translated just as I was finishing this thesis), he replaces a semiology of elements with an interpretation of the play of differential forces.[293] Thereby he aims to methodologically replace an analysis of penal systems (theory, legalization, or institutions) by attending to their functioning-together (*leur fonctionnement d'ensemble*) as a novel "repressive system," to elucidate on the developent of moral, sociological and psychological notions.[294]

As he remarked in the next year's course (1973/74) on "Psychiatric Power," he thereby aimed to take up his history of madness at the point it broke off, in order to rewrite it through a renewed understanding of the *genesis* of psychiatric discourse.[295] Foucault here begins to addresses not the conditions of certain knowledge or subject formations but, for the first time, their geneses to explore an 'evolutive history' of how asylum discipline had been constitutive of the general form of psychiatric power.[296] In the opening lecture, Foucault begins auto-critiquing his earlier approach under the impression of, and with direct reference to Deleuze and Guattari; aiming to move beyond an "analysis of representations," he intends to begin all over from an analysis of what he started to calls "dispositifs of power."[297]

This notion, which we will examine shortly, may have been conceptually inspired by Jean-François Lyotard, whose *Des dispositifs pulsionnels* (*On drive-ridden apparatuses*, 1973) had also taken up the question of the 'theater of representation,' in reconsidering how the theater itself is not a representative space, but a productive one. In that sense, Lyotard reconsidered the theater (and movie-theaters) as projective or image-giving set-ups—for which he borrowed Jean-Louis Baudry's earlier notion of the dispositif—which simultaneously establish space, inside and outside, subject and object of attention.[298]

292 See Defert's course summary of *Lectures on The Will to Know (1970–1971)*, 274.

293 See Foucault, *Penal Theories and Institutions;* here I rely on the French original. See the notes for the lecture on Dec 15, 1971 and Mar 8, 1972, 47 and 198; see the Burchell's elaborations 53–4 and 217.

294 See ibid., Lecture Nov 24, 1971; here 3.

295 See Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, esp. his opening lecture of Nov 7, 21 and 28, and Dec 5, 1973.

296 Ibid.; see also id., *Discipline and Punish*, 156–60.

297 Foucault, *Psychiatric Power*, 13.

298 See Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Des dispositions pulsionnels* (Paris: Galilée, 1994 [1973]), 98: "In theater space [*lieu théâtral*] this affirmativity implies the ruins of the hierarchical relation … inside/outside. In fact, every theater is an at least twofold dispositif … doubled at least once: … actors playing on stage, spectators sitting in the rang [*acteurs jouant dans des coulisses, spectateurs assis sur la scène*], thus constituted by two limits, two thresholds [barrages] filtering the incoming and outgoing energies: one limit that determines what is

While Louis Althusser had used the notion of the dispositif shortly before to describe ideological apparatuses, it seems to be especially Lyotard's Nietzschean discussion of the dispositif as a system of choices which allowed Foucault to revisit the formation of novel architectures in a very different way:[299]: He started to understand architecture no longer as a simply scenic, however instrumental 'setting' (*appareil*) that enables new forms of (medical) knowledge, but as a productive set-up (*dispositif*) that — as he would argue shortly — literally "'fabricates' individuals."[300]

outside the theater — reality — and what is inside it; and one limit internally dissociates what is to be perceived and what is not." (my trans). Lyotard's conception of the dispositif remains relatively close to how Jean-Louis Baudry had used the term in his cinematographic studies (1970) in how it implies a positioning process, and a respective viewing situation. See Baudry, "Cinéma: Effets idéologiques produits par l'appareil de base," *Cinéthique* 78 (1970), trans. as "Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus," *Film Quarterly* 28, no. 2 (Winter, 1974–1975), 39–47. For a detailed discussion, see also Frank Kessler, "Notes on the dispositif" (Nov 2007), avail. online at http://www.hum.uu.nl/medewerkers/f.e.kessler/Dispositif%20Notes11-2007.pdf. The concept of the dispositif would be further developped in Lyotard, *Libidinal Economy* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994). As Ashley Woodward summarizes "Metaphysically, Lyotard is a materialist, and for him affects must be understood as concrete material entities. An affect might be a sound, a color, a smile or a caress: anything which has an ability to 'move,' to produce feelings and desires. Affects are structured and interpreted in systems made up of dispositifs, libidinal dispositions or set-ups, and society is composed of multitudes of different dispositions that compete to exploit the energies of libidinal events. Lyotard develops a complex set of figures to describe how this process takes place." Ashley Woodward, "Jean-François Lyotard (1924 — 1998)," *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, n.p., avail. online at http://www.iep.utm.edu/lyotard/. Here, Sharon Jane Mee notes, that "what Lyotard calls the dispositif describes a channeling and subsequent exploitation of intensities in an arrangement that allows those same intensities or affects to circulate. … Libidinal intensities, then, are affects or feelings that find expression in the events that take place in the world but are themselves "structured" or exploited by dispositifs. The dispositif thus works with an "idea of an intensity" that, "far from setting itself up on a producer-body," actually "determines it." The difference between the economy of the mechanical apparatus and the economy of the dispositif is therefore a difference of production — or, rather, a difference between these apparatus's conceptions of the time of production (where "production" refers to the creation of either a product or of intensities). To put it differently again, the difference obtains between, for the mechanical apparatus, a mode of production or "accumulation" that allows for capital exchange(s) and, for the dispositif, a mode of production by which intensities arise that are not determined by their exploitation, but by the extent to which their ephemeral and heterogeneous "passage" (even duration) produces a new space of production (constitutive of the dispositif itself)." Sharon Jane Mee, "Jean-François Lyotard's Dispositif," *Philament* (Feb 2016), 19–44: here 20–25.

299 Althusser described that "belief derives (for everyone, i.e. for all those who live in an ideological representation of ideology, which reduces ideology to ideas endowed by definition with a spiritual existence) from the ideas of the individual concerned, i.e. from him as a subject with a consciousness which contains the ideas of his belief. In this way, i.e. by means of the absolutely ideological 'conceptual' device (dispositif) thus set up (a subject endowed with a consciousness in which he freely forms or freely recognizes ideas in which he believes), the (material) attitude of the subject concerned naturally follows." Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in *Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press 2001 [orig. 1971]), 113. For the dispositif as a system of choices, see Deleuze "La logique qu'il nous faut," *Cours sur Nietzsche et les sophistes*, Apr 17, 1975, avail. online at https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/95.

300 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 170 (trans. mod.); and id., *Surveillir et Punir*, 172.

Foucault's Developing Dispositif

Similar to the discussion in *Difference and Repetition* of the integration of a problematic or differential field as a genesis, Foucault began to track "individuations of a multiplicity of heterogeneous differential elements and relations" connected to a series of problems.[301] In this approach we find the Deleuzian nature of what John Protevi calls Foucault's differential historical methodology.[302] In their attempt to construct a continuity of contingent, *but not necessary,* cascading events, genealogies also need to account for the physical conditions of emergent formations, and the catalyzing force fields that gave rise to them. Changing material conditions, which "contingently emerge from the intersection of a complex set of practices," Koopman points out, here become an essential part of problematizations.[303] This enabled Foucault to incrementally include non-discursive formations as essential components of emergent relations. Foucault was thus able, Deleuze noted, to move "beyond the duality of discursive and non-discursive formations, still present in the *Archaeology of Knowledge*, and explain how these two types of formations were distributed or articulated segment by segment (without reducing one to the other, or equating the two)."[304]

Discipline and Punish would consequently map how co-constitutive and reciprocally-determining systems of knowledge and social practices take form in what Foucault would come to call the **DISPOSITIF** of disciplinary society. Importantly, the concept of the dispositif then progressively displaced Foucault's earlier notions such as "discursive formations," "discursive practices," "positivities" and even "ensembles," as it set a clearer methodological focus on identifying the specific "heterogeneous ensemble[s] consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions," that came together within the specific historical geneses inquired. As he later clarified in a famous interview, *Discipline and Punish* thus aimed at identifying "the nature of the connections that can exist between these heterogeneous elements"[305] through which he wanted to

301 Protevi, "Foucault's Deleuzian Methodology," in Morar, Nail, and Smith, *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, 120.

302 Ibid. In naming his differential historical methodology, however, Foucault later still insists upon the difference between a genealogy and a "genetic" analysis; see Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 238–9.

303 Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique*, 101.

304 Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure," 122.

305 Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 194 [cf. the French version "Le jeu de Michel Foucault," in id., *Dits et Ecrits* III: 298–300.] On the concept of 'ensembles' as a proto-conception, see Monique David-Ménard, "Agencements deleuziens, dispositifs foucaldiens," *Rue*

understand, "a formation that, at a given historical moment, had a major function in responding to an urgency. The dispositif thus has a dominant strategic function."[306]

These oft-cited conceptual explanations by Foucault himself, are immediately followed by a lesser-quoted clarification, answering the interviewer's question whether dispositifs are therefore defined "by a certain kind of genesis". Here Foucault points out that, in fact,

> there are two important moments in this genesis. There is a first moment which is the prevailing of a strategic objective. Next, the dispositif is constituted as such and continues in existence insofar it is the place of a double process. On the one hand, there is a process of *functional overdetermination* … [that] calls for a recovery [*reprise*] a re-adjustment of the heterogeneous elements. … On the other hand, there is a process of strategic saturation [*remplissement*].[307]

He still aimed to understand this process very much based on his tripartite idea of a production of production (the dispositif), demand (urgency), and normalization (re-adjustment).

From this point of view, the concept of the dispositif is less a conceptual development of the notion of positivity alone, as Giorgio Agamben argues in his brief genealogy of the term,[308] but initially a much more elabo-

Descartes, 59 (1), 43–55, here 51–52. See Foucault, "The Confessions of the Flesh," in *Power/Knowledge*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 194–95. On the co-constitution of 'dispositifs' in relation to 'problematization,' see Paul Rabinow and Nicolas Rose, introduction to *The Essential Foucault*, vii–xxxv.

306 Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 194–228; here 194–5 (trans. mod.; cf. *Dits et Ecrits,* III: 299). See also his remark: "The longer I continue, the more it seems to me that the formation of discourses and the genealogy of knowledge need to be analyzed, not in terms of types of consciousness, modes of perception and forms of ideology, but in terms of tactics and strategies of power. Tactics and strategies deployed through implantations, distributions, demarcations, control of territories and organizations of domains which could well make up a sort of geopolitics" (ibid., 77).

307 Ibid., 195 (trans. mod.). Agamben, for example, does not discuss this specification.

308 See Agamben, "What is an Apparatus?," in *What is an Apparatus? And Other Essays* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009): 1–24, where Agamben reads the term through the notion of *oikonomia* in its theological/moral function, and its relation to the notion of *dispositio* as a underlying principle of good governance; for a critique of this theological reading, see Nadir Lahiji, "Political Subjectification and the Architectural Dispositif," in *Architecture against the Post-Political* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 53–65; and Matteo Pasquinelli, "What an Apparatus is Not: On the Archaeology of the Norm in Foucault, Canguilhem, and Goldstein," *Parrhesia* 22 (2015): 78–89. Foucault's discussion of dispositions, in fact, shows more interest in the tendencies created by the arrangement of things; see e.g. Foucault's lecture of Feb 1, 1978, in *Security, Territory, Population*, 87–114; esp. 99). In my work, the relation of *dispositio* to *oikonomia* will become relevant in a different way, where my Book I on the crystallizing concept of apartments provides a more rhetorical

rated and explicitly spatial conception of these specific relations of exteriority that positivities had presupposed. For Foucault, it is the spatial setup that makes *quadrillage* possible; it is the way of arranging things that allows different ends to be achieved. In the case of the abovementioned CERFI-discussion between Deleuze and Foucault, this genetic perspective allowed Deleuze to directly distinguish the normalizing effects as a utility of some more causal mechanism and constitutive power relation that ought to be explained—precisely what Deleuze spatially identifies in Foucault's epistemic notion of *quadrillage*. This point is crucial to understand the fact that *Discipline and Punish* revisits *quadrillage* as a basic operating principle[309] in how—in the case of disciplinary society—discursive and non-discursive elements work together around the production of a distinctive "analytical space." This brings us back to Deleuze's insistence to not mistake Foucault for a thinker of enclosure. Thomas Nail, too, stresses that Foucault's interest in biopolitics does not concern itself with "enclosures or confinement" (as just one modality), but more generally with "the management of fluctuating processes in an open field," which Foucault's own explorations into eighteenth-century town planning identified as a matter of "the spatial, juridical, administrative, and economic opening up of the town: [of] resituating the town in a space of circulation" and the distributive processes pertaining to this space of circulation.[310] Concerning this point, Manuel Shvartzberg also highlights Foucault's shifting focus toward an "'environmental' form of power." The latter part of *The Birth of Biopolitics* aims to analyze "the mechanics of how the neoliberal subject is instituted" through certain political forms of control and governmentality that are yet to be understood adequately, concerning the way they always involve techniques of environmental technologies and thus complex environmentalities and subjectivation processes,[311] something that, as Guattari was soon arguing, must be inquired at the intersection of three interrelated kinds of ecologies. It is to this effect that I later

reading of *dispositio* in relation to partitioning processes and topical logic; while my Book III will delve into the dispositif of 'the art of distribution,' in which as I will show, a new economic organization of the household becomes articulated.

309 Here, I am leaving aside that Deleuze would, with Simondon, stress that there is no 'principle' of (or for) individuation but only self-organizing processes of individuation ('as' the principle itself) working without any intentionality.

310 Thomas Nail, "Biopower and Control," in *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, ed. Nail, Morar, Smith, 247–63; here 258–9; citing Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 13.

311 Manuel Shvartzberg, "Foucault's 'Environmental' Power: Architecture and Neoliberal Subjectivization," in *The Architect as Worker*, ed. Peggy Deamer (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 181–205. See here esp. Foucault, *Birth of Biopolitics*, 259; and for a discussion of this notion of 'environmentality,' esp. Frichot, *Creative Ecologies: Theorizing the Practice of Architecture* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), 29ff.

want to show that this 'environmental form of power' cannot be disentangled from the power of the environment to form forms.

In 1973, Foucault seems similarly to be dropping the notion of 'equipments' in highlighting the configurative dimension of these apparatuses over their 'thingness': hence Foucault's own remark that "what I study is an architecture, a spatial disposition."[312] In this regard, his work singles out **FOUR IDENTIFIABLE DISCIPLINARY DISPOSITIFS**: (1) an "art of distributions," that is, concerning the distribution of individuals in space; (2) the "control of activity," which concerns the regulation of life through timetables; (3) the "organization of geneses," in which "the 'seriation' of successive activities makes possible a … detailed control, … of characterizing and therefore using individuals"; and (4) the "composition of forces," arranging 'tactics' in which "the product of various forces is increased by their calculated combination."[313] Therein, the first dispositif of distribution is of particular relevance for architecture, Gordana Fontana-Giusti notes, as it concerns the ordering of bodies in space, for which Foucault further identifies four spatial techniques.[314]

Its first technique is 'enclosure,' as "the specification of the place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself".[315] But, as he clearly stresses, "the principle of 'enclosure' is neither constant, nor indispensable, nor sufficient in disciplinary machinery. This machinery works space in a much more flexible and detailed way. It does this first of all on the principle of elementary location or partitioning (*quadrillage*)," through which "an analytical space … divided into as many sections as there are bodies or elements" is organized.[316] This organizing operation is identified in the specific epistemic 'gridding' distributing entities in space, and through which knowledges take form in new bodies, and in formations that produce them as subjects within an abstract system of reference to discern, classify or describe objects in relation to their proper places, and from which this normalizing function arises. The related third technique is functional organization, or "the rule of functional sites" involving a coding of space that entails a fourth technique of 'ranking'. Since each distributed element is "defined by the place that it occupies in the series, and by the gap that separates it from the others," the organizational "unit is, therefore, neither of the territory (unit of domination), nor is it the place (unit of residence), but the rank: the place

312 Foucault, "Considerations on Marxism, Phenomenology, and Power": 105.
313 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 135–70. See my introduction, note 135–7.
314 See Fontana-Giusti, *Foucault for Architects*, 52–96.
315 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 141.
316 Ibid., 143. Sentence order changed.

one occupies in a classification … the interval in a series of intervals."[317] Taken together, distribution is thus concerned with the organization of this serial space.[318] In this regard, one doesn't need enclosure but entanglements in which things are consistently "tied up" in the co-constitutive relations of an architecture. The location of elements, their organization into functional units, and related processes of hierarchization or functional integration are of course the much more relevant lenses to study architecture than the degree of closure effectuated by such systems.

Deleuze and Guattari's Geophilosophy

If Foucault was investigating historical formations as 'an architecture,' that is, through a description of relations of exteriority, then what could they tell the extended field of architecture about its own historical formation? What becomes increasingly important to understand here is the genetic or productive 'nature' within those "systems of relations" (compared to Deleuze's more difference-theoretical understanding[319]) and their conception as to how these elements determine one another. This 'nature,' I want to show in the next section, proves the initial center of resonance between Deleuze and Foucault, but would also become the point of divergence in their chiasmic theoretical trajectories.

So, to start answering this question, we must follow the longer line leading from Deleuze's critique of representation, which had informed Foucault's methodical transition from positivities to dispositifs through an analysis of relations of exteriority, back to a second shift this transition triggered reciprocally in Deleuze's own approach. This shift lies in the reconceptualization of multiplicities in light of the **MACHINIC ASSEMBLAGES** (*agencements machniques)* of multiplicities, whereby Foucault's four analytical components came to be worked together into a more synthetic approach. Guattari had already introduced the notion of *agencements* into their joint work during late 1960s, thus not only predating Foucault's dispositivistic notion, but also working as a psychoanalytic extension to Deleuze's above-mentioned thinking about complex concatenations in temporal series and individuation processes.[320] As such, assemblages are *not* a more Deleuzo-

317 Ibid., 145–6.

318 See ibid., 147.

319 See the citations mentioned above, notes 168 and 170.

320 See Guattari, *The Anti-Oedipus Papers*, ed. Stephane Nadaud (Los Angels: Semiotext(e), 2006), 38 and 201–23. As Ian Buchanan further points out, it is often forgotten "that *agencement* is Deleuze and Guattari's own translation, or perhaps re-arrangement would be a better word, of the German word 'Komplex' (as in the 'Oedipal complex' or the

Guattarian conception of dispositifs. Instead, Deleuze always acknowledged his deep inspiration from Foucault's thinking, in that the conception of assemblages as emergent wholes takes form in a specific revision of Foucault's understanding of historical formations.

Concerning this revision, Protevi calls our attention to the principal difference that whereas Foucault operates on an epistemological register, Deleuze works on a deliberately ontological (or rather ontogenetic) one.[321] Where the disjunction between the visible and sayable served Foucault as a strategy of thinking, as Monique David-Ménard observes, Deleuze cannot resist radicalizing it into an ontology in which statements are active, productive elements, and forms of visibility are passive, constitutive elements.[322] In this radicalization, Deleuze and Guattari would come to propose a vehemently more counter-structuralist approach to 'historical formations' (a concept that Deleuze prefers, for it covers discursive as well as non-discursive ones). Deleuze once wrote that "I had always been embarassed [*gêné*] by the linguistic viewpoint of Foucault which made the process of language the secret behind everything, notably of machines."[323] For example, Foucault's understanding of the clinical method and discursive formations was modeled deliberately on the dualistic semiology of the signifier and the signified.[324]

'castration complex'). Despite the fact that it is Guattari himself who defines the assemblage this way in the various glossaries he has provided, the connection between Freud's complex and the concept of the assemblage has been almost completely ignored." This gives the wrong impression that the "concept was somehow self-explanatory." Ian Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory and Its Discontents," *Deleuze Studies* 9, no. 3 (2015): 382–92; here 383. An earlier version of this article was pub. as "Assemblage Theory and Schizoanalysis," *Panoptikum* 20, no. 13 (2014): 126–34.

321 See Protevi, "Foucault's Deleuzian Methodology," 122–23 and 126–7 n. 9. May respectively comments that "Deleuze's works are steeped in ontology. … To read Deleuze is to be introduced into a world of proliferating beings and new forms of life." Todd May, *Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 15.

322 See David-Ménard, "Agencement deleuziens," 51.

323 Deleuze, "Letter to Arnaud Villani (Jul 15, 1983)," in *Lettres et autres textes*, ed. David Lapoujade (Paris: Édn. de Minuit, 2015), 83–4 (my trans).

324 See Foucault, *Birth of the Clinic*, 88–106. The chapter "Signs and Cases" analyzed how "new objects were to present themselves … at the same time that the knowing subject re-organizes himself, changes himself, and begins to function in a new way. It was not, therefore, the conception of disease that changed first … nor was it a signaletic system that was changed … but [all]together [*tout ensemble*] … the relation between the disease and the gaze, that it constitutes at the same time" (ibid., 90; trans. mod.). Foucault described the formation of the clinical method through a Sausurrean reading of medical symptoms as a signifier of disease, which Deleuze (in his rejection of Saussurean linguistics) must have found highly irritating. Much of his reworking from the dispositif to assemblages, focuses precisely on deconstructing the structuralist signifier-signified dualism. Note, for instance, that for Foucault, clinical description—"like the philosopher's analysis"—produced an "order of *enchaînement*" (ibid., 95; cf. *agencement*) in which in the clinical method transforms the symptom into a sign wherein "the visible and the manifest come together in at least a virtual identity" (96). Thereby the

This Lacanian-Saussurean model and the related psychoanalytic-linguistic construction of meaning through signifying chains became the prime target of the Deleuzo-Guattarian project to efface structuralist semiology along with its related bad habit of 'interpretosis.'[325]

After these initial efforts, Deleuze and Guattari's collaborative work aimed at further eliminating these bad habits by going on to reconceptualize historical formations in a manner that greatly displaced human agency (i.e., the archaeologist and his epistemic focus on discovering, interpreting, or classifying usually cultural formations), by attending more to the **A-SIGNIFYING** aspects of non-discursive processes that are articulated in complex chains and concatenations of productive material forces. While Foucault had started to conceptually distinguish power and production for his genealogical approach[326], Deleuze and Guattari's genetic approach to material capacities brought Nietzsche and Marx into resonance in a much more anti-humanist and post-anthropocentric fashion. Thereby, Deleuze and Guattari would bring together archaeology's and genealogy's distinctive concerns with discursive layers and historical formations into a geological or geophilosophical approach, which treats each historical stratum not simply as a strategy of thinking. As Deleuze remarked: "we are made up of strata. But to think is to reach a non-stratified material, somewhere between the layers, in the interstices."[327] Because if we are all made up of multi-layered **STRATA**, including co-

clinical method tabbed into the "complexity of combination" of "confused and complicated phenomena in their concrete presentation" (99). For Foucault, this combination is guided by analogy as to identify a "complex figure in the coherence of a unity, and not that of a mixed reality made up of mixed essences" (101). And in *Difference of Repetition* (1968), as is known, Deleuze vehemently debunked the notion of identity and analogy (along with opposition and similitude) as transcendental illusions, in his differential approach to the emergence of thought. Despite the strong differences in content, Foucault here already offers all concepts that the assemblages should work with, including the notions of the "stratum [*couche*]" (91), "articulation" (95), "doubly signifed" (92; cf. '**DOUBLE ARTICULATION**'), "totality" and "its principle of composition" (91), "genesis" (99), becoming (100), "codes" (90).

325 Famously for Deleuze and Guattari, "Significance and interpretosis are the two diseases of the earth or the skin, in other words, humankind's fundamental neurosis" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 114). For an elaboration, see also Bonta and Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy*, 140–43. Perhaps, an example of this bad habit in architecture would be the hard-to-overcome belief that building types are the product of collective, more or less conscious social practices, which they then come to represent.

326 Asked in a 1975 interview about the influence of Nietzschean thinking "as an opposition to the hegemony of Marx," Foucault answered: "Nowadays I prefer to remain silent about Nietzsche. When I was teaching philosophy I often used to lecture on Nietzsche, but I wouldn't do that any more today. If I wanted to be pretentious, I would use 'the genealogy of morals' as the general title of what I am doing. It was Nietzsche who specified the power relation as the general focus, shall we say, of philosophical discourse; whereas for Marx it was the production relation." Foucault, "Prison Talk," in *Power/Knowledge*, 37–54; here 53.

327 Deleuze, "Foucault's Main Concepts," 246. Deleuze and Guattri's stratoanalytic language was partly borrowed from paleo-anthropologist Pia Laviosa Zambotti, including her notion

relative and reciprocally-determined ones (namely intermediary **INTERSTRATA** that regulate the relations between strata; **METASTRATA** that form permeating layers of consistency; and composite superpositions forming *central* **EPISTRATA** with more *liminal* **PARASTRATA** formed alongside), then 'thinking' implies, first of all, to reach a 'non-stratified material' in order to reconstitute them. This requires a completely different strategy of thinking.

As Saldanha notes, a geological reading displaces "the genealogical emphasis on time and kinship (succession, branching, lineage) with an emphasis on space and disruption (layers, vectors, deterritorialization)"[328]. Deleuze and Guattari thus critique genealogy in its too-tree-like model of thought ("there is always something genealogical about a tree" [329]), because it is "the structure or network gridding [*quadrillant*] the possible."[330] According to Deleuze and Guattari, this is done by avoiding not only linear segmentarities, but also too-rigid ones (such as grids) in favor of more supple (if equally rigorous) segmentarities. Such are the **STRIATIONS** (and **RETICULATED** nets they form) that metrically overcode an "open space throughout which things-flows are distributed."[331] The tree-structure only indicates a "macrosegmentarity, because it produces or rather reproduces segments."[332] Against this reproductive character, Deleuze and Guattari famously identify a more micro-segmentary model "that operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots" in rhizoming structures: "the rhizome is an antigenealogy. It is a short-term memory, or antimemory."[333] In so repositioning genealogy *geologically* (the non-discursive) and archaeologically *rhizomatically* (the discursive), this reading does not to simply replicate historical structures. Instead, it actively calls for and tools a way of a thinking that avoids merely representing becoming in too-arborescent schemes of filiation, by means of favoring a more rhizomatic mode of thinking through (and working through) established structures. This way, any inquiry into 'how we have historically become the subjects we are' is thus directed toward future becomings.

In *Mille Plateaux* (*A Thousand Plateaus*, 1980), the analysis of historical formations is thus repurposed in pursuit of an ontology of becoming. In re-posing the problem of how things appear in history as an ontological problem, Deleuze and Guattari's approach to formations as becomings goes

of 'strata,' 'epistrata' and 'parastrata.'

328 Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 18.

329 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateau*s 8 and 11.

330 Ibid., 222–3 [orig. 259]

331 Ibid., 361.

332 Ibid.

333 Ibid., 21; also 11.

radically further, because this shift in registers addresses precisely the question of material causality. This alternative ontology of material formations —centering on the core concept of **ASSEMBLAGES**—re-conceptualizes the co-constitutive relationship between material and expressive components within non-totalizing wholes, whose agency is immanent to their composition. As Thomas Nail clarifies, "an assemblage is not just a mixture of heterogeneous elements; this definition is far too simplistic. The definition of the French word *agencement* [from French *agencer*, "to organize, arrange, lay out, piece together, match"] does not simply entail heterogeneous composition. Rather, it entails a constructive process that lays out a specific kind of arrangement" as a complex chain of associations resulting in affective relations,[334] namely as emergent ensembles characterized by their synthetic relations of exteriority.

On Relations of Exteriority

In the last part of my introduction, I had already mentioned Deleuze's careful caution against reducing Foucault to a thinker of (spaces of) enclosure. Contrariwise, he suggested, any cellularities within environmental figurations, such as architecture, must always be approached in terms of their larger function of exteriority. While this exteriority of relations is the key ingredient of Deleuze's ontogenetic approach to mapping geneses or emergent formations, it is not a principle for Deleuze. On the contrary, "it is a vital protest against any principles," which always involve vertical hierarchies.[335] For this reason, "if one takes this [more horizontal model of an] exteriority of relations as a conducting wire or as a line, one sees a very strange world unfold, fragment by fragment."[336]

Against the classic conception of part-to-whole relations, this relation of exteriority implies first of all, as Manuel DeLanda summarizes, "that a component part of an assemblage may be detached from it and plugged into a different assemblage in which its interactions are different. In other words, the exteriority of relations implies a certain autonomy for the terms they relate," since "relation(s) may change without the terms changing".[337] In this sense, its

334 Nail, "What is an Assemblage?," 24. I here refer back to Buchanan's emphasis on the psychoanalytical component of the concept of assemblages as a complex.

335 See Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, 55.

336 Ibid.

337 DeLanda, *A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 11–12. In the latter passage DeLanda directly references Deleuze's argues that "things do not begin to live except in the middle. … relation is neither internal to one of the terms which would consequently be subject, nor to two together. Moreover, a relation may change without the terms changing" (Deleuze and

allows assemblages to be taken apart analytically, as DeLanda notes, while guaranteeing that they are not reducible to their parts, since it maintains that the interactions of parts always results in a true synthesis.[338] Bringing us back to a differential/ethological view of bodies, Pierre Macherey further reminds us that relations of exteriority imply that all individual formations or bodies must be conceptualized as singular assemblages held together by the "pressure of ambient forces" (Guéroult) until changes in these external conditions resolve in recompositions of those corporeal entities into different singular systems of relationships determined in exteriority.[339]

Similar to Foucault's archaeological materialization of history, but rather contrary to Foucault's configurative notion of the dispositif, the chapter "Geology of Morals" radical situates the emergence of historical formations in an ambient socio-bio-geo-techno-material milieu in and through which forms historically come to matter.[340] Resonating with Braudel's geohistory of civilizations, *A Thousand Plateaus* continues Deleuze's earlier attempts at bringing together Spinoza's geometric and Nietzsche's genealogical methods to offer a new reading of the changing compositions of material bodies and their resultantly changing capacities to affect and be affected.[341] Thus, less interested in the possible (i.e. epistemological) condition of historical formations, they highlighted the virtual (i.e. ontological) condition of any becoming ('the plane of consistency'), and became increasingly interested in how history is actualized by the transformations in which these formations come about and take form. In this view, their *geological* approach problematizes formations and becomings in terms of a history of material transformation processes through which structures take form under continuous transformation. This way, we stop approaching historical formation from the question 'for which reason things happen' in favor of tackling what problem their geneses machinically responded to, in investigating 'what was going on in what happened'. In that sense, we transform structures into assemblages by opening them to the outside, while embedding them in an intensive material milieu, as opposed to an extensive space-time.

Parnet, *Dialogues*, 55).

338 DeLanda, *New Philosophy of Society*, 11–12.

339 See Macherey, *Hegel or Spinoza*, 175–81

340 See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 39–74; for an excellent introductory guide with glossary of terms, see Bonta and Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy*; see also Henry Somers-Hall, Jeffrey A. Bell, and James Williams, eds., *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2016), 134–151

341 For Deleuze's longer attempt at cross-connecting Nietzsche and Spinoza, see below, note 78.

Mark Bonta and John Protevi appreciate that "because of their insistence on a politically-informed use of complexity theory when considering social systems, Deleuze and Guattari's work enables us to re-conceptualize … the seemingly unsolvable structure/agency dilemma."[342] In re-conceptualizing how historical formations are always brought about (due to their emergent effect) by irreducible concatenations of circumstances including their material conditions, Deleuze and Guattari displace the problem dramatically as they address this process not in terms of emergence of newly composed substances alone, but rather their subsequent stabilization. That is, if all becomings are taking form as processes of constant transformation, then what happens so that certain things become stable at all? In his early work, Deleuze had approached history to a large extent "by way of the relationship between the virtual and the actual"; here he would "come to accord more and more attention to the actual . . . and to the question of history." He thus "moves from a privilege of the virtual, of the becoming of constituted individuations, toward the phenomena of consolidation,"[343] which in geology organizes the sedimented order of newly formed stratifications. In using the notion of **STRATIFICATION** to map the formation of the different levels of organization of a body as a concatenation of co-constititive components, *A Thousand Plateaus* re-centers the problem of historical formations and geneses *more geologico* on the condition of the stabilization of any such contingently composed and dynamically changing bodies.

342 Bonta and Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy*, 2–3.

343 Sauvagnargues, "Becoming and History," in *Between Deleuze and Foucault*, ed. Morar, Nail, and Smith, 174–5.

0.2.3 From *Quadrilatère* to Double Articulation, and from Gridding to Framing

This geophilosophical approach undermines the first dualistic semiological model regarding discursive formations by decentering a second dualistic conception of non-discursive formations, namely the bad habit of **HYLOMORPHISM**, according to which matter is formless until it receives form by (human or godly) agents.[344] Similar to the way the signifier-signified model has long opposed any 'expression' with its presumed 'content,' the hylomorphic model opposes 'form' to the 'substance' it is composed from.

The Danish linguist Louis T. Hjelmslev had provided an alternative semiotic model that recombines substance and form, content and expression in a 'semiotic net' that Deleuze and Guattari strategized in its potential to escape both dualisms at once.[345] Despite Hjelmslev's underlying structuralism, his semiotic net largely destroyed, as Helen Palmer notes, "the hierarchy and the directionality of signification" within semiotic systems.[346] *Anti-Oedipus* applauded its abandonment of all privileged reference in installing a "relationship of reciprocal precondition between expression and content."[347] In engaging matter and form in this new way, its twofold matrix underscored initially

344 Although this is not mentioned explicitly in this chapter; for an explicit critique of hylomorphic scheme see the chapter "1837: On the Refrain" in Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 369 and 408–11. For a critical discussion of hylomorphism in architecture, see esp.. Lloyd Thomas, introduction to *Material Matters*, 2–12.

345 Ibid., 43–45. See also Deleuze, *Foucault*, 31–44. For Hjelmslev's 'glossematic' work, see Louis Hjelmslev, *Prolegomena to a Theory of Language*, rev. and ed., trans. Francis J. Whitfield (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1969); orig. pub. as *Omkring Sprogteoriens Grundlæggelse* (1934). In the preparation of *Anti-Oedipus*, Guattari introduced the semiotic approach of Hjelmslev. See Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus Papers*, esp. 38–39, 201–41. For Guattari's reading of Hjelmslev, see his own "The Role of the Signifier in the Institution," in *Molecular Revolution*, 73–81; and moreover Gary Genosko, ed., *The Guattari Reader* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 145–70; and id., *Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction* (New York: Continuum, 2002), 155–93; as well as Janell Watson, *Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought* (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), 45–51. For a succinct analysis of Deleuze and Guattari's adaptation of glossematics in *A Thousand Plateaus'* use, I refer to Brent Adkins, "One or Several Wolves: The Wolf-Man's Pass-Words," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy*, ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams, 29–45; and Ronald Bogue, "Who the Earth Thinks It Is," in the same work, 46–63. As Bogue here notes, Roland Barthes initially popularized Hjelmslevian terminology, when he "recognizes the potential of Hjelmslev's linguistics for a general semiology" and equated forms and substances as 'two strata' (ibid., 48–50 in reference to Roland Barthes, *Elements of Semiology*, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (New York: Hill & Wang, 1967)).

346 Helen Palmer, "'What Happened Next?': Hjelmslev's Net, Arachne's Web and the Figure of the Line," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy*, ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams, 134–51; here 140. See also Genosko, *Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction*, 155–85. For a critical discussion of Hjelmslev's structuralist aspects, see also id., *Baudrillard and Signs: Signification Ablaze* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 58.

347 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 242–3.

that "structures are connected to processes."[348] This allowed Deleuze and Guattari to debug from a process-ontological angle, the rather static model, and quasi-linguistic conceptualization of discursive formation that Foucault had provisionally provided in *Les mots et les choses* (*The Order of Things*, 1966): his quadrilateral, which modeled the double process articulated by discursive formations .[349] As a model that is no longer concerned with generating meaning or signification, but instead with the **A-SIGNIFYING** production process of language as a sign system, Hjelmslev's semiotic net provides the basis for an alternative, non-reductive approach to historical formations through which "Deleuze and Guattari convert this static scheme of a general semiology into a dynamic component of a general ontology."[350]

In presenting this scheme, the "matrix of stratification," Deleuze and Guattari utilize Foucault's own example of the prison to highlight how to go about analyzing the stabilization of emerging assemblages from an asignifying angle.[351] Here, Deleuze and Guattari deliberately borrow the "terms from Hjelmslev, but apply them to Foucault in a completely different way, since content is not to be confused here with a signified, nor expression with a signifier. Instead it involves a new and very rigorous division":[352] as a form,

348 Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus Papers*, 201.

349 In 1961 Foucault formulated his theory of the 'quadrilateral of language'; see Foucault, *Order of Things*, 115–6 and 201. Therein he concluded, regarding the appearance of new discursive formations that, "what had changed was the space in which [their formation] was possible and from which it was possible to describe them (ibid., 131). Foucault here argued that the four theories of proposition, articulation, designation and derivation "form, as it were the segments of a quadrilateral. They confront each other in pairs and reinforce each other in pairs. Articulation gives content to the pure and still empty verbal form of the proposition; it fills that form, yet is in opposition to it, as a nomination that differentiates things is in opposition to the predication that links them together" (ibid., 115). Cf. the relation of form and content, and notion of 'articulation' below. Notably, Foucault comes back to these notions in his easy "Archaeology of Science," 316ff, in arguing that "These four 'theories'—which are lour formative schemata of concepts—have describable relations between them: they assume each other; they oppose each other in pairs; they derive one from the other and, in elaborating their logical sequence, they link up the discourses, which can neither be unified nor superposable, into a single pattern. They form what may be called a *theoretical network*. This term must not be understood to mean a group of fundamental concepts which could regroup all the others and permit their replacement in the unity of a deductive architecture but, rather, the general law of their dispersion, heterogeneity, and incompatibility (whether simultaneous or successive)—the rule of their insurmountable plurality. And it is only permissible to recognize an individualizable set of statements in general grammar insofar as all the concepts that appear are interconnected, intersect, interfere with and follow each other, are hidden and scattered in it, are formed from one and the same theoretical network" (ibid., 317–18). Deleuze and Guattari here greatly re-purpose Foucault's clinical concepts (see above, note 325).

350 Bogue, "Who the Earth Thinks It Is," 49.

351 See Deleuze, *Foucault*, 23–44; *Thousand Plateaus*, 66–69, 87–89. For a detailed introduction, see esp. Brian Massumi, *A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 10–46.

352 Deleuze, *Foucault*, 47. "Signifier enthusiasts take an oversimplified situation as their



3 THE QUADRILATÈRE
Foucault's quadrilateral model of discursive formations. Redrawn from Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 201.

'the prison' is not just the signifier for a specific content such as 'the prisoner.' The prison does not make prisoners. This historical formation of content always involves a process of selection; this non-discursive content-selection is called **TERRITORIALIZATION**. What Deleuze and Guattari argue with Hjelmslev, is that any content (such as Foucault's 'visible') always has "both a form and a substance":[353] for example, prisoners (as well as guards, administration, staff, and visitors) make up the selected matter in a prison, while the 'prison form' is a specific arrangement that spatializes, structures, contains (or confines), but principally holds together (in the assemblage-theoretic sense

> implicit model: word and thing. From the word they extract the signifier, and from the thing a signified in conformity with the word, and therefore subjugated to the signifier. They operate in a sphere interior to and homogeneous with language. Let us follow Foucault in his exemplary analysis, which, though it seems not to be, is eminently concerned with linguistics. Take a thing like the prison: the prison is a form, the 'prison-form'; it is a form of content on a stratum and is related to other forms of content (school, barracks, hospital, factory). This thing or form does not refer back to the word 'prison' but to entirely different words and concepts, such as 'delinquent' and 'delinquency,' which express a new way of classifying, stating, translating, and even committing criminal acts. 'Delinquency' is the form of expression in reciprocal presupposition with the form of content 'prison.' Delinquency is in no way a signifier, not even a juridical one, the signified of which would be the prison. That would flatten the entire analysis. Moreover, the form of expression is reducible not to words but to a set of statements arising in the social field considered as a stratum (that is what a regime of signs is). The form of content is reducible not to a thing but to a complex state of things as a formation of power (architecture, regimentation, etc.). We could say that there are two constantly intersecting multiplicities, 'discursive multiplicities' of expression and 'non-discursive multiplicities' of content" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 66–67)

353 Deleuze, *Foucault*, 47.

4 THE SEMIOTIC NET
Deleuze and Guattari's adaptation of Hjelmslev's "semiotic net". Redrawn after Deleuz=e and Guattari, *Thousand Plateaus*), with the double articulation between "substance" and "form," "content" and "expression". *Opposite page*, The exemplary "matrices of stratification" of the formation of the Prison (left), and of DNA (right).

of the term content[354]) these selected components as heterogeneous substances.

As a part of what the prison contains, the prisoner is thus a "substance of content"[SC], while the containing edifice of the prison is called the "form of content"[FC] ⊠[4]. The prison could, however, have never taken form if there was no historical process in which these forms have entered a process of mutual and reciprocal determination. This determinant element is presented by historically formed expressions; this discursively expressed definition is called **CODING**. According to the semiotic net, any expression (such as Foucault's 'sayable') also has both a substance and a form ⊠[4]. The formation of the prison could not have been stabilized without a "form of expression"[FE] (in this case, 'Penal Law') that defines prisoners as legally coded subjects. And this legal code in turn requires a specific "substance of expression"[SC], which is their determining 'delinquency.'[355] In all assemblages, "forms of content like the prison, [or] the asylum, engender secondary utterances which produce or reproduce delinquency and mental illness; but also, forms of expression like delinquency engender secondary contents which are vehicles of the prison."[356]

The historical formation of the prison takes hold as soon as these discursive and non-discursive components and configurations enter into reso-

354 Note the etymology of content, from Latin *contentus* "contained; satisfied," past participle of *continere* "to hold together, enclose." See Online Etymological Dictionary.
355 See ibid., and also id., *Foucault*, 41.
356 Deleuze, "Foucault's Main Concepts," 63.

FC	FE
Prison form	Penal Law
SC	SE
Prisoners, Guards, etc.	Delinquency

FC	FE
Protein structure (tertiary structure)	Nucleic acid sequence (primary structure)
SC	SE
Protein elements, or amino acids (functional groups)	Nucleic elements, nucleobase, nucleosides, or nuclotides

nance and change, stabilize, and disintegrate only according to the relative transformation and linkages of these components. As such, assemblages form when four components (a substance of content [SC], a form of content [FC], a form of expression [FE], and a substance of expression [SE] come to reciprocally stabilize one another through a form of grid-locking. This concatenation is what an *agencement* historically and process-ontologically consists in. Therefore, any reduction of history to only the discursive or semiotic (and its already formed elements) is not wrong, but heavily oversimplified.[357] Rather, Deleuze and Guattari redistribute Foucault's discursive and non-discursive components into a multiplicity of all sorts of co-constitutive coded expressions and territorialized contents.

To my knowledge, not enough attention has been paid to elaborating how Deleuze and Guattari more or less directly reframed Foucault's archaeo-/genealogical method into their wider geological "stratoanalysis." Besides borrowing some of Foucault's own notions to name these four components, Deleuze and Guattari here implicitly re-map Foucault's **FOUR DISPOSITIFS OF MODERN SPACE** onto their matrix of stratification (and at the same time, we can even map his four techniques of distribution onto it, as a sort of *nested* assemblage). This is the scheme that my study will repeatedly rely on in order to map how certain architectural assemblages came to be. ✉[5]

357 See Bryant, *Onto-Cartography*, 7–8.

5 STRATOANALYTIC MATRICES
The stratoanalytic matrix of machinically-stabilized historical formations: Foucault's four dispositifs of modern discipline (from *Discipline and Punish*) can easily be mapped onto an Deleuze and Guattari's stratoanalytic matrix (from *A Thousand Plateaus*).

The Theory of Double Articulation

On this point, commentators like Manuel DeLanda have long foregrounded the role of complexity theory and non-linear systems within Deleuze and Guattari's thinking.[358] In such complexes, Ronald Bogue sums up, "forms organize, or 'code,' substances and thereby fix, or 'territorialize,' substances. Hence, the substance of content is territorialized matter that is coded by the form of content; and the form of expression further codes, or 'overcodes,' the stratum of content and thereby increases territorialization in the substance of expression."[359] To that extent, Deleuze and Guattari argue that historical formations always involve (reciprocally determinant) stratification processes, which involves a **DOUBLE ARTICULATION** of content and expression through which milieus are organized into more stable structures.[360] In pointing out how this

358 See Manuel DeLanda, *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines* (New York: Zone books, 1991); id., "Nonorganic Life," in *Incorporations*, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New York: Zone 6, 1992), 129–67; and id., "The Geology of Morals: A Neo-Materialist Interpretation," *Virtual Futures* 95 (1995), avail. online at http://www.t0.or.at/delanda/geology.htm; id., *A Thousand Years of Non-Linear History* (New York: Zone books, 1997).

359 Bogue, "Who the Earth Thinks It Is," 49.

360 The notion of the double articulation in the matrix of stratification serves hence as a radical extension to his identification of the parallelism in Spinoza's geometric method, and the specific relation between substance and form, content and expression, that are prefigured in *Spinoza: Expressionism*, esp. chapter 6: "Expression in Parallelism," 99–111. As Bogue has pointed out, the notion of double articulation itself was borrowed from André Martinet: "Martinet's distinction between two fundamental levels in linguistic expression – a first articulation of *morphemes* (monemes, in Martinet's parlance), or the smallest units possessed of form and meaning; and a second articulation of *phonemes*, the smallest units that distinguish or contrast meaning, without themselves having any meaning but solely

"double-articulation is the condition of all order, structure and regularity," Ray Brassier underscores that this theory of stratification is "[one of] the most impressive, but also most perplexing, achievements of *A Thousand Plateaus*. I think it is absolutely central to its entire conceptual construction; without it, nothing works. But its pivotal role is often overlooked. The theory of stratification is a theory of the self-organization of matter. It is unabashedly metaphysical; indeed, it is perhaps the most ingenious and ambitious metaphysical hypothesis proposed by any twentieth-century materialists."[361] Therein, "the first articulation chooses or deducts, from unstable particle-flows, metastable molecular or quasi-molecular units (substances) upon which it imposes a statistical order of connections and successions (forms). The second articulation establishes functional, compact, stable structures (forms), and constructs the molar compounds in which these structures are simultaneously actualized (substances)."[362] In this twofold process, contents are formed through ordering processes that form specific bodies (i.e. 'sorting' or 'sedimentation' in geophilosophical terms), while expressions are processes that organize bodies through enunciative acts (e.g. through 'folding' or 'consolidation').[363] As such they are at the same time understood in terms of what was going on (= RHIZOMATICS) in what was taking form in certain historically-consolidated formations (= STRATOANALYSIS).

As Brassier clarifying summarizes these articulations: "content is articulated by splitting material flows into successively coordinated molecular units. Expression is articulated by establishing molar compounds onto which these structures are superimposed. MOLECULAR substance is formally coordinated" into substances and forms of content that are stratified as formed matters, while "MOLAR compounds are formally structured" as substances and forms of expression that are stratified as structured functions.[364] Concerning these distinctions, Brassier is adamant about Deleuze and Guattari's emphasitic

form – was seen by many semiologists as a guide to the analysis of nonlinguistic sign systems" (Bogue, "Who the Earth Thinks It Is," 48). On this, see also Bonta and Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy*, 150.

361 Ray Brassier, "Concrete Rules and Abstract Machines: Form and Function in *A Thousand Plateaus*," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy*, ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams, 260–79; here 263 (emph. added). On the theory of stratification, see also Bonta and Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy*, 150–53; see also the works by DeLanda and Protevi cited above. I also refer to Luciana Parisi's *Abstract Sex: Philosophy, Bio-Technology, and the Mutation of Desire* (London: Continuum Press); esp. 18–26, as a reading that has greatly operationalized a stratoanalytic angle.

362 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 40–1.

363 See Lapoujade *Aberrant Movements*, 227; DeLanda, *Intensive Science*, 204–8

364 Brassier, "Concrete Rules and Abstract Machines," 264. I've taken the liberty to interchange the order of the first two sentences here. Typographic emph. added.

insistence that the difference between content and expression involves a **REAL** (if relative) distinction, while that between substance and form is a merely **MODAL** one: "a *modal* distinction is a distinction of variations in intensity of attributes in actual individuals; this means an individual may possess a given attribute to greater or lesser degrees."[365]

A Thousand Plateaus illustrates the real distinction, by using the feudal assemblage as an example: "on the one hand [the content in the feudal assemblage] is a **MACHINIC ASSEMBLAGE OF BODIES**, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting, to one another; on the other hand it is a **COLLECTIVE ASSEMBLAGE OF ENUNCIATION**, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies"; the form of content therein is the specific spatial arrangement "of bodies defining feudalism."[366] As such, self-consistent formtaking processes and formations emerge and stabilize, change and dissolve, according to the various forces that hold them together in particular yet metastable configurations. In such assemblages, the **FORM OF CONTENT** consists in its spatial configuration, a chosen order, or hierarchy that gains a fully a-signifying (rather than non-discursive) function by how it arranges a multiplicity. Its agency thus comes from how its setups of spatial relationships come to produce a specific effect, but one that cannot be known in advance. With that, their troubleshooting of the Foucauldian system recovers the full range of ecological and economical dimensions in the problem of arrangement.

The full implication on the question, how things can get stable at all, is given in their second example of the DNA ✉[4]. Here, the form of content is given as the spatial configuration of proteins. It configures its productive potential, but even more importantly, this configuration lays out the reproductive capacities; a capacity for a 'continuous production'! Hence, this "form of content is reducible not to a thing but to a complex state of things as a formation of power (architecture, regimentation, etc.)."[367] If the form of con-

365 Ibid. 265. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 44. On a longer Spinozist elaboration on modal existences and substance-attribute(/form) relations, see Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, esp. 191–216. Manuel DeLanda has also extensively discussed the modal status of multiplicities, in *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, esp. chapter 1. On this modal distinction, see James Williams, "Deleuze's Ontology and Creativity: Becoming in Architecture," *Pli* 9 (2000): 200–19; esp. 210; and also Adkins, "One or Several Wolves," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy*, ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams, esp. 36; as well as Henry Somers-Hall, "The Smooth and the Striated," in ibid, 242–59; esp. 255–57.

366 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 89–9; cited also in Adkins, "One or Several Wolves," 37.

367 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 66. See also ibid., 43–44, 59, and 66–67; and moreover Protevi's entry "Organism," in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. Parr, 95–196.

tent is always 'an architecture,' then architecture is, and ought to be foremost understood, as a FORM OF CONTENT.[368] And thus *the* form of content within any formtaking assemblage.

What Architecture Does within Assemblages

Not only in this way did Deleuzian thought offer "a crucial retake on the influence of architectural form,"[369] but it also "aims at an entirely different way of thinking, centered on the problem how we can think the new as an emergent formation."[370] To highlight the conceptual differences thus exposes the explicitly counter-structuralist agenda within Deleuze and Guattari's conception of historical formation, against Foucault's notion that is largely locked in a symbolic-linguist framework. Hjelmslev's model insists that "no form can exist for itself, outside of processes of [its] formation."[371] What we find here is the Bergsonian vision of entities as historical-genetic processes. Architecture, positioned at the intersection of form and content, is thus freed from its hylomorphic predicament (substance ⟷ form) as well as any symbolic reading (content ⟷ expression). Instead, it is reconsidered as an a-signifying arrangement in which a content is determined by means of how it is drawn together in a complex of state of affairs. Inmates, divisions, corridors, views, and layouts thus attain a specific function based on the relation they produce or reproduce. This function lies in how it operates; in what a prison *does*: not only as an architecture, but also as a penal system, a governmental institution, a legal entity, a corrective instrument, an economic facility, a social ecology, as well as a micro-climatic device, a solar collector, and so on.

I feel that, now, we are in a position to go back to Deleuze's above-mentioned critique that it is a mistake to regard Foucault as a thinker of enclosure; not only since Foucault saw enclosure only an *optional* technique but also, as Deleuze underscores, because "enclosure is always … in service of another function, which is a function of exteriority" operating on a much larger scale; in fact, at an ontological level.[372] And it is this function of exteri-

368 See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 66.

369 Neil Leach, ed., *Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural Theory* (London/New York: Routledge, 1997), 309.

370 Julian Jachmann: *Von Serlio bis Ledoux: 'Differenz und Wiederholung' in seriellen Publikationen zur französischen Wohn- und Residenzarchitektur*, 2 vols (Cologne: Kunsthistorisches Institut der Univ. Köln, 2016), I: 17.

371 Félix Guattari, *Lines of Flight: For Another World of Possibilities*, trans. Andrew Goffey (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 118.

372 Deleuze, "Les formations historiques" (seminar), Dec 12, 1985 and Apr 8, 1986, (my trans). Audio files and transcripts avail. online at http://www2.univ-paris8.fr/deleuze/). As mentined in my introduction, the fact that enclosure is optional, is stressed in Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 141–43.

ority, I want to argue, through which theory needs to reconsider what it is that architecture does.

In Deleuze's reading, "hospitals and prisons are first and foremost places of visibility dispersed in a form of exteriority, which refer to an extrinsic function, that of setting one apart and controlling."[373] This regime of visibility in no way implies a simple form of external conditioning.[374] As mentioned before, regarding the exteriority of relations, Deleuze recognized Foucault's work for having approached the question how the conditions of apparition are at once the genetic elements of that which appears. Deleuze's longstanding distinction between appearance and apparition[375] still helps to correct two wide-spread misreadings of dispositifs: one view reduces dispositifs to their manifested forms in Weberian ideal institutional types. Another view aggrandizes dispositifs in the Althusserian reading, as an ideological form manifesting oppressive social control structures. This undermines, however, why Foucault employs the French term *'dispositif'* over *'appareil'* in carefully avoiding, as Paul Veyne has argued, to fall back on the notion of structure.[376] Deleuze instead understands the dispositif in Baudry's and Lyotard's theatric-cinematic use in a literally illuminating sense of a projective device configuring certain fields of visibility.[377] But rather than being a device rendering visible, making us see or be seen (=appearance), dispositifs 'make appear' (=apparition).[378] This manifesting sense is why, Monique David-Ménard stresses, Deleuze is so interested in the mediating element in the relation between forms of visibility and statements, which in Foucault is the **DIAGRAM** that Deleuze would go on to mine so elaborately as a concept.[379]

373 Deleuze, *Foucault*, 43, 60.

374 Cf. Wallenstein, *Biopolitics*, 6.

375 On this distinction, see above, note 117–19.

376 See Gregg Lambert, "What is a Dispositif?," Lecture for Society for the Study of Biopolitical Futures, UNSW, Sydney, (2013), avail. online at https://www.academia.edu/25507473/What_is_a_Dispositif; and "What Is A Dispositif? – Part 1" (2016), avail. online at http://jcrt.org/religioustheory/2016/07/11/what-is-a-dispositif-part-1; and Paul Veyne, *Foucault: His Thought, His Character*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 149 n.12.

377 See Deleuze, "What is a Dispositif?," in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher*, ed. and trans. Timothy J. Armstrong (New York: Routledge, 1992), 159–61. See here the statement that "apparatuses are like Raymond Roussel's machines, such as Foucault analyses them; … Each apparatus has its way of structuring light" (ibid., 160); and his related observation that "A machine does not have to be optical; but it is an assembly of organs and functions that makes something visible and conspicuous (the 'prison-machine' or Roussel's machines)" (Deleuze, *Foucault*, 58).

378 See Lambert, "What Is A Dispositif? – Part 1": n.p. (online).

379 Note that the notion appears only twice in *Discipline and Punish.* Deleuze, however, was adamant on his feeling that Foucault's "diagram notion was a very rich one" (Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure," 132). For Deleuze's understanding of it, see esp. *Foucault*, 33–40.

Allow me to avoid a discussion of the various (mis)uses of diagrams in architectural discourse since the 1990s here, and to only restrict myself to aligning with those who see diagrams in their anti-representational and processual capacity as an antidote to postmodern thinking. Sven-Olov Wallenstein, for example, harshly critiqued the degree to which architecture theory has focused on an all-too-representative understanding of diagrams, and thus missed out on understanding the truly creative-transformative function of architectural form within processes of subjectivation, and hence its function in bringing new subjects about.[380] As is known, for Deleuze "a diagram never functions in order to represent a persisting world" or even something real, but it always "produces a new kind of reality," a "real that is yet to come."[381] They are therefore the prime **DETERRITORIALIZING** factor of any given assemblage; in fact, "what holds an assemblage together is … its most deterritorialized component, a cutting edge of deterritorialization."[382] Here, we need to reclaim their anti-representational potential in order to move beyond approaches that address the historical agency of power diagrams as disentangled from the material figurations that configure them. To do so, we need to first stop conflating diagrams with representational forms. This confuses at a basic level why Deleuze and Guattari distinguish **CONCRETE ASSEMBLAGES** from **ABSTRACT MACHINES**.

A diagram is essentially something that is marked out through lines, and in "What is s Dispositif?" Deleuze takes the dispositif precisely as amultilinear ensemble in which several lines appear. As David-Ménard points out, for Deleuze, "the diagram is the abstract formula of connections in a dispositif [that] produces a spatialization that enables the actualization of concrete assemblages."[383] This conception goes beyond a distribution of the sensible (Rancière). The diagrammatic component of assemblages does not involves any *mise-en-scène* of an already existing subject. But, as Guattari argued, it

380 See Wallenstein, "Genealogy of Modern Architecture," 385.

381 Deleuze, *Foucault*, 35; Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 7. See also ibid., 136–48.

382 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 336.

383 David-Ménard, "Agencement deleuziens," 52 (emph. added). Regarding the study of concrete assemblages in relation to history, Guattari emphasized: "The reason for considering concrete machines is that they should make it far harder for us to try to describe history in terms of significations, above all of significations similar in nature to a particular level of a major power formation. What one has to examine here is the whole genealogical perspective; indeed there is probably no genealogy that can account for madness, illegalism, shutting up children and so on without reference to concrete machines that came into being independent of the relationships of molar forces, concrete machines existing independently of large-scale balances of power, of the diachronic implications of the machinic phylum in the sphere of the economy, of demography, of war machines, etc." Guattari, "Concrete Machines," in *Molecular Revolution*, 159.

must be rigorously approached as a *"mise-en-existence."*[384] Regarding this existential production, Beatriz Colomina too has stressed that architecture never simply serves as a "platform that accommodates the viewing subject[;] it is a viewing mechanism that produces the subject. It precedes and frames its occupants."[385] As Hélène Frichot and Helen Runting continue this argument, one must thus align with an "ontological position that holds that the subject never comes first."[386] This ontological starting position allows us to reposition how existence is framed by architecture, and the specific apprehension of life we attain from it.[387]

To arrive at an alternative reading that affirms architecture as fundamentally framing our existence, one has to side with Elden's suggestion of a close relation between dispositifs and Heidegger's "enframing" as the essence of technics; and that such "technologies should not be analyzed in isolation, but need to be located in the context in which they develop—what Foucault terms a dispositif. … Architecture is understood as a *technē*, and forms part of a dispositif." [388] In the late 1970s Foucault started suggesting that "if one wanted to do a history of architecture, I think that it should be much more along the lines of … [a] general history of *technē*, in the widest sense of the word,"[389] and that it ought to be written in terms of the technical use of its 'framing' function.[390]

384 Guattari, "Microphysics of Power/Micropolitics of Desire," in *The Guattari Reader*, ed. Genosko, 178–9.

385 Colomina, "The Split Wall: Domestic Voyeurism," in *Sexuality and Space* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1992), 84 [my emphasis].

386 Frichot and Runting "In Captivity," in *Architecture and Feminisms*, ed. Frichot, Gabrielsson and Runting, 141. In my opinion, this lacking acknowledgment leads to much reductivism within the current stream of 'phenomenology redux' architectural theories re-centering on human perception. While valuably calling for a new sensibility to environments, these study often neglect that the co-constitutive affective relation between humans and their environments, transgresses mere psychological affection within what Yi-Fu Tuan has named "the affective bond between people and place[s] or setting[s]," because it is no longer limited to already individuated subjects (Yi-Fu Tuan, *Topophilia: A Study of Environmental Perception, Attitudes, and Values*, 2nd edn. (New York: Columbia UP, 1990 [1972]). Such frames and set ups have an *individuating effect*; i.e. an actual effect under which individuation can occur. As such they are capable of producing new ways of seeing, new sensibilities, and new habits of perception and action. This is why, for instance, Jasbir Puar argues that within assemblages there are subject/object relations between perceiving bodies and perceived things, because "perceiving and being perceived can no longer be separate processes, nor processes that act as extensions of each other. This would be one difference (among many) between appendage[s] and assemblage[s]" (Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages* (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2007), 193).

387 I take this point more generally from Judith Butler's *Frames ow War: When is Life Grievable* (London: Verso, 2009), 1–5.

388 Elden, *Mapping the Present*, 109–11; translit. mod.

389 Rabinow, ed., *Essential Work* III: 361–2, and 4 (mod., cf. *Dits et Ecrits*, IV: 283–85).

390 For a preliminary attempt, see here esp. Kim Dovey, *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form* (London/New York: Routledge, 1999).

When, in the following, I take the Foucauldian attitude of subsuming the history of architecture to that of *technē*, I will do so from a more Deleuzian reading of framing dispositifs. Since framing is *the* technique of any dispositif, Deleuze too had granted it a decisive agency, and a specifically architectural one.[391] Relevant here is not so much the frame as a thing in itself, but (en)framing as a process—which always implies a deframing—that gains an ontological boundary-drawing function. For framing involves an existential production within which spatializations (or territorializations) work as a sort of ENABLING CONSTRAINT in non-discursive processes through which things come to appear. It is precisely this conception that puts the classic dichotomy between structure and agency into question, in foregrounding how material arrangements act as enabling constraints. They bring about individual subjects or bodies in defining subjectivation or individuation processes, and not merely confining (even if emancipating) individualization processes.

To acknowledge this individuating effect of material setups, one must reject the exclusive relation with which many diagrammatic readings (of panopticism and visibility for example) have divorced diagrams from their material expressions and follow an approach that, as Guattari demands, is "flush with material conditions."[392] In this view, subject formations, such as the prisoner, come to appear as enunciated subjects only through the manner in which they become disseminated and dispersed within a coded milieu that each dispositif sets up.[393] It is here that, from the dispositivistic notion of architecture as a field of visibility, Deleuze's work on cinema re-conceptualizes Foucault's notion of enclosure and *quadrillage* (gridding/partitioning) as *cadrage* (i.e. framing), which would come to be subsumed under new techniques of *cutting*, as distributing entities in time in modern moviemaking.[394] For Deleuze, the frame's most elementary form is partitioning. In their later work, Deleuze and Guattari follow Bernard Cache (a French architect who attended Deleuze's seminars), who considers architecture "the art of introducing intervals in a territory in order to construct frames of possibility."[395]

In constituting relative insides or outsides, architecture's central function is not to separate, but to selectively re-establish particular environmental

391 For a discussion of this framing function, see especially Bernard Cache, *Earth Moves: The Furnishing of Territories* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); and Elizabeth Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art: Deleuze and the Framing of the Earth* (New York: Columbia UP, 2008), 1–24.

392 Guattari, *Lines of Flight*, 62.

393 See Deleuze, Seminar Dec 12, 1985 (2); and id., *Foucault*, 43.

394 See Deleuze, *Cinema*, 2 vols (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986/89).

395 See Cache, *Earth Moves*, 21–30; see also Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art,* esp. 10–7.

relationships (=**INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION**) by cutting through material milieus. Cache, like Elizabeth Grosz, has greatly reconsidered architecture's production of 'interlocking frames.' If "the wall is the basis of our coexistence," it is not due to its function of separation alone, but its capacity to select (or rarefy) and bring in.[396] Robin Evans already said that architectural plans articulate "the nature of human relationships, since the elements whose trace it records—walls, doors, windows—are employed first to divide and then selectively re-unite inhabited space."[397] But if in this selecting capacity, architecture is—as Andrew Ballantyne argues— "an art of relations," it is precisely not because it places people and bodies in relation with one another "as they are brought together and kept apart by walls and spaces," but because it only differentiates them through the reciprocal determination of part-to-part relations.[398] To avoid falling back onto a mereologically reductive conception, Brian Massumi therefore challenges architects to understand built forms beyond an enclosing or separating function, as he observes that "to build is to produce a closure-effect, by regulating movements … A building is a technology of movement [that] functions topologically, [by] folding relational continua into and out of each other to selective, productive effect":[399] it only plots relations against relations; not pre-existing spaces against spaces, bodies against bodies, or objects against objects. This relational view asks us to reconsider that modern subjectivity was determined by conditions of 'being confined.' Studies of networks have made evident that 'containment' is less an issue of static enclosure than rather a matter of adaptively controlling flows. As Quentin Meillassoux says, individual entities are simply "a local rarefaction of fluxes: … that is to say, a selection, … a place where fluxes can no longer pass through fully and indiscriminately."[400]

396 Cache, *Earth Moves*, 24; cited after Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art*, 14. Cf. also Evans "The Rites of Retreat and Exclusion," in *Translations from Drawing to Building and Other Essays* (London: Architectural Association, 1997), 35–54. Cf. here Tschumi's denial of the possibility of synthesis in modelling architectural disjunction into a systematic theory similar to Bataille's heterology, and re-lated design strategy of montage (as a cutting together), where connection also overarches parthood structures, Bernard Tschumi, *Architecture and Disjunction* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994); see Carola Ebert, "The Dilemma with Disjunction," *Thesis* (2003), no. 4: 14–21.

397 Evans, "Figures, Doors, Passages," in *Translations*, 54–91; here 56.

398 Andrew Ballantyne, ed., *Architecture Theory: A Reader in Philosophy and Culture* (London: Continuum, 2005), 239–40.

399 Brian Massumi, *Parables for The Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham: Duke UP, 2002), 203–4.

400 Quentin Meillassoux, "Subtraction and Contraction: Deleuze, Immanence, and Matter and Memory," in Collapse 3, ed. Robin Mackay (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2007): 96–7. See above my note 256.

Thereby it gains a consolidating function.[401] Based on this view, Deleuze and Guattari would famously come to name architecture "the first of the arts," as it "endlessly produces and joins up planes and sections. That is why it can be defined by the 'frame,' by an interlocking of differently oriented frames."[402] Framing, which in essence always involves a specific 'deframing,' is not reducible to mere framework, but a selective process. Selection, Gökhan Kodalak stresses, is not a reactive activity, but an affective coupling of "extensive materials with intensive forces."[403] This way, subjectivation processes must be reconsidered through a process of a reciprocal determination or re-definition within a field of criss-crossing relations of forces and affective powers. In this intensive view, Claire Colebrook has rethought the built environment and its formation of bodies as a "milieu of mutual self-distinction,"[404] operated by thresholds. Here the intensity of proximity entails a specific 'delay' through which "urbanity, then, is a complex creation of increasing difference."[405] Such a capacious view of the modern habitat as a "milieu machine"—to borrow a formulation of architecture theorist Wim Nijenhuis for architectural arrangements that do not represent but

401 In *Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari had written: "Consolidation is not content to come after; it is creative. The fact is that the beginning always begins in-between, intermezzo. Consistency is the same as consolidation, it is the act that produces consolidated aggregates, of succession as well as of coexistence, by means of the three factors just mentioned: intercalated elements, intervals, and articulations of superposition. Architecture, as the art of the abode and the territory, attests to this: there are consolidations that are made afterward, and there are consolidations of the keystone type that are constituent parts of the ensemble" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 329).

402 Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?,* trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 186. "By making architecture the first art of the frame, Bernard Cache is able to list a certain number of enframing forms that do not determine in advance any concrete content or function of the edifice: the wall that cuts off, the window that captures or selects (in direct contact with the territory), the ground-floor that wards off or rarefies …, the roof that envelops the place's singularity …. Interlocking these frames or joining up all these planes-wall section, window section, floor section, slope section is a composite system rich in points and counterpoints. The frames and their joins hold the compounds of sensations, hold up figures, and intermingle with their upholding, with their own appearance. … Frames or sections are not coordinates; they belong to compounds of sensations whose faces, whose interfaces, they constitute. But however extendable this system may be, it still needs a vast plane of composition that carries out a kind of *deframing* following lines of flight that pass through the territory only in order to open it onto the universe, that go from house-territory to town-cosmos, and that now dissolve the identity of the place through variation of the earth" (ibid., 187 [emph. orig.]). On this 'deframing' function of architecture, see also Marko Jobst, "Exception, Rule and Architecture out-of-field," *Rhizomes* 21 (Winter 2010), avail. online at http://rhizomes.net/issue21/jobst/index.html.

403 Gökhan Kodalak, "Affective Aesthetics beneath Art and Architecture," *Deleuze and Guattari Studies* 12.3 (2018): 418.

404 Claire Colebrook, "Sex and the (Anthropocene) City," *Theory, Culture & Society* 34, nos. 2–3 (2017), 39–60; here 46.

405 Ibid., 41, 47.

work[406]—would require a 'machinic' approach to the built environment as a machine "determining what is related to what."[407]

If we acknowledge that cellular figurations in the built environment are always conditioned by and therein render visible **RETICULAR** forces, these can no longer be understood as limitations, and especially not as representing limiting conditions, as Massumi highlights, "as they are in standard, normative architecture. They are no longer constraining. They are the enabling constraints of a renewed selection," selecting for future conditions of reality shaped from the co-existence of reciprocally-determinant and thus co-dependent formations.[408] Thereby architecture's territorializing capacity, and the reticulated milieus it forms, must be rethought and analyzed assemblage-theoretically as a specific 'cultural technique,' as Siegert has argued, whose technical function (or **TECHNICITY**, as Simondon would call it) lies in materializing 'filters of relations' among specifically entangled social, technical, cultural, economic, and ecological systems.[409]

Not to be equated with the concatenation within assemblage as such, but the enabling constraint necessary for it to happen, this framing process coincides precisely with the selective production of a **FORM OF CONTENT** in a given assemblage. The form of content, we said, consists in the problematic state of affairs in which content appears depending on how it is made up, set up, linked up, arranged, and posed therein. The form of content is here an agential arrangement. Dispositifs and assemblages are not exactly identical concepts, but they intersect exactly where they touch on the diagrammatic agency of spatial configurations and material arrangements.[410] Perhaps it is here that William Braham's notion of a 'diagrammatic analysis' could re-emerge in a fully productive fashion;[411] that is, provided we avoid reducing arrangements again in any typological sense of already existing architectures, but draw "the flow-charts of desiring subjects."[412] Here, I agree with Wallenstein's observation that Foucauldian analysis is nowhere near being

406 Wim Nijenhuis, *Riddle of the Real City: Or the Dark Knowledge of Urbanism* (Amsterdam: Duizend en Een, 2017), 35.

407 After Levi R. Bryant, *Onto-Cartography: An Ontology of Machines and Media* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2014), 9.

408 Brian Massumi, *Semblance and Event*, 103.

409 See Bernhard Siegert, *Cultural Techniques: Grids, Filters, Doors, and Other Articulations of the Real* (Oxford University Press, 2015).

410 This is why Deleuze repeatedly emphasized that "an assemblage of desire will include dispositifs of power …, but they must be situated between the different components of the assemblage." Deleuze, "Desire and Pleasure," 125 (my emphasis).

411 William Braham, "After Typology: The Suffering of Diagrams" (2000), Departmental Papers (Architecture) 24, avail. online http://repository.upenn.edu/arch_papers/24.

412 Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*, 91.

exhausted in its potential to challenge historiography. But his sketch for a genealogical research program focusing on how architecture "reflects the processes by which we are individualized and subjectified," I am afraid, still misses the true problem of genetic thinking.[413]

In starting over from relations of exteriority, the task would instead be to analyze architecture more directly, as Wallenstein suggests, as one of those convergent technologies that historically arranged the affective conditions through which specific socio-environmental spatializations came to be actualized. As this elaboration has demonstrated, it first involves a greater challenge to venture beyond what has been adopted in representationalistic readings of power structures, by leaving behind typologically-reductive readings of architectural apparatuses characterized by heterotopic spaces or environments of enclosure. An ethological approach to cellular architectural arrangements therefore attends much more to the composition of relations and capacities among different things that determine one another reciprocally.

Hence, to avoid any further sedimentation of the merely 'reflective' relations between signifier and signified, I now want to set up a more **DIFFRACTIVE** body of methods, as discussed by feminist scholars like Donna Haraway, Karan Barad, and Iris van der Tuin[414], which allows the heterogeneous history of this interference between architecture and subjectivation to appear. As a differential way of looking at what this interference could be, by way of asking "what happens when *x* meets y, and how does their encounter influence the way in which *y* impacts upon *z* to transform the relationship

413 See Wallenstein, "Genealogy of Modern Architecture," 404.

414 See Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," *Feminist studies* 14, no. 3 (1988), 575–99. Later Haraway specifies that "Diffraction patterns record the history of interaction, interference, reinforcement, difference. Diffraction is about heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike reflections, diffractions do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less distorted form, thereby giving rise to industries of metaphysics. Rather, diffraction can be a metaphor for another kind of critical consciousness at the end of this rather painful Christian millennium, one committed to making a difference and not to repeating the Sacred Image of the Same. … Diffraction is a narrative, graphic, psychological, spiritual, and political technology for making a consequential difference." Haraway, *Modest Witness: Feminism and Technoscience* (New York/London: Routledge, 1997), 273. See also Karen Barad, "Diffracting Diffraction: Cutting Together-Apart," *Parallax* 20, no. 3 (2014), 168–87 (the entire issue of *Parallax* 20, was recently re-published as *Diffracted Worlds—Diffractive Readings: Onto-Epistemologies and the Critical Humanities*, ed. Birgit Mara Kaiser and Kathrin Thiele (London/New York: Routledge, 2018); and Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning* (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2007), esp. 70–94 and 97–185; as well as Iris van der Tuin, "Deleuze and Diffraction," in *Posthuman Ecologies*, ed. Bignall and Braidotti, 19–40.

with *a* such that effects *b* and c might emerge?"[415], the next section will redirect our preliminary conclusion as to how (i.e. 'in which way' and 'by what means') architectural arrangements bring about new subjects in such chains.

415 Braidotti and Bignall, introduction to *Posthuman Ecologies*, 6; in reference to Deleuze, "The Method of Dramatization," 111.

0.3
Arrangements and the Machinic Ecologies of Architecture

In the last section, I marked out how the selective aspect of framing (= **INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION**) within any dispositif or arrangement puts the classic dichotomy (**EXCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION**) between structure and agency into question. To advance an understanding of material arrangements as enabling constraints, hence, differentiating elements within historical formations, the following section will establish a tactical alliance with a growing stream of so-called **NEW MATERIALIST** theories. The term 'new materialism' was coined independently from each other by both the philosophers Rosi Braidotti and Manuel DeLanda in the mid-1990s, and has recently gained greater currency among sociologists and social theorists who are reconsidering how material arrangements have a specific agency in constituting our existence.[416] Having come forth from Foucault and Deleuze's groundbreaking work, such new materialist theories today propose a radically more productive and deliberately post-anthropocentric understanding of material formations and transformation processes.

As matter-oriented methodologies, new materialist approaches do not constitute a 'theory' that 'explains' the world, social entities, or historical developments in the way historical materialism did. This older form of materialist thinking, as in its Marxist vein, claimed that the organization and development of societies is determined by the material conditions of a given mode of production and the social relations that it produces. Therein, it was long recognized as "a means to describe and explain contemporary social processes," but it also "inflected materialist analysis with a concern with 'structural' or 'macro-level' forces."[417] In their rebooted version, materialist approaches are not interested in positing such overarching superstructures or underlying mechanisms. What matters in materialism is matter itself. This does not mean that nothing exists but matter; materialism is not about matter itself but about things *that* matter, about understanding how things come to matter.[418]

416 See Diana Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics* (Durham: Duke UP, 2010); Iris van der Tuin and Rick Dolphijn, "The Transversality of New Materialism," *Women: A Cultural Review* 21, no. 2 (2010): 153–71; Iris van der Tuin and Rick Dolphijn, eds., *New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies* (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2012); Nick J. Fox and Pam Alldred, *Sociology and the New Materialism: Theory, Research, Action* (London: Sage, 2017); and Sarah Ellenzweig and John H. Zammito, eds., *The New Politics of Materialism: History, Philosophy, Science* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).

417 Fox and Alldred, *Sociology and New Materialism*, 5. This tendency to look at the material structures of the world harbors a particular political strength to expose hidden injuries. See Jane Bennett, "The Force of Things: Steps Towards an Ecology of Matter," *Political Theory* 32 (Jun 2004): 347–72; here 366–7. In this vein, many Marxist geographers as Harvey, Soja, or Thrift have rightly emphasized questions of social or 'spatial justice' in an increasingly divided globalizing world.

418 See Isabelle Stengers, "Diderot's Egg: Divorcing Materialism from Eliminativism,"

In this renewed ontological concern with how thing come to matter, these diverging approaches methodologically reconsider the agential status of materialization, arrangements, and spatializations in their concerted efforts of rethinking emergent phenomena in a decidedly posthuman (and ecofeminist) perspective. In so aligning with views of self-organization, "new materialism presses for the widest possible distribution of agency in its project of decentering the human," but thereby, it "invests in an ontology of vital matter in order to ensure new forms of *political* action and engagement."[419] In looking for new points for intervention, they thus attempt to rescue materiality from the linguistic turn, and its representational understanding of actual social structures.

Based on the previous discussion, I want to now consider some of those views, starting with the queer/feminist positions of Barad and Braidotti, which help radicalize Foucault's and Deleuze's groundbreaking work in their concerted efforts to rethink emergent phenomena as intensive formations of, and not simply in, a material milieu.[420] This yet-to-be-affirmed conception renders more clearly that structures are never simply representative settings for subjects, but constitutive setups for subject formations. As DeLanda rightly points out, Foucault focused foremost on those scientific discourses that are rather "directly tied to the power of certain organizations" (like criminology, psychiatry, and clinical medicine, rather than physics, chemistry, or biology).[421] Yet as Barad powerfully contends, all discursive practices are similarly dependent on specific material setups. By structuring an environment's 'possibility space' and 'state space,' these setups enable certain phenomena to come to matter (and other setups enable different ones).

Radical Philosophies Magazine (Jul/Aug 2007), 7–15.

419 Ellenzweig and Zammito, eds., Introduction to *New Politics of Materialism,* 3 and 9 (emph. added).

420 See Karen Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning* (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2007); and Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*.

421 Manuel DeLanda in conversation with Christopher Cox, "Possibility Spaces," in *Realism, Materialism, Art*, ed. Christoph Cox, Jenny Jaskey, and Suhail Malik (New York/Berlin: CCS Bard, Sternberg, 2015), 87–94; here 88–9

0.3.1 (Recon)figuriations Cutting Together/ Apart Material Milieus

The conception of apparatuses as enabling constraints can be greatly clarified through the oft-cited work of quantum physicist turned feminist/queer theorist Karen Barad, who has reworked the notion of the apparatus into an "agential realist" approach to physical experimentation. Barad's *Meeting the Universe Halfway* (2007) forcefully argues that experimental apparatuses are not passive observing instruments for the detection of natural phenomena (read: epistemological devices). Rather, they have an ontogenetic function as to how phenomena come to matter. As Barad reminds us with Ian Hacking, it is easy to forget that physical experimentation means first of all "to create, produce, refine and stabilize phenomena."[422] Through Foucault's productive conception of the apparatus, Barad understands experimental setups as materially working configurings, that—by means of **CUTTING TOGETHER/ APART** the physical world—come to matter in certain physical phenomena. This vision foregrounds that physical phenomena are not preexisting entities that interact with experimental setups, but that certain material arrangements produce certain phenomena to certain extents only as they emerge *with* them. Barad remarks that "if Foucault, in queering Marx, positions the body as the locus of productive forces, the site where the large-scale organization of power links up with local practices, then it would seem that any robust theory of the materialization of bodies would necessarily take account of how the body's materiality … and other material forces as well (including nonhuman ones) actively matter to the process of materialization."[423] This approach accounts for the materiality of setups within experimental apparatuses as an enabling constraint that creates the conditions for specific phenomena to actualize, that is, to come to matter.[424]

In these (as Barad terms it) "intra-active" processes, entities materialize in co-constitutive ways, and their ability to act emerges from within the material relation they enter into. An agential realist position thus never detaches phenomena from the reconfigurings of a material environment that brought them about as an event. In such a vision, there is no room for any (seemingly so innocent, but highly exclusive) container space 'in' which actions *take*

422 Ian Hacking, *Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983), 230. Cited after Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 144.

423 Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 64–5 [orig. italics removed].

424 See ibid., 129, 132–53, and 169–70.

place, in favor of problematizing the material reconfigurings 'through' which emergent bodies or phenomena *take form*. Countering Newtonian conceptions of space in which things interact and have agency before they encounter one another, Barad's notion of "intra-action" thus advances Foucault's notion of the apparatus (*dispositif*) and its underlying "principle of exteriority" through the quantum-theoretical insight that things or entities, as so-called relata, only materialize, or become actualized in co-constitutive ways.

Relata "emerge through and as part of their entangled intra-relatings," in which their boundaries are constantly (re)drawn within a field always already populated by productive forces and material bodies. Such **BOUNDARY-DRAWING PROCESSES** consist in **MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE PRACTICES**, by which we understand all ongoing reconfigurings of the world, including non-linguistic (and thus mind-independent) practices involving causal interventions in the world that, as Barad writes, come to matter in both new materialities and mutually articulated meanings.[425] This material-discursive view no longer distinguishes discursive and material practices as complementary yet separately identifiable entities, as architecture theorists like Stan Allen and recent approaches to materiality have done.[426] Instead, in reconsidering architecture as a fundamentally material-discursive practice reconfiguring the world, it appears as a primary candidate—as my introduction indicated—to be re-investigated regarding its articulation of boundary-drawing processes; its constitutive **CUTTING TOGETHER/APART** of the world into interlocking frames.

425 DeLanda, "Possibility Spaces," 91; and Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, ix. Similar to Foucault's archaeological approach, Barad's notion of 'material-discursive practices' argue that in order to exist, discourse must be materialized. Barad thus refuses to position the discursive 'in' a material world, by highlighting how materialities and discursivities are co-constituting each other mutually in practices constituted by both matter and meaning. In these practices things 'come to matter' as "matter and meaning are mutually articulated. Neither discursive practices nor material phenomena are ontologically or epistemologically prior. Neither can be explained in terms of the other. Neither has privileged status in determining the other." Barad, "Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of how Matter comes to Matter,' *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 28 (2003): 801–831; here 822. Donna Haraway had earlier called this the "material-semiotic"; a concept aiming "to portray the object of knowledge as an active, meaning-generating part of apparatus of bodily production. … Their boundaries materialize in social interaction. Boundaries are drawn by mapping practices; *objects do not preexist as such*. Objects are boundary projects. But boundaries shift from within; boundaries are very tricky. What boundaries provisionally contain remains generative, productive of meanings and bodies." Haraway, "Situated Knowledges," 588 and 595).

426 Stan Allen, *Practice: Architecture, Technique & Representation*, expanded second edition (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2009 [2000]) xiii–xv; see also the introduction to Lloyd Thomas, *Material Matters*.

Could we then not approach the emergence of architectural formations and their production of social realities and forms of subjectivity in an intra-active way? Going beyond Martina Löw's sociology of space, Heike Delitz, for example, provided a wider 'arrangement theory' (*Gefügetheory*) of built society that breaks ground in investigating architectural and urban arrangements as constitutive, rather than representative social structures, made to make specific differences.[427] In her dissertation she outlines how a city's figuration actualizes the specific visible and tangible "spatial organization or 'configuration,' in and by which it makes that particular society only effectually 'exist' in the first place," by fixing each of its specific segmentation and hierarchies. Against the conception of architecture as passively framing social realities or containing social relations, we have to reclaim a notion of how architectural apparatuses arranges our collective relationships. As I stated in the beginning, most materially engaged disciplines are aware that changes do not happen in an environment, but that it matters as a transformation of a material environment. Architectural arrangements, too, are constitutive material reconfigurings of the world that must not to be confused with the product they catalyze or give rise to. To account for this catalytic causation, architectural arrangement must be thought of not so much as a 'condition,' but a conditioned, yet further conditioning process enacted in the ongoing reconfigurings of an intensive material-discursive milieu. Having become configured into forms, these reconfigurings form becomings among three distinct yet interconnected social and techno-environmental and mental realities "through which modern subjectivity and our habits, habitats, and modes of inhabitation are co-constituted" in the relational ecologies of architecture.[428]

Regarding this co-constitutive dimension, we need to approach these reconfigurings of material environments (as material processes) in a way

427 Heike Delitz, "Architektur als Medium des Sozialen," manuscript (2010), avail. online at http://www.heike-delitz.de/Architektur_als_Medium_2010.pdf; see also id., *Gebaute Gesellschaft: Architektur als Medium des Sozialen* (Frankfurt M./New York: Campus 2010). See also her "Architectural Modes of Collective Existence: Architectural Sociology as a Comparative Social Theory," *Cultural Sociology* 12, no.1 (2018), 37–57. Cf. Martina Löw, *The Sociology of Space: Materiality, Social Structures, and Action*, trans. Donald Goodwin (New York: Springer, 2016).

428 Peg Rawes, ed., introduction to *Relational Architectural Ecologies*, 1–17; in reference to Guattari, *The Three Ecologies*, trans. I. Pindar and P. Sutton (London: Athlone Press [1989] 2000), esp. 27–69. See also Erich Hörl with James Burton, eds., introduction to *General Ecology: The New Ecological Paradigm* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017); and Radman, *Ecologies of Architecture* [forthcoming].

that avoids reducing them to a mere phenomenology of configurations or 'constellations' (as symbolic forms). In the latter case, we would again be succumbing to a representational mode of thinking that in its **PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM** prevents understanding how things come to matter.[429] A fundamentally non-representational and antireductivist stance challenges the assumed "ontological distinction between representations and that which they purport to represent," like Barad's diffractive critique of representationalism, which posits in its problematic presupposition that representations could be "independent of all practices of representing."[430]

Here we are referred back to Bruno Latour's abovementioned injunction to consciously avoid confusing what one should explain (processes) with an explanation (products such as, for instance, 'types'), but instead to problematize the historical formation of such constructed entities.[431] More than Latour's constructivist notion of things, an agential-realist view of causation helps explore how certain social or psychological phenomena are generated, produced, refined, and stabilized by means of specific experimental reconfigurings of the world. In Deleuze, 'specification' means the determination of 'species' by means of relating difference to difference only, a synthesis of difference.[432] Barad's intra-active view—relating difference to difference only,

429 Note that this is not an 'anti'-phenomenological stance, but a more careful approach (elaborated below) that takes a critical distance from those highly reductive phenomenological approaches within architecture history and theory, that I have difficulties stomaching in its neo-humanistic and anthropocentric framework, in which the postmodern concern with defensive architectures resurfaces in a context of technological and ecological risks. I follow Braidotti's preference for an *analytically posthumanist*, and *methodologically post-anthropocentric* approach (and not a normatively neo-humanist one, "that brings back all the neo-Kantian stuff") to understanding socio/techno/ecological phenomena of individuation so as to creatively intervene in ongoing transformation processes. See Braidotti, "Posthuman, All too Human," Durham Castle Lecture Series, Durham Univ., Jan 25, 2017. Video recording avail. online at https://youtu.be/gNJPR78DptA; here at 0:37:25–38:11).

430 Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, 46. See also id., "Posthumanist Performativity," 803–5. For the anti-reductionist mantra "Do Not Reduce," see also Van der Tuin, "Deleuze and Diffraction," 30–35, who reminds us that this critique was, as in Haraway, introduced in a discussion about the presuppositions of representation pointed out by Trinh T. Minh-ha. This anti-reductionism consists in not reducing emergent phenomena within symptomatological practices, in critical terms of etiology of bodies that detects, cures, and prescribes therapies for pathological developments, but in clinical terms of an ethology of forces that opens toward a radical call for experimentation to arrive at new ways of comprehension what material arrangement can do, and thus foster transformative and empowering practices. Cf. the similar efforts in post-Deleuzian studies in geography that have followed Nigel Thrift's call for a *Non-Representational Theory* (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2008).

431 I refer to my citation, above in note 39 of Latour, *Re-Assembling the Social*, 130–1; here also DeLanda, *New Philosophy of Society*, 8–10.

432 See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 31; and Hughes, *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, 41.

not subjects and objects, bodies and things—helps avoid reintroducing any dichotomist relation between structure and agency (and its ethically-outdated privileging of human action and intentionality). Instead, the mutual supposition of structure and agency is recognized as the two sides of inseparable, but ontologically distinct modalities (virtual or actual) of a reciprocally determined body. One historico-theoretical challenge is to never reduce the productive dimension of architectural arrangements within various becomings, whose "power (to)" is laid out in the material state-of-affairs through which they take form, to a historically-produced, but static or isolated form (or individual subject). Since these differential force fields never represent an existing reality, but produce a real-yet-to-come, we must avoid reducing the virtual potential of material milieus (e.g., seeing spatial structures as mere conditions of possibility) to its actual products (like real agents). Understanding the virtually real dimension of this 'existential production' allows us to map historical formations involving architectural arrangements more machinically and analyze and relate individuation and subjectivation processes in a radically irreducible fashion.

To help foster such an machinic approach to the built environment, we might consult the post-human philosophy of Rosi Braidotti, one of the early proponents of a new-materialist approach. In powerfully continuing Deleuze's philosophy of difference from a feminist angle, her work urges us to avoid perpetuating dualistic modes of thinking and oppositional otherness. Her feminist-materialist agenda to make difference "operative at last" calls for new "navigational tools" to critically analyze and creatively intervene in the present.[433] Braidotti identifies a need to "learn to think differently about ourselves and our systems of values, calling to make adequate cartographies of our embedded and embodied positions."[434] She understands **CARTOGRAPHIES** as "embedded and embodied genealogical accounts of [the present, and] our own respective theoretical practices" that, in making them, provides "both exegetical tools and creative theoretical alternatives."[435] To provide "a politically grounded and theoretically infused account of the webs of power relations we are all entangled in" and thus structure our present, in both its real lines of division and its possible forms of collectivity, her work

433 Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects* 118; 146–67, here 144. Her nomadic ontology attempts to overcome the dualistic structure intrinsic in a phallogocentric view of sexual relations and "oppositional otherness" in male paradigms, due to which difference is misrepresented from the beginning as a "difference from" that often entails "being less than" (166).

434 Braidotti, *Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), 31.

435 Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*, 32, and 2.

thus "combines Foucauldian genealogies with [a] feminist politics of location."[436] Thereby, she thoroughly re-conceptualizes historical formations, subject formations, and social, technical and environmental formations alike as "embodied, embedded, relational and affective" figurations: "by figuration I mean a politically informed map that outlines our own situated perspective. A figuration renders our image in terms of a decentered and multi-layered vision of the subject as a dynamic and changing entity."[437] In this situated approach, (different) figurations are not 'figurative' ways of thinking, but existential conditions that translate into a (differential) style of thinking; an alternative scheme of representation about limits and thresholds of sustainability.[438]

Braidotti is very aware that the attempt to think subject formations this way amounts to nothing less than an ethical project—in fact, an 'ethico-aesthetic' one, as we could say with Guattari. This transformative project is also waiting to be picked up by fields like architecture theory, in the task of helping us to arrive at a "non-unitary" and "positive vision of the subject as a radically immanent intensive body, that is, an assemblage of forces, or flows, intensities and passions that solidify in space and consolidate in time within … singular configuration[s]."[439] Similar to Barad's intra-active view, a purely positive vision of bodies as intensive formations calls for a thorough critique of all sorts of (in fact, highly political) metaphysical conceptions through which subjects and objects only exist, rest, and move against some spatial, temporal background, or on different levels of reality. Here, Braidotti argues, a MONIST position as updated by Deleuze could promote—by virtue of its radically immanent view—a much more democratic and "ontologically pacifist" position for thinking a post-anthropocentric world,[440]

436 Braidotti, "Posthuman Critical Theory," in *Critical Posthumanism and Planetary Futures*, ed. Debashish Banerji and Makarand R. Paranjape (New Delhi: Springer India, 2016), 13–32; here 15. Here, I refer also to the entanglements that anthropologists and social studies of science, have recently stresses. Besides Latour's well-known actor-network-approach, I am also thinking of Povinelli's "embaginations" or Corsín Jimenéz's "Spiderwebs, where environments trap people and where people trap environments." See Elizabeth A. Povinelli, "Routes/Worlds," *e-flux journal* 27 (Sep 2011), n.p. [online]; and Alberto Corsín Jimenéz, "Spiderweb Anthropologies: Ecologies, Infrastructures, Entanglements," in *World of Many Worlds*, ed. Marisol De la Cadena and Mario Blaser (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2018), 53–82.

437 See Braidotti, "The Matter of the Posthuman," *Springerin* 1 (2016), n.p. (online); and id., *Metamorphoses*, 2.

438 See Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*, 1; *Transpositions*, 9 and 20; and *Metamorphoses*, 2.

439 Braidotti, "Affirmation versus Vulnerability: On Contemporary Ethical Debates," in *Gilles Deleuze: The Intensive Reduction*, ed. Constantin V. Boundas (London: Continuum, 2009), 143–60; here 144–46.

440 See Braidotti, *The Posthuman* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 86. With this intensive vision of bodies, Braidotti places herself in a line of immanence running from Spinoza through

because it is expressed in multiple and different, partly contradictory ways.[441]

As a deliberately flattened ontology, **MONISM** articulates "first and foremost the refusal to treat one stratum of reality as the really real over and against all others."[442] Thereby it challenges the longstanding logic developed from Aristotelian through scholastic and Cartesian notions, to early and modern evolutionary biology, of ordering being into a hierarchical chain of being according to vertical ranks of degrees of perfection or complexity. Yet, as Gökhan Kodalak notes, "hierarchical ontology begets hierachical ethics."[443] Spinoza's *Ethics*, with its ethological conception of bodies as composed of differential speeds and slownesses, foregrounding the world's radical plane of immanence, promoted instead a more **HETERARCHICAL** ontology. As Kodalak poignantly notes in distinguishing these two conceptions, the latter is much better suited to approach the reciprocal becomings of heterogeneous ensembles and the mutual becoming-different (= **HETEROGENESES**) effectuated by such assemblages, which include, as we shall see, not just ecologies, but also socially-constructed systems, as well as technological ones.[444] By systematically drawing humans, things, and environmental formations radically onto one plane, new materialism similarly approaches social formations from the

Nietzsche and her teachers Foucault and Deleuze. Pierre Macherey helpfully elucidates that, from Spinozist perspective, a [con]figuration "is neither an idea nor a thing but a limit"; understanding [con]figurations "is not at all to perceive a thing, such as it is, but it is to conceive it as determined, that is, insofar as it is limited by another thing; the figure expresses nothing other than this reciprocal limitation, which exists between finite and determinate bodies …. To perceive a figure is to conceive a thing insofar as it is limited by another." Macherey, *Hegel or Spinoza*, 113–213; here 128. Macherey takes this distinction from Baruch Spinoza's Letter 50 to Jelles, in *Spinoza: Complete Works*, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002), in his critical discussion of Hegel's dialectical generalization of the here presented famous proposition that *determinatio negatio est*. Concerning this limited conception of figures, Macherey stresses that, "insofar as it depends on such [an external] determination, does not represent the positive existence of a being" (ibid.). Here the genetic challenge is to arrive at a more adequate conception of these part-to-part relations by understand them causally, that is, as results of always mutually-constitutive configurations within heterogeneous material milieus that taken form in "embodied, embedded, relational and affective" figurations that reciprocally determined another by intensive differences that manifest in specific boundary-drawing practices. The finite cannot be explained through itself (ibid, 138.). Nor can it be explained by negative differences (= exclusive disjunctions). It can only be approximated differentially (= inclusive disjunctions).

441 John Ó Maoilearca, "Making Non- Standard Thoughts," in *Realism, Materialism, Art*, ed. Cox, Jaskey, and Malik, 137.

442 Bryant, comment on "Flat Ontology," *larval subjects* blog, posted on Feb 24, 2010, at https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/02/24/flat-ontology-2.

443 Gökhan Kodalak, "From Architecture Lifeless to Achitecture Alive," in *Architectures of Life and Death*, ed. Andrej Radman and Stavros Kousoulas (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021), 39–62.

444 Ibid. Concerning this *becoming together-with* the terms 'sympoiesis' and 'epiphylogenesis,' at the remmainder of these preliminaries, will come in handy.

same level of reality, so as to trace the immanent dynamic spatial practices that form figurations in a "fragile synchronization of forces" through which lines of demarcation actualize "the borders that are the thresholds of encounter and connection" between these different forces.[445] In this view, "more than its taking-form," the body as a figuration "is an ecology of processes … always in co-constellation with the environmentality of which it is part. A body is a node of relational process, not a form per se."[446] Like Foucault's systematic materialization of history, this methodological stance does not constitute a 'theory' that 'explains' historical developments through material conditions (or superstructures) in the way historical materialism did, but approaches and explores more immanently how humans are drawn into assemblages with specific material environments. Therein, a flattened ontology accounts for the externality of relations based on Spinoza's ethological conception of *ratio* (*Verhältnis*) as the causal state of affairs (*Verhältnisse*) for finite individual things to come to exist.

As I want to argue, new materialist thinking offers an excellent basis for a post-anthropocentric analytic framework to study the built environment in terms of its relational ecologies[447] and to embark on an ethological understanding of what it is that architecture does. Resonating with both Barad's intra-active reading of experimental apparatuses and Braidotti's intensive vision of composed bodies, a third position is presented by Levi R. Bryant. Hecalls attention to our embeddedness in a material world, which he conceptualizes as an "ecology of machines" of interacting and co-dependent not-only-human and always-more-than-human assemblages.[448] This expanded understanding of matter includes not only interlaced assemblages of human/nonhuman-continuum, but it also materially and technologically mediated entities in media-nature-culture milieus, in which transformative agency is not restricted to *bios* only, but also granted to zoë-/geo-/techno-entities.[449] And thus also to architecture and the (built) environment.

In complementing DeLanda's well-known assemblage-theoretic work that I expand on below, Bryant's work proposes a radically more machinic

445 Braidotti, *Nomadic Theory: The Portable Rosi Braidotti* (New York: Columbia UP, 2011), 311; citing Genevieve Lloyd, *Part of Nature* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1994), 23.

446 Erin Manning, *Always More Than One: Individuations Dance* (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2013), 19.

447 See Rawes, ed.,, *Relational Architectural Ecologies*; and Radman, *Ecologies of Architecture* (forthcoming).

448 Bryant, *Onto-Cartography*, passim.

449 See also Braidotti, "Human, All Too Human, Part 2: Aspirations of a Posthumanist," video recording of the Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Mar 2, 2017, avail. online at https://youtu.be/LNIYOKfRQks, 00:10:23–12:07.

conception of any individual entity, object, thing, body, as "beings that function," perform, or operate in and on the world, and that have power and efficacy of their own. This conception of functions moreover maintains the idea of reciprocal determination by conceiving them as determined only in interaction with those other machines they operate together with.[450] This twofold conception goes beyond a Latourian notion of things as composite and networked assemblages, by situating the machinic component not within the composition of the entities themselves but in the interactions (or intra-actions, to use Barad's term) of structural couplings.[451] It is from this angle that machines are "transformation engines: they transmit and produce—they create consistency (assemblages)" in establishing outward-bound relations with a number of external forces.[452]

In aiming to understand "how particular worlds came to be," Bryant's *Onto-Cartography* (2014) calls for an investigation of how certain machines (that we may not yet recognize) play a role in organizing the present.[453] Such a machinic reading differs substantially from earlier readings like Mumford's, whose *Technics and Civilization* famously understood the city as a machine; or more accurately as part of a technological complex operating through "chains of command, deliberate planning, and accounting procedures").[454] While Mumford thus explicitly connected city-machines to industrialization (as an era), a radicalized machinic reading would start from the notion that buildings, settlements and cities have always worked as machines since their earliest inception. But in this renewed conception, architecture does not remain a Corbusian *machine à habiter* in service to human agents and human living; it requires that we generalize this notion into a machinic conception of the built environment. As architectural theorist Andrew Ballantyne highlights, it may be self-evident that "buildings are always machines," but more accu-

450 See Bryant, *Onto-Cartography*, 15. In his Simondonian inspiration ("Machines are beings that operate"), Bryant refutes the mechanistic, deterministic understanding of machines, and contests the conception that (a) machines were rigid (critique of essentialist, mechanistic thinking); (b) machines were designed, arguing that they are rather generated by other machinic setup (critique of hylomorphic thinking); and (c) machines were having a purpose (critique of functionalism), arguing that they happen to "take on a [function] when structurally coupled to other machines" (ibid., 15–25).

451 In attending to such couplings, I will try to directly take into account the observation by feminist scholars who have noted that a conceptual focus on couples tends to overlook the characteristic differences between the components of an assemblage, and the ways in which those capacities are individuated differently (Deutscher, *Foucault's Futures,* 82).

452 Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*, 251.

453 Bryant, *Onto-Cartography*, 263.

454 See Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 2010 [orig. 1934]), citation here after Bruno Latour, "On Technical Meditation: Philosophy, Sociology, Genealogy," in *Common Knowledge* 3, no. 2 (1994), 29–64.

rately perhaps, they are component "parts of machines … that produce within and around them the conditions in which life can flourish."[455] But he notes that such an "idea of the building as part of a machinic assemblage … leads one to want to understand it in terms of what it produces" in different terms than if it were a product with effects.[456]

Long before (and maybe more radical than) Bryant's onto-cartographic approach to an ecology of machines, Guattari had called for a radical ecological expansion of the notion of the machine, which not only provides an explicit evolutionary account of machines as inhabited by diachronically evolving diagrams and plans, but also as synchronous "processes of selection, elimination, and generation, of machines by machines, which never cease producing new … possibilities" that enable these machines to operate and to change in the long run.[457] In this regard, it is important not immediately to isolate the machine as an instrumental device (e.g. Kleinherenbrink's slogan that "everything is a machine"); thus even an"ecology of machines'" (in Bryant's reading) misses the point, as it misses the machinic itself as an immanent form of co-constitutive causality, and the lineages of technically-mediated (co-)evolutions: the machinic workings of ecology as a 'machinic ecology' (which is a tautology, of course). As a particularly evident machinic ecology, the built environment plays a crucial "catalytic role in how social assemblages come to be organized and what entities belong to those social assemblages."[458] In it, one large aspect is how the differing relationalities produced weave specific social fabrics in which distributions and spatializations, territorializations and segmentarities actualize and catalyze changes in specific world-structuring processes that matter in irreducible entanglements.

Part of the irreducibility advocated by these and other new-materialist positions thus concerns the close and co-constitutive relation of social realities and material environments, as such a flattened ontology also challenges the longstanding dichotomy between nature and culture. There are two major consequences of such a flattened understanding of our relation to material environments, which the rest of this chapter will detail, to resolve

455 See Andrew Ballantyne, "Deleuze, Architecture and Social Fabrication," in *Deleuze and Architecture*, ed. Frichot and Loo, 182–96; here 182–87.

456 Ibid.

457 See Guattari, *Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972–1977*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. David L. Sweet, Jarred Becker, and Taylor Adkins (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), 18. In my view, in not referring to Guattari single-authored work, Bryant misses a great opportunity to develop his approach.

458 Bryant, *Onto-Cartography*, 269.

two central points of misunderstanding, namely concerning relations as such, and the precise degree of 'flatness' of this flat ontology. These two consequences namely concern a combined and generalized 'ecologization' and 'technicization' of material environments. Let us start with this ecologization, by observing that ecology (if not confused with an outdated notion of 'nature' as a background or outside for 'culture') is in no way opposed to 'technics,' to which I return later. The technicized (i.e. built) environment is simply a specifically anthropogenic (if wildly more-than-human) ecology. We hence ought to side with those posthuman and new-materialist positions promoting what Erich Hörl recently called a "denaturalized and technologized—and thereby deterritorialized and generalized—concept of ecology, which is critical of all anthropocentricism."[459] From a post-anthropocentric stance, this generalized concept of ecology emphasizes multiply differentiated and co-dependent relationships among co-existing life-worlds and existential territories.

Machinic Ecologies, Arrangements, and Milieus

To calling something ecological, political theorist Jane Bennett reminds us, "is to draw attention to its necessary implication in a network of relations, to mark its persistent tendency to enter into a working system."[460] In this sense, 'ecologic' and 'machinic' come conceptually close. New materialism thus calls for a fundamental ecologization of theory and thinking in general, a general ecology that—as a fundamentally posthuman ecology that includes queer assemblages of politics, desire, and sex—rigorously situates relational thinking not just in some sort of space, but embeds it in particular material and therefore affective environments.[461] We must go beyond excavating (= ARCHAEOLOGY) the most imbricated forms of dualistic, non-relational images of thought, but rework and transform them, we could say with Jasbir Puar, through "even queerer modalities of thought, analysis, creativity, and expression" in establishing transversal alliances.[462] This transversal understanding of intersecting spatial systems implies a thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the built environment, which—far from being reducible to an extensive space that contains relations—ought to be understood

459 Hörl and Burton, eds., introduction to *General Ecology*, 3.

460 Jane Bennett, "The Force of Things," 365.

461 See Hörl, *General Ecology*. Here I also refer to the publications of Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson, *Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire* (Bloomington/Indeanapolis: Indiana UP, 2010); Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*; and Bignall and Braidotti, eds., *Posthuman Ecologies.*

462 Puar, *Terrorist Assemblages*, 204–5.

as a highly relational and reciprocal material milieu, made up of intensive differences and differential relations.

The French term **MILIEU** means both middle and surrounding, thus undermining any facile inside/outside distinction that is grounded in a subject/object divide. In its environmental connotation, the notion moreover challenges deeply any notion of context or contextualism, which incorrectly grounds architectural formations in historical, cultural, expressive, or discursive contexts, yet never within the material conditions that it transforms. In thinking *par le milieu*, (i.e. starting from the middle and the environment) structure, stasis, form and agency, flows and (trans) formations are absolutely inseparable.[463] Humans have no different agentic status here regarding how they produce the world. In line with a Bergsonian-Simondonian view of individuation, such an approach would first no longer separate or isolate entities or formations 'in' an environment 'from' that environment. Simondon critically contests a passive understanding of 'adaptation,' as an adaptation to an environment, which lacks the specific agency that characterizes ontogenesis.[464] For Simondon, entities are not forms in milieus, but compositions of milieus. This is why he identifies the need to not start from already constituted individuals, but from the individuation that consists in a twofold process involving both an adapting *to* as well as an adapting *of* a milieu.[465] Due to this mutual

463 See Stengers, "Introductory Notes on an Ecology of Practices," in *Cosmopolitics* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota, 2010), 183–96, here 187: "An ecology of practices may be an instance of what Gilles Deleuze called 'thinking *par le milieu*,' using the French double meaning of milieu, both the middle and the surroundings or habitat. 'Through the middle' would mean without grounding definitions or an ideal horizon. 'With the surroundings' would mean that no theory gives you the power to disentangle something from its particular surroundings, that is, to go beyond the particular toward something we would be able to recognize and grasp in spite of particular appearances. Here it becomes clear why ecology must always be etho-ecology, why there can be no relevant ecology without a correlate ethology, and why there is no ethology independent of a particular ecology" (ibid.).

464 "Adaptation is a correlative to individuation; it is only possible through individuation. The entire biology of adaptation … implicitly presupposes the already individuated living being as given. The processes of development are set aside: it is a biology without ontogenesis." (Deleuze, *Review of Simondon*, 45). See also Simondon *L'individu*, 209.

465 For this point, see Simondon, *L'Individuation psychique et collective*, 24; and "The Position of the Problem of Ontogenesis," trans. Gregory Flanders, *Parrhesia* 7 (2009), 4–16, here 10. See also Jean-Hughes Barthélémy, "Fifty Key Terms in the work of Gilbert Simondon," in *Simondon: Being and Technology*, ed. De Boever, et all (Edinburgh: EUP, 2012), 207. Barthélémy has here helpfully highlighted that this twofold process, for Simondon, actually involves and links *three* different regimes of individuation, that must be properly distinguished according to three types (or scales) of "'non-life' that condition life as evolution," corresponding to three layers: (1) cultural artefacts, making possiblea *psycho-social* life; (2) cell death [and differentiation], corresponding to the material conditions of a merely *bio-social* vitality; (3) and chemistry, corresponding to *bio-chemical* origin of vital processes (Barthélémy, "'Du Mort Qui Saisit Le Vif': Simondonian Ontology Today," trans. Justin Clemens, *Parrhesia* 7 (2009), 28–35; here 31; see also id., *Penser la connaissance*

recomposition, milieus are never 'given,' nor can they be 'isolated' from the genesis of individual forms they condition, but ought to be understood as an **ASSOCIATED MILIEU** produced by this genesis. The latter presents the material condition for ongoing mutual becomings and reciprocally-determined transformations through those **TRANSDUCTIVE**[466] processes in which individuation achieves auto-affective regularizations between the reciprocal determination and organization of structure and their operation.

Becoming must thus be coupled to topology and *t*opological modifications of material milieus that—as active de- and re-structurings or reconfigurings of existential territories by means of establishing certain relations—are connected to processes of *selective* niche construction by which developmental niches for evolution are co-constitutively formed.[467] In looking at such

et la technique après Simondon (Paris: Harmattan, 2005); and *Life and Technology: An Inquiry Into and Beyond Simondon*, trans. Barnaby Norman (Lüneburg: Meson Press, 2015). Respectively, the first dimension of individuation concerns their formation from a 'pre-individual reality' composed of bio-chemical matters, from which individual forms form, and which is anterior and exterior to the individual. But to the extent that individuation concerns such bio-social individuals that are only given in their perpetual adaptation to and of their milieus, it also entails what Simondon calls a 'transindividual' dimension. This dimension is equally anterior and exterior to the individual, but ought not be confused with the first, because this aspect of individuation carries out (and carries on) 'transductive series' by means of those entities that constitute our *psycho-social* reality. These three intercalated regimes of individuation: the pre-individual, individual, transindividual; and the formation of bio-chemical, bio-social, and psycho-social entities that characterize them, thus come close to Guattari's *Three Ecologies* of the 'environmental,' the 'social,' and the 'mental' registers, as much as Deleuze's tripartite scheme of 'memory,' 'habit,' and 'thought' above, and to which I will return, further below, when discussing Bernard Stiegler's distinction of the 'genetic,' 'epigenetic,' 'epiphylogenetic' dimension of technics.

466 On the notion of transduction, see Simondon, *Mode of Existence*, 155–6, and *L'Individuation psychique et collective*, esp. 24–33, and 55–65. An interesting thematic study of the transductive dimension of materializing technologies was provided by Adrian Mackenzie, *Transductions: Bodies and Machines at Speed* (London/New York, Continuum, 2002).

467 The theory of niche construction, and its relation to the relational ecologies of architecture, is recently foregrounded by Andrej Radman, for instance, who summarizes: "The theory of niche-construction proposes that an organism does not passively submit to the pressures of a preexisting environment, but that it actively constructs its niche (genetically, epigenetically, behaviorally and symbolically)," which calls for a complete reversal of common views of 'adaptation.' Radman, "Architecture's Awaking from Correlationist Slumber: On Transdisciplinarity and Disciplinary Specificity," *Footprint* 10–11 (Spring 2012): 129–42; here 133; and id., *Gibsonism: Ecologies of Architecture*, PhD diss., TU Delft (2012), 51–52, 196–8. For the evolutionary importance of niche-construction as a specific inheritance system, see esp. John Odling-Smee, "Niche Inheritance: A Possible Basis for Classifying Multiple Inheritance Systems in Evolution," *Biological Theory* 2, no. 3 (2007),276–89. In the above-mentioned distinction between selective and developmental niche construction, I refer to Karola Stotz, "Why Developmental Niche Construction is not Selective Niche Construction: And Why it Matters," *Interface Focus* 7 (2017), n.p. (online)): "Just like the construction of the selective niche, the developmental niche plays an important role in evolution: the environment not just *selects for*, it also constructs new heritable variation." In these often neglected reciprocal processes lifeforms actively influence evolutionary dynamics by modifying not only directly selection pressures by shaping specific habitats, but also by more indirectly constructing new developmental systems for adaptive variations to become

auto-affective processes, ethology is not so much concerned with the behavior or development 'in' a niche (=social practices), but those behaviors and developments 'of' niche production that are co-produced by it (=material-discursive practices). As Kodalak points out, in such process one finds a co-compositional activity that "couples nonarbitrary arrangements with developmental openness."[468] From this perspective, one can no longer segregate the ontological status of any such becoming from the intra-active reconfigurings of the material milieus in which these becomings take form by transforming it in turn. Historical formations are never given outside of these differential processes that their geneses generate within a milieu. The formation of individual entities thus never takes place 'against' a given environment or container space; individuation takes form in and is given generative reconfigurings resulting in specific arrangements. Rather than a void, space should be understood as a Leibnitzian "plenum" full of material potentials, as Peg Rawes suggests, "from which architectural practice, relations and products can be understood, not as expressions of the idealist division between matter and form, or subject and other, but through a series of material and spatio-temporal relations that are irreducible yet particular – embodiments, generated from an 'internal' form of geometry."[469] Such a reciprocal conception of material arrangements challenges us then to rethink "intensive" figurations irreducibly through this co-constitutive history of material transformation, to arrive at a new reasoning about architectural formations.

It is precisely from this immanent angle that the Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of 'arrangement' remains a relatively unmined field in the ethological study of mutually-constitutive historical formations in the built environment. While I cannot (nor wish to) provide any easy 'answer' in the form of a generalizable method or theory, I do have a hunch that a renewed processual and materially-embedded notion of arrangements—in its tangible emphasis on co-constitutive formation processes, not formed products (and thus in a fundamentally non-typological sense)—could help architectural theory in advancing a more generalized ecosystemic understanding of the built environment. What would that be, an architectural arrangement? By arrangement we understand certainly a resulting form, but foremost the specific process that expresses forces giving form to this resulting architecture as a spatialized product. So, first it must be distinguished from a layout or plan, which is con-

selectively inherited by means of extra-genetic factors.

468 Kodalak, "Affective Aesthetics," 419.

469 Rawes, "Plenums: Re-Thinking Matter, Geometry and Subjectivity," in *Material Matters*, ed. Lloyd Thomas, 56–66.

sidered an expression of an idea or intention. The relation of architectural arrangements and plans, material forces and intensions is only a conceptual one. Because intentionality is only actualized with a subject(ivity) forming alongside an object(ive) taking form, the plan cannot be reduced to any architect's intentionality, but must be referred back to an impersonal architectural problem, a problematic field, a tension, that produced both at once. The arranged and its layout as a resolution of this problematic field is not the arrangement in itself.

Arrangement—understood as agencement—is never an arrangement of something, it depends neither on objects nor subjects acting it out. In Deleuze, assemblages are immanent co-dependent forms defined by their internal consistency.[470] This consistency is not just a logical consistency. Consistency is the very logic defining arrangements. It is the formal logic inherent in arrangement. Moreover, this formal logic does not concern a consistency holding together preexisting things and forms; it is a logic of how certain things form through co-constitutive and reciprocally-determinant intra-actions. When spatializations are understood as part of this complex state of things from which forms and bodies as well as their differing capacities to act, to affect and be affected are effectuated, a reductive understanding of layouts (as plans) can be circumvented by avoiding to ascribe any intentionality to these formal resolutions, by reading them merely as the expression and local resolution to problematic fields, to historical problems. As such they are identified as a genetic element. Architectural arrangements can therefore never be read reductively as representative expressions of historical subjects,

470 "The problem of consistency concerns the manner in which the components of a territorial assemblage hold together. But it also concerns the manner in which different assemblages hold together. … If we ask the general question, 'What holds things together?,' the clearest, easiest answer seems to be provided by a[n] … arborescent model. … It seems more important to us to underline a certain number of factors liable to suggest an entirely different schema. … [I]n considering the system as a whole we should speak less of … a higher center than of coordination between centers, and of the cellular groupings or molecular populations that perform these couplings: … This represents a whole behavioral-biological 'machinics,' a whole molecular engineering that should help increase our understanding of the nature of problems of consistency. The philosopher Eugene Dupreel proposed a theory of consolidation; he demonstrated that life went not from a center to an exteriority but from an exterior to an interior, or rather from a discrete or fuzzy aggregate to its consolidation. This implies three things. First, that there is no beginning from which a linear sequence would derive, but rather densifications, intensifications, … intercalary events. … Second, and this is not a contradiction, there must be an arrangement of intervals, a distribution of inequalities, such that it is sometimes necessary to make a hole in order to consolidate. Third, there is a superposition of disparate rhythms, an articulation from within of an interrhythmicity. … Consistency is the same as consolidation, it is the act that produces consolidated aggregates, of succession as well as of coexistence." Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 327–29.

such as social groups, classes or power structures, but must be accounted for genealogically: in contrast to reductive typological reasoning, the differentiations that can be identified within architectural arrangements must be made morphogenetic elements expressing and catalyzing the ongoing differenciations of these changing historical formations. In this way it would be akin to an "assemblage theory" (such as heralded by Manuel DeLanda and his efforts to synthesize from Deleuze and Guattari's writings a non-reductionist paradigm for the study of socio/bio/geo/techno-material formations[471]), while hopefully becoming more specific in moving beyond representationalistic conceptions of architectural arrangements *as* apparatuses/assemblages, but accounting for their function as enabling constraints through which socio/bio/geo/techno-material formations take form in particular assemblages.

In this ontology of becoming, the constitutive dimension "through which" implies neither a hasty determinism nor a timid catalysis. As John Protevi argues, it implies instead that we eventually move beyond the ethically too facile view of autopoietic thinking about self-generative processes.[472] In this regard, I adopt a **SYMPOIETIC** view, the one recently propagated by biologist turned feminist philosopher Donna Haraway, who forcefully highlights that what is going on in speciation is not autopoiesis—as a making of an emergent self—but sympoiesis—a 'making with,' in which "nothing makes itself."[473] Rather, producing one thing requires initially having at least two entities that enter into a mutualistic becoming. This "'becoming with' is the name of the game" within which "sympoiesis is the mode of systemic relationality" through which all sorts of systems evolve by way of synergistically-coupled processes.[474] In extending Deleuze's differential

471 See DeLanda, *New Philosophy of Society*; and id., *Assemblage Theory*. A second alternative was developed with Bruno Latour's Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), which I will not discuss here. For a critical reading, how both these two extensions of Deleuze and Guattari "drifted a long way from its origins," see Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory and Schizoanalysis"/"Assemblage Theory and its Discontents."

472 As developed by biologists Maturana and Varela in the 1970s, "autopoietic theory distinguishes between the (virtual) organization and the (actual) structure of organisms. Organization is the set of all possible relationships of the autopoietic processes of an organism.… Structure is that selection from the organizational set that is actually at work at any one moment. … The difficulty here is that the assumption of organization as a fixed transcendental identity horizon prevents us from thinking life as the virtual conditions for creative novelty or diachronic emergence. … Autopoiesis is locked into a framework which posits an identity horizon (organizational conservation) for (structural) change. Protevi, "Deleuze, Guattari, and Emergence," *Paragraph* 29, no. 2 (2006), 31.

473 Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2016), 58.

474 Haraway, "Making Oddkin in the Chtulucene," Lecture (2016) Anthropocene Consortium Series, Evergreen State College, Washington; avail. online at https://youtu.be/fWQ2JYF-

notion of emergence through reciprocal determination, this sympoietic view is informed by Lynn Margulis's reminder that emergent formations such as speciation processes present a convergent system in which different strains, each with their own characteristics and capacities, come together and thus also 'become-together-with' and 'through-one-another' in what are effectively intra-active relatings.

These continuously bring about novel forms that change with and in response to one another in co-constitutive and co-adaptive processes of **SYMBIOGENESIS**, as the fundamental condition for speciation itself. Through symbioses forms become different together in symbiogenetic deterritorializations.[475] Therein becomings are not 'comings-about' or evolutions of existing, separate, or self-producing things, but the formation of entirely new assemblages, created by mutually and reciprocally determined 'collectively-producing systems.' A history that traces any becomings in terms of such collectively-producing systems thus requires looking at both these convergent couplings and their lines of differenciation (as singlesidedly foregrounded in phylogenetic representations). In a world of entangled processes of becoming-with, there are only inclusive disjunctions of degrees of "belonging-together."[476] In it, a sympoietic view answers to the task posed by Simondon, to think atoms, things, objects, or bodies not as something preexisting those relations into which they (can) enter, "but as something simultaneously 'constituted by' and 'constituting'" these relations.[477] They are always made from, or result from, respond to, resolve, and thus displace a virtual problem structure, a morphogenetic field of intensive differences that gave rise to them. Yet, instead of having arrived at a convenient conclusion, this resulting ecosystemic-ethological vision is the point where it gets multiply complicated: or to put it more affirmatively: interesting.

Because the principal price to pay for such an ontology of becoming is that relations attain an ontological primacy over the relata they bring about.[478]

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475 See Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan, *Acquiring Genomes: A Theory of the Origins of Species* (New York: Basic Books, 2008). See also Keith Ansell-Pearson, *Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 132.

476 Brian Massumi, "Prelude" to Manning, *Always More Than One,* xv.

477 Filippo Del Lucchese, "Monstrous Individuations: Deleuze, Simondon, and Relational Ontology," *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 20, nos. 2–3 (2009), 179–93; here 186.

478 See also Bryant, "Relata do not precede relations," *larval subjects* blog, posted Sep 27, 2012, at https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/27/ . Massumi offers a clear example of the primacy of relations, when he writes: "Our commonsense way of thinking about a relation like giving would be to analyze it into its terms, or decompose it into parts, and

Especially in a differential/ethological/sympoietic vision of mutually-constitutive becomings, real relations co-emerge with their terms.[479] Therefore this view does not reintroduce any inverted hierarchy; it just means that objects and things do not come first.[480] To this extent, it is counter-productive to speak of a primacy of relations, as Toscano notices, because it first depends on a fundamental refusal of all dichotomist images of thought, in which relations are only thinkable as "occurring *between* constituted terms."[481] It is simply a stance to save difference from being hierarchically reduced to difference between things, or worse, difference from which according to Braidotti necessarily equals "being less than."[482]

From this discussion, we may conclude that from Deleuze's notion of reciprocal determination to Haraway's sympoiesis, from Foucault's relations of exteriority to Barad's material-discursive practices, from Spinoza's ethology of the body to the relational ecologies of architecture, the key to this new materialist thinking lies in a methodological starting point that objects (such as any thing or body, including those of knowledge) never preexist as such, but materialize in situated intra-actions with the world[483] as they enter into new assemblages. In mapping these material becomings through these worldly re-arrangements, rather than serving as a facile explanation, this methodological position redirects our attention to architectural arrangements as a constitutive component within historical geneses, and the formation of objects of knowledge and related subjectivation processes. It is from this particular angle that the notion of arrangements remains a relatively unmined field, particularly in relation to the built environment. It would offer a much

then put it all back together again. In this case, you decompose the giving into a giver (A), a gift (B), and a recipient (C). In theory, you should be able to reconnect A to B (giver to gift) and B to C (gift to recipient) and get the giving again. But what you actually get is two successive holdings: A holding B, then C holding B, with nothing to hold the holdings together. What holds the holdings together isn't in the terms, or their part-to-part connections. What holds the holdings together is a oneness-in-manyness of a moving on" (Massumi, *Semblance and Event*, 34–35).

479 See Toscano, *Theatre of Production*, 136–9.

480 As Massumi respectively explains, this means acknowledging "that objects are derivatives of process and that their emergence is the passing result of specific modes of abstractive activity. This means the objects's reality does not exhaust the range of the real. The reality of the world exceeds that of objects, for the simple reason that where objects are, there has also been their becoming. And where becoming has been, there is already more to come. The being of an object is an abstraction from its becoming (Massumi, *Semblance and Event*, 6). He thus cautions that "if you start by presupposing a subject-object divide, there is no way of preventing the separation from deepening into an abyss" (ibid., 7).

481 Toscano, *Theatre of Production*, 137–39.

482 Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects*, 147.

483 Haraway, "Situated Knowledges," 595.

more process-ontological and at once more materially embedded mode of thinking than the concept of apparatuses would ever allow, as it de-ontologizes and de-essentializes historical architectural forms in favor of re-conceptualizing them through their formations or geneses as capacious bodies coming about within affective material environments that, in turn, will be reconsidered from an ontogenetic angle as differentiating milieus of individuation, or fields of becoming composed of intensive relations of exteriority.

The Flatness of A Flat Theory

In order to further advance this genetic ontology of arrangements to help set up and calibrate a more machinic conception of the built environment and a technological understanding of architectural arrangements, it is necessary to first clarify an aspect concerning the flatness of the relational ontology entailed in this notion of arrangement, and its implications for accounting for historical differentiation processes in a non-reductive fashion. This is because in current discourses, this relational ontology is often rejected in its supposed 'primacy' of relations in favor of a so-called object-oriented ontology promoted by a somewhat reactionary stream of contemporary theorists, including Graham Harman and Tim Morton, who have helped invoke the speculative realist trend in contemporary philosophy.[484] Harman, for example, holds a deep animosity against what he calls "relationism," because it would distract attention from the non-connections between objects.[485] But such a rejection of relational ontology on the basis of the search for an intrinsic nature of things is misguided, because the primacy of relations does not entail any strong holistic conception that 'everything is connected' or 'related,' as is sometimes argued.[486] Contrasting with the false focus of such a reductive and pseudo-ecosystemic notion of (inter)relatedness, Deleuze's ontological posi-

484 Also known as OOO ("triple-O"). For proponent studies, see e.g. Harman, *Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects* (Peru: Open Court, 2002); id., *The Quadruple Object* (Winchester: Zero books, 2011); Levi R. Bryant, "Onticology — A Manifesto for Object-Oriented Ontology," *larvalsubject* blog (Jan 12, 2010), avail. online at https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com; id., *The Democracy of Objects* (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2011); id., *Onto-Cartography*; Timothy Morton, *Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2013); and id., *Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology, Causality* (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2013).

485 Graham Harman, "The Well-Wrought Broken Hammer: Object-Oriented Literary Criticism," *New Literary History* 43, no. 2 (2012): 201; Harman here laments that "'everything is connected' is one of those methods that has long since entered its decadence, and must be abandoned." See the response by Jane Bennett, "Systems and Things: A Response to Graham Harman and Timothy Morton," in ibid., 232.

486 Steven Shaviro, "Consequences of Panpsychism," in *The Nonhuman Turn,* ed. Richard Grusin (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2015), 19–44; here 36.

tion that differential relations are the extrinsic genetic element of things foregrounds that all things ought to be understood as generated by and composed of particular relationships, meaning simply that 'everything is relational.'[487] It is for this reason that new materialist thinking grants an ontological and analytical primacy to relations in approaching bodies as relational entities within affective milieus, since for these thinkers relations *are* everything, as Agnieszka Wołodźko brilliantly distinguishes.[488]

Donna Haraway addresses a common misconception, when she clarifies that even in ecology "nothing is connected to everything"; the point is that "everything is connected to something."[489] And some, if not most ecologies, as Frédéric Neyrat stresses, co-exist by being "specifically separated or cut off from some things."[490] In foregrounding the other side, Andrew Goodman recently coined the notion of a "gathering ecology," as a broadened "concept of emergent self-organization in interactivity, [that] emphasizes an event's ability to move toward the generation of its own outcomes out of emerging difference within relations. This self-motivated or ecological gathering is always on the level of the virtual—a gathering of potential—as much as it is an actual entanglement of relations."[491] Yet, in still relying on autopoietic views of emergence, such an isolated view of gathering easily misses the

487 Didier Debaise, "What is Relational Thinking?," trans. T. Jellis, *Inflexions* 5 (Mar 2012): 1–11; here 1. Since this touches the bottom-line of my own practice of thinking, this 'relational' may be my most unthought concept. While writing this part, I was reminded by Marilyn Strathern that it matters substantially "what counts as relations," in the end. In Western thinking, she points out, relations are usually "epistemic relations: cause and effect, covariation, taxonomic hierarchies, evaluation, comparison; … a means for comprehending a world thought of as connections between persons, however fractious, and however we describe values, collectivities, institutions, alliances, intimacies, and so on." Strathern, "Opening Up Relations," in *World of Many Worlds*, ed. De la Cadena and Blaser, 23–52; here 28. In resonance with my above distinction between relationism and relational thinking, she critically highlights with Isabelle Stengers that relations are much more constitutive of particular ecologies of knowledge-generating practices and systems based on such ways of thinking. Therefore 'relationality' is in itself heterogeneous; it is composed of different kinds of constitutive relationships, divergent practices of relating, and different relational potentials; and respectively it cannot be accounted for in any universal fashion.

488 See Agnieszka Anna Wołodźko, "Bodies within Affect," PhD diss., Leiden Univ. (2018), 35–7.

489 Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble,* 31; paraphrasing Thom van Dooren, *Flight Ways: Life at the Edge of Extinction* (New York: Columbia UP, 2014), 31.

490 As Frédéric Neyrat notes, this "principle of principle of ecology" was put forward "as early as the 1970s, [by] Barry Commoner, in his *The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology* (New York: Knopf, 1971) [who] articulated one of his four laws of ecology as follows: 'Everything is connected to everything else.'" Frédéric Neyrat, "Elements for an Ecology of Separation: Beyond Ecological Constructivism," trans. James Burton, in *General Ecology*, ed. Hörl, 101–21. See also id., *The Unconstructable Earth: An Ecology of Separation*, trans. Drew S. Burk (New York: Fordham UP, 2018).

491 Andrew Goodman, *Gathering Ecologies: Thinking Beyond Interactivity* (London: Open Humanities Press, 2018), here 21.

sympoietic dimension, in which gathering (intensification) always involves a mutually constitutive dimension of depletion and extraction of neighboring ecosystems. The same misreading plagues the theorization of assemblages.

Object-centered approaches one-sidedly foreground the withdrawal of separated things, the fact that things have been withdrawn, and are thus in no relation to other entities. Withdrawal, however, denominates not only the action of subtraction or cutting off, but rather the effects of a specific rarefaction, or contraction.[492] A relational approach emphasizes by contrast the capacity of things to selectively draw bodies near and allow them to enter specific assemblages, even if these bodies seem co-exist in a certain relation of nonrelation.[493] In this state, elements are not merely separated, nor are they connected into a new unity; they are made to exist in a state of an inclusive disjunction as they coincide. Sara Ahmad points out that this notion "suggests how different things happen at the same moment, a happening that bring things near to other things, whereby the nearness shapes the shape of each thing."[494] As I have shown, this inclusive view conceives relations only in terms of differential intensities. This intensive view challenges again all extensive views in which space *contains* relations, countering that space—understood more as a material milieu of forces—*is* intensive relationality. Hence, extension—space—is not simply "the site of nonrelations between things," or of "mutual exteriority of [partially linked] objects, … while time is the interior," as Harman insists. Nonrelations involve both material intensities and spatial extensities. What is necessary to grasp is how spatializations or boundaries only emerge from intra-actively determined material-discursive processes within machinic assemblages.

492 See Meillassoux, "Subtraction and Contraction." In Heidegger's work employs the conceptual pair of *alētheia–lēthē*, to conceptualize how beings or meaning comes to exist in processes wherein truth is revealed in the unconcealment or disclosure of things, from an originary concealment.

493 This state of affairs is summed up by Massumi the following way: "Elements contributing to an occurrence come into relation when they come into effect, and they come into effect in excess over themselves. In themselves, they are disparate. If they are in tension, it is precisely as a function of the differential between their positions. It is as a function of their distances from each other. The factors do not actually connect. Their distance is enveloped in a field effect that is one with the tension culminating in the strike of an event. The event effectively takes off from its elements' contribution to it. As an extra-effect, it does not connect to them as its 'cause.' … The phrase 'relation-of-nonrelation' is a way of holding together, in the concept of the event, the differential status of its conditioning elements and the dynamic unity of their sheer occurrence. Massumi, *Semblance and Event*, 20–21.

494 Sara Ahmed, *Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others* (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2006), 39.

This more nuanced view, clarifies Bryant, who has progressively departed from a too object-ontological approach, challenges us to give all attention to "how things are actually related or not related," in understanding the consequences the specificity of changing relations "for understanding the structuration of particular ecologies."[495] A useful analytical tool in this respect is his onto-cartographic approach to machinic ecologies. It aims at outlining a genetic "map of relations between machines" through which to analyze how particular assemblages, understood as structural couplings between machines, "organize the movement, development, and becoming of other machines in the world."[496] Therein it proposes a "topological conception of space composed of paths—themselves composed of machines—between machines that determine what is related to what."[497] This topological conception of spacetime is backed by quantum physics, in which time, mass, and matter are emergent properties of the causal propagation of patterns of interactions confined within (that is: intra-acting) the complex ensembles we call objects.[498]

Perhaps this is where an architectural mode of thinking can help take up the challenge to advance this relational ontology, especially given how architectural production is built on a specific modality of producing nonconnections. Architects have a quite intuitive understanding that things, and their

495 Bryant, *Onto-Cartography*, 261. Bryant gives Marx, Braudel, Freud, Darwin, and DeLanda as exemplary genetic cartographers. Genetic cartography differs from a 'topographic map' that offers more a "snapshot of worlds or assemblages at a point in time," which I hope to have provided on the current understanding of apartments in this introduction. Bryant argues that "the converse of genetic maps are vector maps. … Vector maps chart the trajectories along which worlds are unfolding. … The work of Marx in Capital is an… example of work in vector cartography. … Finally there are modal maps or maps of possible futures … that could exist if we were to intervene in ecologies in particular ways" (ibid., 259–66).

496 Bryant, *Onto-Cartography*, 7 and 35.

497 Ibid., 9. As he elaborates: "Where a Newtonian conception of space conceives space as a preexistent container in which machines are housed, a topological conception of space treats space as arising from machines. In a topological conception, space is conceived of as a network of paths between machines or nodes produced by machines. The first point to note here is that under a topological conception of space, there will not be a single, all-embracing space containing all machines. Insofar as space is composed of paths there will be different spaces depending on the structure of paths between machines. Second, notions of proximity and distance become different under a topological conception of space" (ibid., 144).

498 Therein, "matter is composed of massless lightspeed components, confined by interaction with other particles and forcefields." An object in this view represents an impossibly complex ensemble of so-called lightspeed worldlines. Any "thing is then not a single worldline, but an arrangement of many light-like paths, that—only taken together—give us a sense of stillness, and thingness, and time. This sense of time manifests as the rate of change of its internal machinery and this rate is governed by the speed of which this machinery can interact." Matt O'Dowd, "The Origin of Matter and Time," *Space Time*, PBS Digital Studios, avail. online at https://youtu.be/fHRqibyNMpw.

connections as well as nonconnections are never given, but that they must be mutually and equally produced. Anyone who has ever designed a floor plan is quite aware that relata (such as a stair, or a bedroom) do not exist before or apart from the determination of their form in the exact spatial relations and layout in the design of a building. The primacy of relations is precisely the source of creativity, a genetic component. It is precisely here that I want to situate my own approach to the formation of apartments, in its arrangement of our current nonconnections in how we relate to one another. In this sense, my study concerns itself with the constitutive nonconnections of our current togetherness in a deliberately double-edged flat theory, whose assemblage-theoretic approach starts from an ontologically flat vision of historical formations to account for the multiple layers and stratifications in this genesis.

0.3.2 Flat Ontologies and Socio-Spatial Stratifications

Regarding the production of "nonconnections," German sociologist Georg Simmel (1858–1918), for instance, long highlighted the function of boundary-drawing practices for social processes: "boundaries are not spatial matters of fact with sociological effects, but a sociological fact, which is spatially formed."[499] More than Lefebvre's uni-directional conception of produced space, Simmel had already argued that boundaries emerge from those *constitutive framings* that manifest reciprocal and mutual socio-spatial relationships and differentiations.[500] My introduction points out Thomas's Nail's recent theory that boundaries primarily have a *binding* function through which they become a prime site of production of socio-environmental organizations.[501]

In that sense, it would be worthwhile to re-read Simmel's theory diffractively with Deleuze's approach to reciprocal determination, as an initial intra-active approach to boundary-drawing practices. Similarly, although not

499 Georg Simmel, *Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*, ed. von Ottenheim Rammstedt (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1992; orig. pub. 1908), 697 (my trans.).

500 Ibid., 699 [orig.: "*gesellschaftlich verfasster Raum*"]. The German term 'verfasster Raum' has a doubly defined sense in both *'fassen'* ("to grasp, take," and "contain, frame") in connection to the already more delimited notion of *Raum* ("room"), vis–à–vis 'space.' 'Gesellschaftlich verfasst,' might be translated as "socially-constituted," but this is reductive as *Gesellschaft* also implies a form of togetherness, or assembly, that parallels the way that Simmel conceived socialization [*Vergesellschaftung*] through reciprocal and mutual states of affairs [*Wechselwirkungs- und Gegenseitigkeitsverhältnisse*]. As such the entire notion implies some framing condition arising from this assembled state. Compare below, how assemblages hold together by delimiting the space of possibility associated with it.

501 Nail, *Theory of The Border* (New York: Oxford UP, 2016), 35–40. I refer back to my introduction, page 55.

through a Deleuzian lens, Pierpaolo Donati observes in his "Manifesto for a Critical Realist Relational Sociology" that Simmel understood social relations as "a peculiar effect of mutuality [*Wechselwirkung*] between the terms that it links"; an understanding that inaugurated a relational turn in the social sciences, which understand society *as* relationality.[502] Donati and Margaret Archer critically note a growing stream of proponents of relational approaches to sociology, comprising rather contradictory positions ranging from methodologically individualistic to holistic ones that widely share an endorsement of a flat social ontology.[503] As Archer and Donati argue, this flattening of social ontology is prone to "central conflationism," however, in which "objectivism and subjectivism are supposedly 'transcended' [as soon as] flows replace structures."[504] Flows are only structures disguised in their own dynamisms. For Archer, this conflation persists principally in an analytical confusion of the level of structure with a level of action, to the extent that "this method of transcending dualism then produces an ontology of 'social practices' which are held to be the ultimate constituents of social reality."[505] As Archer clarifies, this is not a problem of an identifiable school of thought, but it appears in a specific conceptualization of culture and cultural systems that are said to produce unified behaviors and mentalities (she points to Bourdieu and Giddens, but also Zygmunt Bauman; yet we also see this widely in court studies and studies of bourgeois domesticity with their focus on normative behaviors) but which often obliterate the level of material constraints.[506]

502 Pierpaolo Donati, "Manifesto for a Critical Realist Relational Sociology," *International Review of Sociology* 25, no.1 (2015): 86–109; here 87. See also id., *Relational Sociology: A New Paradigm for the Social Sciences* (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2011). For a more focused discussion on the overlaps between Deleuzian philosophy and relational sociology, see Peter Lenco, "Deleuze and Relational Sociology," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Relational Sociology*, ed. François Dépelteau (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).

503 Margaret R. Archer and Pierpaolo Donati, *The Relational Subject* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2015). See also Margaret R. Archer and Andrea M. Maccariri, eds., *Engaging with the World: Agency, Institutions, Historical Formations* (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2013).

504 Archer and Donati, introduction to *Relational Subject*.

505 Archer, *Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995), 93–135; here 101. Here Archer, in outlining the "deficiencies of central conflationism," concludes that "conflation is always an error in social theory. The deficiencies of its 'upwards' and 'downwards' versions were those of epiphenomenalism; that structure and agency respectively were deprived of relative autonomy and could thus be reduced to one or the other. Central conflation instead deprives *both* elements of their relative autonomy, not through reducing one to the other, but by compacting the two together inseparably" (ibid.). Focusing exclusively on social practices collapses external social structures into an internalized conception of these structures, and thus avoids to critically study their precise relation, and co-constitutive relationships.

506 See esp. ch.4, "Central conflation: The Duality of Culture," in Margaret Archer, *Culture, and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 72–96. See here also Torkild Thanem, *The Monstrous Organization* (Cheltenham: E. Elgar, 2011), 92. As Thanem comments, Michael Reed critiqued from a similar viewpoint the reduction

Avoiding Mesoreductionism

DeLanda's realist social ontology problematizes this central conflation for its specific **MESO-REDUCTIONISM** of the complexity involved in social organizations. He adds this third form to the other two principal forms of reductionism[507] between the micro- and macro-levels of social reality: the micro-reductionism latent within the phenomenological individualism of social constructivism, and the fervent macro-reductionism in the Marxist view of super-structures.[508] These explain social or material entities exclusively by either reducing them to effects of component parts (the level of individual

of Foucauldian studies or organizations to merely discursive practices, thus "obscuring, if not obliterating, the constraining or regulating role that social structures play in the process of institution building," which involves much material aspects such as architecture. Michael Reed, "In Praise of Duality and Dualism: Rethinking Agency and Structure in Organizational Analysis," *Organization Studies* 18, no.1, 21–42; 27; cited after Thanem, *The Monstrous Organization*, 92.

507 DeLanda does so in direct reference to Archer; see DeLanda, *Assemblage Theory*, 120 n5. Cf. Archer's tripartite scheme, mentioned above, which also resonates with Harman's tripartite scheme mentioned in the following.

508 See DeLanda, *Assemblage Theory*, 3–4: "Traditionally, this problem has been framed in reductionist terms. Reductionism in social science is often illustrated with the methodological individualism characteristic of microeconomics, in which all that matters are rational decisions made by individual persons in isolation from one another. But the phenomenological individualism of social constructivism is also reductionist even though its conception of the micro-level is not based on individual rationality but on the routines and categories that structure individual experience. In neither one of these individualisms is there a denial that there exists, in addition to rationality or experience, something like 'society as a whole.' But such an entity is conceptualized as a mere aggregate, that is, as a whole without properties that are more than the sum of its parts. For this reason, we may refer to these solutions to the micro-macro problem as 'micro-reductionist.'/The other position that has been historically adopted toward the micro-macro problem is that social structure is what really exists, individual persons being mere products of the society in which they are born. The young Durkheim, the older Marx, and functionalists such as Talcott Parsons are examples of this stance. These authors do not deny the existence of individual persons but assume that once they have been socialized by the family and the school, they have so internalized the values of the societies or the social classes to which they belong that their allegiance to a given social order may be taken for granted. This tends to make the micro-level a mere epiphenomenon and for this reason this stance may be labeled 'macro-reductionist.' There are many other positions taken in social science toward the problem of the articulation of the micro and the macro, including making an intermediate level, such as praxis, the true core of social reality, with both individual agency and social structure being byproducts of this fundamental level. This seems to be the stance taken by such prominent contemporary sociologists as Anthony Giddens, a stance that may be labelled 'meso-reductionist.'/These three reductionist positions do not, of course, exhaust the possibilities. There are many social scientists whose work focuses on social entities that are neither micro nor macro: Erving Goffman' s work on conversations and other social encounters; Max Weber's work on institutional organizations; Charles Tilly's work on social justice movements; not to mention the large number of sociologists working on the theory of social networks, or the geographers studying cities and regions. What the work of these authors reveals is a large number of intermediate levels between the micro and the macro, the ontological status of which has not been properly conceptualized."

actions) or larger context ('society as a whole,' 'the market').[509] The criticism to such approaches, shared by many new materialists,[510] is its ignorance of the agency of emergent wholes across a variety of intermediary scales. As Harman contests, this causes a fundamental undermining of the agency of matter in the organization of social structures, which at the same time leads to 'over-mining' (such as in idealism, social constructionism) the agency of things, groups, and other organizations.[511] The problem with micro-reductionism (as undermining) is that it fails to account for emergence; macro-reductionism (as overmining) fails to account for change in fixing the nature of component parts—and in the worst case, theories 'doumine,' that is, combine the weaknesses of both.[512]

This is the problem of **MESO-REDUTIONISM**, and its reification of an "intermediate level, such as *praxis*, [as] the true core of social reality, with both individual agency and social structure being byproducts of this fundamental level."[513] This brings us back to the observation made at the beginning of this preliminary discussion concerning praxeological approaches and their forms of retroactive hypostaticization [→ 0.1.1]. Realist sociologists and new materialist scholars claim in concert that it is *practices* that are always an intermediary product: yet not as a given effect, but as *effective* and *giving* becomings. This leads us to the two questions of flat and relational ontologies. Speculative realist Ray Brassier helpfully distinguishes two kinds of flat ontology and their specific forms of immanence.[514] On the one hand, we have a phenomenological approach that reduces immanence to a single plane of empirical givenness to human perception.[515] Brassier identifies that these object-oriented theories, by retaining the phenomenological primacy of intentional interac-

509 See DeLanda, *New Philosophy of Society*; id., *Assemblage Theory*, 9–21. See also Harman "The Assemblage Theory," 181.

510 See Fox and Alldred, *Sociology and New Materialism*, 6–8, and 13–73.

511 A brief summary is provided by Morton, who writes "Undermining is when things are reduced to smaller things that are held to be more real. … Overmining is when one reduces a thing 'upward' into an effect of some supervenient system" (Morton, *Hyperobjects*, 156). On the problem of supervenience, see also the following section.

512 See DeLanda, *Assemblage Theory*, 9–10; and Harman, "Undermining, Overmining, and Doumining: A Critique," in *ADD Metaphysics*, ed. Jenna Sutela (Otaniemi: Aalto Univ. Design Research Laboratory, 2013): 40–51; here 47. See also Levi R. Bryant, "The World is Enough: On Overmining and Undermining," *larvalsubject* posted online, Oct 11, 2013, at https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/10/11/the-world-is-enough-on-overmining-and-undermining/.

513 DeLanda, *Assemblage Theory*, 5

514 Brassier, "Deleveling," 64–80. For a discussion of the different kind of ontological flattening, see also DeLanda and Harman, *The Rise of Realism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), 85–90.

515 Brassier, "Deleveling," 67–68. See also Harman, "The Assemblage Theory of Society," in *Towards Speculative Realism* (Winchester: Zero Books, 2010), here 180.

tion, do not usually address how those things emerged and thus fail (from the point of view of genesis) to account for any object-individuation.[516] On the other hand, the more Deleuzo-Guattarian strand of flat ontologies straightforwardly starts from the question of **INDIVIDUATION**; *how the given is given*.[517]

Therein assemblages are the more complex ontological entities, rather than objects, because with the latter one only accounts for already constituted objects, isolated from their historical formation and ongoing becomings, whereby one deprives oneself, as DeLanda argues, "of the means to define causality as a productive relation."[518] In its more **MONIST** approach to individuation, becomings cannot be isolated, as I have shown, from a material milieu of individuation. Thereby, it accounts for the self-organizing capacity and thus reclaims the vital(ist) component of what is still commonly seen as material inert to the social.[519] This vision is a political matter, for such a take on substances refers back to the monistic political ontology of Spinoza. Luciana Parisi stresses that this monism advantageously begins not from already established units, but from an always already heterogeneous continuum that evolves through differentiation;[520] a differentiation through a mutual and reciprocal determination that always arises in **SYMPOIETIC** processes as becomings-together-with. Therefore, this monist stance affirms a univocal form of immanence that is only immanent to itself. Therein the world is not totally flattened, without any 'strata,' as Grosz clarifies.[521] What is simply taken out of the equation is the ontological exceptionalism of human agency, and the level of human experience as the 'really real' over any other.

Therein this flat ontology is fundamentally realist. A realist sociology, following Roy Bashkar who coined the term 'flat ontology' pejoratively in his book *A Realist Theory of Science* (1975),[522] defends a stratified view of social reality. As Alex Callinicos comments, this view holds that social reality "is dependent on the interaction of what he [Bashkar] calls generative mechanisms that co-exist at different levels and that *are irreducible to one another*.

516 Brassier, "Deleveling," 68–69. As a result, he argues "Harman's account of real objects fuses epistemic ineffability, i.e. not being able to specify where sensual properties end and real ones begin, with ontological inscrutability, i.e. not being able to say what real objects are" (ibid.).

517 Ibid., 69–70.

518 DeLanda, "Possibility Spaces," 92

519 Braidotti, *Posthuman*, 55–103; and id. *Transpositions*, 128.

520 Parisi, *Abstract Sex*; cited in Braidotti, *Posthuman*, 158.

521 "Rather, the hierarchies are not the result of substances and the nature … but of modes of organization of disparate substances. They are composed of lines of movement, speed, and intensities, rather than of things and their relations." Grosz, *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana Univ. Press, 1994), 167.

522 Pointed out by Brassier, "Delevelling," 65.

The key concept that Bhaskar and Archer both use to conceptualize this stratification is that of emergence."[523] The same goes for DeLanda's realist interpretation of assemblage theory in *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (2002), which promotes a highly emergentist approach to social relations (as opposed to merely relationist theories) through which his work "debunks conceptual totalities and the conflation [or reduction] of different levels of scale and analysis in favor of a multileveled social reality."[524] Yet, what distinguishes it from the more phenomenally-reductivist relationist approach isthe materialism fueling this emergentist vision. As DeLanda poignantly puts it: "all (coherent) materialists must be realists, but not all realists must be materialists." And this materialist component is what distinguishes his assemblage-theoretic approach from both Harman's realist object-ontology[525] and Archer's morphogenetic approach to social formations, because the neo-materialist position avoids to draw an ontological difference between these different levels of social reality.[526]

523 Alex Callinicos, "Introduction to the Second Edition, *Making History*, xxvii–xxxii; here xxviii.

524 Thanem, *Monstrous Organization*, 92.

525 See here the somewhat tenuous discussion between DeLanda and Harman, *The Rise of Realism* (Cambridge: Polity, 2017), 4. This book offers a wider discussion of Harman's and DeLanda's differing approaches.

526 For the sake of some brevity, I will relegate this discussion to an extensive sidenote: Archer (with Donati) and Delanda both identify one prominent precursor to a flawed (i.e. central conflationist or meso-reductionist) brand of 'relationism' — which generally reduces relations to 'connectivity' or 'transactions' — in Giddens's structuration theory which had argued that agents and structures are conceptually inseparable (see esp. Giddens, *Central Problems*, 49–95). Objecting to this inseparability, and resulting conceptual conflation of structures with **FLOWS**, Archer developed an 'morphogenetic approach' to social theory to provide an alternative explanatory theory for transforming social structures, as it analytically distinguishing the formal element (morpho-) from the transformative (*genetic*) one. Therein, "the 'morpho' element is an acknowledgment that society has no pre-set form or preferred state: the 'genetic' part is a recognition that it takes its shape from, and is formed by, agents, originating from the intended and unintended consequences of their activities" (Archer, *Realist Social Theory*, 5). She thus argued for an analytical dualism that treats structures and agency in their own terms: "Structure and agency constitute different levels of stratified social reality, each possesses distinctive emergent properties which are real and causally efficacious but irreducible to one another. The problem, therefore, is … *how to link the two* rather than conflate them" (ibid., 1 [my emphasis]. Several scholars have since criticized this dualism as a counterproductive ontological distinction. For example, Callinicos approaches social structure as 'power conferring relations' that are "connecting persons, material resources, supra-individual entities (social institutions of some kind), and/or structures by virtue of which some persons (not necessarily those so connected) gain powers of a specific kind. This definition maintains the connection between structures and powers but also draws a line between them" (Callinicos, *Making History*, xxiii). This conception of linkage is, however, still formulated on a non-primary conception of relations, acting merely as a "connector" mediating between agency and structure. On this, see Archer, *Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003); and Archer and Donati, introduction to *The Relational Subject*. As such they do not account for the constitutive exteriority of relations that Deleuze and DeLanda in their approaches to multiplicities and assemblages have identified as the truly genetic element. To this extent,

When analyzing social practices and its figurations as becomings effectuated by and effectuating emergent dynamics within a material field of individuation, from which these becomings—as I have shown—cannot be isolated, we can avoid meso-reductionism if we start from the level of material-discursive practices through which boundaries and relationships are drawn. So, rather than attempting to link structures and agency, a materialist relational flat ontology (= ECOLOGY) never disentangles them in the first place, by conceptually accounting for how "power-conferring relations" (Callinicos) in material environments co-constitute bodies and their twofold affective capacities as reciprocally determined aspects of the same stuff. In thus respecting the exteriority of relations, it conceives relations always as intensive differentiations of material milieus and forcefields (not merely 'in' extensive spaces). In Deleuze and Guattari's anthropological thinking, all societies or social formations are constituted by fluxes or flows. This ontological foregrounding of constitutive flows over places (processes over products) is called nomadology.[527] Places or territories, such as cities, are results of intersecting matter-energy flows. Therein, it is the boundary-drawing effects that these intersections exert, that entail specific blockages of fluxes that are constitutive of specific territories. Crucially, these processes are not limited to human action, but entail a posthuman notion of those machinic couplings of bodies with environments.

In taking on this intensive reading of differentiations, a flattened ontology encounters a problem when working through these layers of what happened, by recovering through what processes certain hierarchical structures have successively been produced and sedimented, more stratoanalytically than archaeologically. Here, one "difficulty of getting through" (Ahmed), with an assemblage-theoretic position is how such an approach puts researchers in an unsettlingly accountable position that a traditional historical description

> I follow DeLanda over Archer. In line with this (pro)position, I argue, any radically relational view ought to conceptually start from the primordial production of (non)relations different/ciating the two sides in this 'social morphogenesis.' As I will discuss later, this social morphogenesis ultimately not only concerns the morphogenesis of the social (as a form of relationality), but captures also a morphogenesis that does not happen 'out of itself' but when things enter into intra-active and sympoietic becomings with something else alongside which they take form. Thereby we can avoid reiterating 'produced structures' or 'produced agencies' as *intrinsic* elements of historical formations or geneses. It is precisely here that we no longer have to limit ourselves to "construing these influences as [either] 'constraints' [or] 'enablements,'" since in this entangled state, precisely, the ongoing differentiation of material conditions acts as an enabling constraint for potentially changing ('morphogenetic') and stabilizing ('morphostatic') formations (cf. Archer, *Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation*, 3–4.).

527 Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 45–6.

could avoid, as one is tasked to offer what Braidotti calls "embodied and embedded [relational and affective] accounts of the multi-layered and complex relations of power" structuring our co-existence.[528] Therein, one encounters a notable fault of earlier assemblage theory-inspired readings, and also a significant fault-line within current new-materialist approaches concerning the fact that proponents of flat ontologies and intensive views have yet to come to terms with the enabling constraints that come with scale-dependent, or scale-variant phenomena. Several new-materialist scholars have started to challenge especially "Barad's [attempts] to move seamlessly from a micro quantum register to macro social theory."[529] In this regard, a concerted effort must be made to re-conceptualize the multiple strata of reality, without separating them onto ontologically different planes, and without losing the ontological distinction between the actual and the virtual. Scalar invariance is much more important for *actual* spacetime than it is for virtual problem structures, as stressed in Arun Saldanha's suggestive clarification that **ABSTRACT MACHINES** may be flat, but "assemblages are necessarily stratified, hence scalar."[530] In this respect, Saldanha maintains, it is Deleuze who "more than anyone … provides an ontology adequate to this scalar nature of reality."[531] This adequacy lies in Deleuze's specifically **STRATOANALYTIC** notion of assemblages.[532]

528 Braidotti, "Posthuman Critical Theory," 15.

529 See Derek Woods, "Scale Variance and the Concept of Matter" in *New Politics of Materialism,* ed. Ellenzweig and Zammito, 200–24; here cited after the introduction, 10. Woods also argues that DeLanda's description of his flat ontology through the notion of "self-similarity across scales of the concept of the individual, mak[es] it incompatible with scale variance" and critically highlights the symmetry-breaking processes in the progressive actualization of a *heterogeneous*, virtual continuum into discontinuous individuals (Ibid., 213). See also the essays by N. Katherine Hayles, "The Cognitive Nonconscious and the New Materialism," in ibid., 181–99. I hope, to have sufficiently taken this critique into consideration in compiling this section, in which I have tried to stress this heterogenenity.

530 Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 99. See also ibid, citing Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 69–70: "The plane of consistency knows nothing of differences in level, orders of magnitude, or distances. It knows nothing of the difference between the artificial and the natural. It knows nothing of the distinction between contents and expressions, or that between forms and formed substances; these things exist only by means of and in relation to the strata."

531 Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 96. Saldanha has critically highlighted the attempts of "some Deleuze-inflected geographers [who] argue that flows, networks, and emergence put an end to the scale concept" (ibid., 98). While for him indeed "to understand assemblages properly is incompatible with presuming a verticality of levels beforehand," but "this doesn't mean there is no complex layeredness to spatial processes. … Most processes are multi- scalar, and if a particular scalar hierarchy transpires it is entirely contingent on the flows constituting it. Scale is real, that is, constructed. Causality goes up, down, and sideways. If flat ontology wants to abolish scale it is not only empirically absurd, this counter-critique says, but incapable of political strategizing" (ibid.).

532 This capacity is partly evacuated from DeLanda'a assemblage-theory, where he understands assemblages as "a concept with knobs that can be set to different values to yield

If an assemblage-theoretic position always accounts for "countless layers of larger and smaller structures,"[533] it does so precisely due to its relative distinction of reciprocally-determinant **MOLECULAR** and **MOLAR** components of which assemblages are composed. This distinction can circumvent the "many scalar binaries that have plagued [the social sciences], like individual/society, society/nature, local/global, and micro/macro. Everything happens at the meso-level."[534] This is the level where the differing scales of intra-acting assemblages play out in producing specific organizations, institutions, or normative systems at the intersection of specific scales. Thereby assemblage theory forces us to problematize the influence of (especially extensive) scalar transformations, as theorists in the field of actor-network-theory-inspired urban analysis have acknowledged.[535]

Nested Scales and Higher-Order Emergent Constraints

This is where DeLanda has most rigorously identified a key ingredient to avoiding any reductionism and meso-reductionism, in particular in the need to overcome the longstanding "ontological fetishism that focuses on the individual."[536] His assemblage theory therefore identifies a strategic target in the verticality of Aristotle's three-part "taxonomic essentialism in which genus, species, and individual are separate ontological categories," and which therein legitimizes reductive concepts of part-to-whole relations in the first place.[537] In proposing a more horizontal mode of thinking, an assemblage-theoretical approach to individuation processes starts from a specific ontological flattening, to the extent that, DeLanda argues, it presupposes "nothing but different-scaled *individual singularities* … This implies that persons are not the only individual entities involved in social processes, but also individual communities, individual organizations, individual cities, and individual nation-states."[538] Assemblage theory, Harman comments, therefore considers individual formations across different scales within geneses 'on the same ontological foot-

either strata *or* assemblages (DeLanda, *Assemblage Theory*, 3 (emph. added)). A stratoanalytic lens would, as Guattari's schizoanalytic approach rather foreground the direction of either territorializing or de-/reterritorializing, inter- and parastratic processes within and across nested assemblages.

533 Harman, "The Assemblage Theory," 180.

534 Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 97.

535 See for instance Alan Latham and Derek P. McCormack, "Globalizations Big and Small: Notes on urban studies, Actor-Network Theory, and geographical scale," in *Urban Assemblages: How Actor-Network Theory Changes Urban Studies*, ed. Ignacio Farías and Thomas Bender (London/New York: Routledge, 2010).

536 Bryant, *Onto-Cartography*, 118.

537 DeLanda, *New Philosophy of Society*, 28.

538 Ibid.

ing.'[539] "Because the ontological status of all assemblages is the same," DeLanda writes, it approaches those individual entities "operating at different scales" to be reconsidered as directly interact[ing] with one another, individual to individual; a possibility that does not exists in a hierarchical ontology, like that composed of genera, species, and individuals."[540]

In bypassing both the fallacy of essentialism and "typological thinking, that style of thought in which individuation is achieved through the creation of classifications and of formal criteria for membership in those classifications,"[541] such a Bergsonian-Simondonian view of individuation presupposes no species (natural kinds) nor types (also including 'unnatural' kinds, such as the panopticon penitentiary') that could be based on any logical distinction, or any "essential traits." Instead of "representing timeless categories," all individual formations are "historically constituted entities" that can only be distinguished "by the morphogenetic process that gave rise to it."[542] An ontology of assemblages thus understands individuation not in terms of "process[es] of logical differentiation" but as "one of historical differentiation."[543] Similarly, after thus proposing that individuals are the only actual entities, rather than species, DeLanda then argues that PHYLA (to which I come back shortly) and not *genera* represent the level of virtual multiplicities, because in a flattened ontology, families, classes, orders and genera are as contingent as species and thus have no real explanatory power.[544] Here a deliberately anti-typological conception allows him to again replace the logical differentiation of Aristotle's genera as reified generalities (which in our case would be classes of buildings such as prisons) with a real historical differentiation.[545]

In this view, Braidotti demands a full-blown "shift away from epistemological theor[ies] of representation to an ontology of becoming."[546] Here the greatest challenge for historical studies is to first abandon the essentialist

539 Harman, "The Assemblage Theory," 180–3.

540 DeLanda, *Deleuze: History and Science* (New York/Dresden: Atropos Press, 2010), 12.

541 DeLanda, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, 41: "Besides the avoidance of essentialist thinking, Deleuze's speculation about virtuality is guided by the closely related constraint of avoiding typological thinking." See also DeLanda, *New Philosophy of Society*, 26–30.

542 DeLanda, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy*, 9–10.

543 DeLanda, *New Philosophy of Society*, 29.

544 On this point, Harman greatly misreads DeLanda, when he argues that "the role of the virtual is played by the genus." Harman, "DeLanda's Ontology: Assemblage and Realism," *Continental Philosophy Review* 41 (2008), 367–83; here 375. It is clear that, for DeLanda, the category of the genus 'animal' is a reified generality that is not abstract enough to serve as a body-plan.

545 See DeLanda, *New Philosophy of Society*, 28–29.

546 Braidotti, *Nomadic Theory*, 214.

and typological thinking and help foster a "qualitative shift away from 'speciesism' toward an ethics of what bodies can do," an "ethology of forces," of clusters of capacities rather than scientific categories. The Deleuzo-Guattarian example par excellence is their insistence that the "racehorse is more different from a workhorse than a workhorse is from an ox."[547] In calling to move from descriptive approaches to explanatory ones, Braidotti argues, "we need to adopt non-linearity as a principle."[548] This would finally allow us, as Eugene Holland adds, to appreciate "contingency and emergence as better paradigms for understanding history."[549] One implication for typological analysis is clear: a rigorous rejection of static categories of thought in favor of a new diagrammatic analytic of how these typological distinctions came about through specific resolutions of virtual problem-structures. For the analysis of historical formations in architecture this implies to rigorously foreground what was transforming (=topology) in what was taking form (in certain arrangements).

To understand this transformation non-reductively, assemblage-theoretic approaches have instigated a shift away from "the paradigm of 'being individual' to that of 'being relational'" in order to promote a decidedly "non-modern ontology and epistemology" that began to differentiate itself in an ecosystemic re-conceptualization of the world.[550] As ecological, relational entities, assemblages are greatly misunderstood whenever they are conceptually reduced to being merely a heterogeneous set of elements. Because as multiplicities, they rather consist of differential relations between reciprocally-determined molar and molecular components. These come together not simply as a set of elements (=part-to-whole relations), but as a concatenating process (*agencement*) of ambient forces and sympoietic becomings (=primacy of relations). This is a dynamic process that produces specifically **NESTED** part-to-part relations; **HETERARCHIES** of nested individual singularities.[551]

547 See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 257; cited in Braidotti, *Nomadic Theory*, 85; and Radman, *Gibsonism*, 77.

548 Braidotti, *Nomadic Theory*, 137.

549 Eugene W. Holland, "Nonlinear Historical Materialism and Postmodern Marxism," in *Culture, Theory & Critique* 47, no. 2 (2006): 184.

550 Hörl, *General Ecology*, 2–3, referring to Debaise, "What is relational thinking?." See ibid., see also 7, where Hörl, in quoting Latour's position that modernity means "to lose the experience of relations," argues that "relationalism is always already non-modern" (citing Bruno Latour, *An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2013), 256). See also my discussion above, notes 22–30.

551 Shortly before his death, Deleuze had abandoned a planned project to write with Alain Badiou on *Sets and Multiplicities*. Saldanha respectively discusses that whereas "Set theory is able to systematically reduce all thinking and knowing to the formal figure of multiplicity," it is rooted in a too axiomatic approach that, in its *formalization* of "sets [as] discrete wholes in which membership is entirely clear and homogenous …, fundamen-

At this point we thus need to address a crucial problem that Ian Buchanan identifies in DeLanda's still reductive rhetoric of assemblages as a sort of part-to-whole aggregates, stressing that the true assemblage-theoretic challenge lies in attending to the reciprocal determination of doubly articulated (i.e. content and expression) material and discursive elements that—as we have seen—operate as modally different and differently scaled components (molecular and molar substances and forms), that in specific concatenations help stabilize certain assemblages. DeLanda does consciously substitute assemblages for Braudel's too holistic conception of "society as a set of sets," which allows him to re-conceptualize social formations as causally irreducible yet analytically decomposable individual entities. In this view, DeLanda argues, "an entity such as 'the Market' [or 'the State,' or in the following, 'the Apartment,' 'the City,' or 'the Court'] … would not be an acceptable entity to be incorporated into explanations of historical phenomena because it is not an individual emergent whole but a reified generality." He stresses the need to replace such reifications by the nested intra-actions of reciprocally determining "emergent wholes operating at different scales": an individual building, an individual city, and individual state, and so on.[552] This **NESTING** does not reintroduce simple part-to-whole relations, but only relations between parts-to-**(DIFFERENTLY-SCALED-)PARTS**. Or, to put it differently: components with different levels of organizational complexity.[553]

In this respect, DeLanda's explanation can be criticized for its explanatory emphasis on differently-scaled organization (communities, organizations, cities, and nation-states), while he also maintains that assemblages involve not just different geometric scales as an extensive property, but are mainly driven by complex differential factors within intensive properties such as energy potentials, pressures, densities, and so on. Perhaps the real problem is that we habitually reduce these examples immediately to their different

tally misses the point (or rather, the flow) of what it means to be a multiplicity. For Deleuze, in order to grasp multiplicity ontologically, it is rather differential or infinitesimal calculus – which aims to determine covariation of quantities toward immanent limits" (Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 47–48). It is for this reason that, for Deleuze, "becoming and multiplicity are the same thing. [In contrast to a set, a] multiplicity is defined not by its elements … each multiplicity is already composed of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis, and that a multiplicity is continually transforming itself into a string of other multiplicities" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 249, cited in Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 49). This is sympoiesis.

552 DeLanda, *Deleuze: History and Science*, 6–8. To stress the above distinction, I here avoid to repeat DeLanda'a still partly reductive emphasis on individuals within nested sets. See Nail's comments above, note 320.

553 This approach lends itself not just for urban history, but is also suited for an architectural scale, especially if we understand with Deleuze the city just as an territory produced by a particular control of flows.

extensive scales (thanks to what Erin Manning and Brian Massumi call 'chunking' after Anne Corwin[554]), rather than their focusing on intensively-different states of complexity that emerge at each level of those (increasingly stratified) organizations. A more STRATOANALYTIC view, attending to how these assemblages (as specific forms of content and expression) and nested scales (as strata) are historically produced articulations, would force us to not fall back on parthood structures as explanations but keep our focus on the immanent limits and critical thresholds of these layered systems of organization (ABSTRACT MACHINES).

As a whole that exists *alongside* its parts (hence, on the same ontological level), assemblages remain easily misunderstood as entities whose emergent components are 'more than the sum of its parts'; say, for instance, as an effect from the specific selection [SC] and arrangement [FC] of its component parts. Yet as Deleuze and DeLanda warn us, a materialist metaphysics must always account for the structure of possibility spaces as a dimension immanent (i.e. within; "n-1"), not transcendent (i.e. added to; "n+1") to the self-organization of matter.[555] This concerns the Deleuzo-Guattarian conceptual distinction between a "plan of organization" in which a transcendental unity is added to a supplementary dimension (n+1) and an immanent "plane of consistency," "from which the One is always subtracted (n–1)."[556] This is how the "multiple must be made … : at n-1 dimensions."[557] Individual entities are always 'drawn off' [*soustraict/retire*] from the multiple that holds them together. The key, again, lies in understanding this process as an inclusive selection more than an exclusive separation (i.e. a 'withdrawal' in Harman's sense).

The crucial point here is that the logic of *agencement*, "and …, and …, and," implies a sufficient sense of definition that, based on its aggregation of interlocking frames, or intersecting and transversal lines of thought, need not fall back on any exclusive disjunctions. To do so, it is important to assemble and reconstruct what convergent lines lead, in coming together, to a specific divergent line. As Deleuze and Guattari insist, becoming involves "alliances," not "filiations": phylogenesis in its focus on tree diagrams "imposes the verb 'to be' [*être*]," but the sympoietic fabric is produced in "the conjunction, 'and …

554 Erin Manning and Brian Massumi, *Thought in the Act: Passages in the Ecology of Experience* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2014), 17–25; Manning, *Always More than One*, 219–20;

555 See ibid., 123–4.

556 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 21, see esp. ibid., 265–72; *Foucault Lecture* 10/12/1985-4, n.p.)

557 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 6.

and … and … [et … et … et].'"[558] This anti-genealogical stuttering scrambles all-too-arborescent schemes and calls for critically extending our attention to what was happening through a more rhizomatic thinking.[559] This distinction brings us back to the selective component of enabling constraints through which we can now better address especially the machinic dimension within interlaced assemblages. Here, the binding power or consistency of assemblages actually arises from the fact that—when passing certain critical thresholds—systems re-arrange themselves into metastable states of least binding energy.[560] In falling into this lower energy level, the system forms larger scale assemblages that engage of fasten existing meta-stably interlocked assemblages quasi-causally: "once a larger scale assemblage is in place, it immediately starts acting as a source of limitations and resources for its components. In other words, even though the arrow of causality in this scheme is bottom-up, it also has a top-down aspect: an assemblage both constrains and enables its parts"—and component assemblages.[561] They exert an effect on its components and flows that physicists call 'downward causation.'

In downward causation, Terrence Deacon explains, constraints affect lower-level interactions of components through a configurational effect through which the system's organization enacts a reduction of causal probabilities.[562] Being precisely what architectural arrangements and their boundary-drawing practices do in their selecting function, this delimitation must not be understood as any *efficient cause* within historical formations or emergent processes. Rather, it is to be understood as a sort of *formal* causation arising from the particular *constellation* of reciprocal relations.[563] By acknowledging that the very notion of parts is indeed process-dependent, we can recast the problem of emergence in terms of *processes* (which in

558 Ibid., 25.

559 Ibid., 8,11, and 21.

560 DeLanda, "Philosophy of Energy" (Draft, 2016), uploaded to research gate, Jul 2017), n.p.; avail. online at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/310644943_The_Philosophy_of_Energy.

561 DeLanda, *Deleuze: History and Science*, 12.

562 Terrence Deacon, *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter* (New York: Norton, 2012), here 161. Deacon's book does not properly reference the work of other theorists, such as Alicia Juarrero's earlier study *Dynamics in Action: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System* (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 2002) or Evan Thompson's *Mind in Life* (New York: Harvard UP, 2007), who also distinguish the bottom-up causation of enabling constraints and the particular top-down causation of (selective) higher-order emergent constraints within dynamic systems. They give similar (albeit partly divergent) accounts from which Deacon's below-mentioned distinction of "homeo-, morpho- and teleodynamisms" and his explanation through reciprocal relationship of these dynamics differs.

563 Deacon, *Incomplete Nature*, 231–2.

contrast to parts cannot be decomposed analytically) that are defined by their *level-specific organization.* The latter is only expressed by some form of regularity that emerges at that level.[564] Thus countering the classically more synchronic notion of emergence (and its theoretical foundation on supervenience and mereology[565]), Deacon then promotes a more dynamic and diachronic conception of emergence as processes wherein the distinction between part and whole and synchrony and diachrony are dynamically intertwined.[566] In this view, a dynamic theory of emergence would start from

> distinct *dynamic regimes* [that exist at different levels of scale or complexity] and their relationship … Although the relationship is in this sense loosely analogous to a supervenience relationship, in that higher-level dynamical regimes require lower-level dynamical regimes, it cannot be understood in terms of simple part/whole compositionality. Nor is the existence of lower-level properties explainable irrespective of higher-level properties. Higher-order processes are more accurately 'nested' within lower-level dynamics as distinctive special cases.[567]

And it is this nested organization of interdependent systemic processes that implies a new understanding of the emergence of regularities through the propagation of constraints. 'Constraint' and 'regularity' thus even do away with the autopoietic notion of 'self-organization,' supporting a more sympoietic notion of such processes.

Nested layers of organizational complexity do not mean *different* levels of reality. At the same time, this view is not falsely flat, as their increasingly complex organizational dynamics revolve around specific scale-invariant phenomena. To avoid any reductivist view, Deacon stresses, this dynamic view must importantly include — if not center on — those emergent and dynamically-supervenient couplings that come to be established between distinct organizational dynamic processes across three ascending domains of organizational complexity. Respectively discerned as **HOMEO-**, **MORPHO-**, and **TELEODYNAMISMS** by Deacon, these processes of progressively higher orders of complexity successively add constraining and thus regularizing effects onto lower-order processes that help maintain them; these are the

564 Ibid., 177–81. See also Juarrero, *Dynamics in Action,* 66, and 6–7, 29, 113–4, 123.
565 Deacon, *Incomplete Nature*, 177.
566 Ibid. See also ibid., 164; and Juarrero, *Dynamics in Action*, 73ff.
567 Deacon, *Incomplete Nature*, 179–81; Juarrero, *Dynamics in Action,* 5 and 129ff.

most important to reconstruct in understanding emergent transitions within organizational complexity. Here, it is not enough to separately study the scale-dependency of phenomena on each stratum; more than these analytically-decomposable layers, it is the particular phase-shift in those irreducible machinic assemblages, generated through **INTER-** and **META-STRATIC** couplings, that needs to be accounted for in the study of evolving systems. This is ultimately what both Foucault's dispositif and Deleuze and Guattari's assemblage is about: the ongoing reconfigurings of a system wherein different processes (so-called orthograde processes, oriented toward a particular end) are falling into a new state. It effectuates a **CONTRAGRADE** tendency that — by synergistically coupling otherwise unrelated dynamics into complex chains — constrains the system in such a way that it can now maintain and regenerate itself.

As I said before, here one needs to again be careful not to present this downward causal efficacy reductively as an effective cause, supposedly representing the diagrammatic component within historical formations. Assemblages are never causes but systemic resolutions (as Buchanan warns) that reduce what DeLanda calls the **SPACE OF POSSIBILITY** associated with a given assemblage.[568] Hence, any assemblage "is less than the sum of its parts."[569] Such systems are analytically reducible, but not always 'decomposable,' meaning that they cannot be understood "one part at a time," or even one layer at a time.[570] Because, as Deacon argues, "what we understand as parts are in most cases the consequence of differentiation processes in which structural discontinuities and functional modularization emerged from a prior, less differentiated state."[571] This is exactly where *agencements* (including architectural arrangements) are — at any rate and level — more productively understood as so-called **HIGHER-ORDER EMERGENT CONSTRAINTS**, which no longer act as enabling constraints for higher levels of complexity to form, but as *selective* constraints restricting the system's degrees of freedom. These phenomena involve wholes that are specifically "*less* than the sum of their parts," as social scientist Jeremy Sherman explains based on the work of Deacon: within the dynamic interactions between self-organizing systems

568 Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory and Schizoanalysis," 129; "Assemblage Theory and its Discontents," 388; DeLanda, *New Philosophy of Society*, 30. DeLanda argues that we need this notion of a **SPACE OF POSSIBILITIES**, to distinguish between properties and capacities, as both being real, yet distinct, insofar as properties are always actual, whereas capacities are only virtual potentials actualized in specific actions (idem, "Possibility Spaces," 92).

569 Deacon, *Incomplete Nature*, 43.

570 Ibid., 85.

571 Ibid., 135; Juarrero, *Dynamics in Action,* 143.

and their own emergent patterns of regularity, two or more *regulatization* processes can mutually (or "TELEODYNAMICALLY" as Deacon terms it[572]) stabilize one another, and prevent one another from dissolving, through the appearance of a higher-order constraint in which the underlying regularization dynamics come to enter a synergistic coupling that increases the system's overall ability to self-regenerate.[573] In such selective interactions, paths described by spatiotemporal dynamics repeatedly *gridlock* each other, canceling out other paths.[574] Such selective elimination of possible paths is an auto-affective systemic response. This elimination of paths is not negative but purely generative and creative; the real condition for emergence and evolution. N. Katherine Hayles stresses how systems evolve "so that only the most viable self-organizing systems or models will emerge."[575] Importantly, as Hayles succinctly notes, this auto-affective "fracturing of agency" within evolving systems is exactly what underlies Deleuze and Guattari's notion of stratification and mutating assemblages.[576] An assemblage-theoretic approach is best suited to reconstruct *which* material-discursive concatenations came to produce a causal efficacy within consolidating systems (more than giving rise to accidental events[577]), and *how they did so* by giving rise to higher-order emergent constraints that happened to narrow down those possibilities that have led to our present.

In this regard, an stratoanalytic analysis of historical formations ought to first take up Bryant's abovementioned quantal notion of spacetime as made up of paths produced by machinic interactions, because in Deleuzian ontology, Saldanha writes, "paths and places are relays. Their function is to keep the social multiplicity moving [or make them slow down]. What physicists call path dependency—the constancy of a virtual diagram of behaviors—is necessary for the existence of all social formations."[578] This path depen-

572 See the eponymous ch. 9 in Deacon, *Incomplete Nature*, 264ff.

573 See Jeremy Sherman, *Neither Ghost nor Machine: The Emergence and Nature of Selves* (New York: Columbia UP, 2017), 28–40, 125–159; see also the eponymous lecture video recording, Talks at Google, published Sep 11, 2018, avail. online at https://youtu.be/EPzXQfJy19k. See also Juarrero, *Dynamics in Action,* esp. 131–62.

574 Sherman, *Neither Ghost nor Machine*, 14–15, 275–6.

575 N. Katherine Hayles, "Desiring Agency: Limiting Metaphors and Enabling Constraints in Dawkins and Deleuze/Guattari," *SubStance* 94/95 (2001), 144–59; here 145.

576 Ibid.

577 Buchanan discusses, for clarification, John Law's example of a train crash as an unproductive example for an assemblage-theoretic analysis: "while it is an undoubtedly complex event, with a great many elements, there is no particular analytic advantage in describing it as an assemblage. It lacks the necessity of the 'true' assemblage – it is an accident, not an arrangement" (Buchanan, "Assemblage Theory and Schizoanalysis," 128–9; "Assemblage Theory and its Discontents," 387)

578 Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze*, 56.

dency does not entail any teleological cause-and-effect relation of purpose, but reveals teleonomic effects of means-to-end dynamics.[579] In the built environment, Saldanha points out, this dynamic is "rigidly and permanently inscribed into the striated landscape of civilization as roads and monumental buildings."[580] By thus bringing us back to the problem of circulation and mechanisms of security, this view can easily be transposed onto the architecture of apartments as a conducting device. As such, it resonates intensely with Sara Ahmed's mantra that "the more a path is used, the more a path is used," with which her analyses show how institutionalization reproduces and stabilizes the socio-environmental conditions that have happened to produce institutions in the first place, by canceling out disturbing factors in a regularization of material-discursive practices.[581] Such processes actually operate by way of 'dysselective' elimination, in that paths come to be constrained so that fewer alternative pathways become likely, so that "prevented dynamics account for presented dynamics."[582]

Such auto-affective processes were also noted by Foucault, who in his work on security mechanisms identified a sort of "self-cancellation of phenomena, by the phenomena" within certain dispositifs.[583] Architecture, too, selectively narrows down spaces of possibility, in its configuration of material environments that specifically enact selected socio-environmental relationships that slow down or speed up processes involving material-energetic flows. Within social or architectural organizations, for example, auto-affective couplings emerge in producing CRYSTALLIZING figurations, and through reproducing CONCRETIZING relations (rather than others). Simondon here revealed the "recurrent causality" in the technical individualization of systems through an associated milieu that guarantees its functioning.[584]

This notion of causality marks the crucial point where a certain *abstract reasoning* is required, and where the notion of abstract machines becomes instrumental. Like Barad's intra-active approach to the apparatus, or Haraway's sympoietic vision, the methodological advantage of approaching

579 Sherman, *Neither Ghost nor Machine*, 12, 41–44, 54–5

580 Ibid.

581 Sara Ahmed, "Institutional As Usual," posted online, Oct 24, 2017, at https://feministkilljoys.com/2017/10/24/institutional-as-usual/. See also her "Uses of Use: Diversity, Utility and the University," video recording of a lecture given at the CRASSH Impact Lecture Series, Univ. of Cambridge (Mar 5, 2018), avail. online at https://youtu.be/avKJ2w1mhng). Cf. also Donna Haraway and Judith Butler earlier discussions how agency arises as "an instituted practice in a field of enabling constraints." Cited after Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York/Abingdon: Routledge, 1991), 135.

582 Sherman, *Neither Ghost nor Machine*, 14, 146 and 114.

583 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 66.

584 Simondon, *Mode of Existence,* 63

emergent systems in abstract terms of their machinic couplings of regularization processes, is that it is much easier to maintain a relation of reciprocity that allows such dynamic systems to evolve by selectively narrowing down possible states (= **TERRITORIALIZATION**). unless, if failing to do so, emergent crises that spontaneously open up new paths lead the system to settle around a new attractor (= **DE-/RETERRITORIALIZATION**). This way, we arrive back at Bryant's abovementioned quantal notion of spacetime as being made up of paths produced precisely by machinic interactions.

Equipped with this understanding of how higher-order emergent constraints *enable* the formation and stabilization of specific assemblages, we can undo undue speeds (some theory) and slownesses (some history) by systematically plotting their different levels of complexity aside one another and try establish a creative coupling. At the intersection of philosophy, art , and activism, Erin Manning and Brian Massumi have repeatedly discussed emergent constraints as at once a boundary and a relational technique They describe its positive function in generatively conditioning favorable events to unfold as they limit purely open encounters, fields of perception, or modes of entry; it is a channeling that immanently propels "specific conditions for creative interaction" to occur (which implies that this conditioning works in a fundamentally non-deterministic manner).[585] This generative conditioning also emerges in evolutionary systems: Stuart Kauffmann, for instance, highlights the need for understanding the production of niches, in terms of how "enabling constraints generate new adjacent possible ways of life and shape them, thereby generating yet newer enabling constraints yielding newer 'adjacent possibilities' for evolution."[586]

By approaching architectural arrangements as enabling constraints, based on a topological notion of both space and time as (actively shaped) selective paths, architecture-historical analyses—or better: stratoanalytic studies of historical formations in the built environment—could tap into the 'phase-space' (=the intensive *spatium* of virtual problem structures), from which historical formations (=concrete assemblages and social configurations) actualize in specific interactions of abstract machines on what Deleuze and Guattari have called the **MACHINIC PHYLUM**. This concept, DeLanda

585 See Manning and Massumi, *Thought in the Act*, 93–94; citation from Massumi, *Politics of Affect* (Cambridge: Polity, 2015); here 73 and 175. See also Manning, "Artfulness," in *The Nonhuman Turn*, ed. Richard Grusin (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2015), 45–80. For a closer discussion of enabling constraints as "modes of entry," see esp. Manning, *Always More than One*, 104–16.

586 Stuart A. Kauffmann, foreword to *Beyond Mechanism: Putting Life back into Biology*, ed. Brian G. Henning and Adam Scarfe (Lanham: Lexington, 2013), 1–24; here 15.

reminds us, "was created in an effort to conceive the genesis of form (in geological, biological and cultural structures) as related exclusively to immanent capabilities of the flows of matter-energy-information" to self-organize.[587] Its second part is initially "borrow[ed] from biology where [a *phylum*] denotes the evolutionary category just under 'kingdom' (we, as vertebrates, belong to the phylum 'chordata,' for example)."[588] While DeLanda's reworking of species and genera into individual entities and phyla may sound relatively complex, the underlying argument is easily understood with an architectural mindset, when DeLanda's flattened ontology identifies the taxon of phyla as the level of virtual multiplicities, in arguing that a phylum may be identified with a common body-plan. Having evolved over millions of years, this common body-plan "can yield a variety of concrete designs for organisms. The idea of a 'machinic phylum' would then be that, beyond biological lineages, we are also related to non-living creatures (winds and flames, lava and rocks) through common 'body-plans' involving similar self-organizing and combinatorial processes."[589] As such it promotes a more *heterarchical* vision of the *hetero*genesis that evolution effectuates.

DeLanda hence theorizes the machinic phylum as "the set of all the singularities at the onset of processes of self-organization—the critical points in the flow of matter and energy, points at which these flows spontaneously acquire a new form or pattern."[590] But such abstract body-plans

> cannot be specified using metric notions such as lengths, area, or volumes, since each realization of the body-plan will exhibit a completely different set of metric relations [and thus shapes]. Therefore, only nonmetric or topological notions, such as the overall connectivity of the different parts of the body, can be used to specify it. To put this differently, a body-plan defines a space of possibilities … and this space has a topological structure.[591]

587 Manuel DeLanda, "The Machinic Phylum," essay for "TechnoMorphica," (1997), avail. online at https://v2.nl/archive/articles/the-machinic-phylum. Within biological taxonomic classification, a phylum is the rank above 'class,' and represents thus—polemically—a level 'before classification.' It can be seen as a grouping of organisms based on the general specialization of a body-plan. The term was coined in 1866 by Ernst Haeckel from the Greek φῦλον, "race, stock," related to φυλή, "tribe, clan."

588 Ibid., n.p.

589 Ibid., n.p.; id., *New Philosophy of Society*, 29; *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines*, 132.

590 DeLanda, *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines*, 132.

591 DeLanda, *New Philosophy of Society*, 29.

This **SPACE OF POSSIBILITIES** thus concerns the relation between *individual singularities* and the distribution of specific topological invariants (i.e. properties, such as compactness and connectedness, that are preserved under continuous deformations). As such, these abstract body plans constitute

> what Deleuze refers to as a diagram, a set of universal singularities … that would structure the space of possibilities associated with the assemblage. Thus, while persons, communities, organizations, cities and nation-states are all individual singularities, each of these entities would also be associated with a space of possibilities characterized by its dimensions, representing its degrees of freedom, and by a set of universal singularities. In other words, each of these social assemblages would possess its own diagram.[592]

Instead of spaces of possibilities merely opening up a zone of indetermination for evolving forms to become otherwise, the degrees of freedom of an assemblage are the "greater the more a consistency is striated" by critical thresholds, as Hanjo Berressem fiercely argues in his attempt to champion striation.[593]

This is where the configurative dimension of architectures (as the form of content within assemblages) plays out. Read carefully, this view greatly complicates any attempt to distinguish—from a materialist perspective—a history of architectural plans (as "form creation," that is, design, praxis, agency) from a history material possibilities (as "sites of potentiality," that is, buildings or structure), as the architecture philosopher Andrew Benjamin

592 Ibid., 30.

593 Hanjo Berressem, "'Degrees of Freedom': Felix Guattari's *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*," in *Schizoanalysis and Ecosophy*, ed. Boundas, 128–48. Similarly, Grosz has elaborated a theory of freedom, that no longer conceives freedom "primarily as the elimination of constraint or coercion but more positively as the condition of, or capacity for, action in life." Grosz, *Becoming Undone: Darwinian Reflections on Life, Politics, and Art* (Durham: Duke UP, 2011), 59–73. She does so based on Bergson, who—in posing 'indeterminacy' as the defining characteristic of life—"has provided an understanding of freedom that is not fundamentally linked to the question of choice, to the operations of alternatives, to the selection of options outside the subject and independently available to it. It is not a freedom of selection, of consumption, a freedom linked to the acquisition of objects, but a freedom of action. A freedom, while he ascribes it to a self, is above all connected to an active self, an embodied being, a being who acts … in a world of other beings and objects. Acts, having been undertaken, transform their agent so that the paths that the agent took to the act are no longer available to it except abstractly or in reconstruction. Indeed, there are no paths … until the action is acted. … The path can only be drawn after the movement is completed. Once the act is performed, we can divide, analyze, assess, and treat as necessary what in the process of its performance remains undivided, unanalyzable, surprising, and utterly contingent" (ibid., 67).

proposes.[594] Concerning this diagrammatic space of possibilities, let me repeat with Massumi that "the virtual cannot be understood as a 'space' of potential" in itself, and especially not as a 'space of possibilities' that can be realized—because "it is, after all, event potential," a pure abstract potential to be actualized in an event.[595] The "space of possibility associated with a given assemblage," mentioned by DeLanda, thus does not directly involve this potential of actualization; the potential is only affected and effectuated by the specific arrangement (as both a spatial configuration and process of reconfigurings of the world, as Barad would have it) of the virtually possible FORM OF CONTENT of a given assemblage, as it selectively (de)intensifies certain trajectories of actualization over others. But since this selective structuring of the space of possibilities (as paths) plays out in each individuation, this diagram cannot in advance be generalized to types and developments, because its deterritorializing potentials play out in its contingent morphogenetic processes. This is precisely why we must replace logical differentiations with historical ones, in which material milieus and environmental influences play a much greater role in the development of individual forms.

Phase Spaces and Switching States

What is at stake here, as John Protevi has brilliantly picked out, is a new embracing view of the virtual within the study of historical or emergent formation. Protevi critically observes that synchronic emergence—what we know as 'emergence out of chaos'—has so far dominated the discussion regarding the historical emergence of new forms. Yet, when it comes to processes of individuation, we must look at something else. To understand these becomings, "we need to think diachronic emergence."[596] Diachronic emergence concerns the creation of new patterns and thresholds in a system, which in turn re-patterns the system.[597] If this diachronic emergence has long escaped history, it is, as Deleuze suggests, because without a

594 Andrew Benjamin, "Plans to Matter: Towards a History of Material Possibility," in *Material Matters*, ed. Lloyd Thomas, 14–28. As Benjamin already notes: "The question of actualization (a possibility held in place by abstraction) – bringing not just a link to material but an inscription of material possibility into the process – is integral to the move from the centrality of the plan. Conversely, part of the argument will also be that, despite appearances to the contrary, the convention both of the plan as well as the relation of separation and connection—including temporal determinations—will allow for the incorporation of a certain conception of materiality which can be thought in terms of these conventions. In other words, if there is to be a redefinition of the architectural object then the move from the plan is not a move to materiality *tout court*."

595 Massumi, *Semblance and Event*, 16.

596 Protevi, "Deleuze, Guattari, and Emergence," 27.

597 Ibid., 23–4.

6 Protevi's description of four interrelated emergences. To the extent that this establishment of emergent functional compounds (as higher-order emergent constraints) coincides with the substance of expression, this model can be mapped onto the stratoanalytic matrix of stabilizing assemblages. Hence, akin to how Foucault's four distributive dispositifs of modern space can be said to be a nested subset (or intra-assemblage) in the virtually-possible form of content, I like to understand Nail's four politics of assemblages as nested within the quadrant of "bio-socio-technical assemblages" within Protevi's matrix.



genetic lens "becoming is not part of history; history designates only the collection of conditions, however recent, that need to be overcome in order 'to become,' that is, to create something new."[598] Protevi suggests that we look at four intra-related transversal emergences that resonantly take form within and across strata and within synchronic (dx/dy) and diachronic (dx/dt) rates of change.[599] In his four-part model ✉[6], Protevi notably points out the "diachronic construction of functional structures in complex systems that archive a synchronic focus on systematic behavior as they constrain the behavior of individual components."[600] This is where, according to Protevi, DeLanda's work forcefully reclaims "the virtual [a]s the realm of patterns and thresholds … that structure the intensive morphogenetic processes that produce actual systems and their behaviors."[601]

This is ultimately relevant concerning the actualization of the virtual in time. In our observation that **DIFFERENT/CIATIONS** are always double articulations, we said that it is the lines of differenciation that mark diachronic emergences in the long run. So, in order then not to place too much emphasis on the synchronic/sympoietic dimension of metamorphosing becomings-with, we may want to introduce a diachronic or "**DIAPOIETIC**" dimension of differenciation.[602]

598 Deleuze, *Negotiations, 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia UP, 1995), 170–1.
599 See ibid., 27–9.
600 Ibid., 19, 27–9.
601 Protevi, "Deleuze, Guattari, and Emergence," 23.
602 The term was used by Harry Kunnemann in the context of civic meaningfulness, to coin a notion for "other-directed forms of interaction, in which the neologism 'diapoiesis' is a compound between 'poiesis' and 'dialogue.' Harry P. Kunneman, "Ethical complexity,"

Here the prefix 'dia-' marks a second dimension that expands the necessarily too-narrow ethical conception of the 'auto' in autopoietic conceptions of emergence, in emphasizing what actually happens [*qu'est-ce qui se passe*] within those passings-through and (be)comings-through emerging from virtual sympoietic processes of synchronization. A twofold sym-/diapoietic opens autopoietic thinking to the complex relations in which these sympoietic couplings between different bio-socio-technical assemblages (and their double articulation of symbioses and symbiogeneses within each assemblage) and their different forms of relationality *give rise to*. in actualizing the virtual along diachronically-divergent series and lines of differenciation within co-evolution of these assemblages as *irreversibly* transforming systems. As Radman observes, "the transversal coupling (sympoiesis) remains reversible across the same scale (symmetry-preserving), but crucially, it is irreversible across different scales (symmetry-breaking)" and in its diapoietic dimension.[603]

In that sense, my genealogy of apartments will map their diachronic emergence from an entanglement of co-evolving and partly convergent systems: former architectural reconfigurings, material, social, climatic, and legal constraints and discourses; at the same time it will often re-pattern many of these systems in turn. This requires attending to the many contingent lines of a complex development in which one cannot single out social systems in the production of space and thus reduce changing architecture to manifestations of changing social practices, which—as we have argued—are always a result of these complex articulations within intra-acting assemblages. Genetic thinkers from Bergson to Deleuze to DeLanda hence urge us never to reduce a cascade of symmetry-breaking sequences (=**SYM-/DIAPOIESES**) to a chronological one (=History), but to retain its intersectional position as a contingently-converging series of events having resulted in distinct divergently-developing lineages. Instead of making things unnecessarily complex, this complication simply helps make it impossible to end up merely classifying certain "types of assemblages" (as with Bryant's ecology of machines). In this regard, we ought to draw attention to **FOUR DIFFERENT**

in *Complexity, Difference and Identity*, ed. Paul Cilliers and Rika Preiser (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 131–164. I borrow the term from Kunnemann's ethical view for "forms of interaction between living beings that emerge out of co-creation" (ibid., 146), but apply it in the original sense of 'dia-' as "through/throughout," to distinguish it from the notion of sympoieses, in a manner analogous to the distinction between syn-/diachronic geneses. Here while sympoiesis draws new lines of differentiation, diapoesis involves historical differenciation. Sym-/diapoieses = syn-/diachronic = different/ciation.

603 Radman, "Involutionary Architecture," 75.

FORMS OF POLITICS of assemblages that, as Nail points out, concerns not so much fully distinguished types, as divergent ways to how concrete assemblages work as historically differentiating elements.[604]

As a first form, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish **TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLAGES**, which arrange their constitutive elements in such a way that they become coded according to proper or natural use. They thus "divide the world into segments, coded according to use."[605] A second form, **STATIST ASSEMBLAGES**, or state assemblages are by contrast characterized by the way that elements are arranged in an "attempt to unify or totalize all the concrete elements and agencies" that make it up by aligning them around a "centralized point of transcendence."[606] A third form, the **CAPITALIST ASSEMBLAGE**, is characterized by its process of axiomatization, the production of a set of legitimating principles that decode relations through privatization, thus disengaging agents from assemblages.[607] A fourth form is the **NOMADIC ASSEMBLAGE**, in which all elements and agencies "are arranged in such a way that … the assemblage is able to change and enter into new combinations"; a "participatory arrangement … incompatible with territorial hierarchies."[608] In the following, I will rely on these distinctions to tell the difference between the different spatial relationalities produced by different architectural arrangements [→ BOOK II]. Yet, regarding this actualization of the virtual in space, Deleuze and Guattari always cautioned to maintain an ontological difference between the virtual (=**ABSTRACT MACHINES**) and the actual (=**CONCRETE ASSEMBLAGES**). Concerning the reductive approach to diagrams, here we must avoid reinstating a reductive and representationalistic relation of resemblance, for instance, between virtual body-plans (diagrams) and the concrete assemblages (material force-fields) through which their actually take form. The task is instead to diagrammatically grasp these differing operations of concrete assemblages in terms of interacting abstract machines by mapping the effects of their different synchronization of forces on the **MACHINIC PHYLUM**. In this affirmative view of the virtual, the phylum *is* the composition of forces.

What is then increasingly interesting in the problem of these geneses is not the question of any synchronous conditions, but that of the critical points in the synchronization of forces; these diapoietic moments, where systems de- or reterritorialize in switching state. Types of eggs or germs, for example,

604 See Nail, "What is an Assemblage?," esp. 28–33.
605 Ibid., 28.
606 Ibid., 30.
607 See ibid., 31–2.
608 Ibid., 32–3.

undergo different developmental processes due to their differing setup as intensive material milieus in which, Deleuze writes, "the orientations, the axes of development, the differential speeds and rhythms … are the primary factors in the actualization of a structure and create a space and a time peculiar to that which is actualized."[609] In evolutionary biology, for instance, phyletic transformations are no longer seen as involving gradual morphological change, but as constituting systems of punctuated equilibria. These are triggered by critical intensive differences among symbiogenic species developing at different rates. DeLanda's *Intensive Science* (2002) famously exemplifies the individuation of forms similarly as a cascade of symmetry-breaking events. In many environmental systems, DeLanda explains, these events trigger phase transitions that occur at differentially determined intensities across phase boundaries, or lines of equilibrium of each system's specific phase diagrams, and thus switch into a new stable aggregate state.[610]

It is interesting to note that Protevi's analysis comes closer to Guattari's single-authored works on machinic semiotics. As he and Deleuze advanced a theory of production, Guattari immediately made a next step as he called for a new analytic that would displace its interpretative focus on systems of statements (discourse analysis), bypassing semiotically already-formed matters in order to foreground **A-SIGNIFYING** semiotic components[611] (**= MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE PRACTICES**), in a matrix with initially six fields that distinguish matter, substance, and form against content and expression ✉[11]. Thereby, he aimed to locate those unconscious "interrupting ruptures … with the potential to set off large-scale sociopolitical transformation[s]."[612] In the 1980s, he would rework Hjemslev's semiotic net, reducing it to four quadrants, based on an understanding of the modal (i.e. relative) distinction between formed and unformed matters.

First presented at the 1983 Cérisy colloquium in honor of Ilya Prigogine and first published in Guattari's *Cartographies schizoanalytiques* (*Schizoanalytic Cartographies,* 1989)[613], this reduced scheme ✉[7–9] is made up of

609 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 214.

610 See DeLanda, *Intensive Science*, esp. 8–12, 18–9, 49.

611 For a discussion of this a-signifying component in relation to architecture, see Deborah Hauptmann and Andrej Radman, eds., *Footprint* 14 (Spring 2014).

612 Guattari, *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, 19 and 27; and id., *The Guattari Reader*, 151–2 (trans. mod.). See also Watson, *Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought*, 161. On the relation of concrete assemblages to bypassing semiotically formed matters (see note 370, above).

613 See Guattari, *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, trans. Andrew Goffey (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 27; here Watson, *Guattari's, Diagrammatic Thought*, 99 and 111. For a strategic employment of these functors, see Radman and Sohn, "The Four Domains on the Plane of Consistency," 1–20.

FOUR ONTOLOGICAL FUNCTORS of Guattari's own invention: a complex economy of flows (F) of actually real matters and physical signals; rhizoming abstract machinic phyla (Φ) that comprise actually possible evolutions and their blueprints, plans, and diagrams; existential territories (T) arranged in cut-outs of virtually real existential segmentarities; and "constellations of incorporeal Universes of reference" (U) made up of values, non-discursive references, and other virtual possibilities. These are the **FOUR DOMAINS OF THE PLANE OF CONSISTENCY**, holding assemblages relatively together in its specific interactions that, as Guattari defends, can only occur along the orthogonal axes (virtual–actual, or possible–real), while there can be no direct, diagonal cross-communication between the doubly-different domains.

As Janell Watson has demonstrated, this advancement constitutes nothing short of a diagrammatic "theory of history" that "culminates in the theory of **MACHINIC HETEROGENESIS**, which serves Guattari as an ontology of a universal history precariously balanced between existential consistency and revolutionary change."[614] As she shows, in this theory, the machinic phylum attains a central function, as history consists in these machinic interactions (tensors) between and across various phyla (technical, scientific, social…). With the help of Guattari's own theorization and some secondary analyses, it is possible to combine this model with the matrix of stratification to arrive at a scheme of those transversally intra-acting machinic domains and tensors between systems and structures that one would have to map.[615] 9–10

614 This part owes greatly inspiration by Watson's splendid reconstruction of Guattari's conception in the chapter "History as Machinic Phylum," in her *Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought*: 135–65; here 137. Challenging what he considered as empty, repetitive, structuralist 'antihistory,' Guattari aimed for an analytic corresponding to "a possible cut in a given order, a rupture, a revolution, a cry for radical reorientation" (Guattari, *Molecular Revolution*, 178–9; cited in Watson, *Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought*, 144). To understand the heterogeneous factors and causalities driving history and social processes, Guattari located a key component not in structures but in 'machines' and the "connections between different machines." Guattari, *Soft Subversions: Texts and Interviews, 1977–1985*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, trans. Chet Wiener and Emily Wittman (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2009), 227; cited in Watson, *Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought*, 15. His conception of machinic phyla not only provides an explicit evolutionary account to machines as inhabited by diagrams and plans, but it also explicitly "emphasizes the diachronic dimension." As Watson remarks, he equally highlights the synchronous "processes of selection, elimination, and generation, of machines by machines, which never cease producing new … possibilities" that enable these machines not only to operate but also to change (Guattari, *Chaosophy*, 18; cited in Watson, *Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought*, 161). See also the related citation above, note 421.

615 Mapping Guattari's four ontological functors on the Deleuzo-Guattarian matrix of stratification is, however, not an easy task or self-evident. And to my knowledge, this has not been attempted systematically. If we simply follow an enumerative logic (FE, FC, SE, SC, and F, T, Φ, U), one would arrive at an equivalence relation FE := F, FC := T, SE := Φ, SC := U. By contrast, Holmes equated (probably by mistake) territories with the **SUBSTANCE OF EXPRESSION**. Brian Holmes, "Guattari's Schizoanalytic Cartographies: or, the Pathic Core



7 *Top left*, redrawn scheme of Guattari's "four ontological functors" of deterritorialization and the related interactions and discursivities, as elaborated in his *Schizoanalytic Cartographies* (Fig. 1.1–1.2). As Gary Genosko succinctly summarized this scheme: "The ontological square consists of four equal parts. On the bottom left side one finds material–energetic fluxes and on the top left side, the machinic phyla and their diverse technological strands; on the bottom right side, there are the existential territories of subjectivities (human and non-human and inorganic) and on the top right side, incorporeal universes containing values, points of reference, relations with others, aesthetic experiences, utopias, imaginings, etc. On the left hand side of the square (flux and phylum) are techno-materialist functions expressed discursively, whereas on the right hand side (territories and universes) are ethico-aesthetic concerns and a myriad of qualitative issues organized non-discursively." (Genosko, *Guattari: A Critical Introduction*, 9).

8 *Top right*, the second diagram shows the specificities of striation in relation to the matrix of stratification, and the respective tensors between systems and structures: Striation of constellation of constellation of the Universes of references; a rhizomatic striation of the machinic Phyla; a striation of existential segmentarities/Territories; striation of the instantiation of Flows (after Guattari's *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, and Genosko's *Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction*).

(continued overleaf)





(continued from previous page)

9 *Previous page, bottom left*, the scheme with the ontological functors integrated into the matrix of stratification and Foucault's four dispositifs, as illustrated above. Please note that — according to Guattari's scheme — the functors communicate only vertically (i.e. between forms and substances), or horizontally (i.e. between content and expression), yet not diagonally. Regarding architectural arrangement, this means that there is direct correlation between functional groups (SC, as an 'organization of geneses') and (institutional) organizations (FE, as a 'composition of forces'), nor between spatial setup (FC, 'art of distribution') and their function (SE, 'control of activities'). This way we avoid both architectural determinism, as well as meso-reductionism.

10 *Previous page, bottom right*, specificities of striation from Guattari's from *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, in relation to the matrix of stratification, and the respective tensors between systems and structures: Striation of constellation of constellation of the Universes of references; a rhizomatic striation of the machinic Phyla; a striation of existential segmentarities/Territories; striation of the instantiation of Flows.

11 *Above left*, In his early critique of "The Place of the Signifier in the Institution" (1973), Guattari argued that "the semiotics with which we are confronted in an institutional context, bring into play two additional dimensions of nonsemiotically formed [intensive] matters" (Guattari, *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, 17). Therein he extends the matrix to six domains. It first distinguishes the "a-semiotic, or natural encodings" that fall outside the semiotically accessible. This is the field of virtual multiplicities and its genetic encoding of material intensities that takes place without any semiotic 'inscription'. By contrast those "signifying semiologies" — that rest at the core of each historical stratum — rely on processes of semiotic inscription: Guattari distinguishes here 'symbolic regimes' working through gestural postural or ritual semiotics from what he denounces as "semiologies of signification" relating to the historical appearance of regimes of inscription. Against this overcoding role of post-signifying semiotics, Guattari highlight the crucial function of a-signifying semiotics — elsewhere called diagrams — that, by bypassing substance in going from matter to form, enable 'revolutionary analytic machines'.

12 *Above right*, with Ole Moysted's work, we can review this scheme also as an attempt to capture the specific 'doubling' that happens between the double articulation of substance and content in two processes of sedimentation and consolidation, which center on a certain folding, an existential niche production: in which sedimented substances are always "formed matters" (F/f) in relation to more unformed matters (S/s).

As I have shown before, in *A Thousand Plateaus* the form of content was "always an architecture." This would imply to understand architectural arrangements, configurations, forms, plans, and so on as specific constellations (i.e., "universes" in Guattari's scheme), rather than 'cut-outs' ("territories"). As Watson remarks, existential territories are constructed "out of the various semiotic materials and social connections available, holding everything together" by means of specific patterns of repetition.[616] In this regard, the existential territory is the modally-different, selected niche produced by certain arrangements and their really-distinct conjunction of regulated flows (e.g. circulation, and activities). But to avoid any either/or-thinking here, it may be more fruitful to go back to Guattari's earlier six-part scheme ☒[11] and review how his reduction from six to four quadrants might be understood as an attempt at conceptually abstracting a certain 'doubling' that happens in the

at the Heart of Cybernetics" (2009), n.p., avail. online at https://brianholmes.wordpress.com/2009/02/27/guattaris-schizoanalytic-cartographies/). This expressive reading of territory seems to stem from Deleuze and Guattari's conception that the "Territory is the result of the becoming expressive of milieu components and expressive qualities may be called art" (Genosko, *Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction*, 110). But this is not an equation, for as such it is precisely the non-discursive content of what becomes expressive. Guattari's work is superficially only relatively clear on the expression/content distinction (Guattari, *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, 88–90). Respectively Genosko, as also Watson does, maps *Territories* and *Universes* definitely as a 'content' (see resp. Fig. 5.1a "Assemblage of the four functorial domains," in Genosko's *Aberrant Introduction*, 204; and Fig. 3.1 "The four ontological functors," in Watson's *Diagrammatic Thought*, 100). A second difficulty, concerns the mapping of the possible/real distinction with substance/form (and the variable/constant) distinction. Especially Deleuze had repeatedly insisted on the purely mental or *modal* difference drawn between substances and forms. This, Deleuze insisted, differs from the *always real* difference distinguishing content from expression (see above, note 366). Perhaps it is this modal difference that underlies Guattari's excitement over Hjelmslev's work in which "structures [i.e. forms: as *phyla* and *universes*] are connected to processes [i.e. substance: *flows* and *territories*]" (see above, note 349). Here, Genosko refers to Guattari's own footnotes in which he mentions that in addition to how "Louis Hjelmslev had divided up the Saussurean notion of substance into matter and substance," he "divided up the notion of form into incorporeal Universes and abstract machinic Phyla. Thus, by transposing the formula according to which substance is the manifestation of form in matter, we might say here existential *Territories* are the manifestation of incorporeal Universes and machinic Phyla in energetico-signaletic Flows" (Guattari, *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, 271 n18; Genosko's *Aberrant Introduction*, 203). From this statement we would place U and Φ in the 'forms'-half. This would be consistent with understanding "references" (U) and "body plans" (Φ) as specific 'constants' (=form), while understanding flows (F) and configurations (T) as crucial 'variables' (=substance). This way, one would have *existential territories* be the substance of content, and more generally give an equivalence between SE :=F, SC :=T, FE :=Φ, FC :=U. Lastly, the specific machinic interactions in Guattari's transversal ontology, included in the diagram, are taken from the great elaboration Genosko, *Aberrant Introduction*, esp. 200–16; and id., *Guattari: A Critical Introduction* (London/New York: Pluto, 2009); as well as id., *Reinventing Social Practices: Essays on Félix Guattari* (London/New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018). In constructing this model, I also relied on Massumi's *User's Guide*, and long (email) discussions with Andrej Radman.

616 Watson, *Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought*, 10–11. This is where to position 'habit.'

double articulation of only modally-different substances and forms in the two related processes of sedimentation and consolidation.

Based on the guiding ideas of Ole Möystad's recent work,[617] I would like to further develop this model of historical formations by reconsidering this doubling topologically as involving a certain folding by which sedimented substances are always only "formed matters" (F/f) relative to more "unformed matters" (S/s), producing those integrated layers of modally-different substantial contents (here indicated as ∫C) ⊠[12] that make up our real universe. Not only are these composed from a singular substance, that is, individual formations (=**MONISM**), but they are also the resulting layers folding these differentially-modal substances back onto-themselves. These can then be better understood as representing the transversal relations established between heterogeneous substances formed to different degrees, while those stratifications established between differently-scaled assemblages, figurations, bodies, or partial objects, are represented by the concentric circles in the diagram. In stretching both ways (=**DOUBLE ARTICULATION**), the same folding process occurs between relatively (un)structured expressions (∫E). As Genosko stresses, Guattari aimed to directly connect "signs (form) and things (matter) … with one another independently of the subjective 'hold' that the agents of individuated enunciation (substance) claim to have over them."[618] Beyond the realm of signification we find a much greater field of **ASIGNIFICATION** that for Guattari consists in those "non-human forms of enunciation in and among machinic systems."[619] By "swerving around substance," Genosko argues, Guattari's metamodeling "shows how asignification cuts across the strata."[620] As such the a-signifying encoding, as I would argue, occurs precisely through these relative distinctions as they unfold and evolve in involving niches or phase-spaces of semiotically-interlocked, that is specifically-stratified assemblages, territorialized in its virtual contents and coded in its actual expression. In this regard, it is especially the level of asignifying semiotics in which doubly twofold (de-/re)territorializing and (de-/re)coding processes play out.

Here, the organizing role of existential territories and their "striation of existential segmentarities" carried out by territorialization processes, will be crucial in understanding the emergence of apartments not so much as an

617 Ole Möystad, *Cognition and the Built Environment* (London/New York: Routledge, 2018), esp. 33ff.

618 Gary Genosko, "Information and Asignification," *Footprint* 14 (Spring 2014), 13–28; citing Guattari, *La révolution moléculaire* (Fontenay-sous-Bois: Encres/Recherches, 1977), 282.

619 Genosko, "Information and Asignification," 20.

620 Ibid., 22.

architecture in general, but more specifically as a serial space [→ PART II]. As I will demonstrate, it is produced by a certain mapping that can "produce new kinds of social practices"; and this "mapping has to do with 'systems of transformation.'"[621] For my purposes, this difference is crucial to prevent falling back onto an approach of tracing the typologically developing architecture of apartments as a result of (or response to changing) social practices, by reducing the production of this existential territory to a developing lived space, as Lefebvre would have it. From an anti-representational perspective, one needs to render visible and diagram how the collective history of building types and their phylogeneses inscribed into the topological invariants of body-plan on a phyletic level, has set up a specific phase-space (that is never reducible to either historical periods or regional developments, but which encompasses differential spatio-temporal patterns of repetition). In this process, architectural arrangements facilitate and enable new social relations, power formation, and state assemblage to actualize. In this view, the evolving architecture of appartements, as it were, thus became an enabling constraint for the court assemblage to unfold as it did, in its sequence of differentiated spaces.

0.3.3 Mapping Integration-Differentiations in Architecture

Regarding this mapping of emergent systems, it would be necessary to approach evolving architectures more *epigenetically*, meaning through a process of progressive differentiation. In aiming to understand the evolving residential systems of appartements in aristocratic palaces and *hôtel* in the following books by mapping their historical differentiation, we ought to note, however, that this development, in particular, was studied in predominantly 'cladogenetic' terms, primarily emphasizing their regional differentiation.[622] What I mean by this is that historians have often analyzed these stately architectures through geographic (e.g. national, i.e. implicitly cultural) determinants and changing environmental conditions (population growth/density), or by descriptively focusing on morphological or typological (formal) or behavioral, praxeological, or stylistic (expressive) differences. Here, and concerning many more buildings, the innate view of typological thinking has over-emphasized

621 Ibid., 11; citing Guattari, *Cartographies Schizoanalytiques*, 41.

622 *Cladogenesis* (from Ancient Greek κλάδος, "branch") means the splitting of newly forming species through geographic separation, which contrasts 'anagenesis' in which a species slowly accumulates change until it is sufficiently different to be recognized as a different species or form.

pheno- and genotypical aspects by tracing diverse histories of building types. I explicitly use tracing here, meaning they conflate the process with the product. Describing speciation often becomes a problem of cladistics (and in the worst case, 'phenetics'), that is, the positing of a common ancestor by means of classification based on (merely apparent) shared derived characteristics.[623] Therein, the question of 'provenance' (where things came from) is still greatly reduced in the name of a quest for 'origins,' failing to account for emergence in genetic terms—those moments of entering forces that a genealogical view and ontology of becoming proper aims to foreground in understanding geneses (from where things come to be).[624]

More complex than this traditional cladogenetic developmental theory of geographic differentiation, **EPIGENETICS** centers on the question, how environments influence and modify evolving forms within a structural coupling that in turn proves to have effects on following generations, thus influencing phylogenetic processes. Epigenetics is a branch of biology that originally developed against preformationism in embryonic development. It involves the notion that organisms gradually take form through and evolve within successive differentiation processes. In searching for the related differentiating factors of development that—acquired over an individual's life—come to be "activated within a generation (ontogeny, development) and transferred from generation to generation (phylogeny, evolution)" within this gradual emergence of forms, epigenetic research is at the forefront of revolutionizing our understanding of evolution, in foregrounding a variety of factors of non-genetic heritability such as "molecular, biochemical, hormonal, physiological, behavioral, experiential, and/or environmental factors [that] can modify patterns of gene expression."[625]

Akin to an **ETHOLOGY** of forces forming bodies from intensive material milieus, epigenetic thinking foregrounds generative rhythms.[626] For theorizing

623 In evolutionary biology, phenetics (from φαίνειν, "to appear"), was an early attempt to classify organisms by way of ungrounded analyses that—based solely on similarities in observable traits—often ignored their actual evolutionary relation. This approach is today superseded by cladistics, in which phylogenetic relations between organism are tested and represented based on molecular evidence.

624 Of course, I am here referring to Foucault's Nietzschean distinction between *Ursprung*, *Herkunft*, and *Entstehung* (see above, note 86). On emergence as the entering of forces, see Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," 149.

625 Adam Scarfe, "Epigenetics, Soft Inheritance, Mechanistic Metaphysics, and Bioethics," in *Beyond Mechanism: Putting Life Back into Biology*, ed. idem and Brian G. Henning (Lanham/Plymouth: Lexington, 2013), 372–408; here 372–3; and Brian Hall, "Epigenesis, Epigenetics, and the Epigenotype: Toward an Inclusive Concept of Development and Evolution," in ibid, 348–371

626 For a study that situates the emergence of epigenetic theory in a history of the concept of rhythm, and a specific rhythmic episteme, see esp. Janina Wellmann, *The Form of*

epigenetic processes, one must move beyond historical or morphological description in order to conceptualize this form of becoming in terms of its continually changing component structures that simultaneously change with their interrelationships. This, we have seen, is best done in at once sym/diapoietic terms. If lines of differenciation are best caught by the term 'evolution,' then this incremental differentiation entailed in epigenetic processes is better thought of as an **INVOLUTION**; an inward-directed process of formation by folding in, or internalizing an associated milieu. As the third element within morphogenetic processes, epigenesis takes a middle ground between genetic determinism and multiple environmental influence on the individuation of forms (or applied to architectural history, 'types' and 'social practices'). In this regard, epigenesis is the Simondonian milieu of individuation, as Catherine Malabou foregrounds, as it marks "the meeting point between the old and the new, the space where they reciprocally interfere and transform one another."[627] This interference would again require rendering visible what is going on (= **SYNCHRONIC EPIGENESES/SYMPOIESES**) in what was happening (= **DIACHRONIC PHYLOGENESES/DIAPOIESES**).

From Genesis to Epigenesis and Epiphylogenesis

It is from this twofold understanding that the built environment can be rethought from an ecosystemic-cum-machinic perspective. In carefully distinguishing living and non-living systems, Gilbert Simondon recognized that "the living being solves problems not only by adaptation, that is, by modifying its relation to the milieu (as a machine can), but by modifying itself, by inventing new internal structures, by inserting itself completely in the axiomatic of vital problems."[628] I like to investigate more closely now how reversing this logic, and indirectly showing that the adaptation of environments seems to have a specific machinic component. But before I can go further on this point, I should address a justifiable concern about the limits of applying these biological conceptions to the built environment. While buildings can certainly 'grow,' they are most definitely not undergoing developmental processes of forming organs and tissues through cellular differentiation from germinal cells like living entities. Yet, epigenetic thinking applies to

Becoming: Embryology and the Epistemology of Rhythm, 1760–1830, trans. Kate Sturge (New York: Zone, 2017), here 110.)

627 Catherine Malabou, *Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality,* trans Carolyn Shread (Cambridge: Polity 2016), 11, 158.

628 Simondon, *L'individuation psychique et collective*, 17; cited and trans. from *L'individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d'information*, 28 in Voss, "Simondon on the Notion of the Problem," 95;

architecture in a different manner. Because, for differentiation to take place in biology, "epigenesis must be recapitulated," as philosopher of technology Bernard Stiegler argues in strong resonance with Deleuze's above-mentioned view that repetition is the condition of emergence of the new.[629] From this perspective, we should note that architecture *does have a specific* developmental process, too, in being designed in an incremental and iterative process that involves a repetition and differentiation of previous architectural entities.[630] With Stiegler, we can thus argue that the formation of architecture, like the genesis of any other technical object, involves "a recapitulating, dynamic, and morphogenetic (phylogenetic) accumulation of individual experience (epi)" that is "conserving the trace of past epigenetic events … as lessons of experience."[631] It is with this view that we finally arrive at what Stiegler named "epiphylogenesis."

EPIPHYLOGENESIS is an anthropotechnical concept coined to describe the co-evolution of brains and cognitive or mental patterns in reciprocity with tools. This epiphylogenetic view goes far beyond the dominant concern of many philosophers of technology who look into the ways human agency is mediated by technology, as it understands both the genesis of our species and life-world in general, and ethnic or cultural differentiations in particular, as fundamentally dependent on certain technologies, or more precisely, technics.[632] This coupling of human evolution with technical evolution was initially suggested by anthropologists like André Leroi-Gourhan, for whom Western civilization has not only been modified by the development of machines, or has evolved through, or co-evolved with a set of characteristic technics, but for whom human evolution can generally not be detached from the development of technics and technology. In this reciprocal development of humans and their technical instruments, Stiegler observes the beginnings of a higher form of evolution unique to humans. This form consists in a characteristic

629 Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998); *Technics and Time 2: Disorientation*, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009); and *Technics and Time 3: Cinematic Time and the Question of Malaise*, trans. Stephen Barker (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2011); hereafter cited as *Technics and Time*, I–III. Here *Technics and Time*, I: 140.

630 Here I am not implying a difference to 'buildings,' for all buildings to come to be shaped through some form of recapitulation, only that especially the pre-designed mode seems prone to greater differentiation.

631 Ibid., 177.

632 I rely here on Simondon's sharp distinction of technics (and techniques) form technology, wherein the latter pertains to the meta-theory of technics. See SImondon, *Mode of Existence*, 15 n1. English still does not always cater to this radical distinction, without having to resort to "technique(s)" over "technology."

"externalization" of accumulated experience within an environment specifically technicized into a site of inheritance and transmission.

Thus transposing the evolutionary notion of symbiogenesis onto a technological level, it debunks simple nature-culture divides and helps transpose an ecosystemic vision of historical formation of the built environment toward an explicitly machinic one.[633] Yet, in advancing this transposition here, I like to suggest that we directly mitigate the fact that Stiegler's work widely restricts itself to the question how technics thus make us human, or who we are. Thus highlighting that there has never been such a thing as 'the human' to begin with, Stiegler's work can (and should) be revisited and critically extended through more critical feminist, queer, and decolonial conceptions that have been developed in parallel by scholars including but not limited to Claire Colebrook or Kathryn Yusoff. Yusoff's notion of anthropogenesis, particularly, accounts far more adequately for the extent to which different techniques also make us differently human.[634] Others, like Alexander Weheliye, have highlighted that technological ensembles also (de)humanize us to differing degrees and in different ways, as they involve a variety of hierarchizing assemblages[635] and boundary-drawing practices.[636] Together, they are shifting the universalizing question of anthropogenesis toward a more nuanced problematization of **HETEROGENESES.**

Based on this implicit update, the concept of **EPIPHYLOGENESIS** stands in for a techno-mediated evolutionary theory of (the human) species through its structurally coupled co-evolution to evolving technical systems, and their production of multiple differences that it generated. Stiegler's account of how this higher-order sort of evolution works is based on Leroi-Gourhan's suggestion that technics ought to be seen as an "exteriorization of memory" to which

633 The notion of epiphylogenesis has since received some exposure in the field of media studies, initially by Belinda Barnet, "Technical Machines and Evolution" (2004), ctheory.net, avail. online at https://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/ctheory/article/view/14545/5392; and id. and Andrés Vaccari, "Prolegomena to a Future Robot History: Stiegler, Epiphylogenesis and Technical Evolution," *Transformations* 17 (2009): n.p., avail. online at http://www.transformationsjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Vaccari-Barnet_Trans17.pdf. See also Chris Abel, *The Extended Self: Architecture, Memes, and Minds* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2014), chapter 4. I thank Andrej Radman for introducing me to this concept.

634 See esp. the notion of anthropogenesis promoted by Yusoff, "Anthropogenesis: Origins and Endings in the Anthropocene," *Theory, Culture & Society* 34, nos. 2–3 (2017): 105–27, which aligns with Sylvie Wynter's social-constructivist notion of sociogeny. See Katherine McKittrick, ed., *Sylvie Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis* (London/Durhan: Duke UP, 2015), 1–8. For a bridging reading of sexual difference to architecture, see also Colebrook, "Sex and the (Anthropocene) City," *Theory, Culture & Society* 34, nos. 2–3 (2017), 39–60.

635 See here again esp. Weheliye's *Habeas Viscus*, passim.

636 Here in reference to the aforementioned works by Barad and Haraway.

	1. Memory/Synthesis	2. Memory/Synthesis	3. Memory/Synthesis
memories	Genetic Memory given/inherited	Epigenetic Habit(at)s acquired/contracted	Epiphylogenetic Technics
associated milieus	pre-individual milieu = "already-there"	milieu of individuation = "in the making"	individuated figurations = "of the world"
cf. Anti-Oedipus	synthesis of differentiated partial objects and flows	synthesis of differentiating singularities and chains	synthesis of differenciated intensities and becomings

13 THE THREE SYNTHESES II: Stiegler's *Technics and Time* distinguishes three memories; genetic, epigenetic, and epiphylogenetic memories. As those are modelled on Kant's three syntheses, they can be mapped onto and re-read through Deleuze's scheme.

all techniques can be traced back,[637] Stiegler reconsiders **TECHNICS** (*la technique*) as the evolution of the living "by means other than life."[638] Yet this externalization also comes with a specific loss of memory, that Stiegler work hopes to recall, so as to counter our technological illiteracy regarding how this process works. Stiegler's *La technique et le temps 1* (*Technics and Time 1*, 1994), extending Leroi-Gourhan's work, distinguishes three types of memory through which individuals and species develop: (1) genetic memory, (2) epigenetic memory, and (3) epiphylogenetic memory.[639] In contrast to inherited genetic memory, and secondary epigenetic memory accumulated during but not conserved beyond individual lives, epiphylogenesis is "the conservation, accumulation, and sedimentation of successive epigeneses."[640] As "the trace of past epigenetic events that accumulate as lessons of experience" (as a

637 André Leroi-Gourhan, *L'homme et la matiere* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1943); id., *Milieu et techniques* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1945); see also id, *Le Geste et la Parole*, 2 vols (Paris: Albin Michel, 1964/65). See Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, I: 43, and also Yuk Hui, *The Question Concerning Technology in China: An Essay in Cosmotechnics* (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2016), 216.

638 Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, I: 17, 135.

639 See ibid., 177.

640 Ibid., 140.

"past that I never lived but that is nevertheless my past, without which I would never have had a past of my own"), this memory is conserved in what is already there.[641] As such, epiphylogenetic memory is always exteriorized memory, "housed outside the body through the organization of the inorganic."[642] Recently, Stiegler has called this an "exosomatic organogenesis" (or **EX-ORGANOGENSIS** for short), in which certain techniques take concrete form.[643] Yuk Hui notes that such an exteriorization and **EX-ORGANIZATION** of memory is found in the form of "languages, the use of tools, the consumption of goods, and ritual practices."[644] Unfortunately, with this spatialization and materialization of previous experiences beyond consciousness, which thus "constitutes an unconscious, if not the unconscious,"[645] this exorganization also involves a specific forgetting; an increasing unawareness, if not outright technological illiteracy, as to how this 'offloading' of memory into some spatial template (as Deacon would call this) technically operates within epiphylogenetic processes.

To Stiegler and Hui's list (of such forgotten epiphylogenetic technics) we should add the built environment. Stiegler already diagnosed that "to create one's own milieu is to build"[646]; as building implies adaptive niche-construction, not just passive adaptation. And this is where architecture comes into play in its epiphylogenetic capacity. As an anthropogenic system, the built environment too conserves in its organization an accumulated memory that has become externalized into a particular arrangement of an environment adapted by previous modes of inhabitation. In this regard, the habitats we inhabit are always inherited and 'forestructured.' As such it also inhibits certain possibilities. Yet, this forestructure, as I have argued throughout, is as an acquired structure not reducible to Bourdieu's "structuring structure" or Giddens's "structuration" organizing practices.[647] Rather, it is an enabling constraint for transforming the already there, closer to Guattari's differentiating factor, something to work with, always producing a 'space of possibilities'

641 Ibid., 177 and 140; see also Hui, *Question Concerning Technology*, 216.

642 Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, III: 206.

643 Stiegler, *The Neganthropocene*, ed., trans. Daniel Ross (London: Open Humanities Press, 2018), 64.

644 Hui, *Question Concerning Technology*, 216.

645 Stiegler, *For a New Critique of Political Economy*, 8.

646 Stiegler, *Technics and Time* I: 80.

647 Protevi here helpfully clarifies that "The relation of 'rule' to 'pattern' is what Bourdieu calls 'habitus,' and what Deleuze and Guattari call de-territorialization accompanied by compensatory reterritorialization." Protevi in "Deleuzian Interrogations: A Conversation with Manuel DeLanda, John Protevi and Torkild Thanem," in *Tamara: Journal for Critical Organization Inquiry* 3, no. 4 (2004), 65–88; here 70, avail. online at https://tamarajournal.com/index.php/tamara/article/view/234.

(DeLanda) associated with each technical ensembles and their material-discursive practices of organizing the inorganic. This possibility space always bears the potential to transcend the acquired structure in understanding, undoing, or reworking how environmental arrangements have been tooled into specific technics. As Grosz notes, this capacity lies in "the virtualities, the potentialities, within biological existence that enable cultural, social and historical forces to work with and actively transform that existence."[648]

Stiegler similarly sees epiphylogenesis as a transcendental concept,[649] not only because it "designates the appearance of a new relation between the organism and its environment, which is also a new state of matter" that radically changes the conditions for organogenesis, because this accumulated "epigenesis exerts a powerful counter-effect on the reproduction of the species" as it conditions, stimulates, or channels "the transformative conditions of 'selection pressure.'"[650] Such a conception of selection, Luciana Parisi argues, does not presupposes any linear process of sorting out order, but understands instead the metastable feedback loops between entities and their environment.[651] In this sense, architecture involves 'chreodic' paths of evolution as it topologically modulates the developmental potential on the 'epigenetic landscape.'[652] This modulation lies in a gradual folding-in of a niche in the morphogenetic field, which with Möystad we can understand as representing a certain counter-pressure on natural selection.[653] ✉[14]

648 Grosz, "Darwin and Feminism: Preliminary Investigations for a Possible Alliance," *Australian Feminist Studies* 14, no. 29 (1999), 31–45; reprinted in *Material Feminisms,* ed. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekmam (Indianapolis/Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2008), 23–51; here 24.

649 Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, I: 243.

650 Ibid., 177; and id., *Technics and Time*, III: 206.

651 Parisi, *Abstract Sex*, 53

652 Both the notion of the epigenetic landscape and the 'chreod' were coined by embryologist Conrad H. Waddington, whose book *Organisers and Genes* (1940), featured a frontispiece depicted developmental morphogenetic evolutionary processes as a complex valley landscape rather than tree diagram. See Susan M. Squier, "Epigentic Landscape," in *Posthuman Glossary*, ed. Braidotti and Hlavajova, 132–3. Introducing the latter morphogenetic concept of the chreod to architecture, Kwinter wrote: "A chreod—even the name was invented, a combination of the Greek words for 'determined' or 'necessary' and 'pathway'—belongs to a theory of formation in which space is deeply implicated both in its genesis and its product. A chreod refers to an invisible but not imaginary feature in an invisible but not imaginary landscape on which a developing form gathers the information and the influence necessary for it to make itself what it is." Sanford Kwinter, "A Discourse on Method (For the Proper Conduct of Reason and the Search for Efficacity in Design), in *Exploration in Architecture: Teaching, Design, Research*, ed. Reto Geiser (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2008), 34–47. For an innovative topological reworking of Waddington's concept, see also Möystad, *Cognition and the Built Environment*, 143–61. See also Radman, *Gibsonism*, esp. 198; and *Ecologies of Architecture* (forthcoming).

653 Möystad, *Cognition and the Built Environment*, 23–24.

Concerning this (counter-)selective component, the enveloping of a developmental potential by niches brings us back to Grosz's idea of worlds as territorial framings.[654] With Grosz, several feminist theorists including Parisi and Braidotti have started reclaiming Darwinian modes of thinking as a relevant lens for the humanities to rethink what makes evolving human social systems so different in involving environmental adaptations to help stabilize social ecosystems.[655] Grosz, most notably perhaps, links this emergence of a "new kind of relation between life and its surrounding support systems" to the contraction of 'habits.'[656] For her, habits are closely tied to "how environments impact and transform the forms of life they accommodate and are themselves impacted and transformed by these forms of life."[657] Through a line of thinking spanning Félix Ravaisson, via Henri Bergson, to Deleuze, she understands habit not merely in passive deterministic terms but as an active, dynamic notion of habit. Malabou had earlier highlighted with Ravaisson and Deleuze that habits are not passively acquired but rather "contracted," meaning that habit exists "owing to a change, with respect to the very change that gave birth to it"; "a residue of repetition."[658] As such we can understand habit, as Toscano furthermore noted, as "an iterative procedure in which chance is captured by or 'canalized' into regularity, and in which regularity itself is always prey to the novelty-inducing irruptions of change."[659] Like the Aristotelian notion of habit as a disposition (diathesis), the notion of habit thus etymologically refers to tendencies in which an entity behaves or "holds itself" according to the place it holds and onto through various expressive forms, styles, and demeanors.

As in Deleuze's second synthesis of disjunction and Malabou's differential reading of epigeneses, habit thus acts as "a middle ground, where the passive and the active meet."[660] Here we find the reciprocal determination of technicized material milieus (rather than nature) modified by co-evolving modes of inhabitation (rather than cultures), in which we should understand

654 See Grosz, *Chaos, Territory, Art*.

655 See also Grosz, *Becoming Undone*. For Colebrook's feminist reclamation of Darwin, see—besides her article, "On Not Becoming Man," in *Material Feminisms*, ed. Alaimo and Hekman, 52–84—id., *Death of the Posthuman: Essays on Extinction, Vol. 1* (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2014); and id., *Sex After Life: Essays on Extinction, Vol. 2*. See these studies for further literature. See also Braidotti, *Metamorphoses*, 117–39.

656 Grosz, "Habit Today: Ravaisson, Bergson, Deleuze and Us," *Body & Society* 19, nos. 2–3 (2017): 217–39; here 218

657 Ibid., 219.

658 Malabou, "Addiction and Grace," preface to Félix Ravaisson, *Of Habit*, trans. Clare Carlisle and Mark Sinclair (London/New York: Continuum, 2008), viii; and Ravaisson, *Of Habit*, 25.

659 Toscano, *Theatre of Production*, 126.

660 Grosz, "Habit Today," 222.

the formation of habit(at)s as a twofold material-discursive process of reconfiguring the world. As Grosz points out: "habit is the way in which life accommodates materiality and brings its own materiality into coordination with the material forces that regulate its environment."[661] We can thus understand the workings of a habitat as an accumulated or acquired structure akin to habit, as both are results of "our modes of engagement with and transformation by the real; and this is quite precisely a measure of the extent to which the real is itself transformed by living beings."[662] Challenging the traditionally representationalistic relationship between types and practices in architectural history, in such an immanentist vision habits and habitats are just complementary aspects of the same process: of internalization and exteriorization, involution and evolution, adopting and adapting. Instead of one being the 'container' for the other, they are two differently-scaled yet co-constitutive assemblages taking form in human/social and architectural/spatial bodies.

It is in this sense that avant-garde architecture theorists like Kwinter and Radman have urged us to fundamentally rethink the level on which environmental formations such as architecture technically operate within ontogenetic processes.[663] Stiegler's conclusion that in them, "the *what* invents the *who* just as much as it is invented by it," is translated into architecture with Radman's argument that "the psychotropic cry that 'we shape our cities; thereafter they shape us' is to be taken literally."[664] In fact, "the built environment has no other purpose but to transform us."[665] As such we face a twofold task of more generally acknowledging architecture's technical function to transform us and the world, while exploring its entanglement within specific technical ensembles in order to reveal possibilities for recomposing the modes in which it does so.

From Technology to a General Organology

Therefore it seems sensible that architectural thinking, as Radman suggests, "ought to reclaim its vanguard position within the Epiphylogenetic Turn which embraces *technē* as constitutive of (post)humanity, and not merely the other

661 Ibid., 231.
662 Ibid., 218.
663 Sanford Kwinter, "A Discourse on Method," 40–45; and id., "Neuroecology: Notes Toward a Synthesis," in *The Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism: Part Two*, ed. Warren Neidich (Berlin: Archive Books, 2014), 313–33.
Radman, "Involutionary Architecture," 61–86; and "Architecture's Awaking," 133.
664 Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, I: 177; and Radman, "Ecologies of Architecture," in *Posthuman Glossary*, ed. Braidotti and Hlavajova, 117–120; here 119.
665 Radman, "Ecologies of Architecture," 118; in reference to Sanford Kwinter, "Neuroecology," 313.

way around."[666] Yet approaching architecture's technical function as producing 'life by other means' implies first of all an employment of "othered and alien [modes of] reasoning for new ends," as Antonia Majaca and Luciana Parisi have argued; namely, that of "instrumentality," or "*technē*—as the instrument itself."[667] In understanding instrumentality not as the means to realize an idea, but as an enactment of learning, this 'logic,' they argue, can only be understood in terms of what Charles Sanders Peirce called abductive reasoning. Thereby we understand a speculative form of creative (and designerly) reasoning working with conjectures and extrapolating theoretical insights in reframing empirical findings.[668] Here the machinic challenges us to employ techno*logy* as a post- and more-than-human, more artificial mode of reasoning (and not just not just a form of subjectivity), as Luciana Parisi stresses, that is no longer constrained to human rationality, but embraces a (denaturalized) ecological, processual rationality enabled and elaborated by self-regulatory physical systems, learning interactively through responsive feedback loops.[669]

What is still missing is a wider acknowledgment and multi-layered understanding of this capacity of the technicity of the built environment to transform us. The Simondonian notion of **TECHNICITY**, Aud Sissel Hoel comments, "offers an operational theory of technological mediation" within Simondon's genetic theory of technical culture,[670] another part of which is a distinct 'theory of operations' that he had called **ALLAGMATICS**, interested in

666 Radman, "Ecologies of Architecture," 119 (modified).

667 Antonia Majaca and Luciana Parisi, "The Incomputable and Instrumental Possibility," *e-flux journal* 77 (Nov 2016), n.p. (online).

668 Ibid. See here for instance, Stefan Timmermans and Iddo Tavory, "Theory Construction in Qualitative Research: From Grounded Theory to Abductive Analysis," *Sociological Theory* 30, no. 3 (2012), 167–86. For a discussion of abduction as a 'designerly way of knowing,' see Nigel Cross, *Designerly Ways of Knowing* (Basel: Birkäuser, 2007), esp. 35–37, 53.

669 Luciana Parisi, "Computational Logic and Ecological Rationality," in *General Ecology*, eds. Erich Hörl and Burton, 75–100; see also her video lecture "Instrumentality or the Origin of Techno-logic," ICA Miami, avail. online at https://www.icamiami.org/channel/luciana-parisi-instrumentality-or-the-origin-of-techno-logic/.

670 Here after Aud Sissel Hoel, "Technicity," in *Posthuman Glossary*, ed. Braidotti and Hjalajova, 420–3. For an introduction on Simondon's notion of technicity, see esp. Gilbert Simondon, "The Genesis of Technicity," *Deleuze Studies* 5.3 (2011), 408–24, where Simondon argues that "The genesis of a particular phase can be described in itself; but it cannot be really known in its sense and, consequently, understood in its postulation of unity, unless it is repositioned in the totality of its genesis, as a phase in relation to other phases. This is why in trying to understand technicity it is not enough to start with constituted technical objects; objects emerge at a certain moment, but technicity precedes and surpasses them; technical objects result from an objectification of technicity; they are produced by it, yet technicity is not exhausted in these objects and is not entirely contained in them" (ibid., 410). See also Arthur Bradley, and Louis Armand, eds., *Technicity* (Prague: Litteria Pragensia, 2006).

the general and specific modalities how such individuating systems variously operate. Therein it problematizes the precise degree of **CONCRETIZATION** of specific technicities that, as he argued, are usually social before they become technological.[671] Through the notion of concretization, Simondon's *Du mode d'existence des objects techniques* (*On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, 1958) foregrounds a mode of analyzing technology that, as Stavros Kousoulas reminds us, does "not focus on fixed properties and functional attributes but rather on the genealogical—therefore temporal—evolution of technical objects," including their genesis.[672]

Concerning this technogenesis, Simondon had thus called—in parallel to Martin Heidegger and Bertrand Gille—for a new form of knowledge: 'technology' or 'mechanology,' which is not simply a knowledge of technical objects, but rather lies in a new awareness of the mutual development of human and machines (or the **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLES** they form); and a related literacy concerning the mediating function of technics within historical processes.[673] Similar to Nietzsche's and Foucault's genealogical position toward utility, Simondon and Stiegler have stressed the need to account for technical dynamics in a radically non-anthropological fashion by radically refusing to reify technical objects as utensils, tools, or instruments, and using technology instead as a lens to overcome anthropocentrism in keeping the focus on becomings within processes in which technicities come to be concretized into either technical objects or larger technical ensembles.[674]

To conceptualize this concretization process, "we need to consider [its] being not only in *analogy* with living being but … in its *coupling* with it."[675] Simondon notes that technical objects (as objects used by users) are always

671 Hoel, "Technicity," in *Posthuman Glossary*, ed. Braidotti and Hjalajova, 68–71; Simondon, *Mode of Existence*, 25–51. Concretization, too, is a Simondonian concept. I use it here in both its particular sense as well as its general comprehensive meaning as it implies an actualizing, production or bringing about of social relations, while implying at once a specific hardening of process of fixation related to its process of materializing or reification of social relations.

672 Stavros Kousoulas, "Shattering the Black Box: Technicities of Architectural Manipulation," *International Journal of Architectural Computing* 16, no. 4 (2018), 295–305; here 299.

673 Simondon, *Mode of Existence*, 19. Here, Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, I: 22. As Stiegler notes: "The stakes are high. The incorporation of the history of techniques into general history is particularly difficult," in order to "not falling into a specialized, parceled history of techniques" but to arrive at "a history of technics [*la technique*]" (ibid., 30). This challenge lies in not directly reducing technics to a specific system of what Sloterdijk would later investigate as an anthropotechnics. because, Stiegler adds, "the logic of invention is not that of the inventor. One must speak of a techno-logic, of a logic literally driving technics itself" (ibid., 36); therein, "the human is no longer the intentional actor in this dynamic. It is its operator" as Simondon would say (ibid., 66).

674 Simondon, *Mode of Existence*, 72.

675 Hoel, "Technicity," 421.

part of TECHNICAL ENSEMBLES whose "technicity can be understood only through the integration of the activity of a human user or the functioning of a technical ensemble."[676] Note that concerning this distinction, architectural arrangements are, more than a technical object, (a part of) technical ensembles. This integration of users and tools into technical ensembles happens through a "functional overdetermination," which, as Stiegler similarly sees, "means that the part becomes what it is only through its insertion into the whole."[677] Due to the functional overdetermination of organs within bodies, or components within systems, neither components nor systems cannot be understood in isolation, because in establishing a "relation of objective implication," they produce a co-implication, a complication through their mutual presupposition.[678] So instead of approaching these parts in any isolated fashion, a "mechanology studies the machinic dynamic[s] of … objects that function. Objects that function accomplish functions by synthesizing them, in the double sense of *incorporating* them, which is the process of concretization by functional overdetermination and in the sense of reproducing them to realize them in place of."[679]

As Deleuze and Guattari understood from Simondon, any technical ensemble "no longer determines a social system; it is itself determined by the social system into which it is incorporated in the exercise of its functions. In brief, it does not cease being artificial, but it becomes concrete, it 'tends to concretization' while subordinating itself … to a field of forces operating as a

676 Simondon, *Mode of Existence*, 245. Simondon here concludes: "The use of this genetic method defines the technical abject through reference to the technicity of the artisanal operation or the technical ensemble, and not the technicity of the operation or that of the ensemble on the basis of some property of the object that technicity would be. This functional aspect, however, and this conditioning of the technical object's genesis are indeed effectively translated by a particular type of the technical object's coming-into-being, what we have called the concretization of the technical object. The process of this concretization can be directly apprehended by the examination of a certain number of examples of technical objects. But the sense of this concretization, which is an inherence in the object of a technicity that is not entirely contained in it, can be understood only by philosophical thought following the genesis of the technical and non-technical modes of the relation between of man and the world. Whence the use in this study of a genetic method applied first to technical objects and then to the study of the situation and role of technical thought in the whole [l'ensemble] of thought" (ibid., 245–6).

677 Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, I: 74; 73. The term "functional overdetermination" itself is borrowed from Freud, via Althusser's historically materialist idea of the term, that in any production processes constituting a historical moment, every single component element becomes determined by all others, so that there is no longer a single cause (William Lewis, "Louis Althusser," SEP, n.p. (online), avail. online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/althusser).

678 Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, I: 71.

679 Ibid., 69.

concrete physical system."[680] This is why the double articulation presents a specific 'double-bind.'[681] This way, Hoel understands, it "incorporates parts of the natural world into its system by entering into a relation with its environment (milieu). Thus, through the process of concretization, the technical object loses its artificial character and approaches the mode of existence of natural objects. In becoming more concrete, the technical object comes closer to constituting a natural system; it 'naturalizes itself' by incorporating parts of the natural world into its regime of functioning."[682] This integration, as Simondon already argued, is not opposed to any differentiation (as we have seen before with Deleuze): rather, "the differentiation of structures within a system of reciprocal causalities allows [us]… to suppress side-effects that were hitherto obstacles (by integrating them into the functioning)."[683] This suppression of side effects brings us back to the selective function of apparatuses, which help us understand how "technical tendencies" come to be concretized into **HIGHER-ORDER EMERGENT CONSTRAINTS.**

For Simondon, technical tendencies are both an immanent technological dynamism and an external relation these technical systems enter into with other systems[684] through which technological differentiations lead to historically discernible lines of differenciation. These differentiations appear through emergent self-organization processes within material milieus, for which Simondon employs the analogy of crystallization, by which we understand the emergence of relatively regular, solid-state structures through processes of nucleation and subsequent growth "in which each already constituted molecular layer serves as an organizing basis for the layer currently being formed. The result is an amplifying reticular structure."[685] Once we apply this amplifying relation between differentiating forms and organization processes to the built environment, it urges us, as Kousoulas does, to "move from architectural objects to an architectural technicity which operates in terms of reticularity: located within assemblages, reticularity is the immediate relation of events and actions that occur in a given structure which, however, is understood in terms of its potentials for action, not in its extensive and formal outlines, and has to be studied in ethological, that is affective, terms."[686]

680 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 221.
681 On this Batesonian concept, see also Radman, "Double-Bind: On Material Ethics," in *Schizoanalysis and Ecosophy*, ed. Boundas, 241–56.
682 Hoel, "Technicity," 421; citing Simondon, *Mode of Existence*, 57.
683 SImondon, *Mode of Existence*, 38.
684 Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, I: 44–53.
685 Simondon, *L'Individuation psychique et collective*, 11; trans. in id., "The problem of Ontogenesis," 11.
686 Kousoulas, "Shattering the Black Box," 299.

With this reticular-affective, ethological, machinic view, we finally arrive at an irreducible understanding of the built environment and the functioning of architectural arrangements. These first produce a crystallization, meaning a material externalization, which becomes a differentiating factor in the concrescence and co-evolution of mutually solidifying (or otherwise mutually dissolving) concrete assemblages. The latter are made up, in turn, of heterogeneous and differently-scaled bodies and ensembles with systemic tendencies, internalized affordances and behavioral habits; a composition whose stratified 'architecture' variously reproduces, regularizes, or transforms the underlying reticular forces, relationalities and selective structural couplings that brought them about in the first place.

To begin to understand this selective functioning of the double different/ciation, (a functional differentiation and integration of functionings), I want to refer back to *Anti-Oedipus*'s approach to the workings of the unconscious and the theory of the **THREE SYNTHESES**. Similar to Deleuze's version of the three syntheses, Stiegler's tripartite scheme is also modeled on a reworking of the Kantian syntheses [13]. The most notable difference is that, while in Deleuze's scheme, memory is contained in the first connective synthesis, in Stiegler's it is an aspect of all syntheses, in the sense that it embeds the syntheses in an already-there. Here the Heideggerian influence is clear.[687] More recently,[688] Stiegler has reworked this tripartite account into what he calls a **GENERAL ORGANOLOGY**. With this term he points toward a three-stranded theory of the joint evolution or co-articulation of organs and organizations, be they bodily/physiological (brain, hand, eyes, neural system), artificial/technical (tools, instruments, objects, artworks, technical ensembles and systems), or collective/social (groups, institutions, or organizations, whether juridical, linguistic, religious, political or economic). This theory is developed in the light of a wider genealogy of these aesthetic dimensions of the sensi-

687 Respectively, there remains an open question here (simply because I feel that I do not overlook the full consequences), concerning the extent to which Stiegler necessarily repeats the Heideggerian move of making the third synthesis the first, in spatializing the three syntheses, by reintroducing an external condition (because 'exteriorized') space. As Hughes points out, Deleuze tries his best to avoid this in his reworking (Hughes, *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, 105). As far as I understand, it nonetheless maintains a synthetic relation of exteriority, however. To the extent that they are embedded in an 'already there,' they seem to be the spatiotemporal equivalent of Deleuze's idea of the *three repetitions* of the static order of time (which are different from the three syntheses, as Faulkner (*Three Syntheses*, 19) stresses) as "cyclic repetition" (= genetic **MEMORY**), "intracyclic repetition" (= epigenetically accumulated **HABIT(AT)S**), and an "eternal return" (epiphylogentic **TECHNICS**). See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 91ff.

688 See Stiegler, "General Ecology, Economy, and Organology," in *General Ecology*, ed. Hörl, 129–50.



14 Synthetic diagram of the twofold production of habits and habitats, as unfolding niches on the matrix of stratification.

ble, describing how they combine into transduction (and transversal) relationships across the psychic, social, and technical individuation.[689] In thus re-conceptualizing the intertwined co-evolution and **HETEROGENESIS** of technical, social, and psychical individuals, it further mechanologizes the three registers

689 Composed from Stiegler, *Symbolic Misery*, trans. Barnaby Norman (Cambridge: Polity, 2014/15 [2004/5]), Vol. I: 1, and Vol. II: 11 ff; id., *For a New Critique of Political Economy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010 [2009]), 34, and id., *Neganthropocene*, ed. & trans. Daniel Ross (London: Open Humanities Press, 2018), 19–21. As Hörl summarizes, its comprises a "complex assemblage of three organological levels: the level of psychosomatic or endo-somatic organs of the psychological individual that form a psychic system; the level of artifactual or exosomatic organs of the technical individual that form a technical system; and social organs, organizations, and institutions of all kinds that form a social system. The central task of general organology is to conceptualize the intertwined formation processes of psychical, technical, and social individuals. It describes their reciprocal processes of adaptation and dedaptation that produce concrete apparatuses of individuation operative for a given time. General organology, in other words, examines the relationships between organic organs, technical organs, and social organizations" (Hörl, introduction to *General Ecology,* 25).

of the environmental, the social (social relations), and mental (human subjectivity), elaborated in Guattari's *Three Ecologies*.[690] In this resonance, it should be possible to bring these ontogenetic schemes together by considering architectural arrangements as higher-order emergent constraints that arise from the **TELEOGENIC COUPLING** of the aforementioned three material-discursive milieus, with their own morphogenetic (or structure-generating) processes as well as morphodynamic (or self-regularizing) tendencies, which architecture metastabilizes and regularizes through its downward-causational effects. To my knowledge, no one has ever done this or determined what can be done with this, and my conjectures are probably incomplete. But one thing seems doubtful: namely, to equate the connective synthesis too hastily with technics as externalized memory. For, thereby, we would confuse the third synthesis with the first, which implies to assume both an already constituted space and in it an already produced subject that externalizes. In this case, there would be nothing to synthesize. As we have seen, subjects are only produced alongside co-constituted associated milieus in which there exist only a synthetic relations of exteriority, synthesizing the given.[691] This synthesis can only start from discontinuity, for one has to end up with a constitution of subjectivities ✉².[692]

In this respect, we ought to tentatively distinguish: (1) A first order of genetic memory: rather than being a psychological register, this consists first in a physiological internalization or gathering that operates as an immanent **CONNECTIVE SYNTHESIS** of material-discursive differentiated partial objects and flows. This differentiation lies in the production of a materially differentiated heterogeneity. It consists of reciprocally determined, differentiated yet entangled, and causally connected relata, formed from nested part-to-(differently-scaled)-part relations drawn from a field of ambient, reticular forces, and differential speeds and slownesses. As the stuff 'already-there,' this pre-individual reality (=the virtual), from which both individuation and the co-production of an 'associated milieu' take form in mutual adaptations, consists of sympoietic and finely synchronized relations within problematic structures. As such this order is genetic. It concerns the fabrication of a body with any distinct quality (=production).

(2) The organization of epigenetic habit(at)s: rather than being a mere background landscape, it consists in a binding arrangement, or contracting,

690 Guattari, *Three Ecologies*, esp. 27–69. Like Guattari might have as well, Stiegler takes the trilogy also from Simondon's tripartite call for a "mechanologist, alongside the psychologist and the sociologist" (Simondon, *Mode of Existence*, 19).

691 Hughes, *Deleuze's Difference and Repetition*, 115.

692 For this reversed ontology, see for instance Claire Colebrooks essay, "How Queer Can You Go?," in id., *Sex after Life*, 179–202; here 180.

that operates as an inclusive **DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** of differentiating material-discursive singularities and chains. This differentiating factor lies in a production of differences that make a difference, where primitive reticular structures, meaning those intensive figurations of material milieus, form emergent constraints. These enable specific individual bodies, forms, societies, ecologies, and so on, to come to exist and hold together. A plane of consistency in-the-making, this material reticulation is the real milieu of individuation (=the intensive) from which the topological invariants, as individual and universal singularities, emanate as thresholds. They adumbrate a space of possibilities associated with a given assemblage versus the assemblage's characteristic politics and disposition in relation to existing enabling constraints. This play calibrates the interdependent individuations of abstract machines and becomings that selectively narrow down or open up evolutionary paths. Because this process is driven by environmental aspects working on acquired structures, this point is epigenetic. It concerns the production of habits from which subjectivity emerges (=recording).

(3) The order of epiphylogenetic technics: rather than being reducible to mere objects, it consists in technical geneses and lineages actualized in a subjectivating externalization or embodiment that operates as an (integrating) **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** of differenciated material-discursive intensities and becomings. This differenciation lies in a production of historically-differenciated heterogenesis in which particular socio-bio-geo-technical tendencies increasingly come to be concretized into assemblages, forming emergent higher-order emergent constraints that in turn effectuate lines of differenciation. As reconfigurings of the world, this effective reality (*Wirklichkeit* =the actual) yields and calls forth relatively individuated entities as resolutions to diachronic and diapoietically-distinguishable becomings. As such, as it involves certain accumulatively concretized technical ensembles, this process is epiphylogenetic. It concerns the production of a mode of inhabiting the world (=consumption), by inhibiting others.

Furthermore, between (1) and (2), or inversely, we find a sympoietic process of passive adaptation in which habits and environmental factors, the habitat, increasingly come to be incorporated on a behavioral and morphological level, through a shared **DE- AND RETERRITORIALIZATION**. Between (2) and (3), by contrast, we find a diapoietic process of active adaptation or niche-construction in which material-discursive practices increasingly come to be concretized within spatial and technological systems. As these two articulations are squarely those of content and expression, the latter expression of concrete assemblages consists in an operation of mutual **DE-/RECODING**). [13] These

three interrelated processes can be systematically mapped onto the matrix of stratification ⊠[14] if we understand with Guattari, and via Möystad, especially the central production of habits and habitat as an inclusive disjunction that produces a twofold or co-dependent existential niche.[693] Therein, this double articulation opens a space of possibilities associated with the development of a given assemblage by way of its production of intermediary (i.e. differently-scaled) and intercalated (i.e. interlocked and concatenated) matters formed as embodied and embedded, relational and affective modal substances. These differenciation processes comprise all that one may call a semiotics of the epigenetic landscape: the generation of virtually possible forms from real matters, in both their double articulation in specific territorializations and codings. Here especially, the decoding tendencies lie in what one could call with Guattari 'epiphylogenetic encodings' that fall outside the field of semiotically understandable, that is, in the realm of the machinic: there we find sympoietic processes of passive adaptation to environments, and diapoietic processes by means of an "active modulation of (and by) th[is environment as an] annexed milieu" constituting a habitat.[694] And it is in this twofold modulation that any machinic history as an epiphylogenetic becoming is hiding.

Toward a Machinic History of Architectural Arrangements

This is the point where we can draw some conclusions, not necessarily to generalize, but to resingularize them in terms of how my genealogy of apartments is going to employ these converging (and diverging) approaches for an **EPIPHYLOGENETIC MAPPING**. So how can we go about putting these theoretical aspects and concepts to analytical use? In this preliminary discussion, I have illustrated how to tool these theoretical insights at the heart of a (epiphylo-) genetic practice of investigating into historical formations of architecture.

Obviously, doing so is no easy task, as my lengthy preliminary discussion illustrates. For it first requires setting up an entire apparatus of theoretically and methodologically-operative concepts to start functioning. Moreover, this intra-active device must be carefully calibrated depending on the phenomenon under investigation. This means, first, that architectural formations can never be approached in a generic fashion (e.g. by categorically separating material forms from social practices) within historical studies, but ought always to be accounted for as constitutive components, as genetic (and, to be precise, epiphylogenetic). To help understand this, the architectural historian must thus

693 I thank Andrej Radman for his helpful comments in doing so.
694 Radman, "Involuntary Architecture," 70.

become not only a genealogist making genetic maps of the present by charting changing discourses, but also an epiphylogenetic cartographer, mapping those transformative material-discursive practices involving human-environmental assemblages and more machinic couplings; a mechanologist. As I have shown, my genealogy of apartments, in its genetic mapping of their formation of this milieu of individuation in the heterogenesis of the modern urban landscape, is necessarily an epiphylogenetic mapping of apartmentalization, which is why it must be apporached as a mechanological work, an attempt at a more machinic history that approaches architecture not just along the general lines of *technē*, but that maps architectural formations within a wider technological lineage and epiphylogenetic evolution.

Here, the first task has been to bring all these experimental methodologies into resonance, at the points that they are struggling with, namely in understanding historical formations as processes operating in and on the world through different dispositifs or assemblages made up of heterogeneous and reciprocally-determinant components existing in relations of exteriority. Understood from both a process-ontological and materialist angle, these processes are always reconfigurings of the world as a material milieu. To bring all these strands together, let me recapitulate and integrate the many differentiations drawn here into an epiphylogenetic notion of architecture. Through Deleuze and Guattari's **ASSEMBLAGE-THEORETIC** (and especially **STRATOANALYTIC**) generalization of Foucault's **DISPOSITIVISTIC** reading, we have arrived at a **NESTED** system of production; a system of nested dispositifs where $D_{quadrillage} \subset D_{organization\ of\ geneses} \subset D_{disciplinarity}$. In this system, architectural arrangements always act as a **FORM OF CONTENT** that distributes, configures, and orders **HETEROGENEOUS ENSEMBLES** into complex geneses, production chains, (co-)individuations, becomings(-together-with). Herein lies the specific function of different spatial, physical, or material distributions, configurations, or arrangements as a **DIFFERENTIATING FACTOR** within machinic assemblages. This **MACHINIC** element arises from the way arrangements necessarily act as **FRAMES**, that is, **ENABLING CONSTRAINTS** that actualize virtual forcefields (or **DIAGRAMS**) into dynamic fluxes.

This happens where, with specific **SETUPS** or **PHYSICAL APPARATUSES**, setting up contingently obligatory but not necessary socio-spatial relations—and not just 'settings' rendering geneses visible (*mise-en-scène*)—different virtually-real configurations (**FC/T**) reciprocally determine actually-possible organizations (**FE/Φ**), for different phenomena to come about (*mise-en-existence*). They do so by establishing the necessary conditions (=**RELATIONALITIES**) by first reducing the **SPACE OF POSSIBILITY** associated

with each specific assemblage up to critical thresholds that re-pattern these systems, and then — in a PATH-DEPENDENT sense — select for certain phenomena (=RELATA) to come to matter and acquire meaning within associated MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE MILIEUS. By extending Foucault's reading of how partionining operates within such systems, this chapter has arrived at the more complex notion that systems generally operate by way of BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICES. These occur SYMPOIETICALLY in the form of HIGHER-ORDER EMERGENT CONSTRAINTS, which arise throughout a system's contragrade morphodynamic tendencies and regularization processes. Thereby, the latter come be regularized themselves on a larger level of organizational complexity. Here TELEOGENIC COUPLINGS exert a downward causation by intersecting and thus also blocking certain flows that CUT TOGETHER/APART and gridlock mutually-constitutive and autoaffectively dynamisms, thus predisposing, effectuating, stabilizing, and consolidating certain assemblages to take form over other possible ones.

It is this emerging end-directed evolution that effectuates a progressive differentiation (EPIGENESIS) and differenctiation (PHYLOGENESIS) of reciprocally-determined and now EPIPHYLOGENETICALLY-coevolving elements and their simultaneous INTEGRATION into larger environmental ecologies and, to the extend that these are thus becoming TECHNICIZED, TECHNICAL ENSEMBLES. And it is in this complex DOUBLE ARTICULATION of any formtaking socio-techno-environmental assemblages that the technicity of architecture concerns the way that arrangements, configurings, spatializations, and layouts are involved in the (EX)ORGANIZATION OF (HETERO)GENESES within co-individuating or CONDIVIDUATING ensembles.

Regarding this history, we should perhaps not talk about an evolution, or any revolutionary development when the system is re-patterning, but rather an INVOLUTION (as a process taking form in a process of folding-in, rather than a historical unfolding). It involves a gradual integration (resolution) and differentiation (reproblematization) of these generative configurings, taking form in particular RETICULATED milieus that forestructure future becomings. In approaching architecture (and in particular the architecture of apartments) in view of these boundary-drawing practices, my theoretico-methodological apparatus is thus designed specifically to understand architecture as a spatial technique whose differentiating function is to cut us incrementally together/apart. My introduction has already mentioned my position that these cellular differentiations cannot be captured by a view that presupposes a separation or co-isolation of preexisting cellular structures, but requires the concept of condividuation. Now we are in a position to better understand this process as

consisting of sympoietic epigeneses that, in driving the differentiation of the virtual processes through which these structures are actualized, render condividuation a complex effect of these cells (as small assemblages) being co-implied through and through, or nested within larger assemblages or more complex systems. These assemblages of assemblages actualize reciprocally-determined boundaries drawn differentially at certain critical levels of organizational complexity, resulting in mutually-constitutive cells, organs, bodies, and so on. Thereby, I can approach the architecture of apartments in a way that does not reduce it (logical differentiation) to an aspect of separation (=**EXCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION**), but as an arrangement whose morphogenesis (historical different/ciation) can only be thought through a diagrammatic selection (=**INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION**) of reciprocally-determinant and sympoietic relations within intra-acting assemblages.

In this process, diachronic differentiations are brought about by a specific system of differential forces and relations that, as Goodman writes with Simondon, "might be seen as transversal connections, as ongoing acts of the transduction of flows of forces across bodies and objects that co-implicated them in a collective, performative emergence leading toward concretization."[695] Not exhausted but embodied when these forces gather into concretizing systems, this productive relationality determines (always reciprocally), as Bryant writes, "what is related to what" (i.e. physico-material relations), not only on the same level of organization, but also enabling and constraining systems of membership upwards and belonging downwards. Therein, systems arrange themselves into metastable states of least binding energy. The 'falling-into' this lower energy level 'locks' of 'fastens' these meta-stably interlocked assemblages, that actualizes a higher-order emergent constraint, which 'reduces' the space of possibility associated with any assemblage, and selects more possible paths. It is through this selective function that humans are drawn into assemblages with specific material environments. And it is these specific material environments that have enabled history to unfold the way it did.

A history attending to this machinic dimension ought to reconstruct the different **SYNTHESES** as multiple contingently obligatory, but not necessary, series of events and transformations operating at different speeds. These syntheses have taken form in either convergent processes through which intra-acting and intra-locking assemblages consolidated or stabilized one another, or in divergent processes building up toward or passing critical

695 Goodman, *Gathering Ecologies*, 195.

thresholds, which in reconstituting and destabilizing existing assemblages enabled new organizations to emerge. I have tried my best to always account for this machinic integration–differentiation in its **DOUBLE ARTICULATION**, as an **INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION** that establishes a veritable synthesis necessary for a genetic understanding which, as I have argued with Deleuze, is lost whenever one judges historical geneses and emergent formations through logical categories, pre-established concepts, or types, that all entail the use of exclusive disjunctions (either/or). The effect of this perhaps abstract position will become quite tangible when the following maps the historical (i.e. material-discursive) formation of the architecture of apartments in more machinic terms. Part I of the following main corpus of my study will map the genealogy of appartements in its initially (material-) discursive formation as an abstract diagram for the differentiation of architectural multiplicities, opening a new space of possibilities within architecture's disciplinary assemblage. In Part II, this topological view will prove fruitful in revisiting the material-discursive formation of appartements as an evolving differentiated spatial organization (rather than evolving building type). As an abstract body-plan, realized through certain topological invariants that enable it to emerge as a diagram in its specific pattern of movement or circulatory system, it will become the necessary condition for the evolving spatial form of apartments to realize its machinic production of social relations through a blockage of movement through specific filters of access (=**HIGHER-LEVEL EMERGENT CONSTRAINTS**). Part III will then chart these access filters more deeply in their machinic concretization as a technical ensemble within a new social assemblage.

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IMAGE SOURCES
FOR BOOK 0

1– All comparative charts
14 and diagrams redrawn
by the author.

VOLUME ONE

THE GENEALOGY OF APPARTEMENTS

PART I

1540: The Crystal-lizing Conception of Appartamenti

"There are no simple concepts. … All concepts are connected to problems without which they would have no meaning. … [On the one hand] every concept always has a history … In any concept there are usually bits or components that form from other concepts, which corresponded to other problems and presupposed other planes … A concept requires not only a problem through which it recasts or replaces earlier concepts but a junction of problems where it combines with other coexisting concepts."

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 15–18.

1.1
The Introduction of Appartamenti into Architectural Discourse

Appartements have proven a central conceptual fixture within the many studies and scholarly works that attend to transforming residential architectures during the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. This is because their architecture has repeatedly been asserted as a central driver in historical socio-spatial and typological transformation processes. But in tracing the formation of those characteristic spatially-differentiated dwelling units, many historical studies also employ the notion of apartments as a fixed concept—often under a disclaimer acknowledging that the very concept of apartments only emerges at the end of the sixteenth century—or as a technical term for denoting the principle planning unit, especially aristocratic building types such as Italian *palazzi*, or French *châteux* and *hôtels*, with their characteristic sequences of increasingly private receptions rooms. As such the term *appartement* presents a highly codified concept within architectural history, where this unitary sense legitimates a certain anachronistic use of the term.

Due to this conceptual codification architectural historians have not often engaged with the emergence of the very concept of apartments itself. In the same way that things undergo a historical formation in which they come about or come to be, the concepts we use to describe these emerging formations are also historically formed. From the perspective of a history of ideas or thought, the entire *conceptual* dimension of the historical formation of apartments remains understudied. Not simply by neglect, since it has rather actively been written out of this history. Rosi Braidotti reminds us that it is only when categories lose their self-evidence (stemming from a discursive dominance) that they become (re-)thinkable. In this vein, in the following I hope to reposition this predominant notion, in taking a more GENETIC perspective in order to chart the historical formation of apartments through their very conception within architectural discourse.[1]

Since such a conceptual genealogy remains a perceived lack in the history of apartments, this chapter will initially venture into a first reconstruction of the emerging concept of apartments. Thereby its purpose is to map their crystallizing conception within architectural discourse as a first step

1 To address this history of thought, as proposed by Foucault, this introduction hopes to convey a specific concern regarding the genealogical relation between concepts (in my German thinking *Begriffe*), and the history of their emergence or formation [*Entstehung(sgeschichte)*]. In German it is quite easy to relate the genesis of concepts, their conception [*Entstehung von Begriffen*], to a genealogical approach to a history that must be *conceived of* in its own formation [*in der Entstehung begriffen*]. For this, I will resort to the word 'conception' as an emergent formation here, in a bridging genealogical sense.

toward a wider genealogy of apartments. As I want to argue here, such a conceptual genealogy of apartments remains an ultimate requirement to reconsider how apartments came to be the notorious planning unit in Renaissance residential architecture and the related French discourse on the art of distribution; how they came to attain their organizational capacity in the first place. This genealogical approach necessarily challenges certain essentialist assumptions that the following aims to debunk. Among the first is a crucial terminological reduction concerning the initial notion of apartments, which would come to articulate itself in an architecture of progressively differentiated room sequences, but which throughout many architectural and historical writings is often unintentionally or unconsciously equated to, and reduced, to the modern idea of apartments as a dwelling unit. The resulting conceptual imprecision, passing over this formal distinction (from differentiated sequences to separated units) leads to a sort of terminological coding (or overcoding) that invites further reductionist modes of thinking, allowing for example the idea that 'something like apartments' had always existed. Coding is thus tied to a schema of representation subsuming differences (and to many different things) under one idea. It cannot account for difference itself.[2] Rather than explaining anything, this bad habit operates by explaining away the generative history of changing conceptions of apartments. This operation eventually transforms a knowledge gap into a blind spot, as it renders redundant the need for any conceptual history of apartments.

In order to account for this conception non-reductively, we must approach the concept of apartments not as a fixture but a fiction; as a historical construct. Therefore, I will start by historicizing the very concept of apartments and deconstruct its modern coding as an individual dwelling unit, and thus as essentially a form of separation, related to the determination of a certain individuality, finality, whole, or unity. As an individual space or spatial unit, the apartment was thus overcoded by an idea of the 'one' itself. This unitary idea, as I will call it, seems to stem from a long line of modern encyclopedias purporting to explain the etymology of the term 'apartments'. Still central to this image of thought was Augustin-Charles d'Aviler's *Cours*

2 "For poststructuralism, coding offends on a number of fronts" as it "assumes … fixed relations among discrete entities. [Thereby] things are condemned always to contract the same sorts of relationship to one another. … This is the logic of representation. … Coding does not allow that things … form something new. It cannot cope with difference in itself — as movement, change, and emergence." Maggie MacLure, "Classification or Wonder? Coding as an Analytic Practice in Qualitative Research," in *Deleuze and Research Methodologies*, ed. Rebecca Coleman and Jessica Ringrose (Edinburgh: EUP, 2013), 164–83; here 167–9.

d'architecture (1691), that in its appended explication of terms defined the apartment as "a suite of rooms necessary to render an accommodation complete, which ought to be composed of at least one anti-chambre, a chambre, a cabinet, and a garderobe. There are grand and smaller ones. The word derives from the Latin *Partimentum*, from the verb *partiri*, 'divide,' or *parte mansionis*, for it forms a part of the house."[3] This claim was repeated in Chambers' *Cyclopædia* (1728), which defined an apartment as "a portion of a large house, wherein a person may lodge separately. … The word comes from the Latin *apartimentum*, of the verb *partiri*, 'to divide.'"[4] The claim was also repeated in Jacques-François Blondel's entry "appartements" in Diderot and d'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* (1751–72), which—like all of Blondel's subsequent publications—stated that "the word comes from the Latin *partimentum*, from the verb *partiri*, 'divide.'"[5]

While offering a seemingly straightforward explanation, this definition contains a rather complex reductivism through which this (actually operative) statement becomes a rectoactive hypostatization. To reconsider this reductivism, the spatial definition of apartments given here becomes less interesting than the somewhat tautological etymology employed in defining them. To begin with, we should remember that in all Latin languages, the notions around 'part(ıng)' and division also connotes "to distribute, to share" (in its related meaning of "leaving something to someone") to the point of equivocity.[6] As such they must be understood as operative definitions within modern

3 Orig.: "apartement; c'est: une suite de pieces necessaires pour rendre une habitation complet, qui doit être composée au moins d'une Anti-chambre, d'une Chambre, d'un Cabinet et d'une Garderobe. Il y en a de grands et de petits. Ce mot vient du Latin *Partimentum*, fait du Verbe *Partiri*, diviser, ou bien à *parte mansionis*, parce qu'il fait partie de la demeure" (my trans.). Augustin-Charles d'Aviler, *Cours d'architecture qui comprend les ordres de Vignole … avec une ample explication des termes d'architecture…* (Paris: Nicolas Langlois, 1691), Vol. II: 375, avail. online at http://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-90.

4 "Apartment," in Ephraim Chambers, *Cyclopædia, or, a universal dictionary of arts and sciences…*, 2 vols (London: s.n., 1728), Vol. I: 114, avail. online at https://artfl-project.uchicago.edu/.

5 Orig.: "Ce mot vient du Latin *partimentum*, fait du verbe partiri, 'diviser'." Blondel, *Architecture françoise, ou Recueil des plans, élévations, coupes et profils des églises, maisons royales, palais, hotels…*, 4 vols (Paris: Jombert, 1752–56), Vol. I: 26, note G; *Cours d'architecture, ou Traité de la decoration, distribution et construction des bâtiments…* 6 vols, each with accompanying volume containing plates (Paris: Desaint, 1771–1777), IV: 108–9.

6 Modern English has lost the capacity to carry this ambiguity. While also the German 'teilen' still shares this equivocity on which my argument will rest, modern English strongly altered it in the sense that—in addition to "to divide"—the verb 'to part' has another connotation of "to withdraw, to go away, leave," similar to the French *partir*. See here Philibert Monet, *Invantaire des deus langues, françoise et latine…* (Paris: C. Obert, 1636) , avail. online at https://books.google.fr/books?id=Q7xKAAAAcAAJ, listing "*Partiment:* Divisus, huius divisus, Divisio, Partitio" shortly after the synonymous entry "*Partage et division*: Divisus, huius divisus, Divisio, Partitio" (ibid., 519; italics orig.; and also Randle

systems of classification. Later dictionaries such as Littré's normative *Dictionnaire de la langue française* (1863–72) have resituated this divisive etymology in a more juridical context in referring to Du Cange's late seventeenth-century Latin glossary.[7] Even after all those Late-Latin explanations turned out to be partly misconstrued, the idea of apartments as a form of separation still prevails and is perpetuated by most modern dictionaries. They may even have fostered it through their significantly redacted explanation, which more or less consensually locates its etymological source in the now-antiquated Spanish *apartamiento,* from the verb *apartarse* ("depart, detach," a movement or process of separation).[8] The term initially articulated a geographic notion of spa-

Cotgrave, *A dictionarie of the french and english tongues* (London: A. Islip, 1611), avail. online at https://books.google.com/books?id=lOhMAAAAcAAJ, which has no entry on "apartments" but lists "Partiment: m. *A parting, dividing, sundering, severing; also a parting, or departing*" (ibid., n.p [italics orig.]).

7 "Appartement," in *Dictionnaire de la langue française*, ed Émile Littré (Paris: Hachette 1863–72), avail. online http://www.littre.org/definition/appartement. This entry refers to the *Glossarium ad scriptores mediæ et infimæ latinitatis*, ed. Charles du Fresne Du Cange (Paris: Billaine, 1678), Vol. I: 324b: "Partitio, divisio bonorum inter lieros. Consuetudines Tolosanæ: 'Sin in ultima voluntate sua relinquat … vel jure institutionis, vel Appartiamenti, etc.'"; avail. online at http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/APPARTIAMENTUM.

8 Still used in Mexican Spanish against the term *apartamento*, it connotes the act and effect of parting, or remote place than some compartmented space or dwelling unit. See the *Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana por La Real Academia Española* (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1817), 73. A few recent online dictionaries do not follow this explanation such as the Online Etymological Dictionary (hereafter OnED); or the Wiktionary. For this inquiry, I have consulted a variety of modern and contemporaneous dictionaries. Besides the aforementioned works and standard French dictionaries *Trésor de Language Français*, *Larousse*, and *Littré*, most importantly the lexicographic studies by Walter von Wartburg, ed., *Französisches Etymologischer Wörterbuch: eine Darstellung des galloromanischen Sprachschatzes*, 25 vols., (1922–2002), hereafter Wartburg, *FEW*; avail. online at http://www.atilf.fr/FEW/; Wilhelm Meyer-Lübke, ed., *Romanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1911); and Edmond Huguet, *Dictionnaire de la langue française du seizième siècle,* 4 vols (Paris: Champion, 1929–67), avail. online at http://hdl.handle.net/1959.9/540235. Various older dictionaries have been consulted via the website of the Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales, at http://www.cnrtl.fr/, and the research unit Analyse et Traitement informatique de la langue Française (ATILF), at http://www.atilf.fr, including the *Electronic Dictionary of Chretien de Troyes*; Robert Martin, ed., *Dictionnaire du Moyen Français (1330–1500),* hereafter *DMF*, avail. online at http://www.atilf.fr/dmf/. Moreover consulted were various pre-modern dictionaries and glossaries, available via Lexilogos at https://www.lexilogos.com/francais_renaissance.htm, and DicFro at http://micmap.org/dicfro/, referred to in detail below. Italian etymological dictionaries consulted include the *Vocabolatio degli Academici della Crusca Compendiato* (Florence: s.n., 1738), reprinted as Academia della Crusca, *Dizionario della Lingua Italiana* (Padova: Minerva, 1827), here Vol. I: 416, avail. online at https://books.google.com; and the contemporary version (available at http://www.gdli.it) which starts only with Bartoli and Vasari; Ottorino Pianigiani, *Vocabolario etimologico della lingua italiani* (Rome: Albrighi & Segati, 1907), avail. online at http://www.etimo.it; Giovanni Battista Bolza, ed., *Vocabolario genetico-e-timologico della lingua italiana* (Vienna: Stamperia di Corte, 1852), avail. online at https://google.books.com; Salvatore Battaglia, *Grande dizionario della lingua italiana* (Torino: Utet, 1961); and the online dictionary http://www.treccani.it/vocabolario/. Modern Spanish dictionaries consulted include Joan Corominas and José Pascual, eds., *Diccionario crítico etimológico castellano e hispánoco*, 6 vols. Madrid: Gredos, 1991–1997), hereafter *DCE*; and

tial detachment that is said to have first appeared in Ciéza de Leon's *Crónica del Perú* (Chronicle of Peru, 1553) through which it somehow must have come to be used in architecture.[9]

From a historical standpoint, however, these explanations are unsatisfying not only because the exact historical process through which the term became an operative architectural notion remains unknown; but also because it is factually incorrect. s the following will demonstrate, it was Sebastiano Serlio (1475–c.1554), the same *professore di architettura* who made the classic orders of architecture speciate, who in his seven books on architecture introduced the new notion of *appartamenti* into ordering discourse, after combining several textbooks on geometry and rhetoric in a fashion befitting his neo-platonic disposition.[10] Mentioned first in *Il terzo libro … nel qual si figurano e descrivono le antiquità…* (The third book … [On Antiquities], 1540) ☒[1], and some subsequent volumes,[11] *appartamenti* make their debut not as the cellular units we know today, but as a more geometric diagram for the twofold **DIFFERENT/CIATION** of architectural **MULTIPLICITIES**. Not only has Serlio has never been credited for his catalyzing role in helping introduce the notion of apart-

the older glossaries cited below.

9 In this text, written between 1540 and 1550, published after 1553, the notion appears twice in an abstract sense of spatial compartments: The first mention gives "la línea equinoccial es una raya o círculo imaginando por medio del mundo de Levante en Poniente en igual apartamiento de los polos del mundo [the equator line is an imaginary line or circle, that divides the world of East and West into equal 'apartments' from the poles of the world]." The second mention gives "En muchos valles de estos llanos, en saliendo del valle por las sierras de rocas y de arena hay hechas grandes paredes y apartamientos, adonde cada linaje tiene su lugar establecido … [In many valleys of these plains, leaving the rocky and sandy mountains, there are great walls and 'apartments,' in which every family has its established place]." Cieza de Leon, *Crónica del Perú*: 136, and 180 (my trans.). This geographic sense can also be found in contemporary France, as confirmed by Huguet's *Dictionnaire,* which cites Jacques Amyot's translation of Plutach. It lists "Appartement: Région.—A quelque révolution de temps le rond du Soleil vient à donner en quelque appartement de la terre qui n'est pas habitée [At some time revolution the circle of the Sun comes to give in some piece of the earth that is not inhabited]."

10 See Sebastiano Serlio, *Regole generali di architetura sopra le cinque maniere degli edifici…* (Venice: Marcolini, 1537). Here and throughout the following I have creatively appropriated narrative parts of the plateau "Geology of Morals" from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Vol. II* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1987). Therein they present the conceptual persona of Professor Challenger, a figure borrowed from Arthur Connan Doyle, whom they portray as a destratified non-specialist. I regard Serlio as a similarly challenging character, misunderstood in his transdisciplinary and transversal thinking.

11 Sebastiano Serlio, *Il Terzo libro di Sebastiano Serlio Bolognese nel qual si figurano e descrivono le antiquità di Roma, e le altre che sono in Italia, e fuori d'Italia* (Venice: Francesco Marcolini, 1540). Hereafter *Terzo libro.* The following references and translations provided in square brackets are taken from the modern translation of Book I–V and Book VI–X in *Sebastiano Serlio on Architecture,* ed. and trans. Vaughan Hart and Peter Hicks, 2 vols (New Haven: Yale UP, 1996 and 2004), in Vol. I and II respectively; hereafter referenced in square brackets.

ments into architectural discourse, but what has also remained unstudied (and what the following aims to expose), is the abstract organizational manner in which this emerging concept appears in a sense quite different from its later meaning as a cellular dwelling unit; a sense that—if affirmed—opens an interesting path to the organizational capacity apartments later attain. In this context, this historiographic inconsistency—far from being a philological detail—promises a great opportunity to fully reconstruct and reconsider the crystallization of the concept into an operative architectural realm.

The Discursive Debut of Apartments

This conceptual crystallization has been noted only sporadically by historians. Hence, only a few historical studies have scrutinized Serlio's role in introducing the concept of apartments into architectural discourse, among which the most prominent is an article by Jean-Marie Pérouse de Montclos.[12] He quotes a sentence that he came across in the *Terzo libro*, where Serlio—in treating Roman antiquities and other historical Italian edifices—twice mentions the so-called *appartamenti di magazzini*[13] that make up the layout of the six warehouses in the ancient Harbor of Ostia [2]. This expression articulates the quarter-like organization of each warehouse building, which Serlio illustrates in the scaled-up plan appended on the bottom of the page.[14] For Pérouse de Montclos, this organizational but non-domestic sense presents a "primitive" conceptual stage, as it designates only "the fraction obtained by a regular division of space."[15] This is why, he argues, it can only be found in a plural, more adverbial sense that is still too far from the notion of the apartment proper to the later art of distribution.[16] Closer inspection, however, reveals that

12 This seems to be first specified in an article by Maurice Cagnon and Stephen Smith, "Le Vocabularies de l'architecture en France de 1500 a 1550 (suite)" in *Cahiers de Lexicologie*, Vol. XVIII: 89–108 and Vol. XIX: 94–108 (Paris: Garnier, 1971). See also Alberto Jelmini, "Sebastiano Serlio: Il Trattato d'Architettura," PhD diss., Univ. Fribourg (1975): 223, 236; and Jean-Marie Pérouse de Montclos, "Logis et appartements jumelés dans l'architecture française," in *Architecture et vie sociale: L'organisation intérieure des grandes demeures à la fin du moyen âge et à la renaissance*. Actes du colloque tenu à Tours du 6 au 10 juin 1988, ed. Jean Guillaume (Paris: Picard, 1994), 235–43. Shortly before, Rosci had identified the ground-breaking use of the Italian '*appartamento*' in the work of Serlio and Cataneo, as well as its recent coinage. See Marco Rosci, *Il Trattato di architecttura di Sebastiano Serlio*, Vol. I (Milan: Istituto di Storia dell Arte, I.T.E.C, 1967); here esp. 59 and 64.

13 Serlio, *Terzo libro*: f. 83 [I:173]. Orig.: "ogni faccia haveva un spatioso cortile con le logge intorno, e quattro appartamenti di magazzeni circondati da le loggie con una ambulatione [later edited to 'andito'] nel mezo [Each building had a spacious courtyard surrounded by loggias, and four apartments of magazines surrounded by loggias with a passage in half]."

14 See also further below.

15 Pérouse de Montclos, "Logis et appartements jumelés," 236 (my trans.).

16 Ibid.: Pérouse de Montclos here apparently relies on the earlier analysis of the

1 SERLIO'S *TERZO LIBRO*: Frontispice of *Il Terzo libro di Sebastiano Serlio* (1540).

this reading is not only incomplete, but also misguided when it draws the categorical conclusion that Serlio had not yet arrived at a clear concept of apartments, and locates their origin in France instead.[17] This discursive analysis thus ends up rejecting any substantial contribution on the part of Serlio, completely neglecting the final segment of the *Terzo libro*, in which a much more clear-cut concept of apartments is conveyed.

One apparent genetic methodological problem consists here in the manner in which the notion of apartments is taken in terms of its yet-to-be fixed meaning as a dwelling unit, and which prevents Pérouse de Montclos from appreciating Serlio's concept in its nascent stage, which as we shall see, denominates something altogether different; something that derives from this. It may be obvious and belaboring this point seems unnecessary, but merely juxtaposing Serlio's Italian conception of *appartamenti* with the canonical French notion of appartements as it takes form from the end of the sixteenth century onwards, which presupposes a historical identity (or immutability) and

Renaissance vocabulary by Cagnon and Smith. He finds it particularly noteworthy that the term is absent in the description of Serlio's own project for the Grand Ferrare and its characteristic single apartment.

17 Ibid.: Looking for a different origin, Pérouse de Montclos instead tries to ground the notion in a French cultural substrate, namely by reference to the entry "Appartement" in Godefroy's *Dictionnaire de l'ancienne langue française…*, which offers an alternative Medieval French and non-architectural root of the word *apartament*, "in an evident manner". Hereby Pérouse de Montclos introduces a cardinal and complex mistake. First, this explanation obviously adds relatively little to illuminate the conceptual formation of apartments. Rather, it becomes quite apparent to what degree apartments are still entangled in a sort of 'methodological nationalism' (Ulrich Beck) in posing the question where apartments come from. Pérouse de Montclos seems to insinuate that Serlio did not understand a supposedly French notion of apartments, encountered after moving to France. This is implausible, simply because Serlio used the notion in its domestic sense before having moved to France. Moreover, it should be noted that, on closer inspection, Godefroy's entry also appears to be factually flawed. It confuses two temporarily converging heteronyms: one related to *apart*, with one deriving from *apert,* "open". Therein it conflates the etymology of *appertement* (variously spelled *apartment, apartamant* during the 14th century), coming from the Old French *apert*, meaning "manifest, in an evident manner," from Latin *aperīre* "to open, uncover"; or "adroit, skillfully," and another form that derives from the Latin *expertus*. (See the entry "appartement" in the DMF, and the Anglo-Norman Dictionary avail. online at http://www.anglo-norman.net). Godefroy's dictionary falsely finds the notion in the *Chroniques de Saint Denis* at the end of the history of King Louis IX, citing that "Ie tout puissant fist moult de beaux miracles, et de grands appartements, par le fais et par les merites du bon roy saint Loys" in the context of the elevation of his sepulcher. But the entry falsely re-constructs the scribal abbreviations, from their written form *grās apptement*, falsely turned into a plural noun. The newer transcription of the BnF reads: "N[os]t[r]e Seigneur tout puissant fist moult de beaux miracles et de gra[n]s app[er]tement par les fais et par les merites du bon roy." Anon., *Les Grandes Chroniques de France* (s.l.: s.n., s.d. [1390–1405]), f. 349v; avail. online at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b8451604g/f708.item. Here "grans" is a singular noun, an old form of *degrée* (Wartburg, *FEW*, IV:204–5); the uninflected '*appertement*' being an adverb. The sentence thus actually translates: "Our almighty Lord made many beautiful wonders, and great works manifested by the achievements and merits of our good king."

I Romani per la grandezza de l'animo sempre cercarono di far cose, le quali dimostrassero quanto eglino fussero potenti e generosi in tutte le attioni in pace et in terra: onde per il commodo di Roma fecero questo maraviglioso porto di Ostia, il quale veramente è per la commodità, e per la grandezza de gli edifici, e sopra tutto per la fortezza sua, è gli può dire mirabile, & è di forma exagona, cioè di sei facce, & ogni faccia è per longitudine .cxvi. canne, et ogni canna è palmi .x. de queste principal misure si potrà comprendere la grandezza sua, ogni faccia haueua un spatioso cortile con le loggie intorno, e quatro appartamenti di magazzeni circondati da le loggie con una ambulatione nel mezo, e lungo la ripa su le acque erano per ordine tronchi di colonne, a i quali si legauano le naui, & a la bocca del porto erano assai torrioni per guardarlo da gli nimici bisognando, e perche in così picciola forma mal si possono comprendere gli appartamenti; io gli ho disegnati in maggior forma qui sotto appartatamente.



2 THE HARBOR OF OSTIA
Plan of the Harbor of Ostia, in which "each building had a spacious courtyard surrounded by loggias, and four *appartamenti* of magazines surrounded by loggias with a passage in half".

unity of the concept and its architectural expression, will not help the understanding of any of Serlio's contributive steps toward it. Here, we need to alter the form of the question. In taking the position that a question always deserves the answer depending on how it is posed,[18] the following takes a much more affirmative position regarding the incipient meaning of appartamenti. By using at once a closer, critical and wider, embracing view, I hope to illustrate that such a view closes some gaps while opening new questions concerning the introduction of the concept of apartments in architectural discourse, and the way in which it would come to gain a central agency in the French art of distribution.

A few years before Pérouse de Montclos, Bertrand Jestaz already noted that Serlio's notion of apartments asserts the idea of a particular suite composed of several differentiated pieces, although not yet codified in either number or order of the rooms. In spite of this striking clue, he remains hesitant to attribute any special role to Serlio in introducing the term to French architectural discourse, when he observes that contemporary French texts frequently use the approximative term *appartenance* (from French *appartenir*, "to belong to").[19] Etymologically not directly related, but given the similar sound, its sense of designating the dependences of a house, Jestaz argues, must have lent itself quite naturally "to be applied to a suite of rooms united under a common regime."[20] Based on this conjecture, in the following chapters I will illustrate that this process was indeed much more complicated than just involving a phonological transition.[21] I offer a closer reading of the com-

18 Famously, for Deleuze a problem always has the solution it deserves according to the manner in which it is posed. Gilles Deleuze, "How Do We Recognize Structuralism?," in *Desert Islands and Other Texts, 1953–1974*, edited by David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 181; and *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 154–59.

19 See Bertrand Jestaz, "Étiquette et distribution intérieur dans les maisons royales de la Renaissance," *Bulletin Monumental* 146, no. 2 (1988): 109–20. An example of this protonotion can be found in the entry "appartenance" in Jean Nicot (ed.), *Thresor de la langue francoyse, tant ancienne que Moderne… reveu et augmenté* (Paris: David Douceur, 1606), 36: "La Maison & ses appartenances, Domus & quae domui cedunt." For the notion of appartenance, see also the entries "Appartenentia" in Du Cange's *Glossarium mediae et infimae latinitatis*, Vol. I: 324b; avail. online at http://ducange.enc.sorbonne.fr/APPARTENENTIA; and the related entries in the DMF, and the FEW, Vol. 25: 34–35), which highlight its meaning as a 'subsidiary part' or 'dependance.' On this relation, see the second-next note.

20 Jestaz, "Étiquette et distribution intérieur," 113 (my trans.).

21 In anticipating my conclusion, it seems important to point out that Jestaz's conjecture misses the complex historical context in which apartments would enter French discourse through a specific *conjunction*, at the point where the emerging notion of apartments resonates with the French practice of the *département de logis*, which is actually the proto-conception of apartment as a socio-spatial system of drawing distinctions (see my Part 2.3 and 3.1–3). In this respect, this chapter first traces in more detail the provenance of

plex historical context and crucial conceptual displacement processes —missed by Jestaz—within which, as I want to argue, Serlio *does* merit recognition fora certain catalytic role in helping bring the architectural concept of appartamenti to an operative level.

That Serlio's conception is neither primitive nor unitary, and certainly not static, can be inferred from the fact that already in the *Terzo libro* the concept features in more instances and in more nuanced senses than previously identified.[22] In taking the concept on its own terms, we can appreciate what 'appartamenti' denominates before becoming a term proper to the French art of distribution. This allows for refracting the longstanding problem of previous analyses of 'where apartments come from.' To encounter the notion of appartamenti in its fabrication, I will follow Deleuze and Guattari's post-structuralist philosophical position and pursue an analysis of concepts that, much more radically than etymological or discourse analytical approaches, takes their differences as a point of departure to problematize (mutating) concepts as a function of (changing) problems.[23] In this perspective, concepts have no identity but only a 'becoming.'

To investigate how concepts enter discourse, this analysis would require first determining, uncoding, and reassembling the problems that appartamenti pose or to which they respond. This entails a substantial methodological challenge, however, as it requires looking at the ways in which architectural arrangements are newly conceived through the form-taking concept of apartments, and the progressive conceptualization of their organizational capacities within architectural discourse. Beyond a merely etymological concern then, this genealogical problem lies at the heart of a two-fold formation—discursive as much as it is material and non-discursive—regarding architectural arrangements. Any analysis concerned with a historical becoming in which discursive and material formations mutually co-determine each other must place emphasis on understanding reciprocal **MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE** practices.

Toward a New Concept of *Appartamenti*

A fruitful complication to pursuing this analysis comes with the condition to map at the same time the material-discursive milieu from which this notion emerges: Serlio's serial treatise, composed of seven books on architecture

this organizational affordance that would be actualized in this conjunction.

22 Serlio, *Terzo libro*, fols. 54, 83, 96, 146, and 152.

23 Daniel W. Smith, "Analytics: On the Becoming of Concepts," *Essays on Deleuze* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2012), 122–45; here 134–37.

that, published successively between 1537–75, became an unparalleled publication success across Europe as one of the most influential Renaissance publications on architecture,[24] and would generate a new standard for architectural publications in its systematic use of illustrations and serial structure.[25] Yet, Serlio's achievement of making architecture easily understood by everyone and his didactic mission to democratize design skills and proliferate architectural knowledge, seems to have greatly undermined the specific relation to practices within his theoretical conceptions.[26] He came to be derogated as a vulgarizer, and his work disparaged as an all-too-practical pattern book to be copied.[27] In countering such views, the last part of this essay will in fact conclude with some implications concerning Serlio's work, that can be inferred from a better understanding of the provenance of the notion of apartments and its central position within the seven books' didactics, and thus

24 As one of the pioneering vulgar Italian writings after Di Giorgio Martini's unprinted *Trattato* (written between 1475 and 1495) and Cesariano's Vitruvius translation (1521), also Serlio's seven books were widely studied and credited in their effect of proliferating architectural knowledge. Serlio started writing his books after he moved to Venice (around 1527, following the Sack of Rome), where he wrote and published the first volumes, beginning with Book IV in 1537 and Book III in 1540. These books became a great publishing success, and were soon translated across Europe. Based on this reputation Serlio attracted the attention of King Francis I of France, who had begun hosting the leading artists of Europe at his court. The cultural climate in the sixteenth century facilitated widely the inter-cultural exchange between Italy and France. Serlio was invited to France, and arriving there in 1541, started advising on the design for the Château de Fontainebleau in matters of construction and decoration. Serlio stayed in France, and composed here the last volumes of his treatise. Book VI was composed between 1542 and '46. Book VII was written probably between 1544 and 1550. This year Jacopo Strada acquired a copy, which was published in 1575, twenty years after Serlio's death. After Serlio's death, one manuscript of Book VI remained in France, where it continued to have a great impact. It must be known that the sixth volume on domestic planning, which actually incorporated Serlio's cross-cultural experiences, remained unpublished until the mid-twentieth century. The history of the rediscovered Sixth Book is comprehensively discussed in Myra Nan Rosenfeld, ed., *On Domestic Architecture* (Minneola/New York: Dover, 1996; orig. pub. 1978).

25 On this serial structures, see esp. the study by Julian Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux: 'Differenz und Wiederholung' in seriellen Publikationen zur französischen Wohn- und Residenzarchitektur*, 2 vols (Cologne: Kunsthistorisches Institut der Universität Köln, 2016), which will be repeatedly discussed in more detail throughout the rest of my study.

26 Hart and Hicks, *Sebastiano Serlio on Architecture*, Vol. I: ix.

27 Until recently, this call marked him euphemistically as a plagiarizing second-rate talent. For a summary of Serlio's intellectual and practical discrimination, see Rosenfeld, *On Domestic Architecture*, 7; Sabine Frommel, *Sebastiano Serlio: Architect* (Milano: Electra, 2003): 9–12; cf. Mario Carpo, *Metodo e ordini nella teoria architettonica dei primi moderni, Alberti, Raffaello, Serlio e Camillo* (Geneva: Droz, 1993), 10–11. For a critical discussion to what extent Serlio's publication are a mere 'plagiarism,' extension, or autonomous theoretical work of the planned treatise of his teacher Baldassarre Peruzzi, see Hubertus Günther, "Das Geistige Erbe Peruzzis im vierten und dritten Buch des Sebastiano Serlio," in *Les traités d'architecture*, ed. Jean Guillaume (Paris: Picard, 1988), 227–45, and "Ein Entwurf Baldassare Peruzzis für ein Architekturtraktat," *Römisches Jahrbuch der Bibliotheca Hertziana* 26 (1990), 133–70. Rosenfeld, Burns, and Günther have considered Peruzzi's theoretical outlines more like 'working material' for Serlio.

reclaim a view—defended by scholars like Sabine Frommel—that acknowledges the complex interrelations between his theoretical and practical works.

Serlio's intellectual contribution consisted not only in providing a new terminology in translating a purely Latin canon and reasoning; these works also had to venture for the first time into new conceptual realms as they literally invented a new language for architecture. The detailed philological study of Serlio's seven books conducted by Alberto Jelmini, reveals the pains he takes in proposing concepts for foreign terms. This goes beyond simply italianizing foreign or Latin notions, guided by Cesariano's Vitruvius translation and with the assistance of his humanist friends including Delminio and Cornaro.[28] But, as Jelmini points out, Serlio sometimes resorts to introducing neologisms into his new design vocabulary. Among these, Jelmini locates the term appartamenti,[29] proving false the idea that the notion is derived from a translation of an already existing Latin term for some separate dwelling unit. Nor is it necessarily a term for a residential structure that can be said to have existed for millennia, given that Serlio's *appartamenti di maggazini* names no residential units but rather a certain geometric spatial relationship. It may even be misleading to categorize 'appartamenti' as a neologism, because it is not a newly invented word (supposedly coined by Serlio) for something 'like' apartments; we are dealing instead with a new conceptual logic, a new way of conceiving of spatial differentiations as such.

Perhaps it is worth clarifying that I do not want to claim that the appearance of a new spatial term implies that the spatiality it would come to denominate was not already there or at least in the making (implying that without the concept people could not think of it); the apparition is instead related to a changing conception (implying only that with different conceptions people think differently about it). For sure, architects always have always possessed notions of spatial differences, room types, or building tracts, and a language to describe them. At the time, rooms were nominally

28 See Frommel, *Sebastiano Serlio*, 63. For a longer discussion of his humanist acquaintances and friends, see ibid., 13–31, and 61–63; and Loredana Olivato, "Per il Serlio in Venezia: Documenti Nouvi e Documenti Rivisitati," *Arte Veneta* XXV (1971): 284–91; Manfredo Tafuri, *Venice and the Renaissance*, trans. Jessica Levine (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 2–13; Rosenfeld, *On Domestic Architecture*: 1–8. For his relation to Camillo, see also Yves Pauwels, "La method de Serlio dans le Quatro Libro," *Révue de l'Art* 119, no. 1 (1998): 33–42.

29 Jelmini, "Serlio: Il Trattato," enlists the notion 'appartamenti' on page 223 and 236. But due to his synoptic focus in which single notions did not receive close attention, Jelmini mentions it only in passing, noting it as a "curiosity," in reference to Bruno Migliorini, *Storie della lingua Italiana* (Florence: Sansoni, 1962), 419; and Salvatore Battaglia, *Grande dizionario della lingua italiana*, passim.

discerned according to their differing sizes, social function, relative position, and accessibility within the entirety of the domestic space (e.g. *sala, anti-camera, camera, rietro-camera, camerino*). Distinctions were made on a level of (or between) rooms; the so-called *stanze*.[30] The concept of a specific set of rooms (like appartements) operates on a different level. Until the 1550s, residential spaces and different accommodations were conceived of as 'lodgings,' divided along lines of gender and possession. In Serlio's works, too, the term *alloggiamenti* name those concrete spaces intended for living in.[31] Residential space was thus thought of in terms of the 'lived space' as practiced by the inhabitants. Here, the notion that spatial practices are lived before they become conceptualized, allows us to contrast *appartamenti* tentatively as a 'conceived space', abstracted through a set of spatial relations, geometrical or other coordinating signs, codes, and discourses that make explicit a particular dimension of planning.[32] This more abstract dimension is lacking from earlier spatial conceptions, such as Vitruvius's species of spaces in the Greek House,[33] the specific rooms in the Younger Pliny's Villa,[34] or Alberti's specification of the "discreta coniunctave habitatione" for male and female residents, or the related rooms in Grapaldo's *De partibus aedium* (On the parts of the house, 1516).[35]

30 The term derives from the Latin *stāre* "to stay, remain, stand."

31 See Serlio Book VI, 1v [II: 4]

32 I am referring here to the distinction made by French sociologist Henri Lefebvre, who distinguishes between *espace vécu* (lived space), *espace conçu* (conceived space), and *espace perçu* (perceived space). See Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden: Blackwell, 1991), 34. See also Tim Rogers, "Henri Lefebvre, Space and Folklore," *Ethnologies* 24, no.1 (2002): 21–44.

33 In chapter 6.7 of *De architectura*, Vitruvius introduces the nomenclature of the living areas of the Greek House, whose major parts are named after each of its typical occupants: *andronitides*, *gynaeconitis,* and *hospitalia* (6.7.4). These living areas have often been translated as men's, women's, or guest apartments respectively. Conceptually, in their nominative case, for Vitruvius these areas are lived spaces of their own kind, however. In his conflation of spatial practices, representations of space and spatial representations, he never needs any general higher-order category comparable to our notion of apartments, other than living spaces. Conceptually then, their translation as 'women's quarters' or 'guest apartments' introduces both an attributive sense as well as a higher-level order of planning, which unifies and re-classifies these different species of spaces as subgroups of what we could call a 'genus-level taxa' presented by apartments. *Taxa* and *genera* will be further discussed below.

34 For the specificity of room labels in roman houses, see e.g. the chapter "The Rooms of the Apartments and their Names," in Gustav Hermansen, *Ostia: Aspects of Roman City Life* (Edmonton: Univ. of Alberta Press, 1982), 17–24. As he points out, Pliny uses *cenaculum* (from *cēnō*m, "I dine," going back to PIE "portion"), and *-culum* (diminutive suffix used to form nouns from verbs, particularly those representing tools and instruments), and *diaeta*, "dwelling (room), place" (from Greek δίαιτα, "way of living, mode of life, dwelling), see Pliny the Younger, *Epistles*, 2.17.15 and 6.21.31: "*in hac diaeta dormitorium cubiculum*."

35 Francesco Mario Grapaldo, *De partibus aedium* [Parma: A. Ugoleto, c.1494]

Concerning the way in which all these spaces were retroactively dubbed 'apartments,' I am not contending that the earlier terms listed above are missing the idea of areas separated in some way. What is missing is the greater level of abstraction which the term 'apartments' carries as a planning concept. Therefore it is important to elucidate how the conception of apartments operates within the progressive explication of this planning dimension. Regarding the becoming-operative of the notion, the question is thus not only how the concept of apartments takes form as a discursive formation itself. As we necessarily talk about a reciprocal process, the question implies that we also look at how the conceptualization process that brings apartments to a discursive realm gives rise to new conceptual problems and possibilities, ultimately generating its own discourse. The entering-into-discourse and becoming-operative of concepts marks an irreversible *terminus a quo*; for after introducing a new concept, sometimes all stakes become different.

While architectural historians have otherwise shown great interest in the changing vocabulary of structural and decorative elements, the notion of apartments is passed over repeatedly.[36] From an analytical level, this can be attributed to the fact that Serlio nowhere ever felt the need to define the term, so that one may justifiably assume a somewhat established or at least common concept. That it first occurs in a book on Roman antiquities does not really help correct this assumption. Remarkable in a book to be understood by everyone, the absence of a definition may indicate that rather than inventing a new term, Serlio was appropriating a contemporaneous neologism for spatial differentiations as it was entering the Italian language. For example, there is evidence that the Iberian term *apartamiento* was already in use a century before Ciéza's *Crónica*, although mainly in a geographic sense of distinction.[37] In this initial sense, the Iberism entered the Italian language in

36 Cf. the recent articles by Peter Burke, "Translating the Language of Architecture," in *Early Modern Cultures of Translation*, ed. Karen Newman and Jane Tylus (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsilvania Press, 2015), 25–44; Eelco Nagelsmidt, "Visualizing Vitruvius: Stylistic Pluralism in Serlio's Sixth Book on Architecture," in *The Transformation of Vernacular Expression in Early Modern Arts*, ed. Joost Keizer and Todd Richardson (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 339–72. Most regrettably perhaps, also Hart and Hicks's re-edition inadvertently passes over the term 'appartamenti' in the commented glossary of the only recently available modern translation of Serlio's seven books. Missing in the glossary of the first volume, where the notion appears first, the second volume only list "apartments," to implausibly refer to Cosimo Bartoli's Italian later translation of Alberti (1550); see Hart and Hicks, *Sebastiano Serlio*, Vol. I: 597.

37 See Francisco Javier Sánchez Martín, "Estudio del Léxico de la geometría aplicada a la téchnica en el renacimiento hispano," PhD diss., Univ. Salamanca (2009): 462, who finds the term dating back to at least 1526 in a naval sense of distance that persists until the late sixteenth century. See also "parte" in *DCE* IV: 414–5. In this sense, it seems likely that

its close connection between spatial distinctions and the determination of subject formations.[38] In this socio-geographic meaning, the word *appartamento* also appears in another work—published simultaneously with the *Terzo libro* in Venice—in which the formulation "secessione et appartamento" names distinguished areas in a military context.[39]

But even if Serlio bases his new conception on a contemporaneous common notion of *appartamenti*, it can hardly have been an established architectural notion, at least, at the time when Serlio initially uses it. This can be easily inferred from the observation that after being introduced into his writing, the notion undergoes a dramatic, but previously unobserved, conceptual

this conceptual transmission was facilitated by the annexation of the Kingdom of Naples to the thalassocracy of the Crown of Aragon (1442–58/1501). A later transmission can be seen in the mid- to late 1540s translations of Spanish literature including Antonio de Guevara and Mabrino Roseo, *Institutione del prencipe christiano* (Venice: s.n., 1544), avail. online at https://books.google.de/books?id=YiA8AAAAcAAJ; Garci Rodríguez de Montalvo, *Le prodezze de Splandian, che seguono à i quattro libri di Amadis di Gaula* … (Venice: s.n., 1557), avail. online at https://books.google.de/books?id=2gl8AAAAcAAJ, [N.B.: Amadís de Gaula was a landmark work among the chivalric romances which were in vogue in sixteenth-century Spain]; Anon., *Historia del valorosissimo cavaliere della Croce* (Venice: Giglio, 1559), avail. online at https://books.google.com/books?id=zAY8AAAAcAAJ.

38 See Aelius Antonius de Lebrixa, *Dictionarium (latinohispanicum, et vice versa hispanico-latinum)…* (Zaragosa: Cocus, 1514), f. 187, avail. online at https://books.google.com/books?id=caJNAAAAcAAJ: "Apartar. segrego, separo. secerno.is; Apartamiento. segregatio. separatio; Apartamiento de casados. divortium.ii …; Apartamiento enesta forma. abactio …; Apartar lo limpio. secerno.is. discerno. is; Apartamiento assi. secretio. discretio; Apartar en differencia. discrimono.as; Apartamiento assi. secretio. discretio …; Apartar lo confuso. distinguo.is. distinxi. Apartamiento dello. distinctio.onis." See also Cristóbal de las Casas, ed., *Vocabulario de las dos lenguas toscana y castellana…* (Sevilla: Aguilar, 1570), f. 162: "Apartamiento. Discostamento, disgiontione, rimotione, ripostiglione," and Hierosme Victor Bollonnois, ed.,*Tesoro de las tres lenguas española, francesa y italiana…* (Geneva: Crespin, 1644), avail. online at https://archive.org: "apartár, *separer, esloigner, detache, desunir, discerner, seduire, divertir, destourner, escarter, oster;* separare, dividere, spartire, distornare, titrare, levare. apartárse, *se separer, se distraire, se destourner,* separarsi, dilvugarsi, distornarsi. apartádo, *separé, éloigné, diverti, seduit,* separato, diviso, dilungato. Apartadame[n]te, *separément, distinctement, à part,* separatamente, distintamente, posto a parte. apartadízo, *separable, separé, un lieu escarté*, un luogo separato, o a parte. apartamiento, *esloignement, separation, divorce, seduction, divertissement, lieu separé comme un garderobe*, lontananza, lontano, discosto" (I: 55). The second French volume, does not feature any related entry (II: 20–22), neither does the Italian (III: 35–37), but mentions "partigione, e partimento, divisione, *partage,* partija" as a process or act of division or sharing, or parceling" (III: 324).

39 Jacopo Nardi, *Le Deche delle historie romane di Toto Livio Padovano, tradotte nuovamente nelle lingua Toscana* (Venetia: s.n., 1540), f. 51r, avail. online at https://books.google.com/books?id=PUhmAAAAcAAJ: "non vi vergognate, che in piazza si vegga quasi maggior numero de vostri littori, et sergenti, che de gli altri togati: che fareste voi, se i nimici venissero alla volta della citta: et se la plebe (poi che per la secessione, et appartamento da quella fatto non ci moviamo) tornasse di qui à poco armata … Et che la secessione, et appartamento de soldati et della plebe, non susse imputato à fallo ad alcuno." Note that here the term *secessione* primarily denotes the aspect of separatedness, while the term *appartamento* denotes a more abstract geographic aspect. This abstract notion is still recorded in the *Vocabolario degli Academici della Crusca: Glossario* (Florence: Cellini, 1867), 58; avail. online at https://books.google.com/books?id=dzQ-AAAAYAAJ.

development within the *Terzo libro*, and Serlio's thinking in general. Therefore, mapping this development as it unfolds throughout Serlio's publications allows for reconstructing the conceptual CRYSTALLIZATION of this new notion into a fully-fledged technical term. Thereby, I want to then illustrate that rather than being a newly-invented (and static) concept, Serlio's true neologistic accomplishment lies in introducing a more abstract planning concept for conceiving of spatial differentiation processes, which is incrementally brought onto a discursive realm.

An Organizational Concept in the Making

To understand this emerging planning dimension, we must go back to Serlio's initial mention of the term *appartamenti*[40] in the description of the Theater of Ferento: ⊠⊠[3]

> A canto questo teatro a man sinistra ci sono li vestigi di due edifici. Ma tanto ruinati, che non si trovano i suoi finimenti: nondimeno l'edificio F, per quel che si vede, accenna ch'ei fusse circondato da altri appartamenti [Near this theater, on the left-hand side, there are remains of two buildings. They are, however, so ruined that none of their boundaries can be found. Nevertheless the building F, from what can be seen, appears to have been surrounded by other *appartamenti*]."[41]

The rather diagrammatic plan of structure F—illustrating a Patrician *domus* neighboring the theater—shows a matrix of four rooms in the distant corners of a 3×3 grid, with intercalated loggias. This even more abstract sense posed apparent problems to Serlio's translators and, with the exception of the Spanish translation, the cryptic conception is not taken over at this point: interestingly enough, the French translation renders the term as "aultres appartenances [other appurtenances]"; the Latin gives "proximis et conterminis ædibus [adjacent and bordering buildings]"; the initial English translation eventually resorted to "other things."[42] The concept entered these translations only with

40 On a clarifying side-note: This instance in the *Terzo libro* presents the first instance readers would encounter in the seven books, given both its chronological and non-successive publication order and writing history.

41 Serlio, *Terzo libro*, f. 54 [I:144, trans. mod.]. The former studies by Montclos and Cagnon/Smith seem to rely exclusively on the French translation alone, as both miss this instance.

42 Quoted here and in the following are the respective Spanish translation by Juan Villalpando, *Tercero y quarto libro…* (Toledo: Juan de Ayala, 1552), here f. 24v (which is also before Cieza's *Cronica*); the French translation by Pieter Coecke van Aelst, *Des antiquités, le troisième livre…* (Antwerp: Coecke, 1550), here f. 25v (*appartenances*); Giancarlo Saraceno,

FErento città molto antica presso a Viterbo sono li vestigi d'un theatro molto ruinato, & ancho di poca opera, e di pochi ornamenti, per quanto si vede: perciochè reliquie non ci sono, da le quali si possino comprender gli ornamenti, anzi si vede, che al portico del theatro erano pilastri quadri, & ancho le scale erano molto semplici, benche mal si comprende come stessero per le ruine loro. La scena di questo theatro è molto differente da le altre, come si vede ne la seguente pianta: ne sopra terra vi è in piede tanto, che si possa comprendere come stesse la scena, ne il pulpito. questa pianta fu misurata col piede antico, e prima parlando de la orchestra. A. la quale è di mezo circolo, il suo diametro è piedi cento quaranta uno e mezo. tutto il corpo del theatro, cioè i cunei con tutto il portico, & il pilastro angulare, è piedi trenta cinque. il pilastro de l'angolo è piedi cinque per ogni lato. l'entrata del portico verso la scena è piedi otto. il conio è piedi venti due. la grossezza del muro circa l'orchestra è piedi tre e mezo. l'hospitalia segnata. X. è in longitudine piedi quaranta e mezo, & in latitudine piedi trenta. la larghezza del portico circa al theatro e piedi vndici. i suoi pilastri sono grossi per ogni lato tre piedi et vn terzo. l'apertura de gliarchi è piedi noue. il netto de la latitudine de l'orchestra. B. è da piedi venti, e'l luogo del pulpito. C. è in longitudine piedi quaranta e mezo, la sua latitudine è piedi dodici, e la sua porta è piedi noue. il luogo segnato. D. deuria essere il portico post scena; nondimeno non ci sono vestigi alcuni di colonne, anzi dinota che ci fusse vn muro, il quale è sopra vna ripa. la latitudine di questo luogo è piedi dicinoue e mezo. A canto questo theatro a man sinistra ci sono li vestigi di due edifici, ma tanto ruinati, che non si trouano i suoi finimenti: nondimeno l'edificio. F. per quel che si vede accenna ch'ei fusse circondato da altri appartamenti. la latitudine doue è la F. è piedi trentauno. le due picciole stanze sono piedi otto e mezo per vn lato, è dieci e mezo per l'altro. le loggie, doue sono le quattro colonne, che per tal cosa io le tolgo, sono in longitudine piedi venti sette, & vn quarto, & in latitudine piedi dieci e mezo. la larghezza de l'edificio notato. E. è da piedi venti. i nicchi da le bande sono piedi diciesette. la longitudine del tutto è piedi sessanta, & è discosto dal theatro piedi cento quaranta uno, e discosto da l'altro edificio piedi settanta sei, e mezo.

3 **"ALTRI APPARTAMENTI": Within Serlio's *Terzo libro*, the concept of *appartamenti* appears first in the Theater of Ferento, whose description gives "Near this Theater, on the left-hand site, there are remains of two buildings. They are, however, so ruined that none of their boundaries can be found. Nevertheless the building F, from what can be seen, appears to have been surrounded by other appartamenti."**



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the second instance, the abovementioned description of the Harbor of Ostia, where the notion is used to similarly describe an axially symmetric arrangement of elements in plan.

But is also pointed to something entirely different, namely a certain understanding of an organizational capacity of layouts in general, or the spatial effect of partitioning measures into some structures set apart into appurtenant structures. This sense—again largely lost in the translations of the text—can be noted where Serlio states his intention for appending a larger-scale zoom-in of the *appartamenti di maggazini* "appartatamente" on the same plate.[43] It is this more complex organizational, layout- and scale-related sense that underlies the description of the Diocletian Baths with its "appartamenti grandissimi," with which the notion becomes consolidated in its denomination of some sort of symmetrically-arranged structures.[44]

As we see, the new term does initially appear in a complex layout-related sense. And, contrary to Pérouse de Montclos's observations, the concept also already appears in a decidedly- residential sense (although not as an individual dwelling unit). This happens not only with Structure F, but in the final segment of the *Terzo libro*, as it concludes its presentation of antique exempla with three modern examples: Bramante's Belvedere in the Vatican, Raffael's Villa Madama outside Rome, and Giuliano da Maiano's villa Poggio

De architectura libri quinque … , (Venice: Chrieger, 1569), here 120; and Robert Peake, *The first [-fifth] Booke of Architecture*… (London: Peake, 1611), here f. 24v.

43 Serlio, *Terzo libro*: f. 83 [I:173]. Orig.: "E perche in cosi piccola, se mi mal sipossono comprendere gli appartamenti; *io gli ho disegnati in maggior forma qui sono apparta-tamente*." This passage is edited and parenthesized in the French translation, which gives: "Chascune face avoir ung spacieus courtyl, envyronnee de loges ou galleries, [et] quattre appartements (cy desoubz en grand forme denote) signee de AB, mesmes envyronne de loges avec une ambulation au mitant." The original English translation by Peake, stays closer to the Italian, "Every Facie had a large walking place, with Galleries round about, [and] [four] Appertiments also, compassed with Galleries, and a walking place in the middle. … And for that you can hardly perceave the Apparttiments in so small a forme [i.e. scale], therefor I have placed them beneath in a greater forme [i.e. larger scale]." Note that especially the Italian term *appartatamente* (from *appartate,* past part. of *appartare* "to set apart"), cannot be reduced to separate, or isolated, because in this context, it specifically denominates the larger-scale drawing being *appended* (in the sense of 'added') below. This casts a further doubt on a facile understanding of a merely divisive sense of *appartare*.

44 Orig.: "Le Therme Diocletiane sono veramente un ricchissimo edificio, per quanto si comprende nelle ruine, che anchora si veggono sopra terra, [e] oltra gli appartamenti grandissimi, e di varie forme, chi vi sono con ricchi ornamenti; il gran numero di colonne, e di buona grossezza che vierano, è gran testimonia della grandezza sua [The baths of Diocletian were indeed very sumptuous buildings, as far as can be understood from the ruins which are still to be seen above ground. In addition to the various forms of enormous apartments with their opulent ornaments that are present, the great number of far-sized columns which it once had, bears fine witness to its grandeur]." Serlio, *Terzo libro*, f. 96 [I:186]. Coecke, f. 46v: *appartementz*; Villalpando, f. 50v: *apartamie[n]tos*; Saraceno, 158: *distributiones*; Peake, f. 45v: *Appertements*.

Reale ☒[5].[45] After appearing in his praise of Bramante's design and its "belli appartamenti,"[46] the concept comes to lie at the heart of the book's most instructive passages. For didactic purposes, Serlio takes the liberty of silently 'improving' the design of the Villa Madama. Yet, in the case of the Poggio Reale and its appraising discussion, Serlio complements the original design with an alternative version with an improved schematic layout.

As is known, the depicted 'original' version of the Poggio Reale, rather than presenting an actual building, presents a typological abstraction. What it stands for is the recent pattern of centrally-organized residential building types that—as Sabine Frommel has discussed—Francesco di Giorgio Martini was one of the first to systematically deal with, and which was greatly advanced by Guiliano da Sangallo in a series of projects including the Medici villa Poggio a Caiano (beg. 1483), the Poggio Reale (1487–88) in particular, and the study for a palace for the King of Naples (1488), as well as later designs by Leonardo da Vinci and Baldassarre Peruzzi, who were the first to adopt the Floretine formal pattern of organizing floor plans.[47]

The 'improved' version, the last plan of the *Terzo libro,* appears to have been included to help promote but also advance these recent examples. It presents not only a synthesis of these precursory projects, but as such, also served as a representation of the current 'state of the art' in presenting a more differentiated cluster of interdependent, hierarchical rooms grouped around a central hall; representing a model to achieve a new order and facilitate a new way of life.[48] With this innovating residential scheme, Serlio presented a

45 Serlio, *Terzo libro*, fols. 146–52 [I: 236–42].

46 Orig.: "un planicie [in later editions: 'piano'] molto grande con belli appartamenti [A very broad terrace with beautiful apartments (i.e. in the sense of 'a beautiful layout')]." Ibid., f. 146 [I: 236]). Cf. Coecke f. 9v: *appartemens*; Villalpando, f. 75v: *apartamientos*; Saraceno, 208: *distributionibus*; Peake, f. 68v: *appertements*.

47 For a more detailed analysis of this model and these projects, see Frommel, "Medici Villas as Expression of a New Way of Life and of Perception," in *The Early Modern Villa: Senses and Perceptions versus Materiality*, ed. Barbara Arciszewska (Warsaw: Museum of King Jan III Palace at Wilanów, 2017), 17–34; and "Leonardo da Vinci und die Typologie de Zentralizierten Wohnbaus," *MKHIF* (2006), 257–300; here 257. For Sangallo's projects see esp. her monography *Giuliano da Sangallo* (Florence: Edifir, 2014), wherein it is suggested that just before Sangallo's died in 1516, Sangallo appears to have drawn up the basic design for the Villa (ibid., 371); and moreover Dario Donetti, Marzia Faietti, and Sabine Frommel, eds., *Giuliano da Sangallo: Disegni degli Uffizi* (Florence/Milan: Giunti, 2017), 35ff, 90ff. On Sangallo's Neapolitan projects, see also Bianca de Divitiis, "Giuliano da Sangallo in the Kingdom of Naples: Architecture and Cultural Exchange," *JSAH* 74, no. 2 (Jun 2015), 152–78. On the nexus of planning ideas, see also Frommel, "Giuliano da Sangallo and Leonardo da Vinci: Cross-Pollination or Parallels?," in *Illuminating Leonardo*, ed. Constance Moffatt and Sara Taglialagamba (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016), 85–99, esp. 87-ff.

48 See Frommel, "Medici Villas as Expression of a New Way of Life," passim. Cumulating in this instance, this call for a new order finds itself just in-between Serlio's relativistic view of culture and history (Hanno-Walter Kruft, *A History of Architectural Theory: From Vitruvius*

design not of his own invention but drawn up by his teacher Peruzzi ✉6,[49] although this fact was strangely veiled by the phrasing of Serlio's remarks that

> Considerando al bello edificio del poggio reale; mi è venuto in pensiero di disporne uno circa a quella visione: ma in altra forma di appartamenti, e forse con miglior commodità; percioche le stanze di quello sono tutte d'una grandezza, la qual cosa non se conviene [Considering the beautiful building, Poggio Reale, the idea came to me to show a similar version, but in another form of apartments; and perhaps with greater utility, because the rooms of the former are all the same size, something which is not suitable].[50]

While Serlio's appropriation of this project was one contributing factor that earned him the reputation of a plagiarist, for our analysis it is more important to note how in taking up and including this scheme, the new notion of appartamenti came to be inscribed at the heart of the newly emerging type of residential organization or disposition. As we can see in this instance, the notion of appartamenti had here still not been reduced to a sort of spatial unit. By contrast, the formulation "in altra forma di appartamenti" demonstrates that the early conception mainly carried a sense of what one may today think of in terms of 'a different layout,' due to which the central core with its "sala e le quattro camere saranno sempre fresche, per non vi potere

to the Present (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1994), 76). It openly expressed "desire for a new order and harmony" (Hart and Hicks, *Sebastiano Serlio*: xxiv), and his most blatant critique of politics. Cf. his anti-Romanist digressions in Book VI that manifest a political consciousness rarely found in an architect of the sixteenth century. Tafuri was respectively the first to raise a debate on the influence of Serlio's protestant faith (see Tafuri, *Venice and the Renaissance*, 67).

49 The design is based on a drawing by his teacher Peruzzi (see fig. 6), in connection to a set of similar projects). On this point, see Hubertus Günther, "Ein Entwurf Baldassare Peruzzis für ein Architekturtraktat," *Römisches Jahrbuch der Bibliotheca Hertziana* 26 (1990), 133–70; here 150; and Rosci, *Il Trattato*, I: 22 and 69. Frommel has critically commented that such regularized plans for the residential type of the fortified villa had also "already been widely disseminated by the drawings of Francesco di Giorgio and Guiliano da Sangallo" (see Frommel, *Serlio: Architect*, 211).

50 Orig.: "Considerando al bello edificio del poggio reale; mi è venuto in pensiero di disporne uno circa a quella visione: ma in altra forma di appartamenti, e forse con miglior commodità; percioche le stanze di quello sono tutte d'una grandezza, la qual cosa non se conviene" (Serlio, *Terzo libro*, 152 [I: 242, trans. modified]). Cf. Coecke, f. 72v: *appartamentz*; Peake, f. 71v: *appertsments.* N.B.: Villalpando's translation, which uses 'apartamiento' throughout, exceptionally employs the word *aposentos* ("room, chamber, lodging, quarter," from Latin *pausente(m),* participle of *pausare*, "to stop, halt" as lodging of a King and his court) in this instance (f. 28v). This further indicates that also in Spain, the term was apparently not yet used for labeling individual lodgings.

In questa figura qui sotto ho voluto dimostrare la parte di fuori e di dentro, la parte notata. A. dinota la parte di fuori. la parte. B. rappresenta le loggie interiori. la parte notata. C. dinota le stanze ne la parte interiore. In questa figura qui sotto non ho notato il coperto de l'edificio, percioche al mio parere io uorria tale edificio scoperto di maniera, che si potesse usare per spasso a mirare la campagna.



PIANTA DEL POGGIO REALE DA NAPOLI.



V ii

4 **POGGIO REALE : Serlio's plan of the 'original' Poggio Reale, in fact a typological abstraction of the actual building. Neither is the depiction of rooms accurate, nor was the building laid out as a perfect square. The external loggias are also pure invention.**

Onſiderando al bello edificio di poggio reale ; mi è uenuto in penſiero di diſporne uno circa'a quella uiſione, ma in altra forma di appartamenti, e forſe con miglior commodità: perciochè le ſtanze di quello ſono tutte d'una grandezza, la qual coſa non ſi conuiene, anzi è di biſogno che le prime ſiano maggiori de le ſeconde. In queſto edificio non ui faccio cortile ne acre di dentro: perciochè eſſendo coſa per la uilla; ella non è impedita da neſſun lato, doue i quattro angoli hanno la luce aperiſſima. Ma alcuno potria dire, che la ſala con le quattro camere ſaria tenebroſa per non hauere la luce ſe non da le loggie: la quale non è luce perfetta. A queſto ſi riſponde, che eſſendo fatto queſto edificio per uſarlo ne i gran caldi, e non hauendo cortile nel mezo; la ſala, e le quattro camere ſaranno ſempre freſche, per non ui potere il Sole: li quali appartamenti ſaranno boniſſimi e godeuoli nel mezo giorno. E dato che non haueſſero quella perfetta luce, che hanno le altre ſtanze; nondimeno elle haueranno tanta luce che ſupplira al biſogno, e queſto ſi uede in Bologna, la qual'è ſimilmente porticata, et anchо dentro le caſe ui ſono cortili con loggie, e le ſtanze ſi habitano pur continuamente. Queſto edificio è talmente diſpoſto che ſe li muri angolari ſaranno di buona groſſezza; tutto il rimanente d'eſſo ſarà fortiſſimo, quantunque i muri ſiano di mediocre groſſezza, per eſſer tutti contraforti l'un de l'altro; talmente che le forze di queſto edificio ſaranno tutte unite. Io non trauero de le miſure perche eſſendo queſto proportionato; lo eſperto Architetto potra ſecondo la uolonta del padrone immaginarſi la grandezza d'un luogo, e di quella fare tanti piedi, o altre miſure, da le quali miſure ſi potranno conoſcere tutte l'altre parti de l'edificio. E ſopra il tutto queſto edificio ſia collocato di ſorte, ſe'l ſito lo comporta; che'l Sole leuante, prima bagni in uno angolo, acciochè tutte le parti del edificio uenghino a participar del Sole, perche ſe'l Leuante baueſſe per una faccia, et il Ponente per l'altra, e'l mezo di per l'altra; ſeguitaria che la loggia poſta a Settentrione non haueria mai ſole, e ſaria mal ſana.



5 POGGIO REALE : *Left*, Serlio's improved version "in other form of apartments", with more differentiated room clusters.

6 *Right*, Peruzzi's original drawing for this scheme (Nationalbibliothek, Vienna Cod. 10935, 136a, r)



il Sole [the hall and the four chambers will always be cool, for the sun does not reach them]," while "li quali appartamenti saranno bonissimi, e godevoli nel mezo giorno [these appartamenti will be great and comfortable during midday]."[51] Here the parallel sentence structure seems to suggest a certain synonymy between the four chambers and 'appartamenti'. Yet on a closer look, the synonymy is not established between some residential unit of apartments and the rooms directly; it is established between the configuration of the rooms and the four quadrants of the sky in which these 'quarters' are positioned.[52]

While the *Terzo libro* puts this climatic/cosmological principle of organization (to which we shall return shortly) in resonance with a residential

51 Serlio, *Terzo libro*, 152 [I: 242, trans. modified].

52 Serlio more or less explicitly alludes here to the Vitruvian principle of subdividing the site according to the quarters of the sky (Vitruvius, *De Architectura*, Book 6, ch. 4. This fourfold logic of quadrants as an organizational principle and their cross-like symmetry along two orthogonal axes, world axes, or cardinal directions, certainly dates back to the logic of the Roman *castrum* and the quarters produced by their *cardo* and *decumanus*, that represented the order to the world. Also Cieza de Leon's notion of *apartamiento* in the sense of hemispheres point in this direction. For the founding ritual of dividing the heavens into four quadrants, see also Bernard Cache, "De Architectura: On the Table of Content of the Ten Books on Architecture," *Candide* 1 (Dec 2009), 9–48; here 32. N.B.: the term "quarter" that thus seems to lend itself as a closer translation, entered English language only later, via the French verb *écarter*, which reciprocally means 'to set apart' but was only in the 1590s used in sense of "portion of a town," then military dwelling; see the entry "Quarter" in the OnED.

milieu, the synonymy between appartamenti and rooms would only become explicit in Books VI and VII. These works, prepared between 1541–53, not only feature the concept much more extensively (approx. 40–50 times each); they also enrich it through variously specified and dissimilar senses. For example, they make frequent use of the singular "un appartamento." We also find "un particulare appartamento [a particular apartment]" as a set of rooms, often personally attributed as "li appartamenti dal padrone [the apartments of the master of the house]" or the "appartamenti di Principi [apartments for Princes]."[53] In these latter works, the single apartment transgresses the function as a conceived space to become perceived space — a socially produced and materialized spatiality with empirical reality. As Marco Rosci notes, *trattatisti* from Serlio and Pietro Cataneo onward have thereby progressively given precision to a novel conception of those differentiated room complexes[54] that, as we will see in the next book, were long in the making. [→ 2.1–2.3]

Cosimo Bartoli (1503–1572), for instance, readily adopted the term in his vernacular translation of Alberti's treatise on architecture (*L'Architettura*, 1550). But by using it exclusively in a sense of individual private spaces,[55] it greatly furthered that apartments were ultimately understood as separated private dwelling units. In the 1580s, the writings of Vincenzo Borghini attest the more common use of the term for a "copia di stanze, o come oggi li chiamano, appartamenti [a chain of rooms, or as one calls them today, *appartamenti*]."[56] This testimony is slightly misleading, however, since those spaces were not directly denominated by the isolated term; what Borghini means is that they were now referred to by a new compound notion, "*appartamenti di stanze* [suite of rooms]" thanks to which the higher-order neologism would slowly

53 See Serlio, Book VII: 218 [II: 364]; Book VI: f. 18Av [II: 40]; Book VII: 96 [II: 256]).

54 See Marco Rosci, *Il Trattato di architecttura di Sebastiano Serlio*, 2 vols (Milan: Istituto di Storia dell Arte, I.T.E.C: 1967), Vol. I: 59. Serlio himself already increasingly distinguished in his later writings apartments as an empirical space from the complementary notion of 'compartition [compartitione],' which names the architect's task of subdividing the site or building. Another pupil of Peruzzi, Pietro Cataneo similarly employs the notion in his treatise *I quattro primi libri di architettura* (Venice: figli di Aldo, 1554). In addition, he speak of the "molti appartamenti" and "stanza appartata" (f. 8v) of public palaces, whereas in residential palaces we usually find "due appartamenti" (fols. 47v, 49r, 49v, 52v, 53r). By contradistinction the term *compartimenti* appears in relation to the planning of cities and *castelli.* These passages were later repeated in Cataneo's *L'architettura…* (Venice: P. Manutius, 1567), fols. 11, 98, 100, 101, 103, and 104), where we additionally find the term "quatro appartamenti" (ibid., f. 147). Here, the notion of *partimenti* is also still mentioned in the modularization of columns (ibid., f. 114).

55 Alberti, *L'Architettura … tradotta in lingua fiorentina… Con la aggiunta de disegni,* trans. Cosimo Bartoli (Florence: Lorenzo Torrentino, 1550), f. 130. Bartoli uses 'appartamenti' twice to translate the Latin *conclave* ("space accessible by a key," from *cum*-, "with" and *clavis*, "key"); see ibid., 124–26.

56 See Vincenzo Borghini, *Discorsi Di Monsignore…, parte seconda* (Florence: Giunti, 1585), f. 576.

stand in as a *pars pro toto* for an organizational unit.

When Serlio arrived at an ambiguous understanding of apartments as some sort of pieces, used synonymously with 'lodgings' but in a more abstract sense,[57] he himself does not seem to not have conceived of them as 'separate habitations' after all. That this sense is still missing from the initial conception of appartamenti is best attested where his writings explicitly distinguish between "appartamenti conjunti" and "appartamenti separati."[58] Sounding like a pleonasm nowadays, the latter expression evidences that the initial conception did not entail any aspect of being separated in itself. Rather, the layout schema that appartamenti are produced by, appears to condition an architectural means to conceptualize, articulate, and generate relations such as separation and connection. Formulations like "*altro tanto appartamento* [another such piece]," or "*medesimi appartamenti* [identical pieces]" allow Serlio to juxtapose the mere number of lodgings to certain room sets.[59] In that matter, let us note that throughout Serlio's publications, from its debut mention in the annex building in Ferento, apartments typically came in sets of four.[60] In its logic of quadrants or quarters, the 'matrix of appartamenti' forms a basic organizational device ⊠↓27, similar to those biaxially-symmetrical planning schemes that Palladio will later promote as a compositional principle.[61] Serlio

57 E.g. in the quantitative sense that modern French uses the term *pièce* as synonymous for apartment, as well as room. Precisely because they are not directly etymologically related, pieces (in their meaning of 'to join, put together') may be a tentative remedy to reconsider the interrelations of parts that apartments produce.

58 The formulation 'appartamenti conjunti' is mentioned in Serlio, Book VI: f. 2v. The formulation 'appartamenti separati' appears in Serlio's Book VII: fols. 4, 14, 50.

59 Formulations as "altretanto (or) altro/i tanto/i (di/d') appartamento/i" appear in Serlio's Book VI: fols. 3v, 10v, 19v, 26v, 27v and Book VII: 6, 16, 30, 54, 224. The formulation "medesimi appartamenti" appears in VI: fols. 14v, 21v; VII: 34, 148, 180, 188.

60 For reasons already indicated (see above, note 49), I do not want to discuss this as a merely numerological factor at length, but the number of four apartments runs also forth in subsequent lyrical works. See here e.g. Joachim (Jean) Du Bellay, *Les Regrets et autres oeuvres poetiques* (Paris: Fédéric Morel, 1559), f. 38, avail. online at https://books.google.com/books?id=Uzo8AAAAcAAJ. For a discussion of Serlio's neo-platonic number symbolism and Pythagorean harmonics that lie at the base of his logical order, I refer to Hart and Hicks, *Sebastiano Serlio*, Vol. I: xxvi–xxxi. For a discussion of the qualitative, magic aspect of Pythagorean numbers that goes beyond the merely quantitative reading of proportion, as established by Wittkower, see George L. Hersey, *Pythagorean Palaces: Magic and Architecture in the Italian Renaissance* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1976). For the ancient Pythagorean-Platonic idea of the cube as procreator; "the source of all number and form," see ibid. 19.

61 A note for completion concerning the mapping of the use of the term *appartamenti*: Andrea Palladio used the notion five times in his *I quattro libri dell'architettura* (Venice: De' Franceschi, 1570): Book I: 64; II: 8 "Oltra di ciò servirà anco questa partitione in caso che i discendenti del sudetto gentil'houmo volessero havere i suoi appartamenti separati [Besides this partition will also serve in the event that the descendants of the said gentleman want to have their separate apartments]," II: 64 "appartamenti delle stanze [apartments of rooms]"; II: 72 "un'appartamento"; I: 73 "due appartamenti di sette stanze

7 THE MATRIX OF APPARTAMENTI: The bi-axial matrixual logic underlying the conception of appartamenti in Serlio: *left*, the Structure 'F' near the Theatre of Ferento; *right* the Poggio Reale.



8 | 9 THE MATRIX OF APPARTAMENTI
Within his own built work, such as the design of the Grand Ferrare in Fontainbleau (*bottom, left*) and the château d'Ancy-le-Franc (*right*), Serlio used the matrix of appartamenti and the principle *ad quadratum* as a compositional device.



himself applied it (while adapting it to French customs) in his design for the Grand Ferrare [8] (c.1542–46), the Château d'Ancy-le-Franc [9] (c.1544), and the later projected Château de Rosmarino (c.1551).[62] As is known, together with the innovated Poggio Reale scheme (which presented one of Serlio's most absorbed and discussed ideas), these projects—with which Serlio not only disseminated the notion of apartments to France but also introduced the idea of the *antichambre*—would gain a seminal influence on the evolving planning of French residential building types.[63]

The underlying *ad quadratum* method, Frommel has pointed out, had been used since the Middle Ages, but when Alberti promoted it as a formal starting point for the layout of buildings it was "updated again in view of the new rational techniques of representation, which attributed a precise place to every object in space."[64] Thereby, composition/compartition was no longer a matter of arranging rooms (as *stanze*) within a house. Going beyond simple part-to-whole relations, the mereological conception of pieces puts more emphasis on part-to-part relations within more regularly-arranged, self-similar structures.

Concerning this self-similarity, the two partial and independent Latin translations of Serlio's seven books[65] provide proof of how newfangled this conception was at a time predating the modern idea of symmetry. Neither book actually adopts the term, not because there was an already existing concept, but rather because there was no equivalent conception in Latin

[two apartments of seven pieces]." Le Muet's initial French translation of the first Book (1645) takes up the notion as it appears in Book I, while already adding another in the same context more freely in the sense of 'upper apartments.' See Pierre Le Muet, *Traicté des cinq ordres d'architecture, desquels se sont servy les Anciens. Traduit du Palladio Augmenté de nouvelles inventions pour l'art de bien bastir…* (Paris: Langlois, 1645): 177 and 199. The shortly after following full translation of Palladio into French by Fréart de Chambray (1650) employs the term more numerously. See Roland Fréart de Chambray, *Les quatre livres de l'architecture d'André Palladio…* (Paris: E. Martin, 1650), 50, 61, 65, 71, 77, 111, 121, 122, 127, 130, 131, 133, 137, 140, and 147. Translated terms comprise *dispositione, case, allogiamenti, luoghi,stanze pertinenti*). It employs the term freely in more distributive contexts as to render Palladio's frequently-used "luoghi" precisely not in terms of the older French concept of the *logis*. When discussing the Vitruvian Greek House, Chambray finally introduces the "appartements pour les étrangers" that the original had described as "allogiamento" and "case per i foristieri" (ibid., 111; cf. Palladio, *I Quattro Libri*, II:43).

62 For a detailed study of these buildings, see Frommel, *Serlio: Architect*, 83–241, and 338ff. See also below Part 2.3.

63 For their prototypical aspects for the evolving French *hôtel particulier*, see ibid., 171ff and 209ff; see also id., "Gli hôtels particuliers a Parigi," *Bolletino d'arte, volume speciale* (2016), 392–418.

64 Frommel, "Medici Villas as Expression of a New Way of Life," 21 and 23.

65 In addition to Saraceno's translation of Books I–V, the remaining Book VII, edited and posthumously published by Jacopo Strada in 1575, appeared in a in a bi-lingual edition that complemented the Italian original with a parallel Latin translation as *Il settimo libro d'architettura/Architectura liber septimus*.

whatsoever. Considerably struggling with the term *appartamenti*, the translations got stuck with their formal identity and—interestingly enough—freely paraphrase the concept in either distributive or dispositional terms.[66] The Latin texts thereby end up losing the precise problem that appartamenti actually pose within Serlio's geometric-descriptive design method, in which expressions such as 'another such piece,' or 'the same pieces' proved to have a direct methodological implication, as those written explanations predominantly instruct how to lay out or draw these plans piece by piece.[67] On this point, George Hersey helpfully highlights how especially Serlio's revamped version of the Poggio Reale seems to be generated by triply splitting the square plan horizontally and vertically, producing a matrix of symmetrical rooms.[68] In Hersey's account, the differentiation proceeds from the outside

66 This is nevertheless a valuable record helping to gain a sense of the connotations that the translators attributed to the term. The earlier translation renders the term 'appartamenti' as derivatives of *distributiones* (Serlio, *Libri quinque*: 158, 208, 214, and 220), to the exception of the abovementioned "proximis et conterminis ædibus" in Ferento (ibid., 120), and "divisiones" in the case of the Harbor of Ostia (ibid., 146). The unknown translator of Strada's publication rendered the many occurrences in Book VII with a wide range of more *dispositional* formulations, including general descriptions for habitable spaces, lodgings or building parts (*partes/pars, loca, habitatione, mansione*; see Serlio, *Liber Septimus*, 6; 60; 96, 138; 136, 146, 166, 170, and 210), to more specified forms such as *separatæ habitationes* (4, 50, 96, 152, and 218) or *mansionum collocatio* (ibid., 10 and 212). Interestingly, the earliest appearances also retain and express Serlio's formal (quadr)angular conception in formulations as *habitationes angulares* (ibid., 14) or *angulis quatuor separatæ fient habitationes* (ibid., 10). Strada's translation thus repeatedly renders apartments as a room configuration. This becomes most tangible in its Vitruvian renderings as *dispositio(ne)* (ibid., 180, 188, 218), *dispositionis domus* (ibid., 10 and 212), or *structura* (ibid., 218 and 220).

67 E.g. project XXV describes one of configuration of rooms in a *palazzo*-type building, after which he adds that "another such apartment be on the other side [*Et altre tanto d'appartamento sara dal altro lato*]" (Serlio, *Liber Septimus,* 54). This shorthand for the layout's bi-lateral symmetry—as we easily intuit today—poses a difficulty for the Latin text that, without a modern conception of axial symmetry, resorts to introducing this equivalence indirectly, e.g. as "just as many [*totidem*] lodgings and rooms [*totidem mansiones et totidem loca*]," or "on the other side of this building, the rooms' and spaces' similarity and proportionality differs in no way [Et alterum quidem latus huius ædificij, similitudine atque proportione mansionum atque locorum nihil omnino differet ab eo quod modo declaravimus]" (ibid., 58 and 224 [my trans.]). The related formulation "medesimi appartamenti," caused similar editorial responses (ibid., 180 and 188).

68 See the figures 1.5 and 1.6 in George Hersey and Richard Freedman, *Possible Palladian Villas* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 21–22, highlighting the 1:1:3:1:1 ratio of each side. In this study, Hersey and Freedman have approached the rule-based design of Palladian Villas by exposing their [parametric] generative grammar, through the attempt of re-generating them, as merely 'analyzing' in a Wittkowerian fashion. This work is inspired by the pioneer study by G[eorge] Stiny and W[illiam] J. Mitchell, "The Palladian Grammar," *Environment and Planning B* 5 (1978): 5–18, that highlighted a generative design rule analogous to Latin conjugation and declension. For a synoptic discussion of Wittkowerian analytical, versus these (and following) generative approaches, see the second chapter "The Thirteenth Villa" of Caroline O'Donnell, *Niche Tactics: Generative Relationships Between Architecture and Site* (New York/London: Routledge, 2015).

inwards. But where Serlio himself describes his planning approach, he expressly suggests to always start from the middle of the street-facing property-line, where the door ought to be located.[69] The building is then iteratively generated through a compartmentalization process following from this initial bipartition. This way we can finally appreciate Serlio's crystallizing notion of appartamenti as a generative organizational concept for techniques of laying out floor plans. ⊠↓27

69 An example is provided below, where I come back to Serlio's position to "start from the middle."

1.2
Compositional Peda-gogies from Partition to Partimenti

Having deconstructed the overcoding of the apartment as a dwelling unit, we can finally appreciate Serlio's form-taking notion of *appartamenti* as a generative organizational concept for the layout of floor plans. But this completely redirects the hitherto unsettled question 'where the notion comes from' in a more productive direction. Because in the newfangled problematization of pieces versus part-to-whole relations, this conception must be understood not only in the context of the transmission of emergent patterns of planning and the filiation of ideas that have been passed down a lineage of master/apprentice relations, but also in response to a long-standing theorization of organizational practices and pedagogies of (com)partitioning outlined in the treatises of these architects. To fully embrace this organizational genealogy, a second difficulty lies in overcoming the dominant understanding of parts as passive, preformed, or elementary objects, because their organizing function in pre-modern conceptions of partition is diametrically opposed to their consolidating function of separation and classification in modern knowledge systems. Serlio's work runs on a similar conception of partitioning processes.

Here we would do well to pause briefly and reflect more closely on how partitioning conceptually operates within Renaissance discourse. Let me thus go back to the aforementioned observation that the notion of parts initially expresses "a share of something coming to be distributed."[70] In all Latin languages, *to part* equivocally connotes "to divide" and "to share." While this ambiguous sense persists in the German notion of *teilen*, even in modern Italian this relation between part(ition)ing (*dividere*) and sharing (*condividere*) has become more detached from one another, albeit less so than in French (*diviser/separer* vs. *partage*) or English (divide/separate vs. share), where with later reflexive forms "parting" attained a distinct sense of "to go away, to withdraw oneself." Yet, with *partus* being "birth," parts are that which is being given through, or with(in) an act of apportioning or dealing out, or sharing; entities that emerge *cum partitione*. They thus principally articulate symmetry-breaking processes that condition relationships and the formation of related bodies or subjects, rather than finite objects in an atomistic sense of parts. In that sense, rather than parts being passive objects, (com)partition is a crucial agent of ontogenesis (*par, per*).

From this perspective, one could argue that pre-modern partitioning practices express an immanent world-view in which every given is differentiable as "every beginning is dividual," rather than individual; every given articu-

70 See e.g. the principle dictionary by Von Wartburg, *FEW,* VII: 672. For a related theoretical discussion of partition, see esp. Gerald Raunig, *Dividuum: Machinic Capitalism and Molecular Revolution*, trans. Aileen Derieg (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2016).

lates itself through a partitioning process consisting in both a condivision and a corresponding condividuation.[71] Rather than drawing lines of separation between preexisting entities, partition draws lines of connections and genealogical relations![72] As a transversal and transgressive movement (i.e. to part, parse, pass, pierce) partition brings about and sets forth reciprocally-determined relations and states, entities and subjects, by introducing an intensive difference such as distance, position, and so on. In this conditioning and constituting function, partition includes secondary meanings that enunciate participating subjectivities and agencies (i.e., to have one's part, to take part). These forms capture the resulting associative states of belonging and manifold relationships involved in these processes (i.e., person, partner, party), as well as the state of order resulting from it (i.e., passage, portion, partition, parcel, *paries* [wall]). In that sense partition is always tied to the production of relationships and the formation of bodies, groups and their members.

This notion evidently reframes the repeated concern expressed in Renaissance theory of problematizing how the different parts of an entity or composition are given. It is due to this generative agency that partitioning processes, and the derivation of pieces, have proven the prime concern of architecture theory from Vitruvius's problematization of modularity (*symmetria*) onward.[73] It simply expresses an ontological concern about the problem of how reality is organized.

71 As I referred to in my introduction, Gilbert Simondon's most basic argument holds that an individual, thing, or object is never given in advance; it must be produced, coagulate, or come into being, through an ongoing process of individuation. At the same time individuals are no necessarily units but rather collectives, composed of more than one person or entity. In this sense also ensembles undergo processes of individuation. I use the term here in an extended post-Simondonian sense, read through the Nietzschean-Deleuzian concept of the 'dividual' as recently theorized by Raunig, *Dividuum*, here 11.

72 Forgotten with the modern convergence of meaning of 'to part' with 'to separate,' the wider etymology of *pars* ("a part, piece, portion, share, division, section") is related to words as *forare* ("piercing"), via the root **per-* ("to lead, pass over") through the wider 'transgressive' etymology stemming from Greek notions around the stem *por-*, such as e.g. πόρω ("to offer, give, destined to"), πείρω ("to pierce/run through"), or πρόσω/πόρρω ("forward, further, at a distance"). It stems from the Proto-Indoeuropean root ***prtu-* ("a going, a passage"). Related English notions range from "ferry," "firth," "forth," "passage," "parse," to "partner." See the varioes entries in the OnED.

73 The historical relation between spatial arrangements and ordering practices was long quite explicitly expressed in the first two of his fundamental principles of architecture with which Vitruvius jump-dives into the problem that architectural design poses. Rather than discussing Vitruvius's definition of *ordinatio* as "Ordinatio est modica membrorum operis commoditas separatim universeque proportionis ad symmetriam comparatio" (Vitruvius, *De architectura* 1.2.2) and *dispotitio* as "Dispositio autem est rerum apta conlocatio elegansque compositionibus effectus operis cum qualitate" (ibid.), we should pay attention to the emphasis of the two interrelated and complementary practices of differentiation engaged here; i.e. *comparatio* and *conlocatio*. These practices are

Such inquiries have repeatedly gone astray, however, in becoming a transcendental principle; especially whenever partitioning came to be (mis) understood in terms of how architectural parts, composition, or objects represent (rather than condition) the social or cosmic order as a whole. The most monumental case may be the conception of *partitio* that Leon Battista Alberti (1404–72) presented as the third of the six operative scales of architecture (or what Françoise Choay calls the 'operators'[74]) that come to generate built reality. In his architectural treatise *De re ædificatoria* (1485), Alberti defined that

> partitio est quae totius aedificationis aream in minoris areas partitur; unde fit, ut quasi membris in unum adactis et coaptatis totum aedificii corpus minoribus aedificiis refertum sit [Compartition is the process of dividing up the site into yet smaller units, so that the building may be considered as being made up of close-fitting smaller buildings, joined together like members of the whole body].[75]

This notion of *partitio* transfers the third of the six Ciceronian criteria of the organization of speech (*dispositio*) in Latin rhetoric[76] onto spatial organizations. As the outline of the major points in the argument, partitio serves two purposes: it presents a way of laying out an argument by both distinguishing the issues in dispute and enumerating the arguments in their order of appear-

completely distinct, yet related, as they operate each on a plane of reality that one would discern (with Deleuze) as the virtual and the actual. The aim of these basic ordering processes, that condition and actualizes both quantitative and qualitative differences in to find states of resonance — *eurythmia* — a composition brings about when the members of the work correspond symmetrically. This 'symmetry' is defined as what we mean by modularity today; see Pavlos Lefas, "On The Fundamental Terms of Vitruvius' Architectural Theory," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 44, no.1 (Dec 2000): 179–97.

74 Françoise Choay, *The Rule and The Model: On the Theory of Architecture and Urbanism*, ed. Denise Bratton (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 70–74; and id. "De Re Aedificatoria als Metapher einer Disziplin," in *Theorie der Praxis: Leon Battista Alberti als Humanist und Theoretiker der Bildenden Künste*, ed. Kurt W. Forster and Hubert Locher (Berlin: Academie, 1999), 217–32; here 244.

75 Leon Battista Alberti, *De re ædificatoria* (Florence, Niccolò di Lorenzo, 1485); repub. as *De re ædificatoria/L'architettura*, trans. Giovanni Orlandi, with an introduction and comment by Paolo Portoghesi (Milan: Il Polifilo, 1966), 23. The following translations are taken from Alberti, *On the Art of Building in Ten Books*, trans. Joseph Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), here 8.

76 Cf. Howard Burns, "Leon Battista Alberti," in *Storia dell'architettura italiana: Il Quattrocento*, ed. Francesco P. Fiore (Milan: Electra, 1998), 114–65; ; and Heiner Mühlmann, *Ästhetische Theorie der Renaissance: Leon Battista Alberti* (Bonn: R. Habelt, 1981), who both in their discussion of Alberti's use of Ciceronian rhetoric do not discuss partition, as Burns focuses primarily on his substitution of Vitruvian *eurythmia* with *concinnitas*, and the aspect of *dispositio*; or the specific "aesthetic categories" that Mühlmann foregrounds in his affect-communicational approach as it emphasizes the rhetorical roots of Alberti's *decorum*-based teachings.

ance. Hence, beyond this mere act of differentiation, as Quintilian especially emphasized, partitio also marks (and makes) the transition to each new argument,[77] through which it attains a function of ordering and SERIATION (to which I will come back to later). In that organizing aspect, Alberti's auxiliary clause must not be read in terms of the resulting parts (as the translation foregrounds), but ought to be read concerning where it situates this agency: if we follow the agential nominative forms *partitio* and *quasi membris in unum*, these parts set forth (*adactis*) and hold together (*coaptatis*) the larger construct that they have assembled . In that sense, partition works as an organizing tool to differentiate, and thus actualizes the functional relations, parts, or members within any larger body.

The organizational problem lies in what assures its (logical or real) consistency. This is why Alberti does not define that partition is the process of division; *partitio* is that by which (*quae*) a given whole attains its logical or real consistency, hence, an operation, instrument, or method. Only given the complexity of this twofold agency, can we make sense of the famous adage that "all the power of invention, all the skill and experience in the art of building, are called upon in compartition; compartition alone divides up the whole building into parts by which it is articulated, and integrates every part … into a single, harmonious work."[78] The limitations of Alberti's rhetorical approach to trying thus to clarify Vitruvius's primary problem of *ratiocinnatio*, have been critically outlined by Choay. What is problematic here is mainly the degree to which the transfer of rhetorical operations into the field of architecture not only displaces them from a metaphorical use in Cicero into the concrete realm of architecture, but also thereby situates them in a very different complex of problems. While Choay acknowledges this transfer as a first step toward a semiological approach to the built environment, she also identifies that this "proto-anthropological exploration into what underlies social order"[79] drifted quickly into a problematic realm where Alberti posits that composition should be ruled by the steady-state of *concinnitas*; the harmonic neatness and cleverness that arises from a work skillfully put together.[80] Placed at the core of his notorious definition of beauty, composition becomes

77 Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria*, trans. H. E. Butler (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1920), 3.9.3.

78 Alberti, *On the Art of Building*, 421.

79 Choay, "Metapher einer Disziplin," 220.

80 See "Concinnitas" in the glossary of Alberti, *On the Art of Building,* 421–2. See Robert W. Tavernor, "Concinnitas in the architectural theory and practice of Leon Battista Alberti," PhD diss., Univ. Cambridge (1985); Harry Francis Mallgrave, *Architectural Theory,* 2 vols (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), Vol. I: 30–35; and Kruft, *A History of Architectural Theory*, 21–29 and 41–50.

a linear task of fitting parts "that are quite separate from each other … so that they correspond to one another."[81] In understanding design as a composition of parts different from one another, Alberti effectively abandons, Wim Nijenhuis writes, the previous "reliance on an external, cosmological model for determining the whole … But even when a design is a composition, formed by linking together elements, the problem of the whole inevitably remains."[82] Yet by presenting *ratiocinnatio* as a "rational system in which all the parts are linked by geometrical and arithmetical relationships,"[83] the integrative logic of 'making parts fit' presented in *De re ædificatoria* only revamps what in rhetoric remained a problem of consistency (to which I will also return later) into a totalizing principle for architectural composition as a whole:[84] partition becomes an aesthetic regime, a means in the service of concinnitas. This greatly overshadows the two-fold capacity that partition afforded in the first place.

Partition Measures as an Image of Thought

The problem we must therefore focus on is the false unity of composition in partitioning processes. To identify this two-fold organizational capacity, we must be careful to observe that this instrumentality lies not in some thing, but in something deeply rooted within Latin grammar and its capacity to articulate operationality through inflection.[85] While for Vitruvius the house was a coded space that embodied complex symbolisms,[86] which in its Latin thinking could widely conflate spatial practices, representations of space, and spatial representations by its very grammar, non-Latin thinking on the other hand can no

81 Alberti, *On the Art of Building*, here, 302–3. The respective passage — re-cited in many accounts on Renaissance theory — defines beauty as the result of a "reasoned harmony of all the parts within a body, so that nothing may be added, taken away or altered, but for the worse" (ibid., 156). On this point, see Brian Vickers, "Humanismus und Kunsttheorie in der Renaissance," in *Theorie der Praxis*, ed. Förster and Locher, 9–74; 57–63.

82 Wim Nijenhuis, "Alberti, Mingling, Resemblance, and 'as if,'" in *Riddle of the Real City: Or the Dark Knowledge of Urbanism* (Amsterdam: 1001 publishers, 2017), 366–8.

83 Frommel, "Medici Villa," 22.

84 Here, I rely on the Guattarian contradistinction that "consistency is not totalizing"; Félix Guattari, *Lines of Flight: For Another World of Possibilities* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 154.

85 In Latin thought, the agency of material processes was deeply rooted in the very grammar of its classical vocabulary, since the oft-used ablative case such as *ordinatione, dispositione*, or *partitione* articulates things of an instrumental character related to concepts that the English prepositions as "from/with/by," or "in/at" express. In its inflected form, this case generally expresses separation, indirection, or the means, instrument, or cause, by which an action is performed.

86 For Vitruvius, the spatial differentiation of buildings is based on a set of simultaneous conditions in his discussion of propriety which involves social standing, customs and usage and natural dispositions. Their simultaneous resolution and arrangement is the main task of the architect. See also below, note 98.

longer engender the organizational instrumentality of architectural practice in inflected forms. Romance languages indicate operative relations by morphological processes of derivation, and thus by means of analytical systems of marking dependence. Thereby spatial practices become more and more distinguished from their representational aspects. Renaissance theory in its changing language was forced to re-situate and re-conceptualize the social, or representational, and compositional aspects that were often conflated in the highly polyvalent Latin terms. Here, Alberti's operators initially problematized a conceptual bifurcation between spatial practices and spatial representations through the distinct concepts of *partitio* and *concinnitas*, which decouples the production of distinctions from the harmony they generate.

This is where a confusion set in, as the operative nature of *partitione* was re-situated when it became explicit through the prefixation in its vulgar rendering like *compartitione*. This term was used by Filarete (Antonio di Pietro Averlino, c.1400–c.1469), in whose treatise (written between 1451–65) this more processual term was reserved for describing the act of laying out buildings by subdividing the site [→ App. A]. But we also already find it in variegated design methodological terms like *partimento/i*, *di(s)partimento/i*, or *(s)compartimento* (and related adjectival forms),[87] which all articulate an idea of a process, a state or condition, a means or instrument of action, or the place of an action itself. Here, it is the agential suffix *–ment* that makes the 'in-built' organizational instrumentality of partition an explicit tool of architecture: a tool for organizing parts. Therefore we see a basic conceptual difference emerging between the MULTIPLICITY of parts (as *partimenti*) produced by organizational practices (through *(com)partitione/-mento*), in the same way that divisions arise from condivision. No longer a merely metaphysical operator of Albertian doctrine, partition fuels what Thoenes calls "the dream of omnipotence" in Filarete's conception of architecture's organizational agency.[88] Here, in appropriating the Latin precursors, Filarete seems to be one of the first to explore the explicit instrumental relation between "misura e membri [measure and members]" or "misura e scompartimento [measure and (act of) compartition]."[89]

In his book XXII, Filarete critically extends Alberti's thoughts in attending more closely to the question what *disegno* is: "the first thing that seems to me

87 Antonio Averlino, detto il Filarete, *Trattato di architettura*, ed. Anna Maria Finoli and Liliana Grassi, 2 vols (Milan: Edizioni Il Polifilo, 1972). For the extensive bibliography on the treatise see here I:xcii–civ.

88 See Christoph Thoenes, "Notes on the Architectural Treatises of the Renaissance," *Zodiac* 15 (1996), 13–32; here 23.

89 See Filarete, *Trattato*, f. 5r [I:25]: "Misura e membri" and f.154r [II:575]: "misura e scompartimento".



Liber

uedrai squadrato questo diquadri piccholi perquesto potrai intendere
lemisure grandi proportionate dacqueste picchole:

Come to detto. Io timosterro questo pliniamento ilquale e riquadrato in
quadri piccholi tuglipotresti intendere grandi & piccholi atuo senno maio
glintendo diquesta misura cioe diquattro stadij pciascheduno quadro che fare
che almodo nostro mezzo miglio pquadro. Siche uedendo questo tupuoi sa
pere quanto uiene aessere grande poi lacuta, o uuoi dire miglia, o uuoi
dire stadij ouuoi dire braccia tu sai quanti stadij e uno miglio & sai
quante braccia e lostadio moltipricha & saperrai quanto ella circunda
& quanto elle perogni uerso. Et cosi allaragione diqueste misure massim

10–12 FILARETE'S COMPARTITION MEASURES
***This page*, sketches showing the compartitioning of the city according to the principal wind directions and compass from the Sixth book of Filarete's *Trattato*, Codex Magliabecchiano I.II.140 (Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Florence [BNCF]): f.13v. *Overleaf*, spread from the same book (fols. 42v and 43), illustrating the famous diagrammatic plan of Filatete's ideal design of the envisioned city of Sforzinda. *Subsequent page*, a centralized structure 'sparto per mezzo' (fol 49v).**

muro sandra allacqua quando facessi bisogno & poi ilpiano terreno Io fo dalcā
to dentro ilmuro grosso due braccia & si lascio diuano & plauia sotterranea sen
tra inquesto luogho & cosi pquesta uia disopra altondo siua & alla somita deli
quadro siui fo una scala chesia comune achi uorra andare sulprimo quadro
& questo ho fatto che sepure entrasse niuno insu questo quadro contro alla
uolonpta delpadrone chepquesta uia simandi gente neltondo disopra acatt
rgli fuori ben chepoco danno potessono fare & inquel luogho disotto come
ho detto uoglio congegniare due porte dibronzo ouero diferro īmodo ch
non siparra & niente dimeno bisogniando siserreranno pforza & puia di
uite īmodo chenon sipotra uietare & anche disopra adirittura sifara piō
batoie dabuttare sassi :-

Ogni cosa sta bene mipiace uoglio che mitruoui parecchi buoni maestri iqua
li sappino bene intagliare dimarmi & anche dibronzo pche uoglio far fare
quattro caualli inquesta forma & quello cheuiene adirictura della torre
austra uoglio fare uno ponte che intrauersi ilfosso dalla torre inquestentra
ta & desso puia dimuro sipossa andare pinfino alcastello. A mi inteso/cre
do auerui inteso. Voi dite inquesta forma sebene intendo come uo disegnā
to qui Bene Io mandero pli maestri accio chessidia hordine presto pche
questi non sono cosi spacciatiui come seno hauessimo tanti lauori inquesto:
mezzo che questi maestri uerranno sifara laltre preparationi chebisognian
ptutti equattro & ancora sipotra cominciare alla compartitione della citta
tanto delle strade quanto delle piazze & accio nonsiperda tempo. Darami
antendere unpoco come tu lauuoi compartire & diquelli hedificij chetu intē
di prima difare & metterai questi maestri & lauoranti in hopa accio chenō
pdano tempo Ilcompartimento cheuoglio fare sie questo imprima uoglio
fare lapiazza īmezzo della citta & uoglio chesia lalarghezza cento cin
quanta braccia & trecento lungha. Et pche lauostra Signioria meglio mī
tenda Io uela disegniero inquesta carta Non istante cheprispecto che e
incosi piccholo spatio non cosi dipunto sipuo disegniare lecose come aranno
a esse. Ma quello chepdisegni non sipotra dimostrare colla uera sua mi
sura lodiremo īmodo ilpiu chesipotra lodaremo aintendere :

Entrata delle mura de
lla citta nel Castello :

Imprima pche intendiate lamisura deltutto secondo uoi uedete questi
quadretti ogniuno e uno stadio come e detto dinanzi & e trecento settā
ta cinq braccia siche pquesto disegnio sipuo moltipricare & uedere quā
ta e grande & cosi ogni hedificio sipotra cōmisurare uedere quanto e
grande: Io lo qui indigrosso trascritta. Et pche difficile sarebbe adisegnā
rla intanti modi Io diro come indue modi hauemo pensato discompar
tirla & hordinarla & poi secondo auoi parra chestia meglio cosi sifa
ra elmodo della scompartitione sie questo & come qui sipuo compren
dere & come siuede lapiazza & inmezzo della citta & come ho detto
disopra lasua larghezza e braccia cento cinquanta & lasua lunghezza
trecento laquale e posta daoriente aoccidente lalatitudine e dameridi a

Settentrione: Questi quadretti sono ciascuno uno stadio ilquale stadio e 375 braccia:



La discriptione della Citta:

I nella testa doriente Io fo lachiesa maggiore & inquella doccidente fo ilpalazzo reale lequali grandezze alpresente non toccho pche quando la faremo allora intenderete tutto dalla parte della piazza inuer setten trione Io fo lapiazza demercatanti laqual fo largha uno quarto dista dio cioe nouanta tre braccia & tre quarti & lungha mezzo stadio & dalla parte merediana della piazza fo unaltra piazza oue sara come dire uno mercato & iui suendera cose damangiare & come e labeccheria & frutte & herbe & altre simili cose plobisognio della uita delhuomo & questa sara lar gha unterzo distadio & lungha due terzi cioe braccia dugento cinquanta a ppresso diquesta intesta glifo ilpalazzo delcapitano dacanto apresso lacor te, che solo lastrada lasparte & inquella demercatanti dauna testa fo ilpa lazzo delpodesta & dallaltra parte opposita quello doue sitiene laragione del comune. Dalla parte settentrionale fo laprigione comune laquale uiene aesse direto alpalazzo della ragione. Dalla parte orientale dacanto della pia zza fo lerario cioe doue sifa & conserua lamoneta & appresso ladoghana nella piazza delmercato sara come o detto ilpalazzo delcapitano & dauna

& poi sparto ˉmezzo pogni uerso ˉmodo dicturo partuto inquesti quadri. fatto questo insu ogni angholo io lasso uno diquesti quadri come o scom partuto acquesto modo Io segno ˉlmuro conunaltra linea & dalluno sogˉ allaltro cioè daluna linea allaltra sie ser braccia & questi so ple mura prin cipali difuori e uero diesipotreno fare più sottili ma poche sia ledificio più for te & più durabile Io leso diquesta grossezza Laltre mura diesono dentro lo leso di quattro braccia excetto quelle diesono neiquadri diˉrispondono insu canti iquali sono dibraccia uentiancp ꝓquadro Maquanto tiene ilquadro diquesti cantoni Io glisso auanzare dalcanto difuori didrieto delmuro due braccia ciascheduno & questo ꝑbuon rispetto:

Vorrei sapere ꝓche tusti questo & anche questi quadri diuentiancp braccia ꝓ ogni quadro canto Io uidiro ogni cosa quando tempo sara credo mabbia teˉ intesso pinfino a qui fuoria intendere come tu tiri queste mura dentro le mura dentro desaranno equadri decentom saranno grossi braccia otto uoi potete ꝓquello che e disegnato qui meglio sipuo intendere chedire abocchaˉ ꝓquesta cagione Io lo disegnato tutto questo quadro & sparttolo insei qua dri equali & sono uentiancp braccia pogni uerso & questo quadro e trenta sei diquesti quadri ouolete dire parelli Io iparlero sopra questi. Sidete tene te bene amente quello chedico ꝓche sono scabrose. Imprima uoi uedete quel to canto qui ialquale come uo detto e uentiancp braccia diuano come ciascheˉ duno deghialtri Io imprima notolgho dentro due braccia & queste letolgho glomuro dacanto dentro inuerso ladriesa da ledue porti oppositi cioe delmu ro difuori luno inuerso lapiazza & laltro inuerso serentrano nonguene to ghe senone uno braccio sidee questo quadro muesta uentidue braccia pogni uerso & lesue mura difuori sono grosse come o detto otto braccia. Ma insul cantone proprio otto braccia dauno lato & otto dallaltro & tenete bene a mente che quello chesto anno so arimi equattro ecanti pighio poi cancp trā diquesto quadro pogni lato & alle cancp so uno braccio dimuro grosso tre & due alto & questo ua intorno intorno acquesto quadro & su uimetto due co lonne ꝓfaccia duno braccio grossa & septe alta & ladistranza tra luna & laltra sie tre braccia & disopra otto uno archetto duno braccio & mezzo secondo chequi inquesto quadro disegnato sipuo comprendere. Vedete Sigˉ re embisogna hauere lanimo molto atento ꝓche sono molto scure antedere queste scomparutioni:

Ette poi io so una uolta disopra acqueste colonne angulare cioe incroce alta sei braccia dimolura intendete cheuiene aesse alta questa uolta braccia diciotto daterra & lascala laquale andera su nella sommita sara nello sp tio di cancp braccia diportico ben cheluano delportico sara solo quattro: tā acqueste lascala non loccupera due braccia solo daluna delle facce & questa andera su disopra acquesta uolta elli sara spianato & fatto in questa forma chequello muro cheua disopra duno braccio & disotto alle colonne andera su alto alpiano della uolta & poi figurera una uoltetta



lhuomo uuole essere il corpo suo bene disposto e bene organizato
per hauere tre proprieta come allui sappartiene Cosi ledificio.
Allhuomo sappartiene esser ben formato bene organizato e anch
di buona compressione compressionato accio possa esser sano e ui
uere assai e anche sia capace di buono intellecto accio possa
exercitarsi a quello che lui fu creato e mancando una di qste
tre cose non puo essere in pfectione e cosi il dificio bisogna
a ordinare a tucte le sue cose con modo ch habbi materia a
essere sofficiente sicondo sua qualita Si ch io per questo ti diro
come ho disposto di fare questo Accio habbia tucte e tre qste
conditione Eternita Belleza et Vtilita:
Ilecternita in prima noi caueremo un fosso di largheza di
braccia uinti e questo lo faremo in torno al quadro delle cete
nouanta braccia facto questo io ne faro poi due altri in croce
in questa forma della medesima largheza e in su ogni canto
ne e cosi nel mezo di questi fossi io faro di legname come
a dire una botte di du braccia di uano e metterale giu tanto
al fondo quanto io trouero lacqua e questi pozi uenghano a
essere 17: facto questo io li mettero ghiara e calcina tanta
che uerra al pari di queste botti e poi uoglio hauere buone
pietre e mettere tanto che sia un braccio piu alto e ogni
pozo sia pure ispedito e poi p tucto questo fondamēto Io
lassero due braccia di uano e alto quattro e poi fare il mu
ro sequente con una uolta e a diritto de pozi a ciaschduno
lassero un bugio di mezo braccio di uano e poi come saro
a presso a terra e io uoglio girare uolte dalluno muro allaltro
tanto alte ch uenghino set braccia sopra al piano terreno e le
uolte grosse un braccio e mezo ben forti Accio ch le mu
raglie di sopra siano ben fondate e queste uolte sotto terra
daro percio loro lumi in modo si potrano usare Et accio
siano bene forti io girero in sur ogni angolo cioe cantoni
del mezo un archo di dieci braccia largho e poi p lo mezo
della crociera la metto in archi tanto ch tucte le uolte sa
rano equali e questo fo p piu forteza uerrano a essere
tucte queste uolte uinti du braccia la loro largheza e di
ece laltezza si ch sarano da usare per sepulture e per altre

diuotioni



14–15 FILARETE'S COMPARTITION MEASURES: *This spread and following page*, Filarete's basic design scheme for centralized structures 'sparto per mezzo' from a spread of the Codex Palatinus E.B. 15.7 (BNCF), n.p.

membri ne anche della psona. Si che adunqz ledificio debbe esse
re anchora lui bene proportionato e hauere membri confa
cienti alla sua grandeza. E anchora come chel corpo del lhuomo
e organizato e ha i suo uacoui e donde per suo mantenimeto
alla intrata e anche i luoghi da uacuarsi: Cosi ledificio lui
anchora bisogna e come uedi lapparenza del lhuomo essere
dinanzi alla faccia e anche il pecto e tucta laltra pte dinanzi
e per quello e conosciuto Cosi ledificio uuole essere nella pte
dinanzi piu bello e piu dilectuolo E come nella faccia del
lhuomo e la maggior parte della belleza Cosi lui de anchor
essere. E come lentrata del corpo del lhuomo e la bocca e cosi
p gli occhi uede cosi bisogna fare alledificio, cioe la porta
elle finestre donde che ueggha lume e poi per glialtri
membri quasi a una similitudine e come p lo mangiare
lhuomo uiue, cosi il dificio bisogna esser mantenuto, e go
uernato come dinanzi hauete inteso:

uesto basti per al presente della formatione delledificio
a similitudine del huomo delle proportione e membri sie
che ledificio uuol hauere i suoi membri confacienti alla sua
grandeza, ch come e dicto se e grande ledificio uuole an
chora ogni suo membro grande: che non istarebbe bene
a un tempio grande fare colonne piccole ne gliarchi, ne
anche le porti e tucti glialtri membri uogliano essere pro
portionati sicondo il corpo delledificio: In quanto alle misure
e le ragioni che uogliono questi loro membri sicondo la
sua grandeza questo anchora ui diro p hoggi basti questo:
Ia sequente uenne allora usata colla sua norma i mano
subito mi monstro: E come quando lhuomo desidera
dimprendere una cosa che con una affectione domanda.
Cosi facea lui E io corregendoli glierrori glimonstrauo
di quelli modi che erano da douere imparare. E lui col
lanimo attento mascoltaua, e domandauami di piu cose
appartenenti allo imparare molto piu che non haria cre
duto. E poi domanda pure sopra alle ragioni e misure
delledificio. Io ueduto lo tanto auido e amoroso a questo
tucto uoluntaroso, e anchora per potergle lo meglio dare,



in need for anyone wanting to draw is to understand and see what is *disegno*, and whence it originated, and in what mode it can be understood and its principles and progress; and how every thing that is done by hand, is founded under the order and mode of *designo*."[90] He describes, in a Euclidian manner similar to Alberti or Piero della Francesca's work on painting, how to move from singular points (the "principio di disegno"), to lines, to surfaces, to bodies.[91] As he then argues: "From these bodies … various measures are born, as they have various forms. And all as I have said, they are the surface, and the lines, and the points, and they know each other by the subdivisions [*dispartimenti*] of these lines and points. … And of these bodies we have found there to be certain instruments, … which is to say measures [*misura*]" with which bodies can be drawn up with reason.[92] These rational measures thus include certain 'legitimate' modes of drawing and constructive techniques.

As Filarete's sixth and seventh book describes in reference to Vitrivius's second principle, in order to be well disposed and organized, a building or city should be laid out or compartitioned [*ascompartite*] not only according to natural principles—as represented by his Sfordinza design ⊠⊠[12]—but moreover similar to the human body that embodies them.[93] But beyond direct anthropomorphic references to the placement of parts, Filarete does not develop the human analogies further. He extends this principal form of compartitioning to the proportional, that is, symmetrical and at the same time 'fractal' structure of bodies. He here introduces an initial design scheme

90 Orig.: "La prima cosa che mi pare bisogni a uno che voglia disegnare è intendere e vedere che cosa è disegno, e donde ebbe origine, e in che modo si può intendere e' suoi prencipii e progressi; e come ogni cosa che di mano si faccia è fondata sotto questo ordine e modo di disegno" (Filarete, *Trattato*, f. 173v–177 [II: 639–49]; here 173v)

91 The full passage reads: "Come che uno è principio d'ogni numero, e per se medesimo non fa numero e agiugnerne più che uno lo fa, così uno punto per se medesimo è poco, e agiugnerne insieme fa linea. E così una linea per se sola fa un segno, ma dividere non si può se non per lungo, e aggiugnerne più insieme fa superficie. E superficie con altre superficie insieme fa corpo. E di questo corpo nasce angoli retti e inretti, e fistole, cioè cannoni, donde ne viene linee flesse, cioè non diritte. E da questo nascono, come è detto, tutti gli angoli e dispartimenti da vedere prima che cosa è questo punto, e che cosa è linea, e che cosa è superficie, e così che cosa è corpo" (ibid., [II: 639–40]).

92 Orig.: "Da questi corpi … nascono varie misure, come che hanno varie forme. E tutti come ho detto, si fanno da superficie, e da linee, e da punti, e conosconsi da' dispartimenti di queste linee e punti. … E di questi cotali corpi s'è trovati esserci strumenti … coi quali a volergli fare non si può errare, però che v'è la ragione. Come che chi volesse fare un corpo quadro è mestiere avere uno di questi strumenti, o vuoi dire misura, e questa sie è quelle che si chiama squadra" (ibid.).

93 See Filarete's Book VI (fols. 37v–46 [I: 148ff]) and VII (fols. 46r–54v [I: 177ff]): "Ora avete a intendere che ordine do a esso, acciò sia etterno, bello e utile, ché come l'uomo vuole essere il corpo suo bene disposto e bene organezzato [organizato] per avere tre proprietà come a lui s'appartiene, cosi l'edificio" (ibid., f.47v [I: 183]). Cf. the Cod. Palatinus (E.B. 15.7, BNCF), reprinted in ibid., II: tav. 137–41.

16 | 17 **PARTIMENTI:** ***Left*****, sketch showing the "Misura e Partimenti" of a human foot, and the in the margins of Francesco di Giorgio Martini's** ***Trattati*****, Codex Saluzziano 148 (Biblioteca Reale, Turin): f. 16v.**

Right**, plan illustrating also the Partimenti d'un giardino, from the subsequent page, f. 17r.**



based on the progresive diminution of quadrants through bisection [sparto per mezzo] ⊠⊠[13–15] as soon as he addresses the problem of an adequate and commensurable scale of the parts among one another.[94]

Concerning such compartition measures, it was Francesco di Giorgio Martini (1439–1501) who contributed a conceptual leap when he more explicitly identified the fundamental design measure (*misura*) of architectural production in partitioning processes. In his *Trattati* (drafted, written, and re-written between 1475 and 1495), the vernacular term *misura* evidences a similar conceptual ambiguity between measuring as action and unit of measurement, practice and representation. To untangle this twofold agency, he re-conceptualized two interrelated concepts in the didactical elaborations on how to find the guiding module for domestic layouts. In what Mays-Merrill has called a "rebuttal to Alberti's impractical theory of architecture"[95] (i.e., his impractical metaphysical theory of architectural composition, to be precise), Martini's writings discriminate more rigidly between *compartitione* as the basic design procedure of subdivision with which (*cum*-) to derive the so-called *partimenti*

94 See ibid., fols. 48v–49v [I:189–92]: "Questo basta per al presente della formazione dell'edificio a similitudine de l'uomo. Delle proporzioni e membri: si che l'edificio vuole avere i suoi membri confacenti alla sua grandezza … E poi sparto per mezzo per ogni verso, in modo che, tutto partito in questi quadri, fatto questo, in su ogni angolo io lasso uno di questi quadri." In the respective instance on the Cod. Pal., Finoli and Grassi connect this scheme to Filarete's own notion of a "prima scompartitione." See the captions to table 137–41, II: n.p. [704]; for Filarete's notion, see his book XIV.

95 Elizabeth Mays Merrill, "The Trattato as Textbook: Francesco di Giorgio's Vision for the Renaissance Architect," *Architectural Histories* 1, no. 1 (2013), 1.



as the equal design modules resulting from this measure, assuring their commensurability.[96] In this conceptual pair, the singular *-mento* (in its stronger process-character) stands in contrast to the plural *-menti* (as concrete instances, units or pieces). [→ App. A] As a concept for the resulting pieces, the term *partimenti* first appears in the margins of the early versions of the manuscript, captioning the "misura e partimenti [measure and pieces]" of a human foot ✉16.[97]
In his theoretical obsession with anthropometric proportions and search for formal analogies between human bodies and architectural form,[98] the quadri-

96 This understanding of *partimenti* as "partes regulae" is also confirmed by the *Hypnerotomachia Poliphili*, which features the notion *partitione* in the sense of "commensa distributione et aequale partitione." Compare here esp. the later definition by Alessandro Falconi, Breve Instruzione … (Florence: C. Giunti, 1612), 37: "Larghezza è la parte d'un meridiano qualsivoglia, compresa fra due paralleli, de' quali une è l'equinoziale; e questa larghezza la chiamano i marinari appartamento della linea [Width is the part of whatever meridian between two parallels, of which one is the equinoctial; and this width is called the median 'apartment' of the line]." This was noted already in the *Vocabolario degli Academici della Crusca: Glossario* (Florence: Cellini, 1867), 58. The present edition pictures the breadth of connotations.

97 Francesco di Giorgio Martini, *Trattati di architettura ingegneria e arte militare*, ed. Corrado Maltese, transcr. Livia L. Maltese Degrassi, 2 vols (Milan: Il Polifilo, 1967): Cod. Torinese, f. 16v [I: 258] and f. 17 [ibid.]. On the following pages, the term is similarly used to denominate the partitions and pieces of a garden (note here also the microcosmic relation to the *partimento* of Sangallo, mentioned below in relation to fig. 22), and a facade (20v), and an architrave (21r). In German, this ambivalence is expressed in the single word *Gliedmaßen* ("extremities", "appendages"), which is used by Dürer is a similar context (see below). On the anatomical aspect of this measure, see also Emanuele Lugli, "Measuring the Bones: On Francesco di Giorgio Martini's Saluzzianus Skeleton," *Art History* 38, no. 2 (Apr 2015), 346–63.

98 See Thoenes, "Notes on the Architectural Treatises," 23.

18 MARTINI'S DESIGN MEASURES I:
A variety of schemes of centralized plans from Martini's *Trattati*, Codex Magliabechiano, II.I.141 (BNCF): fols. 20v and 21.












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
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
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
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
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
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19 MARTINI'S DESIGN MEASURES II:
A variety of schemes of centralized plans from Martini's *Trattati*, Codex Magliabechiano, II.I.141 (BNCF): fols. 21v, 22.



T p che dellalteze longheze et largheze delle sale et ticlini sia assai suffiziante mente descripto et auendo dimostrato molte uarie figure & forme di Public he & Priuate chase hora in questo mi occorre p piu chiara notitia dimostrare alcune alte diuerse misure et p ch tutte le alteze decti Sale et ticlini le proportioni lo Sitruoua di numeri Semplici essere tracti et essi numeri non possono ha uere senon sorda radice & cosi resstano mobili ma tucti ano modi et reghole conposte di piu uarie et proportionate linee si come nellesemplo hor seguire



Acisi uno doppio quadrato cioe di due equali et conessi quadri p li quali sitiri dalluna extremita & laltra cioe dal E & il P una linea semicirchulare Di poi si tiri una linea diagonia ciamata Q P et unaltra linea quella intersecante et la parte che neresta fralla linea del Q P al semicirculo questa Sara T R presa questa portione et latitudine Laquale sitrouara circha adcinque la linea diagonia laqale nella alteza si riferischi cioe dal S al G et la planitia infra sectte ilsuo diamitro E P Sitrouara siche essendo la portione del T R una parte di queste cosi adtucto loedifizio debba essare modulo



Er altro modo faccisi Le equali conessi & duplicati quadrati ilquale la linea media Sia quadripartita di poi sitiri una linea diaghonia dal A al B intersecante il partimento medio et quanto sara laltezza della diaghonia linea tanto sia laltezza & isfogho ne duplicati quadrati il qui diamitro et basa sara parti octo & la linea A B Sara circha anoue una delle dicte parti Sara modulo atucto Lo edifizio & conqueste simili regule moltiplicando la latitudine imagiore diamitro tirando la linea diagonia da angulo ad angulo actribuendo quella nellalteza lo hedifizio uerra auere iusta & conueniente misura

20–21 MARTINI'S DESIGN MEASURES III:
Geometric construction measures in Martini's *Trattati*, Codex Magliabechiano (BNCF): II.I.141: fols. 41v–41r, and 42v, *overleaf*.

da angulo ad angulo et due altre linee che tochino tuctti & quatro ipartimenti
del Quadro Cioe T S V X & faccino unaltro quadrato fuore dellangulo Z D
& Sia Quadripartito Come ilmagior quadrato & nella linea media al ponto Q
Sitiri uno Semicirculo che in fra lelinee fara portione di circulo in mezo
della qual portione sitiri una linea dal ponto Q al G chiamata A B Et questa
portione sara modulo actuctto lo edifizio conla quale Siparti lalinea diagonia
et quante parti sitrouera essa linea di Portioni tanto in nella alteza sidara
agiongendo sempre una parte piu allora hara iusta alteza alla Larghezza
Seguendo lordine della presente figura ☿





T Per uolere la medesima forma inmitare faccinsi due con exi quadri
dequali faccia tirata una linea plo mezo danbe due Sengniata C D et
nel mezo dessa alponto N & dal V al K Sitiri uno Semicirchulo Dapoi dalla
estremita del Semicirchulo terminato K Simuoui una linea diaghonia passante
pla intersecazione della linea media insino alla extremita dellangulo X la
quale linea fara una portione di circulo lineato dal N al T della quale sipigli
O S Laquale latitudine sara modulo actuctto iltempio Delegali senedia parti
5 alla linea media dal ponto N A et Questa Sara laltezza del tuctto terminato
La transuersa linea B F Si che sara pti vij insuo diamitro come la figura et
questa Sipuo ancho pigliare dal Somo del Semicirculo Q la Sua alteza discende
ndo pla linea media insino allinbasamento D



TPazcha alchuna volta Pare molto dificile & tedioso fare alchuno cieq
ulare partimento & maxime nele cõstitutioni de facciati templi pli ma
lti interualli dicolonne Cappelle Stipiti o porti Et Pazo essendo questo aptissimo
modo di Partire breuemente com manifesta figura dimostrarco Treata Lacirc
umferentia Sia quadriparzita d quatro zacche linee dipoi le due linee angu
lari cioe A B C Siano Ciascuna quadriparzita Dipoi sitiri una linea diagonia dal
ponto D E & dalla linea diagonia al Ponto G Sitiri una tramsuersa linea chi
amata G F ilqual diuidra Sia partito in parti cinque della quali parti Sitrouara
Lacircumferentia tracinto Saxanta Cinque Dipoi triando unaltra linea diagonia
dal Ponto G E comla tramsuersa H I lequal parte et latitudine Sitrouarra
cinquanta di tucta Lacircumferanzia



Nacha sifacci uno Quadrato dequale lati & ciascuna faccia sia Quadriparzita
tirate le linee dallumo partimento allaltro sitiri unaltro Contra quadrato che
lelinee medie Siano altermine dallo cioe A B C D Dipoi Sitiri quatro altre linee miez
medie pongni faccia ad Quella Et quatro altre contralinee lequali forano nelle
estremita dalli angoli hemicicli Si come quelle dalla B C D Lequali contra linee Si
ciamano E F M N I L Dipoi sitiri altre tramsuerse linee dal ponto E F & dal G H
& dal M N & dalli N lequagli extremita dangoli & poramento di linee terminarano
& quatro emicicli Si come quelle della B C D Et cosi ucranno hauere proporzionata
misura Et accordando formarra il tolo ouero Cipola Sidia trouare lacircumferentia
alle intersechationi medie dal minore ho magiore quadrato Si chome pla figura piu
Chiara mente Sidimostra & Quelle Simili figure preso la forma el modo Supossimo
ad piu varie compositioni di templi adacitare

Ecche appara molto piu necessario alla Ragiona douera satisfare che
alcuno nostro Sensuale appitito & maxime quelle chi con arte et ingengno
debbano essere ghouernate Si chome nel comstituire alcuno diuino ho Sacrato
tempio Et pche esonno molte varie oppinioni donde nel Partimento abbi auito
hozzigine ho principio e daconsiderare chi molti Solerti & Specularim ingengni essono
astrictioni y mitrure lanature intucti li exercitij at dequella hanno tracto la
Ragioni Si come hoparctimenti e membri del corpo umano dalquale chiamare
perfecto chome Plato ne deforme Si troua essere tracto & Vetruuio lamisura
& proporzioni de tempi et Colonne senza lacui simetria dice alchuno uerificar potre
misura cosa con zagiona bene hoperare & trouando molte varie oppinioni



imparare esso corpo ho terminato alquna breue mēte dimostrare Imprima e da
Sapere ch̄ in due modi Sipuo diuidare cioe in parti noue et in parti sette Quello
di parti noue e tutta laltezza della faccia dalla extremita del mento al nasci
mento de capelli & una parte dalla forcina della Gola allo extremo pectto
unaltra & daquesta dal nascimento de testicholi & parti due da Queste
allastragholo del ginoccio due altre legambe insino insul collo del pie laltre
due ch̄ fanno ilmi mero di octo laltezza del Pie & diamitro della Gola fanō laltezza
dela Nona & Questo e ilpartimento ditutto ilcorpo Di Poi Siparti latesta in
tre hequali parti cosi partito Siponghi ilcentro alla linea media extremita
del Pectto circū uoltando una linea dal naso allo extremo busto lecui extremita
Sara tutta lalargheza del tempio dalla Quale Sitirara lerecte linee infino
alla Basa linea delli extremi chalchangni laquale Sara quadripartita liquali pa
rtimenti & linee sitirara insino al Somo Dipoi Sipigli leparti dal naso al Craneo
& Quelle daman dextra & Sinistra dela linea Centrale A.B. Satribuischa
le quali tutte partite inparti quatro faranno lacircumferētia delli emicicli &
cusi quelle delli anguli preso lordine loro Sopra le intersechationi della circ
umferenzia & cosi tirare tutte lequadrature delle linee & tuttti li emi
cicli Sitiri una circulare linea pla naue o Tolo tochando la extremita de
lli anguli delquadrato dmezo chiamato C D E F & simile dentro alminore
Quadrato Sipuo constituire Et qsto Sara partito pigli si una parte dellaltezza
della testa M T ouero ilmezo del emiciclo Sedici parti lacircumferentia
del tolo Sitrouarra & cosi tutte lenaui & Colonne sicollocaranno come partita
mente nela presente figura Simanifesta

Altra misura & diuisione del corpo pigliandosi laltezza ditutta latesta
in sette equali parti debba essar diuiso Dipi Sipongha ilponto del circino
insu limbellicho et intersecatione delle linee una circumferentia dallaltimo
mento alastragallo del ginochio & allextremita del circulo sitiri le linee la
terali terminanti dal Craneo ala Basalinea delli infimi calcangni laqual linea
in quatro parti Sara diuisa Dipoi sitiri uno Semicirculo al Somo del Craneo
terminato A B & ad Questo Sara illoco del Simulacro Di poi Sopra limbellicho
Sipigli unaltra Cintricha circunferentia tochanti le extremita delle linee
medie terminate D E F G & questo e quando accadesse affar lacupola ouero
tolo che lenaui Senza impedimento possino Circumdare si come lafigura
ne manifesta



partite measure of *partimenti* thus came to be used as the base module for architectural design schemas.[99] This module comes to rule the organizational correspondence of architecture according to the "pieces and members [*partimenti e membri*] of the human body."[100] Here we find the concept at the heart of the extensively discussed analogical drawings of church plans. ☒[21]

It remains unclear if it was under this anthropometric image of thought that the concept of partimenti was taken up by Serlio's teacher and alleged source and inspiration, Baldassarre Peruzzi (1481–1536). Peruzzi was an enigmatic and ellusive character mediating between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.[101] A skilled draftsman and master of *disegno*, trained by Martini in Siena, his occupation shifted from painting to architectural assignments after moving to Rome. Here he started working on the St. Peter's basilica with Bramante, Raphael and Antonio da Sangallo the Younger, and co-conducted archaeological surveys and the reconstruction of ancient monuments. Through the latter, his work seems to have attained an incremental systematicity, driving practical considerations so far that they came to assume a more

99 These Roman compartitioning methods were also recorded in the first Spanish architecture treatise, the *Medida del Romanos* (1526) written by humanist cleric Diego de Sagredo (who appears to have conversed with the Raphael circle during his visit to Italy including Florence and Rome before 1522): "Conclusion muy averiguada es entre los filosofos, ser el ho[m]bre de mayor y mas complicada perficion de todas las criaturas; por tanto le llamaro[n] Microcosmo que quiere dezir menor mundo: porque ningua cosa ay ta[n] subida y estimada enel mu[n]do que enel hombre no se halle. [Y] como los primeros fabricadores no tuviessen reglas para traçar, repartir, y ordenar sus edificios: parecioles devian ymitar la co[m]position de hombre: el qual sue criando y formado de natural proporcion: y especulando los tercios y escudriñando las medida de su estatura, y cotejando unos miembros a otros: hallaron la cabeça ser mas excele[n]te: y della todos los otros: como de miembro mas principal tomavan medida y proporcion … y finalmente todo el cuerpo: de donde tomaron ciertas reglas y medidas naturales para dar proporcion y autoridad a los repartimientos y ordeneças de sus edificios. De manera que todo edificio bie[n] ordenado y repartido es comparado al ho[m]bre bien dispuesto." Diego de Sagredo, *Medidas del Romano…* (Toledo, R. de Petras, 1526), Salamanca Univ. Library, BG/36176(2), avail. online at http://hdl.handle.net/10366/83105. Note that the book was translated to French as *Raison d'architecture antique, extraicte de Vitruve…* (Paris: S. de Colines, s.d. [1536]), wherein *repartido* is translated as "comparti" (n.p. [6v]).

100 Martini, *Trattati di architettura*, Cod. Torinese, f. 44 [II: 401]: "Che le proporzioni de' templi sono dedotte da quelle dell'uomo: Perchè appare molto più necessario alla ragione dovere satisfare che ad alcuno nostro sensuale appetito, e massime per quelle cose che con arte e ingegno devono essere governate, siccome nel costituire alcuno divino o sacrato tempio, e perchè e' sono molte varie opinioni d'onde tal partimento abbia avuto ragione o principio: è da considerare che molti solerti e speculativi ingegni si siano affaticati ad imitare la natura in tutti gli esercizi, e da quella hanno tratto le ragioni siccome imitando i partimenti e membri del corpo umano, dal quale il numero perfetto, come Platone ne descrive, si trova esser tratto; e Vitruvio narra delle misure e proporzioni de' templi e colonne, senza la cui simetria dice nessuno artefice poter nissuna cosa con ragione bene operare."

101 On Peruzzi, see Christoph L. Frommel, ed., *Baldassarre Peruzzi, 1481–1536* (Venice: Marsilio, 2005); for a recent reassessment of Peruzzi's artistic career on the basis of his drawings, see Ann C. Huppert, *Becoming an Architect in Renaissance Italy: Art, Science, and the Career of Baldassare Peruzzi* (New Haven/London: Yale UP, 2015).

theoretical character[102] during the 1520s, a time when he apparently started to pen down his teachings. Unfortunately, no autographic version of Peruzzi's (planned) treatise has ever been found.[103] The *Taccuino Senese* (a notebook with sketches conserved in the Communal Library of Siena, formerly thought to be a sketchbook by Peruzzi himself but now believed to be a copy[104]) includes a brief theoretical outline, the second chapter of which, treating the compartition of architecture, re-affirms Martini's proposition that the city should be laid out according to the human body by "distributing the parts [*parti*] of the city like [*si come*] its divisions and pieces [*divisioni e partimenti*]."[105]

That Peruzzi did not take this notion at face-value, however, can be seen from his drawn work, wherein there are hardly any anthropometric images, but instead more abstract, relative measures ubiquitously spread across many of his drawings. In these, the notion of *partimenti* appears in at least one drawing for the projected remodeling for the house of Count Cornelio Lambertini in Bologna ☒[22] (c.1522/23). It was one of the projects on which Serlio started working as an assistant to Peruzzi and where we find that characteristic organization which—as Serlio would later promulgate—"starts from the middle of the street,"; but it also coincided with Serlio's introduction to leading humanists and their heterodox ideas.[106] This point seems to stress the other filiation that Ann Huppert has identified in Peruzzi's particular analytic use of drawings, which "visually broke down the larger whole into its component parts, so as to understand their [structural] relationship," and in which it is closely connected to the technical use of drawings by Sienese engineers.[107] Where Martini's

102 Günther, Ein Entwurf," 137 (my trans).

103 Huppert, *Becoming an Architect*, 154ff.

104 Bibliotheca Communale degli Intronati, Siena, S.IV.7. The original work had been tentatively ascribed to Peruzzi, as [Baldassare Peruzzi], *Trattato di architettura militare*, ed. Alessandro Parronchi (Florence: Editioni Gonelli, 1982), Parronchi identified the work as a copy of Peruzzi. Günther argued that the work (situated between Martini's two *trattati* is more logically attributed to Martini himself, and who identifies Peruzzi's thinking in the group of drawings in the Cod. 10935 (Vienna Nationalbibliothek) includes copied drawings of both Martini and Peruzzi. Huppert notes that also Codex 10873 may be based on Peruzzi's writings too. For a recent discussion, that attributes the copy to Passaroti, see Valeria Cafà, "The Young Bartolomeo Passarotti and the 'Sienese Sketchbook of Baldassarre Peruzzi,' *Master drawings* 51 (2013), 15–30.

105 [Peruzzi], *Trattato*, here f. 9v–10r [90]: "La città dia essare conposta a forma del corppo umano, e così dia avere le sue adorne e propotionate parti adatate colle medesime distribuitioni. In prima sia posto la rocha hovero forteza nella più allta e suprema parte del capo, e della forcina della gola a l'utimo petto la grandeza del tempio, e resto del corpo e cientro dello imbalicho una circhulare o riquadrata piaza. E così distribuire le parti della città si come le divisioni e partimenti d'esso, oservando le tre parti della testa e lle sette e nove si come in dirieto nel suo luogo mostreò." See also ibid., f.54v [147].

106 On Peruzzi's and Serlio's relation in Bologna, see Frommel, *Serlio: Architect*, 14ff.

107 Huppert, *Becoming an Architect*, here 13; see also 17–18 and 49–55. This analytic usage of drawings, she stressed, points to his Sienese heritage, and specifically Martini and



22 A RESIDENTIAL PLANNING SCHEME
Peruzzi's Project for the house of the Count Cornelio Lambertini, a powerful member of the Senate, in Bologna (Gabinetto dei Disegni e delle Stampe, Galleria degli Uffizi 353 A r, Florence); reprinted in Wurm, *Peruzzi: Architekturzeichnungen*, 135. Here, the annotation on the lower right records: "Non diremo mente del partimento de le botegho in la faciata [We shall not mention the compartition of the botegho in the façade]".

precursor Taccola recognized drawing as an instrument for elaborating technical concepts, Martini argued that only through *disegno* can one "understand the composition of the [constituent] parts of architecture."[108] This way, the act of drawing gained a pedagogical dimension.

In all these filiating thoughts, the measure of *partimenti* was lying at the heart of a recomposition concerning the problem of image and model in architectural design techniques. On this point, Stanislaus von Moos notes how the modus operandi was heavily promoted by contemporary tools of measurement: geometry. In its half-mythical, half-technical aspect, it perfectly illustrates the direct relation of measuring techniques and design methods.[109] Through geometric techniques, architectural imaging techniques thus gained an increasingly representational function to embody 'natural principles' in architectural forms. Those architectural representations no longer operate on any 'plane of consistency,' but are based on specific 'plans of organization,' that is, a level of reality that presupposes a transcendental dimension supplementary to the given.

On this level, we seem to have gotten a little lost with regard to our notion of apartments. Yet, there are quite some things at stake in these endlessly proliferating conceptual repositionings answering to changing problems. As a model of reality, on the one hand, anthropometrism presumes a certain universal equivalence of measurement between architectural and human proportion; as an image of thought, on the other hand, anthropomorphism presumes a formal or visual resemblance of measures, a homeomorphism between architectural and human forms. In these conceptions, "the world was perceived as a constant materialization of geometry"[110] and organized according to a trans-scalar correspondence, in which—as

his predecessor Mariano di Jacopo, called Taccola (ibid., 12), whose ideas about machines and technical devices he developed in the Vatican Codicetto (c. 1465–1475, Ms. Lat. Urbinate 1757, Biblioteca Apostolica), rep. as Francesco di Giorgio Martini, *Das Skizzenbuch Urb. Lat. 1575*, ed. Luigi Michelini Tocci (Zurich: Belser, 1989); avail. online at https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Urb.lat.1757. This manuscripts, as well as Taccola's, would be worth checking for occurrences of the term. I am here reaching a limit with my paleographic abilities. Some anthropometric sketches appear in the second half of the manuscript, fols. 126r and 134v.

108 Orig.: "intendere le composizioni delle parti dell'architettura" (Martini, *Trattati*, II: 293–4; cited in Huppert, *Becoming an Architect*, 26. On Peruzzi's, relation to Martini and Taccola, see here, 25ff, on the relation of the latter two, see also Riahi, "Ars et Ingenium: The Embodiment of Imagination in the Architectural Drawings of Francesco die Giorgio Martini," PhD diss., McGill Univ. (2010), 11ff; abbrev. version pub. as id., *Ars et Ingenium* (London/New York: Routledge, 2015).

109 Stanislaus von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk: Beiträge zu einer politischen Ikonographie der Italienischen Renaissancearchitektur* (Zurich: Atlantis 1974), 202.

110 Alberto Pérez-Gómez, *Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983), 40.

famously expressed in Alberti's analogies—living organisms, houses and the city resemble each other as micro- or macrocosmic replicas.[111] This correspondence between the internal division of the human body and that of a house dates back at least to Plato's *Timaeus.* Reciting the fabrication of the world, this creation myth discusses the demiurgic mode of divination in terms of mimetic operations.[112] Earlier treatises such as Filarete's *Trattato* have long conceptually reduced built structures to mimetic schemata, based on Renaissance culture's preoccupation with proportion. In establishing these correspondences between the micro- and macrocosm through geometric relations, architecture claimed a reconciliatory function, Pérez-Gómez writes, since "geometrical forms guaranteed the truth of theory while geometrical operations were used as a tool for the transformation of the world, reinforcing the traditional meaning of practice."[113] But architectural design was thus restricted to a representative aesthetic regime (a regime that Foucault has called "the episteme of resemblance"[114]) in which the representation of nature organizes ways of doing under the yoke of resemblance.

Even if Serlio's seven books depend heavily on these earlier treatises, his work does not fall back on any anthropomorphic imagery; it is characterized instead by a demonstrative disinterest in any such image of thought. Rather, through this active avoidance, Serlio's treatise advances Martini's geometric approach at the point where design didactics still center on the mimetic relations between model and built reality as modeled. None of the former anthropometric positions seem particularly helpful in Serlio's wider mission to propagate architectural competencies on the matter how architectural compositions come into being.[115] In this mission, Serlio seems to resort

111 See Alberti, *De re ædificatoria*, Book 1, ch. 9.: "Quod si civitas … maxima quaedam est domus et contra domus ipsa minima quaedam est civitas."

112 Plato, *Timaeus*, cited after *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vol. 9, trans. W.R.M. Lamb (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1925), 48e–49a; avail. online at http://data.perseus.org. "And in the breast, and in what is termed the thorax, they encased the mortal soul; and as the one part of this was superior and the other inferior they divided the cavity of the thorax into two parts, as the women's and men's apartments are divided in houses, and placed the midriff to be a wall of partition between them" (ibid., 69e). On this platonic conception of creation in architecture, see also Patrick Healy, *The Model and its Architecture* (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2008), esp. 42.

113 Péréz-Gómez, *Crisis of Modern Science*, 90.

114 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things* (New York: Random House, 1970), 19ff; esp. 33–35.

115 Alberti's metaphysical operator of *partitione*, remains outside any practical realm. In Filarete, the rather geomorphic relation of *misura e scompartimento* confuses instrumentality and coming-to-produce-an-effect: compartition thus remains a demiurgic agency of a somewhat omnipotent architect. In Martini, the obsessive anthropometric relation of *misura e partimenti* distinguishes means and results. Thereby partitioning becomes a technique of composition, yet it also remains restricted to forms of imitation. In the anthropomorphic relation of *divisioni e partimenti* in Peruzzi, which seems to conflate means and

instead to Cesariano's decidedly generative reading of Vitruvius.[116] Based on this generative conception, Serlio concerns himself more pragmatically with the question how built reality is aptly generated by means of compositional tech-

result again, *partimenti* are finally in danger of deteriorating into a merely rhetorical means of justification. *De re ædificatoria* was written for a readership of Humanist patrons, and thus expresses ideas about architecture; over all from a rhetorical and transcendental perspective. In contrast, Serlio's treatise was geared toward architects, as has often been claimed, yet, not exclusively. See Myra Nan Rosenfeld, ed., *On Domestic Architecture* (Minneola/New York: Dover, 1996), 7.

116 See Cesare Cesariano, *Di Lucio Vitruvio Pollione de Architetura Libri Dece traducti de latino in Vulgare affigurati…* (Como: Gottardo da Ponte, 1521). Cesariano's translation of Vitruvius — which Serlio consulted for his purposes (Jelmini, "Serlio: Il Trattato," 14) — had been providing an explicitly *generative* reading, which may have further catalyzed the concept of *appartamenti*. This concerns a specific passage of its discussion on the layout of private houses (which Serlio most probably studied) in Book VI, which outlines the general methods of building regarding the arrangement of private houses, which he begins to divide the layout of houses according to climate (Vitruvius, *De Architectura*, book 6, ch.1), site specifics (6.2), use (6.3), and orientation (6.4). Vitruvius original introduction to orientation reads "Nunc explicabimus, quibus proprietatibus genera aedificiorum ad usum et caeli regiones apte debeant exspectare [We shall next explain how the special purposes of different rooms require different exposures, suited to convenience and to the quarters of the sky/Now we will explain the adjustments by which the various apartments may look out suitably to their proper aspects]" (6.4.1; trans. Granger/Morgan). Cesariano phrased this explanation in terms of "con quale proprietate le generatione de li aedificii al uso e le regione del Coelo aptamente debano spectare [by what property the generation of the building('s parts), according to the regions of the sky, shall aptly be oriented toward]." (ibid., f. 44; my trans.). Resonating with the common notion of *apartam(i)ento,* this formulation brings Vitruvius' question regarding different kinds of rooms much closer to a design methodological question regarding their relationship. More so, since Vitruvius's original aim to explain *by which properties* (pl., dat.) different kinds (pl., dat.) of rooms (n. pl., gen.; since he talks about rooms in the following passage) ought to (v. 3rd-pers. pl. pres. act. subj.) attend to (v. pres. inf. act.) fitting use and the regions of the sky. In contrast Cesariano asks, 'with/by what property' (sing.), the generation (n. sing.) of buildings must (v. 3rd-pers. pl. conj.) look out/await (v. ind.) according to apt use and the orientation. This adjacency between a 'generation' of buildings, their use, and the fourfold structure of the cardinal directions is, on its own, rather too coincidental to be neglected. It would be interesting to verify a possible contributive influence of Cesariano's notion *aptamente* on the choice of the term *appartamenti*. It may well be, given that in his marginal sidenote, Cesariano tried to clarify that, "Vitruvio tracta apertamente da quale regione del Coelo debiamo fare li membri de uno bene considerato palatio vel altro' importante aedificio facio con ratiocinate symmetrie: acio in epso non mancha de diligente cura lo architecto a fare che lo loci propriamente rendano la conservatione a le persone: e cose in epsi sono opportune a collocare etc. [Vitruvius treats apparently by what quarter of the sky we must make the members of a well-considered palace (or likewise important building constructed with reasoned modularity), so that it does not lack the diligent care of the architect to make the rooms properly conserve persons, and things that are convenient to be placed together therein" (ibid.; my trans.). In the following chapter, Vitruvius calls attention to consider social standing, regarding the problem "quibus rationibus privatis ædificiis propria loca patribus familiarum et quemadmodum communia cum extraneis aedificari debeant [how in private houses, those rooms belonging to the family, and how those which are shared with visitors, should be planned]" (Vitr. 6.5.1; trans. Granger). Here Vitruvius neither draws a distinction between two parts of a building, nor between two kinds of spaces in the dualistic sense that we use to discriminate between public or private ones today. Cesariano's comments that "in questo capo Vitruvio com brevitate vole distinguere li edificii per la sorte de ciascune persone [in this chapter, Vitruvius briefly wants to distinguish buildings for all sorts of people" (Here

niques. In this respect, Serlio must have found himself drawn to Martini's elaborations on geometric constructions (Martini was also a geometer and mathematician) as a practical training of *disegno*.[117] Here, *partimenti* initially appear

after Cesariano's second edn., 1525, fol. 105; my trans.). Serlio would take up this though and develop in his sixth book. In this distinction lies a fundamental design problem to which Vitruvius proposes a method concerning what reasons condition this distinction socio-environmentally, and through which architectural means it is brought about. Clearly, for Vitruvius this differentiation matters in two distinct formalization of access: one "by invitation" and one "by common right" as he outlines in the next sentence. Vitruvius bases they argument on a larger distinction in social standing, dividing those who pay visits to others, and those who receive calls. Consequently the houses of the latter become instrumental in re-producing this (difference in) standing through a layout fit to receive guests. Yet this division is not merely a classification, and specifically not as a socio-political class-model; the differentiation of movements — lets call it 'socio-spatial management' of accessibility itself produces, and actualizes (differences in), social standing. In this formalization of receiving guests we find the most far-reaching strand for a genealogy of apartments, and the difference their architecture introduces. In this respect, let me add here in a side-note, how Vitruvius' central formulation "quibus rationibus privatis aedificiis," came to be reductively rendered as "those apartments in private houses" (Vitr. 6.5.1; trans. Morgan). Morgan takes up a long misreading that begins also with Cesariano, who introduces "ogni conclavii" in this context (Cesariano, *De Architetura,* f. 94), which the later translation by Daniele Barbaro, *I dieci libri dell'architettura di M. Vitruvio…* (Venice: Francesco Marcolini, 1556) also adopts (ibid., 174); and which the French translation by Claude Perrault, *Les dix livres d'architecture de Vitruve…* (Paris: Jean-Baptiste Coignard, 1673) will render as "*appartements*." *Rationibus*, being a reckoning, calculation, or business, is however a processual and instrumental term. In contrast to Morgan, who reads the sentence as a dative case, Granger — as cited above — tries to correctly capture its *modus ablativus* (see above, note 77), which has no grammatical equivalent in modern English language. In its inflected form, this case generally express separation, indirection or the means, instrument or cause by which an action is performed. The general meaning of *ratio* includes modes and manners, as well as reasons, methods, systems or theory to achieve this task. Hence, this sentence problematizes "how, in which way, or for what reasons" [*quibus rationibus*] and "in what manner" [*quemadmodum*] standing becomes an instrument or modus operandi of design and should be treated respectively. When Vitruvius is concerned with any internal division of houses, he does not address any parts of private houses (genitive) here, as Morgan's translation suggests; he did so in chapter 3. The term *conclave*, which appears throughout Book VI and VII and means one or, accurately speaking, several rooms accessible by a key, has more often been understood as a term for an apartment. But in contrast to other Latin texts, Vitruvius actually never uses the notion in its nominative singular form, but only as *conclavis* (genitive singular, in Vitr. 7.4.1.) and plural *conclavium, conclaviorum* (genitive plural, in ibid., 7.9.2/6.3.8.) and mostly in the ablative case *conclavibus* (dative plural, in ibid., 6.6.7, 7.2.2, 7.3.4, 7.4.1, 7.5.1.). In all these cases the attribution is somewhat built-into the notion, as neither an explicit space 'of' someone, nor a set of spatially differentiated rooms.

117 For a recent discussion of the epistemic value of practical or operational knowledge of *disegno* and the way it was encoded in written treatises, as Martin's *trattati*, see esp. Merrill, "The Pocket-Size architectural Notebook and the Codification of Practical Knowledge," in *The Structures of Practical Knowledge*, ed. Matteo Valleriani (Cham: Springer, 2017), 21–50. See also Riahi, "*Ars et Ingenium,*" 69ff. For the specific role played by drawings, see also the two essays by Sven Dupré, "Visualization in Renaissance Optics: The Function of Geometrical Diagrams and Pictures in the Transmission of Practical Knowledge," in *Transmitting Knowledge: Words, Images, and Instruments in Early Modern Europe*, ed. Sachiko Kusokawa and Ian Maclean (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2006), 11–40; and Sachiko Kusokawa, "The Uses of Pictures in the Formation of Learned Knowledge," in ibid., 73–96.

in an entirely non-anthropomorphic sense, as an interval, produced by geometric compartition processes in which the process of 'taking measure' is equivalent with the operation of determining parts (as in the French notion of '*prendre le parti*').[118] This sense is the one also reflected on by the treatise attributed to Peruzzi.[119] We may thus find here the technical source of the fourfold matrix of appartamenti, as in the corresponding geometric diagrams the *partimenti* precisely denominate the quartered areas of square compositions, based on which Martini would develop his more regular grid-like building schemes. ⊠[19]

Appartamenti as a Geometric Figure of Thinking

Admittedly having digressed at length about partioning processes, the point was to arrive at several conclusions concerning the supposed logical consistency within compositional measures. All these abstract compositional concepts are tied to what Simondon has understood as the 'made-to-measure'-aspect of artisanal production, which is geared at an "analytical organization that always leaves the path open for new possibilities."[120] A similar but different hint to an equally non-representational conception of *partimenti* is recorded in Sangallo's *Taccuino Senese* (c. 1490–1513), where the notion appears in a drawing captioned "uno partimento d'una volta anticho a Roma [a compartition of a vaulted ceiling at Rome]" ⊠[23].[121] This caption appears a few pages before the afore-mentioned plans *ad quadratum* in the draft plan for the Poggio Reale, which Sangallo worked out from Lorenzo de' Medici's own sketches, and the palace for the King of Naples ⊠[24], for which the Neapolitan king Ferrante d'Aragona had requested a *modelo* from Lorenzo in 1488[122], and which

118 See Martini, *Trattati*, Cod. Magliabechiano, f. 22 [Vol. II: 349]: "Per altro modo faccisi li equali connessi e duplicati quadrati il quale la linea media sia quadripartita; di poi si tiri una linea diagonia dal A al B intersecante il partimento medio." See also ibid., fols. 38v [394], 40v–2 [399–402].

119 Peruzzi, *Trattato*, f. 28r [117–8]: "Stendesi una linia la quali dirivi dal centro e facci geometriche una circhulare forma, partita la circunferentia in cinque o sei parti, tirate le linie da l'uno partimento a l'altro, formando di pari li intevalli."

120 Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, trans. Cécile Malaspina and John Rogove (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2017), 29.

121 See Sangallo's *Taccuino Senese* (Bibliotheca Communale da Siena, Cod. S IV, 7), f. 13v, avail. online at https://www.wdl.org/en/item/10597/. The plans follow on fols. 17, 17v, and 19v. The term does not seem to appear in the *Codice Barberiniano* (Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Lat. 4424), avail. online at https://digi.vatlib.it/view/MSS_Barb.lat.4424; or those conserved at the Gabinetto dei Disegni e delle Stampe degli Uffizi, repr. in Donetti, Faietti, and Frommel, eds., *Giuliano da Sangallo*.

122 Frommel and De Divitiis have emphasized the designerly role of Lorenzo de' Medici whom King Ferrante of Naples approached to provide a design scheme to build a new royal residence, in a letter supposedly sent on Apr 4, 1488. The original letter is lost, but it was represented in a portrait by Girolamo Macchietti in 1585, wherein it appears with an

23–24 SANGALLO'S SCHEMES: Spreads vom Sangallo's Sketchbook, with a design for the "partimenti d'una volta [compartition of a vaulted ceiling]", a sketch design for a villa with central octagon (*top*); a design for a Palace for the King of Naples; and the final ground floor plan of the Medici Villa at Poggio a Caiano (*bottom*).

Sangallo finalized.[123]

This idea of composition must have resonated with Serlio's thinking, given not only his expertise in coffered ceilings and woodworks,[124] but also the formal resemblance of the ideal plans with central octagons. ☒[18] But on this point, the persistent problem of studying Serlio's relation to Peruzzi remains: that is, to know to what degree he relied on the drawings and models inherited from Peruzzi, and Peruzzi's teachings in general, which Serlio—expressing his deep indebtedness toward his teacher in the preface of the *Regole generali*—hoped to propagate, or to what extent he reformulated them on his own account, taking them merely as a point of departure.[125] These theoretical ideas and formal approaches certainly have a decisive influence on Serlio's intellectual formation. Yet, a point speaking for the relative novelty and comparative advancement in Serlio's thinking can be inferred in noting that for Peruzzi and Martini's design schemes, *partimenti* still largely function as a representation of the real, due to their conceptual identity to the members of the body. In contrast to this relatively closed compositional system, within Serlio, geometric elaborations no longer present partition as such an image of thought. What he seems to have further developed from Martini and Peruzzi's teachings is namely the idea how *partimenti* condition a geometric-projective method. Therein, they no longer work as an anthropomorphic unit of measurement but as a fundamentally non-anthropomorphic and non-unitary measure for the construction and progressive specification of form.

evidently-modernized writing (discussed initially by Vladimir Juřen, "Le projet de Giuliano da Sangallo pour le palais du roi de Naples," *Revue de l'Art* 25 (1974), 66–70). Accordingly, it apparently mentioned specific features that Ferrante desired for his design, a request that in represented letter reads: "Desidero per mezzo di V[ostra] S[ignori]a Mag[nifi]co Sig[no]re Lorenzo uno disegno di un palazzo che sia di forma quadrata … e nel mezzo sia un cortile di forma di dua quadri … e sia questo cortile loggia sopra loggia e lo spatio che resta sia compartito di maniera che serva per 4 appartamenti copioso in stanze grande e pic[c]ole e sia d'ogni appartamento una sala grande" (after a transcription by Giovanni Poggi, "Di alcuni ritratti dei Medici," *Rivista d'arte* 6 (1909), 322n1; cited in Juřen, "Le projet de Sangallo," 67; quoted also in Frommel, *Sangallo*, 97n9). While the word *appartamenti* can indeed be read in the painting, its latter date, representative function, and the evident modernization of the letter therein, prevent any ascertainment of the actual currency of the term in 1488; which at this does not seem to have be taken much beyond the existing notion of *partimenti*.

123 See the caption of the worked out scheme in Sangallo's *Libro* (Cod. Barb. lat. 4424), f.39v, which reads: "Questo é la pianta di uno modelo d'un palaz[z]o ch'el Magnifico Lorenzo de Medici mando a Re Fern[an]do di napoli e io Gioliano S[ant]o G[all]o poi[c]hé io l'ebbi finito andai colo m[odell]o sopra deto."

124 See Frommel, *Serlio: Architect*, 19, also 181–208.

125 See Rosenfeld, *Serlio on Domestic Architecture*, 2; in reference to Howard Burns, "Baldassare Peruzzi and Sixteenth Century Architectural Theory," in *Les traités d'architecture de la Renaissance*; Actes du colloques tenu a Tours, Centre d'études Supérieures de la Renaissance, Jul 1–11, 1981, ed. Jean Guillaume (Paris: Picard, 1988), 208–9 n4–6. See also Frommel, *Serlio: Architect*, 13ff.

Here, an intellectual exchange with Francisco da Holanda—who met Serlio during his scholarship travel in Venice in 1540 and was presented an edition of Serlio's treatise—and his aim to establish a "sciencia do disegno" in which the artist synthesizes his knowledge through sketching, would seem plausible but still needs to be examined.[126] Unlike Holanda's hylomorphic focus on the genesis of the world in a series of divine divisions,[127] *partimenti* become a design measure without a transcendent unit but takes its measure from the **MULTIPLICITY** of space itself. But Serlio too uses geometric imaging methods in a more generative function: as something compelling the geometric concept of *partimenti* toward another conception of architectural design, a new methodical conception which ceases to be merely representational. That something, I want to suggest, is related to understanding construction as a projective technique. Drawing is no longer restricted to a representative function, merely mimicking the cosmic order (an *Abbildungsfunktion*), but it reclaims a more generative notion as to how imaging techniques (*Bild-verfahren*) present a cultural technique for knowledge formation processes, which Serlio would strategize in its didactic-creative function (*Bildungsfunktion*).[128] They work as an instructive, or instrumental 'figure of thought,' a figure organizing thought and reconfiguring the role of geometric measures in architectural composition.[129] This figurational sense allows for the rethinking of compositional drawings as existential condition that translates into a particular style of thinking.[130] But since thinking always comes

126 Francisco da Holanda, *Lembrança … de quãto serve a sciencia do desegno…* (1571) repr. in Jorge Segurado, *Francisco d'Ollanda* (Lisbon: Excelsior, 1970) 131–68; see also Eduardo Côrte-Real, "Francisco d'Hollanda's 'Sciencia do Disegno': Early Modern Designology," in *Designology: Studies on Planning for Action*, ed. Wojciech W. Gasparski and Tufan Orel (London/New York: Routledge, 2017), 19–26. Here, Frommel, *Serlio: Architect*, 19.

127 Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa, "Les De Aetatibus Mundi Imagines de Francisco de Holanda," in *Monuments et mémoires de la Fondation Eugène Piot* 66 (1983), 67–190.

128 I here distinguish representative function and didactive-creative function in the German sense of (*Ab-)Bildungsfunktion*.

129 Bernard Cache has highlighted the role of geometrical tools as "instruments of thought." See esp. Cache, "Dürer—Vitruvius—Plato: Instruments of Thought," recording of a lecture given at the Environment Review Days, KTH Stockholm (Apr 10–12, 2013), avail. online at https://youtu.be/VxzdW4H4aww). Here, I connect it to the trem "figure of thought," as coined in Nikolaus Gansterer, ed., *Drawing a Hypothesis: Figures of Thought* (Vienna: Springer, 2011), to differentiate it from earlier **IMAGES OF THOUGHT**. On the problem of 'figures,' or the 'figural' in relation to mannerism in general, that I cannot cover here, see Sjoerd van Tuinen, "Serpentine Life: The Nature of Movement in Gothic, Mannerism, and Baroque," in id., ed., *Speculative Art Histories: Analysis at the Limits* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2017), 163–83; esp. concerning the "metamorphic quality" of Mannerism, that "Renders visible the relation of force and form, such that form and being-formed coincide in the figure as an actual trace of virtual movement" (ibid., 168).

130 See the discussion of Braidotti's cartographic notion of "figurations" in my preliminary discussion.

second, drawings are not just a 'figure of thinking' but one that configures individuation; a 'milieu of individuation' or a 'site of becoming' of both objects and subjectivities.

Today, Serlio scholars defend the trailblazing position of the seven books within the history of projective practices. Christof Thoenes, for instance, credits Serlio with being the first to have reflected on the workings of compositional practices.[131] Serlio's practical theory should thus be understood as a formal pedagogy (*Formenlehre*).[132] This compositional interest is conventionally attributed to his early training as a painter,[133] while his pictorial approach was classically identified with the copious use of illustrations of many visual models.[134] Indeed, with his didactic use of images and the resulting "systematic organization of knowledge into a readily intelligible format," which Peruzzi had not achieved, Serlio contributed a decisive advancement.[135] But to assume that Serlio was the first to 'teach architecture in images' is misleading: painters have long relied on specific visual models in training for their craft; cognitive schemas that apprentices learned until they thought through them. Starting from visual schemata, apprentices could make configural variations to experiment on how things go together, how composition works.

Among a generation of architectural practitioners trained through painting and drawing, Serlio simply inherited a more practical (i.e. technical) conception of composition, based more on the manual element of artistic production (which does not devalue any of his intellectual labor). On this matter, I am enough of a materialist to assume a deep resonance between biographies, conditions of production, and discursive formations.[136] It may not necessarily amount to a conscious critique, but especially Martini's rigid external geometric outlines of human bodies must have appeared a strange

131 Thoenes, "Notes on the Architectural Treatises," 24, and "Profusione: Serlio e la trattatistica," in id., ed., *Sebastiano Serlio;* Sesto Seminario Internazionale di Storia dell'architettura, Vicenza 31 agosto–4 settembre 1987 (Milan: Electra, 1989), 9–18. For a recent study of Serlio's early training, see Frommel, "Sebastiano Serlio as a Painter-Architect," in *The Notion of the Painter-Architect in Italy and the Southern Low Countries*, ed. Piet Lombaerde (Turnhout: Brepols, 2014), 39–57; and id, *Serlio: Architect*, 43ff.

132 Thoenes, "Profusione," 9; and Frommel, *Serlio: Architect*, 12.

133 Serlio's obscure early life has long been ignored by historians; see Richard J. Tuttle, "Sebastiano Serlio Bolognese," in *Serlio: Sesto Seminario,* ed. Thoenes, 22–29. We only have biographies, who Serlio was, over the last decades, as there has been a great renewed commitment by historians to reconstruct his early life; see also Frommel, *Sebastiano Serlio: Architect.*

134 Kruft, *A History of Architectural Theory,* 74.

135 Huppert, *Becoming an Architect*, 154–70; here 161.

136 I take this great formulation from Rosi Braidotti's reading of Spinoza's writings (Rosi Braidotti, "Posthuman, All too Human? A cultural Political cartography," video recording of a lecture at the Inhuman Symposium, May 25, 2015, avail. online at https://youtu.be/gNJPR78DptA; here at 1:03:24).

compositional technique to someone used to drawing bodies iteratively from the inside out. I would speculate that Serlio's work here helps advance a novel design didactics that problematizes composition processes, based on how painters are trained to bring their work into being through a recursive technique of progressively differentiating compositional outlines.[137] ☒ 25–27

This realization sheds a very different light on the practical aspect of Serlio's treatise that, against its traditional devaluation as a design manual for mediocre architects, ought to be re-evaluated as being just an architectural design manual: meaning a first attempt at inducing a relatively novel non-representational mode of thinking-through and becoming-with compositional techniques; the technical knowledge key to practicing architecture. It is an ethics.[138] Practical knowledge involves practice as an activity. It is for this reason that Serlio's treatise starts with the two propaedeutic books on geometric construction, emphasizing the importance of a proper technical training in visual media as a crucial component for becoming an architect.[139] Thus in contrast to the rather unsystematic presentation of Euclidean geometric elements first appearing in Martini's *Trattato,*[140] Serlio's first book starts, similar to Pacioli's *Divina Proportione* (Divine proportion, 1509) and Dürer's *Vier Bücher Menschlicher Proportion* (Four books on human proportion, 1527), with a series of practical definitions of geometrical figures as a geometry applied to solving architectural problems.[141] Previous studies have noted that Serlio thus "goes a step further" than previous treatises.[142] But they fail to note

137 This realization is largely inspired by Robert Gjerdingen (see below, note 183). On this recursive practice, see also the median line and saggital symmetries in Albrecht Dürer, *Vier Bücher von Menschlicher Proportion* (Nuremberg: s.n., 1528), the first book of which starts from Dürer's way to draw human figures by "taking a ruler taller than the paper, on it I then draw a straight line as long as the image shall be" from which the human figure incrementally takes shape (ibid., Book I, f. 2v–3v).

138 I take this observation from Scott Lash, *Experience: New Foundations for the Human Sciences* (Cambridge/Medford: Polity, 2018), 34.

139 Huppert, *Becoming an Architect*, 166.

140 As Michele Sbacchi clarifies, "already Alberti,… was well aware of Euclidean geometry, a discipline which he dealt with in one of his minor works, the *Ludi mathematici*. Yet Alberti's orthodox position within the Classical tradition could not allow him to challenge the primacy of numerical ratios for the making of architecture. Therefore, not surprisingly, Euclidean methods are left out of his *De re aedificatoria*." See Michele Sbacchi, "Euclidism and Theory of Architecture," *Nexus Network Journal* 3, no. 2 (2001): 25–38; here 28.

141 Maurizio Lorber, "I primi due libri di Sebastiano Serlio: Dalla struttura ipotetico-deduttiva alla struttura pragmatic," in *Serlio: Sesto Seminario,* ed. Thoenes, 114–25, see also Pietro Roccasecca, "Sebastiano Serlio: Placing Perspective at the Service of Architects," in *Perspective, Projections, and Design*, ed. Mario Carpo and Frédérique Lemerle (London/New York: Routledge, 2008), 95–104. See ibid., for a longer discussion of Serlio's relation to Pacioli's work and also Piero della Francesca's *De Prospectiva pingendi* (c. 1474) and Jean Pélerin (Viator)'s *De Artificiali perspectiva* (1505), and Egnazio Danti's suggestion that Martini's work acted as a 'go-between' (after ibid., 99). For Dürer's book, see below.

142 See Sbacchi, "Euclidism and Theory of Architecture," 27.









25–26 PARTITIONING IN ART
***Previous page, top*: Painters usually define figures in an iterative process of progressively differentiating compositional outlines. This can be seen in this exemplary drawing study by Paolo Veronese, "Studies for The Allegories of Love", c.1570–75.**

***Bottom*: The traditional artistic schema for drawing a three-dimensional face, shown in three positions.**

27 STARTING FROM THE MIDDLE
***Above*, for regularizing irregular sites, Serlio advocated a design scheme that always starts from the middle of the street-facing facade, and progressively define the layout in a series of iterative steps. The above drawing recreates this compositional method of constructing architectural plans through constructive guidelines (*linee occulte*), after a project from Book VII.**

28 | 29 GEOMETRIC PROPAEDEUTICS
***Right and overleaf*: The First three pages of Serlio's *Primo libro di Geometria*, fols. 3r–4r**



PRIMO LIBRO
DI GEOMETRIA,
DI SEBASTIANO SERLIO
BOLOGNESE.

RIMIERAMENTE, punto è una cosa indivisibile la qual non ha in se parte alcuna.

Punto.

Linea è una retta & continua imaginatione da un punto, all'altro, in longhezza senza larghezza.

Linea.

Parallele, sono due linee continuate di egual distantia.

Parallele, ò equalmente lontane.

Superficie è di due linee equidistanti serrate dalli lati, cioè una cosa, che ha longhezza, & larghezza senza profunità, & ancora può esser superficie di diuersi & inequali lati.

Superficie.

Angolo retto sarà, quando una linea perpendicolare, cioè à piombo anco detta catetto cascherà sopra una linea piana.

Linea perpendicolare, ò à piombo.

Angolo retto, ò à squadra.

Angolo retto, ò à squadra.

Et quando detta linea cascherà sopra una linea piana più da un lato, che dall'altro sarà un'angolo acuto & uno ottuso, l'angolo acuto sarà minore del retto, & l'angolo ottuso sarà maggior del retto, che si può dire angolo sotto squadra, & sopra squadra.

Angolo acuto, ò sotto squadra.

Angolo ottuso, ò sopra squadra.

Angolo.

the extent to which geometric thinking permeates Serlio's practical architecture theory.

In fact, I want to provocatively suggest that it could and should be placed on a multi-linear trajectory toward the increasing geometrization of knowledge in the following century, and its major theoretical expositions written *more geometrico*.[143] In loosely emulating the presentation of Euclid's *Elements* ✉[28–29], Serlio's serial treatise and its practical pedagogy is set up in a manner that can be described quite similarly to Foucault's characterization of Descartes's *Meditations,* insofar as, starting from a group of propositions, it establishes "a system, which each reader must run through if he wishes to experience their truth; and a group of modifications forming an exercise, which each reader must carry out, and by which each reader must

143 Of course, this structure is far from being developed in any systematic fashion in Serlio's work. Presentations *more geometrico* are axiomatic theories presented in a rigidly structured arguments, starting from definitions and axioms, propositions and demonstrations, that would evolve during the sixteenth to mid-eighteenth century in works on mathematics and military fortifications (see here esp. Stevin and Marolois, and later Vauban), gardening, and natural philosophy (including here Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz). See here, e.g. Pérez-Gómez, *Crisis of Modern Science*, esp. 88–127, 166–235. Serlio is entirely missing from this discussion.



be affected, if he wishes in his turn to be the subject enunciating this truth on his own account."[144] It is this methodological repositioning of the very function of geometric architectural imaging techniques toward creativity, which eventually requires a highly iconoclastic design didactic that is no longer concerned with representation and *mimesis*, but becomes a technique geared toward invention, or *poiesis*.[145]

144 Foucault, "My Body, This Paper, This Fire," Appendix II to id., *History of Madness* (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2006); here 563.

145 A clarifying note on the distinction between the Aristotelian notions of *poiesis*, *technē*, and *praxis*: While *mimesis* is both a process, means, and end in itself, we must understand *poiesis*, as a quite different form. *Poiesis* is not the production of things (= *technē*), but a process of 'bringing into being.' As Agamben stresses, this production process is fundamentally different from production activity (= *praxis*), as an wilfull act or the doing of the production. Agamben thus understand *poiesis* not as the product of any will, but—following the Heigeggerian notion that *technē* is what guides *poiesis*—as a product of *technē*, which he identifies as a "mode of truth"; a "causing to appear," distinguished from *poiesis* as a 'bringing into being,' is understood in terms of 'acting/doing,' but in terms of 'knowing.' *Praxis*, by contrast, is etymologically related to crossing, limits, a 'passing through' as a going through an action. The aim of praxis lies in itself; the aim of *poiesis* lies in the work resulting from this action. See chapter 8, "Poiesis and Praxis," in Giorgio Agamben, *The Man without Content*, trans. Georgia Albert (Stanford: California UP, 1999), 86–93. This distinction, I argue, helps us distinguish the pedagogical dimension of component techniques and geometric construction from the supposed intentionality within compositional practices, by re-emphasizing its intricate relation to a specific production of

Peg Rawes reminds us that "geometry is the major discipline through which a priori concepts of space are formed; for example the geometric operations of measurement and deduction produce abstract and intelligible understandings of individual spaces and relationships between spatial objects."[146] This way, geometric techniques, acts of drawing, and figural composition ought to be understood performatively "as different forms of artistic *technē* … in which the technical procedure is [not] separated from the aesthetic act," as Rawes observes in suggesting that such forms of reasoning ought to "be rethought because they are expressions of reflective thinking, not constructions of ideal … truths" but "aesthetic enactments."[147] She emphasizes how, for Platonists, the drawing of diagrams was closely linked to learning; in particular by way of the act of recollecting, assembling, or constructing an argument.[148]

With this performative reading of *technē*, we can review the neoplatonic impetus of Serlio's generative approach to imitation. In his *Trattato dell'imitazione* (Treatise on imitation, 1530), Giulio Camillo Delminio, a neo-platonic philosopher who greatly influenced the organization of Serlio's books,[149] had identified Plato's *Timaeus* as a model for understanding creative processes in terms of how differences come into being. Its myth of creation followed the Pythagorean concept of the universe as an initially all-inclusive whole, which incrementally takes form through a series of differentiating changes,[150] a process somewhat similar to Euclid's later geometric definitions of forms. As Patrick Healy notes, one greater aim of the Neoplatonists was to arrive at a serial dialectic, in which all that follows is a consequence of what came before.[151] Any creation or composition thus necessarily passes through a pre-constituted order, rank, or hierarchy. This order,

knowledge in the act of drawing.

146 Peg Rawes, *Space, Geometry and Aesthetics: Through Kant and Towards Deleuze* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3.

147 Ibid., 25–6 (punctuation modified).

148 Ibid., 29–31; see also Brian Massumi, "The Diagram as Technique of Existence: Ovum of the Universe Segmented," in *Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011): 87–104; orig. pub. in the special issue "Diagram Work," ed. Ben van Berkel and Caroline Bos, *ANY* 23 (1998): 42–7.

149 On Serlio's relation to Delminio see Loredana Olivato, "Dal teatro della memoria al grande teatro dell'architettura: Giulio Camillo Delminio e Sebastiano Serlio," *Bollettino del Centro internazionale di Studi di Architettura 'A. Palladio'* no. 30 (1979); Carpo, "Ancora su Serlio e Delminio: La teoria architettonica, il metodo e la riforma dell'imitazione," in *Serlio: Sesto seminario*, ed. Thoenes, 111–13. See moreover Tafuri, *Venice and the Renaissance*; and Pauwels, "La méthode de Serlio."

150 Plato, *Timaeus:* 31a–36b; see Anne Aurasmaa, "The conceptualization of time and space in the memory theatre of Giulio Camillo (1480?–1544)," *Nordisk Museologi* 1 (2003): 51–70; here 57.

151 Healy, *The Model and its Architecture*, 47.

which since Aristotle's treatise on rhetoric had been identified with *taxis*, sets the conditions from which any composition takes form.[152] Consequently, as Lefaivre and Tzonis have investigated, *taxis* long presented an intercalary formal device in classical architecture to produce the elements and relations shaping a building. As a *technē* of composition, it "constrains the placing of the architectural elements that populate a building by establishing successions of logically organized divisions of space."[153] In their highly structuralist reading, they then theorize taxis mainly in its function as an elementary compositional technique, in which matrices serve as the design grid "ready to be populated by architectural elements," the so-called *genera*.[154] In this generic reading, they reduce Serlio's design method to an *ars combinatoria*; a view still shared by many scholars. Mario Carpo, for instance, recognized the 'revolutionary' aspect of the approach to composition in this imitative model,[155] but overlooked the more genetic (or generative) function these matrices gain as a system for architectural production. I will come back to this point after now showing in more detail, how they become a much more radical problem-solving activity within the genesis of form.

The matrix of appartamenti primarily serves as an architectural production system, an instrument for designing, if by this we mean a problem-solving activity within the genesis of form.[156] Because beyond serving as

152 Already Vitruvius places order — "ordinatio, quae graece *taxis* dicitur" — as his first principle (Vitruvius, *De Architectura* 1.2.1. Greek τάξις, from τάσσω "to arrange, put in order," "to appoint," "to place." For a detailed discussion, see Liane Lefaivre and Alexander Tzonis, *Classical Architecture: The Poetics of Order* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986). As they argue then, "the canonic system that operates when a classical building is being composed … can be summarized through three levels of formal devices: (1) Taxis, which divides architectural works into parts; (2) genera, the individual elements that populate the parts as divided by taxis; and (3) symmetry, the relations between individual elements. The three levels … are equally important and operate simultaneously in shaping a building. In addition, they are proscriptive, not prescriptive. This means that they do not so much direct action as constrain it" (ibid., 6).

153 Ibid., 4: "Aristotle and the other theoreticians of poetics and rhetoric discussed formal devices, the *technē* of composition, in a general way, so that the results could be applied to any subjects, to any class of things (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.2.1). They dealt universally with 'the ordering and distribution of matter' (Cicero, *Ad Herennium* 1.2.3)."

154 Ibid., 23 and 35. They therein present this mother taxis as shown on the left side. Elements, or genera, here "form a level of formal constrains that organize an architectural composition. Although taxis governs the relation of parts to whole, the genera dictate the direction, seriation, and hierarchy of the parts," (107) while symmetry finally "is used to cover universally all constraints of architectural composition that refer to how elements are chosen and placed in relation both to one another and to the overall structure of taxis." (117) Yet the operative agency, and intentionality is still situated in the architects mind alone. In my own post-structuralist and new-materialism-informed reading I would aim at eliminating both the superstructural function of taxis as well as the resulting mechanistic conception of architectural design that it entails.

155 See Carpo, *Metodo ed Ordini*; and id., "Ancora su Serlio e Delminio," passim.

156 See DeLanda, "Deleuze, Diagrams, and the Genesis of Form," 33.

a formal device, order(ing) is also a recursive compositional technique closely tied to the act of drawing plans.[157] In contrast to classical rhetoric, where so-called *topoi* (or commonplaces) were the starting point of discourse, drawings act as a material environment out of which architectural thought begins and things take form.[158] Robin Evans reminds us that "making drawings for buildings"[159] is the defining agency of the newly emerging figure of the architect. With this reminder, we note that Serlio similarly situates the operativity of partitioning in the very act of drawing plans. Drawing techniques played a pivotal role in Serlio's way of looking at architecture, hence his way of thinking, in which similarly to the platonic conception of geneses, the act of drawing lines itself comes to be foregrounded.[160] Yet, in contrast to Alberti's *lineamenta*, for example, Serlio's *linee occulte* do not represent an existing ideal reality; they are merely 'constructive guidelines' concerned with constructing a contingent reality that does not yet exist.[161] In this sense, the fourfold matrix of appartamenti is yet to be understood as a fully productive and thus projective diagram that, in a Deleuzian sense, does not merely

157 In Renaissance literature, the notion of "order (*ordine*) is never separated from a plurality of 'orders' (*ordini*). 'Order' is used both for a set of architectural elements … and for the 'order' of a certain building,' … but also for the totality of 'orders,' for the 'order of the orders.' This use might seem confused, but it is not all that different from the use of concepts in logic such as 'set' or 'class,' and architectural 'ordering' generates exactly the same logical complications of any other recursive procedure" (Pier-Paolo Tamburelli, "Space; or, Bramante's Problem," *San Rocco* 11 (Summer 2015), 111–27; here 115).

158 I am thinking here specifically of Plato's conception of the *chōra,* which in the *Timaeus* is presented as the matrix (*hypodoche*) of all becoming (Plato, *Timaeus,* 48e–49b and 52a). Chōra is the material condition of difference; see e.g. Robert Hahn, "Material Causality, Non–Being, and Plato's 'Hypodoche': A Review of the Timaeus in Terms of the Divided Line," *Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science* 14, no.1 (1980): 57–66. In recent critical theory, the notion of *chōra* has received quite some attention. Here, I refer more to feminist reading that foreground the material embeddedness of emergence, as *chōra* is not simply a place 'in which' things take form; rather, it situates beginnings, creation, and invention in concrete material environments, 'out of which' things emerge. See also my preliminary considerations, in chapter 0.2.

159 Ibid., 21.

160 Raunig, *Dividuum*, 79.

161 See Hersey, *Phytagorean Palaces*, 64–87. "*Linee occulte* are the unmarked or partly marked axes, edges, and coordinates of cubic architecture. They are graphic metaphors for invisible affinities. … They help architecture to descend from idea to materiality, and they help it to rise back. Physically *linee occulte* are two different things. They are unseen stylus with which the architect makes a geometrical grid on which to cast his plans or elevations. And after the building is erected, they are the imaginary geometric scaffolding that the critic applies to the structure he sees. … Earlier there had been confusion about what to call these lines" (ibid., 64–5). For Alberti, these lines he called *lineamenta* are purely mental, yet they have greater primacy as "they transcend and preexist the material building" (ibid., 65). For Serlio, *linee occulte* are merely the guidelines drawn to project a building; the constructive pencil lines that were later removed from the final drawing (ibid., 81–3). Yet, philosophically, *linee occulte*, were also "secret connections that, when perceived, show unsuspected relationships … correspondences, and actions-at-a-distance" (ibid., 84).

represent reality but brings about new ones by extending the possibilities for thought.

The pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce claimed that "the greatest point of art consists in the introduction of suitable abstractions."[162] It is here that we ought to understand the deterritorializing function of the matrix of appartamenti as a diagrammatic planning device abstracting spatial conceptions from objects of lived experience. In this regard Brian Massumi helpfully stresses that "diagramming is the procedure of abstraction when it is not concerned with reducing the world to an aggregate of objects but, quite the opposite, when it is attending to their genesis."[163] Serlio's treatise directly connects the exercise of drawing plans to the genesis of architectural ideas: it is here that Serlio seems to adapt the recursive agency of partition at the point where its generative capacity becomes most explicit: that is, in terms of how buildings are literally drawn into reality.[164] As drawings are the prime instruments for understanding how structures are put together, composing drawing involves a particularly architectural education.[165] It is no coincidence that plans become the prime pedagogical instrument in Serlio's treatise, to instruct those interested in becoming an architect.

As such, Serlio's diagrammatic architecture differs fundamentally from those schematic plans such as Filarete's Sforzinda, which—as microcosmic replicas rooted in the episteme of resemblance—serve as retroactive visual simplifications, or 'copies' of the real. Concerning this practical pedagogy, an

162 Charles S. Pierce, *Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Lectures on Pragmatism* (Albany: State Univ. of New York Press), 226; cited in Massumi, *Semblance and Event*, 15.

163 Massumi, *Semblance and Event*, 14–15.

164 For an example of such descriptions in Serlio's work, see esp. the construction of triangles (See Serlio's book I: fols. 5–6), and optical correction of facades (ibid., 8v), which mentions the formulation "tirata un linea" several times in relation to partition and "spartimenti," and the construction of columns and architraves (Book IV, f. 6v); the formulation "sian tirate le sue/tutte le line" (ibid., IV: 10v, 11, and 58v); but especially his descriptions as to how to regularize irregular sites in See the first propositions, that mention "Let us take for example the situation where there is a site whose corners are A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I. … First, take the midpoint between A and I and draw a perpendicular line the length of the site, forming first the doorway with the passageway A. …" (ibid., VII: 128 [Hart/Hicks II: 282]); or similarly "Then, from the corner C draw a line at right angles to the street, going 6 feet onto public land from corner B.…" (VII: 132 [II: 286]). This procedure is repeated, as "The first thing to be done is that you should take the center of the facade and draw a line perpendicular with the front face, and continue it to the end of the site" (ibid., VII: 136 [II:290]), before Serlio generally recommends: "I would always place the [main entrance] door in the center [of the street facade], draw a passage way at right-angles from the street, and then complete the rest in whatever way required" (ibid., VII: 148 [II:302]).

165 As Huppert writes, "Peruzzi and Sangallo both used drawing as a form of education. In this sense their drawing can be read as part of an effort to forge a professional identity." Huppert, *Becoming an Architect*, 92.

30 Projection of an instrument onto a flat surface. Woodcut from Dürer's *Underweysung der Messung* (1525).

31 | 32 *Overleaf*, Serlio's introduction to perspectival geometry (*left*); Serlio's introduction to projection from flat surface to three-dimensional object (*right*) in the *Primo* and *Secondo Libro*.



intermediary role is taken by Albrecht Dürer, whose *Underweysung der Messung* (Instructions for Measuring, 1525) provided a sophisticated method for projection. ⊠[30] As projective techniques mapped things (or more accurately the lines coming from them) onto a surface, the same perspectival technique could be used in the opposite direction to project flat figures so as to create three-dimensional objects. ⊠[31–32] Thereby a procedure for representing real objects becomes a tool for constructing new ones.[166] In instructing geometric constructions, the *Underweysung* presented procedures that helped learners, following them, to come to both a greater technical skill and genuine understanding of projection.[167] As Bernard Cache moreover affirms,

166 Here Robin Evans, "Architectural Projection," in *Architecture and Its Image: Four Centuries of Architectural Representation* (Montreal: CCA, 1989), 19–35; here 24. One could further expand on this point, by noting that projection as a mapping of three-dimensional bodies onto a two-dimensional plane, is a 'conformal' mapping: conformal meaning that rules are scale-invariant, i.e. the same for different scales. Shapes are invariant to the chosen grid size or resolution of the 'gridding' of reality used by these projective techniques; in fact, projection does not need a uniform grid to begin with. It is always already based on a scale-invariant field theory that encodes 3D bodies on 2D surface; In return, 3D objects can thus be 'holographically' brought about by 2D surface. Drawing architectural compositions is thus a form of conformal field theory.

167 Albrecht Dürer, *Underweysung der Messung mit dem Zirckel und Richtscheyt, in Linien ebnen unnd gantzen corporen* (Nuremberg: Hieronymus Andreae, 1525). The preface's expresses Dürer's aim to rectify that painters are not taught in the art of measurement: "weyl aber die [messung] der recht grundt ist aller mallerey hab ich mir fuergenomen allen kuenstbegyrigen jungen eyn anfang zuostellen und ursach zuegeben damit sie sich der messunge zirckels und richtscheyt underwinden unnd darauß die rechten warheyt erkennen unnd vor augen sehen moegen damit sie nit alleyn zuo kuensten begirig werden sonder auch zu eynem rechten und groesseren verstant komen moegen [Since



this procedural pedagogy operated on a principle of incrementally putting things into variation.[168] Such a practical pedagogy must have resonated with Serlio's neo-platonic conception of architectural production as geared toward invention.

Serlio then no longer concerns himself with the nature of architecture, but attends more to the cultural nature specific to architectural production through drawing as a cultural technology. In resonance with Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, architectural production (as *poiesis*) through drawing technics, becomes a 'way of revealing' ideas through artistic activity. Drawing brings into being what does not yet exist.[169] Making drawings is thus "not simply a geometric composition of lines," as Rancière notes, but involves a

[measurement] is the right foundation of all painting, I have resolved to offer an initiation to all youngsters eager for art, and give a reason for that they subject themselves to measuring with compass and ruler, and out of it realize and visualize the genuine truth; so that they not only become eager in the arts, but also may come to a genuine and greater understanding]" (my trans.).

168 See esp. Cache, "Dürer — Vitruvius — Plato" (video recording), and id., "Proportion and Continuous Variation in Vitruvius's *De Architectura*," in *Geometrical Objects: Architecture and the Mathematical Sciences 1400–1800*, ed. Anthony Gerbino (Springer: s.l., 2014), 47–58; here 50.

169 Bernard Stiegler, *Technics and Time 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, trans. Richard Beardsworth and George Collins (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998), 9. On the relation between technics and *poiesis*, see also Lash, *Experience*, 17–18, 33–49, and 98–100. On Serlio's relation to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in terms of both '*il mezzo*' ("I took the route which everyone must take, that is, the middle way") and *decorum* (hence of "drawing differences"), see esp. Hart and Hicks, *Serlio: On Architecture,* II: xxi–xxvi.

specific "distribution [*partage*] of the sensible."[170] It entirely re-poses the problem that drawings map out or set in motion, and fully reorganize or reconfigure what can be seen, said, or done.[171] By first re-aligning words, shapes, objects, and persons, "diagrams work to generate a kind of cognitive sweep that extends the possibilities of thought" for something new to emerge.[172] Thus in contrast to more symbolic-iconic graphic visual representations of information that merely emblematize ideas, that is, communicate complex arguments in a simple way, diagrams proper are projective-creative tools working through complexification, concretization, and problematization; they first render visible, or actualize organizational problems.[173]

Through this existentializing function, diagrams never represent an existing order of things or given reality. To the extent that they "anticipate new organizations and specify yet-to-be-realized relationships," a diagram is rather "a map of possible worlds."[174] Massumi reminds us that therefore "the diagram in this sense is a constructivist technique of existence. It is a technique of bringing to new existence. A technique of becoming. Becoming-concrete. … [But if] diagramming is abstraction … then the very process of becoming determinately concrete is a process of abstraction."[175] As a process of abstracting reality, projection avoids dichotomizing the abstract (i.e. ideas or drawing) to the concrete (i.e. forms or buildings), and thus circumvents what Whitehead would call the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness": that is, to think of the concrete as opposed to the abstract. This happens because projection involves a characteristic 'exteriorization' of thought through which abstract architectural ideas are concretized.[176] In projecting possible worlds (thus concretizing possibilities determinately by abstracting reality) on paper, the act of drawing therefore has its own reality, and transgresses the realm of mere possibilities, by the way drawings operate on a fully VIRTUAL function in catalyzing the graphical organization of narrative arguments. Regarding this

170 Jacques Rancière, *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible* (London/New York: Continuum, 2006), 15.

171 Nick Butler, Emma Jeanes, and Birke Otto, "Diagramatics of Organization," *Ephemera: Theory & Politics in Organization* 14, no. 2 (May 2014): 167–75; here 169.

172 Kenneth Knoespel, "Diagrams as piloting devices in the Work of Gilles Deleuze," *Litérature, Théorie, Enseignement* 19 (2001): 145–65; here 146; cited in Leeb "A Line with Variable Direction," 31–33.

173 Susanne Leeb, "A Line with Variable Direction, which Traces No Contour, and Delimits no Form," in *Drawing a Hypothesis*, ed. Gansterer, 29–42; Deborah Hauptmann and Andrej Radman, "Asignifying Semiotics: Or How to Paint Pink on Pink," *Footprint* 14 (2014).

174 Stan Allen, *Practice: Architecture, Technique + Representation* (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2009), 50–51. On the Deleuzo-Guattarian conception of diagrams, see my preliminary discussion, page 182 onwards.

175 Massumi, *Semblance and Event*, 100.

176 See the related segment in my preliminary discussion, section 0.3.3.

virtual function, we must understand appartamenti not so much as lived space in a Lefebvrian sense, but the concrete form in which a creative-generative form of architectural practice, operating through a potent form of a "lived abstraction,"[177] comes to be embodied.

In this creative-generative modality, the recursive exercise of drawing plans begins from an ASIGNIFYING distribution of positions and sequences of multiple points, lines, planes, figurations and their parts, so as to arrange topological relationships with no direct reference to form or (geo)metric ratios and proportions. In producing form out of formless processes,[178] drawing works entirely non-discursively at the intersection of operative conceptions of distributive processes and graphic techniques of organization. ☒[27] Therefore, drawing (or training to draw/compose plans) functions on the same level of the real. Architectural agency is situated within the drawing process.[179] This more immanent conception of geometric projection puts an end to any representational approach to composition based on resemblances, because partition drives the actualization of architectural compositions precisely through difference, divergence, and differentiation.[180]

Appartamenti as an Order of Multiplicities

Serlio needed drawings to see past resemblances; as a *technē* working against the episteme of resemblance. In this sense, Serlio's practical treatise works not on the basis of AXIOMATIZATION but, as Maurizio Lorber notes, through a specific problematization.[181] In problematizing the generative nature of pieces and part-to-part relations, far from offering any facile design solution, *appartamenti* first articulate the space defining the problem itself.

177 "True lived experience [*le vécu*] is an absolutely abstract thing. The abstract is lived experience. I would almost say that once you have reached lived experience, you reach the most fully living core of the abstract. In other words, lived experience represents nothing. And you can live nothing but the abstract and nobody has ever lived anything else but the abstract" (Deleuze, Seminar at Vincennnes, Mar 21, 1978; transcript avail. online at https://www.webdeleuze.com/textes/67).

178 Sanford Kwinter, "The Hammer and the Song," *OASE* 48 (1998): 31–43, repub. in Mark Garcia, ed., *The Diagrams of Architecture* (Hoboken: Wiley, 2010): 122–27.

179 This concerns the misleading, but still widespread idea that drawing is just a process of representing (or, that a drawing is just the representation of) an idea preconceived, or elements preformed, or a figuration pre-composed in the mind of the artist/architect/draftsman. Such is still suggested in Tzonis and Lefaivre's structuralist reading of composition. For approaches on the material agency of drawing; see Andrej Radman, "Figure, Discourse: To the Abstract Concretely," in *Cognitive Architecture: From Bio-Politics to Noo-Politics*, ed. Deborah Hauptmann and Warren Neidich (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2010), 430–51; and the abovementioned works of Evans, Allen, Gansterer, and Leeb.

180 Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 212.

181 Lorber, "I primi due libri di Sebastiano Serlio," 119.

Serlio thus taps into a complex of organizational problems that calls for a new conception of the subject of architecture.

Any belief in the possibility of isolating this displacement from a specific 'ecology of practices' would thus be mistaken. Because more than a peculiar design philosophy, the Seven Books present a specific design pedagogy. Based on Serlio's biography, his didactic runs on an agenda that persistently engages with multiple figurations in space and their interrelation—not just single objects. In fact, traversing his layout, publication order, and ethics, his singular awareness and acknowledgment of multiplicitous socio-political organizations, local styles and practices was formed by a need to adapt to changing circumstances, in a time characterized by increasing instability, mobility, and class conflict.[182] This again must be accounted for in quite materialist terms. As is clear from his oft-cited notion of a "discordia concordante"[183], architectural education must for Serlio primarily be geared toward the mastering of differences and irregularities, as it proves vital for becoming an "architect-selector"[184] able to differentiate: a practical pedagogy teaching invention from within the given.[185] It is this critically-selective aspect that, as Hart writes, clearly puts Serlio "amongst the first moderns."[186]

In his understanding of architecture's inherent **MULTIPLICITY**, Serlio's notion of mastering differences certainly does not opt for resolving difference

182 See Hart and Hicks, *Sebastiano Serlio*, Vol. 1: xxx; and Lefaivre and Tzonis, *Classical Architecture*, 38.

183 The term is borrowed from the *theorica musicae* of Italian music theorist Franchino Gaffurio (1451–1522); see also Vaughan Hart, "'Of Little or Even No Importance to the Architect': On Absent ideals in Serlio's drawings in the Sixth Book, on domestic architecture," in *The Rise of the Image: Essays on the History of the Illustrated Art Book*, ed Rodney Palmer and Thomas Frangenberg (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2016), 87–105; here 96.

184 Serlio, Book VII: 168 [II: 322]: "In questa facciata non son compartitele finestre d'eguale distanza, … ma è una discordia concordante: come anchora avviene nella Musica: percioche il Soprano, il Contrabaffo, et il Tenore, et il Contralto, che acconcia il tutto, paiono discordi uno dall'altro nelle voci: ma la gravità d'una, et l'acutezza dell'altro, con la temperatura del Tenore, et l'interpositione del Contralto, per la bellalissima arte del compositore, fanno quella grata armonia all orecchie de gli ascoltanti, che sarà anchora nell'Architettura la discordia concordante, pur che vi sia sempre parità [In this facade, the windows are compartitioned at unequal distance …, but this compartition is a harmonious discord, as also happens in music. Just as the soprano, the bass, the tenor, and the contralto arrange the ensemble, all seem to be discordant one to another in their voices, yet the depth of one, the height of the other, with the tempering of the tenor and the interposition of the contralto, combined with the excellent art of the composer, in total make that harmony which pleasing to the ears of the listeners, so also in architecture there is a harmonious discord, provided that there is always parity]."

185 On this point, Hart points out Serlio's harsh critique of Renaissance artist to not have produced a better world. Hart, "Of Little or Even No Importance," 96.

186 Ibid. It is, as Hart put it there, "as if Serlio identifies with the irregular house" that he presented in Book VII.

through mere integration or imitation. To spatialize or 'lay out' the problem of organization (in contrast to Alberti's linear methodology), and to temporalize planar constructions (against Martini's static geometry) enables a non-linear order under which these **MULTIPLICITIES** can be progressively defined between terms, yet arranged on the same level of reality.[187] Again, this is precisely why drawing plans become a pedagogical means.

Countering particularly Alberti's vertical regime of correspondences (= part-to-whole relations), such a pedagogy conceptually operates horizontally on a plane of consistency (= relations among pieces), holding together heterogeneous elements *as* such.[188] Multiplicities namely involve "a peculiar type of complexity — a complexity in divergence — where it is not a matter of finding the unity of a manifold but … of seeing unity only as a holding together."[189] As John Rajchman has pointed out, multiplicities engender a "complexity-in–divergence" that works two ways: as a "co-emergence-in-differentiation" but also a "differentiating-in-jointness."[190] As a result, these assemblages no longer involve (subjugated) groups whose "unity lies outside

187 Alberti's regime of vertical accordance and chordal harmonics thereby parallels the musical texture of homophonic compositions, which are characterized by a higher-order melody and a subordinated accompaniment. Against this correspondence of part-to-whole relations, Serlio sets the focus on part-to-part-relations and locates the work of the architect (as a composer) primarily in the mastering of dissonances; in fact, in direct recourse to polyphonic arrangements. In his digression on the "discordia concordante," he argues that the architect (as composer) must know how to arrange several co-present and relatively independent voices, so that they strive for equivalence and independence, yet without losing consistency. This emergent musical effect of consistency is called counterpoint. This effect is not reducible to musical content (i.e. meaning) alone. In contrast to vertical compositions, counterpuntal arrangements produce mobile combinations that interweave simultaneous melodic lines horizontally, and focus on melodic interaction and secondarily on the harmonies and structures that arise form that interaction. Rather than making parts fit, arrangements is a question of mutual determination and attunement, in which a resonance arises when separate voices contribute to an emergent polyphonic structure that sustains each individual voice in return. See John Rahn, "Music Inside Out: Going Too Far," in *Musical Essays*, introduced and commented by Benjamin Boretz (Amsterdam: G+B Arts Intern., 2000), 177. In this polyphonic sense, composition is not reducible to a common denominator. See Gary Genosko, *Reinventing Social Practices: Essays on Félix Guattari* (London/New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 49.

188 David Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze* trans. Joshua David Jordan (South Passadena: Semiotext(e), 2017), 204. See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 266. Opposed to the 'plane of organization' with its transcendental forms, the 'plane of consistence' comprises only complex networks of forces, particles, connections, relations, affects and becomings; subjectless individuations that constitute collective assemblages. "Here, there are no longer any forms or developments of forms; nor are there subjects or the formation of subjects. There is no structure, any more than there is genesis" (ibid.). See also Félix Guattari, "The Plane of Consistency," in *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 120–9.

189 John Rajchman, *Constructions* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998), 15.

190 Ibid.; see also Bracha Ettinger, "Ko-Poesis," in *Materialität der Diagramme*, ed. Susanne Leeb (Berlin: b_books, 2012), 215–30; here 220–1.

themselves," but (subject) groups that enable each member "to become a signifier in a communication system whose members are interdependent, yet simultaneously in a relation of difference."[191]

In approaching the construction of plans more integrally and processually, that is, as an operation of progressive differentiation in a series of symmetry-breaking transitions, partitioning pieces offers a means to measure and express architectural part-to-part relations and symmetries in differential terms.[192] Such a differential view of arrangement forcefully liberates architectural design didactics from their representational predicament. It finally breaks with former forms of representational thinking in all four of its transcendental illusions of identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance.[193] This break happens where Serlio dramatizes the conceptual fission that Martini's measure of *partimenti* had announced: where Serlio further distinguishes *compartimento* (as a VIRTUAL process) from *appartamenti* (as an ACTUAL configuration).[194] In using the prefixed form *ap*partamenti[195], this notion becomes much more spatial and gains a more configurative dimension, in the sense that *ad partem* ("to the side of") describes a new totality that emerges 'alongside' the parts themselves. That totality consists in an entirely novel reality that — instead of just 'coming to' or being ascribed to the parts — is 'arising from' how they are constituted by partition measures (*compartitione/compartimento*); an emergent reality that endows them with a certain thingness, or objective character; and some 'thisness' or identity created by a structural relationship that serves as a relative measure (*ad symmetriam comparatio*) of resulting positionalities, proximities, or distances. Thereby, it

191 Gary Genosko, *Félix Guattari: An Aberrant Introduction* (New York: Continuum, 2002), here 84 (modified) and 82. The distinction between subjugated groups and subject groups is Guattari's. For me, personally, this is mainly a fully fledged political issue! For Serlio, it may primarily be a religiously motivated concern, if we account for Serlio's protestant faith.

192 It should be re-emphasized that this happens in a time before any modern notion of bilateral symmetry. It bears witness instead to the fact that the origins of the modern concept of symmetry derive from group theory rather than geometry. On this point see, Ian Stewart, *Why Beauty is Truth: A History of Symmetry* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), vii–x.

193 See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 262–72.

194 If not rigidly, as Serlio ponders between the concepts *(s)compartimento* and *(s)compartitione*, seemingly trying to preserve the processual character. See my Appendix A, below.

195 Prefixation in Latin languages usually expresses a transformation of state or condition, such as re-describe that a former situation happens again or is set back to an earlier state. The prefix *ad-* now has three characteristics: The first case is related to fixture, in which the basis maintains the instrument of fixture. The second case concerns verbs that denominate acts of giving, mediation, and creation, where the basis is either a given bodily sensation or emotion, or an abstraction of concrete things. The third case denominates transient actions. See "Die Wortbildung des Verbs im Italienischen," Institut für Deutsche Sprache, Mannheim, accessed at https://grammis.ids-mannheim.de/kontrastive-grammatik/4085.

poses a problem that could never have been articulated by Alberti's conception of *partitio*, Filarete's *compartitione* or Martini's *partimenti*.

Serlio had thus disentangled two terms that are no longer identical in concept. Breaking with the four transcendental illusions, this introduced a fundamental conceptual difference between design processes (*compartitione*) and architectural forms (*appartamento/i*), effectively disentangling liberated design techniques from the problematic opposition of predicates that had, by referencing something outside architecture, constrained earlier analogical design procedures (anthropometrism) and their modus operandi of visual resemblance (homeomorphism). As Foucault helpfully observed, this "old system of similitude relied on a 'comparison of measurements.' In contrast, a modern 'comparison of order' establishes order without reference to an exterior unit."[196] In a comparison of order, there is isomorphism but no correspondence. Isomorphism here means the parallelism of structural relations.[197] More specifically, it means a formal equivalence between terms, which establishes equality with regard to their formality, yet, without any formal identity that would establish transcendental correlations, causal connections, or linear hierarchies.[198] Rather, as Foucault further argues, "comparison by means of order enables us to pass from one thing to another. … In this way we establish series … in which other terms are established according to increasing differences."[199]

It is this comparison of order that—from his first publication, Book IV, juxtaposing the different orders of architecture, to his last drafts, Book VI with its houses for all kinds of social ranks, and Book VII responding to all kinds of local situations—allows Serlio to strip architecture of any reference outside itself.[200] Serlio's painterly approach attends instead to the immanent formation of arrangements by means of a recursive and self-referential practice of finding form through progressive differentiation of a manifold given. Thereby *appartamenti* introduce an entirely new design measure in which architecture is no longer measured against an external referent. Instead, the matrix of

196 Foucault, *Order of Things*, 53.

197 Vera Bühlmann, "Architectonic Disposition: *ichnography, scaenography, orthography*," in *The Posthuman Glossary*, ed. Rosi Braidotti and Maria Hlavajova (London: Bloomsbury, 2018), 55–59; here 58–59.

198 Ibid.

199 Foucault, *Order of Things,* 53.

200 Architecture becomes however not necessarily a 'self-referential sign' (Eisenman), nor mere 'index of production' (Aureli); cf. Peter Eisenman, "Aspects of Modenism: Maison Dom-Ino and the Self-Referential Sign," (1979) republished in *Log* 30 (Winter 2014): 139–52 and Pier-Vittorio Aureli "The Dom-ino Problem: Questioning the Architecture of Domestic Space," ibid.: 153–68.

appartamenti—in its inherent multiplicity—renders visible a system of self-referentiality, in which architecture, differenciated along its cardinal point, comes to be measured only against itself.[201] This effectively replaces the aesthetic regime of partition and its metaphysical operators, with an **E(THI)CO-AESTHETIC** methodology in which partition attains a more creative function as a piloting device for architectural production.[202] ✉[33]

The matrix of appartamenti thus lies at the center of a pedagogy based on the repeated act of drawing plans. Therein, the incremental local differentiation into more and more detailed shapes, does not change the overall relation between shapes. The differentiation within partitioning practices thus involves a transformation that preserves not scalar relations but a configurational relation between elements. As such, this conformal mapping introduces a specific symmetry (i.e an invariance) that rather than being a constraint within composition, becomes an enabling constraint; one that adds a compositional degree of freedom everywhere. No longer the object of any representational scheme, here progressive differentiation has a double function as a creative tool for architectural formation, that is as both a designerly technique and designerly education. First, as a compositional technique, progressive differentiation

201 See Jachmann's notion that Serlio's serial presentation is connected to creating a specific self-referentiality "that allows moving beyond individual buildings and building types and question anew formal generative principles and the relation between space and function on a fundamental level" (Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 240 [my trans.]).

202 Frommel ("Medici Villas," 19ff) has stressed how Sangallo's schemes (and specifically the underlying ideas of Lorenzo de' Medici for them) were informed by the neo-platonic ideas in Marsilio Ficino's writings. In a similar way Philibert de L'Orme will later use this geometric cross as a generative matrix, arguing that "il fault toujours commencer par une ligne perpendiculairement tirée sur une droicte: laquelle represente et figure un charactere de croix [one must always start from a line perpendicularly drawn to a straight [one]." De L'Orme, *Le premier tome de l'architecture* (Paris: F. Morel, 1567–68), 32. Yet, following Ficino, he ties this perpendicular figure back to a divine creativity, and the figure of the cross that he traces back to the creation of the world. De L'Orme thus refers back to the *axis mundi* and its two lines that divide the world into the four world regions. Ibid.: "Dieu auteur de toutes choses l'a faicte et ordonnée premierement en creant le ciel et la terre, … Car apres avoir creé de sa seule parole toute la machine de l'univers sou un forme ronde et spherique, il divisa la circonference d'icelle en quatre parties egales moiennant deux lignes droictes qui s'entrecouppent au centre et milieu, ou, si vous voulez, au poinct de la division qui est la terre. Lesdictes parties font figurées par une croix, et divisent tout l'univers par leurs extremitez en quatre parties, appellées Orient, Occident, Midy, et Septentrion, ainsi que vous le pouvez voir par la prochaine figure … la croix du monde." This re-inscription of divine agency, should probably be read as a result of the Wars of Religion in France). We know the wider mythological meaning of the central point of the cross as the world 'navel'; the world's point of beginning. This notion sheds a further light on the apparently 'naval/nautic context in which the term *apartamento* arises; a view that will gain more consistency once this genetic reading helps us reveal how partitioning processes come to work as a steering device, as both a 'navigational tool' and a cybernetic device. I am referring here to the Greek κῠβερνητῐκός ("steersman," metaphorically "guide, governor"), from κῠβερνᾰ́ω "to steer or pilot a ship, direct as a pilot"). Hence the reference to Knoespel's above-mentioned notion of diagrams as "piloting devices."

33 THE MATRIX OF APPARTAMENTI, and its production of multiplicity, part-to-part relations, and resulting non-unitary system of measurement.



entails a new, non-representational design thinking, that uses differences didactically to drive the spatial specification of configurations within the heterogenesis of architectural assemblages. Therein, geometric construction acts as a "uniquely embodied … aesthetic 'action' or procedure"[203] that secondly involves a pedagogical dimension in helping teach the technical ability of drawing differences.

This didactic stance changes the problem of architecture to its inherent differences; the differences within architectural forms and discourses, as well as the differences that architecture produces. The comparison of different orders frees compartition from any metaphysical agency and symbolism. Not simply a sort of geometric formalism, it eventually enabled Serlio to put forward a first non-anthropocentric design approach. The creative agency of the architect becomes instead fully situated in the process of partitioning manifold structures (+), and at the same time embedded in a non-discursive practice of drawing distinctions out of which it arises. Here, as agents of their own event, *appartamenti* act as counter-actualizations that—as virtual forces that have become REAL—are able to unleash a creative capacity. Following the machinic equation that structure *is* genesis, here the matrix of appartamenti (+) directly translates into a creative power of "and"; a fleeting line drawing new connections.

203 Rawes, *Space, Geometry, and Aesthetics*, 2.

1.3 Teaching the Technical Skills of Differentiation

This diagrammatic use of the matrix of appartamenti brings us back to the argument about Serlio's design didactics and to what extent they should be understood as an *ars combinatoria* (Carpo), a self-referential system based on a formal game of composing elements through mathematical logic that "transform[s] architectural theory into a set of [prescriptive] technical rules," or whether they are also an *ars fabricandi* that, as Pérez-Gómez has argued, turned architecture theory into a functionalistic methodology for "the technical control of practical operations."[204] Evidently, Pérez-Gómez adds, "in such a framework, architecture could no longer be an art of imitation," and began to incrementally adopt the stance of a positivistic science.[205] While we will follow this development later [→ 3.2], the task of the following part is first to more carefully reevaluate the role of Serlio's practical theory of architecture, and the central position of the matrix of appartamenti as a diagrammatic design measure within this later development of geometrical techniques from *poiesis* to *mathesis*.[206] Before approaching my conclusion, I want to add

204 Pérez-Gómez, *Crisis of Modern Science*, 4–10.

205 Ibid., 11.

206 On this point, and the following point some precaution is due, concerning how over the next two centuries geometric techniques would be progressively 'demoted' from their metaphysical status as the principal generator of forms into more practical compositional techniques. On this later development, see esp. where Pérez-Gómez highlights that "for Newton, the origin of geometry was not intellectual but practical; geometry was only a part of universal mechanics" (Pérez-Gómez, *Crisis of Modern Science*, 78). While Newton's philosophy was thus based on a platonic cosmology, in which "number and geometry were the essence of external reality" (ibid.) and "had transcendental value and power in themselves" (ibid., 11), he did recognize the limitations of traditional geometric form of thought, opting instead "for inductive methods and asserted that knowledge should always derived from the observation of reality. This created the belief in the possibility of demonstrating the mathematical and geometrical essence of reality for the observation of nature" (ibid., 80). When architecture took up this implicit methodological stance, Pérez-Gómez noted, it in fact reduced geometry's generative dimension a mere tool for representing reality or nature, that in this form persisted throughout the symbolic geometries of Enlightenment architecture, despite the incremental establishment of a geometric *science* in which geometry lost much of its symbolic, metaphysical dimension (32, 97–105). Pérez-Gómez personifies the final transition of architecture theory into a self-referential instrument with Durand's axiomatically systematized design procedure to all kinds of buildings (see Pl. 21 in Durand's *Précis des leçons d'architecture données à l'École royale polytechnique* (1809)). Such dry 'design mechanisms,' contrary to earlier compositional paradigms of *ars combinatoria* and the later art of distribution, involves no longer any representation of reality but an economic one (Pérez-Gómez, *Crisis of Modern Science*, 303; cf. Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*). Even if it is devoid of transcendental intentions, it is nonetheless a highly axiomatic approach. To avoid to forcibly reintroduce any transcendental dimension, we must avoid diminishing the interval that separates Serlio and Durand's design methods, and the counter-position that Durand problem-solving strategy presents vis-à-vis Serlio's problematic pedagogy of progressive differentiation as a didactic technique. For an elaborate discussion of the precise extent to which Durand's approach effectively presents a counter-position to Serlio's serial approach, I refer to Jachmann's study, who treats many points that go beyond the scope of the argument developed here and below, but which help avoid reducing Serlio's work

a third and last layer relevant for this analysis (because, as a Deleuzian, my argument is organized by plateaus, each diffracting the previous one, so that we progressively outline a series of differences that we can work with). Of course, all of these changing conceptions do not happen in an intellectual vacuum, for Serlio's quest for invention is embedded in a very specific economy of knowledge. The increasing production of knowledge during the Renaissance was calling for a new *ars brevis* to allow a synoptic access through 'commonplaces,' or *topoi*. During the sixteenth century, topical logic—'to know by example'—became one of the dominant patters of reasoning. This topical logic—as Julian Jachmann has recently shown—is key to truly unlocking Serlio's seven books.[207] Topical logic is a technique that proceeds by distinguishing cases of commonly established discourses through progressive differentiation. *Topoi* contribute to canonizing subject-matters by structuring their conditions of determination.[208] By instantiating possibilities of predication, the topic field thus rasterizes and orders specific discourses as much as it makes them available for reproduction.[209]

Carpo has extensively analyzed the epistemic dimensions of humanist exemplarism, by elucidating how the imitation of exemplars becomes a process, a didactic technique.[210] He sees the use of topoi as reducing the art of discourse to a technique of citation, which, as he argues, is turned into a "systematic composition method" by Serlio. Carpo already pointed out that Delminio's *Trattato dell'imitazione* sharply discriminates the "banal imitator" who limits himself to mere citation of rhetorical topoi from "true imitation," which must "repeat, isolate, and analyze" the specimen so as to understand the "invisible mechanism of its construction," an understanding of which may then "spark a new invention."[211] This 'scientific model' of deducing rules from extrapolating samples is obviously not archived in Serlio's work. Through this relative failure, Carpo credits Serlio with having transformed architectural

to promoting an *ars combinatoria*, such as Mario Carpo does and whose work will respectively be discussed below, in order to highlight how this matrix of appartamenti is yet to be appreciated in its attempt to reclaim the creative function of geometric techniques. So, when the following uses Pérez-Gómez's helpful efforts to expose the *loss* of the transcendental dimension in architecture theory, I do so against his efforts to *re-introduce* it back into theory (to help overcome the contradictions of modernity), as I will instead emphasize the *genetic* aspect of this *process of abstraction* as a crucial factor in the genealogy of modern architecture.

207 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, I: 245–6.

208 Sebastian Lalla, "Einleitung in die Dialecticae libri duo," in *Petrus Ramus* (Stuttgart: Frommann, 2011): xxxv, cited after Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, I:247. I will come back to Ramism in relation to systems of classification in my Part III.

209 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, I: 247.

210 Carpo, *Metodo e Ordini*, 33.

211 Ibid., 53–4.

composition into a "mechanic assemblage of *ready-made* pieces."[212] This is not necessarily wrong if we look at Serlio's reception in Renaissance France, where the seven books (i.e. Book IV–VII, to be precise) came to be used as what Carpo sees as a "'user-friendly' collection of examples [*atlante esemplare*]."[213] But this resulting use cannot be equated with Serlio's intentions, especially if we acknowledge how copying is tied to a non-discursive formation of technical skills of invention.

In this regard, Jachmann has challenged the way in which historians have hitherto perceived Serlio's treatise as a pattern book mostly containing templates to be copied by mediocre architects, by identifying its inherent seriality as a strategy of creating types, which are "precisely characterized by processes of crystallization," hence as a technique of typification: the confirmation and development of types.[214] This way, Jachmann can expose the close connection of Serlio's approach to topical logic, or topology — the dominant system of ordering knowledge in the sixteenth century — that serves "as a key to understanding Serlio's work."[215] By understanding topoi not just as modular components but forms tied to techniques within rhetorical strategies of setting up arguments for dialectic invention, Jachmann aims to refract Carpo's and Pauwels's earlier topological interpretations[216] by highlighting how Serlio's topically-structured books are based on a "flexible ordering pragmatic" that, based on an introductory segment preparing a directed reception, set up an argument that comes to be confirmed by a concluding consensus-generating section.[217] This way we understand not

212 Ibid., 10–11 (my trans.), 55.

213 Ibid., 42 and 62 (English in the orig.). See Rosenfeld, "Sebastiano Serlio's Contributions to the creation of the Modern illustrated Architectural Manual," in *Serlio: Sesto Seminario,* ed. Thoenes, 102–10; here 107; Carpo, "The Making of the Typographical Architect," in *Paper Palaces: The Rise of the Renaissance Architectural Treatise*, ed. Vaughan Hart and Peter Hicks (New Haven: Yale UP, 1998), 166; and André Tavares, *The Anatomy of the Architectural Book* (Zurich: Lars Müller, 2016), esp. 214; cf. Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 210.

214 See Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux,* 209, 214–22; here 219. All translations in the following are mine. Cf. Rosenfeld, *Serlio: On Domestic Architecture*, 107, Carpo, "Ancora su Serlio et Delminio." Copying is more carefully recognized as starting point for a creative process by Frédérique Lemerle and Yves Pauwels, *Architectures de papier: La France et l'Europe (XVIe-XVIIe siècles)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 161–9.

215 Ibid., 245–6.

216 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux,* 245–50. Cf. Mario Carpo, "Ancora su Serlio et Delminio," and id., *Architecture in the Age of Printing: Orality, Writing, Typography, and Printed Images in the History of Architectural Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), 48–51. As Jachmann notes, a critique of this position was initially begun by Sylvie Deswarte-Rosa. Jachmann discusses here specifically the likely inspiration of Agricola's *De Inventione Dialectica* (1515); see esp. Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 250–66. For a list of related discussions and works, see there.

217 Here, Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 251. He then uses Agricola's emphasis on the

only each book but also the entire series as a "rhetoric-topologic construct" that is methodologically unfolded.[218] This method is of course altered throughout the following serial publications, toward a more heuristic and systematically scientific approach, which Serlio (as Carpo correctly surmises) could not have arrived at.

Through a deliberately Deleuzian lens, Jachmann instead reveals the structure of 'difference and repetition' of the seven books and their highly serial structure.[219] He thereby reassesses their topological organization neither as a mere collection of commonplaces, nor as an inventive scheme, but as a "flexible ordering pragmatic" that follows a didactic sequence rather than any natural order.[220] Here the projects constitute a series that teaches differences. On this matter, I want to continue the argument by adding that Serlio seems to have recognized the aspect of progressive differentiation within partition itself as a unique epistemic practice, especially in his attempts to organize an entire field of knowledge. With regard to Foucault's observation on a comparison of order, Serlio's serial publications and their pedagogy of progressive differentiation must be entirely repositioned in relation to epistemic practices of topical logic. This seriality induced by topological practices of progressive differentiation is not only much more suited to discerning discursive fields, but highly relevant for training technical skills.[221] As Jachmann shows, it is ignorant to think that Serlio did not consciously construct the serial organization of his treatise in view of as a learning process in which initial imitation serves as a starting point for the progressive definition and refinement of creative skills and inventiveness through repeated differentiation. That he did not manage to make this method more explicit is another story.

exordium, and *peroratio*, that frame any *expositio* or *argumentatio* (254–5). "By interlacing architecture with rhetoric mediation, also the profession of the architect becomes a *topos* as defined by Agricola, a *tertium* participating in all of the themes and topics invoked in the seven Books, procuring plausibility [*Glaubwürdigkeit*] from them and providing for their coherence" (Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 266).

218 Ibid., 264–6. Jachmann then goes on to analyze how, and in which differing ways this method is varied in the subsequent serial publication format in architecture during the following centuries. I will come back to some of his observation in my PART III.

219 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, esp. 205–66.

220 Ibid., 251.

221 Ibid., 205; see also Constantin V. Boundas, "Deleuze: Serialization and Subject-Formation," in *Gilles Deleuze and the Theatre of Philosophy*, ed. idem and Dorothea Olkowski (New York: Routledge, 1994), 99–116. Bernhard Cache has highlighted, that this seriality can already be noted in "Vitruvius's instructions-in-series" (Cache, "Proportion and Continuous Variation," 50).

On *Partimenti* as Musical Lehrstücke

To appreciate Serlio's didactic intentions, we can position the transition from *partitio* toward *appartamenti* as a historical parallel to the conceptually related musical genre of *partimento* that became central to the training of European court musicians from the late 1600s until the early 1800s in Neapolitan conservatories. Perhaps connected to an early dialogic art form called *partimen*, during the second half of the sixteenth century there emerged a new idea within the arrangement of polyphonic musical compositions: basso continuo, and later, partimento.[222]

The underlying idea of basso continuo and partimento was to supply a bass lines that instead of defining a precise musical figuration,[223] outlined how a piece should be realized. Based on these bass lines, performers would improvise the details (or diminutions) that 'fill in the gaps' between the major lines adequately, and make progressive variations thereof according to the technical level acquired. Here the affordance of the instructional baseline is that it calls for mutation. For the realization of partimenti, trainees—the so-called *partimentista*—did not need a unified theory, but a practical awareness of conflicts and overlaps between local and more global contexts that need differential resolutions. As such, these exercises in contrapuntal improvisation reinforced practical skills through training and modulating exemplars; creating *ritornellos.*[224]

222 *Partimen*, more known as *jeux-partis* or *parture* in French ; and *joc partit* or *partimen* in Occitan is a genre of Occitan and Old French lyric poetry blossoming in the twelfth to thirteenth century : A form of dialogic courtly chanson type, in which two poets debate a dilemmatic questions in alternating stanza : A first speaker would present a problem to which there are two possible solutions. An opponent would be given the choice of which solution to defend, while the first speaker would take it upon himself to defend the opposite side. In this way, the participants each defend a theory, in separate *envois* ; not out of conviction, but for the sake of *practice* (according to the definition of Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partimen, see also Samuel N. Rosenberg's entry "Jeu-Parti," in *Medieval France: An Encyclopedia*, ed. William W. Kibler, Grover A. Zinn, John Bell Henneman Jr., and Lawrence Earp (New York/London: Garland, 1995), 944. See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Basso_continuo; and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partimento.

223 When it comes to polyphonic musical notations, during the sixteenth century written-out full scores—partitura—were rare and used mainly for educational purposes; the common format was instead the performative choir book format, where the four voices (*superius, tenor, altus, bassus*) where comparatively laid out in each corner of a book spread; parts that where otherwise printed separately as 'part books' a format fostered by initial technical constraints in printing musical scores. See Elam Motem, "Intabulations in the 16th and 17th centuries," Early Music Sources, posted online on Dec 31, 2017, at https://youtu.be/nl1m7bOol7I.

224 In his communication theoretical comparison of the opera tradition to the Neapolitan tradition of partimento, music theorist Robert Gjerdingen, citing Sanguinetti, argued that "the rational approaches [of the operatic tradition] privileged a transmission model amenable to reception by outsiders, while the partimenti favored a ritual model of

Given the way this genre is tied to a successive shift from monophonic sacral music to a more polyphonic and secular form,[225] it may not be too far-fetched to draw parallels with Alberti's attempt to rationalize architecture for his patron readers on the one hand, and Serlio's pedagogy for practitioners with its striking emphasis on 'exemplars' on the other. In teaching the technical skills through seriation, conservatories relied on similar cognitive models that are based on the variation of musical pieces through repetition and progressive differentiation. Serlio's serial publications work by means of a similar variation through repetition and progressive differentiation. Here composition (as recursive repetitions of progressive variation) becomes a process of invention; pure production. On this matter, Serlio's examples and *inventioni* seem to be deeply misunderstood, when seen as a collection of proposals simply to be copied by mediocre architects or chosen by potential clients.[226] As inventions still do in musical training, they function as *Lehrstücke*—practical exercises for composition students—to be repeated by apprentices: because practical knowledge must involve practicing as an activity. Serlio's Seven Books similarly train professionals through the repeated differentiation of architectural arrangements in a series of dis- and re-assemblage, proceeding from abstract rules to concrete situations. But rather than cutting architecture into pieces (*genera*) to be re-collaged in a mechanic assemblage,[227] with every iteration pieces are put into variation by

shared symbolic practices performed best by insiders. Or in terms of the psychology of categorization, the rational approaches were theory-driven while the partimenti reinforced the formation of prototypes through the learning of exemplars." Robert O. Gjerdingen, ed., Monuments of Partimenti, website at http://faculty-web.at.northwestern.edu/music/gjerdingen/partimenti/index.htm. Here Gjerdingen refers to the visual models used by painters, which I took up earlier including the examples of Veronese and Gombrich in the discussion above. See Gjerdingen's lecture "Building Musical Minds in 18th-Century Naples," at CIRMMT Distinguished Lectures in the Science and Technology of Music, Feb 17, 2011, video recording avail. online at https://youtu.be/ii6VtnUVsok). See moreover id., "Partimento, que me veux-tu?," *Journal of Music Theory* 51, no.1 (2007): 85–135; and Peter van Tour, "Counterpoint and Partimento: Methods of Teaching Composition in Late Eighteenth-century Naples," PhD diss., Univ. Uppsala (2015). On the Guattarian notion of the ritornello, see "Ritornellos and Existential Affects," in *The Guattari Reader*, ed. Gary Genosko (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 158–71.

225 As we have seen Serlio's design approach not only parallels the polyphonic structure as in the motets—the preeminent form of polyphonic vocal music; it also parallels a the secularization process of this form of polyphonic composition as we see it with the emerging genre of the madrigals—an secular vocal music composition—that emerged in the 1520s partly due to the re-awakened interest in the vernacular Italian language.

226 See Mühlmann, *Ästhetische Theorie*, 54: "Die *inventio* … geht vom konkreten partikularen Anlaß aus und erfindet etwas aus dem endlichen Vorrat der Topik. Diese Erfindung zielt auf einen konkreten Zweck. Der Ausgangspunkt der *inventio* ist nicht absolut sondern historisch relativ. Dasselbe gilt für das Ergebnis. Die *inventio* ist nicht werkbezogen, sondern handlungs-bezogen."

227 See Andrej Radman, "Gibsonsm: Ecologies of Architecture," PhD diss., Univ. Delft (2012):

derivative production processes (*generatione*). This variation fosters the skills of the apprentice, as a sort of 'becoming-with-differentiation.' In this view we cannot, as Carpo suggests, directly reduce the repeated process to lead to a sort of design automatism that kills the creative component.

In his account of the genesis of technical objects, Simondon argues that automatism presents

> a rather low degree of technical perfection. … The true progressive perfecting of machines, whereby we could say a machine's degree of technicity is raised, corresponds … on the contrary to the fact that the operation of a machine harbors a certain margin of indeterminacy. It is this margin that allows the machine to be sensitive to outside information. … it is this sensitivity to information on the part of machines that makes a technical ensemble possible.[228]

Therefore this earlier stage of CONCRETIZATION of the matrix of appartamenti as an 'open machine', as an abstract system of measurement gaining internal coherence, is not to be confused with the later stage and the almost industrial scale of production that such tools of commensuration would acquire in the concrete assemblage of polytechnic education. Rather than already presenting a normative technique, its analytical organization of composition deliberately opens the path for alternative values, by recomposing compositional habits.

At the end of my preliminary discussion [→ 0.3], I distinguished the negative understanding of the contraction of habits, against which a Deleuzian view understands habits as a middle ground that initially opens up a space for creativity. Elizabeth Grosz helpfully highlights three particular characteristics of habits: "they are acquired by repetition; they demand a decomposition and recomposition of various actions or practices; and they are contracted, that is, 'stored up in a mechanism which is set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse.' … Habits reconstitute what would be or could be considered conscious movements by a process of analysis or decomposition."[229] This recon-

133–9, and the critique of diacritical models, and the critique of any design thinking that starts from any 'presumed' or laments eventually 'lost totalities': "the question is whether it is possible to go … beyond the technique that draws things together from unrelated contexts into a new context [i.e. collage]" but toward a more "difficult unity achieved through inclusion rather than the easy unity through exclusion" (ibid., 136 [italics orig.]).

228 Simondon, *Mode of Existence*, 17. On the difference between the abstract and concrete stage of technical objects that I rely on here; see for instance, ibid., 29.

229 Grosz, "Habit Today: Ravaisson, Bergson, Deleuze and Us," *Body & Society* 19, nos. 2–3 (2017): 217–39; here 228 (emph. added); citing Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (New

stitution lies in a re-organizing of the world through lived regularities, by establishing an "ever-growing connection between the subject and the object of thought … that by-passes consciousness to produce effects around and through it."[230] Grosz insists that this bypassing does not at all "arrest or mechanize, or reduce consciousness to unconsciousness or automatism; rather it … performs a kind of condensation or compaction of bodily action … [that] brings about a new kind of consciousness, one not aware of itself but prone to act."[231] Habit generates an embodied form of knowledge, a memory derived from repeated practice.[232]

As she further suggests, habits principally "change the disposition to action; they entail a change, a new virtuality, a new tendency to act, a new potentiality. They bring about a new ability."[233] This ability responds to the "complexification entailed in routinization"; an embodied ability to respond to repeated practical problems. It is a problem-solving strategy where "habit schematizes both the ways of being and acting of living things and the effects of the forces that impinge on and affect living things. It is thus an index not only of the internal organization of living being; it also signals a milieu or environment that living beings must internalize" through selective movements.[234] But rather than limiting designers (creatively), these selective constraints open up the universe, by enabling free acts, that actualize new degrees of freedom, allowing for new compositions.[235] It is a educational strategy leading out[236] of architecture's representational predicament.

An Abstract(ion) Machine

For this reason Serlio's 'practical' pedagogy and the diagrammatic conception of appartamenti it deploys cannot be stripped of a new 'theoretical' recomposition. Brian Massumi reminds us that practice is "a synonym for composition: [concerning] 'how' processual differentials eventfully play out as co-composing formative forces. … The co-composing of formative forces constitutes in each exercise of experience a novel power of existence: a power to

York: Zone Books. 1988), 81.

230 Grosz, "Habit Today," 223.

231 Ibid., 223 and 221.

232 Ibid., 228.

233 Ibid., 220.

234 Ibid., 228 and 218–21.

235 Ibid., 225–6.

236 Claire Colebrook, "Leading Out, Leading On: The Soul of Education," in *Nomadic Education: Variations on a Theme by Deleuze and Guattari*, ed. Inna Semetsky (Rotterdam: Sense, 2008), 35–42.

become."[237] In this sense, we can avoid plotting *technē* reductively "up against *epistēmē"* as a form of a priori knowledge.[238] Rather, as *technē*, it is practical knowledge in the making, one opening for a recomposition of systems of knowledge.

More than having a modularizing, unifying function, partition has a modifying or modulating, differentiating function. It addresses the "reciprocal assumption of form from matter"; as "an actualization, which generates subjects and objects at the same time … rather than thinking of the object as constituted by the subjective form."[239] Similarly, Serlio seems to offer us a completely novel take on Vitruvius's call for modularity (*symmetria*). While modularization (i.e. elementarization, separation, individuation) is aimed at the production of objects that can be distinguished, integrated and combined, while maintaining their structured form, modulation (that is, partitioning, or differentiation 'on the go') aims at constant production processes that assume endless variation of matter as its objective,[240] as a continuous development of form through the differentiation of 'geometric primitives.' This would offer a more fitting understanding of Pérouse de Montclos's observation of the 'primitive' conceptual stage of appartamenti.

In this understanding, I read the diagram of appartamenti as a topologized schema that does not simply draw lines of distinction, but lines of configural variation. As I read it, in an education geared toward an architect-selector able to master differences at times of social, political, and professional transformation, this "modulatory power is engaged in the continuous anticipation of events in what it perceives as a turbulent system."[241] For this reason, I understand the matrix of appartamenti as something that Deleuze and Guattari call an ABSTRACT MACHINE.[242] As Spuybroek explains, this notion implies "on the one hand that abstractions function as machines

237 Massumi, *Semblance and Event*, 12.

238 Lash, *Experience*, 73.

239 Anne Sauvagnargues, "The Concept of Modulation in Deleuze," in *Sauvagnargues, Anne. Artmachines: Deleuze, Guattari, Simondon*, trans. Suzanne Verderber with Eugene Holland (Edinburgh: EUP, 2016), 61–84; here 70.

240 See David Savat, "Deleuze's Objectile: From Discipline to Modulation," in *Deleuze and New Technology*, ed. idem and Mark Poster (Edinburgh: EUP, 2009), 54–62; here 54–6.

241 Savat, "Deleuze's Objectile," 57.

242 "The diagram or abstract machine is the map of relations between forces, a map of destiny, or intensity, which … acts as a non-unifying immanent cause which is coextensive with the whole social field. The abstract machine is like the cause of the concrete assemblages that execute its relations; and these relations take place 'not above' but within the very tissue of the assemblages they produce" (Deleuze, *Foucault* (London/New York: Continuum, 2008), 32). See also Georges Teyssot, "The Diagram as Abstract Machine," *V!RUS* 7 (2012), avail. online at http://www.nomads.usp.br/virus/virus07/secs/invited/virus_07_invited_1_en.pdf.

themselves and are generative, and on the other that machines are abstractions and convergences,"[243] that is, in this case, a semiotic system in which architectural production reaches a 'pure functionality.' As an instrumental creative process, drawing gains a productive function that is—as Deleuze would stress—'abstract enough' to enable forms of production that are not tied to representation. Yet, far from bringing us directly to an *ars combinatoria* or *ars fabricandi*, I also see Serlio's pedagogy of partitioning as radically reclaiming a work of abstraction.[244] This abstraction concerns not simply a loss of previous symbolic meaning, but rather an undoing that, irrespective of Serlio's intentionality or awareness, must be acknowledged as a powerful transformation of architecture's significance; in ceasing to be representative, it comes to catalyze, in the act of ordering, newly-emerging architectural subjectivities and subjects of architecture.[245] Given this epistemic dimension tied to practical techniques, this abstraction strongly contrast to later polytechnic pedagogies. Therein, the arithmeticization of geometric construction, as Husserl remarked in a different context, "is drawn into a process of transformation, which … becomes a mere art of achieving results, through a calculating technique according to technical rules. … 'Original' thinking that genuinely gives meaning to this technical process, and truth to the correct results … is here excluded."[246]

With Sullivan, we can locate this original thinking in the way compositional exercises train apprentices to oscillate between figuration (through drawing) and abstraction (from Latin *abstrahere,* "to draw away, withdraw"), by repeatedly bringing plans into reality; by detaching a partial object from a dominant field of signification, a partial object that "operates as a rupture

243 Lars Spuybroek, excerpt from *The Architecture of Continuity* (Rotterdam: V2/NAI Publishers, 2008) 185–93, repr. in *Diagrams of Architecture*, ed. Mark Garcia (Chichester: Wiley, 2010), 270–81; here 272.

244 Cf. here Aureli's "Form and Labor: Toward a History of Abstraction in Architecture," in *The Architect as Worker: Immaterial Labor, the Creative Class, and the Politics of Design*, ed. Peggy Deamer (London: Bloomsbury 2015). This analysis is not radical enough in its 'a-symbolic' reading of the abstraction within Serlio's work.

245 On this point, I follow Wallenstein as discussed in my introduction and forthcoming chapters.

246 Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr. (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1970; orig. pub. 1954), 46 (orig. italics omitted); cited after Stiegler, *Technics and Time*, I: 2–3. See here also Stiegler's critique that "With the advent of calculation, which will come to determine the essence of modernity, the memory of originary eidetic intuitions, upon which all apodictic processes and meaning are founded, is lost. Technicization through calculation drives Western knowledge down a path that leads to a forgetting of its origin, which is also a forgetting of its truth. This is the "crisis of the European sciences" (cf. Pérez-Gómez).

but also a point around which a different subjectivity might crystallize."[247] Architects thus draw forth their own subject (and subjectivity), but they also draw forth a new audience. Therefore, modulation, continuous variation and progressive differentiation are not merely to be understood as a theory of practice, but rather as an ecology of practices, centered on the very creative agency of the architect.

In the realization of appartamenti, progressive differentiation thus goes radically beyond a mere design technique. Where the design measure of partimenti instead folds architecture onto itself, and architecture is no longer the object of any representational scheme, *exempla* become the *subject* of a new architectural discourse that they set in motion. Therefore, progressive differentiation also entails a discursive dimension regarding the organization of knowledge, as Serlio's work brings together in addressing architectural discourse at large. If we now bring back the observation that partitions etymologically express the determining condition of part-to-part relations and their subjectivities, then the *loci* or *luoghi* of lived space increasingly emerge as a new topos. Literally as the site of a new discourse, it was able to gather and frame certain longstanding design problems in and methods for composing and organizing residential buildings, to live the proper life in a diversifying world that was becoming not just increasingly connected, but also more and more politically, religiously, economically, and socially divided.

On the Discursive Development of Apartments

Only later on would all of this take on a more concrete meaning [→ 3.1–3.3]. Once introduced into architectural discourse, the term 'apartments' seemed to promise a bright future as an architectural concept. Here, rather than reducing design practices to a "mechanic assemblage" of generic elements (Carpo), Serlio's later publications set in motion a highly generative **MACHINIC ASSEMBLAGE** of teaching architectural skills of differentiation through drawing distinctions. Thereby his series of publications, as Jachmann argues, launched an entirely novel new genre of architectural publications: the well-known series of pattern books, in which apartments successively came to be placed at the heart of the emerging modern systems of classification, and social distinctions. Serlio's serial work, his pedagogy of progressive differentiation, and its conception of apartments helped generate a specific **ASSEMBLAGE** of its own: the fanous series of highly didactic architectural publications in the

247 Simon O'Sullivan, "From Aesthetics to the Abstract Machine: Deleuze, Guattari and contemporary art practice," in *Deleuze and Contemporary Art*, ed. idem and Stephen Zepke (Edinburgh: EUP), 189–207; here 205.

so-called discourse on the art of distribution. Serlio's concept of apartments would lay a new conceptual base for a system of spatial representations (*espaces conçus*) during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when *appartenenza* or *appartenance* was problemetized. Here, apartments would take form in an entirely new species of architecture in which the differentiation that apartments introduce into our spatial conceptions became instrumental for non-discursive practices of ranking. In this new socio-spatial practice, the spatial segmentation of residential arrangements came to be a useful framework for the reception of guests.

Within this social assemblage, the matrix of appartamenti served as a powerful 'planomenon', as Deleuze and Guattari call the plane drawn by an **ABSTRACT MACHINE**; and the principle of organizing, laying out, and distributing that which is in turn produced by this plane, whose diagrammatic dimension must be distinguished from the real aspect of the planomenon itself.[248] While these planes and diagrams cannot be empirically observed, as David Lapou-jade reminds us, **CONCRETE ASSEMBLAGES**, as observable historical-social phenomena, can only be understood through the abstract machines that—in their blueprint—account for their precise functionings.[249] In a genealogical approach to the form-taking architecture of the apartment, this functioning is then to be understood in terms of how this diagram became a kind of program, recoding or overcoding existing spatial conceptions and arrangements. As Lapoujade argues in agreement with Deleuze, this transformative aspect, in which abstract machines change concrete assemblages, can not be understood without examining the co-extensive stratification processes in the concrete social assemblages within which these abstract machines operate.[250]

This is then exactly what I will map in the next part [→ 2.1–3], with the aim of understanding how *appartamenti* in their conceptual migration to France would come to introduce a new conception of residential arrangements, and how it started to overcode an architectural arrangement with a longer history, by means of an already institutionalized managerial practice of accommodating the train of people and courtiers of the nomadic court.[251]

●○○

248 See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 90–91.

249 Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements*, 208–10.

250 Ibid., 210.

251 Serlio's decisive influence on French discourse is largely known, as is that of the *Sesto Libro* whose manuscript version remained in France after Serlio's death. Jacques Androuet

du Cerceau owned the Avery Ms. of the *Sesto Libro*. His *Livre* (1559) drew heavily on the manuscript, not only in its form. Nevertheless, it did not take up the notion of apartments. Only two generations later is the notion taken up, when Androuet du Cerceau's grandson, Salomon de Brosse, worked together with Pierre Le Muet, whose famous *Maniere* (1623) features the notion a couple of times. As can be seen in my Appendix B, Only from 1630, and especially 1639 onwards, the notion of appartements also appears increasingly in literary works and comedies, and later (1660s) in several travelogues. There were about 50 French books before Claude Perrault's influential commented re-edition of Vitruvius in 1673, in which the word "appartements" features extensively, as it does in the *Abrégé* published the year after. Fostered by François Blondel's *Cours d'architecture* (1675–98) and later Augustin-Charles d'Aviler's same-titled book (1691, and its second edition by A. Le Blond 1710), increasingly led to the academic codification of the principles of domestic planning, which the following two chapters will deal with in more detail. Serlio's decisive influence on French discourse is largely known, as is that of the *Sesto Libro* whose manuscript version remained in France after Serlio's death. Jacques Androuet du Cerceau owned the Avery Ms. of the *Sesto Libro*. His *Livre* (1559) drew heavily on the manuscript, not only in its form. Nevertheless, it did not take up the notion of apartments. Only two generations later is the notion taken up, when Androuet du Cerceau's grandson, Salomon de Brosse, worked together with Pierre Le Muet, whose famous *Manière* (1623) features the notion a couple of times. Only from 1630, and especially 1639 onwards, the notion of apartments also appears increasingly in literary works and comedies, and later (1660s) in several travelogues. There were about 50 French books before Claude Perrault's influential commented re-edition of Vitruvius in 1673, in which the word "appartements" features extensively, as it does in the *Abrégé* published the year after. Fostered by François Blondel's *Cours d'architecture* (1675–98) and later Augustin-Charles d'Aviler's same-titled book (1691, and its second edition by A. Le Blond, 1710), increasingly led to the academic codification of the principles of domestic planning, which the following two chapters will deal with in more detail.

CONCEPT	FILARETE Trattato	MARTINI Trattato I (Codex Torin.)	 Trattato II (Cod. Magl.)
partite/-tito/ -tita	—	T6, 6v, 7v (2×), 12 (2×), 15v (2×), 16, 21, 21v, 22, 23 (3×), 25v, 30v, 39v, 60v	M22, 41, 41v, 42 (3×), 42v (5×), 80
(s)c(h)ompar- tire	I: 1v, 14v, 23v, 27v, 27r (3×), 37v, 42v, 43v, 47r, 86v, 96r ; II: 121 (2×), 145r		
(s)compartito/ -i/-a	I: 2r, 5r, 6r, 8r, 23v, 27r, 33v, 3 4r, 41v (2×), 42r, 44r, 49v, 53r, 54r, 57v (3×), 58v, 60v, 64v, 66r (2×), 66v, 72r, 72v, 79v, 81r, 82v, 85v, 97r, 101r, 105v, 107v; II: 120v (3×), 121r, 121v, 134r (2×), 144r, 144v, 146v, 149v, 158v, 163r	T7 (3×), 7v, 11v, 13, 13v (4×)15v (2×), 19 (2×), 19v, 21v (2×), 36v, 39v (3×), 65 (3×), 65v	M7v
(s)c(h)ompar- tizione	I: 28r, 39r, 39v, 42r, 42v (2×), 44r (2×), 49v, 54r, 61r, 62v, 71r, 71v, 72r (2×), 85v, 102r; II: 121v, 144r (2×), 145r (3×), 145v, 146v (3×), 150r, 163v		
scompar- tizioni	I: 3v, 27r, 41v (3×), 42r, 49 r, 51v, 54r, 60v, 61r (2×), 62v, 66r, 72v, 73r, 78r, 78v, 84r, 84v (2×), 98r; II: 121r, 121v, 132r, 141r, 143v, 144 r, 144v, 146v (2×), 163v		
(s)compart- imento	I: 42r, 42v, 44r, 60v, 85v, 86v, 105r, 105v, II: 154r	T13	
spartizione	I: 39v (2×), 85r		
dispartimento/i	II: 134r, 145v, 174r (2×)		
dipartimenti	II: 162v		
(s)parti- mento/i	I: 63v (2×), II: 127r, 145r, 162v	T7, 15*, 20v, 30v*	M22, 38v, 40v, 42 (3×), 42v
partimenti		T5, 12, 13, 16v*, 17*, 21, 22v (2×), 41v, 67v, 68	M41v, 42, 42v

CONCEPT	SERLIO Book IV 1537	III 1540	I/II 1545	V 1547	VI n.p.	VII 1575
partir(l)e/ -tito/-tita			2v, 17v, 20v			
compartire/ -tito/-tita	25v, 30v, 32v, 33v, 48v, 57v	5, 14, 68, 106, 116, 135 (2×), 150	—	12, 14v, 17v, 25 (2×), 25v, 30v	56v, 74r (3×)	66, 74, 78 (2×), 84, 94, 126 (2×), 156 (2×), 168, 170, 198
compartition(e)	22v, 34v, 35v, 55v	—	—	—	14v, 74r	60, 122, 132, 166, 168, 180, 208, 232
compartimento	153v, 70v	106	—	—	—	84
compartimenti	70, 71	20, 150	44, 47v	—	74v	188, 209
partizioni			8v			
appartate				30v		
appartamenti	54, 83, 96, 146, 152				2v, 8v, 9v, 17v, 18v, 18Av (2×), 20v, 27v, 28v, 30v, 38v, 48v, 51v, 55v, 57v, 61v (2×), 63v (3×), 65v, 66v (2×), 79v (2×)	4 (2×), 6 (3×), 10 (2×), 14, 16, 18 (2×), 26, 30 (2×), 34, 50 (3×), 52 (2×), 54 (2×), 58, 60, 96, 128, 148 (2×), 150, 152, 164, 166 (2×), 170, 180 (2×), 188, 210, 212, 224
appartamento					3v, 4v, 10v, 19v, 38v, 50v (2×), 74r (4×), 79v	50, 136, 138, 180, 218 (5×), 220

35 Appendix B
Chart of the Conceptual Genesis of Appartamenti (*continued overleaf*)

	ENGLISH	FRENCH	ITALIAN	LATIN	SPANISH
1450			1451–65 Filarete, *Trattato*: "(com-)partimento/-zione"	**1443–52 Alberti, *De Re Ædif.*: "*partitio*"**	
1475			**1475–90 Martini, *Trattato*: "partimenti"**		
1510			1511 Vitruvius (Giocondo)	1512 Alberti, *De Re Ædific.* [2 nd ed.]	**1514 Lebrixa, *Dict. Latino-hispan.*: "*apartamiento*"** **1515 Anon., *Amadis de Gaula*: "*muy tristes por su apartamiento del rey*"**
1520			1521 Vitruve (Cesarino): "*partitione, compartione*"		1527 Ximenez, *La natura angelica*: "*differencia y apartamiento*"


1530
1530 Anglus, *Tractado muy utile*: "*fin apartamiento ninguno*"
1537 Serlio IV: "*compartition(e) , compartimento/i*"
1540
1540 Serlio III: "appartamenti"; Nardi, *Le Deche*: "*appartamento*"
1541 Alberti, *De Re Ædific.* [3rd ed.]
1542 Serlio, IV (trans. Coecke)
1541–53 Serlio Book VI[A] / VI[B]: "appartamento" (unpublished)
1545 Serlio, I–II (trans. Martin)
1543 Fauno, *Gli costumi* (106v, 233); 1544 Roseo, *Institutione del Prencipe* (12), and *Le Vite del diece Imperatori* (224v); 1544 Floccus, *I sacerdotii*; 1546 Guevara, *Institutione*; 1547 Montalvo, *Prodezze*; 1548 Contarini, *Republica* (57)
1547 Vitruve (trans. Martin)
1549 Martin, *C'est l'ordre*
1550
1550 Serlio III, (Coecke); Serlio IV[3], (Coecke); 1551
1550 Alberti (trans. Bartoli): "*compartimento* + *apparta-menti*"; 1550 Vasari, *Le Vite*: "*appartamenti di stanze*" (30–31)
1552 Serlio III & IV (trans. Villalpando); 1553 Cieza de Leon, *Crónica del Perú*: "*apartamiento*"; 1554 Amberes, *Todas las Decadas*: "*apartamiento de mugeres*"; 1556 Borja, *Obras muy devotas*; Nieva, *De la Christiana consciencia*
1552 Vitruve (Philandrier)
1553 Alberti, *L' Architecture* (Martin) : "*compartiment, ou distribution*"
1554 Cataneo, *Quattro Libri*: "*due Appartamenti*"
1556 Mauro, *Le antichita…*
1559 Du Cerceau, *Livre I*
1559 Anon., *Historia del valoros. cav. della Croce*
1560
1560 Valverde de Amusco, *Historia della compositione del corpo humano* (119)
1563 Roseo, *Amadis de Gaula*

1566 Serlio, Libro I-V+X (ed. Bartoli)

1568 De l'Orme, *Le premier tome* "départiment de logis" (A2.)

1568 Vasari, *Le Vite*

1568 Perez de Moya, *Fragmentos Mathematicos*

1570

1570 Palladio, *Quattro LIbri* (I:64; II: 8, 64, 72, 73)

1573 Perez de Moya, *Tratado de cosas de astron.*

1576–79 Du Cerceau, *Bastimens I/II*

1575 Serlio, Libro VII : "appartamento" (in print)

1575 Serlio, Libro VII (ed. Strada)

1580

1583 Vignola, *Regole*: "App. delle stanze" (fol. 306, also 41, 51, 223 [2x], 238, 241, 242 [5x] …)

1582 Perez de Moya, *Arithmetrica*

1584 Du Cerceau, *Édifices antiques*

1584 Serlio, *Tutte l'opere*

1585 Borghini, *Discorsi*: (576)

1585 "*appartement*" in French Royal decrees. See my Chapter 2.3.3

1590

1590 Baldi, *Versi e prose and De gli appartamenti*

1590 Venuti, *Dittionario*

1600

1602 Arnigio, *Costumi dell'*

			umana vita 1606 Ramusio, *Delle navigationi*	
1610	**1611 Serlio, Book I-V (trans. Peake): "appertiments"**	1615 De Vigenére, *Les Images*		
1620	1624 Wotton, *Elements*: "compartiment"	**1623 Le Muet, *Manière* (2, 10, 18)**		
1630		1630 Montluc, *Jeux de l'incognue*; 1632 Bauoin, *L'esprit* 1639 Desmarets, *Les visionnaires* and *Rosane*; 1640 Béraut, *Le satyre*; 1641 Bérauts, *Oeuvres poétiques*; 1646 Hézecques, *L'homme de douleurs*; 1648 Desmarets, La *vérité des fables*; *Relation du voyage*		
1660	1656 *Advertissements* (trans. Monmouth): "addition of new appartiments" (297) 1663 Palladio, *The first book of architecture…* (trans. Richards)	1645, Le Muet (trans.), *Traicté dés cinq ordres* 1650 Palladio, *Quatre livres de l'architecture* (trans. Fréart de Chambray)	+ 1648 Sorel, *Polyandre*; 1651 Gomberville, *Alcidiane;* 1655 Scarron, *Le romant*; 1656 Olearius, 1659 Errard, *Ornemens de appartemens;* 1661 Chorier, *Histoire générale*; 1662 Vernon, *Le roy*; 1663 Payen, *Les voyages*; 1664 Abelly, *La vie & Colletet*; 1665 Nevers, *Les mémoires;* 1666 Olearius, *Relation* II; 1667 Marmol y Carvajal, *L'Afrique*; 1668 Du Cange, *Histoire de S. Louis*	
1670		1673 Perrault, *Les dix livre*; Blondel, *L'Architecture françoise;* 1674 Perrault, *Abrégé des dix livres*		

IMAGE SOURCES
FOR PART I

1 Frontispiz of *Il Terzo libro di Sebastiano Serlio Bolognese* (1540). Image source: TU Delft Library, Trésor TR 521401. Photo: author's own.

2– Pages from the *Terzo libro,*
3 from Serlio, *Tutte l'opere* (1584). Image source: TU Delft Library, Trésor TR 521401. Photo: author's own.

4– Pages from Serlio's *Terzo*
5 Libro, showing the Theater of Ferento. Image source: TU Delft Library, Trésor TR 521401. Photo: author's own.

6 Drawing from Peruzzi, Nationalbibliothek. Vienna, Cod. 10935, 136a, r. Image scanned from Wurm, *Peruzzi: Architekturzeichnungen*, 262.



7 Diagram illustrating the matrix of appartamenti underlying the plan of Ferento and the Poggio Reale. Redrawn by the author.

8 Page from Serlio's *Tutte l'opere* (1584), 57. Image source: TU Delft Library, Trésor TR 540512. Photo: author's own.

9 Page from the Munich manuscript of Serlio's Book IV. Image source: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich, Cod.icon. 189, fol 18; avail. online at http://daten.digitale-sammlungen.de/bsb00018617/image_40 (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0)

10– Pages from Filarete's
12 *Trattato*, Codex Magliabecchiano I.II.140 (Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Florence): fols.13v, 42v, and 43.

13– Pages from Filarete's
15 *Trattato*, Codex Palatinus E.B. 15.7 (BNCF), n.p.

16– Giorgio's *Trattati*, Codex
17 Saluzziano 148 (Biblioteca Reale, Turin): f.16v.

18– Pages from Francesco Di
21 Giorgio's *Trattati*, Codex Magliabechiano II.I.141 (Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Florence): fols. 20v–22, 41v–42v.

22 Sketch by Peruzzi. Gabinetto dei disegni e stampe degli Uffizi, Florence, 353 A r. Image scanned from Wurm, *Peruzzi: Architekturzeichnungen*, 135.



23– Sketches from Sangallo's
24 *Taccuino Senese* (Codex S.IV.8, Biblioteca Comunale degli Intronati, Siena), fols. 13v, 17, 17v, 19v; avail. online at https://www.wdl.org/en/item/10597.

25 Paolo Veronese (Paolo Caliari) (Verona 1528–1588 Venice), Studies for The Allegories of Love, 1570–75. Pen and brown ink, brush and brown wash. Image Source: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, 1975.150. CC0/Public Domain.

26 Drawing by the author, redrawn after Robert O. Gjerdingen, "Partimento, que me veux-tu?," *Journal of Music Theory* 51, no. 1 (2007): 90.

27 Analytic drawing by the author.

28– Pages from the *Primo Libro,*
29 from Serlio, *Tutte l'opere* (1584). Image Source: ETH-Bibliothek Zurich, Rar 6799. Public domain.

30 Albrecht Dürer, *Underweysung der Messung*, 1525, f. 181. Image Source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

31– Pages from the Primo
32 and Secondo Libro, from Serlio, *Tutte L'Opere* (1584). Image source: TU Delft Library, Trésor TR 540512. Photo: author's own.

33 Diagram of the Matrix of appartamenti, drawn by the author.

PART II

1334–1585: The Form-Taking Architecture of Apartments. Three Syntheses of a Dispostif of Power

“We may say that an institutional organization is territorialized to the extent that the human bodies that compose it have been sorted out into the ranks of a hierarchy.”

Manuel DeLanda, *Deleuze: History and Science*, 39–40.

“Power resides not in any territorialization; it resides in the axiomatization of flows.”

Félix Guattari, *Les équipements du pouvoir*, 135 (my trans.).

“The more a path is walked, the more a path is walked. … [and] if a path is very linear, blockages can occur.”

Sara Ahmed, “Complaint as Diversity Work,” n.p.

2.1
The Connective Synthesis of a Segmentary Architecture

This part attempts an assemblage-theoretic analysis of the form-taking architecture of apartments and its evolving socio-spatial system. The analysis will map this genesis in terms of an emerging **EQUIPMENT OF POWER**, in order to outline its **TRANSDUCTIVE** relation to consolidating powers and emerging cultural technologies for drawing distinctions. To pursue this genealogical analysis in an irreducible fashion, and from a genetic angle that offers new insight, this part will successively attends to the three different syntheses within this genesis.

Approaching an Architecture of Power

Numerous historical studies have contributed to our understanding of the complex transformation through which the architecture of apartments took form from the mid-fourteenth to late-sixteenth century, when the residential architecture of the landed nobility transformed from defensive castles into open palaces, visited and frequent by courtiers paying calls to those in power. During the 80s, architecture historians started to question, however, to what degree this emergence could be explained 'out of itself,' as a typological evolution, or in terms of mere stylistic classifications.[1] Wolfram Prinz's and Ronald Kecks's classic study of the development of French castles into palaces approaches this transformation afresh from the perspective of a wider cultural history.[2] They present transforming architectures as a reaction to contemporary conditions causing castles to lose much of their military character, assuming instead residential and representational functions. To better understand these transforming architectures, historians since Bertrand Jestaz have gradually recognized the need to study palaces not only in their exterior form but inherently as residences.[3] This emerging field of research[4]

1 Wolfram Prinz and Ronald G. Kecks, *Das Französische Schloß der Renaissance: Form und Bedeutung der Architektur: Ihre geschichtlichen und gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen* (Berlin: Mann, 1985); hereafter *Schloß*.

2 Ibid., 13. Prinz and Kecks still argued that studies of Renaissance architecture in Italy and France are characterized by their different methodical approach. While Italian studies are characterized by a synoptic, cultural scope, since the classic studies by Jacob Burckhardt's *Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien* (1860; trans. 1878 as *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*) and *Geschichte der Renaissance in Italien* (1867), French historians focused on formal analyses of single buildings, leaving only a 'few attempts at approaching this epoch in its entirety' as Palustre's *L'Architecture de la Renaissance* (1892), or Hautecœur's *Histoire de l'Architecture classique en France*, 7 vols (1943–1957). Recently, the opposite seems to be true, as we have more synthetic studies on changing French architecture.

3 Bertrand Jestaz, "Etiquette et distribution intérieur dans les maisons royales de la Renaissance," *Bulletin Monumental* 146, no. 2 (1988), 109–20.

4 What is called *Residenzforschung* as different to court studies [*Hofforschung*] in German. In the 80s, this field was not yet established in the history of art, before being taken up in the context of the Centre André Chastel at the Sorbonne, as Monique

started growing when historians became increasingly interested in spaces of everyday life and related social practices.

These studies are characterized by a decisive methodological shift toward praxeological approaches based on changing social practices and modes of inhabitation. In the introduction to the pioneering anthology *Architecture et vie sociale*, which contains important contributions that investigated different aspects of the changing residential systems in fourteenth- to sixteenth-century Europe, the French historian Jean Guillaume conclusively suggested that the transition from earlier types of lodgings to apartments must be studied systematically through the emerging notion of distribution.[5] A forerunner to the modern concept of planning, this notion would generate an entire discourse on the art of distribution within French architecture theory—a development that the last part of my genealogy will attend to in greater detail. Especially after the 1720s, architectural treatises came to be heavily invested in outlining a normative system for the layout out of aristocratic residences, and according to which the arrangement of rooms represented the social rank or status of its inhabitants. [→ PART III]

In his introduction, Guillaume traces the formation of this socio-spatial system—which took form in sixteenth-century palaces such as the Louvre of Charles V, the Papal palace in Avignon, and the Almudaina in Palma de Majorca, as he notes—back to the ancient distinction between a hall as a space of appearance and a chamber as a space of retreat.[6] To trace the formation of apartments as a system of distinction, Guillaume argues, one therefore needs to look back to fourteenth-century systems of architecture,

Chatenet note in an Interview with Caroline zum Kolk ("Entretien avec Monique Chatenet," published online on Cour de France, May 1, 2011, at http://cour-defrance.fr/article1911.html), director of the research association *Cour de France.fr* (website: https://cour-de-france.fr), which was established recently as a European research network akin to the *Society for Court Studies* (website: http://www.courtstudies.org) and the *Residenzen-Kommission der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen* (website: http://resikom.adw-goettingen.gwdg.de/index.php) directed after 1990 by Werner Paravincini, who also initiated the publication series, called Residenzenforschungen.

5 Jean Guillaume, ed., "*De logis à l'appartement*," introduction to *Architecture et vie sociale: L'organisation intérieure des grandes demeures a la fin du moyen âge et a la renaissance, Actes du colloque tenu à Tours du 6 au 10 juin 1988* (Paris: Picard, 1994), 7.

6 Guillaume here distinguishes them as 'public' and 'private.' I would like to avoid these modern terms here in reference to Richard Etlin, *Symbolic Space: French Enlightenment Architecture and its Legacy* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996), 127–34; here 130. The notion of the 'public' also fails to include how appearances became everything in court culture. From clothing to comportment, courtly appearances were governed by a strict rules for recognizing ranks in various situations. See Jacques Revel, "The Uses of Civility," in *History of Private Life, Vol. III: Passions of the Renaissance*, ed. Roger Chartier, Philippe Ariès and Georges Duby, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993), 194–96.

which Renaissance architecture 'perfects' by inserting more pieces into the dual relation of hall and chamber.

In the progressive growth of apartments, especially praxeological approaches have consensually identified courtly ceremonies, both of special occasions and everyday life, as the crucial determinant for the process in which more complex forms of interaction demanded more complex spatial arrangements.[7] In this view, Patricia Waddy appreciated the architecture of apartments as a "stable framework within which … the reception of guests could be played out."[8] Residential arrangements that "would not accommodate the ceremony of receiving callers were useless,"[9] because the paying of calls was a major activity. As a vehicle of diplomacy, paying a call consisted of a complicated set of rules and elaborate etiquette that held together in a more or less fixed hierarchy; it was a way for, and by means of which courtiers asserted their membership of and position within the social figuration of the court.[10] Differences in rank would be recognized and established by a linear sequence in which the guest would be met, given audience, and take

7 The literature on courtly ceremonial is more than substantial and cannot be covered here, also since my reading proposes a complementary approach. A Non-exhaustive bibliography on courtly etiquette can be found online at https://châteauversailles-recherche.fr/IMG/pdf/bibliographie_corpus.pdf. More specific references will be provided below. Here, I am referring specifically to Mary Whiteley, "Royal and Ducal Palaces in France in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: Interior, Ceremony and Function," in *Architecture et vie sociale*, ed. Guillaume, 47–64, which provided helpful insights. Another helpful comprehensive account on the complex relations between courtly ceremonial and architecture was found in Monique Chatenet and Krista de Jonge, ed., *Le prince, la princesse et leur logis: Manières d'habiter da l'élite aristocratique européenne (1400–1700). Actes des septiemes Rencontres d'architecture européenne, Paris, 27–30 juin 2011* (Paris: Picard, 2014), 9–22; here 10. In her introduction Chatenet and De Jonge, point out the foundational role nearly forgotten essay by Hugh Murray Baillie, "Etiquette and the Planning of the State apartment Apartments in Baroque palaces," *Archaeologia Miscellaneous Tracts Relating to Antiquity*, CI (1967), 169–99; which had appeared before the translation of Norbert Elias, *The Court Society,* trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 39. I have also taken helpful guidance from Werner Paravincini, ed., *Zeremoniell und Raum, 2nd edn* (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1997); for a more anthropological approach to ceremonial, see Tristan Weddigen, *Raffaels Papageienzimmer: Ritual, Raumfunktion und Dekoration im Vatikanpalast der Renaissance* (Berlin: Mann, 2006), 11–58.

8 Patricia Waddy, "The Roman Apartment from the Sixteenth to the Seventeenth Century," in *Architecture et vie sociale*, ed. Guillaume, 155–166; here 158. The article is an abbreviated version of the first chapter "The Apartment," in Waddy's *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces: Use and the Art of the Plan* (New York/Cambridge: Architectural History Foundation/MIT Press, 1990), here 8.

9 Waddy, "The Roman Apartment," 155; and *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces*, 3.

10 As Gottfried Kerscher clarifies, 'ceremonial' generally ought to be understood as those organizational principles, defining the external form of repeated symbolic acts around representative occasions and events in written documents; while etiquette describe the respective internalizes behavioral patterns and interactions of court members. Gottfried Kerscher, *Architektur als Repräsentation: Spätmittelalterliche Palatbaukunst zwischen Pracht und Zeremoniellen Voraussetzungen* (Tübingen: Wismut, 2000), here 28–9.

their leave. This linear space was part of "two interdependent systems—an etiquette based on hierarchical distinctions with respect to an architectural framework, and the particular form of that architectural framework."[11]

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, apartments were thus recognized as a crucial apparatus for the display of power. Architectural analyses of Baroque palaces, such as those of Waddy (but also Peter Thornton's lesser-known study of the material culture of interior planning in Italian aristocratic residences) have then offered more diagrammatic readings that allow reconsidering how the architecture of apartments works as an integrated domain of appearance.[12] This point is also stressed in Monique Chatenet's canonical monography on the evolving architecture of the French royal architecture in the sixteenth century.[13] This part will draw much from this comprehensive study, and its excellent analytical descriptions and synthetic arguments, which—given that it remains untranslated—will be partly repeated here in order to expand them. As Chatenet argues, this integrative system reached a turning point during the 1580s, when the *antichambre* was introduced into the royal lodgings. Anterooms allowed certain functions to be outsourced from the bedroom. This idea already caught on during the 1430s in Italy, where the anteroom was initially positioned behind the chamber, not preceding it, as was the case with later planning practices that would also be taken up in France during the mid-sixteenth century.[14] Another factor to which we will return concerns the multiplication of anterooms in the later

11 Waddy, "The Roman Apartment," 158; *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces*, 8.

12 Besides Waddy's works, see on this notion also Peter Thornton, *The Italian Renaissance Interior: 1400–1600* (New York: Abrams, 1991). I use the term "integrated domain' here *in lieu* of Waddy's notion of an integral system, to describe a specific human-technology relationship, as detailed below, note 402.

13 See Monique Chatenet, *La cour de France au XVIe siècle: Vie sociale et architecture* (Paris: Picard, 2002); hereafter *La cour* (all trans. mine). This work traced the formation of royal residences at the intersection of social and architectural history. With its detailed discussion of many architectural examples, socio-historical facets of changing court life, it is not only praiseworthy in its attention to gender differences, but also its deliberate inter-cultural perspective, given its complementary discussion of many Italian primary sources. The text is comprehensive, and serves as an excellent reference book, due its it highly ordered, almost elementary setup, discussing by chapter (1) "the nomadic court," (2) "the King's residences," (3) "the lodgings of courtiers," (4) "Courtly Customs [usages]," (5) "the *logis du roi*," and (6) those of the other royal family, (7) festivities, (8) the king with his subjects, and a final section on the (9) Kings' architects. Such a topical organization necessarily compromises on establishing some closer theoretical attention onto the workings, genetic aspects, and mutually constitutive relationships among these 'elements' within this machinery, and how it evolves. This is why the following discussion—that would have never been possible without the guidance and information provided by Chatenet's invaluable work—will uses these observations to approach the court somewhat more assemblage-theoretic approach as a transforming socio-environmental milieu. I would like to express my indebtedness to her work and its insights.

14 Cf. Thornton, *Italian Renaissance Interior,* 294–5.

planning practices. Placing multiple anterooms, before the chamber potently prolonged the *parcours* of guests. As such facilitated the hierarchization of spaces with limited access. This meant that social status and power became measured according to the depth that visitors were allowed to penetrate the suite of rooms, which depended on the visitor's rank and degree of intimacy with the host. The first anterooms were used to receive acquaintances, intermediate ones were used to receive close friends, and the innermost rooms were reserved for intimate friends. Such a hierarchically organized sequence of differentiated rooms, Julian Jachmann writes, was "therefore an essential precondition for persons of rank for 'realizing' their social role."[15]

If this spatial system was strictly coded, it also afforded a built-in flexibility in the display of power,[16] as Waddy's notion of a "stable framework for the flexible drama of receiving guests" stresses. In return, architecture theorist Kim Dovey noted a dramatization of this flexibility. Dovey illustrates a crucial systemic transformation. In earlier times, inhabitants occupied inner rooms, whereas later power formations by contrast 'reverse' this arrangement. Royal palaces — such as Versailles, for instance — gradually turned into a powerful apparatus for ranking visitors and courtiers "in the deepest cells within the structure where they [we]re placed under [permanent] surveillance."[17] Recent studies have similarly stressed the relation between palatial architecture and questions of access to political power.[18] In the rising field of court studies, Drees Raeymaekers and Sebastiaan Derks observe that the concept of access has gained much currency since David Starkey initially

15 Julian Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux: 'Differenz und Wiederholung' in seriellen Publikationen zur französischen Wohn- und Residenzarchitektur*, 2 vols (Cologne: Univ. Köln, 2016), 122 (all trans. mine).

16 Ronald G. Asch, similarly emphasizes respectively that "The palaces in which court life took place had been designed to create the condition which facilitated the display of authority and power, and the way in which space was organized at court was meant to convey a political message. … [But whereas] the court has often been seen as a space which imposed strict rules … more recent research has largely rejected this approach and sees the court more as a space which left room for a process of constant negotiation about status and power." Ronald G. Asch, "The Princely Court and Political Space in Early Modern Europe," in *Political Space in Pre-Industrial Europe,* ed. Beat Kümin (London/New York: Routledge, 2016), 43–60; here 43.

17 Kim Dovey, *Framing Places: Mediating Power in Built Form* (London/New York: Routledge, 1999), 22–3.

18 For recent publications, see e.g. Marie-Françoise Auzépy and Joël Cornette, eds., *Palais et Pouvoir, de Constantinople à Versailles* (Saint-Denis: PU de Vincennes, 2003); Christy Andersson, "Architecture of Ascendancy: Buildings and Power," in *Renaissance Architecture* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013); Silvia Beltramo, Flavia Cantatore, and Marco Folin, eds., *A Renaissance Architecture of Power: Princely Palaces in the Italian Quattrocento* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016); and Dries Raeymakers and Sebastiaan Derks, eds., *A Key to Power? The Culture of Access in Princely Courts, 1400–1750* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016).

highlighted the "politics of access" as an important political tool.[19] Appreciating that the question of "access has [since] grown into a dominant, explanatory factor," Raeymaekers and Derks critically underscore that it remains but "one aspect in a broad array of factors that have to be taken into account."[20] They identify an oversight, because "seldom is the question posed, though, regarding, what is involved in regulating access."[21] Especially architectural layouts, they conclude, have been insufficiently analyzed; the apartment could be grasped as a 'performative space,' with antechambers and enfilades serving "as a sluice in which visitors were sorted out" (in a kind of architectural *triage*) according to rank.[22]

Moving from Spatial Systems to Spatial Technologies

Scholars inclined to architecture theory have long engaged with (and insisted on) the performative aspect of architectural arrangements, by conceptualizing—from a quite different point of view—the ways in which architecture constitutes the conditions for (the display of) power in its regulation of access.[23] Architectural historians seem to understand the performativity of

19 Raeymaekers and Derks, introduction to *A Key to Power?*, 3–4; citing David Starkey et al., *The English Court from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (London: Longman, 1987), and (among others) Asch, "The Politics of Access. Hofstruktur und Herrschaft in England unter den frühen Stuarts, 1603–1642," in *Alltag bei Hofe 3: Symposium der Residenzen-Kommission der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen*, ed. Werner Paravicini (Sigmaringen: Thorbecke, 1995), 243–66; and Brian Weiser, *Charles II and the Politics of Access* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2003).

20 Raeymaekers and Derks, introduction to *A Key to Power?*, 5–6.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 6 and 10. On the enfilade see also Robin Middleton, "Enfilade: The Spatial Sequence of French Hotels of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *Daidalos* 42 (Dec 1991), 84–95.

23 See the citation of Ronald Asch above. Such a view of development makes it necessary to avoid any essentialist perspective in which the world is already segmented by logical categories, types, and objects to start from a continuum of intensive differences that becomes historically segmented into 'species' of built formations. So instead of approaching the form-taking architecture of apartments 'phylogenetically,' as an evolving building type, we must begin more 'epigenetically' by looking at the processes of cellular differentiation that drive this development. This approach, I argue, methodologically extends the observation of recent studies that, despite the great number of monographic studies, "Renaissance court palaces have not been addresses *organically* until now: that is to say, looking at their [diverging] development over the course of time and from a comparatively angle." Beltramo, Cantatore, and Folin, eds., foreword to *A Renaissance Architecture of Power,* i. In endorsing this ambitious approach, I want to suggest that architecture history would benefit greatly from addressing the formation of courtly palaces at once more 'anorganically'; that is, by looking at the environmentally-embedded transformation processes that facilitate the organization of these form-taking political bodies in the first place. In understanding the formation of apartments as a specific organigenesis, this 'anorganic' angle would take inspiration from theories of evolutionary developmental biology that identified 'epigenetic' processes as the true 'form of becoming' and respective calls to take inspiration from the way embryology

architectural dispositions primarily passively, as indicative of a power that uses spatial differences as a 'scenography' or 'liturgy of power' to distinguish the person and function of the king.[24] But in such readings, irrespective of the many contributions of praxeological studies, an underlying analytical limitation persists, namely the way in which many historical studies still seem to be based on structuralist readings of spaces as representative products or symbolic social practices. [→ 0.1.1]

In approaching social practices as the sole determinant for explaining socio-spatial figurations, structuralist conceptions perpetuate a 'representationalistic' reading and highly reductive container conception of architecture [→ PREF.] that manifests in seemingly innocent concepts such as "a sluice in which," "framework," "setting" "display," and so forth. Not only do such conceptions implicitly reduce evolving architectures (=apartments) to results of changing practices (=ceremony/distribution). These conceptions also—and this is the more problematic aspect—implicate and endorse a conceptual anachronism underlying in what terms a developing residential architecture has been traced through the notion of distribution, which would only take a central position in the 1720s, when apartments start to constitute a normative apparatus.[25] Here, the idea that architecture is a spatial product representing symbolic practices becomes a fully fledged structural problem, limiting historical scholarship to retroactively describe, in our case, how emerging sys-

studies processes of cellular differentiation through which organism acquire their bodily organization within material milieus criss-crossed by intensities and thresholds. For an epigenetic reading of historical formations, see esp. Janina Wellmann, *The Form of Becoming: Embryology and the Epistemology of Rhythm, 1760–1830*, trans. Kate Sturge (New York: Zone books, 2017).

24 Boris Bove, "Les palais royaux à Paris au moyen age (XIe–XVe siècles)," in *Palais et pouvoirs: De Constantinople à Versailles*, ed. Marie-Françoise Auzépy, Joël Cornette (Vincennes: PU de Vincennes, 2003), 45–79; here 61–2.

25 This approach has often led authors to trying to pin down the precise date at which 'the apartment' emerges, or through a single process epitomizing the birth of the apartment. As such, it has been done based on completely contradictory notions of what an apartment is supposedly defined by, emerging as either a recognizable 'clustered planning unit' (Blunt), or 'room sequence' (Prinz and Kecks), emerging through a 'characteristic multiplication and differentiation of rooms' (Chatenet), or linearization of architecture suitable for ranking (Waddy). By isolating specific exceptional buildings as an 'origin,' this form of reasoning has a tendency of preventing us from properly conceptualizing an ongoing form-taking process, in typically nudging other (older) architectures beyond a threshold, demarcated by this new kind of building, that in return is used for an art-historical periodization. But such a demarcation procedure cannot count as an historical 'explanation': not only because it gives very different datings, but also because it reduced 'the apartment' to one static thing, that fails to capture an evolving architecture that must be mapped more comprehensively in its long complex genesis by going through all these developmental stages.

tems of distribution and access become increasingly legible[26] or expressed[27] within architectural structures. This presumes a too passive and hylomorphic approach to architecture that misses the technical individuation within form-taking assemblages. If my analysis in the remainder of this part aims to move beyond this self-imposed limitation and resulting limited vision, it should not be mistaken as a move against the established disciplinary boundaries of architecture history but against some remaining structuralism (a 'structuralist hangover') and resulting representationalism. Post-structuralist thinking has shown the need for problematization as much as recent materialist and feminist positions have illustrated the necessity of accounting for historical formation that no longer separates the discursive from the material.[28] One of these material-discursive aspects concerns the larger problem of accounting for spatial production processes and how they historically enabled new social practices and spatial concepts to take form. A too structuralist reading neglects how architectural arrangements actively constitute the socio-environmental and material conditions for actualizing the power structures (that architecture supposedly represents). A more co-constitutive notion of architecture's agency—which greatly contrasts with the one toward which historians have gravitated—is powered by Foucault's dispositivistic notion of architectural apparatus as instrument of social production.

When architecture is approached as an instrument of social production, several methodological and conceptual complications become apparent. They concern the manner in which previous historical studies have often reduced the formation of apartments into a 'purely assertory' descriptions that investigated them in terms of this instrumentality, without problematizing how it came to be.[29] To do that, it is necessary to leave behind retroactive hypostatization of the given and start from a point of view of its genesis, hence genealogically, how the given is given. Let me therefore reconsider, how the archi-

26 Guillaume, *Architecture et vie sociale*, 8.

27 Raeymaekers and Derks, introduction to *A Key to Power?*, 14.

28 In this regard, I side with those that call to reconsider the role of theorization, not as relativism but precisely to inquire historical relations. See my preliminaries.

29 See Jacques Rancière, "The Concept of Anachronism and the Historian's Truth," *InPrint* 3, no.1 (Jun 2015), 21–52; here 40. Avail. online at http://arrow.dit.ie/inp/vol3/iss1/3. If the following aims to induce a certain changing view in this field of analyses, by offering an alternative reading attending more to architecture generative agency, the problematizing mode of the following is likely to be 'too much' (theoretically speaking) for some readers, and 'not (historically rigorous) enough.' To those readers, I would want to ask an acknowledgment of the intersectional position from which I operate, and the synthetic view (with all its fuzzy points) in trying to create a carefully constructed connection that aims to initially draw together the aforementioned historico-theoretical problematics, in repos(ition)ing the complex problem concerning the form-taking architecture of apartments not as a representative setting but generative setup for changing power formations.

tecture of apartments actually came to form, alongside later systems of distribution, a socio-environmental assemblage of differentiation. Other than a historical description, a genealogical one involves critical theorization and problematization as to how architectural forms of regulating access and production of spatial differences came to enable an emerging power formation that started employing the form-taking architecture of apartments toward a socio-environmental system for drawing distinctions. This problematic urges us to consciously circumnavigate essentialist trappings by re-conceptualizing architecture not just as a 'setting' or 'display' for existing social systems of power formations but as a productive 'set-up' and 'equipment of power.' Approaching architecture and power from a genealogical angle allows us to critically extend Guillaume's afore-mentioned suggestion to study the transition from lodgings to apartments systematically "through the notion of distribution," and redirect it toward Raeymaeker's and Derks's open question of architecture's involvement in regulating access. By investigating architecture as a process that produces social relations (and thus power formations) through (i.e. by means of) regulating access and forms of distribution, we can account for (and simultaneously problematize) architecture constituting an emerging power that eventually leads to these residential systems as we know them. Thus we avoid explaining the genesis of apartments 'in terms of' the normative function they would gain within the later discourse on the art of distribution.

This part critically reconstructs the form-taking architecture of aristocractic apartments, not only across political systems but also by mapping their genesis specifically with regard to the complex, contingent socio-environmental modifications through which the heterogeneous ensembles of architecture came to produce the material conditions for emerging power formations to progressively become a reality (i.e. absolute monarchy, the art of distribution, its hierarchical forms of access and modes of ranking). Thereby we approach the apartment as a 'diagram' of emerging powers (and not representing existing ones). In order to analyze architecture's facilitation of social and power relations, it is neither possible to isolate building practices from social figurations nor distinguish architectural forms from spatial practices by reverting to either exclusively typological views on the formation of specific materially manifested types or objects or praxeological positions attending exclusively to discursively mediated or symbolic social practices.[30]

30 Here, I cannot develop this point—already indicated in my preliminary discussion in chapter 0.2—beyond repeating that the abovementioned container conception of architectural apparatus is thus based on (and permeated by) anthropocentric views of cere-

Instead, architecture needs to be approached in a radically non-symbolic, non-representational or MACHINIC fashion that affirms its asignifying and *material*-discursive workings as a socio-environmental technology. We can take inspiration from philosophers of technology, such as Gilbert Simondon and Bernard Stiegler, who embrace Nietzsche's genealogical position that the eventual utility of certain things is never a sufficient explanation for their formation [→ 0.2]. Instead, these philosophers of technology advocate a genetic vision to study the formation and concretization of specific technicities. Instead of approaching their geneses independently of the use patterns and social practices established with these structures, they pay closer attention to the question of how the latter emerge with former. Simondon's work thus never starts from already concretized technical objects but from the genesis in which existing TECHNICITIES — that is, capacities for 'becoming technological' that are social before being technological — come to concretize specific technical objects.[31] Guided by these observations, the following section approaches the progressively form-taking architecture of apartments as a technical object that incrementally TRANSDUCES social relations. Based on this discussion, we can then — in the next chapter — reconsider the constitutive function of apartments for a co-extensive cultural technique (and political technology) of distribution evolving into a concretely coded socio-spatial system of drawing distinctions.

Diagramming Connection Structures of Emerging Courtly Assemblages

In systematically approaching architecture's influence on changing socio-spatial relations, Stephan Trüby's recent study, on the evolution of corridors within aristocratic residences, has replaced a typological lens with

monial as a meaning-producing forms of symbolic action or communication, as outlined by structuralist-anthropologists as Pierre Bourdieu. Paravincini, clearly distinguishes between 'ceremonial' and 'ritual' (see Paravincini, introduction to *Zeremoniell und Raum*, 11–37; see also Barbara Stollberg–Rilinger, "Zeremoniell, Ritual, Symbol," *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung* 27, no. 3 (2000), 389–405, and Olaf Mörke, "The Symbolism of Rulership," in *Princes and Princely Culture, 1450–1650* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 31–50; here 38–39), yet the concept that never seem to be mentioned anywhere in this debate is the more posthuman one of 'habitual behavior,' or 'habits,' which — rather different from the more essentialist notion of 'habitus' — was promulgated in its *a-signifying* function by several philosophers of technology as Gilbert Simondon, Bernard Stiegler, or Catherine Malabou). In this reading 'habit' is not an underlying 'structuring structure' for action, but rather an 'inherited structuration,' which can be modulated on the surface. Habit is plastic and genetic because humans produces their own milieu, as a specific habitat.

31 On this point, I refer back to the last part of my preliminary discussion in Book O, esp. the subsection "On the Concretization of Technical Ensembles." Here after Gilbert Simondon, "The Genesis of Technicity," *Deleuze Studies* 5.3 (2011), 408–24.

a more topological approach to transforming architectural arrangements that repeatedly touch on aspects relevant to a genealogy of apartments.[32] The following section will extend and radicalize this analytic approach in an attempt to not only render visible changing spatial arrangements (i.e. connection structures and part-to-part relations that underlie this transformation process) by means of access diagrams similar to Dovey's but also emphasize an emergent structuration resulting from this topological transformation.

Starting from connection structures helps to correct the misleading idea haunting the historiography of apartments that their emergence is reducible to a spatial subdivision and that the apartment can be fully conceptualized in these terms.[33] This chapter will further develop the argument presented in the previous chapter—that the concept of apartments emerges within a specific compositional technique—by illustrating that the very architecture of apartments derives from additive building practices inherited from the Middle Ages. I take this insight from Waddy, whose studies illustrate apartments taking form within the progressive extensions and reorganizations of older residential structures and then touch on a point many previous studies have entirely ignored concerning the provenance of their segmented[34] structure. An additive provenance of apartments, however, raises

32 See Stephan Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors* (Paderborn: Fink, 2018); esp. ch. 2, "Beletage, Enfilade und Distribution: Zur Emergenz de Höfischen Geheimkorridors," 59–116. Only during the finalization of this chapter in late spring 2018, could I consult Trüby's work. Based on a Foucauldian reading and a topological approach, it not only proved to share many viewpoints and methodological stances with my work, but also confirmed many of my intuitions that I had arrived at independently. Given that we both are discussing a co-evolving arrangement, his study also describes many of the French and Italian buildings selected to illustrate my case, while our foci diverge. In this respect, I have amended my work with references to shared views. Among the major points adopted are notably the discussion of the Majorcan palaces, and several conceptual tools which I have incorporated into the text, as indicated below. The largest difference concerns perhaps a certain limitation in his analysis, which—as I argued in the introduction—relies on reprinted floor plan illustrations. For my own study, I wanted to further highlight the specific connection structures by means of redrawn plans and diagrams that, I believe, render visible changing part-to-part relations and thus changing **MEREOTOPOLOGICAL** structure that Trüby targets at as well, but leave implicit in his work.

33 This concerns a specific language issue, for the segmented arrangement of rooms in the *logis* is difficult to be properly conceptualized in terms of partition. And this presents a specific difficulty in French where *répartition*, "subdivision," is usually used to mean "layout," whereas only *agencement* would be better suited to understand the additive origin of these layouts through the additive building techniques, as extensions of buildings were the main 'mode of production' of these architectures. Therefore, the following uses a more assemblage-theoretic approach to get to this cumulative mode of production.

34 Here, I use the term 'segmented' in the German sense of *Gliederung*, but later also in a specific theoretical sense. This chapter uses the terms 'segments' to more generally describe the differentiated architecture of these socio-spatial structures without

the questions of when and how these additive architectures of the late-medieval feudal society started to gain a more 'distinctive' function in the Baroque systems of distribution that court society or absolute monarchy employed. Concerning fundamentally changing political powers and social organizations, I want to complement my dispositivistic lens with an assemblage-theoretic approach. This kind of approach helps establish a specific relation between the additive provenance of the architecture of apartments, their progressive architectural differentiation and their eventual conjunction with concrete courtly systems comprising reciprocally determined and mutually changing architectural spaces, social figurations and political organizations. I take this reading from Gilles Deleuze's helpful conception of historical differentiation processes and the problem of the 'new,' which holds that any so-called **DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** (generally meaning any production of difference) is always preceded by a characteristic **CONNECTIVE SYNTHESIS** (by which particular things come together as a generative condition of the new) and always succeeded by a **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** (in which the differences are individuated into new or just different subjects).[35] [→ 0.2]

Guided by this three-part logic, my mapping of the form-taking architecture of apartments thus proceeds from Deleuze's conception of the con-

qualifying them as either sequences or series, in the German sense of *Gliederung*. Previous studies have often relatively indiscriminately described apartment were in terms of a suite, sequence, or series of rooms, or *Raumreihe* or *Raumfolge* in German (see e.g. Prinz and Kicks, *Schloß*). Throughout the first half of this chapter, I will preferentially use the notion of the 'sequence' , to emphasize the primary ordering principle within these suites (from Latin *sequor*, "to follow," "to come or go after"). Sequences play an important role in the field of topology, and can be generalized to 'filters,' which — becoming important in the central section of this chapter — in mathematics are special subsets of a partially ordered set, which in return formalizes the ordering and arrangement of any elements in a given set, that can be graphed into diagrams of specific topological orderings. By contrast, I want to reserve the notion of 'series/seriality' for the latter half to distinguish a specific form of *organization*, to distinguish what Deleuze and Guattari have presented as two different forms of 'segmentarity,' into which societies are structured, which I will explained later in more detail (see also note 77, 196, and 373, below).

35 See again my preliminary discussion, esp. chapter 0.2. For Deleuze these three syntheses concern three interrelated productions: A (1) production of production, (2) a production of recording, and (3) a production of consumption, which necessarily "reboots the entire reproductive process." Here I repeat, that this ontological argument does not imply that they are entirely chronological, but rather coextensive. I use this tripartite division and order here merely as a narrative device, highlighting not a real distinction but a methodological one. See here especially the production of desiring machines in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 9–21. A summarizing discussion is provided by Steven Shaviro, in his blog entries "The Connective and Disjunctive Syntheses" (Jul 7, 2008), avail. online at http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=646, and "The Third (Conjunctive) Synthesis" (Jul 14, 2008), avail. online at http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=648. The following conceptual formulation are taken from here.

nective synthesis as an initial production of productive relations. The first section maps the conditions for the formation of these relations and their provenance in Medieval additive building techniques. The purpose of the second section is to (re)locate the defining disjunctive synthesis that acts as a catalyst for the form-taking architecture of apartments. Following Deleuze and Guattari's elaboration that a genealogical view needs to understand this central process in terms of an inclusive disjunction, not an exclusive one, I will stress a modification of the internal arrangement that critically counters the kinds of exclusive disjunctions that have hitherto been used to explain the formation of apartments. The third and final section discusses the specific conjunction in which this differentiation individuates into a concrete technical object that—rebooting the entire process of social reproduction—would enable a new power formation constituted by this architectural apparatus for drawing distinctions.

2.1.1 From Additive Building Techniques to Sequential Spatialities

The sequential-processual organization of space is nothing new. It is undoubtedly a powerful space-organization technique that is as old as the architecture of palaces or temples. As such it is not a distinguishing feature of apartments but a distinct socio-spatial segmentarity[36] that this form or organization, and the court-ceremonial apparatus for drawing distinctions it was connected to.

To start mapping this connection, and the connective synthesis of apartments as a segmentary socio-spatial system, we need to go back several centuries. The additive provenance of ceremonial spaces of distinction can be identified in the successive enlargement and liturgical organization of pre-Romanesque papal palaces, the architecture of which "staged processions and ceremonies emphasizing the sovereign role of the pope."[37] Already in the old Lateran Palace, ⊠[1] the historical principal papal residence, we see the immediate proximity of the papal lodging (*habitaculum*) to the so-called *triclinium* of Leo III, built in the early ninth century as the main

36 See my previous note 34.

37 Flavia Cantatore, "The Vatican Palace of Nicholas V: Continuity and Innovation in the Vatican Palaces," in *Renaissance Architecture of Power*, ed. Beltramo, Cantatore, and Folin, 290–319; here 293.

reception, banqueting hall and center of palace life.[38] This division between the inner and outer part is an ancient Roman scheme and not particularly remarkable for the formation of apartments. What is important is the way the inner palace connects to the outer parts, which can best be observed in the early Vatican palace. ☒[2] This palace initially consisted of a small nucleus, characterized by a longitudinally oriented basilical audience hall (today the *aula tertia*) and an adjacent tower that housed the papal treasury and bedchamber.[39] Then, in the thirteenth century, the residential potential of the Vatican hill was recognized, and this nucleus was enlarged to become the Palatium Novum. Two reception halls (the Aula Secunda or Sala Regia) were added in front of the audience hall and also a new rear wing that enlarged the residential area of the tower toward the east.[40] This emerging room sequence would only be further extended after the papacy returned to Rome. During the second half of the fifteenth century, Pope Nicholas V enlarged the Vatican palace—the new principal seat of the papacy—in the image of a fortified four-towered *castrum* scheme.

The papal court first took on this external appearance during its exile in Avignon, where the papal palace ☒[3] moreover assumed a primary internal spatial structure of a linear sequence of hierarchically differentiated rooms. When Clement V was elected in 1309, he refused to move to Rome and established his court in the papal enclave of Avignon instead; his papacy lasted until 1377.[41] When the second Avignon pope, John XXII, took permanent residence in Avignon, the papal seat regained its judiciary function as a supreme court. In this function, a new audience hall (*audientia sacri palatii*) was added outside the confines of the existing episcopal palace.[42] As the existing palace no longer facilitated the evolving courtly ceremonial, John

38 Gary Radke, "Form and Function in Thirteenth-Century Papal Palace," in *Architecture et vie sociale*, ed. Guillaume, 11–24; here 12–4.

39 Diocletio Redig de Campos, *I Palazzi Vaticani* (Bologna, Capelli, 1967), 22–5.

40 Redig de Campos, *Palazzi Vaticani*, 25–41. The exact building history is disputed, see Pierre-Yves le Pogam, "Le Latran, le Vatican," in *De la 'Cité de Dieu' au 'Palais du Pape': Les résidences pontificales dans la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle (1254–1304)* (Rome: Publications de l'École française de Rome, 2005), 23–94, avail. online, at http://books.openedition.org/efr/172; based on the revisions made by Anna Maria Voci Roth, *Nord o sud? Note per la storia del medioevale Palatium apostolicum apud Sanctum Petrum e delle sue cappelle* (Vatican: Bibliotheca Apostolica, 1992).

41 Around 1300 a conflict between the papacy and the French crown broke out. In a papal bull, Pope Boniface VIII invigorated the supremacy of the Roman pontiff. King Philip IV of France's indignant response led to the death of Boniface VIII. After his successor died shortly within several months, the French Bertrand de Got, a friend of the Philip IV, was elected as the new pontiff.

42 For a recently revised reconstruction of the old episcopal palace, see Kerscher, *Architektur als Repräsentation,* 69–74, and 35–168 for the building history in general.

XXII's successor, Benedict XII, radically remodeled the existing structure into a large palatial complex during the 1330s and 1340s. Further enlarged by Clement VI, this complex became the largest court in fourteenth-century Europe between 1334 and 1342.[43] Under the influence of the French crown, the papacy adopted many aspects of French–Burgundian court life and would perhaps become what Werner Sombart calls the first modern European court.[44] This new palace added a novel element by entirely reconfiguring the papal lodgings.

These lodgings were initially located in an isolated building and comprised a treasury below the pope's chamber. During the renovation, the papal lodging was relocated to a fortified tower (*tour du Pape*) in line with the old consistory wing and the treasury. It housed a number of rooms—most prominently the papal bedchamber (*camera pape*), including a study room. The papal lodging could thus be accessed from inside the palace. In order to gain access, one had to move through a chain of rooms that were initially separate buildings: the *tinellum magnum*, a large hall that resembles a *triclinium* and the old treasury building, the upper rooms of which became the so-called *camera paramenti*. This parament chamber was a 'habitual' space that—at least since Avignon—gained a significant function for the liturgical ceremony during which 'investment' procedures pertaining to "the parament bed [*lectus paramenti*] was part of the furniture required in the context of the *præparatio ad missam pontificalem*."[45] This

43 For the following part, I follow the description of Bernhard Schimmelpfennig, "Ad maiorem pape gloriam," in *Architecture et vie sociale*, ed. Guillaume, 25–46, and Mary Whiteley, "The Importance of Lodgings of the Kings, Queens, and Royal Princes in France, during the Fourteenth Century," in *Le prince, la princesse et leur logis,* ed. Chatenet and De Jonge, 9–22; here 10.

44 Werner Sombart, *Der Moderne Kapitalismus* (Munich/Leipzig: s.n., 1922), Vol. I:720; cited in Elias, *Court society,* 39.

45 Weddigen, *Papageienzimmer*, here 97, see esp. 75–9; see also Schimmelpfennig, "Ad maiorem pape gloriam," 34. The *camera paramenti* emerges as a room type during the 14th century. Its placement before the bedchamber facilitated the latter to become more secluded and serve as a room to retreat into. Initially, it functioned as an audience, or council room in which visitors were received, or treaties signed, and accommodated functions during elections. In addition, it was also used as a dining room and guard-room. Initially it served as the dressing room where the liturgical vestments where handed out and taken on in *præparatio ad missam*. In this sense, the *camera paramenti* is a specifically habitual space (in the connection between 'vestments' and 'habits.' It was probably taken over from the Burgundian court with its parade room the *chambre à parer* (from Latin *parāre*, "to dress, trim, adorn" but also "to halt, stop, prevent, guard against." The name of the parament chamber (or chamber of vestments), is said to derive more from the practice of this chamber being 'dressed up' with *tapisseries* on special occasions. But, as Weddigen argues, this can be questioned to the extent that "such a textile equipment presented no distinctive feature at the time" (Ibid., 75). Conceptually, it may thus well derive from its initial instrumental function for preparing and setting up daily routines and special events. In this case, we would read

pseudo-bed for the papal vestments presumably gave the Avignon room its name, but it was functionally quite different from the courtly state bed in the *chambre de parement* or *chambre à parer,* which were rooms equipped with rich wall hangings in the French and Burgundian courts. ✉[8] It remains ambiguous whether the paraments describe the vestments of the wall hangings, but the parament chamber was a habit-changing space that could have been a delayed result of the Investiture Controversy and the progressive decline and reconfiguration of papal authority in the early 1300s in the face of rising secular state powers and the subsequent bureaucratic reforms the papacy took on from the European monarchs and instituted.

Kerscher describes how, during the late 1337–40s, this linear chain of hall, parament chamber and papal chamber—detached buildings connected by bridges—was gradually fused into a continuous block with an integrated, transversal sequence of differentiated reception rooms.[46] Following Kerscher's analysis of the Palace of Avignon in his evolutionary history of the corridor, Trüby reads this connection of an elevated hall building with a *donjon*—the traditional French seigneurial tower that historically combined a medieval fortress and an aristocratic residence—as the beginning of the developing system of apartments.[47] Kerscher, however, situates this emerging system in the spatial differentiation that resulted from the doubling of the parament wing under Clement VI to add a second anteroom: the adjacent *tinellum parvum*, a lesser hall used for meals with special guests and where the pope could retreat from the anterooms used for official functions.[48] Here Kerscher also reclaims the long-overlooked innovative

paramenti from Latin *parāre* ("to prepare, provide, equip"), from Proto-Indo-European **per-* ("produce, procure, bring forward, bring forth"); apparatus going back to Latin *ad-* ("to, towards, at") + *parāre*. The term *chambre d'apparat* and *chambre de parade* come to be used more in the 17th century, but appear at least since the 1560s (see "parare," in Wartburg, *FEW*, VII: 627). In the 1590s, we respectively find the notion of the "apparat" entering literature more widely. Around 1600, this room is fully understood as a "Presence chamber," as some Dictionaries attest; see for example, Randle Codgrave, *A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongves* (London: Adam Islip, 1611), n.p. The very term "camera paramenti" appears in papal documents since 1369 (i.e. during the Avignon Papacy). According to the *Dictionnaire du Moyen Français*, the notion "chambre de parement" is attested at least from around 1390; the term "Chambre (à) parer" for the reception room distinct from the other chambers in secular buildings is used at least since the 1360s, peaking in the 15th century; see "parement" and "parer," in *DMF*, n.p. (online). Concerning language, the state bed "lit de parade" replaces the "lit de parement" similarly toward the end of the 16th century (Weddigen, *Papageienzimmer*, 101).

46 Kerscher, *Architektur als Reprasentation*, 104–5, Fig. 27–28; 118–20.

47 Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors*, 65.

48 See Kerscher, *Architektur als Reprasentation*, 121–28. See here also id, "Die Perspektive des Potentaten: Differenzierung und 'Privattrakt' bzw. Appartement und Zeremonialräumen im Spätmittelalterlichen Palastbau," in *Zeremoniell und Raum*, ed. Paravicini, 155–186. Kerscher critically notes how earlier studies have often called this

1 PAPAL PALACES
The Old Lateran Palace in Rome was initially built in the fourth century. In the twelfth century, the papal lodging was located directly off the *triclinium* (cut at left edge) Further pieces (a *camera* and *cubiculum*) were added by later popes, so that the papal accommodation soon comprised several pieces, including a study (*camerula*) for retreat.



influence of the two great palaces of the kingdom of Majorca: the Almudaina (in what is now Palma de Majorca) and the so-called Palace of the Kings of Majorca in Perpignan ☒[4].[49] These palaces are characterized by what Kerscher calls the "Majorcan quad"; a matrix of four interconnected rooms that he also recognizes in the Papal palaces in Avignon and Montefiascone. This matrix would re-appear in the Vatican palace and the Palazzo Venezia in Rome.[50]

wing the "appartements privée," in correctly pointing out that these rooms where far from being private; they rather presented a different way of structuring publicness.

49 Kerscher, *Architektur als Repräsentation*, 231. A direct 'imitation' of any 'masterplan' has been questioned by Schimmelpfennig, "Der Palast als Stadtersatz," in *Zeremoniel und Raum*, ed. Paravicini, 239–56; esp. 248–9, in favor of a common co-evolution related to "changing conceptions of space and use." Kerscher suggests a strong "innovating influence," see Kerscher, *Architektur als Repräsentation*, 225–332. Concerning this Majorcan pedigree, I share Kerscher forward position concerning the wide neglect and longstanding central-eurocentric bias within architecture historical studies that have consistently overlooked (not to say eradicated) the 'minor' provenance of these innovative architectural elements and disposition, that can be traced back to earlier islamic building traditions and cultures (see ibid., 228–9).

50 Orig. "mallorquinische Vierergruppe" (my trans.), Kerscher, *Architektur als Repräsentation*, 123/"Perspektive des Potentaten," 167–8; Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors*, 64–8. Kerscher reconstruted the use of these room from the Leges Palatine, one of the first European writings documenting courtly ceremonials. Allowing the king to appear in and retreat from public display, these rooms, he argues with German-American historian Ernst Kantorowitz, provided a double pair of rooms for the "the king's two bodies" (in reference to Ernst H. Kantorowitz, *Die Zwei Körper des Königs: Eine Studie der politischen Theologie des Mittelalters* (Munich: DTV, 1990), orig. pub. as *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology* (New York: Princeton UP, 1957).



2 PAPAL PALACES II: Floor plan and spatial organization of the Papal Palace, Vatican. The palace's nucleus consisted initially of an audience hall (today the *Aula Tertia*) with an adjacent tower. It housed the papal treasury and bedchamber. This nucleus was incrementally extended during the twelfth to thirteenth century, by adding not only two reception halls (the *Aula Secunda* and *Sala Regia*) but also a new wing to the east, enlarging the former tower. The four-tower scheme was finalized toward the end of the fifteenth century by the addition of the Sistine Chapel and the addition of the Torre Borgia.
Level +01 ◔ For room keys, see back flaps

3 PAPAL PALACES III: Floor plan and spatial organization of the Papal Palace, Avignon. After the Papacy's move to Avignon, the second Avignon pope complemented the existing episcopal palace with an audience hall. Pope Benedict II radically enlarged the size of the papal lodgings, when he transformed the residence into a fortified castle (further enlarged by his successors). The plan of the doubled parament wing bears some resemblance to the four-fold matrix of the Majorcan palaces depicted on the next page.
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

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4 MAJORCAN PALACES

Top, plan and spatial organization of the Royal Palace of La Almudaina (*Civitas Maiorca*) as extended from the old Moorish Alcazaba after 1303 by Pons Descoyl, with the king's and queen's lodgings. Here the matrix of four interconnected rooms is clearly visible.

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Bottom, plan and spatial organization of the Palace of the Kings of Majorca in Perpignan, built c. 1276–1309 with reconstruction of the rooms around 1330. The layout of the KIng's four-room lodging is similar, if more irregular.

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





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Trüby additionally notes how in Avignon, this matrix is initially complemented by a further room in the tower, the *camera pape.* (One could also argue the fifth room is, in fact, the *studium* that, in contrast to the *retrete* located in the corner tower behind the Majorcan *camera regis*, is positioned before the camera.) This addition necessitated another mechanism for managing spatial complexity.[51] One of these mechanisms was a sequential arrangement of progressively smaller and more private rooms in a straight line, and this was to become the new model for all subsequent papal and cardinalatial palaces. In this aligned arrangement (in which Trüby finds a specific form of power expressing itself in the progressive traversing through the hierarchically organized domain of the Domus Pape),[52] the papal chamber became the most private in a row of consecutive audience rooms. Extending the liturgical conception of ecclesiastic space, this spatial arrangement was enhanced by the newly introduced use of royal ceremony at the papal court, to help physically regulate and behaviorally code the movements of the pope, his visitors and their encounters and interaction.

The Old Segmentarity of the French Royal Lodgings, c.1300s.

The French monarchy quickly adopted and emulated the sequential arrangement of the 1350s Domus Pape to institutionalize "the [courtly] ceremonials that were performed both on special occasions and in everyday life."[53] Earlier, palaces largely separated the royal lodgings from the reception hall in which the king traditionally held daily audiences with princes, courtiers and important visitors. In later times of political stability, such as during the reign of King Philip IV (*1268, reigned 1285–1314) and then again under King Charles V (*1338, 1364–80), the French court attracted a growing number of visitors.[54] One should remember that the king was accessible all day. Each

51 Trüby, *Geschichte de Korridors*, 67, and also 46, where Trüby, in referring to graph theory and Luhman's systems theory, understand four rooms as the maximum of simply interconnected rooms. In geometric space, five rooms can only be interconnected by means of devices like corridors. He thus sees these modification as "the relative starting point of the evolution of corridors" (Ibid., 66). In a similar vein, we can agree that this combination also acts as a catalyst in the formation of the architecture of what would later be called 'apartments.'

52 Ibid., 64. In the German original, Trüby coins the term 'Transversalenherrschaft,' which could be translated as 'transversal dominion' to distinguish this spatial *traversing* (as a 'passing through' rooms) towards the ruler, the from the more tangential form of circumnavigation that characterizes the corridor. This employment of the term 'transversal' does not match up with Guattari's notion of **TRANSVERSALITY** as a *non*-hierarchical organization, i have decided to circumscribe it in a way that emphasizes the traversing.

53 Whiteley, "Royal and Ducal Palaces," 47–63.

54 Philip IV the Fair (*1268, reign 1285–1314) and his advisors were instrumental in the transformation of France from a feudal country to a centralized state. During his political

5 PALAS TYPOLOGY
The *Palas* of Imperial Ottonian and Carolingian Palaces. These residential blocks, like at the Palas of the landgraviate Wartburg near Eisenach, combine hall and chambers, hence residential quarters and official program, in one longer building that is internally more differentiated in comparison to older palaces.



subject addressed him in an immediate and direct way.[55] A symbol of the king's public image regarding his relation to his subjects, this accessibility was an old French tradition. But it caused a 'certain amount of disorder' that conflicted not only with the "closure demanded by the necessities of politics, but also between the need to control the curial space," as Florence Berland observes.[56] Eventually, this accessibility had to be fundamentally transformed.

This transformation process is already tangible in the early extension of the traditional royal administrative complex in Paris: the Palais Royal on

conflict with Pope Boniface VIII, which caused the Avignon papacy, he called for a first assembly precursor of the États generaux in 1302.

55 Pierre-Yves Le Pogam, in "La fabuleuse histoire du Louvre," archive de l'émission "Des Racines et Des Ailes," aired on France 3, Apr 27, 2011, avail. online at https://youtu.be/77Rw4gH3giA. Also access to the king's urban residences, as what Florence Berland pictures as spaces "entwined in the Parisian urban fabric … seems to have been remarkably easy." See Florence Berland, "Access to the Prince's Court in Late Medievan Paris," in *Key to Power?*, ed Raeymaekers and Derks, 19–39; here 39: "One may infer that it was the extreme competitiveness between the different princely houses in late medieval Paris that resulted in the quite remarkable openness of the aristocratic hotels and the accessibility of their rulers. At a time when popular endorsement was an asset in the struggle for power, to stage one's accessibility was a way of showing just how close the prince was to the people. … Charles the Bold would give audience to his subjects and answer their requests himself, while Louis XI would take interest in ordinary people. Nonetheless, this tradition of openness seemed to fade at the turn of the fifteenth century. … If such a dramatic change is not easy to explain, it is interesting to note that the withdrawal of the king began precisely at the moment when competition between princes started to diminish."

56 Berland, "Access to the Prince's Court," 28, 31.

the Île de la Cité ⊠[6]. It was the principal seat of the French kings since Capetian King Robert II (*972, 993–1031). Initially, the existing Gallo-Roman *castrum* was transformed into a palatial complex that beside the royal palace also housed the Parliament of Paris, the Court of Appeal and the Justice Court.[57] In its basic layout, the *palais* still largely followed the tripartite layout of the Carolingian *palaces* of the Holy Roman Empire, in which three distinct power structures (*aula regis, capella,* and *camera*) were loosely held together by communicating pathways.[58] In twelfth-century palaces of the Holy Roman Empire, this tripartite structure merged into a single compact hall building—the so-called *palas*.[59] As can be seen in the Wartburg (b.1157–65) and with the imperial palace in Gelnhausen (b.1159–70), these buildings are characterized by joint residential and official spaces in one oblong yet internally differentiated building block with segmenting walls ⊠[5].[60] Accommodating both residential and administrative spaces 'under one roof,' these edifices reflect the political ambitions of centralization and an emerging absolutist conception of power.

A similar transformation could be observed around 1300, when Philip IV radically rebuilt the Palais de la Cité and the royal lodgings (under the supervision of his chamberlain, Enguerrand de Marigny) to become a palatial complex capable of hosting the events that resulted from the increasing centralization of royal power. The exact layout of the king and queen's stacked lodgings can only be reconstructed schematically in its sequence of audience room (*chambre verte*), a chapel (*l'oratoire du roi*), a day chamber (called *chambre du bois d'irlande*), and a night chamber with *garderobe* in

57 On should note that this complex does not yet present the tripartite system separating executive, legislative, and judiciary powers. The *parlement* was initially not a legislative body. It consisted of a dozen or more appellate judges that formed a court of final appeal of the judicial system. But soon, the *parlement* judges would aim for active participation in the legislative process, which brought them into increasing conflict with the ever-increasing monarchical absolutism of the *Ancien Régime*.

58 Antje Kluge-Pinsker, "Wohnen im hohen Mittelalter," in *Geschichte des Wohnens: Band 2, 500–1800: Hausen, Wohnen, Residieren,* ed. Wüstenrot-Stiftung and Ulf Dirlmeier (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1998), 85–288; here 191.

59 Paraphrased from ibid.: 194–5. On this relation, see also the article "Palais," in Viollet-le-Duc, *Dictionnaire raisonnée* VII:1–36. The *palas/pfalz*, is discussed in Michael Welman Thompson, *The Rise of the Castle* (Cambrdige: Cambridge UP, 1991), 22–8, and id., *The Medieval Hall: The Basis of Secular Domestic life, 600–1600 AD* (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1995), 33–37. Besides more archaeological survey studies, see for Gelnhausen see the architectural guides by Wolfgang Einsingbach, *Gelnhausen—Kaiserpfalz: Amtlicher Führer* (Bad Homburg: Verwaltung der Staatl. Schösser und Gärten, 1980); and Thomas Biller, *Kaiserpfalz Gelnhausen* (Regensburg: Schnell & Steiner, 2000); for the Wartburg, see id., "Der Wartburg-Palas" in *Elisabeth von Thüringen: Eine Europäische Heilige*, ed. Dieter Blume (Petersberg: Imhof, 2007), Vol.I:94–100.

60 The same point was made by Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors*, 63–5.

the Tour Carrée.[61] This basic distribution follows the layout of the early Capetian palace in Laon, which was rebuilt late during the twelfth century to make the chapel an integral part of the main structure of the building to symbolize an architecture of sacral kingship.[62] In their palace, the Capetian kings conceived of the segmentary structure of the enlarged royal lodging. Boris Bove notes that the new palace replicated "in a minor mode, the distinction between *aula*, *capella*, and *camera,* like a '*mise-en-abîme*'" of the older palatial complex, while maintaining the traditional tripartite arrangement with a large hall (*grand-salle*) and the royal lodging.[63]

To properly conceptualize this internally differentiated tripartite residential structure, I want to resist labeling this segmentary arrangement an 'apartment,' since we are dealing with something paralleling the formation of the Domus Pape, namely, the emerging notion of the royal lodging —the *logis* itself—and the form-taking architecture of the *corps de logis*. Originally, the expression "*chambres et salles*"—denominating the principal semi-public bedchamber with its appurtenances and the multipurpose reception hall—was used in documents to designate the residential and official spaces within palatial arrangements. In the fourteenth century,[64] the term *logis* began to replace the earlier expression, after the parament chamber—modeled after the papal residences—brought them together in a connective process, which should be analyzed on its own terms. Conflating the unitary structure of the (*corps de) logis* with the later architectural formation of apartments within it is conceptually misleading. We are not talking about the same rationale. The connective synthesis of the *logis*—paralleling the

61 Whiteley, "Importance of the Lodgings," 9–10, 18 fig.1); see also Jean Guerout, "L'Hôtel du roi au palais de la Cité a Paris sous Jean II et Charles V," in *Vincennes aux origines de l'Etat moderne*, ed. Jean Chapelot and Elisabeth Lalou (Paris: Presses de l'ENS, 1996), 231–35; and Jean Chapelot, *Le château de Vincennes: Une résidence royale au Moyen Age* (Paris: CNRS édns, 2001; orig. pub. 1994).

62 On this point, see the detailed study by Meridith Cohen, *The Sainte-Chapelle and the Construction of Sacral Monarchy: Royal Architecture in Thirteenth-Century Paris* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014), esp. Ch. 2: "The Architecture of Sacral Kingship," 113–145; here 125–6.

63 Bove, "Les palais royaux," 59.

64 Mary Whiteley initially argues this happens at the end of the fifteenth century (Whiteley, "Royal and Ducal Palaces," 50, which is the time when the term gains much currency. The notion of the *logis* seems to appear, however, already in the 1350s–60s, and *logis du roi* is recorded before 1400, as attested by the DMF "logis," B.1, in reference to the entry "laubja" in the FEW Vol. XVI: 446–52; cf. the entry "logis" in the TLFi. The way the term emerges in the context of the installation of tents providing accommodation for army troupes, is worth being investigated itself not only typologically—or perhaps 'stylistically' in a Semperian sense—but also relevant in light of my own Deleuzo-Guattarian argument, since at the end of this section I will posit a relation between the emerging architecture of apartments as a state apparatus and a specific 'war machine,' see below in section III.

6 THE PALAIS ROYAL DE L'ÎLE DE LA CITÉ, PARIS:
The Île de la cité was site of an ancient Roman *castellum*. King Robert II here built a new palace around the year 1000. He transformed the ancient citadel, building the first royal lodging, that can be seen on one of the miniatures of the *Très Riches Heures du duc de Berry*. He also rebuilt the tribunal building comprising a *Salle du Roi* (*Aula regis*), with a *Chambre du Roi* to the east. The plan follows the scheme of Carolingian Imperial Palaces, that usually consisted of three principal structures: a church or chapel, a grand *hall* and a residential area (the *logis*). The latter was built in close connection to the hall, yet remained visibly distinct structures, connected by arcades.





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7 THE OLD LOUVRE

Floor plan and spatial organization of the old Louvre castle, Paris. The Louvre complex was a military fortress, initially consisting of a *donjon* built around 1190 and a quadrangular enceinte in 1205–10, built by Philippe Auguste, and subsequently enlarged for Louis IX with residential and representative spaces. Immediately after ascending the throne in 1364, he commissioned master mason Raymond du Temple to transform it into a magnificent palace through a new representative wing extending and more than doubling its size of the older royal lodgings along the northern perimeter of the *enceinte*. It contained the queen's and king's lodgings and reception rooms on the first and second floor.

Level +02







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transversal structure of the Domus Pape—concerns a transformation related to reterritorializing power structures.

New Arrangements in the French Royal Lodgings, 1350s

This connective synthesis can clearly be seen in the renewed royal residence built after Charles V's decision to transfer the royal court to the Louvre. ⊠[7] After his ascension, the Louvre was radically modernized into a state-of-the-art royal residence.[65] With the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War in 1337, and the Black Death a decade later, the first Valois kings faced considerable security concerns. The openness of the royal palace made the king physically vulnerable to political attacks.[66] Regarding the relocation of Charles' court, Alain Salamagne points out that the Louvre was not necessarily any safer than the Palais de la Cité, but in its technical purpose of controlling access to the city, it may have been seen as facilitating better control over the access to the king.[67] Similar to the Castle of Vincennes ⊠[30↓] (c.1337–1410)—the royal residence just outside Paris that Charles's grandfather Philip VI began transform into Europe's tallest fortified structure, and in which Charles had grown up—the Louvre's design was freestanding. Similar to the Palais de la Cité, the Louvre formally consisted of two superimposed, highly defensive yet equally symbolic components of seigneurial power: a Roman *castrum* scheme and a central *donjon.*

Expanded over time, Charles's newly extended residential wing (with the renovation work carried out under master mason Raymond du Temple in the 1360s) entirely reconfigured the spatial separation of hall and chambers into the sequential arrangement developed in Avignon, including a ceremo-

65 An initial reconstruction of the royal lodgings in the old Louvre, has been provided in the oft-cited studies of Mary Whiteley, "Le Louvre de Charles V: Dispositions et fonctions d'une résidence royale," trans. Monique Chatenet, in *Revue de l'Art*, no. 97 (1992), 60–71; and her above-cited studies id., "Royal and Ducal Palaces in France," and id., "The Importance of the Lodgings of the Kings." Recently, some of these observations, especially her reconstruction of the internal disposition, were revised by Alain Salamagne, "Lecture d'une symbolique seigneuriale: le Louvre de Charles V," in *Marquer la ville: Signes, traces, empreintes du pouvoir (XIIIe–XVIe siècle)*, ed. Patrick Boucheron and Jean-Philippe Genet (Paris/Rome: Édns de Sorbonne, 2013), 61–81. Cited from the unpaginated online version). See also Salamagne, "Le Louvre de Charles V," in id, ed., *Le palais et son décor au temps de Jean de Berry* (Tours: PUF-Rabelais, 2010), 75–138.

66 Whiteley, "Royal and Ducal Palaces," 50. During the captivity of his father John II, Charles in his new position as Regent was residing at the Palais de la Cité, when in 1358 a riot led by the leader of market traders Etienne Marcel, invaded the palace, and murdered several the king's advisors before his eyes. Horrified, the Dauphin decided to leave the island to settle in the Hôtel de Saint-Pol outside the city, which he should subsequently rebuild into a closed, yet not heavily fortified, suburban residence, close to Vincennes. See also Salamagne, "Lecture d'une symbolique."

67 Ibid., n.p. (online §§ 6–9).

nial and structured pattern for both everyday government business and state occasion. In this addition, the *chambre à parer*—modeled after the parament chamber—became a novel copula interlinking hall and chambers.[68] The new wing integrated the formerly gender-separated lodgings of Charles V and Jeanne de Bourbon (who had the right of her own reception rooms) into a single representative building, where each of them disposed over a vast set of rooms on the first and second floor.[69] Visitors would ascend to the royal lodgings up the *grand vis,* a monumental staircase—reminiscent of the ceremonial entrance stairs (Les Grands Degrés) at the Palais de la Cité—connecting the king and queen's lodgings. The open bays of this helicoidal stairway in its projecting tower (b.1365) distinguished it from minor entrance towers. This ascending device plays a dual role as a dispositif: it combines a representational-ceremonial function—as a display of royal power—with a more defensive strategy—of slowing down the approach to the king. From here, visitors would progress to the central *salle du roi* that led to the *chambre à parer*, ☒[8] the *chambre de retrait*,[70] and the access-restricted

68 Here, I need to simplify this development slightly, first, for the ease of the larger argument, second since Salamagne's revised distribution remains partly inconclusive (see the second-next note below). The parament chamber was not built to interlink them, but installed in a new north wing that, as Salamagne describes, had been built by Philip the Fair towards the end of his reign. In the thirteenth century, the queens lodgings—composed of a *chambre* and *garde-robe*—constitutes a freestanding *logis* centrally-positioned along the northern *enceinte*—i.e. what is now the *salle du roi.* In this extension, the existing voids were filled with complementary rooms: according Salamangne a *salle du roi* (west to the queen's *logis*, now the *chambre à parer*) and a smaller *salle de la reine* (to the east, now *salle du conseil*). See ibid., §4, and fig 1. and 2.

69 In the Castle of Vincennes, the king would soon occupy the vertical arrangement of the great *donjon* tower after its completion in 1368–9, while the queen would remain in the *manoir*, that the royal family initially inhabited. Also in their main residence in the Hôtel de Saint-Pol, did they occupy different lodgings. As Salamagne and Whiteley have argued the queen's accommodation on the lower level still signified her relatively lower position, as much as the structuration of the building reflected worldly order in general. See Salamagne, "Lecture d'une symbolique," n.p (online).

70 The *chambre de retrait* was an en-suite privy room to which the king could retreat for dinner or secret audiences, which was often accompanied by a *garde-robe,* as a room in which clothes and other belongings such as furniture and objects were stored (Berland, "Access to the Prince's Court," 33). Salamagne situated the *garde-robe* in the west wing, but locates not separate *chambre de retrait*, in contrast to Whiteley. Both Whiteley and Salamagne refer to Antoine Le Roux de Lincy, "Comptes des dépenses faite par Charles V dans le Louvre des années 1364 à 1386," pub. orig. in *Revue archéologiques* 8 (1851–52), 670–91, 760–22, rep. in Adolphe Berty and Henri Legrand, *Topologie historique du Vieux Paris* …, Vol. I (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1885), 181–99, avail. online at https://archive.org/stream/topographiehisto01bertuoft. It describes the *logement neuf* as consisting of a *salle*, a "*chambre à parer devers la Fauconnerie*," "*chambre ensuivant*" that would be a *chambre de retrait*, and a "*grand chambre où fut la salle Sainct-Louis*" (ibid., §51). It also mentions "*ses trois chambres, devers la Fauconneries, en l'allée des aisances*" (§52, which Salamagne reconstructs as a corridor) and "*deux chambres devers l'artitilleries*" (ibid.). That the latter were housing the *salle du conseil*, with an annexed *garde-robe,* is noted in the description by Henri Sauval, *Histoire et recherches des antiquités de*

chambre du roi. To the right of the stairs could be found the official rooms including a council hall (*salle du conseil*) with adjacent service rooms.[71]

While Whiteley's initial reconstruction presupposes a certain spatial separation between private and public rooms, Salamagne argues that this sequence of "interlocking reception rooms" in which the *salle* loses its historical primacy to the king's lodging in general.[72] As such, the *corps de logis* integrates functional differences between hall and chambers into a continuous differential field that, as Guillaume notes, is "organized between two poles" of (in)visibility.[73] This bipolar arrangement did not stage the king's appearances as much as it actually facilitated a specific field of visibility through which the sovereign could appear and retreat (in a more mutually or co-constitutive fashion), thus primarily facilitating royal power through specific socio-spatial relations of difference and hierarchization of access.[74]

Integrating two formerly separate spatial segments into one new *space*, the architecture of the *logis* presents a specific connective synthesis in which two spatial poles are replaced by a bipolar relation of functional

la ville de Paris, Vol. II: 21–22, avail. online at gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k1040563h. Sauval's account, which Whiteley had also based her reconstruction on, describes also four (maybe consecutive) halls: a *salle du roi*, a *salle de la reine*, a *salle* overlooking the garden [perhaps the *chambre de retrait*], and the one of Saint-Louis. Used also by Salamagne, his otherwise convincing reconstruction disregards the possibility that there was perhaps another hall between *chamber à parer* and corner tower. Cf. Salamange, "Lecture d'une symbolique"; and id., "Le Louvre de Charles V." The *chamber à parer* may have been installed in the earlier *salle du roi* without any alteration in size, with an adjacent *chambre de retrait* overlooking the garden in the north, as a *chambre aisé*, i.e. with *garde-robe* and access to the study and latrines as indicated in the plan (dashed lines). Regardless of the exact position, I want to re-introduce the notion of the en-suite room over the *garde-robe/corridor* reconstruction here, not only since it stresses Salamagne's argument of an 'interlocking sequence of rooms,' but also since the interesting thing is that this tripartite sequence—*chambre à parer, chambre de retrait,* and chamber—cannot be found in the Papal Palace (Bove, "Les Palais Royaux," n.p.) but emerges more clearly in the later palaces of Charles, such as Creil.

71 See ibid. For earlier attempts at reconstructing the internal distribution of the wing, cf. Whiteley who argues that the *vis* led to the more widely accessible audience hall—the *chambre à parer*—with an adjacent withdrawing room, the *chambre de retrait*, to the more access-restricted *chambre du roi.* This sequence was complemented by a *salle* leading to an again access-restricted area for night use that comprised two more chambers. Whiteley, "Royal and Ducal Palaces in France," 47–64; and id., "Le Louvre de Charles V."

72 I take this from Salamagne, "Lecture d'un symbolique," n.p. (online §10). He originally uses the term 'imbrication,' which I translate here as 'interlocking.'

73 Guillaume, *Architecture et vie sociale*, 7 (my trans.); see also Whiteley, "The Importance of Lodgings of the Kings," 9. Guillaume here distinguished these as poles as 'public' and 'private' (cf. note 5–6, above). The historical differentiation of the 'public' and the 'private,' and its relation to domesticity and state power is extensively treated in Michael McKeon's *The Secret History of Domesticity: Public, Private, and the Division of Knowledge* (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2005).

74 Berland, "Access to the Prince's Court," 33.

8 | 9–10 **THE CHAMBRE À PARER:** ***Right*, detail of a miniature depicting a royal château with the king's parament chamber in which Pierre Salmon authoring his manuscript to Charles VI. From the *Dialogues de Pierre Salmon* (c. 1409), BnF Ms. 23279, fol. 53.**

***Overleaf left*, detail of a miniature depicting Salmon in discussion with Charles VI. From the *Dialogues de Pierre Salmon* (c. 1409), Geneva Library Ms. 165, fol. 4.**

***Overleaf right*, the Queen's chamber as visible in a miniature, depicting Christine de Pisan presenting her book to queen Isabeau, seated in her bedchamber. From *The Book of the Queen* (c. 1410–14), British Library, Harley 4431.**

dissymmetry. If this bipolarity can be understood as the beginning of the development of apartments, it is not because this spatial distinction would necessarily lead to the architecture of apartments as a differentiated sequence of rooms; rather, it can be understood as introducing a condition of irreversibility into a lesser and non-directionally differentiated space of the *logis*, namely, an axis of internal development that in essence opens the technical lineage of an evolving architecture.[75] But this is only a first (horizontal) bipolarity, repeated in a second (vertical) bipolarity that the *logis* imposes in its differentiation of the stacked lodgings of the king and the queen as the traditional gender topology of the French royal household.[76]

In this dual bipolarity, the *logis*—as a whole—sets up a generic spatial matrix that, in both its ordered sequence of rooms and its stratified social order, reproduces the segmentarity of feudal society in its underlying molecular structuring.[77] The molecular arrangement of the *logis* can thus be under-

75 This idea is based on Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, trans. Cécile Malaspina and John Rogove (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2017), 44.

76 In this newly structured edifice, Berland argued, the cohesion of the royal family and the councilors under Charles V was demonstratively 'set in stone,' see Berland, "Access to the Prince's Court," 32.

77 I use this notion as a theoretical extension of the notion of segments, as aforementioned in my note 34 above, on the notion of segments and segmentarities. Introduced in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari's concept of 'segmentarity'—adopted and adapted from the field of political anthropology—refers to basic questions of social stratification. It articulates the stratifications, territorializations, or organizations within connected heterogeneous multiplicities, in a non-unitary manner, by distinguishing 'molecular structurings' from 'molar structurings'; a distinction which I will resort to

stood as the spatial 'diagram' of monarchical power, the formation of which can be traced in its inherent connection structures. In these structures, we identify the segmentarity of the *logis* as facilitating a specific reterritorialization of power into hierarchically differentiated part-to-part relations that allow for a gradual distinction between personal and representative state spaces, and the ways in which the much more complex (i.e. more regulated) flows of movement produced by the 'interlocked' arrangement of rooms called for instituting equally complex forms of behaviorally coded and hierarchically restricted access. We ought to see the *logis* as a 'tertiary structure,' not in its tripartite structure, but rather in its conditioning configuration of the spatial part-to-part relations that will lead to the architecture of apartments.

later. Segmentarity is thus understood as an "asignifying rupture: [as conceptually positioned] against the oversignifying breaks separating structures or cutting across a single structure." Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Vol. II* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1987), 1–9. In this sense, will I use this theoretical concept to avoid discussing both the *logis* in terms of a formally 'unified' structure as well as apartments as already constituted, individual units, but in terms of their individuation, as to avoid the related discrete logic of subdivision. See here also my critique of unitary thinking in note 185, below. For an introductory discussion on Segmentarity, see also William Bogart, "Sense and Segmentarity: Some Markers of a Deleuzian-Guattarian Sociology," *Sociological Theory* 16, no. 1 (Mar 1998), 52–74. See also Eugene W. Holland, "Micropolitics and Segmentarity," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy,* ed. Henry Somers-Hall, Jeffrey A. Bell, and James Williams (Edinburgh: EUP, 2016), 152–71.

In this way, one can re-conceptualize the form-taking architecture of apartments not as a simple typological evolution emerging out of the *logis* itself but—as we will see—as a development involving this tertiary structure and its sequential part-to-part relations to fold onto itself and produce a complex quaternary structure that would manifest in the very architectural system of apartments. In this topological sense, I want to suggest something quite different than the typological 'fourfold.'[78]

This is to counter how (or reconsider in what way) previous studies saw the evolution of this architectural system in the development from the fourteenth-century *logis* to the sixteenth-century *appartements* to be initially interrupted by the political upheavals of the 1420–1430s.[79] The forced relocation of the French court through the British invasion resulted in "a simpler style of royal life [that] evolved within more modest residences," that only ended when Charles VIII created a new building of distinction with the Château d'Amboise ⊠[36↓] in the 1490s.[80] This sensible statement is problematic, however, not so much from a genealogical view—which is admittedly characterized by it deliberately discontinuous approach to time—but from the genetic angle of an assemblage-theoretic approach. First, we have seen that the segmentary architecture of the *logis* is the result of a specific socio-political 'linkage' consolidating with an emerging **STATE ASSEMBLAGE**; the architecture of apartments should develop through a later socio-spatial and functional differentiation, which—as we shall see—by contrast constitutes a **TERRITORIAL ASSEMBLAGE** dividing the world into coded segments. To tell the difference (or precise relation) between these rather different **POLITICS OF ASSEMBLAGES,**[81] we must resist the facile shortcut of an interrupted (that

78 Instead, I use the notion of primary, secondary, tertiary, and quaternary structures in a more emergentist, developmental bio-chemical sense.

79 Whiteley, "Royal and Ducal Palaces," 57. These upheavals concern the instabilities induced by minority and later mental instability of Charles VI, the quick succession of Charles V' younger sons as kings, whose failure to produce male offspring resulted in a crisis of succession that led to the Hundred Years' war and the subsequent British invasion of large territories of France including Paris.

80 Ibid.

81 As already mentioned in my preliminary discussion, page 393ff., four different, although never purely existing forms of "politics of assemblages" can be distinguished in Deleuze and Guattari's work (Thomas Nail, "What is an Assemblage?," *SubStance* 46 no.1 (2017), 28–33): As their first form, one should distinguish "territorial assemblages," that arrange their constitutive elements in such a way that they become coded according to proper or natural use. They thus "divide the world into segments, coded according to use" (Ibid., 28). A second form, "statist assemblages," or "state assemblages "are by contrast characterized by the way that elements are arranged in an "attempt to unify or totalize all the concrete elements and agencies" that make it up by aligning them around a "centralized point of transcendence" (30). A third form, the "capitalist

means, somehow linear) development from *logis*/*palas* to apartment and investigate instead the different historical lineages along which aristocratic architecture takes form.

2.1.2 *Palazzi*: From Axiomatic Structures to Statist Assemblages

This immediately leads us to the second point, as the connective synthesis of palatial structures continues mainly elsewhere in the meanwhile. Because a similar internal rearrangement of socio-political structures lies at the base of the formation of Italian palaces. The predominantly stylistic focus of the historical formation of *palazzi* in relation to the evolution of Renaissance architecture often overshadowed their genealogical relation to the medieval *palazzi communale* that developed from older fortified structures; this development took place during the democratic emancipation and later re-feudalization of the political institutions of Northern Italian city states.[82] These municipal administration buildings, such as the paradigmatic communal palace of Florence, manifested the novel socio-political structures through which they developed during the eleventh century into city states and their newly gained political autonomy. Around 1300, however, the democratic emancipation of Italian municipalities from earlier aristocratic rule and epis-

assemblage," is characterized by its process of *axiomatization* (see also my note 105) that decodes relations through privatization, thus disengaging agents from assemblages (31–2). A fourth form is the "nomadic assemblage," in which all elements and agencies "are arranged in such a way that … the assemblage is able to change and enter into new combinations" a "participatory arrangement … incompatible with territorial hierarchies" (32–3). In the following, I will fall back on these concepts, to tell the difference between the different forms of relationality produced by architecture. More interesting than establishing a symbolic reading as to how architecture represents these political assemblages I want to foreground the precise "politics of these assemblages," and the way they lay out relations as produced by means of architectural arrangements.

82 The numerous available social and economic histories of Italian communes, their dynastic families, and different forms of patronage in Renaissance art and architecture touch rather generally on their political architectures. Often these studies remain in a rather superficial 'symbolic' reading of architecture's display of power structures, such as Charles Burroughs, *The Italian Renaissance Palace Façade: Structures of Authority, Surfaces of Sense* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), or the recent study by David Rollason, *The Power of Place: Rulers and their Palaces, Landscapes, Cities, and Holy Places* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2016). So does the more comprehensive typological discussion of communal palaces provided in Stanislaus von Moos's, *Turm und Bollwerk* (Zurich: Atlantis, 1974). I will continue to rely on this work here, however, given its 'deeper' technological reading of architectural form, for reasons that will become evident in the following section. Besides the monographic studies mentioned below, for the most recent findings on various Italian communal palaces I refer to the abovementioned recent study by Beltramo, Cantatore, and Folin, eds., *Renaissance Architecture of Power*.

copal authority came to a sudden end, when a few families started to seize power. The famous Renaissance *palazzi* of the ruling families was a historical precursor to the townhouse in which the *appartamenti di stanze* also took shape. It is important to investigate the function of the *palazzi* within courtly assemblages in relation to other socio-political structures, because they have a specific effect on the later formation of *appartements* in France. An excursus on this a-parallel evolution addresses the problem that typological studies have generated—'where apartments come from'—by attending instead to how they repeatedly come about within different architectural ecologies.

Italian Political Ecologies and their Different Social Edifices, 1290–1340

The communal palace was generally a two-story hall structure with a peristyle courtyard and a central tower.[83] The eleventh to twelfth-century Salic and Staufen imperial palaces were an immediate typological precursor of the hall structure. Like these palaces, the hall was designed to fulfill two functions, an official and a residential one. The same proximity between assembly hall and residential space can be found in the communal palace as in the palatial topologies described above. We find this proximity also in earlier communal palaces, for example the Domus Communis of Volterra ✉[11] (built in the early thirteenth century), which influenced the Florentine communal palace.[84] The Domus Communis was built as residence for the elected officials, called the *priori*, and the building itself was shaped by the restriction on their movement, as they could not leave except on official business.[85] The *piano nobile* comprised the official rooms: an oblong *sala*,

83 The long iconological relation of these towers to the older *torri gentilizie*—the urban tower-houses of the Italian gentry that arose during the twelfth and thirteenth century and famously characterized the skyline of many Italian cities, including Bologna, Pavia, San Gimignano, Siena, and Vicenza—is well-known. While the verticality of these towers houses testified to the political struggles and anarchic condition in these communes, it attained a new meaning in the *palazzi communale,* where they became 'warrants for security.' See Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*, 24.

84 Some historians such as Howard Saalman have contested this "early dating of the Palazzo dei Priori in Volterra which now finds its proper place not as the astounding precedent, but among the provincial echoes and variants … of the great prototype in Florence." See Howard Saalman, "Review of Jürgen Paul, 'Der Palazzo Vecchio …'," *The Art Bulletin* 53, no.1 (Mar 1971), 115. Trachtenberg has, however, convincingly highlighted the mutual and reciprocal influence in which Volterra later imitated mainly the Florentine tower. Marvin Trachtenberg, "What Brunelleschi Saw: Monument and Site at the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence," *JSAH* 47, no.1 (Mar 1988), 14–44; here 16.

85 The reason behind this restriction was to prevent the municipal government from being influenced by outsiders. Jürgen Paul, *Der Palazzo Vecchio in Florenz: Ursprung und Bedeutung seiner Form* (Florence: Olschki, 1969), 15.

with adjacent council room and a chapel in the back. The second floor, planned for the required permanent residence of the priors, comprised assembly and dining rooms and the bedrooms. The upper floor comprised service rooms such as kitchens.[86]

Such a vertical stratification strongly contrasts with the horizontal segmentation that characterized palaces of rulers with long-term assignments. The vertical stratification could be understood as the result of the joining of an institutional edifice with a domestic structure. An example of this joining of powers can be found in the nucleus of the Ducal Palace of Mantua [12], which initially consisted of a *palazzo del capitano*, an oblong building constructed around 1295, and an adjacent but initially freestanding *magna domus*.[87] We also still find traces of such a structural joining in the Doge's Palace in Venice. [13] Dating back to the 1340s, the Doge's Palace's longitudinal wing on the lagoon side accommodated the duke on the first floor.[88] The golden stairs spatially set apart his lodgings (rebuilt in the 1480s) from the institutional rooms that had semi-public functions.

Such a connective synthesis is also clearly visible in the layout of the municipal administration complex of Florence, where the function of the priors was established in 1282. In 1298, the priors of Florence commissioned a new building to replace the older communal palace—the Palazzo del Podestà, known today as the Bargello (b.1255 for the *capitano del popolo*, the first position established to control the political power of the aristocratic elite). The new Palazzo dei Priori (b.1299–1313/15 by Arnolfo di Cambio) is the oldest nucleus of today's Palazzo Vecchio [14].[89] Like the Bargello, an "aggregate of original [urban] fabric"—and built on the ruins of two earlier palaces—

86 See Alessandro Furiesi, "Palazzo dei Priori," in *Volterra d'oro e di pietra*, ed. Mariagiulia Burresi and Antonio Caleca (Ospedaletto: Pacini, 2006), avail. onl. at http://www.comune.volterra.pi.it/flex/files/D.0872680e549c75f80a20/7_Palazzo_dei_Priori.pdf.

87 This nucleus was later massively extended by the Gorganza family by a *castello* (b.1395–1406, by Bartolino da Novara), and the *domus nova* (b.1480–84, by Luca Fancelli), to grow into a palatial complex of the *signoria*. For the sake of brevity, I am perhaps not sufficiently distinguishing the complex relations between the *priori, capitano*, and *popolo* that—as the palaces of Lodi attest—were three distinct social structures. The *capitano del popolo,* a function created in the early 13th century initially as a municipal officeholder able to balance the political power of the nobles represented by the *podestà*, soon became soon a breeding ground for despotism, through which most communes transformed into a (hereditary) lordship (the *signoria*).

88 For a discussion of the Doge's Palace in Venice, see Deborah Howard, *The Architectural History of Venice (rev. edn.)* (New Haven: Yale UP, 2002; orig. 1980), esp. 90–95. Monographic studies, include Giovanni Mariacher and Egle Renata Trincanato, eds., *Il palazzo ducale di Venezia (I Tesori no.18)* (S.l.: Sadea-Sansoni, 1966).

89 For monographs, see Nicolai Rubinstein, *The Palazzo Vecchio, 1298–1532: Government, Architecture, and Imagery in the Civic Palace of the Florentine Republic* (Clarendon





11–12 COMMUNAL PALACES: *Above*, the Palazzo Ducale, Mantua (c. 1300s), joined two existing edifices: the oblong Palazzo for the Capitano del Popolo (right side), and the Magna Domus (left side) of the Signoria. *Right*, the Domus Communis, Volterra. One of the earliest Communal Palaces in the northern Italian City States, housing the City's Priors on the upper floor.

the priors' palace was a compound of two main structures:[90] a building housing the town hall on the *piano nobile* and a cubiform courtyard housing the chancellery on the first floor; and the Signoria comprising the lodgings of the eight priors and the presiding *gonfaloniere di giustizia* on the upper floor in "cloister-like isolation."[91] These heterogeneous parts are joined by a vestibule with a staircase.

Press, 1995) and the earlier studies by Giulio Lensi Orlandi, *Il Palazzo Vecchio di Firenze* (Florence: Martello-Giunti, 1977); Ugo Muccini, *Il salone dei cinquecento in palazzo vecchio* (Florence: Lettere 1990); Ugo Muccini, Alessandro Cecchi, and Raffaello Bencini, *The Apartments of Cosimo in Palazzo Vecchio*, trans. Terry Dodman (Florence: Lettere, 1991), orig. pub. as *Le stanze del principe in Palazzo Vecchio* (Florence: Lettere, 1991). For a reconstruction of the earliest nucleus, see esp. the analysis by Trachtenberg, "Archaeology, Merriment, and Murder: The First Cortile of the Palazzo Vecchio and its Transformations in the late Florentine Republic," *The Art Bulletin* 71, no. 2 (1989): 565–609.

90 That is, the Palazzo dei Fanti and the Palazzo dell' Esecutore di Giustizia of the recently banned Uberti family. In the limits of this study, I have not been able to verify to what precise degree this bipartition resulted from of joining the two earlier edifices, or whether to assume a more typological relation. Studies, as the one by Paul, usually highlight only the typological relation to the earlier public building of the Bargello, noting, however, that this layout was the result of an architectural growth process. The citation is taken from Trachtenberg, "Archaeology, Merriment, and Murder," 565.

91 Ibid., 595. As Trachtenberg suggests, the mezzanine between the first and second floor likely accommodated additional residential rooms in times with a higher number of Priors.

13 DUCAL PALACES
Floor plan and spatial organization of the Doge's Palace in Venice. Rebuilt on the site of an older *castello*, extended into an earlier ducal palace in the 1180s, the current building was started in the 1340s after political changes leading to a massive increase of the assembly in 1297, had made it necessary to enlarge the earlier palazzo. It was later completed by the two wings toward the Piazza San Marco in the 1420–80s.
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

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14 PALAZZO VECCHIO
Plans of the oldest section of the Palazzo Vecchio in Florence, the so-called Palazzo dei Priori, built around 1300 as the official residence for the Priors, who were residing on the second floor. In the plan we still see the combination of two older structures: The hall building and the residential courtyard building. Originally, the residential part was accessed through external balconies, removed with Michelozzo's remodeling in the 1450s. Thereby the building as typologically modernized into a more integrated spatial system.
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









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In contrast to the ducal palaces, these 'democratic' municipal institutions were conceived of as miniatures of urban cohabitation. Noteworthy, their courtyards were originally equipped with wooden access galleries that are commonly seen in medieval domestic structures. Michelozzo di Bartolomeo Michelozzi remodeled the palace in 1454, removing these balconied galleries to imitate the spatial grandeur of the more representative, contemporary courtyards, such as those of the Bargello or the Palazzo Pubblico of Siena. This transformation constituted, as Trachtenberg notes, not only a stylistic update of the utilitarian medieval facade to a representative one but also a typological modernization of the building itself to an integrated spatial system.[92]

From Communal Palaces to Private Palaces, 1444

This system of circulation is articulated more rigidly in Michelozzo's previous project for the Florentine Palazzo Medici ☒[15] (b.1445–56/58). The reason of this changing organization lies in the special status of the Florentine republic among the political ecologies of the Northern Italian city states. In Florence, the incremental re-feudalization of stately and social order became visible only later, due to the Medici's efforts at maintaining the fiction of a republican order.[93] When Cosimo de' Medici (1389–1464) became the unofficial ruler of Florence, rather than maintain the city's existing power structure,[94] he cautiously articulated his ascent by reinterpreting the existing political structure in economic terms.

As the seat of a pan-European banking enterprise, the Medici private residence, must, Emanuela Feretti writes, "be understood as a real point of accumulation" in which traditional elements came together into a novel architecture.[95] Typologically, the Medici palace is clearly within the tradition of the communal palace,[96] specifically given its rusticated external appear-

92 Ibid., 577.

93 Partly paraphrased from Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*, 31.

94 Only after returning from their exile in 1512, did the Medici start to turn away from "specifically republican-bourgeois forms of living and representation in favor of the traditionally feudal and courtly ones" and the subsequent re-feudalization of stately and social order (see Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*, 67). This process culminates symbolically when the later Cosimo I de'Medici, Grand duke of Tuscany (1519–1574) would move his official residence to the Palazzo dei Priori in May 1540, as thereby different offices became literary occupied by a single autarchic person.

95 Emanuela Ferretti, "The Medici Palace, Cosimo the Elder, and Michelozzo: A Historiographical Survey," in *Renaissance Architecture of Power,* ed. Beltramo, Cantatore, and Folin, 263–89; here 273.

96 For the partly unclear attribution see ibid., 281–4. Michelozzo had just built the *palazzo communale* in Montepulchiano, which was based on the Palazzo Vecchio of Florence. See Christoph L. Frommel, *The Architecture of the Italian Renaissance*, trans. Peter

15 PALAZZO MEDICI

Plans and spatial organization of the Medici Palace, in Via Guilia (Florence), built 1444–84, by Michelozzo di Bartolomeo. The highly-systematic floor plans beneath indicate the principal apartment, consisting of a hall and three progressively smaller rooms, a *camara*, an *anticamera*, and a small office (*scrittoio*), accessed along a linear axis. While looking similar to the spatial sequences of ecclesiatic buildings, this aligment is based on a specific axiomatization of spatial relations reifying domestic power structures.

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







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ance. However, its most politically charged features (the symbolic tower and crenellation), as Christoph Frommel notes, are incompatible with Cosimo's appearance as *primus inter pares*.[97] In assuming the form of other stately palaces Cosimo frequented, the residence boldly took on the internal layout of the communal palace, thus transposing its basic bipartition into the domain of the *domus* with its more complex parthood structures. This resulted in another form of spatial differentiation, the innovation of which lies in the organization and rationality of its geometrically gridded floor plan.[98] Entry to the building is through an extremely clear and functional circulation system. This system—which was quickly copied in other palaces and spread to Rome via Antonio da Sangallo the Younger's designs[99]—consisted of an entrance hall (*androne*) succeeded by a courtyard loggia and grand staircase. It progressed to the *piano nobile* in the mirrored arrangement of stairs, vestibule, and hall through which the principal suite of rooms would be approached. It initially consisted of a sequence of four progressively smaller and more intimate rooms that were linearly connected and ran the full length of the street facade: a *sala*, a *camera*, a smaller *anti-camera* (in the relative position of a *guardacamera*) and an adjacent *scrittoio*. This small office or study manifested "the physical and symbolic place of the family's business" in the residence of a banker's family.[100]

Despite the spatial alignment of the sequence, each room remains individually accessible for the vestibule. On the other side of the 'spinal cord,' this four-room sequence was repeated in a smaller hall (*salotto*), an audience room (*camera d'udienza*), an adjacent *anti-camera* and *scrittoio* toward the garden. A second staircase provided independent access to two additional groups of internally connected rooms in the rear for the other family members. As Ferretti illustrates, this "system of distribution … was not an utter novelty, rehearsing, for example the sequence of rooms found in the old Medici complex on Via Larga, with which it also shared the fact that the most important room sequence was assigned not to the head of the family but rather to the eldest son."[101] Cosimo inhabited the smaller suite of rooms in

Spring (London: Thames & Hudson, 2007), 27.

97 Frommel, *Architecture of the Italian Renaissance*, 70.

98 Ferretti, "The Medici Palace," 273. An initial reconstruction of the initial layout was provided by Wolfger A. Bulst," Die ursprüngliche innere Aufteilung des Palazzo Medici in Florenz," *MKHIF* 14, no. 4 (1970), 369–92. These hypotheses were revised, see Howard Saalman and Philip Mattox, "The First Medici Palace," *JSAH* 44, No. 4 (Dec 1985), 329–45.

99 Ferretti, "The Medici Palace," 274. Those include the Palazzi Farnese, Sacchetti, and dei Tribunali.

100 Ibid. 277.

101 Ibid., 276–7.

the south-west wing, but only during winter. During summer, he would live on the ground floor in a similar sequence of a large hall, a bedchamber and small room leading to his *scrittoio* located between stairs and the family loggia, which extended over the vaulted space for celebrations and the polyvalent *grande camera* (large chamber). Due to the spaces being mirrored, the *scrittoio* assumed a mediating position to the loggia, which was initially open to the street. The proximity to the garden and adjacent loggia reflects the lodging's initially intended seasonal use.[102]

In thus transporting the political edifice of the *palazzo* to a domestic domain, the Medici palace expresses an emerging economic structure's incremental reconfiguration of socio-spatial arrangements from within. In decoding the qualitative socio-spatial differences of the *palazzo* through forms of privatization that disengage elements and agents from the assemblage, it establishes an equivalence between these newly de-qualified (or 'decoded') spaces as strictly quantified ones.[103] This decoding modality largely differs from the way territorial assemblages (such as the *domus*) loosely coded spatial segments according to proper usage, first, because "privatization requires a series of complex stratifications … and this can only occur through an organization … in which social bonds are measured by units."[104] Hence, in its recombination (or complexion) of purely quantitative relations, such an axiomatization[105] of space, through which spatial organi-

102 On this seasonal use, see esp. Deborah Howard, "Seasonal Apartments in Renaissance Italy," *Artibus et Historiae* 22, no. 43 (2001), 127–35; here 132–3. As she illustrates, Cosimo the Elder initially inhabited two portions as such 'seasonal apartments,' while his oldest son Piero occupying the large apartment on the Via Larga. Only later would, as Ferretti argues, the building be divided up into purely personal apartments. Under Lorenzo the Magnificient (1449–1492), for example, there were three upper apartments occupied by his father Piero de'Medici (the main one), the second of equal importance by his uncle Giovanni di Cosimo who largely took care of the family's business interests, and a third one for his brother Giuliano di Piero along the garden facade; Lorenzo inhabited only the apartment on the ground floor (Ferretti, "Medici Palace," 275–7). The initial occupation may have been that Cosimo the Elder would have lived in the apartments atop the ground apartment during the winter, and thus possessed of the two suites from street to garden in the south wing, with his oldest son Piero occupying the large apartment on the Via Larga, and his younger son.

103 On this assemblage-theoretic differentiation, see Nail, "What is an Assemblage?," 31; Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 137–8. Unable to do this here, it could be worthwhile to look at this decoding more closely in relation to the problem of proportion that emerges as a central point in Renaissance theory, and the way it would develop into modern forms of rationality. I hope the last chapter's attention to Serlio's attempt at de-anthropometrizing architectural relationships has made a step in this direction.

104 I take this formulation, out of context, from Claire Colebrook's "Sex and the (Anthropocene) City," *Theory, Culture & Society* 34, nos. 2–3 (2017), 39–60; here 43–4.

105 In philosophy and mathematics, an axiom is a "statement of self-evident truth." The term comes from Greek ἀξίωμα (*axíōma*, "authority"; literally "that which is thought worthy

zation becomes a principle of legitimation, differs greatly—although not necessarily appearing differently in its spatial expression as a room sequence—from the 'alignment' that is characteristic of the qualitative differentiation in the sequential arrangement of ecclesiastic edifices. In these edifices, all elements are arranged hierarchically in relation to a transcendental element, which, in the Medici palace, is no longer the semi-public bedroom but the business office.

Transforming Clerical Palaces and Disappearing Towers, 1451–69

This observation brings us back to the papal palaces and their highly coded political ecologies. From its initial forms of alignment, ecclesiastic space is tied to the formation of a specific state assemblage and its relatively fixed form of coding multiple flows in spatial constellations that unify or totalize all elements and agencies in order to centralize control. Here, one ought to pay attention to another trajectory in the connective synthesis of apartments, in which the tower—as well as the practice of inhabiting it—remarkably survives as a major motif, especially within clerical buildings.[106] The building complex in which Pope Martin V took residence when the holy chair returned to Rome in 1420 was anything but a modern palace. In contrast to the magnificent Florentine palaces, it rather resembled medieval strongholds, not unlike the 'castles of a tyrant' found in the duchies of upper Italy.[107] This traditionally defensive appearance seems rather strange in the anti-Gothic climate of the Renaissance, yet it was the organizational scheme of the four-tower-castle in

or fit," from ἄξιος (*áxios*, "fit, worthy," literally "weighing as much as; of like value"), from ἀγ- (*ág*, "to drive, draw out or forth, move"). Axiomatization is not directly related to the establishment of axes. To continue the argument made above in my commentary on the **FOUR POLITICS OF ASSEMBLAGES** (see above, note 82), let me elaborate here on the third, **CAPITALIST ASSEMBLAGE**. More than merely accumulating differences, Deleuze and Guattari define capitalist assemblages and capitalist modes of production—which, as Fernand Braudel's work has shown, emerge exactly at that time—through their characteristic form of 'axiomatization': "The true axiomatic is that of the social machine itself, which takes the place of the old codings and organizes all the decoded flows, including the flows of scientific and technical code, for the benefit of the capitalist system and in the service of its ends" (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 233; on this difference see for example also DeLanda, "Molar Entities and Molecular Populations," in *Deleuze and History*, ed. Jeffrey A. Bell and Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh: EUP, 2009), 225–36). In this sense, we ought to differentiate two forms of spatial sequences, cf. Bernard Tschumi, "Sequences," in *Architecture and Disjunction*, 153–68; here 155.

106 Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*, 106–7, and 114–9. In that sense, Von Moos argued, the tower is not the result of a sort of revival, but of a survival of earlier traditions.

107 Ibid., 70. In *De re aedificatoria*, Alberti distinguished the castle of a tyrant—who, needing to protect themselves from their subjects, had their residence outside the city—from the palace of a good king, that is located in the center of the city (Book V, Ch.1).

16 ROMAN PALACES I
Palazzo Senatorio, Rome, during the middle of the sixteenth century. The building was initially designed in an idealized four-tower scheme representing the function of the building as the traditional seat of the Roman municipal administration and symbol of both communal autonomy and papal authority.



which towers referred to seigneurial power, inherited from Medieval times, that was apparently sacrosanct.[108] After the papacy's return from Avignon, its self-conception and self-representation in institutional edifices had completely changed, leading away from its traditional residential forms.[109] The related renovation launched by Pope Nicholas V's extension of the Vatican palace and the formal unification of its existing, heterogeneous medieval structures closely emulated this ideal scheme. The site did, however, not allow for realizing this geometric ideal. But it was realized in the Palazzo Senatorio ⊠16—the traditional seat of the Roman municipal administration and symbol of both communal autonomy and papal authority.

Regarding this highly charged scheme, Waddy emphasizes that the pope's unique position disqualified his residences as a wider model; instead, as leaders of Roman society, the cardinals and their residences set the norm.[110] A tower—if a single one—was also the defining characteristic and a standard feature of cardinal palaces, as Cortesi's ceremonial manual *De Cardinalatu* (1510) attests.[111] This is also the case in the palace of Cardinal

108 Redig de Campos, *Palazzi Vaticani*, 46; Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*, 91.

109 See Kerscher, *Architektur als Repräsentation*, 61. The implementation of *castello* schemes into Italian papal residences begins already during the Avignon papacy with Aegudius Albornoz's designs for the papal *rocca* in Viterbo and Montefiascone, and the Palatium Apostolicum in Bologna. See here ibid., 348–430; for Montefiascone see also the analysis by Le Pogam, "Montefiascone: Le palais-forteresse," in *De la 'Cité de Dieu' au 'Palais du Pape*,' 407–57.

110 Waddy, *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces*, 3.

111 Paolo Cortesi, *De Cardinalatu Libri Tres …* (San Gimignano: Castro Cortesio, c.1510).

17 ROMAN PALACES II

Plan and spatial organization of the Palazzo Barbo (now Palazzo Venezia) in Rome with its characteristic tower. It was initially built for Cardinal Pietro Barbo in 1451–54, and greatly enlarged after 1464, when Barbo became Pope Paul II. The design was often attributed to Alberti, but was likely built by one of his pupils. Originally, the nucleus of the Cardinal's palace comprised approximately the bedchamber and the two larger halls (as indicated by reconstruction by C. L. Frommel, shown on the right), adjacent to the church of San Marco. With the extension, the basilica became enveloped by a vast sequence of representative, and liturgically differentiated reception rooms, modeled after the Vatican Palace, but with a cleaner design in its sequence of progressively smaller rooms.

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



18 ROMAN PALACES III
Plan and spatial organization of the Palazzo Farnese (Rome), built from 1514 to designs by Antonio da Sangallo the Younger for Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, and extended in 1534 when Farnese became Pope Paul III.
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

19 *Bottom*, the plan of the unexecuted design for the Palazzo dei Tribunali (Rome), projected c. 1506 by Donato Bramante for Pope Julius II.
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

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Pietro Barbo (b. 1451–54), the nucleus of the present Palazzo Venezia, ☒[17] which has been identified as an early catalyst in transforming the defensive ecclesiastic buildings into a representative Renaissance architecture.[112] Its nucleus, directly connected to the titular church of San Marco, housed the cardinal on the first floor. A staircase led to two identical halls that gave access to the cardinal's bedchamber, the position of which was articulated by a tower. It was complemented by a suite of backrooms that served as *anti-camere*; one was probably used as a dining area. The palace was extensively enlarged after 1464, when Barbo became Pope Paul II. Struggling to make the Vatican palace a home,[113] he complemented his former residence with a vast sequence of representative and liturgically differentiated reception rooms that enveloped the basilic. This spatial sequence was modeled after the papal palaces but with a cleaner design in its sequence of progressively smaller rooms.[114] As Trüby notes, for the first time, "here—as different from the Vatican still—an enfilade connected all rooms with a transversal axis of visibility and movement."[115] It was accessed through a new principal staircase leading to the *prima aula* (main hall), the *aula seconda* (secondary hall) and the *sala del mappamondo* (World Map room), which extended the older cardinals rooms (the *sala dei paramenti* and *sala del pappagallo*)[116] to the papal bedchamber as the traditional point of transcendence. Behind the bedchamber, the sequence was extended by a new study/collection room in the *camera della torre* (tower room) that gave access to the new loggia via a hallway. In this palace, which was later extended on the other side of the new staircase to accommodate a smaller residence for the cardinal,[117] we thus

112 See Christoph L. Frommel, *Der Palazzo Venezia in Rom* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982). The later reconstruction and extensions into the papal residence in 1466 were variously attributed to Giuliano da Maiano, Bartolomeo Bellano, or Bernardo Rosselino. Alberti is moreover often assumed as the architect. Frommel has repeatedly proposed Francesco del Borgo as the architect. See id, "Francesco del Borgo: Architekt Pius' II. und Pauls II. Palazzo Venezia, Palazetto Venezia und San Marco," in *Römisches Jahrbuch für Kunstgeschichte* 21 (1984), 71–164.

113 Frommel, *Palazzo Venezia in Rom*, 7–9.

114 Cantatore, "The Vatican Palace of Nicholas V," in *Renaissance Architecture of Power*, ed. Beltramo, Cantatore, and Folin, 297.

115 Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors*, 69.

116 Already added in the Vatican Palace, this secondary *camera paramenti* was reserved for the preparation of the pontifex, and drew a distinction between the Pope's and the Cardinals's preparation (Weddigen, *Papageienzimmer*, 79). Its naming after parrots, probably goes back to Majorcan customs, as hypothesized in Kerscher, *Architektur als Repräsentation*, 150–1.

117 Barbo's nephew, Marco Barbo, completed the project, adding a new cardinal's palace. In 1564, Pope Pius IV, attempting to win the sympathies of the Republic of Venice, gave the building to the Venetian embassy, under the condition that this part of the building would be kept as a residence for the cardinals of the titular church of San Marco.

20|21 ROMAN PALACES IV
Right, the Palazzo della Cancellaria Apostolica, Rome (b. 1489–1513 by Donato Bramante). Here, the traditional corner towers, that have characterized earlier ecclesiastic palaces, are just about to vanish.

Opposite page, the Palazzo Farnese, Rome (begun 1514 to designs by Antonio da Sangallo the Younger), lacking the towers that had traditionally marked cardinalatial palaces.



recognize the architectural intention to channel visitors through the entire sequence of rooms.[118]

In this catalytic function, the palace had an impact on the further development of Roman palaces. The external symbolism of the tower would slowly disappear the more this room sequence came to constitute an internal framework that determined the 'appearance' of its inhabitant. For example, in the newly erected Palazzo della Cancelleria ☒[20] (b. 1489–1513 by Donato Bramante), the super-elevated towers are almost absent, reduced to corner risalits .[119] The tower finally disappears with the Palazzo Farnese ☒[21] (b. 1514 to designs by Antonio da Sangallo the Younger), which — similar to the Palazzo Venezia — was enlarged in size and conception when Cardinal Alessandro Farnese became Pope Paul III in 1534. It is here that Waddy locates a "change from the compact princely apartment … to the extended linear suite."[120] The initial project of 1514 consisted of a 'miniature palace,' built around a central courtyard. ☒[18] The *sala* and adjacent rooms were added after 1515 and extended into a *camera seconda* or *salotto*, and a cam-

118 Thornton, *Italian Renaissance Interior*, 301. In contrast to the vestibule of the Palazzo Medici, here the corridor serves as a shortcut for the occupant and servants to circumnavigate the rooms.

119 Like the Palazzo San Marco, the palace is the residence of a Cardinal, whose titular church it envelops.

120 Waddy, *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces*, 10; and "The Roman Apartment," 161. See also Christoph L. Frommel, *Der Römische Palastbau der Hochrenaissance*, 3 vols (Tübingen: Wasmuth, 1973), I: 66–75.



era on the corner. The early parts were largely rearranged after 1540 by repositioning the staircase: The new stairs would now lead into a new grand reception hall, the *salone*, making the former *sala* a *salotto* that served as an anteroom to the *salotto seconda*. The corner room would become the parament chamber or third salotto. Here, too, it served as a hinge to a suite orthogonally continuing in the northern wing. In the development of Roman ecclesiastical palaces, we can thus clearly see a shared development in which the explicit signifying function of the tower becomes outmoded by the **ASIGNIFYING** organization through which this institutional edifice centralizes power.

Before the tower's function as a spatial marker fully disappeared during the sixteenth century, it left a major trace exactly where its organizational scheme was multiplied into an ideal four-tower one in a highly political project. The Palazzo dei Tribunali ☒[19] (proj. 1506, by Donato Bramante) is an imposing courthouse designed in response to Pope Julius II's political objectives to unify civil and canon law by creating a single headquarter for the four tribunals of Rome.[121] In this unfinished project, this usurping unification was

121 Besides the seminal studies of the design by Frommel, "Il palazzo dei Tribunali in via Giulia," in *Studi Bramanteschi - Atti del Congresso Internazionale, Milano-Urbino, Roma 1970*, ed. Comitato nazionale per le celebrazioni bramantesche (Rome: De Luca, 1974), 523–34; and Franco Borsi, "Palazzo dei Tribunali in via Giulia - San Biagio," *Bramante* (Milan: Electra, 1989), 281–86; see Nicholas Temple, "*Palazzo dei Tribunali* and the meaning of Justice," in *Renovatio Urbis: Architecture, Urbanism, and Ceremony in the Rome of Julius II* (London/New York: Routledge, 2011), 94–125. In contrast to the former study concern with locating the stylistic or typological precursors of this palace in different *Palazzi communale*, who evaluate the wider political and religious objectives

disguised by the external appearance of single-towered medieval communal palaces. If this scheme followed the Palazzo Senatorio, its implicit four-towered scheme largely determined the layout of the building as a bi-axially mirrored one housing four identical but independently accessed official residences for the judges. The plan provides conceptual traces of corner towers, their thicker walls merging with the main building. Here, the tower rooms (*camera nel torre*) serve as a spatial hinge, joining the central sala with its adjacent rooms (a *camera* and *guardacamera*) and the sequence of rooms (two *camere* and a studio with a small dining room (*tinello*) accessed through the second room) connected to it.

2.1.3 *Castelli* and *Villas*: From Territorial Assemblages to Nomadic Domains

A third kind of connective synthesis happens in yet another political ecology, in which the alignment of the highly coded sequentiality of ecclesiastical state assemblages strangely evolves into the axiomatic form that decodes spatial differences through privatization. This is the case in the Ducal Palace of Urbino ☒[22] (transf. after 1454; from 1466–72 under Luciano Laurana, and after 1476 by Francesco di Giorgio Martini).[122]

of the project and Julius II's attempts to "usurp the political and juridical authority of the Roman Senate. In order to legitimize this initiative it Would seem appropriate that Bramante had sought to emulate the communal palace on the Capitol in his design for the Palazzo dei Tribunali" (ibid., 96).

122 More than a planned figure, its regular shape was the outcome of complementing an older palace by a closed courtyard. For an analysis of the ducal apartment, see Andreas Tönnesmann, "Le palais ducal d'Urbino: Humanisme et réalité sociale," in *Architecture et vie sociale*, ed. Guillaume, 137–53. The complex comprised not only the apartments of the prince, his wife, and their children, but also apartments for guests and their suite; the premises of the *famiglia* (i.e. the staff working at the court and lived in the palace to the extent that their service required it), the chancery (i.e. the administration of the court and the state), and offices and stables (ibid., 141). For the newest authoritative study, overturning many older findings regarding the building history, see Janez Höfler, *Der Palazzo Ducale in Urbino unter den Montefeltro (1376–1508): Neue Forschungen zur Bau- und Ausstattungsgeschichte* (Regensburg: Schnell & Steiner, 2004), 158–9. The present complex was begun to be built after 1454, by complementing an existing Montefeltro palace, that according to Höfler is preserved in the footprint of the northern wing comprising the ducal apartments. In the 1430s the wing was extended through an existing east wing (the Palazzo della Jole) towards the south. Between 1457–60 and 1463–65, the courtyard was closed on the remaining southern and westerns side. When Luciano Laurana — who perhaps specialized in transforming medieval structures — began working on the palace in 1466 he found most of the palace completed. Laurana and Di Giorgio Martini finalized the complex by rebuilding the older northern wing into the present ducal apartments, by adding the turreted facade.

Where Cosimo 's residence appropriated the image and internal organization of the communal palace, the residence of Duke Federico da Montefeltro assumed the internal setting of ecclesiastical buildings. This spatiality was largely based on the older medieval Montefeltro palace, which initially consisted of a hall building and a residential cluster.[123] If its famous turreted facade decisively marks the building as a princely residence,[124] this singular tower block barely conceals an ecclesiastical connotation, as the palace's interior features the spatial sequencing of ecclesiastical buildings.

Access to the *sala* was given "through *andito*, loggia, and staircase, and, as in the Vatican [palace] and the Palazzo Venezia, the rooms became progressively smaller."[125] The *salone* and a banqueting hall, the *sala dei banchetti*, preceded the ducal chamber.[126] This room cluster could be entered through either an official room for audiences or from a private bedroom. With the addition of the representative facade, these terminal rooms became annexed by a *guardaroba* (serving as a treasure room) and the famous *studiolo* that became the connector within a 'U'-shaped arrangement doubling back on itself that Thornton sees as retrogressive, given its lack of a clear sequence—or at least a less rational sequence than that of the old Appartamento della Jole—to channel visitors.[127] Tönnesmann affirms instead how Urbino palace's novelty "lay not in the use of spaces of appearance, but in the appearance of a personal domain, removed from public scrutiny. By so disengaging the persona of the sovereign from the assemblage, there is henceforth a private sphere in the life of the sovereign that had hitherto unfolded entirely under the eyes of the court." [128]

123 This old cluster, as Höfler observes, was located beyond the old fortifications. Consisting of a room *guardacamera* and a *studiolo* with adjacent paned loggia, it already evidenced a certain disposition for isolation, which the transformation developed further. See Höfler, *Palazzo Ducale in Urbino*, 55–72; here 71.

124 Höfler suggests that Federico de Montefeltro, whose idea this facade was, must have 'somehow' been inspired by book illustrations of French aristocratic residences. Ibid., 159–60.

125 Frommel, *Architecture of Italian Renaissance*, 70.

126 Regarding the internal distribution, Tönnesmann, hypothesizes here a closer relation to the spatial disposition of the Papal residence in Avignon, with its two differently-sized *tinelli*. This could be likely, if one also considers that through the sloping topography, the residential cluster of the old Montefeltro palace must have already had a tower-like form similar to the papal tower in Avignon.

127 Cf. Thornton, *Italian Renaissance Interior,* 301.

128 Tönnesmann, "Palais ducal d'Urbino," 146. Unsuited for actual intellectual work, this piece had a more symbolic function in the exercise of power, as "it expressed an idea, presented to distinguished visitors at the end of an impressive series of pieces: the spectacle of the erudite prince" (ibid., 146–7). According to Höfler, it thus repeated in miniature the older configuration of *studiolo*, and *guardacamera*.

Besides this arrangement for managing visibility, a second outstanding feature of the palace has always been the symbolic position of the duchess's residential spaces, which constituted a separate lodging in an older outlying building.[129] Interesting for a genealogy of apartments is the way in which the duke's and duchess' lodgings were connected by the sala. As Tönnesmann notes, this produces a certain "fiction" to the extent that "conjugal life never took place in this room. … However, the visitor conversing with the Duke or waiting for a secret audience must have had the illusion of having already been introduced into the private sphere."[130] We can thus locate in this junction the beginnings of a spatial differentiation process, produced by (as much as further producing) a "dissociation between the figural and real function of a room" that Tönnesmann notes, "seems to anticipate a process that will culminate … in the *appartements de parade*" within the hierarchical arrangement of baroque aristocratic architecture. I will come back to this in the last part [→ PART III].[131] Important to note at this point is that, in going beyond the sequential orderings of space, in both these structural features—combining axiomatization and alignment—we are witnessing a first concretization of a newly emerging form of segmentarity in which these sequences began to be used as a **SERIAL SPACE**.[132]

Before we can follow how these reterritorialization processes helped to determine French aristocratic architecture, we first have to map the concurrent deterritorialization process mediating between Italian and French architecture. To do so we must attend to a fourth—and relatively complex—connective synthesis that brings us back to the question of visibility and access. Within the various political ecologies of Northern Italy during the Renaissance, we also find visibly articulated processes; for example, where

129 Federico's second spouse Battista Sforza had already passed when Federico realized his earlier plans to rebuild this building into a representative counterpart to his own apartment (ibid., 198, 245–7). It was finished only after 1482. In an earlier stage, the great stair divided the principal lodgings. Then, Duke Federico inhabited the older chapel room, which his half-brother Oddantonio profanized as a lodging during his rule. Battista Sforza initially inhabited the *piano nobile* of the Palazzo della Jole, which determined the compromising position of the staircase. See Höfler, Palazzo Ducale in Urbino, 61, 166. Deborah Howard points out, both duke and duchess, possibly possessed over a suite of cooler rooms for summer use directly beneath their apartments, on garden level. But "there is no evidence that they were actually used as a summer lodging" (Howard, "Seasonal Apartments," 134). Tönnesmann suggests, the lower rooms where occupied by the heir apparent.

130 Tönnesmann, "Palais ducal d'Urbino," 146.

131 Ibid.

132 I refer to my hyper-thread in my note 34, and note 77, and 376.

22 DUCAL PALACES II: Plan and spatial organization of the Palazzo Ducale, in Urbino. The present complex was begun to be built after 1454, by complementing an existing Montefeltro palazzo, that according to Höfler is preserved in the footprint of the northern wing comprising the ducal apartments. In the 1430s the wing was extended through an existing east-wing (the Palazzo della Jole) toward the south. Between 1457–60 and 1463–65, the courtyard was closed on the remaining southern and western side. When Luciano Laurana — who perhaps specialized in transforming medieval structures — began working on the palace in 1466, he found most of the palace completed. Laurana and Di Giorgio Martini finalized the complex by rebuilding the northern wing into the present ducal lodgings, by adding the turreted facade.
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

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the progressive re-feudalization of communal administration in the dynastic city states and the related restructuring of its institutions are expressed as a novel type of government building. These are the *castelli signorili*. These seigneurial castles fell back on an older building tradition: the defensive *castello* scheme with its four corner towers around a quadrilateral courtyard structure. Proliferating with the Norman encastellation of South Italy,[133] such castles have long been misconceived as purely utilitarian structures, as fortresses offering their owners protection against the attacks of their political enemies. The symbolic dimension of towers and crenellations in their connotation of high status remained poorly understood.[134] Von Moos reclaims these architectures as art-historical subjects and is one of the first to appreciate the *technical form* of towers and their function to display power. He notes that, especially when towers are used in clusters of four, the political iconography of their architecture transgresses mere defense to become a complex aesthetic apparatus that strongly converges with and formally represents the emerging ideal conceptions of the city.[135]

With this convergence of formal systems of order, the *castello* form enabled a new "architecture of political representation" that continued to be influential well into the sixteenth century.[136] On this point, the Peace of Lodi has been recognized for its transformative effect in prompting projects of unprecedented ambition at the three principle monarchic seats of Italy: the Castel Nuovo in Naples, the Castello di Milan and the Papal Palace in the Vatican.[137] These castles were transformed into courtly dwellings even if they never fully lost their defensive appearance and despite their radical "symbolic de-militarization"—as Patrick Boucheron has famously called the encasing of Gothic structures within a unifying classical facade. The medieval fortress was thus "far from being a relic of the past," Marco Folin notes; it only "took on a new appearance in the second half of the fifteenth century, confirming

133 The four-tower scheme that characterizes the formation of castles emerges also elsewhere, for example in Spain and England. For their 'minor origin,' see my note 49 and further below. The conquering Normands had introduced castles to England after the 1060s, both as built type in imposing their new rule on the country, as well as a notion among other juridico-political concepts that spelled out the architecture of a new social order.

134 On this point, see Jürgen Schulz, *The New Palaces of Medieval Venice* (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2004), 36n24; and Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*.

135 Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*.

136 Ibid., 31. The original gives "politische Representationsarchitektur."

137 See Marco Folin, "Princes, Towns, Palaces: A Renaissance 'Architecture of Power'," in Renaissance Architecture of Power, ed. Beltramo, Cantatore, and Folin, 3–27; here 7.

its status as a 'royal' residence par excellence."[138] It thus inspires a veritable trend to build palaces 'as if they were castles.'[139]

The Sforza Castle as an Architecture of Political Representation, 1450s

This visible change is but one, if significant, side of the story. Another side is hidden in the structural changes in the connective synthesis in which the architecture of the tower and its implicit organizational form do not become as decoupled as in the previous three types of assemblages. This process is best exemplified in the Sforza Castle in Milan ⊠[24–25] (reb. from 1540 on), the principal residence of the Sforza family and, under Ludovico, the setting of one of the most illustrious courts of Europe. When Francesco Sforza seized power in 1450, he asserted his new-found authority with the decision to reconstruct the Castello di Porta Giovia, which duke Gian Galeazzo Visconti built during the late fourteenth century as a residential citadel outside the city walls of Milan. In its four-tower scheme, the citadel followed the Castle of Pavia ⊠[24] (b.1361) in its function as the principal Visconti residence,[140] and the earlier Castello di Pandino in Cremona (c.1354–61) as another important example of fortified fourteenth-century Visconti architecture. The castle was destroyed by the Ambrosian republic in 1448–49, after Duke Filippo Maria Visconti lived there in isolation during the last years of his reign.[141] This large structure and its division into two nuclei (now the *rocchetta* and *corte ducale*) served as a foundation for a new palace, one that was completed under the reign of Francesco's son Galeazzo Maria.[142]

The official residence of the new Sforza family remained the Corte dell'Arengo, a relatively permeable complex in Milan's urban heart that dates

138 Ibid., 8–9. Folin uses the notion of 'symbolic de-militarization' after Patrick Boucheron, "'Non domus ista sed urbs,' Palais princiers et environnnement urbain au Quattrocento (Milan, Mantoue, Urbino)," in *Les palais dans la ville: Espaces urbain et lieux de la puissance dans la Méditerranée,* ed. idem and Jacques Chiffoleau (Lyon: PU de Lyon, 2004), 294–84.

139 On this point, see Howard Burns, "Castelli travestiti? Ville e residenze di campagna nel Rinascimento italiano," in *Il Rinascimento italiano e l'Europa. Vol. 6: Luoghi, spazi, architetture,* ed. Donatella Calabi and Elena Svalduz (Treviso: Cassamarca, 2010), 465–546.

140 Aurora Scotti, "The Sforza Castle of Milan (1450–1499)," in *Renaissance Architecture of Power*, ed. Beltramo, Cantatore, and Folin, 134–62; here 134–5.

141 For this decision "he was unanimously dismissed by his contemporaries as eccentric"; see Folin, "Princes, Towns, Palaces," in *Renaissance Architecture of Power*, ed. Beltramo, Cantatore, and Folin, 7–8.

142 Scotti, "The Sforza Castle of Milan," 135–6, for a detailed history of this complex construction history.

23 | 24 CASTELLI
***Left*, depiction of the of the principal Visconti residence, the Castello di Pavia (c. 1360s). *Right*, depiction of the Sforza Castello in Milan (rebuilt after 1450), as extended in the sixteenth century**



back to the 1300s.[143] Nadio Covini explains this choice politically; for an Italian sovereign, depending on the foundation of stately power in municipal institutions, it was essential to live a public-official life by being visible and accessible. Especially the Sforza, Covini notes, a new dynasty that came to power by virtue of a military conquest, "were constantly careful to appear often in public and to show themselves accessible to all."[144] They hosted receptions at the Corte dell'Arengo or "in the ducal castles of the countryside and, conversely, frequented the houses and palaces of private citizens, taking part in parties, receptions and banquets."[145] The architecture of the new castle must be understood in this sense: the Duke's lodging was located on the ground floor in the *corte ducale*'s north-west wing. It consisted of two rooms (a *guardacamera* and *camera*) and an adjacent *sala*, and a great banquet hall toward the inner courtyard. The corner tower with its square room, the so-called *sala delle asse*, connected his rooms to those of his spouse, Bona of Savoy, in the north-eastern wing, which comprised a hall and a room ☒[25].[146] Aurora Scotti emphasizes how "the rooms inside the castle did not have a set or fixed use, especially the first-floor apartments"

143 Nadia Covini, "Visibilità del principe e residenza aperta: le Corte dell'Arengo di Milano tra Visconti e Sforza," in *In principe inVisibile: Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi (Mantova 27–30 novembre 2013)*, ed. Lucia Bertolini, et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2015), 153–72; here 160.

144 Ibid., 155–6 (my trans., here and in the following).

145 Ibid., 167.

146 Scotti, "The Sforza Castle of Milan," 147–8.



that were being built with identical layouts after 1469.[147] The flexible use of space was the result of the "itinerant lifestyle" of the ducal family who, as Scotti stresses, moved between their various residences.[148]

From an assemblage-theory perspective, this 'nomadic' form of inhabitation is based on a distribution that does not assign so much value to fixed elements as sedentary state assemblages do but forms a continuous variation of space that acts as a relay. It is possible, because the fortress itself is already a specific regulator of movement.[149] Here space is no longer distributed and hierarchized according to (and representing) an external logic (*logos*) 'outside or above what is distributed,' but a more immanent principle of distribution within itself (*nomos*):[150] in contrast to alignments and axiomatizations, this nomadic distribution organizes relations so as to 'mobilize forces.' This can be seen in Galeazzo Maria's decision in 1466 to introduce a courtly etiquette limiting access to his private rooms and person,

147 Ibid..

148 Ibid., 146.

149 The notion of a regulator of movement is borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 386.

150 From Greek νόμος, from the verb νέμω, *némō*, "to dispense or to allot." On the Deleuzo-Guattarian definition of nomadic distribution by opposing *logos* to *nomos*, see Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 352–423, esp. 369–373. I borrow the formulation here from Claire Colebrook, "Nomadicism," in *Deleuze Dictionary (rev. edn.)*, ed. Parr, 185–8: "In the first, space is divided, distributed, and hierarchized [analogically] by some law, logic, or voice (*logos*) that is outside or above what is distributed. … *Nomos* or nomadic law has its principle of distribution within itself. … A certain distribution occurs in and through the act."

25 SFORZA CASTLE

Plan and spatial organization of the Castello di Milan, as extended by Francesco and Galeazzo Maria Sforza. In 1450 work began on the lateral wings of the Rocchetta, including three rooms and a hall on the south-western side and one room and a vast reception hall on the north-western side. The Corte Ducale, a U-shaped structure, was built under the involvement of architect Benedetto Ferrini. Antonio Averlino (il Filarete) was working on the urban front of the palace, and the perimeter wall with its round corner towers and an entrance with its central tower (whose lost design remains uncertain).

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

DELLA BALLA)
SA
CA. DEL DUCA
GR
TORRE DEL TESORO
PONTICELLA
†
CA. VERDE
SA
LOGGIA
CA
GR?
NEW RECEPTION HALL (SALA DELLA BALLA)
†
CA

1:1000

and to make the *castello* his official residence a year later.[151] If the previously discussed assemblages produced relative negative deterritorializations (meaning changes that maintain and reproduce established state assemblages), this NOMADIC ASSEMBLAGE would cause a 'relative positive deterritorialization' (a change that neither reproduces an established assemblage nor is able to produce an entirely new one).

An 'absolute positive deterritorialization,' eventually enabling an entirely new assemblage, would only happen once the *castello* scheme would be taken into a different nomadic context. This process began when, during the French campaigns in Italy in 1499, Milan fell in to the hands of the French King Louis XII (to remain tributary land until 1525). The *castello* was now a part of France, where the scheme and its round corner towers found as much resonance as it inspired—as the next section will discuss—a radical turn in the design of aristocratic residences. This radical turn, I argue, is related to a specific structural transformation of the tower's technical function in this relative positive deterritorialization.

The Villa's Breaking Up of the *Castello*, 1450

This deterritorialization is not so much related to the *castello* scheme itself than to the crucial opening process that it underwent at the end on the fifteenth century. In earlier castles, towers were just defensive annexes or appurtenances to the residential wings. With the trend of building palaces 'as if they were fortresses,' which initially persisted in princely residences in the Italian countryside, the architecture of towers would incrementally give shape to a new type of villa in the late fifteenth century, as architects progressively transformed these corner towers into projecting parts of the residential wings themselves.[152] The Villa Medici at Fiesole (c.1450 by Antonio Manetti

151 Covini suggest that a curious trait of the residential history of the Visconti-Sforza dynasty was its constant alternation between open urban or secreted fortified dwellings. Concerning the motives of Galeazzo Maria, both measures have been seen as aspiring to monarchic ambitions but they were also a political tactic: "The story is known: the impatience of the young duke to share the government with his mother Bianca Maria went hand in hand with the intolerance towards the interference of a group of powerful nobles of the Ghibelline side that constituted the entourage of the mother" (Covini, "Visibilità del principe," 169).

152 Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*, 122. Von Moos sees this as the indicator of a "continued influence of a scheme passed down from medieval times: the 'portico villa with projecting corner wings'" (Ibid.). This type, as postulated by architecture historian Karl Swoboda, had an arrangement not dissimilar to the facades of the four-towered *castelli*, or the norther wing of the Vatican Palace. This scheme, in which a loggia framed by two flanking towers constitutes a representative facade was conserved in the facades of the Venetian Palace. But it gained a new importance in the design of Tuscan and Roman Villas.

Ciaccheri for Giovanni de' Medici), one of the first 'de-fortified' and regularized plans, represents a new building type that, as Sabine Frommel has shown, emerged alongside the arrival of a "new way of life."[153] The defortification expressed a "wish for a more intense relationship with nature," a desire that led private buildings to incrementally take on the "aesthetic principles" connoted to nature, such as "symmetry, equilibrium and hierarchy, which had been formerly reserved for religious edifices."[154]

The Villa Farnesina ⊠[26] (b.1506–10) is usually seen as representing the synthesis of this type-formation process, as is the Villa Trisino in Cricoli ⊠[26] (c.1535), which inspired a new architecture in which residential rooms were arranged in tower-like protruding corners of a building.[155] Often discussed in this context is the groundbreaking Medici Villa, Poggio a Caiano ⊠[26] (b.1483 to designs worked out in an intimate dialogue between Lorenzo de' Medici and his favorite architect, Guiliano da Sangallo[156]). Its lateral voids emerge through a subtraction, by means of which not only the central *sala* but also the rooms in the remaining corner pavilions received more daylight. This villa

153 For a detailed analysis, I refer to the related research by Sabine Frommel, "Medici Villas as Expression of a New Way of Life and of Perception," in *The Early Modern Villa: Senses and Perceptions versus Materiality*, ed. Barbara Arciszewska (Warsaw: Museum of King Jan III Palace at Wilanów, 2017), 17–34; id., "Giuliano da Sangallo and Leonardo da Vinci: Cross-Pollination or Parallels?," in *Illuminating Leonardo*, ed. Constance Moffatt and Sara Taglialagamba (Leiden/Boston: Brill 2016), 85–99; and id., "Leonardo da Vinci und die Typologie de Zentralizierten Wohnbaus," *MKHIF* (2006), 257–300; see also id., "Gli hotels particuliers a Parigi," *Bolletino d'arte, Volume speciale* (2016), 392–418.

154 Frommel, "Medici Villas as Expression of a New Way of Life," 17.

155 Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*, 115 and 124. Since I will not be discussing these villas at length, I refer to the respective monographic studies. For the oft-discussed Villa Farnesina in Rome's suburbs, built by Baldessare Peruzzi in 1506–10 for papal banker Agostino Chigi, see Christoph L. Frommel, Guilia Caneva, and Alessandro Angeli, eds., *La Villa Farnesina a Roma/The Villa Farnesina in Rome*, 2 vols (Modena: Panini, 2003); and Frommel, *Die Farnesina und Peruzzis architektonisches Frühwerk (Neue Münchner Beiträge zur Kunstgeschichte)* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1961). For the Villa in Cricoli near Vicenza (remodeled in the 1530s, with the assistance of Andrea Palladio) by Humanist Giangiorgio Trissino, who based its tower-flaked facade with a central arcaded loggia on Serlio's drawn records of the Villa Madama or Cornaro's Odeon in Padua), see Robert Tavernor's introduction to Andrea Palladio, *The Four Books of Architecture*, trans. id. and Richard Schofield (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), viii–xi. The design is noteworthy for its symmetry, and the three-room sequence with central enfilade. For its influence of this 'archetype' "on Everything later undertaken by Palladio," as pointed out by Rudolf Wittkower's two-part essay, "Principles of Palladio's Architecture I," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 7 (1944), 102–122, here 109; and id., "Principles of Palladio's Architecture II," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 8 (1945), 68–106; see also James Ackermann, *Palladio* (London: Penguin, 1991; orig. pub.1961), Giovanni Giaconi, and Kim Williams, *The Villas of Palladio* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2003), 22–6; and Loren Patridge, *Art of Renaissance Venice, 1400–1600* (Oakland: Univ. of California Press, 2015), 273–5.

156 Here after Frommel, "Medici Villas as Expression of a New Way of Life," 24; on this point, see my Part I, note 123. On the genesis of the design itself, see id., *Giuliano da Sangallo* (Florence: Edifir, 2014), 70ff. See here for a list of monographic studies.

has often been seen as a radical antithesis to earlier country estates of the Medici, since, as Von Moos notes, all "remembrance of medieval fortification building schemes seems erased, replaced by an antique design vocabulary. A look at the plan brings a useful correction of this opinion. … It is obvious, that this layout barely conceals the medieval *castello* type."[157] Instead, the capacities of its compositional scheme *ad quadratum*[158] were further explored in the design of the Poggio Reale ☒[27] (b.1487–89 by Giuliano da Maiano to a *modello* conceived by Lorenzo de' Medici—probably assisted by Sangallo—on the request of Alfonso d'Aragona).[159] As Von Moos notes, it radically "strips the *castello* type more consistently of its defensive function. … Here, the corner towers owe their form not to a necessary and massive isolation from the outside, but by contrast, to a need for openness" to the surrounding landscape and garden.[160]

Taking place at the beginning of the Little Ice Age, this opening maximized the illumination of residential spaces and triggered a fundamental transformation as the former defensive provenance of this architecture was finally undermined. Thereby, something rather remarkable happens through which the tower becomes a central (if rather unexpected) figure in the genealogy of the apartment. It is here that Von Moos's initial 'technical' reading helps to identify how these architectural arrangements—under their changing surface—gain a novel **A-SIGNIFYING** function in responding to changing environmental conditions. As I will show next, this practice will become important for the reconsideration of the organizational differentiation of buildings into wings and pavilions in French architecture around the 1550s. And it is this differentiation that should dramatize the longstanding problem related to the problem of access. The architectural arrangement of towers and castles that gives them their potential for access control would become the catalyst and transformative agent in this process.

The purpose of this first section was to emphasize that any isolated view of this development (i.e. a spatial focus on separation, or regional outlook or study) fails to account for the fact that one is dealing here with a parallel evolution of various political ecologies, and their different politics of

157 Here Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*, 123 (all trans. mine).

158 Frommel, "Medici Villas as Expression of a New Way of Life," 21.

159 Here after Frommel, "Medici Villas as Expression of a New Way of Life," 24; id., *Giuliano Sangallo*, 82ff. For a recent monography with reconstructions, see esp. Paola Modesti, *Le delizie ritrovate: Poggio Reale de la villa del Rinascimento nella Napoli aragonese* (Florence: Olschki, 2014).

160 Here Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*, 122 (my trans.); on this openness as a constitutive to a new form of living, see Frommel, "Medici Villas as Expression of a New Way of Life," 23ff.

26 ITALIAN VILLAS
Beneath the floor plans of several villas formally based on the *castello* scheme: *Left*, the Villa Medicea at Poggio a Caiano (as show on the painting, *above*), built c. 1483 by Giuliano da Sangallo.
Level +01

***Center*, the Villa Farnesina (Rome), built by Baldessare Peruzzi, 1506–10 for papal banker Agostino Chigi.**
Level 00, +01

***Right*, the Villa Trissino (Cricoli), remodeled in the 1530s by Trissino with help of by Palladio.**
Level +01





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27 POGGIO REALE
Conjectural rendering of the Villa Poggio Reale (near Naples), designed by Lorenzo de'Medici and Giuliano da Sangallo, and built 1487–89 by Giuliano da Maiano. The project is fully based on the *castello* type, yet strips it consequently of its defensive function. Thereby the corner towers open toward the countryside, evidencing a radical need for openness. Beneath the reconstructed floor plan and spatial organization.
Level 00







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spatial assemblage. As I have shown, the political iconography of inhabiting seigneurial towers gradually came to be replaced by the sequentialization of spatial functions within growing and increasingly differentiated room series. The next section will investigate, how the emerging segmentarity further catalyzed the form-taking architecture of appartements in France.

2.2

The Disjunctive Synthesis in the Logis's Internal Modification

The previous chapter mapped the different politics of assemblages driving the divergent palatial architectures. This mapping highlighted how statist and capitalist assemblages lead to a specific 'alignment' and 'axiomatization' of residential structures in what I identified as negative deterritorialization processes. In these processes, the external tower comes to be substituted for growing internal room sequences, which can be distinguished from a specific nomadic form of distribution in which the spatiality of the *castello* itself gains a technical function as regulator of movement, leading to a 'relative positive deterritorialization' of aristocratic architecture in which the new four-tower scheme resonates with new ideal conceptions of the city.[161] In this chapter, I look closely at how an 'absolute positive deterritorialization' is effectuated at the beginning of the sixteenth century, when this nomadic dispositif enters a productive relation with the French court.

In the sixteenth century, the French court was a still a rather nomadic institution that retained many organizational characteristics of an army camp and the war machinery that it had appropriated.[162] After being displaced from Paris during the English invasion, the French monarchs governed in an itinerant fashion. Up until the reign of Henry II, the court resided at any one place for only a few months.[163] This lordly nomadism and its inherited forms

161 Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*.

162 Françoise Boudon and Monique Chatenet, "Le Logis du roi de France au XVIe siècle," in *Architecture et vie sociale*, ed. Guillaume, 65–82; here 65. Here also after Elias, *Court Society*, 35. See also Chatenet, *La cour*, 15–35. For a detailed study, see "Résumé des communications du colloque 'Le nomadisme châtelain (IXe–XVIIe siècle),' 6e colloque international au château de Bellecroix, 14 au 16 octobre 2016, available online at http://www.cecab-châteaux-bourgogne.fr/activites/2016-nomadisme-chatelain-interventions.html. If we wish to be conceptually rigorous, and stay true to Deleuze's dictum that 'migrants change habitat, nomads change habits,' then this itinerant lifestyle is in fact a more 'migratory' mode of living than a truly nomadic one. Given the conceptual consensus in historical court studies, I will use the (usually more metaphorically-used) term in a 'philosophically anexact' way to analyze the progressive 'becoming-sedentary' of the de-territorialized French court after the political upheavals around the Hundred Years' War, and the crucial change in the court assemblage, this 'settling down' involves as a re-territorialization process. Perhaps the courtly nomadism is most appropriately understood as a pastoral form of living, if we follow Braudel's distinction that "Nomadism … involves the whole community and moves it long distances: people, animals, and even dwellings," whereas, for instance transhumance as "one form of the Mediterranean pastoral way of life, … concerns a specialized population: the shepherds [or courtiers]. It implies a division of labour, a settled form of agriculture [domestic culture] with crops [courts] to maintain, fixed dwellings, and villages." Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Volume I*, trans. Sian Reynolds (New York: Harper, 1992; orig. pub. 1972), 87–91. In this regard one would need to update Foucault notion how the state emerges from 'pastoral power,' as developed for instance in Foucault "Subjects and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (Summer 1982), 777–95.

163 Chatenet, *La cour*, 15–16. Chatenet provides a calculation of the number of days spent in each château during the reigns of Charles VIII–Henri III, see id, *La cour*, esp. 36–38 and

of displaying power and masculine identity was primarily a tool of governance allowing "to defend borders, or conquer new territories, to replenish the royal finances … to revive the monarchic cult by showing himself to his subjects, and to tighten ties amongst a disunited kingdom."[164] By the beginning of the sixteenth century, however, the French monarchy started evolving from a feudal agglomeration of territories into a relatively centralized, modern kingdom centered at the newly established royal court at Amboise ⊠[35].[165] Yet, the court itself remained largely nomadic due to the political claims, in the context of the Italian campaigns, of the French Kings Charles VIII (reigned 1483–98), Louis XII (1498–1515) and François I (1515–47).

This nomadism was also the political precondition for a cultural climate that facilitated a wide inter-cultural exchange between Italy and France. Art historians stress the importance of the years 1494–1525, during which the repeated French invasions resulted, as Anthony Blunt nicely phrases it, in "a reverse invasion of France by Italian taste."[166] It is well known that Charles VIII started to deeply misappreciate his principal royal residence at Amboise following his encounter with Italian architecture. In 1495, he left his residence in the Poggio Reale, the country estate and suburban retreat of the royal family of Naples, with the plan to recreate this 'earthly paradise.' During the early 1500s, the royal court regained a leading cultural position.[167] Especially under François I's patronage, the growing court attracted a circle of thinkers, humanists, painters and architects, luring also Italy's greatest artists and thus establishing a new nexus of creativity. This contributed to a fundamental transformation (that I like to read as an 'absolute positive deterritorialization') of French architecture — namely its own Renaissance.

Studies of French renaissance architecture have thus considered the typological transformation from relatively enclosed castles into open, permeable palaces, and the emergence of apartments within this transformation, in

its annex, 318–23.

164 Ibid., 18. On the aspect of masculine identity, and the related aspect of hunting castles, see Christy Anderson, *Renaissance Architecture* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2016), 196.

165 As Anthony Blunt writes: "Louis XI had done much to break down the strength of the feudal nobility and to concentrate the effective power of government in their own hands, and Louis XII, and Francis I were to continue this process. At the same time they strove to break down the spirit of the *États* and the *Parlements*, which were another source of resistance to complete centralization. … Francis I … had gone far towards the construction of that personal absolutism which was to be the characteristic of the French constitution for the next two hundred years." Anthony Blunt and Richard Beresford, *Art and Architecture in France, 1500–1700* (New Haven: Yale UP, 1999), 1.

166 Ibid.

167 Ibid.: "As the Crown became the center of French administration, the Court became the focal point of culture in the kingdom. Under Louis XII it was [still} possible for a great minister like Cardinal Amboise to be the leaders of taste, far in advance of the King."

light of these political and cultural changes. For example, Wolfram Prinz's and Ronald Kecks's study approaches the evolving architecture of palaces from the specific "metamorphosis" of the traditional French *donjon* tower —historically a combination of defensive structure and domestic architecture—from a compact and closed building into an open one.[168] Since before but especially after the 100-year war and the subsequent centralization of power, the *donjon* lost much of its dominant character as a territorial epicenter, Prinz and Kecks argue. The resulting decrease in defensive function gave way to increasing residential demand to break open the constrained architecture of the tower.

The shift of emphasis to dwelling more comfortably resulted in a new representative *leitmotif* that was found in the architecture of the four-tower scheme:[169] as genealogically an equally defensive (hence 'powerful') but—compared to the *donjon*—more spacious (thus 'grand') architecture. This way, we see not only a metamorphosis of the *donjon* into an open arrangement but also, as Hanser has shown, a parallel development in which French castles were "in the process of becoming separate types of [four-tower-scheme] structures," diverging toward either more defensive fortresses (*châteaux forts*) or representational manors (*châteaux*).[170] These two parallel and diverging —yet somehow also converging—developments characterize this period: a 'decomposition' in which the compound structure of the *donjon* reverts back to its initial elementary defensive and residential components, and a similar process in the evolution of the castle scheme. I avoid this typological view, however, since it misses a specific moment in which these two evolving architectures lead to a **DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** within the evolving topology of apartments. This disjunctive synthesis is a technical term in Deleuze's thinking to capture "a synthesis of divergent series that do not converge [into the same] yet somehow manage to communicate by virtue of a difference that passes between them like a spark."[171]

As such, it means something coming together in a certain entanglement. It is from this perspective that I want to return to Von Moos's claim that

168 Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*; see also David A. Hanser, *Architecture of France* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2006), 47–53; here 47. The *donjon* was similarly described as the "germinal cell of the French palatial architecture" by Uwe Albrecht, *Von der Burg zum Schloß: Französische Schloßbaukunst im Spätmittelalter* (Worms: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1986), 7.

169 Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 32.

170 Hanser, *Architecture of France*, 47. See also Jean Mesqui, *Châteaux forts et fortifications en France* (Paris: Flammarion, 1997).

171 Levi R. Bryant, "Love," larvalsubjects blog, posted online on May 19, 2011, at https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/05/19/love/.

the *castello*/*castrum* scheme "sparked the novel idea to arrange the residential rooms in tower-like projecting corners of a building," which was the catalyst for the architecture of the *donjon* to crack open.[172] In this way, I hope to contribute another reading of this process that underscores an as-yet unobserved disentanglement of the architecture of the tower from its capacity to regulate movement. I will illustrate that this disentanglement resonates with the nomadic dispositif of the *castrum* as a specific regulator of movement.

2.2.1 The Internal Differentiation of the *Donjon*

This defining dis/entanglement is concealed in a specific re-arrangement that Prinz's and Kecks's typological inflection only tangentially touches on. They note the progressive growth and internal differentiation of the one-room character of the *donjon*. Earlier *donjons*, and also the one in Vincennes, were built around a central room, with smaller rooms in the projecting corner towers. One of these towers traditionally contained the spiral staircase. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, we find important innovations. In the Donjon of Sarzay, ☒[28] (c.1440) the central space is divided into two rooms differentiated in size. This dividing wall was a constructive feature of another type of smaller castle: the *manoir*.[173] For example, the Manoir of Camarsac ☒[28] (built around the end of thirteenth century) features two room sequences divided by a central longitudinal partition. Here, too, access is gained through a spiral staircase in a corner tower and a vestibule, and the large *salle* provided access to the smaller chambers adjacent to it.

From *Donjon* to *Plan massé*, 1440–1540s

Staircases in external turrets (*tour hors œuvre* in French) are truly a French invention. In Sarzay, the staircase was progressively displaced, however, and re-situated in an additional tower centrally positioned on the main facade to give access to multiple rooms. While this displaced staircase tower would also have a decisive influence on the development of the linear architecture of the *corps de logis* ,[174] it also reflects the beginnings of a development in

172 Von Moos, *Turm und Bollwerk*, 124.

173 The *manoir* originated from a hybrid type in which a wooden building was enclosed by protective a stone wall. The dividing wall is likely a constructive feature of the gable roof construction of the central building. The roof was divided along the long axis to avoid big spans. It was also a characteristic feature of some Norman Castles.

174 Cf. Uwe Albrecht, "Le petit château en France et dans l'Europe du Nord aux XVe et XVIe siècles," in *Architecture et vie sociale*, ed. Guillaume, 193–206.

28 FRENCH CHATEAUX
***Top right*, a photography of the Château de Martainville. *Below*, the plans and spatial organizations of various *donjons* and *chateaux* with a more compact layout, the so-called *plan massé*.**

Donjon de Romefort (Indre)
c. 1180–90s
Level +01

Manoir de Camarsac (Gironde),
b. end 13th century
Level +01

Château de la Muette (near Paris) and below Château de Challeau (Seine et Marne), b. 1542, by Pierre Chambiges
Level +01



Donjon de Sarzay (Indre)
c. 1440s
Level +01



Château de Martainville (Seine-Maritime), c. 1495–1505 for Jacques le Pelletier
Level 00, +01





Château de Chenonceau (Indre-et-Loire), b. 1515–21
Level +01







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29 CHÂTEAU DE CHAMBORD: Plans and spatial organization of the Royal Château de Chambord (Loir-et-Cher), built from 1519–50, probably by Domenico da Cortona, incorporating earlier design features of Leonardo da Vinci.
Right: Level +01 and mezzanine. Below: Level 00




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30 VINCENNES: The castle of Vincennes is situated about 10 kilometers outside medieval Paris. After his ascension, Charles V completed his father's architectural project by adding a *donjon* tower (1369–70), the fortificatory fucntion of which was later emphasized by a large surrounding *castrum* wall (1373–80), with nine residential towers with accommodations for the king's councilors.
Section Donjon, and floor plan of levels 00, +01, 02, 03





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

31 | 32 ITALIAN INFLUENCES
***Right*, Cortona's original design of the central Keppp of Chambord with straight Italian stairs; *opposite page*, a sketch of Leonardo da Vinci's sketch for the unexecuted Romorantin Palace—a microcosmic replica of an ideal city.**

which the *donjon* would progressively develop into a compact castle type, based on the so-called *plan massé,* Prinz and Kecks argue. The plan of the Château de Martainville ⊠[28] (b.1495–1505) for example introduces a side-spacing hallway between the entrance and the staircase that simultaneously serves as a vestibule and corridor to allow independent access to all principal and their adjoining complementary rooms in the enlarged corner towers. The bipartition of the *logis* caused by such an *allée*[175] would culminate in Château de Chenonceau ⊠[28] (b.1515–21), where the stairs, following the Italian model, were moved entirely inside the building volume, not only separating hall and chambers but also further disengaging the chambers from one another.[176] Later, in the private castle of Bailleul (b.1543) and the royal hunting castle of Challeau ⊠[28] (b.1542), the *allée* would further detach these rooms.[177]

175 Du Cerceau's second volume of *Les plus excellents bastimens*, records: "ce lieu est fort bien basty: car d'vne terrace qui est fur le deuant, on entre dans le *logis* à vne allée, faifant séparation du corps du bastiment en deux dont chacun costé est bien & suffisamment fourny de membres necessaires pour vn tel lieu" (fol. 5r).

176 For monographic studies of the oft-discussed château de Chenonceau, see Jean Guillaume, "Chenonceaux avant la construction de la galerie. Le château de Thomas Bohier et sa place dans l'architecture de la Renaissance," in *Gazette des beaux-arts* 73, no.1 (1969), 19–46; Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Chenonceau* (Paris: Biro, 2002); see also Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 525–32.

177 For the plan of the Château de d'Angerville-Bailleul, see also Claude Sauvageot, *Palais, châteaux, hôtels et maisons de France du XVe au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Morel, 1867), Vol. III, 43–55; and Michel Hochmann, "Le château de Bailleul," *Bulletin Monumental* 150, no.3 (1992), 239–63. For Challeau, see Albert Bray, "Un des 'plus excellents bastiments de France': Le château de Saint-Ange (Challeau)," *Bulletin Monumental* 114, no.4 (1956), 267–74.



Regarding this disengagement, the focus should shift from the formation of the corridor structure to the emerging clustering of rooms.

In this regard, the initial design for the famous and well-studied royal hunting castle of Chambord ☒[29] (b. 1519–50 to designs of Domenico da Cortona) is quite telling.[178] Art historians like Blunt and Hanser have long identified Chambord as particularly exemplary for its supposedly unprecedented regularity. Blunt as well as Prinz and Kecks have stressed, however, that several smaller châteaux, built for private individuals, in fact preceded the grand royal schemes. These smaller châteaux are characterized by a completely new regularity in plan inspired by Italian *castelli*.[179] Among these, the most notable are the Château Le Plessis Bourré (b. 1468–72), the prototypical Château Le Verger

178 The architect responsible for the design and execution is contested. We know that the first plans were made around 1519, when work began a few months after Leonard's death. Like Hanser (*Architecture of France*, 47–53), many historians credit Leonardo as chief designer. Already in 1913 Marcel Reymond pointed out that this and many of Chambord features could well be traced back to Leonardo, some historian claimed that da Vinci had a role in the design. For a discussion, see Hidemichi Tanaka, "Leonardo da Vinci, Architect of Chambord?," *Artibus et Historiae* 13, no. 25 (1992), 85. Blunt long maintained the position it was 'with every probability' designed by Domenico da Cortona (c. 1465–c. 1549, an Italian architect and pupil of Giuliano da Sangallo), while being strongly modified in the course of the execution (Blunt, *Art and Architecture in France*, 10–19). The early conception contained straight principal stair (as recorded in André Félibien's drawing of Cortona's original wooden *modello*) by the grand spiral staircase. At least, or especially the idea for the central spiral staircase, is now consensually attributed to Da Vinci. See Jean Guillaume, "Chambord, château of," in *The Dictionary of Art*, 36 vols., ed. Jane Turner (New York: Grove, 1996), VI: 415–17).

179 Blunt, *Art and Architecture in France*, 9.

(b.1494–99), the stylistically relevant Château de Gaillon (b.1501–06), Bonnivet (b.1516–24), the paradigmatic Château de Bury (b.1511–24) and Azay-le-Rideau (b.1518–27).[180] ⊠↓38–43

Here a common starting point has been the idea that regular shapes facilitate spatial differentiation processes, according to which art historians began to trace the internal spatial differentiation of apartments in the context of an external, typological transformation.[181] In this view, the plan of Chambord ⊠29 and the greatly enlarged central keep with its four corner towers was most characteristic. Other than its allusion to sacral architecture, the innovation of this spatial disposition, Blunt argues, concerns the way in which the central keep "is divided into four parts by a Greek cross, the arms of which lead from the entrances to the central staircase. This arrangement leaves in each corner a square space divided into a large room, two smaller ones, and a closet."[182] Hanser more closely observes that these room clusters actually comprise a large bedroom and six smaller pieces (including those on the mezzanine level) including dressing rooms, studies and oratories, while the towers house four additional smaller lodgings each consisting of a bedroom with four smaller rooms.[183] Guillaume names this arrangement a "triumph of the centralized layout—itself a wholly Italian element."[184] The other characteristically Italian design element is the 'Italian stair,' featuring in the initial design by Cortona, where—similar to Chenonceau—an internal hallway spatially separated the rooms. ⊠31 The realized central double-helix stair, and cross-like layout that came to replace it, even more forcefully disengages the resulting corner clusters.

Scholium I: On Inclusive Disjunction

This formation can best be understood by looking at the process producing this disengagement, namely the inclusion of the stair that generates these

180 Long recognized as the most ambitious project of its time long, Gaillon was the summer archiepiscopal residence of Georges d'Amboise, Cardinal and Archbishop of Rouen, who transformed an existing château-fort into a palace of unparalleled luxury and magnificence. Le Plessis-Bourré was built for Finance Minister Jean Bourré, the principal advisor to King Louis XI; Le Verger was built for the maréchal de Gié; Bury was commissioned by his successor Florimond Roberet, the last ones by wealthy financiers. See Blunt, *Art and Architecture in France*, 9.

181 Besides Blunt, and Prinz and Kecks, see Jean-Pierre Babelon, ed., *Le Châteaux de France au siècle de la Renaissance* (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), for a French study perpetuating this view. These quadrangular dispositions date back to the 14th-century *châteaux* built by Bertrand de Got (later Pope Clemens V), at Villandraut, Roquetaillade, and Fargues.

182 Ibid., 12.

183 Hanser, *Architecture of France*, 50–1

184 Guillaume, "Chambord."

clusters as partly disconnected structures. The historical formation of apartments should not be confused with the appearance of a regular unit that can be identified in plan. This confusion would constitute illegitimate use of the **DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** and lead to the inadequate notion that the apartment was formed at a singular moment in time.[185] Disjunctive synthesis does not imply the emergence of a closed system but of a dissipative structure linking incommensurable entities, a reproducible, steady state that both organizes the connective process and appropriates its product. In this process, the real 'disjunction' happens where a (spatial) product becomes disentangled from the (spatial) production process of which it was part. The following section attempts to map this disentanglement by shifting the focus from the apparent regularity of architectural plans to the inherent regulative capacity within architectural arrangements. It is precisely here that we need to avoid a weak mereotopological view toward part-to-whole relations (and its foregrounding of closed systems and negative and non-productive conception of difference),[186] in order to arrive at a more productive conception of the **INTENSIVE DIFFERENCE** operating this process.

185 Historical studies have, in overlooking the process leading to clustered formations, wildly confused the emergence of a *regular unit in plan* for an explanation when they directly equated the formation of these apparently disengaged clusters in plan with the birth of 'the French apartment' as a spatial sub-unit. Blunt for example does so in identifying this clustered disposition as "the appartement, which was to be the regular unit of French domestic planning for the next two centuries" (Blunt, *Art and Architecture in France*, 12). Yes; one can certainly consider—and, as I outlined above, this was predominantly done—this history as a gradual process starting from a 'unification,' which resulted in the planning 'unit' (*Einheit*) of an apartment that then becomes internally more differentiated and thereby grows and proliferates. Yet, in an assemblage-theoretic reading—avoiding both the unitary hermeneutic tradition of historical studies and their discrete view of architectural structures—this merging into a single entity (*Vereinigung*) involves not so much a homogenizing 'unification' (*Vereinheitlichung*), nor any 'unitizing' subdivision (*Répartition, Einteilung*). Instead it is just a differentiation, that as I want to show, must be understood as a distributed process consisting not only of three interrelated syntheses. But also, as my introduction has elaborated on at length, the central **DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** must be understood in terms of an *inclusive disjunction*. Here, it seems worthwhile to repeat the theoretical underpinnings of this historiographically provocative position, here, to clarify what I mean by 'illegitimate.' Principally, I argue, this unitary way of thinking is illegitimate from a theoretical point of view because—in relying on a fixed image of thought (e.g. a clear and distinct unit in plan)—it merely leads to what Spinoza criticized as "inadequate ideas" (See my Book O, note 183). Based on this view, tracing buildings in an attempt to answer 'whether this or that is an apartment' or not, is based on the illegitimate use of an **EXCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION** that in its essentialist view fails to foreground the long process "becoming-apartment" within the transformation of aristocratic architecture, that in failing to answer the question *genetically*, only offers an inadequate idea of this historical formation.

186 For an excellent explanation, I refer to Claire Colebrook's entry "Disjunctive Synthesis," in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 2nd edn., ed. Parr. More than implying this would be a mistake of the respective authors, I here take the Deleuzian realization that this is a wider basic flaw of human thinking. As Shaviro notes in a discussion of Deleuze's conception of the

In this regard, let me shift attention away from the supposed 'unique' character of Chambord and the 'unitary' character of the clusters not only to the heterogeneous room sizes within each cluster but also to the different scales between the central and the tower clusters. By attending to the difference in scale, we can avoid the distinction (and simply studying the relations) between 'internal' and 'external' transformation, and rather approach this transformation as the result of an entanglement of two mutually changing but differently scaled assemblages, the *donjon* tower and the four-tower *castrum* scheme brought together in Chambord's basic morphology, and directly address the complex morphogenesis resulting from their combination. The design of Chambord is not only based on the traditional *donjon* and *castrum* scheme that characterized Charles VIII's earlier palatial arrangements at the Louvre and Vincennes; similar to the logic of the *logis*, it also merges both on an entirely novel scale. Like Alberti's famous Vitruvian conception of the house as a microcosmic replica of the city and vice versa, the *castrum* form translates this image to a political level as it converges with the ideal conception of the city. In this vein, Leonardo's earlier ideal project for Romorantin ☒[32] proposed a palace that serves as a microcosmic replica of an ideal city.[187] In this symbolism, especially the *castrum* form, the Roman model for founding towns could be seen as the form of sedentary power per se . When Chambord continues this scheme, it also transcends this microcosmic conception to develop the much more synecdochic scheme of Vincennes as a city within a city. The central keep is scaled up halfway between the quadrifoil *donjon* of Vincennes and the Louvre fortress, while the outer ring is scaled down somewhere between the *enceintes* of the Louvre and the outer perimeter wall of Vincennes. ☒[7, 28–29]

Thus repeating the earlier mise-en-abîme that we detected in the transformation in the royal lodging of the Capetian palaces, palatial architecture manifests an entirely new, trans-scalar conception of the House of France.[188] Beyond the benefits of understanding this disposition in its repre-

three syntheses: "Although the disjunctive synthesis depends, both logically and materially, upon the connective synthesis, it always appears as if the second synthesis came first." Steven Shaviro, "The Connective and Disjunctive Syntheses," posted online on Jul 7, 2008, at http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=646.

187 Von Moos describes Romorantin as the apotheosis of the Renaissance idea of the ideal city: "From the start Romorantin was conceived as a 'Rome minor,' and the regular plan with its towers presents the most impressive attempt of the sixteenth century, to realize the ancient Roman idea of the *castrum* in a new form" (Von Moos, *Schloß*, 68).

188 In this well-known scheme, the palace manifests en miniature the House of France. Therein, similar to Alberti's famous Vitruvian image of the house as a microcosmic replica of the city and vice versa, the *castrum* form translates this ideal image onto a political level. See above, Book I, note 112.

sentational regularity within the Renaissance episteme of resemblance,[189] I would emphasize the need to acknowledge this formation as a crucial **RETERRITORIALIZATION** of the regal system of power into an architectural dispositif. That process is far from being finalized in Chambord, nor did it start here.

The French Château, 1480s–1520s: Beyond Regular Dispositions

The challenge for an assemblage-theoretic approach is to understand what modification in the internal arrangement generated these partly disconnected structures and their more complex topologies. An answer, I suggest, would lie in the introduction of the straight Italian stair—as a literally deterritorialized element. Studies of the evolving French *hôtel* have often mentioned the relative incompatibility of these conceptions, when the French tried to include this element of access into the morphology of the *corps de logis simple*, leading to a fundamental deterritorialization of this local form into more clustered ones.[190] In the previous subsection, we established that the internal differentiation of the *plan massé* was initiated by a disengagement of the stair from its initial position within a corner tower. If this staircase tower was a part of the *donjon* scheme, what then was the spatial production process it constituted? And why did its displacement allow or trigger the *donjon*'s one-room characters to become differentiated into clusters? To understand this process, I argue, the attention needs to shift from the external regularity of architecture to its inherently regulating function, and thus from the morphological to the technological.

This regulatory view brings us back to the initially discussed problem of accessibility.[191] The spiraling stairs in the *donjons* had, as we saw, a specific defensive function. When the *donjon* lost its defensive function, the staircase and its specific spatial **TECHNICITY** started disengaging from this type while still

189 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1970), 19–50.

190 The later attempts of French architects and clients to emulate the formal centrality of Italian architecture, has been said to have played a key role in the distribution of French Renaissance architecture, as its clashing with inherited spatial conceptions caused a creative friction for architects to produce innovative layouts, especially in the way that its introduction disrupted the spatial sequence in the traditional *corps de logis simple.* For a description of early stair cases, see Prinz und Kecks, *Schloß*, 130, and 262–97. For the mediation role of Serlio, see esp. Schreiber, *Französische Renaissance-Architektur*, 50–62. For the influence on the development of the *hôtel*, see Michael Dennis, *Court and Garden: From the French Hôtel to the City of Modern Architecture*, (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 1986), 52–75; and Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 131–4. On this point, see further below.

191 For the question of regulating access see Part 2 of Raeymakers and Derks, eds., *A Key to Power?*.

33 ROYAL CHATEAUX I

Left, **plan and spatial organization of the Logis royal, Château de Loches (Indre-et-Loire), built 1370/c. 1490–1500 (arch. unknown)**
Level +00/01

Right, **the Château de Creil (L'Oise), rebuilt between 1377–88 (arch. unknown)**
Level +01

Bottom left, **the Château de Langeais (Indre-et-Loire), built between 1461–69 (arch. unknown), for Louis XI by finance minister and royal advisor Jean Bourré**
Level +00







ROOM DISTRIBUTION CONJECTURED IN TOPOL. ANALOGY TO THE OLD LOUVRE

CHATEAU DU LOUVRE (IN COMPARISON)



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maintaining the defensive organizational logic of the *donjon*. Also in the spatial organization of the *donjon*, we find the *salle* occupying an asymmetric entrance position, deriving from the additive medieval building tradition of elongated, one-room-deep wings.[192] In his comparative analysis of French and Italian buildings, Serlio views this alignment as a cultural difference, noting "The French are accustomed to having a … stretch of apartments lengthwise."[193] These so-called *corps de logis simples* were segmented to constitute a sequence of progressively smaller rooms illuminated from both walls. In Italy, the *sala* fulfills a different function, as its central placement facilitates access to lateral room clusters. Compared to this arrangement, the organizational possibilities within the transversal French structures were relatively constrained.

Especially the *donjon*, with its highly constrained, vertical organization, enforced a special conception of movement and rhythm that was based on the spatial stratification that naturally presents the morphological principle to organize its uniform structure. This spatial structuration becomes particularly evident when we look at the Donjon of Vincennes ☒[29] (compl. 1369).[194] Both morphologically and topologically speaking, we can identify a close structural connection between the vertical sequence of the *chambre à parer*—day and night chambers accessed along a linear axis (the spiral staircase)—and the horizontal differentiation and alignment of the room sequences in the *logis* of French palaces. Here, the building-technology-determined access, through a lateral tower, to the vertically stacked rooms perfectly maps onto the horizontally segmented sequence of rooms in the *corps de logis simple*

192 Fritz Schreiber, "Die französische Renaissance-Architektur und die Poggio Reale-Variationen des Sebastiano Serlio," PhD diss., Martin Luther Univ., Halle-Wittenberg (1938), 27.

193 See Sebastiano Serlio, *Sesto Libro delle habitationi di tutti li gradi degli homini* (CMS, Project IV, I, 9), in Serlio, *On Architecture*, II: 616 (trans mod.). As the translators note, Serlio edited this observation out in his later manuscripts. See also, Eelco Nagelsmit, "Visualizing Vitruvius: Stylistic Pluralism in Serlio's Sixth Book on Architecture," in *The Transformation of Vernacular Expression in Early Modern Arts*, ed. Joost Keizer and Todd M. Richardson (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), 339–72; here 354. Here, several studies seem to basically confuse the internally-aligned arrangement of rooms with the externally-linear architecture of the *corps de logis simple*.

194 See Whiteley, "Importance of the Lodgings," 14. In the *donjon*, the first floor serves as the entrance level, and the central room was a reception hall (called *salle des gardes*), with the *chambre du roi* being traditionally said to have been on the second floor. Whiteley has located, by contrast, a *chambre à parer* on the first floor, the King's day chamber on the second, and his night chamber on the third (ibid). She does so—in critiquing the inconstance of medieval naming of the rooms—based on the term "haute chambre du roi," which for her indicates that the room, must have served initially as a *chambre*—a *chambre à parer* directly following the entrance. See also id, "La grosse tour de Vincennes, résidence de Charles V," *Bulletin monumental* 152, no. 3 (1994), 316–290; here 321. The *salle* was located in an adjacent building.

with its asymmetrical access route through doors placed *enfilade*. In this sense, the architecture of towers intensified a particular problem connected to the arrangement of additive buildings, namely access.[195]

Without any specific symbolic dimension, such 'problematic' architectures generate a characteristic technological effect that does not simply replace the stratified arrangements, such as in the superimposed royal lodging. Rather, this effect consolidates the stratified arrangements within differently layered—meaning horizontally segmented—formations and in new socio-spatial assemblages. Because where existing tower houses already comprised vertical access—with the *salle* being located on the first floor—all added rooms had to be accessed from this point. We can see this transposed logic in the *logis royale* in the Château de Loches ⊠[33] (b.1370s, extended c.1490–1500), where the old hall was complemented by a suite of progressively smaller rooms that provided comfort and privacy.

2.2.2 The *Logis* as a Territorializing Arrangement

In this view, the organizationally constrained architecture of both the *donjon* tower and the *corps de logis simple* serves as an enabling constraint for the formation of functionally differentiated spatial series[196] in which spaces that can potentially serve as throughways are placed before rooms suitable to private activities because they are remote and less frequented. It is from this genetic perspective that we can specify how studies have previously considered the *corps de logis* itself as the determining ordering principle. According to Prinz and Kecks, "a sequential scheme of spaces" was necessitated within complexes of additive buildings, "within the organizational possibilities [of which] the apartment takes shape … as a fixed spatial sequence"[197] of three

195 I fully admit the counter-intuitive appeal of using a vertical form of access to 'explain' the horizontal segmentation of apartments, but inversely and analogously, the first chapter in Vol. II, will partly use the emerging architecture of *dégagements* and corridors to understand the vertical stratification of apartment houses, precisely in its capacity to avoid visibility and contact.

196 As already mentioned in my elaboration **ON SERIES**, here and in the following I will discriminates 'sequences' from 'series' in an arithmetic sense. Therein, a spatial sequence is understood as any ordered set of n spaces (S_n) with a constant difference (S_1, S_2, S_2, …, S_n); here simply the difference between two rooms as '1.' A (finite) series indicates rather the sum or limit value of any ordered sequence (i.e. $S_r = S_1 + S_2 + S_3 \ldots + S_n$), and the study of such series is a major component of mathematical analysis in the study of continuous change as well as the study of finite structures. See my note 34.

197 Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 129–30 (my trans.); see also the entire chapter "Die Innere Gliederung des Schloßes," esp. 129–36.

rooms of decreasing size: the *salle*, the *chambre* and the private *garde-robe* (or later *cabinet*).[198]

Like the aligned arrangement of ecclesiastic buildings, such a habitat fosters the consequent formation of equally serially organized spatial practices and daily habits that shape patterns of inhabitation. But here it is the differentiated arrangement that commands (or consolidates the formation of) differentiated functionalities—not the other way around! In contrast to the apparatus of ecclesiastic space, which universally codes these spaces in part-to-whole relations, this **TERRITORIAL** assemblage operates intrinsically, since spatial differentiations are coded *as* different spatialities only in relation to another and by way of how they are connected.

Scholium II: On Transduction as a Self-Generating Mode of Territorialization

As a genetic diagram of variable existential territories (rather than a representation of an invariant cosmological constellation),[199] the technical individuation of architecture and the psychical individuation of inhabitants enter into a strong relation, what Simondon calls **TRANSDUCTION**. He defines transduction as a conceptualized, self-generating and self-propagating process that may be "physical, biological, mental, or social," and in which already constituted structures serve as a catalyst for the gradual structuration of regions in their vicinity, "so that a modification extends itself progressively at the same time as this [fore]structuring operation."[200] In basic terms, transduction concerns

198 Betrand Jestaz, noted that *garde-robes*, as servicing side rooms where belongings were stored, appear at least since 1501; the *cabinet* whose functionality remains more ambiguous, was initially mentioned in 1529 in the *devis* of Fontainebleau (Bertrand Jestaz, "Etiquette et distribution," passim). It has been repeatedly noted, that the naming of rooms as either *garde-robes* or *cabinets*, was not only relatively unstable, they have also been switched at a later point, cf. Du Cerceau's preference for *garde-robe* versus De l'Orme's for *cabinet*. For the fluid meaning of both terms, see Chatenet, *La cour*, 150–4.

199 Here, I am implicitly referring to Guattari's "four functors of deterritorialization," as developed in my preliminary methodological discussion, that I will further elaborate on in the last section of this chapter.

200 Gilbert Simondon, *L'individuation psychique et collective: à la lumière des notions de forme, information, potentiel et métastabilité* (Paris: Aubier 2007; orig. pub. 1987), 24–5; translated and discussed in Gilbert Simondon: Being and Technology, ed. Arne de Boever et al. (Edinburgh: EUP, 2012). As Elizabeth Grosz writes, in this anthology, "Transduction addresses singularity and particularity, the forces of the real in its nuanced specificity, rather than general rules as do deduction an induction. It is a 'logic' for the emergence of objects things, processes rather than a mode of generating conclusions," because it "articulates a logic of invention of creativity, a mode of bringing into being something that sustains its own internal resonances while functioning within a milieu. This is not the logic of an inventor or a creator, but the logic of an invention process, objects and practices that produce themselves." Elizabeth Grosz, "Identity and Individuation," in

the transformation of structure/form into operation/function and vice versa. This is precisely the double meaning of 'territorialization' in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms. As Anne Sauvagnargues writes, such auto-catalytic processes eventually lead to "a complete reconfiguration of the [material force] field, starting from a new, differentiating restructuration" of an existing disparity that becomes topologically reorganized through an existing boundary-condition.[201] It is the resulting 'disparation'—the tension generated by the 'coming together' of a problematic heterogeneity that needs resolution—that, as Elizabeth Grosz writes "enables a new order to emerge at another level," because it entails the production of different individuating relationships or modes of territorialization or spatialization.[202]

In the transductive milieu of the tower and *corps de logis simple*, we can, similarly, discover a crucial modification of its internal arrangement that incrementally frees the technicity of regulating access and movement from the structural anatomy of the building (=disparation). This technicity is then incorporated or 'individuated' *as* an architectural dispositif on a rather different scale (=**TRANSDUCTION**).[203] In the mid-sixteenth century, a crucial disjunction relevant to the form-taking architecture of apartments takes place that—as we will see—would incrementally facilitate the formation of a **STATIST ASSEMBLAGE**. In order to facilitate this assemblage, the tower's technical function (or 'technicity') of regulating access would need to become further disparated (or disembedded) from its architectural anatomy and fully **TRANSDUCED** into (or embodied by) another architectural means. As we saw in the case of the compact *donjon*, this disparation triggered a characteristic 'corridorization' of the vestibule and a gradual disengagement and detachment of rooms, and led to a clustered internal organization. Two interrelated displacements seem to fuel the 'metamorphosis of the *donjon*' in two different directions. But because this form-taking presents a singular differentiation process, these two displacements should neither be typologically segregated into different forms (a linear and a clustered organization of apartments, which historians have often contrasted) nor diachronically dif-

Simondon: Being and Technology, ed. De Boever et al., 37–56; here 43

201 See Anne Sauvagnargues, "Crystals and Membranes," in *Simondon: Being and Technology*, ed. De Boever et al., 57–70; here 62; here also after Paolo de Assis, *Logic of Experimentation* (Leuven: Leuven UP, 2018), here 140.

202 Grosz, "Identity and Individuation," 41.

203 In thus generating the possibilities for apartments to emerge, transduction however breaks with linear causality, because it only opens a gap, a virtual potential for them to form. Transduction is thus a virtual cause, or 'quasi-cause.' See Marie-Pier Boucher "Transductive connections and the Genesis of Living techniques," in *Simondon: Being and Technology*, ed. De Boever, 92–109; here 100–2.

ferentiated as an evolution of one primitive form evolving into a more developed one (as others have emphasized).[204] Each of these two morphogeneses is analytically valuable. Yet for my own argument, I need to inquire how architecture's regulating capacity takes on a form, where the two enter into a relation of resonance and amplify the other into a reciprocal formation of a new architectural dispositif co-evolving with newly distributive socio-spatial techniques. To fully survey the complex processes in which these forms co-evolve, we need to interject and attend closer to yet another point.

The Territorializations of the Nomadic Royal Court, 1490s

In older castle-complex arrangements, the royal lodging and its entrance staircase were traditionally located opposite the entrance gate. We can see this, for example, in the royal Château de Creil ☒[33] (b.1375–78).[205] In this castle, the sequence gate/court/stair-tower repeats the external arrangement of the stairs/hall/throne within its tripartite *logis* with its sequence of an audience room, day chamber and night chamber. We also find this disposition at the Louvre, yet the central *donjon* largely blocks the visible alignment of this sequence, symbolically outweighing[206] a potential relation between the gate and the *grand vis* to enter a stronger formal. This resonant relation, I suggest in the following section, develops in the novel principal residences of the French kings at Amboise and Blois. These residences were missing the central *donjon*.

Under the reign of Charles VIII (*1470, 1483–98), the Château d'Amboise ☒[34] became the principal royal residence and the new political headquarters.[207] As the first relatively fixed center of administration after the

204 For the first point cf. e.g. Schreiber, Prinz and Kecks, Trüby, or Waddy who often do so in direct reference to the well-known typological distinction drawn by Serlio between the (more clustered) Italian and (more linear) French organization of houses, mentioned above. For the second point, cf. historians as Chatenet, Guillaume, or Waddy, who in the focus on apartments as a ceremonial architecture often discuss the linearized form of apartments as a more 'advanced' organization.

205 See Whiteley, "Importance of the Lodgings," 16.

206 This symbolic predominance of the *donjon* is illustrated by the monumental Château de Coucy, built between 1225–30 for Enguerrand III, a concurrent feudal lord who aimed to demonstrate his independent power. It features the largest *donjon* in Europe, with 55 meters height, and a diameter of 35 meters.

207 Amboise became a favorite residence of the French kings after Charles VII confiscated the complex from Louis d'Amboise for plotting against Louis XI. Charles VIII rebuilt the complex extensively in the 1490s, with the help of Italian master masons Domenico da Cortona and Fra Giocondo, whom Charles and Louis brought to France, and who introduced the first Italian and Renaissance elements into French royal buildings. Besides the longer description by Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 59–72, and the article by Evelyne Thomas, "*Les logis royaux d'Amboise*," in *Revue de l'Art 100*, no.1 (1993), 44–57, the following recent studies have been helpful: Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Le Château d'Amboise*

English invasion, Amboise saw a steady growth due to the increasing centralization of royal power. In the 1490s, the *château* was extensively rebuilt to accommodate the members of a court growing at a ferocious rate.[208] Whereas Charles V responded to the growth by introducing an intermediate parament chamber into his lodging, Charles VIII introduced a form of organization that centered on the urgent managerial problem of a court growing into a 'whole city on the move.' ☒[44] Accommodating the courtiers and their entourages was a persistent problem, as "the number of individual accommodations contained in the royal castles … came nowhere close to the number of individuals to be accommodated."[209] This development would later give rise to a special office: the so-called *département de logis*, which consisted of several dozen harbingers (*fourriers*).[210] This administrative apparatus was assigned the task of accommodating the members of the peripatetic court within (or, due to space constraints, even sometimes outside of) the royal castles. [211] The *département* was not named as much for its function of organizing the movement of people and goods in and out as for the 'distributive' aspect of its task of equipping courtiers with (or, put differently, 'leaving' them with, as the French word *départir* means 'to leave') a space befitting of their rank and proximity to the king.[212]

Before the castle was extended, the king and queen themselves had to make do with a rather modest suite of rooms in which "the transition between public and private life was concentrated within a single piece": the king's quasi-public bedroom.[213] Accommodated in the so-called 'donjon wing' ☒[34], Charles was lodged on the first floor, above his politically and culturally influential spouse, Anne de Bretagne (*1488–1514). The space constraint necessitating the extension is marked by the grand vis that was situated between *salle* and official rooms on one side (an official tract c omplemented by an external access gallery) and the royal chamber on the

(Actes Sud, Arles 2004); Lucie Gaugain, *Amboise: Un château dans la ville* (Tours: PUF-Rabelais, 2014).

208 The *Maison du roi*, the entourage of king, is described at length by Chatenet, *La cour*, 22–35. The equal status of Anne de Bretagne, introduction of female entourage, effectively doubled this number of courtiers and staff.

209 Boudon and Chatenet, "Le Logis du roi," 65 (my trans.).

210 See Chatenet, *La cour*, 65.

211 On the ancient right (or compulsion) of temporary accommodation of stately members, see Ulf Dirlmeier and Fritz Schmidt, "Geschichte des Wohnens im Spätmittelalter," in *Geschichte des Wohnens* Vol. II: 229–348.

212 Chatenet, *La cour*, 34–5. For a longer discussion of the royal office of the *département de logis*, see ibid., 63–75. See my discussion of the etymology of "to part" as noted in Book I, note 3–8. Note the emerging relation between the Vitruvian category of *distributio* (οἰκονομία) and *decorum;* for the related notion of *appartenance*, see below.

213 Here and for the following, ibid., 142, and 160.

other (a 'private' tract including a *garde-robe* and secret stair connecting the two lodgings). In the restrained suite, the *garde-robe* was "apparently the most private space of the royal lodging," located at the rear end of the sequence.[214] Similar to Anne's lodgings at Loches, the queen's suite was further complemented by some smaller side rooms: a *retrait* that probably served as a sort of study or workspace (what would later be called the *cabinet*) and an adjacent oratory.[215]

With the extension, "new buildings for both the royal accommodation [the so-called Logis de Sept Vertus] and the great hall, the Salle d'État, were added outside the confines of the old courtyard," in a configuration that apparently brought back "the medieval tradition of separating the public and private."[216] This apparent back-formation can be noted also in the resulting division of the castle into a higher and lower court, which somewhat repeated the old distinction between *salle* and *chambres externally*.[217] Yet, keeping in mind Salamagne's cautious critique of too-dualistic views, one should perhaps also try to treat this arrangement as a complex 'interlocking' of spatial frames taking form within the territorialization related to the establishment of a sedentary court fixed around a royal palace. Part of this territorialization concerns the political unity between France and Brittany effected through the marriage of Charles and Anne, and its articulation in the Logis de Sept Vertues ☒[34].[218] In this added wing, we find five symmetrically arranged

214 Ibid., 150.

215 See ibid., 150–154, 198. Traditionally the *cabinet* was situated in the protruding corner towers. In this sense Chatenet understands the *retrait* as a 'ancestor of the *cabinet*' (198). The term *retrait* is also used as a euphemism for the latrines. She describes that around 1500 Italians uses the novel term *gabinetto* synonymously with studio. Sixty years later, De l'Orme notes: "Il est necessaire et plus que raisonnable d'accompagner les chambres des roys, grands princes et seigneurs, d'un cabinet afin qu'il se puissent retirer en leur privé et particulier, soit pour escrire ou traicter des affaires en secret ou autrement" (De l'Orme, *L'architecture*, I, Livre IV, chap.1).

216 Whiteley, "Royal and Ducal Palaces," 56.

217 This separation is perhaps also an early symptom of the later political changes under Louis XII, who reorganized court life, in his decision to rule with a group of confidants, who composed the *conseil du roi*. Among them, we find, Pierre de Rohan the maréchal de Gié, Florimont Robertet, Cardinal George d'Amboise, and his nephew Charles II d'Amboise (Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 64–5.) This line of evolution initially peaks in the following dissociation of public and private life in the entirely separated locations and palatial typologies of François I's public-representative palaces versus his more secluded hunting castles where the king "laissait sommeiller le ceremonial," and which without a *salle*, did not constitute a *logis du roi* in the strict sense of a ceremonial space (See Boudon and Chatenet, "Le Logis du roi," 72). Yet, to follow this line of analysis here would lead us astray.

218 On the Logis de Sept Vertus, see Chatenet, *La cour*, 160–2; and Thomas, "Les logis royaux d'Amboise." As we have seen, traditionally, king and queen resided in stacked lodgings the same *logis* on different levels. The layout of the new building, as reconstructed by Thomas, seems to suggest that here the king and queen lived on the same floor in a

34 | 35 ROYAL CHATEAUX II

***Right*, plan and spatial organization of the Royal Château d'Amboise (Indre-et-Loire). It became the principal royal residence and the new political headquarter under the reign of Charles VIII. In the 1490s, he rebuilt the complex extensively, initially with help of Colin Biart, Guillaume Senault, Louis Armangeart, Pierre Trinqueau and Jacques Sourdeau, later with the help of Italian master masons Domenico da Cortona and Fra Giocondo, whom Charles and Louis brought to France. In this building phase, the Grand-Salle was erected, with the adjacent *logis du roi*, which was superelevated in 1515 under François I, and further extended in the 1550s. The massive access towers (Tour de Minimes — visible in the center front of Cerceau's rendering — and Tour Heurtault) were added in the mid 1490s. The Logis de Sept Vertues, which is characterized by the architectural parity of it twin apartment, was achieved between 1494–98.**
Level +00/01

***Overleaf*: plan and spatial organization of the Royal Château de Blois. Here, the Logis Neuf, the eastern wing toward the city, was added from 1498–1503 by Colin Biart and Jacques Sourdeau for Charles XII. Similar to the Logis de Sept Vertues at Amboise, it consists of a twin apartment, connected by a *salle*. The wing of François I was added between 1515–18 by Jacques Sourdeau, by doubling an existing *corps de logis*. It is characterized by its prominent open stair, halfway incorporated into the wing, as can be seen on the idealized rendering (*right*).**
Level +01

rooms that constituted a 'twin apartment' for the king and queen. A central *salle* gave access to merely two chambers with a *garde-robe* each. This 'architectural parity'[219] and novel gender topology also characterizes the layout of the Logis Neuf at the Royal Château de Blois ⊠[35] (b.1498–1503 by Colin Biart and Jacques Sourdeau).[220]

Built under Charles's successor, Louis XII (*1462, 1498–1515) — who remarried Anne to keep France and Brittany united,[221] and who finished the

twin-apartment (called *appartements jumélée* in French) that probably symbolized their political parity. Yet, such a symmetrical arrangement with a central *salle* with each a *chambre* and *garde-robe* in the back was conflicting with the existing court etiquette, which would have caused the king's and queen's visitors to have waited in the same *salle*. "Could it be," she concludes "that the plan perhaps translates a desire to create a private space, distinguished from the official spaces?" (Ibid., 51–3). Bouroucher, respectively remarked that "Charles VIII, Louis XII and Anne de Bretagne inhabited in reality different wings; those of the *donjon* laid out in a more conventional manner." Solveig Bouroucher, "Les logis des châteaux de Chinon et de Loches," in *Prince, princesse, et leur logis*, ed. Chatenet and De Jonge, 23–32; here 26. On this point see also Prinz's and Kecks' earlier hypothesis, that king and queen lived separate lives on the opposite sides of the castle: the queen residing in the Logis de Sept Vertus, the king in the apartment next to the grand hall, as connected by a covered hallway.

219 For a discussion of similar symmetrical apartment at the German Court, see Stephan Hoppe "Architectonic Parity: The Coordinated Apartments of Ruling Princes and Princesses in German Court Residences, 1470–1547," in *Prince, princesses et leur logis*, ed. Chatenet and De Jonge, 159–76; and Claudia Hagenguth, "Logis ducal juxtaposé: l'example du château de Veste Heldburg," in ibid., 177–90.

220 See also the older study of Frédéric Lesueur, *Le château de Blois tel qu'il fut, tel qu'il est, tel qu'il aurait pu être* (Paris: Picard, 1970). See also Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 62–82, and 385–92.

221 After Charles's deadly accident in 1498, when Anne was 21 years old, his cousin Louis XII


AMBOISE
FACIES LIGERIN FLECTANTES
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34

LOGIS DE SEPT VERTUS, 1494–98
GR
CH
SA
CH
GR
G
CHAPELLE DU ROI (-1493)
OLD CORPS DE LOGIS, "DONJON WING", 1463–68
SA
CH
GR
R
O
TOUR GARÇONNET, 1466
LOGIS DE ROI, c.1496
SUPERELEVATED IN 1515
GR
CH
PAR
PARALLEL LOGIS, c.1505
GRAND SALLE
TOUR DE MINIMES, 1495
LOGIS DE SEPT VERTUS
GR
GR
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

WING OF FRANÇOIS I



LOGIS NEUF



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works at Amboise but focused more on extending his birthplace, Blois, into a royal residence—the Logis Neuf was accessed through two corner stairs that opened onto a vast lateral corridor, called *galerie*, corresponding the ground-floor arcades. This parallel disposition allows independent individual access to each single space, without having to pass through all rooms, while an enfilade still interconnects the rooms on the other side of the building. This conjugal arrangement has been explained as reflecting Anne de Bretagne's powerful position at the court.[222] Yet, there is something 'strange' about this disposition, Chatenet notes, suggesting that these twin apartments were in fact not the actual lodgings of the royal couple but only "used for certain circumstances, the nature of which escapes our understanding. … One begins to ask oneself, if the main purpose of this building was not simply to serve as a back-cloth for royal apparitions and accommodate illustrious guests in transit."[223] Yet, to the extent that seemingly every architectural detail staged royal appearances, this novel topology is already an early indicator of the flattening of the superimposed lodging that would be effected under François I, and to which we return at a later point.

A Regulating Device for Controlled Exposure, 1515

François d'Angoulême, Louis's nephew and heir presumptive to the French throne, grew up at Amboise. He was married to the oldest daughter of Anne and Charles, Claude de France. When François came to power in 1515, he restructured the *logis royale*, standing perpendicular to the *salle d'état*, and inhabited this apartment composed of a (proportionally harmonized) sequence of rooms with decreasing size: a *salle*, *chambre*, and *garde-robe*. Claude was housed on a newly added floor above.[224] Claude soon had him refurbish the Château de Blois, which had become the favorite royal residence and the political capital under his predecessor. Here, François doubled

famously had the Pope divorce his marriage in order to marry Anne instead. This was stipulated in her initial marriage contract, which aimed at the permanent annexation of Brittany to France.

222 Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 71–76.

223 Chatenet, *La cour*, 198–206; here 204. The diagram of the internal connection structure, providing individual access to single rooms does in fact look very much like those of modern hotels. But beside this observation, I do not want to easily discard these structures as merely 'symbolic' buildings, since its organization on a single floor would soon change the organization of later royal castles such as Saint-Germain-en-Laye or Villers-Cotterêts (and perhaps even Madrid) by François I. to which I will come back to in the last part in relation to a specific **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS**.

224 Ibid., 161, based on Thomas' reconstruction. The later vertical extension and redecoration of this building was already noted by Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 69, 71. This is the part of the château, which survived the major destruction in 1808–09.

an existing wing to the west of the *salle d'état* and Louis XII's wing. François's wing ☒[35] (b. 1515–18 by Jacques Sourdeau) marks an innovation, since it became the first French building to adopt an Italian internal structure, not just external decoration. The existing room sequence, probably comprising an enfilade of *salle*, *chambre*, and *garde-robe*, was thereby complemented by a parallel sequence of a *galerie*, *oratoire*, and a *cabinet*.[225] Here, too, Claude had the same room cluster on the upper floor. Besides its unconventional organization, the wing is also known for its central open staircase. Unblocked by any *donjon*, and placed in the center of the wing so as not to disrupt the facade's homogeneity, the newly incorporated stair became the distinctive feature and a structuring element of the *corps de logis*.[226] In this incorporation process, the staircase, traditionally a closed defensive architecture, underwent a crucial, formal change in dispensing with its external walls. This opening of the principal stair started during the later fourteenth century in smaller châteaux from Chateaudun to Gaillon. The next section will focus on the changes in internal room distribution, but it is important to note, at this point, how this opening process resulted in the stairs formally starting to resemble entrance gates.

With their equestrian iconology (e.g. the entrance gate toward the city in Louis XII's wing at Blois), gates have traditionally been seen—and also studied—as symbolic of the nomadic habit of the itinerant court. But one should also note a significant shift around 1500, when this nomadism—initially a result of the English invasions—becomes an emancipatory factor in the context of the French campaigns of Italy. Guided by the traditional royal leitmotif of 'being seen,' the open staircase was geared to display a ceremonial and spatial experience, especially in the festive act of the so-called triumphal entry.[227] In this context, then, the staircase/gate manifests a specific formal expression of power and new-found territorial reach. Regarding this expression, I suggest moving beyond a merely symbolic reading, a mere means of representation, of the *mise-en-scène* of a "calculated ascent" to

225 The distribution of François I's wing was initially reconstructed by Jean Guillaume (see Chatenet, *La cour*, 163–5), see also Jean Guillaume, *Le château de Bonnivet. Entre Blois et Chambord: le chaînon manquant de la première Renaissance* (Paris: Picard, 2006). See also Lesueur, *Le château de Blois*; and Annie Cospérec, "L'aile François Ier de Blois: une nouvelle chronologie," *Bulletin monumental* 151, no. 4 (1993), 591–603. See also, Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 97–109, 385–92

226 Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 179.

227 Ibid., 270–2. The triumphal entry, also known as the Royal Entry, or 'Joyous Entry,' was a royal apparatus during the Middle Ages and Early Modern Period in Europe. It staged the formal entry of a ruler (or royal representative) into a city, by means of representative ceremonies and festivities accompanying this event.

the king.[228] Because as already evident in the Louvre, this device completely re-articulates the longstanding problem of the king's accessibility to his subjects. The staircase or gate would prove a crucial device for a novel architecture of access that inspired novel arrangements through the 'controlled exposure' and visibility of the king.

More than just a setting, this device becomes a genetic element, bringing into existence a new territorial assemblage of the modern French court. In this sense, we can conceptualize this opening as a reciprocal reterritorialization accompanying the deterritorialization of the *donjon*, as it continues the above-mentioned differentiation of the *donjon* type in which, as I showed, the technicity of the staircase gradually frees itself from the anatomy of the building. This allowed the staircase to become aligned (i.e. 'reterritorialized') with the gate along one transversal axis during the first decade of the sixteenth century. In this regard, we ought to note a technical resonance. Helical stairs have long been identified as precision pieces of contemporary production and engineering technologies.[229] The pedigree of this device is rather complex and contested, but it clearly derives from the increasing formal and technological resonance between gates and stairs. Besides the oft-mentioned and obvious formal antecedents of these stairs in smaller châteaux, to which I will turn very shortly, I could not find any earlier discussion of another self-evident influence, namely the older access towers at Amboise, where the *château* was situated on a plateau. Here, the spiraling ramps of the Tour de Minimes ⊠[34] (b.1495) and Tour de Heurtault (b.1497) provided easy access by foot or horse and a convenient shortcut to the river and town below. It was an aggrandized version of an earlier access staircase, the Tour Garçonnet (b.1466) in the easternmost perimeter tower. These access ramps are said to have Italian origins, yet perhaps more interesting here is their technical provenance as free-standing (or fully freed) staircase towers.[230]

228 Michel Melot, *Châteaux of the Loire*, trans. Anthea Bell (Cologne: Taschen, 1997), 119. In many works the analysis of gates remains restricted to their iconological function, as e.g. Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 273–96.

229 Melot, *Châteaux of the Loire*, 132.

230 In the context of this chapter, I cannot develop this observation beyond foregrounding the technical genealogy of this element. While Prinz and Keck mention the Tour de Minimes, they draw no explicit connection. Instead, focusing on its symbolic function, they discuss it in relation to the Tour de Lion that Charles II d'Amboise build at Meillant. In a similarly stylistic focus, historians have, however, repeatedly identified the specifically French character of this form, since Italian architects tended to keep stairs out of sight. In from this perspective that, for example, David Hanser can argue that "even if the central idea is from Leonardo da Vinci, the staircase is more French than Italian" (Hanser, *Architecture of France*, 51). The relation of the Chambord staircase to Blois,

2.2.3 Sorting Out: An Inclusive Disjunction

The reterritorialization thus involves the critical potential—in the original sense or the word, of 'sorting out'—of this technical tower form, which would gain a new function in regulating movement; it would become a new regulatory device. The critical potential of the opening to enable 'a controlled exposure of the king' can perhaps best be understood when we avoid an overly 'defensive' and merely symbolic reading of castles and towers as architectural structures or barriers that 'keep out.' This reading confuses defense mechanisms with closed systems. The notion of an open system —by contrast—urges us to move from an iconological reading toward an *immunological* one, because in "operat[ing] the primordial difference of architecture —that between inside and outside,"[231] this kind of architecture is not merely a defensive element. Instead, in interconnecting, filtering and regulating access between the spaces it differentiates, this kind of architecture also allows the controlled internalization of externalities.

Scholium III: On Immunization as a Controlled Internalization of Externalities

In this way, we approach an architectural arrangement as a technology that cuts together/apart specific socio-environmental systems [→INT. & 0.2]. As a controlled form of 'letting in' or as 'filters of relations,' gates set up complex forms of internal self-regulation. Such SYMPOIETIC systems resolve complexity not simply by reducing external complexity but by transforming it into "a complexity that is internal to the system itself," and through which "the system reproduces itself in increasingly complex forms, such that it constitutes the very elements that compose it."[232]

By attending to this complex internalization of the staircase as a filtering device, we can actually map how earlier forms of 'exclusive disjunction,' which characterize the defensive constructions and fortifications of the late

is discussed in Guillaume, "Chambord": 416. Prinz and Kecks indirectly draw a similar argument as they observe the likely Italian provenance of this device, given that since there is no obvious precursor for this tower within French castle complexes (Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 68). In this sense, I agree that this Italian dispositif resonated strongly with the French medieval tradition of the staircase towers.

231 Bernhard Siegert, *Cultural Techniques: Grids, Filters, Doors, and Other Articulations of the Real*, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (New York: Fordham UP, 2015), 193. He here specifically talks about doors; I freely adapt his reading to gates—that he sees as the primordial form of doors—and the technical form of seigneurial towers with their spiral staircase.

232 I take this formulation from Roberto Esposito, *Terms of the Political: Community, Immunity, Biopolitics,* trans. Rhiannon Noel Welch (New York: Fordham UP, 2013), 41.

Middle Ages, are gradually replaced by new forms of an **INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION.** Through this disjunction, royal residences would be transformed into apartments by producing and deploying internal thresholds, along with incorporeal boundaries and use patterns that behaviorally code them in terms of specific behaviors related to the access of the king. In this way, we can understand the form-taking architecture of apartments as a doubly internalized "conduit of arrival."[233] In this view, in their immunological function, the gate of the *castrum* and the tower of *donjons* become part of the genealogy of apartments and illustrate how, in technical terms, architectural arrangements are able to regulate access.

From Charles V's Louvre onwards, the central position of the stairs in the middle of the facade of royal residences introduced a powerful rupture in the continuum of the *logis* and its unitary structure and transversal system of connection. At first a structuring element of the facade, the stairwell was then, following Italian architecture, gradually incorporated into the plan of the building. Yet, concerning this incorporation or introduction, as I have maintained before, an **INCLUSIVE** vision of the disjunctive synthesis is vital to approaching the form-taking architecture of apartments genealogically. We arrive at this inclusive reading when we shift focus to how this introduction imposed a "ceremonial continuity of movement" that cut across "the discontinuity of the architectural [and social] levels" of the *logis*, a "vertical enfilade" so to speak.[234] In this way, the tower's architecture articulates itself in a visible apparatus through which the royal residence would open itself through architectural arrangements, "designed as a sequence of carefully differentiated and articulated threshold- and portal-like situations."[235]

The Involution of the Stair

Regarding this history, we should perhaps not talk about an evolution, nor any revolutionary development, but rather an "involution" (as it takes shape in a process of folding in rather than a historical unfolding).[236] This process

233 I borrow this notion from Nathan Moore, "Diagramming Control," in *Relational Architectural Ecologies*, ed. Rawes (London/New York: Routledge, 2013), 57–70; here 67.

234 I take this formulation from Katie Scott, "Parade's End: On Charles-Antoine Coypel's Bed and the origins of inwardness," *Interiors and Interiority*, ed. Ewa Lajer-Burcharth and Beate Söntgen (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2016) 17–48; here 29; she here recognizes the vertical arrangement of the stairwell as a "vertical version of the enfilade."

235 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 131.

236 For the Bergsonian notion of involution, see Andrej Radman, "Involutionary Architecture: Unyoking Coherence from Congruence," in *Posthuman Ecologies: Complexity and Process after Deleuze*, ed. Rosi Braidotti and Simone Bignall (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 61–76.

quite literally involves a gradual incorporation of the staircase and an external element 'still jutting from the building'[237] into the very structure of the *logis*. This infolding cumulates in Chenonceau or Chambord, where the stairwell became a structuring element in the plan, fostering the detachment of symmetrical room clusters. If this involution disrupted the longstanding unity of the *corps de logis* in both facade and plan, it mainly affected the development of the traditional *corps de logis simple*, including its longstanding transduction process that forestructured the formation of functionally differentiated spatial sequences. Especially in the spatially constrained singled-winged structures of smaller châteaux and urban hotels—such as the Hôtels Jacques-Cœur (b.1441–51) in Bourges, or the Hôtel des Archevêques du Sens (b.1475/1498–1507) and Hôtel des Abbés de Cluny (b.1485–1510) in Paris[238] [→3.1]—the inclusion of the stairs would create an the organizational problematic that could usually be avoided in the plan of the larger royal palaces. Thus a crucial modification in the topological ordering was triggered in these smaller structures that would largely contribute to the formation of the apartment as a specific room sequence.[239]

In older châteaux—such as the royal Château de Langeais ☒[33] (b.1461–69 reconstructed on order of King Louis XI by finance minister and royal advisor Jean Bourré), or the two private châteaux Le Plessis-Bourré ☒[39] and Jarzé (b.1468–72/1485–90 for Jean Bourré himself)—the traditional spiral staircase was still located in its classic corner position, protruding from the facade.[240] Since the stairs gave access to the *salle* in these buildings, the

237 Melot, *Châteaux of the Loire*, 132.

238 See the following Part III. For the Hôtel Jacques-Cœur, see Christian de Mérindol, "L'hôtel Jacques-Cœur à Bourges, la demeure d'un bourgeois homme du roi [nouvelle lecture]," *Bulletin de la Société nationale des Antiquaires de France* (1996): 109–27. For a detailed discussion of the Hôtel du Sens and Cluny (among other Late Gothic Houses), see David Thompson, *Renaissance Paris: Architecture and Growth, 1475–1600* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: Zwemmer and Univ. of California Press, 1984), 39–71.

239 The following focuses largely on this topological transformation. For studies that have paid more attention to the relevant stylistic advancements and socio-political context of these buildings, see—besides the monographic studies mentioned below—here especially Chatenet, *La cour*, 258–314; and more generally Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*.

240 For the Chateau de Langeais, see Frédéric Lesueur, "Le Chateau de Langeais," *Congrès Archéologique de France* 106 (1948): 378–400; and Prinz and Kecks *Schloß*, 44–6. Destroyed during the Hundred Years' War, the castle was rebuilt around in the 1460s. Famously, its grand hall was the stage for the marriage of Anne of Bretagne and Charles VIII. I have not been able to find many studies clarifying the exceptional distribution of Langeais, in which the order of the *chambre de parament* and *chambre de retrait* is inverted. Customarily, such as in Creil and other royal castles, the larger room would have served as the *chambre de parement*, while the *chambre (de retrait)* would have been placed next to the *garde-robe*. This scrambled sequence, closer to Plessis-Bourré and its secondary corner chamber off the *sallette*, was perhaps facilitated by the three equal openings from the corner stairs. For a longer description of Le Plessis-Bourré, see

latter was often positioned asymmetrically in plan. This is also the case in the Château de Châteaudun ☒[36] (b.1459–68 for military commander Jehan de Dunois), where the newly opened corner stairs were a Gothic feature that was later repeated in a more incorporated form in the new side wing (c.1469–91 for François I of Orléans-Longueville).[241] Here the *salle* gave access to two suites of five progressively smaller rooms (including a *sallette* or *chamber de parement*, *chambre*, *garde-robe*, and *retrait*/*cabinet*), one in prolongation of the *salle*, another more clustered one in the shorter corner next to the stairs.[242] While geometrically asymmetric in plan, these lodgings were organized relatively symmetrically from a topological perspective.

The basic configuration of the *logis* from this asymmetric position of the stairs survives even in the plan of Gaillon ☒[40] (b.1501–06 by Colin Biart and Guillaume Senault for Cardinal George d'Amboise, minister of state and first royal advisor).[243] As the residence of a cardinal, it contained only a single suite of rooms that occupies the larger portion of the *corps de logis*. It was accessed through a still asymmetrically positioned but more free-standing Gothic stair tower, modeled after the prominent *grand vis* of royal residences. The principal lodging off the *salle* consisted of six progressively smaller rooms, including the *chambre de parement*, a *chambre*, as well as another larger room in the corner tower,[244] with an adjacent *garde-robe*[245] and *cabinet* on a mezzanine level. These rooms were arranged in a disposition that shifted from a linear sequence toward a partly more parallel room organization. The shorter (southern) end housed a larger chapel.

In its regularized plan, the Château Le Verger ☒[38] (b.1494–99 by Colin Biart for Maréchal Pierre de Rohan–Gié, the rival of George d'Amboise) has classically been identified as a paradigmatic structure. Its layout is analogous in broad strokes to that of Châteaudun, since here, the *salle* give access to two room sequences: the principal lodging, composed of three equal-sized and fully linearly organized rooms with an adjacent *cabinet* in the corner tower[246], and a more clustered secondary lodging. This secondary

e.g. Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 46–51; for Jarzé, see Chatenet, *La cour*, 273–75.

241 For Châteaudun, see Chatenet, *La cour*, 178–180 (fig 84), 270–1 (fig. 126).

242 See Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 489–96.

243 For Gaillon, see Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 481–8; and Chatenet, *La cour*, 265–71.

244 Initially described by its location and wooden furnishing, later qualified as a *garde-robe* (Chatenet, *La cour*, 266).

245 Initially named a *garde-robe*, then *cabinet* or "*cabinet de la garde-robe*" (Ibid.).

246 This grand configuration could have easily been converted into two smaller interconnected apartments, equal to the internal organization of Plessis-Bourré, by drawing a partition in the penultimate room, which would have then produced two *garde-robes*. I have indicated this in the plan.

lodging was not a guest suite. On the contrary, it would serve as the temporary accommodation of the proprietor when the king would visit; according to custom, the king would lodge in the master suite.[247] The secondary lodging was composed of two pieces connected to a *galerie*.

Inspired by Le Verger and as one of the first complexes to perfectly align gate and main entrance, the rather large Château de Bury ⊠[39] (b.1511–24 for royal treasurer Florimont Robertet) had exceptional influence on the regularization of French castles.[248] Here the stairwell—an Italian half-landing stair—was intercalated in the very center of the *corps de logis*, dividing it symmetrically.[249] Thereby, the *salle* no longer gave access to two lodgings. This introduced a subtle but crucial variance in the topological ordering, concerning how this function was now taken over by a *vestibule* formed by the stairwell. On one side, we find the more representative room sequence, marked by the *salle*: the principal lodging with its three rooms (a *chambre*, a *garde-robe* and a *cabinet* in the tower) connected to a large *galerie*. On the other side, we find two secondary lodgings that, with the stairs in the center of the *corps de logis*, gained much more space that was initially filled by complementary rooms through which the chambers were accessed via a small corridor space partitioned off from a *garde-robe* that, in the plan, precedes the *chambre*, leading to a networked access hierarchy. Offering a buffer between the frequented staircase and the chamber, this arrangement also characterizes the now lost Château de Bonnivet ⊠[41] (b.1516–24 for admiral Guillaume Gouffier), which has often been noticed for its hybrid winding stairs.[250] Bonnivet's secondary lodging is preceded by two *garde-robes*, followed by two rooms (likely a *sallette*, the function of which is difficult to pin down, and a *chambre*).[251] But also in the principal suite of rooms the *salle*

247 Chatenet, *La cour*, 275. The obvious nuisance for the proprietor to vacate one's lodging on occasions soon when the king was hosted—which could happen rather frequently—eventually caused rich officials to start building entire wings with a complete lodging for the king. The first to do so is the Château d'Écouen (b.1538–50 by Jean Bullant for Anne de Montmorency, the First Officer of the Crown), which provided a separate *logis du roi*, in a parallel wing to mitigate the symbolic dimension related to spatial hierarchies (see ibid., 279–82). On another note: in its smaller size, the secondary logding could have been used as a seasonal apartment during the winter, see Howard, "Seasonal Apartments."

248 For Bury, see Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 545–52; and Chatenet, *La cour*, 271–5.

249 Another early, perhaps earlier half-landing stair included in the *corps de logis* appears in the Château de Josselin, rebuilt by Jean II de Rohan after 1488. The stair seems to have been built in the first decade of the 1500s (Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 90–92).

250 See the abovementioned monographic study by Guillaume, *Château de Bonnivet*.

251 Here the plan is inconclusive. Normally, chambers can often be identified in plan by their asymmetrically-positioned fireplaces offering enough space next to it for the bed in its traditional position, as opposed to *salles* with their representatively-positioned fireplaces at the center of the wall. See Philibert de l'Orme, *L'Architecture*, I: book IX,

36 SMALLER CHATEAUX I
Plan and spatial organization of the Château de Châteaudun, built 1459–68 for military commander Jehan de Dunois (master mason unknown). The new side wing was added (c. 1469–91) for François I of Orléans-Longueville. Beneath the floor plan of the principal and secondary apartments, with diagrammed connection structure and spatial topology, indicating how the *salle* still functions as a distributive transit space.
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

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37 Plan and spatial organization of the Château de Plessis-Bourré (Maine-et-Loire) 1462–78 (master mason unknown) by finance minister and royal advisor Jean Bourré.
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

38 The Château Le Verger (Seiches-sur-le-Loir), buily 1494–99 by Colin Biart for maréchal Pierre de Rohan–Gié.
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



39 Plan (mirrored for comparison) and spatial organization of the paradigmatic Château de Bury (Loir-et-Cher) was built between 1511–24 for royal treasurer Florimont Robertet. The design features a central Italian stair, integrated in the center of the *corps de logis*. In the secondary apartments, the *garde-robe* is displaced from its traditional position behind the *chambre*, moving before it alongside a small corridor, creating a buffer space to the integrated stairs.
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

40 The Château de Gaillon (Normandie), rebuilt from 1501–06 by Colin Biart and Guillaume Senault for Cardinal George d'Amboise, minister of state and first royal advisor.
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

41 The Château de Bonnivet (Vienne), built 1516–24 for admiral Guillaume Gouffier. Reconstructed floor plan (after Guillaume and Blécon) of the principal and secondary apartments, in which both *chambres* are preceded by the *garde-robe*.
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

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42 Plan and spatial organization of the Château d'Azay-le-Rideau (Indre-et-Loire) was built between 1518–22 for Royal Treasurer-General Gilles Berthelot and his wife Philippa Lesbahy. Beneath the floor plan of the principal and secondary apartments, in which both *chambres* are preceded by the *garde-robe*. Here we see a subtle, yet crucial modification of the internal arrangement, related to the disjunction of *chambres* and *garde-robe* from the *salle*, changing the internal connection structure and spatial topology.

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



43 The Château de Nantouillet (Seine-et-Marne), built in the 1520s for (later Cardinal) Antoine Duprat. Floor plan mirrored for comparison.

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

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seems to have been followed by a now intercalated (and unpartitioned) *garde-robe*. This intercalated *garde-robe* can also be seen in the Château de Nantouillet ⊠[43] (c.1520 for politician (later cardinal) Antoine Duprat).[252]

This symmetrical arrangement was, however, not scale-invariant. In smaller châteaux, the stairwell usually divided the *corps de logis* and its room sequence in such a way that the *salle* was necessarily placed on one side of the stairs, with the *chambre* and *cabinet* on the other. This constraint can be seen in the famous Château d'Azay-le-Rideau ⊠[42] (b.1518–22 for Treasurer-General Gilles Berthelot and his wife Philippa Lesbahy, who supervised the works).[253] As later in Nantouillet, at Azay-le-Rideau the *garde-robe* was moved to before the *chambre* in both the principal and secondary lodging, which in the latter became articulated as an entire side wing. In the principal wing, the stair became the pivotal axis around which the entire building (and life within it) became organized.[254] By dividing the *salle* from the *garde-robe* and chamber, the stair thus functioned as a relational device, introducing an organizational split (in the continuum of the *logis*) that corresponded neither to two different lodgings nor necessarily to a 'public' and 'private portion' (since all the rooms were semi-public) but rather to two kinds of reception rooms with varying degree of (in)formality.

A Modification of Sequential Orderings, 1510–20s

In all of these instances, we see a deeper transformation brought about by the stairs being included in the center of the *corps de logis*. It affects not only the traditional organization of rooms by modifying the internal arrangement but also the traditional relationship between the principal lodging—which would explicitly become the 'showpiece'—and a secondary suite. Michel

chap. I. See also Chatenet, "'Cherchez le lit': La place du lit dans la demeure française au XVIe siècle," orig. pub. in *Aspetti dell'abitare in Italia tra XV e XVI secolo: Distribuzione, funzioni, impianti*, ed. Aurora Scotti Tosini (Milan: Unicopli, 2001), 145–53, revised article (2008) available online at http://cour-de-france.fr/article651.html.

252 Chatenet, *La cour*, 275–8. In the layout of Nantouillet, the chamber in the secondary lodging opens directly onto the principal stairs. But this relation can also still be found in later layouts, such as in the *logis du roi* of the Château d'Écouen. Concerning Duprat's residence, Chatenet notes a certain inconsistency, if not provocation, concerning how here the smaller secondary lodging was later designated as the *chambre du roi* (ibid., 278). For Nantouillet, see also Babelon, ed., *Châteaux de France*, 188–92; and Guillaume, "Nantouillet," in *Le guide du Patrimoine: Ile-de-France*, ed. Jean-Marie Pérouse de Montclos (Paris: Hachette, 1992), 471–6.

253 In Chatenet's study Azay-le-Rideau remains largely undiscussed. For a longer discussion, see Guillaume, "Azay-Le-Rideau et l'architecture française de la Renaissance," in *Les Monuments historiques de la France* 5 (1976), 65–80. For the history of the missing second wing, see Melot, *Châteaux of the Loire*, 104–127.

254 Melot, *Châteaux of the Loire*, 119.

Melot describes this development (in perhaps unnecessarily critical terms) as a process in which "the plan [of the *château*] was reduced to a simple succession of larger rooms … so that the *château* as a whole, was reduced … to a mere instrument of display, unsuitable for any specific function and, in particular for use as a dwelling. Its idealized structure was chiefly a setting for parades, hunting, festivities, and the reception of guests; it was not a place to live in."[255] Rather, these private buildings deliberately became EQUIPMENTS OF POWER, with which those who commissioned them—politicians and officials—could jostle for the king's attention and favor.[256]

There is different aspect that would become 'problematic' (in a Deleuzian sense) for the form-taking architecture of apartments. The placement of the principal staircase in the representative center of the *corps de logis simple* generated considerable difficulties because, as Jachmann notes, three requirements collided that were difficult to resolve at once: (1) a preferably symmetrical layout resulting from the central staircase, but which often affected (2) a desired visual permeability of the corps along an axis from court to the garden, as much as it also disrupted (3) a desired spatial continuity within the wing.[257] Once the unity or integrative logic of the *corps de logis* was thus disrupted, the building mass was further broken down and the resulting segmentarity of the building became articulated through vestibules, protruding corners, the differentiation of main wing over side wings, roof-differentiation and other expressive means. In the Châteaux de Villesavin, for example, the center of the principal wing is accentuated independently of the stair. In Villandry, the round corner towers change into square corner pavilions.[258] Especially the pavilion presented a genuine architectural mutation;[259] the round turrets were first replaced by square towers with an extension at Fontainebleau and Chateau de Madrid ☒[44] in the 1530s, in keeping with a penchant for Italian art. While becoming expressive segments on the outside, the towers allowed the *cabinets* (previously restricted to the turrets) to become integrated into the room sequences. While the

255 Ibid., 131.

256 On this point, see also Chatenet, *La cour*, 258–65. For a discussion of the aspect of 'desire,' see also my point below, note 400.

257 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 133. Prinz and Kecks spoke of "Störungen fur die Einheitlichkeit dieses Wohnbereichs [Disturbance/disruptions of the uniformity of the lodging]" (Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 130).

258 Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 224. Villandry and Villesavin (built ca. mid-1530s, both by Jean Le Breton (ibid., 117, and 560–71). On the formation of pavilions, see ibid., 139–43. The square shape may have been catalyzed by the quadrangular medieval *donjon*. For Villesavin, see Patrick Ponsot, "Le château de Villesavin," *Bulletin Monumental* 184, no. 4 (1990), 383–416.

259 Melot, *Châteaux of the Loire*, 130.

pavilion rooms were initially a transit space, they quickly became the center of the apartment. In this process, the architectural potential of the corner segments became freed up and illuminated, important room clusters were emphasized and thus the potential for new relations with climatic and social machines presented itself. Through these new relations, segmentarity assumed a novel function in the political machinery of the French court and the military tower became a pleasure-pavilion.[260]

This mutation cannot be attributed to a simple evolution (or continued influence) of the *plan massé* alone, since it involves a more complex interaction between (or assemblage-taking form in) the reciprocal disentanglement of the technicities of stair and tower within the shared deterritorialization of the *donjon* and *castrum*. The deterritorialization is shared through the incremental internalization of 'access,' by the literal incorporation of the stair and gate function through which aristocratic architecture progressively opens up across new thresholds. Architecture's filtering function here increasingly starts turning the segmentary space of royal reception rooms into a political apparatus for drawing distinctions that works by creating differences based on which certain socio-political orders can be established. While the threshold function of the staircase as a relational device is thus conferred onto the architecture of the *logis* itself, the architecture of the tower becomes an apparatus for securing private space.

This mutuality is key for understanding the transformation, as it effectively drove the morphological mutation of French palaces (and later *hôtels*) into the open pavilion-like structures as we find them in the 'bone-like' plans of the Château de Madrid ☒[44] (b.1525–30[–70]) with its characteristic *plan massé*, which looks like a larger version of hunting castles such as Muette and Challeau, which were actually built later and inspired by a different typological lineage of villas and castles,[261] or the rather similar plan of the Château-Neuf at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. This mutuality forms the basis of the progressive transformation of the *corps de logis* from its constrained organization and single sequence of rooms to a clustered organization that

260 Ibid.; see also Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 140.

261 For a monothematic study of the Château de Madrid, see esp. Chatenet, *Le château de madrid au bois de boulogne* (Paris: Picard, 1987). This Chateau was traditionally seen to have been inspired by the Poggio Reale, as mediated by Serlio (see e.g. Schreiber, *Französische Renaissance-Architektur*). Concerning the peculiar layout of Madrid, which François designed, without a doubt on his own, in 1525, Fernando Marias has stressed a likely influence of the Casa de Campo, while Chatenet highlights that this Villa may itself be based on Italian Villas as the Poggio a Caiano. See Fernando Marias, "De Madrid à Paris: François I et la casa de Campo," *Revue de l'art* 91 (1991), 26–35; cited after Chatenet, *La cour*, 53–9.



44 The Château de Madrid, designed by King François I in 1525 on return of his captivity from Spain, under influence of his encounter with Spanish building types.
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



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would characterize the soon-following emergence of a *corps de logis (semi-) double* [→ 3.2].[262] Perhaps the earliest trace of this transformation can be found in the parallel arrangement of a *garde-robe* and the buffering corridor, mentioned above. Introduced into the *corps de logis*, the stair is thus the genetic element that brings together formerly disparate elements, while also presenting a first differen*t*iating element in what is thus an **(INCLUSIVE) DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** of apartments. As I showed, this process is not to be reduced to the emergence of an identifiable unit in plan but should be traced in a more subtle, disparation in which the topological ordering of the *logis* is modified to allow for an internal differentiation without division.[263] Since it is a process, this differentiation is not marked by an exact date, but it marks the articulation of technical function of the gate and the stair as technically relational devices into a specific architectural dispositif. In the resulting internal modification of the arrangements of royal residences, the organizational potential of these freed technicities is articulated in a twofold reterritorialization process; first, their segmentary organization (= apartments) and second, a related disengagement of access (= distribution).

262 A *corps de logis* (or *corps d'hôtel*) *double* is the description for an organization of the plan in which we find two parallel rows of rooms arranged alongside a central transversal load-bearing wall. The notion 'semi-double' is applied, when some of the centrals rooms (like the hall or vestibule) occupy the full width of the building, while the lateral rooms are divided into two parallel room sequences.

263 On the last point, see the respective entries on "Differenc/tiation," in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 2nd edn, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: EUP, 2010), 72–73 — which stresses that "An exclusive disjunction 'either or, not both' is a diffenciation (written with a 'c') of a divergent series; an inclusive disjunction ['and …, and …, and …'] enables in contrast the coexistence of compossibles as a differentiation without division" — and *The Deleuze and Guattari Dictionary*, ed. Eugene B. Young (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

2.3
The Conjunctive Synthesis of an Apparatus for Drawing Distinctions

As Monique Chatenet indicates, "Until the end of François I's reign … the *logis de roi* was composed of a *salle*, followed by a *chambre*, a *garde-robe* and a *cabinet*, that were often adjoined by a *galerie*."[264] Yet the precise arrangement of these spaces was relatively flexible, as was clear from the experimental reshuffling of rooms in the private châteaux of the officials of the French kings. But we have still not arrived at the formation of the apartment as a *specific* room sequence just yet.[265] This specific sequence of rooms gained much momentum when the French court—growing in terms of members and power—became increasingly stationary again.

The re-settling of the court in Fontainebleau and then Paris began with kings from the late-chivalric age such as François I and Henri II and the regency of Catherine de Medici. During this time, we see a crucial step toward a court-aristocratic type of royal power and statist form of governance arising under the increasingly absolutist rule of Louis XIII and XIV.[266] From an assemblage-theoretic perspective, this "becoming-sedentary" of the traditionally nomadic court figuration is a progressive (re-)territorialization in which the more nomadic form of life comes to be transposed and socially (re-)coded into a different form of spatio-temporal expression. As DeLanda's assemblage-theoretical work on sedentary organizations notes:

> Foucault emphasized the fact that modern organizations had a double origin, [and] that each of the two articulations had a separate historical source. … We may say that an institutional organization is territorialized to the extent that the human bodies that compose it

264 Chatenet, "Architecture et cérémonial à la cour de Henri II: L'apparition de l'antichambre," in *Henri II et les Arts. Actes du colloque international*, ed. H. Oursel, and J. Fritsch (Paris, Ecole du Louvre, 2003), 355–80; here 355 (my trans.), avail. online at http://cour-de-france.fr/article135.html.

265 Previous studies have noted that while Serlio's uses of the term 'apartments,' the sequence of rooms is not yet fixed. Jestaz, for example, notes that "While the idea of a particular suite composed of several differentiated pieces is asserted" already in Serlio, "the composition of the apartment [was] not fixed yet in either number nor order of the rooms" (Jestaz, "Etiquette et distribution intérieur": 111). The same point is made by Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 129–36. Claiming that this notion is based on a false logocentric premise, I would want to counter this claim in two ways, pointing first to the fact that this 'experimentation process' was beginning much earlier, and second, to the extent that the necessary 'coding' to finally fix these segments in specific sequence would only arrive in conjunction with architectural discourse, and the evolving **DISCOURSE ON THE ART OF DISTRIBUTION** in the seventeenth century that the next Book III will be focussing on.

266 See Elias, *Court Society*, 146–213. This 'linear' development was indeed quite turbulent and majorly disrupted through the conflicts surrounding the succession to Henri IV and the resulting return to a more late-chivalrous kingship. As I shall argue, in the next part, this episode would have another crucial deterritorializing effect in the spatial differentiation of the system of appartements (see Chapter 3.1) but which operated on a first territorilaization to be describe first in the remainder of this part.

45 Painting by Antoine Caron, showing the train of members of the French court leaving the Château d'Anet (c. 1570).

> have been sorted out into the ranks of a hierarchy. … The second articulation involves both the discourses produced in these [territorialized] organizations (whether they are merely legitimizing narratives or formal knowledge used to perfect enforcement practices) as well as the ways in which their practices are coded, from written regulations and rationalized daily routines to ritualized behavior and ceremonial dress. The more these routines and rituals are rigidly specified in writing the more coded the organization may be said to be.[267]

As such, as Braidotti would put it, this sedentation also involves "a sedimentation of established habits," meaning particular forms of living that take shape in spatio-temporal repetition patterns, which in return "consolidate modes of relation and forces of interaction." [268] The basis for any becoming, such differently scaled and reciprocal territorialization processes form the enabling constraints within which subjects are re-territorialized and -coded within evolving systems. It is this double articulation that we now look at, in the remainder of this chapter, to understand the specific 'fixture' (and sedimentation and consolidation of earlier structures) emerging in this sedentation process.

267 DeLanda, *Deleuze: History and Science*, 39–40.

268 Braidotti, "Posthuman Relational Subjectivity," in *Relational Architectural Ecologies*, ed. Rawes, 35.

2.3.1 The Court Assemblage Becoming Sedentary

In the 1460s, the royal entourage consisted of about a hundred courtiers. But starting under Charles VIII and Louis XII, and during the subsequent reigns of François I to Henri II and Henri III, the court grew exponentially and counted more than a thousand members in the 1580s. This growth gave way to greatly reduced mobility and a series of managerial problems. While a nomadic lifestyle allowed the king to maintain some 'private moments' in his daily routine, the progressive centralization of power and increasingly sedentary forms of exercising it, called for a new spatial organization that involve

> a more disciplined arrangement of the interior spaces of the court, in order to keep the various activities carried out in each area distinct, redistributing them according to an essential hierarchy. Almost everywhere we find an attempt to separate reception rooms … from the 'private' quarters … in the least accessible areas of the building. These processes were closely related to another trend: with the expansion of courtly spaces into an articulated constellation of rooms reorganized according to their respective function, a series of privileged routes was set up inside the new palaces.[269]

This was amplified by the development of a courtly etiquette that regulated interactions and encounters. Historians have correctly located this growing regulation as a prime cause of the development from the *logis* to the *appartement* with its characteristic multiplication of rooms that could facilitate these newly regulated forms of courtly living and modes of stationary governance.[270] What we are talking about here is the appearance of anterooms in the royal palaces.

The Appearance of the French *Antichambre*, 1542–47

Sebastiano Serlio's two paradigmatic projects built after his arrival in France introduced the *anticamera*[271] into the country. These are the Grand Ferrare ☒[46] (b.1542–46 for Ippolito II d'Este) and Château d'Ancy-le-Franc ☒[48] (c.1544 for

269 Folin, "Princes Town, Palaces," in *Renaissance Architecture of Power*, ed. Beltramo, Cantatore, and Folin, 17. Following ibid.

270 Chatenet, *La cour*, 159.

271 In Italy, the *anticamera* was an established room type but "not as obligatory for persons of rank, as it should become in France during the times when Serlio was there" (Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 114 n.); see also Frommel, *Serlio: Architect*, 173. In Spain, the *antecámera* was known since at least 1536 (Boudon and Chatenet, "Logis du roi," 74).

Antoine III de Clairmont).[272] The Grand Ferrare was a building "designed by an Italian for an Italian." Built in close proximity to the royal Palace[273] of Fontainebleau, it does not provide a designated *logis du roi*; it was, instead, designed as a single-story town-house for a single resident. It was also built as a response to the project in Saint-Maur-des-Fossés ⊠[46] (b.1541–44 by Philibert de l'Orme) of Ippolito's rival Cardinal Jean du Bellay.[274] The initial project (later overhauled for Catherine de' Medici and then Henri de Bourbon) consisted of a wing with central vestibule and three rooms: a *grand salle* to the left, a *chambre d'apparat* and a *chambre* to the right. Superficially, the Grand Ferrare and Du Bellay's residence share many layout features, including the basic room distribution. But only in the Grand Ferrare do we find an *anti-camera*—to the left of the vestibule—leading to the *camera/chambre*, further connected to a *rietro camera/cabinet* and *galleria*, to the right of the vestibule the *sala/salle* is located, followed by a secondary *camera/chambre* with an adjacent *camerino*.[275] The central vestibule perfectly aligns with the entrance gate across the square courtyard. Instead of placing the stair in the center, Serlio tucked it away in the right corner. This design is said to have "helped establish a characteristic type in French domestic architecture."[276] In this

272 The designs, especially Ancy are comprehensively discussed in Sabine Frommel, *Sebastiano Serlio: architect* (Milan: Electra, 2003), 83–241. For the oft-mentioned typological influence of the Grand Ferrare on French *hôtels*, see moreover Myra Nan Rosenfeld, "Les origines de l'hôtel français de la Renaissance," *Cahiers de l'Association internationale des études francaises* 23 (1971), 45–50; Jean Babelon, "Du 'Grand Ferrare' à Carnavalet: Naissance de l'hôtel classique," *Revue de l'art* 41 (1978), 83–108; Frédérique Lemerle, "L'émergence de l'hôtel particulier à Paris: Entre ostentation et intimité," in Patrique Boucheron, Jean-Philippe Genet, eds., *Marquer la ville: Signes, traces, empreintes du pouvoir (XIIIe–XVIe siècle)* (Paris/Rome: Édns de la Sorbonne, 2013), avail. online at http://books.openedition.org/psorbonne/3275.

273 Boudon and Chatenet "Logis du roi," 74 n (my trans.).

274 See Frommel, *Serlio: Architect,* 235–7. The original design was disguised by De l'Orme's various alterations to the design and modifications, and due to the fact that its design was not published until his *Premiere tome de l'architecture* (1567), in an idealized version "almost alike [*quasi semblable*]" (fol. 17). For a reconstruction of the various building phases, see the study by Monique Kitaëff, "Le château de Saint-Maur-des-Fossés," in *Monuments et mémoires de la Fondation Eugène Piot* 75 (1996), 65–126; and id., and Catherine Grodecki, "Saint-Maur en 1570: Les deux projets de Catherine de Médicis," *Bulletin Monumental* 158, no. 3 (2000), 203–15. Kitaëff recounts that De l'Orme's initial project "had planned two apartments, one to the south for the winter and one to the east for the summer. The state apartments were situated in the real wing that had a central vestibule; the more private pieces were located in the side wings, which the left was largely occupied by a *galerie*," (Kitaeff, "Le château de Saint-Maur-des-Fossés," 78) as the published plan still shows. Chatenet notes this arrangement to be only one in French château with two perfectly symmetrical halls (*La cour*, 211).

275 The room nomenclature is taken from Serlio's own description of the project in the chapter "On the House of the illustrious Prince to he built outside the City" (fol. 14v/15r) of his *Sesto Libro*, reprinted in Hart and Hicks, eds., *Sebastiano Serlio: On Architecture,* Vol II: 30–1; the French from Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 35.

276 Hart and Hicks, *Sebastiano Serlio: On Architecture,* xv.

sense, the Grand Ferrare has often been described as the typological prototype of the French *hôtel*.[277] By contrast, Trüby highlights that, in its arrangement as *corps de logis simple*, the Grand Ferrare can better be positioned as the end of an era, since a second, parallel layer of rooms lies at the heart of the future of French residential design.[278] [→3.1. & –3.3.1]

Similar to the Grand Ferrare, Dennis writes, "Ancy-le-Franc appears to be exactly what it is, a French château designed by an Italian,"[279] but on the inside, its layout follows a distinctly French organization. Serlio's design adopted a disposition similar to that of the Château d'Écouen ☒[47] (c.1538–50, by Jean Bullant for Anne de Montmorency)[280] in providing a separate representative lodging for the king opposite that of the proprietor. An adjacent *logis du roi* does not, in fact, represent a new morphological stratum; rather, it concentrates an archaic organization in a new form. Frommel notes that with Bullant's design—which lies halfway typologically between the Italian *castello* and the French hierarchically articulated château—evidences "a high degree of system and rationality had now been attained by French domestic architecture."[281] Externally, Serlio's design broke fully with the hierarchical differentiation. Yet, internally, a differentiated spatial series is introduced off the principal stair to a *salle*, an *anticamera*, a *camera* connected to another *(rietro)camera* (serving as a *garde-robe*) and a *camerino* (serving as a *cabinet*). Regarding the placement of the *anticamera*, Chatenet highlights that Serlio's projects offer two rather different solutions that both have parallels in French residential architecture.[282] But, she argues, these Italian *anticamere* "cannot be considered as fully French ones, yet," since this arrangement "found … no echo

277 See e.g. Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 31–37.

278 Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors*, 83.

279 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 34.

280 For Écouen, see Chatenet, *La cour*, 279–83; Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 118–9, 139–41, 160, and 576–80; Frommel, *Serlio: Architect,* 214.

281 Frommel, *Serlio: Architect,* 214.

282 "In the Royal lodgings of Ancy …, the antechamber is inserted between *salle* and *chambre*, which according to a long tradition is called the *chambre du roi*. … Such a disposition is not exceptional: In Oiron and Nantouillet, the lodging that follows the hall, is not the proprietor's, whose room opening on the other side of the central stair case as followed by several private pieces including a gallery. Yet, this layout does not follow an older tradition it seems for the most great seigneurial castles of the beginning of the century—Gaillon, Chateaudun, Bury, Bonnivet, and perhaps Verger—the master apartments is situated behind the *salle*. At the Grand Ferrare, the lodging of the proprietor is more separated from the *salle* by a circulation space, as in Oiron and Nantouillet. … Placed in the apartment of the master of the house, … the *antichambre* of the grand Ferrare is not without precedents, too. Due to its position, it is similar to the seigneurial *salletes* of Chateaudun or Jarzé, which open directly onto a stair" (Chatenet, "Architecture et ceremonial," 371–2 (my trans.)). But in all these French cases, she emphasizes, the *sallette* or *chambre de parement* off the *salle*, does not work as an anteroom, however.

until 1547," when this solution came to be used for Lescot's new Louvre wing.[283] Chatenet contemplates how to explain the sudden widespread appearance of *antichambres* during the reign of Henri II.[284] More recently, Sabine Frommel came to attribute the fact that *antichambres* so suddenly became *en vogue* in France, "to the increasing sophistication of court ceremonial—a process that had started before Serlio's arrival at the French court."[285] Yet, this explanation does not necessarily answer what caused this evolving ceremonial to take up the antechamber in this particular arrangement, however. In this matter, I strongly agree with Frommel's insistence on the "prescriptive influence" that Ancy's layout had on "defining the function of the [French *antichambre*] architecturally"[286]; yet I would also suggest that this architectural influence (as a more GENETIC one) must be understood in non-discursive terms.

In this regard, it is to be noted that in Ancy-le-Franc, the placement of the *anticamera* as intercalating and mediating space between *salle* and *chambre* structurally re-introduced—if under an entirely different label—the *chambre de parement.* ☒[50] This chamber came to the fore again in 1548, when Carlos I, King of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor (as Charles V, *1500, 1516/19–56), instituted the Burgundian ceremonial at the Spanish court at Valladolid. With its pronounced recognition of rank and hierarchy, this ceremonial programmatically broke with the customary access the Castilian nobility enjoyed to the king. During the traditional ceremony, visitors were received in separate audience chamber; the new one introduced a semi-private parament chamber with state bed, preceding the private bedroom, which made the sovereign far less accessible.[287]

283 Chatenet, *La cour*, 356.

284 Ibid., 172–4.

285 Frommel, S*erlio: Architect,* 173.

286 Ibid.

287 In the 14th century, the Duchy of Burgundy had become a focal point of courtly culture. Under the rule of Philip the Good and Charles the Bold, the Burgundian court ceremonial had a greater influence of those of royal houses in early modern Europe. It was laid down in Olivier de la Marche's *Estat et Maison du duc Charles de Burgogne* (c.1473); preserved in the *Mémoires d'Olivier de La Marche, maître d'hôtel et capitaine des gardes de Charles le Téméraire, Vol. IV*, eds. Henri Beaune and J. D'Arbaumont (Paris, Renouard 1888), 1–94; avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k65745009). Werner Paravicini has critiqued the a simple 'model'-function of this ceremonial; see Paravincini, "The Court of the Dukes of Burgundy: A Model for Europe?," in *Princes, Patronage, and the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modern Age, c.1450–1650,* ed. Ronald Asch and Adolf M. Birke (London/New York: Oxford UP, 1991), 61–102; and also Maria-Jose Rodriguez-Salgado, "The Court of Philip II of Spain," in ibid., 206–44. See also Paravicini, ed., *La cour de Bourgogne et l'Europe: Le rayonnement et les limites d'un modèle culturel. Actes du colloque international tenu à Paris les 9, 10 et 11 octobre 2007* (Ostfildern: Thorbecke, 2013). Among many related studies, Hans Cools helpfully highlights that 'the Bourgundian



46 | 47 ***Below left*, plan and spatial organization of the elevated ground floor of the *hôtel particulier* of Jean du Bellay (the later Château de Saint-Maur-des-Fossés), 1540s project by Philibert De l'Orme (*shown on top*).**
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***Below right*, plan of the elevated ground floor of the Grand Ferrare, a *hôtel particulier* built for Ippolito d'Este in 1542–46 by Sebastiano Serlio.**
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







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

48 | 49 Plan and spatial organization of the Château d'Écouen (Val-d'Oise), built between 1538–50 by Jean Bullant for Anne de Montmorency (*left*). Here, the *logis du roi* occupies an entire wing, mirroring the proprietors lodgings. As those, the king's suite of rooms is centrally divided by a stair case.
Level +01

In the Château Ancy-le-Franc (Yonne), built around 1544 by Sebastiano Serlio for Antoine III de Clairmont (*top* and *right*), the king's room sequence is undivided. Instead, the plan introduces an *antichambre* into the kings's lodgings.
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





50 Plan and spatial organization of the Louvre. The new-built wing (1546–51) by Pierre Lescot, introducing the *antichambre* between *salle* and *chambre* into French royal palaces. Serving as a waiting room, a spatial threshold for waiting courtiers and visitors, it here becomes paired with the *garde-robe* that displaced from its position as a rear chamber now precedes the chamber. The latter — now located in a corner pavilion — allows the apartment to be opened more to the outside. This sequence is later mirrored in the queen (mother)'s apartments in the southern wing, added under Catherine de Medici (in 1559–68). The king and queen's apartments are joined through the *cabinet* as the royal regulations prescribed.

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

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

51 Diagram illustrating the involution of the Italian stair into the *corps de logis*, and two related changes, crucial for the form-taking architecture of apartments. First, with the inclusion of the stair, the *salle* loses its function as a distributive transit space, connecting two lodgings. In larger *châteaux*, the *salle* remains connected to the principal lodgings. In the scondary lodging, the *garde-robe*, comes to be placed before the *chambre*, alongside a corridor, as a sort of buffer space. In Bonnivet, and Azay, also the *garde-robe* of the principal lodging becomes placed before the *chambre*. Second, in avoiding to subdivide the *logis du roi* by a central stair, the wing offers space to include an *antichambre*, placed between *salle* and *chambre*, so in the position, occupied traditionally by the parament chamber. In the Louvre these two developments come to be combined, in the room pair of both *antichambre* and *garde-robe*, placed before the *chambre*.

As we have seen, this habitual space, where the sovereign would appear to a select group of courtiers, was "in the process of disappearing"[288] from the private châteaux. Its last known use was at Gaillon, and it was replaced by the doubled *sallettes*. Yet the parament chamber's supposedly extinct mediating quality clearly survived in De l'Orme's project for Saint-Maur. Here, the parament chamber served as a reception room off the more private chamber. This re-emerging intercalary room could already be found in the royal Château de Villers-Cotterêts ☒[52] (c.1530–56, more below). Chatenet discusses its unusually extended public sequence, with the square *sallette* following the rather large *salle* in the king's and queen's lodgings.[289] Kristin Neuschel notes how dining, which traditionally took place in the *salle*, was now relegated to the smaller *sallettes*, and Chatenet subsequently identifies the latter room as an antecedent to the *antichambre*, which makes the smaller *sallette* of Villers-Cotterêts an *antichambre* avant la lettre.[290]

The first designated *antichambre* to appear in a French royal palace was in the new Louvre wing ☒[49] (b.1546–56 by Pierre Lescot).[291] Its layout is very similar to that of the wing containing the *appartement du roi* at Ancy-le-Franc (which, after Serlio's death, was completed under Lescot)[292] adopting its sequence of a *salle*, followed by an *antichambre* with adjacent *garde-robe*, *chambre* and *cabinets*,[293] which would later connect to the mirrored lodgings

ceremonial' must not be understood as a fixed set of rules and codes of conduct, but as a specific organization that developed when under Charles the Bold, the court transformed into a military institution; see Hans Cools, "The Burgundian-Habsburg Court as a Military Institution from Charles the Bold to Philip II," in *The Court as a Stage: England and the Low Countries in the Later Middle Ages*, ed. Steven Gunn and Antheun Janse (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006), 156–68.

288 Cf. Chatenet *La cour*, 269.

289 Ibid., 171–2, referring to the monographic study of Christiane Riboulleau, *Villers-Cotterêts: un château royal en forêt de Retz* (Amiens: AGIP, 1991), which I haven't been able to consult. Ibid., 172. Chatenet acknowledges that the French term '*antichambre*' is not mentioned in any document under Francis I, and appears only in official documents under Henri II; while its introduction in architecture discourse was given by with Philibert de l'Orme's *L'Architecture*, that described "Car l'après la salle estoit l'antichambre, puis la chambre du Roy, et auprès d'elle, en retournant a costé, estoit en potence la garderobbe." Philibert de l'Orme, *L'architecture* Vol. I, livre IV, fol. 80r, cited in Boudon and Chatenet, "Logis du roi," 73. For a discussion of Villers-Cotterêts, see also Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 440–447.

290 Chatenet referring to Kristen Brooke Neuschel, "Noble Households in the Sixteenth Century: Material Settings and Human Communities," *French Historical Studies* 15, no. 4 (1988), 595–622.

291 The term *antichambre* is mentioned in a 1551 contract. See Chatenet, *La cour*, 172.

292 Ancy (as Lescot's Louvre wing) evidences a structural similarity with the Ducal Palace of Urbino, which Serlio may have seen around 1510, when he was in nearby Pesaro. Its architecture was already being adopted under François in the Porte Dorée in Fontainebleau. But a direct influence cannot be established. It may be noteworthy that Catherine de' Medici, married to François son Henri, had inherited the title of duchess of Urbino.

293 A second *cabinet*, the *cabinet d'haut* was provided in the upper floor of the Pavillon *du roi* (Chatenet, *La cour*, 184).

of the queen in the south wing (b.1559–68). This was the second iteration of the layout. Shortly before his death, François I planned to modernize the dilapidated Louvre and started tearing down the west wing for a new project designed by Lescot. After his father's death in 1547, Henri II continued the project. But in 1549, he ordered the position of the principal stair—originally planned in the center of the wing—to be changed to gain a larger *salle*.[294] This would have resulted in a room sequence without an *antichambre*. Yet, delegated to the north-end of the wing, the plan saw space for an additional room above the Salle de la Tribune on the ground floor. The Louvre wing can thus be seen as a synthesis, since it is where two streams converge.

The introduction of the *antichambre* in Ancy did not actually have that much of an impact other than consolidating and overcoding a longstanding arrangement of aristocratic architecture that 'vanished'; the space of visual-physical appearance where royal power was expressed was replaced by a space of 'potential-in-waiting' tied to the selective access of visitors. Ancy's plan freed the *chambre*—placed in the corner pavilion—to become illuminated, an articulated segment in the building. And this arrangement—of the *chambre* in the corner pavilion, preceded by an *antichambre*—converged in the Louvre with something that had changed elsewhere in the meantime, namely, the dislocation of the *garde-robe* from its traditional position following the *chambre*. This dislocation came about through the inclusion of the French Italian stair that now preceded the *garde-robe*; it doubled the *antichambre*, redefining and differentiating its function. This local integration actualized two divergent lines of differentiation of a virtual multiplicity. The differenciation into two distinct solutions for rooms *preceding the chambre* would start to open new opportunities to further differentiate this suite of rooms.[295]

Underlying Cross-Cultural Influences, 1530s–60s

While we can say with relative certainty when the first *antichambre* made its appearance, its initial use remains obscure. As Boudon and Chatenet conclude, the elongation of the public sequence, with a room for those waiting for the king, most likely came about because of Henri II's newly implemented *levée* and the '*affaires*'—the king's rising and public act of getting dressed, which was followed by a briefing on matters that needed actioning ('*à faire*') with a small governmental council.

294 See Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 465–79; here 466. But the same arrangement can also be found in Lescot's Château du Vallery (b.after 1548)

295 See my note 249 above.

Contemporaneous documents attest that the *antichambre* initially served a dual purpose, as a waiting room where some control could be exercised over those entering the king's room in the morning, as well as a dining room. As Boudon and Chatenet argue, the word '*antichambre*' was used to mean dining room before it came to mean waiting room also, which probably means that it became preferred above '*sallette*' in reference to dining room.[296] They thus suggest—and it is possible to substantiate this idea—that the doubled *sallette* or *petit salle* preceding the chamber in the smaller châteaux described above were predecessors of the *antichambre*.[297] Yet, this room that was traditionally used for conversing took on a defining function when, as Bertrand Jestaz notes, "Under Henry II, a small governmental council was instituted spontaneously, which was said to be the 'morning business,' for it was held as soon as the king rose in his room, but he would soon be transferred to the neighboring *cabinet*, which would later take the name of the *cabinet du conseil*."[298] It was this relatively close public arrangement that still allowed for the infamous 'familiarity' that characterized the French court.

296 Boudon and Chatenet, "Les logis du roi," 74: "On sait que, sous Henri III, l'antichambre sert a la fois de salle d'attente permettant de régler les entrées au matin dans la chambre du roi, et de salle a manger. A priori, ce dernier usage parait le plus ancien: le mot 'antichambre' serait alors venu simplement se substituer a celui de 'sallette' (dite aussi 'petite salle' ou 'seconde salle'), lieu de repas dont font mention plusieurs textes des XVe et XVIe siècles. Et pourtant, il est difficile de ne pas mettre en rapport l'apparition de l'antichambre avec une réglementation du lever et des 'affaires' instaurée par Henri II.… En ce cas, l'allongement de la partie 'publique' du logis royal (c'est-a-dire la partie placée devant la chambre) correspondrait a une évolution du cérémonial."

297 Chatenet, *La cour*, 174–9. An etymological confirmation of Boudon and Chatenet's thesis can perhaps be inferred from the fact that Blondel later describes the *appartements de parade* positioned between the public portion of the house and the private apartments to be "intended for the magnificence or for the personal residence of the master who there deals with important business [and] receives the persons of consideration" (Jacques-François Blondel, *Architecture françoise, ou Recueil des plans, élévations, coupes et profils des églises, maisons royales, palais, hotels…*, 4 vols (Paris: Jombert, 1752–56) I: 26; see also the following chapter).

298 Jestaz first pointed out that "Sous Henri II enfin s'était institué comme spontanément un petit conseil de gouvernement qu'on disait 'des affaires du matin,' car il se tenait dès le lever du roi dans sa chamber, mais il ne tardera pas à se transférer dans le cabinet voisin, qui en retirera plus tard le nom de cabinet du conseil" (Jestaz, "Étiquette et distributions intérieure," 112). He respectively cites the *Histoire particulière de la court de Henri II*, in the Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France, Prémière série (1835), Vol. III: 282: "Alors fut institué un nouveau conseil, appelle les affaires du matin, encore observé tel [règne Charles IX]. Le Roy estant éveillé, sa chemise luy est apportée, lors tous les grands et la plupart de la noblesse entre pour le saluer. Sa chemise prise [qui luy est baillée par le premier et le plus grand des princes qui se trouve là,] et luy habillé [après s'estre prosterné à genoux devant un petit oratoire et autel qu'on lui dresse en sa chambre,] ses dévotions faites. chacun se retire et ne demeure que ceux de ses affaires." Also Chatenet refers to this in her essay "Architecture et cérémonial," 361–62 n.

Chatenet points out two consequences of the introduction of *antichambres* into the royal suite: "On the one hand, it materially enlarged the distance between king and courtiers … at a court hitherto characterized by its familiarity. On the other hand, it also accentuated a social hierarchy by establishing a distinction between the courtiers that entered this room, and those waiting in the *salle*."[299] While Henri II introduced the *antichambre* as an expression of the intimate union of prince and people, under the reign of Henri III (*1551, r. 1573–75), it became, as Boudon and Chatenet put it, "the material expression of the distance separating the subjects from their king." This distance was filled with boundary markers by means of which the subjects' standing could be measured.[300] This soon led to the multiplication of anterooms. This transformation of the royal lodging is often ascribed to (or explained by) Henri's 'distant' character, in having "inherited from his Grandfather [François I] a pronounced aversion for public life."[301] After his unlikely ascension to the French throne after the death of his two older brothers, Charles and Louis, the climate at court changed radically as Henri isolated himself and installed a physical distance between him and his subjects by establishing a strict etiquette. The distancing did not come about entirely because of his character, however, but also because of the wider emergence of social distinctions that mark the sociogeny of court society [→ 3.2.2], in which social distance was about to gain a much wider systematic function for establishing a new, more encompassing form of royal power. The "distinction underlining the distance separating the monarch and his subjects," Boudon and Chatenet argue, was initially influenced by the strict ceremonial of the Spanish court (which Henri — as Roi Très Chrétien — would certainly have been keen to emulate as well).

The differentiated royal castles of England were another cultural influence on the growing number of distinct rooms, Chatenet adds.[302]

299 Chatenet, *La cour*, 179.

300 I borrow this expression from the*dness* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 181.

301 Chatenet, *La cour*, 60.

302 Boudon and Chatenet, "Logis du roi," 77 (my trans.); Chatenet, *La cour*, 183–4; citing Jacques-Auguste de Thou's *Histoire universelle depuis 1543 jusqu'en 1607, Vol. IX (1604–1608), livre LXXX* (1584), 202: "Henri n'ignorant pas qu'il avoit perdu l'estime de se sujets, et que la majesté royale s'avilissoit de jour en jour, voulut la relever par des dehors pompeux, et par l'appareil d'un cérémonial respectueux. Mais le remède étoit hors de saison, et trop foible pour le mal qu'il pretendoit guérir. Cette pensée lui vint en consequence d'un entretien qu'il eut avec la femme du comte de Stafford ambassadeur de la reine Elisabeth: il y apprit dans un grand détail les formalités et les respects avec lesquels on abordoit les rois d'Angleterre; combien de chambres et d'antichambres il falloit traverser pour arriver jusqu'a eux. Ce cérémonial fut fort de son goüt, et il résolut de le faire observer désormais a son égard. Le derangement arrivé dans le cérémonial de la cour par la licence des derniers tems servit de prétexte aux nouveaux régiemens

Instead of discussing simple influences, the following section aims to contribute to our understanding of what is a more systemic change. Around 1500, English royal palaces, such as Bridewell ☒[51] (b.1500–1530s, under the supervision of Cardinal Thomas Wolsey) were widely designed with stacked lodgings, the form of accommodation characterizing traditional French royal palaces.[303] In the early 1530s, shortly after King Henry VIII of England (*1491, 1509–47) attempted to get his first marriage, to Catherine of Aragon, annulled to marry Anne Boleyn , we see what Simon Thurley's study calls a "drastic turnaround," as Henri abandoned "the stacked lodging and, with his new wife Anne [Boleyn], planned a new set of queens lodgings on the same level as his own."[304]

This "abandonment of the stacked plan" in favor of an earlier arrangement of the royal lodging on one level was nothing short of a "watershed moment" in the architectural evolution of English palaces.[305] The nearly symmetrical organization of Nonsuch Palace in Surrey ☒[51] (c.1538) has in its highly differentiated internal sequence a (here absent) 'watching chamber' or

qu'il publia alors par le conseil de sa mère, comme il est marqué dans le préambule."

303 Simon Thurley, *The Royal Palaces of Tudor England: Architecture and Court Life, 1460–1547* (New Haven/London: Yale UP, 1993), 31. Existing in England for longer, this stacked scheme was perhaps more demonstratively taken over by the English kings when they seized Paris during the Hundred Years' War 1420–1436/41, and through the following expeditions through which they became further acquainted with it. Henri VIII's father Henry Tudor, Earl of Richmond; later King Henry VII of England (*1457, r.1485–1509), had further developed this scheme more intuitively in his Tudor residences as the royal manor in Sheen (ibid., 27). See also id., "The Palaces of Henri VIII," in *Architecture et vie sociale*, ed. Guillaume, 97–106; and id., ed., *Whitehall Palace: An Architectural History of the Royal Apartments, 1240–1698* (New Haven/London: Yale UP, 1999), that reconstruct the development of the English royal castles, in spite of their loss and moreover relatively scarce archaeological evidence.

304 See id., *Royal palaces,* 52–53. One factor for trying to explain Henry's sudden interest in architecture lies in Wolsey's falling out of Henri's favor over the annulment of his marriage to Catherine of Aragon (daughter of Isabel I de Castille and Fernando II de Aragón). Wolsey, left behind an "architectural vacuum" (ibid., 49), which Thurley suggest, was filled by Anne Boleyn (*c.1501, Henry's second spouse, initially maid of honor to Queen Claude of France and then Catherine of Aragon, and eventually queen consort of England from 1533–36), had a catalytic role in intellectually stimulating the king. Moreover, he argues, there was a "remarkable combination of circumstances" leading to structural changes in the organization of the Court and in the architecture of royal palaces. In new-built or extended residences as Whitehall and Hampton Court. These circumstances, Thurley argues, not only include the English reformation in general, and the acquisition of dissolved monasteries, which "hitherto he had used as a guest during royal progresses; second, the acquisition of a large number of houses from courtiers who were either out of favor or whose property attracted royal rapacity. The largest group of acquisitions consisted of properties obtained by purchases, exchange, or forfeit" (ibid.).

305 Ibid., 53. This arrangement on a single level was already existing in the largest medieval palace: Windsor castle, as built by King Edward III around 1320. Id., "The King in the Queens Lodgings," in *Prince, princesses et leur logis*, ed. Chatenet and De Jonge, 67–74; here 68–9.

52 THE ABANDONMENT OF THE STACKED LODGING
Exemplary plans of the transformation of English Royal Castles under Henry VIII. *Above*, the reconstructed plan of Bridewell Palace (built between 1500–30, mainly under the supervision of Cardinal Thomas Wolsey), with its stacked royal lodgings. *Below*, the rather different organization of Nonsuch Palace in Surrey, built c. 1538, with its nearly-symmetrical arrangement of the king's and queen's lodgings on the same level.











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audience hall, a so-called 'presence chamber' (or chamber of estate), a closet with a bypassing corridor, the privy chamber (equivalent to the *chambre du roi*), two rooms constituting the 'privy lodgings' (a 'day chamber' and a 'withdrawing room') before the king's bed chamber. This differentiation of the royal chambers reflects the fact that, under the Henry VIII, court life, and specifically the relationship between the king and his courtiers, was very different.[306] Many newly built palaces under Henry were not really designed to host receptions but rather attested to his "quest for privacy," if by privacy we mean an attempt to selectively allow the presence of courtiers and domestic staff.[307]

The Abandonment of the Stacked Lodging, 1539

The disuse of the stacked lodging is also evident in the gender topology of the French royal palaces after the 1530s. This can be observed especially well in the three renovated older royal châteaux of Villers-Cotterêts, Saint-Germain-en-Laye, and Fontainebleau ☒[53–55], that, as has often been noted, gained importance when François I, returning from his imprisonment in Madrid, transferred his main residence from the Loire valley back to the Île de France. What has been noted to a lesser extent, or less explicitly at least, is that these palaces all abandon the stacked lodging, re-organizing the royal lodgings on a single floor, while retaining the stacked lodging's "essential adjunct: the processional stair." Thus, contrary to the 'fake' twin apartments mentioned earlier, these regal residences embodied a new organizational parity that was completely transforms the architecture of the French court and that would lead to a complex and differentiated interior arrangement in which the *antichambre* gains a specific organizational function.

In the layout of the royal Château de Saint-Germain-en-Laye ☒[54], we see the last instance of a transformation of the twin apartments joined through the *salle* (as in Loches, Amboise, Blois).[308] Saint-Germain-en-Laye was a medieval castle transformed under François (c.1539–55 initially by Pierre Chambiges), who added several *corps d'hôtel*, the longest of which

306 Chatenet, *La cour*, 111. On the highly differentiated development of apartments in England, see also Baillie, "Etiquette and the Planning of State Apartments."

307 Thurley, *Royal Palaces*, 63, and 36; see also Chatenet, *La cour*, 183–4. Thurley speaks of an "exclusion of those not needing to be present." For a critique of this notion of exclusion, see below.

308 Chatenet, *La cour*, 208. See also her elaborate initial reconstruction of the distribution, published as Chatenet, "Une demeure royale au milieu du XVIe siècle: la distribution des espaces au château de Saint-Germain-en-Laye," *Revue de l'art* 81 (1988), 20–30. For Saint-Germain, see also Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 431–39.

was cut in half by the principal Italian stair that lead to the *salle du roi*. A secondary spiral stair interconnected this *salle* to the *salle de la reine* in the adjacent wing. Here, the king's lodging is composed only of a *chambre* with *cabinet*, preceded by a *garde-robe* with adjacent corridor to the *salle*. His room was also joined via the queen's chapel to her lodgings, which consisted of a *salle*, the *chambre de la reine* and three smaller pieces: a *cabinet*, a second '*cabinet triangle*' and an (enlarged) *garde-robe*.[309]

In the Château de Villers-Cotterêts ⊠[53] (c.1530–56 under master masons Jacques and Guillaume Le Breton), the room sequence in the queen's lodging was already inverted (and topologically parallelized[310]), so that the king's and queen's apartments were connected through the more private rooms. Here, the bed chambers were directly coupled by a secret passage: a cross-piece that replaces the famous 'secret staircase' that served as a connector in the earlier stacked lodgings.[311] The king and queen's conjugal apartments were in fact multiply interconnected, thanks to the secondary stair between the two square 'proto-*antichambres*,' but also the external *galerie*. This inversion also occurred in the various phases of expansion in the royal Château in Fontainebleau ⊠[55] (b.1527–60s).[312] Initially located in the northern wing around the Cour Ovale, the king and queen's adjacent lodgings consisted of a *salle*, *chambre* and *garde-robe* (the exact relation between the spaces remains partly unclear), and a *cabinet* in the external turret, which was modernized.[313] A 64m-long *galerie* was added to the king's lodging for his private use and formed part of the projected exten-

309 See also Chatenet, *La cour*, 194, 206.

310 This topological parallelization is even more pronounced at Amboise, where the existing *logis du roi* was doubled with a parallel wing connected by a passage between the apartments of Henri II and Catherine de' Medici. The room distribution was reconstructed by Evelyn Thomas, but its organization of the king's new wing somewhat difficult to understand as has been noted (Chatenet, *La cour*, 208, and id., "Architecture et cérémonial," 360; citing Thomas, "Les logis royaux d'Amboise."

311 This arrangement on a single level can certainly *not* be explained nor does it manifest the queen's role at court as, after the widowed François I's was stipulated in 1530 to marry the elder sister of Holy Roma Emperor Charles V, Eleanor of Austria, his second wife lived an independent life ignored by her husband. If anything it can only be explained, by providing a customary arrangement, paired with a form of symbolic overcompensation.

312 For a discussion of the changing royal lodgings, see Boudon and Chatenet, "Logis du roi," of which some aspects repeated in Chatenet, *La cour*, 166–86. For monographic works on Fontainebleau, see Françoise Boudon and Jean Blécon, *Le Château de Fontainebleau de François Ier à Henri IV* (Paris: Picard, 1998), and Jean-Marie Pérouse de Montclos, *Le Château de Fontainebleau* (Paris: Scala, 2009). For the recently revised dating, see Thomas Clouet, "Fontainebleau de 1541 à 1547: Pour une relecture des Comptes des Bâtiments du roi," *Bulletin monumental* (2012), 195–234. See also Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 416–30.

313 Boudon and Chatenet, "Logis du roi," 69–71.



53 Plan and spatial organization of the Royal Château of Villers-Cotterêts (Aisne), b. 1530–56, under master masons Jacques and Guillaume Le Breton.
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



54 Plan and spatial organization of the Royal Château of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (Yveline), b. 1539–55 initially by Pierre Chambiges.
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





55 Plan and spatial organization of the Royal Château of Fontainebleau: Upon the return of François I form his captivity, the Château royal in Fontainebleau became the principal residence, and was transformed the irregular, twelfth-century château fort into what would become the then largest royal palaces of France. In 1527, the building stared to be transformed into a Renaissance palace under Gilles le Breton. The adjacent lodgings of the king, the queen were initially located in the northern wing around the so-called Oval Court. The projected extension (indicated) was realized between 1534–46 with the addition of a large gallery for king's private use, and the so-called Pavilion de Poêles.

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sion of the old court, with the ambitious, open Cour du Cheval Blanc (b.1534–46). In 1550, Henri II commissioned Philibert de l'Orme to "overturn the château," as Boudon and Chatenet write, and completely invert the existing arrangement of rooms.[314] Around 1556, the king's chamber and its appurtenances were placed in the Pavilion des Poêles — the south-western building around the Cour du Cheval Blanc — which was further modernized two years later to offer a complete suite of rooms with convenient access.[315] This wing provided a sequence akin to the new Louvre layout: a *salle*, an *antichambre*, the *chambre du roi* with an adjacent *garde-robe,* and a *cabinet*. The lodgings of the king's spouse, Queen Consort Catherine de' Medici, were located in the north wing of the Court Ovale and consisted of a *salle*, an intercalated *garde-robe*, *chambre,* and *cabinet*.

To better understand these changes and the queen's decisive influence, which I will shortly discuss in more detail, it is important to situate them in a slightly broader historical and geopolitical context of cross-cultural influences. For, interestingly enough, a similar change can also be observed in the principal Spanish royal residences around the same time. Like François I and Henri II, Spanish King and Holy Roman Emperor Carlos was an itinerant monarch.[316] He commissioned renovations of the medieval Alcázar de Madrid, and the Royal Alcázar de Toledo (the imperial capital and main seat). He started transforming the Alcázar de Madrid ☒[56] from a defensive castle into a royal palace (b.1537 under Luis de Vega and Alonso de Covarrubias).[317] Following the tradition of the Castilian courtyard palaces (the

314 Ibid., 73 (my trans.).

315 Ibid.

316 The thrones of Castille and Aragon were united under the reign of Philip I and Joanna of Castile. From 1516, their son reigned as Charles I, King of Spain. In 1519 he succeeded his Grandfather, when elected Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. After his abdication in 1556, he retired in a Spanish monastery of Yuste.

317 The original fortress was built during the late ninth century by emir Muhammad ben Abd al-Rahman of Córdoba. Given the typological and etymological relation between *alcázar* (from Arabic ٱلْقَصْر 'al-qasr', "the castle" — as different from the Moorish citadels known as *alcazabas* (from Arabic القصبة, 'al-qasbah,' "citadel") — and castles, this process is fully homologous to the French/Italian (and as I will show English) development. Catherine Wilkinson Zerner, "Living Arrangements of the Spanish Habsburgs from Charles V to Philip IV," in *Prince, Princesses, et leur logis*, ed. Chatenet and De Jonge, 125–40; here 126; and id., "Women's Quarters in Spanish Royal Palaces," in *Architecture et vie social*, ed. Guillaume, 128–36; here 130. See also Begoña Alonso Ruiz, "El Alcázar de Madrid. Del castillo Trastámara al palacio de los Austrias (Ss. XV–1543)," *Archivo Español De Arte* 87 (Oct.–Dec. 2014), 335–50. Unfortunately I wasn't able to consult the monographic studies provided by Veronique Gerard, *De Castillo a Palacio: El Alcázar de Madrid en el siglo XVI* (Madrid: Xarait, 1984), and José Manuel Barbeito, *El Alcázar de Madrid* (Madrid: Comisíon de Cultura, COAM, 1992); and "El Alcázar de Madrid," in *Palacios Reales en España. Historia y arquitectura de la Magnificencia*, ed. Delfín Rodríguez Ruiz (Madrid: Visor, 1996) 51–66.

castillo-palacio), a secondary courtyard—the Campo de la Reina to the east—complemented the existing space, the Campo del Rey. This transformation was continued and accomplished between 1561–98 under the reign of his son, Philipp II (*1527, 1556–98) who, upon his return from the Spanish Netherlands in 1556, decided to make Madrid the new capital and permanent seat of government.

As Catherine Wilkinson Zerner notes, it would be "difficult to overstate the importance of the courtyard palace to [the] way of life" or particular 'mode of existence' of the Spanish Habsburg rulers.[318] The Alcázar was organized as a matrix of semi-public rooms arranged around an open courtyard. However, the new occupants, Zerner notes, required isolated spaces that also had to be in close proximity to a church. The deeply devout occupants needed an arrangement to suit them and their self-styling in which the *aposento* (the bedroom, a "resting place") of the monarch was a private sanctuary isolated from the public, modeled after the organization of monastic space.[319] This complex task was achieved by 'inverting' the existing room structure[320] and doubling the original court while preserving the existing

318 Wilkinson Zerner, "Living Arrangements," 131.

319 Ibid., 125. As she remarks, "Catholic orthodoxy was the mark (and official charge) of the Spanish Habsburg dynasty and its kings and queens were deeply religious. Their monastic apartments at Yuste, the Descalzas, San Gerónimo in Madrid, and later at the Escorial were placed well apart from the conventual spaces but looking out on the main altar of the church so the monarch could have a private view of the mass. These religious retreats had an aura of sacred and inviolate privacy that was tangible evidence of the awesome responsibilities of Habsburg kingship and the ruler's sole accountability to God. Their mere existence was a testament to the immeasurable distance between the Habsburg ruler and ordinary mortals. Of all the Spanish Habsburgs, Philip II used personal privacy and retreat to the greatest extent to shape his personal style of kingship" (ibid., 129).

320 According to Zerner, Veronique Gerard in initially wrongly identified the king's private apartment (*camera*, *antecamera*, *retrete*, and *alcobilla*) in the west wing, and attributed some aspects of the design to Gaspar de Vega (see Zerner, "Living Arrangements," 128–29 n). The king's chambers are in the northwest corner, with the queen's chamber adjacent in the west wing. Given the constraints here, I refer to the studies by Zerner for a more detailed analysis on the precise relation between this demand for 'isolation,' which as she notes was mainly fulfilled by the imposing tower (built by Juan Bautista de Toledo) that provided more isolated spaces (ibid. 128), as the (a)symmetrical arrangement of the king's and queens lodgings. Here, my ambition is to complement this analysis by pointing out another aspect. In this light, the asymmetric organization and position of the king's and queen's respective guardrooms can perhaps be inferred from the generic structure of the Alcázar. Generically in the Alcázar's most representative sequence was located in the rear wing. It covered the entire width of the external facade is subdivided in three rooms: a central oblong one with two square end rooms. The same sequence is repeated (as contained within the length of the longer courtyard facade in the smaller side-wings, whose central room is access from the axial center off the courtyard. In this sense, this smaller sequence, that the queen seems to have inhabited in the west wing—and which is still somewhat traceable in the layout, also of the project for Toledo—seems to have been mirrored into the new wing, along with a similar disposition. See the plan drawn

56 ALCÁZAR

Reconstruction of the plan and spatial organization of the rebuilt Royal Alcázar of Madrid, as begun in 1537 under Luis de Vega and Alonso de Covarrubias, for King Carlos I and his son Philipp II (with some of the older and later transformations indicated). Beneath the floor plan of the royal lodgings, in its inverse sequence of rooms, connected at the bedchamber, as illustrated better in the diagram.

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



spacious rooms and the court's basic disposition of two conjoined palaces, with two seemingly symmetrical courts yet rather asymmetrically-organized and counter-rotating room sequences that were conjoined at the king's and queen's bedroom in proximity to the new central chapel.[321] While this double palace was an entirely novel arrangement, its architectural parity therein—Zerner remarks—was a longstanding feature of Aragonese palaces. It can be dated back to the Palace of the Kings of Majorca ⊠↑4 in Perpignan (b.1276–1309) and traced to Albertian and Vitruvian paradigms.[322]

But there may have been a more significant political reason behind this demonstrative conjugality,[323] which not only joins, in one single building in which most of the state business was conducted, the king's and queen's lodgings but also the royal residence with the administrative offices pertaining to the principal seat of governance. As such, it may not be a simple coincidence that the Château-Neuf de Saint Germain-en Laye, ⊠57 commissioned for Henri II and Catherine de' Medici,[324] was called *la maison du théâtre*, as it also served the particularities of the political theater that architecture was facilitating. Formally, this theater (or, more accurately, its *proscenium*) brought back the symmetric organization of Louis XII's and Anne de Bretagne's *appartements jumélées* in the Logis Neuf at Blois. At the same time that the Château-Neuf resorted to this older dispositif, the architect designed—in contrast to De l'Orme's extension of Fontainebleau—the *dépendence* of the older château already under the influence of recent advances in residential design ushered in by Serlio's work, and especially Lescot's related organiza-

around 1540 (For a discussion of the author and date, see Juan Herranz, "Dos nuevos dibujos del maestro real Gaspar de Vega: el primer plano del alcázar de Madrid, atribuido a Alonso de Covarrubias, y el plano de la Casa de Servicios del Palacio del Pardo," in *Anuario de Historia y Teoría del arte (U.A.M.)* 10 (1997–98), 117–32, avail. online at https://revistas.uam.es/anuario/article/view/2518/2665).

321 Alonso Ruiz, "El Alcázar de Madrid," 342. Initially, as Barbeito's reconstruction of the earlier Trastámara castle shows, the king's lodgings were situated in the north-west corner; the queen's adjacent lodging in the south-west wing (ibid., 338, citing Barbeito, *El Alcázar de Madrid*, 5).

322 This alone, she acknowledges, does not necessarily lead to a symmetrical plan, however; see Zerner, "Women's s," 128–31.

323 First to express the recent political unification of Aragon and Castille, and Charles V's universal claim to European power; and later to stabilize the fracturing realm to preserve the long-sought-after Iberian Union that Philip achieves in 1580. To that extent, this formation may then repeat, although in a quite different way, the abovementioned 'symbolical twin-apartments' for the joined realms of Anne de Bretagne and Charles XIII built during the establishment of a more sedentary court in Amboise.

324 For a longer discussion, see Bertrand Jestaz, "Le château-neuf de Saint-Germain-en-Laye," *Bulletin Monumental* 158, no. 4 (2000), 375–78; and, for the later stages, Emmanuel Lurin, "Le Château Neuf de Saint-Germain-en-Laye, une villa royale pour Henri IV," *Bulletin des Amis du Vieux Saint-Germain* (2008), 123–47, avail. online at https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00349442. Here Chatenet, *La cour*, 171–4.

tion of the new Louvre wing. As a result, it presented an (almost) symmetrical structure, a central hall laterally widening into a cluster of differentiated rooms.

Besides being simply settings (*mise-en-scène*) for this conjugal parity and power to be enacted on the level of performative social practices, these organizational transformations also dramatized a wider shift. The changing architectural setups not only renders visible this shift, it also helps to bring it into effect (*mise-en-effet*). Because, as Zerner has highlighted, this organizational merger then coincided with the emergence of a centralized, large and thus differentiated bureaucratic apparatus and system of governance.[325] And this flattening of architectural hierarchies integrated into an internally differentiated system of a higher degree of complexity must thus be placed and understood within a larger conjunction of organizational systems.

2.3.2 A Systemic Conjunction

What seems to not have been highlighted enough, concerning this connjunction , is how this bureaucratic system followed the administrative reorganization of royal power in 1530s England. Macro-historical analyses such as those by Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein have repeatedly identified this reorganization as a catalyst for the progressive actualization of capitalism.[326]

325 Zerner, "Living arrangements," 135: "In this regard, the Spanish Habsburgs differed from other rulers in combining in one building a seigneurial court (the elite of the nobility gathered around and serving the monarch) with the daily conduct of the business of state by trusted secretaries. The two spheres overlapped, however, and some individuals who held what seem like purely honorific positions in the seigneurial court also helped to run the government. From Philip II's time onward, administration was organized into different departments and presided over by committees (*consejos*) whose members were appointed by the king. The bureaucratic system of government that Philip II put in place required many official meetings and secretaries to record their discussions."

326 Originally put forward by British Historian Geoffrey R. Elton, who attributed Thomas Cromwell as the author of a new bureaucratic managerial practice that differed greatly form the medieval, household-like organization of government. In this now-relativized view, he identified — Immanuel Wallerstein writes in his macro-historical study on the emerging modern world-system — "a series of new procedures instituted — a new mode of managing finances, the centralization of administration under the principal secretary, the organization of the privy council as a sphere of coordination, the rationalization of the king's household — each of which involved a reorganization 'in the direction of greater definition, of specialization, of bureaucratic order.'" See *The Modern World-System, Vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York/London: Academic Press, 1974), 232; citing G. R. Elton, *The Tudor Revolution in Government* (London/New York: Cambridge UP, 1953), 4). Here, I follow Silvia Federici's feminist post-Foucauldian/Marxist reading of the rise of the capitalist economy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries stresses that capitalism did not simply evolve out of feudalism. Silvia Federici, *Caliban and the Witch* (Brooklyn:

Wallerstein notes certain divergences, during the sixteenth century, between the establishment of large-scale networks of socio-economic relations and smaller politico-juridical control structures.[327] He suggests the former could be identified as an expression of capitalism that evolves with the latter as an expressions of statism.[328] This statism—characterizing the nascent absolute monarchy in Western Europe—was not simply centered on the figure of the monarch himself but on a withdrawal of the king from banal state business, and the related rise of a state apparatus consisting of a corps of permanent and dependent officials that increased the efficacy and reach of the monarchical rule.[329] In this we witness a fundamental change from the earlier household organization of the royal court into a bureaucratic system. This statism must be identified more precisely as a changing *form* of expression, since—in an assemblage-theoretic sense—organization *is* the inherent **FORM OF EXPRESSION** of a given assemblage. It further encodes the **FORM OF CONTENT** (that is the 'architecture' or spatially configured elements) within this given assemblage.[330] As such, organization concerns the way structural relations or linkages express themselves as specific codes, between the very substance of which these forms are composed. I argue it is this organizational change that must be understood as one of the crucial components within a process of **DOUBLE ARTICULATION**. The following section will attempt to define the related substances of expression and content, as well as the ways in which these elements enter into a new courtly assemblage. [→0.2]

Autonomedia, 2004), 21. This rise, she maintains cannot be understood as a 'transition,' "the concept of a transition to capitalism is in many ways a fiction," used merely to define a period: the long sixteenth century (from ca. 1450–1650). It does not imply a linear development but a highly disruptive change as feudal structures started "breaking down while no new social-economic system was yet in place" (ibid., 62). Therefore she conceptualizes this development as a "counter-revolution [to the decline of feudal power] that destroyed the possibilities that had emerged from the anti-feudal" developments in Europe during medieval times (ibid., 21–22). It is in this sense, that the following attends to the rise of a specific state apparatus.

327 Wallerstein, *Modern World-System*, I: 67.

328 Ibid. As pointed out by Arun Saldanha, *Space after Deleuze* (London/New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 77: "Deleuze and Guattari's reliance on world-systems theory is seldom noted." In addition to Wallerstein, they also employ the work of Samir Amin, *L'accumulation a l'echelle mondiale* (Paris: Anthropos, 1970), and *Unequal Development*, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), who developed a global theory of world-wide economy based on the dichotomy of centers and peripheries, referred to by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus*, 231; and *A Thousand Plateaus* 435–36, 465–68.

329 Wallerstein, *Modern World-System*, I: 132

330 As Ronald Bogue succinctly describes relations in assemblages: "Forms organize, or 'code,' substances and thereby fix, or 'territorialize,' substances. Hence, the substance of content is territorialized matter that is coded by the form of content; and the form of expression further codes, or 'overcodes,' the stratum of content and thereby increases territorialisation in the substance of expression." (Ronald Bogue, "Who the Earth Thinks It Is," in *Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy,* ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams, 46–63; here 49).

For it was precisely this growing bureaucratic organization from the 1530s–60s, which contributed to the initial differentiation of palatial room sequences (as we see initially in England, Italy[331] and then in France) and the subsequent multiplication of *antichambres* (from the 1560s–80s). Previous studies approaching the multiplication of *antichambres* in France as a structural change modeled on the architecture of the English palaces miss the connection to a wide and fundamental organizational transformation of governance impacting architecture.[332] The appearance of multiple *antichambres* should be understood as an epiphenomenon of an underlying transformation that needs to be reviewed systemically — even '(eco)systemically' — in relation to the last phase of the Italian Wars (or Habsburg-Valois Wars) and the managerial problems of this large-scale operation. The war ensued when, in 1551, Henri II attempted to compete against the political predominance of the Habsburg Empire. Ending with the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559), this war financially ruined both France and Spain in 1557. The ensuing economic crisis eventually broke down the imperial system and was further complicated by the subsequent Spanish-Dutch struggles and the outbreak of the Wars of Religion in France. Not only was there a financial crisis and a growing religious one but there was also a royal succession crisis when, after the accidental death of Henri II in 1559, his sickly son Francis died in the tumultuous year that followed.

At this critical point — when "virtually every type of internal political conflict characteristic of the transition toward absolutism" started to coalesce[333] — that a conservative state assemblage kicked in in response to the increasing need for political stabilization, maintenance and preservation of its organs of power.[334] This assemblage answers, as the work of Foucault has shown, the problematic of governmentality that arises from the conver-

331 Note that Waddy has, too situated the beginnings of the transformation of Roman apartments from clustered rooms into increasingly linear suites in the 1540 transformation of the Farnese palace, built precisely after the Medici popes Leo X, and Clement VII. In this view, one could approach this bureaucratization from the point of view of the beginning transformation from earlier nepotism towards the progressive centralization of the curial bureaucracy starting with the reform of Pope Gregory XIII in the 1580s.

332 Here, the 'organizational/structural'-distinction is taken from Wallerstein, *Modern World-System*, I: 225. In this perspective, it seems misleading when studies approach this process in terms of the psychological traits of monarchs, or as a form of male display of some rivaling European monarchs and their competitive imitative distinction. Even if this behavior is a fact, it is not the 'cause' of this transformation other than conditioning to bring these elements into a resonance and perhaps accelerating it.

333 Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London/New York: Verso, 2013; orig. pub. 1974), 91.

334 I take this notion from Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 357: "The concern of the State is to conserve."

gence of two transformations concerning the greater recomposition of feudal structures into the administrative apparatus of territorial states, and the religious recompositions following the (counter-)reformation.[335] This was the beginning of the reshaping of the court's manageability limits into newly enabling constraints: thresholds of control simultaneously serving as points of passage and markers of sustainability that operate against the possibility of extinction of the royal line.[336]

As I hope to demonstrate in the following section, in this convergence process the supple segmentarity of feudal orderings transformed with the more rigid segmentarity of an emergent state apparatus, which, in contrast to earlier statist assemblages, should have started operating on a totalizing scale.[337] To simplify, we can say that the French *antichambre* was the site where all the organizational changes came together; it is a reception room inherited from Italy lending itself to bureaucratic governance coming via Tudor England, with the modes of inhabiting such rigid bureaucratic power structures coming from Spain. And it did so simply because it was capable resonating with the (changing) spatial structures and (changing) (geo)political organization on which the 'administrative architects' of French absolutism (Sully, Richelieu and Colbert) would expand.[338]

The *Département des Heures*, 1560s

Perhaps a more systemic view of this conservative milieu could add to a complementary understanding of the oft-discussed figure of Catherine de' Medici (1519–89) and the crucial role she played during her regency throughout the reigns of her three sons. After the 1560s, Catherine not only influenced politics but also re-organized court life.[339] We know, for example,

335 See Foucault, "Lecture of Feb 1, 1978," in *Security, Territory, Population*, 87–114; here 88–89.

336 This phrasing is borrowed from Rosi Braidotti's cartographic work.

337 I base this reading on the Chapter "1933: Micropolitics and Segmentarity," in Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 208–31.

338 Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, 94.

339 At the age of fourteen, Catarina de' Medici was married to François I's second son, Henri with whom she had several children including the future Kings Francis II, Charles IX and Henri III. During Henri II's reign, Catherine was largely excluded from state affairs, as opposed to Henri's influential chief mistress, Diane de Poitiers. Only after Henri's early death, did she gain much political influence and sudden power by becoming Regent in 1559 during the minority of Francis II (who died shortly thereafter) and Charles IX. Through her continued influence extended well into the reign of Henri III, she is seen as one of the most powerful women in Renaissance Europe. For a comprehensive discussion of Catherine's difficult political 'niche' position in balancing power as regent, dissociating her son's from influence by the Catholic Guise and Protestant Bourbons in the Conseil Privé, and disproving misogynous anxieties regarding her supposed disability as a political actor (as a women under Salic law), see Katherine Crawford, *Perilous*

that Catherine strongly influenced the design of the Tuilleries palace ⊠[58] (b.1564 by Philibert de l'Orme). As De l'Orme attests, she "took the trouble to order the distribution [*ordonner le département*] of her said palace as to the lodgings and locations of the halls, antechambers, chambers, closets and galleries, and to give the measurements of width and length."[340]

Here, a specific form of organization emerges in the distributive notion of planning, expressed in the *département de logis*. As I have already indicated, the *département de logis* was responsible for housing the peripatetic court officials according to their rank. In the early 1560s, the office of the *département de logis* was charged with surveying and recording the lodgings at all the places where the nomadic court may stay. It*s* principal task was to assign (*departir*) the lodgings to court members, officers and staff according to their rank.[341] In this context, the *département* did not concern the economy of a static royal household's space distribution as much as it concerned an ecology of book-keeping practices geared at the dynamics of the nomadic figuration of the court and its stream of visitors. It was not responsible for household management but rather for a form of flow management. In Catherine's hands, however, the *département* would soon become much more striated, an 'instantiation of flows,' fitting the demand for more differentiated forms of power in an increasingly sedentary state assemblage. This way, it would turn the older organization of the *département* as a train of itinerant courtiers ✉[45] into a sedentary lifestyle [*train de vie*].[342]

Performances: Gender and Regency in Early Modern France (Cambridge/London: Harvard UP, 2004), esp. 24–58; here 37–41. For the contemporaneous paranoia about women in power, and her depiction as the "Wicked Queen" in the xenophobic propaganda, see also the article by Elaine Kruse, "The Blood-Stained Hands of Catherine de Médicis," in *Political Rhetoric, Power, and Renaissance Women*, ed. Carole Levin and Patricia A. Sullivan (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995), 139–56. For a critical biography, see Leonie Frieda, *Catherine de MediciI:Renaissance Queen of France* (New York: Harper-Collins, 2003).

340 "[Ainsi … la Royne mere …] prendre la peine, avec un singulier plaisir, d'ordonner le département de sondit palais, pour les logis et lieux des salles, antichambres, chambres, cabinets, et galleries, et me donner les mesures des longueurs et largeurs." Philibert de l'Orme, *L'Architecture,* Vol.I, livre I, chap. VIII, fol. 20r; cited in Boudon and Chatenet, "Logis du roi," 73. Translation taken from Robert Jean Knecht, *Catherine de' Medici* (London/New York: Longman, 1998), 228.

341 See the *Ordre qui de tout temps a esté observe et gardé de par les marechaux des logis et fourriers du roy au faict et department de logis de sa majeste*, that lays out the function of the so-called *Maréchal de logis*, and his four harbingers (*fourriers*). Transcription reprinted as Annex: Document IV, in Chatenet, *La cour*, 327–32.

342 In this sense, the d*épartement de logis* can be seen as an early precursor to the technologies of administration and the development of bureaucracy in the early modern period. Cf. for example the development of German *cameralism*. My argument is here based on an observation by Scott Lash, *Experience: New Foundations for the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Polity, 2018), 67–8.



57 Plan and spatial organization of the Maison de Théâtre planned by De L'Orme as an extension of the Château-neuf de Saint-Germain-en-Laye.



58 Plan and spatial organization of the Tuileries Place project (1578), largely designed by Queen mother Catherine de'Medici, with Philibert De l'Orme, as represented by in Du Cerceau's *Les plus excellents bastiments de France.*



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This organizational turn can dated back to the beginning of Charles XI's reign, when the regent and queen mother moved from her older lodging in the Cour Ovale into the outlying Poêles Wing in Fontainebleau.[343] During this time, the *antichambre* would be duplicated in the royal palaces in both the king's and the queen mother's rooms. We see this at the new project for the Tuilleries, the idealized plan of which features two symmetrical apartments, for the king and queen mother, each composed of a large *salle*, an oblong *antichambre*, a second *antichambre*, connected to a *garde-robe* outside the enfilade, and a square *chambre*, complemented by multiple *cabinets*.[344] We also see it at Fontainebleau, where the king's lodging was relocated to the *donjon* and extended southwards by a new *salle* with a doubled *antichambre*, while the rather long *salle* in Catherine's Poêles wing was shortened to accommodate a second *antichambre*. ☒[55] This doubled *antichambre* was explicitly modeled after the residences of the Roman cardinals (repeating in a way the analogy between the *camera paramenti* and the *camera pappagalli*) and so was the entire arrangement of Catherine's suite on a smaller scale.[345] I concur with studies identifying the Roman cardinals as the initiators of this trend[346] and have also tried to show this lineage. The French royal palaces assumed not only the habitual space (the parament chamber) but also the entire apparatus of its sequentially ordered space.

Here we can return to Foucault's observations on the four interrelated dispositifs that give rise to modern institutional structures, and the way these operate by a characteristic cellularity that is based "first of all on the principle of elementary location or partitioning" aimed at organizing an analytical space.[347] In this process, to borrow an analogy from mathematics, the loosely

343 This move can be said to be strategic, regarding how Catherine thereby ascertained her position at court. But it was also a rather pragmatic move to vacate the queen's lodgings for the future queen consort (Jestaz, "Etiquette et distribution, 115).

344 See Chatenet, *La cour*, 210–11.

345 Boudon and Chatenet, "Logis du roi," 75. This monastic/ecclesiastic practice can be traced to Catherina's upbringing in the proximity to the Medici Popes and her interment in convents during her youth, where she became acquainted with rituals and ceremonials of the catholic church.

346 Waddy, *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces*; See also Chatenet, *La cour*, 183–4.

347 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London: Penguin, 1977), 141; see my preliminary discussion in Book O. One may potentially object such an appropriation of Foucault's work, which has dated the emergence of this 'analytical space' to a later stage, alongside specific forms of (medical) observation. Let me clarify here that this reference should be understood in the sense of a critical extension to Foucault's thinking, similar to the already referenced work of Silvia Federici. Like her, I am trying to describe a somewhat more 'primitive' or antecedent analytical arrangement that precedes and thus preconditions the later formation of these 'modern' forms of observation. In this sense, the specific 'birth' that Foucault describes is simply *one* (later) 'conjunction' between architectural arrangements with a specialist kind of knowledge,

combinatorial character of spatial sequences evolves into the analytic form of a **SERIES**,[348] a serial space the generating function of which encodes spatial sequences by treating them as coefficients of power. In this newly analytical function (of breaking down), seriation would prove a crucial instrument for political assemblages to constitute and institute socio-spatial differentiations by breaking up collective dispositions and thus the familiarity that characterized the court. In this way, seriation entirely reconfigured the long-standing segmentarity of the French court assemblage and its feudal social stratification.

It is in this sense that we can re-strategize Foucault's reading from an assemblage-theoretic point of view, where these four dispositifs map perfectly onto the Deleuzo-Guattarian 'matrix of stratification.' ✉[59] We can identify how palatial architecture takes on this analytic form, as it undergoes what Foucault identified as a secondary process in which previously polyvalent spaces are gradually turned into "functional sites."[349] [→ 0.2]

The Temporal De-/Re-Coding of the *Logis*, 1574

Spatial structures, as Simondon reminds us, have no definite use and thus no fixed functional meaning outside the way in which they gain and **CONCRETIZE** a functioning only in relation to "another functioning, which is that of the human being[s] involved in the action."[350] Only in this relation are patterns of use and behavioral norms and habits established according to specific spatial structures that, in return, are coded in terms of these patterns. This code is established by the serial organization of spatial and human bodies (rather than the sequential order of the *logis* alone). Here, one needs to be careful not to confuse the production of functional sites with a form of territorialization, because it presents a form of coding instead and specifically a form of overcoding that, as David Lapoujade reminds us, means that old codes remain intact, yet they come to be completely overwritten by a new code.[351] In this matter, especially the defamiliarizing Italian arrangement

within a longer series of different conjunctions between architectural arrangements with a segmentarity that becomes increasingly 'disciplinary.' This lineage, I have shown, dates back at least to early ecclesiastic architectures. But, after all, 'analytical' space is basically a palaeolithic invention. Thereby I circumvent the 'optional' aspect of [en]closure in discipline. Later, I will be critiquing descriptions of the cellular architecture of apartments as spaces related to processes of exclusion. However, this process is certainly coextensive the beginnings of the Inclosure Acts and the abolition of the open field system in England. In our case, this open field is instead the *logis*.

348 See my note 34 above.

349 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 143–5.

350 Simondon, *Mode of Existence*, 25.

351 David Lapoujade, *Aberrant Movements: The Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze*, trans. Joshua

of the *antichambre*—assumed via Ancy and the new Louvre—decoded the traditional organization of French royal residences and was quickly reorganized according to new parameters.

We learn this from an 'open letter' written by Catherine de' Medici to Henri III probably at the beginning of his reign around 1574. Chatenet argues that this letter "constitutes the first official document establishing in a precise manner the *département des heures*," a day-time schedule according to which the king is expected to "lead by example a regulated life [*a vie reglée*] at an ordered court [*court ordonée*]."[352] This extensive set of rules organized daily life into a meticulously ordered habitual regime ☒[60] that differs greatly from the inhabited familiarity that previously characterized the ceremonial at the French court.[353] In itself, this regulation of daily routines was nothing particularly new. Obviously inspired by monastic life, such a scheme could already be found at Charles V's court in fourteenth-century France.[354] The novelty in the 1500s lay in the more bureaucratic context in which it was now being re-instated to become a mechanism for courtly appearances.

Roland Barthes has suggested that bureaucratic apparatus arise as 'ideorrhythmic' structures begin to crystallize in spatial organizations. By this term he conceptualizes the emergent form of self-organization within cenobitic groups, in which a heterogeneous ensemble of individuals is attempting to live together in a highly regulated manner, while preserving their own (irregular) rhythms.[355] It emerges from a conjunction of two basically divergent or (**CONTRAGRADE**) tendencies, a **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS.** In this conjunctive synthesis, compartitioning practices are the operational base for the production of compartmentalized structures. But how does this conjunction work? First, in addition to the production and attribution of **FUNCTIONAL SITES** within a larger system, this **SERIATION OF ACTIVITIES** also leads to a programming of space, which entails a certain **CONTROL OF ACTIVITIES** due to their ordering in time.[356] This seriation of activities introduces a temporal dimen-

David Jordan (South Passadena: Semiotext(e), 2017), 173.

352 Chatenet, *La cour*, 112, 334n. Chatenet offers several excerpted transcriptions and a longer discussion, see "La journée du roi," ibid., 112–32. The full letter is published in Hector de la Ferrière, ed., *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1885), Vol. II: 90–95, avail. online at https://archive.org/details/lettresdecatheri02cathuoft.

353 Cf. Frédérique Leferme-Falguières, "La ritualisation du quotidien: les temps de cour," in *Les courtisans: Une société de spectacle sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris: PUF, 2007), 223–302.

354 For example the ceremonial and daily routines of King Charles V at the Louvre are well-known thanks to the documentary writings of court writer Christine de Pizan (1364–c.1430).

355 Barthes, *How To Live Together* (New York: Columbia UP, 2013.), 42–3.

356 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 149.

59 EXPLANATORY DIAGRAM
Specificities of striation from Guattari's from *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, in relation to the matrix of stratification, and the respective tensors between systems and structures: Striation of constellation of constellation of the *Universes* of references; a rhizomatic striation of the machinic *Phyla*; a striation of existential segmentarities or *Territories*; striation of the instantiation of *Flows*.



sion of organization that complements the hierarchical and functional distribution of spaces within the royal *logis*, rendering explicit the fact that ranking was as much connected to temporal as to spatial distinctions.[357] This means the proper time given to certain activities consolidates the proper place given to them. But it is precisely this normative dimension that opens up of a greater **SPACE OF POSSIBILITIES** for also accommodating exceptions at a time of strong political instability, religious recomposition, economic change and social unrest. This point can be elaborated upon with the distinction Foucault draws between disciplinary dispositifs that structure space according to a "hierarchical and functional distribution of elements"; and those attendant to its inherent dimension of security, which is concerned with "plan[ning] a milieu in terms of events, or series of events of possible elements, of series [of variables] that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework."[358]

357 See Baillie, "Etiquette and the Planning of State Apartments," passim.

358 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977–1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, François Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 20. Note that in reading Foucault's work on disciplinary dispositifs through his later work on governmentality, I am not wishing to present this convergence as an announcement or already a real beginning of the unfolding of apparatus of security, predating the biopolitical forms of governance that Foucault saw emerging in the mid 18th-century. It would be anachronistic to analyze this transformation in already 'biopolitical' terms but, as I will argue in the next book, in view of its specific contribution toward biopolitical forms of governance. What I simply recognize is that, at this still undifferentiated stage, the securing/stabilizing aspect within the seriation of activities is still inherent to disciplinary dispositifs. Cf. my note 350.

60 THE DÉPARTEMENT DES HEURES
Diagram of the day time schedule prescribed by Catherine de'Medici's *département des heures*: Following in the footsteps of his father and grandfather, Henri III's rigid daily regime begins with the selectively-public *levée* in the presence of courtiers and officials. It is followed by a private council (*les affaires*) to listen to official reports for one or two hours, before the king attends the public mass at ten. He then dines in a public ceremony. Afterwards — at least twice a week, as Catherine stipulates — he holds audience to content his subjects. Upon retiring, the afternoon should be reserved for social activities with the queen, or queen mother, for about half an hour. After that, the king is allowed to retire to his study. At three o'clock, pastimes and physical exercise are suggested to be carried out at least every other day with the nobility, to please them. The following supper is designated as a moment with the family, after which, twice a week, a ball should be attended in the *salle de bal*.



As Waddy shows, the linear framework of apartments had a built-in flexibility, allowing some degrees of freedom in the reception of guests, an indeterminacy that was encoded into the linear arrangement of rooms. Yet in complementing this spatial framework (the *département du logis du roi*) with a temporal one (*département des heures*), we see this multivalent and transformable framework slowly emerging as a higher-order regulative ensemble that stabilizes and secures the organizational structures of the royal household, as it would lead to the appearance of the *appartement du roi*. Here, beyond being a symbolic framework for the exercise of power, the *appartement du roi* begins to appear as part of what Simondon would call a TECHNICAL ENSEMBLE for the exercise of a new form of royal power. Constituted by the conjunction of the two *départiments*, this ensemble provides a twofold space of possible events allowing to integrate uncertainty. This space of organizational possibility could perhaps be more directly identified in the clustered arrangement of rooms and the branching organization through which the royal household functionally facilitated a great deal of those programmatic uncertainties in the functional integration of sub-ensembles. This production of sub-ensembles pertains to the disciplinary dispositif, which breaks down place, time, movement and action (coded against an analytical-practical grid of the spatial and temporal axis latent in the two *départiments*) only to re-link them optimally according to the circulation of people and information.[359]

So, in this spatio-temporally optimized organization, the royal apartment and its serial space works as a conducting device and a regulating apparatus [*appareil règlementé*]. It also establishes a normative spatio-temporal matrix for this conduct, a practical guide according to which action is carried out and against which it is measured. Complementary to the territorialization of actions, this conduct is expressed and encoded in the court regulations [*règlements*] binding the court as a whole (and not just as a collection of individuals differentiated by their status)[360] to a common code of behavior. One can then recognize how—in this restriction—a SPACE OF POSSIBILITIES is unlocked, and this court assemblage develops involutionarily through the further cellular differentiation of apartments.

This differentiated distribution is a specific control mechanism. We therefore pass from an already highly stratified system (the rigid segmentarity of serial space) to a multidimensional articulation in which segments rigidify

359 Ibid., 56–7.
360 Ibid., 75.

into 'space-time blocks' that become component units of a larger system.[361] For this composition of forces, partition becomes, as Gerald Raunig calls it, a "mode of separation, of striating time and space, of attributing and distributing the parts. In the mode of partition the parts are assigned to appropriate places, functional position, rightful owners. Partition is the attribution of the parts which has limitation both as goal and as effect."[362] Here, partition as a spatio-temporal striation entails a specific mode of participation; an "organic partaking," geared at the "constant production of a whole" in which, as Raunig argues, parts are made independent of one another, only to be woven into a "certain social relation of wholeness" in which these part—acting as organs having specialized functions in and depending on a larger organism—become reproductive agents of a whole.[363] It is here that the state as a modern matrix of individualization gains as a new form of pastoral power concerned with the management of multiplicities, of the many.[364]

This twofold function instated a truly MACHINIC interaction between what Chatenet describes as two fundamental revolutions: "First, a spatial revolution: a prolonging spatial sequence … and then, a temporal revolution: a system of entries."[365] Rather than talking about 'revolutions,' I like to conceptualize this function as a powerful conjunction of two cutting edges of deterritorialization in order to move away from the idea that this process is a 'historical break.' It is in actual fact only the point at which a new court assemblage is actualized out of the potential of an older one. The point regarding the form-taking architecture of apartments is not that it takes us from the socio-spatial assemblage of (loosely coded) spatial sequences to the strata of (highly coded) serial spaces, but *how* precisely we do so. We should, however, be careful not to read this seriation as royal architecture

361 Félix Guattari, "Machine and Structure," in *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 144–53; here 147.

362 Gerald Raunig, *Dividuum: Machinic Capitalism and Molecular Revolution*, Vol. 1, trans. Aileen Derieg (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2016), 73.

363 Ibid., 73–5.

364 See Michel Foucault "Subjects and Power," *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 4 (Summer 1982), 777–95; here 783; and Stuart Elden, "Strategy, Medicine and Habitat: Foucault in 1976," in *Space, Knowledge, and Power: Foucault and Geography*, ed. idem and Jeremy Crampton (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 67–82; here 72. The pastoral modes of living (see above, note 162), we can say with Foucault, have an individualizing power—taking form in the notion of appartenance—that requires an individualized knowledge about the court and its members. (I take these observations from a discussion of Antoinette Rouvroy's work in Momammad-Ali Rahebi, "Biopolitical Immanence," La Deleuziana 1 (2015), 73–90; here 77–78) But this court knowledge is not centralized in an individual person ('pastor'); there is thus not linear development from any individualized forms of control to a more systemic one; but a simply new phase of machinic enslavement.

365 Chatenet, *La cour*, 139.

simply re-assuming another element of ecclesiastic organizations, as it did in the thirteenth and mid-fifteenth century.[366] This would obscure how —in assuming the organization of the church as a transnational institution— the state form actualizes its own institutional organization in this totalizing move. Therefore, one needs to understand this **STATE SPACE** abstractly, as a specific configuration of a socio-spatial system in which the variables along the spatial axes are no longer ecclesiastical but stately ones. In contrast to the evidently transcendent system of reference, "States are not at all transcendent paradigms of an overcoding but immanent models of realization for an axiomatic of decoded flows,"[367] which must be identified in a rigidification of their initially nomological distribution of space.

Here we can use Nancy Cartwright's famous description of apparatus as "nomological machines," by which she understands any "fixed (enough) arrangement of components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of stable (enough) environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular behavior" that can be represent by certain laws (i.e. *nomos*), describing the relatively stable behavior produced by and consolidated with(in) these systems.[368] This stability, Arjen Kleinherenbrink adds, "arises because machines exert their capacities to pull other machines into particular trajectories or functions, and keep them there."[369] This is the **MACHINIC PHYLUM** through which we understand formations more immanently by way of transforming matter flows and **RELATIONS OF EXTERNALITY**.[370]

In the past, the functional coding of residential spaces took place according to their relative topological relation to each other, where they now come to be encoded according to a specific function (and position) within the whole of the building, hence mereonomically, that is as an absolute

366 I refer back here to the 'architecture of sacral Kingship' and the inclusion of the *chambre de parement*.

367 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 455.

368 Nancy Cartwright, *The Dappled World* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999), 50 (emph. added). I owe this insight to Arjen Kleinherenbrink.

369 Arjen Kleinherenbrink, *Alles is een Machine* (Amsterdam: Boom, 2017), 127 (my trans.).

370 In Deleuzo-Guattarian thinking, the notion of the 'phylum' (or the 'machnic phylum') stands in for a greater problem concerning the formal causalities within emerging historical formation, in which the evolutionary differentiation of an organism often confused with its resulting phylogeny. As DeLanda reminds us that "The concept of the 'machinic phylum' was created in an effort to conceive the genesis of form (in geological, biological and cultural structures) as related exclusively to immanent capabilities of the flows of matter-energy-information" (DeLanda, "The Machinic Phylum," Essay for "TechnoMorphica" (1997), V2 Lab for unstable Media, avail. online at http://v2.nl/archive/articles/the-machinic-phylum). For my purposes, this boils down to not fall back onto a hylomorphic approach explaining the architecture of apartments as a result of social practices. Instead, we need to account for how architectural arrangements facilitate and enable this new power formation and state assemblage to actualize.

hierarchy.[371] The whole is, of course, the integrative matrix of the *logis* that—having offered a spatial system of intensive ordinates that now serve as extensive coordinates in which rooms are measured in terms of units—constitutes and delimits the possibilities for this differentiation. In this way, the supple segmentarity of the *logis* as an ordered room sequence (as a molecular line) is transformed into the rigid segmentarity of a striated, serial organization that pertains to hierarchical institutions and the concomitant emergence of a bureaucratic apparatus.[372] This bureaucratization involves a reterritorializing distribution of powers classically confined to the court. Such arrangements constitute molar aggregates that are no longer "formally coordinated" but "formally structured."[373]

This transformation occurs quite abruptly through Catherine de' Medici's regime of temporal regulations, which—in their political economy—totally decode the inherent regularity of the *logis* and the usage-generated differentiation between the *salle*, *chambre,* and *garde-robe* it comprised. Decoding in this instance means that this temporal regulation—loosening the previously coherent logic of the *logis*—no longer works according to the integrative logic of the *logis*, moving its cohesion to a higher plane of abstraction. Regulation has become axiomatic.[374]

371 "Through codings, the world 'itself ' and for itself becomes the world for something else that is, at the same time, of it and that 'trails the world behind' … the code-for-itself, in becoming a code-for-something, brings about 'a *striation*, a heterogeneization (or hetero-genesis) of *the sensible world*.'" Hanjo Berressem, "'Degrees of Freedom: Felix Guattari's Schizoanalytic Cartographies," in *Schizoanalysis and Ecosophy: Reading Deleuze and Guattari*, ed. Constantin A. Boundas (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 128–48; here 139–41; citing Guattari, *Schizoanalytic Cartographies,* trans. Andrew Goffey (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 78.

372 In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari differentiate two types of segmentarity: "one type is supple, more molecular, and merely ordered; the other is more rigid, molar, and organized" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 41). They later explain, that "the molar and the molecular are distinguished not by size, scale, or dimension but by the nature of the system of reference envisioned. Perhaps, then, the words 'line' and 'segment' should be reserved for molar organization, and other, more suitable, words should be sought for molecular composition" (ibid., 217), for which they resort to quanta and flows instead. In this sense, one could say that, "The molecular develops transitory segmentations-in-progress that are defined by quanta of deterritorialization on an intensive scale. See Taylor Atkins, "A Thousand Plateaus, Chapter Eight: Lines and Segmentarity," posted on Jun 1, 2008, at https://fractalontology.wordpress.com/2008/06/01/a-thousand-plateaus-chapter-eight-lines-and-segmentarity.

373 On this difference, see also Ray Brassier "Concrete Rules and Abstract Machines: Form and Function in A Thousand Plateaus," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy*, ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams, 260–79; here 264.

374 I owe this notion to Ian Buchanan, "Space in the Age of Non-Place," in *Deleuze and Space*, ed. idem and Gregg Lambert (Edinburgh: EUP, 2005), 16–35; here 34 n. See also Manuel DeLanda who clarifies, "The more despotic or totalitarian a state apparatus is, the more everything becomes coded: dress, food, manners, property, trade. Deleuze and Guattari refer to this operation as 'overcoding.' These two processes yield molar entities,

Rather than replacing it, this axiomatization 'rewired' or 'tied together' the longstanding relationship in which the spatial logic of the *logis* had expressed itself in two codes: an internalized one, consisting of the habitual regulation of courtly appearances, behaviors or movement, which was externalized into an apparatus of written regulations that formally consolidated (or institutionalized) the first. This machinery had already been at work in earlier court regulations. But it can be observed particularly well in the two royal regulations of 1578 and 1585 that instated a fundamental re-organization of the royal household into a bureaucratic organization.[375] In this, as Chatenet describes, the initial *règlement général* of 1578 "did not really modify the form of the royal suite comprising (like Henri II's) a *salle*, *antichambre*, *chambre*, *garde-robe,* and *cabinet*. But the meaning given to each room gave it a different meaning altogether. The *antichambre* henceforth served to filter those who had the privilege to enter the king's chamber, through three distinct entries, from those who had to wait until the king left his apartment to see him. Each [court member] was thus classified according to his rank or, more so, depending on his standing with the king."[376] It was this gradual hierarchization that would become the distinctive feature of French aristocratic residences.[377]

more or less territorialized and coded, out of molecular populations. But other processes, deterritorialization and decoding, can perform the opposite operation, giving rigid molar entities a more supple form or even dissolving them into their component parts. … An illustration of a process of decoding is the effect of the spread of commercial and industrial organizations in Europe starting roughly in the fourteenth century. If a state apparatus can be said to be the main example of a coding (or overcoding) historical actor, these organizations had the opposite effect: to produce a constant flow of money, food, clothes, tools and so on, that circulated against the barriers imposed by government organizations." DeLanda, "Molar Entities and Molecular Populations," in *Deleuze and History*, ed. Jeffrey A. Bell and Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh: EUP, 2009), 225–36; here 233, referring to Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus,* 448.

375 To this extent, we stay true to the Deleuzian distinction between real 'nomadic' and more 'migratory' modes, since in fact the court not merely "change habits" (as true nomads would) but primarily adapt "their habitat."

376 Boudon and Chatenet, "Logis du roi," 76 (my trans.).

377 Waddy notes, for example, how this gradual distinction differed from the organization of Roman apartment, which—although fundamentally based on forms of ranking as well—maintained a stricter division between the rooms to which guests were received (the *sala*, two anterooms, and the audience room), and the rooms reserved for the occupant (the bedroom and its annex rooms). See Waddy, The Roman Apartment," 160. As we have seen, this was also the case in the traditional Spanish ceremonial, and we can even see this in the Old Louvre, concerning the way that the *chambre du roi*, is still set off the official sequence of rooms in the *corps de logis*. In her comparative discussion, Waddy mentions that there was no "spatial distinction between reception and sleeping," that were both conducted in the *chambre*" (ibid.). This is imprecise to the extent that her diagram refers to only one intermediary moment in the development of apartments in France, the tripartite the early-mid sixteenth-century configuration, which neglects the transition from the *chambre de parement* (reception) to the *antichambre* (waiting), but

The social and political implications of these intricate ranking processes and the resulting courtly 'politics of proximity' are well known,[378] yet these micropolitics have hardly been approached from a relational or 'proxemic' angle.[379] In his difference-theory reading, Julian Jachmann elaborates on the precise way in which the differentiated spatial program of apartments and their production of numerous socio-spatial thresholds come to be "connected to processes of exclusion."[380] From his account it is clear he understands this architecture in a similar way to Thurley as a competitive "exclusion of those not needing to be present,"[381] and not a simple production of privacy. As has long been noted by historians such as Philippe Ariès, the modern dichotomy use of 'public' and 'private' is highly misleading, since especially sovereigns, acting in a public function, were continuously surrounded by others. In this sense, one must approach the production of privacy as intrinsically social. American social psychologist Irwin Altman describes privacy in dynamic terms as a boundary regulation process that operates by means of "a selective control of access to the self and one's

also the later changes associated to the multiplication of *antichambres* and *cabinet* in the 1560–80, and re-introduction of audience rooms that are (if still different) closer to the seventeenth-century Roman apartments she discusses. More precise would be to say that here the (state) bed became an essential feature of ceremony and reception.

378 For an exemplary description, see Waddy, *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces*, 4–6: "A fundamental Issue in Roman etiquette was the recognition of the respective ranks of the participants. Rank itself was established by several considerations: the distinction between ecclesiastical (higher) and secular (lower) status; particular offices held; the distinction of one's family or, in the case of ambassadors, the prince or nation served; one's position within that family; and one's age. Signs of rank included [among others] … the points in the guest's progress toward the audience room at which he would be met first by gentlemen attendants and then by the host … and, on departure, the points in the suite at which the guest was bade farewell, first by the host and then by his gentlemen attendants … and these points were different from those at which he had been greeted." On this point, see also id., "The Roman Apartment," 155–7. For the evolving, dynamic social hierarchy and ranks during the *Ancien Régime,* see also Elias, *The Court Society*; and Henri Brocher, *À la cour de Louis XIV: le rang et l'étiquette sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris: F. Alcan, 1934); newer studies on the transition from late medieval social hierarchies to ranking include Karl-Heinz Spieß, "Rangdenken und Randstreit im Mittelalter," in *Zeremoniell und Raum*, ed. Paravincini, 39–61; and François Bluche, "Rang, étiquette, credit," in *La noblesse française au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, Hachette, 1995; orig. pub. 1973), 83–7. On the military origins of ranking, see Ellery Schalk, *From Valor to Pedigree: Ideas of Nobility in France in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Princeton; Princeton UP, 1986). For a detailed discussion of the meritocratic culture of the Ancient Régime and its relation to Absolutism, see Jay M. Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600–1789* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1999).

379 I take the notion of proxemics from Barthes's ideorrhythmic use of Edward T. Hall's neologism, for what is essentially a spatial 'anthropotechnic,' the use of space as an affective milieu (See Roland Barthes, *How to Live Together* (New York: Columbia UP, 2013), 111.

380 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux,* 142.

381 Thurley, *Royal Palaces*, 36.

group."[382] Privacy is thus based on a socio-environmental technique producing various degrees of openness and closeness—thus varying degrees of 'dis/closure'—over time and across various levels.[383]

In an akin sense, Jachmann conceives of palatial layouts as "exclusion machines" that operate through a two-way definition of accessibility: "The first defining aspect consists in a temporally delineated assembly of persons, and a distribution or qualification of rooms and sites through which a controlled and differentiated form of publicness is produced. … The second aspect concerns the constraint to withdraw more exclusive areas from a principally openly accessible [*öffentlich*] space."[384] He terms this an "at once generating and limiting" process that produces publicness (understood as a general spatial permeability) [*Öffentlichkeit*] while simultaneously producing levels of exclusion through architectural thresholds that "filter multiple user groups and functions against the osmotic pressure of an outside."[385] This conception has several advantages. First, the rather apt term 'osmosis'—a process that takes place through selectively permeable membranes—helps to highlight that we are dealing with a dynamic system of differential pressures, hence a differential system. The notion of a differential system neatly sidesteps the one-sided terms of a production of privacy and allows us to reconsider how the introduction of *antichambres* facilitated these "controlled and differentiated forms of publicness." These forms of publicness facilitate the complex actions required for exercising power, namely public acts set up around an openly accessible yet incrementally hierarchized space.

Concerning the formation of a state apparatus, this differentiation of the public territory of the palace and the rhizoming segmentarity in its proliferating spatial intervals foster practices of ranking. Ranks are not fixed social strata. The number of categories or functions according to which ranks were established constantly evolved according to the required differentiation of the court—which can be seen as a process of constructing differences and thus producing hierarchies.[386] The system formed by the apartment and its

382 Irwin Altman, *The Environment and Social Behavior* (Monterey: Brooks/Cole, 1975), 24.

383 As Philip Masur stresses, it is thus consistent with understanding environments as both "a determinant of as well as an extension of behavior." Philip K. Masur, *Situational Privacy and Self-Disclosure* (Cham: Springer, 2019), 54. See also Sandra Petronio, *Boundaries of Privacy: Dialectics of Disclosure* (New York: SUNY Press, 2002). The slash in 'disclosure is added here to emphasize this dynamism.

384 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux,* 143. Jachmann's German text here plays with the ambiguity of the notion of *Öffentlich(keit)* as implying that public space is open (*offen*).

385 Ibid.

386 I take this notion from Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*, 61,

form of progressively limited access therefore constitute essential equipment of aristocratic power. This equipment produces an instrumental space (*espace outil*)—or rather an instrumental differentiation of space, a segmentation of space, hence, a striated space—to measure relations between people. The instrumentality of this apparatus resides not in its over-emphasized function as a setting for receiving guests and exercising royal power. Politics consisted of receiving visitors, and this apparatus needed to be recognized as the socio-spatial **SETUP** making this reception possible. It does so by facilitating its emerging absolutist form, for which practices of ranking —which, as Foucault writes, imply the introduction of "interval[s] in a series of intervals"[387]—are instrumental to draw hierarchical distinctions.

This production of intervals constitutes an immanent "technique for the transformation of arrangements [because it] individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations."[388] This is exactly what the very notion of **ARRANGEMENT** in its etymological relation to 'rank' implies—a "putting in the proper order."[389] It does so precisely by integrating earlier systems of nomadic distribution. As I have argued before, this integration does not assign fixed elements as much as sedentary state assemblages do but rather forms a continuous variation of space that acts as a relays. These relays are integrated in this rigid arrangement of the *logis* that in its linear organization allows for a specific blockage of movements constrained within a system of channeled circulation.[390] (One might even want to connect this back to Werner Sombart's emphasis of the origins of capitalist societies around the problem of circulation.[391])

In fact, the channeling itself becomes the precondition for blockages to occur. This incremental blockage through an increasing number of rooms opens a future trajectory that—via the growing room sequences in baroque

and Rosi Braidotti's productive conception of differences.

387 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 145.

388 Ibid., 146.

389 See the OED, entry "arrangement," defining it as the "act of arranging, act of putting in proper order," 1740, from French *arrangement* (Old French *arengement*), from *arranger* "arrange" (late 14c.), *arengen*, "draw up a line of battle," from Old French arengier "put in a row, put in battle order" (12c., Modern French *arranger*), from *a-* "to" (see ad-) +*rangier* "set in a row" (Modern French *ranger*), from *rang* "rank."

390 See the notion, quoted in my epigraphs, "that if a path is very linear, blockages can occur" from Sara Ahmed, "Complaint as Diversity Work," recording of a lecture given at the CRASSH Impact Lecture Series, Univ of Cambridge (Mar 9, 2018), avail. online at https://youtu.be/JQ_1kFwkfVE).

391 Sombart, *Moderner Kapitalismus*, passim. See also the related discussion of the CERFI research approach in my Book O. I come back to this throughout Part 3



61–62 ***Above***, **plan and spatial organization of the Palazzo Pitti, Florence, built 1485, shown here after its extension in 1550/57–78.**

Below, **plan and spatial organization of the Palazzo Barberini, Rome, built in 1560, and extended in 1606/11.**

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

Italian palaces such as the Palazzo Pitti ☒[61] in Florence and the Palazzo Borghese and Barberini ☒[62] in Rome[392]—will lead to the (Kafkaesque situation of) antichambering courtiers in the Palace of Versailles. ☒[III: 47] Here, the nomadic monarchy was going to be replaced by a sedentary state assemblage in which the palatial sequence of rooms would become a system of "machinic enslavement,"[393] integrating court members into an absolutist megamachine that emerged alongside the first attempts at engineering and fixing human and social bodies into a territorial ensemble "enlarged and canalized by the state."[394]

Along a quite well-studied trajectory, one can identify how this architectural system contributes to the formation of an absolutist state apparatus the power of which becomes concretized in this progressive blockage of movements (= SEDENTATION) by first acknowledging that the blocking potential is fully immanent in this system of circulation. As such, this potential also presents the characteristic form of power 'built into' such systems without being actualized from the start. Instead, this power has to be actualized. As Guattari elucidates: "Power resides not in any TERRITORIALIZATION; it resides in the AXIOMATIZATION of flows," meaning a "*mise-en-contrôle*" of flows by means of their instantiation.[395] What is actualized in this instantiation is nothing less than an affective economy of power/desire, geared at produc-

392 For the Palazzo Pitti (b. 1455, extended by Vasari c.1550, by Bartolomeo Ammanati in 1557–78, and again after 1618), see Marco Chiarini, *Pitti Palace* (Livorno: Sillabe, 2001), and for the internal distribution, esp. Christina Strunck, "Gender and Power: Layout and Function in the Palazzo Pitti, Florence (1587–1636)," in *Le prince, la princesse et leur logis*, ed. Chatenet and De Jonge, 207–28. For a detailed account on the enlagement and internal planning of the Palazzo Borghese (b.1560, probaby by Vignola, extended in 1606/11 for Cardinal Camillo Borghese), and the Palazzo Barberini (alle quattro fontane) (b.1549 for the Sforza, extended for the Barberini family between 1627–33 by Carlo Maderno and Francesco Borromini), see Waddy, *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces*, 73–128, and 173–271.

393 This formulation is borrowed from Pierre Goubert, *Louis XIV et vingt millions de français* (Paris: Fayard, 1966), 111. Here, I use the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of 'machnic enslavement' to more generally point to the fundamental role and systematic function of slavery for the history of capitalism! I've borrowed a respective formulation from Gary Genosko, *Reinventing Social Practices: Essays on Félix Guattari* (London/New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018), 53. In contrast to the feudal formal requirement of accommodating an appartement du roi, the sedentary state assemblage would be reterritorializing the nobility from their lands by making them settle in a new palace that accommodated appartements and offices for those willing to court the king and compete for his favors. This receiving of privileges according to the kings favors, depended heavily on the courtier's observed presence at court, which was fostered by an elaborate court ritual, that captured court aristocracy in an artificial requirement for public display and the need on spending money on appearances often to the verge of bankruptcy.

394 François Fourquet and Lion Murard, eds., *Équipements du pouvoir* (Paris: Union Générales d'Éditions 10/18, 1976), 72.

395 Guattari in discussion with Fourquet, in ibid., 129–45; here 135 and 142.

ing and extracting desired behaviors. In such a view, a blockage is no not simply an accident or something that happens 'in' systems of circulation. Rather, a blockage expresses a machinic component middling in what is happening here; something emerging from machinic interactions by which this system of circulation starts to operate as a system of passages. This middling operation is structurally articulated twice. On the one hand, it is a spatial system to be passed through and traversed (as a 'framework'). On the other hand, it engenders a spatial, forestructuring passing-on or **TRANSDUCTION** of the transversal (i.e. horizontal yet hierarchical) relationality of ranks (an **EQUIPMENT OF POWER**). [→ 3.2.2. & 3.3.3]

In thus cutting through structure to operation and vice versa, this system of passages, or entries, becomes not only a space of conduct for visitors but a 'conductor,' an event space for visits (everyday business and special events) actualized in a specific series of spatial practices, actions and conducts, such as gestures and speech acts. Not yet a 'machine for living in,' the *appartement du roi* presented a control mechanism for conducting, channeling, and controlling visitor flows by breaking them up and conjugating them. It was a sorting or filtering arrangement that controlled how far any one visitor was allowed to advance. This '*machine à ranger* (ranking machine)' was a spatial device and equipment for a new form of power that emerged with the increasing instrumentalization of all these capacities. It had a particular closing systemic effect on the form-taking socio-spatial assemblage of the court.

We can formulate a tentative answer to how this process conjoins spatial and social production processes. For, akin to a strand of DNA, the precise arrangement of a spatial sequence forms a template that codes particular processes of court-aristocratic social production. These sociogenic processes are dynamically interpreted within the spatio-temporal translation of this template into a chain of events. In themselves, these event sequences only mean something (for a social system in which this sequence is decoded) in terms of functional correspondences, measured reciprocally within an apparatus. It is thus less of an apparatus for receiving guests than an actual 'receiving system,' 'receiver,' or 'receptor'; it works as a technical apparatus for receiving (i.e. registering and recording) and transducing signaletic flows. The apartment channels the noise of environmental signals into discretized flows; precisely from this discretization and its modalities does this apparatus produce certain codes of conduct. As Waddy describes in so much details, these codes gain significant informational values and referential meanings.

Through such ranking arrangements, and the "hierarchizing assemblages" (Weheliye) they effectuate, people were literally 'realizing' social standing and power.[396]

The same may go for 'the state,' as this conductive system is also a precondition for the fixing or "grid-locking" of an earlier form of nomadic distribution through a sedentary statist power structure that recomposes palatial edifices into highly coded socio-spatial segments.[397] Here, the notion of grid-locking requires some conceptual tight-roping. Especially the notion of an exclusion machine neglects this specific **INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION** within architecture's production of boundaries, and the ways such reconfigurings, in incorporating the virtual, open up the potential for not-yet-actualized arrangements.[398] It is the potential for blockages that—as a fully fledged form of power—can emerge only through and alongside a **DESIRING MACHINE** (a rather patriarchal model[399]) that channels visitors (led by a desire to meet the sovereign) toward a final climax; a channeling of movement that—in contrast with earlier processional organizations—is incrementally blocked. In such a compartmentalized control structure, people and bodies are not simply progressively excluded, because these warding-off mechanisms[400] involve behaviors and affective investments through which heterogeneous elements come to be incrementally integrated at specific levels of an encom-

396 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 122.

397 The first point, owe inspiration to Sara Ahmed's aforementioned idea "that if a path is very linear, blockages can occur." The observation in the following sentence is also inspired by her discussion of Frantz Fanon in id., *Queer Phenomenology* (Durham: Duke UP, 2003), 159. The notion of the grid-locking within statist assemblages is inspired by Miguel de Beistegui, "'A Book? What Book?,' Or Deleuze and Guattari on the Rhizome," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy*, ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams, 9–27; here 10. It is in this way, that I read the recognition of ranks in ceremonies and codes accompanying the paying of calls that Waddy ("The Roman Apartment"; and *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces,* esp. 3–8) describes, and in which where guests would be greeted and bid farewell at points commensurate with their rank not inverse to previous studies, but just more ethologically.

398 I take this reading of inclusive disjunction from an essay by Claire Colebrook, "How Queer Can You Go?," in *Sex After Life: Essays on Extinction, Vol. 2* (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2014), 179–202; here 192. Here I am referring back to my critique on the the illegitimate use of exclusive disjunctions in my note 185 above. Respectively, the concept of 'exclusion machines' assumes again a too-majoritarian position towards historical powers that overshadows the specific becoming-minoritarian of aristocratic architecture that takes form in this process, which require rendering visible the *actualization of a novel potential.* To do so we must arrive at an inclusive reading understand this opening up diagrammatically, as not representing an already existing reality (i.e. social or power relations) but as producing or generating a new diagram of power, through which an earlier court assemblage comes apart.

399 I owe this observation to Luciana Parisi, *Abstract Sex: Philosophy, Bio-Technology, and the Mutations of Desire* (London/New York: Continuum, 2004), 1–2.

400 Note here also the etymology of Middle French *parade*, or Italian *parate* "a warding or defending," or Spanish *parada* "a staying, stopping" (see "Parade" in the OED).

passing and complex system of discrimination. It is here that the system of apartments constitutes an integrated domain, "in which one cannot distinguish technological systems from some sort of power without falling back on some arbitrary distinction between a natural and an artificial world."[401]

The integration of instantiated flows into the greater **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLE** of apartments and the produced desire and affective work courtiers invested to become part of this machinery require an inclusive conceptualization. This re-conceptualization could be attempted through Deleuze's and Guattari's conception of all sorts of recording or registering devices as **APPARATUS OF CAPTURE**; a notion that they use synonymously with the state: "What begins with the State or the apparatus of capture," they claim, "is a general semiology that overcodes the primitive semiotic systems" by subjugating traits of expression related to the distribution of singularities to a new form of expression based on certain resonances within "a general space of comparison."[402] Any apparatus of capture thus initially "creates the very thing it captures" by effecting its own conditions of possibility in coupling

401 I borrow this notion from Brandt Dainow, "Integrated Nodes," unpublished conference paper, "Philosophy of Human Technology Relations," Jul 11–13, 2018, Univ. of Twente (Netherlands).

402 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 444–5. I do not intend to propose or invest here in a fully-blown 'theory of the state,' nor theory of capitalism, as Deleuzo-Guattari do and which they largely take from French political anthropologist Pierre Clastres. Cf. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, esp. the chapters "Treatise on Nomadology: The War Machine" (ibid., 351–423), "Apparatus of Capture" (ibid. 424–473), and :The Smooth and the Striated" (ibid., 474–500). Here, my argument is based simply on the observation that Deleuze and Guattari strategize in their theory of state formation, that the state emerges through what they phrase the "appropriation of the war machine," which in their reading is the characteristic of nomadological formations. In this respect, I've here rephrased, or simplified the rather cryptic formulation of Deleuze and Guattari, which continues as follows: "Instead of traits of expression that follow a **MACHINIC PHYLUM** and wed it in a distribution of singularities, the State constitutes a form of expression that subjugates the phylum: the phylum or matter is no longer anything more than an equalized, homogenized, compared content, while expression becomes a form of resonance or appropriation" (ibid.). See also ibid., 437: "The State as apparatus of capture has a power of appropriation; but this power does not consist solely in capturing all that it can, all that is possible, of a matter defined as phylum. The apparatus of capture also appropriates the war machine, the instruments of polarization, and the anticipation-prevention mechanisms." On the appropriative aspect, and the spatial conception of this conception of the state, see also the entries by Alberto Toscano, "Capture," and by John Protevi, "State + Geography," in *The Deleuze Dictionary* (second edition), ed. Parr, 43–45, and 270–272 respectively; see also Daniel Smith, "7000 BC: Apparatus of Capture," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy*, ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams, 223–241. As I want to imply in my argument then, this can be used to understand how the acquisition of an army of bureaucrats captures earlier form of 'nomadic distribution' of power under the feudal order. Thereby, I only highlight one genealogical element pertaining to the hierarchical-bureaucratic organization of space-time in emerging modern state and its capitalist economy. John Milios, *The Origins of Capitalism as a Social System* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 17.

material and semiological machines.[403] As such, 'capture' is not a negative notion, since it involves transgressing a division between two formerly different worlds.

It really is no coincidence that this assemblage fastens at the moment when the parament chamber is replaced by the antichamber. The former presented an intercalated room that, by connecting relative locations of (in) visibility, gained its function as a space for corporeal appearances. This function was entirely transposed by the latter space, which — although located in the same location — instrumentalized this intercalary position differently, in acting as a access point into a system of passages. This transitive system consisted of a series of activities — instantiated onto spatial intervals — segmented as to produce incorporeal effects of befores and afters, positionality, parthood, and belonging. This transpositional space, the *antichambre*, becomes the principal boundary marker that relates two environments in an inclusive relation of disjunction. While it demarcates one from the other (the space of appearance and the space of retreat), it also clearly articulates them as two distinct domains: the public and the private.[404]

With this notion, we can reconsider the architecture of apartments as a privacy-producing instrument but also have to foreground its principal function as an equipment of political power — in fact, as a technique latent in the architecture of palaces, as the first **COLLECTIVE EQUIPMENT OF POWER** — by means of which the state territorially fixes itself.[405] This is because all architectural arrangements ensure, as Foucault notes, "a certain allocation of people in space, a canalization of their circulation as well as the coding of their reciprocal relation."[406] In this machinic function, it binds (certain) parts into (certain) functional wholes by generating an (certain) **ABSTRACT DIAGRAM** for those processes in which particular ensembles are formed by specific complexity-reducing measures. This specificity concerns machinic processes of social stratification, as a machine is that which "binds parts into a functional whole."[407] A machinic view thus ought to ask how it is binding. Here, Deleuze and Guattari hint at an explanation in their notion that the

403 Smith, "7000 BC: Apparatus of Capture," 226.

404 I take this point from Deleuze's discussion of Chronos and Aion in *Logic of Sense*, 162ff.

405 Fourquet and Murard, eds., *Équipements du pouvoir*, 72. I refer here back to the point made in my introduction, note 106.

406 Foucault, "Space, Knowledge, and Power," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1991), 239–57; here 253 (trans. modified).

407 John Protevi, "November 28, 1947: How Do You Make Yourself a Body without Organs?," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy*, ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams, 99–114; here 102–3.

state itself is not so much an apparatus of capture but emerges when sedentary assemblages effectuate a capture of what they call the PHYLUM, the immanent plane of form-taking processes.[408] What the state captures is a war machine and the system of distribution. In our case, we can understand this simply in terms of how statist assemblages appropriate nomadic forms of distribution and turn them into expressive acts. Here, the blockage of movement can be identified as a (changing) trait or SUBSTANCE OF EXPRESSION of (changing) power relations.

In an assemblage-theoretic view, then, this new court assemblage could only lift off (in contrast to earlier transitions) because it coincided with a second transformation, that concerning the very 'substance of content' of the royal lodging, that is, its changing segmentarity from a molecular ordering into a molar organization, which sediments established habits that take shape in spatio-temporal patterns of differentiation and repetition. This transposition of habits into a habitat consolidates modes of relation into frames of interaction through which subjects come to be re-territorialized.[409] As already indicated, this 'framing' happened through an increasing striation or RETICULATION of space. Deleuze and Guattari note that "one of the fundamental tasks of the State is to striate the space over which it reigns."[410] In this striated STATE SPACE, "there is still a need for fixed paths in well-defined directions, which restrict speed, regulate circulation, relativize movement, and measure in detail the relative movements of subjects and objects … going from one point to another in a striated space."[411] This 'relativization' of movement was facilitated with the recoding of the 'primitive territories' of the *logis*, after the *département des heures* decoded its transductive spatiality and made regulation axiomatic. This turned the *logis*' segmentary body plan into a formal code that imposed upon its spatial connections a specific "regime of signs" and related "arborescent conjunctions."[412] [→ 3.3.2]

408 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 415 and 437.
409 After Rosi Braidotti, "Posthuman Relational Subjectivity and the Politics of Affirmation," in *Relational Architectural Ecologies*, ed. Rawes, 21–39; here 35.
410 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 385–6.
411 Ibid.
412 Ibid., 415.

2.3.3 The Conjugation of Flows

This capture eventually constitutes the **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** within the form-taking architectural system of apartments that was to come. As Daniel W. Smith describes, "a conjunction of flows occurs when one flow blocks or constrains other flows, in such a manner that it brings the latter under the dominance of a single flow capable of overcoding them (hence Deleuze and Guattari's use of terminology such as 'capture,' 'integration,' 'sedimentation,' 'stratification,' and so on)."[413] Of course, this conjunction is closely connected to the catalyzation of a new connective synthesis. In this catalysis, the newly concretized architecture of apartments would soon start to form a normative socio-spatial system. This connection, in contrast to conjunction, "occurs when two flows enter into relation in such a manner that something passes between them, and their interaction produces something new which introduces a real transformation in a given field,"[414] which we will find in socio-spatial transformations effected by the form-taking system of apartments. Similarly, Eugene Holland emphasizes that Deleuze and Guattari "invoke a key distinction between the connection of flows and the conjugation of flows. Under propitious circumstances, the connection of flows boosts their intensity and accelerates their rates of decoding and deterritorialization; the result is greater than the sum of the parts, and can even become revolutionary. The conjugation of flows, by contrast, reduces their potential, 'performs a general reterritorialization, and brings the flows under the dominance of a single flow capable of overcoding them.'"[415] The latter presents a **HIGHER-ORDER EMERGENT CONSTRAINT** of two contragrade morphogenetic dynamisms in a **TELEOGENIC** coupling.

With Guattari's work, we can also reconsider how this coupling allowed the earlier, more diagrammatic striation of the virtually real existential segmentarities of the *logis* to be sensibly rendered into an actually possible 'instantiation' or 'striation of flows.'[416] This striation was only made *virtu-*

413 Daniel W. Smith, "Paul Patton—Deleuze and the Liberal Tradition: Normativity, Freedom, and Judgment," in *Essays on Deleuze* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2012) 339–60; here 350.

414 Ibid.

415 Holland, "Micropolitics and Segmentarity," 161; citing Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 220.

416 This notion is especially developed in Guattari's own writings that stress that flows are always highly-striated. In Guattari, the striation of flows takes place at the junction of two types of smoothing: (1) a discursive smoothing along the 'sensible/diagrammatic' axis Flows–Territories, that articulates 'sensible qualities" and (2) a deterritorializing smoothing along the 'open/closed systemic' axis Flows–Phyla, "which positions it in the register of abstract qualities inherent to machinic propositions" (Guattari, *Schizoanalytic*

ally possible by the hierarchization of the royal lodging's architecture that, while segmented, still allowed for the free movement of bodies in its relatively 'smooth space'—the famous familiarity of the French court, and the traditional access to the king. With the becoming-molar of this segmentary space, movement becomes an internal, quantized *vector* for distributing particular values.[417] This vectorization converted the integrative matrix of the *logis* into a spatial metric, measured in terms of units and orientations along a single axis.[418] This is then how the a-signifying spatial system [semiotics] of the *logis* was transformed into a signifying one [semiology] of a new courtly **ASSEMBLAGE OF ENUNCIATION**.[419] In its surjective mapping of different social ranks onto spatial sequences, this semiological system, as a 'general space of comparison,' entails an integration or homologation of heterogeneous elements and flows in its systematic commodification or reification of social relations into spatial ones (as a consolidation or sorting). This system also entails a differentiation or heterogeneification (as a 'selection'), a **HETEROGENESIS**. It is the latter qualitative differentiation in the sequential ordering of space that thus reaches a new level, because it no longer imitates the given order but, as Wallenstein puts it, becomes an ordering instrument[420] capable of establishing a particularly ranked social organization of the court.

Cartographies, 83). More generally on this point, see esp. the section "Assemblage of Enunciation" (ibid., 78–80); with the explanatory "Figure 3.7 Cycle of the Assemblages of enunciation" (ibid., 79); and the chapter "The Domain of Flows (117–28), including the section "The striation of the in-stantiation of Flows" (124–28). For an elaborate critical discussion of this supposedly contradictory notion of 'striated flows,' see Berressem, "Degrees of Freedom," 137.

417 See Neil Cummings, "Common," in *Distributed*, ed. David Blamey and Brad Haylock (London: Open editions, 2018), 18–28.

418 This conception would become much more explicit with the 1630s theorizations in analytic geometry and its development of coordinate systems. See Pierre de Fermat, *Methodus ad disquirendam maximam et minimam et de tangentibus linearum curvarum* (1636), manuscript published as "Ad Locos Planos et Solidos Isagoge," in *Varia opera mathematica* (Toulouse: Pech, 1679); and René Descartes, *La géométrie* (1637), published as an appendix to *Discours de la méthode: Pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la vérité dans les sciences* (Leiden: Maire, 1637).

419 I here alter Guattari's concept of "collective assemblages of enunciation," to differentiate the court as a particular collective.

420 Sven-Olov Wallenstein, *Biopolitics and the Emergence of Modern Architecture* (New York: Buell Center/Princeton Architectural Press, 2009), 20 and 39. Following Foucault biopolitical reading, Wallenstein discusses modern architecture as becoming a "tool for ordering itself." What he does not explore, is how ordering, concerning the production of spatial layout, or distribution of elements in space entails—on a larger—level new forms of organizations.

63 **Summary diagram of the DOUBLE ARTICULATION of the form-taking architecture of apartments, with an indication of the crucial changes in the historical formation from the *logis* to the appartement that reciprocally-determine and mutually enforcing components in their articulation as both processual substances and structured forms, as well as in their discursive and non-discursive modality. In this view the configuring architecture of apartments is the configuring FORM OF CONTENT, or spatial dispositif in this emerging assemblage.**

The Double Articulation of Appartements and Distribution, 1585

To map the appearance of this new assemblage, one needs to first identify a crucial change concerning where and how these processes were performed by a filter that arose from the spatial differentiation between the space of retreat (the chamber) to the largely accessible space of apparition the *chambre de parament*). With the introduction of the *antichambre*, however, this filter was multiplied—and eventually displaced—by a more selective function of sorting visitors before they entered the king's chamber (a space to receive selected courtiers). Architecture thus joins a selection process regarding the **SUBSTANCE OF CONTENT** and a sorting process regarding the **FORM OF CONTENT** in this new court assemblage.

That sorting enacted by behavioral and architectural boundaries has a specific binding function, has famously been noted by sociologist Norbert Elias. He theorized about the constitutive function of etiquette within the sociogenesis of court society.[421] It bound together the court as a specific social figuration with a more or less fixed hierarchy, he argues, by means of which courtiers asserted they membership to and position within it. Architectural arrangements, too, have a binding function within Elias's argumentation, as they configure the template for interaction and social production that guarantees the social and sociological cohesion of this figuration (= **ASSEMBLAGE**). In this binding function, in which—complementary to exclusion and boundary-drawing processes—we find the **INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION** driving its particular "composition of forces" as Foucault's fourth dispositif within formations of power. We may productively understand this composition of forces as a crucial externalization process in which architecture becomes an instrument generating a counter-pressure directed at its outside. [→ 3.2] In this differential sense, the osmotic process complements the above-mentioned immunological function of architecture—referred to in the previous section, to stress a bio-social technique that comprises an "internalization of externalities" through specific filters of relation—by using these components for a sort of controlled outsourcing of power, previously constrained to the regal sphere in the public. It is precisely this externalization process[422] that

421 See Elias, "The Bonding of Kings Through Etiquette and Status Changes," in *Court Society*, 117–45. Here, and in the following, I also refer to Nail's reading of boundaries as binding, that I referred to in my introduction, Thomas Nail, *Theory of the Border* (New York: Oxford UP, 2016), 35–40. I will come back to Elias's theory centrally in chapter 3.2.

422 In his recent work, Stiegler conceptualises biological organogenesis—analogously to an internalization of externalities—as an "endosomatization of the exosomatic." He then posits the inverse process— an "exosomatization," that is an exteriorisation of internal

renders a longstanding diagram of power sensible in the architecture of apartments.

As I have shown, longstanding modes of inhabitation and related behaviors have progressively produced the transductive territoriality of the royal *logis*. In it the possible use of the appartement as a spatial framework for the reception of guests came to be incrementally realized the more its constitutive organization of the royal household [FE]. And its changing distribution of people in and around spaces [FC] came to be actualized in the territorialization and expression of an emerging sedentary court assemblage ☒[63]. Here, apartments are not the FORM OF EXPRESSION of this state apparatus but the form of content, the configurative territorial arrangement through which virtually real relations of the court [FC] incrementally fix their constitutive elements. The actually real form of expression lies in a bureaucratic form of organization [FE]. The substance of this form of organization in turn lies in a blockage of movement [SC] that transforms the sequential spatiality of the royal *logis* into the serial configuration of the appartement as an arrangement of different spatial affects [FC] composed of qualitatively differentiated rooms [FC]. This differentiation does not work without the behavioral coding that functionally re-structures the spatial compound and its differences through a system of entrances that made its use for marking social distinctions actually possible [SC]. It also does not function without the modality this order attains in the bureaucratic organization through which those fixating behaviors in and around the *appartements du roi* as the reproductive unit of this court assemblage are actually realized [FE]. Configuring a productive force—externalized into new official functions, yet with internalized new behavioral codes and habits—social relations were thus embedded into a newly differentiated spatial segmentarity that enabled such a DOUBLE-BIND. Thereby, the sequence of individual rooms became replaced by a DIVIDUAL arrangement that enacted a specific control structure.[423] These are segmented (or dare we say compartmentalized) as "to ensure and control the identity of each agency, including personal identity."[424] In rebooting the entire reproductive process, architecture's technicity of regulating access thus concretizes into a cultural technology.

organisations, resulting in an "exosomatic organogenesis"—as characteristic for the concretization of technicities into technical objects consists in. See Bernard Stiegler, *The Neganthropocene*, ed. and trans. Daniela Voss (London: Open Humanities Press, 2018).

423 Deleuze, "Postscript on the Societies of Control," *October* 59 (Winter 1992): 3–7; see also John Marks "Control Society," in *Deleuze Dictionary, 2nd edn.*, ed. Parr, 56.

424 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 195.

As Lars Spuybroek reminds us, "For an organization to be a machine, it needs to be a system. For a system to differentiate over time, we need a procedure. For a procedure we need rules. All relational logic asserts that relations are external and therefore follow a rule-based, not law-based, logic."[425] As soon as architecture's diagrammatic technicity in regulating movement was rendered sensible, and externalized into the very architecture of apartments, it also allowed this machinic interaction to become 'noematic,' which means that it came to be consciously thought about. This concerns the point at which this apparatus was named as 'an apartment.' What comes into play at this point is again an "abstract machine, which constitutes and conjugates all of the assemblage's cutting edges of deterritorialization."[426] To locate this conjunctive synthesis, we must then identify the specific **DOUBLE ARTICULATION** that happens between these **CONTENT** components within a **MACHINIC ASSEMBLAGE OF BODIES** (=courtiers and rooms), on the one hand, and the **EXPRESSION** components within a **COLLECTIVE ASSEMBLAGE OF ENUNCIATION** (=bureaucratic organization of space-time) on the other, as it is the latter that effectuates the conditions for this resonance.[427]

It is here that a Simondonian understanding, which holds that machines are social before they become technological, makes it easy to locate this conjunction. As I have been pointing out, the phylum captured in this process consisted in nomadic distribution, the above-mentioned social practice of sorting and organizing court members, the so-called *département de logis*. Hence, from an assemblage-theoretic perspective, one would need to identify what change in this natural resonance would

425 Lars Spuybroek, excerpt from *The Architecture of Continuity* (Rotterdam: V2/Nai, 2008) 185–93. Note the etymological relation of "rule" to Latin *regulare,* from PIE root **reg-* "move in a straight line".

426 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 459 and 141.

427 See ibid., 40–1: In this **DOUBLE ARTICULATION**, a "first articulation chooses or deducts, from unstable particle-flows, metastable molecular or quasi-molecular units (substances) upon which it imposes a statistical order of connections and successions (forms),' whereas the second articulation 'establishes functional, compact stable structures (forms), and constructs the molar compounds in which these structures are simultaneously actualised (substances)." See also 88–9; and also Brent Atkins, "One or Several Wolves," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy*, ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams 28–45. Respectively, Jeffrey A. Bell cautions In the same work, that "the 'collective assemblage of enunciation,' is not to be confused, however, with the set of external conditions that render a statement meaningful," because Deleuze and Guattari argue that collective assemblages of enunciation are coextensive with linguistic systems and thus only "expresses the set of *incorporeal transformations that effectuate the condition of possibility of language* and utilise the elements of the linguistic system.'" Jeffrey A. Bell, "Postulates of Linguistics" in ibid., 64–82; here 66–7, citing Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (emph. added [JB]).

trigger the *département de logis* to develop a ranking system articulated in the architecture of appartements.

This capacious resonance, I want to conclude, is to be found in the notion of *appartenance*. As I already mentioned in the previous chapter on Serlio, Bertrand Jestaz suspects that the appartement arose from "an approximate form" in the existing French notion of *appartenance*,[428] in its implication of "something that pertains to," "something according to one's disposition or reach," ranging from property and propriety to appropriateness (in the Vitruvian sense of decorum).[429] If one is aware of the initial distance separating the early notion of *appartenance*—denominating something subordinate to a more important thing, an accessory, trapping or feature—from the modern notion of appurtenances, it is easy to see how the royal lodging and its semi-public chamber, specifically the *garde-robe* and *cabinet* to which one could retire alone or with selected visitors, came to be named. As such, they form spatial equipment pertaining to status or rank and also instrumental for exercising a function or position to the extent that, without this equipment, one's rank could not be established. An *appartenance* is, in fact, an equipment through which (*per-*) a position is taken or held (*tenere*). In this dispositivistic reading, it is crucial to maintain a genetic and non-representational vision to distinguish that *appartenance* did not simply come to serve as a 'proto-notion' for an existing spatiality, as Jestaz seems to implies. It also does not develop in a simple linear fashion. Rather, this slippage from *appartenance* to *appartements* must be acknowledged and reconsidered as a transformative machinic component, one that started resonating with another machine. This second component is the nomadic distributive practice of the *départiment de logis*. Only after the latter was increasingly decoded when the court became sedentary, this resonance gave rise to the notion of the appartement as a normative apparatus, an equipment of a sedentary power. As such, it is the encounter of two interacting machines—one traditionally pertaining to '*dispositio*/*diathesis*' and one to '*distributio*/*oikonomia*'—that, as they came to be coupled around an organizational problem, produced an entirely different arrangement. This is the point where, through a slippage of

428 Jestaz, "Etiquette et distribution intérieur," 113 (my trans.). See my Part I, note 19.

429 From Old French *apartenir/apertenir*, from Late Latin *appertinere* "to belong to, pertain to." See the entry "appartenance" in the TLFi and DMF. See also the entries "appurtenance" and "pertain" in the OED. As an example, of the initial meaning, see Battista Della Valle's *Libro continente appertinentie à capitanii, retenere & fortificare una città con bastion* (pub. first in Naples: Antonio Frezza, 1521), and trans. as *Livre contenant les appertenances aux capitaines pour retenir & fortifier une cite* (Lyon: Jacques Moderne, 1529) in which term *(ap)pertinentie/appertenances*, describes only several features pertaining to the presented matters of fortification 'to hold' a city. Cf. esp. perteneō.

perspectives through a structural coupling of the problems of membership [*appartenance*] and distribution [département] intersect and a new future came into existence,[430] one that would be driving the emerging dispositif of distribution, mapped in the next part. [→ PART III]

The New Subject of *Appartements*, 1585

This conjunction in which something on the order of a new subject emerges can clearly be situated in the *règlement général* of 1585—the first French royal document in which the term "appartements" appears. It proclaims:

> Sadicte Majesté veult, s'il est possible, que l'appartement de son logis soit à plain-pied, tant de sa salle, antichambre, chambre d'Estat, chambre d'audiance, chambre royalle que cabinetz, dont il y aura à un cabinet pour le moins. / Veult Sadicte Majesté entrer tousjours de son cabinet en la chambre de la reyne sa femme où Leurs Majestéz couchent, que l'appartenance du logis de ladicte dame reyne soit à plain-pied de ladicte chambre s'il est possible. Et qu'il y ait un assez grand cabinet contre la susdicte chambre, puis une antichambre et après une salle. / Que l'appartenance du logis de la reyne mère de Sadicte Majesté soit, s'il est possible, à plain-pied de celuy de Leurs Majestéz, sinon le plus prest et commode qu'il se pourra, où il ayt salle antichambre, chambre et cabinet. [His Majesty wishes that, whenever possible, the apartment of his lodging be on one level, that is, his hall, antechamber, state chamber, and audience chamber, royal chamber room, and cabinets, of which there be at least one. / His Majesty wishes to always enter, through his cabinet, the chamber of the queen, his wife, where Their Majesty sleeps, and that the appurtenance of the queen's lodgings be at the same level of the said room whenever possible; and that there be a large-enough cabinet against the aforesaid room, then an antechamber, and after that a hall. / That the appurtenance of the lodging of the queen's mother of His Majesty is, when possible, on the same level as that of Their Majesty, if not the most elaborate and convenient it may be, where it has hall, antechamber, chamber, and cabinet.][431]

430 For clarification, let me add that this 'sedentary' decoding had clearly not taken place in the war machinery of the Burgundian court. Here, we also see the proto-notion of appartenances, appearing in Olivier de la Marche's *Estat et Maison du duc Charles de Burgoigne* (c.1473), 19: "Or ay devisé de l'estat de la *chambre* et de divers offices y appartenans"; the as well as the "depart de logiz" (ibid.), 77.

431 Anon., "Règlement général faict par le roy à Paris, le premier jour de janvier 1585, de tous



64 Diagrammatic summary of the developing linear architecture of apartments.

Presenting a "crucial episode in the history of the French court,"[432] as Chatenet stresses, this *règlement* already required three pieces between the *salle du roi* and the *chambre du roi*: the *antichambre* proper, an audience chamber (*chambre d'audience*) and a state chamber (*Chambre d'Etat*) ☒64.[433] This differentiation of the institutional space—previously occupied by the intermediary *antichambre* alone—constitutes the ultimate *mise-en-*

les estatz de sa maison," Paris, A.N., KK 544 f.55 r–113r; here 65r (my trans.). The transcript by Alice Camus, under the direction of Bernard Barbiche and Monique Chatenet, at the Centre de recherché du château de Versailles, is avail. online at https://www.chateauversailles-recherche.fr/IMG/pdf/4._reglement_1585.pdf. For a discussion, see also the article by Chatenet, "Henri III et l'ordre de la cour: evolution de l'étiquette à travers les règlements généraux de 1578 et de 1585," in *Henri III et son temps. Actes des colloque de Tours, octobre 1989*, ed. Robert Sauzet (Paris: Vrin, 1992), 133–9, and Jestaz, "Etiquette et distribution intérieur."

432 Chatenet, *La cour*, 139.

433 Ibid., 182.

abîme, unleashing a powerful differentiation of the multiplicity of the royal lodging in its multiplied and increasingly impermeable spatial filters. Thereby, as Boudon and Chatenet observe, it initiated "a complete overhaul of the spatial distribution of royal residences,"[434] which were adapted under great spatial compromises. In the Louvre, for instance, the *grand-salle* was truncated by two bays to create a new *antichambre*, *chambre d'audience* and *chambre d'état* in the *antichambre* and *garde-robe* of Henri II.[435]

Regarding the statement that the notion of the appartement "replaces the former term of the *logis*," it may be more accurate to say that it specifically displaces the former conception with the more differentiated expression "appartements de logis." This term—notably appearing amid synonymous uses of "appartenances du logis"—is clearly not a clear-cut concept nor spatial unit, yet.[436] Rather denominating an organizational unit (or better: ensemble), something crucial happens here "between chains of semiotic expression, and material chains."[437] Evidently, the differentiated notion of appartements became the site where the territorial conception of *appartenance* and the distributive technique of the *département* began to CONCRETIZE in a topical conjunction of highly decoded flows. The distributive practice of the nomadic court—the *département de logis*, previously firmly coupled to abstract territorialization processes—was broken free. In this irreversible process, the practice thus achieved a certain autonomy, allowing a recoding of distribution—as an aspect initially relating to a military apparatus or war machine—into a concrete social code.[438] In a sort of chiasmic move, the abstract notion of appartenances—previously located on the edge of the socially coded domain of the *logis*—came to be coupled with spatial hierarchization processes leading to their recoding as concrete territories. The appartement comes to centrally organize the entire residential body and actualize an incipient diagram in which two abstract notions concretize into two coupled technologies: appartements and spatial practices of ranking.

Thus reterritorialized into a rigid segmentary structure, this nascent state assemblage would, over the next century, come to employ spatial differentiations and distribution forms—as the most deterritorialized component,

434 Boudon and Chatenet, "Logis du roi," 77.

435 Alexandre Gary, "Le Roi, la reine … et la reine mère," in *Prince, princesses et leur logis,* ed. Chatenet and De Jonge, 229–44; here 232. See also Chatenet, "Henri III au Louvre. Distribution et mobilier du logis du roi en 1585," *Revue de l Art* 169, no. 3 (2010), 39–47.

436 Boudon and Chatenet, "Logis du roi," 71 n55.

437 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 330.

438 Id., *A Thousand Plateaus*, 434. The crucial point being that, "A movement of decoding runs through the war machine" (ibid., 400). See also my note 285 and 433.

which always holds together an assemblage—to realize an axiomatic socio-spatial system coded and instantiated in the architecture of appartements. Subsequently, this process presents the concluding **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** of apartments to the extent that this emerging subject would reboot the entire process in which architecture would come to reproduce social order. In this sense, the architecture of appartements needs to be identified as a crucial convergence phenomenon, a conjunction full of potential and generative effects.

Some Conclusions

In mapping the form-taking architecture of apartments, we have arrived at the point to draw some conclusions. My extensive mapping has demonstrated that the historical formation pertaining to the architecture of appartements out of the *logis* cannot be reduced to the mere evolution or differentiation of an increasingly regular architecture into a new planning unit. Instead, I have shown that it can be comprehensively conceptualized in complex, abstract and relational terms of three interrelated syntheses that explain how aristocratic architecture, in changing from the *logis* to the appartement, came to be a specific equipment of power. It not only facilitated a *mise-en-scène* for royal power but also incrementally produced it through a series of *mise-en-abîmes* in which this power structure repeatedly folded back onto itself, thus bringing into existence a new power formation based on a specific, **EPIGENETIC** differentiation of the royal residential domain.

In this regard, my first section highlighted that the differentiated spatiality and segmentary architecture of institutional buildings was initially shaped by the additive building practices of medieval times. The section also showed that different modes of employment of this segmentary space must be distinguished based on their differing politics of assemblages within different political ecologies. I highlighted a specific nomadic dispositif related to the *castello* scheme, that would, in its migration to France, contribute to an absolute positive deterritorialization of the residential architecture of the French landed nobility: both the *donjon* and the *logis*. This process was mapped in the second section, where I highlighted how both these changing architectures—as specific regulators of movement—came to be entangled over a specific internal modification necessary for the architecture of apartments to take form. In this regard, I indicated how the inherent regulating function (not regular form) of architecture allows us to understand a particular disjunction within architectural arrangement as an

inclusive rather than exclusive disjunction. I located the formation of apartments not so much in the emergence of identifiable units in plan or as a specific sequence of rooms but in the process leading up to a differentiation of the internal arrangement of the *corps de logis*, which I located in the introduction of the Italian stair. The third section highlighted how this modification, along with a set of cross-cultural influences, led to a crucial conjunction in which royal palaces were transformed in terms of their household structure to take on a bureaucratic organization pertaining to hierarchical institutions. This mapping complements previous attempts at understanding the formation of apartments through privation. It does so by attending to the specific differentiation of public territory of royal palaces and the way the royal palace became the site for new ranking practices, in the new conception of *appartenance*, through which the notion of appartements was coming to be part of the very conception of royal residences.

With this reading, I hope to contribute to a comprehensive conception of the complex and mutually presupposing processes in which a long-standing feudal architecture changes from an integrative matrix with sequentially ordered spaces and stratified lodgings into an integrated domain with serially organized and highly striated rooms that was in the process of becoming an architectural apparatus for drawing distinctions. Alongside the rise of an absolutist state, this apparatus would soon become the focus of an entire discourse, spanning the next two centuries, in which the differentiated architecture of appartements became a highly normative socio-spatial system through the emerging notion of distribution.

●●○

65 APPENDIX A: An Evolutionary Diagram of the Formtaking Architecture of Apartments

formal invention

formal similarity / influence (external form)

organizational influence (internal sequence of rooms)

parallel development

N.B.: Time-placement partly mod. and varies ± 10 yrs. due to layout



ENGLIS
INVASIO
OF FRA


Private castles with apt. du roi and second. apt. connected via salle
42 G+ ?|CH|SA|PAR|CH|GR/C
40 GR|CH|SA|PAR|CH|+?
41 CH|GR|CH|GR|↑|SA|CH|GR|C + G
reterr. of garderobe
43 C|CH|GR|GR|↑|SA|GR|CH|C
44 C|CH|GR|↑|SA|S|GR|CH|C
=relative deterr. with castrum form
=recoding of room preceeding the chamber as antichamber
Private hôtel with parallel wing with app. du roi
49 SA|↑|CDR|GR|C
50 G|SA|AC|CDR|CH|C|GR
CH|AC|GR|AC|CH|C|GR+
hôtel
Private hôtel with single appartement
48 CH|SA|↑|AC|CH|RC
38 SA|↑|SA|S/PAR|CH|GR|R
S/PAR|CH|GR|R
39 SA|S/PAR|CH|GR|GR|CH
CH|GR
47 CH|SA|↑|PAR|CH|+
classic corps d'hôtel
53 HA|KW|KP|CL|PC|CH ...
abandonment of stacked lodgings in England
=absolute deterr.
Royal castles with two reverse appartements conn. via cabinets
53 HA|KP|CL|PC|PL|CH|+
HA|QP|CL|PC|PL|CH|
51 →SA|GR
AC|CDR|CH|C+
→SA|GR|CH|C
35 SA|↑|PAR|CH|R
GR
Royal castles with two parallel apt.'s conn. via salle and ch. du roi-
Royal castles with symmetrical Appartements jumelées
37 GR|CH|CH|SA|CH|CH|GR
36 GR|CH|SA|CH|GR
54 →SA|S/AC|GR|CDR|C
→SA|S/AC|GR|CDR|C
55 →SA|↑|SDR|GR|CDR|C+
→SA|CDR|C|GR
36 (Donj.) SA|↑|CH|GR+QUEEN'S APT.
spanish influence
C|C
58 SA|AC|AC|CH
GR
56 SA|AC|AC|CH|C
GR
Hunting lodges with plan massé
28 +SA|↑|CH+
28 +SA|↑|CH+|CH+
28 +CH|SA+|↑|CH+|CH+
19 GR|CH|CH|GR|SA|S|GR|CH|CH|GR
GR|CH|CH|GR|GR|CH|CH|GR
25 SA|CA|GR
27 CA|SA|V|SA|CA
CA|SA|SA|CA
54 →[SA|GR|↑O|CH|C GR]×4
deterr. pertaining to nce of the Italian sala ral connecting space
22 →SA|SA|AR|CA|GR|ST
S|CA|GR
15 V|SA|CA|AC|ST
SA|CA|AC|ST
19 →[SA|CA|CA|CA|ST]×4
17 →AU|AU|SA|PAR|PAP|CA|ST
18 →SA|SA|SA|PAR|CA?|CA|ST
1500
1600
H
ON
NCE
FRENCH CAMPAIGNS IN ITALY

66 **APPENDIX B: Map indicating the locations of the discussed buildings and projects**

Wartburg
Gelnhausen
HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE
SWITZERLAND
DUCHY OF MILAN
Milan
Pavia
Turin
DUCHY OF MANTUA
Mantua
REP. OF VENICE
Venice
Bologna
Genoa
Florence
Siena
TUSCANY
PAPAL STATES
Split
(TO GENOA)
Rome
Naples
(TO ARAGON)
(TO ARAGON)

IMAGE SOURCES
FOR PART II

Painting by Antoine Caron, *La cour de France quittant le château d'Anet* (c. 1570). Black chalk, pen and brown ink, brown wash on paper 32.2 × 48.7 cm. Musee du Louvre, Paris, dép. des Arts graphiques, RF 30624 (reproduction © RMN).

1 Ichnographia Antiqui Aedificii Basilicae et patriachii lateranensis, plan Cesare Rasponi, *De Basilica et patriarchio lateranensi libri quattuor…*, (Rome, 1656), *Arachne*, Archaeological Institute of the Univ. of Cologne (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 DE), avail. online at http://arachne.uni-koeln.de/books/Rasponi1656

2 Vatican Palace, after Maarten van Heemskerck, view of Old St. Peter's and the Vatican Palace in Rome, 1532–34, pen and brown ink, 27.5 × 62.1 cm. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain. Plan redrawn from Letarouilly, *Le Vatican*. Room distribution from Yves Le Pogam, "Le Latran, le Vatican," after Anna M. Voci, *Nord o sud?,* and Diocletio Redig de Campos *I Palazzi Vaticani*.

3 Avignon: Detail of a larger drawing showing the Palais des Papes in Avignon, drawing by Étienne Martellange (c. 1610), 38 × 55 cm, Bibliotèque national de France [BnF], département Estampes et photographie, ark: btv1b6937566b. Plan redrawn after Viollet-le-Duc, and the reconstructions by B. Schimmelpfennig and G. Kerscher.

4 Plan of the Almudaina (Palma de Majorca) and Palace of the Kings of Majorca (in Perpignan), redrawn after G. Kerscher, "Perspektive des Potentaten," and S. Trüby, *Geschichte de Korridors*, 94–95.

5 Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Photograph by user Metilsteiner, licensed under (CC BY 3.0).

6 Depiction of the Royal lodging at the Palais Royal, Île de la cité, Paris in a detail from the month of June, haymaking, in the *Très Riches Heures du Duc de Berry*. Public domain. Plan reconstructed after B. Bove, "Palais royaux à Paris au Moyen Age," 45–79; and Cohen, *Sainte-Chapelle*. Reconstruction based on the "Plan detaillé de l'île de la cité" by Abbé Delagrive (1754). Source: http://paris-atlas-historique.fr; and "Le cadastre de Paris par îlot" by François Vasserot (1810–1836). A.P., F/31/94/04, avail. online at http://archives.paris.fr/r/138/plans-parcellaires/.

7 Depiction of the Louvre of Charles V, in a detail of from the month of October, in the *Très Riches Heures du Duc de Berry*. Public domain. Plan redrawn from M. Whiteley and J. Blécon/CRAHAM. Room distribution after Salamagne (cf. Whiteley).

8 Detail of depicting a royal *château* with the king's parament chamber in which Salmon authoring his manuscript to Charles VI, from the *Dialogues* de Pierre Salmon (c. 1409), BnF, Département des Manuscrits, ark: btv1b84546920/f111, Ms. 23279, fol. 53. Image source: Wikimedia Common. CC0/Public domain.

9 Detail of a miniature depicting Salmon in discussion with Charles VI. From the Dialogues de Pierre Salmon (c. 1409), Geneva Library, Ms. 165, fol. 4. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain.

10 Detail of miniature depicting Christine de Pisan presenting her book to queen Isabeau, seated in her bedchamber, from *The Book of the Queen* by Christine de Pizan. (c. 1410–14), British Library, Harley 4431, fol. 3. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain.

11 Domus Communis, Volterra. Image source: Scan of a xilography by Guiseppe Barberis, from Strafforello Gustavo, *La patria, geografia dell'Italia* (1902), via Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain.

12 Palazzo Ducale, in Mantua. Image source: Scan of George Street, *Brick and Marble in the Middle Ages* (1855), 251, via Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain.

13 Detail from the Veduta di Venezia, Jacopo de'Barbari (c. 1500), woodcut, 132.7 × 277.5 cm. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain. Plan redrawn from various plans found online including Wikimedia Commons, and "Plan of the ground floor of the Palazzo Ducale," *Venetian Art*, accessed August 10, 2018, http://library.bc.edu/venetianart/items/show/574. Room distribution according to the brochure *Palazzo Ducale*, by the Fondatione Musei Civici di Venzia avail. online at http://palazzoducale.visitmuve.it/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Guida-Ducale-ENG.pdf

14 Palazzo Vecchio in Milan. Detail of the *Pianta del buonsignori* (1594). Image source: Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain. Plan redrawn with room distribution from M. Trachtenberg.

15 View of the Medici Palace, from F. L. del Migliore, *Firenze Citta Nobilissima* (1684), n.p. [pl. 198]. Getty Research Institute Digital Collections, via https://archive.org/details/firenzecittnobil00migl/page/n224. Public domain; digital image courtesy of the Getty's Open Content Program. Plan redrawn with room distribution after Emanula Ferretti, "The Medici Palace," 286–7, and Deborah Howard based the plan provided by W. Bulst, "Ursprüngliche innere Aufteilung des Palazzo Medici," and H. Saalman and Ph. Maddox, "The first Medici Palace."

16 Palazzo dei Senatorio, Rome. Anonymous drawing, "Veduta della Piazza del Campidoglio" (c. 1554–1560). Louvre, Paris, dép. des Arts graphiques, INV 11028 (reproduction © RMN).

17 Reconstruction of the original Cardinal's Palace from Christoph L. Frommel, *Der Palazzo Venezia in Rom*, 10. Historical photograph by J. H Parker (n.d.). Image source: Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain. Plan redrawn from ibid., 15, and the plan avail. online at http://museopalazzovenezia.beniculturali.it/.

18 Plan of the Palazzo Farnese, redrawn from Letarouilly, *Edifices de Rome modernes* Vol. II: pl. 116–7, under consultation of the plan by Antonio da Sangallo the Younger (c. 1540), GDSU, Florence, UA 298; as reprinted in Frommel, *Der Romischer Palastbau*, 54–5, and the reconstruction of the 1516 project, offered by Frommel.

19 Plan of the Palazzo dei Tribunall: Redrawn after C.L. Frommel, *Romischer Palastbau*, 146–7 and A. da Pellegrino, "Floor plan of the Piano Nobile" after Bramante's project, GDSU Florence, UA136r.

20 Palazzo della Cancellaria Apostolica From an 18th-century engraving by Giuseppe Vasi. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain.

21 Palazzo Farnese. From an 18th-century engraving by Giuseppe Vasi. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain.

22 Palazzo Ducale, Urbino. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Photograph by user Bedini Massimo, licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0. Plan redrawn from Janez Höfler, 58, 60, 133, 164–5, 168, 197. Room distribution according to Höfler and Tönnismann.

23 Castello di Pavia. Detail of an aerial view of Pavia, from Martin Zeiller, *Itinerarium Italiae nov-antiquae* (1640), n.p. [f. 92 tav.]. ETH-Bibliothek Zurich/e-rara, doi:10.3931/e-rara-46317. Public domain.

24 Sforza Castle. Detail of an aerial view of Milan, from Martin Zeiller, *Itinerarium Italiae novantiquae* (1640),

n.p. [f. 96 tav.]. ETH-Bibliothek Zurich/e-rara, doi:10.3931/e-rara-46317. Public domain.

25 Plan of the Castello of Milan with room distribution redrawn from Aurora Scotte, "The Sforza Castle in Milan," 159; in combination with plans of the entire complex found online, including the "planimetria generale" provided in Luca Beltrami, *Leonardo e la sala delle asse* (1904), accessed online at http://vinciana.blogspot.com/2015/02/1904-beltrami-leonardo-e-la-sala-delle.html.

26 Painting of Villa Medicea at Poggio a Caiano, Vialla di Poggio a Caiano, by Giusto Utens (c. 1609), Museo di Firenze, Italy. Imaage source: Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain.

Plan of the Villa Poggio a Caiano, redrawn from Silvestro Bardazzi and Eugenio Castellani, *La Villa Medicea di Poggio a Caiano* as reprinted in Leon Satkowski, "The Palazzo Pitti," 346.

Plan of Villa Trissino, redrawn after Scamozzi, avaiil on Wikimedia Commons.
Plan of the Villa Farnesina, redrawn from C. L. Frommel, *Farnesina.*

27 Detail of Marielle MacLeman (c. 19th century?), "Il giardino perduto di poggio reale." Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Copyleft attribution. Conjectural plan of the Poggio Reale reconstructed from comparing various plans from Wikimedia Commons, esp. the plan by Carlo Vantivelli and Pierre-Adrien Pâris (c. 1800s), and in accordance with measures provided by De Divitiis, "Sangallo and the Kingdom of Naples." Cf. the reconstruction by C. L. Frommel, *Die Farnesina*, 93, after the hand sketch by Peruzzi has a more compact proportion.

28 Chateau de Martainville, Normandie. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Photograph by user Tristan Nitot, licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0.

Plan of the Donjon de Romefort, redrawn from Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 40.
Plan of the Donjon d'Anjony, redrawn from Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 40 (after Boutin).

Plan of the Manoir de Camarsac, redrawn from Viollet-le-Duc, *Dictionnaire* VI: 313.

Plan of the Donjon de Martainville, redrawn from Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 42; after Sauvageot, *Châteaux, Hôtels, et Maisons de France* Vol. IV: 85.
Plan of the Château de Chenonceau, redrawn after Du Cerceau, with the room distribution of his description.

Plan of the hunting castle of La Muette, redrawn based on the plan by Du Cerceau, room distribution according to his description.

Plan of the hunting castle of Challeau, redrawn based on the plan by Du Cerceau, room distribution according to his description.

29 Plan of the Château de Chambord. Redrawn from Du Cerceau, and De Cotte (BnF gallica, ark: btv1b55005453b). Room distribution after Chatenet.

30 Plan of the Château de Vincennes. Redrawn from a 1668 plan (BnF gallica, ark: btv1b8442516c), tower levels after Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß, 27*. Room distribution after Whiteley, "Importance of the Lodgings," and "La grosse tour de Vincennes."

31 Early design of Chambord, drawing by A. Félibien (c. 1650s) based on a 15th-century model by Domenico Cortona, Scan from the original work: Jean-Pierre, Babelon, *Chateaux de France au siècle de la Renaissance* (Paris: Flammarion, 1989). Image source: Wikimedia Commons. CC0/Public domain.

32 Plan for castle of Romorantin by Leonardo da Vinci. Detail from the *Codex Atlanticus*, fol. 76v. Bibliotheca Ambrosiana Milan. Image taken from, Fig. 7 of Ludwig H. Heydenreich, "Leonardo da Vinci, Architect of Francis I," *The Burlington Magazine* 94, no. 595 (Oct 1952): 277–85.

33 Plan of the Logis Royal, Château de Loches. Redrawn from Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 80. Room distribution after Chatenet, *La cour*, 199 (after a drawing by Mickaël Robert/CESR). Cf. Solveig Boroucher, in Chatenet and De Jonge, eds., *Prince, Princesse, et leur Logis*, 30.
Plan of the Château de Creil, redrawn based on the

plan by Du Cerceau. Room distribution after Mary Whiteley, in Chatenet and De Jonge, eds., *Le Prince, princesse, et leur logis*, 22. Château de Langeais. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Photograph by user sybarite48, licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Plan of the Château de Langeais, redrawn from Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 44. Upper floor, after Martinez and Salch, *Dictionnaire des châteaux et des fortifications du moyen-âge en France* (Strasbourg: Edns Publitotal, 1979), 651.

34 Bird's-eye view of the Castle of Amboise. Engraving from Du Cerceau, *Plus excellents bastiments,* I (1579). Image source: B.N. INHA, coll. J. Doucet, Fol RES 538 (2), pl. 8. Open Licence. Plan of Amboise. Redrawn after De Cotte's, Plan général du château d'Amboise. BnF gallica, ark: btv1b53050259m/f2 and Schreiber, *Poggio Reale*, 16. Room distribution from Chatenet, *La cour*, 160/175/202–3 (after Évelyne Thomas).

35 View of the courtyard of the Castle of Blois. Engraving from Du Cerceau, *Plus excellents bastiments,* I (1579). Image source: B.N. INHA, coll. J. Doucet, Fol RES 538 (2), pl. 4. Open Licence. Plan of the Château de Blois, redrawn based on the plan by Du Cerceau. Room distribution from Chatenet, *La cour*, 164/205 (after C. Langlois). Cf. Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 385–76.

36 Left: Chateaudun, Dunois stairs. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Photograph by user Manfred Heyde licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0. Right: Chateaudun, Longueville wing. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Photograph by user Selbymay, licensed under CC BY 2.0. Plan redrawn from Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 489, and Chatenet, *La cour*, 270 (drawings by M. Robert/CESR).

37 Plan of the Château de Plessis Bourré. Plan redrawn from Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 50. Room distribution after Chatenet, *La cour*, 273.

38 Plan of the Château du Verger, redrawn from Chatenet, *La cour*, 270; after F. Masson/CESR.

39 Plan of the Château de Bury, redrawn based on the plans by Du Cerceau/Viollet-le-Duc. Room distribution after a drawing by M. Robert/CESR, in Chatenet, *La cour*, 274.

40 Plan of the Château de Gaillon. Redrawn based on the plan by Du Cerceau, with room distribution from Chanenet, *La cour*, 266–67 (after a drawing by F. Bardati).

41 Plan of the Château de Bonnivet. Redrawn with room distribution according to Jean Guillaume and Jean Blécon, in Chatenet, *La cour*, 276 (drawing by M. Robert/CESR), and Prinz and Kecks, *Schloss,* 135.

42 Entrance front of Château d'Azay-le-Rideau, Loire. Image source: Wikimedia Commons, photograph by user Manfred Heyde licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0. Desaturated from original. Plan of the Château-d'Azay-le-Rideau, redrawn from Prinz and Kecks, *Schloß*, 114/133.

43 Plan of the Château de Nantouillet. Redrawn from Chatenet, *La cour*, 270 (after Flaminia Bardati).

44 "Boulogne dit Madril." Engraving from Du Cerceau, *Plus excellents bastiments,* I (1576). Image source: B.N. INHA, coll. J. Doucet, Fol RES 538 (1), pl. 16. Open Licence. Plan redrawn after ibid.

45 Painting by Antoine Caron, *La cour de France quittant le château d'Anet* (c. 1570). Black chalk, pen and brown ink, brown wash on paper 32.2 x 48.7 cm. Musee du Louvre, Paris, dép. des Arts graphiques, RF 30624 (reproduction © RMN).

46 "Sainct Mor, Face dedans la cour …." Engraving from Du Cerceau, *Plus excellents bastiments,* I (1579). Image source: B.N. INHA, coll. J. Doucet, Fol RES 538 (2), pl. 28. Open Licence. Plan of Saint-Maur, redrawn after the 1540s project by De l'Orme, *L'architecture* (1576) Vol. I: fol. 17v, and Kitaëff, "Le château de Saint-Maur," 73 and 114.

47 Plan of the Grand Ferrare, redrawn from Sabine Frommel, *Serlio: Architect,* 220–22 (drawing by F. Michalek); based on Serlio's plans.

48 Plan of the Château d'Écouen, redrawn from S. Frommel, *Serlio: Architect,* 173 (after

Jean-Claude Rochette); and Chatenet, *La cour*, 283 (drawing by Mickaël Robert/CESR); based on the plan in Du Cerceau, *Les plus excellents bastiments* (1576).

49 "Anssi le franc, l'élévation du bastiment …." Engraving from Du Cerceau, *Plus excellents bastiments*, I (1576). Image source: B.N. INHA, coll. J. Doucet, FoI RES 538 (1), pl. 55. Open Licence. Plan of Ancy-le-Franc, redrawn reconstruction of final project and room distribution by S. Frommel, *Serlio: Architect*, 172; based on Serlio's different versions.

50 Detail of the Merian map of Paris (1615), showing the castle of the Louvre, and the west facade of the Lescot wing. Image source: BnF Ét. FOL-QB-201, ark: btv1b8401874f.

51 Diagram, authors own.

52 "Palativm regivm in angliae regno appellatvm noncivtz," depicting the Castle of Nonsuch by Joris Hoefnagel (1568), British Museum 1943, 1009.35. Plan of Bridewell and Nonsuch Palaces, redarwn after Simon Thurley, *Royal Palaces of Tudor England*, 41 and 62.

53 "Desseign de l'élévation du chasteau de Villiers-Costeretz …." Engraving from Du Cerceau, *Plus excellents bastiments*, I (1579). Image source: B.N. INHA, coll. J. Doucet, FoI RES 538 (2), pl. 18. Open Licence. Plan redrawn based on the plan by Du Cerceau and with room distribution, after Chatenet, *La cour*, 82/170 (after drawings by M. Robert/CESR and S. Galletti).

54 "Sainct-Germain, faces du dehors …." Engraving from Du Cerceau, *Plus excellents bastiments*, I (1576). Image source: B.N. INHA, coll. J. Doucet, FoI RES 538 (1), pl. 36. Open Licence. Plan of the Château de Saint-Germain-en-Laye, redrawn and with room distribution, in Chatenet, *La cour*, 68/82/143 (after a drawing by J. Blécon/CRAHAM); based on the plan by Du Cerceau.

55 "Fontainebleau, vueus du logis du coste de lestang …." Engraving from Du Cerceau, *Plus excellents bastiments*, I (1579). Image source: B.N. INHA, coll. J. Doucet, FoI RES 538 (2). Open Licence. Plan redrawn from various plans (drawn by Jean Blécon, CRAHAM) by Françoise Boudon and Monique Chatenet, "Logis du Rois," 80–82, reprinted in Chatenet, *La cour*, 169, 175, 180, indicating the varioius building phases.

56 Anton Van der Wyngaerde: Vista del Alcázar de Madrid, 1567. Österreichische National-Bibliothek, Vienna, Cod. Min. 41, http://data.onb.ac.at/rep/1004787F. CC0/Public domain. Plan of the Alcázar de Madrid, reconstructed based on the *Planta superior del Alcázar de Madrid* (c. 1542–c. 1548?), by Gaspar de la Vega(?), Madrid, Archivo general del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Cajón 8, n.7; the *Planta principal del Alcázar y Planta baja del Alcázar* (c. 1626) by Juan Gómez de Mora, Biblioteca Apostólica Vaticana (avail. online at https://investigart.wordpress.com/2016/05/10/dar-luz-a-la-oscuridad-el-alcazar-de-madrid/dsc_0029/; and the *Orthographia del Real Alcázar* (c. 1705) by Teodoro Ardemans. Drawing based on *Alcazar: plan du premier étage* (1711), by Antoine Du Verger (BnF gallica, ark: btv1b530434146).

57 View of the Château-Neuf de Saint-Germain-en-Laye. BnF département Estampes et photographie, EST RES VE-26 (G), ark: btv1b7740407z. Public domain. Plan redrawn by the author after the partial plan and larger site provided in De Cerceau's *Plus excellents bastiments* I (1576), with conjectural room distribution by the author, reconstructed under consideration of esp. the organisation of Henri II's and Catherine de' Medici's double lodging in Amboise, as reconstructed by Évelyne Thomas, pub. in Chatenet, *La cour*, fig. 80.

58 Plan of the Palais des Tuilleries. Redrawn after a plan by Alexandre Gady, "Le Roi, la reine, … et la reine mere," 240; based on the plan in *Les plus excellents Bastiments de France* by Du Cerceau (1579). Room distribution after a drawing by M. Robert/CESR, in Chatenet, *La cour*, 209.

59 Diagram, authors own

60 Diagram, authors own

61 Plan of the Palazzo Pitti, edrawn by the author based on the plans published in Fontaine and Percier's *Plans de plusieurs châteaux, palais et résidences de souverains de France, d'Italie, d'Espagne et de Russie, … gravés par Hibon* (Paris: C. Marquerie fils, 1833), B.N. INHA, NUM FOL GT 33 (2). With room distribution after Waddy, *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces*.

62 Plan of the Palazzo Barberini, redrawn by the author based on the plans published in Fontaine and Percier's *Plans de plusieurs châteaux, palais et résidences de souverains de France, d'Italie, d'Espagne et de Russie, … gravés par Hibon* (Paris: C. Marquerie fils, 1833), pl. 81. B.N. INHA, NUM FOL GT 33 (2). With room distribution after Struck; "Gender and Power," in *Prince, princesse et leur logis*, ed. Chatenet and De Jonge

63 Diagram, authors own.

64 Comparative diagram, authors own.

65 Evolutionary diagram, authors own.

66 Map, authors own. Based on a vector map avail. online at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/87/Europe_1789.svg; 1560s borders based on the map available at http://scrye.com/~station/hist190/map.jpg; and https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2c/Europe_about_1560.jpg.

PART III

1623–1752: The Concretizing System of Appartements. Town Houses and the Discourse on the Art of Distribution

“It is true that for me, architecture, in the very vague analyzes of it that I have been able to conduct, only constitutes an element of support, which ensures a certain distribution of people in space, a *channeling* of their circulation, as well as the coding of the reciprocal relationships. Architecture constitutes therefore not only an element of space, but is precisely thought of as being inscribed in a field of social relations, into which it introduces some specific effects. … If one wanted to do a history of architecture, I think that it should be envisioned along the lines of a general history of *technē* … in the wider sense of the term.”

Michel Foucault, “Space, Knowledge, and Power,” 361ff (modified)

Detail of the Plan Saint-Victor (1615)

3.1
The Co-Evolution of Appartements and the Hôtel

Concerned with the form-taking architecture of appartements within royal palaces, in the last part I deliberately passed over the contemporaneous formation of similar systems or organization in minor residences. I did this to draw out one specific lineage in the genealogy of apartments, concerning the way in which the linear form of organization underlying the *corps de logis* progressively became a certain equipment of power. As we saw, it gained momentum in a historical conjunction of the organizational practice of the *départements de logis* with the status-related notion of *appartenance*, in which the architecture of appartements as hierarchically-organized suites of rooms became a spatial apparatus instrumentalized in its ability to help mark social distinction. Equipped with this reading, we are now in a better position to reel back a bit and take a wider perspective that will weave together the two analytic strands opened up by my first two parts. These addressed the **CONNECTIVE SYNTHESES** in the historical formation of apartments in a crystallizing sense of a more abstract, discursive concept for spatial relations [→PART 1.1], and the **DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESES** through which this notion takes a more concrete form in the spatial segmentarity of the architecture of the linear *corps de logis* [→1.2]. Guided by the notion that sense and segmentary can be said to constitute together the foundational problems in sociology,[1] this longer last part (again comprising three chapters, with three subchapters each) will shift gears to bring these stands together in looking at the **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESES** of apartments, in their concretization as a residential system during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In looking at the evolution of residential space of in France,[2] previous scholarship has sensibly approached the form-taking residential system of appartements in connection to the evolving residential building types in which it took form; namely the Parisian *hôtel*. Traditionally a single-range structure (meaning a building made up of a single row of rooms, with

1 I am referring here to the Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of 'segmentarity,' which in their writing refers to those foundational problems in social theory that "involve basic questions of social stratification and power." See also William Bogard, "Sense and Segmentarity: Some Markers of a Deleuzian-Guattarian Sociology," *Sociological Theory* 16, no.1 (Mar 1998), 52–74.

2 As the following will focus—yet again—on French architecture, one note should be made to the choice of continuing this quite well-studied, even hegemonic, history, rather than devoting my study to similar developments taking place elsewhere in the building practices, forms of living, courtly etiquette, and theoretical debates of neighboring European countries, in order to identify respective cultural differences, and cross-cultural influences. Despite the danger of remaining ignorant to these developments, or downplaying their role within historical developments elsewhere, a deliberate choice for the hegemonic French context lies in the intensity with which this residential system concretizes in both material form (territorialization) and discursive content (coding). It is thanks to this intensity—I would hypothesize—that this system attained its very hegemony position in

windows at both sides of each room), built within the urban fabric on rather constrained plots, this townhouse type has often been characterized in terms of its ideal disposition 'between court and garden.' Already canonized in Corrozet's *Antiquitez, Histoires, et Singularitez de Paris* (1550), this scheme implied placing the main housing block, the *corps de logis*, in the middle of the plot, so that it divided an entrance court accessed from the street, from a garden in the rear half of the plot). Based on this basic arrangement, "the typological evolution of urban residences [in France] follows a distinctly different path," Sabine Frommel notes, compared to other European countries.[3] This path becomes increasingly tangible in the first half of the seventeenth century, when, by contrast, the large aristocratic *appartamenti* of the Florentine Palazzo Pitti, the Roman Palazzi Borghese and Barberini, and the Neapolitan Palazzo Reale were characteristically growing into rather long chains of rooms, sometimes complemented by a second, parallel room range, but always formed in the spatial matrix of freestanding courtyard building types.[4] Within the more constrained conditions surrounding the Parisian townhouse, we note a different kind of transformation, indeed a series of organizational shifts, when its traditionally linear space morphs into a more matrix-like structure with parallel ranges of rooms.

In itself, this typological transformation of the *hôtel* has been well surveyed in a vast field of studies covering many books and articles that either visually convey the history of the most prestigious and luxurious mansions and their changing styles, including the many monographic studies of their architects, or analyse and theorize more comprehensively the characteristic elements and typological evolution of these buildings.[5] The evolution

European culture (including contemporary Western art-history); in a process that must then be problematized from a genetic point of view. Here, I hope my respective findings and attempts to reconfigure this discourse can be generalized to some extent, by being both integrated and differentiated in further studies of these developing socio-spatial systems in neighboring contexts.

3 Sabine Frommel "Gli Hotels particuliers a Parigi dal XV," *Bolletino d'arte, volume speciale* (2016), 392–418. See also Myra Nan Rosenfeld, "Les origines de l'hôtel français de la Renaissance," *Cahiers de l'Association internationale des études francaises* 23 (1971): 45–50.

4 See here esp. Patricia Waddy, *Seventeenth-Century Roman Palaces: Use and the Art of the Plan* (New York/Cambridge: Architectural History Foundation/MIT Press, 1990).

5 Such descriptions of great houses have a long history—discussed later—that dates back even beyond Henri Sauval, seventeenth-century work, *Histoire et recherches des antiquités de la ville de Paris*, 3 vols (Paris: Moêtte/Chardon, 1724). For recent studies, see Olivier Blanc and Joachim Bonnemaison, *hôtels particuliers de Paris* (Paris: Terrail, 1998), trans. as *Mansions of Paris* (Paris: Terrail, 1998); and Alexandre Gady, *Les hôtels particuliers de Paris du moyen âge à la belle époque* (Paris: Parigramme, 2011; orig. pub. 2008).

of the classic *hôtel* type after 1600 was outlined in Jean-Pierre Babelon's classic study on Parisian residences,[6] after which the earlier origins were further elucidated by David Thomson, who centered on the earlier formative period of the *hôtel* from Gothic to early Renaissance houses and aristocratic buildings from 1475–1600.[7] The most comprehensive typological study of the evolution of the *hôtel* as an evolving spatial *dispositif* in the urban fabric of Paris was offered by Michael Dennis's *Court and Garden*. It valuably isolates the successive basic morphological types (a renaissance 'prototype,' a baroque, rococo, and neoclassical type) with their differing internal organization,[8] and an evolutionary account that I want to update and develop further from a more non-linear angle ⊠². Concerning this form-taking *dispositif*, Bettina Köhler reviewed the development of the *bâtiment particulier* between 1600–1750 in its closer connection to evolving legal notions of planning.[9] She thus provided a first detailed analysis of the discursive codification of the townhouse in French planning literature and architectural theory (hitherto studied in an isolated manner). Her study identified apartments as a prominent subject in a 'discourse on the art of distribution,' within which their organization is incrementally instituted as a highly-differentiated and socially-coded spatial system consisting of various sorts of suites and their more functionally-specific rooms and connection structures—a residential system most explicitly discussed by Richard Etlin.[10]

To understand this residential system, it is of course necessary to have a basic notion of these spaces as inhabited, lived spaces, contemporary modes of living, and spatial practices. Historian Peter Thornton had initially objected that "architectural historians have tended to think [the planning of houses] in primarily spatial terms" to the cost of helping "understand how

6 Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Demeures parisiennes sous Henri IV et Louis XIII* (Paris: Hazan, 1991; orig. pub. 1965).

7 David Thomson, *Renaissance Paris: Architecture and Growth 1475–1600* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1984).

8 Michael Dennis, *Court and Garden: From the French hôtel to the City of Modern Architecture* (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 1986)

9 See the doctoral dissertation of Bettina M. Köhler (1993), publ. as *Die Stadt Paris und das Wohnhaus: Zum 'Bâtiment Particulier' in der französischen Architekturtheorie von 1600–1750* (Alfter: VDG, 1994).

10 See Richard Etlin, "'Les Dedans': Jacques-François Blondel and the System of the Home c. 1740," *Gazette des Beaux-Arts* 91 (Apr 1978): 137–47; this text was further developed as Chapter 5, "The System of the Home," in id., *Symbolic Space: French Enlightenment Architecture and its Legacy* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1996), 127–35. See also the studies by Reed Benhamou, "Planning for Privacy: Zoning in Jacques-François Blondel's Maisons de Plaisances," in *Public Space of the Domestic Sphere*, ed. Servanne Woodward et al. (London/Ontario: Mestengo/Univ. of Western Ontario, 1997), [1–10]; avail. online at https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/frenchebooks/2.



2 Synthetic diagram illustrating the basic morphological evolution of the Parisian *hôtel*. Critically adapted, after Dennis, based on my own work.

the[y] … were supposed to be used."[11] Since then, much work has been undertaken in exactly this direction: to study architectural transformations in terms of the changing modalities of use, and changing functionality of rooms distributed in the architect's plan. Via Philippe Ariés's ground-laying work, scholars inclined to social history have begun to valuably complement these more typological analyses of the *hôtel* as a residential space with more praxeological approaches to these changing residential and planning practices. Scholars including Monique Eleb, Anne Debarre and Katie Scott have all studied this transformation in the more sociological and psychological terms of a search for comfort, privacy, intimacy, and ostentation,[12] resulting in

11 Peter Thornton, *Seventeenth-Century Interior Decoration in England, France, and Holland* (New York: Yale UP, 1978); cited after Nicolas Courtin, *L'art d'habiter à Paris au XVIIe siècle: L'ameublement des hôtels particuliers* (Paris: Faton, 2011), [5].

12 See here esp. Philippe Aries, Georges Duby, and Roger Chartier, eds., *History of Private Life, Vol. III: Passions of the Renaissance*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993); and Monique Eleb and Anne Debarre-Blanchard, *L'architectures privée: Maisons et mentalités, XVIIe–XIXe siècles* (Brussels: Archives d'architecture moderne, 1989). For a discussion of the emerging notion of residential space in relation to 'intimacy'—the supposed "superlative of the word interior." Here after Eleb, "L'habitation entre vie privée et vie publique," in *Logement et habitat: l'état des saviors*, ed. Marion Segaud, Catherine Bonvalet, and Jacques Brun (Paris: Éditions la découverte, 1998), 68–74; see also Eleb and Debarre, *Architectures de la vie privée*, 187ff; and esp. the thematic study by Annik

changing modes of inhabitation, and internal organization and social function of these residential spaces. It is this praxeological lens on changing planning and dwelling practices, and their relation to a variety of contemporary innovations in cultural and spatial technologies, that serves as the basic framework of more recent studies. These revisit how (or why), as Nicolas Courtin notes, with the advances made in residential planning around the middle of the seventeenth century, a new residential life style [*art de vivre*] arose.[13] Aside from both complementing and critically updating earlier analyses with new archival findings, recent scholarship has also more successfully reconsidered these transforming planning practices through the underlying discursive exchanges and their long-neglected cross-cultural influences, which Frommel, especially, has foregrounded.[14]

Yet, these interdependent changes are highly complex, and the praxeological approach to archival documents has its limitations, since as Courtin has recently re-emphasized, any generic room label like '*chambre*' or even more specific ones like '*chambre de parade*' indicated in plans or inventories, do not really tell us what actually took place in them, how they were used on a daily basis, and requires much interpretation. Methodologically speaking, this interpretative problem may be even bigger, I would argue, based on the notion that a problem always merits the solution it deserves depending on how it is posed. For as I have explained in my preliminaries, we ought to let ourselves be reminded by Nietzsche's genealogical argument that even the most perfect understanding of the use of any thing is no explanation for its emergence. Changing uses, residential practices and modes of living are not really an explanation for those changing architectural arrangements with which they co-evolve, and which give social relations a concrete physical reality. Reposing this problem precisely as a larger problem, may open research in a new direction.

As an object of study, however, the Parisian town has been subject of several disciplinary divides, as Natacha Coquery notes in her study of the

Pardailhé-Galabrun, *La Naissance de l'intime: 3000 foyers parisiens, XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles* (Paris: PUF, 1988), trans. as *The Birth of Intimacy: Privacy and Domestic Life in Early Modern Paris* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. For a more recent study, see the article by Frédéric Lemerle, "L'émergence de l'hôtel particulier à Paris: Entre ostentation et intimité" in *Marquer la ville: Signes, traces, empreintes du pouvoir (XIIIe-XVIe siècle)*, ed. Patrick Boucheron and Jean-Philippe Genet (Paris/Rome: Édns de la Sorbonne, 2013), avail. online at http://books.openedition.org/psorbonne/3262. For Scott's interior-design related study work, see Katie Scott, *The Rococo Interior: Decoration and Social Spaces in Early Eighteenth-Century Paris* (New Haven/London: Yale UP, 1995).

13 Courtin, *L'Art d'habiter à Paris.*

14 See here for instance Frommel's abovementioned study.

hôtel: "in the history of art, the hôtel has been understood as an architectural object …; in urban history, it was more often analyzed in its relation to space …; in social history, it became the frame of aristocratic life," but these aspect are yet to be brought together in a more dynamic reading that, in addition, understands the evolving *hôtel* more integrally as an unfolding economic structure.[15] In the following I hope to answer to this call, and move some steps further in this integral reading, by attending more closely to the historical formation of appartements as a residential system in its connection to the development of a new residential planning practices outlined in the ART OF DISTRIBUTION, in which French architecture theorists elevated the aspect of distribution (*quae graece* οἰκονομία *dicitur*, as Vitruvius argued) into the first principle of architecture. Thus, I shall argue, we arrive at a fuller understanding of the complex modalities of socio-spatial production that come together in the fabrication of the system that it constitutes. Lefebvre's dictum that "(social) space is a (social) product" still holds, but it does not mean that the practices that shape spaces are not themselves by-products. A residential building is never really fully adapted to an inhabitant's specific use, as some scholars seem to presume; it is something designed or laid out by an architect who is adopting a rather generic collective pattern of (continuously evolving) uses, and adapting them to a specific site and a specific set of personal, or ongoing social, aesthetic, and technological developments. As both architects and inhabitants adopt and adapt wider social patterns, they also adapt to their habitat by adopting planning/living habits shaped by its specific organization. Changing uses, residential practices, mentalities and spaces, are thus mutually constitutive.

Part of this mutuality presupposes the multiple layers of social, spatial technics, but also technologies in the widest sense possible, that, intercalated into this process, structure and operate it. Because planning techniques and respective architectural/technological modes of thinking have always evolved in direct connection with other evolving technics, arts, and sciences, and the related implicit or explicit knowledge systems for ordering the world. Here, a further task lies waiting, which consists in helping not only illustrate the *generic* correspondences between social, spatial, and epistemological patterns (as I shall show), but also making a step toward a more *genetic* understanding of this reciprocally-determinant historical transformation, and

15 For a study recontextualizing the hôtel in terms of aristocratic status consumption, and economic mentalities, see Natacha Coquery, *L'hôtel aristocratique: Le marché du luxe à Paris au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Édns de la Sorbonne, 1998), avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k33285692. Here ibid., 14 (my trans).

its constitutive concatenations of various machines, meaning the ways in which this machinic assemblage came to be. The machinic concatenation must thus be reconstructed at the intersection of environmental, social, and psychological dynamisms, and the tangible organizations they co-constitutively form through reciprocally-determinant cognitive, social, and s patial practices; habits, habitus, and habitats; arts of living (i.e. using space) and residential planning (i.e. producing space), related mentalities and knowledge systems; social, spatial/architectural, and mental/psychological/cognitive territorialization processes, and how they come to be discursively-codified within a larger **INDIVIDUATING** residential system.

In relying heavily on the analytical work conducted and examples used in these previous studies, in the following part I intend to achieve two complementary things in this regard: on the one hand, in reviewing and connecting these older typological studies of the evolution of the French *hôtel,* accounting for recent findings, this part hopes will serve as a wider and thoroughgoing update of some lines of thought made in these canonical studies. On the other hand, this critical update lies in the way these studies are drawn together in a new way, in a more explicitly topological approach to the co-evolving residential system of appartements within the Parisian *hôtel* type, and in it a concretizing new socio-spatial form of organizing and planning residential space. This, I will show, requires that we approach this system not just from the isolating angle of changing spatial and cultural practices, nor just typologically, but also more epistemologically. The central and latter chapters of this part will attend more closely to the formation of appartements as a discursive subject, that arises and starts to take a more concrete architectural form when the matter of the proper organization (i.e the social coding and related territorializing) of residential space incrementally arises within the proliferating disciplinary discourses of the seventeenth century.

This is the discourse on the art of distribution, in which a specific discursive system comes to be elaborated alongside transforming architectural (i.e. cultural and spatial/material) practices (which are articulated in both codings and territorializations) elaborated at the same time. For understanding this process in a more genetic manner, it is then necessary to analyze these two discursive and non-discursive lineages together, so as to reveal those co-constitutive relations that gave rise to a novel **MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE** system, and map how this system came to be **DOUBLY-ARTICULATED** and concretized through a series of transformations during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries.

3.1.1 Revisiting the Formation of the *Hôtel*

Unfortunately, the historical formation of appartements and their progressive development into a residential system has remained a more or less implicit element of these analyses, being reduced to an arrangement resulting either from the changing architecture of the *hôtel*, or changing modes of inhabitation. To analyze the formation of this system emerging at the intersection of these changes, in the following I hope to bring these partly disjointed and divergent morphological (formal) and praxeological (social) analytical angles closer together and critically extend them by way of an assemblage-theoretic reading. I will reconsider these transformations from a much more topological perspective that foregrounds the recompositions (or 'molecular revolution') that underlie these transformations. Taking the analytical angle of a recomposition, I argue, is particularly relevant not only for understanding this evolving residential system from a more integrally-combined social/cultural and spatial/architectural perspective, but also for reconsidering these new modes of living in their relation to fundamentally changing ways of thinking. We can thus more sufficiently account for the both epistemological and technological dimension of planning. This, I argue, is relevant for more fully understanding this concretizing system for organizing residential space as the genesis of a highly integrated **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLE**, an assemblage that can only be mapped as an ongoing recomposition of social, environmental, and mental ecologies by way of reconfiguring material milieus that in turn resigularize ways of thinking and discourse about them.

In mapping this recomposition, the following will then take a more complex approach in the aim to demonstrate that this central metamorphosis of the *corps de logis* into an organizational logic entirely alien to French residential design conceptions, greatly disturbed the inherited planning logic of the *hôtel* as a single-range structure with sequentially-organized spaces. Fostered by fundamentally changing conceptions of residential space , it was this disturbance—upsetting and rendering useless the old logic of organizing residential space—that called for an entirely novel conception based on which a new rationale for planning had to be established. This, I will show, happens as a material-discursive reconfiguration process that must be drawn together in its multiple connections between experimental practices in architectural design and systems of though within architectural theory. From this angle, we can better understand how—on an abstract machinic level—this organizational system was eventually coming to concretize as a more multi-linear alternative to the traditionally linear logic of the *corps de logis,*

while—on a concrete technical level—architectural arrangements came to be re-conceptualized and newly instrumentalized as a cultural technique (and bio-political technology) for drawing distinctions at the same time. In looking at this concretizing system more synthetically, this concluding part of my genealogy of apartments will also be extending and complementing, and thereby substantiating some of the last part's theoretical views, by generalizing this arising instrumentality from a wider sociological and technological point of view. This generalization is not the point of contribution nor potential contestation of this analysis, in the sense that it assumes architecture as a social technology; I believe my own contribution to lie rather in the way my study encompassingly extends this technological reading of architectural arrangements in a way that largely transgresses (and contests) earlier readings of this concretizing system and how this process takes form in the *hôtel*-type as an architectural arrangement.

With the abovementioned aim to more closely connect the (architectural) territory to the (social) code it implies, this more multi-directional approach wants to help move beyond the often structuralist reading of the 'introverted' disposition[16] (or dispositif) of the Parisian town house, namely as corresponding to its status "as a dwelling reserved for the quasi-exclusive use of a family leading a certain lifestyle," as Jean-Pierre Babelon writes, namely one of a "*vie particulier*" for which the arrangement of the *hôtel* offers a functional framework.[17] Norbert Elias famously interpreted these town houses as indicating a particular social structure.[18] He identified a close connection in their organization to older feudal castles in the countryside, which for him symptomatizes the weaker bond their inhabitants have to urban life than other, professional citizens, because of the stronger ties to their manorial homelands and fiefdoms.[19] This manorialism, and the fiefs in their possession from which they gained both their income from land tenure and certain positions of power, qualified them as having a certain status (*état*) that set the high-born gentry (*gens/gentil*) apart as a different race (*genus*) from the common people (*peuple*). As Elias points out, we should remember that the notion that people, regardless of rank, were equal, was "entirely alien" to the medieval and pre-modern age with its organization into estates. This thinking in terms of estates as qualitatively different social strata was directly

16 Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 118.
17 Babelon, *Demeures parisiennes*, 132 (my trans.).
18 Norbert Elias, *The Court Society*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), esp. 41–65.
19 Ibid., 44–45.

expressed in the traditional lexicographical system of distinguishing residential buildings according to three 'genres' that corresponded to the different classes: the *palais* of the royal family, the *hôtels* of the nobility, and the *maisons,* or ordinary houses.[20]

On the Particularity of the Hôtel Particulier

Jean-Pierre Babelon has highlighted that the designation 'hôtel', from its medieval meaning of the urban habitations of the monarch and the nobility, was indeed only gradually extended to lesser houses.[21] Still in the early seventeenth century, he writes, while the principal residences of the members of the monarchy were coming to be designated as 'palaces,' the denomination '*hôtel*' remained reserved largely for the aristocracy, and one would distinguish the town houses of those belonging to the upper echelons of society (the clergy and the nobility) from the dwellings of persons that were not members of the nobility proper. But with the introduction of a *noblesse des lettres* under François I, and the legal recognition of a *noblesse de robe* in 1600, and with the incremental institution of venal offices given to ennobled members of the Third Estate, this distinction progressively weakened. Given the somewhat arbitrary nature of and changes to this coding, the term 'hôtel' itself can be employed more freely without introducing an anachronism, as it helps emphasize certain architectural invariances in the evolution of not just a building type but also a specific functional ensemble within a wider socio-spatial transformation process.

What cannot be used indiscriminately, however, it is the later notion of the so-called *hôtel particulier*, which requires much more precision to not be misapplied in an anachronistic and moreover typologically reductive fashion. This is because the French notion of *le particulier* is a particularly complex one: while it implies a sense of 'being apart,' it cannot be reduced to the modern notion of some separate or freestanding house for an individual,' personal or private owner. Its 'particular' meaning is closer to a sense of distinction in which, even today, the 'particular' is what is not 'common.' However, it is not to be conflated with the special status of the high-born nobility. Whereas it implies a certain sense of social status, the *particulier* is not a person of rank (*personne de qualité* or *personne de distinction*); it signifies instead belonging

20 I am sticking here with the contemporary term and avoid resorting to the modern conception of classes/classifications, as below this **STRATOANALYSIS** will be progressively touching on the subsequent processes where the generative notion of gen(e)re was going to be transvalued and superseded by a more generic notion of classes and types.

21 Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 131.

to a group of people who were characterized in turn by their belongings, property, or ownership, which sets them apart from those commoners who hardly ever had the luxury of privacy. Instead, the *hôtel* is primarily a collective space, a residential facility housing a number of people and heterogeneous occupants ranging from the principle inhabitants and their family members down to the service staff and domestics of lower social status accommodated here as part of its machinery. As such a facility, it forms a specific social **MILIEU** that—in spite of the formal closure of its court form—is better understood in terms of an open, relational, system; in short, as a particular assemblage, which produces the *particulier* or anything particular in general. In contrast to the upper and lower social strata, these *particuliers* formed an intermediary socio-economic stratum of financiers and ennobled officials. The relative wealth of the *particuliers* alone did not compensate for their differences in status vis-à-vis the nobility, however, as wealth was not the defining factor of the latter. Instead, it was a feudal power derived from holding lands in the countryside—where their family's name-giving primary residence was located—and from which they drew revenue. Their status, like that of the aristocracy as a social group, was tied to and expressed itself in a specific status-oriented consumption of power, or **STATUS-CONSUMPTION**. In this context, the building of a secondary urban residence, a town house near the King's palace, was traditionally one of the means to be close to court, participate in its activities, and facilitate related business with and entertainment of peers. Aside from accommodating more or less temporary or permanent residents, it also hosted an entire apparatus of services to facilitate this residential organization. As a means to enable this form of status-consumption and thus express one's membership to this social group, the *hôtel* is thus not only a collective facility, but also already a **COLLECTIVE EQUIPMENT OF POWER**, an assemblage based on a particular organization of the domestic sphere into a system of interdependencies and hierarchies: configured not only in spatial terms (in its internal organization into a sequence of rooms) but primarily in socio-spatial ones, both in its territorialization and its coding.

It is this rather general dispositif of socio-spatial relationships between heterogeneous components integrated into a functional ensemble, which came to be recomposed as it became incrementally reconfigured toward (and re-codified as) a system of particularly-organized functional relations. This systemic recomposition—I argue—is a co-constitutive and differentiating factor in the historical formation of a wider social figuration (i.e., court society) and socio-technical assemblage (i.e., architectural discourse), without which the concretizing system of appartements cannot be understood; at

least not from a genetic (i.e. processual, not structural, thus non-totalizing, non-exclusive, and anti-essentialist) perspective.

The Early Evolution the *Hôtel Particulier*, 1400s–1540s

If we want to briefly recapitulate the early typological evolution of the Parisian town house, we are quickly faced with the problem that most of the early town houses that could illustrate this process, have unfortunately not survived the repeated restructurings of the urban fabric. In other cities, too, few examples of older town house structures remain; the most notable is the Hôtel Jacques Cœur [3] (b. 1443–56) in Bourges.[22] Among those that have survived in Paris, we find the Hôtel des Archevêques de Sens [4] (b. 1475–1518 for archbishop Tristan de Salazar) in the Marais.[23] Like the partly-surviving Hôtel de Clisson (c. 1375) it had a rather defensive appearance with its turreted entrance gate. Its plan has been reconstructed conjecturally. The irregularity of this plan already evidences "many pointers to future developments," as Thomson writes,[24] especially in the attempts to axially align the gate with the *corps de logis*, which is in the position between court and garden that would become the normative arrangement for town houses. The upper floor is more difficult to reconstruct. Gaignière's aerial view indicated that the largest room of the principal floor may have been above the *remise*, thus probably giving access to two *chambres*, one above the *scalier*, and one in the side-wing above the stables, with a view toward the garden.

This disposition is similarly found in the Hôtel des Abbés de Cluny [5] (reb. 1471–98, ext. 1500–10 for Jacques d'Amboise, the youngest brother of the cultural influencer Georges d'Amboise, who would built the Château de Gaillon in 1501–6), with its flamboyant Gothic style.[25] The *corps de logis* was bisected by a central staircase tower that led onto a central *salle*, from which the principal apartment—consisting of the rooms located to the right of the stair to the gallery—could be accessed.[26] The official rooms on the left led to

22 Regarding the dates, I follow Frommel.

23 For the Hôtel de Sens, I rely on the description in Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 38–43, as based on Charles Sellier, *Anciens hôtels de Paris: nouvelles recherches historiques, topographiques et artistiques* (Paris: Champion, 1910), avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k56529899; with partly corrected dating based on M. Troche, "Notice historique sur l'hôtel de Sens ancienne résidence a Paris des archevêques de Sens," *Revue Archéologique* 4, no. 1 (1847): 146–63, avail. online at http://www.jstor.org/stable/41745622.

24 Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 43.

25 For the Hôtel de Cluny, see Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 43–50; based on Charles Normand, *L'hôtel de Cluny* (Paris, 1988); cf. Frommel, "Gli hôtels particulier," 395. He identifies a more Italian disposition in the hall being flaked by two square rooms.

26 Frommel has highlighted the Italian disposition of a hall flanked by two square rooms (Frommel, "Gli hôtels particulier," 395). Cf. the traditional disposition of 15th to 16th-cen-

the chapel (located above the open loggia seen in plan). The Hôtel Le Gendre ☒[5] (c.1506 for royal treasurer Pierre le Gendre) stood alongside a group of aristocratic residences near the Louvre.[27] The plan of the house, both workplace and residence, features a rather deep main block. Here we see two adjacent *salles*, oriented longitudinally and thus rotated by 90 degrees compared to the traditional transversal arrangement of rooms in the *corps de logis simple*. Instead, we see the beginning of a new organization of deeper building blocks, the *corps de logis (semi-)double,* with a (partial or) continuous central dividing wall. This organization is still limited to two (work) rooms (probably a *chambre* and *cabinet*). Offering a comprehensive account of the evolution of aristocratic residences is complicated by the fact that only a few of the many residences built were historically documented.[28]

Some other buildings in other cities partly bridge the gap, such as the Hôtel de Than (c.1527 for Thomas Morel) and d'Escoville (b.1533–40) in the City of Caen, the Hôtel d'Haussonville (b. 1528–43) in Nancy, or the Hôtel d'Assézat (b.1555–57 by Nicolas Bachelier) in Toulouse,[29] but usually we see different characteristics arising in these. For the evolving Parisian type, Thomson highlights the importance of the Hôtel de Neufville ☒[6] (later Longueville, beg. 1519), the plan of which survives in the form of its later extension.[30] We find the original disposition in the series of a *salle*—accessed via the external *vis*—a secondary *chambre* to one side, and a suite of rooms to the other. In the latter (having probably consisted of *chambre à parer* and *chambre*, connected to a secondary stair, with backrooms and the gallery), we still clearly recognize the configuration of the *corps de logis* of châteaux.

tury French châteaux, as outlined in my Part II, and the alignment and dis/symmetrization of the two apartments.

27 For the Hôtel le Gendre, see Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 50–59. The building was documented by Viollet-le-Duc and Lenoir before its destruction in the *quartier des halles* in the 1841. See also André Chastel, "Les vestiges de l'hôtel Le Gendre et le véritable hôtel de la Trémoïlle," *Bulletin Monumental* 124, no.2 (1966), 129–65.

28 Thomson argued that there was a larger gap from the 1540–1600s (Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 104ff); while many of the great residences have not survived, this gap can be partly patched up by some monographic studies that have since been conducted. From a genetic view the greater gap concerns those before 1540, especially those building built on smaller *lotissements*.

29 See Bruno Tollon, "Hôtels de Toulouse," in *Congrès archéologique de France* (Paris: Société française d'archéologie, 2002).

30 Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 67–8. It was built on the site of the dilapidated Hôtel d'Alençon, divided in the 1470s into the *grand* and *petit* Hôtel d'Alençon. It was the latter which Trésorier de France Nicolas II [not I] de Neufville, seigneur de Villeroy, rebuilt in 1519. A part of the vast property was acquired around 1581 by Marie de Bourbon Saint-Pol, duchesse de Longueville, who had it further renovated. See Alfred Fierro, *Dictionnaire du Paris disparu* (Paris: Parigramme, 2003), via https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/hôtel_d'Alençon; see also M.J. De Gaulle, *Histoire de Paris et de ses Environs* (Paris: Pourrat frères, 1839), 246–8; avail. online at https://books.google.nl/books?id=ZVhfAAAAcAAJ.

3 | 4 EARLY ARISTOCRATIC TOWNHOUSES:
***This page*, floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel Jacques Cœur, in Bourges.**
Level +01

***Opposite page*, conjectural floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel des Archevêques de Sens, in Paris.**
Level +01

R. de la Mortellerie
R. des Figuiers


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5 | 6 EARLY ARISTOCRATIC TOWNHOUSES II:
***This page left*, floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel des Abbés de Cluny (*shown above*) in Paris, reb. 1471–98, extended in 1500–10, for Jacques d'Amboise.**
Level +01

***This page right*, the residence built c. 1506 for royal treasurer Pierre le Gendre.**
Level +01

***Opposite page*: floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Neufville, later Longueville (*shown above*), beg. in 1519 in close proximity to the Louvre.**
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




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On the Lotissements

One modernizing condition for the sixteenth-century Parisian town house appeared during the 1540–50s with the so-called *lotissements*. These were schemes for selling lots on larger sites cleared for re-development. The building lands available in the medieval urban fabric were organically-shaped, irregular plots; the *lotissements*, by contrast, were characterized by wider streets and more regular patterns of rectangular plots arranged in a grid-like pattern. Concerning the evolution of the town house, the more regular layout of both the street plan and the buildings themselves had a more or less direct influence the organization of its interior spaces. On this point, several architecture-historical scholars have discussed the *lotissement* as a crucial factor in the morphological and typological evolution of the Parisian town house.

Other scholars have underscored the role of the *lotissement* as a key economic factor in the urban development of Paris. In themselves, these development schemes originated in the practice of selling off and subdividing unwanted royal town houses. As Babelon has pointed out, the very idea of a possible alienation of royal lands had only slowly taken hold in the fifteenth century, along with the sale of multiple smaller properties.[31] It was during the mid-1540s that the *lotissements* attained a new scale, with the sale of royal town houses such as the Hôtel de Flandre and the Hôtel de Saint-Pol (in 1543), as well as holdings in underdeveloped and otherwise commercially unsuccessful lands.[32] As Thomson points out, these alienations initially served as a means for financing contemporary warfare. Another example was the Hôtel de Tournelles, ☒[7a] which was abandoned and disposed of by Catherine de' Medici after Henri II had died there in 1559. In the related development proposal, Thomson finds the first beginnings of a coherent town planning practice, even if those plans are not comparable to the urban plans set by later sovereigns toward an encompassing 'embellishment' of the city as a whole.[33] They were instead quite pragmatic reactions to circumstances, yet they had wider causal effects in conjunction with other practical needs.

The city's population had been growing steadily during the sixteenth century to 275–340.000 inhabitants by 1550,[34] much of whom settled outside

31 Jean-Pierre Babelon, "Histoire de l'architecture au XVIIe siècle," in *École pratique des hautes études: 4e section, Sciences historiques et philologiques* (1970–71), 537–43, avail. online at www.persee.fr/doc/ephe_0000-0001_1970_num_1_1_5503.

32 Ibid., 8 and 30–33. Thomson here points out the direct correlation of Francois I's war declaration against Emperor Charles V, and the selling and division of various royal hotels.

33 Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 36.

34 Here, I rely on the (partly inconsistent) demographic data based on Dupâquier's *Histoire de la population française*, avail. online at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paris_in_the_17th_century; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Paris; https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/

7(A-D) THE LOTISSEMENT: Urban development of the Coûture Sainte–Cathérine in 1530 (*top*), 1550 (*bottom*), c.1552 (*overleaf, top*), and the 1650s (*overleaf, bottom*)



the city gates. The Royal Ordinance of 23 November 1548 had (for various purposes, including security issues and taxation) interdicted all new constructions beyond the city wall, in the *faubourgs*.[35] This interdiction increased an already existing demand for available building land within the city's perimeters. As such, the selling of properties was a great solution to accommodate the landed nobility looking to settle in Paris.[36] Historical studies have long identified these alienations of royal lands as the initiating point of a series of projects intended to "attract those with means," including the *nouveaux riches* consisting of lawyers, treasurers and royal favorites, to whom the plots were sold or leased for maximum profit.[37]

In forming a differentiating grid for fostering and regulating urban development, the *lotissements* thus present a specific dispositif tied to a wider socio-economic and territorial restructuring that can be situated in a historical lineage with (or parallel to) the processes of enclosure that began at this time in England, where previously common land came to be incrementally appropriated by and assigned to legal landowners with exclusive right of use. But aside from this parceling aspect of the *lotissement* and the resulting grid-structures, there are many obvious characteristic differences, the most evident being that they concern about urban, not rural land. We could argue that although it involves a formally similar process of gridding, we are talking rather about the reverse process, as—in contrast to the British phenomenon—the *lotissement* was based on a practice of alienating parceled land holdings cut loose by the French crown and church. This alienation did not result in any exclusion process or exclusionary use, however, but in a strategic inclusion (=INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION) that generated a specific double bind by means of which urban production and development came to be relegated onto private individuals, while also establishing a new guiding legal framework that incrementally regulated building activities in turn.

To understand this binding relation in more assemblage-theoretic terms, it is necessary to look more closely into the relations shaped by the larger scale of the *lotissement*—as a transformative apparatus, as the social/organizational system of the household, as the spatial/architectural system of rooms constituting the apartment, as a nested dispositif. Given that with the apartment, the house, and the plot we are talking about three differently-

Population_des_villes_européennes_vers_1600. Thomson's estimate of a million inhabitants by 1577 is exaggerated. Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 35.

35 Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 33–35; also Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 58.

36 Frommel, "Gli hôtels particulier," 393.

37 Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 8 and 32.

scaled yet directly interdependent forms and organizations, it is easy to predict the regularizing effect that this interdependency (as a constraint) will have on the evolving system of appartements. It is more complicated to arrive at an understanding of this dispositif as a 'developmental niche,' which I am attempting here. Therein this interdependency acts as an enabling constraint for the reciprocally-determinant assemblage of co-evolving systems. To do so, an important factor may be found in the fact that these planning practices were, from the start, based on a system of socio-spatial distinction; a system that becomes visible, for instance, in the distribution and scalar differentiation of smaller plots (intended for shop houses) along the busier streets and larger plots (for *hôtels*) in the more remote areas. Extending Coquery's aforementioned argument, I want to demonstrate that one primary binding factor connecting the three integrated systems is indeed the notion of economy, understood as that longstanding notion of economy that was synonymous with the problem of distribution, which as Vitruvius wrote, is what the Greeks called "*oikonomia,*" the nomological organization of the *oikos* as a habitat. Based on this notion we can reconsider the regulating aspects in this historical formation, and the emerging planning system, in organizational and territorial terms of an affective control of flows. To do so, the remainder of this first part [→ 3.1.1] will initially map out the increasing influence that the *lotissement* gained on helping regularize the internal structure of the house into a specific dispositif.

A Newly-Regular Arrangement (or Two), 1540s–60s

The system of the *lotissement* attained a new scale when the practice of creating revenue from land holdings was also taken up by the church.[38] In 1545, the priory of Sainte-Catherine du Val-des-Écoliers, having come under financial pressure, decided to follow François I's example, alienating more than 3 hectares of cultured land (*coûture*) in a marshy area just outside the ancient walls of Philippe-Auguste. This site would become the starting point of the Marais district's development as a veritable hot spot where many of

38 Historians have rightfully underscored the greater importance of the church on the urban development of Paris. It is worthwhile noting that such developments of lands held by the church would prove particularly important for the understanding of the emergence of flatted forms of living for the middling sort of people, and the taller tenement buildings that — both mitigating and exploiting the accommodation pressures for the lower ranks — appeared near the main urban throughways. But this process deserves to be discussed on its own terms, namely in a forthcoming genealogy of apartment houses and housing. To conclude our analysis of the genealogy of the segmentary space of appartements with this Part III, we will first stay closer to the differentiated residential systems within the emerging baroque hôtels and the formation of distributive planning practices.

Henri II's and Henri III's courtiers and office holders would build their great residences lining the present rue des Francs-Bourgeois.[39] ⊠7A–D

Here, one of the first — if not the first — regular structures situated between court and garden in Paris[40] was realized: the paradigmatic Hôtel de Ligneris ⊠8 (later called Carnavalet; b. 1547–60, by a court architect, probably Pierre Lescot, for an important nobleman of the robe: Jacques de Ligneris, president of the Parisian *Parlement*).[41] His acquisition of five adjacent parcels (each 8×15 *toises*, i.e. 600 *toises carrée* = 2350 sqm) allowed him to build a residence fitting his rank. The building, built at a noticeable moment of modernization in French residential design, which as has often been noted, arose from the transmission of Italian planning practices, has been long recognized as one of the most original contributions to French architecture: having gained a greater influence on the planning of private residences, Lescot's original design (transmitted only indirectly through Jean Marot's engravings, which show later adaptations[42]) had first been reconstructed by Babelon; a reconstruction to which historians like Leproux, Gady, and Frommel have recently suggested some minor revisions that contest the false modernity

39 See Béatrice de Andia and Alexandre Gady, eds., *La rue des Francs-Bourgeois au Marais* (Paris: Délégation à l'action artistique de la Ville de Paris, 1992); esp. the introductory essays by Alexandre Gady, Jean-Claude Garreta, and Robert-Henry Bautier, in ibid., 32–37, 38–43, 44–49, respectively. For the sake of clarity, I will be ignoring the historically-changing names of the streets.

40 Jean-Pierre Babelon, *Nouvelle Histoire de Paris: Paris au XVIe siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1986), 344–9.

41 Bernard de Montgolfier, "L'hôtel et le musée Carnavalet," in *Rue des Francs-Bourgeois*, ed. Andia and Gady, 180–203. For a recent monograph on Lescot, see also Jean-Marie Pérouse de Montclos, *Pierre Lescot, 1515–1578: Architecte du roi & de la Pléiade* (Paris: Picard, 2018).

42 The original appearance of one of the most richly-decorated private houses in Paris and most original has survived through Marot's collection of plans. Jean Marot, *L'Architecture française, ou Plans … des églises, palais, hôtels et maisons particulières de Paris* (Paris: s.n., s.d. [1683] = "Grand Marot"), BnF RES-V-371, avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:12148/bpt6k10402607. And id., *Recueil des plans, profils et élévations des [sic] plusieurs palais* (Paris: s.n., s.d. [pub. bef. 1659]= "Petit Marot"]. I am using here the version BnF RES M-V-176, avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b84965642. The originally unnumbered and unpaginated plates are hereafter referred to with the later-added plate number or pagination (and the digital page view number used) by the BnF. In general these depictions are not exact, however, given that they present a renovation project with several idealized and modified parts, especially in plan. Those adaptations are not of too much interest here. This secondary court came to be overbuilt by a second side-wing, added by Mansart in the 1660s, who also heightened the opposite gallery wing and front wing to two full stories. The heightening of the side wings to the height of the principal facade, historian contested, not only altered the original layout but also much of the open character and liveliness of the initial design. It also muted the architectural language a building with clearly articulated volumes, emphasized by a differentiated roof scape. See Montgolfier in *Rue des Francs-Bourgeois*, ed. Andia and Gady, 187 (see my previous note).

8 TWO DIFFERENT RESIDENTIAL PROTOTYPES: Floor plans and spatial organization of the neighboring Hôtel de Ligneris/Carnavalet (*right*), built 1548-60 by Lescot and Goujon, and the Hôtel d'Angoulême (*left*), begun 1559 likely by De l'Orme. The two buildings represent two competing arrangements with a linear organization or more symmetric, bisected one. The latter is visible in the garden view of the Hôtel d'Angoulême (*top*), from Merian and Zeiller's *Topographiae Galliae* (1655).

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

long attributed to the building.[43] It initially had a strictly logical layout: its main block, eight bays wide with five windows fronting the court, was entered from a staircase located on the right of the court, a *grand vis* in a projecting tower. The main block features a well-devised linear sequence of four rooms, whose general disposition—it was often said, from a typological perspective—generally comes close to Serlio's design of the Grand Ferrare (b. 1542–46) ☒II:46. Thomson, for instance, argues that the latter building was a synthesis of traditionally-French as well as recently-imported elements, yet it presented an 'ideal design' whose direct imitation was made difficult by the irregularities of the dense fabric of Paris.[44]

It is important to note that—to the extent that Lescot's design is not bisected by a central vestibule—it actually came closer to the internal organization of (the wing containing the *appartement du roi* in) Serlio's project of Ancy-le-Franc (c.1544), ☒II:48 which is here somewhat fused with the Grand-Ferrare design. This fusion, we see, crucially kept intact most of the traditional features of the French residential design, and its inherent, inherited logic of the *logis*. As Frommel, too, notes in a recent essay on the evolution of the town house between 1540 and 1600, the influence of Serlio's designs can thus not be pinned down to any direct 'prototypical function' (neither in typological terms, nor in more praxeological terms of a new residential practice or system), as was repeatedly posited by earlier scholarship. Instead, it must be revealed in how the Italian designs (in all their real as well as idealized variations) served as a DIAGRAM that enabled the actualization of novel ways of designing, planning, and organizing residential space; all together participating in a new 'distribution of the sensible' and an epistemological transformation that—in deterritorializing traditional modes of thinking and planning—would help bring about a new form of urban residence. Thus to be understood once more as a convergence process, here the innovating influence worked much more indirectly. It principally operated, as Frommel

43 For the reconstructions, see Babelon, "Du Grand Ferrare à Carnavalet. Naissance de l'hôtel classique," *Revue de l'art* 41 (1978) 83–108, reprinted in his *Demeures Parisiennes*, and since in subsequent scholarship. For the revision (hypothesizing a smaller principal stair and incorporating a passage way shortening the ground floor *salle*), see Frommel, "Gli hôtels particulier," fig. 4a. She here takes up the critical reconstruction published by Guy-Michel Leproux, "L'hôtel Carnavalet au Marais," in Jean-Pierre Babelon and Claude Mignot, eds., *François Mansart: Le génie de l'architecture* (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), 199–217. On this point, see also the lecture by Alexandre Gady, "L'hôtel particulier en France, XVIe–début XIXe siècle," at the Cité De L'architecture et Du Patrimoine, Paris, Feb 7, 2008, given in the public lecture series "Généalogie de l'habitat à travers les siècles," École de Chaillot (2007–2008). Video recording avail. online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9a_ASHxc8o, 00:58:54–01:09:38, esp. 0:16:06.

44 See Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 105–10.

stresses, through Lescot's Louvre wing b.1546–51) ☒[II:49]. Initially designed with a stair monumentally placed in the center of the wing,[45] it was eventually realized with a (then) lateral staircase, leading to a longer linear room arrangement that came closer to Serlio's Ancy-project with its innovative take on the traditional transductive spatiality of the French *corps de logis*. And it is this arrangement to which the basic disposition of the Hôtel de Ligneris is related much more strongly.

In Ligneris's residence, Lescot designed the principal apartment, located on an elevated ground floor, as consisting of an *salle*, followed by a square *grande chambre* (a *salette* serving as a reception or waiting room), a square *chambre*, and a half-width *cabinet* that—via a secondary stair on the left of the court—was connected to the lateral open gallery (more of an elevated loggia, separated from the court) that framed the court. On the other side, there was an open arcade. This disposition stood in a long tradition dating back to Gothic houses. It partitioned off a service court. Its accommodation introduces a slight asymmetry into the plan as it causes the axis of the entrance garden to misalign with that of the entrance gate. The gate was placed centrally between two three-bay-wide pavilions housing the kitchen and the stables, so that the remaining bay formed a separate entrance to the stables and service court. Later changes in which this *basse court* was overbuilt changed much of the exterior articulation of the building into clearly-differentiated segments. This segmentation underlies many projects in Du Cerceau's first *Livre d'architecture* (1559). In this publication, discussed more extensively below, we are also presented with a similar plan with the Project XIII.[46] Not only through this engraving did Lescot's design gain its oft-cited 'prototypical' function, which can be felt on the neighboring sites, where we find subsequently-built residences of state functionaries with a quite similar general disposition.

45 Aside from Frommel's abovementioned study, see esp. "Un Nouveau Château: Le Louvre de Pierre Lescot et des derniers Valois, 1541–1588," in *Histoire du Louvre*, ed. Geneviève Bresc-Bautier and Guillaume Fonkenell (Paris: Fayard/Louvre éditions, 2016), Vol.1: 127–41, where Lescot's first project with a central stair is discussed in more detail.

46 Jacques Androuet Du Cerceau, *Livre d'architecture* (Paris: B. Prévost, 1559), pl. XIII. Here the scheme is articulated as a freestanding building, i.e. as a countryside residence, with added corner pavilions. The fronting pavilions are replaced by a complete sidewing. The principal *corps de logis* also features the secondary doubled at the end of the *salle* customary for country-side châteaux, which the Ligneris project has disposed of. See my chapter 2.2.

Implementing an Alternative Arrangement

One building that was long said to have done taken up Lescot's scheme was the neighboring Hôtel d'Angoulême ⊠[8] (beg. 1559 likely by Philibert De l'Orme[47], and later completed between 1584–1611 for Diane de France, recently made duchesse of Angoulême), located on the other side of the rue des Francs-Bourgeois. Yet, with a fuller view of its original design one could almost speak of an actual counter-model, at least when it comes to its initial internal organization. Only later remodeled into a continuous room sequence, the design and its almost generic, simple plan, was initially characterized by a *corps de logis* realized with a central stair. As has been noted, one characteristic feature of late sixteenth-century architecture especially was its novel striving for a symmetrical organization of the plan around a central axis.[48] To emphasize it, architects started to take up the practice of placing both the main entrance and the principal stair in line with the entrance gate. As we have seen in the last chapter, this model had emerged in the early 1500s in

47 The building was traditionally attributed to Baptiste Androuet du Cerceau. Thomson initially suggested Louis Métezeau as the architect (Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 152; see also Hilary Ballon, *The Paris of Henri IV: Architecture and Urbanism* (New York/Cambridge: The Architectural History Foundation/MIT Press, 1991), 43), but he was to young. Gady suggested that it could have been his father Thibault Métezeau (Gady, *Les hôtels particuliers de Paris*, 180–1). Recently, Guy-Michel Leproux discovered several documents in the Archives Nationales that reveal an earlier history of the building, according to which the building was designed by De L'Orme for bishop François de Pisseleu (brother of Anne, duchesse d'Etampes). Still unfinished, the property was initially bought by Jean Bodin, sieur de Montguichet, who completed the central *corps de logis* with it classic facade (adapted probably by Baptiste Androuet du Cerceau or Thibaut Métezeau based on De l'Orme's distinct use of unfluted giant Corinthian pilasters. See Leproux, "Philibert Delorme architecte à Paris sous le règne de François Ier: les hôtels de Pisseleu et de Saint-Han dits d'Angoulême et de Marle," in *Documents d'histoire parisienne* 14 (2012), 17–37; and id., "Les travaux exécutés pour Jean Bodin de Montguichet à l'hôtel de Pisseleu en 1576," in *Documents d'histoire parisienne* 16 (2014), 21–28; it was also discussed at the De l'Orme colloquium at Tours in 2014, published as Leproux, "Philibert De l'Orme et l'architecture privée parisienne," in *Philibert De l'Orme: Un architecte dans l'histoire, arts, sciences, textes*, actes du LVIIe colloque international d'etudes humanistes, CESR, 30 juin–4 juillet 2014, ed. Frédérique Lemerle and Yves Pauwels (Tours: Brepols Publishers, 2015), 109–20. Leproux's findings were initially contested by Jean Guillaume, "Philibert Delorme à l'hôtel d'Angoulème? Réflexions sur une attribution," *Bulletin monumental* 172, no.1 (Mar 2014), 47–52; today the discussion seems to yet be settled. For a summary, of the debated points, see esp. Jacques Moulin, "Archéologie d'une polémique: l'attribution à Philibert De l'Orme de l'hôtel de Pisseleu," *Bulletin monumental* 174, no.3 (2016), 392–4. For a detailed description of the building, see also Gady's entry in *Rue des Francs-Bourgeois au Marais*, ed. Andia and Gady, 69–87; and those by Isabelle Pébay and Claude Troquet, and Camille Pasqual in ibid., 88–101).

48 Frommel has rightfully pointed out the similarities in both facade and plan to three projects XVII, XIX, XXIII (and we could also enlist project XX) in Serlio's *Architecturae liber septimus* (pub. 1575), 41, 47, (49,) 55; see Frommel, "Gli hôtels particulier," 402–3. As she acknowledges, these plans have no central stair, but Du Cerceau's variations of a similar type in his *Livres d'architecture* (e.g. project V and VI in Vol I., and proj. III, XXIIII in Vol.III) do.

the larger castles in the country. There, it initially helped not only to define the spatiality of apartments, but also to regularize architecture and its articulation into symmetrically organized room clusters.

A monumental dispositif befitting aristocratic demand for representation that would gain more momentum in town house design, the Hôtel d'Angoulême was one of the earliest projects we know to have taken up this bisected disposition. Built on five parcels, but with the garden oriented eastward, the site was accessed from the western side street, the so-called rue pavée. From here one accessed the courtyard, whose original design did not need to mitigate any asymmetry as, in contrast to the De Ligneris residence, the service court and stables were outsourced onto a lot opposite the rue pavée. The building was originally entered through a central door opening onto a vestibule with the principal stairs (the *grande montée*)[49] that bisected the main wing into two halves. To the right, we find the reception hall, the *grande salle*, at the left end of which there were a larger *cabinet* (serving as a storage space for furniture and accessories needed for receptions) and a smaller one. To the right end there was a smaller service stair connecting to the kitchen below and the upper floor, probably (based on the structural logic) in the pavilion. To the left were several rooms for the duchess's staff. On the upper floor, the duchess's room was located above the *salle*. Initially the same size as the *salle*, and without any *antichambre preceding it*, the *chambre* was connected to a *cabinet* in the garden pavilion serving as Diane's workspace, and a *garde-robe*. It was later slightly shortened to accommodate an oratory with altar.[50] On the other side of the principal stair, there was a second reception room, called *chambre neuve,* equipped with a *dais*, at the back, a *cabinet* and *garde-robe*. The adjacent pavilions, of which the northern one was later extended to accommodate a stair, housed lateral cabinets. The originally completed garden facade, with its central *risalit* and high degree of symmetry, can be seen in contemporary engravings.

It is this bisected model, which catalyzed a certain vogue for the representative axial arrangement within town house planning, a divergent typological lineage opened up. Thus here, in the case of the Hôtel d'Angôulème,

49 Pébay and Troquet, in *Rue des Francs-Bourgeois,* ed. Andia and Gady, 90. The following description of the internal distribution is taken from here, 90–91.

50 The exact arrangement of this cluster remains partly unclear, and the reconstruction illustrating Frommel's article seems incomplete concerning this oratory, which according to Pébay and Troquet (in *Rue des Francs-Bourgeois*, 91) was installed "between" the two pavilions, meaning it would have most likely shortened the *chambre* by half the width of the pavilions; perhaps represented by the thinner partitioning wall we still see in De Cotte's renovation plan



9 Floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Gondi (later Condé, *shown above*), built in 1582–83 by an unknown architect for the Florentine banking family of the Gondi, and gifted in 1610 by Marie de' Medici to her political rival Henri II de Bourbon, prince de Condé, who will transform it in the 1640s

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

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10 | 11 *Below left*, floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Mortier de Soisy. Finalized in 1587, the building appears to have been bisected by a central stair, with *salle* in the right half (the half later destroyed after the subdivision of the original building), and two rooms in the left, whose size—it seems—has been changed later, compared to the current subdivision
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Right, floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel Concini, later Hôtel des Ambassadeurs
Level 00

Overleaf, idealized rendering of the Hôtel de Nevers, begun 1582 by an unknown architect for Louis Gonzaga, of which only the northern half had been built. *Below*, conjectural plan, with supposed room distribution.
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









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12 Detail of the Merian Map, showing the unfinished Hôtel de Nevers and the Hôtel de la Reine Marguerite outside the Port de Nesle, in the Faubourg St.-Germain.



we could more accurately speak of a true prototype, namely as a sort of counter-model to the traditional disposition of the *corps de logis* and its lateral axis points. This counter-model was also taken up (according to Sauval's History of Paris[51]) by the most magnificent house in town: the vast Hôtel d'Adjacet, the later Hôtel d'O (c. 1570s, owned by Claude Le Roux, before being bought in c.1573 by the Italian Banker Lodovico da Diacceto, later by François d'O[52]).[53] The original plan is barely reconstructible, but as the Vasserot atlas indicates, the *corps de logis* featured a central staircase. This was also the case idea in the design of the Hôtel de Gondi ☒[9] (later Condé, b.1582–83 by an unknown architect for the Florentine banking family of the Gondi), where the central stair is visibly articulated in a higher avant-corps with open bays.[54] The symmetrical organization depicted in Marot's engraving

51 Sauval, *Histoire et recherches* II: 235–6. Shown in Fig. 7d.

52 Thomson argued that the building was built c.1570 to design of Thibault Métezeau (Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 154); which I wasn't able to verify. In Babelon's respective essay the sale to the marquis d'O is dated to 1558, probably a typo that should have been 1585.

53 See Jean-Pierre Babelon, "De l'hôtel d'Albret à l'hôtel d'O," *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de Paris* (1970), 87–145; passim; and Gady, in *Rue des Francs-Bourgeois*, 130.

54 For monographic treatment, see Étienne Faisant, "L'hôtel de Condé, une demeure princière au faubourg Saint-Germain (1582–1666)," in *Monuments et mémoires de la fondation Eugène Piot* 94, no.1 (2015), 243–83; who writes that the building's feature suggest the design to be attributable to a member of the De Cerceau family of Claude Vellefaux. See also Leproux, "L'hôtel de Condé au faubourg Saint-Germain avant 1651–1665," in Babelon and Mignot, eds., *Mansart: Le génie,* 202–3. Discussed also briefly in Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 148–9.

is fictitious, the plan being rather asymmetrical in fact. Itself inspired by some of Serlio's designs (as Frommel has recently stressed[55]), here the bisected plan was resolved in a way that structurally prefigures the later Hôtel de Sully, and in fact may have well served as its precedent.

One case where this alignment seems to have been better achieved, aside from the Hôtel d'Angoulême, was the nearby Hôtel de Mortier ☒[10] (fin. 1587, for royal secretary and notary Claude Mortier, sieur de Soisy). Its central staircase-passage apparently disrupted the continuity of the apartments across the *corps de logis*: its surviving western half evidences two rooms,[56] probably an *antichambre* and *chambre*, plus *cabinet* that —via a *garde-robe* perhaps— would have been connected to the western wing with a *galerie,* while the destroyed eastern half seems to have contained the *salle* with some complementary rooms. Based on its external symmetry, previous studies have often placed this building in line with contemporaneous symmetrically-organized projects such as the Tuileries, or the (projected) Hôtel de Nevers ☒[11] (beg. 1582 by an unknown architect) for Louis Gonzaga.[57] Yet, from this merely external perspective, we overlook the crucial difference that in these larger projects the *salle* was always part of each suite, while in the smaller cases discussed above, the stair places the *salle* apart from the *chambres*, resulting in a very different room topology that is closer to those bisected, early sixteenth-century châteaux, and which we may assume to also have formed the unknown disposition of the Hôtel de la reine Marguerite ☒[12] (1606–15) on the Left Bank.

Early Practical Syntheses, 1570–1610s

Within the existing urban fabric, even on the *lotissements* with their regular lot structure, such representative symmetrical schemes were not always easy to realize. It was especially difficult wherever the building was not built 'in

55 See Frommel, "Gli hotels particulier," 405ff. As the extent of the original building and the phases of the extensions remain not fully clear, the precise room functions — often adapted it seems — are somewhat difficult to establish. In the later plans one can see remainders of a partition that indicates a *garde-robe* preceding the *chambre*, but this could have been a later subdivision of an earlier *antichambre.*

56 See Babelon and Fouquernies's entries in *Rue des Francs-Bourgeois*, ed. Andia and Gady, 220–32. Built on a huge 60×120m plot, the hôtel was later divided in half, following the death of Claude Mortier in 1604. The western half was progressively overbuild and finally destroyed in 1823. The other half was later heightened by two stories, when it became an investment property. Those were removed in the recent restoration. The street-fronting building was rebuilt in 1767.

57 A. Don Johnson has provided a partial reconstruction, reprinted in Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 138–19. A newer reconstruction of the building and its later alterations, was provided by Guy-Michel Leproux, "L'hôtel de Guénégaud du Plessis, près du Port de Nesle," in Babelon and Mignot, eds., *Mansart: Le génie*, 199–201.

one go' or ex novo. Town houses are shaped by more constraints and determinants. These arise, for instance, from the successive acquisition of properties, their structure, and the position and possible reuse of existing structures upon them, that often determined the layout of new projects. As a result, it was a predominant planning practice that successive owners progressively enlarged and adapted their residence to fit their status. Thus sensibly, most town houses came about in a piecemeal approach to planning, characterized by a complex organizational logic that can still be discerned in the even the grandest of schemes.

It can be seen in the new town house of Queen Catherine de' Medici just south of the *lotissement* of the Hôtel de Flandre. On abandoning her Tuileries palace in 1572, the queen acquired and moved into the old Hôtel d'Albret and various neighboring buildings that were restructured into a complex known as the Hôtel de la Reine ☒[13] (the later Hôtel de Soissons, beg. 1572 by Jean Bullant) with a large garden to the west.[58] At the large scale, the complex mitigates irregularities of a site shaped by preexisting structures. At the smaller scale, we find the organization typical for smaller town houses intelligently incorporated. The new southern extension of the *hôtel*, with the queen's apartment, constituted a small residence in itself. Here, too, the entrance gate from the street (although a secondary entrance) is aligned with the middle court in a transversal axis with a principal stair. The latter is placed centrally within a wing classically bisected into a *grand-salle* in one half. Yet here, this arrangement was combined with a linear suite of rooms in the secondary wing. Relative to this transversal axis, this annex wing may have formed a 'side wing,' but in the grand scheme, this wing—with an uninterrupted sequence of rooms—came to lie properly between court and garden. It thus inventively upscales the dispositif of the *hôtel* between court and garden by twisting its inherent logic, so that both models come to be combined. The lateral portrait gallery here connected the queen's apartment with the other wings that contained the apartments for the king, his wife Louise de Lorraine, and their daughter.

Even if it seems a minor aspect of the design, this transversal axis may have contributed to opening new design possibilities, as it helped legitimate the placement of the principal *corps de logis* to the side of the main court.

58 To establish the garden, adjacent sites were bought up including the convent of the Filles-Pénitentes, which stood on the site of a thirteenth-century hôtel built for Jean II de Nesle (this was the site of the old Hôtel de Nesle, owned by the Clermont family, not to be confused with the Hôtel de Nesle on the left Bank, whose tower the Tour de Nesle, had survived into the seventeenth century). The hôtel was further expanded to its final form in the first decades of the 1600s, for Anne de Montassis, comtesse de Soissons.



13 Hôtel de la Reine, the Hôtel de Soissons, transformed by Jean Bullant after 1572. Plan showing the multiply twisted axial system, based on which the Queen's apartments is fitted into the overall symmetries of the larger ensemble.
Level +01



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

14 Conjectural plan of an earlier state (around 1590–1635) of the later Hôtel d'Albret (beg. 1546 for Pierre Le Gay, expanded in 1586–88 for Mario Bandini at n°29bis–31 rue des Francs-Bourgeois), before being enlarged by Mansart (c. 1635–51), for the Guénégaud and Albret family.
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This influence can be seen in the formation of the complex now known as the Hôtel d'Albret, ☒[14] a block down the street from the Hôtel d'Angoulême on the rue des Francs-Bourgeois. Babelon and Garreta have described the history of the successive extensions with all its literal twists and turns.[59] The building that forms the present main block was in all likelihood initiated by royal banker Mario Bandini. In 1586–88, he extended an existing building (beg. 1546 for Pierre le Gay, and which consisted of two pavilions, of which one survives in the present north-eastern pavilion) into a three-winged complex. Around this time, the complex had a layout rather close to that of the Hôtel de Ligneris, with the difference that it had a transversal axis, as its entrance was initially located on the rue de Lamproie, perpendicular to the rue des Francs-Bourgeois. The wing opposite the entrance housed a gallery overlooking a rear garden to the east. The latter arrangement was also found in the nearby Hôtel du Roi de Sicile, where a long gallery, spaced between *salle* and *chambres*, acted as a sort of screen between the court and the garden. The garden of the Hôtel Bandini was similarly located behind the gallery, toward the east. The *corps de logis* only gained its twisted position between court and garden after a re-orientation of the property in the 1630s,[60] with a new garden established south of the main wing.

The ground floor of the principal *corps de logis*, later incrementally subdivided into smaller rooms, appears to have originally consisted of just two pieces: an oblong hall, accessed via the grand staircase (*grand palier*), and a

59 The full history of the building was described in Jean-Claude Garreta's contribution on the "Hôtel d'Albret," in *Rue des Francs-Bourgeois,* ed. Andia and Gady, 102–13; and Babelon, "De l'hôtel d'Albret à l'hôtel d'O," esp. 91–104. The following reconstruction is based on but critically expands on Babelon's study and Garreta's written description. As Garreta clarifies, the owner was Pierre Le Gay, conseiller du roi et trésorier de l'extraordinaire des guerres. His name was often said to be Le Jay, following a confusion created by Jaillot. Babelon argued that the Le Gay property was oriented north-south, before it was bought and enlarged in 1563 for Anne de Montmorency, who acquired the remaining two plots on the block (ibid., 93). Garreta assumes an east-west orientation from the start. This orientation to the ruelle de la Lamproie and position of the entrance gate there can be seen, for instance, in Dheuillant's copy of the Saint-Victor plan (c.1550) (see ibid., 103). This depiction conflicts partly with Babelon's reconstruction of an initially more open gate between pavilions — but of course this depiction is more of a chiffre. The Quesnel map shows three independent *corps de logis*, with a larger block in the position of the gallery, connecting to the street. When the ruelle de la Lamproie was closed in 1606, the general orientation initially remained. The building contract of June 27, 1610, cited by Garreta, for instance, still describe "une autre cour derrière le grand corps d'hotel et jardin à costé des dits lieux" (ibid., 104).

60 The later owner, financier Pierre Le Charron, who had bought the property in 1601, greatly expanded his property westwards, and eastwards by acquiring the adjacent empty lots). These lands were largely sold off after his death in 1626, before the 'amputated' property was acquired by Gabriel de Guénégaud in 1629. The latter bought instead the lot south of the principal *corps de logis* in 1633–35, for accommodating a larger garden, giving the hôtel its present orientation (see Babelon, "Hôtel d'Albret," 95–7). The *basse court* was relocated, along with the stables, on the remaining space behind the gallery-wing.

square one, as the sole rooms mentioned in the 1626 inventory, complemented by a *cabinet* with fireplace.[61] The upper hall was slightly smaller, as it accommodated two smaller rooms (serving as storage spaces, *garde-meubles*) to one side. The principal apartment on the other side consisted of a *chambre* with garden view (meaning east-ward), another *chambre* with adjacent *garde-robe*, a "*cabinet* adjoining the chamber with view on garden and court," another adjoining *cabinet* (with fireplace) and a *petit cabinet*.[62] By 1638, this division had been repeated similarly on the ground floor. This suite of rooms would come to be entirely inverted in the extension of the residence by the subsequent owners.[63]

61 For Babelon, the previous *corps de logis* corresponds with the existing extent. He argues that the oblong hall was initially six bays long, the smaller one three. This may seem a bit unlikely, but a possible dividing wall could be positioned in a previously closed bay (see my drawing). The smaller hall is specifically mentioned as a view on the garden, i.e. east-wards. An inventory made in 1626 for the Le Charron family, specifies the smaller room as a *Petite salle*, whereas the 1638 one specifies it as the *grand chambre*. This inventory also speaks of a "Cabinet dud. feu Sr Le Charron," that is not specifically located. The later inventory names also an adjacent *chambre*. This could mean that the smaller square *salle* had already been divided, or the *cabinet* was located in the gallery wing, perhaps behind a stair. Garreta's essay (Garreta, "Hôtel d'Albret," 104–5) describe this more partitioned plan without dating it.

62 See A.N., Min. cen., **MC/ET/LXXXVIII/126** (Oct 2, 1626, and Feb 13, 1638), transcribed by Nicolas Courtin, avail. online at http://www.centrechastel.paris-sorbonne.fr/sites/default/files/media/hotels/01_albret_intro.pdf. The 1638 inventory (see ibid.) — written after the reorientation — describes the ground floor similarly, as being composed of a *grand-salle*, behind which we enter the *grand chambre*, another *chambre* to the side, with adjacent *cabinet*, a '*garde-robe des filles*' with *arrière-cabinet*. Possibly the position of the *garde-robe* and *cabinet* was interchanged due to garden view? For the upper floor, the inventory only gives an incomplete account of a *grand chambre* with *garde-robe* next to it, an adjoining *petit chambre*, and a '*chambre galetas*' in the attic above the gallery wing. From these descriptions alone, the distribution of these six rooms is difficult to reconstruct in the given volume and there are some unresolved inconsistencies: Babelon's account, for instance, ignores the mention of the two smaller rooms above the *salle basse*, i.e. the "Chambre au-dessus de la grande salle du côté du grand escalier," and the mentioned "Autre petite chambre joignant la susd. à côté de la grande salle haute" in the 1626 inventory. The choice of the term '*au-dessus*' suggests that the related section found on the ground floor was partitioned off at a later stage. Babelon also argued that apparently in 1638, the upper floor was divided length-wise by a hallway connecting directly to the *chambre*. But as is evident from the inventory, the space above the smaller hall was subdivided at least by 1626, given how it describes the smaller room as lying to the side of the chimney of Madam Charron's *chambre*. It seems that the configuration was still that visible in the 1811 cadastral maps. More problematic is the allocation of the three cabinets. If the ambiguous description of a "Cabinet de lad. défunte dame Le Charron joignant la chambre ayant vue sur le jardin et la cour" implies the view from the room (as is more likely), then the 1811 cadastral map seems to still evidence the 1626 stage: meaning also the *salle* was then already divided lengthwise into a relatively oblong room of 2×5 bays. Alternatively, if the ambiguous description evidences a view from the *cabinet*, this would mean that the latter must have been in a lateral pavilion protruding south-east to the service court (perhaps accommodating several cabinets), the presence of which is also suggested by Garreta. Cf. here the Hôtel de Zamet, which had a similar configuration, with a *cabinet* and some smaller pieces in a side wing protruding from the north-eastern *corps de logis*.

63 Between 1635–51, Gabriel de Guénégaud initiated an extension and larger transformation



15 Conjectural reconstruction of the plan of the Hôtel de Bouchage, built around 1585, partly by Baptiste Androuet du Cerceau.
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

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

16 Plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel Zamet (or Zametti).
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

Another building with a latitudinal organization and lateral *corps de logis* was the Hôtel de Bouchage ☒[15] (c. 1585 partly by Baptiste Androuet du Cerceau[64]). It was built not on a *lotissement* but within the medieval urban fabric on an irregular plot near the Louvre. Within the given circumstances, the site was organized latitudinally along an axis stretching across the principle court and the adjacent service court, with the main *corps de logis* situated to the left of the main entrance gate, at the opposite end of which was a gallery wing. The main wing has a rather 'clean' linear layout from the principal entrance tower (classically cornered between the avant-corps and *corps de logis*), to a *salle*, *antichambre*, two chambers with *cabinet*, from where, via the secondary staircase, the gallery was accessed.

The influence of existing structures on the layout and internal organization of private residences can also be seen in the Hôtel Zamet(ti) (later Lesdiguières) ☒[16], according to Sauval "one of the greatest houses in Paris," and one of the most celebrated buildings of the seventeenth century.[65] The

of the complex, continued by his oldest son, Henri de Guénégaud, segnieur de Plessis-Belleville, and then the spouse of Henri's sister Madeleine, César d'Albret. The Albret's where known for their sumptuous lifestyle, and their habit of frequently hosting receptions, for guests including César d'Albret's cousin, the Marquis de Montespan, and his wife Françoise-Athénaïs de Rochechouart. These receptions were organized by several 'friends' exploited by the Albrets, most notably Françoise d'Aubigné, the then impoverished widow of poet Paul Scarron, who would become the future Marquise de Maintenon, mistress and second wife to Louis XIV. See Garreta, "Hôtel d'Albret," in *Rue des Francs-Bourgeois*, ed. Andia and Gady, 106–7; here also Olivier Blanc and Joachim Bonnemaison, *Mansions* of Paris, trans. Murray Wyllie (Paris: Terrail, 1998), 52–56. In 1639–1641, Mansard will add an *haute-galerie* connecting the *salle* with the old fortification tower, extended the service court by heightening its flanking buildings. He also added a new pavilion toward the garden, as Babelon determined, that prolonged the new-built gallery wing around the court. The exact distribution at this stage is difficult to reconstruct. But the entire organization of the apartment will come to be completely inverted, when around 1659, a new principal stair case was installed in this new gallery wing. Therein, the upper hall was relocated in the place of the former smaller pieces, followed by a square *antichambre*, a *chambre à l'alcove*, and *cabinet* giving access to the toward the *galerie haute*.

64 As Thomson noted, in 1586 Baptiste Androuet du Cerceau, was responsible for the construction of the entrance wing. In the 1580s he built several *hôtels* on the surrounding sites for leading court personalities (Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 154–8).

65 Sauval, *Histoire et Recherches*, II: 243. The construction phases are detailed in Rosalys Coope, "John Thorpe and the hôtel Zamet in Paris," *Burlington magazine* 124, no. 965 (Nov 1982), 671–81; avail. online at https://www.jstor.org/stable/880904. For studies of the destroyed Hôtel Zamet-Lesdiguière, see the respective discussion and literature provided by Courtin, "Corpus des hôtels parisiens du XVIIe siècle," no. XVI: hôtel de Lesdiguières. See also the conference "Construire et habiter l'hôtel Zamet-Lesdiguières à travers le XVIIe siècle," organized by Courtin at the Archives de Paris, 2012; and his Lecture "Construire et habiter l'hôtel Zamet-Lesdiguières à travers le XVIIe siècle," Oct 13, 2016 in the lecture series "Construire, se loger, habiter à Paris (Oct-Dec 2016, Archives de Paris), avail. online at https://youtu.be/qxVq8aaJpKk. As Coope describes, Zametti came to France as a ropemaker in the entourage of Catherine de' Medici. In France, he quickly made a fortune and became one of the wealthiest banker of the time. He was also a favorite of King Henri IV, his gambling partner and superintendent of the household of the queen.

complex was the result of an amassment of property by the rich Italian banker Sebastiano Zametti, known as Sébastien Zamet, who had bought and joined two modest properties on the *lotissement* of the Hôtel d'Étampes,[66] and extended them into a grand complex to his own ideas (c. 1587–1600, by master mason François Petit). In its layout, it was said to be totally alien to Parisian building conventions, as it does not seem to share many of the defining features of most typical contemporary town houses. Upon closer investigation, however, some kinship becomes apparent. At the overall scale, the site's latitudinal organization was quite close to such contemporary projects as the Hôtels d'Albret or Bouchage, where on entering the principal court, we find the *corps de logis* to one side and a gallery placed in axis with the entrance gate. What set the design apart, however, was the peculiar U-shape of the residential wing, composed of two parallel *corps de logis*. These wings, built at least partly on existing structures, were set apart by a secondary court that each contained one apartment; the owner occupied the wing situated between the smaller court and the tertiary service court toward the main street. In itself, this placement comes close to the customary placement of the proprietors lodging between court and garden, strongly suggesting that this part had very likely been an existing *corps de logis* that Zametti occupied without much change. The parallel wing was joined centrally by a double central stair ("esteemed for its singularity" according to Sauval).[67]

Placing the stair in line with the entrance gate presented a monumental model befitting aristocratic forms of status-representation and the related practice of receiving visitors. As we have seen before, the earlier involution of the stair into the main wing of the most representative of châteaux had helped distinguish the different apartments from one another, and shape them according to their differing purpose. But, for the planning of town houses built

66 As Coope describes, these two properties that Zamet initially leased (in 1583) and then bought (in 1587) consisted initially of two lots owned by François Scibec da Carpi, on the south-western corner, three adjacent lots, owned by Claude Girard. In 1573, when these properties were bought by Aimeric de Rochechouart, Bishop of Sisteron, the former contains three older *corps d'hôtels* (probably those surrounding what became the later service court), and the latter a long building, which — with the indication of a building of 10 bays sur rue — matches the street-fronting wing before the great court, to which later the stables were added on an adjacent lot. Between 1595–98, when '*le viel hostel*' was altered, and a '*logis neuf*' was added, along with a gallery, to a design, by Zamet himself (Coope, "Hôtel Zamet in Paris," 675–6). Courtin argues that, both parallel blocks are re-used existing structures; see Courtin's lecture "Construire et habiter l'hôtel Zamet-Lesdiguières," around 00:12:45.

67 As Frommel notes, the stair recalls the design of the château de Verneuil (projected c. 1560 for Philippe de Boulainvilliers); see Frommel, "Gli hôtels particulier," 393; on the château, see also Monique Chatenet, *La Cour de France au XVIe siècle: Vie sociale et architecture* (Paris: Picard, 2002).

17 Floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel d'Alméras, with its initial layout (*black*) and later transformations (*white*).
Level +01



18 Plan of the Hôtel de Boissy (later Mayenne), as built initially in 1567–69 with a linear sequence of rooms, accessed via a stair included at one end of the *corps de logis*. Rebuilt in 1606–09, the stair was expelled into a new-built pavilion protruding into the garden, while the pavilion on the opposite site was enlarged (*white*).
Level +01





1:1000

on often constrained and delimited sites, imitating the placement of the stair in the center of the *corps de logis*, and the resulting organizational split of the *corps de logis* into two different areas did not hold the same advantages beyond generating an external monumentality. Rather, here it became the junction of several mutually-exclusive ambitions,[68] to the extent that this arrangement impeded the desired continuity of the room sequence inside. Equally if not more important for representational practices taking place within the town house, this conflict became apparent in many smaller buildings where, in contrast to the many aristocratic palaces, the *corps de logis* could accommodate only a single suite of rooms.

Hence, especially in smaller town houses, whenever the stair was included in the principal wing, certain conflicts arose. These conflicts can be seen in the Hôtel d'Alméras ☒[17] (b. 1611 by Louis Métezeau with master mason Nicolas Jacquet for Pierre d'Alméras, advisor and secretary to King Henri IV).[69] Its layout is conditioned by land ownership and the later acquisition of a strip of land, initially handed over to the neighbor.[70] It was perhaps in anticipating the reacquisition of this strip of land that Métezeau located the stair off the center of the court so that it would align with the (future) axis of the garden. It is worth noting that Métezeau and Jacquet would later build a new residence (beg. 1612) for Italian banker Concino Concini (later maréchal d'Ancre) near the Louvre, based on the layout of his older residence on the south bank (beg. 1566 for Florentine banker Albizzo del Bene, rec. 1607), which had a similar disposition.[71] Later serving as the Hôtel des Ambassadeurs ☒[10b], here, the bisected plan was resolved in a way that structurally prefigured the later

68 Julian Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux: 'Differenz und Wiederholung' in seriellen Publikationen zur Französischen Wohn- und Residenzarchitecture,* 2 vols (Cologne: Abteilung Architekturgeschichte der Univ. Köln, 2016), I: 133.

69 Leproux, "L'hôtel d'Almeras," in *Rue Francs-Bourgeois*, ed. Andia and Gady, 244–49. See also Babelon, "Les hôtels de Sandreville, d'Alméras et Poussepin: étude topographique et architecturale sur le lotissement du parc du cardinal Bertrand ," in *Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France* (1972/1973), 63–107.

70 As Leproux writes, in 1611 Madeleine Alméras ceded the property to her brother Pierre, except a six-meter strip of land promised to the neighbor Jean Duhamel, for extending his property. Having installed a basse cour here, this strip was bought back by Pierre d'Alméras in 1625.

71 See Frommel, "Gli hôtels particulier," 407, who in reference to Marco Calafati "Tra Firenze, Lione e Parigi: Architettura e Committenza dei Gondi nel 'beau XVIe siècle,'" Post-doc. thesis, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Sorbonne, 2015: 369, highlights the Italian character of the disposition. Here, the position of the stair may go back to the older structure. For the relation to the hôtel d'Alméras, see Leproux, "L'hôtel d'Almeras," in *Rue Francs-Bourgeois*, ed. Andia and Gady, 244; and id. "Le Logis du maréchal d'Ancre, rue de l'Autruche, construit en 1612 par Louis Métezeau," in *Documents d'histoire parisienne* 3 (1995), 31–38.

Hôtel de Sully ☒[30], and may well have served as its precedent. [72] Thus part of a group of bisected plans, in the Hôtel d'Alméras, too, the stair divided the *corps de logis* into a *grande salle* to the right and a *salette* to the left; the upper floor carried a *grand chambre*, with *garde-robe* with complementary *pièce* (*aide à garde-robe*) above the *salle*, a simple *chambre* above the salette. The stair in the side wing was installed in the second half of the sixteenth century, and is preceded by a *grand vestibule*.[73] In this move, the *salle* was relocated to archive a sequence of progressively smaller rooms, including an *antichambre*. The doubled organization of the north-western wing results from the later acquisition and annexation of the *basse court* built by the neighbor. It was probably then that the lateral *cabinet* was added to balance out parts projecting into the garden.

One classic example where a more innovative solution concerning this misalignment was found is the old Hôtel de Boissy ☒[18] (later Mayenne, b.1567–69 for Grand Ecuyer Claude Gouffier, marquis de Boissy on an existing structure, then reb. 1606–09 probably by Jean Androuet du Cerceau for Charles de Lorraine, duc de Mayenne).[74] Here the stair was initially placed at one end within the principal *corps de logis*, an ingenious solution, connecting the main *corps* with the lateral gallery wing, as well as providing a passage from court to garden.[75] From there, one accessed the *salle*, a *chambre* and *garde-robe*, subdivided to provide a passage to a *cabinet* in a garden pavilion. The part west of the *chambre* was reconfigured in 1607 to provide a larger *chambre* in lieu of the *garde-robe*, thus allowing the square room to serve as an *antichambre*. In this building phase, a western pavilion was enlarged into a longer wing, mirrored in a lateral pavilion into which, in 1609, the Italian stair was displaced, its former bay becoming a vestibule-passage on the ground floor and added space for the upper hall.

72 See below. As the extent of the original building and the phases of the extensions remain not fully clear, the precise room functions — often adapted it seems — are somewhat difficult to establish. In the later plans one can see remainders of a partition that indicates a *garde-robe* preceding the *chambre*, but this could have been a later subdivision of an earlier *antichambre.*

73 Leproux, "L'hôtel d'Almeras," in *Rue Francs-Bourgeois*, ed. Andia and Gady, 246.

74 Babelon, *Demeures parisiennes*, 118, 327. For a monographic study, see also François-Charles James, "L'hôtel de Mayenne avant son acquisition par Charles de Lorraine," *Bulletin de la société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile-de-France* (1970), 43–85, avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k96032991. Sauval had attributed the reconstruction to Jacques II Andouet du Cerceau, which also Babelon long followed, butch which had come to be challenged (see James, "Hôtel de Mayenne," n139). Jacques Hillairet had proposed the name of Jean. In many instances, an alternative transformation date of 1613–17 is mentioned.

75 James, "Hôtel de Mayenne," 81.

This novel layout seems to have remained a rather unique solution. But the underlying problem to which this plan poses a solution, is the general one: as in all aforementioned cases, the design challenge was to find a certain arrangement in which an axial relation between gate, stair, building, and garden, a symmetrical organization around this axis, and a continuity of the sequence of rooms could be co-established in a way that each of these requirements did not exclude the possibility of realizing the others.[76] Here, both the repeated resolution to either displace the stair from the center, or to eject it entirely from the principal wing, render visible a larger incompatibility of the formal placement of the stair with the internal organizational logic of the *corps de logis simple*. And, we will see several major changes and new attempts to bring these together over the next few decades. In this quest for a regular configuration to resolve this problematic junction, what ultimately appeared was the need for a kind of wider design strategy for the planning of town houses.

3.1.2 A Discursive Shift in Residential Planning

This is the point where a 'prehistory of the Parisian town house' comes to an end, relatively speaking; but not because—as many previous studies have assumed—there was some kind of historical break with the end of the Valois rulers, the devastating Wars of Religion, and the rise to power of Henri IV, whose reconstruction campaigns and urbanistic aims are usually interjected at this point,[77] as they are said to have launched a renewed interest in exemplary private buildings. Instead, I would argue that a greater break occurs when, in need of arriving at a wider design strategy, private building entered the realm of the conscious and discursive; that is, when residential planning became incrementally thinkable as an architectural problem and articulated object of organizational regularity. With this becoming-thinkable, the 'pre-history' comes to an end, because with the slow entering of the novel term 'appartements' in the second half of the sixteenth century, we see an epistemic transition, after—or with—which its real historical development takes off to the extent that from the 1560s onwards, the planning of private

76 I am referring to the related remarks by Jachmann, see my note 68 above.

77 See, for instance Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 43–51; Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 9–10, 19–20. For thematic treatments, see esp. the abovementioned studies by Ballon, *Paris of Henri IV*; and Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennnes*, which also explicitly starts from the reign of Henri IV.

houses comes to be articulated as a consciously-formulated practical problem and theoretical issue within architectural discourse.

This transition is closely tied to the conceptual introduction and codification of the new notion of spatial planning by way of the French reception of Italian architectural theory, and the wider cross-cultural exchange on strategies for organizing residential space. We must therefore situate the formation of the concretizing system of appartements in the changing form of the *hôtel* within—and against—a broader discursive and epistemological field. This field includes, but stretches far beyond the historical context of the early 1600s, as it (despite its wider political and socio-economic dimensions) does not directly explain the transforming architecture of residential systems under discussion. Following the lead of theorists like Isabelle Stengers, this systemic transformation must instead be approached from a mutually changing ecology of both non-discursive and discursive practices.[78] In this respect, I want to suggest approaching this transformation as more closely tied to a changing conceptualization of building, or architecture and architectural practice itself, and the formation of new planning practices.

To better situate these changing planning practices in their epistemological dimension, we must account for some of the historical context around King Henri IV's ascension to power and the ensuing struggle for stability:[79] having come to power after the assassination of Henri III in 1589, Henri de Bourbon, King of Navarre, the closest relative, twenty-two degrees removed from the royal bloodline, was not initially accepted as the new ruler. The city of Paris had been a stronghold controlled by radical Catholic rebels, of which the Protestant king, after trying to besiege the city between 1589–94, could only gain control after his conversion. Not only did the first Bourbon king struggle to consolidate a new dynasty; he also did so in the context of a country ravaged by three decades of war over religious matters that had divided it and fragmented its political landscape. Political power had become more distributed across the local authorities of France's semi-autonomous provinces. This greatly limited the King's power;[80] he subsequently attempted to assert greater control by centralizing power in Paris. It was in this socio-politically changing milieu that the monarch decided to launch a wider city-building program. It can be understood as the establish-

78 For a discussion of this aspect and references to Stengers' work, I refer to my chapter 0.3.1, note 452.

79 Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV: The Struggle for Stability*, 2nd edn. (London/New York: Routledge, 1995; orig. pub. 1984.

80 Ballon, *Paris of Henri IV*, 2–3.

ment of a secular socio-economic framework that helped rebuild Paris into the capital city; a framework that manifested itself in new spatial paradigms reconfiguring the relation of architecture and the city.[81] Therein, transgressing the immediate needs of accommodation or lodging, residential building activity started to be conceived as a productive force feeding into the construction of the emerging centralized state.

Against the planning agency ascribed to the king within previous scholarship, Sara Galletti rightly stresses the need to study the transformation of Paris into a capital as "a complex, multi-authored, and *longue durée* process," a structural transformation enacted by various projects of different agents, as a collective enterprise that dramatically changed the perception of the city, including especially the interventions of female regents: first Catharine de' Medici, then later Marie de' Medici and Anne of Austria.[82] Projects like the residence of Marguerite de Valois, the Palais de la Reine Marguerite ☒[12] (b.1606–15), and the Palais de Luxembourg ☒[29] (b. 1615–31 for Marie de' Medici, initially by Salomon de Brosse) located on the south bank, acted as both a powerful catalyst and steering mechanism for a greater physical, economic, and social transformation of the Faubourg.[83] In the same way, Henri IV's early

81 See Maria S. Giudici, "Specific Places: Government and the Emergence of *Architecture d'accompagnement*, 1584–1765," in *The City as a Project*, ed. Pier V. Aureli (Berlin: Ruby Press, 2013), 140–69.

82 See Sara Galletti, "Female Agency and Early Modern Urbanism: The Paris of Maria de' Medici," *JSAH* 71, no. 2 (June 2012), 186–203; here 188, 195. Against the almost mythical personification of Parisian urbanism with Henri IV, Sara Galletti has valuably expanded this story in exposing the failure of historical scholarship to sufficiently acknowledge female agency in the early urbanism of Paris: not only of Catherine de' Medici's Tuileries project, but also the urban residences for the queen consorts Marguerite de Valois and Maria de Medici.

83 As the first royal project to be located on the south bank, the building was said to express her 'oppositional position' to Henri's court. While, in fact, as Galletti's analysis stresses, "its location, outside the Porte de Nesle, was to encourage and accelerate the urban development of the area bounded by the rue de Seine and the newly opened Rue Dauphine (1607), creating a pole of attraction for the people, activities, and commerce that followed royal households" (Galletti, "Female Agency," 192). Also the Palais de Luxembourg — far from being the retreat of a retired, widowed queen — is yet to be properly understood in its planned function to as magnet for an infrastructural development and urban renewal of the south bank. Galletti has justifiably critiqued the oft-repeated yet misguided conception of the Luxembourg palace as some sort of "isolated peripherally-located residence of a widowed queen" (ibid., 196; in reference to Andreas Tönnesmann's notion of the palace as a *Witwensitz*). As she forcefully reminds us, the building (like all others built by the female members of the court) was built precisely as to mark its occupant's accession to power (i.e. the various regencies of Catherine de' Medici, Maria de' Medici, and Anne of Austria; or the resumed position at court in the case of Marguerite de Valois), rather than a retreat from it (ibid., 198). She respectively contends that many historians have — based on this misconception — misplaced the building as being typologically closer to country houses than urban town houses. This is not true, and the reason for choosing this suburban location at a distance was imply an economic one: the available land for realizing such grand residential complexes. In re-emphasizing the building's typological lineage as a town house, Galletti

projects must be understood as specific spatial instruments for socio-economic production. This instrumentality of architecture for producing a novel urban reality[84] is particularly evident in the first project, the Place Royale (beg. 1605), which was initially conceived as a production facility.[85] We see here a strategic status-change concerning building practices. Contrasting the sale of royal land holdings under Valois kings, Ballon writes that the new Bourbon monarchy "sacrificed immediate income in order to promote broader policy objectives offering longer-term benefits."[86] Land was awarded in recognition of the merit of private individuals (usually members of the

has relativized the extent, to which the design was long said to have been modeled after the Pitti Palace in highlighting the processes of translation, hybridization and invention underlying its composition. See Galletti, *Le Palais du Luxembourg de Marie de Médicis, 1611–1631* (Paris: Éditions Picard, 2012); and id., "L'appartement de Marie de Médicis au palais du Luxembourg," in *Marie de Médicis: Un gouvernement par les arts*, ed. Paola Bassani Pacht, Thierry Crépin Leblond, and Nicolas Sainte Fare Garnot (Paris: Somogy, 2003): 124–33. See also id., "Pitti a Parigi? Metamorfosi di un modello architettonico al seguito di Maria de' Medici," in *La réception de modèles cinquecenteschi dans la théorie et les arts français du XVIIe siècle*, ed. Frommel and Bardati (Geneva: Droz, 2010), 177–98; here 194.

84 In line with the argument put forward in my preliminary discussion, also Ballon's critiqued the traditional view that restricts architecture to be a mere reflection of social reality. It fails to capture the agency of architecture in this transformation process, as Henri "understood that the rebuilding of Paris played an essential role in the creation and representation of the centralized state … far more than [providing] decorative backdrops" (Ballon, *Paris of Henri IV*, 12). Instead, in developing this argument further, it is important to identify how the state (i.e. all the central organs for building and maintain a state) are coming to be actualized within and through this transformation.

85 As Ballon's analysis detailed, the project derived from an aggressive campaign to revive domestic manufacturing to stimulate commercial activities and economic growth. As part of this strategy, in 1603, a silk production facility was established by royal decree on the still-undeveloped lots of the old Hôtel des Tournelles. In 1605, the King announced his plan to enlarge the existing silkworks into a grander production ensemble that accommodated more manufacturing sites and workshops, as well as rental housing for artisans and merchants (Ballon, *Paris of Henri IV*, 57–113; here 58–9). The scheme, with its pedigree in French medieval market squares with their vaulted ground floor arcades, determined the original organization of the framing buildings into smaller chain of identical 'pavilions,' and the plots programmed to accommodate a bourgeois town house (ibid., 77, 83). Yet, this intended use was never realized. As an experiment, this unprecedented urban development, was intended to be realized by private individuals: noblemen whom the King awarded land in recognition of their service to the crown (ibid., 92). The crown thereby hoped the beneficiaries would assume a role in building parts of the larger complex to a unified design; as an investment from which they would gain further profits. Yet, many beneficiaries appeared to be reluctant to build rental housing for bourgeois tenants; instead, as Ballon reconstructed, a substantial portion of the surrounding lots were quickly resold to aristocrats who combined and subdivided the smaller properties scaled for bourgeois houses into larger ones, on which they would built they own residences (ibid., 93). Designed as an economic motor, the projects' economic *eigenlogic* quickly turned it into an aristocratic residential square; constituting a prototype of a well-known development form in later European urbanism. Subsequently stripped on its initial program, it was completed from 1608–12 with the silkworks were torn down for the fourth flank of pavilions that joined the buildings into a continuous frame.

86 Ballon, *Paris of Henri IV*, 91.

noblesse de robe, like Achille de Harlay, president of the *Parlement* in the case of the Place Dauphine[87]) who were incrementally incentivized to develop the land according to a scheme provided by chief minister and *grand voyer* Sully. These projects showed, first of all, that—under the existing demand—urban development needed to be less incentivized than regulated.

Having been delegated onto private individuals, urban building processes had become the object of increasing regulation as formulated in a new system of rules and guidelines that systematized customary building practices, for instance through the institution of building lines in 1607.[88] This is of course the famous planning practice of the *alignement*, which on the urban scale mirrored the quest for regularity that we have seen in the planning of private residences. While both practices have their origin in attempts to regu-

87 For a detailed account of the project's; see Ballon, *Paris of Henri IV*, 114–65.

88 Concerning the urban history of Paris, we find a complex set of local legislations, customary laws—the so-called *us et coûtumes*, initially unwritten customary laws, first put into writing in 1510, and 1580—and royal degrees that—by regulating the height of buildings and fostering their alignment to newly straightened building lines—aimed to increase the width of the narrow medieval streets in the dense urban fabric. Dating back to at least the 14th Century, when the "Crown intervened with ordinances protecting the thoroughfare [roads] from a variety of permanent and temporary intrusions" (Anthony Sutcliffe's Paris: An Architectural History (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1994), here 18), these ordinances established more rigid regulations starting during the mid-sixteenth century. In 1599, Henri IV inaugurated the office of the "Grand Voyer de France," controlling the construction and maintenance of roads. One of the most notable degrees, the edict of 1607, introduced the alignment of buildings (i.e. their facade to the street) according to fixed building lines, in obliging the Grand Voyer to "pourvoir à ce que les rues s'embellissent et s'élargissent au mieux que faire se pourra et en baillant par lui les alignements, redresser les murs où il y aura pli et coude et empêcher toute saillie et porte-a-faux." Georges Duby, ed., *Histoire de la France Urbaine*, 5 vols. (Paris: Seuil, 1981), III: 140. Later decrees in 1667 and 1783/84 which I will discuss in relation to the emergence of apartment houses, were more concerned with prescribing maximum height and fire-retardant materials, to improve and secure urban cohabitation. These regulation had only a limited effect before a more rigor division between police and legislation was established (Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus,* 21–22). As these edicts will have more impact on the evolution of apartment houses, these edicts would be discussed in more detail in a forthcoming Volume II. Here I am alluding more to the *us et coûtumes*, whenever I speak of something "customary." For a longer discussion I refer to the extensive treatments of the topic in other studies. Aside from Köhler's overview of the different aspect of regulations of private building activities (*Paris und das Wohnhaus,* 19–57), previous studies as Louis Harouel's *Le droit de la construction de l'Urbanisme dans la France du XVIIIe siècle* (1974) have offered a comprehensive overview of the subject. Architectural studies as Sutcliffe's *Paris: An Architectural History* (Cambridge: Yale UP, 1996), 8–23 provides an introductory overview have more highlighted how these decrees have influenced the urban history of Paris, while others have stressed their effect on the evolution of building types (e.g. Duby, ed., *Histoire de la France Urbaine*, esp. III: 129–144, and IV). In this aspect, discussions of these regulations are an integral part of many typological studies on Parisian building types, including Gallet, *Paris Domestic Architecture* (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1972); 9–17; Loyer's *Paris Nineteenth Century : Architecture and Urbanism*, trans. Charles Lynn Clark (New York: Abbeville Press, 1988), 129–30; and Cabestan, *La Conquête du Plain-Pied: L'immeuble à Paris au XVIIIe Siècle* (Paris: Picard, 2004), esp. 94–128.

larize planning, they also diverged quite substantially in their objectives. The notion of alignment would find its expression in the so-called embellishment of the city (that is, the precursor to modern urban planning) implementing the vision of a coherent representation of the city as a capital city, in giving it an "appearance of order," to borrow Mpho Matsipa's term.[89] The search for organizational regularity within residential planning, by contrast, centered more on making visible a specific organizational problem, namely, the problem of 'distribution,' which had been raised in architectural discourse.

Early French Architecture Publications, 1560s–80s

From about 1500 onwards, Dennis argues, French architecture theory had contributed mainly to extending "Italian Renaissance ideas in public buildings such as Versailles," while also opening an entirely novel trajectory, when "from

89 Under 'alignment' urban historians understand the progressive efforts at widening and straightening the dense medieval street fabric. At this time, alignment was intended as a set of local 'corrective procedures.' It did not constitute the reactive kind of globally acting upon a congested city by means of an encompassing and incisive infrastructural reconfiguration of urban flows of Paris during the nineteenth century. Here, Nicholas Papayanis has valuably contested the view that modern planning started with Haussmann renovation of Paris; rather the latter had its roots and epistemological precondition in these regulative planning practices (see Nicholas Papayanis's *Planning before Haussmann* (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 2004), esp. 1–6; here 14).Aside from referring back to the notion of an equipment of power, the following is also drawing theoretical inspiration and concepts from the way in which Mpho Matsipa has discussed the transforming spatiality in post-apartheid Johannesburg and related urban renewal strategies seeking to construct a coherent representation of the city. See Mpho Matsipa, "The Order of Appearances: Urban Renewal in Johannesburg," PhD diss., Univ. of California, Berkeley (2014), 5–6. For the following, I used this work as a helpful methodological lens to learn disentangle and re-conceptualize some of the normative ideas related to the cultural practices and power relations underlying the sixteenth-century transformation of Paris in more non-universal and non-hegemonic terms. As her work made me think, it would be a worthwhile endeavor to re-interrogating this alignment as part of a certain cultural practice/technologies geared at proactively consolidating political powers within a changing social fabric; a transforming spatiality that strategically produces a different urban subjectivity by producing new desires and aspirations. As a formal strategy, it can be said to enact a novel regime of power invested in the construction of a coherent representation of the city as a capital city, based on a recodification of the city by giving it an "appearance of order" (Concepts and conceptualizations borrowed from ibid., 6, 85). This representational (or aesthetic) regime is, of course, the notorious 'embellishment' striven-for by the Bourbon kings. The formation of this regime of representation cannot properly be understood retroactively in representational terms; it is not a representation of an existing royal power, but a generative means, an equipment having come to facilitate a new constellation of power to come into existence. To conceive this regime in genetic terms, it needs to be properly identified and situated, as Matsipa does in her work, as an operative interface that couples two previously separate systems in a twofold project: First, the further transformation of France into a centralized state (involving, in our case, Paris to be transformed from a town into the capital), which is attempted by means of more liberal organization of the city and its urban economy (involving, in our case, an abstraction of the means of urban production; and architectural dispositifs as a means for social production) (ibid., 36). This is then exactly what the *lotissements* projects will facilitate after the 1600s.

the middle of the sixteenth century, French practice was involved with private buildings—the *hôtels*—which were based on different principles and which were to prefigure a new style, a new social order, and a new sensibility."[90] This sensibility expressed itself in the attempt to establish an organizational regularity within residential planning, which became the object of architectural and architecture-theoretical discourse.

It arose when Pierre Le Muet published a manual that placed a renewed emphasis on the systematic planning of town houses, in which the notion of distribution (*la distribution*) gained a central position in problematizing their proper layout.[91] It was this central notion that founded a veritable architecture-theoretical discourse in France, centering on the *art of distribution*.[92] Peaking during the 1690s–1750s, it paid increased attention to the complexities in properly mastering the distribution, that is the layout and planning of the internal arrangement of rooms (*l'agencement des pièces*).[93] Through the works of especially D'Aviler, Courtonne, and Blondel, distribution would incrementally be instituted as a new art of building well (*l'art de bien bâtir*), perfected by French architects by attending to achieving good layouts (*l'art de bien distribuer*) based on particular planning principles. Therein, the orderly arrangement of rooms was presented as the distinguishing feature and specific achievement of French architecture. Said to mark France's cultural superiority, it quickly became "a source of particular pride of French architects"[94]—a certain group fantasy around which the discipline of architecture would be institutionalized as a scientific practice.

Previous architecture treatises in France had covered only a selection of great ancient architecture, and recent architecture of the most powerful and wealthy, such as Jacques Androuet du Cerceau's two-volume publication of *Les plus excellents bastiments de France* (1576/79).[95] It offered a repre-

90 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 15 (italics orig.).

91 Ibid., 99.

92 See Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 207.

93 To compile the following overview of the emerging art of distribution, I have resorted to the helpful work done by previous studies, especially the extensive discussion of the serial architectural publications by Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux,* esp. I: 103–409. For a primer to the notion of *distribution* in French architecture theory, see also the first chapter "Distribution, Disposition, Composition," in Jacques Lucan, *Composition, Non-composition: Architecture and Theory in the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries,* trans. (Lausanne: EPFL Press, and Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 11–28; for an introduction of the respective theoretical works, see e.g. chapters 10–12 in Hanno-Walter Kruft, *A History of Architectural Theory from Vitruvius to the Present* (New York: New York/London: Princeton Architectural Press/Zwemmer, 1994), 180–40.

94 Etlin, *Symbolic Space*, 129.

95 Jacques Androuet du Cerceau, *Plus excellents bastiments de France* (Paris: s.n., 1576–1579). Hereafter commonly referred to as Du Cerceau in the text, the books are listed

sentative selection of built examples of French architecture, which were —more or less explicitly—presented as models for well-planned architecture. When it came to residential architecture, these architects usually resorted to idealized if not fictitious projects. As Bettina Köhler notes,[96] the groundwork for this distinct theorization of residential design had been laid by Serlio's manuscript for his sixth book on "habitations of all sorts people," and the later published seventh book on accidents (1575) that was also included in the complete, collected work (1584).[97] Inspired by Serlio, Du Cerceau's first *Livre d'architecture* (Book on architecture, 1559) ✉[19] compiled fifty inventive designs intended for instructing—as the full subtitle declares—"those wishing to build, be they of small, middle or high status."[98] He later added another *Livre d'architecture* (1582), with various plans and designs for country houses. More encumbering than their selective character was the predominantly additive character of the chosen layouts. As Köhler points out, its layout planning is grounded in a compositional notion that "comprehends the entirety of the building as an ensemble, pieced together from different parts."[99] But Du Cerceau's entire way of thinking about composition was based on this kind of additive thinking. This can also be seen where he persistently describes individual apartments—without ever using the term—as the suite of generic rooms it comprises. On a closer look, all these examples "emphasized the connection or entanglement of environment, garden, and architecture" toward a larger geometric-formal unity, as Jachmann notes.[100] As such, this compositional strategy was suited to grand

in the bibliography under Androuet du Cerceau. See also the critical edition, by Françoise Boudon and Claude Mignot, eds., *Jacques Androuet du Cerceau: Les dessins des plus excellents bâtiments de France* (Paris: Picard, 2010); Jean Guillaume and Peter Fuhring, eds., *Jacques Androuet du Cerceau 'un des plus grands Architectes qui se soient jamais trouvés en France'* (Paris: Picard, 2010), 231–40; here 232; cited after Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 272.

96 See Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 99.

97 Sebastiano Serlio, *Il settimo libro d'architettura…* , ed. Jacopo Strada (Frankfurt: André Wechel, 1575); and *Tutte l'opere d'architettura …* (Venice, Francesco De Franceschi, 1584). It is unfortunate to know that Lescot's manuscript for an illustrated architecture treatise was lost. See Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*, 88; in reference to François Grudé la Croix du Maine, *Bibliotheque françoise* (Paris: Angelier, 1584), Vol. II, 276. So we can only speculate how it had dealt with the planning of town houses, as it would have certainly drawn some similar lessons from the design of the hôtel de Carnavalet.

98 Androuet Du Cerceau, *[Premier] Livre d'architecture … Contenant les plans [et] dessaigns de cinquante bastimens tout differents: pour instruire ceux qui desirent bastir, soient de petit, moyen, ou grand estat* (Paris: B. Prévost, 1559); and id., *[Troisième] Livre d'architecture … auquel sont contenues diverses ordonnaces de plants et élévations de bastiments pour Seigneurs, Gentilhommes [et] autres qui voudront bastir aux champs …* (Paris: s.n., 1582).

99 Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 75 (my trans.).

100 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 288–9 (my trans.).

freestanding residences and palaces in the country, yet quite difficult to employ on smaller, constrained urban sites. Hence, despite Du Cerceau's promotion of this additive compositional scheme, the underlying aims toward a freestanding building with *plan massé* did not find much application within Parisian building practice, which largely held on to a medieval tradition of building contiguous wings around courtyards.[101]

These different schemes can be said to imply two fundamentally different conceptions of space with a diametrically opposed relation to architectural form.[102] In the first, additive scheme, an architectural object is surrounded by space, pertaining to the *castrum*, the *palazzo*, the *plan massé*; in the second, pertaining more to urban fabrics, architectural form—rather than being a mere frame—is the result of an active structuration of space. This spatial structuration was not only tied to the production of social space, but became a specific means for social production itself. Thus in contrast to any container-space reading of the court as some sort of passive frame, it is actually the additive, object-oriented scheme which, in foregrounding form, is based on a passive notion of space. It is of course the latter active structuration of space by means of architectural frames, that would become the means of production, especially social production, in the urban restructuring of Paris in the first decades of the 1600s. In the planning of town houses, too, this active notion of spatial structuration proved to be the more suitable approach to work from within the givens of constrained urban planning, which Du Cerceau's additive approach to composition fundamentally failed to account for.

De L'Orme's Premier tome de l'architecture *(1567)*

A general scheme for planning more constrained town houses was not provided in the early French architectural treatises like Philibert de L'Orme's *Premier tome de l'architecture* (First volume on architecture, 1567).[103] But along with Jean Martin's work, De L'Orme's publication had a great part in helping define and institute the figure of the architect in France, by integrating architectural practice within a consolidating cultural system shaped by

101 See Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 132.

102 On this point, see for instance, Alain Borie, Pierre Micheloni, and Pierre Pinon, *Forme et Déformation des objects architecturaux et urbains* (Marseilles: Parenthèses, 2006), 13–25; here esp. 20.

103 Philibert De L'Orme, *Premier tome de l'architecture* (Paris: F. Morel, 1567–68).

19 Exemplary project from Du Cerceau's *Livre d'architecture* I (1559), combining the castrum scheme with the dispositf of the townhouse.



humanism.[104] As Köhler has pointed out,[105] the work outlined a relatively systematic theory of architectural practice by offering a set of guiding rules regarding construction, layout, and decoration of small, medium, and grand houses, whereby their layout was identified as the site of many interdependences and potential conflicts.[106] To explain some of these rules and explore how to solve possible conflicts, De L'Orme's eighth book of the *Premier Tome* centrally discusses the planning of his own medium-sized town house ☒20.[107] He thus offered it as a single example that could be generalized for "all sorts of buildings one may desire [de faire bastiments de toutes sortes qu'on sçavroit desirer]."[108]

And practically speaking, it did so. At the end of the sixteenth century several builders adopted this model in some variation. This adaptation can be seen quite well on the block between the rue Elzévir and rue Payenne, where

104 See Françoise Fichet, *La Théorie architecturale à l'âge classique: Essai d'anthologie critique* (Brussels: Mardaga, 1979), 19.
105 Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 80–87.
106 De L'Orme, *Premier Tome*, 14; Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 81.
107 De L'Orme, *Premier Tome*, Book VIII, ch. XVII, 252v–258v.
108 Ibid., here 257v.



20 Exemplary design from De L'Orme's *Livre d'architecture* (1567), based on his own townhouse.

we find an interesting range of room configurations of smaller *hôtels* ⊠[21].[109] Here we find the smaller *hôtel particulier* for Médéric de Donon, which closely resembles the design of Philibert de l'Orme's own house in the Marais in the 1550s. Its narrower, four bays wide *corps de logis* is divided into a *salle* with adjacent chamber. In Babelon and Blécon's reconstruction of the plan, the rooms differ just slightly in size; the Vasserot map shows it being divided closer to a 2:1 ratio. The adjacent building features a similar plan, yet divided in three rooms (with an added *vestibule*, as also seen in the Hôtel Savourny (b.1585–87 for Charles de Savornini) next door. The Hôtel de Marle (c.1558/1572, ext. c.1639, built for Christophe Hector de Marle, advisor to the Parisian *Parlement*) features the same three-part *corps de logis* with lateral cabinets on the northern side facing the garden. Here the principal stair is rather narrow, leading to a *salle*, *grand chambre* and *chambre*, connected to a side wing with central secondary stair. The first room of the *chambre* likely served as a *garde-robe*. One door along, the Hôtel de Chatillon (also known as Hôtel

109 Babelon, "Sur trois hôtels du Marais, à Paris datant du règne d'Henri III," in *Bulletin Monumental* 135, no 3 (1977), 223–30.

de Lude, b.1605 by Claude Chastillon) is characterized by its two more pronounced pavilions to the court.

But De l'Orme's inclusion of his own house also had a theoretical function. More important than his demonstrative positioning of the architect in the middling bourgeois social stratum was his emphasis on the mediating function of architecture. He considers architecture a problem to be started from the different means of those wanting to build, especially the middling clients, "qui doivent touiours considerer ce qui est facile [et] possible à leur force & moyens, selon la qualité d'un chacun [who always need to consider what is possible and in their power and means, depending on the status of each one]."[110] In De l'Orme's Vitruvian vocabulary the architect has a guiding role, in which creativity and invention to arrive at fitting solutions is linked to the notion of *ordonnance* (the act of ordering, as in 'giving an order'). In this role, the architect must have a command of several arts and sciences, to maintain an supervisory position and make choices.[111] For De L'Orme it was only through the combination of theoretical and practical knowledge that a creative process could arise to narrow down the infinite possibilities associated with planning private houses.[112]

Savot's Architecture Françoise *(1624)*

Another treatise on planning was written by the royal physician and hygienist Louis Savot, known for his theoretical contributions to chimney design and air circulation. His unillustrated treatise, *L'Architecture Françoise des batiments particuliers* (French architecture of private buildings, 1624), described pertinent aspects of healthy planning for urban residences for nobles or the wealthy bourgeoisie. A precondition for good planning is an adequate knowledge (*sçavoir*) of the so-called *devis*, the act of devising a plan. He defines the *devis* as "a description and discourse of all appurtenances and members of a building, their position and form, and of its rooms and appurtenances, and aside from that the measures and proportions of all its parts."[113] In the next chapter, Savot describes this aspect in its four components.[114] The first

110 De L'Orme's *Premier Tome*, 7–8; here 8 (my trans.).

111 See ibid., Book I, ch. IIII.

112 Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 87.

113 Louis Savot, *Architecture Françoise des bastiments particuliers* (Paris: S. Cramoisy, 1624), 16–17 (my trans.). Orig.: "une description, et discours de toutes les appartenances [sic], et membres d'un bastiment, de la position, et forme tant d'iceluy, que de ses pieces, et appartenances, et outre ce, des mesures, et proportions, tant de ces pièces, et appartenances, que de toutes les parties d'icelles."

114 Ibid., 20 (my trans.): "sçavoir au département, en la position, la forme [ou figure], et les mesures, ou symmetries.»

21 Plan of various late-seventeenth-century *hôtels* build in the Coutûre St.-Cathérine. *From top to bottom*: Hôtel for Claude Chastillon at n°13 rue Payenne; *hôtel particulier* beg. 1558/1572 for Christophe Hector de Marle at n°11 rue Payenne; Hôtel de Donon, at n°8 rue Elzévir; a building with similar layout at n°6 rue Elzévir; and the Hôtel de Sovourny, b. 1585–87 for Charles de Savornini, at n°4 rue Elzévir
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knowledge component concerns the practice of laying out through *compartitioning* (*le département*). Following Vitruvius's first principle of ordering, Savot says that "compartition [*le département*] is nothing else than ordering [*l'ordonnance*]." As Jean Martin had rendered it in his Vitruvius translation, it consists in the determination of a specific *modal* relationship; the "commodité de membres."[115] This is the *commoditas* (from Latin *cum-* "with," + *modus*, "measure, manner") under which Vitruvius conceptualized the purpose of ordering in determining a common measure or relation of commensurability between parts within a larger whole; their appropriate or suitable measure, hence something 'fitting.' This ancient meaning becomes clear when we realize how Du Cerceau, for instance, uses 'commodité' entirely synonymously to the allocation of rooms (in a sense that an plan 'accommodates' rooms) when he describes two superimposed stories with identical layouts as having the same "*commodité et membres*."[116] Similar to Cerceau's enumerative logic in describing the greatest buildings, Savot presents the *département* as a description "of the members, pieces and parties of which a building is composed, [and] which are of greater or smaller number depending on the different people for whom one builds."[117] Here, too, social status is measured in the quantitative terms.

The second knowledge component concerns *position*. Here, too, the second Vitruvian principle of *dispositio* is followed closely, when Savot defines it as the correct arrangement of the house and its parts according to the aspects of the sky:[118] a problem of qualitative distinctions. Regarding our genealogy, it is worth noting that it is in this dispositional aspect that the term appartement is used in the treatise for the first time,[119], but without defining the term or contributing much to its codification. Rather, after having problematized these mereo-topological aspects as two constraints—that is, quantity and social standing, and quality and orientation—they are directly linked to questions regarding *forme* and *symmetrie*. The work significantly deviates from Vitruvius, where it—under the third knowledge component of *forme*—formally distinguishes between buildings that employ simple or doubled-range *corps de logis*. After stressing that building the former around

115 Jean Martin (trans.), *Architecture ou l'Art de bien bastir* (Paris: J. Gazeau, 1547); see Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 104.

116 See Du Cerceau *Livre d'architecture* I, proj. XII, XIII, XVII, XXIII).

117 Savot, *Architecture Françoise*, 20 (my trans.): "Le département n'est autre chose que l'ordonnance. Et description des membres, pièces et parties dont est composé un bastiment, lesquelles sont en plus grand, ou plus petit nombre, suivant la difference des personnes pour lesquelles on bastit."

118 Ibid., 25.

119 Ibid.

the four sides of a court presents the "ordinary practice," Savot highlights the recently emerged practice of building two contiguous ranges of rooms as the "more convenient [*plus commode*]" solution, due to the better room climate in summer and winter.[120] Here Vitruvian *commoditas* comes to be displaced from being an ordering measure to a dispositional one, as it is recoupled to a more qualitative measure. As such, Savot's thinking represents a significant step toward the modern idea of *commodité* as invoking a sense of comfort that will be more evident in later planning discourses.

In this reading, the fourth and final knowledge component, of symmetry, concerns the relationship of the different rooms—thereafter described in detail—to one another. After breaking down the constitutive elements, the smaller service rooms are more explicitly codified in terms of their functional relationships of dependencies. In defining and distinguishing the role of these elements and their relation, Savot's work already points toward later, more encyclopedic works in which abstract knowledge is made available. . But entirely unillustrated, this comprehensive approach to planning did not necessarily help the arrival of a more holistic and integral understanding necessary for the process of designing town houses.

Le Muet's Manière de bastir *(1623)*

Such an integral approach would first be attempted in Pierre Le Muet's *Manière de bastir pour toutes sortes des personnes* (Manner for building for all kinds of people, 1623) ☒[22], which was published at the same time and proposed a new approach to the planning of private residences of varying sizes.[121] Like Serlio's serial publication, with which it stands in a direct line,[122] Le Muet's work was largely misunderstood in having been labeled a pattern book, supposedly presenting exemplary design solutions to be imitated for town houses. Admittedly, one can easily form this impression, given that the book presents twenty-one *distributions* (i.e. plates illustrating design solutions and schematic layouts), for thirteen *places* (i.e. somewhat idealized urban building sites) in a series of plans ☒[24b–f] sorted according to increasing plot size that correspond to differing sorts of people of increasing wealth and status.[123] As Julian Jach-

120 Ibid., 45–46.

121 Pierre Le Muet, *Manière de bien bastir pour touttes sortes de personne …* (Paris, Melchior Tavernier, 1623), avail. online at http://cnum.cnam.fr/CGI/fpage.cgi?FOLKO5/11/100/122/0/0. In the following, I cite from the second version of *Manière de bien bastir pour touttes sortes de personne … reveue, augmentee et enrichie …* (Paris, François Langlois, 1647), avail. online at http://architectura.cesr.univ-tours.fr/Traite/Images/CESR_40382Index.asp. On the serial format of these publications, see Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux.*

122 See the last note of my Part I.

123 For the sake of simplicity, the following will give the respective distributions for the places

mann in his pertinent historical reconstruction of the serial publication format has stressed,[124] the *Manière* does not simply offer us a 'catalogue' of different design solutions for different types of plots either. What is more important is the way in which this 'serial presentation' of progressively differentiated layout examples outlines a comprehensive approach for designing and constructing buildings within urban contexts, as the title announces.[125]

To achieve this, Le Muet initially invests in a stricter systematization of architectural knowledge, which is unfolded or explicated by means of his presentation of examples, ordered according to a socio-economic grid.[126] Regarding this gridding, Jachmann points out that here (social) structure and (social) meaning are uncoupled, by means of which Muet's series gains an "almost scientific appeal" in its relatively clear order.[127] In the French reception of Serlio through Jacques Androuet de Cerceau and Pierre Le Muet's series of buildings organized with growing complexity, we see an increasing systematicity, which Claude Mignot described as an effort toward a "systematic declination" of architecture.[128] In Le Muet, this declension is carried out in conjunction with a novel attention to the 'minor architecture' of urban houses; it could also be seen as a 'becoming-minor' of architecture theory. Here, the programmatic title of Le Muet's work already indicates this fierce displacement within planning discourse. Instituted since Martin's translation of Vitruvius's ten books as *Architecture, ou l'art de bien bastir* (1547), architecture was identified with a certain qualitative distinction that set the complex

with decimal numbers. Thus "3.1" would mean the first distribution of the third place.

124 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 296–312.

125 See also Claude Mignot, introduction to Pierre Le Muet's *Manière de bastir pour touttes sortes de personnes …* (Aix-en-Provence: Pandora, 1981), xi–xv; Köhler *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 112ff, and Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 296–312.

126 Here and in the following, I borrow and freely translate here Jachmann's German notion of an "Ordnungsraster" with gridding, to make a conceptual connection to the epistemic dimension, Foucault stresses.

127 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 298. Jachmann contests evaluations, such as by Claude Mignot, to read this ordering principle as an axiomatic approach moving from simple to complex forms (Claude Mignot, introduction to Le Muet's *Manière*, xiii–xv). While acknowledging that the first distributions do have an axiomatic appeal that, as he acknowledges, is fostered by the textual descriptions, he stresses that the is no consequent development of an axiomatic in the series.

128 Mignot "Le langage architecturale," in *Jacques Androuet du Cerceau,* ed. Guillaume and Fuhring, 231–40; here 232; cited after Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 272. See here Jachmann illuminating discussion of the relation to the essayistic work of Michel de Montaigne, through which we can correct the misconception of the supposedly less systematic work of Androuet de Cerceau, which remains misunderstood in its pedagogical intention of breaking up the argument (toward generating architectural types) with "a sort of antithesis," that in the series, is then reconciled as to confirm the type (here ibid., 268–9, see also 274–81).

art of architecture apart as the art of building well.[129] The *Manière,* completely resituated the traditional critique as to what constitutes good architectural planning with a more gradual approach to building well, suitable for the many.

The French Art of Distribution

In preparing this gradual approach, the *Manière* starts from the narrative thesis that the specific achievement of French architecture lies in having mastered the art of distribution; that is, the layout and planning of the internal arrangement of rooms. Le Muet's dedication outlines a brief evolutionary history of architecture that, following Vitruvius's theory of the origin of architecture in the primitive hut, peaks in the perfection manifested within French residential design and its achievement to plan houses in such a way that it combines *commodité* and *magnificence*.[130] This, of course, overturned theoretical conventions as it foregrounded the very last aspect of what architecture—according to Vitruvius—consists in: namely, distribution (*oikonomia*). If this does not necessarily entail a direct 'reversal of Vitruvianism,' it at least continues and points to an ongoing re-composition based on a new starting point, in which 'economic' considerations gain a greater instrumentality within evolving planning practices. It is for this reason that the work, as Köhler writes, "decisively contributed to the notion of 'distribution' becoming a *pars pro toto* for economic, comfortable, and beautiful architecture in French architecture theory."[131]

But more than becoming merely synonymous with design solutions, the concept of distribution became the foundation of the technical activity of architectural design.[132] This specific approach to planning is exemplified by the given examples (as distributions). On this point, scholars have already noted Le Muet's different use of illustrating plans. His distributions illustrate plans on (perhaps idealized) rectangular plots, framed by a heavy border line, indistinguishable from the hatched walls. This way of presenting architecture facilitates a certain compositional strategy that, as Jachmann notes, operates from within the pictorial logic deployed in the plans.[133] Therein architectural

129 Note that the first book with this title was however Hans van Schille's *Maniere, reigle, moyen et façon de bien bastir…* (Antwerp: Gerard de Jode, 1573), an illustration of fortifications.

130 Le Muet, unpaginated dedication "au lecteur" recto; see Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 98.

131 Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 97, also 131.

132 Ibid., 131.

133 He uses the term "bildimmanent"; Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 65.

De Bibliotheca parisiensi pp. minimorum ad plateam Regiam 1698.

Dono D. Niceron.

22 Frontispiece of Le Muet's *Manière de Bastir* (1623).

Fol. Sc A 1595

DISTRIBVTION DE LA PREMIERE PLACE, AYANT DE LARGEVR DOVZE PIEDS, ET DE PROFONDEVR DEPVIS VINGT-VN PIEDS ET DEMY A TOVTE AVTRE QVI SERA MOINdre que vingt cinq pieds.

EN CETTE place premiere de douze pieds de largeur, ſur vingt-vn pieds & demy de profondeur, la largeur ſe diſtribue en vne ſalle de neuf pieds, & vn paſſage de trois pieds: la profondeur ſe diuiſe en la ſalle de quatorze pieds, & en vne cour de cinq pieds & demy de largeur: & le reſte de la largeur ſur toute ceſte profondeur, eſt employé en vn eſcalier qui aura ſix pieds en quarré, où ſous le rampant des marches ſera fait le priué. A vn des angles de la cour, joignãt la ſalle, eſt le puys. Pour la deſcente de la caue elle ſe fera au paſſage, par le moyen d'vne trappe, tant en ceſte figure comme aux ſuiuantes, iuſques à la ſixieſme diſtribution de la ſixieſme place.

Pour le regard du ſecond eſtage, la chambre occupera la largeur, tant de la ſalle que du paſſage, & partant aura douze pieds de largeur; & pour la profondeur, elle eſt reglee par celle de la ſalle de deſſous, qui eſt quatorze pieds: le reſte de ce plan ne differe point du premier.

Et quant ſur ceſte meſme largeur d'edifice, la profondeur ſe trouueroit entre vingt-vn pieds & demy, & vingt cinq, les meſures de la largeur demeurant en leur entier, il faudroit diſtribuer le ſurplus de la profondeur en la cour, & en la ſalle, ſelon le deſir de celuy qui baſtiroit.

Et auons trouué bon de declarer toutes les meſures des edifices, ſur le diſcours particulier que nous auons faict de la ſtructure d'vn chacun: encor que nous les euſſions marquez par chiffres ſur les plans, pour plus grande inſtruction de ceux qui ſont moins exercez en la cognoiſſance des plans.

ET POVR le regard des hauteurs, le premier eſtage aura neuf pieds ſous ſoliues depuis l'aire de la ſalle; & l'eſpaiſſeur du plancher, les ſoliues compriſes, aura huict pouces, qui ſera plus que ſuffiſamment ſur vne ſi petite largeur. Donc toute la hauteur ſera de neuf pieds huict pouces, laquelle eſtant departie en dix huict marches, ce ſera ſix pouces cinq lignes deux tiers pour la hauteur de chacune: laquelle diſtribution ſuiura auſſi au ſecond eſtage, lequel a neuf pieds de haut, cõme le premier. Le troiſieſme eſtage a de hauteur huict pieds ſous ſoliues, & huict pouces d'eſpaiſſeur, compris les ſoliues & plancher: Ceſte hauteur de huict pieds & huict pouces eſtant diſtribuee en ſeize marches, nous donnera ſix pouces & demy de hauteur pour chacune, qui ſont deux tiers de ligne de plus que les autres marches, & partant leur difference eſt comme inſenſible.

Au deſſus ſeront greniers.

Et dautant que l'eſchapee neceſſaire pour l'eſcalier eſt empeſchée par la hauteur qu'il faut donner au priué, on deſcendra de la cour au priué par deux marches, dont l'vne ſera dans la cour, & l'autre dans le priué, ayant chacune neuf pouces de hauteur.

23 The *Manière*'s introductory discussion on "the art of distribution"

layouts are devised through an inward-directed differentiation of a given field: the urban plot. By approaching residential design from within this urban constraint—and we may want to add that these constraints are precisely the central problem of Le Muet's work, from which he works—it offered a very different approach to planning (or what can be called design methodology) vis-à-vis the free additional compositional strategy that characterizes Du Cerceau's examples. Even if starting from a different constraint, this layout method works rather similarly to the progressive differentiation in Serlio's strategy of starting from the middle [→1.3]. But as Jachmann identifies, in an illuminating passage of his analysis, there is also a crucial change between Serlio's and Le Muet's series, to the extent that the former develops a modulation of a shared *topos*—a symmetrically growing complex around a courtyard—while the latter is characterized by a certain claim to comprehensiveness, completeness, or integrity.[134]Both the presentation of the *distributions* and the newly strategized notion of distribution itself throughout the book, together promote an immanent way of thinking based on an internal order, an organization from within. Ordering is thus presented as a comprehensive knowledge that employs architectural methods of composition, by repositioning this methodology, previously conceived in terms of (com)partition, through the synonymous French notion of distribution that supplanted it.[135]

Instead of grounding architecture in any formal ideas or ideals,[136] Jachmann sees the *Manière* as an attempt to resituate the French art of building as consisting "in a rationally comprehensible method, manner, procedure, practice, or technique."[137] In this regard, we may want to dwell on his perceptive observations of how these transformations are epistemologically connected to the wider attempt at systematizing all sorts of knowledge in the

134 Jachmann (*Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 310) talks about a "*Vollständigkeitanspruch*."

135 In the 1670s, the members of the Académie will remark that the translation of the term *partitione* into compartiment, would be better rendered as distribution. Session of Monday July 17, 1673, in Henri Lemonnier, *Procès-verbaux de l'Académie royale d'architecture, 1671–1793. Publiés pour la Société de l'histoire de l'art français* , 10 vols (Paris: J. Schemit 1911–29); here Vol. I: 40; avail. online at ark:/12148/bpt6k9686906x.

136 On this point, Köhler has granted a wider influence to Le Muet's work, given its' practical simplification in which this relationship of equality comes to be more explicitly grounded in a modern notion of bi-lateral symmetry as fostered by Palladio (whose work Muet will publish a partial translation of in 1645, thus introducing this formal requirement to French architecture discourse) that the resulting equal measures that "*belle ordonnance*" consists in (See Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 106ff). The problem that will be raised in this re-composition concerns a wider re-conceptualization of the very notion of planning as the employment of specific suitable means [*moyen*] according to which solutions can be established.

137 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 305 (my trans.). N.B.: Jachmann uses the single German term "*Verfahren*" as a suggestive translation of the French *Manière*, which covers a variety of those English connotations listed in this more freely translated sentence.

second half of the seventeenth century. Jachmann himself has pointed here to the reception of the work of Pierre de la Ramée,[138] better known under his latinized name Petrus Ramus, and his contested efforts at building encompassing and elaborately-organized systems of thought. Marking a boundary between the Medieval and Renaissance worlds, as Foucault noted[139], Ramism—in its critique of previously more AXIOMATIC geometric methods—assigned a specific logical function to the mutual constitution (we also could say 'reciprocal determination') of establishing a system of elements forming an ensemble, which it did precisely under the category of distribution:

> Distributio, est distinctio totius in partes. Totu[m], est quod continet partes. Pars, est qu[a]e continetur a toto. Atque ut distinctio totius in partes, distributio; sic collectio partium ad constituendum totum, inductio dicitur [Distribution is the distinction of the whole into parts. A whole is what contains parts. A part is what is contained by a whole. And to make the distinction of the whole into parts, and their distribution, i.e. drawing together the parts establishing the whole, we call induction.[140]

Here the serial argument, illustrating how this reciprocal determination works, constitutes not only a relative closure of the logic as a system, but also the openness in terms of how it can be defined in various ways. Instead of adding up elements, linking up parts, one must begin from the totality of all the giv-

138 See Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 305–12.

139 See Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1970), 19–50; esp. 38ff.

140 Ramée's book was published in 1555 in French as *La Dialectique* (M. Dassonville, 1555), where we find this quote: "Distribution est distinction du tout en ses parties: Lesquelles sont du tout ou causes ou effectz ou sub[j]ectz ou ad[j]oinctz: car en distribution n'y a regard d'aucune ny opposition ny comparaison" (ibid., 48, see on google books), according to the four kinds of distribution that he hereafter describes. The *Dialectique* was translated into Latin as *Dialecticae libri duo* (Paris: A. Wechelus, 1556), where the same passage reads: "Distributio, est distinctio totius in partes. Totu[m], est quod continet partes. Pars, est qu[a]e continetur a toto" (therein, fol. 144; see on google books). The final posthumous revision, titled *Dialectica* ([Basel:] Episcopius, 1572) uses the same phrasing (therein fol. 198, see on google books), as does the 1585 edn (therein fol. 180, link to e-rara), while another shorter Latin edition remains closer to the French version (Paris: Iacobi, 1566), 89. Cf. Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 311, who cites "Distributio est *cum totum in partes distribuitur.* Totum est quod continens partes. Pars est, quae continetur a toto," after Petrus Ramus *Dialecticae libri duo*, ed. and intro. Sebastian Lalla (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2011), 68 (emph. added). I have not been able to verify this particular phrasing, which—with its stronger tautology, seem to appear only later with John Milton's Ramist work; Lalla's edition—based on a 1572 edition in Herzog August Library in Wolfenbüttel (HAB A: 3.15.3. Log)—does not mark variations, nor does it have a critical apparatus.

ens, taking everything into account, and then define things by drawing differentiations and relationships.[141] In this respect, we need to briefly hark back to my initial observations regarding partitioning processes [→1.2]. Because what had previously been a singular generative non-discursive operation (*partitione*), has thus been turned into a self-referential system of signification.[142] In such systems of signification, it is the reciprocal determination of things in relation to one another by which they come to be progressively defined the more they become differentiated from each other. At this point, compartition becomes distribution. And the underlying logic of this system of signification is the distributive logic of the household itself (*oikonomia*).

This way, the *Manière* allowed a certain simplification as it also proposed a pragmatic design method that can be found in the notion of 'distribution' itself. It is the technique of distribution that is now presented as the inherent logic for planning houses. By beginning to rationalization architecture's built-in constructive logic,[143] the *Manière* represents not just a search for a wider *formal* design method, but also a greater step toward a more *technical* notion of distribution, in problematizing the base logic of generative planning techniques. We should compare Köhler's observation of how Le Muet establishes his discourse by means of an explicit reference to the Vitruvian notion of distribution, as the subtitle—while seemingly alluding to Serlio's *Sixth Book*—actually employs the secondary definition of *distribution*. In Martin's translation, distribution first of all consists in "a certain administrative task regarding the [building] site and materials [un certaine administration tant du lieu que la matière"; but there is "another degree of distribution," he adds, concerning the different means invested in the construction by different people, according to which "distributions should suit (or be suitable to) all sorts of people [les distributions soient bien commode à toutes maniere de personnes]."[144] This problem of suitable means initially converges with the greater problem of *quantitative* differences, without

141 Jachmann elaborates on this relation through the distinction made by the historian of philosophy Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, who wrote that "where Agricola's topoi formed more islands in a sea of knowledge, Ramism aimed at charting a continuous field of knowledge." See Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, *Topica universalis: Eine Modellgeschichte Humanistischer und Barocker Wissenschaften* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 39 (here more freely translated); after Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 310–11.

142 For the following argument cf. Pérez-Goméz's argument that only with Durand, architecture—and architectural *theory* in particular—is turned into "a self-referential system must be combined through mathematical logic." Alberto Péréz-Gómez, *Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983; orig. pub. 1980), 4.

143 See here also the *formal* reading of Giorgio Grassi, *La costruzione logica della architettura* (Padua: Marsilio, 1967)

144 Martin (trans.), *Architecture, or l'art de bien bastir,* f.7.

being directly reducible to the qualitative differences one may assume between different kind of people. This quantitative notion underlies the notion of distribution as promoted in Le Muet's work.[145] But instead of overturning the Vitruvian system in requalifying commodity in dispositional terms (as Savot does), Le Muet's distributive approach establishes a quantal connection between the use of suitable means in relation to a comparative measure for the layout of architecture (as *ordonnance*). This is because De L'Orme aimed to situate this mediation in the architect's role. Within distribution, the mediating function of architecture lies between internal appropriateness and external decoration; here we see a persistent recourse to 'means' and mean measures.[146] It raises the question by what means distinctions are to be drawn.

Contrasting with the earlier notion of planning as giving an order (*ordonnance*) of the *département (de logis)* under the influence of Italian treatises, in Le Muet's time these notions were understood as one organizational aspect of finding an adequate order by means of the compartition or 'distribution' of the house, as the instrument of planning, of which the new term appartements had come to name the specific object. We should note that, at this stage, it is not yet the suite of rooms that becomes defined as a coded system; Le Muet initially only offers four basic rules concerning their ease of use and convenience, namely that "the principal halls and chambers should—if possible—be accompanied by a *garde-robe* and also a *cabinet,*"[147] apart from fulfilling minimum measures, their proportionality (*simmetrie*), and their correct placement regarding health (*santé*).[148] The detailed discursive coding of apartments will only happen incrementally with the subsequent discourse on the art of distribution launched by Le Muet's work, and from which it also substantially differs to the extent that in the ensuing, the technology of distribution will come to be subsumed, as we will see, under a distinctive social rationale. What is defined or isolated at this stage as a discursive subject is initially the art of distribution itself as a technical

145 This quantitative relation also underlies the not yet 'technically-conscious' notion of distribution in De L'Orme's work; see e.g. De L'Orme's *Premier tome de l'architecture*, 233.

146 See Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 87.

147 Le Muet, *Manière*, f.2: "Pour ce qui regarde l'aisance et commodité, il faut observer: que les appartemens soient assis les une aupres des autres, selon le besoin qu'ils ont l'un de autre, [et] desgagez entr'eux le plus que faire se pourra; que les principaux appartemens, commes Salles [et] chambres principales soinet accompagnées d'une garde-robe, [et] aussi cabinet, s'il se peut faire; que le appartemens d'un mesme estage soient assis de plain pied; que chaque appartement soit d'un grandeur convenable pour service à qouy vous l'avez destiné."

148 Ibid., fols. 2–4.

means, the proper knowledge of which is indispensable for proper planning. On this point, we may want to reconsider the *art* of distribution with Foucault as an emerging *technē peri ton bion*: as an art concerned with one's way of life, a technique for modifying and improving behaviors. Here, it becomes an instrument geared at fostering new planning behaviors necessary for improving both residential design and the living conditions within it. As such, this approach was not presented in the deductive form of a piece of abstract knowledge (*epistēmē*) offered by Savot, but a method inductively demonstrated as an art or technique (*technē*), a skill that is acquired by an understanding of the progressive logic of compartitioning or distributing sites.

[→ 0.1.2–3]

Toward a Method for Distributing Town Houses, 1620s

The technical logic is demonstrated by the way Le Muet's distribution is organized as a series of incrementally differentiated plans. Already in the successive steps from the first to the second and third place ☒[24a–c], the series visualizes the principle of an internal differentiation that underlies distribution. This presentation starts, as Jachmann describes in his close reading, from a kind of 'minimum' dwelling providing the bare necessities and equipment: a *salle* with a fireplace, with chambers atop, and a well and loo in a court; that is then complemented first by cabinets on the second site, and by a separate kitchen and *garde-robe* on the third.[149] For this third place, Muet already provides three options that come with the positioning of the staircase. As Jachmann describes in more detail, in the designs for the following places, this nucleus comes to be extended by integrating backhouses and side wings in various possible basic configurations, depending on the number of family members, including older children, and staff to be accommodated here or in the attics.[150] The distribution for the fifth place already insinuates the classic *hôtel* type,

149 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 298.

150 On the space of children in the *hôtel* see for instance, Eleb and Debarre, *Architectures de la vie privée*, 20–27. As several (social) historians have noted, much uncertainty surrounds the position and spatiality of children in aristocratic houses. As such, a reconstruction of the space of 'everyday family life,' especially the accommodation of the (younger) children of the families proves a difficult task; especially to historical approaches that classically reconstruct the distribution of the houses by means of notarial descriptions of the interior, in which those spaces are not described. Especially in noble families, infants were increasingly given to wetnurses from the beginning of the seventeenth century; younger children were then supervised by learned tutors, responsible for the education and instruction of families. One suitable location for younger children was the *garde-robe de madame*, which otherwise often served as the *chambre des filles/demoiselles de madame* (maiden's room). Later, the common spaces in the side-wings and in the attic (*les galetas*), where other family members but also the domestics and staff lived, was the most suitable space.

24 DISTRIBUTIONS FROM LE MUET'S *MANIÈRE*: ***From left to right*: the first "*distributions*," (i.e. exemplary layouts) for the first, second, and third "*place*" (i.e. exemplary building sites), offered in Le Muet's *Manière*.**



which is first presented in the distribution for the seventh place ⊠[25a], albeit with a two-room apartment with no *cabinet*, and a rather tiny garden.

As Jachmann's discourse analysis convincingly shows, the principal aim of this introductory series is to instill a general awareness of and design method for how to deal with different plot sizes: namely, by means of laying out spatial stripes (segmented into rooms) across the plot.[151] This is where the *Manière* offered a new formal approach to the design of urban buildings. Close to the French building tradition shaped by the *corps de logis*, this underlying spatial principle of organizing linear room arrangements is also characteristic of Androuet du Cerceau's *Livres.*[152] It is due to this traditional organizational principle that the differentiating organizational grid does not come to be echoed here in a more matrix-like formal planning logic as can be found in Serlio's or Palladio's compositional schemes. Instead, by putting this mode of composition into variation, the first examples serve not so much as models to be imitated, but more as an *exordium* which, as Jachmann describes, is the preparatory part in classical rhetoric, building up to a central

151 He orig. employs the notion of "Raumbänder"; Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 305.
152 Ibid., 304–5.



argument: "Quite similar to the starting series in Serlio's sixth book, [the *Manière*] initially presents an exemplary argument, that does not yet touch on the central theme that Le Muet will explicate in the ideal disposition *entre cour et jardin*."[153] It was a presentation that built up toward the latter disposition, which was just coming to be codified around this time. In offering a compositional strategy, this introduction initiates a transfer of designerly knowledge geared at generating reproductive know-how[154] to enable readers to find their own solutions within the interplay of givens and desires. This can be seen in the digressions problematizing alternative possibilities for laying out buildings on more difficult sites, such as the eighth place.

Only after this problematization do we find the more canonical arrangements for building a *hôtel* between court and garden. These plans are presented in the different distributions (especially the arrangement of the side wings, on the ninth place ☒[26–7]: the first distribution of the ninth place shows the central *corps de logis* asymmetrically divided—into *salle* and *chambre*—by a staircase placed in the central axis of the court and entrance gate. The

153 Ibid., 304; Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 107.
154 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 304.

25–26 ***This page***, the "First distribution of the seventh place," from Le Muet's *Manière*, with the lower (***left***) and upper (***right***) floor plan of the two-story building. ***Opposite page***, the "first distribution of the ninth place." More than representing an example to be copied, the plan logically plays through the traditional scheme of placing the principal stair in the middle of the *corps de logis*, aligned with the entrance gate. It illustrates a formal resolution that, based on the inherent logic of this scheme, leads to a bisected plan with two distinct suites of rooms, separated by the stair. On the given medium-sized plot, this scheme still leads to rather minimal apartments rather than one larger apartment per floor, whereby Le Muet's implicitly illustration that this model has a certain scale-dependence with regards to the plot size, and is better suited for wider properties.

27 ***Subsequent spread***, the second (***left page***) and third distribution (***right page***), as progressively ideal alternatives.



second distribution places the stair already in a second side wing, thereby arriving at a visually much cleaner composition that allows for a high degree of external symmetry. It is also clearer, because the spatial stripe formed by the principal block is made more legible. The upper floor houses a principal and secondary apartment: the first, situated above the *salle*, consists of a *chambre* "*qui est la principale*"[155] with adjacent *garde-robe*; the second comprises a *chambre*, preceded by a *galerie*. Projecting from the corner of the *corps de logis* are two projecting privies. These indicate the efforts to arrive at a 'complete' apartment, which as Le Muet's introduction describes, means "that [to] the principal apartments such as the hall and chambers be added a *garde-robe* and also—if possible—a *cabinet*."[156]

The third distribution of the ninth place presents a deliberately asymmetrical version of the last layout. The ground floor differs only in replacing the previous *galeries* with an additional *chambre* and *garde-manger* next to the kitchen, which—as in all the previous versions—is located in the service

155 Muet, *Manière*, f.58. Orig.: "Que les principaux appartemens, comme les Salles [et] Chambres principals soient accompagnees d'une garde-robe, et aussi d'un cabinet s'il peut se faire."

156 Ibid., f.2.



block lining the street, whose upper story provides additional lodgings. Similarly, in all versions, the upper story of the principal *corps de logis* features two *chambres*, each finally equipped with a *cabinet* projecting into the garden. The rooms are separated by a central (shared) *garde-robe*. Here, the three rooms are accessible via a long passageway that—in extrapolating the logic of the *dégagement* that had been modulated in the previous examples alongside the placement and subtraction of a secondary stair—presents more of a counter-example. The fourth distribution shows, by contrast, how this corridor can be resolved in a more suitable arrangement in which the position of the *chambre(s)* and *garde-robe* is shifted, as it also is on the ground floor.

With these three schemes, the *Manière* provided the reader with three basic dispositions that together form the cornerstone for the following codification of the *hôtel* between court and garden as a specifically-organized building type, or dispositif. As such, the series of plans that we have mapped here is a key point in the development of French architectural treatises. Through this mapping we can note a crucial evolution. Contrary to both Du Cerceau's collection of a cornucopia of exemplary models and De l'Orme's single mediating model to be adaptively imitated as a scheme, these three



successively-presented alternative arrangements and their variations can no longer be reduced to the provision of exemplary models to be imitated. Instead, as Jachmann's study of these treatises convincingly argues, in its serial logic, the *Manière* must be understood as a didactic approach rooted in a process of successive refinement.[157] As such, it is through these alternative models and their variation that the *Manière* presents a more integrative design approach, which problematizes the implementation and variation of this basic scheme in its necessary adaptations.

This point requires more emphasis. Because as long as the *Manière* is falsely seen as a pattern book, the inclusion of a *corps de logis simple* with its centrally-integrated stair, and the fact that Le Muet starts his codification of the *hôtel* type with this scheme ☒[26], can lead to the misunderstanding that Le Muet presented there an equally-valid if not advocated design scheme—as some scholars have thought.[158] This idea was fostered, it seems, by the fact that the choice of a stair in the center of the *corps de logis* over lateral stair-

157 On this aspect, I refer back to the last part of my Part I.

158 Cf. Babelon's reading that Muet allegedly advocates this use (Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 188)



cases was indeed explicitly advised in Savot's treatise (1624).[159] Based on this reading, Le Muet's work has sometimes been judged to be partly outdated at the time of its publication, when numerous innovations had already appeared within residential planning (such as the *appartement double*, or *alcôves* which I will discuss in the next section [→ 3.1.3]), and which the *Manière* does not include or address.[160] In view of these, especially the first model does indeed appear somewhat outdated.[161] Yet, this is precisely the point. In this serial presentation, the first distribution must not be taken as advice for placing the stair within the *corps de logis*, but rather a starting point for codifying the organization of the *hôtel* in critically starting from a scheme that — as we have seen — had gained a certain currency in the previous decades, but in which

159 "On place l'escalier presque toujours au milieu [du corps de logis principal], ou bien on fait la porte principale au milieu pour aller trouver l'escalier à costé. Mais il n'est pas si bien en cette disposition qu'on est constraint de fermer une partie des croisées qui l'esclairent" (Savot, *L'Architecture Françoise*, 47–48).

160 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 62.

161 Cf. Claude Mignot, "L'escalier dans l'architecture française," in *L'Escalier dans l'architecture de la Renaissance*: actes du colloque tenu à Tours du 22 au 26 mai 1979, ed. Jean Guillaume (Paris: Picard, 1985); cited in Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 148n. Here the word 'archaic' appears, which is conceptually problematic for it instill the idea that this model is older, i.e. traditional, whereas it was a rather recent one in town house planning.

the practice of including the stair in axis with the entrance gate had also created several unresolved problems.

The three alternative distributions create an awareness of a specific design problematic. In starting from the problem, the three alternatives are logically playing through different options. The first distribution simply serves as the starting point for problematizing this placement against available alternatives, by consequently highlighting these variation's various (dis)advantages, which—rather than being mere design choices—present points of careful calculation within planning processes. This way, the initial case illustrates merely that the above conflicts can be resolved formally, but the scheme's inherent logic results in a bisected plan with two distinct suites of rooms per floor. By realizing this scheme on a smaller site, where it results in rather small and unequal room sequences, Le Muet insinuates that the choice for using this bisecting scheme (in contrast to the following ones) is much more scale-dependent than the other dispositions. As such, it is much better suited for the wider plots and grander buildings from whence it derived, as we can see in the distribution for the tenth place where this scheme makes a comeback and is realized with more complete lodgings.

In this respect, Le Muet's idea of providing a "manner for building for all kinds of people" does not simply imply a gradual approach, but a design didactics that creates a sensibility for the different possibilities and limitations that come with varying means, and plot sizes, hence making more explicit the difficulties of architectural planning, especially the production of adequate layouts and the skills required for the art of distribution of selectively drawing differences. Hence, it is this publication that marks a relative starting point in the ongoing concretization of apartments as a residential system, the planning of which would hereafter be discussed under the notion of distribution as pertaining to the wider problem of architectural layouts; the proper production of this distribution was hereafter incrementally identified as a difficult art. It is in its problematization that Le Muet's book presents a response to an interest or urgent need for offering exemplary buildings.[162] Instead of being a collection of exemplary design models to be copied, the title of the *Manière* itself proclaims its programmatic aim of providing a first, relatively systematic planning method for designing town houses. It outlined a sufficiently comprehensive and practical method that allowed designers to distinguish certain solutions, and draw further distinctions from them.[163]

162 Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 9.

163 If Le Muet's work presents what Guidici calls a "formulaic architecture" (Giudici, "Specific Places," passim.), whose success lies in taking up building patterns and practices of

In comparatively presenting progressive alternatives, the *Manière* answered to this need by promoting a shift in thinking, in which composition was approached in a newly holistic and comprehensive manner. This manner consisted in a reversal that, promoting a more analytical approach to planning by breaking down structures rather than adding up or combining pieces, foregrounded internally consistent logics. It was here that the *Manière*'s strategic attention to the planning of constrained town houses served as the point of departure for the subsequent *discourse* on the art of distribution. It can also be seen as articulating some of the imminent epistemological transformations in Western systems of thought, as well as some fundamental social recompositions during the seventeenth century, to which we shall shortly turn [→ 3.2]. But to reconsider what is going on in this later development from an explicitly epistemological and sociological angle, let us first map the ongoing contemporary socio-spatial differentiation processes in which certain new differences were coming to be drawn.

3.1.3 The Spatial Differentiation of the *Hôtel*, 1630s-40s

Le Muet's inclusion of the recent monumental model of a *corps de logis* bisected by a central staircase did not make the book outdated; in fact, it thereby actually provided a very timely relativization of this scheme's assumed model function for residential design. Indeed, with the *Manière* and its initial codification of the *hôtel* type within architectural discourse, the asymmetrical position of the stair would become a conceptual cornerstone of a wider design strategy for planning town houses. The initial layout of the Hôtel d'Angoulême was an exception (maybe even a special case to suit Diane de France) which proved that with the central stairs, too, an arrangement could be found on plots less wide. But realizing this strict symmetry long remained a powerful instrument of representation, and a formal feature appropriate for the grand palaces such as the Palais de Luxembourg [28] (b. 1615–31 by de Brosse), built on more spacious sites. The latter is an inter-

common citizens, then this notion does not square up to a general prescriptive 'scheme' or 'model', or lesser form of architecture, but rather a formal diminution (in the sense that *formula* is the diminutive of *forma*) that allows it to become more widespread. In Deleuzian terms, this is a practice of **MINORITIZING** architecture. Indeed, it revokes any facile approach in which 'grandeur' is falsely equated with formal symmetry. Yet, as we shall see, this design methodology is itself rooted in an underlying logic of drawing distinctions, that we will look at in the next part [3.2], which incrementally comes to be formulated into a **MAJORITARIAN** logic as soon as it became connected to a logic of social production.

esting hybrid residence[164] that was at the same time a mini-version of the original design of the Tuileries palace ☒II:56 and a scaled-up version of the bisected *hôtel* dispositif, reaching a compromise of sorts in its formal resemblance to the classic château-form. Thereby, this peri-urban residence brought together for the first time the ideal organization of the *corps d'hôtel* into a fully-symmetrical twin apartment (bringing back the older symbolism of parity in these *appartements jumelées* [→ 2.2–3]); something that the Hôtels de Nevers or Zamet, and even de Brosses' extension of the Hôtel de Bouillon ☒28 (beg. 1612) had not yet fully achieved.

Especially on the even narrower plots of more constrained townhouses, the arrangement of the stair in a lateral tower presented the 'safer choice' and more practical solution in which the representational aspect was attained by instead achieving a grander suite of rooms. Regarding the preference for this arrangement, scholars have often foregrounded the role of another prominent female figure: Catherine de Vivonne, the later marquise de Rambouillet; known for her insistence on more practical arrangements of rooms and service functions.[165] On moving into the Hôtel Pisani (later de Rambouillet), ☒29 she started adapting the older structure (reb. 1618–20). This adaptation was aimed at better facilitating a semi-informal setting for entertaining the guests of the literary *salon* she had started hosting; establishing a renowned center of intellectual life (later demolished in the extension of the Louvre palace). Reconstructed first by Babelon and Courtin, and amended here,[166] the plan for

164 For Galletti's monographic study, and her placement of the Palais de Luxembourg in the category of townhouses not châteaux, see note 83 above. While seconding her re-classification within her own argument, for mine the emphasis of this *convergent* aspect seems more important.

165 Reginald Blomfield, History of French Architecture … Vol. II (London: Bell and Sons, 1911), 141–44; Gallet, *Paris Domestic Architecture*, 27; Dennis, *Court & Garden*, 53–4. For studies of the *hôtel* itself, see also Babelon, "L'hôtel de Rambouillet," *Paris et Île-de-France — Mémoires* (Paris: Fédération des sociétés historiques et archéologiques de Paris et Ile-de-France, 1960), Vol. IX: 313–61; and Gady, *Les hôtels particuliers de Paris,* esp. 140–41. Courtin, summarized that "D'après les descriptions des poètes et des mémorialistes, un nouvel art de vivre semble être apparu à l'hôtel de Rambouillet au milieu du XVIIe siècle. On attribue facilement à la marquise l'introduction à Paris de la notion de confort, de la maîtrise du chauffage et des dispositions spectaculaires de l'appartement entre régularité de l'enfilade et surprises des alcôves." Courtin, summary of *L'art d'habiter,* n.p. (online), accessed at http://www.univ-paris4.fr/IMG/pdf/COURTIN_Position.pdf. For more literature on the Marquise and her *salon*, see there.

166 Babelon provided a first reconstruction, 186–88, reprinted in Dennis's study; here, I follow the more recent reconstruction provided in Nicolas Courtin, "Hommes et femmes dans les hôtels parisiens de la première moitié du XVIIe siècle," in *Le prince, la princesse et leurs logis: Manières d'habiter dans Félite aristocratique européenne (1400–1700),* ed. Monique Chatenet and Krista de Jonge (Paris: Picard, 2014), 257–64, fig. 5. Based on superimposing available plans, I have conjecturally amended Courtin's more schematic reconstruction. While the newer reconstruction has arrived at a more likely arrangement of the central *chambre à alcove*, it is partly incomplete, however, as it does not follow the more oblique



28 Floor plan and spatial organization of the Palais de Luxembourg.
Level +01



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29 Conjectural plan of the Hôtel de Madame Rambouillet, conjecturally adapted from N. Courtin's reconstruction, with plan of the adjacent Hôtel de Chevreuse (*center*). The etching (*top*) by A. Bosse presumably shows a gathering in the *chambre bleue* of the Marquise.
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





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this residence was supposedly drawn up largely by the marquise herself. She remained little satisfied—as a seventeenth-century biographer recalled—with the designs submitted by her architects, for apparently they only "knew to make [*savoit que faire*] a hall on one side, a chamber on the other, and a stair in the middle."[167] Yet, as we have seen, this *savoir-faire* is better understood as a trending design solution, whose resulting discontinuity in the suite of rooms was quickly coming to be considered a serious inconvenience.[168] By instead insisting on placing the stair in the side-wings, the marquise opted for a grander suite of rooms clustered on a relatively narrow building strip filled entirely by the width of the *grand-salle*, from which an adjacent *antichambre*, *chambre*, and *cabinets* all opened onto an adjacent garden. Concerning the oft-mentioned credit the marquise deserves for promoting and innovating this more practical than stately arrangement, it would be more accurate to say that she critically countered a trend for formal symmetry as her residence resorted to the more asymmetrical older organization, dating back to the medieval position of spiral stairs. With this switchback, the town house dispositif greatly evolved as the external monumental symmetry became transposed into an internal organizational symmetry: a strategic internal split that allowed an organizational differentiation through which—in a mini-version of the Palais de Luxembourg—an *antichambre commun* gave way to a state bedroom with complementary rooms on the one end, and another more informal sequence of reception rooms on the other.

From this angle, if the same configuration with a longer stair appears in the adjacent Hôtel de Chevreuse ⊠[29] (later Longueville), it seems more inspired by these earlier projects, given moreover the basic arrangement of

plot lines, or fails to include the chapel mentioned near the entrance-door to the *grand-salle*. Moreover, based on the reconstructible position of the neighboring *hôtel* for available, more detailed later plans, the suggested position of the avant-*chambre* (lit by a side court) and an alcove toward the *antichambre* (suggested presumably because of the mention of an "alcôve de lad. antichambre" in the inventories), seems unconvincing. I have here inverted this position, which also allows the *oratoire* and *garde-robe* "next to the alcove" to be more sizable rooms. This correction was made under the assumption that the later Écuries d'Orléans were (at least in parts) built on the foundations of the *hôtel*, hypothesizing that the larger court in the south wing of this later building shown in the Verniquet map, may have been extended from an existing *basse-court*, which Babelon also presumes in his reconstruction. Another correction concerns the principal range of rooms, which—located in an old *corps de logis*—would likely have had a consistent depth, as shown in Babelon's reconstruction, with more same-sized, square-ish rooms. Based on these conjectures I have arrived at a hybrid-arrangement somewhere between the two earlier reconstructions.

167 Here after Gédéon Tallemant des Réaux, *Les historiettes …* (Brussels: Meline, 1834) Vol. 3–4: 147. See also Babelon, *Demeures Parisienne*, 69.

168 Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 188.

the principal *corps de logis*—similarly bisected into a *salle* and two square rooms—which seems to have been extended (1621–24 by Clement II Métézeau) by two flanking pavilions with more clustered, complementary spaces to the garden.[169] We should stop ascribing the 'invention' of this scheme to anyone, for it remained the more general disposition simply due to the fact that the stair, with all its contradictory layout requirements, most often happened to 'settle' in a corner position within the majority of residential projects. One factor that helped (re-)consolidate this disposition was the fact that this old arrangement avoided a crucial design problem of the trending inclusion of the central symmetrical stair as a scale-dependent model. In the case of smaller properties where the bisected scheme was not feasible, the grandeur was produced instead by enlarging the lateral staircase progressively into an open well stair, with three or four flights of stairs, such as at the abovementioned Hôtel de Chatillon (b. 1605) or also the Hôtel d'Hozier (beg. 1608). Here, instead of two alternative design choices, we find a critical threshold or 'line of differenciation' emerging between two possible systematic solutions. This is where the *Manière* did lag behind developments, to the extent that by the time Le Muet formulated a general solution to the problems of designing town houses, those problems had already started to bifurcate into two different directions, making residential design revolve around two possible solutions.

While the placement of the stair on the side presented the more advantageous option for achieving a continuous suite of rooms, this arrangement was nonetheless counter-productive in the larger town houses of nobles and important officials, whose occupation required their residence to contain incrementally vaster suite of rooms to fulfill their stately function.[170] Concerning this point, we need to go back to the Zametti residence, because there we find one detail that has hitherto not received sufficient attention: in it the old model of a central stair also entailed the re-introduction of the formal problem from which it had originally sprung, namely, the sixteenth-century practice of providing a separate suite of rooms on the same floor, reserved for the king; here found in the northern wing between main court and garden. Courtin notes that the provision of such an *appartement du roi* was com-

169 For this project, I rely on a later inventory plan for a projected extension by De Cotte, conserved in the BnF Ét., Réserve HA-18 (25)-FOL. Given this plan, the symmetrical elevation in Marot's engravings appears to be an idealization. The extent of the older mid-sixteenth-century building, built for Nicolas Neufville de Villeroy, a minister of Henri III, is unclear. See Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 54–56.

170 Ibid., 268–9.

pletely unheard of in the context of town houses.[171] As we have seen [→ 2.2–3], this had been a chivalric custom and prestige practice of competing courtiers who, as Babelon reminds us, had "made it their obligation to hold the most memorable receptions for the monarch and the court"[172] in their houses and install a guest suite for the ambulant king. Yet, practice, which was this largely virtual anyhow, became quite nonsensical in the context of an urban residence (and especially in Paris, the royal seat). Nonetheless, already toward the end of the sixteenth-century with its shifting power structures, we see some court members attempting to symbolically include a second suite in their larger symmetrically-planned residences, in competing for royal favor.
This also appears to have been the ambition for the uncompleted Hôtel de Nevers.[173] In the case of Zametti's residence, this inclusion of an *appartement du roi* can be explained quite plausibly by Henri IV's exceptionally outgoing personality and his pursuit of leisure activities, in which Zametti was his companion. More than a mere symbolic gesture, his residence did actually serve as the site of the King's entertainment.[174] Thus reintroducing an older form of male bonding based on an asymmetric socio-spatial differentiation or **HETEROGENESIS** integrated into the organization of residential space, within the changing power structures around 1600, the Zametti residence did something that works quite differently compared to the symmetricization and the underlying efforts at establishing some sort of architectural parity that becomes increasingly visible in the projects of powerful female court members. Yet, especially concerning this differentiating and heterogenizing function, Zametti's house—and its untypical parallel (but asymmetric) suite of rooms—was omitted from earlier analyses on the evolving *hôtel* type or system of appartements. And so scholarship has not yet sufficiently analyzed the ways in which this parallel suite of rooms started to resonate with the ideal symmetry particularly of larger town houses, and how this resonance was

171 See Courtin's Lecture "Construire et habiter l'hôtel Zamet-Lesdiguières, avail. online at https://youtu.be/qxVq8aaJpKk: 00:23:20.

172 See also Babelon, "De Vaux à Versailles," in: *Le Fablier: Revue des Amis de Jean de La Fontaine* 6 (1994), 25–31; here 30.

173 It is difficult to determine exactly whether those larger symmetrical structures provided a grand appartement of some sort. It would seem likely, but studying this on a case-by-case, which I was not able to do here, basis would be a valuable focus for future studies.

174 Offering an accommodation for Henri IV's mistress, the private residence was also the king's "Palais d'amour" serving minor pleasures, as Sauval phrased it, these spaces served as an accommodation for visiting ambassadors. Aside from being the first private townhouse to feature an *appartement du roi*, it was also the first to feature a steam bath [*étuve*], and *appartement d'étuve*, serving equally as a site for informal social interaction. See Coope, "Hôtel Zamet in Paris" 672, in reference to Sauval, *Histiore et Recherches … de Paris*, II: 243; here also Mark Greengrass, *France in the Age of Henri IV,* 140.

triggering the development of an entire system of appartements made up of two (and later three) sorts of spaces, increasingly differentiated according to their the scale or grandeur, and specific uses for different kinds of reception.

Of course, the Zametti residence cannot be said to have had any real or direct causal efficacy in having 'inspired' this system, especially when, after Henri IV's assassination, the following Bourbon kings were incrementally distanced behind their chief ministers, and this requirement for this type of space immediately became more virtual again. But also because, since it brings back an older model, this re-introduction of an older (chivalric/rural) differentiating factor into a new (courtly/urban) context, it cannot be said to be any starting point. Rather, what seems more relevant, is to consider this resurfacing of a grander suite within in the town house as a symptom, that is, as an epiphenomenon actualized by a wider social transformation and civilizing processes below the surface events [→ 3.2.2], for which this integration-differentiation proved to have a catalytic instrumentality. As such, it was quickly embraced in the organization of the larger town houses of functionaries and ministers such as Sully (and later De La Vrillière, and also Séguier), which I will analyze in more detail in the following section. It is then no coincidence that all these designs, built in the 1620–30s, were starting to also feature again a separate, grander suite of rooms reserved for official receptions and the visitation of stately guests. In the seventeenth century, this suite slowly came to be designated as the *grand appartement*. Centered on the *chambre de parade*, developed from the old *chambre à parer*, this suite would later come to be known as the *appartement de parade* (usually translated as 'state apartment').

Here we note a further conceptual differentiation. Against the hitherto relatively stable idea of the appartement as a spatial suite designated for the use of a particular person, we witness the spatiality of the appartement itself coming to be differentiated—initially via a scalar distinction in grandeur—into specific sets of spaces, differentiated in terms of certain modes of use (rather than being different 'kinds' or 'types' of spaces, for reasons explained later). As we have seen in the case of the castle, this reconceptualization begins first where the traditional identification of the *corps de logis* with the principal lodging and the very logic of the *logis* came to be broken apart in its transductive relationship. In the Parisian *hôtel*, this breaking point occurs later on in a long process in which the *hôtel* comes to be topologically transformed into an integrated residential system of functionally-differentiated sub-en-

sembles of rooms.[175] And it occurs under somewhat different terms, because while we will start seeing a stronger differentiation of the internal arrangement of the *corps de logis*, it is a differentiation that occurs along multiple lines of differenciation.

Implementing a *Grand Appartement*, 1610–30s

This integration of a third suite, differentiated in both scale and grandeur from the two smaller residential spaces of the owners, turned out to be not only a great differentiating factor in the further evolution of the *hôtel,* as in the case of the châteaux of state functionaries; it was also the factor that would help qualitatively distinguish the building from ordinary ones, meaning, the *hôtel* proper from the *maisons* of the *particuliers*.

In this regard, the integration of a *grand appartement* into the *hôtel* must thus be understood as one of the crucial moments catalyzing a complex socio-spatial transvaluation process. As such, it cannot be investigated in isolation, as it would soon induce a new spatial differentiation into the established system of the town house that entirely overcoded its existing binaries. In this transvaluation process, the symmetry produced by the split lodging was coupled back to the problem of an externally-relevant axial alignment, but without leading to some simple symbolic equality or parity; what is more, it was directly tied to the complex intrinsic differences and organizational asymmetries within manifold spatial dispositions. As one of these intrinsic asymmetries, the *corps de logis* began to become more differentiated along gendered lines. Courtin notices the beginnings of a specific gender distinction coming to be drawn within residential planning practices around 1600, in allocating predominantly a single suite of rooms for women, mostly composed of two chambers, while usually providing two distinct suites for men, each usually composed of a single room.[176] He here speaks of a "spatial principle of inequality"[177] that is accentuated whenever one member of the couple was an active collector of things, or occupied an official function. With the adoption of a *grand appartement* in the houses of officials and later more generally, we note a moment in which this spatial asymmetry, articulat-

175 As such it can be identified as a first marker of a transformation sped up with the later appearance of deeper wings, where we find a spatial redistribution of gender, which repeats — if with a larger 'phase-delay' — the flattening of the stacked lodging into more parallel arrangements that had happened in the English and French royal castles during the 1530s–80s. See my chapter 2.3.

176 Courtin, "Hommes et femmes dans les hôtels," in *Prince, princesse et leurs logis,* ed. Chatenet and De Jonge, 268–9.

177 Ibid., 268.

ing a finely-layered system of distinction, gains momentum and comes to function as a marker of the host's membership to upper class society.

From a genetic perspective, however, we should be cautious not to reduce 'inequality' to an applied 'principle' of individuation, meaning that spaces were designed according to inequalities in social standing. Rather, as an immanent factor within spatial manifolds, this inequality is a differentiating factor. This means, more than directly representing any sense of individuality or class/group subjectivity, that it allows difference to occur within individuating or subjectivating processes, where spatial differentiations become the means by which interpersonal and social distinctions are drawn. They are thus actualizing certain virtual relations and making them more concrete. In our case, what the inclusion of the *grand appartement* as a differentiating factor brings into play is not a new parallelism, but a third term: a newly included middle-ground. Now, the plan of the *hôtel* accommodated a space commonly used by the couple on important occasions of state, when the couple could appear together, as a house. Or better: by means of which, because in its very structure, the *logis* had never actually facilitated this possibility. As such, it opened up a new phase space, where this newly-produced SPACE OF POSSIBILITY proves an important addition to the traditional gender topology of the *hôtel*.[178] But not being simply a conjugal space in the general sense of being shared, and far from leading directly to an 'architectural parity' as symbolically expressed in the layout of some royal palaces, this dynastic spatiality would find its expression in a more conjugated spatial diagram, facilitating much more differentiated forms of togetherness and social life.[179]

To sufficiently understand the complex interrelations of these transforming residential conceptions, these differentiation processes must be situated against the background, or rather, within the problematic field of the abovementioned formal planning problems: the position of the stair giving

178 Following the old aristocratic custom, the couple was leading a life together apart in apartments on separate floors (as a scheme wherein the female partner usually disposed of the upper floor; at least in town houses with a *corps de logis simple*). On this point, Elias reminds us that within elitist conceptions, marital life had the primary objective of continuing 'a house.' This form of marriage is defined not by the more conjugal spatiality of the bourgeoisie, but required a spatial organization that expressed this reproductive function. For respective studies, see—among others—Noémie Hepp's literary analysis *Dames en leur hôtels* (1989). I here rely on Courtin's analysis of inventories of Parisian *hôtels* in Courtin, "Hommes et femmes dans les hôtels," 258.

179 The conjugated spatiality that derives from this, cannot be reduced to the production of more gender-differentiated spaces that could be explained by essentialist views about masculinity of femininity; rather, it is more fully in terms of the couple's different reproductive function within various types of receptions, and the performative aspect that gender played within etiquette. But this analysis must take place elsewhere.

access to this differentiated space, and the increasingly complex plans deriving from the inclusion of service courts, , the increasing number of service spaces and servants, and so on. The spatial differentiation underlying the here evolving system of appartements is then tied to, on the one hand, the complexification of the plan and the social ensemble that is the house, and on the other hand the architectural attempts to arrive at a more systematic spatial response to this complexity. It is the tension arising from this complexity that can be felt in the plan of the *hôtel particulier* built for the contr-oler of finances, Mesme Gallet du Petit-Thouars (b.1624–29, prob. by Jean Androuet du Cerceau): the later Hôtel de Sully, ☒[30] residence of Maximilien de Béthune, duc de Sully, Henri IV's former chief minister. Here, the spatial inequality is expressed in a stronger differentiation of the sides around the principal axis, as well as between the two levels. Each of the three wings is still bisected by a central stair. The principal stair is placed in the middle of the main wing. Here, as Dennis notes, the architect cleverly tried—if to no avail—to intercept and hide many of the irregularities arising from the differing width of the court (reduced by one or two bays due to the side-wings) and the garden fronts. But where the asymmetric position of the stair helps maintain a continuous axis, it also contributes to a dissatisfactory asymmetry in garden facade, revealing that the axes of the building (the *vestibule*, or an *avant-corps*) and the court (in the form of the entrance gate) or garden (in the form of the paths and the parterre pattern), do not fall in line. In Dennis's analysis, this misalignment serves as the starting point for tracing a typological lineage emerging with some subsequent designs of the 1630s that more strategically employed and cleverly concealed such axial displacements in plans ordered along multiple shifting axes, which is arguably a defining trait of a distinct rococo-type of *hôtels* of the early 1700s.[180] [→ 3.1.3]

With respect to mapping the evolving system of appartements, we can here identify an even more affirmative way in which, in the internal arrangement, asymmetry is productively employed to distinguish the different suites from one another. Asymmetry, be it in the extrinsic size or in the intrinsic organization, is the individuating factor for their difference. To the left of the principal stair, the ground floor *salle* continued into a small *sall(ett)e* with *cabinet*, located in the wing next to the small garden.[181] On the upper floor,

180 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 52–57.

181 See the inventory A.N., Min. cen., **MC/ET/III/554** (May 5, 1634), transcribed by Courtin, "Corpus des hôtels parisiens du XVIIe siècle," no. XXII: hôtel de Sully; avail. online at http://www.centrechastel.paris-sorbonne.fr/sites/default/files/media/hotels/22_sully_intro.pdf.

we find the *grand appartement*: the space above the *salle* was subdivided into an *antichambre* and *chambre*, with a rear *cabinet*; another *cabinet* was located in the left side-wing, connecting to a gallery that filled the rest of the side wing. To the right, we have the duchess's apartment on the ground floor, composed of a *chambre*, preceded by a bypassed *garde-robe*, and connected to another smaller room in the side-wing, serving as *cabinet*.
The duke's apartment on the floor above had a similar disposition, with the exception that the vestibule opened directly on a *chambre* with the *garde-robe* in rear.

This asymmetrical organization would come to be dramatized when, during the 1620s–30s, a new element of convenience was incrementally integrated into the design of larger *hôtel* complexes especially: the *basse cour*, a separate, secondary court around which the service rooms such as kitchens, offices, stables, and coach houses are grouped.[182] It not only led to more complex plans, it also dramatized the latent misalignment in 'forcing an asymmetry' upon the residential complex, as Dennis writes.[183] He illustrates this formally in the case of the Hôtel de Bouillon ☒[31] (later called Liancourt). But, according to recent findings, the complex was not the outcome of an ex novo design. Instead, as Monique Etivant has revealed, it originated from a merger, when in 1612 the duc de Bouillon acquired the Hôtel Dauphin, located south of the Hôtel de la Reine Marguerite, along with a smaller neighboring property, which allowed for the extention and renovation of the existing *hôtel* (beg. 1612–13 by Salomon de Brosse, continued after 1635 by Jacques Lemercier for Roger du Plessis, duc de Liancourt).[184]

182 Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 136.

183 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 57.

184 According to Sauval, the *hôtel* was initially built for Louis III de Bourbon-Vendôme, duc de Montpensier (Sauval, *Histoire et recherces*, II, 67). Monique Etivant has demonstrated that Louis bought the property in 1572, containing "une grande maison consistant en trois grands corps d'hôtel, cour et jardin." See Etivant, comment on "Les 14, 16 et 18," La rue de Seine blog, posted online on Sep 30, 2017, at http://rue-de-seine.com/index.php/category/les-14-16-18/; here esp. §6 and 9. This complex — visible on the Quesnel map — seems to have consisted initially of a smaller *corps de logis* with gallery and a street-facing entrance building. If the arcaded gallery depicted by Quesnel is accurate, this would indicate that the wing left of the court probably accommodated a *galerie*, connected, customarily by a secondary stair. The plan also seems to indicate the former extent of this preexisting wing. Likely the extension was based on existing structures or foundations. On the Quesnel map we can discern existing neighboring buildings in positions that come rather close to the position of the wings in plan. Etivant's findings were not accounted for in older discussion of the *hôtel*, including Constance Toothe, "The Private Houses of Louis Le Vau," PhD diss., Univ. of London (1961); here 149–73; summarized in Rosalys Coope, *Salomon de Brosse and the Development of the Classical Style in French Architecture from 1565 to 1630* (London: Zwemmer, 1972), 56–74. It is also not yet accounted for in the description by Courtin, "Corpus des hôtels parisiens du XVIIe siècle," no. XIV: Hotel de Liancourt. Dennis, had dated the second phase to 1623; Tooth, as well as Braham and Smith, had argued that the



30 The Hôtel de Sully, built 1624–29, by Jean Androuet du Cerceau, on a lot just behind the south-west corner of the Place Royal (*top*).
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



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31 Floor plans and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Bouillon, later Liancourt-Rochefoucauld, build in stages 1612-35 by De Brosse and Lemercier on two joined existing properties. The upper floor plan is my own conjectural reconstruction, based on some detailed structural-organizational considerations.

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



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32 ***Left***, **floor plans and changing spatial organizationn of the Hôtel de Bazinière, in which the bisected model with central vestibule was transformed into a linear room organization.**
Level +01

Right, **floor plan of the Hôtel de Bautru, in which an externally-emphasized symmetry hides the organizational dissymmetries of the linear organization. The etching (*top*) shows the buildings strong volumetric articulation.**
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













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

33 Floor plans and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Bretonvilliers beg. 1635 by Du Certeau. The etching (*top*) shows the *galerie en retour* with view on the river Seine.

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

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What happens in this transformation reveals quite a lot about the complexity involved in such extension projects. As the plan still indicates, the older C-shaped *hôtel* consisted of a main wing with a more symmetrical organization, featuring a central stair that separated the *salle* (to the north) from an appartement with at least two rooms connected to the old *galerie* wing (now the wing between the two courts), presumably with more complementary spaces and service stairs. The extension of the *corps de logis* onto the neighboring property radically altered the organizational logic of this existing structure: the central stair was relegated to the old gallery wing,[185] which now came to lie in the middle of a rather long *corps de logis*. The latter was articulated into smaller segments by the addition of larger corner pavilions —with a similar symmetrical organization that De Brosses would develop in his Luxembourg design (b. 1615–31)—and a central *avant-corps*, behind which the vestibule, accessed from the principal stair, allowed access to multiple suites. In the resulting complex, the new wing accommodated two apartments for the proprietors atop one another, each consisting of a *salle* with several rooms in the quartered pavilion (partitioned into an *antichambre*, *chambre*, *cabinet*, and *garde-robe*).[186]

Complemented later by new the gallery closing the old court, the *grand appartement* thus occupied the top floor of the old *corps de logis*, newly subdivided into a number of smaller pieces, whose function and relation have proven difficult to reconstruct.[187] The plan as shown in Marot's engravings has a rather odd spatial logic, which the existing archival evidence does not help to clarify, but if we look at the position of segmenting walls as indicated by the chimney pieces and their direction in the successive rooms,[188] we can

second-phase main wing was "built or rebuilt" for Louis Petit in 1635. See Allen Braham and Peter Smith, *François Mansart*, 2 vols (London: A. Zwemmer, 1973), fig. 127.

185 The principal stair is quite likely a later enlarged one, in the position of a previous, as it happened in the extension of several contemporaneous such as the Hôtel d'Aumont.

186 See Courtin, "Corpus des hôtels parisiens du XVIIe siècle," no. XIV: Hotel de Liancourt, citing Gady.

187 The dating for this new gallery wing is uncertain as well. Braham and Smith have argued that the right gallery wing was built after 1652, but that would mean that the building had no gallery between Petit's adaptation of the old gallery wing in 1635 and 1652.

188 Previous reconstructions have ignored the thicker segmenting wall, with fire places, in the southern wing, depicted in Marot's ground floor plan of the *hôtel*, in his *Recueil des plans* (avail. online at e-rara) This is likely due to the fact that it is absent in the plans adjoining Marot's elevations (direct link to plan). On closer inspection, it is not representing the upper floor (as the unwashed walls in the protruding *cabinet* indicate, as well as the missing small *cabinets en saillie*, protruding in the corner where the pavilions and the *corps de logis* meet); more likely the drawing was 'cleaned up' to emphasize the central passage way. This is confirmed by the depiction of the respective chimney pieces, as shown in Silvestre's engraving, as well as Marot's garden elevation (link to plan). This means, that this wall must have existed on the upper floor, too. This realization allows



conjecturally reconstruct an upper floor divided into at least four main rooms: the *antichambre* (a function fulfilled here by the central vestibule), a *grand chambre*, behind which there was a smaller *chambre verte*. What is not visible in Marot's plans is that the latter had a direct connection to the *grand cabinet* (mentioned as a *cabinet aux tableaux attenant lad[ite] chambre,* hence an adjoining cabinet for artworks) via the added cantilevered *cabinets*. The last room appears to have accommodated a rear *antichambre*, or *anti-cabinet* for those accessing through the secondary staircase. There was also a fourth smaller suite (probably for winter use or for accommodating family members) installed in the old gallery wing, serviced like the other three suites from the still 'central' stair.

Relativizing Dennis's argument, it rather appears that in ex novo designs, architects indeed invested much of their intelligence in avoiding or hiding any formal asymmetry from both the inclusion of the *basse court* and the arrangement and internal differentiation of multiple apartments. In the

some structural speculations as the floor plan suddenly seems much more symmetrical: First, it would already give a more likely proportion of the *grand chambre*, if it was located in the northern corner. But this position is challenged, however, by a later inventory (A.N., Min. cen., **MC/ET/XCVIII/255** (July 16, 1674), transcribed by Courtin, avail. online at http://www.centrechastel.paris-sorbonne.fr/sites/default/files/media/hotels/14_liancourt_intro.pdf). It mentions a *cabinet* and *garde-meuble* (i.e. those rooms in the northern pavilion), to be adjacent to a so-called *chambre verte*, that also had a separate *antichambre*! If we try to make this compatible with the presence of a *grand chambre* with *antichambre* logically, another—also more classical—configuration seems more likely, as indicated in my conjectural plan.

34 Floor plans and spatial organization of the Hôtel de la Vrillière, built between 1635–50 by Mansart.
Level +01





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

35 ***Top and left***, **floor plan and spatial organization of the Maison Scarron (later Hôtel d'Aumont, *shown above*), beg. after 1631 by an uncertain architect, later extended around 1648 by Le Vau.** Level +01

36 ***Right***, **floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel d'Aubespine, transformed between 1627–1632 by Mansart.** Level +01





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Hôtel de la Bazinière ☒[32] (b. 1635 built by entrepreneur Simon Delespine for royal treasurer Macé Bertrand de la Bazinière), the designer initially avoided any arising asymmetry, with the service facilities outsourced onto the adjacent lot. Here too, we see a more bisected plan that still bears the formal (or design conceptual) traces of a central stair, which was replaced (whether already in the design phase or at a later stage in unclear) in favor of a single grand sequence of rooms (later ext. by François Mansart).[189]

A contemporaneous project in which this this grand sequence had been directly planned as such, was the Hôtel de Bautru ☒[32] (b. 1634–36, ext. 1665 for Guillaume II de Bautru). An early work, and first *ex nihilo* design of Louis Le Vau, the plan of this innovative building has been described as ingenious.[190] Yet, its novelty is also attested by the way the design remains rather formally unresolved; especially if we note how the building's external structuration into markedly articulated volumes (which recall more the form of a château than an urban residence[191]) does not match with the internal division, as it had a single *grand appartement* composed of a clear sequence of stairs, *salle*, *antichambre*, *grand chambre* with adjacent *garde-robe*, two smaller backrooms, with service corridor (probably with an unlocalizable secondary service stair), connecting to a grand *galerie*. In this project, too, a lateral service court mitigated the asymmetry or axial displacement, while saving space by being allocated a narrow strip occupied by a lateral gallery bordering the garden; one of the first *galeries en retour* after the Hôtel d'Aubespine ☒[35] and the first of Mansart's town house designs.[192]

In the case of the Hôtel de Bretonvilliers ☒[33] (beg. 1635 by Jean du Certeau, after 1638 possibly under Le Vau, for Claude Le Ragois de Bretonvilliers, secretary of the Conseil du Roi under Louis XIII), developed on a regular site on the south-eastern tip of the newly-developed Île Saint-Louis, the resulting asymmetry is mitigated by a more complex formal operation

189 This seems more likely, given that the contemporaneous Hôtel de Chevry (see below) with its similar plan is attested to have had one. See also Leproux, "L'hôtel de La Bazinière, quai Malaquais," in Babelon and Mignot, ed. *Mansart: Le génie*, 199–217.

190 The first illustrated compilation of Le Vau's designerly work, esp. his residential projects, by Cyril Bordier, *Louis Le Vau, architecte, Tome 1: Les immeubles et hôtel particulier parisiens* (Paris: L. Lages, 1998), was sharply faulted by historians. For a critical monographic study of Le Vau's work, see Alexandre Cojannot, *Louis Le Vau: et les nouvelles ambitions de l'architecture française, 1612–1654* (Paris: Picard, 2012), on the hôtel design (and its attribution to the invention of the then 22 year-old designer), see esp. ibid., 16–25. Here, an earlier reconstuction is provided that partly corrects an earlier attempt by Tooth ("Private Houses of Le Vau,' 508–18), after contract recorded in A.N., Min. cen., **MC/ET/VI**/234, and plans found in A.N. **N/III/**Seine-et-Oise/510/1–3.

191 Cojannot, *Louis Le Vau*, 18.

192 Braham and Smith, *François Mansart*, I: 31, also n1; on the design itself and its probable attribution to Mansart, see ibid., 34ff.

that, aside from including a gallery wing bordering the garden, is based on the segmentation of the principal block into pavilions, including a central avant-corps masking the misaligned axes of court and garden (French historians call this arrangement *plan désaxé*). On the inside the asymmetry helps articulate the hierarchical relation between the larger and smaller apartments. In contrast to the previous examples and closer again to the layout of the Hôtel de Bouillon, the stair was no longer located on the side opposite the service court. Here we also note a correlated change of position of the *salle*, swapped in its organizational attachment to the stair into the center, thus fulfilling the function of directly mediating between two suites.

A similar layout strategy characterizes one of the most notorious examples concerning the axial problematic: the Hôtel de la Vrillière ⊠[34] (b.1635–50 by François Mansart for royal secretary Louis Phélipeaux de la Vrillière). The building is situated in an urban quarter that constituted the principal experimental laboratory for residential design in the 1630s,[193] comprising the close-by Palais Cardinal (beg. 1628 by Lemercier), and the Hôtels Bautru (beg. 1634 by Le Vau) and Duret de Chevry (beg. 1635 by Thiriot). Located on a highly irregular plot, its plan, was characterized by an intelligent distribution of built masses and voids: a court with adjacent service court, the larger garden to the south, and a smaller one to the north west, later built over.[194] But the project started out as a rather regularized design on a cleared site, as Dietrich Feldmann has illustrated. The main court was aligned with the newly built street that ended on this plot, and for which the gate and court would become a visibly articulated endpoint. It also eased the entry of the coaches coming from the street. The axial displacement occurred only when in 1634, Richelieu bought part of the initially rather regularly-shaped property to enclose his garden and closed of all views into it with a row of pavilions. Thereby the garden was much curtailed, and as a result the garden axis had to be displaced to create as much depth as possible.[195] To accommodate the service court, additional pieces of neighboring land were bought from the

193 Cojannot, *Louis Le Vau*, 17.

194 Here Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 61. In the following I base my account on the detailed description in Dietrich Feldmann, "Das hôtel de La Vrillière und die Räume 'a l'italienne' bei Louis Le Vau," in *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte* 45, no.4 (1982), 395–422. See also the respective essay by Joëlle Barreau and Alexandre Gady, in *François Mansart*, ed. Babelon and Mignot, 147–51. Regarding this false emphasis on irregularity, one should note that in one oft-reprinted plan of the *hôtel* (see e.g. fig. 168, of Anthony Blunt's *Art and Architecture in France*, 136; also used in Dennis's *Court and Garden*) the garden gallery is drawn much more out of line with the court wings than is the case; as can be seen in the floor plans.

195 Feldmann, "Hôtel de La Vrillière," 397.

remaining block, which caused the irregular outline of the site. So, the intelligence of the design lies in the dynamic response to these circumstantial constraints and opportunities.

Attesting to the initial regularity, the *corps de logis*'s vestibule is placed in the axis of the entrance gate. From here, one accessed the *salle*, behind which the proprietor's apartment is located. It consisted of an *antichambre*, used as a *salle à manger* (serviced via the *basse cour*), and a *chambre*, next to which a *garde-robe* was situated toward the secondary court. The apartment of De la Vrillière's spouse Marie Particelli was located atop, accessed via the grand stair case and *salle haute*.[196] To the right of the vestibule, the ground floor opened on an *anticabinet* that gave access to three sequences: centrally it led to a library with a later added *cabinet*; to the court a *salle de passage* to the lower gallery; and to the garden: a *cabinet* leading to an orangery with aviary. These spaces were used for daily business and receptions. Above this sequence is the *grand appartement*, with a gallery, used for receptions on special occasions.[197] The side wings, initially one story, were both immediately heightened by another story. The left wing offers a smaller accommodation; the right wing, planned in all likelihood by Louis Le Vau, includes an *appartement de parade* consisting of an *anticabinet* and *cabinet* for business, an ostentatious "chambre de parade ceintrée a alcauve" (a vaulted room called *chambre à l'italienne*), and a *chambre à coucher*—in total the program of a small *hôtel* in itself, as Feldmann points out.[198] Around 1644, a staircase was added behind the west wing, reducing the small garden, in order to better access this portion as a third suite of rooms that—later occupied by a son—may have been used as a smaller winter apartment.[199] This schema thus presents a quite disciplined treatment of various multiplicities in space, constructed around an empty space along a central axis, but framed by well-calculated dissymmetries functioning according to a tripartite hierarchy.[200]

196 Ibid., 399.
197 Ibid., 402.
198 Ibid., 406–7.
199 Ibid, 406.
200 Formulation adapted from Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 17.

From Single-Room Ranges to Clustered and Doubled-Up Wings, 1630–40s

Going back to the Hôtel de Bretonvilliere, we should note another thing. Along with the displacement, the *corps de logis* was becoming broken down volumetrically and offset into staggered pavilion-like segments. Inspired by De Brosse's work, this volumetric staggering was more accentuated in an earlier plan of the Hôtel d'Aubespine ⊠[35] (reb. around 1627–32 by Mansart), where the strategy cleverly helped absorb the irregularities of the constrained lot. In this project, Mansart began to refrain from the formal scheme to articulate the principal *corps de logis* as a clear, continuous stripe stretching across the entire width of the plot. This clarity is broken by the principal stair, no longer positioned in front of the *corps de logis* but pushed one bay into it. With the resulting staggered plan, however, an axially-aligned access to the *salle* was facilitated on the upper floor. In return, the *salle* served two *chambres* on both sides. This scheme was directly imitated in the first phase of the more compact Maison Scarron (later Hôtel d'Aumont; beg. after 1631 by an uncertain architect, later ext. by Le Vau).[201] ⊠[35]

Moreover, it also inspired much of Le Muet's built work, in which he often moved beyond the basic scheme that his planning manual had promoted in stressing the didactic value of composing buildings by way of simple spatial stripes. This being merely a strategic starting point, Le Muet discards any formalism in favor of more practical arrangements. This practical but more complex solution is already prefigured in many plans of the *Manière,* namely, in the small awkward passageways partitioned off the *chambre*, which we see in many of the distributions of the *Manière*. The fact that Muet so easily discarded this formal strategy retroactively highlights that it was indeed only a didactic simplification to reach more practical arrangement. Here Le Muet would arrive at a certain base scheme (involving more of a morphogenetic model, and mode of planning, than presenting some 'prototype')—not only for his work, in which this more practical geometry was a

201 Tooth, "Private Houses of Le Vau," 515. See also Cojannot, *Louis Le Vau*, 244ff. The building arose from three adjoining plots with existing structures, that Le Vau rearranged and completely refaced between 1641/4–48. It was greatly extended by François Mansart for the Duc d'Aumont in 1656. Scholars have repeated that the grand stair in corner pavilion was 'added' in the 1660 by Mansart. But according to the internal logic, it seems more than likely that when Le Vau's added the right half in 1644–48, the principal staircase would have likely been transposed to this place before. Perhaps it was a still smaller staircase that—for reasons of symmetry—could have been a bay shorter to mirror the protrusion of the earlier staircase on the left. With Mansart's renovation and the implementation of a grander stair, those pavilions may have then been extended.

37 *Top*, floor plans of the Hôtel Lambert, built 1639–44 by Le Vau. Level +01/02

38 *Bottom left*, the Hôtel d'Hesselin, built 1641 by Le Vau. Level +01

39 *Bottom right*, the Hôtel d'Avaux, built 1644–47 by Le Muet. Level +01









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40 Site plan of various *hôtels* built by Le Muet, around the Palais Mazarin (*right top*) (the older 1635 to designs of Jean Thiriot), including the Hôtel Coquet (1639–44), the neighboring Hôtel Colbert de Torcy (1649–1655), and the serial *petit hôtel* Tubeuf (c. 1642)
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


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41 Location and floor plan of Le Muet's later, more clustered designs. The Hôtel de Chevreuse, later de Luynes, built between 1650–57.
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





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shared feature in a series of projects, but one that was also adopted and adapted by other architects.[202]

The formation of this base scheme can be seen in the early design, later extended, of the Hôtel Coquet ⊠[40] (b.1639–44), where we can see that basic disposition in its transitional stage where the structure of the passage is still visible, but the stair starts breaking through the wall.[203] In its model function, this scheme was also included among the augmentations for the *Manière,*[204] as it was the basis for Le Muet's subsequent designs for the various *hôtels* designed for Jacques Tubeuf in close proximity. In 1641, when Tubeuf had been nominated as controller-general of finances, he bought an unfinished *hôtel* ⊠[40] (beg. 1635 to designs of Jean Thiriot for Charles Duret de Chevry, a rich financier), initially designed with a plan with central stair resembling the Hôtel de Bazinière. In 1644, Tubeuf was starting to refurbish and extend the building by two superimposed apartments with *galeries* to designs of Mansart.[205] This extension went on after 1649, when Tubeuf sold the property to chief minister of state Cardinal Jules Mazarin,[206] who greatly extended the complex into what is now known as the Palais Mazarin. This sale was a direct result of the fact that the cardinal started letting two of the three, almost identical speculative town house projects, which Tubeuf—upon acquiring an adjacent lot stretching westwards along the rue de Petits-Champs in 1642—began building to a basic town house scheme designed by Le Muet.[207] It was the plan of the middle one, the so-called *petit hôtel* Tubeuf ⊠[40], that he would append to his augmented second edition of the *Manière* (1547), where it is shown as an idealized scheme isolated from its context.

After eventually selling the larger *hôtel* to the cardinal, Tubeuf charged Le Muet to build another *hôtel*, now known as the Hôtel Colbert de Torcy ⊠[40] (b.1649–1655), just south of the Hôtel Coquet. Its plan is a scaled-up version of Muet's basic design scheme, extended—in a way that recalls the arrangement of the left wings of the Hôtels de Bautru and Bretonvilliers—by a strip of two bays, accommodating more service spaces and a small service court, yet

202 That this classic design scheme proved quite adaptable can been seen in the fact that Marot relied on the basic model for his own design of an *hôtel* (c.1663 for Gabriel de Rochechouart, Duke of Mortemart) on a non-rectangular plot, which was included in Marot's *Architecture française*, f.41.

203 This transitional stage become especially visible in the respective plan shown in the Vasserot map. On the Hôtel Coquet, later called Desmarets, located at n°18 rue Vivienne.

204 See the "Plan d'un bastimant [sic] seiz [sic] rue vivien … ," in Le Muet, *Manière … augmentée et enrichie*, pl. F.

205 On the difficult-to-establish attribution of the 1644 design and its execution, see Braham and Smith, *Mansart*, 72.

206 See ibid., 71.

207 Ibid.

without the gallery being located in the garden. This plan features several innovative adaptations to the classic scheme, leading to fundamental reconfigurations. First notable also for its apparent lack of *antichambres* in the principal apartments, the ground floor accommodates, for instance, two larger rooms to both sides of the *salle*. Following the room labels in the *Manière*'s augmented plans, the northern room must have served as a petit *salle* doubled by an accompanying *cabinet*, used for dining. The practice of providing a more independently-accessed hall for setting up dinner emerged in the 1630–40s as a consequence of the introduction of antechambers and vestibules.[208] Here, the elongated festive hall, which would have been used both as a festive dining room and as a waiting room for visitors, was eventually replaced in favor of two rooms *en suite,* as Babelon relates: a dining room, or "*salle à manger*, born from the combination of the *salle* and the *antichambre*, and, following a longer development, a *salon*, born from the combination of the *salle* and the *chambre*."[209] While we see the first merger in Le Muet's plans, the second—to which we shall soon return—did not take place in Le Muet's projects. Instead, Le Muet first deals with another merger. It came from the recent practice of replacing the *garde-robe* traditionally adjoining the principal *chambre* with a bed niche to produce a so-called *chambre à l'alcôve*. Highly *en vogue*, here it is seen on the upper floor where the *salle* directly (i.e. without an intercalated *antichambre*) opens onto the *grand chambre*, directly connected (i.e. without *garde-robe* or *cabinet*) to a *galerie*. This immediate connection of a *salle* to a *grand chambre à l'alcôve* was already a feature of Mansart's plan for the Hôtel Chevry-Tubeuf; it can also be seen in the Hôtel de Beauvais ☒[44] (b. 1652 by Le Pautre), but here the function was taken over by a spacious vestibule.

Altogether, we thus see that his basic design scheme serves as a model that could be adapted freely to include many of the recent innovations according to his clients' varying desires for following these fashions in the organization of their apartments. For instance, in the *grand appartement* of the Hôtel de Chevreuse ☒[41] (beg. 1650–57 [1660?], the newer residence for Marie de Rohan, Duchess of Chevreuse) there was still an *antichambre* mediating between *salle* and the *chambre de parade* with alcove, which was followed by a secondary *chambre*, plus complementary rooms. On the ground floor, the same sequence is displaced and missing the secondary *chambre* through the intercalation of a vestibule between the *salle* and a

208 Gallet, *Paris Domestic Architecture*, 86ff.

209 Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 200; repeated by Lemerle, *L'émergence de l'hôtel particulier*, n.p. (online), §9 (my trans.).

square *antichambre* serving as *salle à manger*, opening onto a *chambre à l'alcôve*. Here, the left portion of the plan with the complementary rooms is innovatively clustered into a tripled range of rooms, wherein the central *garde-robe* is illuminated only by a small light-well.[210] In his earlier design for the Hôtel d'Avaux ⊠[39] (b. 1644–47, for diplomat Claude de Mesmes, Comte d'Avaux),[211] Le Muet had to adapt his design scheme more radically to deal with the irregular plot. As here the principal stair could not be relegated to its traditional position, he resorted to placing it on the lot's left perimeter wall. He arrived at a rather intelligent solution by eliminating the *salle* on the ground floor altogether, in favor of a vestibule creating a visual link from the entrance to the garden, while the *salle* was replaced by two smaller halls on the ground floor of the side wing: a dining room (*salle à manger*) and a separate commoner's hall (*salle des communs*) where the domestics ate. On the ground floor this leads to a not-fully-resolved layout, given the somewhat superfluous *chambre* (as it is generically labeled in the *Manière*'s augmented plans, but serving as a second *antichambre* with secondary access to the garden) preceding the *chambre à l'alcôve*. But on the upper floor, it allowed the creation of a grand sequence, closely resembling the core of the Hôtel de la Vrillière, of a vestibule, *antichambre*, and *chambre à l'alcôve* leading to a cluster of smaller rooms filling the residual space. This way, the top floor accommodates the traditional sequence of a *salle*, *antichambre* with access to the gallery wing, and the *chambre à l'alcôve* with its auxiliary service rooms.

While here the clustering of spaces, as a formal means, enabled innovative solutions, Le Muet's design scheme appears rather conservative when compared to the experiments conducted by his contemporaries, where the clustering and staggering were conceptually loosening the logic of the *corps de logis* toward a new aggregate form. One notable example is the oft-mentioned Hôtel Hesselin ⊠[38] (b. 1641 by Le Vau for head of the royal household, Louis Hesselin, seigneur de Condé).[212] Built by a designer particularly keen on

210 On the design of the new Hôtel de Chevreuse, later called Hôtel de Luynes, see Mignot, "L'escalier dans l'architecture Architecture Française," passim; and id, "La galerie au XVIIe siècle: continuités et ruptures," *Bulletin Monumental* 166, no.1 (2008), 15–20, here 17–18.

211 For a discussion of the *hôtel*, now known as the Hôtel de Saint-Aignan, see Michel Le Moel, "L'hôtel de Saint-Aignan à Paris," *Cahiers Saint Simon* 5 (1977), 76. See also Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 61–69. See also the related historical sketch on the website of the Musée d'art et d'histoire du Judaïsme occupying the *hôtel* today, by Claude Mignot, posted online Nov 3, 2015 at https://www.mahj.org/fr/decouvrir-musee/l-hotel-de-saint-aignan.

212 On the design, see Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, esp. 196–7; and Feldmann, "Hôtel de La Vrillière." For a discussion focusing more closely on its street-fronting *galerie*, and its newer proximity to the principal stair, see Mignot "La Galerie au XVIIe siècle," and Courtin, "Ameublement des galleries dans les hôtels parisiens du XVIIe siècle," *Bulletin Monumental* 166, no.1 (2008): 63–70; here 63ff; and id., "Corpus des hôtels parisiens du

formal experimentation, here we see an interesting architectural arrangement that (aside from repositioning the *galerie* as a space of display closer to the principal stair) "seems to consist of a cellular structure freely resolved as an assemblage of singular rooms offset to one another" as Feldman writes.[213] Allowing a more flexible pattern of circulation, this intelligently staggered composition was centered around the central room: a so-called *salon à l'italienne*, which alludes to the fact that the central *sala* within Italian residences was often two stories high. Alluding to an new way of living and sociality,[214] this doubled room height introduces a further qualitative distinction between the hall and the chambers, which had previously shared the same room height. Instead it repeats the existing height differentiation that had existed within the French suite of rooms between the principal rooms themselves and their accompanying service spaces, where intermediate ceilings had often been installed. The height differentiation further helped articulate and distinguish *salle(s)*, *chambres*, and auxiliary spaces, as three different spatial zones.

Le Vau gave the classic disposition of the town house another "imaginative twist"[215] with his design for the Hôtel Lambert ☒[37] (b.1639–44 by Le Vau for Jean-Baptiste Lambert on the Île Saint-Louis). This project, Dennis argued, marks a tangible turning point in French residential design history.[216] The turn lies not only in its stylistic employment of figurally-shaped rooms into the plan (taken up through the contemporary critical engagement of French baroque designers with Italian Renaissance theorists), but also in the way the residential spatial arrangements started moving away from a relatively simple alignment of rooms and tend to a more complex configuration of rooms arranged into an intricately concatenated and interlocked "field."[217]

XVIIe siècle," no. XI: hôtel Hesslin. See also the resp. chapter in Tooth, "Private Houses of Le Vau."

213 Feldmann, "Hôtel de La Vrillière," 417 (my trans.).

214 As Feldman argued, the *salon* or *chambre a l'italienne* became a socially-effective form of representation generating a feeling of mutual understanding and recognition be-tween host and guest about their shared modern idea of living, rooted however in a classic idea of power, as the central hall within Italian palaces goes itself back to the basilical organization of old architectures of power (ibid., 17–18). Cf. Frommel's discussion of the new way of living within the centrally-organized plan of Italian residences.

215 Braham and Smith, *Mansart*, 34.

216 Here Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 70–75. For the Hôtel Lambert, designed originally for the Jean-Baptiste Lambert a rich financier, but finalized and eventually occupied by his younger brother Nicolas, who later became president of the Chambre des Comptes, see ibid., see also Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 140–43; Tooth, "Private Houses of Le Vau"; and Courtin, "Corpus des hôtels parisiens du XVIIe siècle," no. XII: hôtel Lambert. For a monographic discussion, see Cojannot, *Louis Le Vau*, 79–101.

217 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 72–75.



42 THE CORPS DE LOGIS DOUBLE:
Floor plans of the Hôtel Tambonneau, beg. in 1639 by Le Vau, showing the mirrored directionality between *salle* and *chambre* on the upper and lower floor.
Level 00/01





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


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
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
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43 THE CORPS DE LOGIS DOUBLE II: ***Previous page left,*** **floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel Chalon-Luxembourg.**
Level +01

Previous page right, **floor plans and spatial organization (*bottom left*) of the Hôtel de Jars (*shown above*), begun 1648 by Mansart, with its original (*black*) and extended distribution of rooms (*white*).**
Level 00/+01

44 ***This page top,*** **floor plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Beauvais built between 1654–55 by Le Pautre.**
Level +01



45 Bottom, plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Lionne begun in 1661 by Le Vau.
Level +01

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Here it was a compositional strategy to resolve the axial turn between entrance and river-side garden. But this strategic transition from sequences to fields was perhaps most famously exemplified by the Hôtel de Beauvais ☒[44] (b. 1654–55 by Antoine Le Pautre for Catherine Bellier, wife of Pierre de Beauvais, and first lady-in-waiting of queen mother Anne of Austria).[218] In the plan of this project, realized as an extension of an existing structure on an extremely irregular site, we see an increased degree of compositional and organizational freedom emerging (=**PHASE SPACE**); a new "freedom of the plan" that arose from the playful manner in which the rooms came to be configured into more multilayered and interlocked figures and figure-ground relations.[219] In this respect, the latter configuration is still to be understood as a **HIGHER-ORDER EMERGENT CONSTRAINT**, as I will later substantiate; as an organizational constraint that arises within this field of possibilities, and more specifically in the way these elements mutually determine and delimit one another in scale and position.

Morphogenetically speaking, this degree of freedom was opened up by the building's deeper main wing. This happened around 1650, as Lemerle summarizes, when "the simple *corps de logis* and linear room sequences … were [incrementally] given up in favor of a doubled *corps de logis*," in which the arrangement of rooms in two parallel ranges "not only increased the available space but also greatly facilitated the distribution, as the number of rooms was multiplied and at the same time disentangled from the layout of the ground floor."[220] The double-up structure allowed for the resolution of many of the problems that had haunted the single range structure, especially regarding the incorporation of a central stair. Here, a solution that gained considerable momentum was to arrange the stair alongside a central vestibule placed on the entrance axis, with a *salon* behind, so that a line of visibility was achieved. Another noteworthy reconfiguration concerns the disentanglement of the *chambre de parade* and the *chambre de retrait/à coucher* that traditionally followed it in the *corps de logis simple*. With the doubled up *corps de logis*, the latter was soon taken out of the principal enfilade and outsourced into the second range. Forming an increasingly independent suite of rooms,

218 For a monographic study, see Robert W. Berger, *Antoine Le Pautre: A French Architect of the Era of Louis XIV* (New York: NYUP, 1969), here 37–46; and also the recent book by Bernard Fonquernie, and Thomas Berthod, *L'hôtel de Beauvais* (Paris: Artrelia, 2019).

219 For Dennis's respective analysis Ibid., 73–75; on its relation to the free plan, see also Colin Rowe, Fred and Koetter, *Collage City* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), esp. 78; for its baroque aspects, see also Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 197. For a wider study of Le Pautre's work, see Berger's, *Antoine Le Pautre*.

220 Lemerle, "L'émergence de l'hôttheculier," §10 (my trans.).

this smaller apartment was thus no longer symmetrically juxtaposed to the grand one, as we have seen before, but came to be placed alongside it. The resulting two parallel suites were differentiated by their grandeur, meaning both their sheer scale and the related socio-spatial function for being inhabited or for receiving guests. Note that in the Hôtel de Jars, ☒[43] however, the *chambre de parade* was initially relegated to the court-facing room range, due to its classic connections to the gallery.

The organizational potential connected to this differentiation was likely one of the principal reasons why this model started to be embraced as a general disposition for the layout of larger *hôtels* too. Le Vau's Hôtel Tambonneau ☒[42] (beg. 1639 for President of the *chambre des comptes* Antoine Tambonneau) was among the first designs to embrace this two-range solution in its organizational possibilities. Unfortunately no plans of it beyond simple building outlines have survived, so that one can only speculatively reconstruct some of its internal features.[221] Certainly, we have to use the label 'first' with caution here, since this doubling had appeared several decades earlier on more constrained, narrow lots such as in the Hôtel de Chalon-Luxembourg ☒[43] (c. 1623–25 perhaps by Jean Thiriot for treasurer Guillaume Perrochel).[222] As can be seen in my reconstruction, here the single range of rooms was not monumentally bisected along the traditional *salle*/*chambre* distinction, but more pragmatically broken and folded onto itself, now forming a structure of rooms two ranges deep.[223] A wider constraint for townhouses built on smaller lots, building into the depth presented the most viable solution to generate sufficient squaremetrage for accommodating all required rooms. In this regard, this folded disposition for lesser houses added another layer of complexity to the two scale-dependent systems of organization that Le Muet was at the same time trying to contradistinguish: the (traditional, practical, and more general) linear arrangement and the (more distinguished, monumental,

221 For a monographic treatment and reconstruction of the Hôtel de Tambonneau, see esp. ch. 17, in Cojannot, *Louis Le Vau*, 185–204; on the distribution and amenities, see ibid., 193ff.

222 See Babelon, *Demeures parisiennes*, 196.

223 As can be reconstructed from the regular position of the court-facing windows, it appears that the original plan looked slightly different from the one recorded by later cadastral maps, reprinted in previous studies. In spite of its visual axis, one entered the building via the axially-offset principal door in the lateral stair case. From here one customarily accessed the *salle* (the subdivisions recorded in later plans of this room on the ground floor into a vestibule and some smaller rooms must have been carried out at a later point). It most probably, led to a central *antichambre* that served two lateral *chambres* in the rear range of rooms; at least the position of the chimney in the central room speaks against the possibility that this range comprised a lateral *antichambre* with two subsequent *chambres*. With the later changes these central room became a *salon*, with one lateral room being likely used as a grand *cabinet*.

and specific) bisected model. Here the folded disposition actually reposed and transformed this categorical distinction. Instead of marking some sort of beginning, the Hôtel Tambonneau simply marks a point of transgression, and a transposition; his folded disposition was found an adequate solution for the layout of a larger *hôtel*. This may have been possible because it was indeed the *maison* of a noble of the robe.

This transposition was further actualized when Mansart—among his multiple residential projects in the 1640s—employed a doubled *corps de logis* in the Hôtel de Jars ⊠[43] (b. 1648 just east of the Tubeuf/Mazarin complex, for François de Rochechouard, commandeur de Jars) for the first time for the residence of a noble of the sword. In the present analysis, I cannot provide an answer to the interesting question how the *corps de logis double* became an acceptable spatial dispositif for a member of one of the oldest noble houses in France.[224] But acknowledging that there is a certain lineage implies to critically contest how previous scholarship has only described this transposition on a formal level by reifying this doubling up of the *corps de logis* by a second row of rooms as a "veritable revolution" in the organization of French residential design.[225] In this statement, however, the underlying reasons for this transformation remain relatively obscure. There are certainly morphological hypotheses arguing that the doubling occurred in Mansart's intention to take full advantage of the narrow plot,[226] yet with around 17 *toises* (c. 33m) the plot is only slightly smaller than that of the Hôtel Tubeuf (c. 18.5 *toises*), and much larger than the that of the Hôtel de Ligneris (c. 14 *toises*), and the Tambonneau plot was even a few *toises* wider. To this measure, sheer spatial constraint cannot be a sufficient explanatory factor; at least not in the same way as it would for resolving really narrow plots. Instead, I would suggest, this doubling presented an **ENABLING CONSTRAINT.** It allowed Mansart to better mitigate the persistent problem of the broken alignment between the axes of court and garden, which we see clearly in both the Tambonneau and Jars design. As Köhler has noted, the placement of the stair "presented a compromise" between the monumentalal placement of the stair in the center and the corner placement in favor of a larger suite of rooms.[227] With its more complex

224 Aside from its potentially-symbolic meaning regarding the denigrated status of the Commander, who had greatly fallen out of Richelieus' favor during the 1630s, was exiled and later barely escaped execution, I suspect the design decision for this disposition to be probably based on practical considerations that the lost representational function allowed in effect.

225 Here Babelon, *Demeures parisiennes*, 196.

226 Here Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 61.

227 Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 160.

spatial organization, allowing far easier access, this building was much more conveniently organized than earlier designs,[228] and as such contemporaries lauded the *hôtel* to be one of the most commodious of its time. It not only marked a new stage within Marsart's evolving designs, due to its more abstract qualities, but it also proved a landmark in the evolution of *hôtel* design in general.[229]

Causes for the Doubling-Up of the *Corps de Logis*

Resorting to an arrangement with a doubled-up plan, with two contiguous room ranges that allow for a more complex configuration of spaces may have been a stroke of genius indeed. But for our genealogical analysis something else is even more striking: namely that, with this intermediary position of the stair in the doubling up of the *corps de logis,* the two alternative and somewhat incompatible[230] arrangements of the *corps de logis simple* which we

228 See Braham and Smith, *Mansart*, 78.

229 See ibid., 77 and 68.

230 That this question concerning the two incompatible models was not entirely settled into a normative answer, until late into the late 17th-century, can be also seen in the extension of the Hôtel de Guise. Built on the site of the ancient Hôtel Clisson (b. 1371–75) whose turreted entrance gate still survives, the Hôtel de Guise, residence of the Dukes of Guise, is now incorporated in the ensemble built by Pierre-Alexis Delamair, for François de Rohan, prince de Soubise, who bought and completely remodeled the site after 1700. As Patricia M. Ranum discovered, the building was renovated in 1666 by Jacques Gabriel. See Patricia M. Ranum, "'Feindre des poutres pour faire Simmetrie aux vrayes': La rénovation de l'hôtel de Guise, 1666–1667," in *Histoire et Archives* 10 (Jul-Dec 2001); see also the content on Ranum's personal website at http://ranumspanat.com/feindre_hotel.html. Ranum published two plans drawn after BnF Etampes, VA/419/J, Tome 9 (4), avail. online at http://ranumspanat.com/images/guise%20plan%20I.jpg; and the A.N., AB/XIX/600, avail. online at http://ranumspanat.com/images/guise%20plan%20IIa.jpg. According to Ranum's findings, the Hôtel de Guise consisted originally of the buildings meandering around two courts. With Gabriel's extension the *corps de logis* on the main court was restructured, as its ground floor was initially bisected by a passageway or vestibule from which an apartment consisting of three rooms (*antichambre*, *grand chambre*, *chambre*) and complementary cabinets and *galerie* was accessed. To the left of the vestibule was a kitchen. Gabriel merged the latter, the vestibule, and *antichambre* into a larger *salle*, and complemented the *corps de logis* by a grand stair in a new wing on the garden that gave access to the state apartment on the upper floor. To not traverse the *salle* when accessing the upper rooms, the new stair was accessible through a passage circumnavigating the enlarged *salle* via a small side court to the south. The upper apartment consisted of a *grand-salle*, *antichambre*, and *grand chambre*, complemented by a grand *cabinet* in a pavilion to the garden, and a series of rooms (*chambre*, *cabinet* and *garde-robe*) in the sidewing that connected to the secondary lodgings. In the later rococo palace, these rooms will become an *antichambre*, *salle d'assemblée*, *chambre de parade*, behind which a newly-added oval *sallon*, hinging to tract with a *chambre à coucher*, and *salle du dais* where added; complemented by a service tract with *garde-robe* and *cabinet*. It is due to this transformation that later architects obviously struggled with the organizational problem that ground floor *salle* had to be traversed to enter the upper floor. In 1703, Jules Hardouin-Mansart would devise two — seemingly unconvincing — variants: one with a vestibule, partitioned off the *salle*; one with the grand stair relocated in the norther gallery wing. For Hardouin-Mansart's initial project of 1703, see the plans documented in the BnF département

have seen diverge into separate stands [→3.1.1], were here strung together again into a single lineage that, as we shall see, was leading up to the emerging rococo-type *hôtel*. Here, however, scholarship has never sufficiently stressed or made explicit enough that this lineage more generally derives from a typological convergence. This SYMPOIETIC becoming concerns the fact that aside from formally converging with the planning of minor urban residences, through its doubling-up, the planning of town houses also more widely re-converged with the planning of the larger country residences.

As we have seen in the last Part [→2.1], these too—if much earlier—had started diverging along a somewhat separate morphological lineage, drawn by the more clustered, symmetrical structures of the royal hunting castles, the larger Châteaux de Chambord and Madrid, or the Châteauneuf-de Saint-Germain, the Tuileries palace. In the seventeenth century, then, this lineage was initially continued by the abovementioned Palais de Luxembourg, and other designs where this H-shaped scheme progressively grows into more bone-like arrangements with staggered and clustered side wings. We see this clearly in two subsequent designs by Le Vau: the Château de Raincy ☒[46] (b. 1643–50, for intendant of finances Jacques Bordier) and the Château de Vaux-le-Vicomte ☒[46] (b. 1656–61, for superintendent of finances Nicolas Foucquet), the first château built in the grand manner that would become characteristic of Louis XIV's reign. In the first case,[231] the central part of the plan features a deeper, but still mostly one-room deep structure, a so-called *corps de logis semi-doublé*, with a cluster of rooms in the two flanking pavilions. Here the central oval portion forms a vestibule with a spacious stair to the left side, leading to the oval *salon* atop. It separated two suites. To the left, there was a smaller apartment comprising a larger square

Estampes et photographie, RES HA-18 (A, 5)-FT 4, ark: 12148/btv1b53050236f; and HA-18 (22)-FOL, ark: 12148/btv1b69390452.) The final alteration to Delamair's design, turned the building's orientation by ninety degrees, adding the grand entrance court accessed from the rue Francs-Bourgeois. The thus produced longitudinal orientation of the main *corps de logis* was hidden by incorporating the apparently already existing southern side-wings into a 'screen' mimicking a transversal block at the end of the entrance court. For monographic studies of the Hôtel de Guise-Soubise, see Charles-Victor Langlois, *Les hôtels de Clisson, de Guise & de Rohan-Soubise au Marais* (Paris: Librairie Jean Schemit, 1922), avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6379895w/; and Jean-Pierre Babelon, "Nouveaux documents pour la restauration de l'hôtel de Guise, 58 rue des Archives," in *La vie urbaine* (Jul–Sep 1965); and also Philippe Béchu and Christian Taillard, *Les hôtels de Soubise et de Rohan* (Paris: Somogy, 2004.

231 For the Château du Raincy, see Robert W. Berger, "Louis Le Vau's Château du Raincy," *Architectura* 6, no.1 (1976), 36–43; and id., "Berger, "Louis Le Vau's Château du Raincy: an addendum," *Architectura* 14, no.2 (1984), 171–71. See also the research and digital reconstruction by Franck Devedjian, available on the French wikipedia site at https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Château_du_Raincy.

46 LE VAU'S MID-SEVENTEENTH CENTURY CHÂTEAUX DESIGNS: Floor plan and spatial organizations of the Château de Raincy (*top*), built between 1643–50; the Château de Saint-Sepulchre (*center*), built between 1654–62; and the Château de Vaux-le-Vicomte (*bottom*), built between 1656–61.

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











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47 Floor plan and spatial organization of the Palace of Versailles, illustrating the first phases of extension beg. 1660s, with the *enveloppe* in 1668 by Le Vau around the old structure. While the extended structure was designed to accommodate to equal suites of rooms for the King and Queen (*left diagram*), this symmetrical organization was later radically broken in favor of a set of differentiated apartments to the King's use (*right diagram*), as effectuated in later the extensions of the palace's third building campaign (after 1678) by Jules Hardouin-Mansart.

Level +01

chambre (likely serving as an *antichambre* and *salle à manger*) with *cabinet* en suite to the garden, and a smaller *chambre* with access to several smaller spaces to the court. And to the right, the *grand appartement* composed of a *chambre à l'italienne*, a *chambre de parade* (called '*chambre d'orée*'), and two *cabinets* en suite.

In the second case,[232] the vestibule with its two symmetrical and smaller stairs and the *salon* had been placed together on the same level in a deeper and more clustered structure. This combination had appeared a little earlier in the Château de Saint-Sepulchre ☒[46] (b. 1654–62 for Louis Hesselin) as a single-story structure. In the designs by either Louis Le Vau or his brother Francois,[233] the *salon* was initially turned by ninety degrees[234] and the two room ranges more intricately offset to one another, so as to maintain a rather rigid external geometry. In Vaux-le-Vicomte, it protruded outward from the main structure, so that its axis was in line with the enfilade in the rear. The two lateral apartments were here more equal in size and configuration, each composed of an *antichambre*, *chambre*, and *cabinet* along the enfilades, complemented by another larger square room used initially as a secondary *antichambre/salle à manger* (with adjoining service space used as a buffet) and later as a 'summer salon' (*salon d'été*), as well as a smaller *chambre* with work *cabinet* in the fronting pavilions. The only difference here lies in the *appartement des bains* accommodated in the portion recessed between the corner pavilions of the left half, which was designed expressly as an *appartement du roi* to flatter the young Louis XIV,[235] who would shortly after take up the plan to enlarge the Château de Versailles ☒[46].[236]

In both cases, the placement of the stair in the center was given up in giving the *salon*—as the center of social life—the central position in the building. As Norbert Elias has noted, this differentiation cannot be understood in isolation from the evolving requirements of the aristocracy to keep up appearances, which formed their social reality, and the related changes in the social structurations of this space of appearance. We will return to Elias's studies in more detail later; here it is sufficient to note that a major change

232 For the château de Vaux-le-Vicomte, see Jean-Marie Pérouse de Montclos, and Georges Fessy, *Vaux le Vicomte* (Paris: Scala, 2008; orig. pub. 1997).

233 See Robert W. Berger, *Palace of the Sun: The Louvre of Louis XIV* (University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1993), 17. For the attribution and a list of related literature, see ibid., note 33.

234 Cf. here the contemporary Château de Turny (beg. 1654), included in Marot's *Architecture française*, n.p. [63].

235 Fourquet's intention eventually backfired as he was arrested in 1661 for the supposed misappropriation of public funds, and the property seized to the King.

236 See Babelon, "De Vaux à Versailles," passim.

occurs in the transforming social function that accompanies the transition of the *salle* into the *salon*. As we have seen, the *salle* had always existed twice, in two different socio-spatial functions: traditionally one distinguished the *salle basse,* as a larger recreation room on the lower floor, in which the entourage of visitors sojourned, while the visitors themselves were entertained on the upper floor, in the *salle haute* or *grand-salle*.[237] Traditionally it was not counted as part of the apartment itself, but in some sense extraterritorial to it. In the Parisian town house, we saw this distinction coming to be transposed horizontally through the differentiation of the lower halls into two *salles*: a *salle à manger*, coming to be attached to the suite of rooms, while still staying independent, and in the 1640s a designated *salle commun* in the service area. It just more clearly distinguished spaces for two different social strata.

By contrast the *grand-salle*, which in its own representative genealogy and function as a festive dining hall remained a unique feature of upper class residences,[238], was undergoing a different differentiation. Being a socio-spatial hybrid formed from the functional merger of the *salle* with the *chambre*, as Babelon notes[239] the *salon* became integral for facilitating more frequent social gatherings such as the hosting of a *salon*. In the Hôtel de Rambouillet this event still took place in the rooms of the marquise; in later châteaux and *hôtels*, we will see this eventspace coming to slowly take form as a separate suite of rooms: a so-called *appartement de société*, as it would be called in the eighteenth century, but which at this stage was still an implicit structure. This term is somewhat difficult to render in English; it denominates a third set of spaces, reserved for the entertainment of family members and friends on various afternoon gatherings such as soirées or concerts. Designed as a more frequently-used eventspace, it had an intermediary degree official in character, between the *grand appartement* and the smaller ones.[240] These spaces were thus, strictly speaking, not 'public rooms' or 'rooms for public display' where official business were transacted; instead, they facilitated the specific interstitial social space needed for the socialization activities of select groups among the elite and their specific forms of bonding.[241] The

237 Eleb and Debarre, *Architectures privée*, 297.

238 See Pardailhé-Galabrun, *Naissance de l'intime*, 61. As is the case with the following comments on the differentiation of *salle*, I take these insights from Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 110–5; here 111n325.

239 Babelon, *Demeures Parisiennes*, 200; see also my note 209 above.

240 See Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 267 n24.

241 This becomes more evident in the later room designations of the various *salles* as a *salle d'assemblée* [assembly/gathering hall] and *salle de compagnie* [lit. hall for company] make evident. I will come back to this in chapter 3.3.

introduction of the intermediary space was closely tied to these bonding mechanisms. Yet, as they also involved a spatial selection process, this facilitation entailed a further socio-spatial differentiation of this spatiality, as it was soon coming to be divided into multiple, more specific reception *salles*, *salettes*, and complementary *cabinets*, suiting the customary course of events during these gatherings.

In this sense, an *appartement de société* emerged out of a further differentiation resulting from the aforementioned merger of the *salle* and *chambre* into the *salon* (something that did not happen in the merger of the *salle* and *antichambre* into the *salle à manger*, as the latter was simply part of the general multiplication of *antichambres*). As a space producing a certain collectivity, or helping establish a certain group subjectivity through spatial selection processes, the formation of this third suite is particularly well disposed to be reconsidered in assemblage-theoretic terms. Here we should note that, both as an intermediary spatiality between the larger and smaller suites, and in its internal differentiation, the formation of this group of rooms repeated, on a higher organizational level, the multiplication of *antichambres* between the *salle* and the *chambre* in the royal castles a century earlier. But contrary to the multiplication of the *antichambre*, which was in the process of constituting an APPARATUS OF CAPTURE as I have argued [→ 2.3], the later emergence of the *salon* and the *appartement de société* was characterized by a different, more general, and more open form of bonding.

Here, a number of scholars have already foregrounded the emancipating and empowering effects of this differentiation, as it opened up a space of possibility to dismantle (or at least undermine) the subordinate social position of women, and allow them to gain more equal footing.[242] Salons and

242 In this regard, any historical account is incomplete without accounting sufficiently for the encompassing ways in which women, locked into the house — less a home than a reproductive socio-economic structure and socio-spatial arrangement — were kept from many means of self-determination, thus rendered an agent of social reproduction of a patriarchally-organized legal, economic, and social structures (i.e. property, household, family). Within this dispositif of power, this reproductive agency had just dramatically been redefined in the gynocidal attack on women during the era of witch-hunting, which, peaking between the 1580s and the 1630s, coincided with a time when feudal social relation gave way to economic and political institutions characteristic of mercantile capitalism, and its novel specification and commodification of class relations. See Federici, *Caliban and the Witch*, here esp. 14–5 and 166, It is in this time, that novelist and translator Marie Le Jars de Gournay's proto-feminist treatises *Égalité des Hommes et des Femmes* (*Equality Between Men and Wome*n, 1622) and *Grief des Dames* (Complaints of Ladies, 1626), will expose the misogynist prejudices based upon which women were denied access to knowledge, property, and public offices. Repub. in Marie Le Jars De Gournay, *Apology For the Woman Writing and other works*, ed. and trans. Richard Hillmann and Colette Quesnel (Chicago/London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2007.

their adjacent cabinets (as well as the later 'withdrawing rooms') allowed women to briefly escape from a life of representing the house;[243] but more importantly they also allowed them to participate more actively in a variety of social events. Countering the wider social exclusion of women, these events offered them a platform for more fully demonstrating their level of knowledge, appear as equals, and thus stake their claims to power,[244] for instance by gaining a leading function in hosting these events. Thus helping redefine their social role, the salons established a more subaltern than alternative form of affective bonding by means of specifically female-dominated relational techniques that often undermined existing social demarcations. In this regard, the formation of the *salon*, greatly institutionalized by progressive women such as the Marquise de Rambouillet, and its close connection to the strategic employment of the transformative potential of built projects by powerful and cultured female court members such as Catherine de' Medici, Diane de France, Marguerite de Valois and Marie de' Medici), ought to be appreciated as a spatial catalyst for social transformation processes. Here, the merger of the extraterritorial *salle* with the *antichambre* had a greater deterritorializing effect.

But the differentiation of this collective space is also tied to a second form of bonding with an equally deterritorializing effect. It is this second aspect that is important for understanding the emergence or apparition of this newly-differentiated spatiality of appearance. This apparition and the related co-transformation of social and spatial structures, I will argue, is coupled to a very different formal (or morphological) cause . To get to this causal level, let us note that—to the extent that we see this differentiation first in rural residences—it should be reconsidered as a further step in the ongoing evolution of the *château* type. From this angle, it is easy to note a clear morphogenetic and genealogical relationship to the *châteaux*'s older dispositif, where—before the involution of the central stair—the *corps de logis* was organized with a more-or-less central *salle* giving access to two asymmetrical suites of rooms [→ 2.1–3]. Thanks to the doubling up, this older dispositif could now finally be combined with a central stair, leading to a much more resolved arrangement in which the *salle*-turned-*salon*, coupled to the principal stair, became the hinge of a plan differentiated into two suites of reception rooms, distinguished according to their degree of official-

Here after Margaret L. King and Albert Rabil Jr.'s "Introduction to the Series 'The other voice in Early Modern Europe,'" in Gournay, *Apology*, vii–xxvi; here xxii.

243 Ibid.

244 Ibid.



48 Diagram of the epigenetic differentiation of the *corps de logis*.

ity and respective grandeur.[245] Dennis speaks of a fruitful "principle of discontinuity" that Le Vau thus introduced in the internal planning.[246] Here an internal, organizational dissymmetry could be produced in spite of—and thus somewhat decoupled from—the requirement of external symmetry. Since this older dispositif had also survived in the classic disposition of the town house, and especially the larger residences where the problem of accommodating two different suites was persistent, here the planning of rural and urban residences largely converged around the new organizational possibilities that this disposition opened up.

From this perspective, during the mid-seventeenth century, residential planning practices for the distinct genres of *châteaux*, *hôtels*, and *maisons* were becoming progressively 'flattened' onto one and the same conceptual level, and generalized concerning a more shared planning problematic, thus implicitly continuing Le Muet's aim to arrive at a general strategy for planning architecture and organizing residential spaces as a socio-spatial system. The emerging *corps de logis double* thus flattened out many of the transductive relations and stratifications pertaining to the logic of the *logis*, and allowed for a more flexible organization by way of intercalated rooms and room sequences. Some *hôtel* designers did indeed imitate and experiment with the novel disposition of a central *salon* with two mirrored suites,[247] following and extending the morphological lineage of the bisected model. But the doubled plan was predominantly resolved in a way closer to the lineage of its more conservative disposition, that two different suites were now accessed from the principal stair via the vestibule: a smaller one leading to the court and a larger one containing the *grand-salle*, to the garden. This is also the case in the abovementioned Hôtel de Beauvais, as well as in the Hôtel de Lionne ☒[45] (beg. 1661 by Le Vau). In contrast to the Hôtel de Jars, in these designs the *chambre de parade* had—albeit in two differing ways—come to be located in the rear room range.

245 Here the notion of 'private/public life' is inadmissible, insofar court aristocrats had no professional life, strictly speaking, and that their social valency, their aristocratic status, was tied to living a life 'in society' (Elias, *Court Society*, 55). Only those that did not belong to or maintain this 'associated milieu,' lead a private life [*vie particulière*] (ibid.).

246 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 20.

247 See for instance the design Marot projected for the Mouçeaux residence, on the lot adjacent to the Hôtel de Jars, but where a different project by Chamois was realized in 1680 for François Michel le Tellier, marquis de Louvois, included in Blondel's *Architecture Françoise*, Vol. III (1754), ch. XV. See Kristina Deutsch, *Jean Marot: Un graveur d'architecture à l'époque de Louis XIV* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2015), 159–63.

Here, the perspective of a 'flattening' allows us moreover to notice a second way in which the doubling-up of the *corps de logis* can be understood quite literally as a typological convergence phenomenon. This convergence becomes more evident when we compare the plan of Vaux-le-Vicomte with the Hôtel de Jars. Here, we see that the latter, like so many other *hôtels*, formed 'half a *château*,' so to speak ☒[48]. Due to the absence of the second counter-distinguishing half, the principal wing was instead split transversally into two room ranges that—although somewhat similar to Le Vau's plan in the general distribution of functions—were differentiated from each other. One may justifiably assume that the plan of the Hôtel de Tambonneau was a likely mediator or stepping stone in this process, although I am not trying to prove a line of inspiration here, but rather demonstrate the formation of a new line of differentiation. To understand this differentiation, we cannot consider this metamorphosis only in terms of a doubling up, because, morphologically speaking, it is the result of a specific INTEGRATION. In this doubling up, the two previous alternative arrangements of the *corps de logis simple* that we have seen bifurcate at the end of the sixteenth century, were coming to be brought together, integrated into a more matrix-like structure that allowed new organizational possibilities. More than the linear model becoming folded onto itself (as seen in the case of the Hôtel Chalon-Luxembourg), here both models were folded on each other, placed side by side, and integrated with one another: as one strip based on a grander sequence of rooms, and one strip based on the bisected model including the stair and its smaller sequence or rooms. ☒[48]

In this metamorphosis, these two hitherto mutually exclusive design options came to be structurally coupled and also design-conceptually conjoined as two component structures integrated into a larger ensemble. From a genetic point of view this integration was less a matter of the designer's geniality than of the design's genetics, meaning it is the rather stringent result of combining the DNA of two strands with their inherited features. We should note two things: first, that, based on the two alternative morphologies, the result of this combination is not just a heterogeneous ensemble or dispositif, but an apparatus that integrated two differently-scaled component structures (i.e., a larger and smaller suite of rooms). Thus differing from the more symmetrical, oppositional arrangement of the *grand appartement* vis-à-vis the smaller one in earlier designs (e.g. Liancourt or Vrillière), here we see a much more asymmetrical, appositional arrangement of two more interconnected suites. While both arrangements are based on a reciprocal determination of

these components, it is the latter in which the transformation of a symmetrical structure into an asymmetrical one more fervently facilitates a further logical and functional *differentiation* of these component structures as two interdependent, not just distinct, sub-ensembles. Therefore, it is this specific twofold **INTEGRATION/DIFFERENTIATION** enabled by the doubling up of the *hôtel*, thanks to which the system of appartements would hereafter concretize as a spatial system composed of hierarchically-differentiated sub-ensembles.

Marking the beginning of the third, **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** of appartements as a discursive subject and articulated residential system, this transversal integration/differentiation did away with many of the organizational disadvantages restricting the older arrangements. Instead, with its more complex spatial relationships, it opened up a new space of organizational possibilities. It is for this reason that it became the driving factor in the following metamorphosis of the classic dispositif into the rococo-type *hôtel* with its characteristic compositional play with these shifting axes. As Middelton summarizes, with the parallel room structure resulting from the doubling up of the principal wing, any discrepancy between the court and garden facades was masked, since the vestibule/stair could now be placed more freely in axis with the entrance gate without having to be in the actual center of the plot. Here, the earlier strategies of axial displacement developed in the 1630s could be coupled quite productively with the inherent organizational asymmetries of on the one hand, the suite of rooms and the desire to enter it ideally from the extremity of the *corps de logis* so as to arrive at the longest possible view through the enfilade, and on the other hand, of the house as a larger ensemble and the desired inclusion of service courts and spaces.[248] It is for this reason that the disposition of the *corps de logis double* would have quite some success in modernizing French residential design during the next hundred years.

Instead of looking at this process from a morphogenetic angle, existing architecture historical studies have discussed this modernization predominantly in functionalistic terms (as the expression of an arising search for privacy or comfort that led to adapted residential morphologies) or formalistic ones (as the expression of stylistic changes toward the more perplexing compositions of baroque architecture).[249] Here, typological studies especially have often traced this modernizing effect through a visible architectural or

248 Robin Middleton, "Enfilade: The Spatial Sequence of French Hotels of the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *Daidalos* 42 (Dec 1991), 84–95; here 88.

249 The respective studies are discussed below, in part 3.2.2–3.3.1.

INFRASTRUCTURAL transformation, namely, the formation of a more flexible system of circulation within these doubled-up structures.[250] This aspect concerns the progressive inclusion of bypassing service ways (called *dégagements*) and corridors that would incrementally start to appear in these more matrixial spaces, and which, in forming an alternative system of circulation to the enfilade, facilitated the residential space to be broken down into a more cellular structure in the eighteenth century, to which we shall come back in more detail [→ 3.3.1]. As we have seen in the last chapter, already much earlier, the linear principle of arranging rooms in enfilades was being broken up whenever a form of parallel circulation was required, for instance in the *garde-robes dégagés* that presented a longstanding marker of the imminent transversal split of the *corps de logis*, and the resulting modernization of its spatial structure into more layered arrangements, hierarchically-differentiated along multiple axes.

It is here that the view of the doubling-up of the *hôtel* as a convergence phenomenon opens up some possibilities of adding a complementary explanatory lens that critically extends this infrastructural view, because in it, a third aspect, which is the driving factor behind this modernization, has often escaped scholarly attention: that is, the fact that the shift toward deeper room ranges coincided with an anomalous global cooling event during the 1620s to 1680s, the Little Ice Age, with its peak occurring precisely in the 1640s.[251] In this regard, history repeated itself, first in Italy, then in France, to the extent that the appearance of the *corps de logis double* recapitulates the formation of the villa, whose morphology was a direct response to an earlier cooling phase.[252] Taking these changing climatic conditions into account would imply a challenge to some of the explanations given by more socially- and culturally inclined studies, concluding that the metamorphosis of the *hôtel* can be attributed to the inhabitants' changing modes of inhabitation and/or changing compositional strategies of planning practices that designers arrived at through their engagement with Italian architecture (theory). Aside from changing mentalities and the fact that publications like Rubens's *Pallazzi di Genova* (1622) certainly did their share in helping this model to migrate to France, the question as to why it was adopted remains. These explanations are incomplete, to the extent that both typological/morphological and praxeological/sociological lenses reduce (and eventually explain away) the rather

250 See esp. the abovementioned works Evans, Dennis, Middelton, Eleb and Debarre, Jachmann, and also Stephan Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors* (Paderborn: Fink, 2018).

251 This cooling is linked to a period of low solar activity is known as the Maunder Minimum.

252 This period marks the Spörer Minimum between 1460 and 1550.

complex relationship in which such changing environmental conditions trigger interdependent responses in the built habitat, planning habits, and modes of inhabitation as three environmental, social and mental ecologies.[253] So, without considering this catalytic influence and interrelation, the very problem of the emergence of the *corps de logis double* and the formation of the system of appartements formed within it, remains badly posed in the history of residential design. This history is substantially more complicated.

This complexity, I want to argue, arises from the way in which these changing climatic conditions happened to put into question the traditional 'simple' form of the *corps de logis simple* with its linear organizational logic, which incrementally failed designers and inhabitant alike in its ability to mitigate this climate change. By contrast, the more matrix-like organization in the *corps de logis double* presented a more adequate morphology and formal logic in response. This adequacy can be understood in quite concrete technological and thermodynamic terms, as it presented a more compact structure. Yet this transformation in to a more compact structure can also be reconsidered in more 'machinic' or abstract terms of a changing system. because, in contrast to the intrinsic or internal (socio-spatial) logic of the *logis,* it was already shaped by a combination of external factors and environmental forces or pressures (solar orientation, density, land prices, building costs) absorbed into its multiplicitous configuration. In the context of French town house planning, the introduction of this matrixial morphology entailed the need for a more multilinear logic of organizing residential space. These residential buildings have a very different body plan, closer to Italian houses, but they are not directly descended from them. Instead the villa and French *corps de logis double* with their different DNAs have to be understood as climatically-induced homoplasies, that is, environmentally-selected analogous structures that were selected independently from each other, in the non-linear evolution of residential space.

In understanding the formation of the doubled-up *corps de logis,* scholarship has mainly looked for an 'intrinsic pathway.' But this evolution could well have been induced along a more extrinsic pathway. For from this angle, climate change greatly contributed to (or effectuated) a correlated 'intellectual climate change,' since established forms of reasoning, ways of living, and manners of planning came to be upset. Alternatives had to be looked for. As the real condition of emergence (and thus underlying cause) of

253 See my preliminary discussion, chapter 0.3.1, note 429, 448, and 466 on Guattari's **THREE ECOLOGIES**; and 0.3.3., note 690ff on Stiegler's **GENERAL ORGANOLOGY**.

this alternative form of organization, it was thus the catalytic climatic change to which the doubled-up *corps de logis* as a dispositif presented "a formation that, at a given historical moment, had a major [strategic] function in responding to an urgency."[254] In this view, the abovementioned flattening of residential planning practices is also the symptom of a systemic response to a rising need for re-establishing a new overall organizational logic holding household structures and residential systems together; for re-establishing a new consistency—incrementally coming apart in these times—within forms of architectural planning.[255] And it is here that a more evolved spatial system of organizing residential space, a new dispositif, was going to form in response to this problem.

Taking Stock by Opening Up a New Problem

With this reconsideration of the formation of the *corps de logis* as a convergence of the two earlier bifurcating morphological lineages, we have arrived at a certain intermediary conclusion of this section. We have seen the ways in which these two morphologies had various effects on the internal organization that was co-evolving in both of them, as two completing systems for organization the linear space of the *corps de logis simple*. Their convergence into doubled-up structures is the point at which a more complex spatial system would henceforth take a very different, more multi-linear form, in which this consistency was re-established. We can note a certain break, quite like the one observed above regarding the changing ideas of residential planning promoted by Le Muet's first step to a more integral approach to residential planning within urban conditions. And like my above discussion of this point [→ 3.1.2], we must again situate the formation of the concretizing system of appartements within a broader discursive horizon. At this stage, however, this systemic response had effects on a much larger scale, and as such was not absorbed or resolved by a single strategy but a complex de-and re-stratification process. At issue is not a break, but a series of breaks, or rather de- and re-couplings and shifts, that constitute a line along which apartments would concretize as a more differentiated system for organizing residential space.

254 I am alluding here to Foucault's third characteristic of emerging dispositifs, as mentioned in "The Confessions of the Flesh" (Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 194–5).

255 In this respect, this process is connected to and deeply intertwined with the wider formation of capitalist structures as a new socio-economic system. See note 242 on the changing role of women, as well as my related notes in Part II.

But in this view, approaching this process as a convergence phenomenon also opens up our analysis to a rather different problematic than the one we have mapped so far. More than attending to the evolving spatial system of appartements in the changing architectural morphology of the *hôtel*, at this stage, it becomes necessary to entirely repose the problem of its concretization and answer it by displacing the question. This displacement, I argue, lies in decoupling it from the historical formation of the building type of the *hôtel*, and shift focus more generally to the formation of new organizational systems in the following, second section of Part III. There I will connect and reconsider this intellectual climate change through the ongoing epistemological transformations and newly-arising systems of thought [→3.2.1], as well as the correlated transformations in contemporary social structures [→3.2.2], based on which this alternative organizational logic would be re-established in the field of architecture [→3.2.3]. To map this lineage from a genetic point of view as well as from a more systems-theoretical angle, these interrelated processes should thus be approached more specifically as a production process. First it should be seen as something that had to be made: a transition toward an alternative strategy of organizing spatial relationships, in which its 'modernizing' effect consisted.

What is important to account for concerning the early appearance of the doubled-up *corps de logis* as a dispositif, is that it merely renders visible (i.e. epiphenomenal) a wider underlying recomposition, which around the 1640s started to irreversibly affect all sorts of systems including social, economic (the advancement of mercantilist capitalism), political (absolutism), and knowledge-related ones (Cartesianism). In this transforming milieu, the doubling-up of the *corps de logis* is not a structural transformation in itself (in the sense that changing socio-economic structures represent changing socio-environmental preconditions); it is one of the transformative structural operations that help effectuate, or actualize that transformation; an operation (which, as such, is a genetic condition) for reconfiguring preexisting socio-spatial and socio-economic structures. But as an epiphenomenonal product, the infrastructural transformation investigated by previous studies just presents a product in which this production process was recorded, so to speak, in the organization of the built environment. This recording cannot be taken as an explanation of how it was itself produced (= **PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION**), nor for the spatial system evolving with it. Exactly contrary to the logic of the *logis*, the system of appartements no longer resembles the socio-economic household structure, or the matrixial morphology it is built on (in the same way that a car does not resemble the production line it is assem-

bled on). In this regard, the concretizing organizational logic underlying and generating the spatial system of appartements with its inbuilt enfilade structure has to first be mapped on its own terms, and not in terms of the alternative system of organization that would eventually supersede it.

As we have seen up to this point, this emerging organizational logic started to take on a more concrete form the more a transversal schism broke into the rigid logic of the *logis*. The schism occurs where an inner dividing wall was intercalated between the two ranges of rooms differentiated by their grandeur (i.e. scale and representative function). Now that these room ranges came in multiples, as multiplicities that start serving as substrates for one another, this transductive linear relationship was broken up. Yet, the organizational logic of appartements derived not just from this older logic coming apart; it derived from the recomposition that this loosening logic enabled, which, as I have suggested, was itself the result of a more complex convergence process. Thus, when truly taken as a production process, this process would be better understood as one in which certain things were coming together in a new way, a new arrangement. Therein they entered into new relations through which a new consistency would eventually be established. This means, however, that instead of being presented as something given (or something that was just happening), the production of the new consistency underlying this doubling-up (and the internal recomposition resulting from it) must be analyzed in terms of how the given was given, or what was going on in what was happening. Here the task is to understand how this consistency arose from the corresponding changes and counter-balancing forces within systems of thinking and planning.

This requires approaching this recomposition as a 'molecular revolution' produced by a series of multiple converging lines. The following sections [→ 3.2.1–3] will thus take a less linear view that will open up several strands to reconsider the formation of a new logic beneath the doubling-up of the *corps de logis* and the spatial differentiation processes that arise from these convergence processes. Because if we wish to gain some idea of the counter-forces becoming coupled in this modernization as a convergence process, we must first map the various lineages that were coming together in it. In order to understand the emerging system of appartements more specifically as a product of the relations reconfigured by these convergences, I will take a broader approach in mapping the formation of this new organizational logic in its wider connection to both changing systems of knowledge and the effectuated social, cultural, and moreover technological changes involved in this process. The underlying causes for these interre-

lated effects prove to be rather complex and require being addressed in substantially more detail. I will do so in the next part, where I hope to offer some insights into how this convergence led to some new differentiations along these shifting lines, in which we see the beginnings of a fundamental recomposition of the internal organizational logic of residential space. As I will show, it challenged French architects to arrive at nothing less than an entirely new system for outlining spatial relations within these more matrixial arrangements. For this, we shall see, they had to entirely reconceptualize their inherited ordering practices and come to terms with a newly non-linear notion of ordering, as well as a much more instrumental conception of architecture as a technology of ordering itself, in the second half of the seventeenth century. [→ 3.2.3]

This more instrumental ordering system — i.e. the art of distribution — would be found (and founded on) those new reconceptualizations of space and object relationships that were ushered in with the tremendous intellectual climate changes during the second half of the seventeenth century and its novel systems of knowledge (Cartesianism) and power (Absolutism), in which more interdependent or 'functional' relations took on an integral form. But in order to put this new organizational logic into practice, architecture — recently having established itself as the technical science of distribution — had to co-produce a new consistency, meaning a system of relations, by virtue of which this new system was going hold together and was going to operate as an 'abstract machine.' From an assemblage-theoretic angle, it is important to first draw a difference between the *hôtel* as a historical formation (or stratum) and the production of this technological 'plane of consistency,' whose workings, as Deleuze and Guattari stress, are wholly distinct from strata insofar as this surface not only regulates the new relations produced between strata, but thereby entirely recomposes established relationships between content and expression.[256]

As a mediating division placed between these strata, it was the transversal wall and the *dégagements* formed alongside it, that thus constituted a new surface of stratification with which this new relationship was re-estab-

256 Borrowed from Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 40, 73, and Ronald Bogue's commentary essay "Who the Earth Thinks It is," in *A Thousand Plateaus and Philosophy*, ed. Somers-Hall, Bell, and Williams; here 62. A note for clarification: According to Deleuze and Guattari's geophilosophy, these **INTER-** and **METASTRATIC** phenomena pertain to the 'plane of consistency,' or *planomenon*, and as such is transversally linked to the 'plane of composition,' or *ecumenon* of stratification processes, in which all strata are always further divided into epi- and parastratic processes that I have described in the **TRANSDUCTIVE** spatiality of the *corps de logis* and its internal differentiation, in my chapter 2.2.

lished, and alongside which it was carried out. As we shall see, this re-establishment itself consists in a topological operation (a kind of folding-onto-one-another) being turned into a new structuration (the *hôtel*), which in turn is turned back into operation (i.e. architectural practice). Here, it acted as an interface, we could say from a more technological angle, onto which (epigenetic) socio-spatial production processes come to be inscribed, thereby becoming both historically recorded and transfixed as an externalization or materialization of these practices into the organization of a specifically technicized environment (= **EPIPHYLOGENESIS**). This interface is not something unorganized, something of which we can draw no plan or map. But it requires a more non-representative and diagrammatic view in order to draw it as a zone of intensity, crisscrossed by thresholds or traversed by gradients that mark new becomings. If approached as the progressive production (or putting into operation) of an alternative organizational system (which, of course, is the system of appartements), then this modernization can not be reduced to the introduction of some parallel structures (be it a parallel range of rooms or a parallel circulation), nor can it be reduced to a mere 'revolution' in the sense of a simple historical breaking point. If baroque residential design marks a spatial revolution, then it is one in which structures are folded onto one another, where the underlying planning logics and conceptions come to be connected and rethought in terms of more multi-layered and interconnected systems.[257]

257 As I will elaborate in the following chapter then, these recomposing relationships no longer concern so much 'real distinctions' of **EPI- AND PARASTRATIC** relations within **STRATA** but concern the modal distinctions of inter- and metastratic relations found among intersecting strata. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 72ff. In this **INTERSTRATIC** dimension, we first greatly touch on the technological potential of architectural arrangements, to be used as a means for recomposing relations and matters of living by means of non-living matter. 'Architecture' like all material arrangements is located precisely at this interstratum of life and non-life. But this potential cannot be understood without taking into account the metastratic effects that this concatenation gains in relation to existing **ABSTRACT MACHINE**s, by producing new degrees of freedom; new **SPACES OF POSSIBILITY**, opening up new thresholds of deterritorialization and thus 'lines of flight' for becomings. It is exactly this recomposition of established relationships, that happened with the series of seventeenth- to eighteenth-century designs and designerly reflections that constitute the disciplinary discourse on the art of distribution. Therein spatial relationships and differences were being reconfigured into (and reconceptualized as) more functional(ized) ones; as a reconceptualization that — on the one hand — manifested itself in a new system of architectural knowledge by way of which this architecture came to be coded through a new style of thinking, as well as a new form of planning wherein — on the one hand — the *hôtel* was reconfigured into a more integrated residential system composed of partial components, or spatial sets, the functional relations of which was being established in this codification.

49. Detail of the Gomboust Map (1652)

Palais des
Tuileries
—Hôte
—Bouchage
—Longueville
Hôtel de la Reine Marguerite—
Hôtel Dauphin—
—Nevers

l de la Reine
Le Gendre
Ameras
Mortier
Donon
Albret
Angoulême
Carnavalet
Hôtel des
Tournelles
LE DE LA CITÉ
Notre-Dame
Sens
Boissy
La Bastille
Zamet
1:30000

3.2
Socio-Spatial Systems of Distinctions and Disjunctive Cultural Technologies

In the first half of the seventeenth century, French residential architecture had started to become more differentiated, spatially, volumetrically, and functionally. In the previous part, especially its last section [→ 3.1.3], I have illustrated the drastic changes more in archaeological terms of what happened. The following part will shift gears to operate at a slower speed, and on multiple layers, in the aim of offering some explanations into the genealogy and genetic factors of these speedy changes (i.e., what was going on in these changes). I argue above that the emerging system of appartements is tied to a more conscious instrumentalization of compartitioning measures, which enabled a new design approach in the context of urban residential planning. In this vein, I have situated the emerging planning notion of distribution less in a historical context, considering it rather as a fundamental epistemic change in the ways of thinking about residential planning. This view has allowed us to explain some of the crucial changes and changing conceptions through which the idea of distribution gained a more central position within French architectural discourse. To follow the emerging conception of an art of distribution within the related discourse from the last decades of the seventeenth century onwards, a more complex approach is needed, as architecture—like many fields of knowledge and ecologies of practice—was incrementally affected by a range of changing conceptions of nature, forces, matter, space, things, bodies, humans, societies, and organizations.

These greater changes had not only been fostered by changing climatic conditions, as we have seen, but also by the greatly changing socio-political and intellectual climate to which we must now turn more explicitly. These changes were ushered in by the epistemic disruptions and social transformations that—as Foucault's *Order of Things* describes— began to turn Europe's established systems of organization and knowledge on its head. This process cannot be reduced to a simple shift or supersession, but must be understood more accurately as an irreversible recomposition. In this recomposition, one initially finds (at least) two competing streams forming in Europe: namely, English empiricism and continental rationalism. The former view, advanced by thinkers like Bacon, Locke, Hobbes, and Hume, held that all knowledge is based on experience and is inductively derived from the senses and sensation, that is, observation, and also experimentation, as Newton qualified; the latter view, with Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz as its most famous proponents, held that an understanding of the world and the intrinsic logic of reality could be arrived at and tested deductively by the power of reasoning alone.[258]

258 For an introduction, see Peter Markie's entry "Rationalism vs. Empiricism," in the *SEP*,

3.2.1 Toward a New Rationale for Residential Planning

As two theoretical standpoints and approaches that had initially created a hot controversy, both of these novel philosophies would eventually exert a crucial innovating influence on all fields of knowledge, including the emerging body of architectural theory.[259] Looking at France specifically, we can say (with some simplifications) that this roughly happened first under the increasing championing of developing rationalist logic in seventeenth-century studies of theoretical cosmology and physics, before the experimental sciences and natural history incrementally adopted a more empiricist stance around the end of the seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century. In fact, it is this increasing theoretical reflection on architecture and the role of distribution as an 'art' (and then 'science'), that—I want to suggest—is the tangible transductive effect of this influence.

In this epistemic shift, older forms of knowledge and their more topological patterns of reasoning (like the aforementioned Ramist logic [→3.1.2]) had started to be ridiculed and consequently lost much popularity. In this process, the earlier serial architectural treatises and their method of progressive differentiation— that as we have seen, was closely related to these topological forms of reasoning—seem to suddenly disappear. In discussing this disappearance, Jachmann, in his comprehensive analysis of the evolution of the serial format, notes that after Le Muet's *Manière,* the serial treatise only makes a comeback in the eighteenth-century versions where it resurfaces in a form that employs a more complex ordering system, as 'series of series,' and then typological grids. In his topical focus on this evolving format, Jachmann moves rather quickly through the complexification process by observing a mediating change in logic from simple series to series of series. But given that the very *formation* of these newly-complex ordering systems—alongside which the residential system of appartements would evolve into a more complex form—lies within this gap, it would be fallacious to directly jump to these

avail. online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/rationalism-empiricism/. Deductive reasoning is a top-down logic in which conclusions are reached by reducing or narrowing down problems on the basis of general rules; inductive reasoning, by contrast, is a bottom-up logic in which conclusions are arrived at by generalizing observations and postulating rules on the basis of observing specific cases.

259 A general overview on the establishment and changes in classic French architecture Theory, is provided in Hanno-Walter Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory* (New York/London: Princeton Architectural Press/Zwemer, 1994), esp. 128–40; for the establishment of classic French theory, in particular, see Francoise Fichet, *Théorie architecturale à l'âge classique: Essai d'anthologie critique* (Brussels: Mardaga, 1979). For more specific contextual discussions of singular books and authors, see below.

more complex ordering systems. Because in doing so we would miss out a greater set of genetic processes in this formation, as a nested system whose concretizing logic we are trying to understand in both its complex co-evolution or SYMPOIESIS, which I hope to address in more detail in this part.

While this complexification within formal planning strategies is, to a certain degree, comparable to the differences separating Du Cerceau's additive and Le Muet's distributive ordering conceptions, this 'nesting' especially cannot be as easily inferred just from the gap separating these treatises. It can be partly deduced, however, from other contemporaneous publications in the field of architectural discourse. Aside from being occupied with re-translating Palladio, Vignola and Vitruvius, and canonizing the architectural orders, this field is marked by the famous *Querelle des anciens et des modernes*. Heating up in the 1680s over the precedence of classical architecture and the problem of innovation, it fostered the incremental systematization and codification of architectural knowledge through pedagogical publications as the *Cours d'architecture* by Blondel and d'Aviler, and Perrault's work. In these works (to be discussed later), we can detect the beginnings of an entirely new conception of apartments, which became more concrete in the architectural publications of the 1680–90s. But then again, in going to these treatises directly, or looking at architectural discourse in an isolated fashion, we would risk glossing over many successive conceptual slippages and large-scale displacements concerning the very terms—and these more complex ordering conceptions—on which the later discourses would be based.

It would be misleading to posit a changing type of discourse and explain it away as an epistemological break, instead of analyzing the immanent causes of the characteristic change by mapping the series of slippages through which the discourse on the art of distribution—perturbed by the wider recomposition of knowledge at large—came to be *recomposed or reconfigured* from a topological form of reasoning toward more typological forms of reasoning. Situating architectural modes of thinking in a greater ensemble of changing systems of knowledge and broader epistemological transformation, is of particularly importance here, to determine those "positivities" (as Foucault called the real conditions of emergence of discursive statements[260]) that enabled this recomposition. In this aim, the following sections delve progressively more deeply into the contemporaneous evolutions within rationalist system of thinking [→ 3.2.1].

260 See Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge*, 166–77. See my preliminary introduction, chapter 0.2, esp. note 209, but also note 69.

I try to connect these transforming systems of knowledge back to the vastly transforming social and political systems within the consolidation of absolutist monarchy in France and its proliferating system of social distinctions [→3.2.2]. In thus opening up the problem of changing patterns of ordering that traverses and ties together (meta)physical, social, and architectural systems of knowledge in the middle of the seventeenth century, we can more comprehensively understand the formation of the system of appartements as the result of a set of conceptions centering on ordering practices [→3.2.3].

There is consequently a rather extensive field to cover, with more complexities that most similar architectural studies have reasonably engaged with. I am aware that mapping the milieu of this complexification process to a degree sufficient for revealing the genetic effects (i.e. what's going on in what's happening), here in the middle of Book III, may seem like a rather risky choice that disrupts the above analysis by moving us quite far away from tangible architectural examples. Yet precisely this disruption is necessary for rendering visible the convergence of some conceptual and technological lineages and pin down their multiple conjunctions, through which this residential system became much more concrete throughout the seventeenth century. To facilitate this, I have chosen to do so in an anexact yet rigorous way, discussing a chain of processes that interlock incrementally, in an effort to strike a balance between overcomplicating and oversimplifying. Opening a set of apparently unrelated strands may seem to risk losing focus on the topic of apartments, but by not discussing them would mean ignoring so many more precise observations made in the multi-disciplinary field by which my efforts are informed. But this risk is worth taking, and necessary to arrive at a synthetic picture of the overall milieu in which these convergences form, and thereby understand the concretizing residential system as an emerging **DISPOSITIF** or **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLE**. Equipped with this understanding, which we will return to the relevant examples in the third part of this book [→3.3].

Logical Tree-Structures

One relatively obvious way to approach these architectural changes in their epistemological dimension lies in going back to the observation that Le Muet's work, and especially the buildings realized in the 1630–40s, was situated in the midst of a greatly transforming system of reasoning (=thinking *par le milieu*). As Foucault has shown, until the end of the sixteenth century resemblances played a constitutive role within Western knowledge. In Renaissance thought, for instance, the world was ordered according to relations of resemblance and degree of similarity between things. This inherited

logic of similitude (a logic that from today's perspective confuses hermeneutics and semiology) came to be incrementally challenged and rejected by thinkers like Bacon and Descartes, who helped shape a new logic built on establishing "identity and difference," which triggered the classic age with its characteristic *episteme* in which representation played a newly-dominant role in the organization of knowledge.[261] The Ramist form of reasoning that Jachmann identifies in Muet's work is, according to Foucault, already a "transitional logic" no longer solely located in the world of resemblances, but that had not arrived in that of representation either. Instead it was a logic—which we have already encountered in Le Muet—in which the reason behind logical structures and the distribution of things came to be laid open to scrutiny. It started problematizing the relations in the very distribution of things, at a moment when, with the Reformation and the heliocentric turn, the established order of the world was severely uprooted.

Ramée had defined logic first of all as "nature[']s reason] made into an art," a technically grounded theory-practice.[262] To reveal the logical structure of an art, Ramée and his followers often drew up a kind horizontal tree-diagrams, so-called dichotomies ✉[51] organizing things in a series of binary categories.[263] More of an *ars memoriæ* and ordering tool than a method strictly speaking,[264] the purpose of these diagrams was to reveal "the con-

261 Foucault, *Order of Things*, 17, 29. Foucault here identifies four similitudes; namely 'convenience,' 'emulation,' 'analogy,' and 'sympathy.' See also Fichet, *Théorie architecturale*, 6.

262 Petrus Ramus, *Dialecticae Institutiones* (Paris: 1543) 15r and 44r; cited after Reijer Hooykaas, "Humanties, Mechanics, and Painting," *Revista da Universidade de Coimbra,* Vol. XXXVI (1991), 1–31; here 5. This means first, that logic is a practice put to artful use and second, that logic is always artificial, not 'natural' for there are many artful ways that correspond to nature. See Erland Sellberg, "Petrus Ramus," SEP, avail. online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/ramus/, §3.1). On the debate this idea generated, see also Hooykaas's study.

263 For the non-coincidental name of Ramus (meaning 'branch'), and a wider discussion), see Steffen Siegel, *Tabula: Figuren der Ordnung um 1600* (Berlin: Academie, 1999), 65–66, in which I found a concise overview of the topic. I have also consulted the works cited by Jachmann, including Schmidt-Biggemann's *Topica universalis*, and id., "Topische Modelle in Theorie und Praxis der Renaissance," in *Visuelle Topoi: Erfindung und tradiertes Wissen in den Künsten der italienischen Renaissance*, ed. Ulrich Pfisterer and Max Seidel (München: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 2003), 11–20.

264 The *SEP* respectively explains that among Aristotelians, "Method was a topic of enormous interest during the sixteenth century. The problem was to determine whether method was a way of acquiring knowledge or of displaying it. … It became obvious that more than one method could exist and that there was a difference between *methodus* and *ordo.* The latter term came to be applied to a pedagogical method, a way of teaching or displaying. But it was also necessary to think about natural vs. artificial, *methodus* and *ordo*, as well as considering the correct way of proceeding from the general to the particular and vice versa. Among Aristotelians there was considerable disagreement on these issues. But Ramus took an extreme position. He explicitly denied that there could be more than one method and that there was any difference between *methodus* and *ordo*." For Ramus's approach to revealing relations, this position implied that "What is more general with

51 LOGICAL TREES



Left, the "Arbor elementalis" from Llull, *Arbor scientiae* ([Lyons]: Fradin?], [1515]), Wellcome Library, London, B12208838, via Wikimedia Commons. *Center and right*, dichotomies from Agricola, *De Inventione dialectica* (1542) 10v; and Ramus, *Institutionum dialecticarum libri tres* (1552), f.343.

junction in the order of things conjoined."[265] Resurfacing under Ramus's programmatic name, such diagrams had previously been employed by thirteenth-century logicians such as Petrus Hispanus and Ramon Llull.[266] These tree diagrams were all derived from the *Arbor porphyriana.* ✉[51] The Porphyrian tree, Eco summarizes, was conceived in a (somewhat reductive) commentary on Aristotle's *Categories* by the third century Neoplatonist Porphyry, and long served as the point of reference for any theory of definition, especially in the scholastic tradition that had developed this theory into a visual system for representing logical relationships.[267] Connected to the

respect to nature must consequently have priority in our method over what is more particular. … In medicine, for example, it is natural to start with the whole body before you go on to the limbs. … This method was an important part of Ramus' logic since it had direct relevance for his philosophy as a whole. Every art must be founded on it, given that it was not merely the correct but the only method (Sellberg, "Petrus Ramus," *SEP*, §3.4).

265 Foucault, *Order of Things*, 35; citing Ramus, *Grammaire* (Paris, 1572) 125–6.

266 For a comprehensive synopsis on the evolution of tree diagrams, see also Nathalie Gontier, "Depicting the Tree of Life: The Philosophical and Historical Roots of Evolutionary Tree Diagrams," *Evolution: Education and Outreach* 4, no. 3 (2011): 515–38; avail. online at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12052-011-0355-0.

267 See esp. ch. 1 of Umberto Eco, *From the Tree to the Labyrinth: Historical Studies on the Sign and Interpretation*, translated by Anthony Oldcorn (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2014).





emerging format of the dictionary,[268] it helped define things that could be logically discriminated through a downward chain of defining (i.e. mutually exclusive) distinctions. This discriminative logic of classifying substances or beings was closely connected to an ontology according to which the world is understood as a *plenum formarum,* with all substances hierarchically ordered according to their scales of being, their degree of perfection from the most general to the most specific, as relative genera and species differentiated by second-order *differentiæ*.[269] This is the "great chain of being" (the *scala naturæ*), and eponymous title of Arthur O. Lovejoy's history of ideas.[270]

268 Ibid.

269 According to this logic, based on the Aristotelian mode of defining extant things, any species (εἶδος) is a complex of two substantial kinds: a genus (γένος) and a *differentia* (διαφορά) or specific difference; that is, a sort of genus of thing is differentiated into species by some sort of characteristic or specifying difference (*differentiae*), which is external to the genus, but — together with it — reciprocally defines the species in its essence or nature. Thus the definition of the 'human' (= *species*) as a 'rational' (= *differentiae*) 'animal' (= *genus*).

270 The longer history of the idea of the chain of being is outlined in Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1961; orig. pub. 1936). A concise overview is provided in Lia Formigari's entry "Chain of Being," in the *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, Vol. I, ed. Philip Wiener (New York: Ch. Scribner's Sons, 1973), avail. online at http://xtf.lib.virginia.edu/xtf/view?docId=DicHist/uvaBook/

As he and other scholars have noted, the hermeneutically closed deductive system formed by such diagrams—ones that we would today qualify as directed graphs or more specifically directed acyclic graphs forming nodes in a hierarchical system of definitions—foregrounded the formal ordering of knowledge. As such, they proved a valuable visual instrument for demonstrating argumentative orderings. They helped visualize—in the form of a chain or hierarchy—the relation of various things from the most simple to the most complex. Initially used as mnemonic devices, these diagrams gained a wider influence on the development of the genealogical form of rendering visible lineages of filiation or dependencies (especially via attempts to determine biblical and noble bloodlines). Taking their known shape in the second half of the sixteenth century, these diagrams played an important role in thinking about causal structures between successive elements, for instance, how historical events have shaped the order of things in the present world. In fact, they are closely connected to the very notion of historiography as different from 'chronicles' or 'annals,' in raising the question of causal relations and problematizing the possibility of progress. Coming from this lineage, these diagrams played a key role in the genealogy of modern scientific fields themselves. Instead of being simply superseded by modern forms of reasoning, such diagrams often helped earlier topological forms of reasoning in the mid-sixteenth century to drift toward a more taxonomic reasoning in the natural sciences during the eighteenth century, for instance, in the way Linnaeus used them for his botanical classification of plants, helping constitute (evolutionary) biology.

Within their historical lineage, these diagrams must be approached not just in epistemological terms, but rather in *techno*logical terms, as historian of ideas Vera Keller has pointed out, not only due to their specific mnemotechnical dimension within practices of knowledge production, but also more generally because this production was considered an art. Because "in the seventeenth century, *technologia* meant the system of knowledge—that is, the rational account (*logos*) of the relationship between the various arts (*technai*)."[271] Hence, as a secondary effect, they also drew the lines between

tei/DicHist1.xml;chunk.id=dv1-45. Also under the concept of the 'tree of knowledge,' it has been the subject of several studies. See also Manuel Lima, *The Book of Trees: Visualizing Branches of Knowledge* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2014); and Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, *The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding* (Boston: New Science Library/Shambhala Publications, 1987).

271 Vera Keller, *Knowledge in the Public Interest, 1575–1725* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2015), 169.



PRIMVS. 17

Forma uniuersa omnium, quæ arte fiunt consideratur.
- uel in se
  - uel secundum quantitatem
    - uel secundũ ordinẽ accipiẽ dæ quantitatis. ordinatio
    - uel secundum responsum quantitatis. symmetria.
  - uel secundum qualitatem: dispositio
- uel comparata
  - ad aspectum, sic Eurythmia.
  - ad id, quod decet, sic decor.
  - ad usum, sic distributio.

Nos singula dilucide interpretabimur.

Ordinatio, est modica membrorum operis commoditas, separatim, uniuersæque proportionis ad simmetriam comparatio, Hæc componitur ex quantitate, quæ Græce ποσότης dicitur, quantitas autem est, modulorum ex ipsius operis sumptione, singulis membrorum partibus uniuersi operis conueniens effectus.

Quoniam multis in rebus inuenitur ordo, dispositio, decor, distributio, & reliqua, quæ supradicta sunt, Ideò non dubitamus affirmare, quin hi termini ampliores, & communes habeantur, qui ea ratione, quæ pluribus rebus accommodari possunt, diffiniendi sunt, uniuersalium enim uniuersales oportet esse diffinitiones, & uocibus uniuersalibus, & fusis explicari debent, cum uero eas quisque artifex ad res sibi subiectas transferre uult, pressiores illas efficit, & proprias artis suæ, quemadmodum hoc loco a Vitru. fieri uidimus in his rebus diffiniendis, nos primum in ipsa ordinatione, deinde in aliis id considerabimus: certum est ordinem communi, & ampla ratione & suapte ui nihil aliud esse nisi cum res propria ratione præponit unum alteri, hinc est, quod ubi ordo est ante & post esse necesse sit, ante uero & post sunt communes, & ampli rerum termini: dixi autem propria ratione, quoniam multis in rebus inest ante & post, in quibus nullus est ordo, quoniam illud ante & post, non ex propria rei natura oritur. necessitas enim quædam, & naturalis rerum consequutio in ordine requiritur. quando igitur quod sua natura, præcedere debet præcedit, & quod sequi oportet, sequitur, tunc ordo proprie dicitur. Sed hæc ratio uniuersalis est, & multis rebus accommodari potest: sed hanc Architectus reddit pressiorem, & contractiorem, idem quisque artifex facit; ad ordinem enim, qui in singulis artibus est propositus, quisque eam accommodat. Vitr. Ergo (inquit) ordinem esse cum in artificio, & opere sua ui quantitas quædam præponitur, quædam sequitur. solent enim artifices quantitatem unam præsumere (quam modulum appellant) quæ sit ratio totius operis metiendi. Hac ratione ordinis diffinitio propria facta est applicatione scilicet communium, & uniuersalium terminorum; nulla

52 TREE STRUCTURES IN ARCHITECTURAL THOUGHT: In his 1567 commentary on Vitruvius, Daniele Barbaro had added a visual aid to help clarify the logical consistency within Vitruvius's position as to what architecture (according to his interpretation) consists in.

the various branches of science *as* separate disciplines. These, Annarita Angelini comments, did not yet constitute "isolated specializations but … articulations of universal and coherent systems of signs," whose logical relationship was comprehended by their ratio, as an extrinsic measure of things and as a distribution of the intelligible.[272] It is precisely concerning this distribution that in many of these diagrams, a certain relation to an architecture (in the sense of configuring relations into some sort of hierarchically-organized structure) becomes evident. And indeed, aside from being understood as a tree, many of these knowledge structures drawn up between the mid-sixteenth and early seventeenth century were incrementally conceptualized as "buildings or edifices," as Angelini notes.[273] So it is no coincidence that as early as 1567, such dichotomies made their way into architectural discourse as well, apparently first with Daniele Barbaro's commented edition of *De architectura Libri Decem* (1567). ✉[52] There they appear as a visual help for clarifying Vitruvius's explanation of what architecture precisely consists in.[274] As we shall see in the latter segments of this book, there is a yet-

272 Annarita Angelini, "Encyclopedias and Architecture in the Sixteenth Century," in *The Power of Images in Early Modern Science*, ed. Wolfgang Lefèvre, Jürgen Renn, and Urs Schoepflin (Berlin: Springer, 2003), 265–88; here 283. Note here also the proximity to Rancère's formula.

273 On their relation to sixteenth-century discourse on architecture, see ibid., 265.

274 See Daniele Barbaro, *Vitruvii Pollionis De architectura Libri Decem cum commentarii…* (Venice: De Franceschi & Criegher, 1567), 17, see also 52; avail. online at http://echo.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/MPIWG:4ZU9ZFZQ; Barbaro's work was recently translated and annotated by Kim Williams, ed., *Daniele Barbaro's Vitruvius of 1567* (Basel: Birkhäuser,

53 Pages from Francis Bacon's posthumously edited *Of the Advancement and Proficiencie of Learning* (1605), where the editor appended a dichotomy-like diagram that shows at a glance, generall argument' and 'designe of this work.'



FRANCICI DE
VERVLAMIO
ARCHITECTVRA
SCIENTIARVM.

THE GENERALE
IDEA AND PROIECT
OF THE
LO. VERVLAMS
INSTAVRATIO MAGNA.

Represented in the
PLATFORM OF THE
DESIGNE OF THE
I PART *thereof*,

As it was Conceav'd in the mind of the Author
and is expreſſed in the Modell
of the VVork.

DEUS OMNIA
IN MENSVRA, ET NVMERO, ET ORDINE,
DISPOSVIT.

to-be-made point concerning the relation of these diagrams to architectural forms of organization, because, as I shall argue, the system of appartements concretized in exactly the same diagrammatic, tree-like form in its topological structure.

One book that exerted a great (and unwanted) influence in proliferating these sorting systems was a work by the father of empiricism, Francis Bacon: *Of the Advancement and Proficiencie of Learning* (1605).[275] The work includes

2017); here 55. He possibly got to know these diagrams through the studies in the natural history conducted by (and with) his great uncle Ermolao Barbaro; although I have not been able to find them included in any of his books. The introduction of these diagrams here should still be studied.

275 First published as Francis Bacon, *The Tvvoo Bookes … of the proficiency and advancement of Learning, divine and human* (London: H. Tomes, 1605), repub. as *Of the Advancement and Proficiencie of Learning, or, The Partitions of Sciences, IX Bookes*, ed. and trans. Gilbert Wat[t]s (Oxford: L. Lochfield, 1640). For the modern edition, see *The Oxford Francis Bacon, Vol IV: The Advancement of Learning*, ed. Allan Steward with Harriet Knight (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), here 76.





a proposal for a "Universal partition of Human Learning," meaning a general classification of knowledge into three branches: history, poetry, and philosophy. Bacon based this differentiation on the differing ways in which these forms of knowledge generally process information by means of memory, imagination, or reason, respectively. In a posthumous edition (1640), the editor appended nine taxonomic tree diagrams [53] representing the relation of these "distributions and partitions of knowledge,"[276] in a section following Bacon's written outline of the "generall argument" or "designe of this work," which illustrates at a glance the overall "architecture"—as it specifically calls its internal organization—of each of the books.[277] In contrast to earlier authors

276 They respectively show an overview of (1) "the dignity of learning"; (2) "the advancement of learning"; (3) "the partition of knowledges in general"; (4) "the partition of humane knowledge"; (5) "the partition of the use and object of the faculties of the mind"; (6) "the partition of the art of elocution"; (7) "the partition of morall knowledge"; (8) "the partition of civile knowledge"; (9) "inspired theology."

277 Bacon, *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning*, 60ff. As historian of Ideas Vera

like Jakob Bornitz, who had frequently used such dichotomies,[278] Bacon had refrained from representing his ideas in such outlines, as Keller stresses, as he was critical toward the way in which such schemes structure thought.[279] Albeit influenced by Ramism, he wanted to move beyond reifying static systems in the hope to make, Keller writes, "the ordering of knowledge into a social system that … as living machines or growing trees … was supposed to advance and expand over time, and with its changing structure, also transform the shape of society."[280] Here, diagrammatic thinking was opened up to a transformative project. This reconfigurative opening of knowledge effectively became a modernizing social technology.[281] Easily neglected, it is precisely this reconfigurative opening through which the epistemic and social dimensions were directly tied to an architectural one; a relation that would lead to a reciprocal instrumentalization of architecture as a transformative social technology for ordering. It is here that a new rationale (*logos*) for architecture as an art (i.e. *technē*) of distribution arose during the second half of the seventeenth century, in which distribution—as an art of ordering—was progressively recognized as a technical means and instrument, and in which the system of appartements would

Keller notes, the notion of an architectural sketch, or the concept of a 'project' had been used to refer to the outline of a future book; there represented 'desiderata.' On this see also the illuminating chapters 5–6 in the part II, "The Invention of Wishlists," in Keller's *Knowledge in the Public Interest*, 127–199; here 134.

278 Bornitz was an influential cameralist from Saxon and first systematizer of fiscal policy. In his book we find small diagrams as the "Delineatio discursus" in his *Discursus politicus de prudentia politica comparanda* (Wittemberg: Säuberlich, 1604), unnumbered page before the first chapter (link to google books), up to a four-page "Tavola synoptica" in *De nummis in repub. percutiendis et conservandis: libri duo* (Hannover: C. Marnium, 1608), 14–17 (link to google books). See also the "diathesis adumbrans rerum connexionem et consequentiam," in the *Tractatus politicus de rerum sufficientia in Rep. et civitate procuranda* (Frankfurt: Tampach, 1621), 1–2 (link to google books), and the "Tabula Capita Instrum. et congeriem repræsentans synoptica," in his *Instrumentis sive documentis literariis tractatus methodicus es synopticus* (W. Seiffers, 1626), unnumbered page (link to google books).

279 Keller, *Knowledge in the Public Interest*, 134, citing Bacon, *De augmentis scientiarum*, Book VI, ch. 2 285. In the Watts translation, the respective passage reads: "But for one onely Method, and continued Dichotomies we neede not speake much of them; for it was a little Cloude of knowledge which was soon dispersed. Certainly a triviall invention, and an infinite prejudice to Sciences; for these Dichotomists, when they would wrest all things to the Lawes of their Method, and whatsoever doth not aptly fall within those Dichotomies they would either omitt or bow contrarie to their naturall inclination; they bring it so to passe that the Kernels and Graines of Sciences leape out, and they claspe and inclose onely the drie and emptie huskes: So this kinde of Method brings forth fruitless Compends, destroyes the substance of Science." Bacon and Watts, ed., *Advancement of Learning*, Lib. VI, ch. II; 271–2.

280 Keller, *Knowledge in the Public Interest*, 170.

281 Ibid. Antoine Picon has also highlighted the importance of accounting evolving technological thought; that is, those changing mental frames characterizing types of knowledge concerning the relation between nature and social/cultural production: "The major transformations of technological thought correspond to changes in those representations." Picon, "History of Technological Thought," in *Technological Change: Methods and Themes in the History of Technology*, ed. Robert Fox (London: Harwood, 1996), 37–49.

emerge as a specific dispositif or diagram. And this occurs precisely where, as we shall see, the hierarchical ordering logic of filiation within the chain of being became "embodied in architectural plans as the enfilade" and its incremental logic of sorting and ranking visitors, as Paul Emmons has noted.[282]

Cartesianism: A New Image of Thought, 1620–40s

How did this technologization of architecture happen? Perhaps we can start with better understanding the specific reconfiguration of knowledge in the early seventeenth century. Concerning this modernizing effect, both British Empiricism and continental rationalism proceeded from a thoroughgoing critique of similitude as the level on which knowledge is acquired.[283] While the British empiricists tried to undermine the notion of similitude through gathering empirical evidence from sensory experience and observations, the continental rationalists called for a more rigorous form of reasoning.

Especially for Descartes, this rigor seems to consists in making deductive logical inferences[284] based on which he outlined a specific method aimed at the proper ordering of thoughts. It consisted in pursuing a train of reasoning in which complicated propositions were broken down into constituent problems (analysis). By the same token, these constituents would then have to be arranged in a causal serial order, depending on their mutual dependence on one another.[285] In reducing complexity to such a degree that the question often became one of mere differences in magnitude,[286] this analytical procedure thus entailed a progressive decomposition which may then aid to reconstruct the initial problem more intuitively (synthesis). Rather than presenting an entirely unprecedented way of thinking, Descartes's method arose from a

282 Paul Emmons, "Embodying Networks: Bubble Diagrams and the Image of Modern Organicism," *Journal of Architecture* 22, no. 5 (2006): 854–74; here 857.

283 See Foucault, *Order Of Things*, esp. 50–58.

284 On this shared aspect of the rationalists, see for instance Jonathan Bennett, *A Study of Spinoza's Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1984), 29–54; and Pauline Phemister, *The Rationalists: Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). For the following analysis, however, the synthetic investigations of Peg Rawes's *Space, Geometry, and Aesthetics: Through Kant Towards Deleuze* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) have again proven a most valuable source for helping clarify the complex interrelations and adaptation within the successive establishment of rationalist systems of thought, in their implication to conceptions of space.

285 As Descartes himself writes, the "main secret of [his] method; and there is no more useful Rule in this whole treatise" is that "all things can be arranged serially in various groups, not in so far as light can be referred to some ontological genus (such as the categories into which philosophers divided things), but in so far as some things can be known on the basis of others." Rule 6 of "Rules for the direction of the Mind," in René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985), I: 21.

286 Rule 17 in ibid., 170.

specific reformulation of older systems of knowledge. It consisted in the generalization and systematization of the geometric-axiomatic method employed by Greek mathematics, so that knowledge was generated in an **ANALYTIC-SYNTHETIC PROCESS**. This method, first outlined in the *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii* (*Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, 1620s) was first methodologically grounded in his *Discours de la Méthode* (*Discourse on Method*, 1637)[287] and subsequently put into practice in the *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia* (*Meditations on First Philosophy*, 1641), which elaborated on this philosophical system and distilled its metaphysical principles to then compose a mechanistic physics based on and consistent with it: the *Principles of Philosophy* (1644).[288]

Formally speaking, Descartes's method still stood in line with Ramist dichotomies. In fact, Descartes's early works even resorted to including tree-diagrams in an expository manner. We find one, for instance, in the *Regulae*, at the end of the fourteenth rule on the extension of bodies,[289] and another where he provides a more developed dichotomy in the response to the seventh set of objections made to his *Meditations* (1642). ✉[54] Descartes here provides an argument written *more geometrico*, intented to demonstrate his reasoning; a demonstration that was later critically revised by Spinoza's *Ethica Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata* (pub. 1677).[290]

While the Ramist mnenotechnical apparatus and Cartesian mechanistic philosophy were not directly analogous, there was at least a similar logic in operation, an operational similarity consisting in the hierarchical/binary differentiation of species/genera relations. A major operative difference in the latter appears where the *Principles* (Descartes's handbook for a mechanistic

287 Descartes first work toward a proper method for scientific and philosophical thinking, were the *Regulae ad Directionem Ingenii*, which remained an unfinished project. It was first published — in an abbreviated form — in a Dutch translation, by Jan Hendrik Glazemaker as "Regulen van de bestieringe des verstants," in *Alle de Werken van Renatus Des Cartes* (Amsterdam: J. Rieuwertsz, 1684), Vol. 2, and in *Meditationes de prima philosophiae: of bedenkingen van d'eerste wysbegeerte … also ook de Regulen vande Bestieringe des verstants* (Amsterdam: J. ten Hoorn, 1690). The work was published in Latin as "Regulae ad directionem ingenii," in Descartes, *Opuscula posthuma, physica & mathematica* (Amsterdam: Blaeu, 1701, part 4). His 'method' was outlined, instead, in Descartes, *Discours de la Méthode Pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la vérité dans les sciences* (Leiden: Maire, 1637).

288 Descartes, *Meditationes de Prima Philosophia…* (Paris: M. Soly, 1641); and *Principia Philosophiæ* (Amsterdam: Elzevir, 1644).

289 See Descartes, *Meditationes … of bedenkingen*, 536 (link to google books); Descartes, *Opuscula posthuma*, 56 (link to google books). Here the connecting lines are not drawn, probably due to technological restrictions.

290 See Descartes, *Objectiones septimae in meditationes de prima philosophia cum notis authoris* (Amsterdam: Elzevir, 1642), 72 (link to google books). For Spinoza's demonstration, see further below.

54 CARTESIAN TREES: Page from Descartes's *Objectiones septimae ...* (1642), 72; showing the progressive dichotomistic division of beings.



72 *Objectiones & Responsiones septimæ.*

Substantia cogitans

Corporea, sive habens corpus, & illo utens — Incorporea, sive non habens corpus nec illo utens

Extensa & partibilis — Inextensa & impartibilis — Deus — Angelus

Anima equi — Anima canis — Mens Socratis — Mens Platonis

R r En secundum. Determinaté, Indeterminaté. Distincté, confusé. Explicité, implicité. Atque illud quoque animo volvas & revolvas ad dies 5. Erit operæ pretium, si tuis ipse propositionibus singula, ut decet, applices, si dividas, si distinguas. Nec vero facere defugerem modo, nisi vererer
R r tædium. En tertium. Quod nimis concludit, nihil concludit. Nec meditando tempus assignatur. Instat, urget. Age, refer animum ad tua illa, & vide num eodem modo progrediar. Sum res cogitans novi me esse substantiam cogitantem, substantiam cogitantem existere, & tamen nondum novi Mentem existere, imo nulla mens

philosophy) present the resulting tree-structure as a metaphor for philosophy or the organization of knowledge and the world itself. As the preface to the French translation asserted:

> The whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics and morals, [by which] I understand the highest and most perfect moral system, which presupposes a complete knowledge of the other sciences and is the ultimate level of wisdom.[291]

It is here that the arborescent model became a guiding IMAGE OF THOUGHT of philosophy as a metaphysical system,[292] in which the conjunctive order of things drawn together is turned into a disjunctive system for discriminating

291 Descartes, *Les Principes de la philosophie* ... (Paris: H. Le Gras, 1647), n.p., trans. in *Philosophical writings*, 186 (my trans.). On this point, see also Roger Ariew, "Descartes and the Tree of Knowledge," in *Synthese* 92, no.1 (1992), 101–16.

292 As a result, henceforth, thought was going to be "imitating the multiple on the basis of a centered or segmented higher unity." Here, Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 16; see also Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia UP, 1994). passim.

55 CARTESIAN MATERIALISM: Page from Descartes's *Principia philosophiae* (1644), 96; showing the system of vortices, Descartes physiological explanation of forces hypothesized.



things. In it, the older epistemology of resemblances seems less overcome than 'swept under the rug' by being 'folded into' and formally encoded and consolidated within the episteme of representation. This happened where Descartes, in making the tree-structures of previous technical forms of reasoning into a rational form of logic, discarded the practical act of imagination as a source of potential error. In ignoring the (mneno)technical function of drawing these diagrams as a form of knowledge production, he thus discarded them in a diametrically opposed argument to Bacon's critique of how they structure thought, by reifying them specifically as the rational structure of the world. Thereby he had begun instead to ground reasoning in what Foucault identifies as an "analysis based on terms of identity and difference," which operates with two different kinds of comparison: on the one hand, a comparison of measurement that reduces complexes into units that allow the establishment of relations of equality and inequality, and on the other hand a comparison of order by which the most simple elements identified allow for the arrangement of differences according to the smallest possible degree.[293] This latter process enables a passage from one term to another, as Foucault

293 Foucault, *Order of Things*, 53.

notes, by using measurements to "establish series … in which the other terms are established according to increasing differences."[294] In this dual process, Foucault observes, "comparisons ceased to fulfill the function of revealing how the world is ordered, since it was now accomplished according to the order laid down by [an image of] thought progressing naturally from the simple to the complex."[295] This is the point where he identifies a fundamental modification in the "*episteme* of Western culture," as henceforth "the activity of the mind … no longer consist[s] in drawing things together [*rapprocher*], but on the contrary, in discriminating [*discerner*], which is to say: establishing their identities, then the inevitability of the connections with all the successive degrees of a series."[296]

In an increasingly successful manner, Descartes explained worldly processes by decomposing overall phenomena or functionings into a succession of elementary actions or processes. Descartes's method thus promoted a logic based on the proper order of thinking. It consisted in the attempt to arrange the objects of thought is such a way that they lead to a clear and distinct idea.[297] The means to do so was to break complex propositions down to elementary ones. Descartes's dichotomous approach thus transposes serial logic of "hierarchizing being *pro gradu perfectionis*," Serres argues, into an analogical theory of knowledge production where human understanding filters, classifies, and orders ideas "*pro gradu distinctionis*."[298] It thus presented a model in which the subject of modern reasoning (ratio) is fashioned after its capacity to discriminate, based on which the thinking subject distinguishes itself as rational. This, as I will elaborate on soon [→ 3.2.2], generated a certain point of resonance with the distinctive subjectivity emerging within the aristocratic court elite. Within this newly-discriminative logic, however, previous forms of dichotomist reasoning were modified toward a dualistic ontology in which things, instead of being defined in the operation of establishing relationships of similitude, or drawing connections, were assumed to exist in antithetical relations of mutual exclusion and hierarchical relations. This was done by categorically discriminating things, on a first level of generality, into non-living and living things. Those could then be further specified in an analogical division, for instance, of the latter into (non-human) animals and humans, and subsequently discerning humans' material body and imma-

294 Ibid.
295 Ibid., 51–55.
296 Ibid. (modified).
297 After *Fichet, Théorie architecturale*, 21ff.
298 Here after Michel Serres, *Le système de Leibniz et ses modèle mathématiques: Étoile – Schémas – Points* (Paris: PUF, 1968), 117–27.

terial soul, et cetera, down to an underlying fundamental dualism separating the passive matter of which bodies are composed from the active incorporeal sources that motivate them.

Based on this distinction, Descartes founded not only his theory of material *res extensa* and immaterial *res cogitans* as two different kinds of substances, but also his notorious mechanistic interpretation of physics generally. There, the passive conception of bodies and matter that do not possess the power of self-movement but whose state is dependent on external influences,[299] has since been read as promoting a worldview in which things play out in a fully determined manner, as set in motion by an original mover. Yet, more complex in its original form, his "maverick assertion"[300] was that the universe is a *plenum*—at the lowest level of which matter is indistinguishable from the extension of space—full of colliding particles and material vortices (*tourbillions*) ✉[55]; a claim that seemed to undermine the need for an original setting in motion.[301] Unfortunately, this static system gets stuck precisely on the problem of dynamics, which would be formulated in Leibniz's later approach to the concept of substance and virtual forces. Already developed in *Le Monde* (beg. 1629), Descartes's mechanistic philosophy was intended to challenge the received Aristotelian scholasticism in which things where differentiated by a hylomorphic combination of matter with forms (i.e. organized sets of functional capabilities and structures) giving matter its shape in four kinds of causal processes (material, formal, efficient, and final cause).[302] According to this mechanistic interpretation, things are simply differentiated by the arrangement of matter, thus eliminating the need for any forms to define the differing nature of things, and reducing everything to the result of efficient causes, that is, external conditions.[303]

299 Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy," in *Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, II: 1–62; here 17.

300 In critiquing a longstanding supersessionist reading of Cartesianism, Sarah Ellenzweig has recently defended the complexity in Descartes thinking about matter, and the materialist consequences incipient in it; see Sarah Ellenzweig, "Who's Afraid of Inertia?" in *New Politics of Materialism*, ed. idem and John H. Zammito (London/New York: Routledge, 2017), 19–43; here 22.

301 Ellenzweig, "Who's Afraid of Inertia?" (see previous note), 21–23, pointing to Descartes, "The World," and "Principles," in *Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Vol. I: esp. 85–88, 90–93, and 224–32.

302 In *Physics* II.3, Aristotle remarks that causes [*aition*] can be spoken of in different senses, i.e. in terms of "what it is," "what it is made of," "what brought it about," and "what it is for," which have been understood as a formal, material, efficient, and final cause. To put is too simplistically perhaps, the material cause, explains things as a result of being made up of specific constituents; the formal cause, as the result of being structured in a particular way; the efficient cause, as a result of certain external conditions; the final cause, as a result of (what we could call) the general tendencies in the behavior of evolving systems.

303 See *The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes*,

But on this very point, Elisabeth of Bohemia had early on detected a crucial inconsistency in Descartes's dualistic account. [304] An accomplished mathematician known for her eloquent philosophical correspondence, the princess challenged Descartes to provide an answer to how, within a dualistic framework, immaterial substances could possibly interact with material ones in properly mechanistic terms.[305] Descartes had raised this problem without ever offering any solution to it: mechanical laws explained everything but unity; *the coming together of things*. The problem was that a dualistic vision to substances still maintained a remnant formal cause (i.e. a causal relation attributed to the changing form, arrangement, or appearance of a thing, which as Aristotle maintained, does not explain how this form came to be or how change occurred). Interestingly enough, this formal causality can be found—quite figuratively—in the strange formalism within Descartes's significantly shifting use of branching tree diagrams. As Princess Elisabeth maintained, the mind is to a great degree autonomous, but it is still heavily dependent on the condition of the body. This implies that affects, percepts, and concepts always depend on the state of affairs of things they participate in. This is precisely the problem posed by Elisabeth, based on which Descartes would revise his work by eventually resorting to the mediating notion of the passions, in an attempt at consolidating body and soul as interdependent yet distinct things; which was ultimately flawed, as Spinoza would soon demonstrate [→ 3.2.2–3].[306]

Scholium I: On Disciplinary Knowledge Structures

It is probably already apparent what I am trying to get at concerning the emerging system of appartements as an organizational structure. And, indeed,

ed. and trans. Lisa Shapiro (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2007), 26–27. See also ch. 7 "Passions, Imagination, and the Persona of the New Savant," in Ofer Gal and Raz Chen-Morris, *Baroque Science* (London/Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2013), 233–82.

304 As Shapiro summarizes: "Whereas Descartes is willing to entertain a species of formal causation to explain the interaction of mind and body, Elisabeth squarely rejects the idea that the Scholastic notion of a real quality demonstrates the kind of causation in play in the case of the human being. It is important to her that any causal explanation be a mechanistic one, and on the mechanist models of efficient causation both cause and effect are material. Given her commitment to mechanist causal explanation, Elisabeth would have it that mind is just as material as body" (Shapiro, ed., *Correspondence*, 41).

305 "In a bizarre twist, Descartes proposed that mind and body interacted, but never explained how the interaction might take place beyond saying that the pinneal gland was the conduit for such interactions. … However, by emptying mind of any physical property, Descartes made contact impossible" (Shapiro, *Correspondence*, 188). See also Chantal Jaquet, *Affects, Actions and Passions in Spinoza: The Unity of Body and Mind*, trans. Tatiana Reznichenko (Edinburgh: EUP, 2018), here 5ff.

306 For a longer discussion, see Gal and Chen-Morris, *Baroque Science*, esp. 273ff.

it would be possible to refer this discussion on the changing organization of systems of knowledge back to the realm of architecture at this point. This epistemological shift may be appreciated on a deeper level if we first investigate more fully the fact that Descartes's method, instead of offering an easily applicable solution, presented a fundamental problem to thought and knowledge production.[307] Its attempted application rendered visible a perplexing problem within axiomatic geometrical analysis (and related forms of reasoning) itself: it demonstrated that logical inferences are not easily inverted into synthesis.[308] With today's perspective, we can pin this problem down to the fact that within geometric reasoning a simple reversal of analysis into synthesis is made impossible, as Finnish philosopher Jaakko Hintikka notes, due to its reliance on "auxiliary constructions."[309] This means that synthesis is not just analysis in reverse: what is analyzed is always a working configuration; what is synthesized is an argument about the workings of the whole and not about the configuration or relation of the parts into which it has been broken down. Synthesis therefore does not consist in putting the elements back together. Instead it involves a process of learning to construct or reconstruct a working mechanism. Ramée had therefore already employed the term genesis.'[310] In this sense, the Cartesian approach to method initially revealed that analysis cannot guarantee synthesis, that is, an ability to construct arguments well or 'make them work.' But on this point, having taken out the practical aspect of diagrammatic reasoning, Descartes failed to properly conceptualize the act of progressive refinement that determines the acquisition of a technique and learning to make it work. Instead, he would ground synthetic processes in a guiding set of normative principles (= image of thought) that—rather similar to Cartesian coordinate space—sets up a gridded frame-

307 In contrast to the ideals underlying Renaissance thinking, the baroque starts from the impulse of improving imperfect states. Baroque science and the tense struggles, anxieties, and paradoxes that characterize it: "When one reads Descartes' promises of certainty in the *Discourse on Method* in light of the disturbing insights of the *Optics,* which the *Discourse* prefaces; … [they] no longer appear to comprise a self-standing, coherent, and confident philosophy or 'method' that drives the new means and ways of producing knowledge. Rather, they reveal themselves as tense struggles with the same dilemmas… : the submission of all phenomena to a small set of exact mathematical laws" (ibid., 7–8).

308 See Jaakko Hintikka, "A Discourse on Descartes' Method," in *René Descartes Meditiations on First Philosophy in focus,* ed. Stanley Tweyman (London/New York: Routledge, 1993), 118–34; here 120–22. See also the following essays.

309 Ibid., 124; on this see also id., *Logic, Language-Games, and Information* (Oxford: Clarendon, Press, 1973).

310 This way Deleuze, for instance, faults Descartes's method to be "a method for solving supposedly given problems, not a method of invention appropriate to the constitution of problems or the understanding of questions." See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 161 (emph. added).

work according to which constructive movements, actions, and so on can be measured or evaluated.

This framework would gain a greater influence on much of contemporary education and knowledge production, and left a distinct mark on French pedagogy from 1690–1740. It can also be observed in the major intellectual milieu of architecture, the Académie Royale d'architecture in 1671, the foundation of which coincided with the wider implementation of Cartesian ideas after 1650. As Cartesian rationalism had distanced knowledge from former forms of similitude and subjective forms of experience as a potential source of error, it suggested a possible elimination of the *practical* aspect of knowledge creation. For all practical training, this implied that learning a craft like architecture tacitly through compositional practices (figures of thought) and apprenticeship (configuration of knowledge production) does not guarantee that one would build 'well'. At least, it did not guarantee it in the sense that 'building well' transgresses immediate needs or subjective value judgments by being connected to a new morality in which quality is only measurable against a set of normative and discursively expressed a priori principles about the "veritable rules" of architecture, outlined by the Académie and taught as an abstract body of knowledge that would help elevate contemporary architectural practice as an art (*technē*).[311]

The related transformations of architectural knowledge structures have beenstudied by some architecture theorists, who have focused on the increasing institutionalization of architectural practice into a distinct discipline within the wider scientific revolution during the second half of the seventeenth century.[312] But this focus leaves several questions unanswered. Notably, in assuming a 'scientific revolution' (i.e. break) in architecture as a discipline and implicitly attributing changing forms to a changing mode of knowledge production, these studies have not always accounted sufficiently for the changing subject of knowledge and the assemblages alongside which it is produced. As such they often fail to arrive at a fuller genetic understanding of knowledge practices through the historical, cognitive, or socio-

311 Jachmann speaks of a "verbal foundation of the art of building" (Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 312–5; here 313).

312 See here esp. Pérez-Gómez's *Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science*. In focusing on the structural change in the organization of architectural knowledge, these studies have attended to the changing perception of architectural objects in the modern quest for objectivity that characterizes the scientific revolution, that becomes tangible in various phenomena as the demotion of geometry into a subservient discipline, the disciplinary divide between academic architects and polytechnic engineers, the rise of verbally-coded theory, grounded in sensualist theories, and newly-emerging aesthetic ideologies.

genetic aspects of the operations on which they are based.[313] For our purposes, what requires more attention is the fact that this changing type of knowledge is closely connected to the changing social assemblages and ecologies of practices to which these bodies of knowledge characteristically pertained,[314] namely, a transformation of the serial patterns of passing down knowledge in the master-apprentice assemblage of workshops into a different one.

Importantly, this assemblage is not directly transformed into the dispositif of a school and the teacher-pupil relations of class-room settings, where architectural know-how and related technical forms of training come to be uprooted from its constructivist material-discursive territory. Instead, it was initially reformed into a new form of assembly in the (bi-)weekly conferences held by the select members of the Académie[315] tasked with debating and resolving relevant aspects of architecture, in the greater ambition to establish a normative doctrine that could then be taught in the public lectures given at the Académie to learning architects.[316] These conferences and lectures established a professional network. The membership to this relatively exclusive club also helped accentuate a differentiation that was taking place between entrepreneurial builders and architects as a new workforce placed in the service of the state.[317] And since we are not talking about a 'dissolution' of previous assemblages, we should also note that this transformation is not a one-sided process. Other scholars, who had long worked in a purely reflective realm and held manual labor in contempt, were incrementally starting—thanks to the influence of Newton in particular—to embrace practical experimentation, which newly connected to rationalist thinking and

313 See the reference to Piaget in my Book O, note 1. Above, we have already seen—thanks to Jachmann's observation—that this operative dimension is a key for unlocking how topological forms of reasoning were closely connected to visual media and techniques. I am referring back to the material-discursive practice of drawing buildings progressively into reality in a series of successive refinements, which within the work of Serlio and Le Muet comes to tooled into a specific design strategy (both as an architectural mode of production as well as thinking).

314 I owe this sharp observation to Stalianos Giamarelos, "Interdisciplinary Deflections: Histories of the Scientific Revolution in Alberto Pérez-Gómez's Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science," *JAE* 96, no.1 (2015), 17–27; here 24; in reference to Edgar Zilsel, "The Sociological Roots of Science," American Journal of Sociology 47, no.4 (1942): 544–62.

315 These were collected and published in Lemonnier's *Procès-Verbaux,* mentioned above in my note 134.

316 For an introductory discussion, see also Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*, 128ff.

317 See Anthony Gerbino, "Blondel, Colbert et l'origine de l'Académie royale d'architecture," n.p. (online); and "Architectural Theory in the Service of the Crown: The foundation of the *Académie royale d'architecture*," in *The Politics of Making*, eds. Mark Swenarton, Igea Troiani, and Helena Webster (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2007), 95–104.

moreover to technological progress; as such, they presented a precondition for the modern scientist to come to exist.[318]

From the 1680s onwards, architecture was establishing itself as a positivist science through the successive codification of these of veritable rules, where the art of building would no longer be a means. Instead, the art of building *well*—now distinguished from mere construction—becomes a means to an end, namely, for normalizing practices and thus consolidating a newfound socio-political order. It is this slippage, opening architecture toward a new dispositif, where architecture gains its scientific status through the increasing systematization and theorization of its own ecology of (knowledge)practices: the art of distribution. Yet, establishing the complex historical relations in which such dispositifs of power-knowledge express themselves in social assemblages is not an easy task, and it must be done meticulously. It is easy to see that we cannot assume a simple linear causality from one to the other; instead we must start from a reciprocal supposition between them. From now, the question ought to be: Is it not the particular discourse on the art of distribution, unfolding precisely within the very establishment of architecture as a discipline by means of which architecture reciprocally comes to be established as a cultural institution (and thus institutionalized as a cultural technics)? If we start from this question, we would need to reveal through what specific rationale (*logos*) the discipline of architecture was established in France *as* a particular art (*technē*); what new role did distribution gain in it, and how therein did the art of distribution come to be coupled to a specific social rationale for drawing distinctions?

Corollary I: On Disciplinarity, Distribution, and Dispositifs

From a genetic angle, we are thus tasked to reconstruct a mechanism in the historical process in which this dispositif of the art of distribution comes to be actualized in two movements: first, the establishment of disciplinary discourses, meaning the discursive establishment of architecture as a discipline. And, second, the ongoing formation of disciplinary society more generally. It is crucial to not conflate these two disciplinary aspects, in order to determine the technological resonances established between the two through which (and the particular ways in which) architecture incrementally comes to be thought of as a cultural technics for instrumentalizing spatial differences, to social and political ends.

318 Giamarelos, "Interdisciplinary Deflections," 24.

It is in this sense that the consolidation of architecture as a discipline converges closely with the consolidation of what Foucault called disciplinary society. Of course, it is to this emerging disciplinary dimension, and how its structures and mechanisms successively manifest themselves and come to be employed within architectural organizations, that we must now attend. But concerning the relation between the discourse on the art of distribution and the unfolding disciplinary dimension of architecture (in its twofold sense), we must be wary of handling Foucault's arguments in a too simplistic a manner, especially in regard to his later discussions about the biopolitical instrumentality of architecture within disciplinary societies. In fact, in the context of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it becomes too easy to understand "power/knowledge" exclusively in terms of political technologies (and the managerial problem of governance, as a constraining form of 'power over') and thus gloss over a wider understanding of power/knowledge in terms of social or cultural technologies (and the ecological problem of co-existing heterogeneous lifeforms and lifestyles, as an enabling 'power to' [*potentia*], not restrictive 'power over' [*potestas*]).[319] Since we have been looking more at houses in this chapter (and not palaces, where—as we have seen at the end of the last book [→2.3]—*potestas* is more important), we are thus faced with the challenge to reconstruct the wider social ordering mechanism, because machines are "always social before being technical."[320]

Concerning this point, I may be forgiven to insert another assemblage-theoretical reflection into this analysis, for the sole sake of clarification. Because, even if this constitutes a digression in what has already turned into a digression, it is important to account for another operational similarity. Like Descartes's problematization of analysis in the *Discourse on Method*, Foucault's early discourse-analytical method, too, only raises the problem of reconstructing a sort of 'mechanism' capable of synthesis. Only in Foucault's later synthetic work, where he reviews this epistemological transition from a genealogical angle, does he identify a reconfiguration of "power-knowledge" into what he calls a disciplinary apparatus: as an apparatus that predominantly "analyses and breaks down; it breaks down individuals, places, time,

319 Below, I will elaborate more on this governmental dimension in relation to a difference (or convergence) between Foucault reading of government "as a *disposition* of things" (discussed further below) and the problem of order lying within the *distribution* of things.

320 This Simondonian argument was originally developed by Guattari, and further formulated by Deleuze, in Deleuze and Parnet, *Dialogues*, rev. edn., trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia UP, 2007; orig. pub. 1977), 70. Here also Anne Sauvagnargues, *Artmachines: Deleuze, Guattari, Simondon*, trans. Suzanne Verderber with Eugene Holland (Edinburgh: EUP, 2016), 187.

movements, actions, and operations. It breaks them down into components such that they can be seen, on the one hand, and modified on the other."[321] These disciplinary mechanisms, he argues, are effectuated specifically by four dispositifs. As my preliminary discussion has outlined, those are first, the techniques of DISTRIBUTION (which operate primarily through a form of *quadrillage* that enables a hierarchical RANKING and functional allocation of elements produced according to how they are distributed in an ANALYTICAL SPACE, grid, or table, that in turn 'identifies' them and 'makes them differ from one another'); second, the CONTROL OF ACTIVITY this gridded space engenders; third, the ORGANIZATION OF GENESES it enables; and fourth, the COMPOSITION OF FORCES it generates.[322] [→ 0.2]

In drawing a lesson from both Descartes's and Foucault's central problematics, the question is thus to reconstruct the mechanism in which this breakdown of structure is effectuated. Here we encounter a difficulty for our analysis, because Foucault explains these emerging disciplinary mechanisms precisely on the basis of the techniques of distribution by means of which they are effectuated. This means, however, that we cannot simply invert this cause/effect relationship and explain the (discourse on the art of) distribution by way of disciplinarity in turn; at least not uncritically without addressing what has changed in the form of distribution. Otherwise, this reverse-engineering would introduce both a flawed cause/effect-relation and anachronism that falsely turns Foucault's analyses into some sort of synthesis. This concerns the methodological problem of any *res extensa* notion of mechanisms or machines, namely, how breaking down processes or chunking history into a series of 'befores' and 'afters' according to which identities and differences can be established, will ultimately fail to arrive at a synthetic vision of the workings or operative mechanisms of such segmentary systems. What promises a more synthetic vision of how such systems work, is instead a more machinic notion of those techniques of partitioning (*quadrillage*) that—according to Foucault—operate this shifting social assemblage in the first place.

321 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 56; see also id., *Discipline and Punish.*

322 See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 135–70. I refer to the discussion in my preliminary discussion. In this chapter, I am taking the liberty of connecting the "art of distribution [*l'art de distribution*]" i the emerging discipline of architecture, with the disciplinary dispositif that Foucault talks about while using the French term *l'art de repartitions.* To me this seems legitimate enough given not only based on the conceptual origin of the notion of apartments as elaborated in my chapter 1.1–1.3, but also given the aforementioned quasi-synonymy between the terms 'compartition' and distribution in contemporaneous French. Furthermore this seems to be legitimized by the common translation of the French *repartition* (in Foucault) or *partage* (in Rancière, see the second-next note below) as 'distribution.' For the sake of transparency, I will hereafter give the original French term wherever this other translation is used.

Aside from the need to approach partition or distribution in terms of open systems [→ INT./BOOK 0] in which differentiations can lead to identities and identification, leading to further differentiation within ongoing recompositions, these mechanisms also need to be reconstructed in their changing mechanics and the changing assemblages they enter. Without doing so, we remain caught in a representationalist vision that eventually confuses diagrams (as **ABSTRACT MACHINES**) with actualized material, with social or institutional structures (as **CONCRETE ASSEMBLAGES**).[323] Diagrams never represent, but bring about new realities; hence, it is a recomposition that any diagram, as a map of relations of forces renders visible. To the extent that partition or distribution operates this recomposition, it must be understood precisely as one of those diagrammatic components driving an abstract machine, enacting the conjunction of those forces and powers it conditions, and which traverse the concrete assemblages of heterogeneous components they give rise to. But to arrive at this transversal diagram of forces through which those assemblages concretize, it is necessary first to bring the transition down to an (abstract) machinic level, or engineering stratum of these processes. On this level, we find a larger recomposition in the distribution of the sensible (to adapt Rancière's term). It is this redistribution in which the classical disciplines were established through the reorganization of knowledge into a more *technological form*, that in turn manifests itself in a similar reorganization of spatial arrangements, where distribution—far from just being a tool for discrimination—draws them together in a new way. This is because distribution presents the operative link within the changing concatenations in the four dispositifs isolated by Foucault, in which techniques of distribution turned incrementally into an art (*technē*) that then became increasingly instrumental, and formed a dispositif in a specific social assemblage.

Following the machinic process that takes form in this transitional phase does not mean that another pseudo-epoch, an 'episteme of distribution' between Foucault two epistemes, is being isolated; rather, by focusing

323 Importantly, the institutionalization of architecture, and even less so the Académie as an institutional body, cannot be said to be any **DIAGRAM** representing or indexing the specific social structure and relations of forces of the Ancien Régime; not even the relation between architects and the state. The institutionalization of architecture and the changing relation it produces are but one of the concrete **MACHINIC ASSEMBLAGES OF BODIES** whose establishment enables a specific social functioning (here absolutist rule). The real diagram of this social assemblage—the **ABSTRACT MACHINE** of 'disciplinarity'—traverses all such concrete assemblages, from which they are entirely different: The machinic assemblage is something entirely different from the abstract machine, even though it is very closely connected with it" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 71).

on the formation of a specific dispositif of distribution within this phase-shift, it implies that *technē* is being strategically reintroduced where partition or distribution progressively slips onto new levels of organizational complexity. After this slippage distribution was used differently than before, and for a different technical reason or rationality; alongside an arising "technical mentality," as Simondon would say. This technical mentality concerns exactly the missing, changing subject of knowledge: namely those planning practices grounded in the techniques of distribution discussed above. But exactly in this technical dimension, it forces us to move from a purely epistemological level to a more technological level; a level on which such systems are configured altogether. This is what Deleuze and Guattari call the **MACHINIC PHYLUM**. It is on this level that we have to identify the changing techniques operating within the art (*technē*) of distributive reasoning (*logos*) itself, from which it is possible to map the emergence of the specific rationalist aspect (order) as it gives rise to a novel technical ensemble—the discourse on the art of distribution.

[→ 3.3]

Moreover, on this machinic level we are in a more advantageous methodological position, as we are no longer isolating academic discourses from a wider field of discursive formations that are formed by **COLLECTIVE ASSEMBLAGES OF ENUNCIATION**. These cannot be directly reduced to scientific discourse, due to their social or cultural dimension. As Sauvagnargues has argued with Guattari, collective assemblages of enunciation, such as institutions or institutional discourses, cannot work without presupposing a social investment into specific "desiring machines producing a subjectivity adjacent to these components."[324] It is this peculiar production of a specific subjectivity generated by the desiring-machines' collective assemblages, and the social codings to which they are tied, that I hope to outline in the following section, in switching registers onto a more sociological plane. With this switch, I am trying to avoid explaining the formation of the residential system of appartements on a 'level of the social' on the one hand (i.e., of court society, absolutist monarchy, and institutional academic discourses), or on the other hand, on a 'level of the individual' (and the there often assumed quest for privacy). By focusing instead on the intermediary meso-level of the collective, I wish to show that Descartes's formal consolidation of earlier dichotomous forms of reasoning into a discriminative logic can be used as a thread for following the social coding of appartements as a system of discrimination. To avoid the logical shortcut of explaining this structural transformation as merely repre-

324 Guattari, *Chaosmosis*, 34; Sauvagnagues, *Artmachines*, 191–2.

senting structural social or individual psychological processes, it is necessary to reveal the complex ways in which this differentiation was driven by a certain concatenation of architectural arrangements, social figurations, and systems of knowledge.

In such an assemblage-theoretic vision it then this is this conjunction in which this discriminative system will arise, as a discursive subject around which a new subjectivity and new objectives come to be expressed and concretized, as well as a concrete object around which new social practices and subjectivities crystallizes in return. To do so, I want to zoom in on the co-constitutive function and sympoietic dimension of architectural arrangements within not just power/knowledge dispositifs but moreover techno-social figurations. That is; we must map how (and locate where) rationalist forms of thinking, enter the social realm, or take on a social form—in the sense that it forms an organizational set of functional capabilities—under the emerging absolutist form of power during the Ancien Régime. As with all technical ensembles, here the task will be to stay on the level of operational similarity.

3.2.2 The Court Aristocracy's Sociology of Distinction: A Heterogenizing Form of Social Production

Concerning the reciprocal relationship within the dispositif of distribution and disciplinary structures, one important thing to consider is the *social logic of distinction* that—as Norbert Elias has succinctly shown—drove the SOCIOGENESIS of French court aristocracy, and the specific subjectivity this social order generated. As his magisterial study *Court Society* describes, the formation of this group as a specific social figuration begins to take on its evolved form after the 1620s, and especially during the reign of Louis XIV (1654–1715).[325] He describes how, in the social order of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, conceived in terms of the three estates, there was a qualitative difference in kind between the high-born nobility and the low-born bourgeoisie. Aside from birth and lineage, the status of the nobility was directly connected to its ability to spend. It was this ethos of spending as 'status consumption' that distinguished the nobility from the economic ethos of the bourgeoisie, preferring to limit consumption in the interest of sav-

325 As Elias defines, a court is a specific social figuration in which hundreds or thousands of people are bound together, in a more or less fixed hierarchy around a monarch, by way of a precise etiquette (Elias, *Court Society*, 35).

ing.[326] This status consumption was moreover encoded in the axiomatic obligation of the nobles to display their rank,[327] forming part of the particular importance of appearances within courtly culture.

During the sixteenth century, however, this difference became more blurred: particularly the boundaries between the lower ranks of the nobility and the upper strata of the bourgeoisie became indistinct due to the rising social strata of financiers and *noblesse de robe*. The latter had taken away much actual power from the nobility, expelled from the judiciary and administration, while especially the rich bourgeois financiers' emulation of the aristocracy's form of consumption undermined established estate ethos, against which the higher rank of the nobility became increasingly contra distinguished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as Haddad describes.[328] The contradistinction triggered a complex socio-politico-legal process in which social conditions were reconstructed and recategorized on the basis of genealogical lineages, constructing new generic categories of social classes, which rather than explaining, require explanation. This reconfigutaion was aggravated by the fact that Henri IV had opened up the city for expansion, thus dismantling the city as a legally privileged place.[329] The king did the same with the court: as part of his attempts to centralize power, Henri promoted an "alternative system of patronage attached to office holding" as a means to break up the established feudal bonds.[330] Seeing their feudal privileges diminished by the French king's successive attempts to create a centralized government, the nobility responded vigorously in rebelling against this encroachment, before Cardinal Richelieu and Louis XIV finally succeeded in eliminating all remnants of feudalism—especially the feudal concept of liberty.

326 Elias, *Court Society*, 64–7. See also Scott, *The Rococo Interior*, 81ff. As she comments "During the Ancien Régime, consumption in its widest sense was not a matter of personal and private gratification but a public art act of social responsibility" (ibid., 81). For a study recontextualizing the *hôtel* as a model of aristocratic status consumption, and economic mentalities, see esp. Part 1 of Coquery, *L'hôtel aristocratique*, 17ff.

327 Elias, *Court Society*, 65.

328 See ibid., 38, 57–66, 180. "'Nobility of the Robe' and 'Nobility of the Sword,' two expressions commonly repeated in historiography of the nobility of the modern era, are not simple social descriptions. Their chronologically staggered appearance, and the development of their usage in the seventeenth century are the result of the transformations of the Second Estate. … The distinction … was thus at the heart of the political clash between different conceptions of the place of the nobility within the absolute monarchy." Élie Haddad, "Nobility of the Sword, Nobility of the Robe: Social Spaces and Ideological Borders," trans. Vicki-Marie Petrick, *L'Atelier du Centre de recherches historiques* 22 bis (2021), n.p. (online); avail. online at http://journals.openedition.org/acrh/12045.

329 See Guidici, who develops this line of reasoning in reference to Foucault's essay "Space, Knowledge, Power" (Guidici, "Specific Places," 141).

330 Ballon, *Paris of Henri IV*, 3–4.

Yet, instead of positing some break in the formation of absolutist monarchy, Wallerstein suggests that we reconsider this social change as the systemic effect of a "time of dramatic tension" during which "the usual mechanisms of compensation within a social system prove so ineffective … that a major restructuring of the economy begins to occur,"[331] in the context of a wider recomposition of social relations and relations of power. It is concerning these "tensions" and new "compensation mechanisms" that Elias's work can still offer important clues, when we update his sociogenetic approach systematically in view of recent findings as to how this recomposition was fostered by the climatic anomaly in the late 1630s and early 1640s, when Europe entered a greater economic, social, political, religious, scientific and artistic crisis.[332] While similar changes affected all of Europe, in France they initially led to a reinforced aristocracy and facilitated the country's rise to a hegemonic position of power.[333] This restructuring was then connected to the consolidation of earlier aristocratic figurations into a court-aristocratic one. The above-mentioned changes, which greatly undermined the nobility's longstanding qualitatively-different status in kind, were one preconditioning factor and catalyst for this recomposition in that they engendered a larger de-stratification of established social strata. This in turn led to a somewhat reactionary response by the aristocracy, who started to incrementally distinguish itself from other social groups.

331 Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern Worldsystem, Vol. II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of European World-Economy, 1600–1750* (New York/London: Academic Press, 1980), 7.

332 The historiographic notion of a 'general crisis" in the seventeenth century, that helped European economy to pass from a feudal into a capitalist one, has been popularized by Eric Hobsbawm (1954) and Hugh Trevor-Roper (1959). Here after the earlier formulation by Roland Mousnier, cited in the introduction "Crises of the Seventeenth century?" to Wallerstein, *Modern Worldsystem*, II: 3. For a detailed account of esp. the political and cultural transformation, see also Geoffrey Parker, *Europe in Crisis: 1598–1648*, 2nd edn. (Oxford and Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001; orig. pub. 1979). Parker has vigorously shown the connection to a massive global cooling trend, effected by an exceptional series of volcanic eruptions between 1638–43 and decrease in the activity of the sun after 1645, that changed the course of history world-wide. Especially 1647–48, a year of extreme weather, saw multiple revolutions in Europe. See also Parker, *Global Crisis War: Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century,* abr. and rev. edn. (New Haven: Yale UP, 2017).

333 At the time, Europe was destabilized by recurrent plague epidemics (causing for instance the death of a million people in France between 1628–31). The Thirty Years' War (1618–48) had eroded the powers of the Catholic Habsburg; the Spanish Empire was caught in multiple wars (the resumed Dutch War of Indepencence, and in 1640 Habsburg Spain — in economic and political decline since the 1620s — was at the brink of a total collapse. In France, the Fronde, a revolt of nobles against royal authority (beginning with Colbertian reformations, started levying taxes on the previously tax-exempted nobles), erupted in 1648, when with the Peace of Westphalia, through which France will gained a more dominant position in the new political order of Europe. This civil war, has been said to have fostered French absolutist rule to emerge.

During the reign of Louis XIV, we initially see the gap between the estates widen, and other social distinctions sharpened, due to its instrumentalization by the King to consolidate his power.[334] The pressure for distinction was steadily intensified by the increasing competition repeatedly posed by rising bourgeois strata,[335] which further blurred the boundaries between the estates. In fact, we could go so far as to say that under these existing social and environmental pressures, the estate system finds itself in a somewhat 'smeared' state that characterizes systemic phase transitions. The novel figuration of the court aristocracy then emerged alongside a re-stratification into a multi-layered figuration driven apart by increasing degrees of intensity, which generated more internal divisions within each stratum itself. In his social application of assemblage theory, DeLanda notes that "whenever a heterogeneous group of people comes together, they tend to organize themselves in an interlocking … pattern that interconnects them without homogenizing them."[336] Especially in the upper layers, this process fostered what Elias calls an elitist rationality of mutual self-distinction,[337] shaping the behavior characteristic of this new social figuration, which would hold it together as a powerful assemblage. As such, it is the restratification process where this new assemblage takes form that constitutes a specific **HETEROGENESIS**.

According to Elias's figurational sociology, one precondition for this inclusive and reciprocal form of mutual self-distinction—a form that obviously also articulated itself in the multiplication of socio-spatial differences within contemporary royal palaces and aristocratic residences—consisted in the way the aristocracy had internalized this elitist rationality in the expressive form of specific habits and behavioral codes pertaining to courtly etiquette. It made it possible to express one's membership to a social stratum by marking one's position within it; as such, it constituted the social reality of court aristocracy; or rather, in it a specific subjectivity was being realized. Here, as Elias writes, the rather recent alienation of the aristocracy from the countryside had altered not only their social position but also their self-conception. It initially implied a specific uprooting of the aristocratic subject from some state of nature. This required an ability to reflect and detach oneself, the principal individuating factor within these civilizing psycho-sociogenetic processes,[338]

334 Elias, *Court Society*, 70.

335 Ibid., esp. 66–73, 103, and 179ff.

336 Delanda, *A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History*, 31.

337 Ibid., 78–116, esp. 92, 100, and 103.

338 For Elias, civilizing processes over time (=sociogenesis) come to be repeated in the psychogeneses of civilizing norms in parallel to biogenetic processes/ontogeny (Elias, *The Civilizing Process*, rev. edn., trans. Edmund Jephcott (Hoboken: Blackwell, 2000),

which fostered not only a greater self-awareness of the court-aristocratic subject, but also their sense of distinction.[339]

This subjectivation process is not driven by any simple form of self-distinction. It is effectuated by forms of mutual distinction, which involves a reciprocal determination of a social group that distinguishes itself from other groups. It thus entails a wider systematic behavior within an assemblage. As this systematic form of behavior, the distinction is thus quite literally tied to social **STRATIFICATION PROCESSES**. Indeed, conceptually it implies not so much the marking of differences by separation (*Abgrenzung*) but a sort of vertical distancing (*Abhebung*) or hierarchization in relative standing and inequality between the estates as different social strata; the sociology of distinction can hence be reconsidered as a systemic response of hierarchically-stratified groups whose sociogenesis or historical formation can be explained by changing degrees of social pressure.[340] It is in this systemic sense that Elias—with reference to his work on civilizing processes—conceives the court aristocracy as "a social figuration within which an extensive transformation of external into internal compulsions takes place";[341] and it was this internalization in which rational forms of behaviors were produced. By 'rational', we should not understand some sensible behavior according to a certain logic; the term implies instead a deeper distributive logic of how any behaviors arise when systems settle into specific states of affairs, configuring relations of exteriority, which in turn produce certain internal structures, such as distinct social strata.

In this stratification process, social distinctions are established by a delicate synchronization of forces that calibrates social tensions and pressures of mutual dependences and hostilities into a complex system of metastably ordered contrasts. What happens in it is an **INTENSIVE** process that diachronically effectuates an actualization of the virtual where—we could

II: 109). As Cultural sociologist Nico Wilterdink valuably pointed out in a response, posted online on Jan 17 2007 at http://norberteliasfoundation.nl/blog/?p=13, this view was inspired by Ernst Haeckel's notion how the formation of individuals involves a short recapitulation of phylogeny, i.e. epigenesis. See here my chapter 0.3, and my epilogue below. Here, I am implicitly extending this reading through Frantz Fanon's and Syvia Wynter's more nuanced notion of sociogeny, as the formation of things that are socially-produced rather ontologically given (Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2008); Katherine McKittrick, ed., *Sylvie Wynter: On being Human as Praxis* (London/Durham: Duke UP, 2015), 1–8, 9–89; as much as I approach it from a sympoietic material-discursive angle.

339 Elias, *Court Society*, 242–3.

340 See also Jean-Pascal Dalos, *The Sociology of Elite Distinction: From Theoretical to Comparative Perspectives* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

341 Elias, *Court Society*, 92, in reference to id., *Civilizing Process*, II: 191ff, 240ff, and esp. its Part 4.2, 379ff

say—vertical pressures lead to horizontal tensions that challenge the cohesion of the system, while this cohesion is maintained in establishing new bonds, or binding factors. As such this social rationality, instead of being a simple exclusive disjunction, is based on establishing inclusive disjunctions. And it is this establishment in which we ought to search for the reasons for the complex creation of increasing socio-spatial differences.

Mutual Self-Distinction as an Affective Mechanism

From this angle, the elitist rationality of mutual self-distinction ought to be understood as a systematic response to changing environments and environmental relationships that are (re-)configuring social figurations, namely the apprehension of insecurity that people began to internalize through the contemporaneous instabilities regarding changing political, religious, and intellectual climates. The court aristocracy as a social figuration thus emerged in the configuration of a specific stratification process pertaining to this recalibration of changing relations of exteriority, which were transformed into structures internal to the system. In this internalization of externalities, we can note again an 'immunological' phenomenon, albeit this time from a specifically psychological and sociological angle. [→ Intro, 2.2.3]

Yet instead of looking at this constitutive internalization process in more depth, Elias's analysis in *Court Society* first foregrounds the resulting forms in which the assimilation was expressed in certain social structures. In his more structuralist approach, Elias sees this elitist rationality expressing itself in a characteristic spatial relationality, one that, Elias argues, also configured the organizational logic of French aristocratic houses. His study presentes the arrangement of aristocratic houses as "an expression of the co-existence of constant spatial proximity and constant social distance" established between the people of different status and rank living and working there.[342] This expressive reading, taken up by some architecture-historical analyses, gives some clues to how this system of both belonging and distinction, became externalized into the built structure of the *hôtel* and its *dépendences*, namely where the *corps de logis*, containing the principal lodgings, was articulated by standing out (*abheben*) from the lower common parts reserved for other family members, guests, and staff. But learning from the fallacy of structuralist hypostatizations, we need to be more careful concerning this externalization; specifically, if we wish to move beyond readings

342 Elias, *Court Society*, 48 (trans. mod.). The translation of German '*ständig*' with "constant" loses the original sociological allusion to '*Stände*' [estates] in this passage.

in which architecture only fulfills a passive role for staging social processes, responding to the call of contemporary sociologists like Martina Löw and Heike Delitz for an approach that starts from the constitutive agency of spatial configurations for social processes.[343]

Aside from describing epiphenomenal manifestations of this rationality, Elias's work offers the deepest insights where he stays on the level where social processes are being (re-)configured (i.e. its 'machinic level' or 'engineering stratum'). Here he is able to reveal how courtly social interactions operated with three kinds of "civilizing" cultural techniques that rather neatly align with (and can thus largely be reconsidered through) three of the disciplinary mechanisms and technologies of the self that Foucault's work would independently isolate in (a) "the organization of geneses," (b) "the control of activities," and (c) "the composition of forces."[344] In the context of the courtly dispositif, Elias describes these techniques as (a) the vital "art of observing people" that develops in conjunction with a specific form of introspective self-observation, as well as a regime of description; (b) the civilized manners in the social "art of dealing with people" that consist in a highly diplomatic form of conduct or conducting oneself for probing into power relations, which take form in (c) a specific rational, that is, compartmentalized social structure, in which social interaction "was organized and broken down into partial processes [that] could be supervised and controlled."[345] But precisely concerning this latter point, his account is missing a more genetic angle as to how architectural arrangements — as an externalization — helped structure these affect-controlling cultural techniques of interaction, as such, to begin with. ✉[56]

What was supposed to be controlled, here, were affects. "Like every type of rationality," Elias notes, this elitist type "evolves in conjunction with particular constraints enforcing control of the affects."[346] In sociology the notion of affect control problematizes how individuals construct culturally-based affective meanings through (inter)action and how social institutions maintain these.[347] Underlying much of Elias's very notion of civilization pro-

343 See here especially the outlines of a sociology of space and architecture by Martina Löw, *The Sociology of Space: Materiality, Social Structures, and Action*, trans. Donald Goodwin (New York: Springer, 2016), and Heike Delitz, *Gebaute Gesellschaft: Architektur als Medium des Sozialen* (Frankfurt, M./New York: Campus, 2010).

344 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 135–169.

345 See Elias, *Court Society*, 104–11, talking about organizations in general here.

346 Ibid., 92.

347 Affect control theory was further formulated as a wider theoretical framework with social psychologist David Heise, *Understanding Events: Affect and the Construction of Social Action* (New York: Cambridge UP, 1979).

cesses, it involves auto-affective systems of self-conditioning that, arising from a more basic form of constraint through mutual control, attunes the individual to co-existence with others.[348] This way, the notion of control as an affective modulation resonates deeply with the Foucauldian notion of discipline, especially if filtered through Deleuze's extension of it.[349] It brings us back to a more basic level, the engineering stratum, of social structuring operations. To arrive there, we must sharply distinguish between two notions of control: one used in specific terms of dominance or political power, and another used in more general terms of self-regulatory systems or affective force fields, in which the notion of affect points beyond the subject.[350]

Closer to the latter sense, Elias concentrates on a psychological process of compartmentalization that, as he perceptively recognizes, does not engender a simple separation process, but involves processes of both "involvement and detachment"[351] through which this subjectivity is brought about in boundary-drawing practices that are at the same time structuring operations binding a specific social group or net of individual actors to one another. The subjectivity arising from compartmentalizing cannot be reduced directly to a process generating 'individuals' by sheer force of isolation or a subjugating power instilling a sense of selfhood, responsibility, or autonomy. Instead, this process is a genesis in which—within socio- and psychogenetic processes operating on a social and then psychological level—a new subjectivity arises from within the immanent dynamics effected by social systems and their specific affective constellations, in response to which individuals internalize external pressures. Emerging subjects thus repeat a differentiation process that we have seen taking place on the larger scale of society as an ordered system of contrasts. Capturing the intensive

348 Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, rev. edn., ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Malden and Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), esp. 365ff; and id., *The Society of Individuals*, ed. Michael Schröter, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York/London: Continuum, 2001), 128ff. On the 'uses of civility,' see also Roger Chartier's introduction, and Jacques Revel's respective chapter in *History of Private Life, Vol. III: Passions of the Renaissance*, ed. Aries, Duby, and Chartier, 163–205: "Civility was supposed to restrain the emotions, bridle the passions, dissimilate the impulses of the heart and soul. Manners were rational, and rationality required that behavior toward another person take that person's rank and desired effect into consideration" (ibid., 164).

349 I am referring here to the notion of control that Deleuze develops in his "Postscript of the Societies of Control," and monographic study, *Foucault*. See my preliminaries, chapter 0.2.1, esp. note 271.

350 In this view, it is first worthwhile to read Elias's analysis through Gabriel Tarde's micro-sociological thesis that repetition is the genetic condition for difference and not the other way around.

351 I refer to Elias's article "Problems of Involvement and Detachment," *British Journal of Sociology* 7, no. 3 (Sep 1956), 226–52; passim.

aspect of this restratification process, this perspective does not allow us to understand this internalization as a mere reification of established social positions of different subjects (i.e., a static social system); rather—as Elias already did—this behavior is understood in view of a reciprocal interaction that opens the possibility space for reconfiguring social positions in establishing a "zone of indeterminacy" that allows social mobility, and related subjectivation processes.

Given that we are investigating the emergence of the court-aristocratic or modern subjectivity within this (con)figuration process, we must resist falling back on an already constituted subject that would be 'compartmentalizing.' The question is exactly how this compartmentalizing gives rise to an elistist-rationalist subjectivity. As such, we need to rescue the discussion from falling into a sort of psychological explanation, and stay on the level of the socius. To do so, we can further stress the necessarily transsubjective, relational, or collective dimension built into the notion of mutual distinction. This relational perspective comes with the realization that affects differ from emotions to the extent that they are not socially and culturally constructed personal experiences but a-personal events generated by matter, due to which they can "be 'channeled' or 'governed' by other social processes and … embedded in different social formations."[352]

In this respect, the scholarship into affect of last decades helps us understand that any 'control of the affects' is always tied to (and must be understood in the milieu of) specific cultural technologies of organizing the affects, not just on the level of culturally constructed meanings, but also states of affairs that culturally come to matter in a non-discursive and a-signifying manner. They involve specific "affect disposition(ing) regimes" in which a specific form of regulation becomes part of a specific dispositif; or rather, an "affectif" as Robert Seyfert has recently called the relational constellations of affects and (not-only-human) bodies involved in the emergence of affects through forms of distributed agency.[353] Affect is never

352 Christian von Scheve, "A Social Relational Account of Affect," *European Journal of Social Theory* 21, no.1 (2018): 39–59; here 41–2: "Whereas the social construction of emotion is predominantly said to operate via norms, rules, values, and discourse, the concept of affect in some theories—particularly in cultural studies but also in 'new materialism' sociology…—is hailed as being 'beyond' language, discourse, and representation. This beyondness in many cases hinges on a revisionist ontology that capitalizes on processes and relations instead of substances and entities" (ibid.). For a new materialist reading of affect as pre-subjective events generated by matter, see esp. Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, *New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies* (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press, 2012).

353 I take this reading from Bernd Bösel's article, "Affect Disposition(ing): A Genealogical Approach to the Organization and Regulation of Emotions," *Media and Communication*

located within a subject itself, but points beyond it to a collective body, because affects always arise within ensembles. Going further in this direction, other affect theorists have consistently emphasized the resulting affective economies and ecologies that these organizing constellations set in motion,[354] thus highlighting, as Peg Rawes does, that these are "constituted by the difference or pattern of information that organizes its material and immaterial relations."[355]

In this sense, it is tied to the rising awareness of (and turn of thought toward) physiological processes and material causes of events taking place in the middle of the seventeenth century. Here, we can identify a clear operational similarity between the affect economy of elistist rationality and other cultural systems. Descartes's mechanical physiology of the passions, for instance, constituted an important shift away from the inherited 'aretological' organization around the classical key virtues. Shifting toward a more 'mechanological' regime of affect disposition(ing), it was marked by a strategic deployment of media or apparatuses known for their capacity to elicit affective states; for example with the political theater and grand festivities at the Court of Versailles.[356] In this mechanological regime and the characteristic affective economy in the milieu of court society, the 'compartmentalization–by-channeling' presents *the* organizational mechanism with which the court-aristocratic subject, learning to discriminate itself, arises as a collective subject. With the latter notion, I am referring to Guattari's distinction between "subject (or subjugated) groups" determined according to external determinations, and "subject-groups" that fabricate their own internal norms through which a particular collectivity (or collective subjectivity) coalesces around an institutionalized object, and whose formation "is recognizable … in a splitting, … the detachment of a sub-whole."[357] In this regard, a helpful conception of subjectivation processes is to understand them as self-structuring tendencies of auto-affective systems or milieus. This conception is presented by Simondon's transductive notion of individualization, as the

6, no. 3 (2018): 15–21. Here, also Robert Seyfert, "Beyond Personal Feelings and Collective Emotions: Toward a Theory of Social Affect," *Theory, Culture & Society* 29, no. 6 (2012): 27–46; here 31.

354 Sara Ahmed, "Affective Economies," *Social Text* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 117–39; and Marie-Luise Angerer, *Ecology of Affect: Intensive Milieus and Contingent Encounters*, trans. Gerrit Jackson (Lüneburg: Meson Press, 2017).

355 Peg Rawes, "Architectural Ecologies of Care," in id., ed., *Relational Architectural Ecologies*, 46.

356 Bösel, "Affect Disposition(ing)," 16–17.

357 Ronald Bogue, *Deleuze and Guattari* (London/New York: Routledge, 1989), 86; see also Félix Guattari, *Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), 39 and 289.

ongoing individuation of an already individuated entity. Any such entity has itself been produced in an individuation process in which a problematic field of tensions came to be resolved into a preliminary structuration of a milieu within which (and for the functioning of which) the constituted individual entity forms a functional unit. But rather than seeing this structuration process as stably reproducing itself through its co-constitutive components, this view suggests that individuating systems always be approached as metastable processes, the self-structuring dynamics of which always carries the possibility of bringing about new structurations.[358]

This notion of individuating systems corrects the exclusive disjunction that Elias installed between the psychic and the social in its genetic dimension. Instead, it suggests a new understanding of how "the individual psyche is paradoxically developed on the basis of the collective," with others, as the philosopher of technology Jean-Hugues Barthélemy stresses[359] in describing the distinct dimension characterizing what Gilbert Simondon called "psycho-social life."[360] Opposed to mere 'bio-psychic' or 'bio-social' life, psycho-social life relies heavily on some artifact, something artificial, some non-living thing or technical object helping maintain metastable states, which supports and makes it possible, and conditions its evolution or individuation.[361] As such, this psycho-social dimension is precisely where spatial dispositions and architecture as a cultural technology come into play, not on the level of any symbolic order, but on the level of the real, that is, social reality. And this is particularly true of the architecture of appartements, as a spatial technology that facilitated acts of breaking down, framing, and regulating a number of different (psycho-)social interactions and encounters for which etiquette served as an affect-controlling technology of the court-aristocratic self. In this regard, we must move from a (bio-)sociogenetic plus (bio-)psychogenetic description to a wholly (psycho-)sociogenetic one,

358 See Gilbert Simondon, *L'Individuation psychique et collective* (Paris: Aubier, 2007; orig. pub. 1989), 132ff.

359 See Jean-Hugues Barthélemy, "'Du Mort qui saisit le vif': Simondonian Ontology Today," trans. Justin Clemens, *Parrhesia* 7 (2009), 28–35: "The artefacts produced by animals other than humans, such as, for example, the bird's nest or the beehive, don't aim at making possible a *psycho-social* life, but only a *bio-psychic* or *bio-social* life: as Simondon remarks, the 'pure social,' that we must understand in opposition to the *psycho-social* and not in opposition to the biological, exists in insects because their social character doesn't nourish a psyche. Reciprocally, birds and, even more so, mammals develop a psyche without passing by the social. Only the primates and, even more so, humans, are psycho-social, that is, a reality in which the *individual* psyche is paradoxically developed *on the basis of the collective*" (ibid., 29).

360 Simondon, *L'Individuation psychique et collective*, 19.

361 Barthélemy, "Du Mort qui saisit le vif," 28–29; Simondon, *L'Individuation psychique et collective*, 62.

centering on the collective dimension which involves a co-constitutive technological dimension, which according to Simondon, must always be accounted for in the overall ensemble of knowledges.

Corollary II: A Mechanistic Physiology of the Social?

How does this collective compartmentalization process become transposed into a spatial or architectural form? As we have seen above, Elias approaches "the structure of dwellings as an indicator of social structure,"[362] yet concerning this "indexicality" he offers only a rather reductive reading, even if it is much less symbolic than the interpretation of structuralist authors. As a type of sign differing from both symbols (that receive meaning from some arbitrary pattern) and icons (where there is a physical resemblance between the signal and the meaning), indices were distinguished by Charles Sanders Peirce precisely as being *acquired* or *trained* expressions of environmental affects, in which meaning is produced in the establishment of certain correlations of spatio-temporal regularities.[363] In this sense, structure should never be reduced in any linguistic sense of a sign pointing to some object (i.e. social figuration), but indicates certain regularities in processes. In line with Elias's own warning to avoid "process reduction" (which his reading of the house nonetheless falls prey to, succumbing partly to the fallacy of equating form directly with content, not processes), structures simply 'point toward' those non-discursive processes that regulate socio-economic relations. This way, typical plans like 'the hôtel' cannot be said in any way to represent some type of society (or social organizations) or even relations of production[364]; in its emergent regularities, series of plans can only render visible a certain configuration (i.e., a recomposition process) of productive relationships and social force-fields. What is more: to the extent that we are here talking about non-discursive processes, we must avoid describing these external conditions or externalization of operations into material structures as an 'expression' (= **CODING**), the more we acknowledge that this articulation is not one of an already established (individual or collective) subject. *Enabling* subjectivation process instead, such articulations consist in a

362 Elias, *Court Society*, ch. II; the German original uses "*Anzeichen*," which can also be translated as 'symptom' based on which this approach can be positioned as a symptomatological approach; see here again my Preliminary discussion.

363 Here, I have relied mainly on the summary provided in R[obert F.]. Port, "Icon, Index, and Symbol," posted online on Sep 4, 2000, at https://cs.indiana.edu/~port/teach/103/sign.symbol.html.

364 On this point, cf. Francesco Marullo, "Architecture ad Revolution: The Typical plan as an Index of Generic," in *The City as a Project*, ed. Pier-Vittorio Aureli (Berlin: Ruby, 2013), 216–60; here 218–19.

specific content selection (=**TERRITORIALIZATION**) according to which systems evidence specific behaviors.

As the configuring **FORM OF CONTENT** within assemblages [→ 0.2] the configuration of selected contents, like the arrangement of dwellings, points us to those configuration processes with which social figurations establish themselves, as Delitz would say with Deleuze, within specific terrorialization processes. Indexes are always territorial signs.[365] In this sense, their indexicality is better understood in its informational sense of an aggregate measure of the distribution of variety in an associative array or map. In this sense, taking information as a difference that makes a difference, the map is never to be misunderstood as the territory itself.[366] What is more easily mapped is the diffraction pattern that emerges with specific setups. Arising from the interaction of intensive differences that come to matter in how they are actualized within those setups, these diffraction patterns render visible the specific dis/entanglements (or "involvements and detachments") and recomposition processes.[367] In the case of socio-spatial transformation processes —it should be clear—such social recomposition processes cannot be represented by any isolated plan; this transformation can only be mapped in a series of changing floor plans.

Concerning the question how this elitist r(el)ationality is articulated, we need to thus reveal how "the co-existence of constant spatial proximity and constant social distance" (as Elias argues in the passage quoted above[368]) comes to be configured within a characteristic proxemics.[369] What is articulated in this idiorrhythmic or ethological territorialization process is the (de-/re-)territorialization of those proximities and distances that characterize this specific social figuration in its increasingly heterogenizing differentiation. It thus consists in, as Roland Barthes notes, "an ethics (or physics) of distance[s] between cohabiting subjects,"[370] this process does not imply that an elitist r(el)ationality is directly, visibly expressed within built objects. More diagramatically, it the field of virtual social pressures and tensions that is rendered visible in the way social organizations come to be external-

365 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 55.

366 Here after Gregory and Mary Catherine Bateson, *Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred* (Toronto: Bantam, 1988), 17 and—evoking Alfred Korzybski's famous phrase—21; see also Gregory Bateson, *Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays…* (Northvale/London: Aronson, 1987; orig. pub. 1972), 455.

367 Barad, *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, esp. 72ff.

368 Elias, *Court Society,* 48 (trans. mod.).

369 See Roland Barthes, *How to Live Together* (New York: Columbia UP, 2013), 111; citing this neologism of Edward Twitchell Hall.

370 Note the reference to Spinoza in ibid., 113, and 71–78; here 72.

ized—or rather, EX-ORGANIZED—through the production of a specifically-structured habitat that, resolving this problematic field, furnishes and provides for certain behaviors and comportments feeding on hierarchies and gradients. As such, this exteriorization is an articulation of an organizational diagram through which—as Delitz argues—particular social figurations only realize themselves in setting up a specific spatial configuration.[371] With this realizing setup, social figurations come to be articulated twice: not just as a composition of (virtually-real) forces, but as an actually-real arrangement, actualized by narrowing down other possible organizations. In this diagrammatic reading, the built environment gains the function of mediating society's transitive shape, by selecting for it one possible configuration of an environmental ecology, as a specifically-organized habitat that, shaped by the life-forms inhabiting it, shapes all its habits in turn.

Habitat, habits, and inhabitant all always emerge in SYMPOIETIC processes of niche production, in reconfiguring existing historically produced ecologies.[372] In seventeenth-century France, such reconfigurative processes can be found in ecologies of three different levels: the city of Paris as a larger whole, the court as a social figuration, and the house as a component structure. Albeit different in scale, these structures (and the tensions they counter-actualize) are not really different in the way they function; across scales there is an operational similarity, because they all operate through a reterritorialization of social forces, bringing about and stabilizing not only new forms of subjectivity, power, and governance, but also their specific relation within court society as a whole. If the particular 'life-form' of the court aristocrat and the assemblage they form, Elias argues, is brought about and held together by specific external pressures and internal tensions, then specifically-structured operations like architectural arrangements, configuring and organizing spatial processes, present a prime means for conserving those tensions and differences that generated this social figuration in the first place[373], while at the same time facilitating and allowing for better regulation of the specific form of affect-control through which this elitist life-form/figuration progressively articulated itself in the increasing regulation of residen-

371 Delitz, *Gebaute Gesellschaft*, 123 (my trans.).

372 For a longer discussion see my related preliminaries here, as well as my own article, Gorny, "Reclaiming What Architecture Does," *Architectural Theory Review* 22, no. 2 (2018), 188–209.

373 Compare here, for instance, Jacques Revel's argument that 'externalization' of courtly rules of behavior can best be illustrated by courtly forms of dancing, i.e. an organized spatial structuring of movement, that as a "social art," presents the "most polished and complex discipline of self-presentations" (Revel, in *History of Private Life*, III: 194–96).

tial space. In this respect, the recomposition in which the residential system of appartements forms is but one of the transversal conservative processes that help (meta-)stabilize a social system pushed out of a previously stable state, around a new basin of attraction.

Rather than being canceled in a 'change,' the resolution of these problematic tensions within this trans-scalar process lies in a self-generative qualitative distinction that emerges through the modulation of disparate (we could also say heterogeneous) elements from which it is composed.[374] It gives rise to an auto-catalytic process of **DISPARATION** (or **HETEROGENESIS**) that, according to the way these are configured—extends itself within a specific structuring operation within saturated systems. This, of course, is the transductive dimension that we have already encountered in Book II,[375] in which a "disparity is topologically … restructured across some [material] interface," conditioning this restructuring.[376] This complicated approach, I want to argue, makes it easier to consider how an elitist rationality of drawing distinctions or distancing is tied to affect-control in (modulational) terms of self-regulatory processes. Approaching this compartmentalization-as-disparation from an assemblage-theoretical angle allows us to understand this process as an exteriorization or reterritorialization that is driven by the elitist rationality of mutual self-distinction. This process is not individual and psychological; it must instead be understood as a collective and culture-technical dimension that—as an integral part of civilizing or self-disciplining mechnisms—engenders spatial recomposition processes that involve both involvement and detachment. This way, Elias's account of the three cultural control techniques through which this social rationale is configured, can then be re-read quite clearly—and befitting Descartes's universalist impulse—as a Cartesian, mechanistic physiology of the social. Like the *tourbillions* making up the turbulent material world, the social world becomes what Colebrook calls a "milieu of mutual self-distinction," where passive entities define one another, and whose collisions or colliding tendencies determine each other's paths in uncontrollable or unintelligible ways. Translated into today's terms, this physics of the social must be understood as an attempt at problematizing nothing else than the "complex creation of increasing differences" that characterizes

374 Sauvagnargues. *Artmachines*, 65, 70; in reference to Simondon, *L'individuation psychique et collective*, 24–5. I am here bringing together Simondon's notion of the dispars/disparation, with the Foucauldian/Deleuzian terminology of heterogeneity.

375 See my "Scholium on Transduction as a Self-Generating Mode of Territorialization," in Book II.

376 Paolo de Assis, *Logic of Experimentation* (Leuven: Leuven UP, 2018), 137ff; here 140.

social environments.[377] Therein disparation proves to be the milieu, or middling ground for those (psycho-)social transformation (or better, transduction) processes that will bring us closer to the modern psyche of the individual (i.e., a subjectivity that, as Foucault demonstrates, will not only arise with the recognition of the problem of leading a life, but also co-emerges alongside a larger problematization of the control, government, or management of security, territories, and populations). [→ 3.3.1–3]

Equipped with these modern sociological and systems-theoretical notions, we can reconsider how such a similar regulatory concern—especially in its initially passive conception of the subject—is presented by mid-seventeenth-century moral-philosophical discussions concerning the problem of the passions. The notion of the passions, scholars have pointed out, is a difficult one, to the extent that it is torn between "a physical reality as regards its cause and a mental one as regards its effects."[378] Concerning the latter, moral philosophers regarded the passions as external disruptions, disturbing the soul. Mastering the passions had thus fallen under the art of living, rather than being a concern for science.[379] Yet, to the extent that for Descartes the attempts to regulate the passions necessarily involves the regulation of their material and bodily aspects,[380] mechanistic physiology opened a new path in the sense that it suggested a new form of possible treatment. That is, if the passions are caused by the conditions of bodies, then operating on those conditions indirectly modulates the passions that arise in the union of mind and body. Descartes argued that "the principal effect of all the human passions is that they move and dispose the soul to want the things for which they prepare the body."[381] Precisely in this regard, the concept of the passions is not reducible to psychological or emotive states; rather, surfacing at a time where Europe was going through a lot of disruptive changes, it must be approached as part of the long lineage connecting it to modern psychoanalysis, and especially the negative conception of desire and its production.

Concerning precisely this negativity, Spinoza's pre-psychoanalytic thought discredited the passions as being simply a result of our inadequate ideas about the world.[382] The passions, he claims, are both but a perceived

377 I am adopting and adapting here to reading of the urban environment as a "milieu of mutual self-distinction," as developed in Claire Colebrook, "Sex and the (Anthropocene) City," *Theory, Culture & Society* 34, nos. 2–3 (2017), 39–60.

378 Jaquet, *Affects, Actions, and Passions*, 28.

379 Ibid., 35.

380 Shapiro, introduction to *Correspondence*, 31.

381 Descartes, *Passions of the Soul*, art. 40; in id., *Philosophical Writings*, I: 325–404; here 343. On this and the following point, see also Jaquet, *Affects, Actions and Passions*, esp. 27–46.

382 Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics* (London: Penguin, 1996); excerpted from *The Collected Works*

effect and ill-conceived notion resulting from having conceptually split body and mind into interacting things, into passive matter and active forces, and the sense of passivity or impotence to control what is happening. I say perception rather than conception, here, because in a quite literal sense, passions are an emergent effect of machines of desiring production that are passively recorded by the mind in terms of the effects of what happens (as in the French sense of "*qu'est-ce qui se passe*"), of events taking place or going on (in the Latin sense of "*quid venit*"). Only a more adequate idea of this relation, Spinoza argues, allows not only a better grasp on life, but also the power to act. By progressively putting the axiomatic use of geometric methods back into practice,[383] Spinoza's *Ethics*) arrived at the problem of the **AFFECTS** (*affectibus*) in finding that, by splitting mind and body as interacting things, "no one … has determined the nature and powers of the affects, nor what, on the other hand, the mind can do to moderate them."[384] In contrast to the lived idea of the passions, the concept of affects problematizes the power to act.[385] Where passions depend on a unity of body and mind that is framed in an interactionist frame of thought, the concept of affects starts from a more intrinsic relation of matter and mind.[386] By Spinoza's own definition, affect is the name for a more inclusive ensemble of drives, motivations, emotions, feelings and akin affections "by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished,

of Spinoza, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, 2 vols (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1985), here I: 408–617. Hereafter cited according to the *Collected Works*.

383 Note that this methodological point brings us back to the particular problem that Descartes had initially evacuated all practical aspects from his method. In this regard, the apparent failure of the Cartesian method in that analysis is not easily turned into synthesis, arises from that fact that it does not account for the bodily aspects. Synthesis, as was noted with Hintikka, depended on the practical/technical use of 'auxiliary constructions' within geometric reasoning. More importantly, the synthetic aspect within practical procedures of "geometric thinking reveals that an aesthetic act of construction is required," as Peg Rawes perceptively writes (Rawes, *Space, Geometry, and Aesthetics*, 56). Concerning this aesthetic component, Spinoza's Ethics would rigorously employ the geometric method as a synthetic method, as a procedure of deducing truths in a specific series of set definitions, postulates, axioms, and theorems. Underlying this employment is the proposition, Rawes noted, "that the axiomatic formation of geometric thinking is a means through which [an] aesthetic unity between the immaterial mind and the material body is produced" (ibid., 65). It is the axiomatic scientific structure working together with the aesthetic experience of reading that helps rework inadequate notion into adequate ones, thus improving life and thus producing an ethical subject (ibid., 62). To this extent, axiomatic forms are not structures for revealing a truth, but for effectuating a form of (adequate) knowledge that allows turning passions into actions.

384 See the preface to Part III, in Spinoza's *Ethics*, in *Collected Works*, I: 491.

385 Jaquet, *Affects, Actions, and Passions*, 9–10, 25, and 72. As Spinoza writes in the *Ethics* II, Def. 3 (exp): "I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to indicate that the Mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of the Mind" (Spinoza, *Collected Works*, I: 449).

386 Jaquet, *Affects, Actions, and Passions*, 27ff.

aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections."[387] As such, it is always a twofold capacity to (actively) affect and (passively) be affected. Spinoza thus identifies affect as the genus comprising passions as well as *actions,* as two species of affect differentiated by their productive cause.[388] Hence affects, not passions as Descartes fails to realize, constitute the real middle ground (= INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION); a medium or milieu in and by which causes, effects, forces, or influential conditions proliferate. As such, we must necessarily proceed, as Spinoza concludes, from a yet-to-be-achieved understanding of the workings and affective capacities of bodies, discussed more closely in the remainder of this section.

In this affective dimension, and the sense of agency it imbued to material things, Spinoza's theory may not have found a direct application in contemporary theory production and it has certainly not gained the tantamount influence that Cartesianism (or rather, the Cartesian conception of space) did. But it may be wrong to categorically discard any influence at all, to the extent that Spinozism gained a certain indirect influence. This concerns not only those aspects developed in Leibniz's thinking, but it should also include those aspects where Descartes—in approaching the passions dispassionately as a *physicien*—already prefigures Spinozist thinking and thus—stretching it a bit farther—presents an ancestor of new materialist thinking.[389] Hence, far from constituting a historical or theoretical excursus, all these observations have a very practical implication for our study: I have argued above that a culture-technological investment into desiring-machines, modulating or channeling desire as an affective intensive force, is precisely what is necessary for collective assemblages of enunciation to get going. On this point, a more nuanced conception than presented by Elias's static understanding of affect-control is required, in order to account for the ways in which the control of the passions is put into action, along with a renewed understanding of affects, by means of new affective mechanisms. In this view, an affect-theoretical understanding of the passions presents the particular culture-technological lens for revealing what is going on in what is happening in the evolving residential system of appartements.

I have until here only discussed this evolution in its germinal stage. But what is more easily revealed based on this perspective, is its technologi-

387 Part III, Def. 3 in id., *Ethics*, 70; *Collected Works*, I: 491. See also Antonio Damasio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain* (London: W. Heinemann, 2003), 8. Similarly, the notion of affect is conceptualized as a more inclusive category than emotion within sociological approaches, especially Affect Control Theory.

388 Jaquet, *Affects, Actions, and Passions*, 41.

389 Ibid., 34.

cal trajectory. This concerns the way in which the suites of rooms, especially within the Parisian *hôtel*, stops serving as a mere linear conductor (a "space of conduct," to use Foucault's term, or a space conducive of forms of reception) that narrows down access for visitors ranked spatially according to how far they are allowed to advance. Instead it turns into a greater culture-technological matrix, in which it (like any architectural arrangement in general) comes to be identified in its potential of affecting what can take place, by way of narrowing down the space of possibility of what is going on. As Eleb and Debarre write in a passage that carries an illuminating twofold sense: "The architect controls how all pieces are affected/what happens in each room [*l'affectation de chaque pièce*]" and this affect arises from the fact that "each room [*pièce*] is qualified by what is going on (or who is passing through them) [*qu'est-ce qui s'y passe*]."[390] It becomes an affective space modulating what is happening in or passing through it. And this affectivity comes from architecture's ability to channel; a physiological treatment that is always 'educing' (leading out), which implies a management, modulation, or control fluxes.[391] Control is at base a logic of flows.[392] As a conductive space, the architecture of appartements especially comes to be identified as an auxiliary mechanism for helping control the affects, the actions (inhabitation, receptions, services) and passions (climatic conditions, business, nuisances from co-habitation).[393] At the same time, we have also seen that it is a longstanding **TRANSDUCTIVE** cultural technology. [→ 2.1–3]

Architectural arrangements here slowly entering the realm of a **TECHNICAL CONSCIOUSNESS** (to borrow Simondon's term); something that slowly becomes "thinkable" (to fall back on Foucault). This something is the very possibility of a specific rationale (i.e. *logos*) according to which the art of distribution (as *technē*) helps structure social interactions, including all other possible logics that might help structure them differently. For this assemblage to form, we need a second middling ground as a stabilizing factor.[394] This

390 Eleb and Debarre, *Architectures de la vie privée*, 46.

391 Spinoza symptomatically uses the Dutch term 'lijdingen' which carries the same ambiguity between 'suffering' and 'directing' in the English terms 'passive,' 'passion,' 'passage,' 'passing through,' and 'channeling pipes,' or 'ducts.'

392 Nathan Moore, "Diagramming Control," in *Relational Architectural Ecologies*, ed. Rawes, 56–70; here 69 n3.

393 But it is in this sense that apartments as a conducive space 'with which to lead' already have always already entailed a transductive dimension of 'leading over' to a new dispositif, or technological stage with(in) which this transductive dimension becomes more explicit.

394 With Deleuze and Guattari's analytic of stratification processes, we can understand the affect-control through etiquette what Elias named the 'art of dealing with people') encoding conduct, as *but one* of these middling grounds, consisting in an actually-real economy of signaletic flows that facilitates a certain 'control of activities,' distributed

56 THE ASSEMBLAGE OF MUTUAL DISTINCTION: Diagram mapping Elias's civilizing mechanisms and affect control techniques, onto to Foucault's disciplinary techniques as divided up into Deleuze and Guattari's 'Matrix of stratification' [→ BOOK 0]

second middling ground is symptomatically absent from Elias's list of the affect control techniques [56] that, as I have suggested, can otherwise be translated quite neatly into Foucault's disciplinary dispositifs comprising (a) the "organization of geneses" (including the art of distribution'), (b) the "control of activities," and (c) the "composition of forces." In more stratoanalytic terms, this scheme corresponds thus to (a) a "form and substance of content" (courtiers/court); (b) a "substance of expression" (the function of etiquette); and (c) a "form of expression" (reproductive organization). But we also see lacking a distinction (a) precisely concerning how these cultural techniques were complemented (and stabilized as an assemblage) by a fourth one, connecting the court's organization into partial processes (FE) with a spatial structure that allowed observation and control of what happens (SC) not just via an etiquette encoding how to conduct oneself (SE), but a certain conducive configuration (FC). This absent distinction is not attributable to some lacuna in Elias's analysis; rather, it is a historical distinction that has yet to emerge, where architecture is not thought of as just a symbolic expression (of

> across the 'existential territories' of the house. As an affective space the apartment already works as a conductor, the complement of the conduct encoded by etiquette, that territorializes conduct. Yet — for consolidating a stable subjectivity — this system of mutual self-distinction must become articulated twice. But instead of this being an **EXPRESSION** (i.e. a discursive coding of behaviors), this second articulation is also one of **TERRITORIALIZATION** (i.e. a non-discursive configuring of contents). What happens here is that that the substance of content in residential architecture including the apartment is connected to a specific **FORM OF CONTENT**; where — on a formal level — a normative configuration will be given to the apartment, by consolidating it as historical sedimented structure, finally territorializes the conduct of conduct — to borrow Foucault's phrase — within courtly organization. This is where, as we will now see, a second middling ground is shaped in the form of an affective constellation of a 'referential Universe' (a **FORM OF CONTENT**) in which those virtual pressures shaping social relations between specific groups come to articulate themselves in a structural manner: which the matrix of stratification already identifies with the emerging art of distribution.

a worldly order), but in which architectural forms of distribution and planning are an instrumental ordering mechanism by selecting from all virtually possible spatial configurations of relations those that are conducive for the real and actual processes of social production. ✉[56]

Only by mapping the technological reconfiguring through which architecture frees itself from the restriction of reproducing existing (psycho-)social structures will we be able to account genetically for the way in which it came to be understood as a transformative instrument of social production (de-/reterritorialization); that is, the becoming-instrumental of architecture and the built environment within the very discourse on the art of distribution, or what we now call planning. In this respect, the Art of Distribution is not reducible to a mere discursive phenomenon. As a form of content, it primarily consists in a specific non-discursive process of establishing—or rather, institutionalizing—a structure (re)configuring elements of knowledge into a particular technological system. As I have said before, where in Le Muet the art (i.e. planning technique) of distribution had been used as a "*technē peri ton bion*" (i.e., a biopolitical technology for managing culturally-structured life and processes involving the living[395]), the emerging discourse on the art of distribution subsumed this technique under a specific *logos*: the elitist rationale of distinction, forming at once a new cultural technique and political technology.

Scholium II: On Modal Distinctions

Equipped with these insights, concerning how epistemological changes involve both a becoming-conscious on a collective, psycho-sociogenetic, and technological dimension, we can slowly work back to an architectural level. But not without clarifying another conceptual complication beforehand: to the extent that the social system of the court aristocracy was effectuated in the transition from the feudal nobility as a relatively simple stratification in kind into a more multi-layered figuration differentiated by degree, we must also account for the structural transformation that consolidates the intensive field of social distinctions that catalyzed the formation of the court aristocracy in the first place, in a more dynamic fashion. This dynamic comes into play with the second articulation in any assemblage, because aside from properly accounting for the **REAL DISTINCTION** between discursive aspects ('expression') and non-discursive ones ('territorialization') within these reciprocally-determinant material-discursive processes, an assemblage-theoretic approach must take care to maintain the so-called **MODAL** distinction—to which we turn

395 For the related Foucauldian notion and literature, I refer to my preliminaries.

now—between substances and forms (or species and genera) within both.[396] Practically, this modality means that one ought to posit only differences in degree between individual historical formations that must be accounted for on the same ontological footing. Only this way is it possible to map evolving forms in dynamic terms of increasing degrees of complexity, without drawing facile distinctions in kind or historical ruptures.

As we have seen, this shift toward differences in degree rather than kind had already latently been promoted in the architectural treatises (not only in the work Le Muet, but even more so in the Serlio's book on housing *tutti gli gradi di homini*). Here degrees were still understood in terms of qualitative 'steps,' not as a continuum. This continuity is more developed in the practical philosophy of Spinoza and then the polymathic theories of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, who both started to understand qualitative distinctions themselves more quantitatively in terms of their degree, which allows us to think about continuity. This attempt—obviously related to the social de-stratifications at the time—answers to the problem of dynamics raised by Descartes's dualistic ontology. In Leibniz's approach to the concept of substance and virtual forces, it was not movement that was immanent to matter, but an active force that—containing a certain effective causal activity (a 'primitive force' inspired by the Aristotelian notion of entelechy)—presented a middle ground between the capacity to act and the action itself. As such it involves a certain 'drive.'[397] This drive was the pre-psychoanalytical notion of *conatus* coined by Spinoza who, in rewriting the metaphysical principles outlined in Descartes's geometric demonstration in the "Reply to the Second Objections"[398] in a more consis-

396 According to scholastic philosophy, and Descartes and Spinoza's divergent work there are three kinds of (metaphysical) distinctions: real, modal, and rational, that pertain to the modes of existence of objects. A distinction between various things is called **REAL**, when it concerns a difference between elements that can (supposedly) exist or can be conceived independent or apart from another (e.g. the mind and the body as *two substances* (in Descartes) or *two attributes or modes* of a single substance (in Spinoza); **MODAL**, when it concern things of which one cannot exists or be conceived without the other, while the other is not (e.g. the mind and will; i.e. a substance and its modes); and **RATIONAL**, when it concerns things that are actually the same, but of which one cannot exist or be conceived without the other, while the other can (e.g. a thing and its properties; i.e. a substance and its attributes).

397 Leibniz clarifies his notion of force as "midway between the faculty of acting and the act itself," greatly in the "Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance," *Acta eruditorum* (Mar 1694), in id., *Philosophical Papers and Letters* Vol. II, §45, 432–4; here 433. Orig. "Sed vis activa actum quemdam sive ἐντελέχειαν continet, atque inter facultatem agendi actionemque ipsam media est, et conatum involvit." Cited after Leibniz, *Opera Omnia: Nunc primum collecta, in Classes distributa …* (Geneva: Tournes, 1768), Vol. II: 194.

398 As scholars have stressed, this recomposition serves Spinoza as an introduction to his Ethics written in the following years; see Baruch Spinoza, *Renati des Cartes Principiorum Philosophiæ Pars I et II More geometrico domonstratæ … accesserunt ejusdem cogitata metaphysica in quibus difficiliore, quætam in parte Metaphysices generali, quam speciali*

tent manner in his *Ethics*, generally accepted Descartes's physics while forcefully rejecting its dualistic metaphysics.[399]

In the *Ethics*, coping with Descartes's substance dualism between *res extensa* and *res cogitans*, Spinoza's monist approach re-framed the problem as a perceived and hitherto ill-conceived aspect dualism of a single substance comprehended under two attributes (thought/extension), and expressed as two modes.[400] For Descartes, modes had been, like attributes, certain numerical qualities; for Spinoza, by contrast, modes were better apprehended as a certain quantity of quality, since only from this angle did all qualified substances form one substance in terms of their differing degrees of 'perfection' (i.e. reality or realization).[401] He thus demonstrated that the difference between thought and

occurrunt, quæstiones breviter explicantur (Amsterdam: J. Riewerts, 1663); reprinted with an editorial introduction as "The Expositor of Descartes," in Spinoza, *Collected Works*, I: 219–346.

399 For a broader discussion on the philosophical relation between Spinoza, Descartes, and Cartesianism, see, amongst other studies, Gilles Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (New York: Urzone, 1990), 155–68; Pierre Macherey, *Hegel or Spinoza* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2011), 33–76; and Don Garrett, *Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy* (New York: Oxford UP, 2018), 221–42. Studies on the closer relation between Leibniz and Spinoza, studied in many work of either philosopher, include Alan Hart, "Leibniz on Spinoza's Concept of Substance," *Studia Leibnitiana* 14, no.14 (1982): 73–86; Bertrand Russell, *The Philosophy of Leibniz* (London: Routledge, 1992), esp. ch 7–8; and Garrett, *Nature and Necessity*, 176–99. For a comparative description, focusing of the varying notions of substance between the rationalists, see Roger Woolhouse, *Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics* (New York: Routledge, 1993); and Bennett, *Spinoza's Ethics*, 55–59 and moreover ibid., 60–109 for a longer description of Spinoza's monist position. On the latter point, see also the various essays in Philip Goff, ed., *Spinoza on Monism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). For an introductory description on this point, I refer to §3 of Richard Manning's entry, "Spinoza's Physical Theory," *SEP*, avail. online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/spinoza-physics/.

400 Monism means that for Spinoza there is only a single substance. By substance, Spinoza classically understands "what is in itself and is conceived through itself"; while "what the intellect perceives of a substance [or concerning it], as constituting its essence" are its **ATTRIBUTES** (Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I, Def. 3–4 and Prop. 10, in *Collected Works*, I: 408, 416). By contrast, the **MODES** (or modifications) of a substance "are the affections of a substance, *or* that which is in another [i.e. something else, *quod in alio est*] through which it is also conceived," meaning "those things whose concept is formed from the concept of the thing in which they are" (ibid., ID5, and IP8 scholium II, in *Collected Works*, I: 409, 412–16). Substance being that which expresses itself in itself (in modern English one can substitute 'is explained by itself'), Spinoza's monist notion of only a single substance (i.e. of only a single thing as that exists independently, which he — following Descartes — identifies in God, as an infinite being co-extensive with the whole of what there is, i.e. 'nature,' being the only thing whose existence is 'self-explaining' in the sense that its cause lies in itself) implies that all things need an explanation in terms of a cause lying outside them. Modes are those things that have external causes; and since there is only one substance expressing all there is, this means that all things in the world have external causes. As Leibniz will later say: there must be a sufficient reason for anything that happens. On this, see also Jaquet, *Affects, Actions, and Passions*, 6–7.

401 Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part I and esp. Part II, Prop. 7 Scholium, in *Collected Works*, I: 408ff and 451. Cf. Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy," Part I: §61, in *Philosophical Writings*, I: 214, who

extension consists merely in a 'modal distinction,' which—in contrast to a 'real distinction' which is obtained between two substances, and a 'conceptual distinction' obtained between a substance and its attributes as perceived by the intellect—arises between a mode and the single substance of which it is a mode, and between two different modes of that same substance.[402] In this gradual view, there is no 'real' different ontological status because apparent things and forms are not distinguished by any extrinsic distinctions (such as 'kinds'), but—expressed as modes of the same substance—they involve and presuppose intrinsic modes of individuation based on differences in degree, or what we would call 'intensive differences' today.[403] Over this point, Spinoza, in his aim to prove that perception is tied to bodies and thus calling attention to a better understanding of their material workings,[404] began to rework Descartes's corpuscular theory of causation in positing that all bodies (cor-

argues that "A modal distinction can be taken in two ways: firstly, as a distinction between a mode, properly so called; and the substance of which it is mode; and secondly, as a distinction between two modes of the same substance. The first kind of modal distinction can be recognized from the fact that we can clearly perceive a substance apart from the mode which we say differs from it, whereas we cannot, conversely, understand the mode apart from the substance. … A different case, however, is the distinction by which the mode of one substance is distinct from another substance or from the mode of another substance. … It seems more appropriate to call this kind of distinction a real distinction, rather than a modal distinction, since the modes in question cannot be clearly understood apart from the really distinct substances of which they are modes." For the Cartesian definitions, cf. Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy," Part I: §§48–74, esp. §§56–65, in *Philosophical Writings*, I: 208–20.

402 On this point, see also Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, 191–234; here 66. Spinoza discriminates thus that the idea of substance is "the same thing as its properties considered collectively. But 'distributively' the attributes are like parts of a whole, and it is in this sense that they are easier to produce" (ibid., 84). It is here, Deleuze argued, that "against the Cartesian theory of substances thoroughly imbued with analogy, and against the Cartesian conception of distinctions which runs together the ontological, the formal and the numerical (substance, quality and quantity), Spinoza organizes a remarkable division into substance, attributes and modes" (Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 40). As he elaborates in the following sentences: "From the opening pages of the *Ethics*, he shows that real distinctions are never numerical but only formal—that is, qualitative or essential (essential attributes of the unique substance); and conversely, that numerical distinctions are never real, but only modal (intrinsic modes of the unique substance and its attributes). The attributes behave like real qualitatively different senses which relate to substance as if to a single and same designated; and substance in turn behaves like an onto logically unique sense in relation to the modes which express it, and inhabit it like individuating factors or intrinsic and intense degrees" (ibid.). On this point see also id., *Expressionism in Philosophy*, 37, 84–85, and 183.

403 "The individuation of the finite does not proceed in Spinoza from genus to species or individual, from general to particular; it proceeds from an infinite quality to a corresponding quantity, which divides into irreducible intrinsic or intensive parts" (Deleuze, *Expressionism in Philosophy*, 195–9).

404 For the argumentation, and what can be inferred from this, see Spinoza, *Ethics*, esp. Part II, P7–13, in *Collected Works*, I: 451–62. For the workings of the body, see IIP7s and esp. IIIP2s where we Spinoza's famous observation that the exact mechanism of how bodies work are yet to be determined.

pora) are singular (i.e. finite) things distinguished not by substantial differences but by different speeds and slownesses. He thus comprehended finite things on the same ontological footing, for they "agree in certain things [*quibusdam*],"[405] namely that they involve one and the same perceptive attribute (i.e. a ratio of motion, *ratiōne mōtus*) whose infinite degrees they express in their different measure (*modus*).[406]

While Spinoza kept a predominantly extensive notion of substance,[407] especially Leibniz's *Discours de métaphysique* (1686) began to revoke more emphatically the Cartesian notion of the body as a *res extensa*, a thing whose essence is extension, . In line with Spinoza's monism, it posited that everything that is divisible is actually not an individual substance strictly speaking due to its lack of unity in itself [*unum per se*].[408] In Leibniz's system, such unity never arises simply from the sole composition of infinite parts, for a continuum of a multiplicity is never 'composed' of something, but essentially 'consists' of forces.[409] It follows that bodies, as aggregates of simple substances deserve a

405 We are going to come back to this agreement later. Spinoza here repeats the genera/species distinction introduced by the Port Royal logicians Arnauld and Nicole between 'extension' and 'comprehension' (later called 'intension'), as a first semiological theory distinguishing ideas into a thing that represents and a thing represented. ("Or dans ces idées universelles il y a deux choses qu'il est tres important de bien distinguer, la comprehension et l'étenduë. J'appelle comprehension de l'idée, les attributs qu'elle enferme en soy comme l'idée du trangle. J'appelle étenduë de l'idée, les sujets à qui cette idée convient, ce qu'on appelle aussi les inferieurs d'un terme general qui à leur égard est appellé superieur, comme l'idée du triangle s'entend à toutes les diverses especes de trangles." [Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole], *La Logique, ou l'Art de Penser: Contenant … plusieurs observations nouvelles…* (Paris; Guignard, s.d. [1662]), 69. On this distinction, see also Foucault, *Order of Things*, 66–70.

406 Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part II, P13 lemma 1–3, in *Collected Works*, I: 458–9.

407 As Rawes sharply summarizes: "Spinoza's concept of substance is predominantly *extensive and modal* … Leibniz, on the other hand, produces a notion of extended bodies or figures that are *intensive and multiple* … provid[ing] a fascinating 'parallel' to Spinoza's conceptualization" (Rawes, *Space, Geometry, and Aesthetics*, 96 (emph. orig.).

408 Reprinted in Leibniz, *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, I: 303–30, esp. §§8–10. For an overview of Leibniz's ontology of substances and their unity, see §4.1–2 in Brandon C. Look's entry on "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz," in *SEP*, avail. online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/leibniz/. Already Descartes had defined a substance following Aristotelianism as that which subsists in itself, independently of another substance. See Descartes, "Principles of Philosophy (orig. pub. 1644)," Part I, §51–54; reprinted in *Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, I: 177–291. On this point see, for instance, also "Substance" in John Cottingham, ed., *A Descartes Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 160–61; and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Descartes's Substance Dualism and His Independence Conception of Substance," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 46, no.1 (2008), 69–90.

409 Leibniz, "Système nouveau de la nature…" (orig. pub in French in the *Journal des savants,* Jun 27, 1695), trans. as "A New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances, as well as the Union between the Soul and the Body," in *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, 453–9; here cited after the original, avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k56542r/f294.item.

special ontological status [*unum per aggregationem*].[410] This displacement, Rawes notes, helped shift "the long-standing opposition between quality and quantity, so that these two modes of differences are brought into a single concept of magnitude," based on which Leibniz postulated a highly intensive notion of material aggregates as "qualitatively differentiated by degree within a continuum (i.e., it is not a 'mixture,' as the Stoics propose)" of matter: a *plenum*.[411] We also find this notion of intensive differences operating in Leibniz's relational theory of space as a real manifold. There, space came to be defined more abstractly as an "order of situations [*situs*]" that expresses itself in the arrangement of bodies. By *situs* Leibniz understood the possible distances of objects, so that space could be considered as being constituted by (and not just 'composed of') points.[412] As is known, in the 1670s, Leibniz's attempt to rigorize and ground geometry led him to develop his "analysis situs" as—to a certain degree—the precursor to today's field of topology. He thereby forcefully liberated himself from the method *more geometrico*, as for him such forms of linear deduction presented but a 'special case' of coherent reasoning. In this matter, his *De Arte Combinatoria* (1666) had already distinguished complexes (or complexions) as a part-to-whole relation (i.e. mereological concept) from situ(ation)s as a relation of the smallest parts (i.e. topological concept). The latter he differentiated again into an absolute relation of parts with respect to the whole (i.e. 'order'), and a relative relation of parts with respect to parts (i.e. 'vicinity'). The former expresses itself in lines; the latter in outlines, closed upon themselves.[413] In such a closed or self-referential system, we move from the problem of dispositions to the problem of composition of compossibles.[414]

It is especially this relative, self-referential angle, I want to argue, that makes it possible to conceptualize the changing recompositions of residential

410 See Look's entry on "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz" (see the second-to-last note), §4.2.

411 Rawes, *Space, Geometry, and Aesthetics*, 96. For a more detailed discussion of Leibniz's notion of corporeal and incorporeal magnitudes, see ibid., 91–120, esp, 99ff; on the notion of the *plenum*, see esp. 113ff. It was this principle of plenitude and continuity that helped diffuse the idea of a plurality of inhabited worlds within an infinite world, as promoted by thinkers as Bruno, Fontenelle, and Leibniz who would finally connect the principle of plenitude to the principle of sufficient reason, as a criterion of the compossibility of these worlds (Formigari, "Chain of Being," III: 1–3). Via Kant's 'temporalization' of the chain of being, this helped shape the idea of natural history as specification: a gradual build-up of differences. On this point see ibid., IV–VI.

412 See Vincenzo de Risi, "Analysis Situs," in *The Oxford Handbook of Leibniz*, ed. Maria Rosa Antognazza (New York: Oxford UP, 2018), 247–58; see also Risi, *Geometry and Monadology: Leibniz's Analysis Situs and Philosophy of Space* (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2007).

413 Leibniz, "Dissertation on the Art of Combinations," § III: 8–9 and Def. 3–4, in id., *Philosophical Papers and Letters*, here 76–77.

414 Ibid., Def. 5 [78].

space in the late seventeenth century. As we have seen at the end of the last part [→3.1.3], this recomposition expresses itself in an increasing differentiation of spaces into more specific rooms. This differentiation, it is clear, is driven both by the production of "functional sites," as Foucault called them, with which disciplinarity articulates itself across a larger ensemble of material-discursive practices of membership, hierarchies, or practices of ranking, and therewith also by a new form of collectivity and relationality, including a new form of governance,[415] while what underlies it is the particular elitist sociology of mutual self-distinction. Especially the collective dimension of the latter in configuring proximities and distances, has emphasized that such differentiation processes always operate on the level of relative part-to-part relations. Concerning this relative dimension, we should maintain the PRIMACY OF RELATIONS. It means that this differentiation involves processes of reciprocal determination in which spatial relations and territories come to be defined, measured, and ranked by way of a common measure (*commoditas*) of distinction. We have already encountered such a relative relation in the differentiation of apartments according to their degree of grandeur, which modally distinguishes the *grand appartement* as such. But the process of reciprocal determination also facilitated a further relative differentiation, in which the various rooms constituting each apartment became incrementally specified against another, depending on their differing function within a larger ensemble. I employ the term 'function' here not in any modern functionalistic sense but in its specific mathematical sense of a dependence of varying quantities on one another, which arises at the end of the seventeenth century in the work of Leibniz and Bernoulli. In 1670s Leibniz first employs the term to designate this dependence more specifically as differential (dy/dx).[416] In Bernoulli's first definition of the term, a function is a quantity composed in some way of a variable and any constants whatsoever.[417] The function of a room as a quantized space similarly arises from the combination of a spatial constant as differentiated by its variable use, which — as I will discuss in the next part [→3.3] — comes to be newly problematized in contemporary architectural treatises.

With this mathematical notion, we will be better equipped to understand the changing relationship — because in its classical conception, 'func-

415 I am thus freely extending here Karen Barad's agential-realist notion of *apparatus*, as discussed in my preliminary discussion, toward a more sociological theory, that hopefully avoids valid critiques of scale invariance.

416 Laura E. Herrera Castillo, "El concepto leibniziano matemático de función en 1673," *Cultura* 32 (2013), 127–44; avail. online at http://journals.openedition.org/cultura/1998.

417 Yvon Belaval, *Leibniz critique de Descartes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 343.

tion' presented a branch of the general concept 'relation'—between rooms and apartments as suites of rooms, or the entire house, as the specific domain with which this function is associated. Previously, these domains had consisted in generic, polyvalent and multifunctional rooms (i.e. *salle*, chamber, etc., as genera) often specified only in attribution to their occupant (e.g. *chambre du roi*). Around the middle of the seventeenth century, however, rooms started to be distinguished incrementally by their specific function (bothin terms of use and position) within the domain of the house. More than being a simple specification in terminology, this conceptual change marks an important epistemological (or rather: technological) transition, one that would trigger the wider functionalization or modification and respective encoding of all the elements constituting the house. Here, functionalization or modification did not yet imply that rooms were modified to suit a certain function(ality); rather, they first became a functive, meaning an element (or rather: a term) within a propositional discursive system.[418] Here, a relational angle allows us to reconsider this functionalization as a differentiation or individuation of the intrinsic differences within the serial space (=**TERRITORIALIZATION**) of the French house. They express themselves and come to be attributed (=**CODING**) as an extrinsic distinction that incrementally modifies (i.e. 'makes modal') the generic room types. This modification articulated itself as a major driver within the contemporaneous striving to make architecture *commode,* meaning to make rooms fit (in the sense of 'with measure' to) a particular mode of inhabitation; a modality that then articulates itself once more in the tertiary conceptual distinction by means of which rooms came to be coded according to a defining attribute (i.e., the differentiating use to which it is put).

This functional differentiation undermined the longstanding difference in kind between the different room types, that now become species of spaces instead. What does this mean? It means that, according to the modal logic, traditionally ordered according to degrees of generality, the *salle à manger* presented a species of space in relation to a generic '*salle*' as a higher-order genus, but which itself would be a species of space relative to some generic type of 'room.' Down this scalar order, the '*salle à manger*' and '*salle commun*' presented two species of the genus '*salle*,' dialectically specified by a differentiating *proprium* that conveys its determining use ('*à manger*').[419] This differen-

418 I take the notion from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), 117.

419 To be clear: the modal, or relative distinction makes it unnecessary to identify them 'exactly' according to modern taxonomic ranks of subspecies, species, genus, family, order, classes, etc.. See also DeLanda's critique of Aristotelian distinction of genera and species as separate ontological categories in my Book 0.3.

tiation is a modal difference, since modes or modalities always pertain to different attributes (extension and thought) of substance; modifications pertain to that single substance. So, if we tentatively assume some single substance of architecture, then the *salle à manger* is a space named in its two modes: the *salle*, as a hall, as a mode of extension or body; and its functional modality, or mode of use, as a mode of thought or soul. These are the attributes it implies and substance that envelops it, and of which it is a modification or 'manner,' and that expresses itself in both attributes. For social as much as spatial or technical beings, this implies a distinction that is based on a scale of quantitative relation (an ontological distinction by degree, not kind), and a mode of existence that has a qualitative reality according to this polarity (as an ethological dimension). It is an ensemble of relation of speeds and slownesses of modifications, extended and intelligible.

In this respect, we see here the effects of the Cartesian container-conception of space transforming the perceived space of the Renaissance to a more abstractly conceived one, filled with extension, quantitative relations and forces. This, Françoise Fichet notes, led to an intellectualization of perception itself,[420] one that in turn led to an aesthetic redistribution of the sensible that opened new 'visibilities' and 'sayabilities' (as Foucault called them). It is in this process that, as Lambert notes with Foucault, architectural terms started to be "detached from the representation of things, and this detachment is accompanied by its dispersion into several forms that are themselves 'objects' of epistemological inquiry and specialization."[421] This detachment articulates itself in a specific double movement differentiating substance (space) and content (function). Having voided space (*res extensa*) from the built-in idea of functionality that it represents (*res cogitans*), this detachment presented the 'urgent need' for recombining them conceptually into a new dispositif. It is thus absolutely no coincidence that this recombination repeats the resituating of the inherent operativity of compartitioning strategies in Italian treatises into some spatial structure and pertaining structuring process. [→1.3]

Corollary III: From Trees (or Scalæ) to Distributed Systems

The specification of rooms and conceptual recomposition expressed through arising functional hierarchies, is however not reducible to a simple progressive development in evolving spatial conceptions or planning terminology. Instead, I would argue that it was greatly fostered by the contemporary cli-

420 Fichet, *Théorie architecturale à l'âge classique,* 22–3. See my Book I.

421 Gregg Lambert, *On the (New) Baroque* (Aurora: Davies Group, 2008), 86; referring to Foucault, *Order of Things*, 331ff.

mate-change-induced deterritorialization of the *corps de logis* as a single-range structure into two parallel sequences of rooms. Crucially, there we move from one variable — presented by the serial arrangement of rooms — to two interdependent ones in a much more complex arrangement. In this arrangement, any relative distinction forces us to leave the plains of topological series, and include a more set-theoretical lens. By series (or serial space), we have previously conceptualized some sum of elements of (or rooms placed in) a certain sequence. In the field of mathematics, with its stricter definitions, 'sequences' are only sufficiently defined in the presence of a metric space according to which they are linearly ordered. Concerning the form-taking architecture of appartements within royal palaces, my last Book II has equated this metric space precisely with the linear spatiality of the *corps de logis simple*, which exactly around this time came to form a rigid spatio-temporal metric for measuring and coordinating access and social standing. [→ 2.3]

Yet, due to the combined effects of environmental changes resulting from ecological and economic pressures and the heated social dynamics in the mid-seventeenth century, this linear configuration of the *corps de logis simple* as an aggregate was incrementally losing cohesion as a wider system, becoming instead a kind of special case, a spatial dispositif and equipment of absolutist power. By contrast, first and foremost in the realm of the more minor domestic architecture, we have seen the serial arrangement beginning to collapse and fold onto itself [→ 3.1.3]. Thus it was reconfigured into a more compact aggregate, the configuration of which absorbed the cumulative environmental pressures and externalities (climatic, social, economic) that concentrated in the organization of residential space. Borrowing from thermodynamics and biochemical systems theory, we can see this as a shifting 'state of matter.' In this phase transition, there is no sublimation process through which "all that is solid turns into thin air"; instead, the architecture of the *logis* is modernized by transitioning from a stable solid-crystalline state (the *corps de logis simple*) into a more meso-phasic and metastable liquid-crystalline phase (toward the matrixial *corps de logis*). Thereby it assumes a more complex configuration in which the rigid coordinating space of the *corps de logis simple* and its alignment were newly reconfigured.[422] With this coupling of two or more series of rooms, which responded

422 That this 'de-coordination' of space with its flattening of inequalities occurs in fact not after the coordination that I have talked about in II.III, is no coincidence but just the other side of the coming-to-realization of the inbuilt political dimension of the inherited structure of the *corps de logis simple*.

not only to the changing climate but also to the demand for flexibility that the spatial matrix of the resulting arrangement facilitated, an internal resonance within the system was created. It established a positive feedback loop that helped actualize a new resolution, preventing the system from dissipating by transmuting toward a more isotropic form (a state that presents an energetically lower state that minimizes binding energy); this can be seen in the more freely configured arrangement of baroque plans. Here the crystalline arrangement of the linear *logis* attains a new state, a meso-phase. But this phase-shift instead leverages a counter-entropic potential that will ultimately come to be relevant for the socio-spatial system of appartements to evolve into a system broken down into partially-ordered components, as we shall see.

Socio-spatially speaking, this systemic de-coherence does not amount to a collapse of an established world of values., Instead, the recomposition of residential space from metric to matrix generated a new space of possibility, by eliminating the highly-constrained organizational template set up by the *corps de logis simple*. But thereby it also loosened the function of this traditionally transductive template for social production and other organizations of geneses in general. It is here that this spatial transmutation and its entailed socio-spatial transvaluation start to play out. To locate this space of possibility, we need to attend not to the metric but topological space produced by the matrixial space of the *corps de logis double*, where we go from simple spatial sequences to a multilinear spatial ensemble, meaning a network. Therein we move from linear or simple tree-like hierachies, as topological orderings of elements constituted through simple bijective mappings of functions and domains, and simple representational systems, to more mesh- or net-like **HETERARCHIES**[423] organized dynamically in a multiplicity of different, yet interdependent ways, and complex systems of production that will contain linear and tree-like orderings. This multilinear network must thus be understood as a generalized topology of the specific linear organization pertaining to the *corps de logis simple*. Here, informed again by the stricter definitions of mathematics, I refer to the fact that in topological terms, any network presents a so-called generalization of the concept of a sequence. Because, as we have seen in Leibniz's aforementioned distinctions about genera and species, all sequences are but a special case of nets; nets are a higher, hence more general, order that includes simple

423 I develop this point from an article by Thor Magnussen, "Musical Organics: A Heterarchical Approach to Digital Organology," *Journal of Musical Research* 46, no. 3 (2017), 286–303; in reference to Eco's, *From the Tree to the Labyrinth*.

sequences. Concerning architecture, this notion implies that sequential space is but a special case (hence its use for a special kind of power) of a much more general dispositif of spaces and spatial relations presented by the matrixial model, more commonly used in Italy. But this notion also makes it clear that these two organizations should not be juxtaposed as two different types, such as Robin Evans has done in his study of the emerging corridor,[424] but must be understood as a qualitative difference between more generic and more specific organizations. In this regard, we can extend our observations made at the end of Book II that the organization of royal apartments such as in Versailles produced a specific dispositif; a spatial metric that facilitated the formation of a remarkable 'apparatus of capture.' [→ 2.1.3] From the lines drawn in this, the first half of this Book III, this dispositif must then be specified as a special case of a system of distribution (i.e. gridding [*quadrillage*]) of which the spatial matrix of the *corps de logis double* presents the much more general case. This generality lies in the way that in it, spatial organizations are controlled by systems in which elements reciprocally determine (i.e. mutually establish and distinguish) each other.

In mathematics, generalization problematizes false logical constraints derived from looking only at special case. For my investigation, this critique implies that we have to problematize that—with the exception of the special case of linear sequences—all non-linear nets can be defined without resorting to spatial metrics. This is possible because spatial elements are determined by their reciprocal relations to one another. Moreover, as we saw, this reciprocal determination was exactly the key to understanding Serlio's matrix of *appartamenti*. A net can be described immanently, without reference to an external metric. Mathematicians thus define it not as a 'linearly-ordered set,' formalized as {1,2,3,…}, which still implies an external metric according to which the set is ordered. Instead, they define it as a 'directed' set, formalized as {1>2>3…}, which stresses inherent order. In the case of the enfilade of rooms of an appartement, this directed set lies quite intuitively in the visitor's *parcours*, as a directed pathway that has no linear architectural form but a linear form of organization in the successive movements through rooms. As these can vary from person to person, and as they also do not coincide with the linear arrangement of the spaces; they actually form more of a net.[425] This leads us to another general point: while directed sets normally consist of

424 See Robin Evans, "Figures, Doors, Passages," in *Translations from Drawing to Building and Other Essays* (London: Architectural Association, 1997), 55–91.

425 In the last book, we have seen that the closest architects have gotten to a strictly linear organization was the Palazzo Venezia.

'totally-ordered' ones, they can also consist of what mathematicians call partially-ordered sets (of which totally-ordered sets are again but a special case). This is especially relevant, given that in the mathematical formalization and generalization of our intuitive notion of orderings or arrangements, the common example of partially-ordered sets is presented precisely by those dichotomies or genealogical trees in which the different relations of (non-)relation between elements are diagrammed, that is, made explicit. It is this organization into partially-ordered structures is what we see in the topology of residential space.

I want to suggest, then, as one of my core theses, that it is this generalization from ordered sequences to directed nets that comes with the reconfiguration of the doubled-up *corps de logis,* seen increasingly from the 1620s onwards, where the inherited metric planning logic of the *logis* largely went to pieces and had to be re-generalized into a more matrixial space (thereby also generalizing the notion of apartments). This is because the dissolution of the *logis* and its rigid metric into a more liquid-crystalline structure also irreversibly liquified the built-in 'superlinearilty' of the rooms in their established order. The problem is that nets dissolve—in a similar way that the Cartesian container conception of space had done so—the above-mentioned superlinearity of expression between 'real-essential distinctions' (translation) into a mere linearity of expression of 'real-real distinction' between intensive states (transduction): "Genetic linearity is above all spatial, even though its segments are constructed and reproduced in succession; thus at this level it does not require effective overcoding," as Deleuze and Guattari tell us."[426] The overcoding comes in where, in this intensive folding process (both architecturally and conceptually), we find one of the central conditioning constellations that, as I have stressed above, enable the shift from simple series to a series of series; a series of intersecting series. This is to say, a grid-like or **RETICULATED** structure, generating a net.[427] This grid forms a series of series that allows—and in fact requires—the establishment of an order of co-existences.[428] That is, the importance no longer lies in the arrangement of series themselves, but in their composition together, as an ensemble of compossibles. If the series is but one constitutive element of order, then we must always account for the overall composition of these

426 See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 62; also 17.

427 Serres, *Le système de Leibniz*, 30ff; see also id., *Hermès IV: La distribution* (Paris: Édn. Minuit, 1977), here cited after the German translation, Serres, *Verteilung*, trans. Michael Bischoff (Berlin: Merve, 1993), 113.

428 Serres, *Hermès III: La traduction* (Paris: Édn. Minuit, 1974), 129.

linear elements, in a similar way as one does for the arrangement within each series.[429] In this sense, the *corps de logis double* thus leads us back precisely to the conceptual origin of apartments within the technique of compartitioning matrix-like structures, the parallelism of which had led to an operative notion of spatial equality due to which a multiplicity of equal spaces of the same kind could be reciprocally determined [→1.2.3]. Disembedded from the *corps de logis simple*, the apartment as a suite of rooms thus came to be connected back to its conceptual origin within the establishment of a more multi-layered, or HIGHER-ORDER system of organization (which is not in contradiction to it being in a lower-energy state).

As the next section will show [→3.2.3], the establishment of this spatial equality and higher-order system eventually entailed nothing less than a new conception of ordering . Here, in conjunction with the new Cartesian notion of space, the entire socio-spatial logic of the house and its use, and older modes of planning, had to be reconstituted as a coherent system. As we shall see, this poses a great challenge in terms of achieving a coherent logic, because with the generalization from trees (or *scalæ*) to nets, we move from the production of simple centralized systems to the production of more multi-linear networks made of complexes of physically-separated but spatially-interlinked nodes, which we nowadays call distributed systems.[430] That the art of distribution is centered precisely on making this transition, on producing this new system, has yet to be understood in these systems-theoretical terms. As the following sections will demonstrate, , this problematic is the point where the 'becoming-scientific' of residential planning—that is to say, the disciplinary discourse on the art of distribution within French architecture—would kick in. One helpful clue to investigate this process may be taken from the way in which Serres has defined the workings of classic science precisely as an attempt at "outlining a tree within a wider network, and defin[ing] its paths, which is to say relationships, in their specific difference" and then establishing or "outlin[ing], in the tree, a chain."[431] As in Leibniz's system, the logic of the tree is replaced by a multilinear and multivalent network in which, as Serres notes, "a deductive chain is always checked back [*contrôlée en retour]* by multiple other chains,"[432] meaning that, like chains are always outlined

429 Serres, *Système de Leibniz,* 30.

430 In the chapter "Rhizome," in Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Vol. II* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1987) the authors derive the concept of rhizomes in reference to an article by Pierre Rosenstiehl and Jean Petitot, "Automate asocial et systèmes acentrés," *Communications* 22 (1974), 45–62.

431 Serres, *Hermès*, III: 27.

432 Serres, *Système de Leibniz*, 10–18; here 18.

from trees, trees are always formed on the basis of networks.[433] It is thus concerning the emergence of these triple feedback systems (of nets, trees, and chains) in the art of distribution, that we must examine exactly how architectural theory and compositional practices as a technique for drawing distinctions in particular, came to be integrated into a wider ensemble of control mechanisms, and thus 'cybernetic' forms of organization.

As we shall see, this process can be mapped in the changing topological structure of the *hôtels* illustrated in the treatises pertaining to the discourse on the art of distribution. There, the interesting topological transformation happens exactly when the set of rooms constituting an appartement slowly came to be conceived in terms of a totally-ordered set. Bringing back, albeit under different terms, a conception inherited from the *corps de logis simple*, it was due to this 'special case' that the spatial matrix came to be seen as a distributive lattice onto which eighteenth-century architects tried to project the metric principles of the *corps de logis simple* and its linear order. As I will conclusively demonstrate in the last part [→ 3.3.1–2], this happened by outlining distinct chains, as totally-ordered subsets nested within a partially-ordered system. As Serres remarks,this process forms of nesting (*emboîtement*), which came to be more and more visible within the plans of baroque and rococo residential architecture, is just another way of producing a tree structure.[434] This nesting order irrevocably modified the very terms in which the house was constituted:[435] it was no longer to be thought of as a set of generic terms

433 Serres, *Hermès,* III: 27ff

434 Ibid., III: 37 (my trans.).

435 Therein, we make the larger conceptual step from appartements being a spatialized form of membership and belonging (cf. 'appartenance') to a more inclusive notion of appartements as a (compartmented) spatial set. In set theory, the concepts of 'belonging' and 'inclusion' describe very different things (For an introduction, see Paul R. Halmos, *Naive Set Theory* (Mineola: Dover, 2017; orig. pub. 1960), ch. 1, 1–3). Belonging pertains to presentations; inclusion — as a more reflexive and transitive terms — pertains to representation. See Alain Badiou, *Being and Event* (London/New York, Continuum, 2005), 102, table 1: "$x \in A$," meaning 'x belongs to A'; while "$x \subset A$," means 'x is included in A'). As Badiou distinguished, the concept of belonging accounts for compositions of the multiple (or situations of multiplicity) without recourse to unity; inclusion re-counts multiplicities in terms of the state of a situation of multiples of multiples in which they take part (ibid., 93–103). Belonging as *appartenance* will thus finally retrieve its unique role of articulating discourse upon the multiple, instead it gives rise to a special type of the multiple (ibid., 445). This process involves a certain closure through the interlocking of frames, but no enclosure. What conditions the relative 'closure' of each subset therein, is no longer based on any pre-established accord between totalizing part-to-whole relations, but the relative relation of 'identity and difference' established between parts selected, differentiated, and organized according to a unique point of view from which they differ. We thus go, as Serres argues, from an analytic use of geometry measuring and division as in Descartes, to a newly projective one under a specific point of view as in Desargues. Yet, as we will see, it is precisely this differentiating condition of selection, making them into different types of spaces evolving on diverging paths, that will be disappearing in their identity as

(Foucault would have said 'group of statements'), or a simple sum of parts in which elements no longer represent part-to-whole relations. Instead, it became conceptually reconstituted by way of a new set of more functive terms (i.e. a new group of statements) recoding the house as a more complex domain composed of connected, open subsets.[436]

This is precisely the process that we can now discover especially in Perrault's, d'Aviler's, and Blondel's successive theorizations, where appartements—the classic connection structure—incrementally came to be conceived as a subset of rooms linked within a multi-linear ensemble, as well as the binding element linking a set of material-discursive problems that arose with the need for ordering such systems. In thus being progressively generalized, the suite of rooms was starting to serve as a conceptual grid or meta-structure for ordering smaller components, while also coming to be conceived a specific sub-ensemble, that is, as a spatial set composed of spaces whose functional differentiation undermined their difference in kind as genera, and which as species of spaces gained a more specific function for the ensemble which they co-compose. These component structures are parts with positive determinations that can be (techno-)logically integrated under the category of a higher-order object, as well as differentiated according to their function therein.

While with this integration/differentiation, the serial system of the *logis* was coming to be replicated in a finite region delimited by other component subsets,[437] the system of appartements concretizing in this redistribution should not be reduced to some planning unit; at least not from a proper technological angle. While technical ensembles do always establish functional unities from heterogeneous parts, structures, and operations, these cannot be reduced to mere (sub)units, for they always enter into relations of (inter-)

appartements; see the discussion of Leibniz's monads in Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley (London: Continuum, 2006), 136–7; adapted from Lambert, *On the (New) Baroque*, 173–83. In this vein, apartments as a newly distributed system, or system of distribution, will form a projective device, as a dispositif of power realizing itself through a multi-linear ensemble, an organizational diagram, bringing about a newly-ordered social world.

436 A set is a multiplicity or ensemble of distinct objects, members, elements, or terms, here the 'rooms' of the house. From a topological perspective, rooms are bounded sets, not closed ones. Such bounded sets need not contain their boundary, and are as such open sets. This does not mean that such spaces are infinite; because in topology openness and closure are not mutually exclusive. In architectural terms, this distinction can be greatly clarified by saying that the 'space' of the room does not contain the matter delimiting it. This translates directly into the fact that the architectural elements, like walls, are not part of the partially-ordered set of rooms depicted in topological diagrams of the precise connection structure provided here.

437 I take this cue from Serres, *Système de Leibniz*, 102.

dependence and establish communications that traverse and cut through the whole, which they form. They are always 'put to work,' or made to function by establishing an internally coherence. Their function is co-dependent on functioning of the entire ensemble. The concatenated system of appartements is precisely the technical object of establishing this internally coherent logic within planning practices in the late seventeenth-century. As such, they must be conceived more adequately as a concretizing planning principle (rather than unit), for making distribution (as a planning procedure [*Verfahren*]) operational again.

Having previously worked as an elastic principle for organizing a serial space, the distribution of suites of rooms now had to transform into a *plastic* principle for organizing a more complex spatiality. Theoretically, this plasticity, and the nesting from which it derives, refers us back to Deleuze's argument that the essential trait of the baroque is that it produces 'folds.'[438] But while this folding—as a style of thought—is tied to the very history of the baroque as a style, it does not legitimate that we explain this formation in art-historical terms of a 'history of styles.' This would once more reduce this style to an expression of a new way of thinking, rather than mapping a novel subjectivity as it is elaborated with/in a reterritorialization, carried out through an incremental imposition of frames upon frames, or frames within frames, creating a *mise-en-abîme* that would shape a specific style or form of expression capable of drawing heterogeneous media together.[439] In folding onto itself, the logic of the *corps de logis* now set up, contained, and expressed—as we could say with Leibniz—an entire (social) world. As such, this folding simply names that organizational process that generates an increase in organizational and functional complexity.

To end this part (and lead into the next one), it is necessary to remember that this increase of complexity and need for a more plastic principle was directly tied to the fact that in this folding, the entire problem of planning is re(com)posed. Instead of being merely a problem of organizing space according to an established order, with the *corps de logis double* distribution became a problem of organizing circulation, requiring the establishment of multi-linear relationships by means of alternative ordering techniques. This problem of organizing circulation—prefigured in the emerging bypassing corridors, which

438 Deleuze, *Fold*, 3.

439 Ibid., 39. See also Lambert, On the (new) Baroque, xv–xix, in reference to Deleuze, *Fold*, passim. For the relation between Baroque and modern thinking, from the angle of modern social theory, see also Christine Buci-Glucksmann, *Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity*, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: SAGE, 1994).

made the transversal differentiation of the *logis* long imminent—were hereafter addressed with the notion of the *dégagement,* as the inclusion of transversal service corridors by means of which the linear system of moving back and forth through a spatial sequence was replaced by a true system of circulation. And to the extent that distributed systems do not imply free circulation, but rather more channeled circulation, we thus also move from a regulatory system to a self-regulatory system in the sense that this circuit established a responsive system made up of various feedback loops[440] in the sense of an informational network or cybernetic system; or simply a remarkable APPARATUS.

In this matter, the conceptual establishment of such partially-ordered or distributed system in architecture within baroque styles of thought, directs us to the increasing technological awareness of architecture as an instrument of controlling the affects by adaptively channeling flows, on which the art of distribution is based. Yet as this establishment concerns the selection of connections from a net, it also reels us back to the aforementioned technological function of those transformative tree-like organizations of discursive elements within seventeenth-century systems of ordering knowledge [→3.2.1]. The following section [→3.2.3] respectively present the two crucial moments when this technological awareness unfolded within architectural discourse, in its arising understanding as a technical instrument, and the formulation of a specific rationale (*logos*) guiding its use.

3.2.3 Technologies for Ordering Residential Space

Within architectural discourse, a technological understanding of architectural arrangements as something capable of affect or control of physical and social environments became more concrete in the discourses and theories following the mid-1670s. Discursively, this time was marked by the so-called quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns (*Querelle des anciens et des modernes*). This debate was sparked over a newfound pride in the contemporary work of French artists as having achieved the same level as—and perhaps having surpassed—the art of ancient Greece and Rome, whose long-held superiority and authority had thus come to be challenged. Scholars have extensively discussed the complex content and positions in this debate, and have revealed it as a crucial component in the formation of modern architec-

440 See also Serres, *Hermès III*, 39.

ture theory.[441] Particularly interesting here is the cultural or culture-technical dimension on which this re-theorization of architecture was based.

Antoine Picon has highlighted that the *Querelle* was the direct result of two fundamentally incompatible positions concerning the conception of order in architecture.[442] The main proponent of the Ancients was the director of the Académie, François Blondel, a trained mathematician and person with more old-fashioned mindset,[443] who conceived of architectural order in the inherited sense, where order was seen as arising from the employment of conventionally-established proportional measures (i.e. a comparison of measure), from which a harmonious affinity should emerge, as Alberti argued. Within Blondel's top-down approach, the layout of buildings is thus entirely subordinated to their external decoration and the correct application of the orders (as Blondel equated *ordonnance* with *columnaison*).[444] Aside from this representationalist view of decoration, however, Blondel's first autographic work on architecture also followed a modern Cartesian impetus in demonstrating how several recurrent problems concerning architecture could be innovatively resolved by the help of higher mathematics, especially geometry, as a means of transcending everyday architectural practice.[445] Related to these efforts, the Moderns, especially Claude Perrault (1613–1688), advocated a more instrumental reading of ordering practices entailed within architecture. This counter-position was first outlined in Perrault's translation with commentary of Vitruvius's *De architectura* (pub. 1673, along with an abbreviated version in 1674)[446],

441 In architecture, the debate started with Charles Perrault's *Le siècle de Louis le Grand* (1687), and his *Parallèle des Anciens et des Modernes* (1688–1692). For a discussion of the quarrel in architecture theory, see Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*, 128–40; Harry F. Mallgrave, *Modern Architectural Theory: A Historical Survey, 1673–1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), 1–12; Anthony Gerbino, *François Blondel: Architecture, Erudition, and the Scientific Revolution* (London/New York: Routledge, 2010), 148–65. For a wider cultural perspective, see for instance also Joan DeJean, *Ancients Against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siecle* (Chicago/London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1997).

442 Antoine Picon, *Claude Perrault 1613–1688: Ou la curiosité d'un classique* (Paris: Picard, 1988), 155: "While Blondel conceives of architecture as a reflection of a natural order…, for Perrault architecture refers back to an autonomy of human reason and the capacity of the institution that holds it. The natural order to which [Blondel] refers unifies objective laws of optics and subjective givens of vision. Nothing like this is necessary for [Perrault], for whom reason operates without any need to resolve the difference of optic laws with perceptive structures" (ibid., my trans.).

443 Joseph Rykwert, *The First Moderns: The Architects of the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980), 15.

444 François Blondel, *Cours d'architecture…* (Paris: Rouilland, 1675), Vol.I: 4.

445 Blondel, *Resolution des quatre principaux problemes d'architecture* (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1673). See here esp. Gerbino, "François Blondel and the *Résolution des quatre principaux problèmes d'architecture* (1673)," *JSAH* 64, no.4 (2005), 498–521.

446 Claude Perrault, *Les dix livres d'architecture de Vitruve, corrigez et traduits nouvellement en françois, avec des notes et des figures* (Paris: Coignard 1673), avail. online at http://

which Colbert had tasked him with in the aim of helping codify the fundamental architectural principles and terminology. Like translators before him, Perrault attempted to render the ancient text relevant by connecting it back to the concepts used and complexities faced by contemporary building practice. But in this regard, especially Perrault's heterodox notion of order and its later application in *Ordonnance des cinq espèces de colonnes* (1683),[447] came to spark a polemical debate with Blondel.

As has been remarked upon repeatedly, in the translation, Perrault's own notes constitute nothing short of a treatise in themselves. As Lucia Allais points out, "in accordance with his erudition, Perrault appended his translation with footnotes so copious that most of the pages are divided in two halves: translated ancient text at the top, and modern explanatory footnotes at the bottom."[448] ☒[58] This way, "two theories of architecture, literally juxtaposed" were presented parallelly in a single work, thus structurally anticipating how Perrault's brother Charles would present the oppositional arguments dividing the Ancients and the Moderns in his own *Parallèle*.[449] Thereby, it transformed the debate from an oppositional mode by way of using parallelism as a "conciliatory" device.[450] In its reconciliatory function, this treatise within the treatise went far beyond philological clarifications to make the text widely accessible; it completely dislodged and updated Vitruvius on a fundamental level by elaborating the scientific and technological character he assigned to building: a

doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-19627; and id., *Abrégé des dix livres d'architecture de Vitruve* (Paris, Jean-Baptiste Coignard, 1674), avail. online at http://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-19386; both also avail. online at http://architectura.cesr.univ-tours.fr. As Picon noted, this choice was "rather paradoxical," given Perrault's outspoken critical stance toward antiquity (Picon, *Claude Perrault*, 115). But Perrault had a vast knowledge across the fields of medicine, mathematics, astronomy, philosophy and music. He thereby not only incorporated Vitruvius' description of the ideal architect, but also presented a perfect translator for the Latin text with its multifarious digressions beyond architecture (Picon: *Claude Perrault*, 115). The general decision to translate the work is inseparable from its resulting 'normative preoccupation' to "incite artists and architects to subscribe [regarding formal and expressive structures] to rules founded on ancient examples" (ibid., 155–9). Jean Martin's earlier translation 1547 and the illustrated re-edition of 1572 had both become outdated in terms of language and iconography. The newly commissioned translation performed another function for the Académie. See also Wolfgang Herrmann, *Theory of Claude Perrault*, 2 vols (London: A. Zwemmer, 1973); French ed., *La théorie de Claude Perrault,* trans, Marie-Claire Stas (Brussel/Liege: Mardaga, 1980).

447 Perrault, *Ordonnance des cinq especes de colonnes selon la methode des Anciens…* (Paris: Jean-Baptiste Coignard, 1683), avail. online at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k85663c. Available in English as *Ordonnance for the Five Kinds of Columns after the Method of the Ancient,* trans. Indra Kagis McEwen (Santa Monica: Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1993), 1–41.

448 Lucia Allais, "Ordering the Orders: Claude Perrault's 'Ordonnance' and the Eastern Colonnade of the Louvre," *Thresholds* 28 (Winter 2005), 58–74; here 62.

449 Ibid., see above, note 441.

450 Ibid., 65.

revolution "played out in the footnotes" as to how architectural structure was being conceived.[451]

Likely inspired by the way Descartes compared the human body to a hydraulic-pneumatic machine in his *Traité de l'homme*,[452] it presents theaters, for instance, not as monuments but foregrounds their structural function as an old technology for employing and controlling physical phenomena. Here, Perrault widely accommodates references to his own physi(ology)cal studies. A relentless researcher trained as an anatomist and physiologist, Perrault's thinking was grounded in an epistemological empiricism. He began his studies in natural history from where he quickly turned to music, sound and physics, part of a general interest in theorizing the behavior of matter.[453] These theories are deeply influenced by Perrault's earlier work on the natural phenomena of 'attraction' and 'coagulation'[454] in the late 1660s, when he studied the peculiar "propensity that all bodies have to join each other [*à se joindre*].[455] At first glance, these theorizations appear to present an analogically mechanistic position of organicist inflection.[456] Yet, it is more interesting to attend to how such analogies come to be used heuristically in architectural theory, which, as Picon defends, should thus be recognized as preceding the natural sciences in its attempts at creating formal typologies,[457] if by this we mean a study of the relationship of things within specific structures. Where in Descartes's dualist approach mechanical bodies operated merely by transmission of forces by material bodies, Perrault—who had met Leibniz—translated this dualism into a more differential approach between matter and forces: internal causes do shape the configuration of bodies, but it is external causes that provide for their cohesion.[458] Concerning this cohesion, we

451 Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*, 133; citing Antonio Hernandez, *Grundzüge einer Ideengeschichte der französischen Architekturtheorie von 1560–1800* (Basel: [BNZ], 1972), 56.

452 Picon, *Claude Perrault*, 120, 127. For a related discussion of Perrault's perfect example for a machine-edifice; the astronomic observatory, see ibid.., 205.

453 Perrault's, *Essais de physique, ou Recueil de plusieurs traités touchant les choses naturelles*, 4 vols (Paris: Coignard, 1680), consulted online via BnF Gallica.

454 See Picon, *Claude Perrault*, 89ff.

455 Perrault, "De la chaux" (Jan 15, 1667), in *Procès-Verbaux de l'Académie des sciences*, Vol. I: 308–27; here 309. See also Perrault, "Mémoire sur les causes de la coagulation" (August 10, 1669), in *Procès-Verbaux*, VI: fol. 141v-149; cited in Picon, *Claude Perrault*, 261n50.

456 Picon, *Claude Perrault*, 152–3.

457 Ibid., 120–6.

458 Ibid., *Essay de physique*, I:15–16. See here also id., *Claude Perrault*, 75, who moreover argues that "By taking ambient matter into account, their pressure (i.e. 'compression') and the resulting tension that we find for instance in muscles within bodies, Perrault thoughts are one of the rare moments where corpuscular philosophy can explain the cohesion and elasticity of bodies" (ibid., 91).

should also note the particularly 'pre-disciplinary' disposition with which Perrault attempted a mutual information across the field of studies he engaged with.[459] No wonder that in this physiological research trajectory, 'architecture'—conceived as any logically-coherent organization holding multiplicitous structures together—attained a progressive importance.

Perrault's Theory of Ordering, 1673–83

In Perrault's thinking, structure denominates not only the formal organization of the body, but at the same time its economy or distribution. It is thus no wonder that Perrault often digresses into descriptions of the internal functioning of bodies; of how they operate. From this angle, it seems no coincidence that Perrault operationalized the notion of appartements, which —now coming to be introduced into Vitruvius's work through Perrault's commentary—features extensively in (especially the annotations of) the *Dix livres,* as it does in the *Abrégé* published the year after. Especially in connection to Vitruvius's sixth book, we clearly see the notion of summer and winter apartments (or the disposition of different types of buildings or rooms) standing at the center of a discussion emphasizing that climate does not simply determine the style of the house, but that on the contrary, architectural forms and means also work as a mechanism for controlling climate, by helping selectively rarefy or increase fluxes of air and light, by establishing specific spatial relationships.[460] But this conception of architecture as a control mechanism also permeated Perrault's thinking in a much more subtle manner; namely, where this instrumentality of architectural arrangements crystallizes around his novel conception of *ordonnance*. In fact, it is precisely based on this instrumental notion, I want to argue, that Perrault became one of the first modern theorists to put into question the representational conception of order.

Like many commentators before, discussing "what architecture consists in" in Vitruvius's Book I, Chapter II, ☒[58] Perrault highlights the difficulties of understanding the obscure operators of architecture. He cites Barbaro and Scamozzi's "unsuccessful attempts at explaining the essential differences between the order, disposition, and distribution of a building."[461] What he thereby critiqued was Barbaro's differentiation of the six operators into

459 One could be tempted to call this a transdisciplinary stance, but that would be anachronistic to the extent that we are talking about the period in which different domains of knowledge and practice become initially more isolated from another, as different disciplines.

460 Perrault, *Dix livres*, 14n2, 190, 192; *Abrégé*, 92.

461 Perrault, *Dix Livres*, 9n1.

terms that refer either to things in themselves (*vel in se*) or things which by nature refer to others (*vel comparata*). ✉[52] Barbaro placed the first three in the branch of things in themselves, where he differentiated quantitative aspects—differentiated again into *ordinatio* in the establishment of common measures and the corresponding *symmetria*—from a qualitative element (*dispositio*).[462] This seems to have left Perrault unconvinced, hand he offers an alternative interpretation based on a complex move that starts from 'correcting' Vitruvius, suggesting that one ought to read "Ordinatio est modica membrorum operis commo-ditas separatim universeque proportionis ad symmetriam comparatio" as "… universique proportioni ac symmetriae comparata."[463] This correction largely dislodges the classical notion of *symmetria* in its sense of establishing a common measure between parts with regard to the whole from which *eurythmia* as a harmonic affinity arises. By distinguishing *symmetria* from the modern sense of symmetry, Perrault legitimized his move to combine *symmetria* and *eurythmia* into a new conception of "proportionality [*proportion*]." Thereby he understood a comparative relationality that effectively relegated the older notion of a harmonic affinity to the theoretical "trash heap."[464]

With this idea of proportionality, the idea of ordering (*ordonnance*) underlying planning practices can no longer function in terms of a hylomor-

462 See Barbaro, *De architectura*, 17; Williams, ed., Barbaro's Vitruvius, 53–54).

463 Perrault, *Dix livres*, 9n1. Cf. Vitruvius Book 1, ch. 2, 1, Grangers's most known translation renders this difficult sentence as "Order is the balanced adjustment of the details of the work separately, and, as to the whole, the arrangement of the proportion with a view to a symmetrical result." Morgan's gives "Order gives due measure to the members of a work considered separately, and in symmetrical agreement to the proportions of the whole." Difficulties arise from the fact that symmetry does not refer to any spatial orientation but 'commensurability,' that is the establishment of a common measure, whereas 'proportion' indicates a dependence 'in function of.' In Pavlos Lefas' reading, a more appropriate rendering would be that "Order[ing] is the balanced and measured adjustment of the members of the work considered separately, toward the creation of a hierarchy of magnitudes [as a relation of scale], to keep symmetry [as commensurability] in the overall work" (See Lefas, "Fundamental Terms," 195 [modified]).

464 Erik Terlouw, "The Architecture of Reason," *OASE* 75 (2008), 178–201; here 192. For a detailed discussion see e.g. Fichet, who more clearly captures how Perrault thus distinguished two aspects of proportion, which can be understood either as "*ratio* or the *relation between two quantities* [i.e. 1:2] or *proportio* properly speaking—or equality of reason—which bears on the *relation between two couples of quantity* [i.e. 1/2:1/3] This first fundamental distinction arises from a second one, more complicated to understand, between *symmetria* and *proportio*" (Fichet, *Théorie architecturale*, 24). For a discussion connecting this distinction to Perrault's notion of beauty, and its effects, see also See also Matthew A. Cohen, "Two Kinds of Proportion," *Architectural Histories* 2, no.1 (2014), n.p. (online). On Perrault's modern sense of symmetry, see Werner Szambien, *Symétrie, gout, charactère: théorie et terminologie de l'architecture de l'âge classique* (Paris: Picard, 1986), esp. 61–78, and Middleton, "Symmetry: A French Obsession," *Diadalos* 15 (1985), 71–81.

En quoy consiste l'Architecture.

Proportion. Symmetria. Decor. Gouvernement domestique.

*[1] L'ARCHITECTURE consiste en cinq choses : sçavoir, l'Ordonnance, qui est appellée *Taxis* par les Grecs ; la Disposition, qui est ce qu'ils nomment *Diathesis* ; l'*Eurythmie*, ou *Proportion* ; la *Bienseance* ; & la Distribution, qui en Grec est appellée *Oeconomia*.

* [2] L'Ordonnance est ce qui donne à toutes les parties d'un Bastiment leur juste grandeur, par rapport à leur usage ; soit qu'on les considere séparément, soit qu'on ait égard à la proportion ou symmetrie de tout l'ouvrage. Cette Ordonnance dépend de la Quantité appellée en Grec *Poçotes*, qui dépend du Module qui a esté pris pour regler l'œuvre entier & chacune de ses parties séparément.

Les Figures. Le Plan, l'Elevation geometrale, l'Elevation perspective.

La Disposition est l'arangement convenable de toutes les parties, en sorte qu'elles soient placées selon la qualité de chacune. [3] Les Representations, ou, pour parler comme les Grecs, *les Idées* de la Disposition se font en trois manieres : sçavoir, par l'*Ichnographie*, par l'*Orthographie* & par la *Schenographie*. [4] L'Ichnographie est lorsqu'avec la Regle & le Compas dans une espace mediocre on trace le Plan d'un Edifice, comme si c'estoit sur le Terrain. [5] L'Orthographie represente aussi dans un espace mediocre l'élevation d'une des faces avec les mesmes proportions que doit avoir l'ouvrage qu'on veut

1. L'ARCHITECTURE CONSISTE. Cette division des choses qui apartiennent à l'Architecture est fort obscure, tant à cause de sa subtilité, qu'à cause des fautes qui sont selon toutes les apparences dans le texte. Henric Votton dans ses Elemens d'Architecture semble estre de cette opinion, quand il dit que cet endroit de Vitruve est disloqué. Il a paru si embroüillé à Philander, qu'il n'y a point voulu toucher du tout dans ses commentaires. Daniel Barbaro & Scamozzi s'estendent fort au long pour l'expliquer, mais avec peu de succés ; car les differences essentielles qu'il y a entre l'Ordonnance, la Disposition & la Distribution des parties d'un Bastiment, est une chose dont on ne s'aperçoit pas d'abord, & il est assez difficile de comprendre que la Proportion sans laquelle il n'y a point d'ordonnance de Disposition, ny de Distribution dans un Edifice, soit une espece separée de toutes ces choses.

2. L'ORDONNANCE EST. Il faut deviner le sens de cette definition de l'Ordonnance, ou supposer qu'il y a faute au texte & y corriger quelque chose. Mon opinion est qu'au lieu de *operis commoditas, universaque proportionis ad symmetriam comparatio*, il faut lire *Universique proportionis ad symmetria comparata*. Cela estant le sens sera que l'Ordonnance d'un Bastiment consiste dans la division de la place qu'on y veut employer : cette division se faisant de telle sorte que chaque partie ait sa juste grandeur convenable à son usage & proportionnée à la grandeur de tout l'Edifice. Par exemple l'ordonnance d'un Bastiment, si on la compare à sa disposition, est quand la cour, la salle & les chambres ne sont ny trop grandes, ny trop petites pour servir aux usages ausquels elles sont destinées, sçavoir la Cour pour donner le jour aux appartemens & pour contenir ce qui y doit entrer ; la Salle pour recevoir les grandes compagnies, & les Chambres pour y coucher ; ou bien quand ces parties ne sont ny trop grandes, ny trop petites, estant comparées à la grandeur de toute la place ; c'est à sçavoir quand on n'a pas fait une grande Cour dans une petite place, ou de petites Chambres dans une grande place ; au lieu que la Disposition est quand toutes les parties sont mises en leur lieu suivant leur qualité, c'est à dire dans l'ordre qu'elles doivent avoir selon leur nature & leur usage, & que le Vestibule par exemple est suivy de la Salle, ensuite de laquelle sont les Antichambres, les Chambres, les Cabinets & les Galleries.

L'Ordonnance suivant la definition que Vitruve en donne ici, peut convenir à la Disposition des colonnes, qui font le Pycnostyle, l'Eustyle, l'Areostyle, &c. dont il est traité au 2. chap. du 3. liv. Car cette Disposition qui en ce lieu est apellée *Compositio* & *Dispositio*, n'est rien autre chose que la maniere de determiner la grandeur du Diametre des colonnes à l'égard de celle de leurs Entrecolonnemens, en donnant par exemple 6. piez aux entrecolonnemens du Pycnostyle, si les colonnes ont quatre piez de diametre ; & dix-huit piez aux entrecolonnemens de l'Eustyle, si les colonnes ont huit piez de diametre.

Or parceque pour bien faire tant cette Ordonnance des grandeurs, que cette Disposition, ou situation de tout le bastiment, ou de ses parties selon leurs qualitez, il faut se regler par la Proportion qui fait que toutes les parties s'accordent bien ensemble à cause qu'on a eu égard à la Bienseance & à l'Oeconomie ; Vitruve a ajoutté la Proportion, la Bienseance & l'Oeconomie à l'Ordonnance & à la Distribution, non comme des parties de l'Architecture, mais comme ce qui les perfectionne, & il a voulu dire sans doute que l'Architecture a deux parties, sçavoir l'Ordonnance & la Disposition qui donnent à tous les membres de l'Edifice leur perfection, lorsque la Proportion est telle, que la Bienseance & l'Oeconomie le requierent : car il est difficile de faire entendre que ces cinq choses soient cinq especes comprises sous un mesme genre.

3. LES REPRESENTATIONS. Il y a dans le Latin, *Species Dispositionis quas Graecis dicuntur Idea, hae sunt Ichnographia, Orthographia, &c.* Les Interpretes entendent que cela signifie qu'il y a trois especes de Distribution qui font l'Ichnographie, l'Orthographie, &c. sans prendre garde que le mot Latin, *Species*, de mesme que le Grec *Idea*, ne signifie pas seulement *Espece*, mais encore *Figure*, *Apparence*, & *Representation* qu'on apelle vulgairement *Dessein*, aussi-bien qu'*Espece* ; & que le sens du texte ne sçauroit souffrir que le Plan, l'Elevation & la veuë Perspective d'un Bastiment, soient les Especes de la Disposition, mais bien ses Representations. Car la verité est que ces trois manieres de dessiner appartiennent autant à l'Ordonnance, qu'à la Disposition, parcequ'un Plan & une Elevation ne servent pas moins à marquer les grandeurs des parties, qu'à en faire voir l'ordre & la situation. Desorte que quand Vitruve attribue la Representation & le Dessein à la Disposition, il faut entendre qu'il comprend aussi l'Ordonnance qui en effet n'est proprement qu'une espece de Disposition de tout l'œuvre, laquelle appartient ou à la grandeur de tout l'œuvre & de ses parties qu'on apelle Ordonnance, ou à la situation du tout & des parties qu'on apelle specialement Disposition.

4. L'ICHNOGRAPHIE. Ce mot signifie la representation ou le dessein du Vestige d'un Edifice : C'est ce que nous apellons le Plan. *Ichnos* en Grec signifie le Vestige ou l'impression qu'une chose laisse sur la terre quand elle y est posée.

5. L'ORTHOGRAPHIE. Ce mot signifie la representation d'un Edifice faite par des lignes droites, c'est-à-dire Horizontales. Nous l'apellons l'Elevation Geometrale ; elle est ainsi apellée, parce que *Orthos* en Grec signifie droit, & c'est cette rectitude des lignes paralleles à la ligne de l'Horizon, qui distingue l'Orthographie de la Scenographie ou Elevation Perspective, dans laquelle les lignes qui sont paralleles à la ligne de l'Horizon dans l'Edifice aux endroits qui s'enfoncent au dedans ou qui fuïent par les costez, sont obliques dans la Perspective.

58 Page from Perrault's *Les Dix Livres de Virtuve* (1673).

phic act of 'giving an order' (as in De l'Orme's notion) but must consist in a more experimental process of 'finding, or establishing order.' From this angle, Perrault's notion of *ordonnance* is perhaps most accurately translated—as Bernard Cache comments—as 'arrangement.'[465] This means it was re-conceptualized as a process of deriving and configuring relative relations. Its relativity explains why it became blurred with the operation of disposition within his own definition of order:

> The establishment of order in a building consists in the division of the site which one wishes to use: this division being done in such a way that each part has a just size that suits its usage and is proportionate to the scale of the whole building. For example, this orderliness of a building … arises when its courtyard, hall and chambers are neither too big nor small to serve their designated use … while Disposition concerns that all parts are put in their place, according to their quality, that is to say: *in the order they must have according to their nature and usage*, and the Vestibule by example is followed by the hall, from which are the antechambers, the chambers, the cabinets, and the galleries.[466]

Ordering thus consists in the establishment of a relative size (which in fact implies not just some quantity, but a quality of quantity) of co-constitutive elements. Disposition then concerns their functional placement in accordance with both this particular and more general established orders of functioning. Here, Perrault famously advocated that the adaptation of the parts of a building to each other and to the whole consisted in the selection of relative measure that, following Vitruvius, he called a module, by which he meant not so much a unit as an average means, or the smallest common denominator, that regulates (*règle*) the whole and its parts.[467]

465 See Bernard Cache, "Sollertiae ac rationis pro portione," trans. Celine Jeanne, in *Hunch* 9 (Summer 2005), 56–65; here 62.

466 Orig.: "[L']Ordonnance d'un Bastiment consiste dans la division de la place qu'on y veut employer: cette division se faisant de telle sorte que chaque partie ait sa juste grandeur convenable à son usage [et] proportionnée à la grandeur de tout l'edifice. Par exemple, l'ordonnance d'un Bastiment, si l'on compare à sa disposition, est quand la cour, la salle [et] les chambres ne sont ny trop grandes, ny trop petit pour servir aux usage ausquels elles sont destinées … au lieu que la Disposition est quand toutes les parties sont mises en leur lieu, suivant leur qualité, c'est à dire dans l'ordre qu'elles doivent avoir selon leur nature [et] leur usage, [et] que le Vestibule par exemple est suivy de la Salle, ensuite de laquelle sont les Antichambres, les Chambres, les Cabinets [et] les galleries" (Perrault, *Dix livres*, 9 [my trans.; emph. added]).

467 Cache, "Sollertiae ac rationis pro portione," 62. Cf. Vitruvius' formulation "Haec conponitur

In this modular approach, Cache identifies the beginnings of a "switch from a network system of relations linking any part to any other part" (such as that characterizing the idea of harmonic affinity), toward a form of organization that "involve[s] a centralized system" into which parts came to be integrated in terms of a common measure thanks to which the entire building constitutes a logically-coherent (i.e. commensurable) system.[468] Thus connected to Perrault's problematization of the cohesion of things, we can understand how his method of modularization newly problematized the consistency of part-to-part relations, more than just part-to-whole relations. As in Spinoza and Leibniz's modal approaches to logic, this modality shifted the classical problem of finding or defining the intrinsic relations between parts of buildings toward an extrinsic conception of their relations within ordered systems themselves. In this sense, this extrinsic conception observes the PRIMACY OF RELATIONS (of the reciprocal determination and mutual adaptation of parts), in pointing toward the fact of how such relative elements come to be established within ordering practices. This analytical dimension is what distinguishes it from disposition, as a synthetic arrangement based on established orders. While Perrault may not have consciously grasped the operative dimension of this synthetic use in reconstructing or rendering visible mechanisms, his reconceptualization of the analytical modality of ordering practices greatly modified established ideas about order. Instead of coming from mathematical proportions, here the 'just scale' came from a relative measure (a means coming to be defined in terms of customary usage), that is established in a (reciprocally-determinant or differential) process, based on which the related parts in it could be compared (i.e. their

ex quantitate, quae graece posotes dicitur; Quantitas autem est modulorum ex ipsius operis sumptio e singulisque membrorum partibus universi operis conveniens effectus [Order is made up of Quantity, which in Greek is called Posotes; [this] Quantity is the selection of modules from the members of the work itself and, starting from the individual parts of members, the construction of a harmonious whole]" (Vitruvius, Book 1, ch. 2, 2 [trans. by Lefas]) with Perrault's "Cette Ordonnance depend de la Quantité … qui depend du Module qui a esté pris pour regler l'œvre entire [et] chaque de ses parties." As Fichet further notes that, if *eurythmia* "is beauty and fitness in the adjustments of the members," —which as Vitruvius "is found when the members of a work … correspond symmetrically," which in return is defined as "a proper agreement between the members of the work itself, and relation between the different parts and the whole general scheme, in accordance with a certain part selected as standard [symmetria est ex ipsius operis membris conveniens consensus ex partibusque separatis ad universae figurae speciem ratae partis responsus.]" (Vitr. 1.2.3–4 [trans. Morgan])—then modularity can be understood as a method to achieve a harmonic effect. Blondel, by contrast had insisted on understanding symmetry as an overall effect. See Fichet, *Théorie architecturale*, 23–25.

468 Cache, "Sollertiae ac rationis pro portione," 62. I am slightly amending Cache's argument here.

relative scale according to their intended use) and then collocated (in their relative position established according to customary practice).[469]

Perrault put his theory of order into practice with the *Ordonnance*. The very title, Allais points out, of Perrault's "'The *Ordering* of the Five *kinds* of columns according to the *method* of the ancients' … shows that he nested his analytical categories in a [larger] scheme where modern agency and ancient authority might converge."[470] Ordering through modules thus still activates a progressive reasoning for establishing relations.[471] In this sense, Perrault's work also has a specific seriality, although it is starting to form a nested logic, a series of series, in which, as in Leibniz, relative modal distinctions drawn within manifolds constitute a self-referential analytical system. But with Perrault's formal logic, we already go a step further. This is because in his logic, the derived module also gains a strategic position at the point where this iterative seriality expresses itself no longer in the forms of trees, but in the matrixial form of tables by means of which these median modules are derived. Interestingly enough, Leibniz had presented the table exactly as a generalized order (*ordonnance généralisée*) involving a multiplicity of serial orderings of co-existence that comes to be established within such matrices.[472] And it is this very relation that is expressed in the twofold notion of the method of *établissement* (as 'drawing up tables') itself.[473] In identifying the drawing up of tables as "one of the great problems of the scientific, political and economic technology of the eighteenth century,"[474] Foucault notes how it involves the production of a higher-order "grid [*espace*] of identities, similitudes, analogies," as a more general order according to which one is "accustomed to sort out [*distribuer*] … different things" (i.e. as species).[475] It is due to this selection of parameters based on which an order among things is established, that the logical coherence of this order no longer consists in the linkage of consequences of necessary concatenations, but in a synthetic "grouping and isolating, of analyzing, of adjusting and nesting concrete contents."[476] This way, the older generalizations produced by those "con-

469 It should be noted that usage—like the legal term *us et coûtumes* mentioned before—denominates first of all a customary practice, skill, or habit (Latin *usus*) and resulting rights of how something is used, and not so much 'utility, usefulness, purpose(fulness)' nor 'utilization, or (beneficial) consumption.' In this regard, Perrault's French notion of *usage* has to be read as 'usage' and not 'use.'

470 Allais, "Ordering the Orders," 65 (italics orig.).

471 Cf. Fichet, *Théorie architecturale*, 25.

472 See Serres, *Système de Leibniz*, 31.

473 Ibid., 133, 216ff, 399; see also Leibniz's letter to Burnett.

474 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 148.

475 Foucault, *Order of Things*, xix. Cf. *Les mots et les choses*, 11.

476 Ibid.

fused, useless or dangerous multitudes" of things connected by mere similarity were being reconfigured into "ordered multiplicities" based on a relation of difference and identity.[477]

As is known, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this reconfiguration was first attempted based on its innate disposition or 'character,' which Foucault has recognized as a step toward—if still miles apart from—a more evolutionary approach to characteristic traits.[478] It is in this development, as Fichet notes, that—from Perrault onwards—architectural theory progressively turned—through a series of further conceptual slippages and resulting de- and recouplings—into "a theory of order, which grounded a scientific aesthetics that, underpinned by the royal academic institutions, yielded a possibility for reproducing power" or power/knowledge to operate on the social.[479] As a scientific aesthetic, this view is not directly concerned with the perception of morphological features, but with a specific subjectivity that arises from the scientific view of these features. Especially from a mechanicist angle, this means that the promoted beauty is not one of the object itself, but lies in its internal workings and the economy that shapes it. In this thesis, rather than promoting a static notion of order into which elements have to be fitted, it emphasizes that (establishing) order is the result of (establishing) certain functionings. Ordering is itself a means of establishing and measuring functionings. As such, it is just a tool and instrument, not an end in itself.

The notion of *ordonnance* denominates the instrumental operation of establishing (relative) order, by distributively arranging or organizing differences (i.e. comparatively ordering the orders), and is thus recognized as a specific art (*technē*), and moreover a specifically architectural technique that, as Allais notes, "activates the productive power" of an analytic raster by which differences can be organized and plotted against another.[480] It is the disci-

477 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 148–9.

478 Here the problem becomes one of "linking the table of identities and differences to the series of successive events," as Foucault writes, which can be done in two ways: a 'preformationist' (non-evolutionary) way of thinking, that "consists of integrating the series of successions with the continuity of the beings and their distribution over the table" by arranging it [*disposer*] a-temporally according to "the requirements of a classifying grid." (Foucault, *Order of Things*, 164–65) By contrast, "a 'quasi-evolutionist,' and truly taxonomist, way … recognizes … historical changes in conditions cause the appearance of new forms, or how different environments determine the function of organs in which that function takes place; here, the exterior elements intervene only in so far as they occasion the emergence of a character. And that emergence, though it may be chronologically determined" (ibid., 167).

479 Fichet, *Théorie architecturale*, 9 (my trans.).

480 Allais, "Ordering the Orders," 66–7. On this point, she also discussed Péréz-Goméz's false critique that this was merely an "opportunistic attempt to scientize the art of building by creating a rigorous discipline in which 'creative tasks' occur as the literal application of

plined structure of the grid that was coupled back to grid-like structures such as the recently-multiplied matrix of rooms in the *corps de logis*, the cellular structure of which — like a table — became a condition for ordering multiplicities and establishing functional relations or hierarchies among heterogeneous elements.[481] We thus move beyond these contents being mere elementary functives within a propositional discursive system, as the method of drawing up tables or grid-structures comes to function as non-discursive system of enunciation, wherein 'comparison' and 'collocation' are much more connected through their non-discursive working. Here we enter the level of the functioning of structures themselves, as differentiating factors, and especially the functioning of specific structures or arrangements, and an operationalization of these specific functionings, including the ways they depend on larger ensembles. With his theory of order, Perrault greatly helped determine the characteristic workings of architectural structures in their variable internal orderings, highlighting their internal consistency as a system, and their functionings (and possible deployment) for larger social ensembles.

The Order of Residential Space, 1673–76

To the extent that Perrault seems to have grasped this non-discursive function of structures, it also helped him to recognize the characteristic workings of architecture in their dependence on specific socio-environmental ensembles, where they come to be deployed differently. This becomes more evident where Perrault connected the abovementioned extrinsic aspect of establishing order to a new rationale (as *logos*) for distribution (as *technē*) itself. Yet, instead of grounding the derivation of modules within ideal mathematical proportions (ratios), he established a more general rational measure for lay-

a 'theoretical position'" (Allais, "Ordering the Orders," 59, in reference to Péréz-Goméz's introduction to Perrault's *Ordonnance for the Five Kinds of Columns*, 1–41).

481 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 148–9: "In organizing 'cells,' 'places' and 'ranks,' the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical. It is spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; … It was a question of organizing the multiple, of providing oneself with an instrument to cover it and to master it; it was a question of imposing upon it an 'order.' … But the table does not have the same function in these different registers. In the order of the economy, it makes possible the measurement of quantities and the analysis of movements. In the form of taxonomy, it has the function of characterizing (and consequently reducing individual singularities) and constituting classes (and therefore of excluding considerations of number). But in the form of the disciplinary distribution, on the other hand, the table has the function of treating multiplicity itself, distributing it and deriving from it as many effects as possible. Whereas natural taxonomy is situated on the axis that links character and category, disciplinary tactics is situated on the axis that links the singular and the multiple. It allows both the characterization of the individual as individual and the ordering of a given multiplicity. It is the first condition for the control and use of an ensemble of distinct elements: the base for a micro-physics of what might be called a 'cellular' power."

outs in the dispositional requirements that the derived elements should —as mentioned above— have an order "according to their nature and usage [ordre qu'elles doivent avoir selon leur nature et leur usage]."[482] This connection of order to both nature (laws) and usage (i.e. not just utility but the custom of how something is used) is a subtle but quite substantial shift, comparable and in fact closely connected to his more prominent and oft-studied disputation of the traditionalists' mistake of confusing the "arbitrary" beauty of accustomed forms with a natural or "positive" beauty.[483] Based on this distinction, Perrault proclaimed that "the usage to which each thing is destined according to its nature, must be one of the principal grounds on which the building's beauty is founded [l'usage auquel chaque chose est destinée selon leur nature, doit ester une des principales raisons sur lesquelles la beauté de l'Edifice est fondée]."[484]

To better understand this grounding, or rather foregrounding of the according use of architecture, we have to pay attention to Perrault's more inclusive combination of the nature of things (i.e. intrinsic characteristics) with regard to their usage (i.e. extrinsic characteristics).[485] Thereby he brings together two classically antithetical terms: *physis* (nature) which, according to Aristotle, is dependent on art (*technē*), and which is opposed not to metaphysics but to *nomos* (unwritten social conventions). By grounding architecture in usage, these social conventions were understood nomologically, as a new *logos* (rational account) for this art (*technē*). Looking more closely at the

482 Perrault, *Dix livres*, 9–10 n2 (my trans.).

483 On Perrault's important distinction between positive and arbitrary beauty and the resistance it sparked in the Académie, see ch. 5 in Herrmann's *Theory of Claude Perrault*. For an introductory summary, see ch. 12 of Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*, esp. 134ff. An analysis of Perrault privileging of arbitrary beauty is analyzed by Picon, *Claude Perrault*, 145ff. For a discussion of its aesthetic implications, see Péréz-Gomez's introduction to the new translation of Perrault's *Ordonnance*, esp. 21–22, 32ff. The relation of this distinction to Pierre Nicole's *Traité de la vraie et fausse beauté dans les ouvrages d'esprit et particulièrement dans l'épigramme* (1689, orig. pub. in Latin as *Dissertatio de vera pulchritudine et adumbrate*, 1659; and re-pub. as *La vraie beauté et son fantôme et autres textes d'esthétique,* ed. Béatrice Guion (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1996) and Port-Royale logic, was first pointed out by historian of aesthetics Władysław Tatarkiewicz, "L'esthétique du grand siècle," *XVIIe siècle* 78 (1968), 21–39. Nicole was a friend of the Perrault family. For a related discussion, see esp. Rykwert, *First Moderns*, 23–53; and moreover Lily H. Chi, "An Arbitrary Authority: Claude Perrault and the Idea of *Charactère* in Germain Boffrand [and] Jacques-François Blondel," PhD diss., McGill Univ. (1997); here esp. 1–110; and Maarten Delbeke, "The Beauty of Architecture at the End of the Seventeenth Century," in *The Insistence of Art: Aesthetic Philosophy after early Modernity*, ed. Paul A. Kottman (New York: Fordham UP, 2017), 170–93.

484 Perrault, *Dix livres*, 204 note 2 (my trans.).

485 On the related distinction of natural and customary law in jurisprudence in regards to Perrault's notion of the arbitrary, see esp. Chi, "Arbitrary Authority," 30–58, esp. 41ff; and on the "Rule of Custom," see ibid., 30ff.

accordance in spaces designed 'according to destined or intended use' or constructed for a purpose, we note that it first of all implies an end-directedness that guides the selective modification of a thing's (as here some spaces') physical properties or characteristics. But this characteristic necessarily lacks a direct representation according to which it operates. This implies that purposive phenomena are characterized by an "intrinsic incompleteness."[486] It is this incompleteness that we see being compensated for in the conjunction or coupling coordinating two different substances — a general kind of space (genus) becoming linked with an extrinsic and operative difference (differentiate) — from which the functional specificity of spaces like the *salle à manger* emerges. This conjunction or emergent coupling leads to functional differentiation in the form of both speciation and specialization.

It should be noted, however, that Perrault's approach is not readily reducible to a sort of proto-functionalism or utilitarianism. Far from this, it initially complicated everything by folding use on itself, thus repositioning established "uses of use" (to borrow a conception by Sara Ahmed). Because in raising the problem of different uses of space within planning, by critically asking "what is the use of planning,"[487] a new use value of *ordonnance* in architecture was outlined. Here, in challenging established mores and customs, and practices and conventions concerning the orders, Perrault initiated a tangible transvaluation of established values: not only did he recognize architectural arrangements as a device for controlling physical phenomena, but by doing so, he also recognized architecture as an instrument for social production, especially from the angle of contemporary mechanistic conceptions of society and its physiology. It is probably because Perrault approaches usage (*nomos*) as a *physicien*, that it is recognized in its technical dimension, based on which he builds a nomological theory of architecture.

In this regard, distributive practice was attaining a new level of complexity. We have seen above that Le Muet had started to connect distribution quantitatively to *ordinatio* as the "modica membrorum … comparatio" in the layout of buildings, in which distribution was connected to a specific design technique for planning. From the mid-1670s–90s, we see a problematization of the general disposition of distribution (layout) attaining a more technological dimension, where layout planning is incrementally reframed in socio-cultural terms as the "rerum apta collocatio" engendered by this art.[488] In addressing

486 See Terrence Deacon, *Incomplete Nature: How Mind emerged from Matter* (New York/London: Norton & Comp., 2012), 25ff

487 See Sara Ahmed, *What's the Use? On the Uses of Use* (Durham/London: Duke UP, 2019).

488 Vitruvius, *De architectura* 1.2.2

the aptness of the technique of distributing things, apartments and their organization soon began to be reified as the concrete *object* of the art of distribution. It is in this sense that Perrault's concern should perhaps not be reconsidered solely as an attempt to place architecture in the framework of the new scientific mentality or aesthetic, as Péréz-Goméz and Fichet have proposed, but rather in that of a technical mentality in which spatial distribution and architectural arrangements began to be conceived in an already proto-dispositivistic way as a socio-technical setup or apparatus. One crucial conceptual slippage allowing this to happen occurred with the progressive convergence of the notion of disposition and distribution, which scholars have observed happening throughout seventeenth century discourse.[489] In this convergence, we find a necessary condition of emergence for the following discourses on architectural *caractère* [→ 3.3] and typological thinking emerging throughout the eighteenth century. The essential(izing) role and function of the academic treatises that followed in the subsequent decades, was then to first determine which characteristics of architectural elements could form the basis of any such classification or distribution. As we shall see, while the determination of these characteristics was informed by a renewed understanding of the internal working and coherence of various bodies and machines,[490] it also fostered novel conceptions of how architectural arrangements could be tooled for various ends.

As I want to argue here, this conjunction also presents the process in which the appartement was instituted as a discursive subject in the first place. Equipped with an understanding of Perrault's theory of ordering, we are in a position to go back to the function that the notion of apartments came to have in this emerging theory. Interestingly enough, precisely this happens in Perrault's retroactive insertion of the term 'apartments' into Vitruvius's work. At first sight, his discussion of residential spaces may appear to lack the revolutionary appeal of his footnotes, as it strictly sticks with the inherited sociology and tripartite spatial system of the Greek house. ☒[58] As Vitruvius described, it consisted of three kinds of spaces: the men's quarters (*andrōnitis*; trans. as *appartemen[t]s des hommes*), women's quarters (*gynaikōnitis*; trans. as *appartemen[t]s des femmes*), and guest quarters (*hospitalia*; trans. as *appar-*

489 Jachmann points out how for later Jean-Baptiste Alexandre Le Blond, for instance, disposition would concern solely the arrangement of the built volumes, while it for Briseux, consists in the arrangement of rooms, where *commodité* consists in the disposition of the rooms.

490 Adapted from Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 77, see also ch. 5 of id., *Order of Things*, 128–45.

temen[t]s des survenants).[491] This definition was also given in Félibien's outline of the *Principes de l'architecture* (1676), one of the first architectural treatises to have added a separate dictionary that filled almost half of the 800-page book, defining architecture's technical terminology. ☒[59] Apparently following Perrault, in the *Principes* an appartement was briefly defined as a "lodging or particular dwelling [*demeure particulière*] in a house," specifically with reference to the Greek spaces.[492] In reading Perrault's *Abrégé*, we feel an alternative rationale emerging, where he, implicitly referring back to his overall position that order of architectural elements ought to be established according to nature and usage, specifies these "sortes d'appartemen[t]s" in dispositional terms of the "different usages of the parts that make up buildings"[493] —as spaces modulated by their different functionings.

For reasons that I will elaborate later [→ 3.3.2], it is important not to reduce this modular differentiation of sorts directly to a question of 'types' of spaces, because the notion of types would introduce an unproductive anachronism that obscures that these sorts are not yet situated on the same level of generality. Morever, Perrault's distinction implies an unmentioned fourth category—the symptomatically absent general order of the owners' rooms[494] —according to which the terms are still nested (as in Barbaro's general thinking that Perrault was apparently agreeing with more than he admits) into a genera/species dichotomy that can be represented diagrammatically ☒[60]. In the old conception of order, the *differentiæ* distinguishing these parts of the dwelling is traditionally the 'nature' ascribed to them, the mores, customs, and morality according to which they are internally differentiated into two spaces different in kind (the genera of the owners' rooms and the guest quarters), and species.

A quite different conception arises with Perrault's discussion of the disposition of houses according to the different social standing of people, in Vitruvius Book 6, Chapter 5, entitled: "Des diffèrentes parties qui sont dans les Logemens sèlon qu'ils sont Communs ou Particuliers, et qu'ils conviennent à des personnes de différentes conditions [On the different parts that are found

491 See Book VI, ch. 10 in Perrault, *Dix Livres*, 210ff.

492 André Félibien, *Des Principes de l'architecture … avec un dictionnaire des termes …* (Paris: J.-B. Coignard, 1676), 472. Orig.: "Appartement, veut dire logement ou demeure particuliere dans un maison."

493 Perrault, *Dix livres*, see also 205; *Abrégé*, 92. Orig.: "differens usages des parties qui compose les bastimens."

494 I am not able to develop this point here, but it seems to evidence to what degree ownership and property possession is still 'inbuilt' into this system of distinction; it is not yet a simple attribute, as the notion of propriety/property still has to come to be articulated as two different factors.



EXPLICATION DE LA PLANCHE LVI.

Cette Planche eſt le Plan des maiſons des Grecs. A, eſt le paſſage apellé Thyrorion. *B, ſont les Ecuries. C, eſt la loge du Portier. DDD, ſont les trois Portiques du Periſtyle. E, eſt le lieu apellé* Proſtas. *F F, ſont les grandes Salles où les meres de famille filoient avec leurs ſervantes. G H, ſont les chambres de parade apellées* Thalamus *&* Antithalamus. *I I, ſont les chambres de ſervice. KK, ſont les garderobes. L L, ſont les ſalles à manger. M M M, ſont les beaux Veſtibules pour les appartemens des hommes. N N, ſont les portes particulieres aux appartemens des hommes. O O, ſont les ſalles apellées Cyzicenes. P, eſt le cabinet de Tableaux. Q Q, ſont les Bibliotheques. RR, ſont les cabinets de converſation. S S, ſont de grandes ſalles à manger. T Y, ſont les paſſages apellés Meſaules. V V V, ſont les appartemens des ſurvenans. X X, eſt le Portique Rhodien. Z Z Z, ſont les trois autres Portiques des appartemens des hommes.*

58 **Pages from Perrault's *Les Dix Livres de Virtuve* (1673).**

de grand appareil, pour dire bien épaiſſe. On dit *mettre des pierres d'un meſme appareil*, c'eſt-à-dire de meſme hauteur; *Une pierre appareillée*, c'eſt une pierre tracée, ſelon les meſures qu'on en a données pour la joindre avec d'autres, ſuivant un deſſein arreſté.

APPAREILLEUR, eſt celuy qui a ſoin de tracer les pierres & les marquer, avant que les Tailleurs y travaillent.

APPARTEMENT, veut dire logement ou demeure particuliere dans une maiſon. Les Grecs nommoient *Andrones* les appartemens des hommes, & *Gynecoonitis* les appartemens des femmes. Vitr. l. 6. c. 10.

APOPHYGE en grec veut dire fuite; c'eſt l'endroit où la colonne ſort de ſa baſe, & commence à monter & eſchaper en haut, à cauſe de quoy les ouvriers appellent cet endroit *Eſcape*, *Congé*. Vitruve ſe ſert auſſi quelquefois du mot *apotheſis*. Alberti appelle *nectrum*, le quarré ou filet, dont la fuite ou retraite ſe fait vers le nud de la colonne. Il dit que ce mot ſignifie une bandelette dont on lie les cheveux. *V. Eſcape.*

APPLANIR un chemin ou une allée, c'eſt la mettre entierement de niveau, ou ſuivant ſa pente.

APPLANIR une piece de bois, c'eſt la rendre unie dans ſa ſuperficie.

APPREST, parmy les Vitriers & ceux qui peignent ſur le verre, *ſçavoir l'appreſt* des couleurs, c'eſt ſçavoir colorer ſur le verre. *V. page 246.*

APPRESTEUR, c'eſt un Peintre qui peint ſur le verre.

APPROCHER

59 ***Appartement***: Page from Félibien's ***Principes de l'architecture*** (1676) with the entries on apartments.

60 Diagram illustrating the dichotomous technological order underlying Perrault and Félibien's conception of the different sorts of apartments in the Greek House



in the Lodgings, whether they be Common or Particular, and that they are suitable for people of different conditions]."[495] Here, the order of "common" and "particular" spaces (the latter being reserved for the owners and distinguished guests), in fact produces a further level of generality that must be added to the above dichotomy. With this nested notion of residential space, Perrault's passage seems to try to translate a planning notion that is expressed in the original Latin header given to this section as "quibus rationibus privatis aedificiis propria loca patribus familiarum et quemadmodum communia cum extraneis aedificari debeant."[496] Having proven rather difficult to translate, what this header had problematized was precisely not the social function of different spaces or parts of a building, but the spatial workings behind the qualitative differentiation of the house with respect to social standing, and how it ought to be employed. He intended, it seems, to reconceptualize or repose the problem of through what logic or modality (*quibus rationibus*/*quemadmodum*) of structures produce such arbitrary orderings. While the translation does indeed evoke the notion that different spatial means should be established according to established social orders, the entire passage targets the way in which social and spatial structures are co-constitutive, underscoring what the Latin header captures quite concisely. For in its ablative mode, 'rationibus' addresses a deeper design

495 See Book VI, ch. 8 in Perrault, in *Dix Livres*, 208ff (my trans.).
496 As problematized in chapter 1.2.1, note 117.

problem concerning not just the (immaterial) reasons or rationales behind this differentiation according to social standing, but by what (spatial, i.e material) means (social) standing can be established; hence stressing the instrumental function of spatial relations and architecture in this process.

Although it is not articulated as a straight-forwardly expressed idea, with this translation, distribution came to be tentatively identified as an instrumental tool (and cultural technology) for drawing differences in terms of social standing or power: power thus arises from a specific (but arbitrary) cultural use of spatial layouts, and how the spatial differentiations produced by them come to be instrumentalized for social production processes. This is not the simple symbolization of order and representation of differences in status through the application of established orders as usually promoted by the Ancients like Blondel. What allows for constituting differences or order are functionings established by culturally-specific arbitrary structures.

That this functionalization (or operationalization of use) strongly feeds into and tightens the contemporaneous convergence between the consolidating elitist rationality, evolving hierarchies within absolutist power, and new forms of classification, does not need much further explanation. What does, is that the organizational logic of apartments as a system of discrimination itself also evolves and begins to operate within this convergence. This happens where Perrault's ascription of this instrumentality to the effect, also enables —through the reconfigurative space opened by such conceptual slippages— a specific overcoding. By translating the problematizing notion 'quibus rationibus' (with its built-in instrumentality) with 'appartement,' as Perrault implicitly does for the first time, this instrumentality is directly transposed from the general procedure of laying out buildings (that is, those ordering practices working by means of compartition/distribution), to become confused with its resulting effect: the specific distribution configuring the architecture of appartements.

In Perrault's case this inscription is no simple generalization, but tied to a specific argument. Symptomatically then, in the *Abrége*, Vitruvius's discussion is condensed into a general comment on the "Distribution des Appartemens des Anciens" that can be read as a somewhat proto-evolutionary (at least cladogenetic) and culture-relativistic reflection on two different instrumentalizations of use of architectural structures as a sociogenetic cultural technology.[497] The notion of the technical use of architectural structures thus

497 See Partie II, ch. II, art. 4, in Perrault, *Abrégé*, 198.

comes to be operationalized in itself, as an operative theoretical concept.[498] This distinction does not so much highlight the technical aspect of distribution itself, as the technological rationale of this technique being put to work. This subtle shift may be better apprehended with recourse to Simondon, who theorized how technical objects emerge whenever objects come to be used by users in specific functions. In this process, functionings are established through the integration of activities of users (like distribution or sorting) into what he calls a **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLE**. These always emerge through a seemingly contradictory movement, Simondon tells us, which establishes at the same time a characteristic specialization (or functional differentiation of technical objects becoming tooled for specific purposes), as much as it establishes a generalization (an integration of technical objects and their operations into the wider workings of a system).[499] Integration, we note, is by no means the inverse of differentiation, but according to Deleuze forms an original process of differenciation (with a 'c'); an evolutionary history of forking paths along which particular differentiations, and the assemblages within which they take form, unfold.

Specifically connected to the formation of disciplinary dispositifs, at the end of the seventeenth century this wider integration of activities of users seems to have been a response (because, as Foucault saw, new dispositifs always form in response to an urgent need), not directly to the changing climatic/environmental conditions to which the doubling of the *corps de logis* was the solution, but connected to the related irreversible upsetting of the inherited planning logic and the resulting decoding of lived and conceived space. With the rising prominence of Cartesian conceptions of space, the different kinds of lived space denominated by terms like *salles*, *chambres*, and so on had been decoupled from its built-in functional meanings. The generic notion of 'spaces' (*espaces)* turns into a more abstract, geometric container space determined by what takes place within it. As such, there seems to have occurred an urgent demand for re-inscribing or re-encoding functionality within space or into spaces. Hence, this integration of activities is actually a re-integration; a reconfiguration recoupling spatial conceptions, architectural arrangements, and their functions.

498 Picon noted that Perrault's notion of ordering led to "the demise of classical theory," leading instead to "the emergence of an independent technological discourse" (Picon, *Architects and Engineers*, 5); this technological discourse is however not restricted to the formation of engineers, and the foundation of the École royale des ponts et chaussées (est. 1747), or the École Polytechnique (est. 1794). I am expanding this observation here.

499 See Gilbert Simondon, *On the Mode of Existence of Technical Objects*, trans. Cécile Malaspina and John Rogove (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2017), 25ff, 63ff, 157, and 223ff.

Concerning this operative dimension, Perrault's modernizing "scientific aesthetic" of spatial structure is not reducible to the formation of a functionalist theory of beauty; rather it must be understood as a vision of a mechanistic inflection (and precursor of a machinic vision) pertaining to the idea of distribution as a specific **TECHNICAL OBJECT**. Reified in the architecture of appartements, the technical object of compartition/distribution and the technicity of how layouts work as a means to organize, control, or modulate socio-environmental phenomena, come to be coupled under the overall aim of achieving a fitness for use (*commodité*) with which ordering practices are carried out. In this reading, Perrault still conceptually distinguished distribution from their position ("scituation," "exposition," and "disposition des bastimens") that, as discussed before, determines the *commodité*—which with the *Abrégé,* explicitly means a measure of usability (*utilitas*)[500]—of a building itself.[501] There may be one proper way of disposition to achieve *utilitas* in general. Yet, the possible differentiation in exactly what way (*quemadmodum*) different spatial organizations accommodate different functions raises the need to understand how such functionings or utilities are established through (*cum*-) the specific spatialized modes of usage; as modal distinctions within nested spatial ordering.

This means that, just like apartments cannot be reduced to a simple separation of functions, the establishment of *commodité* central to ordering processes cannot be reduced to any apportioning, simple sub-division, or chunking-up of space to any small measure (*modicum*) of absolute value. Instead of breaking down (=analysis), it has to generate or produce (=synthesis) a specific system of relations; a specific mode of establishing relative units (*modulus*). These, more than being simple derivatives, are functional components that operate within a wider system of functions, and it is this establishment of functional relations that determines the particular dispositions or tendencies of specifically-ordered systems, which in turn 'suit' different ends. *Commodité* must thus be understood as an effect arising from the task of resolving contradictory demands within a fitting room arrangement. In this operative dimension, *commodité,* having presented a quantitative concept, comes to be understood qualitatively[502] as 'suitability' in terms of a *degree* of perfectibility. This gradual system establishes differences as relative or modal relations (or to use Perrault's preferred notion: proportion, mea-

500 While the *Dix livres* used '*utilité*,' in the *Abrégé*, the Vitruvian paradigm of *utilitas* was explicitly rendered as '*commodité*' (ibid., 35–36).

501 Ch. III, art. I–III, in Ibid., 88–102.

502 On this point, cf. Köhler, *Paris und das Stadthaus*, 104.

sured in degree or intensity, determining a quantity of quality) over established differences in kind (qualitative differences). This explains why, for Perrault, proportionality is of 'a different kind' than order, disposition and distribution[503]: it is those proliferating proportional distinctions (as *differentiæ*), that, as we shall see, catalyze the further apportioning of the space of appartements (as differenciated species) perceived and conceived according to their differing degrees in scale and intensity of function.

It is exactly due to this twofold **DIFFERENT/CIATION** process that the emergence of appartements as a residential system cannot be reduced to a functional differentiation of space without accounting at the same time for the specific integration of their functionings in a larger ensemble. This larger ensemble, and the ensemble of thought of this technological thinking, is the mutually self-distinguishing social logic of contemporary rationalism, based on which the re-encoding of spatial function in terms of *commodité* comes to inscribe itself onto the notion of distribution. This allows us to understand how Perrault defines distribution, albeit in Vitruvian terms, under a much more operative, layout-related sense: "Distribution, in terms of architecture, is the moderated division and fitting dispensation [i.e. *commoda dispensatio*, in Vitruvius] of the spaces that make up a building; as well as a reasonable spending of means in what the Greeks call *oikonomia*."[504] Here the notion of dispensation or spending, which Perrault also employs where he translates distribution as that which "consists in having regard to the use [*usage*] the building is destined to have, the money one wishes to spend,"[505] is illuminating with respect to Elias's aforementioned observation of the way social status consumption was tied to spending, especially if we understand with Deleuze how consumption is precisely the process that eventually brings about new subjects and subjectivities.[506] It highlights the subtle distinction that distribution does not deal with a sort of economically-optimized plan (in the sense of saving space and money), but a 'reasonably' organized layout optimized according to the arbitrary modalities of elitist rationality. As such, the building is drawn upon an arbitrary model that employs architecture's general capacity

503 Perrault, *Dix livres*, 9 n1.

504 Orig.: "Distribution, en termes d'Architecture, est un division, [et] commode dispensation des lieux qui composent un bastiment; [et] aussi une dépense raisonnable dans ce que l'on fait, que les Grecs nomment οἰκονομία" (ibid., 561). In this economic sense, it is still more demarcated from the notion of disposition, which Félibien — under direct reference to Vitruvius defines as "une convenable situation de toutes choses, [et] un certain arrangement qui … regarde [la qualité] des parties de l'ouvrage," while the idea of it "consiste dans le plan, dans l'élévation, [et], dans le profil" (ibid.).

505 Perrault, *Dix livres*, 14.

506 See my discussion of the **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** in chaptear 0.2.1, page 144.

for channeling/controlling affective flows to certain ends in a special manner. It is the instrumentalization of this 'special case'-type of organizing residential space, through which this group sets itself apart. Let me elaborate on that.

The emerging ideas about distribution as a technique for rendering residential space more fitting (i.e. *commodité* as a quality measured in terms of the suitability of architectural arrangements and its internal organization according to certain uses) marks a point of transgression at which a new assemblage began to lift off. At this time, a wider disciplinary discourse of the art of distribution arose, within which the architecture of appartements would be codified as a socio-spatial construct and thereby concretize as a technical ensemble.

The Beginning Systematization of Appartements in D'Aviler's *Cours* (1691)

Rebooting the entire formation process of the evolving residential system, this series of further conceptual slippages, recompositions, and axiomatizations in the first half of the eighteenth century presents the **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** in the formation of the residential system of appartements. In it, the discursive subject of appartements emerged more clearly, at the same time that it became a more concrete **TECHNICAL OBJECT** of a larger technical ensemble (*la distribution*) shaped by the emerging form of power/knowledge. This conjunction was furthered with the *Cours d'architecture* (1691) ✉[61] by architect Augustin-Charles d'Aviler (1653–1701).[507] Following François Blondel's *Cours* (1675–98), the first didactic conception of architectural knowledge, D'Aviler's work "was the most important manifesto of academic doctrine," Dennis writes, in combining Perrault's rational system with Blondel's giving precedence to classical architecture.[508] It included the first comprehensive codification of the state of the art concerning the art of distribution, in illustrating the guiding rules for domestic architecture. Carried out on behalf of the Académie, the *Cours* had a second volume that, for the first time, included a systematic glossary explaining the technical terms pertaining to the field of

507 Charles-Augustin D'Aviler *Cours d'architecture qui comprend les ordres de Vignole … avec un ample explication par ordre Alphabetique de tous les Termes* (Paris: Langlois, 1691), published in two volumes with consecutive page numbers; avail. online at http://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-90. The book is based on a commented translation of Vignola's *Regola delli cinque Ordine*, as carried out by request of the Academie (Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 151; for a longer discussion see here 151–91).

508 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 7, and 105. For the latter and following point, see also Sam Jacoby, "The Reasoning of Architecture," PhD. diss., TU Berlin (2013); esp. 33–43, here 37; and moreover Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 30.

architecture.[509] This *Explication des termes d'architecture*, covering four thousand terms on five hundred pages, was posthumously amended by Alexandre Le Blond (1710), and later re-published as a separate *Dictionnaire d'architecture* (1755).[510] ☒62–3

In contrast to Félibien's definition, D'Aviler's terminological explication defines an appartement as "a suite of rooms necessary to render complete a habitation, which ought to be composed of, at least one *antichambre*, a *chambre*, a *cabinet*, and a *garde-robe,*" thus listing its constitutive elements —possibly under the direct influence of his earlier translation of Scamozzi's work and the intermediary term *appartamenti di stanze* used there.[511] D'Aviler directly adds that these come in two varieties, as "there are large and small ones."[512] Interestingly enough, while D'Aviler's dictionary stopped giving the etymology of all terms and sorting them by family—such as the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie françoise* (1694), compiled at the same time, still did[513]—it nonetheless included the etymology of the term 'appartement.' It is in this instance that we find that operative etymological statement—discussed in the beginning of my Part I, but which can now be better reviewed in the milieu of the evolving art of distribution—according to which the term 'appartement' derives from the Latin verb *partiri*, and is said to carry a specific instrumental sense of 'division' (*diviser).* But as an instrumental process, it also addressed a

509 See also Jean-François Cabestan's summary description of D'Aviler's *Cours* at http://architectura.cesr.univ-tours.fr/traite/Notice/ENSBA_LES223.asp?param=en.

510 For the 1710 edition, see Charles-Augustin D'Aviler, ed. Jean-Baptiste Alexandre Le Blond, *Cours d'architecture qui comprend les ordres de Vignole* (Paris: Mariette, 1710) and *Explication des termes d'architecture* (Paris: Mariette, 1710). The latter was separately re-published in an improved edition as Augustin-Charles d'Aviler, *Dictionnaire d'architecture civile et hydraulique et des arts qui en dépendent … nouvelle édition* (Paris: Charles-Antoine Jombert, 1755).

511 Vincenzo Scamozzi, *L'idea dell architettura universale… in [10] libri*, 2 vols (Venice: s.n., 1615), the sixth book of which was translated by Aviler as *Les Cinq ordres d'architecture …* (Paris: Coignard, 1685). Cf. *Scamozzi*, II: 50; and the missing notion in the respective passage in D'Aviler, *Cinq Ordres*, 42.

512 Orig.: "**APARTEMENT**; c'est: une suite de pieces necessaires pour rendre une habitation complet, qui doit être composée au moins d'une Anti-chambre, d'une Chambre, d'un Cabinet [et] d'une Garde-robe. Il y en a de grands [et] de petits. Ce mot vient du Latin Partimentum, fait du Verbe *Partiri*, diviser, ou bien *à parte mansionis*, parce qu'il fait partie de la demeure" (D'Aviler, *Cours d'architecture,* II: 375). For the updated version of 1755, see below, Part 3.3.2. In Roland Fréart de Chambray's translation of Palladio (1650), we find the formula "Appartemens, que nous pouvons appeller des anti-chambres, des chambres, [et] des garde-robes." Fréart de Chambray, *Les quatre livres de l'architecture d'André Palladio…* (Paris: Martin, 1650), 111. In the third part, Book III, ch. VIII, of his *Cours* (1683), Blondel had only used the equation "appartemens comme des Sales, des Chambres, des Anti-chambres, des Cabinets [et] des autres," in passing. See Blondel, *Cours d'architecture … seconde et troisieme partie* (Paris: Langlois, 1683), 266. Also repeated in Bullet's *Architecture Practique* (Paris: Michallet, 1691), 260.

513 See Cabestan's entry on D'Aviler's *Cours* at http://architectura.cesr.univ-tours.fr/traite/Notice/ENSBA_LES223.asp?param=en.

61 The second volume of D'Aviler's *Cours d'Architecture* (1691), with its appended extensive glossary explaining technical terms.



EXPLICATION
DES TERMES
D'ARCHITECTURE,
QUI COMPREND
L'ARCHITECTURE, LES MATHEMATIQUES, le Geometrie, la Mécanique, l'Hydraulique, le Deſſin, la Peinture, la Sculpture, les Meſures, les Inſtrumens, la Coûtume, &c.
LA MAÇONNERIE, LA COUPE, ET l'APAREIL des Pierres, la Charpenterie, la Couverture, la Menuiſerie, la Serrurerie, la Vitrerie, la Plomberie, le Pavé, la Foüille des Terres, le Jardinage, &c.
LA DISTRIBUTION, LA DECORATION, la Matiere & la Conſtruction des Edifices & leurs défauts.
LES BASTIMENS, ANTIQUES, SACREZ, PROFANES, champeſtres, de Marine, aquatiques, publics & particuliers.
Enſemble les Etimologies, & les Noms latins des Termes, avec des Exemples & des Preceptes: le tout par raport à
L'ART DE BATIR;
Nouvelle Edition revûë & beaucoup augmentée.
Suite du Cours d'Architecture,
Par le Sieur A. C. DAVILER Architecte.
A PARIS,
Chez JEAN MARIETTE, ruë ſaint Jacques, aux Colonnes d'Hercules, & à la Victoire.
M. DCC. X.
AVEC PRIVILEGE DU ROY.

difficulty that was not present in the way the *Dictionnaire de l'Académie* defined 'appartement' simply as a "lodging composed of several rooms, a series of rooms in a building."[514] Here the seriality encoded within their spatiality, the longstanding generative feature of the specifically French organization of residential space, becomes more explicitly coded as a generic feature (or quality). In D'Aviler's dictionary, too, a related displacement takes place where the apartment, as a suite of rooms, now becomes a more general or 'higher-order' concept according to which space could be organized in different ways.

One of D'Aviler's most crucial contributions concerns his codification of two functionally-different or modally-distinct varieties of suites, which the dictionary entry distinguished for the first time in architectural discourse: the *appartement de parade* or *appartement de cérémonie* that "contains the grand rooms of the principal floor," from the smaller *appartement de commodité* that "is of a more average size yet the most inhabited,"[515] thus re-qualify-

514 Orig.: "Logement composé de plusieurs chambres, de plusieurs pièces de suite dans une maison." Within the entry "Part," in Anon., *Le dictionnaire de l'Académie françoise dedié au Roy* (Paris: Coignard, 1694) Vol. 2: 186:

515 Orig.: "**APARTEMENT DE PARADE**; celui qui comprend les grands pieces du bel Etage d'un

que uſage, comme les Temples des Payens dont on a fait des Egliſes, que des fragmens de ceux qui ont été ruinez par le temps ou par les Barbares, comme à Rome les reſtes du Palais *Major* ſur le Mont Palatin. Ces *Antiquitez* ruinées s'appellent en Latin, *Rudera*, à cauſe de leur difformité qui les rend méconnoiſſables à ceux qui en ont lû la deſcription dans les Auteurs, ou qui en ont vû les figures. *p.* 32. & 308.

ANTI-SALLE. Grande Salle qui en précede une autre pour les Ceremonies, comme on en voit dans les Bâtimens conſiderables, & principalement en Italie.

APAREIL; c'eſt l'Art de tracer les pierres, & de les bien placer & poſer: ainſi on dit qu'*un Bâtiment eſt d'un bel Apareil*, quand il eſt conſtruit avec le ſoin & la propreté que cet Art demande, comme le Portail du Louvre. *p.* 337.

APAREIL; c'eſt auſſi-bien la hauteur d'une pierre tirée de la Carriere, que d'une nette & taillée, puiſqu'on taille dans les Carrieres des pierres du haut apareil, & d'autres du bas apareil, c'eſt à dire, d'une plus grande ou d'une moindre hauteur. Toutes les pierres d'un même lit doivent eſtre d'un même apareil. Le Liais eſt une pierre *de bas Apareil*, & la pierre de S. Cloud *de haut Apareil*. *p.* 202. &c.

APAREILLEUR. Principal Ouvrier d'un Attelier, qui conduit les pieces de Trait, & trace les pierres ſur le Chantier. *p.* 232. & 236.

APARTEMENT; c'eſt une ſuite de pieces neceſſaires pour rendre une habitation complette, qui doit eſtre compoſée au moins d'une Anti-chambre, d'une Chambre, d'un Cabinet & d'une Garderobe. Il y en a de grands & de petits. Ce mot vient du Latin *Partimentum*, fait du Verbe *Partiri* diviſer, ou bien *à parte manſionis*, parce qu'il fait partie de la demeure. *p.* 179. *Pl.* 61. & 62.

APARTEMENT DE PARADE, celuy qui comprend les grandes pieces du bel Etage d'un Logis. *p.* 180. *Pl.* 62.

APARTEMENT DE COMMODITE', celuy qui eſt de moyenne

62 Page from the second volume of D'Aviler's *Cours d'architecture* (1691), with the entries on appartements (*continued overleaf*)

grandeur & le plus habité. *ibidem.*

APARTEMENT D'ESTE', celuy qui eſt expoſé au Nord : & *Apartement d'Hyver*, celuy qui eſt expoſé au Midy. *Pl.* 72. *p.* 257.

APARTEMENT DE PLAIN PIED, s'entend des pieces d'un ou de deux Corps de logis, dont le Plancher eſt de niveau ſans reſſauts ni ſeüils au deſſus du carreau ou parquet. *p.* 180.

APARTEMENT DES BAINS ; c'eſt une ſuite de pieces ordinairement au rez-de-chauſſée, qui comprend les Salles, Chambres, Garderobes, Salles de Bain, & Etuves : le tout decoré & enrichi de marbre, de ſtuc, &c. de peinture avec des compartimens de pavé fort riches, comme au Château de Verſailles, & au Louvre à Paris dans le lieu appellé *les Bains de la Reine*. Il doit toûjours eſtre expoſé au midy. *p.* 352.

APENTIS, du Latin, *Appendix*, dépendance ; c'eſt un demi-comble en maniere d'Auvent, qui n'a qu'un égoût, comme on en voit qui ſervent de Remiſes dans les baſſe-cours. *p.* 223. & *Pl.* 73. *p.* 259.

APLANIR. *Voyez* REGALER.

APLOMB. Terme d'Ouvrier qui ſignifie Perpendiculaire ou Vertical. *En ſurplomb*, c'eſt n'eſtre pas *à plomb* & deverſer en dehors ou en dedans. *Plomber*, c'eſt verifier ce qui eſt *à plomb* : & *Contre-plomber*, c'eſt par une operation contraire s'aſſeurer de ce qu'on a plombé. *p.* v. & *Pl.* 68. *p.* 249.

APOPHYGE. *Voyez* CONGE'.

APOTICAIRERIE, du Grec *Apotheca*, Boutique ou Magazin ; c'eſt par raport à l'Architecture une Salle dans une Maiſon de Communauté, ou dans un Hôpital, où l'on tient en ordre & avec décoration les medicamens. Celle de Lorette en Italie, ornée de vaſes du deſſein de Raphaël, eſt une des plus belles. *p.* 353.

APUI, du Latin *Podium*, qui ſelon Vitruve ſignifie Baluſtrade ; c'eſt le petit mur qui eſt élevé entre les deux Pié-

ing the older, more implicit and scalar distinction between larger and smaller suites in explicitly functional terms, and in a way that nearly prefigures (I will come back to this) the binomial nomenclature of later taxonomic systems. To clarify its functional contradistinction from the ceremonial space of state apartments, existing scholarship has often resorted to discussing this latter suite of more commodious rooms with its difficult-to-translate designation as the owner's 'private apartments.' While in the 1750s the *appartement de commodité* would indeed be reconceptualized as an *appartement privé*, an all-too-quick retroactive application of the term at this stage obscures the central conception of these spaces as being specifically organized to accommodate two different modes of inhabitation related to the spatial requirements of daily life, vis-à-vis the representational apparatus required for receptions. As this conceptual precision turns out to be a crucial point to advance a reading of the differentiated system of appartements subsequently concretizing, I will need to intersperse another digressive comment in the hope of countering a longstanding categorically incorrect (or at least incorrectly stressed) line of differenciation, that scholars of residential space have drawn between the public gathering spaces of the reception rooms versus supposedly more private spaces for the isolation or retreat of individual inhabitants. In taking a lead from Elias's views, several French social historians and sociologically-inclined architecture historians and scholars, including Eleb and Debarre, have reconsidered these contemporaneous transformations as a result of a desire for privacy.[516] They have foregrounded that this search generated new ways of organization and planning through which the smaller *hôtels* and *maisons particuliers* also accommodated opportunities to retreat and possibilities of being alone, which had long been a rare privilege of the aristocracy.[517] As we saw in Part II, the 'quest for privacy' had started

logis; **APARTEMENT DE COMMODITÉ**, celui qui est de moyenne grandeur [et] le plus habité" (D'Aviler, *Cours d'architecture,* II: 375) In addition he enlists an "apartement des bains" containing "Salle, Chambres, Garde-robes, Salle de Bain, [et] Etuves" on the ground floor (ibid., 376).

516 The problem of privacy was the guiding analytical view in the canonical compilation by Aries, Duby, and Chartier, eds., *History of Private Life, Vol. III*, esp. part 2 with its history of mentality toward new "Form of Privatization," 161–396; and 4–7. Eleb and Debarre's work already situates the organization of privacy better in Foucauldian terms of a dispositif of power and counter-forces (Introduction to Eleb and Debarre, *L'architectures privée*, 6, and 10–12). Richard Etlin (see below) will further displace the public/private distinction, with his conception of the residence as a bipolar system of display and retreat. But thereby it neglects the socially-mediating function of the third apartments, soon coming to be codified (see below).

517 Until the seventeenth century, Eleb summarizes French urban dwellings were characterized by "the promiscuity of people, polyvalence of spaces, and imprecise room denominations"; see Eleb, "L'habitation entre vie privée et vie publique," 69.

with various forms of spatially facilitating the rulers to retreat from the permanent regime of visibility that the medieval model of monarchy required, and instead instituted and legitimized a new form of rule in which power relations were re-measured in terms of ranks of proximity and access.[518] While a notion of this diagrammatic reading is essential to understand the new form of power emerging from it, this emancipatory view is also crucial to explain how the differentiated system of appartements actually concretizes as a spatial dispositif and technical ensemble.

Yet, the analytic foregrounding of privacy is problematic for several reasons; one being the dualistic view that it fosters, and the **EXCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION** it draws between the above distinctions. First, the difference between the two suites cannot conceptually be reduced to some sort of spatial dialectic, be it public/private, collective/individual, display/retreat, or representation/intimacy. Instead these two **DIFFERENTLY-SCALED ASSEMBLAGES** are both formed by two gradual forms of sociability. They are principally differentiated by two different ways of receiving visitors, involving differing degrees of officiality[519] and degrees of intensity of mutually-enforced self-control. Thus connected to two regimes of visi(ta)bility, this intensive difference does not involve a direct difference in kind. Instead, from a monist perspective, it is built only on a **MODAL** distinction that is analytically more important to understand as a **DIFFERENTIATING FACTOR**. Because, first, akin to the early linear *logis*, the real distinction (and greater distinction regarding social standing) of differences in kind existed between the individual rooms within each suite of rooms. Second, this difference in kind is falsely predicated on the problematic notion of desire as involving some lack, here supposedly the lacking opportunities to retreat that are to be fulfilled by architecture. Deleuze and Guattari have most famously defended that desire never lacks anything, and desiring-production is never organized on the basis of a preexisting need; rather, it is a form of social engineering by deliberately creating needs whose internalization attains a (re)productive social function for a dominant class.[520] Social production thus derives from desiring produc-

518 See my Part 2.1 and 2.3.

519 On this point, see also Antoine Lilti, *Le monde des salons: Sociabilité et mondanité à Paris au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 2005), here 96–7; and Scott, *Rococo Interior.* Lilti critiques Elias, perhaps unjustified, for not properly distinguishing between the *appartement de société* and the *appartement de parade*, in foregrounding their shared social function; for Elias's respective distinctions, see his *Court Society*, 51–52.

520 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia,* Vol.I (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1983), 39–41. here they argue, this lack is always "created, planned, and organized in and through social production," which is "purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions." Cf. Fourquet and Murard, ed.,

tion.[521] Consequently, it ought be considered as a machinic production connected to other socio-technical systems.[522]

The ability to retreat is hence a technical extension of the mode of social production underlying the aristocratic sociology of self-distinction.[523] As we have seen before with Elias, this elite subjectivity was precisely generated by forms of self-distinction that expressed social status in terms of their own membership to a select group. This mode of social production distinguished the elite not only against the lower classes, but also the exact social positions within that select group. This group subjectivity, I have argued, is co-constituted by the differentiated spatial organization of the group, to the extent that architectural arrangements enable specific relational regimes, such as certain modes of isolation or select groupings. Here they act as transformative setups for subjectivation processes, and reconfigurations of established subjectivities to take form. The organization of the residence does not represent this select social group structure; rather, architectural and psycho-social structures co-emerge as mutually-constitutive compartmentalizing or selecting structures in a particular economy of desire, aimed at the control of flows.

Third, one result of drawing a false difference in kind here, is that the individuation process of appartements just becomes analytically subordinated to an arising notion of individuality, which is then taken as a principle of its individuation. In my preliminary discussion I have belabored this point, concerning the ways in which this approach insufficiently accounts[524] for the

Equippements de Pouvoir.

521 Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 46.

522 Ibid.

523 During the seventeenth century, this characteristic mode of social production of distancing oneself from others—initially enabled to take form within spatial setups wherein this distance was externalized and expressed—became increasingly internalized. It resulted in a new need and socio-spatial requirement for an emerging elite-subjectivity shaped by and grounded in a different desire to be able to withdraw and be by oneself ('*être chez soi*'). It is with this investment in the ability to retreat that a new subjectivity arises. Its resulting emancipatory power, was directly connected to the 'apprenticeship' entailed by this more independent, individual mode of living; and which consisted in the mastery to learn control the passions or what is happening ('*qu'est-ce qui se passe*'). This distinct desire, Deleuze and Guattari write, is then simply a "set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies" (ibid., 39) into the compartmentalized architecture of appartements.)

524 In spite of their explicit dispositivistic reading, Eleb and Debarre have stayed closer to Foucault's earlier analyses in which architecture is seen as a 'setting' for changing social practice, not a differentiating **SETUP** in the social production of space. I have repeatedly hinted at this methodological problematic, but it may be worthwhile repeating and expanding on it in a sidenote, here: In taking several crucial cues from Foucault work on dispositifs, the main effort of these studies lied in the valuable extension of social history from the standpoint of emancipatory everyday practices. Having greatly contributed

individuating effects of emerging dispositifs and technical ensembles from the point of view of genesis. In the aim of re-conceptualizing this individuating socio-technical system from a more genetic psychosocial angle — and thus rather as a COLLECTIVE EQUIPMENT — we ought to look at these socio-spatial transformations through the epistemological conditions for these changing subjects of knowledge to occur, as I have tried to do in the above. Without doing so, an analysis of these changes would struggle with the same methodological problem that Foucault's discourse-analyses were trying to overcome:

> to expanding our understanding of these transformations, these praxeological analyses inscribe themselves often more than less explicitly into the historiographical tradition of the 'history of mentalities,' as the subtitle of the second part "Evolution des mentalités et des sensibilités: Les effets sur la distribution" (in Eleb and Debarre, *L'architectures privée*, 58ff; and Part II, ibid., 167ff), clearly evidences. They thus remain closer to the history of (residential) ideas, than the history of (planning) thought proper to the emerging discipline of architecture (For the methodological differences between a history of changing mentalities as promoted by Ariès and Duby or a 'history of ideas' to a 'history of thought' and an analysis of epistemological transformation processes as promoted by Foucault; and a discussion of the theoretical consequences, I refer also back to the section "Understanding Foucault's Historiographic Problematique" in my preliminary discussion). Evidencing instead a far more Lefebvrian stance that social space is produced by social practices and relations, Eleb and Debarre's work considers the structure of dwellings thus as an 'object-figuration' (following here not Elias, but the work of art historian Pierre Francastel). As such an object figuration, they argue, residential space became itself a specific object of civilizing processes as well (ibid., 14–15). This is not wrong, but incomplete from a genetic point of view, since it does not account for processual reciprocity. Thus, their analysis of the emergence of private space succumbs — like Elias's own conception of architecture before — to a certain process reduction. Methodologically, it is thus the way how the problem is posed in terms of a desire for privacy, due to which these studies are predisposed to start from an already-constituted reified subject of knowledge, which ultimately prevents these studies from inquiring its emergence from a more genetic point of view, that would reconsider this process in terms of a new subjectivity co-evolving with (as both 'alongside' and 'by means of') yet reconfigured through these *transforming* spatial practices; as well as their reconfiguring function in the emerging dispositifs of civility and disciplinarity. So instead of looking further into the particular psychological aspects of this arising desire concerning contemporary forms of dwelling, the following sections hope to go a step further by looking at those spatial factors and planning practices, which facilitated and mediated the 'production of this desire,' in order to reconsider the psycho-social effects generated by architectural arrangements on forms of inhabitation in this co-evolving process. This proposition is not meant to undermine the relevance of studying residential practices. The focus on changing planning techniques only helps reconsider these changing spatial practices *technologically*. As a configuring setting they remain understood as an adaptation to space (dwelling/accommodation through residential ones) that is then — from a humanist point of view of representation — said to have some transformative effect on forms of planning in adapting spaces themselves. By considering them more as a *setup*, we approach them initially inversely in terms of an adaptation of space (facilitation through planning practices) that — in a more machinic point of view of production — gained a transformative effect on subjectivation processes and spatial/residential conceptions. Therefore, I have not and not going to use 'residential' practices (as perceptions) as an explanation, but contingently-changing spatial practices and changing conceptions thereof within planning practices (as conceptions), that are always material-discursive ones as they necessarily take for in and are mediated by architectural arrangements.

that is, studying transformations without really being able to explain why they occurred.[525]

So, for what reason did D'Aviler's *Explication* encode this differentiation into *appartements de parade* and *de commodité* under these specific terms? And how did the differentiation of *appartements de commodité* from the *appartement de parade* and their reciprocal coding help bring about a new type of assemblage enacted in the form of the discourse on the art of distribution? To answer this, we must move back again from the level of the visible surface effects of codings to the engineering level of de-/reterritorialization processes and material-discursive reconfigurings. Throughout the previous parts we have mapped the progressively rising awareness of the instrumentality of distribution for drawing distinctions. Distributive practices were initially based on implicit socio-spatial differentiations, but slowly this more subconscious practice rose to a level of technological consciousness. This transformation of planning practice into planning technics, rendered explicit and employed more consciously, called for a new technical awareness of the art of distribution, which was articulated within a related disciplinary discourse that outlined the rationale for the use of this technique. In this articulation, however, the socio-spatial differentiations underlying the art of distribution were incrementally consolidated into a particular dispositif, with institutionally-codified (= **OVERCODING**) planning conventions concerning propriety according to social standing (i.e. representation).

To follow this process, we should note that the rising awareness was fostered precisely by the difficulties in the production of *commodité* (= **RE-TERRITORIALIZATION**) as a spatial means and measure for the proper distribution and appropriate planning (i.e. production). As the site naming the very problem to which it responds, the *appartement de commodité* would prove a central concern of residential planning efforts toward the end of the seventeenth century, as it—facilitated by the *corps de logis double*—was to be planned on the same floor as the state apartment and in close proximity to it, while forming a distinct set of rooms that were possible to use relatively independently from it.[526] But far from being reducible to the provision of privacy, the architectural problematic expressed by the *appartement de commodité* resided in the complexity—already identified Vitruvius and trans-

525 Here the social-/psychological explanation via 'privacy' is indeed too simple and rather teleological. It implicitly assumes that the house-owners simply progressively ordered, or the architects simply arrived at more suitable solutions; instead than understanding these changes in terms of a problematic field of tensions that incrementally precipitated its own resolutions.

526 See here Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 69 and 96–97.

lated to a French milieu by Perrault—that designers struggle with constantly, namely, that establishing order involves a twofold task of **DIFFERENTIATION-INTEGRATION**, wherein differently-scaled sub-ensembles of rooms with their differentiated modalities of use need to be put together in such a way that they form independent components integrated into a larger functional ensemble (i.e '*commoditas separatim ac universeque*') that is not only formally resolved but also resolutely economic or efficient.

In this regard, the *appartement de commodité* presents a not only a differentiating factor in the genealogy of apartments, but at the same time a differentiating/integrating one. Embedded in the notion itself, this twofold task presented the major conceptual problem in its distribution, which had a crucial function in simultaneously facilitating two complementary yet independent modes of inhabitation. It had to, on the one hand, accommodate the resident's retreat from representative functions, social gatherings, and daily business, while on the other hand, connecting them to the domain of domestic life.[527] Having been formed, as we have seen [→ 3.1.3], from the extraction of the *chambre à coucher* from the rear range of rooms in the doubled-up *corps de logis*, and which had begun to form an increasingly independent parallel suite of rooms, the *appartement de commodité* had a differentiating as well as integrating function, as a spatial filter that selectively connected spaces. As such, not only did it have to be perfectly fitted into the layout of residential space, but thereby it also became a central concern within contemporary reflections on residential planning.

Reconfiguring Scalar Differences

Contrary to the linear or serial organizations of earlier ideas of distribution, this intercalation led to some notable conceptual difficulties with inherited planning conceptions. These can be felt where D'Aviler's dictionary juxtaposes the "distribution of the plan," which consists in "the division of rooms that compose the *Plan* of a building," as "what Vitruvius called *ordering,*" while dispositioning lies in the "arrangement of the rooms [*pièces*] in relation to the entire ensemble."[528] This somewhat clumsy attempt to disentangle these division/arrangement-techniques—the very instrument of the art of distribution—evidences how deeply upset French planning logic was over

527 Eleb, "L'habitation entre vie privée et vie publique," 70–73; Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 109.

528 See the "Explication des termes" in D'Aviler, *Cours d'architecture*, Vol. II, which defines "**DÉPARTEMENT;** ce mot signifioit autre-fois la distribution d'un Plan … " (ibid., 353). "**DISPOSITION**; c'est arangement des parties d'un Edifice par raport au tout ensemble" (ibid., 537); "**DISTRIBUTION DE PLAN**; c'est la division des pieces qui composent le Plan d'un Bastiment" (ibid.); for "**PLAN**," see ibid., 761.

the fact that the internal organization of rooms was no longer ruled by the linear organization of the *corps de logis simple*, and bears witness to the enormous reconceptualization effort it took to establish a new organizational logic. Concerning the new relation of the ordering and arrangement, D'Aviler situates a greater designerly difficulty in judging, "what relative proportion the parts [*parties*] of a building should have to one another, without finding therein some overall composition."[529] In this view, establishing order lies precisely in the task of 'outlining trees in a net' that I have spoken of above. The spatial matrix of the *corps de logis* and its distributive gridding [*quadrillage*] for localizing elements turns into to a form of triangulation that starts to co-ordinate differentiation processes. Here a more exclusive form of disjunction emerges [→ 2.3], not through the differentiations themselves, but between the ensemble of scalar differentiations and something that remains indifferent. This is the "entire composition,'" which concerns the proper decoupling of specific spatial segments within a multi-linear ensemble, set apart and made independent by employing a differentiating/integrating system of circulation, strategically integrated to form a whole, in which all parts come to have a designated functionality with regard to the whole.

It is on the matter of establishing order and function that the many definitions in the *Cours* are appended as an auxiliary tool for aiding this synthetic design process. As one more crucial auxiliary construct, didactically intended to illustrate the underlying problematic, it also presented an exemplary design for a *grand corps d'hôtel,* supposedly of D'Aviler's own invention ☒[62–3].[530] Projected for a site of 22.5×75 *toises* (i.e. 45×146 meters), the plan actually presents an enlarged version of the scheme presented by the Hôtels de Jars or Tambonneau. ☒[42–3↑] It was complemented and regularized (and thus 'idealized') by a symmetrical portion mirrored around the vestibule/gate axis, which accommodated a grander set of spaces befitting the requirements of aristocratic status consumption. Yet, more than being an ideal design, it was intended to offer a didactic illustration that demonstrates, at a glance, the major rules of architectural planning that the *Cours* hoped to instruct in the form of some general "precepts."[531] As described there, the two-story building over a semi-basement consists of a *corps de logis double*, with single-range side wings enclosing a nearly-square courtyard. The 'walk-through' descrip-

529 D'Aviler, "De La Distribution des Plans," in *Cours d'architecture*, I: 172–189; here 172 (my trans.).

530 For a discussion in connection to D'Aviler's codification of distribution, see also Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 151ff, esp. 156–66.

531 Ibid.

tion of this again more bipartitioned plan with two juxtaposed suites, starts from the main vestibule and the principal stairs, from which one enters the central of the five largest rooms located toward the garden; here, following examples from the 1660s, the central *salle* attains a certain hybrid position, as Jachmann writes, in on the one hand distinguishing two complete *grands appartemens* (marked C and D, but not further conceptually differentiated), while on the other hand connecting them in such a way that they could be merged through the *salle* into a larger sequence for special occasions.[532]

On the left side, the first *grand appartement* (C) consists of an *anti-chambre*, a *chambre de parade*, a *chambre à coucher* with alcove, a *garde-robe*, and a *cabinet* that could be accessed via a secondary vestibule. A *salle* à manger, connected to the vestibule, *antichambre*, and bedroom, serves as a second *antichambre* to the latter. On the right side, the *salle* gave access to a more complex sequence of rooms that had a more social function (D): an *anticabinet*, followed by a *grand cabinet*, a *chambre à coucher*, connected to a *garde-robe*, with an *antichambre* that was accessed via a secondary vestibule and accompanied by two smaller rooms, a *cabinet* and *chambre* with further mezzanine levels. This sequence thus contains the set of rooms that would soon be specified as the so-called *appartement de société*. But this notion is not yet employed here. Left functionally unspecified as a "more average apartment [*appartement plus moyenne*]," it is thus conceived in terms (pertaining to the older scalar distinction) of its intermediary scale. In the same way, we find an additional 'lesser apartment' (E) for guests or family members in the left side wing, which had the four rooms required "to be complete": *antichambre*, *chambre, cabinet* and *garde-robe*.

After the differentiation between left and right side, a secondary differentiation comes in vertically between ground floor and upper floor, the latter of which "determines the distribution of the entire site and determines [*règle*] the other floor [*plans*]."[533] Also called the *bel étage*, D'Aviler explains,

> [it] contains the ceremonial apartment and the parade rooms; in Italy it is the most richly furnished and the least inhabited [space], especially since the Maître of the house is always living upstairs to find rest; in France it is occupied by the ladies.[534]

532 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 112–3, n331. See also Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 183

533 D'Aviler, *Cours d'architecture*, I:176 (my trans.).

534 Ibid., I: 180.



62 Design for an exemplary *hôtel*, from D'Aviler's *Cours d'architecture* (1691). Note how the plan presents an enlarged and symmetrically-extended version of Mansart's original design for the Hôtel de Jars, whose conceptual traces become especially visible if we look at the structurally akin concatenation of antechambers and bedrooms (if shifted by the insertion of another *antichambre*), and the bedroom niche, *cabinet*, *garde-robe*.



(*continued*): Bel étage of D'Aviler's exemplary hôtel design, from the *Cours d'architecture* (1691), with a *grand appartement* with *galerie* on the right, a smaller appartement *de commodité pour Madame* in the left half of the principal *corps de logis*, and a minor appartement in the lateral wing opposite the *galerie*.



64 Diagram illustrating the conceptual dichochomic ordering of apartments within D'Aviler's exemplary *hôtel* design, from the *Cours d'architecture* (1691)

Based on these lines of distinction, the layout is thus slightly different: the ceremonial apartment lies on the right. It is accessed via the landing of the grand stair that centrally gives access to the *salle*, an *antichambre*, and *chambre de parade*, leading to a *chambre à coucher*, *cabinet* with connection to a *salon* and *galerie* in the right-hand side-wing. To the left of the *salle*, we see a more compact room matrix that is organized quite similarly to the appartement *pour le maître* on the ground floor. Aside from the *antichambre* and *chambre de parade* in prolongation with the principal enfilade, the remaining corner compartment forms an independently accessible "*petit appartement pour la commodité* [*de madame*]" (H4–10) that must be provided on the same level so as to mediate between the parade rooms—which are, in fact, not part of an *appartement de commodité*.[535]

Eventually, this 'exemplary' design, however, led to some confusion concerning the logical division of the various apartments,[536] for instance given that the same suite on the ground floor was called a *grand appartement,* as it included the master's parade bedroom; we can thus find a nested hierarchization similar to Perrault's discussion of the Greek house underlying this design.

535 Here also after Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnaus*, 165.

536 Note how the plate features a strange inconsistency in the alphanumeric labeling the apartments by letter, that is difficult to explain: Perhaps a mistake slipped in during the engraving/printing process, through which the principal *antichambres* and *chambres de parade* (G/H 1–3) seem mislabeled. But this 'mislabeling' may well have been intentional, precisely so as to differentiate that the two state bedrooms in the rear form no part of the '*petit appartement*' formed by the rooms H4–10.

64 But here the modal distinction between the *grand appartement* and the *appartement de commodité* constitutes an intermediary level, presenting two specific modes of use relative to the owner's space in general, and thus two generic modes that started to reconfigure and overcode the difference in kind previously drawn between the older gender-specific distinction of spaces. And, as Köhler notes, D'Aviler's project also included in its attic—albeit only shown in section—an array of even smaller accommodations for domestics, accessed by a central hallway.[537]

It is this more complex hierarchical relation that underlies this instructive plan, clearly accentuated by some of the choices that D'Aviler made in drawing it, be it the relative inferiority of the left-hand side (built along the wall of a bordering property) where the intermediary and smaller apartments are located, as compared to the right (connected to the street) with the state and society rooms, or the hierarchization of the two-range main wing and the single-range side-wings. As the simple and lower parts of the building, the latter also express this internal hierarchy on the outside; as does the differentiation in height between the floors. Given its didactic function as an example, these differentiations have an indicative and demonstrative purpose, due to which this plan cannot be said in any way to 'represent' a sort of idealized hierarchical social structure of the household. At least not in the simple structuralist sense that sees architectural plans as capturing, as Evans phrases it, "the nature of human relationships, since the elements whose trace it records … are employed first to divide and then selectively re-unite inhabited space" [538]); rather, what it articulated is the use of the twofold logic in how exactly those relations come to be selectively configured, as territorialized relations that then become expressive as soon as these spatial markers of distinctions are coded as pertaining to natural, that is, 'physical' differences. This coding is what happens here. What figures in D'Aviler's didactic distribution is the established, hierarchically nested social logic of estates and distinction that had long been implicit within residential planning, but which now incrementally became explicitly expressed as some code.

In this regard, D'Aviler's plan represents nothing but another step in which—with a rising technological awareness of built arrangements—distribution as an act of ordering was carried out in terms of the configuring logic of establishing a distinct social order by marking differences. It is the point where the generative logic of planning became operationally more

537 Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 166.
538 Evans, "Figures, Doors, Passages," in *Translations*, 54–91; here 56.

similar to the social logic generative of French court aristocracy itself. And this is thus exactly the point where planning also started to become more operative as an instrument for a distinctive form of social ordering. If Perrault had prepared the technical aspect of this becoming-instrumental of architecture, D'Aviler can be said to have tied this instrumentality to a new rationale, in a no longer nomological (or nomothetic) understanding, but instead employing an expressly physiological (or ideographic) model for using the architecture of appartements as a social technology. But this ideographic dimension is exactly why an analysis of a wider phenomenon of this concretizing residential system cannot afford to treat D'Aviler's singular example as an isolated representative case: because it marks a point at which a specific representationalism (and the modern episteme of difference and identity) has fully kicked into this technical ensemble, and renders visible is reconfigurative effects.

It is at this stage that we can better situate this case (and our entire discussion) back in a wider group of non-discursive statements. These are presented by those earlier plans from which D'Aviler had modeled his example. But they also include the subsequent practical design experiments (discussed in more detail in the next chapter) that this model would inspire in the early 1700s. By following this longer line of inspiration, we can start to draw together some more synthetic considerations. For thereby, I want to argue, we are immediately mapping a particular technological convergence. What converges here is firstly (i.e. technically) the technicization of distributional techniques for drawing differences, and secondly (i.e. logically), the ongoing reconfiguring systems of thought through which the general notion of apartments comes to be further differentiated into, and reconceptualized as, a complex system of hierarchically-organized spaces. It is by mapping this reconceptualization, and especially its transition from a system of a purely-scalar differentiation (*grand/petit appartement*) into a more programmatically/functionally-differentiated one (*appartement de parade/de commodité*), as we shall see, that we can reconstruct the concretization of the system of appartements as a larger dispositif.

65 Map of Paris around 1700

MONTMARTRE
FAUBOURG
SAINT DENIS
—Colbert de Torcy
—Chevry-Tubeuf/Mazarin
—Bautru
—Vrillière
—Palais Royal
Rambouillet
—Guénegaud
—Liancourt
—Beauvais
—Aumont
—Sully
—Mayenne
FAUBOURG
SAINT ANTOINE
—Lambert
—Bretonvilliers
—Gondi/Condé
—Palais du
Luxembourg
FAUBOURG
SAINT VICTOR
FAUBOURG
SAINT JACQUES
1:30000

Detail of Paris Rousseau Map (1736)

FAUXBOURG
MONTMARTRE
FAUXBOURG
S. DENIS
Jardins Potagers
FAUXBOURG
S. MARTIN
Rue de Jarome
Jardins
Potagers
Rue du Rempart
Porte du Temple
Rue de Fau
Rue du Mail
Rue Neuve St Eustache
Rue du Bout de la Croix
Rue Montmartre
Rue du Monde
Rue Plastriere
Rue Platrieres
Rue Mauconseil
Rue Montorgueil
Rue Tiquetonne
Rue Mondetour
Rue Coquillere
Rue Jean Lantier
Rue Pierre Lescot
Rue Neuve St Denis
Rue du Petit Carreau
Rue du Cocq
Rue du Gros Chenet
Rue Bourbon le Chateau
Rue Beauregard
Rue Neuve St Sauveur
Rue du Grand Hurleur
Rue Thevenot
Rue Montmartre
Rue Montorgueil
Rue Mauconse

3.3
The Coupling of Concrete Assemblages and Abstract Machines into a Technical Ensemble

In the first chapter of this part [→ 3.1], we have seen a fundamental change within the formation of the *hôtel* and the residential system of appartements during the mid-seventeenth century, when its traditionally linear structure, made up of a single room range—the *corps de logis* and *appartement simple*—transforms toward a more field-like matrixial one made of a doubled-up room range, the *corps de logis double*. Opening up new organizational possibilities, this transformation totally upset the inherited segmentary planning logic of distribution as compartition and required the art of distribution to be conceptually reconstituted in less linear, deeper terms; both a conceptual and structural change which, as I have [→ 3.2] elaborated in the previous chapters, came about through a complex set of interrelated epistemological and social changes connected to the emerging intellectual and social structures of the enlightenment and absolutism, and their effects on architectural changes. I mean here architecture in its broadest sense as a spatial practice, an organized or institutionalized discipline, its theoretical discourse, and its physical forms. In this more encompassing reading of *what was going on* in these transformations, I have tried to render visible an immanent transformation of organizational practices toward a more distributed system, hierarchized in multiple directions. As I have argued, this transformation should be reconsidered in technological terms, as in it, architectural techniques of distribution were also becoming more consciously thought of as a technology for controlling environments, and therefore increasingly instrumentalized in an affective realm. On this point, I argue above that the form of gridding found in the spatial metric of the royal apartment, starting to form an apparatus of capture that is instrumentalized by the absolutist state [→ 2.1.3], was but a special case of that found within the spatial matrix set up by the baroque and rococo *hôtel* (connected to a general technical apparatus of control).

This wider apparatus of control, I have suggested, is presented not by the suite of rooms itself, nor its specific distribution; it is the art (*technē*) of distribution in general, as the underlying organizational technicity of architectural arrangements. It was the progressive becoming-conscious of this technicity, and an associated emerging technical knowledge, within which the appropriate distribution of apartments would become the technical object of a certain knowledge practice concerned with outlining or codifying the principles of this art, meaning: how this technique works and should be employed. This is because it largely served in outlining a rationale (*logos*) of its employment, as a sort of 'manual' (*mode d'emploi*) for the various modalities of its use. This is exactly what happened next in the eighteenth-century discourse on the art of distribution. In it, the *hôtel* was not reduced to a spe-

cific disposition; hence the *hôtel* does not so much form a second special case of a dispositif, but rather it was the art of distribution that would prove to be the basic technology with which a socio-technical assemblage was set in motion. And in this emerging dispositif of distribution, the general organization of the apartment would become a crucial case to foster a technological skill of drawing a variety of differences. This is why the organizational system of appartements co-emerged in the becoming-conscious of distribution as a technology, and the formation of this technical knowledge of distribution, within which this system of organization became the diagram of an arising technical ensemble. It is the formation of this technical ensemble to which we will now turn, by resuming our architectural analysis of this concretizing system in the reconfiguring spatiality of the town houses.

Equipped with the complex reconsiderations of the previous chapter [→ 3.2.1–3] on the many epistemological and sociological transformations and their various interrelations and effects on architecture and the way it became increasingly understood as a technology for controlling planning processes, we can now resume our architectural analysis of the emerging baroque plans.[539]

3.3.1 A New Manner of Distributing Plans

In the foregoing analysis of the formtaking Parisian town house, we left off with the emergence of the doubled-up *corps de logis* [→ 3.1.3], especially in the work of Le Vau, who also applied this scheme in his envelopment of the Château de Versailles ☒[47], but refracted it as a wider process pertaining to a more complex form of organizing circulation within more grid-like structures. Repeating (and thus complexifying) the process we have detected in the transductive spatiality of the *corps de logis simple* [→ 2.2], the complexity that comes with organizing circulation is then a specific 'interstratic' phenomenon (and not 'metastratic,' because metastrata do not necessarily entail an increase in complexity); it is a fissure or crack between two stratic formations,

539 As a clarifying note, I should mention that—of course—a new wave of town houses and palaces was planned in and around Versailles during the reign of Louis XIV. Yet, for the present analysis these turn out to be of a relatively lesser importance as far as we had been looking at the transformations triggered by the more intense morphogenetic pressures surrounding the Parisian town houses, as regards their changing mode of planning regarding the organization of apartments. In this matter, more attention will be paid to the mutual influence of architectural discourse and architectural practice.

where transcodings and passages occur.[540] Here the internal stratification of the folded *corps de logis* continues on an **ALLOPLASTIC** stratum where life-forms, rather than just autoplastically adapting themselves, or their habits, adapt and modify themselves in tandem with the habitat and external environments that shape them.

It is on this alloplastic level that technologies and technical social machines (**= CONTENT**) come to be correlated with semiotic collective machines and regimes of signs (**= EXPRESSION**).[541] Here, it is effectuated not just by transductive relations between content and expressions, but moreover by establishing *translational* ones.[542] This process becomes an important aspect for apprehending how apartments, having hitherto been a **ASIGNIFYING** semiotic structures, become a signifying semiology, meaning a socially-coded spatiality with an increasingly explicit representational function; a function to represent other social structures in view of a status quo in the process of establishing itself. With the highly-regimented absolutist power structure taking form under both the Ancien Régime and the comprehensive world view or aesthetic regime of the scientific revolution, the establishment of these translational relations and their fixing of this representational function of apartments, is of course found in the normatizing definitions of residential spaces, their meaning or function, their interrelations, and their proper order. These definitions concretize with the deeper-going discourses on the art of distribution around 1700, and which we will now map in more detail.

The Novel Manner of Distributing Plans

Indicating a larger change of conception within residential planning around the first decade of the eighteenth century,[543] Jean-Baptiste Alexandre Le Blond (1679–1719) issued an amended second edition of the *Cours d'architecture* in 1710, updating — some years after D'Aviler's death — the twenty-year old work with the latest advancements and insights. The re-edition included — directly following D'Aviler's didactic design — thirteen pages of text on "La Nouvelle Manière de distribuer les Plans [the new manner of distributing plans]," followed by several plates that illustrate it by way of four further exemplary built hotels: a rather constrained urban town house[544] with a

540 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 502; see also Eugene Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus: A Readers Guide* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 59–63.

541 Holland, *Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus*, 64–65.

542 See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 60, and "Strata" in Mark Bonta and John Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary* (Edinburgh: EUP, 2004), 150.

543 See Middleton, "Enfilade," 93.

544 As Köhler notes, this building was likely planned for the site adjacent to the second

single court and stacked apartments ☒[67], a larger *hôtel* (the Hôtel de Vendôme, b. 1706–7) with two courts and an asymmetrical layout ☒[68a-b], an articulated, compact and symmetrical '*batiment à l'Italienne*' ☒[69], and a fourth kind of hybrid structure that has been identified as an early sketch for the Hôtel Clermont[545] ☒[70].[546] There we find increasingly symmetrically differentiated organizations. In the addition, Le Blond points out that since every building differs from others, it is impossible to offer any concrete rules or method for how to lay out plans. Working out plans presents, as any designer knows, more of a heuristic technique. Resolving plans works through an iterative process of designerly experimentation for which only some general observations regarding the required arrangement of rooms, their *dégagement* and *commodité* can be given. In this regard, the development of a manner of planning, and the advancement of the art of distribution consisted, as Köhler notes,[547] not just in the proper arrangement of rooms but primarily in a newer form of organizing their interrelations by means of *dégagement*. Under this notion, architects now understood not just bypasses, but the wider efforts at producing strategic shortcuts between the *appartement de parade* and the *appartement de commodité* by way of secondary doorways and convenient cross-connections, specifically between the *chambre de parade* in the enfilade of the former and *chambre à coucher* outsourced into the minor room range. These connections between served and servicing spaces were principally facilitated through the spatial disengagement of the two room ranges, which was initially achieved by offsetting the segmenting walls in relation to one another, as opposed to using a stricter axial grid. This structural strategy was later replaced by a more 'infrastructural' approach, to which we shall return, based on the integration of transversal passageways between the two room ranges, which—like their antecedent form of spatial bypasses—were denominated by the same name.

Against the increasing efforts at terminological definitions within the discourse on the art of distribution, this practical experimentation began to constitute a necessary part of planning discourse. It is in this respect that published collections of plans, from Le Muet's serial *Manière* to Marot's more r*ecueil*-like plan collection regained a renewed importance, through the collection of exemplary French architecture publishing by Jean Mariette

example (Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 179).

545 See ibid.

546 D'Aviler, *Cours d'architecture … ,* ed. Alexandre Le Blond, 2 vols (Paris: Mariette, 1710), I: following page 185, paginated 185*1–13, pl. 7–10. Avail. online at http://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-10. This new system is described in Dennis, *Court & Garden,* 105 and 267 n24.

547 Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 251n70.





67–68 LA NOUVELLE MANIÈRE DE DISTRIBUER: First (*top*) and second (*bottom*) of the four projects appended by Le Blond to the second edition of D'Aviler's *Cours* (1710) exemplifying the 'new manner of distributing plans.'





69–70 LA NOUVELLE MANIÈRE DE DISTRIBUER II:
Third and fourth of the projects exemplifying the 'new manner of distributing plans,' appended by Le Blond to the second edition of D'Avler's *Cours* (1710).

(1727/38, republished by Blondel in an edited and commented version in 1752[548]) in continuation of Marot's work, and the more serial *Architecture Moderne* published by Claude and Charles-Antoine Jombert (1728/64) as a redux of Le Muet's work. If we understand these works—discussed more comprehensively below—not simplistically as a set of models to be imitated, but focus instead on their formative function in offering a comparative analysis and architectural criticism of advancing planning practices and techniques, it is easy to recognize them as forming a necessary non-discursive basis for the evolving art of distribution. That is, its increasingly terminologically-defined and conceptually-clarified aims and theorems come to be illustrated by a set of built works in which these aims have been realized to differing degrees. More than a single ideal design could ever do, this series of works formed the heuristic basis from which the theorems of distribution came to be distilled. At the same time, they also came to be encoded by means of these exemplifying plans. As I want to show in this first section then [→ 3.3.1], this work lies in how these plans—after having been produced more contingently and experimentally in a slow and experimental manner, and in often contradictory approaches to achieving these aims—were made sense of in a series of publications that tried to generate a common notion of these distributional practices. These collections often presented a retroactively edited and more hierarchically organized series of plans that exemplify ways of planning. Akin to the older serial form of planning, they were arranged according to increasing building scales and thus degrees of organizational complexity. And as we will then see, it was precisely this aspect that then came to be progressively encoded as the technological and socially significant aspect of the art of distribution within Blondel's distributional practice. [→ 3.3.2]

These common discursive notions derive from not-fully-adequate, non-discursive ones. Therefore, a genetic analysis must, before looking

548 See Jean Mariette, ed., *L'Architecture Françoise; ou Recueil des Plans, Elevations, coupes et profils …* 3 vols (Paris: Mariette, 1727). The order of the plates partly varies between the different collections. Here, I am following the order of the unpaginated version of the Östereichische Nationalbibliothek 60 B3, avail. online via google books, Vol. I at https://books.google.nl/books?id=hgtUAAAAcAAJ; and Vol. II at https://books.google.nl/books?id=oQtUAAAAcAAJ, under indication of the pdf-pages. Volume IV was a reprint of the Grand Marot. For the larger Volume V, published in the 1738 volume, I have consulted the exemplar from ETH-Bibliothek Zurich, Rar 9865 GF; avail. online at https://doi.org/10.3931/e-rara-8957. For the re-edition, see discussed in more detail in the following section 3.3.2, Jacques-François Blondel, *Architecture Françoise, ou Recueil des plans, élévations, coupes et profils des églises, maisons royales, palais, hotels …*, 4 vols (Paris: Jombert, 1752–56). On Blondel's participation, on Mariette's publication, see Aurélien Davrius, *Jacques-François Blondel: architecte des Lumières* (Paris: Garnier, 2018), 40–45.

further at these discourses and their retroactive evaluation of these contingent plans, look more closely at the designerly experimentation that takes place. Yet, it must do so in a way that sees them not only as retroactively taking on a set of spatial inventions (i.e. the *corps de logis double*, an again-more-bipartitioned plan with two asymmetrical suites on the same floor, its intercalated arrangement of rooms, its implicit organizational hierarchy, etc.) recorded and highlighted in D'Aviler and Le Blond's work. Rather, what must be revealed are the diverging experiments of working them into, that is both integrating them and making them work in, the inherited forms of residential planning. As a description of what was going on in what was happening during the first two decades of the 1700s, this view allows us to account more genetically for the characteristic changes in the planning of Parisian *hôtels* and the typological transformation that this integration of new planning techniques initiated.

The Non-Discursive Articulation of the Rococo-Type *hôtel*, 1700s

The influence of Mansart's doubled-up design is not only evident in D'Aviler's idealized plan. It was also taken up more widely, for instance in Le Vau's adaptations. In the design of the Hôtels Crozat and d'Evreux ☒[71] (b. 1702 and 1707 by Pierre Bullet) on the northern corner-lot of the newly-replanned Place Louis-le-Grand, the later Place Vendôme.[549] Within our analysis there is no need to repeat the planning history of the square itself,[550] beyond the fact that with its difficult implementation history, the speculative form of urban production through embellishing royal squares, begun a century earlier under Henry IV, returned in a new form. This new form partly resided in the way the organizational structure of the baroque *hôtel* as a courtyard building—specifically the Hôtel de Beauvais, as Dennis argues—as a stable frame enabling a new freedom of planning[551] clearly comes to be more scaled up to an urban scale.

In Bullet's designs, we can identify a further externalization of the particular technologies and forms of endo-organization transposed from a residential to an urban scale of planning. Similar to the Hôtel de Beauvais, the Hôtel Crozat was characterized by its non-traditional disposition of a *corps de logis sur rue*, meaning that it was built directly at the street without any forecourt. Here, the urban square itself substituted for a sort of outsourced (or **EX-ORGANIZED**) shared court for a residence that was in fact not a proper noble's *hôtel*, but the aggrandized *maison* of a rich bourgeois. A further similarity to the

549 Plans reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [151–71], and Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 106ff.

550 I refer to the analysis be Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 79–90.

551 Ibid., 87.

Hôtel de Beauvais can be seen in the basic distribution of corps *de logis* and its related coupling of the *appartement de commodité* to a *galerie en retour*. Moreover, Bullet's design repeated and amplified the already latent nesting of four scales of organizational complexity that Dennis's analysis has so valuably revealed in these plans, including the larger dimension of the square as itself an ex-organized court.[552]

To describe this scalar differentiation into different levels and the resulting hierarchical organization and mise-en-abîme of enveloped spatial sets, Dennis strategically employs the anachronistic nineteenth-century concept of the *poché* (residual space).[553] For our analysis of a concretizing planning system, the more crucial point illustrated by Dennis's analysis ✉[71] is the scalar nesting that—in line with the wider strategies of folding that conceptually underly the formal means of baroque thought[554]—may be alternatively conceptualized as a niche. In contrast to the idea of in-fills, the more dynamic notion of a niche and more specifically the notion of niche-production may help foreground that such organizations always involve territorial cutouts from a certain milieu; produced not simply by cutting off but **CUTTING TOGETHER/APART** a set of specifically selected relationships (of both connection and non-connection). They thus form selective membranes, filters, or interfaces that produce more multi-layered, differentiating yet differentiated relations between outside and inside, in incrementally internalizing externalities, thus agentially establishing different ecosystems.[555] Here, these different ecosystems set apart the inhabitants' gradually differing relations and interactions within the house and with the outside world. It is along these relational and ecosystemic lines of differenciation that the bipolar spatiality of the apartment was further differentiated into separate species of spaces. Together, they form the functional sub-ensembles thanks to which the emerging rococo-type *hôtel* slowly started to constitute a bipolar space of display and retreat (according to Etlin's formula), and eventually came to be consciously designed in its function as such during the first half of the eighteenth century.

This ecosystemic vision allows us not just to juxtapose this visibly more complex, intricately nested form of organization from the particular formation

552 See Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 94, figs. 144–47.

553 Eleb and Debarre make a similar observation concerning the Hôtel de Béthune and its full exploitation ["*rachat*"] of residual spaces, as a formal strategy that was fairly common during the baroque period. See Eleb and Debarre, *Architectures de la vie privée*, 61–64..

554 Here, I am referring of course to Deleuze, *Fold*, passim.

555 I am referring here both to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of "existential territories" as one of the four ontological functors, as well as queerly to Barad's notion of "agential cuts" to maintain the **PRIMACY OF RELATIONS** on this point. See Book O.

of the rococo-type *hôtel* as a "generally-symmetrical plan with articulated *corps de logis*."[556] Instead, it helps us to conceptually bridge their apparent formal differences, because this nesting appears as but one formally complex, elaborate strategy to co-integrate the different scales and functional differences of the various suites into a more regularized ensemble. This integration has long been approached in a more simplistic, formal manner. Following the two longstanding lineages described before [→ 3.1], it was approached either through an often forced attempt at establishing some symmetry between the differently-scaled and functionally-differentiated parts juxtaposed within a larger structure, or — if that could not be achieved — through the strategic employment of multiple symmetries generated through a play with axial displacements. While architects still wavered between these two scale-dependent strategies that each had their advantages and disadvantages, around 1700, we see these strategies coming to be newly combined in the increasingly complex task of residential planning. As we shall see, it is in this combination that the structural play with more nested forms of organizing complexity made a greater infrastructural comeback, when it facilitated a new form of internal organization through an outsourced circulation. This led to a slow breakthrough from an either/or approach toward a both/and method, which initially formed within early eighteenth-century designerly experimentation and then became consolidated into a new form of planning.

Organizational Reconfigurings

The first part of this organizational breakthrough includes one of the last designs for a *hôtel* ✉[70] (proj. between 1699–1708) by Mansart's great-nephew and inheritor Jules Hardouin-Mansart (1646–1708).[557] Its plan consists of a large avant-court with lateral service court that forms, as Dennis has noted, a more elaborate version of the Hôtel de Jars. Here, too, the *corps de logis double* comprised the larger sequence of reception room toward the garden, and a parallel smaller suite to the court. On the upper floor this parallel arrangement was then substituted for a bipartitioned arrangement with an *appartement de parade*, composed of an *antichambre*, *grand chambre*, *cabinet* and *arrière-cabinet;* the *cabinet* gave access to the bedroom with complementary garde-robes taken out of the principal sequence and accessible

556 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 79–117; here 106.

557 Plans reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise* II: n.p. [85–9]. For a monographic study of Hardouin-Mansart's work, see the recent publication of the 1962 dissertation of Bertrand Jestaz, *Jules Hardouin-Manstart: Œuvre et vie*, 2 vols (Paris: Picard, 2008), and the extended study by Alexandre Gady and Georges Fessy, eds., *Jules Hardouin-Mansart: 1646–1708* (Paris: Maison des sciences de l'homme, 2010).

71 **The Hôtels de Crozat and d'Évreux in the northern corner of the Place Louis-le-Grand (later called Place Vendôme)**



72 **Jules Hardouin-Mansart's ideal project for a *hôtel particulier* (1699), published in the *Architecture Françoise* (1727 and 1751)**



via a secondary *antichambre* and stair. The principal *antichambre* gave access to a compact *appartement de commodité* above the lower *salle*. The general disposition of the site and the *corps de logis* were adopted and adapted in a series of speculative projects for president François Duret,[558] designed by Hardouin-Mansart's assistant Pierre Cailleteau, known as Lassurance. The series includes the (destroyed) Hôtel d'Auvergne and the neighboring (and surviving) Hôtel de Maison, and the neighboring Hôtels de Roquelaure and Lude, that together exemplify four very different experimental approaches to distribution.[559]

558 On this point, see Bruno Pons, "Hôtel de Maisons puis de Soyecurt, 51, rue de l'Université," in *Le Faubourg Saint-Germain. Rue de l'Université, ed. Délégation à l'Action artistique de la Ville de Paris* (Paris: Institut Néerlandais, 1987).

559 Plans reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [250], [277], [285–7], and [291–3] respectively. A monographic treatment of Pierre Cailleteau's work is still missing. See https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pierre_Cailleteau; and also Gallet, *Architectes parisiens du XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Menges, 1995), 284.

Lassurance's Hôtel d'Auvergne ☒[73] (b. 1705, bought by general Frédéric Maurice de la Tour d'Auvergne, Duc de Bouillon) presents a partly unconventional plan, where the principal rooms were located on the ground floor, where they formed two parallelly arranged but interconnected sequences. The grand sequence begins with a vestibule, where — as Blondel's plate shows — the [missing] grand stair would typically be located. After this we find the *sallon* and a so-called *chambre principale*. The latter was a hybrid room that served as an antechamber, as it was located before the chamber with state bed, as the plan indicates. But it also served as a *salle d'assemblée*, in which case the preceding *sallon* or vestibule would have taken on the antechamber function.

As we see in the plan of the Hôtel de Maison ☒[73] (b. 1706–8 bought by Claude de Longueil, marquis de Maison), the ground floor accommodated two more symmetrical and reduced apartments, the larger of which consisted of an antechamber that opened onto a chamber as well as a *cabinet* with *garde-robe* to in the court-facing portion. The upper floor featured three larger and functionally differentiated apartments. A sequence of doubled-up *corps de logis* accommodated two parallel sequences: the state rooms in the rear range consisted of a *grand-salle*, *antichambre*, *chambre à coucher* and *cabinet*, the smaller court facing room range accommodated the *appartement de commodité* consisting of an *antichambre*, *chambre à coucher*, and *garde-robe*. A second sequence of reception rooms was found in the pavilion on the left side, which off the *grand-salle*, opened directly onto the largest *chambre à coucher*, a *(grand) cabinet*, with *arrière-cabinet*, and *garde-robe*.

The further influence of Mansart's and Hardouin-Mansart's design schemes can also be felt in the first private house planned by Robert de Cotte (1656–1735), the latter's son-in law and successor as *Premier architecte du Roi* in 1708[560]: the Hôtel de Lude ☒[74] (b. 1710 for Duret and sold to the Duchesse Douairière du Lude). Planned on a wider plot, it resorted to the more representational dispositif of a *corps de logis simple* complemented by a clustered annex wing behind the service court. The plan presented a mirrored version of the general layout of the Mansart-scheme, while also recalling some of Le Muet's designs in its basic combination of a *corps de logis simple* with a clustered annex.[561] It reveals a stringent organization in which the *appartement de parade*, accessed from the right vestibule, featured a central *chambre*

560 For a monographic study, see Robert Neuman, *Robert de Cotte and the Perfection of Architecture in Eighteenth-Century France* (Chicago/London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994), for his residential designs here esp. 76–153.

561 Plans as reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [277]. For a discussion, see Neuman, "French Domestic Architecture in the Early 18th Century: The Town Houses of Robert de Cotte," *JSAH* 39, no. 2 (May, 1980), 128–44.

du dais (a seating apparatus different from the state bed) and *grand cabinet*. It was followed by an *appartement de commodité* (in the doubled-up section on the left) that could be alternatively accessed via a secondary entrance hall on the right side of the court.[562]

The comparatively most complex distribution is found in the adjacent Hôtel de Roquelaure ☒[74], built (bet. 1722–30 by likely Pierre, but maybe Jean Cailleteau and then Jean-Baptiste Leroux for the maréchal de France Antoine-Gaston de Roquelaure) as an extension of an older structure, the Hôtel de Villetaneuse.[563] Its plan comprises three suites. In the older *corps de logis*, the *appartement de parade* was accessed through the right vestibule via two antechambers. The first of these, an older *salle*, also opened onto a smaller apartment in the court-facing room range. The *appartement de parade* itself centrally featured a *salle d'assemblée* and *chambre de parade*, which could also be accessed through a *sallon*. Newly installed in the rear section, which would previously have been occupied by a *chambre à coucher* with *cabinet* and *garde-robe*, this larger room was entered through the added left vestibule, thus constituting a second sequence of rooms for a different (less formal) kind of reception. The *antichambre* in this sequence also gave access to a second *appartement de commodité* in the western side-wing, which would have been designed for the duchess.

Mansart's scheme was also repeated in the rather reduced—if not retrogressive—form of a single-room-range structure (b.1704 by Jacques V Gabriel for the wife of ambassador Pierre Roque de Varengeville) ☒[76], the plan of which was said to have a quite diagrammatic, modern quality.[564] But in this clear organization, it also came to be used as a base scheme for the planning of bourgeois residences, as in the Maison de Monsieur Sonning ☒[77] (c.1704/11 by Nicolas Dulin), with stair, *antichambre*, a second, more polyvalent antechambre doubling as a reception room more than dining room, a *chambre de parade* with *cabinet*, and *chambre à coucher*[565]; or the rather eccentric arrangement of the Hôtel de Rohan (b. 1705–8 by Pierre-Alexis Delamair for Bishop Armand-Gaston-Maximilien de Rohan).[566] By contrast,

562 Neuman, "French Domestic Architecture," 132.

563 For the history of the somewhat challenging extension, see also the related French wikipedia article, which also includes an unrealised but design version (no.3) where three sequences where accessed from the left vestibule.

564 Plans as reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [243–5]. Here after Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 97. See also https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/H%C3%B4tel_de_Varengeville

565 Plans reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [113–5], and Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 87ff.

566 Plans as reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [63–5]. For a monographic study see, Philippe Béchu and Christian Taillard, *Les hôtels de Soubise et de Rohan* (Paris:

73 ***Top*, plans and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Maison (*left*), with the neighboring Hôtel d'Auvergne (*right*), in the rue de l'Université.** Level 00/+01

74 ***Bottom*, plans and spatial organization the Hôtels de Roquelaure (*left*) and de Lude (*right*), located on the opposite side of the same block, on the rue de St. Dominique.** Level 00



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75 *Top right*, plans of the Maison de Mr. d'Argenson, built in 1704–5 by Boffrand.
Level 00/+01

76 Below, left: Plan of the Hôtel de Béthune (beg. 1708 by Lassurance), and the adjacent Hôtel de Varengeville (b. 1704 by Jacques V Gabriel), in the rue de St. Dominique.
Level 00

77 Below right: Plan of the contemporary Maison de Mr. Sonning, built c. 1704/11 by Nicolas aDulin, at rue de Richelieu.
Level 00



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

78 Plan of the Hôtel de Rothelin, built between 1700–1704 by Lassurance
Level +01





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

79 Plans of Plan of the Hôtel Rivié/Desmarets (later Luxembourg), built between 1704/6–10 by Lassurance, and the nearby Hôtel de Cours des Chiens, built around 1706 by Pierre Levé.
Level +01 ●

1:1000

the bipartitioned arrangement of the upper floor can be found in the Hôtel de Béthune ☒[76] (beg. 1708 by Lassurance)[567]. Here, too, a shared *antichambre* mediates between a larger state apartment and a more compact suite. The former was composed of two *chambres*, a *chambre à coucher* and *cabinet* (but in Blondel's later rendition of the plan these rooms were functioning as a *salle d'assemblée*, state bedroom, *[grand] cabinet* and *arrière-cabinet*).[568]

All these linearly organized examples are quite different from the more symmetrically arranged type of plans, which regained new momentum in the wake of the ideal design promoted in D'Aviler's *Cours*.[569] Its influence can already be felt in the design for the larger *hôtel* for the Marquis de Rothelin ☒[78] (b.1700–4 by Lassurance): the symmetrical plan with a *salle* divided an smaller apartment with *antichambre*, *chambre à coucher*, *cabinet* and *arrière-cabinet*, and a slightly larger state apartment that, in its mirrored configuration, was complemented by a secondary *antichambre* (serving as dining hall), and lesser *chambre (à coucher)*.[570] Another symmetrical and more compact model can be found in the Hôtel d'Argenson ☒[75] (b.1704–5 by Germain Boffrand for a state secretary and war minister), located in one of the narrow parcels around the gardens of the Palais Royal.[571] Its central *corps de logis* featured six rooms that, accessed through a small antechamber in the right side-wing, opened onto a *grand-antichambre* with semi-partitioned *salle* à manger, leading to a *cabinet en bibliothèque* with *arrière-cabinet*, and an *appartement de société* to the garden composed of the large, double-height *sallon*, with an adjacent *grand cabinet* and *salle d'audience*. The *arrière-cabinet* was connected to a secondary stair that gave access to the upper floor via a small and larger secondary *antichambre* leading to a *chambre à coucher* with bed *en niche*, and another *chambre* with a *cabinet* in the rear.

This symmetrical organization can also be seen in the smaller plan of the Hôtel Rivié, later called Desmarets ☒[79] (c.1704/6–10 by Lassurance),[572]

Somogy, 2004). On Delamair, see also Gallet, *Les architectes parisiens*, 175.

567 Plans as reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [269].

568 For a closer discussion, see Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 97ff; and Eleb and Debarre, *Architectures de la vie privée*, 61–63, for the changing room labels between the plans as reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [36], and Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 52ff.

569 See Köhler, *Paris und das Stadthaus*, 183ff.

570 Plans as reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [231]. For a discussion, see Middelton, "Enfilade," 92ff.

571 Plans and description in Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 52ff.

572 Plans as reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [133–35], and Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 95. Blondel (*Architecture Françoise*, III: 95) gave 1704 as the construction date. Cf. Gady, *hôtels particuliers*, 313. For the detailed history of the building, see http://hotelmontmorency.online.fr, ed. Michel Courtier, and Louis Sanchez. As the have reconstructed, based on Brice's *Description de la ville de Paris* (1725) and other sources,

especially striking if compared with the Hôtel de la Cour des Chiens ☒[79] (c.1706 by Pierre Levé), located nearby.[573] The latter is clearly organized in a linear fashion, via the left entrance and stair through the principal sequence made up of an *antichambre*, *chambre (de parade)*, *chambre à coucher*, two *garde-robes*, *cabinet* and *arrière-cabinet*, and a parallel sequence that on the top floor—of which no plan is provided—likely included a parallel *appartement de commodité* (composed of secondary *antichambre*, *chambre* and *garde-robe*), as connected to the secondary staircase. By contrast, the former has a much more bipartitioned layout (in fact, it is doubly-bipartitioned, reminiscent of the Château de Vaux-le-Vicomte discussed earlier), which Blondel later judged as quite ingenious (*assez ingenieuse*).[574] Yet, as has Köhler noted[575], this formal symmetry still hides a larger functional asymmetry: on the ground floor the central vestibule with the integrated staircase leads to a *sallon* that, to the right, opens onto a grand *cabinet* with *arrière-cabinet* (thus forming the society rooms), and to the left onto a small *chambre à coucher* (with *cabinet* and *garde-robe*). Thus initially designed as a small suite of rooms for the proprietor, this bedroom had been used as *salle d'assemblée* extending the state apartment of the later proprietor, who preferred to inhabit the upper floor. Here, the stair's landing opened onto a first antechamber with the second, grand *antichambre* in the rear range. The latter acted as a shared antechamber dividing—like in a reduced version of D'Aviler's plan—two near symmetric sets of state bedrooms with *cabinet* and *garde-robe* to the garden, while the former served as a *chambre à coucher* with *cabinet* and *garde-robe* in the left corner pavilion on the court-fronting room range. As the right pavilion houses a fourth, *petit appartement*, there is a double bipartition of D'Aviler model taken up in a more tripartite hierarchy, which—as we shall see—was developed further by Blondel. [→ 3.3.2]

the building was built initially for royal counsellor Thomas Rivié, after his ennoblement in August 1705, the building was sold to Controller in 1710 to Controller-General Nicolas Desmartesde Mallebois. The building was later called Hôtel de Montmorency-Luxembourg. For a discussion see also Neuman, "French Domestic Architecture," 131ff.

573 Plans as reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [129], and Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 93ff. On the building, see also Jacques Hillairet, *La Rue de Richelieu* (Paris: Edn. de Minuit, 1966).

574 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 95.

575 Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 183.



80 *Top*, the peri-urban lot structure of the St. Germain area

81 *Bottom left*, plan and spatail organization of the Hôtel de Pompadour, built 1704–5, in the rue Grenelle.
Level +01

82 *Bottom right*, plans and spatail organization of the Hôtel d'Estrée, built between 1711–13 by De Cotte, in the rue Grenelle.
Level 00/+01







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83 ***Top*, plan and spatial organnization, of the Hôtel de Torcy, as executed in 1713 to designs by Boffrand**
Level +01

84 ***Bottom*, plans and spatial organnization of the Hôtel d'Humière, begun in 1715 by Mollet (*left*) and the adjacent Hôtel de Maine, built in 1716–19 by Mollet (*right*)**













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85 De Cotte's initial design for the Hôtel de Torcy.



The Breaking Free of the Corps de Logis

Not included in Dennis's analysis, the Rivié/Desmarets *hôtel* plays a central role, as Robert Neuman has argued, in the way the town house transforms into a more pavilion-like "mini-château." The design had absorbed, as Neuman notes, many architectural features and inventions of the design of the Château Neuf in Meudon (1706–9 by Hardouin-Mansart), including the beginning use of corridors, and an attempt to articulate the main wing as a separate structure. On sufficiently large sites, this articulation of the main wing provided not only an equally monumental arrangement, but also an easy means of generating the striven-for symmetry. We see this trend beginning with the Hôtel de Pompadour ⊠[81] (b. 1704–5)[576], where the *corps de logis* begins to be freed from the adjoining party walls. This trend would gain momentum in the middle of the 1710s, when this trend informed the designs of a series of buildings, including the Hôtel d'Estrées ⊠[82] (b. 1711–13 by De Cotte),[577] the Hôtel d'Humière ⊠[84] (b. 1715) and Hôtel d'Evreux ⊠[86] (b. 1718 both by Armand-Claude Mollet),[578] and the celebrated Hôtel de Matignon ⊠[88]

576 Plans as reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise* n.p. [237].

577 Plans reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [223–25]. See Neuman, "French Domestic Architecture," 132ff, and also Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 101ff.

578 Plans reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, II: n.p. [51–3], and Blondel,

(b.1722–24 by Jean Courtonne),[579] to which I return below. Most of these projects—and thosediscussed just before and after—were built in the peri-urban area of the Faubourg Saint-Germain, on the Left Bank, which had developed from the *lotissement* of the Hôtel de la Reine Margueritte. It was developing further west-wards from the Pont Royal/rue du Bac to the Hôtel des Invalides along the parallel streets of the Quai d'Orsay/rue de Bourbon, and the rues de l'Université, Grenelle, and Varenne. As can be seen especially in the perspectival Turgot Map (1739), the area characteristically contrasted with the older intramural quarters in its morphological structure of lots continuously enclosed by walls and lower annex wings, with more articulated *corps de logis*.[580] ⊠[80]

Concerning the formation of the latter, Dennis sees the Evreux design—built in the Faubourg Saint-Honoré on an extensive peri-urban lot just north of the Champs Élysées—as the example that typified a noticeable transition in the basic disposition of the *hôtel*, which started shifting away from planning an asymmetric structure resolved by shifting axes and concatenated rooms, as it can still be seen in Mollet's earlier designs.[581] The related reorganizations behind this typological transformation process are exemplified especially in De Cotte's more moderate plans for the Hôtels d'Estrées ⊠[82], and the following project for the Hôtel de Torcy ⊠[85] (b.1713 to a different design by Boffrand ⊠[83]),[582] which amplifies many of its ideas, the initial design for the nearby Hôtel de Maine ⊠[84] (b.1716–19)[583], and finally the Hôtel d'Étampes ⊠[88] (beg. 1703 and ext. c. 1722 by Dulin) and the neighboring Hôtel Mazarin ⊠[88] (beg. 1703 by Courtonne, trans. 1736 by Leroux) whose plan Blondel praised.[584] Throughout this series of projects, the traditional internal organizational asymmetry became progressively coupled with, and mitigated by, an

Architecture Françoise, III: 156ff respectively. Discussed in Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 110ff. On Mollet, see also Gallet, *Architectes parisiens du XVIIIe siècle*, 369–70.

579 For a monographic study, see Christian Albenque, et al. *L'hôtel de Matignon* (Paris: La documentation française, 2018).

580 Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 179.

581 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 106 and 112.

582 Plans reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, II: n.p. [19–23]. See Neuman, "French Domestic Architecture," 136ff.

583 Plans reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, II: n.p. [41]. For a discussion of the project, later developed by Mollet, see Neuman, "French Domestic Architecture," 142–43.

584 Plans reprinted in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [203], and Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 215ff. There is a potential confusion between the depicted Hôtel d'Étampes, later Rohan, built—according to Blondel—to designs of Sicilian Duc Fornari, who also made a plan for the neighboring—partly extant hotel—at rue Varenne 61: the Hôtel de Vendôme, built by Jean Courtonne in 1703 and transformed c.1736 by Jean-Baptiste Leroux for the Duchesse de Mazarin, of which Blondel expresses his regrets to not be able to provide its praiseworthy plan (ibid.). See also the annotated historical map provided at https://cdn.paris.fr/paris/2020/02/26/cb19477751fe4e023632de216ae44667.ai. The plan survived through the Plan Vasserot, 38e quartier, îlot n°13, F/31/92/27.

86 *Top*, the Hôtel d'Evreux (b. 1718 both by Mollet), the later Palais d'Elysée
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

87 *Bottom*, the Hôtel de Noirmoutier (b. 1721-24 by Courtonne)
Level +01



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88 Plans and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Matignon, built in 1722–24 by Courtonne (*left*); the adjacent Hôtel d'Étampes, begun in 1703, and extended around 1722 by Dulin (*center*); and the Hôtel de Vendôme, later called de Mazarin, begun 1703 by Courtonne, and transformed in 1736 by Leroux (*right*).
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
R. Hillerin Bertin
de
Varenne
H. de Maugnon
H. Mazarin
H. de Castres
H. de Villeroi
H. de Clermont

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89 Plan of the Palais Bourbon, with its Versailles-esque arrangement of an *enveloppe* of larger receptions rooms from the right vestibule, and the smaller appartement *de commodité* fronting the court. Here, a central *dégagement* separates and selectively connects the two apartments. This western wing contains a group of smaller accommodations arranged alongside a corridor.
Level 00



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externally more symmetrical shape. In it, De Cotte had been increasingly influenced, as Neuman notes, by the Hôtel Desmarets, which forms the central point of convergence in this typological transformation process.

The central vestibule and *grand antichambre* behind it divides the left *appartement de commodité* from the *appartement de parade* on the right, which in the latter design (as in the aforementioned Hôtel de Rothelin) is just slightly larger and more symmetrical, while the *appartement de commodité* is functionally differentiated and complemented by smaller rooms and service passages. The functional differentiation of two complementary sides, and not simply "the asymmetrical development of the plan" behind the symmetrical form, as Dennis suggests,[585] becomes more visible in the plan of the Palais Bourbon ☒[89] (b. 1722–29 to designs originally by Lorenzo Giardini and Jules Hardouin-Mansart, and completed under Lassurance, Jean Aubert and Jacques Gabriel, for Louise Françoise de Bourbon-Condé). In the well-known plan, we see the scalar distinction between the large and small suite of rooms finding a new expression, not just as a juxtaposition of private and public spaces in the sense distinguished by Etlin; rather, we see "two internal worlds" being mutually constituted by becoming newly coupled and reciprocally differentiated from each other in scale and thereby in function. In the plan,, we also note another fundamental change within residential design that was taking place during the 1720s: that is, that the *bel étag*e was increasingly often lowered onto an elevated ground floor, especially in peri-urban residences, but also within urban settings. As Trüby remarks, "with the wish to access the gardens more directly, the possibility of relegating service spaces on the ground was lost," so that with this lowering of the principal floor, the circulation of services became enfolded into it,[586] where they acted as an interface between these the two types of space.

The Beginning of the Breakdown of the Corps de Logis

As the plan of the Palais Bourbon features many on the interrelated points described above, it eventually presents a "*high point* of internal planning."[587] Its apical aspect lies not so much in the building's hyperbolical position as one of the last demonstratively *grand* aristocratic *hôtels* (along with the Hôtels de Peyrenc-de-Moras (later Biron), Rouillé, and Janvry) built before the soon-ensuing decline of aristocratic power and cultural predominance.[588]

585 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 106.
586 Stephan Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors* (Paderborn: Fink, 2018), 85.
587 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 109.
588 Ibid.

Rather, it marks a point of highest intensity, where the tensions between these two types of suites (*grand* and *petit*) articulate into two very different modes of organization: one, the *appartement de parade*, comprising the hierarchical sequence of rooms that envelops one another, and two, the *appartement de commodité* with its adjacent baths, comprising a cluster of more intricate smaller rooms with intercalated corridors. This arrangement, Trüby writes, "established in hitherto never realized fashion two separate circulation systems, two 'parallel universes,' on the same floor":[589] a transversal perambulation across the spatial thresholds through the enfilade, and a tangential one through the cross-connecting corridors.[590] Where the former dispositif is geared toward the specifically urban form of status consumption pertaining to paying visits, the latter is aimed at another form of consumption of a more secluded lifestyle. This seclusion does not (or not just)lie in a more individual lifestyle, as many scholar since Dennis and Eleb and Debarre have suggested. They often portrayed the characteristic disengagement of the articulated principal wing into a more and more free-standing block—progressively played free, or broken free, from its dense urban surrounding[591]—as an expression "of the independence and individuality characteristic of the period" that required a new type of residence.[592] Nor can it be understood as a form of expression manifesting itself in a particular (rococo) style. This notion would be a too facile retroactive hypostatization, falling prey to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, meaning that it would reduce or reify this disengagement to (and mistake it for) a physical or concrete reality that it does not have, instead of problematizing from a genetic angle the way this disentanglement renders visible a system in the process of its concretization.

As I have explained in my preliminary notes [→ 0.3], in approaching concretizing systems, we must start from individuation in terms of individuals or individuality as its principle. From this system-theoretic angle, we could situate those planning practices leading to the progressive physical disentanglement of the *hôtel* from its conditioning surroundings in line with another process: the beginning of the conceptual sorting of ideas about establishing a general order of buildings, and about the establishment of hierarchies, to which this changing form of planning is material-discursively related. This angle points us to the fundamental change in conception regarding the structuration of space and architectural form facilitating this isolation, as a continuation of the

589 Ibid., 84.
590 See Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors*, 84–5.
591 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 96, 101.
592 Ibid., 101.

aristocratic sociology of distinction.[593] And as I will later substantiate and conclude [→ 3.3.3], in this way this reterritorialization articulates a changing organizational notion of the distinct collective lifestyle that was—in reaction to the demonstrative display of absolutist power—slowly rediscovering its rural origins. This included older residential dispositifs, around which the power of aristocratic houses had originally been structured around the specific economy, that is, distribution and organization of workflows and services that facilitate this form of social production, reproduction, and consumption through the proper planning of spatial relationships and forms of circulation. But to arrive there, we have to locate, much more slowly, the couplings between these individuating systems.

Conventional Planning and Disposition, 1706–28

The reterritorialization described above can only be understood as an indication pointing to an underlying recomposition in the distribution of the sensible, which is precisely found in the concretizing formal correspondence between these systems. In this regard, abbot Jean-Louis de Cordemoy (1655–1714) had in the meanwhile published his *Nouveau traité de toute l'architecture* (1706),[594] a small handbook printed in *octavo* size, intended for *entrepreneurs et ouvriers*. Among its several innovations, it furthered the conceptual convergence of architectural dispositions with distributions. This happens where Cordemoy, influenced by Frémin and Perrault, and apparently attempting to reduce the complexity of planning, structures his handbook into three sections, according to the three concepts in which architecture is said to consist: *ordonnance*, *disposition/distribution*, and *bienséance* (the term with which Perrault had translated the Vitruvian notion of *decorum,* literally meaning "sitting well," but figuratively denominating the proper match, fittingness or propriety between social function and appropriate form[595]). For our analysis, is it not necessary to fully outline Cordemoy's exact arguments leading him to this reduction; more interesting is that in the resulting logical structure of his treatise, architectural layouts—both in terms of disposition and distri-

593 I refer to the distinction made by Borie, Micheloni, and Pinon, *Forme et Déformation*, 13–25, mentioned before in note 102, above.

594 [Jean-Louis] de Cordemoy, *Nouveau traité de toute l'architecture* (Paris: Coignard, 1706). For an overview of Cordemoy's position within French architectural theory, see Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*, 141ff. For a closer study of Cordemoy's critical theory, see Margit Bánát-Szűcs, "J. L. De Cordemoy's Theory of Architecture: First Appearance of Direct Architectural Criticism and of Rational-Functional Approach at the Beginning of the 18th Century," *Periodica Polytechnica Architecture* 30, nos. 1–4 (1986): 9–17, avail. online at https://pp.bme.hu/ar/article/view/2297/1402.

595 Scott, *Rococo Interior*, 82.

bution, which Cordemoy takes to be synonymous—clearly gain a more central position, making explicit their mediating role between the act of establishing order and the equally foregrounded effect of *bienséance.*

As scholars have pointed out, this term named the appropriateness in view of established customs, that is, moral and ethical conventions, according to which a building is judged to be beautiful when its decoration established a certain degree of propriety in agreement with and appropriate to its intended use.[596] This effect was also expressed in the difficult-to-translate notion of *convenance* that as a noun comes from the Latin verb *convenire* which, connoting something 'coming to(gether)'[597], initially described an analogical relation between two things or measures. But increasingly, it became synonymous with and finally superseded the notion of appropriateness expressed as *bienséance*, as an "enigmatic measure" and "binding principle" (Lily H. Chi) for cohesive planning in the early 1700s. More than just the common measure in resolving suitable room arrangements, the notion of *convenance* added a new layer of complexity to the art of distribution in its more normative (but problematic) conception that an idea (*sujet*) should agree or go together with its object; that it should match' or be congruent

596 The notion of *bienséance*, Szambien writes, "constitutes one of the examples of a development that occurs relatively frequently in the history of words: the signified exists before the signifier." Szambien, "Bienséance, convenance et chactère," *Les cahiers de la recherche architecturale* 18, no. 4 (1985), 38–43; here 38. As he summarizes this development: "Perrault reserved this notion for three domains: to the correction of the use of forms as defined by the Greek *thematismos*, decoration and the use of ornaments, and the salubrity of the site …; Félibien, on the other hand defined [its] role … from the solidity of a building in reference to the theory of orders … A first normalization comes with D'Aviler's *Dictionnaire*," wherein proper decoration, under the notion of *convenance*, "signified nothing else than the conformity to the destination, correspondence, and use" (ibid.) that a building is put to. See also Szambien, *Symmetrie, gout, charactère*, 93ff. For a monographic study of the notion of *bienséance*, see also Anne Röver-Kann, *Bienséance: zur ästhetischen Situation im Ancien Régime, dargestellt an Beispielen der Pariser Privatarchitektur* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1977). On the relation between *bienséance* and *convenance*, see here esp. 8–12 and 96–122; and moreover Peter-Eckhard Knabe, *Schlüßelbegriffe des Kunsttheoretischen Denkens in Frankreich von der Spätklassik bis zum Ende der Aufklårung* (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1972), 100ff.

597 Based on its etymological relation the term has sometimes been rendered as 'convenience,' which overshadows it wider connotation of propriety or appropriateness, decency, integrity. Yet all these translations not only undermine the changing shift in meaning toward it, starting from the more conjunctive sense of things 'coming together' wherein this agreement is formed. In Spinoza's writings, for instance, the notion is traditionally translated as 'agreement.' In his work, the notions surrounding the Latin verb *convenire*, denominate an 'accord', a *coming-together* (for instance naming the ways rays of light are bundled to a single point, as Spinoza explains the lens-like effect of the eye in his letter to Jelles), or a becoming-one(-voice), gathering, or convention (as the use of the notion in the *Theological-Political Treatise* implies). See the lemma '*overeenstemmen*' in Maarten van Buuren, *Spinoza: Zijn filosofie in vijftig sleutelwoorden* (Amsterdam: Ambo/Anthos, 2019).

with it.[598] On this very point, architectural theory thus closely followed the earlier logical proposition made by Nicole that, whereas the relation between words and things was established by arbitrary customs, "true beauty" lies in "that which agrees with the nature of the things themselves as well as with the inclinations of our senses and our soul."[599] For the moderns, however, the object of convention and propriety was architecture's arbitrary use (its customary use, as should be repeated[600]). As such, this agreement problematizes and cannot be isolated from specific uses of architecture's own instrumentality. The latter arises from the way that relations and agreements are established in the process of drawing plans. Through this establishment distribution comes to be positioned as a mediating technology, that is, a technical rationale (*logos*) for architecture as an ordering instrument mediating between the established order of things and cultural conventions concerning ideas.

(Another side-note on my post-Foucauldian thinking in this chapter: underlying this critical attention to the cultural use of this technology is the contemporary engagement with Greek philosophy's classic distinction between life in accordance with custom or convention (κατὰ νόμον), and in accordance with nature (κατὰ φύσιν). Advocated initially by the Cynics' practical approach to philosophy as a way of life, foregrounding life's necessary aspects over those arbitrary cultural systems formed by social conventions and regulations, Stoic philosophical theory more often equated life 'accord-

598 It is this searched-for correspondence between words and things, between content and expression, that is epistemologically crucial as it touches on all the central methodological positions problematized by Cartesian and Foucauldian thinking. And as I would argue, it is the same difficulty faced by the still-too-structuralist, praxeological approaches that have looked for the way in which (discourses about) spatial notions and practices formally correspond to spatial structures, not operational similarities. Instead of reducing everything to a single stratum, what must be understood is the multi-layered stratification process underlying the production[!] of a particular arbitrary system, and the establishment of a reciprocal presupposition between content and expression, on both their substantial and formal layers, through which this emergent system gains consistency and concretizes.

599 Here after Nicole, *La vraie beauté et son fantôme et autres textes d'esthétique,* ed. Béatrice Guion (Paris: Honoré Champion, 1996), 57 (my trans.); and also 71 and 103 where he articulates "an axis of convenance between 'things' and 'people' in progressively abstract terms" (as noted by Allais, "Ordering the Orders," 73n30). On the related notion of convenance in Arnauld and Nicole's *Logique, ou l'Art de Penser*, 150; see my note 405 above. One should note the conceptual relation of Port Royal logic to the use of the concept in Spinoza (who — as I said — owned a copy of *L'art de penser*), and his idea of adequacy. The Port-Royal *Grammar* also proposed a veritable "syntax of convenance"; see Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot's *Grammaire générale et raisonnée contenant les fondemens de l'art de parler* (Paris: Petit, 1660), 140, see also 35ff.

600 On this point, see also below, note 482–3.

ing to nature' with living according to reason (κατὰ λόγον).[601] While this more physiological conception necessitated, the Stoics argued, a recognition of the divine, or a human-divine co-creation (and thus a form of enunciation that entails a heteronomous account on this 'accordance' based on resemblances and similarities), the nomological (cause and effect) or nomothetic (law-seeking) notion of living in accordance with custom was tied to an autonomous form of self-conception or self-realization, based on understanding, revealing, or decoding the immanent, internal dynamics within systems through which differentiated parts are generated. As such, the call "know thyself" (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) which presented the goal of Stoic philosophy of living in accordance with nature (ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν) implied the need to conceptualize things or selves as capacious yet delimited parts within larger systems. For the Stoics, this reconceptualization was achieved by means of specific 'techniques of the self,' an art (*technē*) whose acquisition necessarily involved a training[602] in the art of drawing differences.

As Foucault has noted,[603] these formative techniques were geared toward substituting simple and inadequate formal correspondences or analogies based on references to an exterior unit, and the reductive conceptions of part-to-whole relations they entail, with an adequately complex understanding of the analogical elements within form-taking systems. As I have argued [→ 1.3], this implies a different conception of those parallelisms occurring between structural relations or 'operational similarities,' where systems establish order not through simple formal correspondence, equivalence, or identity that would create transcendental correlations, causal connections, or linear hierarchies, but through isomorphic homologies between non-linear ordering processes nested into series of series, trees, or networks.

Hence, in order to account from the point of view of genesis, for the conceptual reconfigurings that drive the epistemological transition of distributional techniques concerning these accordances between the 'nature' of aristocratic architecture and its 'cultural' usage into a novel planning system, it is crucial [→ 3.3.2] to stay on this intermediary level to avoid falling back onto the older heteronomous view, while at the same time bypassing a purely autonomous reading of this emerging planning system.

601 See John Sellars, *Stoicism* (Durhan: Acumen, 2010; orig. pub. 2006), 4ff; in reference to Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 7.1/7.4; I am ignoring here the complex distinctions between *zoon* [ζῶν] and *bios* [βίος]. On this point see e.g. Sellars, *The Art of Living* (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), 21ff; and esp. 22 n36.)

602 In the literal etymological sense of an act of drawing out (from 'train,' from Latin *trahere*, "to pull, draw."

603 Foucault, *The Order of Things*, passim.

In this trajectory of emerging planning thought, Cordemoy was, indeed, one of the precursors of modern functionalism,[604] which is evident in his discussion of the layout of buildings, where the mediating role becomes apparent. For instance, the second edition of the *Nouveau traité* (1714) with its newly included dictionary, refers distribution simply to the definition of disposition, as the "appropriate arrangement [*arrangement convenable*] of all parts of a building."[605] In his earlier discussion of *bienséance*, however, Cordemoy had more elaborately problematized this proper arrangement in terms of the requirement that in a building all spaces need to be arranged so that there arises, as had Perrault demanded, "une convenance selon l'usage où la commodité pour lesquelles ils sont faits [an agreement proper to the use or the amenity for which they are made"; meaning to avoid that in this disposition "il n'y ait rien de contraires à la nature ni à l'accoûtumance [there be anything contrary to the nature or to established custom]."[606]

While establishing this proper agreement is precisely what constitutes a beautifully worked-out arrangement (*belle disposition*), it also presented a problem for Cordemoy, especially where it was coupled with the requirement of symmetry:

> Rien n'est si aisé que de faire les apartemens commodes. Mais rien n'est plus difficile que de les disposer commodément avec symétrie. Car presque toûjours la Symétrie donne de la peine à trouver les mesures, et les scituations convenables aux commodités [et] aux usages de chaque piece. [Nothing is as easy as making apartments convenient. But nothing is more difficult than arranging them conveniently with symmetry. Because almost always, the symmetry makes it difficult to find the measures and situations appropriate to the amenities and uses of each room.][607]

In an section appended to the second edition, answering to his critics like Frézier, Cordemoy reframed this problem in terms of the notion of the proper

604 Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*, 141.

605 Cordemoy, *Nouveau traité … avec un dictionnaire* (Paris: Coignard, 1714); here 236 (my trans.).

606 Cordemoy, *Nouveau traité,* 118–9 and 130 (my trans.). Cf. Perrault's heterodox notion of ordonnance (Perrault, *Dix livres*, 9), discussed above; and the definition of disposition as the "arrangement convenable de toutes les parties." On Perrault's etymology, see esp. the article by Cathérine Fricheau, "Les étymologies de Claude Perrault," *Littératures classiques* 75, no. 2 (2011): 167–82.

607 Cordemoy, *Nouveau traité,* 148–49 (my trans.).

dégagement of the building's rooms, to disentangle the circulation of inhabitants, visitors, and services. Conceptually somewhat antithetical to the synthetic notion of *convenance*, he always held the correct *dégagement* to be the prime means that helps eliminate all that is inappropriate (*inconvenable*) in the first place, and through which an appropriate arrangement (*arrangement convenable*) arises whenever it creates an assemblage that produces a structural unity facilitating the independence of its parts.[608] It is here that the yet-to-be-consolidated logic of integrating functional sub-ensembles, and outlining trees from nets, slowly comes to the fore.

But by way of this operatively-subtractive definition of disposition-distribution in its understanding of *dégagement-convenance* as an inclusive disjunction, Cordemoy's reading also happened to introduce an exclusive disjunction between order and convention, which partly eliminated or counteracted the complex mediality and instrumental function that architectural distributions gain in establishing such agreements. This happens where he, in an attempt to eliminate some unnecessary complexity of planning, resorts to a guiding image to formally avoid any contradiction between nature and custom. In this formal use of their disjunctive relation, he relegates this agreement to a conservative, common denominator. This IMAGE OF THOUGHT is the conventionally established, conceptual distinction between the *palais*, *hôtel*, and *maison* as the different genres of residential buildings (with the genre or *genera* being, like the *topos* from rhetoric, what a subject has in common with another[609]) that correspond to the different ranks or '*condition des personnes*.'[610] Pointing out this slippage should not be seen as some sort of critical comment from my side; rather, it needs to be understood clinically as a symptom of the specific use of architectural disjunction that had been established during the reign of Louis XIV. In Versailles, architecture's technicity had come to be politically instrumentalized in its capacity to mark social distinctions; a political technology that had become a conventional tool for signifying rank and marking membership to a group. What does require a more critical lens, then, is the way in which Cordemoy's discursive generalization of this political technology in the realm of planning helped to further reify and code architectural differences as social differences.

Within this analysis of appartements as a residential system, we must also more critically understand how, within Cordemoy's complexity-reducing

608 Cordemoy, *Nouveau traité … avec un dictionnaire* (Paris: Coignard, 1714), 165ff; here 174. See Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*, 141.

609 See Chi, "Arbitrary Authority," 196.

610 Cordemoy, *Nouveau traité,* 130–1.

proposition, this illegitimate use of the disjunctive synthesis helped conjure up a rather confused and inadequate idea of 'representationalism,' which obscured the actual workings of architectural arrangements. More than a critique of Cordermoy's thinking, this confusion must be understood as tied to the image of thought through which Descartes had embedded the logic of visual similitude into the classic episteme of difference and identity. In this regard, it is key to observe that this formal relation symptomatically co-emerged when the notion of *convenance*—which Foucault's analysis of epistemic structures, enlists specifically as one of the older conceptions of similitude—gained a newly dominant function in architectural discourse.[611] As in Descartes's formalistic use of trees, here too the problem arose of an ordering through finding formal correspondences between words and things, content and form.

The emerging formal solutions of rococo plans and the structural incongruences made in the name of *commodité* started to pose a fundamental structural problem. Together with Perrault's and D'Aviler's institutionalization of a suggested correspondence between social and architectural organizations, this search for a formal correspondence made the notion of *convenance* into a conceptual node of a complex inquiry that gave rise to a provisional theory of signification (or proto-semiological theory) according to which architectural decoration or form had to express not only harmonic proportions, but primarily had to convey a building's function or purpose,[612] thanks to which plans could be resolved in a simpler and structurally congruent manner.[613] Thus hoping to contribute to the legibility of a building at a time that was marked by a wider crisis of architecture's formal language, we find here what Lily H. Chi has called a progressive "characterization of architectural use" emerging in what constitutes a proto-functionalistic theory of architectural form, the tenet of which was that each genre of buildings should be given a matching expression and distinct character [*caractère*] according to its intended use.[614] This notion, promulgated by Germain Boffrand in his

611 See Foucault, *Order of Things*, 18.

612 Aside from Szambien's work, see here Chi, "Arbitrary Authority"; here 9.

613 Pierre Patte would respectively argue later in 1769 that "L'art de la distribution, qui s'est perfectionné depuis quarante ans en France, a nui plus qu'on peut pense à la solidité des bâtimens, en occssionnant quantités de formes, dont on tourmente la plûpart leur plans, sous prétexte de rendre les appartements plus commodes: il en résuté un multitude de porte-à-faux qua varient quelquefois à chaque étage, tellement qu'à peine peut-on deviner comment l'un peut subsiter au-dessus de l'autre, tant tout y est dénature." Pierre Patte, *Mémoires sur les objects les plus importans de l'architecture* (Paris: Rozet, 1769), 160; cited in Lucan, *Composition, Non-composition*, 14; more freely translated, after Hautecœur, in Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 119.

614 Chi, "The Use of Architecture: The Destination of Building Revisited," in *Chora: Volume*

Livre d'architecture (1745), was imported from the field of rhetoric, literature and drama, and had since its introduction in Perrault's work (where it served as a translation for the old notion of *genera*) begun to be coupled with architectural ordering practices.[615] Although I cannot delve in detail into this topic here, we should note that therein *convenance*—as an effect of the agreement between the (part-to-whole) relations of structures and usages—became a binding principle in the double sense of the term.[616]

As Chi describes, the search for the characteristics or distinctive signs of things was a commonplace (or *topos*, in a context nurtured by rhetoric) in which a thing was conceived, identified, or grouped in relation to something else that is shares some common feature with.[617] And the first, most literal commonplace is the genre into which these things are gathered.[618] In this respect, another crucial line linking up to this theory is found in the work of Antoine Desgodets (1653–1728). In a parallel effort to deal with the complexity of architecture in the 1720s, he developed a formal systematization of the different genres of buildings into a "generalized order" that—as a preliminary attempt still at quite some distance from an understanding of functional types—sorted according to levels of generality.[619] It is this general order of genres of buildings that eighteenth-century architectural theory started to weave together with the notion of intrinsic characteristic differences, according to which buildings can first be formally sorted; it thus also became easier to accord objects form in agreement with their destination.

Two, ed. Alberto Péréz-Goméz and Stephen Parcell (Montreal: McGill UP, 1996), 17–36; here 23–-24. See here also Kerim Salom, "L'architecture du discours, du caractère au type: Quatremère de Quincy et l'inversion des valeurs de l'architecte à la fin de l'âge classique," PhD diss., Univ. Paris-Est (2014).

615 See Salom, "Architecture du discours," 121ff; here 125.

616 Chi, "Arbitrary Authority," 194.

617 Ibid., here 172ff and 195–96.

618 Ibid., 195f.

619 Developed as a lecture series in 1723, it was published posthumously as Antoine Desgodets, *Les lois des bâtiments suivant la coutume de Paris* ([Paris]: s.n., 1748). On this history of this book, in the context of the Académie, and its contemporaneous engagement with Palladio's classification of ancient temples, I refer to Wolfgang Herrmann's lucid analysis, "Antoine Desgodets and the Académie Royale d'Architecture," *The Art Bulletin* 40, no.1 (Mar 1958), 23–53; esp. 47ff. Desgodets also penned several lecture notes on commodité, see esp. the *Traité de la commodité de l'architecture concernant la distribution et la proportion des édiffices, par M. Desgodets … recueillies par Jean Pinard, élève et étudiant de l'Académie royale d'architecture* (c. 1722–23), avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b10308952m. See also http://www.desgodets.net/commodite-presentation. Pinard's first volume is concerned almost exclusively with the 'external distribution' of orders; the second volume "concernant la Distribution des Ediffices," sadly misses the third section that was supposed to "contient les Palais, les hôtels, et les Maisons particulier" (see also http://www.desgodets.net/commodite, note 3), which could have shed light on the possible influence of Desgodet's thinking on Blondel (see below).

Concerning the formal agreement of built objects with their ideas, we see several innovations in the *Traité de la perspective* (1725), written by architect Jean Courtonne (1671–1739), who appended a longer "Digression on some difficulties regarding architecture," in which he briefly touches on the problem of distribution.[620] Courtonne, too, celebrated the "new art of distribution" that the French had invented "through the fortunate discoveries that have been made in the last century," having pushed the commodities within residential planning "to a point that outperforms the achievements of other nations and what our forebears have done in this genre."[621] In the following passage, distribution was presented, for the first time, as that particular aspect of architecture "that should be regarded as the main and most essential, all others being, so to speak subordinate."[622] Reformulating the aim of establishing an agreement between things and ideas, the intention of this subordination lay in establishing a relation of formal correspondence between the inside (or internal distribution) and outside (external disposition) of a building.[623] For Courtonne, this formal correspondence thus lies in a "natural arrangement of all parts [*pieces*] of a building, that preserves the stateliness [*noblesse*], greatness [*grandeur*], and proportionality that is appropriate to them [proportion qui leur est convenable]."[624] He then illustrates how this is achieved, by way of his executed designs for the Hôtel de Noirmontier ⊠[87] (b. 1721–24) and even more so, the Hôtel de Matignon ⊠[88] (b. 1722–24),[625] the accomplished plans of which gained him a position at the Académie.

If Perrault had highlighted an instrumental theory of a comparative order in architectural arrangements according to their different uses and the ordering problem of *commodité*, the coupling of distribution to disposition in the treatises of the early 1700s attempts to integrate this instrumentality into a specific functional ensemble, within which distribution denominates the means to an end, hence, a set purpose. As can be seen in Courtonne's proposition, the discussion now shifted from the usage of architecture to problematizing its nature.[626] It is this certain amount of 'nature' in which the town house

620 Jean Courtonne, *Traité de la perspective pratique, avec des remarques sur l'architecture; suivies de quelques édifices considérables…* (Paris: J. Vincent, 1725), 89–116; esp. 91ff.

621 Ibid., 92.

622 Ibid. (trans. Etlin).

623 Ibid., 93.

624 Ibid., 94.

625 Shown on the plates, following page 114 and 116, the latter was begun as a house for Christian-Louis de Montmorency-Luxembourg, prince de Tingry, the site and begun building were sold in 1623, to Jacques III de Goyon, sire de Matignon et de la Roche-Goyon due to the higher-than-estimated costs. On the design, and is axial displacement, see Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 101.

626 Nature (*phūsis*), natural laws (physiology) and classical natural rights, rather than being

became physically and metaphysically enveloped, , that this new system of convention now concretized, and thus came to be established along with a new culture-technical usage of architecture regarding social conventions.

The Architecture Moderne *(1728)*

As we know, there are no tendencies that do not evoke counter-tendencies. A book that, on this aspect, tended to a radically different approach, was the *Architecture Moderne, ou l'art de bien bastir pour toutes sortes de personnes* (first pub. 1728).[627] As its title indicates, the publication drew an explicit connection to the older manuals of Serlio and Le Muet, whose didactically organized serial format it was bringing back in its presentation of sixty "Distributions de Maisons, la plûpart nouvellement Bâties," drawn up by Gilles Tiercelet.[628] As the preface of this practical design manual contends: "Though since sixty years several excellent treatises on architecture had been published, … [they] made almost no mention of that part of architecture, that teaches [how] to distribute the parts/rooms [*pièces*] that shall compose an edifice, to make something commodious depending on the area of land one wishes to use and the quality of the persons who must live there."[629]

We may expect to find this teaching spelled out in the first text volume, as it touches on a variety of practical aspects such as construction materials

opposed to culture, constitute a specific cultural ecology during the eighteenth century. Natural rights were connected to how thing are defined by or in function of their essence, because it defined their nature, and this way their right of nature; an assumption that had been challenged and inverted by Hobbes.

627 See Claude Jombert, ed., *Architecture Moderne, ou l'art de bien bastir pour toutes sortes de personnes…* , 2 vols. (Paris: Jombert, 1728), avail. online at https://archive.org/details/architecturemode01jomb (Vol. I.) and https://archive.org/details/gri_33125011132210 (Vol. II). The book was long often falsely attributed to Briseux. A possible authorship by Tiercelet was first noted by Emil Kaufmann and then endorsed by Wolfgang Herrmann. See Kaufmann, "Die Architekturtheorie der französischen Klassik und des Klassizismus," *Repertorium für Kunstwissenschaft* 44 (1924), 201; and Herrmann, "The Author of the 'Architecture Moderne' of 1728," *JSAH* 18, no. 2 (May 1959), 60–62. While the publication clearly originates from a set of engravings by Gilles Tiercelet, (the precise extent of) his possible authorship of the text remains uncertain. Jachmann, for instance, wonder to what degree the serial organization can be attributed to Tiercelet (Jachmannn, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 69–75). The book was republished by Jombert's son as Charles-Antoine Jombert, ed., *Architecture Moderne, ou l'art de bien bastir pour toutes sortes de personnes…* , 2 vols. (Paris: Jombert, 1764), avail. online at https://books.google.nl/books?id=_HY_AAAAcAAJ (Vol. I), and https://books.google.nl/books?id=5Ck5AQAAMAAJ (Vol. II). This is a greatly expanded, substantially-altered, and more coherent edition with an avant-propos that as regards distribution added nothing decisively new. In his *avertissement* he remarks that his father asked several practitioners to provide texts, and that these "did not fulfil his expectations," it seems likely that Jombert had at least an editorial function in compiling the book. I will therefore reference the book as "Jombert, ed.," for the simple reason of finding both work back in the bibliography.

628 See the previous note.

629 C. Jombert, ed., *Architecture Moderne*, I: i; C.-A. Jombert, ed., *Architecture Moderne*, I: vii.

and techniques, and also offers a longer discussion on and mores and customs (*us et coûtumes*). The volume includes not only a long reflection on the legal and juridical components and complications involved in architectural production,[630] but puts an even greater emphasis on the decision (*jugement*) concerning the selection of an appropriate or suitable general arrangement as distinguished by their different position on the plot. In this latter dimension, Jachmann identifies this work as marking a greater shift away from an open topology toward a general "grid of alternative basic arrangements to choose from."[631] Like the earlier serial treatises, the *Architecture Moderne* is not a pattern book but a pedagogical treatise teaching the capacity to select the most fitting arrangement from within a continuous series of possible configurations.

But rather than being spelled out beyond some basic requirements, this ability to choose is conveyed only in a practical manner, implied in the organization of the series plates without commentary constituting the second volume. The distributions are again organized into a series of somewhat generalized building schemes.[632] But instead of being arranged according to topical logic, they are sorted according to the layout's growing degree of complexity (rather than just a growing plot width). This ordering grid presents a mediating position between earlier creative topology and later organizing taxonomy; hence, between multiplicity and classification.[633] While thus presenting certain counter-position to Le Muet's work, this update must be attributed to the fundamentally changed problem of distribution after the wider introduction of the *corps de logis double*. As we have seen above, Muet's *Manière* opposed the two possible forms of organizing the *corps de logis simple,* either in a more bisected or more linear fashion.

630 See here esp. Köhler, *Paris und das Wohnhaus*, 207–35; who offered a first systematic analysis of the work.

631 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 326–7 (emph. added). As he argues, in advancing Agricola's rhetorical theories, Ramus's *Dialectica* had complemented the earlier discussion of *inventio* with the second aspect of the *iudicium*, or judgment. In advancing Agricola's rhetorical theories, Ramus's *Dialectica* had complemented the earlier discussion of *inventio* with the second aspect of the *iudicium*, or judgment. See §§3.2–3 of Erland Sellberg, "Petrus Ramus," *SEP*, accessed online at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/ramus/. For the same reason as mentioned above, I am omitting here Jachmann's qualification of this grid as a 'typological ordering grid', as somewhat misleading to the extent that it is only rastering buildings according to a static generic order.

632 Rather than presenting actual building, the titling simply expresses the series claim to be directly of practical use, as Jachmann pointed out; especially for *newly constructed* buildings.

633 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 329.

The *Architecture Moderne* does exactly the same in problematizing the scalar constraint, which these two basic models entail, and which still persists in the *corps de logis double*. It thus didactically alternates between these two models on increasingly larger plots. The critical width appears around distribution 26 and 27 ☒[90–91], where the plans use a more circular *parcours* through two antichambres, a generic *chambre*, *cabinet* and *garde-robe* than for the *appartement de parade* on the upper floor. In distribution 31, we see the bisected model applied to a slightly wider plot ☒[91]. Here, on the upper floor, we see a central *antichambre commun* dividing two equal suites, consisting of an *antichambre*, *chambre*, *cabinet*, and *garde-robe,* and on the ground floor the central *sallon*, with *(grand) cabinet* and *arrière-cabinet* to the left (the *appartement de société*), and a *chambre* with *cabinet* to the right (*appartement de commodité*). This same basic scheme was used for the preceding distribution 30 on a narrower plot, but here the *cabinet* is missing, hence the apartment is not complete.

This limit of this bisected model, and the advantageous form of organizing more modest buildings in a more practical fashion, is not criticized in the description included in the 1764 edition, where the editor seems not to have properly grasped the PROBLEMATIZING organizational logic of the plates;[634] but he did recognize the wider examples as the ones where "one can join the practical [*l'utile*] and the appropriate [*l'agréable*]."[635] Distribution 32, using the same basic disposition, further highlights the ability of this model to better mask structural asymmetries, while distributions 34 and 35 ☒[92] more productively connect external and structural symmetries with internal, organizational asymmetry. After some variation of this scheme, distributions 44 and 51 ☒[93] offer a scheme with a longer sequence of rooms on the top floor, where the generic *chambre* in the foregoing plans is differentiated into a *chambre principale* and a separate *chambre à coucher*, with a second *appartement de commodité* on the right end. After this, the larger examples shown (including built examples, like Courtonne's Hôtels de Matignon or Noirmontier, and variations thereof) illustrate how this minimal but complete program can be expanded with additional service courts and annex wings, so that the main wing becomes an incrementally articulated and later free-standing structure.

634 In the 1764 re-edition, the plan sequence had partly been reorganized; see here the caption to C.-A. Jombert, ed., *Architecture Moderne*, pl.28, 123–4.

635 C. Jombert, ed., *Architecture Moderne*, 124.





90 A SERIAL DISPOSITIF I:
Plates from the *Architecture Moderne* (1727)





91 A SERIAL DISPOSITIF II:
Plates from the *Architecture Moderne* (1727)





92 A SERIAL DISPOSITIF III:
Plates from the *Architecture Moderne* (1727)





93 A SERIAL DISPOSITIF IIII:
Plates from the *Architecture Moderne* (1727)

In re-coding architecture in terms of a "theory of order" as Fichet writes—or perhaps we should say: in recoding architecture toward a *distributive* theory of ordering—during the early eighteenth century, French theoretical discourses on planning practices became heavily reinvested with deducing distribution as a "serial dispositif."[636] One formal factor that caused the serial treatise to make a comeback was the growing need to structure the increasing complexity of architectural design and the task of producing good layouts faced by designers. To resolve these, and to keep up with the evolving planning requirements, designers needed not only general formal design schemes; rather, they worked toward more formally structured design strategies and compositional pedagogies with a new rationale for distribution.[637] There, distribution was made more explicit as a fundamental, but also fundamentally-changing mode of architectural production. This aspect of reorganizing the modes of production of planning concerns precisely what Foucault, in his theory of dispositifs, calls the "ORGANIZATION OF GENESES," as a way of organizing interrelated socio-spatial production processes. If we want to explain the return and complexification of this 'serial dispositif' within the art of distribution, it is imperative to avoid reducing 'serial' structurally to 'linear.' This would pitch the earlier linear logic of the *logis* against the network logic of the doubled-up *logis*. As a result, one might be tempted to draw a simple distinction between two supposedly discontinuous models, one succeeding the other. But this distinction does not explain the transformation by which this dispositif turned from one form into another; how the simple linear model became incrementally transposed into a more gridded, network logic.

In this matter, Jachmann has already made a valuable step in placing the *Architecture Moderne* in the context of the reception of Locke's sensualist conception of 'ideas.'[638] Where in Descartes's theory of knowledge, reasoning proceeded dichotomically by "hierachizing being *pro gradu perfectionis,*" while "human understanding filters, classifies, and orders ideas *pro gradu distinctionis*," it largely eliminated any possible combinations or intermediary forms.[639] In approaching the world as a plenum, Leibniz had begun reversing this rationalist logic into a more open system, as he apprehended combinatory logic in its infinity as an incrementally growing theory of knowledge.[640]

636 Ibid. 100–102.
637 See Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 104.
638 He here specifically stresses the relation of the formation of ideas to the crystallization of types. Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 326ff.
639 See above. Here after Serres, *Système de Leibniz*, 117–27.
640 Ibid.

As an empiricist, Locke understood ideas as things that are primarily formed by successive experiences, not just reasoning. This experiential concept, Jachmann writes, was transmitted to French thinking especially through Jean-Pierre Crousaz's post-Cartesian discussion about the ordering of diversity by degree (*pro gradu*) in his *New Essay on Logic* (*Nouvel Essai de logique*, 1712).[641] It more strongly advocated a theory that presented knowledge as something 'perfectible,' and proposed logic as a means to train the structuring of *diversité* or *varieté* toward *unité*. It thus posited that knowledge is acquired in a synthetic process of deriving unity from diversity, that is, when amongst the plenitude of things, certain regularities can be outlined.[642] Here the structuring of diversity toward unity, related—albeit in a somewhat inverted fashion—to Descartes's formalistic generalization of tree-structures, leads us back to the slowly crystallizing notion of *convenance*. From Nicole and Spinoza, through Perrault, Cordemoy and Courtonne, it incrementally problematized an instrinsic degree of formal reality (or formal correspondence) that is proper to this sort of ordering diverse (i.e. heterogeneous) elements integrated into a larger ensemble. This formal integration is the point where the dispositional or dispositivistic notion of distribution arises.

Rather than presenting a single coherent series sorted by scale from small to large, this emerging notion of ordering was based on forms of grouping things by their degree of complexity (albeit not under this modern term), and ranking them by the level of simplicity or complexity they owe to integrating a gradually increasing number of constitutive elements. Here, a clear parallel can be established in the (changing) organization of the resurfacing serial treatises. As we have seen, in French architecture the simple serial logic of the *logis* and its superlinearity had been broken; this serial dispositif came to configure an ensemble of diverse elements employed to gradually draw 'a tree from a net' of possible paths within residential planning practices, which now operated on the more complex level of functionally diverse sub-ensembles that had to be brought together. This organizational difference becomes evident in comparing the *Manière* with the *Architecture moderne.* Instead of offering a single or a few normative examples demonstrating the ideal application of the new principles, the serial treatise and its ability to allow learners to progressively engage with complexity through a series of cases, once again presented an adequate means to foster the skill required by the art of distribution and its aim of earning and applying those skills to achieve *convenance*.

641 Jean-Pierre Crousaz, *Nouvel Essai de logique* (Amsterdam: Honore, 1712); after Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 328.

642 See Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 329.

We can therefore reconsider the resurfacing and complexifying serial dispositif in less formal and more pedagogical (regarding distributive practices) or technological (regarding the art of distribution) terms of the 'organization of geneses,' that is, the organization of architectural production of designerly knowledge in particular. To do so it seems helpful to reconnect this observation with Foucault's earlier-mentioned understanding of the term *convenance* as one of the older conceptions of similitude, in the sense that things are "sufficiently close to one another to become juxtaposed."[643] As such, it conceptualizes "a resemblance tied to space in the form of successive steps [*dans la forme du 'proche en proche'*]. It is of the same order as conjunction and adjustment."[644] This **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** by means of "formes du proche-en-proche," lies not in some simple production of proximities and niches (*pochés*). Rather, what underlies it is an approximation by means of an incremental nesting of scales, and the resulting forms of *mise-en-abîme* that we have repeatedly detected in the earlier stages of this form-taking system. And in this synthesis, those are now slowly compounded into a new mode of planning that arises from the progressive convergence of the two oppositional planning schemes under the idea of establishing *convenance*.

A Kick-Starting Machinic Assemblage

Aside from giving a clue about the resonance between the notion of *convenance* and the structure of the serial treatise, this conjunctive dimension of 'adjustment' within conventional planning (as the act of matching, finding something fitting), also opens it to an assemblage-theoretical view. This 'fitness' is irreducibly systemic, for it consists in the reciprocal adaptation of certain forms of living and their environment; a mutual relation that resides in a specific agreement (*convenance*). Bringing distinct and heterogeneous things together in such a consistent system of mutually enforcing relations was exactly the problem of establishing conventional agreements, or achieving *convenance*. This point becomes especially explicit where the preface of the *Architecture Moderne* problematizes the demand (later called an exigency) that, when building a house, the apartments be distributed proper to conventions (*convenablement*), so that the appropriate (*le commode*) and the necessary (*le necessaire*) are combined.[645]

643 Foucault, *Order of Things*, 18.
644 Ibid. (trans. mod.); cf. id., *Les Mot et les choses*, 33.
645 C. Jombert, ed., *Architecture Moderne*, I: n.p. [a ii]; C.–A Jombert, ed., *Architecture Moderne*, I: viii–ix.

Here, we note a crucial shift in the evolving system of conventional planning and its problematization of the correspondence between heterogeneous elements. For as the second edition specifies, *convenance* consists in the extent (i.e. degree) to which these disparate aspect are skillfully brought together: as the *Encyclopédie* later stressed, "appropriateness or proper agreement [la convenance] lies between things; the appropriate or conventional propriety [le convenable] lies within actions. … The appropriate consists in the conformity between behavior and established customs [la conformité de sa conduite avec les usages établis]."[646] It thus problematizes a conformity-in-action (=OPERATIONAL SIMILARITY), so that—by way of planning practices fitting characteristic spatial organizations—those two aspects are brought together as well as possible and in a way that they mutually amplify another (in the original sense of *confortare*). In this sense, it was directly tied to specific conformations and matching structural arrangements, from which *convenance* was seen to arise as an effect. This effect, and the degree to which it was structurally achieved by avoiding ill-fitting dispositions in general, thus minimized adverse effects of mutually-diminishing elements through fitting distribution, based on which the planning of apartments was then effectively measured and judged to be beautifully resolved.

With this much more operative notion of what 'establishing *convenance*' as a skill or art means in its implicitly technical dimension, the *Architecture Moderne* countered the complexity-reducing approaches of architects like Courtonne, who understood and promulgated the establishment of formal correspondence between the inner and outer organization of a buildings, through which architectural theory incrementally arrogated distribution with some sort of inherent sign-function to represent its content.[647] Rather, the *Architecture Moderne* first promoted a technical aesthetics, an aesthetics of establishing *functionings* through the art of matching external, formal/structural and internal/operational characteristics in a mutually amplifying manner. Building on this observation, we should note that it can only be established over an internal organization coming to articulate itself in some external form. It is precisely in the externalization of this formal correspon-

646 See Denis Diderot, and Jean le Rond d'Alembert, *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers,* … IV: 160. Cited after the modern online edition, ed. Robert Morrissey (Univ. of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project, Spring 2013), avail. online at http://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/.

647 As Katie Scott critically pointed out, where even orders and decoration "can at best only allude to social values obliquely" (instead of being said to 'representing them'), a buildings layout has near to any real representational capacity in itself (Scott, *Rococo Interior*, 104).

dence, as a specific FORM OF EXPRESSION, that a certain convention can be established by coding its underlying organization so that, like in languages and sign-systems, architectural form gives rise to a discursively established and thus semiologized correspondence between the form of things (or *res extensa*) and content of ideas (*res cogitans*). In order to function conveniently/conventionally, this formal system must obscure the point of its genesis and those non-discursive, material practices configuring these FORMS OF CONTENT in the first place.

By obscuring this point of genesis, however, this process reveals itself as the precise point at which a certain machinic assemblage kicks in and becomes effectuated. Because machines—rather than revealing or rendering visible the underlying mechanism of functioning, as Heidegger argued—characteristically operate in a way that allows users to become increasingly ignorant of their workings, as philosopher of technology Antoinette Rouvroy has emphasized.[648] Here, we have seen that this commencing assemblage was effectuated by the conceptual conjunction of distribution with disposition, which led to the becoming-prevalent of the idea of *convenance* over *commidité* as the organizational principle for the planning of apartments, which in turn resonated closely with (and thus brought back) the older pedagogical principle of a serial organization knowledge (production). This concatenation therefore presented the SUFFICIENT REASON (or 'POSITIVITY' as Foucault would have said; the *real* condition of emergence) for the discursive subject of apartments to form as a thematic subject throughout the discussed discourses. It is really the conception of *convenance* that marks the third CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS, as Deleuze and Guattari name the level at which a new subject forms. By "rebooting the entire process" all over, it serves as the configuring part through which the system of appartements now concretized as a system of organization within the wider dispositif. Made up of various powers and knowledges interested in revealing the affective mechanisms underlying the art of distribution, it aimed at attaining a technical awareness of the mechanics between co-constitutive and mutually-affecting spatial and social systems, in order to re-employ the serial organization of geneses in a way that may help achieve a greater conformity between architectural structures and social activities taking place within it.

648 Antoinette Rouvroy, "Technology, Virtuality, and Utopia: Governmentality in an Age of Autonomic Computing," in *Law, Human Agency, and Autonomic Computing*, ed. Mireille Hildebrandt and Antoinette Rouvroy (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2011), 119–40; here 133.

If we remember that partitioning or gridding (*quadrillage*) is what drives this dispositif, then a tentative answer might be this: like the earlier notion of *appartenance*, the notions of appropriateness (*commodité*) and propriety (*convenance*) are best viewed as "boundary objects" which, as Katie Scott argues concerning property, present "a [sociological] concept or idea that balances at the intersection of a number of different discourses."[649] Such objects are (as Haraway and Barad insist) always established or constituted by equally intersectional—but more non-discursive—ecologies of boundary-drawing practices that stabilize and recompose those disparate domains in the first place. Here we see a new stage in the systemic individuation of architectural technique of compartition or distribution and its recently-identified status as a technical object. Beyond the prevailing of the strategic objective (here: the becoming-prevalent of *convenance*) that enables a new dispositif to form, Foucault suggests that its further genesis (here: the concretization of conventional planning as an individuating system) is conditioned by something else, namely, a twofold process that is characterized, on the one hand, by a functional overdetermination that recursively readjusts (*reprise*) the heterogeneous elements it is composed of, and on the other hand, a strategically flattening saturation (*remplissement*).[650] It is this twofold process, perhaps better apprehended through Simondon's notion of **INTEGRATION-DIFFERENTIATION**, or Deleuze's **DIFFERENT/CIATION**, through which this dispositif gains a function within a larger evolving **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLE** effectuated by the machinic assemblage of residential planning based on conventional agreements: the concretizing system can not be explained by a representational notion of (establishing) *convenance* alone, but only through a more productive understanding of its own functioning in terms of which discursive and non-discursive components came to be readjusted and flattened out in its name. What is the specific reconfiguring that facilitates this integration of the notion of establishing conventional relations into the discourse of the art of distribution?

649 Katie Scott, "Maps, Views and Ornament," in *Privilege and Property: Essays on the History of Copyright*, ed. Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer and Lionel Bently (Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2010), 255–88; here 256; freely avail. online at https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0007. Scott herself takes the notion from the works in the sociology of science, referring to Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, "Institutional Ecology, 'Translations' and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907–39," *Social Studies in Science* 19 (1989): 387–420; and Joan Fujimura, "Crafting Science: Standardized Packages, Boundary Objects, and 'Translation,'" in *Science as Practice and Culture*, ed. by A. Pickering (Chicago/London: Chicago UP, 1992), 168–211.

650 Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 194, cited in my Book 0, note 306–8. Concerning this replenishment [*remplissement*] note again the relation to the connection of the principle of plenitude to the principle of sufficient reason, as a criterion for ordering diversity by degree as noted by Rawes and Formigari, above note 411.

In the ongoing individuation of systems, it is the integration or differentiation of the functional unit, as I have explained before, that enables new structurations to emerge.[651] The (de- and re)coupling of certain systems —which can be identified here as the progressive convergence of the notion of distribution and disposition—must be analyzed in terms of which technologies operate, mediate, and come to be concretized within this process; that is the crucial understanding at stake here. So, in order to not just reiterate or reify individuation in terms of this species/genera-distinction, we have to approach it in connection to the **MACHINIC PHYLUM**, the engineering stratum on which all individuations are configured. On this level, all individuals can only emerge within an intrinsic (i.e. double) articulation in relation to an **ASSOCIATED MILIEU**, co-produced within this process. For the rococo *hôtel*, a large part of this co-produced associated milieu lay in the treatises that encode and thus institutionalize the normative organization of the apartment as a specific species of space. In this regard, the convergence of distribution with disposition furnished a socio-technical milieu that provided the necessary reproductive isolation mechanisms in which the residential system of appartements could speciate as a technical individual. This happened through its **ALLOPLASTIC** adaptation to the wider social milieu with which it was coupled. Against earlier socio-spatial distinctions, spatial systems of distinction now operated as a driving cultural technics for a more finely grained and highly-stratified society, in which distinction had attained not only the status of a (psycho-sociogenic) "technology of the self" of the court aristocracy, but thereby also became increasingly instrumentalized as a political technology.

Precisely in this technical respect, the in next section I shall focus in more detail on the work Jacques-François Blondel, who, as scholars have often noted, was the first architect to take the crucial step of starting to encode the art of distribution in a more systematic manner. The following will then extend previous and recent readings, by showing two things: initially, I will illustrate how Blondel's work successively established a proper system of planning, by revealing how its systematicity was achieved by progressively resituating the conforming operational similarity of planning techniques into the social milieu in which this system actually constitutes *as* a system of functionings; secondly, in doing so, I want to render how this move contributed to transforming the art of distribution toward a new machinic assemblage, that is, modern planning.

651 Simondon, *L'Individuation psychique et collective,* 132.

3.3.2 The Theory-Practice of Distributing with *Convenance*

During the late 1730s, we can observe that the distribution of *hôtels* is becoming a more concrete ordering instrument for establishing a logically-coherent socio-spatial system. In it, the discourse on the art of distribution was starting to outline a specific dispositif, responding to an urgent need within architectural planning problematics. One architect who identified the need to rethink architecture precisely in terms of these arising needs, Picon notes,[652] was Jacques-François Blondel (1705–74).[653] From this identification, Blondel increasingly invested in a new design didactics, a first step toward which we find in his first publication *De La Distribution des maisons de plaisance* (On the distribution of country houses, 1737–38) ✉[94].[654] This book set the architect on a trajectory to establish himself as the first (and perhaps the greatest) theory-practitioner of distribution through his later work, including his many entries for Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* (first pub. in 1751), his theoretical elaborations on residential planning in *Architecture francoise* (French architecture, 1752), his (unpublished manuscript for an) *Abrégé d'architecture, concernant la distribution, la décoration et la construction des bâtiments civils* (Abstract on architecture, concerning the distribution, decoration, and construction of civil buildings, s.d.), and finally his *Cours d'architecture* (Lectures on Architecture, pub. 1771).[655] Throughout all these works, Blondel started to

652 Antoine Picon, "'Vers un architecture classique': Jacques-François Blondel et le *Cours d'architecture*": *Cahiers de la recherche architecturale* 18 (1985), 28–37; here 28: "Blondel perçoit la nécessité de repenser l'architecture en fonction des besoins qui se font jour."

653 Hereafter, when I write 'Blondel', I always refer to Jacques-François Blondel, not the elder François Blondel, unless specified otherwise. For a recent biographic analysis of Blondel, see esp. Aurélien Davrius, *Jacques-François Blondel: architecte des Lumières* (Paris: Garnier, 2018), for older biographic and thematic works, see here. For a re-edition of Blondel's writing including previously unpublished documents, see esp. id., ed., *Jacques-François Blondel, un architecte dans la 'République des Arts': Étude et édition de ses Discours* (Geneva: Droz, 2016).

654 Jacques-François Blondel, *De la distribition des maisons de plaisance…* (Paris: Jombert, 1737–38).

655 See Blondel [fils], *Abrégé d'architecture, concernant la distribution, la décoration et la construction des bâtiments civils, composée par Blondel fils, architecte*, Bibliothèque Mazarine Ms. 3691; recently avail. online at https://mazarinum.bibliotheque-mazarine.fr/ark:/61562/mz3071. On the dating, see below note 774. Blondel, *Cours d'architecture…*, 6 vols with plates (Paris: Desaint: 1971–77). At the same time, the recognition Blondel gained as a theorist, teacher, or pedagogue has overshadowed (although to a lesser degree then in Serlio's case) the deliberate designerly didactics that underlie his theory-practice, and the multifaceted attempts at formulating both a novel way of conceptualizing architecture alongside a novel design methodology for conceiving it. In this regard it is historical irony that Pierre Patte, when finalizing of the *Cours* after Blondel's death, found it necessary in praising his didactics to mention "on sait qu'il [i.e. Blondel] appliquoit plus à former des Théoriciens que des Praticiens" (Patte's preface in Blondel, *Cours d'architecture*, VI: x).

systematically describe and for the first time codify the different component structures of residential planning (including the different appartements), their constitutive elements (i.e the rooms [*les pièces*]), and their relationships. Especially in the latter aspect, thanks to Blondel's changing way of sorting these component structures into a logically coherent system, this method was becoming incrementally concrete. This concretizing system is best understood in the context of Blondel's evolving thought on residential design practices. Therefore, let me briefly map this discourse in this section in order to uncover the strategic objective that unfolds in it.

Blondel's De La Distribution, *1737–38*

Blondel gained much recognition for his first publication, *De la distribution,* which was published just before he opened the first private school for architecture in France, the Ecole des Arts, in 1740. Here, Laure Chabanne writes, the "larger projects consisted in bringing together, for the first time, in a single spot, and in a coherent full-time teaching program, all the knowledge and know-how that aspiring architects had hitherto only been able to glean from miscellaneous settings."[656] Concerning residential planning, he did something similar, with the rather unconventional topic of his publication, which gave renewed attention to the planning of country residences (or peri-urban ones, to be more precise). Its greater relevance lies in the way that Blondel, who in all likelihood had attended Desgodets's lectures on his general order of building, added the house as a (or perhaps the) basic genre of building.[657] More importantly, Indeed, *De la distribution* was the first architectural treatise that deliberately broke with the serial format of presenting different genres of residential buildings for all sorts of people, in focusing on one isolated genre.[658] Yet, as it still "declinates" this genre through five "pedagogical fictions" (as Davrius describes these examples), we can note in it a certain technological remnant of the older format. What set *maisons de plaisance* apart from urban townhouses and made them a great case to be illuminated in a

656 See the paper presented by Laure Chabanne, "L'École des arts de Jacques-François Blondel ou l'invention d'une pédagogie des relations entre architecture, sculpture et peinture," at the conference "Jacques-François Blondel et L'enseignement de L'Architecture," at the Cité De L'architecture et Du Patrimoine, Paris, Dec 14, 2017. Video recording avail. online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vy0oADXeVPg, 15:00 (my trans.)

657 After Reed Benhamou, "Parallel Walls, Parallel Worlds: The Places of Masters and Servants in the 'Maisons de plaisance' of Jacques-François Blondel," *Journal of Design History* 7, no.1 (1994), 1–11; here 1. On Desgodet's possible influence on Blondel, see also above, my note 619. Davrius (and Hélène Rousteau-Chambon) have highlighted the similarities between passages of Desgodet's *Traité d'ordre de l'architecture* (1719); see also Davrius, *Blondel: architecte*, 250ff.

658 On Blondel's *De la distribution*, see also Davrius, *Blondel: architecte*, 57–86; here 368.

more isolated fashion, was that their planning was not directly overshadowed by the resolution of conflicting constraints. They thus allowed the architect to address planning principles more freely. While preparing a more independent discourse on planning, this publication only offers—despite its programmatic title—an "informal presentation of established guidelines" concerning residential planning, as Etlin notes, not a full-blown theory as we find stated in his later works.[659]

In the "preliminary reflections on architecture in general" preceding the project description, Blondel makes distribution the "main objective [objet capital] of architecture."[660] In doing so, he sided with Courtonne's position that distribution "is, properly speaking, the part [of the architect's duties] that should be regarded as the main and most essential, all the others being—so to speak—subordinate."[661] The text then promptly states that the distribution of plans "consists in arranging well [à bien arranger] all rooms [toutes les pièces] that compose it," while "there is also another sort of distribution regarding its decoration, both inside and outside [tant intérieure qu'extérieure]; and the architect's merit is to render all the parts in perfect relation to one another [rendre toutes les parties parfaitement relatives les unes aux autres]."[662] This way, while based on the conflation of distribution and disposition, he contradistinguished two aspects of distribution: the internal layout of rooms constituting the various suites, and the external segmentation of the building masses.[663] Between these aspects, he argues (in a manner that refers us back to the formal correspondence between ideas and objects), there must be some sort agreement (*convenance*) that "should be observed judiciously [soit observée judicieusement]."[664] Intended to "inspire a good taste in architectural students"[665] on this matter, the treatise was demonstrated the establishment of these correspondences through a comparative presentation of five instructive projects of decreasing size, where we move from rather unrestrained, ideal compositions to smaller ones in which the establishment of correspondences was complicated by the need to resolve conflicting requirements.

What *De la distribution* thus implicitly illustrated is that these conflicts, multiplied in the design of urban residences, are not caused by external con-

659 See Etlin, *Symbolic Space*, 127–35.
660 Blondel, *De la distribution*, 3.
661 See Courtonne, *Traité de la perspective*, 92; after Etlin, *Symbolic Space*, 130.
662 Blondel, *De la distribution*, 3.-4
663 See also, Blondel, *Cours d'architecture*, Vol. IV, 108.
664 Blondel, *De la Distribution*, 3.
665 Ibid.

94 Plates from Jacques François Blondel's *De la distribution des maisons de plaisance . . .* (1737–38).


DE LA
DISTRIBUTION
DES
MAISONS DE PLAISANCE,
ET DE LA
DECORATION
DES EDIFICES EN GENERAL.
Par Jacques-François Blondel.
Ouvrage enrichi de cent soixante Planches en taille-douce, gravées par l'Auteur.
TOME PREMIER.
A PARIS, RUE DAUPHINE,
Chez Charles-Antoine Jombert, Libraire du Roy pour l'Artillerie & le Génie, à l'Image Notre-Dame.
M. DCC. XXXVII.
AVEC APPROBATION ET PRIVILEGE DU ROY.

straints; rather, they are caused by something inherent in planning itself, a scale-dependent phenomenon that emerges at a certain threshold concerning size and/or level of organizational complexity.

Differences with Briseux's L'art de bâtir, *1743*

Blondel's organizational logic of a few examples from large to small is not particularly serial at first sight, and Jachmann's discussion of serial treatises passes over the work relatively quickly. Yet, it could be worthwhile to take more time to reconsider this transformative technological break and the inverted (decreasing) order in relation to another aspect that his analysis specifically touches on. This concerns Condillac's critique, soon to follow, of contemporaneous theoretical edifices (*Traité des systèmes*, 1749) and the proposed inversion of the epistemic process underlying the geometric method: that, instead of moving from simple points to complex bodies, one ought to start from the unity of bodies, and then proceed through a series of successive comparisons and differentiations.[666] Here, the idea of the whole

666 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 338ff; here esp. 343.



95 ***This page***, **plate from Blondel's *De La Distribution.* Plan of the first exemplary project, ground floor, with added diagram.**
Scale ca. 1:1000

96–97 ***Opposite page***, **plates from Blondel's *De La Distribution*: ground floor plan of the fourth exemplary project (*top*), and of the fifth exemplary project (*bottom*), with added diagrams.**
Scale ca. 1:666

comes first, albeit a whole that must be made, an assemblage expressed in an empirical process of experimental or experiential construction of differentiated elements and their overall relations.

While this inverted serial logic is already anticipated within Blondel's work, Jachmann's analysis finds its more direct expression in the organization of Charles-Etienne Briseux's *L'art de bâtir des maisons de campagne* (The art of building country houses, 1743)[667] ✉[45], a book that, as has been repeatedly noted, was inspired by *De La Distribution.* As the lengthy subtitle of Briseux's publication announces, it intended to treat the distribution, construction, and decoration of country houses by way of various "Projects in 27 [in fact, roughly 5] differing widths, from 10 to 26 *toises*" for which "4 different *Formes*" (i.e. a sort of base-scheme with the same facade) are given, with partly "different

667 Charles-Etienne Briseux, *L'art de bâtir des maisons de campagne, ou l'on traite leur distribution, leur construction, et leur décoration* , 2 vols (Paris: Prault, 1743).









Distributions" (i.e. layouts). Organized in this nested logic, the book was conceived to cover three *classes* of building (for the bourgeois, the *gentilhomme*, and the seigneur) in two *volumes* each. But of these six volumes only the two volumes of the first class were published. Even in these, Jachmann finds the serial logic adapted to an increasing complexity, broken down into separate smaller series, according a "more consequent realization of an ordering system," but also more complex ordering grid, which does not directly reflect an organizational logic that potential builders could use when looking for examples.[668] Indeed, in stark contrast to the highly rigid ordering logic, the plans appear quite freely organized, if not randomly. Instead, the multi-linear ordering logic of the partitions of the book was reflected within the partitioning of the architecture presented in it.

668 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 79 (my trans.).

98–99 BRISEUX'S L'ART DE BÂTIR DES MAISONS DE CAMPAGNE (1743): Title page (this page) and plates from Briseux's *L'art de bâtir* (1743): Here, the first and second distribution for the first 'form' of 10 *toises* (10.1.1/2, *opposite page*). Scale ca. 1:500



L'ART DE BÂTIR
DES
MAISONS DE CAMPAGNE.
OÙ L'ON TRAITE
DE LEUR DISTRIBUTION, DE LEUR CONSTRUCTION,
& de leur Décoration.

On y donne des Projets sur dix-sept différentes longueurs; sçavoir, depuis dix toises de face jusqu'à vingt-six.
Quatre différentes Formes de Bâtimens sur chacune de ces longueurs, avec leurs Elévations, leurs Coupes, & plusieurs Distributions sur chacune des Formes.
Quelques autres Formes de Bâtimens, dont les uns ont leur Avenue ou leur Entrée par un de leurs côtés, & les autres sont oblique, par rapport à la situation de leurs Jardins.

AVEC L'EXPLICATION DE CES PROJETS,

Et des Desseins de Menuiserie, de Serrurerie, de Parterres, & d'autres Ornemens propres à la Décoration intérieure & extérieure.

TOUS CES PROJETS ET DESSEINS GRAVÉS EN TAILLE DOUCE.

Ouvrage très-utile, non-seulement pour construire des Maisons de Campagne, mais aussi pour bâtir dans les Villes, & qui peut fournir des idées pour donner aux anciens Bâtimens, des Distributions plus commodes.

Par le Sieur C. E. BRISEUX, Architecte.

TOME SECOND.

A PARIS,
Chez PRAULT Pere, à l'entrée du Quay de Gêvres, au Paradis.

M. D C C. X L I I I.
AVEC APPROBATION ET PRIVILEGE DU ROY.

Directly apparent here are the spatial hierarchies of the more intricately intercalated rooms. The smallest residences at the start of the book are generally characterized by an asymmetrical organization into a single suite ⊠[99–100]. With the two distributions for the fourth form of ten *toises* ⊠[101], and the subsequent first distributions of the first form of thirteen *toises* ⊠[102], the possibility of a more symmetrical organization of the plan into two suites on one floor is introduced. Here the didactic theme of the *Architecture Moderne*, to waver between symmetrical and asymmetrical organizations, returns and is, thanks to the ordering logic of the distribution in each form, connected to the increasing depth of the wing (*simple, semi-double, double*). This theme is developed, although not strictly linearly, through the distributions for the second and third forms of eighteen *toises* ⊠[103], or in various distributions of the first form for twenty *toises*, so that an internal, organizational asymmetry resulting from two differentiated suites becomes increasingly coupled with structural symmetry. The second volume starts with a *grand project* organized in this exemplary way. ⊠[104] Even more developed in his Hôtel d'Augny (b.1746–48) that serves as the exemplary illustration to





his *Traité du beau essentiel* (Treatise on essential beauty, 1752)[669], this derived model is then subsequently re-adapted to more constrained lots. Briseux's first volume thus ends, in a sense, where *De la distribution* had started. Another aspect in which it greatly differs from Blondel's work is its way of organizing interconnections and spatial relationships:[670] the inclusion of corridor spaces structuring the plan, at least on the top floor.[671] The history of corridor spaces themselves as an element of circulation for organizing more interconnected matrices of rooms in Italian and English planning[672] is of lesser interest here, precisely to the extent that the evolving idea of structuring the plan around corridors dissolved the residential system of the appartement

669 See Charles-Etienne Briseux, *Traité du beau essentiel dans les arts: appliqué particulierement à l'architecture, et démontré phisiquement et par l'expérience …* (Paris: Chereau, 1752), Vol.1, pl. 33.

670 See Etlin, "Le Dedans"; and id., "System of the Home," in *Symbolic Spaces*, passim.

671 In the first distributions we characteristically find a transversal corridor on the upper floor, which is here problematized as a disturbance when placed above the principal bedrooms; the secondary option present various ways in which this can be avoided. See for instance, Briseux, *L'art de bâtir,* Vol.I, pl.2 vs. 3; 6 vs. 7; 10 vs. 11

672 On this history see esp. Vincent Droguet, "Le couloir central dans la distribution: son apparition et son développement au XVIIIe siècle," *Bulletin Monumental* 160, no.4 (2002), 379–89; and Trüby's *Geschichte de Korridors*, esp. 59–115. Here also in reference to Evans's "Figures, Doors, Passages."



100–1 Further plates from Briseux's *L'art de bâtir* (1743): The first and second distribution of the second 'form' of 10 *toises* (10.2.1/2, *top*); and the first and second distribution for the fourth 'form' of 10 *toises* (10.4.1/2, *bottom*).
Scale ca. 1:500



102–3 Briseux's first and second distribution of the first 'form' of 13 *toises* (13.1.1/2, *top*); and the first and second distribution for the first and second 'form' of 18 *toises* (18.1.1/2, *bottom, upper row* ; 18.2.1/2, *below*).
Scale ca. 1:500 / 1000

104 **Briseux's distribution for the first 'form' of 26 *toises*.**
Scale ca. 1:1000



with the traditional French system of enfilades and *dégagements*, that Blondel (as supposedly more conservative representative of rococo positions[673]) advocated. While historians have often juxtaposed or opposed the systems for organizing spaces, this oppositional reading is not entirely correct. As Trüby has pointed out, Briseux, too, was wary of corridors as a potential noise disturbance for the inhabitants and reserved them for the layout of the upper floor only, whereas Blondel had initially even included *dégagements* on the main floor of one of his exemplary designs.[674] Rather, both systems evolved in parallel, in mutual presupposition. They must be understood as two diverging spatial responses to ordering conceptions. In this regard, what is more important, and also incrementally comes to the fore in Briseux's subsequent distributions, is instead the spatial hierarchization that becomes visible in the plans, specifically in the constructive differentiation between load-bearing structures and non-load-bearing partitions.

Making-Operative a New Planning System, 1751–52

As I want to argue, a similar hierarchization occurs in the work of Blondel, which, as also Jachmann notes, employs a classification system that ended up being even more complex than Briseux's.[675] It operates on a very different, rather

673 Here after Kruft; their differing organizational systems were also described in Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 118–124. In this context, Trüby diagnoses of a remarkably-"explicit inhibition of using corridors within architectural theory" against the many courtly ordinances and ceremonial rules that, by contrast, allow for their inclusion (Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors*, 86 (my trans.))

674 Here after Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors*, 85.

675 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 344 and 355 n1162.

complex level, that will take the entire remainder of this section to properly unravel . Yet, once understood in its underlying logic, it will allow us to reconsider corridors and enfilades as two alternative technologies for planning spatial hierarchies, which as I shall show, emerge from two alternative approaches to managing flows [→3.3.3]. Of course, the system of *dégagements* and corridors would more directly appear to be the device for channeling and engineering flows; yet, as I have shown before, the enfilade, too, was a complex instrument for the control of flows of select visitors. As we have seen in the last chapter [→3.2.2], flows and their mechanics started to affect planning. By posing new problems, these dynamics completely reconfigured existing social and spatial technologies.[676] Eighteenth-century engineers still lacked the instruments to properly control the natural and social realities they were trying to organize, and resorted initially, as Picon comments, to using "a provisional method consisting in a systematic decomposition of things and phenomena," as advocated by Condillac's reversal of geometrical into analytical rationalities.[677] In thus "following the order by which ideas are formed," the necessary condition for forming knowledge resides in a comparison of orders (*rapports*) through a systematic "decomposition of an object, and the distribution of its parts, in an order that their generation becomes easy,"[678] an idea that he had started to develop in his early *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines* (Essay on the origin of human knowledge, 1746), and in the *Traité des systèmes* (Treatise on systems, 1749).[679]

Within this epistemological and technological transformation, Briseux's and Blondel's systems should be also reconsidered in tandem as two diverg-

676 As Picon has highlighted: "Whereas the Classic philosophers, scientists and engineers, used to consider nature as something organised according to the laws of order and proportion, as something essentially architectonic, eighteenth-century elites were increasingly impressed by the mobility of natural elements." Antoine Picon, "History of Technological Thought," in *Technological Change: Methods and Themes in the History of Technology* (London: Harwood, 1996), 37–49. On this point, see also the related essay by Alexandre Guilbaud, "À propos des relations entre savoirs théoriques et pratiques dans' l'Encyclopédie: le cas du problème de la résistance des fluides et de ses applications," *Recherches sur Diderot et sur l'Encyclopédie* 47 (2012), 207–42.

677 Picon, "History of Technological Thought," n.p.; citing E. Bonnot de Condillac, "Cours d'études pour le prince de Parme: L'art de penser," *Œuvres philosophiques de Condillac* (Paris, P.U.F., 1947–1951), I: 769. Here cited after *Œuvres philosophiques de Condillac* (Paris: Houel, 1798), avail. online https://books.google.nl/books?id=kH_duD2gXN8C.

678 Condillac, *Œuvres philosophiques,* 169 and Part II "Des moyens les plus propres à acquérir des connoissances" Ch. IV, "De l'analyse," 221ff. On the aspect of the comparison of orders, that "enables us to pass from one thing to another. … In this way we establish series … in which other terms are established according to increasing differences," see the discussion of Foucault, *Order of Things*, 53.

679 Condillac, *Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines*, 2 vols (S.l.: Pierre Mortier, 1746), avail. online at https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Essai_sur_l%E2%80%99origine_des_connaissances_humaines; and *Traité des sistêmes …* (La Haye: Neaulme, 1749).

ing ways of establishing a new consistency within architectural planning techniques. In Briseux's physiological approach, this analytical decomposition became directly translated into the segregative spatial hierarchies articulated in architectural layouts. By contrast, in Blondel's work, I want to show in the next sections, this rationality became technologically integrated into the very logical basis of planning; something that has a greater complexity, and only became apparent in the way planning itself was logically organized. This happened when planning techniques and their rationale were made more explicit for the first time.

Blondel's Architecture Françoise *(1752)*

Concerning their differing notion of distribution as the establishment of spatial hierarchies for managing flows, Blondel and Briseux had offered discussions in which their principles remained implicit, represented rather by the very structuring of their series of projects. A first, much more explicit and systematic exposition of the art of distribution was provided by Blondel's editorial work for the re-edition of Mariette's *Architecture Françoise* (1752–56).[680] In itself, the publication presented a massive four-volume compendium (initially intended in eight volumes but interrupted halfway) of the most exemplary built projects realized in the last century.[681] ✉105

Entrusted to Blondel at the peak of his career, the production and organization of this work was a tremendous editorial project, as Edoardo Piccoli notes,[682] which quickly gained him recognition and a position at the Académie Royale d'Architecture in 1755. There — made Professeur-Royal in 1762 — Blondel further elaborated the didactics he had initially developed for his private school, the École des Arts,[683] in establishing a set of aesthetic values and principles shared across a multiplicity of diverse building practices into which architecture was embedded. Thereby these principles quickly became 'bind-

680 Jacques-François Blondel, *Architecture Françoise, ou Recueil des plans, élévations, coupes et profils des églises, maisons royales, palais, hotels, …*, 4 vols (Paris: Jombert, 1752–56); repub in facsimile as *L'Architecture Françoise dite le Très Grand Blondel*, ed. Pérouse de Montclos (Paris: Édn. de l'Académie de l'architecture, 2009).

681 On the *Architecture Françoise*, see Davrius, *Blondel: architecte*, 237–61.

682 Edoardo Piccoli, "Jacques-François Blondel à son apogée (1749–1756)," in *Repenser les limites: l'architecture à travers l'espace, le temps et les disciplines.* Actes des colloques (Paris: INHA, 2005), avail. online at http://journals.openedition.org/inha/1176. The introduction was probably written after the publication of the *Encyclopédie* in June 1751 somewhat speedily with some inconsistencies (ibid., 2).

683 See here the paper presented by Hélène Rousteau-Chambon, "Jacques-François Blondel, un professeur innovant à l'Académie royale d'architecture?," at the conference *Jacques-François Blondel et L'enseignement de L'Architecture,* at the Cité De L'architecture et Du Patrimoine, Paris, Dec 14, 2017. Video recording avail. online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q_-ssqfyx5A.



ARCHITECTURE
FRANÇOISE,
OU
RECUEIL
DES PLANS, ELEVATIONS,
COUPES ET PROFILS

Des Eglises, Maisons Royales, Palais, Hôtels & Edifices les plus considérables de Paris, ainsi que des Châteaux & Maisons de plaisance situés aux environs de cette Ville, ou en d'autres endroits de la France, bâtis par les plus célébres Architectes, & mesurés exactement sur les lieux.

Avec la description de ces Edifices, & des dissertations utiles & intéressantes sur chaque espece de Bâtiment.

Par JACQUES-FRANÇOIS BLONDEL, *Professeur d'Architecture.*

TOME PREMIER,

Contenant une Introduction à l'Architecture, un Abrégé Historique de la Ville de Paris, & la description des principaux Edifices du Faubourg St. Germain.

Enrichi de cent cinquante-deux Planches en taille-douce.

A PARIS, RUE DAUPHINE,

Chez CHARLES-ANTOINE JOMBERT, Libraire du Roi pour le Génie & l'Artillerie, à l'Image Notre-Dame.

M. DCC. LII.

AVEC APPROBATION ET PRIVILEGE DU ROY.

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105 Title page of Blondel's *L'Architecture Françoise* (1752).

ing' values in a unifying sense, producing a new consistency in conception, intention, and execution, that helped regulate practice.[684]

In this context, the *Architecture Françoise* constituted an entirely new kind of architecture treatise, in the way it merged Savot's prescriptive design instructions with the serial treatises on residential architecture including Serlio's or Le Muet's didactic publications, or plan collections like those of Du Cerceau or Marot. By bringing these genres together, a new level of rationalization emerges, as Dennis notes,[685] in the way that the use of (primarily built) examples is recombined with a (more independent) codification of planning principles. It was for this more independent codification that Blondel could fall back on the many definitions of architectural topics that he had—since mid-1748—been drafting[686] for the publication of the first volume of the *Encyclopédie* (pub. in 1751). ✉[106] With the idea to contextualize

684 See Pierre Caye's preface to Davrius, *Blondel dans la 'République des Arts'*, 18.
685 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 8.
686 On Blondel's entries for the *Encyclopédie*, see Davrius, *Blondel: architecte*, 171–235.

106 Title page of the first Volume of Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* (1751).


ENCYCLOPÉDIE,
OU
DICTIONNAIRE RAISONNÉ
DES SCIENCES,
DES ARTS ET DES MÉTIERS,
PAR UNE SOCIÉTÉ DE GENS DE LETTRES.
Mis en ordre & publié par M. DIDEROT, de l'Académie Royale des Sciences & des Belles-Lettres de Prusse; & quant à la PARTIE MATHÉMATIQUE, par M. D'ALEMBERT, de l'Académie Royale des Sciences de Paris, de celle de Prusse, & de la Société Royale de Londres.
Tantum series juncturaque pollet,
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris! Horat.
TOME PREMIER.
Seconde Edition enrichie de notes, & donnée au Public
PAR M. OCTAVIEN DIODATI NOBLE LUCQUOIS.
A LUCQUES
Chez VINCENT GIUNTINI Imprimeur
M. DCC. LVIII.
AVEC APPROBATION.

and systematize the following built examples, the first volume of the *Architecture Françoise* starts with an introductory 'book' attempting to offer a general introduction to architecture. Its first chapter begins from an abridged cultural history that peaks in the "discovery made by French architects on the internal distribution" of buildings, and in which French architects were now "surpassing the Ancients."[687]

In this passage that, for the first time, outlined a basic genealogy of French architecture, the *Architecture Françoise* contributed perhaps the most systematic instrumentalization of recent French precedents,[688] in the name of making French architecture synonymous with the art of distribution. At the same time, the author took care to position this art as partaking in an evolu-

687 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise,* I: 3ff; here 21–2; see also *Cours d'architecture* IV: 100. Blondel here still distinguished two kinds of distribution, an internal one regarding the room division inside the appartement and an external one concerning the organization of the volumetric of the building (Blondel, *Cours d'architecture* IV: 107–8).

688 Davrius, *Blondel: architecte, 184*; and Jacoby, "Reasoning of Architecture," 39–40

tionary process, as something under development and possible to improve. It was with the aim to contribute to the further perfection of the art of distribution that the presentation of examples is preceded by a 150-page didactic exposition of the "general principles of architecture and planning,"[689] which, compared to his earlier work, is much more formal. In that way it answered a need signalled in his *Encyclopédie*-entry "Distribution," where Blondel pointed out that

> It is difficult to give exact rules on this part of architecture. … It is not as easy to acquire the art of distributing buildings as that of decorating them. … To succeed in distributing with *convenance*, there are general laws, … concerning the arrangement, shape, and use of spaces of necessity, convenience [*commodité*], and propriety [*bienséance*]. … [And] it this objective of propriety that creates all the difficulties and virtues of architecture.[690]

By thus coupling the fact that architects had adumbrated appropriateness [*bienséance*] only negatively, as Cordemoy had done, and that it was impossible to provide definite rules for laying out plans, as Le Blond had argued, Blondel thus unveiled an urgent need for developing the art of distribution, namely a more positive notion of this art and how it can be acquired systematically (and here Blondel was probably also inspired by Condillac's work[691]).

The Twofold Art of Distributing with Convenance

This is precisely where the notion of *convenance* comes into play; or better: where Blondel's evolving notion of it plays out, in gaining a new didactic function in acquiring the art of distribution. In 1738 he had presented *convenance* simply in terms of what Perrault's translation of Vitruvius called *bienséance*, as an appropriateness in the sense of propriety. After the 1750s, he refined a definition: "One says that a building has *convenance*, when we notice that its exterior disposition and the principal parts of its decoration are

689 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 21–170.

690 Orig.: "il est difficile de donner des préceptes précis sur cette partie de l'architecture. … il est moins aisé d'acquérir l'art de distribuer les bâtimens, que de les décorer . Pour parvenir donc à distribuer avec convenance, il est des lois générales … [qui] concernent l'arrangement, la forme [et] l'usage des pieces de nécessité, de commodité [et] de bienséance … [Et] c'est cet objet de bienséance qui fait toute la difficulté [et] tout le mérite de l'Architecture." Blondel, "Distribution," in *Encyclopédie*, I: 1063–4.

691 The proximity of Blondel's thinking to the sensualist theories of Condillac was often noted. If the following is drawing out some further connections, these are not distilled from a hermeneutic analysis, that remains yet to be made.

entirely related to [*absolument rélative à*] the objective that has given rise to the building."[692] On this point, he now repeated Courtonne almost verbatim, when he argued—pitting his view against the formal complexity of rococo plans—that distribution lies in a "natural arrangement of all parts of a building, and wherein one seeks a stateliness, greatness, and proportionality referring to [*relatif à*] the idea of *convenance*,"[693] as the most essential principle for designing buildings, the rules of which, he stressed again, must be strictly observed.[694] "For the spirit of *convenance* to rule a plan," he would later argue, "each room must be located according to its use and following from the nature of the building, and have a form and proportion related to [*relatif à*] its destination."[695]

This natural arrangement, and its difference from rococo approaches, presented the starting point of his didactic elaboration, which is deepened in a special chapter inserted just before his introduction to the principles of the art of distribution; a digressive sort of scholium, titled "Dissertation sur le gout relativement à l'architecture" (Dissertation on taste in relation to architecture)[696] It touched directly on perhaps the most arbitrary aspect concerning architecture, but which, Blondel intended to show, formed the basis for an ability to distribute with *convenance*. Half a century before, Perrault had provocatively argued that any sense of proportion is not a "positive beauty," but an "arbitrary one," meaning it resides not in fixed mathematical relations but rather is acquired by habituated practices (*accoutumance*) and thus, as Kruft notes, a cultural effect of mutual agreement within dominant social strata.[697] Within Blondel's exposition, this argument was now developed toward a notion that taste concerning architecture consists in what Chi fit-

692 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 22 (my trans.); see also *Cours d'architecture*, I: 389.

693 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 21 (my trans.)

694 Ibid., 22, note a. Blondel's footnotes defined *convenance* in the following way: "La convenance doit être regardée comme la partie la plus essentielle du bâtiment; c'est par elle que l'Architecte assortit la dignité [et] le caractere de l'édifice qu'il doit élever; elle enseigne le choix des emplacemens [et] celui des matériaux propres à chaque partie de la construction c'est elle qui, selon l'objet du bâtiment, détermine à sacrifier plus ou moins de pièces principales ou de dégagemens dans un plan soit pour la commodité personnelle du maître, ou de ceux qui sont en relation avec lui soit pour celle des domestiques; c'est enfin la convenance qui détermine l'ordonnance, la richesse ou la simplicité de la décoration extérieure [et] intérieure. / Ce que nous entendons ici par convenance est nommé par Vitruve bienséance, [et] c'est selon cet Auteur l'aspect d'un édifice dont la décoration est … fondée sur quelque authorité" (ibid., 22 note a; here also 26).

695 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 26: "Pour que l'esprit de convenance régne dans un plan, il faut que chaque piece soit située selon son usage [et] suivant la nature de l'édifice [et] qu'elle ait une forme [et] une proportion relative à sa destination."

696 Ibid., 22–25.

697 For a summary of this general point, see Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*, ch. 13. Here also Salom, "Architecture du discours," 83ff.

tingly describes as a "cultivated sensibility": an acquired critical capacity to avoid both the inconvenient (*l'incommode*) and inappropriate (*l'inconvenient*), and instead productively combines and resolves conflicts arising from the demands of *convenance*, proportion, symmetry, *ordonnance*, and harmony, into a built assemblage forming a beautiful whole.[698] This recalls how, in 1734, the Académie had defined good taste as consisting in an "accordant relation of the whole and its parts [l'accord du tous et de ses parties]," which depends on the layout of parts with appropriate measures, distributed according to established customs.[699]

Blondel, too, stressed that architects should follow established use (*usage*), not trends (*la mode*).[700] As Kruft points out, not only the trending formal complexity of rococo designs, but especially the increasingly reductive way of interpreting architectural ensembles and their part-to-whole relations as something to supposedly express and render legible intrinsic dispositions in external structural characteristics, started to de-cohere and decompose the established systems of planning.[701] Against the trending entropic complexity of baroque and rococo architecture, Blondel was putting work into regularizing this system, in advocating for the formation of taste as the only way to achieve a natural arrangement by way of appropriate planning practices (i.e., *distribution avec convenance*). He critically updated the understanding of this subject by advancing a proto-functionalist aesthetics, which concerns the beauty of function, that is, the expressive function of buildings, the guiding principle of which was that the whole ought to be given "an appropriate characteristic [le *caractère* que lui convient]," that conventionally fits, suits, or 'belongs to' a building so as to express its function.[702]

Blondel begins this exposition of the art of distribution proper in the form of some general precepts.[703] He starts by again paraphrasing Courtonne's position that "distribution ought to be the primary objective [le premier objet] of the architect."[704] Yet, more bluntly than any author before, he then immediately elevates distribution from its former position within Vitruvius's operators to the prime status of 'ordering,' in re-defining that by

698 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 22–23; see also *Cours d'architecture*, I (text): xx. See also Chi, "Arbitrary Authority," 152 and 160.
699 Lemonnier, *Procès-verbeaux*, V: 142ff; cited after Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*, 143.
700 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 25.
701 Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*, 143.
702 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 24
703 Ibid., I: 26ff.
704 Ibid., I: 26 (my trans.).

distribution, one ought to "understand the division and arrangement of the diverse rooms [pièces] that compose the plan."[705] Much more precise than his definition of distribution in the *Encyclopédie*,[706] or De Jaucourt's definition of *ordonnance* there,[707] Blondel thus restated a notion of ordering that was first fostered by Perrault's translation and was also encoded in D'Aviler's treatise.[708] This presentation of distribution as ordering in explicitly twofold terms, (twofold as it entails both division and arrangement) thus institutionalized distribution as a specific production process; a means to an end.

In this regard, the *Abrégé* especially understood distribution-as-ordering synonymously with that process by means of which the various suites were planned.[709] As such, this twofold notion of distribution directly entailed that these suites and their planning logic became an increasingly explicitly-discussed discursive subject. At the same time, focus was thereby shifted from the technical objective of distribution as ordering, to the system of appartements as the **TECHNICAL OBJECT** within which this objective is effectuated.

In contrast to Perrault's identification of the spatial organization of apartments as an instrument, here the very concept itself became operationalized as an instructive-instrumental notion. This instrumentality is embedded—and embodied—in the way that Blondel's defining discussion also repeated D'Aviler's etymological stance that the term appartement comes from the Latin verb *partiri*, meaning 'to divide/devise [*diviser*].[710] As I have mentioned before, the *Dictionnaire universel françois et latin* (1704),

705 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise* I: 26 (my trans.). Blondel here in fact commingles distribution with both *ordinatio* and *dispositio*, in also connecting it to the notion of 'arrangement,' and even with the notion of symmetry!

706 "**DISTRIBUTION**, (Architecture.) sous ce nom on entend la répartition de tout le terrein sur lequel on érige un édifice, de quelqu'usage qu'il puisse être; car il ne suffit pas que le principal corps de bâtiment soit distribué avantageusement [et] commodément, il faut aussi que ceux qui en dépendent soient non seulement exposés relativement à leurs usages, mais qu'ils soient aussi situés convenablement suivant leur destination, [et] le rapport que chacun d'eux a avec le bâtiment [et] les différentes personnes qui l'habitent." Blondel, in *Encyclopédie*, IV: 1063; avail. online at https://artflsrv03.uchicago.edu/philologic4/encyclopedie1117/navigate/4/5258/.

707 "**ORDONNANCE**, (Archit. civile.) on entend par ce terme la composition d'un bâtiment, [et] la disposition de ses parties. On appelle aussi ordonnance l'arrangement [et] la disposition des parties qui composent les cinq ordres d'architecture." Louis, chevalier de Jaucourt, in *Encyclopédie*, XI: 594, avail. online at https://artflsrv03.uchicago.edu/philologic4/encyclopedie1117/navigate/11/2743/.

708 Cf. D'Aviler, *Cours*, II: 537: "**DISTRIBUTION DE PLAN**; c'est la division des pieces qui composent le Plan d'un Bastiment, [et] qui sont situées [et] proportionné à leurs usages, … c'est ce que Vitruve nomme Ordinatio."

709 See the "avant-propos" in Blondel's *Abrégé*, n.p. [3]

710 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 26nG; also *Cours d'architecture*, IV: 108–9. On this point, see my earlier discussion in 1.1.1.

especially in the second edition of 1721, had more accurately described that the term "derives, like the term *partimentum*, from the verb *partior*, 'I share/divide up, I devise/divide [*je partage, je divise*].'"[711] The latter was an important source for Chambers' *Cyclopædia* (1728), on which the *Encyclopédie* relied in turn.[712] There, Blondel's entry "Appartement" had just helped institutionalize D'Aviler's more operative etymology; an etymology which Blondel—having taken it up in his close engagement with D'Aviler's *Cours,*[713] further consolidated by restating it in his own *Cours d'architecture* (1771–77).[714] This describes how, for the production of apartments as suites, by way of a 'division/devising' process, no simple separation is entailed. Instead, as is clear from the *Abrégé*'s attempt to define that "by 'appartement,' one understands the communication and arrangement of multiple rooms,"[715] distribution is a more complex relational art that consists in a twofold process of establishing parts differentiated from, but thus also integrated with, one another. This conceptualization thus dramatizes the problems Cordemoy had pointed out concerning the act of disengagement that distribution entails, and the way it establishes commensurable relations between parts and whole, or inside and outside.

In was on this matter that the *Architecture Françoise*'s introduction (written after the publication of the *Encyclopédie* in June 1751) squarely repeated the definition of distribution Blondel had provided for the *Encyclopédie* in the aforementioned argument, that *convenance* arises when rooms, are located according to the building's use and nature, and given a form and proportion related to its destination.[716] Blondel's argument implies, that a building is 'naturally' given an appropriate character as it expresses itself in the structural characteristics of any arrangement of spaces designed according to their use and nature. This implicit argument (not expressed in Blondel's words but rather in how it works) becomes explicated by how the text immediately following it introduces Courtonne's conventional distinction

711 See the anon. pub., *Dictionnaire universel françois et latin* (Trevoux: E. Ganneau, 1704), [I:135], avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k316297v/f135.image; cf. *Dictionnaire universel françois et latin … Nouvelle Edition* (Paris: Compagnie des libraires associés, 1721); here I: 461–2 [punct. mod.], avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k509621/f258.image.

712 See "Apartment," in Ephraim Chambers, ed., *Cyclopædia, or, a universal dictionary of arts and sciences …* , 2 vols (London: n.p., 1728), 114. Available at https://artfl-project.uchicago.edu/content/chambers-cyclopaedia. See Blondel, "Appartements," in *Encyclopédie,* Vol. I: 546, avail. online at https://artflsrv03.uchicago.edu/philologic4/encyclopedie1117/navigate/1/3295/.

713 Blondel was namely participating Jean Mariette's re-edition of D'Aviler's *Cours* (Paris: Mariette, 1738); see Davrius, *Jacques-François Blondel*, 115ff.

714 See Blondel, *Cours d'architecture,* IV: 108–9.

715 See "Des appartement en general," in id., *Abrégé,* n.p. [7].

716 See above note 46. Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 26.

of buildings by rank (i.e. *palais*, *hôtels*, *maisons*), or depth (i.e. *corps de logis simple*, *semi-double*, or *double*). This distinction, conjoined with the re-emphasized agreement (*rapport*) between inside and outside for which he uses Courtonne's Hôtel de Matignon as an example,[717] now implies not just a differentiation by degree, but the possibility of a more categorical division in kind (by nature and destination), in conceptually ordering differences within the same genre of building. And in the passage directly subsequent, this logic guides Blondel's definition of the different apartments according to their grandeur. I am going to return to this definition in more detail in the next section. But to better understand the logic underlying it, we must first understand how this more categorical division emerges by way of Blondel's twofold notion of distribution as ordering, and how it is connected to conventional planning.

Toward a Method of Distribution-as-Ordering

The first thing to note is that Blondel's notion of distribution as an ordering process that operated by way of a twofold process of "division and arrangement" newly stressed the potentially methodological or didactic nature of distribution, as it becomes analogous to the analytic-synthetic (breaking apart and putting together) process based on which — in the classical episteme — difference and identities come to be established. Hence in Blondel's notion of conventional planning we witness the notion of *convenance* transgressing a certain threshold as it becomes transposed from the older episteme of resemblance into the episteme of representation. To appreciate this transgression, we should note that, this way, instead of placing distribution once again under the yoke of resemblance , the establishment of a natural arrangement is no longer understood as a purely mimetic task of imitating a nature already generated and fixed (*natura naturata*). Rather, it becomes one of establishing more productive relations in ordering multiplicities according to a generative nature (*natura naturans*) like a set purpose, end, or finality. In the original sense of the word 'destination,'[718] the latter is thus something to be established, in the way constructions are designed as an instrument, a means to produce a specific effect. This effect lies in the way the formation or formal articulation (i.e. territorialization) of a plan reciprocally co-articulates (i.e. 'expresses') functionalities, concerning both the relation of its constitutive elements, and the relation of the ensemble to other ones. That is, the form

717 Ibid., I: 28.

718 See the entry "Destination" in the OnED, avail. online at https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=destination.

"*relativement à*" any set purpose can never be based on a purely relativistic logic(as in Perrault's notion of *usage*), but rather distribution consists in an establishment of agreements in which differences are co-constitutive (closer to Perrault's method of *établissement*), as differential elements that actualize while being fitted together into a larger ensemble.[719] This process can only be guided by already established examples.

Secondly, it is in this matter that Blondel's reframing of the twofold process in relation to (*relativement à*) already-established projects and conventions entailed a new **POSITIVITY** (as Foucault would say) to emerge where Blondel integrates the function of residential planning itself back into a larger system of functionings. Against Cordemoy's negative adumbration of what suited buildings of different genres, or for different ranks, Blondel identified an "indispensable knowledge" in an awareness of social conventions and cultural relativities surrounding ideas of appropriateness, which learning architects needed to accustom themselves to aside from learning the specifically architectural knowledge[720] pertaining to planning techniques. While still siding with Le Blond's position that it is impossible to provide positive rules for laying out plans, Blondel thereby identified that the underlying 'good sense' of distinction necessary for planning with *convenance*, can in fact be acquired in a positive way. This acquisition happens simply by enculturation to the world of high society (*le monde*), as he peripherally indicated in the *Encyclopédie*:

> It is this diversity of ranks … from which the different character of buildings must arise; an indispensable corpus of knowledge that cannot be acquired but by [*par*] studying art and particularly by way of the use of high society [*par l'usage du monde*]. It is by this latter that one doubtlessly arrives at [an understanding of] appropriateness [*la convenance*], by noticing what is fitting [*bienséance*]; so

719 Historical scholarship has long highlighted the newly historically and culturally-relativistic understanding of architectural form, a relativistic architectural aesthetic, that surfaces within theorizations concerning character or 'taste.' But scholarship has yet to explore the degree to which in Blondel's approach, in particular, re-established the correspondence between formal characteristics and internal organization and functions in terms of relations that are no longer intrinsic, like proportions, but rather extrinsic, as relations that are external to their terms, as the following hope to show.

720 See here also Blondel's pedagogical aim to 'indoctrinate' students (with 'doctrine' being understood as the constitution and transmission of knowledge) through knowing the guiding (i.e. vitruvian) principles of architecture. See Caye's preface to Davrius, *Blondel dans la 'République des Arts'*, 11–12.: "Architecture is a knowledge and not just an art; or to be more precise, it is an art, and the first among all, foremost because it is a knowledge."

> that an ability to judge is formed, order in the ideas arises, taste [*goût*] comes to be refined, and one thus gets to affirmatively know the proper character[istics] one has to give to each building.[721]

Mentioned in other places as well, Blondel's view that the architect ought to be an 'homme du monde'[722] does not so much concern a broad education, as much as it problematizes the conceptual point of access where architectural education could be meeting the world of aristocratic culture halfway.[723] Blondel's phrasing "par l'usage du monde" implies to no longer simply subject architecture to customary use. Rather, it implies that architectural education must entail 'actively getting used to' or 'accustomed to' the specific ways that architecture is put to work within the world of high society.

Thus—through working themselves into this logic—learning architects can work their way into the exclusionary culture. As a result, this marginal statement finds itself at the crossroads of Blondel's didactic aims; not just is it closely connected to the (only recently studied more deeply) ways in which he newly valorized experience as a means of educating students through a more empirical apprehension of (built) reality.[724] He also seems to have more generally grasped that the acquisition of taste instilled for appropriate planning was

721 Blondel's commentary on "Planche XXII," in the *Encyclopédie*'s accompanying *Recueil de Planches* (Paris: 1762), Vol. II: 10, avail. online at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c0/Encyclopedie_volume_1-185.png. Orig.: "C'est de cette diversité du rang, … que doive naître nécessairement les differens charactères d'édifices; connoissances indispensables qui ne peuvent s'acquérir que par l'étude de l'art, [et] particulierement par l'usage du monde; c'est par ce dernier, n'en doutons point, qu'on arrive à la convenance, qu'on observe les bienséances, que le jugement s'acquiert, que l'ordre naît dans les idés, que le goût s'épure, [et] qu'on apprend à connoître positivement le charactère propre qu'il faut donner à chaque bâtiment."

722 See Blondel, *Cours d'architecture*, IV: Ix: "Nous l'avons dit plus d'une fois, il faut être homme du monde pour bien entendre la distribution d'un Bâtiment, [et] pour devenir un habile Architecte dans cette partie de l'Art."

723 See also Lilti, "Sociabilité et mondanité: Les hommes de lettres dans les salons parisiens au XVIIIe siècle," *French Historical Studies* 28, no. 3 (Summer 2005), 415–45, who describes that "l'usage du monde consiste à justement discerner les distinctions sociales qui permettent aux grands de se montrer aimables avec les hommes de lettres qu'ils protégent" (ibid., 430). Salom's analysis on the emerging notion of type, cited Blondel's entry in view of the specific 'imprint' this experience leaves on the student (See Salom, "Architecture du discours," 161).

724 For the ways in which 'goût' was recentering teaching around the experiential dimension of architecture and its conception, see also the paper presented by Sigrid de Jong, "L'enseignement de l'expérience architecturale chez Blondel et ses collègues anglais," at the conference *Jacques-François Blondel et L'enseignement de L'Architecture,* at the Cité De L'architecture et Du Patrimoine, Paris, 14 Décembre 2017; video recording avail. online at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RM7Cp9oeJ4o. I cannot develop this point here, but it would be worthwhile to respectively study to what extend his tripartite theory of architecture through experience, theorization, and projection as she argues, is the modelled the partition of knowledge outlined in the *Encyclopédie* into memoire, raison, imagination.

an art passively acquired and stoically trained by lived experience; a disposition or HABIT that—while maybe contracted analogously to how planning techniques were imprinted by repeated acts of drawing plans together in a series of progressive differentiations (as in Serlio)—consisted in a very different rationale (*logos*). This different rationale could be better acquired by entering into relation with the social milieu where the production of spaces or drawing of differences was associated principally with social production.

To fit this connection, Blondel had to invest in (mnemo-)technically coupling the art of distribution with a rationale that had evolved in parallel: the sociology of distinctions and forms of civility. This means that *convenance* is not a logic inherent to planning; it is not something whose consistency comes simply from how things are tied together in certain arrangements; it depends on use, how these arrangements are used within processes of social production. This way, however, distribution with *convenance* is not only something relativistic (*relativement à)*, but includes something outside it, something that—while being related to it—is entirely external to the terms or object of planning with which it would be associated. Blondel thus problematized the internal structure of residences not just in conventional agreement (*convenance*) with the external form of the building fitting its set purpose, but he purposefully set this 'fitness' into an ASSOCIATED MILIEU *for which* distribution—as an inherently ASIGNIFYING compositional technique [→ PART 1]—had taken on an increasingly signifying function to express social positions.

Here, Blondel breaks architecture open toward a transdisciplinary knowledge, and also opens it to a transversal individuation. The latter occurs, where he re-situates the meaningful production of architecture into an environment from which information is sampled, so as to guide decisions. This way architecture no longer embodies the art of distribution in its own generative structuring operations; the organization of geneses through spatial differentiation is instead s offloaded onto another structuring system "that does its own kind of thing" (as Deacon would say), from which this organization is decoded, and which thereby gains some semiotic function.[725] By then integrating into planning techniques a dimension that has previously largely remained an externality to the rationale guiding distribution with *convenance*, Blondel managed to arrive at a more integral planning logic, developed to mitigate the toxic effects of merely formal approaches to establishing *conve-*

725 I am developing this point more generally on the basis of some of Deacons conceptions, esp. his talk "Life before genetics," SETI institute, May 14, 2013, avail. online at https://youtu.be/jeMwy3xuEs8, here ca. 00:30:00–01:00:00; see also Deacon, *Incomplete Nature*, 454ff.

nances, by advocating a way of taking on the aristocratic semiology of mutual recognition and drawing distinctions from within the system of functions. It is a way that calls for a certain investment in internalizing this semiology by the only means of appropriate training in the matter: an apprenticeship **PAR LE MILIEU**, in which the designer forms a conceptual filter for learning to distribute with *convenance* as a mode of planning according to social conventions and its arbitrary rules. Taken together, the integration and internalization process of this sociological dimension presents a further **IMMUNIZATION** process, a mutual co-immunization in which the restratification of the aristocratic rationale of self-distinction now contributed to a heterogenesis of architecture and its technical rationales. There, its associated milieu came to be assimilated by way of a specific technical object, which in our case is exactly the system of appartements and their distribution.

An Allagmatic Approach to Conventional Planning

How does this happen? As Stiegler writes, within any associated milieu "the functional opposition between production and consumption [becomes] obsolete, and externalities come to be cultivated and (trans)valuated economically,"[726] a new spatial economy that emerges here through a redistribution of shared sensibilities (to adapt Rancière's phrase) concerning the technical setup for social functionings. To better understand what exactly this technical dimension consists in, we must first remind ourselves that this coupling was only possible insofar as the Cartesian method had initially taken away the technical aspect of repetition and refinement in earlier forms of knowledge production [→ 3.2.1] on which older French or Italian planning practices were based. This decoupling made it possible to recouple the (learned) understanding and production of socio-spatial differentiation with repeated acts of acquiring and accumulating experiences. In this way architecture was coming to be used as a cultural technics. As a result, while likely inspired by Perrault's relativistic notion of use, here cultural distinction in technical uses came to be operationalized on a very different level. In contrast to those earlier systems of planning guided by the establishment of static correspondences, the primary objective to be acquired by architectural students of planning with *convenance* was now to gain an understanding of the cultural dynamics behind the organization of the house into series of rooms, as it is subject to evolving socio-cultural practices in which architectural arrangements or distribution

726 Bernard Stiegler, *For a New Critique of Political Economy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 51 (trans. mod.).

serves as a spatial technique for drawing distinctions. But instead of only problematizing the differentiation of rooms concerning their convenience (in terms inherited from the notion of *commodité*) and suitedness to different social functions or cultural conventions (in terms of their *bienséance*), and offering outlines for their relationship, Blondel re-strategizes the notion of *convenance* more productively to technically reintegrate distribution itself back into an evolving system of social functionings and cultural practices. He seems to have recognized that instead of forming a static system with built-in meaning, the art of distribution (and its *usage du monde*) must be conceived and taught in terms of a dynamic mutually-evolving (cultural) technology in which space is no longer modeled after the natural world, but after the cultivated world, and more specifically its changing modes of social production through distinction. From this culture-historical and culture-technical angle we can understand Blondel's statement "that the ensemble of rooms called 'appartement' was already quite elaborated during the reign [*à l'époque de*] of Charles V" more adequately.[727] While this highly operative statement seems first of all to ground the art of distribution—and the advancements it had made over the past years—historically in France, more importantly, it serves as an anchoring point for an argument Blondel advances here in implying that whereas the basic ensemble had already been there, the rationale, or technical logic for organizing it, was not; at least not in the more complex form that characterized contemporaneous aristocratic architecture. And it is this more complex planning practice for which Blondel was setting out to establish a conceptually cohesive or consistent organizational socio-technical logic.

In order to properly analyze the residential system that results from this approach in the next section, a last point that will aid our understanding concerns the very consistency with which the organizational logic of this twofold framework increasingly became transposed onto the doubly-articulated ordering conception on which Blondel's notion of apartments was based. As Deleuze reminds us, while concepts have no identity but only becomings, they must have a consistency, and this consistency, he argues, is always twofold: concepts have an internal **ENDO-CONSISTENCY** (i.e. it is consistent in itself) as well as external **EXO-CONSISTENCY** (it is consistent with some other concepts), that both hold heterogeneous ensembles together within dynamic milieus.[728] It

727 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 26–44. While this statement has helped introduce and legitimize a highly-anachronistic use of the term apartments within historical scholarship, it is far from being a simple retroactive hypostatization, that renders apartments a reified spatial generality.

728 Deleuze, *What is Philosophy?*, 22.

is precisely the domain of exo-consistency, which provides for the capacity to open up new spaces of possibilities and create new constellations for referential systems,[729] such as we see it enacted here. In Blondel's dual technique required for mastering the art of distributing with *convenance*, establishing *convenances* means to create certain structural regularities in resolving conflicts endemic to planning but which primarily affect social production (being either in agreement with or in conflict with established practices). Architectural education cannot transmit prescriptive rules for good layout or building well; good taste, as an eye for functionings, must be trained by way of a subservient stance for convening social production through architecture's expressive function. By contrast, the normative aspect of taste for judging the resulting organization and its resolution of conflicts becomes outsourced, or exteriorized into a distinct 'good sense.' The latter is formed in a parallel process of enculturation, subjectivation, or individuation, leading to a cultural refinement somewhat external and independent of architectural education, through the encounter with an exterior associated milieu.

As such, the seriality of architectural production through progressive refinement becomes coupled to an akin organization outside its own body; an **EXO-SOMATIC ORGANIZATION** of material-discursive ordering practices. In this light, taste is acquired through an **EXORGANOGENESIS**, the production of an external organon of references. It provides for the wider exo-consistency that meta-stabilizes the serial production of an already internally coherent (but culturally relative) conceptual system of reciprocally determinant functionings (**TERRITORIALIZATION, CONTENT**). It does this through the co-formation of a stabilizing framework of operative principles (**EXPRESSION, CODES**) based on which the system's internal consistency can be judged. And it is this external framework produced by references and guidelines, that—as the analytic methods requested [→ 3.2.1], serves as a grid allowing the experimentation to be measured, evaluated, judged, and taught. From this angle, the establishment of this grid-like logic can be reconsidered in its production of a higher-level organization logic. This meta-logic is based on a technical constraint that guides architectural production: its culturally-specific use within con-

729 See here Guattari, *Schizoanalytic Cartographies* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013) chapter 4 (103ff), and therein the section "Exo-consistency/Endo-consistency" (113ff). For the sake of some brevity, I cannot further develop the argument here, but in Guattari's schizoanalytic vocabulary, the apprenticeship that Blondel proposes would act as a transistent "pathic operator" between the "existential striations" characterizing both the 'existential Territories' and 'referential Universes' of both the members of the aristocracy and architectural designers.

temporaneous modes of social production. In appreciating this emergent constraint as a technique of refinement, Blondel imposes as a logic befitting the more matrixial space of the doubled-up *corps de logis*, and to better fit its parts.

As we have already seen with Perrault, the establishment of a logical raster enabled the production of hierarchical relations, and may even establish them entirely, because, as Sherman notes, "once things are run through a net, they become neater."[730] What he means is that in this process, many latent relations are netted out and thus other possible paths become gridlocked or canceled out in a selective process. Where order simply arises from morphogenetic processes and their form-generating capacity, Deacon reminds us that functional organizations emerge **TELEODYNAMICALLY**[731] from interactions of the latter: those dynamically-supervenient couplings of self-organization processes. These operate on a higher-order level of organizational complexity where the initially a-signifying **CONTRAGRADE** morphogenetic ordering processes gain a much more informational capacity and signifying function, depending on the characteristic regularities within any such specifically-structured systems. It is here that an existing social machinery becomes technologically operative.[732] This operationalization happens where Blondel transposes the reductive idea of expressing functionality in a formal correspondence through structural similarities between inside and outside, onto a *modus operandi* in which an agreement between the two disparate technical and social logics endemic to planning and civility respectively, is reached by way of an **OPERATIONAL SIMILARITY**, namely, an analogy[733] in its structuring *operations*.

In this regard, Blondel proposed an **ALLAGMATIC**[734] notion of *convenance* that cannot be readily reduced to a 'principle,' as architectural historians may feel tempted to highlight. For, as this system started to work, it operated in a way that no longer directly resembled what it conditions or produces: being an analytic cognitive process or "operation of the soul," as

730 Jeremy Sherman, *Neither Ghost nor Machine: The Emergence and Nature of Selves* (New York: Columbia UP, 2017), 127.

731 For Deacon, **TELEODYNAMIC PROCESSES**, as couplings of two (morpho)dynamic systems, are the emergent level where semiosis spontaneosly arises. See Terrence Deacon, *Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter* (London/New York: Norton, 2012), 264–325.

732 I am referring to the Guattarian notion, see my Part II, note 60.

733 Importantly, in this analogy, it is precisely inscribed in a regime of representation, as Deleuze's work would remind us.

734 Allagmatics is Simondon's name for a theory of operations (Simondon, *L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*, ed. Jérôme Millon (Grenoble: Millon, 1995), 259–68.

sensualists like Condillac would say, it results in the production of knowledge (*connaissance*). In contrast to the "principes généraux de [l'architecture]" or "principes concernant la décoration," Blondel presents "préceptes généraux concernant la distribution."[735] ☒[107] Precepts, rather than being principles, are general rules of conduct given before any measures or actions are taken, a warning, or instructions for dealing with self-regulating systems that precipitate their own solutions. So within the vision of a history of architectural thought, the formation of the very framework of conventional planning—forming a dispositif with a foundational role in the emerging assemblage of enlightenment architecture theory, which allows architecture to be established as a more scientific discipline—consists in a quite convenient strategy. By this, I refer back to Foucault's argument that in a formtaking dispositif, certain statements gain a dominant function in responding to an urgent need. These express a strategic objective prevailing in a transformative process that, as he argues, consists in a twofold "process of functional overdetermination … [that] calls for a recovery a re-adjustment of the heterogeneous elements" and "a process of strategic saturation [*remplissement stratégique*]" or folding, through which these new relations become consolidated.[736] In Deleuzian terms, those are the de- and re-stratification mechanisms that pertain to the **DOUBLE ARTICULATION** of assemblages.

In Blondel's theory of conventional planning, and how the twofold ordering conception of a new **MACHINIC** consistency is established between the components it combines. In doing so, it is precisely in the **ALLAGMATIC** externalization of establishing *convenance*, as a specific **FORM OF EXPRESSION**, that certain structural conventions can be derived by coding its underlying organization so that, like in languages and sign-systems, architectural form gives rise to a discursively established and thus semiologized correspondence. This correspondence is established diagonally between the form of things (or *res extensa*) and content of ideas (*res cogitans*). In order to function conveniently and conventionally, however, this relation must obscure the mediating non-discursive, material practices configuring these **FORMS OF CONTENT** in the first place; the form of content being the very architecture generating (or giving) this logic. By obscuring this point of genesis, it actually reveals itself as the precise moment at which a certain **MACHINIC ASSEMBLAGE** becomes effectuated. Here we are referred back to Rouvroy's reminder that machines, rather than revealing their mechanism of functioning, render users

735 Blondel, *De la Distribution* I: ch. III; and id., *Cours*, IV: 108.
736 Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 194–228 ; here 194–5 (modified).

oblivious to their workings.[737] Having managed to uncover the way Blondel's conventional planning worked, we can now move on to try to understand in what way this machinic assemblage and the twofold logic operating it underlies Blondel's specific system of appartements.

Blondel's Changing Sorts of Appartements, 1751–52

It may not come as a surprise if I want to argue now that the production of this grid-like logic for establishing selective relations is especially visible in the residential system of appartements that Blondel elaborated in his later work. This residential system has been described in sufficient detail in the pertinent and well-known studies of Richard Etlin. Historical studies have since taken up and refined Etlin's observation of the way in which this residential system, formed by "extremely particular architectural and social systems with clearly articulated rules of organization and composition" concerning residential spaces, was geared at generating what he famously termed a "bi-polar system of display and retreat" made up of spaces for display on the one hand, and spaces for retreat on the other.[738] As has since been emphasized, and as we have seen in the analysis up to now, this was indeed a more traditional characteristic of the organization of aristocratic residences; what was actually new within Blondel's system was that it was now constituted by three component structures:[739] an *appartement de parade*, an *appartement de société* (which Blondel seems to include for the first time under this name in his definition of appartements), and the *appartement de commodité*, which in Blondel's later work was called an *appartement d'habitation*, *appartement privé* or *appartement particulier*—a terminological shift that I will expand on later. It is this novel distribution of the residential realm into three distinct sorts of functionally different, but interdependent suites of rooms, that Blondel was trying to convey more systematically by way of the analogously-sorted structuration of his teachings. In this aim, Blondel himself perfectly defines the specific functional differences and overall relations of these suites in the relevant passage in the *Architecture Françoise* [108]:

> In general, there are three sorts of appartements [*sortes d'appartemens*] in a building: those *de société*, those *de parade*, and those *de*

737 Rouvroy, "Technology, Virtuality, and Utopia," 133. See above, note 648.

738 See Etlin, "Les Dedans," 137–47; developed in id. *Symbolic Space*, 124–47; here 130.

739 This description of a system made up of three components may seem at odds with Etlin's 'bipolar' view (something that to my knowledge has never been discussed). Yet, it does not mean that Etlin was entirely wrong, as we shall see.

commodité. An *appartement de société* serves [*est destiné*] to receive one's family and one's friends; for that it should be located on the upper floor, so that—if need be—it may be joined to the other appartements through the principal enfilade to form but a whole [*un tout*] that—in the event of festivities—announces the magnificence of the proprietor. One should arrange [*distribuer*] these appartements in a way that in their alignment no rooms intended for servants are to be found. / An *appartement de parade* serves [*est destiné*] the proprietor's magnificence or as a personal accommodation. There, he deals with important business and receives persons of considerable status [*de consideration*]. It contains all the treasures, paintings, and valuable furniture. This appartement must be arranged [*disposé*] in such a way that if joined with the one *de societé*, all rooms composing them offer at a glance and through the same enfilade, the magnificence of the interior of the main building. [This magnificence] should be manifested in the richness of the material or in the choice of ornaments, and attract, from outside, those strangers that take pleasure in paying visits to the great houses. / An *appartement de commodité* is, contrariwise, that one which in any building of importance is rarely open to strangers, in serving [*étant destine*] the retreat of the lord or the lady of the house. It is in these appartements that they sleep during winter or when they retire in case of indisposition, and deal with personal matters [*affaires particuliers*] and receive friends and family.[740]

From Two to Three Sorts of Appartements

Remarkably, however, in the article "Appartement" that Blondel wrote for the *Encyclopedie* ⊠⊠[109] (published just one year before), he had distinguished just two "*sortes d'appartemens*" in terms of their general differentiation into two *grand* ones and one smaller one. This was still the dialectic scalar distinction in which *la distribution des appartements* logically consists, as D'Aviler *Cours* argued.[741]

At first sight, Blondel's entry seems to lack clarity in its organization. It begins with an outline of the etymology of the term appartement, and its meaning of a complete suite of rooms composed of "one or several antechambers, reception rooms [*salles d'assemblée*], bedchambers [*chambre à coucher*], *cabinet*, *arrière-cabinet*, *toilette*, *garde-robe*, etc." Blondel then explains

740 Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I:26f (my trans.). For the original see the figure 118.
741 See D'Aviler, *Cours*, 177; or page 199 in the 1738 re-edition.

CHAPITRE TROISIEME.

INTRODUCTION A L'ARCHITECTURE,

Contenant les principes généraux de cet Art.

S'Il ne s'agiſſoit que de rapporter les préceptes des Anciens concernant l'ordonnance de leurs édifices, ou de traiter des principes qui regardent notre diſtribution moderne, tant d'Auteurs de réputation nous ont laiſſé par écrit & ont donné les modeles les plus parfaits de l'antiquité, qu'il paroîtroit ſuperflu d'en parler ici. D'ailleurs la quantité d'exemples des édifices François que nous offrons dans cet Ouvrage ſembleroit ſuffire & être le moyen le plus propre à inſtruire de cette partie de l'Architecture, par les remarques qu'on peut faire ſur chaque eſpece de bâtiment. Mais notre objet étant de concilier ces deux genres & d'enſeigner la ſource de la beauté de l'un & de l'agrément de l'autre, on eſpere que l'étude que nous propoſons aura lieu de plaire & d'être regardée comme le ſeul moyen d'atteindre à l'excellence de l'Architecture.

Avantages de notre diſtribution ſur celle des Anciens.

Perſonne n'ignore que les édifices des Grecs & la plupart de ceux des Romains étoient plutôt recommandables par la magnificence des dehors que par la commodité des dedans. Ce que nous en avons rapporté dans l'hiſtoire de l'Architecture, & la deſcription que tous les Ecrivains de leur tems nous en ont laiſſée, prouvent aſſez que ces peuples donnant aux édifices publics toute la perfection de l'Architecture, préféroient à tout autre objet dans les bâtimens particuliers la ſolidité & la ſalubrité, & qu'il s'en falloit beaucoup que l'intérieur de leurs demeures eut les commodités que les Architectes François ont ſçu donner aux leurs. Il ſemble même que depuis environ cinquante ans ces derniers ayent à cet égard inventé un art nouveau; tous nos voiſins conviennent de ce que j'avance, & ceux qui font profeſſion de l'Architecture reconnoiſſent qu'avant ce tems nos édifices en France, à l'imitation de ceux d'Italie, offroient à la vérité une décoration extérieure où l'on voyoit régner une aſſez belle Architecture, mais dont les dedans étoient peu logeables, & où il ſembloit qu'on eut affecté de ſupprimer la lumiere; on avoit même de la peine à y trouver la place d'un lit & des principaux meubles, les cheminées occupoient la plus grande partie des piéces, & la petiteſſe des portes donnoit une foible idée des lieux auxquels elles ſervoient d'entrée. Mais à préſent que l'on fait conſiſter la perfection de la diſtribution dans l'arrangement naturel des pieces de tout un édifice, & qu'on y recherche la nobleſſe, la grandeur & la proportion, relativement à l'eſprit de convenance; les appartemens, quoique moins vaſtes, ſont mieux percés, & la ſimétrie y eſt obſervée avec plus de régularité. C'eſt de cette diſtribution que nous entendons parler, & non de celle qui a été imaginée par quelques Architectes, qui font conſiſter la beauté d'un plan à donner à chaque piece des contours différens, à faire des murs circulaires, à en conſtruire quelques-unes de forme quarrée, à faire celles-ci à pans, & à compoſer celles-là de toutes ces figures, ce qui donne à la forme intérieure d'un bâtiment l'apparence d'une piece de gazon découpée; affectant d'ailleurs une ſimétrie mal entendue entre la droite & la gauche des appartemens, & qui eſt auſſi peu eſſentielle dans l'intérieur qu'elle eſt importante à obſerver dans les dehors, pour que les formes extérieures ayent entr'elles un parfait rapport.

Quoique nous ſurpaſſions les Anciens dans la diſtribution, nous ſommes forcés de reconnoître qu'ils l'ont emporté de beaucoup ſur nous dans la partie de la décoration extérieure de leurs édifices: pour s'en convaincre il n'y a qu'à jetter les yeux

107 Pages from the introduction on the art of distributing plans, in Blondel's *L'Architecture Françoise* (1752).

108 Pages from the introduction on the distribution of apartments, in Blondel's *L'Architecture Françoise* (1752).

Préceptes généraux concernant la Diſtribution.

Regles ſur la diſtribution. La diſtribution (*f*) doit être le premier objet de l'Architecte ; la décoration même dépend abſolument d'un plan déterminé ; c'eſt la diſtribution qui établit les longueurs, largeurs, & hauteurs d'un édifice. Lorſqu'on néglige la relation intime qui doit ſe rencontrer entre les dedans & les dehors d'un bâtiment, l'on ne peut ſe flatter de plaire aux perſonnes intelligentes, parce qu'elles ne ſont frappées d'une certaine joye ſecrette que lorſqu'un édifice ſatisfait l'organe de la vûe par l'harmonie de ſes parties avec ſon tout-enſemble.

La convenance, que nous avons dit être le premier principe de l'Architecture, eſt autant eſſentielle à obſerver dans la partie intérieure d'un bâtiment, que dans ſon ordonnance extérieure. Pour que l'eſprit de convenance régne dans un plan, il faut que chaque piece ſoit ſituée ſelon ſon uſage & ſuivant la nature de l'édifice, & qu'elle ait une forme & une proportion relative à ſa deſtination ; par cette conſidération la demeure d'un particulier ne doit pas être diſtribuée comme le Palais d'un Souverain ; ni la réſidence d'un Prince comme une maiſon de chaſſe. Ainſi dans la diverſité des bâtimens, l'on en conſtruit de ſimples, de ſemi-doubles, de doubles, ou même de triples, ſelon le beſoin ; par exemple, on appelle un bâtiment ſimple, celui dont les principaux appartemens ſont compris entre deux murs de face, tels que le Palais du Luxembourg, l'Hôtel de Toulouſe, le Château de Clagny, &c. On appelle un bâtiment ſemi-double, celui qui entre deux murs de face contient un appartement du côté des jardins, & dont celui de la cour eſt ſeulement occupé par des pieces qui n'ont de profondeur que la moitié ou environ de celles qui leur ſont adoſſées ; tels ſont l'Hôtel de Maiſons à Paris, l'Hôtel de Noailles à St. Germain en Laye, la maiſon de M. le Prince de Rohan à St. Ouen, &c. On entend par bâtiment double celui dont le principal corps de logis comprend entre deux murs de face deux pieces d'une égale profondeur, comme l'Hôtel de Matignon, le Palais de Bourbon, le Château de Montmorency, &c. On appelle bâtiment triple celui qui dans ſa cage contient trois pieces enfermées par deux murs de face & deux de refend, tel que l'Hôtel de Duras, la maiſon de M. Crozat, &c ; ſans parler de ceux qui quelque fois ſont appellés quatruples ou quintuples, lorſque, comme le Château de Perigni, ils ont quatre ou cinq rangs de pieces dans leur profondeur ; & ſans faire mention de ceux qui ſont compoſés tout enſemble de pluſieurs corps ou ailes de bâtimens ſimples, ſemi-doubles, doubles ou triples, ainſi que les Châteaux de Verſailles, de Trianon, de Marly, ou les Hôtels de Noailles, de Lambert, &c.

Diſtinction de trois ſortes d'appartemens. En général on diſtingue trois ſortes d'appartemens (*g*) dans un bâtiment ; ceux de ſociété, ceux de parade, & ceux de commodité.

Un appartement de ſociété eſt deſtiné à recevoir ſa famille & ſes amis ; pour cela il doit être ſitué dans un bel étage, de maniere que dans le beſoin il puiſſe ſe joindre aux autres appartemens, pour de la principale enfilade ne former qu'un tout qui, en cas de fêtes, annonce la magnificence du propriétaire : on doit diſtribuer ces appartemens de façon qu'il ne ſe trouve dans leur alignement aucunes pieces deſtinées aux domeſtiques. Voyez l'alignement EF de l'Hôtel de Matignon, Livre II. Chap. 6. Pl. premiere.

(*f*) La diſtribution eſt nommée par Vitruve *ordonatio*, & s'entend de la diviſion & de l'arrangement des diverſes piéces qui compoſent le plan des différens étages d'un bâtiment.

On comprend encore ſous ce nom l'arrangement, la forme, l'expoſition, & la ſimétrie, tant des cours que des avant-cours, même des baſſes-cours & des terraſſes, & les différentes ailes des bâtimens dans leſquels ſont placées les orangeries, ménageries, cuiſines, offices, écuries, remiſes, chenils, &c ; elle regarde auſſi la beauté & la commodité des bâtimens érigés pour la demeure des hommes au-deſſus du commun.

(*g*) Appartement, en latin *partimentum*, qui vient du verbe *partiri*, diviſer.

Un appartement de parade eſt deſtiné pour la magnificence ou pour la demeure perſonnelle du maître ; il y traite d'affaires importantes, & y reçoit les perſonnes de conſidération ; il y renferme ſes bijoux, ſes tableaux & ſes meubles de prix. Cet appartement doit être diſpoſé de maniere que ſe joignant à celui de ſociété, les différentes pieces qui les compoſent offrent d'un ſeul coup d'œil & par une même enfilade, la magnificence intérieure du principal corps de logis qui doit ſe manifeſter par la richeſſe de la matiere ou par le choix des ornemens, & attirer de dehors les étrangers qui ſe plaiſent à viſiter la demeure des grands Seigneurs. L'Hôtel que nous venons de citer peut être regardé, dans cette partie, comme un des plus conſidérables que nous ayons à Paris.

Un appartement de commodité eſt au contraire celui qui dans un bâtiment d'importance eſt rarement ouvert aux étrangers, étant deſtiné à la retraite du maître ou de la maîtreſſe du logis. C'eſt dans ces appartemens qu'ils couchent l'hiver ou qu'ils ſe retirent en cas d'indiſpoſition, qu'ils traitent d'affaires particulieres, & reçoivent leurs amis & leur famille. Ces ſortes d'endroits procurent aux perſonnes de dehors la liberté de voir les grands appartemens, ſans qu'on ſoit obligé d'obſerver un cérémonial quelque fois gênant entre ceux qui ſont de même rang. Lorſque l'étendue du terrain ne permet pas de pratiquer ces appartemens près de ceux de parade, on les place en entreſole.

Les pieces qui en général compoſent les appartemens dont nous venons de parler, empruntent auſſi les noms de parade, de ſociété & de commodité ; par ces dernieres on entend celles qui ſemblent être d'une néceſſité abſolue & réelle, parce qu'il paroît indiſpenſable qu'un édifice élevé pour la conſervation des hommes ſoit pourvû des pieces néceſſaires & relatives à l'état du maître qui le fait ériger. C'eſt de cette néceſſité que naît la diverſité des bâtimens, quoiqu'élevés pour la même fin, & que proviennent les différens étages que l'on eſt obligé de conſtruire les uns ſur les autres, quand un propriétaire ſe trouve contraint de faire bâtir dans un quartier ſerré, ſoit par rapport à ſes emplois, ſoit à cauſe du voiſinage des Grands avec leſquels il eſt en relation. C'eſt ordinairement dans cette partie de la diſtribution qu'un Architecte a toujours de nouvelles occaſions de manifeſter ſes talens, en ſçachant accorder les choſes de néceſſité avec l'harmonie générale du tout, & en les tenant dans une relation directe avec les parties de la conſtruction & de la décoration : la premiere exige que les vuides ſoient en rapport avec les maſſifs, & que les parties qui ſoutiennent ſoient relatives à celles qui ſont ſoutenues ; la ſeconde demande que les portes qui donnent entrée au bâtiment, ſoient en proportion avec la totalité de l'édifice, & que les croiſées qui l'éclairent ſoient d'une grandeur proportionnée & au diamétre des pieces & à l'ordonnance des faces extérieures.

Les pieces qui regardent la ſociété ont auſſi leur ſujettion, à cauſe du rapport qu'elles doivent avoir avec l'expoſition générale du bâtiment, avec ſa ſituation & ſa diſpoſition, & parce qu'il faut obſerver la relation que ces différentes pieces doivent avoir avec ſa grandeur totale, de maniere que ces pieces, celles de parade, celles qui ſont deſtinées au repos, ſoient ſuffiſamment pourvûes d'antichambres & de dégagemens où les domeſtiques puiſſent ſe tenir & faire leur ſervice, ſans que les maîtres ſoient interrompus. Faute de cette prévoyance l'on ne jouiroit pas des commodités de la vie, & l'on ne ſatisferoit pas le déſir naturel qui nous porte à chérir ce qui nous eſt propre, & à éviter tout ce qui peut nous nuire.

A l'égard de la diſtribution des pieces de parade ou de bienſéance, il eſt difficile d'en parler méthodiquement, parce que ce genre de diſtribution, qui appartient tout à la magnificence, eſt ſujet aux différens uſages des nations, ce qui fait que ce que nous regardons tous les jours en France comme un principe de convenance, eſt traité différemment par nos voiſins, tant à cauſe de la diverſité des

109 Spread from the first Volume of the *Encyclopédie* (1751), with Blondel's entry on appartements.

le lieu *apparent* sera dans la base distincte. *Voyez* MIROIR, CONCAVE & CATOPTRIQUE.

On peut toûjours déterminer le lieu *apparent* de l'objet dans un miroir convexe.

Le lieu *apparent* d'une étoile, *&c.* est un point de la surface de la sphere, déterminé par une ligne tirée de l'œil au centre de l'étoile, *&c. Voyez* LIEU.

Le lieu vrai ou réel se détermine par une ligne tirée du centre de la terre, au centre de la planete, ou à l'étoile, *&c.* (*O*)

APPARITEUR, s. m. (*Hist. anc. & mod.*) c'est le nom du bedeau d'une Université, dont la fonction est de porter la masse devant les docteurs des Facultés. *V.* BEDEAU, UNIVERSITÉ, MASSE.

On appelle aussi *appariteurs*, ceux qui ont l'emploi de citer quelqu'un devant un tribunal ecclésiastique. *Voyez* SOMMER, CITATION.

Les *appariteurs*, chez les Romains, étoient la même chose que les sergens ou les exempts parmi nous; ou plûtôt c'étoit un nom générique, exprimant tous les ministres qui exécutoient les ordres des juges ou des magistrats; & de-là leur est venu le nom d'*appariteurs*, formé d'*apparere*, être présent.

Sous le nom d'*appariteurs*, étoient compris, *scribæ*, *accensi*, *interpretes*, *præcones*, *viatores*, *licitores*, *flatores*, & même *carnifices*, les exécuteurs. *Voyez* SCRIBE, LICTEUR, *&c.* On les choisissoit ordinairement parmi les affranchis des magistrats: leur état étoit mépriſé & odieux, tellement que le sénat imposoit comme une marque d'infamie à une ville qui s'étoit révoltée, le soin de lui fournir des *appariteurs*. Il y avoit aussi une sorte d'*appariteurs* des cohortes, appellés *cohortales* & *conditionales*, comme étant attachés à une cohorte, & condamnés à cette condition. Les *appariteurs* des prétoires, *appariteres prætoriani*, étoient ceux qui servoient les préteurs & les gouverneurs de provinces; ordinairement le jour de la naissance de leurs maitres on les changeoit, & on les élevoit à de meilleures places. Les pontifes avoient aussi leurs *appariteurs*, comme il paroît par une ancienne inscription en marbre, qui est dans la voie *Appia*:

APPARITORI
PONTIFICVM
PARMULARIO. (*G*)

*APPARITION, *vision*, (*Gram.*) la vision se passe au-dedans, & n'est qu'un effet de l'imagination: l'*apparition* suppose un objet au-dehors. S. Joseph, dit M. l'abbé Girard, fut averti par une vision de passer en Egypte: ce fut une *apparition* qui instruisit la Madeleine de la résurrection de Jesus-Christ. Les cerveaux échauffés & vuides de nourriture sont sujets à des visions. Les esprits timides & crédules prennent tout ce qui se présente pour des *apparitions*. *Synon. Franç.*

APPARITION, se dit *en Astronomie* d'un astre ou d'une planete qui devient visible, de caché qu'il étoit auparavant.

Apparition est opposé dans ce sens à *occultation*. *Voyez* OCCULTATION.

Le lever du soleil est plûtôt une *apparition* qu'un vrai lever. *Voyez* SOLEIL & LEVER.

Cercle d'*apparition* perpétuelle. *Voyez* CERCLE. (*O*)

APPAROIR, *en style de Palais*, est synonyme à paroître: faire *apparoir*, c'est montrer, prouver, constater. (*H*)

* APPARONNÉ, adj. (*Comm.*) on dit à Bordeaux qu'une barique, ou qu'un vaisseau a été *apparonné*, quand il a été jaugé par les officiers commis à cet effet.

APPARTEMENT, s. m. (*Architect.*) Ce mot vient du Latin *partimentum*, fait du verbe *partiri*, diviser; aussi entend-t-on par *appartement* la partie essentielle d'une maison royale, publique ou particuliere, composée, lorsque l'*appartement* est complet, d'une ou plusieurs antichambres, de salles d'assemblée, chambres à coucher, cabinet, arriere-cabinet, toilette, garde-robe, *&c.* En général on distingue deux sortes d'*appartemens*; l'un que l'on appelle *de parade*, l'autre *de commodité*; ce dernier est à l'usage personnel des maitres, & est ordinairement exposé au midi ou au nord, selon qu'il doit être habité l'été ou l'hyver: les pieces qu'il compose doivent être d'une médiocre grandeur, & d'une moyenne hauteur; c'est pourquoi le plus souvent, lorsque l'espace du terrein est resserré, l'on pratique des entresolles au-dessus pour les garde-robes, sur-tout lorsque ces *appartemens* de commodité sont contigus à de grands *appartemens*, dont le diametre des pieces exige d'élever les planchers depuis 18 jusqu'à 20 ou 22 piés: ces petits *appartemens* doivent avoir des communications avec les grands, afin que les maitres puissent passer de ceux-ci dans les autres pour recevoir leurs visites, sans risquer l'hyver de prendre l'air froid de dehors, ou des vestibules, antichambres, & autres lieux habités par la livrée; & pour éviter la présence des domestiques ou personnes étrangeres auxquels ces sortes de pieces sont destinées. Il est sur-tout important d'éloigner ces *appartemens* des basses-cours, & de la vûe des domestiques subalternes, & autant qu'il te peut même de la cour principale, à cause du bruit des voitures qui vont & viennent dans une maison de quelqu'importance. Le nombre des pieces de ces *appartemens* de commodité n'exige pas l'appareil d'un grand *appartement*; le commode & le salubre sont les choses essentielles; il suffit qu'ils soient composés d'une antichambre, d'une deuxieme antichambre ou cabinet, d'une chambre à coucher, d'un arriere-cabinet, d'une garde-robe, d'un cabinet d'aisance, *&c.* mais il faut essentiellement que ces garde-robes & antichambres soient dégagées, de maniere que les domestiques puissent faire leur devoir sans troubler la tranquillité du maitre.

Il faut savoir que lorsque ces *appartemens* sont destinés à l'usage des dames, ils exigent quelques pieces de plus, à cause du nombre de domestiques qui communément sont attachés à leur service; qu'il faut augmenter le nombre des garde-robes, & y pratiquer quelques cabinets particuliers de toilette, *&c.*

A l'égard des *appartemens* de parade, il faut qu'ils soient spacieux & exposés au levant, autant qu'il est possible, aussi bien que placés du côté des jardins, quand il peut y en avoir: il faut surtout que les enfilades regnent d'une extrémité du bâtiment à l'autre, de maniere que l'appartement de la droite & celui de la gauche s'alignent par l'axe de leurs portes & croisées, & s'uniſſent avec symmetrie avec la piece du milieu, pour ne composer qu'un tout sans interruption, qui annonce d'un seul coup d'œil la grandeur intérieure de tout l'édifice. Sous le nom d'*appartement de parade*, on en distingue ordinairement de deux especes; l'un qui porte ce nom, l'autre celui *de société*. Les pieces marquées *Y* dans le plan de la onzieme Planche, peuvent être considérées comme *appartement de société*; c'est-à-dire, destiné à recevoir les personnes de dehors, qui l'après-midi viennent faire compagnie au maitre & à la maitresse du logis; & celles marquées *Z* composent celui *de parade*, où le maitre pendant la matinée reçoit les personnes qui ont affaire à lui, selon sa dignité: mais en cas de fête ou d'assemblée extraordinaire, ces deux *appartemens* se réuniſſent avec le grand sallon du milieu pour recevoir avec plus d'éclat & de magnificence un plus grand nombre d'étrangers invités par cérémonie ou autrement. Ces

grands *appartemens* doivent auſſi être munis de garde-robes & de dégagemens néceſſaires à l'uſage des maîtres, des étrangers & des domeſtiques. *Voyez* la deſtination de chacune de ces pieces, & la maniere dont il les faut décorer, dans les définitions des mots SALLE A MANGER, CHAMBRE A COUCHER, CABINET, *&c.* (*P*)

APPARTEMENS *d'un vaiſſeau.* Il eſt défendu aux gardiens de prendre leur logement dans les chambres & principaux *appartemens* des vaiſſeaux, mais ſeulement à la ſainte-barbe ou entre les ponts. (*Z*)

APPARTENANCE, ſ. f. (*Manége.*) ſe dit de toutes les choſes néceſſaires pour compoſer entierement le harnois d'un cheval de ſelle, de carroſſe, de charrette, *&c.* quand on ne les détaille pas. Par exemple on dit une ſelle avec toutes ſes *appartenances*, qui ſont les ſangles, la croupiere, *&c. Voyez* SELLE. (*V*)

APPARTENANCE, ſ. f. (*en Droit.*) eſt ſynonyme à *dépendance*, *annexe*, &c. *Voyez l'un & l'autre.*

Ce mot eſt formé du Latin *ad*, à, & *pertinere*, appartenir.

Les *appartenances* peuvent être corporelles, comme les hameaux qui appartiennent à un chef-lieu; ou incorporelles, telles que les ſervices des vaſſaux ou cenſitaires. (*H*)

*APPAS, ſ. m. pl. *attraits*, *charmes* (*Gram.*); outre l'idée générale qui rend ces mots ſynonymes, il leur eſt encore commun de n'avoir point de ſingulier dans le ſens où on les prend ici, c'eſt-à-dire, lorſqu'ils ſont employés pour marquer le pouvoir qu'ont ſur le cœur la beauté, l'agrément ou les graces: quant à leurs différences, les *attraits* ont quelque choſe de plus naturel; les *appas* tiennent plus de l'art, & il y a quelque choſe de plus fort & de plus extraordinaire dans les *charmes*. Les *attraits* ſe font ſuivre, les *appas* engagent, & les *charmes* entraînent. On ne tient guere contre les *attraits* d'une jolie femme; on a bien de la peine à ſe défendre des *appas* d'une coquette; il eſt preſqu'impoſſible de réſiſter aux *charmes* de la beauté. On doit les *attraits* & les *charmes* à la nature: on prend des *appas* à ſa toilette. Les défauts qu'on remarque diminuent l'effet des *attraits*; les *appas* s'évanoüiſſent quand l'artifice ſe montre: on ſe fait aux *charmes* avec l'habitude & le tems.

Ces mots ne s'appliquent pas ſeulement aux avantages extérieurs des femmes; ils ſe diſent encore en général de tout ce qui affecte agréablement. On dit que la vertu a des *attraits* qui ſe font ſentir aux vicieux mêmes; que la richeſſe a des *appas* qui font quelquefois ſuccomber la vertu, & que le plaiſir a des *charmes* qui triomphent ſouvent de la philoſophie.

Avec des épithetes, on met de grands *attraits*, de puiſſans *appas*, & d'invincibles *charmes*. *Voyez les Synon. Franç.*

APPAS, *ou* APPAST, ſ. m. ſing. c'eſt le nom générique ſous lequel on comprend tous les moyens dont on ſe ſert, ſoit à la pêche ſoit à la chaſſe, pour ſurprendre les animaux.

APPATER, v. act. *terme d'Oiſeleur*, mettre du grain ou quelqu'autre amorce dans un lieu pour y attirer les oiſeaux qu'on veut prendre. On doit *appâter* les perdrix pour les prendre au filet.

On dit auſſi en terme de pêche, *appâter le poiſſon.*

APPAUMÉ, adj. (*terme de Blaſon.*) il ſe dit de la main ouverte dont on voit le dedans, que l'on appelle la *paume.*

Baudry Piencourt en Normandie, de ſable à trois mains droites, levées & *appaumées* d'argent. (*V*)

APPEAU, *vieux terme de Palais*, qui s'eſt dit autrefois pour *appel*: on dit même encore dans quelques juriſdictions, le greffe des *appeaux*. (*H*)

APPEAU, ſ. m. c'eſt un fifflet d'*Oiſeleur* avec lequel il attrappe les oiſeaux en contrefaiſant le ſon de leur voix: l'*appeau* des perdrix rouges eſt différent de celui des perdrix griſes; il y en a auſſi pour appeller les cerfs, les renards, *&c.* ce ſont des hanches ſemblables à celles de l'orgue, qui ont différens effets, ſelon les petites boîtes qui les renferment. On donne auſſi le nom d'*appeau* aux oiſeaux qu'on éleve dans une cage, pour appeller les autres oiſeaux qui paſſent, & que l'on nomme plus communément *appellans.*

APPEL, *en terme de Droit*, eſt un acte judiciaire par lequel une cauſe jugée par un tribunal inférieur eſt portée à un ſupérieur; ou le recours à un juge ſupérieur pour réparer les griefs qui réſultent d'une ſentence qu'un juge inférieur a prononcée. *V.* JUGE & COUR.

Les appels ſe portent du tribunal qui a rendu le jugement dont eſt *appel*, à celui d'où il reſſortit nûment & ſans moyen: par exemple, d'un bailliage à un préſidial, d'un préſidial au parlement, lequel juge ſouverainement & ſans *appel*: mais il n'eſt pas permis d'appeller, *omiſſo medio*, c'eſt-à-dire d'un premier juge à un juge ſupérieur d'un tiers tribunal intermédiaire. Il faut parcourir en montant tous les degrés de juriſdictions ſupérieurs les uns aux autres.

Il faut excepter de cette regle générale les *appels* en matiere criminelle, leſquels ſe portent *recta* au parlement, *omiſſo medio*. Il faut dire la même choſe, même en matiere civile, des *appels* de déni de renvoi & d'incompétence. *Voyez* DÉNI.

On a quelquefois appellé d'un tribunal eccléſiaſtique à un ſéculier ou à une cour laïque. Le premier exemple que l'on en a, eſt celui de Paul de Samoſate, lequel étant condamné & dépoſé par le ſecond concile d'Antioche, refuſa de livrer la maiſon épiſcopale à Domnus, qui avoit été élû ſon ſucceſſeur, & appella à l'empereur.

La même choſe ſe pratique journellement dans les cas où il y a lieu à l'*appel* comme d'abus. *Voyez au mot* ABUS.

L'*appel* a la force de ſuſpendre, toutes les fois qu'il a pour objet de prévenir un mal qu'on ne pourroit réparer s'il étoit une fois fait.

Mais quand l'*appel* n'a pour objet qu'un jugement préparatoire, de reglement ou d'inſtruction, il ne ſuſpend pas l'exécution du jugement, lequel eſt exécutoire proviſoirement & nonobſtant l'*appel.*

L'*appel* périt par le laps de trois ans, c'eſt-à-dire lorſqu'on a été trois ans depuis le jour qu'il avoit été interjetté & ſignifié, ſans le pourſuivre; l'appellant n'eſt pas même reçû à interjetter un ſecond *appel* de la même ſentence, laquelle acquiert par la péremption force de choſe jugée, & vaut arrêt. *Voyez* PÉREMPTION.

L'appellant qui ſuccombe en ſon *appel*, eſt condamné, outre les dépens, en l'amende de 6 livres dans les préſidiaux; & de 12 dans les cours ſupérieures.

APPEL *comme d'abus. Voyez* ABUS.

APPEL *ſimple* par oppoſition à *l'appel* comme d'abus, eſt celui qui eſt porté d'une cour eccléſiaſtique inférieure à une ſupérieure; au lieu que l'*appel* comme d'abus eſt porté d'une cour eccléſiaſtique dans un parlement.

Les *appels* dans les tribunaux eccléſiaſtiques ſont portés comme dans les cours laïques, du moins en France, par gradation & ſans omiſſion de moyen, d'un tribunal à celui qui lui eſt immédiatement ſupérieur, comme du tribunal épiſcopal à celui de l'archevêque, de celui de l'archevêque à celui du patriarche ou du primat, & de celui-ci au pape. Mais en France lorſque l'*appel* eſt porté à Rome, le pape eſt obligé, en vertu du concordat, *tit. de cauſis*, de nommer des commiſſaires en France pour juger de l'*appel*. De même ſi l'*appel* d'un official François eſt dévolu à un archevêché ſitué hors de France, les parties conviendront de juges réſidans dans le royau-

that "generally speaking, one distinguishes two sorts of appartements; one that is called *de parade*, [and] another *de commodité*":[742] a larger suite for the reception of guests, and a smaller connected suite designed for inhabitation. It is only after the discussion of the latter and some specificities pertaining to the gender-related aspects in its use, that the last part of the entry starts to differentiate the *grand appartement* itself further into "two species [*espèces*]": the *appartement de parade* proper and the *appartement de société*.[743] Here, more than D'Aviler did, Blondel starts to contrast the former as a space "where the master, in the mornings, receives people to deal with in accordance with their rank," whereas the latter serves as a more informal space suiting the "reception of visitors, who in the afternoon, pay company to the master and mistress of house."[744] Directly following this differentiation, Blondel refers to the volumes of plates (pub. only in 1762), where he provides an illustrating plan for a rather large *hôtel* ✉[110].[745] Taking up the inclusion of a didactic design in D'Aviler's *Cours* (which Blondel was hoping to thus critically update[746]), this plan was intended to exemplify these newer more differentiated principles of distribution and their components. It did so in its formal articulation of spatial hierarchies, which clearly indicates the rooms belonging to the *appartement de parade* (A, left half of the main wing) and the *appartement de société* (B, right half of the main wing)), as two contiguous suites juxtaposed in the principal *corps de logis double*.

In discussing this project, Elias notes that here "the division of the reception rooms into two has a quite specific social function,"[747] as it disentangled the apparatus of rooms where the strictly formal affairs were conducted (the state apartment proper) from those spaces furnishing more intimate social intercourse with people keeping the owners company during afternoon visits. The latter provided a semi-informal setting—"not unduly bound by etiquette"— for socializing with frequent visitors, contrasting with the much more formal settings required for official social interactions and

742 Ibid.

743 Ibid.

744 Blondel, "Appartements," in *Encyclopédie*, Vol. I: 546, avail. online at https://artflsrv03.uchicago.edu/philologic4/encyclopedie1117/navigate/1/3295/.

745 See the "Plan au rez-de-chaussée d'un grand hôtel" in the Encyclopédie's *Recueil de Planches* I; art. "Architecture," part V, pl. XXIII; avail. online at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Encyclopedie_volume_1-217.png. The text refers to the eleventh plate Y Z, in the plan here indicates them A and B. The plan was accidentally mirrored in printing. See Blondel's commentary on "Planche XXIII," in *Recueil de Planches*, Vol. II: 10–11; here 11, avail. online at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c0/Encyclopedie_volume_1-185.png.

746 Etlin, *Symbolic Space*, 124, 135ff.

747 See Elias, *Court Society*, 51–52.

ceremonial events.[748] Longer in the making, as we have seen, this differentiation, now made explicit, can only be understood by accounting for the different modalities within the (behavioral as well as spatial) requirement of keeping up appearances.[749] It is these specific modalities of use, and the different degrees of formality that these uses entail (with resulting spatial equipments), that allow Blondel to codify this differentiation by way of a modal difference of degree within the larger suites of rooms, while maintaining the scalar difference that set this ensemble apart from the smaller *appartements de commodité,*[750] where his projects are placed within single-range side wings to the court (C). ⊠[110]

Within the *Encyclopédie*, this exemplary project was contrasted in its more ideal character (as a pedagogical fiction, to use Davrius's term) with the plans of a realized, representative bourgeois town house ⊠[111].[751] In the plan of this intricately-resolved rococo layout for an extremely irregular site,[752] perhaps selected by Blondel for its capacity to represent the more constrained character of lesser townhouses for which more complex forms of planning seem more appropriate, we find the *appartement de société* (consisting of an *antichambre* serving as *salle à manger*, a square *salle de compagnie* and round *sallon*, which—oriented on the garden axis—serves as a hinge to a *cabinet en galerie*, with *arrière-cabinet*) filling the larger part of the ground floor. The upper floor included a larger suite (here just called a *bel appartement*[753]) consisting of an *antichambre*, a *(grand-)chambre* and *(grand-)cabinet,* and servicing side-rooms, plus two *appartements de commodité*, set apart by a secondary stair. The placement of the *appartement de parade*

748 Ibid. See also the respective discussions in Scott, *Rococo Interior*, and Lilti, *Monde du Salon*.

749 Cf. Lilti critique of Elias's account for "neglecting the distinction between 'société' and 'parade'" and "being little sensitive to the chronological evolution" (Lilti, *Monde du salon*, n.p. (online); my trans.).

750 Here, in fact, already called *appartement privé*, for the ongoing terminological shift, see below.

751 The design is that of the residence of the Marquis de Villefranche in Avignon, by François Franque, of whom Blondel will also include two further exemplary designs in his Cours IV: 365–92, pl. XLVI–XLVII.

752 See Blondel's respective comment in the *Encyclopédie*'s *Recueil de Planches*, Vol. II: 11.

753 Elias (*Court Society*, 58) argued that in this design—and the bourgeois house in general—the appartement de parade was entirely absent. Blondel's description does indeed mention the *grand appartement* only as an "bel appartement" for the master of the house and four less considerable ones for family and friends (*Recueil de Planches*, Vol. II: 11). Perhaps this description is better understood as a case illustrating a "distribution sufficient for the residence of a rich person … who striving to living in comfort and style [qui se détermine a se vouloir loger commodement et avec gout]," appropriates the residential pattern of the nobility, without the obligation of paying calls. It is this pattern that is advocated as a standard, while highlighting the openness of use.

directly atop the *appartement de commodité* attests that this modal difference and the level of formality, was in fact an inherited characteristic connected to the different levels on which these suites were typically located. As such, it shows that the *appartements de société* also emerge out of a programmatic and spatial differentiation of the *salle* in the *salle basse* and *salle haute.* But it was a differentiation that was transposed in the moment when those two suites had—given the aristocracy's aforementioned requirements of keeping up appearances—to be combined on a single floor. This way, the new modal difference had to be coupled with or reinscribed within the older logic of juxtaposing the larger and smaller suites themselves, as we see it we compare Blondel's ideal *hôtel* vis-à-vis to D'Aviler's. ☒62–3↑

Thanks to the way this modal distinction displaced the older scalar differentiation, Blondel initially managed to disentangle the functional and gender-related aspects that were still conflated, for instance, in the way Briseux's *L'art de batir* described the relation of the two larger and another small suites to be arranged on one floor. Briseux had simply contrasted the two larger appartements in rather incomparable terms by stating that "one of these [suites] is intended for [the reception of] important visitors," and as such distinguished from the symmetrical but connected suite that "is inhabited by the lady of the house" (and—implied by way of comparison—her less-important visitors), and that "is next to this one that the small apartment occupied by the house lord is to be situated."[754] Blondel thus more clearly sorted the suites based on their general function as spaces for reception. But by then contradistinguishing two species of *grand appartements*, he implicitly ascribed a more genetic, higher-order difference between the large and small suites. This way, he retroactively and implicitly presented the earlier two sorts as being two different *genera* of space, or two substances, ontologically distinct in their scale of being.[755]

While perhaps fitting the basic notion that these two suites have two different characters,[756] strangely enough, this logic ended up undermining the very attempt to define 'apartments in general'. The problem arose from the transposition of the modal difference onto the old logic of scalar distinction. It

754 Briseux, *L'art de batir*, I: 23. Orig.: "Au rez-de-chaussée des Bâtimens un peu considerable on pratique duex grands Appartements à coucher, [et] un petit. L'un de ces grands, est destine pour les étrangers d'importance, l'autre est habité par la maîtresse de la maison, [et] c'est à côté de celui-ci qu'on place le petit, qui doit être occupé par le Maître."

755 Cf. the discussion of Lilti, who rephrases Blondel's "two species" *en passant* as "sub-genres." Lilti, *Monde du Salon*, n.p. (online), ch. "L'aménagement du salon."

756 See Salom's observation that the idea of characters squarely translated the notion of *genere*, discussed later in my note 788.





110 Spread from the first Volume of the *Recueils des planches*, for which Blondel's provided an exemplary design for a large *hôtel particulier*.



111 **Spreads from the first Volume of the *Recueils des planches*, for which Blondel's provided an exemplary design for a smaller *hôtel particulier* or *maison*, with a more complex layout that results from a more constrained lot, where the appartement *de parade* is still placed atop the appartement *de sociéte*.**



opened up a new conceptual problematique in raising the question of what sort of differentiation ought to be made within the grander suites, so that they could be distinguished from the smaller ones without ascribing a difference in kind between them. Blondel seems to have realized this. Presumably left unsatisfied with his own definition, he promptly reversed this defining logic in the *Architecture Francoise* by now differentiating the suites of rooms, first by means of the sort of reception they facilitate, and subsequently contradistinguishing these spaces from the third sort of suite defined by visitors' reduced access to them, which immediately characterizes them as spaces for inhabitation. While thus still sorting appartements in two differing *differentiae* (i.e. attributes), he could now avoid making them into two different *genera* (i.e.

substances) while understanding these two sorts of heterarchical differentiations on the same level again.

An Attempt to (Techno-)Logically Break Down Appartements

This logical reversal marks a rather imperceptible shift or inversion, but one that is crucial to understand both in terms of what it consisted in and the effects it produced. Before we can try understand its consistency, let us first look at some of its effects. A first effect, visible directly in Blondel's own work, was that this logic allowed a more stringent structuration of elements from large to small, which had already characterized *De la distribution* and generated a more consistent analytical logic for treating residential space systematically. The *Architecture Françoise* and Blondel's subsequent works began from some general remarks on appartements,[757] their constitutive differences, and their constitutive elements. The latter were described in the serial order in which a visitor would run through the respective rooms: *vestibules*,[758] *salons*,[759] *antichambres*,[760] the different species of *salles*[761] (i.e. *salles [pour reçevoir] de compagnie*,[762] *salles d'assemblée [ou se tient les hommes]*[763]), various *cabinets*,[764] *chambres*,[765] *garde-robes*,[766] *galeries*,[767] chapels, and stairs). While the exact order was still changing slightly throughout his work, we can generally note that against the older order of the appartement as consisting of (*vestibule*, *salle*,) *antichambre*, *chambre*, *garde-robe*, and *cabinet*, we have a new sequence of rooms coming to be instituted with names reflecting the changes in how they were used: a *vestibule*, *(grand) salon*, *antichambre* (or two, if the second is serving as *salle à manger*), *salle de compagnie*, *chambre à coucher*, and *cabinet*; as spaces they were not only functionally more specified, but their functional specificities depended on the

757 *Architecture Françoise*, I: 28ff; *Abrégé … concernant la distribution*, 7; *Cours d'architecture*, IV: 208ff.

758 *Architecture Françoise*, I: 29; *Abrégé*, 10; *Cours*, IV: 201.

759 *Architecture Françoise*, I: 30, here still after the *antichambre*. *Abrégé*, 11; *Cours*, IV: 214..

760 *Architecture Françoise*, I: 29; *Abrégé*, 11; *Cours*, IV: 222.

761 *Architecture Françoise*, I: 31; *Abrégé*, 11. Here not yet divided.

762 *Abrégé*, 13; *Cours*, IV: 227.

763 *Cours*, IV: 231.

764 *Architecture Françoise*, I:35, here initially after the *chambres*; *Abrégé*, 16; *Cours*, IV: 237

765 *Chambre à coucher* in *Architecture Françoise*, I:32, in *Abrégé*, 18; *chambre de parade* in *Cours*, IV: 249

766 *Architecture Françoise*, I: 36; *Abrégé*, 22. No longer separately treated in the *Cours*, it specifies: "sous le nom de Garde-robes, on comprend les petits Anti-chanbres de degagement, les Cabinet de toilette, les Meéridiennes, les petites Chambres en niche, cells ou couchent les Valtes-de chanbre, les lieux de soupape, les petits pieces où se tiennent le linge; ou autant de lieux privés, également indispensables [pour la commodité]" (Blondel, *Cours*, IV: 255).

767 *Architecture Françoise*, I: 36; *Cours*, IV: 262.

suite in which they were located. In this sense, Blondel had made a breakthrough in logically breaking down the organization of residential space in a systematically analytical manner.

A wider effect came from the way this clearer system was subsequently taken up. Eventually, Blondel's modal notion of "three sorts" of apartments from the *Architecture Françoise* and the generic "two sorts" from the *Encyclopédie* were mixed up in the corrected and considerably augmented re-edition of D'Aviler's *Explication des Termes* as a *Dictionnaire d'architecture* (1755).[768] Its entry "Appartements" ☒[112–3] stated that there are three kinds (*sortes*), described in a rather D'Avilerian way in purely scalar terms as "de grands de moyens, [et] de petit." Thereby, the two ways of sorting that Blondel maintained in his more dichotomous definition are flattened out and its twofold difference evaporates into a plainly trialectic system of three kinds, as sorts on the same ontological level. Importantly, through this flattening, the term became a much more general concept, that is, in contrast to Chambers's earlier definition of the apartment as a space for habitation, it was now a reified generality; a concept transposed to a higher level of generality or organizational abstraction. Hence, in exactly the same way as had happened a century earlier with the functional specification of rooms (e.g. the *salle à manger),* the apartment was becoming a *genus*; a generic spatial umbrella-concept. The term was now categorically applied to a spatial subset that was further specified by a binomial attribute naming some qualitative distinction, functional attribute, or formal characteristic (*appartement de …*).

Whereas in Chambers's and Blondel's definitions apartments were conceived as differential elements (i.e. "a portion of a house") whose function was reciprocally constituted by their difference in scale or grandeur, the *Dictionnaire* subsumed this tripartite scalar difference entirely to the logic of identity, according to which they are differentiated through something they have in common:[769] that is, that they are all "a suite of rooms," as D'Aviler had first defined, which the *Dictionnaire* repeated.[770] In this regard, following a general entry, we find further specifications of a more heterogeneous set of suites including the *appartement des bains* and some obliquely related special dispositions presented by the summer and winter apartment, or the apartment on a single floor (*appartement de plain-pied*), and *appartement particulier*.

768 Charles-Antoine Jombert, ed., *Dictionnaire d'architecture civile et hydaulique et des arts qui en dépendent …* (Paris: Jombert, 1755).

769 In develop this point from Daniel W. Smith, "The Deleuzian Revolution," *Deleuze and Guattari Studies* 14, no.1 (2020), 34–49; here 44.

770 See "Appartement," in D'Aviler, *Explication des Termes*, 377; *Dictionnaire*, 17.

rapport à l'Architecture autant des anciens Bâtimens qui ſervent encore à quelque uſage, comme les Temples des Payens, dont on a fait les Egliſes, que des fragmens de ceux qui ont été ruinés par le tems & par les Barbares, comme à Rome les reſtes du Palais Major ſur le mont Palatin; ceux des Amphithéâtres à Arles, à Niſmes, &c. (*Voyez* l'*Architecture hiſtorique* de *Fiſcher*, l'*Antiquité expliquée* du P. *Montfaucon*, les *Antiquités Romaines*, &c.) Ces *Antiquités* s'appellent en latin *Rudera*, à cauſe de leur difformité, qui les rend méconnoiſſables à ceux qui en ont lû la deſcription, ou vû les figures dans les Ouvrages que nous venons de citer.

ANTI-SALLE, ſ. f. Grande ſalle qui en précéde une autre pour les cérémonies, comme on en voit dans les Bâtimens conſidérables, & principalement en Italie.

APPAREIL, ſ. m. C'eſt l'art de tracer les pierres, & de les bien placer & poſer. Ainſi l'on dit qu'un Bâtiment eſt d'un bel *Appareil*, quand il eſt conſtruit avec le ſoin & la propreté que demande cet art, comme le Portail du Louvre, par exemple.

APPAREIL. Ce terme a encore deux ſignifications: premierement, il exprime une pierre tirée de la carriere; & en ſecond lieu une pierre nette & taillée. Ainſi on taille dans les carrieres des pierres de *haut Appareil*, & d'autres de *bas Appareil*, c'eſt-à-dire, d'une plus grande ou d'une moindre hauteur. Toutes les pierres de même lit doivent être de même *Appareil*. Le liais eſt une pierre de *bas Appareil*, & la pierre de S. Cloud eſt de *haut Appareil*.

APPAREILLEUR ou APAREILLEUR, ſ. m. C'eſt le nom du principal Ouvrier chargé de l'appareil des pierres pour la conſtruction d'un Bâtiment, c'eſt-à-dire, qui conduit les piéces de trait, & qui trace les pierres ſur le chantier, les épures par panneaux ou par équarriſſement, qui préſide à la poſe, au raccordement, &c. Un bon *Appareilleur* ſçait le Deſſein qui lui ſert à profiler & à former des contours élégans, gracieux & ſans jarrets. Il ſçait encore la Géométrie, qui le met en état de connoître la pouſſée des voûtes, le poids, la charge & le fruit qu'il convient de donner au mur.

APPARTEMENT ou APARTEMENT, ſ. m. Ce terme vient du mot latin *partimentum*, fait du verbe *partiri*, diviſer, ou bien du latin *à parte manſionis*, parce qu'il fait partie d'un bâtiment. Auſſi entend-on par *Appartement* une ſuite de piéces néceſſaires pour rendre une habitation complette. Il y a trois ſortes d'*Appartemens*, de grands, de moyens & de petits. Un grand *Appartement* eſt compoſé d'un veſtibule, d'une premiere anti-chambre, d'une ſeconde anti-chambre, d'une chambre principale, d'un ſallon ou cabinet de compagnie, d'une chambre à coucher, de pluſieurs cabinets, & de quelques garde-robes. Les *Appartemens moyens* n'ont pas tant de piéces, & les *petits* encore moins; le tout ſuivant les uſages & l'état des perſonnes pour leſquelles ils ſont deſtinés. Mais les moindres *Appartemens*, pour être complets, doivent être compoſés de quatre piéces; ſçavoir, une anti-chambre, une chambre, un cabinet & une garde-robe, qu'on dégage par un petit eſcalier. Toutes ces piéces ont une décoration particuliere, que nous expoſons aux articles auxquels elle donne lieu. C'eſt donc aux mots VESTIBULE, ANTI-CHAMBRE, CHAMBRE, SALLON, CHAMBRE à COUCHER & GARDE-ROBE, qu'il faut recourir, ſi l'on veut connoître la décoration générale d'un *Appartement*. Nous allons maintenant entrer dans le détail des uſages des *Appartemens*, en ſuivant l'ordre que preſcrit la dénomination qu'ils reçoivent de ces uſages.

APPARTEMENT DE COMMODITÉ. *Appartement* compoſé de piéces de moyenne grandeur & d'une moyenne hauteur, deſtiné particulierement à l'uſage du maître de la maiſon. Il doit être contigu aux grands *Appartemens*, qui ordinairement élevés depuis dix-huit juſqu'à vingt ou vingt-deux pieds, donnent lieu aux entreſols, qu'on pratique au deſſus de la garde-robe de celui de *commodité*. La communication de cet *Appartement* aux grands eſt néceſſaire, afin que le maître puiſſe y paſſer ſans être vu des domeſtiques ou des perſonnes étrangeres, qui pourroient l'attendre dans les premieres anti-chambres. La ſituation d'un *Appartement de commodité*, eſt ce qui fixe preſque toute l'atten-

C

112 Pages from Jombert's, *Dictionnaire d'architecture* (1755) (*continued overleaf*).

tion d'un Architecte. Il doit être commode, ſalubre & loin du bruit. A l'égard des piéces dont on forme cet *Appartement*, elles ſont à peu près les mêmes que celles d'un moyen *Appartement*, à moins qu'il ne ſoit deſtiné pour la Dame de la maiſon, auquel cas on augmente le nombre des garde-robes, & on pratique quelques cabinets de toilette..

APPARTEMENT D'ÉTÉ & APPARTEMENT D'HIVER. Le premier eſt expoſé au nord, & le ſecond au midi.

APPARTEMENT DE PARADE. *Appartement* qui comprend les grandes piéces du bel étage de la maiſon. Cet *Appartement* eſt ordinairement ſpacieux, expoſé au levant, & a la vûe ſur le jardin, s'il y en a un. L'enfilade de ſes piéces regne ou doit regner d'une extrêmité du bâtiment à l'autre; de ſorte que l'*Appartement* de la droite & celui de la gauche s'alignent par l'axe de leurs portes & croiſées, & s'uniſſent ſymmétriquement avec la piéce du milieu; ce qui ne compoſant alors qu'un tout ſans interruption avec le reſte de l'édifice, en annonce, au ſimple coup d'œil, la grandeur intérieure.

APPARTEMENT DE PLAIN-PIED. C'eſt un *Appartement* dont le plancher des piéces qui le compoſent eſt de niveau, ſans reſſauts, ni ſeuils au deſſus du carreau ou parquet.

APPARTEMENT DE SOCIÉTÉ. *Appartement* deſtiné à recevoir les amis de la maiſon, qui viennent ordinairement l'après-midi faire compagnie au Maître ou à la Maîtreſſe. Cet *Appartement* ſe réunit avec le grand ſallon du milieu de l'*Appartement* de parade, afin que dans des aſſemblées extraordinaires ils puiſſent ſeconder celui-ci, & étaler avec plus d'éclat la magnificence de l'édifice.

APPARTEMENT DES BAINS. C'eſt une ſuite de piéces ordinairement au rez-de-chauſſée, qui comprend les ſalles, chambres, garde-robes, ſalles de bains & étuves, le tout décoré de marbre, de ſtuc, &c. & enrichi de peintures avec des compartimens de pavés fort riches, comme au Château de Verſailles & au Louvre à Paris, dans les lieux appellés *les Bains de la Reine*. Cet *Appartement* doit être toujours expoſé au nord. (*V.* encore BAINS.)

APPENTIS, ſ. m. Mot tiré du latin *Appendix*, dépendance. C'eſt un demi-comble en maniere d'auvent, qui n'a qu'un égoût, comme on en voit qui ſervent de remiſe dans les baſſe-cours.

APPLANIR. *Voyez* RÉGALER.

APLOMB. ſ. m. Terme d'Ouvrier, qui ſignifie perpendiculaire ou vertical. *En ſurplomb*, c'eſt n'être pas *à plomb*, & deverſer en dehors ou en dedans. *Plomber*, c'eſt vérifier ce qui eſt *à plomb*; & *Contre-plomber*, c'eſt par une opération contraire s'aſſurer de ce qu'on a plombé.

APOPHYSE, *Voyez* CONGÉ.

APOTHICAIRERIE, ſ. f. Mot dérivé du grec *Apotheca*, Boutique. C'eſt par rapport à l'Architecture, une ſalle dans une maiſon de Communauté ou dans un Hôpital, où l'on tient en ordre & avec décoration les médicamens. Celle de Lorette en Italie, ornée de vaſes du deſſein de *Raphaël*, eſt une des plus belles. Celle de Dreſde eſt auſſi très-fameuſe. On dit qu'il y a quatorze mille boîtes d'argent toutes pleines de drogues & de remedes fort eſtimés.

APSIS ou ABSIS, ſ. m. Nom de la partie intérieure des anciennes Egliſes, où le Clergé étoit aſſis, & où l'Autel étoit placé: c'étoit le chœur de l'Egliſe. Il étoit bâti en figure hémiſphérique, & conſiſtoit en deux parties, l'Autel & le Presbytere ou le Sanctuaire. Le Sanctuaire contenoit les ſtalles ou places du Clergé, au milieu duquel s'élevoit le ſiége de l'Evêque, ou dans la partie la plus éloignée de l'Autel, placé vers l'autre extrêmité de la Nef. Il en étoit ſéparé par une grille ou baluſtrade à jour, & porté ſur une eſtrade. Au deſſus de l'Autel étoit le ciboire ou la coupe ſous une eſpéce de pavillon ou de dais. (*Voyez les Mem. de Trévoux*, Juillet, 1710. & les *Mœurs des Chrétiens* de M. *Fleury*. Tit. XXXV.).

APPUI, ſ. m. Ce terme a deux ſignifications dans l'art de bâtir. Il ſignifie d'abord le petit mur qui eſt élevé entre les deux piédroits d'une croiſée, & à une hauteur convenable pour s'y appuyer. Il eſt ordinairement recouvert d'une tablette de pierre dure, & il ſe nomme auſſi *Accoudoir*. On entend auſſi par le mot *Appui*,

This step from two to three kinds of apartments and the conceptual flattening on which it is built, seems like a small, even negligible step in the history of architectural thought, yet in a sense it marks a watershed moment,[771] as here, a set of specific constitutive differences vanishes in the conflation of inherent scalar or functional differences with external, morphological or dispositional traits. That this happens in a context exactly where the dispositional notion of *caractère* had gained an increasing currency, is no coincidence.

Neither is it a coincidence that this trialectic stance was mirrored in the general organizational structure of the *Dictionnaire*: especially its *Système figuré de l'architecture* ✉[114]. This organogram of architectural knowledge, appended to the preface, was directly adopted from the famous *Système figuré des connoissances humaines* [Figurative system of human knowledge] included in the *Enyclopédie* ✉[115], which—as an indexical structure for organizing knowledge—had itself been inspired by the aforementioned 'partition of knowledge' appended to Bacon's work. Transmitted via Chambers's *Cyclopedia* ✉[113], this indexical system "epitomizes the materialistic and rationalistic view of the world traditionally associated with scientific thinking"; hence transposed onto the field of architecture, it also endowed the discipline of architecture with a newly scientific character. Where the *Système figuré des connoissances* places architecture along with the other arts—somewhat strangely, indeed, if we look at the untypical line differentiating it—under the knowledges processing information through imagination, the *Dictionnaire* and later Blondel's *Cours*[772] further systematized architectural knowledge by transposing the Vitruvian trinity of *firmitas, utilitas, venustas* into the three branches of civil architecture: the art of construction, of distribution, and of decoration. Of these, the middle one was still presented as the branch of the highest cultural importance in covering the aspects of ordering (*ordonnance*), conventional propriety (*convenance*), and composition/drafting (*desseing*), so that in this overall system *convenance* was literally given the most central position.

Likely due to the fact that Blondel had already implicitly posited and codified appartements as a single substance (i.e. one kind or spatial set

771 It here also opened the gates for the apartment to lose its status as a privileged space, or social marker, and become conceptually generalized and transposed onto other spatial ensembles such as bourgeois houses into which these units were henceforth increasingly implemented, thereby reconfiguring their internal stratification. Of course, this reconfiguration process—subject of a follow-up study—had already begun both in and outside France. But it was now going to happen under new terms. And this new terminology becomes evident in Blondel's evolving sorting of apartments.

772 Blondel, *Cours d'architecture*, I: xix, 131, 190; and III, xiii.

Execution of it. It wou'd look extravagant to ſay, That half the Men of Letters of an Age might be employ'd in it to advantage; and yet it will appear, that a Work accompliſh'd as it ought to be, on the Footing of this, would anſwer all the Purpoſes of a Library, except Parade and Incumbrance; and contribute more to the propagating of uſeful Knowledge thro' the Body of a People, than any, I had almoſt ſaid all, the Books extant.---After this, let the Reader judge how far I may deſerve Cenſure for engaging in it, even diſadvantageouſly; and whether to have fail'd in ſo noble a Deſign, may not be ſome degree of Praiſe.

BUT, it will be here neceſſary to carry on the Diviſion of Knowledge a little further; and make a preciſe Partition of the Body thereof, in the more formal Way of Analyſis: The rather, as an Analyſis, by ſhewing the Origin and Derivation of the ſeveral Parts, and the Relation in which they ſtand to their common Stock and to each other; will aſſiſt in reſtoring 'em to their proper Places, and connecting 'em together.



THIS is a View of Knowledge, as it were, *in ſemine*; exhibiting only the grand, conſtituent Parts thereof. It would be endleſs to purſue it into all its Members and Ramifications; which is the proper Buſineſs of the Book it ſelf. It might here, therefore, ſeem ſufficient to refer from the ſeveral Heads thus deduced, to the ſame in the Courſe of the Work; where their Diviſion is carried on. And yet this would ſometimes prove inconvenient for the Reader; who to find ſome particular Matter muſt go a long Circuit, and be bandied from one part of the Book to another: To ſay nothing of the Interruptions which may frequently happen in the Series of References. To obviate this we ſhall take a middle Courſe, and carry on the Diſtribution further, in a Note in the Margin;

113 Page from Chamber's *Cyclopedia*, Vol.1 (1728), showing a diagrammatic "[Over] View of [the division of] Knowledge."



114 Page from Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*, Vol.1 (1751), showing a similar overview in the form of a configured system



115 The "Système figuré" as adapted for the field of architecture, from Jombert's, *Dictionnaire d'architecture* (1755).

presented by apartments in general, differentiated by its attributes and modes), he, too, tried to reduce his twofold distinctions into a purely quantitative one. This occurred when he took up this flattened tripartite model in the *Abrégé … concernant la distribution* ✉[116], which reconceptualized the three sorts in terms of "three species [*espèces*] of apartments."[773] With this unpublished manuscript for a design manual for planning residences (possibly drafted in the 1740s[774]), Blondel resumed his earlier efforts to teach the art of distribution in a more systematic manner, likely triggered by his conceptual breakthrough in logically breaking down the organization of residential space in the *Architecture francoise.*

As Etlin points out, the *Abrégé* presented a synthetic attempt to conjoin the partly divergent approaches of Blondel's two earlier publications, with the more inductive presentation of projects in *De la distribution* and the more deductive presentation of planning principles in the *Architecture Françoise*, into a single comprehensive presentation of planning principles.[775] It combined an introductory codification of planning principles that are then demonstrated in an explanation of the genesis of an exemplifying design (where it was moreover connected to the contributions to the *Encyclopédie*) for a residence for a more moderate peri-urban residence of 20×10 *toises* ✉[117]. This size, Davrius notes, requires a radical reduction of the distribution to its basic elements. It bears strong similarities with the fourth model of *De la distribution* ✉[↑96] as well as a (more symmetrical) distribution in Briseux's *L'art de bâtir* ✉[↑103b], with the crucial difference that now the larger *cabinet d'assemblée* is no longer juxtaposed to the *chambre*, but precedes it. The opposite room is now denominated as a *salle de compagnie* with it own

773 Blondel, *Abrégé … concernant la distribution*, here 6.

774 Etlin initially dated the manuscript around 1740, a later production date appears more reasonable. Not only for as Etlin himself summarizes: "As the title suggest the *Abrégé* was an abridged version of Blondel's previous work on the home. However, this unpublished manuscript was by no means a mere summary … but rather a unique synthesis of [the] two different approaches found in … Blondel's major treatises on domestic architecture" (Etlin, "Le Dedans," 137; repeated in id., *System of the Home*, 127). In the respective chapter in his Blondel monography, Davrius mentions Etlin's supposed dating, but points out the lacking archival or documentary evidence to support, change or specify it. As he argues, the text may have actually been drafted by Blondel's son (*1730) under his father's guidance (so most likely between the mid-1740s–50s; see below), but it incontestably contains the latter's ideas (Davrius, *Blondel: architecte*, 106–11). Alternatively, it could alternatively functioned as an outline for a lecture, or commanded by the Prince of Monaco (whom Blondel mentions in a 1754 text), whose coat of arms is featured on the manuscripts title page. Based on this, and the below discussion, I consider a period after 1743, and closer to the 1750s more likely. In either of these cases, one may regard the conceptual flattening also as a sort of logical/didactic simplification of the twofold distinction.

775 For an analysis, see Etlin's aforementioned article "Les Dedans," passim.

116 Blondel's manuscript for an *Abrégé d'architecture concernant la distribution* (c. 1740s)

117 On the right page: "Distribution . . . d'un maison de plaisance." Exemplary layout from Blondel's *Abrégé*, plate 1
no scale



cabinet.[776] This way, it presented an exemplary scheme for combining on a single floor all three "species of apartments"[777] in one compact layout. The left half contained the *appartement de société* and the right half an *appartement de parade* where a *cabinet (d'assemblée)* now precedes the *chambre*, which is connected to a (rather compact) *appartement de commodité* to the right of the stair, so that the entire building forms a compact whole. Such a rigid scheme with clear unity—resulting from the clever integration of functional differentiations—had hardly been seen in any earlier plans.

In Blondel's overall synthesis and pedagogical treatise, the *Cours d'architecture*, we still see the same argument embedded in a wider didactics

776 Davrius, *Blondel: architecte*, 108–11. In comparing the plan with Briseux, Davrius discusses the third distribution of the first *forme* of 18 *toises* (pl. 55). The plan is closer, however, to the second one (pl. 53: see my own fig. 103b): albeit in a mirrored version with changed position of the *cabinet (d'assemblée)* and *chambre*. The later order may further suggest a date posterior to Briseux's work. In some of Briseux's distributions, the *cabinet d'assemblée* precedes the *chambre*: most notably the preceding plan of the first distribution of the same *forme* of 18 *toises*, pl 15. Yet here they are usually juxtaposed with a "salle à manger." As such the plan of the *Abrégé* could be considered a corrective synthesis of these three distributions. If so, this would indicate its fabrication after Briseux's publication in 1743.

777 Plus, on the upper floor, four more guest apartments, that are not included in this list of 'species.'



for teaching the art of distribution as "a science difficult to acquire."[778] Here it became more integrated into the cultural history of architectural planning generally. After repeating the general precepts, the elementary principles of planning are detailed in the third chapter of the fourth volumes of the *Cours*, where Blondel centers on "The internal distribution [of buildings] in general," in a first section treating "the form, proportion, and symmetry that should be conventionally observed [*qu'il se convient d'observer*] for all rooms composing the apartments, in particular."[779] Here, the description focuses on the requirement of arranging the two larger apartments along a shared axis in such a way that these contiguous suites could be coupled into a "single ensemble"[780] or made to communicate via the central *salon* that otherwise marks them as distinct suites, whereas the smaller apartment, while required to communicate with the larger ones, need to be decoupled so as to facilitate select connections.[781] It is this difficulty of arranging select connection

778 Blondel, *Abrégé*, 8; Blondel, *Cours d'architecture*, IV: 107 (my trans.).

779 Blondel, *Abrégé*, 3; id., *Cours d'architecture*, IV: 185ff–332.

780 Blondel, *Cours*, IV: 209.

781 In the *Cours*, finally, this compact example was replaced in favor of a rather enormous palace—presented in two variations—that in spite of its unconstrained size of 66 *toises*, incorporated certain planning errors or experimental features for didactic purposes.

between sub-ensembles that the various plans highlight—although in what looks like rather different formal solutions.

Surprisingly, as Blondel's 'last word', the *Cours* seems nowhere to readily state the number of sorts or species of appartements there are, which is quite striking considering the many other passages distinguishing the different species of other things by number. Only implicitly, in his treatment of the interior distribution in general,[782] does Blondel enumeratively differentiate the suites into "les Appartements de parade, de société, [et] les Appartements privés" (as he now called those "appartements d'habitation" made up of "rooms reserved for retreat"[783]). At first sight, he thus seems to be repeating the three species of his *Abrégé*. But, if we look closely, the sentence structure and phrasing, more than enumerating, marks a particular juxtaposition between the *appartements de parade* and *de société*, on the one hand, and the *appartements privés,* on the other. It evidences that he still maintained some larger (i.e. higher-order) difference in kind that generally separate the former two from the latter, as compared to the differentiation in use for specific events associated with the former two spaces. Hence, contrary to the *Abrégé*'s simplification of the system of appartements into three species of spaces, Blondel seems never to have fully flattened his earlier distinction concerning the different sorts of suites as not different kinds of spaces, but as a differentiation that arises from two different *ways of sorting* more general and more specific differences. Rather, what seems to happen is that throughout Blondel's later work, this two-way differentiation is redrawn with the reconceptualization of the *appartement de commodité* through its function as a space to retreat or retire to, and facilitating private matters.

This way, the *appartement privée* formed a spatial equipment to live in, which as Etlin has sensibly suggested, profoundly set them apart from the spaces of display that the *Cours* now often juxtaposed as "appartements *parées*" (furnished/decorated apartments).[784] This juxtaposition underlies the variety of dichotomous conceptual distinctions between appartements as either large or small (*grand/petit*), for display or retreat (*paré/privé*),

Here the *appartement de société*, instead of forming one half of the principal *corps de logis* was now arranged as a central sequence of rooms intercalated between two *appartements de parade*, one of which (to the left) is connected to an *appartement de commodité*, while the other (to the right) includes a *galerie* instead. Blondel, *Cours d'architecture*, IV: 208–9.

782 Blondel, *Cours d'architecture*, Vol. IV, ch. III; 185ff.

783 Ibid., 192; 207–8, 191. See also the similar enumeration here.

784 See e.g. ibid., 330.

reception and social (re)production or inhabitation and recreation (*de distinction/d'habitation*), or summer and winter use (*d'été/d'hyver*), which run through Blondel's wider discussion.

Different Sorts of Sorting Appartements

By maintaining two ways of sorting spaces based on different specifying criteria (*differentiæ*), the difference between these two sorts presented the differentiating factor within the machinic assemblage of Blondel's concretizing conventional planning system. This differentiating factor, and not the differentiated system of spaces produced by it, constituted an individuating difference, in the sense that the articulation of this system was driven by a quest to find the most appropriate logic of differentiation.
He thus re-emphasized the traditional distinction between *salle* and *chambres* (or more accurately, between *chambres à parer* and *chambres de retrait*), which during the conceptual and architectural evolution of apartments vanished increasingly through the multiplication of (intermediary) rooms, and which—thanks to the reconfigurings of the *corps de logis double*—now occurred along a wider transversal line. That Blondel later redrew this distinction in terms of privacy, does not mean that this amounts to a difference in kind; not does privacy become the underlying principle of individuation. Rather, it is an effect of the individuating scalar system itself of differentiating or classifying suites. It is concerning this individuating classification system that, in the following, I want to attend to two things in their mutual presupposition. First, that in the light of the foregoing observations about the two incompatible sorts of differences, Etlin's reading of this juxtaposition in terms of a bipolar system is partly misleading, if it is not further connected to his other observation concerning the way this system is inscribed into the basic organization of the *hôtel* around two compositional axes of an underlying cross-like structure that coordinates the differentiation of the appartements. In the following, I hope to provide an update on this matter, in arguing that these axes are to be understood as pertaining to those two different differences that individuate Blondel's system of apartments. As I like to argue, a more generative notion of this relationship will allow us to understand more accurately (i.e. from a genetic point of view) how this system actually generates a field polarized in two directions.

This update initially hinges on a couple of conceptual precisions and displacements that call for understanding the precise manner in which Blondel constructs his system for sorting apartments non-reductively. In this

regard, we have to first problematize the historical relation—drawn by Etlin and many others—between the emerging system of apartments and the increasing ordering of knowledge during the 1730s as a "truly taxonomic age," and reconsider how this "taxonomic spirit"[785] of classifying things was connected to generating an increasingly "articulated and hierarchically organized arrangement of spaces."[786] Because, recent authors like Jachmann and Jacoby have here critically noted, earlier scholarship has too often comingled the emerging (and moreover radically different, or even contradictory) taxonomic practices of ordering entities in the natural sciences ✉[118–19] (by Linnaeus, Buffon, Stain-Hilliaire, and Cuvier, whose approaches I will discuss shortly) with the idea of 'types' that arose later.[787] This happens exactly where historians like Etlin and Dennis reduce the changing conceptualization of two or three sorts or species of appartements to "three types of suites," that this sorting would eventually codify.[788] From a genetic angle, this is problematic, not only because it introduces an anachronism—because at this point in time, the very concept of 'type' had not been used within architectural discourse—but also because it overshadows something even more important. To start with: even the *Dictionnaire* by Quatremère de Quincy, who famously introduced the notion of the 'type' into architectural discourse, still presented apartments in terms of three *sorts* (and not even 'species').[789] Scholars like Vidler, Martí Arís, and Madrazo Agudin, who have investigated this emerging notion,[790] have repeatedly stressed that the idea conveyed by the concept of type was foreshadowed in

785 Etlin himself speaks of a "*mentalité*," hence positioning his culture-historical work also more in a history of mentalities, which I here counter from a genetic angle of architectural arrangements in the history of *technological* thought.

786 Etlin, *Symbolic Space*, 135–142.

787 Jachmann explicitly critiqued the way how "Vidler—in passing—compared Blondel's classification of buildings types to the highly contradictory taxonomic approaches of Buffon and Linné" (Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 218n766).

788 Etlin, "Le Dedans," 142, Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 118.

789 See [Antoine-Chrysostôme] Quatremère de Quincy, *Dictionnaire historique d'architecture* (Paris: Le Clere, 1832), 58–59.

790 In the field of architectural theory, the discussion of the notion of type until 1800 has been discussed most prominently by Vidler, "The Idea of Type: The transformation of the Academic Ideal, 1750–1830," *Oppositions* 8 (1977), 95–115; repr. in *Oppositions Reader*, ed. K. Michael Hays (New York: Princeton Architectural Press 1998), 439–59, esp. 443ff; Carlos Martí Arís, *Le variazioni dell'identità: Il typo in architettura* (Milan: CLUP, 1991), cited after the Spanish version *Las variaciones de la identidad: Esayo sobre el tip en arquitectura (*Barcelona: Serbal, 1993); and Leandro Madrazo Agudin, "The Concept of Type in Architecture: An Inquiry into the Nature of Architectural Form," PhD. diss., ETH Zurich, 1995. See also Jacoby, "The Reasoning of Architecture," and his article "Typal and Typological Reasoning: A Diagrammatic Practice of Architecture," *Journal of Architecture* 20, no. 6 (2015), 938–61, and Pablo Meninato, *Unexpected Affinities* (London/New York, Routledge, 2018).

the notion of *caractère,* at least in its initial Greek etymology of a mark or impression, and its meaning of an "outline left in the mind as the result of repeated exposures to an object."[791] It is precisely this sense that is expressed in Blondel's assertion that "all the different kinds of production should carry the *imprint* of a particular intention of each building, each should possess a character which determines the general form and which declares the building for what it is."[792] In this sense, this 'charactérology' offered the possibility of distinguishing between different kinds of architectural production, and thus a potential scientific basis for the discipline of architecture[793] based on a particular ontology.

So concerning these two different classifications of sorts (and their distinct ontology of apartments), we must avoid talking about 'types of suites,' precisely to the extent that, as I have argued, Blondel progressively adumbrated apartments in their general characteristic as a single genus. Now, if the notion of *caractère* appears to be a translation of the notion of *genus,* as Salom notes, and if the notion of *caractère* was a precursor of the notion of 'type,' as other historians observe, then that implies that Blondel's system is built on a single type of space, a univocal space of a particular character, further defined in its functional specificity.[794] Within the univocity of the species sorted on the basis of their function, the notion of types basically does not fit. Instead, the notion *caractère* foregrounds the defining characteristics, or characteristic differences (i.e. the *differentiæ*), I want to suggest in extending Salom's already differential reading of ordering characteristics, which allows us to differentiate, to draw general and specific distinctions, and thus to order.

But given this univocal aspect, could we then say that Blondel's system offers a sort of (proto-)typology of apartments? Fichet has argued that Blondel's theory-practice of distribution more generally "proposed a typology of different systems of relation [*rapports*]," in which "the classical norms are replaced within a [wider] system of structural differentiations, of which they are but one manifestation, but that include them."[795] While this largely summarizes how in Blondel's thinking differentiation is coupled to an integrative

791 Vidler, "The Idea of Type," esp. 99ff [443ff]; Martí Arís, *Variazioni dell'identità*; and Madrazo Agudin, "Concept of Type in Architecture"; here ibid., 28.

792 Blondel, *Cours d'architecture*, II: 229; cited and translated in Vidler, "Idea of Type," 443 (italics are Vidler's).

793 Madrazo Agudin, "Concept of Type," 326.

794 Salom, "Architecture du discours," 121ff; esp.125. For a discussion on Blondel's fight against equivocity, see here 159ff. For a discussion of the univocity in the ordering of beings, see also ch. 2 in Smith's *Essays on Deleuze*.

795 Fichet, *Théorie architecturale*, 40.

movement and the generalization of planning, there lurks a potential misreading as to *how* this coupling constitutes 'a typology of different systems of relation.' This view is adequate only as long as we understand '(proto-)typology' non-reductively as advancing a new rationale (*logos*) for techniques of classifying based on characteristic differences, and thus again in the more technological terms explained above [→3.2]. Whereas Martí Arís discusses the emerging notion of typology as a "fundamental epistemological principle" of architectural knowledge, I like to counter that—at least in our context—it is more important to consider through what rationale (both as *logos* and as ontology) the art (*technē*) of distribution individuates and concretizes into a specific epistemic framework.[796] That is, what technical rationale (or technological basis of drawing these distinctions) is at work in the newly-emerging form of organizing differences, and what is the resulting change in logic in which this reorganization of epistemic frameworks actually consists?

This changing logic, I want to show in this section, happened where the rationale of planning as a traditionally practical know-how (*technē*) was **EXORGANIZED** as a more abstract system of knowledge (episteme), and it is crucial to study exactly how it came to be exorganized. This means, how it was articulated through the configuration of its components and their various relationships. Here I do not mean the abovementioned **EXO-CONSISTENCY** of Blondel's system, which with its twofold logic helped set up a grid for judging the consistency of planning logics, alongside its coupling with an associated social system [→3.3.2]. This exo-consistency furnished more of an evaluation system than classification system for ordering buildings and their constitutive elements each defined by their particular caractère, or characteristics formal traits. But in this way, precisely this dislocation implies that such traits are always defined in relation to arbitrary and changing systems of cultural constructs; hence, relations external to their terms. As such, another form of logical system of consistency had to be derived. It is this 'other' logical aspect that we are dealing with here, and which resides in the system's internal consistency, its **ENDO-CONSISTENCY**. As we have seen in this subsection, this consistency arose as soon as Blondel started to sort component structures from large to small, yet maintained two differing differences,

796 It is thus important to avoid approaching the emerging notion of type, and the logic that pertains to it, as an already-existing rationale (*logos*) driving the study of types and their formation, and specifically not at all as an established epistemic framework of method for the study of types; rather, what is important to understand for this stage in which we see the beginning of the very notion of types emerge, we have to note something entirely different as the following will demonstrate.

thus translating this system from a hierarchical logic, having become inconsistent, into a more consistent HETERARCHICAL one.

So, to understand this reestablishment of consistency will require that we modify earlier analyses of Blondel's system through an assemblage-theoretic view of the ORGANIZATION OF GENESES within this dispositif. This view will allow us to reconsider the notion of sorts, for an aspect that the word already implies: namely, that it was principally concerned with deriving a classification by means of different ways of sorting these functional dependencies. Concerning this sorting, I am thus raising a problem that Jachmann also touches on in his analysis of seriality, when he reduces type-formation processes to those repetitive structures or formal similarities that result from it.[797] Rather, we can summarize and extend his arguments concerning the three different suites: one needs to look at similarities (or rather differences!) within structuring operations, that is, the various modalities in how structures are turned into operations and vice versa. Instead of reducing (the various approaches to) taxonomy to phenotypical classification, what needs to be more closely examined is the fact that the various approaches to taxonomic ordering that were being problematized in the natural sciences, centered precisely on the question in what way entities ought to be organized into a natural system.[798] We must inquire into the particular organizational logics that hold these systems together, and pay attention to the constitutive differences that drive various classifications. The task would thus be to uncover the 'natural arrangement' that ties together Blondel's conventional system of appartements.

From this angle, the shift from two to three sorts is symptomatic of the fact that Blondel was dealing (and conceptually struggling) with the question of what way of sorting appartements was the most sensible, concerning their characteristics both generally and in particular. This ontology underlies his codification of their different characteristics. That is, as I will show, the conceptual distinction provided for the most rational planning logic. This sufficiently complex point is more easily understood if we first have a quick look at the differing logics (and by extension ontologies) that tie together the different developing taxonomic approaches in the evolving classification systems of the natural sciences. Carl Linnaeus's *Systema Naturæ* (first pub. 1735) famously proposed a novel hierarchical classification of plants based on distinct, external, morphological characteristics, according to which they were

797 See Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 218ff
798 Ibid., 218.


CLAVIS SYSTEMATIS SEXVALIS.
Schlüssel zur Systematischen Eintheilung der Pflanzen nach beyderley Geschlecht.

118–119 **The Key to the division of plants according to both Sexual System, from Carl Linnaeus, *Systema Naturæ per . . . classes, ordines, genera, et species . . . .* From the 3rd edition (1740) and the 10th (1758).**

organized into ranks (kingdoms, genera, species) ✉[118], whose binomial nomenclature for naming *differentiæ* was derived from Scholastic systems of classification from the general to the particular.[799] Aside from the controversy this system sparked regarding its sexual nature, it also raised the question whether taxonomic ranks were a real characteristic or an artificially imposed universal.[800] Especially its numerical approach of ordering complexity was sharply critiqued by Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon, who in the first volume of his *Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière* (1749), questioned the usefulness of the very concept of species as an artificial taxonomic construct, and the an "ill-conceived method" of dividing being into an entirely "arbitrary arrangement," since—for Buffon—the only real entities in nature were individuals.[801] In his later taxonomic approach, Georges Cuvier (1810) supported a

799 See Carl Linnaeus, *Systema Naturae* (Leiden: De Groot, 1735).

800 Here after Madrazo Agudin, "Concept of Type in Architecture," 31.

801 See Buffon, *Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière* … (Paris: Imprimérie royale, 1749), Vol. I, avail. online at https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:Buffon_-_Histoire_naturelle,_1st_edition,_vol._1,_1749.djvu. Here page 37, 41, 43. On this point, see also the chapter "The Challenge of Plenitude," in *The Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century*, ed. Tore Frängsmyr, J.L. Heilbron, and Robin E. Rider (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990), avail. online at http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft6d5nb455/. After https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Histoire_Naturelle. As Serres noted, in his *History of Scientific Thought*, Buffon "planned to do without any classification in his *Histoire naturelle*: 'Is it not better to follow the horse, which is soliped with the dog which is fissiped, and which in fact does usually follow it, than with a zebra which is little known to us and which has perhaps no other relation to the horse than being soliped."—This does sound reminiscent of Deleuze's argument that—as regards they capacity, not morphology—a horse and an ox may have more in common than a work horse and a race horse. Buffon instead developed the idea of an 'interior mold', that Simondon



REGNUM VEGETABILE. 837

CLAVIS SYSTEMATIS SEXUALIS.

NUPTIÆ PLANTARUM.
Actus generationis incolarum Regni vegetabilis.
Florescentia.
PUBLICÆ.
Nuptiæ, omnibus manifestæ, aperte celebrantur.
Flores unicuique visibiles.
MONOCLINIA.
Mariti & uxores uno eodemque thalamo gaudent.
Flores omnes hermaphroditi sunt, & stamina cum pistillis in eodem flore.
DIFFINITAS.
Mariti inter se non cognati.
Stamina nulla sua parte connata inter se sunt.
INDIFFERENTISMUS.
Mariti nullam subordinationem inter se invicem servant.
Stamina nullam determinatam proportionem longitudinis inter se invicem habent.

1. MONANDRIA.	7. HEPTANDRIA.
2. DIANDRIA.	8. OCTANDRIA.
3. TRIANDRIA.	9. ENNEANDRIA.
4. TETRANDRIA.	10. DECANDRIA.
5. PENTANDRIA.	11. DODECANDRIA.
6. HEXANDRIA.	12. ICOSANDRIA.
	13. POLYANDRIA.

SUBORDINATIO.
Mariti certi reliquis præferuntur.
Stamina duo semper reliquis breviora sunt.
14. DIDYNAMIA. | 15. TETRADYNAMIA.
AFFINITAS.
Mariti propinqui & cognati sunt.
Stamina cohærent inter se invicem aliqua sua parte vel cum pistillo.

16. MONADELPHIA.	19. SYNGENESIA.
17. DIADELPHIA.	20. GYNANDRIA.
18. POLYADELPHIA.	

DICLINIA (a δὶς bis & κλίνη thalamus ſ. duplex thalamus.)
Mariti & Feminæ distinctis thalamis gaudent.
Flores masculi & feminei in eadem specie.

21. MONOECIA.	23. POLYGAMIA.
22. DIOECIA.	

CLANDESTINA.
Nuptiæ etiam instituuntur.
Flores oculis nostris nudis vix conspiciuntur.
24. CRYPTOGAMIA.

CLA

more anatomically-founded classification of beings according to their internal organization and the functional relations of their organs, not their external form. Two anatomical aspects, in fact: first, the functional "correlation of parts" by which Cuvier understood bodies as systems of parts "holding together" in "acting and reacting upon one another."[802] As Jacoby notes, this way of comparatively grouping formal characteristics rendered more explicit the functional structures in the correlation of parts, which enabled not only their scientific description, but it also began to reveal historical developments.[803] The second, anatomical aspect in Cuvier's taxonomy was the so-called subordination of character, meaning a relative invariance of characteristics immediately connected to an organism's conditions of existence, which he and Geoffroy Saint-Hiliaire championed as a new principle for 'naturally' classifying living beings. Based on this, Cuvier was able to distinguish different branches, each characterized by a different type of anatomical structure, or different body plan. Admittedly, this only happened several decades later. But, perhaps actualized by the chiasmic moves where the disciplines of architecture and the

expands on and which is taken up by Deleuze. See Deleuze, *Fold*, 185 n23; or id., *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, 192 n20, in reference to Simondon's *L'Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique*, 41–42. See also Sauvagnargues, *Artmachines*, 72.

802 See Cuvier, ed., *Rapport historique sur les progrès des sciences naturelles* (Paris: Imprimérie Impériale, 1810), here 329–30, avail. online at https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k3855f/; cited in Madrazo Agudin, "Concept of Type in Architecture," 31. Here also after Peter F. Stevens, *The Development of Biological Systematics* (New York: Columbia UP, 1994) 65ff.

803 Jacoby, "Reasoning of Architecture," 66.

natural sciences meet, Perrault's, D'Aviler's and then Blondel's scalar differentiation of appartements elaborates a type of classifying spatial organization in a way that bears some similarity to Cuvier's classification. The operational similarity in how these authors progressively use their different functions as a means of sorting is rather different from Desgodet's more morphological classification of the various *genres des edifices*. Guided by an attempt to establish not formal correspondences, but functionings, this logic for sorting needed to problematize how the meaning of spaces is constituted, as Cordemoy indicated, precisely in a twofold and reciprocally determinant integration and differentiation process.

Corollaries to a Treelike Configured System

From this comparison, four important corollaries would have to be drawn concerning Blondel's shift from two sorts to three species. The first is that, instead of directly talking about different types of suites, we should pay attention to the alternative types of sorting apartments; specifically, the abovementioned two different approaches to grouping or classifying spaces: the more hierarchical and complex one in the *Encyclopédie* that maintains a dichotomous difference in scale or privacy, and the more flattened and reductive one in the *Dictionnaire universel* where apartments become a more generic space. This conceptual difference is entirely lost when we conflate these ways or sorting in terms of types, thus also obscuring the question why Blondel moved from two to three sorts.

A second corollary, directly related to the first, is this: it is rather evident that the two sorts initially constituting Blondel's system in the *Encyclopédie* are not readily reducible to a dualistic system of display and retreat, or private and public space, as it is actually already made up of three components that avoid any symmetry. (In this regard, any discussion that presents this evolving system in purely dualistic terms, is succumbing to an illegitimate use of the conjunctive synthesis, to the extent that it reduces the planning system of appartements as a distributive, polyvocal use, to a segregative, bi- or univocal one. Yet this reduction has already happened, albeit in a different way: in the binomial reduction of apartments to a single genus.) Instead, as we have seen, the three components are produced by two different *differentiæ* according to which spaces are sorted: a more specific, modal difference between the two larger suites, and a more generic difference in their grandeur, that is, scalar or hierarchical difference between the larger and smaller suites. This implies that these 'two sorts' are indeed not yet really 'ranks' in a modern taxonomic sense, simply insofar as they do not operate on the same conceptual level. These generic

distinctions operate on a more abstract level that, as Condillac had noted in his first work, depends on how these differences are being known; and—as he added in a passage that could well have served Blondel as a recipe—it is the manner in which this abstract relation comes to be known that furnishes a way to distribute things through genera/species distinctions into a hierarchical system.[804]

804 See also Condillac, *L'Origine des connoissances humaine*, Vol. I, Sect. 5 "Des Abstractions," §3 [141ff]. Trans. Hans Aarsleff, in id., ed., *Condillac: Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001), 92–100 (modified): "§1 We have seen that abstract notions are formed by *ceasing to think of the properties by which things are distinguished in favor of thinking only of the qualities in which they agree* [*conviennent*] Once we stop considering what makes something extended to be such, or a whole to be such, we will have the abstract ideas of extension and of a whole. Thus ideas of this kind are merely denominations that we give to things when we consider them in light of their resemblance; that is why they are called "general ideas." But it is not sufficient to know their origin; there are also important considerations that bear on their indispensability and on the disadvantages that surround them. / §2 General ideas are without doubt absolutely indispensable. Since people are obliged to talk about things as being either different or alike, it became necessary to refer things to classes that were distinguished by signs. By this means they comprise in a single word what could not without confusion have been contained in a long discourse. There are evident examples in the use we make of such terms as 'substance,' 'mind', 'body,' 'animal'. If we wish to speak of things merely as in each of them we see a subject that supports its properties and modes, all we need is the word 'substance.' If we intend to indicate more particularly the kind [*éspèces*] of *properties* and *modes*, we use the word '*mind*' or '*body*.' If by uniting these two ideas, we plan to talk of a *living whole*, we have the work 'animal'. Finally, as to this last notion we add the ideas that distinguish the different species of animals, usage generally supplies us terms suitable [*conviennent*] for rendering our thought in an abbreviated manner. / §3 *But we must note that it is less by reference to the nature of things* [que par rapport à la maniere dont nous les connoissons]*, than to our manner of knowing them, that we determine the genera and species, or, to speak a more familiar language, than we distribute them in subordinate classes of some to others* [que nous les distribuons dans les classes subordonnées les unes aux autres]. *If our eyesight was sharp enough to discover a greater number of properties in objects, we would soon perceive differences between those which appear to us to be the most conforming, and we could consequently weld them into new classes.* … / §6 All of our first ideas were particular; there were certain sensations of light, color, etc., or certain operations of the mind. All these ideas present a true reality, for properly speaking they are just different modifications to our being [que notre être différemment modifié]. … *The basis for this distinction is that these modifications continually change* and succeed each other in its being, *which to the mind appears as a certain ground [fond] that always remains the same. It is certain that these modifications, when they are thus distinguished from being which is their subject, no longer have any real existence* [*realité*]. The mind, however, cannot reflect on nothing; for that would amount to not reflecting at all. But how then do these modification become an object of the mind, taken as they are in an abstract manner or separated from the being to which they belong [*appartiennent*], and which they only suit [*convient*] insofar they are contained in it? By the mind's continuing to consider them as beings, is the answer. Accustomed as it is, whenever it considers these modifications as belonging to itself, to perceive them with the reality of its own being from which they are not at the moment distinct, it preserves for them, as well as it can, this very reality, even when it makes the distinguishes between them. It is contradicting itself; on the one hand, it considers its modifications as having no relation to its being, and then they are nothing; on the other hand, they are nothing more; on the other hand, since nothing cannot be grasped, it regards them as something by continuing to attribute to them the same reality it first perceived them to have, even though that reality can no longer belong

120 **DIFFERENT DIFFERENCES:**
Diagram illustrating the traditional differentiation between the vertical distribution of genus distinctions (different rank, scale of being, and level of reality) and the horizontal distribution of species distinction (within the same rank)



Helping clarify this issue, Beth Metcalf reminds us (through Deleuze's reading of Spinoza) of the necessity of considering genetic and specific differences as differences that are different in kind: both "are tied together by their complicity in representation" of how being is distributed; meaning, the ontological relation of being and beings or particular existents.[805] But this distribution always works along two orthogonal axes. ✉[120] First, differences are distributed along a horizontal axis, which establishes conceptual or objective identities (substance) according to common formal traits, categories, or common sense. But this distribution is different in kind from the arbitrary way in which these differences also come to be arranged along a vertical axis, whereby ranks or hierarchies between these existents are established.[806] This vertical distribution and ranking of existents, endows these existents and the

> to them [*lui convient*]. In a word, when these abstractions were only particular ideas, they were connected with the idea of existence [*êtres*], and this connection is maintained. Though this contradiction may be harmful, it is nevertheless necessary. *For if the mind is too limited to comprise all at once both its being and modifications, it must distinguish them by forming abstract ideas; and though the modifications in the process lose all the reality they had, it must still suppose they have it, for otherwise they could never become the object* [*sujet*] *of his reflection.* … All these notions have therefore been realized, but more or less in proportion to the things of which they are partial ideas appeared to have more or less reality. The ideas of modifications have shared fewer degrees of existence [*dégrés d'être*] than those of substances. … / §7 Realized in that manner, these ideas have been surprisingly fruitful. … When philosophers use these words 'being,' 'substance,' 'essence,' 'genus,' species' we must not imagine that they mean no more than certain collections of simple ideas that come from sensation and reflections; they intend to go deeper by finding specific realities in each of them" (emph. added).

805 Beth Metcalf, "Univocity versus Analogy" (2009), available on Metcalf's homepage "The Univocity of Deleuze," at http://users.rcn.com/bmetcalf.ma.ultranet/index.htm.

806 See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 34.

arbitrary relations between them with an actuality that they do not have, while it withdraws from them another reality: that of the (changing) onto*logical* structure(s) that generated this particular distribution. To avoid this misplaced concreteness, one must first reveal the arbitrary (onto)logical system that sustains them. Spinoza's work had contended that these two axes do not flatly correspond with genetic and specific differences themselves: "Spinoza's 'attributes' are not categories; his qualified substances are not genera of species; his modes are not species."[807] This explains why the first attempt at systematizing apartments in the *Encyclopédie* had failed. Blondel's two sorts—pertaining to these two attributes—do not automatically constitute two clear-cut categories. It is only after reconstituting this order in the *Architecture Françoise* that Blondel was able to abstract the arbitrary system of differences that characterized the differentiation of the aristocratic space of distinction into a clearer diagram. Therein, as we have seen, there are two ways of sorting differences that more clearly relate to two different kinds of attributes: Condillac's general "properties" and specific "modes or modifications," as two ideas that together describe a living whole.[808] [121]

First, the scalar distinctions become reconceptualized through the differing lived realities that no longer distinguish the *grands appartements* from the small ones as scalar properties, but in purely qualitative terms, as required by Condillac. This is possible thanks to the two attributed functions (of the apartments as a 'substance') that set the *appartement de parade* as a space for appearing apart from the *appartement de commodité* as a space for inhabiting. Between these two, there is thus no longer a modal, but a real functional difference, or real distinction concerning their use for display and retreat. This real distinction comes to be distinguished, akin to the way the older scalar distinction had been drawn, along a vertical, hierarchical axis that traditionally places them in two different orders of being (*sortes d'être*). Indeed, it is the longstanding scalar invariance between the two that effectively prevents these three spaces from being flattened onto the same level. Amounting to a fundamental dissymmetry,[809] this greater difference reposes the problem of the relationship between the larger and smaller suites not so

807 Metcalf, "Univocity versus Analogy," n.p. (online).

808 See Condillac, "On Abstraction," §2. As I would argue here, while Condillac's treatise is explicitely refuting the system of Leibniz and Spinoza, the latter here still serves as a basic reference, since Blondel starts from one substance/genus, which he then—by help of Condillac—distinguishes in its properties and modes, hence in some sort of Spinozist (albeit 'reverse-engineered') geometric manner.

809 Here after Daniela Voss, "The Problem of Method: Deleuze and Simondon," *Deleuze and Guattari Studies* 14, no.1 (2020), 87–108.

121 **Diagram illustrating the interpretation or transposition of the twofold system of differentiation into the abstract spatial matrix of a symmetricaly divided *corps de logis double*.**

much in terms of their compossibility (i.e. possible relations to just be realized), but rather addresses a problematic element located in their virtual relations. These possibilities can actually be realized (i.e. actualized) by virtue of those virtual relationships; for they had to be actualized in conjunction with the modal distinction Blondel draws between the *grands appartements* along a horizontal axis. Within the particular quality of this sort of representative space, two species come to be distinguished on the basis of the differing modes of use, or modalities of representation, and the intensive degree of formality that characterizes the more or less official gatherings for which the *appartement de parade* and *de societé* are functionally specified. By contrast, the *appartement privé*, missing this official character and characterized by its reduced accessibility to visitors, is directly specified by this particular aspect.[810] Thereby, exactly contrary to the former bipolar juxtaposition of the large and small suites, these two differences now come to be intersected in a doubly polarized field spanning a modal, intensive difference by degree, and a real, qualitative difference in kind. ✉[122–3]

All taken together, these two differences are not reducible (precisely because they are just formally distinct, not distinct in substance) to any strictly quantitative difference. This is indeed rather difficult to conceptualize in terms

810 And — extending this logic — since this twofold distinction or (double conceptual division) into spaces for display and retreat did not really apply at all to the guest apartments, such as those suites on the upper floor of the exemplary project of the *Abrégé*, these appartements are always conceived as 'just' apartments further unspecified.

of the old species/genera distinctions, and thus explains what Blondel struggled with in moving from two to three, and thereby surpassing the dichotomous aspect of earlier forms of technologies. Equipped with modern taxonomic terms, it is easy to describe how, rather than the "three species" that Blondel tentatively contradistinguished within the genus appartement, there are actually two species (small and large), the latter of which is divided into two subspecies. Blondel could not have used this term, but this notion is clearly attested by his nested logic, in which the two subspecies plus one other species make up his 'two or three sorts,' depending on what the sorts specify. This conceptual precision may appear a little pedantic, but it is imperative for reconsidering the power of the new sorting logic underlying Blondel's systemization of appartements in the *Architecture Françoise* and its genealogy of French architecture. For in itself, this logic can best be rendered visible if we transform the differenciations underlying the twofold distinctions into a genealogical tree, which in contrast to Perrault's ordering logic, now included a (proto-evolutionary) dimension of a particular historical differentiation. ✉[124]

We can note to what extent Blondel's systematization truly tapped into the MACHINIC PHYLUM on which these differences were historically configured. As we see in the tree ✉[124], the two DIFFERENCIATED subspecies of *grand* suites form a so-called monophyletic group (marked in bold font), by which we understand a group directly evolved from their common ancestor, and which here is the not-yet-differenciated *grand appartement*, which in turn could be said to go back to the official space of the *salle* or *aula* [→ 2.1.1]. By contrast, the branch going to the smaller *appartement privé* (which would have included the guest quarters[811]) forms a paraphyletic group, meaning a more separate group that—in a way that Perrault already highlighted—could be said to go back to Greek and Roman habitations, and which could be said to originate in the chamber or cell). In thus sorting out an older core of residential space that had become coupled to more modern parts accommodating spaces according to changing social conventions, the branching diagram represents the temporal dimension (exactly as the *Système figuré* did along both synchronic and diachronic axes) in the evolution of the appartement.[812] If

811 See the previous note.

812 See the "Discours préliminaire," *Encyclopédie*, I:xv: "Enfin le système de nos connoissances est composé de différentes branches, dont plusieurs ont un même point de réunion; [et] comme en partant de ce point il n'est pas possible de s'engager à la fois dans toutes les routes, c'est la nature des différens esprits qui détermine le choix. … Ainsi plusieurs Sciences ont été, pour ainsi dire, contemporaines; mais dans l'ordre historique des progrès de l'esprit, on ne peut les embrasser que successivement" (emph. added).



122 Diagram illustrating the progressive dichotomous differentiation of appartements from the 1400s to mid-1700s, that conceptually underlies Blondel's cultural history of the evolving art of distribution.

we now connect this diagram to Blondel's historical outline of evolving planning techniques, we note that the split of the *grand appartement* into two distinct subspecies presents the most recent modification of this system (as we could say with Condillac), which consisted in a recent evolutionary split in the formation of appartements.[813] Although implicit in Blondel's didactics, this diagrammatic scheme was fundamental in training designers to apprehend this split, not only because it was intrinsically connected to many of those complex social and cultural conventions surrounding it, but moreover because this modification also harbored the virtue of conveniently coupling the *appartement de parade* with the smaller *appartement privé* into an integrated ensemble. As such, this particular conjunction must be taken as the logical basis for planning with *convenance*. Blondel here really provided a crucial update to D'Aviler's juxtaposed model of larger and smaller suites. This update lies not so much in their spatial arrangement—which may have already been latent, not only in the extraction of the *chambre de coucher* from

813 This way, we can re-appreciate how Elias theorization centered in on the differentiation of the grand apartments in their sociogenetic function, as contrasted to the way historians as Scott or Lilti have traced this differentiation in terms of the tripartite system it was going to give rise to. See Elias, *Court Society*, 51–53; cf. Lilti, *Monde du Salon*, n.p. (online).

the main enfilade, but also in the placement of the smaller suites in the side wings—but rather in a conceptual transposition. For in operating on the level of just two dichotomous species, this juxtaposition did not readily facilitate a conceptual basis for thinking in terms of a more nested logic required for differentiating/integrating these spaces conveniently; and that is where 'three species' will not cut it either.

The more important factor, already pointed out by Etlin,[814] concerns how this logic developed along the two spatial axes around which the *hôtel* was traditionally organized. But we can greatly expand this view by noting that Blondel also managed to conceptually couple these spatial axes with the two different differences that trigger this nested logic. There, to recapitulate, we find a horizontal or transversal axis between the same species of *grands appartements* (=modal distinction) and a more vertical and hierarchical one between the *grand* and *petit appartement* (=real distinction). It is obvious that his exemplary designs directly translate these axes spatially into the plan. If we jump back to the conclusions drawn in the forgoing discussion about the sociology of distinction and the way architectural arrangement formed an affective setup within it for the control of flows and corresponding forms of subjectivation [→3.2], we can note that they now engender two different AFFECTIVE measures.[815] Following Spinoza's ethology, the first difference could be said to develop along a longitudinal axis of affections. It is made up of spatial differences that condition a power over visitors. The second unfolds along a latitudinal axis of affects. It is made up of spatial differences that facilitate the capacity to act and be reacted upon—here the power to retreat.

Within the spatial metric of royal palaces, these affective dimensions had long been comingled in its spatial organization (and perhaps royal power resides precisely in this comingling?). [→2.3] For the residential matrix of the *hôtel*, Blondel eliminates this conflation by analytically sorting out (or 'disentagling' [*démêler*] as Condillac would say[816]) two different sorting mechanisms. There, the generic (i.e. real) and specific (i.e. modal) dimensions mark out two incongruent coordinates: one extensive, the other intensive. The first still pertains to the metric relation of action upon others; the second more to a

814 See above, note 734.

815 As Radman reminds us concerning Deleuze's reading of Spinoza, "affect is distinct from affection. Affection, such as feeling, emotion or mood, relates to the [extensive] status of the body caused by the encounter. An affect, by contrast, is an intensity. As such, it belongs to a nonextensive non-metric and consequently non-representable realm" (Radman, "Figure/Discourse," in *Cognitive Architecture: From Bio-Politics to Noo-Politics*, ed. Deborah Hauptmann and Warren Neidich (Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 2010); here cited after the altered version in id., *Ecologies of Architecture* (Edinburgh: EUP, forthcoming).

816 See the second-next note.

non-metric relation with oneself. Or, as we could say following Foucault's notion of systematicity: an axis of a mode of power (*pouvoir*), and one of a way of being (*ethos*).[817] And it was, of course, the latter around which the emerging measure of privacy was constructed. Around these two axes, a synthetic composition process was structured, which successively put the components back together. It thus formed a positive, practical, and systematic methodic apparatus supporting an analytic-synthetic process in the just sense that Condillac's newly-processual theory of system had been advocating.[818]

From Tree-Structures to Networks

Blondel, the Condillacian technologist, was able to weave a net out of the specific, modal-qualitative and generic, real-intensive distinctions. He translated them quite consistently onto a matrix made up of the general distinction tied to the scalar invariance of the large and small suites, whose duality was broken by intersecting it with the modal distinction within the former. This tactical difference, dramatized in the idea of privacy, is thus operationalized as an individuating difference that, together with the modal difference within the larger suites, constitutes a twofold distinction that now became the primary measure for the logical coherence of a plan: of distributing with *convenance*. The mastery of the latter art lies in learning to make these twofold differences mesh productively. This is accomplished by means of establishing select connections (or more accurately, by selectively opening empowering connections of intersecting paths within a spatial multiplicity) between the different appartements, for otherwise problematic unresolved inconveniences (*l'incommode*) arise wherever the designer cancels out the emergent effects

817 Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?," in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 48.

818 In the concluding chapter of the *Traité des sistêmes*, Condillac discusses the usage of systems in the Arts, wherein he distinguishes two arts the *Beaux arts* and mechanical arts. The latter "is the science that apprehends through the application of artificial machines, the laws of motion." Here the imitation of the "operations of nature" is a means of producing effects through machines. In the *beaux arts*, by contrast, "nothing is more difficult than to sort out [*démêler*] by what artifice it produces effects," for here "all must be reduced to a first idea … The most difficult is not to discover that first idea … The bigger difficulty, is to follow this idea through its transformations and to know how it becomes successively the different parts of the system, and forms—finally—the whole" (ibid., 429ff; my trans.) It is after this genealogical dimension, where the generic difference (of successive scales of being) is understood processually as reconstructing successive steps, that Condillac finally argues that "one does not conceive of a thing properly other than in the process of its analysis": With the example of conceiving a machine, he argues that in decomposing it and observing relations of its component parts and respectively order them, so that, when reassembling or recomposing them, one can understand how they act on another and how the entire machine is working together (ibid., 433).

of either of these differentiations, or their synergies. This problem arises from the spatial mainframe of the house itself, where these biaxial differentiations entail that, in organizing the plan, everything becomes a matter of establishing differential relations in fitting together dynamic systems. This matter cannot be taught positively, as it must be figured out and configured in an experimental process. But it is a synthetic configuration process that can be facilitated by auxiliary tools. In Blondel's system, these auxiliaries are provided by the two differentiated axes for reconciling two contradictory measures and ordering logics.

Thus, analogously to and in close conjunction with how Blondel's twofold system of apprenticeship created a grid for judging operational beauty, these axes pose the problem of conventional planning in a new way, by setting up a basic design matrix. He constructed a new plane of (logical) consistency for planning practices, which a new composition-technical device can tap into: a (technical) plan of composition. Providing an immanent planning logic through an intensive field of individuation, it precipitates its own solution in mediating the translation of these virtual relations and differential elements into an actual structure. By limiting the degrees of freedom (or space of possibilities) in the actualization of these virtual relations,[819] this matrix empowered the architect to conveniently realize a layout that carved out an existential territory, a space for inhabitation, from a spatial network that was otherwise not really designed for being inhabited. And this, in turn, empowered the inhabitant to develop a certain identity and subjectivity, dependent on the ability to withdraw and be with oneself. Blondel's discourse thus serves—in discriminating between these two powers—two distinct technologies of the self[820] in establishing selective

819 On this point, I am relying again on Deacon, Sherman, Protevi, and DeLanda's complementary work.

820 And in that these technologies are reciprocally coupled to another, Deacon would remind us that, they actually constitute a 'teleodynamic' systems of selves that is maintained and individuated by higher-order constraints on reciprocal synergistically-coupled constraint-generating processes. It would be interesting to study the very notion of individuality and privacy from this angle. (Deacon, *Incomplete Nature*, ch. 9–10). As I see it, at least the appartement *privé* as a space, is thus not achieved (or individuated) through a sort of separation of decoupling (i.e. an exclusive use of the conjunctive synthesis), but facilitated through a synergistic coupling, establishing a teleodynamic 'circular self' (i.e. a inclusive conjunction), that I describe in the following. Here in the space previously called *appartement de commodité*, *commodité* is no longer seen as a sufficiently-specifying functional attribute for this space for habitation or being *en privé*. Similar to how in Foucault's reading, it is the Prison (FC), co-emerging with Penal Law (FE) and its discursive production of 'delinquency' (SE), facilitated the formation of a new subjectivity of the repentant prisoner (SC) as a pertaining subject, here it is the recoding of the *appartement de commodité* as an *appartement d'habitation* or *appartement privé* (changing FC), that co-emerging with a changing form of expressing its

interactions with environments that allow the conditions for self-reproduction: one more social, the other more technical in a common socio-technical rationale. If the sum becomes *less* than the sum of its parts in matching and fastening these two selective aspects so that they fall into a conveniently interlocking arrangement, this approach is rather different from the establishment of formal agreements. Instead Blondel here inscribed his more operative or ALLAGMATIC understanding into a new didactic that reemployed the built-in technical logic of distribution which—in acting as an instrument, device, apparatus, or higher-order emergent constraint for learning to master this actualization process—could not directly serve as an invariant formal program or code for production. Instead, by having offloaded the formal code onto another system,[821] Blondel could reconsider the art of distribution in its decoding function, and decode this entire system so as to codify it. It is in this regard that a few more observations ought to be made.[822]

A third corollary could be drawn from the fact that Blondel provided an alternative approach for designing apartments that, finally compensating for the lost constraint within the *corps de logis simple*, presented a system for distribution that was not more constrained, but constrained on a higher

purpose (from '*commodité*' to '*convennance*') (changing FE) now discursively markes a different functional unit for 'habitation' or 'privacy' (SE), that would be facilitating the formation of a new subjectivity of inhabitants being able to be for themselves (SC). Thus against the way that in earlier historical analyses the notion of privacy has been used as a constitutional object, this notion of 'privacy' constitutes only constitutive difference in how the problem of distribution is posed, and that—this way—can already be greatly resolved within the framework of a history of architectural thought alone.

821 I am referring to my comment made above end of 3.3.2.1, concerning the way Blondel had coupled the technical rationale of distribution to an associated milieu.

822 I'm putting this in the notes, but one very interesting aspect still to be studied on this point is that it opens up the question of a possible lineage of a compositional scheme, arising here in a more implicit manner but which would become more explored in the work of his students Ledoux and Boullée, and which became much more explicit, and in a different didactic aim, in Durand's general 'manner for composing all genres of buildings,' as a much more formally reductive approach. In this abstraction, we see indeed a fundamental loss of technical knowledge. To adapt a respective passage from Stiegler's work: Here, "the [architect] … [becomes] a *disindividuated* [designer] whose knowledge has passed into the machine [of distribution] in such a way that it is no longer the architect who is individuated through [making distributions] and putting them into practice. Rather the [no longer co-individuated] architect serves the [distribution-]machine, and the latter has become the technical individual—in the sense that it is within the [distribution]machine, and within the technical system [of polytechnic teaching] to which its belongs, that an individuation is produced. This technical individuation is … a process of concretization through which the system of technical objects [the apartment and its constitutive elements] becomes functionally integrated and thus transformed [into a generic compositional method]—as does the [associated] sociotechnical milieu [of polytechnic teaching]." Adapted from Stiegler, *Critique of Political Economy*, 37. Thanks to this misplaced concreteness, this approach is the opposite of arriving at the abstract concretely, as it entirely disengages architecture from the environment in which it is produced.

organizational level. Perhaps we could tentatively call this design matrix or grid drawn up by the two axes a 'quaternary structure,' to the extent that Blondel was implicitly concerned here with the higher-level organization of elements and structures within a multi-subunit complex. But if the resulting gridding (*quadrillage*) directly manifests in an actual analytic space that rules the distributive location of selected elements, this quaternary structure does not immediately amount to the higher-level epistemological framework that we were tracing. Rather, we should remind ourselves, *quadrillage* always acts as an epistemic operating principle, as Foucault maintains.[823] To understand the changing epistemology effectuated here, we need to first look more closely at the way Blondel's **ALLAGMATIC** notion of *convenance*, and the **OPERATIONAL SIMILARITY** it expresses , became articulated as a planning rationale. This rationale is not encoded on an abstract higher-level discursive layer, in the sense that Blondel never wrote a recipe or guideline for distribution. It still operates on a much more implicit, infrastructural level of architectural ordering/(com)partitioning processes that—in contrast to true principles—do not obscure the real operation of designerly individuation, either in terms of education or form-generating processes. As such, it is encoded within the technical logic of acquiring the skills of distribution itself, hence on a technological level. And this code consists in how it progressively lays out a disjunctive network over an architectural matrix.

In Blondel's conception, we no longer find an arbitrary, tripartite system. More accurately speaking, it is first of all a system drawn on a hierarchical tree, an arborescent model that emerged from a doubly-articulated system organized in a twofold way. Literally, a tree drawn from a net. What has hardly been noted is that it now also emerged more clearly in the topological organization of the connection structures in the plan.[824] It can thus neither be reduced to any dialectic or trialectic system, nor should it be reduced to some sort of 'quad'— but not because, as I have said, these intersecting differences are irreducible to a quantitative distinction. Its real importance and major effect lies instead in the way it inscribed a hierarchical logic into a twofold system, from whence derives its logical coherence. This logical coherence for the art of distributing with *convenance* is a technological coherence, for as I have

823 See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 141–43, as discussed in my preliminaries.

824 It is crucial to not reduce this tree-like system to a tripartite one. Also Lilti warned against subscribing to a "tripartite division" emerging within aristocratic space in arguing that it "is far from being reducible to an opposition between public and private spaces, or between spaces of representation and intimacy" (Lilti, *Monde du Salon*, ch. "L'aménagement du salon," n.p. (online), my trans.). Rather, as we could add, it has to be understood in terms of architectural arrangement producing, facilitating, and such relative differences.

argued, it is generated by a specific employment of techniques of distribution according to the social rationale of mutual distinction, for the use it was put to.

This way, Blondel's didactic for distributing with *convenance*, re-established and consolidated the art of distribution as an immanent planning logic suited to the production of aristocratic residential design, and it did so by reclaiming the traditionally built-in logic of distribution which, if properly understood, provoked both a redistribution of the sensible that in turn provoke a new sensibility for distributing. On this point, Rancière's work helps us to see that—in contrast to the representative regime of *convenance* and its mimetic understanding of *poiesis*—Blondel had thus constructed a more ethico-aesthetic regime in which *logos* came closer to *pathos,* something contracted by going through it. I also say 'more,' because—akin to the *Architecture moderne*— the pathic dimension consists in an apprenticeship of the arbitrary social conventions guiding the use of differences within aristocratic residential space, or training to be undergone. It thus also generates a particular aesthetic for architectural production as a sensible mode of existence. But in contrast to the *Architecture moderne*, this aesthetic is no longer situated simply within architectural production techniques themselves. Instead, in undermining both a potentially autonomous and merely self-referential status of architectural production, architecture's technical rationale becomes an intermediary to social production and is thus subjected to a new *logos* consisting in the distinct ethos that characterizes its cultural function. This ethos lies in the accustomed and habituated mode of existence of architectural objects according to the nature and use of the French nobility's sociogenic forms of distinction.

The Technological Becoming-Conscious of Distribution

Here, we are in a position to go back to Blondel's notion that *convenance* consists in a "natural arrangement," and we can couple it with the related hypothesis made in the "Discours préliminaire" of the *Encyclopédie*, which stated that "the most natural arrangement would be the one in which the objects followed one another by imperceptible shadings which serve simultaneously to separate them and to unite them."[825] Similarly to Blondel, the

825 D'Alembert, "Discours Préliminaire," in *Encyclopédie*, I: xv, avail. online at https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/node/88; the translation here and in the following is from Richard N. Schwab and Walter E. Rex as "Preliminary Discourse," in *The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d'Alembert Collaborative Translation Project* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Library, 2009), n.p. (online), avail. online at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0001.083. Cited also in Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 347.

Encyclopedists hoped to integrate the two analytic/synthetic aspects of ordering into one logical operation.[826] They did so through the progressive conjunction of science and the arts, or theoretical knowledge and practical know-how, whose relation was entirely reconfigured, Picon points out, as soon as techniques and technical know-how were accorded an increasing importance within the systematization of knowledge.[827] It was thus on the level of ordering techniques that, as Guilbaud's analysis notes,[828] the *Encyclopédie* was trying to reconcile two logics: the alphabetic order of a dictionary and the encyclopedic order of a general course of instruction that elucidates the interlinked relationships (*enchaînements*) between the arts and sciences and their various sub-disciplines, at the same time that is facilitates access through a series of incrementally-differentiated definitions that act as indexes or nodes in a network of cross-connections.[829] For the concrete realization of such an interlinked network, the *Encyclopédie* resorted —via Chamber's *Cyclopedia*[830]—to the tentative system of classifying

826 See the "Discours préliminaire," *Encyclopédie*, I: xv: "Il n'en est pas de même de l'ordre encyclopédique de nos connoissances. Ce dernier consiste à les rassembler dans le plus petit espace possible, [et] à placer, pour ainsi dire, le Philosophe au - dessus de ce vaste labyrinthe dans un point de vûe fort élevé d'où il puisse appercevoir à la fois les Sciences [et] les Arts principaux; voir d'un coup d'oeil les objets de ses spéculations, [et] les opérations qu'il peut faire sur ces objets; distinguer les branches générales des connoissances humaines, les points qui les séparent ou qui les unissent; [et] entrevoir même quelquefois les routes secretes qui les rapprochent. C'est une espece de Mappemonde qui doit montrer les principaux pays, leur position [et] leur dépendance mutuelle, le chemin en ligne droite qu'il y a de l'un à l'autre; chemin souvent coupé par mille obstacles, qui ne peuvent être connus dans chaque pays que des habitans ou des voyageurs, [et] qui ne sauroient être montrés que dans des cartes particulieres fort détaillées. Ces cartes particulieres seront les différens articles de notre Encyclopédie, [et] l'arbre ou système figuré en sera la mappemonde. [It is not the same with the encyclopedic arrangement of our knowledge. This consists of collecting knowledge into the smallest area possible and of placing the philosopher at a vantage point, so to speak, high above this vast labyrinth, whence he can perceive the principal sciences and the arts simultaneously. From there he can see at a glance the objects of their speculations and the operations which can be made on these objects; he can discern the general branches of human knowledge, the points that separate or unite them; and sometimes he can even glimpse the secrets that relate them to one another. It is a kind of world map which is to show the principal countries, their position and their mutual dependence, the road that leads directly from one to the other. This road is often cut by a thousand obstacles, which are known in each country only to the inhabitants or to travelers, and which cannot be represented except in individual, highly detailed maps. These individual maps will be the different articles of the *Encyclopédie* and the figurated tree or system will be its world map.]"

827 Picon, "Les Rapports entre sciences et techniques dans l'organisation du savoir, milieu XVIIIe– milieu XIXe siècle," *Revue de synthèse* 4, nos.1–2 (1994), 103–120.) The *Encyclopédie* had classed these technical knowledges according to the kind of material it worked with (ibid., 106).

828 Guilbaud, "Relations théoretiques et practiques," passim.

829 I develop this point from ibid., 210.

830 The "View of Knowledge *in semine*" as depicted in the Preface to Chambers,

knowledge with the aid of Bacon's [posthumous] work. For the Encyclopedists, logic—as the art of an immanent and endoconsistent logic—consisted in "how to arrange ideas in the most natural order, how to link them together in the most direct sequence, … and finally how to present them to others in a form that makes them easy to grasp."[831] According to a longstanding tenet, Western thinkers thought that scientific knowledge was derived by establishing a system of classification that matched (i.e., appropriately represented) the underlying order of the world.[832] Here we can avoid jumping to the resulting formal typologies in architecture that, as Picon argues, in the latter half of the eighteenth century predated biological typologies to a certain extent.[833] In this he follows Angelini's reminder that both these organizational systems arose from the formation techniques that mark out the general trajectory of encyclopedism[834] in its intention to compile knowledge components in a way that facilitates their practical applications. By diagramming this underlying order into a comprehensive image with a tree-like structure, the *Système figuré* was intended to aid knowledge production by serving as a map for navigating a field of knowledge and its multifarious distinctions, in the form of a "Genealogical or encyclopedic tree that gathers them, under a single point of view."[835] It broke down knowledge in a manner that supposedly reduced much of the remnant arbitrariness entailed in any ordering, by "satisfy[ing] at the same time as much as possible the encyclopedic order of our knowledge and its genealogical order."[836] Thereby

Cyclopaedia, I: ii.

831 "Discours préliminaire," *Encyclopédie*, I: ix: "Il enseigne à ranger les idées dans l'ordre le plus naturel, à en former la chaîne la plus immédiate, à décomposer celles qui en renferment un trop grand nombre de simples, à les envisager par toutes leurs faces, enfin à les présenter aux autres sous une forme qui les leur rende faciles à saisir. [It (i.e. logic) teaches how to arrange ideas in the most natural order, how to link them together in the most direct sequence, how to break up those which include too large a number of simple ideas, how to view ideas in all their facets, and finally how to present them to others in a form that makes them easy to grasp.]"

832 After Madrazo Agudin, "Concept of Type in Architecture," 31.

833 Picon, *Claude Perrault*, 152–3.

834 Angelini, "Encyclopedias and Architecture," passim.

835 See D'Alembert's "Discours préliminaire," in the *Encyclopédie*, I: xiv (my trans.).

836 Ibid. I: xv. The full orig. passage gives: "On pourroit former l'arbre de nos connoissances en les divisant, soit en naturelles [et] en révélées, soit en utiles [et] agréables, soit en spéculatives [et] pratiques, soit en évidentes, certaines, probables [et] sensibles, soit en connoissances des choses [et] connoissances des signes, [et] ainsi à l'infini. Nous avons choisi une division qui nous a paru satisfaire tout à la fois le plus qu'il est possible à l'ordre encyclopédique de nos connoissances [et] à leur ordre généalogique. Nous devons cette division à un Auteur célebre dont nous parlerons dans la suite de cette Préface: nous avons pourtant cru y devoir faire quelques changemens, dont nous rendrons compte; mais nous sommes trop convaincus de l'arbitraire qui régnera toûjours dans une pareille division, pour croire que notre système soit l'unique ou le meilleur; il nous suffira que notre travail ne soit pas entierement desaprouvé par les bons esprits. [One could construct the

the branching would indicate both synchronic and diachronic differentiations. The tree-like diagrams resulting from this mapping, and acting in turn as a BREAKDOWN-STRUCTURE granting access, became a crucial auxiliary tool mediating between analytical and synthetic processes. Now, based on the foregoing analysis, it is rather apparent that Blondel—given his move from a still arbitrary order in the *Encyclopédie*-entries to the more arborescent order in the *Architecture Françoise*—must have been occupied with achieving something similar in establishing his conventional planning system as an apparatus for guiding thought in architectural production.

But how so? As I want to argue, it is in the configuration of his apparatus that Blondel indeed added a *more integrative* technical logic for conceptually sorting out these twofold differentiations, which concerned the question what kind of RATIONAL DISTINCTION (the third sort of distinction within Cartesian rationalism[837]) was the most adequate for accounting for the various modal and real distinctions between these sorts of suites, that is, their spatio-temporal dynamisms. Blondel thus accomplished the implementation of a *third axis that* stands like a normal vector to the plane defined by the two (modal/real) axes guiding the analytic-synthetic process of distribution. In contrast to the organizational dimension of a mode of power and a form of being, this third axis represented a dimension of the technical knowledge that 'arises' in the form of an increasing 'control over things.' This was the dimension from which the art of distribution gained a more methodological character.[838] From this angle, we may want to adopt and adapt an observation made by Rykwert concerning the fact that Blondel was the first theorist who offered a more explicit method of distribution.[839] This methodology was not spelled out, but it resided in the fact that in the *Encycplopédie*, distribution had indeed become fully synonymous with method, specifically the method employed by the natural sciences.[840] If we stop—in the spirit of the *Encyclopédie*—pitching *technē* up against *epistēmē*, we can note that the particular architectural system of

tree of our knowledge by dividing it into natural and revealed knowledge, or useful and pleasing knowledge, or speculative and practical knowledge, or evident, certain, probable, and sensitive knowledge, or knowledge of things and knowledge of signs, and so on into infinity. We have chosen a division which has appeared to us most nearly satisfactory for the encyclopedic arrangement of our knowledge and, at the same time, for its genealogical arrangement]"

837 See above, note 396.

838 I take the three axes from Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?," 48; see above, note 811.

839 See Rykwert, *First Moderns*, 417: "Blondel's eclectic teaching, which made the method of distribution the essence of all compositional procedures, the key to all beauty, seems to have been a doctrine which suited the Encyclopedists exactly."

840 See the entry "Distribution" in the *Encyclopédie*, IV: 1062, which simply relegates the reader to the entry "Method."

knowledge and its mastery had always centered on that technological aspect built into the very art of ordering as distribution-*cum*-partition, as involving an organization of differences at the precise moment that they become integrated into larger ensembles. Blondel's didactics of distribution newly reclaimed the built-in technical logic within the process of acquiring (i.e. producing) architectural knowledge by means of drawing differences. Individuated in an ability to discriminate, this operation entailed the contraction and refinement of a taste for beauty that resided in an aesthetics of functionings. In so doing, this didactic championed a form of organizing geneses that perfectly matched the aim of the Encyclopedists, as it connected analytic-synthetic processes with auxiliary techniques. The auxiliary technique lies in the way dually-ordered systems of distribution engender a third logical dimension embodied in its tree-like 'architecture.'

All in all, Blondel's scaffold for the structuring operation of distribution thus consisted of three distinct dimensions: (1) an analytic consistency in the way he started sorting components from big to small, as this made it possible to (endo-)consistently break down the different components of residential space, which were to be (2) put back together (and made exo-consistent) in being integrated into a larger ensemble in a synthetic process (3) driven by an auxiliary matrix for actualizing trees in a net. Thus, recognizing this third auxiliary dimension in the architectural arrangement of the tree-like structure, while not reducing the system of appartements to a tripartite spatial system, is the key to understanding the real discursive tensions on which this three-dimensional conceptual system with its specific tree-like (and thus essentially triangular) relation operates; the problem to which it presents a solution. On the level of how Blondel's systematization works, the twofold species/genera distinctions and the tactical difference they maintain, gain a primarily problematizing function. Like the three-body problem that precludes any facile solution, a plan with three component structures can only be resolved by way of a differential approximation of reciprocally determinant relata for which Blondel's matrix provides an auxiliary construct. This matrix it is still miles away from directly serving as a grid-like raster (of the kind that Durand later prescribed[841]) through which these elements could be located (in a more Foucauldian sense of gridding); after all, we are talking about establishing a hierarchical tree, not yet a net, as a true network production. In Blondel's method of outlining of trees from a net by way of a twofold distinction, partitioning rather acted as a means for first 'triangulating' the placement of

841 See above note 816.

elements. It allows the establishment of organizational hierarchies from within spatial multiplicities through which differential and reciprocally determinant and co-composed components can be actualized within the differentiating/integrating production of larger ensembles.

Let me unpack this idea: within Blondel's allagmatics, these three axes (rational/modal/real) co-ordinate (meaning they conjointly and simultaneously order) the three psychological, social, and environmental ecologies intersected in architectural enunciations. In this intersection, is architecture that enunciates a system of "ethico-aesthetic ordinates" (i.e. cognitive/axiological/ethical), an architectural enunciation which, according to Guattari, involves the reciprocal organization of "diachronic discursive components" and "synchronic existential dimensions."[842] In this architectural enunciation, he argues, a particular "kind of affect is established transversally across the most heterogeneous of levels. Not to homogenize them but, on the contrary, to engage them more deeply in … processes of heterogenesis."[843] That means that where Blondel's matrix folds these two co-ordinal axes (i.e. the modal/axiological/social axis and the real/ethical/environmental axis) technologically back onto themselves by way of a common rationale, their reciprocal determination generates a specific degree of conceptual closure that is achieved SYMPOIETICALLY (through TELEODYNAMIC, synergistic couplings). Yet, this conjunction does not constitute a fully closed or static system. Rather, it engenders a system sufficiently closed to act as a constraint that enables formation processes (in the sense of both artistic creation and scientific education). In that way it also presents a system strategically left open to development. This openness lies in the tactical difference Blondel maintained in his species/genera distinction (as 'the most heterogeneous of levels' within the residential system) and his resultant twofold notion of ordering as distribution (division and arrangement). It allowed that specific coupling of different organizational levels. As contemporary systems-theory tells us, this coupling of levels is constitutive for the emergence of higher-complexity systems. Complexity here actually means 'more regularized' (or organized) systems that are harder to explain.

842 Guattari, *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, 231–9; here esp. 237ff. These include, Guattari argues with Bakhtin: "Cognitive ordinates, that is, the energetico-spatio-temporal coordinates that arise from the logics of discursive sets; … Axiological ordinates encompassing the ensemble of systems of anthropocentric valorization, as much of an ethical as of an economic and political order ordinates. … [And] aesthetic ordinates determining the thresholds of consummation of an entity, an object or a structural ensemble." The axiological ordinates would be the modal distinction connected to the (power over) receiving guests, the ethical ordinates the real distinction in (power to) retreat; and the cognitive ordinate the respective rational distinction.

843 Ibid., 238.

The conceptual difficulty of this regularity concerns the higher-level logic required for nesting by which these structures are regularized through their integration into larger ensembles. D'Aviler's model, which juxtaposed the large and small suites on the same level without integrating them, had led to many confusions. It is here that Blondel's nested system established a much higher degree of integrity (i.e. interconnection and interdependency) between the distinct scales of size and complexity of the larger and smaller layers (or strata) of the system.[844] This integrity arises from the fact that, at larger scales and higher levels of complexity, we often find new scale-invariant phenomena emerging. These higher-order elements tend to have a constraining effect on lower scales or levels. This happens when their formation exerts a top-to-bottom causation (also called downward causation), crucial in understanding how systems operate, insofar as the formation and relation of lower-order elements becomes constrained by the higher-level configurations that they give rise to. This higher-order emergent constraint now leads to an emergent regularization, a higher level of organizational regularity in the overall system. Blondel tapped into this regularizing effect when he—probably inspired by Condillac[845]—inverted his ordering from large to small while maintaining two ways of sorting. This allows a sufficient degree of conceptual closure, as the resulting coupling of the two different coordinates (along the modal/real distinctions) gives rise to a third higher-level emergent constraint (i.e. rational/cognitive/psychological) constraining the underlying regularization dynamics. This enabling constraint thus lies on the level where thought or consciousness arises; it is a third dimension, perpendicular to two plain distinctions intersected to trigger thinking, in becoming aware of the difficulties in meshing these differences productively, and raising an e(thi)co-aesthetic consciousness (i.e. taste) for distributing with *convenance*. The conceptual ability to design with *convenance* requires neither genius nor mechanics (neither ghost nor machine), but the logical operation of thinking through the progressive reduction of possibilities, which leads to an emergent regularization that open design pathways by blocking or gridlocking others, offering an intrinsic and rational design method; a system for creation and invention. We can find here the third, **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** of appartements as a system for planning the inter-

844 I here follow a call made in Paul Davies's *The Demon in the Machine* (London: Penguin, 2019), 209ff.

845 See here for instance Condillac's contestation how simply adding up the mechanism of each part into a general system does not help understand the working of a body (Condillac, *Traité des sistêmes*, 367ff).

nal distribution of aristocratic residential space through its built-in socio-technical logic of drawing distinctions. Assemblage-theoretically speaking, the system of appartements appears not so much as a planning unit (with a high degree of generality), but it is better understood as the emergence of a higher-order module (with a smaller degree of generality) for managing complexity. It operates on an intermediary, meso-level for the precise arrangement of which no exact or fixed rules can be given, beyond just a few meta-rules or quasi-rules, which always depend on the state of the system (or here, the status of the building) concerned.[846] These quasi-rules can only serve to support the self-referentiality that resides in the coupling of the system's distinct layers (and thus the need for an apprenticeship in this particular system of mutual recognition and drawing differences), with the aim of marking a territory that matches the codings through which it is expressed (more than representing it).

What we witness here is a breakthrough in the becoming-conscious of distribution as a meaningful technique for ordering or organizing geneses beyond social production, albeit one that in itself has no aspect of signification. This meaning is not expressed in terms of a direct structural correspondence between form and content. Rather, in arranging relations between elements, defined by their reciprocal relation to one another, ordering-through-distributional techniques as structuring operations have an essentially **ASIGNIFYING FUNCTION**. As the *Encyclopédie* clarifies in the passage already cited above, the effect of things put into conventional agreement (*la convenance*), or what is in agreement (*le convenable*) lies in conformal actions (i.e. an **OPERATIONAL SIMILARITY**).[847] This boils down to the question what arrangement is, or better, what arrangement does. In this sense, architectural arrangements were no longer understood as a static system representing worldly order, but were reconsidered as an auxiliary instrument for establishing order or ordering; a 'plastic force' within those dynamic systems from which order arises. This was exactly what the entry '**ARCHITECTONICS**,' translated from Chambers (and placed just before Blondel's entry on architecture), stated. It defined architectonics as "that which builds a thing up regularly, according to the Nature and Intention thereof. Thus, that plastick Power, Spirit, or whatever else it be which hatches the [eggs] into living Creatures of

846 Here and in the following, after Davies, *Demon in the Machine*, passim.

847 Diderot and D'Alembert, eds., *Encyclopédie*, IV: 160: "la convenance est entre les choses, le convenable est dans les actions; Le convenable consiste souvent dans la conformité de sa conduite avec les usages établis."

the same Species, is by some called the Architectonick Spirit … ."[848] This plastic force is understood in turn as a faculty of forming organized bodies. Substantially expanded upon in the French lemma "Plastique,"[849], Cudworth's *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678) had reclaimed a powerful alternative to Cartesian mechanicism, in putting forward the idea of the "Plastick Life of nature" as a formative principle that—by acting as a middle ground that is not "without some Difficulty in the Conception of it"—offered a more reasonable final causality for the function of life, so that formation processes are neither purely driven by material forces or mere mechanical powers (as Cartesianism implies), nor miraculously operated by an onmipotent creator (which is what it contested).[850] We do not know if Blondel engaged with Cudworth's writings directly. More likely, he absorbed this notion indirectly through Condillac and the circle of the Encyclopedists: his conception was simply symptomatic of a more dynamic concept of architecture (as Picon has suggested[851]). Note the parallels concerning, for instance, the way that the article on "architectonique" centrally translated this build-up of a thing in accordance with it nature, precisely in conventional terms as "that which gives each thing a regular form, matching the nature of that thing [ce qui donne à quelque chose une forme réguliere, *convenable à la nature de cette chose].*"[852]

848 See the lemma "**ARCHITECTONICK**," in Chambers, *Cyclopedia*, 128; for the *Encyclopédie*, see I: 617: "**ARCHITECTONIQUE**, adj. (*Physiq.*) est ce qui donne à quelque chose une forme réguliere, convenable à la nature de cette chose, [et] à l'objet auquel elle est destinée : ainsi la puissance plastique, qui, selon quelques Philosophes, change les oeufs des femelles en créatures vivantes de la même espece, est appellée par ces Philosophes esprit architectonique. Sur le systeme des puissances [et] natures plastiques, voyez l'article **PLASTIQUE**."

849 Cf. the lemma "Plastic," in the *Cyclopedia*, 833; and "Plastique," in the *Encyclopédie*, XII: 729.

850 As Cudworth argued, and the French article paraphrases, "for unless there be such a thing admitted as a Plastick Nature, that acts … for the sake of something, and in order to Ends, Regularly, Artificially and Methodically," either the "efformation" of organized bodies must happen "fortuitously" without the direction of any understanding, or that everything down to the smallest thing must be produced by an omnipotent agent "immediately and miraculously." See the "Digression On Plastic Nature" in the Conclusion Of Chapter III, in Ralph Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe: The First Part* (1678), 146–81, here 146–8, and 155. Cited after *Cambridge Platonists Project*, http://www.cambridge-platonism.divinity.cam.ac.uk/view/texts/diplomatic/Cudworth1678-excerpt006. Cudworth's plastic principle was going to inform Leibniz's idea of entelechy, but also Locke's ideas on the organization of consciousness, and Berkeley's idea of causal agency, as well as—further familiarized through the *Encyclopédie*—many later theories. See Tobias Rees, *Plastic Reason: An Anthropology of Brain Science in Embryogenetic Terms* (Oakland: Univ. of California Press, 2016), 227ff; and Catherine Malabou, *The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality, and Dialectic*, translated by Lisabeth During (London/New York: Routledge, 2005), 5ff; and her *Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality*, trans Carolyn Shread (Cambridge: Polity, 2016), passim.

851 I refer again to Picon's related observation cited in my note 675–6 above.

852 See *Encyclopédie*, XII: 730: "Néanmoins il faut bien se garder de confondre la nature plastique avec la divinité même. C'est quelque chose de tout différent [et] qui est fort au-des-

This 'something' described by the article "plastique" lies in the agreement between words and things: an underlying generative logic ("an internal logic or internal discourse") that articulates itself in an "enunciated reason [*raison proférée*] or external discourse" in the material build-up of things. It was concerning their inherent logic that Cudworth had likened these creative processes to the work of an architect who, unlike manual laborers, supposedly "understand[s] the Reason of the things done, whereas the other[s] … only do, not knowing what they do."[853] Blondel would probably have thought something along the same line, seeing that this was the case with the art of distributing with *convenance* increasingly as a purely mechanical exercise of establishing formal correspondences, rather than being a formative experience creating a technical awareness or consciousness that the art of distribution (endo-)consists in.

Precisely in this anti-mechanistic stance, Blondel's machinic notion fostered the progressive systematization of architectural planning and distributional techniques into an "unexhaustable science [science inépuisable]." Concerning this architectonic aspect of the art of establishing scientific systems, Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) would later show that in contrast to merely 'drawn together' aggregates, true systems form a consistent whole. This consistency is established due to the particular end (*Zweck*) to which all parts are each extrinsically bound, but by which they are also intrinsically bound together.[854] This idea, tying loose aggregates into more consistent

sous. L'art de la divinité, à proprement parler, n'est que la lumiere, l'intelligence [et] la sagesse qui est en Dieu lui-même, [et] qui est d'une nature si éloignée de celle des corps, qu'elle ne peut être mêlée dans la nature corporelle. La nature n'est pas cet art *archetipe* ou original qui est en Dieu, elle n'est qu'une copie, qui quoique vivante [et] semblable à divers égards à son original, conformément auquel elle agit, n'entend pas néanmoins la raison pour laquelle elle agit. On peut exprimer leur différence par la comparaison de *la raison intérieure*, ou *du discours intérieur*, [et] de *la raison proférée*, ou *discours extérieur*, le second quoique image du premier, n'étant qu'un son articulé, destitué de tout sentiment [et] de toute intelligence" (italics orig.). Cudworth here argued that "the Difference between these two, may be resembled to that between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος, the Reason of the Mind and Conception, called *Verbum Mentis*, and the λόγος προφορικὸς, *The Reason of External Speech*; the Latter of which though it bear a certain Stamp and Impress of the Former upon it, yet it self is nothing but Articulate Sound, devoid of all Understanding and Sense. Or else we may Illustrate this business by another Similitude, comparing the Divine *Art* and Wisdom to an *Architect*, but *Nature* to a *Manuary Optificer*; … *We account the Architects in every thing more honourable than the Manuary Opificers, because they understand the Reason of the things done, whereas the other, as some Inanimate things, only Do, not knowing what they Do: the Difference between them being only this, that Inanimate Things Act by a certain Nature in them, but the Manuary Opificer by Habit*" (Cudworth, op. cit. §11, 155 (italics orig.). Note that Salom's analysis has here discussed Cudworth's distinction principally in its mention that nature is but a "copie" of an "archetypal" world originally in God. See Salom, "Architecture du discours," 553–90.

853 See Cudworth's original in the previous note.

854 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by and edited by Paul Guyer and

systems, Kant argued, lies in the very "schema, i.e. an essential manifoldness and order of the parts determined a priori from the principle of the end."[855] While schematics outlined empirically do yield a technical unity from the contingent use of arbitrary external ends, an architectonic unity only arises from schema established in consequence of an idea, according to which, and in conformity with which a whole articulates a closed and organized system.[856]

The binding idea underlying Blondel's theory of distribution and the conventional system of planning therefore does not simply consist of an extrinsic spatial system made up of three component parts according to socio-spatial differentiations. It also consists *in* two other things: its end exo-consists in the way this organization was bound to a particular milieu of self-distinction, in the rationale of which distribution was to be carried out. Matching this idea, this organizing system then endo-consists in an intrinsic technical schema and diagrammatic practice, of laying out a disjunctive network from a three-dimensional matrix. Its third dimension was the dimension where a consciousness arises (in the form of making rational distinctions) from conjoining two distinctions different in kind concerning spatio-temporal dynamisms, which enabled the most rational form of planning. As we have seen, this planning was conducted through an auxiliary construct, which resides in the tree-like diagram of the historical differentiation of French residential architecture and its structuration in both its diachronic and synchronic dimensions. This macro-historical differentiation process is implicitly recapitulated

Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998), esp. II: The Transcendental Doctrine of Methods, ch. 3: "The architectonic of pure reason," A832/B860: "I understand by a system, however, the unity of the manifold cognitions under one idea. This is the rational concept of the form of a whole, insofar as through this the domain of the manifold as well as the position of the parts with respect to each other is determined a priori. The scientific rational concept thus contains the end and the form of the whole that is congruent with it. The unity of the end, to which all parts are related and in the idea of which they are also related to each other, allows the absence of any part to be noticed in our knowledge of the rest, and there can be no contingent addition or undetermined magnitude of perfection that does not have its boundaries determined a priori."

855 Ibid., A883/B861.

856 "For its execution the idea needs a schema, i.e., an essential manifoldness and order of the parts determined a priori from the principled of the end. A schema that is not outlined in accordance with an idea, i.e., from the chief end of reason, but empirically, in accordance with aims occurring contingently (whose number one cannot know in advance), yields technical unity, but that which arises only in consequence of an idea (where reason provides the ends a priori and does not await them empirically) grounds architectonic unity. What we call science, whose schema contains the outline (monogramma) and the division of the whole into members in conformity with the idea, i.e., a priori, cannot arise technically, from the similarity of the manifold or the contingent use of cognition *in concreto* for all sorts of arbitrary external ends, but arises architectonically, for the sake of its affinity and its derivation from a single supreme and inner end, which first makes possible the whole; such a science must be distinguished from all others with certainty and in accordance with principles. Ibid., A833–4/B861–2.

during the design process with its more micro-historical formative act of distribution, which the recapitulation of this structuration turns into operation and vice versa.

And it is this recapitulation of differentiation—as an **EPIGENETIC** process carried out in the morphogenetic matrix that Blondel provided—that the plastic force resides. In arising from the machinic phylum or engineering stratum of this process, the tree-like system for distributing apartments with *convenance* ultimately constituted a "tertiary retention." This concept was coined by Stiegler to capture the externalization, spatialization, or materialization of temporal dynamics on the **EPIPHYLOGENETIC** level of technical co-evolutions. Here, accumulated epigeneses (which in turn retain collective memories such as those concerning spatial differentiations) constitute a "retentional apparatus" that supports the (trans)individuation of (socio-)technical ensembles. That means that aside from the way this tripartition represents a certain social differentiation, it first of all records a historical differentiation process that retained in its specific division all those differentiation processes, like Spinoza's notion of the body as a palimpsest that retains the traces of all that it has encountered. It is in this sense that Blondel's system for sorting suites arose through crystallization processes (not axiomatics), concretizations (not abstractions), accumulations and densifications (not reductions) of characteristics.[857] They are the accumulated effects of ordering practices which, Jachmann argues, are always "time-bound architectural, social, and medial" practices that "depend on their manifestation in built form" as well as their "role in society."[858] This is the point where material-discursive ordering practices gain their agency in configuring specific societies. And these, having supported the individuation of this system itself, primarily had a *productive,* not representative, function in generating this particular tripartition. If we see Blondel's system as a tertiary (not just tripartite) tree-like system, we can avoid obscuring the real operation of designerly individuation, both in terms of education and form-generating processes, and the matrix by which they operate.

Of course, here we see a certain resonance with the matrix of appartements derived by Serlio who, following Perruzzi, advocated "to always start from the middle [*per il mezzo*]." Blondel, too was known for advocating "a middle path [*un voie moyenne*]." Serlio reappraised compartitioning techniques as the only immanent logic for measuring architecture against itself,

857 I here follow Jachmann's characterization of type-formation processes, in id., *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 214ff; here 219 and 221.

858 Ibid., 221.

from which the power of architectural (i.e. material-discursive) thinking arises through drawing together differences. It happened once with Blondel, who at the beginning of the *Architecture Françoise* marked out a plane that sliced through the chaos of distribution,[859] spreading a consciousness of distribution. Its logic of distribution was not immanent to itself, but immanent to the culture for which it was an instrumental medium, and intermediary for processes of social production; there, it would have greater consequences.

3.3.3 The Compounding of an Organon of Control

In the previous section, we have come to a fuller conception of how Blondel's systematization of planning processes operated, or how Blondel's conventional planning system worked in reconceptualizing architectural production. As we have seen, it participated in, and helped catalyze, a wider reconfiguration of all sorts of relations within the ongoing opening of knowledge, acting as a modernizing social technology [→ 3.2.1]. Concerning architecture, I would argue, this innovating moment is to be found where, as Wallenstein has already stressed, architecture ceased to be understood as representing order, and instead, itself started to be conceived and instrumentalized as a means for ordering.[860] We see this slow shift in the late 1730s, when the distribution of *hôtels* was becoming an ordering tool in the work of Blondel and Briseux.

As we have seen, together these works helped effectuate a new assemblage of architectural enunciation.[861] This new assemblage becomes more tangible where the art of distributing with *convenance* underwent a technological shift away from simply matching conventional agreements between things/forms/objects and ideas/content/subjects, toward a more fitting method of successively establishing these relations. For entities and their properties are more appropriately defined in their interdependent position, function, and behaviors within those larger chains, ensembles, or systems from which the components are drawn. Thereby, the base operation of structurally distributing the sensible, and common sense, characterizing the older episteme of resemblance, is transposed into a mode of approximating operational similarities characteristic of the newer episteme of difference and

859 I am here adopting a point made concerning Spinoza and Bergson, within Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 49.

860 After Wallenstein, *Biopolitics and the Emergence of Modern Architecture* (New York: Buell Center/Princeton Architectural Press, 2009), 20 and 39.

861 I borrow the notion from the respective section in Guattari, *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, 231ff.

identity, where the sensible is produced through an act of progressively drawing characteristic differences, and relative species/genera distinctions, on multiple levels. This incremental INTEGRATION-DIFFERENTIATION of mutually presupposing and reciprocally determined elements within larger ensembles underlies architectural planning techniques. It now started to operate as a wider organizational technique, offering a method and instrument for the organization of geneses within a wider technical ensemble. Therein, it gained a more concrete instrumentality for organizing (and regularizing, as we shall see) social production processes, based on the longstanding cosmo- and sociotechnical lineage of compartition/distribution techniques as a generative means for defining orders and membership to a group through socio-spatial differentiations. But by transposing initially social functions to more technical ones, distributional techniques gain significance for organizing or planning particular social milieus in general, and thus on a greater scale. It was this technicization of distributional techniques for social production processes through which the art of distribution came to be elevated to the status of a *science inépuisable,* in the sense of an organized system of knowledge derived through heuristic techniques. And what will be enunciated through this technicization is precisely a notion of planning closer to the modern sense, to which I will now attend in this final section from a TELEODYNAMIC angle, to conclude this analysis of the final stages of the concretizing system of appartements.

As we have seen, Blondel's didactics contributes a crucial step toward this changing understanding, as it presents an attempt to re-gain technical mastery over the complexities concerning the social production processes involved in residential planning. Yet, instead of inventing a new logic, it in fact recuperated an inherited planning logic with its older serial view of the organization of geneses. But at a time when the art of distribution could no longer be reduced to a simple subdivision, it also entirely reinvented the differential production of architecture through a newly systematized approach for planning progressively complex structures. It did so by way of putting into operation a theory that reclaimed the built-in formative technical knowledge of distribution that had been overshadowed by a trending formalism. Blondel's work can be understood as a final attempt to rescue the French art of distribution from its symbolic reduction to merely matching formal correspondences (as in the work of Cordemoy and Courtonne), without resorting to an entirely alien system of organizing architectural geneses or the production of spaces (like Briseux resorted to). Facing this double impasse, he became invested instead in deriving a new consistency from the

system itself, by dramatizing its internal tensions until they precipitate their own solution. But instead of outlining a strict, systematic and normative method for laying out buildings (as his successors would do), this dramatization laid a new foundation that operatively repositioned distribution and planning techniques on a higher level of abstraction: the level of the socio-technical functioning of layouts and distribution within residential planning.

This was where this dramatization contributed to a forceful redistribution of the sensible and a resulted in a recomposition of thought. This in turn yielded a much more machinic than mechanical notion of the art of distribution itself as a generative technique. Reconceiving the art of distribution (as composition) technically as an artistic-creative and pedagogical-educational process of progressive differentiation and integration facilitated its codification (i.e., both decoding and recoding) as a (socio)technical operation. The mastery of this codification requires a certain technical knowledge in the form of an **ALLAGMATICS** as a theory of operations, of how distribution (socially) functions, and of how it functions within social composition processes. This stripped the art of distribution with *convenance* of its focus on qualitative relations (i.e. *commodité*) and possible formalism, and turned it instead into a system of more abstract quantities (conventional agreements) and real formation processes. The formative abstraction and operationalization of distribution allowed Blondel to largely decode and deterritorialize the traditionally ordained system of architectural (knowledge) production. By then putting into operation an allagmatically-systematized design approach, Blondel's system of planning eliminated many of the entropic complexities that had haunted the inherited approach to planning more modern networked spatial structures. Dependent neither on genius nor on mechanics, it put into operation a technical ensemble that drove a **MACHINIC ASSEMBLAGE** of differential components. It worked, as I have shown, through an emergent regularization of its underlying dynamics of planning practices, leading to a new revolutionary simplicity in the successive works of his students. Through this emergent regularization, the system of appartements tended to a greater degree of concreteness as it became increasingly coupled to an analytic/synthetic planning methodology. This coupling takes place precisely on the **MACHINIC PHYLUM**, that is, the engineering stratum on which this convergence configured a new technological ensemble.

To recapitulate: the relation between the abstract machinic dimension of distribution and social engineering was fostered significantly by Blondel's step of recoupling distribution with social production processes, from which a novel exo-consistency for planning is established. An assemblage-theoretic

123 **Matrix of stratification: The concatenation of four domains in the concretizing planning system of appartements [→ BOOK O].**



point of view (in specifically strato- or schizoanalytic terms) allows us to note that this occurs where the non-discursive technical rationale of the art of distribution is overcoded by a more discursive intrinsic logic of distribution in a field external to it: the sociology of distinction. As we have seen, Blondel productively coupled the art of distribution with a newly-operationalized form of observing people (= SC/organization of geneses) through an apprenticeship in the social milieu where this art distribution gained a signifying function. This apprenticeship was directly connected to the mastery of a new form of conducting design (= SE/control of activities). The connection was established through a combined conceptual filter and compartitioning grid that allowed a higher degree of control in the act of establishing functional sites with *convenance*. As a 'referential universe' (U), the art of distribution came to be positioned as an endo-referential yet exo-consistent domain. This means that the art of distribution as spatial production still maintained its immanent, material-discursive, and technical production logic through progressive differentiation. But this production logic only gains its consistency from being connected back to a domain of social practices that remains external to it. This domain is the 'art of dealing with people,' or conduct, as an essentially exo-referential and endo-consistent domain. For as we have seen, within the art of dealing with people, spatial production through spatialization, ordering, differentiation and hierarchization, reciprocally presents a crucial instrument, as the sociology of distinction can only ever be actualized by an enabling architectural apparatus for the striation of flows and affective economies (F). Juxtaposed in

two different senses, these domains are only related via the virtually-real 'architectural territories' (T) and actually-possible MACHINIC PHYLA (Φ). From an assemblage-theoretic perspective, Blondel's aim to (TELEODYNAMICALLY) match the virtual possibilities of planning (and its final cause) with its actually-real function (its material cause) for social production, can only be achieved indirectly, by linking them either via the domain of the actually-possible (i.e. formal cause) or virtually-real (efficient cause).

The assemblage-theoretic point is this: in contrast to exo-referential modeling systems (i.e. representation) or endo-consistential ones (which are auto-catalytic, like the TRANSDUCTIVE *corps de logis simple*), endo-refererential systems of production always call for a multiplicity of meta-modeling categories that account for heterogeneity and processes of heterogenesis.[862] This calibration of co-relative ordinates presents a process that is situated at the junction of two types of "smoothing," as Guattari's schizoanalysis suggests, to which any striation of flows is connected: the first concerns an identification of sensible qualities that guide the transformation of aleatory spatial chains into more controlled, proto-machinic concatenations (F→T); the second concerns an expressive smoothing through more abstract quantities that are engendered by the resulting striation of flows (F→Φ).[863] In the last section we have looked more closely into smoothed forms for the wider organization of (hetero)geneses (T) and the concrete assemblage for planning that the de- and reterritorializations effectuated by Blondel and the Encyclopedists helped construct. If I fell short of exposing clearly what it is that Blondel's system does (abstractly), it is because I am first interested in working out how the dispositif of conventional planning (concretely) re-established (the art of) distribution as a means or method of (technical) mastery, which is to say: a means of control. In this last section, we'll have a concluding look at the accompanying reconfigurings of the machinic phylum (Φ), and locate those new ABSTRACT MACHINEs and apparatuses of control that were starting to operate and get this new assemblage of architectural enunciation kick-started.

From Mastering the Art of Distribution to Control Systems

To better understand this form-taking technical ensemble, it is important to note that the machinic historical component and its phyl(ogen)etic dimension are not readily reducible to the more complex history of the word machine and its conception within architectural discourse, of which I will not give an iso-

862 After Guattari, *Schoizoanalytic Cartographies*, 69.
863 Ibid., 80–84; for the sensible smoothing see also ibid., 115–27, esp. 119–22.

lated account,[864] beyond repeating its original meaning as static scaffolding frames that enable construction processes and operations of moving materials; this may be of further relevance.[865] Rather, based on today's notion of machinic processes and their co-constitutive material-discursive dimension, we can employ the term non-anachronistically in its concretizing meaning as it co-evolves with the changing conception of how material-discursive constructs and scaffolding setups enabled and pre-structured production and regulation processes. This way, it may help explain—from a genetic vantage point—how planning processes came to start operating on a greater, more industrial and more modern scale of production.

It is here that the opening systematic effect [→ BOOK 0] of this reconfiguring of distributive techniques resided, in helping co-consolidating an emerging method for establishing hierarchical organizations (= FE/composition of forces) in general. Through its machinic consistency, Blondel's system for distributing with *convenance* achieved at the same time a necessary degree of *systemic closure*. This closure arises, as we have seen, where architectural arrangements—and especially the hierarchical sorting of appartements—give rise to higher-order emergent constraints for distributive ordering techniques. Centering on the co-formation of selectively interacting environments (i.e. a territorialization process that through differentiation/integration results in niche-production), this system conditions its own narrowing-down of possibilities in a field of differential elements 'falling together' or actualized in some form of content. Here we must avoid reading 'content' directly as 'containment,' because 'content' is something both morphogenetically formed through an internal (or endo-)consistency, and

864 For a concise overview, see here, the introduction to Moritz Gleich, and Laurent Stalder, eds., *Architecture/Machine: Programs, Processes, and Performances* (Zurich: GTA Verlag, 2017), 4–12; including a list of related literature.

865 Therein, it seems specifically suited to Blondel's work;—for one of the few architectural structures that Blondel actually built around this time were precisely those expensive architectural apparatus (*macchine*) for pyrotechnical festivals (*feu d'artifice*), as inspired by the festival of the Chinea in Rome. On the history of the Chinea, itself. See Mario Gori Sassoli, *Della Chinea e di altre "macchine di gioia": Apparati architettonici per fuochi d'artificio a Roma nel Settecento* (Milan: Charta, 1994); and John E. Moore, "The Chinea: A Festival in Eighteenth-Century Rome" (PhD diss), Harvard Univ, 1992. I have unfortunately not been able to consult these studies, here referenced after Kevin Salatino, *Incendiary Art: The Representation of Fireworks in Early Modern Europe* (Los Angeles: Getty Research Center, 1997), 1–46; here esp. 21ff. As Rykwert had pointed out (Rykwert, *First Moderns*, 361–2). Blondel had designed the *macchina* for the festival of 1747, as well as some earlier ones. In 1740, Salatino describes, he had also provided impressive plate of the firework of 1739, which "successfully conflated the whole complex narrative into a coherent compositional whole" (Salatino, *Incendiary Art*, 26). In this regard, I would argue the tableau of Blondel's conceptual apparatus and planning methodology did exactly the same.

morphodynamically maintained in a metastable state, through the external (or exo-)consistency provided by external forces in its milieu. Containment, by contrast, lies in a *higher degree* of systemic closure, where these external forces can be amplified and stabilized by way of imposed constraints.[866] Imposed constraints are different from emergent constraints; they do not arise from emergent regularizations throughout coupled dynamic systems; they arise on an even higher level of organizational complexity where regularization processes themselves become **TELEODYNAMICALLY COUPLED**.

This teleodynamic view of systems and the sufficiently complex conceptual difference drawn here will be helpful for understanding how and why Blondel's system of distribution came to be instituted over any other within the emerging dispositif of disciplinary society. This is precisely the level where regulative apparatuses or setups come into play or arise, and by which regularization processes themselves become further regularized. Within such **TELEOGENIC** systems, this process often occurs through processes of compounding emergent constraints, meaning that different constraints mutually converge and reinforce each other, be it on the same or different levels of organizational complexity. Thereby the system's operations become incrementally normalized by being further delimited or enclosed to the point of a systemic closure through which the system tends to lock itself into a more (meta) stable state, allowing it to be reproductively isolated through auto-regenerative mechanisms and self-enforcing setups. On this matter, I want to suggest that the compounding of constraints occurred—and this was actually what was going on in what was happening in the late eighteenth-century approach to planning—during the longer processes in which the technical instrumentality of architectural arrangements for social production, and the art of distribution as a technology of control, started to be coupled to, and thus increasingly integrated into a greater technical ensemble, namely, the system of political economy emerging in France. Its thinkers pondered the question of how to introduce economy—the wide management of individuals, goods, and the wealth of households, and maintenance of suitable alliances to other houses—to a state level.[867]

Foucault famously repeated De La Perrière's dictum that the problem of government(ality) that had spontaneously broken out during the middle of the sixteenth century[868] consisted in the "droicte disposition des choses, desquelles on prent charge pour les conduire jusques à fin convenable

866 Here and in the following Sherman, *Neither Ghost nor Machine*, 125ff, and 145f)
867 Foucault's lecture of Feb 1, 1978, in *Security, Territory, Population*, 87–114; here 94–5.
868 Ibid., 88–9.

[the right disposition of things arranged so as to lead to a suitable end."[869] As the philosopher of technology Antoinette Rouvroy reminds us, government is thus classically understood as the process, means, or mechanism for producing regularities that organize social interaction and human behaviors, by subjecting them to norms, rules, or laws, which comprise both rights and duties.[870] This subjection is closely connected, as Nathan Moore further notes, to a new kind of 'finality' (i.e. a teleological purpose) arising in the state's pursuit of fostering life. This moment is marked by the 'birth of biopolitcs' that Foucault detected in the convergence or conjunction of various spatial, social, and economic practices and technics.[871] Yet, this new purpose emerges only through the formation of a different dispositif, meaning through a different coupling of various co-constitutive and mutually-reinforcing dynamics. As such, it is a specifically reciprocal transformation process, which thus follows the logic of teleogenic systems to some extent. Therein spatial organizations come to be coupled to social production processes, which in turn conditions the emergence of a different economic regime. This is no longer the dispositif of disciplinarity, but one that morphs into a dispositif of security, or control, if we prefer to use the concept that Deleuze employs, and which moreover allows us to draw a clearer connection between Blondel's ALLAGMATICS and the technical mastery of distribution.

On Control and Circulation

According to the Foucauldian contradistinction, disciplinary setups primarily partition space through "a hierarchical and functional distribution of elements" and "well-calculated dissymmetries" that—as the enfilade—force elements and events into specifically planned paths. Control, by contrast, operates more dynamically in "plan[ning] a milieu in terms of … series of events … that will have to be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework," which is to say that it strives to condition, or rather produce a physical condition that, through delimitation or constraints, guides unfolding

869 Ibid., 136, here cited after the more verbatim translation of the lecture in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991), 95. As Foucault had observed, in the early treatises and the problem of government as La Perrière's *Le Mirroir politique* (1555), "Government is not related to the territory, but to a sort of complex of man … in their relationships, bonds, and complex involvement with things. … Government is the right disposition of things that one arranges (*disposer*) so as to lead (*conduire*) them to suitable end.'" (Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 96, citing La Perrière, 23r).

870 Rouvroy, "The End(s) of Critique," in *Privacy, Due Process and the Computational Turn*, ed. Mireille Hildebrandt and Ekatarina De Vries (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2013), 143–68.

871 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 16–20.

processes more probabilistically.[872] But as this form of production is constrained by the environment in which this condition ought to be realized, material milieus or physical setups necessarily become the conditioning "medium of an action, and the [infrastructural] element in which it circulates. It is therefore the problem of circulation and causality that is at stake… : How should things circulate?"[873] As Moore comments, this means that, in contrast to discipline, control is not so much concerned with a particular disposition (i.e. some static architecture). Instead, it is concerned with processes of disposing or arranging bodies, things, and their relations (thus gaining, through generalization, a greater technical dimension of architectural planning) so that they are disposed to lead to a certain outcome.[874] What is particularly characteristic for control is the dynamic relation of two terms, where a "possibility of constantly re-mobilizing relations irrespective of the terms related" is comes to be realized through a process of AXIOMATIZATION.[875] With this term, Deleuze and Guattari theorized those systemic self-simplifications that consist in the formation of certain component parts that enter into assemblages of production, circulation, and consumption, and which, for them, is also closely connected for the historical formation of the economic system of capitalism.[876] Here we have to locate the convergence for several mechanisms of distribution, (political) economy, and (dispositifs of) control as specific systems of production coming to be integrated into a new ensemble.

To understand the teleogenic function of distribution as economy in this form-taking ensemble—and how the architectural form of organizing geneses (SC) is rearticulated in the domain of 'machinic phyla' as a plane of composing forces (FE) where they start to serve as a general blueprint for production—we need to replace Foucault's lingering container-conception by saying that this genetic condition resides in the particular setup of a milieu by which "circulation is carried out," and by which "a circular link is produced between effects and causes."[877] The circular aspect of this dynamic linkage is embodied in the very etymology of control: coming from "*contre-roller*," control implies a logic that emerges from a coupling of two dynamics or flows that keep each other in check. As a coupling that must be

872 Ibid., 20–2.
873 Ibid., 64.
874 Nathan Moore, "Diagramming Control," in *Relational Architectural Ecologies*, ed. Rawes, 61.
875 ibid. 58.
876 Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 461.
877 Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 21.

made and maintained (and thus requiring work), control resides in the channeling of irregularities into regularized paths that increases a system's ability to regenerate. This regeneration concerns not just a system's parts and structures, or its composition and dynamics, but also (and more importantly) their conditions of possibility. This self-(re)generative condition is found precisely in the establishment of mutually reinforcing and thus causally constraining couplings of non-concurrent processes into **TELEODYNAMIC** ones that, as Deacon's theory suggests, help delimit the perturbing effects of external influences. Control can then be understood as "teleodynamic work." According to Deacon, it is defined precisely against linear (orthograde) teleodynamic processes, from the interaction of which a **CONTRAGRADE** tendency is derived. The latter selectively stabilizes the system by establishing productive feedback loops between otherwise unrelated processes, now tangled up into complex chains.[878] By following Deacon's suggestion to recast the "notion of 'power' in terms of teleodynamic work"[879] against entropic processes, we can reconsider how control entails the steering of events by establishing ever wider feedback loops that, although positive, have an overall negentropic effect.[880] In such entangled systems, the establishment of feedback loops always entails a recalibration carried out through the regularizing effect—what Foucault termed the normalization within discipline dispositifs[881]—of emergent constraints forming throughout (and also constraints imposed onto) dynamic systems.

In outlining the "Transcendental Doctrine of Methods," Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) defined discipline as "the compulsion through which the constant propensity to stray from certain rules is limited and finally eradicated."[882] Where discipline is characterized by external forms of compulsion (imposed constraints or regulations), control resides in forms that are more built in (emergent constraints or regularization). As such both can be interpreted as an auto-regularizing mechanism within formation processes (from which he differentiated discipline), to which—within the positive feedback loops established here between culture and doctrine—it makes a specific *negative* contribution. It does so by predisposing systems (albeit differently), through acts of repetition, toward specific habitual behavioral responses, and iteratively correcting errors or disturbing factors. Through such auto-regular-

878 Deacon, *Incomplete Nature*, 369 and 397.
879 Ibid., 368.
880 See Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 29ff; here 30 and 45.
881 Ibid., 55ff
882 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, II, The Transcendental Doctrine of Method, First Chapter: "The Discipline of Pure Reason," A709/B737 (trans. mod.).

izing mechanisms, a system's constitutive elements and their relation come to be disposed so that they lead to some end immanent to the system's self-maintaining dynamics: a *fin convenable*.This finality lies literally in the teleogenic convergences and the regularities that such systems generate throughout their becomings. By training self-governing responsive systems, *askesis* works by pulling or drawing (*trahere*) systemic behaviors iteratively into path-dependent tracks and trajectories. A sort of systemic *laissez-faire*, this auto-piloting operates specifically on a higher-order teleogenic level from whence its 'transcendental' empiricist dimension derives. At the same time, in attempting to understand the underlying workings of such systems composed of reciprocally determined and mutually constraining elements, Kant's proto-cybernetic vision noted, that for such systems to work, "a quite special and indeed negative legislation is required, which under the name of a discipline erects, as it were, a system of caution and self-examination,"[883] meaning a system of control circuits which continuously cross-checks (and corrects) the functioning of these self-regulating operating systems. This control system is basically hard-wired into the very arrangement and architecture of these circuits themselves, and how they are exorganized into material environments, since only the most fitting arrangements facilitating this continuous cross-checking will persist within the path-dependent evolution of this self-regulating system. That is precisely where their self-conditioning, assemblage-theoretic[884] aspect resides.

Thus filtered through Deacon's teleodynamic view, we arrive at a straightforward synthetic perspective of how the art of distribution and its

883 Ibid., A711/B739: "But where neither empirical nor pure intuition keeps reason in a visible track, namely in its transcendental use in accordance with mere concepts, there it so badly needs a discipline to constrain its propensity to expansion beyond the narrow boundaries of possible experience and to preserve it from straying and error that the entire philosophy of pure reason is concerned merely with this negative use. Individual errors can be remedied through censure and their causes through critique. But where, as in pure reason, an entire system of delusions and deceptions is encountered, which are connected with each other and unified under common principles, there a quite special and indeed negative legislation seems to be required, which under the name of a discipline erects, as it were, a system of caution and self-examination out of the nature of reason and the objects of its pure use, before which no false sophistical illusion can stand up but must rather immediately betray itself, regardless of all grounds for being spared."

884 On a side-note, just hereafter, Kant will discuss mathematics as "the most resplendent example of pure reason happily expanding itself without assistance from experience," since — in contrast to philosophical form of cognition that are based on a rational cognition from concepts — mathematical cognition is based on "the construction of concepts" that involves exhibiting a priori the intuition corresponding to it. See ibid., First Section, A712/B740. That is precisely an 'analytic of concepts' on which Deleuze would base his genetic, non-representational philosophy. See my preliminaries.

principal technique of partitioning offered a control mechanism for all sorts of production of (hetero)geneses. The increasing rise to a level of technological consciousness of architectural forms of partitioning and distributing things, and generating, segmenting, striating, and controlling flow and thereby effectuating certain forms of living and modes of existence, certainly presented a means conducive to this end of 'disposing things to a suitable end'; of gearing heterogeneous ensembles toward particular systemic behaviors. Particularly those architectural arrangements like the architecture of appartements, which had been charged to serve as instruments for social production, that is, a form of social production transformed and normalized by way of new constraints disposing the system toward its own reproduction by maintaining, through exorganized systems of control through all sorts of architectures, its constitutive internal dynamics.

Concerning these re(pro)ductive mechanisms, we should draw out Guattari's extension of Mumford's "mega-machinic" theory of civilizations, which in its extension of the notion of the machine to the social, accounts more (or more explicitly) than Elias does for the technical apparatuses and machinic dimensions with which specific societies come to channel collective energy (and moreover teleodynamic work) into a specific form of social production.[885] With this machinic vision of the function of spatial setups for selecting for specific forms of social production, we can synthetically reconsider the aspects of governmentality, control, and circulation pertaining to the distribution and managerial system of appartements within aristocratic households as a cybernetic system, literally a steering device or conductor.[886] In the conclusion of my second part [→ 2.3.3], we have already noted the arising apparatus of capture and the forms of gridlocking that appear within the Château de Versailles's palatial event-space for conducting stately visits, at the point where a purposeful (i.e. teleological) conjunction of flows occurs, where one affective flow (the *lévée* as part of the older *département des heures*) blocks or constrains other sociogenic flows (the paying of calls, receptions). Now we can reconceptualize this blockage in terms of a teleogenic coupling, a selective short-circuiting where something passes within this intra-acting apparatus so that its regularizing reduction of possibility spaces effectuates a real transformation, an emergent transition through a particular setup that maintains this selected-for state reproductively, by gridlocking flows and keeping perturbing dynamics in check. The spatial

885 See Sauvagnagues, *Artmachines*, 187, 196.

886 As is known, 'governing,' and 'cybernetics' etymologically share a root in the Greek κυβερνάωμ ("to steer). I refer to the fact that also the French *conduire* means "steer, lead."

selection mechanism of appartements not only channels flows of visitors and servants; it also channels the general evolution of aristocratic houses as a socio-spatial system of organization in a systemically self-enforcing direction. It thus consolidates the epigenetic landscape of generative relations that secure the conditions of its own reproduction.

For this reason, this machinic angle brings us back to the physiological problem of the control of the affects, which makes it possible to generalize the architecture of appartements systematically as a state space for regulating what is coming to pass. But in this more general (i.e. higher-order level) auto-affective reading, several things must be accounted for. The first thing to observe is to what extent the concretizing planning system of appartements, as a wider material-discursive matrix for mastering the art of distribution, is embedded within *a* wider genealogy of control. As I have implicitly shown up to here, this genealogical lineage, centering on the underlying structuring operation of distribution as partitioning, acts as a certain counter-genealogy to only placing the architecture of appartements within a genealogy of disciplinary/civilizing spaces. Rather, from the point of view of their genesis, these two aspects are indeed teleodynamically connected, as two reciprocally-constitutive or sympoietic, teleogenic components. In this coupling, it was the progressive gridlocking, the structuring operation of partitioning/distribution that (like Foucault's notion of how partitioning [*quadrillage*] operates within formtaking dispositifs[887]) drove the differentiation of appartements into a concretely differenciated planning system. It thus drove this spatial apparatus, having long helped control the affects and what is happening, to become a wider framework for the planning and dynamic management of affective multiplicities in general.

That said, a second point concerns the need to avoid generalizing apartments as some sort of control structures in a reductive sense that they spatially or architecturally determine people and their behaviors, through an inadequate notion of control that does not account for their teleodynamic dimension within such coupled socio-spatial systems. The generalization forces us to describe the evolving system of appartements in its systemic specificity: namely as a special-case control structure fitting a particular logic of social (re)production. This specificity arguably lies in the fact that this planning system—as it was discursively codified from D'Aviler onwards in the problematization of the art of distribution—proved a crucial technological component in a technical ensemble of architecture as an emerging

887 I am referring back to the first of Foucault's **FOUR DISPOSITIFS OF DISCIPLINARITY**.

discipline. As we have seen, it was the progressive compartitioning logic technically guiding the distribution and planning, that is, production of appartements, that became a more general conceptual control structure. Or rather: it presented a generalizable structuring operation in the organization of (hetero)geneses, and it became successively employed for the controlled production of increasingly complex and larger ensembles. Precisely these technological relations between complex systems, breakdown structures, distributions, and the possibility of planning, control, government, or management of events and movements, came to be increasingly instrumentalized, or technicized during the mid-eighteenth century.

Throughout this part, I have respectively tried to extend Wallenstein's abovementioned observation that architecture stops representing order to become a tool for ordering itself, by revealing how technologies and their inherent tree-like architecture had long formed the particular system of knowledge pertaining to the order of the natural world, and the organization and hierarchy of its beings (according to the old episteme of resemblance). The very technicity of the organizational mechanism or 'organon' of architecture's hierarchical arrangements and distributional techniques for establishing, sorting, and ordering differences and identities, and its instrumentality for all sorts of geneses, had progressively risen to the level of technological consciousness. Planning thereby gained a novel aspect in moving beyond the signifying function of order for social reproduction through hierarchization and segmentation of (static) spaces and spatial form. But with these technics of organizing differences coming to be seen as a tool for ordering itself, their technicization required placing systems of distribution within larger (and dynamic) systems of production and formation processes. They therefore had to be transposed onto a higher level of organizational complexity. Through this transposition the art of distribution began to constitute what Stiegler calls a **GENERAL ORGANOLOGY.**[888] By this we understand a higher-order theory of the co-evolution of physiological, technological, and social bodies and organs, through which a wider system of knowledge pertaining to the organization of technicized environments can be derived (or as Antoinette Rouvroy more

888 Bernard Stiegler, "General Ecology, Economy, and Organology," in *General Ecology*, ed. Hörl, 129–50. For the fundamentals of a general organology, see the introduction to Stiegler's *Symbolic Misery*, Vol. I (Cambridge: Polity, 2014) and Vol II (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), passim. Stiegler develops the notion from Simondon's original notion of 'mechanology' or 'technology' as the knowledge of 'technics' and their functionings. In the context of contemporary mechanicist positions, this original notion seems at first glance more appropriate, but is also dangerous in uncritically perpetuating mechanicist assumptions, without extending them onto a machinic level, as I try to do here.

accurately phrases it, an understanding of the transforming types of knowledge and power that the implementation of such technics imply). It stresses "how the new regimes of visibility and intelligibility implemented by the considered technologies impact on how we conduct ourselves, how we attempt to conduct others, and how others attempt to control our conduct,"[889] and as such, it implies a more nested form of control through the regularization of the 'conduct of conduct' that underlies governmentality. In folding conduct back onto itself, the environmental aspect of control within distributional techniques had thus become integrated (and was in the process of becoming further integrated, or internalized as an externality) into a self-regulating apparatus made up of reciprocally enforcing biosocial, psychosocial, and economic technics, and related ecologies of practices, disposed and geared, in their coupling, toward a teleodynamically-constituted end.[890]

In this short-circuiting system, we find an important technical condition for architecture to become a bio-socio-technical instrument, that is, an instrument for the ordering of life and for those disciplining mechanism within which the dispositif of distribution turned out to become a "tool of social control and reform," as Vidler writes,[891] which it did by disposing the system incrementally toward a more closed state. This is where the dispositif of distribution—teleodynamically forming ever wider loops—came to be connected to forms of strategic disengagement or segregation during the later eighteenth century and the formation of disciplinary architectures and their spaces of enclosure. It happened, as we know, in the shift from the enfilade system to a more cellular spatial system with a central corridor, with which the relatively dichotomous tree-like organization of spaces branched into a more broken-down, analytical spatiality. Of course, much work has already been done on how this differentiation and integration was accomplished through a set of regulating rights and laws, regulating conduct and behaviors, and so on. Establishing the precise sequence of this transformative compounding during the late eighteenth century would merit its own systematic (and systems-theoretical) study but clearly this switching state began from a convergence on the machinic phylum, where this compounding was effectuated through *a wider closed-systemic effect.* With my interest

889 Rouvroy, "Technology, Virtuality and Utopia," 121.

890 I am referring here to Frichot's reading how governmentality involves complex 'environ-*mentalities*' that span Guattari's three ecological registers; Hélène Frichot, *Creative Ecologies: Theorizing the Practice of Architecture* (London Bloomsbury, 2019), 29ff.

891 Anthony Vidler, *The Writing of the Walls: Architectural Theory in the Late Enlightenment* (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1987), 3.

residing precisely in the establishment of this systemic closure (rather than the resulting institutional spaces of enclosure), the last section of the last part of my genealogy will focus on the compounding process pertaining to the integration of the architecture of appartements onto a higher level of organizational complexity, where a dynamic regularization of non-identical regularization processes (i.e. conduct) emerges through constraint propagation.

To look at this systemic closure through the compounding constraints emerging from positive feedback loops, we need to move our analysis to the level of this higher-order organization (of geneses), where these machinic effects are coupled with newly regularized flows. So, rather than falling back into a merely representational reading explaining this regularization process through emerging economic theories like Quesnay's physiocratic theory (1758), we must account, as I try to do in the next section, for their reciprocal formation, and approach this emerging environmental form of governance, planning, or control as an interrelated socio-spatial reterritorialization or reconfiguration process resulting from multiple converging flows.[892] Moreover, every such coupling necessarily entails a set of constitutive decouplings. These become visible in those symptomatizing disengagements that can be noted which the individuation of this higher-order system into the progressively differentiated structuration of a material milieu that is organized by this emerging form of governance and its new forms of planning. This concerns, of course, the formation (and relevant forms of production) of an increasingly reticular milieu broken down into more cellular components. It is precisely within this **RETICULATION** process that the idea of distribution was increasingly coupled with an alternative system of circulation facilitating it: the cell/corridor complex which, in dissolving the serial spatial logic of the enfilade, effectuated a series of other systematic decouplings and a 'molecular revolution.' Yet since, as I will show, this new system emerged where the aspect of control and circulation was progressively outsourced and exorganized into a specific spatial infrastructure for reticular milieus, we are not talking about any rupture, but an emergent transition. This way, we understand how the system of conventional planning as an art of distribution through partitioning was already becoming complicit (as in 'co-implicit') within the new dispositif of control that was beginning to take form.

892 Therein we find, on the one hand, a decoding of the flows of production (including the art of distribution, due to the dissolving traditional planning logic for residences after the advent of the *corps de logis double*, as well as the academicization of building practices); and on the other hand a decoding of the flows of labor (the various forms of business and domestic work conducted within household structures).

In rounding off this last part on the concretizing system of appartements, I will thus look not so much into the further functional differentiation and multiplication of its constituent rooms (although, historically speaking, it is quite interesting to see all sorts of functional *cabinets*, like withdrawing-rooms or boudoirs emerging in the larger plans). For reasons that will become clear, but that basically concern opening this study to the following volumes on apartment houses and housing, I will conclude this part by attending more transversally to a different differentiation process, namely, the formation of a more out-differentiated circulation system, the *dégagement,* that facilitates this differentiation, alongside a related typological transformation through which the *hôtel* incrementally breaks free from its urban surrounding. Because, far more interesting for the history of the present than the out-differenciated spatial system of aristocratic residences alone, it was the particular economy of flows (and breaking or instantiating them) within the system of appartements and their *dégagéments*—as a managerial device for striating flows—that here became further ex-organized to an urban scale. In thus centering on a transformative transposition that happened in a particularly interesting, multi-scalar context, the following section will then suggest that this scalar transposition arises precisely through a systematic constraint propagation and compounding of distributional techniques of this formtaking circulation system. Thereby, I hope to reconsider this twofold differentiation as a further epigenetic process, by also paying attention to the **EPIPHYLOGENETIC** dimension where this differentiation is retained in the more integrated system for planning circulation that it gives rise to.

The Neoclassical Hôtel's Formation through Two Infrastructural Disengagements

After a phase with relatively little new construction during the second quarter of the eighteenth century, slowed further by the War of Austrian Succession (1740–48) and after that, the Seven Years War (1756–63), a new phase of urban expansion started beyond the boulevards on more peri-urban sites.[893] Here European residential architecture once again entered a period of transition, which also sees the final typological evolution of French aristocratic residential architecture toward what Dennis has defined as the Neoclassical type of *hôtel*[894] As his analysis shows, this novel type completely inverted the characteristic intra-urban typology of the baroque *hôtel* as a party-wall building

893 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 136.
894 Ibid., 125ff.

framing a central courtyard. Instead, the design of these new *hôtels* moved closer to that of the *maison de campagne* as a detached and freestanding pavilion-like structure. This turn to such compacted designs (*plans massés)* had—as it did two hundred years earlier—a direct implication for the distribution of the suites of rooms in it. ⊠[2]

Dennis's study suggests that the typological transformation of the *hôtel* is explained as having drawn inspiration from Ange-Jacques Gabriel's Petit Trianon ⊠[124] (b. 1762–68 for Madame de Pompadour at Versailles), a compact plan which had gained a certain model function for the new peri-urban residences.[895] The *plan massé*, structured around a central axis, partly hides the sequential ordering of the smartly-offset rooms. The asymmetrically gridded plan is made of three blocks in decreasing size, each formed by three rooms of which the central one was the largest. Directly connected to one another, these principal rooms formed the main sequence snailing from the principal stair toward a set of smaller spaces in the core of the building. The largest block adjacent to the garden consisted of an *antichambre*, a secondary *antichambre* serving as *salle à manger*, and a third room that—in its connection to the *salle à manger*—acted as a *cabinet à repos*. This smaller third room, set back in the north-western corner, also served as an annex room in the second block. It formed the *appartement de société*, structured around the central *(grand) salon*, in connection to which it formed a *petit salon*. This sequence was traditionally complemented by a grand *cabinet*, which we find in the third room in the north-eastern corner. This room also acted as a *boudoir* within the third block—the *appartement privé*—connected to its central bedchamber, behind which the *garde-robe* is located, and which was further connected to a group of rooms in the core of the building, forming an *appartement des bains*. We thus see a clever combination of a grid-like plan within which the traditional sequential ordering is realized, with its hierarchical differentiation of rooms into stratified segments.

While Gabriel's plan was indeed ingenious in its polyvalent framework (and thus prone to being imitated within residential architecture), the explanation of this development through the building's model function does not really explain the reasons behind the typological transformation of the *hôtel*, nor the ensuing changes in the art of distribution. From an assemblage-theoretic view on the concretizing planning system, it seems more productive to stop ascribing the design a 'model' function, and start problematizing how

895 Ibid., 136.



124 Plan of the Petit Trianon, in Versailles





and why it became a certain model. This would imply that we reconsider the model itself in its embeddedness in a different typological lineage, which is to say the genre of the *maison de plaisance* as a more rural building type. And as Scott notes, the "insertion of the [*maison de campagne*] into the cityscape cannot have been undertaken arbitrarily."[896] Yet, in explaining this transformation through an untimely 'revival' of the rural forms of housing, scholarship has for too long remained content with superficial readings that—as I will later describe—have explained this transformation through the contemporary changing ideas about nature, and the relation between architecture and nature.[897] Such explanations often start from the idea of the 'primitive hut' or ur-pavillion, famously fronting the second edition of the polemical *Essai sur l'architecture* that the Jesuit priest and *amateur* Marc-Antoine Laugier published anonymously in 1753/55.[898] This reading often focused on Rousseau's contemporaneous critique of the corruption of civilized (i.e. urban) society and the supposed innocence of humanity's earlier 'state of nature.' His *Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1755) describes this corruption as a necessary result of civil society's evolution from an undifferentiated natural state toward a more differentiated cultural stage assembled from heterogeneous group of people with mutually interdependent groups, functions, statuses, and roles.

Yet precisely to the extent that this transformation, rather than consisting in an actual return to the countryside, consists in a particular transformation of the urban realm, these analyses have never touched on the machinic phylum

896 Scott, *Rococo Interior*, 90

897 As Ćulafić summarizes, "During the second half of the 18th century, the [Enlightenment] idea of nature [as an expression of righteous, sincerity logic and kindness] played an important role in human interests. … The notion of 'natural cognition' was not only related to the cognition of the physical world and the things that happened in it [i.e. epistemologically], but also the rights, religion, society, politics and art. Natural cognition was a search for the basic fundamental truths in all areas of human existence." Irena Kuletin Ćulafić, "Marc-Antoine Laugier's Aesthetic Postulates of Architectural Theory," *Spatium* 23 (Oct 2010), 46–55; here 49). This is precisely the point where, as Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, or Stiegler will argue that technology and technical ensembles come into play.

898 See [Marc-Antoine Laugier,] *Essai sur l'architecture* (Paris: Duchesne, 1753); and its *novelle edition; revue, corrigé, & augmentee avec un dictionnatire des termes* (Paris: Duchesne, 1755). Trans. as *An Essay on Architecture*, trans. Wolfgang and Anni Herrmann (Los Angeles: Hennessey & Ingalls, 1977). Laugier's work was sufficiently positioned in Wolfgang Herrmann's *Laugier and Eighteenth-Century French Theory* (London, 1962); and Kruft, *History of Architectural Theory*. For a recent analysis of the cultural/philosophical/religious/historical multidimensionality of Laugier's architectural aesthetics, see Ćulafić, "Marc-Antoine Laugier's Aesthetic Postulates," passim. As Bergdoll summarizes: "The [primitive] hut had been a standard feature of architectural theory since Vitruvius; but never had it been proposed as anything more than a fanciful story of primitive origins of architecture. Laugier's radical step was to proposed this origin as a moment of higher truth" (Bergdoll, *European Architecture 1750–1890*, 12). See also Rykwert's *On Adam's House in Paradise: The Idea of the Primitive Hut in Architectural History* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997; orig. pub. 1972), 49.

on which these transformations of urban forms of production were engineered through the proliferating effects of newly re-coupled systems. In this respect, I want to suggest approaching the typological transformation of the *hôtel*—as I have consistently done throughout this chapter—as an effect of two converging flows; as an intersection of two previously branched-off, typological lineages. Here, we should go back to Elias's analysis, which emphasizes that the aristocratic town house never really lost the traces of its formal origin within rural residential estates,[899] meaning that the *hôtel* presented a dispositif transplanted into the city fabric along with its particular sociology of distinction, which had long shaped its internal socio-economic form of organization.

To map this convergent process in which the *maison de campagne* influenced the Parisian town house-type requires positioning this typological transformation itself within the larger-scale transformation of the urban fabric by which the *hôtel* had been shaped, to be able to reconsider in what manner the planning of country houses was reshaping it in turn. That is more than just a rural building type becoming transposed into the city. Approaching the *hôtel*'s transformation through two converging typological lineages requires that we pay closer attention to the ways in which, with the larger morphological transformation of the *hôtel*, the previous form of this particular type of organization becomes transposed from a residential to a more general form of planning larger ensembles. From this angle, during the second half of the eighteenth century this internal form of organization (or 'economy') became increasingly externalized to the organization of the urban habitat. This happened when around 1750, authors like Voltaire and Laugier recognized the need for infrastructural reforms regarding the "obscure, dense, and hideous" center of Paris, which—in its medieval disorder—lacked a clearcut, legible system or comprehensive plan that would give it any orderly regularity and thus 'reason' as a whole.[900] In contrast to the haphazard local creation of monumental squares on underdeveloped sites, these critics and planners called for a more global or integrative view of urban production. This global approach, it was argued, could be derived from implementing a new system of circulation, which—like in the residential planning of *hôtels*—was called after the specific dis/engagements by which it operated: *dégagement*.

899 Elias, *Court Society*, 45, referring to C. Jombert's *Architecture moderne,* 43ff; which discusses construction on marshy lands [*des lieux marécageux*]; see here also the start of its preliminary chapter on construction, 5ff, where this factor is already addressed.

900 See Nicholas Papayanis, *Planning before Haussmann* (Baltimore/London: John Hopkins UP, 2004), 20.

Spelled out by La Font de Saint-Yenne, the doctrine of *dégagement* promoted the disengagement or detachment through which monumental buildings were played free from a background urban fabric.[901] This practice, long reserved for buildings of the church and state, was also coming to be applied to grand residential architecture during the mid-eighteenth century. Replacing the traditionally synecic form of the *hôtel* as an incorporated urban dwelling drastically changed toward the more dioecic[902] form that had long characterized châteaux and palaces as rural structures, this transformation actualized a deeper socio-spatial transformation process that had begun with the elite's efforts to set themselves apart. In it we also see a greater shift away from the traditionally more negative French conception of the relation of urban space and architectural form [→ 3.1.2]. The production of this figuratively carved-out space, as a clearance, had expressed itself increasingly in the planning of royal squares for the embellishment of the city. As we have seen, these dispositifs originated as specific production facilities, that gained a wider function for both urban production and nation building. While the production of these squares, and the form of urban production they entail, was recuperated during the reign of Louis XV ✉[125–6], the related form of urban production started to change. These disengagements now no longer only acted as visual axes onto monuments or monumental buildings, they also carved out new channels through the urban fabric, at the edges of which urban renovation was taking place.

In the writings of Voltaire and Laugier, the street network leading to these squares thus gained an increasing importance. In cutting through and disentangling the city's fabric and its relations, it had a specific reformative function. It worked homologously to the system of circulation emerging in the distribution of the *hôtels.* As we have seen, here the disentanglement allowed a set of select relationships to be strategically established. As Pierre Pinon has shown, it was in city planning that the practice of the *dégagement* increasingly came to be coupled with that of the *lotissements.*[903] Especially with the new urban extension phase after the 1760s, we note a new wave of increas-

901 Barry Bergdoll, *European Architecture, 1750–1890* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000), 48ff. On the relation to Blondel, see also Davrius, *Blondel: architecte*, 288ff, 295ff.

902 From Greek *synoikismós*, the decision of once-autonomous city states and communes to join forces within shared walls, from *syn-oikia*, "dwelling together"; versus the opposite, from *dia-oikia*, "living apart." After Barthes's *How to Live Together*, passim.

903 See esp. Pierre Pinon, "Lotissement Spéculatifs: Formes urbaines et architectues à la fin de l'ancien régime," in *Soufflot, et l'architecture des Lumières* (Paris: Cahier des Rechereche architecturales, 1980), 178–91.

125 *This page*, plan compiling all urban projects intended for the 'embellishment of the city,' with new squares and pierced streets (*dégagements*) leading to them.

126 *Opposite page*, the related infrastructural modernization of the city, through and alongside these newly-pierced throughways.

ingly large speculative *lotissements* on outmoded aristocratic terrains, on which architects including Soufflot, De Wailly, Ledoux, Bélanger and Brogniart, found lucrative opportunities to realize buildings.[904] Aside from the more common sub-division through access roads, these lots where sometimes parceled in a monumental way, so that one central larger building was positioned in such a way that, for representational purposes, it fell into axis with an aligned street leading toward it. This arrangement can be seen in Chalgrin's design of the Odéon Theater on the *lotissement* of the old Hôtel de Condé (1779/84) or Ledoux's Hôtel Thélusson. In generalizing a distinct aspect of residential planning to an urban scale, the production of these clearing throughways, more than merely helping embellish the city visually, thus came to act as a convenient means for reforming the social fabric and economic system. Particularly Pierre Patte's publications of the mid-1760s promoted a rationalist urbanist vision of the city and urban reform, in presenting the city as a physiological apparatus (indeed, with a more mechanistic than organicist vision) that infrastructurally fostered life and prosperity through the spatial

904 Ibid.



articulation of functional organs and their interdependencies.[905]

It rendered the city's coherent organization a new concern for architectural thinking. As such, these disentangling systems must be placed within a longer lineage that would lead to the greater infrastructural modernization of Paris in the nineteenth century, when under Jean-Jacques Berger and Georges-Eugène Haussmann new streets where opened up through the medieval fabric to foster the circulation of air, goods, and thus life.[906] In the urban form of *dégagement,* the aristocratic sociology of distinction and spatial means of hierarchization was externalized in an ex-organizing restructuring of a physical environment. We note a certain repetition of the

905 Pierre Patte, *Monuments érigés à la gloire de Louis XV* (Paris: Desaint/Saillant: 1765) and the aforementioned *Mémoires sur les objets les plus importans de l'architecture* (Paris: Rozet, 1769). Here after Bergdoll, *European Architecture 1750–1890,* 50; and Papayanis, *Planning Before Haussmann*, 17ff.

906 For a more detailed account on this lineage, see esp. Papayanis, *Planning before Haussmann*; here also after Bergdoll, *European Architecture 1750–1890*, 48ff. Not reducible to a simple act of segregation, it was the production of chains and concatenated arrangements that technologically guided later forms of *quadrillage* through urban planning that it enables, and which as a macro-infrastructural apparatus of control was incrementally implemented—as we know—not for any revolutionary modernization, but precisely in the purview of maintaining existing order through an environmental adaptation that reduced spaces of possibly revolutionary practices.

co-constitutive formation of the system of appartements with their *dégagement*, in the formation of the neoclassical *hôtel* alongside the new form of urban production through which this novel type was effectively generated. This way, we understand this typological transformation as being driven by an underlying urban morphodynamics. Here, we find a changing morphodynamics of urban production due to the increasing implementation of the *dégagement* (and the underlying generalization of its internal form of organization) onto an urban scale, along with the specific propagation of constraints —specifically the characteristic (re)alignment of older buildings— and the organizational space of possibilities this new form of general planning entailed. This teleogenic vision, I want to suggest, allows a more integrative, infrastructural outlook of what is going on in the typological transformation of the *hôtel* during the late eighteenth century.

Toward an Infrastructural Reading

This infrastructural reading radicalizes Elias's allusions to reconsidering the *hôtel*'s rural origins by way of architecture's capacity for managing environmental factors. Take the control and distribution of material flows (of water and air) through hydraulic systems, which, according to a longer technological lineage, determines the placement and disposition of architecture, and underlies the internal economy of buildings. In this sense, all that architecture did to control socio-environmental factors was tied to a productive channeling of things, which had increasingly become a technique and logic for social production. As we have seen, within the arrangement of aristocratic residential architecture there was a strong mutually reinforcing technological connection between architecture's longstanding mode of spatial production through the progressive differentiation of spatial multiplicities into heterogeneous ensembles, and the elite's reciprocal forms of social production by way of a related logic of hierarchization and distinction for which such spatial HETEROGENESES were instrumental.

Now: precisely this heterogenizing aspect within Rousseau's sociogenetic and culture-technical account has remained insufficiently accounted for where scholars since Rykwert imagined Laugier's hut on the shore of Rousseau's riverbank, in a physiocratic paradise, where man could live happily, free of the corruptions of urban society.[907] Therefore, I will not invest much either in a further reading of story of the hut as a founding archetype

907 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 125ff; citing Rykwert, *On Adam's House in Paradise,* 49.

and living tectonic principle of the genesis of European architecture,[908] or in the way natural relations were used to justify preconceived formal hierarchies.[909] Rather, I hope to extend these accounts in siding with more recent readings that have stressed how architecture—rather than being referred back to some original state of nature (*physis*)—was therein actually increasingly referred back to the physical mechanism of construction, and its technical lineage as an apparatus for constructing culture. Inscribed thus into the beginning of culture, architecture has thus started to be conceived as a sort of augmented worlding technique for adaptively re-ordering given environments.[910] In helping undermine any facile nature/culture divide, such a radically more anthropological and at the same time technological reading (one informed by a sense that anthropotechnics always involve anthropo*genetic* techniques of differentiation[911]) seems far more appropriate for reconsidering Laugier's

908 For a positioning of Laugier's theory in relation to the enlightenment's interest in origins, see Meninato, *Unexpected Affinities*; and Sigrid de Jong, "The Quest for Origins in Architecture," in *Companion to the History of Architecture*, ed. Henri F. Mallgrave (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2017), n.p. (online). For its archetypal role and tectonic aspect, see esp. ch. 1 of Miles David Samson, *Hut Pavilion Shrine: Architectural Archetypes in Mid-Century Modernism* (London/New York: Routledge, 2016), 43ff. On the latter aspect, see esp. Neil Levine, "Laugier's Prototypal Hut, Soufflot's Sainte-Geneviève, and the Enlightenment Theory of Representation," in *Companion to the History of Architecture*, ed. Mallgrave.

909 On a side-note: Similarly some physiocratic theorists that I mention below, started promoting a retreat of the nobility to their rural lands, and thus a return to the more 'natural' socio-economic interrelations was being promoted as an instrument to strengthen the economy, which had been severely weakened under the absolutist rule. Yet, what actually happened was the inverse, and much more complex: namely, that a new economy and form of production was coming to be infrastructurally implemented in the urban fabric, at the same time that the state's power was exploitatively expanding onto colonized territories. While I cannot afford to describe this larger dynamic here, the following will be critically guided by this thinking more or less implicitly.

910 See Samson, *Hut Pavilion Shrine*, 44; and the section "Architecture as Second Nature," in Richard Ingersoll, "Second Nature: On the Social Bond of Ecology and Architecture," in *Reconstructing Architecture: Critical Discourses and Social Practices*, ed. Thomas A. Dutton and Lian Hurst Mann (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1996), 119–57; esp. 123.

911 With this counter-distinction, I want to critically degeneralize and epistemically decolonize the notion of anthropotechnics (extending with my earlier attempt do to so with the notion of sociogeny, in note 338) in its too-generic anthropological sense employed by, for instance Stiegler or Sloterdijk, who use the term to describes a series of processes and certain self-shaping technics and technologies that make humans different from other animals. Against this, post-colonial theorists as Sylvia Wynter and Kathryn Yusoff have reclaimed the term anthropo*genesis* to specifically highlight that these possession of these technics is directly tooled to hierarchically-order beings, and thus raise (a specific socially-constructed type of) Man over all others. These are thus a set of techniques through the discursive institutionalization of which White European Man have historically placed themselves over and above, as the measure of all things. Since I am concerned here with the propagation of inequalities, this angle seems much more relevant. See esp. Kathyrn Yusoff, "Anthropogenesis: Origins and Endings in the Anthropocene," *Theory, Culture & Society* 34, nos. 2–3 (2017): 105–27.

clearly cosmotechnical approach to the intertwined 'technical origin' of architecture and advanced culture. It also eases a similar reconsideration of Rousseau's proto-anthropological approach to the historically-contingent aspect of social relations, and the resulting proto-genealogy of social differences,hierarchies, political power it provides.[912]

Rousseau's sociogenetic account challenged the simple naturalized assumption that government originated in an arbitrary power possessed by the strongest. It in demonstrated that the problem of government arises precisely from attempts to prevent the monopolization of political power, as this power arises from the specific relation established between people and those chosen to govern, namely the "contract by which both parties bind themselves to observe the laws therein expressed, which form the ties of their union."[913] The mutual ties established by that form of governance thus generate a double-bind, which is to say an enabling constraint, from which power or differences in the power to act arises. From a modern genealogical perspective,[914] to fully expose how these ties have consolidated, stabilized, formalized, or institutionalized the contingent social and power relations that generated the present, it is of course counterproductive to identify or reify such structures in any static essence or entity (such as 'the social/the contract') like Rousseau initially did. Rather, the real genealogical exercise would lie in reconstituting, as I hope to have helped accomplish here, their progressive construction through a series of concatenations and compoundings

912 Of course, I am here not using the exact formulation authors thought about or described this nature. Rather interpreted from today's perspective, we understand better that what becomes here discursively isolated and elevated are those peculiar auto-regulating mechanisms of those regularized/regularizing patterns and habitats, and pertaining behaviors and habits, which material-discursive systems and technically-augmented systems 'naturally' (auto-)generate. With this anexact reading we can more rigorously understand that (mytho)poietic aspect as a technical (anthropo-/socio)genesis, converging greatly over an explicit technological (Laugier) and genealogical (Rousseau) lineage of thought.

913 In *Du contrat social; ou, Principes du droit politique* (1762), Rousseau will complement this naturalized presentation of the social contract with a more normative one, that is meant to remedy the moral and social ills that Rousseau identifies as having emerged from this development, especially the invention of private property that increased social inequality; see Celeste Friend's entry "Social Contract Theory," in *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* avail. online at https://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/#SH2c.

914 This way, one could revisit the famous remark of Rousseau's *Social Contract* that humans, albeit being born free, find themselves all over in chains (*partout dans les fers*), from a specific assemblage-theoretic perspective. It is only in acknowledging our enmeshment in specific relations and the historicity of the problems that we face (which first involves understanding ourselves not as a general unity, or genera, but as the concatenation of differentiated subjects having emerged from this specific enmeshment) that we can resolve those problems, by means of our increasing our capacity to choose how we want to live differently in reworking the relations formed by this enabling constraint.

through which any system's behaviors evolve through auto-affective or self-regulating processes. These behaviors are inherited EPIPHYLOGENETICALLY in the norms and forms of contracted habits and habitats that both—in distributing space—territorialize differences, and the ways in which these spatial differences are coded according to, and articulate in turn, social differences.

This means the construction of culture is specifically connected to the production of hierarchical differences that then act as the very architecture of power. With the rising technological disclosure of the sociogenetic function of spatial constructs (and how they enact social differentiations), this constructivist nature of architecture becomes more technologically conscious as a cultural mechanism. In this regard 'nature' did not serve as a 'corrective' counter-ideal, as many readings have foregrounded; rather, as I want to suggest, the revelation of this cultural history and how architectural structures helped generate and consolidate it, acted more as an antidote, a necessary detox to taking particular systems and the behaviors they engender for granted, allowing us instead to critically reconsider their workings. This effort can also be seen in Cantillon's, De Gournay's, Quesnay's, Mirabeau's, and Turgot's emerging physiocratic theories of economy that—if in opposition to Rousseau's constructivist stance—attempted to systematically decode the 'nature' of economic relations, that is, how they work. And it was the understanding of the workings of nature that, instead of promoting a simple return to a natural order, could be used to strategically re-organize corrupt social or cultural (eco)systems.

This, I want to critically stress, was also the central premise of Laugier's *Essai*. After outlining the construction of the primitive hut by an original man, its presentation of the general principles of architecture states that those principles are derived from nature, since, Laugier argues, they were born from imitating the "course of simple nature" and its "procedures."[915] The central focus here lies not so much in the notion of imitation; we have already critically reconsidered imitation in its more complex educative-creative function within the episteme of resemblance [→1.3]. It lies in the assumed imitation of the successive aspects of the course of simple nature (*la marche de la simple nature*) and its procedures/processes (*de ses procédés)*, from which something more complex arises in a constructive act. This construction must be read more diagrammatically as the point where, or rather the act through which, a dual formative/creative technicity arises. Because, in functionally

915 "Telle est la marche de la simple nature: c'est à l'imitation de ses procédés que l'art doit sa naissance.» Laugier, *Essai*, 9; *Essay*, 12, cited in Bergdoll, *European Architecture 1750–1890*, 12.

127 The *cabane rustique* or primitive hut, as allegorized in the frontispiece of the second edition of Marc-Antoine Laugier's *Essai sur l'architecture* (1755). In the famous illustration by Charles Dominique Eisen, Architecture, personified by a woman leaning on the ruins of the classical orders, points a rather astonished cherubim — iconologically representing the excessive, capricious aspects of Baroque architecture — to the 'structural truth' of architecture represented by the construct of the rustic hut.

heralding the imitation of natural processes as the origin of art, the allegory discursivizes the *operational similarity* between the ways natural and artificial systems work, based on which Laugier attempts to allagmatically rationalize the basic working of architecture in its twofold constructive/tectonic logic, and its strangely simultaneous generative or dynamic and reproductive or stabilizing aspects.

In this view, the allegory of the primitive hut ⊠[124] depicts less an originary house than a basic artifice: a primitive construct, scaffold, frame, or cage, which captures the very essence of spatial construction or production.[916] As such, it is better understood in the proto-dispositivistic terms of a Heideggerian *Gestell* or *Geviert*, the very apparatus of architecture as an autogenerative setup whose underlying mechanisms Laugier, similarly to Blondel,

916 I refer both to the uncertain etymology of *cabane*, that may be related to Latin *capere*, capture, seize, as well as *rusticus*, coming from Latin *rūs*, rural, open space, field" and the adjectival suffix *-ticus*, from *-cus*, "pertaining to."

was trying to reveal and reemploy against an increasing technological ignorance toward its functionings. This view helps explain why he demonstratively stripped architecture, as Vidler points out, down to its structural core by tectonically "reduc[ing] architecture to the rational combination of three structurally defined elements according to the roles of simple geometries, in the service of social needs," at the same time that the allegory "systematically eliminated any references to social and material causes … for a man without tools or fellow-helpers."[917] If previous discussions like Cesariano's had illustrated the hut myth as an essentially social enterprise mediated by inventions like language and fire, Laugier's dry account eliminated all dramatic elements so as to stage this stand-alone construction as an emblem of man's needs for protection against natural dynamics.[918]

It is here that Laugier, as Bergdoll succinctly writes, located "the formation of a certain logic that acted as a norm of procedure rather than model, [providing] an answer to the quest for what Laugier calls 'fixed and unchanging laws.'"[919] For he tapped into that emergent, self-driving, self-structuring, and self-regulating logic pertaining to systems, which arises with any apparatus and scaffolding techniques and the various structures and operations their construction generates, and which also variously underlie the artifices of culture and artistic techniques. Construction—as a technical rather than any symbolic operation[920]—thus precedes meaning. In Laugier's constructivist narrative, the single man does not represent any 'individual'; being Adam, this individual necessarily represents the whole lineage of humans that is said to have genealogically developed from this being. Yet, in this sense, the story is basically tells a critical extension of the Book of Genesis, for it subliminally stresses that after a higher entity created the world through a series of generative divisions ending in the shaping of a primitive form of human being, this being then fashioned its own development in which it started to adapt an apparently imperfect world through the production of auxiliary constructs that helped inhabitation by cutting out existential territories or creating ecological niches. Niche construction—as a base operation or worlding process—also precedes group formations, meaning social logics necessarily based on

917 Vidler, *Writing of the Walls*, here 3 and 18.

918 See the editorial of Matteo Ghidoni, ed., *San Rocco* 9: What's wrong with the Primitive Hut? (Winter 2013), 3–4.

919 Bergdoll, *European Architecture 1750–1890*, 12.

920 Barthes had, based on Rykwert's work, respectively read the construction of the hut as a not merely functional but symbolic operation. Barthes, *How to Live Together*, 49; Rykwert, *Adam's House in Paradise*. On this point cf. also Quatremère de Quincy's further theorization of the hut, as discussed in Jacoby "Reasoning of Architecture," 109–129.

established meanings.[921] As such it precedes subjectivation. There is not a subject that constructs, but a constructed subject that emerges alongside the construction process, in an assemblage.

The higher-order logic of establishing systems, or the divine agency of generating worlds, thus starts to be technologically transposed into particular worlding techniques: on the one hand and more superficially (i.e. structurally), concerning the construction of anthropogenic ('man-made') structures or environments, and on the other hand on a deeper (more operational) level (i.e. the **MACHINIC PHYLUM**), the anthropogenetic workings of such assemblages by which we become-human-with, with their inherent 'human-making,' 'civilizing' and differentiating effects. Thus, like Rousseau soon would, this vision suggests that it is through these territorialization or niche-construction processes that differenciated structures such as group formations, social organizations, and other cultural technics arise. Moreover, we have to note that, as an anthropogenetic assemblage, the base-*gestell*, the 'fourfold' of the hut is indeed a teleodynamic configuration derived from a few enabling constraints (the torn down branches, their disposition *en carrée*, and performative, material features). Once established, this originary technicity had since guided all architectural production in the particular tectonic/technical construction logic from which architecture's generative capacity also springs forth. It was in this sense that Camus de Mézière's *Génie de l'architecture* (1780) would later advance earlier efforts at revealing those vernacular technological bases of congenial architectural and design intelligence, albeit on a rather basic and still very mythopoetic level. But these authors ought to be pardoned to the extent that 250 years later, we are still struggling to arrive at a properly machinic understanding — which is obviously the central core of my own research interests — of this complex auto-generative aspect of such assemblages.

To rephrase what Laugier's origin-story suggests without resorting to already constituted subjectivities and 'needs' by way of desiring-machines: Laugier stages the original encounter in which human subjectivity and technics mutually emerge through a primordial drive to counter and derive **CONTRAGRADE** tendencies from natural systems through artifices, as technical objects, that mediate and facilitate specific **HETEROGENESES**. We have seen

921 Since I implicitly rely on this in the following passage, I should mention again that this point does not contradict the Simondonian view that at the same time such 'machines' are always social before being technical. The contradiction here arises from seeing these machines as **AUTOPOIETIC** rather than **SYMPOIETIC** and **TELEODYNAMIC** systems, within which emergent or constructed regularities gain a signifying meaning.

how a similar tectonic/technical logic has since guided the co-formation of the appartement as a hierarchical space, and related technologies for distributing or organizing it, together with a particular sociogenetic logic of distinction. Here, in an extension of Perrault's scientific aesthetic, grounded in how architecture is used, we find the truly foundational idea on which the Western discipline of architecture was operationally grounded: the mastery of the art of distribution. This mastery concerned that twofold organizational technicity/*technē* built into architectural arrangements as an apparatus or scaffold (*macchina*) for events and social production to take place, and the technical knowledge concerning the aspect of control that resides within planning and distributive practices, including how to instrumentalize it. This also includes the question how to instrumentalize it as an apparatus for the controlled (i.e corrective re-)organization of (hetero)geneses within established (i.e. 'corrupted') systems.

From Infrastructural Reading to Technological Conclusion

Let me break off these tentative considerations here (I will come back to them), because we are now conceptually equipped to resume our infrastructural reading of the typological transformation of the *hôtel* toward a more freestanding structure in terms of the transformation of technological thought. In line with a wider effort in the discourse on the art of distribution to free residential planning from the more contingent constraints imposed by intra-urban construction, like small or irregular plots, the turn toward the older dispositif of the *maison de campagne* as a 'not-so-primitive hut' was technologically connected to the wider generalization of planning techniques in the related discourses during the second quarter of the eighteenth century. [→ 3.3.2]

Here, a more technological reading reveals that Blondel's and Briseux's related works presented the *maison de campagne* not as some specific type of building, but affirmed it as a fundamental genre of residential planning. Thereby, they greatly helped de-generalize intra-urban planning as but a special case that is always 'corrupted, ' in its technical clarity, by the demand of resolving external constraints (that could be resolved by simple structural operations and formal strategies). But this play was not what the evolving art of distribution consisted in. Rather, its technological advancement of planning lay in the evolving understanding of the immanent problems of distributional techniques, and complementary methods of resolving contradictory demands and constraints arising within in planning practices by means other than arrangement alone. Here, the *maison de*

campagne presented the 'ideal' form of planning, while being moreover an increasingly realistic one for the new peri-urban building sites, as these less constrained structures were designed particularly for the owner's leisure. Also called '*maisons de plaisance*,' like an upscaled version of the *appartement de commodité*, their organization forced architects to attend to the complex configuration of the affective relations of spatial proximities and social distances more in terms of securing daily functionings and sequences of operations facilitating the owners' recreation,[922] not just the specific forms of social (re)production required for representational life. As such, they also presented the more ideal form for advancing the art of distribution, by approaching planning in a more isolated, that is, analytical and rational fashion that technologically singled out the underlying generative aspect of organizing such auto-generative setups. It was here that architects like Blondel indeed started to crack the code, and began to operationalize this built-in technical logic of planning internal organization through the progressive integration of functionally differentiated elements. (And while it may be tempting to call this an 'autonomous' planning logic, this would be counterproductive, to the extent that Blondel's emphasis on the system's heteronomy was precisely what allowed him to technologically encode it against more autonomous forms of planning).

As we have also began to note, this form of planning increasingly began to integrate service infrastructures into its functional differentiation and spatial hierarchization, facilitating the particular lifestyle and its underlying form of (status) consumption through a parallel world of domestic services.[923] As Barthes notes, in both facilitating domestic needs and satisfying desires, such proxemic infrastructures, as intercalated and intra-acting arrangements do not simply manifest the divisions in class and labor; rather, they strategically fix them in how these interdependencies and reciprocal relations come to be integrated into a larger reproductive structure.[924] It is concerning this integration that Briseux and Blondel promoted two partially different approaches: the former promoted a spatially more differentiating approach; the latter a technologically more integrative one. But together they helped innovate the art of distribution through the integration of new forms of circulation, since they variously helped—more than any clever

922 See Aurelien Davrius, "Masters and Servants: Parallel Worlds in Blondel's Maisons de plaisance," in *The Comforts of Home in Western Europe, 1700–1900,* ed. Jon Stobard (London: Bloomsbury, 2020), 39–44.

923 Ibid., passim.

924 See Barthes, *How To Live Together*, 75ff. Barthes uses a more reflexive, 'mirror'-based argument, which I have intra-actively refracted here.

room arrangement alone could—resolve the inconveniences that Courtonne and Cordemoy had critiqued.

From the 1720s onwards, the scalar distinction between the two parallel room sequences formed by the *grand* and *petit appartement* as spaces with distinct realities (i.e. the real distinction we have drawn between them) was increasingly accompanied and invigorated by the integration of service-ways sandwiched in between them. Having developed, as we have seen, from the bypassing passages in the *corps de logis simple*, these infrastructures had further formed alongside the *corps de logis double's* inner wall, where those earlier forms of vertical communication through the turreted stairs and service ways eventually became folded during the stage where the *bel étage* was coming to settle on the ground floor. They acted as an **INTERSTRATIC** interface that conveniently interconnected, through selective openings, the two suites that it otherwise detached from one another, by dividing space into two different domains of residential and circulation spaces.[925] We should here make another helpful **ETHOLOGICAL** distinction between the former as a space where bodies generally rest and move at lower speeds (while they are also specifically distinguished by two variant slownesses), and the latter as a space of flows of bodies moving at higher frequencies. As this process involves two reciprocally constitutive ethological differentiations, more than being some sort of simple separation, we find in it a ex-organizing differenciation (*Ausdifferenzierung*), as Trüby's study on the emerging corridor notes, between the "transversal" circulation of visitors through the enfilade and a more "tangential" circulation through these service passages.[926] Due to this initial differentiation, in the later-drawn distinction between the *appartement de parade* and *de societé* and their different modes of use and degrees of formality (i.e. their modal distinction), this process was not repeated in the same way, but more obliquely, since their detachment and coupling was organized by their symmetrical arrangement *en enfilade* around the larger axis of the visitor's access (entrance–vestibule–salon).

If we look back at the Palais de Bourbon ☒[87], we can already note an actually-different, third form that concerns the integrative particularity of the

925 Benhamou situates this as an attempt of the residents to 'resists the encroachment' by the ever-present servants whose critical eyes they tried to escape from, as Cissie Fairchild or Michel Gallet had stressed, while highlighting that Blondel, far from denigrating the servants, in fact stressed the need to not only account for the commodité of the principal residents, but also for those who live with and work for them (Blondel, *De la distribution*, I: 121). See Benhamou, "Planning for Privacy," [2–4]; and moreover his article "Parallel Walls, Parallel Worlds," passim. See also Davrius, "Masters and Servants," passim.

926 Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors,* 86.

dégagement as an interstratic type of circulation, or form of organizing it. For in the plan, we see the enfilade as the organizational principle of the *grand appartement de parade*, as dis/engaged by the *dégagement* of the smaller (yet intermediary) scale of the *appartement de commodité*. But we also note a second level where the first organizational differentiation is recapitulated within the less hierarchical juxtaposition of spaces in the corridor-cell organization. Having traditionally pertained to the upper service floors, here the latter type of organization was also brought down onto the ground floor level. So the spatial differentiation characterizing the layout cannot be thought without accounting for its integrative components. From the point of view of the socio-spatial structure of the appartement, the *dégagement* as a special service element has indeed always presented an outside or externality relative to the served space of the suite, one that became integrated, interiorized, or folded into it (and thus onto a single plane), where the three forms of organization helped distinguish and hierarchize the different spatial sets that had formed within this system.[927]

Operationally similar to the involution of the central stair [→ 2.2], the progressive coupling of the bypassing tangential service-ways with strategic orthogonal shortcuts into fully-fledged corridors constitutes a further development in this involution process in which the inclusion of access structures, cutting distinct sets together or apart, plays out. And like the involution of the stair, the addition of corridors also engenders a specific dis/engagement in selectively de- and re-coupling the spaces it sets apart. As was the case with those dis/engagement processes discussed before, I will argue that this happens once more in terms of an intricate ensemble established through an INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION. There, structures are differentiated and broken down, but not through some facile form of exclusive disjunction or separation, as these reciprocally-constituted functional units are at once integrated into more complex, hierarchically ordered, and stratified assemblages. This integrating/differentiating assemblage of compartmentalized components happens teleodynamically, through the auto-regulation and regularization dynamics occurring throughout coupled flows. As Evans notes, "a compartmentalized building had to be organized by movement through it," as the

927 As Trüby's study of the corridor's formation notes in its central summary, that here the more intrinsic form of mutual self-disciplining in the architecture of court society and its ceremonials gives way to the more extrinsic forms of hetero-disciplining [*Frenddisziplinierung*] in the architecture of disciplinary society with those clearer cell-corridor complexes that his study more closely looked at. Trüby, *Geschichte des Korridors*, here 88–89; see esp. 117ff.

"one remaining thing that could give it any coherence."[928] That is: a consistency arising from the planning and control of movements, as an organization that constructs both a diagram of forces, and an affective infrastructure. It is in this regard that the evolving system of *dégagements* can be thought of as a control-circuit patterned after certain affective drives and desiring-machines. Because precisely by setting up such strategically (de)coupled flows, the *dégagement* operates as a diagrammatic middle ground between the dispositifs of those discursive-legal-technical ensembles forming both micro-physics of power and capitalist macro-economic regimes, and a collective assemblage of enunciating socio-technical groupings made up of and stratified by particular affective economies. It is here that specific regularities (as regularized dynamics or behaviors) sympoietically emerge with specific systems and setups, for which they gain a signifying function.

Earlier in this part [→3.2.1–3], we saw how the compartmented architectonics of tree structures provided the auxiliary means of accessing knowledge by analytically discriminating and synthetically drawing together characteristic differences across various co-relative species/genera distinctions. The newer form of access in residential design, changing from the earlier notion of *dégagement* as an arrangement of cross-connection toward a kind of infrastructure, also presented the auxiliary means for both disengaging and selectively recoupling (sets of) spaces that thereby became functionally differentiated from one another in an overall hierarchical structure. The reciprocal formation of the system of disengaged suites is more adequately understood as a manifold organogenesis. We have seen that with the integration of *dégagement* as a primitive system of circulation, the *logis* transforms from a simple crystal-like or anorganically organized system into a more "organically organized" one[929]; in this it does not constitute some

928 Evans, "Figures, Doors, Passages," 78.

929 Given the way the central corridor becomes folded into the multiplied structure of the house, as its central spine, can thus be understood quite literally as a process of 'gastrulation': Involving a topological transformation within which cellular tissue folds onto itself, gastrulation is the fundamental process in embryonic development through which the spinal chord and bilateral symmetry and anterior/posterior asymmetry are established, and through which also the three types of (endo-, meso-, and ectodermal) tissue come to be initially differentiated. In contrast to mitosis, however, this differentiation is not a cellular 'division' of a single cell into multiple ones, but a later process undergone by already multicellular aggregates within which this cellular *differentiation* is the precondition for the epigenesis of specialized tissues and organs, or organogenesis, necessary for organized systems to form. When I take this reading more than just metaphorically, I am not trying to argue that built structures develop in the same way living organisms do, but am hoping to stress that their developmental processes ontogenetically operate in a structurally similar way; an operational similarity within evolving systems.

living organism, but a spatial system evolving through a progressive outsourcing. With this integration of access structures, the chain- or tree-like organization of space in the enfilade also became partly outsourced. This effectuated a crucial change in the topological ordering of the internal space of the French town house, specifically the directed graphs formed by the enfilade. But it does not change directly into the more cell-corridor-like arrangement, in which spatial nodes in the related graphs have many more than two branching connections. Thomas Markus's space syntax analyses illustrate this development in the changing spatiality of hospitals from more segmentary to more multicellular configurations.[930] Throughout the topological diagrams I have provided, however, this type of 'polyfurcation' or multi-branching does not yet figure much in the topology of the principal floors of buildings like the Palais de Bourbon, or Blondel's didactic designs. And in Briseux's examples it only figures in the subordinate spaces on the upper floors. A feature restricted to wings or attic stories housing smaller accommodations along a central corridor, this type of organization (and its strategic decoupling of spatial sets) would only become more prominent in more modern residential designs. ☒[135–36]

Rather, since as *dégagement* was used for services and the inhabitant's convenience, while the traditional enfilade served as the route for visitors, with the corridor for accessing an array of smaller accommodations on the upper floor, we see a characteristic overlay of various scale- and path-dependent organizational systems with their varying tree-like structures. As can be clearly seen in the respective graphs, we find an increasing multiplication of interconnected spatial hierarchies, forming a spatial network in which multiple distinct branches and chains can be outlined from an overall more RHIZOMATIC system of circulation with closed loops. But where (mathematically-speaking) loops are often obstacles for establishing topological orderings, in the case of these architectures, these systems come to be conveniently combined so that they lead to a convergence of flows which mutually reinforces each topological ordering, by helping distinguish the more-or-less strongly connected components within this graph. Therein we see a stronger hierarchization of the various suites as dis/engaged component structures.

This hierarchization of connections, leading to more strongly connected components that express themselves in the form of an increasingly reticulated milieu, became progressively exteriorized with the formation of

930 See my introduction, fig. 24.

the urban *dégagement* into the organization of the larger built environment. While this exorganogenesis may be more apparent (and as such was studied with regard to the emerging organization of spaces into cell-corridor complexes within disciplinary dispositifs), its reticulation becomes visible first in the nested configurations that we have incrementally seen emerge formally within baroque forms of planning.

Evreux
Crozat
Palais Bourbon
Humière
Maine
Salm
Auvergne
Maison
Noirmoutier
Roquelaure
Lude
Etampes
Mazarin
Matignon

seul—
—Augny
—Court des Chiens
—Desmarets
1:30000

129. Jaillot Map (c. 1790)

SEINE FLEUVE
SEINE FLEUVE
SEINE FLEUVE
ISLE LOUVIER

Epi(-Phylo-Genea)logue: On a Condividuating Technical Ensemble

The Future of Gridding Techniques

From the Hôtel de Beauvais to the Hôtel Crozat, we have found an increasingly multi-layered form of organizing spatial multiplicities and heterogeneities into more nested species of spaces. As I have argued, this nesting presents a specific configuration of sub-ensembles. Their constitutive function is yet to be understood as a more general historical formation, namely, a particular organon of control formed within the dispositif of conventional planning, that started to configure a technical ensemble or assemblage. In this technical ensemble, this formal-organizational technique—through Condillac and the Encyclopedists—became conceptually folded into a wider set of techniques for generating segmentary structures, traditionally produced through linear forms of differentiation and hierarchization. In the longer lineage of serial approaches to the organization of (hetero)geneses in general, and its extension in Blondel's work in particular, this hierarchical nesting was then transposed into a more netlike form of producing architecture. And on this point, perhaps, we can end with a specific contribution toward an outline of a GENERAL ORGANOLOGY of the built environment.

In order to conclude this study on the concretizing assemblage of the systems of appartements, having evolved in conjunction with the dispositif of conventional planning in a reciprocal process of material experimentation and discursive coding of distributional techniques, we should thus take a final look at the dissolution of the underlying serial mode of organization which this individuating technical ensemble would effectuate. Instead of vanishing, this serial modality was rendered invisible within the more complex organizational logic of the grid-based systems characterizing emerging forms of planning. Omnipresent after 1750[931] in these gridding systems, the serial organization of geneses through progressive differentiation was not simply replaced by a different model. To the extent that the latter historically derived from a folding onto itself to establish series of series, serial organization instead survives in (and was thus epiphylogenetically retained in) a technical ensemble with a more nested structure and teleodynamically maintained higher-order regularity.

From Meshworks of Series to Grids

In his study, Jachmann locates a bridging transformation in the the work of Jean-François de Neufforge (1714–1791), whose *Recueil élémentaire d'architecture* (1757) presented a format that would have the most complicated, and

931 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 370, citing Sebastian Gießmann.

differentiated, serial structure among the treatises on the art of distribution.[932] With its ten volumes in all, the third and fourth of which contained "des distributions de Bâtiments Bourgeois à l'usage de toutes sortes de Personnes, Tant pour la Ville que pour la Campagne," this collection of examples was so voluminous that it employed an overlay of various classificatory considerations (like increasing plotwidth and height, location, and building type). This way, the *Recueil* was organized into what Jachmann describes as a complex "meshwork of typological series," each itself subdivided in sequences.[933] Constituting a veritable series of series, this nested serial organization presented an apex in the attempts to establish a serial dispositif. Yet, this very nesting also indicated the beginning dissolution and transformation of the serial principle.[934] For Jachmann, this can be seen where Neufforge still employs the serial articulation of rooms as the basic means for organizing geometrically regularized plans. But he does so, in harking back to the *Manière* and *Architecture Moderne*, by composing strip-like zones which he orthogonally intersects and meshes together in the central areas of the building. This formal reduction of the serial organization leads to a clearer gridding, supporting the strategic dis/engagement of the various rooms or suites.[935] The formal strategy becomes more visible in the last two, larger designs of bourgeois houses in the first series,[936] in the second series[937] (where it moreover leads to a new form of grouping individual units into larger ensembles[938]), and especially in the mansions of the third series.[939] ☒[131]

As Jachmann notes, this formal reduction had "typological consequences" (or building-genre-specific ones, we may more accurately say); for this intersection of strips was particularly suited for the organization of the trending organization of compact buildings (i.e. *plans massés*) with their poorly lit central areas.[940] Against this more basic, economic form of planning, the subsequent fourth and fifth volumes—covering, in principle, two-story buildings that grow incrementally into grander and not-so-compact free-

932 Neufforge, *Recueil élementaire d'architecture*, 7 (+suppl.) vols (Paris: s.n., 1757).
933 Here and the following Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 79–83.
934 Ibid., 369.
935 Ibid., 151–3.
936 Esp. Neufforge, *Recueil*, Vol. III, pls 155–6.
937 Ibid., pls 162, 165, 169, 171.
938 In several of these plans (e.g. Vol. 3, pls. 166 and 172–86), we also see the new trend to build Bourgeouis houses in the disguise of a *hôtel*, in a way that two *maisons*—as half a *hôtel* (sur rue)—or even more (e.g. pl. 182, 185), are grouped together so as to share a common courtyard. On this transitional building type, which will be discussed in Vol. II on the genealogy of apartment houses, see also Cabestan, *La conquête du plain-pied*.
939 Neufforge, *Recueil*, Vol. III, pls 187–204.
940 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 151–3.









130 **Plates from Neufforge's *Recueil* (1757)**









131–2 Plates from Neufforge's *Recueil* (1757).


Plan et Elevation pour un Bâtiment Champêtre ou Maison de Plaisance.
II
Cabinet
Cabinet
Salon
Chambre
Chambre
Garderobe
Vestibule
Antichambre
Antichambre
6 Toises
Composé et gravé par Denoyffrege
A Paris chez l'Auteur rue St Jacques au Chariot Ier avec Privilege du Roy
CXL


Plan et Elevation pour un Bâtiment a l'usage de la Campagne.
III
Cabinet
Cabinet
Salon
Petit Cabinet
Arrière Cabinet
Garderobe
Laboratoire
Antichambre
Salle
Bureau
6 Toises
Composé et gravé par Denoyffrege
A Paris chez l'Auteur rue St Jacques au Chariot Ier avec Privilege du Roy
CXLI


Plan et Elevation d'un Bâtiment d'habitation a l'usage de la Campagne.
IV
Cabinet
Cabinet
Salon
Toilette
Petit Cabinet
Garderobe
Antichambre Commune
Chambre
Chambre
6 Toises
Composé et gravé par Denoyffrege
A Paris chez l'Auteur rue St Jacques au Chariot Ier avec Privilege du Roy
CXLII


Plan et Elevation d'un Bâtiment pour une Maison de plaisance.
V
Salon
Cabinet
Cabinet
Garderobe
Garderobe
Chambre
Cabinet
Antichambre
Chambre
Vestibule
6 Toises
Composé et gravé par Denoyffrege
A Paris chez l'Auteur rue St Jacques au Chariot Ier avec Privilege du Roy
CXLIII









133 **Plates from Neufforge's *Recueil* (1757).**

standing structures—employ the traditionally more complex form of disengaging rooms and suites through concatenated layouts with structurally decoupled, offset walls, passageways, and fill-in-structures.[941] While this may lead to rather rigid-looking plans compared to the work of Briseux or Blondel, this intersection of strips actually presents, as Jachmann notes, a quite elastic design approach, even more so if compared to the grid-based "Manner for laying out all sorts of buildings" that Durand would later promote in his thoroughgoing critique of the serial principle.[942] As is known, this mechanical procedure retooled—for the pedagogical purpose of educating engineers—the logic of progressive differentiation into a more discriminative logic of formally breaking down the various genres of building,[943] as well as their basic component structures. These could then be re-collaged as ready-made modules, distributed with little creativity, in a generic design grid. Here, the serial (i.e. formal) means to an end became a formal end in itself. No longer strongly connected to a technical individuation of knowledge through progressive differentiation, the incremental production of differences within series and chains, and the resulting hierarchies and trees, were compounded within one of the more grid-like systems of organization and *quadrillage* that proliferate during the eighteenth-century, including architecture and emerging macro-structural forms of urban planning.

Within this development, Neufforge was initially invested in opening up residential planning through a strategic relativization and conceptual deconstruction of traditional planning as conceptually erected on the general dispositif of the *hôtel entre court et jardin*, which the *Recueil* repositioned as but one among alternative organizational types and their hybrids.[944] More than a simple generalization of planning methods, this layered approach emphasizes that each type of residential design is located at a specific intersection of planning requirements concerning social status, means, scale, complexity, basic disposition, and so on. With this aim, Neufforge's series demonstrates the various moments where, starting from rather simple structures, incrementally more complex and constrained forms of planning (be it through size, means, or typology) arise, up to a point where—by transgressing at a certain scale—those economic constraints play a less determining role. At these points, more immanent constraints on resolving the formal or structural com-

941 See Ibid., Vol. IV, pl. 233, 236, 239–41, 244–64. The plan of a larger *hôtel*-like plan (pl. 255) presents here the exception proving the rule. See also ibid., Vol V, pl 139–53.

942 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 94.

943 See ibid., 107.

944 Ibid., 357ff and 368ff

plexity of representational requirements begin to play out. It is here that, by situating planning systematically, that is, by intersecting such chains of considerations, simple serial dispositif of organizing the production of residential architecture had to be integrated within (and were thus compounded through) a higher level of organizational complexity regarding the interdependencies between various sets. Formally, these chains within a larger ensemble were now distributed in terms of their concatenation or *dégagement* within a whole, structured by a complex system of circulation.

This nested seriality did not lead to the disappearance of the technical object of the art of distribution: the system of appartements with its rooms *en enfilade*. , As we have seen, architectural discourse had successively and successfully transposed the initially linear system of drawing distinctions into a more integrative system of socio-spatial differentiation along two different axes. Yet, this differing production logic did affect the underlying organization of (hetero)geneses. This qualitative shift in thinking about the organization of apartments found its most outspoken critique in Claude-Nicolas Ledoux (1736–1806).[945] He eventually advocated the position that the longer and more fragmented the room sequence, the less convenient (*commode*) it was.[946]

I will try to channel this investigation to a suitable end by way of Ledoux's conception and conceptual persona because, I argue, this shift in thought was the result of Ledoux having to a large degree internalized the serial organization of geneses, which allowed him to creatively transpose, rather than replace it, into a more integrated spatial system for social production. In this view, Dennis has already pointed out that Ledoux's design work seems to typologically recapitulate the very evolution of the French *hôtel* "to such a degree that it seems almost contrived."[947] This ranges from the modest, near-baroque Hôtel d'Hallwyll ☒[134] (c. 1764–66) that, as a conversion of an older structure, bears a formal resemblance to Le Muet's single-range scheme, to the subsequently built Hôtel d'Uzes ☒[135] (1764–69) with its more rigid double-range matrix, to the Hôtel d'Evry (b. 1785–87) somewhat recalling Le Pautre's Beauvais-design, and the increasingly freestanding designs of the

945 For a monographic study, see esp. Anthony Vidler, *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux: Architecture and Utopia in the Era of the French Revolution* (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2006). For Ledoux's biography, here esp. the introduction and ch. 1. See also the earlier monographic studies Vidler, *Claude Nicolas Le Doux: Architecture and Social Reform at the End of the Ancien Regime* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990); Michel Gallet, *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux* (Paris: Picard, 1980); and Daniel Rabreau, *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux (1736–1806): L'architecture et les fastes du temps* (Paris: W. Blake, 2000).

946 Ledoux, *L'architecture considérée sous le rapport de l'art, des mœurs et de la législation*, 2 vols (Paris: Perronneau, 1804), 53; cited in Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 107 n312.

947 Dennis, *Court and Garden*, 141.

134 *Left*, plans and spatial organization of the Hôtel d'Hallwyll, built 1764–66 by Ledoux.

135 *Right*, plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel d'Uzes (*shown above*), built 1764–69 by Ledoux







136 *Left*, plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Thélusson (*shown above*), built between 1778–83 by Ledoux

137 Right, plan and spatial organization of the Hôtel de Salm, built between 1782–87 by Rousseau.



Hôtels de Montmorency (b. 1769–70), Guimard (1770–72), and de Thélusson [136] (b. 1778–83). His œuvre thus symptomatically recapitulated the evolution of French residential architecture from single-range structures with serial spatial organizations to increasingly complex, compact buildings with more grid-like plans. Topologically speaking, we should note that these plans are still characterized by a rather stringent, serial, and dichotomous organization, instead of being truly matrix-like. This becomes evident when we compare them, for instance, to the contemporary design of the Hôtel de Salm [137] (b. 1782–87 by Pierre Rousseau). Here we see a higher degree of polyfurcation in its topology. Instead of being reducible to a simple opposition between enfilades and matrices (Evans), the 'modernization' of planning is thus presented by the degree to which this polyfurcated form of spatial organization (previously restricted to subordinate spaces) came to be more and more employed in reorganizing the hybrid structure of the doubled-up *corps de logis*, transforming it from its simple cross-connections across rooms toward more differentiated cell-corridor-complexes.[948]

Ledoux's recapitulation can in large part be explained by the fact that many of these earlier projects were conversions of existing structures. Yet, it could be worthwhile studying in more detail, to what degree this might be attributed—at least conceptually speaking—to the phylogenetic theory of architectural differentiation that his teacher, Blondel, had promoted in his genetic account of the cultural history of French architecture [→ 3.3.2]. Particularly during the 1770s and'80s, Ledoux advanced this grid-like logic further when he brought Blondel's generative approach to distributional techniques and functional characterization together with Laugier's cosmo-technical notion of the primitive hut. In the process, he developed a specific interest in the formal relationship between various artisanal forms of production and the building that housed it.[949] This productive formal relation between operations and structures is often (if terminologically anachronistic) described by scholars as a typological relation. In this, scholarship has not sufficiently disclosed the particular (trans)individuating, ontogenetic relation (as Simondon would remind us), and thus machinic dimension within Ledoux's work. This shortcoming comes from conflating two things, or keeping conflated two aspects that are coupled within Ledoux's thinking, but that must be distinguished to explain the coupling he helps effectuate. On the one hand, having found the principal focus in existing scholarship on Ledoux to

948 Here after Trüby. I am referring to Evens, "Figures, Doors, Passages."

949 See here the chapter "Abstraction, Juxtaposition, and Assemblage," in Meninato, *Unexpected Affinities*, n.p.

be on typology, we also see the formal relation of resemblance between (processual) operations and (organizational) structures. In this aspect, it is clearly connected to the epistemological line of thought that we have followed through Cordemoy, Courtonne, and Blondel, in which the older (semio/cosmo)logic of resemblance (*convenientia*) between words/meaning and things/essences transforms toward more typological forms of reasoning about characteristic differences. On the other hand, we find the structuring operations of progressive differentiation that have long pertained to teaching the art of distribution (or compartioning). It presents a transforming (cosmo) technical lineage in the serial format of instructing the production of architectural form. These two lineages, we have seen, largely converged in Blondel's constructivist technology for distributing architectural arrangements.

In the work of Blondel and Ledoux, the conventional logical relation between form and content was by and substantially displaced from a correspondence between two forms, to, along the lines of Blondel's allagmatic thinking, the relation of externality or exo-consistency between parallel techniques and forms of spatial and social production. Blondel had thus problematized the technical homology between various co-constitutive forms of (spatial, social, knowledge) production, and the twofold articulating function that architectonics and scaffolding setups have in the organization of such geneses. In Ledoux's later thinking, a subtle yet crucial slippage occurs, through which he reduced this allagmatic notion of operational similarity once more to an analogy in structural relations. This happens where, in his attempt to radicalize a set of emerging ideas about architectural character and how buildings should be designed in accordance with (*convenant à*) their set purpose and nature, he ended up reducing this co-constitutive aspect to a techno-morphological homology between the production of spatial forms and various (forms of social) production processes generally. This homology articulates itself in the oft-mentioned aspect of *varieté*, which comes to be foregrounded as giving each building a fitting character: "La variété donne à chaque édifice la physionomie qui lui est propre [Variety gives each building its proper physiognomy]." This implies that formal variation was no longer a means to discriminate things according to characteristic differences, but that apparent differences in outer appearance are now said to express and signify (invariant) inherent characteristics.[950]

950 Ledoux, *L'architecture considérée*, 10. Without analyzing this point further, here, we no longer find a character or characteristic form fitting an inner static essence or meaning, things and words; the things have now an expressive function in speaking of an internal meaning or an internal mood, state of affairs, i.e. processes or dynamics.

Still closer to Buffon's foregrounding of individual features in organisms than to Cuvier's later anatomical taxonomy, Ledoux thus extends the general theory of character, which as Vidler has underscored, required the organization of the characteristic structure or distribution to become conventionally expressed through characteristic signs; something that Ledoux approached more through the production of figures than configuration alone.[951]

Another Formal Reduction of Planning

Interestingly, Ledoux's work also marks a further systemic simplification process in the genesis of an increasingly self-structuring system of typological thinking, which—historically enacted by progressively short-circuiting previous generative logics, as we have seen—was getting incrementally locked into the establishment of formal correspondences. With this formal reduction of Blondel's formative allagmatics, Ledoux's design method did not stop working; instead it started working too well. In obfuscating the very functioning of the mechanism of planning with *convenance* through a new axiomatic claim,[952] it generalized architectural planning as a special kind of production process geared at the production of corresponding spatial setups for various production processes. The functioning of the latter was secured by a functional distinction between the various genres of building and larger complexes that had to express in their external form the specific kind of processes they housed, and whose internal arrangement would enable these processes—quite like different machines produced different effects, more or less effectively, based on their exact composition.[953] For this reason, this formal relationship thus became the central knowledge tool and projective technique within the rational and modular method[954] that Ledoux promoted in his *L'architecture considérée sous la rapport de l'art* (written in the 1780s, pub. 1804). As Vidler and Jachmann have described, this mixed-genre or hybrid format book is "a kind

951 Vidler, *Claude-Nicolas Ledoux* (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2006), 17–18.

952 I am referring again to Rouvroy's abovementioned observation that advanced technologies allow users to become increasingly oblivious to their functioning (Rouvroy, "Technology, Virtuality, and Utopia," 133).

953 Of course, in Ledoux's work we see an architecturally-determinist stance; but more than critiquing it, it must be positioned as another attempt—following a line from Alberti to Perrault—at getting behind how (or to what degree) spatial production and architectural arrangements gain a generative/productive function for social production and organizations. Needless to say that in all these problematizations, the question is hidden in the form of a tentative answer, how these techniques operate within social production processes, and how their technicity is instrumental for, and also becoming instrumentalized within them. Here too, it is the strategically-chosen Utopian aspect that may overshadow Ledoux's rather realist approach. On the Utopian aspect, see below.

954 On this point see esp. Daniela del Pesco, "La Méthode de projettation," in *Soufflot, et l'architecture des Lumières*, 261–77; here esp. 262.

135 *This page, right*: Final design of the Saltworks of Chaux, Arc-et-Senans (1774). From Ledoux's *L'art considérée* (1804).

136 *Opposite page left*: Earlier design for the production facility, modeled on a cloister-like square form.

137 *Opposite page, right*: The hospital as a curing machine. Antoine Petit, design for the Hôtel Dieu (1774).



of Encyclopedia gathering all sorts (*genres*) of buildings employed in the social order."[955]

In its topically and medially still clearly serial publication format, the book is structured after Ledoux's social and architectural ideal conceptions, based on a vision in which social unity or cohesion arises from functional differentiation.[956] For Ledoux, who in spite of his seeming utopianism never challenged the hierarchical social order of the Ancien Régime, "society is founded on a mutual need [*besoin mutuelle*] that requires reciprocal bonds [*affection réciproque*]," holding together a group of heterogeneous people.[957] In his thinking, this sociogenetic theory translated to an inherent demand to also express these interdependencies and positionalities spatially and architecturally.[958] Yet, from a truly genetic angle, this notion initially implied that types of societies are generated by the type of interdependencies and economies that produced them, and that by setting up different forms of interdependencies, different form of social production could be facilitated through a new

955 Here after Vidler, "The Theatre of Production: Claude-Nicolas Ledoux and the Architecture of Social Reform," *AA Files* 57, no.1 (Winter 1981–82), 54–63; here 55–56, citing a contemporary review. For the Utopian and reformist aspects in the thought and works of Ledoux, see—among the numerous Ledoux studies—esp. the pertinent monographic analyses by Vidler, *Le Doux: Architecture and Social Reform*; and id., *Ledoux: Architecture and Utopia*.

956 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 385–6. As Jachmann here summarizes, the utopian and travel narrative aspect of the work only allows Ledoux to cleverly combine spatial and social aspects.

957 Ledoux, *L'Architecture*, 3; cited in Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 383.

958 Jachmann, *Von Serlio bis Ledoux*, 383.





spatial order. While Ledoux is the first author since Serlio to strategically connect socio-economic and typological aspects, as Jachmann points out,[959] the resulting order is differentiated not so much by social status, but according to the different functionality of elements within a heterogeneous ensemble. In this view, *L'architecture* presented both a visual narrative and a course for learning the step-by-step[960] production of such social ordering mechanisms, by setting up an endo-consistent socio-spatial production system[961] geared at fostering both personal development, architectural innovation, and social (and technical) progress.

The greater setting for this narrative is the partly realized site of the Saline royale d'Arc-et-Senans ⊠[135–6], a production facility for salt, which Ledoux had been projecting between 1771–74 and later extended into an ideal city called Chaux. First designed as a square scheme based on a monastic model ⊠[136], its final semi-circular design ⊠[135] (redesigned in 1774) was

959 Ibid., 382–5

960 As Meninato describes, the establishment of this correspondence consisted in a three-step process: "First [Ledoux] proceeds to 'disarticulate' architecture into independent parts, then he removes the ornamentation (of those parts), and finally he recombines them according to an unusual logic (or syntax)." See Meninato, "Abstraction, Juxtaposition, and Assemblage," in *Unexpected Affinities*.

961 "L'édifice est défini comme relation *interne* des parties, *composition* fondée sur une méthode qui *présente des acceptions infinies; elle nous apprend a lier les choses les plus simples avec celles qui sont composées; elle nous donne le moyen de tirer des conséquences suivies.*" Del Pesco, "Méthode de projettation," 268 (italics orig.); citing Ledoux, *L'architecture*, 10–11.

inspired by Perrault's technological reading of the Roman theater, and as Vidler suggests,[962] on Antoine Petit's contemporaneous design for a radial hospital ✉[136]. In its theatrical form, the facility was designed as a device that would "enhance labor harmony and management effectiveness," and it did so through "the spatial order for their functioning, a spatial organization that would function of itself as an instrument by which to shape social behavior."[963]

As Ledoux himself argued in describing the general plan of the Saline, the diagrammatic layout economically combined straight lines of visibility and paths so as to ease and speed up work-related processes in a "combination which perfectioned the law of motion."[964] With this dynamically economized layout, it also replaced the more static socio-spatial relations of enclosed guild production as expressed by the monastic model. Instead of being a space of enclosure, the saltworks constituted a semi-permeable (*semi-ouvert*) framework, an enabling constraint for workers (*ouvriers*) opening up annexed milieus. It presented a newly-designed collective form befitting more industrial relations, into which the wider environmental network and exploited forest surrounding were also integrated.[965] A correlate of these networks and grids, the central production facility forms more of an open cage, regulating and condensing movements and processes through selective closure-effects that locally rarefy material fluxes (quite closely to Meillasoux's diagram of the body).[966]

Thus setting up a wider political space, as Vidler has argued, but which, as I would specify, arranges in its spatial organization a specific form of affective regulation of flows and processes, that is, economy, and acts more accurately as an affective space for a specific political economy, the saltworks' radial plan worked rather differently than Bentham's later panopticon penitentiary (1790).[967] Where the Panopticon would render its interned delinquents permanently visible through a central point of surveillance, the saltworks was using another form of transparency in making legible, through

962 Vidler, *Ledoux: Architecture and Utopia*, 46ff.

963 Vidler, "Theatre of Production," 57.

964 "Un des grands mobiles qui lient les gouvernements aux résultats intéressés de tous les instants, c'est la disposition générale d'un plan qui rassemble à un centre éclairé toutes les parties qui le composent. L'œil surveille facilement la ligne la plus courte; le travail il la parcourt d'un pas rapide; le fardeau du trajet s'allègre par l'espoir d'un prompt retour. Tout obéit à cette combinaison qui perfectionne la loi du mouvement." Ledoux, *L'Architecture*, 77.

965 Vidler, "Theatre of Production," 61.

966 See the image in my introduction, fig. 18.

967 See Vidler, *Ledoux: Architecture and Utopia*, 51ff.

the spatial layout of the site, the centralized form of power that shapes its underlying organization.[968] This truly diagrammatic plan of the Saline Royale thus reproduces in its form of organization that form of royal power of a system of political economy within which it presents as a crucial economic node form of maintaining order. This signifying function arises teleodynamically with the expressive exteriorization of social relations, when a previously asignifying spatial distribution gains more meaning in rendering visible social hierarchies pertaining to production processes. In its concentric/radial layout, Meuwissen comments, "the problem of proximity, living next-to-one-another, and the problem of distance, the gaps separating the social strata"[969] found an entirely novel organizational expression, to the extent that—as the mediologist Jacques Perriault first noted—humans come to be defined depending on their hierarchical position within a series of functions ordered within larger production chains.[970] Ledoux's plan here reflects Rousseau's genealogical observation that humans, while born free, find themselves in everywhere chains. And similarly, it implies that a becoming-transparent of these chains is the first means for reforming corrupt systems.

Vidler has stressed the relation of this social transparency to Ledoux's contemporary etching for the Theatre of Besançon (1774), the interior of which is presented within the pupil of an eye ✉[135]. As a microcosmic *teatrum mundi*, Chaux too acted as a space that configured a cathartic affect-regulatory device that reveals to each person their position within a cultural construct, thus disposing them to fulfil their role according to their position. Genealogically speaking, this revelation was the means to break free from the chains and lies that, as Rousseau showed, bind us, and facilitates men to emerge from their self-inflicted immaturity (as Kant would argue in 1784). As has been noted, Ledoux was also invested in the idea that architecture—in the 'spatial expression' (as the traditional reading has it) or externalization (as I prefer) of social relations and hierarchies—could have a transformative effect on the physical and psychological horizon of individuals, and this way contribute to society's regeneration.[971] This regeneration must not be understood in view of the impeding socio-political revolution,

968 On this point, and the relation to Freemasonic symbolism, see also Vidler.

969 Joost Meuwissen and Bernd Wensch, *Zur Architektur des Wohnens* (Zurich: Park books 2018), 37.

970 Jacques Perriault, "Le concept de machine et de système chez Ledoux, Sade et Vaucanson," *Culture technique* 7 (1982), 113–23; here 118.

971 Albert Boime, "Art from Nowhere," in *The Age of Projects*, ed. Maximillian E. Novak (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2008), 215–40; here 233.

139 *Right*, architecture as an optic/physiological apparatus. Rendering for Theater of Besançon from Ledoux's *L'art considérée* (1804).

140 *Opposite page*, Design for Chaus as a 'Physiocratic Utopia.' From Ledoux's *L'art considérée* (1804).



but precisely in its reproductive effects for maintaining an established social order and system of political economy. Therein it presents an antecedent—if partly antithetically tooled in its presumably utopian dimension—device to the disciplinary model of the panopticon that, as Foucault argued, acted as a dispositif designed to correctively redistribute and reform corrupt social elements by locking them into their own specific space.

We can now return to the aforementioned reduction of Blondel's allagmatics within Ledoux's work. By distributing people according to their position within productive chains, or within series of series of productive operations, the art of distributing plans—understood as an individuation technique—no longer functions so much in terms the formation of a technical skill (the art of distribution). Rather, it becomes instrumentalized for the formation of a technical individual (the worker) and technical ensemble (a working environment), forming— akin to the prison/prisoner relation—a substance of content (SC/T) and a form of content (FC/U). As the latter exteriorizes production relations and pertaining patterns and rhythms of life into a specific habitat, the former reciprocally increasingly internalizes them, leading to habitually regularized functional behaviors through the teleogenic coupling. Here, we find the same processes that we had discovered in the linear-segmentary architecture of appartements: their potential for engaging temporal and physical processes in organizing sociogeneses through affective modulation or affect regulation is transposed on a larger and less linear scale. It presents a truly productive factory of subjectivation, more than being

a merely symbolic "theatre of production," as Vidler has it.[972] As such, the Chaux complex presents less an "emblematic of technics" of an arising industrial age in some symbolic sense,[973] but must be conceived as components within a formtaking technical ensemble with a wider scale of production of individuations through disparations and asymmetries.

Technicized Environments

By slightly radicalizing previous analyses, I suggest, the open cage of Chaux described in Ledoux's *L'architecture* can thus be read as extending Laugier's allegory of the culture-technical origins of construction into a wider account of the genesis of (what one can call) technicized environments. There, architecture is presented not as a simple shelter in a primordial riparian landspace, but as a production facility within the wider space of natural flows and dynamics; an ordering apparatus through which humans originally and

972 On this reading see esp. Vidler, "Theatre of Production," passim. On a non-representational reading that understands the notion as a production site of individuations, disparations and asymmetries, I refer to the more Simondonian interpretation in Alberto Toscano's *The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation between Kant and Deleuze* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.)

973 "Ledoux est peut-être le seul architecte de sa génération qui tente d'adapter la logique architecturale aux structures nouvelles de la production sociale et industrielle. La ville de Chaux tout entière représente en quelque sorte le premier exemple d'emblématique de la technique; c'est-a-dire que l'architecte a souligne explicitement les modalités d'adéquation du projet a sa propre attitude vis-a-vis de la technique, au-delà de la fonctionnalité immédiate. Le rapport entre architecture et technique se traduit d' abord par une célébration extérieure de l'industrie" (Del Pesco, "Méthode de projettation," 264).



141 Architecture as an apparatus for the management of flows. Allegorical design for the 'House of the Directors's of the River Loue,' from Ledoux's *L'art considérée* (1804).

technologically (*sous le rapport de l'art, des mœurs, et la legislation*) transform nature's potentially destructive power into a productive relation, the harvesting of which engenders the formation of functional differentiations and sociogenetic relationships that come to be retained in culture-technical ensembles, social norms, and institutionalized laws.[974] Neither its explicitly stated aim not its primary aim, this rather evident reading helps explain the narrative nature of the text. For instance, the way it starts from the very 'pathway' leading to this sort of environmental production that Chaux embodies: a bridge crossing the river Loue, ✉[140] on which the entire production complex runs. This can be read as a proto-performative, morphogenetic account of architectural form, that, inserted into a dynamic fluvial milieu, is shaped in response to its resistance against the course of things, so as to generate and maintain a productive effect by adaptively delaying fluxes.[975] In this adaptive sense, corresponding shapes gain a functional and semantic meaning through the performative behaviors that are enacted within and against specific environmental dynamics.

974 Here and in the following, I am extending an idea from Jachmann, "Water/Space: Ledoux and the Disposition of Architecture and Machines," in *Architecture/Machine: Programs, Processes, and Performances,* ed. Moritz Gleich and Laurent Stalder (Zurich: GTA, 2017), 38–52; here 41–49.

975 Note that salt was not only a valuable commodity, but also the primary agent of preservation, Note that salt was not only a valuable commodity, but also the primary agent of preservation. Interestingly, the second project is a humble edifice of a barn (*grange paré*), which more than just a primitive shelter presents a basic storage facility for harvested produce.

As Jachmann notes, with "the idea of transforming landscapes through building," Ledoux generalizes "the very core of French residential architecture [built *entre court et jardin*]. As these structures communicate between a city-side and a garden-side," architectural filters transform one into the other, principally through the selective openings cut through the central vestibule in the transversal *corps de logis,*[976] or, for that matter, the apartment's series of spatial thresholds that transform the accessible spaces for reception, gatherings, and company into increasingly secluded spaces for retreat, study, and solitude. The third project presented, the allegorical House of the Directors's of the River Loue, uses a similar tactic to transform wilderness into a technicized environment. Designed as a pipe-like valve near the source of the river [141], it forms a semi-permeable gate to control and supervise the source of the city's productivity, and secure its functioning through the specific channeling of its natural flow. Pointing to a larger underlying issue, as Jachmann concludes, here flows become a *tertium comparationis* for reconsidering the relation between architectural form and technical machines, at a time when we see a larger rift between architectural design and engineering.[977] According to Jachmann's machinic reading, Ledoux thus tapped into the wider relation between architectural and urban forms (and the spatial arrangements, or more accurately the spatializations and distributions they entail), social and technical evolution and evolving modes of production, and political economy.

By generalizing architectural techniques of distribution and spatial planning as a physiological instrument for the management of environmental, (bio-)social, and (psycho-)affective flows [→ 3.2.2], Ledoux also contributed to the TECHNOLOGICAL generalization of the underlying mode of social production (and power relations) through spatial differentiation and hierarchization, which has characterized the affect-controlling and conduct-chanelling apparatus of appartements. This generalization participated in the further consolidation of that larger dominant dispositif of power in which social production is carried out by drawing hierarchical differences.[978] In this technological convergence we see a direct matching of the machinic relation between social and spatial production, a relation that expresses itself in the fact that spatial dispositions started to gain a machine-like quality, along with the contemporary understanding of machines: Jachmann has already pointed out the specific defini-

976 Jachmann, "Water/Space," 48.

977 Ibid., 49.

978 Therein it is again closely connected to what Anna Tsing calls the 'Architecture of Man.' See "Earth Stalked by Man," *The Cambridge Journal of Anthropology* 34, no.1 (Spring 2016): 2–16. See also above my note 905.

tion of machines as he discusses D'Alembert's definition of the general task of a machine "to augment and regulate [*règler*] moving forces."[979] Jachmann see a similar focus on a regulation of forces in the engineer Bernard Forest de Bélidor's definition of machines, when in 1768 he stated that "one gives the name in general to the assemblage of several pieces joined together, disposed in such a way that they serve to augment or regulate moving forces according to the different uses to which one applies them."[980] In this machinic sense, we see a generalization of the art of distribution's older affect-regulative dimension of controlling flows onto a greater scale of environmental planning.[981] This way, Ledoux's project exemplifies how the binding socio-spatial configuration of distances and proximities that had characterized the economy of the *hôtel*, and especially the constraint-free planning of the *maison de campagne* as a not-so-primitive hut, was now—through the planning of larger rural built ensembles—coming to be transposed onto a larger scale.

What we need to add here is that this channeling of flows through spaces was becoming an explicit reformative spatial technique, in tandem with it also increasingly being implemented to reform (or transform) the wild structures of the medieval fabric into a more civilized cityscape through a similar reconfiguration and recalibration that mechanologized spatial organizations—as environmental ecologies—to subjectivation processes and sociogenetic relations. We can conclude this epilogue with a contribution to the ongoing attempts to formulate a general ecology of (environmental) technologies and media, the aim of which lies in a more concrete understanding of the abstract workings between technology and society, and the incremental stages of what Simondon and Hörl—in line with the Enlightenment encyclopedists's contributions to an encompassing displacement of older systems of knowledge—have called "technological encyclopaedism."[982] Such displacements are not just reified as epistemological changes between different historical formations and systems of knowledge. Rather, pace Foucault, the very reason for these transformations is laid bare in those mediating and changing techniques and the auto-affective mechanisms that come to be articulated in and strategically employed to transform older systems of knowledge into

979 D'Alembert, "Machine," in *Encyclopédie,* IX: 794–800; cited after Jachmann "Water/Space," 49.

980 Cited after Jachmann, "Water/Space," 50.

981 Throughout this chapter I have tried to respectively radicalize the more suggestive reading by Jachmann, "Water/Space," 49–52, esp. regarding his note 28.

982 Hörl, "A Thousand Ecologies: The Process of Cyberneticization and General Ecology," in *The Whole Earth: California and the Disappearance of the Outside*, ed. Diedrich Diederichsen and Anselm Franke (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013), 121–30; here 122; and id., introduction to *General Ecology*.

newer ones. These transformations structurally break open existing social forms of organizing geneses, which moreover control collective processes of psycho-social individuation via the evolution of particular technical objects.[983] As we have seen with the notion of *convenientia/convenance* and the system of matching the characteristic differentiation of spatial structures with the operational and functional differences they give rise to, in these transformations, older historical stages and technologies are never simply replaced. Instead, these historically-differentiated epigenetic layers are often teleodynamically recoupled within the higher-order formations and phyletic lines of differenciation that they condition and give rise to. In this emergent process, these forms of organization (= EPISTRATA), and both the constraints and possibility spaces they enable (= PARASTRATA)[984], are thus epiphylogenetically preserved.

The concretizing system of appartements rose further to the level of technical consciousness, moving from an instinctively engaged and ritualized socio-spatial mechanism for regulating movement toward a more mature stage in which the underlying organizational techniques of compartitioning and distribution became—with the arising mechanicist and affect-physiological theories—consciously instrumentalized as a technicized environment. Obviously, this analysis is informed by the viewpoint of today's *fourth* stage of this technological encyclopedism. Its more machinic or cybernetic understanding of systems can be retroactively employed without risking any analytical anachronism. It critically and creatively avoids either simply reiterating some mechanistic second-stage vision, or falling back onto an equally determinist third-stage (super)structuralistic reading of such production systems, by approaching such systems in a more relational, assemblage-theoretic, ecosystemic, and teleodynamic vision that highlights the mutually constitutive aspects of reciprocally determining and enforcing elements converging into an emerging technical ensemble.

This allows us to reconsider the incremental becoming-conscious of the older artistic techniques of (com)partitioning and distribution as a generative *machinery*, for which—along with this becoming conscious—a specific rationale and method was outlined within a related discourse. It prescribed increasingly concrete rules for laying out especially residential space; specifically its organization into (sets of) spaces increasingly differentiated by function. For this reason, the system of appartements, and the rooms that consti-

983 Hörl, "Thousand Ecologies," 123.

984 Radman, "Sensibility is Ground Zero," In *This Deleuzian Century: Art, Activism, Life*, edited by Rosi Braidotti and Rick Dolphijn (Leiden/Boston: Brill/Rodofi, 2014), 57–86.

tute it, concretizes in tandem with a technical rationale or technology of the socio-spatial mechanisms of distribution and the acquisition of the skill of its proper employment, which is to say: in a certain technicization of these interdependent processes of spatial and social production.

In this part, I have mapped the progressive becoming-conscious, and related attempts to rationalize, systematize, and technicize thereby, the sociogenic aspect of the organization of appartements for aristocratic forms of social production. Based on this mapping, I hope to have illustrated where a genetic analysis of the concretizing system of appartements can move beyond the predominantly representational explanations, in rendering visible the complex co-constitutive dimensions between co-evolving spatial and social forms and production, cultural techniques, their rationales and employment. This way, in this last part I have tried to reveal a line of technical lineages and morphodynamics of form-taking systems that converged in a teleogenic coupling. It is from this teleogenesis in the concretizing technical ensemble for planning, and the various epistemological or psychological, political or social, and architectural or spatial transformation processes that played out through its concretization, that this system gained its persisting influence for the organization of the present. In this regard, I hope to have shown that the concretizing system of appartements was not just a singular system of organizing space within the history of architecture. Rather, it presents an assemblage, generally mediated by technology yet historically and culturally specific in the general co-evolution of various systems (and ecologies of practices) pertaining to the organization of space, knowledge, and power. This historically assembled system , more than having fallen out of use with the decline of aristocratic power, has, through various forms of recouping, been transposed onto, and integrated into, the wider organization of built environments. Obviously, I am not only talking about the transposition taking place during the eighteenth century, when the aristocratic appartement, as a set of functionally-differentiated rooms, was integrated into and overcoding the rather different socio-spatial organization of the household of the bourgeoisie and the middling classes, and later even into the organization of the space of the working-class. I am also talking about the long technological lineage of the earlier serial organization of the (hetero)geneses of compartitioning techniques that had generated it and which, as we have seen, was consolidated within the progressive differentiation of layouts with more net-like distributed yet equally hierarchical structures, and the emerging form of bypassing circulation and *dégagements* that it helped generate and which had begun to be transposed onto an urban level.

Summary of the Technological Lineage in the Genealogy of Apartments

Throughout the three books of this first volume on the genealogy of apartments, we have successively discovered an arbitrary and arborescent spatial, social, technological, and discursivized construct that had crystallized, was then transduced, and finally concretized into a residential system. In the past three centuries, this system has become so widespread and so generalized in its underlying form of planning, and transposed across so many layers, that its technical lineage, operative mechanism and technology were rendered fully invisible. This technological transposition process began after Serlio —in his crystallizing notion of *appartamenti*— had initially begun to decouple the technical aspect within architectural compartitioning techniques and acts of drawing plans though a series of progressive differentiation from the self-similar and auto-affective system it formed [→ PART I]. Thus conceiving it as a system of production, not representation.

Connecting Technological Stands

By revisiting the notion of *appartamenti* and the (com)partitioning or distributive techniques that generate them as a more topologically-derived concept problematizing the organization of part-to-part relations, we can use this topological vision for revealing the greater genealogy of apartments. This means examining their twofold historical formation (as both an evolving spatial object and an emerging discursive subject) in terms of a specific technological lineage in the history of the evolving thought on residential planning, which my mapping has drawn together. I have shown that the architecture of apartments co-evolved as a particularly organized socio-spatial system for drawing distinctions, with the progressive 'becoming-technologically-conscious' of the instrumentality of distributional techniques for social production (and all sorts of organizing (hetero)geneses), and the corresponding instrumentalization (or technicization) of architectural arrangements and forms of ordering in that matter.

This co-evolution began when —converging with a wider line of Italian influences on French architecture— French architects like Le Muet started to integrate this new spatial conception into an existing planning system, in order to advance inherited planning techniques for the single-range *corps de logis*, with its single or simply juxtaposed apartments. Its transductive architecture was, fostered through a set of meteorological and intellectual climate changes, in the process of a wider topological and typological reconfiguration of French residential architecture [→ PART 2–3]. If, as Guillaume has argued,

the apartment evolved from the old "opposition of the *salle* and *chambre*," then as we have seen, this evolution actually consisted in a more complex epigenetic process involving a successive integration of accumulated differentiation processes with both convergent and divergent syntheses, *and* not only with structural multiplication and transpositions, but also with multiple twists and turns, foldings and convolutions, including crucial conceptual reconfigurings.

All these complex convergences mapped in the last part can perhaps be summarized by the following diagram: in the beginning we have found the traditionally longer and linearly-organized sequence of rooms. An old technique of hierarchically structuring space through the progressive limitation of access, this ancient spatial technology for social production also characterized the French single-range *corps de logis*. Exemplified by buildings such as the Hôtels de Longueville and Ligneris, the Louvre, the Hôtels de la Reine, Mayenne, and so on, it persisted well into the late seventeenth century.

In the second half of the sixteenth century this logic was incrementally challenged by a trending, more bisected model with a stronger division between *salle* and *chambre*, inspired by Italian architecture, whose organizational incompatibility with the older serial organization has not been sufficiently stressed in existing scholarship, specifically regarding its specific reconfiguring effects. As we have seen, this alternative model had already helped differentiate the larger *appartement du roi* from the owner's apartment in early sixteenth-century châteaux [→ 2.2], and was formally repurposed in the designs of residences like the Hôtels d'Angoulême, de Mortier, Nevers, the Tuileries, and the Palais de Luxembourg. In the seventeenth century, the Hôtels de Zamet, Bouillon, and Sully were also organizationally repurposed by incorporating a *grand appartement* in juxtaposition with the stacked smaller suites of the owners' rooms of [→ 3.1.3]. This juxtaposition was entirely transposed, however, when during the first decades of the seventeenth century, the *corps de logis* was increasingly doubled up, partly due to climatic changes, so that new organizational possibilities were explored in the Hôtels de Tambonneau and Jars. There, the *petit appartement* was often collocated next to the *grand* one, thus combining the two parallel linear organizations of the *corps de logis simple* in one more complex spatial matrix, with two differently-scaled suites each on the ground and upper floor.

While providing a more flexible model for organizing residential space, this matrixial arrangement overtook the built-in technical logic of

compartition/distribution within French residential planning which, in the thus emerging discourse on the art of distribution, had to be entirely reconstituted in a new logic that transposed the traditional serial organization of aristocratic residential architecture into a more networked or distributed system. This transformative technical logic was successively outlined and made technologically consistent and operative through Perrault, D'Aviler, and especially Blondel's approach to distribution.

Contextualizing this transposition in the ongoing epistemic transformation of Western systems of thought [→3.2.1], changing mentalities and discourses about residential space and privacy [→3.2.2], and changing social and planning systems and practices [→3.2.3], has allowed me to progressively highlight the related technological transformations that drive these changes, and therefore to approach it in terms of an interdependent material-discursive transformation within the emerging theory-practice of distribution. In doing so, I have drawn heavily on the detailed discussions by authors including Köhler and Jachmann of the emerging discourses on the art of distribution, and specifically the latter's helpful epistemological emphasis on the developing serial formats of these didactic works. While Jachmann generally approaches seriality in Deleuzian terms of difference and repetition, he has not pointed out to what degree the idea of difference and repetition entails a heterogenesis, the incessant production of novelty. Extending this serial reading through a stronger emphasis on the particular organization of **(HETERO)GENESES** within disciplinary dispositifs has allowed me to refract the mediating role of distributional techniques from (com-)partitioning and sequencing to gridding, and trace the related changing conceptions of order(ing) and of establishing hierarchical organizations, toward the agency of architectonics within the establishment of hierarchical systems generally. By situating the mediacity (or better: **TECHNICITY**) of these architectural arrangements, emerging at the intersection of space, knowledge, and power, back into a social milieu allowed to critically correct several all-too-structuralistic theories about the sociogenetic aspects of this formtaking assemblage of residential planning in the eighteenth century.

Differentiating Systems

All in all, we have thus in continuation of and in partly overlapping parallels with the previous part [→PART II] reconsidered how the evolving residential system of appartements transformed (through a series of differentiations, wavering and convergences of alternative organizational models, as well as their successive foldings-into-each-other) from an initially linear or segmen-

tary spatial system into a non-linear distributed network system. At the center of my argument, this was not simply an alternative, more matrix-like model; rather it must be understood as a mutation of the older linear model. Having evolved through a series of convergent and divergent events that eventually compounded the organizational logic of the *logis* within the more integral form of a grid, it allowed a greater 'freedom of planning' by first establishing a greater control over its technological basis and functionings. It is here that a discourse on the art of distribution arose alongside an epistemological transformation of systems of planning. It presented the discursive complement that expressed an ongoing reterritorialization process, namely those reconfigurings through which a historically particular form of (and rationale for) social production emerged within French court aristocracy: the sociology of distinction. By moving away from systems of establishing resemblances toward one of establishing comparative difference and identities, it offered the conceptual basis for modern planning practices through the progressive disengagement and establishment of select spatial connection, with the purpose of specific social production processes and novel forms of power.

As we have seen, D'Aviler's *Cours* formally established this new logic by transposing the traditional old division of the principal *corps de logis* into a larger and smaller suite. Repeating the older distinction between the *salle* and *chambre* (or, more accurately: between the *chambre à parer* and the *chambre de retrait*) they now constituted a more differentiated set of reception spaces on the one hand, and more private rooms, on the other hand, that were juxtaposed as an *appartement de parade* and an *appartement de commodité*. Here, with the aim of distributing these two different suites more conveniently by way of select shortcuts, a new form of planning emerged with the practical experimentation of the early eighteenth century [→3.3.1]. A new consistency for planning with *convenance* was finally established when Blondel managed to organize these differences logically in a twofold manner that suited the production of spatial networks [→3.3.2]. His theory of distribution achieved this, where the two *grands appartements*—which due to their location on the upper and lower floor, were used for purposes of different levels of officiality—had slowly gained distinct functions in serving as an *appartement de parade* for highly official business activities and an *appartement de sociéte* for more informal public gatherings, came to be reconsidered as spaces that differed by degree of formality, not in kind. Thus conceptually flattened, they were to be planned on the same level as two distinct, yet joinable, sequences of rooms. Taken together, this spatial apparatus for

reception was different in kind from the adjacent smaller suites accommodate the activities of daily life by allowing inhabitants to retreat or escape from the official activities taking place there. Thereby the greatest difference was no longer drawn along a central axis, nor between the different stories, but transversally: between suites suiting the differing needs for display and retreat, while both suites maintained the old stratifications of visi(ta)bility. And it was this smaller *appartement privé* or *particulier*, with its minor sequence of rooms, that—at the same time that it concretized as a spatial system—started to be emulated by the rising bourgeoisie, into whose changing residential domain this different kind of organizing space was now increasingly integrated.

As a basis to approach this integration, in the last chapter I suggest that this systemic compounding in the concretizing system of appartements and the art of distribution onto a higher level of organizational complexity must first be understood as an effect of several machinic couplings between material-discursive processes. As such, both this compounding itself and the particular constraint propagation within the selective coupling of spatial differences within the emerging system of appartements, remain ill-conceived as long as they areconceptualized in anthropocentric terms of 'use' as 'utility.' On the contrary, they ought to be conceived in a more machinic (anthropogenetic and sociotechnical), and thus both more proto-Lamarckian and post-Nietzschean sense of 'use' concerning the way its use played out within a directed evolution of a socio-spatial system within which it came to be employed. There, the technical nature of planning usually contributes to a fastening, a **TELEODYNAMIC** interlocking of a goal-directed **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLE** (geared at the establishment of reproductive socio-spatial relations); this is the systematic operationalization (i.e. the 'making work') of the socio-technical nature of the art of distribution. This operationalization happened within the increasing technicization of architecture as these evolving architectural planning techniques of compartitioning and distribution, and their serial mode of production through progressive differentiation, were fundamentally re-conceptualized. This allowed their instrumentality for social production processes within aristocratic architecture and its particular cosmopolitics, as a *technē peri tou bio*, to transform into one of the technicized biopolitical instruments of an emerging power formation.

While these compounding forms thus incrementally effectuated (as an efficient cause) new planning potentials, and were also forming new technologies of knowledge and power and new assemblages, their increasing becoming-technicized also rendered progressively invisible the formal cause

of this efficacy. Regarding this subject, authors like Rousseau and Laugier began to tentatively reveal the operative formal mechanism, the blueprints and workings of these technologies, from which their generative power arose. It is thus the historically contingent concatenation of productive differences through which a system's particular properties are generated machinically through an accumulation of differentiation processes, and the compounding of emergent constraints.[985] As I argue through my teleo-dynamically extended assemblage-theoretic reading, this compounding expresses itself in the contractions or double-binds that reside in the short-circuiting couplings of two things: on the one hand, of emergent constraints that arise throughout systemic differentiation processes, and on the other hand, an epiphylogenetic accumulation of these epigenetic differentiation processes through their retention in the resulting organization of an environment. Epiphylogeneses are always teleodynamic, because the active morphogenetic structuring operation (epigenetic differentiation) is always offloaded onto another higher-order level of organization (an abstract machinic phylum) comprising morphodynamic processes. Here, a morphogenesis of reciprocal structures and operations through the establishment of part-to-whole relationships and functional dependencies and behaviors, comes to be offloaded onto a reticulation which morphodynamically maintains these structuring operations and their very condition of possibility, as constraining enablings. This is where the recapitulation of previous epigeneses is operated, enablingly constrained, and therefore regularized by the already-produced differenciations in the form of basic body plans and phylogenetic lineages. This also applies to non-living systems, for instance in how the planning of *hôtels* was regularized by previous designs, in the social patterns and urban fabric they successively exorganized, contracted, and technicized within processes of social production. They could also have done so in myriad other ways.

985 To be clear, this epiphylogenetic reading is of course not meant to introduce an interpretative anachronism; it simply allows us to interpret the idealistic naturalization underlying social contract theory as a relevant decoding process, speeding up a long deteriorating social assemblage; and the specific destablizing factor it highlights; namely, property; as the emergent effect of asymmetries. Again, my intention is not to argue that this theory of property was an operative dimension in the concretizing system of apartments; what I want to suggest instead, is that it can be used as an indicator revealing what was going on here, because one of these historically-contracted regulative structures of collective life, is certainly the household, with its (changing) norms, normative behaviors, socio-spatial relations, and power structures as an assemblage starting to revolve around the question of property. At this stage, the notion of proprieté must be understood in its still undifferentiated meaning including both 'property' (as possession, ownership) and 'propriety' (as fitness, or appropriateness), as indicating a right by which something pertains or belongs to someone; and a related behaviour expressing it.

If these concluding considerations draw an end to my genealogy of apartments, or my epiphylogenetic mapping of their historical formation (as I have specified it), that is not because nothing much happened with the evolution of the appartement as an aristocratic from of living, or to reinvigorate a sort of historical rupture with the beginnings of the French revolution. Aristocratic social organization—persisted well into the twentieth century, also continuing in neighboring European counties. On the contrary, in opening up a specific problem, my genealogy draws out a future research trajectory. This opening marks a specific point of transposition, where the differentiating/integrating system of social production that has emerged in the planning of royal palaces and aristocratic residences took on a new systemic form, which, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, became incrementally transposed onto the collective habitat of the bourgeoisie and the emerging working class: namely, in the form of apartment houses and apartment housing. This longer history must also be written in terms of the complex production of differences, and this differentiation ought to be approached in terms of the inclusive disjunctions through which apartment houses and apartment housing formed, in particular couplings that established ever wider feedback loops, thus giving rise to a much wider system of social production. It is this emerging wider system of modern planning, that in organizing (hetero)geneses through new forms of gridding, led to increasingly multi-layered socio-spatial and socio-economic interdependencies. As has Dennis provocatively said, it is here that the *hôtel*—and the differentiated residential system of appartements than concretized with its co-evolution—more than being a "symbol of a previous social order" and thus a relic of the past, ought to be reconsidered as the "prelude of something new."

Yet to account for this novelty, and the 'molecular revolution' in the wider topology of urban forms of togetherness that is effectuated across this break, with all its subsequent restructurings of social, political, and economic systems of governance, we will have to account for a wholly different level of complexity, where new regularization processes came into effect through novel disengagements and re-couplings. What increasingly played out in this teleodynamic process were new regulatory dispositifs that structurally affected urban production through the new planning practices that were part of them, and the emerging urban building types and psycho-socio-environmental ecologies that they help form. As a collateral process that converges with the regularization processes that we have

mapped in this chapter, this is the complex formation of apartment houses and tenement buildings in Paris and other cities, and their multiple modernization waves. In order to understand this process in its full complexity, we would first need to formulate in an entirely different historical lineage, or rather a historical multiplicity, of the diverse 'flatted' forms of bourgeois living. These arose, as I mentioned in the introduction, alongside a fundamental socio-economic restructuring through which the traditionally larger household structures of the whole house were dissolved and nuclear family structures were replaced. Due to this restructuring, the town house-types with their traditional multi-purpose spaces were transformed into a new form shaped by the incremental integration of the spatial organization of the apartment and its functional differentiation. Such a lineage would have to account for how this happened at different times, and at different rates, within in different contexts, and within cities with different conditions.

This is not a linear implementation process; rather, this transformation presents a recurring systemic reconfiguration of organizational work/life patters, that was already long in the making. We have thus reached the end of a storyline that had already started to bifurcate. Continuing this analysis then means attending to a wholly different story, multiple stories, for which a multi-layered approach is necessary to map the wider socio-economic lineage on its own terms. We have to identify the various convergences through which the apartment as an equipment of power, a dispositif of social discrimination and hierarchization, came to be transplanted into a transforming collective equipment within the socio-economic assemblage of consolidating capitalist structures. and to analyze how these living arrangements then came to be dispersed world-wide as a new form of housing. To do so, we would have to switch gears and start all over again. Therefore, this analysis must be conducted in detail in two follow-up studies on the genealogy of apartment houses and housing, for which the genealogy of apartments outlined and coming to an end here, will serve as one strand, a base-line, in its related reconceptualizations and conclusions.

So, in order to start all over, let me end with some final epiphylogenetic thoughts, in a sort of epi(phylogenea)logue to reflect on my genealogical exercise. Going over and over through these pages, and those of the books, articles, and archival material I studied, I often heard the narrator's thoughts from the opening passage of Resnais's *L'Année dernière à Marienbad* (1961):

> I made my way, once again, through this corridor, traversing these rooms, in this building that belongs to another century; this immense, luxurious, baroque, grim hotel, where unending corridors succeed unending corridors, silent, deserted; overloaded with a dark and cold decor, laden with woodwork, stucco, illuminated panels, marble, black mirrors, black-hued paintings, columns, carved door-frames, doorways, galleries, transversal corridors that lead in their turn to deserted spaces, spaces overloaded with an ornamentation of another century … like old foliage … on which I advanced once again, to meet you …

Given that in the movie the *hôtel* is a metaphor for the mind, as a supposedly closed circulatory structure, these thoughts seem to give an adequate impression of what it sometimes felt like to study a genealogy of apartments: going down a rabbit hole, getting lost in doing the grey, meticulous work, in patiently mapping all the trajectories and pathways within historical scholarship. Hence it is rather fitting to allude to the psychological *horror pleni* that sometimes comes with engaging in historical scholarship, in all its splendor and overwhelming richness in detail, and also its often creepy edifice with its highly-compartmentalized and self-repetitive structures. It's a remarkable apparatus, especially for someone who is a visitor to it, rather than an inhabitant or permanent occupant; for someone using this structure not just for facilitating a living, but for getting somewhere, as a nomadic journey. Given my own experience with gatekeeping practices concerning my 'too-theoretical' approach to the philosophy of history, and history of (technological) thought, I still find myself antichambering for more access; and to make my own thoughts more accessible.

For I feel that I am queerly coming out of this genealogical exercise, not so much a scholar in the history of (French) residential space, late-gothic to Baroque castles, country and town houses, the systems of appartements they carry, their planning, their cultural use, and their connection to the history of private life. Perhaps it has led me, rather, onto the path of a philos-

opher of technology (of partitioning, distribution, and arrangements), suggesting first of all a new philosophy of history or historical ontology—a flat ontology—based on a more assemblage-theoretic extension of genealogical approaches through a distinct sort of mapping, for studying historical formations epiphylogenetically as technically mediated co-evolutions.

Methodological Takeaways

This more transdisciplinary approach required me not only to lay a thorough theoretical base; its also necessitated the construction of a specific method for the study and theorization of the (organo)genesis of architectural arrangements within the built environment and its three mental/psychological/cognitive, social/cultural/technical, and material/environmental/spatial ecologies. This newly-constructed method, whichis rigorously anti-representational to stress the productive aspect of architectural arrangements in historical formations, has been put to the test in this study into the first stages in the formation of apartments.

Obviously, in having expanded genealogical approaches to this epiphylogenetic mapping, I have tailored (and thus narrowed down) this mapping closely to the particular topic, especially in its topological vision, within the particular process of progressive differentiation that pertains to the formation of apartments. As such, topic and method reciprocally determined one another; they were co-constructed in a synergistic or sympoietic process. But while *A Flat Theory* and its genealogical study of apartments centrally overlap in a productive pun, they are distinct elements that each remains independently generalizable. Probably the most daunting part of this study, the suggested machinic-theoretical conception of architectural arrangements and historical formations, is widely applicable to the analysis of built environments, as it is constructed in the wider view of a GENERAL ORGANOLOGY of built environments. If this approach has demonstrated its potential use for similar investigations, it will have equally evidenced its own limits and bugs. My hope is that it may inspire critical and creative reworkings. For instance, I am well aware that the choice of the very topic entailed limiting myself to a particular Western notion and type of architecture, whose potential generalization will first require a great deal of de-generalization.

With this in mind, the approach taken by this work could be continued in genealogical studies of many other architectural arrangements, built environments, and their organization. My study has touched on a set of intertwined genealogies yet to be written: the genealogy of compartition; of the *département*; of the *dégagement*; of the palace; the *hôtel*; the villa; the *mai-*

son de plaisance; and so on. Concerning the architectural analysis, the 'white-wall'-method of drawing plans or the accompanying topological diagrams, as both extensions of existing research trajectories, can easily be used to foreground the internal spatial differentiation and relationships in the organization of other kinds of built formations. However, it is true that the latter has proven most suitable for buildings with relatively simple topological orderings, so as to more easily render visible crucial organizational transformations, and thereby push their use beyond mere classification of organizational or built types, type-formations, or even types of formations. Rather, employed as a diagrammatic tool, they are used to render transformative lineages visible.

Here, however, I should warn that detaching the analytical methods too quickly, or fully, from the theoretical presupposition of *A Flat Theory*, will lead to a similar problem that encountered in the study of heterotopias or spaces of enclosure, and how those are connected to subjectivation processes. As Simondon warns, only through the "individuation of knowledge" can we achieve a "knowledge of individuation," meaning we can only gain this knowledge by recapitulating or repeating it, and thus become-different-together-with it. This is why genealogy presents more of an exercise for achieving a knowledge, than being some applicable method. An **EPIPHYLOGENETIC** mapping also implies a specific technological co-individuation of knowledge about an environmental formation. It is here that my study provides a general template for analytically mapping, and synthetically drawing together such complex geneses; geneses consisting in formtaking assemblages that emerge at the intersection of three distinct psycho-socio-environmental morphodynamic and organizing processes, that co-emerge and co-evolve (i.e. co-individuate) not just alongside but fundamentally *by means of* **CONCRETIZING TECHNICAL ENSEMBLES**.

Involving genetic, epigenetic, and epiphylogenetic dimensions of this co-evolution, including their constitutive couplings, an epiphylogenetic mapping of historical formations implies a **GENERAL ORGANOLOGY**. It calls for an **ECOLOGIZATION** of thinking regarding historical formations. As we gave seen, this organological field consists of complex co-individuations, or condividuations (to fall back on Raunig's term) that are in a state of constant reticulation. This condividuating reticularity results from ongoing differentiation through mutually-constitutive **BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICES** that find a practical application within planning techniques and the technical rationales for which these technics are used. As such they drive particular systems of production. In the case of the architecture of apartments and the discourse

on the art of distribution, having both evolved from compartition practices, they both co-individuated a heterogenizing form of social production, by means of ex-organizing this heterogenesis into, and epiphylogenetically coupling it to, condividuating forms of spatial production and spatial systems

Technological Awareness

It is here that particular forms of putting to use the generative nature of those compositional/organizational techniques of (com)partitioning or compartmenta(liza)tion within the art of distribution, as an **ORGANIZATION OF (HETERO)GENESES**, and resulting architectural arrangements, rose to a level of **TECHNICAL CONSCIOUSNESS**. This happened where the linear, representationalist logic of socio-spatial heterogeneses were generalized into a two-fold (and thus more **HETERARCHICAL** form of) **ORGANOGENESIS**, which in turn conceptually guided the **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION** of generic and specific differences and their functional differentiation of residential space into a consistent socio-spatial production system. Part of this individuating system is a specific technical mentality of mastering the art of distribution, which with the concretizing spatial system discursively rises to a level of technological consciousness. It is a form of thinking that arises with the deployment of architecture's built-in instrumentality for social production that, fostered by the wider problem of governmentality/environmentality, gives way to a new form of planning. Architectural arrangements were now consciously thought as a tool, as Wallenstein suggests, not just for representing order, but for establishing and maintaining it in the first place. Thus instrumentalized as well as technicized, the architecture of apartments tended to concretize from an initially implicit, social dispositif toward a more explicit, technological dispositif of distribution.

It is by mapping this becoming, that we become aware of the Western technicization of environmental organizations, thus recovering a largely forgotten body of knowledge as to how they technically operate. This awareness, arising from mapping this becoming, then allows us to articulate a specific critique of present forms and techniques of planning. As I state in my chapter on Serlio, this vision unearths an underlying history of technological thought (=**ARCHAEOLOGY**, what was happening) that targets not so much at an understanding of the changing perceptions of space and spatial relations, but their changing conceptualizations (=**GENEALOGY**, what was going on in what was happening). It employs these conceptions to map, epiphylogenetically, a cultural technics and technology that emerges

along a long trajectory of compositional notions of interdependence that, via the royal conception of organizing space and the elitist rationality of the court aristocracy, formed a larger culture-technical ensemble through a series of differentiations/integrations and related forms of subjectivity that co-individuated (or condividuated) alongside it. This subjectivity consisted not just in the new form of retreat from larger groups, or privacy to set oneself apart as an individual under which this differentiation has often been perceived, but more interestingly also in a new condividual subjectivity of planning for facilitating this *co*-individua(liza)tion process: a sort of 'apartmentality' concerning the (hetero)genesis and condividuation through spatial multiplicities. Semantically, 'apartmentalization' then names the processes in which this particular (environ)mentality of privacy forms.

I have attempted in this study to describe the condividuating system of appartements as a series of recompositions, or rearrangement of material-discursive bodies, and show that it does not originate at any point, but becomes more and more explicit and intensive in the progressive nesting of layers of organizational complexity, in which each specific historical and epigenetic differentiation is retained through their respective exorganization into a technicized environment. On the theoretical level of meta-metamodeling this process, apartmentalization could be understood as exactly countering existing compartmentalizations and modes of exclusive disjunction by its characteristic mode of existence: by temporarily inhabiting existing structures and strata accountably, so as to learn to move on; a passing through enacting a becoming-with, passing on alternative becomings.

This vision of history in service of a transformative becoming that is based on (yet irreducible to) an investigation of historical formations and geared toward opening new futures, in recomposing the present by undoing and reworking present stratifications, is in fact nothing particularly new. It simply sends us back to the use of history for life: the epistemic violence within hegemonic history that comes with reductive forms of representationalism, normative conceptions, closeted terminologies. Against such (ab)uses of History, its use-value lies precisely in repeating and recapitulating historical formations, not just for the sake of knowing the past, but for the sake of a knowledge to intervene in the present. Rather than just consolidating historically produced structures once more, socially relevant scholarship in (architectural) history should help problematize, upset and recompose our knowledge to arrive at a new critical conception, vocabulary, and language that critically counters and undoes those that created these problematic formations in the first place.

For this reason I am very happy to feel more like a philosopher of technology than a historian, as it perhaps indicates that I have gotten closer to being what Simondon called a *technologist or mechanologist,* who is able to operate on the present. We find ourselves in queer times, where we can no longer ignore and must dismantle the historical model of Western social production through the continued construction of differences and inequalities that are generated not just through geopoliticized, racialized, sexualized, genderized differences and forms of otherness, but also by means of the built environment and more exclusionary and discriminatory planning practices. It is perhaps here that, beyond its topical contribution to historical scholarship and theoretical advances in understanding what it is that architecture does from anassemblage-theoretic angle, my genealogy of this formtaking organizational system might gain some wider social relevance, to the extent that it identifies the architecture of aristocratic apartments as one of the main mechanisms of discrimination that facilitated such differentiation processes within hierarchizing assemblages.

Recuperating an awareness of the consolidating function of (Western) architecture as such an equipment of power, outlining not only its longer technical lineage within palatial architecture, but also the specific technical operations of discrimination that underly this largely forgotten organon of control, suggests that more than being a relic of the past that has been replaced by a supposedly more democratic one, it was merely transposed, and thus still underlies, modern forms of planning. In this view, it is yet to be studied as a more integrative system whose higher-order complexity only makes it more difficult to see. With this mechanological aim, I believe that I have moved my analysis to a level of complexity that is far more adequate for reconsidering—from the point of view of genesis—a system that emerged in a series of concatenated machinic processes and their various couplings, by way of an assemblage-theoretical account sufficiently complex to stay on the level of these constituent concatenations and couplings without analytically decomposing them into separate processes or simple elements.

As such, the product (the genealogy or epiphylogenetic mapping of a spatial formation co-evolving through a series of material-discursive technological convergences) is indistinguishable from, yet not reducible to the assembly line on which it is fabricated. The epiphylogenealogist has individuated by drawing together, on the same level of reality, an assemblage of

convergent processes that operate on different levels of organizational complexity, but which cannot be flattened to component processes on the level of reified generalities. This drawing together consists in making more minor, transversal, and non-linear connections by agentially **CUTTING TOGETHER/APART** reciprocally-constituted pieces, frames, segments, or sequences; both within the study as a whole, and as a part of a greater discourse out there.

Precisely in staying within this complex, moving through unending corridors succeeded by unending corridors, seemingly pertaining to the past but actually leading out of the present, we immanently open up new pathways and spaces for new encounters, new scholarship, and new becomings. In trying to do so, I have always found myself working at the limit of my capabilities: what I could draw together; handling and maintaining a certain level of complexity; approaching a threshold of intensity. This intensity was sometimes too much to handle, to study, to 'think through,' to 'think with' and 'work together,' to resolve, to communicate, but it was necessary to make the jumps needed to synthesize different levels of complexity. While endo-consistently rigorous, such an anexact account is prone to critiques that will fault my work, for instance, for not sticking to established histori(ographi)cal methods and a resulting unsharpness that makes things "unnecessarily complicated." It should be clear, however, that such a critique, neglecting its exo-consistency within a greater heterogeneity of transdisciplinary discourses, would imply a complete misreading of my aims.

Is this work conclusive? Absolutely not. Is it concise? Not really. Is it consistent? Not always. Is it convoluted? Most certainly! It is convincing? Or am I making things just unnecessarily complicated? Probably both. Primarily a means to my own becoming, my intention was to make this dissertation compelling, and thus be conducive to further becomings through ongoing theorization that embraces the productive complexities in the genesis of particular technicized environmental organizations and spatio-temporal dynamisms that made and make us who we are, and differently so, by means of systems that are cutting us together/apart.

IMAGE SOURCES
FOR PART III

All the plans illustrating this book, are principally based on those ones published in the below-mentioned architectural publications or sources. These are often geometrically idealized (e.g. made more perpendicular), or wrongly measured, which became evident in matching them with the actual plot geometry, as recorded in older and contemporary cadastral maps. Based on these, I have tried to carefully correct these idealizations, by slightly adapting their geometry to contemporary cadastral maps, accessible via the Direction générale des Finances Publiques – Cadastre © 2017, accessed online, during Jan-Feb 2020, at https://www.cadastre.gouv.fr/. Wherever applicable, I have also taken into account the recordings of the Atlas Vasserot, avail. online at http://archives.paris.fr/r/138/plans-parcellaires/. These plans are not geometrically reliable, but have prove helpful in their recording of the internal structure of the below buildings, and of intermediary stages in their transformation. If not otherwise noted the room distribution is my own.

To confirm the location of some *hôtels*, I have also consulted the "Plan historique: Secteur Sauvegarde du 7e Arrondissement de Paris," produced by AUP, SCPA Steffe Lemoine Davy Geffard Berthome, with Fanette Cohen, Jean-Paul Midant, and Phytolab (Nov 2009/Sep 2010), avail. online at https://cdn.paris.zr/paris/2020/02/26/cb19477751fe4e-023632de216ae44667.ai

1 Plan de Saint-Victor, c. 1552. Image Source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

2 Diagram, authors own. After "Graphic Diagram of the time-line chart, 1500–1800" (Dennis's, *Court and Garden*, Fig. 4).

3 Perspectival drawing of the Hôtel Jacques Cœur from Violliet-Le-Duc's *Dictionnaire* (1856), via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan redrawn by the author, based on the later plan published in Viollet-le-Duc's Dictionnaire, Vol. VI: 280–2, and esp. Mérindol (BnF GED-5890, ark: btv1b84448309); adapted to contemporary cadastral maps.

4 "Veüe de lhostel de Sens a Paris…" by [Louis Boudan]. Source: BnF gallica, ark: btv1b6901621d. Public domain. Plan redrawn and conjecturally reconstructed by the author, after an unidentified/uncredited plan republished in Thomson's *Renaissance Paris*, fig. 19, and Dennis's *Court and Garden*, fig. 40; adapted to contemporary cadastral maps.

5 Persectival drawing of the Hôtel de Cluny from Viollet-Le-Duc's *Dictionnaire* (1856), via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan redrawn by the author, based on the later plan published in Viollet-le-Duc's *Dictionnaire*, Vol. VI: 289; adapted to contemporary cadastral maps. Plan of the Hôtel Le Gendre, redrawn by the author, based on the curtailed plan published in Viollet-le-Duc's *Dictionnaire*, Vol. VI: 283; reconstructed by way of the Vasserot Atlas (13e quartier, îlot n° 6, AdP F/31/79/29), and contemporary cadastral maps.

6 Detail of the Merian Map, showing the old Hôtel de Longueville. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain. Public domain. Plan redrawn by the author, based on an unidentified plan reprinted in Thomson's *Renaissance Paris,* fig. 46, under consideration of neighboring sheets of the Vasserot Atlas and contemporary cadastral maps.

7 Detail of the Braun & Hogenberg map of Paris (c.1530); from Georg Braun and Frans Hogenberg, *Beschreibung und Contrafactur der vornembster Stät der Welt*, Köln 1582), Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg VD16-B7188; via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Detail of the Truschet and Hoyau map, 1550, Basel Univ. Library, Kartenslg AA 124, e-rara; via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Detail of the Saint-Victor map, c. 1552. Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde; via Wikimedia Commons. CC0.

Detail of the Gomboust map, 1652. Image Source Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

8 "Pros. de l'Hostel d'Angoulesme," from Mattäus Merian and Martin Zeiller's Topographiae Galliae (1655). Bibliothèque Municipale de Reims, Rès. G 152; via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

Plan of the Hôtel de Ligneris, later Carnavalet, redrawn by the author, after the reconstruction provided in Frommel's "Gli hotel particuliers"; after G.–M. Leproux, and earlier critical reconstructions by Babelon, based on the plan/distribution published in Marot's *Recueil des Plans*, f. 74 [85]. Adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (29e quartier, îlot n°11, F/31/87/23), and contemporary cadastral maps. And plan of the Hôtel d'Angoulême, redrawn by the author, after the reconstruction provided by Frommel, "Gli hotel particuliers," adapted according to a later plan by Robert de Cotte (BnF Etampes, RES HA-18 (C, 7)-FT 6), and under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (27e quartier, îlot n°1, AdP F/31/85/02), and contemporary cadastral maps.



9 View of the Court of the Hôtel de Condé, BnF, département Estampes et photographie, RES FOL-VE-53 (F), ark: btv1b103029748; via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan redrawn and conjecturally reconstructed by the author, based on the plans by De Cotte (BnF Etampes, RES HA-18 (C, 2)-FT 6, ark: btv1b6937256x and ark: btv1b6937257b; under consideration of the Turgot Map, and an unidentifed plan (A.N.?) reprinted in S. Frommel's "Gli hôtel Particuliers," fig. 11b; placed by help of the general massing plan (BnF Etampes RES VE-53 (J), ark: btv1b7744258t) and contemporary cadastral maps.

10 Plan of the Hôtel de Mortier, reconstructed from cadastral maps, published in Andia and Gady, eds., *Rue des Francs-Bourgeois au Marais*, figs 221 and 242, and the Atlas Vasserot, 29e quartier, îlot 9, AdP F/31/87/21. And plan of the hôtel Concini, the later Hôtel des Ambassadeurs, redrawn and conjecturally reconstructed by the author, based on the plans by De Cotte. Image source: BnF Etampes, RES HA-18 (17)-FOL, ark: btv1b55002701g

11 Idealized engraving of the Hôtel de Nervers, from Claude de Chastillon,'s *Topographie francoise ou Representations de plusieurs villes, …* (1641), n.p. [30]. Image source: BnF Gallica, ark: btv1b55010081r). Public domain. Plan conjecturally reconstructed by the author Based on Smith's reconstruction of the plan with Mansart's later alterations, as reprinted in Leproux's article in Babelon/Mignot, ed., *Mansart: Le génie de l'architecture*, fig. 177; and the partial reconstructions by A. D. Johnson (repr. in Thomson, *Renaissance Paris*); under consideration of the Gomboust and Turgot maps; the Vasserot Atlas (37e quartier, îlot n°6, AdP F/31/92/04), and contemporary cadastral maps.

12 Detail of the Merian map of Paris, 1615. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.

13 "Prosp. de l'Hostel de Soissons," from Mattäus Merian and Martin Zeiller's *Topographiae Galliae* (1655). Bibliothèque Municipale de Reims, Rès. G 152; via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan redrawn by the author, after the reconstruction provided by S. Frommel, G. de Leo, and A. Zvereva, repr. in Frommel's "Gli hotel particuliers," figs. 7b–c; and the reconstruction with room distribution by F. Devedian (av. online at wikipedia); based on De Cotte's plan générale de l'hôtel de Soisson (BnF RES HA-18 (A, 6)-FT 4, ark: btv1b53050147x. Adapted under consideration of the floor plans republished in Chantal Turbide's "Les livres trouvés dans l'hôtel de la Reine après le décès de Catherine de Médicis (1519–1589)," figs. 1a–b (Archives d'Etat de la ville de Turin, Sezione Reunite, AZ Savoie-Carignan, Dis n° 0068)

14 Detail of the Gomboust map, showing the Hôtel d'Albret. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan redrawn by the author, after earlier reconstructions provided by Babelon; adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (27e quartier, îlot n°2, AdP F/31/85/03), and contemporary cadastral maps, with room distribution after J.-P. Babelon and J.-C. Garreta.

15 Vue de la Maison et de l'Eglise des Pères de l'Oratoire," engraving by Jean Marot (s.d.). Musée Carnavalet, Histoire de Paris G.22833. CC0. Plan redrawn and conjecturally reconstructed by the author, critically based on the earlier reconstruction and room distribution by A. D. Johnson, reprinted in Thomson's *Renaissance Paris*, fig. 118; but corrected, based on contemporary cadastral maps and under consideration of the later lot structures and remaining building parts recorded in the Vasserot-Atlas (esp. 13e quartier, îlot n°14, AdP F/31/79/37).

16 Detail from the Gomboust map, showing the Hôtel Zametti. Image Source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.
Plan redrawn and conjecturally reconstructed by the author, based on the two plans by De Cotte (BnF Etampes, RES HA-18 (24)-FOL); and two unidentified BnF plans published in Coope, "Hotel Zametti," figs. 17–18; positioned/adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (36e quartier, îlot n°1-3bis, AdP F/31/89/03–05), and contemporary cadastral maps.

17 Plan of the Hôtel d'Alméras. Redrawn by the author, after the Atlas Vasserot (Marais, 29e quartier, îlot n°9, AdP F/31/87/21)

18 Plan of the Hôtel de Boissy, later Mayenne. Redrawn by the author, after the the reconstruction and rooms distribution provided by F-Ch. James, "Hôtel de Mayenne," figs. 2–3; under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (27e quartier, îlot n°2, AdP F/31/85/03), and contemporary cadastral maps.

19 Page from Du Cerceau's *Livre d'Architecture* (1559). Image source: BnF gallica, ark: bpt6k6581357r. CC0.

20 Page from De l'Orme's *Premier tome de L'architecture* (1567-1568), f. 253v. Image source: Universitätsbibliothek Bern, MUE Bong IV 783, e-rara. Public domain.

21 Plans of the Hôtel Donon and other buildings along the rue Elzévir: redrawn the author based on the Atlas Vasserot (29e quartier, îlot n°10, AdP F/31/87/22), and contemporary cadastral maps.

22–27 Pages from Le Muet's *Maniere de bien bastir* (1623), Frontispiece, fols. 6–7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 25, 41, 43, 49, 51, 57, 59. BnF, département Arsenal, FOL-S-1595, avail. online at BnF Gallica, ark: btv1b8626502h. CC0

28 "Veüe du Palais d'Orléans, appelé Luxembourg," Pierre Lepautre (1640s). Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.
Plan redrawn by the author, after the reconstruction and rooms distribution provided by S. Galletti, "L'appartement de M. de Medicis," figs. 2-6 & 9, based on the plan/distribution published in Marot's *Recueil des Plans*, fols. 31 [42]; adapted under consideration of contemporary cadastral maps.

29 Detail from Gamboust Map, showing the Hôtel de Rambouillet. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.
And "Le Mariage à la ville, 1633 - La Visite à l'accouchée," A. Bosse. The MET, 26.49.42. OA/Public Domain.
Plan reconstructed by the author, under consideration of the reconstruction and rooms distribution (adapted) provided by Nicolas Courtin, in *Prince, Princesse, et leur logis*, ed. Chatenet and de Jonge, 257–64; and an earlier one in Babelon's *Demeure Parisienne*; under consideration of the site as shown in the Turgot map, the Verniquet map, and the plan of the neighboring Hôtel de Longueville, by De Cotte (BnF Etampes, RES HA-18 (25)-FOL).

30 Detail of the Turgor Map, showing the Hôtel de Sully. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.
Plan redrawn by the author, based on the plan/distribution published in Marot's *Recueil des Plans*, f. 79 [90]; adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (29e quartier, îlot n°20, AdP F/31/87/28), and contemporary cadastral maps.

31 "Veüe de l'Hostel de Liencourt…," by Israël Silvestre. Wellcome collection. CC BY.

Plan redrawn and conjecturally reconstructed by the author, after earlier reconstruction by Braham and Smith, *Mansart*, pl. 127; based on the plan/distribution published in Marot's *Recueil des Plans*, fols. 40–44 [51–55]. Under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (37e quartier, îlot n°7, AdP F/31/92/05).

32 "Prosp. de l'Hotstel de Bautru," from Merian and Zeiller's *Topographiae Galliae* (1655). Bibliothèque Municipale de Reims, Rès. G 152; via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan redrawn by the author, after earlier reconstructions and rooms distribution by Tooth, and Braham and Smith, *Mansart*, pl. 131; and Cojannot, *Louis Le Vau*, fig. 9; cf. the Atlas Vasserot (12e quartier, îlot n°9, AdP F/31/77/09).
And plan of the Hôtel de la Bazinière: redrawn by the author, after earlier reconstructions by Tooth, Braham and Smith, *Mansart*, pls. 347–8; based on the plan/distribution published in Marot's *Recueil des Plans*, f. 31 [42]: Adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (37e quartier, îlot n°8, AdP F/31/92/06), and contemporary cadastral maps.

33 "Vue et Perspective de la Maison appartemnant a Madame de Bretonvilliers...," Israël Silvetre (1652). Image source: Musée Carnavalet, Histoire de Paris, G.22756. CC0. Plan redrawn by the author, based on the plan/distribution published in Marot's *Recueil des Plans*, fols. 53 [64]: Adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (33e quartier, îlot n°9/10, AdP F/31/90/28), and contemporary cadastral maps.

34 "Prosp: dess Hoffs oder Pallasts de Vrilliere : wie solcher im Garten anzusehen," from Merian and Zeiller's *Topographiae Galliae* (1655). Bibliothèque Municipale de Reims, Rès. G 152; via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan redrawn by the author, after the reconstructions provided by Feldmann, "Das Hôtel de La Vrillière," figs. 1, 3–4; based on a plan by De Cotte (BnF Etampes, RES HA-18 (A, 6)-FT 4). Adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (37e quartier, îlot n°8, AdP F/31/92/06), and contemporary cadastral maps.

35 "Vue de l'Hostel de Mr. le Mareschal Daumont...," Musée Carnavalet, Histoire de Paris, G.435. CC0. Plan redrawn by the author, after the reconstruction/distribution provided by C. Tooth, "Early Private Houses," fig. B; and Braham and Smith, *Mansart*, pl.129; based on the plan/distribution published in Marot's *Recueil des plans*, pl. 83 [94]. Adapted under consideration of contemporary cadastral maps.

36 Plan of the Hôtel d'Aubespine. Redrawn by the author, after the reconstruction in Braham and Smith, *Mansart*, pl. 128, under consideration of contemporary cadastral maps.

37 Plan of the Hôtel de Lambert: Redrawn by the author, after Cojannot, *Louis Le Vau*, fig. 40, based on the plan published in Blondel's *Architecture Françoise* (1752), Vol. II: Livre VI, no. VIII, pl. 1–3: Adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (33e quartier, îlot no.1, AdP F/31/90/21), and contemporary cadastral maps.

38 Plan of the Hôtel d'Hesselin. Redrawn after the reconstruction provided by Feldman, "Das Hôtel de La Vrillière," fig. 10 (positioning of chamber and *cabinet* interchanged); based on the plans/distributions published in Marot's *Architecture française*, n.p. [13r– 15r] Adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (33e quartier, îlot no.8, AdP F/31/90/27), and contemporary cadastral maps.

39 Plan of the Hôtel d'Avaux, redrawn by the author, after the plan/distribution published in Le Muet's *Manière … augmentée*, pl. CC & DD: Adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (25e quartier, îlot no 5, AdP F/31/86/20), and contemporary cadastral maps.

40 Detail from Gomboust map, showing the Area around the Palais Mazarin. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan of the Hôtel de Chevry-Tubeuf, redrawn by the author after earlier reconstructions by Braham and Smith, *Mansart*, pl. 319, under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (7e quartier, îlot no 28, AdP F/31/76/34). Plan of the Petits Hôtel Tubeuf, reconstructed and adapted after ibid., based on the plan/distribution published in Muet's *Manière … augmentée*, pls. B–C.
And the plans of the Hôtel de Coquet, redrawn after the plan/distribution published in Le Muet's *Manière… augmenté* (pl. F); and the Hôtel de Colbert

de Torcy, redrawn after the plan/distribution published in Marot's *Recueil des Plans*, fols. 9–10 [18–19]; both reconstructed under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (12e quartier, ilot no. 9, AdP F/31/77/0). All adapted under consideration of contemporary cadastral maps.

41 Detail of the Turgot map, showing the Hôtel de Chevreuse, later de Luynes. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan redrawn by the author, after the plan in based on the plan/distribution published in Marot's *Architecture française*, n.p. [34r] under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (40e quartier, îlot n° 25, AdP F/31/91/14), and contemporary cadastral maps.

42 Detail of the Gomboust map showing the Hôtel de Tambonneau. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plan redrawn by the author with room distribution, after Cojannot, *Louis Le Vau*, figs. 128/30.

43 "Hôtel de M. Le commandeur du Jars, rue de Richelieu." Engraving by Israël Silvestre, c. 1660s. Image source: BnF, département Estampes et photographie, RESFOL-VE-53 (F), ark: btv1b103030691. CC0. Plan redrawn by the author, after the reconstruction/distribution provided by Braham and Smith, *Mansart*, pl. 328–9; based on the plan/distribution published in Le Muet's's *Manière …augmentée*, f.92 [103]. Positioned by way of the Atlas Vasserot (7e quartier, îlot n° 22–26, AdP F/31/76/30–32), and contemporary cadastral maps. And plan of the Hôtel de Chalon-Luxembourg. Redrawn by the author, based on the Atlas Vasserot (34e quartier, îlot n° 2, AdP F/31/89/19), and contemporary cadastral maps.

44 Plan of the Hôtel de Beauvais. Redrawn by the author, after the plan published in Marot's *Architecture française*, pl. 48; under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (34e quartier, îlot n° 1, AdP F/31/89/18), and contemporary cadastral maps.

45 Plan of the Hôtel de Lionne. Redrawn by the author, after the idealized plan/distribution published in Marot's *Architecture française*, pl. 43–44; based on later plans BnF Gallica, ark: btv1b6937210x and ark: btv1b69372135; a site plan avail. online at http://www.haiedelion-nechoiseul.bio/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/jardin-pontchartrain-gallica.jpg, and under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (7e quartier, îlot n° 21, AdP F/31/76/29), and contemporary cadastral maps.

46 "Veue et perspective du Chasteau de Vaux le Vicomte du costé de l'entrée," anon. engraving [s.d.]. Collections de l'Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Beaux-Arts, NUM EST 4286, B.N. INHA. Open license. Plan of the Château de Reincy, redrawn by the author, after the reconstruction and distribution provided by Feldmann, "Das Hôtel de La Vrillière," figs 11–13; based on the plan published in Marot's *Recueil des Plans*, fols. 14–15 [24–25]. Plan of the Château de St. Sépulchre: redrawn by the author, after the plan published in Marot's *Architecture française* (c. 1670), n.p. [f. 19v–20r]. And plan of the Château de Vaux-le-Vicomte: redrawn by the author, after the plan published in Marot's *Architecture française*, n.p. [f. 38r].

47 Plan of the Château de Versailles: Redrawn and reconstructed by the author, under consideration of the recent reconstructions of the earlier extension stages of the château and its changing internal room distribution by J.-C. le Guillou (first projects), and N. Milovanovic (envelope). Plan of the first extension phase, based on two archival plans: BnF Etampes, FOL-VA-78 (E, 1), ark: btv1b53128434d), and BnF Etampes, FT 4-VA-422, ark: btv1b53128184b); of the second/third extension, based on the engraving of the first-floor by J.-F. Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, IV, pl. 481; BnF Etampes, FT 4-VA-422, ark: btv1b53128453s), and contemporary cadastral maps.

48 Diagram, authors own.

49 Paris around 1600: Adapted by the author, from the vector drawing "Paris en 1600," by Michel Huard (2010), avail. online at http://paris-atlas-historique.fr/resources/paris+1600+a.pdf. CC-BY-NC.

50 Detail from the Gomboust Map (1652). Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

51 "Arbor elementalis" from Llull's *Arbor scientiae* ([Lyons]: Fradin?], [1515]), Wellcome Library, London, B12208838, via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY 4.0. And pages from Agricola's *De Inventione dialectica* (1542), f.10v; via Google Books. And from Ramus, *Institutionum dialecticarum libri tres* (1552), f.343; via Google Books. Both assumed to be in the Public domain

52 Page from Barbaro's *De architectura Libri Decem* (1567), fols. 16–17. Max Planck Institute for the History of Science MPIWG:Q2Z14RK4. CC-BY-SA.

53 Pages from Francis Bacon's *Of the Advancement and Proficiencie of Learning* (1640) Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, Univ. of Toronto, Open Library, OL24431548M, via the Internet Archive. Assumed to be in the public domain.

54 Pages from Descartes's *Meditationes de prima philosophiae* (1690), 536; via google books. And from Descartes's *Objectiones septimae* … (1642), 72; via Google Books. Assumed to be in the public domain.

55 Page from Descartes's, *Principia philosophiae* (1644), 96. Wellcome Library, via Wikimedia Commons. CC BY 4.0

56 Diagram, authors own

57–58 Pages from Perrault's *Les Dix Livres de Virtuve* (1673). Stiftung Bibliothek Werner Oechslin, A05c: app 47; via e-rara. Public domain.

59 Pages from Félibien's *Principes de l'architecture* (1676), 472. Digital Library of the Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg. Public domain.

60 Diagram, authors own

61–62 Pages from the "Explication des termes d'architecture" in D'Aviler's *Cours d'Architecture* (1691), Title and fols. 377–8. ETH-Bibliothek Zurich, RAR 457, via e-rara. Public domain.

63 Plans of the didactic design illustrating D'Aviler's Cours, pl. 61–2. ETH-Bibliothek Zurich, RAR 457; via e-rara. Public domain. Background modified; Diagrams added.

64 Diagram, authors own.

65 Paris around 1700: Adapted by the author, from the vector drawing "Paris en 1700" by Michel Huard (2010), avail. online at http://paris-atlas-historique.fr/resources/paris+1700+a.pdf. CC-BY-NC.

66 Detail of the Roussel Map of Paris (1730). Avail. online at http://perso.numericable.fr/parisbal/plans/. Assumed to be in the public domain.



67–70 Pages from Le Blond's re-edition of D'Avilers *Cours d'architecture* (1738 [1710]). ETH-Bibliothek Zurich, Rar 6836, e-rara. Public domain. Modified, diagrams added.

71 Detail from the Turgot Map, showing the Place Louis Le Grand, with the Hôtels Crozat and d'Evreux. Image source: Wikimedia Commons. Public domain. Plans redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, I: n.p. [151–171]: Adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (3e quartier, îlot n°1, AdP F/31/74/25), and contemporary cadastral maps.

72 Ideal Hôtel by Jules-Harduin Mansart, from Blondel's *Architecture Françoise* (1752), II: pl. 267. Image source: ETH-Bibliothek Zurich, Rar 965:2, via e-rara. Public Domain.

73 Plans of the Hôtel d'Auvergne, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, I: n.p. [285–7]; and the Hôtel de Maison, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in ibid., n.p. [291–3]. Both adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (40e quartier, îlot

n° 23, AdP F/31/91/12), and contemporary cadastral maps. Bottom half: Plans of the Hôtel de Lude [Toulouse], and with the neighboring Hôtel de Roquelaure. Redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, I: n.p. [277/251]. Placed with under consideration of the Jaillot map, the Atlas Vasserot (40e quartier, îlot n° 23, AdP F/31/91/12) [De Lude here already demolished], and contemporary cadastral maps.

75 Plan of the Hôtel d'Argenson, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 52ff.

76 Plan of the Hôtel de Béthune, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, I: n.p. [269]. And plan of the Hôtel de Varengeville, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, I: n.p. [243–5].

77 Plan of the Maison de Monsieur Sonning, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, I: n.p. [113–5], and Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 87ff.

78 Plan of the Hôtel de Rothelin, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, I: n.p. [231], and placed under consideration of contemporary cadestral maps. [Not shown in Atlas Vasserot]

79 Detail of the Turgot Map. Image source: Wikimedia commons. Public domain. Plan of the Hôtel Desmarets, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, I: n.p. [133–35], and Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 95. And plan of the Hôtel de Cour des Chiens, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [129], and Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, III: 93ff. Reconstructed from the Plan Jaillot, the Atlas Vasserot (7e quartier, îlot n° 5, AdP F/31/76/16), and contemporary cadestral maps.

80 Detail of the Turgot Map. Image source: Wikimedia commons. Public domain.

81 Plan of the Hôtel de Pompadour, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, I: n.p. [237].

82 Plan of the Hôtel d'Estrées, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, n.p. [223–25], adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (38e quartier, îlot n° 11, AdP F/31/92/25), and contemporary cadestral maps.

83 Plan of the Hôtel de Torcy, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, II: n.p. [19–23].

84 Plan of the Hôtel d'Humière, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, II: n.p. [328]. And plan of the Hôtel de Maine, Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, II: n.p. [41]. Both adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (3e quartier, îlot n° 16, AdP F/31/91/07), and contemporary cadastral maps.

85 De Cottes plan for the Hotel de Torcy. Image source: BnF département Estampes et photographie, RES HA-18 (3)-FOL; via BnF gallica ark: btv1b69372187/. Public domain.

86 Plan of the hôtel d'Evreux, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, II: n.p. [53].

87 Hôtel de Noirmoutier, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Courtonne's *Traité* (1725), n.p. [first plate following page 111], and placed under consideration of contemporary cadestral maps. [Not shown in Atlas Vasserot].

88 Detail of the Turgot Map. Image source: Wikimedia commons. Public domain. Plan of the Hôtel de Matignon, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Courtonne's *Traité* (1725), n.p. [first plate following page 114]. And plans of the Hôtel d'Étampes and Hôtel de Vendôme, later Mazarin, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Mariette, *Architecture Françoise*, I: n.p. [203], and Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 215ff. The plan of the Hôtel de Vendôme was reconstructed according to the distribution recorded in the

Atlas Vasserot (40e quartier, îlot n°13, F/31/92/27). Adapted under consideration of the Atlas Vasserot (38e quartier, îlot n°13, AdP F/31/92/27), and contemporary cadestral maps.

89 Plan of the Palais Bourbon, redrawn by the author, based on the plan published in Blondel, *Architecture Françoise*, I: 265ff.

90–93 Plates from the *Architecture Moderne* (1728), distributions 24, 26–7, 31, 34–35, 44 and 51



94–97 Plates from Blondel's *De la distribution*, Vol.1 (1737), Title, and pls 2; 32, and 40 BnF département Arsenal, 4-S-4144 (1). Via BnF Gallica. Public domain.



98–104 Plates from Briseux, *L'art de bâtir des maisons de campagne* (1743), Title, pls, 1–3, 6–7, 15–6, 19–20, 51, 53, 60, 62, 67, 69, 85, 87, 89, 91, 137. Source: Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg 80 B 122 RES:1. Public domain.

105 Title page of Blondel's *Architecture Francoise*, Vol. I. Image source: ETH-Bibliothek Zurich, Rar 965:2, via e-rara. Public Domain.

106 Title page of Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* (1758 ed.). Image source: The MET, AE25.E532 1758 Q OA/Public domain.

107–108 Page of Blondel's *Architecture Francoise*, Vol. I. Image source: ETH-Bibliothek Zurich, Rar 965:2, via e-rara. Public Domain.

109 Pages from Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*, 546–7. *Due to lacking access to a physical copy, due to the COVID-19 related-lockdowns, this image has — for the sake of visual consistency — been digitally recomposed with added paper texture* (instances where this was done similarly are hereafter indicated by an *asterisk) from scans (left and right page) available at Wikimedia Commons, and ARTFL Encyclopédie (left and right page). All public domain.

*110 "Plan au rez-de-chaussée d'un grand hôtel" in the Encyclopédie's *Recueil de Planches* (1762), Vol. I; art. "Architecture," part V, pl. XXIII. *Recomposed* from scans available at Wikimedia Commons (Public domain) and a copy available at archive.org. Public domain.

*111 "Project d'un plan ...pour la Maison de Mr le Marquis de Ville franche à Avignon...," from the Recueil de Planches, Vol. I, pl. XXV. Adapted by the author from Wikimedia Commons (left and right), and the copy available at archive.org. Public domain. Diagrams added.

*112 Pages from Charles-Antoine Jombert, ed., *Explication des Termes as a Dictionnaire d'architecture* (1755), 17–18. Adapted from the dig. scans available via Wikimedia Commons (verso and recto). Public domain.

113 Page from Chamber's *Cyclopedia*, Vol.1 (1728), ii. Via Wikimedia Commons. Public domains

114 "Système figurée des connoissances humaine." From Diderot and D'Alembert *Encyclopédie*, Vol.I, [n.p.].

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115 "Système figure de l'architecture." Page from Jombert's *Explication des Termes as a Dictionnaire d'architecture* (1755), xv, pl.1. Adapted from the digitized scan available via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

116 Title page of Blondel's *Abrégé d'architecture concernant la distribution*. Bibliothèque Mazarine, Paris, Ms. 3691. Public domain.

117 "Distribution… d'un maison de plaisance" from Blondel's *Abrégé d'architecture concernant la distribution*. Bibliothèque Mazarine, Paris, Ms. 3691. Public domain.



117–118 "Clavis Systematis Sexvalis," from Carl Linnaeus, *Systema Naturæ* (1740 edn.), f. 27. Image source: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, 4 H. nat 96. NoC-NC 1.0. And from the 10th edn (1758), 837. Via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.

120 Diagram, authors own

121 Diagram, authors own

122 Diagram, authors own

123 Diagram, authors own

124 Detail of "Plan de la ville du château et du parc de Versailles avec les palis et jardins du grand et petit trianon," Charles Picquet (pub. 1821). Image source: BnF département Cartes et plans, GE C-2725, via BnF gallica, ark: btv1b53029909c. Public domain. Plan of the Petit Trianon. redrawn by the author after the plan in Fontain and Percier's *Plans de plusieurs châteaux* (1833), pl. 13. B. N. INHA, NUM FOL GT 33 (2).

125 Pierre Patte's "Partie du Plan général de Paris où l'on a placé les différents emplacements qui ont été choisis pour placer la statue équestre du roi" (s.d.), BnF, GED-5423 (39), BnF Gallica, ark: btv1b84443896. Public domain.

126 Profil d'une Rue, from Pierre Patte, *Mémoires sur les objets les plus importans de l'architecture* (1769), 70, pl. II. Image source: ETH-Bibliothek Zurich, RAR 197 Q; e-rara. Public domain.

127 Frontispiece of Laugier's *Essai sur l'architecture*, 2nd edn. (1755). ETH-Bibliothek Zurich, RAR 1254, e-rara. Public domain.

128 Paris around 1790: Drawing adapted by the author, from the vector drawing "Paris en 1700" by Michel Huard (2011), avail. online at https://paris-atlas-historique.fr/resources/paris+1790+a.pdf. CC-BY-NC.

129 Detail of the Verniquet map (1790). Image source: Plans anciens de Paris; via Wikimedia Commons.

130–133 Selection of plates from Neufforge's *Recueil élémentaire d'architecture* (1757–58). Image source: B.N. INHA, collections Jacques Doucet, FOL EST 303. Open license.

134 Courtyard view of Ledoux's Hôtel d'Uzès. From Ledoux's *L'Architecture considérée…* (1804), II: 225. BnF département des livre rare, RES-V-25, via BnG gallica ark: bpt6k1047050b. Public domain. Plans of the Hôtels d'Hallwyll and d'Uzès, redrawn by the author from Ibid., 227 and 224.

135 "Hôtel Thélusson avec son entrée triomphale," Jean-Baptiste Lallemand (c. 1800). Image source: Wikimedia Commons.

136 "Plan général de la Saline de Chaux." From Ledoux's *L'Architecture considérée…* (1804), I: pl. 12. BnF département des livre rare, RES-V-25, via BnG gallica ark: bpt6k1047050b.

137 "Saline de Chaux premier Projet." From Ledoux's *L'Architecture considérée…* (1804), I: pl. 13. BnF département des livre rare, RES-V-25, via BnG gallica ark: bpt6k1047050b.

138 Exact image source: unknown. Reprinted in Helen Rosenau, “Antoine Petit und Sein Zentralplan für das Hotel-Dieu in Paris: Ein Beitrag Zur Architektur-Typologie,” *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte* 27, no. 3/4 (1964): 228–37, fig. 2.

139 [Theatre of Besançon]. From Ledoux’s *L’Architecture considérée…* (1804), I: pl. 13. BnF département des livre rare, RES-V-25, via BnG gallica ark: bpt6k1047050b.

140 “Vue perspective du pont de la Loüe.” From Ledoux’s *L’Architecture considérée…* (1804), I: pl. 4. BnF département des livre rare, RES-V-25, via BnG gallica ark: bpt6k1047050b.

141 “Maison des Directuers de la Loüe,” From Ledoux’s *L’Architecture considérée…* (1804), I: pl. 6. BnF département des livre rare, RES-V-25, via BnG gallica ark: bpt6k1047050b.

APPENDIX

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Written by a transversal and queer thinker, this ecosystemic and relational study embodies a highly collective spirit that draws from the multiple efforts of diverse authors and studies cited below, without which my synthetic study would have not been possible. Regarding this efforts to draw connections, I should also duly acknowledge the digitization efforts of various online archives, without which most of the mentioned historical (and also theoretical) sources would have been much harder (if not impossible) to acquire or consult; as well as various technologies that make such synthetic work possible in the first place.

For helping me create my own niche in Delft, I am indebted to my promotor, Tom Avermaete. He facilitated this project by opening a research and guest teaching position at the Chair of Methods and Analysis, and his incisive and profound criticism and attention to analytical rigor also greatly helped contain my ambitions throughout the various stages of the project. There are no words to express how grateful I feel toward my co-promotor Andrej Radman for his enthusiastic encouragement throughout the unfoldings and convolutions of this project. Not only were you the central pivot in this transformative project, but you have also always been the crucial node in constructing a mutually amplifying milieu, that nourished and enriched this experience, both intellectually (toward the abstract) as well as personally (i.e. concretely). Your thinking is the virtual voice traversing this work; its diagram, that draws an epiphylogenetic zone of indistinction that cuts us together/apart, both conceptually and pedagogically.

Moreover, it would never have seen the light of day without the support of my academic milieu of friends, colleagues, and teachers at TU Delft, to whom I owe the greatest debt. The first person to thank is my esteemed mentor at the Berlage, Salomon Frausto, for supportively pushing me toward an academic career during and after my studies there. For enabling me to embark on this path at TU Delft, I owe much gratitude to Amber Leeuwenburgh without whose support this study would have not been possible. Thanks to both of you for always having my back! I would also like to extend my gratitude to Klaske Havik, under whose new professorship of the chair of Methods and Analysis (now Methods of Analysis and Imagination) I was lucky to have been offered a permanent teaching position.

My working environment in Delft was vastly intensified by the intellectual setting created by the chair of Architecture Theory, headed by Heidi Sohn. Commuting to the faculty, I always looked forward to the casual encounters at the coffee corner, where Heidi, Andrej, Stavros Kousoulas, Patrick Healy, and I (or others) would gather in all sorts of affective constellations. A special thanks to Patrick for his erudite comments and scholarly references provided on so many occasions. I'm also not sure where I would be without the stimulating discussions during the annual transdisciplinary reading group Ecologies of Architecture, organized by Andrej and Stavros. To Maria Alexandrescu, Lila Athanasiadou, Renske M. van Dam, Setareh Noorani, Katharina D. Martin, Dulmini Perera, Agnieszka A. Wołodzko, I am grateful for many beautiful and insightful afternoons. Outside TU Delft, I have enjoyed much the same stimulus by Rosi Braidotti and Rick Dolphijn, whose Deleuze Seminar was a great lesson in making this period one of the most worthwhile moments of my life.

Writing a doctoral dissertation is still seen as a step that sets one apart during an academic career or intellectual trajectory; a sad time of usually working alone, against all odds. My own experience proves otherwise: despite the seclusion needed to study and write, it was instead a great journey of becoming part of a specific milieu; of establishing close connections to and within a certain discursive, professional, methodological, and theoretical field. In this respect, for making me feel at home, I express my thanks to all the colleagues with whom I had the pleasure of working in different constellations at the chair, the research group Borders & Territories and the editorial board of *Footprint*. Those colleagues previously not mentioned, include Karan August, Nishat Awan, Marieke Berkers, Jana Čulek, Elise van Dooren, Filip Geerts, Esther Gramsbergen, Birgitte Hansen, Carola Hein, Jorge Mejía Hernández, Dirk van den Heuvel, Rachel Lee, Nelson Mota, Armina Pilav, Dorina Pllumbi, Elsbeth Ronner, Negar Sanaan Bensi, Eireen Scheurs, Marc Schoonderbeck, Jules Schoonmann, Angeliki Sioli, Aleksandar Staničić, Léa-Catherine Szacka, Amy Thomas, and Willemijn Wilms Floet. I also want to thank all my students, from whom I'm constantly learning.

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In an extended genealogical sense, I also wish to grant Sokratis Georgiadis due credit for having opened a new world for me during my architecture studies at the State Academy of Art and Design, Stuttgart, in nurturing my engagement with the field of architecture history and theory. I acquired much of my ecosystemic mode of thinking thanks to Andreas Quednau and Sabine Müller, at SMAQ in Berlin. While working there, my colleague and friend Anna Kostreva introduced me to *Publicschool.org*. The political and philosophical discussions and exchanges we participated in there, greatly helped nudge me in the direction of a more academic practice. This was fostered in ongoing discussions with my Berlage friends, especially Golnar Abbasi, Nazmi Anuar, Alejandra Arce, Felipe Guerra Arjona, Jinsun Baik, Anastasiia Gerasimova, Claire Lubell, Shreyank Khemalapure, and Akshara Verma.

The last and greatest thanks goes to my family and friends for their continued love and support. My parents have always fostered my professional ambitions and intellectual ambulation, even if they haven't always been able to follow the logic of my meandering path. I dedicate this work to the memory of my grandmother, Helga.

TIMELINE

I drafted a preliminary form of introduction in February–August 2016, and successively rewrote it in spring and summer 2017 and January 2018. Then I decided to outsource the assemblage-theoretic components into a separate part (which became 'Book O'), and substantially restructure the introduction in October and November 2018, and finalized it along with the prefatory remarks in December 2020. I initially drafted this BOOK O in spring and summer of 2017, rewrote and expanded it in late 2018 to early 2019, and finalized it in the summer of 2020. PART I was researched and drafted in 2016, slightly reworked in summer 2017, and amended in September and October 2018. PART II was researched and drafted from September–December 2017 (2.1–2), with the last chapter expanded until August 2018. The three chapters and the epilogue of PART III were researched, drafted, and rewritten successively throughout 2019 and 2020. This includes the epilogue, which was slightly amended in spring 2021 upon the feedback on my draft. As mentioned in the image credits of his part, some studies and sources were not readily available due to the closure of libraries throughout much of 2020–'21, and will be updated, whenever they are accessible again. I have unfortunaltely not been able to do so, before the printing of this version in late September 2021.

Earlier versions, or adaptations of parts of some chapters have appeared in print before. An early essay based on a preliminary draft of the introduction has been published as "The Immunization of Paris: Closing the Triptych of Modern Clichés for a Twofold Matter of Form-taking" (2015). Parts of its later version appeared as "A Relational Conception of Living Together/Apart" (2018). Segments of my preliminary discussion (and introduction) have been published as an essay titled "Reclaiming What Architecture Does: Toward an Ethology and Transformative Ethics of Material Arrangements" (2018). The research for this part as also inspired the article "A Cartography of Discourses on Architectures of Life and/or Death" (2021).

CHRONOLOGY

1270s– Majorcan Palaces

1300s Early *Palazzi communale* are built in the Italian City states

1300s Extension of the *Palatium Novum*, Vatican
Rebuilding of the Palais de la cité

1337 Outbreak of the Hundred Years' War

1337 –40s Remodeling of the Papal Palace, Avignon, into a serial space, under inclusion of a *camera paramenti*, probably taken over from the *chambre à parer* used in the Burgundian court ceremonial.

1364 Remodeling of the Louvre under Charles V, under inclusion of a *chambre à parer* and *chambre de retrait* behind.

1485 Alberti's *De re ædificatoria* employs the notion *partitio* as "quae totius aedificationis aream in minoris areas partitur"

1420 Return of the Holy Seat to Rome

1420s –90s Relocation/Nomadization of the French court after the British invasion of France

c. 1450s Palazzo Medici, Florence; Palazzo Dudale, Urbino; and Sforza Castle, Milan, built or extended

1460 Beginning of the Spörer Minimum. Period intense cooling during the Little Ice Age

1460s Filarete's *Trattato* uses "(di)s/compartimento"

1464 Palazzo Barbo (later Venetia) extended

1475 –95 Martini's *Trattati* discriminates between "compartitione" as the basic design procedure of subdivision and the resulting "partimenti"

1480s Extension of the Vatican palace under Nicholas V

1480s Sangallo design principle *ad quadratum* is used for design of the Poggio a Caiano and Poggio Reale

1483–98 Amboise becomes the principal royal residence of the French kings

c. 1485s Opening up of the *castello*

1490s Symmetrical room arrangement [or 'two apartments' as historians now call them] built in Amboise and Blois to stress the position of Anne de Bretagne (queen from 1491–98 and 1998–1514)

1494 Begin of the Italian campaigns of the French kings

1494– 1530s Smaller *châteux* inspired by Italian *castelli*

1500s –20s Involution of the Italian stair into the French *logis*

1500s –40s Increasing differentiation of the French *donjon*-type into *plans massés*

1500 –50s Private *châteaux* begin to feature a (suite of rooms around the) *chambre du roi*, as a more symbolic space for potentially accommodating the king on his nomadic journeys, which in practice was tied to the owner's competing for the king's favors.

1514 De Lebrixa's *Dictionarium latinohispanicum* lists the lemma "apartamiento" in its various senses of acts of distancing and resulting states of spatial distinction.

1515–47 Reign of French King François I, under whose patronage a cross-cultural exchange fosters the French Renaissance of architecture

1519–50 Châteux de Chambord built

1520s Perruzzi imparts his analytical use of drawing plans onto Serlio

1521 Cesariano's published his generative interpretation of Vitruvius

1525 Dürer's *Underweysung der Messung* proposes a new projective mapping technique

1526 Earliest attested occurrence of the Spanish term *apartamiento* in its naval sense that persists well into the nineteenth century

1530s –50s Abandonment of the stacked lodging first in England, Spain and France

1540/50 Nardi's *Le deche delle historie romane*, and Ciéza's *Crónica del Péru* attests that the Italian/Spanish term *apartamenti* was used

in an abstract geographic sense.

1540 **Serlio's *Terzo Libro* employs the term "[quattro] appartamenti" for the first time architectural discourse**, but without specifying it as a space for inhabitation or as a specific room sequence. Instead, based on a specific genealogy from architectural compartitioning methods, it was a measure for spatial relations.

1541–53 Serlio's sixth and seventh books employ the singular "un appartamento" in the sense of a 'quarter/quadrant.' Serlio's sixth book on the housing of all sorts of people also inaugurates a newly serial format of architectural treatises, in which the *Bildungs*-function of compartioning and designedly techniques of progressive differentiation is transposed into a particular architectural pedagogy.

1542–46 **The design of the Grand Ferrare and Ancy-le-Franc by Serlio, which will gain a decisive influence on French planning.**

1540s In French royal palaces an emerging *salette* is re-conceptualized as an *antichambre*, through the imported conception of an *anticamera*.

Increasing regularization of the Parisian town house in the wake of the regularization of lots and the influence of Serlio's designs

1546–51 Lescot's extension of the Louvre under influence of Serlio's built work.

1548 Carlos I, King of Spain and Holy Roman Emperor (as Charles V), stipulates the use of Burgundian ceremonial at the Spanish court at Valladolid.

1550 Bartoli translation of *De re ædificatoria* introduces the term "appartamenti" retroactively into Alberti's work.

'Overturn' of the organization of the Royal château of Fontainebleau

1557–78 **Extension of the Palazzo Pitti, Florence, with multiple antichambres.**

1559/60 Death of King Henri II of France. Beginning regency of Catherine de' Medici

1560s Occurrence of more bisected town houses (the Hôtel d'Angoulême and de la Reine), and palaces (Tuilleries)

1574 Beginning reign of Henri III, installment of the *département des heures.*

1578 **In the *Règlement général* of 1578 the *antichambre* becomes the filter for accessing the king's chamber.**

1580s –1610s **More bisected town houses and resulting problematization of stair placement vis-à-vis the traditional linear organization with corner stairs.**

1585 **In the *Règlement général* the term "appartements" appears for the first time in French royal documents. It now required three pieces between the *salle du roi* and *chambre du roi*.**

1585 Borghini's *Discorsi* attests the popularization of the notion *appartementi*, when it describes "[un] copia di stanze, o come oggi li chiamano, appartamenti."

1589 Succession of Henri IV of France; beginning reign of the House of Bourbon

1590s **The Parisian residence of Zametti (re-) introduced the nomadic dispositif of the *appartement du roi* into the planning of hôtels.**

1606–11 Extension of the Palazzo Barberini alle quattro fontane, Rome, with its multiple antichambres.

1612 Hôtel de Bouillon (later Liancourt) extended by Brosse.

1615–31 **Palais de Luxembourg, Paris, within its multiply differentiated and symmetricized room clusters.**

1623 Le Muet's *Manière de bastir* initiates a discourse on "the art of distribution," and codifies, in its serial presentation of didactic plans, the layout of the town house implicitly in terms of its critical scale-dependency. It also first defines an *appartement* as consisting of a *salle*, *chambre*, *garde-robe*, and *cabinet*, which wree already found in earlier designs hence retroactively labels as such.

1624 Savot's *L'Architecture françoise des bastiments particuliers* presents a critique of customary residential planning practices

1620s –60s **First synthesis of the bisected and linear model into a spatial system differentiated in grandeur: a *grand appartement* for official receptions and smaller suites for daily inhabitation** in the single range structures of the Hôtels de Sully, Bretonvilliers, Vrilliere, or Luynes. Repetition of this synthesis in the French châteaus from the Palais de Luxembourg to Vaux-le-Vicomte, with their *corps semi-doublé*. The latter partly inspires a **second synthesis of this differentiated spatial system as integrated in the matrix of the doubled-up *corps de logis*** of the Hôtels de Rambouillet, Hesselin, Tambonneau, Jars, Beauvais, Lionne.

1620s–40s **Spatial hybridizations and resulting reconfigurings supporting this scalar differentiation.** Formation of a *chambre en alcove*, generated by opening the *garde-robe* adjacent to the *chambre*. Around 1630–40, emerging provision of an *antichambre* serving as *salle à manger*, born from a hybridization of the *salle* and *antichambre*. At the same time, or later (under influence of the double-height *sala* of Palladian Vilas) emerging distinction of a central *salon* born out of a merger of the *salle* and the *chambre*; and adaptation of the *chambre* into a *chambre à l'italienne*.

1620 –40s Cartesian rationalist reconfiguration of the knowledge of Western culture. Fundamental transformation of the episteme of resemblance *pro gradu perfectionis* onto an episteme of discerning identities *pro gradu distinctionis*.

1624 –1683 Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, and then Colbert act as First Minister of State in France.

1630–40 Europe is in an greater economic, social, political, religious, scientific, artistic crisis, and multiple revolutions during a peak of global cooling, linked to the Maunder minimum in 1620–80s.

1645/50 (Le Muet's and) Fréart de Chambray's Palladio translations multiply the term *appartemen[t]s* ("que nous pouvons appeller des anti-chambres, des chambres, [et] des garde-robes") to counter-distinguish the Italian *allogiamenti/luoghi* from the French *logis*, and also indirectly introduces the term into Vitruvius work.

1648 End of the Thirty Years' War (beg. 1618), after which France held a more dominant position in the new political order of Europe. Beginning of the Fronde (until 1653).

1654 Beginning of the absolutist reign of Louis XIV, eliminating all remnants of feudalistic structures into more capitalist economic relations. Stronger restratification of the Court-aristocratic social system of mutual self-distinction, by internalizing external pressures into specific affect dispositioning regimes.

1660–68 **First extension and *enveloppe* of the Châteaux de Versailles**, which becomes not just a space of conduct (affective control), but also a physiological mechanism for conducting (and controlling) the flows of visitors through a framework for making the king appear *ex machina*. As such it constituted not only an exclusionary machine but a specific apparatus of capture binding the king and the court in particular interdependencies.

1660s Beginning technological transformation of ordering from outlining trees (series) to establishing nets (series of series)

1671 Institutionalization of architecture in France (Académie Royale d'architecture), establishing itself as a positivist science. Related transformation of architectural pedagogy.

1673 Perrault's translation retroactively introduces the notion of apartments into the work of Vitruvius.

–83 Perrault proposes an innovating understanding or theory of *ordonnance,* as a 'finding order,' as a means of establishing functionings, which entails a technological reconceptualization of the Vitruvian species of spaces in the Greek house (*androne*s, *gyneconitis, hospitalia*) and how spatial differences are connected to social orderings.

1676 Félibien's dictionary defines apartments as "logement ou demeure particuliere dans un maison" under reference of Vitruvius.

1691 Beginning systematization of the planning of appartements in D'Aviler's *Cours*, which defines for the first time apartments as "une suite de pieces necessaires pour rendre une habitation complet, qui doit être composée au moins d'une Anti-chambre, d'une Chambre, d'un Cabinet [et] d'une Garde-robe. Il y en a de grands [et] de petits. Ce mot vient du Latin *Partimentum*, fait du Verbe *Partiri*, diviser, ou bien *a parte mansioni*s, parce qu'il fait partie de la demeure." It subsequently distinguishes the larger *appartement de parade* from the smaller *appartement de commodité*, and exemplifies their planning and scalar differentiation in an didactic project

1700s –20s **Period of intense designerly experimentation concerning hôtel design, particularly in the Parisian faubourgs, where the *corps de logis* was incrementally freed, and the *bel étage* lowered to an elevated ground floor, leading to a further spatial synthesis in the inclusion of bypassing *dégagements*.**

1710 Le Blond's amended second edition of D'Aviler's *Cours* includes more examples of the novel manner of distributing plans, fostering a specific discourse on the (changing) art of distribution.

1714 Cordemoy problematizes the convenient [*commode*] and conventional [*convenable*] planning of appartements.

1728 The *Architecture Moderne* reclaims a more complex serial dispositif the pedagogical function to compartitioning techniques, which had been discarded with the advent of post-Cartesian architectural pedagogies.

1735–49 Emerging taxonomic approaches (and their critique) in the natural sciences.

1737 Blondel's *De la distribution des maisons de plaisance*, isolates a particular genre of building and codifies its distribution

1740s Further differentiation of the *salle/sallon*. *Salles* (and *cabinets*) *d'assemblée* and *salles de compagnie* are placed next to the *salon*.

1751 **In Blondel's many entries for Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie*, the article on apartments would define—in taking up D'Aviler's operative etymology—apartment by first generally distinguishing two sorts of appartements: the *appartement de parade* and *de commodité*; and subsequently distinguishing the former into two species: the *appartement de parade* proper and an *appartement de société*.** As such he inscribe a two-fold species/genera distinction.

1752 **Blondel draws a genealogy of French planning in the introductory discussion to the *Architecture Françoise*, highlighting the incremental refinement and differentiation of planning requirements. He now distinguished three sorts of apartments** mentioned before, more plainly, as he also did in his *Abrége*, wherein those are presented as three species.

1753/55 Laugier's presents his cosmotechnical account of architecture.

1754–63 Seven Years War

1755 Rousseau publishers his proto-genealogy of social differences

1755 **Jombert's *Dictionnaire d'architecture* reduces the system of apartments to three kinds of spaces.**

1757 Neufforge's *Recueil élémentaire* helps transpose meshworks of series into more grid-like systems of planning, in tune with from grid-based ordering systems becoming prevalent after 1750.

1760s–80s In the new phase of urban extension, in Paris, the practice of the *dégagement* and the *lotissement* combine into new forms of urban planning. Therein the art of distribution is transposed onto an urban scale.

NOTES AND ABBREVIATIONS

NOTE ON OLDER QUOTED MATERIAL

In all citations from pre-modern sources, the original spelling (including diacritics) has been retained, to the exception of modernizing — for the sake of legibility — the archaic use of the letters *u* and *v*, as well as the long s (ſ), in addition to carefully restoring omitted letters from common scribal abbreviations (notably the use of straight macrons "…ē" to "…e[m]"), and ampersands ("&" to "[et]").

NOTE ON MEASURES

The *toise*, divided into six *pieds* ("feet"), is a pre-revolutionary French unit of length that equals a little more than six modern feet (6 feet 4¾ inches), or 1,949 meters.

ABBREVIATIONS FOR BUILDINGS/YEAR

b.	built in/between
beg.	begun in
c.	circa ('built around')
ext.	extended in
reb.	rebuilt/transformed in
=	equivalent to

ABBREVIATIONS FOR SOURCES

A.N.	Archives Nationale
A.N., Min. cen.	Archive Nationale, Minutier Centrale
A.P.	Archive de Paris
BNCF	Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze
BnE	Bibliotheca nacional de España
BnF	Bibliothèque Nationale de France
BnF Et.	BnF Etampes
B.N. INHA	Bibliothèque numérique de l'Institut National d'Histoire de l'Art
CESR	Centre d'études supérieur de la Renaissance
CNRS	Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Cod.	Codex
col.	collection
CRAHAM	Centre de recherches archéologique et historiques anciennes et médiévales
dép.	département
DCE	Corominas and Pascual, eds., *Diccionario crítico etimológico castellano e hispánoco*
DMF	Martin, ed., *Dictionnaire du Moyen Français (1330–1500)*
ed(s).	editor(s)/edited by
edn(s).	edition(s)
EUP	Edinburgh University Press
f./fols.	folio(s), under indication of *recto* and *verso* sides, in older books without running page numbers.
fig(s).	figure(s)
FEW	Wartburg, ed., *Französisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*
INHA	Institut National d'Histoire de l'Art
GDSU	Gabinetto dei Disegni e delle Stampedelle Gallerie degli Uffizi, Florence
JAE	Journal of Architectural Education
JSAH	*Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*
KHI	Kunsthistorisches Institut, Florence
MKHIF	*Mitteilungen des Kunsthistorischen Institutes in Florenz*
Ms.	Manuscript
n.p. (online)	Digital sources without page numbers. Where possible, paragraph numbers are given.
OnED	Online Etymological Dictionary
pl.	unpaginated plate (*planche*)
PIE	proto-Indo-European
PU(F)	Presses universitaire (de France)
SEP	Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
s.l./s.n./s.d.	*sine loco, sine nomine, sine dato* for publications of unknown place of publication, publishers name, or date.
Univ.	University
UP/PU	University Press/Presses universitaires

KEY TO ROOM FUNCTIONS IN THE PLANS AND DIAGRAMS (reprinted in the back flap for easier consultation while reading)

A–C	*Anti-cabinet*
AR–C	*arrière-cabinet*
AC	*anticamera/-chambre* (antechamber)
ADC	*appartement de commodité*
ADP	*appartement de parade*
ADS	*appartement de société*
APT	appartement
AU	*aula* (hall)
AR	audience room
B	*bains* (baths)
BD	*boudoir*
BF	*buffet*
BI	*bibliothèque* (library)
C	*cabinet/gabinetto*
CA	*camera* (generic room)
CDR	*chambre du Roi/de la Reine* (king's/queen's room)
CH	*chambre/chambre à coucher* (room or bedroom)
CR	*camera Regis*
CHI	*chambre à l'italienne* (room with double height)
CHP	*chambre de parade* (state bedroom)
CT	*cabinet de toilette*
CU	*cubiculum* (bedroom)
G	*galeria* (gallery)
G–	*grand(e)* … [e.g. *Grand-salle*]
GM	*garde-meuble/-manger* (storage)
GR	*garde-robe/guardaroba*
LO	open loggia
L	*lieu* (loo)
O	Oratory
P–	*Petit(e)* … [e.g. *Petit cabinet*]
PAR	*Camera Paramenti/Chambre de Parement* (parament chamber), or *Chambre à parer.*
PAP	*Camera Pappagalli* in the papal palaces
R	*Retrait/Retrete* (withdrawing room)
RC	*Retrocamera* (room behind chamber)
REE	*Re(e)cambra* in Majorcan palaces
RET	*Chambre de retrait* (withdrawing room)
S	*Saletta/Salette* (smaller hall)
SA	*Salle*, or *Sala/Salone* (larger/largest hall)
SDA	*Salle d'assemblée* (for formal gatherings)
SDC	*Salle de compagnie* (for informal gath.)
SL	*Sallon* (salon, reception room
SM	*Salle à manger* (separate dining room)
ST	*Studiolo/Scrittoio* (study)
TIN	*Tinellum* (dining hall)
V	*Vis/"Grand Vis*," or *Vestibule*
†	*Chapel*

KEY TO THE TYPOGRAPHIC NAVIGATIONAL TOOLS

For simplicity's sake, references to all visual information (i.e. all illustrations, including all plans gathered on separate plates, tables, or maps, including those in each section's appendices) are consecutively numbered per part.

Full-page image or plates

Reference to double-page spread

Image within text column

Buildings discussed are always marked, and differentiated from those mentioned elsewhere.

Relevant **THEORETICAL CONCEPTS** are marked on their repeated occurrence and **STRESSED** wherever defined. Conceptual cross-relations are, where helpful, indicated by equation (**= OPERATIONAL SIMILARITY**). They can be found back in the appended glossary, on page xxxii.

All foreign architectural terms like *chambre* are italicized. Definitions can be found in the appended lexicon, on page xlii.

The gray cross-references in square brackets refer to related discussions in other book sections; **[→3.2.1]** would naturally refer to part 3, chapter 2, section 1).

GLOSSARY FOR A FLAT THEORY

Composed by help of the glossaries provided in the two *Deleuze (and Guattari) Dictionary*, edited by Parr, and Young; Barthélémy's article "Fifty Key Terms," in *Gilbert Simondon*, edited by De Boever et al., 203–31; Guattari and Rolnik's *Molecular Revolution*, 463–72; and Sherman's *Neither Ghost nor Machine*, 271–78. All nouns stand in for related adjectival terms. Under indication of the chapters in which the notion is **defined**, discussed, or employed.

ABSTRACT MACHINES/CONCRETE ASSEMBLAGES In contrast to 'concrete assemblages' of bodies and material apparatus, the notion of 'abstract machines' Deleuze and Guattari use in contradistinction, describes in a more ontological sense the rather abstract functionings and diagrammatic effects of those wider social, technical, economic system, in which humans are caught up.

ACTUAL/VIRTUAL Bergsonian distinction by which Deleuze counters the reductive prevalence of simple possible/real distinctions, onto which it resists to be mapped. Not reducible to the possible, the virtual (like 'virtual forces') *has full reality*; meaning its latent potentiality produces real effects in the world, even if not as an actual thing. In contrast to possibilities coming to be 'realized,' the virtual is always **ACTUALIZED**. Against the privileging of actuality in Western thought and its subsumption of **DIFFERENCE** to differences between actual things, Deleuze's difference-theoretcal approach **PROBLEMATIZED** the **ACTUALIZATION** for the virtual as entailing a twofold **DIFFERENT/CIATION**.

ACTUALIZATION Process by which virtual (i.e. **PROBLEMATIC)** fields are resolved in the formation of actual objects. See **DIFFERENT/CIATION**

ALLAGMATICS **0.3.3** 3.3.2 Simondon's term for a 'theory of *genetic* operations' (as opposed to generic structures, or classifications) that make structures appear and modify them.

APPARATUS **MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE** device or setups making appear physical and social phenomena, not just in terms of a simple form of rendering visible (mise-en-scène) but also rendering existent (mise-en-existance)

APPARATUS OF CAPTURE 2.3.2 Apparatus that generate a **DOUBLE-BIND**

ASIGNIFYING SEMIOTICS Territorialization processes (like *spatializations*, or *spatial differences* as such) that bear in themselves no direct meaning in the classic sense of 'signification'; they are non-discursive processes, articulated in chains of material forces. Yet they do have a semiotic function, and are part of sign systems, as they can attain a semio*logical* signification through their **CODING** (the *social function* of spatializations, or spatial differences), within particular assemblages.

ASSEMBLAGE **0.2.2** Deleuze and Guattari's geophilosophical concept, elaborated through Hjemslev's and Foucault's work, to describe the dynamic historical formation of certain meta-stable environmental/social/technical systems, and their maintenance and evolution through the interaction of heterogeneous components, **STRATIFIED** into material or 'territorialized' **CONTENT** and discursive or coded **EXPRESSIONS**. The former being **VIRTUAL** elements, the latter being **ACTUAL** ones, each have both a (possible) **FORM** and (real) **SUBSTANCES**. An assemblage is respectively formed by the **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION** of these four **DOUBLY-ARTICULATED** domains of virtually-real **FORMS OF CONTENT** (FC), **SUBSTANCES OF CONTENT** (SC), **FORMS OF EXPRESSION** (FE), and **SUBSTANCE OF EXPRESSION** (SC). The **MATRIX OF STRATIFICATION** juxtaposing these components reciprocally-determined along two axes, was intended to break the simplistic *form-content* approach promoted by logocentric structuralist modes of thinking. Guattari will further develop this approach into the **FOUR ONTOLOGICAL FUNCTORS** of the **FTPU**-model.

ASSEMBLAGE, FOUR DIFFERENT POLITICS OF **0.3.2** 2.1–2.3 **STRATOANALYTIC** meta-concept coined by Nail to classify the various functionings of different assemblages into **TERRITORIAL**, **STATIST**, **CAPITALIST**, and **NOMADIC** ones.

AXIOM/AXIOMATIC **2.1.2** 3.2.2 In philosophy and mathematics, an axiom is a "statement of self-evident truth." The term comes from Greek ἀξίωμα (axíōma, "authority"; literally "that which is thought worthy or fit," from ἄξιος (áxios, "fit, worthy," literally "weighing as much as; of like value"), from ἀγ- ("to drive, draw out or forth, move")

AXIOMATIZATION **0.3.2** 1.2.3 2.1.2–3 2.3.2 3.2.1 3.3.3 Respectively the installment of self-evident statements. Process characteristic of **CAPITALIST ASSEMBLAGES**, which operate through the **AXIOMATIZATION OF (DECODED) FLOWS**, and here esp. through axiomatization of space through decoding difference through privatization.

BECOMING 0.1.2 Nietzschean non-essentialist concept of being as always evolving.

BINDING, see **BOUNDARY** and **DOUBLE BIND.**

BOUNDARY i.ii–iii **0.2–3** In contrast to borders separating preexisting entities, a **BINDING** interface that produces entities that are differentially enacted and actualized through co-constitutive **MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE** practices **CUTTING TOGETHER/APART.**

BOUNDARY-DRAWING PROCESSES **0.3.1** 0.3.2–3 Techno-scientific concept elaborated by Donna Haraway and Karen Barad, to **DIFFRACTIVELY** describe how physical/material as well as epistemic/discursive phenomena or structures of reality come to be generated by **APPARATUS** that **CUT TOGETHER/APART** matter and meaning.

CARTOGRAPHY iii **0.3.1** A sort of historical mapping that, in combining genealogy with the politics of location, presents an embodied, embedded, relational, and affective account

CODING 0.2.3 2.3 3.2–3 Within the theory of the **DOUBLE ARTICULATION**, 'coding' concerns the **ACTUAL** side of *discursive* and *signifying*, 'expressive' components within an **ASSEMBLAGE**. This concerns the way that asignifying virtual components like spatializations, compositions, or (social) relations, are actually *decoded* and *encoded* within particular (social) formations and thus given contingent semiological significations.

CONCRETIZATION **0.3.2–3**, 1.3.1, 3.1–3, X Simondonian concept concerning the individuation process of form-taking **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLES** as they evolve move from more abstract social to more concrete technical systems. This coincides with the individua*liza*tion of specific 'technical objects' within particular **MILIEUS**.

CONDIVIDUATION **iii** 1.2/229f X Raunig's terms for an **INDIVIDUATION** that operates **SYMPOIETICALLY** through differentiation-integration, a 'becoming-with' dividuating processes.

CONNECTIVE SYNTHESIS **0.2.1** 2.1 3.1, see **THREE SYNTHESES**

CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS **0.2.1** 2.3 3.3, see **THREE SYNTHESES**

CONSISTENCY, PLANE OF 0.2.2–3 **0.3.1–2** 1.2 3.1–3 Any **ASSEMBLAGE**, or **DOUBLE ARTICULATION**, is held together by a two-fold consistency. Therein an **ENDO-** and **EXO-CONSISTENTIAL** dimension spans up immanent **PLANE OF CONSISTENCY** (hence also 'plane of immanence') that connects processes of transformation across the four domains of **FLOWS**, **TERRITORIES**, **PHLYA**, and **UNIVERSES**.

CONSISTENCY, ENDO-/EXO- 3.3.2–3.3.3 While exo-consistency concerns the external pressures holding together an assemblage, endo-consistency concerns those internally-binding concatenations and relationships.

CONSTRAINT **0.1.1/0.3.2** 3.3.1–3 X A delimiting factor, that reduces the degrees of freedom within a system, that by fostering more-likely dynamics that make other dynamics less likely, lead to a more path-dependent behaviors within a system.

CONTENT (FORM/SUBSTANCE OF) **0.2** *Virtual* and *material/territorial* aspects of an **ASSEMBLAGE**'s **DOUBLE ARTICULATION**

CONTRAGRADE **0.3.2** 2.3.3 3.3.3 X Denomination for flows, dynamisms, or tendencies with countering or opposite directions. Operational basic for **COUPLINGS**. Thus related to the notion of **CONTROL**.

CONTROL **0.2–3** 1.3 2.3 3.3 Function derived from establishing feedback cycles and processes checking back.

COUPLING, SYNERGISTIC **0.3.2**, 3.3.1–3, X (**MORPHO-** or **TELEOGENIC**) coupling between two **ORTHOGRADE** dynamisms on the same (or different) level(s) of complexity, leading to a **CONTRAGRADE SYSTEM** that, through negentropic work, reduces the **STATE OF POSSIBILITIES** for other paths to form, thus stabilizing these dynamics.

CRYSTALLIZIATION **0.3.3** 0.1.1–3 Simondon's genetic conceptualization of the individuation process in which crystals slowly take from within material milieus, and accrue in path-dependent ways due to its built-up and fore-structuring. Different from the individua*liza*tion and **RETICULATION** that characterizes the formation of **TECHNICAL INDIVIDUALS** and **ENSEMBLES** through processes of **CONCRETIZATION**.

CUTTING TOGETHER/APART iii 0.3.1 Barad's notion for the fact that **DIFFERENTIATION** always entail entanglements that entail differentiations.

CYBERNETIC 1.1–2 3.3.2–3 X Used here in the sense of self-governing systems capable of learning.

DESIRING-MACHINE 3.2.2–3 In contrast to the **REPRESENTATIONALISTIC** notion of the unconscious as a 'theatre' within psychoanalysis, Guattari promoted the more radical idea that the unconscious is 'factory' that **MACHINICALLY** produces *subjectivity* and desires, wherein the product does not resemble its process of production.

DIAGRAM **0.2.3–0.3.2** 1.2.2 Diagrams are configurations of forces, marked out through lines, that structure spaces of possibility associated with a given assemblage.

DIAPOIESES The term was used by Harry Kunnemann in the context of civic meaningfulness, to coin a notion for "other-directed forms of interaction, in which the neologism 'diapoiesis' is a compound between 'poiesis' and 'dialogue.' I borrow the term from Kunnemann, yet apply it in a very different sense of 'dia-' as "through/throughout," to distinguish it from the notion of sympoieses, analogous to the distinction between syn- and diachronic geneses. Here while diapoesis involves historical differentiation, sympoiesis draws new lines of differenciation. dia-/sympoieses = dia-/synchronic = different/ciation.

DIFFERENCE i–iii **0.1** Properly understood pure difference only relates difference to difference. As such it is **DIFFERENTIAL**, and only immanent to itself. Outlined in Deleuze's difference-theoretical philosophy, this notion of counters the homologation of difference to identity, and the resulting idea of extrinsic difference between things, to intrinsic difference by way of **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION**. It thus counters the notion of 'difference from,' that as Braidotti powerfully contends, always implies a 'being less then,' and thus a hierarchical ontology.

DIFFERENCE, INTENSIVE **0.1.3**
Non-extrinsic, non-metric property.

DIFFERENTIAL **0.1.3** 1.2.3
Relating difference to difference.

DIFFERENTIATION, PROGRESSIVE
DeLanda's notion for processes that are iteratively unfolding through the ongoing production of differences. Hence related to **HETEROGENESIS.**

DIFFERENT/CIATION **0.1.3** Deleuze's orthographic distinction between two interrelated processes in which problems become fully determined through **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION** (as differentiations) and processes by which particular solutions are constituted (as differenciations with a 'c'); meaning that process through which **VIRTUAL** matters become **ACTUAL** objects.

DIFFRACTION **0.3.1** Diffraction is a feminist methodology aiming to cope with the epistemological problems of representation. Coined by feminist philosopher Donna Haraway as an alternative to reflection, it views difference in terms of patterns interactions, interferences, and difference.

DISCURSIVE/NON-DISCURIVE, see **TERRITORIALIZATION/CODING**

DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS **0.2.1** 2.2 3.2, see **THREE SYNTHESES**

DISPOSITIF **0.2.2** Foucauldian term for the heterogeneous ensemble of discursive, legal, statement, economic or physical, material formations conditioning a given power formation.

DISPOSITIFS, FOUR DISCIPLINARY **0.2.1** 2.2
In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault identified four distinguishing dispositifs marking disciplinary power: First, the "art of distributions," that is, a distribution of individuals in space; second, the "control of activity," which concerns the regulation of life through time tables; third, the "**ORGANIZATION OF GENESES**" that allows a seriation of successive activities, which in return allows greater control; and, fourth, the tactical and calculated "composition of forces" in which power is increased.

DISTINCTION, MODAL/REAL/RATIONAL
In a monist stance, a *modal* distinction derives from comparing a mode and the single substance of which it is a mode, and/or between two different modes of that same substance, leading to *distinction by degree* or *variations in intensity* of attributes in actual individuals. A *real* distinction is, by contrast, derived from comparing two substances, leading to a *distinction in kind.* Finally, a *rational* distinction is derived between a substance and its attributes as conceived, leading in a sense to a *distinction in logic.*

DOUBLE ARTICULATION **0.2.3** 2.3 3.2–3
Deleuzo-Guattarian theory of the self-organization of matter. See **ASSEMBLAGE**.

DOUBLE BIND 0.3.3 2.3.3 3.3.3 Communications-theoretic term used by Bateson to describe 'failed' resolution of a **PROBLEMATIC** situation between two entities, resulting in a latent form of control, that both are **RECIPROCALLY** trapped in.

ECOLOGY In the simplest sense a living, i.e. dynamic **SYSTEM** of mutually interdependent, co-evolving and **SYMPOIETIC** entities.

ECOLOGY, GENERAL 0.3.2–3, 3.3.3, X Hörl's terms, that akin to Simondon's term '**TECHNOLOGY**' denominates a system of knowledge or awareness of technics, an 'eco*logy*' concerns a generalized knowledge of the workings of material environments be they **TECHNICIZED** or not. See also **THREE ECOLOGIES**

E(THI)CO-AESTHETICS 1.2.3 Adaptation of Guattari's "Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm" that stresses the connection between **ETHOLOGY** and **ECOLOGY**.

ENABLING CONSTRAINT **0.2.3** **MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE** notion undermining simple structure/agency divides. As an assemblage- or systems-theoretic concept (via DeLanda, Deacon), also a notion undermining any simple reductivist notion of extrinsic scalar differences as those emerge between intrinsically-different levels of complexity.

EPIGENESIS 0.3.3 Process by which biological entities develop through cellular growth and differentiation into an increasingly organized form.

EPIPHYLOGENESIS iii **0.3.3** 3.3.1–3 X Term coined by Stiegler to describe the co-evolution of humans (or human brains) alongside anthropotechnics (or anthropogenic tools). Extending the notion of **SYMBIOGENESIS** onto a **TECHNOLOGICAL** level, it describes appearance of a new relation between organisms and their environment.

EPIPHYLOGENETIC MAPPING iii, **0.3.3**, 3.3.3, X An **ASSEMBLAGE-THEORETIC, CARTOGRAPHIC** method, extending **GENEALOGICAL** approaches, for mapping the three-stranded co-evolution of social, cognitive, and technical organizations.

ETHOLOGY **0.1.3** Originally the study of animal behavior or habits and environments or habitats, Deleuze uses this notion in reference to Spinoza's Ethics for the wider study of individuation of bodies and milieus in terms of their constitutive **DIFFERENTIAL RELATIONS** of speeds and slownesses, or capacities to affect and be affected.

EQUIPMENT OF POWER, COLLECTIVE ii 0.2.1 Concept used by the CERFI researchers for an infrastructural approach within their genealogy of public facilities (1973).

EX-ORGANIZATION (SHORT FOR EXOSOMATIC ORGANIZATION) **0.3.3** 3.2.2 3.3.1 3.3.2–3, X Stieglerian systems-theoretical concept that extends the idea how certain systems, systemically-organized behaviors not only shape the very organization of material environments, meaning that historical processes come to be externalized (or **EXOSOMATIZED** in the case of memory) into certain spatial patters, structurations, or differentiations, by stressing how these externalized structurations then continue to forestructure, predispose, or organize behaviors 'from an outside' in return. The term **EX-ORGANOGENESIS** refers here more specifically to the offloading of function of biological or social organizations onto environmental/physical formations, that characterizes all **TECHNICS**.

(EX)ORGANIZATION OF (HETERO)GENESES 0.3, 3.3–X My own synthetic extension of Foucault's notion of an 'organization of geneses' within **DISPOSITIFS**, by way of the Deleuzo–Guattarian emphasis on machinic **HETEROGENESES**, by way of Stiegler's notion of **EX-ORGANIZATION**. Here connected to the production of spatial differences and **RETICULATIONS**.

EXPRESSION (FORM/SUBSTANCE OF) *Actual* and *coded/discursive* aspects of an **ASSEMBLAGE**'s **DOUBLE ARTICULATION**

EXTERIORITY OF RELATIONS **0.2** Ontological consequence of the epistemological doctrine of the 'realism of relations,' stating that relations are primary (and thus not defined by hence 'external') to their terms (as 'relata'). Not to be equated with the Kantian causation through *extrinsic conditioning*, effectively substituted by this more intrinsic notion of a causation through **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION**, wherein conditions of apparition are at the same time genetic elements of what appears.

FIGURATION **0.3.1** 3.2 Used here more in line with Braidotti's **ETHOLOGICAL** (not Elias's sociogenetic) attempt to arrive at a more adequate conception of generative part-to-part relations by understanding them causally, that is, as results of always mutually-constitutive configurations within **HETEROGENEOUS**, **MATERIAL MILIEUS** that take form in "embodied, embedded, relational and affective" figurations, which reciprocally determine another through **INTENSIVE DIFFERENCES** that manifest in specific **BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICES**, and **RETICULATIONS**.

FLAT ONTOLOGY **0.3.1–2** Based on a **MONIST** and **HETERARCHICAL** ontology that accounts for things and differences, non-hierarchically, on the same ontological footing, and same level of reality.

FLUXES/FLOWS, MATERIAL **0.3.3** One of the **FOUR DOMAINS ON THE PLANE OF CONSISTENCY**, concerning complexions of **ACTUALLY** real, material fluxes; corresponding to the **SUBSTANCE OF EXPRESSION** in the **MATRIX OF STRATIFICATION**.

FOUR TECHNIQUES OF DISCIPLINARITY ii **0.2.1** 3.2 In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault distinguished four techniques operating within the dispositif of distribution (see **DISPOSITIFS OF DISCIPLINARITY**) First, "enclosure"; second, the principle of "elementary location or partitioning [**QUADRILLAGE**]," by which it an analytical space is established; third, the organization and coding of "functional sites"; and fourth, technique of "ranking," where elements are defined by the place they occupies in a series.

FOUR ONTOLOGICAL FUNCTORS (OR ALSO FOUR DOMAINS ON THE PLANE OF CONSISTENCY = FTΦU-MODEL **0.3.2** Guattari's development of the Matrix of stratification in his *Schizoanalytic Cartographies*, made up of (**REFERENTIAL) UNIVERSES** (U), (existential) territories (T), (**MACHINIC) PHYLA** (Φ) and (**MATERIAL) FLUXES** (F).

GEOMETRIC MANNER iii, 1.2, 3.2 In his *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata* (pub. 1677), Spinoza employed the geometric method of demonstrating arguments to arrive at a 'minor' mode of analysis which countered dualistic, dialectic, and hermeneutic forms of analytic reasoning. In Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, it was used to rework Foucault dualistic 'archaeological' and **GENEALOGICAL** approach to historical formations into an more **MONIST** and materially-embedded 'geological' one.

GENEALOGIES **0.1.2** Histories of the present that inquire how we have **BECOME** the subject we are. They do so by accounting for historical formation from the point of view of their genesis. This genetic thinking, thereby problematizes the productive nature of historical formations.

GENESES/GENETIC **0.1.3** Relating to a process of production or emergence. A genetic approach avoids 'tracing' this process retroactively in terms of the product generated, thus avoiding **PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION**.

HABIT(AT)S Notion used here to describe the co-constitutive nature of habitats and the habits of entities that, shaped by them, shape them in return.

HETERARCHY 0.3.1 Horizontal notion of organization, countering simple vertical hierarchies.

HETEROGENESIS iii **0.3.1** 2.3 3.2–3 Term for the production of and from the different, as the **GENETIC** condition under which something new is produced whenever two forces enter into a relation of **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION**, giving rise to a two-fold **DIFFERENT/CIATION** processes within any becoming, evolution, or **GENESIS**.

HETEROTOPIA/HETEROTOPOLOGY **ii–iii** Medical notion used by Foucault to describe spatial enclaves of otherness; worlds within worlds. Thus related to **NESTING. HETEROTOPOLOGY** is the method of their systematic description.

HIGHER-ORDER EMERGENT CONSTRAINTS **0.3.3** Concept denominating the formation of **EMERGENT CONSTRAINTS** upon emergent constraints throughout a system, whenever a synergistic **COUPLING** and compounding of two interacting regularization processes that—in constraining one another—gave rise to it, so as to maintain them. Therein, **CONTRAGRADE (HOMEO-**, or **MORPHO-)DYNAMISMS** lead to a (**MORPHO-**, or **TELEOGENIC**) regularity on a *higher* level of organizational complexity. This regularization then causes a further regularization of its constitutive lower-order dynamics by further reducing their **POSSIBILITY SPACE**, thus making them more stable. In systems-theory, constraints can both emerge throughout systems or be *imposed* onto them.

HYLOMORPHISM 0.2.3 Reductive conception in which matter is passive and *given* form, rather than being capable of self-organization.

IMAGE OF THOUGHT 0.1.2 Deleuzian concept, critiquing predominant but reductive ideas that are so strongly guiding thought, that they end up preventing the formation of new ideas.

INCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION **0.2.1** 2.2 3.2, General mode of the **DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS**, that does fall into an illegitimate exclusive use of drawing false categorical distinctions in kind.

INDIVIDUATION (VS. INDIVIDUALIZATION) Simondon's onto**GENETIC** concept, calling to approach the individuals through their process individuation, and not inversely consider **INDIVIDUATION** or **BECOMINGS** in essentialist and retroactive terms of a fully formed individual finally constituted therein. Hence avoiding any **PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION**, individuation is distinguished from individu*iza*tion processes, i.e. 'becoming an individual,' or the production of bio-physical or psycho-social individuality. More than being reducible to the formation of individualized entities, individuation reconceptualizes **GENESES** and **BECOMINGS** as connected to the **ASSOCIATED MILIEU**, such as **CRYSTALLLIZATION;** by contrast, individu*iza*tion concerns processes of the stabilization of more complex dynamics, as they **CONCRETIZE** into distinct entities. While distinct the latter, too is more accurately conceived in terms of a (**MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE**) **RETICULATION** of a material milieu. Conceptually connected to **EPIGENESIS/PHYLOGENESIS DISTINCTION.**

INTENSIVE Notion related to a 'pure' conception of **DIFFERENCE** and intensification processes.

INVOLUTION **0.3.3** 2.2 Evolutionary concept emphasizing embryo-/morphogenetic processes or organogeneses through internal differentiations and foldings-in's, rather than historical 'unfoldings.'

MACHINE/MACHINIC iii **0.1–3** 1.1–3.3 X
In contrast to 'mechanisms,' machines operate as open systems within environmental flows; they never operate (and thus cannot be conceived) in isolation, but in environmental assemblages wherein they work in couplings with other machines and machinings that thus co-constitute and (dys)select each another.

MACHINIC ASSEMBLAGES **0.2.1** Deleuzo-Guattarian concept (orig. *agencement machinique*) that describes the auto-affective concatenation of different components into a working system. This concerns the 'machinic assemblages of bodies' (i.e. the **TERRITORIALIZATION** of selected and configured elements) and the 'collective assemblages of enunciation' (meaning that **EXPRESSIVE CODING** of their meaning is always the effect of collectives, social groups, etc) that are connected to it.

MACHINIC PHYLUM **0.3.3** Deleuzo-Guattarian concept concerning the genesis of form

MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE PRACTICES **0.3.1**
Haraway and Barad's notion for complex processes and **BOUNDARY-DRAWING PRACTICES,** that through material milieus and setups and the reconfigurings of reality that these entail, result in phenomena that come to matter in both new (**NON-DISCURSIVE** and **ASIGNIFYING**) materialities and (**DISCURSIVE** and **SIGNIFYING**) meanings.

MECHANOLOGY, see **TECHNOLOGY**, **TECHNOLOGIST**, and **ORGANOLOGY**

MESOREDUTIONISM **0.3.2** DeLanda's neo-materialist and *realist* notion to problematize the reification of the level of social praxis within social history through the combination of what Harman similarly calls under- and 'over'mining of the micro- and macro-levels of social reality.

MILIEU (MATERIAL) **0.3.2** **ECOLOGICAL** concept, countering the container conception of (social) 'space' or environment by stressing its physical and material, and thus affective dimension in the midst of which (social) dynamics *take form*, and not just 'take place.'

MILIEU, ASSOCIATED **0.3.2** Simondonian concept that maintains, in contrast to **HYLOMORPHIC** thinking that **INDIVIDUATION** cannot be conceptualized without accounting for the material environment within (or in the midst of) which it forms, and to which it is thus closely **COUPLED**.

MILIEU, (THINKING) PAR LE **0.3.2** Stengers's expression to account for things that happen in the midst, by way of or through their middlings within physical environments."

MONIST **0.3.1** 3.2 Spinozist philosophy opposed to Cartesian substance dualism and related reductive ways of thought.

MULTIPLICITY **0.1.3** Leibnizian-Bergsonian-Deleuzian concept opposed to 'unitary' thinking that **OVERCODED** the inherent plurality and heterogeneities of things, through false categorical reduction.

NESTING **0.3.2** 3.1–3 **HETERARCHICAL** conception concerning the nesting of differently-scaled **ASSEMBLAGES**, systems, or **ORGANIZATIONS** that operate on the same level or reality and ontological footing (**MONISM**), thus countering their hierarchization.

NEW MATERIALISM(S) 0.3 Grouping of assemblage-theoretic philosophical positions, that re-emphasize the role of matter, material milieus, and materialities as **ENABLING CONSTRAINTS** within any historical formation or **GENESES**, and respectively propose an array of **TRANSVERSAL** matter-oriented methodologies.

ONTO-CARTOGRAPHY iii 0.3.1 Bryant concept of a **CARTOGRAPHIC** approach to the *onto*-**GENETIC** relation between **MACHINES** and **MACHINIC PHYLA**.

OPERATIONAL SIMILARITY **0.3** 3.3.1–3 in contrast to formal and structural resemblance, this Simondonian notion, foregrounds that things or mechanisms work in a similar way. As such, they may be connected *phylogenetically* on the level of **MACHINIC PHYLA**.

ORGANOLOGY, GENERAL **0.3.3** 3.3.3 X Stiegler's post-Simondonian/Guattarian term for a three-stranded theory of the joint evolution and articulation of organs and organizations, be they bodily/physiological (brain, hand, eyes, neural system…), artificial/technical (tools, instruments, objects, artworks, technical ensembles and systems), and collective/social (grouping, institutions, or organizations, be they juridical, linguistic, religious, political or economic), in the light of a wider genealogy of these aesthetic dimensions of the sensible, describing how

these are combining into transduction (and transversal) relationships across the psychic, social, and technical individuation. As such it further mechanologizes Guattari's **THREE ECOLOGIES**.

OVERCODING Process in which codes, articulated in both substance and form alongside related territorialization processes, are coming to be rewritten through re-territorialization beyond mere re-codings into particularly-strong signifying semiotics and forms of representation.

PART-TO-PART/PART-TO-WHOLE RELATIONS **i–iii**, 0.3.2 1.1–1.3 Topological conception advocating to replace simple mereological part-to-whole relations with a more nested conception of assemblages made up of genetic relations between different layers of organizational complexity and part-to-(differently-scaled-) parts.

PHASE SPACE **0.3.3** Representation of all possible states within dynamical systems, (and paths of their evolution therein), based on the systems degree of freedom.

PHASE DIAGRAM iii 0.3.3 Chart used to show a system's phases, such as the solid, liquid, or gaseous state of matter, and their phase boundaries, depending on temperature and pressure.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION **0.1.3** False reduction of production processes to the product generated, or false emphasis on the latter, that fails to account for the point of view of its **GENESIS** or construction.

PHYLUM **0.3.2** In biology the phylum (or division in botany) is a taxonomic classification constituted by distinct 'body-plans.' Against earlier approaches, today, these are no longer based on morphology or developmental similarity, but on *phylogenetic* relatedness; i.e. the actual historical relation amongst or within a group of co-evolving organisms, as they can be diagrammatically represented in a evolutionary tree or network. Like biological species, **TECHNICS** and **MACHINES** also evolve in spacetime. They, too, constitute such **MACHINIC PHYLA** in the base-configurations of **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLES** within **EPI-PHYLO-GENETIC** evolutions.

PHYLUM, MACHINIC (Φ) **0.3.3** One of the **FOUR DOMAINS ON THE PLANE OF CONSISTENCY**, concerning rhizomatic of **ACTUAL** possible organizations; corresponding to the **FORM OF EXPRESSION** in the **MATRIX OF STRATIFICATION**.

POSTHUMANISM **0.3.1** Philosophical predicament that, as Braidotti describes, results from the convergence of anti-humanism and post-anthropocentrism, and which embraces **TECHNĒ** as constitutive of what makes us human, and to differing degrees so.

PRIMACY OF RELATIONS Notion that relations precede their terms or relata. Relations, in their particularity and particular configuration, are thus everything from an analytic point of view. "When two terms … enter into some kind of relation … an interference patters is set up between them which marks the real emergence of something new, something not defined solely by either term" (Jeremy Gilbert, *Anticapitalism and Culture: Radical Theory and Popular Politics*, Oxford/New York: Berg, 2008), 188).

PROBLEMATIZATION **0.1.2** Anti-**REPRESENTATIONAL** mode of inquiry that offers a new model of critique.

QUADRILLAGE ['gridding'] Foucauldian term used for the production of an analytical space in the dispositif of disciplinarity. Later generalized, as a **FUNCTION OF EXTERIORITY**, and connected to the aspect of control, by Deleuze's cinematic notion of *cadrage* [framing], and the diagrammatic function of frames to **SELECT**. Here extended in the systems-theoretical direction of 'gridlocking' through **HIGHER-ORDER EMERGENT CONSTRAINTS**.

RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION **0.1.3** When differential elements or differences (dx, dy) with no determined value (dx in relation to x) enter into a relation (dy/dy), they fully determine another reciprocally.

REPRESENTATIONALISM 0.2–3 Highly-identitarian and -essentialist **IMAGE OF THOUGHT**.

RETICULATION **0.2.3** Simondonian term to describe the basic dynamic structuration processes within **MATERIAL MILIEUS.**

SEGMENTARITY **0.2.2** 2.1–2.3 Deleuzo-Guattarian sociological and anti-structuralist notion, as to how certain societies are structuring themselves into more or less rigid segmentary organizations.

SELECTION iii, **0.3.1–3** Cache's notion for foregrounding the **INCLUSIVE** modality of the **DISJUCTIVE** aspect of architectural elements such as walls, that while having an enclosing, partitioning separating function (**EXCLUSIVE DISJUNCTION**) at the same time selectively reunite space by establishing particular relations.

SETUP **0.3.2–3**, 2.3 Concept, extending the notion of **APPARATUS**, countering the **REPRESENTATIONALISTIC** container notion of 'setting.'

SPACE OF POSSIBILITY 0.3.2 Systems-theoretic term, here also called "probability space," of possible states and dynamics that are associated with a particular system; meaning states that are generally possible and variously-likely to occur, given a particular state of affairs.

STRATA **0.2** In Deleuze and Guattari's geophilosophy, Foucault's historical formations are transposed into **DOUBLY-ARTICULATED** (sedimented and consolidated) series of layers or strata that the present is made up of. More then just being 'layers' that could be mapped onto certain epochs, they are distinguished through reciprocal determination processes, whose workings must be distinguished. For strata can act as **INTERSTRATA**, intermediary layers that regulate the relations between strata, or **METASTRATA** that form permeating layers of consistency; that taken together, can act as **EPISTRATA**, certain central superpositions of layers, or as **PARA-STRATA** formed besides them. Buchanan succinctly summarizes Deleuze and Guattari's deployment of the concept of strata as "the conceptual means of transforming that which seems to have been given … into something that is the product of multiple processes and forces over time." (Buchanan, *Assemblage Theory and Methods*, 26).

STRATIFICATION the **DOUBLY-ARTICULATED** historical sedimentation and consolidation of reciprocally-determined component structures within **ASSEMBLAGES**.

STRATIFICATION, MATRIX OF **0.2** Assemblage-analytical determination of the four reciprocally-determined elements composing **ASSEMBLAGES;** see there.

STRATOANALYSIS/STRATOANALYTIC **0.2** Analysis of the **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION** of component structures within form-taking **ASSEMBLAGES**

STRUCTURE/AGENCY-DEBATE 0.1.1 Discussion on a core methodological problem that has plagued sociological analyses of human behavior and historical causality, due to a reductively-stated juxtaposition of **CONSTRAINING** social (macro) structures versus enabling potential for (micro) actions of individual agents that fails to account for their **RECIPROCAL DETERMINATION**, while at the same time succumbing to a **MESOREDUCTIVIST** explanation via social practices.

SYNCHRONY/DIACHRONY The notion of synchrony and diachrony mark two different and complementary viewpoints of temporal geneses. Theorized by Ferdinand de Saussure, these notions were first applied to linguistic analysis to study the evolution of languages. Historical linguistics had long been characterized by a diachronic approach (from δια- "through" and χρόνος "time") to the development of language. It usually involves a an evolutive focus on its origins, development, historical changes. Saussure emphasized the importance of a viewpoint that captures the synchronic system (from Greek συν- "together") to understand the 'inner workings' of language, which in his approach were primary. With the linguistic turn and the rise of structuralist thinking, this distinction was taken up in many historical fields. The recent approaches to emergence and historical, have according to John Protevi focused too exclusively on *synchronic* emergences, to the detriment of failing to understand the **SPACE OF POSSIBILITIES** that marks *diachronic* emergences.

SYMBIOGENESIS **0.3.2** The notion of symbiogenesis was developed as an evolutionary theory by botanist Konstantin Mereschkowski in the early 1900s. Taken up by Lynn Margulis in 1967 in her "On the origin of mitosing cells," it explains how mitochondria — as previously independent bacteria — become incorporated through endosymbiosis into the emergent unity of the eukaryotic cell.

SYMPOIESIS **0.3.2** A concept coined by Beth Dempster and popularized by Donna Haraway as an alternative to Maturana and Varela 'autopoietic' notion of self-organization, highlighting, that in natural systems "Nothing makes itself" but is formed in the co-evolution or **SYMBIOGENESIS** of complex interacting systems with no self-defined spatial or temporal boundaries.

TECHNĒ (τέχνη) **0.2.1–3** 3.2–3.3 Old Greek concept that refers to a 'craft' or an 'art' (yet different from *poiesis*). In the Stoic sense, of a τέχνη περὶ τὸν βίον (technē perì tòn bíon) used for an art of living, a set of technics of living, technics that make us human.

TECHNICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 3.2.3–3.3.2 Level when technics and their functional logic become consciously reflected on or thought about.

TECHNICAL ENSEMBLE 0.3.3 Simondon's term for those larger ensembles into which a variety of 'technical individuals' or 'objects' such as instru-

ments, **APPARATUS**, and related culture technics, and **TECHNOLOGIES**, come to be employed. Not directly equal to the **DISPOSITIFS** or **ASSEMBLAGES** that as hydro-solar-eco-zoo-bio-noo-psycho-socio-…-technical ensembles comprise them.

TECHNICITY 0.3.3/179f Simondonian concept, that against any instruments reification, stresses the degree of concretization from more social to more technological systems.

TECHNICIZED ENVIRONMENTS **0.3**, 3.3.1–3–X Against a facile nature/culture divide this notion stressed that environments are always adapted or instrumentalized to some extent within niche-construction processes.

TECHNICS/TECHNIQUES VS. TECHNOLOGY 0.3 Post-Simondonian conceptual distinction between **TECHNICS** or **TECHNIQUES** as such, and **TECHNOLOGY** as a kind of knowledge (logos) or science of the functioning of **TECHNICS**, and their intrinsic organizational mechanisms; a **TECHNICAL CONSCIOUSNESS** that usually gets lost with the increasing **EXOSOMATIC ORGANIZATION** of anthropo- and sociogenic technics and their **CONCRETIZATION** within **TECHNICAL ENSEMBLES**.

TECHNOLOGIST (OR MECHANOLOGIST) Someone who—complementary to the psychologist and sociologist, yet on a more general level—retrieves a lost technical knowledge or fosters a **TECHNICAL CONSCIOUSNESS** concerning the functioning of technics, mechanisms, or machines. Concerning organizations in general, this would be the function of a **GENERAL ORGANOLOGY**,

TELEODYNAMISM **0.3.3** This term, coined by Deacon, describes an emergent transition and end-directed (i.e. **TELEOGENIC**) evolution of systems, generated from a synergistic **COUPLING** of two underlying morphodynamisms. This happens whenever **HIGHER-ORDER EMERGENT CONSTRAINTS** arise from any *contragrade* tendencies of morphodynamic regularization processes, that may combine in such a way that an overall *orthograde* tendency arises in the system so that both regularization tendencies maintain and regenerate another.

TELEOGENESIS The emergence of an *end-directed evolution* within auto-affective systems, through a synergistic **COUPLING** of underlying morphodynamic tendencies.

TERRITORIALIZATION **0.2.3** Within the theory of the **DOUBLE ARTICULATION** 'territolialization' concerns the **VIRTUAL** side of the *non-discursive* and **ASIGNYFYING** 'content' of an **ASSEMBLAGE**, complemented by **CODING** on **ACTUAL** side of the 'expression' components. Related to the idea of the production of a certain *Umwelt*, the idea of territorialization and ongoing de- and reterritorialization processes, describes how in an assemblage involves both the **SELECTION** of both heterogeneous components (as real **SUBSTANCES OF CONTENT**), as well as their arrangement into specific configurations (as possible **FORMS OF CONTENT**), that then find their respective expressions. The latter involving, for instance, the (social, legal, …) *meaning* of spatial organizations, territorialization is the basis for (social, legal, …) **MACHINES** to operate.

TERRITORIES, EXISTENTIAL (T) 0.3.3 One of the **FOUR DOMAINS ON THE PLANE OF CONSISTENCY**, concerning cut-outs of **VIRTUAL** reality; corresponding to the **SUBSTANCE OF CONTENT** in the **MATRIX OF STRATIFICATION**.

THREE ECOLOGIES **0.3**, 3.3.3, X In his eponymous book, Guattari develops, via Deleuze's interpretation, the Kantian theory of the **THREE SYNTHESIS** of subjectivity into the idea of three interrelated environmental, social and psychological ecologies, that constitute human subjectivity. Stiegler **MECHANOLOGIZES** these ecologies further in his **GENERAL ORGANOLOGY**. Here, I have begun to extend them also in more Deaconian systems-theoretic terms as three **TELEODYNAMISMS.**

THREE SYNTHESES **0.2.1** Kantian concept, reworked by Deleuze (and Guattari) and then Stiegler, to understand the genesis of subjects through a **CONNECTIVE, DISJUNCTIVE, AND CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS**; or series of **DIFFERENTIATIONS**, **DIFFERENTIATING FACTORS**, and **DIFFERENCIATIONS.**

TRANSDUCTION **0.3.2** 2.2.2 Simondonian concept for self-generating and self-propagating morphogenetic processes within material **MILIEUS**, the exemplary case of which is **CRYSTALLIZATION**. It comprises any "physical, biological, mental, or social operation through which an activity propagates incrementally within a domain by basing this propagation on a structuration of the domain operated from one region to another. … [I]t is that through which a structure appears in a domain of a problematic as providing the resolution to the problems posed" (Simondon, *Individuation*, I: 13–14).

TRANSVERSAL(ITY) 0.3.3 Guattarian term that strives to overcome two impasses: vertical hierarchies, and horizontal relativity, stressing instead a maximum multi-dimensional communication between different levels of organization, complexity, or scale.

UNIVERSES OF REFERENCE (U) 0.3.3
One of the **FOUR DOMAINS ON THE PLANE OF CONSISTENCY**, concerning constellation of **VIRTUAL** possibilities; corresponding to the **FORM OF CONTENT** in the **MATRIX OF STRATIFICATION**.

VIRTUAL **0.1.3** Something physically real, not merely possible, but not yet existing as some **ACTUALIZED** thing. The basis of all systems-theoretic approaches, this factor is not yet sufficiently embraced by the field of history.

LEXICON FOR THE GENEALOGY OF APPARTEMENTS

The following lexicon lists foreign (Latin, Italian, Spanish, French) architectural terms, under indication of German relata, that are included wherever helpful for following some of my conceptual cross-connections between some of the terms. The final Roman numerals indicate the part in which they occur. I II III

Alcôve, chamber en (fr) Bedroom with recessed bed-niche, generated from opening up the bedroom's adjacent → *garde-robe*. Also called, 'chambre en niche,' but sometimes differentiated from it. Via Spanish *alcoba,* from Arabic القُبَّة [*al-qubba*], "vault, chamber with vaulted ceiling." III

Allogiamenti/o; logement (It./Fr) 'Accommodation or lodging(s) in both an architectural and more processual sense, that is more discriminated by the Italian endings.

Andito (It.) A vaulted entry hall or passage way. II

Anticamera/antichambre (It./Fr.) Anteroom. Initially a smaller room placed behind (i.e. "against") the → *camera* in Italian *palazzi*, this back room was coming to be named *retrocamera*. In the 1540s, Serlio introduced the notion to France, where it was applied to a type of → *salette* that had emerged as a kind of buffer space, between the principal chamber and the main hall or principal staircase. This can be found back in the long-standing dual function of 'antichambres serving as → *salle à manger*.' It is from this transposition that it gained its renown 'filtering' function, increased with the multiplication of antichambers during the mid-16th to late 17th century, which was inspired largely by the organization of Castilian and English palaces. II III

Anti-cabinet anteroom preceding the cabinet as accessed from the rear stair case. III

Arrière-cabinet (Fr.) Smaller cabinet behind the principal or → *'grand'-cabinet*. III

Appartenance(s) Appurtenance(s) [Ger. *Ausrüstung/Zubehör* ≈ **EQUIPMENT**], implying the notion of 'membership' or 'belongings'; a pertinent accessories or equipment. The concept falls under the Vitruvian category of *decorum* (propriety); hence different from but related to →**DEPENDENCE(S)**. III

Appartamento/i (It.) Initially a denomination for the quadrants of a mirror-symmetrical plan, drawn through → *compartition* I

Appartamento/i di stanze (It.) Term used to describe a distinct suite of functionally-differentiated rooms forming an ensemble. II

Appartamiento(s) (Sp.) Originally a navigational term, referring to the quarters of the sky. I

Appartement(s) (Fr.) A hierarchically-organized linear (or partly clustered) series of rooms within an aristocratic residence, such as palaces and town houses. It initially contains rooms or spatial segments designated for festivities, receptions, consultation rooms for (state) business activities, related office spaces, prayer rooms, storage spaces, and bedding places, organized so as to be incrementally inaccessible to visitors. II

Appartement de bains (Fr.) Separate suite of rooms around a '*salle de bains*,' forming a bath. III

Appartement de parade/de societée/de commodité (Fr.) Normative tripartite spatial system in 18th-century palaces and aristocratic residence in France. Initially located on the first floor (→ *bel étage*). The *appartement de parade* developed from the → *appartement du roi*, and initially called *grand appartement* (with it *grand-salle* and → *grand-chambre*) due to its size and grandeur. It is traditionally translated as 'State apartment,' since it fulfilled the requirement for hosting stately or highly formal events and receptions. The *appartement de societé* had emerged around the → *salle basse* but was coming to be juxtaposed to the *appartement de parade* on the same floor during the 18th century. It satisfied the need for less formal social activities. It was mainly used, usually in the afternoon, for leisure activities and entertaining families and friends. The *appartement de commodité*, (usually translated as 'private apartments,' but only later called → *appartement privé*) provided comfort and privacy for the inhabitant. III

Appartement du roi, (grand) The King's lodging. In 16th–17th century France, private residences like *châutaus* and then also *hôtels particuliers*, started to incorporate a suite of rooms symbolically reserved for the accommodation of the ambulant king. The largest (hence grand) appartement in the residence, those were juxtaposed to the smaller quarters of the owners. As it was used for official receptions and appearances, around the chambre de parade, it was slowly re-conceptualized as → *appartement de parade*. II III

Appartement, Grand/Moyenne/Petit (Fr.) Earlier scalar distinction of the two, then three sorts of appartements according to their *grandeur*. III

Appartement simple/double (Fr.) Appartement laid out in a single room range, or two parallel rooms ranges. Thus connected to the *corps de logis simple/double*. III

Appartement privé (Fr.) Later denomination (since the mid-18th cent.) of the → *appartement de commodité*, highlighting its more individual and re-creative function. III

Art of Distribution Emerging conception of the art of planning or laying out plans through architectural/plan graphic techniques of compartitioning, first translated in French as → *département* (16th cent), then → *distribution* (ca. 1620s); the mastery of which was claimed to be the defining feature of French architecture. II

Art of distribution, discourse on Architecture theoretical discourse, practical experimentation, and codification regarding the residential planning. II

Aula (Lat.) A hall. II

Bel étage/Piano nobile (Fr./It.) First floor with the main rooms. II III

Bienséance (Fr.) Propriety. Term denominating the proper match between social function and appropriate or fitting form. First used as a translation of Vitruvian aspect of *decorum*. III

Boudoir (Fr.) The room emerged as an informal, even intimate space for the lady of the house to receive visitors during the morning act of getting dressed up; something following the tradition of the king's → *levée*. Its was thus situated (like her husband's → *cabinet* for morning visits), before the bedroom, in connection to a → *garde-robe* and → *cabinet de toilette*, yet so that it also acted as a space to retreat into during evening receptions. III

Buffet (Fr.) Space for setting up dinner. III

Cabinet/Gabinetto (Fr./It.) The cabinet is a small complementary room to the → *chambre* in European castles and town houses, where they are most located in the corner towers and pavilions. Usually not equipped with a fireplace, they offer a room for retreat (mostly for the male inhabitant) that also served as a space for contemplation or study decorated with books and art, hence related to the → *studiolo/scrittoio* and 'closet.' Governmental meaning coming from the fact that the room was often used by the King to discuss stately affairs with his advisory council. In the 17–18th century the rooms became more differentiated by *grandeur* (→ *grand-cabinet*) or function according to the appartement in which it was located, and sometimes doubled by an → *anti-cabinet* or → *arrière-cabinet*. III

Cabinet de toilette (Fr.) small auxiliary room for clothing (from *toile*, 'cloth'), usually within the *appartement de bains*, that Blondel still subsumed under → *garde-robe*. III

Camera/Chambre (Lat., It., Sp./Fr.) Generic room. The term 'chamber' etymologically implies a vaulted room, traditionally used from transit spaces, and not so much an enclosed space. III

Camera paramenti/Chambre de parement (Lat./Fr.) A room in late Gothic papal and royal palaces dressed with decorative textile wall hangings and vestments that gained a liturgical function as a room in which the formal investiture of certain dignitaries would take place. II

Castel(lo)/castillo (It./Sp.) Castle. Initially based on the more defensive → *castrum* scheme. II

Castrum (Lat.) Fortified settlement, usually laid out according to the microcosmic *principium ad quadratum* as a square with two central axes or streets, called *cardo* and *decumanus* forming a cross, dividing four quarters. I II

Chambre à coucher (Fr.) Bedchamber, lit. 'Room for sleeping.' II III

Chambre à parer A decorated reception room. Literally a "room to (be) dress(ed)," related to the notion of 'appearance' (*paraître*). II III

Château (Fr.) Castle. Initially based on the more defensive → *castrum* scheme, from which the → *Palais* was counter-distinguished. II III

Charactère (Fr.) Early 18th-cent. notion promulgated by Boffrand and Blondel for legible architectural characteristics that discriminate between certain spaces or buildings. Said to be a progenitor of the 19th-century notion of 'type,' but conceptually first more related to a differentiation concerning *disposition*; a

result of drawing characteristic differences (i.e. *differentiæ*) between *genera* and *species*, from which biological taxonomies and architectural typologies eventually arise. III

Commoditas/commodité (Lat./Fr.) A measure or relation of commensurability between parts and larger ensembles. From Lat. *cum-* "with," + *modus* "measure." Establishing this commensurality is the central problem of the 'modica membrorum' in Vitruvius notion of → *ordinatio*. Meaning shifting slowly, via the notion of → *convenance* in the direction of 'convieneince/comfort.' III

Compartimento (It.) Compartmentation. The act, but more so the result of → *compartitione*. I

Compartitione (It.) Compartition [Ger., *Einteilung*, lit. "*durch-/mitteilung*"]: The geometric act of dividing the site according to the quarters of the sky; with regards to the whole. I

Convenance (Fr.) From Lat. *convenire*, "coming to[gether]," via *convenientia*. Problematizing the relation or agreement between an object and its idea, or things and words, and related conventions. Related to the form/content dualism. Meaning shifting slowly in the direction of 'convenience/comfort.' III

Convenance, Distribution avec Planning that is both in line with conventional planning standards and which avoids inconvenient layout in terms of both more social improprieties, as well as any practical discomfort. III

Corps d'hôtel The main residential wing of a town house. II III

Corps de logis The central wing or block of a residential building or palace, distinguished either by its placement in line with an entrance gate, or by the formal articulation as a more or less symmetric and accentuated structure, that conventionally contains the principal rooms on the first floor. II III

Corps de logis simple/semi-double/double/etc (Fr.) This distinction qualifies whether the main block is organized with a single or two parallel range of rooms. The 'semi-double' form appears when a central salle or salon is placed between room doubled clusters, or when the range of rooms is intercalated by bypassing passageways and corridors. II III

Cubiculum (Lat.) Private room (lit. a small cubicle), in a Roman *domus* used not only for sleeping, but also secret meetings and receptions. II

Dais (Fr.) Canopied and elevated throne-like seat placed at the end of medieval halls. Replacing the state bed for receptions in a **SALLE/CHAMBRE DU DIAS** that emerges in late-17th to early-18th century planning. III

Dégagement (Fr.) The installation of service corridor and bypassing passages or doorways for circumnavigating and/or short-circuiting the principal circulation through the apartment. The term *dégager* ("disengage") itself stresses no 'connections,' but the act of 'working out' or 'uncoupling/disengaging' such passageways from the apartment. III

Département (Fr.) Earlier technical term for "plan(ing)/lay(ing)-out" connected more to **ORDONNANCE** and **DEVIS**; related but different from → *compartitione*, from *partitio*. II III

Département de logis (Fr.) An administrative office charged with bookkeeping available lodgings for accommodating the numerous members of the itinerant royal court. II

Département des heures (Fr.) A prescriptive day-time spending scheme, scheduling the French King's daily and weekly routines. II

Dépendence(s) (Fr.) Outbuilding(s), constructions or wings belonging to a larger complex, implying a hierarchical relation of dependence and property; hence, different from but related to → *appartenance(s)*. III

Devis (Fr.) Preliminary design, cost calculation, and tender done by the architect or mason ordered to build. As an initial translation of *ordinatio*, it was later called increasingly *ordonnance*. II

Dispositio(n/e) (Lat./It./Fr.) Disposition [Ger. "*Veranlagung*"; cf. **DISPOSTIF**, "Anlage"]. Initially —according to Vitruvius— the requirement of arranging the part of a building according to the quarters of the sky, implying a suitable placement of rooms according to differences (i.e. 'disposition'). In 18th-cent. French architecture theory, the notion will gain a more representationalistic meaning in being re-conceptualized under the notion of *charactère*. III

Distributio(n)/(Di)Stributione Distribution [Ger. "Aufteilung (≈ Layout)/Verteilung"]. See *Art of distribution*. II

Donjon (Fr.) Fortified tower. II

Enfilade An architectural arrangement in which a suite of rooms is placed in a formal alignment so that most or all of the rooms are accessed alongside a usually lateral axis of doors (as the center of the wall was usually occupied by a chimney), that visually connected the rooms down the suite. Doors out of line, either by way of changeover placements, or where the axis is broken round a corner, usually indicate thresholds of access and thus often mark areas reserved for retreat. II III

Galerie An elongated hall-way, usually covered and richly decorated with images and wall paintings, initially reserved as a room for private use and contemplation. II III

Garde-robe/guardaroba (Fr./It.) A small rectangular room in European castles and town houses, the garde-robe is a secondary room to the *chambre*, usually larger than a *cabinet*. Heated by a chimney, it also served as the most private room, and the actual bedroom (where no separate → *chambre à coucher* was placed behind the → *chambre de parade*), or where servants or children could be accommodated. It originated as a lockable room for storing ('guarded') textiles, robes, vestments, as well as valuable goods. When used exclusively for storing furnitures and objects, the room was designated as a *garde-meuble*; the auxiliary space next to the kitchen used for storing foods, *garde-manger*. II III

Grand-cabinet (Fr.) Similarly to the function of the → *garde-robe* off the *salle* in late-16th-century royal palaces, the grand-cabinet acted as a room adjacent to the → *sallon*, to retreat with select guests. III

Hôtel (Fr.) A residential building type, often equated with the canonical Parisian town house between court and garden. The term initially designates any space to be leased or rented for temporary accommodation. As such it conceptually differs from the *manoir* [manor], as a permanent residence or estate. As such it came to designate the various urban residences occupied by the French landed nobility. Initially reserved for the residences of the nobility, after the 1600s, the term came to be used for any large municipal building, as well as smaller private town houses (*maisons particulier*). II III

Hôtel particulier (Fr.) Town house of a member not belonging to the nobility, thus often without apparatus for reception II III

Levée (Fr.) The rising of the King. Installed by Louis XIV at the court of Versailles, the Lévée consisted in the highly choreographed process of getting dressed in the morning combined with the conduct of state business, staged into different successive acts with each wider access to the King granted to increasingly lower ranks of court-members. An extension of courtly ceremonial, esp. the → *département des heures*. II III

Logis (Fr.) Lodging/dwelling. Generic notion for both any accommodation within (otherwise more specified as *un logement*), as well as the entire inhabited main wing of a residential complex (otherwise specified as → **CORPS DE LOGIS** as a structure). As a noun, the notion connotes all economic/managerial aspects of 'lodging' like the English notion does. II III

Ordinatio(ne)/ordonnace (Lat./It/Fr.) Ordering, or the process of achieving order [Ger. "*(An) Ordnen*"]; the first principle of architecture according to Vitruvius. The term connotes the commanding/prescriptive aspect of 'to order/ordain, ordinance' [Ger. "*Verordnen*"]. I III

Palas (Lat.) Compact medieval hall building type, the principal structure in castles, named in reference to the Palatine Hill in Rome. II

Palais (Fr.) Palace. Aristocratic building type initially distinguished from the → *Château* in its more freestanding, and block-like form. II III

Palazzo (It.) Italian aristocratic courtyard building type. II

Partitio(ne) (Lat./It.) Partitioning (from Lat. *pars*, "part") the act of establishing differentiated parts [*(Auf-)Teilung*]. I

Partimenti (It.) The resulting commensurate part-measures, members [Ger. "*Teil, Teilmaß, Gliedmaß*"] produced by compartitioning practices. I

Pavillion (Fr.) In the above context, the term 'pavilion' describe in general any member of a building that—by means of a segmented roof—is articulated as a distinguishable member with-in an ensemble. The term most commonly denominates the square towers protruding for a building's (or its main wing's) corners, while parts projecting to a lesser extent, or in the center of the wings are called → *Risalit* or *avant-corps*. Smaller round corner towers, or turrets are stylistically different. III

Plan massé (Fr.) General disposition of buildings with more compact, clustered plan with central

corridor, counter-distinguished from the traditional → *corps de logis simple* II

Retrait, retrete (Fr./Sp.) Small auxiliary space, for study. Precursor to the → *cabinet*. II

Retrait, chambre de (Fr.) This was the name of the en-suite privy room with restricted access located behind the publicly accessible space → *chambre à parer*, to withdraw from courtly business, for dinner or secret meetings. In English palaces this room was called the privy chamber behind the so-called presence room. The introduction of the *anti-chambre* greatly displaced this threshold. II III

Retrocamera (It.) Initially called → *anticamera*, the name denominates this smaller rooms position *behind* the principal chamber in the Italian *appartement*, as well as its function to retreat. After a functional shift, this backroom would later be described as a → *guardaroba*. II

Risalit/Avant-corps A vertical design element, ordering and segmenting the facade of a building, corresponding to a smaller protrusion in plan. In contrast to a → *pavilion*, these elements are crowed by a tympanum in the roof. Especially when located in the center of a building. III

Sala/salle (It./Fr.) Traditionally the largest room in a house or palace; a hall, used for gatherings, receptions, audiences, dining, and festive occasions, and as such often having an oblong proportion often greater than 2:1. Etymologically coming from a separate Germanic root, denoting a single-room building (as different from hall (going back to "to cover"). In its function, the *sala/salle* is a hybrid between the Roman type of dining space, the *triclinium*, and the *aula* (from Ancient Greek word for "courtyard"). II III

Salle basse/haute Traditionally one distinguished the *salle basse* ("lower/lesser hall"), as a larger recreation room on the lower floor, in which the entourage of visitors sojourned, while the visitors themselves were received on the upper floor, in the *salle haute* (upper/higher hall"), often also called the *grand salle*, as it forms part of the → *grand appartement*. In the Parisian *hôtels*, this distinction was later doubled, with the differentiation of the lower hall, in a → *salle à manger* and a designated → *salle commun* in the service area. III

Salle à manger (Fr.) A functionally-designated room where dinner was served, otherwise serving as an → *antichambre*. Space with one of the earliest *functional* differentiations, due to the organizational complexity surrounding the setting up of dinner. III

Salle commun (Fr.) (Dining) Hall, derived from the → *salle basse*, for domestics and entourage of visiting guests. III

Salle (/cabinet) d'assemblée (Fr.) Assembly hall that came to be intercalated, during the mid-18th century, between the → *chambre de parade* and the preceding → *antichambre* or → *sallon*. It was typically juxtaposed with the → *salle de compagnie* in the → *appartement de société*. (In some larger buildings, as Blondel's ideal *hôtel*, this room would be called *cabinet d'assemblée*, however, to counter-distinguish it from more differentiated *appartements de société* wherein a into a larger *salle d'assemblée* complemented by its own adjacent → *(arrière-)cabinet* preceded the other reception rooms including the *salle de compagnie*. III

Salle de compagnie (Fr.) Developed through some sort of functional shift between the → *sallon* and → *Grand-cabinet*, the *salle de compagnie* proceeding a (smaller) → *sallon* was usually the central rooms within the → *appartement de société*, for receiving guest paying company in the afternoon (unless, in larger residence it preceded by an even larger *salle d'assemblée* and *cabinet*, otherwise constituting part of the → *appartement de parade*). III

Sallette (Fr.) A separate smaller hall, usually in proximity of a grand → *salle*, or in lieu thereof, preceding the → *chambre*. Originally used as a place where dinner was set up, this rooms is both a precursor to the → *antichambre*, as well as the later → *salle à manger*. II III

Saletta/salotto (It.) Diminutive form of *sala*, used for smaller halls. II III

Salone (It.) Augmentative form of *sala*, used for the largest hall. II III

Sal(l)on (Fr.) Space for more informal gatherings and receptions that emerged as a hybrid between the *salle* and the *antichambre*. In the mid-17th century, halls placed in the center of a building behind a vestibule came to named '*sallon*' rather than → *salle*. Often the largest room, typically with an oval shape. But sometimes additional '*petit sal(l)ons*,' that act as axial joints, are found within the corner pavilions. III

Sal(l)on à l'italienne (Fr.) Central hall with doubled room height, that alludes to the basic sectional scheme of Venetian *palazzi* and Italian (and

esp. Palladian) villas. In some cases where also a room other than the *sallon* had a heightened ceiling, this room was called *chambre à l'italienne*. III

Scrittio (It.) A small room serving as a writing (*scrivere*) space or bookkeeping office. II

Stanze (It.) Italian plural noun, etymologically related to "staying," for any set of rooms to 'dwell in'; as such different from →*camera/chambre*. I II

Stanze, appartemento/i di (It.) Term used to describe a distinct series of functionally-differentiated rooms forming an ensemble. II

Studiolo (Lat./It.) A small study space. II

Triclinium Dining area in a Roman house, named after the arrangement of three benches around a dining table; see →*salle*. II

Tinello/tinellum (magnum/parvum) A (greater or lesser) dining hall. II

Twin apartments [Fr.: *appartement(s) jumélé(s) or appartements jumeaux*]. Symmetrically organization of the lodgings of the king and queen, symbolizing their architectural parity. Not to be confused with the →*appartement double*. II

Vestibule A covered half-open hallway, separating and connecting different apartments, and serving as a passage from court to garden. The term originally denotes the space to lay off or put on clothing upon arrival or for departure. II III

Vis (Grand Vis) A monumentally-designed main stair case, traditionally a spiral stair case, positioned—as the term etymologically attests to (*escalier à/en vis*)—in a line of sight for arriving visitors and opened to both be seen ascending and enjoy vistas on the surrounding. II III

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Archive ouverte en Science de l'Homme et de la Société, at https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr
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INDEX

A general index of all buildings and architectural treatises discussed in this work can be found in the inside of the books front and back cover and its gate folds.

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SUMMARY

A Flat Theory presents a genealogical project concerned with the historical formation of apartments. As such, it draws together the first synthetic study of the complex processes through which apartments have become our globally dominant form of urban togetherness. Divided in three volumes, it will map the successive emergence of (I) *appartements* throughout the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries; of (II) apartment houses in seventeenth to nineteenth-century Europe; and of (III) apartment housing in the twentieth century. The present work constitutes the inaugural volume of this larger project, focusing on (and preparing an understanding of) what I describe as a **MATERIAL-DISCURSIVE** formation of *appartements* during the 1540–1780s in western Europe, as an architectural concept, spatial phenomenon, and residential system in three distinct parts. These three parts constitute not any final history of the formation of appartements, in the sense that it conclusively reconstructs the causal chains that have led to our present forms of living together apart, but more genetic analyses—sometimes plainer, sometimes deeper; sometimes faster, sometimes slower—of convergent lineages underlying this history.

INTRO

To situate the larger project, the first volume starts with a general introduction "On the Historical Formation of Apartments." By critically reviewing the manifold discourses on apartments, it identifies the absence of a genetic approach to the formation of apartments. Not a simple research gap, this blind spot is seen as symptomatic of a more complex structural error in the theorization of built environments. Based on this research problematic, I advance a radicalization of some existing studies that approach the historical formation of apartments as a *topological* ordering that has transformed our reciprocal relationships within and with built environments. This transformation is more productively analyzed when studied on a more general, eco-systemic, and technological level. *A Flat Theory* combines historically-grounded scholarship and discourse analyses with a more assemblage-theoretic extension of genealogical methods into a so-called epiphylogenetic mapping. It maps the formation of apartments at the intersection of three intertwined socio-psycho-environmental worlding dynamics through which becomings and subjectivities are co-constituted.

BOOK O

The approach is further elaborated in a preliminary discussion (called **BOOK O**) that zeroes in on several theoretico-methodological aspects. It initially expands on the chosen genealogical method and discusses the methodological requirements of approaching the architecture of apartments through an assemblage-theoretical reading. Through a close reading of (post-)Foucauldian and (post-)Deleuzo-Guattarian studies, **BOOK O** situates this investigation within a wider epistemological perspective calling for flattened ontologies. In debunking representationalistic approaches to architecture, it outlines a non-reductive analytical approach to the built environment. Therefore, it also distills an apparatus of pertinent theoretical concepts (compiled in an appended glossary) that help conceptualize, from a more process-ontological and genetic angle, how historical formations take form in (and through) architectural arrangements.

VOLUME ONE

Following the preliminary discussion, **VOLUME ONE** "On the Genealogy of Appartements" then maps, in its three parts (**PART I–III**), three historical lineages coming together, in the more detailed discussions of the successive emergence of apartments as an architectural concept, space, and system.

PART I

Opening this genealogy, **PART I,** on "The Crystallizing Conception of Appartamenti," recovers the largely forgotten conceptual lineage of apartments as a diagrammatic design measure within Italian architectural treatises from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. The part starts in the year 1540, when Sebastiano Serlio introduced the notion of *appartamenti* into architectural discourse. To correct this little-known fact, the first chapter (1.1) problematizes its obscure abstract sense as an organizational concept and reconstructs its ignored conceptual origin within artistic practices and measures of (com)partition. As the central chapter (1.2) elaborates, these long remained the guiding image for instructing architectural composition at the intersection of geometric techniques and changing ordering conceptions like Alberti's notion of *partitione*, Filarete's *compartitione,* and Martini's *partimenti.* Through an analytic of concepts situating these changing conceptions as responses to changing problems, this part adumbrates how these partimenti evolved from an initially more representational, geometric measure into an abstract, diagrammatic matrix for architectural production, unleashing a new creative power. The last chapter of this part (1.3) draws several conclusions in reconsidering the particular pedagogical function of the matrix of appartamenti, and reclaims not only the vanguard position of Serlio's practical theory, but also derives some lessons for a non-representational approach to architecture generally.

PART II

Reeling back to a parallel process, **PART II,** on "The Form-Taking Architecture of Apartments," tackles a distinctly organized spatial framework that had evolved independently in several lines of transformation in the arrangement of palatial architectures in the Italian states, France, England and Spain.

Starting from a critical review of changing analytic approaches to these linear suites of rooms as a framework for the reception of guests according to their rank, the first chapter (2.1) revisits the longer lineage of the segmentary spatial organization that characterizes aristocratic residences as an apparatus to facilitate the ruler's appearances by way of a spatial distinction between the rooms for reception and retreat. It investigates the **CONNECTIVE SYNTHESIS** of their segmentary organization through traditionally additive building practices (2.1.1). It then touches on some crucial differences in the organization of apartments that underlies different kinds of royal castles, papal, clerical, and communal palaces (2.1.2), *castelli* and *villas* (2.1.3) as well as the progressive opening up of these formerly defensive structures.

The central chapter (2.2) then examines the **DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** that distinguishes the internal modification of French residences and the traditionally single-range structure of their central *corps de logis*. Based on a closer understanding of an internal differentiation of the *Donjon* type (2.2.1), the French *logis* is revisited as a highly self-structuring spatial arrangement (2.2.2). The last section foregrounds the longstanding form of spatial self-organization within these structures and locates a crucial transformation in the introduction of a central stair (2.2.3) that would drive the further evolution of these structures (and the differentiation of appartements within them) in a novel direction: into formally symmetricized, yet organizationally asymmetical arrangements.

The last chapter of this part centers on the **CONJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS** of appartements as a specific dispositif of power (2.3). After placing the genesis of this dispositif in the context of an increasing 'becoming-sedentary' of the French court throughout the sixteenth century (2.3.1), this chapter discusses the apparition of new spatial means (especially the *antichambre*) and their cross-cultural and origins. As I demonstrate, these then converge with new organizational schemes (like the *dégagement des heures*) in a systemic conjunction enacting a spatio-temporal framework for drawing distinctions (2.3.2), in which the architecture of appartements in their increasing delimitation of access facilitated the emergence of a new kind of royal power (2.3.3).

PART III

Bringing all these strands together, **PART III,** on "The Concretizing System of Appartements," examines how this form of organization concretized into a distinctly organized and highly codified socio-spatial system, in the historical context of the planning of Parisian town houses from the late-sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Picking up the central strands from the previous part, the initial chapter builds a more synthetic perspective on the connected evolution of the serial spatiality of appartements and the *corps de logis* of the Parisian town house (3.1). Briefly revisiting the early formation of the *hôtel* up to the early 1600s (3.1.1), and then moving on to a pivotal discussion of the slow systematization of residential planning techniques, particularly with Le Muet's problematization of the 'art of distribution' in the mid-1620s (3.1.2), this chapter sheds some new light on the evolving spatiality of apartments by exploring the distinct male and female agencies that contributed to a spatial differentiation into a *grand appartement* (centered around the *chambre de parade*) from the 1580s onwards, which is increasingly coupled with a smaller apartment, in the incipient doubling-up of the *corps de logis* during the 1630s–60s (3.1.3).

To reconsider this process in a more assemblage-theoretic manner, the second chapter places this crucial disjunction in a wider epistemological, sociological, and technological context of co-evolving systems of distinction (3.2). After revisiting this quest for a new logic for planning technique (3.2.1) in light of the distinct relevance of spatial differentiation within the court aristocracy's form of social production through ranking (3.2.2), the final part elaborates how emerging technical rationales for ordering residential space, and a more technologized conception of ordering and distribution emerged. It entailed the twofold differentiation and integration of a *grand appartement de parade* and a smaller *appartement de commodité,* which became a central technical objective in the discourses of Perrault and D'Aviler (3.2.3).

The concluding chapter of **PART III** presents in detail how in more concrete architectural experimentation during the first half of the eighteenth century, these abstract objectives came to be coupled into a new dispositif of conventional planning (3.3). Starting with examining the emerging manner of distributing plans in the quest to establish distributions with *convenance* in the newly doubled-up structures of the *hôtel* (3.3.1), this analysis centers on the formation of a more complex serial dispositif. In the central section the attention shifts to emerging theory-practices of distributing with *convenance*, in discussing

J.-F. Blondel's didactic works (3.3.2). This discussion marks out a particular technological lineage of converging social and planning techniques through which apartments started to form a highly differentiated and coded spatial system, now composed of three sorts of appartements, arranged according to two differing distinctions, which is to say, in more gridlike manner. The last section works out several conclusions about how these lineages were then compounded into a complex organon of control (3.3.3).

EPI

The study concludes with an epilogue, appended to **PART III**, on the specific epiphylogenetic aspect in the convergence of the genealogical strands and technical lineages. Drawing these together, it synthesizes in what way the system of planning appartements was further transposed on a larger scale of urban planning. That technical ensemble, largely derived from the planning of apartments, would continue to evolve through the architecture of apartment houses during the 1750–1900s, and the related forms of apartment housing as it went global in the 1900s; but which would be the subject of the future volumes to complete *A Flat Theory*.

NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING

A Flat Theory is een genealogisch onderzoek naar de historische totstandkoming van appartementen. Als zodanig, is het een eerste samenhangende studie naar de complexe processen die ervoor gezorgd hebben dat appartementen onze wereldwijde dominante vorm van stedelijk samenleving zijn geworden. Het onderzoek is opgedeeld in drie delen. Het eerste (I) zal de opkomst van appartementen in de 15e tot de 17e eeuw in Europa in kaart brengen. Vervolgens zullen (II) flatgebouwen in Europa in de periode tussen de 17e en de 19e eeuw in beschouwing worden genomen (II) en tenslotte (III) appartement huisvesting voor de 20e eeuw. Dit onderzoek vormt het eerste deel van een groter project dat gericht is op wat ik zal omschrijven als de 'materieel-discursieve' formatie van appartementen in de periode 1540–1780 in Centraal-Europa. Binnen dit onderzoek worden appartementen beschouwd als een architecturaal concept, een ruimtelijk fenomeen en een residentieel systeem.

INTRO

Het eerste deel opent met een algemene introductie getiteld "De Historische Formatie van Appartementen," met als oogpunt het grotere project in te leiden. Het identificeert de ontbrekende benadering met betrekking tot de totstandkoming van appartementen, door de kritische beschouwing van de veelvoudige discoursen omtrent het onderwerp in ogenschouw te nemen. Het gaat hier niet om slechts een simpel kennishiaat, omdat deze blinde vlek wordt beschouwd als symptomatisch en een complex, structureel probleem binnen de theorievorming over de gebouwde omgeving. Gebaseerd op deze onderzoeksproblematiek, bevordert het een radicaliteit voor bepaalde bestaande onderzoeken die suggereren de historische totstandkoming van appartementen te benaderen als een topologische ordening die onze wederkerige verhouding in en met de gebouwde omgeving transformeert. Het is mogelijk deze transformatie op een meer coherente manier te analyseren wanneer zij wordt bezien op een algemener, ecosysteem- en technologie gericht niveau. *A Flat Theory* combineert historisch gevestigde wetenschap en discoursanalyses met een meer assemblage-theoretische uitbreiding van genealogische methodiek, die het ontstaan van appartementen door een epi-phylo-genetische benadering in kaart zal brengen. Het brengt de geschiedenis van appartementen in kaart op het snijvlak van drie met elkaar verweven socio-psycho-klimatologische wereldlijke dynamieken waarbinnen ontwikkelingsprocessen en subjectiviteit samen vorm krijgen.

BOEK O

Deze onderzoeksbenadering wordt verder toegelicht in '**BOEK O**,' een voorbespreking waarbinnen verscheidene theoretisch-methodologische aspecten centraal staan. Het gaat respectievelijk in op de genealogische methodiek en bespreekt de methodologische vereisten voor het benaderen van de architectuur van appartementen. Dit gebeurt door middel van een assemblage-theoretische benadering. Door en close reading van (post-) Foucauldiaanse en (post-)Deleuzo-Guattariaanse onderzoeken, plaatst Boek O dit onderzoek vervolgens binnen een groter epistemologisch kader dat vraagt om minder hierachiseerde ontologieën. Het schetst een niet- reducerende, analytische benadering van de gebouwde omgeving door het ontmaskeren van representationalistische leeswijzen van architectuur. Tegelijkertijd distilleert het een apparaat van theoretische concepten (verzameld in een bijgevoegde glossarium) die vanuit een proces-ontologische en genetisch perspectief inzicht bieden bij het conceptualiseren van de wijze waarop historische formaties binnen (en middels van) architecturale arrangementen vorm vinden.

VOLUME I

Boekdeel Een "Over de Genealogie van Appartementen" brengt in opvolging van de inleidende discussie in drie delen (**DEEL I-III**) drie historische lijnen bij elkaar. Hierbij ligt de focus op het ontstaan van appartementen als architecturaal concept, ruimte en systeem.

DEEL I

DEEL I over "Het Kristalliserend Concept van Appartamenti" reconstrueert de grotendeels in de vergetelheid geraakte conceptuele afkomst van appartementen als zijnde een schematische ontwerpstrategie in de Italiaanse architecturale verhandelingen tussen de 14e en 16e eeuw.

Het boek brengt ons naar het jaar 1540, het punt waarop Sebastiano Serlio het begrip *appartamenti* introduceerde binnen het architecturale discours. Om dit minder bekende feit recht te doen, problematiseert het eerste hoofdstuk (1.1) de abstracte betekenis van de term als een organisatieconcept en reconstrueert diens genegeerde conceptuele oorsprong binnen de artistieke praktijk en de regels van (com)partitie. Het middelste hoofdstuk (1.2) onderstreept hoe deze organisatie eerder een leidend schema vormden om architectonische compositie te onderwijzen op het snijvlak van geometrische technieken en veranderende ordeningsconcepties; met inbegrip van Alberti's *partitione*, Filarete's *compartitione* en Martini's *parti-*

menti, maar ook Sangallos en Peruzzi gebruik van het schema *ad quadratum*. Door een conceptanalyse waarbinnen deze veranderende opvattingen worden gesitueerd als reacties op steeds veranderende problemen, vat dit onderdeel samen hoe deze *partimenti* evolueerden van een aanvankelijk meer representatief, geometrisch principe naar een abstract-diagrammatische matrix voor het ontwerp van architectuur die een nieuwe, creatieve kracht ontketende. Het laatste hoofdstuk van dit boek vat een aantal conclusies samen die gestoeld zijn op het herzien van de specifieke pedagogische functie van deze matrix van appartamenti, om zodoende niet alleen de avant-gardistische positie van Serlio's praktische theorie te herwinnen, maar ook lessen te trekken ten dienste van een niet-representatieve toegang naar architectuur in het algemeen.

DEEL II

DEEL II gaat terug naar het parallelle verhaal over de architectuur van appartementen haar vorm vond. Daarmee behelst dit deel het op een particuliere manier gestructureerde ruimtelijke raamwerk van appartementen, dat door verschillende transformatielijnen binnen de paleisarchitectuur van de Italiaanse staten, Frankrijk, Engeland en Spanje, ontstond. Na een kritische inleiding over veranderende, analytische benaderingen over deze lineaire suites, en diens gebruik voor de ontvangst van bezoekers in overeenkomst met hun verschillende rangen en aanzien, bekijkt het eerste hoofdstuk (2.1) de langere lijn van de segmentaire, ruimtelijke ordening die kenmerkend is voor aristocratische residenties, en hoe deze als een voorziening voor de verschijning van de werkte door een onderscheid te maken tussen ruimtes om zich te etaleren of terug te trekken. Daarin wordt de 'connectieve synthese' van deze vorm van organisatie herkend middels de oudere additieve bouwtechnieken (2.1.1). Vervolgens worden enkele cruciale verschillen binnen de ordening van appartementen geanalyseerd, die achter verschillende typen van koninklijke, pauselijke, kerkelijke paleizen of gemeentelijke gebouwen (2.1.2), en *castelli* en *villa*'s (2.1.3) liggen, met zicht op de toenemende openstelling van deze voorheen defensieve bouwwerken.

Het centrale hoofdstuk (2.2) onderzoekt een kenmerkende 'disjunctieve synthese' die de interne modificatie van de Franse residentiële gebouwen en diens traditionele arrangement van het zogenoemde *corps de logis* als een gebouw dat uit een enkele rij kamers bestaat. Op basis van een diepgravende analyse van een interne differentiatie, uitgaand van het *Donjon*-typus (2.2.1), wordt het Franse *logis* beschouwd als een soort zelfstructurerende, ruimtelijke ordening (2.2.2). Het laatste deel belicht de reeds lang bestaande vorm van ruimtelijke zelforganisatie binnen dergelijke structuren en erkent een cruciale transformatie binnen de introductie van de centrale trap (2.2.3). Dit drijft de verdere ontwikkeling van deze structuren (en de differentiatie van appartementen daarbinnen) in de vorm van symmetrische, maar organisatorisch asymmetrische composities, in een nieuwe richting.

Het derde hoofdstuk gaat over de 'conjunctieve synthese' van appartementen als een dispositief van macht (2.3). Het ontstaan van dit dispositief wordt geplaatst in de context van een toenemend 'sedentair bestaan' van het Franse hof tijdens de 16e eeuw (2.3.1). Vervolgens bespreekt dit hoofdstuk de verschijning van nieuwe ruimtelijke voorzieningen (in het bijzonder de antichambre) en hun interculturele afkomst. Zoals ik aantoon, komen deze vervolgens samen met nieuwe, organisatorische schema's (zoals de *dégagement des heures*) in een systemische verbinding die een ruimtelijk-temporeel raamwerk vormt voor het creëren van sociale hiërarchieën (2.3.2). Zo faciliteerden de toenemende beperkingen in toegankelijkheid binnen de koninklijke appartementen dan ook een nieuw vorm van overheersing (2.3.3).

DEEL III

Al deze onderdelen worden samengebracht in **BOEK III**. Hierin wordt belicht hoe deze organisatiestructuur een concrete uiting vond binnen het hooggeorganiseerd en sterk gecodificeerd sociaal-ruimtelijk systeem van de Parijse *hôtels* in de 16e tot 18e eeuw. Het eerste hoofdstuk bouwt voort op het centrale thema van het vorige onderdeel en schetst een samenhangend perspectief wat betreft de evolutie van seriële organisatie binnen appartementen en het *corps de logis* van het *hôtel* (3.1). Dit hoofdstuk gaat opnieuw kort in op het vroege ontstaan van het *hôtel* tot de 16e eeuw (3.1.1), en een discussie die de beginnende systematisering van residentiële ontwerppraktijken, met en focus op Le Muet's problematisatie van de kunst *de distribution* omstreeks 1620, verder toelicht (3.1.2). Vervolgens worden nieuwe zienswijzen op het evoluerende systeem van appartementen aangetoond, door onderscheid te maken tussen mannelijke en vrouwelijke vormen van agency, die vanaf de jaren 1580 hebben bijgedragen aan de ontwikkeling van ruimtelijke differentiatie in de vorm van een *grand appartement* (met een focus op de *chambre de parade*). Tijdens het begin van de 'verdubbeling' van het *corps de logis* tussen 1630 en 1660, werd deze vaker samengevoegd met een kleiner appartement (3.1.3). Om dit proces op een meer assemblage-theoretische manier

te herzien, plaatst het tweede hoofdstuk deze cruciale disjunctie in een bredere epistemologische, sociologische en technologische context waarin co-evoluerende onderscheidingssystemen centraal staan (3.2). De zoektocht naar een nieuwe grondgedachte of logica voor ontwerptechnieken van plattegronden (3.2.1), wordt in het kader van het belang van ruimtelijke differentiatie binnen het systeem van sociale rangschikking van de hoof-aristocratie onderzocht (3.2.2.). Het laatste deel gaat in op de opkomende technische grondslagen voor het ordenen van residentiële ruimten en hoe deze technologische conceptie van ordening en distributie in een complexer ruimtelijk systeem resulteerden. Deze omvatte een tweeledige differentiatie en integratie van een groter *appartement de parade* en een kleiner *appartement de commodité*; een arrangement dat een centraal probleem binnen het werk van Perrault en D'Aviler vormde (3.2.3). Het afsluitende hoofdstuk van **BOEK III** geeft een gedetailleerd beeld van de wijze waarop deze abstracte doelstellingen werden gekoppeld aan een nieuw dispositief van conventioneel plannen met betrekking tot architectonische experimenten in de eerste helft van de 17e eeuw (3.3). Deze analyse richt zich op het vormen van een complex, serieel dispositief door uit te gaan van een nieuwe wijze om, binnen de verdubbelde structuur van het *hôtel*, plattegronden op een manier te realiseren zodat 'convenance' bereikt wordt (3.3.1). De middensectie van het hoofdstuk vestigt de aandacht op de opkomende theoretische praktijken van het distribuëren met *convenance*. J.-F Blondels didactische werken worden in detail besproken (3.3.2). Deze discussie markeert een bepaalde technologische lijn van convergerende, sociale planning-technieken waarbinnen appartementen zich ontwikkelden als sterk gedifferentieerde en gecodeerde ruimtelijke systemen. Op die manier vallen er drie soorten appartementen, gerangschikt volgens twee verschillende onderscheidingswijzen (en meer rasterachtige wijze) te herkennen. In het laatste deel worden verschillende conclusies uitgewerkt over hoe deze ontwikkelingslijnen vervolgens verbonden werden en uiting kregen in een complex controlemechanisme (3.3.3).

EPI

Het onderzoek wordt afgesloten met een epiloog aan het eind van **BOOK III**. Deze richt zich op het specifieke 'epi-phylo-genetische' aspect binnen de convergentie van genealogische strengen en technische overdrachtslijnen. Door deze samen te brengen, wordt zichtbaar op welke wijze het systeem voor het plannen van appartementen verder opgeschaald werd binnen het kader van stedenbouw. Het technische ensemble dat grotendeels is afgeleid van de ordening van appartementsplattegronden, zou zich blijven ontwikkelen binnen de architectuur van appartement- of flatgebouwen tussen 1750 en 1900 en de aanverwante vorm van huisvesting die wereldwijd gebruikt werd vanaf 1900. AI is dat een onderwerp voor de volgende delen ter voltooiing van *A Flat Theory*.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Robert Alexander Gorny (born January 8, 1984 in Oberhausen, Germany) is an architect, educator, and theorist aiming at promoting a more relational understanding of (and approach to) the ecologies of architecture.

After receiving his *Abitur* from the Elsa-Brändström-Gymnasium, Oberhausen, he studied architecture and design at the State Academy of Arts and Design, Stuttgart, where he obtained his diploma (2003–09). He then gathered several years of work experience at the Berlin-based office SMAQ, working as a long-term collaborator on a wide range of architectural and urban design projects with a decidedly ecosystemic approach to urban environments (2009–12). From 2012–14, he pursued a post-professional masters degree in architectural and urban design at the Berlage Center for Advanced Studies, TU Delft, where he graduated *cum laude*. While continuing to work there as a research assistant, he was admitted as an external doctoral candidate at TU Delft's Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment, Department of Architecture, to conduct this genealogical study of apartments.

Since 2014, Robert has been involved as a guest teacher for various courses offered by the chair of Methods and Analysis (now Methods of Analysis and Imagination), including the design theory-related seminars on the tools and roles of architects and architecture (2014–present). He also acted as co-host and organizer of a lecture series on research methods (2015–2020), recently extended in a lecture series focusing on the relation of research and design-methodological positions (2019–present). In 2016 he joined the editorial board of the internationally acclaimed, peer-reviewed, open-access architecture theory journal *Footprint*.

His doctoral work and wider research on queer theory and technology has been published in professional journals and peer-reviewed international theory journals such as *Architectural Theory Review*, as well as some in conference proceedings and anthologies. He has also presented his research at various international conferences and venues at the University of Amsterdam, DAZ Berlin, ArtEZ Enschede, the Rotterdam Academie van Bouwkunst, University of Twente, and Utrecht University.

List of Selected Publications

Robert A. Gorny, "The Immunization of Paris: Closing the Triptych of Modern Clichés for a Two-Fold Matter of Form-taking," in *Critical and Clinical Cartographies* International Conference Proceedings, ed. Andrej Radman and Stavros Kousoulas, 7–24. Delft: TU Delft/Japsam, 2015.

—— with Dirk van den Heuvel, "New Figurations in Architecture Theory: From Queer Performance to Becoming Trans," *Footprint* 21 (2017): 1–10.

—— "A Relational Conception of Living Together/Apart," in *The Architecture of Together and Apart: An Inquiry into Apartment Buildings*, ed. Matīss Groskaufmanis, Evelīna Ozola, Anda Skrējāne, 179–87. Riga: New Theatre Institute of Latvia, 2018.

—— "Reclaiming What Architecture Does: Toward an Ethology and Transformative Ethics of Material Arrangements," *Architectural Theory Review* 22, no. 2 (2018): 188–209.

—— "A Cartography of Discourses on Architectures of Life and/or Death," in *Architectures of Life and Death: The Eco-Aesthetics of the Built Environment*, ed. Andrej Radman and Stavros Kousoulas, 103–128. London/New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2021.

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Ecologies of Architecture

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KEY TO ROOM FUNCTIONS IN THE PLANS / DIAGRAMS

A–C	*Anti-cabinet*
AR–C	*arrière-cabinet*
AC	*anticamera/-chambre* (antechamber)
ADC	*appartement de commodité*
ADP	*appartement de parade*
ADS	*appartement de société*
APT	appartement
AU	*aula* (hall)
AR	audience room
B	*bains* (baths)
BD	*boudoir*
BF	*buffet*
BI	*bibliothèque* (library)
C	*cabinet/gabinetto*
CA	*camera* (generic room)
CDR	*chambre du Roi/de la Reine* (king's/queen's room)
CH	*chambre/chambre à coucher* (room or bedroom)
CR	*camera Regis*
CHI	*chambre à l'italienne* (room with double height)
CHP	*chambre de parade* (state bedroom)
CT	*cabinet de toilette*
CU	*cubiculum* (bedroom)
G	*galeria* (gallery)
G–	*grand(e)* . . . [e.g. *Grand-salle*]
GM	*garde-meuble/-manger* (storage)
GR	*garde-robe/guardaroba*
LO	open loggia
L	*lieu* (loo)
O	Oratory
P–	*Petit(e)* . . . [e.g. *Petit cabinet*]
PAR	*Camera Paramenti/Chambre de Parement* (parament chamber), or *Chambre à parer.*
PAP	*Camera Pappagalli* in the papal palaces
R	*Retrait/Retrete* (withdrawing room)
RC	*Retrocamera* (room behind chamber)
REE	*Re(e)cambra* in Majorcan palaces
RET	*Chambre de retrait* (withdrawing room)
S	*Saletta/Salette* (smaller hall)
SA	*Salle*, or *Sala/Salone* (larger/largest hall)
SDA	*Salle d'assemblée* (for formal gatherings)
SDC	*Salle de compagnie* (for informal gath.)
SL	*Sallon* (salon, reception room
SM	*Salle à manger* (separate dining room)
ST	*Studiolo/Scrittoio* (study)
TIN	*Tinellum* (dining hall)
V	*Vis/"Grand Vis,"* or *Vestibule*
†	*Chapel*

A Flat Theory presents a first step toward a yet-to-be-completed, larger project: a genealogy of apartments. While centering on the historical formation of apartments, it does not offer a straight-forward history of apartments or flats. Rather, as a contribution to a wider history of the present, it draws together the first synthetic study of the complex processes through which apartments have initially taken form. To do so, it proposes an eco-systemic and assemblage-theoretic extension of genealogical modes of inquiry so as to draw together an epi-phylo-genetic mapping of this complex process. After situating and specifying this approach, *A Flat Theory* charts three converging lineages that mark the 'material-discursive' formation of *appartamenti* and *appartements* as an (I) architectural concept, (II) spatial phenomenon, and (III) residential system during the 1540–1780s in western Europe.

Robert Alexander Gorny is an architecture theorist, transdisciplinary scholar, and educator at the Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment, TU Delft. His research aims at promoting more relational, ecosystemic, and machinic conceptions of (and approaches to) architectural arrangements. He is editorial board member of *Footprint* journal.