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Playing with Politics: Preliminary Results from Interactive Interventions on AI and Democracy in Five Countries with 2024 Elections

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Abstract

More people voted in 2024 than any other year in human history, while often relying on the internet for political information. This combination resulted in critical challenges for democracy. To address these concerns, we designed an exhibition that applied interactive experiences to help visitors understand the impact of digitization on democracy. This late-breaking work addresses the research questions: 1) What do participants, exposed to playful interventions, think about these topics? and 2) How do people estimate their skills and knowledge about countering misinformation? We collected data in 5 countries through showcases held within weeks of relevant 2024 elections. During visits, participants completed a survey detailing their experiences and emotional responses. Participants expressed high levels of self-confidence regarding the detection of misinformation and spotting AI-generated content. This paper contributes to addressing digital literacy needs by fostering engaging interactions with AI and politically relevant issues surrounding campaigning and misinformation.

CCS Concepts

• **Human-centered computing** → Human computer interaction (HCI); HCI design and evaluation methods; Field studies; Interaction design; Empirical studies in interaction design; • **Social and professional topics** → Computing / technology policy; Government technology policy; Governmental regulations.

Keywords

Interaction Design, Human-centered computing, Artificial Intelligence, Learning in games, Digital Literacy, Democracy, Elections

*These authors contributed equally to this research and share first authorship.

1 Introduction

With elections in Europe, Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Oceania, it was projected that more people would vote in 2024 than any prior year in human history [1]. Concurrently, these voters encountered political information online, in environments increasingly driven by algorithms [2]. However, at least some of these algorithms produce misinformation about elections, revealing key vulnerabilities in the platforms voters rely on [3]. This context highlights the urgent need for digital media literacy, such that voters can understand the individuals, corporations, and algorithms that influence them, and ultimately make independent and informed voting choices. What's more, the European Commission views media literacy as a key way to mitigate systemic risks facing our modern electoral processes [4]. Yet the European Commission reports that 46% of EU residents aged 16-74 lack basic digital skills [5], while the European Digital Media Observatory identified disinformation campaigns, particularly related to the electoral process, in 10 different European

elections in 2023 [6]. These empirical phenomena demonstrate the practical and social relevance of meaningful interventions on digital literacy, particularly in 2024, the "Year of Elections." To address this need, we assembled an international, cross-sector consortium with a variety of expertise related to digital literacy, serious gaming, and interactive design. The result of this collaboration was an immersive, tactile exhibition called *fabricated: Unravel Fact from Fiction in Your Digital World.*

We toured *fabricated* through libraries, festivals, and cultural centres in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, the UK, and the US. These showcases offered voters a deeper understanding of their digital media environment and helped them critically engage with political (mis)information. But it also offered an opportunity to address two research questions:

1) What do participants, exposed to playful interventions about AI, digitization, and politics, think about these topics?

2) How do people estimate their own skills and knowledge about identifying and countering misinformation online?

To understand these topics, we surveyed 403 participants who visited the exhibition. This late-breaking work, coming on the heels of the November 2024 US election, serves as a complete "prequel" analysis of the *fabricated* interventions.

Our investigation serves as a compelling illustration of tangible and digital interactions that can affect electoral resilience. Furthermore, it underscores the roles played by media platforms, creators, and consumers in the battle against misinformation and the promotion of digital media literacy—an issue of paramount importance in the field [7-11].

2 Background

2.1 Electoral Misinformation and Its Role in Democratic Societies

Public discourse around mis- and disinformation increased after the election of Donald Trump in 2016 and the revelations of the Cambridge Analytica scandal after Brexit [12]. However, no unified definitions of key terms have been developed, and many terms are used interchangeably. Therefore, differentiating between disinformation, misinformation and similar terms, such as fake news and malinformation is useful.

Disinformation is most often defined as false information that is knowingly and deliberately distributed to harm [13-16] or to advance political goals by manipulation [17]. It often intersects with incivility and negative information [66]. *Misinformation* is distributed without knowledge about the information's factuality or disseminated with ignorance [18, 19]. Moreover, the term misinformation is often used as a summary term to denote various kinds of false information and undesired content [20-23]. Malinformation is considered information that is distributed to harm. However, its factuality is not considered [15]. The term *fake news* is sometimes used. It is very often politically instrumentalized, and because of this, not considered useful for research [13, 25]. This paper uses the term misinformation for a more neutral outlook.

Electoral misinformation is a critical issue in liberal democracies, as its distribution might infringe on voter rights and erode the democratic system [14]. Moreover, elections are phases with intense debates and media coverage that often does not focus on

policy issues but on scandals and emotionalised information, creating a volatile and fast-changing information environment. Electoral misinformation often takes the form of a directed campaign, for instance, the narrative of mail-in-voter fraud after the 2020 US elections, propagated by media actors to undermine trust in the electoral process. Media outlets were crucial in agenda-setting and framing the narrative [26]. However, social media and the distribution of media-produced content on platforms such as Twitter/X also play a role [27]. Multiple X accounts tracked the case of allegedly thousands of ballots found in a dumpster in Sonoma, California, to demonstrate that mail-in voting was problematic. The story was first posted on Twitter in September 2020 with photos of the allegedly discarded ballots. However, the images were from 2018 and showed ballots that were properly disposed of 22 months after the midterm elections. The post was widely distributed on social media and picked up by the Gateway Pundit, a hyper-partisan right-wing media outlet. Finally, the story was also retweeted by Donald Trump Jr.'s Twitter account within the first 10 hours. Sonoma County eventually released a statement disputing the allegations. Afterwards, the story quickly lost traction (even though it experienced a brief regaining of popularity on Facebook a couple of days later) [27]. Such a case shows how quickly misinformation content is distributed, especially if it is supported by opinion leaders and media accounts that have many followers.

The spike in popularity of AI-generated content also impacted the dynamics of creating and sharing misinformation. Large language models have become more successful in generating images, videos and text content, leading to an increased interest in and application of applications such as ChatGPT or Dall-E [28]. The increased accessibility of content generated by AI brings new challenges to platform policy [29], as the image generation is increasingly adopted by far-right groups to influence elections, for instance in Germany [30]. Even in non-malicious cases, the capacity of AI to hallucinate content presents a key challenge for misinformation management [71]. The scale of misinformation dissemination might increase considerably, as these automatically generated products become increasingly convincing [72]. Related issues have already been observed with the use of AI-generated content for scams and fraud [73]. Moreover, AI systems might improve targeting capacity, for instance with more accurate personalization of content [74]. Overall, however, current predictions of increased disinformation are mostly speculative, and many effects are not yet proven [75].

2.2 Considerations in Designing Interventions Relating to Electoral Misinformation

In designing an exhibition to address the digital political landscape, we considered how misinformation is addressed at three different levels: the macro, the meso, and the micro. On the macro level, regulation can restrict the dissemination of misinformation and harmful content. On the meso level, platforms can delete content and accounts, limit the visibility of content [31], or add tags [32] and warnings [33]. These meso-level actions can also be automated through the use of AI to support the identification and deletion of harmful content, as conducted by Meta [34]. Beyond platforms, meso-level interventions are conducted by independent fact-checking organizations and journalists who detect and debunk

misinformation [35], as well as researchers who have developed systems to detect misinformation in videos [36].

While *fabricated* highlights activity from the macro and meso levels, its primary focus is on the micro level. Content moderation at this level typically refers to user contributions to flagging content [37] or reporting misconduct, but these interventions efforts can be challenging. Given the socio-technical nature of addressing electoral misinformation, various levels of literacy become important, including digital literacy [38], media literacy [39], AI-literacy [40, 41], and information literacy [42]. The latter has proven particularly valuable in helping users identify misinformation [43].

Gamified interventions have proven effective in boosting digital literacy and building resilience against misinformation [63]. The interactive, playful nature of *fabricated's* games and installations lowers barriers to developing digital and electoral literacy, encouraging civic engagement. Research shows that gamified learning tools, compared to traditional quizzes, enhance media literacy across all levels of prior civic knowledge [44]. Simon [2010], in her book on participatory museums, highlights how gamified experiences like *fabricated* provide a form of social, active fulfilment that typical museum exhibits often lack, fostering enthusiasm and deeper learning among visitors. Although often perceived as suitable only for children, playful approaches also appeal to adults, creating informal, inclusive environments that make learning accessible and break down traditional knowledge-sharing hierarchies [46, 47].

3 Methods

The exhibition took place in The Hague (five days), Brussels (four days), Berlin (three days), and Amsterdam (five days) ahead of the 2024 EU Parliamentary elections, followed by Newcastle, UK (five days) three weeks after the 2024 UK general election, and Detroit, MI (four days) and Columbus, OH (7 days) ahead of the 2024 US Presidential election. Each showcase was conducted in a public space, such as a library, festival, or common square. Overall, 2876 people visited the exhibition, as tracked by manual clickers. All material was provided in English, Dutch, and German. During the exhibitions, visitors participated in short surveys in one of these three languages, addressing questions about the installations and participant experience and knowledge, developed through consultation of Beatty et al. [2020]. In total, we collected 403 surveys and removed 24 incorrectly completed surveys (6%) from the final analysis.

We asked participants four demographic questions, six Likert-scale style questions on the exhibitions themselves, one knowledge question and one free-text question[1]. Participants filled in the survey on paper, which they typically carried during their visit to their exhibition or picked up at the end of the exhibition path. Once they completed their surveys, participants deposited them in a "ballot box" to experientially evoke the electoral context. The surveys were subsequently digitized manually. The research team analysed the survey questions descriptively and classified the free-text emotions manually according to the circumplex model of emotions by Russell [1980].

Gender distribution of survey participants was relatively even, with 127 (41%) participants identifying as male and 168 (54%) as female and 5 (2%) as nonbinary. Self-identified political leanings (5-point scale) were more skewed, with participants predominantly falling into the categories of Left or Liberal.

4 Games and Interventions in the Exhibition

The scenography of *fabricated* immersed visitors in a dynamic visual and tactile experience. Modular aluminium structures displaying the installations were designed to mimic the frames of digital devices, while translucent fabric imprinted with generative patterns

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[1]For the full survey text, see Appendix B.
[2]For a better understanding of the individual installations, pictures are included in the Appendix.


Figure 1: Illustration of the exhibition. [2]

undulated overhead, symbolizing the constant flow of information. The exhibition's design aimed to create accessible, inclusive spaces for dialogue, encouraging diverse communities to rethink their digital landscapes.

The exhibition was divided into six stages that guide the visitor through several tactile, visual, and text-based elements, covering the following topics: AI in the news, misinformation and fact-checking, content moderation, the industry of digital services dedicated to influencing public opinion, and targeted advertising and facial recognition technology.

4.1 Introduction Video

Visitors were welcomed to the exhibition using an introductory video, 75-90 seconds long and featuring an AI-generated "newscaster." The AI "newscasters" discussed challenges media outlets are facing, with particular emphasis on the impacts of social media and AI on elections. In total, five different videos were used, with speech generated in English (American and British accents), Dutch, German, and French (the only proportion of the exhibition in French); the American "newscaster" was male, while all other avatars were female. 2-3 videos were typically shown on a loop at each location, focusing on relevant languages for the showcase country (e.g., English, Dutch, and French shown in Belgium while only English and German were shown in Germany). While this installation was not studied in the surveys, the researchers observed two predominant reactions among participants: disbelief that the avatar was not human, or critically picking out flaws (e.g., "his eyebrows are weird," "she doesn't blink enough," "her accent switches between Flemish and Dutch," etc.).

4.2 *The Personal Press*

This hybrid installation combined tangible physical elements with digital tools to help participants appreciate the human-computer interaction behind ChatGPT. On a screen, a fictional news article was shown. These articles were regionally localised, with European audiences reading about farmers protesting climate change legislation in Brussels, while American audiences read about a proposed ban on single-use plastics by the Biden administration. Participants could then turn physical dials to alter the "values" or "tone" of the article; before updating the content, coloured pixels briefly appeared all over the screen, to evoke the idea that the machine was "working" or "thinking." Five inputs were available for each knob for a total of 25 possible combinations. On the values knob, participants could choose "altruist," "conservative," "liberal," "anarchist," or "climate;" on the tone knob, participants could choose "cynical," "conversational," "dramatic," "poetic," or "neutral." When these prompts were sent to ChatGPT, different combinations would emphasize or omit various aspects of the content. For instance, choosing the "conservative" value was more likely to mention arrests, which were not mentioned when choosing the "liberal" value.

4.3 *Verify This!*

This installation provided an analogue complement to *The Personal Press*, highlighting the time and effort required for good journalism [50, 51]. Leading up to the showcase, Agence-France Presse (AFP) supplied real social media posts containing misinformation, along with thorough fact-check analyses [52, 53]. Each fact check detailed the specific misinformation tactics used in the posts, such as false claims, satire, AI-generated or mislabelled images, and factual misrepresentations. For localisation, examples were chosen from posts by users from the target country, which had been shared widely 1-6 months prior to the showcase. Posts were chosen to represent issues relevant to the upcoming elections, such as food and health regulations, electric car policies, and (mis)information about candidates or election polling.

To make this fact-checking process both tangible and physical, the installation was designed to mimic a newspaper rack. Participants could lift a wooden rod holding two printed pages, with the original post on one side and the fact-check on the other. Each showcase featured 12 post-and-fact-check pairs, half in English and half in the relevant local language. The posts contained text, images, and occasionally video content, with a still image shown for video posts to maintain the analogue format.

4.4 *Moderator Mayhem*[3]

Having completed a hybrid and analogue intervention, the third installation utilized a digital, gamified approach. In *Moderator Mayhem*, participants roleplayed as a content moderator, deciding whether flagged posts should stay online [54]. In the story of the game, the participant is a new moderator at a website that hosts reviews; they are shown short, individual complaints about posts on the website, and must decide whether to leave the original review up or take it down in response to the complaint. The interface employs the mechanic of Tinder to make this speedy evaluative process familiar: swipe right to keep content online or swipe left to take it down. Only 1-2 explanatory sentences are provided per complaint, though users may click a button for additional context (with a 2-second time penalty). Participants can receive support or criticism from their manager for some moderation decisions; additionally, they may be shown "appeals" for content that fictional users felt was taken down or left up unfairly. The content covers topics like hate speech, nudity, copyright infringement, doxxing, intervention by political actors, and more. The game proceeds in three timed rounds that take approximately 3 minutes to complete, and if participants are either too slow or too out of step with company moderation policies, they are "fired." Participants who make it through all 3 rounds are "promoted" (i.e., they win).

Moderator Mayhem was focused on the challenges of effectively moderating content on social media platforms [55]. The game communicates those challenges in a number of ways: tight time constraints; lack of context around an issue; conflicting policies, values, and ethics; frustrated users; tension between speed and accuracy; and edge cases that don't have clear answers. Through grappling with examples of these issues and seeing the consequences of their choices, players gain a better understanding of this challenging topic.

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[3] *Moderator Mayhem* was originally designed by Copia Institute and Leveraged Play. Our research team adapted it for an EU context. The *fabricated* version is publicly available at .

4.5 The Influence Industry

To further expand the learning modalities of the exhibition, this 2-player analogue game focused on stimulating conversation. This installation utilized data from a research project of the same name led by Tactical Tech, which explores the role of private firms in digital election campaigns [56]. This database was gamified using the mechanics of Connect 4.

In *The Influence Industry*, each participant roleplays as the manager of a rival political campaign. On their respective turn, a participant lifts a physical puck which describes a real, legal service available in the showcase country to influence political opinion. Participants read the name and description of this service aloud, and if they choose to do so, they can place the puck in the 6x7 wooden grid. They "win" once they get four pucks in a row.

Each digital service provides insight into the digital mechanics of political influence. Some services are simple (like A/B Testing of interfaces [57]), but others are much more invasive (like the use of consumer data [58, 59]). This 15-minute experience offers participants the chance to reflect on how digitisation shapes democracy. Furthermore, users have three veto cards (randomly drawn) to block pucks played by their opponents. Each veto card corresponds to the "failure" of the digital service in question, such as the leak of voter records after a campaign app is hacked.

4.6 Who Targets Me?

The exhibition concluded with a two-part, fully digital installation focused on targeted advertising and facial recognition technology. First, participants were shown a display of political advertisements seen on Facebook; for localisation, only ads from the current showcase country were shown. Alongside these ads, participants were shown data about real users who saw these ads, collected by project partner Who Targets Me, a UK-based NGO which offers a browser extension to track which political campaigns track a given user [60-61]. These data included demographic information about the user, including age and self-identified political orientation, along with any Why Am I Seeing This? (WAIST) data available from Meta.

The second part of this installation made the concept of targeting experiential and emotional. Facial recognition technology [62] was used to take a visitor's photo and turn them into a photorealistic AI avatar, gradually combining the AI-generated picture with the original. The depiction also provided descriptions of what an "AI advertiser" guessed about the participant: their age, gender, race, emotion, and even political opinion. This installation allowed participants to visualise classification techniques, including the inaccuracies and biases of AI in predicting participant characteristics.

5 Results

The results are divided in two parts. First, the self-reported knowledge and abilities of participants is described. Subsequently, the emotional response and impressions of participants is reported. Most participants estimated their skills to identify whether online news is misleading as fair or good. Overall, not many extremes were reported, however, some of the participants did estimate their own skills as somewhat poor. The moderation game, however, generated


Figure 2: Responses to questions about *Verify This!, Moderator Mayhem* and *The Influence Industry*.

different results. Most participants reported to be somewhat uncertain regarding their ability to moderate content well in a short time. However, the self-reported ability was distributed quite well as many participants also reported to be neutral or somewhat certain in their ability. Agreement about the influence industry's positive influence on democratic values and institutions was not observed among participants. Almost the same number of exhibition visitors chose disagree, agree or neither. No extreme answers were given.

During the exhibition, participants could engage AI in the contexts of news articles and targeted advertising. As shown in Fig. 3, most participants have neutral to somewhat bad feelings about the use of AI-generated content in these settings. However, no extreme feelings could be observed, and the use of AI in journalism is perceived more negatively than the use of AI for targeted advertising as assigned to the visitor in the *Who Targets Me?* installation.


Figure 3: A comparison between emotional responses and impressions about the use of AI in advertising and newspaper articles.

Participants reported varying knowledge of European regulations on AI and digital services. For the EU dataset exclusively, participants were grouped by knowledge level into three categories:

inexperienced (knows no or only one EU regulation), experienced (knows 2-3 EU regulations) or expert (knows all discussed EU regulations); this analysis was not conducted for US or UK participants, as knowledge of EU regulations was considered too exclusive a metric of "expertise" for those populations. 149 EU participants were categorized as inexperienced, 83 as experienced and 21 as experts.

The freely described emotions were grouped according to the circumplex model of emotions Russell [1980] according to valence (positive/comfortable or uncomfortable/negative) and affect (high/active or low (not active)). Accordingly, emotions were categorized in four categories, whereby category 1 are emotions that are rather pleasant and not active (like being relaxed). Category 2 refers to active and pleasant emotions, like being happy or surprised. Category 3 includes emotions that are active and uncomfortable, such as being stressed or mad. The fourth category includes emotions that are not active and unpleasant, such as being sad, bored, or lethargic. A third of participants did not provide an answer to that question; however, most participants that answered the question could be grouped in either category 2 (active and pleasant) or 3 (active and unpleasant). More experienced participants, however, found themselves in category 2, having an active and positive outlook on the exhibition. Experts that expressed an emotion were only part of category 2 or 3, whereas inexperienced participants felt less active after the exhibition.


Figure 4: **Rated expertise and emotions participants described after the exhibition. This analysis only pertains to EU participants, as knowledge of European digital regulations is not considered a meaningful benchmark of expertise for US participants.**

6 Discussion and Limitations

This study describes preliminary observations on how interactive, gamified interventions can engage the public on digital literacy and electoral misinformation. From anecdotal observations and free-text responses to the survey, we observe that participants found the hands-on approach of *fabricated* helped make complex topics like generative AI accessible and relatable. Participants expressed emotions of "curiosity" (38 instances), "worry" (18 instances), "happiness" (13 instances), "fun" (11 instances), and "intrigue" (11 instances). One participant recounted that they are "normally a pessimistic person, [but they] find this exhibition very good to make

people aware of AI and democracy." Another participant described, "I feel extremely concerned that this tech has taken hold so quickly with such little regulation or ability to teach an already media-literacy-challenged populace." Beyond this subset of words, many participants reported feeling activated and optimistic after their visit, emotions which potentially contribute to an enhanced openness to learning. Psychological inoculation, the process of building resilience against misinformation, has been shown to increase with gamified interventions [63], and the exhibition appears to harness this effect well. The balance between positive activation and moderate discomfort may enhance learning and retention, as observed in prior educational psychology research. Notably, the emotions varied by experience level: more experienced participants tended to feel actively positive, while those less experienced displayed lower activity levels. This highlights the importance of tailoring digital literacy interventions to varied experience levels, which could help optimize learning outcomes for different user groups.

These findings are consistent with research indicating that gamified interventions can enhance users' confidence and build cognitive resilience against misinformation [44]. Moreover, participants' high levels of self-confidence in identifying misinformation suggest that the interactive format of the exhibition may indeed lower barriers to both learning and empowering users to engage critically with digital content. However, this confidence might correlate with the highly educated nature of the sample (see appendix), which could influence how participants perceive their skills.

This gap could also be due to a key limitation of this work, rooted in the tension between maximizing interactions and rigorous data collection. In the initial execution of this experiment, we collected pre- and post-exhibition surveys to better monitor changes in participant attitudes; we soon discovered that this measure dissuaded casual participants from viewing the exhibition. Our attendance numbers and conversational engagement increased dramatically without the pre-exhibition survey. In the interest of maximizing our impact, we pursued this more interactive approach, sacrificing some of the interpretability of the data.

This tension is one of the key design challenges for research situated in public spaces. Similarly, although this setting provided the advantage of capturing organic emotional responses, the sample is skewed toward individuals who may be more engaged or highly educated, potentially impacting the generalizability of the findings. This context might explain the relatively high levels of self-confidence reported by participants in identifying misinformation, as well as their interest in learning about interventions against it.

Tailoring the misinformation examples used in *The Personal Press* and *Verify This!* to local contexts appeared to help participants to more easily relate to and critically engage with the content, as observed through anecdotal conversations. The importance of intercultural considerations is emphasized in recent studies, which suggest that responses to disinformation are influenced by national and regional dynamics [64]. These insights suggest that adaptable, culturally tailored interventions could more effectively foster digital literacy in diverse political landscapes.

Regarding further study, this study contributes to the development of AI literacy and the design of interventions to counter

disinformation, yet several areas warrant further exploration. Future research should consider a longitudinal approach to measure the lasting impact of gamified interventions on participants' digital literacy skills and misinformation resilience. Tracking participants over time would provide valuable data on the durability of the skills and knowledge gained, as well as insights into whether participants apply these skills in real-world scenarios.

To expand the findings of this study, future research could explore the integration of gamified digital literacy tools in formal educational settings, such as schools and universities. Embedding these interventions in structured learning environments could reveal how these tools perform with younger and more diverse populations, highlighting opportunities and challenges associated with implementing digital literacy education in curricula. Additionally, comparing the effects of digital-only, analogue-only, and hybrid interventions could help identify the most effective formats for different educational contexts, guiding future design decisions.

Finally, while this study is complete and self-contained, it will be bolstered by upcoming analyses of additional data collected during the fabricated tour. These data include semi-structured interviews and aggregated content moderation choices of participants collected in-game through Moderator Mayhem. The former will better capture the cross-cultural distinctions between participants, and the latter will provide deeper insight into content moderation.

Acknowledgments

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Appendix

A. Exhibition Photographs and 3D Layout

Figure A.1: *fabricated* **Introduction Video at showcase in The Hague, Netherlands, May 2024. Photo credit: Emily Scott-Wilson.**

Figure A.2: *The Personal Press* **at showcase in The Hague, Netherlands, May 2024. Photo credit: Emily Scott-Wilson.**

Figure A.3: *Verify This!* **at showcase in Berlin, Germany, May 2024. Photo credit: Marie-Therese Sekwenz.**

Figure A.4: *Moderator Mayhem* **at showcase in The Hague, Netherlands, May 2024. Photo credit: Emily-Scott Wilson.**

Figure A.5: *The Influence Industry* at showcase in The Hague, Netherlands, May 2024. Photo credit: Emily Scott-Wilson.

Figure A.6: *Who Targets Me?* at showcase in Berlin, Germany, May 2024. Photo credit: Susannah Montgomery.

Figure A.7: Working drawings for modular exhibition set-up, PK15 Design & Research Studio and team.

B. Survey Questions

1. Country of Residence *Free-text*

2. What is your gender?
1) Female
2) Male
3) No-binary
4) Prefer not to say

3. What is your age?
1) Under 18
2) 18-24
3) 25-34
4) 35-44
5) 45-54
6) 55-64
7) 65+

4. Highest level of education you completed?
1) Secondary education or lower
2) Vocational training (MBO, . . .)
3) Bachelor's degree (HBO, WO, . . .)
4) Post-graduate degree (Master's, MD, JD, PHD, . . .)

5. How would you describe your political views?
1) Left
2) Liberal
3) Centre
4) Conservative
5) Right

6. The Personal Press – How do you feel about the impact of AI-generated content on the news you consume?
1) Very bad
2) Somewhat bad
3) Neither good or bad
4) Somewhat good
5) Very good

7. Verify This – How would you rate your ability to identify if news online is misleading?
1) Very poor
2) Poor
3) Fair
4) Good
5) Very good

8. Moderator Mayhem – How would you rate your overall certainty in the decisions you made in the content moderation games?
1) Very uncertain
2) Somewhat uncertain
3) Neutral
4) Somewhat certain
5) Very certain

9. The Influence Industry – Do you think the influence industry can strengthen democratic values and institutions?
1) Strongly disagree
2) Disagree
3) Neither agree nor disagree
4) Agree
5) Strongly agree

10. Who targets me? – Do you agree that the targeted ads aligned with the demographic data that inspired them?
1) Strongly disagree
2) Disagree
3) Neither agree nor disagree
4) Agree
5) Strongly agree

11. AI in Targeted Advertising – How do you feel about the AI-generated descriptions that were assigned to you?
1) Very negative
2) Somewhat negative
3) Neutral
4) Somewhat positive
5) Very positive

12. AI-Generated Content – How often do you encounter AI-generated news content online?
1) I don't know
2) Never
3) Rarely
4) Sometimes
5) Frequently
6) Very frequently

13. Regulations – Mark all EU-level regulations or agreements relating to AI, online content, or digital services that you have heard of:
1) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
2) Digital Services Act (DSA)
3) Digital Markets Act (DMA)
4) Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act)
5) Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law

14. Describe 1-2 emotions you feel at the end of this exhibition
Free-text

C. Linking Survey Questions to the Relevant Installations

Table C.1: Survey questions by installation.

Question	Name of Installation	Number of Installation (See Fig. 1)
1-5. Demographic questions	Not connected	n/a
6. The Personal Press – How do you feel about the impact of AI-generated content on the news you consume?	The Personal Press	2
7. Verify This – How would you rate your ability to identify if news online is misleading?	Verify This	3
8. Moderator Mayhem – How would you rate your overall certainty in the decisions you made in the content moderation games?	Moderator Mayhem	4
9. The Influence Industry – Do you think the influence industry can strengthen democratic values and institutions?	The Influence Industry	5
10. Who targets me? – Do you agree that the targeted ads aligned with the demographic data that inspired them?	Who targets me?	6
11. AI in Targeted Advertising – How do you feel about the AI-generated descriptions that were assigned to you?	Who targets me?	6
12. AI-Generated Content – How often do you encounter AI-generated news content online?	Question without direct reference to one installation	-
13. Regulations – Mark all EU-level regulations or agreements relating to AI, online content, or digital services that you have heard of.	Question without direct reference to one installation	-
14. Describe 1-2 emotions you feel at the end of this exhibition	All	1-6

D. Example Survey "Ballot"

AI-Generated Content
How often do you encounter AI-generated news content online?

- I don't know
1. Never
2. Rarely
3. Sometimes
4. Frequently
5. Very frequently

Regulations
Mark all EU-level regulations or agreements relating to AI, online content, or digital services that you have heard of:

- General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
- Digital Services Act
- Digital Markets Act
- Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act)
- Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law

Describe 1-2 emotions you feel at the end of this exhibition

Please deposit your completed survey in the ballot box at the end. Your anonymised responses will be used for research purposes. You can review the posted statements for additional information.

fabri cated

EN

BALLOT

Country of Residence

What is your gender?
- Female
- Male
- Non-binary
- Prefer not to say

What is your Age?
- Under 18
- 18-24
- 25-34
- 35-44
- 45-54
- 55-65
- 65+

Highest level of education you have completed?
- SECONDARY EDUCATION or lower
- VOCATIONAL TRAINING MBO, etc
- BACHELOR'S DEGREE HBO, WO, etc
- POST-GRADUATE DEGREE Master's, MD, JD, PhD, etc

How would you describe your political views?
- Left
- Liberal
- Center
- Conservative
- Right

The Personal Press
How do you feel about the impact of AI-generated content on the news you consume?

1. Very bad
2. Somewhat bad
3. Neither good nor bad
4. Somewhat good
5. Very good

Verify This!
How would you rate your ability to identify if news online is misleading?

1. Very poor
2. Poor
3. Fair
4. Good
5. Very good

Moderator Mayhem
How would you rate your overall certainty in the decisions you made in the content moderation game?

1. Very uncertain
2. Somewhat uncertain
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat certain
5. Very certain

The Influence Industry
Do you think the influence industry can strengthen democratic values and institutions?

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

Who Targets Me?
Do you agree that the targeted ads aligned with the demographic data that inspired them?

1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Undecided
4. Agree
5. Strongly agree

AI in Targeted Advertising
How do you feel about the AI-generated descriptions that were assigned to you?

1. Very negative
2. Somewhat negative
3. Neutral
4. Somewhat positive
5. Very positive

Figure D.1: Scan of *fabricated* "ballot" used to collect survey responses in EU.

E. Additional Survey Demographic Information

Table E.1: Full survey demographic data.

Variable	Description	Frequency	Percentage
Ballot language	Dutch	45	11.19 %
	English	248	61.69 %
	German	109	27.11 %
Country of Residence	Austria	1	0.25 %
	Belgium	10	2.49 %
	Britain	1	0.25 %
	Cameroon	1	0.25 %
	Canada	2	0.5 %
	China	1	0.25 %
	England	7	1.74 %
	Estonia	1	0.25 %
	France	7	1.74 %
	Germany	80	19.9 %
	Greece	1	0.25 %
	India	2	0.5 %
	Ireland	5	1.24 %
	Italy	6	1.49 %
	Netherlands	47	11.69 %
	Norway	2	0.5 %
	Qatar	1	0.25 %
	Singapore	1	0.25 %
	Sweden	1	0.25 %
	Switzerland	1	0.25 %
	Turkey	1	0.25 %
	UK	15	3.73 %
	USA	84	20.65 %
	N/A	124	30.85 %
Gender	Female	225	55.97 %
	Male	158	39.3 %
	Non-binary	9	2.24 %
	Prefer not to say	6	1.49 %
	N/A	4	1 %
Age	Under 18	27	6.72 %
	18-24	83	20.65 %
	25-34	136	33.83 %
	35-44	58	14.43 %
	45-54	42	10.45 %
	55-65	40	9.95 %
	65+	11	2.74 %
	N/A	5	1.24 %
Education	Secondary Education	80	19.90 %
	Vocational Training	19	4.73 %
	University Degree	292	72.64 %
	N/A	11	2.74 %
Politics	Center	87	21.64 %
	Conservative	17	4.23 %
	Left	168	41.79 %
	Liberal	104	25.87 %
	Right	7	1.74 %
	N/A	19	4.73 %