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Optimization-based Fault Mitigation for Safe Automated Driving

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Abstract: With increased developments and interest in cooperative driving and higher levels of automation (SAE level 3+), the need for safety systems that are capable to monitor system health and maintain safe operations in faulty scenarios is increasing. A variety of faults or failures could occur, and there exists a high variety of ways to respond to such events. Once a fault or failure is detected, there is a need to classify its severity and decide on appropriate and safe mitigating actions. To provide a solution to this mitigation challenge, in this paper a functional-safety architecture is proposed and an optimization-based mitigation algorithm is introduced. This algorithm uses nonlinear model predictive control (NMPC) to bring a vehicle, suffering from a severe fault, such as a power steering failure, to a safe-state. The internal model of the NMPC uses the information from the fault detection, isolation and identification to optimize the tracking performance of the controller, showcasing the need of the proposed architecture. Given a string of ACC vehicles, our results demonstrate a variety of tactical decision-making approaches that a fault-affected vehicle could employ to manage any faults. Furthermore, we show the potential for improving the safety of the affected vehicle as well as the effect of these approaches on the duration of the manoeuvre.

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Keywords: Functional Safety, Operational Safety, Model Predictive Control, Fault Mitigation, Fail-safe

1. INTRODUCTION

Cooperative and automated driving (e.g., platooning) have been widely researched in the past decades, showing their effects on reducing workload and stress of the drivers Heikoop et al. (2017), but also on society. Driving in a platoon can increase road throughput by driving at closer distances Lioris et al. (2017) and can reduce fuel consumption (and therefore CO₂ emissions) up to 20% Liang et al. (2016). For both cooperative and automated driving (CAD), ensuring safety for higher levels of automation requires architectures that contain health monitoring and management, safety-channels and fallback functionalities ISO (2018); Khabbaz Saberi et al. (2015). The safety mechanisms designed to mitigate potential safety-critical hazards should be able to transition and bring a vehicle to a *safe state*, i.e. an operating mode without an unreasonable level of risk. In addition, vehicles operating in SAE level 4 or 5 should be able to autonomously reach a minimal risk condition in case of a performance-relevant system failure Tax (2016). This implies that the vehicle should, without the interference of a human driver, bring itself to a minimal risk or safe condition when a fault or failure within the vehicle occurs, such that the vehicle can no longer be operated in the absence of unreasonable risk (e.g., a brake or steering failure, in the absence of any redundant or other risk mitigating measures).

To address the concerns above, the authors of Luo et al. (2017) proposed an architecture pattern with a safety channel suitable for automated driving applications and Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) D, which is the highest risk class. In this

work, the safety channel is divided into a health channel and a limp home channel. However, it does not specify the functionalities and methods that should be used in these channels, as this would highly depend on the level of automation and the type of functionalities involved. Falling back to such a channel would be a logical consequence of being able to diagnose a fault, crossing a level of severity which disables the vehicle to operate in a nominal condition. This requires functionalities to diagnose the system and check for the presence of faults and their severity. The survey Gao et al. (2015) provides an overview of methods that can be used to *diagnose* a fault, which implies three steps: (i) detection, i.e. determining whether there is a fault, (ii) isolation, i.e. the location of the fault; (iii) identification, i.e. the type, shape and size of the fault. Furthermore, Gao et al. (2015) briefly discusses fault tolerant control (FTC) strategies, where the system performance is maintained in the presence of faults, yet no real connection is made between the diagnosis and what mitigation measures should be taken. Similarly, Yang et al. (2020) fault tolerant cooperative control is introduced, focusing on mitigation strategies.

All current work focuses on single mild faults, that require a limp home mode or degraded functionality and so far, there is no end-to-end system including functional safety considerations for both diagnosis and mitigation of faults of different types. There are various challenges in knowing all considered faults for design, their severity levels and having detection and mitigation strategies. Nevertheless, once a severe fault is diagnosed, it is of foremost importance to bring the system to a safe




Fig. 1. Scenario description where a severe fault occurs in a string of automated vehicles.

state (i.e., make use of a safe and efficient fallback strategy). To this end, Svensson et al. (2018) focuses on trajectory planning in fallback scenarios by formulating the problem as an optimal control problem, without considering any faults. The authors of Xue et al. (2018) describe an adaptive model predictive control (MPC) algorithm to simultaneously avoid potential collisions with surrounding vehicles and handle the presence of a front perceptive sensor failure. Yu and Luo propose Yu and Luo (2019) a fallback strategy to park on the road shoulder while having a loss of all redundant paths or GPS location. However, they decouple the longitudinal and lateral control of the vehicle, which might hinder the safe vehicle movement towards the road shoulder, especially in high risk scenarios. Furthermore, in all previous works, no failures are considered that influence the vehicle's handling.

Our contributions: the literature on trajectory planning and control for high vehicle automation is rich. Yet, it lacks work on fallback strategies for these functionalities, which form an essential part of the safety mechanisms in functional safety. We sum up our contributions as follows.

- (i) The first contribution of this paper is a fallback strategy which is proven, based on the architectural *pattern* proposed in Luo et al. (2017). We pick up the architectural *pattern* from Luo et al. (2017) and design a functionality with a software architecture that fits in this proven pattern, through which we accommodate fault diagnosis as well as mitigation for automated driving applications. The architectural design aims to facilitate all required steps from nominal operation to transitioning the vehicle to a safe-state in case of severe failures.
- (ii) The second contribution of this paper is focusing on a vehicle affected by a failure and model uncertainty, for which an MPC-based fail-safe mitigation algorithm is introduced with coupled longitudinal and lateral dynamics. This algorithm, deployed inside a safety channel, ensures the safe operation of the vehicle in case of a failure, by bringing it to the emergency lane.

Fig. 1 shows the example scenario considered, where in a string of automated vehicles, running in nominal conditions, one detects a fault and needs to automatically park itself on the road shoulder. Within this scenario, two mitigation strategies are investigated for the faulty vehicle to showcase the influence on the remainder of the string of vehicles: (i) The vehicle will brake inside the current lane, starting from the point that it receives the instruction to park on the road shoulder, and (ii) The vehicle will brake outside of the current lane, starting from the point that it has left the active lane.

This paper is organised as follows. Section II introduces the main components of the proposed architecture which enables nominal and fallback functionalities for an automated vehicle. Section III introduces the fail-safe mitigation algorithm and Section IV presents the simulation results for various scenarios and fault severity levels. Finally, conclusions and recommendations are described in Section V.

2. FUNCTIONAL SAFETY ARCHITECTURE

To ensure safe and comfortable operations, an automated vehicle architecture consists of three parts, namely, a nominal channel, a health monitor and a safety channel Luo et al. (2017). We propose here the architecture shown in Fig. 2, which is an actual applied architecture based on the architectural pattern proposed in Luo et al. (2017). Herein, the nominal channel performs all the nominal vehicle operation, i.e., all automated tasks which could function in the absence of unreasonable risk. The health monitor continuously monitors data coming from the vehicle to check whether this is operating in a healthy state, and the safety channel accommodates fail-safe mitigation to bring the vehicle to a safe-state when needed. The design of the actual module is not in the scope of this paper, however, earlier results show the feasibility of designing a suitable fault estimator van der Ploeg et al. (2022b), which, given appropriate thresholds, can serve as a suitable classification algorithm.

2.1 Nominal Vehicle Operation

Nominal vehicle operation refers to the operation of the vehicle under normal circumstances, that is, in the absence of anomalies, faults or failures (AFFs) which could impose unreasonable risk to the vehicle and passengers. Moreover, in nominal operation, the vehicle is assumed to be driven in its Operational Design Domain. In these conditions, the system can make use of all its functionalities and ensure safe vehicle control.

2.2 Fault Detection and Isolation

To assess AFFs, first, their presence and location should be known. This is done by respectively the detection and the isolation, where the detection solely focuses on the presence of an AFF. Subsequently, the isolation then determines the location of the AFF. Finally, the identification determines its type, shape, and size, using advanced observer techniques such as Proportional (Multiple-) Integral observers, adaptive observers, sliding mode observers or descriptor observers Gao et al. (2015).

2.3 Fault Severity Classification

The risk of the diagnosed fault can be classified using ASIL levels and safety channel hardware, to determine if it is safe for




Fig. 2. Architecture approach for nominal and safety fallback functionality of an automated vehicle, including failures.

the vehicle to continue driving. If it is not safe for the vehicle, the module determines whether the vehicle can continue with degraded functionality or whether it should go to a safe state.

2.4 Tactical Decision Making

In literature, this module is implemented both on a single- and multi-vehicle level, if the vehicle has vehicle-to-vehicle communication and can drive in cooperative modes (e.g., platooning Konstantinopoulou et al. (2019)). Tactical decision making is usually a needed nominal functionality that also contains a health monitoring and management component. In CAD, by using this module, the integrity of a string of vehicles can be maintained while, for example, one of the vehicles abruptly leaves the string of vehicles. In the context of the scenario described in Fig. 1, a benefit of this module is that the behaviour of the Lead Vehicle (LV) can be influenced such that the Trailing Vehicle (TV) can reconnect to the LV while optimizing certain parameters (e.g., fuel consumption).

2.5 Mitigation

Reducing the effect of an AFF is referred to as *mitigation*. Anomalies can lead to faults and consequently to failures, which are undesirable and potentially unsafe. In the context of a failure, i.e., a termination of an intended behaviour of an element or an item due to a fault manifestation ISO (2018), handling this failure means controlling the system in its presence. Depending on the outcome of the Fault Severity Classification (FSC) module, the strategy for the mitigation is chosen to be fail-operational or fail-safe.

2.5.0.1. Fail-operational When the FSC module determines that the vehicle can safely continue operation, possibly with reduced functionality (also referred to as degraded or limp functionality), fail-operational mitigation is performed. Such mitigation is most commonly performed by FTC if the AFF concerns an actuator or process Yang et al. (2020). As exemplified in Khalili et al. (2018), FTC converts the system to be less or not at all dependent on the faulty component, using the information acquired in the health monitor.

2.5.0.2. Fail-safe In case the FSC module determines that the vehicle is in a non-healthy state and cannot guarantee safe operation, fail-safe mitigation is performed by initiating a fallback manoeuvre to bring the vehicle to a safe-state. Similar to fail-operational mitigation, the information acquired in the health monitor is used.

3. FAIL-SAFE MITIGATION ALGORITHM

To describe the fail-safe mitigation algorithm proposed in this paper, we start from the scenario described in Fig. 1. Herein, three vehicles are assumed to drive automatically on the road (with functionalities such as adaptive cruise control and lane keep assist active, i.e., the *nominal* functionality). As shown in Fig. 3, once a severe fault occurs, the faulty vehicle needs to transition to a safe state with the help of its safety channel. The ACC-based longitudinal controller is ensuring a constant time-gap inter vehicle distance, with the following error dynamics

$$e_{tg} = h_{dg} - \frac{d_{x,i-1} - d_{x,i}}{v_{x,i}}, \quad (1)$$

where e_{tg} represents the time gap error between the two vehicles, h_{dg} indicates the desired time gap between the two vehicles, $d_{x,i-1} - d_{x,i}$ is the distance between the preceding vehicle and the ego vehicle, and $v_{x,i}$ is the ego vehicle velocity.

This error is controlled by a Proportional Derivative (PD) controller Naus et al. (2010) with the control law formulated in the Laplace domain as follows:

$$u_{PD} = e_{tg}(k_p + k_d s), \quad (2)$$

where u_{PD} is the control output, k_p the proportional gain, and k_d the derivative gain of the control law.

To ensure safe handling of the faulty vehicle, both longitudinal and lateral control is immediately taken over by the safety channel after AFF diagnosis. Without loss of generality, we assume here the faults are already detected and classified and focus on the Tactical Decision Making (TDM) and Fail-Safe Mitigation (FSM) modules from Fig. 2. The implemented TDM is explained in Section 3.1 and the controller used in FSM is explained in Section 3.2.

3.1 Implemented Tactical Decision Making

Fig. 4 shows the implemented TDM module, in which the FSC module gives a message to the TDM module when the failure is classified and the vehicle should be parked on the road shoulder. The environmental module gives input that determines if the vehicle should brake in, or out-of-lane, e.g. if the road shoulder is long enough to brake out-of-lane, otherwise brake in-lane is required. Eventually, the TDM module sends a message to the TV when it should close the gap back to the LV.

3.2 Functional Safety Mitigation Controller

MPC is often used to generate optimal control commands for the vehicle, Maciejowski (2002); van Nunen et al. (2017); van der Ploeg et al. (2022a), by taking into account the vehicle dynamics and its limitations over a predefined time window, known as prediction horizon N . A Nonlinear MPC (NMPC) performs the high-level control in the safety channel and is required because of the combined longitudinal and lateral dynamics, based on the continuous-time equations of the linear single-track dynamic bicycle model Schmeitz et al. (2017):

$$\dot{v}_y(t) = -\frac{C_{\alpha f} + C_{\alpha r} f_2}{m v_x(t)} v_y(t) + \left(\frac{l_r C_{\alpha r} f_2 - l_f C_{\alpha f}}{m v_x(t)} - v_x(t) \right) r(t) + \frac{C_{\alpha f}}{m} \delta(t) f_1 \quad (3)$$

$$\dot{r}(t) = \frac{l_r C_{\alpha r} f_2 - l_f C_{\alpha f}}{I_z v_x(t)} v_y(t) - \frac{l_f^2 C_{\alpha f} + l_r^2 C_{\alpha r} f_2}{I_z v_x(t)} r(t) + \frac{l_f C_{\alpha f}}{I_z} \delta(t) f_1 \quad (4)$$




Fig. 3. Multiple ACC-driven vehicles of which one encounters a severe fault and needs to reach a safe state.




Fig. 4. Flow chart of the implemented vehicle Tactical Decision Making (hexagons) and its effects on the trailing vehicle (blue blocks).

Where $C_{\alpha f}$ and $C_{\alpha r}$ are the front and rear cornering stiffness, respectively, m is the vehicle mass, l_f and l_r are the length from the front and rear axles to the center of gravity, respectively, I_z is the vehicle's moment of inertia and finally, v_x , v_y , r represent the longitudinal velocity, lateral velocity and yaw rate, respectively. Finally, f_1 and f_2 represent signals, acting on the steering wheel angle $\delta(t)$ and the rear corner stiffness $C_{\alpha r}$, respectively. These signals represent a power steering failure, f_1 , and model uncertainty, f_2 , potentially introduced by a fault. Throughout this paper, we assume that the signals f_1 , f_2 appear as constants and are measurable by a fault diagnosis algorithm. Within the constraints imposed by the linear bicycle model, the tyre dynamics are also linear.

The proposed MPC design requires a discrete-time update model, thus Equations (3) and (4) are discretized using the forward Euler method, to form the nonlinear state-update equations (Equation (6)), from the state vector $x(k)$:

$$x(k) = [a_x(k) \ v_x(k) \ v_y(k) \ d_y(k) \ r(k) \ \theta(k)]^T, \quad (5)$$

where a_x , d_y and θ are the longitudinal acceleration, and lateral position with respect to the center of the current lane and heading angle, respectively.

$$a_x(k+1) = s_{dt} a_x(k) + G_{dt} a_{x,c}(k) \quad (6a)$$

$$v_x(k+1) = v_x(k) + a_x(k) \Delta t \quad (6b)$$

$$v_y(k+1) = v_y(k) + \Delta v_y(k) \Delta t \quad (6c)$$

$$d_y(k+1) = d_y(k) + (v_y(k) \cos(\theta(k)) + v_x(k) \sin(\theta(k))) \Delta t \quad (6d)$$

$$r(k+1) = r(k) + \Delta r(k) \Delta t \quad (6e)$$

$$\theta(k+1) = \theta(k) + r(k) \Delta t, \quad (6f)$$

where s_{dt} and G_{dt} are respectively the discrete-time pole and gain of the first-order transfer function representing the longitudinal dynamics, $a_{x,c}$ is the intended longitudinal acceleration, δ is the front wheel angle, Δv_y and Δr are the increments in v_y and r , Δt denotes the sampling time step and the indicator k denotes the discrete time step.

Model (6) can be rewritten in a more compact notation as:

$$x(k+1) = g(x(k), u(k), f), \quad (7)$$

Where $u(k) := [a_{x,c}, \delta]^T$ is the control vector and $f := [f_1, f_2]^T$ represent the constant values of the determined failure. The NMPC is formulated as

Table 1. Simulation parameters

Parameter	value	unit	Variable	Constraint (min / max)	unit
$C_{\alpha f}$	120	kN/rad	$ \delta $	0.0873	rad
$C_{\alpha r}$	220	kN/rad	$ \dot{\delta} $	0.0818	rad/s
l_f	1.33	m	a_x	-3.5 / 1.5	m/s^2
l_r	1.47	m	$a_{x,c}$	-3.5 / 1.5	m/s^2
m	1845	kg	$\dot{a}_{x,c}$	-14 / 6	m/s^3
I_z	3580	$kg \cdot m^2$	v_x	1.26 / 33	m/s
(a) Vehicle parameters			$ a_y $	2	m/s^2
(b) Constraints parameters					

$$\min_u \sum_{k=1}^N J(x(k), u(k), z(k)) \quad (8a)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad x(k+1) = g(x(k), u(k), f) \quad (8b)$$

$$x_{\min} \leq x(k) \leq x_{\max} \quad (8c)$$

$$u_{\min} \leq u(k) \leq u_{\max} \quad (8d)$$

$$\Delta u_{\min} \leq \frac{u(k+1) - u(k)}{\Delta t} \leq \Delta u_{\max} \quad (8e)$$

$$a_{y,\min} \leq a_y(k) \leq a_{y,\max} \quad (8f)$$

$$x(0) = x_{\text{init}} \quad (8g)$$

$$\forall k \in \{0, \dots, N\}, \quad (8h)$$

where $z(k)$ contains the reference from the trajectory generation and J represents the multi-objective cost function:

$$J(x(k), u(k), z(k)) = w_{v_x} (z_{v_x}(k) - v_x(k))^2 + w_{d_y} (z_{d_y}(k) - d_y(k))^2 + w_{\theta} (z_{\theta}(k) - \theta(k))^2 + w_{a_{x,c}} (a_{x,c}(k))^2 + w_{\delta} (\delta(k))^2, \quad (9)$$

where $w(\dots)$ are the respective weights. Constraint (8b) indicates the dynamic coupling and constraints (8c), (8d) and (8e) indicate comfort and model limitations. Within which δ , $\dot{\delta}$ and $\dot{a}_{x,c}$ are based on the physical capabilities of the vehicle and limits of the dynamic bicycle model. The constraints on a_x , $a_{x,c}$, a_y and v_x are based on the maximum allowed ACC braking, according to ISO 15622, comfort and highway speed limit respectively. The lateral acceleration a_y in (8f) is calculated by the following steady-state relation (imposed as a comfort constraint):

$$a_y = -\frac{C_{\alpha f} + C_{\alpha r}}{mv_x} v_y + \frac{l_r C_{\alpha r} - l_f C_{\alpha f}}{mv_x} r + \frac{C_{\alpha f}}{m} \delta \quad (10)$$

Note, that the problem is assumed feasible in the scope of this work. However, through the use of an additional slack variable in the objective and carefully chosen constraints, one can enforce feasibility by sacrificing certain vehicle-dynamic constraints.

4. SIMULATION RESULTS

For this simulation study, a string of vehicles is considered as depicted in Fig. 3, where all vehicles are modelled using the parameters given in Table 1.a. These parameters correspond to a lab passenger vehicle available at TNO¹, used for research on cooperative and automated driving technologies. The constraint values used in the NMPC model are given in Table 1.b.

The trajectory that the faulty vehicle follows during the fail-safe mitigation is split into lateral and longitudinal movement,

¹ <https://www.tno.nl/en/focus-areas/traffic-transport/expertise-groups/research-on-integrated-vehicle-safety/>

to best accommodate both our mitigation strategies. The lateral trajectory is generated by a 5th order polynomial, taken between current and goal waypoints with appropriate heading angles, following Yu and Luo (2019). The current waypoint is the middle of the active lane and the goal waypoint is the middle of the road shoulder, assuming a straight road. For the longitudinal trajectory, only goal velocities are given, such that the controller determines the optimal control outputs within the given constraints, considering all relevant dynamics. Alternatively, as part of our future work, a local motion planner can also be incorporated into our architecture to adapt the trajectory online to avoid collisions with upcoming traffic (e.g., Ferranti et al. (2019)).

The vehicle model that is used as a plant, to test the controller, is based around the continuous time counterparts in (6).

4.1 Controller settings

The tuning parameters for the Proportional Derivative (PD) controllers performing the longitudinal control for the ACC string of vehicles and the NMPC controller that performs the fallback manoeuvre are given in Tables 2 and 3, respectively.

Table 2 shows the tuning parameters of each vehicle, where the LV is tuned differently compared to the FV and TV, as it is operating in cruise control and tracking a reference velocity instead of a time-gap to the preceding vehicle.

From the dynamic bicycle model in (3) and (4) it can be derived that, as the velocity decreases towards zero, the eigenvalues of the linear differential equations grow towards $-\infty$. This phenomenon is numerically impossible to capture in the Forward Euler approximation used in this paper, as it would require the sampling time to be reduced to 0. Following this line of reasoning, to prevent numerical instability of the internal prediction model, a sampling time of 0.01 s and a $v_{x,\min}$ of 1.26 m/s is selected. The selection of the prediction horizon N , control horizon S and the NMPC weights $w_{(\dots)}$ in the cost function are manually chosen with a trade-off between computational effort and tracking performance, aiming for low computational effort with minimal loss in tracking performance.

4.2 Failure scenarios and braking strategies considered

We present six simulation results: (i) two simulations compare braking in-lane and braking out-of-lane during the fallback manoeuvre, (ii) two simulations investigating the robustness of the controller by implementing realistic failures and uncertainties in the vehicle model and (iii) two simulations investigating the behaviour of the controller if it is reconfigured, following the architecture proposed in Section 2, adjusting relevant formulas and bounds.

The following failure and uncertainty are considered for (ii) and (iii):

- (1) f_1 : Power steering failure The steering output of the controller is decreased by 50% before it feeds through to the vehicle model, thus $f_1 = 0.5$.

Table 2. Settings of PD controllers of each vehicle

Vehicle	k_p	k_d
Leading	5	0.3
Following / Trailing	-150	-2.5

Table 3. Settings of NMPC used for the fallback manoeuvre

Variable	N	S	w_{v_x}	w_{d_y}	w_θ	w_{a_x}	w_δ
Value	30	30	10	100	1	0.5	1

Table 4. Comparison between braking strategies while going to the road shoulder and the effect on upcoming traffic.

Braking mitigation strategy	Stop time [s]	Stop distance [m]	Trailer gap-closing time [s]	Timegap error at t_b [s]
In-lane	8.208	117.534	13.880	1.650
Out-of-lane	10.838	190.610	7.634	1.004

- (2) f_2 : Model uncertainty in the rear cornering stiffness The rear cornering stiffness $C_{\alpha r}$ of the vehicle is decreased by 50%, thus $f_2 = 0.5$.

4.3 Results

To show the performance of the proposed method in bringing the vehicle to a safe state, two time moments are important, t_a , when the parking manoeuvre is initiated, and t_b , when the faulty vehicle has left the initial driving lane.

4.4 Braking in-lane versus braking out-of-lane

Table 4 highlights the trade-off between the two mitigation strategies based on stop time and distance versus the re-connection time of the remaining vehicles on the road (TV to the LV). The stop time is calculated as the time between t_a and the time that the error on the goal velocity is less or equal to 0.01 m/s and the error on the lateral position is less or equal to 0.001 m. The travelled distance between these two instances is the stopping distance. Re-connection time is calculated as the time between the instance that e_{tg} is larger than 0.4 s and the instance that the e_{tg} stays below 0.01 s. Stopping time and distance are largely influenced by $a_{x,\min}$ as the lateral movement consumes less time compared to the longitudinal movement. Furthermore, the duration of the lateral movement has a major impact on the difference in closing time due to the distance and velocity difference it creates between both strategies.

As expected, the timegap error at t_b shows that braking in-lane (BIL) results in a higher time-gap than braking out-of-lane (BOL) and therefore a longer closing time for BIL compared to BOL. This is underpinned by the velocity difference between the TV and LV at t_b and the acceleration length in Fig. 5. The lateral deviation in both strategies is equal, following Fig. 6, however, the steering outputs show different behaviour in both strategies. This, helped by the decreased longitudinal velocity because of braking, translates into an increased yaw rate in the vehicle dynamics for BIL compared to BOL.

As BIL results in higher lateral loads on the vehicle dynamics, this strategy is used in further experiments and as a baseline comparison. Figs. 7 and 8 show the error difference between the input/states of the baseline (BIL without failure) and the input/states of the subsequent failure.

4.5 Robustness of the controller

Following the results in Fig. 7, the steering failure causes the controller to output higher steering inputs for the vehicle. Next

to that, steering is less smooth and shows more abrupt changes in direction, caused by reaching the limit of the steering rate $\dot{\delta}$. This is also clearly visible in the yaw rate r , showing its influence on the lateral vehicle dynamics.

Furthermore, the results show that the model uncertainty decreases the maximum controller setpoint and makes the initially understeered vehicle show oversteered behaviour. The latter translates into the vehicle turning more compared to the baseline with the same steering input. This effect is also observed in the lateral position error, where the vehicle initially steers too much, and thus deviates further from the path.

4.6 Reconfiguration of the controller

The reconfigured controller uses the information on the failures (Section 4.2) to update the internal NMPC model (Equation (6)). For the steering failure, this means that $\delta(k)$ is transformed into $0.5\delta(k)$. Also, the bounds on δ and $\dot{\delta}$ are increased by a factor $\frac{1}{0.5}$. In the case of the model uncertainty in the rear cornering stiffness, $C_{\alpha r}$ is changed to half of its original value. Fig. 8 shows the results, in which the lateral control action is smoother for the steering failure but similar for the model uncertainty, compared to the non-reconfigured controller in Fig. 7. The magnitude of the steering output is comparable to the failure and the model uncertainty in relation to the non-reconfigured simulations.

The steering output and yaw rate of the model uncertainty can be compared with its non-reconfigured result, however, the maximum lateral deviation error is decreased by 92% for the reconfigured controller. For the steering failure, the error on lateral deviation is decreased to under 0.013 mm , a decrease up to 33%, and the yaw rate error to a maximum of 0.00037 rad/s , effectively eliminating the effect of the failure on tracking performance.

When evaluating all figures and Table 4, it is clear that the controller is capable of handling a power steering failure or model uncertainty in the rear cornering stiffness. Especially when reconfiguring the NMPC model, the performance is comparable to that of the system without failure. Furthermore, as BOL results in a lower gap-closing time for the TV, thus disrupts the surrounding vehicles less than BIL, and results in lower dy-




Fig. 5. Longitudinal velocities v_x and accelerations a_x during the lane changing strategies for all vehicles.




Fig. 6. Comparison between both mitigation strategies on steering output δ , lateral position d_y and yaw rate r




Fig. 7. Error plots of the controller with a steering failure and uncertainty in the rear cornering stiffness on steering output δ , lateral position d_y and yaw rate r compared to the baseline.

namic loads thus higher comfort, it is recommended to use this mitigation strategy if the environment of the vehicle allows this.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The contributions of this research focuses on introducing a functional safety architecture that can handle multiple types of faults, the strategy and the fail-safe mitigation algorithm to park the vehicle on the road shoulder in case of severe failures. Such an architecture is essential to enable higher levels of automation and prove the functional safety of a system when a failure occurs.

Our fail-safe mitigation strategy (tactical decision making and motion control) relies on a finite state machine and a tailored MPC formulation, controlling the lateral and longitudinal movement of the vehicle simultaneously. The results, shown for a severe failure (i.e. power steering failure) and model uncertainty in the rear cornering stiffness, highlight the trade-offs for different lane changing strategies for the faulty vehicle, i.e. braking in- and out-of-lane, and for the other vehicle in upcoming traffic. Furthermore, results also show that if the controller can have failure-awareness it can adapt and performance can be improved.




Fig. 8. Error plots of the reconfigured controller with a steering failure and uncertainty in the rear cornering stiffness on steering output δ , lateral position d_y and yaw rate r compared to the baseline.

In future work we plan to validate our proposed architecture and fail-safe mitigation algorithm also through experiments, to verify it using more scenarios and by incorporating the other needed components (such as fault diagnosis and severity classification). Furthermore, we aim to perform a stability analysis on the proposed NMPC controller and look further into the consequences on the remainder of the platoon (e.g. on string stability and time headways). Other work includes real-time implementation and experimental validation.

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