The Bourgeoisification of the Green-Line
the new Israeli middle-class and the Suburban Settlement

Schwake, Gabriel

DOI
10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102223
Publication date
2020
Document Version
Final published version
Published in
Political Geography

Citation (APA)
Schwake, G. (2020). The Bourgeoisification of the Green-Line: the new Israeli middle-class and the Suburban Settlement. *Political Geography*, *82*, Article 102223. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102223

Political Geography 82 (2020) 102223

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Political Geography

journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo

The bourgeoisification of the Green-Line: The new Israeli middle-class and the Suburban Settlement

Gabriel Schwake

TU Delft - Faculty of Architecture & the Built Environment, Julianalaan 134, 2628, BL, Delft, the Netherlands

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:
Suburbanisation
Privatisation
Israel/Palestine
Settlements
Borders

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on Kochav-Yair and Oranit, two localities that exemplify the Israeli Suburban Settlement phenomenon. With the first being developed by a selective group of families and the latter by a single private entrepreneur, yet both with the full support of the state, they represent the selective privatisation of the national settlement project during the 1980s. Examining the geopolitical, social and economic interests that accompanied their development, this paper illustrates how both projects incorporated the upper-middle-class bourgeoisie in the national territorial effort along the border with the occupied West-Bank (the Green-Line). Analysing the planning and construction process of both case studies, as well as their spatial characteristics, this paper explains how the upwardly middle-class and its contractors were granted substantial planning rights. Consequently, enabling them to influence the production of space while promoting a new local suburban typology that is based on better living standards, private family life and a distinctive isolated community. Therefore, this paper illustrates the Suburban Settlement typology as an outcome of the bourgeoisification of the Green-Line, which domesticated the former frontier area and enabled its inclusion in the greater national consensus.

1. Introduction

The 1980s witnessed the rise of the Israeli Suburban Settlement.[1] Interchangeably referred to as *Yeshuv Parvari* or *Toshava* (Benvenisti, 1987, *p. 49;* Nahoum Dunsky Planners, 1991; Central District, 1980), it was used by the Israeli administrations to attract middle-class and upper-middle-class families to the fringes of Tel Aviv and the coastal plain. Easing the pressure off of existing cities and settling regions of national interest, such as the border area with the occupied West-Bank (the Green-Line). Unlike earlier national decentralisation efforts that included peripheral development towns or small-scale rural settlements, the Suburban Settlements were independent localities housing up to 2000 families, offering spacious and relatively affordable houses in isolated homogeneous communities (Settlement Division, 1981); all just a car-ride away from main Israeli cities. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, there are currently around 20 localities that fit the description of a Suburban Settlement.[2] They are all located close to the "*internal frontiers*" (Yiftachel, 1996) of the predominantly northern Arab Galilee, the occupied Palestinian West-Bank and the southern Negev. Yet, still close to the main metropolitan areas of Haifa, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Beer Sheva. They are all characterised by an upper-middle-class socioeconomic Jewish Ashkenazi population (ICBS, 2016b), and except for two West-Bank settlements, they all belong to the secular and politically central-left leaning sector (ICBS, 2016; ICEC, 2019a; ICEC, 2019b).

This paper argues that the Suburban Settlement of the 1980s was a spatial phenomenon that derived from the involvement of the Bourgeoisie middle-class in the national geopolitical project. Therefore, it focuses on two Israeli settlements built in the early 1980s on both sides of the Green-Line, Kochav-Yair and Oranit (illustration 1). Exploring their development, this paper sheds light on the emergence of the local hegemonic middle-class and how it was incorporated in the national

E-mail address: g.schwake@tudelft.nl.

[1] In this article I will be using the term *Settlement*, to refer to a populated place - a city, town, village, or other agglomeration of buildings where people live and work, what referred to in Hebrew as a *Yeshuv,* or in German as *Siedlung*. Not specifically a West-Bank settlement or Colony, which in Hebrew is referred to as *Hitnahlut*

[2] **West-Bank**: Oranit (1985, 9th socioeconomic decile), Alfei Menashe (1983, 9th socioeconomic decile), Efrat (1980, 7th socioeconomic decile), Elkana (1981, 7th socioeconomic decile), Sha'are Tikva (1983, 8th socioeconomic decile) Har Adar (1986, 9th socioeconomic decile) West to Green-Line: Kokhav Ya'ir (1981, 9th socioeconomic decile); Tzur Yigal (1994, 9th socioeconomic decile), Tzoran (1992, 8th socioeconomic decile), Lapid (1996, 8th socioeconomic decile), Matan (1995, upper 3 socioeconomic decile), Tzur Yitzhak (2001, 8th socioeconomic decile), Bat Hefer (1996, 8th socioeconomic decile); Upper Negev: Lehavim (1985, 9th socioeconomic decile), Metar (1984, 9th socioeconomic decile); Galilee: Kefar Weradim (1984, 9th socioeconomic decile).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102223
Received 15 May 2019; Received in revised form 6 February 2020; Accepted 7 May 2020
Available online 1 September 2020



Illustration 1. Case Studies. In green is the Green-Line, in red is the West-Bank Barrier, in purple are parts of the barrier that are under construction. (All illustrations were made by the author). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)

geopolitical agenda. Using historical protocols, correspondences, reports and interviews this paper analyses the territorial role of each site and planning rights and support given to its developers; explaining how the new Bourgeoisie middle-class was able to influence the production of the local built environment, promoting the creation of isolated small homogeneous communities. Then, studying regional outline plans, town zoning schemes, and building permits, this paper explains how the desire for social and cultural distinction was manifested in the settlements' urban and architectural form. Focusing on two case studies on both sides of the Green-Line, this paper claims that this phenomenon was not restricted to official Israeli territory and succeeded in appealing to the secular, politically central-left upper-middle-class that is usually considered as an opponent of settling occupied territories. Consequently, the bourgeoisification of the Green-Line blurred the differences between the settlement campaign in some parts of the West-Bank and that inside Israel's official borders, establishing a wide national consensus. This was made obvious in the construction of the West-Bank Separation Barrier in 2006, which did not follow the official borderline; *de facto* annexing parts of the occupied territories.

2. The Israeli frontier domestication mechanism

Frontiers, unlike borders, are zones of varying widths that are either between two neighbouring states, unpopulated areas within a state or ones that have not yet been incorporated into an adjacent political entity. Moreover, frontiers are usually sparsely settled areas or populated by indigenous peoples who the settling society considers as part of the natural landscape that needs to be tamed (Mbembe, 2003). Though the act of settling frontier areas dates to pre-modern times, in the era of nation-building it became an instrument of the modern state to enforce its sovereignty and to practice its control over a certain territory (Prescott, 1987). Weizman describes frontier settlements as an archipelago of enclaves and exclaves that are isolated from the geographical context that surrounds them. Correspondingly, they constitute an exterritorial geographic system of settling points and connecting lines, where order and law are exempted. Building on Agamben's "*state of exception*", Weizman claims that the exterritorial state of frontier settlements remains until the frontier is domesticated, and larger populations are able to migrate and inhabit it (Agamben, 2008; Weizman, 2006). Therefore, the entire process is chaotic and law-less, yet directed by the remote entity that it serves, allowing it to eventually expand its control and enforce its law (Pullan, 2011). In that sense, it is worth to use Kim Dovey's analyses on the spatial manifestation of power and his distinction between the *power over*, which is the ability to harness the capacities of others to one's interests, and *power to*, which is "*[t]he 'capacity' to imagine, construct and inhabit a better built environment*" (Dovey, 1999, p. 10). Subsequently, as the state grants settlers the *power to* inhabit the frontier then it is able to domesticate it and enforce its *power over* space. Consequently, imposing both its empirical and juridical sovereignty and thus rule over it (Ron, 2003).

"*Kibush HaShmama*", conquering the wilderness, was a leading narrative in the Practical and Labour Zionist approaches that led to the establishment of the state of Israel (Kemp, 1999). Thus, fitting the known concept of "*a land without a people to a people without a land*", which depicted Palestine as an undeveloped and unpopulated frontier waiting to be settled and domesticated (Said, 1979, p. 9). Accordingly, the pre-statehood years were characterised by a vast campaign to establish new frontier rural settlements meant to enlarge the future Jewish state. These efforts emphasised the pioneer lifestyle, which relied on a combination of labour and settlement intended to lead to the physical and spiritual Jewish national renaissance. This led to the famous cooperative agricultural typologies of the *Moshavim* and *Kibbutzim* (Kimmerling, 1983; Efrat, 1991, 2004). After the establishment of Israel in 1948, the young state was interested in securing its *power over* its newly drawn borders, as well as areas with low Jewish presence, and thus sought to settle and domesticate its new "*internal frontiers*" (Yiftachel, 1996, p. 493). As a national effort led by a centralist state in its nation-building years, the act of frontier settlement during the 1950s and 1960s was under the direct guidance that national planning institutions. The allocation of sites was conducted by the Jewish National Fund (JNF) and the newly established Israel Land Administrations (ILA), while the settling groups were organised by the Jewish Agency's (JA) Settlement Department, which was usually in charge of planning the new site and providing the dwelling units.[3] Parallel to the rural mechanism, the state led an effort to establish a series of medium-scale development towns, creating a lattice structure that relied on a combination of housing and industry, meant to provide newly coming Jewish immigrants with occupational opportunities and shelter while further strengthening the state's *power over* its frontiers (Allweil, 2016; Schwake, 2020a,b,c, pp. 1–22; Sharon, 1951; Yiftachel, 2010, pp. 71–103). With the privatisation of the local economy since the late 1960s, Israel began shying away from its socialist-like features, obtaining more individualist-oriented approaches and a privatising economic system (Azaryahu, 2000; First & Avraham, 2009). These

[3] In Kibbutzim the planning process was carried out by the Kibbutzim movement which was in charge of the site.

measures, which emerged already during the late years of the Zionist-Socialist *Mapai* party regime, were further enhanced by the election of the first right-wing liberal, and officially anti-socialist government in 1977 (Filc, 2006; Gutwein, 2017, 2017; Kimmerling, 2001a). Consequently, the frontier settlement mechanism began to transform. The Suburban Settlement, as this paper claims, is one of the outcomes of the privatising territorial project.

3. The bourgeoisification of the Israeli middle-class and the suburban turn

The bourgeoisification of the Israel middle-class is a long process that began during the 1960s (Gutwein, 2017, 2017; Segev, 2002; Ram, 2008). Before the establishment of the state, and during the first proceeding decades, the local hegemony was made out of the veteran Jewish socialist Ashkenazi[4] sector, linked to the ruling *Mapai* party, and consisted of the proletarian-agricultural-industrial classes (Kimmerling, 2001a). Though a local professional-academic white-collar class did exist, according to Bareli & Cohen, its prestige, participation in decision making and access to the country's social and political leadership was limited by the socialist establishment that regarded the emergence of a bourgeoisie class as a threat (2018; Heilbronner, 2017, pp. 128–168). This non-socialist group included also traditional middle-class merchants, homeowners, and craftsmen who did not share the same concerns from the centralized state-led economy (Rozin, 2016).

With the economic growth of the 1960s, this middle-class was expanded by an evolving 'new' class of public officials and executives, technocrats, military officers, and the private sector. Correspondingly, Ben-Porat claims that it is during these years that the Israeli bourgeoisie would become a leading social group (Ben-Porat, 1999). The influence of this emerging class, according to Gutwein, would continue the *Mapai*-led apparatus and some of its pioneer cultural values while adopting bourgeois-like socioeconomic patterns, in what he referred to as "*Pioneer Bourgeoisie*" (Gutwein, 2012, p. 685). The new emerging bourgeoisie hegemony would consist of the emerging white-collar classes, which according to Gutwein, would later align with the economic liberal right-wing *Herut* party that represented the anti-socialist Zionist sector and large segments of the underprivileged Mizrahi[5] Jews, and enable the 1977 political turnover that brought an end to the decades-long *Mapai* rule (Gutwein, 2017, 2017).

The bourgeoisification of Israel received a spatial manifestation. Gonen and Cohen recognised this in the early Israeli suburbanisation of the 1970s, where the focus was on the nuclear family, living in an isolated and retreated private house in the outskirts of the city (Gonen & Cohen, 1989; Schwake, 2020a,b,c, pp. 1–22). Though such neighbourhoods existed in the early statehood years, their scope was yet limited, and the majority of white-collar middle-class families inhabited urban quarters such as Rehavia in Jerusalem, Hadar in Haifa, or the Old North and Ramat Aviv in Tel Aviv. With the suburban turn of the 1970s–80s, the production of housing became entirely low-rise oriented, composing up to 80% of the yearly built dwelling units (Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2015). This suburban turn was not exclusive to the secular Ashkenazi middle and upper-middle-class and characterised other socially upward groups such as the new Mizrahi middle-class (Cohen & Leon, 2008; Shenhav, 2006). However, despite being seemingly similar, the suburbanisation patterns of the different middle-class groups varied significantly. As explained by Bourdieu, the bourgeoisie middle-class that is still economically limited, is able to elevate its social status by distinguishing itself from other parts of society by an emphasis on cultural capital, achieved through education, arts, manners, specific consumer patterns, and taste (Bourdieu, 1984 [1979]; Hines, 2010). The need for distinction, described by Bourdieu, received a spatial expression with the "place stratification model" (Alba & Logan, 1991; Logan & Molotch, 1987), which describes the ability of privileged groups to manipulate the production of space in order to preserve their social, physical and cultural separation from other "*groups they view as undesirable*" (Pais, South, & Crowder, 2012, p. 261). This was highly apparent in the American suburbanisation, which created racially and socially separated communities that went beyond economic classifications (Logan & Alba, 1993). In the Israeli version, the "place stratification model", as noted by Allegra and Yiftachel, was expressed in the ability of "*influential groups*" to move to segregated "*suburban localities, 'protected' from the proximity of 'undesirables'*" (Allegra, 2013; Yiftachel, 2003, p. 36). Among these influential groups, Yiftachel includes the also private developers engaged in the development of suburbia that were able to profit from the construction of these gated communities, which they sold to "*upwardly mobile groups who seek 'quality of life.'*" *(*Yiftachel, 2003*).*

The spatial distinction did not conclude only in physical segregation and continued into the architectural and urban forms of the different settlement typologies. Accordingly, the suburban environments of the existing Ashkenazi bourgeoisie were characterised by simplistic "*good houses*" (Allweil, 2016, p. 14), in comparison to the nouveau riche and flamboyant Built Your Own House (BYOH) neighbourhoods that housed many of the emerging Mizrahi middle-class of the peripheral Development Towns and the rural frontier (Shadar, 2014).

The suburban turn did not only serve the new consumer patterns of the bourgeoisie middle-class but also its economic aspirations. The significance of the different forms of capital, whether economic, social or cultural corresponds with the leading hegemonic values of the relevant period (Bourdieu, 1986). Appropriately, in the early statehood years, one's social capital was of significant value, as the affiliation with ruling *Mapai* party or the hegemonic Labour movement granted one substantial privileges regarding employment, housing, education and other welfare services (Kimmerling, 2001a). Therefore, as noted by Bareli and Cohen, the bourgeoisie middle-class was first interested in gaining cultural capital and entering the existing hegemony (Bareli & Cohen, 2018). This would change with global neoliberal turn, which financialised all aspects of individual and social everyday life and strengthened the importance of one's economic capital (Graeber, 2011; Harvey, 1990, 2005). Subsequently, according to Gutwein, parts of the upwardly old socialist *Mapai* hegemony and the bourgeoisie middle-class fully cooperated with the privatisation processes that followed the 1977 turnover, in order to transform their social privileges into financial capital, maintaining their hegemonic status (Gutwein, 2017, 2017). This eventually resulted in accumulation of private wealth by distinguished groups, an emphasis on individualistic values, and a greater focus on living standards, both as social privileges and a means to promote territorial control; all realised in the Suburban Settlements.

4. Bourgeoisie upper-middle-class and the suburban settlement

As the state's new approach was to subjugate the national planning perspective to the rationale of the market economy (Shachar, 1998, pp. 209–218), the domestication of the internal frontiers began adjusting to the new neoliberal order. Yaacobi and Tzfadia refer to this process as "*selective privatisation*", where the state granted "*selected elites*" substantial spatial rights in order to promote the settlement of its national frontiers and to expand its territorial control (Yacobi & Tzfadia, 2018, p. 6). Returning to Dovey, it is possible to claim that in the privatisation of the settlement mechanism the state began granting specific groups the *power to* settle a certain area, in order to enforce its *power over* space. Consistently, as Dovey argues that there are variant modes to ensure the individual's compliance, which consist of *Force, Coercion, Manipulation, Seduction* and *Legitimation (*Dovey, 1999, p. 3*, p. 3)*, it is possible to claim that with the privatisation of the settling mechanism the state used more inclusive measures such as *Seduction;* unlike the forcibly and coercively populated frontier settlements of the 1950s–60s (Tzfadia, 2000).

[4] Jews originating from European countries.

[5] Jews originating from Islamic countries. Referred to also as Sephardic Jews, or even Arab-Jews.

Consequently, turning the settlers into spatial agents, rather than simply subjects (Dovey, 1999, p. 13).

Correspondingly, the Israel settlement mechanism since the late 1970s, turned into a multifaceted project with an ability to attract almost all groups of the fragmented [Jewish] Israeli society; especially in the West-Bank and its bordering areas. Besides the common perspective that sees that settlement project as a national-religious initiative headed by the nationalist orthodox sector (Newman, 1981, pp. 33–37), it involved also under-privileged Mizrahi families looking for affordable housing (Dalsheim, 2008), young couples of relatively low socioeconomic background that were drawn by the alternative welfare system in the West-Bank (Allegra, 2017; Gutwein, 2017, 2017), newly coming Russian immigrants (Weiss, 2011), Ultra-orthodox families from Bnei Brak and Jerusalem (Cahaner, 2017), American religious immigrants (Hirschhorn, 2017), private developers encouraged by the Ministry of Housing (Maggor, 2015), or wider segments of Israeli society in search for better quality of life (Billig, 2015; Yacobi & Tzfadia, 2018).

The ability of the settlement enterprise to appeal to a variety of social groups was a well-coordinated project managed by the Settlement Division and the Israeli Government. The Division's 1981 plan intended to create this appeal and thus focused on classifying the different areas in the West-Bank according to their demand, as well as the different settlement types according to their size, preferred location and target group (Settlement Division, 1981). This included the City (*I'ir*), Town (*Kirya*), Suburban Settlement (*Toshava*), Community Settlement (*Yeshuv Kehilati*), and Rural Settlement (*Yeshuv Haklai*) (Benvenisti, 1987; Schwake, 2020a,b,c, pp. 1–22). The different settlement types did not only differ in their sizes, more than 10,000, 3000–5000, 500–2500, and 500 families respectively, but also in their target population and their distance from Tel Aviv. The plan suggested reserving the use of community and rural settlements to medium and low-demand areas inside the West-Bank while developing several larger *Krayot* (towns) that would provide regional service. The high demand areas, closer to the coastal plain, would be developed privately, offering low-rise houses in *Toshavot* (Suburban Settlements) close to the Green-Line and the Tel Aviv metropolis (Settlement Division, 1981, p. 16).

Purely residential, with a small-size community the Suburban Settlements insured a relatively homogenous and established population while retaining the ability to influence certain aspects such as education and municipal services. At the same time, they are not too small, and thus enable a larger focus on the private nuclear family, instead of the joint community life like in the former examples of communal rural settlements (Fogel, 2019 [Interview]; Berger, 2015). Targeting white-collar families these settlements were planned according to the pull factors of suburbia, while larger types, like the City and the Town that targeted blue-collar families and offered affordable housing were planned to answer mainly the push factors of existing urban centres. Correspondingly, the first line of settlements along the Green-Line include the Suburban Settlements of Alfei Menashe, Har Adar, Aflei Menashe, Sha'are Tikva, Elkana, and Oranit (Settlement Division, 1982, p. 4), all of which belong to the upper three socioeconomic deciles of Israeli localities (ICBS, 2013; ICBS, 2016). At the same time, the less reachable Ma'ale Adumim and Ariel, both defined as cities (Settlement Division, 1982, p. 6), belong to the intermediate socioeconomic deciles, while the Ultra-Orthodox Modi'in-Illit belongs to the lowest one (ICBS, 2016).

5. Bourgeoisification for the sake of domestication

While relatively limited in its use inside the West-Bank, the Suburban Settlements would become the most popular form along the Green-Line. This area, which remained comparatively undeveloped in the first three decades after the establishment of the state of Israel, enjoyed an increasing interest since the late 1970s as it formed a possibility to expand the Israel coastal plain and the Tel Aviv metropolitan into the occupied territories. The idea to create a sequence of Jewish settlements on both sides of the Green-Line along the western Samarian Hills turned into a clear policy of the Israeli government by the early 1980s, known as the Hills'Axis plan (*Tzir HaGvaot*) (Kipnis, 1979; Soffer, 2018 [Interview]). This policy would receive an official status in the Stars Plan of 1990, which promoted the construction of a dozen new "*suburban settlements*" in order to create "*a settlement sequence in the Hills Axis, in the aim to thicken the [Jewish] settlement in the area*" (Ministerial Committee for Aliyah and Integration, 1990, p. 4). Using the term "*settlement sequence*" meant that the new localities west of the Green-Line were inseparable from those eastern to it, and thus constitute a continuation of the West-Bank settlement enterprise into official Israel territory (Schwake, 2020d).[6]

While all new settlement typologies were a direct outcome of the privatisation of the national territorial project, the Suburban Settlement went a step further. Yacobi and Tzfadia, highlight property rights among the spatial privileges the state granted to frontier settlers. However, they claim that planning rights diminished, as the state centralized the process, limiting the settlers' ability to influence the formation of space. While this might be true for the majority of settlements, especially since the late 1980s, the Suburban Settlements of the early 1980s were an outcome of a significantly different mechanism (Schwake, 2020e). As this paper shows, along the Green-Line, the state granted both organised groups and private developers an almost omnipotent status, with the *power to* influence all spatial and social aspects of the future settlements. This would enable the establishment of residential environments that suited the demands of the bourgeoise upper-middle-class while attracting its members to the area. Eventually, turning the Green-Line into the dormitory of the hegemonic bourgeoise, gentrifying the former frontier and completing its domestication while enhancing the state's *power over* space. The common perspective perceives the suburbanisation of the settlement enterprise as an act of normalisation, which used banal architectural features and planning practices that created a legitimate façade to the national territorial project (Newman, 2017; Segal & Weizman, 2002). Nevertheless, this paper claims that the normalisation of the settlements along the Green-Line derived from the nature of their settlers, whose status turned the area into an integral part of the national consensus. Correspondingly, this paper examines the Suburban Settlements as an outcome of space stratification, which enables restricted groups to form their own distinct residential environment and to significantly improve their living conditions (Logan & Alba, 1993). Thus, arguing that the Suburban Settlements are the outcome of the normalisation efforts. Accordingly, this paper claims that spatial agents behind the construction of the Suburban Settlements along the Green-Line were able to use their connections to receive substantial property and planning rights. Whether in the case of housing associations affiliated with one of the main political parties, or a powerful organisation like the military, the Ministry of Defence or the aerospace industry, these groups were able to transform their political and social capital into the *power to* form space, in return to the state's *power over* it. The Suburban Settlement is thus the spatial manifestation of this reciprocal relationship that enabled the privileged bourgeoisie to manipulate the production of space while promoting the national geopolitical agenda. Therefore, using bourgeoisification for the sake of frontier domestication.

[6] The newly developed localities included Kochav-Yair, Nirit, Katzir, Bat Hefer, Tzoran, Matan, Tzur Yigal, Ela'ad, Tzur Yitzhak, Shoham, Lapid, Reut, Maccabim, Modi'in; all of which, except for the Ultra-Orthodox El'ad, belong to the upper three socioeconomic deciles. Moreover, except for the initially Community Settlements of Nirit and Maccabim, and the cities of El'ad and Modi'in, all these localities emerged as a Toshava (Suburban Settlement), meant to house a community of up to 2000 families living in low-rise spacious houses. Almost all of these communities belong to the religiously secular and politically centre-left leaning, Jewish Ashkenazi sector (ICBS, 2016).

6. Kochav-Yair

Kochav-Yair is located next to the Green-Line, on its Israeli side, 15 km east of Tel Aviv (illustration 2). It is characterised by a significantly well-established community of 10.000 inhabitants that consists of several former high-ranking officers and politicians. Though initially established by the right-wing Herut-Beitar Settlement movement in the early 1980s, Kochav-Yair quickly lost its political affiliation and turned into an upper-middle-class settlement for young families moving from cities in the coastal area into the newly developing suburbia along the Israeli eastern frontier (Berger, 2015; Eitan, 2019 [Interview]). It is made out almost entirely of single-family houses, with more than 90% owner-occupancy (ICBS, 2016). Its location between the so-called "southern-triangle",[7] the predominantly Arab district of Taybeh and Tira, and the West-Bank points out its mission to enhance Jewish presence in the area. In 2002 it was merged with its new and smaller southern neighbour of Tzur Yigal (established 1994), forming one locality named Kochav-Yair-Tzur Yigal (Soffer & Gazit, 2005).

The current site of Kochav-Yair was chosen by the Jewish Agency (JA) already in 1980. The Agency's Settlement Department, interested in strengthening the Israeli side of the Green-Line, led an effort to locate potential sites for new Jewish settlements in the area (Levav, 1980; Eitan, 2019 [Interview]; Soffer & Gazit, 2005). The site was initially called Mitzpe Sapir and was part of three other settlement points in the southern triangle, which formed the southern version of the Settlement Department's *Mitzpim* Plan that focused on promoting Jewish presence in the northern Galilee, inside official Israeli territory (Soffer, 1992). Nevertheless, the nature of the settlement and its future population were not decided by the Settlement Department. This was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) that functioned as a sort of land broker, in charge of allocating site to the different settlement groups interested in taking part in the greater national mission.

Simultaneously, a group of young members of the right-wing Herut-Beitar movement, the ideological backbone of the ruling right-wing Herut party, was interested in establishing a settlement of their own. The group was led by Michael Eitan, then head of Herut-Beitar Youngsters and later a parliament member and minister on behalf of the Likud party.[8] It consisted almost entirely of middle-class city dwellers that were interested in improving their living standards and to move to a private house, while retaining their existing workplaces in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area. Their demand was thus for a suburban type of settlement, characterised by a relatively high quality of life, which was not more than 30 min car-ride away from Tel Aviv, enabling them to commute to work on a daily basis. The group was first interested in settling in the western edges of the occupied West-Bank, just over the Green-Line. Yet, in a meeting in 1981 with the then Minister of Agriculture, Ariel Sharon, Michael Eitan was offered the site of Mitzpe Sapir. The site's proximity to the coastal area and the ideological mission to increase Jewish presence in the Triangle area appealed to the young group and they accepted Sharon's suggestion (Eitan, 2019 [Interview]).

The group initially functioned in similar lines like the previous ideological *Gari'inim* (nucleus) that formed the pioneer core group of settlers in former rural examples. The initial members that belonged to Herut-Beitar chose to name the settlement after the leader of the pre-state nationalist *Lehi* Militia, Avraham Stern, whose *nom de guerre* was *Yair*. [9] As the MA and the Israel Land Administration (ILA), which were in charge of initiating the process, understood that Kochav-Yair would not be a small-scale settlement consisting of dozens of families, but rather hundreds, the initial group turned into a registered association. As a well-connected spatial agency, the association was granted unprecedented rights by the MA and ILA, which included the ability to dictate the profile of joining members and the *power to* control urban and architectural characteristics of the future settlement. Consequently, as the MA and ILA asked to enlarge the project the newly admitted members were not reached through the private market, but rather through personal connections and recommendations, managed by the associations (Eitan, 2019 [Interview]).

Acting as the developer, contractor and representative of settling families, the association still asked to be seen as an ideologically motivated organisation. In 1981, 15 families volunteered to settle the site of *Mitzpe* Sapir as a temporary outpost (Figs. 1–3); A decision that did not have any practical justification and was mainly a residue of former settlement methods, granting Kochav-Yair the aura of a pioneer act (Eitan, 2019 [Interview]). Likewise, in an official letter sent to the Minister of Construction and Housing David Levy, the association voiced their complaints against the ministry's lack of assistance in the settlement's development, stating that:

> *"The Jewish Agency, under the orders of the Israeli Government, established a settlement in western Samaria, on the 67 lines, in order to Judaize the area that is populated by tens of thousands of minorities, in a hostile environment … Herut-Beitar has taken upon itself to establish and develop a settlement in this place, which will be called Kochav-Yair." (Kochav Yair Association, 1984, p. 1)*

Declaring Western Samaria, and not the Eastern Sharon as the location of Kochav-Yair, the association highlighted the connection to the West-Bank project. This is further emphasised by mentioning the Green-Line and the "*hostile*" environment. Moreover, the association claimed to have "*taken upon itself … this mission*"; promoting the image of a pioneer act once more. The lack of support from the Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH), was mainly an inter-ministerial feud with the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), as the former disapproved the latter's uncoordinated efforts, which included the development of sites without receiving the MCH's professional approval first (Wiener, 1983). Ironically, as the association relied more on the help of the JA and the ILA than that of the MCH, its spatial privileged increased. This included a greater control over planning and construction, and also a substantial subsidy in the form of a "conditional loan of 40% of the land value … which would turn into a grant for each settler that will live there for a period of five years" (ILA, 1982, p. 1).

As the demand to join Kochav-Yair grew, the dominance of the Herut-Beitar members and their close friends decreased. Yet, admission was not made freely and was still reserved for specific well-connected bourgeoisie groups. The MA conducted negotiations with different lobbying groups and allocated 200 lots to Herut-Beitar, 100 to the *Lehi* veterans, 100 to members of the Defence Forces, and additional 100 to members of the South-Africa Zionist Federation. All members, regardless of their previous affiliation, became part of the Kochav-Yair association, which was based in *Metzudat Zeev*, the headquarters of the Herut movement. Each member family was entitled to a private lot in the future settlement, paying only half of its market value to the ILA. They were able to choose the size of the lot choosing from three options ranging from 500 to 1000 m^2, while the location was decided through a raffle. This selective privatisation, which granted well-connected families such privileges is perhaps best seen in a letter from the assistant of Deputy Minister of Agriculture Michael Dekel, to Michael Eitan, asking him to admit "*an old member of the Herut movement, a son of an old member*" (Malka, 1982, p. 1).

Simultaneously to the foundation of the association, the ILA issued the first zoning plan for Kochav-Yair (ILA, 1984). The basis of ILA's plan was the residential parcel and the ability to reach it with a private car.

[7] The Triangle is the term that refers to the Arab concentrations eastern to the Green-Line, inside the state of Israel. The Northern Triangle refers to the area of the towns of Kufr Qara, Ar'ara, Baqa al-Gharbiyye and Umm al-Fahm, while the southern one refers to Qalansuwa, Taybeh, Kufr Qasim, Tira, Kufr Bara and Jaljulia.

[8] The successor of Herut.

[9] Kochav in Hebrew is literary a Star - *Stern* in German. Therefore, Kochav-Yair, is a pun that means Yair's Star, but also Yair Stern.

Illustration 2. Kochav-Yair.



Fig. 1. Layout of Mitzpe Kochav-Yair, 1984. The Jewish agency.

Fig. 3. A temporary house in Mitzpe Sapit. Kochav-Yair Collection.

Fig. 2. Mitzpe Sapit. 1983. Kochav-Yair collection.



Fig. 4. Kochav-Yair zoning scheme, 1984. Israel land administration. (ILA).

Designed as secluded clusters of residential parcels and a series of twisting and winding roads and streets, the layout of Kochav-Yair emphasised the desire to create a car-based commuters' town, which is focused on detached private households and less on an integrated and involved community. The use of *cul de sac* secluded each group of houses from the greater context and ensured a higher level of privacy, corresponding with the lack of urban hierarchy that highlighted Kochav-Yair as an assemblage of secluded and isolated private lots. While the ILA's plan included several larger lots, intended for larger housing typologies, as the association took over the planning process it commissioned architect Meir Buchman's office to re-arrange the proposed layout, parcelling the larger lots into the same private housing clusters as in the rest of Kochav-Yair (Meir Buchman Architects and Planners, 1988; Meir Buchman Architects and Planners, 1987). Therefore, ensuring that Kochav-Yair would consist only of detached houses suitable for an upper-middle-class suburban community, unlike denser residential buildings that could harm the settlement's morphological and societal

homogeneity (see Fig. 4).

The design of the private houses was also managed by the association. The design regulations composed by the association and Buchman, corresponded with the ideal Zionist "*good house*" and promoted a homogenous environment made out of two-story detached family units, with simplistic white cubic features and a sloping read-tile roof. As claimed by Eitan, the association feared the BYOH -style "*cacophony*" where everyone does "*whatever he wants*" and this decided to create a limited number of housing models that each member could choose from (Eitan, 2019 [Interview]). The construction of repetitive models was also meant to reduce construction costs and to ensure a quicker and more efficient procedure (Buchman, 2019 [Interview]). The association approached six different architectural offices and invited them to propose several housing models, according to the different lot sizes, location, and topography. In an event held in *Metzudat Zeev* in 1983, the architects presented their ideas to the first 500 members, who were then supposed to vote for the model of their choice (Gil-, 2019 [Interview]; Eitan, 2019 [Interview]) (Figs. 5–7). Eventually, 80% chose the three models of a single architectural office while the remaining 20% chose two additional types.

As bourgeoise houses, they followed modest architectural characteristics and focused on the nuclear family and its privacy. Significantly large with an average area of 200 m^2, they consisted of a clear division between the bedroom area and the joint living room and kitchen space; a division heightened by the use of the split-level home, which characterised all of the different models (Gil-Ad, 2019 [Interview]; Riskin, 2019 [Interview]). Though the popularity of this typology could be explained by the topography of the site, it is also possible to notice that it was used also in lots that had almost no height differences or any significant topographical features. The family's privacy was further enhanced by orienting the living room area towards the backyard while the bedrooms faced the street. Consequently, creating a closed façade towards the street, shutting the house off of its neighbouring environment, while the more open façade was in the secluded family area (Figs. 8–10).

The model system and the dominance of one architecture office did meet the expectations for an efficient design and construction process (Fig. 11). Though seemingly large and spacious, the houses were constructed in a tight and limited budget. According to one of the main architects involved in the project, the houses in Kochav-Yair were "*villas with a budget of social housing*" (Gil-Ad, 2019 [Interview]). However, the well-managed and well-connected association of Kochav-Yair was able to use the recession of the early 1980s, its contacts with leading contractors, and the purchasing power of its members to significantly reduce the price of construction materials (Eitan, 2019 [Interview]). Moreover, with the help of the newly used computer-aided drawing software, the architects were able to produce repetitive plans for the different models and their various implementations (Gil-Ad, 2019 [Interview]). The use of reproduced details and lists was also crucial, and along with the fact that the contractors had to deal with a small number of architects, construction costs were significantly reduced. To create some variety and sophistication in the houses, the architects tried to design breaks and interruptions in the continuous facades by creating setbacks used for balconies and entrances. Furthermore, they also used large concrete beams to frame two or more small windows and to create the appearance of a larger one. Maintaining low construction costs met

Fig. 5. Promotion drawings of a house model in Kochav-Yair. 1984. The South African Zionist Federation.

Fig. 6. Promotion drawings of a house model in Kochav-Yair. 1984. The South African Zionist Federation

Fig. 7. Promotion drawings of a house model in Kochav-Yair. 1984. The South African Zionist Federation.



Fig. 8. A model, facade to the street. Gil-Ad & Yosef.



Fig. 9. A model, rear façade to the street. Gil-Ad & Yosef.



Fig. 10. A model, entrance/side facade. Gil-Ad & Yosef.

Fig. 11. Houses in Kochav-Yair, 1986. Nati Harnik (GPO).

the economic restraints of some of the young families, which though enjoying access to political power as part of the emerging middle-class, this was not (yet) translated into economic wealth. Consequently, due to the well-maintained budget, they succeeded in building their "*villa*" in the price of a "*social housing*" unit.

By the beginning of 1991, Kochav-Yair became a home for almost 1000 families. This was made possible through the association's method of developing the needed infrastructure before marketing the lots. In doing so, the association basically invested the development payments paid by existing members, which they hoped to get back once the lots in the new neighbourhoods were sold. This proved to be highly efficient, as it ensured that all the public facilities such as schools, kindergartens and the country club, would be constructed before reaching the settlement's full capacity. This was made possible mainly due to the help of the ILA, which gave the association the needed support for the entire settlement before all lots were marketed; significantly reducing the risk taken. Eventually, despite a short period during the first Intifada when sales were low and some families chose not to move to Kochav-Yair, this economic model enabled the continuous construction of houses and the admission of new families (Eitan, 2019 [Interview]).

The place stratification deployed in Kochav-Yair turned it into an attractive and very appealing living environment. Known as the home of several generals, ministers and even an acting Prime Minister, Kochav-Yair enjoyed the reputation of an ultimate Suburban Settlement with an ideal high-class community (Figs. 12–13). Consequently, it continued to attract the same upper-middle-class sector that enhanced its elitist nature. To retain this status, Kochav-Yair resisted, quite successfully, almost all attempts of the ILA and the MCH to expand and change its character. These plans included annexing new settlements to Kochav-Yair and turning it into a large regional centre that would serve the entire area. The objections did not concern only the changes planned in the settlement, but also the changes in the character of the region. In the mid-1990s for example, Kochav-Yair protested their disapproval to the MCH's plan to build a new town in the area of Yarhiv Forest, which is

Fig. 12. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak Meeting Yasser Arafat in his private residence in Kochav-Yair, 2000. Amos Ben Gershom (GPO). Note the corner window.

Fig. 13. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and his wife Nava watering the garden of their private residence in Kochav-Yair, 2000. Amos Ben Gershom. (GPO).

more than 10 km away, in fear that this would change the rural atmosphere of the region (SPNI, 1995). For a period, Kochav-Yair was also against the construction of Tzur-Yigal in its southern edge. An objection that was eventually moderated with the promise the new settlement will be also a low-rise, spacious and significantly small one, designed for upper-middle-class families as well. In 2003 both settlements were merged by the Ministry of Interior into one municipal entity. However, they maintain their urban independence as no significant physical connection, such as streets or paths, were created between them; and they are still accessible from two different entrances.

The place stratification in Kochav-Yair was further enhanced by its physical segregation and seclusion. The concept of detachment was an integral part of both the urban and architectural layouts, yet, this is also emphasised by the lack of commercial uses. Though there are a few stores and public facilities inside Kochav-Yair, the main commercial and recreational uses are found in its fringes. This includes the commercial centre that is located in the nearby gas-station compound, which consists of several stores, banks, and cafes, as well as the nearby industrial zone that contains office buildings, shops, and even a supermarket. The gated community aspect is then heightened by a physical barrier and a check post that separate the residential area with its nearby environment and controls those coming in, as well as those going out. To make this procedure more efficient and less troublesome for the residents, the access road consists of two lanes, one for the residents of Kochav-Yair and one for guests. A remote identification system opens the barrier

for cars owned by residents automatically while guests are able to enter only after an inspection of the security guards at the entrance. A similar inspection takes place also while exiting Kochav-Yair, to prevent cases of car theft and burglary (Kochav Yair Council, 2015). The inspection of non-residents is usually visual and based on appearance, meaning that the security guards distinguish by appearance those who fit the profile of possible guests.

The spacious houses and the distinct and intimate community appealed to many upper-middle-class families. On the Israeli side of the Green Line, Kochav-Yair was ideological, yet not too much, and was thus able to attract the sought bourgeoisie families. In a 1984 promotion film done by the South African Zionist Federation, one of the partners in Kochav-Yair, all these aspects were clearly stated:

"Today, Sophisticated technology and a great deal of thought of quality of life are building Kochav-Yair. Located in the vicinity of Ra'anana and Kfar Sava, Kochav-Yair is in easy reach of Tel Aviv and is located entirely in the pre 67 border of Israel. It is easy to work in Tel Aviv and benefit from it culturally, yet to live in a small town. Kochav-Yair will have a maximum of 1200 homes each with a private garden. These homes and the Kochav-Yair lifestyle are available at a price no other quality suburb can offer and in travelling distance from the centre …" (Kochav Yair, 1984).

One of the South Africans moving to Kocahv-Yair quoted in the promotion film went further and state that:

"One thing I want to tell you about the houses in Kochav-Yair; They are not what one envisions when coming on Aliyah, we are talking about luxury houses, spacious … so this standard of housing is very high, very similar to what we have in South Africa, very similar" (Kochav Yair, 1984).

Developed by and for a specific group, Kocahv Yair is a classic case of place stratification. Moreover, the ability of the association to lead such a massive construction feasibly and efficiently couldn't have been done without the support of the different administrations, which demonstrates the selective privatisation enacted by the state. The focus on the detached family unit and simplistic design features, together with the well-perceived core settling families, offered this selected group the suburban dream of a spacious house and a garden in a distinct community while incorporating them into the national-territorial mission. Subsequently, in the early 1990s, as the Israeli Government asked to construct more Jewish settlements in the area, it referred to them as "Stars" (*Kochavim*) as it sought to create several new reproductions of Kochav-Yair along the Green-Line. Kochav-Yair was therefore the prototype of the ideal Suburban Settlement (Fig. 14).

7. Oranit

Ornait is an Israeli West-Bank settlement that is located just over the Green-Line (illustration 3). It has an upper-middle-class community of 9000 inhabitants and belongs to the 2nd highest socioeconomic decile of Israeli localities. Similar to other settlements in the area it is affiliated with the secular central/left side of the political map, and not the religious right-wing West-Bank settlers (ICBS, 2016; ICBS, 2016b). It was established in 1983, and it lies in the fringes of the West-Bank, in the slopes of the western Samarian hills. It borders Horashim forest and Israeli-Arab village of Kufr Bara in the west, the Arab-Israeli[10] town of Kufr Qasem in the south, the Arab-Palestinian villages of Azzun Atma in the east and that of Abu Salem in the north (ICBS, 2016). The relatively sparse Palestinian population around Oranit, the natural landscape surrounding it and its proximity to the central coastal area were leading features which ensured that it would become an ideal location for families looking for a house in the developing suburbia.

Fig. 14. Kochav-Yair, 1992. Saar Yaacov (GPO).

Unlike common settlements, Oranit was almost entirely privately developed. It started as an initiative of Delta ltd. that was formed by five different and quite unrelated individuals with minimal knowledge and experience in development, real estate or planning (Shiloni, 2019 [Interview]). The company began purchasing lands from local Palestinians in the area, in the hope of eventually establishing a new Jewish settlement. They enjoyed close connections to the reigning Likud party and the Israeli Government, specifically with deputy Minister of Agriculture Michael Dekel, who was in charge of new rural settlements in the West-Bank and was known as an enthusiastic supporter of the settlement project in general; particularly privately initiated ones (Figs. 15 and 16). In September of 1982 Delta was personally promised by Dekel, after expressing his enthusiasm, that he will support their project and promote the establishment of Oranit (Dekel, 1982).

The authorisation of Oranit by the Ministerial Settlement Committee in 1983 was a clear act of selective privatisation. Beyond the common decree, the committee's order stated that Oranit will be privately developed, and most importantly, that Delta will be its sole developer (Government of Israel, 1983). Therefore, granting a private entity unprecedented *power to* plan, develop and market space, in order to enhance the state's *power over* it. The incentive behind this decision could be explained by the government's attempt to hand out its full responsibility to one clear developer that would act as its representative and be responsible for the entire project. Yet, in 1994, Dekel would be indicted and found guilty of receiving bribes from different West-Bank developers and land merchants that were connected to Delta. Considering the company's lack of experience and knowledge, the explanation that this decision was taken mainly due to the company's ties with the government is highly reasonable.

Confident in the government's support, Delta began planning and developing the site before the official authorisation. It commissioned Giora Shiloni, a road engineer that had recently returned from working in the US, to form the initial layout, which was later processed into a more detailed urban planning scheme (Shiloni, 2019 [Interview]). Focused on generating an alignment of residential lots, the proposed layout was quite simplistic and recreated the common arrangement of main roads and inner *cul de sac* streets. The attempt to create a distinctive low-rise and low-density environment continued to evolve, and while the first plans included triple-family houses in the settlement's main area, they were later concentrated in its fringes, not interfering with the sought distinct character (Figs. 17–19). Land ownership issues constantly played a major role and though Delta undertook an intense effort to purchase private lands from their Arab owners, these efforts were not always successful. Several were unwilling to sell their lands to Israelis, leaving undeveloped enclaves inside the settlement (Fig. 18). Later, other landowners claimed that their lands were taken from them unwillingly or by fraud, in what will be known as the "*Lands Affair*" (Naveh, 1985, p. 13).

With the capacity to dictate the future population Delta enacted a selective marketing process. Aiming to attract families searching for

[10] "Arab-Israeli town" means a locality housing Palestinian citizen of Israel, inside the pre-1967 borders.



Illustration 3. Oranit.

Fig. 15. Deputy Minister Dekel (middle of picture) visiting the future site of Oranit, 1982. Maariv (Mekel, 1982).

Fig. 16. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (left) and Deputy Minister Dekel (right) visiting the construction site of Oranit, 1984.

Fig. 17. Oranit, 1982, Delta ltd. (Israel State Archive).

better living standards, the houses marketed in Oranit were significantly large, yet still affordable. Labelled as a "*city in nature*" (Delta ltd, 1982), Oranit was depicted as a tranquil and pleasant small-scale settlement, which is surrounded by a pristine and pleasant landscape but close to all cities of the main metropolitan area. The ideal location and the affordable prices, which were less than half of similar houses in cities nearby, enabled Delta to engage in a relatively quiet marketing campaign, which relied more on word of mouth and targeted specific well-profiled and well-connected families. These included officials in the Israeli Aerospace Industries or physicians from Tel-Hashomer Hospital (MCH, 1987). This insured the desired homogenous character of the future population while attracting families with similar profiles. Consequently, almost all homebuyers were upper-middle-class families from cities in the coastal



Fig. 18. Oranit, 1983. Yosef Sivan and Giora Shiloni (Israel State Archive). Note the enclaves of unresolved or unbought private lands.

Fig. 19. Oranit, 1991. Yosef Sivan (ILA). Note the changes in the allocation of lots along the streets, the yellow lots for more dense units are at the fringes of the settlement and no longer along the main street. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the Web version of this article.)

area and some American Jews interested in moving to Israel (Delta ltd, 1982b).

The distinctive profile of the population was expressed also in the layout and design of the houses. Referred to as *villas*, and not cottages like in earlier cases, Delta intended to construct 300 out of the 500 lots while the remaining 200 were meant to be developed in a BYOH method. To retain the homogeneity and reduce costs Delta adopted the model system and proposed the families moving to Oranit seven different options of single and double-family houses (Iron, 2019 [Interview]). Though designed by three different offices that enjoyed substantial professional freedom, the different models were significantly similar and focused on the privacy of the nuclear family living in spacious, yet unpretentious houses. Accordingly, they repeated the common split-level typology and the division between the different areas of the house while maintaining a quite humble appearance, as seen in the marketing pamphlets issued by Delta ltd (Delta ltd, 1982). Accordingly, it emphasised the "*good*" family house that was depicted in the middle of nature, with no neighbours, surrounded by trees and an open landscape (Figs. 20–22). These similar architectural concepts were strengthened by the construction of almost all houses by the same contractor and the use of the same designs in the BYOH lots (Globes, 1985).

Adequate to the profile of the families, Delta referred to them as "*purchasers*" or "*clients*", and not merely settlers (Delta ltd, 1982, p. 2). Delta also referred to the act of purchasing a house as an "*investment*" to be refunded in case the Israeli Government chooses to withdraw from the West-Bank before the end of construction (Delta ltd, 1982). This perspective was mutual, as seen in several residents' comments in a 1985 interview addressing land ownership issues, stating that "*we invested here and we will continue to invest here*" (Naveh, 1985, p. 13).

After the initial selective marketing that granted Oranit the image of an attractive and exclusive settlement, Delta was able to promote a limited number of denser housing units. In the eastern part of the settlement, detached from the core of private houses, Delta developed a series of four-story buildings, which though being multi-family tenements, their design implies that they were planned to recreate the appearance of a private house. Using setbacks, roof terraces and separate entrances, the units were planned as separate apartments offering a high level of privacy to their dwellers. A similar case were the terraced houses in the northern part of Oranit, which were planned to ensure a higher level of privacy while giving the family a feeling of living in a private house, as seen in the detachment of the units from their surroundings and their ornamentation with a tilted roof (Delta ltd, 1982).

The mentioned "*Lands Affair*" caused several setbacks in the development of Oranit. After completion of the first phase, Ashdar, one Israel's largest construction companies, was supposed to develop the nearby site of *Tzamaraot*, owned by a different private company. However, due to the bad publicity and hold-ups in the project, as well as the monopoly of Delta that was not revoked until the mid-1990s, Ashdar eventually withdrew, and though the initial plans were made during the late 1980s (Baron, 1985) this project remained on hold for more than 20 years.

By the beginning of the 1990s, the problems of this selective privatisation and the monopoly granted to Delta began to surface. The main complaints of the newly established local council were that Delta did not develop the inner infrastructure as promised and that the roads that it did pave were done inappropriately. Privately developed meant that the MCH was not allowed to subsidise any of the inner infrastructure works. Consequently, the Oranit council had to allocate funds from its own budget to complete or repair the unfinished works. This meant that it had to issue a road tax for all households, significantly increasing their cost of living (Cohen, 1990). Moreover, in 1990 the office of the State Attorney gave a very strict interpretation to the exclusive status of Delta in Oranit, as it claimed that the company was the only entity with the legal right to commission any new planning schemes or projects in the area of the settlement (Albeck, 1990). Thus, limiting even further the responsibility and authority of the local municipal council while enhancing Delta's spatial privileges. This issue eventually turned into a power-play between Delta, the local council, and the MCH, and the exclusive status was revoked only in 1996 (Government of Israel, 1996).

Though seemingly a private project, Oranit received significant aid that went beyond bureaucratic issues. Located in the occupied West-Bank and not in the official area of the state of Israel, several crucial planning regulations followed the Jordanian planning law and not the

Fig. 20. Model-B, Kaplan, Iron, Shachar (Delta ltd. 1982).

Fig. 21. Model-C, Peri architects.

Fig. 22. Model-H, Yacobovic architects.

Israeli one. One of these is the percentage of public uses in a newly planned residential area. Using the Jordanian regulations, which were much less generous regarding public functions, Delta was able to maximise the amount of marketable residential lots (Shiloni, 2019 [Interview]). Subsequently, the ILA had to assign public lands south of the settlement for the uses of a high school and cultural centre, contributing public property to a private endeavour. Later, due to the lack of available public lands, the MCH planned to expand Oranit across the Green-Line, on state-owned land reserves assigned to the Israeli Arab village of Kufr Bara (Fig. 23) (MCH, 1991). The plan, which started as a conceptual option in the late 1980s, became very concrete in the mid-1990s and received the support of leading politicians like Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres, and even left-wing ones like Yosi Sarid, a fierce opponent of the settlement enterprise (Elgazi, 1996). Eventually, it was not implemented, mainly due to the inability to have one municipal entity on both sides of the Green-Line (Shiloni, 2019 [Interview]), and the only expansion possibilities were the small-scale sites which their ownership was resolved (Fig. 24). Nevertheless, it points out the national consensus regarding Oranit.

Due to its location and population, Oranit continued to attract newcomers over the years. Quite detached from the West-Bank, except for a few incidents and temporary feelings of insecurity, the settlement was not significantly affected by the violent outbreaks of the first



Fig. 23. A plan to extend Oranit towards east, 1991. MCH.

Fig. 24. New area added to Oranit in deep grey, 1992. (IDF).

Intifada. The relative stagnation the settlement witnessed through the 1990s was not an outcome of political tensions or lack of attractivity, but mainly due to the mentioned land ownership issues. The inhabitants of Oranit, well aware of the reputation of their settlement, were interested in retaining it. As a result, they opposed the possibility that people outside of the settlement would come to use public functions inside it, like the school or the new sports club, and therefore insisted on high prising (Oranit Council, 1993). Oranit was thus a gated community, physically as well as socially.

The reputation of Oranit as an attractive and legitimate settlement increased with the construction of the West-Bank Separation Barrier in 2006. Physically detached from the occupied territories and becoming *de facto* part of the official area of Israel, Oranit was cleansed from the stigma of a West-Bank settlement, as well as the defence and legal repercussions that came with it. By that time, the majority of land issues in the nearby Tzamarot area were resolved and two different urban planning schemes were authorised around the year 2000, both by private companies. Though planned separately, the area did have a relatively unified character, which resembled the existing private-house-oriented fabric of Oranit. Unrealised for some time, probably due to the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, they were realised after the construction of the separation wall in 2006 that gave it needed economic feasibility. Ashdar, which was supposed to be the neighbourhood's initial developer in the 1980s (Priel, 1983), bought some 150 dunams[11] in the area (Yamin, 2006), developed them and began marketing prepared lots to individual purchasers. Concurrently, as the exclusive status of Delta was revoked, other smaller private developers received the *power to* plan and market the lands around Oranit. Consequently, leading to additional private projects that expanded the settled area and enhanced the state's *power over* space.

The story behind the establishment of Oranit consists of a mixture of private, economic and national interests. The state, interested in developing Jewish settlement in the area, was willing to hand out its sovereignty to a private contractor on its behalf and by that literarily privatising the settlement enterprise. The developers on the other hand, were able to use the relatively comfortable terms in the West-Bank, their ability to purchase Palestinian lands in the area and their ties with the government in order to receive a monopoly over Oranit and by that to conduct a significantly economic and efficient process. At the same time, the families moving into the settlement were attracted by the location, the affordability, and the relatively small and high-class community.

[11] (Ottoman Turkish: دونم; Turkish: *dönüm*; Hebrew: דונם) An ottoman measurement unit that is an equivalent of 1000m2.

These three interests were entangled one with the other, until Delta's economic interests began contradicting those of the inhabitants, the local council and the MCH. Yet, once this issue was resolved, the coalition of interest between the state, private developers and upper-middle-class families continued onward.

8. Conclusions

Kochav-Yair and Oranit, which represent the Suburban Settlements of the early 1980s, illustrate a unique privatised frontier domestication mechanism. Granting selected groups exclusive spatial rights was already a common method in developing Israeli frontier settlements. Nevertheless, these privileges usually concerned the exclusive use of the planned site and private ownership rights granted to the settling families. On the other hand, the case studies examined in this paper demonstrate a step further, as the developers of both sites enjoyed substantial planning rights that enabled them to dictate the layout of the future settlements as well as the architecture of its houses. Therefore, granting them the *power to* form and develop space in order to promote the state's *power over* it. These substantial powers were reserved to privately initiated Suburban Settlements along the Green-Line while other typologies were an outcome of a state-directed top-down planning approach.

Even though both cases were supported by right-wing politicians, whose main electoral power consists of the underprivileged Mizrahi blue-collar and middle classes, it was the upper-middle-class centre/left Ashkenazi sector that was targeted. Through this state-supported endeavour, this hegemonic group was *seduced*, as Kim Dovey would claim, to settle along the Green-Line, consequently promoting its domestication. Therefore, the bourgeoisification of the former frontier was enabled through the granted spatial privileges and the residential environments that followed were focused on descending spheres of isolations and typical homogeneous lines that fitted the distinct profile of the new pioneer bourgeoise. Following the bourgeoisification of the 1980s, the area witnessed intense development during the 1990s, which turned it into an integral part of the Tel Aviv metropolis (ICBS, 2008). Therefore, the bourgeoisification of the Green-Line was a state-directed gentrification process, which turned the area into the dormitory of the privileged upper-middle-class, legitimising it and eventually incorporating it into the national consensus.

Acknowledgement

I wish to acknowldge the Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich Foundation for funding this research as well as Prof.Dr Carola Hein for her assistance and guidance.

References

Agamben, G. (2008). *State of exception*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Alba, R., & Logan, J. (1991). Variations on two themes: Racial and ethnic patterns in the attainment of suburban residence. *Demography, 28*, 431–453.
Albeck, P. (1990). *Delta Oranit*. Jerusalem: The State Attorney's Office.
Allegra, M. (2013). The politics of suburbia: Israel's settlement policy and the production of space in the metropolitan area of Jerusalem. *Environment & Planning A, 45*, 497–516.
Allegra, M. (2017b). "Outside Jerusalem-yet so Near": Ma'ale Adumim, Jerusalem, and the suburbanization of Israel's settlement policy. In E. Maggor (Ed.), *Normalizing occupation: The politics of everyday life in the west Bank settlements* (pp. 48–63). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Allweil, Y. (2016). *Homeland: Zionism as housing regime, 1860–2011*. London: Taylor & Francis.
Azaryahu, M. (2000). McIsrael? On the ?americanization of Israel? *Israel Studies, 5*(1), 41–64.
Bareli, A., & Cohen, U. (2018). *The academic middle-class rebellion socio-political conflict over wage-gaps in Israel, 1954-1956. Leide; Boston: Leiden*.
Baron, G. (1985). Also here people donated to the Likud 23. *Yedioth Ahronot, 19*, 12.
Ben-Porat, Avishai (1999). *Where are those bourgeois?*. Tel Aviv: Magnes.
Benvenisti, M. (1987). *1987 report : Demographic, economic, legal, social, and political developments in the west bank*. Jerusalem and Boulder: Jerusalem Post and Westview Press.
Berger, T. (2015). *Autotopia: Suburban in-between space in Israel* (1 ed.). Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad.
Billig, M. (2015). The jewish settlements in judea and Samaria (1967–2008): Historical overview. *History and Philosophy of Jewish Settlement*, 331–347.
Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinctions*. New York: Routledge, 1979.
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of the theory and research for the sociology of education* (pp. 241–258). New York: Greenwood Press.
Buchman, M. (2019). *Kochav Yair*. Interview[Interview] (7 3 2019[Interview]).
Cahaner, L. (2017). Between ghetto politics and geopolitics: Ultraorthodox settlements in the west bank. In M. Allegra, A. Handel, & E. Maggor (Eds.), *Normalizing Occupation: The politics of eveyday life in the West Bank settlements edited* (pp. 112–127). Bloomington, Indiana: ndiana University Press.
Central District. (1980). *Regional master plan 3/2 -ayalon modi'in afek area, Tel Aviv: Central district*.
Cohen, Y. (1990). *Letter to MCH regarding infrastructure in Oranit*. Oranit: Oranit Council.
Cohen, U., & Leon, N. (2008). The new Mizrahi middle class: Ethnic mobility and class integration in Israel. *Journal of Israeli History Politics, Society, Culture, 27*(1), 51–64.
Dalsheim, J. (2008). Twice removed: Mizrahi settlers in gush katif. *Social Identities, 14*, 535–551.
Dekel, M. (1982). *A letter to Delta ltd*. Jerusalem: Ministry of Agriculture.
Delta ltd. (1982). *Oranit*. Delta: Karnei Shomron.
Delta ltd. (1982b). *List of homebuyers in Oranit*. Petah Tikva: Delta ltd.
Dovey, K. (1999). *Framing Place. Mediating power in built form*. London: Routledge.
Efrat, E. (1991). Changes in Israel's urban system after forty years of statehood (1948—1988). In *Eretz-Israel: Archaeological, historical and geographical studies* (pp. 19–26). DAVID AMIRAN.
Efrat, Z. (2004). *The Israeli project : Building and architecture 1948-1973. Tel Aviv*. Tel Aviv Museum of Art.
Eitan, M. (2019). *The construction of Kochav Yair*. Interview [Interview] (23 2 2019 [Interview]).
Elgazi, Y. (1996). A settlement into the Green-Line. *Haaretz, 4 9*, 8.
Filc, D. (2006). *Hegemony and populism in Israel*. Tel Aviv: Resling, 2006.
First, A., & Avraham, E. (2009). *America in JeruSALEm: Globalization, national identity, and Israeli advertising*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Fogel, U. (2019). *The highway 6 settlements*. Interview [Interview] (26 3 2019 [Interview]).
Gil, A. (2019). *Houses in Kochav Yair*. Interview [Interview] (25 2 2019 [Interview]).
Globes. (1985). High profits from sales in Oranit. *The Globe, 24 6*.
Gonen, A., & Cohen, G. (1989). Multi-faceted screw-up of neighborhoods in Jerusalem. *City and Region (Ir Veezor), 19*(20), 9–27.
Government of Israel. (1983). *New settlement of Oranit*. Jerusalem: Government of Israel.
Government of Israel. (1996). *Decision number 905*. Jerusalem: Government of Israel.
Graeber, D. (2011). *Debt: The first 5000 years*. New York: Melville House Publishing.
Gutwein, D. (2012). Pioneer bourgeoisie. In M. Hazan, & U. Cohen (Eds.), *Culture, memory and history* (pp. 685–746). Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University.
Gutwein, D. (2017a). The class logic of the "long revolution. *Iyunim Bitkumat Israel (Studies in Israeli and Modern Jewish Society), 11*, 21–57, 1973-1977.
Gutwein, D. (2017b). The settlements and the relationship between privatization and the occupation. In *Normalizing occupation the politics of everyday life in the west Bank settlements* (pp. 21–33). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Harvey, D. (1990). *The condition of postmodernity*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Harvey, D. (2005). *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Heilbronner, O. (2017). *The Israeli victorians. 28*. Iyonim Betkumat Israel.
Hines, J. D. (2010). In pursuit of experience: The postindustrial gentrification of the rural American West. *Ethnography, 11*(2), 285–308.
Hirschhorn, S. Y. (2017). *City on a hilltop: American Jews and the Israeli settler movement*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
ICBS. (2008). *60 Years of Statistics*. Tel Aviv: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.
ICBS. (2013). *Localities within regional councils, socio-economic index value 2013, cluster of locality*. Jerusalem: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.
ICBS. (2016). *Localities in Israel*. Jerusalem: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.
ICBS. (2016b). *Population in Jewish localities, mixed localities and statistical areas, by selected countries of origin*. Jerusalem: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.
ICEC. (2019a). *Results of 21st knesstet elections according to localities*. Jeruslem: Israeli Central Elections Committee.
ICEC. (2019b). *Results of 21st knesstet elections according to localities*. Jerusalem: The Central Elections Committee.
ILA. (1982). *Resolution No. 262 , Tel Aviv*. Israel Land Administration.
ILA. (1984). *Kochav Yair*. Tel Aviv: Israel Land Administration.
Iron, G. (2019). *Houses in Oranit*. Interview [Interview] (11 3 2019[Interview]).
Kemp, A. (1999). *The frontier idiom on borders and territorial politics in post-1967 Israel. 19* pp. 78–97). Geography Research Forum.
Kimmerling, B. (1983). *Zionism and territory: The socio-territorial dimensions of zionist politics*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
Kimmerling, B. (2001a). *The end of Ashkenazi hegemony*. Tel Aviv: Keter Publishing House.
Kipnis, B. (1979). *Potential of developing urban housings along the Hills Axis*. Haifa: Ministry of Construction and Housing.
Kochav Yair Council. (2015). *Kochav yair-tzur yigal council official w*ebsite [Online] Available at: http://www.kyair.org.il/Lists/List2/DispForm.aspx?ID=12. (Accessed 22 April 2019).
Levav, A. (1980). JNF to establish 3 more points in the triangle areas. *Maariv, 28 10*, 1980.
Logan, J., & Alba, R. (1993). Minority proximity to whites in suburbs: An individual-level analysis of segregation. *American Journal of Sociology, 98*, 1388–1427.

Logan, J., & Molotch, H. (1987). *Urban fortunes: A political economy of place*. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987.
Maggor, E. (2015). State, market and the Israeli settlements: The ministry of housing and the shift from messianic outposts to urban settlements in the early 1980s. *Israeli Sociology, 16*, 140–167.
Malka, C. (1982). *Letter to Michael eitan*. Jerusalem: Ministry of Agriculture.
Mbembe, A. (2003). *Necropolitics. Public Culture, 15*(1), 11–40.
MCH. (1987). *Oranit*. Jerusalem: Ministry of Housing.
MCH. (1991). *Oranit*. Jerusalem: Ministry of Housing and Construction.
Meir Buchman Architects and Planners. (1987). *Modification plan SD/1002/7 A: Kochav Yair*. Tel Aviv: Israel Land Administration.
Meir Buchman Architects and Planners. (1988). *Detailed plan GZ/117*. Tel Aviv: Israel Land Administration.
Mekel, S. (1982). Lots and development in a fixed price. *Maariv, 14 12*, 46.
Ministerial Committee for Aliyah and Integration. (1990). *Decision A/82*. Jerusalem: Israeli Government Secretariat.
Ministry of Environmental Protection. (2015). *Residential building pattern in Israel*. Jerusalem: Ministry of Environmental Protection.
Nahoum Dunsky Planners. (1991). *Development of the Hills' Axis: The seven Stars plan*. Tel Aviv: Ministry of Construction and Housing.
Naveh, B. (1985). Arabs sold lands and then complained that it was stolen in order no to take a bullet. *Maariv, 18*(12), 13.
Newman, D. (1981). *Gush emunim and settlement-type in the west bank. 8*. British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, 1.
Newman, D. (2017). Settlement as suburbanization: The banality of colonization. In *Normalizing occupation the politics of everyday life in the west Bank settlements* (pp. 24–47). Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
Oranit Council. (1993). *Council meeting protocol - 20.3.1993*. Oranit: Oranit Council.
Pais, J., South, S., & Crowder, K. (2012). Metropolitan heterogeneity and minority neighborhood attainment: Spatial assimilation or place stratification? *Social Problems, 59*(2), 258–281.
Prescott, J. R. V. (1987). *Political frontiers and boundaries*. New York: Routledge.
Priel, A. (1983). Dozens of large development companies are engaged in JS. *Maariv, 20*(3), 2.
Pullan, W. (2011). Frontier urbanism: The periphery at the centre of contested cities. *The Journal of Architecture, 16*(1).
Ram, U. (2008). *The globalization of Israel*. New York: Routledge.
Riskin, A. (2019). *Houses in Kochav Yair and Reut*. Interview [Interview] (14 3 2019 [Interview]).
Ron, J. (2003). *Frontiers and ghettos: State violence in Serbia and Israel*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rozin, O. (2016). *A home for all Jews, citizenship, rights, and national identity in the new Israeli*. Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press.
Said, E. (1979). *The question of Palestine*. New York: Times Books.
Schwake, G. (2020a). Settle and rule: The evolution of the Israeli national project. *Architecture and Culture*. https://doi.org/10.1080/20507828.2020.1730624.
Schwake, G. (2020b). The americanisation of Israeli housing practices. *The Journal of Architecture, 25*(3), 295–316. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602365.2020.1758952.
Schwake, G. (2020c). The community settlement: a neo-rural territorial tool. *Planning Perspectives*. https://doi.org/10.1080/02665433.2020.1728569.
Schwake, G. (2020d). Supply-side territoriality: reshaping a geopolitical project according to economic means. *Space and Polity*. https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2020.1788930.
Schwake, G. (2020e). An officer and a bourgeois: Israeli military personnel, suburbanization and selective privatization. *Planning Perspectives*. https://doi.org/10.1080/02665433.2020.1781683.
Segal, R., & Weizman, E. (2002). *A civilian occupation: The politics of Israeli architecture*. London: Verso.
Segev, T. (2002). *Elvis in Jerusalem: Post-zionism and the americanization of Israel*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
Settlement Division. (1981). *The 100.000 plan*. Jerusalem: World Zionist Organistation.
Settlement Division. (1982). *Settlements in judea and Samaria*. Jerusalem: WZO.
Shachar, A. (1998). *Reshaping the map of Israel: A new national planning doctrine*. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
Shadar, H. (2014). *The foundations of public housing*. Tel Aviv: Ministry of Cinstruction and Housing.
Sharon, A. (1951). *Physical planning in Israel*. Jerusalem: Israeli Government.
Shenhav, Y. (2006). *The Arab Jews: A postcolonial reading of nationalism, religion, and ethnicity*. Redwood: Stanford University Press.
Shiloni, G. (2019). *Development of Oranit*. Interview [Interview] (7 3 2019[Interview]).
Soffer, A. (1992). Mitzpim in the Galilee - a decade of their establishment. *Karaa, 34*, 24–29.
Soffer, A. (2018). *The eastern frontier*. Interview [Interview] (1 11 2018[Interview]).
Soffer, A., & Gazit, P. (2005). *Between the Sharon and Samaria*. Haifa: University of Haifa.
SPNI. (1995). *Report on the MCH pland for Kochav Yair and Yarhiv Nirit*. Tel Aviv: Society for the Protection of Nature in Israel.
Tzfadia, E. (2000). Immigrant dispersal in settler societies: Mizrahim and Russians in Israel under the press of hegemony. *Geography Research Forum, 20*, 52–69.
Weiss, H. (2011). Immigration and west Bank settlement normalization. *PoLAR, 34*(1), 112–130.
Weizman, E. (2006). Principles of frontier geography. In M. P, et al. (Eds.), *City of collision. Basel: Birkhäuser* (pp. 84–92).
Wiener, A. (1983). *Letter to Michael Dekel*. Jerusalem: Ministry of Construction and Housing.
Yacobi, H., & Tzfadia, E. (2018). Neo-settler colonialism and the re-formation of territory: Privatization and nationalization in Israel. *Mediterranean Politics, 24*(1), 1–19.
Yair, K. (1984). *Directed by bonnie boxer*. Israel: South African Zionist Federation [Film].
Yair Association, K. (1984). *Letter to deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Constrcution and housing David Levy, Tel Aviv*. Kochav Yair Association - Found at the Israel State Archive: ISA-moag-DeputyMinister-0013y15.
Yamin, G. (2006). Ashdar purchased 150 dunnams in Oranit. *The Globe, 8 1*.
Yiftachel, O. (1996). The internal frontier: Territorial control and ethnic relations in Israel. *Regional Studies, 30*(5), 493–508.
Yiftachel, O. (2003). Bedouin-arabs and the Israeli settler state. In D. Champagne, & I. Abu-Saad (Eds.), *Indigenous people between autonomy and globalization* (pp. 21–47). Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Yiftachel, O. (2010). *From Sharon to Sharon : Spatial planning and separation regime in Israel/Palestine. Hagar*.