

**Transport Policy Implementation and Outcomes:
The case of Yaounde in the 1990s**

by

Soter Eddia

MA, Institute of Social Studies,
The Hague, the Netherlands

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my late parents papa Athanasius Njenge and mama Christina Bekono, my wife Christie, my daughters Silvar and Kacey and my son Sidney.

Transport Policy Implementation and Outcomes: The case of Yaounde in the 1990s

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor
aan de Technische Universiteit Delft,
op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. ir. J.T. Fokkema,
voorzitter van het College voor Promoties
in het openbaar te verdedigen op woensdag 9 september 2009 om 15.00 uur
door Soter EDDIA,
Master in Development Studies (PADS), Institute of Social Studies,
Den Haag, Nederland
geboren te Muyuka, Cameroon

Dit proefschrift is goedgekeurd door de promotor:
Prof. dr. G.P. van Wee

Samenstelling promotiecommissie:

Rector Magnificus	voorzitter
Prof. dr. G.P. van Wee	Technische Universiteit Delft, promotor
Prof. dr. H.L. Ottens	Universiteit Utrecht
Prof. dr. K.A. Brookhuis	Technische Universiteit Delft
Prof. dr. ir. H. Priemus	Technische Universiteit Delft
Prof. dr. W.E. Walker	Technische Universiteit Delft
Prof. dr. J.P.M. Groenewegen	Technische Universiteit Delft

This thesis is the result of a Ph.D. study carried out at Delft University of Technology, Faculty of Technology Policy and Management and the Netherlands School for Transport Infrastructure and Logistics, TRAIL.

TRAIL Thesis Series T2009/8, the Netherlands TRAIL Research School

P.O. Box 5017
2600 GA Delft
The Netherlands
T: +31 (0) 15 278 6046
F: +31 (0) 15 278 4333
E: info@rsTRAIL.nl

ISBN: 978-90-5584-113-4

Copyright 2009 by Soter Eddia

All rights reserved. No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the author.

Printed in the Netherlands

Preface

I am indebted to Professor Bert van Wee my promoter at TRAIL, TUDELFT for the enormous guidance and support he provided in the course of supervising this thesis. I also extend my gratitude to the staff of the Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management of TUDELFT, notably Professor Walker, Professor Thissen and Dr. Van de Riet, whose advice were essential in the course of this study at Delft. I extend my gratitude to the Secretary of the Faculty, Trudie, for her kindness and the way in which she handled my problems whilst in Delft and whenever I phoned or sent an e-mail to the Professor. Special thanks also go to the staff of TRAIL who adopted me during the course of this research exercise.

I am also thankful to Professor Jacques Fame Ndong, the Minister of Higher Education of the Republic of Cameroon and Chancellor of the National Academic Orders, for material support which permitted me to travel to the Netherlands to defend my thesis. Finally, I should be thankful to my bosses at the Presidency of the Republic in Yaounde for their support.

Contents

Preface	i
List of figures and tables	vii
1 General introduction	1
1.1 Background of thesis	1
1.2 Urban transport problems in developing countries	2
1.3 Policy reforms in Yaounde.....	4
1.4 Research goal	4
1.5 Research questions	5
1.6 Scope of research	5
1.7 Outline of thesis	6
2 Theoretical framework of the thesis	7
2.1 Introduction	7
2.2 Theories and concepts used in the thesis.....	7
2.2.1 Uncertainty in policy	7
2.2.2 Public policy.....	8
2.2.3 Public policy context and policymaking	9
2.2.4 Public policy research.....	9
2.2.5 Economic and political aspects of neo-liberal doctrine.....	11
2.2.6 Impact of market theories and public policy reforms.....	17
2.3 Limitations to implementing market based solutions for urban transport reforms in developing countries	20
2.4 Conclusion.....	21
3 Research methodologies used in the thesis	23

3.1	Introduction	23
3.2	Policy evaluation outcome model method used in the thesis	24
3.3	Historical causal tracing analysis used in research	27
3.4	Stakeholder analysis	31
3.4.1	Definition of Stakeholders Analysis	31
3.4.2	Appropriateness of the SA for the thesis	31
3.5	Policy implementation analysis	33
3.6	Comparative case study analysis method	34
3.7	Researchers' participant observation and learning	35
3.8	Conclusion	35
4	Research design of the thesis	39
4.1	Introduction	39
4.2	Empirical data collection	42
4.2.1	Primary data	42
4.2.2	Secondary data	44
4.3	Time series analysis	45
4.4	Stakeholder Table and Stakeholder Chart used for this research	46
4.4.1	Stakeholder Table	46
4.4.2	Stakeholder Reference Chart	49
4.4.3	Analysing data in Stakeholder Reference Chart	52
4.4.4	Stakeholder knowledge of policy	53
4.4.5	Analysis of stakeholders' position on policy	53
4.4.6	Analysis of stakeholder power (influence, resources, leadership)	53
4.4.7	Stakeholder power index	54
4.4.8	Analysis of possible alliances for or against policy reform	55
4.4.9	Stakeholder perceptions of policy's achievement of objectives	55
4.4.10	Stakeholder perception of post-policy reform condition	55
4.5	Conclusion	56
5	Implications of policy reforms for the transport system in Yaounde.....	57
5.1	Introduction	57
5.2	Aims and objectives of the policy reform	57
5.2.1	Aims of the transport policy	57
5.2.2	Objectives of the transport policy reform	58
5.3.	Implementation of policy reform	59
5.3.1	Products of the policy reform	59
5.3.2	Assessing time lapse for policy implementation	60
5.3.3	The fourteen policy reforms	61
5.4	Results of policy outputs	69
5.5	Conclusion	70

6	Stakeholder perceptions on policy reforms	73
6.1	Introduction	73
6.2	Stakeholder power analysis of policy reform.....	74
6.3	Stakeholder knowledge, positions and interest in policy analysis	75
6.4	Stakeholder interests and policy alliances.....	75
6.5	Analysing stakeholder actions in policy implementation	76
6.6	Primary stakeholders and policy reforms.....	79
6.7	Chi Square test for significance of statistic.....	82
6.7.1	Chi square value and data significance of two stakeholder groups sampled	82
6.7.2	Opinions of two stakeholder categories on policy reform.....	84
6.7.3	Conclusion.....	84
6.8	Trend analysis of stakeholder perception of policy impact by proxy criteria	85
6.9	Conclusion.....	90
7	A comparative review of urban transport systems in Yaounde, Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala and Douala	93
7.1	Introduction	93
7.2	Urban public transport in Yaounde	97
7.3	Problems and prospects of urban transport systems in developing countries	98
7.4	A comparison of the urban transport of Yaounde with those of Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala and Douala	99
7.4.1	Private sector providers for public transport services	99
7.4.2	Institutional mechanisms for the supply of public transport	102
7.4.3	Difficulties in enforcing transport regulations	104
7.4.4	Under-developed state of non-motorised transport infrastructure and inadequate managing of traffic congestion.....	106
7.4.5	Poor conditions of road system and road maintenance problems	107
7.5	Transport problems unique to Yaounde.....	107
7.6	Conclusion.....	108
8	General research conclusions.....	109
8.1	Introduction	109
8.2	Main research question.....	109
8.2.1	Subsidiary research questions.....	109
8.2.2	Main research question.....	114
9	Epilogue.....	115
9.1	Introduction	115
9.2	Recommendations for future transport reforms in Yaounde.....	115
9.2.1	Demand-side transport, mobility, infrastructure and management policies.....	115

9.2.2	Supply-side transport, mobility, infrastructure and management policies	116
9.2.2.1	Urban governance and institutional renewal	117
9.2.2.2	Need for single urban transport agency	118
9.2.2.3	Road safety and controlling traffic in city	119
9.2.2.4	Enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations.....	119
9.2.2.5	Road safety and environmental performance of vehicles.....	120
9.3	Generalisability of conclusions	120
9.3.1	Similarity of policy context	121
9.3.2	Similarity of public policy actors	121
9.3.3	The specificities of transport and infrastructure in Yaounde	121
	Reference list.....	123
	Appendix 1: Research questionnaire.....	137
	Appendix 2: Problems of public policy reseachers in Third World countries	145
	Appendix 3: Characteristics of the urban transport system in Yaounde	151
	Summary	161
	Summary in Dutch	175
	About the author	191
	TRAIL Thesis Series	193

List of figures and tables

Chapter four

List of tables

Table 4.1:	Link between research questions and research methods	39
Table 4.2:	Stakeholder Table identified for this study.....	47
Table 4.3:	Stakeholder Reference Chart	50

Chapter five

List of tables

Table 5.1:	Policy reform implementation time lapses	60
------------	--	----

Chapter six

List of figures

Figure 6.1:	Criteria 1. Stakeholder perception of the timeliness of the reforms	87
Figure 6.2:	Criteria 2. Stakeholder perception of post policy mobility	87
Figure 6.3:	Criteria 3. Stakeholder perception of post policy reliability and comfort in urban mobility in Yaounde	88
Figure 6.4:	Criteria 4. Stakeholder perception of post policy accessibility to urban public transport	88
Figure 6.5:	Criteria 5. Stakeholder perception of post policy safety, cleanliness of public transport	89
Figure 6.6:	Criteria 6. Stakeholder perception of post policy affordability of Urban Public transport.....	89

List of tables

Table 6.1:	Matrix for Power, leadership and resources of key stakeholders	75
Table 6.2:	Primary stakeholder assessment of policy reforms	80
Table 6.3:	Positive and negative perception of Unions on policy for 3 years	86
Table 6.4:	Positive and negative perceptions of Others on policy for 3years	86

Chapter nine

Table 9.1:	Recommendation and suggested policy area.....	117
------------	---	-----

Appendix 3

List of figures

Appendix Figure 3.1: Map of Cameroon showing Yaounde	152
Appendix Figure 3.2: Map of Yaounde main streets	154
Appendix Figure 3.3: Map of Central Yaounde.....	158

List of tables

Appendix Table 3.1: Synopsis of Bus lines in Yaounde in 1998 and 2008.....	153
Appendix Table 3.2: Traffic Signal in Yaounde between 1987 and 2007.....	155

1 General introduction

1.1 Background of thesis

This thesis examines the organisational and functional problems of public urban transport in Yaounde before the introduction of reforms in the 1990s and assesses the effects of these reforms on the transport system in the city. Public urban transport in Yaounde before the introduction of policy reforms in the 1990s faced some major problems, principally a shortage in the means of urban mobility. At that time, privately owned shared taxis (henceforth-shared taxis) and the state-owned urban transport company, Société des Transports Urbains du Cameroun, (SOTUC), were legally authorised to provide public transport services in the city. During this period, the devaluation of the Coopération Financière Africaine (CFA) franc currency rendered the provision of urban transport services in Cameroon generally and in Yaounde in particular more expensive and less profitable, especially for the state-owned company. As concerns shared taxis, their roadworthiness conditions and numbers declined considerably as a result of the currency devaluation, causing the prices of imported motor vehicle spare parts to double. The currency devaluation also produced similar effects on SOTUC. Besides, the company was experiencing managerial problems resulting in massive deficits that forced the state to liquidate the company after many unsuccessful bail-out attempts, in accordance with prescriptions of the Bretton Woods Institutions, under the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Policy Based Lending scheme that required the state to become a minimal regulatory state and adopt market friendly policies that were essential ingredients of the dominant neo-liberal development paradigm of the era.

In addition, in Yaounde, the mainly road-based transport system was in an advanced state of degradation after many years of neglect as the state was under structural adjustment. Few new roads were built; many streets remained narrow. Yaounde being both a regional and a national hub for inter-urban road transport, huge traffic jams were a regular feature along streets in the city where municipal inter city bus station and inter city travel agency stations are located because of the uncontrolled and disorderly parking attitudes of shared taxis and other road users. Over-flowing sewages from open gutters and uncollected garbage from households blocked some key streets in many parts of the city rendering them unable to handle the ever increasing traffic and aggravating the congestion problem in Yaounde.

Furthermore, the non-maintenance of vast stretches of road network rendered mobility in Yaounde cumbersome because potholes along many streets caused shared taxis to shun these

streets and increased travel times. The few taxis that used these bad roads were often much overloaded. Besides, the absence of or non-functional state of traffic signals at many junctions in Yaounde was often the cause of huge traffic jams at these junctions. Before the policy reforms, there were no marked pedestrian crossings or walks in the city and the streets had no marked out lanes for vehicles. The result was massive congestions in many parts of the city, especially at road junctions almost all day round. As a result of the absence of a public urban bus transport service, that caused the shortage in the means of transport in Yaounde, fares for using shared taxis became unaffordable for a large fraction of the city's population.

The transport problems in Yaounde are not unique to the city because comparable problems occur in many cities in developing countries. Before discussing the policy reforms, the research goal of the thesis and the research questions, I would start by presenting an overview of the transport problems in developing countries in the next section.

1.2 Urban transport problems in developing countries

The World Bank (2002), Gakenheimer (1999) and Maunder and Mbara (1996) have noted the preponderance of road-based transport in developing countries. The GTZ (2005) pointed out the crucial role of transport in urban development in general and city life in particular, indicating areas in which policymakers in developing countries should focus attention. Gakenheimer (1999) pointed out that developing countries face similar transport problems notably, shortages in the means of urban transport and noted that over the years the responses to these problems, particularly the trend towards market liberalisation, has been inadequate. He concluded that contemporary transport policies are usually concerned principally with issues such as: shortages in the supply of means of transport, the environmental sustainability of transport systems, inadequate transport infrastructures and poor town planning, the affordability of transport fares, low level of transport safety and low rate of reliability. The urban transport problems of developing countries, which are of interest to this research, are reviewed in the section that follows:

1. Shortages in the supply of the means of transport.

Shortages in supply of transport means makes certain areas of developing countries and large parts of big cities inaccessible. This led to the development of para-transit means of transport that are run by informal operators, which according to Cervero (1998) serve as gap fillers. In West Africa for example, para-transit operators use mainly motorcycles and small old vehicles for illegal transport in cities. Para-transit operators are usually non-corporate and function outside the official taxation and insurance systems. However, many countries facing transport problems caused by shortages in vehicle supply, tolerate informal transport operators because they are deemed necessary for the provision of services. Non-motorised transport is still widely used in developing countries.

2. Affordability of transport fares.

Policy reforms aimed at addressing the issue of affordability of transport fares is a key element in social policy initiatives of many governments, especially in developing countries. These reforms usually aim to reduce social inequalities and to facilitate mobility of goods and persons as well as promoting development.

Mitric and Carruthers (2005) and Carruthers et al. (2005) acknowledge that the concept of affordability is widely used when discussing public urban transport fares in a context of low incomes and poverty, although it is not universally accepted as meaningful. Transport fare is

the dominant consideration for potential users of urban public transport services worldwide. The World Bank (2003a) argues that affordability is now seen as an important measure of an urban transport system performance especially in low-income environments where access to jobs, schools and other essential services depend on urban mobility. A World Bank study (2005) of Douala, Cameroon, shows that 77 percent of all journeys in the city by low-income groups is made on foot because motorised transport is not affordable. In many countries, governments fix ceilings for transport fares especially those for public urban transport as a social policy measure. However, in some countries, apart from the bus services that respect government fares ceilings, customers are allowed to negotiate fares with taxi drivers. In others, Deb (2003) and Maunder and Mbara (1996), point out that the costs of urban public transport services often discriminate between rich and poor urban areas. Current literature also highlights cases of discrimination and harassment for women in Nigeria (Onibakun 1989) and in Ghana (Bayliss 2001). Other authors, like Elson (1999), point out that, not only do cases of such attitudes restrict and restrain women's access to public transport, they equally impede their ability to contribute to development.

3. Inadequate transport infrastructures and poor town planning.

Adequate infrastructure is a key element for fluid transport. In the absence of infrastructure such as traffic signals, pedestrian walks, wide enough streets and junctions, traffic congestion is likely to mar mobility in cities. The development of infrastructure is also a function of the governance structures of cities and the availability of funds. The infrastructure needs for transport imposes patterns of urban land use in many cities. This makes urban planning an essential ingredient in the pursuit of sustainable transport development.

4. The environmental sustainability of transport systems.

Some authors like the World Bank (2005), Schipper (2003; 2004), Van Wee (2002), and Diana (2001) point out that current trend in both developed and developing countries demonstrate increased global concerns in matters of sustainable public urban passenger transportation. As a result, they note that urban policy in favour of environmental-friendly public urban transport has increased depending on financial feasibility, country culture, history and geography as well as urban form and land use patterns. Besides, there is the general shortage in urban public transport means. Schipper (2005) notes that it has been widely acknowledged that noise pollution, losses of urban space to road infrastructures, the emission of gases such as carbon dioxide, responsible for greenhouse effect from vehicle fuel combustion, and others such as NO_x and CO₂ are known to have negative health effects. This urban transport impact on human health and environmental sustainability has raised the debate on non-motorised transport and clean fuels in some cities. Besides, land use patterns are changed to accommodate more efficient and environmental-friendly public urban transport modes.

5. Low level of transport safety and low rate of reliability.

Some authors like Van der Pas, Walker, Marchau and Agusdinata (2006), Heijden and Marchau (2002), have particularly discussed problems related to safety for transport and public urban transport. The World Bank (2002) and Jacobs and Sayer (1984) reveal that urban motorised transport has become a real hazard to pedestrians, passengers and transporters in many cities in developing countries. Several factors account for this situation notably: over-speeding by drivers, poor training of drivers, defective vehicles, disrespect for transport regulations and underdeveloped road infrastructures. This has resulted to high accident rates with heavy human toll and social costs, thereby becoming a cause for concern to policymakers. The poor condition of certain urban transport vehicles also raises the problem

of reliability in urban transport in many developing countries where roadworthiness certification is often non-existent or when it exists, it is more a formality consisting of selling certificates without proper checks on the condition of a vehicle.

1.3 Policy reforms in Yaounde

In Yaounde, Cameroon in the 1990s, an urban transport policy reform was drafted and implemented with the aim of solving the problem of shortage in the means of urban mobility in the city, following the liquidation of the state-owned urban bus transport company, SOTUC.

This policy reforms had the following six objectives:

1. Liberalising public urban transport by bus, minibus, and motorcycle.
2. Eradicating amateurism by promoting the entry of professionals into the sector.
3. Facilitating mobility for the rapidly growing city.
4. Enabling urban traffic to flow fluidly by reducing congestion.
5. Limiting and eventually eradicate illegal transporters.
6. Fighting urban pollution attributable to public transport.

The policy reform was aimed at boosting the supply of transport means in Yaounde and to fill the gap created after the liquidation of the public urban bus company, SOTUC and make public urban transport affordable and accessible to the majority of the population. This transport policy reform is a national policy with perfect overlap for Yaounde.

However, there is a lot of uncertainty with respect to policy implementation and outcomes. The unpredictable character of the cause-effect relationship that links public policy and implementation processes lead to the occurrence of intended and unintended policy outcomes as demonstrates this thesis with respect to the achievement of desired policy goals. Public authorities enacted statutory instruments aimed at implementing them to cause changes in the means and patterns of mobility in Yaounde. A lack of empirical knowledge exists on what happened in practice due to the policy implementation and why it happened. This thesis therefore examines the implications of this policy reform measures on public urban transport in Yaounde, using data collected over a three-year period: 1998, 1999 and 2000.

1.4 Research Goal

The goal of this thesis is to explicate the occurrence and non-occurrence of certain anticipated policy outcomes through the evaluation of what happened in practice, due to the implementation of public urban transport policy reforms in Yaounde. By so doing, this thesis intends to fill the knowledge gap in relation to uncertainties in policy implementation and outcomes. The level of implementation of the policy reform is the result of the uncertainty in policy implementation processes. This thesis identifies the nature of governance structures in the policy context of Yaounde as being responsible for the level of policy implementation because it permits certain categories of key stakeholders to use their positions of power to promote group interests that negatively affects policy outcomes. The thesis also highlights a major flaw in transport policymaking that neglects the crucial role of developing infrastructure to satisfy mobility needs arising from increases in means and modes of public transport as the population grows. In addition, it also seeks to build an understanding of how in practice, during implementation of the new urban transport policy, certain categories of stakeholders in Yaounde, through a combination of their power, relative importance, resources and influence over other actors in the policy arena, affect urban transport policy

reforms in the city. In addition, this thesis aims to use the case of Yaounde to demonstrate that formulating and implementing market friendly policies, involving multiple actors, require a conducive governance nurturing environment and a new policy making approach to permit it deliver its expected results by overcoming uncertainties in the policy making processes.

1.5 Research questions

The main research question of this thesis is:

What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why? The subsidiary questions are:

1. How was the new urban transport policy designed and implemented and how has the policy performed?
2. How do primary urban transport stakeholders assess the performance of policy reforms through the prism of its objectives set by policy makers? And how do they perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the prism of proxy criteria? Is there a significant trend in perceptions of performances of new policy in 1998, 1999 and 2000 among stakeholders?
3. What are the alternative policies that can be proposed for urban public transport, logistics and infrastructure development for Yaounde, from the lessons learned from the current prevailing situation?
4. What are the similarities and differences in problems and solutions of urban mobility transport infrastructure and management between Yaounde and some cities in Africa?

1.6 Scope of research

This thesis focuses on organisational structures and functional problems of urban transport and mobility in Yaounde, which have obvious importance from a policy point of view such as how multiple policy stakeholders articulate their interests and the implications of this on the policy reforms of public urban transport in the 1990s and beyond. It also addresses the issue of planning and developing transport infrastructure for a fast growing city such as Yaounde to meet the demands for mobility. By focusing on these aspects, this thesis hopes to unveil the nature of issues of power relations in a political context of neo-liberal policy reforms and their impact on policy outcomes that affect the lives of people in ways that are initially unanticipated. This thesis uses the national definition of Yaounde as a city rather than a region to examine urban mobility following policy reforms in the 1990s. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the interconnectivity of urban road networks and existing means of transport make it appropriate to talk of an urban transport system in Yaounde. However, because of Yaounde's geographical location and multiple functions, there exist several interurban bus station and a railway station within the city that serve destinations in other Departments and Regions of the country. In this broad sense, Yaounde can be considered as the hub for a regional transport system. This situation has implications for urban mobility because most interurban public motor parks and travel agency stations are located along major streets leading into and out of Yaounde, and contributes to traffic congestion in the city. However, the analysis of this aspect is out of the scope of this thesis.

1.7 Outline of thesis

This thesis is made up of nine chapters and three appendices. Chapter one introduces the thesis background and research problem. Chapter two explains the theoretical framework of the thesis and presents insights into the adaptive policy design which represents a way forward to policy makers confronted with the problem of handling uncertainty in policy.

Chapter three explicates research methodologies used in this thesis. Chapter four is devoted to the explanation of the research design. Chapters five and six present the research results. Chapter five assesses the results of the new urban transport policy while Chapter six presents research results from stakeholders' analysis that indicates the perceptions, actions and assessment of stakeholders concerning policy reform and how stakeholders with low power affect reform processes. Chapter seven is consecrated to a presentation of public urban transport systems in Yaounde, Dakar, Kampala, Nairobi and Douala, highlighting their differences and similarities as well as the lesson that Yaounde can learn from the urban transport systems in these cities. Chapter eight contains key research conclusions of the thesis. Finally, chapter nine is the epilogue of the thesis. It contains policy recommendations and an assessment of the generalisability of the conclusions of this thesis. Appendix one is devoted to the research questionnaire. Appendix two treats problems of public policy researchers in Third World countries and Appendix three examines characteristics of Yaounde's road infrastructure and traffic congestion before and after reforms in the 1990s.

2 Theoretical framework of the thesis

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the theoretical framework guiding this thesis. The multidisciplinary character of this research informs the plural theoretical framework used. This thesis uses theories from neo-liberal doctrine and public policy. The neo-liberal doctrine contains theories founded in economics, politics and the state. These theories are used because they contain pertinent elements that help to explain, predict, invent, validate, or justify practices and observed phenomena in the implementation of the new urban transport policy in Yaounde. In addition, these two theories are used because of the links between the economic and political aspects of neo-liberalism and its implications for public policy implementation in the Third World context. Public policies designed, and implemented by governments are the products of specific environments that influence them. In the case of policy reforms based on market theories, it is influenced by the neo-liberal doctrine. Scientific theory in particular systematizes current and past knowledge and indicates paths towards new knowledge by providing a set of interrelated propositions. Theoretical issues are broad and complex in policy studies, because of the interdisciplinary nature of the subject and problem orientation of the field. Policy studies draw on a variety of scientific disciplines and philosophical traditions and policy scholars have devised specific strategies to understand policymaking. In the next section, the theories and concepts used in this thesis are explained.

2.2 Theories and concepts used in the thesis

In this section, we explain the manner in which the theories and concepts used in the thesis should be understood. Patton (1980) notes that science begins with the definitions and classification of systems. This therefore leads us to specify the manner in which we intend to use the theories and concepts that guide the theoretical framework of this thesis and explicate how they are related to our research topic.

2.2.1 Uncertainty in policy

Meyer and Greenwood (1980) pointed out that one of the characteristics of policy research is the uncertainty in the implementation process and therefore in the policy outcome.

Koenig (1986) argues that implementation forges a causal link between vague and sometimes conflicting policy objectives. He notes that because policy goals and objectives are usually multiple, conflicting and vague and because of the policymakers cognitive limitations and the unpredictable dynamics of the environment, it is impossible to anticipate all the relevant constraints of a policy at the time of its adoption. Instead, they are discovered as implementation proceeds. It is this element of unpredictability in policy processes that confers uncertainty of outcome to policymaking. The unpredictability of the policy environment leads to uncertainty in policy to the extent that the outcomes of a policy may be the intended ones, that is those anticipated from the known causal relationship that certain kinds of policy actions produces certain kinds of outcomes or unintended that is not anticipated.

Morah (1995) postulates that there are uncertainties in policy implementation in the Third World contexts that prevent the optimal achievement of the set policy goals and objectives. Uncertainty, as used in this thesis refers to the unpredictable nature of the outcomes of a policy reform after implementation because of the influences from the policy environment. Policy implementation takes place within a subsystem that is part of a wider social, economic and political system usually identified as the policy context that influences public policy in practice.

2.2.2 Public policy

Harris (1990) notes that public policy is a complex term that is frequently used inaccurately. In this thesis, it is sometimes simply referred to as policy. Many authors including: Riggs, (1964); Roberts, (1971); Smith, (1973a, 1973b) and Meyer and Greenwood, (1980) have recognized the difficulty of conceptualising a nebulous term such as public policy. While some view it as a process, others argue that it is a political activity that essentially occurs in a cycle. Generally, all authors view policy in terms of policymaking or the planning processes for a public purpose. Hall and McGinty (1997) view policy as the transformation of intentions contained in statutes to actions aimed at providing solutions to problems identified by policymakers. But many authors, including Rajan (2004), have highlighted the difficulties in pursuing structural reforms both in developed and in developing countries.

In this thesis, public policy should be understood as the interventions made by public authorities to solve problems by outlining measures that they assume are efficient for the attainment of determined public interest objectives. Some authors including Tolley and Turton (1995) have defined public policy in relation to transport, which is the subject of this thesis. Their conception of public policy is that, it is generally the process of regulating and controlling the provision of transport. However, according to Slack (2004) an urban transport policy can be defined as the process of establishing authoritative rules and regulations through laws and other legal instruments to govern the functioning of the different modes of public transport within urban areas in view of achieving a given set of objectives. Slack points out that transport policies are public policies crafted by governments in an attempt to reconcile social, political, economic and environmental goals and aspirations of society with realism. Slack concludes that these goals and aspirations change as the society evolves, that is policy is dynamic. Public urban passenger transport policy and planning is imperative because it deals with preparation and implementation of actions designed to solve identified transport problem(s) and achieve objective(s) and goal(s) fixed for public urban road passenger transport policy.

2.2.3 Public policy context and policymaking

Fischer (1980), Weiss (1987) and Fox (1987) note that politics and political considerations intrude in public policy in three different ways: policies are creatures of political decisions, the reports of policy evaluations are used in the political arena to make decisions and policy evaluations have a political connotation because politicians who command them have interests in their outcomes. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) postulated that every public policy implies a theory or causal relationship according to which if certain kinds of actions are taken they will yield certain known kinds of outcomes. That is why; policy is sometimes defined in terms of understanding 'what governments do', why they do it and what difference it makes on targeted groups. This implies that the urban transport policy reform was designed to produce certain known patterns of urban mobility in Yaounde.

Nash et al. (2006) point out that policy is the result of interactions among different organisations with particular interests and ideas – about what course of action should be taken. The sum of these interactions constitutes the policy process. The policy process interactions among organisations and groups – is part of a wider environment, called policy context. Understanding policy context is vital to effectively understanding and analysing policy processes. The political context as used in this thesis refers to political aspects of the environment that are relevant to actions of public policy stakeholders. This includes aspects such as the distribution of power, the range of organisations involved and their interests, as well as formal and informal rules that govern interactions between different stakeholder and policy players. Firstly, the political context shapes the ways in which policy processes work. Context refers to those aspects of the world that are relevant to action: context is the arena for action. Context is crucial in issues concerning a policy for a range of interrelated reasons. Context shapes the likelihood of change – a policy reform, for instance – taking place. Secondly, context shapes the positions and perspectives of those organisations with an interest in the policy reform. And thirdly, context shapes the effectiveness or appropriateness of different actions. In some contexts, it will be more effective to act in a certain way; in other contexts, acting in the same way would be ineffective. Nash et al. (2006) submit that the political context refers to the political aspects of the environment that are relevant to action. This includes aspects such as the distribution of power in the political system, the range of organisations involved and their interests, and formal and informal rules that govern interactions among different players. For development actors seeking to influence policy, political context matters because it determines the feasibility, appropriateness and effectiveness of their actions. Furthermore, many development policies involve substantial changes in traditional ways of life and result in resistance by the population.

2.2.4 Public policy research

Meyer and Greenwood (1980) present the general characteristics of policy research. They noted that policy research among other things is notably:

- a. Goal and objective oriented, that it assesses policy outcome in function of the goal and objectives fixed initially;
- b. Takes a system perspective, that is, carried out within the specificities of the context of the political system that produces the policy;
- c. Is focused on action, that is it analyses the actions taken, their sequence in view of realising the set goal and objectives;
- d. Involve variables that can be manipulated, that is variables that can respond to or depend on the actions of policy maker that is statutes;
- e. Multidisciplinary, that is uses theories founded in other disciplines to help elucidate observed phenomena and explain it and;

f. Involves uncertainty because it produces both intended and unintended consequences.

They conclude that policy research examines the effects of politics and programmes on their targets whether these are individual(s), groups, institutions or communities in terms of the goals they aim to achieve in a given political context.

Smith (1985) and Bamberger (1991) suggest the use of a policy cycle approach as one way of carrying out public policy research in developing country contexts despite the complexities. Smith's policy cycle approach allows the examination of public policy in distinct phases and processes. It also enables the focusing and identification of factors that influence and determine overall policy effectiveness as well as the possibility of making comparisons between different types and styles in public policies. Weiss (1987) posits that theoretically, policy decisions follow several stages from the policy's conception phase to its production of

Firstly, the policy problem is identified and examined. This involves the visualization of the desired state. In the case of this research, it means identifying the causes of the state of public transport in Yaounde, characterised by shortage in the means of transport after the liquidation of SOTUC.

Secondly, the problem is analysed in a critical and rational manner. Policymakers in Yaounde recognised that the organisation and functioning of public urban transport in the city was responsible for shortages in the means of mobility and realised that the solution consisted of introducing market forces to change that state of affairs in public transport in Yaounde.

Thirdly, policymakers decide on a new urban transport policy and issued statutory instruments. This thesis identifies fourteen statutory instruments used by policymakers to intervene in urban transport in Yaounde with the aim of achieving the goal of the policy that was to increase the supply of the means of transport in the city.

Fourthly, they manipulated and modified existing institutional and market forces through policy implementation. Lastly, an assessment of the policies' impact-outcomes vis-à-vis the intended desired state is carried out. Weiss (1991) argues that because policy is a political activity which takes place in a political context, the widely held view that organizations make policy decisions according to a rational model on the basis of their information is a patently inaccurate perception of how organizations work. Public policy therefore may sometimes be devoid of rationality as Weiss points, out. This means that powerful actors in the political system consider many factors, some of which are extraneous to the policy problem before the articulation and inclusion of a policy problem into the agenda of policymakers. Public policy therefore embodies the choice made by policymakers from among alternative competing options based on their values set and ideology that they espouse. However, House (1980) notes that evaluation of policy is by its nature a political activity because it is also a social mechanism for distribution; its results should be both true and just.

Policy studied in this thesis is ex-post. That is the research examines how actions prescribed as policy were formulated and implemented and what were their worth and merit as well as their implications on the policy problem, which was the search for adequate, affordable and sustainable supply of means of mobility in Yaounde. It is for this reason that this thesis addresses issues occurring during the entire policy process. The study of public policy is clearly a multi-disciplinary activity, but Political Science is an essential component. Other key disciplines such as Economics, Law and Philosophy are also involved. Although there are many variations on the definition of public policy, all include either the idea of setting

objectives for public purposes or elaborately defining intentions of a governmental organization to address a social, political or economic problem which interests a given constituency. Generally, public policy products are legislation, judicial decisions, executive orders, and administrative rules and regulations.

2.2.5 Economic and political aspects of neo-liberal doctrine

In this section, we explore the economic and political aspects of the neo-liberal doctrine. The aim of this exploration as we shall see in section 2.3 lies in the fact that current literature points to the inability to assert that market liberalisation is a panacea for inefficiencies and failures experienced by state-run urban transport monopolies and that reforms in urban transport in developing countries based on liberalisations have not always borne the fruits that were expected.

Some authors such as Friedman and Friedman (1980) notes that neo-liberalism is not only an economic doctrine. It is also a political one because it asserts that democratic politics and a slim, efficient state bureaucracy are not only desirable but also necessary for a thriving free market economy. In which case, economic liberalisation should be accompanied by political liberalisation so as to create a governance context in which, political actors and economic stakeholders work in a complementary synergy to promote development. Others like Leftwich (1994) identify three levels of meanings for the concept of governance. Firstly, Leftwich points out that governance denotes political structures and economic power relationships and rules by which productive and distributive life of a society is governed. In short, it refers to a system of political and socio-economic relationships. The second meaning is more political and refers to a liberal democratic regime enjoying legitimacy and separation of powers in which the rule of law is adhered to and elected representatives can influence public policy and public life. The third meaning refers to the narrow administrative aspect of governance that requires that public services should be efficient, accountable and open.

To explicate the relationship between this theory and the policy reform in public urban transport in Yaounde, the next sections of this chapter examines: a. Economic aspects and the recent background of neo-liberalism. b. The influence of neo-liberalism in transport sector. c. Neo-liberalism and the transport sector in the periphery and Cameroon. d. Adapting pragmatic transport policies beyond doctrines. e. Political aspects of neo-liberalism and f. Impact of market theory on public policy reform.

a. Economic aspects and recent background of neo-liberalism

In this section we examine the economic aspects of neo-liberalism and trace its current ascendancy from the 1970s when it became the dominant development doctrine to the point that it had profound influence in the international economic matters and is cited as being responsible for policies such as structural adjustment and Policy Based Lending that international Financial Institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been applying to developing countries in the periphery such as Cameroon with mixed results.

In the 1970s, the post war development doctrine that was dominated by state intervention in economic activities was replaced by a new market oriented one that preached the virtues of a minimal role for states in economic activities. This new doctrine prescribed divestiture, privatisation and deregulation as a means of creating a free market economy. Whenever there is such a major thrust in new ideas, this generates a counter-revolution. Toye (1987) referred to the paradigm shift in economic development thinking as the neo-liberal counter-revolution.

This paradigm shift has had implications for development policy and practice worldwide in the last three decades. The market-friendly and minimal state doctrine differed remarkably from that of state dirigisme, which post war development economists believed was capable of bringing modernisation and progress to developing lands. Several authors including Lal (1983; 1992) have criticised the wisdom of state dirigisme. Lal argued that the poor development records and adjustment failures in developing countries have been a direct consequence of authoritarian rules and deficient governance, all arising from the excessive concentration of political power in the hands of the state which is incompatible with accountable and responsible good governance in a free economy. According to proponents of the new doctrine, the role of the state has to be limited to that of enabler and regulator of economic activity. This minimal role ascribed to states by the neo-liberal doctrine is in reality a utopia because pure capitalism has never existed in real life. In most economies of the world today, public and private ownership exist side by side to manage key sectors of the economy. Despite his plea for economic laissez-faire, Smith (1776) prescribes certain key duties of importance that every state should accomplish. These include provision of “collective goods” for its citizens. Thus, capitalist free market state has historically had ideological basis to provide collective goods to its citizens to correct failures and inadequacies of free markets. These collective goods today in welfare states include: public health, education, infrastructures, transportation, communications, water supply, and energy (coal, electricity, gas and petrol).

b. Influence of neo-liberalism in the transport sector

The World Bank (1986) argues that public urban passenger transport policies are devised by governments due to the importance of urban mobility for life in cities. The World Bank notes that governments with different ideological persuasions device and address transportation policy in general and urban public passenger transport policy in particular because of its importance to urban life and as a means to pursue equity in social policy. Rodrigue et al. (2004), posits that transport policies have been developed to prevent or control monopolistic tendency of many transport modes. For many decades, public authorities employed a wide variety of statutory instruments to implement transport policy reforms. Although the preponderant policy option in many developed and developing countries was state ownership of transport provision services, Slack (2004) notes that there have been historical shifts in economic doctrines which show mutations from direct state ownership of transport services to situations of deregulation that allowed the private sector to enter the industry. During the last two decades of the last 20th century, criticisms from intellectuals and some neo-liberal politicians who held market oriented views argued that public ownership and regulation were not necessarily beneficial to public interest and that regulatory instruments often protected the transport industry more and in some cases, made it inefficient, unable to respond to either technological innovations or clients demands. Policymakers in many countries judged these arguments strong enough to convince them to propose new transport policies based on deregulation.

Tye (2005) points out that the proponents of the policy of regulatory transition made little anticipation of the special problems that would arise during the transition to greater reliance upon competition. He argues that the economic market structure and practices that emerged during the transition were not necessarily the same as those that would have arisen if regulation and state ownership had never occurred. Tye concluded that while the problems caused by traditional economic regulation and state ownership may have abated, the original problems that regulation sought to solve in many cases did not simply go away and certain new problems were created by the transition to market-orientation itself.

Button (2005) addressed markets and governments' role in the transportation industry, explaining that even in economies based on market structures, transport is often regulated because there has been a general tendency since Adam Smith for markets to be seen as largely serving the public interest. He posits that two schools of thought exist concerning transport sector namely: the Anglo-Saxon approach seeks to make transport supply efficient in itself and the Continental European philosophy that sees transport as part of a larger process that requires manipulation to serve a variety of public interests, in which transport is seen as an input aimed at satisfying social and economic development needs, fostering trade and affecting income distribution. Nash (2005) notes that by the 1970s, when much of the transport industry in the world was owned by the public sector, the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom in 1980, pioneered the move in the direction of markets with the deregulation and privatisation of local bus services through the Transport Act of 1985 and the creation of the Highways Agency with responsibility to build and maintain roads.

Nash explicated the historical reasons for government control over transport services firstly by the natural monopoly argument according to which economies of scale involved in transport meant that it made sense to have just one single network of transport services and secondly because transport was so fundamental to all economic activity that it required a degree of central planning and control. Yet, by the late 1970s these arguments lost favour with policy makers in the United Kingdom because the public choice school of thought (Buchanan (2003), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), and Tullock (1987; 1989) argue that government decision making may not always be efficient and sometimes accorded undue weight to political short-term benefits rather than long-term objectives. Secondly, there were no incentives for public companies to operate urban transport services efficiently at minimum costs. Finally the transport sector requires heavy investments that strains public finances. The Thatcher revolution believed in the theory of contestability, which suggested that economies of scale were not a barrier to effective competition and that natural monopoly in transport was confined in infrastructure and it was possible to have competing operators using the same infrastructure. Nash (2005) submits that in all cases there are concerns for congestion, pollution and accidents but that these are better dealt with through regulation and taxation rather than by public ownership. He concludes that outright privatisation accompanied by total deregulation is a less common way forward and in the United Kingdom this has achieved mixed results.

c. Neo-liberalism and the transport sector in the periphery and Cameroon

In this section, we examine the influence of the neo-liberal doctrine on development policy generally during the period under study for developing countries of the periphery including Cameroon before highlighting the special impacts of this doctrine on the transport sector, which is the focus of this thesis. Some authors like Mbaku (1999) note that in the 1980s and 1990s, development policies in countries of the "periphery", especially in sub-Saharan Africa were particularly exposed to the tenets of neo-liberalism, through Policy Based Lending (PBL) of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Brune et al. (2004) point out that divestitures of state-owned assets through- privatisation, has been a defining characteristic of the global economy in the last two decades of the twentieth century because foreign investors perceived the structural reform conditions imposed and adopted by developing countries (better known in international development parlance as Bretton Woods conditionalities) as a caution for "sound" market friendly economic policy reforms that are believed to be able to generate growth and reduce poverty. They add that the magnitude of this effect is striking, because capital from IMF-led privatisation policy reforms that flows

into developing countries helps these economies improve economic growth potential and poverty reduction capacity. However, some authors such as El-Tom (1994) blame this market friendly policy reforms for continued high poverty levels in many developing countries notably in sub Saharan Africa. In public and private economics, divestitures, liquidation and bankruptcy are critical exit mechanisms, which allow under-performing enterprises to be wound-up so that state resources are freed for use in other crucial areas of national development.

Under policy based lending, liquidation and bankruptcy are often used as divestiture mechanisms. Although the two terms overlap, they are indeed distinct divestiture techniques. Liquidation refers to the process whereby the state disposes of an enterprise by transferring the ownership of the enterprise assets (and liabilities), rather than the enterprise itself. Liquidation often enables a quick and efficient divestiture without the trappings and sophistication involved in a bankruptcy. As such, liquidation is a preferred divestiture technique in many developing countries where State owned enterprises (SOEs) have poor or unknown accounts and uncertain contingency liabilities. Bankruptcy is a legally declared inability or impairment of ability of an individual or organization to pay their creditors. Creditors may file a bankruptcy petition against a debtor ("involuntary bankruptcy") in an effort to recoup a portion of what they are owed or initiate a restructuring. However, in the majority of cases, bankruptcy is initiated by the debtor (a "voluntary bankruptcy" that is filed by the bankrupt individual or organization). The legal aspects of bankruptcy mean that it takes time to accomplish while liquidation can be more easily obtained.

Under the influence of the current market-oriented ideology and policy-based lending, divestiture, privatisation and deregulation have taken place in many sectors of Cameroon's economy. In the transport sector, The World Bank (Bulletin, 2001: N° 61) notes that divestitures in the transportation sector in Cameroon has been marked by the creation of a new private civil aviation company, CAMAIRCO, to replace Cameroon Airlines, (CAMAIR), the granting of a management concession for the rail operations of the National Railways Corporation, (REGIFERCAM) to Cameroon Railways (CAMRAIL) a private sector company. The policy reforms also involved sale of public shares in Cameroon Shipping Lines (CAMSHIP) to local and foreign private businessmen, sale of government shares in the Cameroon freight forwarding Company (CAMTAINER), and liquidation of urban transport bus company, SOTUC, in 1995. The liquidation of SOTUC, a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) paved the way for the formulation of a New Urban Transport Policy (NUTP). The main consequence of this new policy was the total absence of the state in the urban transport sub sector and legalisation of new modes of urban mobility such as motorcycle taxi and minibus. This research examines the implications of this policy reform on passenger transport in Yaounde, the capital of Cameroon.

d. Adapting pragmatic transport policies beyond doctrines

Despite trends toward divestitures, deregulation, privatisation and liberalisation, many authors including Estache and Gomez (2005) observe that governments still retain strong influence and control on policy options related to public transportation and public urban passenger transport in particular. Rietveld (2004) and Bayliss (2001) point out that neither market forces alone nor total state ownership have been able to satisfactorily provide efficient urban passenger services that meet the criteria of viability, affordability, reliability, safety, compatibility, equitable and environmental friendliness in many countries. Therefore, as Maunder and Mbara (1996) suggest, debates and contentions over the role of governments in developed and developing countries concerning ownership, control and regulation of public

urban passenger transport services, will continue for a long time especially as empirical evidence cannot yet be brought to weigh conclusively in favour of either paradigms. This situation has given rise to a wide spectrum of ownership models in public urban passenger transport in African countries varying from complete State Owned monopolies to total private sector control. As far as Africa is concerned Dia, (1991) posites that development on the continent should espouse existing cultural values as far as possible. However, joint ventures involving state interests and private sector participation now exist as in the case of Yaounde.

Shaw (2006) postulates that the empirically proven complementary and non-exclusivity of public and private sector provision of public urban passenger transport has generated some new practices for a competitive market for the transportation sector by bus. These practices include: management contracting, franchising and granting of route concessions. However, it is the Public Private Partnership, the PPP, which this thesis defines simply as an arrangement for providing public goods and services (such as public transport by bus) that are normally done by governments through an arrangement with the private sector entrepreneur. In this thesis, a PPP is defined as an arrangement between a government (and other public sector body such as a local municipality) and a private sector party. The private sector party provides infrastructure and/or services that are traditionally delivered by public sector. Price Waterhouse Coopers (2002) notes that a key element in PPP is transfer of business inherent risk from public partner to private sector partner. Shaw (2006) points out that this process usually occurs after market failures for competitive bidding has left cities without adequate supply of urban transport means especially by bus. The government as in Cameroon then adjudicates as a proxy in favour of a private provider after market failures. PPP undertakings are premised on the belief that this organisational form can deliver a public service such as urban transport more efficiently using integrated capacity and mechanisms for accountability that are key management components prevalent in private sector during this age where the pursuit for good governance is paramount.

e. Political aspects of neo-liberalism

In this section, we examine the political aspects of the neo-liberal doctrine, which has profound implications in politics, and the role of the state in many developing countries. In Africa and in Cameroon in particular, this doctrine advanced the view that the state should withdraw from the provision of certain kinds of goods and services such as public transport and that the slim minimal regulatory state was the best form of organisation for the state.

f. The state, politics and values that guide public policy

Fischer (1980) highlighted the role of politics and values in public policy. This link means that public policies emanate from the dominant political party in government and therefore from the political and ideological values of this party. Leftwich (1994) points out that the political influences of the neo-classical counter revolution stress that corruption, mismanagement, lack of accountability and inefficiency in managing public corporations and the resultant economic stagnation are the direct consequences of the grotesque bureaucracies and lack of popular democratic participation and good governance in African countries. According to a 1989 World Bank report, political liberalism, administrative decentralisation, the reduction of bureaucratic control, and the promotion of good governance on the essentially western model were necessary conditions for economic liberalization and growth in sub-Saharan Africa. In the perception of these authors, neo-liberalism is not only an economic doctrine but also a political one containing theories of politics and the state. In other words, democratic politics and a market economy are connected. As Friedman and Friedman (1980) explain, in functional terms, neo-liberal theory asserts that democratic politics and a

slim, efficient and accountable public bureaucracy are not simply desirable but also necessary for a thriving market economy and vice versa because the two go hand-in-hand to promote human progress and social development.

g. The minimal state and private ownership of production means

The pretext for this thesis is to highlight the implications for urban transport in Yaounde following the paradigm shift in the 1970s from the doctrine which emphasized state ownership of the means of production and provision of certain collective goods and services that dominated post war development praxis to a new doctrine which preached the virtues of the free market and private ownership. This new transport policy in Yaounde that is based on the neo liberal doctrine, assumes that governance structures function in developing countries in the same way as they do in western liberal democracies. The theoretical implication lies in the fact that the implementation of similar structural reforms policies in both contexts will induce and produce similar outcomes. Meanwhile an ideology is a value inspired construct that is usually relevant to a particular context and which reveals positive impacts of a doctrine and disguises its perversions. Riley (1999) and Smith (1985) point out that theories and assumptions developed within the North American context characterised by an open competitive political systems and processes cannot produce the same results in Third World contexts characterised by authoritarian and semi democratic systems in which there is little stakeholder consultation in public policy matters. Smith argues that although some of these theories and strategies have been successfully exported to Western Europe and Australasia, their success in these countries has been due to the similar nature of their societies and political processes with those of North America. According to Smith therefore, the basic fact is that, these theories and assumptions are culturally bound to these societies. However, in the Third World, Smith postulates that policies operate in a very different environment, making it difficult to replicate assumptions and strategies that are feasible in North American or European contexts. Smith argues that policy conditions in the West have very little relevance and utility to political contexts of most Third World systems characterised by the absence of features that guarantee an open policy environment such as:

1. Stable political and administrative institutions and processes with regular elections for political leadership and supremacy of the political sector over the bureaucracy,
2. Democratic traditions and practices of individual and group freedoms, open government, active and investigative media, ability to freely criticise government policies and programmes,
3. A diversity of centres of power with checks and balances mechanisms of the legislative arm of government,
4. A deliberative and incremental policy formulation process,
5. Public policies which are incremental and which do not usually demand massive substantial changes on the part of the targeted groups,
6. A professional well paid civil service not exposed to corruption and bribery practices,
7. A strong and active opposition political party out of power but ready to step in after free and fair elections,
8. Political parties that approach major policy issues with pragmatism,
9. A strong civil society with the capacity to independently appreciate policies and conduct debates on national issues and,
10. The availability of a database of information for researchers to conduct studies.

Smith points out that in developing countries, there are pressures to follow policies (such as structural adjustment reforms) that will have visible short term pay-offs even though the

eventual effects may be negative for development. Smith notes that policy making in the Third World sometimes takes place without debate within legislative bodies even when they exist and are dominated by the party in power and without consultations with affected or targeted groups or individuals. Besides, according to Smith, although planning is in vogue in Third World countries, the plans are often vague guidelines for government action and once prepared are never fully used for the purpose of policymaking except in the remotest sense of the word. Smith (1985) posited that the governance context determines the public policy environment for each country and this is based on history, law and type of political regime. In Cameroon, public authorities use legislation and other statutory instruments to create policy output. The hierarchy of these regulatory instruments shows that they range from laws, ordinances, decrees, orders, decisions, circulars, communiqués, messages and sometimes press interviews. Also in Cameroon, most policy statutes require another enforcement prescription called (Enabling Acts), which define the modalities for the application of the initial product. Most of the products of the new urban transport policy are decrees, laws orders, circulars and press releases. The general public learns about additions to the statute book through the government media, that is the radio, the national television, the newspapers and the Official Gazette which is the official government bulletin published monthly which contains all statutory instruments such as Treaties, Laws, Decrees and Executive Orders signed by the President of the Republic, The Prime Minister and members of government.

These characteristics are absent in the Cameroonian regime thus making the political, economic and social context of policy formulation and implementation fraught with risks and uncertainties. In fact, the absence of this context may be responsible for the outcome of many policy reforms undertaken in many sectors in the country such the new urban transport policy that is the subject of this thesis.

2.2.6 Impact of market theories and public policy reforms

The neo-liberal doctrine has important implications for current public policy reforms in developing countries, especially because of the links between good governance and sound economic management as well as the numerous critiques that this paradigm has generated among scholars both in the West and in the periphery.

Santiso (2003) argues that using IFI conditionality to induce governance reforms is confronted with a fundamental paradox, as it tends to make improvements in governance both a condition and an objective of development financing under the neo liberal leverage of the IFIs. This underlying factor echoes a more fundamental one between “good” governance conceived as a pre-condition for development and good governance conceived as an objective of development.

The dilemmas of the governance paradigm reside both in the way it is conceptualised and manner in which it is applied by the IFIs. The two dimensions are intrinsically linked. Economic and political reforms are needed in developing country contexts for market theories to work as they were assumed to. Many authors including Faux (2006) echo global criticisms for the disappointing results from neo liberal economic reform sponsored by the IFIs in different Third World contexts whereas other authors show how well free markets work in the West. This shows that free markets as obtained in older western liberal democracies emerged from particular ideological basis and specific socio-political and economic contexts. These free markets are therefore products of particular political and historical factors. They are social constructs that grew out of defined customs and regulations that only strong governments can create and nurture. However, the vast majority of countries in transition to market economies, who are pursuing IFI-backed economic reforms, lack traditions that

guarantee good governance and provide public policy making and implementation with optimal opportunities for success.

The lack of a universally accepted and conclusive empirical knowledge on the benefits of market oriented reforms especially the IFIs backed structural Adjustment Programmes and their divestiture processes or the removal of subsidies for basic commodities in Africa which has been blamed for causing poverty and hunger, has been highlighted by many authors such as Bayliss (2002) as negative aspects of pursuing market oriented policies in some Third World contexts.

Elkins and Max-Neef (1992) contest neo-liberal approaches to certain collective service provision that IFIs have now put firmly into private hands because purely private interests cannot have the will or ability to provide access to collective goods for poor people in developing countries. The preoccupation for global development with the goal of economic growth, and debt repayment high on the agenda can be seen as problematic to the extent that it poses the problem of the crises of state forms. Although bureaucratic-dirigisme and the liberal-minimal state forms have stood as two poles of a debate throughout the last century, the conflict between markets and administrations, between state interventions and the free market of private interests is a more complex reality. Lee (2005) points that the historical arguments that invited state involvement in economies have not disappeared according to evidence from many countries. The inability of markets to respond to human needs have been highlighted by many authors including Stiglitz (2004) who observed that whatever the original content and intent, in the minds of most people around the world, the neo liberal doctrine has come to refer to development strategies focusing around privatisation, liberalisation and macro-stability. This is a set of policies predicated upon strong faith, stronger than warranted in unfettered markets and aimed at reducing or even minimising the role of the government which for centuries has always the motor of investments in large scale developmental project almost everywhere on earth. This development strategy stands in marked contrast to the successful strategies pursued in East Asia where the developmental state according to Wade (1990) took an active role to change the lives of citizens and achieve phenomenal growth rates over the last quarter century.

Koerberle (2003) reveals that owing to systematic criticisms over the contents and conditionality of financing structural adjustment reforms, there may be a case for reconsidering, and reviewing their appropriateness. The lessons and deceptions with Thatcherism and Reaganomics are not just in developing countries but are also in the west and may be responsible for the new faith expressed by the World Bank (2005) and Shaw (2006) for the need to balance the market forces dominated paradigm with a hybrid model involving doses of government involvement with private sector participation. Although Berg (1989) advocated private provision of public services such as public urban transport, this thesis show that, market solutions may not respond inadequately to certain kinds of needs for essential services, because it sometimes exacerbates these needs when the unintended consequences of market oriented reforms are more pronounced than the desired outcomes. Kbignew (2004) posits that in Eastern Europe, the enthusiasm for market solutions has been short-lived and support for socialized public provision of everything from public transport to water and electricity supply, is now deep rooted in the public sphere because of failures in market solutions. The literature on public policy market reforms for utilities such as urban transport in many developing countries is similar to what Zbignew observes from the East European experience.

Hyden (2006) postulated that although governance matters in policy making in Third World countries, the lack of good governance was in fact due to the nature of the political system and the power relationship among policy stakeholders in the Third World context. As a result he suggested power analysis should be examined to understand issues in the domain of social policy in particular and development in general. Hyden (2005) carried out a power analysis study of Tanzania to explain why things happened the way they did as far as policy matters are concerned. He explicated the lessons from that study in his 2006 work and made the case for the need to analyse power in developing country policy arenas beyond the customary governance prism, which hides salient features of stakeholder relations because this reveals the roles of certain categories of policy stakeholders. Other authors like Riley (1999) have assessed how western policies perform less optimally when they encounter African realities. Ackermann (1999) and Tangri and Mwenda (2001) have shown how in the wake of neo-liberal privatisations, certain fractions of society in some developing countries have sought to draw undue benefits to the detriment of others, especially the poor by manipulating the divestiture process. Zbignew (2004) and Estache and Gomez-Lobo (2005) attribute the proliferation of urban transport vehicles in the transition economies of Eastern Europe and Latin America to liberalisation of the sector but note that these new comers are merely gap fillers. They conclude, however, that these gap fillers sometimes become a problem for public urban transport rather than a solution to the mobility problem that they intended to solve because of the resultant chaos that they bring to the urban transport system.

Governance is crucial in policy environments as many authors have argued and can make or mar the success of policies. Landell-Mills and Serageldin (1991) and Landell-Mills (1992) discussed the public policy environment in many developing countries with particular reference to those in West Africa and highlighted the implications of weak public institutions, lack of accountability, transparency, democratic debates and the public policy environment in developing countries. He observed that several factors including absence of transparency and accountability promote petty and grand corruption that affects development in these countries. Public policy processes in many developing countries are plagued by the actions of some stakeholder categories that hijack formulation and implementation for their own interest in the absence of a democratic structure that guarantees open debates on public policy matters. Hellmann, Geriant, and Kaufmann, (2003) Hellmann and Kaufmann (2004) point out that in transition economies, corruption has taken on a new image in which the so-called oligarchs manipulate public policy formulation and even shape the emerging rules of the game to their own, very substantial advantage.

In this thesis, this form of grand corruption is referred to as state capture. It is increasingly being recognized by Hellmann, Geriant, and Kaufmann, (2003, 2004), Kaufmann and Vicente (2005), Shleifer and Vishny (1994), and Hellmann and Kaufmann (2004) as the most pernicious and intractable problem in the political economy of structural public policy reforms in developing countries because powerful stakeholders in alliance with international risk finance capitalists influence and distort reforms aimed at divestiture, deregulation and privatisation undertaken by governments. In fact, state capture is generally seen in the efforts of big firms and individual tycoons who together with corrupt elites in government shape the laws, policies, and regulations of the state to their own advantage, by providing illicit private gains to public officials. Chalker (1991) linked the granting of British aid programmes to developing countries, especially those in Africa to their adoption of good governance practices notably in the domains of plural democratic politics, and accountability in public management.

Some authors including Kaufmann and Vicente (2005) submit that the current trends in liberalising the economies of developing countries through state divestitures which open internal markets to global risk capital investors, is widely accepted as an avenue which encourages legal corruption and there is collusion between parties typically both from the public and private sectors to gain undue benefits from the process for their individual interests. Legal lobbying contributions by the private sector in exchange of passage of particular legislation that is biased in favour of those big companies or the allocation of procurement contracts may be regarded as examples of interaction of both private and public sector representatives where certain interest groups use publicly invested power at the expense of broader public welfare.

Fourie (2006) highlights the identified weaknesses in the national integrity systems of many developing countries that favour bad governance. Fourie points out that governance reform will only come from within countries through the strengthening of a civil society. He insists that state capture by corrupt elites hampers a number of countries. The challenge now is to better understand how to build public opinion and hence political support to force through reform against entrenched interests that are currently beneficiaries of existing corrupt systems. Fourie proposed better information flows to enhance transparency, overcoming the embedded nature of the social norms that drive the incentive system of institutions and decision makers, and empowering civil society.

Fourie argues that governance reforms will only come from within countries through the strengthening of a civil society and that state capture by corrupt elites are currently beneficiaries of existing corrupt systems applies to Yaounde because it is possible to identify how the lack of social accountability in the attribution of bus route franchises in 1998 led to the selection of offers which proved incapable of operating the routes in the city for many years. Besides, the characteristic bureaucratic corruption in the issuances of transport documents is a public secret in Yaounde.

In conclusion, we note that section 2.2 has highlighted literature dealing with the conditions for success of market oriented public policy reforms in western countries and the resentment of similar policies by sections of society in developing non-Western and transition economies. The absence of good governance in non-western countries leads to practices such as state capture and political corruption. These have implications on these societies and have dampened perceptions about the potency of free market solutions to provide distributional equity, transparent management and social accountability. The literature seems to point to the fact that in the absence of strong democratic institutions, appropriate governance structures and regulations, public policy reforms within the context of the neo liberal market oriented doctrine can sometimes produce negative consequences. These negative consequences put limits to market-oriented reforms in urban transport in developing countries that is discussed in the next section.

2.3 Limitations to implementing market based solutions for urban transport reforms in developing countries

In this section, this thesis assesses factors that limit success of market oriented policy reforms in urban transport in Third World countries such as Cameroon. Market liberalisation as a panacea for inefficiencies and failures experienced by state-run urban transport monopolies has not always borne the fruits that were expected. Many authors including Schipper (2005), Estache and Gomez (2005), Gwilliam (2001), Stiglitz (2000, 2004), Riley (1999), Maunder and Mbara (1996) and Smith (1985) have expounded why structural policy reforms generally

and urban transport policies in particular, designed in the West, fail when they encounter the realities of Third World contexts during their implementation phase. Bayliss (2001) argues that because of the mitigated outcomes of market based solutions and the poverty creating potentials of other structural reforms embodied in the neo-liberal paradigm for economic transformation such as divestitures, liberalisations and privatisations imposed by the World Bank and the IMF on developing countries, in the Third World particularly in Sub Saharan Africa, the new neo-liberal paradigm constitutes a flawed development tool. Although Rajan (2004) pointed out why structural reforms are difficult to implement worldwide, the limits to optimal implementation of policy reforms in the Third World in general and Africa in particular, have been identified by Morah (1995), Harris (1990) and Smith (1985). These authors and others like Hyden (2005, 2006) and Grindle (1980) and institutions like the World Bank (2005) argue that certain factors which have been grouped under the following four broad headings in this thesis, account for the limits to the success of market solution for urban transport in the Third World and Africa. The situation in Yaounde is similar to that of most other African cities.

2.4 Conclusion

In this section, issues related to uncertainty in public policy, the theories used in this thesis, the context of the policy reform and how these connect with public transport have been examined.

In this chapter, we have elucidated the reality of notion of uncertainty that is present in every policy implementation, public policy and deciphered the implication from a theoretical point of view that indicates the differences in context between the policy practices in the West and those of developing countries such as Cameroon especially as far as appropriate governance structures are concerned

The main conclusion in this chapter is that in the absence of good governance and sound democratic institutions with checks and balances that guarantee open contradictory democratic debates over policy reforms, clear rules and regulations governing privatisations, certain practices are likely to characterise the public policymaking and implementing processes for neo-liberal market policy reforms now taking place in developing countries. The theories in this chapter point to the fact that the style of governance structures and practices existing in developing countries has implications for outcomes of policy reforms just as the paradigm used to analyse public policy. The Cameroon context as an emerging democracy in the late twentieth century lacks appropriate governance structures and institutions such as:

1. Stable political and administrative institutions and processes with regular elections for political leadership and supremacy of the political sector over the bureaucracy,
2. Democratic traditions and practices of individual and group freedoms, open government, active and investigative media, ability to freely criticise government policies and programmes,
3. A diversity of centres of power with checks and balances mechanisms of the legislative arm of government,
4. A deliberative and incremental policy formulation process,
5. Public policies which are incremental and which do not usually demand massive substantial changes on the part of the targeted groups,
6. A professional well paid civil service not exposed to corruption and bribery practices,
7. A strong and active opposition political party out of power but ready to step in after free

and fair elections,

8. Political parties approach major policy issues with a lot pragmatism,

9. A strong civil society with the capacity to independently appreciate policies and conduct debates on national issues and

10. The availability of a database of information for researchers to conduct studies.

The above ten policy facilitating criteria that Smith identifies for older democracies in the West and that contributes to the existence of structures that are better capable of handling neo-liberal policy reforms are absent in Cameroon. The Cameroon context shows that policy reforms aimed at achieving desirable social policy objectives will often encounter policy problems that may affect the way in which these policies attain their anticipated outcomes.

As far as the transport sector in general and urban transport in particular which is the subject of this thesis, we conclude that the neo-liberal doctrine has had significant influence in the manner in which the transport industry is organised around the world. In developing countries such as Cameroon, this doctrine has produced important changes in the ownership and control of corporations in the transport sector in general and the urban transport sector in particular. It is therefore possible to note that the policy reforms for the new urban transport policy pursued in Cameroon in the 1990s is the direct result of the influence of this dominant doctrine that was deemed to have important benefits as far as the supply of means of public transport was concerned in the wake of shortages that followed the collapse of the state-owned urban transport company by bus, SOTUC. According to the proponents of this doctrine as theories indicate, the state was seen as an inefficient provider of public passenger transport services. Thus, by opening up the market to private sector ownership, the shortages engendered by state failure would be resolved for the benefit of society and mobility in cities such as Yaounde.

3 Research methodologies used in the thesis

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the two main qualitative research methods used in this thesis as well as the quantitative techniques that are used for trend analysis of longitudinal data relating to perceptions of stakeholders on implications of policy reforms. A more detailed description of the specific research methods used to answer specific research questions is presented in chapter four.

The qualitative research methods used are inspired from Mayers (2005) Steinberg (2004), Davidson (2001), Stufflebeam, Madaus and Kellaghan (1985; 2000), Patton (1987), Mohr (1999), Schmeer (1999) and Tyler (1942). The two main research methods used namely: The policy evaluation outcome model and historical causal process tracing method embody specific research strategies that are discussed in this chapter. This chapter is devoted to the general explanation and description of the research methodologies used in this thesis while the next chapter presents details on how each method is applied in this research to answer each subsidiary research question set for this thesis. The main research question of this thesis is:

What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why?

The subsidiary questions are:

1. How was the new urban transport policy designed and implemented and how did the policy perform?
2. How do primary urban transport stakeholders assess the performance of policy reforms through the prism of its objectives set by policy makers? And how do they perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the prism of proxy criteria? Is there a significant trend in perceptions of performances of new policy in 1998, 1999 and 2000 among stakeholders?
3. What are the alternative policies that can be proposed for urban public transport, logistics and infrastructure development for Yaounde, from the lessons learned from the current prevailing situation?

4. What are the similarities and differences in problems and solutions of urban mobility transport infrastructure and management between Yaounde and some cities in Africa?

The multidisciplinary nature of this thesis requires using plural research methods in a process of triangulation. Triangulation as used in this thesis is the application and combination of research methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon such as the problems of public urban transport in Yaounde, which is the subject of this thesis. The purpose of triangulation in qualitative research is to increase the credibility and validity of the results. In this thesis, the policy evaluation outcome model method and historical process tracing are used simultaneously with other methods as a complementary way of verifying the effects, impacts and outcomes of the public policy reforms process in Yaounde.

Methodological issues are of primary concern in any research and they are especially crucial in policy evaluation research. In this thesis, a research method is understood as a general approach towards the study of a phenomenon or problem. It is therefore a kind of logic that guides the investigation. Rossi Freeman and Wright (1979) hold that the guiding hypothesis for policy evaluation is that the policy reform has no effects, so as to be able to demonstrate any policy outcomes after performing the research using appropriate methodologies. The application of research methods in designing and conducting social inquiries are influenced by paradigms. What is important and legitimate depends on credibility and its theoretical basis. Appendix two discusses the problems related to doing public policy research in Third World countries such as lack of reliable current data, difficulties of collecting new data, administrative resistance to policy research that can portray lapses in government actions. This appendix aims to highlight similarities, differences, problems and implications of doing public policy research in urban transport such as this thesis in a developing country context. This thesis recognises that there is no single best plan for conducting a policy evaluation research neither is there a perfect research design. The choice of methods is dictated by research questions set for each study. In the next section we shall discuss research methods as they are used in this thesis.

3.2 Policy evaluation outcome model method used in the thesis

This section explains the policy evaluation outcome model method used in this thesis and the three hypotheses contained in the model. This method is used to answer the main research question of this thesis that is: What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why? And the subsidiary research questions on how the new urban transport policy is designed and implemented and how did the policy perform?

This research method is concerned with the effectiveness of the public policy reform. Through this method evidence as well as an assessment concerning the extent to which a policy reform has produced or is producing its anticipated consequences can be obtained. Meyer and Greenwood (1980) points out that the focus of policy evaluation research is on causality in the means-ends relationship between policy reforms and their goals and objectives. Through this method, this research can identify occurrences of both intended and unintended consequences of the policy reform under study. The process of public policy evaluation is concerned with determining the extent to which a public policy intervention is contributing to the achievement of desired change. Public policy evaluation is therefore used in this thesis to indicate the mechanisms that allow the urban transport policy to achieve its established goals and objectives. In this evaluation outcome research method, the processes of bringing change through public policy interventions, takes place through certain activities. These activities contribute to the achievement of the desired goals of the policy reforms.

Stufflebeam et al. (2000) discussed policy evaluation models and identified the following elements in the public policy evaluation outcome model: the policy inputs, the policy outputs, the policy effects, the policy impacts and the policy outcomes. In the case of Yaounde, this thesis identifies the following urban transport policy reform elements using the policy evaluation outcome method:

1. The inputs for policy reform. The inputs for this policy reform are made up of the material, financial and administrative effort deployed by the policy makers and policy supporters to produce the statutory instruments. These inputs are processed through the administrative and legislative arms of the government that fixed the goal and objective that the policy reform has to achieve.
2. The outputs for policy reform. The policy outputs are the products of the policy. In this thesis they are identified as the statutory instruments that are laws, executive orders, circulars whose implementation will change the urban mobility in Yaounde and produce the desired effect of increasing the supply of transport means.
3. The policy reform activities. The activities of the policy reform concern the procedures elaborated to facilitate implementation of the policy reform. The central and local administrative services of state are in charge of implementing government policy. This reform involves many departments (Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Town Planning, The Yaounde city Council and the services of law and order in charge of policy enforcement) and concerns preparation of the drafts and documentations that will make the new policy effective. It also involves preparing local and central level bureaucrats as well as other stakeholders such as urban transport unions in the exercise for the task of making the policy succeed.
4. The policy effects, impacts and outcomes. These elements of policy reform are obtained through the analysis of stakeholders and their perception of the manner in which the policy reform has achieved its goal and objectives as well as how they believe that this policy reform has affected mobility in the city. Proxy criteria are devised in this thesis to assess the perception of stakeholders on how they think the policy has affected mobility.
5. The implications of the policy reforms on mobility, the transport system and infrastructure in Yaounde. This is obtained through participant observation and learning by the researcher as well as from historical causing tracing analysis of implementation of policy products of reforms.

Applying the policy evaluation outcome method to this thesis involves using the theoretical assumption that once policy products are implemented, they produce changes in urban mobility patterns and transport system and infrastructure in Yaounde by increasing the supply of transport vehicles and solve the problem of shortage caused by state divestiture from sub sector.

The use of this method is linked to our research design that is explicated in the next chapter because we hope to verify the occurrence or not of expected policy outcomes and reasons for any observed non-occurrences. This method also aims to assess whether there are any unintended and unanticipated outcomes as a result of the policy reform and how these can be addressed. Policy is fraught with uncertainties. This research method permits identification of policy reforms outcomes, an analysis of their contents and a review of implementation problems. This analysis also aims to highlight the role of policy-implementing agency and those of actors involved in this process that is often very crucial for the success of policy implementation especially within the context of the Third World.

Stufflebeam et al. (2000) point out that a public policy can only become effective when the policy is implemented through certain activities. This thesis uses the impact model of evaluation because it offers a useful way to understand and explicate the linkages between the activities of the urban transport policy reform and their expected outcomes. In fact, development interventions can be likened to theories, in the sense that they stipulate that by carrying out certain public policy actions, certain theoretically known outcomes will occur. Thus, this evaluation model is appropriate for this thesis because this thesis hopes to identify and isolate the implications of the new urban transport policy reform on the transport system in Yaounde. An impact evaluation sets questions whose answers determine what difference(s) the policy intervention makes on its target, that is, on urban transport in Yaounde. According to Stufflebeam et al. (2000) the evaluation outcome model embodies three hypotheses that theoretically link public policy intervention to expected outcomes. The next section explains these hypotheses and links them to activities of urban transport reforms in Yaounde.

In the policy evaluation outcome model, the rationale for any intervention likens a development activity to a theory in the sense that the assumptions made in the policy formulation phase, relate to the possibility that if public policymakers perform certain activities, there is a likelihood that certain known effects, impacts and outcomes should happen. Stufflebeam et al. (2000) and Tyler (1942) posit that policy evaluation outcome model is based on three hypotheses, the intervention hypothesis, the causal hypothesis and the action hypothesis that link public policy actions to anticipated outcomes.

These hypotheses correspond to different stages in the life cycle of a public policy identified by Weiss (1991), Harris (1990), Smith (1985) and May and Wildavsky (1978). According to these authors, public policymaking takes place in distinct phases or cycles that involve different activities that are relevant in the determination of their ultimate impacts, effects and outcomes. The three hypotheses of the outcome model according to Stufflebeam et al. (2000) are translated into specific actions that have implications in the policy process and are relevant in determining impacts, effects and outcomes of policy reform.

1. Intervention hypothesis.

For Stufflebeam et al. (2000), the intervention hypothesis in evaluation outcome model explains known theoretical linkage between a public policy and its likely implications in terms of its impacts, effects and outcomes. This hypothesis is essential because it sets the basis for public policy by assuming that a social intervention is required to induce reforms that would otherwise not occur naturally. In the case Yaounde, this intervention hypothesis is the formulation of inputs of urban transport policy reforms. In this research, intervention hypothesis is implied in statutory instruments (laws, decrees) which constitute the new framework for urban transport policy and which set in motion processes and activities whose end products aim to modify urban mobility and the transport system in Yaounde.

The goal of these policy inputs given the initial transport problems in Yaounde is to increase supply of urban transport through the attainment of the following objectives: liberalise urban transport, eradicate amateurism in public urban transport, facilitate mobility in the city, ban clandestine transport, make transport flow fluidly in the city and control urban pollution attributable to transportation. The policy inputs yield policy products in the form of statutory reforms. The implementation of these products is expected to set in motion policy processes and activities that modify the urban transport landscape in Yaounde and deliver the anticipated goal of increasing supply of modes of urban transportation. The theoretical assumption in this hypothesis is that policy reform will create conditions through the new regulatory framework to attract sufficient private profit seeking entrepreneurs into the sector

which will offer significant quantities of different modes of transport to off-set transport supply problems in Yaounde caused by liquidation of SOTUC. This intervention hypothesis, in turn, contains a causal and an action hypothesis.

2. Causal hypothesis.

According to Stufflebeam et al. (2000) the causal hypothesis within the intervention hypothesis implies a theoretically known relationship of causation (cause-effect) that exists between the objectives set for a public policy and the existing initial conditions of the problem that has to be solved. This causal link seeks to demonstrate how activities that will result from implementing a public policy will proceed to bring about desired changes. In this research, this causal hypothesis relates to solving Yaounde's mobility problems and modifying the transport system through the manipulation of statutory instruments that introduce reforms that will cause needed changes to the initial problem conditions to happen. This second hypothesis in the evaluation outcome model generates a third hypothesis, the action hypothesis.

3. Action hypothesis.

The last hypothesis which according to Stufflebeam et al. (2000) contained in the evaluation outcome model is the action hypothesis. This action hypothesis translates policy objectives into a set of appropriate actions, which policymakers must embark upon and implement to make the desired state of the transport system in the city become a reality. Policymakers accomplish this by implementing policy reforms using available public policy instruments at their disposal. In the case of the urban transport policy, these policy instruments include laws, decrees, orders decisions and other regulatory provisions. For this research, policymakers elaborated a set of policy products, which they deemed necessary. These policy products according to the assumption of policymakers, once implemented, will produce desired changes and solve the initial problem, according to the causal relationship known in development theory.

3.3 Historical causal tracing analysis used in research

The second qualitative research method used in this thesis is historical causal tracing analysis often referred in the following section as historical causal tracing. This method is used to answer the main research question of this thesis that is: What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why? Historical process tracing is used in this thesis in conjuncture and simultaneously with the other methods as a complementary way of verifying the effects, impacts and outcomes of the public policy reforms process in Yaounde.

George and McKeown (1985) defines causal tracing as the study of the process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes. This means that process tracing encompasses the analysis of the entire policy process including issues of policy design and implementation as well as the inputs and outputs of a policy. In addition, process tracing also implicitly focuses on the actors involved in these policy processes and explicates the nature of their actions. In this thesis therefore, causal tracing which a qualitative method will be used as an umbrella method for the analysis of policy implementation, for explaining the interaction of policy stakeholders through stakeholder analysis and stakeholder power analysis, for performing a comparative case study analysis between Yaounde and other developing country cities following the liberalisation of their urban transport system. This research method

through historical narratives will also embody the researcher's participant observation and learning of urban transport reform processes in Yaounde.

The reason for using historical causal tracing for this research lies in the fact that causal analysis is inherently sequence analysis. Applying this method to this thesis means, identifying certain things that happen to cause others to follow. In other words, we identify the policy products that generate changes in the organisation and functioning of public urban transport in Yaounde. In this thesis, historical causal process tracing of the policy reforms involves tracking the sequence of occurrence of the implementation activities of each of the products of the policy reform. An example of this historical tracking strategy used in this thesis is the tracking of the processes and outcomes of the policy to legalise the use of motorcycles for passenger transportation in cities. The policy reform introducing motorcycle taxi in Yaounde was implemented only after the statutory instrument legalising the use of motorcycle as a mode of carrying passengers was passed. This establishes a first cause-effect link between policy reform and new transport means. Through descriptive upstream causal tracking, this thesis identified the effective use of motorcycles as a means of public transport in Yaounde and through back stream causal tracking this thesis recorded that this means was banned for use as public transport in Yaounde before the implementation of the statutory regulation. Historical causal process tracing aims to obtain a cause – effect explanation for policy products and their implications for mobility and transport in Yaounde. This means that, in this thesis, observed changes in the means of mobility in Yaounde could be traced and attributed to regulatory reforms introduced by urban transport policy reform.

This method is used because it offers the possibility of tracking the different processes that have been occurring during the life cycle of the ongoing urban transport policy reform. By tracking these processes through historical tracing, this thesis hopes to validate what Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) observed, that policies imply theories whether stated explicitly or not and that policies point to a chain of causation between initial conditions and anticipated, intended or expected future consequences and implications. This is because the core objective of public policies, and the political constituencies supporting them, lies in the hope of producing a causal impact, a solution, on a publicly identified problem such as urban public transport in Yaounde that is worth addressing using publicly available means.

George and McKeown add that in contrast to co-relational approaches, historical causal process tracing evaluates a stream of actions and behaviour through time and seeks explanations of the processes at work which account for the actions and behaviours of policy stakeholders. To these authors, causal process tracing must not only explain the final outcome, but also must account for the stream of behaviour leading to it. In essence, historical causal process tracing breaks down complex chains of events into smaller pieces, and distant relations between antecedents and outcomes into more proximate and understandable cause-and-effect couplings.

Roberts (1996) and Davidson (2001) point out that causal tracing allows causal processes to be selectively decomposed further and further until the plausibility of the component cause-and-effect relationships is so high that further explanation is unwarranted. Bennett and George (1997) distinguish the practice of process tracing from conventional historical narrative by pointing out that a process tracing explanation differs from a historical narrative because it requires converting a purely historical account that implies or asserts a causal sequence into an analytical explanation couched in theoretical variables that have been identified in the research design. The causal importance of historical developments in a reform setting of the transport policy in Yaounde is crucial in the understanding of a public

policy reform whose implementation take place over time because each action in the process is likely to produce an element that could contribute to achieving intended outcomes of policy.

Steinberg (2004) posits that while causal theories play a role in many areas of social inquiry, they are vital to the practice of public policy research such as this one on urban transport in Yaounde, where they are used to diagnose problems, project future impacts of new regulations, and evaluate the effectiveness of a policy and assign responsibility for past interventions. The sequence analysis of historical causation also involves analysing the effects and impacts of the policy by comparing the pre-policy situation with the post-policy one and identifying the implications and consequences on urban transport in Yaounde that can be attributed to the policy reform.

The use of qualitative research methods for this public policy analysis is based on the argument that the implications of a policy such as its impacts, effects and outcomes occur and unfold over the entire duration of the policy process in complex chains of events which cannot be characterised through techniques which do not account for the sequence in which these actions and events occur. These actions and events need techniques that are appropriate for analysing these implications of the policy activities and problems as they unfold. It is for this reason that this thesis gives historical causal process tracing analysis a central role in the methodology used. Historical process tracing is used to shed light on the entire public policy process and therefore in this study, it is appropriate because it encompasses; analysis into the nature of decision-making process used to produce the transport reforms, analysis of the implementation and effectiveness of the policy towards the achievement of the initial goal and objectives, as well as contribute towards an understanding of the evolution of the institutions involved in policy implementation.

Steinberg (2004) points out that policy researchers and policymakers want to learn from past experiences using tools that transcend the limitations of co-relational analysis in tracing causal mechanisms. Steinberg offers several strategies for assessing policy causation through historical causal process tracing. These include reported causation that involves questioning actors and obtaining accounts from newspapers although these have limitations because these rarely provide a contiguous report of the origins and impacts of events or the links among them. Steinberg proposes that to accurately characterize a causal process, it is advisable to use an iterative approach along two axes: lateral iteration between adjacent links (dependent and independent variables) in a causal chain, and vertical iteration between macro-structural causes and the specific configurations of events they shape.

Steinberg posits that to assess the causal influence of variables in a chain of events leading to a policy outcome, one must distinguish between the activities and impact of the agents aspiring to have influence. According to him, after observing the effects of an actor on a particular outcome, the outcome itself must be studied more systematically to make a determination concerning the importance of the actor's efforts relative to the larger constellation of variables shaping the outcome.

Steinberg concludes that lateral iteration occurs when a researcher investigates other upstream causal precedents in greater detail. Another way for tracing causation proposed by Steinberg (2004) is vertical iteration. This involves seeking to understand field observations of a policy's impact in light of broader patterns and their associated literatures, and using these literatures to produce new hypotheses and generate new lines of questioning. He concludes that one of the great advantages of investigating causal mechanisms is that researchers can

move beyond arm's length correlation measures and gain a more nuanced understanding of the chains of real world events that mediate the influence between variables observed to move in tandem.

Steinberg (2003) posits that causal outcomes are the result of sets of conditions. A cause-and-effect relationship is an emergent property of those sets of interacting conditions. Because the relative causal importance of an ingredient in a policy outcome cannot be specified in the abstract, Steinberg postulates that the way out of this apparent dilemma is to tether the analysis to a social or analytic goal that can discern among component causes. This policy research on Yaounde focuses on those components most susceptible to manipulation that Steinberg (2004) termed leverage. This leverage-oriented approach rests its analytic lens on that part of the causal stream where fulfilment of the conditions present at that point would substantially increase the probability of producing the desired outcome "downstream" in the causal process.

Steinberg (2003) discussed latent causation that explains how and why a policy succeeded or failed. He posits that success generally occurs by design, whereas failure can occur by accident - everything from unanticipated consequences to inaccurate diagnoses, overlooked sources of opposition, corruption, turf battles, economic shocks, budget cuts, political turnover and countless other factors are sufficient to move a policy initiative onto a path leading to failure.

As a consequence, any policy success implies averted failure. In this research, historical tracing provides a richer causal explanation by revealing not just the manifest causes of success, but the latent causes - the mechanisms behind averted failure. This allows two things. Firstly, it provides a better explanation of the connection between causes and effects. Secondly, this approach produces information about latent and potential causes of policy failure. Steinberg (2004) recommends the use of causal narratives in explaining causation in public policy research. He indicates that when the purpose of narrative is to assess causation, those components of a chronology that demonstrate, refute, or carry important implications for purported causal mechanisms should be selectively elucidated to portray events in their extended form by linking cause and effects, impacts and outcomes. Steinberg concludes that narratives always involve strategic choices about how to compress and expand chronologies. Portraying events in their "extended form" has the effect of producing more information that can be used to evaluate the validity of descriptive and causal claims posited.

The historical causal process tracing method is a kind of umbrella method that embodies several other methods such as: 1. Stakeholder Analysis (SA) of the individuals and institutions concerned with the policy reforms of urban transport in Yaounde. 2. The historical sequence analysis of the activities (implementation) of the urban transport reforms in Yaounde. 3. Comparative case study analysis method of transport systems, infrastructures and mobility patterns in Yaounde and in selected African and developing country cities. 4. The Participant Observation and Learning component of the policy reform processes, problems and outcomes of the urban transport reforms in Yaounde and, 5. Secondary documentary sources of data and information collected on public urban transport in Yaounde and in some selected cities in Africa that indicate the similarities of the implications and limits of liberalisation in solving the problems of urban mobility in developing countries. The aim is to make the evaluation report in-depth and rich Stake (1995) and Yin (1994). In the next section, each of these methods are discussed in relation to the linkages with the research questions of this thesis.

3.4 Stakeholder analysis

This section, we define the Stakeholder Analysis (SA) and state its appropriateness for this thesis.

3.4.1 Definition of Stakeholders Analysis

One of the research strategies used in this thesis to collect information and analyse data is the Stakeholder Analysis (SA). This research method is used to answer the research question: One of the research strategies used in this thesis to collect information and analyse data is the Stakeholder Analysis (SA). This research method is used to answer the research question: How do primary urban transport stakeholders assess the performance of policy reforms through the prism of its objectives set by policy makers? And how do they perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the prism of proxy criteria? Is there a significant trend in perceptions of performances of new policy in 1998, 1999 and 2000 among stakeholders?

Schmeer (1999) defines a stakeholder analysis as a process of systematically gathering and analysing qualitative information to determine whose interests should be taken into account when developing and/or implementing a policy or programme. Buse et al. (2005) define stakeholder analysis as referring to a range of techniques for mapping and understanding the power, positions, and perspectives of the players (stakeholders) who have an interest in and/or are likely to be affected by, a particular policy reform. Nash et al. (2006) define stakeholder analysis as a critical tool in clarifying the micro political economy of a policy area and can help identify interested parties that should be incorporated in the decision-making process, in addition to understanding the basis for their inclusion. Arulpragasam (2002) defines stakeholder analysis as a prerequisite inquiry for understanding poverty and social impacts which responds to the research question concerning which interests matter in public policy reforms and how is this taken care of in the public policy process is appropriate and is endorsed as the definition used in this thesis. He points out that the analysis identifies people, groups and organizations that should be taken into account when conducting impact analysis for a particular policy, by examining their interests and influence on policy. The World Bank (2006) defines stakeholder analysis as a methodology used to facilitate institutional and policy reform processes by accounting for and often incorporating the needs of those who have a 'stake' or an interest in the reforms under consideration.

Stakeholder analysis as used in this thesis therefore should be understood as a research tool used in a complex multi-actor policy setting, to elucidate and characterise the roles and interactions of individuals, groups and institutions with respect to the policy processes of the urban transport reforms in Yaounde in the 1990s.

3.4.2 Appropriateness of the SA for the thesis

This method is appropriate for this thesis because the basic output of a stakeholder analysis is the identification and analysis of groups in the policy context especially groups that a policy is designed to help, as well as those whose involvement or at least assent is required to make policy work. Stakeholder analysis is particularly useful in identifying the winners usually the more powerful groups and losers often those with less power in a policy context. This method is also useful in highlighting the challenges to be faced to change behaviour, develop capabilities and tackle inequalities in a policy reform process. Data and information collected from stakeholders concerning their interests, position on the policy in question, their power relationship with other stakeholders and their capacity to oppose reform, can show how to best design and implement a policy so that it produces its desired results. The World Bank

(2006) holds that a stakeholder analysis is also a method used for the identification of a policy or project's key stakeholders, an assessment of their interests, and the ways in which these interests affect project risks and viability.

Although stakeholder analysis originated from business sciences, it has evolved into a field that now incorporates economics, political science, decision theory, and environmental sciences. Current models of stakeholder analysis apply a variety of tools and both qualitative and quantitative data to understand stakeholders, their positions, influence with other groups, and their interest in a particular reform. In addition, it provides an idea of the impact of reform on political and social forces, illuminates the divergent viewpoints towards proposed reforms and the potential power struggles among groups and individuals, and helps identify potential strategies for negotiating with opposing stakeholders. Stakeholder analysis is used here to understand the prospects for reform, and the ways in which particular organisations might or have influenced the outcome of the policy processes. Stakeholder analysis is useful for understanding the prospects of policy reforms but, as all stakeholder analyses are focused on particular policy reforms, they provide information that is useful only for understanding that particular reform.

In this thesis, stakeholder analysis provides a highly specific mapping of a political context by providing information about how stakeholders relate to a particular public policy issue or policy decision. Stakeholder analysis generally leads to better choices about how to engage with different stakeholders in a public policy context in view of adopting the most appropriate options and designs for delivering public policy reforms.

Schmeer (1999), Weiss (1991), Harris (1990), and Sloan (1982) note that the political motivations of policymakers is the driving force behind most public policy reforms, more than technical information and data which may identify alternative options. Politicians make the final decision on which policy to undertake and which not to, depending on their political motivations rather than on the dictates of data, ideas and other information. This means that decisions to embark on public policy reforms belong in the political realm. As such, politicians have a major role to play in the policy process. Politics directly affects the ability of policymakers and managers to develop and implement necessary reforms such as the urban transport policy of Yaounde.

Policymakers need information to guide their actions and decisions in the policy process throughout the life cycle of a policy which researchers have devised the stakeholder analysis to serve the needs of politicians. The stakeholder analysis methodology used in this thesis aims to provide information on stakeholders of public urban transport reforms, the political environment surrounding reforms and on areas that are problematic to full implementation of policy. This means that decisions to embark on public policy reforms takes place in the political spheres of state apparatus and belong therefore in the political realm. Politics directly affects the ability of policymakers and managers to develop and implement reforms deemed necessary for social policy development and change.

But because public policymakers need information to guide their actions and decisions in the public policy process throughout the life cycle of a policy, researchers devised stakeholder analysis to serve the needs of politicians. Stakeholder analyses therefore identify key players in a public policy arena through their interests in the policy reform and predict whether they might support or block the implementation of public policy reforms and assess their interaction. Schmeer (1999) points out that a public policy is more likely to succeed if a

stakeholder analysis along with appropriate data collection tools is used to guide its implementation process. The stakeholder analysis design used in this thesis and described in chapter four is adapted from Mayers (2005) and Schmeer (1999).

3.5 Policy implementation analysis

Policy implementation analysis falls within the wider framework of historical causal process tracing method selected as one of two general qualitative methods used in this thesis. It is used to answer the research question on how the new urban transport policy designed and implemented and how did the policy perform? Dinica (2004) argues that policy implementation activities are very complex because they take place in a sequence that needs to be analysed using knowledge from past actions and the theoretical base that underlines their expected outcomes. The author points out that because this complexity relates to the types of activities that are done, their objectives and effect as well as type of actors involved, it is useful to conceive policy implementation as a mixture of activities. While Garn (1999) acknowledges that implementing a policy always encounters problems, O'Toole and Gilson (2005) acknowledge that policy implementation analysis can be used in identifying and tackling gaps and slippages in implementation activities of a policy reform. Policy implementation analysis assumes that individuals take up institutional roles and organizations can be seen as actors in implementation process.

The theoretical framework of this thesis discussed in the previous chapter demonstrates that implementation structures can be described by positioning their actors in the governance context such as: public authorities at different levels (local, regional, national), private actors, various types of mixed agents. This means that a public policy designed at the central government level is often hardly perfectly implemented at the lower tiers of government as its designers imagined. That is why there is need for systematic policy monitoring structures to be built into policy processes to sound alarm bells of policy flaws, before it becomes too late to salvage policy slippages. It also means that good policy implementation needs an open democratic policy environment in which debates take place, the free press can criticize policy options and democratically elected officials (politicians) can be held accountable for failed policies.

Although this thesis is based on the case of Yaounde, it is appropriate to examine public policy practice in the country so as to better elucidate how national level public policy superstructures in Cameroon affect and influence practice in the particular case of urban transport reforms in Yaounde. Smith (1985) posits that the governance context determines the public policy environment for each country and this is based on history, law and type of political regime. In Cameroon, public authorities use legislation and other statutory instruments to create policy output. The hierarchy of these regulatory instruments shows that they range from laws, ordinances, decrees, orders, decisions, circulars, press releases and sometimes press interviews.

Besides, most policy outputs require another enforcement prescription called application texts or implementation guidelines (Enabling Acts), which define the modalities for the application of the initial output. Most of the products of the new urban transport policy are decrees, laws, orders, circulars and press releases. The general public learns about additions to the statute book through the government media, that is the radio, the national television, the newspapers and the Official Gazette which is the official government bulletin published monthly and which contains all statutory instruments such as Treaties, Laws, decrees and Executive Orders

signed by the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and members of government.

Bureaucrats in government ministries perform the preparatory work for new additions into the statute book. Sometimes, local and foreign experts are consulted. If the regulatory instrument has to be promulgated as a law, government tables it to parliament for debates, amendments and adoption. If not, after drafting by bureaucrats and prior approval from the executive hierarchy as the case may be, competent public authorities concerned promulgate the edict. In certain instances, selected stakeholders in the area of activity may be invited for consultation. But given the limited know-how and lack of cogent research-backed proposals, their contributions have been generally cosmetic. The outputs of the New Urban Transport policy come as legislation and other statutory instruments - laws, degrees, orders, circulars and decisions.

The executive wing of government in Cameroon enjoys primacy in formulation, design, and implementation of public policy. Although contribution of "technocrats" bureaucrats of ministries has been well documented, there also exist a relationship between policy formulation and budget elaboration in developing countries. In Cameroon, as far as public policy is concerned, some author including Mawhood (1983) have rightly noted that policy is usually made during budgeting when cabinet ministers lay down the ways and means in which public expenditure will be carried out for the budgetary of the budget. This means that policies are made in function of available funding and thus have a necessarily one-year lifespan pending further funding. This is a central issue because policy takes time to accomplish and funding must normally be available to see through implementation of a policy such as the urban transport policy for more than ten years. Because in the policy cycle, implementation comes after policy formulation and design, we shall also explain practices in these initial stages in the Cameroonian context in general and in the case of the new urban transport policy in particular. This is because flaws and problems from previous stages in the policy cycle can have important implications for the entire policy process.

The worst-case scenario is that these flaws cause policy to fail and therefore prevent policy from achieving its desired goals. By setting objectives for a new urban transport policy, public authorities had implicitly identified and circumscribed the problems that the new policy had to solve. The new urban transport policy was crafted under the particular policy formulation context of Cameroon. This context is not an open policy environment that Smith (1985) notes exists in the West. Besides, Riley (1999) describes how western inspired public policies encounter numerous problems with the realities of Africa in their implementation processes. The policy context in Cameroon that is devoid of policy debates and purposeful stakeholder participation is likely to affect the new urban transport policy because this policy entails rapid policy changes and innovations. Besides, as Morah (1995) submitted, the political regime and the structure of the bureaucracy that is the implementing arm of the administration are the main elements that block the optimal implementation of policies in developing countries. The bureaucracy in Cameroon is not reputed to possess qualities identified by Smith (1985) that exist in the West and that guarantee efficient policy implementation.

3.6 Comparative case study analysis method

Another research method used in this thesis as part of historical causal tracing method is comparative case study method. The comparative case study analysis used in this thesis aims to highlight the similarities and differences in urban transport systems of Yaounde, and those of other African cities: Douala, Dakar, Nairobi, and Kampala that have experienced policy

liberalisation so as to learn reasons for the success or failure of the introduction of competition. The aim of doing this comparison is to obtain ingredients from best practices that have worked in similar circumstances that can be emulated in Yaounde and in other cities to improve urban transport in developing countries. Secondary sources such as the World Bank (2002, 2005), Schipper (2005), Jacobs et al. (1979), Maunder and Mbara (1996), Maunder (1990), Barwell (1979), Kapila et al. (1982), Isolo (2001; 2004) and Lee-Smith (1989), provide information on the situation of urban transport in developing country cities following liberalisation and the introduction of competition. It is from this comparative analysis that some best practices obtained elsewhere are recommended for Yaounde. This analysis of secondary data sources and information which is a part of historical causal process tracing permits that identification of limits to competition alone as a way of increasing the supply of vehicles that will solve the urban mobility, transport system and infrastructure problems facing many developing countries.

3.7 Researchers' participant observation and learning

Many authors including Marsden, Oakley and Pratt (1994) and Feuerstein (1990) have posited that in evaluating social development programmes and policies, researcher participation in a two-way learning process is valuable for successful implementation and problem solving. To carry out this research, it was important for the researcher to be involved and monitor the unfolding of different policy reform processes in Yaounde and assess their implication for the entire reform. For the participant observation (PO), the researcher made systematic monitoring of the sequencing of the new statutory instruments and operational changes that accompanied them during the reform process. It also involved recording actions and interactions of stakeholders of urban mobility in Yaounde.

In social research, therefore the researcher cannot be a passive witness of events. Theories of action research postulate that the research understudies and observers' phenomena. For this research, this research method was crucial because inputs from this method helped the naturalistic approach of this thesis namely observing things as they unfold. Consequently, for this research this method has had a major contribution in the search of answers to the first three research questions and the main research question, because the unbiased observations of the researcher completes information gathered from other sources about the phenomenon under study in a way that makes the study in-depth and holistic.

3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has identified in a general manner the two main qualitative research methods that are used in this thesis namely policy evaluation outcome model and the historical causal process tracing method. While the two methods embody the other methods used, the historical causal tracing process appears as the umbrella method within which the other methods can be classified. The aim of this methodological mix is to allow this thesis to use methods that are capable of answering the research questions. This mix also favours the process of triangulation in which the verification of methods and outcomes can be validated. The policy evaluation outcome model has highlighted the three hypotheses that theoretically guide development policy interventions so as to forecast the anticipated policy induced changes. The use of this method permits the identification of the activities of the policy reform process and how they are theoretically linked to the policy outcome. The policy products are the policy instruments produced by the system to carry out the needed changes. These are usually statutory and regulatory acts. Several activities are carried out to bring the needed changes in the policy environment through policy implementation processes. The policy evaluation

outcome model assumes that public policy produces effects that are indicators showing how and why the policy works or does not work. These effects can be those intended or unintended changes occurring directly or indirectly as a result of the policy intervention. The policy also produces outcomes according to the model. These are the likely or achieved short-term and medium term effects such as the identifiable benefit and costs to stakeholders of a policy's outputs. Finally the model assumes that public policies also produce impacts. Policy impacts are the positive or negative, primary and secondary long term effects produced by a policy either directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. In the case of Yaounde, these policy reforms have produced implications for urban mobility and infrastructure in the city as well as on the lives of policy stakeholders.

The use of historical causal process tracing in this thesis has been explained in this chapter and has been described as an umbrella method within which other methods exist. Historical causal tracing for assessing public policy is useful because causal analysis is inherently sequence analysis. That is, certain things happen and cause others to follow. In the policy implementation process, this is crucial because by tracking certain activities and how stakeholders react to it, a fairly good picture of the policy reforms in Yaounde emerges. In fact, Steinberg justifies his position by pointing out that the outcomes of concern to public policy researchers involves complex chains of events unfolding over time, which defy accurate characterisation through other analysis such as regression analysis with its more static snapshots of co-variation. Steinberg argues that given this, it is unsurprising that historical process tracing has played a central role in the canons of public policy studies where it has been used to shed light on the nature of decisions making processes and the outcomes of public policies. Although Steinberg advanced new approaches to causal analysis in public policy research he advocated that the aims of public policies and the policymakers in their constituencies supporting policy reforms do so in the hope of having a casual impact on issue which the public policy reforms is addressing. Steinberg's analysis is largely drawn from Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) observed that public policies imply theories whether stated explicitly or not policies point to a chain of causation between initial conditions and future consequences. Steinberg focused his work on the production of valid causal explanations through historical process tracing strategies which are useful and suitable for qualitative and mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) studies that use open ended strategies to collect data, especially when the target population size is small.

Historical causal process tracing of the urban transport policy reforms is used to describe, analyse and interpret the processes of evolution, development and change in the urban transport sub sector rather than to quantify it as data is not often readily available. It embodies the stakeholder analysis that identifies key policy stakeholders, the stakeholder power analysis which shows the power relationship among stakeholders, the policy implementation phase with its successes and failures. The comparative analysis of Yaounde's situation with those of other developing country cities aims to show the similarities of the outcome of liberalisation and its limits and the indispensable researchers' participant observation of the policy processes. This offers an ensemble of methods that this research has identified as useful for the answering of the research questions. In addition to the qualitative techniques, this research uses a longitudinal survey technique that generates some numerical data that are statistically analysed using simple methods such as bar charts and tables. The preference for qualitative research technique in this thesis does not therefore preclude the use of quantitative techniques as a complementary tool of analysis. The qualitative approach used in this thesis, seeks to unearth the experiences of stakeholders concerning their perception of how the policy reforms has impacted on them and what are the implications of this policy reform on mobility,

infrastructure and transport system in Yaounde. The next chapter explains how these methods are applied during the research process.

4 Research design of the thesis

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explains how research methods are designed to answer the research questions set for the study. The design uses two main general qualitative research methods namely: the policy evaluation outcome method and the historical causal process tracing method. Although these two methods overlap, there are however certain issues which are specific to each of them. Before I present each of these research methods in the following sections, I use Table 4.1 to show the links between research questions of this thesis and research methods used.

Table 4.1: Links between research questions and research methods

Research question	General method(s)
The main research question of this thesis is: What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy evaluation outcome model method. - Stakeholder analysis. - Stakeholder power analysis. - Researcher observation. - Documentary analysis. - Implementation analysis. - Evaluation outcome model. - Historical causal process tracing.
The subsidiary questions are: 1. How was the new urban transport policy designed and implemented and how did the policy perform?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evaluation outcome model. - Implementation analysis. - Researcher observation - Historical causal process tracing.
2. How do primary urban transport stakeholders assess the performance of policy reforms through the prism of its objectives set by policy makers? And how do they perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the prism of proxy criteria. Is there a significant trend in perceptions of performances of new policy in 1998, 1999 and 2000 among stakeholders?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Implementation analysis. - Stakeholder and stakeholder power analysis using longitudinal data - Historical causal process tracing - Time series analysis using bar charts

3. What are the alternative policies that can be proposed for urban public transport and infrastructure development for Yaounde, from the lessons learned from the current prevailing situation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Implementation analysis. - Stakeholder and stakeholder power analysis using longitudinal data - Historical causal process tracing - Time series analysis using bar charts
4. What are the similarities and differences in problems and solutions of urban mobility transport infrastructure and management between Yaounde and some cities in Africa?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Comparative analysis - Historical causal process tracing - Documentary analysis. - Implementation analysis. - Researcher Observation

The two research methods mentioned above embody several research strategies, which are sometimes assimilated to research methods and which are appropriate for this thesis because they facilitate data collection and analysis. The sub methods used are:

1. The comparative analysis method used to analyse the transport system in Yaounde with those of Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala and Douala.
2. An implementation analysis used to elucidate how the activities of the new transport policy were carried out to modify the transport system in Yaounde and the problems faced.
3. Participant observation and learning strategy, which is indispensable for the comprehension of the sequence analysis of the entire policy processes.
4. The stakeholder analysis and stakeholder power analysis used to examine the manner in which actors in the policy arena articulated their interests during the reform process.
5. The time series analysis to find out whether there was any significant pattern in the perception of the policy by the stakeholders over the three years when longitudinal data was collected.

The questions set for this thesis are informed by the theories of policy evaluation research methodologies and lend themselves to the use of qualitative research techniques. This is because policy reforms such as the urban transport reforms in Yaounde are based on the assumption that the process of providing a solution through public policy is goal oriented, has a systemic perspective, and is focused on action that involves variables that can be manipulated, as Meyer and Greenwood (1980) pointed out. This preference for qualitative techniques such as historical causal process tracing resides in the theoretically backed assertion by Patton (1980) that some phenomenon and human perceptions are not amenable to numerical mediation. It is for this reason that we use the stakeholder and stakeholder power analysis and participant observation and learning to answer the research questions concerning: the nature of the relationships among actors that have a stake in the transport policy reform.

That is, how stakeholders reacted and interacted with each other during the policy processes and how did their action impact on policy effects and outcomes. The investigation and presentation of results on a social phenomenon such as the implications of policy reforms on mobility in Yaounde has many ramifications and involves human behaviour. This means that research results are better described than measured. That is why historical causal process tracing is used to answer the research question concerning: What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why?

The same methods especially the historical causal process tracing is used to answer the research question concerning how the new urban transport policy was designed and implemented because of its capacity for providing a multi source in-depth and descriptive sequence analysis which is indispensable for understanding policy implementation.

Qualitative research methods are therefore more appropriate for evaluation of social policy interventions that concern human beings who have purposes and emotions. Men make plans, have cultures, and hold certain values and their behaviours are influenced by such values. Human actions are therefore understandable in ways that the behaviour of non-human objects is not. It is for this reason that in the historical process tracing method, a stakeholder analysis and a stakeholder power analysis are used to answer the research question concerning how primary stakeholders perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the double prisms of the objectives fixed for the policy reforms by policymakers and through proxy criteria constructed by the researcher for that purpose. Historical process tracing, a qualitative method, is also useful in the study of human actions because it uses detailed descriptions gathered through direct observation that combines the use of a questionnaire and a case study strategy. This evaluation of the new urban transport policy espouses the naturalistic and responsive framework of Stake (1978).

This framework involves doing the things that people do naturally when they want to evaluate something, namely: observe it and record phenomenon as they occur over time as a result of the introduction of policy reform and compare it with similar but not identical situations of successes or failures recorded elsewhere so as to learn lessons and make better options in future using the best practices rule. That is why to answer the questions concerning alternative policies for the urban public transport system, logistics and infrastructure for Yaounde, the lessons learned from the comparative analysis of the transport system in other cities is done.

The similarities and differences of the problems faced by these cities, the solutions proposed showing the limits of liberalisation alone as the solution to their problems leads to further analysis in this thesis which reveals that appropriate best practices which have recorded significant successes elsewhere, as Schipper (2005) pointed out notably in Europe, North America and Asia can be emulated in Yaounde. The overall implications of the policy reform on mobility and the transport system in Yaounde is obtained through the key conclusions from the answers to the research questions.

The qualitative approach in this thesis does not represent an epistemological dogma because no single method can offer an omnibus strategy to assess the worth and merit of a policy reform. While the qualitative research method is predominantly used, quantitative techniques are also employed to collect, analyse and describe certain data because of the multidisciplinary character of the topic. The multidisciplinary nature of this thesis noted above, thus requires an appropriate mix of research methods that can provide answers to the research questions set for the thesis. It is also worth noting that there is often considerable overlap between these research methods. That is why elements from one method are sometimes used in conjunction with other methods to answer a given research question. The historical causal process tracing method was described in chapter three as an umbrella method that aims to track the sequence of occurrence of the policy reform activities so as to establish with a high degree of certainty a cause-effect relationship between the policy outputs and the changes in the transport system in Yaounde after the introduction of these outputs.

Under this historical causal process tracing method, the following research strategies will be used:

1. The stakeholder analysis.
2. The stakeholder power analysis.
3. The historical sequence analysis of policy implementation.
4. The Participant Observation and Learning method of the reform process in Yaounde and,

5. The comparative analysis method for the urban transport systems in Yaounde, Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala and Douala.

The historical causal process tracing method strategy uses primary data collected from stakeholders through the questionnaire and secondary data sources found in literature. The above strategies are used to collect data and information that are analysed using a historical causal process tracing. The goal of this analysis is to provide an in-depth understanding of the policy problems, the role of policy actors and provide a plausible explanation of the cause-effect relationship between the initial urban mobility systems in Yaounde and elucidate how the policy reform affected the system. In policy research the outcomes of interest involves complex chains of events unfolding over time that require recording and analysis. It is for this reason that historical causal process tracing is used in this thesis. Historical causal process tracing sheds light on the entire urban public transport policy reform process in Yaounde. Causal tracing is used to analyse the initial urban transport condition in Yaounde, discuss the decision-making processes used to produce the outputs of transport reforms, analyse the implementation and effectiveness of the policy towards the achievement of the initial goal and objectives. In addition, this study also makes upstream and down stream analysis of policy and stakeholder actions, and behaviour so as to contribute towards an understanding of the evolution of the institutions and stakeholders involved in the implementation of the policy reform with the aim of making recommendations for future policy interventions based on the lessons learnt from the past. In this case, this thesis hopes to get inspiration from many best practices recorded in existing literature through the comparative analysis of implemented solutions in other cities that have introduced competition and liberalised urban transport services and modernised urban transport infrastructures with considerable success.

In the sections that follow the procedures used to design the empirical research for collecting data concerning stakeholder in this thesis are presented.

4.2 Empirical data collection

In this section the procedures and methods used to collect data over three years (1998, 1999, and 2000) on stakeholders as indicated in chapter three is presented. The data is presented in a Stakeholder Table, Table 4.2 and a Stakeholder Reference Chart Table 4.3. The stratification of research subjects just as their categorisation is a major strategy used in social inquiry because it allows researchers to deconstruct complex entities identified for research into meaningful fractions which are capable of elucidating the phenomenon under study. This research therefore stratified stakeholder groups identified for analysis in this study because while all inhabitants of Yaounde are potential subjects for the study of urban mobility, those that possess an undeniable stake in the reform process are more useful for this study as the objective of the research is to identify how they articulate their interests to favour the reform or block the reform and how they use their relative power position to pursue particular interests.

4.2.1 Primary data

This thesis makes use of both primary and secondary data. Primary data is data that is collected by the researcher. It is data that did not exist before. It is collected specifically for the study at hand. The researcher uses certain techniques to better observe the phenomenon or policy under study. The section below explains how the primary data for this thesis was collected.

Although the stratified sampling strategy is the main sampling technique used in this thesis, the research operations for the specific nature of this research imposed the use of a

combination sampling strategy, World Bank/IPDET (2003b). A combination sampling strategy means that this research uses a stratified random and non random sampling because stratified random sampling alone was not feasible for this design, it was deemed necessary to make sure that specific stakeholder groups are included that would otherwise be missed if a simple sample is used imposed the use of a stratified random sample. This thesis therefore introduced another type of sample involving categorising stakeholders into meaning groups based on some identified parameters such as their interest in policy. This strategy allows this sampling process to obtain sufficiently significant numbers from each stakeholder stratum that is judged satisfactory.

This element of researcher judgement means that this design also uses non-random sampling strategies because judgmental selections are based on pre-determined criteria. This sampling strategy was mixed because for the purpose of the survey the sample size was fixed at seventy - (70) subjects as a convenient sample size World Bank/IPDET (2003). World Bank/IPDET (2003) identifies convenience sampling as one on the methodological strategies used by researchers of Small N studies. When the researcher deliberately determines the size of the sample owing to the perceived convenience of the size for the research it is called convenience sampling. In impact evaluation research, the selection of cases from the population depends on the information needs, target populations, survey objectives, unit of analysis and method of contact. The sampling logic used involves the purposeful sampling of information rich cases. Stake (1995) points out information rich cases can provide different and in-depth knowledge about a policy performance. Because as Wilson (1973) argued policy makers especially government official and donor agencies often positively assess the attainment of the anticipated outcomes of public policy intervention that they fund, this thesis does not consider their assessments of the this policy reform

The research questionnaire was the main technique used to collect primary data and information from identified stakeholders for this thesis. After analysing the results of the pre-test, the questionnaire for this research was adapted for use in the field. The respondents of the questionnaire filled out their answers during a face-to-face contact with an enumerator. This contact took place either in offices, motor parks, churches, markets, inside buses and even in homes and beer houses. The questionnaire was administered to 70 subjects each year for three years, making a total of 210 responses for (1998, 1999 and 2000). However, data refinements were carried out in 2007. After the three controls, the findings were computed and tallied.

The questionnaire was designed to collect maximum data and information from stakeholders concerned with public urban transport in Yaounde. Although the questionnaire contains forty-two questions, not all of the questions are exploited for this thesis. Some of the questions were intended to gather information during the data collection exercise given the particular context of Yaounde in which asking only very specific questions to respondents who consider 'researcher' as 'strangers' usually creates an atmosphere of suspicion. The responses to these questions were recorded and scored in an ordinal scale ranging from 0-5. The maximum score of five (5), corresponded to a rating that the new urban transport policy had achieved that desired state very well, while 4= well, 0 = neutral, 2 = not well enough, 1 = not well and, 0 = not at all well. The frequency rating for each objective was obtained and expressed as a percentage of the total responses recorded. The result obtained was tested for significance and are presented and explained in tables in chapter seven of this thesis.

Patton (1986) argues that methodological appropriateness and pragmatism rather than paradigmatic orthodoxy should guide the conduct of social research. Patton points out those research methods which are employed in the service of relevance and use, not as master. A method decision such as that used above suits the identification of primary stakeholders and focuses on relevant research and evaluation questions. That is, the research methods are used as a complement to one another.

The aim of this strategy is to permit better understanding of a policy through the historical causal process tracking of any changes in the perception of stakeholders as the policy reform implementation process progressed. This was deemed primordial because of the uncertainty in policy research involving stakeholders whose perceptions and attitudes are subject to the diverse influences brought to bear on them by certain policy activities which they may consider positive or negative, and which can orientate their initial perception of the entire policy process. The process tracing technique seeks to establish not only the existence of indicators and their trends but also the temporal sequence of events linking the variables of the phenomena under study. This technique required the recording of observations at three points in time, not just before-after observations, in order to establish that the scale of a given effect is outside the range of normal fluctuation of the time series and therefore can only possibly be explained by the policy intervention. A questionnaire was used to collect these observations at three points in the policy process 1998, 1999 and 2000. The responses were recorded as literally as possible, without summarizing what the stakeholder was "trying" to say. The objective of the questionnaire was to record the information accurately, legibly, and by question number for use in the analysis process. The results from the three time series data are used individually for time series analysis. They are also controlled for consistency and unified into a single data before other analysis is done.

4.2.2 Secondary data

Secondary data sources are made up of information gathered for purposes other than the completion of a particular research study but which other researchers in their study can exploit. This research required the use of existing data. This secondary data is not collected by the researcher directly from the respondents using techniques such as the questionnaire as is the case with the primary research data.

Secondary data for this research was collected from the following documentary research sources: books, journals articles, the Internet, newspapers, speeches, seminars and researcher observation.

The selection of documents for use in this research was determined by the data source and the topic. The interdisciplinary nature of this topic required the consultation of a wide variety of literary sources.

The following main sources were selected:

1. Books. This source provided the literature used for the background of the theoretical framework of this research.
2. Journal articles. Several key articles that provide material for this thesis originate from my studies at the masters level.
3. The Official gazette of Cameroon: 1990 to 2007. This is the official publication of the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon that is published monthly and contains all new additions to the Statute Book signed by the Head of State, Prime Minister and ministers. These are usually decrees, and other statutory executive orders. I monitored all issues dealing with urban passenger transportation in the country such as changes in the Municipal Council Acts etc.
4. The legal Departments of government services that have a stake in the urban public

transport policy such as the Ministry of Transport (MINT), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MINEFI), the Ministry of Commerce (MINCOMMERCE), and the Department of Legal Affairs in the Office of the Prime Minister. 1990 to 2007. This source was of high value because it recorded all statutory instruments signed by Ministers that are related to public urban passenger transport, through my regular and systematic consultations with the officials' in-charge of these units because of my statute as a university researcher.

5. The Internet: The Internet today is global library from where researchers can obtain current and vital information on most topics that concern this research. I made regular and abundant use of the Internet resources.

6. Newspapers: Cameroon Tribune the official government owned bilingual newspaper in Cameroon and other local private newspapers. This source in the Cameroon context is very important; The Official government newspaper Cameroon tribune publishes highly accurate information on almost every aspect of government business; the urban transport topic is both societal and concerns almost every inhabitant in the city. During the period under study, I kept copies of key articles dealing with urban transport.

7. Researcher Observation: My interest in this topic as well as my operation of a mini bus in Yaounde sharpened my interest further in the topic.

8. Speeches, Seminars and Publications from the Ministry of Transport. The Minister of Transport published a brochure on the new urban transport Policy that identified the goals and objectives of the policy. Elements from this brochure were regularly cited in his speeches and constituted a source of secondary information used in this thesis.

4.3 Time series analysis

A time series is a sequence of observations, which are ordered in time. The observations used in this research are those collected from the policy stakeholders through a questionnaire. A time series is used because this research aims to increase our understanding of the perception of stakeholders over time by picking out the main features of their assessment of the outcome of the policy reform. The main feature that we seek to understand in this longitudinal data is the trend component. The trend is a long-term movement in a time series. It is the underlying direction (an upward or downward tendency) and rate of change in a time series. The time series strategy is used in this thesis to verify whether there is a significant pattern in the perception of stakeholders about the policy across a given period of time. The pattern is important because it provides an indication of stakeholder perception over time concerning how the new urban transport policy implemented which is one of the subsidiary research questions for this thesis. It is also important because it specifically provides answers to the research question concerning whether there is any significant pattern in the perception of the performance of the policy by stakeholder over the three years when data was collected. If this pattern is persistently negative, this new information about policy performance could be fed back into the policymaking process so that the needed corrective actions could be taken to improve the policy' chances of succeeding. It is for this reason that time series data was collected over three years.

This study therefore employs the successive time series design. This type of repeated measurements of behaviour or opinions (or perceptions) is also called a longitudinal study because it is designed to use a small number of subjects and track their behaviour at multiple points in time then record their perceptions in considerable detail akin to a case study. The successive group of time series approach (longitudinal study) is preferred to the cross section approach because the cross section approach offers only a one snapshot data collection point incapable of offering a historical causal tracing strategy perspective of an ongoing policy such

as the urban transport reforms. Fritz-Gibbon and Lynn Lyons (1987) point out that the time series comes in two varieties. The first one involves measurements on the same group of people. This can be called the longitudinal type of time series design to distinguish it from the more common one, the successive group type. In a successive group type of time series design used in this thesis, the same category of people is measured each time rather than the same actual people. It was not possible to use the same actual people over time because firstly the cost of tracking them was prohibitive and secondly prior respondent knowledge of participation in survey was likely to cause bias in their responses.

4.4 Stakeholder Table and Stakeholder Chart used for this research

In other to perform the stakeholder analysis as explained in chapter three, stakeholders in the urban transport policy reform process in Yaounde are identified in a purposive sample of 70 research subjects and presented in the Stakeholder Table; Table 4.2 for this small (N) study. The stakeholders are identified because of their interest in the policy, their knowledge of the policy, their importance, and power and stakeholder power index as far as the policy is concerned are mapped in a matrix. In addition, 40 primary stakeholders are extracted from the 70, identified, defined and used in the Stakeholder Reference Chart; Chart 4.1. These are the stakeholders who are mostly affected directly by the policy reforms because the reforms affect their ability to use the new modes of public urban transport mainly because of affordability. To perform this primary stakeholder analysis, proxy measures are used to obtain the perceptions of primary stakeholder on the implication of the reform on mobility and infrastructure in Yaounde. This analysis is done with the use of defined and significant policy evaluation criteria.

In chapter seven, the results of the stakeholder analysis is obtained from the Stakeholder Table by selecting and analysing criteria susceptible to elucidate the nature of stakeholder power, influence; importance and leadership roles in the policy reform process. The aim of the presentation, analysis and interpretation of the matrix is to verify whether or not there are stakeholders who could exert influence to orientate the policy for personal interests. Current theory on governance mentioned earlier in chapter two characterises this practice as state capture and corruption.

4.4.1 Stakeholder Table

Table 4.2 presents key information about stakeholders used in this thesis.

The first column gives the identity and general category of stakeholders. The stakeholders in this column are divided into: An international category of stakeholders, Politicians who are stakeholders, Ministry of Transport which is a stakeholder, Ministry of Finance which is a stakeholder, Law Enforcement Agencies that are stakeholders, Trade Unions in the Urban Transport Sector which are stakeholders, Other transporters and road Users who are stakeholders and the last general category is made up of Local Capitalists who are also stakeholders.

The second column is made up of the sub category of stakeholders. In the International stakeholder category, the sub category is made up of the World Bank, The International Monetary Fund and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The sub category column of politicians' stakeholders consists of the President of the Republic, The Prime Minister and Ministers at the national level. At the Local level this sub category is made up of mayors of city Council; the Sub category of stakeholders from the Ministry of Finance is made up of bureaucrats in the central administration. The Law enforcement category has as sub category the police and gendarmes. The Transport Trade Union category has as sub category: taxi

drivers Unions and taxi owners Union. The road and transport users' category has as sub category: passengers of public transport modes and other motorised and non-motorised road users. The local capitalists' category is made up of corrupt elements from the local elites. The last category of stakeholders is the medical corps who has to handle the accident victims from urban transport especially motorcycle taxis and pedestrians.

The Third column of the Stakeholder Table establishes the position of the stakeholder in the policy making process. This can either be internal, indicating the participation of such a stakeholder in the policy process or external that is when the stakeholder is acting as a vector of the ideas of the policy or participates in the implementation process.

The fourth column of the Stakeholder Table presents the number of subjects sampled selected for convenience. A convenient sample is deemed satisfactory for this small (N) study. In the International stakeholder category for example, the sources of information on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are secondary sources that is information concerning them on the policy reform is collected from documents published by these institutions about their role in urban transport policy reforms in sub Saharan Africa and in Cameroon including information concerning funding of these policy reform operations in Cameroon (IMF Bulletin Number 61, 2001).

The fifth column is a direct follow-up of the fourth. It contains the reasons why a stakeholder is selected for this research as a result of their interest in the policy. In the case of the International category of Stakeholders for example, this thesis judged that information from secondary sources were sufficient to establish the interest of the international category of stakeholders in the policy reform process on urban transport in Cameroon and therefore recorded the documented interest position from these sources in the fifth column of the Stakeholder Table which is devoted to the determination of the reasons why a stakeholder has interest in the policy reform process in urban transport in Cameroon.

Table 4.2 presents the stratification of stakeholders for this thesis and the groups that were distinguished. A convenient sample strategy was used to classify stakeholders by category. The main reason for the classification by category is the perceived interest of the stakeholder in the policy reform.

Table 4.2: Stakeholder Table of general information on priority stakeholders identified for this study

Stakeholder Category	Sub Category	Internal/External to MINT	Number Sampled for study	Reason for selection and relation to policy. (Interest in policy)
International	World Bank IMF	External	Not applicable. Secondary sources used to collect data and information.	External support, in both economic and political terms, has been very influential in determining the direction of urban transport policy reform efforts (World Bank SSTPP). It also funds key policy components and lends advice through International Finance corporation (IFC).

	International Private Risk Capitalists/ Investors	External	Not applicable. Secondary sources used to collect data and information.	In this era of outsourcing and globalisation, private risk capitalists are constantly interested in privatisations worldwide and the investment opportunities offered by the new development doctrine.
Politicians	National Executive Policy makers (President Prime Minister, Ministers)	External	Not applicable. Secondary sources used to collect data and information	The provincial representatives have significant impact on the implementation of urban transport reform efforts in the regions and represent the provinces' views. Those to be interviewed are involved in the issues related to this topic.
	Local level "implementers"	External	5	The provincial governors are responsible for implementing the executive plans, and are the coordinators of public institutions at the provincial level.
	City Councils	Internal	5	The City Council is responsible for implementing the executive plans and participates in certain areas of competence especially in transport services, mobility, parking, infrastructure development and land use in Yaounde is concerned. The city council also collects certain charges/fees from transporters.
Ministry of Transport (MINT)	Bureaucrats	Internal	5	The central level of the MINT will be responsible for planning and implementing the policy being analyzed. They will also be affected by this process, mainly in terms of the redistribution of power from the central level to the provincial and local levels, and being held to the new results budgeting.
	Local level bureaucrats		5	Since the process being analyzed includes the provincial and local levels of the MINT in Yaounde who will be responsible for implementing many of these changes. In addition, they will be held to new standards for receiving budget, personal and supplies from the central level.
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MINEFI)	Bureaucrats	External	5	Since the policy deals with resource collection, and the Ministry of Finance currently controls this collection, their support of the new policy is imperative to implement the change. The Ministry also oversees the technicalities of privatisation, liquidation and divestitures through the "Privatisation Committee"

Law Enforcement Agencies	Police Gendarme	External External	5 5	These agencies enforce compliance with the statutory arrangements for urban public transport and road transport rules generally.
Trade Unions	Taxi owners Taxi drivers	Internal and External	10 10	This particular labour sector in the country is very powerful, and through their protests, labour groups are able to stop political efforts that they consider to be threatening their interests. In the urban transport sector alone there are numerous organized labour groups, most within while some are external to the MINT. These groups, if not in support of this policy, may be able to stop its implementation.
Road and Transport users	Passengers Others road users	External and External	10 10	This group would like policy to make urban public transport cheap and affordable so as to facilitate mobility in the city.
Local capital	Corrupt elites	External	Not applicable. Secondary sources used to collect data and information	This group would like to invest in the new opportunity offered by the liberalisation of transport by taxi and especially by motorcycle taxis that are cheaper to operate and profit is significant.
City Hospitals	Doctors and medical personnel	External	Not applicable. Secondary sources used to collect data and information	Attend to urban road accident patients

Source: Researcher data: Adapted from Schmeer (1999:19)

4.4.2 Stakeholder Reference Chart

This section is devoted to explanations of procedures used for collecting and recording data and for defining variables selected for the Stakeholder Reference Chart. For reasons of convenience, entries concerning stakeholder interest in policy reform were not recorded here because it is similar to that recorded in table 4.2 above. However, it should be noted that stakeholder interest in policy refers to the stake that individuals and institutions possess in policy as noted above. Stakeholder group interest is either their effective or perceived advantages or disadvantages that the implementation of this reform may cause to the stakeholder group concerned. See Table 4.2.

Another entry that is not included in this Chart concerns Stakeholders' alliance for or against this policy. An alliance in policy reform means a union or relationship between stakeholders who share a similar stance on policy reform. Alliances are formed when two or more organizations collaborate to meet the same objective, in this case to support or oppose the policy reform in question. The analysis concerning stakeholder alliances in this research is done in chapter six using information on power, resources and leadership recorded in this Chart to create a matrix.

The Stakeholder Reference Chart, Table 4.3 serves two purposes: (1) It provides a means of checking that all stakeholder characteristics are covered in the questionnaire of this thesis and

(2) It helps in recording information faithfully from the questionnaire response sheets. The Stakeholder Reference Chart contains eight titled columns. It was pre-tested alongside the questionnaire to ensure conformity between questions and recording response in the chart. The Stakeholder Reference Chart Table 4.3 presents data on policy reforms for each stakeholder category used.

Column 1 indicates the stakeholder Group,

Column 2 indicates the stakeholder status in the policy, whether the stakeholder is internal or external to the policy decision-making circle,

Column 3 indicates stakeholder knowledge of the policy reform,

Column 4 indicates the stakeholder position on the policy reform,

Column 5 indicates the Stakeholders' level of resources,

Column 6 indicates stakeholder power level and,

Column 7 is the leadership level of the stakeholder.

Table 4.3: Stakeholder Reference Chart

1 Stakeholder Group	2 Stakeholder Status in policy process	3 Stakeholder Knowledge of policy	4 Stakeholder position on policy			5 Stakeholder resources		6 Stakeholder power	7 Stakeholder Leadership
			1. Self	2. Other	3. Final	1. Quantity	2. Ability to mobilise		
International Donors									
World Bank	E	3	S	S	S	3	3	3	Y
IF C	E	3	S	S	S	3	3	3	Y
IMF	E	3	S	S	S	3	3	3	Y
Politicians									
National	I	3	S	S	S	3	3	3	Y
Local	E	1	MS	MS	MS	3	3	3	Y
City	I	3	S	S	S	3	3	3	Y
Ministry of Transport									
Central Office	I	3	S	S	S	3	3	3	Y
Local Services	I	3	S	S	S	3	3	3	Y
Law Enforcing Agencies									
Police	I	3	S	S	S	3	3	3	Y
Gendarmerie	I	3	S	S	S	3	3	3	Y
Unions									
Taxi Owners	E and I	3	MO	O	N	2	2	2	Y
Taxi Drivers	E and I	3	MO	O	MO	2	2	2	Y
Other Road Users	E and I	3	MO	O	O	1	1	1	N
Local elites	E and I	3	MO	S	MS	2	2	3	Y

The sections that follow show how characteristics about stakeholders were obtained and recorded in the Chart.

1. Stakeholder Group. In column 1, stakeholders are classified according to their group that is whether they belong to political class either local or national, international organisations,

the bureaucracy, law enforcing agencies, taxi drivers, taxi owners, road users, the Ministries or the International Financial institutions.

2. Stakeholder status in policy reform. In column 2, stakeholders are categorised according to whether they are internal to the policy arena of the state and this is represented by (I) for stakeholders who work within the organization promoting or implementing the policy reform or (E) for stakeholders who are considered external, that is operating from outside state bureaucracy.

3. Stakeholder knowledge of policy reform. In column 3 of the Stakeholder Reference Chart, stakeholder knowledge level of policy reform is important in identifying stakeholders who oppose policy due to misunderstandings or lack of information on the goals of policy. This column records the level of accurate knowledge a stakeholder has regarding policy reform. This knowledge is rated from 3 to 1: 3 represents – a lot of knowledge; 2 represents – some knowledge and 1 represents – no knowledge. The final rankings are reviewed to ensure consistent scoring among all stakeholders in this Chart.

4. Stakeholders' position on policy reform. Column 4 records the stakeholders' position on policy reform. This refers to the stakeholders' status as a supporter or opponent of the policy. The stakeholder position on policy recorded in Reference Chart is useful to establishing whether or not a stakeholder may block or support the implementation of the policy reform or whether stakeholder is neutral. The position of stakeholder is obtained by gathering information directly from stakeholders (i.e. self-reporting); and through information gathered indirectly from other stakeholders or secondary information (i.e. the perception of other stakeholders). Thus, this column represents the self-reported classification while the next column represents classification done by other stakeholders. The final classification considers results from the first two columns and the position of the each stakeholder is therefore recorded in this final classification (column). Stakeholders who support implementation of policy are considered supporters (S); those who disagree with policy are considered opponents (O); and those who do not have a clear opinion, or whose opinion could not be discerned, are considered neutral (N). Those who express some agreement, but not total agreement with the policy should be classified as moderate supporters (MS). Finally those who express some, but not total, opposition to policy are classified as moderate opponents (MO). Thus, in the relevant (column), the position of the stakeholder as they state it in the questionnaire is recorded in the following manner: (S, MS, N, MO, or O).

5. Stakeholders' resources in policy reform. Column 5 records resources available to stakeholders during policy reform. The resources recorded in the Chart means: "the ability to support or aid the policy process" (Webster dictionary, 1984). Resources can be of many types: human, financial, technological, political, and others. The assessment done under this criterion considers the ability of stakeholders to use resources at their disposal to affect policy implementation process. The resource category is recorded in two parts: the quantity of resources that stakeholders have within the organization or area, and the ability to mobilize those resources. The quantity of resources of stakeholders is classified as: 3 – for many, 2 – for some, 1 – for a few. This classification is inserted into relevant the column of the Stakeholder Reference Chart. Since this score is relative, the final ranking is reviewed to ensure consistent scoring among all stakeholders. The ability of stakeholders to mobilize resources is quantified as 3, – that is, stakeholder can make decisions regarding use of resources in the organization or area; 2 – that is, stakeholder is one of several decision makers on use of resources; 1 – that is the stakeholder cannot make decisions for use of resources.

6. Stakeholder power. Stakeholder power as used in this thesis is “the capacity or ability to accomplish something, the strength, force or might of somebody” (Webster dictionary, 1984). Power is the ability to affect implementation of policy due to strength or force that a stakeholder possesses, or the quantity of resources and ability to mobilize those resources for or against policy reform. Power therefore can be seen in this thesis as a combination of “Resources” which is “a source of support or aid” (Webster dictionary 1984). These resources can be of many types—human, financial, technological, political, and others and “Leadership” which is a willingness to initiate, convoke, or lead an action for or against policy. Power is therefore defined in this thesis as the combined measure representing a sum function of the amount of resources a stakeholder has and the capacity to mobilize them. It is recorded in the Reference Chart as the average scores from the two variables are used to obtain a power index of the stakeholder which is classified in the range of between 3 and 1: 3 – for high power stakeholders, 2 – for medium power stakeholders, and 1 – for little power stakeholders.

7. Stakeholder leadership. Column 7 records stakeholder leadership during policy implementation processes. The leadership variable used in this design should be understood as capacity “to direct an activity, to start, begin or commence a front, foremost” (Webster dictionary, 1984). Leadership is specifically defined here as the willingness and ability to initiate, convoke, or lead an action for or against the policy. Stakeholders either have or lack this characteristic. For those that have it, their status is represented with a “yes” while for those that do not with a “no.” in the Stakeholder Chart.

4.4.3 Analysing data in Stakeholder Reference Chart

In this section this thesis presents strategies to answer questions that are presented in chapter six in the form of a matrix. These questions are: Who are the important stakeholders in the policy reform process whose interests matter? Can those stakeholders with power support or block the reform process through the formation of pro or anti-reform alliances? Information recorded in the Reference Chart on stakeholder knowledge of policy, on stakeholders' position on policy and on stakeholder power (influence, resources, leadership) is used to create the matrix in chapter six. The procedures used to analyse data and information in the Stakeholder Reference Chart to obtain answers to the above questions are also explained. The Stakeholder Reference Chart is a basic tool that contains data for stakeholder analysis in this thesis.

To pursue this strategy, two levels of analysis are carried out. The first level concerns analysis of variables in the Chart related to the different categories of Stakeholders in the Chart. This analysis considers stakeholder interest in policy reform as the main reason for selecting a particular stakeholder group in the Stakeholder Analysis.

The second level of analysis involves extracting key details from the Stakeholder Reference Chart in view of analysing the importance of stakeholders to the policy reform process. This procedure yields stakeholders that are categorised into four major significant groups in relation to their potency for action in the transport policy reforms in Yaounde. The four groups are defined as follows: *Group 1*- consists of stakeholders having leadership and high power recorded in the Chart as level 3 power. *Group 2* is made up of stakeholders not having leadership but have high to medium power recorded in the Chart between level 2 and 3. *Group 3* –includes stakeholders not having leadership but having high to medium power (level 2 or 3) and, *Group 4* – is for stakeholders who do not have leadership and have low power. This rating is based on the premise that those stakeholders having low leadership may

still be able to affect implementation of policy through their power alone. The analysis focused on recording comparative information of significance from the stakeholder Reference Chart and developing a matrix from which conclusions that identify stakeholders' relative importance for success of the new urban transport policy. The higher the power index of a stakeholder, the more likely that stakeholder is to affect policy reforms positively or negatively. Stakeholders in *Group 1* therefore, have a higher power index than those in *Group 4* because of the high sum function of the resources and leadership levels that they possess.

4.4.4 Stakeholder knowledge of policy

The stakeholders' level of knowledge about the policy is often of interest to policy-makers and managers. Stakeholders' knowledge on the policy is recorded as either: 3, 2, or 1 with 3 indicating the highest level of understanding about the policy and 1, the least. Stakeholders with least knowledge on policy would appear in Group 1, and those with the most knowledge on the policy in Group 3.

4.4.5 Analysis of stakeholders' position on policy

The position of stakeholders on policy is established by analysing the following: Information directly reported by the stakeholder in the questionnaire sheet; indirect information gathered through other stakeholders and secondary information (i.e., others' perceptions); and identified interest information. To obtain indirect information, each stakeholder questionnaire response sheet included specific questions about those who are deemed to be opponents (O) of the policy. This response together with self-reporting determines the stakeholders' final position. In the case of the self-reporting position being neutral or supportive stakeholders, cross-referencing with the opinions of others is done because the stakeholder may have an incentive to misrepresent his or her position. When a discrepancy exists between the self-reported stakeholders' position and that perceived by others, the relative weight of viable information using the number of other stakeholders who disagree with the self-reported position in question is perceived to be moderately or strongly opposed to the policy, and any knowledge of the stakeholders' past actions relative to similar policies is considered. The information in the interest's column of the stakeholder table also helped to establish the final position of a stakeholder on the policy (particularly when deciding between a moderate or full supporter/opponent or between conflicting perceptions). The interest's column identifies any advantages or disadvantages of implementing the policy as stated by the stakeholder.

4.4.6 Analysis of stakeholder power (influence, resources, leadership)

Mayers (2005) and Schmeer (1999) note that stakeholder power analysis, (SPA) is an approach for understanding a system by identifying the key actors or stakeholders in the system, and assessing their respective interests in, or influence on, that system. They submit that (SPA) is particularly useful for assisting in decision-making situations where various stakeholders have competing interests and resources as well as evaluating existing policies and institutions. Mayers (2005) concludes that SPA is about asking questions like: Whose problem? Who benefits? Who loses out? What are the power differences and relationships between stakeholders? What relative influence do they have? What are the stakeholders' different degrees of power to control decisions that have effects on policies and institutions, and do they have different degrees of 'potential' to contribute, or 'importance', to achieving a particular objective? Analysis of answers to these questions enables the identification of institutions and relationships that need to be developed or dealt with to avoid negative outcomes and enhance positive ones.

The Stakeholder power analysis is therefore a highly effective tool for developing an understanding of distributional effects of ongoing or proposed public policies. It can also identify who is able to influence policies and institutions and how. The power to influence policies or institutions stems from control of decisions with positive or negative effects. Stakeholder power can be understood as the extent to which stakeholders are able to persuade or coerce others into making decisions, and following certain courses of action. Power may derive from the nature of a stakeholders' organisation, or their position in relation to other stakeholders. The potential to affect, or to be affected by, policies and institutions reside in particular characteristics specific to context.

Given that the main source of stakeholders' power is their resources and ability to use them, the power index constructed for analysis in this thesis is derived from combining and analysing the two data sets, that is, the availability of resources and stakeholders' ability to deploy these resources in the policy setting. These two variables are recorded separately in the Stakeholder Chart. The "power variable" column in the Stakeholder Chart for each stakeholder was recorded according to the definition established above. The quantity of resources available to each stakeholder was classified as follows: The ability of the stakeholder to mobilize resources is quantified in terms of the following: 3 represents stakeholder who have many resources and who can make decisions regarding the use of the resources in his or her organization or area; 2 represents stakeholders who have medium resources and who is one of several persons that can make decisions regarding the use of resources; 1 represents stakeholder with few resources and who cannot make decisions regarding the use of the resources. Since "power" is defined in this thesis as the combined measure of the amount of resources a stakeholder possesses and the capacity to mobilize them, the two resource scores for each stakeholder are averaged, resulting in a power index ranging between 3 and 1: where 3 stands for high power, 2 for medium power, and 1 for little power. The final rankings are reviewed to ensure consistent scoring among all of the stakeholders.

4.4.7 Stakeholder power index

The Stakeholder Reference Chart was further analysed according to variables categorised into four purposefully determined classes in view of elucidating those stakeholders enjoying importance because of their power position, leadership and resources in the policy reform processes. Although many other classifications concerning the level of power of stakeholders do exist, they are deemed to be unable to affect the policy implementation process simply because their levels of power and leadership are low. However, powerful stakeholders who lack leadership could also affect implementation through their power alone. The "importance" of stakeholders is defined here as their ability to affect policy implementation. Power and leadership are characteristics that determine a stakeholders' ability to affect or block the implementation of a policy, these two characteristics form the basis for the analysis of a stakeholders' importance in the policy process. Stakeholder power analysis was obtained after classifying stakeholders in relation to power, influence, importance, resources and leadership as recorded in the Stakeholder Reference Chart. The outcome of this operation is presented in a matrix Table 6.1 in chapter six.

The classification in this SPA aims to show the importance of a stakeholder in the policy reform process. It also indicates possibilities of stakeholders with identical perceptions and interests in the policy reform process to form alliances for or against the envisaged policy reforms when they fall in the same class of the matrix. The stakeholders identified in the matrix are grouped in a way that indicates those whose interests matter in the policy arena.

This SPA was generated from the Stakeholder Reference Chart and permitted the elaboration of four classes of stakeholders with power and leadership to influence policy reforms. This means that they can be considered as important to the policy reform process. The “importance” of stakeholders is defined in this thesis as their ability to affect the implementation of the policy. Since power and leadership are the characteristics that determine a stakeholders’ ability to affect or block the implementation of a policy, these two characteristics are the basis for the “importance” analysis. This research uses SPA as a tool to answer questions about the nature and motivations guiding stakeholder interactions in the policy context of Yaounde and the consequences that these have on the policy reform. This procedure aims to provide a stakeholder power index. A stakeholder power index gives an indication of the relative power of stakeholders in the policy reform process. This power represents the potential of stakeholders to have an impact on the policy implementation process. That is, stakeholders with high power can potentially influence policy implementation either by supporting it or forming an alliance with other stakeholders who have similar level of power to block implementation of reform if they perceive reform as working against their interests.

4.4.8 Analysis of possible alliances for or against policy reform

The possibility of stakeholders to form pro- or anti-policy alliances is identified from information in the SPA matrix by analysing this matrix to identify clusters of stakeholders with similar positions within the same organization or sub-sector. The alliance information in the SPA matrix is cross-referenced with the position on policy data in the Reference Chart to identify those alliances that may be potential sources of support or opposition to the policy. The alliance data is also cross-referenced with the power/leadership analysis results to highlight those alliances that are potentially the most supportive or most threatening for policy implementation.

4.4.9 Stakeholder perceptions of policy’s achievement of objectives

In this section the stated objectives of the policy reform are transformed into questions which are included in the questionnaire to sample the perceptions of stakeholders as to how far they believe the policy reform has achieved its stated objectives. The operationalisation of the stated objectives of the new urban transport policy yielded the following questions:

1. How do you assess the way that the NUTP liberalised the urban public transport in Yaounde?
2. How far can you say that this policy has eradicated amateurism in urban public transportation?
3. How do you assess this policy as far as facilitating mobility in the city of Yaounde?
4. How can describe the performance of this policy concerning the banning of clandestine transporters, in Yaounde?
5. How can you describe the performance this policy concerning the fluid flow of traffic in the city?
6. How can you describe the contribution of this policy in the fight against pollution attributable to transport in the city?

The responses of the stakeholders are recorded and presented in Table 6.1. The analysis of the table gives an indication of how the stakeholders perceive the policy’s achievement of its stated objectives.

4.4.10 Stakeholder perception of post-policy reform condition

In this thesis, a certain number of proxy evaluation criteria were set as questions and included in the questionnaire. The aim was to allow stakeholders to assess the worth and merit of the

policy reform. Through the use of reflexive controls, stakeholders assess the overall impact of the new urban transport policy on their welfare. The responses of stakeholders were scored on a ratio scale and the results are presented in Table 6.3.

These proxy questions concern:

1. The timeliness of the policy reforms,
2. The assessment by stakeholders of the pre- reform mobility condition in Yaounde,
3. Their perceptions on reliability and comfort in urban mobility today,
4. Their perceptions on accessibility to mass urban transit to city dwellers,
5. The safety, cleanliness of the new mass transit system, and
6. The affordability to commuters of the new modes of urban transit.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter the research design for this thesis has been explained with focus on several elements, which are essential to answering the research questions. The design explains how the policy evaluation outcome method is used to elucidate the policy inputs, outputs, activities, effects, impacts and outcomes. Other issues such as: the data collection, recording and description techniques, the sampling strategies used as well as the analytical variables and explanations that guide their recording as well as the modes of analysis for the Stakeholder Table and Stakeholder Reference Chart. This chapter has also explicated the method of analysing the perception of primary stakeholders on the manner in which the policy reforms have achieved their anticipated objective, the use of proxy criteria to assess how this policy has affected the lives of primary stakeholders in Yaounde, is also explained. Finally, this chapter explains how historical causal tracing is designed for use in tracking and analysing the sequence of events, the role of actors (stakeholders) and their actions which have marked the policy reform process with the aim of identifying the implications of the policy reforms on mobility and the transport system and infrastructure in Yaounde.

5 Implications of policy reforms for the transport system in Yaounde

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is the first of two chapters devoted to the research results. It presents research results identified as the goals, objectives and products of the new urban transport policy reform through the analysis of secondary data sources, participant observation and learning and historical causal process tracing analysis. This presentation answers the research question concerning what happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why. In fact, by historically tracking the reform processes, describing and critically examining the outputs of the new policy. The results indicate uncertainty in policy implementation that in some cases. These results show areas in which policy content and implementation were problematic causing the non-occurrence of the desired policy effects. The changes that occurred in urban public transport are historically and causally traced to the advent of the policy reform whose outputs have implications for mobility in Yaounde. This chapter analyses the implementation process of the policy reform.

5.2 Aims and objectives of the policy reform

In this section, the aims, objectives and implications of the policy reforms on the urban transport system in Yaounde are analysed using the historical causal process tracing method. The aim is to examine whether the products of the policy reforms caused an increase in the supply of transport means in Yaounde because before their implementation, certain new modes of public transport did not exist. The introduction of these new modes such as the motorcycle taxi and the minibus in Yaounde after the passing of the statutory instruments are some identified outputs of the policy implementation process.

5.2.1 Aims of the transport policy

This thesis identified that the goal of the market friendly policy introduced in Yaounde under the influence of the new liberal doctrine was to increase the supply of the means of transport in Yaounde. The new policy consecrated the liberalisation and deregulation of urban public transport by bus, minibus and motorcycle. The new policy is part of the response of policy makers in Yaounde to the problems of shortage in urban public transport. It was a full coverage policy. This means that in Yaounde, every urban road users was exposed to the policy reforms

unlike in other policy reform areas that concern specific groups of stakeholders. This also illustrates the social nature of this public policy reform. The policy reform was crafted for the whole country and did not consider specifics about Yaounde. Its impulse was from the central government rather than from the municipality. This is typical of public policies in Cameroon as Mawhood (1983) pointed out.

5.2.2 Objectives of the transport policy reform

In Cameroon, the Ministry of Transport published the goal of the NUTP, in 1998 during seminars held in Yaounde and Douala to acquaint urban transporters with the new policy. In a *White Paper* titled *The New Urban Transporters Guide* (Yaounde Ministry of Transport 1988), the Ministry of Transport identified the following seven government objectives for a new policy.

1. Liberalize and decontrol public urban transport by bus, minibus, motorcycle so as to increase the supply of urban transport means and fill the gap left after the liquidation of the SOE, SOTUC. This objective was expected to enable private entrepreneurs to operate these modes of public urban transport that was either formerly banned (motorcycle) or reserved as a monopoly of the state (bus). The state however never forfeited its right to intervene in the sector.
2. Eradicate amateurism by promoting the entry of professionals into the sector. The quasi-chaotic situation that was reigning in the sub-sector was attributed to the existence of adventurers' side-by-side professional transporters. This objective aimed at making the sector professional and reserved for transporters who fulfil strict conditions and possess the transporters license.
3. Facilitate mobility for the rapidly growing city. The circulation of people on foot and other modes of urban transport in the city of Yaounde were not satisfactory. Huge traffic jams usually clogged major streets at rush hours and out-lying zones were poorly served.
4. Enable urban traffic to flow fluidly. This objective suggests the desire to reduce and alleviate urban traffic congestion. The road network in Yaounde was in a deplorable state after many years of neglect. Many major streets were often congested at peak rush hours as the motorized traffic and road use demand had far exceeded the supply. To improve traffic flow in the city, streets have to be tarred and equipped with traffic lights especially in areas in which these ceased to function many years ago and markets that spill-over into streets have to be cleared. Pedestrian crossings, bus parks, and a radical change in mentality are needed to materialize this goal.
5. Limit and eventually eradicate illegal transporters. The phenomenon of illegal transporters, popularly called "clando" is a permanent feature of the Yaounde transport landscape. These transporters ferry passengers in the city in vehicles that do not meet the specified conditions for operating as a taxi. Often, these illegal taxis are not painted with the regulated yellow colour of taxis and their drivers do not have the necessary documents (permits and licences) to operate taxis. It has even been noticed that owners of private cars who want to make ends meet, engage in this illegal business. Illegal transporters play a cat and mouse game with the police who check vehicle papers and this practice is believed to be a source of the corruption that is decried in urban transport today. This is a paradox because illegal transporters contribute to increasing supply of transport means that is the goal of the policy reform. They are sometimes the only mode of transport serving many outlying areas of the city.
6. Fight urban pollution attributable to public transport. Fight urban pollution attributable to public transport. The present global pre-occupation for environmental matters found its way into one of the goals of the new urban transport policy. For many years, scrap vehicles, used engine oils from roadside garages and other exhaust fumes have given Yaounde an unpleasant

face. This goal aims to keep the environment clean in Yaounde so that the city can be a place where people live healthy lives. These objectives of the NUTP were later transformed into regulatory instruments, which are the results and products of the policy identified in this thesis.

5.3 Implementation of policy reform

This section evaluates the implementation of the policy reforms carried out in Yaounde in the 1990s.

5.3.1 Products of the policy reform

In this section, we identify and analyse the implementation of the products of the policy reforms in Yaounde. Policy products as used in this thesis refers to all statutory instruments such as: decrees, laws, ordinances, executive orders and press releases that materialised the resolve of policymakers to solve the shortage in urban transport in Yaounde. Once these policy products are implemented, policymakers assume that they will produce the desired effects. Through this process, we answer one of the research questions set for this thesis which concerns what took place in public urban transport in Yaounde under influence of the neo liberal market oriented paradigm. This thesis has identified fourteen distinct policy products related to the policy that have a cause-effect relationship with the post reform urban mobility system in Yaounde. The identification of these policy products answers the research question concerning what happened, what changed and why in public urban transport in Yaounde, after the introduction of the new policy.

These policy products are mainly the regulatory instruments produced as a result of the policy intervention. The analysis of the policy products merit particular attention, just as the policy processes associated with them. The policy products of the new urban transport policy are the battery of legislation and related statutory instruments (orders, rules, guidelines, codes or standards) issued to effectively materialise the new policy. These policy outputs fall within the following categories: presidential decrees and orders, prime ministerial decrees and orders, ministerial orders, circulars, press releases, joint press releases, or decisions.

A total of fourteen statutory instruments were identified and selected as the results of our research on the policy. These regulatory instruments were collected from officially available government documents and classified during the research process from the Legal department of the Prime Ministers' Office, The Ministry of Transport Legal Affairs unit, The Legal Affairs unit of the Ministry of Finance, the Legal Affairs Unit of the Ministry of Environment in Yaounde. The classification was carried out using the criteria of relevance of the texts and this yielded the following fourteen instruments that can be described as the most important products of the policy reform on urban transport in Yaounde, Cameroon. They are:

1. Shortening of procedures for Registering as a Road Transporter.
2. Facilitation of the issuing of the « Carte Bleue ».
3. Institution of two categories of road transporters license.
4. Computerisation of vehicle matriculation certificate.
5. Liberalisation of urban transport by minibus, motorcycle and buses.
6. Creation of a commission to evaluate bids of operators of bus lines in cities.
7. Reduction of Customs duty for imported vehicles.
8. Prescription of new rates for Third Party Liability motor vehicle insurance.
9. Institution of identification badges for taxi drivers.
10. Institution of crash helmets for motorcycle taxi drivers.
11. Re-organisation of Transport Offices.

12. Creation of a special windscreen license for vehicles.
13. Protection of national road network and control environmental pollution.
14. Privatisation of technical inspection of motor vehicles.

Table 5.1 presents a synopsis of the identified policy reform products and the time lapses that were needed before implementation started. The implementation tracked in Table 5.1 show that some policy products have been implemented while others have never been. In some cases, these policy products have not been implemented because the Enabling Acts that are expected to lay down the modalities for their implementation are still awaited.

5.3.2 Assessing time lapse for policy implementation

In this section we assess the time lapse needed to implement the policy reforms. Table 5.1 presents a synopsis of the identified policy reform products and the time lapses that were needed before implementation started. The implementation tracked in Table 5.1 show that some policy products have been implemented while others have never been. In some cases, these policy products have not been implemented because the Enabling Acts that are expected to lay down the modalities for their implementation are still awaited.

Table 5.1: Policy reform implementation time lapses

Number of policy Reforms	Title of Policy Reform	Year of enactment of statute	Year of debut of Policy activity
1.	Shortening of procedures for Registering as a Road Transporter.	July 10, 1990.	1990
2.	Facilitation of the issuance of the « Carte Bleue ».	November 9, 1990	1990
3.	Institution of two categories of road transporters license.	January 15, 1991	1991
4.	Computerisation of vehicle matriculation certificate.	September 26, 1994	Never implemented until 2007 when plans were made afresh.
5.	Liberalisation of urban transport by minibuses, motorcycles and buses.	PM decree of February 2, 1994.	1996 in Yaounde after another decree was signed by the PM on November 16, 1995.
6.	Creation of a commission to evaluate bids of operators of bus lines in cities.	1998	No private bus lines ever worked in Yaounde before the PPP arrangement in 2007
7.	Reduction of Customs duty for imported vehicles.	1995	1995 Difficult to implement because of customs fraud
8.	Prescription of new rates for Third Party Liability motor vehicle insurance.	1994	1994

Number of policy Reforms	Title of Policy Reform	Year of enactment of statute	Year of debut of Policy activity
9.	Institution of identification badges for taxi drivers	A decision (00063/MINT/DTT) of January 14, 1997 created the obligation of wearing identification badges for drivers of public transport taxis	2003
10.	Institution of crash helmets for motorcycle taxi drivers		2003
11.	Re-organisation of Transport Offices.	1998	1998
12.	Creation of a special windscreen license for vehicles	The special windscreen license was created by a Prime Ministerial degree of September 29, 1999.	The licenses went out of circulation less than one year later because transporters ceased to buy them as it failed to curb both rampant police control on the streets and the petty corruption that accompanied it.
13.	Protection of national road network and control environmental pollution.	April 1996 A new statute to protect national road network and control environmental pollution from vehicles was decreed	January 2007 only one centre opened in Yaounde.
14.	Privatisation of technical inspection of motor vehicles.	Vehicle inspection and number plate operations were granted to private operators without a fair bidding process. Ministerial order N° 00452/D/ MINT/CAB of March 5, 2003 laying down the organisation and determining the make up of a committee in charge of granting authorisation for motor vehicle technical inspection companies.	2006

5.3.3 The fourteen policy reforms

In the next section, the policy products of the new urban transport policy reforms are explicated and critically analysed to demonstrate their importance in bringing changes to the mobility problems of Yaounde. That is, historical causal tracing is used to establish the link between these products and the post reform mobility system in Yaounde.

1. Shortening of procedures for Registering as a Road Transporter

All professional transporters must be registered with the authorities. This dispensation existed before but what changed under the policy reform as this registration was made easier. Instead of the former unique centre in Yaounde that handled files for the entire country, each transport office at the divisional level was empowered to perform this registration. The effect was that the procedure and time needed to obtain this document was shortened. By so doing, transporters seeking to operate in Yaounde could do so fairly quickly and boost the supply of public passenger transport in the city. The following documents must be submitted to obtain registration in the road transporters register. 1. A valid stamped application. 2. A copy of transporters license or receipt showing proof of submission of file to obtain one. The divisional transport office delivers the road transporters attestation. It mentions the following things: The registration number, the name of the transporters or that of his company, the full address, and the category of the license. The fees for this document are paid to the public treasury against a receipt.

2. Facilitation in the issuing of the « Carte Bleue »

The Carte bleue that is the public transport identification certificate is not a novelty in the Cameroonian transport landscape. However what changed this time is the condition for its delivery and its validity period. To operate as road transporters, everyone in the profession needs a Carte bleue. This Carte bleue according to the Ministerial Order of January 15, 1991, is delivered by the divisional transport office that has territorial competence over the place of residence of the road transporters. The documents required include: 1. Certified copy of matriculation certificate. 2. Copy of transporters license. 3. Attestation of registration in transport registers. 4. An insurance attestation and 5. This document is issued no later than two days after deposition of file. It has a maximum validity period of one year and costs Euros 7, 50 or CFA 5,000 francs. It is renewable. This Carte bleue is a costly duplication because all other documents required for its establishment are already sufficient to prove ownership of a vehicle and membership to the transporters profession.

3. Institution of two categories of road transporters licence

There was only one category of license for all transporters throughout the country before 1990. However, in 1990, a decree created two categories: the ordinary transporters' license and the special transporters' license. The main features of the ordinary transporters' license are that it is divided into six sub categories as follows:

1. Normal licence.

Category one transporters' license is for vehicles with a maximum of five seating places including that of the driver. The vehicle can operate within a range of ten kilometres around an urban area. The license costs Euros 12 or CFA 7, 500 francs per year, (1 Euro = CFA 655.9 francs).

- Category two-transporter' license is for vehicles with eight seating places that can carry passengers inside a range of 40 kilometres in a municipal area. It costs Euros 12 or CFA 7, 500 francs per year.
- Category three-transporter' license concerns passenger carrying buses with nine seating places at least and cost Euros 24 or CFA 15,000 francs per year.
- Category four transporters license concerns goods vehicles and cost Euros 24 or CFA 15,000 francs per year.
- Category five-transporter license is submitted to the rules of international transport and cost Euros 24 or CFA 15,000 francs per year.

- Category six-transporter license is for both goods and passenger transporters and allows the vehicle to cover a maximum of three divisions. It costs Euros 12 or CFA 7,500 francs per year.

2. Special licence.

The main characteristic of the special transporters' license is that it has two categories. The S1 category is for transporters who own school buses for the transport of children within urban areas. It costs Euros 6 or CFA 4,000 francs per year. The second category is the S2 category for transporters who own buses or minibuses for the transport of passengers within an urban area. The new transporters' license gives, the right to exploit an unlimited number of vehicles. To become road transporters the number of documents required were greatly reduced from what it used to be. Once a completed application has been submitted to the Transport office, the office has by statute a maximum of thirty working days to issue the licence not more as it was previously the case. This condition was intended to curb the corruption that prevailed in the issuance of transport documents in the city and in the country in general. This prevented the unnecessary delays of the previous system that fuelled the corrupt practices condemned for years by potential transporters.

4. Computerisation of vehicle matriculation certificate

The policy to computerise vehicle matriculation certificates was instituted on September 26, 1994 but has never been implemented. In 2007, plans were made for a fresh start of the policy that aims to secure vehicles and reduce theft and forging of transport documents.

5. Liberalisation of urban transport by minibuses, motorcycles and buses

The state-owned urban transport company, SOTUC enjoyed the legal monopoly for urban passenger transport in Cameroon by bus, between 1973 and 1995. When the company was divested, the policy product that came in to fill the gap left by SOTUC was that concerning private ownership of minibus and buses for urban public transport. The exploitation of buses and minibuses for urban public transport is governed by decree Number 97/07/PM of February 1997. Article 2 of this decree stipulates the conditions to be fulfilled, which are:

1. Obtain the special license, S2, and a road transporters card.
2. Have permission to operate one or more urban lines.
3. Be registered in the transporters register.

Article 3, points out that this special license can be issued to individuals or companies whose vehicles have at least fifteen seats. The attribution of these lines is by competitive bidding and a special commission evaluates the bids. The authorisation to exploit a bus line lasts for five years and is granted by the Minister in charge of transport. Transporters' sign a convention with the Ministry in charge of transport specifying their rights and obligations. A driver of a bus or a minibus service must possess a category 'D' license and the vehicle must have a controller. Article 10, points out that it is the duty of municipal authorities to fix and develop bus stops and parks for this type of urban transporters. In 1997, the decree granted a six-month period within which everyone involved in the business, should comply with the new regulations. This period of grace expired without incidence and transporters continue to operate as if the law never changed. The government has been showing a lot of tolerance because these new modes increased the supply of transport means in Yaounde and the implementation of very strict rules will cause mobility problems for the population of the city as many of the new modes will disappear because of their inability to conform to the rules.

6. Creation of a commission to evaluate bids of operators of bus lines in cities

The liberalization of public urban transport meant that private entrepreneurs could operate bus lines in the cities. For them to do so, they must bid for bus lines. The problem is that the government created a long list of officials who have to seat in a commission to assess the bids. It is not surprising that since the first series of bids were examined and declared successful, the inhabitants of Yaounde are still waiting for the companies to bring the buses they claimed to possess to the streets of the city for public transport. In fact, ever since bidders won their bids in 1998, none of them has ever operated a bus line in Yaounde making the entire exercise a major hoax. The fact that this is taking too long to happen makes people wonder the basis on which those companies were granted those bus lines. The Ministerial order 00561/MINT/DTT of April 21, 1997 listed the attributions, composition and functioning of the special commission for the evaluation of tenders to operate urban bus lines. Article 2 of the order describes the commission as a special consultative organ attached to the Minister in charge of transport. Its missions include: Identify and define lines to be opened for national bids, elaborate specification terms, open and evaluate bids, propose the granting of the exploitation of these lines to the Minister in charge of transport, make any other recommendations to the Minister concerning any area of its competence. In its articles 3, the order states that the commission is chaired by the Minister in charge of transport or his representative and also comprises:

- Two representatives of the ministry of Transport,
- One representative of the ministry of Town Planning,
- One representative of the ministry of Defence,
- One representative of the ministry of Finance and Economy
- One representative from the Delegation of National Security
- One representative from Douala and Yaounde Urban Communities
- One representative from the operators syndicate,
- One representative from the syndicate of insurance companies.

In addition, a representative from the council through which the bus line would pass is takes part in the special commission. The director of Road Transport in the Ministry of Transport is the secretary of the commission. This commission meets at the convocation of its president. The members are not remunerated but the running costs of the commission are born by the budget of the ministry of transport. The Ministry of Transport in 1998 identified bus lines in Yaounde and Douala and the commission has since attributed these lines to some companies. In Douala at least one company, SOCATUR is operating a bus franchise, in Yaounde, none ever functioned until 2006 when through a PPP arrangement, a bus operator called *Le Bus* began functioning in the city.

7. Reduction of Customs duty for imported vehicles

Another key feature of the New Urban Transport Policy is that custom duty for buses and mini buses was reduced from seventy-five (75%) to thirty (30%) in 1997. Import duties for ordinary tourist vehicles that generally serve as taxis were also reduced from seventy-five (75%) to fifty-four (54%) in 1995. These policy reforms have been interpreted as a bid to encourage operators to buy and run vehicles for mass urban transit services given the shortages that followed the liquidation of SOTUC. The aim was to increase the supply of vehicles in cities to facilitate mobility.

8. Prescription of new rates for Third Party Liability motor vehicle insurance

The Minister of Economy and Finance who oversees the insurance sector in Cameroon took steps to reform this sector in line with the new policy on urban transport because all transport

vehicles that carry passengers in Cameroon are required by law to have an insurance cover. The new “Motor Vehicle Third Party Liability” risk insurance regulation constitutes the substance of Order N° 000380/MINEFI/DCA of 16 November 1994 of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. However, in view of the varied major changes, this order was to enable companies acquaint themselves with this New Deal and make adequate preparations for its implementation. Insurance Companies covering the motor vehicle risk met within the Association of Insurance Companies in Cameroon (ASAC) and set January 1, 1995 for entry into force of the new rates. Consequently, since midnight January 1, 1995 only the rates specified in the Order are applicable throughout the national territory. The new insurance statute carried a number of innovations concerning sanctions and penalties for defaulters. The innovations in the motor transport insurance concerned fresh payment modalities that not only fixed the minimum coverage period at two years, but also laid down minimum rates of payment of insurance premiums per semester. This policy meant that the insurance companies could charge higher rates depending on their assessment of the level of risk involved in by the transporters’. This move effectively liberalised the motor vehicle insurance market in Cameroon through the introduction of innovations. These innovations include:

1. Fixing of basic minimum premiums rates by statute.

All motor vehicle insurance premiums were increased in the new Order. Another innovation, of capital importance is laid down in Article (1) of the Order stipulates that the premiums are minimum premiums and reducing them in any form is therefore banned, except for the limited cases provided for and listed in the Order. Competitive pricing among companies thus ceased to be a factor in selling car insurance policies, as was the case before. This new dispensation eliminated corrupt practices and crooks in the motor vehicle insurance market. The new statute was aimed at making the rules clear in the motor vehicle insurance business. It had to prevent unfair competition in the market by prevent brokers from arbitrarily lowering tariffs to attract customers especially transporters.

2. All pro-rata insurance rates were suspended.

Another major innovation is that the Order has put an end to an illegal practice, “fixing of rates on a proportional basis”, by laying down provisions concerning short-term insurance policies (Articles 6). Any person can insure themselves for successive periods, each not exceeding a year. If a client renews his contract with the same company, he shall bear a five percent penalty, and the added up fractions of (net) premiums may not exceed 105% of the annual premium Art 6. (3).

3. New criteria for fixing insurance rates were created.

Another innovation in the law deals with the criteria for fixing insurance rates of vehicles used to carry passengers in urban areas. Apart from the traditional criteria (use of the vehicle, horse-power, method of propulsion, etc.), the Order lays down a number of new notions in its Article (2). These include fixing motor vehicle insurance rates according to: 1. Traffic zones: Premiums depend on whether the insurer is usually resident in one of the following zones: Zone A: Douala, Yaounde, Bafoussam, Garoua, and Bamenda. Zone B: Maroua, Ngaoundere, Ebolowa, Buea, and other Divisional headquarters and Zone C: Other localities in the country. 2. Socio-professional status: of persons whose business requires them to use cars intensively such as (medical representatives, advertising agents, commercial agents, traders, photographers, reporters, etc.) shall pay an extra premium, contrary to clergymen who shall enjoy a rebate. 3. Age of vehicle owner and driving license criteria. Article 5 (3(a) and (b)) of the Order stipulates that regular drivers aged below twenty five (25) years and those whose licenses are less than two years old, shall be subject to pay an extra premium. The said article

thus penalizes the driver's behaviour in that by virtue of his age and inexperience, he is likely to cause more accidents. 4. Other innovations in the new insurance regulation. The Order in Article (9) line (4) further obliges the insurer to issue, upon the insured's request, a "none-claims" attestation. Cases of insurers who used to refuse to issue the above document under the pretext that their client would go to a rival insurance company became increasingly rare. Finally, it should be noted that category "B" vehicles (interurban passenger carrying vehicles) are excluded from this classification by zones. It is evident that during the early months of its implementations, this tariff posed problems. However, it will not be long lasting, given that the increase was done taking into consideration the interests of insurance companies and their clients.

Apart from standardizing the fixing of rates throughout the market, one of the most striking characteristics is the sanction provided for, by the Order. In its Article (15), the new arrangement also aims to punish "any person" who violates the provisions of the new statute by the provisions of Article (370) of the Penal Code. This could be the insurer, the insured or intermediaries. To bring about harmonization, all insurance companies on the market signed a protocol agreement that clarified vague aspects of the Order. The said protocol agreement aims above all at having all companies observe the Order's provisions. Companies, which fail to respect the new rates, shall be liable to possible sanctions from the Minister of the Economy and Finance and the Regional Insurance Control Commission of Central African states, CIMA. This new insurance Order has been strictly enforced by police officers on the road.

9. Institution of identification badges for taxi drivers

This has been very difficult to implement policy product. Although its necessity cannot be questioned, taxi drivers in the city have fought against this policy product from its creation in 1997. A decision (00063/MINT/DTT) of January 14, 1997 created the obligation of wearing identification badges for drivers of public transport taxis. The badge is issued by a syndicate and must carry the name of that syndicate, the name and place of birth of the badge holder, the number of his/her national identity card, the number of his/her drivers license, that of his/her *capacité* (drivers proficiency certificate) and the registration number of the badge. The fabrication of the badge requires prior approval from the administration. As from January 14, 1997, taxi drivers had one month to comply with the law. The forces of law and order are responsible for controlling the compliance to the law. Immediately after the law, the *Syndicat Professionnel de Taxi men du Cameroun* (SYNPROTAXCAM) condemned this law. Taxi drivers vowed to fight this supplement to the statute book that they claimed would only give more room to policemen to extort bribes from them and cause more red tape to the already overburdened urban transport activity.

In April 2002, the Minister of Transport signed an order, insisting on the policy decision to institute identification badges for taxi drivers. The order noted that wearing badges was necessary given the high level of insecurity and physical aggression suffered by passengers inside shared taxis in the country and the lack of professionalism in the business of urban road transporters. In November 2002, the minister of Transport set January 1, 2003 as the date for the debut of enforcing the regulation on the taxi driver's badge, that is, some seven years after the initial decision to make the wearing identification badges obligatory for all shared taxi drivers. A ministerial order finally spelt out the sanctions facing defaulting taxi drivers. For most people, the nature of the job of a taxi driver in a Cameroonian city is such that wearing a badge is a luxury not only from the point of view of the cost of the proposed badges but also because it cannot provide the security of passengers. No one will inspect a badge of a taxi

driver before he or she jumps into a vehicle during rush hours. Taxi drivers believe that wearing a badge is simply another way to allow policemen to extort bribes from them. The enforcement of wearing badges began in 2003, but this policy has had little effect on the rate of assault of passengers inside taxis during day and night travels. It is generally known in Yaounde that it is not safe to travel at night by taxi because of the risk of assault.

10. Institution of crash helmets for motorcycle taxi drivers

In Cameroonian cities, the use of motorcycles for public transportation prior to the reform was always an illegal business. It was thought to be very unsafe and also very degrading to ride on a motorcycle as a passenger especially in a city like Yaounde, where the vast majority of workers are civil servants who have always wanted to show off some prestige. To make the motorcycle taxi safer, one of the products of the policy was the institution of obligatory wearing of crash helmets by motorcycle taxi drivers. But the onset of the economic crisis changed all this to the point that this motorcycle taxis came to some towns and were quickly adopted by the masses because they were cheaper and ran on the bad roads that the shares taxis were avoiding. The government thus had no option but to legalise this mode of urban transportation. Decree number 94/033/PM of February 2, 1994 fixed conditions for the use of motorcycle as taxis to transport people in urban areas. To be able to do this, the motorcycle rider must have the SMT license category. The owner needs a *Carte bleue*, to register in the motorcycle taxi register. The license cost CFA 4,000 francs or Euro 6.5, and is issued by the senior divisional officer. The *carte bleue* costs CFA 5,000 francs or Euros 9.0 that is CFA 2,500 francs or Euros 4.5 for stamp duty and CFA 2,500 francs or Euros 4.5 as tax per year. The authorised age limit for the driver fixed at eighteen years and the driver must carry a category "A" license.

This is new in Cameroon. The country had never had anything like this before. It is the first time that motorcycles are allowed to transport passengers in the urban areas. This policy product can be criticized for the safety record of this new mode. There can be little comfort riding as a passenger on a motorcycle. When it rains, the passenger is exposed and gets wet. During the dry season, the dust from the un-tarred roads covers the passenger entirely. This new mode in Yaounde was perceived as a reversal of the previous gains that the country had known in urban transportation with the defunct bus operator. The most important factor is that the motorcycle taxi was not permitted in Yaounde in 1994. At that time, the question was for how long could such a ban last given the ever increasing demand for urban mobility and infrastructure in the capital of Cameroon, especially as the goal of the policy reform under study was to increase the supply of modes of transport for cities. In 1995, a decree eventually lifted the ban on motorcycle taxis in Yaounde. Not surprisingly, motorcycle taxis made their entry into some peripheral urban areas in Yaounde due to poor road conditions and shortages of shared taxis.

The government is still carrying out reforms in this mode of public urban transport. In mid-2004, a government-sponsored project to impose wearing of distinctive yellow-coloured blouses and crash helmets was launched for motorcycle taxi drivers after it was realized that the accident rate involving urban motorcycle taxis was alarming. The main problem here is that the passengers of motorcycle taxis do not have insurance covers. The regulation requiring their wearing of crash helmets and the yellow blouses has never been implemented. In addition, insurance companies deem the motorcycle taxi business risky. Motorcycle taxis has a well-known history of regular involvement in ghastly road accidents with deadly casualties and injuries resulting to physical disabilities that represent extremely high costs for insurers to settle. Consequently, there is no insurance policy in Cameroon that covers motorcycle taxi.

This is thus a huge problem area for the new urban transport policy because this mode of urban transport, prone to accidents, is tolerated despite the fact that passengers cannot have insurance cover and do not have roadworthiness certificates. This new mode of public transport has created a major safety problem for all other road users. This absence of road safety is a major flaw in this policy reform.

11. Re-organisation of Transport Offices

After a decade of confusion, petty corruption and anarchy in transport offices nationwide, the minister of transport issued a press release that addressed job definition in transport offices located in every provincial chief town of the country. The 1998 press release came to remedy a situation that had lasted for too long. The implementation of the prescription organising work in Transport offices finally began on January 30, 1991 when a circular letter of the minister of Transport clarified the functioning of provincial and divisional road transport services which are in charge of issuing permits and licences to urban transporters. Before the effective implementation of this division of labour, constant delays in the processing of files provoked corruption as operators paid bribes to hasten the treatment of their applications for permits or licences. This situation was having a negative impact on the policy reform objective of increasing the supply of the modes of urban mobility to satisfy the needs of the city in terms of mobility.

The ministerial press release, number 00283 of April 1, 1998 created two counters in all transport offices. One counter for the reception of files and another for the distribution of signed documents. The ministerial instruction indicated that as a way to fight corruption, only the officially fixed rate for the issuance of a transport document can be charged. The reception counter must keep a register containing the details of each file that is deposited. This must include the date of deposit and the proposed date and time when they are due for withdrawal. The file is then transmitted to the officer in charge of treating them. The press release says that files must be treated in the order in which they are submitted. The minister banned the use of intermediaries and instituted the need for a power of attorney to collect a document on behalf of some one else. While this piece of statute may help curb the corruption in these offices, only time will tell how efficient it can be in terms of changing peoples' attitudes to age old practices. The goal was to allow operators of urban transport vehicles to speedily obtain permits and licences. Long delays before the policy reforms discouraged potential transport operators from entering this sector of business.

12. Creation of a special windscreen license for vehicles

The special windscreen license was created by a Prime Ministerial degree of September 29, 1999. It was effectively launched on April 28, 2000. The license has several categories and colours for each of the following: urban transport, interurban transport, trucks and private vehicles. The license comes in the wake of the age-old taxi drivers' complaint of constant police harassment despite the completeness of regulatory documents. The license is pasted on the windscreen and certifies that a car has the complete documents needed to operate as a taxi. It comes in different colours according to vehicle size, use and duration of validity. It is issued to cover seven other documents namely: "*Carte Grise*", Windscreen license (the ordinary one, urban and inter-urban transport license, Certificate of road worthiness, packing permit, business tax receipt, and tax receipts in the case of trucks. The insurance certificate is not included. Just as the "*capacité*" for taxi drivers.

However, possession of this special windscreen license does not stop law enforcement agents from carrying out routine checks on passenger vehicles and their drivers. But the difference

now is that checks are not on highways but in police or gendarme stations. The impact of this special license as concerns harassment of public transport vehicles cannot be predicted for the time being. But expectations on its efficiency were high as it was in line with government policy to boost transport supply after the liquidation of SOTUC. But this special windscreen license disappeared from circulation since 2000. It was very unpopular so many transporters ceased to buy this license less than one year after it went into circulation because it did not stop police harassment. In this light, we can say it was not implemented. It failed to solve the problem it was intended to. In fact, it was the wrong response to the problem of police checkpoints in Yaounde and other cities that greatly disturbs both taxi drivers and passengers.

13. Protection of national road network and control environmental pollution

A new statute to protect the national road network and control environmental pollution from vehicles was decreed in April 1996.

14. Privatisation of technical inspection of motor vehicles

Vehicle inspection and number plate operations were granted to private operators without a fair bidding process. Despite this regulation, measures for a systematic vehicle inspection have never been implemented leading to the presence in the streets of Yaounde of very old vehicles, especially diesel run vehicles with high gas emissions.

The next section examines the results that the implementation of the transport policy produced for mobility in Yaounde.

5.4 Results of policy outputs

In this section, we analyse outputs of the policy reforms using research design methods presented in chapter three. These are: Evaluation outcome model, implementation analysis, researcher observation, and historical causal process tracing and comparative case review. The results are obtained from: evaluation outcome model, implementation analysis, researcher observation and historical causal process tracing of the policy reforms and highlights what happened in Yaounde as a result of the policy reforms and what changes occurred with respect to public urban transport.

1. By using implementation analysis, researcher observation and historical causal process tracing, we realised that the implementation of the policy increased the modes of public urban passenger transport in Yaounde. Before the policy to liberalise urban transport by minibus, motorcycle and buses was implemented, the shared taxi was the only legal mode of public passenger transport in Yaounde. After the policy, motorcycle taxis, minibuses and buses are now modes of public urban passenger transport in Yaounde. The state no longer has the monopoly for operating urban public bus service in Yaounde. Private entrepreneurs have the legal right to do so. The supply of motorised public passenger transport has increased in the city with the introduction of motorcycle taxis, minibuses and buses.

2. By using researcher observation and stakeholder analysis we realised that the introduction of these new modes of public transport has made mobility in Yaounde more affordable and accessible for urban dwellers. The new modes are all cheaper than the shared taxis. The motorcycle taxi has made certain peri-urban zones of the city that do not have good roads more accessible because motorcycles can use these roads. This has cut journey times for city dwellers living in these zones.

3. By using implementation analysis, researcher observation and stakeholder analysis, we realised that the implementation of the policy reform re-organising work in Transport Offices has facilitated the issuance of transport documents. This has reduced the incidence of petty corruption that was prevailing in the procedures for delivering transport documents such as the: public urban transport licence, registration as a Road Transporter and obtaining the « Carte Bleue » so that many more entrepreneurs can enter the sector easily to boost the supply of means of transport in the city.
4. By using evaluation outcome model, implementation analysis, researcher observation, historical causal process tracing and stakeholder analysis we realised that the implementation of the new rates for Third Party Liability motor vehicle insurance has curbed the practice of issuing fraudulent motor vehicle insurance certificates; this is beneficial to road users because accident victims are increasingly feeling secure.
5. By using the evaluation outcome model, implementation analysis, researcher observation, historical causal process tracing and stakeholder analysis we realised that the policy reform has also brought unintended outputs such as the observed rush - hour congestion at major junctions that regularly occur as motorcycle taxis struggle with other vehicles to have right of way. Another unintended output of the policy is the increasing rate of fatal accidents involving motorcycle taxis. Motorcycle theft is also a new phenomenon in Yaounde. Urban pollution (noise and fumes) is also on the rise in the city as a result of motorcycle taxis. Another unintended output of the new policy is that it has exposed the need for more appropriate road infrastructures and for municipal governance structures, competences and capacity for Yaounde to handle the ever-growing mobility needs of the population through long term planning and development.
6. By using researcher observation and stakeholder analysis we realised that another unintended output of the policy concerns the paucity of road transport infrastructure in Yaounde especially junctions, pedestrian walks and traffic signal, to handle the constantly growing population and the phenomenal increase in the use of personal motorcars. This researcher observed this aspect during the course of the research.
7. Through the implementation analysis and the comparative review of best practices elsewhere in Africa, we realised that the policy reform has revealed the need for appropriate governance structures with the needed capacity in Yaounde to handle the important domain of transport that conditions the quality of life, the sustainability of the city as a healthy place to live in with a clean and safe environment and do business.
8. Through the use of researcher observation, implementation analysis and comparative analysis with other cities in Africa, we realise that the development and growth of Yaounde means that a deliberate policy of decentralisation should be pursued so as to empower elected city officials to elicit participation from inhabitants and embark on long term development plans for Yaounde.

5.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, the outputs of the urban transport policy reforms have been presented and analysed. The changes that occurred in the modes of public urban transport in Yaounde are:

1. Shortening of procedures for Registering as a Road Transporter.
2. Facilitation in the issuing of the « Carte Bleue ».

3. Institution of two categories of road transporters' license.
4. Computerisation of vehicle matriculation certificate.
5. Liberalisation of urban transport by mini-buses, motorcycles and buses.
6. Creation of a commission to evaluate bids of operators of bus lines in cities.
7. Reduction of Customs duty for imported vehicles.
8. Prescription of new rates for Third Party Liability motor vehicle insurance.
9. Institution of identification badges for taxi drivers.
10. Institution of crash helmets for motorcycle taxi drivers.
11. Re-organisation of Transport Offices.
12. Creation of a special windscreen license for vehicles.
13. Protection of national road network and control environmental pollution.
14. Privatisation of technical inspection of motor vehicles.

These changes are attributed to the activities of the policy reform and therefore all occurred after the introduction of the new policy.

The analysis of the implementation of the policy shows long periods of delays in the process, Table 5.1 because the statutory instruments that concretize policy reform need Enabling Acts before they can be implemented. Often, these Enabling Acts take some years before they are enacted making the instruments impossible to implement. This slow pace of policy implementation can be explained by the procedures for policy reform formulation, enactment and implementation within the bureaucracy.

This pace of policy implementation has also caused the partial or non-implementation of some statutory instruments that were expected to contribute to the achievement of the anticipated policy goals. The implementation of the policy reform encountered problems worth mentioning such as:

1. The regulatory texts took a long time to sail through the administrative processes needed to prepare the policy products such as: Laws, Decrees or Executive Orders.
2. There were bureaucratic slippages in the manner of appreciating and pursuing policy activities due to inappropriate interpretation of policy statutes with the effect that policy implementation was sometimes held back indefinitely.
3. The lack of resources to implement these poorly formulated policies has sometimes provoked opposition to the reforms from stakeholder groups. An example is that taxi drivers have never respected the policy requiring obligatory wearing of badges that was decreed for them on January 14, 1997 by a ministerial text. In April 2002, the Minister of Transport was still negotiating the implementation of this policy output. The decision of the public authorities to punish non-compliance with the policy only became possible by 2003. The bus and motorcycle taxi parks that the municipality was expected to build and control has never seen the light of day in Yaounde. Traffic lights and other road signs that assist traffic flow and facilitate mobility in many other cities around the world are largely absent in Yaounde. The performance of the new urban transport policy should also be appreciated in the light of the obsolescence of key policy institutions such as the National Transport Council created by Presidential Order Number 157/CAB/ PR of March 20, 1989 that has never really gone operational. In fact, Articles (1) and (2) of the Order stipulate that the National Transport Council is placed under the supervisory authority of the Minister in Charge of Transport and proposes to government all measures concerning the adjustment of the National Transport Policy. Besides, the council determines the strategic choices of the modes of transport, the building of transport infrastructures (roads in this case) through the drawing up of policy plans. Throughout the life cycle of the reform, the council has failed to give impulsion to urban transport policy.

The main conclusion from this chapter is that although the new urban transport policy produced the fourteen policy products that were identified in this chapter, not all of them have been systematically implemented. The policy products that have been implemented have brought changes in the mobility patterns in Yaounde. In this respect, it is possible to point out that the policy achieved the goal set by policymakers namely: increase the supply of the means of public transport to fill the gap created after the liquidation of SOTUC. The policy reform has also contributed to making urban public transport more affordable through increase in supply and rendered peri-urban areas of the city more accessible with the motorcycle taxi.

There is a cause–effect link between policy goal and objectives and policy outcomes. This means that a given policy goal such as that fixed for the urban public transport reforms in Yaounde may set several objectives whose total attainment is not necessarily required for the achievement of the desired policy goal. In this thesis, the attainment of only one of the six policy objectives that is, the policy objective to liberalise urban public passenger transport by bus, minibus and motorcycle has significantly contributed in increasing the means of mobility in Yaounde. This outcome from the implementation of this policy objective alone could lead to the conclusion that the goal of the policy has been achieved because the goal of the policy was to increase the supply of urban transport in the wake of the liquidation of the state-owned monopoly bus company SOTUC. Hence, the implementation of all policy objectives of the public urban transport policy reform is not necessary for this policy to be deemed to have achieved its intended goal. In the next chapter, the results of the analysis of perception of stakeholders concerning the worth and merit of the new transport policy is presented.

6 Stakeholder perceptions on policy reforms

6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the second part of the research results devoted to analysis of perception of stakeholders on policy reforms. This analysis focuses on the following research questions: How do primary urban transport stakeholders assess the performance of policy reforms through the prism of its objectives set by policy makers? And how do they perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the prism of proxy criteria? Is there a significant trend in perceptions of performances of new policy in 1998, 1999 and 2000 among stakeholders?

The research method used to obtain these results is historical causal tracing process that applies stakeholder analysis, stakeholder power analysis and trend analysis for the three-year time series longitudinal data. The result presented in this chapter aims to explain and answer the research question about how and why the new transport policy performed the way it did in Yaounde.

Schmeer (1999) and Mayers (2005) submit that SA and SPA are particularly useful in understanding policy decision-making situations where stakeholders have competing interests. In this kind of multi-actor policy setting, Van de Riet (2003) posits that the analysis must identify policy actors, their actions and interests in a systems perspective. To conduct an analysis of the impact of this policy, this chapter identifies people, groups and organizations that matter through examination of their interests and influences on policy. This process leads to the identification and analysis of people, groups and organisations (stakeholders) that this policy is designed to help, as well as those whose involvement or at least assent is required to make this policy work. The results of the stakeholder analysis pinpoint interest whose support or opposition critically affects the reform. It indicates: the capacity of people, groups and organizations to influence this policy and the extent to which reform impacts or triggers political or social action. The stakeholder analysis shows ownership of reform as well as the sources and origins of the impulsion for the reform. The factors affecting ownership can be addressed through: an analysis of the political economy, which identifies affected groups and their position vis-à-vis a policy, as well as alliances or potential convergence of interests, and assesses their influence over government decision-makers; and an analysis of social differences based on characteristics, such as knowledge of policy, position on policy, power, resources and

leadership ability of stakeholder to a policy reform. The SA and SPA are concerned with seeking answers to questions such as: Which stakeholders' benefits from reform and which ones lose out? What are the power differences and relationships between stakeholders and what is the relative influence of each stakeholder? The analysis of longitudinal data collected provides answers presented in this chapter and enables this thesis to identify policy processes, institutions and stakeholders' relationships that can explicate certain aspects concerning the policy's performances and the overall perception of stakeholder groups. Historical causal tracing strategies that embody a policy implementation analysis component are built into the research design of this thesis and are used to track and present explanations for results of SA and SPA.

6.2 Stakeholder power analysis of policy reform

In this section, which is divided into two parts, a stakeholder power analysis is carried out using frameworks articulated by Mayers (2005) and Schmeer (1999). We defined the concept of stakeholder power analysis before explicating how we used it in this thesis.

1. Stakeholder power analysis

People in all sorts of situations assess the positions of others on a given issue, to enable them to weigh the level of support or opposition from others, and predict how they will behave if a change is made. A stakeholder power analysis is an organised approach to weigh this relationship. In this thesis, it is an approach for understanding the urban transport reform system in Yaounde by identifying the key actors or stakeholders in the system, and assessing their importance in relation to the specific issue of transport policy reform through the identification and analysis of their respective interests in, or influence on, that system. In short, it concerns the perceived or actual importance of a group or certain groups of stakeholders as far as this specific policy reform is concerned. Stakeholders can be individuals, communities, social groups, or organisations.

2. Stakeholder power analysis in this thesis from Table 6.1

The categorisation and analysis of data recorded in the Stakeholder Reference Chart, Chart 4.1 in this thesis permitted the creation of an SPA matrix table 6.1 which is based on the level of power, resources and leadership capacity that a certain group of stakeholders possess. This SPA matrix was constructed to show four purposefully selected groups identified from the Chart. The classification was based on the premise that those who have high leadership and high power will be most able and likely to affect policy implementation because these traits confer a certain level of importance on them as far as this policy reform is concerned vis-à-vis other stakeholders. However, powerful stakeholders who lack leadership could also affect implementation through their power alone. The results of this classification show the level of "importance" of certain stakeholders; importance as used here should be understood as their ability to affect policy implementation. Since power and leadership are characteristics that determine a stakeholder's ability to affect or block implementation of a policy. These two characteristics are the basis for the "importance" analysis. The four groups identified are made up of the most important stakeholders involved in the policymaking institutions. They have the potency to support or to block the policy reform.

In the matrix for power, leadership and resources of key stakeholders:

Group 1 – stakeholders who have leadership and high power (level 3). These were: the Central and local services of the Ministry of Transport, The Ministry of Economy and Finance and the International category made up of the World Bank/International Finance Corporation and International Monetary Fund.

Group 2 – stakeholders who have leadership and medium power (level 2): Trade Unions, Taxi Owners, and Taxi Drivers

Group 3 – Stakeholders who lack leadership but have high medium power, (level 2 or 3). Law enforcement agencies, other road transporters, and International risk capitalist and investors.

Group 4 – Stakeholders who lack leadership but have low power: These include: Road Users, Road Users, Local capitalists, influential elites and investors.

Stakeholders who do not fit in any group, that is, those who may have no leadership and also have low power are not useful for this analysis and can be removed from the analysis at this point so that focus is on those with power and leadership position because their behaviour is susceptible to influence the reform process.

Table 6.1: Matrix for power, leadership and resources of key stakeholders

Group 1 Leadership and high power	Group 2 Leadership and medium power	Group 3 No leadership and medium or high power	Group 4 No leadership and low power
Ministry of Transport: Central and Provincial services	Trade Unions: Taxi Owners Taxi Drivers	The bureaucracy, Law Enforcement Agencies	Road Users
Ministry of Economy and Finance	Nil	Other road users and Transporters	Local capitalists, elites and Investors
Politicians at all levels	Nil	International private stakeholders. Risk Capitalists and Investors	Nil
International public stakeholders: the World Bank/IFC and IMF	Nil	Nil	Nil

Source: Researcher. Adapted from Schmeer (1999).

6.3 Stakeholder knowledge, positions and interest in policy analysis

In this section, all the data analysed and the scores used are those recorded in the Stakeholder Reference Chart.

Stakeholders in all groups 100% acknowledge that they have knowledge of objectives of new urban transport policy. Stakeholders with low resources and low leadership/power constitute a majority 59% of the population used in this longitudinal survey. These stakeholders are also opponents of policy. Stakeholders' interest in the policy outcome is a determinant factor in the position of each category. All stakeholders involved in policy formulation and design are supporters of the policy while all stakeholders who may pay the costs of the new policy are full or moderate opponents of the policy. Important stakeholders are of two groups. The first group consists of those who are likely to reap financial advantages from the policy and who are supporters of the policy and the second group consists of those who are likely to lose their interests as a result of the policy and who are opponents of the policy.

6.4 Stakeholder interests and policy alliances

The possibility of stakeholder who share common interests in the policy reform can be identified from Stakeholder Reference Chart. The matrix that results from this analysis shows that: trade unions, road users and local capitalists form the opponents' clusters of the policy

representing possible alliances for stakeholders against the transport policy reform. On the other hand, the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, International stakeholders such as IFIs, Politicians and Law enforcement Agencies form supporters' cluster of policy. This shows that interests of stakeholders, their power and leadership levels are factors that are conducive for formation of supporters or opponents who can threaten implementation of policy reform.

6.5 Analysing stakeholder actions in policy implementation

The research results presented in this section highlight the consequences of the particular governance context in the city of Yaounde recorded in Matrix 6.1. Stakeholders articulate their interests and use the power and leadership resources at their disposal to influence policy implementation. The power and leadership level of stakeholders recorded in the Stakeholder Reference Chart, Table 4.3, which was used to create matrix 6.1 indicate that the higher the level of power and leadership available to a stakeholder group, the more that group is capable of exerting influence over policy implementation. The results from the Yaounde case show the classification of stakeholders according to their power and leadership capacity. In the matrix, stakeholders in the same column, share similar interests in the policy. Their attitude towards the policy during its implementation processes is likely to be similar. They are likely to form alliances in favour of or against the policy once their interests are threatened. The following conclusions can be made concerning stakeholders and policy implementation using a historical tracking process strategy of the policy reform in Yaounde that is summarised in matrix 6.1.

1. Powerful stakeholders and policy process.

The first column of the matrix groups stakeholders who have high power. This indicates that they have a capacity to manipulate policy implementation processes to protect their interests at stake. The kingpin reform measure of the new urban transport policy involved the deregulation of state monopoly on urban bus transport operations, legalisation of the motorcycle taxi in cities in Cameroon such as Yaounde. However, from a stakeholder power analysis (interest, influence, importance and resources), this research identified a category of powerful stakeholders with the ability to delay and eventually manipulate this liberalisation. In fact, the allocation of bus routes to operators through competitive bidding amply illustrated this. In 1998, the Ministry of Transport awarded bus routes to certain companies who have never operated them. It is believed that the bidding process was flawed and the winning bidders were well-connected and powerful private national stakeholders. For seven years, this aspect of the policy objective was in a limbo.

This prompted policymakers to resort to the technique of adjudication in which a private partner was selected in 2005, well before Law Number 2006/012 of 29 December 2006, laid down the rules and conditions governing partnership contracts in Cameroon, the powerful stakeholders had already used their leverage to create the urban transport company *Le bus* in the absence of a legal framework and according to their interests. However, the adjudication process took place in the absence of a national legal framework laying down the conditions for this type of economic operation. An exorbitant package of concessions to attract foreign partners was imagined by policymakers. This included notably, the unfinished Ministerial tower block Number One. This building is located in down town Yaounde. It is owned by, the Ministry of Town Planning. Construction work for the tower started in 1986 but was abandoned two years afterwards because of the Economic crisis (*Cameroon tribune of December 29, 2006*). It is worth several thousand million CFA francs and was granted to the private partner under the 2006 PPP arrangement as a form of incentive/subsidy. The local

national political stakeholders and the adjudicator are clearly in alliance with private international risk capital stakeholders who are generally interested in market oriented reforms in developing countries because of investment opportunities offered (Brune et al., 2005).

2. Powerful stakeholders with weak leadership and low resources.

In the second column of the matrix, this research identified taxi drivers as constituting a special category of powerful stakeholders although their leadership and power resources are not strong. They are powerful as a group because they are capable of collectively blocking the implementation of certain policy products through wildcat strikes or threats of them. Motorcycle taxis drivers form another category of powerful stakeholders because they have effectively blocked policy reforms concerning the wearing of crash helmets and have successfully defied regulations that are meant to keep them out of Yaounde's city centre. But their weak leadership and low resource mobilisation capacity often hinder their actions. Their strike actions are often unwanted because certain Unions are usually sympathetic with the government views and are led by members of the governing party.

3. Stakeholders with no leadership, but have medium to high power.

The Third column of matrix 6.1 includes stakeholders that are part of the bureaucracy and includes the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Transport and law enforcing agencies. They are executing agencies and theoretically obey orders from their hierarchy. The bureaucracy's position in implementation of policy reform merits some attention here. The attitude of the state bureaucracy that is the implementation arm for government policy during implementation process is mired with instances of resistance and complaisance of various kinds reflecting both their lack of leadership and their medium to high level of power. The main bureaucracy handling transport matters is the Ministry of Transport (MINT) that is a stakeholder capable of blocking policy reforms during the implementation processes. The implementation of the new urban transport policy has been beset by many instances of the interplay of pressure politics. Motorcycle taxis are now a mode of transport in Yaounde. The bureaucracy and the policy maker tolerates their non respect of safety conditions, and licensing requirements because they can effectively go on strike and affect urban mobility seriously, especially as poorer urban neighbourhoods with bad roads that are foot-paths rely on them for circulation in the city. Many civil servants in the transport administration as well as others operate motorcycle taxis as a survival strategy during this era of new poverty.

The implementing administration has not always viewed stakeholder participation in the policy process as something that has legitimacy. As a result, they have always been inclined to adopt a technicist approach to policy implementation, thus making the processes remote from those really concerned by it. A clear indication is the issue of wearing identification badges by taxi drivers (shared taxis and motorcycles) and the wearing of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and their passengers that have been facing all kinds of problems for their effective implementation. The centralized nature of the transport administration in Cameroon renders the implementation of some policies difficult because follow-up is absent at the field level. The level of feedback that moves up the hierarchy is not adequate so policy slippages are not reported to permit the taking of remedial measures in time. The multitude of time-wasting red tape needed for approval of simple decisions renders the transport administrations burdensome, slow and unable to act promptly to save or solve problems that may arise in the policy implementation process. These characteristics of the Cameroon transport administration and other administrations concerned with urban transport reform, led to delays in drafting Enabling Acts for application of texts concerning several policy products. That is, in Cameroon as explained earlier policy formulation takes place in Ministries and sometimes

Ministers are responsible for signing decisions that will render a statute operational through Enabling Acts.

The procedure for elaborating these Enabling acts takes long because of the nature, working methods and structure of the administrative bureaucracy. The implementation phase of the new urban transport policy has not been different from other policy initiatives where stakeholders and the administration concentrate on squabbles about which group of individuals or stakeholders have lost what or gained what, because of or as a result of the new policy. In this process, the time wasted to renegotiate the policy objectives has affected the implementation of the policy outputs. The bureaucracy resisted the streamlining of procedures for the issuance of transport documents because it was perceived to lead to a reduction in their ability to take bribes from transporters. Hence, the Minister of Transport had to reorganise work in Transport offices. The bureaucracy that has to implement this policy reforms is faced with the paucity of resources to support policy implementation. This situation has always been a factor for the performance of policies in the developing world. This is one reason why the bureaucracy often engages in corrupt practices.

The cumulative efforts necessary to achieve policy aims of the new urban transport policy have not been readily available. The pilot scheme of the Ministry of Transport for computerisation of Vehicle Matriculation Certificates (to prevent the rampant falsification of this document) lacked the necessary resources to go to its logical conclusion and was terminated prematurely. It is also important to note that whatever the means deployed, a bad policy cannot be implemented to produce good results just as the lack of enough resources has the potential to destroy an otherwise good policy. The absence monitoring of this new urban transport policy is an example of the inadequacy of policy implementation resources. The research identified low levels of inter ministerial cooperation among the ministries, local councils and trade unions having a stake in the reform.

The implementation of the new urban transport policy depends to a large extent on intergovernmental relations because many ministries are implicated in the policy output and policy implementation process. Improving the supply of transport vehicles could be engineered by incentives from the Ministry of Economy and Finance through tax breaks for the sector but this has not been the case. Transportation and especially urban transportation is both an economic activity as well as a social one. Therefore initiatives on the two fronts are the most obvious way to realize this dual character of the sector. The sheer numbers of the parties intervening in the sector diminishes the possibility of any harmonious planning. Taxi drivers and taxi owners' trade unions accredit vehicles by printing and selling transport fare certificates. Informal sector workers sell vehicle number plates for taxi usage. The Ministry of Economy and Finance fixes tax rates for taxi business licences and windscreen licences, the Ministry of Trade fixes the price for fuel and the security services enforce compliance with transport regulations. Local Councils collect parking charges and build taxi parks. All these actors give the impression that they are working in isolation for a policy that needs maximum cooperation, consultations and consensus among stakeholders.

Besides, the unstable nature of the post of Minister of Transport has led to stoppages and variations in some aspects of policy and institutions (the Ministry of Transport during the ten years of policy implementation had eight different ministers). There were uncertainties in policy resulting from high fuel prices that policy makers did not and could not anticipate that led to strike actions by urban transporters forcing the government to revise or water-down certain aspects of the policy reform for political reasons. Economic conditions as well as

social evolutions that have been concurrently occurring during the implementation of the new urban transport policy were never really accounted for at the policy design stage. In fact, they cannot be accounted for under normal circumstances. But this also allows the gathering of knowledge on why the same policies succeed in one place and fail in another. Policies of all kinds always involve a certain degree of uncertainty. It is not clear if the genitors of this policy crafted standby measures to handle the unpredictable ways in which the stakeholders could react to the policy especially during the implementation stage when these uncertainties emerge and have to be dealt with. The unpredictability of the original plan includes changes in the value set, socio-economic and political mutations. These uncertainties concern the political context of the reform that Smith (1985) points out is different from the situation of liberal democracies of the West in which most public policies are incremental in character rather than being completely innovative as the new urban transport reforms in Yaounde.

4. Stakeholders with no leadership and weak power.

The fourth column in the matrix of Table 6.1, contains stakeholders who have neither power nor leadership. This group includes the other road and transport users who are not organised and are obliged to bear the consequences of the policy reform. They are the main victims of this reform. Their perception of the performance of the policy reform is often through the prism of their position as victim of the reform who must bear the consequences of the reforms especially the negative unintended outcomes. In the next section the analysis and conclusions from matrix Table 6.1 concerning the identified key stakeholders is presented.

6.6 Primary stakeholders and policy reforms

In this section, results concerning the perception of primary stakeholders on this policy are presented. Mayers (2005) distinguishes primary stakeholder from secondary stakeholders and noted that often, the first useful categorisation in a policy study is to classify stakeholders either as primary or secondary depending on whether they are immediately affected by, or can immediately affect, the system in which the policy is taking place. Primary stakeholders are a key concern for every public policy because their lives are directly affected by policy. In this study, two categories from the stakeholder table are identified as primary stakeholders and forty subjects were purposefully selected for control. The primary stakeholders controlled for this longitudinal data collection are forty, consisting of: Trade Unions group (20) that includes (Taxi owners 10, Taxi drivers 10), Other Road users group (20) that includes (passengers 10, other road users 10). The first policy evaluation operation carried out was the assessment of achievement of the policy's stated objectives. The forty primary stakeholders indicated their perception on a scoring table provided in the questionnaire and produced in Table 6.2. The table is consolidated from three tables taken over three years. Stakeholder responses to the following six questions can convey their perception on how the policy reform achieved its initial objectives fixed by policy makers. The evaluation questions are:

1. Has the NUTP liberalised the urban public transport in Yaounde?
2. Has this policy eradicated amateurism in urban public transportation?
3. Has this policy-facilitated mobility in the city of Yaounde?
4. Has this policy put an end to clandestine transporters, in Yaounde?
5. Has this policy made traffic flow fluidly in the city?
6. Has this policy contributed to fight pollution attributable to transport?

The stakeholders' responses are recorded in Table 6.1, before testing for significance in section 6.7.

Table 6.2: Primary stakeholder assessments of reforms

Primary stakeholder policy achievement perception Table						
Objective	Stakeholder category/ sub category for Analysis	Very Well	Well	Neutral	Not well	Not at all well
		5	4	0	2	1
1. Has the NUTP liberalised the urban public transport in Yaounde?	Trade Unions 20	11	4	4	1	0
	Taxi owners 10	6	1	3	0	0
	Taxi drivers 10	5	3	1	1	0
	Road and Transport users 20	13	5	0	1	1
	Passengers 10	8	0	0	1	1
	Others users 10	5	5	0	0	0
2. Has this policy eradicated amateurism in urban public transportation?	Trade Unions 20	0	4	4	5	7
	Taxi owners 10	0	1	3	3	3
	Taxi drivers 10	0	3	1	2	4
	Road and Transport users 20	13	5	0	1	1
	Passengers 10	8	0	0	1	1
	Others users 10	5	5	0	0	0
3. Has this policy-facilitated mobility in the city of Yaounde?	Trade Unions 20	1	4	3	7	5
	Taxi owners 10	1	1	2	6	0
	Taxi drivers 10	0	3	1	1	5
	Road and Transport users 20	0	8	5	3	4
	Passengers 10	0	4	2	1	3
	Others users 10	0	4	3	2	1
4. Has this policy ended clandestine transporters, in Yaounde?	Trade Unions 20	0	5	3	1	11
	Taxi owners 10	0	4	2	0	4
	Taxi drivers 10	0	1	1	1	7
	Road and Transport users 20	9	6	4	1	3
	Passengers 10	4	1	1	1	3
	Others users 10	5	5	3	0	0

Primary stakeholder policy achievement perception Table						
5. Has this policy made traffic flow fluidly in the city?	Trade Unions 20	2	2	3	3	10
	Taxi owners 10	1	1	2	2	4
	Taxi drivers 10	1	1	1	1	6
	Road and Transport users 20	2	3	4	9	2
	Passengers 10	1	2	1	5	1
	Others users 10	1	1	3	4	1
6. Has this policy contributed to fight pollution attributable to transport?	Trade Unions 20	2	1	2	6	9
	Taxi owners 10	2	1	1	1	5
	Taxi drivers 10	0	0	1	5	4
	Road and Transport users 20	6	1	3	4	6
	Passengers 10	6	0	2	1	1
	Others users 10	0	1	1	3	5

Source: Researcher data.

In table 6.2, the perceptions of primary stakeholders on the manner in which the policy objectives have been achieved are presented. Twenty subjects taken from each of the two categories of stakeholders was selected and their opinions recorded. The columns represent that stakeholder rating of the perceived level of achievement classified as follows: 5 for very well, 4 for well, 3 for neutral, 2 for not well and 1 for not at all well. The result of this assessment is presented in percentages in order to facilitate comprehension. On the first policy objective that is whether the NUTP liberalised the urban public transport in Yaounde, (75%) of the trade Union category of stakeholders believed the policy has achieved its objective either well or very well as against (90%) of Road and Transport users category. On the second policy objective that is whether the policy has eradicated amateurism in urban public transportation, (60%) of the trade Union Category thinks the policy objective has not achieved its objective while (90%) of the Road and Transport user's categories think the policy objective has been either well or very well achieved. On the third policy objective, whether the policy-facilitated mobility in the city of Yaounde, (60%) of trade unions category think it has not while (40%) of Road and Transport users category thinks it has achieved this objective well. On the fourth policy objective on this policy put an end to clandestine transporters, in Yaounde 60% of the Trade Union category think it has not, while (75%) of Road and Transport users category think that this policy objective has been well achieved. On the fifth policy objective concerning whether the this policy made traffic flow fluidly in the city, some (65%) of the Trade union category think that it has not while (55%) of the Road and Transport users category think the policy objective has not been achieved. On the sixth policy objective concerning whether this policy contributed to fight pollution attributable to transport, some (75%) of Trade Union category think it has been achieved while only (50%) of the Road and Transport users category think the policy objective has not been achieved.

6.7 Chi Square test for significance of statistic

To test for significance, data in Table 6.2 was reclassified to give two purposeful criteria of stakeholder response (positive and negative). The neutral category has been left out of the analysis because this category of perception is neither for nor against the policy reform. Besides, another classification was operated for the stakeholders that yielded two categories namely, those who belonged to Trade Unions that is, Taxi Owners and Taxis Drivers and Others, which are made up of other road users. Following this classification, a 2x2 table is obtained for each of the six policy objectives. It is from this table that the Chi square values for the data of each policy objective is obtained as shown in the table's 6.2.1 to 6.2.6. The Chi Square is a technique designed for less than interval level data. It is used in this thesis to test the null hypothesis that the row and column data classification variables of the data's two-way contingency table are independent. Essentially, all chi-square type tests involve arranging the frequency distribution of the data in what is called a contingency table of rows and columns. We use the Pearson Chi-Square significance test for the hypothesis that there is no association of columns and rows in tabular data that is a nominal data. Each of the tables in this section represents the outcome of the perception of key stakeholders about the policy reform. We use only the positive and negative perceptions because these present a clearer picture of perception than the neutral perception expressed by some stakeholders. Tables' 6.2.1 to 6.2.6 is derived from Table 6.2.

6.7.1 Chi square value and data significance of two stakeholder groups sampled

1. Table 6.2.1 below presents the observed frequencies for two stakeholder categories: 'unions' and 'others' on their perception of the policy objective of liberalising urban public transport in Yaounde.

Category of stakeholder	Count for Positive perception	Count for negative perception
Unions	14.5	5.5
Others	17.5	2.5
Total	32	8

Computing for Chi Square:

$$X^2 = 1.578287$$

$$df = 1$$

$$sP \text{ at } 0.05 = 3.841$$

From Table 6.2.1, it can be concluded that the differences between the two stakeholders groups are not significant.

2. Table 6.2.2 below presents the observed frequencies for two stakeholder categories: 'unions' and 'others' on their perception of the policy objective of eradicating amateurism in urban public transportation in Yaounde.

Category of stakeholder	Count for Positive perception	Count for negative perception
Unions	5	15
Others	2	18
Total	7	34

Computing for Chi Square:

$$X^2 = 1.555844$$

$$df = 1$$

$$sP \text{ at } 0.5 = 3.841$$

From Table 6.2.2, it can be concluded that the differences between the two stakeholders groups are not significant.

3. Table 6.2.3 below presents the observed frequencies for two stakeholder categories: ‘unions’ and ‘others’ on their perception of the policy objective of facilitating mobility in the city of Yaounde.

Category of stakeholder	Count for Positive perception	Count for negative perception
Unions	15	5
Others	8	12
Total	23	17

Computing for Chi Square:

$$X^2 = 5.012786$$

$$df = 1$$

$$sP \text{ at } 0.05 = 3.841$$

From Table 6.2.3, it can be concluded that the differences between the two stakeholders groups is significant.

4. Table 6.2.4 below presents the observed frequencies for two stakeholder categories: ‘unions’ and ‘others’ on their perception of the policy objective of fighting clandestine transporters in Yaounde.

Category of stakeholder	Count for Positive perception	Count for negative perception
Unions	6	14
Others	6	14
Total	12	28

Computing for Chi Square:

$$X^2 = 0.8$$

$$df = 1$$

$$sP \text{ at } 0.05 = 3.841$$

From Table 6.2.4, it can be concluded that the differences between the two stakeholders groups are not significant.

5. Table 6.2.5 below presents the observed frequencies for two stakeholder categories: ‘unions’ and ‘others’ on their perception of the policy objective of making traffic flow fluidly in the Yaounde.

Category of stakeholder	Count for Positive perception	Count for negative perception
Unions	4	16
Others	5	15
Total	13	27

Computing for Chi Square:

$$X^2 = 2.84895$$

$$df = 1$$

$$sP = \text{at } 0.05 = 3.841$$

From Table 6.2.5, it can be concluded that the differences between the two stakeholders groups are not significant.

6. Table 6.2.6 below presents the observed frequencies for two stakeholder categories: 'unions' and 'others' on their perception of the policy objective of fight pollution attributable to transport.

Category of stakeholder	Count for Positive perception	Count for negative perception
Unions	3.5	16.5
Others	2.5	17.5
Total	6	34

Computing for Chi Square:

$$X^2 = 1.764704$$

$$df = 1$$

$$sP = \text{at } 0.05 = 3.841$$

From Table 6.2.6, it can be concluded that the differences between the two stakeholders groups are not significant.

6.7.2 Opinions of two stakeholder categories on policy reform

The data in Table 6.2 can be summarised to highlight the main points concerning stakeholders.

1. Stakeholders largely agree that the new policy has liberalised the urban transport sector in Yaounde.
2. Stakeholders believe the policy objective to eradicate amateurism in urban transport in Yaounde has not been achieved.
3. Stakeholders are split on the issue of whether the policy has really facilitated urban mobility. While transport users say it has and transporters think it has not.
4. Stakeholders acknowledge that the new policy has contributed to curbing the phenomena of clandestine transport although it is far from actually banning it.
5. Stakeholders think that the policy has not succeeded in making traffic flow fluidly in Yaounde.
6. Stakeholders believe that the policy objective to fight pollution in Yaounde has not been achieved.

6.7.3 Conclusion

The only significant differences between stakeholder groups is on the policy objectives of liberalising the urban transport and facilitating mobility in the city of Yaounde after the

introduction of the new policy. This conclusion is based on Tables 6.2.3 and 6.2.3 that show that a significant majority of stakeholders are of the opinion that these policy objectives have been achieved. In the next section we shall analyse longitudinal data over three years to verify whether there is a significant pattern in the stakeholder perception about the policy reform.

6.8 Trend analysis of stakeholder perception of policy impact by proxy criteria

In this section, the perception of stakeholders over three years of the longitudinal survey study is compared to find out if there is a trend for approval or rejection of policy. This analysis uses the same criteria for the stakeholder judgments as that used in section 6.7. This trend analysis aims to increase our understanding of a time series by picking out its main features through the trend component. The perception of the forty stakeholders recorded in Table 6.2 is further classified into three categories of positive, neutral and negative. These perceptions are then plotted in bar charts so that in the analysis of the diagram it becomes possible to visually detect similar or divergent levels of appreciation of the policy. The perception score, which can have a maximum of 40 counts, representing the total number of stakeholders is plotted on the vertical axis while the six proxy evaluation criteria are plotted on the horizontal axis. Each year is represented in two charts, which gives visibility to the underlying perception trends and lends itself to comparison. In every policy evaluation research, there are certain elements that permit the researcher to judge the worth and merit of the policy. In this thesis, a certain number of proxy evaluation criteria were set. The second policy evaluation operation consisted of inviting respondents through the use of reflexive controls to assess the overall impact of the new urban transport policy on their welfare. Respondents scored their judgments on a scale as indicated in chapter four that we transformed to; positive, neutral or negative perception. The following six proxy measures are considered as criteria for their judgements:

1. The timeliness of the reforms.
2. Their comparison of mobility now with the situation before policy.
3. Their perceptions on reliability and comfort in urban mobility today.
4. Their perceptions on accessibility to mass urban transit to city dwellers.
5. The safety, cleanliness of the new mass transit system.
6. The affordability to stakeholders of the new modes of urban transit.

The significant stakeholder perceptions (negative or positive) for the three years yielded Tables 6.3 and 6.4. The perceptions of the stakeholders recorded in the two tables are plotted in six visualised bar charts 6.1 and 6.6 for the purposes of verifying whether there is any discernible trend in the perception of stakeholders across the three year-longitudinal data. The section below presents a summary of other main important findings about the perception of stakeholders. Given the low numbers recorded, these trends can be seen as only indicative. This is because perceptions such as those recorded for this study are volatile and are influenced by many factors that are outside the scope of this research.

Table 6.3: Positive and negative Perception of Trade Unions category for three years

Positive Perception of Trade Unions category on policy reforms.

	1998		1999		2000	
	+Ve	-Ve	+Ve	-Ve	+Ve	-Ve
Criteria 1 The timeliness of the reforms.	15	1	14	1	17	1
Criteria 2 Their comparison of mobility now with the situation before policy.	4	12	4	11	4	12
Criteria 3 Their perceptions on reliability and comfort in urban mobility today.	15	2	15	2	15	2
Criteria 4 Their perceptions on accessibility to mass urban transit to city dwellers.	5	12	4	14	3	12
Criteria 5 The safety, cleanliness of the new mass transit system.	4	13	4	13	4	13
Criteria 6 The affordability to stakeholders of the new modes of urban transit.	3	15	3	15	3	15

* +Ve in the table stands for Positive Perception and -Ve for Negative Perception

Table 6.4: Positive and negative Perceptions of 'Others' category for three years

Positive and negative Perception of "Others" category on policy reforms.

	1998		1999		2000	
	+Ve	-Ve	+Ve	-Ve	+Ve	-Ve
Criteria 1 The timeliness of the reforms.	18	2	18	1	18	2
Criteria 2 Their comparison of mobility now with the situation before policy.	8	12	2	17	1	18
Criteria 3 Their perceptions on reliability and comfort in urban mobility today.	8	7	8	9	8	10
Criteria 4 Their perceptions on accessibility to mass urban transit to city dwellers.	5	11	5	14	3	14
Criteria 5 The safety, cleanliness of the new mass transit system.	5	11	5	11	5	11
Criteria 6 The affordability to stakeholders of the new modes of urban transit.	2	15	2	15	2	16

* +Ve in the table stands for Positive Perception and -Ve for Negative Perception

In the bar charts below, the magnitude of the unit count of stakeholder perception is plotted on the vertical axis while the three years are plotted on the horizontal axis. Separate designs are used for each of the three years of the longitudinal data as shown in the key.




Figure 6.1: Criteria 1. Stakeholder perception of the timeliness of the reforms

For this criterion, the Trade Union category and the ‘Others’ category have similar high positive opinion on the policy objective and low negative opinion for the three years.




Figure 6.2: Criteria 2 Stakeholder perception of post policy mobility in Yaounde

For this criterion the Trade Union category and the 'Others' category have a high negative opinion on the policy and a low positive opinion.

CRITERIA 3. Their perception on reliability and comfort in urban transport today.




Figure 6.3: Criteria 3. Stakeholder perception of post policy reliability and comfort in urban mobility in Yaounde

For this criterion, while the Trade Union category has a high positive opinion and low negative one, the positive and negative opinions of the 'Others' category is almost balanced.

CRITERIA 4. Their perceptions on accessibility to mass urban transit for city dwellers.




Figure 6.4: Criteria 4. Stakeholder perception of post policy accessibility to urban public transport

For this criterion, the Trade Union category and the ‘Others’ category have a significantly similar low positive opinion on the policy objective and a high negative one for the three years.

CRITERIA 5. The safety and cleanliness of the new mass transit system.




Figure 6.5: Criteria 5. Stakeholder perception of post policy safety, cleanliness of public transport

For this criterion, the opinions of both the Trade Union category and the ‘Others’ category shows that these stakeholder groups have a similar low positive opinion about the policy and a high negative one.

CRITERIA 6. The affordability to stakeholders of the new modes of urban transit.




Figure 6.6: Criteria 6. Stakeholder perception of post policy affordability of urban public transport

For this criterion, the opinions of the Trade Union category and the 'Others' category are similar. They both have a low positive opinion about the policy objective and a high negative opinion.

We can conclude that the positive and negative opinions of the two groups of stakeholders are similar for all the proxy criteria used except for Criteria 3 where the opinion of Trade Union group and the 'Others' group show significant differences. For each of the stakeholder groups, there is a similar trend of opinion about the policy over the three years.

6.9 Conclusion

This chapter has presented the results from the stakeholder analysis which supports the position that certain categories of stakeholders have articulated their interests in the policy for their benefit to the point that the policy is not fully achieving its desired objectives and other groups of stakeholders are not satisfied with the policy processes and outcome.

These results show the manner in which stakeholders in Yaounde who have low power perceive the performance of the New Urban Transport Policy in terms of the objectives that the public authorities assigned to it. The number of policy objectives themselves represents a measuring instrument to gauge how well the reform has done in view of the overall goal of solving the problems of urban mobility in Yaounde. In this chapter, the appreciation of stakeholders indicates that not all the policy objectives have been satisfactorily achieved judging from their perception of policy performance. Although the perception of the stakeholders may appear subjective, the overall intention of stakeholder analysis is to understand a policy process through the prism of the beneficiaries whose lives a policy affects directly.

Each objective is scored qualitatively and a significant majority (82.5%) of the sampled urban public transport stakeholders in Yaounde thinks that the policy objective of liberalising the urban public transport sector has been achieved very well. The majority of the stakeholders (64%) hold that the objective to stamp out amateurism in the sector has achieved its objective. However, some stakeholders (36%) thought that the policy had not achieved this objective. The perception of stakeholders on policy objective of facilitating urban mobility in Yaounde shows that stakeholders hold diverse views. While some respondents (57.5%) think that the policy has facilitated mobility in the city (43%) think otherwise notably because of the continued traffic jams around major road junctions and narrow streets during rush hours.

On the policy objective to ban clandestine transporters, it is clear from the perception that stakeholders are divided on the issue with (50%) believing that the policy objective has been achieved while (40%) think it has not. Continued shortages of shared passenger taxis and even motorcycle taxis that service peri urban zones exist. The fluidity of traffic in Yaounde has not changed after the new policy. It is therefore not surprising that stakeholders 60% do not estimate the achievement of this objective favourably. But (22%) think the policy has made traffic flow fluidly in the city. On the objective of the policy to fight pollution caused by urban transportation, stakeholder responses show that (62.5%) think the policy has not at all achieved that particular objective; only (25%) think otherwise. There is no visible policy activities directed towards the achievement of this objective. Stakeholder assessed their post new urban transport policy welfare situation through the prism of welfare proxy measures.

Stakeholders believe that the policy reform has not organized urban passenger transport well enough in Yaounde in a way that one can describe the new transport system as sufficiently effective. This perception of policy ineffectiveness by stakeholders represents their judgment

concerning the extent to which the policy reform attained its objectives. The stakeholder generally believe that their livelihood has been negatively affected by the policy intervention because they are now confronted by the new reality of urban transport in the city without buses operating across the many bus lines once used by SOTUC. Now, only taxis and motorcycle taxis are available and which are often not very comfortable or safe especially for women and at night. In addition owing to the known low purchasing power and poverty levels of many city dwellers, stakeholders think the timeliness of the new policy is poor and its radical level of implementation is unfair to the poor and vulnerable.

The motorcycle taxi is not very much appreciated because during the rainy season passengers are often smeared with mud and during the dry season passengers are exposed to clouds of dust and therefore to potential disease causing conditions. The motorcycle taxi and the conventional taxi are known to overload which makes passengers uncomfortable throughout the journey. Stakeholders in Yaounde believe that security of urban public transport is quite low now. Night travel in Yaounde has become full of uncertainty. The days of SOTUC are gone when the buses used to work until 11pm. Now, the taxis have become the sole means of night public passenger travel with the high risk of banditry and other forms of violence and attacks on passengers and the rarity of transport to certain parts of the city. Many stakeholders observed that in a society where ambulances are not yet commonplace ferrying the sick to hospital at night is a nightmare if security concerns exist about the safety of the journey by taxi to that hospital.

On the one hand, the significant difference in the stakeholder perception trend is based on Table 6.2.3 between the two stakeholder groups with respect to their perceptions on how the policy achieved its objective concerns the policy objective of facilitating mobility in the city of Yaounde.

On the other hand, the difference between the two stakeholder groups with respect to: 1. Has the NUTP liberalised the urban public transport in Yaounde? 2. Has this policy eradicated amateurism in urban public transportation? 3. Has this policy put an end to clandestine transporters, in Yaounde? 4. Has this policy made traffic flow fluidly in the city? and 5. Has this policy contributed to fight pollution attributable to transport?

Despite some dissatisfaction with the new policy, stakeholders nevertheless make a positive assessment of the reliability of urban public transport following the new policy. This perception is based on the fact that new modes of public transport have been introduced such as the motorcycle taxi, mini bus and privately owned buses. Thus reliability now means that many forms of urban public transport are available to the city stakeholders. The issue is not whether most people use all of them. The fact is that each stakeholder now has at least three alternative urban transport means from which to choose. The next chapter presents a comparative review of urban transport systems in Yaounde, Dakar, Nairobi and Kampala.

7 A comparative review of urban transport systems in Yaounde, Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala and Douala

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter, a comparative case study analysis is used with the aim of highlighting the similarities and differences in the urban transport systems of Yaounde, and those of other African cities: Douala, Dakar, Nairobi, and Kampala that have experienced policy liberalisation so as to know the reasons for the success or failure of the introduction of competition elsewhere in Africa. Although there are many similarities in public urban transport problems between Yaounde and these African cities, there are however, many problems that are unique to Yaounde as this chapter illustrates.

The aim of making this comparison is to obtain ingredients from best practices that have worked in similar circumstances that can be emulated in Yaounde and in other cities to improve urban transport in developing countries. This chapter aims at answering the research question on the similarities and differences between the transport system of Yaounde and those of Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala and Douala. These cities are selected because they are in sub-Saharan Africa and have similar population sizes as Yaounde and a strong road transport base.

To answer the above-mentioned research question, we first present the transport situation in Yaounde. Secondly, a comparative historical cross-review perspective is used to track urban mobility, transport system and infrastructure policies in the four cities after the introduction of liberalisation and competition. This review will enable this thesis to identify prevailing trends, policy problems and proposed remedies for handling the supply of urban transport modes and infrastructure development after the adoption of liberalisation in these African cities. Finally the urban transport problems that are unique to Yaounde are enumerated.

Although data for Yaounde is scarce, appendix three shows the characteristics of the road network of Yaounde including maps of the city and an assessment of the quality of road infrastructure before and after the policy reform. The aim is to bring out changes that can be

attributed to the reform as far as infrastructure, which is a key component of any transport policy, is concerned. Data for Yaounde presented in this chapter is collected from primary data sources such as: the stakeholder method, case study and participant observation, historical causal tracing processes and secondary sources such as: Maunder and Jacobs (1988). Data for Kampala, Nairobi and Dakar presented in the review is obtained from a variety of sources including: World Bank (2002); World Bank SSATPP (2005) and from other sources such as Gwilliam (2001); Estache and Gomez (2005); Gakenheimer (1999) and Maunder and Mbara (1996, 1997). For Douala, Cameroon, although the World Bank (2005) report was exploited for this thesis, it was completed with information from the researcher's observation and knowledge of urban transport in the city. The description in this chapter of the pre and post-policy reform of the urban transport system and infrastructure situation of Yaounde aims to link certain post policy transport and mobility patterns and practices to the activities resulting from the policy reform intervention.

Some authors including Cronbach (1982) note that the effects of an intervention depend on initial conditions, and without a close review of those conditions, research or experiments will teach nothing. De Melo et al. (1997), posit that initial conditions of a problem affect the extent to which public policy reform processes can provide solutions to it. In view of presenting an edifying picture of what happened in Yaounde after the advent of the policy reforms, it is imperative to use historical causal tracing and describe significant milestones in urban mobility, transport system and transport infrastructure conditions in Yaounde before and after the introduction of the neo-liberal market oriented policies.

Unlike other cities of West Africa, which were large agglomerations in the pre-colonial era, the city of Yaounde is a colonial creature. It was founded in 1889 by Von Tappenback as an outpost for the conquest of the hinterland of the German protectorate. In 1911 Yaounde became the third and final choice for the capital of German Kamerun after Douala (1885-1901) and Buea (1901-1911). Yaounde's population, according to the *Atlas of Cameroon by Jeune Afrique* (2007) is estimated at 1.5 million inhabitants as against 650,000 recorded in the last official national census in 1987. The history of Yaounde is akin to that of the country. After the First World War, Yaounde became the French colonial capital from 1916-1960. Since 1961 it has been the capital of the Federal Republic, then of the United Republic (1972) and of the Republic of Cameroon since 1984. Yaounde serves as the headquarters of one of the ten regions of Cameroon, the Centre region. Yaounde is the chief town of the Mfoundi division one of the fifty-eight divisions in the country. As the seat of the national institutions, the central government's role in the management of Yaounde is considerable. An Urban Community manages the city of Yaounde. This community groups together the six district councils. The Urban Community is a super structure created by the 1987 Council Act. A Government Delegate, appointed by a decree of the President of the Republic heads the urban community executive. Councillors from six District Councils of Yaounde make up the Urban Community Council.

Since 1987 numerous incidents have demonstrated that the working relationship between the appointed government delegate and the elected district mayors is not always smooth. In 2007, six deputy Government Delegates were appointed to take charge of different domains in the municipal administration. Many authors, including Mawhood (1993) have explicated the concept and practice of applying the French model of decentralisation in Cameroon and haveshown limits of centralisation in the functioning of the third tier of government. The city of Yaounde and its periphery make up the Mfoundi division and as such, a Prefect appointed by the President of the Republic is at the head of this administrative unit. The Prefect oversees

the local ministerial services at the divisional level that provide for health, education, trade, sanitation, urban planning, traffic, policing, and transportation. The six mayors and Government Delegate have competence for tasks such as garbage disposal, collection of market fees and granting of building permits. The city lacks real autonomy, especially financial autonomy and this has created a culture of dependence on the central government for funds to carry out tasks such as road repairs and street lighting. The urban community depends on the local administrative unit for the expertise to run its basic services of health, education, planning. Law number 87/015 of July 15, 1987 Creating Urban Communities, which modified and completed certain clauses of Law Number 74/23 of December 5, 1974 organising Councils in Cameroon, in its Article (3) defines the domains of competence of urban communities as follows:

1. Urbanisation and urban development
2. Providing community based infrastructure and equipment
3. Repairing the main road network and proving traffic signals
4. Ensuring circulation and transport
5. Providing public parking and vehicle parks
6. Controlling the municipal slaughter house
7. Proving markets and Exhibition centres
8. Controlling municipal museums
9. Creating gardens and town greens
10. Control municipal cemeteries
11. Carry out land and domain measurement and issue land certificates
12. Perform the naming of streets, places and public buildings
13. Maintain hygiene and sanitation in the city.

In addition, Article (45) of the Law outlines the sources of income of the Urban Community as follows:

Fiscal income from: permits and licences, Communal council tax (CAC)
Income from rents of public and private communal property
Bonuses and obligations from the state
Assistance and bequests
Borrowing for specific projects
Subventions from the state.

SITRASS (1999) notes that despite the growth in size and population of the city of Yaounde, road networks and street infrastructure development has lagged behind. While the central business district has surfaced roads, peripheral and semi-peripheral streets are mostly earth roads. In the dry season clouds of dust rise as cars drive past and during the rains, they become muddy and impassable. Because of urban growth, the problems of mobility are considerable, especially as the urban poor and very poor people exploit and inhabit marginal lands on hillsides and swamps located in the per-urban areas. For them, good access roads to their homes are non-existent. Besides, the growth of motorisation has given rise to traffic congestion during rush hours owing to the narrow nature of streets and deficient road infrastructures such as functioning traffic signals and pedestrian lanes.

The official government-owned daily *Cameroon Tribune*, N° 2885 of Tuesday, May 12, 1998 in an article entitled: “*circuler dans la capitale une veritable gagaure*”, (the hazards of circulating in the capital) paints a graphic picture of the deplorable state of streets in Yaounde which are often riddled with potholes after years of neglect and where vast mud pools and huge mountains of households garbage have blocked certain parts. The article adds that where

the road is not tarred, clouds of dust blow high into the air as cars sweep past. For streets that pass through markets, petty traders, market women (known in Cameroon as *bayam sellams*) and hawkers expose their products on kerbs reserved for pedestrians, forcing them to walk instead on the motorway, reducing drastically the vehicle lanes. This provokes nasty snarls that block circulation for several minutes thus aggravating traffic congestion.

The individual transport modes are: walking, private vehicles, motorcycles, and bicycles. The public passenger transport is made up of: the conventional four-seat taxis, motorcycle taxis, the bus and minibus. Most vehicles used for taxis, buses and motorcycles in Yaounde are imported as second hand vehicles.

Conventional taxis do not operate as buses that follow a known bus line to a bus stop. This makes it difficult for passengers to master the itinerary that taxi drivers use from pick-up point to negotiated destination. Often, taxi drivers prefer routes where they will find passengers who are likely to pay higher fares even if this entails taking passengers who are already in the vehicle further from their destinations, increasing total travel time. Taxis have been in short supply in Yaounde for a long time as *Cameroon Tribune*, the official government newspaper highlighted in an article: Commuters Worried by shortages of Taxi Cabs', in CAMEROON TRIBUNE, N°. 2684 of Tuesday, July 22, 1997.

At the city's Central Post Office roundabout, there is permanent chaos during peak hours. Taxi drivers consequently overload to maximise profits especially because of the low rush hour speed. In the 1990s, fuel prices rose by 65% to hit the CFA 440 francs (Euro 0.70) per litre mark in September 1999. In fact, this 1999 hike provoked a massive taxi drivers' strike that lasted four days in Yaounde. In 2008 a litre of petrol costs CFA 594 francs about USD1.50 cents. Since February 10, 1998, a number of private transport companies were declared successful bidders for tenders to operate bus lines in Yaounde. The Minister of Transport informed the public through Communiqué N° 00095/CRP/MINT/DTT/SDTRU.

Almost ten years after they were granted permission to do so, these companies have never operated bus lines in Yaounde. Urban public transport in Yaounde appears to be defying the neo-liberal assumptions of policy makers concerning the functioning of this sector in Yaounde. In some parts of the city, private cars owners operate illegal 'clandestine taxi' transport as a survival mechanism that also serves to alleviate the supply problem that both shared taxis, motorcycle taxis and the buses, cannot solve. Although motorcycle taxis are not authorised in the city centre, the shortage of public transport means has led authorities, in recent years, to tolerate this mode of public transport in the city centre. It is this 'messy' urban transport situation in Yaounde that the public policy reforms in the 1990s aimed to address. Urban road safety in Yaounde is a major concern for all categories of road users. Although reliable statistics are absent, daily media reports of ghastly road accidents permit an appreciation of the magnitude of the problem. Many factors including: poor road signalling for pedestrian crossings, non respect of regulations concerning city speed limits, obligatory wearing of vehicle seat belts, and helmets for motorcycles, poor vehicle maintenance, the inexperience of drivers and bad road user attitudes especially for taxis account for this poor urban road safety record in Yaounde. This situation has affected the manner in which motor vehicle insurance companies treat certain categories of clients. In Yaounde, insurance companies do not insure motorcycle taxis because of the very high probability for them to be involved in road accident that will require the customers to be paid huge premiums.

7.2 Urban public transport in Yaounde

In this section, the urban transport system in Yaounde is analysed in three phases (see appendix three). The first phase, before 1974, was characterised by the absence of a bus service and the presence of shared taxis with private sector ownership. A laissez-faire policy characterised urban transport in Yaounde before 1974. Ndongko (1988) points out that during the colonial and early postcolonial periods until 1974, private vehicle operators dominated mobility in Yaounde through shared taxis. At that time, the size of the city favoured this kind of mobility that was complemented by non-motorised transport represented by walking and the use of bicycles and two-wheel vehicles. However, the shared urban taxis had a passenger carrying capacity of four persons. It was strictly regulated and the government fixed the fares as well as delivered the necessary licenses. Controls were regular to enforce compliance. During the second phase, from 1974 until 1995, a State Owned Enterprise; SOTUC had the monopoly to provide public urban transport service by bus in Yaounde. SOTUC operated collective urban transport in Douala and Yaounde. SOTUC was created to cater for public passenger transportation at a time when these cities were experiencing high growth rates and were sprawling. SOTUC operated bus lines throughout the city of Yaounde and ran its service from 5 am until 10 p.m. The affordable fares were fixed by the state and preferential rates were practiced for pupils/students and servicemen. The bus service ran side by side the shared taxis until a combination of managerial problems, high running costs for spare parts following the CFA francs devaluation in January 1994, union action to maintain wages and the reluctance to raise fares by the government led to the liquidation of the company in 1995. After 1995, the third phase, through statutory reforms, the state monopoly on urban transport by bus was abolished. Besides, motorcycles were allowed by new laws to operate passenger services in the city. In addition, a bus company run under the public private partners PPP began operating a bus service in Yaounde. It can therefore be argued that urban transport after 1995 has been characterised in Yaounde by deregulation and liberalisation that led to the creation of a PPP arrangement that has been running an urban transport service in the city since 2006.

In Yaounde, after many failed attempts for private companies to operate bus services despite winning route concessions from the government, there has been a move to a new form of urban public transport management with the introduction of a PPP arrangement (*Cameroon Tribune of October 10, 2005*) (PANAPRESS of October 11, 2005) which Shaw (2006) describes as a new and viable market oriented mechanism. After granting bus line concessions in 1998 to private companies who failed to operate them, the government in 2005 adjudicated Parker Transnational Industries (PTI), a private United States company to operate bus services in Yaounde and Douala. Public corporations and institutions such as the National Investment Corporation (SNI), the Hydrocarbons Price Stabilisation Fund, (CSPH), and the Yaounde Urban Community signed a Public Private Partnership agreement to operate urban bus services in Yaounde in 2005. The first consignment of Parker buses arrived in Yaounde in December 2006 (*Cameroon Tribune of December 11, 2006*), and the PPP arrangement for an urban public bus service began operating soon after this date with some twenty-eight (28) buses. Improvement carried out on the road network in Yaounde in 2006 is a major factor in the decision to restart a bus service because a good road infrastructure is indispensable for a bus network.

Shaw (2006) and the World Bank (2005) highlighted the future path for sustainable urban transport. One that holds promise for Yaounde's urban transport system is the Public Private Partnership, PPP. The government of Cameroon entered a PPP with Parker Trans-national

Industries LLC (PTI-C) of the United States of America in view of reviving urban public transport by bus in Yaounde. The PPP convention makes the Parker Trans-national Industries a partner in the provision of urban mass public transport in the cities of Yaounde and Douala. The bus service would later be extended to other cities of Cameroon. The company had planned to begin services in Yaounde in 2005. The PPP arrangement also contained a clause in which Parker agreed to open a bus assembly plant in Douala and Limbe.

The PPP urban bus service called 'Le Bus' started operations with some twenty-eight buses in Yaounde. *Cameroon tribune of* October 10, 2005 points out that the twenty million dollar share capital of the Company is held by Parker Trans-national Industries LLC, (PTI-C) thirteen (13) million dollars in cash and kind and the government of Cameroon six (6) million dollars in kind, that is, facilities and premises. The Cameroon Government provided a further one (1) million dollars in cash. The new PPP Company inherited the premises of former SOTUC and transformed it into its headquarters and Bus Park in Yaounde. The Yaounde Urban Community holds the government shares in kind (that is in material assets such as premises and other properties) whilst the Hydrocarbons Stabilisation Fund (CSPP), and the Chamber of Commerce, Mines and Industry, (CCIMA), hold it in cash (that is in money assets). The PPP bus service may soon provide services in a zoned city because there are plans by the Government for the zoning of Yaounde into seven transport areas. Proposals have been made so that the fare within each zone is set at CFA 150 francs or (Euro 0.20) during the day and CFA 250 francs or (Euros 0.40) during the night. The government that controls issues on public transport fare is yet to take a final decision on this matter. The fares concern shared taxis, motorcycle taxis and mini-buses. However, the slow pace of policy process in Cameroon means that this proposal might take a long time before it is implemented. After this presentation of the transport situation of Yaounde, in the next section, the transport systems in Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala and Douala are reviewed.

7.3 Problems and prospects of urban transport systems in developing countries

In this section, the problems of urban transport systems in some developing countries are reviewed. Gakenheimer (1999) points out that mobility in urban centres and accessibility to public transport systems are declining rapidly in most of the developing world. The issues that affect the transport system, the levels of mobility and possibilities for their improvement are varied but few developing countries have successfully planned and implemented appropriate remedial policy options. He notes that these include the rapid pace of personal motorization, the growth of local demand for public modes of mobility that far exceed the capacity of existing facilities, the incompatibility of urban structure and infrastructure with increasing motorization, a stronger transport-land use relationship than in developed cities, lack of adequate road maintenance and limited agreement among officials as to appropriate forms of approach to the problem.

Gakenheimer notes that analysts have taken various approaches to this problem particularly through the adoption of market liberalisation, but so far the results are not encouraging. Developing country cities have shown significant leadership in vehicle use restrictions (Bogota: World Bank 2002), new technologies (Singapore World Bank 2002), privatisations (Kenya: Ndegea 1995), and transit management (World Bank 2002; Fouracre and Gardner 1992). Only a few, however, have made important strides toward solving the mobility problem such as Bogota (World Bank 2002). Developing cities have lessons to learn from developed cities as regards the role of new technologies, forms of institutional management

and the long term consequences of different de facto-policies toward the use of the automobile. These experiences, however, especially in the last category, need to be interpreted very carefully in order to provide useful guidance to cities with, for the most part, entirely different historical experiences in transportation. Gakenheimer (1999) concludes that continued progress is needed to satisfy the demand for urban mobility in developing country cities. He recommends that these cities focus on:

- (a) Highway building, hopefully used as an opportunity to rationalize access,
- (b) Public transport management,
- (c) Pricing policy for the different modes,
- (d) Traffic management, and
- (e) Possibly an emphasis on light rail rapid transit based on new revenue techniques.

Many authors like Godard (2006) Fouracre and Gardner (1992) point out that for many decades, the lack of sufficient financial resources has impeded the exploration and development of the potentials of road based and non-road based transport in developing country cities. However, the introduction of policy reforms through liberalisation and deregulation has offered the possibility of using new mechanisms for raising capital to meet the financial costs of engaging in transport and infrastructure improvements World Bank (2005). Shaw (2006) points out that public and private sectors are working together through joint public-private partnerships using innovative mechanisms such as: the Build Finance Operate Transfer (BFOT), Build Operate Train Transfer (BOTT) and the Design Build Finance Operate (DBFO) to develop transport infrastructure and provide urban transport service in some cities in Africa.

The World Bank (2005), SITRASS (1999) and Godard and Ngabmen (1998) present the general characteristics of urban public transport in African cities and reveal that national governments face severe financial difficulties, which limit the funds available for transport system infrastructure support. Road maintenance in particular is badly under-funded and many cities experience badly congested peak hour traffic. The World Bank (2005) points out that the poor quality of the roads and the lack of effective traffic management, exacerbate the congestion problems in these cities.

7.4 A comparison of the urban transport of Yaounde with those of Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala and Douala

The comparative case study analysis used in this chapter aims to highlight the similarities and differences in the urban transport systems of Yaounde and those of some African cities: Douala, Dakar, Nairobi, and Kampala that have experienced policy liberalisation so as to learn reasons for the success or failure of the introduction of competition. The aim of doing this comparison is to obtain ingredients from best practices that have worked in similar circumstances that can be emulated in Yaounde and in other cities to improve urban transport in developing countries. In this section the urban transport system in Yaounde is compared with those of the above four cities and presented under the following points: introduction of private providers of public transport services, institutional mechanisms for supply of public transport, difficulties in enforcing transport regulations, underdeveloped state of non-motorised transport infrastructure and inadequate managing of traffic congestion, and poor conditions of road system and road maintenance problems.

7.4.1 Private sector providers for public transport services

Historically, Yaounde and all four cities originally relied on a state monopoly supplier of conventional sized buses to provide public transport. Fares were regulated and the

governments were often reluctant to allow increases. As a consequence, the bus companies had difficulties maintaining and replacing their fleets, which led to deterioration in service coverage and quality. The monopoly supplier faced increasing competition from minibus operators who provided unregulated but effective services. In Dakar and Douala the original bus companies, which were State owned, were eventually declared bankrupt. This is the case of SOTUC in Yaounde. The 21 bus lines in Yaounde have now been granted to the PPP bus operator, which began functioning in 2006. In Dakar, the World Bank (2005) notes that after its formal liquidation, the remains of the original company, SOTRAC, were transferred to a private company, Dakar Dem Dik (DDD). Diouf (1998) World Bank (2005) point out that the problems associated with running a moribund fleet caused the DDD to be unable to initially provide an effective service and was dependent on substantial state subsidies. Recently, however, DDD has acquired over 400 new buses, through Swedish and Indian aid, which permits the company to offer much-improved services.

In Douala and Yaounde, SOTUC was declared bankrupt and closed down in 1995. In the case of Douala, the World Bank (2005) points out that it was the government's long-term policy to operate a completely open market in public transport, allowing operators to compete on fares, service quality and route structure. But the authorities recognised the need for a transition phase and after a call for tenders, a franchise was granted to a newly formed private company, SOCATUR, to provide services on 15 routes at fixed fares. In order to provide protection during the transition phase, SOCATUR's monopoly was supported by the effective suppression of competition from minibuses. But SOCATUR had great difficulty in providing the agreed services. The poor quality of some of the city roads meant that it was not possible to operate on some routes, and the company had to withdraw some of its vehicles, partly as a result of damage inflicted by the poor roads. Currently it operates on nine routes in the city of Douala, (World Bank: 2005).

As a consequence, most of the public transport is carried to a large extent by shared taxis and motorcycle taxis, (Ebounbou, Habyarimana and Ngabmen:1998).

According to the World Bank, conventional public transport services, in the form of large buses run by a single large company, now only provide a small part of the total public transport services in Douala, Dakar and Nairobi, and ceased to operate in Kampala in the 1970s. Godard (2006) observes that the mainstay of the public transport system in African cities is now the informal sector, which the World Bank (2005) points out that in Dakar, Kampala and Nairobi consists of large numbers of private operators providing minibus services. The World Bank (2005) points out that in Douala, where the minibus operations were banned in an effort to protect the conventional bus company, the role of the minibuses is taken by shared taxis and, in outer areas, by motorcycle taxis. The case of Nairobi was rather different. The World Bank (2005) points out that the Kenya Bus Services (KBS), which was owned jointly by United Transport International and Nairobi City Council, had a monopoly on the operation of conventional (big bus) services; even after the legalization of *matatus* (minibus) services in 1973, Kapila et al. (1982), Barwell (1979), Lee-Smith (1989) and Obodho (1993), Aduwo (1990) (the monopoly was broken in the early 1980s, with the foundation of Nyayo Bus Services, which subsequently failed). Fares were controlled, but at a level which enabled the company to continue to operate profitably, although it was not sufficiently profitable to justify expansion. As a consequence, the *matatu* operators met the needs of market growth, and the market share of KBS gradually fell. The company now concentrates on high volume routes, where it is able to compete effectively with the *matatus*.

In the early 1990s, the World Bank (2005) notes that KBS was taken over by Stagecoach Holdings (a major United Kingdom transport operator).

The company attempted to take advantage of the recently liberalized market regulations by raising fares, in the belief that passengers would be prepared to pay a premium for the better quality of service. In the event, this strategy was not commercially successful, and Stagecoach sold out to a consortium of local investors in 1998. KBS now provides two different kinds of services in Nairobi, each operated by separate divisions of the company. The Bus Track division provides a conventional service, with a fleet of 270 single deck vehicles. Interestingly, the operation of the routes has been contracted out to 22 independent groups, in order to take advantage of the more flexible labour and operating practices of small enterprises.

Until recently, the services were profitable, but recent changes in safety rules, which have prohibited standing passengers, are threatening the division's long-term financial viability. The KBS also set up a special division, Metro Shuttle 2, to provide a premium service, with higher service quality and comfort, designed to appeal to car commuters and higher income passengers. A higher fare is charged, but the service has proved successful and is being imitated by other operators, the main one being City Hoppa. However, the World Bank (2005) points out that the combined market shares of the premium services is very small, approximately 2.5 percent of total city traffic. In Uganda the World Bank (2005) points out that the privately owned company was nationalized in 1972 and stopped providing urban services some years later. A private sector company introduced a limited service with 40 buses in 1994 but there was intense competition from the minibus operators, so the service did not last for long. Isolo (2001, 2004), Kisaalita and Sentongo-Kibalama (2007) and Benmaamar (2001) recognise the role that motorcycle taxis (*boda-boda*) play in the delivery of urban transport in Kampala. The main characteristics of the transport system in the four cities are highlighted below.

1. Minibuses as a means of urban transport.

The minibuses play such a vital role in the provision of public transport. They were introduced by the 1990 reforms in Yaounde but already existed in Dakar, Nairobi, Douala and Kampala. In Yaounde however, this mode plays only a very minimal role in the transport system of the city. In Kampala and Nairobi the majority of minibuses have 14 seats, though in Nairobi, the number of larger minibuses, with 25 to 39 seats has been growing rapidly. In Dakar the *Cars Rapides* are larger with 23 or 25 seats. A few larger vehicles with 30-39 seats are operated in both Dakar and Nairobi. Douala is an exception, because minibuses were banned throughout most of the city to promote the private bus operator and motorcycle taxis, but this policy was later changed as it provoked anger from city inhabitants and strike action from motor taxi drivers. In all four cities it is now normal for owners to be investors, rather than owner-drivers. Ownership is very dispersed, with most owners having less than four vehicles. However, in Dakar, the World Bank (2005) notes that there are also two major operators, one with 400 vehicles and another with a fleet of 200, out of a total fleet of around 3,000.

In Dakar, Kampala and Nairobi, the World Bank (2005) notes that governments make no attempt to control supply of minibuses. Effective control has been passed to route associations or syndicates. These operate in owners' and drivers' interests but there is always a danger that outside agents who use their de-facto monopoly power to further their own interests may control them. This situation, according to the World Bank (2005) does not appear to be a

major problem in Dakar. The Government in Kenya has recently taken steps to try to break the power of criminal syndicates that were extorting revenue from the operators of some minibuses. In Kampala, the Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association (UTODA) effectively control supply of minibus services. The buses are licensed by Kampala City Council to operate the only taxi park (bus terminal) in Kampala, and all minibus operators are obliged to start and end their journeys in the park (and pay a fee to UTODA for each entry). UTODA was initially set up to protect and promote the interests of owners and drivers. However, it has become extremely powerful and earns a substantial income from charges levied on minibus operations.

2. Shared taxis in Douala and Yaounde.

The shared taxi is an essential mode of urban mobility in Douala (Eboumbou et al.: 1998). This is the same with Yaounde even before the policy reform of the 1990s. The effective suppression of minibus services in Douala was intended to strengthen the position of SOCATUR, the conventional bus company. However, SOCATUR's failure to provide acceptable service levels and coverage has left a gap in the market that is filled by shared taxis. The industry structure of the taxi companies in Douala is very similar to that of the minibuses in the other cities. The vehicles are rented out to drivers on a daily basis at a fixed price that depends on the condition of the vehicle. The drivers retain all the fares. The owners are responsible for vehicle maintenance, while the drivers are responsible for fuel costs. While there are some owner-drivers, most do not drive their taxis. Ownership is much dispersed, with very few owners having more than one or two vehicles. There are eight taxi syndicates, responsible for representing operators' interests to the government. It is a legal requirement for taxi operators to be members of a recognized syndicate, although there are a substantial number of unregistered taxis, known as *clando* (*clandestine taxis*). There is little evidence that the syndicates are able to exercise any significant market power because of their weak leadership system and inadequate resources.

3. Motorcycle taxis in Douala and Yaounde.

The use of motorcycles for taxi services has grown very rapidly in Douala in recent years, mainly as a consequence of the poor state of the roads. Motorcycle taxis exist in Yaounde following their legalisation in the 1990s. But unlike in Douala where they are allowed to carry passengers throughout the city, in Yaounde they are limited to work only in peri-urban and suburban areas because they are deemed to cause traffic jams in the city centre. Motorcycles appear to be more adapted for use in narrow roads with potholes than motor vehicles. Initially, they provided access from the residential areas to the main roads where passengers would take taxis or buses. However, they can now be seen on the main roads and even in the city centre. The World Bank (2005) notes that motorcycle taxis may now account for as much as 30 percent of all motorized public transport trips in Douala. Generally motorcycle taxis in Douala and Yaounde have small capacity. The drivers are often young and inexperienced, and fatal accidents are common. The World Bank (2005) and Isolo (2001; 2004) note that the use of motorcycle taxis (*boda-boda*) is widespread in Kampala. Motorcycle taxis exist in Nairobi but are much less widely used, and almost unknown in Dakar.

7.4.2 Institutional mechanisms for the supply of public transport

The World Bank (2005) points out that the institutional and regulatory structure used to determine the supply of road based public transport is different for each of the four cities. For Douala and Yaounde in Cameroon and for Dakar in Senegal the responsibilities for vehicles and drivers licensing services lie with the Ministry of Transport. In Douala and Yaounde responsibility for setting official fare levels lies with the Ministry of Commerce and in Dakar

with the Ministry of Finance. In Nairobi and Kampala, the Transport Licensing Boards (TLB) controls the supply of road public transport services. The Governments of Kenya and Uganda have pursued generally free market policies with respect to urban transport. The TLB in both cities has the right to specify the route on which the vehicle operates. In Kampala, in practice, there is a form of area licensing, allowing the operators to provide services anywhere in the urban area. In Nairobi, route licenses are issued, and the police endeavour to ensure that operators stick to the allocated route.

The TLB in Nairobi is reluctant to issue licenses if it believes that there is over-capacity on a route. But there are, in general, no serious barriers to entry into the markets in either of the two East African cities, as anyone with a suitable vehicle will be granted a license. Fares in both cities are unregulated. In Kenya the Government has recently introduced measures to improve the quality of service offered by the minibuses by insisting that everyone wears a seat belt, and that drivers and conductors are more closely controlled. The Government has also recently banned standing passengers on the buses operated by the Bus Track division of Kenya Bus Services. The Ugandan Government has introduced a similar policy. The regulatory reduction of fleet capacity in Kenya created a new market opportunity. Short-term fare increases, permitted under market liberalization, allowed super-profits for the existing operators and encouraged new entrants. Fares have since fallen back as supply increased.

For the West African cities of Dakar and Douala as well as Yaounde (since 2006 when the PPP arrangement began operating a public bus system), the situation is more complex. The Ministry of Transport that allocates routes to the operator and also controls fares tightly regulates the fares for the conventional bus services in these cities. In Yaounde it is CFA 100 francs per stop or about Euro 0.20. However, the shared taxis supply most public transport services, in Douala and Yaounde. The informal sector also plays a major role in urban transport in these cities and it is more difficult to regulate.

In Dakar, the *car rapide* operators run on recognized routes, which were initially laid down in local government decrees. However, the operators' associations currently decide the allocation of routes to operators. The Ministry of Finance has set fares for the *cars rapides*, but the fares charged are essentially set in the market. Public transport services are being restructured, with the creation of a coordinating body, CETUD (*Conseil exécutif des transports urbains de Dakar*). The intention is to group the informal operators into larger units, known as *Groupements d'intérêts économiques* (GIE), and then agree on allocation of routes to all public transport operators, both the GIE and the conventional bus company DDD. The new route franchises would also specify both service quality and fares, and could be withdrawn if operators do not fulfil their obligations. If the agreed fares are lower than those required to break even, in principle, a subsidy could be paid.

However, CETUD's main source of funds is contributions from the operators, so subsidies can not be paid without funding from the Government. No subsidies to the GIE have yet been offered, and it is not clear if the Government's financial position would permit a long-term commitment to subsidise urban transport. CETUD was set up in 1998 and progress towards restructuring has been very slow. By mid-2005, 13 GIE for *cars rapides* (plus DDD as a GIE for bus) had been formed. As noted above, six of the GIE have agreed to take part in the fleet renewal program, and have been allocated route franchises. The concession agreements are being finalized and will be signed when the new vehicles are delivered. The slow progress, in part, can be attributed to CETUD's lack of powers of compulsion, and this has been further complicated by the attempt to tie the restructuring to an unpopular proposal for fleet renewal.

However, it also seems fair to say that the slow progress is a reflection of the problems of trying to regulate the fragmented informal sector.

In Douala, the suppression of the minibus services was quite effective, but shared taxis took their place. Although the Ministry of Commerce fixes transport fares officially, on the road the reality is different because a fare for each journey is usually the result of negotiations between taxi drivers and customers. There is, naturally, no route structure for the shared taxi services. SOCATUR's franchise for the monopoly provision of conventional bus services in Douala ended in 2005. The revoking of the ban on minibus operations in the city has enabled minibuses to serve many areas of the city. In Cameroon, until 2006, SOCATUR was the only formally constituted public transport operating company and it is not clear whether there will be sufficient interest among local entrepreneurs to form new companies to take over the routes that are to be franchised, judging from the experience of Yaounde, the capital of Cameroon.

A common complaint in all four African cities was that the route structure was too concentrated on radial routes out from the city centre. Even in Nairobi and Kampala, where the open market structure would appear to permit, if not encourage, innovation, there was a perceived lack of circumferential routes. In Kampala, this is partly due to the role of UTODA in requiring all minibuses to use the centrally located taxi park. Devising an appropriate route structure is a complicated process and requires detailed study. CETUD have tackled this problem in Dakar by seeking agreement with the operators but, as noted above, progress has been slow. Douala should, in principle, review the route structure before re-franchising, though it is not clear that the Ministry has the technical capacity to do this. Both Nairobi and Kampala are carrying out urban transport studies, which may offer suggestions on route structure. However, before the TLB can introduce a formal, centrally determined route structure, a major effort at institutional strengthening will be required, to ensure that they have the necessary skills to design the network.

7.4.3 Difficulties in enforcing transport regulations

Yaounde and the four cities reviewed encounter serious difficulties in enforcing transport regulations. The main problem areas in this domain identified are:

1. Vehicle inspections inadequacies

All the cities have formal requirements for regular bi-annual or annual checks on public transport vehicles. However, observations in the streets show that many vehicles are in poor and possibly dangerous conditions. Part of the problem is that there appears to be inadequate capacity to carry out the number of inspections required, but there also appears to be a casual attitude to the process of inspections. In Kampala, Uganda, the World Bank (2005) notes that the government is currently considering the privatisation of vehicle inspections, which should increase inspection capacity. In Yaounde since 2007, a private corporation carries out vehicle inspection for a fee of CFA 10,000 (Euro 150). There are no facilities in any of the cities for checking vehicle emissions (although in Cameroon a 1996 decree provides for this). This aspect may need to be implemented if there has to be any serious prospect of improving urban air quality.

2. Overloading problems

The operators have a clear commercial interest in squeezing as many passengers as possible into their vehicles. This not only reduces the quality of service, but is potentially unsafe. There appears to be no interest in enforcing regulations on overloading in Dakar and Douala.

However, in Kenya, the World Bank (2005) notes that the Ministry of Transport has recently managed to impose and successfully enforce regulations to prohibit overloading and to require that all seats were fitted with seatbelts and that all passengers had to use them. It also managed to enforce a regulation forbidding standing passengers on buses. According to the World Bank, plans for a similar enforcement of anti-overloading regulations in Kampala are underway but notes that there has been some criticism of these regulations, particularly the ban on standing passengers because operators believe this will increase the costs of public transport provision capacity. This example shows that given the political will, urban transport regulations can be effectively enforced.

3. Traffic management problems

There are parking controls in all four cities. In Douala, charges are levied on the use of street parking spaces, and attempts are made to ensure that vehicles only use the designated areas. In Kampala, the charges are time related and aim at reducing the risk of abuse. In Nairobi, a flat charge is levied and collected by the city council and there is widespread abuse. In general, illegal parking can be widely observed throughout all the cities, with attendant reductions in traffic flow capacities. Similarly, although there are regulations forbidding the use of road space and sidewalks by street vendors, they can still be seen encroaching on road space and blocking traffic in all four cities. In Yaounde parking fees were introduced in 2007 and are privately collected on behalf of the Urban Community.

4. Monitoring urban transport performance

There are no arrangements in place in all four cities to monitor the performance of public transport, or the transport system in general. It is impossible to get basic statistics such as time-series for the number of licensed operators, and it is clear that no attempts are made to collect information on system performance. If serious efforts are to be made to improve the quality of public transport, there need to be an agency responsible for the systematic collection of relevant statistics that would demonstrate that public policy goals are being met and whether the performance of the system was improving or deteriorating.

The World Bank (2005) points out that passengers are principally concerned with the affordability of public transport. In Yaounde as in the two East African cities, large numbers of city dwellers regularly walk long distances. To them, the issue of affordability of urban transport is a concern. In Nairobi, this may have been influenced by the raise in fares as a result of the recent changes in legislation that has reduced the effective vehicle capacity to the number of seats provided. In Yaounde as in all four cities passengers are keen to see an enhanced role for bigger buses. The World Bank (2005) notes that passengers in Dakar and Douala show a marked preference for using the bigger buses rather than minibuses or shared taxis when bigger buses were available. The very much-reduced scale of the big bus fleet however means that most passengers, most of the time, have no alternative but to use smaller vehicles. The World Bank (2005) reveals that passengers generally dislike using minibuses. In Nairobi, and especially in Kampala, passengers particularly disliked not knowing the fare they would be charged until they boarded the vehicle. In Dakar passengers complained of the tendency of minibus drivers to change their minds as to where they were going if heavy congestion looked like prolonging journeys and if they could spot more profitable options elsewhere.

The World Bank (2005) points out that passengers especially women, also complained that they felt less safe in minibuses and were more likely to be subject to harassment. Passengers were also concerned about road congestion, which leads to extended journey times and would

have preferred the existence of a wider possibility of destinations available without the need to change vehicles. In Nairobi, Kenya Bus introduced the Metro Shuttle, which was designed to provide a higher quality service that would encourage car owners to switch to public transport. The service has proven popular and, at least in the short term, profitable. However, Metro Shuttle only caters for a very small share (about 1.5 percent) according to the World Bank (2005) of the public transport market. Its importance is that it has been successful in persuading car owners to switch to public transport. As such it may indicate a useful option for further development both in Nairobi and elsewhere.

The World Bank (2005) points out that a large number of passengers, particularly in Kampala and Nairobi, cannot afford to use public transport on a regular basis and instead tend to walk long distances to and from work. The Bank reveals that in Douala, total transport costs, mainly for journeys to work, account for a very substantial part of family income, from 16 percent for the non-poor to 30 percent for the very poor groups. Whilst it is difficult to obtain accurate statistics, the transport system is clearly not as safe as it should be. Drivers' behaviour (particularly of minibuses) in all cities was criticized as erratic and dangerous and many vehicles are barely roadworthy (World Bank 2005). Journey speeds in Yaounde are slow as they are in all four cities as a consequence of congestion. Journey times are extended by the need to change between modes or routes. The World Bank (2005) points out that waiting time in the informal sector services in Douala (motorcycle-taxis and shared taxis) and in Dakar (*cars rapides*) were much shorter, 5 to 10 minutes, than for the conventional bus services, where waiting times of 30 to 50 minutes were common.

The World Bank (2005) observes that passengers appear highly dissatisfied with the quality of service offered by the minibuses, despite the fact that they are the largest supplier of public transport in the three cities where they are allowed to operate. However, passengers appear to be more satisfied with the quality of service offered by the conventional bus operators in Dakar and Douala, although the diminishing fleets mean that they would only offer very infrequent services. Similarly, bus passengers in Nairobi were relatively satisfied with the quality of service and found the frequency on the core network acceptable. Predictable fares were also seen as an advantage and some *matatu* operators are now adopting fixed fares.

7.4.4 Under-developed state of non-motorised transport infrastructure and inadequate managing of traffic congestion

In Yaounde, Nairobi, Douala and Kampala, there is substantial demand for non-motorized transport, where many city dwellers walk long distances to their job sites. The facilities for pedestrians are very poor, being badly designed and maintained. It is clear that insufficient attention is paid to pedestrian safety. Road congestion is a problem in all four cities. Congestion is particularly acute in Dakar, where the central business district is at the tip of a narrow peninsular, and all trips between the residential and business areas are concentrated on a small number of radial roads. In fact, failures of traffic management in all four cities (Douala, Nairobi, Dakar, and Kampala) contribute to the congestion problem. The traffic signal control system in Nairobi as in the other cities has been allowed to decay and has not been replaced with an effective police control. In all four cities, regulations restricting parking and commercial activity on sidewalks are not enforced, pedestrians spill out onto the roads, reducing road capacity and increasing safety hazards. Some of the problems can be dealt with in the short-term, such as enforcement of existing regulations on parking or on commercial activities that spill out on the sidewalks and streets. Others, such as modification of traffic signal settings and general traffic flow priorities at major junctions, require careful study, but are relatively cheap to implement.

7.4.5 Poor conditions of road system and road maintenance problems

Godard and Ngabmen (1998); Godard (2006) note that the poor quality of the road system is compounded by maintenance problems confronting all cities. In Yaounde, Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala and Douala the lack of funds is the main cause of the poor condition of the road system. The poor state of roads and their width reduce vehicle speeds, thus aggravating congestion problems, as well as increasing vehicle-operating costs. There is a particularly acute problem in Douala, where poor quality of access roads means that some areas of the city could not be served by conventional buses. In all four countries, responsibility for road maintenance is split between national governments that look after the national highway system within the city, and the city authorities that look after all the other roads. Kenya and Senegal both have Road Agencies, responsible for the long-term maintenance of the national road network. In Cameroon (the case of Yaounde) the administration of the national and rural roads is the responsibility of the Ministry of public works, while responsibility for urban roads in major towns, such as Douala, lies with the Ministry of Town Planning. In Uganda, responsibility for national roads lies with the Ministry of Works, Housing and Communications.

The sources of finance for road maintenance and improvement vary between countries. However, the World Bank (2005) notes that in all countries, the national government provides some financial assistance to local governments for road maintenance. In Cameroon, and Kenya this comes in the form of a dedicated proportion of the national funds, though the allocations are small and do not reflect the proportion of total national vehicle-km accounted for by the cities. Even with allocations from central road funds, none of the cities have sufficient funds to ensure good quality maintenance of the local road systems, much less fund improvements according to the World Bank (2005). Consequently, central governments have often become involved in the financing and planning of local road systems, which has led to confusion as to the real allocation of responsibilities for the roads between the two levels of government.

7.5 Transport problems unique to Yaounde

The transport system in Yaounde is facing several problems; for the purposes of this research we can enumerate the following problems that are peculiar to the city and that are of interest from a policy point of view:

1. Insufficient supply of means of mobility especially the bus system that has a high carrying capacity,
2. Modal split in favour of low occupancy vehicles such as shared taxis, motorcycle taxis and minibuses,
3. Low rate of enforcing transport regulations,
4. Weakness of municipal authorities to plan and manage urban transport policies,
5. Paucity and outright inadequacy of infrastructures such as traffic signals at junctions, pedestrian walk, footbridges, flyovers and subterranean drainage to prevent sewage from overflowing into streets,
6. Narrow streets that cannot handle increased motor vehicles traffic;
7. The use of the motorcycle taxi is the source of congestion, and is increasing the rate of traffic accidents,
8. The general absence of road signal markings such as pedestrian crossings, pedestrian walks and guard rails is a source of congestion in many areas of the city in which markets spill over into the road,

9. The preponderant role of the central government authorities in urban planning and road policy development in Yaounde is a source of the poor level of implementing policy reforms in the city, and
10. Road maintenance policy and practices in Yaounde are inadequate.

7.6 Conclusion

The comparative case study analysis used in this chapter aims to highlight the similarities and differences in urban transport systems of Yaounde and those of other African cities: Douala, Dakar, Nairobi, and Kampala that have experienced policy liberalisation so as to learn reasons for the success or failure of the introduction of competition. The aim of doing this comparison is to obtain ingredients from best practices that have worked in similar circumstances that can be emulated in Yaounde and in other cities to improve urban transport in developing countries. The urban transport system in Yaounde has many similarities with those of Dakar, Kampala, Nairobi and Douala. Despite the liberalisation of the sector in these cities, problems of mobility subsist. This means that liberalisation is not a panacea for the mobility problems of cities in Africa. Issues that need to be addressed include: infrastructure development to reduce congestion, more attention to the sustainability of urban transport in respect of the environment, the use of technology to assist traffic flow at junctions and intersections, consideration to the use of other modes of transport such as the rail transport as in Dakar and Nairobi, clean energy sources to curb pollution, the use of more conventional buses to balance the modal split, the empowerment of municipal institutions for more effective urban management. Land based transport needs adequate road infrastructures such as sufficiently wide roads with the creation of pedestrian walks, space for non-motorised transport such as the bicycle, which is lacking in almost of these cities.

The transport system in these cities is not integrated, that is, passengers cannot use the same ticket to board public transport modes as is the case in many metropolises in the West. Urban transport and urban form go hand in hand, this means that in Yaounde as in the other cities, the examples of best practices noted by Schipper (2005) could offer appropriate examples that can be emulated in these cities in sub-Saharan Africa. In Yaounde, Dakar, Nairobi, Kampala and Douala, the high rates of road traffic accidents indicate the lack of safety measures for all categories of road users. The authorities in these cities need to address the issue of educating and sensitising all stakeholders on the use of roads in cities and provide road signals such as pedestrian crossings and other road signals such as traffic lights to curb this high trend for road accidents noted by Jacobs and Sayer (1984) in cities in developing countries. The review highlights the weak nature of the municipal institutions in terms of capacity to initiate and execute meaningful policies of urban transport and infrastructure development, poor governance structures and procedures, inadequacy of policy implementation structures, the absence of monitoring units to evaluate transport mode performances and the lack of vision for non motorised modes and environmental friendly urban transport policies. Whilst in all the cases reviewed, private and public bus operators exist in the market through different mechanisms, Yaounde offers a significant difference with the absence of both the private and publicly owned operator since SOTUC was liquidated in 1995, despite many statutory attempts to attract private bus operators to the city. Yaounde waited for more than ten years before the PPP arrangement of 2005 finally brought a public urban transport operator in 2006.

The next chapter presents the general research conclusions of the thesis.

8 General research conclusions

8.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the main conclusions from the research that are presented in the form of answers to the research questions set for the thesis.

8.2 Main research question

The main research question is: What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why?

8.2.1 Subsidiary research questions

1. How was the new urban transport policy designed and implemented and how did the policy perform?
2. How do primary urban transport stakeholders assess the performance of policy reforms through the prism of its objectives set by policy makers? And how do they perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the prism of proxy criteria? Is there a significant trend in perceptions of performances of new policy in 1998, 1999 and 2000 among stakeholders?
3. What are the alternative policies that can be proposed for urban public transport and infrastructure development for Yaounde, from the lessons learned from the current prevailing situation?
4. What are the similarities and differences in problems and solutions of urban mobility transport infrastructure and management between Yaounde and some cities in Africa?

The conclusions presented here are the answers to the subsidiary research questions followed by those for the main research question.

1. How was the new urban transport policy designed and implemented and how did the policy perform?

The results presented in chapter six of this thesis show that the new urban transport policy was designed by the government of Cameroon with the active support of the Bretton Woods Institutions notably the World Bank through the Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Programme (SSATPP). The policy was drawn up by the administration (Central state bureaucracy) with no participation from none-state stakeholders or deliberation in the

legislature. Its outputs are mainly statutory instruments drawn up by the executive arm of the government and the bureaucracy rather than laws voted by the legislature. Its implementation has not been thorough and has been affected by the articulation of the interests of powerful key stakeholders. Besides, there were significant delays in implementing key aspects of the policy reform. This level of implementation has affected the achievement of objectives set by the policy makers. The policy performances are judged as unsatisfactory by a significant population of stakeholders owing to the low level of objective attainment.

Chapter five and chapter six discuss, in historical perspectives, how the new urban transport policy reform effectively liberalised public urban transport by bus, minibuses and motorcycle taxis for use as a means of urban public passenger transport. In short, the implementation of policy reform caused an increase in supply and use of different motorised modes of public urban transport in Yaounde. The management of the new policy was principally done by the bureaucratic structure of the government that includes the Ministry of Transport, law enforcement agencies and the Ministry of Finance. In addition, agencies under the supervision of the Ministry of Transport such as the private companies that perform roadworthiness controls on vehicles were also involved (see table 5.1). Private bus operators have never really entered the market in Yaounde for many reasons including the lack of governance in the bidding processes organised for many years. The arrival of motorcycle taxis in Yaounde has worsened the safety of urban public transport both for passengers and for the other road users, especially pedestrians who are often victims of the numerous accidents involving motor cycle taxis. The absence of a bus system has had implications for the cost of urban travel in Yaounde owing to the long distances to be covered in the city. The fares for shared taxis, which are the only public urban transport mode allowed circulating in the city centre, have now become prohibitive to the poorer fractions of the city population. While some new road infrastructure have been built, there is still a very significant absence of the kind of facilities that go hand in hand with the new policy such as traffic signals at many road junctions, the widening of the numerous narrow streets and roundabouts, the building of pedestrian walks and the materialisation of roads signs for speed limits. In addition, the enforcement of traffic regulations is still poor. Corruption is rife among traffic wardens who are mainly policemen.

2. How do primary urban transport stakeholders assess the performance of the policy reforms through the prism of its objectives set by policy makers? And how do they perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the prism of proxy criteria? Is there a significant trend in perceptions of performances of new policy in 1998, 1999 and 2000 among stakeholders?

In Chapter six, sections 6.5 and 6.8 the perception of stakeholders shows how low power stakeholders in Yaounde perceive the way that the New Urban Transport Policy has performed in terms of the objectives that the public authorities assigned to it. It also identifies and explains the differences in stakeholder group perception of policy's performance in an indicative manner. The historical process tracing in chapter six identifies the activities involving policy stakeholders and how they reacted during the policy process. This also gives an indication of how this interaction affected the policy outcomes. The stakeholder power index in chapter 6 (Table 6.1) gives an indication of the interaction of policy stakeholders during the policy process based on their power and leadership capabilities. Although one can describe the perception of the stakeholders as subjective, the overall intention of stakeholder analysis is to understand a policy process through the prism of the beneficiaries whose lives the policy affects directly. Each objective is scored qualitatively and a significant majority (82.5%) of the sampled urban public transport stakeholders in Yaounde thinks that the policy objective of liberalizing the urban public transport sector has been very well achieved. The

majority of the stakeholders (64%) hold that the objective to stamp out amateurism in the sector has achieved its objective. However, some stakeholders (36%) think that the policy has not achieved this objective. The perception of stakeholders on the policy objective of facilitating urban mobility in Yaounde shows that stakeholders hold diverse views. While some respondents (57.5%) think that the policy has facilitated mobility in the city, a fraction (43%) thinks otherwise, notably because of the continued traffic jams around major road junctions and narrow streets during rush hours.

The different perceptions of stakeholders on the policy objective to ban clandestine transporters show that they hold divided viewpoints on the issue with 50% believing that the policy objective has been achieved while (40%) think it has not. The continued shortages of both shared taxis and even motorcycle taxis servicing peri urban zones inhabited by the poor who rely heavily on this means of transport shows that the new policy has some limits. The fluidity of traffic in Yaounde has not changed after the new policy. It is therefore no surprising that stakeholders 60% do not assess the achievement of this objective favourably. Some (22%) think the policy has made traffic flow fluidly in the city. On the objective of the policy to fight pollution caused by urban transportation, stakeholder responses show that (62.5%) think the policy has not at all achieved that particular objective, only (25%) think otherwise. There are no visible policy activities directed towards achievement of this objective.

Stakeholders believe that the policy reform has not organized urban passenger transport well enough in Yaounde in a way that one can describe the new transport system as sufficiently effective. This effectiveness concerns how the stakeholders judge the extent to which the policy has attained its objective. In this case, the objective is to efficiently organize urban public transport. Stakeholders generally believe that their livelihood has been negatively affected by the policy intervention because they are now confronted with the new reality of urban transport in the city without buses operating across the many bus lines once used by SOTUC. Until 2006, only taxis and motorcycle taxis were available. These modes cost more and are often either not very comfortable or safe especially for women and at night. In addition owing to low purchasing power and poverty levels of many city dwellers, stakeholders think that the implementation of the new policy was not well timed and that its radical level of implementation is unfair to the poor and vulnerable. Stakeholders point out that government failed to consult the public on the new policy so that their views were never taken into account before the policy was launched. Public urban transport users who constitute a category of key primary stakeholders who have low power perceive the policy through the prism of its effects on urban transport fares. For them, the policy has made urban mobility costly, uncomfortable and unsafe.

In section 6.8, the major differences between stakeholder groups (Trade unions and Others) with respect to their perceptions on how the policy has achieved its objectives show that the significant difference based on Table 6.2.3 between the two stakeholder groups with respect to their perceptions on how the policy has achieved its objectives concerns the policy objective of facilitating mobility in the city of Yaounde. The difference between the two stakeholder groups with respect to: 1. Has the NUTP liberalised the urban public transport in Yaounde? 2. Has this policy eradicated amateurism in urban public transportation? 3. Has this policy put an end to clandestine transporters, in Yaounde? 4. Has this policy made traffic flow fluidly in the city? And 5. Has this policy contributed to fight pollution attributable to transport? is not significant.

3. What are the alternative policies that can be proposed for urban public transport and infrastructure development for Yaounde, from the lessons learned from the current prevailing situation?

The lessons learned from the design and implementation of the new urban transport policy in Yaounde show that many alternative policy options can be suggested for Yaounde to improve urban mobility, infrastructure development and management. These options are presented in chapter nine, which is devoted to proposed policy recommendations. This research makes recommendations for future development of mobility in Yaounde and in other African cities. These policy-based recommendations are categorised under the demand-side and supply-side policies. The recommendations below are deemed important and realistic, from a policy point of view, for Yaounde.

1. Demand-side transport, mobility, infrastructure and management policies.

This thesis proposes the following demand-side urban public transport policies for Yaounde.

1. Charge parking fees in the central business and administrative areas.
2. Create more one-way streets.
3. Create many more pedestrian sidewalks on streets.
4. Create a gridlock of zones within the city to regulate traffic and fares.

2. Supply-side transport, mobility, infrastructure and management policies.

This thesis proposes the following supply-side urban public transport policies for Yaounde.

1. Improve the quality of public passenger transport services by enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations so as to encourage their usage by those tempted to use personal cars.
2. Take initiatives for building a rail-based system to complement the road-based one.
3. Consider policy actions to influence and reduce the modal split of urban transport modes in the city with the introduction of PPP arrangements and the re-introduction of High Occupancy Vehicles.
4. Encourage the use of Intelligent Transport Systems Technology at road junctions to facilitate traffic flow especially at rush hours.
5. Consider city zoning schemes for a more equitable and just fare system.
6. Use the collaboration with informal sector because it is the main provider of urban public transport.
7. Address non-motorised transport needs in infrastructure development by creating and constructing pedestrian walks and cycling tracks so as to facilitate movement and guarantee environmental and transport sustainability of the city.
8. Negotiate the creation of a Metropolitan Transport Authority for Yaounde that can oversee mobility and infrastructure development for the city.

4. What are the similarities and differences in problems and solutions of urban mobility transport infrastructure and management between Yaounde and some cities in Africa?

In chapter seven of this thesis the similarities between Yaounde and other cities in Africa are explained. They can be summarised as follows:

1. Liberalisation policies for urban public transport are on going but mobility problems in the transport system subsist.
2. The public bus system has experienced problems and is financially not sustainable.
3. There is some government regulation, especially concerning the fixing of transport fares.
4. Where the public bus system existed it served principally the city centres.
5. Para-Transit modes represented the preponderant mode of urban public transit making the modal split to weigh against High Occupancy Vehicles (HOVs) such as the bus.

6. In all the cities there is poor enforcement of transport regulations.
7. In all the cities, there is inadequate statutory powers accorded to the municipal authorities in urban mobility issues and infrastructure development. Central government intervention is significant in city transport management and infrastructure development. There is also a lack of significant vehicle inspection that is part of the cause of accidents and sometimes pollution. In these cities, the transport means, especially mini-buses, motorcycle taxis and shared taxis often practice overloading. These African cities suffer from inappropriate traffic management as a result of the lack of staff, capacity and modern infrastructure based on modern technology. Lastly, there is no monitoring unit to assess urban transport policies and their implementation.
8. Non-motorised modes of public transport rarely exist and are not encouraged specifically by public policy.
9. No road user education institutions or schemes to assist both motorists and pedestrians on how to avoid the increasing rates of road accidents attributed to the rising motorisation of these cities and the paucity of appropriate infrastructures.

The main differences between Yaounde and the other four African cities in this thesis are highlighted in chapter five as follows:

1. After policy reforms which introduced divestitures, liberalisation and privatisation, privately-owned minibuses as well as privately-owned conventional buses play a significant role in urban public passenger transport in all cities included in this research (Dakar, Harare, Nairobi and Kampala) except in Douala, Cameroon where the authorities banned minibuses because they hoped this move could be a useful way to protect SOCATUR, a privately-owned urban bus operator. This example of Douala, in Cameroon, shows how in some countries in the developing world, deregulation and liberalisation policy reforms are implemented selectively depending on the interests at stake. In Douala, where urban transport problems are known to be acute, the introduction of minibus services that were meant to boost supply, was banned because lower level policy implementation officials became motivated to ban it in favour of the privately-owned SOCATUR bus operator, which in any case could not satisfy the very high demand for urban transport in that city.
2. The motorcycle taxi exists in Yaounde and Douala while it does not in the other three West and East African cities examined in this thesis.
3. There is an absence of urban rail transit system in all the cities except in Dakar, Senegal although it has been observed that this land-based mode can contribute significantly in upgrading the supply of transport means in a city like Yaounde where an under-utilised rail line runs across the city.
4. The shared taxi mode is the most used and preferred public transport means in Douala, Cameroon. Although there are no statistics available for Yaounde, in Cameroon, the participant observation and learning used by the researcher during the research process permitted the identification of the urban transport pattern in the city. This indicates that the shared taxi is the most used mode for urban mobility in the city.
5. The legalisation of the motorcycle taxi in Yaounde through statutory instruments, as part of the policy reform is a major difference between Yaounde and the other cities studied. The implication of this for mobility in the city is twofold. Firstly it has increased the rate of traffic accidents in the city and secondly, it has alleviated the transport problems in the city for a

significant fraction of the population that inhabits areas of the city which lack roads that can be used by motor vehicles. The motor cycle taxi, while it has the advantage of dropping passengers on their doorsteps, also has the inconvenience of exposing clients to the caprices of the weather especially getting wet during rain storms and dust during the dry season.

8.2.2 Main research question

What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why?

This thesis has demonstrated in chapters five and six that the innovative urban transport policy has brought radical changes to the patterns and modes of urban mobility in the city, notably the legalisation of the use of motorcycles, private buses and minibuses as means of public transport. Although some of the intended outcomes of the policy have been achieved, such as the liberalisation of passenger transport by bus, and the deregulation of minibuses and motorcycle taxis, there have been some unintended consequences of the policy such as the higher costs of conventional taxi fares. The introduction of motorcycle taxis has increased the frequency of transport related accidents notably those caused or involving motorcycles taxis. This thesis, through the stakeholder analysis and stakeholder power analysis has also demonstrated how local political context affects policy reforms in the urban transport sector in Yaounde Cameroon and that the bureaucratic elite have captured the state policy mechanism during this era of privatisation, divestitures and deregulation through the building of alliances and the award of contracts on crony basis, thus affecting the optimal implementation of the policy reform. This research has also shown that the theoretical assumptions concerning private bus operation, following deregulation and liberalisation, has not occurred in Yaounde. Instead, public bus services have been re-launched in Yaounde after twelve years, through a public private partnership arrangement after many failed attempts at outright privatisation of bus service with route franchising.

9 Epilogue

9.1 Introduction

The goal of this epilogue is to present recommendations for future urban transport policies in Yaounde and to assess the generalisability of the results of this research on Yaounde to other Cameroonian and Third World cities.

9.2 Recommendations for future transport reforms in Yaounde

This section is devoted to certain ideas informed by this research and personal viewpoints on the pathways for future development of the urban transport system in Yaounde. These ideas concern policy issues on the modification of the transport system in Yaounde. These ideas are categorised under the demand-side and supply- side policies. While the systematic increase in the supply of the means and modes of public urban transport are necessary, efforts are needed at the same time to tackle the problems of congestion, pollution and road safety that the city is facing. The ultimate goal of these suggestions is to make urban transport sustainable and affordable. Demand-side management policies involve measures taken by public authorities that will have restrictive impacts on urban circulation by making the use of known congested areas of the city more costly for personal car owners. The aim is to reduce the volume of circulation in certain parts of the city so as to enable traffic to flow fluidly. Supply-side management policies, on their part are measures taken by public authorities that will have the effect of increasing the volume of traffic that can flow in certain parts of the city. The aim is to improve circulation in these areas by reducing congestion. These recommendations are important and realistic for Yaounde from a policy point of view.

9.2.1 Demand-side transport, mobility, infrastructure and management policies

In this section, demand-side mobility, infrastructure development and management policies for urban public transport in Yaounde are analysed and proposed. Demand- side policies are usually unpopular because they impose restrictions on circulation within the city. These restrictions take the form of charges on road users and discourage vehicle transport in certain parts of a city such as parking fees with the aim of curbing congestion. Parent (2005) proposes that new technologies can be used in Europe to boost sustainable urban transportation. Yaounde can emulate this example. Some of the measures that are recommended for Yaounde are presented below:

- **Charging parking fees in the central business and administrative areas**

The city municipal authorities within the limits of their legal attributions can use physical restraint strategies in certain parts of the city to divert traffic to others. It is possible to develop and map out areas in which parking fees could be introduced to curtail the disorganised use of curbs for parking in the city centre that is the source of traffic congestion. The collection of such fees in Yaounde, which began in 2007, will require training and capacity building to avoid the shortcomings and loopholes that bedevil urban revenue collection. If parking fees have to be levied therefore, transparency, accountability and integrity mechanisms should be put in place and regular monitoring and control should be enforced.

- **The creation of one-way streets**

Curbing traffic congestion in Yaounde requires the creation of not only wider streets but also one-way streets in certain parts of the city to prevent the bumper-to-bumper jams that often characterise these zones. Although this is possible, the nature of the urban structure means that in some areas transport users will travel longer distances to their homes because of this kind of innovation.

- **The creation of pedestrian sidewalks on streets**

The streets in Yaounde often lack pedestrian walks making it difficult for vehicle traffic and pedestrians to cohabit in the city. The Stop and Go pick-up practices of shared taxis and other infrastructure deficiencies such as narrow streets and the absence of pedestrian walks have the effect of increasing journey times of passengers and constitutes one factor which increases fuel consumption in taxis and can be identified as a cause which infringes on the profit margins of shared taxis. The creation of streets reserved for pedestrians could help alleviate this problem.

- **Creating a gridlock of zones within the city to regulate traffic**

Yaounde is a multi-modal city although from the researchers' observation the most used motorised mode of public passenger transport in the city is the shared taxicab. The city's transport gridlock is organised around half a dozen bus lines inherited from the SOTUC era. However, privately owned public transport does not respect or follow these bus routes. The gridlock may use as criteria for fares and traffic regulation, distance from the city centre to suburban and peri-urban areas. The next section presents the supply side recommendations for improving urban mobility and infrastructure development in Yaounde.

9.2.2 Supply-side transport, mobility, infrastructure and management policies

The supply side recommendations for improving urban public transport in Yaounde are presented in Table 9.1; the recommendations are grouped into the following purposeful policy areas, because firstly as simple recommendations they need to be formulated as policy before they could be implemented. Secondly, there is overlap, as some recommendations need actions in more than one policy area to produce the desired outcomes.

Table 9.1: Recommendation and suggested policy areas

Recommendation	Policy area
1. Improve the quality of public passenger transport services by enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations so as to encourage their usage by those tempted to use personal cars.	- Urban governance and institutional renewal - Need for single urban transport agency - Road safety and controlling traffic in city - Enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations
2. Take initiatives for building a rail-based system to complement the road-based one.	- Urban governance and institutional renewal need for single urban transport agency
3. Consider policy actions to influence and reduce the modal split of urban transport modes in the city with the introduction of PPP arrangements and the re-introduction of High Occupancy Vehicles.	- Urban governance and institutional renewal - Need for single urban transport agency - Enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations
4. Encourage the use of Intelligent Transport Systems Technology at road junctions to facilitate traffic flows especially at rush hours.	- Urban governance and institutional renewal - Need for single urban transport agency - Road safety and controlling traffic in city
5. Consider city zoning schemes for a more equitable and just fare system.	- Urban governance and institutional renewal - Need for single urban transport agency - Road safety and controlling traffic in city - Enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations
6. Use the collaboration with informal sector because it is the main provider of urban public transport.	- Urban governance and institutional renewal - Need for single urban transport agency - Enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations
7. Address non-motorised transport needs in infrastructure development by creating and constructing pedestrian walks and cycling tracks so as to facilitate movement.	- Urban governance and institutional renewal - Enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations
8. Set an agenda for the creation of a Metropolitan Transport Authority for Yaounde that can oversee mobility and infrastructure development for the city.	- Urban governance and institutional renewal - Road safety and controlling traffic in city

9.2.2.1 Urban governance and institutional renewal

The most important pathway for implementing a sustainable public urban transport system in Yaounde appears to lie in the urban governance puzzle. Urban councils in some Third World cities like Bogotá in Columbia, Curitiba in Brazil, Santiago in Chile and Nairobi in Kenya, have been tinkering with urban development through the empowerment of city councils in a tradition which understands the role of decentralisation and the responsibility of elected local officials vis-à-vis their electorate and who must therefore perform in the direction of good governance. Urban councils in cities such as Nairobi run bus services that help in balancing the modal split from the domination of private sector-run taxicab and minibuses. Yaounde needs to revisit the institutional arrangement of the city council in the direction that will enhance the capacity of the city council to plan and execute not only road transport projects for the city but also raise specific city taxes and use the resources to improve and facilitate urban mobility. Collective urban transport by bus, that is publicly owned renders urban transport manageable especially given the public preference in developing countries for this mode of urban mobility owing to its high occupancy rate as against that of either the current taxicab or motorcycle taxi. It also facilitates the materialisation of modal integration that is indispensable in a situation such as in Yaounde where many non-motorised and motorised modes operate in the city.

As a big player in the urban transport landscape, Municipal bus terminals such as in Nairobi can become beachheads for urban modal integration. Crozet (2006) points out that decentralisation helped France make a cultural revolution which will empower local councillors to raise the funds needed to develop urban transport infrastructure and systems and end the tradition of fiscal translation which allowed people to believe that a tax paid by others will fund the public expenditures that they clamour for. Yaounde should seek alternative governance dispensations that can provide sources for funding urban public transportation. The following possibilities that are already in use in some countries may be examples that can be adapted to the context of the city:

1. The beneficiaries of public transport services are charged a tax for the use of public transport and the development of the needed infrastructures. This is often a flat rate tax levied on all road and transport users. This is the case of the French Transport Tax that requires that employers with more than nine staff to contribute towards the cost of public transport investment and operation and in addition, in the Paris area, they must also reimburse to their employees half the cost of public transports seasonal tickets.
2. Polluter pays. That is, those who use motorised transport in urban areas pay a charge to the city council for the pollution that is attributed to their transportation. The proceeds from this charge will then fund public transport and environmental friendly activities in the city. Vehicles with high horse powers as well as those that use engines with less capacity to efficiently burn fuels pay a higher tax in the form of windscreen licences.
3. The general public pays through local and national taxation whether or not they are public transport users. The quest for environmental protection should be viewed as a national and even global enterprise that needs the collective efforts of citizens in the global village as a fair practice towards intergenerational equity. In practice, financing urban public transport may involve a wide combination of mechanisms including partnerships with the private sector or other forms of borrowings such as through the stock exchange. The introduction of franchising and other partnership arrangements have been identified by the World Bank (2005) as a way of reducing costs and risks of running urban collective transport for the municipal authorities at a time when the public is asking for more public goods even though the state cannot fund them through the raising of taxes. The search for alternative sources to fund urban transport is an imperative for Yaounde and the new PPP arrangement with Parker International appears to be one way forward.
4. The city should imagine more pragmatic solution through partnerships between public and private sector but which does not include SOEs such as is the case now in the deal with Parker Trans-national Limited, in which several big SOEs have a stake.

9.2.2.2 The need for single urban transport agency

Urban transport has become ultra important to the point that it requires a specific single agency to handle policy in the domain for a major city such as Yaounde so that this can guarantee efficient short, medium and long term planning that takes into account issues such as sustainability, affordability and modal split and the friendliness of the city as a place of living. The present organisational fragmentation in policy matters of Yaounde is partly responsible for difficulties encountered in formulating, designing, implementing and monitoring an efficient urban transport policy for Yaounde. A single agency will coordinate the myriad tasks now dispersed across government ministerial departments and the

municipality of Yaounde on urban transport matters. Such a single agency will have both national and local level responsibilities under the purview of the mayor.

9.2.2.3 Road safety and controlling traffic in the city

Jacobs and Sayer (1984) discuss low cost remedial measures to improve public urban road safety. They posit that in Nairobi, Kenya, the introduction of more traffic signals on major and important road junctions forced a new sense for the respect of the Highway Code amongst urban passenger transporters. This implies that traffic jams and congestion in Yaounde could be lowered through the use of this kind of low cost technological adaptation especially as the city is notoriously lagging behind in road traffic signals. In the same vein, it is reasonable to also introduce signals for pedestrian crossings in Yaounde and increase the current low numbers of traffic lights at major road junctions. Taxi drivers' behaviour could be change if lane discipline is enhanced through the marking of streets lanes. Further improvements in human safety can be achieved through the designation of speed limits on urban arteries, which can easily be monitored through low cost radar technology already available in the market. Yaounde city needs to improve on the passenger safety inside taxicabs through the use of available technology based on GPS systems to identify taxis, their position and incidents before sending out a distress alarm. In London the Pink Ladies, a women's only call taxicab service was created to provide safe transit for women in response to the insecurity that women faced inside the normal London cabby especially at night. In Yaounde, there are many poorly materialised junctions in the Melen, Etoudi, Elig Edzoa, Carrefour Warda, Biyem Assi Carrefour, Mvog Mbi, Essos and Mokolo neighbourhoods and narrow streets that, if redesigned, will go a long way to improve urban circulation and make traffic flow fluidly. Another range of low cost technologies adaptable to Yaounde and which are discussed by Jacobs and Sayer (1984) include:

1. The use of guardrails to prevent spill over of pedestrian traffic onto arteries and restrain taxicabs and mini buses from rampantly practicing their Stop and Go passenger pick up.
2. The construction of many footbridges to ease pedestrian traffic.
3. The pedestrianisation of many streets especially around markets and busy shopping centres
4. The creation of many more one-way streets in Yaounde to ease traffic congestion.
5. The restriction of parking in certain parts of the city.
6. Imagining a route allocating strategies on a transparent bidding basis. Use cheap intelligent transport systems technology to regulate traffic at key junctions. In fact traffic lights that work should be installed and maintained regularly.
7. The designing of a gridlock zoning system for Yaounde that would ensure a more equitable and just urban transport fare system using electronic mileage counters.
8. The programming and construction of guardrails to prevent commercial spill over into key city arteries and footbridges. The identification of busy congested streets that should be reserved for pedestrian use only must be considered as a traffic and mobility facilitating measure.

9.2.2.4 Enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations

The problem of safety in urban passenger transportation in Yaounde is that, the rules and regulations in force are rarely enforced (the obligatory wearing of helmets for motorcycle taxi drivers and passengers, seat belts for taxi drivers and passengers, penalties for vehicle overloading, control for older vehicles because of their higher levels of emissions levels. A statute was issued in 1996 to protect the national road network and control pollution (see Table 5.1). There is a formidable array of traffic regulations and public passenger vehicle standards in force in Cameroon for many decades now, besides the universal Highway Code,

that are rarely enforced. In Cameroon, urban passenger transport vehicle drivers need specific certification called (*Capacité* in French), Taxi driver aptitude license in English, to qualify to perform their trade. The rules laying down the modalities for issuing this certificate remains murky in the same way, as with the normal drivers' license. The present system needs to be secured through computerisation. Until 2005, vehicle roadworthiness certificates for public urban transport vehicles with a validity lapse of three months were regularly issued as a formality without any inspection. Revenues from vehicle inspection are a source of income for the state. The administration simply sold out roadworthiness certificates without any substantial vehicle inspection. No doubt poor vehicle condition is a key factor in urban road accidents. Jacobs and Sayer (1984) point out that in Singapore and Cairo, Egypt, significantly lowered their urban public passenger transport accident rates though Traffic law Enforcement. In both cases, traffic policemen and women received training and spent more time on traffic Law Enforcement rather than on traffic control. New low cost and appropriate equipment was acquired to help them achieve their goals successfully. The implementation of Traffic Law Enforcement in Yaounde could therefore have the capacity to reduce traffic jams, urban congestion and enhance human safety through accident reduction. In addition, education, information and communication can play a key role in improving pedestrian safety in Yaounde, if parents and other stakeholders join the municipal authorities to teach children and other pedestrian safety issues on a regular basis.

9.2.2.5 Road safety and environmental performance of vehicles

The ever-increasing rate of road accidents in which fatalities are high together with the high rate of air pollution from motor vehicles is particularly serious in Yaounde and the problem is crucial. Although the new urban transport policy reforms liberalised the sector in Cameroon, it also permitted the advent of new modes of urban mobility such as the motorcycle taxi whose safety record is known to be poor. Besides, there is still a low rate of enforcing existing road safety and anti-pollution regulations in the city. Although there are no viable statistics for Yaounde on road related transport accidents and pollution attributable to urban transport, the city can learn from the experience of Asian countries whose urban transport development was once on a largely unsustainable path (traffic congestion, road accidents, air pollution) before they took a series of measures to reverse the situation. These measures began with the creation of a cooperation agreement under a Partnership for Sustainable Urban Transport in Asia (PSUTA) that permitted the collection and sharing of data and information on urban transport. This has allowed member countries to understand how today's transport system evolved from the past, and how it could change in the future but more so it shows that given the will, the present generation can pursue growth and improve future transport systems and achieve sustainable development. PSUTA members are able to use a participatory approach with local stakeholders to take decisions on new simple technologies in road signalling, energy use, fuel type and appropriate modes of urban mobility such as (creation of pedestrian tracks, cycling track, light rail, bus, metros) which takes care of environmental sustainability and road safety. Some of these measures require the institution of incentives and subsidies for the use of clean energies as well as penalties for big polluters.

9.3 Generalisability of conclusions

In this section, we assess the generalisability of the conclusions for Yaounde to other Third World cities. This assessment is done through the prism of public policy context, public policy actors and their actions in Yaounde and some Third World cities. Many authors like Smith (1985), Morah (1995), Hyden (2006) and Fourie (2006) have described the particular policy context in Third World countries and the implication of this on public policy. This

thesis empirically elucidates the policy practice in Yaounde with respect to urban public transport.

9.3.1 Similarity of policy context

The policy context in Yaounde, Cameroon, bears multiple similarities to those of other Third world cities especially in the domain of governance because public policy is a political activity. The absence of the kind of governance tradition and structures that are found in older western democratic countries in Cameroon and Third World countries could be one of the reasons for the type of public policy processes in Third world contexts that is centred on politicians who have an interest in the outcome of policies rather than as a result of interaction among stakeholders in the entire political civil society spectrum of the country. This implies that there is likelihood that public policy problems in the context of Yaounde are similar to those of other Third World countries and cities.

9.3.2 Similarity of public policy actors

Public policy actors in Yaounde, Cameroon are mainly politicians. They pursue public policy in a pragmatic rather than a rational way. This implies that multiple strategies are employed to achieve desired policy goals. The actions of policy makers should be focused on satisfying the interests of the constituencies that support them either locally or at the nation level. Elected officials are more responsive to constituency demands than non-elected ones. This implies that as far as urban public transport is concerned, there is a case for a new form of urban governance that places the aspect of city management within the competence of local elected mayors. The implication of the absence of this aspect in the case of Yaounde as this thesis demonstrates is likely to be similar in other Third World cities. Future urban transport policies in Yaounde should be city specific rather than simply implementing a national urban transport policy in a city that has its specificities that need particular measures.

9.3.3 The specificities of transport and infrastructure in Yaounde

The transport system in Yaounde is facing several problems. For the purposes of this research we can enumerate the following problems that are specific to the city and that are of interest from a policy point of view:

1. Policy implementation.
 - a. Motorcycle taxi pose particular problems of safety because of the non-respect of regulations on crash helmets and the absence of insurance cover for Third Party liability. Besides, there are no roadworthiness certificates for motorcycle taxis,
 - b. The preponderant role of the central government authorities in urban planning and road policy development in Yaounde is a source of the poor level of implementing transport policy reforms in the city.
2. Policy outcome.
 - a. Modal split in favour of low occupancy vehicles such as shared taxis; motorcycle taxis and small minibuses do not address the problem of affordability,
 - b. Although government fixes transport fares for shared taxis and motorcycle taxis, the rates are only indicative because clients negotiate fares with taxi drivers according to their destinations and traffic situations. The situation after the reform is just as before the reform when an open market for fares existed for the shared taxis. After the reforms, an open market for fares exists in Yaounde for these two means of transport,

- c. The motorcycle taxi is the source of congestion that the city is now trying to fight, and is increasing the general traffic accidents rate in Yaounde,
 - d. Parking charges are in force in central Yaounde to reduce congestion.
3. Inadequacy of governance institutions.
 - a. Low rate of enforcing transport regulations,
 - b. Weak capacity of municipal authorities to plan and manage urban transport policies, such as those related to pollution, fight against illegal transporters and security in public transport,
 - c. Centralised tax collection system makes local authority powerless to plan and finance transport strategies.
4. Poor infrastructure development despite policy reform.
 - a. Paucity and outright inadequacy of infrastructures such as traffic signals at junctions, pedestrian walk, footbridges, flyovers and subterranean drainage to prevent sewage from overflowing into streets,
 - b. Narrow streets that are not adapted to increases in motor vehicle and motorcycle traffic,
 - c. The general absence of road signal markings such as pedestrian crossings, pedestrian walks and guard rails is a source of congestion in many areas of the city in which markets spill over into the road.

Reference list

Ackermann, R.S. 1999. The economic impact of corruption: in corruption, government, causes, consequences and reform. Cambridge: University Press. 9-26.

Aduwo, G.O. 1990. Productivity, efficiency and quality of source of the Matatu mode of public transportation in Nairobi, Kenya: A geographical analysis. Unpublished thesis. Nairobi, Kenya: University of Nairobi Geography Department.

Arulpragasam, J. 2002. An approach to poverty and social impact analysis. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

Bamberger, M. 1991. The monitoring and evaluation of public sector programs in Asia. Why are development programmes monitored but not evaluated? Evaluation Review Vol. 13(3): 223-242.

Barwell, I. 1979. The Matatu public transport sector in Nairobi: Mission report for Urban Department of the World Bank. London: Intermediate Technology Transport Ltd.

Bayliss, K. 2001. Privatisation and the World Bank: a flawed development tool. Global Focus Vol. 13 June.

Bayliss, K. 2002. Privatisation and poverty: The distributional impact of utility privatisation. London: PSIRU, Greenwich University.

Benmaamar, M. 2001. Urban transport services in sub-Saharan Africa: Recommendations for reforms in Uganda. London: TRL Limited.

Bennett, A. and A. George. 1997. Case studies and process tracing in History and Political Science: Similar strokes for different foci. Colin and Miriam F. Elman (eds.). Bridges and boundaries: historians, political scientists, and the study of International Relations. Boston: MIT Press.

Berg, E. 1989. Private provision of public services. Washington D. C.: World Bank. Mimeo.

- Binnendijk, A.L. 1989. Donor agency experience with the monitoring and evaluation of development projects. Evaluation Review. (13) 206-222.
- Brune, N.G, Garrett, and B. Kogut. 2004. The IMF and the global spread of Privatisation. IMF, IMF staff Papers. 51(2) 195-408.
- Buchanan, J.M. 2003. Public choice: The origins and development of a research program. Fairfax, Va.: Center for Study of Public Choice, George Mason University.
- Buchanan, J.M, and G. Tullock. 1962. The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Buse, K., N. Mays, and G. Watt. 2005. Making health policy. Maidenhead. London: Open University Press.
- Button, K.J. 2005. Markets and government failure in transportation. Button, K.J, D.A, Hensher (ed). Handbook of transport strategy, policy and institutions. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 11-27.
- Campbell, D.T. 1969. Reforms as experiments. American Psychologist. (24) 409-429.
- Carruthers, R., M. Dick, and A. Saurkar, 2005. Affordability of public transport in developing countries. Transport Paper, TP3, TUDTR, Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
- Cervero, R. 1998. Para transit: The gap fillers. Habitat Debate 4 (2) 8-9.2.
- Chalker, L. 1991. Good governance and the aid programme. London: Overseas Development Administration.
- Cronbach, L.J. 1982. Designing evaluations of educational and social programs. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Cure, C. 1992. Transport, traffic and mobility in Sub-Saharan African cities. The Courier (131) 69-71. Jan-Feb.
- Davidson, E.J. 2001. Ascertaining causality in theory-based evaluation. New Directions for Evaluations 87(17-26).
- De Melo, M., C. Denizer, A. Gelb, and S. Tenev. 1997. Circumstances and choice: The role of initial conditions and policies in transition economies. World Bank Economic Review 10(3) 307-324.
- De St. Laurent, B. 1998. Overview of urban transport in South Africa, in Freeman, P. and C. Janet (eds). Urban transport policy: A sustainable development tool. Proceedings of the International Conference, CODATU VIII, Cape Town. Rotterdam: Balkema.
- Deb. K. 2003. Restructuring urban public transport in India. Journal of Public Transport 5 (3) 85-102.

- Dia, M. 1991. Development and cultural values in Sub-Saharan African. Finance and Development. Washington. D.C.: IMF (10-13).
- Diana, K. 2001. Sustainable development in urban transportation. Budapest. University of Budapest, Hungary.
- Dinica, V. 2004. The evolution of national policy implementation structures under the Europeanization of policy-making. Plenary Conference of the European Political Science Network. Prague: 18-19 June.
- Diouf, I. 1998. SOTRAC's customer mobility changes study owing to the decline in the offer. CODATU VIII, Cape Town. (347-352).
- Dessler, D. 1991. Beyond correlations: Toward a Causal Theory of War. International Studies Quarterly 35:337-355.
- Dwyer, L. 1982. The alleged value neutrality of economic: An alternative view. Journal of Economic Issues 16(1) 75-106.
- Eboumbou, J.C., M. Habyarimana, and H. Ngabmen, 1998. L'expérience des taxis motos à Douala. A la croisée des logiques économiques et sociales, Rapport provisoire pour SITRASS. Juliet.
- Edelenbos, J. 1999. Design and management of participatory public policymaking. Public Management 1(4) 569-578.
- Edelenbos, J., R. Monnikhof, and O. van de Riet, 2003. A double helix approach: a proposal to forge a better integration of analysis and process in policy development. International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management 3 (1) 1-21.
- Elkins, P., and M. Max-Neff. 1992. Real-Life economics. Understanding with creation. London, New York: Routledge.
- Elson, D., B. Evers, and J. Turner. 1999. Transport sector programmes in developing countries: Integrating a gender analysis. Manchester: University of Manchester.
- El-Tom, O.A. 1994. Mugging the poor, The Bretton Woods Institutions and the pursuit of African Development. London: Institute of African Alternatives.
- Estache, A., and A. Gomez-Lobo. 2005. Limits to competition in urban bus services in developing countries. Transport Reviews 25(139-158).
- Faux, J. 2006. Rethinking the global political economy. Speech to the Asia-Europe-US Progressive Scholarship's Forum: Globalisation and Innovation of Politics. Tokyo, Japan. April 11-13.
- Fischer, F. 1980. Politics, values and public policy: The problem of methodology. Boulder Colorado, Westview press.

- Fouracre, P.R., and G. Gardner. 1992. Mass transit in developing cities: the role of high performance bus systems. London: TRL. DFID.
- Fourie, D. 2006. The application of Good Governance in public financial management. Journal of Public Administration 41(22) 434-443.
- Fox, C.J. 1987. Biases in public policy implementation, evaluation, Policy Studies Review Vol. 7(1) 128-141
- Freeman, P., and C. Jamet. 1998. Multi-modality in urban transport policy: A sustainable development tool. Proceedings of the International Conference, CODATU VIII, Cape Town. Rotterdam: Balkema.
- Friedman, M., and R. Friedman. 1980. Free to choose. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Fritz, G., C. Taylor, and L.M. Lynn, 1987. How to design a program evaluation. California: Sage. Chapter 5.
- Fuersteien, M.T. 1990. Partners in evaluation: Evaluating development and community programmes with participants. London: Macmillan.
- Gakenheimer, R. 1999. Urban mobility in the developing world. Transport Research Part A. 33(671-689).
- Garn, G.A. 1999. Solving the policy implementation problem. The case of Arizona Charter Schools. Education Policy Analysis Archives. [http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/ 7 \(26\)](http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/7(26))
- George, A.L., and T.J. McKeown. 1985. Case studies and theories of organizational decision making. Robert Coulam and Richard Smith (eds.). Advances in Information Processing in Organizations. JAI Press 2(21-58).
- Gilson, L. 2005. Applying policy analysis in tackling implementation gaps. Presentation made at Forum 9, Mumbai, India. 12-16 September.
- Godard, X. 2006. Coping with para transit in developing cities, a scheme of complementarities. Future Urban Transport Conference Goteborg, Sweden, 2-5 April
- Godard, X., and H. Ngabmen. 1998. Urban transport in sub-Saharan Africa. UNCHS, 4 (2) 15-16.
- Gomez-Ibanez, J.A., W.B. Tye, and C. Winston. (ed). 1999. Essays in transportation economics and policy: a handbook in honour of John R. Meyer. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Grindle, M. (ed) 1980. Politics and policy implementation in the Third World. Princeton: University Press Princeton.
- GTZ. 2005. The role of transport in urban development policy: A sourcebook for policy makers in developing cities. Berlin. Germany.

- Guba, E.G., and U.S. Lincoln. 1985. Naturalistic inquiry. Newbury Park, California: Sage.
- Geurts, J. L., and C. Joldersma. 2001. Methodology for participatory policy analysis. European Journal of Operational Research, Special issue on methodology for handling complex societal problems. 128 (2) 300-310.
- Gwilliam, K.M. 2001. Competition in passenger transport in the developing world. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 35(1) 99-118(20)
- Hall, P.M., and J.W. McGinty. 1997. Policy as the transformation of intentions: Producing program from statute. The Sociological Quarterly 38: 439-467.
- Harding, P. 1991. Qualitative indicators and the project framework. Community Development Journal 26 (4) 294-305.
- Harris, P. 1990. Policy and policy problems. in Foundation of Public Administration: A Comparative Approach. Hong Kong: Sage. (166-201).
- Heijden van der, and V.A.W.J. Marchau. 2002. Innovating road traffic management by ITS: A future perspective. The International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management. 2(1) 20-39.
- Hellman, J., J. Geraint, and D. Kaufmann. 2003. Seize the State, seize the day: State capture and influence in transition economies. Journal of Comparative Economics 31(751-773).
- Hellman, J.S., and D. Kaufmann. 2004. The inequality of influence, in Janos Kornai and Susan Rose-Ackerman (eds.), Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- House, E. 1980. Evaluating with validity. USA: Sage.
- Hyden, G. 2005. Why do things happen the way they do? A power analysis of Tanzania. Sida http://hei.unige.ch/news/files/Goran_Hyden_Power_analysis.pdf.
- Hyden, G. 2006. Beyond governance: Bringing power into development policy analysis. Paper presented to the Danida/GEPPA Conference on Power, Politics and Change in Weak States. Copenhagen.
- Isolo, P.M. 2001. Urban sprawl and the challenges of public transport services delivery/provision in Kampala City Uganda. Institute of Geography. Master of Philosophy, Social Change (Geography) Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Trondheim, Norway.
- Isolo, P.M. 2004. Urban change in Uganda: The Challenge of managing urban areas in a global environment. Paper for the college of urban Planning and public Affairs CUPPA Conference University of Illinois Chicago USA 22-24 July.
- Jacobs, G.D., D.A.C. Maunder, and P.R. Fouracre. 1979. A comparison of bus operations in cities of developed and developing countries. Transport and Engineering Control. London: June. TRRL. DFID.

Jacobs, G.D., D.A.C. Maunder, and P.R. Fouracre. 1981. Transport problems of urban poor in developing countries. London: TRRL. DFID.

Jacobs, G.D., and I.A. Sayer. 1984. Road accidents in developing countries: urban problems and remedial measures. London: TRRL.

Kapila, Mutsembi and Davider. 1982. The Matatu mode of public transport in metropolitan Nairobi. Nairobi. Kenya: Mazingira Institute.

Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and P. Zoido-Lobaton. 2000. Governance matters: From measurement to action. Finance and Development 37(2) 1-6. www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/.

Kaufmann, D., and P. C. Vicente. 2005. Legal Corruption. www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/.

Kisaalita, W.S., and J. Sentongo-Kibalama. 2007. Delivery of urban transport in developing countries: the case of the motorcycle taxi service (boda-boda) operators of Kampala. Development Southern Africa 24(2) 345-357.

Klitgaard, R. 1991. Adjusting to reality: Beyond 'state vs market. Economic Development. San Francisco: ICS Press and International Centre For Economic Growth.

Koerberle. S. 2003. Should policy based lending still involve conditionality? The World Bank Research Observer 18(2) 249-273.

Koenig, L. W. 1986. An introduction to public policy. California. Prentice-Hall

Lal, D. 1983. The poverty of development economics. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.

Lal, D. 1992. The misconceptions of Development Economics. Wilber C. C and K.P Jameson (eds) (5th edition). The political economy of development and underdevelopment. New York: McGraw Hill. (27-35).

Landell-Mills, P., and I. Serageldin. 1991. Governance and the external factor. World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. Washington D. C.: World Bank.

Landell-Mills, P. 1992. Governance, cultural change and empowerment in West Africa. Journal of Modern African Studies (534-576).

Lee, T.G. 2005. Sub-urbanizing the masses: Public transport and urban development in historical perspective. (Review) Technology and Culture 46 (3) 662-664.

Lee, R.A., and J.C.M. Shute. 1991. An approach to naturalistic evaluation: A study of the social implications of international development projects. Evaluation Review 15(2) 254-265.

Lee-Smith, D. 1989. Urban management in Nairobi: A case study of the Matatu mode of public transport. African cities in crisis: Managing rapid urban growth. (ed) Stren, R.E and R.R. White. San Francisco, London: Westview Press. (248-276).

- Leftwich, A. 1994. Governance, the state and the politics of development. Development and Change 25 (363-386).
- Marsden, D., P. Oakley, and B. Pratt. 1994. Measuring the process: Guidelines for evaluating social development. Oxford: INTRAC.
- Maunder, D.A.C., and P.R Fouracre. 1987. Public transport provision in Dar es Salaam Tanzania. London: Transport aid Road Research Laboratory Working Paper WU23 1. Unpublished.
- Maunder, D.A.C, and G.D. Jacobs. 1988. Public transport provision in Douala and Yaounde, Cameroon. London: TRL Unpublished paper.
- Maunder, D.A.C., and S. Jobbins. 1988. Public transport provision in Harare Zimbabwe. London: Transport and Road Research Laboratory Working Paper WU248. Unpublished.
- Maunder, D.A.C. 1990. The impact of bus regulatory policy in five African countries. London: TRL.
- Maunder, D.A.C., and T.C. Mbara. 1996. Liberalisation of urban public transport services: What are the implications? London: ODA.
- Mawhood, P. 1983. Applying the French model in Cameroon. Local government in the Third World: The experience in Tropical Africa. P. Mawhood (ed). (177-200).
- May, J. B., and A. Wildavsky. (eds). 1978. The policy cycle. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Mayer, R, and E. Greenwood. 1980. The nature of policy research. in, The design of social policy research. USA: Prentice-Hall (41-66).
- Mayers, J. 2005. Stakeholder power analysis; DGIS BMZ, DFID. www.Policypowertools.org.
- Milanovic, B. 1999. Explaining the increase in inequality during transition. Economics of Transition. 7(2) 299-341.
- Mitric, S., and R. Carruthers. 2005. The concept of affordability of urban public transport service for low-income passengers. Washington D. C.: The World Bank.
- Mbaku, J.M. 1999. Preparing Africa for the twenty-first century: Strategies for peaceful coexistence and sustainable development. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Mohr, L.B. 1999. The qualitative method of impact analysis. The American Journal of Evaluation 20(1) 69-84.
- Morah, E.U. 1995. Obstacles to optimal policy implementation in developing countries: Movement towards a manageable framework analysis. African Administrative Studies 44(17-43).

- Nash, C. 2005. Privatisation in transportation. In Button, K..J. and D.A, Hensher. Handbook of transport strategy, policy and institutions. Amsterdam: Elsevier. (96-113).
- Nash, R., A. Hudson, and C. Luttrell. 2006. Mapping political context: A toolkit for civil society organisations. London: ODA.
- Ndegea, S. 1995. The role and potential of the taxi mode of urban transport in the city of Nairobi, Kenya: A geographical analysis. Unpublished thesis. University of Nairobi, Geography Department.
- Ndongko, E. 1988. Economic management in Cameroon: Policies and performance. Yaounde: Institute of Human Science.
- Nkemngu, M. 1997. Commuters worried by shortages of taxicabs. CAMEROON TRIBUNE (2684) Tuesday July 22.
- Obodho, R.A. 1993. Urban public transport in Nairobi, Kenya. In D. Plat (ed) Transports en Afrique sub-Saharienne. Laboratoire de Transport, Lyon, France : (91-112).
- OECD. 2002. Evaluation and aid effectiveness: Glossary of key terms in evaluation and results based management. Paris: Development Assistance Committee.
- Onibakun, A.G. 1989. Urban growth and urban management in Nigeria. Stren and White (eds), African cities in crisis: Managing rapid urban growth. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. (68-111).
- O'Toole, L.J. 2004. The theory practice issue in policy implementation research. Public Administration 82(2) 309.
- Overseas Development Administration. 1995. Guidance note on how to do stakeholder analysis of aid projects and programmes. Social Development Department, July.
- Parent, M. 2005. New technologies for sustainable urban transportation in Europe. Paris: INRIA- IMARA.
- Patton, M. Q.1980. Quantitative and qualitative methods. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Patton, M. Q. 1987. How to use qualitative methods in evaluation, California: Sage.
- Patton, M. Q. 2002. Qualitative research and evaluation methods. 3rd (ed). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage.
- Pressman, J., and A. Wildavsky. 1973. How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland, or why it's amazing that federal programs work at all. Berkeley, CA: University of California.
- Price-Waterhouse-Coopers. 2002. Public private partnerships and beyond. Alberta, Canada: Price-Waterhouse-Coopers Power-point presentation.

- Rajan, R. 2004. Why are Structural Reforms so difficult? Finance and Development. June. 41 (2) 56-57.
- Rietveld, P. 2004. Urban transport policies: The Dutch struggle with market failures and policy failures. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper.123/3.
- Riggs, W.F. 1964. Administration in developing countries. The theory of prismatic society. Boston: Houghton Migflin and Co.
- Riley, S. 1999. The political economy of anti-corruption strategies in Africa. European Journal of Development Research 10(1) 19-28.
- Roberts, C. 1996. The logic of historical explanation. USA. Penn State University Press.
- Roberts, G.K. 1971. A dictionary of political analysis. London: Longman.
- Rodrigue, J-P. 2004. (ed) Transport geography on the web. www.HofstraUniversity Department of Economics and Geography.
- Rondinelli, D.A. 1982. The dilemma of development administration: Uncertainty and complexity in control-oriented bureaucracies. World Politics Vol. XXXV (1) 43-72.
- Rossi P.H., H.E. Freeman, and S. R.Wright. 1989. Evaluation: A systematic approach. California. Sage.
- Sabatier, P.A., and H.C. Jenkins-Smith. 1993. (eds.) Policy change as learning: An advocacy coalition approach. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Santiso, C. 2003. The paradox of governance: Objective or condition for multinational development finance. SIAS. Working Paper series.
- Schipper, L. 2004. International comparisons of energy end use: Benefits and risks. Encyclopaedia of Energy (3) 529-555. Elsevier.
- Schipper, L. 2005. Sustainable transport: From city vision to policy. Vision 2025: Does the mess on the streets suggest we need a new transport paradigm? EMBARO's lessons from the transport trenches. The WRI Center for Transport And Environment 'Transport Week' World Bank. March.
- Schmeer, K. 1999. Guidelines for conducting a stakeholder analysis. Partnership for health reforms. Washington D. C.: Abt. Associates Inc.
- Seer, D. 1969. The meaning of Development. International Development Review 11(4) 2-6.
- Shaw, A. 2006. Public private partnerships in the transport sector. S. Africa: Development Bank of Southern Africa.
- Shleifer, A., and R.W. Vishny. 1994. Politicians and firms. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109(4) 995-1025.

- SITRASS. 1999. 5eme séminaire SITRASS Yaoundé, 2-4 novembre: les politiques sectoriels des transports en Afrique sub-saharienne: bilan et réflexions. Novembre.
- Slack, B. 2004. Transport geography on the web. www.Hofstra University Department of Economics and Geography.
- Slaon, J.W. 1982. Comparing public choice and public policy in Latin America. Journal of Developing Areas (16) 421-446.
- Smith, A. 1776. An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. London: George Routledge and Sons. (1990 Edition).
- Smith, T.B. 1973a. The study of policy making in the developing nations. Policy Studies Journal (1) 244-249.
- Smith, T.B. 1973b. The policy implementation process. Policy Science (4) 197-213.
- Smith, T.B. 1985. Evaluating development policies in the Third World. Public Administration and Development 5 (2) 129-144.
- Stake, R.E. 1978. Program evaluation. California: Sage.
- Stake, R.E. 1995. The art of case study research. Thousand Oaks, C.A: Sage.
- Steinberg, P.F. 2003. Understanding policy change in developing Countries: The spheres of influence framework. Global Environmental Politics 3(1)11-32.
- Steinberg, P.F. 2004. New approaches to causal analysis in policy research. Paper prepared for the panel "Multi-Methods in Qualitative Research," Annual Convention of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2-5.
- Stiglitz, J. 1991. Some theoretical aspects of privatisation application to Eastern Europe, Paper Presented for the Third Villa Mandragone International Conference, Rome, Italy. June.
- Stiglitz, J. 2002. Globalisation and its discontents. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
- Stiglitz, J. 2004. The post Washington Consensus: Initiative for policy dialogue. New York: Columbia University Working Paper.
- Stren R.E., and R.R. White. (ed) 1989. African cities in crisis: Managing rapid urban growth. San Francisco: Westview Press.
- Stufflebeam, D., and A. Shinkfield, 1985. Systematic evaluation: A self instructional guide to theory and practice. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
- Stufflebeam, D.L, G.F. Madaus, and T. Kellaghan. 2000. Evaluation models: Viewpoints on educational and human services evaluation. Boston: Kluwer.
- Stufflebeam, D.L. 2003. The CIPP model for evaluation. presented at the 2003 annual conference of the Oregon Program Evaluation Network. Oregon Portland, Oregon. March.

- Tangri, R., and A. Mwenda. 2001. Corruption and cronyism in Uganda's privatisation in the 1990s. African Affairs 100 (117-133).
- Thissen, C.J.A.M., and P.G.J. Twaalfhoven. 2001. Towards a conceptual structure for evaluating policy analysis activities. European Journal of Operations Research (129) 627-649.
- Tilley, C. 2001. Mechanisms in Political Processes. Annual Review of Political Science 4:21-41.
- Tolley, R., and B. Turton, 1995. Transport systems policy and planning: a geography approach. London: Longman. Chapter 1-3 and 7-9.
- Toye, J. 1987. Dilemmas of development: Reflections on the counter-revolution in development theory and policy. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Tullock, G. 1987. Public choice. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. 3. (1040-44).
- Tullock, G. 1989. The Economics of Special Privilege and Rent-Seeking. Boston & Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers
- Tye, W.B. 2005. Regulatory transitions. Button, K.J and D. A, Hensher (ed). Handbook of transport strategy, policy and institutions. Amsterdam: Elsevier. (29- 44).
- Tyler, R.W. 1942. General statement on evaluation. Journal of Educational Research (36) 492-501.
- Van de Riet, O.A.W.T. 2003. Policy analysis in multi-actor policy settings: Navigation between negotiated nonsense and superfluous knowledge. PhD thesis Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology. TRAIL Series.
- Van der Pas, J.W.G.M, D.B. Agusdinata, W.E. Walker, and V.A.W.J. Marchau. 2006. Dealing with Uncertainties in Transport Policymaking: A New Paradigm and Approach. Proceedings of the 11th Meeting of the Euro Working Group on Transportation (Advances in Traffic and Transportation Systems Analysis) and The Extra Euro Conference on "Handling Uncertainty in Transportation: Analyses, New Paradigms, Applications and Comparisons". Bari, Italy: Polytechnic of Bari, Faculty of Engineering, (694-701).
- Van Wee, B. 2002. Land use and transport: research and policy changes. Journal of Transport Geography 10 (4) 259-271.
- Wade, R. 1990. Governing the market: Economic theory and the role of government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press.
- Walker, W.E. 2000. Uncertainty: The challenge for policy Analysis in the 21st Century. Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Delft University of Technology. The Netherlands.
- Ward, M. 1983. Missing the point: sampling methods and types of error in 3rd world surveys. Social Research in Developing countries (125-142) (ed) M. Bulmer and D. Warwick (ed).

- Weiss, C.H. 1987. Where politics and evaluation research meet. The politics of program evaluation D. J. Palumbo (ed) California: Sage. (47–70).
- Weiss, C.H. 1991. Policy research: data, ideas or arguments? P. Wagner et al (ed) Social Sciences and Modern States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (307-332).
- White, L.G. 1990. Implementing policy reforms in less developed countries: A strategy for designing and effecting change. Boulder: Lynne Reiner.
- White, L.G. 1994. Policy analysis as discourse. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 13 (3) 506-525.
- Wildavsky, A. 1973. If planning is everything, maybe it is nothing. Policy Sciences 4 (2) 127-154.
- Wildavsky, A. 1988. Speaking the truth to power. The art and craft of policy analysis. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.
- Wilson, J.Q. 1973. On Pettigrew and Amor: An After Thought. Public Interest (33) 133.
- World Bank. 1986. Urban transport: A World Bank policy study. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- World Bank. 1989. Sub Saharan Africa from crisis to sustainable Growth. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
- World Bank. 1996. Sustainable transport: priorities for policy reform. The World Bank, Washington D.C.: USA.
- World Bank. 1997. Privatisation in Africa: Present and future trends. African Development Bank Group 1997 Annual Meeting Symposium on: Private sector development in Africa. Abidjan. May.
- World Bank. 2000. Reforming public institutions and strengthening governance: A World Bank Strategy. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2001. Transport sector reforms, summary of the operations. Evaluation Department. N° 61. February.
- World Bank. 2002. Cities on the move. A World Bank urban transport strategy. Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- World Bank. 2003a. A lifetime of walking, poverty and transportation in Wuhan, China. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
- World Bank Group, Carleton University, IOB/ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands. 2003b. International Programme for Development Evaluation Training (IPDET). www.worldbank.org/oed/ipdet/

World Bank. 2005. A study of institutional, financial and regulatory frameworks of urban transport in large Sub-Saharan African Cities (SSATPP Working Paper (82). Douala, Dakar, Nairobi, and Kampala) Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

World Bank. 2006. What is Stakeholder analysis? www.worldbank.org

WWW.Kenyaweb.com/ Transport

Yin, R.K. 1994. Case study research: Design and methods. Newbury Parks, London and New Delhi: Sage.

Zeckhauser, R. 1975. Procedures for valuing lives. Public Policy 23(4) 419-464.

Zbigniew, K. 2004. Filling the gap in urban transport: private sector participation in transition countries. London: EBRD.

Appendix 1: Research questionnaire

**(Please it is highly recommended that you always try to explain the questions if the interviewee is not bilingual)
(1998, 1999 and 2000)**

Preliminary Section.

Date.....

Identity of Respondent.....

Introduction:

We are carrying out a study on the new urban transport policy in Yaounde for purely academic purposes and we would like to obtain your opinion about certain aspects of the policy. As you know, you are one of a group of persons who have a great interest in the success or failure of this new policy as you know. We plan to conduct about one hundred interviews of this kind and your opinion will help us a lot to see how the new policy is working in Yaounde.

It is important for us to inform you that you shall in no way and in under no circumstances be identified. You must have come across students who do this type of work for their studies in the University of Yaounde.

Sir/ Madame, we will therefore like to ask you a few questions that will not take much of your time as we know that you are very busy. There is nothing to fear as we are students from the University of Yaounde II, in Soa and it is for purely academic purposes. Thank you in advance.

Section One: What stakeholders know and/or think about the policy reforms.

1. **Have you heard or seen any thing in the transport sector in Yaounde that can make you feel that something new is happening?**
2. **If so what have you seen or heard?**
3. **Can you tell us what you think this new policy is all about?**
4. **Do you think that this new way of urban transport can bring some good things and benefits to people in Yaounde and to you?**
5. **Can you think of any disadvantages to you and you organisation of this new transport system in Yaounde?**
6. **Do you belong to any organisation? If so indicate as appropriate.**
7. **How is the organisation organised, is there a leader who calls meetings to decide what to when there are problems in the transport are in the city?**
8. **How can you yourself describe the new policy of public transport in Yaounde?**
 - a - I very much support it.
 - b - I do support it.
 - c - I do not support it or oppose it.
 - d - I feel that I oppose it.
 - e - I strongly oppose it.

Note that if stakeholders answer **a, b, c**, then continue with the questions below. If they answer **d or e**, pass straight to question **10**.

9. **For those who answered a, b, c, please provide more explanation on the question What things do you support in the new urban transport policy?**
 - a. The arrival of new modes of transport?
 - b. The ability of motorcycles to drop passengers at their doorsteps?
 - c. Traffic is not so much as before?
 - d. Transport fares are now cheaper?
10. **How can you show your support for the new aspects in the new policy that you support?**
 - a. How can you demonstrate this support?
 - b. Can you use money to support this policy?
 - c. Can you make public this support?
 - d. Can you join other people to show this support?
 - e. Do you need any other thing to show your support for this new transport policy?
 - f. How involved are you prepared to go to show your support for? Can you join others to demonstrate in favour of it?
 - g. Can you support for it very quickly if the need arises?

Explain the conditions that will push you not to show support for this policy?

.....

For those who answered d, or e in question 6. Please allow them to answer this question.

11. Which aspects of the new urban transport policy do you oppose?

- The new modes are not comfortable.
- Traffic congestion is still very high.
- The private buses are not there yet.
- Taxis cost more now?
- There is now many more accident with the motorcycle taxis.
- There has been a rise in violence and aggression in taxis.
- The roads are not developed to contain the new traffic flux from the new modes.

12. For the aspects you oppose concerning the urban transport

- a- How can you show your opposition?
- b- Would be prepared to use money to show your support such as pay a Union contribution to help your cause?
- c- Can your opposition to the policy be made public?
- d- Can you join others to show opposition to this policy?
- e- What do you need to show this opposition to this policy?
- f- Can you lead this opposition or want others to do this?
- g- Can you quickly mobilize your opposition to this policy?

13. What aspects can cause you to support this policy?

.....

Section Two: Stakeholder perceptions about policy reforms and how they judge other stakeholders.

Please we shall now ask you to give us your opinion about how this policy is being implemented.

14. Do you know of other people of organisations who support this policy?

15. What do you think these other supporters of the policy gain from it?

16. Which of them do you think can take the lead to support this policy?

17. List the supporters who can work together to support he policy?

18. Explain the conditions that you believe that these supporters can oppose the policy?

19. Who else do you think can support the policy?

20. What do you think that those who oppose the policy can gain from this opposition?

21. List some of these people who would work to oppose the policy and their allies if you can think of any?

22. How and why do you think that those who oppose the policy can be made to support it?

Section Three: Sociological background and mobility habits of respondents.

23. Sex: M. F.

24. Age group

0-11

12-17

18-24

25-40

41-55

56-70 and more.

25. Are you a family head? Yes. No.

If yes underline your monthly income group in CFA francs from the range below.

Note that: One Euro= CFA 656 francs.

Below 25,000

25,000 - 50,000

25,000 - 50,000

50,000 - 75,000

75,000 - 100,000

100,000 - 125,000

125,000 - 150,000

Other (specify)

26. Education level.

Primary school

Secondary School

High School

University

Professional School

Vocational

27. Professional activity (employment)

Self- employed

Private Sector

Public Sector

International sector

NGO

Missionary

Unemployed

Other (specify)

28. Give the name of the location of your school or place of work

.....

29. In which neighbourhood do you live?

.....

30. Name one area in Yaounde that you hate to travel through and state why.

.....

31. Classify the following modes of transport in Yaounde independently of the one you now use often. The number (1) should denote the hypothetical best.

Taxi

Private car

Minibus

Motorcycle

Walk on foot

Bus

Company Transport

Other (Specify)

32. How far is your school or job site from your home?

Less than 1 Km

Between 1 Km -5 Km

Between 5 Km -10 Km

Between 10 Km - 20 Km

Over 20 Km

Other (specify)

33. How much time do you spend travelling to your school or job site in the morning?

Less than 15 minutes

Up to 30 minutes

More than 30 minutes

Other (specify)

34. Has this time lapse changed recently?

If yes, explain any reason(s) you think might explain this.

.....

35. Estimate the fraction of your income you spend on transportation each month.

.....

36. Has this changed in recent years?

.....

37. If yes explain why you think this amount has changed.

.....

38. Do you think that if you changed your mode of transport to school or job site you will spend less? Why?

.....

Section Four: Respondent evaluation of the means of transport used regularly in Yaounde.

(Tick your choice in the boxes provided)

39. What is your perception of these modes of transport that you use regularly?

1. Taxi:

Taxi

Taxi

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Very comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Very convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Very reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not Know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know |

2. Bus: (SOTUC)

Bus

Bus

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Very comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Very convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Very reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not Know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know |

3. Buses (Private:

Buses

Buses

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Very comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Very convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Very reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not Know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know |

4. Minibus:

Minibus

Minibus

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Very comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Very convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Very reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not Know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know |

5. Walking on foot: Walking on foot Walking on foot

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Very comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Very convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Very reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not Know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know |

6. Motor taxi: Motor taxi Motor taxi

- | | | |
|---|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Very comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Very convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Very reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Fairly reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> neutral | <input type="checkbox"/> Neutral |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not Comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Not convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Not reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all comfortable | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all convenient | <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all reliable |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not Know | <input type="checkbox"/> Do not know |

Explain the reasons for your choice(s) in the evaluation above.

.....

Section five: Respondent perception of how policy reform achieved its objective.**40. Assess the extent to which the new transport policy has achieved the following objectives. (Tick your choice)**

5	4	3	2	1	0
Very well	Well	Neutral	Not well enough	Not well	Not at all well

- 1) Liberalise the sector
- 2) Eradicate amateurism
- 3) Facilitate urban mobility
- 4) Ban clandestine transporters
- 5) Make city traffic flow fluidly
- 6) Fight

Pollution

Do you have any other thing to add?

.....

41. As users of urban public transport or transporter choose the term which best describes to you the current transport system in Yaounde.

5	4	3	2	1	0
Very well	Well	Neutral	Not well enough	Not well	Not at all well

- 1) Its Efficiency
- 2) Its Comfort
- 3) Its Cost to uses
- 4) Its Reliability
- 5) Its Security
- 6) The timeliness of such a system

Do you have any other thing to add?

.....

Section Six: Respondent assessment of the transport system in Yaounde.

42. What do you dislike most about the Yaounde urban transport system?

.....

43. Specify any changes or improvements that you can recommend to the authorities as concerns transport and mobility in Yaounde. Explain the importance of your suggestion.

.....

Thank you for your cooperation.

Appendix 2: Problems of public policy researchers in Third World countries

Introduction

Appendix two examines the problems related to carrying out social research in developing countries such as: the lack of data, difficulties in data collection, documentation, supervisory guidance and resistance from policy stakeholders. Evidence from this thesis helps in the analysis of the similarities, differences and dilemmas facing researchers in the task of analysing public urban transport policy reforms. It is important in this section of the appendix to highlight these issues so as to elucidate some of the limitations of this thesis and bring out the merits of the exercise despite the difficulties that exist in developing countries related to the conduct of social policy research in the absence of base data, the paucity of financial resources to engage in field work, the ultra sensitive character of public policy research which is at the heart of politics and the quest to satisfy promises made to the electorate especially in a situation where social and economic development demands are extremely high. Government officials and policymakers are reluctant to conduct policy evaluations for fear that findings could reveal lapses in the policy formulation, design and implementation phases of the interventions. As Bamberger (1991) points out, they prefer instead to monitor policies, projects and programmes.

Riley (2000) and Smith (1985) highlight the differences in the public policy context between developing areas and the West. Morah (1995) elucidates the reasons for the lack of optimal implementation of public policies in developing countries. A cross-analysis of the postulations of these authors points principally to the differences in the governance traditions of the two areas that negatively affect policy processes in developing areas more than in the West.

The next section explicates some of the public policy problems faced by researchers in developing country contexts like in Cameroon, and explains the implications of these problems for this thesis.

1. Weaknesses in public policy formulation, design, administration implementation, monitoring and evaluation in developing countries

Many authors including Smith (1985) and Harris (1990) analysed policymaking in developed and developing country contexts. The two authors highlight the fact that the nature of political

regimes in the West facilitates gradualist policy processes characterised by incremental policy reforms and an open policy environment with a bureaucracy that is highly professional. They also highlight certain problems of conducting policy analysis in developing country contexts such as Cameroon. They posit that developing countries after independence had high hopes for their development but have not been able in many cases to build mechanisms for policy manoeuvres existing in Western countries. In many instances developing countries tried many innovative policies that ended in disaster such as the experiences with socialism in States such as Tanzania. Harris proposed a method of policy analysis that combines rationalism, flexibility and incremental policy reforms as a way out for policy problems in developing countries. He noted that better efforts at sequencing can help advance the cause of policies aimed at development. In Africa, as Harris notes, solutions that depend on dogma are sometimes doomed from the start when the solution proposed runs contrary to the prevailing dogma. In the next section, some of the key dilemmas facing public policymaking and the work of public policy researchers are discussed.

1.1. Socio - political and economic context

In a developing political context such as Cameroon, avenues for debates and criticisms of projected public policies are usually limited and often absent. Almost every phase in the policy process is under governmental and administrative control. Even at this level it is usually possible to document difficulties in inter-governmental relations aimed at achieving a given public policy's' goals as the system is often beset with the poor disposition of public policy implementers to fully grasp goal clarity and the utility of communication in a policy reform setting which aims to bring all stakeholders on board in a consensual manner for better results. This aspect is compounded by what has been called the lack of political will to implement needed but unpopular public policies that might have some impact on powerful stakeholders in the political establishment. There is a dilemma here, for, the most useful forms of evaluation are difficult to apply primarily for political reasons. There is of course a great deal of realism in this dilemma: problems which can be identified by an implementation analysis may not be amenable to easy solutions and some may be inherent in the society or political administrative system as Smith (1985) pointed out. The functional problems and obstacles to the optimal implementation of policies in Africa summarised generally by Morah (1995) remain valid today as far as urban transport policy reforms of Cameroon are concerned. There is in addition, the lack of built in mechanisms for monitoring and eventually evaluating policy orientation and the lessons to be learned from past experiences. History, geography, culture and traditions in matters of policy differ greatly with that of the west where the liberal political system has a long history and tradition of open debates and gradual incremental policies; generated by interest groups, lobbies and party ideologies in an accepted democratic framework are absent in developing countries making the business of policymaking fraught with uncertainties.

1.2. Rarity of baseline data, research institutions and publications

The research traditions and open policy environment which fuels debates on social policy among western intellectuals in universities and other Think Tanks rarely exists in developing countries to the point that most social research on issues in developing countries is conducted by westerners. Applied social research training is not a priority in developing country contexts such as Cameroon. The example of urban public transport in Cameroon is very edifying. The literature, which exists, is found in books and journal written either by the World Bank or researchers from Western donor institutions such as European Union and universities. Under these circumstances, it becomes difficult for the ordinary researcher in Cameroon to conduct

further research without the means to collect data. Often administrative records and data that exist are usually considered state secrets to which access is highly restricted if not prohibited.

1.3. Resistance for innovation and imported solutions to problems

While there are no development models that can perfectly fit the murky developing country political context for policy making. There are nevertheless certain “best practices” that can be copied to promote social development and progress in an area such as public urban transport. But what obtains can simply be described as muddling through. The regime type as far as the policy process is concerned is unique and lacks the institutions, structures, and intellectual base to conduct policy in the urban transport domain. No doubt recourse is usually made to foreign experts who hardly master the local realities of the system involved to fly in and propose policy solutions that will hardly satisfy the needs of the people especially if the proposed remedies and models are based on economic benefits. Often these policies are adopted although there may be the likelihood that they do not address the particular developmental goals of the people for the simple reason that they neglect the crucial aspect of stakeholder participation, which has now been recognised as key to policy success.

1.4. Absence of formal procedures for public policy formulation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation

In most developing countries, like in Cameroon, there is only a vague respect for the theoretical concept of a policy cycle as Smith (1985) and others have pointed out. It is common in Cameroon for occasional bursts of announcement by senior public officials to become public policy without the methodological phases that provide the basis for discussion and debate including criticisms of how such a policy will benefit the public and at what costs. The implementation of such policies may never take place as theory assumes. It is therefore important that during this era of policy based lending when multilateral and bilateral donors can exert considerable leverage on developing countries efforts to encourage sound public policies in the spirit of good governance should be encouraged and even imposed as part of the conditionality for financial support. This will permit social policy development interventions acquire improved chances of meeting their anticipated objectives. Besides, if the activities in the public policy cycle are carried out it will be possible for developing societies to use monitoring and evaluation to learn lessons about public policy problems during implementation and take the necessary remedial measures in the interest of the livelihoods of the poor and general interest. But if however, these foreign donors and partners of developing countries continue to rely on cost benefit analysis as their tools to assess impacts of their funding, there is reason to believe that development and change will be difficult to achieve in many developing countries because methodological tools used to evaluate change are based on notions and assumptions that are acceptable to authoritarian regimes and to international donors because these methodologies ignore the problems of policy related to its effectiveness such as handling uncertainties in policy implementation. These methodologies fail both in provision and use of information necessary for improving public policy as well as to indicate to policy formulators and implementers where public policy problems are located and identify the stakeholder groups, individuals who are responsible for this.

1.5. Paucity and misallocation of public policy resources

Campbell (1979) advises that evaluators should concentrate only on policy alternatives and ignore the influence of programme administrators on policy recipients. This assertion cannot be taken seriously in a developing country context such as Cameroon if public policy researchers are serious and honest about investigating why policies succeed or fail. Administrators and target groups are not neutral entities; they have interests, and positions in

public policy as all stakeholders do. They also have a very direct impact upon the result of public policies. In the Third World countries despite the paucity of public policy resources, the problem of their misallocation has been well documented by many authors including: Ackermann (1999), Kaufmann (1999), Mwenda and Tangri (1994) Riley (1999) and Landell-Mills (1994). Often, both policy administrators and target groups have been identified as being responsible for policy failures for different reasons.

2. Possible solutions for improving conduct of public policy in developing countries and realise development objectives

This section proposes some simple, innovative and pragmatic manner of formulating public policy and for carrying out research on public policy in developing country contexts that assumes that the lack of policy resources alone does not constitute the main obstacle. Political leaders must accept that sometimes there is the absence of administrative and technical capacity to reflect on appropriate development oriented public policies and take steps to remedy the situation. Policy makers should also arm themselves with the political will and commitment for social development. As for policy making, political leaders should adopt and codify as far as possible the following stages:

Firstly, public policy problems should be identified and examined in open participatory debates in truly legislative institutions in which the civil society can make fruitful contributions.

Secondly, considerable analysis must be carried out in a critical and rational spirit and procedures devised that can work allowing the policy to be implemented. Harris (1990) posits that in developing states there is a need to think differently and governments may desire to make general improvements in education, transport, and health or city environment. Where a uniform improvement is needed such as in the urban public transport domain, the operations of the market may be inadequate. There will often be a need to find minimum standards such as those relating to basic needs of the entire population. The operations of the black market and the impact of bureaucratic corruption may involve heavy social costs in Africa especially. But African governments sometimes perceive Western public policy analysis as culture bound activity and as unnecessarily scientific or sometimes rhetorically term it as a form of imperialism. What they fail to know is that, Western states are already modern and may improve themselves in particular ways that are not feasible in Africa. Development countries seek modernisation and the agents of modernisation are governments. In a developing country an objective policy analysis may be difficult to achieve and so most of the policy analysis stages, proposed by theorists cannot be applied to the developing country context. Smith (1985) noted that institutions, structures and processes of government vary significantly throughout the world.

In the Third World a plethora of regime types are prevalent, ranging from military juntas to parliamentary democracies and from monarchies to radical revolutionary regimes. Some have quite common features such as chronic instability with unscheduled leadership or regime changes and a tendency towards bureaucratic authoritarianism through a combination of military and civilian authorities. A strong and functioning opposition to the ruling government, so common to the political system of North American and Western Europe, is not prevalent and if there is an active opposition, in most cases, it is ignored or suppressed. It is no surprise that the process of policy formulation is so different from the slow deliberative processes in countries where public policy analysis, public policy studies and programmes evaluation are developed. Sloan (1982)) comments on Latin American experience in public

policy formulation and points out that the politics of achieving development whether pursued by civilian or military regimes, is burdened and distorted by the politics of regime survival virtually every regime is considered alien and inappropriate by varying but significant portions of its citizens. He further notes, that political instability in Latin America forces policymakers to employ scarce resources to attain legitimacy, or at least survival, rather than developmental objectives. There are pressures to follow policies that will have short-term pay-offs even though the eventual effects may be negative for development. Policymaking becomes characterised by sudden policy announcements by governmental leaders without debate in legislative bodies (which many not exist) and without consultation with affected groups or individuals. The illegitimacy of governments may result in the government taking office by force and declaring the policies of the previous regime to be void and promoting new ones it takes over power.

Third world regimes are vulnerable to the point that they are adopting trendy development strategies such as basic needs, integrated development advocated by influential international agencies privatisations, liberalisation, and deregulation without the appropriate debates and reflections on the implications of these policies to the sectors concerned or their populations. Wildavsky (1979) observed that although planning is in vogue among Third World nations, the plans are often only vague guidelines for government action and once prepared are not fully used for the purpose for policy making except in the remotest sense of the term. Yet, there are policy analysts in the Third World who are mainly economists. Rondinelli (1982) pointed out that economists had an obsession for quantitative solutions to problem solving by adopting the systems management approach that had a paternalistic view of rural development by administrators. Data and knowledge base for policy formulation is inadequate in Third World countries creating bias in the capacity of planners to propose realistically pro-people development solutions.

In the West, public policies are incremental and policies tend to be extensions of what already exists. But in the Third World countries make broad and ambitious development plans. Because of their histories, after independence many developing countries sought to catch up with the rest of the world. This objective required new policies that needed considerable skill, both human and in terms of training. But constant regime changes ruined policy processes in many cases. These countries were thus faced with problems that had never been solved elsewhere on earth. Many policy initiatives in developing countries needed large bureaucracies to handle them. Most regimes had a tendency to think and imagine grandiose projects. These also required massive changes of attitudes that provoked resistances from those affected and the big policies floundered because they tended to deprive powerful interests groups of their sources of power and livelihood.

When a government makes a policy in the Third world, it is assumed that the policy will be implemented and some of the anticipated outcomes will be achieved. However, there are immense slippages when it comes to translating these policies into concrete activities during the implementation phases, which are fraught with uncertainty. Many policies remain only symbolic statements by political leaders or laws on statute books, while others that are implemented achieve little of what was originally expected. Many policies are designed by and involve people from diverse regions of many countries whose perspectives may not necessarily be the same and are sometimes in competition. Hence, the people who intend to benefit from them do not participate in the design of many development policies.

The next section discusses how this thesis tried to overcome these hurdles for conducting social policy research in a developing country context.

3. Strategies used for this research in spite contextual hurdles.

The problems of doing social policy research in a developing country context are many and affect the nature of research produced under such circumstances. However, this research exercise was designed and conducted with the full knowledge of these impediments and used several strategies to avoid these hurdles from affecting the research output. These strategies are explained in this section.

1. We used the Participant Action Research (PAR) (Participant Observation) or Participatory Learning (PL) as the latter is now often called, to learn and understand through observations from within, the transport sector and obtain information on the subject in Yaounde. In fact, as a survival strategy I became an urban public transporter of a mini bus so I was acquainted with the policies and praxis in the field. That was a decade ago. I also kept personal records that have helped a lot in this present research exercise.
2. We benefited in data collection from stakeholders through the position that I hold as a university teacher and worker at the Presidency of the Republic. Collecting information was usually informal through personal contacts with key persons involved in the sector who were sometimes the custodians of important documents on urban public transport especially access to the records department of Ministry of Transport.
3. We systematically collected copies of the official daily newspaper *Cameroon tribune* that publish statutes on many issues including the urban transport sector.
4. The paucity of research books, journals in the field was circumvented by recourse to the Internet which became a major resource for me to obtain data on the subject in other developing country cities and access to key sources referred to in this thesis.
5. Despite the absence of official public and private funding for this research, our determination to pursue knowledge and carry out research for a higher degree led us to use of our limited financial resources and means to have access to the Internet, travel in the city of Yaounde elaborately and devote considerable time over many years to conduct the survey with the help of some of our students who were also carrying out term paper research.

Appendix 3: Characteristics of the urban transport system in Yaounde

1. Introduction

In this appendix, issues related to the problems of transport infrastructure and traffic congestion in Yaounde are examined. The aim is to demonstrate the functioning of the public transport system in Yaounde and highlight a relationship between traffic congestion and paucity of existing road infrastructure despite the policy reform. This appendix seeks to provide answers to the following questions:

1. What was the quality of the transport infrastructure in Yaounde before the 1990 policy reforms?
2. What changed with respect to the quality of the transport infrastructure after the introduction of the policy reforms?

In the absence of all data needed for this analysis, those that are created by the researcher indicate a major limitation of the policy reform process in the 1990s aimed to increase supply of public transport without adequately addressing transport infrastructure that is a major determinant in a holistic transport policy approach. The characteristics of road infrastructure network in Yaounde are analysed before and after the policy reform. The first question in this appendix can be answered with aid of available data from secondary sources and those collected by the researcher. These data point to the fact that the development of transport infrastructure and urban planning has not kept pace either with population growth in Yaounde (see Chapter five). Yaounde's population according to the *Atlas of Cameroon* by *Jeune Afrique* (2007) is estimated at 1.5 million inhabitants as against 650,000 recorded in the last official national census in 1987). The analysis in this appendix is based on the fact that transport policy efficiency is a function not only of modes of transport and their numbers but also on the appropriateness of the road infrastructure that these modes and increased traffic will use. To perform this analysis, data and information on many determinants related to infrastructure such as: road network condition, road width, lanes markings, availability of kerbs, carriageways and boulevards, pedestrian walks, pedestrian crossings, gutters for run-off water, junctions, fly-over, traffic signals, pedestrian walks and one-way streets, are needed. Although most of these data and information such as: taxi stations, modal split and number of

trips and persons per kilometres are not available, some however exist. Data from existing sources together with some created by this researcher are used in this appendix to analyse the characteristics of transport infrastructure and mobility in Yaounde. The map below (Appendix Figure 3.1 of Cameroon) shows the location of Yaounde, the capital city.

Appendix Figure 3.1: Map of Cameroon showing location of Yaounde, the capital city



Source *Jeune Afrique* 2007, *Atlas du Cameroun*.

2. Characteristics of bus lines in Yaounde

The characteristics of the road infrastructure network in Yaounde were analysed in 1998 by the Sub-Directorate for Urban and Road Transport in the Ministry of Transport. The analysis was based on what the Ministry identified as bus lines. The bus lines use the main roads in the city that are also used by motor vehicle traffic especially bus traffic because of the size of buses. More general information on roads in Yaounde is not available. These bus lines contain bus stops. Following in Appendix Table 3.1 is a synopsis of the 1998 Ministry of Transport general analysis of the state of the urban road network in Yaounde.

Appendix Table 3.1: Synopsis of Bus lines in Yaounde in 1998 and 2008

Bus Line Number	Destinations	Length	Characteristics of road on bus lines in 1998	Characteristics of road on bus line in 2008
1.	Lycée Bilingue-Tsinga (Sub Divisional Office)	10Km	Good	Good
2.	Ekombitié- Etoug Ebe	17.6Km	Bad from Melen Market to Handicap Centre in Etoug Ebe	Good
3.	Lycee Bilingue-Mbankolo	13.4Km	Largely Good	Good
3. Bis	Lycee Bilingue-Anguissa-Mbankolo	11Km	Very bad from the Elf filling station Emombo-Lyce Anguissa The rest Good	Good
4.	Mimboman-Mbankolo	12.8Km	Good	Good
5.	Nsimeyong- Tsinga (Sub Divisional Office)	9.6Km	Very bad from Shell Nsimeyong to Obili Junction	Good
6.	Nkoa-Abang-Mballa II	11Km	Good in some parts and not in others	Good
6. Bis	Nkoa-Abang-Tsinga	14Km	Largely Good	Good
7.	Zamengoue- Eton-Messa	10Km	Good	Good
7. Bis	Cité Verte Estate-Odza	14.3Km	Good	Good
8.	Cité Mendong Estate – General Hospital	18.9 Km	Good	Good
9.	Ahala- Etoudi-Abatoir	14.8Km	Not Good in some sections of the Line in Rue Mangier	Good
10.	Soa- Université Yaounde I	20.2Km	Good	Good

Source: Sub-Directorate for Urban and Road Transport in the Ministry of Transport 1998.

In Table 3.1 above the term:

Good, refers to roads that are tarred and do not contain potholes capable of slowing down or damaging an urban public transport bus,

Not good, in some places refers to a road in which there are potholes,

Largely good, indicates a road that has a few patches of potholes, which are insignificant to effect bus traffic,


Very bad, indicates roads which are not tarred and which have potholes so that when it rains it is unusable for urban bus traffic and during the dry season clouds of dust rise as vehicles pass, and,

Bad, indicates a road that has potholes but can be used by bus traffic all year round.

These labels for 1998 were obtained through the inspections and observation analysis of transport engineers in the Sub-Directorate for Urban and Road Transport in the Ministry of

Transport. The labels for the state of roads in Yaounde in 2008 used by this researcher are similar to those used in 1998 by the Ministry of Transport officials.

Appendix Figure 3.2: Map of Yaounde showing the main streets in bold type and the other motor roads in ordinary type



Source: Yaounde City Council 2003 Scale: 1:1.5Km.

The synopsis of the road network characteristics of Yaounde indicates that almost all the major streets defined as bus lines can be described as good. This means that they are surfaced

roads. However, these streets are not wide enough to support current traffic needs. Appendix Table 3.2 that presents the Traffic Signal situation for selected junctions in Yaounde between 1987 and 2007 indicates that the majority of the major junctions in Yaounde in 2007 lack the necessary infrastructures such as sufficient traffic signals to help make traffic circulation.

3. Road infrastructure

In this section we evaluate the road infrastructure in Yaounde. To understand congestion in Yaounde, it is important to examine infrastructure over a long time span considering that population growth and increased demand for mobility as well as increases in motor vehicles and motorcycles will necessitate additional improvement in infrastructure to cope.

3.1. Traffic signal at junctions

Appendix Table 3.2 shows the Traffic Signal situation for selected junctions in Yaounde between 1987 and 2007. The base year of 1987 was selected because the most recent population census for Yaounde dates from that year (see chapter seven). Forty-five major junctions were purposefully selected for analysis. The table indicates the location of the junctions. The twenty-year time lapse includes the period before and after the policy reform. In the table, 'Yes' stands for the presence of traffic signal at a junction and 'None' for the absence. Yes/out stands for the presence of signal that is not functioning. The researcher constructed a rating scale of 1 to 3 in which 1 stands for low congestion in which vehicles spend less than five minutes, 2 stands for high congestion in which vehicles spend between ten and fifteen minutes and 3 stands for very high congestion in which vehicles spend between fifteen and twenty minutes at very low speed. These result times are the averages from three observation and recording exercises carried out by the researcher.

Appendix Table 3.2: Traffic Signal situation for selected junctions in Yaounde between 1987 and 2007

	Junction identification and location in city	1987 The existence of Traffic signal at the junction in this year	2007 The existence of Traffic signal at the junction and their functionality in this year	Observation/ Congestion Rating at Rush Hours
1	Central Post Office	Yes	Yes	3
2	Mvog Mbi	None	None	3
3	French Cultural Centre	Yes	Yes	3
4	Pharmacy Soleil	None	None	3
5	Warda	Yes	Yes	3
6	Madagascar Pharmacy	Yes	Yes	1
7	Madagascar Market	Yes	Yes	2
8	Mokolo Texaco	Yes	Yes	1
9	Niki Shop Mokolo	Yes	Yes	2
10	University Hospital	Yes/ Out	Yes	3
11	Nlongkak Valley	Yes/Out	None	3
12	Nlongkak Bata	Yes	Yes	3
13	Elig Edzoa	None	None	3

	Junction identification and location in city	1987 The existence of Traffic signal at the junction in this year	2007 The existence of Traffic signal at the junction and their functionality in this year	Observation/ Congestion Rating at Rush Hours
14	Douala Motorpark	None	None	3
15	Ecole Departementale	None	None	3
16	EMIA	Yes	Yes	1
17	Melen Market	None	None	3
18	Obili	None	None	3
19	Biyem Assi	None	None	3
20	Acacia	None	None	3
21	MINEDUC	None	None	3
22	Behind Capitol Cinema	None	None	3
23	Camair	None	None	3
23	Elig Essono	None	None	2
24	Pharmacy Intendance	None	None	3
25	Monté Zoe	None	None	3
26	Officers' Mess	None	None	1
27	Mbalmayo Park	None	None	2
28	Tsinga Fecafoot HQ	None	None	1
29	Etoudi Market	None	None	3
30	Tongolo Entrance to West Province Park	Yes/out	None	1
31	Texaco Omnisport	None	None	1
32	Mobil Omnisport	None	None	3
33	Total Ngouso	None	None	3
34	Olezoa Mobil	None	Yes	3
35	Pharmacy Olezoa	Yes	Yes	3
36	Trois Statuts	None	None	3
37	CRADAT	None	None	3
38	Bastos	None	None	3
39	Labogenie	Yes/Out	Yes	3
40	Emombo 1 and 2	None	None	3
41	Coron	None	None	3
42	Mvan	None	None	3
43	Palais des Congrès	None	None	2
44	Essos Market	None	None	3
45	Etoudi Zebra Crossing	None	None	1

In our sample of 45 major junctions in Yaounde, there are 32 very highly congested junctions representing (71%). There are 5 highly congested junctions representing (11%) and 8 low congestion junctions representing (18%). From this indicative sample it is possible to note that during rush hours many junctions in Yaounde experience considerable traffic congestion. Our observation of the traffic situation in Yaounde shows that at junctions not equipped with traffic signal, wardens control traffic. Researcher observation points to the fact that the

fluidity of traffic at junctions equipped with traffic signal appears to be superior to those with wardens.

3.2. Road width

In this section we consider the width of a road because wider streets with more lanes allow traffic to flow better and therefore reduce the potential for congestion. This researcher identified six road stretches in Yaounde are carriageways with three lanes on each side. These carriageway streets were built before 1987. That is before the introduction of the policy reform. They are:

1. Nlongkak Roundabout to Etoudi State House junction.
2. Nlongkak Roundabout to Texaco Omnispport.
3. Melen Marché/ University Hospital to Ecole Departmental.
4. Avenue Germaine to Essos Market.
5. Mokolo Market to Madagascar Pharmacy.
6. Palais des Congres to Bastos Primary School junction.

The surfaced roads in Yaounde are between four and eight metres wide and carriageways have widths of fifteen to thirty meters wide. Since the debut of the policy reforms carriageways that can absorb increased vehicle traffic from new means of mobility such as motorcycle taxi have not been developed in the city. Besides, only one flyover that links the two sections of the city was constructed along the New Bastos road behind the War Veteran Building in 2001.

3.3. One-way streets

This researcher counted two one-way streets in Yaounde created between 1987 and 2007. These are:

1. Mvog Mbi Roundabout through Mvo Mbi Market to Mvog Atangana Mballa
2. Ministry of Public Service junction through Central Hospital to Messa Housing Estate.


3.4. New surfaced roads

The road network in Yaounde has improved since 2001 in some ways with the building of some new roads and the carrying out of maintenance works in sections of many others that had been neglected for two decades. It is important to note that the building of a carriage way is crucial for urban circulation as it facilitates circulation in urban traffic because vehicles travelling in opposite directions do not struggle for space as is the case with the simple streets. Flyovers are needed along many roads in Yaounde but have not yet been constructed. Carriageways are much wider two way streets with many lanes that permit traffic to flow fluidly in both New Bastos Road, New Omnispport Road, the Emombo to Nkomo road, the Rue Manguier road, the Nkomo to Nkodengui Mobil Station road, the Emombo Sapeur Pompier to Nkoa Abang road, the Cité Verte to Etoug Ebe road and the College Vogt to Obili Roundabout road.

3.5. Map of Yaounde showing road density

The maps analysis aims to give a visual presentation of the density of roads and streets network in Yaounde that can be used by vehicles. The aim of this analysis resides in the fact that because Yaounde has a road – based transport system, the denser the road network, the more likely will it be to handle increased volumes of traffic.

Appendix Figure 3.3: General Plan of principal streets in Yaounde



Source : Ministère Français des Relations Extérieures. Scale: 1:1.500Km.

Appendix Figure 3.2 shows the paucity of road infrastructure for vehicles compared to built-up areas in Yaounde. This shows the key city locations and streets. The roads link mainly the central business district in the city centre and the urban area. The peri-urban areas are not shown. It also indicates that in Yaounde there is a higher density of major roads in the city centre. This corresponds to the older part of the city built during the colonial era and

constitutes the administrative and business areas of the city around the main central post office junction. Apart from major streets, there are few roads in the neighbourhoods that can be used by motor vehicles. This situation has favoured the proliferation of motorcycle taxis in Yaounde along streets that are either too narrow or in a very bad state that vehicles, including taxis, avoid using them. Roads occupy a very small proportion of the urban land in Yaounde compared to major cities in Europe, Japan and North America.

3.6. Taxi Stations

While some bus stops have been built in the past two years for Le bus urban transport service, there are no conventional taxis or motorcycle stations in Yaounde. Motorcycle taxis and conventional taxis practice Stop and Go. These modes of public passenger transport pick and drop clients anywhere along the road. In Yaounde congestion can occur whenever taxis stop to pick up clients. Although there are no survey data available, researcher observations indicate that the modal split is still largely in favour of conventional taxis. Motorcycle taxis are ranked second followed by urban bus service and minibuses are the least used mode.

3.7. Conclusion

In this appendix, we set out to seek answers to the following question:

1. What was the quality of the transport infrastructure in Yaounde before the 1990 policy reforms? 2. What changed with respect to the quality of the transport infrastructure after the introduction of the policy reforms?

As concerns the first question in appendix three we can not that the road infrastructure before the reform was generally bad with many streets not tarred and difficult to use by vehicles; in many instances road signals were absent just as were pedestrian walks marked street lanes and pedestrian crossings; the widths of the road infrastructures were also not convenient to carry the traffic volume.

As concerns the second question, it is important to note that there has been a significant attempt to improve the road infrastructure in Yaounde since the introduction of the policy reform. Although the volume of traffic and the number of modes of mobility, which now includes motorcycle taxis, appears to be largely inadequate for current traffic demands. The characteristics of road infrastructure network in Yaounde indicate that the streets in the urban zone are in generally good state. However, the paucity of traffic signals at major junctions is a handicap for the fluid flow of traffic in the city.

The city has not invested sufficiently in modern infrastructure developments for roads such as flyovers and extension of road width that could be able to carry the increased demand from motorists and other road users.

Generally we can conclude that between 1987 and 2007 the road network in Yaounde has improved in some ways with the building and surfacing of some new roads. But these are insufficient to contain observed current traffic demands. Maps of Yaounde transport infrastructure shows that the urban space devoted to roads for vehicle transport in Yaounde is very low for a city whose transport system is road-based. The density of roads that can be used by vehicles is low.

The quasi absence of motorcycle and conventional taxi parks causes these public transport vehicles to stop just anywhere and carry passenger creating traffic jams along main city arteries.

The policy reform was mainly devoted to increasing the supply of modes of public transport but neglected another crucial component in urban transport that is infrastructure development and planning in view of providing solutions arising from urban growth, as is the case in Yaounde. This neglect appears to lead to congestion in the streets of the city and the subsequent long travel times thus mitigating the impact of increasing supply of means of transport in Yaounde. The programming and development of adequate road transport infrastructure is an important determinant in any transport policy. In Yaounde, the population growth noted in chapter five leads to increase in demand and use of public and private transportation. Yaounde city authorities and the government need to embark on an ambitious infrastructure development policy for wider streets/roads and junctions, create many adequate taxi stations, bus stops, install and modernise road traffic signals to satisfy demands of mobility in the city.

Summary

1. Thesis background and context of reform

The thesis examines the organisational and functional problems of urban public transport in Yaounde before the introduction reforms in the 1990s and assesses the effects of these reforms on the transport system in the city. Urban public transport in Yaounde before the introduction of policy reforms in the 1990s was facing major problems principally a shortage in the means of urban mobility. At that time, shared taxis and the state-owned urban transport company, *Société des Transports Urbains du Cameroun* (SOTUC), were legally authorised to provide urban public transport services in the city. During this period, other factors notably the devaluation of the currency, Coopération Financière Africaine (CFA) francs rendered the provision of urban transport services in Cameroon in general and in Yaounde in particular more expensive and less profitable especially for the state-owned company. As concerns shared taxis, their roadworthiness conditions and numbers declined considerably as a result of the currency devaluation that caused the prices of motor vehicle spare parts imported into the country to double. The currency devaluation also produced similar effects on SOTUC. Besides, the company was experiencing managerial problems resulting in massive deficits that forced the state to liquidate the company after many unsuccessful bail-out attempts, in accordance with prescriptions of the Bretton Woods Institutions under the Structural Adjustment Programme and the Policy Based Lending scheme that required the state to become a minimal regulatory state and adopt market friendly policies that were essential ingredients of the dominant neo-liberal development paradigm of the era.

In addition, in Yaounde, the mainly road-based transport system was in an advanced state of decay after many years of neglect as the state was undergoing structural adjustment. Few new roads were built; many streets remained narrow. Poor drainage, overflowing gutters and uncollected garbage from households blocked some key streets in many parts of the city and these streets were unable to handle the ever-increasing traffic aggravating the congestion problem in Yaounde. In addition, the non-maintenance of vast stretches of the road network rendered mobility in Yaounde cumbersome because potholes along many streets caused shared taxis to shun these streets and increased travel times. Furthermore, the absence of or non-functional state of traffic signals at many junctions in Yaounde was often the cause of huge traffic jams at these junctions. Before the policy reforms there were no marked

pedestrian crossings or walks in the city and its streets had no marked out lanes for vehicles. The result was massive congestions in many parts of the city especially at road junctions. As a result of the shortage in the means of transport in Yaounde, the fares for using shared taxis were becoming unaffordable for a large fraction of the city's population. The transport problems in Yaounde are not unique to the city because similar problems occur in many cities in developing countries.

It is within this context of a shortage in the means of urban public transport that policymakers in Cameroon designed urban transport reforms and set the following six policy objectives for these reforms:

1. Liberalize and decontrol public urban transport by bus, minibus, and motorcycle.
2. Eradicate amateurism by promoting the entry of professionals into the sector.
3. Facilitate mobility for the rapidly growing city.
4. Enable urban traffic to flow fluidly by reducing congestion.
5. Limit and eventually eradicate illegal transporters.
6. Fight urban pollution attributable to public transport.

For policymakers, the goal of these six policy objectives was to increase the supply of the means of urban mobility through the drafting and implementation of statutory instruments that will transform their intentions into public policy and increase public transport supply in Yaounde. By so doing, they intended to fill the gap created after the liquidation of the state-owned urban transport company by bus, SOTUC.

The policy reforms intended to remove the legal barriers preventing private entrepreneurs from providing public transport by bus, minibus and motorcycles so as to increase the supply in the means of urban public transport and also make it affordable.

The intended policy reforms were:

1. Shortening of procedures for Registering as a Road Transporter.
2. Facilitation of the issuing of the « Carte Bleue ».
3. Institution of two categories of road transporters license.
4. Computerisation of vehicle matriculation certificate.
5. Liberalisation of urban transport by minibusses, motorcycles and buses.
6. Creation of a commission to evaluate bids of operators of bus lines in cities.
7. Reduction of Customs duty for imported vehicles.
8. Prescription of new rates for Third Party Liability motor vehicle insurance.
9. Institution of identification badges for taxi drivers.
10. Institution of crash helmets for motorcycle taxi drivers.
11. Re-organisation of Transport Offices.
12. Creation of a special windscreen license for vehicles.
13. Protection of national road network and control environmental pollution.
14. Privatisation of technical inspection of motor vehicles.

This thesis has identified the occurrence of some anticipated policy outcomes as well as the non-occurrences of others. We traced this situation from the uncertainty and unpredictability in policy implementation and outcome. However, the following reasons can explain the non-occurrence of desired policy outcomes: 1. Partial implementation of policy activities 2. Bureaucratic bottlenecks affect pace of policy implementation. 3. Slippages occurred in the interpretation of statutes that tended to put implementation on hold. 4. Lack of resources to implement policies has sometimes provoked opposition to the reforms from stakeholder groups. 5. Lack of political to empower local governance in transport policy matters and 6. The lack of monitoring and use of new information on the policy reforms.

Policymakers aimed to achieve the desired policy goal of increasing the supply of the means of public transport in Yaounde by facilitating the acquisition of licences, reducing administrative bottlenecks and corruption in the urban transport sector and instilling measures to improve transparency and accountability in the issuance of public transport vehicle documents. This transport policy reform is a national policy with perfect overlap for Yaounde.

2. Research gap, aims of thesis and research questions

a. Research gap

There is a lot of uncertainty with respect to policy implementation and outcomes. The knowledge about the cause-effect relationship that links public policy implementation processes to the occurrence of intended and unintended policy outcomes is largely lacking in current literature. This thesis is different from previous works in the field because it uses empirical knowledge on what happened in practice in Cameroon, due to policy implementation and links it to policy outcomes, in view of bridging this knowledge gap using the case study of Yaounde. This thesis seeks explanations using primary data on changes in mobility, infrastructure and the transport system of Yaounde after policy reforms. By identifying the categories of stakeholders, their interests, their role and actions in transport reform process in Yaounde, this thesis hopes to identify the determinants for the success or failure of policy reforms.

b. Aims of thesis

The goal of the thesis is to explicate the occurrence and non-occurrence of certain anticipated policy outcomes through the evaluation of the implementation of the policy reforms. The level of implementation of the policy reforms is the result of the uncertainty in policy implementation processes. This thesis identifies the nature of governance structures in the policy context of Yaounde as being responsible for the level of policy implementation because it permits certain categories of key stakeholders to use their positions of power to promote group interests that negatively affects policy outcomes. The thesis also highlights a major flaw in transport policymaking that neglects the crucial role of developing infrastructure to satisfy mobility needs arising from increases in modes of public transport and population growth. This thesis also aims to suggest feasible solutions to real existing problems of passenger transport system, mobility and road infrastructure in Yaounde.

c. The main research question of the thesis

What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why?

The subsidiary questions are:

- 1. How was the new urban transport policy designed and implemented and how did the policy perform?*
- 2. How do primary urban transport stakeholders assess the performance of the policy reforms through the prism of its objectives set by policymakers? And how do they perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the prism of proxy criteria? Is there a significant trend in perceptions of performances of new policy in 1998, 1999 and 2000 among stakeholders?*
- 3. What are the alternative policies that can be proposed for urban public transport, logistics and infrastructure development for Yaounde, from the lessons learned from the current prevailing situation?*
- 4. What are the similarities and differences in problems and solutions of urban mobility, transport infrastructure and management between Yaounde and some cities in Africa?*

3. Research methods used in this thesis

This thesis uses both qualitative and quantitative research methods. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, xxi) note that policies imply theories. This means that whether stated explicitly or not, policies point to a chain of causation that is a cause-effect relationship between initial conditions and future consequences as a result of purposefully implemented policies. This thesis uses research methods that are suited for the task of tracking causal inferences. The two research methods used in this thesis are: *policy evaluation outcome model and historical causal tracing analysis*.

a. In the policy evaluation outcome model, the rationale for any intervention likened a development activity to a theory in the sense that the assumptions made in the policy formulation phase relate to the possibility that if public policy makers perform certain activities, there is a likelihood that certain known effects, impacts and outcomes should happen. Stufflebeam et al. (2000) and Tyler (1942) posit that the policy evaluation outcome model is based on three hypotheses, the intervention hypothesis, the causal hypothesis and the action hypothesis that link public policy actions to anticipated outcomes.

In this evaluation outcome research method, the processes of bringing change through public policy interventions takes place through certain activities. These activities contribute to the achievement of the desired goals of the policy reform. This thesis identifies the following policy reform elements using the policy evaluation outcome method:

1. The inputs for policy reform. The inputs for this policy reform are made up of the material, financial and administrative effort deployed by the policy makers and policy supporters to produce the statutory instruments. These inputs are processed through the administrative and legislative arms of the government that fixed the goal and objective that the policy reform has to achieve.

2. The products of policy reform. The products of this policy are identified as the statutory instruments which are laws, executive orders; circulars whose implementation it is assumed will change the urban mobility in Yaounde and produce the desired effect of increasing the supply of the means of transport.

3. The policy reform activities. The activities of the policy reform concern the different procedures elaborated to facilitate the implementation of the policy reform. The central and local administrative services of the state are in charge of implementing government policy. This reform involves many departments (Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Town Planning, The Yaounde city Council and the services of law and order in charge of policy enforcement) and concerns the preparation of the paperwork and documentation that will make the new policy effective. It also involves preparing local and central level bureaucrats as well as other stakeholders such as urban transport unions in the exercise for the task of making the policy succeed.

4. The policy effects, impacts and outcomes. These elements of the policy reform are obtained through the analysis of stakeholders and their perception of the manner in which the policy reform has achieved its goal and objective as well as how they believe that this policy reform has affected their mobility in the city. Proxy criteria are devised in this thesis to assess the perception of stakeholders on how they think the policy has affected their mobility.

5. The implications of the policy reforms on mobility, the transport system and infrastructure in Yaounde. This is obtained through participant observation and learning by the researcher as

well as from the historical causing tracing analysis of the implementation of the policy products of the reforms.

The policy evaluation outcome method theoretically assumes that once the policy outputs, which are mainly statutory instruments are implemented, they produce the necessary changes in urban mobility and the transport system and infrastructure in Yaounde by increasing the supply of transport vehicles and solve the problem of shortage caused by the divestiture of the state. This design is expected to verify this theoretical assumption and identify whether the expected policy outcome occurred and assess if that was not the case, find out why.

b. The historical causal tracing analysis method is another research method used in this thesis. This method is used because it offers the possibility of tracking the different processes that have been occurring during the life cycle of the ongoing transport policy reforms. By tracking these process through historical tracing, this thesis hopes to validate what Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) observed, that, policies imply theories whether stated explicitly or not and that policies point to a chain of causation between initial conditions and anticipated, intended or expected future consequences and implications. This is because the core objectives of public policies, and the political constituencies supporting them, lie in the hope of producing a causal impact, a solution, on some issue(s) that has been publicly identified as a problem worth addressing using publicly available means.

The historical causal process tracing method is a kind of umbrella method that embodies several other methods such as: 1. Stakeholder analysis (SA) of the individuals and institutions concerned with the policy reforms of urban transport in Yaounde. 2. The historical sequence analysis of the activities (implementation analysis) of the urban transport reforms in Yaounde. 3. Comparative case study analysis method of transport systems, infrastructures and mobility patterns in Yaounde and in selected African and developing country cities. 4. The Participant Observation and Learning component of the policy reform processes, problems and outcomes of the urban transport reforms in Yaounde and, 5. Secondary documentary sources of data and information collected on urban public transport in Yaounde and in some selected cities in Africa that indicate similarities of implications and limits of liberalisation in solving problems of urban mobility in developing countries. The aim is to make the evaluation report in-depth and rich, Stake (1995) and Yin (1994). Quantitative techniques are used for the trend analysis of the longitudinal data relating to the perception of stakeholders on the implications of the policy reforms.

c. Links between research methods used and research questions of the thesis

The table below presents the methods used to answer research questions.

Research questions of thesis	Research method(s) used
The main research question of this thesis is: What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Policy evaluation outcome model method. - Stakeholder analysis. - Stakeholder power analysis. - Researcher observation. - Documentary analysis. - Implementation analysis. - Evaluation outcome model. - Historical causal process tracing.
The subsidiary questions are: 1. How was the new urban transport policy designed and implemented and how did the	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Evaluation outcome model. - Implementation analysis. - Researcher observation

policy perform?	- Historical causal process tracing.
2. How do primary urban transport stakeholders assess the performance of policy reforms through the prism of its objectives set by policy makers? And how do they perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the prism of proxy criteria. Is there a significant trend in perceptions of performances of new policy in 1998, 1999 and 2000 among stakeholders?	- Implementation analysis. - Stakeholder and stakeholder power analysis using longitudinal data - Historical causal process tracing - Time series analysis using bar graphs
3. What are the alternative policies that can be proposed for urban public transport and infrastructure development for Yaounde, from the lessons learned from the current prevailing situation?	- Implementation analysis. - Stakeholder and stakeholder power analysis using longitudinal data - Historical causal process tracing - Time series analysis using bar graphs
4. What are the similarities and differences in problems and solutions of urban mobility transport infrastructure and management between Yaounde and some cities in Africa?	- Comparative analysis - Historical causal process tracing - Documentary analysis. - Implementation analysis. - Researcher Observation

4. Answers to research questions

This thesis produced answers to the main research question and subsidiary research questions. The subsidiary research questions and answers are presented below. The main research question and answers are presented in section 5 of this summary.

1. How was the new urban transport policy designed and implemented and how did the policy perform?

The results presented in chapter five of this thesis show that the new urban transport policy was designed by the government of Cameroon with the active support of the Bretton Woods Institutions notably the World Bank through the Sub Saharan Africa Transport Policy Programme (SSATPP). The policy was drawn up by the administration (Central state bureaucracy) with no participation from none-state stakeholders or deliberation in the legislature. Its outputs are mainly statutory instruments drawn up by the executive arm of the government and the bureaucracy rather than laws voted by the legislature. Its implementation has not been thorough and has been affected by the articulation of the interests of powerful key stakeholders. Besides, there were significant delays in implementing key aspects of the policy reform. This level of implementation has affected the achievement of objectives set by the policy. The policy performances are judged as unsatisfactory by a significant population of stakeholders owing to the low level of objective attainment.

Chapter five presents a historical perspective on how the new urban transport policy reform effectively liberalised urban public transport by bus. This liberalisation resulted in the deregulation of minibuses, buses and motorcycle taxis for use in urban public passenger transport. In short, the implementation of policy reform caused an increase in supply and use of the different motorised modes of public urban transport in Yaounde. The management of the new policy was principally done by the bureaucratic structure of the government that includes the Ministry of Transport, law enforcement agencies and the Ministry of Finance. In addition, agencies under their supervision of the Ministry of Transport were also involved such as the private companies that perform roadworthiness controls on vehicles (See Table 5.1). Private bus operators have never really entered the market in Yaounde for many reasons including the lack of governance in the bidding processes organised for many years. The

arrival of motorcycle taxis in Yaounde has worsened the safety of urban public transport both to their passengers and for the other road users especially pedestrians who are often victims of the numerous accidents involving motor cycle taxis. The absence of a bus system has had implications for the cost of urban travel in Yaounde given the long distances to be covered in the city. The fares for the shared taxis, which are the only public urban transport mode allowed circulating in the city centre, have now become prohibitive to the poorer fractions of the city population. While some new road infrastructure have been built, there is still a very significant absence of the kind of facilities that go hand in hand with the new policy such as traffic signal at many road junctions, the widening of the numerous narrow streets and roundabouts, the building of pedestrian walks and the materialisation of roads signs for speed limits. In addition, the enforcement of traffic regulations is still poor. Corruption is rife among traffic wardens who are mainly policemen.

The outputs of the policy products that indicate what happened as a result of this policy can be summarised as follows:

1. Shortening of procedures for registering as a Road Transporter

This reform was implemented because instead of the unique issuing centre in Yaounde for the entire country as before, every divisional headquarters in the country could now issue this document, which greatly reduced the administrative bottleneck and bribery that characterised the practice prior to the reform. This facilitated the procedures for public transporters entering the business and helped in rapidly increasing the modes of public urban transport in Yaounde.

2. Facilitation in the issuing of « Carte Bleue »

This reform was implemented because instead of the unique issuing centre in Yaounde for the entire country as before, every divisional headquarters in the country could now issue this document, which greatly reduced the administrative bottleneck and bribery that characterised the practice prior to the reform. Its duration of validity was also extended from one year to five years.

3. Institution of two categories of road transporters licence

This policy was implemented through the effective creation of two categories of public urban transport licence that is the normal licence for shared public taxis, and the special licence for school buses to transport children in urban areas and other high occupancy vehicles such as buses and minibuses. The licensing fees are also different.

4. Computerisation of vehicle matriculation certificate

This policy reform has never been implemented. In 2007 when plans were made for a fresh start to this policy implementation but there is no headway yet for the implementation of this policy. Those who have interest in this domain have never really found the funds and manpower to implement this policy.

5. Liberalisation of urban transport by minibuses, motorcycles and buses

This is the kingpin reform in the 1990s because it allowed new modes of public transport to quickly become operational in Yaounde and contribute to solving the shortage problem in Yaounde. Although the minibuses and motorcycle taxis came very quickly to the scene, this was not the case with private buses. This anticipated outcome did not occur because stakeholder interests in this area and state capture by administrative elite who wanted to benefit from this liberalisation policy together with the costs involved, the experience and logistics needed to run an urban transport service by bus prevented the occurrence of this

policy outcome until the arrival of the PPP arrangement more than ten years after the beginning of the reform.

6. Creation of a commission to evaluate bids of operators of bus lines in cities

This Commission was created and held some sessions in which it selected companies to run urban bus services in Yaounde. However, the bidding process was flawed because the companies that were granted the bus lines in Yaounde never operated bus any services. This left the city for a decade without an urban bus service.

7. Reduction of Customs duty for imported vehicles

This reform has been difficult to be implemented fully because of custom fraud and the falsification of import declaration documents.

8. Prescription of new rates for Third Party Liability motor vehicle insurance

This policy was immediately implemented because all vehicles are required by law in Cameroon to have insurance cover to protect parties in case of an accident; however there are often cases of fraud with the use of fake certificates.

9. Institution of identification badges for taxi drivers

A decision (00063/MINT/DTT) of January 14, 1997 created the obligation of carrying identification badges for drivers of public transport taxis. In November 2002, the Minister of Transport fixed January 1, 2003 as the date for the debut of enforcing the regulation on the taxi driver's badge, that is, some seven years after the initial decision to make the wearing identification badges obligatory for all shared taxi drivers. A ministerial order finally spelt out the sanctions facing defaulting taxi drivers.

10. Institution of crash helmets for motorcycle taxi drivers

A decision (00063/MINT/DTT) of January 14, 1997 created the obligation of wearing identification badges for drivers' of motorcycles used as public transport taxis. This policy to protect motorcycle taxi drivers and their passengers has never been implemented because of their refusal to do so and the hygienic conditions involve in many passengers wearing the same helmet.

11. Re-organisation of Transport Offices

In 1998 the Minister of Transport ordered a new policy to govern the working practices in the Transport Offices of the Ministry; this has been responsible for curbing the petty corruption in the issuance of public transport documents.

12. Creation of a special windscreen license for vehicles

The special windscreen license was created by a Prime Ministerial degree but it has never been really implemented. It was intended to curb the rampant police checks of vehicles that often ended with the giving and taking of bribes. Although the licenses were printed they were quickly abandoned less than one year later because they failed to stop police and gendarmerie checks on transport vehicles. Public transport vehicles ceased to buy them and this license has since disappeared. The petty corruption that it was intended to curb has continued.

13. Protection of national road network and control environmental pollution

In April 1996 a new statute to protect national road network and control environmental pollution from vehicles was decreed. January 2007 only one centre opened in Yaounde. But no Enabling Act has yet laid down the modalities for the application of this statute.

14. Privatisation of technical inspection of motor vehicles

Vehicle inspection and obtaining vehicle number plates were granted to private operators without a fair bidding process. A Ministerial order N° 00452/D/ MINT/CAB of March 5, 2003 laid down the organisation and determined the make up of a committee in charge of granting authorisation for motor vehicle technical inspection. However, the conditions of urban transport vehicles on the streets of Yaounde leave much to be desired about the efficacy of this inspection.

2. How do primary urban transport stakeholders assess the performance of the policy reforms through the prism of its objectives set by policymakers? And how do they perceive the effects of this policy on their daily lives through the prism of proxy criteria? Is there a significant trend in perceptions of performances of new policy in 1998, 1999 and 2000 among stakeholders?

The perception of stakeholders on the achievement of the policy objectives and how it has affected their daily lives is presented in chapter six, sections 6.5 and 6.8 the results show the perception of low power stakeholders in Yaounde about the manner in which the New Urban Transport Policy has performed in terms of its set goal and objectives. In chapter six we also identify differences in stakeholder perception according to groups about policy performance. The historical process tracing used in chapter five identifies the activities involving policy stakeholders and how they acted during the policy process. This gives an indication of how their actions affected and influenced the policy outcomes. The stakeholder power index in chapter six gives an indication of the action of policy stakeholders during the policy process based on their power and leadership capabilities. Although the perception of the stakeholders can be seen as being subjective, the overall intention of the stakeholder analysis is to understand a policy process through the prism of the beneficiaries whose lives a policy affects directly.

In chapter six, sections 6.5 and 6.8 the perception of stakeholders shows how low power stakeholders in Yaounde perceive the way that the New Urban Transport Policy has performed in terms of the objectives that the public authorities assigned to it. It also identifies and explains the differences in stakeholder group perception of policy's performance in an indicative manner. The historical process tracing in chapter six identifies the activities involving policy stakeholders and how they reacted during the policy process. This also gives an indication of how this interaction affected the policy outcomes. The stakeholder power index in chapter 6 Table 6.1 gives an indication of the interaction of policy stakeholders during the policy process based on their power and leadership capabilities.

Although one can describe the perception of the stakeholders as being subjective, the overall intention of stakeholder analysis is to understand a policy process through the prism of the beneficiaries whose lives a policy affects directly. Each objective is scored qualitatively and a significant majority (82.5%) of the sampled urban public transport stakeholders in Yaounde thinks that the policy objective of liberalizing the urban public transport sector has been achieved very well. The majority of the stakeholders (64%) hold that the objective to stamp out amateurism in the sector has achieved its objective. However, some stakeholders (36%) thought that the policy had not achieved this objective. The perception of stakeholders on the policy objective of facilitating urban mobility in Yaounde shows that stakeholders hold diverse views. While some respondents (57.5%) think that the policy has facilitated mobility in the city, a fraction (43%) thinks otherwise notably because of the continued traffic jams around major road junctions and narrow streets during rush hours.

The perception that stakeholders on the policy objective to ban clandestine transporters show that they hold divided viewpoints on the issue with 50% believing that the policy objective

has been achieved while (40%) think it has not. Continued shortages of shared passenger taxis and even motor cycle taxis servicing peri urban zones inhabited by the poor rely heavily for this mode of transport especially because of the poor conditions of the roads leading to these areas. The fluidity of traffic in Yaounde has not changed after the new policy. It is therefore no surprising that stakeholders (60%) do not assess the achievement of this objective favourably. Some (22%) think the policy has made traffic flow fluidly in the city. On the objective of the policy to fight pollution caused by urban transportation, stakeholder responses show that (62.5%) think the policy has not at all achieved that particular objective, only (25%) think otherwise. There are no visible policy activities directed towards achievement of this objective.

Stakeholders believe that the policy reform has not organized urban passenger transport well enough in Yaounde in a way that one can describe the new transport system as sufficiently effective. This effectiveness concerns how the stakeholders judge the extent to which the policy has attained its objective. In this case the objective is to efficiently organize urban public transport. Stakeholders generally believe that their livelihood has been negatively affected by the policy intervention because they are now confronted by the new reality of urban transport in the city without buses operating across the many bus lines once used by SOTUC. Until 2006, only taxis and motorcycle taxis were available. These modes cost more and are often either not very comfortable or safe especially for women and at night. In addition owing to low purchasing power and poverty levels of many city dwellers stakeholders think that the implementation of the new policy was not well timed and that its radical level of implementation is unfair to the poor and vulnerable. Stakeholders point out that government failed to consult the public on the new policy so that their views were never taken into account before the policy was launched. Public urban transport users who constitute a category of key primary stakeholders who have low power perceive the policy through the prism of its effects on urban transport fares. For them, the policy has made urban mobility costly, uncomfortable and unsafe.

On the trend analysis of the stakeholder perception of policy achievement over three years, Table 6.2.3 indicates that there is a significant difference between the two stakeholder groups with respect to how the policy achieved the objective of facilitating mobility in the city of Yaounde.

The trend analysis also indicates that the difference between the two stakeholder groups with respect to the following five proxy measures is not significant:

1. Has the NUTP liberalised the urban public transport in Yaounde?
2. Has this policy eradicated amateurism in urban public transportation?
3. Has this policy put an end to clandestine transporters, in Yaounde?
4. Has this policy made traffic flow fluidly in the city? and
5. Has this policy contributed to fight pollution attributable to transport?

Despite some dissatisfaction with the new policy, stakeholders nevertheless make a positive assessment of the reliability of urban public transport following the new policy. This perception is based on the fact that new modes of public transport have been introduced such as the motorcycle taxi, mini bus and privately owned buses. Thus reliability now means that many forms of urban public transport are available to the city stakeholders. The issue is not whether most people use all of them. The fact is that each stakeholder now has at least three alternative urban transport modes from which to choose.

3. What are the alternative policies that can be proposed for urban public transport, logistics and infrastructure development for Yaounde, from the lessons learned from the current prevailing situation?

This research makes recommendations for future development of mobility in Yaounde. These policy-based recommendations are categorised under the demand-side and supply-side policies. Our recommendations below are deemed important and realistic from a policy point of view for Yaounde.

1. Demand-side transport, mobility, infrastructure and management policies.

This thesis proposes the following demand-side urban public transport policies for Yaounde.

1. Charge parking fees in the central business and administrative areas. 2. Create more one-way streets. 3. Create many more pedestrian sidewalks on streets. 4. Create a gridlock of zones within the city to regulate traffic.

2. Supply-side transport, mobility, infrastructure and management policies.

This thesis proposes the following supply-side urban public transport policies for Yaounde. 1. Improve the quality of public passenger transport services by enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations so as to encourage their usage by those tempted to use personal cars. 2. Take initiatives for building a rail-based system to complement the road-based one. 3. Consider policy actions to influence and reduce the modal split of urban transport modes in the city with the introduction of PPP arrangements and the re-introduction of High Occupancy Vehicles. 4. Encourage the use of Intelligent Transport Systems Technology at road junctions to facilitate traffic flows especially at rush hours. 5. Consider city zoning schemes for a more equitable and just fare system. 6. Use the collaboration with informal sector because it is the main provider of urban public transport. 7. Address non-motorised transport needs in infrastructure development by creating and constructing pedestrian walks and cycling tracks so as to facilitate movement and guarantee environmental and transport sustainability of the city. 8. Set an agenda for the creation of a Metropolitan Transport Authority for Yaounde that can oversee urban mobility and infrastructure policy development for the city.

4. What are the similarities and differences in problems and solutions of urban mobility transport infrastructure and management between Yaounde and some cities in Africa?

In chapter seven of this thesis the similarities between Yaounde and four African cities are explained. The lessons learned from this research and the Yaounde case study is summarised here.

For Yaounde and other developing countries cities, the lessons learned from the design and implementation of the new urban transport policy in Yaounde shows that many alternative policy options can be suggested to improve urban mobility, infrastructure development and city transport management. Best urban transport policies and practices found in current literature can be emulated both in Yaounde and in the other cities. In the section below, the lessons learned are grouped in the following purposeful policy areas and explained.

1. Urban governance and institutional renewal.

The most important pathway for implementing a sustainable public urban transport system in Yaounde and in the other cities of Africa appears to lie in the urban governance puzzle. Yaounde and the other cities in Africa need to revisit the institutional arrangement of the city in the direction that will enhance the capacity of cities to plan and execute not only road transport projects but also raise specific city levies and use the resources to improve infrastructures and facilitate urban mobility and make travelling in the city more accessible and affordable for city dwellers.

2. Need for a single urban transport agency.

Urban transport has become ultra important to the point that it often requires a specific single agency to handle policy in the domain. For a major city such as Yaounde and the others reviewed in this thesis such an agency can guarantee efficient short, medium and long term planning that takes into account issues such as sustainability, affordability and modal split and the friendliness of the city as a place of living and population growth. Such a single agency will have both national and local level responsibilities under the purview of democratically elected mayors as part of good governance and decentralised management.

3. Road safety and controlling traffic in city.

The ever-increasing rate of road accidents in which fatalities are high is particularly serious in Yaounde although there are no viable statistics for the city on road related transport accidents. The problem is no less crucial for the other cities as existing literature indicates. Jacobs and Sayer (1984) for example discuss low cost remedial measures to improve public urban road safety in developing countries that can be applied to Yaounde and the other cities. They posit that in Nairobi, Kenya, the introduction of more traffic signals on major important road junctions forced a new sense for the respect of Highway Code amongst urban passenger transporters. This implies that traffic jams and congestion in Yaounde and in other cities could be lowered through the use of this kind of low cost technological adaptation especially as the city is notoriously lagging behind in road traffic signal.

4. Enforcing existing transportation standards and regulations.

The problem of safety in urban passenger transportation in Yaounde just as in other cities is crucial for all road users. The rules and regulations in force are rarely respected as Jacobs and Sayer (1984) point out. However, they noted that Singapore and Cairo in Egypt have significantly lowered their urban public passenger transport accident rates though Traffic law Enforcement Yaounde and the other African cities could do same by learning from these examples and implementing similar policies. In addition, education, information and communication can play a key role in improving pedestrian safety in Yaounde, if parents and other stakeholders join the municipal authorities to teach children and other pedestrian's safety issues on a regular basis on the media, through spots on radio and television and on posters along roadsides.

5. Environmental performance of vehicles.

The level of pollution attributable to urban transport in Yaounde is significant just as it is in other African countries. Yaounde and other African cities can learn from the experience of Asian countries whose urban transport development was once on a largely unsustainable path (traffic congestion, road accidents, air pollution) before they took a series of measures to reverse the situation. These measures began with the creation of a cooperation agreement under a Partnership for Sustainable Urban Transport in Asia (PSUTA) and has permitted the collection and sharing of data and information on urban transport and the elaboration of measures to curb potentially dangerous levels of urban pollution attributable to urban transportation Yaounde and African cities can move in this direction to alleviate their pollution problems.

5. Summary of research results

1. Before the policy to liberalise urban transport by minibuses, motorcycles and buses was implemented, the shared taxi was the only legal mode of public passenger transport in Yaounde. After the policy, motorcycle taxis, minibuses and buses are now means of public urban passenger transport in Yaounde. The state no longer has the monopoly for operating

urban public bus service in Yaounde. Private entrepreneurs have the legal right to do so. The supply of motorised public passenger transport has increased in the city with the introduction of motorcycle taxis, minibuses and buses.

2. The introduction of new means of public transport has made mobility in Yaounde more affordable and accessible for urban dwellers. The new modes are all cheaper than the shares taxis. The motorcycle taxi has made certain peri-urban zones of the city that do not have good roads more accessible because motorcycles can use these roads. This has cut journey times for city dwellers living in these zones.

3. The implementation of the policy reform re-organising work in Transport Offices has facilitated the issuance of transport documents. This has reduced the incidence of petty corruption that was prevailing in the procedures for delivering transport documents such as: the public urban transport licence, registration as a Road Transporter and obtaining the « Carte Bleue » so that many more entrepreneurs can enter the sector easily to boost the supply of means of transport in the city.

4. The implementation of the new rates for Third Party Liability motor vehicle insurance has curbed the practice of issuing fraudulent motor vehicle insurance certificates; this is beneficial to road users because accident victims are increasingly feeling secure.

5. The policy reform has also brought unintended outputs such as the observed rush - hour congestion at major junctions that regularly occur as motorcycle taxis struggle with other vehicles to have right of way. Another unintended output of the policy is the increasing rate of fatal accidents involving motorcycle taxis. Motorcycle theft is also a new phenomenon in Yaounde. Urban pollution (noise and fumes) is also on the rise in the city as a result of motorcycle taxis. Another unintended output of the new policy is that it has exposed the need for more appropriate road infrastructures and for municipal governance structures, competences and capacity for Yaounde to handle the ever-growing mobility needs of the population through long term planning and development.

6. Another unintended output of the policy concerns the paucity of road transport infrastructure in Yaounde especially junctions, pedestrian walks and traffic signal, to handle the constantly growing population and the phenomenal increase in the use of personal motorcars. This researcher observed this aspect during the course of the research.

7. The policy reform has revealed the need for appropriate governance structures with the needed capacity in Yaounde to handle the important domain of transport that conditions the quality of life, the sustainability of the city as a healthy place to live in with a clean and safe environment and do business.

8. The development and growth of Yaounde means that a deliberate policy of decentralisation should be pursued so as to empower elected city officials so that they can elicit participation from inhabitants and embark on long term development plans for Yaounde are now very necessary.

We conclude that the policy reform produced both intended and unintended effects on the urban transport system in Yaounde.

6. Conclusion of thesis: answers to main research question

The conclusion of this summary of the thesis is presented as answers to the main research question that is: *What happened with respect to the transport system in Yaounde due to the policy reforms and why?* In chapters five and six, this thesis has demonstrated that this innovative urban transport policy has brought radical changes to the patterns and modes of urban mobility in the city notably the legalisation of the use of motorcycles to transport passengers in the city as a mode of public transport. Although some of the intended outcomes of the policy have been achieved such as the liberalisation of passenger transport by bus, and the deregulation of minibuses and motorcycle taxis, there have been some unintended

consequences of the policy such as the higher costs of conventional taxi fares. The introduction of motorcycle taxis has increased the frequency of transport related accidents notably those caused or involving motorcycle taxis. This thesis through the stakeholder analysis and stakeholder power analysis has also demonstrated how local political context affects policy reforms in the urban transport sector in Yaounde Cameroon and that the bureaucratic elite have captured the state policy mechanism during this era of privatisation, divestitures and deregulation through the building of alliances and the award of contracts on crony basis, thus affecting the optimal implementation of the policy reform. This research has also shown that the theoretical assumptions concerning private bus operation following deregulation and liberalisation has not occurred in Yaounde. Instead, public bus services have been re-launched in Yaounde after twelve years through a public private partnership arrangement after many failed attempts at outright privatisation of bus service with route franchising. The results from data analysis presented in chapter seven suggest a trend for negative perception by a significant fraction of primary stakeholders about the manner in which the policy reform achieved its objectives. The policy objective of liberalising urban transport is the lone objective for which all stakeholders groups hold a positive perception.

Summary in Dutch

Samenvatting

1. Achtergronden bij dit proefschrift en context van de hervormingen in Yaounde, Kameroen

Onderwerp van dit proefschrift zijn de organisatorische en functionele problemen van het stedelijk openbaar vervoer in Yaounde voorafgaand aan het begin van de hervormingen in de jaren '90 van de vorige eeuw en de beoordeling van de effecten van deze hervormingen op het transportsysteem van de stad. Stedelijk openbaar vervoer in Yaounde ondervond grote problemen voordat de hervormingen begonnen, hoofdzakelijk door een tekort aan middelen voor stedelijke mobiliteit. In die tijd hadden deeltaxi's en het staatsbedrijf dat het stedelijk openbaar vervoer verzorgde (Société des Transports Urbains, SOTUC) de wettelijke toestemming om stedelijke openbaar vervoerdiensten aan te bieden. Gedurende deze periode maakten andere factoren en met name het devalueren van de lokale munt Cooperation Financiere Africaine (CFA) francs de voorziening van openbaar vervoer in Kameroen in het algemeen en in Yaounde in het bijzonder duurder en minder winstgevend, zeker voor het staatsbedrijf. Het aantal deeltaxi's en de geschiktheid ervan voor deelname aan het verkeer namen beide drastisch af als gevolg van de devaluatie van de munt, die ervoor zorgde dat de prijs van geïmporteerde reserveonderdelen voor de voertuigen verdubbelde. De devaluatie van de munt zorgde voor vergelijkbare effecten bij SOTUC. Verder kampte dit bedrijf met managementproblemen, resulterend in ernstige tekorten. Deze dwongen de staat het bedrijf te sluiten na vele mislukte overnamepogingen. Dit in overeenstemming met de voorschriften van het Bretton Woods Instituut, neergelegd in het Structuurhervormingsprogramma en het op beleid gebaseerde leenschema dat vereiste dat de staat zo min mogelijk zou reguleren en zo marktvriendelijk mogelijk beleid zou voeren; beide waren essentiële ingrediënten voor het dominante neoliberale ontwikkelingsparadigma van het tijdperk.

Daarenboven verkeerde het voornamelijk op wegtransport gebaseerde transportsysteem in een verregaande staat van verval na vele jaren waarin de staat het bedrijf had genegeerd, doordat zij structurele hervormingen onderging. Er werden slechts weinig nieuwe wegen aangelegd; veel straten bleven smal. Slechte drainage, overlopende riolen en niet opgehaald huisvuil blokkeerden belangrijke straten in veel delen in de stad en deze straten waren niet in staat het toenemende verkeer af te wikkelen, waardoor het fileprobleem in Yaounde verergerde. Het niet onderhouden van grote delen van het wegnetwerk in Yaounde had zijn weerslag op de mobiliteit. Zo meden deeltaxi's bepaalde wegen door de vele gaten in het wegdek, waardoor

reistijden verder toenamen. Ook het niet functioneren of zelfs volledig afwezig zijn van verkeersregelinstanties op veel kruisingen zorgde vaak voor lange files op deze kruisingen in Yaounde. Voor de beleidshervormingen bestonden er geen gemarkeerde voetgangersoversteekplaatsen of voetpaden in de stad en hadden de straten geen gemarkeerde rijstroken. Enorme files in vele delen van de stad, vooral op de kruispunten, waren het gevolg. Als gevolg van het tekort aan transportmiddelen in Yaounde stegen de prijzen voor de deeltaxi's en werden deze onbetaalbaar voor een groot deel van de bevolking. De vervoersproblemen in Yaounde zijn niet uniek voor Yaounde; vergelijkbare problemen doen zich voor in veel steden in ontwikkelingslanden.

Het is in de geschetste context van een tekort aan middelen voor stedelijk openbaar vervoer dat beleidsmakers in Kameroen een hervormingsplan voor het stedelijk openbaar vervoer hebben opgezet, bestaande uit zes beleidsdoelen:

1. Het liberaliseren en flexibiliseren van stedelijk openbaar vervoer per bus, minibus en motorfiets.
2. Het uitbannen van amateurisme door het toetreden van professionals tot de sector te bevorderen.
3. Het faciliteren van mobiliteit in de snel groeiende stad.
4. Het vloeiend afwikkelen van het stedelijke verkeer door de congestie te verminderen.
5. Het beperken en eventueel uitbannen van illegale transporteurs.
6. Het tegengaan van vervuiling door het openbaar vervoer.

Beleidsmakers wilden met deze zes beleidsdoelen het aanbod van middelen voor stedelijke mobiliteit vergroten. Dit door het ontwerpen en implementeren van statutaire instrumenten die hun bedoelingen zouden omzetten in beleid en het aanbod van openbaar vervoer in Yaounde zou doen toenemen. Het was hun bedoeling hiermee het gat op te vullen dat was ontstaan na de sluiting van het staatsbedrijf voor stedelijk openbaar busvervoer, SOTUC.

De beleidshervormingen hadden de bedoeling de wettelijke barrières op te heffen die private ondernemers ervan weerhielden openbaar vervoer per bus, minibus of motorfiets aan te bieden om zo het aanbod van middelen voor stedelijk openbaar vervoer te vergroten en om het ook betaalbaar te maken.

De bedoelde beleidshervormingen waren:

1. Het verkorten van de procedures voor Registratie als Wegtransporteur.
2. Het faciliteren van de uitgifte van de zogenoemde "Carte Bleue".
3. Het instellen van twee vergunningscategorieën voor wegtransporteurs.
4. Het digitaal maken van de inschrijvingen van voertuigen.
5. De liberalisering van stedelijk openbaar vervoer per bus, minibus en motorfiets.
6. Het installeren van een evaluatiecommissie voor biedingen van bedrijven op buslijnen.
7. Het reduceren van de importheffingen op geïmporteerde voertuigen.
8. Het voorschrijven van nieuwe tarieven voor de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid binnen de motorvoertuigenverzekeringen.
9. Het instellen van identificatiebadges voor taxichauffeurs.
10. Het instellen van helmen voor taxichauffeurs op een motorfiets.
11. De Reorganisatie van de Transportraden.
12. Het instellen van een speciale vergunning voor op de voorruit van voertuigen.
13. De bescherming van het nationale wegnetwerk en beheersing van de milieuvervuiling.
14. De privatisering van de technische keuring van motorvoertuigen.

Dit proefschrift heeft het voorkomen van enkele verwachte beleidsuitkomsten en het niet optreden van andere geïdentificeerd. We gaan in op de onzekerheid en onvoorspelbaarheid in

de invoering en uitkomsten van beleid. De volgende redenen kunnen het niet optreden van de gewenste beleidsuitkomsten verklaren:

1. Partiële invoering van beleidsactiviteiten.
2. Bureaucratische bottlenecks vertragen de snelheid van de invoering van het beleid.
3. Er waren 'fouten' gemaakt bij het instellen van statuten; deze fouten konden de invoering ervan ophouden.
4. Het gebrek aan middelen om beleid te implementeren heeft soms weerstand ertegen opgeroepen van groepen van belanghebbenden.
5. Het gebrek aan politieke macht om lokaal bestuur in vervoerszaken te machtigen.
6. Het gebrek aan monitoring of gebruik van nieuwe informatie over de beleidshervormingen.

Beleidsmakers hadden tot doel het gewenste beleidsdoel van een toenemend aanbod aan openbaar vervoer in Yaounde te bereiken door het verkrijgen van vergunningen te vereenvoudigen, het verminderen van administratieve bottlenecks en corruptie in de stedelijke openbaar vervoerssector en het instellen van maatregelen om transparantie en verantwoordelijkheid in het uitgeven van voertuigdocumenten te verbeteren. Deze hervorming van vervoersbeleid is nationaal beleid met perfecte overlap voor Yaounde.

2. Kennislacune, doelen en onderzoeksvragen

a. Kennislacune

Er is veel onzekerheid met betrekking tot de invoering van beleid en de uitkomsten daarvan. De kennis over de relatie tussen oorzaken en gevolgen die de processen rond de invoering van beleid verbindt met het optreden van gewenste en niet-gewenste beleidsuitkomsten ontbreekt vrijwel geheel in de huidige literatuur. Dit proefschrift gebruikt empirische kennis over wat er in de praktijk in Yaounde, Kameroen gebeurd is door de invoering van beleid. Dit proefschrift zoekt verklaringen door primaire data te gebruiken over veranderingen in mobiliteit, infrastructuur en het transportsysteem in Yaounde door de beleidshervormingen. Door het identificeren van de categorieën van actoren, hun interesses, hun rol en acties in het transporthervormingsproces in Yaounde hoopt dit proefschrift determinanten voor het succes of falen van beleidshervormingen te identificeren.

b. Doelen van dit proefschrift

Het doel van dit proefschrift is inzicht te geven in de vraag welke beleidsuitkomsten zijn opgetreden door de beleidshervormingen. Het proefschrift gaat in op onzekerheden in allerlei beleidsprocessen. Dit proefschrift gaat daarbij in op de beleidscontext van Yaounde; deze is van belang voor de invoering van beleid, mede omdat het bepaalde categorieën van belangrijke actoren toestaat hun machtsposities te gebruiken om hun belangen te behartigen, ook al beïnvloeden ze de beleidsuitkomsten negatief. Dit proefschrift gaat ook in op het belang van het negeren in transportbeleid van de cruciale rol van infrastructuur die nodig is om aan de mobiliteitsbehoeften te voldoen; deze behoeften nemen toe door onder andere de bevolkingsgroei. Dit proefschrift stelt enkele oplossingen voor, voor de problemen in het transportsysteem van Yaounde.

c. Onderzoeksvragen van dit proefschrift

Dit proefschrift tracht de volgende onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden:

1. Hoe was het nieuwe stedelijke vervoersbeleid ontworpen en geïmplementeerd en hoe presteerde het beleid?
2. Hoe beoordelen de primaire actoren in het stedelijke vervoer de prestaties van de beleidshervormingen in het licht van de door de beleidsmakers opgestelde doelen? En hoe

ervaren zij de effecten van dit beleid in hun dagelijkse leven in het licht van hun proxycriteria? Is er onder de actoren een significante trend in ervaring van de prestaties van het nieuwe beleid in 1998, 1999 en 2000?

3. Wat zijn de alternatieve beleidsopties die kunnen worden voorgesteld voor de ontwikkeling van het stedelijke openbaar vervoer, de logistiek en de infrastructuur in Yaounde, vanuit de geleerde lessen uit de huidige situatie?

4. Wat zijn de overeenkomsten en verschillen in problemen en oplossingen voor stedelijke mobiliteit, transportinfrastructuur en management tussen Yaounde en enkele andere grote steden in Afrika?

3. In dit proefschrift gebruikte onderzoeksmethoden

Dit proefschrift gebruikt zowel kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve onderzoeksmethoden. Pressman en Wildavsky (1973, xxi) constateerden dat beleid theorieën impliceert. Dit betekent dat – expliciet genoemd of niet – beleid wijst naar een keten van causaliteit, die een oorzaak-gevolgrelatie is tussen initiële omstandigheden en toekomstige gevolgen als gevolg van resoluut ingevoerd beleid. Dit proefschrift gebruikt onderzoeksmethoden die geschikt zijn om inzicht te krijgen in de causaliteit van constatering. De twee in dit proefschrift gebruikte hoofdonderzoeksmethoden zijn: het uitkomstenmodel voor beleidsevaluatie en de analyse van historische processen.

a. Het uitkomstenmodel voor beleidsevaluatie legt een verband tussen de aannames en acties van beleidsmakers, en de kans op uitvoering van beleid, optredende beoogde effecten en neveneffecten. Deze onderzoeksmethode gaat expliciet in op activiteiten als gevolg van beleidsinterventies. Deze activiteiten dragen bij aan het bereiken van de gewenste doelen van de beleidshervorming. Dit proefschrift identificeert de volgende elementen van beleidshervormingen, gebruikmakend van het uitkomstenmodel voor beleidsevaluatie:

1. De inputs voor beleidshervormingen. De inputs voor deze beleidshervorming bestaan uit het materiële, financiële en administratieve inspanning van de beleidsmakers en beleidsondersteuners. Deze inputs zijn afkomstig van de beleidsmakende en wetgevende diensten van de regering.

2. De producten van de beleidshervorming. De producten van het beleid zijn geïdentificeerd als de statutaire instrumenten, zoals wetten en opdrachten aan de staf: ringwegen, waarvan wordt aangenomen dat invoering de stedelijke mobiliteit in Yaounde zal beïnvloeden en het gewenste effect met betrekking tot de toename in aanbod van transportmiddelen zal hebben.

3. De beleidshervormingsacties. De activiteiten van de beleidshervorming hebben betrekking op de verschillende procedures die zijn uitgewerkt om de invoering ervan te vergemakkelijken. De centrale en lokale bestuursdiensten zijn verantwoordelijk voor het implementeren van overheidsbeleid. Deze hervorming vereist acties van veel departementen (Ministerie van Transport, Ministerie van Financiën, Ministerie van Stedelijke Planning, de gemeenteraad van Yaounde en de handhavende diensten in geval van politieoptreden) resulterend in documenten voor de effectuering van het nieuwe beleid. Dit behelst ook het voorbereiden van ambtenaren op het lokale en centrale niveau en van andere actoren, zoals stedelijke transportverenigingen, op de uitvoering van de taak om het beleid succesvol te maken.

4. De beleidseffecten, bijeffecten en uitkomsten. Deze elementen van de beleidshervorming zijn verkregen door de analyse van de actoren, en hun percepties van de manier waarop de beleidshervorming de doelen hebben bereikt en hoe zij vinden dat de beleidshervorming hun mobiliteit in de stad heeft beïnvloed.

5. De gevolgen van de beleidshervormingen op mobiliteit, het transportsysteem en infrastructuur in Yaounde. Deze zijn vastgesteld door participerende observatie en lering van

de onderzoeker en door de analyse van historisch onderzoeksmateriaal over invoering van beleidsproducten van de hervormingen.

De onderzoeksmethode richt zich zowel op de opgetrede veranderingen in stedelijke mobiliteit, het transportsysteem en de infrastructuur in Yaounde, als op de niet-opgetrede veranderingen. IN het laatste geval wordt ook ingegaan op de vraag waarom dat dan niet gebeurd is.

b. Een andere gebruikte methode in dit proefschrift is de analyse van historisch onderzoeksmateriaal. Deze methode is gebruikt, omdat deze de mogelijkheid biedt om verschillende beleidsprocessen na te gaan die zijn opgetreden gedurende de levenscyclus van hervormingen van het transportbeleid. Door deze historische processen te onderzoeken, hoopt dit proefschrift te valideren wat Pressman en Wildavsky (1973) waar hebben genomen: beleid impliceert theorieën – expliciet of niet – en beleid wijst naar een keten van causaliteit tussen initiële condities en geanticiperde, gewenste of verwachte toekomstige gevolgen en implicaties.

De analyse van historisch materiaal is een soort paraplu-methode die verscheidene methoden behelst, zoals: 1. Actoranalyse van de individuen en instituten belast met de beleidshervormingen van het stedelijk openbaar vervoer in Yaounde. 2. De analyse van de historische volgorde van activiteiten (analyse van de invoering) van de beleidshervormingen in het stedelijk vervoer in Yaounde. 3. Een vergelijkende methode van case study-analyse op transportsystemen, infrastructuren en mobiliteitspatronen in Yaounde en in geselecteerde steden in Afrikaanse landen en ontwikkelingslanden. 4. De methode van participerende observatie en lering van de processen, problemen en uitkomsten van de hervormingen van het stedelijk vervoer in Yaounde. 5. Secundaire dossierbronnen met data en informatie, verzameld in het stedelijk openbaar vervoer in Yaounde en enkele geselecteerde steden in Afrika die overeenkomsten aangeven van de implicaties en beperkingen van de liberalisering in probleemoplossing van stedelijke mobiliteit in ontwikkelingslanden. Het doel is om een diepgaand en rijk evaluatierapport op te stellen (Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994). Kwantitatieve technieken zijn gebruikt voor trendanalyse van longitudinale data over de perceptie van actoren ten aanzien van implicaties van de beleidshervormingen.

Nu de twee hoofdonderzoeksmethoden zijn beschreven, gaan we hieronder in op de specifiekere methoden die per onderzoeksvraag zijn gebruikt. Onderstaande tabel geeft een overzicht.

Onderzoeksvragen uit dit proefschrift:

De hoofdonderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift luidt: wat gebeurde er met betrekking tot het transportsysteem in Yaounde als gevolg van de beleidshervormingen en waarom?

De deelvragen zijn:

1. Hoe is het nieuwe stedelijk vervoersbeleid ontworpen en geïmplementeerd en hoe heeft het beleid gepresteerd?

2. Hoe beoordelen de primaire actoren in het stedelijk vervoer de prestaties van de beleidshervormingen in het licht van de doelen die door de beleidsmakers zijn opgesteld? En hoe beoordelen zij de effecten van dit beleid op hun dagelijkse leven in het licht van hun proxycriteria? Is er onder de actoren een significante trend in beleving van de prestaties van het nieuwe beleid in 1998, 1999 en 2000?

3. Wat zijn alternatieven die kunnen worden voorgesteld voor het beleid van het stedelijk openbaar vervoer en voor de infrastructuurontwikkeling in Yaounde, vanuit de geleerde lessen uit de huidige situatie?

4. Wat zijn de overeenkomsten en verschillen in problemen en oplossingen voor de transportinfrastructuur voor stedelijke mobiliteit en het beheer daarvan tussen Yaounde en enkele andere grote steden in Afrika?

4. Antwoorden op de onderzoeksvragen

Dit proefschrift heeft antwoord gegeven op de gestelde hoofdonderzoeksvraag en deelvragen en de antwoorden worden hieronder weergegeven. De hoofdonderzoeksvraag en de antwoorden daarop worden gepresenteerd in paragraaf 5 van deze samenvatting.

Gebruikte onderzoeksmethoden:

- Methode van uitkomstenmodel voor beleidsevaluatie
- Actoranalyse
- Machtsanalyse van actoren
- Observaties door de onderzoeker
- Documentenanalyse
- Invoeringanalyse (analyse van de invoering van beleid)
- Uitkomstenmodel voor de evaluatie
- Analyse van historisch onderzoeksmateriaal

- Uitkomstenmodel voor de evaluatie
- Invoeringanalyse
- Observaties door de onderzoeker
- Analyse van historische conclusies
- Invoeringanalyse
- Actoranalyse en machtsanalyse van actoren gebruikmakend van longitudinale data
- Analyse van historische materiaal
- Analyse van tijdseries gebruikmakend van staafdiagrammen

- Invoeringanalyse
- Actoranalyse en machtsanalyse van actoren gebruikmakend van longitudinale data
- Analyse van historische conclusies
- Analyse van tijdseries gebruikmakend van staafdiagrammen
- Vergelijkende analyse
- Analyse van historische conclusies
- Documentenanalyse
- Invoeringanalyse
- Observaties door de onderzoeker

1. Hoe is het nieuwe stedelijk vervoersbeleid ontworpen en geïmplementeerd en hoe heeft het beleid gepresteerd?

De resultaten, gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk vijf van dit proefschrift, laten zien dat het nieuwe stedelijk vervoersbeleid was ontworpen door de regering van Kameroen met de actieve ondersteuning van de Bretton Woods Instituten, voornamelijk de Wereldbank, door het Sub Saharan Africa Transport Programme (SSTAPP). Het beleid was opgesteld door de regering en de bureaucratie van de centrale staat, zonder enige deelname van andere actoren of beraad met de wetgevende macht. De invoering is niet grondig geweest en is beïnvloed door het doordrukken van belangen van belangrijke actoren. Daarnaast waren er significante vertragingen in de invoering van belangrijke onderdelen van de beleidshervormingen. Dit niveau van invoering heeft het bereiken van de beleidsdoelen beïnvloed. De beleidsprestaties zijn door relatief veel actoren als onvoldoende beoordeeld als gevolg van het lage niveau van doelbereiking.

De hoofdstukken vijf, zes en zeven geven een historisch perspectief van de vraag of de beleidshervormingen in het stedelijk openbaar vervoer daadwerkelijk hebben geleid tot de liberalisering van het stedelijk openbaar busvervoer. Deze liberalisering resulteerde in de deregulering van de minibusjes en motorfietstaxi's in het stedelijk openbaar personenvervoer. Samengevat veroorzaakte de invoering van de beleidshervormingen een vergroting in het aanbod en gebruik van verschillende middelen van gemotoriseerd stedelijk openbaar vervoer in Yaounde. Het beheer van het nieuwe beleid werd vooral uitgevoerd door de bureaucratische structuur van de regering: het Ministerie van Transport, uitvoerende instanties en het Ministerie van Financiën. Verder waren er ook instituten betrokken die onder toezicht staan van het Ministerie van Transport, zoals private ondernemingen die de veiligheidsinspecties (soort APK) van voertuigen uitvoerden (zie tabel 5.1). Private busondernemingen hebben om vele redenen nooit echt de markt in Yaounde betreden, door gebrek aan leiding in de vele jaren georganiseerde biedingsprocessen. De ingebruikname van motorfietstaxi's in Yaounde heeft de veiligheid van het stedelijk openbaar vervoer verslechterd, zowel voor hun passagiers als voor de voetgangers die vaak het slachtoffer waren in de vele ongevallen waarbij motorfietstaxi's betrokken waren. De afwezigheid van een bussysteem heeft gevolgen gehad voor de kosten van het stedelijk vervoer in Yaounde. De tarieven voor de deeltaxi's, de enige toegelaten vorm van openbaar vervoer in het stadscentrum van Yaounde, zijn nu onbetaalbaar geworden voor de arme delen van de bevolking. Verder blijkt dat er weliswaar enige nieuwe weginfrastructuur is aangelegd, maar dat andere weginfrastructuur gerelateerde infrastructurele voorzieningen vaak onbreken. Het gaat bijvoorbeeld om verkeerslichten op veel kruisingen, het verbreden van vele nauwe straten en rotondes, het aanleggen van voetpaden en het plaatsen van verkeersborden voor de maximumsnelheid. Daarenboven is de handhaving van de verkeersregels nog steeds slecht. Corruptie is wijdverbreid onder verkeersbeheerders, veelal politieagenten.

De uitkomsten van de beleidsproducten die aangeven wat er gebeurd is als gevolg van dit beleid, kunnen als volgt worden samengevat:

1. Het verkorten van de procedures voor Registratie als Wegtransporteur

Deze hervorming was geïmplementeerd, omdat in plaats van het enige uitgiftekantoor in Yaounde voor het hele land, nu elk regionaal hoofdkantoor in het land dit document kon uitgeven, wat de administratieve bottleneck en de omkoping, die de praktijk van voor de hervorming karakteriseerde, drastisch verkleinde. Dit vereenvoudigde de procedures voor openbaar vervoerbedrijven die in de markt wilden stappen en hielp met het snel toenemen van het aantal beschikbare middelen voor openbaar vervoer in Yaounde.

2. Het faciliteren van de uitgifte van de zogenoemde “Carte Bleue”

Deze hervorming was geïmplementeerd, omdat in plaats van het enige uitgiftekantoor in Yaounde voor het hele land, nu elk regionaal hoofdkantoor in het land dit document kon uitgeven, wat de administratieve bottleneck en de omkoping, die de praktijk van voor de hervorming karakteriseerde, drastisch verkleinde. De geldigheidsduur was ook verlengd van één naar vijf jaar.

3. Het instellen van twee vergunningscategorieën voor wegtransporteurs

Dit beleid was geïmplementeerd door het effectief creëren van twee categorieën van openbaar vervoersvergunningen, zijnde de normale vergunning voor openbare deeltaxi's en de speciale vergunning voor schoolbussen om kinderen in stedelijke gebieden te vervoeren en voor ander Hoogwaardig Openbaar Vervoer, zoals bussen en minibusjes. De leges zijn ook verschillend.

4. Digitaal maken van de inschrijvingen van voertuigen

Deze beleidshervorming is nooit geïmplementeerd. In 2007 zijn plannen gemaakt voor een frisse start van de beleidsinvoering, maar er is nog steeds geen traject uitgestippeld voor de invoering van dit beleid. Degenen die interesse hebben in dit domein hebben nooit echt de middelen en mankracht gevonden om dit beleid te implementeren.

5. Liberalisering van stedelijk openbaar vervoer per bus, minibus en motorfiets

Dit was de centrale hervorming van de jaren 90 van de vorige eeuw, omdat hierdoor snel nieuwe vormen van openbaar vervoer in Yaounde kwamen, welke bijdroegen aan het verminderen van de tekorten in Yaounde. Hoewel de minibus en motorfietstaxi's snel op het toneel verschenen, was dit niet het geval bij de private bussen. Deze verwachting dat die bussen er zouden komen, kwam niet uit, omdat de belangen van actoren en staatsinmenging door regerende elites. Andere belemmerende factoren waren de kosten, gebrek aan ervaring, en gebrek aan logistieke benodigdheden om een stedelijke busdienst aan te bieden. Door het uitblijven van het beoogde resultaat werd - meer dan tien jaar na de start van de hervorming - de PPS-constructie werd opgezet.

6. Het installeren van een evaluatiecommissie voor biedingen van bedrijven op buslijnen

Deze Commissie werd opgezet en heeft enkele sessies gehouden waarin ondernemingen werden geselecteerd die stedelijke busdiensten in Yaounde mochten gaan uitvoeren. Echter, het biedingsproces vertoonde gebreken, doordat de bedrijven die de rechten kregen toegewezen nooit busdiensten hebben uitgevoerd. Hierdoor bleef de stad een decennium verstoken van busdiensten.

7. Het reduceren van de importheffingen op geïmporteerde voertuigen

Het was moeilijk deze hervorming te implementeren door douanefraude en de falsifiëring van documenten ter verklaring van de import.

8. Het voorschrijven van nieuwe tarieven voor de wettelijke aansprakelijkheid binnen de motorvoertuigenverzekeringen

Dit beleid werd onmiddellijk ingevoerd, omdat alle voertuigen in Kameroen bij wet verplicht werden verzekerd te zijn tegen wettelijke aansprakelijkheid voor schade en letsel aan derden bij een ongeval; desondanks waren er vaak gevallen van fraude in het gebruik of valse documenten.

9. Het instellen van identificatiebadges voor taxichauffeurs

Een beslissing (00063/MINT/DTT) van 14 januari 1997 creëerde de verplichting voor bestuurders van openbare taxi's een identificatiebadge te dragen. In november 2002 bezegelde de minister van transport het besluit om vanaf 1 januari 2003 de regels omtrent de bestuurdersbadge te gaan handhaven. Dat was ongeveer zeven jaar na het eerste besluit om de identificatiebadge verplicht te stellen aan alle taxichauffeurs van openbare deeltaxi's. De sancties op het niet naleven hiervan werden uiteindelijk per ministerieel decreet vastgelegd.

10. Het instellen van helmen voor taxichauffeurs op een motorfiets

Een beslissing (00063/MINT/DTT) van 14 januari 1997 creëerde de verplichting voor bestuurders van openbare motortaxi's een identificatiebadge te dragen. Deze regel om motorfietstaxi's en hun passagiers te beschermen is nooit ingevoerd, vanwege de weigering om de regel uit voeren en de hygiënische gevolgen van het laten dragen van één helm door vele passagiers per motortaxi.

11. Reorganisatie van de Transportraden

In 1998 heeft de minister van transport nieuw beleid uitgevaardigd om de werkpraktijken in de Transportraden van het Ministerie te besturen; dit is verantwoordelijk geweest voor de inperking van de beperkte corruptie die bij de uitgifte van vervoersdocumenten bestond.

12. Het instellen van een speciale vergunning voor op de voorruit van voertuigen

De speciale vergunning voor op de voorruit van voertuigen was ingesteld per decreet van de minister-president, maar nooit daadwerkelijk ingevoerd. Het was de bedoeling de wijdverbreide politiecontroles van voertuigen die vaak eindigden met het geven en aannemen van steekpenningen, in te perken. Ondanks dat de vergunningen waren gedrukt en uitgegeven, werden zij minder dan een jaar later al weer afgevoerd, omdat zij er niet in slaagden de voertuigcontroles door politie en gendarmerie in te perken. Voertuigen voor openbaar vervoer weigerden om de vergunningen aan te schaffen en zo is sindsdien de vergunning verdwenen. De wijdverbreide corruptie waarvan het bedoeling was om hem in te dammen, tiert nog welig.

13. Bescherming van het nationale wegnetwerk en beheersing van de milieuvervuiling

In april 1996 was een nieuw statuut uitgevaardigd om het nationale wegennetwerk te beschermen en de milieuvervuiling door voertuigen te controleren. In januari 2007 is er slechts 1 centrum geopend in Yaounde. Echter, het is nog niet in een uitvoeringswet vastgelegd op welke modaliteiten dit statuut betrekking heeft.

14. Privatisering van de technische keuring van motorvoertuigen

Voertuiginspectie en het verkrijgen van nummerplaten waren aan een private partij gegund zonder een eerlijk biedingsproces. Een ministeriële regeling (00452/D/MINT/CAB) van 5 maart 2003 legde de organisatie vast en bepaalde de invulling van de commissie die de toestemming gaf voor de motorvoertuigeninspectie. Desondanks laat de kwaliteit van de stedelijke vervoersmiddelen in Yaounde veel te wensen, door een gebrek aan doelmatigheid van de inspecties.

2. Hoe beoordelen de primaire actoren in het stedelijk vervoer de prestaties van de beleidshervormingen in het licht van de doelen die door de beleidsmakers zijn opgesteld? En hoe beoordelen zij de effecten van dit beleid op hun dagelijkse leven in het licht van hun proxycriteria? Is er onder de actoren een significante trend in beleving van de prestaties van het nieuwe beleid in 1998, 1999 en 2000?

De perceptie van actoren over het bereiken van de beleidsdoelstellingen en hoe het hun dagelijkse leven heeft beïnvloed, staat vermeld in hoofdstuk zes. Paragrafen 6.5 en 6.8 laten de percepties zien van de actoren in Yaounde met weinig macht over de manier waarop het Nieuwe Stedelijk Vervoerplan zijn uitwerking heeft gehad op het gestelde doel en de doelstellingen. In hoofdstuk zes identificeren we ook verschillen in percepties tussen de actoren volgens groepen over de beleidsprestaties. Het nagaan van het historische proces in hoofdstuk vijf laat de activiteiten zien waarbij beleidsactoren betrokken waren en hoe zij hebben opgetreden gedurende het beleidsproces. De machtsindex van actoren in hoofdstuk zes geeft een indicatie van het handelen van een beleidsactor gedurende het beleidsproces, gebaseerd op hun macht en leiderschapskwaliteiten. Ondanks dat de perceptie van actoren als subjectief kan worden gezien, is de globale bedoeling van de actorenanalyse het beleidsproces te begrijpen in het licht van degenen, wiens leven direct wordt beïnvloed door het beleid.

Hoofdstuk zes, paragrafen 6.5 en 6.8, laat zien hoe actoren met weinig macht in Yaounde de prestaties van het Nieuwe Stedelijk Vervoerplan beoordelen in termen van doelen die de publieke autoriteiten eraan hadden verbonden. Het laat ook op een indicatieve manier de verschillen zien in de perceptie van verschillende groepen van actoren over de beleidsprestaties. Het nagaan van het historische proces in hoofdstuk zes identificeert de activiteiten die inmenging van beleidsactoren vereisten en hoe zij hierop hebben gereageerd. Dit geeft ook een indicatie van de vraag hoe deze interactie de beleidsuitkomsten heeft beïnvloed. De index van de macht van actoren in tabel 6.1 in hoofdstuk 6 geeft een indicatie van de interactie van beleidsactoren gedurende het beleidsproces en hun macht en leiderschapskwaliteiten.

Perceptie van actoren zijn uiteraard subjectief. Dat is geen groot bezwaar, want de bedoeling van de actorenanalyse is om (de perceptie van) het beleidsproces te begrijpen door ernaar te kijken door de bril van de door het beleid direct begunstigen. In dit proefschrift is elk doel kwalitatief beoordeeld. Een significante meerderheid van 82,5 % van de steekproef van actoren in het stedelijk openbaar vervoer in Yaounde denkt dat de beleidsdoelstelling over liberalisering van de stedelijke openbaar vervoerssector zeer goed bereikt is. De meerderheid van de actoren (64 %) gaat er vanuit het doel om amateurisme in de sector uit te roeien bereikt is, terwijl 36 % er vanuit gaat dat dat doel niet bereikt is. De perceptie van actoren op de beleidsdoelstelling over het verbeteren van stedelijke mobiliteit in Yaounde laat zien dat actoren verschillende opvattingen hebben. Terwijl sommige respondenten (57,5 %) denken dat het beleid de mobiliteit in de stad heeft vergemakkelijkt, denkt de andere 43 % precies het tegengestelde, vooral doordat er tijdens het spitsuur nog steeds files staan rond grote kruisingen van wegen en in de nauwe straten.

De perceptie die actoren hebben over de beleidsdoelen om clandestiene transporteurs te weren laten wederom zien dat zij verschillende opvattingen hebben over dit issue. 50 % vindt dat het beleidsdoel is bereikt, 40 % vindt van niet. Problemen zijn de voortdurende tekorten aan deeltaxi's en zelfs aan motorfietstaxi's die de suburbane gebieden aandoen. In die gebieden woont het arme deel van de bevolking, dat op deze vormen van vervoer is aangewezen. Deze tekorten hangen samen met de slechte condities van de wegen die naar deze gebieden leiden. De doorstroming van het verkeer in Yaounde is niet veranderd na de invoering van het nieuwe beleid. Het is daarom niet verwonderlijk dat 60 % van de actoren het bereiken van dit doel niet positief beoordeelt. Ongeveer 22 % denkt dat het beleid de doorstroming in de stad wel heeft verbeterd. De antwoorden van de actoren laten zien dat 62,5 % denkt dat het beleid heeft gefaald in het bereiken van de doelstelling de milieuvuiling door stedelijk vervoer te verminderen, terwijl 22,5 % denkt dat die doelstelling wel is gehaald. Er zijn geen zichtbare beleidsactiviteiten om deze doelstelling te helpen bereiken.

Actoren geloven dat de beleidshervormingen in Yaounde het stedelijke personenvervoer niet goed genoeg hebben georganiseerd om het nieuwe transportsysteem als voldoende effectief te kunnen beoordelen. De effectiviteit betreft de mate waarin actoren vinden dat het beleid de doelen heeft bereikt. In dit geval is het doel om het stedelijk openbaar vervoer efficiënt te organiseren. Actoren geloven in het algemeen dat hun leefomgeving negatief is beïnvloed door de beleidsinterventie, omdat zij zich nu geconfronteerd zien met de nieuwe werkelijkheid van het stedelijk vervoer, zonder bussen die ooit de vele buslijnen van de SOTUC bereden. Tot 2006 waren er alleen taxi's en motorfietstaxi's beschikbaar. Deze modaliteiten kosten meer dan de vroegere bussen, en zijn vaker niet comfortabel en / of niet veilig, zeker niet voor vrouwen die 's nachts reizen. Daarbovenop denken veel actoren dat de invoering van het nieuwe beleid niet erg goed getimed is gezien de lage koopkracht en de grote armoede van veel inwoners; ze vinden het radicale niveau van invoering oneerlijk tegenover de armen en de kwetsbaren. Actoren wijzen erop dat de overheid het publiek niet heeft geconsulteerd over haar nieuwe beleid, zodat hun visies nooit zijn meegenomen voordat het beleid van kracht werd. Gebruikers van het openbaar vervoer zijn een groep van belangrijke, primaire actoren, maar hebben slechts weinig macht. Ze beoordelen het beleid vooral vanuit de effecten op de tarieven en kwaliteit van het stedelijk openbaar vervoer. Voor hen heeft het beleid stedelijke mobiliteit duurder, oncomfortabel en onveiliger gemaakt.

Tabel 6.2.3. toont dat de trendanalyse van de actorenperceptie van de doelbereiking over drie jaren een significant verschil laat zien tussen de twee groepen van actoren met betrekking tot de manier waarop het beleid zijn beleidsdoelen over het vergemakkelijken van stedelijke mobiliteit in Yaounde heeft bereikt: verenigingen van taxichauffeurs en van andere weggebruikers zijn in het algemeen positiever over het beleid over het faciliteren van mobiliteit, dan andere groepen actoren. De trendanalyse laat ook zien dat het verschil tussen deze twee groepen actoren met betrekking tot de volgende vijf proxymaatregelen niet significant is:

1. Heeft het NUTP het stedelijk openbaar vervoer in Yaounde geliberaliseerd?
2. Heeft dit beleid amateurisme uit het stedelijk vervoer verbannen?
3. Heeft dit beleid de clandestiene transporteurs in Yaounde een halt toegeroepen?
4. Heeft dit beleid de verkeersdoorstroming in de stad verbeterd?
5. Heeft dit beleid bijgedragen aan het tegengaan van milieuvervuiling die is toe te rekenen aan het vervoer?

Ondanks enige ontevredenheid met het nieuwe beleid, hebben actoren desondanks een positieve beoordeling gemaakt van de betrouwbaarheid van het stedelijk openbaar vervoer dat is ontstaan met het nieuwe beleid. Deze opvatting is gebaseerd op het feit dat nieuwe modaliteiten voor openbaar vervoer zijn geïntroduceerd, zoals de motorfietstaxi, minibus en private bussen. De betrouwbaarheid betekent dus dat veel vormen van stedelijk openbaar vervoer beschikbaar zijn voor de stedelijke actoren. De vraag is niet of de meeste mensen ook al deze modaliteiten daadwerkelijk gebruiken, maar feit is wel dat elke actor nu uit tenminste drie alternatieve modaliteiten voor stedelijk openbaar vervoer kan kiezen.

3. Wat zijn alternatieven die kunnen worden voorgesteld voor het beleid van het stedelijk openbaar vervoer en voor de infrastructuurontwikkeling in Yaounde, vanuit de geleerde lessen uit de huidige situatie?

Dit onderzoek stelt aanbevelingen op voor de toekomstige ontwikkeling van mobiliteit in Yaounde. Deze op beleid gebaseerde aanbevelingen zijn verdeeld over beleid met betrekking tot de vraagkant en de aanbodkant. Onze aanbevelingen hieronder worden belangrijk en realistisch geacht vanuit het beleidsoogpunt van Yaounde.

1. Vraagkant van het transport, de mobiliteit, infrastructuur en beheersprocessen.

Dit proefschrift stelt de volgende maatregelen voor de vraagkant van stedelijk openbaar vervoer in Yaounde voor: 1. Hef parkeerbelasting in de centrale bedrijven- en overheidszones. 2. Creëer meer eenrichtingsstraten. 3. Leg meer voetpaden aan langs de straten. 4. Laat de verkeersopstoppingen in bepaalde stadszones ontstaan om het verkeer te kunnen reguleren.

2. Aanbodkant van het transport, de mobiliteit, infrastructuur en beheersprocessen.

Dit proefschrift stelt de volgende maatregelen voor de aanbodkant van stedelijk openbaar vervoer in Yaounde voor: 1. Verbeter de kwaliteit van het openbaar personenvervoer door de bestaande vervoersstandaarden beter te handhaven en te reguleren om zo het gebruik aan te moedigen onder degenen die voornamelijk hun eigen personenauto gebruiken. 2. Neem het initiatief om een railgebonden systeem op te zetten dat complementair is met het weggebonden systeem. 3. Overweeg beleidsacties om de modal split van stedelijke modaliteiten te beïnvloeden en te verminderen met de introductie van PPS en herintroductie van Hoogwaardig Openbaar Vervoer. 4. Moedig het gebruik aan van technieken voor Intelligente TransportSystemen op kruisingen en om de doorstroming van het verkeer, vooral tijdens het spitsuur, te bevorderen. 5. Overweeg een zoneringsysteem in de stad voor een meer evenredig en eerlijk tariefsysteem. 6. Gebruik samenwerking in de informele sector, omdat die de belangrijkste aanbieder is van stedelijk openbaar vervoer. 7. Kom tegemoet aan de niet-gemotoriseerde transportbehoefte door in de infrastructuurontwikkeling voet- en fietspaden te ontwerpen en realiseren om zo deze verplaatsingen te vergemakkelijken en de duurzaamheid van het stedelijk vervoer in de stad te vergroten. 8. Stel een planning op voor het opzetten van een Grootstedelijke TransportAutoriteit voor Yaounde die de beleidsontwikkeling rond de stedelijke mobiliteit en infrastructuur in de stad kan overzien.

4. Wat zijn de overeenkomsten en verschillen in problemen en oplossingen voor de transportinfrastructuur voor stedelijke mobiliteit en het beheer daarvan tussen Yaounde en enkele andere grote steden in Afrika?

In hoofdstuk zeven van dit proefschrift worden de overeenkomsten tussen Yaounde en andere Afrikaanse steden uitgelegd. De lessen die uit dit onderzoek geleerd kunnen worden in combinatie met de casus van Yaounde, worden hieronder samengevat.

Voor Yaounde en andere steden in ontwikkelingslanden laten de geleerde lessen van de invoering in Yaounde van een nieuw stedelijk vervoersbeleid zien dat veel alternatieve beleidsopties voorgesteld kunnen worden om de stedelijke mobiliteit, infrastructuurontwikkeling en het beheer van het stedelijk vervoer te verbeteren. Het beste stedelijke beleid en de uitvoering daarvan die gevonden is in de literatuur kan zowel in Yaounde als in andere steden worden nagestreefd. In de volgende alinea's worden de geleerde lessen uitgelegd, gegroepeerd in een aantal doelgerichte beleidsterreinen.

1. Stedelijk bestuur en institutionele vernieuwing.

Het belangrijkste traject voor de invoering van een duurzaam stedelijk openbaar vervoersysteem in Yaounde en andere Afrikaanse steden lijkt te liggen in de problematiek van het stedelijk bestuur. Yaounde en andere Afrikaanse steden moeten hun instituties zo herzien dat zij de capaciteiten krijgen om niet alleen wegtransportprojecten te plannen en uit te voeren, maar ook specifieke tol te heffen voor de stad, middelen gebruiken om de infrastructuur te verbeteren en stedelijke mobiliteit te vergemakkelijken en het reizen in de steden toegankelijker en beter betaalbaar te maken.

2. Noodzaak voor slechts één stedelijk vervoersbureau.

Stedelijk vervoer is dusdanig enorm belangrijk geworden dat het vaak een zelfstandig bureau vereist dat al het beleid in het domein afhandelt. Voor een belangrijke stad zoals Yaounde en de andere in dit proefschrift behandelde steden kan zo'n bureau efficiënt een korte-, middellange- en langetermijnplanning garanderen die rekening houdt met zaken zoals duurzaamheid, betaalbaarheid, modal split, leefklimaat van de stad als woonplaats en bevolkingsgroei. Een dergelijk zelfstandig bureau kan zowel op het landelijke als op het lokale niveau bevoegdheden hebben onder de wettelijke bepalingen van democratisch verkozen burgemeesters, als onderdeel van goed bestuur en gedecentraliseerd beheer.

3. Verkeersveiligheid en verkeersbeheersing in de stad.

Het almaar toenemende aantal verkeersongelukken, waarbij het aantal slachtoffers ook hoog is, is in het bijzonder hoog in Yaounde. Er bestaan overigens geen goede statistieken voor ongevallen in het wegverkeer Yaounde. Het probleem is niet minder cruciaal voor de andere steden, zoals de literatuur aangeeft. Bijvoorbeeld Jacobs en Sayer (1984) behandelen kosteneffectieve maatregelen om de veiligheid van openbare stedelijke wegen in ontwikkelingslanden te verbeteren, die ook kunnen worden toegepast in Yaounde en de andere steden. Zij stellen dat in Nairobi (Kenia) de introductie van meer verkeerslichten op de belangrijkste kruispunten een nieuw gevoel van respect heeft opgeroepen onder de stedelijke passagiersvervoerders voor de snelwegwetten. Dit impliceert dat opstoppingen en congestie in Yaounde en de andere steden mogelijk verminderd kan worden door het gebruik van een dergelijke goedkope technologische aanpassing, vooral als de stad notoir achterloopt met het plaatsen van verkeerslichten.

4. Handhaving van bestaande transportstandaarden en -regels.

Het probleem met de veiligheid in het stedelijk passagiersvervoer in Yaounde is net als in de andere steden cruciaal voor alle weggebruikers. De geldende regels en wetten worden zelden nageleefd, zoals Jacobs en Sayer (1984) aantonen. Echter, zij hebben aangetoond dat Singapore en Caïro (Egypte) hun aantal ongevallen in stedelijk openbaar passagiersvervoer significant hebben verlaagd door de handhaving van de verkeerswetten. Yaounde en de andere Afrikaanse steden zouden hetzelfde kunnen doen door te leren van deze voorbeelden en gelijkwaardig beleid in te voeren. Verder kunnen educatie, informatie en communicatie een hoofdrol spelen in het veiliger maken van het voetgangersverkeer in Yaounde als ouders en andere actoren de gemeentelijke autoriteiten helpen de kinderen en andere voetgangers de kennis over veiligheid op een regelmatige basis bij te brengen op basis van de media, zoals spots op radio en televisie en posters langs de weg.

5. Milieuprestaties van voertuigen

Het deel van de vervuiling in Yaounde dat is toe te rekenen aan het stedelijk vervoer is significant, net als in de andere Afrikaanse landen. Yaounde en de andere Afrikaanse steden kunnen leren van de ervaringen opgedaan in de Aziatische landen, waar de ontwikkeling van het stedelijk vervoer zich ooit ook op een zeer onduurzaam pad bevond (congestie, ongevallen, luchtvervuiling), voordat zij een serie maatregelen hebben genomen om het tij te keren. Deze maatregelen begonnen met het opzetten van een samenwerkingsovereenkomst onder Partnership for Sustainable Urban Transport in Asia (PSUTA) dat heeft toegestaan om data en informatie over het stedelijk vervoer te verzamelen en te delen en de uitweiding over maatregelen om mogelijk schadelijke niveaus van stedelijke vervuiling die aan het stedelijke vervoer zijn toe te rekenen in te dammen; Yaounde en de Afrikaanse steden kunnen zich in deze richting bewegen om hun vervuilingproblemen te boven te komen.

5. Samenvatting van de onderzoeksresultaten

Samenvattend zijn de belangrijkste resultaten van dit onderzoek de volgende.

1. Voorafgaand aan het beleid om het stedelijk vervoer per minibus, motorfiets en bus te liberaliseren werd ingevoerd, was de deeltaxi's de enige legale vorm van openbaar passagiersvervoer in Yaounde. Nadat het beleid was ingevoerd, maakten ook motorfietstaxi's, minibusjes en bussen deel uit van het stedelijk openbaar vervoer in Yaounde. De staat had niet langer het monopolie op het uitvoeren van de stedelijke busdiensten in Yaounde. Private ondernemers hadden het wettelijke recht om dit te doen. Het aanbod van gemotoriseerd openbaar vervoer is sinds de introductie van de motorfietsen, minibusjes en bussen toegenomen.

2. De introductie van nieuwe vormen van openbaar vervoer heeft de mobiliteit voor de stadsbewoners van Yaounde beter betaalbaar en toegankelijker gemaakt. De nieuwe middelen van openbaar vervoer zijn alle goedkoper dan de deeltaxi's. Wel zijn de relatief goedkope bussen verdwenen. De motorfietstaxi heeft bepaalde suburbane gebieden met slechte wegen beter bereikbaar gemaakt, doordat motorfietsen deze wegen wel kunnen gebruiken. Dit heeft de reistijden voor de stadsbewoners van deze gebieden bekort.

3. De invoering van de beleidshervorming van het reorganiseren van de Transportraden heeft de uitgifte van vervoersdocumenten vergemakkelijkt. Dit heeft de frequentie van kleine corruptie verkleind, die voorkwam in de procedures voor het afgeven van vervoersdocumenten, zoals de stedelijke openbaar vervoervergunning en registratie als wegtransporteur en bij het verkrijgen van de "Carte Bleue". Daardoor kunnen vele ondernemers nu gemakkelijk tot de sector toetreden om het aantal vervoersmiddelen in de stad te kunnen opstuwen.

4. De invoering van nieuwe tarieven voor wettelijke aansprakelijkheid bij de motorvoertuigenverzekering heeft de praktijk van het afgeven van valse verzekeringsbewijzen ingedamd; dit is gunstig voor de weggebruikers, doordat slachtoffers van een ongeval zich in toenemende mate gezekerd weten.

5. De beleidshervorming heeft ook onverwachte uitkomsten gebracht, zoals de waargenomen spitsuurcongestie rond belangrijke kruispunten, die regelmatig optreedt wanneer motorfietstaxi's met andere weggebruikers strijden om de voorrang. Een andere onverwachte uitkomst is het stijgende aantal ongevallen met dodelijk afloop, waarbij motorfietstaxi's betrokken zijn. Diefstal van motorfietsen is ook een nieuw fenomeen in Yaounde. De stedelijke vervuiling (geluid en gassen) neemt ook toe als gevolg van de motorfietstaxi's. Een andere onverwachte uitkomst van het nieuwe beleid is dat het de noodzaak van meer kwalitatief goede weginfrastructuur belicht,

6. Een andere onverwachte uitkomst van het beleid betreft het gebrek aan weginfrastructuur in Yaounde. Het gaat vooral om de capaciteit van kruisingen, en het gebrek aan voetpaden en verkeerslichten. Deze capaciteit is van belang om de groeiende bevolking en de fenomenale toename aan personenauto's de ruimte te kunnen bieden.

7. De beleidshervorming heeft de noodzaak van adequate bestuursstructuren met de juiste capaciteiten voor Yaounde tot uitdrukking gebracht voor het belangrijke domein van vervoer, dat de duurzaamheid en kwaliteit van leven in een stad bepaalt. Het gaat daarbij om ondermeer om de stad als gezonde, schone en veilige plek, en de stad als plek voor bedrijvigheid.

8. De ontwikkeling en groei van Yaounde betekenen dat een doelbewust beleid van de decentralisatie moet worden nagestreefd. Decentralisatie kan participatie van de bevolking ontlocken. Daardoor kan de bevolking zich wellicht beter vinden in plannen voor de lange termijn, die nu zeer belangrijk zijn voor Yaounde.

We concluderen dat de beleidshervorming zowel verwachte als onverwachte effecten op het stedelijk vervoersysteem in Yaounde heeft gesorteerd.

6. Conclusie van dit proefschrift: antwoorden op de hoofdonderzoeksvraag

De hoofdonderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift is: *wat gebeurde er met betrekking tot het transportsysteem in Yaounde als gevolg van de beleidshervormingen en waarom?* In de hoofdstukken vijf en zes heeft dit proefschrift laten zien dat het innovatieve stedelijke vervoersbeleid radicale veranderingen aan het patroon en de modaliteiten van stedelijk vervoer in de stad heeft gebracht, vooral door de wetgeving die het gebruik van motorfietsen in het openbaar vervoer heeft toegestaan om passagiers in de stad te vervoeren. Hoewel sommige van de verwachte beleidsuitkomsten bereikt zijn, zoals de liberalisering van het passagiersvervoer per bus en de deregulering van de minibus en motorfietstaxi's, zijn er ook onverwachte uitkomsten van het beleid, zoals de hogere kosten van het conventionele taxivervoer. De introductie van motorfietstaxi's heeft de frequentie van vervoersgerelateerde ongevallen doen toenemen, vooral van ongevallen waarbij een motorfietstaxi betrokken was. Dit proefschrift heeft met de actorenanalyse en de machtsanalyse van de actoren ook laten zien hoe de lokale politieke context de beleidshervormingen in de stedelijke vervoerssector in Yaounde beïnvloedt. De bureaucratische elites hebben het mechanisme van landelijk beleid gebruikt tijdens de periode van privatisering, ontmanteling en deregulering door het opzetten van allianties en het uitgeven van contracten aan handlangers. Daardoor hebben ze de 'optimale' invoering van het beleid beïnvloed. Dit onderzoek heeft ook aangetoond dat de theoretische veronderstellingen over de invloed van dereguleren en liberaliseren op private busondernemingen niet zijn bewaarheid in Yaounde. In plaats daarvan zijn publieke bussen na twaalf jaar van afwezigheid weer geïntroduceerd door middel van een akkoord over publiekprivate samenwerking na vele mislukte pogingen tot volledige privatisering van de busdiensten zonder franchising. De resultaten van de data-analyse die gepresenteerd werd in hoofdstuk zeven suggereren een trend voor de negatieve perceptie van een significant deel van de primaire actoren over de manier waarop de beleidshervormingen hun doelen hebben bereikt. Het beleidsdoel van de liberalisering van het stedelijk vervoer is het enige doel waarover alle betrokken actoren een positieve perceptie hebben.

About the author

Soter Eddia was born on the 25th of January 1963 in Muyuka, Fako Division of the South West Province of the Republic of Cameroon in West Africa. After attending primary school for seven years he entered Secondary school at Bishop Rogan College Buea in 1974 from where he graduated in 1979 with the GCE Ordinary level. In 1979 he enrolled in High School at the Cameroon College of Arts, Science and Technology, (CCAST), Bambili, in Bamenda, Cameroon from where he graduated in 1981 with the GCE Advanced level. He registered into the University of Yaounde in 1981 to read Law. But in 1982 he left Law, to read Journalism at the Advanced School of Mass Communication, ASMAC, of the University of Yaounde. He graduated with a degree in Journalism in 1985. From 1985 to 1991 he worked as a journalist with *CAMEROON TRIBUNE*, the national Bilingual daily newspaper of Cameroon and was based in Yaounde. From 1993 to 1995, he read Political Analysis at the University of Yaounde II where he obtained the Masters degree. He then worked for two years in the Ministry of Communication in Cameroon before gaining admission into the Institute of Social Studies, ISS, in The Hague in the Netherlands in 1995 from where he obtained a Masters degree with a B+ honours in the Politics of Alternative Development Strategies, PADS, in 1996. Upon his return to Cameroon, he was recruited as Lecturer in The University of Yaounde II at Soa. He has attended internships in France, Germany, Canada and Kenya. However, in 2003, he was appointed Attaché at the Secretariat General of the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon. He still lectures at the University of Yaounde II. He has been working on his PhD in the field of urban transport policy and development. He is married with three children.

TRAIL Thesis Series

The following list contains the most recent dissertations in the TRAIL series. See for a complete overview the TRAIL website: www.rsTRAIL.nl.

The TRAIL Thesis Series is a series of the Netherlands TRAIL Research School on transport, infrastructure and logistics.

Eddia, S., *Uncertainty in Transport Policy Implementation and Outcomes. The Case of Yaounde in the 1990*, T2009/8, September 2009, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands

T.E. Platz, *The Efficient Integration of Inland Shipping into Continental Intermodal Transport Chains. Measures and decisive factors*, T2009/7, August 2009, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands

Tahmasseby, S., *Reliability in Urban Public Transport Network Assessment and Design*, T2009/6, June 2009, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands

Bogers, E.A.I., *Traffic Information and Learning in Day-to-day Route Choice*, T2009/5, June 2009, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands

Amelsfort, D.H. van, *Behavioural Responses and Network Effects of Time-varying Road Pricing*, T2009/4, May 2009, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands

Li, H., *Reliability-based Dynamic Network Design with Stochastic Networks*, T2009/3, May 2009, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands

Stankova, K., *On Stackelberg and Inverse Stackelberg Games & their Applications in the Optimal Toll Design Problem, the Energy Markets Liberalization Problem, and in the Theory of Incentives*, T2009/2, February 2009, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands

Li, T., *Informedness and Customer-Centric Revenue*, T2009/1, December 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands

- Agusdinata, D.B., *Exploratory Modeling and Analysis. A promising method to deal with deep uncertainty*, T2008/17, December 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Kreutzberger, E., *The Innovation of Intermodal Rail Freight Bundling Networks in Europe. Concepts, Developments, Performances*, T2008/16, December 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Taale, H., *Integrated Anticipatory Control of Road Networks. A game theoretical approach*, T2008/15, December 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Li, M., *Robustness Analysis for Road Networks. A framework with combined DTA models*, T2008/14, December 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Yu, M., *Enhancing Warehouse Performance by Efficient Order Picking*, T2008/13, October 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Liu, H., *Travel Time Prediction for Urban Networks*, T2008/12, October 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Kaa, E.J. van de, *Extended Prospect Theory. Findings on Choice Behaviour from Economics and the Behavioural Sciences and their Relevance for Travel Behaviour*, T2008/11, October 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Nijland, H., *Theory and Practice of the Assessment and Valuation of Noise from Roads and Railroads in Europe*, T2008/10, September 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Annema, J.A., *The Practice of Forward-Looking Transport Policy Assessment Studies*, T2008/9, September 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Ossen, S.J.L., *Theory and Empirics of Longitudinal Driving Behavior*, T2008/8, September 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Tu, H., *Monitoring Travel Time Reliability on Freeways*, T2008/7, April 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- D'Ariano, A., *Improving Real-Time Train Dispatching: Models, Algorithms and Applications*, T2008/6, April 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Quak, H.J., *Sustainability of Urban Freight Transport. Retail Distribution and Local Regulations in Cities*, T2008/5, March 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Hegeman, G., *Assisted Overtaking. An assessment of overtaking on two-lane rural roads*, T2008/4, February 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Katwijk, R.T. van, *Multi-Agent Look-ahead Traffic Adaptive Control*, T2008/3, January 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands
- Argiolu. R., *Office Location Choice Behaviour and Intelligent Transport Systems*, T2008/2, January 2008, TRAIL Thesis Series, the Netherlands