

## Introduction: Intelligence, Instituting, Archiving

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Edited by Stavros Kousoulas and Andrej Radman

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# Introduction: Intelligence, Instituting, Archiving

Stavros Kousoulas  and  
Andrej Radman , editors

Delft University of Technology

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## Abstract

This issue builds on the 16th International Deleuze and Guattari Studies Camp and Conference, held at Delft University of Technology in July 2024. Hosted by the Architecture Philosophy and Theory academic group and its Ecologies of Architecture research team, the event focused on processes of subjectification. The production of subjectivity has been a central concern for Deleuze and Guattari since *Anti-Oedipus*. Guattari further developed their schizoanalytic approach to social formations, expanding *Anti-Oedipus*'s three syntheses into a more general account of three broader ecologies: environmental, social and mental. Today, it is increasingly evident that these three ecologies can no longer be addressed in isolation by the sciences, humanities or arts. Half a century after the publication of the first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, this line of transversal thinking is more pertinent than ever for addressing the ever-evolving bio-, techno- and noo-spheres, shaped by hyperautomation, algorithmic governance and increasingly systemic forms of disempowerment.

**Keywords:** intelligence, instituting, archiving, anxiety, subjectification, transmonadism

This issue builds on the 16th International Deleuze and Guattari Studies Camp and Conference, held at Delft University of Technology in July 2024. Hosted by the Architecture Philosophy and Theory academic group and its Ecologies of Architecture research team, the event focused on processes of subjectification. The production of subjectivity has

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been a central concern for Deleuze and Guattari since *Anti-Oedipus* (2008). Guattari (2008) further developed their schizoanalytic approach to social formations, expanding *Anti-Oedipus*'s three syntheses into a more general account of three broader ecologies: environmental, social and mental. Today, it is increasingly evident that these three ecologies can no longer be addressed in isolation by the sciences, humanities or arts. Half a century after the publication of the first volume of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, this line of transversal thinking is more pertinent than ever for addressing the ever-evolving bio-, techno- and noo-spheres, shaped by hyperautomation, algorithmic governance, and increasingly systemic forms of disempowerment (Yuk Hui 2019, 2021, 2024).<sup>1</sup>

Structured around the three irreducible syntheses and irreversible ecologies, this issue examines three socio-techno-environmental regimes: intelligence (Braidotti, Debaise), instituting (Portanova, Reed) and archiving (Tsagdis, Smith and Stivale). The seven articles collectively revisit the material-discursive ecologies of instituting and archiving practices as critical and creative endeavours, exploring how these practices may counter systemic stupidity and foster collective intelligence (Kousoulas and Radman 2025). Rather than addressing the essentialist question of what intelligence is, they focus on the pragmatics: how it happens, who institutes it, and through which technologies it is archived. Drawing on (post-)Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts and methods, extended through critical and clinical analysis, the contributors reveal the reciprocally determinant structures and operations of these three regimes. Far from providing a glorified summary of the arguments presented in the respective chapters, our introduction aims to function as a stand-alone (meta) article, exploring the intricate entanglement of intelligence, instituting and archiving.

## I. Ectopic Embryogenesis

There is something truly extraordinary about the processes of anthropogenesis. However, this realisation should not be mistaken for an endorsement of the thesis of human exceptionalism. Indeed, the thesis of univocity remains intact—being is said of all things in the same sense (Deleuze 1994: 32–9). Yet, as one commentator astutely observed, ‘all things exist equally, but not all things equally exist’ (Bryant 2010). The human infant is unique in retaining its embryological state for a considerable period after birth (Ruyer 2016; Deleuze and Guattari 1994).<sup>2</sup> This premature birth occurs because a fully developed skull would be unable to pass through the birth canal (Wexler 2010:

163). This (enabling) constraint arises from the evolutionary shift to an upright posture, which necessitated a change in locomotion and the subsequent topological adjustment that brought the hips closer together—a process of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of the limbs (Leroi-Gourhan 1993: 229).<sup>3</sup> What initially appears utterly debilitating (especially compared to other animals) proves to be remarkably advantageous. This parallels the concept from ‘The Geology of Morals’ plateau in *A Thousand Plateaus*, where Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 55) frame the act of fleeing as an act of conquest and creation. The premature ‘eviction’ from the womb before reaching full maturity places the subject under the care of a social environment and exposes it to a rich array of stimuli—natural, artificial and everything in between. The developing brain thrives on the augmented influx of information, forming an astonishing million neural connections per second during the first months after birth (Kwinter 2024). In the words of neurocognitive scientist Bruce Wexler:

Humans, and humans alone, shape and reshape the environments that shape their brains. This cultural evolution differs from Darwinian biological evolution in several important ways. Firstly, it creates more rapid, more incremental, and more widespread population variability. Second, cultural and biological evolution use very different processes to store the information that influences brain development, structure, and function. In biological evolution, information is stored in the largely stable base sequence of DNA molecules. In cultural evolution, the information is stored in the minds and behavior of adult members of society; in cultural artifacts such as books, architecture, and works of art; and in social institutions including laws, customs, and schools. In biological evolution the information is stored in identical and complete form in many individuals. In cultural evolution, the information is distributed in different and incomplete forms across many individuals and artifacts. (Wexler 2010: 143)

In this context of the associated milieu—which is both effect and cause (Wexler 2006; 2010: 159)—we approach the *pharmakon* of instituting and archiving as modes of protention and retention, each bearing the capacity to engender both intelligence and stupidity. It is important to emphasise that stupidity is not merely a psychological disposition; rather, it is, as Stiegler (2019) identifies, the process of a disindividuation—the closure of possibilities for projective (speculative) thought. We will soon return to the concept of disindividuation, as it is central to the argument we aim to present. In doing so, we will also move beyond Stiegler’s somewhat one-sided interpretation.

Following the ethological and ecological lineage from Jacob von Uexküll to Gilbert Simondon, we consider instituting and archiving as technicities or modes of relation that a living being establishes with its milieu, rendering humanity technical from the start. The annexed milieu, with all its active-perceptive and energetic characteristics, is one of four milieus, alongside the interior, the exterior and the membrane (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 51; Simondon 2017: 59–66). The membrane is particularly intriguing for its ability to modulate exchanges between past and future—not necessarily in chronological order. In this sense, a milieu (middle) is as much emergent as it is constructed. The same applies to the subject. Perhaps, then, it is time we referred to them as ‘objectiles’ and ‘subjectiles’ (Cache 1995: 87–97). Deleuze makes it clear in the axiological and topological sense in his interview on Leibniz:

The thing is, everyone has habits of thinking: I tend to think of things as sets of lines to be unravelled but also to be made to intersect. I don’t like points; I think it’s stupid summing things up. Lines aren’t things running between two points; points are where several lines intersect. Lines never run uniformly, and points are nothing but inflections of lines. More generally, it’s not beginnings and ends that count, but middles. Things and thoughts advance or grow out from the middle, and that’s where you have to get to work, that’s where everything unfolds. (Deleuze 1995: 161)

In thinking from and through the middle, one needs to destabilise certain terms (acting as points) and, rather, embrace the gradient space that allows their emergence. As such, and expanding on a pluralistic understanding of intelligence and stupidity, we ask: What is it that binds (rather than distinguishes) intelligence and stupidity? In other words, if we understand them both as individuating lines, what singular point emerges when they intersect? And, crucially, what does that say for technicities of instituting and archiving?

Let us provide two very concise definitions. Our most general definition of intelligence is the capacity to properly determine a problem; nothing to do with measures and metrics, a talent in numbers, writing with proper syntax or any other cliché. Plain and simple, intelligence is the ability to problematise. Not surprisingly, its counterpart, stupidity, is also connected to problematising. To be stupid means to be effectively unable to determine a problem; once again, nothing to do with metrics, with saying two plus two makes five or with mixing up verbs and nouns. Our most general definition of stupidity, therefore, is the inability to discern between the singular and the trivial (Kousoulas and Radman 2025). So, what do the stupid and the intelligent share?

## II. Of Germs and Events

If we indeed understand the subject and the object not as fixed terms but as processes – as subjectiles and objectiles – then we cannot but explicitly acknowledge the primacy of experience itself (James 2008). Experience is the problem of the living: continuous, irreducible and contingent. Let us then start from the experiential middle. The intelligent and the stupid should not be understood as individuals but as individuating; experience is the very process of interiorising through which the polarised relation between the realm of the psychic (subjectile) and the environment (objectile) towards which the psyche is oriented, is brought into being in the first place. Experience, then, is the act of becoming (a psychic) individual (Wrbouschek and Sluneko 2021: 51). In simple terms, experience is individuation, the folding (Deleuzo-Leibnizian pun intended) of subjectiles and objectiles, interiors and exteriors, pasts and futures. It is, as Simondon would have it, the present of the living being – intelligent or not – as a confrontation in the operation of selective assimilation which:

is formed by this polarity of passage and obstruction between past substances and substances to come that are present to one another via the operation of individuation; the present is this metastability of the rapport between interior and exterior, past and future; the exterior is exterior and the interior is interior relative to this mutual allagmatic activity of presence. (Simondon 2020: 254)

Any Simondonian concept will therefore always start with individuation rather than the individual, precisely because the individual is never stable but metastable. A physical system is said to be in metastable equilibrium when the least modification of system parameters suffices to break its equilibrium (Combes 2012: 4). Pre-individual being, and in a general way, any system in a metastable state, harbours potentials that are incompatible because they belong to heterogeneous dimensions. This is why pre-individual being can be perpetuated only by dephasing. During dephasing, being gives birth to both an individual mediating two orders of magnitude and to a milieu at the same level of being (Combes 2012: 4). As such, a metastable system is transversed by potentials that can be activated at any moment, through the most minute imbalance or the most fleeting encounter, the consequences of which usually being orders of magnitude larger than the incidents that set them in motion (Shaviro 2016: 197). Therefore, metastability governs

experience through intensity, since it is the intensive that can energise the potentials of the present and allow the individual to dephase.

At this point, Simondon and Deleuze converge. For Deleuze, the virtual is a problematic field, made of differential relations and singularities that are later actualised by intensive processes of individuation and by spatiotemporal dynamisms. The movement from the virtual to the actual, through the intensive, comes close to what Simondon conceptualises as a purely relational individual made of different orders of magnitude (Bowden 2012: 145). Deleuze himself acknowledges his proximity to Simondon when he claims that:

Gilbert Simondon has shown recently that individuation presupposes a prior metastable state—in other words, the existence of a ‘disparateness’ such as at least two orders of magnitude or two scales of heterogeneous reality between which potentials are distributed. Such a pre-individual field nevertheless does not lack singularities: the distinctive or singular points are defined by the existence and distribution of potentials. An ‘objective’ problematic field thus appears, determined by the distance between two heterogeneous orders. Individuation emerges like the act of solving a problem, or—what amounts to the same thing—like the actualization of a potential and the establishing of communication between dispartes. The act of individuation consists [...] in integrating the elements of disparateness into a state of coupling which ensures its internal resonance. The individual thus finds itself attached to a pre-individual half which is not the impersonal within it so much as the reservoir of its singularities. In all these respects, we believe that individuation is essentially intensive, and that the pre-individual field is a virtual-ideal field, made up of differential relations [...] Individuation is the act by which intensity determines differential relations to become actualized, along the lines of differentiation and within the qualities and extensities it creates. (Deleuze 1994: 246)

Individuation does not resolve the pre-individual tension by reducing free energy (more on this below), but, rather, transforms its energetic potential in a novel relational configuration of the living being (Wrbouschek and Slunecko 2021: 49). This energetic transformation is one that happens of and through the intensive. Deleuze and Simondon share many conceptual affinities since they are both philosophers primarily interested in the genetic rather than the generic. One of those affinities, as indicated in the passage above, is the importance they place on intensity as that which energizes the virtual (for Deleuze) or the pre-individual (for Simondon) and continuously sets forth processes of individuation (Hui and Morelle 2017). Both Deleuze and Simondon have reserved a very special term in their work for that intensive space and

time that allows, catalyses, constraints or transduces intensity: it is the Deleuzian event or the Simondonian germ.

At the outset of his book *Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event*, François Zourabichvili claims that there is no event except in the plural: the event is always at least two (Zourabichvili 2012: 40). With that claim, he underlines that it would be a mistake to conceptualise the event in terms of a single and absolute occurrence, something that is born out of nothing. On the contrary, the event should be approached in terms of a becoming, one in which both a before and an after cease to exist separately without dissipating. The event, as the encounter and its relational catalysis, does not bring forth time as the past or the future, but rather time as the actual: as what is always in becoming. Therefore, the event, understood as the actual encounter that proliferates the virtual, is not modal but genetic. This is also why the event exists only in the plural, only as the succession that actualises a new dimension, a relation between forces that constantly produce new points of view, new subjectiles.

In a similar line of thinking, Simondon is clear that what catalyses the resolution of a problematic field is what he calls the germ. As architectural theorist Bernard Cache points out, the germ produces two effects when its affectivity is disparately coupled with metastable tensions. Its asymmetry destabilises the energy contained in the resolution, while simultaneously giving this destabilised energy a structure that prefigures the novel individual (Cache 1995: 106). The crucial issue, according to Simondon, is not to find the origin of the germ; that would not only be futile but would also go against everything that individuation stands for. The real challenge is to discover the conditions under which the germ will be able to catalyse an effect. The germ (the event) and the milieu are not constituted by the absolute presence or absence of a structure but by that structure's state of actuality or virtuality. The individuation of a system, according to Simondon, essentially results from the meeting of a structural and an energetic condition (Simondon 2020: 81). The germ catalyses (or not) a compatibility and compossibility between the two; the germ is a relation that can allow more relations while also (in)forming the parts that emerge through the relation itself. This relation is neither purely quantitative nor purely qualitative: it determines the mutual interiority of a structure and of a potential energy within a singularity. However, this interiority is not spatial, since what occurs in the germinal event is the relational structuration of both an individual and its environment at once (Simondon 2020: 81).

The germ potentialises the individual but does not remain distinct from it. It remains included in the individual, which becomes a more extensive germ on its own. The *soma* is coextensive with the *germen*, and vice versa. The *germen* becomes *soma*; its function is coextensive with the (membranic) limit of the individual that it develops. The eventful individuating power that produces both a milieu and an individual is a property of the limit. Simondon urges us: we can no longer say ‘the properties of an individual’. We must always refer to the properties of the limit. (Simondon 2020: 81). Ontogenetic operations are always accomplished on surfaces (membrane) where interior layers express past activities, futural encounters are of the exterior, and the present is that of the liminal and eventful individuation, vibrant with an intensive dynamism. What differentiates between physical and living individuals is that the latter retain a memory of their interiorised past—through processes of instituting (protention) and archiving (retention), we would add.

### III. My Soul (That is Not Mine)

It is precisely at that point that we depart from Stiegler: the individuating capacity of the event stems, paradoxically, from its disindividuating power. The event has three characteristics: it is involuntary, isolating and disindividuating (Krtolica 2012: 84). While its involuntary (and therefore necessarily contingent) nature is evident through the Deleuzo-Simondonian line we are following, the other two are less obvious. To understand the isolating and disindividuating aspects of an event, we need to clarify a crucial Simondonian argument: the difference between the transindividual and the interindividual. Where Simondon differs from traditional (Freudian, Jungian or Lacanian) approaches is in his claim that, when these theorise the collective, they do so through the interindividual: an understanding of social relationality in which individuals relate to one another via the representations they have of one another as if they are fully constituted individuals (Mills 2016: 84). These interindividual relations do not lead to the invention of new psychosocial structures but are instead based on the iteration of established norms, dominant representations and known identities (Lapworth 2023: 1509). To both psychology and sociology, Simondon poses the same objection: psychology understands the individual as a primitive fact and the group as a mere aggregate of fully formed individuals, while sociology approaches groups as givens and the individuals as derivatives of groups (Krtolica 2012: 78). As philosopher

Igor Krtolica puts it, the common error for both psychological and sociological reductionisms concerns the fact that in each case

they evacuate the problem of the operation of individuation of the group, which is relegated to an ‘obscure zone’—in psychology by treating this operation as prior to the individuation of the group, and by sociology as consequent, but neither the fact of the already constituted individual nor that of the existence of the group are able to account for the simultaneous genesis of the psychic and the collective. (Krtolica 2012: 78)

In other words, the interindividual leads to all sorts of psychosocial reductionisms by dint of prioritising the supposedly established (psychosocial) terms in favour of processes of individuations. This is where the concept of the transindividual becomes crucial: to examine the genesis of both the group and the individual at once by merit of individuation itself rather than any established term. Put succinctly, the transindividual does not relate terms; it relates relations (Lapworth 2023: 1509). As Simondon writes, the transindividual:

can be understood as a relationship that does not relate individuals by means of their constituted individuality separating them from one another, nor by means of what is identical in every human subject, for instance, the *a priori* forms of sensibility, but by means of this charge of pre-individual reality, this charge of nature that is preserved with the individual being, and which contains potentials and virtualities. (2017: 253)

It would be inappropriate to the (meta) relational character of the transindividual if we were to understand it as a supposed pre-existing condition of collective life; that is precisely where the (intensive) event comes to fore. As cultural geographer Andrew Lapworth underlines, the transindividual is not a readymade condition that simply awaits discovery but can ‘only begin the process of its emergence following an event or encounter that suspends constituted identities and interindividual relations’ (2023: 1510). The event where interindividual relations are stripped bare is what Simondon calls an event of disindividuation.

Let us use an example that is revealing of the plural nature of disindividuation (rather than its solely negative aspects, which Stiegler accounts for). Intelligent or otherwise, let us assume that one has been able to properly problematise the conditions, causes and effects of climate crisis. In doing so, an urge (one would say an intensive impulse) is felt. The subjectile cannot but wonder: ‘How can I go on as the person I know to be “myself” now that I feel this urge?’ (Bencherki, Brummans and Vézy 2024: 1356). This is the primordial

disindividuating aporia: I can no longer live as before; I can no longer be who I was. It is, paradoxically, a solitary moment; Simondon becomes the most intriguing, where he claims that the transindividual can only be encountered through an 'ordeal of solitude' (Simondon 2020: 284). It is with solitude that the experience of the transindividual can potentially commence; this solitude is necessary, and it is precisely this solitude that needs to be transversed for the (actually transindividual) collective to emerge: "'I" is another'. As Krtolica puts it: beyond the interindividual, solitude; beyond solitude, the collective (Krtolica 2012: 85). Granted, the problematising capacities one possesses determine both the propensity and the direction the disindividuating intensity takes. However, true to its contingent nature, the event does not allow for assumptions: intelligence (or stupidity) need to be proven continuously. That is precisely the moment when both the intelligent and stupid (can) meet: in the felt intensity of the disindividuating event, they can either resolve its tension interindividually or transindividually.

If we proceed to resolve the disindividuating tension of the event interindividually then we necessarily rely on established social norms, roles and identities. Relying on the given, the subjectile cannot escape the profound novelty of the event, cannot affirm its existential aporia. It can only reproduce and, therefore, represent the given. But the given does not suffice; if that were the case, then the event would not be a cause of disindividuation. It would be mere repetition without difference. Faced with such a realisation, the disindividuating event resolved interindividually becomes catastrophic and permanent. This is Stiegler's proletarianisation: the proliferation of a self-centred, self-referring, self-consuming anxious subject. The anxious, intelligent or otherwise, tears its flesh apart, unable to know how to know beyond what they already know (Krtolica 2012: 83). However, for Simondon, anxiety is ontological, 'the highest achievement that being on its own can attain as a subject' (Simondon 2020: 284). It is the vital first step towards the transindividual, assuming that anxiety does not become permanent (Lapworth 2023: 1510). How can one avoid that permanence? Close to Guattari, Simondon would claim that no subjective strategy can manage or reduce anxiety; it is, rather, a schizoanalytic collectivising process that can salvage anxiety from its catastrophic tendencies and elevate it to the condition of the transindividual.<sup>4</sup> In other words, one can also disindividuate transindividually and therefore only provisionally; the question of intelligence then becomes an issue of (literally) managing the interiorisation of the disindividuating event. Next to problematisation, instituting and archiving the conditions of what makes us anxious (what

is worth living for) becomes the litmus test of a collective that can disindividuate in catastrophic interindividual loops or can condition the transindividual, both soul and social body together, therefore allowing for a subjectile and an objectile that are by default irrepresentable to emerge.<sup>5</sup> Once again, it is the *how* that makes the *what* that makes the *who*: my soul belongs to me by belonging to everything that is not me.

#### IV. Shaping the Objectiles That Shape Our Subjectiles, Transmonadically

Transindividuation induces changes in (post)human capabilities, desires and expectations far more rapidly and through mechanisms markedly distinct from those of Darwinian biological evolution (Wexler 2010: 166). Archiving and instituting constitute cross-generational processes that shape psychosocial individuations; these individuations, in turn, drive cross-generational recursive dynamics, accelerating the irreversible transformation of the environment—impacting both sentience and sapience—which effectively began two million years ago (Colebrook 2021). Initially, such alterations were highly limited and constrained, but they became significantly more pronounced over the past 40,000 years, with a dramatic acceleration observed in recent times (Wexler 2010: 167). Lynn Margulis’s words seem remarkably prescient:

Life is always expanding, always making more of itself. Now, some people use a fancy word for this, and they call it autopoiesis, that is the self-making. And this is a good word, because this word tells us that the components are taken from the environment, the energy is taken from the environment, but by what? By the live thing. The live thing keeps moving, keeps making more, keeps making more, keeps growing, to make more, to grow, to reproduce . . . So life is not the thing or the matter, because the matter is the same right after death. Life is the property of growing, of making oneself, making more of oneself, and so on. (Margulis 2000)<sup>6</sup>

This ‘appetite’ of the soul cannot be explained away through mechanistic terms, nor can it be linked to the skyhook of vitalism. Neither efficient causality nor finalism alone suffices (Juarrero 2023). To invoke Deleuze’s Leibniz again, the fold (2006) must be recognised as the concept that successfully incorporates the moment of differentiation, producing it in such a way that it remains a genuine multiplicity without collapsing into a binary. ‘Closed, it retains something of the primal unity of the rhizome, of the great magma before the subject/object split, before distinction,

before all identity and difference, before minds and bodies, subjects and objects, signifiers and signifieds' (Jameson 2023: 50). The ground floor of the Baroque house (with its five openings and the pleats of matter) and the windowless first floor (the monad with its folds of the soul) remain irreducible and mutually determining. 'The soul is the foundation of the body, but the body is the (abysmal) ground of the soul' (Van Tuinen 2022: 89).

It is no surprise that, for Leibniz, the (Newtonian) concept of absolute space and time, independent of existents, is utterly abhorrent (Kavanaugh 2007: 255). According to Guattari, 'transmonadism through the effect of retro-activity crystallises within the primitive chaotic soup spatial coordinates, temporal causalities, energy levels, possibilities for the meeting of complexions, a whole ontological "sexuality" composed by axiological bifurcations and mutations' (Guattari 1995: 115). Contrary to common assumptions, the purpose of instituting and archiving is not to streamline our collective noetic processes. On the contrary, these technicities ought to serve as vehicles for 'discognition', allowing us to evade the trap of self-fulfilling prophecies perpetuated by the 'smartness mandate' and its ergodic principle (Halpern and Mitchell 2022).<sup>7</sup> Shaviro's neologism of 'discognition' is employed 'to designate something that disrupts cognition, exceeds the limits of cognition, but also subtends cognition' (Shaviro 2016: 10–11).


Transmonadic disindividuation and discognition serve as an antidote to the overly popular – and therefore pernicious – principle of free energy (Parr, Pezzulo and Friston 2022), which posits that the cognitive system's functioning can be explained by its drive to reduce free energy and, consequently, minimise surprise. Simplified further, this principle advocates reorienting as much as possible to conserve energy. However, as Margulis's example demonstrates – 'life keeps making more, keeps making more' – we adopt the exact opposite perspective. Reducing surprise is certainly not what life does (Kousoulas and Radman 2024). Life does not strive to minimise free energy; rather, it pursues what Howard Odum termed 'maximum power' (Hall 2004; Odum 2007: 32–62).<sup>8</sup> Why? Simply, for the sheer joy of it, as Rosi Braidotti might say. Life is gregarious, not optimising.


In *The Exhausted* (1997), Deleuze describes Beckett's fictional characters who 'play with the possible without realising it' as employing a viable strategy to rid ourselves of ourselves through exhaustion. It is crucial to highlight the distinction Deleuze draws between being tired (*le fatigué*) and being exhausted (*l'épuisé*): 'the tired person can

no longer realise, but the exhausted person can no longer possibilise' (152). Realising the possible always requires an a priori plan – this rather than that. The possible belongs to the realm of chance and operates through exclusion: for example, in rolling dice, the probability of rolling a six is 1/6, and in coin flipping, it is 1/2, all based on (automated) statistics (Labatut 2023).<sup>9</sup> Exhaustion is something completely different. It does not concern what happens versus what does not (probability); instead, it not only exhausts possibility (a retroactive hypostatisation of the real) but also suspends us in the unsettling yet welcome state of anxiety. Recall that fear is always of something, whereas anxiety is of nothing (in particular) – anxiousness lacks an object (1/∞). Framed in this way, anxiety might reveal itself as the *vinculum* to the virtual, whose disjunction is radically inclusive – where everything divides, but only into itself.

How, then, can we foster life-affirming processes of instituting and archiving to support transmonadic intelligence? This can be achieved by 'renouncing all order of preference and all organization of goal, all signification' – in other words, by rejecting platitudes (Deleuze 1997: 153). To think is to 'think otherwise', for 'we think only otherwise' (Zourabichvili 2012: 64). This is why 'thinking otherwise' and 'transmonadic intelligence' should be understood as both pleonasm and synonyms.

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## Notes

1. The co-dependency of bio-, techno- and noo-diversity is a recurrent topic in Yuk-Hui's trilogy *Recursivity and Contingency* (2019), *Art and Cosmotronics* (2021) and *Machine and Sovereignty* (2024).
2. On the philosophical implications of embryogenesis, see Ruyer's *Neofinalism* (2016) and Deleuze and Guattari's *What is Philosophy?* (1994).
3. According to Leroi-Gourhan, humanisation may be said to begin from the feet more than from the head, since the brain 'profits' from locomotion but does not provoke it.
4. Deleuze and Guattari do not refer to Simondon's disindividuation, but they clearly have something similar in mind when they write in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) that:

every love is an exercise in depersonalisation on a body without organs yet to be formed, and it is at the highest point of this depersonalization that someone can be named, receives his or her family name or first name, acquires the most intense discernibility

in the instantaneous apprehension of the multiplicities belonging to him or her, and to which he or she belongs. A pack of freckles on a face, a pack of boys speaking through the voice of a woman, a clutch of girls in Charlus's voice, a horde of wolves in somebody's throat, a multiplicity of anuses in the anus, mouth, or eye one is intent upon. We each go through so many bodies in each other. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 35–6)

Notably Deleuze refers to depersonalisation in the first session of his 1972–3 second cycle of the *Anti-Oedipus* seminars. See the *Deleuze Seminars*, Anti-Oedipus II, session 1 (12 February 1973):

The immediate effect of the body without organs is identical with the experience, the experimentation, of a depersonalization. What seems fascinating to me is that it is at the very moment of an attempt at depersonalization that one acquires the true meaning of proper names, that is to say, one receives one's true proper name at the very moment of depersonalization.

5. In a similar vein, the *Xenofeminist Manifesto* (2015) advocates for alienation as a catalyst for creating new worlds:

It is through, and not despite, our alienated condition that we can free ourselves from the muck of immediacy. Freedom is not a given—and it's certainly not given by anything 'natural'. The construction of freedom involves not less but more alienation; alienation is the labour of freedom's construction. Nothing should be accepted as fixed, permanent, or 'given'—neither material conditions nor social forms.

6. Transcribed from a video shown as a part of Bruce Clark's lecture 'Gaian Technics: Sympoiesis = Symbiosis + Autopoiesis = Natural Technicity' at the *Posthuman Symbioses Masterclass: A Thinking-With Donna Haraway and Rosi Braidotti* on 8 December 2023, Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment, TU Delft, <https://youtu.be/JtnEQZrH3Hw?feature=shared>.
7. In mathematics, ergodicity conveys the idea that a point within a moving system, whether a dynamical system or a stochastic process, will eventually visit all parts of the space the system occupies, in a uniform and random manner. This suggests that the average behaviour of the system can be deduced from the trajectory of a 'typical' point. Similarly, a sufficiently large collection of random samples from a process can represent the average statistical properties of the entire process. Ergodic systems embody everyday notions of randomness, such as smoke eventually filling all parts of a closed room, a block of metal eventually reaching a uniform temperature throughout, or a fair coin's flips producing heads and tails in equal proportion over time.
8. Odum emphasised that an ecosystem and its components need to maximise the use of all the energy available to it in its pursuit of maximum power. He believed that all systems—from ecosystems to stars—under pressure from natural selection, whether organic or otherwise, would operate to develop structures that would feed back to enhance the capture of more energy in a self-reinforcing manner.
9. AI relies heavily on statistical methods to learn from data and make predictions. These methods enable AI systems to detect patterns, identify relationships, and infer conclusions from data. In this sense, it may be more accurate to say that AI systems 'predict the past'. Labatut's book focuses on a prodigy whose extraordinary gifts unnerved those around him: John von Neumann. Von Neumann revolutionised every field he engaged with, inventing game theory,

developing the first programmable computer, and laying the groundwork for AI, digital life and cellular automata.

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