Fragmented Cities in the Caribbean
Violent crime and sociospatial cohesion in Jamaica and Curaçao

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Kingston, Jamaica and Willemstad, Curaçao are two Caribbean cities characterized by high rates of violent crime, specifically homicides. This paper approaches the phenomenon from an urban anthropology perspective, linking violence to perceptions of the urban environment. The paper aims to describe the socio-spatial fragmentation of these two cities, resulting from historical and contemporary processes, and how this relates to violent crime. Data is used from ethnographic fieldwork in four inner-city neighborhoods in Kingston and Willemstad, where resident perceptions of their own community and the broader urban environment were studied. The first section discusses the research areas and how residents view their own community and the rest of their city. In this discourse, residents differentiate between urban areas on the basis of violence and crime and development. A next section describes theoretical and empirical links between urban violence and poverty. Social capital is a mediating factor in this relationship; a brief overview is given of this concept and its relevance for understanding the connection between sociospatial fragmentation and urban development issues, especially at the local level. This allows a closer look at the dynamics of urban fragmentation in Kingston and Willemstad: while internal cohesion can be quite strong at the community level, cohesion at the inter-community or city level is much scarcer. It would appear that the type of social capital present in the cities under study - both of which experience high rates of violent crime - is of the 'bonding' rather than the 'bridging' variety. This in turn has implications for analyzing patterns of urban crime and more general urban development policy.

Perceptions of the urban environment in Jamaica and Curaçao
The fieldwork to which this paper refers was conducted in four low-income neighborhoods, in the context of broader research on urban environment in the Caribbean. The two areas in Kingston, Jamaica were the 'downtown communities' Riverton and Rae Town. The two neighborhoods in Willemstad, Curaçao were the so-called 'marginal *barios*' of Wishi/Marchena and Seru Fortuna/Seru Papaya.[1] In-depth structured interviews were held with a total of 118 residents (60 in Jamaica, 58 in Curaçao), supplemented by a number of unstructured interviews.[2] The following gives a short summary of resident perceptions of the urban environment in Jamaica and Curaçao, differentiating between the level of the neighborhood and that of the larger urban area.

Kingston, Jamaica
Kingston Metropolitan Area is a sprawling urban agglomeration. While most residential areas and commercial development used to be located downtown near the harbor front, with time both commerce and upper-class residential areas moved uptown - businesses to New Kingston and US-modeled shopping malls, the wealthier citizens to the cooler hills that surround Kingston. Despite intermittent attempts to redevelop downtown Kingston, the city remains segregated by color and class - split into an uptown and a downtown. Political tribalism, accompanied by frequent outbursts of political violence, has divided downtown areas into 'garrison communities' affiliated with one of the two leading political parties.

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[2] Perceptions and constructions of the city were studied specifically through the use of two methods, the repertory grid method and sentence completion exercises, of which the first was used in Riverton and Wishi/Marchena and the second in all communities. In addition, neighborhood social capital was explored in Rae Town and Seru Fortuna/Seru Papaya using a scale composed of selected items.

Residents in the 'downtown' research communities of Riverton and Rae Town take pride in their own communities, describing them as pleasant and as being characterized by unity and a lack of violence. However, many expressed the need for 'development': more and better employment, housing and educational opportunities ranked high, along with improved environmental infrastructure and services.

Coherent patterns are apparent in resident constructions of their surroundings at the city level, the way in which various neighborhoods are perceived, separately and in relation to one another. Violence and crime emerge as the topmost preoccupation, alongside the uptown-downtown duality: socio-economic differences in income, class, color, formal vs. informal facilities, residential vs. 'garrison' areas. The labels uptown and downtown refer to economic development, poor vs. rich, but the divide goes much deeper: on one side you find ghetto areas where 'ghetto youth' and working-class people live, these are places that need 'upliftment'. Commerce is in the hands of vendors who sell cheap goods on the streets; the Downtown market is such a shopping area where 'yu can get di tings dem cheap, it for poor people'. The 'garrisons' and 'ghettos' that are downtown are unplanned and 'hot' and 'need touch up' or 'want to develop'. On the other side you have the residential areas, communities where educated people live in pretty houses, where the residents are 'hoity-toity' and high-class. These are the areas where 'top a di top people' live, 'who wanna step up further inna life cause it's quiet'. Uptown is also clean, 'cool' and organized and only 'dear tings' are sold in the formal plazas and shops. New Kingston is such a 'beautiful business place, with lots of tall building', like 'a small part of Miami'. The uptown communities are admired because they are rich and quiet, though the responses are tinged with a slight resentment. Downtown is associated more closely with crime, violence and 'war'. However the dichotomy has inner differentiation; different types of ghetto can be distinguished on account of their level of violence or development, or their location as when 'inner-city ghetto' is contrasted with 'more nature ghetto' or 'developed ghetto' with 'cool hill ghetto'. The uptown-downtown dichotomy relates to the other principal category by which the city is organized: violence and crime. The city is a crazy-quilt where patches of peace, cool and quiet alternate with no-go zones where urban warfare rages. Communities are characterized by words like 'war', 'peace' and 'tension' and with references to the political tribalism prevalent throughout downtown Kingston. Some communities are peaceful and safe, with low crime rates and 'anybody can come and go'. Others are 'gunmen town', 'warrified', characterized by 'cussing, fighting' or worse: killings and 'pure gunshot'.

Thomas-Hope (1996: 15) argues for Jamaica that 'the lack of attachment to the environment in urban communities is associated with negative attitudes towards that place'. Place attachment refers to affective, but also cognitive and behavioral bonds between individuals or groups and one or more places (Altman and Low 1992).[3] Disempowered, stigmatized communities may display limited feelings of attachment to their physical environment. Despite theoretical support for this position, fieldwork did not confirm the link between stigmatization and lack of place attachment; both Riverton and Rae Town tend to disprove this.[4] Residents appear to like their own community and despite its bad reputation feel safe and at home. In the face of strong area stigmatization and occasional intra-community tension, residents display a pride in their community that is related to social organization or achievements. Simultaneously, they are afraid of other neighborhoods throughout Kingston, at least those in downtown. A picture emerges of a fragmented city, consisting of an uptown and a downtown. The first has low levels of violence

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[3] Jorgensen and Stedman (2001) distinguish between three types of people-place bonds: place attachment (positive emotional connection to place), place dependence (functionality of a place for an individual's goal achievement, in comparison to alternative places) and place identity (self-identification in relation to the physical environment).

[4] See Dodman (2003: 182) for similar positive evaluations of inner-city areas in contrast with assessments of Kingston itself. In a survey of Kingston adolescents, he found that 'young people attending school in the KMA are generally positive about their surroundings ... these young people are proud of the areas around their homes, which they feel are extremely safe, happy, pretty, good, healthy and clean. They have mixed feelings about Jamaica: while they feel it is very pretty and quite happy, they are less certain that it is clean, healthy, or good, and are unsure whether it is a safe or dangerous place overall. In contrast, feelings towards Kingston are much less positive: although they feel it is generally happy and pretty, they do not feel that it is particularly clean, healthy, or good, and are inclined to think that it is a dangerous place'.

and is safe, residential, rich, cool and quiet. The ghettos or garrisons of the latter have high levels of violence and crime, they are 'warrified', hot and crowded and are inaccessible to outsiders. Inner-city residents experience a restricted mobility that is somewhat self-imposed. Few venture uptown on a regular basis except for those who have work there - and on account of location only this would be considered a good job - or friends or relatives in one of the uptown ghettos. Explanations for the restricted range of mobility can be found in tacit cultural impositions as Downtown residents feel unwelcome - 'it nah for the lower-class people' - and are uncomfortably unfamiliar with Uptown areas - 'mi lost when mi go up there'. Speaking generally, there seems to be no feeling at all of a cohesive urban entity - 'Kingston Metropolitan Area' seems to spawn very little 'Kingstonian' feeling. What certainly appears to an outsider as a city can be said, with slight exaggeration, to function in the minds of residents as a collection of loosely connected community islands, whose residents have far less than unrestricted access to each other's territory. Chevannes (2001: 133) calls Kingston 'an overlapping congeries of communities'.

Willemstad, Curaçao
The urban agglomeration of Willemstad is a series of neighborhoods of *barios* circling the city's harbor. In public perception, it is not a city in any real sense of the word. When speaking of 'Willemstad' most Curaçaoans will be referring to the old inner city which consists of four *barios*. The urban sprawl encircling the refinery-dominated harbor is not perceived as a unit, a whole. Curaçaoans do not live in a city but in *barios* which may have a large measure of internal cohesion. Inter-community commonality, cohesion at the city level, is scarcer. Partially, this lack of urban cohesion can traced back to state-sponsored Shell company policy from the 1940s on. Having attracted refinery laborers from all over the world, the company purposely promoted segregation by providing separate housing for the various ethnic groups.

Many residents of the 'marginal *barios*' Wishi/Marchena and Seru Fortuna/Seru Papaya take pride in their own community, which they describe as a nice (*dushi*), good neighborhood (*bon bario*) that is harmonious and undeserving of its bad reputation, though in certain areas residents felt that their street or block was safe, but not the entire *bario*. Residents articulate the variety of problems afflicting their *bario*, in which issues related to social and economic issues as well as physical infrastructure and environmental quality take precedence. Major concerns are the interrelated processes of unemployment, diminishing social control, the influx of foreigners, migration to Holland, drug use and trade, and unemployment and poverty. These 'trends' are seen as resulting in crime and violence, another broadly shared worry, though many residents are reluctant to substantiate their neighborhoods bad reputation.

At the city level, constructions and perceptions of the various urban *barios* reveal preoccupations with the concepts of crime and violence, development and ethnicity. A prominent theme in discourse on the city is violence and crime, including shootings, fights and murder, but also prostitution and drug addicts. For instance, the 'bad' neighborhood of Koraal Specht was described as being 'like Dallas, with gunfights', 'annoying', and 'it's a ghetto, the streets are trouble'. In contrast to Jamaica, where the term 'war' is used frequently, Curaçaoans speak more subtly of 'problems' versus 'quiet' or 'nice' (*dushi*) areas and often refer to prostitution and drug addicts in addition to the more violent crimes. Violence and crime are obviously associated with busy areas, which is presumably why quiet areas are so often viewed positively. Wishi/Marchena and Seru Fortuna/Seru Papaya are both popularly conceived of as 'bad' neighborhoods. While residents are often keen to put their own *bario*'s reputation into perspective, they are often afraid of other bad areas. So people from Wishi/Marchena see as Seru Papaya as a 'problematic *bario*' with lots of problems and violence. One resident described the area as 'a dangerous *bario* with gunfights and rapes … you can't walk there, it's scary.' Correspondingly, Seru Papaya and Seru Fortuna residents describe Wishi/Marchena as 'a very aggressive bario' with 'nothing but problems' and 'a lot of problematic people', though they concede that it has improved in recent years. Concepts related to activity level appear to be a dominant dimension of appraisal for residents, who see the city in terms of quiet and busy. Another way of looking at the city relates to development. Residents tend to differentiate communities on the basis of disparities of income and general or specific or development. More so than in Jamaica, this concept was defined rather narrowly to income - 'rich people' neighborhoods were contrasted with 'normal', 'marginal' or 'poor' people. Wealthier areas are

described as places with less *ambiente* or atmosphere. One resident described a wealthier community as 'pretty big houses but all closed up [*será*]: separate, isolated', while poorer areas were 'open, normal' and their inhabitants described as 'humble people who struggle to survive'. In addition, there is a fair amount of resentment felt towards rich people, who are perceived as arrogant and racist. Residents from the *marginal* areas feel excluded from these parts of the city: 'I can't get in there'. One such area is described as 'a very protected *bario*, if I walk there on foot, with my [dark] color, within five minutes someone will have called the police'. Ethnicity is a noticeable factor in concepts of the city: wealthier areas are associated with *makambas*,[5] Jews or East Indian business men (*hindu*) and less *yu di Kòrsou*,[6] while poorer areas have large groups of Latino and Caribbean immigrants. As witnessed in residents' description of their own community, foreigners are a pertinent social issue. The Dominicans, Haitians, Columbians, Jamaicans and so on are distinguished from the rich European Dutch, but both are frequently portrayed negatively.

Residents sketch a fragmented city, divided in the minds of respondents into parts that are nice and quiet and parts that are busy and are plagued by problems, crime (drugs, prostitution and violence) and foreigners. Despite the negligible physical distances between different communities and different parts of the island, most Curaçaoans seem to have developed a limited mobility that is self-imposed (cf. Eikrem 1999: 22). Many people are truly familiar with only a limited range of places and thus feel uncomfortable or unsafe outside of those areas. Speaking generally, there seems to be no feeling at all of a cohesive urban entity - 'greater Willemstad' is a concept used by government planners (fairly ineffectively, at that) that appears to be totally absent in the minds of citizens. What an outsider might conceptualize as an urban sprawl can be said - with some exaggeration - to function in the minds of residents as a collection of loosely connected *bario* islands.

Urban violence and poverty
In Kingston and Willemstad, as in many Caribbean cities, the incidence of violence in recent years has led to increased popular and policy concern, mirrored in a growing body of knowledge in development agencies and academia alike.[7] Violence is not restricted to urban areas, nor to developing countries, but the economic, social and political environments of cities throughout the South, including those discussed here, increase the rate, intensity and consequences of violence in those locations (Winton 2004: 165). Moser (2004) distinguishes between four categories of urban violence. Her typology differentiates between political, institutional, economic and social violence, and is conceived of as an interrelated continuum with multiple links and overlaps between the different types.[8] The countries under study are not characterized by political violence in the way that, for instance, many Central and South American countries have been and are. Institutional violence is clearly present in countries such as Jamaica (Harriott 2000), in the form of police killings and mob justice. Territories such as Curaçao have less instances of this type of violence, though physical and psychological abuse on the part of the

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[5] *Makamba* = European Dutch.
[6] Yu du Kòrsou = 'real Curaçaoans'.
[7] For instance studies by Harriott (2000, 2003); Harriott *et al.* (2004); Ayres (1998); Moser and Holland (1997), Moser (1998); Levy and Chevannes (2001); de Albuquerque and McElroy (1999a); Sanders (2003); Schmidt (2001).
[8] Political violence is motivated by the will to gain or maintain political power, and includes both state and non-state violence. Forms of political violence include paramilitary and guerilla conflicts, as well as political assassinations. Institutional violence is perpetrated by the state and non-state institutions, including the private sector. Manifestations are extra-judicial police killings, abuse by health or education workers, 'social cleansing' by state or vigilante groups, and vigilante justice such as lynching. Economic violence is motivated by material gain and often takes the form of street crime, including robberies, theft and violence connected to drugs and kidnapping. Social violence ranges from intra-household violence such as partner violence, intergenerational conflict and child abuse, to sexual violence in the public arena and gratuitous, 'routine' violence. Further manifestations include ethnic violence and other forms of territorial or identity-based 'turf' violence.

authorities has been recorded.[9] Both Jamaica and Curaçao experience high rates of economic and social violence, a source of grave concern to both government and the general population.

Various studies have pointed out the salience of crime and violence as development issues.[10] On the one hand, violence contributes to poverty in that it thwarts economic growth and (sustainable) development; simultaneously poverty and underdevelopment can provide motivations for violence. Ayres (1998) shows how crime and violence are linked to growth, poverty and development in that, first, they adversely affect the stock of physical capital in several ways: infrastructure is degraded through vandalism, investors are hesitant and tourists are reluctant to spend their holidays in an environment perceived as violent and dangerous. The involvement of Jamaican national John Lee Malvo in the Washington, DC sniper killings of 2002 and the (perceived) impact of this on Jamaican tourism is a recent and extreme example. Likewise, the disappearance of US teen Natalee Holloway in Aruba in mid 2005, followed by intense media coverage, was assumed to inflict considerable damage on the island's tourism industry. Second, crime and violence have negative impacts on the development of human capital, through their effect on health and education (women's health in situations of domestic violence, reduced productivity through disabilities, decreased access to or quality of education). Third, social capital is eroded; see below for more detail. And fourth, crime and violence impair government capacity, as a larger proportion of scarce resources is diverted from other development expenditure towards crime fighting; corruption increases within the public sector; and the state loses relevancy and legitimacy as citizens cannot rely on the government for adequate protection. These combined factors result in an increase in poverty and a reduction in growth (Ayres 1998: 7-8).

Though the link is not undisputed, urban poverty is often seen as a major contributory factor to crime and violence. Studies by criminologists such as Currie (1998) find that inequality, extreme poverty and social exclusion are at the roots of violent crime, mainly through their impact on institutions such as family and community. Galtung (1969) introduced the term 'structural violence' to refer to non-physical, psychological forms of violence. Structural violence in the shape of exclusion, oppression and deprivation is rooted in social structures and regularized by institutions, yet is invisible compared to physical violence. The deprivation and inequality omnipresent in the urban Caribbean heighten the potential for the emergence of 'reactive violence', whether criminal, as in Trinidad, or political, as in Haiti. Consequently, poverty does not cause urban violence but 'the exclusionary processes active in the *unequal* distribution of resources in urban contexts throughout the South have a strong impact on violence levels' (Winton 2004: 167).

In the Caribbean, recessions during the 'lost decade' of the 1980s hit hard in combination with IMF-imposed cuts in government expenditure on social services and basic urban infrastructure. These processes are linked to violence and crime, in that the quality of life deteriorated and unemployment and underemployment increased (Ayres 1998: 11-15), in precisely the same period of time that cocaine cartels emerged as a significant presence in the region. In Jamaica, the dearth of formal work and the expansion of the informal sector led to perception of jobs, especially among young males, as 'unprofitable'. 'Deviant adaptive strategies' become increasingly attractive as status and masculinity are increasingly associated with access to money, rather than work or wage employment (Harriott 2000: 6-7). Simultaneously, when status through the accumulation of material goods cannot be achieved, young males sometimes choose an alternate route to respect, assuming the posture of the violent, trigger-happy hero glorified in movies and music.[11]

In participatory studies (Moser and Holland 1997; Levy and Chevannes 2001), Jamaican inner-city residents themselves analyzed causal relations in patterns similar to those encountered

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[9] For instance 'Polis a bati yu di promé minister', *Vigilante*, December 24, 2003; 'Manifestashon kontra di polis den Marchena a paralisá tráfiko', *La Prensa*, July 23, 2005.

[10] Following Ayres (1998: 24), violence is defined as 'the undue exercise of physical force'; not all violence need be a crime and obviously not all crimes are violent. Violent crime is defined as 'criminal homicide, rape, shooting, robbery, felonious wounding and assaults' (Harriott 2000: 202, note 3).

[11] The omnipresence of (cable) television displaying and promoting conspicuous consumption and also an economy catering to wealthy tourists increasingly confront the poorer segments with the skewed distribution of resources both locally and globally.

in research in Rae Town and Riverton. High unemployment is seen as leading to frustration and idleness, which in turn leads to higher levels of gang violence, interpersonal conflict and domestic violence. Violence then leads to area stigma, reducing employment opportunities for members of notorious communities or leading to denied access to credit. This isolation and reputation, together with police brutality, can provide a self-justification for criminal or violent behavior. The economic dependency on parents or partners resulting from lack of income is also seen as a source of conflict; while limited mobility and the scarcity of entertainment (such as dancehalls or youth or sport activities) are felt to contribute to boredom and frustration and the increased attractiveness of activities involving gangs, drugs and guns. Lack of or vandalizing of basic infrastructure such as streetlights and telephones also contribute to a context in which crimes such as rape, murder or robbery are committed more easily. While there are less ethnographic or otherwise detailed studies of this type, the Jamaican linkings reflect the Curaçaoan context. Curaçaoan respondents in this research associated crime and violence with the migration of long-time residents to other *barios* or the Netherlands and the subsequent influx of Latino immigrants. Materialism and 'laziness' are fuelled by criminal opportunities following the emergence of drugs. Drug-related crime, prostitution and other 'problems' are facilitated by the changing population composition and diminishing social control, factors related to the concept of social capital.

Social capital
While rooted in earlier sociological theory (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988), recent years witnessed the rapid emergence of 'social capital' as a key term in development discourse. A substantial volume of literature has been generated on the concept of social capital, with a corresponding array of definitions.[12] In the context of this paper, I prefer Putnam's (1993: 167) commonly cited definition of social capital as 'features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions'. In other words, social capital refers to those aspects of social ties that enable collective action, including generalized trust, norms of reciprocity and organizational linkages. Social capital is a useful conceptual tool in understanding the variation of socioeconomic outcomes among different groups, providing insight in how social networks influence social and economic development and change. Focusing on the varying presence of trust, norms, and networks can help explain why certain groups manage to achieve collective goals and others do not. Tight networks characterized by strong norms of reciprocity and high levels of generalized trust tend to be more capable of realizing benefits for group members, though benefits to wider society may vary. The concept helps elucidate the links between micro-, meso- and macro-level behavior and change. Understood as a crucial asset of poor individuals and households in their livelihood strategies, the concept links individual or household strategies through formal or informal networks and associations to higher-level institutions, policies and processes. In addition, the sociospatial character of these networks and linkages in which social capital is located provides opportunities for urban analysis, as detailed below. Examples of social networks in cities such as Kingston and Willemstad include neighborhood-based groupings or CBOs; politically based networks including local level political groups; religious linkages and associations such as church groups; savings and credit groups including ROSCAs;[13] employment-based networks and associations such as trade unions; and recreational associations from football to domino clubs (cf. Phillips 2002: 135).

Not all social capital is 'good'. As McIlwaine and Moser (2001: 967-968) point out, violence and crime can promote 'perverse social capital' in the form of gangs, drugs cartels and mafia-like organizations. Perverse social capital and social organizations may have positive outcomes for group members, but negative consequences for the community at large. In contrast, 'productive' social capital is beneficial to both members and broader society. Most work on social capital refers implicitly to productive social capital, obscuring the concept's 'dark side': social capital in the form of strong networks and solidarity can also lead to the exclusion of outsiders, restrict individual freedom, and function as a downward-leveling mechanism (Portes 1998).

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[12] See for instance Adam and Roncevic 2003; Johnston and Percy-Smith 2003; Lochner et al. 1999; Portes 1998; Putnam 1993, 2001 for discussions of the concept and its measurement.
[13] Rotating savings and credit associations, known in Jamaica as *pardna* and in Curaçao as *sam*.

Both Willemstad and Kingston have high levels of poverty and crime, that are interwoven in the cities' texture of fragmentation. Crime and violence are linked to poverty and development in manners illustrated above. However, the relationship between poverty and (violent) crime is mediated by social capital: 'where the social fabric is strong - where, for example, there is a dense network of intermediary organizations … or where "family values" remain intact - poverty is considered less likely to result in crime and violence' (Ayres 1998: 17-18; cf. Sampson *et al.* 1997). At the same time, violence and crime, and the concomitant fear, can erode social capital (cf. Moser 1998; McIlwaine and Moser 2001).

In all four research neighborhoods, social capital appeared to be contained largely within the unit of the neighborhood, with residents forming the in-group. Other areas and their residents were regarded with distrust and networks at a broader urban or societal level were limited. Putnam and others (e.g. Narayan 1999) distinguish between three types of social capital: 'bonding' social capital refers to strong ties within relatively homogenous groups or between similar people; 'bridging' social capital refers to connections between disparate groups or people, while 'linking' social capital are ties people have with those in positions of economic and political power. While linking social capital is visible in the clientelist relationships the poor have with politicians in Jamaica and to a lesser extent in Curaçao, at the urban level the contrast between bonding and bridging social capital is most evident. On a small, very local level, individuals have very strong connections to those residing in the same community. They feel similar to their neighbors, share an identity based on locality and day-to-day interaction in the public arena of the street. Residents feel they can trust those who are 'born and raise' in the same place as they and have developed informal networks of support that are indispensable in the context of high levels of poverty and unemployment. In short, bonding social capital is manifest. However, community residents are less proficient at building networks and relations of trust and cooperation with groups from different areas, with different income levels or of different ethnic backgrounds. The fact that most social interaction takes place inside the community results in perceptions of other groups and communities being based on stereotypes and media reports. This weak bridging social capital has led to a near-absence of grass-roots movements at the urban or national level. In fact, to achieve results that necessitate action and inputs above the local level, residents rely on community leaders, politicians and occasionally on NGO members, in other words their linking capital.

Urban fragmentation
The socio-spatially differentiated manifestations of social capital lead us to the reality of urban fragmentation and the implications for urban management. Although the difficulties of comprehensive urban management of megacities have been recognized (cf. Myllylä 2001), less attention has gone out to problems linked to the splintering and heterogeneity of smaller cities. In management terms, the city is implicitly envisioned as a cohesive entity. Urban environmental management in Caribbean cities must contend with the effects of fragmentation, problems presented by specific constellations of class and ethnicity rather than size. In addition, the nexus of violence, poverty and environmental degradation described above is, not coincidentally, concentrated in certain areas. Privatization of basic services and of security, following neoliberal restructuring, result in cities where a safe and healthy environment is available at a price that not everyone can pay. The ensuing concentration of urban blight ultimately reinforces patterns of fragmentation through fear, repulsion and isolation.

The idea of fragmented cities is not especially novel, their existence has been documented throughout the world and particularly in (post)colonial societies. Balbo (1993) sees this type of city as being prevalent throughout the developing world; socio-spatial fragmentation is visible in both the physical and the social environment, as the various 'pieces' of the city differ in income, services and infrastructure, but also in sub/culture and institutional systems. Though he views urban fragmentation as a direct consequence of the colonial period, current causes include rapid urbanization; the functioning of the urban economy which involves a large informal sector that functions at a local rather than urban level; the western or colonial ideology of urban planning and the role of the state.

As described above, the groups of urban residents researched generally liked their own community, identified with it and despite processes of stigmatization felt safe and at home.

Simultaneously, they felt afraid of or unwelcome in other neighborhoods throughout the urban area. This reinforces the impression of fragmented cities, though the pattern of fragmentation differs per island. Willemstad is divided in the minds of respondents into parts that are 'nice' and quiet and parts that are busy and are plagued by problems, crime (drugs, prostitution and violence) and foreigners. Kingston is split into an uptown and a downtown. Uptown areas are seen as crime-free and safe, residential, rich, cool and quiet. The latter - the 'ghetto' or 'garrison' - are hot, crowded and plagued by violent crime or 'war'. In both cities, the feeling of a cohesive urban entity - 'Kingston Metropolitan Area' or 'greater Willemstad' - seems to be completely absent. Feelings of ownership for or identification with the urban area as a whole cannot be observed. What one would define spatially as a cohesive urban entity does not function as such in the minds of residents. Rather, the municipality is experienced as a number of separate communities or *barios*, loosely connected but often lacking in physical and symbolic interaction. Although community as well as national identities are felt strongly, identification at the city level is low. People do not see themselves as 'Kingstonians' or 'from Willemstad'; rather they identify themselves as coming from one community, or as Jamaicans and Curaçaoans. Histories of intentional ethnic, class and political segregation combined with current conditions of violence and fear have led residents to see the city as an urban jungle, while their own 'bad' neighborhood is perceived as an island of relative harmony and security.

Kingston and Willemstad are both urban centers of Caribbean countries that, as throughout in the region, are characterized by a legacy of slavery, colonialism and different versions of what is termed 'plantation society'. The socio-historical context is visible in the contemporary urban form and culture: both cities are fragmented by ethnicity and color, which correspond with income level. For Kingston, Clarke and Howard (2005) demonstrate how religious pluralism also finds spatial expression along these lines. In addition, Kingston is split into political factions, as is to a far lesser extent Willemstad. Both cultures display high levels of suspicion, distrust and fear, reflecting characteristics of small island societies and the impact of high rates of violent crime. Consequently, identification does not occur uniformly at the level of the city, nor is it possible to speak of unalloyed class-based alliances. Urban identification is crosscut by politico-ethnic divisions, reinforced by 'geographies of fear'. Fear of violence isolates and segregates both the poor, in their homes, and the rich, in their fortified communities. For Kingston, Howard (2004: 98) notes that 'whether the city's differences are visible or verbal, one of the most divisive forces is that of fear, separating and dividing people into their imagined citadels of safety … Anything or anyone outside the norm, in an uptown suburb or downtown neighborhood, elicits cause for concern or outright anxiety'. Such isolation in turn serves to maintain fear concerning the urban Other, and reinforces the fragmentation of cities (Moser 2004; Lemanski 2004). As Harvey (1996: 432) observes, the common response to fear of violence against persons and properties is to 'search for defensible urban spaces, to militarize urban space and to create living environments which are more rather than less exclusionary'. Such defensible spaces are both the visible barriers of the gated communities of the rich and the 'invisible' gates barring access to the poorer areas. Both mechanisms serve to restrict citizen mobility.

These processes have implications for urban management. How to manage a city when in the mind of many citizens 'the city' does not exist? Communities think in terms of 'neighborhood', not of 'city' and their identifications follow a analogous course. This is perhaps reinforced by the minor role of municipal government: in Curaçao such a government is absent, while in Jamaica the municipality has little (though increasing) power. In the absence of strong municipal authorities, residents and neighborhoods look to national level government and politicians, a tendency reinforced by clientelist politics. In contrast, national and island level governments do tend to think in spatial and social terms of 'urban' development. While this broader perspective is indispensable to comprehensive urban planning, it may conflict with local level perspectives and priorities. Socio-ethnic fragmentation is emphasized and colored by the differing constructions of urban environment; diverging views of what constitutes 'the city' complicate meaningful communication and solutions.

Conclusion
Various studies have explored the relation between poverty and violence, studying among other things social capital; it would appear that the type of social capital present in the cities under

study is of the 'bonding' rather than the 'bridging' variety. Historical processes of segregation and exclusion in Kingston and Willemstad have led to marginalization and isolation of urban areas and their residents. Both cities are fragmented by ethnicity and/or color, which correspond with income level. In addition Kingston is split into political factions, as is to a far lesser extent Willemstad. High rates of violence and crime contribute to a geography of fear in which residents perceive their own 'bad' neighborhoods as islands of harmony and safety in an urban jungle and trust is limited to kin and neighbors. This increased localization of social capital results in strong communities but a weak city. Although community as well as national identities are felt strongly, identification at the city level is low.

The fragmented nature of the cities under study, and the predominance of intra-community, bonding social capital over 'bridging' social capital at the city level have implications for urban development policy. It will be hard to implement policy at municipal level when most citizens identify and act only at the local level. In achieving collective action towards real improvements in neighborhood safety and development throughout the city, the most efficient strategy is to draw on existing social capital - those networks, norms of reciprocity and relationships of trust that are present in these communities. Citizens may well be inclined to invest in their communities; if 'ownership' of urban space is operative principally at the community level, focus should be on encouraging and facilitating the conversion of ownership into concrete collective action at that level. This in turn entails promoting and incorporating participatory efforts, partnerships and grassroots action. The cumulative effect of cleaner, healthier and safer neighborhoods is a cleaner, healthier and safer city.

With regard to violence and crime, this local-level social capital stands for a higher level of social control and a potential resource in the formation of community-based security initiatives, such as neighborhood watches (which indeed have emerged in low-income areas in Kingston). The flipside of tight bonding mechanisms lies in the perverse nature they may take on, especially in contexts of urban marginalization. While intra-community violence may not always be negligible, localized social capital can be used to explain the more marked tendency towards perpetration of crimes outside the own community and the united front against external institutions such as the police.

In the long run, I believe any city would benefit from a strengthening of bridging links, which allow all residents to feel safe, free and welcome throughout the entire city, as well as responsible for its well-being and sustainability. Unfortunately, given the historical development of urban fragmentation in the Caribbean cities researched, it is unlikely that such an inclusive city will develop in the near future.

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