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Effective strategy making

Co-designing scenarios as a tool for effective strategic planning

Jan Vogelij

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Effective strategy making

Co-designing scenarios as a tool for effective strategic planning

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Local ownership is the first ingredient for success.

D'Hondt, F. (2012)

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Summary

Subject of this study

For establishing main lines of their future development, governments on several levels of government prepare spatial development visions, for assessing individual plans and initiatives against the background of a desired direction of development. Such strategic visions help to avoid the necessity to start considering again and again the question which direction long-term development should take. The European Commission promotes making such development strategies, hoping this leads to innovation in the regions and increased competitiveness of Europe. More particularly, the Commission expects a substantial contribution to prosperity of the rich diversity of local characteristics as assets for the development and innovation of the European territory.

This study aims to explore the factors for success of strategic spatial planning.

Strategy making happens in the different circumstances in European countries, legally regulated or informally, using terms like: Structure plans, structural visions, master plans, development visions and spatial development strategies. Here the term (spatial) development vision is used.

The central question is: *Which aspects of planning processes and place-related conditions support the effectiveness of strategy making?*

The processes of strategy making and the place related circumstances are intensively interrelated. The diversity of circumstances in the European countries is expressed in the different national and regional planning cultures. That includes the set of procedures, competencies, education of planners and other experts and their resulting attitudes towards strategy making. In a development strategy all interests of society come together. Therefore the constructive working together of representatives of different sectors and interest is key to the success. Because of this crucial issue, we distinguished between co-operation, as just contributing to someone else's activity, co-producing, as making together a product and collaboration towards a strategy, defined as a common exploration of possibilities. The interactions of the participants in the strategy making process, potentially creating trust and enhancing social cohesion, may be more important than the resulting concept for a development strategy. Therefore our attention focused on the way strategies are made in the black box of specific processes. The interactions aiming at co-ownership and collaboration are central in this novel 'interactions approach'.

The resulting strategy does not necessarily contain (infra) structural projects; a spatial strategy concerns a selected localised policy and argumentative framework for future development.

Societal relevance

Being a planning consultant with over forty years of experience in practice, the author highly values practical applicability in society. Understanding of practice-related factors for effectiveness of strategy making is important because effective public management saves costs for society; a framework expressing the aimed-for direction of development provides clarity for private initiatives; an agreed strategy helps to coordinate sector policies; several EU and national subsidies for projects require a locally agreed structural frame.

Because a development vision concerns the direction of an envisaged development, its effectiveness is defined in terms of performance of the argumentative framework based on the story lines developed in the discussions during the strategy making process. Our search aims at identifying recommendations for enhanced chances for performing strategies in praxis.

Approach

A theoretical frame was composed based on literature in the fields of planning theory, policy analysis and design. Research questions were formulated concerning the importance of the process related variables: open process management, co-ownership, co-design, the application of scenarios and visualizations. Concerning the importance of the place related aspects, research questions consider: planning culture, multi-level embedding, involvement of politicians and the experiences of actors in previous processes.

The explorations for composing the theoretic frame aimed to do justice as much as possible to the complexity of network society in which a strategy has to be agreed. First (im-) possibilities for governing public administrations in network societies are explored. That exploration concluded that since the authority of data, experts and politicians are not self-evident anymore; there is a greater need than before that actors become convinced by arguments. Not interests as they see it (differently) but *story lines* support converging to an agreed selection of located objectives. Strategy making should therefore be organized as a societal process aimed at sharing *ownership* of ideas among participants.

The second exploration for composing the theoretic frame considered conceiving a development strategy as a decision-making process. The interdependencies of social, economic, ecologic and man-made physical systems in a territory require integrated decision-making involving the relevant interests. Acknowledging that the representatives of different sectors and non-governmental and private organizations foster different views on reality, implies that the specific procedures of spatial planning will generally not be accepted by all, as the procedure for the strategy making process. That entails decision-making occurring in a non-envisaged number of *rounds of decision-making* in different groupings. The ultimate success of a long-term development policy consists of flexible but continued application of the argumentative frame of the strategic vision. Fairly assessing long-term strategies requires evaluation, often decades after deciding on the strategy. Society seldom allows that time for assessing the success of a strategy because different urgent issues developed since it's making and the vision became a "historic" view in the eyes of many. Therefore a different approach for establishing expected success was needed.

The specific, pivotal round of deciding about the concept of a strategic vision is called here *effective*, if the agreed strategy as resulting from that round of decision-making is expected to eventually *perform*. But effectiveness of decision-making is not sufficient; an effective strategy also implies a new promising perspective for the development of a territory. Effective decision-making consisting of effective continuation of an existing trend or more efficiently deciding on a concept does not need a strategic development vision. Those activities are not considered here for effective strategy making.

Therefore, the third exploration for composing our strategic frame focused on *creativity* as a requirement for discovering a novel direction of development. Discovering new possibilities for developments and re-interpreting existing qualities for new applications require an open creative approach. Design is needed for expanding the possibilities of what society sees as a probable future and above all for avoiding that the search for innovation would be restricted to what important actors consider possible. Central is the search for agreement about a desired future and how to make it possible. A process of co-designing a new vision of the desired future, whereby participating actors become co-authors of something not-existing before is assumed to bring about stronger and longer lasting commitment, which is essential for the long-term success. The assumed larger commitment would result from the combination of a maximal open process of decision-making like in designing, in which ideas of every participant are welcomed as valuable contributions and which takes the freedom of not starting by accepting limitations and conditions as coming from several sides. Such creative process is expected entailing forms of co-authorship. Important is that the relevant higher government level approaches the process positively and supportive, although without unconditional commitment to any outcome of the process.

The empiric part contains case studies of five strategy making processes in different European countries.

The selection of cases was based on a pre-selection proposed by planners, representing their countries in the European Council of Spatial Planners (ECTP-CEU) They responded to the request for good examples of cases of successful strategy making in their countries. The final selection of five was chosen applying practical considerations about expectations of local help in assembling information. The selected cases were: Piano Strutturale Comunale di Bologna (IT), Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030 (NL), the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan (UK), Vision Gherdëina (IT) and Meetjesland 2020 (BE). Next to plan documents and existing evaluations, forty-one interviews formed important sources of information for connecting casuistic and theory. Applying our definition of effectiveness, first the effectiveness of our cases was established. Not all of those five appeared to be effective according to our criteria as formulated in the theoretical frame. Next the cases were analysed, using pre-formulated hypotheses for process and place-related conditions influencing the performance of spatial development strategies. The accounts of cases in different planning cultures related to the process and place-aspects of the theoretic frame provided insight in the different process aspects and the circumstances in which those processes were conducted. That, in combination with the earlier established (non-) effectiveness enabled characterizing the processes within their various administrative and societal environments. Subsequently the process aspects and the place-related aspects of the five cases were compared and analysed applying the research questions, the hypotheses and the chains of evidence. Such comparison allowed for conclusions about factors for effectiveness.

Conclusions

The study did not provide evidence that strictly regulated, rigid planning cultures were prohibitive for strategy making. In all five processes a form of co-production existed, which in most cases resulted in some form of co-ownership of the results. Co-ownership evaporated soon in the cases that were not qualified as effective. Remaining co-ownership appeared to be most important for the eventual success of the spatial development vision. That has been established in Drechtsteden, Glasgow and Grödental (Vision Gherdëina). The strategy making in Bologna and Meetjesland was not successful. In Bologna lack of success resulted from extensive procedural requirements, political instability and the complexity of the administrative embedding, despite a strong concept for future development. In Meetjesland the failure was related to the lack of a sound administrative embedding together with insufficient specificity of the vision: a set of nine objectives without concrete elaborations and selective site locations did not build lasting support.

The study confirmed that effective decision-making processes for long-term developments are open, interactive collaborations towards new concepts applying visualizations (maps) and the related storylines of representatives of the interests that are considered relevant locally.

Although the selection of cases consisted of processes, which were found successful by planners of the country in which the cases are located, two of the cases were not effective according to our criteria. Not only satisfaction about the initial result and a form of co-ownership was important, the continuation of the processes in subsequent rounds of decision-making was even more important. The openness of decision-making is of special importance for converging to an agreement. Introduction of a design attitude in strategy making, applying maximal openness results in creating co-authorship, which entails stronger, lasting commitment to the agreed vision. Here the specific attitude is not meant of some, who concentrate on conditions and on mapping the limitations set by what important actors see as possible or feasible as a starting point. That approach tends to design in the limited space left over by other sector's claims. Designing as meant in the current study regards the open "*what if, then that*" iterations during which designers focus on exploring new possibilities, not respecting conditions and limitations in advance. Preparing a spatial development strategy as a societal decision-making process by applying an open design attitude implies generating ideas, assessing, correcting, improving and refining solutions.

The study confirmed the importance of visualizations as tools for enhancing the effectiveness of communication during the collaborative process. In order to open up minds for different ways of viewing during the process and to do justice and pay respect to ideas of the participants, decision-making is preferably organized as scenario planning, considering simultaneously several options and in which every tabled idea is considered and assessed according to its potentials, (im) possibilities and consequences.

Discovering new possibilities together and co-designing a desired future entails co-authorship, which goes beyond and enhances co-ownership. This also applies for the administrative embedding: in two of the three successful cases the higher level authority acted as co-authoring partner of the development vision. Important for such vertical commitment is that the number of administrative layers with which the strategy making process must relate, should be small: preferably only one higher authority. In such cases, the strategy making process will not become an arena in which several higher authorities conduct their institutional policies for fighting their struggles for hierarchy. The only (approving) authority can support the process according to its commitment and act as a partner. Acknowledging that the responsibilities of a higher authority do not allow full commitment in advance to a yet unknown output, applying a form of *loose coupling* is helpful. This implies that the higher authority supports the process and commits to positively considering consequences of the output, provided

that specific process conditions are fulfilled. This especially applies if envisaged large infra structural projects require substantial investments of higher authorities.

The study confirms the importance of involving spatial designers and a design attitude in the collaborative decision-making process towards long-term development strategies. The necessary openness of such processes requires conducting designing not as a person-focused internal activity but to design as a process of group creativity in the collaboration of relevant participants. The 'interactions approach' provided useful conclusions and contributes as a novel to existing planning theory.

Samenvatting

Onderwerp van dit onderzoek

Om hoofdlijnen voor de ruimtelijke ontwikkeling voor de lange termijn op te stellen maken overheden ruimtelijke ontwikkelingsvisies, waarmee ze een instrument in handen krijgen om plannen en initiatieven te kunnen beoordelen. Dat zou helpen voorkomen dat bij elk plan opnieuw de vraag beantwoord moet worden welk toekomstbeeld de plaatselijke maatschappij voor ogen heeft. Projecten die het gewenste toekomstbeeld ondersteunen zijn welkom, andere ideeën worden afgewezen of aangepast. De Europese Commissie propageert het opstellen van lange termijn plannen die de in de regio's en steden aanwezige kwaliteiten maximaal benutten omdat zij verwacht dat dit de innovatie van de regio's bevordert en daarmee de concurrentiekracht van Europa vergroot.

Het opstellen van zo'n lange termijn visie is ingewikkeld niet alleen omdat vrijwel alle plaatselijke sectoren en belangen in het geding zijn, maar ook omdat vaak de medewerking van hogere overheden nodig is. Door de complexiteit van de samenleving zien we dan ook vaak ruimtelijke ontwikkelingsvisies mislukken.

Met mijn onderzoek wil ik de factoren in kaart brengen die voor het succes van strategische ruimtelijke plannen belangrijk zijn. Anders dan bij regulatieve ruimtelijke planning, gaat het hier om lange termijn ontwikkelingsstrategieën. Dit gebeurt in de Europese landen al dan niet via wettelijke procedures onder termen als structuurvisies, structuurplannen, masterplannen of ruimtelijke ontwikkelingsvisies. De verschillen in bestuursculturen tussen de Europese landen betekenen dat die ontwikkelingsvisies op verschillende manieren tot stand komen. Met betrekking tot ons onderwerp zijn deze verschillende omstandigheden hier samengevat onder het begrip planningsculturen.

De verschillende planningsculturen werken niet alleen door in de wijze waarop het proces om tot zo'n lange termijn strategie te besluiten kan worden georganiseerd maar ook in de aard van de gewenste ontwikkeling.

De vraag die ik in dit onderzoek heb proberen te beantwoorden is: Welke aspecten van strategisch planningsprocessen en welke plaatsgebonden omstandigheden zijn belangrijk voor het succes van een ruimtelijke ontwikkelingsstrategieën?

Het opstellen van een visie en de omstandigheden waaronder dat plaatsvindt kunnen niet los van elkaar gezien worden. Die uiteenlopende omstandigheden zijn zowel oorzaak als gevolg van de bij die planningsculturen behorende procedures, opleidingen

en houdingen van de experts en verantwoordelijke politici. Het gaat dus steeds om een combinatie van procesaspecten en omgevingsaspecten. In het besluiten over een toekomstvisie gaat het er om hoe de betrokkenen, die verschillende belangen vertegenwoordigen, samenwerken. Omdat dit zo cruciaal is hebben we onderscheid gemaakt tussen samenwerken als een ondersteunende dienst verlenen (co-operation), iets samen maken (co-producing) en iets samen nieuw ontwikkelen (collaboration). Onze nadruk in deze studie op de wijze van samenwerking in wat vaak een black box lijkt, houdt voor de planning theorie een nieuwe benadering in. Deze aanvulling op de socio-institutionele en discourse analyses noemen we de 'interacties benadering'.

Het gaat om dat laatste: een ontwikkelingsvisie opstellen die aan alle relevante belangen recht doet vraagt om het met elkaar aangaan van een ontdekkingstocht, die voor iedereen risico's en onzekerheden in houdt. Bovendien, omdat het weinig zin heeft een strategie te ontwikkelen voor het faciliteren van een bekende trendmatige ontwikkeling, gaat het hier meer specifiek om het ontdekken van een nieuwe veelbelovende ontwikkelingsrichting voor een bepaald gebied. Dat vereist ontwerpen en een ontwerp houding van de deelnemers in het proces. Belangrijk is het te weten dat het daarbij niet altijd om (infrastructurele) projecten gaat, maar meer algemeen om een specifieke selectie van beleidsdoelen die te realiseren zijn op bepaalde locaties en vooral om de set van doelstellingen en overwegingen: het argumentatiekader dat een overeen gekomen ontwikkelingsvisie biedt gedurende een langere periode.

Maatschappelijk relevantie

Ik hecht veel waarde aan de maatschappelijke relevantie van ruimtelijke plannen. Immers: effectief handelen van de overheid beperkt maatschappelijke kosten; duidelijkheid over de gewenste ontwikkelingsrichting biedt houvast voor particuliere initiatieven; het helpt uiteenlopend beleid van overheidssectoren te coördineren en bovendien eisen sommige Europese en nationale subsidies een democratisch vastgestelde ontwikkelingsvisie.

Omdat het in essentie gaat om de gewenste ontwikkelingsrichting is een strategische ontwikkelingsvisie effectief als deze de richting van de ontwikkeling in een bepaald gebied beïnvloedt gedurende een periode langer dan bijvoorbeeld tien jaar. Als de strategie concrete projecten voorstelde is hun realisatie uiteraard een belangrijke indicator voor het succes van de ontwikkelingsstrategie. Met deze studie wil ik inzichten ontwikkelen die de effectiviteit in de praktijk van ruimtelijke planning vergroten.

Methodologie

Op zoek naar belangrijke factoren voor effectieve strategische ontwikkelingsvisies is eerst een verkenning uitgevoerd in literatuur uit de vakgebieden planologie, bestuurskunde en ontwerpen.

Drie verkenningen zijn uitgevoerd, respectievelijk rond de vragen:

- Wat is de invloed op het opstellen van zulke visies van de huidige netwerk samenleving?
- Hoe kan besluitvorming tot stand komen in die omstandigheden?
- Hoe organiseren we een creatief proces?

Een effect van de netwerksamenleving is dat wetenschappelijke data, experts en politici niet vanzelfsprekend vertrouwd worden. Het gaat vooral om het op basis van gelijkheid met elkaar eens worden. Het werken aan een ruimtelijke ontwikkelingsvisie is dan het gezamenlijk opbouwen van een verhaal over de gewenste toekomstige ontwikkeling van het betreffende gebied. Dat betekent dat het proces vooral als een maatschappelijk proces gezien moet worden dat gericht is op het creëren van *gedeeld eigendom* van zowel de visie als het proces onder degenen die aan de besluitvorming deelnemen.

In de tweede verkenning bekeek ik het opbouwen van ontwikkelingsvisie vooral als een besluitvormingsproces. De samenhang en onderlinge afhankelijkheid van alle denkbare systemen in een gebied vereisen een integrale benadering. Dit betekent dat het proces meestal niet georganiseerd kan worden in de procedures van één van de betrokkenen partijen: alle belangrijke sectoren kennen eigen procedures en verantwoordelijkheden en waarom zouden die van een bepaalde sector door de andere overgenomen worden? Dit heeft tot gevolg dat de besluitvorming in een onvoorzien aantal *rondes* plaatsvindt in wisselende groeperingen. Dit maakt het proces moeilijk stuurbaar.

Het uiteindelijke succes van een lange termijnbeleid bestaat uit zijn langdurige invloed op besluiten over ontwikkelingen en projecten; de doorvoering van de visie. Omdat de maatschappij doorgaans geen tijd neemt om bijvoorbeeld na decennia het succes van een (inmiddels historisch geacht) strategisch beleid te evalueren, is een andere praktische methode nodig om succes vast te stellen. Daarvoor hebben wij een besluitvormingsronde waarin de strategie ontworpen is *effectief* genoemd als die ronde naar verwachting bijdraagt aan de uiteindelijke doorvoering van de strategie.

Maar effectieve besluitvorming als zodanig is niet voldoende, het gaat ook om een vernieuwend perspectief voor de ontwikkeling van een gebied. Als effectieve besluitvorming alleen maar zou bestaan uit het effectiever doortrekken van een bestaande trend of uit het efficiënter beslissen over een concept, dan zou strategische visievorming immers niet nodig zijn. Daarom wordt hier onder een effectieve

besluitvormingsronde begrepen een ronde die een vernieuwende strategie oplevert en die waarschijnlijk doorgevoerd wordt.

Daarom richtte de derde verkenning zich op *creativiteit* die voor vernieuwing van ontwikkelingsrichtingen nodig is. Het ontdekken van nieuwe toekomstige ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden en het steeds opnieuw interpreteren van de bestaande kwaliteiten van een gebied voor nieuwe toepassingen vereist een open creatieve houding. Ontwerpen is nodig om de mogelijkheden van wat als de waarschijnlijke toekomst (trend) voor een gebied gezien wordt uit te breiden. Het zoeken naar een gewenst toekomstbeeld blijft dan niet beperkt tot wat men bij voorbaat mogelijk vindt. Het gaat om het met elkaar ontwerpen van een concept voor een gewenste toekomst en te ontdekken wat nodig is om die mogelijk te maken. Verondersteld wordt dat gedurende dat gezamenlijk ontwerpen van een nieuw gewenst toekomstbeeld, de betrokkenen tot mede auteur worden van iets nieuws. Dit gedeelde geestelijk eigendom zou tot de sterkere en duurzamere betrokkenheid leiden die voor de lange termijn doorvoering van de strategie nodig is. Deze veronderstelde grotere betrokkenheid zou het gevolg zijn van een maximaal open besluitvormingsproces, waarbij ideeën van elke deelnemer als bijdrage aan het proces verwelkomd worden, en waarbij gezamenlijk een toekomstbeeld ontworpen wordt.

Zoals gezegd moeten de aspecten uit deze drie verkenningen steeds in combinatie bekeken worden met de verschillende omstandigheden waaronder de besluitvorming verloopt. De verschillen in cultuur en in de relatie tussen bestuurslagen zijn daarbij essentieel door de verschillende mate van vrijheid die ze bieden.

Na deze verkenningen zijn onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd. Voor wat betreft de proces aspecten gaan de onderzoeksvragen over de invloed van respectievelijk open proces management, mede eigenaarschap, co-design, het gebruik van scenario's en visualisaties. Voor wat de plaatsgebonden omstandigheden betreft zijn onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd over de invloed van de planningscultuur, de inbedding van het proces in bestuurslagen, de betrokkenheid van politici en eerdere ervaringen van participanten.

Om antwoorden te vinden op deze vragen zijn case studies van vijf strategische visievormingsprocessen in verschillende Europese landen uitgevoerd. De selectie van cases vond plaats door eerst een voorselectie te maken bestaand uit cases die planners in de European Council of Spatial Planners (ECTP-CEU) op gaven als succesvolle strategische projecten in hun respectieve landen. De selectie van vijf cases ontstond op basis van praktische overwegingen en verwachtingen over de mate van lokale medewerking. De geselecteerde cases betroffen het Piano Strutturale Comunale van Bologna (IT), De Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030 (NL), het Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan (UK), de Vision Gherdëina in het Gröndental (IT) en Meetjesland 2020 (BE).

Op basis van criteria voor effectiviteit (en succes) zijn de afzonderlijke cases aangemerkt als effectief of niet effectief. Niet alle vijf geselecteerde projecten bleken effectief volgens onze criteria. Naast plandocumenten waren eenenveertig lokaal georganiseerde interviews de belangrijkste bron van informatie voor de koppeling van casuïstiek en theorie.

De cases zijn vervolgens geanalyseerd aan de hand van eerder geformuleerde hypothesen over de invloed van proces- en omgevingsaspecten op het succes van de strategieën. De confrontatie van deze analyse met de (in) effectiviteit van de besluitvormingsrondes was de basis voor conclusies.

Conclusies

De cases leverden geen aanwijzing op dat rigide door regulatieve planning gevormde planningsculturen als zodanig een te grote barrière vormen voor strategische planvorming. In alle vijf de processen was sprake van een vorm van samenwerken, die initieel tot enige vorm van mede-eigenaarschap van de uitkomst leidde. Echter, in twee gevallen bleek deze gedeelde eigendom ook weer snel te verdampen vooral waar geen sprake was van verticale betrokkenheid van de hogere overheid. Belangrijk voor het uiteindelijke succes van strategisch ruimtelijk beleid voor lange termijn ontwikkeling is het beklijven van mede eigenaarschap, ook door bestuurslagen heen. Dit is vastgesteld in de effectieve processen in Drechtsteden, Glasgow (mindere mate) en Grödental. De processen in Bologna en Meetjesland bleken niet succesvol. In Bologna, ondanks een sterk ontwerp voor de toekomstige ontwikkeling van de stad, door de combinatie van politieke discontinuïteit en te complexe bestuurlijke inbedding. In Meetjesland bleek de combinatie van ontbrekende bestuurlijke inbedding van het proces en te weinig concrete visievorming desastreus: een set van negen doelstellingen zonder concretere uitwerkingen en locatiekeuzen genereerde onvoldoende draagvlak.

Het onderzoek bevestigde dat effectieve besluitvormingsprocessen voor lange termijn ontwikkelingsvisies, gericht op nieuwe concepten met hun visualisaties en bijbehorende argumentatielijnen bestaan uit maximaal open, interactieve samenwerking van vertegenwoordigers van de belangen en interesses die in de plaatselijke maatschappij relevant zijn.

Ofschoon de selectie van cases bestond uit gevallen die succesvol gevonden werden door de planners uit de betreffende landen, waren niet alle processen in onze cases naar de maatstaven van dit onderzoek succesvol. Tevredenheid over het initiële resultaat en een vorm van mede eigenaarschap van een eerste ronde is onvoldoende, het continueren van het proces in meer, opeenvolgende besluitvormingsrondes is essentieel. Wat vooral ook belangrijk blijkt volgens dit onderzoek is de openheid in procesvoering om tot een gezamenlijk besluit te komen. Het ontwikkelen van

een maximaal open ontwerphouding in het besluitvormingsproces kan uitmonden in mede auteurschap wat tot een sterkere, langdurige betrokkenheid bij de overeengekomen visie leidt. Hier is niet de ook wel voorkomende ontwerphouding bedoeld die zich allereerst richt op *randvoorwaarden* en bijvoorbeeld het maken van belemmeringenkaarten.¹ De hier bedoelde ontwerphouding is het verkennen van nieuwe mogelijkheden in “*what-if, then that*” iteraties waarbij randvoorwaarden en beperkingen niet bij voorbaat gerespecteerd behoeven te worden. Zo’n ontwikkelingsstrategie opstellen in een maatschappelijk besluitvormingsproces met een ontwerphouding betekent ideeën genereren, evalueren, corrigeren, verbeteren en het verfijnen van zich ontwikkelende concepten.

Het onderzoek bevestigde het belang van visualisaties als middel om de effectiviteit van communicatie te vergroten. Om het proces vooral open te laten zijn, en creatief en om de ideeën van de participanten recht te doen is het belangrijk het proces te organiseren rond verschillende scenario’s, waarin elk ingebracht idee op zijn potenties, (on-) mogelijkheden en consequenties wordt bekeken. De bevindingen van die iteraties bieden evenzoveel aanleidingen tot verbeteringen, verfijningen en concretisering. Het samen ontdekken van nieuwe mogelijkheden en het samen ontwerpen van een wenselijke toekomst voor het betreffende gebied, levert mede- auteurschap op, wat verder gaat dan mede-eigenaarschap.

In de hier als succesvol aangemerkte cases, bleken de naast hogere overheden zich niet alleen als mede-eigenaar op te stellen maar ook mede auteur te zijn.² Deze vorm van verticale betrokkenheid lijkt essentieel. Belangrijk hiervoor is dat het aantal bestuurslagen dat zich met het proces bemoeit klein is, bij voorkeur slechts één. Daardoor is de kans kleiner dat het besluitvormingsproces tot een strijdtoneel wordt van concurrerende overheidssectoren en lagen. Echter, omdat dat bijvoorbeeld bij (infrastructuur) projecten waar grote overheidsinvesteringen mee gemoeid zijn, vaak niet mogelijk is mag van een verantwoordelijk overheidsorgaan niet verwacht worden zich bij voorbaat geheel te committeren aan ongeacht welke uitkomst. Daarom wordt hier gewezen op de mogelijkheid van *loose coupling*, waarbij de hogere overheid zich zodanig committeert en het proces ondersteunt, dat wanneer aan door haar gestelde proceseisen wordt voldaan, zij de uitkomsten en consequenties van het proces, positief benadert en ernstig in overweging neemt.

¹ Randvoorwaarden die veelal gebaseerd zijn op wat anderen zien als *mogelijk* of *haalbaar* en die restruimte van sectorale ruimteclaims als de ruimte voor ontwerpen begrijpen.

² In Glasgow kon dit beter.

De studie onderstreept het belang van het betrekken van ontwerpers en een ontwerpbenadering bij het opstellen van strategische plannen. Tegelijk is het duidelijk dat strategisch ruimtelijk ontwerpen niet als een persoonsgebonden activiteit gezien moet worden, maar als een maatschappelijk groepsproces, waarin ontwerpen een cruciale rol speelt. De hier beoogde 'interacties benadering' blijkt een zinvolle bijdrage aan de planning theorie te leveren.

1 Introduction

As an introduction to the subject of this study, I first explained in this Chapter my choice for the subject. Curiosity emerging after long experience in planning practice about factors influencing the effectiveness of strategy making processes in different planning cultures determined my interest.

Besides, being a planning practitioner I hope to contribute to planning theory. More particularly I had the impression that what happens among participants in the black box of plan making deserves more attention. An 'interaction approach' would add to the social-institutional and discursive analyses of planning theory.

Next, I discussed the societal relevance of this search for success factors of spatial strategies, not only in my home country but also for other European societies. After clarifying the concept of strategy making, I considered the large influence of the variety of planning cultures. Applicability of conclusions in spatial policy-making practice in different European planning cultures is considered important. A most influential impact on effective strategy making may be expected from the general development in modern societies, to which Castells pointed: modern network societies require innovative approaches to governance. That influence is discussed in next Chapter.

§ 1.1 Subject of study

The choice for the subject of this study followed after encountering results of my previous activities as practising spatial planner. More specifically, when I was coincidentally confronted with spatial development in *Drechtsteden*, a sub-regional co-operation for which I happened to chair the strategy-making process as a consultant thirteen years earlier, I was surprised about the long-term performance of that strategy. Together with experiences abroad, this triggered my interest in the success factors for strategy making processes. Later, drafting the ECTP-CEU recommendations (Vogelij 2010) for the planning practitioners of the European Council for Spatial Planners (ECTP-CEU) raised my awareness that the intuitively formulated recommendations would gain from a sound scientific basis. Besides, having experienced differences and similarities in planning practices in several European countries, I wondered which aspects of the applied approaches were more or less independent of the obvious differences in planning cultures. I decided that systematic analysis of spatial development strategy making in diverse contexts, based on academic literature and theoretic considerations would provide possible answers on the above questions and

exploring those possible answers empirically in concrete cases would bring useful insights for planning theory as well as planning practice.

This study searches for factors enhancing the success of strategic spatial planning for long-term development processes. I consider here strategic spatial planning as the preparation of a multi sector policy for long-term future developments of cities and regions. Acknowledging that such policy-making implies deliberations in the confrontation of values, (Hajer 1995, Salet and Faludi 2000, Albrechts 2004) the search for success factors is approached within the perspective of political decision-making processes for future developments.

As a (reflective) practitioner I put much value to the internalized experiences of practice and the applicability of results in society. By conducting this research I aimed to contribute to narrowing the gap between planning theory and planning practice to which Heather Campbell referred recently in *Planning Theory and Practice*. (Campbell 2014) I hope the insights developed during this study and conclusions based on the multi-case analysis will provide lessons for effective strategic planning practice. Increased effectiveness of spatial strategies is an objective I foster in order to enhance the relevance of spatial planning for society.

“ Do not give me a different perspective, give me a proposal.” This quotation stands for the general need of politicians to be advised with applicable proposals. Van Eeten’s study of continuing controversies, from which this quotation has been taken (Van Eeten 1999)(91) aims to make sense of diverging perspectives in such a way as to come up with proposals for a new, tractable agenda. He asks how we can avoid that politicians drowning in analyses, unable to know what to decide. That general experience, which is consistent with observations in the cases analysed in the current study, stresses the importance of applicable results.

The relevance for society of increased effectiveness of strategic planning is not restricted to The Netherlands; strategic planning for territories gains importance and relevance throughout Europe through the general European Cohesion policy. (Rivolin and Faludi 2002, Albrechts 2004, Van Ravesteyn and Evers 2006, Waterhout 2008, Barca 2009, CEC 2010, Dühr, Colombe et al. 2010, Faludi 2010, Mourato and Tewdwr-Jones 2012) Although the European Commission holds no remit for spatial planning, its influence on spacial developments in Member States increases through a multitude of EU policies with spatial impacts, which affect existing national policies and procedures in direct and indirect ways, (Van Ravesteyn and Evers 2006). That moreover stresses the societal relevance of strategic planning. Place-based approaches to development are promoted as supportive for achieving objectives of regional economic and sustainable development(CEC 2004, CEC 2008, Barca 2009, CEC 2010, Dühr, Colombe et al. 2010, Faludi 2010). EU’s development policy (*Europe 2020, Towards a Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Europe*) suggests basing development on assets,

existing within the specific ability, culture and physical environment of the regions. The Commission's *Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion* (CEC 2008) propagates the diversity of the regions as strength for enhancing their competitiveness; consequently its subtitle is: *Turning Diversity into Strength*. In 2011 the European Commission published her vision on the future of the European city: *Cities of Tomorrow* (European Commission 2011). At the European level spatial planning slowly gets (lightly) institutionalised. (Waterhout 2008, Dühr, Colombe et al. 2010, De Vries, Janssen-Jansen et al. 2012, Mourato and Tewdwr-Jones 2012). That converging force does not imply that spatial planning would become a similar activity in the European countries. The different planning cultures exercise diverging influences.

This study aims to provide applicable insights in such a way that planning practice can serve society with enhanced effectiveness of strategy making. Our understanding of the term effective, which became core to our considerations, addresses the innovative effect on general development, which the European Commission expects of spatial development strategies. (Barca 2009) During the study, acknowledgement increased that the need of politicians for concrete proposals requires practicing a design attitude in making the development strategy. As elaborated in the explorative Chapter 4, research-by-design may enlarge "the existing collection of possible futures" so that more imaginable desired futures become reality.

The processes for strategic development are to be distinguished from conventional plan procedures. (Healey 2003, Albrechts 2004)

In many cases agreements on long-term developments result in non-legally binding (if any), documents under various names like visions, perspectives, or strategies. (Zonneveld 2005, Dühr, Colombe et al. 2010, Faludi 2010) The main envisaged effect of a strategic decision-making process is furthering a sense of common orientation in society, which sustains a period of time. The expression of a common orientation of a multitude of stakeholders in a vision document provides a framework for other decisions. Such a conceptual framework is a tool for the coordination of sector plans and projects, which enables addressing some of the main effects of the actual quite common fragmentation of policies.

For becoming accepted and sustained, these decision-making processes and their outcomes require broad support in society. That is one of the main challenges for preparing spatial developments in future. A core challenge of planning practice is organizing decision-making processes in such a way that professional planning experts serve society by helping actors to commonly co-create their vision for future development of their society.

Acknowledging the importance of an accepted framework for coordinated development of a territory, the relevance of this study for society will depend from the answer on the question:

Which process and place-based characteristics offer best possibilities for a broadly supported development vision?

Various authors, planning theorists (Healey 2006, Albrechts 2011) as well as policy analysts and management experts (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) point to the importance of sharing ownership of the results and the process. Besides it has been suggested (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) that a process characterized by going from option variety towards selection, offers best chances for effective decision-making. Our hypothesis is that a decision-making process, which is mainly shaped by the divergence of together generating, improving and assessing several scenarios followed by convergence through selecting optimal combinations of aspects, will entail shared ownership of a performing strategy.

Next to the large influence of planning cultures, the influences of modern network society on strategy making are probably even larger. (Castells 2010) The gradual shift towards a network society implies large impacts on planning practice. As Teisman indicates: Planning departments like other public bodies notice that they are equal players among others. (Teisman 2001)

Network society demands for a change to governance: Acting within a larger network of entangled rulers who together lead development is needed. Existing planning cultures, institutions and regulations are often not adapted to these new requirements. Strategic planning requires a different orientation of many planning practitioners: An adapted planning capacity and a shift in planning style is needed, in which stakeholders are actively involved on the basis of a joint definition of the action situation and of sharing interests, aims and relevant knowledge. (Albrechts 2004).

The policy-making aspect of preparing a strategic development vision implies that strategy making is not necessarily conducted within procedures and processes of regulative planning. Therefore we explored strategy making more generally as a decision-making process in the context of network society. (Chapter 2) Because strategic development visions are hoped to provide new perspectives for a promising future, it is not enough to focus on effective strategy making. Opening-up minds for new perspectives and un-envisaged options require creativity in the decision-making process. The notions of shared ownership, network relations, opening-up minds and creativity relate to the ways participants to strategy making interact.

§ 1.2 Structure of this study

This study is structured as follows: after this Introduction to the subject, Chapter 2 addresses the complexity of network society. It concludes in the importance of aiming at shared ownership during the interactions of spatial strategy making.

Chapter 3 further explores strategy making as a decision-making process, which includes acceptance of the multi-round character of a societal process. It has been noticed that effective deciding as such does not imply that the best decision is made.

Therefore Chapter 4 explores strategy making as a creative process, which searches for better than the obvious, generally expected trend developments: A society can develop awareness and a vision of their desired future development.

The research frame is elaborated in Chapter 5 considering co-designing as a crucial activity, which supports sharing ownership. That Chapter concludes in formulating the research questions to the study.

The empiric part of a multi-case study is prepared in Chapter 6, presenting concrete activities towards responding the research questions.

The Chapters 7 – 11 present accounts of five cases, respectively in Bologna, Drechtsteden, Glasgow, Grödental and Meetjesland in four European countries: Italy, the Netherlands, Scotland and Belgium.

The information of the accounts of the cases is presented in an overview in Chapter 12, together with the assessment of the effectiveness of the five decision-making processes.

Then the information is analysed in Chapters 13 and 14, respectively with regard to the process factors and to the place specific factors, influencing the processes in the different cases.

Finally, Chapter 15 formulates the conclusions of this study, which are followed by a discussion about insights and views resulting from this endeavour in Chapter 16.

The structure of the study is represented in following figure 1. 1




FIGURE 1.1 Structure of this study.

2 Spatial strategy making in network society

Aiming to do justice to the complexity of network society, Chapter 2 explores the process aspects of strategy making within the conditions set by network society. Strategic planning is not a simple straightforward technical activity. Local and regional development includes most aspects of local and regional societies, thereby touching upon and confronting often-conflicting interests. Development strategies intervene between political objectives, sector interests and the interests of individuals in civic society. Traditional governmental approaches do not apply, since there is no single accepted problem owner or responsible institution for the future development of society. Strategic planning requires good governance.

This Chapter first discusses aspects of network society, which affect possibilities for spatial policy making. (§ 2.1) Coordination of interventions during development is needed for effective government policies. Realization of political aims and spatial qualities does not emerge coincidentally. Doubts about the effectiveness of spatial planning are reason to discuss its relevance in § 2.2. Although the effect of planning has its limitations, the preparation of development policies can help avoiding unnecessary problems. The discussion about the evolutionary character of strategic development in § 2.3 concludes that success of a strategy is to be seen as performing into a direction, rather than conforming to (quantitative) requirements or a specific design. Interactive strategic planning is the subject of § 2.4, this regards working together in formal or informal co-operation. For real integrative approaches policy coordination is not enough. § 2.5 about integrated planning and participation, suggests that co-producing plans and together developing information is needed to share ownership of the results, needed for commitment. § 2.6 concludes that the importance of visualizations on maps must not be underestimated. § 2.7 clarifies that the multi-level embedding of strategy making processes is of large influence. Regional/national planning cultures are almost determining factors, but planning cultures develop and mind-sets can be influenced through concrete experiences in strategy making. § 2.8 discusses the importance of the right moment to influence the political agenda. § 2.9 summarizes lessons of this Chapter: strategic planning is to be seen as a collaborative decision-making process within the complexities and uncertainties of network society. Lasting commitment and broad support are essential factors for a successful strategy. Sharing ownership of a strategy and the process are probably key factors to commitment and support. That specifies the central research question into: "Which process and context characteristics offer best chances to produce co-ownership of a strategy?"

§ 2.1 Strategic Spatial Policy in Network Society

The gradual shift towards a network society with its complexity and uncertainty affects spatial policy making severely. The transformations in society, which Castells identified in his first edition of 1996 of *The Rise of the Network Society* was evaluated at the occasion of the second edition (Castells 2010). Although not meant as predictions, the evaluation confirmed largely that the identified aspects of network society belong to actual reality. The search for success factors for strategic planning should take the impacts of network society into consideration, because as Castells noticed, there is not only a growing incapability of institutions to handle global problems but also to handle local demand. The growing complexity not only affects the relations between government and society but also the relations among governmental institutions.

In the complexity of network society the multitude of actors foster a multitude of ideas and opinions. (Hajer 1995) No specific idea or opinion is automatically supported by all members of society. That influences the attitude towards information and knowledge. Individuals and organizations in society do not simply accept scientific data as factual and relevant information. People are aware of limitations to what we really know. Misinterpretations of an overload of data, commercial propaganda, scientific mistakes or even fraud, together with different weighing of interests and the focus of media on opinions and emotions, added to limit the influence of scientific findings. In modern society, scientific data are often treated as another opinion of just some body, being of equal value to everybody's private opinion. On top of that, the individualization in modern society has led to value private interest high, sometimes to the detriment of the common interest or even direct neighbours.

The mediatisation of society (Hajer 2009) means that both *scientific knowledge* and *public knowledge* became relevant for public decision-making. Within that reality, existing prejudices have to be addressed and agreeing on a common development policy will be extra difficult. The influence of the changed role of media in information society requires reconsidering the role interpretation of governments. In order to address what Hajer called "dumbing down", a different way of communication of public authorities is needed. Governance needs to be performed by actively creating relations with different sections of the wider public.

Experts are not automatically trusted as reliable sources of information or guides through complex situations. People are aware of mechanisms like: the one who pays, determines. But also the facts that specialist experts assume specific professional perspectives and do not foster everybody's private values make experts not the natural allies for defending all different interests.

Good governance requires not only (new) capabilities and style of experts (Albrechts 2004), but also different use of information. That is why effective process management in multi-actor networks is suggested to start with explicitly agreeing on basic information to be used in further steps of the process. (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007)

Not only experts, but also politicians, although democratically elected, are not automatically trusted. A logic consequence of a specific political decision is that other options, which serve other interests, are not chosen. As a result some people tend to mistrust politicians simply because choices are made different from their individual own preference. As Teisman (2001) emphasized with regard to the role of government bodies, that planning departments like other public bodies notice that they are equal players among others. The shift consists of government previously being the steering entity, towards a larger network of entangled rulers who together lead development. Where networks appear, hierarchy disappears and a complex entity develops. This requires attention for co-operation between public administrations, public private co-operation and interactive policy-making. Networking conflicts with territory bound and sector segregated governmental organizations. Networking undermines the organization as policy making entity and line management as the usual organizational structure. Because networks undermine department's autonomy administrative leaders aim at enhanced positioning of their department. (Teisman 2001)

The resulting complexity creates extra difficulties for those assuming responsibility for future development of their city or region. Existing procedures do hardly comply; controversies tend to survive attempts for solving problems. "Dialogues of the deaf" (Van Eeten 1999) develop: confrontation of different perspectives and related value systems often demonstrate the validity of different standpoints on basis of scientific evidence. Problem solving approaches as such often lead to deepening the standpoints. In short, network society demands for a change to good governance: acting within a larger network of entangled rulers who together lead development.

Traditional planning cultures and the related institutions are in general structured in a hierarchical manner, and not adapted to the requirements of a network society. The characteristics differ as shown in table 2.1.

HIERARCHY	NETWORK
Uniform	Pluriform
Unilateral	Mutual dependencies
Openness/ receptive for hierarchy	Closed to hierarchical signals
Stable	Dynamic

TABLE 2.1 Difference between hierarchically structured and network.
[Source: De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007]

In the complexity of network society it became unclear what the general interest is, for which politicians assume responsibility. Now actions are more focused on the common interest of those involved. As a result, participation and involvement in decision-making became more important. But the role of a politician in a democracy remains: Politicians in democracies still have to decide and to select among options (Teisman 1998).

Although the complexity (Salet and Faludi 2000) of society requires integrated approaches, the conditions in network society are not in favour of an integrated approach. The spatial planning discipline's claim to be specialist expert in integrating aspects in territorial development is not automatically accepted by other disciplines. Representatives of sectors having prepared projects for implementation are generally not inclined to reconsider their design for the sake of optimal integration in the spatially planned environment. Network society requires an approach based on governance.

The need to agree on a strategy for the long-term spatial development of regions has been aired quite often in planning literature. (Salet and Faludi 2000, Albrechts 2004, Healey 2007) Strategic planning concerns the preparation of long-term spatial development towards a desired situation. We can summarize Albrechts' view on strategic planning in next description: Strategic spatial planning is a public sector-led (Kunzmann 2000), socio-spatial (Healey 1997) process through which a vision, actions, and means for implementation are produced that shape and frame what a place is and can become. (Albrechts 2004) He distinguishes value rationality (develop alternative futures), communicative rationality (involve growing number of actors), instrumental rationality (best ways to solve problems) and strategic rationality (dealing with power relations).

The extreme dynamics of network society affects the possibilities of effective deciding about a long-term development strategy. Hot issues in media evoked by incidents, can suddenly change political agendas, political configurations in parliament and councils seem to change more extremely in recent elections, opinions, which are not informed by facts are influenced by populists. Those turbulences conflict with the required continued goal orientation of long-term strategic development. At the same time, politicians assuming responsibility for well-considered development are under constant pressure of media to react on incidents and to score with popular issues.

The transformations into a network society added-up to increased complexity. Since existing institutional structures and the related procedural arrangements are generally designed in a different, simpler hierarchical context, actual complexity makes effective strategic planning extra difficult. As long as no specific view dominates in society, controversies tend to deepen and may result in a complete standstill.

The above indicates that spatial policy making in network society should adapt to the requirements set by its dynamics, interdependencies and pluriform character. Basic information must be explicitly agreed with participants to the planning process. Equal to information, experts and politicians are not automatically trusted or accepted as guides through complex problems. Trust is an essential aspect. (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007) Trust can be earned on basis of common experiences and intensive communication in closely working together. Therefore the process of together working on a specific subject is more important than before. The issue addressed in this study is how to *commonly produce an effective vision, actions, and means of implementation within specific place conditions?*

§ 2.2 Relevance of Spatial Planning in Network Society.

Growing awareness of the fact that future is not makeable and that development can only partially be influenced by political decision-making, poses the question whether policy-making on desired spatial developments beyond focusing on solving actual problems, is useful.

An important argument is that developments in society go so fast that the (slow) procedures connected to spatial planning cannot keep pace with developments in society. (Friedmann 2004) When a new long-term strategy is finally officially adopted, reality in society has changed and the agreed policy can already be out-dated. So, why prepare complex legislation and organize institutions for conducting bureaucratic procedures, if developments do often not conform to envisaged plans? Besides it has been noticed that the outcomes of development are generally not the straight results of planning (Teisman 1997) and that possibilities to influence the development are limited. Others argue that the strong government orientation of spatial planning causes ineffectiveness by not allowing civic creativity and initiatives. Therefore some argue that planning should be an outside-in actor relational approach. (Boelens 2010, Boonstra and Boelens 2011) It has also been argued that the fact that proposals for interventions and the concepts of spatial planning cannot be falsified or evidenced, spatial plans should not be accepted as a basis of development policies. (Van Eeten and Roe 2000)

An important counter argument is that if unwished developments are expected, for instance because different sectors claim space for conflicting functions, it would be wise to make use of existing knowledge and capabilities to avoid the foreseeable negative situation even if the future is not makeable. The responsibility of democratically elected politicians for the future of society requires (normative) preparing for future developments as good as possible. This is because:

- Most problems can be solved in different ways, consisting of different combinations of policies or projects on different locations. Solutions, which hamper a wished-for development, are to be avoided. Contrary, preferably those solutions are to be elaborated, which support desired development.
- The combination on the ground of a multitude of projects, which aim to solve problems within different sectors, may result into a situation in which the one project increases problems to another project. Coordinated development requires guidance based on some agreed main lines.
- The combination of different solutions within a project can create extra value; synergy and win-win solutions can be achieved by integrated planning. That may provide for extra spatial quality and more efficient functioning of a territory.
- A basic objective of plan preparation is to optimize the functioning of a territory. A spatial distribution of activities, which avoids unnecessary travel distance, requires spatial planning.
- Leaving as many as possible possibilities for unpredicted developments is also considered as a quality for future oriented spatial planning. This requires smart decisions about infrastructures and locations of functions. (Bertolini 2010) The openness for unforeseen developments might be facilitated by neutral infrastructure and large-scale landscape structures, which enhance the territorial qualities and prepares for receiving future functions. Such structures are to be designed, decided, and realized.
- Although decision-making about future development requires a confrontation of views and interests, which in some cases result in lasting controversies, not all spatial plan making ends up in a controversial dilemma. Our assumption is that together producing story lines for the future (Hajer 1995, Throgmorton 1996), distracting the attention from the controversial issue towards a desirable future, complies with the recommendation to formulate a new agenda. (Van Eeten 1999) That implies application of the transformative power of dialogue. (Innes 1996, Innes and Booher 2004)

General spatial policy objectives like for instance those promoted by Healey: *distributive justice, sustainable wellbeing and economic vitality* (Healey 2007) will not be achieved as a coincidental outcome of unplanned developments. It is also clear that the long-term perspective of strategic planning creates tensions between the abstractions of long-term objectives and the concreteness of the actual circumstances in which decisions are to be taken. On top, the tensions between the way stakeholders see their direct interests and the wider common interest of a coordinated long-term development also requires dedicated attention in decision-making. Some others (Friedmann 2004) obviously being critical about conventional (regulatory) spatial planning, emphasises the problems of extensive legal procedures. These often result in solutions for problems of the past, which have already been substituted by new issues during the long procedure. But he admitted that studies comparing development under alternative assumptions (scenarios) might be useful. Others see it differently:

“Strategies not only shape conceptions in institutional sites beyond those in which they were constructed. They also have effects on material realities, as they are used to generate investment projects, to justify resource allocations and regulatory decisions.”(Healey 2007) (221)

She pointed to the potential performance of strategic plans through their persuasive power. Hajer also pointed to the dynamics of processes changing mind-sets in (environmental) policies through story lines in discursive actions. He described ecological modernization as a democratic process stimulating a shared vision for the future. (Hajer 1995)(280) Most criticism of spatial planning is related to effects and procedures of regulative planning. Also not-conformance to predictions of quantitative projections is often seen as argument against spatial planning. However we focus here on the preparation of development strategies as a decision-making process about the direction of long-term development. This political responsibility requires making use of available expertise and insight of society. Such a process is about the governance of decision-making for evolutionary performing into a desired direction. The challenge is to adapt planning to requirements of network society. Less relying on regulative planning, more focussing on strategies, working on broadening perspectives and changing mind-sets and allowing more creativity in decision-making are responses to Friedmann’s and other’s messages.

We conclude that spatial planning is relevant for society, not only in order to avoid negative developments, but also for supporting wished-for developments and aiming at realizing synergies and optimal functioning of a territory. That is not a scientific analytical exercise. The normative basis of development should be the focus. (Hajer 1995) But the circumstances in which future developments have to be prepared differ often severely from the assumptions on which regulatory planning was organized and the related planning institutions and agencies were established. Network society requires a different attitude and new approaches of good governance in planning practice.

§ 2.3 Evolutionary Aspects of Strategic Development

In the complexity of network society the linear plan-decide-implement assumption is not effective anymore (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007). A topical approach would require at least agreement on the formulation of the problem, on the best solution and on basic data. Such agreement is not (anymore) a given fact at the start of a process, but should be achieved as a result of decision-making. The large variety of interests, perspectives and perceptions of reality, together with the need for broad

support, make such agreements difficult to achieve. (Hajer 1995) Many problems present themselves in a fuzzy way not fitting in the definitions and procedures of the normal professional and organizational conventions. *“Planning problems are inherently wicked”* (Rittel and Webber 1973) (160) That applies even stronger for spatial strategy making. Most organizations, including planning agencies are predominantly organized according to their primary processes consisting mainly of maintaining rules and applying administrative procedures. Policy making for long-term developments however requires not a juridical but an open exploring attitude, searching for future opportunities, which can differ substantially from the circumstances in which actual management structure is constituted.

The effectiveness of political decision-making implies making progress into the direction, which is desired or accepted by society. Acknowledging the step-wise development from the one situation into a new one includes aspects of an evolutionary approach. (De Roo and Silva 2010) Considering aspects of strategy making should take account of its evolutionary character. (Van Bueren 2009) Some argue for conducting a form of evolutionary planning, which’ main objective would be to keep options open for the future. (Bertolini 2010) That would comply with the objective of sustainability serving the interest of future generations. But that might evoke the question whether such a defensive approach, which probably enhances the need for regulative planning, would support the objective of sustainability more than pro-active sustainable planning efforts.

For the effectiveness of planning, the distinction is relevant between planning as deliberately specific goal setting for future development and evolution, which is not necessarily developing into a precisely prefixed goal. As noticed before, spatial planning, with its procedures and documents does not determine spatial development, whereas at the same time spatial development is not an evolution towards a coincidental outcome of the fittest. Effective planning should find a balance between juridical regulation and freedom stimulating initiatives. Unrestricted capitalism would result in survival of the strongest, whereas survival of the fittest would imply that the “surviving” development would be the one that fits best in the local environment, consisting of the existing social, economic and physical circumstances. Not only “natural” forces steer development. Governments are democratically legitimized to influence developments in their territory according to their political objectives.

As Healey formulated: (Healey 2007) (182) *“...strategy formation does not proceed in an orderly way through specified technical and bureaucratic procedures. It is a messy, back-and-forth process, with multiple layers of contestation and struggle.”*

That multi-layered struggles can be regarded as the socio-economic and cultural environment struggling for selecting best fitting development. In order to improve that struggling, management for change is required among existing organizations, which

often focus only on their sector interest without putting much weight to the impacts on the wider society. That applies strongly for the multi-sector character of policies for spatial development. The evolutionary “survival” process among the possible options requires a place-specific balance between legal regulation, commercial initiatives, interest group forces and political steering. If plans are steps in a continuous process of transformation of reality with selective influences from all place-related aspects of social, economic and physical environment, only those options that fit in the peculiarities of the existing environment, which resulted from the previous developments, will “survive”.

For assessing a spatial development policy, the evolutionary aspect is essential: assessment should establish progress into the agreed development. (Van Bueren 2009) Acknowledging the need to open-minded react on new opportunities and limitations, while at the same time aiming at objectives as points on the horizon, the logic criterion for establishing success of development is progress into the envisaged direction. Conformance to concrete quantitative specifications belongs to the realm of blueprint planning.

The distinction between conformance to a plan and performance to a strategy has been emphasised earlier in planning literature. Referring to Barrett and Fudge (1981) Mastop (Mastop 2000) emphasised that plans are never followed blindly; they are reinterpreted and re-enacted according to the specific situation. And Faludi defines: *“A plan is fulfilling its purpose, and is in this sense “performing”, if and only if it plays a tangible role in the choices of the actors to whom it is addressed”.* (Faludi 2000) (306) Planning statements are the means to an end, the end being to let ideas of the maker (s) of the plan become a part of subsequent decision-processes. Subsequent decision-making together translating in each step the strategy into a more elaborated specific situation creates a form of shared ownership, which is important for commitment.

The evolutionary view on spatial development puts extra emphasis on the step-by-step dynamic process character of plan preparation and on the importance of place related circumstances, offering specific opportunities as well as limitations. It also underlines the difference between the strategy making of spatial development processes and the blue print character of project planning. The success of the last can be established through conformance to a design or sets of specific requirements in its *terms of references*, whereas the evolutionary aspect of spatial development demands for local freedom of interpretation and performance with regard to a previously agreed direction of development.

§ 2.4 Interactive Strategic Planning.

For integrated planning communication with other sector institutions in and outside government and with the broader public is essential. A separation of the production of the strategy from the decision-making about the strategy would not support sharing ownership. Production in a dedicated office, instead of co-production, would exclude stakeholders from together developing knowledge and ideas. According to policy sciences (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) the process of preparing a decision and the content can hardly be separated. Also Healey (Healey 2003) emphasized that process and content are closely related. Support and understanding is required within a context in which the weights of arguments differ depending from the individual perspectives. According to Healey:

“ The artistry of spatial strategy making lies in combining a continually evolving strategic imagination about urban dynamics and potentialities, fed from multiple perspectives and politics, with a capacity for selective focusing on critical relations and choices where action now will make a difference. It involves creative synthesis among competing possibilities and values in ways that have a broad resonance with those whose judgements and feelings give legitimacy to governance interventions, while also showing how different strands of arguments and their proposals fit into and are affected by the synthesis arrived at”.(Healey 2007)(287):

These phenomena of different significance of arguments exist among public as well as private organizations, on the national, regional and local levels. Hajer (Hajer 1995) emphasised the linguistic aspect of policy discourses: words have different meanings and connotations in different institutional contexts. Defective understanding may evoke power play in a struggle for supremacy of a specific view on reality. It has been suggested to become multi-lingual and “streetwise” in order to increase effective communication. (Healey 2007) But there is also simple power play among administrative units resulting from their different views on the role of a sector or discipline in society with regard to future development. Conflicts even may result from discussions about the meaning of visualization, which is as such a clarifying means to support communication during a decision-making process. (Carton 2007) And of course, difficulties in communicating about decisions can also result from deliberately negative framing the legitimating of an agreed decision, which resulted from constructive enriching co-operation, for instance by simply disqualifying the result of a negotiation as “horse-trading”. (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007) A resulting effect is exerting power for obstructing the process (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) and “strategic political behaviour” within the decision-making process. (Teisman 1998) As a consequence of mutual power play, the focus of together agreeing on a common strategy among the co-operating institutions decreases and the complexity of the process increases, so that the struggling institutions and actors become part of the problem.(Rotmans 2006)

Healey (2007) emphasised that the complexity of urban life, with its multiplicity of sectors influencing spatial development, institutions with different views, private companies and individuals with often conflicting interests, requires strategy-making to be conducted in a diffuse governance landscape. The question is how to converge opinions and views into a common vision for future development within such a diffuse governance landscape. This refers to the core challenge of integrated planning: how to successfully integrate the diversity of views and objectives of sector policies and stakeholders into a plan in such a way that those parties are satisfied with the outcomes?

(Healey 2007)(228) ... *“the work of strategy formation becomes an effort to create a nodal force in the ongoing flow of relational complexity. This force is drawn forward through summoning up conceptions of urban areas, in ways that selectively lock together transecting relations, opening up connectivities to encourage new synergies to emerge, creating strategy with persuasive and seductive power, which can become itself an actor in the ongoing flow of relational dynamics and have effects on materialities and identities”.*

The above clarifies that views differ about the role of public bodies in strategy making. For our investigation about factors for success we consider the role of public authorities, including their experts as a variable in the context of a strategy making process, which is to be decided by the locally existing distribution of political powers. Albrechts, discussing Healey's view (Albrechts 2009) remarked that spatial planning is inherently a governance activity: Healey defined strategic spatial planning as a social process through which a range of people in diverse institutional relations and positions come together to design plan-making processes and develop contents and strategies for the management of spatial change. Earlier Judith Innes published positive experiences as an planning practitioner in *Planning Through Consensus Building* (Innes 1996). In *Reframing Public Participation: Strategies for the 21st Century*, (Innes and Booher 2000) (429) keys to success were listed: the transformative power of dialogue, respect and equally approach and the learning of new ideas. The proposed framing is: *“Participation should be seen as a multi-way interaction in which citizens and other players work and talk in formal and informal ways to influence action in the public arena before it is virtually a foregone conclusion.”*

Such observations direct the attention to the importance of the interaction of participants in decision-making processes.

Next to the perspectives of managing decision-making processes, socio-institutional analysis and discourse analysis, an 'interaction approach' would shed light on our research question.

§ 2.5 Integrated Planning and Participation

The above and other lessons learn that participation is essential for an integrated approach and that the interactions among a group of involved representatives of specific interests belong to the core of planning actions. Thinking is not restricted to groups of experts; public debate may develop new insights. Some speak about the *Wisdom of the Crowds* (Sorowiecki 2004) and *The City as Brain*. (Hemel 2012) This includes that the individual as well as institutional related different views on reality and the concepts in which those views are expressed in actual network society are facts have to be dealt with when aiming at agreements in an integrated approach to future development.

With regard to interactions aiming at integrating sector and stakeholder interests Healey presented an overview of degrees of integration in various co-operative actions:

	TYPE OF INTEGRATION	MEANING OF INTEGRATION
A	Co-ordination	
A1	Aligning	Fitting in other policies and strategies
A2	Co-aligning	Mutual adjustment among diverse strategies
A3	Multi-level Co-aligning	Mutual adjustment both vertically and horizontally
B	Framing	
B1	Widening a policy frame	Extending existing frame to encompass a new dimension
B2	Creating new frame or vision	Developing a new policy frame and discourse
B3	Creating a place-focused policy frame	Focus specifically on place qualities and spatial organization
C	Linking policy and action	
C1	Policy and delivery	Connecting policy assertions to specific delivery mechanisms
C2	Regulation and investment	Linking principles governing land-use to those governing development investment
D	Linking multiple actors	
D1	Involving	Drawing community and stakeholders into plan-making processes
D2	Sharing knowledge and ideas	Drawing and developing knowledge with stakeholders
D3	Sharing ownership	Developing a shared commitment to the content and legitimating plan/ strategy

TABLE 2.2 Degrees of Integration. [Source: Healey 2006]

This overview suggests that for achieving lasting commitment, necessary for the effectiveness of a long-term strategy, the integrative interactions of co-operation (A), framing (B) and linking policy and action (C) are not sufficient. Linking a multitude of actors, through involvement in plan making (D1), together developing knowledge (D2) and sharing ownership (D3) is required for shared commitment to the content and the process. These activities listed by Healey are essential for our quest: drawing community and stakeholders in plan making, develop together knowledge and commitment to the achievements. When not involved in the thinking and decision-making, members in the social network may seek to undermine or even sabotage the project if their needs are not considered. (Conklin 2005) Collective intelligence is a natural property of socially shared cognition, a natural enabler of collaboration.

That brings our quest for success factors for strategy making down to aspects of successful co-producing a long-term development strategy involving a large variety of actors representing various interests in such a way that all involved experience ownership.

The co-production of a strategy, which can be agreed among sectors and stakeholders, requires organizing a process in which decision-making focuses on converging to a common view on the future: a commonly owned vision.

Healey suggests organizing processes of collaborative planning as the way forward. (Healey 2003) That implies that interactions for co-producing an integrated strategy or vision depend on the specific collaboration in a location, which can differ with regard to the broadness and intensity of interactions. Or in other words, citing Innes and Booher: Such strategy making processes are:

“self-organizing and adaptive to many unique conditions and problems. They are not hierarchical or bureaucratic, not dependent on authoritarian leadership, and not primarily grounded in the advice of technical experts. Instead they involve simple heuristics with decisions devolved to agents in society-including agencies, groups, individuals, and businesses. The knowledge they rely on is socially constructed and shared among experts and non-experts. The approach involves vision, but is collectively created rather than the product of a single visionary. These strategies depend on power but it is the power of networked relationship, shared information, identity, and meaning.It is planning by doing, not just by thinking- planning through dialogue, interspersed with action....it is about moving in a direction, but letting the future unfold, while players constantly monitor what is happening, get feedback and adjust their actions.”(Innes and Booher 2000)(176)

Collaborative approaches as propagated by Healey, go further than coordination: Coordination is the orchestration of organizations (or persons) towards a particular goal that provides shared rewards. Collaboration involves a willingness of parties and

stakeholders involved to enhance one another's capacity for mutual benefit, sharing risks, responsibilities and rewards, invest substantial time, share turf and have trust. (Poocharoen and Ting 2013) (referring to Himmelmann) Trust, implying acceptance of risk, commitment and shared understanding are key.

With regard to working together, the differences between co-operation, co-production, and collaboration can be characterized as follows:

	CO-OPERATION	CO-PRODUCING	COLLABORATION
Level	Individual	Organizational	Organizational
Breadth	Depends on will	Agreed output	Outcome
Intensity	Depends	Intense	More intense
Co-ownership	Limited	Yes	Yes

TABLE 2.3 Working together, differences between co-operating, co-producing and collaboration. [Source: inspired by Poocharoen and Ting 2013]

The different forms of working-together can be organized among departments in one organization, between several sector organizations and including civil society. Co-producing a strategy in a multi-sector decision-making process includes requirements to the interaction of institutions working together to make a common product. That includes a form of agreement among the co-operating parties about the contours of the output. Collaboration is wider; it implies a common effort aiming at together achieving objectives as an outcome. Such a common enterprise entails an explorative process, rather than a linear goal oriented production process.

“Urban Complexity and Spatial Strategies” (Healey 2007) analyses experiences with strategy making in the complexities of Amsterdam, Milan and Cambridge Sub-region, from a socio-institutional point of view. In her approach she links the social processes in which meaning is produced as a “sociological variant of institutionalist analysis” The sociological aspect refers to the way governance processes and policy meanings are produced through social relations in which potentially multiple frames of reference are constructed, mobilised and shaped into policy discourses which then interact with various practices of governance. The institutionalist term refers to the complex and evolving ensemble of formal and informal norms and practices through which governance processes and discourses are constructed, consolidated and transformed. (p.14) Her accounts of these experiences in planning practice illustrate the complex reality of urban life. She shows the multiplicity of sectors influencing spatial development, institutions with different views, private companies and individuals with often-conflicting interests creating a complex governance landscape, in which the planning practitioners found their ways (or not) in the three plan making processes she analysed. The socio-institutional perspective of Healey’s analysis addresses the interactions among institutions, stakeholders, civil society, regulations and politics.

The question of how broadly composed the co-producing grouping should be in specific cases brings us to the issue of the of public participation. Some, emphasising the drawbacks of representative democracy and bureaucratic agencies, plead for applying self-organizing principles in strategy-making processes in civil society. (Boelens 2010). In actual reality of network society that view on democracy is seldom regarded realistic. For our search for success factors for strategic decision-making in groupings we assume the broadness and intensity of participation to the discretion of local / regional democracy. In the one situation the decision-making is done in a grouping of sector experts, in another locality civic society may have the decisive say when participating in the co-production of a strategic vision.

For evaluative analysis of processes in specific cases, these differences of group composition, which is to the discretion of the existing democratic authorities, might establish relevant variables to be considered. In how far has an agreement about a development been achieved in (narrow) co-operation or in (broad) collaboration and, who were participants in co-producing: civil society, representatives of non-governmental and commercial organizations, or only sector officials? These considerations partly address the local circumstances of our main question (§ 1.3) about the *process and place-based characteristics, which offer best possibilities for a broadly supported development vision.*

§ 2.6 Relational Geography and Visualization

Healey situated her socio-institutional analysis of three European cases within the place-related complexity of relational geography, consisting of all thinkable relations, connections and interdependencies among groupings and persons in an urban area, which she contrasted with the physical geography.

She characterized the difference between these two types of geography as complexity versus proximity, thereby suggesting that the metaphor shifts from a map or design to a multiplicity of more or less loosely coupled webs, with nodes, links and loose threads. (Healey 2007) (225)

Characterizing physical geography only as proximity is a far-going simplification. That characterization seems to be proposed in order to replace the concept of physical geography by relational geography, based on an assumed incomparable description of the contrasted geographies: a map or design versus webs of relations. A map is a tool for communicating ideas in a visualized way. A design is a concept, which can be communicated visually by means of a map. The physical geography represented on a

map can according to the physical situation, similar to the relational web in wordings, visualize a multiplicity of more or less coupled physical or virtual networks, with nodes, links, barriers and isolated patches. Besides, it is also possible to visualize Healey's preferred relational webs too on a relational map. We do consider the proposed relational geography an enriching concept, which does not need to come instead of the communicative and analytical capabilities of a visualized physical geography.

The communicative value of visualization may not be underestimated; it is a more basic human capability for developing and conveying ideas than language. Visualization seems to have preceded language in the evolution of human brain (Arp 2008) Arp argues that a specific unique property of human intelligence is visualizing scenarios, which are imagined actions aiming at a desired result. Scenario visualization is a psychological phenomenon that has emerged from neurobiological processes, that actively selects and integrates visual information from mental modules so as to produce coherent imagined pictures. (157)

Different from the ability of all mammals of the cognitive process of forming a visual image or recalling a visual image from memory, scenario visualization requires a mind that is more active in the utilization of visual images, through the process of selectivity, integration and projection. It is what the mind does with visual images in terms of actively selecting and integrating visual information for the purposes of solving some problems relative to some environment that really matters. (p.7) Scenario visualization emerged as a natural consequence of our evolution. Arp referred to the example of early tool making. Tool making of primitive humans, consist of segregate information for selecting material, integrate pieces of information into a coherent picture and project that picture in scenarios for constructing the tool; it is a central feature of conscious behavior. He characterized routine problem solving as stereotyped and lacking innovation. Non-routine creative problem solving entails an innovative ability to make connections between wholly unrelated perspectives or ideas. Arp argues that scenario visualization is not just intermixing of visual information from mental modules but involves the active selection and integration of that information for the purposes of solving some non routine problem creatively in an environment that a human inhabits; it is selectivity. (Arp 2008)

Visualization on maps play an important role in planning practice (Dühr 2004, Dühr 2009): they summarize concepts in an overview showing envisaged or possible relations between components and consequences of locating functions within the topography, thereby depicting problems as well as solutions. That relates to and completes the relational geography of a territory, which is important for analyzing the interrelations of interests and powers in a specific society. Groups of actors can build their wished-for future development vision by noting on maps spatial effects of ideas as expressed in the group and by sketching impacts and re-sketching possible solutions. On top of that, working with visualizations during group sessions concentrates the

attention of the participants to the specific scale and selected issues in drawings. The summarized discussions presented as visualized overviews provide an overall integrated view of mutual relations of components. The scale of the sketches is helpful for focusing the group on a certain level of abstraction of the considerations. This important by-effect of working with maps is that it helps to structure the group's discussions and considerations in the ongoing decision-making towards a development strategy.

Visualization and working with maps is important for analytical as well as conceptual stages of strategy making. The non-linear character of creative decision-making includes the productive continuous switch between analysing, assessing and synthesising. Because interests and powers are often place-related, such continued switching might also include switching between relational geography and physical geography. Creative interaction is not limited to visualized concepts, also verbally generating options in terms of metaphors and concepts adds to the co-producing process.

§ 2.7 Multi-level Embedding and Planning Culture

The administrative environments in which planning processes are conducted differ strongly, not only between countries, but also between regions and local municipalities. Place-related spatial development is specifically promoted in EU territorial development policies (CEC 2008, Barca 2009), because local characteristics are seen as assets for future development and innovation. The diversity of local circumstances in social, economic cultural and physical terms is recognized as a European richness. That requires taking on board local circumstances for strategic decision-making. The importance of the local environment enhances the notion of evolutionary spatial development planning: Spatial development is not only a step-wise development where the next stage develops through building on the previous stage, but also a place related development, in which those specific options for developments, which best fit in the circumstances in a specific place have best chances to survive. (*Survival of the fittest*) That notion is an extra reason to take place-related aspects into account. Not only local circumstances, but also regional regulations and aspects of the national administrative level are the place-related aspects to be taken into account when considering a specific decision-making process. When considering the specific planning culture of a locality, this is composed of national, regional and local specificities influencing processes and views.




FIGURE 2.1 Decision-making process in its triple-layered context.

The triple-layered embedding of strategy making processes of figure 2.1 illustrates the complexity of the process environment in many countries: the (national) level determines competences and legal regulations, together with the middle layer it defines possibilities for interactions with approving authorities fostering their own objectives and requirements, and the direct interests and political preferences of the lower level have more specific influence. These embeddings and the related culture, with its distribution of competencies differ between countries: even more complex situations of four administrative layers occurred in two of the cases in our empirical study.

Referring to Healey (2003) who stressed that process and context cannot be separated as being co-constituents of planning processes, this study considers the combination of aspects of the administrative environment and the specific way in which the interactions are organized in strategy making processes. Many authors considered the large influence of the diversity of planning cultures, because planning as a social activity is embedded in the particularities of history, beliefs, and traditions. (Gullestrup 2009, Knieling and Othengrafen 2009, Waterhout, Mourato et al. 2009) The European Compendium on Planning Systems and Policies (CEC 1997) providing a categorization of planning systems has a somewhat limited value for our search. Since its conception in 1997, planning cultures developed and in several countries the planning competencies were devolved to sub-national levels, entailing regional differentiated planning cultures. There are also general warnings for using the compendium (Stead and Nadin 2009, Nadin and Stead 2012) because any model is an abstraction reducing the complexity of variation among countries in some “families”. The authors notice however a reasonable correspondence between the ideal types expressing basic values and the planning systems. A further elaboration on the European planning cultures with regard to decision-making processes in spatial planning is presented in Chapter 3. In this Chapter about influences of network society more general aspects of cultures are considered.

Gullestrup (2004) (4) defines culture as the “*world conception and the values, moral norms and actual behavior- as well as material and immaterial results thereof- which people ... take over from a past generation, which they ... seek to pass on to the next generation.*”

He distinguishes horizontal and vertical culture dimensions, of which the horizontal segments contain the perceivable artifacts like processing, security creating, management and decision, conveyance, distribution, identity creating, social and the integration segment. Differences are noticed in the confrontation with other cultures.

Our quest for success factors for spatial strategy making regards this horizontal cultural dimension, regarding processes of decision-making. But the deeper insight in the immediately perceivable layer can only be understood through the deeper less perceivable, vertical layers in which Gullestrup situated non-perceivable existence, basic values, fundamental world conception and the like.

The current study compares decision-making processes in various cases, without going into the basic world-views behind the processes. Acknowledging the importance of co-ownership of achievements of the processes, I focused on the occurrence of co-ownership in the different planning cultures, as a proxy of changed mind-sets, resulting from the transformative power of the interactions in the strategy making processes.

Cultures of planning are always historically grounded. The notion of culture is often used for referring to values that must be defended against change, often suggesting that culture is static. However Gullestrup’s definition includes that *time* has also a cultural dimension. Foreign cultural elements are continuously consciously or unconsciously taken over from other cultures. Therefore cultures are not to be taken for granted as static values, they are subject to changes over time. Because changing circumstances create new environments, planning continuously reinvents it self, adapting to new contexts. Change initiating factors are exogenous (transfer of knowledge, technology and discourse) as well as endogenous. Important exogenous change initiating factors are for instance globalization, Europeanization and the turn to market driven economy in central and Easter Europe as a reaction on the negative image of the planning culture of the previous political context. (Gullestrup 2009) In Europe and elsewhere we see an internationalization of planning education, harmonization of policies like territorial cohesion, influence of programs like Interreg and comparable European values. These present converging forces. Change initiating factors are however confronted with cultural resistance factors causing different effects of globalization due to different local interpretations, different ways of implementation of European influences, different intellectual styles. These differences in “receiving” environments have a diverging effect. Europeanization never follows common structures nor does it produce homogeneous domestic structures and spatial planning identities. Although traditions of planning are always historically grounded, Reimer

and Blotevogel (2012) suggest that individual forces are also essential in shaping the evolution of traditions of planning action.

Culture has become a major challenge to adapt to diversity and use it as a potential in terms of innovation and global connectivity, an important factor to be taken on board for strategy making. (Knieling and Othengrafen 2009)(302) *“Thus “diversity management” of cultural differences is seen as a key issue for the competitiveness of enterprises as well as cities and regions.”*

The dynamics of culture reveal that planning mechanisms could be useful in network society for triggering and guiding developments. This is essential if policy objectives need to be set in a non-conformative way to existing culture, or as Healey suggested, strategic planning must change practices, cultures and outcomes of place governance. According to Gullestrup, we know different planning cultures through their horizontal dimensions of processes and practices, which reflect the under laying basic beliefs and world-views. Dynamics in planning cultures consist of influencing those underlying convictions through experiences in the aspects of horizontal culture in planning praxis. That implies that changing mind-sets as an aspect of strategy making (Hajer 1995, Healey 2003, Albrechts 2004) could result from specific experiences in specific processes. Collaboratively developing story lines in discussions during strategy making influences mindsets of participants. Besides, feelings of co-ownership and co-authorship may emerge.

§ 2.8 Right Moment for Political Decision-making

A difficulty is that political decisions addressing future problems are to be made within the present political context. Envisaged decisions concern future issues, which are identified within a specific corner of society, at a moment that public opinion is engaged in quite different problems. The point is how to include a long-term serious issue on the political agenda if society is not interested? Teisman, addressing this problem, distinguished independent developments within the scientific, policy and the political realms.(Teisman 2000) The start of decision-making about a long-term development requires choosing the right moment. Teisman pointed to the importance of the specific moment in which the output of policymakers and politics meet. This means that after awareness has been raised in society about a specific issue, and the experts in the official agencies formulated appropriate policies for addressing the issue, the right moment must be chosen for including the issue on the political agenda of the responsible politicians. That requires coordinated alignment of actions, which are normally prepared separately in different realms of society. Scientific studies may have

resulted in urgency of the issue in scientific circles, but that does not automatically include that time is ripe for inclusion on the political agenda. If policy-making for addressing the issue in the realm of experts takes too much time, the political momentum can be over.

Long-term development strategies, aiming at avoiding expected problems to develop, are not automatically recognized in society as topics of high urgency, because problems expected in the future situation are not (yet) experienced and as a consequence, the raised issues will be perceived as mere theoretic considerations of experts, which are hardly relevant in the eyes of people concentrating on their actual problems.

Interactive participation aiming at sharing ownership assumes awareness of the relevant stakeholders of the issues at stake. For effective decision-making on strategic items it is necessary that stakeholders acknowledge the issues of a future situation as important with regard to their own interests. Issues stemming from theoretic considerations may be high on the scientific agenda, but more is needed to attract interest and efforts for policy makers to address the problem. Prospective studies of the "scientific stream" can only help to raise awareness. Urgency of an issue, making it a hot item in the media, attracting attention so that many start discussing it and formulate opinions, moves policy-makers into action. Politicians feel addressed with regard to their responsibilities and will urge the experts within their administrations to explore the issues and prepare political standpoints and measures. Many hot topics in a society are problems, which regard specific actually violated interests. Only some of those issues are related to long-term structural developments. The overload of information in media complicates raising awareness for important urgent issues.

It is obvious that issues, which are hot topics in a local or regional society, will attract the attention required to position it at the political agenda. That does not imply that all structural issues get political priority. The abstractness, related to the long-term and the large scale of future regional development creates a perception for the population of a theoretic and hardly relevant exercise.

Strategy making for long-term developments in network society should acknowledge the above complexity and active responsible politicians should be involved in creating urgency at the right moment in time. Getting long-term development strategies in the public attention and on the political agenda requires a large degree of political leadership, combined with political sensitivity of experts.

§ 2.9 Summary, Importance of Sharing Ownership

This Chapter 2 explored the societal context, which establishes conditions for organizing strategy making in network society.

In 2.1 we discussed the increasing complexity for strategic planning as a result of the transformation to network society: more dynamics, interdependencies and pluriform relations are apparent. Creating trust by working together set extra requirements and new focus to the traditional organizations. We argued that spatial planning (§ 2.2) and more particularly strategic spatial planning will remain relevant for policy making for the future of society. Although the influence on developments in the complex reality of network society is restricted, positive influences are expected from the preparation of long-term territorial development strategies. Such long-term spatial plans or visions indicate a wished-for direction of development, which may offer guidance for later steps in the evolutionary process (§ 2.3). That includes that a strategy making process is instrumental for a society to agree on a vision on a wished-for future situation. The content of such a strategy containing selected and located interventions for meeting agreed objectives is the subject of the strategy making process.

The evolutionary dynamic aspect stresses on the one hand the importance of freedom to interpret main lines according to local circumstances and on the other hand that success of a spatial development strategy cannot be established on basis of conformance to a designed concept or specific quantitative data. It is about the performance of a strategy, in terms of progress into the agreed direction or argumentation for adjustments. (Van Bueren 2009) Performance depends on factors like involvement in a collaborative process resulting in commitment. Interactive strategic planning as discussed in § 2.4 learned that the place-related complexity of network society includes that decision-making cannot be organized in a standardized manner. Views about the role of public bodies and on the formality or informality of organizing the related processes differ in different locations. The local context requires a local specific approach. That also applies for the degree of participation. (§ 2.5) In order to optimally perform, table 2.2 (of Healey) suggests that broad commitment and legitimacy are related to sharing ownership. Co-producing a vision is key, but should preferably be conducted in a collaborative way.

Considering the relation between relational geography as reflection of the complexity of network circumstances and the conventional physical geography in § 2.6 concluded in the importance of both, thereby stressing the role of visualizations on maps as a tool for analysis, assessing and synthesis of ideas. Next part of the exploration regarded the administrative embedding of the process in § 2.7. The multi-level embedding appears an important factor influencing possibilities for interpretations of main lines in accordance to local circumstances. These are part of the place-specific culture of

planning, which may support open collaborative explorations or may present strict regulations and legal barriers. In 2.8 the aspect of influencing the political agenda is discussed. More specifically the temporal aspects of raising awareness, drafting a policy and creating feelings of urgency related to interests are relevant for an emerging window of opportunity for political decision-making.

The exploration of aspects of network societies provided insights relevant for further exploring the organization of decision-making processes in Chapter 3. It clarified that circumstances in network society set different requirements to strategic spatial policy making than usually assumed in the distribution of competencies and responsibilities among public institutions. Conventional approaches do not satisfy anymore, new ways have to be identified.

This Chapter stressed the inseparability of the specific conditions in society and the possibilities for decision-making on strategies. That provided aspects to be addressed in the next Chapter where I will focus more specifically on the decision-making process.

A main conclusion of the above considerations is the importance for the performance of a strategy of broad, lasting commitments, which are closely related to sharing ownership of the strategy and the process of producing and agreeing on the strategy. That directs the focus of our search towards identifying strategy making process aspects in combination with place related specificities, which create trust and co-ownership, so that commitment may result. Shared ownership is not only important among those representatives of sectors who were involved in making the strategy, but also across layers of administrative embedding and maybe most importantly, the political level. That requires further exploration of interactions of persons representing different interests during the decision-making process of the making of spatial strategies.

3 Strategy making as a decision-making process

This explorative Chapter addresses issues of strategy making as an interactive decision-making process. The fact, as established in Chapter 2 about effects of network society, that no single responsible party is accepted anymore is of large influence in decision-making for spatial development in which the integrated approach necessarily assembles many powerful sectors. Analysing decision-making processes requires taking account of these realities and the search for effective decision-making must build on the resulting insights.

This Chapter 3 further seeks to identify chances for success by exploring strategy making in network society as sketched in the previous chapter. In § 3.1 we consider the goal of strategic planning as achieving a common coherent vision in a decision-making process. Decision-making requiring coalitions and stories is the subject of § 3.2. Network society influences that process; in praxis it develops in ways characterized in Hajer's terms as a struggle for discursive hegemony. This process can take a long time and requires many consecutive steps, according to Teisman so-called "rounds" in decision-making. (Teisman 1998) That has been discussed in § 3.3. We distinguished between an effective round of decision-making and a successful strategy in § 3.4. For deciding in spatial strategy making, plan concepts are crucial. (Zonneveld 1991) These plan concepts are output as well as tools in the usually ongoing process of decision-making. The use of concepts in a multi-actor setting is considered in 3.6. § 3.7 addresses the issue of the right moment of introducing a concept for political decisions. Conclusions, accepting the occurrence of several rounds of deciding are presented in 3.8. Finally we conclude that effective decision-making is probably not enough for lasting commitment. This paves the way for Chapter 4.

§ 3.1 Strategic Planning towards a Coherent Vision

Spatial planning regards influencing transformations of reality. Different from general thinking, those transformations do not necessarily imply that buildings or infrastructural projects are constructed. Regulative planning as well as strategic planning can focus on the protection and promotion of values like monuments, natural areas, cultural landscapes and other spatial qualities without proposing the implementation of substantial investments.

Regulative planning focuses on specific concrete spatial objects and subjects by providing regulations for building and utilizing sites. These regulations differ throughout Europe according to national legislation. In most countries at the European continent they are binding and have force of law. (*Bebauungsplan, Piano Regolamento Urbanistico Edilizio, Bestemmingsplan* etc.) The UK *land-use plan* does not directly bind individuals in society. The regulative goal of conventional spatial planning articulates its technical juridical character. The tension between public policy objectives aiming at protection of qualities and avoiding problems in future on the one hand and private interests on the other hand built extensive jurisdiction, which enhanced the image of planning of restricting private freedom. This often conflicts with opinions about the role of government in relation to individual freedoms in network society. Adaptation of planning tools is considered in many countries across Europe.

A distinct aspect of strategic planning is that it concerns long-term structural developments: it is about establishing a global direction of the development of a territory. Such global direction of development relates directly to policy objectives, so that strategic plans are mainly general development policies for a territory. Those development policies contain at best internal coherent strategies, forming a narrative story line. The internal coherence consists of a set of arguments and causalities, which selects specific objectives and priorities for future development. Those story lines are the core of a strategy, which are to be agreed and maintained for a period of time in local society. Tools of strategic planning are less juridical-technical oriented. That global direction is often summarized in the form of a commonly agreed coherent vision for the long-term development of the related territory. The required content of a strategic plan is in some countries or regions legally defined ³, in other countries the content is not regulated, but depends largely from local/regional issues and conditions. ⁴ A strategic plan consists of programming a combination of sector policy interventions, together forming a scenario for development into an agreed direction. Next to multi-level coordination (§ 2.7), multi-sector coordination is an important aspect of such interventions in future spatial development.

The long-term aspect of strategic planning complicates establishing its success: Not only the time horizon may cover several decades, but also after agreeing on a long-term development policy, plans have to be elaborated, projects identified and specified and finally decisions about for instance investments require time consuming procedures. As a consequence, realizations on the ground may come long time after or even never after achieving an agreement about a strategic vision. This evokes the question how to assess the success of strategic planning?

³ As in Scotland and Emilia Romagna

⁴ For instance in the Netherlands

If concrete impacts of interventions resulting from a strategic plan cannot always be identified, what criteria can be used to monitor the implementation?

Besides, the combination of strategic interventions of different sectors may consist of proposals for interventions, which have been proposed and considered earlier, but which' combination provides a new framing.

The value of an adopted strategy is that agreement has been achieved about a specific combination of (sometimes previously separated) interventions or projects, which individually do not necessarily have to be new, fit in and contribute to the coherence of a specific concept. The newly established coherence of a development policy on which society agreed is the valuable achievement. Instead of a chaotic situation of many different ideas, interventions, proposals and often-conflicting standpoints of different initiators, an agreed vision provides a framework for selecting and prioritizing interventions, which enables concerted actions. The value of strategic planning consists of forming a recognisable spatial concept or clear scenario, which has a guiding effect for decisions about forthcoming interventions towards meeting agreed objectives, territorial cohesion and possible synergies.

Acknowledging the challenges to achieve agreement about future development in the complexity of network society necessitates defining success in terms of the process. Literature on management and policy sciences (Teisman 1998, De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) suggest that a strategic planning process can be valued successful if the multitude of actors representing different interests agreed on a common vision for future development: The process succeeded to converge the numerous diverging opinions, points of view and preferences that usually exist in society. That does not necessarily result in a spectacular new urban or regional reality. The evolutionary aspect of spatial development, as a continuous transformation of a city or a region implies gradual modifications. Maps of a development vision mainly depict recognisable existing situations on which desired interventions are projected. But in order to arrive to a commonly supported coherent vision for the future, the complexity of society requires extensive decision-making processes with many actors. Plausible solutions are not the automatic outcome of development processes. Open-mindedness of participating actors is needed in order to realize forms of coordination. Processes aiming at a common vision do not always succeed, but the effect can also be valued positive for its indirect impacts on the individual actors: the learning effect of together formulating a strategy. This learning of participants deriving from their experiences in the interactions, influences the content as well as the organization of further steps in decision-making processes, thereby enhancing the chance of success.

§ 3.2 Decision- making, Coalitions and Stories

Decision-making for a strategy is not only place-related as seen before, in network society the technical simplistic plan-prepare-implement assumption, which is at the base of many institutional regulations, does not apply any more. The so-called waterfall method of linear problem solving (Conklin 2005) applies for (co-) producing a well defined output. The wicked character (Rittel and Webber 1973) of planning problems and strategy making requires an approach different from the command and control paradigm of conventional management, which reinforces blindness about the true nature of complex problems. (Conklin 2005)

The content of strategic planning and the decision-making process to agree on a strategy can hardly be separated: they are co-constituted. (Healey 2003) The content is severely influenced by the process, and the process ought to address and fit on the content issues.

In situations where strategic planning is a not strictly regulated, informal activity, the process management is free to organize the process as deemed relevant in relation to the issues and the local situation. The issues addressed are regional/local problems and opportunities, and the processes are organized in relation to local/regional institutional possibilities and limitations for co-operation. In praxis no two of the processes searching for agreement about a long-term spatial development within specific territories, are equal; decision-making for a regional or local development strategy is place-based.

The possibilities to organize a decision-making process depend partly on the place-specific mix of content aspects and process characteristics as defined by the organizational and regulative circumstances. Even within equal national or regional legal circumstances the way in which decision-making is organized as well as the content of the issues may differ sincerely. Even stronger, within one region or one municipality the practice within a decision-making process is influenced by the specificities of the process management, the organizational structure, local territorial issues and last but not least, the persons playing their roles as initiators, stakeholders and experts and their interactions.

The interaction of participants with their different views on reality is the core of decision-making. The search for factors enhancing the effectiveness of decision-making should pay due attention to the local/regional and related human peculiarities. Concentrating this study about success factors for strategic decision-making by exclusively analyzing the content/process aspect would include an over-simplification of the issue. As stated in the previous Chapter local/regional characteristics and peculiarities influence the content as well as the process architecture and management in such a way, that they should always be considered in combination.

Acknowledging that decision-making processes are organized with participants representing institutions, Hajer's discourse analysis of environmental modernization (Hajer 1995) provides relevant insights in functioning of institutions, how power is structured in institutional arrangements, and how political change in such arrangements come about in network society.

Each organization existing some time develops its own culture. That culture together with their tasks and responsibilities influence the way of considering the outside world including other institutions in society. This specific view is enhanced by the education of the organization's employees. The employees hold specific professional expertise, mainly gained from specific educational institutions, with (again) their specific fostered cultures and pride. The position in society of large organizations influencing the ways of seeing society, establishes their distinct reality.

The specific idea of reality or of the actual status quo, influencing the convictions of key actors, is according to Hajer imperative for their behavior. He argued that there is a considerable power in such structured ways of seeing of institutions. The professional technical terminology, applied in combination with the specific way of perceiving the world, creates institution-specific language and meaning. A routinized form of discourse develops in the "ways one talks." These verbal practices of assumed "ways one talks", often include implicit discursive positioning. As a result, actors are entangled in webs of meanings (Hajer 1995)(56). Also outside institutions, in normal communication people use metaphors, which implicitly frame messages according to their convictions. Those metaphors are seldom recognized and people are usually not aware of using them. (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2011)

The necessity of sector integration in strategic planning increases the challenge to organize constructive co-operation. Integration has to be realized in the context of network society among equal partners. Professional pride can easily become a factor hampering constructive collaboration if one of the representatives of a specific profession stresses his responsibility and simply does not accept "to be integrated".

The argumentative approach of analysis as suggested by Hajer conceives political decision-making as a struggle for discursive hegemony in which actors try to secure the support for their specific way of viewing and defining reality.

Decision-making for development strategies has not only to do with institutional integrative approaches; participation of the public and of private organizations is also imperative. This severely complicates decision-making, since basic information, expertise, roles and responsibilities are as we have seen not automatically respected. (§ 2.1) Good governance is a necessity for achieving agreement among coalitions of actors about the direction of strategic development.

Decision-making towards an agreement involves developing coalitions between sectors and stakeholders, (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007) which requires according to Hajer interactive story making. He stressed the importance of language in the related interactions between stakeholders. (Hajer 1995) He suggests that story lines are the cement of coalitions (65), not interests. Discourse coalitions are formed if previously independent practices are related to one another and if a common discourse is created in which several practices get a meaning in a common political project, based on an adopted story line. Social interactive perspective sees actors as active selecting and adapting, mutating and creating thoughts in the continuous struggle for argumentative victory against rival thinkers. Categorization of issues or stressing its uniqueness makes a difference, like framing elements as appropriate or problematic. Story lines are a subtle mechanism of creating and maintaining discursive order. They give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena. These lessons provided by Hajer emphasize the importance of argumentations in story lines for decision-making among parties fostering various perspectives.

New story lines may re-order understanding. Therefore, finding the appropriate story line becomes an important form of agency. (59) The argumentative approach focuses on the level of the discursive interaction and argues that discursive interaction (language in use) can create new meanings and new coalitions, i.e. may alter cognitive patterns and create new cognitions and new positioning.

The argumentative approach conceives politics as a struggle for discursive hegemony in which actors try to secure the support for their story, based on their definition of reality. The dynamics of this game is determined by credibility, acceptability and trust. Metaphors may provide a common ground between various discourses. Interactive decision-making can come to a conclusion by discursive closure: if complex research work is reduced to a visual representation or catchy one-liner. In planning terms this comes down to a summarizing concept. Story lines, working as a metaphor facilitate the reduction of discursive complexity and create possibilities of problem closure. The challenge seems to be:

"To think of a process that allows for social change to take place democratically and in a way that stimulates the creation of a -at least partially- shared vision of the future". (Hajer 1995)(280)

Decision-making about strategies partly refers to the convincing arguments, enticing proposals and seductive qualities of attractive concepts for participating actors.

As noticed earlier, the complexity of society requires an approach to future developments taking account of the multitude of all relevant interests. Those interests, or how they were seen at the moment of constituting organizations, are the basis of organizing governmental departments, agencies, institutes, non-governmental

groupings, and private companies. Individuals, the representatives of these groupings are appointed to express and exercise those interests. But, according to Hajer's discourse analysis, coalitions are formed around (different) story lines. A relevant lesson from Hajer's analysis is that although multi-sector decision-making requires involvement of organizations, which are organized according to the representation of interests, coalitions, necessary for achieving broad agreement on a development strategy require the *cement of story lines*. Story lines imply adoption of value-based (political) standpoints, often addressing issues beyond the organization's primary process.

The assumed representation of the specific interest of an organization and the challenge to agree on common story lines will create an inherent tension among participants in a strategy making process.

The confrontation of different views on reality as existing in network society requires weighing of often-conflicting political objectives. This pulled strategic planning into the realm of general policy-making. Instead of the planning-technical activity lead by a planning agency responsible for regulative planning, preparing a spatial development strategy includes interactive and inter-sector deciding on spatial policy-making.

The different views on reality and on the mutual relations between sectors and their institutions include also questioning competencies for integrated approaches. As a consequence the simple prepare- plan- implement order of realizing a technical construction does not apply for deciding about a strategic development policy. In praxis such decision-making undergoes several cycles of reconsidering in different contexts: strategic decision-making continues in several rounds.

§ 3.3 Decision-making in Rounds

We considered the decision-making process for strategic planning within the framework of decision-making *in rounds*. (Teisman 1998) According to Teisman's analysis of concrete decision-making for infrastructural investments, the complexity of decision-making in modern society requires usually several successive decision-making processes for convincing and building support within the many policy sectors and societal groupings, which are directly or indirectly affected by the envisaged decision.

He distinguished (Teisman 2000) decision-making processes characterized respectively by:

- Concentration around a focal actor, (traditional spatial planning)
- Co-incidental links between actors, (co-operation between relevant sectors) and
- Interaction of actors, (collaborative interaction in network relations)

The steps in the ongoing process differ: Teisman calls the steps in the focal actor concentrated organization type *phases*, steps in the inter-sector co-operation are called *streams* and the steps in interactive network decision-making are called *rounds*. The *rounds* model seems most in accordance with actual praxis of strategic planning in network society: there is not one specific agency accepted to be responsible for the whole process and society can repeatedly initiate decision-making about new views on the issue. Such a *round* of decision-making can end when the participants achieve an agreement, which lays the foundation of subsequent rounds, to be possibly conducted in different arenas, thereby focussing on new aspects or elaborating on the previous agreement. The occurrence of following rounds continuing previous rounds can be seen as a positive outcome of a specific round.

Although rational planning of decision-making processes is part of orderly managing such processes, it is in practice impossible to predict which specific step of the larger decision-making process will be decisive. In such processes the exact moment of a certain decision is often unclear. (Teisman 1998) In the reality of practice it is often observed that at a certain moment all involved persons were conveying the similar message. In such cases “the decision” is the confirmation of the gradually developed common insights of actors during a collaborative co-operation. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008)

For the whole of the decision-making process as well as for a specific round applies that it should end with an adoption or approval by the appropriate authority, being preferably an elected council. Teisman stresses the importance to distinguish decision-making in three different sectors of society: the content oriented fact finding of scientists, the solution oriented actions of policymakers and the feasibility oriented negotiations of politicians.

Steps within a decision-making round are successful if: (Teisman 2000)

- Scientists succeeded in creating awareness of an issue among those in administrations who prepare policies, and if
- Policy makers prepare a policy addressing the issue, and if
- Politicians accept the issue on the political agenda.

The different rounds of decision-making are important for making progress. But the success of a decision-making round requires coinciding of the moment of the output of policy making with the susceptibility of the political realm. Science may be too early with awareness raising and policy preparation may be too late for the politicians for creating the required leverage leading to changes in society.

The above means that for assessing the success of cases we have to clearly distinguish between the specific single process of a decision-making round and the multi-rounds process of the eventual strategy making.

Although an elected council may have confirmed the achievements, an effective round of decision-making contributes to the success of the larger process, without necessarily ending in a successfully implemented strategy.

Several subsequent rounds of decisions about for instance elaborations, specifications and consequences of concepts are usually needed to become a successful process. In a successful process, such consecutive decisions influenced development into the desired direction. As mentioned before, many of those “decisions” are insights grown among participants. It regards learning processes influencing decisions in an implicit, indirect way.




FIGURE 3.1 The process as multi-rounds decision-making

§ 3.4 Effective round versus a successful strategy

Establishing the success of deciding about a long term spatial development is only possible by hindsight, after the envisaged long term, which may sometimes even take several decades.⁵ However, politics and public opinions are short-term oriented, and do not accept postponing the evaluation of recent or actual decision-making processes. For lessons about success factors of decision-making for long-term ongoing processes, Teisman's theory of deciding in rounds might suggest to analyse available information about a single pivotal step in the process, such as the conception of the (draft) strategy. But what can we consider or qualify as successful decision-making?

Successful decision-making is important for the implementation of a strategy and for the relevance of development strategies for society, but establishing the success is difficult: At which moment in time can a final evaluation of a long-term policy be established?

Because it is hard in actual society to predict which step in a longer decision-making process will deliver the final decision for strategic investments, the success of a process can only be established after its final closing, often after many years. But the criteria for assessing the success of a strategy probably differ from the objectives valid at the (historic) moment of deciding about the strategy. Here we arrive at a property of the science of history. History is again and again re-written by each generation within the context and perspectives of the new generation. (Von der Dunk 2007)

Acknowledging Teisman's *rounds* model in accordance with practice in the complex reality, monitoring a decision-making process have to be done within the dynamics of flows of *rounds* of decision-making. The rounds model of Teisman allows focusing on the internal decision-making within one specific round.

A **single round** with agreed and approved output is qualified here an **effective round**; A **multi-round** process based on an approved agreement, which' outcomes guided or otherwise influenced future development, is qualified a **successful** process.

The assessment of cases of long-term processes, which apply a time horizon, which is still far away in the future, cannot provide a final evaluation. However, acknowledging the lack of patience in politics as well as in the media, early assessments are required, even during the continuing process. At most, such early assessment can result in a provisional expectation about the final success. Provisionally assessing processes of cases, which are not finalized, can be done through analyzing a decision-making

⁵ In the nineties, most Dutch strategic visions choose 2030 as a time horizon

round, which is expected to be crucial for subsequent rounds. Against that background, the search for success factors for strategic decision-making identifies factors, which influence the effectiveness of a specific round and are expected to contribute to the final success of the strategy.

The question whether a specific round has been decisive for successful implementation of the strategy can only be concluded after finalizing the decisions about implementing the envisaged development policy and evaluating effects at a moment in accordance with the vision's time horizon. Even then, dynamics in network society demand for taking account of developments in the temporal context with regard to changed values and criteria when evaluating a decision-making process of the past.

That emphasises the question of what criteria can be applied for successful decision-making. As the above indicates, it is not easy to assess the long-term success of a strategic process in absolute terms. Most simple indicator for success is whether and how many of the envisaged projects have been realised on the ground. But that indicator applies only for decisions about investments for buildings and infrastructure. However strategic developments, which do not envisage investment for constructions, but aim to secure room for developing for instance nature in natural areas, connecting and bridging isolated protected areas, or restoring wetlands or forests, may also be of strategic importance for the development of a region. Moreover, even less detectable effects like participants learning from the experience in a decision-making process may be of great importance for future developments as well. (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007) A by-product effect of intensive co-operation is that participants develop a common understanding of specific words or concepts. A specific group language may develop. (Hajer 1995) This implies that a strategic decision-making process can be considered successful according to its impacts on the tangible as well as on the less perceptible reality of developing insights and knowledge, due to its indirect learning effect. Assessment is extra complicated because we have to take account of the effect of the factor time that the essential institutional learning effects can fade away easily due to continuous turnover of personal.

These considerations do not take away that for our search for success factors of a decision-making process for long-term development, indicators consist of the amount of implemented strategic policy-specific aspects. These policy aspects are for instance next to proposed and envisaged infrastructure and urban constructions, jobs, protected natural area, services for health or education, increase of GDP, renewable energy, modernized regulations, protected monuments, etcetera.

As stated before, the eventual result of a strategy, which depends from continued political will and economic conjuncture, can often only be established a long time after approving the strategy, while at the same time society tends to prioritize short-term assessments. As a consequence, apart from exceptional long-term evaluations most

lessons for strategic planning practice are to be drawn from specific rounds of decision-making. Those lessons concern the effectiveness of a round of decision-making in the light of its potential contribution to the final success of the development strategy.

EFFECTIVE ROUND	SUCCESSFUL STRATEGY
Agreement achieved/approved	Planned Realizations/New Regulations
Subsequent rounds followed	Socio-economic Improvements
Satisfaction about Output	Pride on Outcomes
(Group language) ¹	Convincing Stories

TABLE 3.1 Difference between an effective round and a successful strategy

A basic driver for positive outputs of the specific round and the outcomes of the strategy is the learning effect of the interactions of participants. For the effectiveness of a round of decision-making, continuation of the decision-making in following rounds is essential. This implies that the specific round of decision-making prepares for and nourishes forthcoming rounds, which might concern elaboration, specifying details and /or deciding about new regulations or even institutions.

A round of decision-making can be valued effective in process terms if it is closed with an explicit agreement among the participants about the results. Such an agreement may include agreeing on a set of objectives, a specific concept or preferred scenario, concrete projects as well as an envisaged policy.

The satisfaction of participants can also be regarded as an indicator for an effective round. (Teisman 1998, De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) Although satisfaction depends on individual expectations at the start of participating in the decision-making, an experience of constructive collaboration and respect for a person's contribution may provide a fruitful basis for supporting the next steps. Teisman qualified effectiveness in relation to common interests as the degree of satisfactory results. (Teisman 1998)

The indicators for effectiveness of table 3.1 are assumed to indicate the contribution in an evolutionary step consisting of a decision-making round to a successful strategy. The first two indicators can be established independently, in desk research; the third one, satisfaction being a perception, requires asking actors about their experience. The possible negative influence of developing a group language is reason for not applying group language as an indicator for effectiveness. Developing a language separating the group from not-participants may become a barrier for external communication, which does not support the effectiveness of the process. The second indicator (subsequent round followed) is not a necessity if the agreement was the final positive decision for terminating the process. The second indicator is also not a necessary condition if the previous round appears to contain by hindsight the finalizing

decision about an agreement, thereby terminating the process as a surprise. That may happen thanks to new insights about the issue making continuation of the process redundant. Effective decision-making can also result in achieving agreement to stop a process if for instance a previously established development vision appears still valid. That agreement would confirm the earlier achievement. If a process is stopped because an agreement among actors about future development is impossible or necessary subsequent decisions do not follow, the decision-making round is considered failed.

The above implies that the notion of effectiveness became key to our investigation. Because the qualification of effectiveness is understood in different perspectives, it is relevant to distinguish between different understandings of "effectiveness". The general notion of effectiveness in strategy making might include, depending from different points of view, the following three meanings:

- **Effective making of a strategy as a fast and goal oriented activity: an efficient process**
- **Contributing to the implementation of the strategy: a feasible strategy**
- **A strategy, which' effect is that new perspectives for future development emerged; a creative strategy**

As stressed before, the effectiveness of a process is more than achieving any agreement, independent from the quality of the content of the strategy. Efficiently decision-making solely concentrating on the progress of the process evokes the risk of "negotiated nonsense" (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) Effectiveness of a strategy making process also includes that the specific round of decision-making contributes to the implementation, as a factor of success of the strategy. This concerns the difficult-to-assess eventual success, for which the criteria of the right hand column of table 3.1 would apply. But an effective strategy for future development is also a strategy, which provides perspectives, opening up new possibilities for the wellbeing and prosperity of its population in the long-term. That refers to the innovative effect, expected by EU territorial cohesion policy. (CEC 2004, CEC 2008, Barca 2009)

The third dimension brings us into the realm of spatial planning practice, in which concepts and design of proposals play an important role.

§ 3.5 Concepts and multi-actor setting

Traditionally, spatial planning practice prepares concepts for solutions of problems and designs of plans for developments. We here consider the role of concepts, as aspects of the content in spatial strategy making processes.

Earlier, Zonneveld emphasized the importance of plan-concepts for spatial strategy making (Zonneveld 1991) through analyzing processes and patterns in Dutch spatial planning practice. The application of concepts (or plan-concepts) is an important component of (the relative success of) Dutch spatial development policy: a rich history of ideas and options for possible developments nourished vivid debates on future spatial development of the country. (Zonneveld 1991) National planning in the Netherlands has been characterized as a concepts producing activity. (Van Duinen 2004)

Plan-concepts can be described as presentations of summarized, often integrated sets of ideas in various forms: wordings (metaphor), graphics (emblematic), story lines (causal relations) and scenarios (what if, then that reasoning). More specific sub-concepts can form a kind of defence lines around a broader concept, which enhances the sustainability of the concepts. (Zonneveld 1991) According to him relevant for decision-making on future developments are the cognitive, intentional, communicative, institutional and action aspects of concepts. The basis of the notion of "concept" lies in the verb "to conceive", meaning to create an idea, a (summarized) way of understanding, to imagine. In Hajer's terminology concluding in a concept can be seen as discursive closure in which complex research work is reduced to for instance a visual representation or catchy one-liner. (Hajer 1995) Referring to Popper, he noticed that investigatory practice leads to (diverging) fragmentation whereas story lines, which have similar effects as metaphors, facilitate reduction of discursive complexity and creates possibilities of problem closure. Conceptualization of a story line is a convergent activity; it synthesizes foregoing analytical diverging considerations.

For the definition of the term plan-concept we cite (Zonneveld 1991):

"Spatial plan-concepts express pithy, in words and images, the way in which an actor views his preferred spatial development together with the necessary interventions".⁶

The crisp presentation in wording and/or graphics, emphasizing main characteristics of a possible future situation works as stepping-stones in the process, partly due to the general ambiguity of concepts. As a step in a decision-making process, concepts

⁶

Authors translation

may result in a (provisional) decision, offering room for elaboration into more specific concepts or projects in forthcoming steps.

A concept summarizing a set of considerations into a verbal and/or graphic expression explicates the achievement of foregoing steps and at the same time inspires further elaboration. Since literature suggests similar summarized ways of understanding of graphic concepts, metaphors, story lines and scenarios, these four notions are relevant for the synthetic process towards an agreement.

This wide understanding includes designed graphic concepts as often used in spatial planning and architecture, verbal metaphors, characterizing problem-solution combinations, story lines representing causal-consequence-solutions, and scenarios depicting consecutive steps into a certain direction of development.

The summarizing character of plan-concepts includes necessarily a large degree of ambiguity of concepts. That ambiguity supports the decision-making process for agreeing on a direction of future development if the concept is broad enough for interpretation within the various perspectives of key players and at the same time specific enough to provide direction and focus for elaboration in comprehensive plans and sector plans. The application of concepts, introducing a degree of ambiguity, supports searching for a direction of future development as an explorative activity. A relevant question for effective decision-making with regard to strategic development in European regions is, whether concept production contributes to success in the different planning systems in Europe.

Concepts are outputs as well as tools for decision-making. In planning practice, concepts are both: the result of a decision-making process, as well as a tool for further decision-making, serving as stepping-stones during the process. Such stepping-stones summarize in an understandable way for those involved, the achievements until a specific stage of the process. The concept then offers the starting point for a following step in the process. Generic concepts can be introduced in a specific situation. Then the re-interpretation according to place characteristics, opinions and values colours the decision-making activity. The activity within a next step generally consists of addressing the undesired aspects or elaborating and specifying other aspects of the concept resulting from the previous step.

In order to serve those dynamics of the decision-making process, concepts need to be sufficiently ambiguous. By offering room for multiple interpretations larger groups may support the main lines, providing common ground for further elaboration and specification. If a concept would be considered as a fixed feature during several rounds, the modifications due to re-interpreting its ambiguous content during the following rounds can be mistakenly regarded as a weakness of the concept. (Van Duinen 2004). But a concept recognized and applied as a tool for decision-making makes the

developing content step by step a bit more specific. That explorative activity of trying different interpretations of sketched concepts has been clarified on the small scale in *The Reflective Practitioner*. (Schön 1983) He characterized that activity as a *continuous dialogue with the context, which talks back*.

It concerns explorative activities in an evolutionary process. Gradually evoking new aspects will bring new items to the fore to be considered in successive discussions. That goes for the verbal as well as the graphic representation of a concept. The gradually more specified representation of the developing concept allows for considering unforeseen impacts to be addressed in the following steps.

The application of concepts in the multi-sector decision-making process as considered here, regard for many a way of considering issues, which do not belong to their group think or normal institutional way of seeing reality. (Hajer 1995) Such activity requires an environment of mutual trust in which core values of participants are well respected. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) It includes different framings of issues and opening up minds for different perspectives. Subsequently considering together unconventional views may open new perspectives for the participants and thereby new possibilities to agree on solutions.

Within such circumstances, the content of concepts develops gradually. The inherent ambiguity, which allows for broad support because it can be understood in accordance with different views, includes a dynamic character. Concepts work as a common understanding as long as it is needed for addressing specific issues. New issues emerge during the discourse and the content will shift accordingly, a different concept might emerge. (Van Duinen 2004)

Although generally meant as global indications, as milestones for future development, in communication with people who are not used to be involved in preparing concepts, misunderstandings about the meaning of concepts quite often emerge, possibly creating conflicts hampering the process.

For those, not used to be active in a group considering future development, the unpredictability of the future nourishes their feelings of uncertainty. The expectation that the involved planners will design the plans, which are wrongly expected to be the usual project plans for direct realization similar to blueprints for architectural projects, will enhance those feelings. Interactively creating a concept requires an open explorative attitude. Lay people as well as non-planning experts are generally not used to the degree of openness required for an explorative activity. This not only applies for the involvement of representatives of private stakeholders in society and representatives of non-planning sector institutes, but also for some planning experts specializing in juridical regulating procedures. Also some planning practitioners, who are not confident about the outcomes of open group processes and eager to come

forward with their solutions, give reason to feelings of others of being trapped within a process with precooked solutions. Mistrust may result, hidden agenda's suspected and conflicts may arise, jeopardizing the process towards an agreement.

These phenomena come on top of the often-developing general political struggles about competencies among departments within larger organizations. The differing perspectives and expectations of sectors (Carton 2007) and their experts, resulting in different views on reality (Hajer 1995) and on the role of the sectors with regard to future development, evokes power play and struggles for supremacy.

The required integrated multi-actor approach to the preparation of strategic developments, involving relevant stakeholders requires building mutual trust and needs acting as equals among the other rulers, practicing basics of good governance. It is clear that the required openness for unusual ideas needs careful management of expectations about the process among the participants.

§ 3.6 When to Introduce a Concept?

Introducing a proposal for a draft concept in the start of a decision-making process may be disruptive for the progress. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) Discussing a proposal in the early stages of decision-making, when details are not yet specified and questions cannot yet be answered, may induce feelings of uncertainty among stakeholders: Many of them will be confronted with information, which relevance and content do not relate to their view on reality and which' content seems rather arbitrary. If specific questions are not adequately answered, such feelings of uncertainty will probably grow, possibly even developing into mistrust and suspicion about hidden agenda's. Such situations may lead to institutional strategic behaviour of actors and their organizations (Hajer 1995) and use of obstructive power, (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007) thereby creating obstacles for a constructive explorative team activity.

This means that the moment of introducing a concept is important. Management literature recommends refraining from introducing content related choices (proposals) at the start of decision-making process. Instead a process of content variety towards selection of options is recommended. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) For effective interactive decision-making, concepts providing potential solutions for a problem should not be introduced when there is no demand. When multi sector teams of actors experience difficulties in finding ways out of a dilemma, the demand for nourishing the process with new ideas increases, probably indicating the right moment for introducing a new concept.

Concepts can be introduced or emerge at different moments in decision-making processes, with different consequences:

- At the very start of the process,
- Gradually developing during the process
- At a moment of dilemma or conflict during the process,
- As a result, when formulating conclusions.

In cases in which a design is presented at the very start of a decision-making process as being the solution to the problem as formulated by the initiator, the decision making process is used as a means to convince others of the quality of the specific preconceived solution. The concept is in such cases applied as a communication tool to sell the previously prepared design: as propaganda.

Many participants may feel abruptly confronted with a solution, which seems arbitrary and does not relate to their view on reality and the phase of the process. Reactions will depend from their emotions and rationalization will determine their arguments. Some may react enthusiastically, especially if the proposal addresses their interests in an attractive concept. But other people will react confused or irritated especially if they are not sure about the usefulness of their expected contribution in the process. Representatives of specific interests or other organizations may be even upset because they feel trapped within the frame of the initiators and being used to provide support to a proposal, which is not theirs.

This became clear in a study addressing the question why mapped concepts resulted so often in conflicts. (Carton 2007) That study showed that the different backgrounds and perspectives of those involved in a planning process created different expectations, which were at the basis of strong reactions. The confrontation with mapped solutions resulted often in conflicts because clear choices about some ones field of responsibility or discipline was done by people from a different discipline: not only conflicting frames, but also disregard of other discipline's professional pride are at stake The human emotional factor is apparent: Instead of co-operation on an equal level, such action was perceived as if others usurped in some one else's remit. Mutual trust will be jeopardized.

However introducing a *set of various* options in the start of a process can work out positively. If a multitude of thinkable solutions is presented impartially, and participants recognize that their interests are treated respectfully in one of those options, such opening of a decision-making process may become the start of constructive discussions. This complies with the suggestion to organize decision-making as a process from *content variety towards selection*. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) The different ways in which specific interests are included in different options can then be compared in terms of the advantages and disadvantages of

the various integrated solutions. Ideas for new solutions may emerge. Possibilities beyond sector boundaries can be considered, improvements suggested. The fact that a multitude of options is presented instead of one (single) solution apparently makes the difference.

The emergence of new concepts *during* the process can have a positive effect: the content is gradually prepared by previous actions and discussions within the team. The resulting concepts form the stepping-stones for further actions. Co-producing enhances the perception of teamwork. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) By doing so, a concept is not introduced, but emerges from the deliberations. This may be assumed the best way of developing decisions towards agreement. This is similar to Teisman's finding that the moment of a decision can often not be detected: at a certain moment during discussions a view on the issue had gradually been developed, which was regarded the view of the participants. The "decision" then became the moment of officially confirming what has emerged earlier as the agreement. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008)

Dilemmas and conflicts quite easily emerge during such processes, which address complex issues within an unconventional context for most participants. The introduction of new concepts at the stage of emerging conflicts in the process may help to solve the conflict and relax the situation. That stage of decision-making, after sharing a dilemma may be the appropriate moment for introducing new ideas: "the time is ripe"; there is a demand. By showing one or several different possible solutions, the perspectives of participants may widen-up and unthought-of solutions can be considered.

It is also possible that a new concept emerges as the result of the decision-making at the very end of the process, during the formulation of conclusions. Although this may be positively experienced as the result of co-operation, earlier surfacing of concepts creates the advantages of providing more time to (re) consider, enrich and get used to the result for those involved. (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007) That situation provides participants more time for internalization. With regard to the issue of the moment to introduce a concept there is an apparent tension between time needed for getting used and understanding, which would plead for early introduction versus the disadvantages of too early introducing a concept. That creates strong arguments for early introducing a set of options, like different thinkable scenarios for future development and organizing the process in such a way that new solutions will emerge instead of being proposed.

The emergence of a concept and subsequently gradually confirming its content in an agreement supports shared ownership. Their contributions to the story lines through discussing and considering arguments make actors part owner. The common experience of actors contributing to an agreed set of ideas creates commitment to a concept.

§ 3.7 Decision-making in Different Planning Cultures

As discussed earlier, (§ 2.7) the embedding in administrative environments of decision-making processes about strategic development reflects the basic values and world-views of the society. Since spatial planning strongly developed as a regulative activity, the planning legislation as established in national contexts influenced strongly the various cultures of planning. These different planning traditions as influenced by planning legislation are not restricted to the national level, several European countries devolved planning legislation to sub-nation state level. That happened for instance in Germany, Italy, Belgium and the UK.⁷

That implies that the national level categories of the EU Compendium for Spatial Planning Systems and Policies, (CEC 1997) which aimed to provide a categorisation of European planning traditions, do in fact not justice (anymore) to the reality, which is more complicated than the categorisation in a grouping of four “ideal types” provides. It should also be reminded that the focus during drafting the compendium was on the juridical regulative aspects of the systems. Those four types of traditions or models of European spatial planning together with some distinct characteristics are: (Dühr, Colombe et al. 2010, Nadin and Stead 2012)

- The comprehensive integrative model: *wide scope, coordination, horizontal and vertical integration, mature systems, trust in planning;*
- The land-use management model: *regulation of changes of land use and property, physical development, local level, narrow scope to meet societal provisions like housing and protection of heritage, private sector led planning.*
- The regional economic planning model: *mitigating social and economic disparity, spatial equity at regional scale, public sector oriented, strategies, programmes and economic support.*
- The urbanism model: *design, creation of places, zoning, design codes, building control, dominance of private sector, limited citizen involvement.*

These models are on the one hand necessarily simplifications and the very pure form is not existing in reality: the national planning cultures of countries are mixes of the above characteristics. (Nadin and Stead 2012) On the other hand, as discussed in 2.7 planning cultures also developed during the course of time.

⁷ The use of the term “nation” is not uniform: In the UK Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are called “nations”.

The existing national and regional differences in governing and planning cultures are reflected in the competences and institutional arrangements of agencies involved in decision-making processes for spatial strategies (Dühr, Colombe et al. 2010, Lingua and Servillo 2014, Nadin and Stead 2014, Van den Broeck, Moulaert et al. 2014, Zonneveld and Evers 2014). The different orientations of national planning systems, with different degrees of juridical control mechanisms affect the possibilities for open process architecture and practicing informal process management.

Planning cultures and the education of professional planners mutually influence each other as well as the relation to other experts. The way planners see reality, consider their position among other sector experts and in relation to society will be influenced through the content of the lessons during their training. As a result the perspectives and framings of participants in strategic planning processes differ severely in different places.

The national or regional legislation on spatial planning, specified in regulations, legal procedures and regulative institutions determines institutional competencies and arrangements more specifically. That implies a great variety of the juridical administrative contexts of European cities and regions in which development strategies are to be decided. The related procedural, process and competencies are part of the horizontal planning cultures, as Gullestrup defined them, in contrast with the basic beliefs, world views etcetera of the underlying vertical cultures. (§ 2.7) The different embeddings of the decision-making processes among other sector agencies and other levels of government constitute relevant circumstantial conditions. Each of the agencies and levels of government fosters its competencies and develops its policy and preferences. The more parties have a say in the strategy making, the more complex the administrative embedding of a strategy making process will be. Or in Healey's words: the more complex the relational geography is. It is clear that those planning cultural aspects affect the possibilities for an open exploration of possible and desired strategies for future development severely.

The multi-level embedding can complicate decision-making if different levels develop different political preferences. That applies specifically if the political composition and policy objectives of elected authorities at the higher level, in the cases where they have to approve plans, contrast with the political orientation on the level where strategy making is exercised. The difference between a decision-making process in a context where the higher-level (approving) authority does not agree with the local spatial development objectives and the situation where a higher-level authority stimulates the locally preferred direction of development with concrete incentives is quite extreme. The multi-level planning-cultural embedding of a strategic decision-making process is therefore an important factor for its effectiveness.

The fact that local decision-making processes are always organized within a specific regional and national administrative context makes the aspect of the multi-level embedding relevant for organizing and assessing spatial strategy making. That applies as well for the legal regulations and procedures of a formal context as for the more indirect cultural influences from the planning tradition and education of experts in informal contexts. The categorization in four groupings of the Compendium for Spatial Planning in Europe provides a background with some correspondence with the local planning culture, (Nadin and Stead 2012) but its value is mainly historic. Characterization of the embedding of explorative processes requires regional differentiation and awareness of local peculiarities. The aspects of planning cultures as discussed here underline the importance of considering process aspects in close combination with aspects of the local planning cultural circumstances.

With regard to the importance of openness for successful decision-making (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) we can consider the categories of the Compendium as follow:

- The comprehensive integrative model might be expected to provide the required openness: The wide scope would allow for broad explorative actions. The indicative character of higher-level plan documents stimulates open negotiations about local interpretations and the way of performing and meeting objectives.
- The land-use model is less broad and does hardly stimulate local or regional authorities to explore future development strategies and create new argumentative frames. The private sector and appeal-led character make public decisions about desired futures vulnerable. (Nadin and Stead 2014)
- The regional economic planning model would provide more openness, although the dominance of economic development might set limitations to the integrated character of strategies.
- The urbanism model, focussing on the quality of urban design and the required conformation to often strict rules, does not stimulate open explorations of strategic possibilities, although some regional planning systems include strategy making. (Servillo and Lingua 2014)

Acknowledging that these expectations of degrees of openness refer to the out-dated national categorizations of the Compendium, which was focussed on legal regulations and that our subject concerns strategic planning, these planning cultures in different countries anyhow still influence the possibilities for openness in strategy making processes. The rigidity of higher-level regulations and requirements to conform to specific rules or quantities often poses tensions to local application through not allowing for the openness required for local interpretations in relation to local specificities. At the same time we keep in mind that planning traditions are not static and can be influenced through specific experiences. (§ 2.7)

§ 3.8 Summary, several Rounds needed for Deciding on a Strategy

Chapter 3 considered the making of a strategy as a process of interactions within the perspective of public decision-making. In § 3.1 we confronted the political character of strategies for future development with the juridical-technical character of regulative planning, requiring different mind-sets. That set the scene for strategy making in the complexity of society. In order to arrive at an agreed vision, sectors struggling for hegemony of their vision need to converge and form coalitions. According to Hajer, story lines about future developments are most important for converging into an agreement. Teisman indicated a way forward through his theory of decision-making as a semi-manageable process of subsequent rounds of decision-making. Accordingly we distinguished an effective round of decision-making, for which continuation of the process in subsequent rounds of deciding is essential, from a successful strategy, which eventually performs. Zonneveld (1991) emphasized the important role of plan-concepts, as stepping-stones for deciding about long-term strategic planning, summarizing ideas into a coherent picture or story, often demarcating a round of decision-making. It has been noticed (§ 3.7) that the moment of introducing new concepts within the decision-making process probably influences its success. We concluded that a process in which several options are introduced early and in which new concepts emerge gradually supports the effectiveness of the decision-making process. Effectiveness would result, because developing feelings of co-ownership among the involved actors as discussed in Chapter 2, support continuation into subsequent rounds.

Important complicating factors for decision-making have been discussed in § 3.8 regarding the influence of different planning cultures. Planning cultures have a large, possibly even determining influence on the way decision-making can be organized and the broadness of content aspects, which can be taken into consideration. Planning cultures influence the embedding in networks of competences of decision-making processes and the procedures and thinking of regulative planning, which forms and educates the majority of planners. Although planning traditions are not static and can be influenced by involvement in specific discourses and processes of strategy making, the different planning traditions influence severely the degree of openness of process management as well as of openness to place specificities and innovation. Those considerations confirmed the importance of analysing each decision-making process in combination with the specific conditions in its specific environment. Chapter 2 concluded in the importance of sharing ownership for success in network society. Chapter 3 adds the essential role of planning culture as main variable, influencing the process and the content of a strategy.

Distinguishing between three possible understandings of effectiveness: respectively efficient making of a decision, making an applicable, performing strategy and making of an innovative strategy, this Chapter 3 addressed the aspects of decision-making towards a performing strategy.

However, sound strategy making is more than effectively reaching any agreement. An agreed concept for a future development policy should indicate a promising way forward towards objectives as desired in society. A decision-making process, which is not sufficiently professionally informed and content focused, might result in effectively *agreed nonsense*. Strategy making makes sense when aiming at realizing qualities and values. Moreover a strategic vision aims to identify new possibilities for a promising future for a territory. That implies that effectively deciding is not enough: confirming existing trends through an effective process might deliver undesired situations. Often hidden opportunities and chances in the localities and regions require to be disclosed. Strategy making should be an exploration of possibilities for realizing a desired future. That demands for including creativity in the decision-making process. That is the subject of next Chapter.

4 Strategy making as a creative process

Although effectively reaching an agreement in the network complexity of society is quite an achievement, the content of a strategy requires extra attention in order to avoid the risk of: “the process supersedes the content: no negotiated knowledge, but negotiated nonsense (comes) instead” (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) (164). Strategy making must focus on creating optimal conditions for a societal-desired future to come about. Focussing the process on solving actual problems would be too narrow: a solved problem repairs a defect in the existing situation, which itself may be part of the problem. Deploying the innovative capacity of strategic spatial planning for Europe’s development and the competitiveness of cities and regions like the European Commission expects (CEC 2004, CEC 2008) requires more than effective decision-making, it requires a process of exploring and developing new, innovative possibilities. That draws our attention to future studies and research by design. According to several authors, designing and a design attitude is key to strategy making. (De Jong 1992, De Jonge 2009, Shamiyeh 2010, Van den Broeck 2011) That evokes the question how to organize a societal strategy making process, which stimulates creativity and explores new possibilities. The process from content variety towards selectivity (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) complies with scenario planning as practiced in spatial planning praxis. The essential component of that approach is the generation and comparison of several options. Our assumption is that conducting scenario planning interactively in close collaboration with relevant participating parties would entail the aimed for commitment leading to enhanced co-ownership of the outputs. (Chapter 2)

§ 4.1 considers the possibility-widening exploration according to research-by-design. § 4.2 focuses on design in relation to strategy making. In § 4.3 design and design attitudes are discussed in order to increase the creativity in the process. In § 4.4 we take a closer look to the practice of scenario planning. With regard to the importance of co-producing for sharing ownership of the output, we discuss co-designing scenarios for conceiving a strategy in § 4.5. § 4.6 takes a closer look to visualization as a tool for strategy making. Next, aspects related to participating individuals, experts as well as non-experts and the roles they play in the societal process are discussed in 4.7. This Section frames the strategy making as a process of society in which experts facilitate, serve, nourish and partly guide the actors. Finally, § 4.8 provides conclusions about creative strategy making in preparation of our research frame of Chapter 5.

§ 4.1 Design in spatial planning

Spatial development is a dynamic process consisting of continuous transformations towards the future and spatial development strategies aim to influence the course of those transformations in a direction preferred by society. That implies that society would be able to imagine and agree about specific desired qualities in the future situation, and that the content of strategies for long-term development considers specific qualities for the futures of cities and regions. Although spatial development is largely an evolutionary process, (§ 2.3) influencing the course of development requires continuous re-interpretation of current situations, which resembles continuously re-inventing the identity of cities and regions for facilitating future developments. Our search for effective decision-making should therefore include those explorative actions, searching for possibilities to realize qualitative objectives. As referred to in Chapter 2 the EU Cohesion Policy promotes local and regional strategy making, expecting that unleashing covert endogenous opportunities will contribute to innovation and increased competitiveness of European cities and regions. (CEC 2008) That enhances the importance of place-based policies and place-specific solutions, (Barca 2009) the traditional focus of spatial planning. In this Section we take a closer look at the future and at expanding future possibilities, a claim of research-by-design.

Our knowledge of the future is extremely limited. Our knowledge can be categorized as: (Taleb 2001)

- *Known knowns*, considering possible projections of actual developments to the future. The experience is that such predictions seldom come true.
- *Known unknowns*, consisting of things we are aware of but have little knowledge of
- *Unknown unknowns*, things we do not know that we even do not know.

This emphasises the unpredictability of the future and the limitations to our analytical power. Our analytical power enables predicting trends and variations on trends, but problems develop if the probable developments as expressed in trends do not comply with desired developments of society. New solutions are needed, which require unconventional thinking. Research-by-Design (De Jong 1992) claims that the creativity of design widens our horizon through adding more *possible futures* to the generally assumed collection of possible futures. With regard to a categorization of "collections of futures", *Kleine Methodologie voor Ontwerpend Onderzoek*⁸ (De Jong 1992) distinguishes:

⁸ The Dutch title of this reference translates in English as: Taeke de Jong: *Concise Methodology for Research by Design*

- Possible Futures
- Probable Futures
- Desirable Futures

The collection of *possible futures* contains the *probable futures*, which can be detected on basis of scientific analysis of actual and past developments: trends following known causalities. If *probable futures* would not be regarded possible, they could not be qualified as *probable futures*. Not all *possible futures* are *probable futures*; *Desirable futures* are future situations, as society would wish the future to become. Those *desirable futures* are not necessarily *possible futures*. Desired futures, which are not regarded possible, create a problem including the question if all possibilities are taken into account. *Desirable futures*, which are not *probable futures*, require a dedicated development policy. *Probable futures*, which are not included in the collection of *desirable futures*, create a problem: how to avoid that development?

The explorative activity as meant in this *Concise Methodology for Research by Design* consists of considering the implications of (extreme) different options. Those options are designs, which cannot be evidenced scientifically, but are hypothetical ideas, which can be contemplated with regard to their possibilities and consequences. De Jong locates design next to science. Science explains, predicts and identifies problems evidenced with scientific causalities. Empirical research investigates the *probable futures*; and design is about *possible futures*. (De Jong 2007) Design detects conditions for new possibilities and offers thereby a widening of the collection of possible futures.

According to De Jong, the task of design is exploring the improbable possibilities. He called the core business of design: developing unpredictable possibilities. The predictable components of design are available, delivered by empirical search. Development of science supposes creative imagination. That applies for formulating hypothetical new ideas and also for literally opening–up new perspectives enabled by (designed) new technical tools, which allow looking further or in more detail,⁹ than previously possible.

With regard to spatial strategy making, design extends science from considering exclusively probable futures into possible, imaginable futures. That offers hope in a world of depressing predictions. New possibilities could not be desired or imagined before they were designed. Newly designed possibilities free policy makers and politicians from limiting suppositions about probable futures.

⁹ He refers to designed technical inventions like microscopes; but this also applies for means of communication, travelling, building.

The Reflective Practitioner (Schön 1983) provides a clear insight in the practice of designing, which Schön described as *reflection-in-action*. (Cross 2001) The designer sketches proposed ideas for a solution and tests the consequences. It shows how to act in the messy environment of wicked problems (Rittel and Webber 1973), without an agreed problematic: Reflection-in-action is at once exploratory testing, move testing and hypothesis testing. (147). The activity of spatial designing is typically place-based. The example he elaborates in the *Reflective Practitioner* about locating a school in a specific location shows the moves: projecting a specific solution in the characteristics of the site specifies consequences on which the designer reacts with new proposals. That happens several times until the new situation satisfies all requirements. A kind of design dialogue develops, in which the location “talks back”. He stated that (94.) “Up until now there has been little research available concerning the role of design in the visioning and capacity building processes, despite there being a lot of practice and experience.”

Schön appreciates that (234) “Managers have remained persistently aware of important areas of practice which fall outside the bounds of technical rationality. The awareness of uncertainty, change and uniqueness is important for the art of decision-making in uncertainty.” A problem may be that education is scientific oriented, whereas professionals acting in reality are not rationally problem solving rather than reflecting-in-action.

According to Van den Broeck in *Spatial Design as a Qualitative Strategy for Social-Spatial Transformation*, (Van den Broeck 2011) design is a key activity within a visioning process, imagining possible futures and perspectives, as a practical way to position projects in a wider sphere in order to make them strategic, as the art to materialize and make concrete futures and to create possible realities that can be used as source of learning, discussion, negotiation and implementation. He defines design as:

“The capacity and the artistry to create, to generate, to conceive, to represent, to diagnose, to read and to question possible futures, strategies, actions and projects in a proactive and co-productive way in order to use them for framing, social judgment, negotiation and decision-making. This is done in a collective and individual process, and results in what Healey calls collective sense-making about social -spatial transformations and innovation.” (Van den Broeck 2011)(87)

Design deals with the exploration of realities, the development, representation and exploration of visions, concepts, scenarios, metaphors and stories, the design of policies and processes, solutions, etc., looking for possible “*futures of becomings*” in such a way that exchange of information, interpretation and integration of knowledge of a different kind, and visions are generated.

There is a strong relation with the policy making process: (88) Design confronts values, visions, interests, discussions negotiations and deal with power play.

He continues by saying

“ Design is a powerful tool that should be used as the art of creating and representing possible “ sustainable and qualitative becomings” and operationalizing them into a “collective” and co-productive process, which “integrates” different actors in an equal way.” (89)

With regard to the spatial quality of designs Van den Broeck notices that space is not a neutral consumers good: it autonomously contributes to ordering, shaping and identifying human activities. Therefore, design as a research method starts from the specific characteristics. All spatial developments are situated on a specific physical reality of soil, relief, nature-value, and historic-cultural characteristics, which serve as inspiration for developing specific opportunities. Space is the frame in which social, cultural, economic and ecological artifacts and activities can be integrated, in which their invisible relations can be materialized into a cohesive entity with its own new and individual significance. This strong place related characteristic of spatial design as the professional support and guidance of an evolutionary process, clarifies the fact that spatial design is usually, in contrast with architectural design, not resulting in spectacular new images. Strategic frameworks often consist of a combination of ideas and concepts of which several may have been discussed separately before within the existing context. The value is in the power of the combination in terms of selectivity, location, relations and synergies.

De Jonge’s understanding of the design process is presented in *Landscape Architecture between Politics and Science, An Integrative Perspective on Landscape Planning and Design in Network Society*: (De Jonge 2009) Design is analysis through synthesis (rather than analysis preceding synthesis), and the problem definition and solution are inseparable. Design problems are always “wicked” problems. Moving to the most desired solution occurs through trial-and-error, requiring creative imagination and reflective practice. Thus, in the design process we go through alternating sequences of generating variety and reducing variety, searching for possibilities and evaluating until the result is felt to be satisfactory. That is consistent to the recommendation of policy scientists. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) The activity consists of comparing advantages and disadvantages of alternatives, and searching for synergies and exclusions. The design develops during the process of iteratively reconsidering and improving previous forms of the concept.




FIGURE 4.1 The iterative process of designing

Next to sketching visualized concepts in which *the situation talks back*, as Schön describes, the discussions among actors develop important aspects of group creativity: new ways of seeing, new ideas, unexpected solutions emerge.

The process of designing is a trial-and-error process, trying options, considering consequences and improving earlier design options. This *reflection-in-action* leads from some primarily sketches based on initial assumptions, through a process of enriching modifications, towards a design. Previous steps are starting points for reconsidering the provisional achievements during design processes.

This “*If this, then that*” approach, which is common for design trainings, resembles what happens in laboratory research: options are tested, rejected, modified or refined. It is an exploratory learning process in which facts, values and preferences are considered. That approach fundamentally differs from conventional value-free investigations where a problem is pre-formulated and a research technique is applied in order to analyse the isolated issue and identify the solution. In such investigations analysis precedes synthesis, whereas design can be described as analysis through synthesis. (De Jonge 2009) Different from the problem orientation of conventional analytical sciences, design is solution focused: the core activity of designing is trying-out various thinkable solutions.

During iterative trial-and-error and *if this, then that* discussions, story lines emerge step-by-step. The narratives are built from sets of common concepts and often implicitly agreed causal relations. Story lines relate in a selective manner the various components of a strategy. The concepts include implicit metaphors, which play an essential role as building blocks for common understanding.

Although graphic representations may summarize and stimulate the developing story line well, there is a strong linguistic character to those story lines: it is partly persuasive story telling. (Hajer 1995, Throgmorton 1996)

The: *if this, then that*, causal relations of story lines (Hajer 1995) comply largely with the explorative *trial and error* practice of designing. (Schön 1983, De Jonge 2009)

§ 4.2 Design Attitudes for Creativity in the Process

With regard to process management two principles can be confronted (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) the one in which the process manager focuses on formulating conditions and (fast) consolidation of output versus processes in which process management offers space (for contemplation.) The first principle may result in any decision, without consideration of the quality of the output. The latter, facilitating role interpretation provides the following advantages:

- It supports emerging trust among participants
- May decrease strategic behavior
- Supports the progress of the process
- Content variety at the start
- The manager learns about the participants sensitivities
- It entails a relaxed decision-making environment. (P.130),

With regard to our focus on the quality of the content of the output, the second process manager attitude will allow room for more careful considering the quality of the content of the output.

Distinguishing between a *decision-making attitude* and a *designing attitude* in the book section *Design Matters for Management* (Boland and Collopy 2010) the need for a design attitude is argued for replacing the narrow decision-making attitude. Their argument is that the decision-making attitudes assume that (producing) alternatives is easy and that deciding is difficult, whereas a designing attitude assumes that good alternatives are the difficult challenge and if a good alternative has been designed, deciding will be easy. The decision-making attitude assumes problem solving in a well-established stable situation; which is not the case when looking to the future with its multitudes of uncertainties and “unknowns”.

The decision-making attitude concerns agreeing through applying available information, which will, according to the authors, not entail inventions or extend the collection of possible futures. They referred to the economist Herbert Simon (*The Science of the Artificial*) pleading for educating managers with design training, because they have to act on making a better world.

Shamiyeh points to the managerial practice of problem solving in *Creating Desired Futures, How Design Thinking Innovates Business* (Shamiyeh 2010): Managerial practice of problem solving is fixing a problem, but fixing does not bring the desired situation. When focusing on problem solving, the solver exploits existing capabilities. Knowledge tends to develop around the usual business and increased information helps mainly the efficiency of the actual situation. Therefore Shamiyeh suggests fundamental rethinking and re-making through taking a design attitude instead of working on incremental transformations.

“ Because its goal is to create a set of actions transforming a situation from its current reality to its desired future, design becomes the very essence in today’s strategic business thinking” (10).

Solving a problem is acting in a closed problem/solution space, focusing on optimizing and perfecting the existing situation. Management usually assumes that the alternatives at hand include already the best one, whereas designing is concerned with inventing better ones. Comparing designing with the scientific method Shamiyeh argues that the architect’s approach is not inductive or deductive but abductive¹⁰ Creativity is needed for the creation of a new hypothetical, invented and up to then untested general rule. Generally, deduction provides an explanation of a phenomenon and induction may be synthesizing, but consistent with Popper: the examination of some particulars cannot justify the truth of its generalizations. Since strategy making for the future development of a territory is different from establishing a scientific truth a design cannot be proved or evidenced. Abduction in the sense of trying possible, imagined solutions, supports the search for best fitting concept. Quite freely trying solutions, which do not have to be evidenced earlier, is the core activity. Instead of problem driven this open process is opportunity driven. (Conklin 2005) In contrast with the evolutionary aspects of decision-making, the architectural method of designing could be called revolutionary: starting at more or less extreme ends in order to assess the consequences. The iteration of imagining and assessing, conceiving hypotheses and testing its consequences, can consist of many rounds, comparable with the process of decision-making in rounds as illustrated in figure 3.1. Trial and error develops in the specific round of conceiving a concept during an iterative process, in which each iteration results in a synthesis of the new information into a new, better concept.

¹⁰

Thereby referring to Peirce

That happens in a multitude of rounds, which resemble the process of sketching on paper when designing. That is a process of spiraling towards a concept that is most consistent with the desired future. De Jonge called these iterations *oscillating* between concepts and consequences. In other words:

“Every discourse sequence “shapes” the situation and thereby provides continued feedback that brings forth further considerations that may be taken into account.” (Schön 1983) (77)




FIGURE 4.2 The iterative process “spiral”
[Source: Creating Desired Futures, How Design Thinking Innovates Business (Shamiyeh 2010) (109)]

Hypothesis generation and testing as in abduction, requires liberation from the conventional disciplinary values. The creativity of designing is needed for discovering new possibilities. Traditional reacting with the linearity of induction and deduction plus prescribed techniques and the lack of appreciation of complexity conflicts with the wickedness of design problems. Shamiyeh emphasizes that scientific approaches “do not fit” because of the complexity of interconnectedness, amplifying loops, unintended consequences, trade-offs and conflicts with stakeholders in actual network society. Each formulation of problems corresponds to different contestable problems. Designing, trying various solutions is learning and searching for emerging solutions.

If we intend to identify the desired future for aiming at in a development policy, its characteristics must first be defined through designing, because people do not know what they want, until possibilities are shown. (Shamiyeh 2010)

For including more creativity in the process, De Jonge provided some characteristics of favourable conditions for developing a design dialogue. ¹¹

- Ambition beyond compromise
- Involvement of experts and “professional amateurs”, using imaginative, graphical, verbal, factual narratives language of different rationalities.
- Making design moves, iterating creative imagination and reflective judgment with stakeholders, thereby creating new insights.
- Process providing “free-space dialogue” as a condition for learning and creativity.
- Open-mindedness; participants can connect conceptual ideas to implementation power.

Fundamental openness towards information, persons and opportunities is the general essential precondition for creativity to develop.

In order to encourage those struggling to shape the future Healey (Healey 2007) provided suggestions to planning practice with regard to more openness and creativity in the process.

It is clear that the design attitude, necessary for a creative process in which possibilities are extended beyond initially accepted assumptions, concerns a process organization, which stimulates free out-of-the box thinking away from conventional institutional limitations. The suggested open-mindedness of a design attitude is to be applied when exploring the content aspects of a development strategy: considering probable, possible and desirable futures. It also implies that unnecessary limitations, conditions as coming from different sides should not be accepted as a starting point.

¹¹

Summary of page 209 of De Jonge (2009)

Strategy making as a creative process would imply that several options in the form of concepts or scenarios, which' contents are not limited to actual probabilities are imagined and assessed along requirements for realization. Those requirements are inputs for further improvements.

§ 4.3 Scenario Planning

Here we arrive at the issue of the making of the content of a strategy: how to generate concepts, which inspire and support bringing forward desirable futures? As noticed earlier, policy analysts (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) recommend effective decision-making as a process from content variety towards selectivity. This Section, focussing on the use of options through scenario planning, addresses the question what types of scenarios offer best conditions for effective strategy making?

Collaborative open exploration of opportunities (Conklin 2005), trying solutions in place-specific circumstances is similar to scenario planning. Planning practice widely applies scenario planning as a tool to agree at a common conclusion about a concept or a scenario for future development. Several authors suggest approaches to the content of strategy making by considering different options, using terms like: possible futures (De Jong 2007), possible futures of becomings (Van den Broeck 2011), options (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) scenarios (Lennerts, Dammers et al. , Van Notten, Rotmans et al. 2003, Albrechts 2005, Vogelij 2010, Secchi 2011, Dammers, Van 't Klooster et al. 2013)

The commonly suggested core activity of scenario planning is reasoning from the content variety of considering several options towards the selection of a preferred option. As argued in § 4.3 it is quite unsure that most desired options are already available at the start of the process within the frame of initially assumed possible futures. Not only initial options have to be generated at the start of the strategy making for nourishing the process, but widening the *collection of possible futures* (De Jong 1992) requires creativity and a design attitude in the decision-making process.

Scenarios can be regarded as a specific form of concepts, which emphasize the evolutionary process aspect of future development as well as the story line and causal relations aspect, which is according to Hajer, "the cement of coalitions."

Scenarios concentrate on the dynamics of development, considering consecutive steps in time, whereas concepts focus on a desired (end) situation. That does not exclude that scenario planning can result in an agreed concept.

Scenarios used as a tool for decision-making do, unlike forecasts or prognoses, not seek to predict future events. Instead, the intent is to understand how a number of possible development pathways may produce the future. (Dammers and Evers 2008) As a definition for the notion of scenarios I use the simple definition for a scenario as formulated by UNEP:¹²

“Scenarios are descriptions of... possible futures.”

Many different types of scenarios are included in the above definition; which specific sort of scenarios support strategy making through scenario planning?

Dutch New Worlds, Scenarios in Physical Planning and Design in the Netherlands, 1970-2000, (Salewski 2010) provides a critical overview of experiences with organizing scenario planning and studies in the Netherlands. Salewski’s analysis of those experiences learned that scenarios were not always helpful as a device for planning, prediction, analysis and communication. His account contains negative experiences: the overload of studies and the unreliability of projections.

It is clear that expectations about what scenario studies can deliver should be realistic. Positive expectations may be based on Salewski’s analysis as well:

The option generating capacity of scenario planning enables creation of alternative futures. Analysing what-ifs of different options learns a lot about interdependencies, threats and potentials of alternatives. The narrative quality of scenarios can be attempting. Imagined scenarios help to think of the unthinkable and the unthought-of, especially at the large scale. It can provide a breakthrough for new pathways.

The analysis of Salewski revealed at the same time that expectations about the meaning of scenarios lead to misunderstandings. He noticed that, *“scenario makers and their audience often mistook scenarios as probable, makeable and normative plans”* (420). That stresses the need for managing expectations about the meaning of scenarios in decision-making processes.

In order to streamline scenario making the Dutch government ¹³ document, (Dammers, Van 't Klooster et al. 2013) called (in translation) *Assistance Report for Making Scenarios for the Environment, Nature and Space*¹⁴ aims to support researchers in applying available knowledge, facilitate conducting scenario studies, increase the quality in policy and scientific terms and independency, and to ease co-operation between institutions. The report underlines that scenarios are meant to better manage the complexity and uncertainty connected to strategic policy and to reduce chances on sub-optimal outcomes and failing policies. (16). Scenario studies would increase insights in developments and their effects, discontinuities, policy alternatives and their consequences. The apparently aimed for practical manual ambitions of the report is not achieved, it focuses on researchers. The *research-by-design* and option generating capacity of scenarios are insufficiently addressed; the PBL report states that indeed the role of designing is “less elaborated”. The intent of applying scenarios is to understand how a number of possible development pathways may produce the future. (Dammers and Evers 2008) These pathways are often created by adjusting a limited number of variables within a particular causal-effect chain of events. Such adjusting of some (quantified) variables in a stable environment does usually not bring more than modifications of a projected trend, which remains in the realm of problems being *known knowns*.

These remarks illustrate the policy analysis orientation of (most of the) scenario studies, whereas our search focuses on generating and elaborating strategic spatial development concepts in practice. As has been argued in foregoing Sections, the creativity of designing is needed for strategy making in order to develop strategies beyond the assumed limitations to possibilities. Isolating and quantitatively adjusting a number of variables within a particular causal-effect chain for analyzing the effect will probably not support increasing of possibilities for future development.

The diversity of contemporary types of scenarios as analysed in existing scenario studies with regard to public policy making is large and the resulting multitude of categorizations reflect the diversity of disciplinary perspectives and research questions. According to the publication *Updated Overview of Scenario Typology* (Van Notten, Rotmans et al. 2003) the typology of scenarios gets out dated as the subject of scenario studies develop.

Planning practice searches for place related characteristics and peculiarities for capitalizing on for desired future development.

¹³ PBL, government agency for policy analysis for the environment, nature and the territory

¹⁴ Scenarios Maken voor Milieu, Natuur en Ruimte, Handreiking PBL, 2013

Because of the place-based character of spatial planning and the search for possible future development require focusing on specificities and peculiarities in the local social-economic and physical environment, analytical categorizations of scenarios, based on generalizations have a limited relevance for strategy making. The simple basic distinction made by De Jong (Jong 1992) between a *possible*, *probable* or *desired* future, applied to scenarios, which is in the heart of strategy-making about future development, seems sufficient.

The values, problems and discourses of local or regional society are important inputs for scenario planning in order to make the process relevant for society so that involvement may be expected. The challenge for effective strategy making is to aim value-related considerations not only on “what is”, or “what will probably become” (predictive studies) rather on “what can” (possible futures) and ultimately on “what should” develop (a desired future).

Our foregoing considerations entail some requirements to the character of scenarios in order to support effective decision-making:

Chapter 2, discussing the implications of network society stressed the importance of creating lasting commitment through co-ownership of the outcomes. The need to organize an interactive integrative process of decision-making concluded in the requirement of co-producing a strategy in a collaborative way (Healey 2003). That implies that participants in co-production must trust the process and the involved experts. Too much expert-specific knowledge and methods put non-experts in a drawback position, which may create distrust about the intention of the process and the initiating organization. Therefore the communicative aspect of concepts and scenarios (Zonneveld 1991, Albrechts 2004) is of utmost importance; Introducing quantitative validations and calculating methods in participative processes is often perceived as an attempt to draw lay people within the perspective of the experts. That contrasts with the aim that the participants perceive trust and respect for their values (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) The different options as introduced in the deliberations must be relevant for the participants. That implies that they must recognize their interests and the values, which are subject in the (political) discussions in their locality or in general. Those remarks argue for applying value-based scenarios and against the application of complex quantitative scenarios. But, in order to open-up minds in a creative explorative process, value-related options should not limit the explorative character of searching for new possibilities. Together discovering, inventing or just confirming emerged possible futures would be supportive for feelings of shared ownership of the outcomes. Therefore the open-mindedness of the exploration requires that all thinkable possibilities be considered within practical limitations.

The question remains, which characteristics of scenarios are relevant for scenario planning as a tool for collaborative strategy making? The scenario study *Bridging Gaps in the Scenario World, Linking Stakeholders, Modellers and Policy Makers* (Van Vliet 2011) provides a useful comparisons of types and roles of scenarios and quality in terms of relevance for different groups in society, credibility, legitimacy and creativity. Scenarios as tools for interactive integrated decision-making processes for future development strategy are useful if being relevant, credible and legitimate (Van Vliet 2011) for the various groups of participants while supporting:

- Awareness raising,
- Open-minded, creative search for options, and
- Converging into an agreement.

TYPE OF SCENARIO	Qual/Quant	Sector Experts	Stakeholders	Civic Society	Politicians
Predictive	Quant	X	X	x	x
	Qual	x	x	x	x
Explorative	Quant	X			
	Qual	x	X	X	x
Normative	Qual		X	X	X

TABLE 4.1 Relation between types of scenario and relevance for participants. [Source: Van Vliet 2011]
 X: strong relation; x: relation.

Of the three distinguished types of scenarios: predictive, explorative and normative scenarios the two first ones exist in quantitative as well as qualitative forms. The predictive type of scenarios equals to De Jong’s collection of probable futures. Those scenarios, as prepared by experts can be best applied for providing information, nourishing the process with expected, projected developments. These (trend) analyses help to identifying problems by comparing with desired (normative) scenarios. This would comply with the earlier suggested approach to decision-making in network society: agree first on basic information and continue from content variety towards selectivity. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008). Teisman called such reports at the start of decision-making beacons for inspiration, and visualizers enabling others to see possibilities for scoring. (Teisman 1998) Normative scenarios are about preserving values and transforming situations into new, desired (value based) situations.

The above suggests that collaborative strategy making is best served through applying qualitative explorative scenarios as a tool. The importance of open communicating with stakeholders, civic society and politicians make value based qualitative, explorative scenarios most useful during the diverging explorative core stages of the process. Also, when the process arrives at the converging selection process stages, these scenario properties are helpful. Predictive, explorative and normative scenarios are tools for strategy making relevant within different stages of strategy making:

Trend scenarios, based on scientific scenario studies, considering (quantitatively and qualitatively)) *what will happen*, provide predictions on basis of available data. Although experience learned that predictions never realize, trend studies of experts will help to raise awareness of problems and urgency to take decisions.

These scenarios consider **probable** futures.

- *The start of an explorative decision-making process can be effectively nourished by information coming from trend studies.*

The core of strategy making is mainly an explorative activity, generating options and assessing aspects of different options while gradually searching for a new wished-for option. The option-generating aspect of scenario planning is most valuable and must be supported by an open process organization allowing for group creativity and application of the design attitude.

These scenarios concern **thinkable** futures.

- *Explorative qualitative scenarios addressing the question “what can happen”, trying several integrated options, support effective integrative and participative decision-making and co-designing.
After deliberations, the developing options will become more specific in the way that different values and political preferences can be combined.*
- *Several possible desired futures expressing normative preferences can open-up minds for new perspectives.*
- *Comparing and combining aspects of normative scenarios addressing the question “what should happen” will support emerging concepts for achieving an agreement.*

That can result in emergence of a commonly **desired** future.

§ 4.4 Co-designing Scenarios for Conceiving a Strategy.

This Section considers designing of a development strategy as a group activity. Approaching strategy making as a societal process and acknowledging the importance of co-ownership, strategy making is approached as a process of creatively co-producing. (Chapter 2) As concluded in previous Sections, together making new concepts and scenarios is more than co-producing; it also includes together imagining not before existing coherent story lines about sets of objectives and future structures.

With respect to the making of a strategy for future developments, within the “goal-seeking explorative type of decision-making”, Patsy Healey promotes *Collaborative Planning* (Healey 2003): The decision-making process is organized in broad groups, consisting of stakeholders and experts, directed on producing together a concept or a scenario on which can be agreed, according to accepted data, various perspectives and diverse preferences.

But due to the complexity of network society, this is not a simple activity. Healey formulated that as follows: (Healey 2007)(p182)

“ ... strategy formation does not proceed in an orderly way through specific technical and bureaucratic procedures, it is a messy, back-and-forth process, with multiple layers of contestation and struggle. Strategies emerge from these processes as socially constructed frames, or discourses. ... it is not just about the articulation of strategic ideas, but about persuading and inspiring many different actors, in different positions in a governance landscape, that particular ideas carry power, to generate and to regulate ideas for projects.”

Early experiences with co-producing a strategy in the United States were reported in *Planning through Consensus Building, A new View of the Comprehensive Planning Ideal*. (Innes 1996) Participants moved towards a strategy of action in a qualitative way. They sought shared frameworks for problems and discussed policy ideas, standards, and guidelines in the light of criteria developed within the group. Unanticipated, innovative proposals emerged with nearly unanimous support from the consensus process.

“Partially under influence of communicative and participating planning methods, design approaches have moved on to include more users and stakeholders in the creative negotiation and decision-making process and hence can endow strategic projects with enriched qualitative and inclusive substance by using its creative and eye-opening capacity.” (Van den Broeck 2011)(90)

Van den Broeck sees a strategic plan as the result at a “political” moment, containing a policy, a vision, goals and objectives, action plan and agreement. Spatial projects and actions will be strategic only if they are at the same time the result of a learning process with an open character and a process aiming at the transformation of socio-spatial reality. That requires broad participation in strategy making in a proactive and co-productive way in order to use the resulting strategy for framing, social judgment, negotiation and decision-making. This is according to Van den Broeck done in a collective and individual process, and results in what Healey calls collective sense making about social -spatial transformations and innovation.

Planning is partly convincing storytelling. (Throgmorton 1996) Although the resulting framings can be misused in public participation, commonly building convincing story lines contributes to internalization, group-creativity and common ownership. Group activities consisting of actively compare, assess, reject, correct, select, improve, refine, in short: enriching initial scenarios, implies co-producing a new scenario. Policy science learned not only that presenting several options but also that keeping them open long during the process, will have a de-freezing, relaxing effect on deliberations, which would support the effectiveness of the process of decision-making. (Teisman 2001, De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007)

Co-producing different options seems to be an essential phase in the decision-making process to a common vision. For real co-production the making of the options is the essential activity. Together making a common product creates shared experiences, a shared language and shared insights, condensed in a shared concept with the related story lines. Participants need to develop insights and discover concepts as much as possible together, by themselves: internalization of achievements may lead to ownership. Acknowledging the importance of co-production for co-ownership (Chapter 2), the factors for effective making of options and deciding on a common view constitute the core of our search.

The success of decision-making will be enhanced if the relevant actors expect gains or potential future profits. (Teisman 1998, De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) That suggests that effective co-production implies that each of the contributions of the actors includes some larger or smaller support to their own (institutional) interest as they see it. Analysing and making the different interests explicit provides transparency and will help to relax the interactions. (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007) That information about what drives the other participants also will probably enlarge mutual understanding among the representatives of the different interests.

Stakeholders are to be actively involved not only on the basis of their (partly) overlapping interest and of joint definitions of the situation but also on basis of aiming at together influencing their future situations. It is important for the quality of the process that they will bring different perspectives and relevant specific knowledge. (Albrechts 2004)

It is stressed that transformative processes should not focus upon a result in advance, but that this result should be developed and grow through confrontation of possibilities, values, visions, ambitions and interests. (Van den Broeck 2011). In other words, the common vision preferably emerges during deliberations.

According to Hajer, story-lines rather than interests are the basis of forming coalitions. (Hajer 1995) If the processes consist of together building story lines for options of future development, the “cement” for coalitions around specific strategies will develop. As apparent in many experiences in praxis, co-production is the real challenge for achieving support. (Salewski 2010). The importance of achieving support in network society for agreement on a decision is obvious. Some even stated that “*local ownership is the first ingredient for success.*”(D’ Hondt 2012)

Data, experts and politicians are not automatically trusted as reliable sources of information or guides through complex situations. (§ 2.2) Trust is an essential condition for constructive co-operation. This means that creating trust is an indispensable challenge for stimulating a constructive co-operative attitude. An open process of co-production is a tool for building trust and hopefully support in network society. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) Confidence can be jeopardized if representatives of stakeholders are overwhelmed with expert knowledge from other sectors. But in contrast, participants discovering insights themselves, may change opinions and depart personal or institutional prejudices, mindsets may change.

Strategic planning is not needed for enabling the implementation of the probable development of an established trend. A strategic development vision searches for a novel, promising direction of development, which requires open mindedness and creativity. A creative option generating process requires opening up minds of participants for new perspectives. This does not regard adopting new ideas for all participants, but the openness for ideas, which differ from their own ideas during the start of the collaboration, is essential. The collaboration as meant here consists of what Hajer called the confrontation of *competing realities*, which easily entails a *struggle for hegemony*. The explorative activities aiming at together formulating new story lines as basis of a new concept or scenario, regards the designing of a new coherent vision. Therefore it is relevant to distinguish co-designing as a more specific way of co-producing.

The difference between co-production and co-designing can be related to the output. Co-production is basically together making a well-defined (earlier designed and specified) product, whereas co-designing regards together creating a not earlier existing concept: Designing precedes production.

	CO-DESIGNING	CO-PRODUCING
product	Freely imagined	Predetermined conditions
Plan	Imagined concept	Elaborated concept
Strategy	New unforeseen vision	Presenting a strategy

TABLE 4.2 Difference between co-designing and co-producing

The distinction between co-designing and co-production is not a sharp line as would be required for scientific analysis. The interactions in an integrative approach in the complexity of reality imply that an eye-opening discovery for the one participant may concern basic knowledge for the other. The distinction might be useful on the level of the process. Strictly regulated processes can probably be characterized as co-producing, allowing for less creativity.

Scenario planning preferably not starts with presenting one specific concept but with considering various options for comparison of possibilities and their effects.

Concepts are often presented as the single solution and as a consequence, often understood like an architectural blue print, to be realized. That hardly stimulates actors to further elaboration, nor constructive co-operation; they are confronted with someone else's solution. If one single concept would be proposed in a decision-making process while suggesting influence of the actors, the proposal will probably become target for critical attack and that will in return evoke defensive reactions; not the best start of a process aiming at a common vision. Providing one solution might even create the risk that the whole process is to be restarted, from scratch. (Verbart 2004)

The main goal of presenting initial options is to trigger further exploring and to start a creative search for improvements of those initial options towards an improved and wished-for new common view on the future. The comparison of values and preferences of coalitions as reflected in different options can result in together developing the insight that not all confrontations are conflicts, that less aspects are conflicting and that unforeseen combinations are possible anyway .

Co-designing can start with introducing a set of draft options in an early stage.

Within an explorative approach aiming at creating a new strategy, the initial concepts or scenarios are to be addressed as tools for conceiving iteratively (a) new concept(s) or scenario(s), not as proposals for implementation. The necessary activities: comparing, assessing, rejecting, improving, correcting, refining, in short: enriching of initial concepts or scenarios, constitutes the creative activity towards a commonly desired concept or scenario.

These iterations may require several subsequent sub-rounds of decision-making in diverse groupings. (§ 3.3) Presenting several options instead of a single proposal will support an open, relaxed way of working and an open trustful atmosphere, which is needed for constructive co-operation. (Healey 2003, Albrechts 2005, De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) Presenting openly various options for consideration brings a team into a neutral attitude, because comparing a variety of possibilities implies that choices are up to the participants. By presenting possible solutions in an equal manner, the consequences and impacts of an idea can be considered in order to mitigate negative effects, detect synergies and discover new opportunities.

The interactions are to be oriented on reconciliation, connecting and arranging of different views, since connecting objectives and actors and arranging inter-organizational decision-making are core actions for successful deciding in complex situations. (Teisman 1998)

A contribution to a theoretical basis for co-design is provided by *Landscape Architecture Between Politics and Research*. (De Jonge 2009) She clarifies that design approaches require openness and informality for developing new ideas. Especially option generation demands for openness for other perspectives and the related framings. Sometimes even mental modifications are needed if the existing problem-solution space includes too many restrictions creating impossibilities.

The author (De Jonge 2009) suggests that informal processes help to provide the necessarily widened problem-solution space and facilitate the emergence of new concepts. As part of the method to co-designing she propagates sketching and re-sketching, similar to Schön's description of design as a reflective conversation with the situation, thereby inviting all stakeholders for active involvement in the explorative process. During such a process, impacts and consequences are discussed and improvements to make options acceptable are considered. Contributions of all stakeholders are thus potentially enrichments.

Enthusiasm may develop among participants if a common concept is reached and (almost) every idea is tried in the iterative process of sketching and re-sketching possibilities.

The discussions during the decision-making process address the inherent ambiguity and multi-interpretability of concepts or scenarios. Those discussions about an ambiguous concept focus on partially taking away specific disadvantages, structurally improving the solution and rejecting pre-proposed solution, in order to create a new, improved solution. (Pauly 2001). The process sheds light from various sides, thereby enriching the story lines of the initial concepts or scenarios. The continuous deliberations among participants reveal and clarify what the (often implicit) objectives, preferences and values of the participants are, and will demonstrate that

initial prejudices and solutions are not always serving interests in the best possible way. This process can be deliberately focused on actively “interweaving of goals” and inter-institutional arrangements. (Teisman 1998) Such discussions, which include the confrontations of values, are needed for internalized and sustained agreement. (Hajer 1995).

Elaborating simultaneously various options within differing perspectives and frames contains a form of creative competition, which can be organized through elaboration of specific parts of different options in sub-groups. Teisman qualified creative competition as an innovative way of governing. (Teisman 1997) If the process is really open and consists of creatively exploring possible futures, *research-by-design* can develop and initial sets of *possible futures* will appear to be too limited: The assumed possibilities are restricted by preconceptions and individual or institutional prejudices.

A process of creative interactions, enriching initial concepts during several iterative *what-if, then-that reasoning* rounds, as well as other trial-and-error actions, will generate new options, thereby widening the collection of possible futures. (De Jong 1992) Participants will experience together discovering, inventing, and designing new options, which usually entails excitement about what has been achieved together. Such together making of newly invented coherent concepts or scenarios regards the process of co-designing. The feelings of co-ownership of participants after experiencing such creative processes are probably much stronger than feelings induced by a less intensive co-producing experience. Together designing new options for different possible future developments will make those options to the team of actors’ intellectual property, enhancing feelings of *shared authorship*. Co-producing or co-making something that is not experienced as inventing something new, refers to elaborating or rearranging components into a predefined solution. In contrast, inventing or (co-) designing something new makes participants to co-authors.

We assume here that co-authorship resulting from an experience of co-designing a new strategic concept includes a stronger form of commitment and co-ownership to the achievements than co-producing would entail. That assumption will be considered when assessing cases. The hypothesis is that outputs of processes of co-designing have larger chances to result in successful strategies.

The orientation on decision-making for future development strategies includes an approach from the actual situation towards a future situation. That does not exclude back casting. After agreeing on a desired direction of development, backwards reasoning remains possible and recommendable. Back casting, which starts from an envisaged future situation, is useful in order to identify essential decisions within their time frame, which enable and support the steps towards a wished-for development. Newly generated options will probably nourish further decision-making. The final agreed option consists not necessarily of the representation of a scenario. The direction

of long-term development could also be presented as a concept depicting globally a wished-for situation. But in that case it should be clearly emphasised that it concerns a point at the horizon, depicting a global direction of development and not a blueprint to be implemented.

§ 4.5 Visualization as a tool for strategy making

We have emphasised the importance of visualization when exploring the network society context of decision-making processes (§ 2.6). Especially in spatial planning, mapping is a widely applied tool in quite different practices in the various European planning traditions.(Dühr 2004, Dühr, Colombe et al. 2010) The implicit power of images and representations within design processes may not be underestimated. (Schön 1983) Images and representations can easily be read and understood by people, at least when represented in a communicative way. Therefore concepts are usually summarized in graphic representations together with a crisp characterizing name. (Zonneveld 1991)

Equal to texts, visualization may not be mistaken as full representation of “whole reality”¹⁵. Both means of communication are selective. Texts are based on words and story lines, deliberately chosen in order to convey an argument. The selected wording includes implicit metaphors, which are not neutral. (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2011) Drawings are similarly based on legend units, which are also deliberately selected in order to draw attention to specific phenomena.

Acknowledging that these aspects of media influence the content of the message, both languages are to be applied carefully.

Visualization is a specific language depicting situations, as they exist, as they have been in history, or how they might look like as possible futures. These visualizations always contain a selection of components, which are considered important for conveying a message. The advantage of visualization on maps is that it provides an overview of aspects, whereas texts present ideas in a time sequential order. Overviews on maps depict relations, barriers, networks and patches of relevant functional, imaginative and physical qualities. Such overviews provide useful information about relations and interdependencies for nourishing decision-making processes. Visualized concepts are often used as tools in decision-making processes, also in strategic spatial planning.

¹⁵

Both being necessary reductions of the complex reality.

They may serve as a tool for negotiation and as a concrete frame for agreements. But especially for creative design processes visualizing in the form of drawing sketches and re-sketching in an iterative process of trying imagined solutions (possible futures), oscillating between visualizations of proposals and consequences, is essential. (§ 4.3, 4.4) And the agreed result, the concept emerging from collaborative scenario planning as described in § 4.5 is usually communicated as a visualized summary: as a spatial concept.

With regard to the place-based character of spatial development and the expectations about innovative effects of local/regional development strategies (CEC 2008, Barca 2009) encountering of the local/regional geography is important. Developing knowledge about how the situation came to be, and discovering an “opportunity structure” for spatial strategy making through envisaging relations and developments to eventuate, requires mapping the situation. (Hillier 2011) The “what might happen if ...?” approach, asking questions different from “evidence” explores possibilities for development.

Design and its visualized product, is not only a medium for integration of content but also a way to confront values, visions and interests, to discuss and negotiate, and to deal with power structures. That core activity of strategy making requires discussions, which are often organized around maps. Maps make consequences explicit: ideas for locations of activities are shown in their mutual relation, and maps help to focus discussions on a specific scale level. Modifications may contain improvements resulting from discussions in a spiraling dynamic iteration. (Fig.5)

But the application of maps may also result in problems in multi-disciplinary or multi-cultural processes:

The avoidance of graphics depicting spatial developments during the last stages of the preparation of the European Spatial Development Perspective(CSD 1999), resulted from heavy discussions among planners from the different national ministries. (Faludi and Waterhout 2002) Mapping potentials and possible developments located on maps of the European territory was too specific for the majority of national representatives in 1997. It was finally agreed (1999) to present the ESDP only illustrated with emblems depicting general principles. Place related visualizations of the agreed objectives could not be considered as stepping stone, being input for further discussions.

Also on the local level the explicitness of a graphic image of a concept can develop into a source of conflicts among stakeholders (Carton 2007) Instead of summarized information generated for feeding next steps in the deliberations, the concept is sometimes apparently implicitly understood as a fixed blueprint: not as an option to be considered for further improvement, but as a proposed plan to be realized. In well-organized explorative processes these “conflicts” are the welcome confrontations of different perspectives, being the drivers for further search.

Both ways of considering concepts, as fixed feature or as a source of conflict, do insufficiently acknowledge neither the inherent decision-tool aspect, nor the inherent dynamic quality and ambiguity of a concept's content in planning practice. Regarded within the context of the theory of rounds of decision-making (Teisman 2001) also visualized concepts are tools for decision-making in a specific round aiming at a resulting new concept, for (again being a tool) nourishing a following round, which might be followed by a new round, or (sometimes surprisingly by hindsight) appears to be the final round. In that latter case the last concept becomes the final outcome of the decision-making process.

These experiences in working with visualizations argue for more openness in the process, inviting all participants to express their thoughts not only in wording but also in drawings. Essential is the creation of trust and respect for each disciplinary or national cultures and giving the processes sufficient time to develop. Those responsible for the process must be aware of these risks of different reading of visualized possibilities, which may jeopardize the progress. Expectations should be managed.

§ 4.6 Roles of Actors in Strategy making

The importance of organizing strategy making processes in a way that creativity and (co-) design can become effective and innovations may follow, set requirements to the role interpretation of the different actors. The requirements to planning experts in strategy making assume their role interpretation not as an external observer, analysing what is going on, but as an active participant. Within that role interpretation, planners are serving society through nourishing the process with knowledge, insights and practical moves and tabling ideas, concepts and designs at moments in the process, when participants have a demand. Thus they are facilitators who serve to orient and guide a process of drawing out collective intelligence from the assembly. (Van Alstyne 2010) The balance between serving and guiding is important in order to avoid that the process results in agreed nonsense.

Chapter 2, about the network society environment in which strategy making is to be conducted, made clear that spatial strategies are not the activity of sole planning agencies anymore. Healey speaks about collaborative planning and others about outside-in, actor-relational approached planning in which government plays a marginal role. (Boelens 2010) Although there is a lot of complaint about what might be called the "juridification"¹⁶ of spatial development and the negative

¹⁶

Heavy complaints in various interviews in Bologna, Glasgow and Gröndental

effects of bureaucracy, it may be doubted whether doing without public services and democratically elected councils would improve the situation, especially with regard to the responsibility for long-term development policies. Although others intend to maximize democratic influence through outside in participative deciding, (Boelens 2010, Boonstra and Boelens 2011) here we assumed representative democracy as context for our search.

Collaborative strategy making through interactive co-designing activities implies participation. The broadness of participation is to be decided in local or regional democracy as a social-relational place-based condition. The basis of such decision can be the *relational geography* (§ 2.7) as Healey suggested. With an eye on the effectiveness of the processes and the support in society, we argue for involving all relevant parties as practically can be organized, because information and insights from all relevant angles will enrich the quality of the considerations.

Clarity about the roles and responsibilities of all parties is important for avoiding misunderstandings about possible legal or important administrative conditions. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) As a principle, outputs are proposals, serving the responsible politicians. An open-minded informal approach and a communicative attitude usually widen possibilities beyond those of a formal distant attitude of the responsible politician. A distant attitude might result from his/her fear to be trapped in the disciplinary thinking of the advising experts. In practice responsible politicians are happy with well-prepared alternative proposals for their decisions, which already gained some support in society. (Teisman 1997) The narratives connected to alternative scenarios include proposals for weighing values in different ways. That information helps politicians to consider their standpoints and preferences for making choices. If participation has been broad and open, normative weighing of the alternative scenarios during the strategy making process nourishes the political decision-making, informed by preferences of society.

It is in most cases not fair to require politicians to fully commit to the yet unknown outputs of a process of strategy making. Politicians can commit to the process and defend it, but can not commit to yet unknown results. It is recommended to organize and agree a form of *loose coupling*, (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) in which politicians commit to defend the process and to their willingness to positively consider the outputs on the condition that the process fulfils their explicit (procedural) requirements.

The intention to translate the “preferences of society” cannot easily be realized, because civic society is not a well-defined grouping with homogeneous preferences. Civic society is composed of different groupings with different, often opposing interests. Therefore (political) decisions about a development strategy require selective choosing. That will be no problem if the role of a politician as a selector is respected. A politician

is well served if well-prepared options are made available together with the relevant considerations. (Teisman 1998) The responsible politicians are in a complex situation, having to decide often in conflict with the perception of short-term interests in society, and depending on experts, which have to adhere their scientific disciplinary values. The politician must assume responsibility for the process and defend the process externally, even when the complex and vulnerable process is in a difficult stage ¹⁷ and seems to fail in making progress.¹⁸ In order to allow creative processes, opening –up new *possible futures* to develop, politicians must provide sufficient freedom to move for the process and at the same time he or she must not be committed too early to a specific solution, which would restrict his/her possibilities to take an ultimate decision. The responsible politician still has to play his role in the context of representative democracy as a final selector, especially in those cases where the team of participants does not achieve an agreement.

The (public) audience looks at debates by authorities without distinction between scientists or populists, not choosing for complex arguments but for common sense stemming from personal experience. (Shamiyeh 2010) Therefore, experts, politicians and stakeholders must be aware of effects of using expert language or complex quantifications, analyses and rhetoric communication. Scientific data, complex relations and quantifications as well as the experts presenting ‘facts’ are not automatically trusted. Trust must be gained.(De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) In order to apply understandable language, Healey advises to be “multilingual” and act “streetwise”. Representatives of stakeholders and civic society must be given the opportunity to formulate what their aims for participating in the process are and the process manager should foster the role of connector. (Teisman 1997)

During the activities of strategy making, actors communicate about ideas, preferences consequences etcetera, each within his /her own perspective. During discussions about different considerations mutual understanding will grow and gradually a common language will develop, framing their way of saying and doing in developing crucial story lines. That indicates successful communication in the sense that a common understanding developed, but a risk is that a common language can also exclude those who did not participate. The external communicative value of the output, in the sense of possibilities for simple understandable explications to others is important for ongoing decision-making in subsequent rounds. Besides, it is important to acknowledge that in discussions people use metaphors, which’ meaning and value differ substantially among the various groups and institutions

¹⁷ Which might be the case during essential stages of emerging creative inventions, which are sometimes externally interpreted as conflicts.

¹⁸ Which usually is taken up and sensationally reported in the press.

they represent. (Hajer 1995) These metaphors are strongly related to the framings belonging to their specific institutional or individual reality. In discussions consisting of confrontations of different values like in searching for a common vision, those framings are often conflicting. Since people are hardly aware of the covert metaphors which may determine their convictions (Thibodeau and Boroditsky 2011) process management has to deal with behaviour based on implicit convictions. Openness for different meanings, and transparency in process management would help to master that challenge.

Agreeing on a strategic development vision can result from common choices after a selection between a variety of options and converging towards a common story line, which reflects the values and preferences of different coalitions. Also problems will be identified if consequences of specific developments conflict with ideas about a *desired future*. Dilemmas, which are common for different stakeholders create a base for together searching for solutions. Instead of qualifying a dilemma as a conflict of interests, progress of the process requires to share dilemmas as a common challenge. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) However, full agreement on the results will not always be possible among participants. In those cases the responsible politician has to decide and create a steppingstone for further processes towards implementation.

§ 4.7 Summary, Creative Strategy making

This Chapter 4 took the perspective of strategy making as a creative process aiming at discovering novel directions of development as an essential aspect of strategic planning. Designing and the design attitude are recognized as important for innovation. The Chapter concludes in assuming a way of conceiving a development strategy by co-designing scenarios. Acknowledging that effectively deciding as explored in Chapter 3 does not automatically include the best decision, lead to search for widening possibilities beyond the existing established opinions about what is (im) possible in a local or regional society. We first went to the basic considerations of *research-by-design*, which consider design next to the scientific analytical approaches of induction and deduction. Design offers the possibility to expand the presumed collection of possible futures. (De Jong 1992) In order to increase understanding about what is often perceived as arbitrary output of a black box, we specified design and the design attitude for strategy making. The dynamic process orientation of scenarios nourished the assumption that applying several different options, as explorative tools for decision-making would add to the quality of the content through considering and comparing alternatives. Predictive studies, based on trend analysis may have a useful role in awareness raising of issues at the start of strategy making processes.

But extending the *collection of possible futures* (De Jong 1992) requires scenarios exploring *thinkable futures*, while addressing the question *what would happen if*. Through including designing and a design attitude in scenario planning, possibilities for innovation would increase. That also would enhance the content aspect of the effectiveness of decision-making. Strategy making as a creative process would imply that several options in the form of concepts or scenarios, which contents are not limited to actual probabilities, are imagined and assessed along requirements for realization. Those requirements are inputs for further improvements. Acknowledging the importance of shared ownership in network society implies that co-designing scenarios supports the effectiveness (and success) of decision-making and contributes to the innovative quality of a strategy as well. That would result from converging effects of interactively exploring possibilities for agreeing in a common vision, which increase support because of enhanced commitment and ownership among the involved parties. This collaborative activity of co-designing scenarios for development strategies is understood here under the term scenario planning.

This Chapter further took a closer look to the important tool of visualizations within the interactions and provided in last Section considerations about the roles the different participants, lay people as well as experts, would play in order to increase chances for success and develop design attitudes in the interactions towards a spatial development strategy.

In addition to the importance of creating co-ownership (Chapter 2) and the limitations of steering the strategy making process in several rounds (Chapter 3), this Chapter 4 contributes to our research frame by emphasizing the need to apply a design attitude during strategy making. Scenario planning and visualizing during the process are seen as important tools for effectively co-designing.

Our resulting assumption is that co-designing, implying a more intensive experience than co-producing, will not only entail co-ownership but also the stronger feeling of co-authorship. That would include that co-designing a strategy provides larger chances for lasting commitment to the strategy.

An important issue for our search for success factors is whether different planning cultures enable, support or obstruct those aspects of group creativity during strategy making. That means that planning cultures not only influence the possibilities of openness of management of the decision-making process, but also the openness needed for widening possibilities for desired futures.

5 Research frame

Lessons and suggestion from the three explorative Chapters are merged here into our research frame. Those previous explorations suggest that co-production of a strategy creates co-ownership and commitment contributing to the effectiveness of decision-making. Co-ownership is an expression of a changed mindset, because it includes new cognition as well as a new positioning towards an issue. Moreover we saw that in order to achieve continued commitment, the process and the process management must not only enable, but also stimulate co-design. It is suggested that designing contributes to the innovative quality of the content of a strategy. Our search further focused on identifying process and place characteristics or planning culture aspects, which stimulate creativity and co-design. That requires addressing the questions how a decision-making process is organized so that actors commonly create their vision for future development. The distinction made in 3.2 between an individual strategy making round of decision-making and the long-term strategy is an essential component of our theoretic frame. The far distance in time between the outcomes and the making of a strategy together with apparent irrelevance for society to respect the strategy's long time horizon, makes that a fair evaluation of a long-term strategy is seldom conducted. However, assessing a long-term strategy would provide lessons for future preparation of development strategies. The implications of this Chapter for our main research question: "Which aspects of planning processes and place-related conditions support the effectiveness of strategy making?" (Chapter 1) and for our research methodology are formulated in six more detailed research questions. These research questions address the selection of variables, which are assumed relevant for the study. But acknowledging the close interrelation between factors of context, content and process, the possibility of rival factors for success are not excluded in our analysis. Most variables affecting the effectiveness are expressions of the place-related planning culture. That regards the degree of openness in the management of the decision-making process, as well as the degree of openness towards content related options in the making of the strategy. In order to prepare for the empirical approach, we first considered the importance of openness for an effective round and possibly for a successful strategy in § 5.1. § 5.2 summarized the importance of openness for the process as well as for the issues of the content. § 5.3 regarded the difference between co-production and co-design, whereas in 5.4 their effects on co-ownership and co-authorship are discussed. § 5.5 considers aspects of effectiveness of a round of decision-making and the potential eventual success of a strategy. § 5.6 presents the research questions for empiric exploration in the multi-case study, as elaborated in Chapter 6.

§ 5.1 Openness, Effectiveness and Success

Previous Chapters, exploring influences of network society (Chapter 2), decision-making processes (Chapter 3) and the importance of creativity in strategy making (Chapter 4) provided increased understanding of the interrelation of success factors for strategic vision making. The general presumption is that the differing openness of planning cultures influences the possibilities for strategy making and that the commitment to the output influences its eventual success. We suppose three causal relations, respectively between the openness of the process and the enabling of co-production; co-production and the emergence of co-ownership of the outputs (and commitment to outcomes); and co-ownership resulting in effectiveness of the specific round.

The degree of openness in the various planning cultures is supposed to be a determining variable for the effectiveness of strategy making processes in network society. The openness permitted by different planning cultures, would influence the possibilities of the way strategy making is organized. That varies between the conventional plan preparation by experts in circumstances with a low degree of openness at the one end and freely considering all thinkable options in circumstances of maximal openness. And as argued before, these variables are expected influencing the effectiveness of specific rounds of decision-making as well as the possibilities for eventual success in network conditions, through emerging feelings of ownership. Strategy making within closed circles of planning experts within an existing planning agency, without open communication with sector representatives, politicians and civic society would not be very successful in actual network society.

The exploration of Chapter 4 focused on the importance of creativity in the decision-making process towards a strategic development vision. The strategy making process for a long-term development vision searches for a new desired promising future for a specific territory. A new development vision is not needed for realizing a *probable future*. But for identifying a *desired future* the large degree of openness as practiced in design is required; not starting with inventorying and accepting limitations from various sides. Decision-making applying such a design attitude is expected to entail a degree of co-authorship, which has been assumed important for longer-lasting co-ownership. That means, that on top of the openness of process management, which' entailing transparency is important for creating trust among participants, an extra degree of openness is required related to the issues of the content in order to allow creativity flourish. Chapter 4 suggested co-designing through scenario planning as the way forward for sharing authorship and optimizing chances for a performing strategy. On basis of our explorations, we distinguish respectively: openness of the process management, openness of the issues of the content, co-producing a concept and co-designing scenarios (scenario planning). The assumed interrelations between

shared ownership and expected effectiveness of a round and performance (success) of a strategy are summarized in table 5.1.

OPENNESS	PROCESS	SHARING	EFFECTIVE	SUCCESS
Low	Producing by experts	No/ partly	--	
Openness process	Co-producing a concept	Ownership	+	
Open process and content	Co-designing a concept	Ownership/Authorship	+	+
Open process and content	Co-designing scenarios	Ownership/Authorship	++	++

TABLE 5.1 Supposed effectiveness and success of different degrees of openness

The chances for eventual success of the strategy are estimated higher in cases of co-designing through generating and assessing different options in scenario planning than in cases of co-designing a specific concept.

Acknowledging the limitations for establishing the eventual success of a strategy (Chapter 3) our search focuses on the effectiveness of the specific decision-making round of making the strategy. Therefore, the causality to be analysed empirically for our search in a specific round in a specific case consists of:

Co-producing a Strategy → Co-ownership → Effectiveness

Analysing these relations in specific cases will (or will not) confirm the importance of working together in an open process aiming at shared ownership for the effectiveness of a strategy making round. The specific planning culture in a case influences the openness of the process, creating the transparency supportive for trust among participants. That same planning culture influences also the possibilities for approaching the issues of the content in an open way as well. That openness for exploring new possibilities includes not accepting unnecessary limitations, restrictions or conditions at the start of the process, but allowing the open design attitude in the strategy making process. Therefore it would be good if analysing the co-production in a process, to look at the degree of openness of the content as well as at the applications of options for decision-making. That might result in establishing co-designing in a specific case, with or without scenario planning. Similarly, when establishing the occurrence of co-ownership among participants in a process, the possibility of establishing co-authorship exists if participants express a stronger degree of ownership by pointing to the specific ideas they claim authorship of. In such cases the general wording of co-producing a strategy can be reformulated in the more specific activity of collaboratively co-designing scenarios. Regarding the above causality, the more specific activity of co-designing scenarios would entail co-authorship, being a stronger form of commitment than co-ownership. The collaborative activity of co-designing scenarios has been earlier simpler termed as “scenario planning”. (§ 4.8) In such cases, it might

be possible to establish the probability of a performing strategy, which we qualify successful, along the following causal relations:

Scenario Planning → Co-authorship → Successful Strategy

Analysis of those relations demand for operational definitions of what is considered here as:

- Open process
- Co-production and co-design
- Co-ownership and co-authorship
- Effective decision-making round and eventual success of a strategy

§ 5.2 Open Process

Managing an open process is one of the challenges for effective process management: it widens perspectives of the participants and supports trust among them in the process. Modern governance in strategic planning contrasts with the conventional legal procedures with often, fixed (sector) participants and juridical determined competencies over fixed territories as prescribed in many planning cultures. The resulting bureaucratic fragmented requirements are considered problematic for strategic planning, because they often hamper forward-looking integrated approaches. More open approaches are needed for effective decision-making, whereby trust among participants is a basic precondition.

On top, openness is assumed to be an important condition for emerging creativity in groups: openness to ideas from all sides, impartial presentation of various options and minimal limitations for argued modifications of proposals. Policy science emphasized openness as essential factor for the success of decision-making. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) Accordingly we assumed open decision-making processes a core condition for creative co-designing of a commonly supported result. That would support the capability of interactively considering thinkable concepts or scenarios in order to open eyes of people for new views and to offer previously non-envisaged perspectives, so that prejudices and single solution-attitudes can be doubted and left aside. This implies influencing mental maps, which is a sensitive and vulnerable process needing further informal openness and trust among participants. In practice, complete openness of process management is quite impossible. Not only limitations set by legal regulations or resulting from the culture of planning, but also practical conditions will limit the possibilities for openness. Establishing the degree of openness

of concrete processes in successful cases of strategic decision-making will provide insight in the influence of openness on possibilities of co-design.

The openness of processes is here considered in relation to the organization of discussing the content of strategy making and the participation of actors. Organizational out-lines of decision-making processes are considered “open” if the following expectations are reasonably met: (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008)

- **Agenda setting is open**
- **The process has an informal character**
- **The process is objective oriented**
- **Participation is broad and flexible**

Open agenda setting includes that neither predefined problem definition is applied at the start, or proposals for a solution. The issues under consideration may derive from considerations and ideas of all the participants.

Besides, open agenda setting and flexible participation relaxes the group dynamics: participants are not forced in the perspective of initiators presenting their proposal, but are invited to help exploring possibilities for the future of their region and for expressing their preferences.

A complete open and informal start of a decision-making process however, will create uncertainty and fuzziness among participants. Policy sciences recommend (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) making the process architecture an explicit issue of discussion and agreeing on the organization among the participants in the very start of the process. Of equal importance is initial clarity about responsibilities and roles in the process, thereby of course taking account of legal requirements and competencies.

Openness as a requirement for a constructive exploring attitude demands for an informal non-legalistic managerial atmosphere. Informal process management will stimulate thinking beyond the conventional social and cognitive classifications and categorizations. An informal organization supporting open exploration of options and out of the box thinking, will probably offer optimal circumstances for developing new views.

The decision-making process aims to build agreements about a vision for future developments and not primarily at fulfilling juridical requirements. The process is not competence or procedural focused; exploration of the issues is guiding, not legal procedures or official competencies. (Healey 2003, Albrechts 2004, Salewski 2010). Discovering common interests in the future development and together building of a set of objectives, which are located in the territory composing a vision for future development is the aim.

Flexible participation to the process means that the represented interests of society may switch according to the issues at stake, and the territory under consideration. The territory is functionally defined according to important relations and flows, (functional areas) not primarily following administrative borders. Un-envisaged representatives of sectors or other stakeholders can join, as well as representatives of territories beyond the initiating authorities boundaries (Almendinger and Haughton 2008), if needed with regard to relevant functional relations. (Practical limitations to the amount of participants apply however)

Another aspect of openness and the balance between informal and formal decision-making is that the results of informal decision-making must be fixed in formal approvals within the appropriate democratic elected councils. Although openness requires possibilities for flexible reconsiderations, progress on the road to implementation requires also regularly fixation of achievements. The clarity about the responsibility of certain elected bodies in the local or regional administrative context is another aspect to be formally established at the start of a decision-making process; decision-making as meant in this study is not final. The group of participants decides about the agreement, which they will submit for approval by the appropriate council.

Co-producing requires an adapted role of experts (Sehested 2009, Sehested and Groth 2012, Albrechts 2013). Co-designing needing more openness towards other options requires even more adaptation. The individual interpretation of the way experts fulfil their roles, influences the degree of openness. Their role interpretation depends from the national/regional planning tradition, with the related formal juridical procedures and other regulations as well as from the planning education. Less strict regulative and more informal planning systems might be supposed to offer better conditions for openness than strong juridical articulated systems. Problems with too strictly juridical regulating spatial development are perceived in the confrontation of rules based on generic categorizations with the reality of specific local circumstances. (Nadin and Stead 2014, Van den Broeck, Moulaert et al. 2014) (Lingua and Servillo 2014, Zonneveld and Evers 2014) That implies that planning systems, which allow more room for interpretation of the general rules towards the concrete local specificities, would create less problems and better place-related development. That would include that planning cultures, which are mainly indicative from above offer better chances for performing that strict juridical focused systems.

The learning effects of previous experiences of planners within similar projects or processes will also influence the degree of openness towards governance and new process requirements. It might be supposed that those earlier experiences provided useful lessons, which support effective participation.

Chapter 4, arguing for co-designing in explorative scenario planning in order to develop concepts or scenarios for strategies aiming at desired futures, implies the following expectations about the attitudes and roles of planning experts.

- **Openness to any ideas from all sides**
- **Facilitating the process**
- **Nourishing the deliberations with knowledge and ideas**
- **Connecting horizontally and vertically, between disciplines and politics and between representatives of layers of government.**

These attitudes of experts would allow for openness to local specificities. Co-producing and co-designing demand a plurality of different attitudes of planning experts, towards other sector experts, stakeholders and civic society. These attitudes may concern partly facilitating, partly mediating, partly guiding. Co-ownership requires internalization of concepts by the actors, therefore actors need to develop insights and discover concepts by themselves. Planning experts can support developing insights and discovering concepts by facilitating exploration through designing possibilities, presenting data if requested, assess ideas if needed, point to consequences when relevant, estimate impacts if requested, sketch solutions during dilemmas.

Although their expertise and experience will often urge them to intervene in certain stages of the discussions, stimulating co-ownership requires a reserved attitude of planning experts. But at the same time, the demand for professionalism of planners increases due to the many requirements of interacting in network society. Facilitating the process requires planners at certain crucial moments to summarize results verbally and visually in new concepts, metaphors, story lines or scenarios, detect possible synergies, optimize solutions, show remote impacts, sketch attractive environments and possibilities to increase efficient functioning of systems.

Acknowledging that institutions are often part of the problem, (Teisman 1997, Rotmans 2006, De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007) the specific individual activities of their representatives (partly being the experts) are important factors for effective decision-making. These factors not only influence horizontal co-operation with other sectors, but also co-operation between tiers of government. In such cases, not only aspects of the content or possible different political orientations nourish the discussions but also individual opinions of higher level bureaucrats fostering possibly the ways of seeing, which were valid at the moment in the past that their institute was established. In last case the power of a higher, approving authority enhances the *struggle for hegemony* (Hajer 1995) Such aspects of the multi-level embedding may be decisive for the possible openness of the process and the effectiveness of strategy making.

The attitude of the participating actors influenced by their personal interpretation of their role as representative of institutions in the national legal/institutional framework affect the possible openness of the process and of the explorative actions, both assumed essential conditions for co-design.

Also the confidence of individuals representing civil society towards authorities and experts is important. Planning experts must build trust in the interactions with all those participants in strategy making. Trust can mainly be earned in real transparent, open processes.

But the role planners can play in specific situations largely depends on the relation to the responsible elected politician(s). The balance they exercise between taking political responsibility and room for developing an open process is quite delicate. Expertise and leadership would both flourish without unnecessary limiting the openness, but commitment to the process of the politicians is a condition. Therefore loose coupling so that the process is secured if specific procedural conditions are fulfilled is necessary and the politicians offer the perspective of positively considering the output of the process.

§ 5.3 Co-production and Co-design

Chapter 2, discussing the influence of network society on public decision-making argued that co-producing a strategy is a condition for an integrated approach creating the necessary co-ownership of the output. The challenge to the strategy making process is to converge the different opinions as much as possible for proposing the output as decisions of the responsible politicians.

Here we consider co-producing in contrast to co-designing as a process of making, according to predetermined requirements and conditions. Participation in such processes, experiencing the emergence of solutions provides important learning effects. That does not only produce satisfaction about common achievements, but can create also pride about and feelings of ownership of the achievements. The following simple indicator defines co-production:

- **All participants contribute to the output**

The distinction between co-production and co-design (Table 4.2) consisting of together making a partly determined concept versus together inventing new options is important for the effectiveness of strategy making. It has been assumed that co-ownership resulting of co-production is more vulnerable to evaporation in later rounds of decision-making than the commitment of a co-authored concept.

Co-designing is understood as together making a (relative) new concept or scenario through a process of generating and assessing options, which results in together inventing something not existing before. The iteration of generating and assessing possibilities is essential for designing. The process of synchronically iterating corrections and assessments among several solutions gradually produces insights and story lines, but also clear views about desired qualities of the actors. Group-creativity is expected to result from together exploring new opportunities in an open process developing non-envisaged options.

Indicators defining the occurrence of co-designing are:

- **Any idea, coming from different backgrounds is considered and tried for its potentials and implications;**
- **New ideas emerge during considerations and sketching;**
- **Non-envisaged (combinations of) options (scenarios) or new synergies develop or are discovered.**

Any idea is welcomed in the process as a contribution enriching the content. Issues coming from the different perspectives and framings are considered equally. (Healey 2003), Respectfully considering thoughts as possibly relevant for the future, not only supports the required openness, but also may develop as promising concept when considered in different framings. The various perspectives are enriching sources of inspiration. Chapter 4 further concluded that scenario planning as a specific form of co-designing, consisting of generating and considering several optional scenarios, creates a more neutral (open) attitude than proposing a single concept. Neutral, impartial considerations and comparisons of several alternative possible futures in team discussion support relaxed, trustful interactions among participants. Processes, which compare different options like considering alternative concepts and scenarios, are expected to enhance and further facilitate openness for new ideas allowing and stimulating creativity.

Application of scenarios is defined as participants interactively iterate options according to the following indicators: (§ 4.5)

- **Diverging through generating, creating, designing a visualized set of concepts for scenarios of possible desired futures.**
- **Comparing and assessing the consequences and impacts of different optional scenarios through several rounds of improvements**
- **Converging through selecting and agreeing on a commonly preferred future summarized in a visualized concept or scenario.**

In order to nourish the start of strategy making options are to be generated. The advantages of scenario thinking were explained in 4.4. Essential is that several options are compared, that the options are qualitative and value based, and in order to

be relevant for society, relate to issues in the city or region. Start options for scenarios are preferably generated together, but for stimulating a fast start of discussions, planning experts tabling several possible options in an impartial way and explained neutrally as possibilities, will evoke the needed reactions.

As described in § 4.5 during deliberations about scenarios ideas emerge and can be summarized in new scenarios, based on various underlying values. (Teisman 1998, Salewski 2010) Starting question to participating stakeholders is comparable to: “how do you like the future of the territory to be (-come) in for instance 30 years?” (This would include all relevant economic, social, environmental aspects)

An approach inspired by scenario planning seems most promising thanks to its impartial openness, explorative character and option generating capacity. For constructive exploring solutions, options are preferably considered through the lens of: “what is to be modified to make it acceptable?” (Teisman 1997) By considering the various options, comparing advantages and disadvantages, the activities consist of trial-and-error like, assessing, rejecting, improving, correcting, selecting. (Schön 1983, De Jonge 2009) In short, this regards the deliberate emergence of new options and story lines while aiming at a commonly preferred scenario. During co-designing a development vision, often a new non-tangible (verbal metaphor) or tangible (mapped) structure emerges, which brings coherence among existing loose ideas or projects.

In society discussions about developments often take the course of choosing between functions and projects as if the higher degree of complexity of combinations excludes conjuncture. Design often produces new options and may extend the imagination about possible and desirable futures. Similarly in processes of co-designing participants encounter more possibilities of combinations and potential synergies. Such experiences contain important learning effects.

Visualizations on maps play an important role: they summarize scenarios or concepts in an overview showing relations between components and consequences of locating functions within the topography, thereby depicting problems as well as solutions. In the process as assumed here the group of actors builds it's wished-for future development vision step by step by noting on maps spatial effects of ideas as expressed in the group and by sketching impacts and re-sketching possible solutions. The summarized discussions presented as visualized overviews provide an over-all integrated view, usually showing non-envisaged combinations of components.

The emergence of a common language and metaphors during periods of intensive and lasting co-operation is an indicator of the emergence of common understanding. A risk is that the specific way of expressing and viewing reality, comparable to *group-think*, creates a barrier for external communication of the achievements in later steps of the process.

§ 5.4 Co-ownership and Co-authorship

Co-ownership was identified in Chapter 2 as important factor for success of integrated planning in network society. Sharing information, knowledge and insights resulting from co-production would entail shared ownership. Shared ownership of the output of a decision-making process is considered essential for the effectiveness of a strategy making round and the eventual success of a strategy. In *Territory, Integration and Spatial Planning*, Healey (2006) qualifies co-ownership as the ultimate form of integration. She described co-ownership as developing a shared commitment to the content and legitimacy of a plan or a strategy. Co-ownership as used here, implies sharing the set of core values of the strategy¹⁹, and story lines, which determine the agreed direction of development. The feeling of co-owning will probably not be equal among all stakeholders. Co-ownership implies forms of commitment to the achievement.

The common experience of an effective process of co-designing, which includes together inventing or discovering something new, is expected to create feelings of co-authorship. The commitment entailing co-authorship is assumed stronger and lasting longer than the commitment resulting of feelings of mere ownership. This study does not cover the different psychological effects between co-owning and being co-author, but it is quite obvious that for instance just possessing a house or a book creates a lesser degree of commitment than owning a self-designed house or self-authored book. The assumption is that being co-author of the content, together with the common experience of co-designing, results in a stronger degree of longer-lasting commitment to the content and the process.

Indications for co-ownership are:

- **Pride about the process and the outcomes among participants;**
- **(Defensive) explanation of the content to outsiders (especially by others than the responsible initiators);**

On top, co-authorship is indicated if:

- **Participants take credit for personal contributions to the results.**

Because we assumed that the effectiveness of strategy making depends on broad support in society based on the shared ownership of results, we consider the effectiveness of strategy making as a dependent process variable of the occurrence of co-ownership and of the stronger form of commitment entailing co-authorship.

¹⁹

Which does not necessarily require sharing basic values and convictions of the actors.

Being one of the producers of a positive achievement may create pride. In interviews feelings of pride can be detected, by direct as well as indirect questioning about the interviewee's relation to the strategy.

In contact with not-involved persons a co-owner of ideas is in the position to explain his understanding of the content and the process. Critical remarks will be responded in an explanatory or defensive reaction. That officials or other persons responsible for the process will explain or defend the outcomes is quite obvious. Therefore, most interesting are the reactions of other participants.

Taking credit: *"this and this were my ideas, I was the first to propose this solution"* and similar expressions are clear indicators for feelings of a stronger form of ownership. Taking credit for specific items or the strategy as a whole indicates feelings of intellectual proprietorship. Taking credit for (components of) the strategy is a clear indicator for feelings of authorship.

The occurrence of co-authorship can be established through inside information coming from interviews revealing especially the extent and fierce of taking credit.

§ 5.5 Effective Decision-making Round and a Successful Strategy

In § 3.4 a clear distinction has been made between a single round in the multi-rounds strategy making process and an ultimately successful strategy. Literature suggested indicators for an effective round. (Teisman 1998, Teisman 2000, De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) Although "effectiveness" resembles the process aspect of "efficiency", the content of a strategy as a contribution to a desired future situation, is an equal component of effectiveness.

The realization on the ground of projects is deliberately not included in our definition of effectiveness of a decision-making round. Although realizing envisaged projects would be a most clear indicator for successful planning, the following arguments are decisive for not applying this as a component of the definition for effectiveness:

- According to Teismans "rounds" model of strategic decision-making in complex situations is it almost impossible to predict which round will be the final one for deciding about investments.
- The period of time between deciding about a strategy and the realization of projects does not fully depend on the quality of the decision-making about the strategy. Probably more determining influence comes from factors like the economic

conjuncture, the climate for investments and the time needed for legal procedures connected to spatial planning, building and environment.

- Not all strategic developments regard investing in constructions or infrastructure: also doing nothing or the conservation of landscape and monuments can be essential components of a development vision.

Decision-making process rounds are considered here as non-effective, if they did not result in an agreement among the participants, or no next round followed although the process required further elaborative decision-making. A non-effective process round stopped with a dilemma or conflict, without an agreed concluding vision. A round of decision-making, which decided to terminate the strategy making process, for instance because there is no reason for making a strategy anymore, is not necessarily to be qualified as a failed round. The category of non-effective process cases is relevant for learning about aspects hampering the effectiveness of a round of decision-making

A *round* of decision-making is here defined as effective if the following criteria are met:

- **The participants achieved an agreement, which was approved in an official decision.**
- **The specific round of decision-making was followed by another round of further decision-making;**
- **The results satisfied the project leader and principal. The other (than spatial planning sector) participants and the private and company representatives, characterize the result at least as neutral.**

The achieved agreement may include decisions about an important new common vision on future development, which' mainlines can be summarized in a scenario or concept for a strategy, completed with the related story lines and which is visualized. The approval of an elected council of the output may be regarded as content related reality check, although political support is no guarantee for professional quality. The decision can also consist of the termination of the process, because no further decision-making towards implementation is needed.

But in other cases, an important aspect of effectiveness is that the process continues and another round of deliberations follows. This supposes that the specific round of decision-making nourishes the start of new discussions possibly with other stakeholders and a new framing of the issue within the problem, policy or politics streams.(Teisman 2000)

It is also important that satisfaction exists among the participants. Several authors connect satisfaction directly to the effectiveness of decision-making. (Teisman 1998, De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007) This includes not only happiness with the result, but also with the learning effect of new insights about possible solutions for own or others interests, as well as better understanding of the different frames and positions

within the societal context. It is clear that the above aspects of effectiveness are mutually connected.

The fact that it is possible that some participants remain not satisfied reflects the reality that not every agreed decision can fully compromise on all interest. The notion of being not satisfied about the results can be related to different expectations about the aim of the process.

A successful strategic decision-making process is a process producing a development strategy, which eventually succeeded in meeting most of the envisaged goals. Support, necessary for the eventual success of a strategy, depends on the commitment of key actors. This not only applies for the specific process and results of the strategy-making round, but also for sustained support in subsequent rounds, which requires continued and maintained appreciation of the contribution of earlier strategy making rounds. Sustained commitment and consistency regarding the core values and main lines of development during long periods in which economic conjuncture, political powers, political correct opinions and fashions change, is a main challenge to strategic planning.

As noticed earlier, the success of strategy making can usually only be established after a long period of time since the specific round of decision-making in which a strategy was agreed and approved. That large distance in time does seldom comply with the impatient demand for fast clarity from society.

The eventual success of a strategy includes that relevant parties were almost continuously committed to the strategy during the long period for elaborating and implementing the strategy. That also implies a combination of flexibility and consistency with the main lines of the vision underlying the strategy, during successive elaborative and specifying decision-making rounds.

A successful strategy influenced reality in (a combination of) four possible ways:

- **Envisaged concrete (non-) physical projects are realised,**
- **Socio-economic improvements are implemented**
- **Organizations or regulations are modernized**
- **Learning processes brought new insights and better understanding in society**

Although the above indicators are important to be established for fairly assessing the success of a larger policy process, due to the dynamics in society and the usual long-term orientation of development strategies, establishing direct effects of a strategy on the course of development is quite impossible. That is related to the indirect influences from learning in society on how society is organized. That learning effect may be the most influential impact of a strategy making process. The more direct effect

of an agreed strategy is that it provides main objectives and an orientation for further decisions. It is a framework of agreed objectives and values to be pursued, providing an argumentative discursive frame for future policy making. (Hajer 1995) But making progress towards a point of orientation may also induce arguments for correcting the course of development as foreseen in the strategy, because unforeseen phenomena developed or minor items developed into major problems. That refers to the discussion about transformative powers of a strategy (Albrechts 2004, Van den Broeck 2011) and the performance of a strategy. (Salet and Faludi 2000) Like plan concepts playing a guiding role during a period will develop during their life (Van Duinen 2004) scenarios forming the basis of a strategy will also be valid as long as the underlying desired future requires political steering.

Although these challenges touch upon the limits of possibilities for effective policymaking, values like *efficient functioning of cities and regions, healthy, sustainable and attractive environments* and a *competitive, innovative economy* or, as Healey (2007) puts it: *distributive justice, environmental well-being and economic vitality* require as good as possible preparation of long-term development policies.

§ 5.6 Research Questions

Our research frame is based on the explorations of preceding Chapters and on experience in strategy making processes. The theoretic considerations lead to the following hypothetical assumptions, which prepare for research questions:

- Co-ownership of the content of a decision, as well as of the process is essential for effective strategy making; it entails commitment to the output.
- The occurrence of feelings of co-ownership depends on forms of co-production.
- Co-designing is a stronger form than co-producing concerning non-predefined, new solutions of which actors can share authorship, which is supposed a stronger form of ownership, entailing stronger, longer lasting commitment to the outputs.
- Organizing a process of co-designing requires governance through open process management as well as openness to place specificities. Co-designing, the ultimate form of open process conducting towards a common vision through exploring several options for *thinkable futures* is called here scenario planning. Co-designing a *desired future* through scenario planning consists of moving from content variety to selectivity.
- Visualization of issues, ideas, proposals and scenarios is an important tool for supporting effective decision-making

The research approach, based on the theoretic frame aims to detect the relation between the effectiveness of decision-making processes, the degree of co-ownership and the degree of co-designing a spatial development vision within a specific process round in concrete cases within their specific concrete context. The relations between the process aspects openness, co-production and co-ownership are here assumed as causal relations leading to the effectiveness of a round of decision-making. But not as a simple linear relation: an open attitude in the process will help sharing feelings of ownership, but at the same time co-designing during scenario planning will enhance the openness of the process as well as the feelings of ownership, because actors become co-authors.

The planning cultures determining the possible openness of process management as well as the width of the perspectives of options which may be taken into consideration, are important variables; context, process and content are intensively interrelated and cannot be considered separately.




FIGURE 5.1 Context, process and content are co-constituted

The definitions and clarifications of those process aspects as presented in this Chapter are applied as conceptual tools for empirically testing the causalities of 5.1 between these aspects of the decision-making process and the effectiveness of a specific round of decision-making. An essential notion is the degree of commitment, as induced by shared ownership or shared authorship, which supports during longer periods the continuation of the process and the flexible application of the argumentative frame behind the strategy

Assuming co-designing essential for stimulating enhanced co-ownership, interesting questions are whether and in which specific way co-designing is conducted in specific cases. We expect extra positive influences on commitment to the output of synchronically exploring possibilities of several options (possible futures) through scenario planning. Scenario planning can be regarded as a specific spatial planning interpretation of open agenda setting in combination with deciding as a process from content variety towards selectivity. That open process would not only entail sharing ownership, but also feelings of intellectual property, which enhances commitment.

As can be learned from the explorative Chapters 2, 3 and 4, commitment to outputs as a factor for support in society is essential for effectiveness of decision-making in the topical complex circumstances of network society.

Our thesis is that open process management as such is not sufficient for lasting commitment. Open process management and the related transparency as such do not secure the degree of openness of the content as required for a creative explorative process. If the planning culture requires conformation to specific concepts and strict rules, unforeseen place-specific opportunities remain outside the scope and will not be addressed. It is also possible that in transparent open processes planning experts are involved, which' education does not stimulate creatively trying solutions and opportunities and abduction of new concepts, like discussed in Chapter 4. Although co-production will create forms of co-ownership of the output, co-designing in the form of scenario planning will create stronger forms of commitment through sharing authorship.

The vulnerability of the performance of long-term spatial strategies would require perseverance combined with flexibility and adaptability aiming at desired outcomes, rather than output. Next to the differences between co-production and collaboration (§ 2.5, table 2.3) implying the distinction of output and outcome, the difference between co-production and co-designing (§ 4.5, table 4.2) implying creativity in the process, is relevant.

Collaboratively co-designing scenarios for a future development strategy, focused on meeting long-term objectives, in short:

scenario planning is assumed the effective approach.

Therefore also the following causal relations as supposedly resulting in an eventual performing strategy are looked for, if we can detect scenario planning and co-authorship in specific cases.

Scenario Planning → Co-authorship → Stronger Commitment

The circumstances as condensed in planning cultures, in which decision-making processes are conducted influence the interactions of the participants including the causalities we assumed. The possibilities of effectively co-designing depend partly on personal convictions, worldviews and capabilities of participants, which are influenced by their professional education, the legal planning system and the distribution of competencies. That implies that influences to the process may come from the external context in which a process is located as well as from specific conditions within the location.

The Process as Multi-rounds Decision-making (figure 3.1) depicted the process as the different steps, which' number cannot be predicted according the *rounds of decision-making* of Teisman. The context of that process influences the progress of the subsequent rounds and content of the decisions. Therefore the figure distinguished between the overall context consisting of institutions and regulations, from the location context, consisting of place related social, economic, cultural and political peculiarities.

Aspects of the *location context* are:

- The complexity of the planning issues in terms of number of involved stakeholders and size of cities/region.
- The complexity of the co-operation in terms of the number of co-operating municipalities and degree of public participation.
- The composition of the participating representatives of stakeholders in terms of individuals with relevant experiences and the continuity of their involvement.
- The involvement of politicians.

Aspects of the *wider context* are:

- The national/regional planning legislation
- The administrative embedding of the process
- The education of experts




FIGURE 5.2 (Same as figure 3.1) Context influencing rounds of decision-making

In some cases the process management cannot influence the composition of the participating group or the way the involvement of the politician will be arranged, in other cases they can. The broadness and intensity of public participation is also location related. The degree of (co-) deciding as meant in the ladder of Arnstein is a political decision to be made explicitly at the start of strategy making processes. We suspect that the overall context influences the process in a more indirect way: legal system, procedures and education would influence the attitude of experts affecting the possibilities of openness of the process.

When addressing our research questions the circumstances of the cases must be taken into account because the process and the context are so strongly interrelated, that they co-constitute each other. (Healey 2003) Most external influences can, in contrast with process aspects hardly be influenced during strategy making. Therefore, in our analysis such influences on the process are included as independent variables, thus not being "context" for the analysis.

Both context aspects of figure 3.1 (and 5.2) referring to regulations, processes and competencies are part of what Gullestrup (Gullestrup 2009) called the horizontal culture, whereas the underlying convictions and worldviews of actors, as partly resulting from their professional education, are part of what he called vertical culture.

As a consequence the above suppositions are to be assessed within the national/ regional context and the specific place-based organizational circumstances of different cases. Both "contextual" influences belong to the specific planning cultures of the cases.

Taking into account the explorations and the above considerations about intensive contextual influences on strategy making, next to the variables of organizing the process, we considered next interrelated assumptions about place related factors as most promising variables for our analysis.

- The national/regional planning culture affects the possibilities for open and creative processes.
- Supportive multi-level embedding (also an aspect of planning culture) of a strategy making process is essential for success of the strategy
- The involvement of politicians is a decisive factor
- Continuity of actors is important
- The experience of participating experts with similar processes is a factor for effectiveness.
- Previous developments make society "ripe" for strategic planning

The influences from the environment in which strategy making is conducted are probably as important as the aspects of organizing the process, which can be decided through the process management. That implies that those influences are in research terms not part of the context, but variables of our analysis for effectiveness and success. Acknowledging the inseparability of the characteristics of the complex environment of strategy making processes, conclusions of the analysis require careful considerations of possible rival variables.

Our assumptions lead to posing the more specified research questions concerning relevant factors for the effectiveness of process management in a decision-making round:

- **Is Co-Ownership of results and process essential for Effectiveness?**
- **Is Co-Design essential for the Effectiveness of a decision-making round?**
- **Is the Application of Scenarios essential for the Effectiveness?**
- **Is application of Visualization as a tool essential for Effectiveness?**
- **Is Open Process management essential for the Effectiveness?**

The more specific research questions with regard to place-related factors originating from the specific environment of strategy making processes, are:

- **Do different Planning Cultures allow for sufficient Openness for making a strategic development vision?**
- **What influence does the Multi-level Embedding of the process exert?**
- **How important is the Involvement of Politicians?**
- **What is the influence of the previous Experiences of the Actors?**

As a consequence of the above considerations, we distinguished for our analysis between the openness of the management of the decision-making process and the openness of considering options for making of the strategy within the specific place characteristics. Both require openness, and both are influenced (possibly even determined) by the planning culture. Openness of process management implies the possibilities enabled by procedures and competencies offered in the planning culture. Openness for creatively exploring opportunities depends on the openness for place specificities allowed by the planning culture.

As argued before, the openness of a specific planning system for place specific interpretations will probably result in better fitting place-based solutions. Such less strict juridical regulations, which are not rigidly requiring conformation to higher-level concepts, enable cities and regions better to apply specific endogenous characteristics as assets for future development. (CEC 2008, Barca 2009) Therefore the distinction between openness for process management and openness for place-specificities, which enables explorative scenario planning, is important.

Applying visualizations as a tool for communication rather than merely as illustration of concepts or scenarios is regarded to be a tool included in the collaborative activity of co-designing scenarios, which we called scenario planning.




FIGURE 5.3 . Planning culture related to process and place-specific content.

Our assumption, to be tested empirically, is that not only co-ownership leads to an effective round, but that particularly co-authorship, entailing the collaborative creative design process of scenario planning, enhances the sustained commitment resulting in effectiveness and increases the chances for success of strategy making.

6 Research Methodology

Chapter 6 presents the approach to the empiric multi-case study for exploring the research questions of 5.6. The variables to be applied in the analysis of data are those selected in 5.6. Because of the close interrelation of factors induced by local circumstances and the selected variables, due attention will be given to explanations different from those implied in the chosen variables.

The effectiveness of specific rounds of decision-making in specific cases is established on basis of information assembled in project documentation, professional publications and in interviews. The result of that initial assessment is confronted with the openness, co-design, and co-ownership as defined in Sections 5.2 – 5.4. ; Section 6.1 summarizes the criteria applied. In 6.2 the information needed for analysis is discussed, together with the related chains of evidence. Then Section 6.3 describes the approach of the research activities, starting with lessons learned when testing the checklist for interviews. Section 6.5 presents the selection of five cases in four European countries. Finally, Section 6.6 summarized the approach to the empiric research.

§ 6.1 Criteria

The time passed, since the decision-making process was closed establishes the possibility to assess the final success of a development strategy of a specific case. As argued earlier the direct influence of a strategy on the course of development can hardly fairly be established. We will do so when assessing our cases, only in a conditional manner, because in general, the period since decisions were made differs among cases and the *performance* of a strategy develops indirectly within the context of general developments of society.

Under those restrictions we assessed the success if possible by applying the criteria:

- Envisaged concrete (non-) physical projects are realised,
- Socio-economic improvements
- Organizations and /or regulations are modernized
- Learning processes brought new insights in society

Because of the limitations to fairly addressing the success of a strategy, we concentrated on establishing the effectiveness of a decision-making round for conceiving a long-term development strategy as a feasible proxy for possible success. The indicators for effectiveness as listed in 5.5 are used for establishing the effectiveness in cases. Criteria for an effective round of decision-making are:

- Agreement achieved
- Next round followed
- Satisfaction about result

The limitations to assessing a long-term strategy require concentrating on information derived from the specific round of making the strategy.

In Chapter 5 causal relations are assumed between the combination of open process management and co-ownership on the one hand for establishing the effectiveness and co-design by applying scenarios and co-authorship on the other hand for a performing strategy. Co-ownership is considered essential for commitment, which implies support towards a performing strategy. The definitions as presented in Sections 5.2 – 5.4 are applied as criteria for establishing respectively: openness, co-design and co-ownership in the various cases.

Criteria for establishing the openness of process management are:

- Open agenda
- Informal process
- Objective oriented
- Broad flexible participation

Criteria for establishing openness to place specificities are:

- Application of place related options, like in scenario planning
- Occurrence of co-design applying maps in an early stage.
- Room for local interpretations of higher-level concepts.

The criterion for establishing co-production, being

- All participants contributed or could contribute to the output is included when establishing the occurrence of co-design.

Criteria for the occurrence of co-design are:

- Any idea considered
- New ideas emerged
- New options developed

Criteria for the occurrence of co-ownership are:

- Pride of participants
- Defensive explaining

On top, the extra criterion for establishing co-authorship is:

- Taking explicit credit for (parts of) the content.

Establishing the occurrence of the above criteria can be done in discussions with participants; measuring different magnitudes of those criteria goes beyond the requirements of our analysis.

Apart from the criteria for establishing the openness to place specificities (e.g. legally required compliance to higher level policies versus the legal possibility to decide differently and vary around indicated objectives), which can be quite factual, most applied criteria are not easily measurable. That is related to the specific perspective of this study claiming that effectiveness and success of strategies are very much dependent on the way persons interact in specific cases of strategy making.

For instance, an agenda can be formally open for tabling new items in a meeting, but the way the participants interact in reality with new items may be largely dismissive. Experience as well as the theoretic part of this study learned that the eventual success of a strategy depends on sustained commitment during many rounds of decision-making. Co-ownership can entail commitment, but the success of a long-term strategy requires sustained, long lasting and strong commitment.

Our theoretic frame suggests that co-designing a strategy creates such strong form of commitment through developing feelings of co-authorship among participants. Such distinct degrees of ownership can be illustrated with next analogy: it regards the difference between owning a book after purchasing it, versus possessing your own book after having written it. The latter form of ownership will entail much stronger commitments to the content and the process.

For testing the assumptions suggested in the theoretic part about the effect of co-design and co-authorship on the success of a strategy, the occurrence of co-authorship and co-design must be established empirically. That means that criteria for establishing perceptions and feelings of participants during specific experiences are needed. Without arriving in the realm of psychology, such feelings can be detected in quite open discussions. These are organised in the interviews, after creating trust between interviewer and interviewee so that sufficient openness for talking about feelings developed. That required an experienced planner as interviewer and taking sufficient time for the interview. (Most interviews took two hours). The interviews aimed at establishing the occurrence of for instance the perception that any idea could be tabled and was seriously considered, acknowledging that it concerns a perception. Likewise the occurrence of feelings of co-authorship was detected focussing on

expressions of interviewees confirming co-designing like “Our ideas compose the vision”, or “this or that idea came from me”.

Instead of applying an elaborated formal questionnaire, which does not provide necessary valid answers, an interview situation was created during which the researcher consistently tried to probe the interviewees perceptions.

I assume that having established the occurrence of the specific feelings and perceptions was sufficiently possible in the interviews for this empiric study.

Quantitatively measuring the magnitude of such feelings and perceptions enabling comparison of the intensity of feelings among different persons would require a deeper psychological research approach.

The distinction between the indicators for co-design, co-ownership and co-authorship requires quite subtle observations: Establishing the occurrence of co-design required discussing and establishing the activities as perceived by the interviewee during strategy making.

The gradual difference between the occurrence of the resulting feelings of co-ownership or of the stronger feelings of co-authorship sits in the explicit claims of interviewed participants of intellectual ownership of specific ideas or concepts. Also the way in which interviewees refer to the (making of) strategy gave quite clear indications for establishing co-authorship. “We decided a strategy, which is now our strategy”, expresses less commitment than “Mine and other participants ideas form the new vision for how we will develop our region”, or (literally noted: “we live our vision”)

The occurrence of co-design and co-authorship are detected separately in the interviews and considered as mutual confirming in the analysis.

Expecting large positive influences of co-production and co-design on the effectiveness of decision-making towards an agreed strategy, the independent process variables for our search are the occurrence of coproduction or co-design practices in open processes, and the dependent variable is the effectiveness of the decision-making process through the commitment resulting from co-ownership and co-authorship.

§ 6.2 Chains of Evidence and Information needed

The above criteria are applied for establishing the occurrence of openness, co-design, co-ownership and effectiveness of the strategy making in each individual case.

The occurrence of specific combinations of the aspects per case may indicate possible causal relations, potentially answering our research questions. Yin (2004) suggests formulating in advance and independent from the cases the theoretically assumed causalities as hypotheses to be confirmed or denied by the specific information of the cases. Making these assumed causal relations explicit previous to analyzing the

cases allows for open, neutral approaching the information derived from the cases. The process variables as chosen in 5.6 are the basis of the causalities expressed in the chains of evidence.

Applying these *chains of evidence* is recommended as a tool for sound case studies: It supports the construct validity of the study and allows tracing the evidentiary process backwards. (Yin 2004) Besides, the formulation of chains of evidence helps to identify the information required for empiric analysis. Basic information for this step is qualifying the cases as being effective or not effective and of the process aspects in terms of: openness of the decision-making process, the occurrence of co-production or practiced co-design, the established feelings of co-ownership (or even co-authorship) of and satisfaction about the process.

PROVISIONAL CHAINS OF EVIDENCE

Writing the assumed factors for effectiveness as:

- Open process architecture and management: OP
- Co-design: CD
- Co-ownership: CO
- Application of options: AO

The specified chains of evidence for answering the (sub) research questions (§ 4.9) reads as follows:

- *Co-ownership* contributes to the *effectiveness* if (the output of) an *effective* qualified case is also *co-owned*.
- Confirming relations between these factors for effectiveness are qualified as “contributing”.
- Other relations are qualified “irrelevant”, if some or none of the cases show that relations.

<i>CO contributes to effectiveness</i>	Effective cases are CO.
<i>CO irrelevant for effectiveness</i>	No effective cases are CO / non-effective case is CO
<i>CD contributes to effectiveness</i>	Effective cases are CD, with or without CO
<i>CD irrelevant for effectiveness</i>	No effective case is CD / non-effective case is CD
<i>CD contributes to CO</i>	CO cases are CD.
<i>CD irrelevant for CO</i>	No CO case is CD / non CO-cases is CD
<i>AO contributes to effectiveness</i>	Effective cases are AO
<i>AO irrelevant for effectiveness</i>	Effective cases are non-AO / non-effective case AO
<i>AO contributes to CO</i>	CO cases are AO.
<i>AO irrelevant for CO</i>	CO cases are non-AO / AO cases are non-CO
<i>AO contributes to CD</i>	CD cases are AO.
<i>AO irrelevant for CD</i>	CD cases are non-AO / AO cases are non-CD
<i>OP contributes to CO</i>	CO cases are OP, with or without CD
<i>OP irrelevant for CO</i>	No CO cases are OP.
<i>OP contributes to CD</i>	CD cases are OP.
<i>OP irrelevant for CD</i>	No CD cases are OP.

- The above combinations of relations, allow for draft conclusions, which are to be understood as possible causal relations with different degrees of probability.
- Sound conclusions require in depth consideration of these possible relations in each of the case within their specific local and wider context.

TABLE 6.1 Chains of evidence, process actors for effective strategy making

Factual information about each of the cases about the type of planning culture and the administrative embedding is accessible in documentation. The involvement of politicians and previous experience of planners are asked for (and discussed) in interviews. We concentrated first on establishing the effectiveness (of a specific) round of decision-making and then we related the established effectiveness to the distinguished process aspects in each of the cases as in table 6.1. Confronted with the assessment of cases, qualifying them effective (or successful) may show possible matching patterns and suggested conclusions.

Sound conclusions require in depth consideration of these possible relations in each case within the environment in which decision-making took place. Detected causal relations are based on the information of the cases in documents and interviews, confronted within the perspective of the theoretical frame with the established occurrence of openness, co-design, co-ownership and effectiveness. Information about other explanatory factors especially referring to the interactions and the context derived from the semi structured interviews, which offered due space for discussions and additional information.

The combinations of other case properties, which are irrelevant for potential causalities, may be also interesting for our quest; they enrich our analysis. Information about factors for non-success provides lessons for success factors too. Besides, all cases are considered with open eyes for alternative explanations differing from those coming from the pre-formulated chains of evidence. Such aspects may be important for discovering *rival explanations*. (Yin 2004)

The categorization of the cases according to our criteria will quite probably seldom fully fulfil the criteria of effectiveness, co-ownership, co-production and open process management. Full open process management or complete co-design will probably seldom be detected in practice in the cases. As a consequence in order to give due respect to cases, most characterizations ought to be formulated in relative terms, expressing the *degree* of for instance *openness*. That made the analysis, which is searching for evidence, less simple or robust, but subtler. But for practical analytic reasons categorizations are used, which are more bipolar bluntly characterizing a process as for instance *open* or *not open*. Therefore we aimed at a balance between clear conclusions and formulations in nuances of grey shades and explanations take account of the large diversity of specific place-based circumstances.

The empirical research required information of selected cases on the results of the process, the ownership of the results, the way the process was managed and the practical interactions and activities during the process. A draft checklist was prepared in order to structure interviews with participants in the cases. Semi structured interviews are organized as an important source of information, because important aspects like satisfaction, interactions and role interpretations refer to personal experience and perceptions of participants, which are usually not documented.

The checklist contains issues for specific information per case being the round of decision-making during which the interviewee has participated.²⁰ Specific questions are posed for providing information related to assessing according to the pre-defined criteria, but the openness towards not envisaged information and perceptions required sufficient space for an open-questions part of the checklist. Interviews consisted of a short closed part and an open part, which allowed for discussing items tabled by the interviewees. The closed part consists of factual information about the interviewees, his/her role in the process, expertise and experience and of reactions on pre-formulated propositions like:

“ My contributions are important components of final agreement”.

“I am more interested in future development since my participation.”

“I gained more understanding for the views of other participants.”

The open conversation-like part oriented on getting insight in the perceptions and experiences of the interviewees. Their remarkable key wordings are noticed at relevant items. The semi-structured interviews are locally organized as face-to-face meetings; in some cases the information gathered was reason for organizing additional information, which required extra meetings or a Skype interview.

§ 6.3 Research activities

As one of the first research activities, the draft checklist was tested in a pilot study. Before presenting the research activities as a sequence of steps, I first discuss the lessons of the pilot study.

For this pilot study the Dutch case of *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* of 1997 was chosen for practical reasons: the amazement about the continued influence of the project, in which the researcher had acted thirteen years earlier was reason for the current study and the accessibility of the project within the researcher's homeland. The possible bias of self-assessment in this specific case regarded two items: first the qualification of the effectiveness or success of the case, and secondly establishing the openness and flexibility of chairing the meetings of the production group. With regard to the assessment of the effectiveness/success of the Drechtsteden process, this bias was no problem. The obvious success on the ground created my interest for this research to investigate the factors for success. Besides, several independent evaluations were carried out before.

The bias with regard to asking questions about the way the meetings of the production group were chaired, had our full attention when discussing the methodology. When carrying out the pilot study in Drechtsteden however, this risk was dissolved more or less because the interviewees were keen to take the time for telling about their experiences and insights in a manner disconnected from the checklist. The accounts of the interviews were produced through rearranging the discussion notes according to the order of items listed in the checklist. The interviewees later controlled those accounts. Besides there was hardly a personal relation: there has been no contact since a period of over thirteen years. Some interviewees did even not remember how the meetings were chaired; they talked about the creativity in the decision-making process, using wordings like: “any idea was considered”, “we produced together a new vision”, “my ideas were easily taken up”, etc. And one interviewee was spontaneously clear about the way the meetings were chaired, using expressions like: “open, providing professional knowledge and enabling flexible contemplations”. We considered this potential bias sufficiently addressed.

With regard to the information assembled, the pilot study learned that the checklist functioned rather well. But some issues require modifications:

- The first question about the effectiveness of the project, listed aspects like agreement achieved and next round, which are factual information available in plan documents, whereas the satisfaction by hindsight is a perception of the interviewee, which can only be asked in the interview.

By establishing the effectiveness on basis of an evaluation of facts available in documents (like realisations on the ground, agreement achieved and next rounds), a relative degree of effectiveness can also be established independent from interviews. The feelings of satisfaction of the interviewees provide extra information. This meant that next to checking facts, the first question in the checklist could be more focussed asking about the interviewee’s perceptions and satisfaction.

Other modifications regarded the questions about co-ownership and co-design. For instance: The question about co-ownership: “did you have to defend the results?” Was responded quite blank. The results of the decision-making, the vision, seemed to interviewees so self-explaining that questions about the outcomes were not perceived as requiring defensive answers about the outcomes, but simply as questions for more explanation.

- Operationalization of the notion of co-ownership in the modified checklist required indirectly establishing the emotional involvement of the participants:
- Did you ever (proudly) tell others that you contributed to the vision/plan?
- Did you ever explain or clarify to someone (aspects of) the vision?
- Did you ever tell about your specific contribution to the content of the vision/plan?
- Which contribution do you take credit for?

Also considering the specific activities in the team in terms of “co-design” required some explanation clarifying the terminology during the interviews.

Operationalization of the notion of “co-design” required rephrasing questions like:

- Did initial proposals and visualizations change as a result of discussions in the group?
- Were ideas from actors incorporated in the existing proposals/ maps?
- Did new ideas develop in discussions in the group?
- Were new potential qualities discovered by for instance together locating functions next to each other or by combining activities? (Synergies)
- Do you remember moments of excitement about a new idea?
- If so, what were they?
- The notion of “scenarios” in the questionnaire may be too much related to the specific approach in the *Drechtsteden Scenariostudie 2030*.

The essential aspect for neutralizing the discussions is that several options are tabled for consideration, comparing and improving. It appeared to be better to ask when discussing this issue whether several options are presented in the decision-making process in the cases.

- Experience with the interviews showed that interviewees want to tell about wider impressions in the very start of the interview. Open discussions tended to start in the beginning.

Therefore due time is given to the five theses in the start of the checklist. It is interesting to learn the interviewees’ opinion about the specific factors, which they identify as important influences on the success or failure of the process within their cultural context. That information provided extra, enriched background knowledge offering insights, important for considering possible explanations.

- The importance of visualization for the effectiveness of the decision-making process required extra attention.

The important distinction to detect here within the envisaged case studies is whether visualizations were used as a tool for decision-making, being introduced early in the process and modified, re-sketched, re-placed, or were the visualizations mere illustrations of the results of discussions at the very end of the process?

- The long period of 15 years after terminating the specific *round* of 1997 of the informal decision-making in our test case *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030*, made assembling printed information and detecting informants not easy.

After so many years memory bias could be expected to play a role during interviews. The fact that hardly written information has been produced is a handicap for this assessment. But the memories of interviewees did not express different views; they completed and detailed each other's information. The impression is that this handicap was not an important effect during the interviews. That impression is confirmed: sending the written accounts of the interviews back to the interviews for controlling the content did hardly proceed corrections or suggestions. Since the other selected cases are terminated not as long ago as the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* it is expected that more printed or digital information is available in the other cases. It is also probable that not so much of the envisaged policies and projects can have been realised in the ground.

- The number of six interviewees seems to fit the need to get information from several differing points of view: the political one working with the results of the process within the political reality, the officials who were responsible on behalf of the principal from the standpoint of their organization in relation to other sectors, the economist looking from his point of view to designing a spatial development strategy, the representative of an other project (*Drechtrovers*) with his specific interest about the impacts on his project, and the persons within the consultancy who are made responsible for the progress, the budget and the quality of the results.
- Decision-making leading to co-ownership in a process of co-production with public participation would have been a better thinkable example for a pilot study providing more information about the applicability of the checklist.

The above lessons were applied for redressing the checklist before organizing interviews in the cases.

A drawback of establishing the effectiveness of a process in the past after a long period would be that relying on memories of actors might jeopardize the reliability of the findings. But it can also be argued that checking feelings of co-ownership and considering the interactions of actors after a long period is more reliable than doing the same directly after the interactions, because doing so after a long period might provide more balanced and better considered information than asking about experiences directly after the interactions. Fresh experiences of hectic, emotional, interactions and negotiations would influence the content of that information. On the other hand, acknowledging that each generation rewrites its history (Von der Dunk 2007) implies that taking account of past experiences now, provides the actual way of seeing of the interviewee, based on applying actual criteria. That is nevertheless also valuable information. For taking into account those differences with regard to the period of time between the decision-making and the interview, it would be good to take notice of the duration of that period. That could reveal an explanation, rival to our assumptions.

The main lines of the methodology of the empirical study consisted of selection of cases, assembling information, analyzing information and drawing conclusions. After selection of cases (see 6.5), and requesting for support of stakeholders in all cases, project and process documentation are initially analysed for preparing the interviews. After analysing the initial information derived in the first email or telephone contacts with representative(s) of cases, more specific questions per case are formulated in order to clarify unclear issues during the interviews about the content of the project, the positioning among organizations and the active discursive streams. Interviews are organized at the locations of the decision-making processes. The reported responses and extra information of the interviews are sent back for control to the interviewees. The accounts of cases are compared, aggregated and analysed by pattern matching according to the chains of evidence. In the cross case analysis, the assumed causal relations are confronted with information about possible alternative contextual explanations. Conclusions are drawn after considering possible rival explanatory factors.

The approach to the research, conducted as a multi-case study, of five decision-making processes in four European countries is elaborated in the following steps:

- The theoretic exploration led to propositions about possible success factors. These formed possible chains of evidence, for testing experiences in specific cases.
- Then the set of five cases was identified (see 6.5), which were regarded successful within their different national contexts. (That does not imply a positive assessment according to the criteria applied in this study)
- After selecting the relevant cases, contact persons were addressed in order to vitalize requests for active co-operation and ask for available project documentation and names of persons and organizations for relevant other contacts.
- After initially analysing documents, more specific case related information was asked for. Further contextual information about the legislation, administrative embedding and planning culture was assembled in literature.
- Then cases were assessed provisionally regarding aspects of interactive co-operation as points of attention for applying the checklist when interviewing informants.
- The open parts of interviews allowed informants to express their views on the process, supported by parts asking for reactions on prepared propositions.
- On basis of data and the responses in interviews, each case was characterized with regard to the effectiveness (or success,) co-ownership, co-production, application of options/scenarios and the openness of the process organization.
- Analysis per case focused on causal relations between these process aspects, which were enriched with the contextual information deriving from the open questions.
- Then the draft conclusions for the individual five cases were related to each other and mutually compared, according to the prepared chains of evidence.
- The multi-case analysis led to draft responses to the research questions, which were further confronted with possible rival explanations based on information about the project derived from open questions in interviews, comments of interviewees and literature.

- Informants were asked for comments on draft conclusions about their case and explanations of specific phenomena and possible alternative causalities.
- Final conclusions are formulated, giving appropriate attention to aspects of process and context, relevant for effectiveness (and possibly the eventual success of strategies).

§ 6.4 Sources of Information

The data needed for establishing the different aspects of the decision-making process in each of the cases is assembled from a variety of sources:

- General publications about the project and the process
- Project documentation (including web-sites)
- Articles in professional magazines
- Scientific evaluations
- Interviews with participants, experts and politicians

Information derived from interviews is especially important because the required inside-information, about internal interactions between persons representing different stakeholder groupings is hardly publicly available.

The analysis of cases took as good as possible into account the available information, being aware of limitations to its value for sound analysis.

The availability of documentation, articles and evaluations greatly differs from case to case. Critical analysis of the available documentation took into account the reasons why documents have been produced and published. General project information like brochures, folders concern usually aspects of propaganda: the information is drafted for an audience, which is targeted in order to create better understanding and support for the project. Equally, not all articles in professional magazines will provide impartial information. The preferences and perspectives of the author influence the assessment. Many spatial planning projects are discussed in magazines applying architectural criteria, which are only partly relevant for our search.

Minutes of meetings seldom express the struggles of power play and strategic behaviour underlying the discussions. Minutes often implicitly present the dominant perspective of the process management. This is especially the case where formal attitudes towards meetings exist: The minute taker, usually being a public servant, often needs approval by signatures of chairman and secretary of meetings. Even scientific evaluations cannot be taken as completely reliable base for final conclusions; authors always apply their specific perspectives for assessing projects. Against the background of these critical considerations, written information and scientific articles is used for providing factual data and as a source for critical analysis.

The other main source of information is data coming from the responses to the interviews with stakeholders. One of the assumptions about factors for success and conditions, which enable co-design and co-ownership in decision-making about development strategies, is that real openness towards other perspectives, different framing and conflicting realities is essential. Information from interviewees is so important because our theoretical frame includes aspects of open interactions among participants, which implies a large challenge for process management. The challenge is to create a process, stimulating creative unprejudiced collaboration among participants who not automatically trust the initiators and act mainly in the institutional appropriateness of their organizations, which are often deploying strategic behaviour. Changing mind-sets (Healey 2007, De Jonge 2009) and interweaving of goals (Teisman 1998) requires feelings of trust and protected core values (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008), which enable safe exchange of values (Hajer 1995), sharing of aims (Albrechts 2004, Healey 2007) and reflection in action (Schön 1983). These influences on mind-sets and attitudes coming near to the identity and personal privacy of participants, relate to creativity and the design attitude, which seem so important for real openness during exploration of possible futures. (4.5)

Information about these feelings of openness could be gathered by requesting after the experiences and perceptions of the participants in interviews. In order to keep sufficient openness for unexpected influences coming from unforeseen conditions, which might include rival explanations, the interviews provided room for openly responding on individual “why” and “how” clarifications. Besides, the context of administrative embedding, distribution of competences and planning education for the whole decision-making process as well of the specific round is highly important. The institutional embedding of the process, the connection with higher levels of government, the specific planning culture, together with the personal qualities of actors in the locality will exert important influences. These factors influencing the possibilities of organizing real open and explorative processes are searched for in combination with the process factors in the interviews.

The composition of the group of interviewees differs per case. The longer ago a decision-making process of a case has been, the larger the chance that no participant can deliver information about his/her experience. This is not only due to the memory bias, but also to the fact that people move jobs or disappear through retirement or ill-health.

It is important that not all of the interviewees are persons who were responsible for the process as project leader or responsible politician. Their perspective will provide justifying responses; the perception of others provides more independent views. The practical limitation to the number of interviewees allows for two or three persons representing other public sector organizations and two to four representatives from the general public, private company or pressure group. But we did not always succeed in assembling an ideal composition of the group of interviewees like:

The interviews addressed the research questions partly in a direct way: What is the perception (by hindsight) of the interviewees about the proceedings: the application of options (or scenarios), the openness of the process and the importance of an open process for the application of concepts? Acknowledging the bias resulting from limited memory and misunderstanding due to miscommunication, each of those three simple questions are elaborated into sub-questions which allow detecting misunderstandings and which helped to recall details and specificities.

The specific information of the discussions about the sub-questions considered “how” and probably “why” questions allowing correction of possible misunderstandings as well as more specific conclusions.

The open conversation style of the semi-structured interviews appeared important to obtain information about non pre-identified issues, which are relevant for the effectiveness of the decision-making process. This especially applies to influences such as multi-governance aspects, inter-institutional relations, urgency of issues, experiences of actors and open-mindedness of representatives of specific interests. The degree of openness when interacting is assumed an essential factor for exploration of possibilities and co-creativity in developing solutions.

The interviewees is attached in Appendix C. The summarized accounts of the individual interviews are accessible through a link:

<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/4b8t43csx56muvc/AAAnrK6kxWSksB7IWY4cLOd2a?dl=0>

§ 6.5 Selection of Cases

The selection regards cases, which are qualified in planning literature or otherwise among professionals as being a “successful” strategic decision-making process. More specifically, in meetings with professional planners, representing the national associations of planners within the General Assemblies of the European Council of Spatial Planners, the ECTP-CEU, was asked for examples of successful spatial strategy making in their country. That did not imply common criteria for selecting that cases; it were cases considered successful in the context of the country. So, the opinions about successful cases within the specific different national planning cultures were partly guiding for proposing cases. Cases considered successful in different countries are addressed because we search for success factors for effective strategy making and success factors will be different per country under influence of the planning culture. The large variation of planning traditions, educations and positions of spatial planning in the national institutional and legal frameworks implies large differences in understanding of what can be called a successful strategy. These factual differences were to be accepted because of their implicit connection to the national/local context.

Acknowledging the existence of different criteria for calling a process successful in different planning cultures, for this study, which compares effectiveness of decision-making and success of strategies in different European countries, we have set equal criteria for effectiveness and (if possible) for the eventual success of a strategy for our analysis. The assessment of effectiveness of cases according to our own criteria concluded that the processes of certain cases are not effective. That is no problem for our search because non-effective cases provide lessons about success factors as well.

The provisional selection consisted of a thirteen cases long list.²¹ Initial communications about support and co-operation with developing personal contacts lead to selection of five cases in four countries, which are presented hereunder together with the category of planning systems according to the Compendium of European Planning Systems. (Stead and Nadin 2009, Dühr, Colombe et al. 2010, Nadin and Stead 2012) Cases are selected in four countries, differing according to the distinctions between traditions or models of spatial planning made in literature. Those four types of European planning traditions are: (2.5.)

- The comprehensive integrative model,
- The land-use management model,
- The regional economic planning model and
- The urbanism model.

These models are necessarily simplifications and the very pure form is not existing in reality: the national cultures of countries are mixes of the above characteristics. The different orientations of national planning systems affect the possibilities for informal open process architecture and process management. We assume that the existing national and regional differences in governing and planning cultures will be reflected in the degree of openness of the decision-making process, in a way which influences the possibilities for open exploration and co-design of concepts and scenarios and, as a consequence, for co-ownership of the result.

Three criteria are applied for selecting a set of five cases among the cases of the long list: The specific project must be regarded successful or effective, the cases are located in areas with different planning cultures and the information and contacts of the cases are accessible. The considerable efforts of getting information, data, documents and interviewing participants, limit the number of cases that can be considered within this study. The availability and accessibility of printed or digital process information and of persons who were participating in the process was an important criterion for selection. The willingness to active co-operate and spend time to support the search is equally important. Therefore personal acquaintance of participants is also a criterion for selecting cases.

The eventual selection of five cases consists of the following strategic planning processes in four countries.

- IT (Urbanism Planning Tradition) Emilia Romagna:
Piano Strutturale Comunale di Bologna;
- NL (Comprehensive Integrated Planning Tradition) Zuid-Holland
Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030;
- UK (Land Use Management planning tradition) Scotland
Glasgow and Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan 2012;
- IT (Urbanism Planning Tradition) Bolzano- Alto Adige/ Südtirol
Vision Gherdeina;
- BE (Land Use Management Planning Tradition) Oost-Vlaanderen
Meetjesland 2020, Toekomstplan

The selected specific decision-making rounds of the cases, which were pivotal stages in which the strategy was decided, are assessed according to the criteria for effectiveness of this study as defined in 5.5

Although both countries are categorized as land use management planning the legal systems of the UK (Scotland) and Belgium (Vlaanderen) differ fundamentally. The Scottish system differs from the English system. The planning system in Belgium is different within the three parts of the Belgian state. In Italy spatial planning is also devolved to and regulated at the regional level. The selected cases are respectively located in Emilia Romagna and Bolzano-Alto Adige (South-Tyrol), being regions with different planning systems. That implies that the sub-national level is most relevant for differentiating among planning cultures.



FIGURE 6.1 Location of cases in Europe; the five cases depicted in blue.

§ 6.6 Selecting of cases and possible consequences on outcomes

An important practical reason for using the attribute “successful” when asking for cases among national planners in the European Council of Spatial Planners was that that would entail more support for a request for co-operation with those involved in the cases. During the request for cases I was fully aware of the fact that since I did not provide a definition of what would be considered “successful” processes, cases would be proposed that have a positive image at that moment in time among planners in the specific country. So, the attribute “successful” had no well-defined meaning, it could also have been “interesting” cases of integrated processes of preparing strategies for long-term spatial developments. The suggestion related to asking for successful cases included that the different opinions of success in the different countries, allowed for exploring what works and what not. A definition of effectiveness and success for application in our analysis was independently formulated during the explorations in the theoretic part of the study. Acknowledging that unified definitions of an “effective” round of decision-making and a “successful” strategy could, when applied on the selected cases result in qualifying cases ineffective or not successful, our pre-formulated chains of evidence (Table 6.1) included considering the occurrence of not successful qualified cases. Two of the five cases did indeed not comply with our criteria for success.

Another formulation of the request at that moment in the ECTP-CEU would probably not produce a different yield than the long-list. The question whether the request for “successful” cases for our selection would have influenced the outcomes is interesting but cannot be answered on basis of this study.

By hindsight, reflecting on the reasons why ECTP-CEU national representatives proposed the cases as included in the long list, I can guess about the criteria they probably implicitly applied, because I did not add a unifying criterion to my request. All five cases of the short list have specific positive attributes: I can now say that **Bologna** was quite certainly proposed in the ECTP-CEU because of its design quality; **Drechtsteden** because its obvious success; **Glasgow** because of its continuous progress in strategic planning; **Grödental** for its promising bottom-up approach and **Meetjesland** because of intensive regional co-operation. The qualification of success at the moment of request only says something about the impression/opinion of those proposing the cases. The selection among so-called successful cases did probably not influence the outcomes of this study.

Another issue is the influence of the national / regional planning systems on the findings. This component of the central research question of this multi-national study is subject of our analysis.

Within the text several expectations are formulated about the possible influences of the different planning systems, which mainly refer to the degree of freedom for organizing a real open explorative process of strategy making. The different categorizations of the compendium and of Nadin and Stead about the more basic general legislative systems²² provide some useful differentiations, but the dynamics in the continuously developing systems as well as the regional/local interpretations of national systems demand for looking at the planning systems as interpreted locally, instead of referring only to the general systems. In 6.5 we assumed a direct relation between the distinguished planning systems and the possibilities for the required openness. More particularly we expected that strict regulated systems would not enable sufficient openness.

That has not been confirmed in our findings: Formal and strict regulated systems are found in Emilia Romagna, Scotland and South Tyrol. The cases in the two latter regions were assessed positively: as being effective. With regard to the influence of the planning systems it is also important to mention that planning in only two of the cases was organized within statutory procedures (Bologna and Glasgow) That means that the local/ regional culture of planning and interaction of representatives of interests played an important role. The influences of the different planning systems in our cases on the outcomes are reported in 13.5.

Chapters 7- 11 provide the accounts of case studies of each of the five cases. Each account is reported in a Chapter consisting of the similar components:

After an introduction consisting of a concise description of the case area and main spatial development issues, completed with a map depicting its location in Section 1, the relevant planning system and the related administrative embedding of the strategy making process is described in Section 2. The administrative embedding of the case is discussed in Section 3. Then the strategic plan is presented, referring to the main planning issues, the planning process in general terms, the concept and other content aspects in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the impact of the strategic plan. The process is considered in Section 6, putting attention to respectively, its effectiveness and the occurrence of co-ownership, co-design and openness in the process. The plans are evaluated in Section 7. Finally conclusions with regard to effectiveness are presented in Section 8.

7 Bologna: evaporated support for an exciting design

PIANO STRUTTURALE COMUNALE DI BOLOGNA

§ 7.1 Introduction

Bologna, with in total about 370.000 inhabitants is the functional regional centre as well as the capital of the Emilia Romagna region in Italy. It functions as a tertiary and logistical centre for the wider area of mid Italy. The city boasts some unique assets including the oldest university of Europe and a rich cultural heritage. Besides being the capital of the Emilia Romagna and centre of world famous Italian gastronomy and luxury car making, the city is an important tourist destination.



FIGURE 7.1 Location of Bologna (in blue) in Emilia Romagna

Decades of neglect of spatial development in the city of Bologna deepened the urban problems. The large majority of urban services are concentrated in the very heart: the historic city centre where capacity is limited. That requires careful and large renovations in a vulnerable historic spatial context, which is extra complex because of high costs of renovation of monuments and the complex national procedures around protected cultural heritage. The concentration of activities in the city centre causes large flows of traffic consisting of cars of commuters, tourists and deliveries. Problems of accessibility and infrastructure have been discussed for decades but not structurally addressed because of long-lasting political inertia. . Part of those discussions concerns the improvement of the public transport system, which became a source of heated political controversy. One of the main problem areas is the area around the main station and the station itself, where capacity needs to be increased and a connection with Bologna airport is required. On top of these problems come the issues related to abandoned industrial sites and former military areas and the run-down university facilities in the city centre. After those decades of political inertia and increasing problems, the elections of 2004 brought in an executive, which wanted to actively address Bologna's spatial development.

The newly elected municipal executive (2004) started the process of preparing an urban development policy for the city of Bologna. The *Piano Strutturale Comunale di Bologna* (PSC) concerns the resulting development strategy for the city as capital of the Emilia Romagna region. The making of that structure plan was organized in the period of 2005- 2007 after the long period of neglecting the city's spatial problems.

The actual assessment of the process of decision-making about the plan was done in 2012, five years after the approval of the plan. Acknowledging the effect of the 2008 crisis, the period between the plan making and the assessment was (too) short for establishing the eventual success of the strategy, but the decision-making process of the PSC could be analysed with regard to its effectiveness

The information about the case Bologna mainly derives from next sources:

The Italian spatial planning periodical *Urbanistica* dedicated thirteen articles (in Italian and English language) in forty-seven pages to the Piano Strutturale Comunale (PSC). The issue included a CD-ROM containing additional information and documents. (*Urbanistica* (2008) 135, p 44-91)

At the Crossroads between Urban Planning and Urban Design: Critical Lessons from Three Italian Case Studies. A project evaluation, published in *Planning Theory and Practice*. (Palermo and Ponzini 2012)

Echoes of the "Berkeley School": An Italian Experience of Urban Planning. In the *Journal of Urban Design* (Gabellini 2011)

A book section about developments in Italian planning. *The Modernization of the Italian Planning System*.(Lingua and Servillo 2014)

The article in European Planning studies, The Innovation of the Italian Planning System: Actors, Path Dependencies, Cultural Contradictions and a Missing Epilogue. (Servillo and Lingua 2014)

Extra documentation about the project received during visits to the *Bologna Urban Centre*.

Interviews with six persons involved in different roles in the making of the PSC begin 2013.

The issue of *Urbanistica* tells the stories of assumptions and objectives from the points of view of political responsible persons, municipal experts, consultants as well as academics from the universities of Oporto and Milano.

The evaluation of the Bologna plan in *Planning Theory and Practice* (Palermo and Ponzini 2012) is part of a comparison of the *Piano Strutturale Comunale* of Bologna with the *Piano del Governo del Territorio* of the Comune di Milano and the structural framework for Roma, the so-called *Poster Plan*. That article emphasised the important role of design in the making of the PSC and in urban planning in general. A Skype interview was held mid January 2013 with Davide Ponzini, assistant to professor Palermo of Politecnico Milano, who evaluated the PSC.

Interviews were held in Bologna for assembling information and individual perceptions from persons involved in the strategy making for Bologna on 07/02 and 08/02 2013. Their different roles in the process were political responsible, communication expert, spatial planners and director of a construction firm. An additional in-depth interview with Patrizia Gabellini took place in January 2014.

§ 7.2 The Planning legislation of Emilia Romagna

The European Compendium on Spatial Planning Systems and Policies (CEC 1997) categorized the Italian planning system in the Urbanism model (Dühr, Colombe et al. 2010, Nadin and Stead 2012), which is articulated by urban design, townscape and building control through zoning and codes. The outdated 1942 National Planning Act of Italy has not been renovated. Since 2001 the national system was altered, so that spatial planning became a regional responsibility and the individual regional

governments had to introduce their own planning legislation. In fact there exists at the national level of Italy no up-to date planning system. (Lingua and Servillo 2014) Contingent political or ideological orientations of the moment of the introduction of the new regional planning legislations coloured the large variety of regional planning systems throughout Italy.

The Emilio Romagna regional government promulgated in 2000 an innovative planning act. (Palermo and Ponzini 2012) The instruments according to the new regional legislation are: Structural Plans (*Piano Strutturale Comunale PSC*), binding Urban Building Regulations (*Regolamento Urbanistico Edilizio, RUE*), and the binding Operational Plans (*Piano Operativo Comunale, POC*). The PSC is meant to be the long-term strategic guiding framework, providing main (indicative) lines for the other two binding plans: The RUE for regulating procedures and decision-making; the POC providing norms and standards for implementing realizations. The legal planning system requires final approval (at the same moment) of these three planning documents: the Structural Plan (PSC), the Urban Building Regulations (RUE) and the Operational Plan (POC). The law sets requirements for the content of the Structure plan; it should consist of a report, including the knowledge framework and the preliminary starting document, regulations and illustrations for the interventions and concrete proposals. Besides, a Territorial Sustainability Assessment and the Constraints Chart are to be considered. (Gabellini 2008)

In order to regulate functional centres or systems with specific functions as managed by public, semi-public, or private organizations, the regional spatial planning legislation and Territorial Coordination Plan of Emilia Romagna of 2000 provides for the construction of “Territorial Agreements” between the municipalities, the province and the managing authority of organizations. (Evangelisti 2008) For instance: the agreement about developing the railway station and the surrounding area, which includes objectives for the planning of that area like connecting separated parts of the city and realization of a people mover.²³

The elaborations of the regulations into the detailed building regulations (RUE) and the operational plan (POC) are binding. Structure plans have to be geo-referenced, meaning that strategic interventions are projected on specific sites and that the plan is visualized on maps. That stimulates decision-making processes with visualizations on maps, thereby balancing between the global indication of types of development and the concrete features of projects.

²³

Accordo Territoriale, Bologna 18/07/2005. Between province of Bologna, municipality of Bologna and the national railways, RFI.

Interventions having impacts on sites with monuments and other aspects of cultural heritage are nationally regulated (protected) and are to be approved by a national commission based in Rome.

At this moment Bologna (2013), qualified as a metropolitan city, is preparing the strategic plan for the metropolitan area. The Emilia Romagna law does not regulate the content for the strategic plan of the Bologna metropolitan area.

The modernization process of spatial planning is reported to be incident lead instead of professional thinking - lead. (Lingua and Servillo 2014)

The gradual devolution of power to the regions relating to urban development and territorial governance collided with a concentration and central intervention on some projects and specific issues, causing new conflicts between the central and local levels. After thirty years of debate the achievements of modernization has again reached through an emergency (the crisis) and not through well-thought disciplinary debate. But there are signs (Lingua and Servillo 2014) that the reform includes performance and strategic planning instead of conformance to predesigned codes and that the traditional "urbanism" model is being combined with innovative elements of strategic economic thinking.

§ 7.3 Embedding of the planning process

The administrative embedding of Bologna during the preparation of the Structure plan was not simple. Within Italy's system of government Bologna municipality is (until mid 2014) positioned at the fourth level. The first level is the state of Italy, holding ministerial competencies in domains for military areas, of which are several in the city, the university and the protection of monuments and cultural heritage. The second level is the region of Emilia Romagna, holding planning legislative competencies as well as specific political views on planning, the third level is the province, in Bologna governing the direct surrounding territory of the city and obliged contract partner in territorial and planning agreements. The fourth level is the municipality. The level of the region has been introduced in 1992. The level of the province is terminated in mid 2014.

The regional government of Emilia Romagna adopted polycentric development as the basis of its spatial development policy. The regional interpretation of polycentric development included the promotion of the distribution of services and facilities over the area stretching from Piacenza to Rimini. As a result the region contains for instance four airports and several university departments are spread over five

cities. Especially since the 2008 crisis the other towns are financially supported and Bologna is compressed.²⁴

Among the Emilia Romagna legislative requirements for structural plans is to start a structural planning process by achieving an agreement with the province: *Accordo di Pianificazione*. In this Planning Agreement²⁵ all laws, legal regulations, actors and interest groups, including the urban neighbourhoods are mentioned and agreed to take into consideration. In further formal agreements with stakeholders like the national railways organization (*RFI*) or the national agency managing domains like military areas, next to the municipality, the region as well as the province, may be contract partners.

With regard to monuments and other cultural heritage aspects, national approval is required for each intervention of the Rome based agency for the conservation of cultural heritage. But Rome is also strongly involved in interventions regarding the military and university domains in the city.

The administrative level of the province between the municipal and the regional levels was questioned and the Provincia Bologna became considered redundant. In June 2014 the province of Bologna will be abolished and the complexity of Bologna's multi-level embedding will be reduced, the city will be on the third level. At the national level, Bologna was qualified as one of the Italian metropolitan areas, which positioning has to be developed. Together with the (disappearing) province steps are set to prepare for a metropolitan plan. According to last information²⁶ activities for that plan consisted of juridical focused inventory and objectives.

The interviewees expressed the general complaint about the legal procedures and the connected juridical attitude of higher authorities. Several interviewees suspected public bodies to believe that the answer for every single problem is a new law or regulation. As a consequence laws are adjusted again and again to newly experienced problems. When after the long-lasting procedures a new regulation comes finally into force, the new regulations are out-dated already: addressing a problem of the past. A partnership in addressing severe problems was missed. The fact that a national commission in Rome safeguards aspects of history and culture was referred to as an example of disconnectedness to serious local problems.

²⁴ Interview P.Gabellini 09/02/2014

²⁵ Accordo do Pianificazione, between commune and provincia di Bologna. 10/05/2006

²⁶ Second interview Patrizia Gabellini, alderman for spatial planning.



FIGURE 7.2 Bologna's historic city centre

§ 7.4 The Piano Strutturale Comunale di Bologna

Bologna's main planning issues

The issues to be addressed by the long-term structural development strategy are manifold, due to over twenty years of neglecting.

Bologna's functions as the regional centre for Emilia Romagna and as a touristic centre for Europe generate heavy incoming traffic. Recent intervention in the urban infrastructure such as facilities for slow modes, traffic calming and dedicating public spaces, especially for pedestrians, aggravate those issues. The issues of accessibility and mobility have created a long history of large political problems. Several systems for improving traffic in the city have been considered: a tramway system with some underground lines and a system with magnetic buss lines. Premature investment in that last system caused large financial problems in the municipal budget.

Stopping further investment in too ambitious plans, plus stopping further discussions about infrastructure for accessibility were the central themes in the 2004 mayoral election campaign of Sergio Cofferati. And as a consequence, when Cofferati was elected as mayor, discussions about accessibility and mobility were excluded. That was the situation at the start of the PSC process.

But reduction and rearranging motorcar traffic, parking and main infrastructure for public transport were still necessary. Public transport increasingly suffers from the dominance of private car use. For improved international connection the introducing of a people mover has been agreed between Bologna international airport Marconi and the central station. But the municipal role in this project as arranged in the concept contracts for building and operating the new system cause administrative-legal problems about potential false economic competition. This connection to the airport, the capacity problems of the central railway station as well as preparation for high-speed trains demand for urgent, large renovation of the station and the wider environment including bus stations.

Vacant old industrial areas of out-dated mechanical and textile production, containing deteriorated building complexes and polluted soil, provide desolate images in several corners of the city. Vacant land due to redundant military facilities in the city needed urban reconstruction. Also many of the complexes of facilities of the university required substantial spatial reorganization and renovation. The demand for more and qualitative better social housing is also an important issue. Brownfield developments, together with some extensions are expected to reduce those problems.

Next to those issues many public places in residential areas have been neglected too long and are in need of refurbishment. The population of several specific urban areas felt threatened by concrete projects and less clear project ideas proposed by project developers in their neighbourhood without proper information providing insight in the future of their environment.

The challenges to address those issues are extra severe not only because Bologna's city centre contains an extremely rich cultural heritage, but also because the city's development had experienced a period of standstill of two decades. On top Bologna had to reinvent itself within topical perspectives of environmental aspects, energy use, climate change and other requirements of modern quality of life.

General overview of the planning process

The latest *Piano Generale* of Bologna dated from the mid 1980's.

Since the nineties, the lacking of an overall spatial policy was felt and broad discussions about urban development and specific projects emerged in the local society. Many committed groupings and associations became active. Many different ideas were proposed but a structural framework allowing politicians to select and prioritize among the proposals did not come in existence.

When after the June 2004 elections, a new municipal government entered function, Sergio Cofferati (Mayor) and Virginio Merola (Alderman) initiated the current project by (re-) launching the urban planning programme.

Their motivation was clear: Bologna had considered many too different ideas for projects and a transformation of the city needed a spatial framework based on a vision for the future development providing guidance for decision-making about those and other ideas.

The decision-making process of the PSC covers the period from July 2004 to December 2007. The goal of the newly mandated municipal government was to build the new outline plan before the expiration of their four-year administrative term of office. The PSC aims to provide the frame, which enabled selection and could bring coherence among the many thinkable projects for transforming Bologna.

On 20 December 2005 the *Giunta*²⁷ of Bologna approved the final version of the starting document (*Documento Preliminare* and the *Valutazione di Sostenibilita Ambientale e Territoriale*.) Then citywide public meetings were organized providing some structure to the previous hectic discussions. Ideas, proposals and plans were gathered in the meetings and some common preferences and agreements about objectives for future development came to the surface in 2006. But a clear, common over-all vision was still missing.

Next to objectives of sound spatial planning, there was the clear desire to try out new forms of communication and public involvement related to choices for territorial policies. The mixture of methods and instruments for interaction assured flexibility as well as calibrating the degree of interaction, alternating information and consultation with project development. The municipal organizers aiming at optimal transparency, paid large attention to define parameters for discussions: clarity was provided about what has been decided already and what is still open for debate. Issues of infrastructure and accessibility were clearly excluded.

From mid 2005 onwards, the *giunta* organized urban forums, which were open for the public. Information and consultation were combined in the re-launch of the Urban Centre Bologna in 2005, in which public discussion forums and expositions were held.

The population was long since grouped in all kinds of associations of which many had developed ideas about the development of the city. In the very start of the process public workshops were set up to look at, discuss and comment on the existing old general plan. Those activities harvested plenty of ideas, fragments of concepts and projects, referred to by some as a chaotic collection. The forums also produced numerous contributions in different forms: ideas, comments and proposals.

After the preliminary phase, leading to approval of starting documents, obligatory Planning Conferences were organized with the required official parties end 2005. The final written proceedings of the conferences (18 Jan 2006) form the basis of agreements for co-operation with several parties of strategic relevance for Bologna's development. The very first stage of participation provided already interesting results in 2006. A full comprehensive statement was made with all contributions, geo-referenced on maps. That enabled reviewing the preliminary documents and successive planning documents.

Mid 2006 the *Accordo di Pianificazione* was closed with the Provincia di Bologna. That agreement constituted aspects of co-operation, content and process of the project, which included lists of all parties and all residential quarters involved and rather detailed objectives with regard to green areas or environmental aspects. The planning regulations envisage agreements with specific stakeholders, which are called territorial agreements. A territorial agreement was closed with the *Rete Ferroviaria Italiana SpA* (RFI, the national railway company), about developing the new railway station area. This *Accordo Territoriale* contained territorial, town-planning and infrastructural aspects for reorganizing and renewing the central station and the wider area around the central railway station. Strategic objectives of this four-party agreement among the region of Emilia Romagna, Provincia di Bologna, Comune di Bologna and RFI addressed:

- Urban and infrastructural aspects of the central station and the west railway area, in order to create a new metropolitan centre.
- The central station to become a principal node of strategic importance for local, metropolitan and international relations of the regional capital.
- The new station area will become a new urban centrality, connecting with, instead of separating from the historic centre.

Next to the citywide forum discussions, neighbourhood workshops were set up. The neighbourhood workshops made it possible to carry out more in depth consultations between citizens, experts and administrators. (Ginocchini 2008)

So participation of citizens was activated through various channels of information in the Forum and in the neighbourhoods involving individual citizens, representatives of the financial world and community organizations and leading figures in social and cultural life.

But, still after two years, in the start of 2007 the harvest of the large efforts in those discussions consisted of many loose ideas, and different objectives.

The concept of "7 Cities"

In January 2007 Patrizia Gabellini professor in urban planning in Milano, was commissioned as consultant responsible for the making of the PSC ²⁸ and design activities started. She brought practical experience from work in Rome and studies in Milan about conceiving a coherent spatial planning concept within the urban complexity of a large city.

Her task was described as bringing "soul" in the results of the discussions. (Gabellini used the metaphor of modifying a baby into a mature person)

Applying designing language, she selected and summarized in the chaos of ideas and proposals harvested until then and sketched a coherent mapped structure: the concept of "7 Cities". The concept brought together seven major strategic interventions into one visualized spatial framework, which was recognized by stakeholders and the population as *the* answer for the many issues facing Bologna.




FIGURE 7.3 The concept of "7 Cities" [Source: PSC Bologna, 2007]

Although many of the ideas and objectives, which formed the basis of the new concept, were formulated interactively with the population, the experts within the Bologna planning department, led, guided and inspired by Patrizia Gabellini, made a specific selective interpretation of the many different intentions, objectives, ideas and proposals. The concept was conceived without public participation. The spatial planner “consulted” the relevant sector heads and regulations.

Strategic development projects, often consisting of (modified) existing proposals, have been selected and made coherent with the “7 cities” concept according to the PSC core objectives and priorities. The local issue and solution orientation included a project-oriented approach for the structure plan although concrete projects are to be specified later. Communication about the underlying spatial development vision and further clarification of the concept was organized subsequently through successive concentration on each “City” separately. Each “City” was approached using the same method: For each of the seven city areas the programme arranged a public meeting, and guided tours in the related area. These Saturday activities received a lot of attention in Bologna. In the related Thursday afternoon meetings at the Urban Centre, visualisation of possible elaboration of projects played an important role.

The success of the approach (as reported in most interviews) was due to the fact that the visualized “7 Cities” vision summarized and brought order through one clear recognisable structure, in the until then, more or less chaotic plenty of ideas and proposals. Many of these ideas and proposals seemed before controversial or conflicting; the “7 Cities” concept showed that several of the ideas and proposals could be combined in one coherent structure.

Illustrative designed plans were used for exploring the potentialities of important projects at strategic locations and in the neighbourhoods. In this way, the structure plan prioritized selected project ideas, modified and integrated them with complementary interventions and policies.

This allowed for infrastructural, morphologic, social use, and semiotic features to evolve and mature, into clear spatial guidelines and regulations. (Palermo and Ponzini 2012)

That the design was exactly bringing the right order in the chaos was demonstrated by the fact that after disseminating the “7 Cities” concept, the stakeholders and the public seemed satisfied and subsequent participative actions consisted mainly of clarifying and agreeing on the aspects of the concept.

Only after five months since her involvement, and after extended consultations with several sectors and institutions, Patrizia Gabellini introduced the spatial development concept of “7 Cities”. This concept selected, summarized and structured previous loose considerations into one vision for the whole city, addressing various different issues by proposing urbanistic solutions in 7 issue-related specific locations within the city.

The design process from preliminary documents towards the structural plan was marked by “far reaching” selection of objectives to which forums and workshops have clearly contributed. The structural and strategic proposals in the finally approved municipal structure plan embodied the proposals of the concept of the “7 Cities”. That structural concept provided guidelines for a second line of participation through the neighbourhood workshops.(Ginocchini 2008)

After the diverging discussions since 2005, the concept of the “7 Cities” was recognized as the converged way forward by civic society as well as by the politicians. Enthusiastic reactions are reported, discussions stopped and adoption by the *Giunta* came in a few months after introduction of the design.

The neighbourhood workshops dealt with specific places in city quarters. The thirty-five neighbourhoods were considered in intensive participative workshops with the population and other stakeholders, resulting in explorations of improvements of the quality of life with potential projects in the localities. These discussions in and about the smaller scale localities were more specific and closer to the population than the structural considerations of the city level. Results of that second line of participation consisting of more specified elaborations of potential local developments were used to illustrate aspects of the strategic plan with concrete examples of possible elaborations. Fourteen public meetings in the Urban Centre involving more than 1000 people have been organized and a website was made available. In April 2008, 400 observations were received as reaction on the plans, for analyzing and responding.

In 2007 an agreement was closed with the Ministry responsible for the real estate of the (former) military areas and of the University (Bologna 2007).

And finally, in 2008 the municipality agreed on a memorandum of understanding with nine groupings of private companies for co-operation in implementing spatial, environmental, socio-economical strategies.(Bologna 2008).

The PSC, OP and RUE were approved in 2008.

Content aspects of the concept

The structural concept clearly underlying the vision of the “7 Cities” is the spatial distribution of activities over the urban area of Bologna. This concept contrasts to the general self-evident spatial policy tendency in Bologna to concentrate all services and activities within the historic centre. The concept of “7 Cities” widens the scope for possible locations of functions and projects to locations outside the historic part city centre. This spatial policy aims at relaxing the tension on the “hyper-used” historic centre, and will also bring services and facilities closer to the residential areas.

The concept of “7 Cities” addresses the main challenges for improving Bologna’s functioning through proposing interventions for developing seven different problematic locations. The design of this concept by Patrizia Gabellini bringing together solutions for various structural problems worked as an eye-opener. The attractiveness of not only solving different problems but also providing a coherent vision was apparently a positive surprise to many who have been involved in long lasting chaotic discussions.

The concept showed that by solving a problem outside the historic centre not only specific structural or local problems could be solved, but also:

- People living within the specific location became better served,
- Restructuring the specific site with the envisaged problem solving projects provided clear identity to the area,
- Pressure in the historic centre decreases, and
- Problems of mobility diminish due to better spreading of traffic

The specific redevelopment strategy as proposed in the concept of the “7 Cities” completed with elaborations in so-called “situations”²⁹ substantiated the societal objectives. Virginio Merola, mayor of Bologna since 2012, mentioned that there was a wide support and participation, thanks to over 190 public meetings.

The PSC proposed an innovative structure vision for Bologna. This vision is a conceptual framework attempting to overcome the sector definitions of typical sector “spatial systems” normally respectively referred to as infrastructures, green areas, or public services. (Palermo and Ponzini 2012)

“The “7 Cities” are the strategic and structural image of the new plan: they recognize the existence of new types of urbanity, already present or potential; they take their name and shape from places, aiming to become familiar to those living there and to enter the “non-expert” public communication circuits; they seek to mobilize thoughts, encourage pause, promote actions and motivate care. The “7 Cities are the “operational stratagem” for dealing with problems and projects. (Gabellini 2011)(P.286)

Each “City” consists of a complex part of Bologna, which features peculiar physical and social assets and represents the spatial articulation of a selected planning theme. Each “City” represents an interpretive description of a different part of the metropolitan area, which embodies strategic proposals for future action providing a mix of sector programming and integrated spatial policies. Visualizations highlight the specificities and potentials of each local situation: types of settlement, population and social uses of space, nodes and links, emerging public and private interventions.

²⁹

The term “neighbourhood” is used in this study for those localities in the city, which are referred to as “situations” in documents.

The underlying concept of the PSC's "7 Cities" is the spatial distribution of urban functions, which anticipates the ever-increasing problems of congestion. These congestion problems substantiate in the problematic motorcar traffic and mobility problems of public transportation. Those issues were excluded from public participation in the very start of the process of 2005 and are still the problems all of the interviewees mentioned as Bologna's main actual challenges.




FIGURE 7.4 Visualized concepts of each of the "7 Cities" [Source: Urbanistica 135]

The proposed "7 Cities" are strategic devices with specific location-specific objectives:

- “Railway City” (strengthening infrastructural accessibility, central places and international visibility),
- “Beltway City” with massive trade fair developments and
- East and
- West Cities along the “Emilia Route”, which both balance the development trends and provide connection at the metropolitan level;
- City by the “Hillside” offering attractive natural environment and well-to-do residential areas;
- “Reno River” The North-south green structure along the river bringing coherence in neighbouring west side urban areas, and
- “Savena River City”. The North-south reconstruction zone at the eastern edge of Bologna

These last three “cities “ aiming for bettering environmental quality and social cohesion in the outskirts, provide components connecting to the higher scale of the actual strategic metropolitan plan. Each “city” represents a selective picture of the strategic parts of the metropolitan³⁰ area in which sector programs and urban policies are to be integrated. (Palermo and Ponzini 2012)

A spatial diagram specifies the characteristics of each of those strategic areas: environmental features, infrastructure network, urban morphology, social and demographic trends, planned public and private projects.

The design of “7 Cities” brought order in the chaotic harvest of ideas, objectives and projects resulting from two years of discussion. The concept of “7 Cities” locates strategic thematic issues of Bologna’s future development within the urban spatial pattern in relation to infrastructure and existing features in such a way that a perceptible structure resulted. The concept implies the distribution of developing urban functions over the city’s territory, avoiding concentration of car traffic in the historic core.

³⁰

The authors used here the tern “metropolitan” for the city, not for the wider, previous provincial territory.

§ 7.5 Impact of Piano Strutturale Comunale

When discussing the impact of the PSC we look at realizations of projects on the ground and subsequent administrative activities. The concept of the “7 Cities” was recognized as the way forward by civic society as well as by the politicians. Adoption and approval followed rather fast in a few months after its introduction. The process of open participation was broadly appreciated, especially in the elaboration of the concept in neighbourhoods.

According to the obligatory requirements of the regional planning legislation, the PSC has been elaborated into the *Regolamento Urbanistico Edilizio* (RUE) and the *Piano Operativo Comunale* (POC). The content of these documents with a strong legalistic and regulative focus is supposed to be nourished with the strategic spatial development policy proposals of the PSC, the concept of the “7 Cities”.

On the ground several items are realized or in the process of realization ³¹:

- Several public spaces are refurbished for pedestrian use.
- The “Beltway city” process silently continues
- The “Railway city”: the station and its environment is in a process of complete transformation
- The “City of Hills” is confirmed
- Some housing projects in the Bolognina area are completed.

The making of the strategy and the adoption by the council was followed by several subsequent activities. The city council adopted the plan mid July 2007.

The documents were published after a long period of 5 months in order to attract more observations so that new private initiatives could accompany the plan.

The obligatory elaboration of the PSC into the *Regolamento Urbanistico Edilizio* (RUE) and the *Piano Operativo Comunale* (POC) can be regarded as next rounds of decision-making.

The council approved the PSC in 2008 a year after its adoption (14/07).

³¹

Mid 2013

For each of the strategic “cities” a survey of investments and initiatives under way was developed highlighting strategic and critical areas and projects to be implemented through unitary development initiatives. In addition, a portfolio of prospective projects or urban design explorations was prepared along with the assessment of their feasibility or degree of completion. (Ginocchini & Manaresi, 2008).

The existence and the organization of many participation activities of the *Urban Centre* located at the second floor of the *Sala de Borsa*, within Bologna’s historic heart at *Piazza Nettuno* is generally regarded as an important achievement of the PSC process. The accommodating of broad participative actions and the role in communication about plans and projects was according to the interviewees highly appreciated. The regulations applied for public participation for the PSC are assumed also for the coming implementation stages.

Since Bologna has been qualified by the national government as a “Metropolitan City”, it took a new perspective in 2012. The co-operation of the Municipality with the Province of Bologna started the preparation of a *Piano Strategico Metropolitano* in begin 2013. Although the province of Bologna will be abolished in June 2014, the municipal government and the province work together on the *Piano Strategico Metropolitano*, for the wider environment of Bologna city. This new action does not seem to be approached as building on the achievements of the PSC process, as being a successive further step, but as a separate step. The few items of the “7 Cities” concept, which connect to the wider environment, seem in any case to fit in the strategic plan without problems. Also the general policy character of agreeing on intentions and objectives of the metropolitan strategic plan does not seem to create conflicts with the more concrete and space-specific character of the PSC. The new plan preparation is organized from two sides: The province chairs the group of technicians preparing the plan, and the municipality chairs the group of academics following the plan process. These more or less equal positions of province and municipality do not seem to produce an effective decision-making process. The expectation is that the metropolitan strategy will probably be a document consisting of policy objectives about social, economic and environmental policies; there are no activities envisaged to prepare for a place-related development vision. The outputs of the decision-making process for PSC are not directly used as input for the wider territory in the metropolitan strategy. But the general character of the new strategic plan is not expected to create controversies with the more specific and concrete content of the PSC.

The discontinuity of processes in combination with short memory of people probably stimulated starting the metropolitan plan as a brand new start, disconnected from the previously agreed strategic principles of PSC.

§ 7.6 Process aspects: Effectiveness, Co-ownership, Co-production and Openness of the decision-making

In order to gather more specific information giving insight and background to the process, interviews were organized with six persons, being connected to the making of the PSC from different positions: the planner, being now alderman, the participation /communication expert, an academic evaluating the PSC, a representative of the regional planning community, a project developer and an architect. Most interviews were held in Bologna's city hall, the Palazzo D'Accursio in 2013 and one in 2014.



FIGURE 7.5 City Hall Bologna in Palazzo D'Accursio

Effectiveness

The short period of four years between the approval of the PSC and the evaluation, during which the 2008 crisis developed, does not allow for conclusions about the eventual success of the strategy. Albeit too soon for an ultimate evaluation, the fact that several projects are (partly) realized might indicate that it regards a development towards a partly successful strategy. There are some modest realizations on the ground and the extensive participation process brought some learning of actors. But the effectiveness of the decision-making could be assessed according to the criteria of 5.5: being: agreement achieved, next rounds of decision-making followed and actors are satisfied. **Agreement** and approval of the PSC was achieved soon after its conception and the start of **next rounds** of decision-making developed also. The aspect of satisfaction by hindsight of the informants had to be established in the interviews. A general feeling of satisfaction could be confirmed more or less when asking interviewees about their feelings of **satisfaction** about the PSC process of 2007. The interviews showed however also that there remains, after 5 years no broad general feeling of satisfaction anymore. The persons who were responsible during the PSC decision-making were, as might be expected most satisfied, but as one reported:

“It is only a small group of technicians and cultural groups who still feel connected to the PSC process.”³²

The ones playing active roles were clearly happier about the process than others. One interviewee said his satisfaction would depend on how the actual mobility problems will be solved. But another was positive specifically about the process:

“Bologna had never such an intensive participation process before”³³

The informants showed rather different feelings of satisfaction about the process in retrospect. The general impression was that the positive feelings gradually evaporated. The project developer had a clear and strong opinion: PSC was old-fashioned and green field development oriented. (In fact the PSC advocates and mainly prepares for the transformation of the city and brown field areas)

³²

Interview Gabellini

³³

Interview Picinnini

Co-ownership

Establishing feelings of co-ownership of the PSC decision-making process was not easy, because in the discussions about the structure on the city level with several informants those aspects seemed quite irrelevant. They were happy with the process to the plan, but not co-owning the contents.

Clearly, the ones responsible for the process felt ownership: their ideas are substantiated in the PSC decision-making process. They also pointed to the fact that the feeling of ownership is fading away since the standstill of some years since 2009. The responses also illustrate the importance of continuity: the representatives of associations during the process are meanwhile followed by their successors, which were less involved than their predecessor. The persons responsible for the process are still involved.

The discontinuity in the strategic considerations due to formal RUE and POC requirements, enhanced by the political standstill during two years, combined with the general short memory of people resulted in almost forgetting the positive experience of contributing to the decision-making and fading away of feelings of ownership (§ 5.4). **Pride** of contributing to the process, **defensive** reactions and **taking credit** for specific components of the plan could not be noticed by those who were not the author of the concept of “7 Cities”. We must conclude that co-ownership applies only for a very limited group in Bologna.

Co-production/co-design

Also co-production activities as a potential achievement of the process management could not be detected in the answers of informants who experienced the decision-making process. Co-design as defined in 5.3 did not occur; Gabellini conceived the plan assisted by the municipal planning department. The process of PSC did not stimulate co-designing in the sense of iterative trial and error and what-if, then-that reasoning on the city level. The designer conceived the concept of “7 Cities”. It was not a co-designing activity.

The distinction between the participation on the level of the city and on the neighbourhood level as suggested by the interviewed communication/participation expert is relevant. At the level of neighbourhood workshops co-designing happened in some degree: development of new ideas among the participants about building and refurbishing public places were mentioned in interviews. Although no new options for the city structure emerged, the participation and neighbourhood workshops enriched the initial visualizations. Those who were actively engaged in that neighbourhood-level process noticed moments of excitement about creativity, For instance in a housing projects in Bolognino). Most informants validated the experienced learning effect of their involvement in the exercise positively.

Openness

We assumed the openness of the process important for creativity in an interactive process. (§ 5.2) The **agenda** was not completely open. At the start of the public meetings, clarity was provided about what was decided and what could still be discussed. One of the restrictions, as perceived by several interviewees was that infrastructure could not be discussed. The actual political responsible, who was the consultant planner in 2007, complained about the fact that she was engaged when several decisions about objectives were taken in conferences and forum discussions. The neighbourhood workshops continued during the period of designing the concept. They were helpful for discovering implications and opportunities within mainlines of the framework of the "7 Cities". Participation in that very first stage of the inventory of ideas was **flexible** in the sense that the forum discussions were open to everybody. The neighbourhood workshops were consisting of invited representatives of the neighbourhoods.

The "7 Cities" concept did not contain seven **alternative options or scenarios** for different directions of development of the city. The name refers to seven more or less thematic interventions proposed in seven different locations.

The process was not organized for exploring alternative options for future developments; the "7 Cities" addressed seven different problem/solution locations and delivered one proposal for each location.

Such an approach directs the discussions to elaborating, phasing and prioritizing interventions to solve existing problems. That approach does not draw the attention to contemplate different possible directions of future development of the city as a whole.

One of the interviewees complaining about the problematic mobility, considered the PSC not relevant anymore: "there is a need for a new vision."

Ignorance about the relation of spatially spreading activities and relaxing traffic intensities is apparent. PSC's vision of the "7 Cities" provided an appropriate response to the congestion problem, (Spreading some new central functions away from the historic heart over the urban area, which is still an urgent problem). The same person, head of the regional association of project developers, qualified the "7 Cities" concept as a green field concept, whereas in fact the development concentrates on brown field areas.

With regard to the **role of experts**, almost all informants were explicitly positive about the role of Patrizia Gabellini as author of the concept of the "7 Cities". The way in which that concept understood and translated the foregoing discussions was experienced as an eye-opener. Apparently there was a person providing a surprising

overview over the, until then increasing mass of studies, proposals, ideas and comments. The ongoing visualization in forums and neighbourhood meetings was experienced as very important: it further structured the chaotic discussions and summarized considerations.

Also the Urban Centre as a spin-off of the PSC process is seen as an important achievement. The head of Urban Centre, first employed by the municipality developed into a professional consultant as organizer of communication and participation activities.

§ 7.7 Evaluation and remaining issues

The context

The complex administrative context of the municipality, with a provincial, a regional and a set of national authorities to deal with, having each own spatial policy objectives created a complex administrative embedding with negative effects on the process. The region, aiming at polycentric development (referring to the EU policy objective), did not support the city of Bologna as the regional motor of development, but supported dispersed investments in the region. However proclaiming Bologna as a metropolitan city and the actual deletion of the provincial level simplify the administrative embedding of Bologna. But the planned process of reorganization and the envisaged inclusion of (previous) provincial officers in the municipal organization will probably again distract the attention from Bologna's strategic development for some time, thereby continuing the discontinuity of the PSC process.

The process

The PSC process was organized in a regional legal framework with many formal requirements. These implied that direct after the adoption of the strategic guiding principles of the PSC a period of regulative planning started.

The judicial focus of the legal obligations distracted attention from the strategic considerations of PSC towards detailed regulations, which did hardly seem related to the agreed strategy. The required procedures and juridical focus had as effect that the general positive feelings about the PSC more or less evaporated soon. The preparation of RUE was experienced as a mere juridical bureaucratic professional exercise. As one of the interviewees complained:

“RUE was a cage for planners”

The disappearing interest was even getting worse because of the two years of political standstill up to 2011. Positive feelings of the foregoing steps faded away.

The regional legislative requirement to prepare regulations (*RUE*) and an action plan (*POC*) directly after conceiving a structure plan (*PSC*) and to submit those juridical documents for approval together with the structure plan is problematic. The strategic considerations resulting in a political value-based agreement, is interrupted by judicial and bureaucratic discussions, causing fast evaporation of the constructive forward-looking atmosphere. Regulative requirements are felt to be too detailed and too judicial oriented. The preparation of *RUE* and *POC* was perceived as an important decreasing influence on the commitment to the development vision, which followed soon after the general positive reception of *PSC* in Bologna. The end result of the judicial focus in the *RUE* seems, according to several interviewees, hardly related to the content of the *PSC*. The *PSC* round of decision-making can be qualified as effective but it was a short temporary success.

PROCESS ASPECTS	PSC BOLOGNA	
openness	Open agenda setting	Partly, during start
	Informality	
	Objective focus	yes
	Broad/flexible participation	Not during conception
Co-production/design	Ideas from any side	Partly
	New ideas emerge	
	Un-envisaged options	Not co-produced
Co-ownership	Pride	Evaporated
	Defensive actions	Initially
	Take credit	Evaporated
EFFECTIVENESS NO	Agreement achieved	Yes
	Next round	Yes, but negative
	Satisfaction	Initially
(Pot) SUCCESS No	Realizations	Few
	Socio-economic impacts	No
	New regulations	No

TABLE 7.1 Process aspects PSC Bologna

The *PSC* process was initiated bottom-up by a newly elected municipal executive.

The population, historically committed to the development of their city, was involved from the start of the process in many discussions.

Those discussions led after more than two years to a collection of fragmented ideas and objectives, which formed the basis of the formal agreement with the provincial authorities.

Clarity at the start of the process about issues, which could be discussed, and issues, which were already decided, excluded infrastructure/mobility from the agenda. Excluding these essential drivers of spatial development resulted in the fact that accessibility and mobility remained the most important problems of the city. The conclusion is that the openness of the process leading to the “7 Cities” was limited and restricted the envisaged integrated approach.

Accepting the general responsibility for the PSC and the outcomes of the content related deliberations in local society, Gabellini designed the concept for the spatial transformation of Bologna in almost five months. The visualized concept of “7 Cities” was received as an eye-opener, presenting an integrated design for the way forward. The concept was recognised as a clear vision for future development, which offered solutions for the many, long discussed problems. Assumed controversies did not come true; the discussions were converged into a broad general agreement. Only five months after presenting the concept of “7 Cities” the council adopted the PSC. That experience illustrates the essential role of a designed concept in such a complex decision-making process.

With regard to the **content** of the “7 Cities” concept of the PSC it can be noticed that it has been partly successful.

The strategy had some success in realizations on the ground: some public places are refurbished and developments in the “Beltway City” and the complex “Railway City” are gradually underway. Some residential areas are realised. Also the establishment and activities of the Urban Centre are regarded as important achievements.

The PSC strategy-making process was positive in the short period after its adoption thanks to the designed concepts, the related visualizations of place-based solutions of and the council’s fast adoption of the vision. The underlying spatial policy of developing services and activities, which enhance Bologna’s position as regional centre, at locations outside the historic centre, seems to have received insufficient attention. The concept of “7 Cities” can be qualified as probably the right response to the urban issues Bologna is confronted with. But severe discontinuity at the political level, together with the legal regulative planning context, requiring complex bureaucratic procedures jeopardized these initial positive experiences.

Persons

Another factor of discontinuity occurred at the political level: PSC, RUE and POC were approved in the municipal council, as the last act of that council before new elections. The persons composing the new council were less connected to the approved documents, and tended to start new interpretations of the content of PSC. The (2008) newly elected mayor had to leave after six months and then a period of a national appointed commissioner came to fill the gap. This situation obliged the *Giunta* governing the city by only addressing non-essential (non-strategic) issues. As a consequence a political standstill followed with regard to strategic thinking of two years after approving PSC, RUE and POC.

The actual municipal executive's composition (since 2012) can be regarded as an attempt to restore continuity in the PSC process: Merola, the co-initiator of and alderman during the preparation of PSC became the new mayor, and Gabellini who was the consultant for preparing the PSC, became invited as alderman responsible for PSC.

The roles and activities of those individual persons for the effectiveness of the decision-making process in the Bologna case may not be underestimated. First the 2004 newly elected politicians Cofferati and Merola initiated the strategic development process. Second, after assembling large amounts of ideas, comments, proposals and plans, the chaotic plethora had to be structured and brought into life in a vision. Then, almost three years after the start of the executive's mandate, the consultant was engaged: Gabellini got the task to substantiate the massive quantity of facts, ideas and propositions for projects into a coherent vision for future development. At her start Patrizia Gabellini considered the limitation of the scope not in the interest of the future development, but designed in five months the "7 Cities" concept, which apparently surprised and satisfied all as the way forward. Also the successful communication about the PSC and the organization of interactions and participation was strongly influenced by an individual person: Giovanni Ginocchini, head of Urban Centre.

But after adoption of PSC the big discontinuity started with the preparation of juridical plans, a failing mayor and a national commissioner. That period of a national commissioner reigning did not allow the preparation of strategic politics. That problematic situation is addressed after the elections in 2011, when Merola became mayor and Gabellini became alderman attempting to restore continuity. But the existing commitment of the public, stakeholders and the politicians had already decreased too much.

The preparation of the Metropolitan Strategic Plan, together with the province seems to result in listings of objectives, without utilizing concrete outputs of the PSC process. The situation at the start of the metropolitan strategy contains similarities with the situation of the preparation of PSC of 2007: hundreds of ideas were assembled and a structure and vision are needed again.

Remaining **issues and controversies** are related to the problems of accessibility of the city. At the start of the process in 2005 further talking about the controversies about the system of public transport was simply excluded by the new *giunta*. That was accepted in local society; everybody was tired about the subject and the money spoiled in studies and a failed project. But after approving the resulting plan (“7 Cities”) in 2007 the problems of accessibility still existed, moreover it had substantially increased. The issues were still dominating in the interviews in 2013. The “7 Cities” concept included distracting the increasing traffic pressure from the historic centre through distributing new facilities around the historic centre. That was not implemented due to the standstill of the process after 2007. This part of the creative design would partly comply with recast agenda setting as an approach to the controversy. (Van Eeten 1999) The project for a “people mover” connecting *Bologna Centrale* (main railway station) with the international airport was not excluded from consideration, because it was declared not to belong to the PSC but to regard a component of the metropolitan infrastructure. The plan preparation for this project has stopped, waiting for legal courts verdict about the judicial status of the municipal role in the implementation and operation of that connection.³⁴ And such juridical procedures may demand many years. The general infrastructure for accessibility by various modes of transportation, which could not be taken into consideration in the PSC from the start on in 2005, is still not addressed by integrated planning, so that the problems of accessibility of the city remain.

The evaporated support and commitment to the PSC will quite probably include that the outputs as summarized in the “7 Cities” concept are not applied as the spatial framework for future development anymore.

That would imply that the activities for constructing the new railway station and restructuring its environment would be the main results of the comprehensive PSC.

A structural controversy refers to the polycentric spatial planning policy of the Emilia Romagna region. It is unclear whether the region continues with distributing support, investments and financial facilities over the region, aiming at polycentric development at the scale of the region. For the future development of its capital city Bologna, a clear spatial framework of Emilia Romagna would provide clarity about the possibilities to address its large problems.

³⁴

According to Italian legal procedures that can take many years.

§ 7.8 Conclusions: No effectiveness of Bologna PSC

The context of the process, consisting of strict legislation and a complex administrative embedding, was not supportive to the effectiveness of the PSC process. Higher authorities seemed mainly acting as controllers with a juridical focus, not as partners to the municipality.

The process of strategy making started quite open; but restrictions were set regarding the possibility to discuss problems of infrastructure and accessibility. After two years a large collection of studies, ideas and loose proposals resulted, still not suggesting strategic mainlines. The consultant designer prepared in five months the concept of "7 Cities", which was selective among the existing chaos of ideas and structured the strategy for future development. The attractive visually presented concept was convincing and created broad support among the public and the politicians. It was soon officially adopted. But then the juridical focus of next step in legislative procedures took gradually away the initial support. A real next step in the strategy making did not occur and the process became not effective.

The place-related circumstances were also not supportive to the effectiveness. The local political discontinuity, caused by a failing mayor after elections in 2008, resulted in a strategic standstill during more than two years. The later established attempt to take-up the process by the 2012 elected mayor, (being one of the initiators of the process in 2004) to install the designer of "7 Cities" as responsible alderman came too late: PSC became history.

8 Drechtsteden: long-term performing scenario planning

SCENARIOSTUDIE DRECHTSTEDEN 2030

§ 8.1 Introduction

Drechtsteden is the name of the co-operation of eight³⁵ municipalities around Dordrecht, located south of the Rotterdam agglomeration in the province of Zuid-Holland in The Netherlands. The Drechtsteden area consists of the territory of the municipalities Dordrecht, Zwijndrecht, Hendrik Ido Ambacht, Papendrecht, Sliedrecht, Alblasterdam, s' Gravendeel, Heerjansdam. The Rotterdam agglomeration is part of the metropolitan Southwing of Randstad Holland.



FIGURE 8.1 Location of Drechtsteden, South of Rotterdam

³⁵

The number reduced to six after merging of two municipalities in other municipalities.

The Drechtsteden area includes about 265,000 inhabitants in an area of 17.000 ha around the central city of Dordrecht (120.000), which claims to be Holland's oldest town. Dordrecht is traditionally characterized by harbour and harbour related activities, which expanded into the area around the town. The large rivers of the Rhine estuary determine important components of the identity of the landscape: High dykes surrounding low laying agricultural polders. The villages developed mainly where roads or polder streams cross the dykes. In the post-war period those villages developed into sub-urban settlements predominantly for commuters to the Rotterdam area. The spatial development issues in this sub-region are many: previous shipbuilding and other industry left (polluted) waterfront areas, important international traffic flows intersect the area with waterways, the freight dedicated Betuwe rail line connecting Rotterdam to the German hinterland, heavy road infrastructure towards the European hinterland and between the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp, and the suburbanized regional municipalities compete with offering housing, zones for economic activities and service centres. City renovation is needed on a large scale especially in Dordrecht. Sub-urbanisation tends to occupy the surrounding typical polder landscape units. The individual municipalities developed each zones of economic activities, which were quite mediocre as a result of mutual prize competition.

The Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030 was prepared in 1997. The Drechtsteden co-operation was a voluntary activity of municipalities, which considered their interests relative to the future context of the wider Rotterdam Rijnmond agglomeration. These common interests included issues of urban regeneration, infrastructure, accessibility, liveability, employment, environment and landscape. One of the issues the municipalities wanted to tackle in co-operation was the large need for urban regeneration.

The province of Zuid-Holland, preparing the regional spatial development plan, (streekplan) which provides the indicative framework for municipal plans, wanted to stimulate multi-municipal planning and promised support to the outputs of the Drechtsteden co-operation towards a common development vision for inclusion in the regional plan.

The Drechtsteden project has been used as a pilot project in this study for testing the approach to the subject and more specifically the applicability of the draft checklist for interviewing informants of the actual study.

Since the municipal councils of the involved municipalities agreed the policy more than 15 years ago, it was not easy to assemble documents about the informal process of preparing the strategy. Archives of the Drechtsteden organization (formally existing since 2005) did not cover files of the informal period of co-operation in which the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* was prepared. On the Internet only a summary of the scenario study existed.

The informal, pressure cooker character of the decision-making process of the working group, meeting every Friday in a period of four months, included that the weekly appointments for envisaged next steps were made orally and that minutes were simply not made.

Available written information consisted of the few printed reports presented at the meetings of municipal responsible persons of all the municipalities for approval and later to the Councils of the municipalities for final agreement about the commonly preferred direction of development. The available information consisted of:

- Project Drechtsteden and Zandvoort, Ordening & Advies, 1997, *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030, naar een samenhangend ontwikkelingsperspectief*.
- Project Drechtsteden and Zandvoort, Ordening & Advies, 2000, *Ontwikkelingsplan en – Programma, Stedelijke Vernieuwing en Groene Contramal Drechtsteden*.
- *Nieuwe Verbindingen en Oude Barrieres, een institutionele kijk op regional samenwerking* (Hornis 2004) An evaluative MSc thesis about the related *Drechoevers* project. The *Drechoevers* project gave rise to the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* and was later included within the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030*.
- *Zaandrecht- De Hollandse Waterstad in Transformatie. Report of Breed Beraad Stadsvernieuwing* (De Graaf 2005) Evaluation of *Drechoevers* project: www.forum-sv.nl/pdf/sfsv_verslag_zaandrecht.pdf
- *De Drechoevers; 20 jaar oeverontwikkeling, lessen voor de toekomst.* (Bode and Seip 2011) Evaluation of *Drechoevers* project.
- *Netwerkstad Drechtsteden; Voortdurend in Ontwikkeling* (Plasmeijer and Van de Laar 2010) Evaluation of the co-operation of the seven municipalities in Drechtsteden.
- Interviews. The lack of written material was to be addressed in encounters with participants in the decision-making process as far as they could be detected after 15 years.

The interviewees provided useful background information about the process. The author's memory, being chair of the production group on 1997 was refreshed and enriched by the perspectives of other participants. Although after 15 years, the memories of the interviewees were not contradictory about facts, they mutually completed the picture. Besides, the subject of the information needed from interviews consisted largely of personal evaluations of the process and perceptions of activities regarding aspects like ownership (pride, taking credit of ideas), openness of the process, co-creating solutions etcetera. The perceptions of the proceedings during the making of the vision appeared to be rather similar in the individual interviews

As mentioned before, the relative success of this round of decision-making in which the researcher was involved 15 years ago, gave rise to the idea for the current study when re-encountering the project after 13 years. The triggering question was: if that intuitively led decision-making process resulted in a quite successful strategy, which conditions supported that success?

§ 8.2 The Netherlands Planning System

The EU Compendium on Spatial Planning Systems and Policies in Europe qualifies the Dutch planning tradition as belonging to the category of the *integrated comprehensive* model of planning. The Dutch legislation of spatial planning in force at the moment of conceiving the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* was the *Wet Ruimtelijke Ordening* (WRO, Act on Spatial Planning) originally of 1966 with its amendments. In Dutch planning legislation municipalities possess a relative large degree of autonomy. Municipalities have the power to bind parties to specific land uses. Municipalities are legally obliged to dedicate locations to specific types of land uses by preparing and adopting so-called *bestemmingslannen*³⁶ for (parts of) their municipal territory. The municipal *bestemmingsplan*³⁷ is the only binding spatial plan. The regions (*provincie*) have their regional plans (*streekplan*), in which the regional development policy is explained in a clarification report and maps. The regions approve³⁸ the municipal plans on basis of their regional development policy as expressed in the regional plan documents, but the regional plans are indicative. Dutch national planning policy is expressed in national plans, which are also (not always) consisting of maps and integrative reports and supported by study reports, subsidies and policy recommendations. The national government controls the regional plans. The power of national plans is, like the regional plans for the local level also indicative. That means that both higher tiers of government indicate their preferences by means of (mapped) plans, but not in absolute terms. They are also open for better ideas or interpretations. In practice, municipalities and provinces often communicate and negotiate about the content of their spatial development policy. The approval of *bestemmingsplannen* by the province often includes indications for modifying the municipal plan. This system of balancing top-down and bottom-up policies implies a lot of communication and negotiations between municipalities and the representatives of higher authorities. (*poldermodel*)³⁹ In order to speed-up such negotiations about higher level interests, the 2008 renewed planning legislation provided the national and the provincial level the competence to also prepare binding plans; the so-called *inpassingsplannen*.

³⁶ Literally translated: plans giving a future (or actual) functional destination to sites

³⁷

³⁸ Actual modernized planning legislation (*Omgevingswet, 2008*) does not require formal approval anymore and gives provinces and the national government also the possibility to secure their interests in binding *bestemmingsplannen*.

³⁹ The expression *Poldermodel* refers to the tradition in Dutch democracy aiming at building support, consensus and personal commitment through extensive negotiations, which are suspected to originate from the interdependencies of parties for adequate water management in (*polder*) land below sea level.

Although the standing national policy for gradually increasing the size of municipalities preferably above 20.000 inhabitants through merging ⁴⁰ of smaller municipalities (actual coalition agreement included a long-term preference of at least 100.000 inhabitants ⁴¹) it is recognized that addressing important issues like labour market, housing market, environment and traffic infrastructure require co-operation of groupings of municipalities in larger functional areas anticipating on larger units. That is reason for higher authorities to promote preparing comprehensive, integrated structure plans or development visions for long-term development preferably in co-operation of several municipalities. Although co-operation in developing (sub) regional development strategies is supported by the Dutch spatial planning policy, there is no obligation for multi-municipal strategy making for strategic spatial development. As a consequence no specific formal requirements apply to strategy making and the administrative system does not strongly articulate juridical aspects. Although some regulations include financial support for co-operative actions, co-operation is voluntary.

Previously, main motors of spatial development in The Netherlands were municipal initiatives for urban expansion for housing and urban renovation. Municipalities expanded with large residential areas after the war. During the sixties and seventies programmes of over 120.000 dwellings were yearly realised, of which a large proportion of social housing. That changed in the late nineties, and during first decade of twentieth century. Under influence of EU policies privatisation of housing corporations, level playing field objectives and expanded possibilities for project developers decreased the role of municipalities as driving forces for spatial development. The influence of EU environmental directives and economic competitiveness supported the shift towards (regional) strategies. (Van Ravesteyn and Evers 2006, Zonneveld and Evers 2014)

⁴⁰ In 1950 the Netherlands counted 1000 municipalities, in 2013: 408

⁴¹ Recently politically softened and reduced to 50.000

§ 8.3 Administrative embedding of the process

The formal administrative embedding of the *Drechtsteden* project was quite simple. A form of co-operation, consisting of representatives of municipalities was established, facilitated through the Joint Provisions Act.⁴²(1995) That enabled the grouping of individual municipalities to communicate with the higher authorities as being one party. This form of co-operation facilitates organizing services, which can better be organized at a level beyond the local level, the intensity and subjects of co-operation to be decided by the involved partners. The ambitious and inspiring *Drechttoeversproject*, affecting the territories of the eight municipalities, which was initially welcomed by all municipal councils, had triggered the need for closer co-operating in spatial development processes.(Bode and Seip 2011) The province of South-Holland actively supported and stimulated such sub-regional co-operation as a possibility for better coordinated development. The original light common arrangement for the Drechtsteden area (*Gemeenschappelijke Regeling Drechtsteden*) was after 2005 modified in a more formal council. (*Drechtstedenraad*). That was a consequence of a continuous search for more effective managing the co-operation of the municipalities. Especially the need to realize projects through a voluntary organization without strong powers for implementation stimulated the search for effective arrangements. (Hornis 2004, Plasmeijer and Van de Laar 2010) The province earlier supported the *Drechttoeversproject* in 1995, concerning the ambitious development vision for fourteen waterfront projects in the sub-region. Two years later, the *Drechtstedenproject* was set up, because a more integrated approach to spatial development than the physical urbanistic Drechttoevers Master Plan was felt to be necessary.⁴³ (De Graaf 2005) The province continued its support and contributed actively as co-principal to the new project with experts and budget.

The issue of neglected areas in *Drechtsteden* required to be addressed with a common policy for urban renovation. The Dutch national government provided a system for financially supporting municipalities for implementing urban regeneration (ISV)⁴⁴. Within that system larger cities like Dordrecht could enjoy facilities like fast track application for subsidy in direct relation with the relevant Ministry. Smaller municipalities like the other seven *Drechtsteden* municipalities, had to apply for financial support through the provincial authority. The *Drechtsteden* municipalities considered, supported by the province, requesting financial support together as if they were one larger municipality. One of the requirements for national financial support

⁴² *Wet Gemeenschappelijke Regeling* (WGR) see:OECD (2014). Territorial Review: Netherlands 2014.

⁴³ Interview G.J.Vogelaar, responsible politician for Drechtsteden development

⁴⁴ Investeringsbudget stedelijke vernieuwing.

for urban regeneration is that the regeneration projects are component of a wider integrated long-term policy based on an agreed vision for future development. As a consequence, the combined multi-municipal request for financial support had to include a multi-municipal integrated development vision. That long-term integrated vision was prepared within the *Drechtsteden* project.

The resulting administrative embedding of the *Drechtsteden* project was a bottom-up initiated voluntary collaboration, which could operate as a single actor and had to communicate with one (supportive) higher authority: the province.

§ 8.4 Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030

Issues to be addressed

The issues to be addressed in the *Drechtsteden* area consisted of a mix of problems:

- Rundown industrial activities like shipbuilding, process industry and demolition of vessels have left large areas of derelict and polluted land, especially located at waterfronts.
- Housing stock, partly dating from pre-war periods, partly consisting of post-war fast building activities, required renewal.
- Fragmented development in the sub-region caused a weak structure of retail and services for the population as well as redundant offer of competing sites for economic activities, of mediocre quality.
- Urban expansion of individual municipalities threatened valuable landscape entities
- Recent infrastructure projects in this gateway to *Randstad* (highways and *Betuweroute* for dedicated rail transport Rotterdam - Germany) required adapted connection and environmental impact mitigation.
- Public transport needed larger capacity (partly for commuters to *Randstad*)

Next to these issues, the *Drechttoeversproject*, of Teun Koolhaas, inspired the local politicians and created enthusiasm about the suggested potentials for future development. That caused a shift in viewing the region among municipal council members. (1995) Instead of first considering the region as an assembly of separated villages located along and behind the high river dykes, the new perspective suggested a large urban area connected over rivers. The grouping of municipalities decided to co-operate for exploring possibilities for realizing the Master Plan *Drechttoevers*.

The *Drechtmevers* project consisted of urban projects for derelict land, thereby focussing on the large need for regeneration of old factory and shipyards. It proposed waterfront redevelopments along the rivers, which cross the region, providing redundant capacity for new housing.




FIGURE 8.2 Drechtmevers project
[Source: *De Drechtmevers; 20 jaar oeverontwikkeling, lessen voor de toekomst.* (Bode and Seip 2011)]

The experience with the *Drechtmevers* waterfront project, identifying locations with a potential capacity for over 5000 dwellings learned that not only selectivity and prioritization was needed but also a comprehensive approach. That included that next to waterfronts, also the whole of the municipal territories had to be taken into consideration. Therefore the so-called *Drechtstedenproject* was identified as the way forward for the conurbation of eight municipalities in early 1997 in order to provide the required framework for a more realistic development strategy.⁴⁵

⁴⁵

Interview G.J. Vogelaar

The aim of the project was to develop an integrated spatial framework in which the commonly preferred future situation was depicted, globally identifying locations of land-use functions like types of residencies, areas of different economic activities, services, highway connections, railway stations and other public transport facilities like light rail, waterbuses and ferries, but also the embedding in the wider landscape.

So the issues to be addressed were not only the specific problems listed in the start of this paragraph but also a wider, long-term development perspective was needed, which encompassed the ambitions of the *Drechttoevers Master Plan*.

Achieving a common vision on the future included agreeing on the positioning of the sub-region within the wider region and positioning the individual municipalities within the sub-region. That implied discussions about the future economic basis and other objectives of development. The core issues, addressing the interest of each of the individual municipal councils consist of decisions about locating the different functions in the territories of the previously competing municipalities within the sub-region.

The process of strategy making

The organization of the making of the vision was as follows:

The Drechtsteden organization hardly existed when the process started. Deliberately the co-operating municipalities had decided that the (organizational) structure would follow the content. (Plasmeijer and Van de Laar 2010) The *Drechtstedenproject* was politically backed through a "council" consisting of the aldermen responsible for spatial development of the involved municipalities. A steering group consisting of the mayors was overseeing that council of aldermen. The representative of the second large municipality was appointed as responsible for the *Drechtsteden* project in the meeting of municipal aldermen. This *Zwijndrecht* alderman, *Gertjan Vogelaar*, choose the secretary general of *Zuid-Holland Zuid*, *Fred Meerhof* as responsible official for the project. The supporting provincial authority assumed co-principal ship to the project. The consultant fitting in the aims of the project was invited to propose and specify activities, process, products and the time schedule.

The envisaged aim was globally indicated: to identify a direction of a common development of the eight municipalities, which could be agreed and supported by all of the individual municipal councils and which provided a spatial framework for the many individual ideas and potential projects, which had been proposed or considered in the different municipalities, without an over-all vision. That challenge was interpreted as the task to produce an agreed common long-term development vision in an interactive way. The activity was named after the proposed approach for conducting scenario planning: *Scenario studie Drechtsteden 2030*.

The combination of insights of the responsible official Fred Meerhof, and the experiences of the consultant with more or less similar processes of preparing multi-municipal strategic decision-making, formed the basis of organizing an interactive process in the production group. The principal had clear views on the way to connect informal and legal processes:

- Organize the decision-making as a project next to, but not separated from the municipal line-organizations;
- Include individual experts from those municipal organizations in the production group;
- Keep the responsible politicians and the heads of the municipal organizations intensively informed;
- Approve and fix achievements in formal council decisions

A so-called production group was established with municipal experts from different relevant disciplines such as environmental sciences, landscape planning, economy, housing, sociology and policy sciences and experts from the *Drechtveers project*, together with spatial planning experts from the side of the consultancy, both design oriented and research oriented. In total the production group consisted of fifteen persons, all of them experienced in their discipline. The production group met every Friday morning in *Dordrecht*.

The consultant, contractually responsible for the progress, was appointed to chair the working group and meet the required deadline. The secretary general of *Zuid-Holland Zuid* supported the moderation of the chair. Due to the time pressure to agree within about four months, public participation or representations of private or non-governmental institutions was not envisaged. In later steps more organizations and representatives of civic society were involved. According to interviewees that such a process would probably be organized differently now.

Connected to the provincial support consisting of co-financing the decision-making process and assisting with experts in the production group the province set two important conditions influencing the process:

If the grouping of municipalities could unanimously agree on one common integrated vision for future development, the province would adopt the output and include the result in its forthcoming regional plan (*streekplan*) and,

If the communities could together agree on one submission for the national grants for urban renewal based on their common vision for spatial development, than the grouping of *Drechtsteden* as a whole would get the provincial support for the existing extra facilities of a large city for urban renewal subsidies.

The first condition included that a common vision had to be produced and agreed within about a four months period. The deadlines were set by the time schedules of the preparation of the provincial *streekplan* (before the end of July 1997) and the date before which requests for subsidy for urban renewal had to be submitted. Related to the ISV subsidy was that first regeneration projects had to be realized (dwellers housed) in 2005. Those facilities offered by the province and connected to a time schedule, created a clear sense of urgency among the co-operating municipalities.

An approach was agreed within the production group, for considering together the basic question:

Which possible directions of development after 2010 would exist and which direction of development would we recommend in case we, as a group, would be responsible for steering that development?

Some actors received this exciting question in sceptical way: *“Is it not the consultant’s task to submit his proposals for our comments?”* But during the discussions understanding grew that interactive option creation was deliberately aimed at.

The core activity of the agreed working programme was simple and flexible: The consultant’s office would facilitate the production group’s work through weekly nourishing the discussions with ideas, options, considerations, data. The group would collaboratively consider, sketch, elaborate, modify, develop ideas and decide.

- 1 The consultants would present preferably mapped new draft ideas and options for open consideration by all, in each weekly meeting.
- 2 The production group members would discuss the options and react with ideas, alternatives, views and preferences.
- 3 The consultants would assess, elaborate, modify or reject the production group’s reactions on the presentations of the previous weekly meeting, and present the assessed, elaborated, modified or rejected ideas in the week thereafter for decision by the group.
- 4 The modification and/or reactions as prepared by the consultant are discussed and decided, and in the same meeting new proposals for further options, (as in the first step) will be presented for open consideration.
- 5 Then the second step follows again.
The aim was to generate new, better options for future developments.

The tight time schedule resulting from deadlines for submitting contributions to the provincial *streekplan* and the submission of requests for grants for urban renewal (ISV) set the obligation to deliver end July 1997. The metaphor of working in a *pressure cooker* was used frequently.

After taking account of relevant policy papers and comparing the related maps of the national, the provincial and local levels, it was agreed that there was a clear need for coordinating the separate policies of municipalities and sectors. It was also clear (in 1997) that approved spatial development policies for projects within the coming 10 years, had to be considered as existing reality because decision-making was finished and the implementation of those elaborated policies were already in progress.⁴⁶ In order to create a common basis of information, global explorations were prepared such as quantitative projections of demographic development trends. Maps distinguishing spatial patterns according to types of residential areas and zones of economic activities within the conurbation, the age of different urban entities, the landscape characteristics and a summarizing map was produced indicating the more or less "existing" situation: *Kaart Drechtsteden 2010*. That information was accepted as basic information for starting the group's explorative actions.

First a global overview based on available spatial-economic studies⁴⁷ about the relative strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats to future developments of the *Drechtsteden* region was presented. That overview was extensively considered and discussed by the production group. The discussions aimed at broad acknowledgement of the importance of spatial economic aspects for future development. It was considered highly important that all participants digested these studies in order to create a common feeling of the relative position of the territory in terms of strength and opportunities in comparison with other (sub) regions: It was intended that it became the SWOT of the production group, not just another expert's report. And, maybe equally important, the considerations during discussions gradually unveiled the objectives and values used by the participants and the organizations they represented.

The values, which were apparently relevant for the actors in the start of the process, formed the basis of drafting four global, thinkable scenarios, as options for future development. The territorial expressions and implications were drafted on maps 1:100.000 and presented with clarifying story lines, articulating the distinct characteristics of the diverse options.

⁴⁶ This was agreed in the production group, unless the results of the Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030 would clearly point to the necessity to modify an existing policy

⁴⁷ Commissie Toekomst Drechtsteden; 1990; Drechtsteden in/naar een Strategische Alliantie. AB Onderzoek BV; 1996; Profielschets Drechtsteden.

- The first scenario was a trend scenario indicating the impacts of continuation of the actual fragmented development: each municipality aiming at own objectives. The map of this scenario was called *local autonomy*.



FIGURE 8.3 Four initial scenarios [Source: Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030]

The other three draft scenarios depicted other possible integrated developments, respectively emphasizing:

- The interest of concerted economic development, called *accent on strong sectors*;
- Putting an accent on *ecology and sustainability* as third scenario, and the fourth one:
- Focussing on *high residential quality and quality of life*.

The production group extensively considered the four draft scenarios in several successive meetings, commented, corrected, completed, enriched and modified the initial ones into more elaborated possible integrated developments. The gradually developing maps became more detailed on scale 1:25.000. During these considerations, the preferences and values represented by the different actors became more specified and explicit. The apparent values of the actors were reformulated in terms of criteria for assessing redressed scenarios. The first scenario was abandoned in an early stage, since fragmented development was not considered as a wished-for way forward. Especially the problems deriving from oversupply: developing too many, quite similar zones of economic activities in the various municipalities, which resulted in price-competition and low quality, was strongly recognised. The value of considering that trend scenario was: triggering actors to think about different ways of influencing future development, into a different direction.

The next step was comparing the resulting three scenarios: Three maps depicting three different integrated possible future developments were presented equally, next to each other. The visualized scenarios were related to the values of the group as expressed in previous discussions. (These different value systems were characterized as “liberal”, “green” and “social”)

The different options were extensively discussed in terms of advantages and disadvantages, scoring pluses and minuses on an overview. The terminology of “advantages” and “disadvantages” was deliberately utilized as rule of the game, in order to avoid actor’s tendency to only think about their single preferred solution, which fits their sector interest best and leads to rejecting and excluding other options. That not-open type of thinking would evoke attacks and defence reactions in a group, whereas the aimed for underlying question is: what is to be modified in order to make an option acceptable? Qualifying options in advantages or disadvantages resulted in a broad overview of pluses and minuses, which were then again considered for improving the three scenarios.

Various approaches consisted of next considerations:

- Analyse which advantages of different scenarios, as established in the previous step, could be combined without creating new problems;
- How possible newly created problems could be solved;
- Which possible synergies resulted from combinations of items;
- Which new synergies could be created?

That happened while sketching on maps, indicating locations, relations and mixing functions: generating new options. Previously assumed impossible combinations of items from different scenarios did surprisingly hardly appear.

The contrary was noticed: synergies developed.

The vision expressed in the agreed scenario depicted clear choices about locations for developing economic zones, residential areas, infrastructure and nature. The locations for waterfront developments were adopted from the *Drechttoevers* project, which was included as a component of this *Drechtsteden* project.

During preparation, the work was regularly checked in the grouping of the various municipal heads of spatial planning. The production group produced the integrated vision within the given time: between April and end July 1997. At the end of the preparation process, the achievements were presented to the responsible provincial politician, who accepted and supported the result for inclusion within the provincial *streekplan*.

Shortly after, all of the eight councils of the municipalities agreed on the proposed preferred scenario for development and decided formally to adopt the proposed direction of development.

The concept

The activities of the value based, qualitative scenario study resulted in an agreed scenario for future development with the year of 2030 as time horizon. The *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* contained recommendations to the politicians and localised interventions in the form of the visualized scenario for the development of the conurbation on two maps, depicting the internal urban structure and the external context of the landscaped green belt. The report included clarifications on the background and the considerations regarding the proposed content of the production group.



FIGURE 8.4 Development vision *Drechtsteden 2030* in two maps: urban and landscape development. [Source: *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030*]

Characteristics of the *Drechtsteden 2030* scenario are:

- Compactness of urban development. The landscaped green belt surrounding the urban area is envisaged to act as a counterforce against sub-urbanisation.
- Relative high densities and mixed functions around stops of improved public transportation system,
- Spatial qualities of residential areas and areas for economic activities are differentiated according to local characteristics and specific economic activities.
- Waterfront developments including brown field developments along the rivers provide characteristic residential and mixed environments.
- A system of waterbuses and ferries cross the river barriers in order to enhance functional relations with the regional centre in *Dordrecht*
- Clear spatial distinctions between urban and rural areas (green belt), but
- Intensive functional relations between urban and rural areas. (Sport, recreation)

- Non-built green functions and water bodies required for managing water levels in the polder system and for recreation, together with entities of protected nature and agricultural production areas are located in the green belt around the conurbation.
- Specialization of the zones of economic development in accordance with their location assets.

The functional and mental core, Dordrecht's historic city centre is located at the three-forked crossing of rivers *Beneden Merwede*, *Oude Maas* and *Noord*.

Concentrating facilities and services around railway stations and other stops of public transport, aimed to reduce car-use thereby supporting enhanced ecologic, economic as well as residential qualities. The green belt around *Drechtsteden* would support the natural quality of the un-built environment and offer attractiveness to the nearby residential sites. Concentrating city apartments in *Dordrecht* centre would enhance the urban quality there and allowed for open green residential areas in the smaller municipalities, thereby increasing the variety of residential environments in the conurbation. These sets of extra advantages enhancing the spatial quality of the whole conurbation resulted from synergetic juxtaposition of functions when visualizing ideas on the maps.

§ 8.5 Impact of the strategy

The *Drechtsteden* project and the *Drechttoevers* projects have been subject to several evaluations. The *Drechttoevers* project, which formed the start of *Drechtsteden* has been included in the *Drechtsteden* project because a more comprehensive development policy was considered necessary. Evaluations of the *Drechttoevers* project (Hornis 2004, De Graaf 2005, Bode and Seip 2011) were ambiguous. The one of 2004 concentrated on the problems of co-operation of autonomous entities, which are represented in the co-operation by elected persons, responsible for the interests of their voters. Noticing that in 2004 not many of the projects envisaged in the Master Plan are realized would provide a quite depressing impression of the effectiveness. For a fair evaluation the time horizon of the plan should have been taken into consideration and a more evolutionary approach to the assessment (Van Bueren 2009) would do more justice to the process character of strategic development. Besides, the wording "Master Plan" is confusing because the original plan was deliberately not presented as a blue-print; it was an indication of opportunities. (De Graaf 2005)

The 2005 evaluation of experts of the urban regeneration forum is taking account of the wider perspective, looking at progress of previously non-existing co-operation and understanding of issues of implementation of a project, which by far extends the size of what is normal for the involved organizations. The 2011 evaluation reported progress: roughly half of the projects are implemented. Also shifting interpretations in some of the waterfront developments of the *Drechttoevers* project were noticed



FIGURE 8.5 New housing project in Dordrecht

Our subject, the *Drechtsteden* project has also been evaluated before. (Plasmeijer and Van de Laar 2010) The co-operation has been qualified as quite fruitful: Working together is eased, trust among partners grew and many municipal tasks are carried out in the common organization. The development of the organizational structure during addressing content issues is not easy but appeared to be satisfying. Municipalities tend to support regional interests more than before. Despite difficult market situations, projects made progress.

The outcomes of *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* as assessed 15 years after its adoption can be qualified as successful. Although 2012 (moment of interviews) is halfway, (the time horizon of the scenario study is 2030) most of the envisaged projects are already realised. Checking the projects realised on the ground in an interview with the actual (2012) responsible for spatial development of *Drechtsteden* confirmed the success of the strategy:

- Almost all of urban renewal projects (ISV) have been realised
- Most of the urban expansions are realised
- Half of the envisaged waterfront developments are realised, some are under construction
- Waterbuses system operates
- Fast ferry system operates
- Three new stops in *Merwede Linge* railway line are in function
- Improved connections to A15 and A16 highways are implemented
- Investment in *Biesbosch* national park are done
- Landscaping projects along *river Merwede* are realised.

Although not all envisaged projects can be attributed to the scenario study, because many locations for waterfront developments were previously identified in the *Drechtveers* project, together with the ideas about public transportation over water, the general framework of the scenario study was apparently needed to decide on a coherent framework, elaborations, priorities and investments. It is clear and not amazing that progress on the most ambitious and difficult waterfront projects as identified in the *Drechtveersproject* are most lagging behind.



FIGURE 8.6 Waterbuses system

Not only many concrete projects have been realized also many new integrated plan documents and sector elaborations based on the scenario study followed.



FIGURE 8.7 Detail of Riedijkshaven project Dordrecht

“The Scenario Studie Drechtsteden 2030 and the resulting mapped image became the basis for all next policy.” (Hornis 2004)(P.33)

Several municipalities elaborated their municipal structure plans, providing guidelines for binding local plan documents, based on the agreed scenario.

The making of the vision, clearly influenced subsequent activities: most of the following documents referred to the vision as its starting points. The vision performed. The envisaged flexibility of interpretation of the framework has been sparsely used: Some projects are elaborated a bit differently from the ideas of 1997: It has been decided that one of the waterfront areas in *Papendrecht* will not provide new residencies, but remain available for maritime economic activities, a residential area meant for well to do housing was skipped, and part of the landscape design North of *Zwijndrecht* is elaborated differently.

The 1997 initiative (ROM-D) to commonly manage and invest in all municipal zones of economic activities was less successful. After a promising start, practice developed that municipalities only submitted their economically problematic possessions and kept their successfully exploited zones of economic activities. Also the idea of a light rail connection with Rotterdam did not yet realize.

The voluntary *Drechtsteden* organization became an official organization. In 2006 the co-operation of municipalities formalised in the official common arrangement called *Gemeenschappelijke Regeling*. (GR) which since then absorbed many municipal tasks of the constituent municipalities.

The *Drechtsteden* bureau consisting in 1997 of five persons employed 850 persons end 2012, executing the majority of municipal tasks. The municipalities expecting increased efficiency tend to intensify co-operation.

Many subsequent activities followed. In order to secure instruments and budgets, the (sub) region and the province undersigned a memorandum of understanding⁴⁸ in the spring of 1999. That agreement led to the *Implementation Programme Drechtsteden*⁴⁹, which consisted of two coherent projects: Urban renewal/restructuring and the Greenbelt.⁵⁰ Both projects are explicitly elaborating on and specifying the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* (1997) and *Streekplan Zuid-Holland Zuid* (1999)

All reports related to urban renewal considered urban aspects consisting of residential areas before 1970 (28 residential areas) and zones of industrial or other economic activities (17), as well as landscape aspects consisting of the proposed green belt and urban green corridors. The integrated approach of residential areas, economic zones and large-scale landscaping was maintained in steps towards implementation. Intersecting themes were: coherence, identity and sustainability. Associations for housing as well as groupings of entrepreneurs were involved in the bottom-up inventories and analysis of areas in need of renewal, which formed the basis of the application for urban renewal subsidies. The aim to display clear results of urban regeneration on the ground in 2005 has been realised.

Individual municipalities decided to elaborate and specify the regional frame of the scenario study into local structure plans⁵¹: the content of the *Zwijndrecht* and *Dordrecht* structure plans are local elaborations of the sub-regional vision. After approving and adopting the results, decision-making about many more municipal and regional policies and plans were initiated, based on the outcomes of the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030*.⁵²

⁴⁸ "Programmaverklaring Drechtsteden", 1999

⁴⁹ "Uitvoeringsprogramma, Agenda" voor de Drechtsteden

⁵⁰ Groene Contramal

⁵¹ Gemeente Zwijndrecht en Zandvoort, Ordening&Advies, 1998, "Structuurvisie Zwijndrecht 2030."

⁵² Project Drechtsteden en Zandvoort Ordening &Advies BV 1997: "Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030, naar een samenhangend ontwikkelingsperspectief."

Different groupings worked in different combinations and compositions on next steps towards implementation.

Those off springs consisted of elaborations of agreed policy options and thematic aspects and of specifications of the decided direction of development for specific municipal areas: In 1998 a study was carried out focussing on sustainable urban renewal of zones of economic activities as well as residential zones. That study was produced in a co-operation of *Drechtsteden*, *Drechtzoekers* and the province of *Zuid-Holland*. That policy report, including model projects⁵³, provided necessary information for submitting the requests for the state subsidy for urban renewal. (ISV) The off springs of the scenario study referred to the scenario study report as the agreed underlying policy.⁵⁴

The process of *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* resulted in an agreement and several next rounds. Interviews showed still satisfaction among participants after fifteen years. The strategy performed well and had transformative power as well. It was successful in realizing many projects halfway the time horizon, but it has also been a factor entailing closer co-operation resulting in the common *Drechtsteden* organization.

The *Drechtsteden* organization was during the specific round in its very start: only four to five persons were employed during the time of the scenario study. In 2012 it has been developed into an organization responsible for many municipal functions for the co-operating municipalities: social services, taxes, human resources etc, except the strategic policy-making, which remained separate in the municipalities. *Drechtsteden* nowadays employs almost more than 850 persons.

In the 15 years since the scenario study was finished, gradually new actors were involved who were increasingly ignorant of the achievements of the scenario study, and/or considering the scenario study just something from the history. Despite this usual development of turnover of generations of employees in organizations, some interviewees emphasised the amazing magnitude of the influence of the study during a long period.

⁵³ Provincie Zuid-Holland, Project Drechtsteden, Project Drechtzoekers en Zandvoort, Ordening&Advies BV, 1999; *“De Drechtsteden werken aan Herstructurering, voorbeeldprojecten in de gemeenten.”*

⁵⁴ Provincie Zuid-Holland, Project Drechtsteden en Zandvoort, Ordening&Advies BV, 2000, *“Ontwikkelingsplan en Programma Stedelijke Vernieuwing Drechtsteden”*

At the start, co-operation at the scale level of *Drechtsteden* was a big step forward for strategic decision-making. Nowadays inclusion within the much larger *Randstad South Wing* co-operation consisting of the *Rotterdam* and *The Hague* metropolitan conurbation is increasingly seen as the more appropriate level for a next step in future development, being a gateway to *Randstad*. But also positioning itself centrally between *Rotterdam* and *Breda* is considered as a possible positioning.

A less successful item of the *Drechtsteden* co-operation is the experience with *ROM-D*. This common organization for (re) developing the economic zones of the municipalities (*ROM-D*) was in 1997 an innovation of national importance. This *ROM-D* organization gradually lost inspiration and importance. Fragmented development and management of economic zones, being important sources of municipal income, became again gradually the dominant approach. The municipal politicians were not able to keep the initial spirit based on the intention to level out the values of possessions (areas in economic zones) and to realise selectivity and specialisation within a common marketing policy on the regional level. The *Dordrecht* seaport is actually managed by *Rotterdam Port Authority*, which always was one of the shareholders in *ROM-D*.

§ 8.6 Aspects of the process: effectiveness, Ownership, Co-production/co-design, Openness

Effectiveness

The criteria for effectiveness of decision-making are composed of three aspects, of which the occurrence of **next rounds** of decision-making and the achievement of an **agreement** are obvious facts in the *Drechtsteden* case. The **satisfaction** of actors is checked in interviews. All six interviewees were simply satisfied about the decision-making process. The process ended up in general agreement on a common vision, support of the vision by the provincial authorities and full adoption of that vision by the councils of the participating municipalities. Some interviewees emphasized the spirit of the co-production:

“We wanted not to miss any step: it is happening here”. ⁵⁵

The responsible politician, after rereading the scenario study report when preparing for the interview, expressed his amazement:

“What an amazing influence of this four months’ action even still after fifteen years”. ⁵⁶

Although memory bias will play a role after fifteen years, the overall impression deriving from the interviews was that *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* was an important and effective decision-making process in 1997. Maybe most important for qualifying the process positively are the answers of the economic expert and the representative of the *Drechtsoeverproject* (who happens to be educated as an economist as well)⁵⁷. Next to the others, also those experts, who were not directly responsible for organizing the process, felt clearly satisfied about the achievements and the process, as well as strong co-ownership of the result.

The interviewees did not remember any remaining heavy controversies to be addressed after closing this specific round of decision-making.

Ownership

Co-ownership of results is assumed important for effectiveness of a process.

Without an exception the interviewees felt co-ownership. The strongest indication was that some claimed to be main owners of the idea to conduct such a study or **took credit** for specific items. Although difficult to establish, feelings of **pride** were expressed by the interviewees, also by those not directly responsible for organizing the process. Less clear were the reactions on the question whether the interviewee had to **defend** the results and the process during the period after adoption. The discussions on the subject of ownership implied that the results seemed so self-evident for interviewees that there were no memories of *defending* the outcomes against critics of others, but the results had sometimes to be “clarified to others”. (...)

⁵⁶ Interview Gertjan Vogelaar

⁵⁷ Views of this discipline are important since spatial planning is often regarded as not favourable for economic development.

Co-production/ Co-design

The theoretic framework assumes **co-production** or even **co-design** important aspect of the organization of effective decision-making processes. According to 5.3 criteria for co-design are: **Any idea** is considered and tried; **new ideas** and options emerged during deliberations; **un-envisaged combinations**/synergies appeared.

Interviewees were asked to their memory about what happened during the production group meetings. Most of those participating in the meetings confirmed all three aspects of the checklist.⁵⁸ Interviewees recalled that ideas stemming from the framing and different wording of various sectors were welcomed as useful contributions and tested in the discussions on the relevance for future development. They found important that the effects of individual proposals and other contributions were clearly visualized and assessed, presented on maps, prepared for discussion in the next week. The conclusions of those discussions were then included modifying and/or enriching the related scenario-sketch and story line. The interviewees spontaneously acknowledged better understanding of others and sometimes surprise about new ideas and new possibilities of combining solutions. More generally, the iterative process of what is the impact "*if this happens*", was characterized by several, in terms like:

"learning and enriching".⁵⁹

Several interviewees referred to specific ideas they contributed to the outputs and talked in terms of "my" ideas for "our" vision. It was not a process of together making something that has been pre-defined or specified before. The resulting vision was a not before existing over-all comprehensive view on the region. Co-designing was the apparent form of co-producing.

⁵⁸ The responsible politician was not directly participating in the production of the vision.

⁵⁹ Interviews Wim van der Linden and Fred Meerhof

Openness

The openness of the process architecture and the process management was according to our definition sub-divided in: open agenda setting, informal objective orientation and flexible participation.

All interviewees confirmed a quite neutral, open start of the decision-making process and the **agenda** setting. The start of the scenario study consisted of agreeing on basic information and the process. The qualitative character of the information used, deriving from existing, earlier accepted reports and the SWOT analysis, created a value orientation. The few quantitative data about development of the population, intensity of land-use and age of built-up entities provided a global common understanding as background for explorative considerations.

The main concept/direction of development implying compact urbanisation within a landscaped green belt forming a contour line, apparently corresponded with the regional views and was accepted almost without discussion, as being an appropriate component of the global urbanization concept for the *Drechtsteden* region.⁶⁰ All interviewees considered the **agenda setting open**: new items, ideas or proposals deriving from individual contributions to the discussions in the production group were respected and considered. Another aspect of an open process, namely **flexible participation** of actors and variation in the group of actors due to discovering not envisaged functional relations with other regions, did not realize: The *Drechtsteden* area was defined by administrative boundaries of the participating municipalities; no new actors were invited to participate in the (short) process. Instead, the number of participating municipalities reduced by two, due to mergers: The smallest municipalities 's *Gravendeel* left the co-operation due to merging with *Binnenmaas*. *Heerjansdam* remained within *Drechtsteden* but became a part of *Zwijndrecht*. The reductions of the number of municipalities did not influence the number of participants in the production group.

Neither private companies nor non-governmental organizations nor the public were involved directly in the production. The regional Chamber of Commerce was informed during the process. (Several interviewees qualified their reactions as those of a governmental institution instead of representatives of private initiative.)

⁶⁰

The application of contour lines for indicating boundaries of urban development was during discussion of the national spatial development policy within the Parliament rejected, because members of parliament assumed that municipalities would not accept such limitations. In *Drechtsteden* the municipalities were eager to adopt such contour lines for limiting sub-urbanization.

Interviewees responsible for the process and representing the principal expressed that if they had to start a similar process now, the production group would have been composed differently, earlier including public participation and key-persons from the private sector. But the question remains unanswered whether the deadlines could be met in that case.

All informants confirmed that the **informal** setting of the process management was supportive for the openness of the decision-making process. There were no legal procedures to be followed. Communicating with the elected politicians, informing them about the progress, was intensive and appreciated. The informal and open process supported the orientation on values during decision-making. Legal responsibilities and competencies of experts representing sector organizations or disciplines were not strongly exercised during the deliberations. An interviewee referred to the meetings as:

"The value of the common interests dominated over sector values." ⁶¹

The use of **scenarios** played an important role in the decision-making process. The type of scenarios introduced in the decision-making process, is assumed relevant for its effectiveness. All interviewees clearly remembered the fact that initially four scenarios of a qualitative character, expressing political values in graphics and story lines, were considered and discussed for exploring possible futures. A discussion item in the production group as well as in the Drechtsteden Council of Aldermen was related to the expectations about the initial approach of the decision-making process. Some participants understood to be invited simply to select a preferred option among the four initial scenarios. The trend scenario demonstrating that continuing the ongoing actual development would increase existing problems, opened-up the minds for possible alternative developments. The initial scenarios were thus primarily used as a tool for opening-up minds, for starting to explore possibilities in a structured way and for preparing the search for common preferences.

The three types of scenario reasoning (Salewski 2010): what *will*, what *can*, what *should happen* were all three applied. The interviews revealed by hindsight the logic applied as basis for the decision-making process: First a trend scenario (what *will* happen if **local autonomy** continues to dominate) was presented. This showed impacts of fragmented development and triggered thinking about an alternative development: co-operation of the municipalities. Second the other three scenarios focused on applying specific (political) values: What *can* happen if **economy** would dominate, what *can* happen if **ecology** dominates, and what *can* happen if **residential quality** would dominate. Those discussions about the impacts of the different perspectives

⁶¹

Interview Fred Meerhof

had an explorative character. Comparing the scenarios resulted in an overview of relative advantages and disadvantages. Third, the production group converged its considerations about the various options on what *should* happen, and a process searching for improvements and synergies started, towards a *wished-for* scenario. The search for a new commonly wished-for scenario became the core of the decision-making process towards a proposal for the politicians: the preferred scenario, being the production group's spatial vision.

About the **role of experts** in the process was also asked in the interviews, because conducting an interactive process, real openness of agenda setting and co-production set other than mere content oriented professional requirements to planning practitioners. Here the memory bias played a role in interviews. The general memory was somewhat vague, like: Yes we look back on a constructive co-operation of together inventing a strategy, but it is hard to remember exactly what happened. The most remembered notion was that options and ideas were considered and compared neutrally. Several informants emphasised the importance for the quality of the process, of expert knowledge and of experiences with similar processes. Important by hindsight was the fact that all members of the production group were experienced experts in their field, which did not in the first place represent their interest group, but were all open for together exploring possibilities for avoiding disadvantages or negative consequences of certain options. The atmosphere in the meetings was trustful; no competitive or strategic institutional behaviour among the participants was noticed.

Also the relation to the **politicians** was without problems. The responsible alderman was informed weekly about progress and the council of aldermen never interfered. The principal who was the official responsible representative of *Drechtsteden (F. Meerhof)* kept a close relation with the political responsible alderman by reporting almost weekly. At the same time, the principal kept some distance between the responsible alderman and the production group in order to protect the politician from possible questioning by the other politicians in the *Drechtsteden Council of Aldermen* about too close involvement with the production of the preferred scenario and priority to the interests of his own municipality. According to those responsible for the communication with the responsible politicians, the political involvement was active and intense.

§ 8.7 Evaluation

Context

The administrative environment in which the decision-making process resulting in the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* was organized was rather clear and simple. Next to the co-operating group of (eventually) six municipalities the process was only influenced by the direct higher-level, the province. Communication with the provincial representatives was direct; they participated in the meetings of the production group. The importance of the context provided by the multi-level embedding was large, maybe even decisive. The province although on the background even in the production group meetings, played a crucial role. The province supported the process with incentives consisting of financial support, expertise and accepting outcomes of unanimous agreements. The tight time schedule, affected the process in terms of not allowing occasions for non-object oriented sideways.

That created time pressure, in the first place for producing a development vision for the sub-region, for timely inclusion in the regional *streekplan*. In combination with incentives like the support for fast track and more subsidies for urban regeneration, the time pressure influenced the effectiveness of decision-making quite sure. The mutual commitment with the province to deliver elaborations of urban renewal plans on future moments created also a longer-term influence. As such the multi-level embedding provided a favourable context for the process. In the period after adopting the scenario, gradually the organization of Drechtsteden developed more influence and power for implementing projects.

Process

The specific process conducted in the *Drechtsteden* project can be characterized as informal bottom-up, applying value-based qualitative scenarios, exploring possible future developments.

The initiative to the process leading to *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* came from the municipalities after having experienced some previous co-operation in the *Drechttoeversproject*. That preceding co-operation concluded that a strategy for future development of the sub-region required a broader approach than a designed exploration of the potential capacity for urban development of the waterfronts. That preceding project prepared for the scenario study, supporting to make “the time ripe”.

PROCESS ASPECTS	DRECHTSTEDEN	
openness	Open agenda setting	yes
	Informality	yes
	Objective focus	yes
	Broad/flexible particip	yes/no
Co-production/design	Ideas from any side	yes
	New ideas emerge	yes
	Un-envisaged options	yes
Co-ownership	Pride	yes
	Defensive actions	Not needed
	Take credit	yes
EFFECTIVENESS YES	Agreement achieved	yes
	Next round	yes, many
	Satisfaction	yes
(Pot) SUCCESS YES	Realizations	many
	Socio-economic impacts	Drechtsteden organization
	New regulations	Extended co-operation

TABLE 8.1 Process aspects Drechtsteden

The interactive approach was limited to a group of municipal experts guided by the consultant and with close contact with the politicians and the municipal planning agencies. Interactions with wider groups of stakeholders and civic society was organized in later stages during elaborations of the policy. The agreed strategic policy as such did not receive heavy comments during those steps. According to the interviews, the participants perceived the decision-making process resulting in a preferred and agreed scenario as a process of co-design. To the type of making of the vision was referred in terms of “we made together something new”; similar to being co-author.

The **content**:

Although not all realised projects were original ideas developed in the scenario study, the general framework provided by the scenario study was necessary for elaborating and implementing the multitude of projects. Several projects and ideas were aired before, but the agreed vision brought structural coherence among fragmented ideas, allowing for a coordinated development policy.

The list of projects, which are realized, provides important evidence that not only the decision-making process of the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* was effective, but also that the resulting strategy was eventually successful. Apparently there was transforming power in the vision. (Albrechts 2009).

Not (yet) realized project ideas are some *Drechtsoever* waterfronts and a light rail connection. By hindsight we might ask whether the decision-making in 1997 had to be more critical and selective with regard to the quantity of waterfront locations included in the strategy. Almost automatically, all locations proposed in the *Drechtsoever project* were included in the scenario study. The urban character of some of the waterfront development (some in villages) would not fit equally in the available locations. But the *Drechtsoever* project as originally proposed had the character of exploring and indicating chances rather than a Master Plan, which would suggest blueprint-like preparation for construction. Considered as a Master Plan, we might assess the *Drechtsoever* projects as being too ambitious. Spatial coherence around the wide meeting point of the three rivers opposite Dordrecht seems not possible. Functional coherence is arranged with the well-served water crossing facilities.

Considering the realisations on the ground fifteen years after the adoption of the preferred scenario, the success of the over-all strategy can be established. The sustained vision as presented in the agreed scenario of *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* provided the framework for elaborations, specifications and flexible implementing. The strategy clearly performed during a long time. (Faludi 2000, Mastop 2000)

Persons

Successful implementation of a long-term strategy would require lasting, continued and consistent commitment of many persons to the vision. For lasting support of a vision and developing a continued orientation towards agreed goals, attractiveness of the vision for many, active support for the agreement from the side of different interests and feelings of co-ownership seem indispensable.

Acknowledging that we seek for effective interaction, the roles of the individual persons deserve specific attention. The team working in the production group consisted of experienced experts from several disciplines, working in municipal organizations, together with representatives of the *Drechtsteden* co-operation, the province and experts from the consultancy. All of them were well-educated experts with at least about ten years of experience. Apart from the consultants, their experience was not gathered in a similar interactive co-production to a strategic development vision.

Both the responsible politician and the *Drechtsteden* representative acting as principal were informally operating open persons, not putting limitations to the process management. The representatives of the second principal, the province, acted reserved and supportive to the discussions, never referring to the potential provincial approval or disapproval of specific concepts. All interviews confirmed the importance of informal openness among the participants in the production group for the effectiveness of the

decision-making and the success of the strategy. There was a dominant atmosphere of trust among the participants and a common orientation on the goals of the exercise. The time pressure, together with the incentives offered by the province had a positive influence on effective decision-making.

The continuity of persons is a factor influencing the continued commitment to the vision after adoption. Important aspect is that the politician responsible for the 1997 process of the making of the strategy became later, after his political mandate director of the *Drechtsteden* organization. Although he doubted it in the interview, referring to the experience that in his new role as director he was not regarded equal to the new politicians, this change of roles must have been of great importance for the continuity.

Also several of the civil servants active in the production group continued servicing in their municipal departments.

The political orientation of the politicians active in the *Council of Aldermen* during the decision-making about the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* was probably also a factor supportive for its success, almost all were socialist party (*PVDA*) oriented. In his interview the responsible politician for the process (*G.J.Vogelaar*) doubted that influence, because “*every alderman focussed in the first place on the interests of his own municipality.*”

The few **controversies**, which developed during decision-making, were related to direct interests of two municipalities conflicting with main lines of the vision.

A serious problem existed with the municipality of *Sliedrecht*, which had advanced procedures to expand its residential area with about three hundred dwellings north of the location of the green belt in the *Alblasserwaard* polder, beyond the green belt boundary, which was proposed as the northern limit of urbanization in the vision. That problem was tabled in the *Council of Aldermen* and remained undecided until the evening of the deadline date (next morning), on which an appointment with the provincial responsible politician was scheduled. In that last evening that problem was solved as a result of the offer by the other aldermen to help *Sliedrecht* financially with regenerating its business park, with an amount of Dfl. 25 mio. The officially agreed formulation was that *Sliedrecht's* expansion would be re-decided, “if demographic development would demand for the additional amount of dwellings.” The *Sliedrecht* alderman accepted that help and supported the limit to *Sliedrechts* expansion. (But the financial support never realized.) The negotiation about the strategy resolved that controversy.

Another controversy was of minor importance: The site of the *Slobbegors* zone of economic activities in *Papendrecht* did initially not fit into the agreed vision because the related area, a (*Drechtrovers*) waterfront location was, dedicated to residential uses. This modification was accepted to be included in the vision. It was qualified a non-essential issue, fitting in the flexibility the vision offered.

The issue of competing offers of zones for economic activities, one of the triggers for co-operation was despite a promising start at the end of the 90's eventually not successfully solved. The specifically established *ROM-D* organization became the owner of mainly those sites, which were economically problematic for individual municipalities. This issue, implying important financial interests expresses a gradually decreasing degree of inspirational power of the agreed vision after fifteen years.

§ 8.8 Conclusions: The effectiveness of Drechtsteden process

The context of the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* was important as a supportive factor: The Netherlands' spatial legislation and planning culture allows for and stimulates local policy making for spatial development without a strong juridical focus. The simple administrative embedding in which communication was almost only required with the province was helpful. The province actively supported the process in many ways, including through applying incentives. The provincial time pressure, created by envisaged inclusion of results in the regional plan, has put urgency to the process. Although the province supported the process on specific conditions, clarity existed that not all financial consequences entailing the vision would be automatically covered.

The process was organized as an option-generating, exploring and selection process in which visualized scenarios were used as a tool for decision-making. A production group of about fifteen experienced experts of different relevant disciplines agreed in four months on a preferred scenario, which was submitted as a proposal to the council of aldermen of the municipalities. The long-term development vision as depicted in the resulting scenario became influential during a long period after its adoption. It offered the aimed for framework for concerted development for about fifteen years.

The actually resulting situation is reason for a reorientation within the frame of the common *Drechtsteden* organization. Does future development require further up scaling and consider *Drechtsteden* as a component (the southern entrance) of the Rotterdam-The Hague conurbation, or as an independent agglomeration between Rotterdam and Breda?

The place-based circumstances of the decision-making process were although not easy, eventually favourable for the success of the strategy. The separate municipalities were historically a bit isolated conservative agricultural and partly industrial settlements, developed along and behind the high river dykes. The *Drechttoevers* project of 1995 presented a different vision for the long term as an urbanised area around the large rivers crossing the region. That ambitious vision showed a large number of potential sites for waterfront development and urban renovation, which created curiosity and some enthusiasm among the municipal officials. That common experience of the eight municipalities enhanced the wish for closer co-operation. The *Drechtsteden* project was created in 1997 to provide a wider, more integrated framework for the whole area of the municipalities. Although the physical circumstance created by the great divide caused by the large rivers, make territorial coherence quite difficult, the *Drechtsteden* vision provided mainlines in which most envisaged projects have been realized, partly aiming at more spatial coherence.

The co-operation resulted in an ongoing process of spatial development and a common multi-municipal office dealing with a majority of municipal tasks. The *Drechttoevers* project, initially meant as a showcase of chances, was presented as a Masterplan. For those who read it as a blueprint for urban development in the *Drechtsteden* the *Drechttoeversproject* was probably too ambitious.

9 Glasgow: evolution of a performing strategy

GLASGOW and the CLYDE VALLEY STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN

§ 9.1 Introduction

In order to support development, Scottish Government appointed four city regions respectively located around Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen. These Metropolitan Regions must according to Scottish Planning legislation prepare Strategic Development Plans. The Strategic Development Plan for Glasgow city region is called Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan, which area includes the territory of eight municipalities around the city of Glasgow. Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan (GCVSDP) is the largest area of those four city regions. For preparing regional development strategies the municipalities of the Metropolitan Regions establish a dedicated organization for strategy making and steer the process through a Joint Committee consisting of two representatives of each of the municipal councils. The municipal entities co-operating in the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley area are: East Dunbartonshire, East Renfrewshire, Glasgow City, Inverclyde, North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, South Lanarkshire and West Dunbartonshire, with a total of 1,75 million inhabitants. The Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan area is located in the West of central Scotland. The relative peripheral location of Scotland in the North Western corner of Europe requires extra attention to its economic competitiveness. Glasgow and its region were until the nineties of last century characterized by heavy industry, steelworks and shipbuilding. The disappearance of those activities, together with the earlier removal of textile industries heavily hit the prosperity of the region. Financial services industry developed subsequently as a relative important economic activity. Then Scotland suffered quite severely from the 2008 financial crisis. The fact that the Scottish government decided to settle in Edinburgh after devolving relative autonomy from the United Kingdom, decreased Glasgow's relative importance and did not bring the related new administrative jobs to Glasgow.



FIGURE 9.1 Location of the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley city region in Scotland

The Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan (GCVSDP) is the result of a step in a longer process of strategic planning in the West of mid Scotland. The Strathclyde Structure Plan and the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Joint Structure Plan preceded the actual GCVSDP before the 2006 revision of the Scottish Planning Act. The content of the strategy developed gradually out of foregoing plans more and more into the direction of strategic selectivity and prioritization. The plan activities are part of a quite continuous process; a revision is obliged every four years. That implies that the strategy making as analyzed here does not consist of producing or designing a complete new strategy. The activities consist of elaborating and specifying previous versions responding to developments in the context, the regional society and to the comments of Scottish Ministers to the previous version. As such it concerns an ongoing process in rounds of elaboration.

“The Strategic Development Plan (SDP) fits in the tradition of the West of Scotland, which recognises that well being of the communities is interdependent.

Long term thinking and strategic settings for sustainable economic growth forms the heart of the SDP.” (Councillor Harry Curran, Convener of GCVSDPA)

The following account of the GCVSDP is based on the following sources of information:

- The website of Glasgow and the Clyde-Valley Strategic Development Plan Authority, which publishes plan information as well as background studies and minutes of important meetings at their web-site: <http://www.gcvsdpa.gov.uk>
- The relevant plan document is *Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan* of May 2012, which contains next to the four main sections, Philosophy and Principles, Economic and Demographic Framework, Spatial Vision and Strategic Spatial Development Strategy, a glossary, strategy support measures and an overview of the 14 background reports.
- The *Futures Background Paper* of the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Futures Group presented interesting theoretic and practical considerations about the strategy making. <http://www.gvcore.gov.uk>
- *The strategic and economic implications of the recession in Scotland, May 2009* of Oxford Economics situates the city region in a wider economic context.
- *Minutes of the meetings of the Joint Committee* covering the period from 01/12/2008 – 10/06/2013 show relevant discussions in the steering group. (Joint Committee)
- *Interviews*, checking personal experiences of six actors about effective decision-making in strategic planning, conducted in February 2014.

§ 9.2 The Scottish Planning System

The compendium on European Planning Systems and Policies positions the UK spatial planning in the category of the land-use management model, but the Scottish system contains important differences with the spatial planning system in England. Strategic planning on levels beyond the municipal level is an important component of the Scottish planning tradition. The *Clyde Valley Regional Plan* dates from 1949.⁶²

The Spatial planning legislation of the Scottish Government replaced the previous Structure Plans in 2006, which were perceived as too extensive, with new Strategic Development Plans. The new plans must be 'concise and visionary, shorter, more strategic and easier to use.

Scotland's Development Plan system (*the Planning etc (Scotland) Act 2006* and the *Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act 1997*) sets out two key statutory documents for the long-term future: the *Local Development Plan (LDP)* and the *Strategic Development Plan (SDP)*.

⁶²

The so-called Abercrombie plan

Strategic Development Plans are critical because they set the context for Local Development Plans for guiding decisions about planning applications. They also inform and coordinate decisions on strategic infrastructure investment.

Strategic Development Plans have to set out a clear vision and spatial strategy for their area. The plans will largely focus on the key land-use and development issues that cross the municipal planning authority boundaries and the external relations relevant for the development of the area of the Strategic Development Plans.

Under the *Scottish Planning Act* the content and processes of Strategic Development Plans are governed by the *Town and Country Planning (Development Planning) (Scotland) Regulations 2008* and *Planning Circular 1, 2009 Development Planning*.

Strategic Development Plans have to include:

- A Vision statement;
- A Spatial Strategy;
- Analysis of relevant relations with developments in neighbouring areas;
- Map or diagram describing the spatial strategy.

According to the planning legislation Strategic Development Plans address the region specific supply of land for housing, as well as major business and shopping uses. Protection of environmental assets and the provision of important infrastructure for transport, waste, water and energy will be covered, as may the promotion of green belts and networks.

In addition the Strategic Development Plan is informed by the *Scottish Government's National Planning Framework 2 (NPF2)* and its *Scottish Planning Policy (SPP) 2010*, which sets the national context. Both these document will be republished in June 2014.

The Strategic Development Plan is required to conform to the National Policy Framework and Scottish Planning Policy and Local Development Plans have to conform to Strategic Development Plans. The Scottish Planning Policy requires revision of the Strategic Development Plan every four years from the date of its approval.

§ 9.3 Administrative embedding

The institutional embedding of the GCVSDP activities is quite simple: With regard to spatial planning legislation, Glasgow and the Clyde Valley is the second tier within the Scottish national administration. As the GCVSDP website puts it:

In 2008 Scottish Ministers established Strategic Development Planning Authorities for each of the four Scottish city regions. This established the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Planning Authority (GCVSDPA) which is a Local Government Joint Committee comprising of the eight local authorities of East Dunbartonshire, East Renfrewshire, Glasgow City, Inverclyde, North Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, South Lanarkshire and West Dunbartonshire Councils working together on strategic development planning matters as required in the Planning etc. (Scotland) Act 2006.

The principal role of the GCVSDPA is to prepare and maintain an up to date Strategic Development Plan (SDP) for the area. This process involves engagement through joint working and consultation with a number of key stakeholder organizations and the wider community. To support this process a Management Team comprising senior planning officers from the eight local authorities and a dedicated Core Team have been established.⁶³

The GCV city region consisting of the grouping of eight municipalities relates directly to the Scottish Planning Ministry, which must approve Strategic Development Plans (SDP's) after an open and transparent *Examination* process.

Several issues, which have to be addressed within the GCVSDP need to be considered within the wider context. Implementation of strategies addressing those issues requires support from higher authorities. The improvement of accessibility by high-speed railway connection, the Green Network, and the management of water and drainage are to be addressed as part of larger spatial networks.

Scottish Ministers approved the actual GCVSDP on 29th May 2012.

⁶³

GCVSDP website: Who we are

§ 9.4 Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan

Issues

Addressing large structural issues characterize the decision-making for the strategic development plan for the city-region. The GCV city-region is in a long-term process of spatial transformation. The run-down traditional industries of last century e.g. shipbuilding and steelworks have left enormous areas of partly contaminated soil. These areas mainly concentrated at both sides along the River Clyde and in Lanarkshire, provide large problems, requiring big investments and at the same time provide large opportunities for brown field development. In terms of the scale of the issue some 6% (3,100ha) of the GCV urban area is covered by vacant and derelict land.

With regard to economic competitiveness the accessibility from Europe and the wider world is seen as a crucial factor for Scotland's business service providers, that was reason to commission Oxford Economics to analyse the impact on Scottish economy and on potentials for future development.

The (rail) connection of Glasgow city centre with Glasgow International Airport, and intensified high-speed connections to the South of England have been proposed as essential infrastructural projects for the future development of the city region.

Housing is a core component of the SDP, both for the private and social housing sectors and is therefore the focus of much citizen, developer and political interest. Existing housing stock is in need of improvement, qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Large residential areas are in a bad shape, providing living conditions that do not meet actual standards. Urban renewal and revitalizing urban areas is a main issue, not only in the city of Glasgow, but also in the surrounding towns.

Also the provision of services in the municipalities around the city is an issue of strategic relevance for the city region. Town centres suffer from up scaling of service providers thereby leaving shops, bank counters and post offices empty, whereas large retail organizations seek to settle and expand out of town.

The environment is considered a key asset of Scotland. The SDP took the environment as an important issue for the city region's future development. Not only the tourist sector, being Scotland's second economic pillar, requires well-kept and accessible natural assets, but the positive effect on the quality of life and on attracting new economic activities is explicitly sought in the SDP.

The process

As noticed before, the strategy of the SDP emerged gradually in preceding plans. The process of producing the strategy is part of a continuous process. Main features of the actual plan emerged in the strategy making in the end-nineties, based on elaborating four initial scenarios.⁶⁴ The city region has to prepare and review every four years its strategic development plan and the organization of the GCVSDPA, the strategic planning authority constantly works on improving the previous strategy, reacting on the comments of Scottish Ministers on the previous plan and taking care of new facts and insights. The organization does so within the network of relevant organizations in close co-operation and constant communication with the representing individuals. The main policy lines for the content of the strategy derived from the previous *Strathclyde Structure Plan* and the *Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Joint Structure Plan* amended with issues getting more attention like climate change and flooding and aspects that have been dictated in the *Scottish National Planning Framework*. Strategic Development Plans must conform with Scottish development policy, which aims at low carbon energy and low carbon economy for Scotland. Important requirements from the Government to the new version of the Strategic Plan were: make it more strategic (selectivity) and do not provide us with a pile of studies but present compact strategic proposals.

The decision-making process for the actual GCVSDP is organized as plan preparation initiated in the dedicated GCV planning office, consisting of a small group of mainly strategic planners. Reduction of budget reduced the planning office to seven persons managed by Stuart Tait, who has been involved since 1986. The Management team consisting of the municipal planners of the eight councils plus the manager and assistant manager of the GCVSDP office, coordinates with local planning and sees to the mainlines of the strategy. The steering group, called Joint Committee, consisting of two councillors of each municipality oversees the process and meets twice a year. The Joint Committee is according to the minutes of their meetings distantly involved in mainlines of the process: budgeting of the activities, human resources and the few controversial issues about the content (such as problems about housing figures with Scottish Ministers and a conflict about locating a large retail centre with a project developer). The Convener, chairing the Joint Committee's meetings, is one of the councillors representing the second largest municipality: North Lanarkshire.

Close relations developed with representatives of for instance economic affairs, public transport, housing and landscaping. That is appreciated as a more open way than in earlier steps of the ongoing process, in which only municipal officials participated in plan making. As a result, next to the representatives of the municipalities, more groupings of stakeholders became involved.

The decision-making is organized as an open process. According to several interviewees, representatives of all relevant sectors are involved in the plan-making/ elaboration process as soon as a sector interest appears into the discussions.

*“ You do have relations with persons, not with institutions”.*⁶⁵

For starting the process preparing last version of the strategy, new inspiration was sought in taking some distance from actual problems in order to develop more fundamental views on future development. The Joint Committee introduced systematic futures analysis and established the Futures Group in 2007. The refreshed perspective of that grouping played an important role in setting the vision for the actual Strategic Development Plan.

The Futures Group consisted of representatives from the local authorities, and thirteen public organizations, which are relevant for spatial development in the city region. These were: Scottish Government, Scottish Enterprise, Scottish Natural Heritage, Forestry Commission of Scotland, Scottish Environmental Agency, Glasgow University, Strathclyde Partnership Transport, Scottish water, British Airport Authority, Chamber of Commerce, and Glasgow Centre of Population Health.

The remit of the Futures Group was to deliver:

“Hard” outputs:

- Deliver spatial stories up to 2035,
 - Explore implications of those stories
 - Identify key strategic details that will drive success,
 - Inform and share knowledge with key partners,
- “Soft” outputs:

- Develop an effective engagement strategy with key partners
- Help us face critical uncertainties,
- Challenge established thinking and behaviour,
- Stimulate innovation and vision,
- Make a compelling case for action and change,
- Create awareness that organizations operate in changing world.

The process in the Futures Group led by Joe Scott of the GCVSDPA first identified and categorized the drivers of change through so- called STEEP analysis: of Sociological, Technological, Economic, Environmental and Political aspects.

⁶⁵

Interview Stuart Tait, 20/02/2014

During next step in the process sets of key change drivers were identified under each of the five STEEP categories. Then the key critical uncertainties were identified for the city-region together with a matrix. On that basis four initial spatial stories were created as scenarios for the GCV area in 2035.

The matrix axes for distinguishing the different stories were: The Availability (or not) of Resources and (the low or high intensity of) Demand Management.

That allowed for populating the matrix with four “stories”, which story lines are summarized as:

Me, me, me

Resources readily available/Limited Intervention

Decline and Fall

Limited resources/ Limited intervention

Make do and mend

Limited resources/Significant intervention

Back to future

Resources readily available/Significant intervention

The elaborated “stories” are four possible outcomes of different directions of developments in the external context of the vision. The core aim of that process was to confront the vision of the strategic plan with those possible changes in the environment.

The four stories were roughly characterized by respectively: (1) Unlimited individualization, large differences in prosperity and a weak public sector, (2) Weak public steering in a modest prosperous society (3) Strong public steering in an average prosperous society, (3) Strong public steering in a highly prosperous society.

Then the Futures Group considered the spatial outcomes, within the logic of each of these four stories, for respectively issues of housing, transport, retail, industry/business and tourism; as well as for environment, energy, waste, water/sewerage and flooding.

The members of the Futures group further considered impacts of these thinkable changes in the societal context as summarized in the four stories for the Scottish National Planning 2 Framework Priorities, the Strategic Transport Projects review (2012-2022) and the Metropolitan Development Strategy legacy. That whole process together with last exercise brought insights in the vulnerability as well as the robustness of the vision and the higher-level policies for changes in the environment. That knowledge informed the selection of essential strategic projects and priorities.

It must be noticed that those four scenarios are not used as decision-making tool for drafting a new strategy. The exercises of this process were meant as tests for the robustness of the draft strategy when confronted with four different possible changes in the economic and political environment. That testing helped to identify the components of the strategy, which were vulnerable for non-envisaged developments and essential for delivering the strategy. That resulted in qualifying investments in public transport infrastructure, connecting Glasgow centre with Europe and the rest of the world as most essential for the region's future.

But the process in the Futures group also looked inwards to the different attitudes of representatives of sectors and organization, which would be required by those changes in the environment: The important other question in the Futures Group was: how would the organization, which the members of the Futures Group represented, need to respond to operate in situations described in each of the future stories? Therefore the drivers of change are confronted with the diversity of actual activities of their organizations for addressing the question what influence the drivers of change would have on the organization's future work. Such a question addresses an important learning aspect for integrated development: when considering the future, all components of the environment will develop. That part of the exercise in the Future Group implies that learning effects for stakeholder organizations, affecting group think were deliberately sought as well. That would address underestimating dynamics in society:

"If sectors are obliged to assess territorial impacts, they consider the environment of their sector project (other sectors) as stable, without development."⁶⁶

⁶⁶

Interview Kevin Murray, evaluating Scottish strategic planning for Scottish Government

The Futures Group workshops concluded:

- The strategic direction for the SDP would remain the 2006 Structure Plan’s “*Agenda for Sustained Growth*”, but amended to reflect the new drivers (Climate change, flood risk, waste management, Strategic Transport Projects Review, Scottish Planning Policy and health). In the context of Scottish Government policy and recent legislative changes this was considered to be the only viable sustainable strategy.
- The delivery and timing of appropriate funded strategic priorities was seen essential for the delivery of the SDP.
- Improving public transport infrastructure was considered to be the key component of SDP.

The strategy

These conclusions of the explorative process in the Futures group were related to the existing strategy, based on the heritage of foregoing strategies and the Scottish policy priorities with regard to sustainable- low carbon development.

That determined the five key issues central to the new city-region’s spatial strategy of 2012:

- Breaking down distance to economic markets
- Supporting a sustainable economy
- Promoting environmental action: an economic necessity
- Tackling risk: strategic development priorities.
- Responding to the needs of a low carbon future is found fundamental.

Emphasizing to look beyond the short-term impact of global economy for shaping the future of the city region, these objectives are translated in spatial policy interventions localised on specific sites in the municipalities in the territory of the city region. The related choices for zones of economic activities and service centres included strategic decision-making through substantially reducing the numbers of development sites of the previous strategy.

The Vision for 2035 as reported in the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic development Plan of May 2012, consisting of five sections and eight maps depict interventions on specific selected locations:

- Economy: Key locations, with Glasgow City as the core of low carbon economy, are all accessed by sustainable modes of transport; Glasgow Central and Glasgow International Airport are connected; High Speed Rail connections to Europe and beyond with more frequent and coordinated timetable.
- Urban fabric: Brownfield land recycled: Urban fabric renewed based upon passive and low carbon building, focusing on sustainable compact city region; Run down and excluded communities regenerated towards healthy urban environments, according to the Clyde Gateway model; Economic agglomeration and higher density will be realised in order to provide critical mass to services. (Example Flagships for this approach are Clyde Gateway, Clyde Waterfront and Ravenscraig); A city regions network of centres (with different roles) will be the focus of economic activity, social and community life and sustainable accessibility;
- Infrastructure: The sustainable transport network integrating the surroundings with Glasgow city stations will shrink distances; New upgraded water and drainage networks will underlie urban regeneration; Public mass transport and transit systems will be the key transport mode, with priority to car use. Growth of communities will be based on this location policy;
- Environment: Green infrastructure is key to the quality of urban environment, important for competitiveness. The city region Green Network will be linked to and integrated in the Central Scotland Green Network; New areas of woodland will be planted as part of Green Network; Commercial forests addressing UK's need for timber will characterize the landscape.
- Energy: As an adjunct to centralised generation, decentralised distributed power plants based on new technologies will be located across the city region, aiming at a shift to decentralised alternative renewable sources.

The Spatial Vision 2035 is related to strategic drivers of change, being: Scottish Government, climate change mitigation, sustainable low carbon economy, economy and population, delivery resources and environmental legislation.

The Spatial Development Strategy, specifying the delivering of the Vision, linked the (spatial) aspects of development corridors and spatial frameworks to the aspects of the Vision. Locations of strategic importance of the different aspects are selected and agreed. The vision has been presented in a concise report depicting in eight maps the strategic interventions.

Also economists confirm its value of spatial quality for attracting economic activities and support the envisaged enhancement of the regional landscape through elaborating the Green Network

“The quality of place is important for me as economist.”⁶⁷




FIGURE 9.2 Strategic communities; service centres; economic investments and freight hubs in GCVSDP [Source: GCVSDP 2012]

The city region Green Network received a large impulse during the preparation of the vision. Like several more projects the idea of the Green Network emerged partly already in 1997, establishing coherence in the projected green belts, as a successful component of the Strathclyde Structure Plan. It remained a component of increasing significance in the later steps in strategic planning. In 2007 the GCV Green Network Partnership was established, involving fourteen organizations. The Scottish government financially supported the start of the partnership. The Green Network Partnership is located within and managed by the GCVSDPA office. Since then the Scottish government obliged also the other three city regions to consider their SDP as a component of the wider Scottish landscape structure.

⁶⁷

Interview Martin Wright, senior strategic manager Scottish Enterprise

The actual 2012 version of the plan gained strategic value especially with regard to selectivity in housing areas, service centres, sites for economic activities and the Green Network. The lists containing the locations for housing, service centres and economic activities of strategic importance for the development of the region became much shorter in the last version than in the preceding Structure Plans.



FIGURE 9.3 Part of the Green Network in GCVSDP [Source: GCVSDP 2012]

The list of fifty-three locations for economic development of the previous Structure Plan was reduced to twenty locations in the GCVSDP. That reflects results of the discussions in the Joint Committee among the representatives of the eight municipalities agreeing on the relative importance of their individual development areas. Such difficult discussions between co-operating and at the same time competing municipalities resulting in an agreement belong to the core of strategic decision-making. The general support of the Joint Committee members, being elected in surrounding municipalities, for acknowledging Glasgow City as most important asset for the regional development is an achievement of the co-operation. The legally obliged four years cycle of strategic development planning in Scotland includes that since the approval of 2012 the preparation of next round started. The 2012 plan is the heritage to be elaborated with the comments from Scottish Ministers and potential new policy issues for the 2016 version.

§ 9.5 Impact of the strategy

The longer history of foregoing steps providing a spatial frame, which strategic character increased during every step, allows for pointing to concrete achievements. Several large projects have been identified in preceding versions of the regional strategy and the ongoing process will identify issues within the context of future situations. The selectivity of the framework in combination with the elaboration of the Green Network makes also clear that certain developments must not happen at specific other sites. Achievements of the ongoing process are:

- Service centre regeneration is a continuous policy with results in several municipalities.
- The Clyde Gateway regeneration project is an example for success.
- The quite spectacular centre regeneration project is the transformation in Glasgow City Centre. (Buchanan and Merchant City).
- The regional sporting park in Ravenscraig has been realized.
- Ten million pounds have been spent for new road connections.
- Several house-building projects in growth areas are in progress. (Some struggles about land-ownership).
- Investments are done to adapt the Glasgow Central Railway station to envisaged improved connections and increase capacity.
- Large facilities for the distribution of goods are realized.
- The Green Network of the GCV is an obvious success story.

There is a broad general support for the Green Network structure offering self-evident quality for all. In the GCV ten local plans already responded on the Green Network⁶⁸. The large Seven Lochs Wetland Park of regional importance is close to realization since substantial money became available. The GCVSDPA actively provides expertise to individual municipalities in elaborating elements of the Green Network in localities. Since 2007 the green Network shows its transforming power and gained general support, also from Scottish Government, which financed the start of the Green Network Partnership. The Green Network grows through connecting loose patches and organizations see it as a vital activity. The green network does not only contribute to the territorial cohesion of the SDP but also through its general support it adds to the social cohesion.

“The integrated green-land-use thinking is now a well-accepted routine”⁶⁹

⁶⁸ End February 2014

⁶⁹ Interview Max Hislop, manager Green Network

Although the GCVSDP process should be regarded as a step in an ongoing process of strategy making it evokes also new subsequent activities like the landscape planning. Because legislation requires reviewing of strategic development plans every four years, preparation of the Strategic Development Plan 2 (SDP2) started directly after the approval of SDP1. The 2012 approval of the SDP by Scottish Ministers includes some requirements for modifications in next version, which entail ongoing discussions especially with regard to the calculation of the needed number of houses. The degree of precision required by the Scottish Ministers seems to contrast with the character of a long-term development vision of the strategic plan. Since the approval some experts in the GCVSDP authority office put efforts in trying to fulfil the detailed requirement of the government. The formulation of the required information at the GCVSDP's approval was to "*provide evidence*" for the revised Strategic Development Plan (SDP2) of "*truly generous and genuine effective housing supply*". This wording⁷⁰ reflects the government's wish to include more sites for building residential areas in the plan. That wish may jeopardize the core strategy of selective concentrated urbanization around (service) centres.

The letter of the Scottish Minister containing the approval of the SDP explicitly excludes any commitment by the Scottish Government to the payment of any grant on any particular project or timing of capital expenditure to deliver the contents of the plan. The wording seems to exclude any possible support for realizing essential infrastructural projects like the improvement of high-speed connections or the rail link to the airport.

§ 9.6 Process aspects: Effectiveness, Co-ownership, Co-production, and Openness

Effectiveness

With regard to the effectiveness of the decision-making process, information was assembled in interviews about the satisfaction of the participants with the results. The **agreement** about the achievements of decision-making was clear; the plan has been approved. Also next round(s) of decision-making are secured simply through the legal planning system in Scotland.

⁷⁰

(Reads like a request to proof the future)

The Survey on Scottish Strategic Development Plans, conducted in commission of the Scottish Ministers by Kevin Murray Associates and the University of Glasgow, contains a questionnaire in which 80% of those who responded reported that the GCVSDP process was an effective exercise⁷¹

“Tensions between public planning and economic development are much less than in the other metropolitan city regions.”⁷²

Within the current study we consider the effectiveness of the GCVSDP in the context of the ongoing process of strategic decision-making, which' main lines gradually developed in subsequent foregoing steps. Apart from the impact of the strategy resulting in effects on the ground and on policies as discussed before the effectiveness of decision-making includes learning effects, which will influence further steps in the process. The specific achievements of the GCVSDP with regard to those learning effects should not be under estimated.

The plan preparation succeeded in achieving more selectivity, which requires making difficult choices among politicians, representing different communities. Those choices are important for making the long list of an inventory of elements to the short list of elements of strategic importance. The participants representing potentially competing municipalities agreed on identifying service centres and sites for economic activities of strategic significance for the development of the city region as a whole. Discussions changed from telling, *“I want to be on that list”* to asking: *“What are requirement for coming on that list”*.⁷³ The original list of 53 service centres has been reduced to 20 deemed to be of strategic importance for the development of the city-region. The same applies for prioritization of steps in the delivering of the strategy. The Councillors, representing the interests of the surrounding municipalities have explicitly acknowledged the strategic importance of Glasgow City centre for the development of the region, which has been disputed before.

The learning effect, contributing to the sustainable effectiveness of the strategy was explicitly sought in the “soft outcomes” of the remit of the Futures Group through addressing the question what the effect of the four scenarios for developments in the economic and political context would be on the participant’s organization. That urges participants to not behave as someone representing a fixed and steady interest, but to reconsider his/her own position in the possible new contexts of dynamic developments. This concerns affecting the mind-sets of participants. The interviews confirmed the **satisfaction** of participants in the process, so the specific round of GCVSDP 2012 can be qualified effective.

⁷¹ Interview Kevin Murray, 21/02/2014

⁷² Interview Martin Wright, senior strategic manager of Scottish Enterprise

⁷³ Interview Gordon Laing, Glasgow 20/02/2014

Co-ownership

The assumed importance of shared ownership is defined according to three criteria, being feeling pride about the results, having defended out puts to others and claiming credit for one or more specific ideas.

All interviewees reported aspects of feeling co-ownership to the SDP. Examples were given for specific ideas included in the concept or influences on the decision-making process. **Credits** were claimed for ideas about better understanding of economic constraints, ideas about strategic importance and feasibility of projects, green thinking etc. **Pride** of being involved and contribute to the process, was expressed not only by those who were responsible for the organization. The process organization clearly aimed at sharing ownership. Re-installing the Futures Group, expanding the group of municipal participants with representatives of 13 new organizations, broadened the support of organizations now co-owning the results of the Futures Group. Also the Green Network Partnership and the many activities for elaborating the Green Network enhanced feelings of ownership to the strategy.⁷⁴

The municipal politicians, although “silently deciding,”⁷⁵ seem to keep a bit more distance, but generally support their officers’ and co-own the process.

The fact that Scottish Ministers at the approval of the plan explicitly exclude any commitment to the content, without offering any perspective on support for delivering the strategy is highly remarkable. There was not even a signal of *loose coupling* to the process. That might be understood as a form of top-down thinking without any engagement, declaring no sharing of ownership whatsoever. The evaluator of the Scottish Strategic Plans system reported his intention to recommend the government to start acting as a partner to the city-regions.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Interview Max Hislop, Glasgow 19/02/2014

⁷⁵ They seemed to be shocked once, when the chairman asked for a vote. This would confirm Teisman’s observation that decisions in such processes “emerge”: At a certain moment every participant says same things.

⁷⁶ Interview Kevin Murray, Glasgow 21/02/2014, that recommendation has later been included in the report. Murray, K. (2014). Review of the Strategic Development Plans in Scotland, Kevin Murray Associates and Glasgow University.

Co-production

The co-making of the strategy or even co-design is seen as a factor for sharing ownership. The openness to influences and the way the process was managed, confirmed the feelings of co-producing aspects of the strategy. Co-design probably applies for the elaborations in more specific local elaborations of the Green Network and of service centre regeneration plans.

The integrated approach in which ideas from **any side** were considered of land-use and green planning was reported as almost fixed routine in the city-region thanks to the experiences of co-operation.⁷⁷ The revolving process as obliged according to Scottish law, was freshly inspired by **new views** coming from the work of the Future Group

The same message was expressed about planning for public transport. Although there is a too high density of organizations dedicated to public transport in West Scotland, which severely adds to ineffectiveness within that sector, the co-operation with spatial planning on the strategic level feels like co-producing.⁷⁸

The focus of the Futures Group on challenging fixed opinions and on impacts for the specific ways of seeing in the organizations of the participants, can be regarded as a learning tool for enhancing capabilities for co-producing and agreeing on a common plan.

Openness

[The next criteria for openness of the process were given in our theoretical frame: open agenda, informality and flexible participation.

All interviewees reported experiencing the process management during working on the strategy with the GCVSDPA as very open and relaxed. They refer to the manager of the GCVSDPA, Stuart Tait as organizer of open **informal** discussions, inviting any relevant stakeholder from the start of considering an issue. He, supported by the Joint Committee (re) started in 2007 the Futures Group, involving 13 organizations next to the 8 municipalities.

⁷⁷ Interview Max Hislop, Glasgow 19/02/2014

⁷⁸ Interview Bruce Kiloh, Glasgow 20/02/2014

Openness did not only apply for the **agenda** setting and the ways of reacting on contributions from different sectors, but also for the composition of topic specific working groups. The general feeling was that everybody representing an interest, which might be relevant for future development of the city-region, could **participate** to the considerations.

Based on our review of literature, we assumed organizing a decision-making process towards an agreed concept or scenario for future development through considering a set of options in the form of different **scenarios** a fruitful way of effective decision-making for a development strategy. That assumption would apply if different directions of development would be under consideration. That was not the case in preparing the GCVSDP. The main lines of the strategy have already emerged and agreed in previous steps. The Futures Group applied scenarios in the form of four story lines for testing the robustness of the existing draft strategy. That approach focused on the question: what are the risks of delivering the strategy under four different circumstances in the economic and political context? The focus of that question is clearly not on considering different possible concepts of a future strategy, but it considers the impact of different possible future developments on a given strategic policy.

The **role of experts** interacting in a decision-making process is seen as quite crucial. The evaluator of Scottish experience in strategic planning emphasised that it is all about processes between people, and how amazing small teams of experts organize these strategic processes in Scotland.⁷⁹ He also emphasised that research in planning insufficiently acknowledges the roles of practitioners as actors. Planning practitioners are not neutral observers, but heavily involved experts, influencing the processes. He stressed that an important activity is building peoples networks, and Stuart Tait and his team does that.

The interviewees experienced the experts of GCVSDPA as professionally facilitating experts bringing persons from relevant sectors together.

“The planners acted as the central connecting points, bringing different perspectives together and making sense out of the different outings.”⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Interview Kevin Murray, Glasgow 21/02/2014

⁸⁰ Interview Gordon Laing, assistant business manager (development plans) North Lanarkshire Council, 20/02/2014

The openness towards stakeholders and influences resulted in trust, which is essential for co-operation. The support for the strategy among organizations has been broadened as a result of the GCVSDPA's policy to invite more parties in the Futures Group and the activities of the Green Network Partnership. Involving investors in discussions entailed achieving selectivity in strategic zones for economic activities: some outsider telling municipal officers that he "would never risk a penny" in investing in a specific site, was quite convincing.⁸¹

All interviewees referred to the manager of the GCVSDPA as essential factor for the success of the strategy. When interviewed he formulated his policy with regard to developing support for the plan as:

*"Relations are among persons; not between institutions; I like to bring people in such contact that they can take up the phone and ask any question."*⁸²

The importance of legally obliged **visualizations** for the success of the strategy was emphasised by several interviewees. The economist representing Scottish Enterprise said:

*"The quality of place is very important for an economist and that demands for visualization. Maps and images show the relations and that things work."*⁸³

As a contrast with their experience in the GCVSDP preparation, most of the interviewees referred to the negative aspects of legalistic thinking in many organizations and they referred to previous experiences. The dominant focus on demarcation of powers and conflicts creates a context in which constructive co-operation is difficult. The Scottish legislation on planning differs in that respect with the English system, which they still characterized as "appeal led planning".

The non-commitment of the government to the plan might indicate that apparently not all persons in the departments of the Scottish Ministry are adapted to the required different attitude of governance.

⁸¹ Interview Gordon Laing, Glasgow, 20/02/2014

⁸² Interview Stuart Tait, Glasgow, 20/02/2014

⁸³ Interview Martin Wight, Glasgow 20/02/2014

The short-term cycle of budgeting in the various institutions cause problems for long-term strategy delivering. It limits thinking within narrow constraints: Every investment requiring multi-annual write-offs can be rejected because there is no existing budget. The legal obligation of revision of SDP every four years from the date of approval seems rather short. It included that directly after approval of SDP1, activities to prepare SDP2 were started. On the other hand such next rounds allow showing small results on the long way to delivering the strategy, which might help to continue building support to the strategy.

§ 9.7 Evaluation and remaining issues

Context

With regard to the environment of the process, the characteristics of actual network society seem to apply only at the level of the city region, not in the governmental environment at the national level: The multi-level embedding of the GCVSDP process can be characterized as a quite simple, but formal legalistic top-down dominated structure. Procedures as well as requirements for the content are strictly regulated. The national policy for spatial development prescribes policies to be elaborated on the regional level, seemingly without much room for local interpretation. The SDP must conform to national plan documents. Since the national policy issues seem completely supported in the city region there are no signals of negotiating the content among the different layers of government.

The GCVSDPA succeeds in bringing different sectors with their varying views on reality together in a constructive co-operation. The practiced integrated approach contrasts with the sector led control of the government. A functioning network society would require adaptation of openness, goal orientation and co-operation of all levels. The explicit non-commitment of the government to the plan, which they formally approved, demonstrates the non-engagement of legalistic thinking. The same seems to apply for the required precise calculations for housing needs specified for different localities at different future moments up to 2035. The housing officials of the Scottish level require precise, differentiated projections, applying a “⁸⁴generous attitude as well as evidence”.

Process

Despite the above, the process of strategy making for the GCVSDP is effective.

An open integrated approach is conducted with many co-operating stakeholders in an atmosphere of informality and trust. The efforts of the GCVSDPA in organizing co-operation are aiming at building support among a broad group of stakeholders. Their early involvement in close co-operations resulted in together co-producing the improvements to the plan. As a consequence the interviewees reported co-ownership of the results and of the process, which may be expected to secure further support. Commitment of the organizations, which are involved in producing the strategy, will be important for implementation of projects while delivering the strategy.

Interestingly the approach in the Futures Group also addressed the attitudes and ways of seeing reality of the different organizations through focussing on the impact of scenarios on the organization of the stakeholders. That may induce a broader learning effect of the strategy-making process than only with regard to the strategic development plan. Learning as influencing opinions and mindsets was deliberately aimed for in the Futures Group.

The process aspects, effectiveness and success of the decision-making for the GCVSDP of 2012 are summarized as follows:

PROCESS ASPECTS	GCVSDP	
openness	Open Agenda	yes
	Informality	yes
	Objective focus	yes
	Broad/flexible particip.	yes
Co-production/design	Ideas from any side	yes
	New ideas emerge	Selectivity/ green netw.
	Un-envisaged options	
Co-ownership	Pride	yes
	Defensive actions	
	Take credit	yes
EFFECTIVENESS YES	Agreement	yes
	Next round	yes
	Satisfaction	yes
(Pot.) SUCCESS YES	Realizations	yes
	Socio-economic impacts	yes
	New regulations	Legislation evolved

TABLE 9.1 Evaluation process aspects of GCVSDP

Content

The content of the strategic vision implies redevelopment of the plethora of brown field sites and a preference of concentration of activities around service centres and stops of public transportation, within a general environmental sustainability policy frame with regard to transportation, energy generation and landscape development, in line with the national spatial policy framework.

The strategy addresses concrete region-specific problems like the supply of improved housing, regeneration of town centres, development of employment locations, regeneration of brown field sites and improved accessibility particularly for public transport and walking and cycling.

One of the main achievements of the actual plan is the increased degree of prioritisation and selectivity among the many sites for economic activities and the regeneration of the network of centres.

The difficult decision-making between representatives of partly competing municipalities for distinguishing among sites of strategic significance and sites of local importance requires going for the common, regional interest. The GCVSDPA succeeded in creating sufficient trust in the process, so that such difficult choices are accepted, supported and at least partly co-owned.

Another large achievement is the Green Network, which influenced the wider landscape and development policy. The elaboration of the Green Network within several local projects provides quick wins, which are supportive for acknowledging the Green Network and the strategy.

Persons

The persons representing their organizations are the essential factors for effectiveness of the process. Constructive co-operation is not a self-evident outcome of putting representatives of several sectors together. Actual network society requires openness to all possibly relevant influences and trust among actors. The evaluator of Scottish Strategic Plans strongly emphasised the human aspect as factor for success and the positive experience in Glasgow and the Clyde Valley. The GCVSDPA management succeeds in exploiting that human factor for the effective decision-making towards the commonly owned strategy. People are closely and early involved in informal interactions aiming at agreement about the city-region's future. The interviews revealed that the participants highly value the efforts of the planning experts to connect relevant influences and professionally facilitate the groups in making decisions.

Remaining issues

Controversies playing a role during the preparation of the plan and the stage of examination in the approval procedure consisted of problems with for example a project developer about a shopping centre and those with a housing interest about the way of calculating housing demand. The political level resolved the problem about the shopping centre. A minor controversy is related to the fact that the Green Network is to be elaborated at a lower scale level, where not all local technicians feel connected to the regionally agreed aspects of sustainable development. Discussions with civil engineers concentrate on their standpoint that drainage in the landscape should be secured by means of piped sewerage systems, whereas the Green Network envisages nourishing aquifers through ponds and ditches.

The discussions with the level of Scottish Ministers about the techniques of quantifying housing demand per location continued after approval of the plan. Within the review into the second version of the Strategic development Plan (SDP2) evidence is required for precise numbers. This demand of the government contrasts with the character of a long-term development strategy.

Although improved accessibility of the city region through infrastructure for sustainable modes of public transportation is identified as the key element of the plan, and the (high-speed rail) connection of Glasgow with European economic centres is considered essential, these issues remain problematic since Scottish Ministers did not provide any perspective on positively considering such projects.

§ 9.8 Conclusions: the effectiveness of GCVSDP

The **context** of the decision making process is a regulated legal procedure of a four years cycle of reviewing the strategy. The administrative embedding is quite simple: the GCVSDPA has only to relate to the Scottish government. The process is organized in a steady, well-established organization, which' planning experts gained experience through the years. That context supports the continuous strategy making process.

The **process** consists of elaborating previous steps, reacting on higher-level indications and requirements and of developing new insights and views. The visualizations and scenarios are not applied as tools of decision-making. The visualizations of the strategy are maps used as means of external communication indicating the locations of strategic interventions. Scenarios are used as possible changed contexts for exploring the vulnerability of the agreed strategy for changed external circumstances; not as options for possible different strategies. That process results in continued consideration of strategic development.

The **place-related** circumstances of the process seem to support the effectiveness: The little organization developed a network of dedicated persons representing different stakeholders of the region. Mutual trust is apparent in the open process management. Commitment of the different actors to the process is probably based on openness to involvement combined with the common awareness of the importance of better connections to the outside world for Scottish future development.

10 Grödental: communities arranging their valley

VISION GHERDEINA / MASTER PLAN

§ 10.1 Introduction

South Tyrol is the bilingual (German and Italian) North Italian province in the eastern Alps (Dolomites). Its name in Italian language is Bolzano-Alto Adige; in German the name of the province is Südtirol. Its surface of about 740.000 ha lies for more than 85% higher than 1000 m above the sea level. The population size is about 500.000 persons. The province boasts an exceptional degree of autonomy within the Italian national legislation. The Grödental is located in the South- East corner of Südtirol in the Dolomites area, of which a large proportion is Unesco world heritage. Gherdëina (The valley's name in the local Ladin language, in Italian: Val Gardena and in German language Grödental) is a narrow 25 km long valley of 15.000 ha, which is one of five Italian valleys with a majority of Ladin speakers (two of these valleys are in South Tyrol). The valley includes (parts of) five municipalities. The total population is about 10.000 permanent inhabitants, but yearly about 2,5 million overnight stays of guests are counted in the valley's 17.000 (hotel) beds. (Kämpf and Weber 2003) The German language names of the five municipalities in the Grödental are Santa Christina, Sankt Ulrich, Wolkenstein, Lajen, and parts of Kastelruth (only the two Ladin speaking parts of the latter municipality, being Überwasser and Runggaditsch).

The valley is best known as being among the world's best ski resorts. With its connection to Dolomiti Superski, the large ski carousel, and the nearby Alpe di Siusi, it is an Eldorado for many winter sport lovers. The Dolomiti Superski Pass offers unlimited access to lift facilities in the Dolomites with 500 km interconnecting slopes surrounding the Sella Group of mountains and a total of 1.220 km slopes in 12 zones. The woodcarving industry, which flourished in Gherdëina since the 17th century, also makes the valley widely known. Thanks to the flourishing tourist sector and the entrepreneurship of the inhabitants, the valley's GDP ranks amongst the highest, not only provincially but nationally.

The whole of the territories of the three first mentioned municipalities are located in the Grödental. Lajen is located at the mountain north of the valley's West entrance.

The quality of a narrow valley in a mountainous area is at the same time the source of problems. The accessibility of the valley is a problem, specifically at moments that tourists arrive and leave. Also through traffic is perceived as problematic especially when crossing village centres. But also the fact that the spectacular scenery attracts too many rallies, motoring groups and bicycle racers demonstrate the overload of the capacity of infrastructure. An important issue is the protection of the landscape. Limitations are to be set to facilities for skiing as well as to the expansion of facilities for guests: the villages tend to develop into one ribbon development of the valley. The spatial quality of some zones for economic activities located at entries of villages, jeopardizes the attractive image of the valley. Reconstruction is needed and extension of the capacity for economic activity.



FIGURE 10.1 Location of Grödental (blue) in Bolzano-Alto Adige/ Südtirol

The Bolzano based European Academy (EURAC) ⁸⁵ produced information in a presentation, entitled “*Südtirol–Wohin?*” within the framework of an attempt to prepare the provincial overall spatial development plan in 2007. That report provided inventories and analyses of data for the province as a whole. Since those analyses did not provide the expected recommendations or a concept for a provincial development strategy, the provincial executive decided to look for an occasion for a pilot project for strategic planning on a smaller scale. The *Grödental* was chosen for conducting the experiment of a pilot project initially called *Grödental Master Plan*. The municipalities in the valley intended, after an earlier attempt in 2005, to better coordinate their development.

The EURAC was then commissioned by the provincial executive to prepare in an interactive way with local stakeholders an integrative, long-term spatial development vision; if successful, this pilot project might become an example in the province for strategy making in other sub-regional areas.

With active involvement of the provincial office for spatial planning, EURAC organized an interactive process, which resulted in the Master Plan or *Vision Gherdeina* at the end of 2010. The document was finally presented and welcomed at the provincial executive and in the five municipal councils in April 2011. The plan has not been formally approved then. This was envisaged to happen as soon as the new provincial executive has been composed, later it was decided together with the provincial authorities, not to go for a formal agreement. In mid 2014 the local councils formally adopted the vision.

The *Grödental Master Plan*, later called *Vision Gherdeina*, has been prepared by the EURAC in commission of the provincial department for spatial planning. For the current evaluation of the strategic decision-making process about the future development of *Grödental* the following sources are used:

- The report *Vision Gherdeina*, (Eurac and Südtirol 2011)(also referred to as Master Plan) as technically adopted in 2011,
- The presentation “*Südtirol – Wohin?*” by Eurac of 2007,
- Information produced for two local workshops in 2007 and 2011 and
- Eight interviews with participants in the production process of the *Vision Gherdeina* in early 2013.

⁸⁵

(EURAC Research: Institut für Regionalentwicklung und Standortmanagement).



FIGURE 10.2 Dolomite Unesco world natural heritage scenery [Source: Südtirol and Dolomiti Superski]

§ 10.2 The planning system

South Tyrol is an autonomous province within the region Trentino-Alto Adige/ Südtirol since 1948 with a relative large degree of administrative, budget, and legislative powers among which the legislation for spatial planning.

Although the *European Compendium for Spatial Planning Systems and Policies (CEC 1997)* positions the Italian planning system in the Urbanism model, in fact in Italy no planning system exists on the national level. The National Planning act of 1942 represented the basic legislation on national level. Since then legislative power with regard to spatial planning has been devolved to the Italian regions, especially after the '90 s. In the case of Bologna, the region Emilia Romagna modernized the planning legislation, envisaging procedures for strategic planning. The South Tyrolean spatial

planning legislation is still based on the out-dated, hierarchical and rigid planning system of the 1942 national Planning Act. In Bolzano- Alto Adige (Südtirol) a continuous process of modifications of the 1942 national law, in reaction of specific incidents gradually created a complex, unclear and chaotic complex system, posing daily problems of interpretation.⁸⁶

In that old system, plans and procedures are based on rigid regulative land-use planning. Decades of provincial adjustments reacting on non-envisaged problems, or facilitating politicians with specific projects, made the provincial legal planning system to an almost unmanageable system.⁸⁷ Actual regulative plans tend to respond more to immediate necessities rather than aiming at organizing a coherent spatial structure or implementing a development visions.(Lingua and Servillo 2014)

The planning legislation does not regulate the possibility that groupings of municipalities prepare common strategic development plans for the long term.

Against that background the preparation of the *Master Plan Grödental* was an innovative attempt to escape from strict regulative planning and to construct a common framework for strategic coordinated development. Never before such a common strategy was drafted in South Tyrol. *Vision Gherdëina* was promoted by the provincial office of spatial planning of South Tyrol as a pilot for developing a proactive, future oriented approach for municipal co-operation. Virna Bussadori, director of the office for spatial coordination of the autonomous province wrote:⁸⁸

- *“The elements that make the Gardena’s Vision almost unique in South Tyrol are twofold: First of all its territorial focus is neither strictly municipal nor provincial/regional but based on a territory (a valley) which started recognising common issues and potentials and therefore aimed at looking at common (territorially agreed) solutions. This is quite new for our planning tradition, which is still anchored on a rigid administrative base and on a hierarchical system.*
- *The second element derives from the first and that is that the process started on a voluntary base (this kind of planning instruments are not foreseen by law) and developed free from codified schemes, in a sort of “learning by doing” process where actors identified step by step the actions needed.*

⁸⁶ Interview Virna Bussadori, director territorial coordination. (coordinazione territoriale)

⁸⁷ Interview Virna Bussadori

⁸⁸ Email 27/08/2012 From Virna Bussadori to Jan Vogelij

The result is a plan with a long term focus for the territories involved that aims at harmonising decision making processes in order to guarantee the best option for development.”

§ 10.3 Administrative embedding

The fact that the province wanted to organize a pilot project as an experiment for strategy making included that no formal procedures were to be followed. The planning power of the province (without having to refer to the national level in Rome) enabled direct and informal co-operation with the municipalities in the valley. No public administration exists at valley level, so that the voluntary co-operation among the municipalities could also take an entirely informal form, inspired by the bottom-up wish for more coordinated development. The mayors are meeting regularly and since working together on the vision, civil servants of different municipalities contact each other easily since co-producing the vision.

These circumstances, together with the active co-operation of the provincial office of spatial coordination, resulted in most simple multi-level embedding: only the two layers, co-operating municipalities and the province were involved.

The province wished to support concerted actions of the municipalities and the content of the actions was to be established by the villagers.

§ 10.4 Vision Gherdëina

Issues

The first initiative for improved spatial coordination came from the representatives of the valley-wide organized touristic sector, which noticed issues like unnecessary competition among villages in investments, such as multiple investing in swimming pools and skating tracks.

The narrow east-west oriented valley suffers from the bottlenecks at the western entrance and at the passages of the villages. Accessibility is problematic especially in the tourist seasons in winter and summer. Moreover the valley and its eastern pass,

offering spectacular views, are popular among organizers of motorcar and motorcycle tours, thereby increasing the existing functional through-traffic for supplying villages in further valleys.

The issue of ever-increasing number of ski tracks crossing slopes, jeopardizing natural values and agricultural land, also require stronger spatial coordination.

The valley's capacity with regard to the facilities of tourists, hotels, restaurants, ski lifts is perceived as being at its limits: almost exhausted.

Another issue to be addressed in a spatial development strategy relates to spatial quality: zones of economic activities at the entrances of some of the well-maintained characteristic villages are characterized by unattractive facilities for manufacturing, which require reorganization and relocation.

The requests from the tourist board resulted in a meeting of the five mayors of the valley in 2008, deciding to commit themselves towards coordinated spatial planning. Acknowledging the provincial responsibility for spatial development, they contacted the provincial authorities in order to secure co-operation. Arguments were:

- The villages of the five municipalities of the valley experienced similar problems of density in the narrow valley, real estate pressure and accessibility especially during winter sport season and needed integrated approaches to solve common issues.
- Some forms of co-operation were already practiced (*Grödner Initiative*, 2005), especially in the field of tourism.
- There existed historically a relative strong degree of social and cultural cohesion among the populations of the villages at the bottom of the valley as a consequence of the common language of the local inhabitants: *Ladin*.



FIGURE 10.3 Santa Cristina

The province, after the disappointing attempt of EURAC to prepare a provincial strategy for spatial development in 2007, looked for an occasion to experiment and develop methods for modern governance within a pilot study. The initiative of the five municipalities fitted into the provincial need, and the province decided to support and part-finance the process.

The process

In order to steer the process in terms of content and process organization and to communicate every step with the stakeholders, a steering group was established.

The steering group consisted of the five mayors accompanied at key moments by the provincial deputy governors⁸⁹ of the involved sectors, assisted by the representative of the provincial planning department and EURAC.

⁸⁹

"Landesräte", elected authorities, which together with the Governor (Landeshauptmann) constitute the provincial executive.

The steering group met once a month during the process.

EURAC was charged with the responsibility for the process and the reporting. The EURAC project leader⁹⁰ worked in close co-operation with the provincial director of spatial coordination.⁹¹ That co-operation of two planners acted as “motors” of the process.

The process of the making of the vision was subdivided in four steps, elaborated in the period July 2008 – April 2010. Next to the political and administrative representatives about 100 persons representing various parts of the population, groupings and interests coming from the 5 municipalities, were actively involved.

The discussions during the interactive decision-making process were organized around maps of the valley, and invitations to all participants to sketch ideas for the future on those maps. As a consequence the final agreement consisted of territorialized objectives, identifying problems and interventions at specific locations.

The first step in July 2008 consisted of exploring and evaluating the historic and existing developments of the economy, settlements and traffic, the landscape, social aspects of the valley and to assess in small thematic working groups the main issues and opportunities of the valley. (SWOT). Five thematic working groups were created considering respectively economy/tourism, traffic/ mobility, social aspects, landscape/environment and settlements; each group consisted of local experts in the above sectors. Particular attention was given to the fact that every municipality needed to be represented in each of the five groups. These groups met in early 2009 up to end May nine times.

The aim was to analyse issues, identify opportunities and prepare proposals to be discussed with a broader group of actors. The discussions addressed potentials and problems through questions like:

What functions well, what is to be improved in the valley?

How would you envisage to live, work and spend your free time in the future?

Which objectives would enable the desires of your envisaged future?

What measures would be needed for your objectives?

⁹⁰ Dipl. Ing. Lisa Kofink, spatial planner educated at TU Kaiserslautern

⁹¹ Dr. Virna Bussadori, spatial planner educated at University of Venice

In the first sessions the workshops were organized separately according to the five themes: economy, settlements, mobility and traffic, landscape and social aspects. During the meetings it was asked to participants to visualise on maps both existing issues as well as proposed interventions. This helped participants to distinguish between proposals that are geographically determined and other issues (especially cultural and social) that can hardly be graphically designed. The interviews revealed that together working with maps, discussing about the future and plans created a positive, constructive sphere among the participants: their ideas and opinions were assembled and used in discussions. Issues discussed in the meetings were for instance: the ideas to close passes at certain hours in order to address the problems of through-traffic, limit the ever-increasing number of ski-tracks through dedicating slopes for protected nature, avoid growing-together of villages, close and /or renovate certain zones of economic activities, which jeopardize the spatial quality, but also items like the insufficient availability of kindergarten. All participants could propose issues and solutions in those meetings.




FIGURE 10.4 One of the assembled collections of ideas [Photo: V. Bussadori]

During the second step the discussions were organized by combining the thematic groups. In the plenary session of end May the discussion focused entirely on objectives and interventions for the future development of the valley.

These objectives and interventions were then summarised by the project leaders into three optional spatial policy concepts, which provided different guidelines:

- *United Gröden*
- *Diversity in Gröden*
- *Calmed traffic in Gröden*

The third step consisted of a broad public discussion in two forums about the objectives summarized in the three concepts. These policy concepts were understood as possible scenarios for future development like: What would happen if we emphasize the common development into one united structure of the valley, or what would happen if development is mainly guided by the wish to emphasize differentiation between the villages, or which development would result if we give priority to strict traffic calming?

The invitation (in German and Ladin languages) to participate in those forum discussions expressed the intended openness of the decision-making process:

“We invite you to discuss with us the future of the valley and to contribute with your opinions to the development. The Master Plan is a common strategy that must offer equal chances for inhabitants, private companies and tourists.”

The two forums were organized at the end of the year 2009. In total 38 organizations were involved in the discussions, of which 6 of the provincial government.

The objective was to inform the representatives of different interests, associations and civil society about the results so far and to take notice of their appreciation of the objectives and interventions resulting from their specific opinions and perspectives. Of those newly involved persons, several were from their point of view doubting the feasibility of proposals another was simply cynical. Therefore a little extra workshop was organized among experts about the expected effectiveness and feasibility of the objectives and the interventions.

After that forum discussion and with the available information the participating organizations were invited to formulate their written standpoints and send it to EURAC.

In the second forum EURAC presented the received standpoints, which were included together with the assessment of each of the comments within the Master Plan documentation to the meeting. The meetings enabled the local groupings and specific interests to validate the proposed objectives and (re-) formulate standpoints, being a third step.

During the fourth step the objectives and interventions were adapted and modified according to the written reactions to the forum discussions and elaborated into the draft Master Plan agreement for the future development. (Part three).

The trans-municipal and trans-sector character of the discussions resulted in complex issues and difficult discussions within the various workshops. Therefore at the end of the workshops a plenary discussion was opened, confronting the different views, focusing on prioritising the proposed objectives and interventions. Although in that stage the views of the professionals, which have been involved in the workshop on feasibility were dominant, all participants agreed on the conclusions about order and priority of objectives.⁹² That was the basis of further ordering, elaborating and projecting the results on maps. A first draft was presented and generally approved in the steering group on the 1st of September 2009.

The objectives of the three distinct concept or guidelines: *United Gröden*, *Diversity in Gröden* and *Calmed Traffic*, were then specified in partial strategies.

Those partial strategies are then, according to their priority and feasibility related to various relevant time horizons: now, tomorrow, long-term and “sustainable” (forever)

The concept

The *Vision Gherdëina* (Master Plan) provides guidance for envisaged long-term interventions, meant as a framework for orientation and action. It assumes flexibility, adapting objectives to experiences and new insights. Although the main lines probably remain valid in the long-term, new conditions and knowledge may lead to modifications, which are to be approved by the five municipal councils. The idea is to evaluate the realisation after each municipal election. Specific policies can be specified at the start of each next mandate period. The vision as expressed in this Master Plan is according to the authors meant as a start for a continuous strategic development process.

The report on the *Vision Gherdëina - Masterplan* (Eurac and Südtirol 2011) describes the objectives, the content and the process resulting in the agreement among the participants. According to the report, the functional region seeks to improve the efficiency of planning and development, looking for synergies and capitalising on existing assets. Objectives are: interaction of systems; balancing inter-local initiatives; cohesion between common objectives and individual local decisions; creativity and new approaches to common problems; communication and involvement in

⁹²

Interview Lisa Kofink, Eurac project leader.

decision-making of all with regard to the wellbeing of society. With this Master Plan it is intended to plan pro-actively instead of only re-acting on issues and solving problems, which characterizes the existing common spatial planning practice in *Südtirol*.⁹³

The plan aims to establish long term (sub-regional) objectives which are geographically related and which allow, next to specific interventions, to keep possibilities open for future developments. (Eurac and Südtirol 2011)

The concise Master Plan, which final version was called *Vision Gherdëina*, consists of four parts:

Introduction, containing a 12 pages description of the process leading to the Master plan as well indications for future implementation.

The Vision 2050+, which is one short paragraph stating the aim of the five municipalities to become eventually one unique municipality. (...!)

Agreement for the future. This part describes in 28 pages the sector aims, objectives and guidelines, agreed with the participants, to be commonly implemented.

Master Plan: Three maps geo-referencing the objectives and guidelines.




FIGURE 10.5 Vielvältiges Gröden (section) [Source: Vision Gherdëina 2011]

The sector aims, objectives and guidelines are distinguished according to priority of implementation: qualified for “now” (2012-2016), “tomorrow” (2017-2022), “long-term” 2023-2040) and “sustainable” realization.

Common policies to be decided collaboratively in the five municipalities are:

- Locations of areas of manufacturing,
- The parts of slopes dedicated to ski tracks,
- Boundaries of the built-up areas,
- Infrastructure for accessibility of the valley and the different villages, preferably including a light rail facility and regulations to temporarily close the east pass.
- As common goal of the vision it is decided to become one administrative unit; one municipality.

The strategy includes an improvement of the accessibility of the valley in two ways: The main road of the valley will surround the built-up areas of all villages and a light rail system is proposed to entice tourists to leave their cars and enter by public transport. Further, regular closure of the pass at the East end of the valley is proposed in order to reduce through-traffic. Also re-organization of zones of economic activities is foreseen: one to be re-structured and dedicated to residential uses, and at the West entrance of the valley a common new economic zone is projected in *Pontives* in the municipality of *Lajens*.

OVERVIEW OF THE AGREED OBJECTIVES
Guideline United Gröden
Objective 1. Uniting Gröden territorially
Programme for inter-communal actions
Rural, settlement-specific villages and buildings
Uniting infrastructures
Objective 2. Improve quality of Life
Enhance pedestrian areas in the centres
Utilize riverbed in the villages
Green corridors
Mix functions within the centres of villages
Identify most important winter sport areas
Objective 3. Protect natural area
Priority to nature
Validate sites in the villages
Identify urban expansion areas
Increase existing densities.

>>>

Objective 4. Secure social balance
Social balance at private investments
Control system for "Konventionierung"
Objective 5. Excellent area for ski sport
Qualitative improving of facilities
Connecting ski arenas
Connecting ski lifts in the valley
Guideline Diversity in Gröden
Objective 6. Quality instead of quantity
Limits to growth
Regional economic zone Pontives
Restructuring of existing economic zones
Tourist development in Lajen
Objective 7 Provision of alternative energy
Protection against climate and energy saving
Bio mass
Research to alternative energy
Guideline Traffic Calming in Gröden
Objective 8. Reduce traffic
Complete ring roads
Reduce traffic at the passes in the Dolomites
Limit the passage of motorcycles.
Objective 9. Greening the traffic
Light railway in the valley
Local public transport
Expansion of pedestrian and cycle routes
Logistic and multi-modal passenger facilities in Pontives

TABLE 10.1 Agreed objectives in Grödental

The most specified objectives as agreed in the Vision, which are called partial strategies⁹⁴ are grouped according to four temporal horizons:

- Now, up to 2016
- Tomorrow, 2017 - 2022
- Long term, 2023 – 2040
- Sustainable (not defined but clearly longest term; forever)

Critical consideration of the three guiding principles, which are initially presented as options or scenarios for future development, results in the conclusion that they do not exclude each other; they can be combined without creating large problems. As a consequence, the Master Plan consisting of the set of three separate maps visualizing each of the three guidelines can be projected over each other. That implies searching for a balance between a coherent structure of the valley and differentiated identities of its components while addressing the issue of calming the traffic in the valley.

§ 10.5 Impact of the strategy

The agreement among the participants in the decision-making process has been presented in all five municipal councils where it has been positively received without an exemption. Several council members have been involved in the process of the making of the vision. Because the infrastructural proposals such as temporarily closure of passes, or realization of a light rail connection, affect other valleys, further support of and co-operation by the province is needed. This applies specifically also for financial support for implementing the proposed large infrastructural investments of the vision, like for public transport.

Although there is no formal approval of the vision sought, the interviews revealed that several steps on the road to realization are set.

That was reported in terms like:

“ We already live the vision”. ⁹⁵

A close relation developed among the municipalities at the bottom of the valley: the mayors meet regularly and municipal officials and technicians are said to meet each other more easily. The boundaries of urbanised areas and protected natural areas dividing urbanized areas are established together. A common vision on the development of ski-tracks is decided, which includes decisions about the location of a connection and limitations to new ski-tracks. The initial problems with the powerful organization Dolomiti Superski about new, connections between ski tracks are settled since the vision gives clarity about the common municipal policy. Studies about alignment of the light rail are started. The vision provides also clarity about the agreed distribution of specific services between the (previously competing) villages in terms of accent on education in Wolkenstein, on sport facilities in Santa Christina, on wood

⁹⁵

Interviews Adrian Senoner and Ambros Hofer

production in Sankt Ulrich and on energy production in Lajen. A new common zone for economic activities and distributions is projected in Pontives in the municipality of Lajen. But also concrete projects are realized on the ground: a villages-connecting bicycle route and places for staying along the river are realized.

The positive experience with this process of decision-making in the valley supported the far going idea of merging the municipalities in the bottom of the valley, into one new municipality. Merging of municipalities, which all like to foster their traditions and separate identities is quite uncommon in Italy.

The Vision is mid 2014 officially adopted in the municipal councils, but not formally submitted to the provincial authorities. First the idea was to await the municipal elections. The mayors, who were newly elected after the production of the vision, first had some hesitation to support the vision. Then the idea was to await the provincial elections in order to acquaint with the new "Landesrat". Behind this hesitation was the long experience with strict regulative juridical focused existing planning culture of Südtirol, which caused fear among the mayors about the way to continue. If the Master Plan would be adopted and the wording "plan" is applied, they feared becoming subject to a new juridical planning control system. Therefore it became important to call the Master Plan "Vision" (and avoid the word "plan") The way forward, agreed with the provincial authorities was to officially adopt the vision in the municipal councils and to informally "inform" the provincial authorities about the valley's vision for future development.

§ 10.6 Process aspects: Effectiveness, Ownership, Co-production / Co-design and Openness

Interviews were organized in the valley with eight participants in the decision-making process towards the Master Plan (*Vision Gherdëina*) in the period 5-7 June 2013. Within the executives of the small communities the mayors and aldermen are local people having a job next to their municipal responsibility. According to their professional background they are locally considered mayor and at the same time representative of the interest of their profession.

The number of persons involved in the making of the Vision Gherdëina was large thanks to meetings open to the general public, more than 100 persons participated reacting on the invitation to 35 organizations plus to the general public. Eight persons of different professions like farmer, teacher, industrial entrepreneur, administrator of tourist organization and a sport instructor, several of them also active in municipal organizations, were interviewed.

Effectiveness

The interviews were almost without an exception very positive about the effectiveness of the making of the vision.

Although a period of three years is too short to establish success of the strategy, which would include results like mentioned in 5.5: realizations on the ground, socio economic improvements, new regulations implemented, the effectiveness of the making of the vision is apparent. There was a clear **agreement achieved** and welcomed in the municipal councils. Subsequent activities in realizing projects were developed. Several small projects are realized, some policies are coordinated among the municipalities and several municipal services are now organized and provided together. These elaborations included **next steps** based on the agreement among the participants. And the interviews showed that there was clear **satisfaction** about the process and its results among the participants.

Ownership

Almost all interviewees felt committed to the vision: it is their vision and they want to implement it. Several interviewees expressed it like this:

“ Although not (yet) officially agreed in the councils, I live the vision since we made it”

The feelings of co-ownership were still strong and general among the interviewees after three years. One said that his municipality uses the vision for every decision. Most interviewees expressed **pride** on the common results explicitly, no need to defend. Almost all **took credit** for specific ideas of the vision. The valley-wide tourist sector was considered initiator of the whole process. Apart from one interviewee, who had only participated in an initial workshop, all others had participated enthusiastically during the whole process.

“ I keep my copy of the vision always on my desk, to refer to the mainlines.”⁹⁶

Co-production

Apparently the co-operating project leader and the representative of the province succeeded in challenging the participants and broader forums to express their ideas and to listen to other's ideas so that consensus grew. The interviewees all referred to

⁹⁶

Interview Ambros Hofer

the activities during the preparation of the vision as together making. **Any item** of every participant could be discussed and that was according to the interviews appreciated. Most interviewees stressed that the open discussions with other interest groups provided better understanding for their views. The discussions during the process and the resulting vision offered them **new views** on their valley. The fact that at the end the three different options for future development could be combined in the one vision was a surprising discovering for some. The openness of the discussions and the project leaders who did hardly steer the content: (“it was to be the valley’s vision”)⁹⁷, enhanced the ownership of the vision. It was new, invented from scratch, like designing.

“ Yes, co-design that is what we did.”⁹⁸

The fact that ideas were developed together and that (at least the combination of) the ideas was new, confirmed broadly that forms of **co-design** have been practised.

Openness

With regard to the openness of the process the process management received broad compliments as facilitators and moderators: “the process and the discussions were organized in a professional and flexible way; they did the right thing at the right moment”. (Although the “motors of the process” both were involved in such a process the first time and referred to several moments in which they improvised.)

“ Every discussion was an open confrontation with other ways of seeing.”⁹⁹

There was not too much steering with regard to the content, the moderators only pointed sometimes to consequences or better possibilities for addressing an issue. Most meetings were open to the general public.

The openness of the process management was reflected in the answers about the openness of the process: there was **no strict pre-set agenda**, the process was organized in an **informal, objective** oriented way and **participation** was open.

⁹⁷ Both, L. Kofink and V. Bussadori

⁹⁸ Interview Adrian Senoner. When suggesting in the interview to characterize the activity and to choose between “mit machen” (together making) or “mit entdecken”(together discovering) he answered “ Ja, zusammen etwas Neues bedenken, das war es” (inventing something new). That may be called co-design.

⁹⁹ Interview Adrian Senoner



FIGURE 10.6 Participative workshop [Photo: V. Bussadori]

Some expressed that although maybe not all ideas were new, but that the coherence and consistency showed in **visualizations** stimulated and led to new combinations.

"The visualizations made formulations understandable".¹⁰⁰

The three guiding objectives giving direction to different approaches for future development, which resulted from first discussions and then were tabled to inspire the start of the participative process, were initially not meant as alternative **options** but as thematic perspectives. But they worked as optional scenarios during discussions in the process. They were guiding principles of different thinkable futures.

The first scenario: *United Gröden* aiming at exploring consequences of stronger territorial cohesion in the valley would imply interventions aiming at specialisation of the municipalities and valley-wide infrastructure. The second one: *Diversified Gröden* exploring aspects of enhanced identity of the villages could imply activities leading to enhanced competition among the municipalities and a rather weak overall service level. The third perspective *Traffic Calmed Gröden* addressing the issues of traffic and accessibility, could result in insufficient integrative focus of the approach. This last perspective may also be seen as a thematic scenario.

Nevertheless, these three different perspectives were applied as different options for approaching the valley's future development in first stages of discussion. Finally, and after visualizations each of the three options appeared to offer different valid qualities, each of which could eventually be combined with other options. The mapping helped lay people to discover that specific issues or spatial qualities are related to plan interventions at different scales or in different locations and that different options do not always exclude each other.

Without visualizations the three options would probably remain competing notions, concentrating discussions on questions like: which solution must be chosen and who prefers which notion. In fact all three options applied in the case of *Grödental* implied elements for future development, which could easily be combined in an integrated designed spatial concept. That happened eventually and composed the *Vision Gherdëina*.

The information from the interviews suggests that the way the **experts** conducted this strategy making has been: interactively, open and creatively. That was not only effective, but stimulated the participants to optimal results.

Visualization played an important role during the discussions. Participants were invited to localise their remarks on maps and sketch their proposals.

Although the management of such a process of strategy making was the first time for both the EURAC project-leader and the provincial principal, the interviewees spoke about professional leadership, doing the right things at the right moment.

Openness was maximal, co-design happened, co-ownership resulted and commitment seems quite general.

§ 10.7 Evaluation of the Grödental case

The making of the development strategy *Vision Gherdëina* was organized in a **context** where the spatial planning culture is characterized as a strict regulative focus under provincial legislation with heavy bureaucratic requirements.

The need for a strategic approach to planning was noticed at the provincial office for spatial coordination. An earlier attempt for formulating a development strategy for the province was approached as a study and reached a deadlock of inventories and analyses. The *Grödental* tourist organization, experiencing a lack of coordination among the municipalities in the valley, demanded for a more concerted spatial policy in the valley. The five mayors of the *Grödental* municipalities adopted that request and asked for provincial support. That coincided in 2008 with the provincial intention to organize a pilot project for strategic planning and the related requirements of governance. The province stimulated the municipalities by financing and active guiding the project as principal to the consultancy. As a result a context was created of conducting an experimental pilot project for which neither legal regulations nor procedures existed. Such optimal circumstances for a learning environment enable open processes and an informal environment.

The experience within the existing formal context with regard to spatial planning caused hesitations about formal next steps. The mayors feared to produce a document, which leads to more and new juridical control from the side of the province. They finally decided together with the province to officially inform the province about the content of their agreed vision.

The **process** organized as an experiment in modern governance was set up in close co-operation of the consultant from EURAC Bolzano and the provincial office for spatial coordination. Broad groups of the population participated in open meetings. No procedural or other regulative requirements did apply. The resulting proceedings were so open but at the same time so focused on achieving a common strategy, that the activities were not only co-making or co-production but, since new coherent concepts developed, the activity was recognized as co-design. The co-designed mapped interventions were agreed among the large grouping of participants.

Co-ownership of the results was three years after the agreement among the participants apparent: participants reported active application of the strategy during the interviews.

It is too short to evaluate the strategy definitively as eventual successful. Important decisions about infrastructure and accessibility needing support from the provincial executive are to be made. Especially the option of light rail access to the valley requires provincial investment. But the decision- making process was clearly effective.

PROCESS ASPECTS	VISION GHERDEINA	
openness	Open agenda setting	yes
	Informality	yes
	Objective focus	yes
	Broad/flexible particip	yes
Co-production/design	Ideas from any side	yes
	New ideas emerge	yes
	Un-envisaged options	yes
Co-ownership	Pride	yes
	Defensive actions	
	Take credit	yes
EFFECTIVENESS YES	Agreement achieved	yes
	Next round	They live the vision
	Satisfaction	yes
(Potential) SUCCESS YES	Realizations	few
	Socio-economic impacts	Considering merging
	New regulations	no

TABLE 10.2 Evaluation process aspects of Vision Gherdeina

The situation in which interviewees report to “live the vision”, in which a few projects are realized already and common policies are agreed would justify the expectation that the broad commitment to the vision may be expected to last.

Open informal project management, interactively considering several options, sketching solutions and co-designing a concept resulted in broad agreement and co-ownership.

The **content** of the envisioned development focused on the main lines of future development in the small valley: spatial coordination in establishing contour lines for urbanization, green landscape structures separating individual villages, establishing locations for ski track developments and connections between ski slopes reaching agreement with the powerful Dolomiti Superski organization, emphasizing different characteristics of individual villages, (re) considering locations of economic activities and reorganization of accessibility so that traffic calming results. The mapped vision indicates locations of specific interventions and leaves flexibility for specification and elaboration in concrete projects.

The **persons** of the EURAC project leader and the provincial director of spatial coordination organized the decision-making interactively improvising according to developments in the process. Both had no previous experience in similar processes, but were according to interviewees highly appreciated for their professional approach. Four of the newly elected mayors entered reluctantly in the process, but when it appeared to result in an agreement supported by the province, they got more intensively involved. The mayor of Santa Christina developed into the great promoter of merging of the municipalities. Within the valley commitment to the vision seems to continue, but that applies as long as people say that they live the vision and have the report always on their desks.

The *Landesrat*, which acted as political provincial responsible for the initiative, was temporarily replaced in 2012 until the 2013 elections. That caused some political discontinuity. The newly elected *Landesrat* has not been intensively involved in this experiment. Also municipal elections caused some discontinuity in the process, but the new mayors also picked up the achievements. The EURAC project leader experienced no support within her organization and has chosen to leave the spatial planning department of EURAC. The provincial director of spatial coordination is still on her post¹⁰¹ but received hardly support within the department of spatial development and decided to leave initiatives to the mayors of the valley. Finally the five mayors decided to officially adopt the vision in the councils, that happened mid 2014 and to inform the provincial authorities.

This case can be evaluated as a probable successful strategy, based on an effective decision-making process, creating strong bottom-up commitment.

Controversy?

The relation to provincial politicians might be qualified ambiguous. The process in Grödental has been started and conducted as a provincial experiment. That experiment is here assessed as effective decision-making and probably resulting in a successful strategy mainly on basis of the reactions of interviewees in the valley, and the supportive and stimulating attitude of the provincial director of planning. But there is not much indication of broader support than of her department at the provincial level. Although the policy objectives on which the five municipalities agreed can mainly be implemented by concerted actions of those five, for larger infrastructural interventions and valley extending decisions about through traffic, the provincial authorities are needed.

¹⁰¹

Only the name of her office changed from *coordinazione territoriale* in *pianificazione territoriale*.

Now further actions with regard to implementation of projects addressing the problems of accessibility like a rail line and traffic flows require financial support from the provincial level, and the new *Landesrat* did not (yet) show commitment to this provincial experiment.

§ 10.8 Conclusions on the success of Vision Gherdëina

Despite the strict juridical focussed planning system of the province of Bolzano-Alto Adige/Südtirol, the external **context** of the strategy making was supportive: The administrative embedding was simple and the province wanted to experiment and did not apply any regulation or procedural requirement. Instead, the provincial director actively co-organized and co-moderated the process, and the province co-financed the process.

The **process** had a more or less improvising character, reacting on ideas and development and was conducted in an open, interactive way. Although not initially meant, the development of the content consisted of elaborating and comparing options as in scenario planning.

The internal **context** was a supportive factor for the effectiveness of the process. The demand for working towards a common development vision came bottom-up. Although consisting of competing villages the valley favoured also a large degree of social cohesion: they are Ladin speaking persons in a German-speaking region.

11 Meetjesland: strategy making without political support

MEETJESLAND 2020, TOEKOMSTPLAN

§ 11.1 Introduction

Meetjesland is a small (sub) region located in the Northwest corner of the Belgian province of Oost-Vlaanderen, North of the city of Ghent, East of Bruges and South of Zeeuws-Vlaanderen at the national border with The Netherlands.

Meetjesland is a rural area, consisting of 13 small municipalities with Eeklo (20.000) as the regional centre. In total the surface is about 663 km², and the area counts 181.000 inhabitants. The names of the constituting municipalities are: Aalter, Assenede, Eeklo, Evergem, Kaprijke, Knesselare, Lovendegem, Maldegem, Nevele, Sint-Laureins, Waarschoot en Zomergem.

The flat agricultural polder countryside is mixed with creeks and canals at the northern border and some small forests in the central part. The agricultural land-use has been historically dedicated to flax. Nowadays corn is the more general crop cultivation. Urbanisation came together with industrialisation in the 19th century: textile and more specifically felt production were main industries.

The activities of discussions about regional co-operation and development, culminating in the long-term development vision Meetjesland 2020, changed the non-descript area in 2007 into a sub-region with some degree of pride about its identity.




FIGURE 11.1 Location of Meetjesland between Brugge and Gent

Information is abundantly available at *Streekplatform*¹⁰² Meetjesland website http://www.meetjesland.be/streekplatform/Meetjesland_2020.htm.

Relevant information is provided by the following reports:

- *Meetjesland 2020, Een plan met Toekomst*. This so-called halfway report is published by *Streekplatform+ Meetjesland* in July 2006.
- The report *Meetjesland 2020 Toekomstvisie* conveys the vision for future development as agreed by the *Streekplatform+*.
- *Masterplan Toerisme en Recreatie in het Meetjesland* This report conveys ideas about developing leisure activities in the sub-region in the period 2012-2017.
- *Het Land van Meten, naar een eerste editie van de monitor Meetjesland 2020*. This concerns a draft report aiming at creating a monitoring tool by *University of Ghent*.
- *Multi-level Governance voor Subregionale Duurzaamheid in Vlaanderen* (Debruyne and Vandewiele 2009)
- *Conflict in Samenwerking; voorbij een optelsom van belangen* (Salet, Metzke et al.)
- Eindrapport Ontwikkelingsgroep Streeknetwerk Meetjesland. (Oyaert and Woestyne 2011)
- Eight interviews with members of the future group and the board of *Streekplatform Meetjesland*

The available information covers aspects of the content, the way of co-operating, the processes as conducted with regard to creating a common vision on the regional development, as well as other achievements of the regional co-operation.

¹⁰²

An informal, voluntary council specifically established for this regional co-operation.

More detailed questions regarding the research to success factors have been addressed in interviews carried out in the (sub)-region in the period end March to begin April 2013. Interviews were held in the offices of the *Streekplatform* in Eeklo.

§ 11.2 Background of Streekplatform and Flemish planning system

An extreme density of organizations representing all kinds of interests in society was generally felt to be an obstacle for effective government in the Flemish sub-regions. The large number of ninety-two (2007) ¹⁰³ organizations in Meetjesland consisted of various interest groups working in several (sub-) regional municipalities, actively aim at improvements of specific issues and efficiency in the functioning of the small rural area. The quite general problem of organizational density was addressed by the Flemish government ¹⁰⁴with its policy for strengthening development in weak rural areas: In order to enhance administrative effectiveness, the Flemish government established so-called *Streekplatforms* in 1995, which had to co-ordinate and better organize the fragmented organizational landscape in Flemish sub-regions, through working towards a regional development vision. *Streekplatforms* were organized on basis of the interest groups in society, like organizations for social help, cultural heritage, health service, education, arts and cultural activities, sport, private companies, landscape protection, tourism, agriculture and deliberately not governed by local politics. The reason for organizing coordination through non-political organizations was that the government aimed at a governmental innovation, and local politics were considered not to offer the appropriate innovative climate. *Streekplatforms* formed the network of independent civic associations, which were expected to build bottom-up transforming power. The co-operation of those associations in Meetjesland prepared *Meetjesland 2020* as a common vision for an integrated future development of the area. This common vision, which was agreed in 2007 by the municipal councils, consisted of a set of nine objectives for future development of the sub-region. These objectives, aiming at integrated development were horizontally, cross-sector formulated.

¹⁰³ Eindrapport Ontwikkelingsgroep Streeknetwerk, p 17

¹⁰⁴ One of the three "Gewesten" constituting the Belgium state: *Vlaanderen* (Flanders), *Wallonie* (Wallonia) and *Brussel Hoofdstedelijk Gewest* (Brussels Capital Region)

The *Streekplatform*, established as a broad societal co-operation working on a vision for the future development, was not defined as a spatial development strategy-making organization. Spatial planning legislation could possibly apply for later activities, elaborating the vision when locating functions and projects in the regional territory.

According to *The European Compendium for Spatial Planning Systems and Policies* (CEC 1997) (Dühr, Colombe et al. 2010, Nadin and Stead 2012), the Belgian planning system is characterized according to the so-called Land Use Management Model, in which the regulation of changes of land-use and property is dominant. However, the variety of spatial planning legislation among the three administrative parts of Belgium: *Vlaanderen*, *Wallonie* and *Brussel Hoofdstedelijk Gewest*, makes that generalized characterization hardly relevant for *Vlaanderen*. The Flemish planning culture seems at least in theory to comply better with the tradition of European spatial planning which was called the Comprehensive Integrated Model. But categorization of Belgian planning systems is more complex because developments in political thinking about the position of spatial planning lead to continuous changes. A constant issue is the tension between private properties and the legitimacy of public interventions. It has been characterized as changing from land-use planning towards spatial structure planning and back. (Van den Broeck, Moulaert et al. 2014) Home ownership has since long been an important component of Flemish cultural identity, which does problematically comply with public interventions and maintenance of regulations, limiting the freedom for site selection and building. Permissiveness characterizes the issuing of planning permits in *Vlaanderen*.

"Today the Flemish structure planning and land-use planning have been reoriented towards the protection of private property, which hampers the capacity of the government to implement a coherent spatial policy and collective spatial projects." (Van den Broeck, Moulaert et al. 2014)(p. 185)

Within the Flemish culture of planning municipalities possess some autonomous responsibility for spatial planning, within restrictions set by the Flemish (Gewest-level) government and the provincial regulations. (In this case the province of *Oost-Vlaanderen*)

Vlaanderen and *Wallonie* are subdivided in provinces, which are composed of municipalities. Co-operation among municipalities on common issues is organized in so-called *Intercommunales*, which are steered by the participating municipalities. Individual municipalities, being the fourth administrative level, are embedded in a quite complex administrative situation, because submitted to possible regulations from three higher levels, which all may exercise some influence on development. On top there are in Belgium the four cultural communities¹⁰⁵, which regulate person-related policies.

¹⁰⁵

According to the languages: Dutch, French, German and mixed French/Dutch in Brussels

§ 11.3 Administrative embedding

The specific organization established to facilitate the work for the sub-regional decision-making of the case under consideration is *Streekplatform + Meetjesland*. *Streekplatforms* were deliberately composed of civic organizations of sectors and specific interests in society, and also quite deliberately governed at some distance, independent from local politics. The government's argument for not directly involving local politics was the fear for political power play of local politics, which would include obstructive factors for the necessary innovations.¹⁰⁶

The municipal-independent organizations of *Streekplatforms* constitute a platform where representatives of civic organizations could meet in order to harmonize initiatives and actions and to contribute in a concerted way to the welfare and wellness of the regional population. Its mission was: *to create consensus about an integral and sustainable development vision, to coordinate policies, stimulate co-operation, initiate and carry out projects and improve the conditions for successful development of the sub-region.* (Meetjesland 2007)(p.49)

The Flemish government stimulated *Streekplatforms* by part-financing its organization and activities (50%), the rest of the budget came from the province and private organizations. The envisaged integrated approach to development included the representation of organizations of all relevant sectors.

The activities promoted by the Flemish government for preparing integrated development visions for weak areas were not embedded in spatial planning regulations. The Flemish government abandoned this policy concept of *Streekplatforms* in 2006. The new policy installed so-called RESOC's,¹⁰⁷ socio-economic deliberation committees consisting of representatives of municipalities, employers and employees, focusing on socio-economic sector policy, and more specifically on employment. The envisaged broad representation of regional society was now interpreted as the primacy of local politics. The discontinuity entailing the higher administrative level policy change caused severe problems in the decision-making process of *Meetjesland 2020*.

¹⁰⁶ Interviewee wanted to be anonymous.

¹⁰⁷ RESOC: Regionaal Economisch en Sociaal Overleg Comité

§ 11.4 Meetjesland 2020

Issues in Meetjesland

Sub-urbanisation is the prevailing spatial problematic issue of Flemish regions. This is related to the importance of home ownership and the related feelings of desired freedom to build how and where the individual prefers. (§ 11.2) The sub-urbanization developed along rural roads causing the typical Flemish spatial structure of ribbon development, which led to extremely fragmented landscapes.

Regions, which experienced relative limited prosperous development were less affected by the ribbon development, which so strongly characterizes the predominant spatial quality of Vlaanderen. Especially in the creeks area at the northern national border to The Netherlands, *Meetjesland* enjoys relative larger open landscape units, which are quite rare in Vlaanderen. The fact that this relative weak rural region is less prone to ribbon development is a consequence of lack of dynamics in that part of the sub-region.

Combining forces and common actions were expected to improve the situation in the highly fragmented social and administrative landscape. The main aim of the intensified co-operation in the sub-region is to bring more coherence among the many different sector initiatives in the region: territorial cohesion, although without using this EU term yet, was the general objective.

The process towards Meetjesland 2020

The activities of producing *Meetjesland 2020* are a pivotal step in a range of previous steps, which aimed at concerted actions of stakeholders in the rural region. Within the sub-region forms of co-operation developed among several civic associations and the municipalities as early as the 1960's. The Flemish policy towards weak rural regions in that time promoted impulses to development in so-called *Impulsgebieden*.¹⁰⁸ A vision for most of the area had been adopted in 1991: *Streekvisie "Impulsgebied Meetjesland"*. That vision fitted in the (then) Flemish policy for stimulating growth in weak areas, which changed in 1995 with the new policy establishing *streekplatforms*. In 1999 a next vision for the development of the sub-region was adopted called: *Missie voor het Meetjesland*. (Mission for Meetjesland) Since then activities were organized in sector working groups, bringing together associations with overlapping interests

in order to create co-operation and concerted actions. Parallel to those activities and in close contact with the *Streekplatform Meetjesland*, within the framework of the EU Leader programme, studies were conducted with regard to agricultural and rural development. In 2005 time was ripe to start working on the common, integrated vision for the future development of the sub-region.

A twenty-person future group of experts has been established in January 2006, The (independent) future group had to formulate text proposals for decisions to the wider *Streekplatform* council. The results were used as basis for the renewed mission for the regional territorial development.

For broader reflexion a group of 50 stakeholders was organized around the future group. In order to avoid too much in crowd considerations, so-called “fresh blood” from outside as well as “old boys” from inside the sub-region were involved.¹⁰⁹ A larger grouping of stakeholders, consisting next to the small group of mayors, regional councillors and bureau members of the *Streekplatform* + organization, is supported by a three person process team (two of *Streekplatform*_+ and one consultant.)

The future group reports formally to the general meeting of the *Streekplatform* + and the local Leader group (71 voting members, 39 advising members), but feedback was also organized within local municipal councils, provincial government, societal organizations, regional umbrella organizations and the wider population. Hundreds of persons were informed in large meetings. (But also via website and newspaper). With regard to its decision-making and voting procedure, the voluntary co-operation seems to be shaped rather complex. The preparation of texts was organized in such a way that the content was co-produced by all governmental and sector bodies together. The most important actors agreed and undersigned a declaration of engagement, which included a form of commitment to the process.

The first stage of the future group work consisted of an analysis of developments in the region. (Van Herck and Meetjesland 2006). Then the group exercised individually responding to the question: please describe your image and the characteristics of the future of the region.¹¹⁰ This resulted in story lines expressing values and preferences of the individual future group members. Then an extended systematic SWOT analysis has been conducted. That happened not by approving a report of an expert, but the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the sub-region were extensively discussed among the group members. The work on the SWOT was considered a core task: many meetings were dedicated to fully understand the relative position

¹⁰⁹ “Oude streekkratten”

¹¹⁰ Some interviewees experienced that as most important discussions. Interview Mark Arnout

of *Meetjesland* within the wider context. The SWOT analysis was summarized in a star graphics in which aspects of *Meetjesland* were compared with the average of same aspects of *Vlaanderen*. This star diagram expressed the relative importance of territorial capital of the region in a variety of nine sectors. (fig.18) It shows that the *Meetjesland* sub-region scores lower than Flemish average on eight of those nine items. Only the spatial quality of the landscape scored higher than the Flemish average.

In order to articulate the envisaged distinct position among other Flemish regions on basis of the existing strengths identified in the SWOT, five core challenges have been agreed:

- Carefully towards spatial quality;
- Progressively applying social-economic and technologic developments;
- Stimulating innovative and creative competencies;
- Reinforcing network co-operation;
- Improving the region’s image;




FIGURE 11.2 Star diagram expressing regional assets of *Meetjesland* related to *Vlaanderen* [Source: *Meetjesland* 2020]

The openness of the landscape was identified as an important asset, a distinct quality in comparison to many other Flemish regions. Other aspects were valued average or a bit below the Flemish average (3). During the process, all basic information has been made accessible on the website. Core values emerged during the discussions and were reformulated and agreed first into the *Meetjesland Mission* and later in the set of objectives, which were reformulated as the vision *Meetjesland 2020*.



FIGURE 11.3 Scenery in North part of *Meetjesland* [Source: *Masterplan Toerisme en Recreatie in het Meetjesland*]

Meetjesland 2020 aimed at an integrated vision for future development, which balances economic, social, cultural, ecological and spatial interests and the related ambitions. The development vision *Meetjesland 2020*, has been prepared in compliance with the ambitions of the European programme Leader+ *Meetjesland*, to stimulate agricultural/rural development for the region. Studies conducted in the Leader framework provided useful information at the start of the future group. The aim was to create a structure within the sub-region, which provides a framework, stimulating respectively:

- Concerted actions for initiatives in different sectors (economy, tourism, landscape, quality of life), as a directive for regional organizations and actors.
- Municipalities to mutually co-ordinate actions and
- Clarity to private actors. But also useful for:
- Co-operation with higher-level authorities: investments of the Flemish government or spatial initiatives of the province of *Oost-Vlaanderen*.
- Application for European co-financing

The vision of *Meetjesland 2020*

The *Meetjesland* mission for future development was formulated and agreed around the three core objectives: attractiveness, social, innovative and dynamic network. Then the nine objectives for future development were selected and put in an order as components of the regional vision.

The finally agreed nine objectives were:

- Enhancing the quality of the landscape;
- Investing in attractive, vivid village centres;
- Provide the economy with new perspectives;
- Well organized mobility;
- Cross-border co-operation;
- Stimulate education an innovation;
- Effective and efficient regional co-operation;
- Convey a strong trade mark;
- Test of impact on sustainability (people, planet, profit)

Examples are formulated for the ways to apply these objectives in the fields of wellbeing, economy and culture. The proposals were abstract, non-localised verbal intentions. Concrete projects to be implemented at specific locations were not identified. ¹¹¹The vision was not geo-referenced with visualizations indicating interventions on maps; it was meant to be a regional charter. In the report (Meetjesland 2007) the clarification of each of the objectives was followed by a short description about how to meet the objective and supportive actions. Also these descriptions did not indicate located interventions; they were formulated as aimed-for goals.

After adoption of the vision *Meetjesland 2020* in all of the thirteen municipal councils in 2007, the set of nine objectives for development was agreed.

The process resulted in 2007 in the translation of core challenges into an “action plan” consisting of identifying elaborations and specifications in the years there after. Elaboration of the objectives towards implementation was the task of the various participants in the process: regional sector organizations as well as municipalities were expected to formulate specified actions to be undertaken by those organizations. The action plan consisted of expressing the expectation that the organizations of the participants in the process would initiate actions. The *Streekplatform* itself envisaged own activities regarding the organization of several specific meetings. As next round of decision-making it was intended to create a monitoring tool for measuring progress in implementing objectives. ¹¹²

In order to monitor progress in meeting the agreed goals, establishment of the monitoring system was started by the University of Ghent. (Block 2010) That activity was not finished, due to the shift of attention to the large problems related to the (changed) administrative embedding of the *Streekplatform*.

The idea of the vision with regard to subsequent activities was that a common direction of long-term development had to be established and that the various participating partners would organize next steps. But that did not comply with the administrative reality of Vlaanderen: The sector organizations were co-financed by their sector Ministry, which required them to remain recognisable as a regional representative of the specific sector. That requirement caused that co-operation with other sector organizations was only possible to a certain degree. The obvious better solution for some problems in the organizational density, like merging organizations was not practicable, because that would jeopardize their financing. An effect of the obligation

¹¹¹ Although the report *Meetjesland 2020, Toekomstvisie* (p. 26; adopted in 2007) cited Jef Van den Broeck: “If the *Meetjesland* municipalities want to attract external financing for further shaping their landscape, they must be able to propose convincing concepts and projects.”

¹¹² Interviews Aimee Heenen 29/03/2013) and Bart van Herck (July 2013)

to show evidence of an organization's explicit sector representation is that instead of common achievements, own successes have to be shown, thereby emphasizing differences with the co-operating organizations instead of similarities and common achievements. Consequences of that administrative fragmented complexity do not stimulate integrated approaches.

Governmental financing of the *Streekplatform* stopped in 2006 when the government of Vlaanderen changed policy and decided to stimulate regional socio-economic organizations (*RESOC*), with tasks overlapping those of the *Streekplatforms*. The new organization differed sincerely in two essential aspects: *RESOC* focuses predominantly on economic development and employment, and the local politicians steer the board of *RESOC*.

That replaced the aimed-for integrated development by a dominant economic sector orientation and in contrast with the independence from local politics of *Streekplatforms*, *RESOCs* were steered by the mayors.

The stronger local political embedding of *RESOC* enhanced the struggle for power with the quite independent existing *Streekplatform*; it became almost a struggle for life. The process towards implementation, which the municipalities and others were assumed to conduct, did not realize. The initial *Streekplatform* director changed jobs and the process came to a standstill in 2009. The new director started mid 2010 and tried to arrange a workable *modus vivendi* within the actual increased complexity of the administrative embedding. The name *Streekplatform* was replaced by *Netwerk Meetjesland*. The director left the organization September 2014.

§ 11.5 Impact of the strategy

The activities of preparing the development vision influenced mind-sets of many:

“Since the activities started, associations engage with each other, but the municipalities remained autonomous.”¹¹³

Impacts were also described in interviews like:

“First only daily incidents¹¹⁴ were discussed, now also aspects of the future”¹¹⁵

The work of preparing the development vision included enhancement of the regional identity. The small rural region located in between the two famous cultural centres¹¹⁶ Brugge and Gent of Vlaanderen felt a need for enhanced local self-esteem. The sub-region’s identity became articulated by focussing on the history of the area and its socio-cultural assets. This goal seems to be met: within the region every municipality, but also other institutions make themselves proudly known in their written (and physic¹¹⁷) expressions as a “Meetjesland” organization. Official as well as private organizations widely utilize the logo of this co-operation. (fig. 20) A clear impact of the work is that before the actions the name *Meetjesland* was only used by a small group of persons interested in regional history, whereas the name is actually used as a trademark. But the impact of a logo is also perceived as quite limited:

“Meetjesland 2020 is a trade mark, less content.”¹¹⁸

¹¹³ Interview Luc Joos, coordinator welfare organizations.

¹¹⁴ “Dagjespolitiek”

¹¹⁵ Interview Edy Bertin (previous chair of Streekplatform.

¹¹⁶ The historic cities of Ghent and Brughe.

¹¹⁷ Indications at the entrances of the villages.

¹¹⁸ Interview Luc Joos, regional coordinator of social well fare.



FIGURE 11.4 logo of Meetjesland

The logo conveys the rural/agricultural character of the sub-region and suggests some dynamism. The strap-line formulates an encouragement with an ambiguous meaning, saying in Dutch: co-make it (the future region), participate and experience (the process).

Apart from the branding of *Meetjesland* as a regional trademark and the preparation and implementation of some modest touristic projects, no next steps aiming at implementing the vision were set. Almost all subsequent efforts were addressing the growing organizational problems. Especially after 2010, when three municipalities proposed to stop the *Streekplatform* activities.

The envisaged activities as formulated in the action plan did roughly speaking not realize. In general terms, apart from the tourist promotion organization *Toerisme Meetjesland* the organizations ¹¹⁹, which were assumed to initiate these activities, did not deliver. As one of the interviewees said:

*“The objectives of Meetjesland 2020 must still “land” politically”*¹²⁰

The lack of elaborations and concrete steps towards implementation of objectives and the resulting standstill was reason for an attempt to stimulate actions. When it was noticed that no actions were initiated, a group of nine influential key persons were

¹¹⁹

Mainly the municipalities

¹²⁰

Interview Piet Quataart, representative of landscape conservation, member of future group. The verb “to land” was meaning being adopted by politicians.

invited to act as “*peter*” and “*meter*” for each of the individual objectives identified and agreed in the development vision. The “patrons” were assumed to take responsibility for promoting and initiating projects in order to meet the agreed objectives. This patronage was meant to enhance co-ownership of the vision at a moment when the process needed revitalization. The patrons were expected to play an important role in communication with the wider public about the development vision and to initiate actions. But these individual persons did not have the tools or back-up organization to make them really influential. Appointing those “patrons” for different objectives did not work out as hoped, with one exception: the regional branding.

Since 2011 almost all activities of the *Streekplatform* became dedicated to the institutional policymaking trying to remain the *Streekplatform*’s position upright. Decreasing income enhanced weakening the organization.

The number of persons or parties involved in the making of *Meetjesland 2020* cannot exactly be determined. There were several large meetings open to the public, hundreds of persons were at least informed about activities in meetings. The organization covers thirteen municipalities and has thirteen sponsoring regional partners. But over sixty organizations and associations were engaged in the discussions. The future group preparing the vision, consisted of twenty persons with different representations and different roles, eight of those involved in the future group or in the board of the *Streekplatform* were interviewed.

At the request of the thirteen municipalities, the *Streekplatform* started in January 2011 drafting proposals for simplifying the governmental/ organizational density in the region. The resulting report (Oyaert and Woestyne 2011) proposed installing a *Meetjesland*-wide so-called *Intercommunale* for a set of specific tasks for the municipalities. Components were initially fourteen regional organizations (in which 256 board member seats of municipal representatives), which were not statutory or through financial arrangements excluded from merging into a new organization. After ninety-seven (!) meetings in different compositions eventually six organizations merged and the so-called *Streeknetwerk Meetjesland* was starting begin 2013. A new organization was born and the director of *Streekplatform + Meetjesland* became also director of the new organization. The yearly account of the *Streekplatform +* about the tasks and activities in the year 2013 does not mention activities, which might be considered as steps in next rounds of strategy making. (It mentions only that attention of politicians and regional organizations was regularly called to the vision) The account also mentioned that the five persons (part-time) bureau is steered by a general assembly of sixty-nine members plus thirty advisory members. Since February 2013 no new publications have been put on the *Streekplatform*’s website. The director left for another job in September 2014. The impact of the Vision *Meetjesland 2020* can be called minimal.

§ 11.6 Process aspects: Effectiveness, Ownership, Co-production and Openness of the process.

Effectiveness

With regard to the effectiveness of the decision-making process of *Meetjesland 2020* we noticed through the interviews that the process had led to satisfaction among the participants to the decision-making process and a broad agreement among the stakeholders in the year 2007. That moment promised successful further developments: objectives were agreed, all co-operating organizations were expected to take next steps. Next rounds of decision-making were assumed to take place within the several sector co-operations on the level of the sub-region. That happened in some sectors like tourism and regional branding, but not in general.

The horizontal objectives of *Meetjesland 2020* provided a framework for existing and new forms of co-operation between organizations especially in the fields of tourism, social services, culture, housing and mobility. But concrete organizational or physical projects on the ground have not been identified or realized. The process of decision-making might be evaluated as rather effective at the moment of approval; in any case an agreement has been achieved, but in the light of the broader process it appeared to remain more promising than successful, because next steps did hardly realize.

The interviews show a degree of satisfaction by hindsight among the interviewees about the specific round of decision-making for *Meetjesland 2020*.

The reported satisfaction of participants can probably be related to the learning effect of the production of the *Meetjesland 2020* vision: several interviewees pointed to increased understanding of viewpoints of others and to the positive feelings they had being involved in such a cross-sector process of together contributing to a vision for the first time.

The quite general satisfaction as appeared in the interviews clarifies partly why decision-making for *Meetjesland 2020* has been perceived successful among Belgian planning professionals, when asked for successful cases for this study.

Ownership

Also the feeling of co-ownership of the results of the decision-making of *Meetjesland 2020* was initially quite general among the interviewees. According to the information of several of the interviewees, sharing ownership was related to the fact that such a broad process of inter sector co-operation was new. That caused feelings of pride about their contribution to the deliberations. But also difficulties in later stages might have contributed to the proud feelings: having to defend common achievements, articulated the feeling of ownership. Several interviewees could also point to specific items in the vision, which they claimed ownership of the idea in the discussions: they took credit for those items. But those feelings were mainly related to the initial achievements in 2006/2007, being agreement about the set of nine objectives for future development, not to progress towards implementation in subsequent rounds of decision-making.

Co-production/Co-design

The interviewees who were not active in the future group are blank on the aspect of co-production. But those who participated in the making of the vision in the futures group were clearly positive about the co-production in the group's decision-making process. The specific exercise to imagine the future region and spell-out characteristics, which were discussed in the future group, were an example of open discussions; any idea was considered. Also increased understanding of other perspectives creating new views on reality was mentioned.

The learning effect of the exercise reported by most interviewees, was partly related to the SWOT analysis, which was for almost all participants a first time experience creating more specific awareness of regional assets. Participants found increased openness and understanding of other interests important lessons. One of the reported lessons, mentioned by several interviewees was to concentrate more on opportunities than on weaknesses and threats.

Since the set of objectives resulting from the exercise did not present new objectives or new concepts, the decision-making can be characterized as co-producing an order of priorities in the inventory of ideas and opinions. Co-design would imply more new, non-envisaged place-specific solutions including clear choices for locating specific activities or concrete projects, which are needed to meet the objectives.

Openness

The openness of the process was clear and confirmed in all interviews.

Without exception the interviewees characterized the process as led by Bart van Herck as open, offering a right balance between professional steering and openness for consideration of any point of view. The criteria for openness consisting of open agenda setting, informal process management, objective and not competence or procedure oriented and flexible participation all applied according to the responses of the participants in the making of the vision.

With regard to the question of flexible participation, it has been noticed that most meetings were open to the public and that the number of participating municipalities increased with two.

The decision-making process was not organized as a **scenario** study. It did not imply selecting and optimizing different (components of) options in order to construct new options. The *Meetjesland 2020* process achieved broad agreement on a listing of general, horizontal objectives for the future development of the sub-region. These objectives resulted from analytical considerations during the SWOT analysis and negotiating priorities and principles between the stakeholders on an abstract level. But a coherent concept for a structure indicating relations and locations throughout the territory of the (sub-) region, or a scenario indicating a sequence of located interventions did not result.

The general experience of all interviewees was that the **person** of the first director of *Meetjesland*, *Bart van Herck* inspired and powered the process.

The conflict with the competing economy focused organization (*RESOC*), led to his departure and a standstill of the process. The content related experts in the future group evaluated the process as led by *Bart van Herck* and the learning effects most positively. The role of an external expert active in the process has been mentioned as a constructive support to the project leader.

During the standstill period, the initiatives of the patron for identity and region branding ¹²¹ were very fruitful. General acceptance and frequent application of the name *Meetjesland* and the logo with strap-line contributed to the self-confidence and pride in the modest sub-region.

§ 11.7 Evaluation

The context

The interviews provided information clarifying that the *Meetjesland 2020* process is to be regarded within the context of a struggle for political power. The attempt to create a platform for (sub-) regional co-operation for future development, aiming at enhancing prosperity within the relative poor region is jeopardized by local governments fearing loss of power. When the Flemish government initiated “*streekplatforms*” in 1995, it was explicitly decided not to compose the council of these platforms with local politicians: the regional interest groups of different sectors were expected to develop bottom-up initiatives.

But when the Flemish government decided in 2006 to establish *RESOCs* (regional economic and social committees) steered by boards with local politicians, and at the same moment decided to stop financing the inter sector “*streekplatforms*”, the future of the latter co-operations was jeopardized.

Of all of the Flemish sub-regions, only *Meetjesland* kept its “*streekplatform*”, next to the newly established *RESOC*. The *RESOCs* must formulate the so-called *streekpacts* (regional agreements), which aim to provide a plan for the future of the region. That focus of the mission of *RESOCs* is less inter-sector and more specific economic and employment sector oriented. Theoretically *RESOC*'s work could be enriched by the *Meetjesland 2020* experiences, but co-operation was impossible for several reasons. The most important reason was that mayors, steering the *RESOC* aimed to steer the *streekplatform* as well, shifting focus from the level of the sub-region towards individual towns and villages. Introducing local politics in the board instead of the regional sector interest groups would induce a shift from “*what is good for the region is good for the towns*”, towards “*what is good for the towns is good for the region*”.

The discussions and related power play during at least three years are important factors for the standstill and failure of the process.

Merging existing organizations appeared almost impossible due to Flemish legislation and regulations about financial support, which requires (sub-) sector initiatives and organizations establishing and articulating their specific recognisable identity. (Sub-) regional sector interest groups, who aim at closest possible co-operation by considering fusion with others, would lose their finance by doing so. Instead, they have to demonstrate evidence of their useful sector existence yearly towards their sector Ministry in order to get finance next year. These bureaucratic requirements jeopardize integrated approaches. Instead they stimulate competitive behaviour and articulation of enhanced distinction between sectors.

During these years solutions are tried based on amalgamation of as many as possible of the large number of relevant regional organizations. Fusion would enhance the integrated approach as aimed at by formulating the horizontal objectives of *Meetjesland 2020*. An attempt was made for a new regional organization: SNW (*Streeknetwerk Meetjesland*) was proposed as an administrative experiment to the government of Vlaanderen. This proposal included merging of fourteen organizations, which were not prone to the limitations to close co-operation because of their independence from sector ministry financing. But financing from Vlaanderen and the province was needed in any case and therefore the administrative experiment was proposed to the Flemish government as a component of the governments program for administrative innovation. The Flemish government initially rejected the proposal to support that new organization as an experiment, but decided to support it later.

The context in terms of administrative and multi-level embedding of this case can be qualified as too complex. The *Meetjesland 2020* process must be assessed in accordance with the modest opportunities within this sub-region: There are not many potential drivers for development in the rural area and ironically, the main asset is the emptiness of the landscape. The administrative complexity of public and semi public organizations, of which many had to demonstrate their *raison d'être* by emphasizing their importance within their specific sector, is not supportive to the envisaged integrated approach. The hoped-for strength of initial independence from local politics of the *Streekplatform* organization became a weakness and a source of continued institutional politics and political power play. A battle which was finally lost.

Discontinuity of the higher administrative level of Vlaanderen, which changed its policy contributed strongly to changes in the context, which entailed weakness of the position of the *Streekplatform*.

The *Streekplatform*, which previously stimulated stakeholders to new views and a common vision, was mainly occupied by addressing aspects of institutional power play and competences in a struggle for life since 2010.

The fact that informants implicitly evaluate the achievements of the decision-making within the context of the extremely fragmented institutional organization combined with their general satisfaction about the initial results, indicates that even minor results require large efforts in such complex circumstances.

The process

The process organization during the making of the vision included a clear orientation on creating support in society from the very start on. A great number of local organizations participated and the process was financially sponsored by over 20 organizations. During SWOT analysis a star-diagram brought several aspects together in a visualized overview comparing indicators with Flemish averages. The future group could agree on the sub-regional assets, being specifically the open landscape. The resulting document of *Meetjesland 2020* was well illustrated, but considering geographically possible locations and relations of different functions was not used as a decision-making tool for achieving agreement about a more concrete framework. Although the historic identity of the sub-region and the boundaries of the administrative units of the small municipalities defined the territory, flexibility in the composition of participating groups was organized through deliberately inviting “fresh blood” and “old boys” from the region and by also inviting some persons from outside the region. The process was open.

PROCESS ASPECTS	MEETJESLAND 2020	
openness	Open agenda setting	yes
	Informality	yes
	Objective focus	yes
	Broad/flexible particip.	yes
Co-production/design	Ideas from any side	yes
	New ideas emerge	no
	Un-envisaged options	no
Co-ownership	Pride	evaporated
	Defensive actions	initially
	Take credit	
EFFECTIVENESS NO	Agreement achieved	yes
	Next round	no
	Satisfaction	evaporated
(Potential) SUCCESS NO	Realizations	Very few
	Socio-economic impacts	Actor network contacts
	New regulations	No

TABLE 11.1 Evaluation of process aspects of Meetjesland 2020

The process of common decision-making in large groupings was envisaged, and co-production of the objectives was realized on basis of the SWOT analysis. But explorative considering alternative options or applying maps for considering locations and visualizations were not practiced. Ordering a set of objectives according to priority cannot be qualified as co-designing of a strategic development concept or scenario. The process aimed at listing objectives. That co-produced list remained abstract verbal intentions, not

translated into localised interventions. Such a list has insufficient transforming power and such a strategy can probably not perform. (Faludi 2000, Mastop 2000, Albrechts 2004) Decision-making about locating interventions, choosing between more or less competing municipalities belongs to the main challenges of strategy making. That stage was not envisaged in the making of *Meetjesland 2020*. The (then) project director¹²² mentioned that such more specific and concrete decisions were not intended, but he admitted that it would have been better if they had gone into that degree of specification and concreteness. Agreement about more specific, localised projects would probably have entailed support by those whose interest would be served if specific interventions were realized.

The fact that the result of the process was a set of objectives, to be elaborated by others and that no concrete specific projects have been identified for realization adds to the poor outcomes or is maybe an important factor for poor outcomes. Several interviewees confirmed that notion. Working on the realization of concrete projects might have created enthusiasm and renewed pride among involved stakeholders. But also municipal politicians possibly receiving attractive projects might support the realization of such projects.

The lack of a next step was according to interviewees related to the obstructive effect of the struggle for power with municipalities and the *RESOC*.

The envisaged next step in the decision-making process was a monitoring system measuring progress of actions, which was in preparation at the *University of Ghent*. (Block 2010) But the effect on the process of introducing a monitoring system can be doubted: it is merely a controlling activity: probably too negative for inspiring actions.¹²³ If other parties are expected to initiate and realise next steps and those steps are not clearly defined and agreed in concrete projects, a monitoring system would not help to realize those projects. The probable only effect would be that lack of progress would be established quantitatively, by measuring, adding to disappointment.

When the group of influential key persons were invited to act as “*peter*” and “*meter*”¹²⁴ of the development vision in an attempt to stimulate the elaboration and implementation of the agreed list of objectives, it was too late. This patronage was meant to enhance the co-ownership of the vision when the process needed revitalization. The patrons were expected to take actions and play an important role in communication with the wider public. That only succeeded for region branding.

¹²² Skype interview Bart van Herck, July 2013

¹²³ Interview Aimee Heenen, past chairman of Streekplatform

¹²⁴ Peter and meter is the Roman Catholic role for respectively a man or a woman, taking care of a godchild.

The persons

Although there was initial agreement on the content of the vision, the interviews reveal that the *Meetjesland 2020* process lost its leverage. That happened despite the fact that it has been a vital activity bringing self-esteem and several actions in the sub-region in the period up to 2007. Modest effects of the decision-making process existed in several sectors of local society. Some private as well as official organizations acted some time in more or less concerted ways, considering future developments by collaboratively looking at agreed objectives. Many participants spent a lot of energy in supporting the process towards a common vision and now have to report in interviews after ten years of efforts that the process came to an end. Despite initial feelings of pride and shared ownership of the set of objectives, concrete achievements can only be noticed in the fields of region branding, tourism and co-operation in some socio-cultural activities. Although the period between agreeing on the vision and the actual assessment is short, the actual situation does not include promising perspectives for continued development. In fact the process stopped after adoption of the set of objectives. In fact political adoption of a set of general positive intention is not very problematic as long as difficult choices are not proposed.

The disappointing experience might be related to the discontinuity in the administrative context, but also to the level of abstractness of the content. According to definitions of development strategies (Healey 2003, Albrechts 2004, Albrechts 2009) strategies have to include *vision, actions and means to implement shaping and framing what a place is and can become*, as well as *strategies for the management of change*. The transformative potential of a listing of objectives is apparently insufficient. The abstract objectives do not evoke the effect of plan-concepts (Zonneveld 1991) as tools for decision-making, requiring a *pithy way of expressing in words and images a view, together with the necessary interventions*. These *necessary interventions* and *strategies for management of change* are not sufficiently covered in the elaboration of the nine objectives in the text parts about “how to achieve the objective” and “actions supportive to the objectives”. These texts (Meetjesland 2007) are only intentional remarks and objectives, not including specifically located proposals, offering a spatial as well as discursive framework, which may be attractive to specific actors and can stimulate initiatives. Proposals for policy interventions and projects on specific locations require practical spatial planning knowledge. Mapped images are helpful in decision-making but require more specificity and concreteness than listing of objectives. The decision-making was not embedded in a strategic spatial plan making process. No spatial planners were involved.

According to our theoretic frame, such a degree of more specificity of choices about locations would probably result from the comparison of options like in a scenario study. But no integrated options for different directions of possible developments were considered. The set of nine objectives was a direct result of the SWOT analysis.

The role and power of individual **persons** is however remarkable. That applies especially for the influence of the first director of *Meetjesland Streekplatform*. *Bart van Herck*, who was generally seen as the motor and initiator of the process. He empowered the groupings of participants during the initial actions resulting in *Meetjesland 2020*. He practiced openness of the decision-making process aiming at building support and clearly achieved that aim. But the struggle for power between the *Streekplatform Meetjesland* and the *RESOC* did not result in a fruitful co-operation or a new organizational structure. *Bart van Herck* then left *Meetjesland*, leaving a vacuum. The expected effect of saving and revitalizing the process through appointing patrons for specific issues and themes did, apart from an exception, not work out. Although these *patrons* and *patrons* were all well qualified influential and respected persons, they were individuals without organizations able to initiate activities.

Controversies

The *Meetjesland* process is heavily affected by the struggle for hegemony between the *Streekplatform* and the municipalities. The municipalities are convinced that being the democratically elected councils entitles them legitimately to the responsibility for future development. That controversy was a main reason for ineffectiveness. Eventually the municipalities were the winners in this institutional struggle.

§ 11.8 Conclusion, Ineffectiveness of Meetjesland 2020

The **context** of the decision-making process of *Meetjesland 2020* did not provide discontinuity and was too complex. The process towards a development strategy has been organized in the framework of the Flemish policy to enhance the position of weak regions, not as a spatial planning strategy. The conflicting relations with municipalities in the region and the changing conditions set by the higher-level authorities characterized the problematic multi-level embedding. The strategy making process severely suffered from the contextual complexity.

The **process** concentrated on agreeing on a set of objectives. No located interventions or concrete projects on specific locations were envisaged. As a consequence, the verbal strategy does not present to stakeholders concrete attractive and enticing perspectives to which they can commit activities aiming at realizations. Without enticing projects to be implemented in specific locations there are hardly reasons for any efforts. These process aspects do not support the effectiveness of strategy making. The difficult relation with the municipalities articulated the **place specific circumstances**. Too much energy and attention went into institutional struggles and strategic behaviour. The difficult situation stimulated at the other hand the cohesion in the future group, but that was not enough for the effectiveness of the process.

12 Overview and evaluation

The information of Chapters 7- 11 providing accounts of the five cases of strategy making allow for general remarks about the interrelated content, the process and the context of strategy making in Europe. Each of the accounts confirmed in different ways that content, process and context are interrelated and cannot be considered in separation. The accounts of the individual case studies contain specificities and details for drawing conclusions about themes of strategic planning as well as the specific combinations of factors of process management and of the planning cultures influencing the effectiveness of strategy making within different planning practices.

In this Chapter we first assessed the effectiveness of the decision-making processes in the five cases, before comparing the different process and context aspects of our theoretic frame.

Acknowledging the distinction made between a successful strategy and an effective round of decision-making, here the effectiveness of the decision-making rounds of the cases are established applying the criteria of § 5.6:

- Agreement achieved,
- Next round followed and
- Satisfaction among actors.

With regard to expectations about the eventual success of the strategies it is as argued in Chapter 2 quite impossible to predict whether and when the output of spatial policy making will attract the attention of politician and will be included on the political agenda. Besides, deciding about implementation of the strategy and key investments requires involvement of new actors. These uncertainties inspired to applying the “rounds model” of Teisman’s theory in this study as being most complying with reality in network society. Hereunder considerations about expectations for the eventual success of the cases are added to the assessments of the effectiveness of the decision-making rounds in the different cases. Therefore we applied next criteria indicating the eventual performance of a strategy of § 5.6:

- Projects (not necessarily physical) realized
- Socio-economic improvements
- Modernized regulations
- Learning processes

As noticed before, the success of a long-term strategy is to be seen as progress into a desired direction by applying an argumentative frame: It is about performing (Faludi 2000) through indirect influences, which not necessarily includes for physical transformative power. Therefore we concentrated on the effectiveness of specific rounds of decision-making in our cases.

The established effectiveness of cases is presented in § 12.2. As additional information we added expectations about the eventual success, albeit under due reservation.

§ 12.1 Overview assessment

CASES		BOLOGNA	DRECHTST	GLASGOW	GRÖDEN	MEETJES
Success ¹	(Performing)	--	+	+	+	--
Effectiveness	Satisfaction	+/--	+	+	+	+/--
	Agreement	+	+	+	+	+
	Next round	--	+	+	+ ²	--
Co-owner	Pride	+/--	+	+	+	+/--
	Defend	--	+	+	+	+/--
	Take credit	--	+	+	+	--
Co-design	Any idea ⁴	+ ³ --	+ ⁴	(+)	+	+
	Options	+ --	+	--	+	--
	New ideas	-- +	+	(+)	+	--
Appl options		--	4	(4) ⁵	3	--
Visualization ⁶	Early		+	+	+	
	Late	+				
	None					+
Openness	Agenda	+/--	+	+/--	+	+
	Informal	+	+	+	+	+
	Flexible	+	+	+/--	+	+
Planningculture	Open/Regulative	R	O	R	R	
Multi-level		--	+	+	+	--
Inv politicians		+/--	+	+/--	+	--
Continuity		--	+	+	+	--
Experts		+	+	+	+	+

TABLE 12.1 Overview of aspects of the decision-making processes in five cases. Occurrence is indicated +; partial +/--; missing--.

- ¹ Assessing the success of a strategy requires more time after establishing and approving the strategy. The provisionally expected success of related cases are indicated between brackets.
- ² Approval after four years
- ³ Openness for ideas from different backgrounds
- ⁴ Left column refers to gathering objectives; right column refers to designing the "7 Cities" concept.
- ⁵ Applied four options when the concept was conceived (in the nineties) (Information Vincent Goodstadt)
- ⁶ Occurrence and moment of working with visualizations in the process.

This overview is to be understood as a rough simplification of the large qualitative diversity of the information of the narratives in the accounts gathered about the decision-making in the separate cases. (Chapters 7 – 11) The overview is useful for the multi-case analysis in combination with the specificities of the texts of the accounts of the individual cases.

§ 12.2 Evaluation of cases

Effectiveness of decision-making could be established for three of the five decision-making processes. Those three effective, and (provisionally) successful qualified strategies are:

- Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030 (*Drechtsteden*),
- Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan (*Glasgow*)
- Vision Gherdëina (*Grödental*).

The non-effective decision-making rounds are:

- Piano Strutturale Comunale (*Bologna*) and
- Meetjesland 2020, toekomstvisie (*Meetjesland*)

The PSC process in *Bologna* seemed effective since Gabellini designed the concept of the “7 Cities”. But soon after its enthusiastic reception, commitment disappeared due to the juridical focus of next regulative steps. Support further evaporated since the strategic standstill during the episode of political discontinuity.

Although some participants in the *Meetjesland* process were rather satisfied about the achieved agreement, but that case cannot be considered effective. It did not get into the important continuation in subsequent rounds of decision-making.

According to the overview, the process aspects of co-ownership, co-design and openness contribute to the effectiveness as well as the success of the cases.

The accounts learned that all five cases regarded co-production and a professional, stimulating role of the involved experts.

The accounts confirmed that co-ownership is related to the open process of making a strategy and *co-production*. (Apart from *Bologna*). The perception of together inventing something new, which we called *co-design* occurred in the cases, that could be qualified as successful or, taking account of the rather short term of *Grödental* as *most promising*. Most apparent feelings of *co-design* were found in the interviews in *Grödental* and *Drechtsteden*. In those cases, feelings of *co-authorship* were clearly conveyed in the discussions with informants. In the case of *Glasgow* the activity can be characterized as evolutionary improving previous versions of the strategy, gradually enhancing the strategic strength of the *Strategic Development Plan* through increased selectivity and prioritizing of the proposed interventions of the strategy. That regards the apparent effective step-by-step process of strategy making as envisaged in Scottish legislation.

As mentioned earlier, the specific eventual performance of a strategy is not easy identifiable. That is not only because of the long-term perspective, but also because spatial development strategies usually contain combinations of ideas and concepts, which can have surfaced earlier and may have influenced developments individually. The power of a strategy is the framework, integrating several interests in overarching story lines, providing a discursive background for future issues. The difficulty of assessing long-term strategies was reason to concentrate on the effectiveness of a specific round of decision-making. Therefore next qualifications concerning the success of strategies are to be considered as strong probabilities, because no absolute verdict can be passed.

The cases of *Drechtsteden* and *Glasgow and the Clyde Valley* are qualified successful. Superficially it can be noticed that only *Drechtsteden* has been decided long ago enough for establishing success of the strategy. The considered process of *Glasgow and the Clyde Valley* is a specific round of decision-making as a part of the longer process: a regulated continuation of refreshing the existing main lines of the strategy. That process of gradually improving the strategy performs also; it delivers realizations.

Grödental fixed the outputs of the *Vision Gherdëina* in council decisions after four years of producing the vision. During most of that period participants were carefully protecting their vision, because their achievement could be jeopardized if it would land in the wrong (regulative) context at the provincial level. In the meantime they “live the vision” as interviews showed, and realized several intended policies and projects.

CASES	EFFECTIVE	(SUCCESS: EXPECTED)
Bologna	(X)/--	--
Drechtsteden	X	X
Glasgow	X	X
Grödental	X	X
Meetjesland	--	--

TABLE 12.2 Summary of effectiveness and (expected) success of the cases

¹ Due reservation applies

§ 12.3 Effectiveness of Rounds and Expectations about Success

The decision-making process for establishing the *Piano Strutturale Comunale* of **Bologna** was initially effective: General satisfaction and positive surprise about the concept of “7 Cities” was apparent in the start of 2007 and next (regulative) steps followed. But during those steps the feelings of connectedness and satisfaction of actors evaporated soon. Further steps did not follow. The interviews revealed that support was lost. With regard to expectations about the success of the *Piano Strutturale Comunale* large doubts appeared. Although the political council adopted the strategic development policy, due to the dissatisfying influence of the juridical focus of preparing regulative planning documents, together with the political discontinuity, the initial support decreased fast after the decision-making round, which produced the design of “7 Cities”. The strategic vision of “7 Cities” disappeared from the political agenda. The strategy of *Piano Strutturale Comunale* of Bologna is expected to be not successful although the initial round of decision-making can be qualified as partly¹²⁵ effective.

The **Drechtsteden** process regards the only case of which the eventual success could be assessed, thanks to the 15 years period after establishing the vision. § 8.4 showed that the large majority of envisaged projects were realized, the *Drechtsteden* organization matured to a 900 persons organization, and actors reported large learning effects. Besides, feelings of co-ownership and co-authorship claims were expressed in interviews. The 1997 round of decision-making, resulting in the agreed vision for future development appeared effective: an agreement has been achieved (1), next rounds followed (2) and the participants were still satisfied (3). After 15 years of the 33 years plan horizon almost all projects have been realized. As noticed in § 8.5 the less successful aspect is the common management of the local sites of economic activities (*ROMD*). Of the many envisaged infrastructural projects (highway connections, railway stations, fast ferries and waterbuses) the light rail connection to the Rotterdam agglomeration is still missing. Although not all envisaged projects are implemented halfway the plan’s time horizon, it can be concluded that the *Drechtsteden* case of 15 years ago was not only effective but also that the resulting strategy was successful.

The effectiveness of the **Glasgow and the Clyde Valley** decision-making process has also been established. The ongoing regulated process of strategy making according to Scottish legislation makes strategic thinking to a continuous point of attention on the political agenda. Compared to the previous stage of strategic planning (the *Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Joined Structure Plan* of 2000, with alterations) the new *Strategic Development Plan* is shorter, more strategic and selective.

¹²⁵

“Partly”, because next round created evaporation of commitment.

The vision of the *Strategic Development Plan* has been agreed and approved, next rounds follow (obligatory) and the interviews showed co-ownership and satisfaction among the actors. The higher authorities approved the strategy, expressing at the same time that approval does not include commitment to the content. So the *policy makers* succeeded in including the strategy on the agenda of the *politicians*, but the higher-level *politicians* say that this does not imply consequences. This probably applies specially for the essential investments required for improved accessibility. But at the same time, envisaged city regeneration, housing and landscape projects are gradually implemented, intensive co-operation among actors representing stakeholders are reality, actors are satisfied and learning effects broadly reported.

The decision-making process of the **Grödental** case towards the *Vision Gherdëina* of 2010 was clearly effective: A vision was agreed in interactive participative actions. Implementations were started and general satisfaction together with expressions of strong feelings of ownership appeared during the interviews. The problem of accessibility and the long-term future envisaged rail connection requires next steps in co-operation with the provincial authorities. Unclear is whether other next steps have to follow; the small scale of most concrete envisaged interventions hardly require other next decision-making process rounds.

According to the information from the interviews, the Grödental case appears to be promising, since almost all local interviewees expressed strong feelings of ownership, implying co-authorship. Several interviewees reported to be "*living the vision*". Important envisaged spatial policies like limiting and regulating the expansions of ski-tracks, protection of landscapes and developing bicycle routes are implemented or under construction. The interviews revealed that actors were enthusiastic about the learning effects of the collaboration. Four years after achieving agreement the vision has been officially adopted in all municipal councils. That preceding period consisting of careful interaction with the provincial authorities, for securing the outcomes of their achievements, illustrates the value local societies connected to their strategic development vision.

The effectiveness of the **Meetjesland 2020** process is assessed in accordance with the circumstances within this sub-region; there are very little drivers for development. Small effects of the decision-making process are spread in several sectors in the local society. Private as well as official organizations act in some more concerted ways, taking decisions about future developments collaboratively as a result of agreeing on the objectives for development. The awareness that a poor region can achieve results through co-operation grew. As a result of the set of objectives, questions about future development, which were never considered before were discussed in several organizations in the (sub) region. But the existential struggle for power of the *Streekplatform* with the municipal politicians since 2007 made further development of *Meetjesland 2020* very doubtful. Next steps did not follow, satisfaction evaporated.

The decision-making was not effective. The awareness raising of the sub-regional self-esteem resulted in a development policy formulated in a set of intentions and objectives. The difficult choices about concrete projects at specific locations were not addressed and next rounds of strategy-making not occurring. The local politicians did not accept the role of the *Streekplatform* as *policy-makers* and a struggle for existence required all energy and creativity. The *Meetjesland 2020* case cannot be expected to result in a successful strategy.

The overview of the assessed effectiveness is completed with (apart from Drechtsteden), the author's expectation of successful strategies in Glasgow and Grödental. It may be expected that despite the fact that Scottish Ministers approved the Strategic Development Plan while (now) denying commitment, confronted with the continued pressure from its main city and recognizing the strategic value of improved accessibility, will (later) find ways to support and finance the proposed essential infrastructural interventions. Within the Scottish system, the requests for those investments may be repeated in every four-year cycle. The positive expectation about the Grödental case is based on the extraordinary strong bottom-up commitment appearing in the interviews and the perseverance, which resulted in council adoptions after four years.

The assessment of the Bologna case shows that effectiveness of a strategy-making round does not secure the eventual success of the strategy. We concluded that the effectiveness of a decision-making process as defined in 4.5 is relevant, but not sufficient for the eventual success of a strategy.

The question remains how to sustain commitment and support in subsequent stages of decision-making during a longer period.

13 Assessment of cases

In order to analyse the influence of factors for effectiveness, which have been distinguished and selected as variables for our analysis in the research frame of Chapter 5, our cases are assessed more in detail in this Chapter 13. These factors are the factors of the first column of table 12.1. We considered the occurrence of co-ownership in § 13.1. Whether we can detect Co-design (or co-production) in the strategy making in our five cases is considered in § 13.2. The application of Options including visualizations in the cases is assessed in § 13.3. The openness of the processes is discussed in 13.4. The aspect of different planning traditions in the cases is considered in § 13.5. The influences of the administrative embeddings are regarded in § 13.6. In § 13.7 we discussed aspects of the relations with politicians, including the importance of continuity. In 13.8 the roles and experience of experts are considered. The importance of space-specificities for strategy making is apparent. As appeared in our explorative Chapters 1 – 3, aspects of process management cannot be separated from the place specificities. Therefore, combinations of the distinct factors, possibly explaining the effectiveness or failure of strategy making processes, are considered in the subsequent Chapters.

§ 13.1 Co-ownership in the Cases

Our theoretic frame assumes shared ownership an important factor for effectiveness and success. (Chapter 1) The criteria for assessing the occurrence of co-ownership as defined in § 4.4 are:

- *Pride of participants,*
- *Defensive reactions about the output,*
- *Taking credit for specific topics.*

In the case of the *Piano Strutturale Comunale* (PSC) of **Bologna** the broad discussions about project ideas created support in society to the resulting collection of ideas and opinions before 2007. Then *Gabellini* designed the visualized vision summarized in the concept of “7 Cities”, which showed recognisable and respectful application, selection and elaboration of ideas, proposals and objectives. After conceiving and publishing the concept of “7 Cities”, broad support to the process developed. The convergence of ideas in the design of “7 Cities” substantiated and symbolized local society’s support for the process and the content. Those feelings were enhanced since the design appeared to

summarize existing ideas in a surprising, eye-opening new concept, which addressed all issues and provided possibilities to resolve most of the urban problems.

The fact that the conception was clearly no co-production but the (strongly appreciated) design of *Gabellini*, indeed created much appreciation, although without lasting shared ownership among stakeholders and the general public.

The judicial focus of requirements of the regional regulative planning system in next step jeopardized the positive perceptions. During preparation of the *Regolamento Urbanistico Edilizio* and the *Piano Operativo Comunale*, taking two years of bureaucratic activities, the initial enthusiasm evaporated. That negative effect was severely enhanced by the political problems and standstill between 2009 and 2011. Now the *Piano Strutturale Comunale* is almost forgotten.

Co-ownership of the *PSC* is non-existent.

The process of preparing the **Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030** was organized as the collaboration towards a preferred new scenario. The interviews among actors revealed that feelings of shared ownership still existed, even after fifteen years. Some of the interviewees referred to specific ideas of which they took credit, some others felt ownership of the process itself. "Defending" the vision was not felt necessary: the reaction on that question in some interviews was that "*a strong vision sometimes needed to be clarified*".¹²⁶ The perceived co-ownership seemed to be a result of the co-designing of the strategic vision in the production group. Several interviewees mentioned the large learning effect of the strategy making process.

Co-ownership of **Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan** was also apparent among the interviewees. The openness for personal contributions to the discussions from any side of the process organization was generally referred to. The continuous revolving process of the Scottish strategic planning system does not result in a new spatial development concept in every four-year's cycle, but implies rather small steps improving the previous stage. As a consequence co-ownership relates to the specific improvements, which in the specific stage at stake in this assessment, refers to the selectivity in locations for service centres, business areas and the elaborations of the Green Network.

According to the interviews and the realizations in the sub-region, ownership of the **Grödental** vision is enthusiastically shared. Although formal decisions in the five municipal councils are organized quite late, participants "*live the vision*" already and implement ideas in policy and reality, because participants feel authorship.

Here the most far going option for future development is brought into the discussion with stakeholders by the mayors: merging the actual municipalities of the valley into one new municipality.

A kind of common pride came to exist about the region's identity since the development perspective of **Meetjesland 2020** was agreed and approved in 2007. But since then the efforts went into a struggle for life of the *Streekplatform*, and next steps, potentially supportive for maintaining ownership did not happen.

The process aimed from the start on at creating strong support in society: A great number of local organizations (110 are mentioned) participated and the process was financially sponsored by over 20 organizations. In order to save the support to the process, a group of influential key persons were invited to act as "*peter*" and "*meter*"¹²⁷ of the development vision. This patronage was meant to enhance sharing ownership of the vision at a moment when revitalization of the process was needed, but did not work out, except from region branding. The initial degree of co-ownership of the Meetjesland process has disappeared gradually.

The importance of co-ownership of a vision is apparent. Long-term consistency and devoted commitment are requirements for the eventual success of a strategy. For increasing chances for success, process management of decision-making processes for development strategies aimed at creating as much as possible shared ownership of the strategy. The questions: how to enhance chances for co-ownership in planning practice and how to intensify feelings of ownership so that they last longer, became more pregnant.

§ 13.2 Co-design

Our theoretic frame considered in § 4.5 the differences between co-production supporting co-ownership and co-designing, probably enhancing intensified ownership of the content and the process. Together designing something not existing before requires maximal openness of the process. Analysing the processes of the five cases, we applied the indicators of co-design (§ 5.3) being:

- Any idea coming from any side is considered
- New ideas emerged during considerations
- Non-envisaged options and synergies developed.

With regard to the occurrence of co-design in the **Bologna PSC** case, the city level must be distinguished from the neighbourhood level. At the city level, the extensive discussions preceding the making of the vision were open to every idea that could be considered. That period consisted essentially of making an inventory of ideas among the population. The result was an assembly of many loose and often abstract ideas. A structure, distinguishing main items from details and modifying project ideas so that they not only fit into, but also contributed to the overall structure, was needed to provide the framework, necessary for deciding for instance about investments. Through designing the “7 Cities” concept, the planning consultant *Patrizia Gabellini* professionally ordered the data, opinions and objectives into a spatial design based on a coherent concept. Although she was assisted by the urban planning department of Bologna, this activity on the city level cannot be regarded co-designing as defined in this study.

Actions at the more concrete neighbourhood level were more close to the population. At that level people had more influence on the output. Discovering new potentialities and synergies and also participants clarifying and defending proposals to others (aspects of co-ownership) were reported about the participation on the neighbourhood level. Forms of co-production developed on the neighbourhood level in Bologna, not at the city level.

The decision-making process towards the **Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030** vision was referred to in the interviews as together shaping the vision. The interviewees reported that ideas of the participants received equal attention. The comparison of the simple initial options tabled at the start of the process and the resulting new concepts, illustrate that the group activities can be qualified as together producing new options with non-envisaged outcomes. The *productiegroep* co-designed the strategy. Especially combinations of previous loose ideas, partly coming from the *Drechttoeversproject*, and fragmented notions created new coherent concepts in several improving and specifying steps in a four months short period.

The resulting preferred and agreed scenario, the common vision, clearly substantiated and localized the agreed objectives for future development with projects in the topography of six municipalities. The commitment lasted at least one and a half decade.

The decision-making process for the Glasgow and the **Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan** cannot be qualified as a process of co-designing. An exception may be the component of the Green Network. Although the interviewees report that any idea coming from every side is considered as a contribution to the deliberations, emergence of new ideas or concepts, or developing non-envisaged options or synergies did not characterize the process. The influential *Futures Group* study helped to identify priorities through assessing the robustness and vulnerability of the vision for changes in the context. The contribution of the specific round of decision-making to the gradually developing vision consists of specifying and elaborating previous versions. These important, politically sensitive steps made in this last version, is the commonly supported selectivity in locations for service centres, housing and economic activities as well as the recognition of the City's role for the prosperity for the whole region.

The conception of the **Vision Gherdëina** consisted of together shaping a vision, including value-based objectives and interventions in the topography of the valley. Such a valley-wide vision had never before been created. The co-designing exercise was organized interactively with broad public participation by proposing three policy options for different directions of development, which after elaborative exercises on maps appeared to be non-conflicting components of the emerging vision, which then was agreed.

The participants in the **Meetjesland 2020** process shared ownership of the outputs of their work. But agreeing on a set of objectives for development without substantiating into new localized options affecting various interests is usually a not very controversial stage in preparing strategy. The difficult stage of selecting and prioritizing place-related strategic interventions did not happen. Listing a selected set of objectives cannot be qualified as co-designing a development strategy. The essential negotiations about locating and prioritizing functions and investments, thereby requiring decisions and standpoints about conflicting interests of stakeholders did not occur in the *Meetjesland 2020* process.

The cases confirm that co-producing an output and co-creating a new place-based development vision (co-designing) are conditions for effective decision-making entailing that participants feel committed to (implementing aspects of) a vision. Aspects of co-designing could be established in the Drechtsteden and the Gröndental cases. Co-design concerns not only shared ownership supporting commitment, but also closer involvement and more intensive experience of together exploring and inventing something new. That implies that there is a more profound understanding of different

aspects and details of the common achievement. Such deeper understanding will support the consistency of the commitment to the vision in later stages. In both cases where co-design has been detected, and where participants discovered and invented new insights ¹²⁸ the feelings of ownership are probably more intense than in just co-making: as suggested in § 5.4, the difference regards co-authorship. Co-designing does not necessarily include spectacular new forms. Next to emphasized specific aspects, maps indicate mainly recognisable existing elements of the situation. That relates to the evolutionary character of spatial development. (§ 2.3)

But the process of gaining new insights when exploring thinkable futures creates feelings of discovering new perspectives, which influence mind-sets. The related larger degree of openness of minds establishes an important difference between co-producing and co-designing.

§ 13.3 Application of Options and Visualizations

As explored in § 4.4, next to openness as an aspect of process management of decision-making, the openness in terms of broadness of content issues taken into consideration is assumed essential for effective strategy making. Figure 5.3 depicted the interrelation of a planning culture with the openness of process management as well as with the openness of scenario planning. Collaborative scenario planning was supposed the effective way forward for the making of the content of a strategy. (§ 5.6) That refers to the group creativity expected from applying a multitude of options, in the form of concepts or scenarios. The dynamic process aspect of scenarios, underlines the evolutionary stepwise progress in spatial development. (§ 2.3.)

Although not all cases applied equal options or scenarios as a method, several cases organized decision-making processes around the comparison and gradual improvement of options for different thinkable futures:

¹²⁸

New insights for a specific participant may consist of common knowledge of another participant. The openness to other views is essential for influencing mindsets, which is required for consensus building.

CASES	OPTIONS
Bologna	No Options
Drechtsteden	Four Scenarios
Glasgow	Four Scenarios for testing the strategy
Grödental	Three Scenarios
Meetjesland	No Options

TABLE 13.1 Options as tool of decision-making

The **Bologna** case shows proposed solutions for specific place-based problems as identified in public discussions. Those project ideas summarized in the concept of “7 Cities” did not include seven different options for solving problems in one specific location; they presented seven project proposals for addressing problems in each one of the seven different locations. That proposed designed concept for the future development of the city was broadly appreciated, but did not consist of applying options as meant in this study.

In **Drechtsteden** the *Scenariostudie 2030* was deliberately approached as scenario planning in which four initial scenarios were introduced at the start in order to stimulate the deliberations in the decision-making process about possible and preferred future developments. The four scenarios were value based, qualitative alternative options for future development: (1) Continued separate development of the 8 (6) municipalities, (2) integrated development mainly based on existing economic strong sectors, (3) integrated development aiming at sustainable ecology, (4) development dominated by quality of life. (figure 8.3)

In the **Glasgow** process, the development of the strategy consisted of improving the existing strategy without considering different scenarios for possible different directions of development. Scenarios have been applied in the *Futures Group*, which was organized in order to create a fresh view on the future development. Those four scenarios were applied to assess the consequences of the strategy within different socio-economic contexts. The Futures Group identified the four options in the combinations of *Readily availability of resources versus Scarce resources*, and *Intensive public interventions versus Hardly public interventions*. This exercise provided value based alternative scenarios for future socio-economic environments for comparing with the strategy. That confrontation informed about the feasibility and risks of the strategy in different future situations. More insight in the robustness and the priorities of the proposed interventions resulted. That does mean that scenarios were not applied as tools for creatively exploring possibilities. Although the specific round of decision-making we analysed did not apply scenarios for shaping the latest modification of the strategy, for conceiving the basic strategy of this ongoing process, four alternative scenarios have been applied in the late nineties.

Grödental approached the quest for a vision by applying three options: Based on questions like: do we prefer to organize the valley's future by (1) emphasizing the individual identity of the villages or by (2) enhancing the cohesive unity of the valley as a whole, or (3) do we concentrate efforts on solving the problems of circulation and accessibility? Although partly thematic, those options for integrated development include alternative value based qualitative scenarios for possible development of the valley.

Meetjesland did not apply different options for deciding about possible directions of development of the sub-region. The crosscutting objectives followed from analysing SWOT and negotiations about objectives among stakeholders.

With regard to the application of different options for deciding about a future development the experiences in Drechtsteden and Grödental confirm the supportive effect of applying several scenarios for open decision-making and for co-designing the development vision. The application of scenarios in the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley case was different in the sense of considering different environments for assessing the robustness and feasibility of implementing the strategy. That happened in the specific round of decision making of our case, but as mentioned earlier, the original conception of the strategic concept was also based on comparing consequences of four different options. The strategy making of the specific decision making round in our Glasgow case regarded enhancing the strategic strength of the earlier conception. Those experiences in effective cases of Drechtsteden, Glasgow and Grödental confirm our assumption.

In § 3.5 the effect of concepts in spatial planning (Zonneveld 1991) has been discussed thereby stressing the importance of graphic expressions for communication about concepts. The visualization of aspects of strategic development visions provides overviews on the relations between functional systems and focus on specific scale levels. In our exploration of strategy making as a creative process, we assumed conceptualization of plan concepts and their consequences on maps supportive to effective decision-making not only by structuring discussions and focussing on a specific scale level, but mainly by opening up minds for various views. Also the moment of introduction of a concept or a scenario on maps was supposed to influence the effectiveness of decision-making: the earlier in the process the better. (§ 3.7.)

The cases applied visualization of notions in different stages of the decision-making processes:

CASES	EARLY	LATE	NONE
Bologna		X	
Drechtsteden	X		
Glasgow	X		
Grödental	X		
Meetjesland			X
CaptionHere			

TABLE 13.2 Moment of introduction of maps in the cases

The (late) visualization of the design of “7 Cities” when the process was already two years active, short after Gabellini’s appointment in the start of 2007, provided the tipping point in the PSC process in **Bologna**. The enthusiastic reception of the visualized concept of “7 Cities”, to which most interviewees referred, was called an eye-opener for all. Many of the (loose) objectives, assembled during two years of discussions, appeared to be applicable as components of a coherent visionary strategy. Functions and ideas were located and translated into concrete projects in specific locations in the city. Relations became visible and consequences could be discussed. The images of the designed structure provided overview and territorial coherence. That experience was a strong illustration of the influence of a visualized design.

The decision-making process of **Drechtsteden** was based on continuously making drawings on maps from the start onwards. Sketches, representing ideas for locating functions, identifying barriers, exploring possibilities, identifying relations were used to react on and act with ideas of the participants. The initial four simple options tabled at the start were gradually more and more modified while developing new images. That activity demonstrated the openness for ideas during the exploration of possibilities and consequences of the notions, which emerged in the discussions of the production group.

Also in the case of **Glasgow and the Clyde Valley** maps were used from the start on because the previous strategic plans provided the images for elaboration when preparing the new *Strategic Development Plan*. The decision-making consisted of improving the strategy with regard to the requirements of the new legislation to make strategic plans more concise and more strategic (selective) and to address actual policy topics like low carbon development and climate change.

The **Grödental** process included visualization of notions on maps in the early stage of the decision-making process. Although the scale of interventions compared with the scale of the valley, made visualization not easy especially for the participating lay people, participants were enticed by the process managers to draw their ideas on maps. As a result, consequences became clearer, potentials became more concrete and discussions converged so that the three options at the start eventually were combined.

The **Meetjesland** process remained limited to producing a set of objectives. No spatial planning experts were involved in the preparation of the development vision. As far as visualizations were applied only an illustrative star diagram, comparing analytical aspects of the sub-region with Vlaanderen's average and a map of the actual situation were considered. The abstractness of only presenting objectives, without the (much more difficult) selectivity and proposals for the locations of interventions were in retrospect regretted by the project leader of the pivotal round for *Meetjesland 2020*.

These considerations confirm that application of visualizations is indeed supportive for effective decision-making. Not only the provision of overview and the focus on a specific spatial scale level but also the effect of widening perspectives and new possibilities are helpful for effective decision-making. The assumption as formulated in § 3.7, that visualized concepts or scenarios applied in an early stage of decision-making enhance the effectiveness of the process is clearly confirmed in our effective cases. The negative Meetjesland experience provides also evidence for the assumed importance of visualizations. Working without maps avoided confrontations of interests and controversies to be addressed and resolved for effective strategy making. A list of agreed intentions (objectives) did not sufficiently specify place-specific initiatives, which could potentially increase interest, create support and provide perspectives for specific local actors.

§ 13.4 Openness of Process

Applying an open agenda, in which any idea can be considered (1), deploying an objective, non-procedural goal oriented activity (2) together with flexible participation (3) are used as the indicators for open process management. Co-designing, consisting of together exploring possibilities is probably the most far-going form of open process management.

Within the **Bologna** case, structural issues of infrastructure, mobility and accessibility were excluded from public participation in the very start of the process (2005), which implied some limitations to the openness of the integrated approach. These issues

are still the same problems the interviewees mentioned as Bologna's main actual challenges. At her appointment *Gabellini* had to accept such notions and limitations, which she felt at that moment "*not to be in the interest of the city*". The basic concept underlying her "*7 Cities*" design anticipated the increasing problems of congestion through spatial distribution of urban functions.

Despite the limitations set at the start of the process, according to most interviewees the public discussions in Bologna in the period 2005-2007 were experienced as open to any idea. Apparently limitations to the subject under discussion were not felt important as long as ideas and considerations got appropriate attention. The shaping of the vision was a technical (design) activity translating and modifying the harvested ideas into a coherent spatial framework.

The workshops in the neighbourhoods were perceived as open and creative activities. The main lines of the structural concept of "*7 Cities*" were accepted as appropriate for being elaborated in the neighbourhood workshops.

Although the strategy making consisted of collaborative interactions among sectors and municipalities, the making of the **Drechtsteden** strategic vision was not organized as a societal process of broad public participation. The production group of about fifteen experts, representing different disciplines and sectors was appointed to deliver in four months. The interviewees reported experiencing the decision-making process as open to any idea or proposal. Ideas were welcomed as contributions. Regularly informing politicians created trust and room to move. Informally working towards an agreement, which as soon as agreed has been anchored in formal decisions in the councils, was helpful for progress. The participation in the production group was not experienced as being flexible. The participants felt to belong to a fixed working group with a clear task to be finished under time pressure in short time. Participants reported that they were eager to miss none of the Friday meetings: "*It was happening here*".

The area under consideration was also not flexible; it consisted of the territories of the initial eight municipalities.

The interviewees perceived the process organization in **Glasgow** as an open process in which participants felt that they could put any subject on the agenda. The process was characterized as goal oriented. Participation was not open to any one willing to join; the composition of working groups was fixed. The participants accepted the rather strict, top-down regulated procedures of Scottish planning system putting national policy items as requirements to the regional plans. The legal requirements to conform national objectives were apparently not perceived as limitations to the openness of the process.

The preparation of the strategic development vision for the **Grödental** has been perceived as a very open process. The process management stimulated identifying issues and assets and especially sketching solutions on maps. The openness of interactions and the help of process managers facilitating the stakeholders expressing their ideas were repeatedly explicitly appreciated in the interviews. Open agenda setting, goal orientation and flexible participation were practiced. The interviewees clearly appreciated receiving professional information and pointing to consequences by the process leaders, when working on their ideas.

The process of agreeing on **Meetjesland** was organized in an open way. All interviewees mentioned the professional balance between openness for ideas and goal orientation of the process manager towards agreeing on a set of objectives. Also the participation into the process was perceived as flexible, new parties could join.

Real openness of decision-making processes as suggested by policy science, appears effective and applicable in spatial strategy making in the various planning cultural contexts of our cases. The differences in planning cultures among our five cases are apparently not prohibitive to openness. Both Italian cases are situated in strict regulative systems, but the personal involvement of the South Tyrolean planning director, co-organizing the process as an experiment enabled open process management. The Bologna and the Glasgow cases showed also that limitations to openness, if considered reasonable, are accepted as long as contributions of the participants are respected. Open-minded professional behaviour combining respect to interests of society and awareness of professional extra value seems to be an essential factor for enhancing the effectiveness of strategy making. The explorative attitude required for co-designing (§ 14.3) may be regarded as an ultimate degree of openness to possible futures. Co-designing and developing group-creativity require adequate training of planners during their education.

§ 13.5 Planning cultures

Spatial planning traditions provide the environment for strategic decision-making processes. Spatial planning traditions, being a component of the national and regional governmental praxis, are strongly related to the spatial planning legislation and the connected regulations. That context influences the possibilities for informality, flexibility and the degree of openness when organizing and conducting a decision-making process. We assumed that formal legalistic planning systems allow for less openness for process management and for place-specific characteristics than less regulated systems. Informality, facilitating group-creativity, is needed for co-designing a development

scenario to which people can commit. In § 5.6 we distinguished openness of process management from openness to place specificities, which implies the possibilities for local interpretations as needed for place-related scenario planning. At the same time, anchoring the qualitative outputs requires some degree of formally fixing of the achievements of important steps. An ongoing process consisting of subsequent rounds of decision-making requires the oscillation between informal and formal steps. That is a similar process to: switching between exploring possibilities and selecting options, between designing possible futures and assessing impacts and qualities.

Although out dated (Nadin and Stead 2012) and lacking a better version we discuss planning systems against the background of the European Compendium of Planning Systems and Policies. (CEC 1997) According to the distinction made in the European Compendium of Planning Systems and Policies, our five cases would fit in respectively:

The comprehensive integrated model:	Drechtsteden
The land-use management model:	Glasgow and Meetjesland
The urbanism model:	Bologna and Grödental

TABLE 13.3 Cases and planning traditions

The **Bologna** case is conducted in the regional planning system of *Emilia Romagna*, which contains a strict regulated set of juridical fixed rules for strategic planning. That regulation contains obligations to agree contracts for co-operation with identified (mainly public) partner organisations. Plan regulations (RUE) and specifications (POC) for implementations must be approved at the same moment as the strategy (PSC). The project orientation of Bologna confirms the *urbanism* model of planning. Bologna demonstrated that the legal regulation of procedures for strategy making could be counterproductive. The juridical focus during two years entailed evaporating interest and commitment, which initially followed on the enthusiastic reception of the design of "7 Cities". *The project orientation of Bologna confirms the urbanism model of planning. The formal character of the strict regulated system will be a factor for a formalistic and even non-supportive role of the higher level authorities.*

The case of **Drechtsteden** was conducted in the Dutch comprehensive integrated model of planning. The relative loose, indicative character of the system requires negotiation allowing for open communication and co-operating with higher-level authorities. In the Dutch governmental structure municipalities are quite autonomous. The strategy making process developed close co-operation horizontally as well as vertically, without developing a legalistic controlling attitude or struggles for power.

The **Glasgow and the Clyde Valley** case is conducted under Scottish legislation, requiring an integrated approach for strategic planning, whereas the Compendium of European Planning Systems and Policies qualifies the UK system as land-use management. The system requires conformation to Scottish policy. A quite formalistic attitude is noticed at the level of Scottish Ministers, entailing a not-partner like legalistic attitude. The Glasgow case shows at the one hand the advantages of legislation obliging continuous focussing on strategic development, but at the other hand a top-down directional behaviour of Scottish government, showing discouraging non-commitment.

The **Grödental** experience, organized like an experiment with modern governance, can be qualified as a comprehensive integrated approach. That was possible thanks to the provincial initiative to organize the process as an experiment, decoupled from procedural obligations. The bottom-up approach was taken up by the provincial planning agency. This experience confirms the fact that too strict regulated planning stimulated creative ways out in Italy. (Servillo and Lingua 2014)

Meetjesland has been organized in a territory where the Flemish planning legislation applies, but the case, although focussing on the spatial development of the sub-region, has not been organized as a spatial planning activity. The strategy making was organized as a societal process, establishing objectives without addressing the difficult choices about the locations of specific interventions. It is not possible to relate this experience to a planning system. It suffered from the extreme administrative and organizational density in Vlaanderen and slowly died in a struggle for hegemony with the municipalities.

We assumed openness essential for successful strategy making. Therefore we distinguished roughly open planning cultures and stricter regulated planning cultures, whereby the Italian and the Scottish planning cultures are clearly regulative¹²⁹, whereas the Dutch planning culture, functioning on basis of indicative planning documents from the higher levels, is characterized as open. The Belgian case was not conducted in a spatial planning framework. The failure of PSC Bologna can be related to the de-motivating effect during production of the juridical documents Regolamentoo Edilizio Urbanistico and the Piano Operativo Comunale. But at the same time, literature on Italian planning (Lingua and Servillo 2014, Servillo and Lingua 2014) suggests that the highly regulative character of the Italian planning tradition has stimulated experiments in informal planning practices in Italy. The case of the Grödental experiment in Bolzano/Alto-Adige clearly confirms that suggestion. Although the South Tyrolean spatial planning culture has been characterized as a rigid regulative bureaucratic “burden”, the experience in the Grödental case showed that effective strategy making could do without detailed juridical prescriptions. The multi-level embedding, based on political will is essential.

The interviewees in Bologna and Glasgow complained about the bureaucratic focus of representatives of higher authorities. The cases Drechtsteden, Meetjesland and Grödental were more informal, non-regulated decision-making processes.

The cases demonstrate no direct relation between the above categories of legal planning systems and the formality or informality of the practised decision-making process. An indirect relation would be that rigid planning systems seem to stimulate the search for informal ways out.

All five cases have been conducted in an informal constructive atmosphere, all interviewees referred to the openness of the process management. The assumption that strong regulative planning contexts do not allow for openness in the processes is not confirmed. Non-regulated (informal) approaches seem important for the openness, which is required for common, objective oriented search for an agreement, consensus building and co-design. But the case of Glasgow and the Clyde Valley demonstrates that an informal non-regulated process is not a necessary condition for effectiveness.

Strategy making implies building a common (political) will to address a future situation, whereas regulations tend to secure existing conditions and powers with judicial means, thereby potentially limiting the possible outcomes to the conventional, well known solutions of the past, which may be part of the problems that triggered the need for a future strategy. That limits the openness, flexibility and creativity needed for a constructive and innovative process.

§ 13.6 Administrative Embedding of the Process

The embedding of strategy making processes concerns content, political, administrative and process aspects. A strategy making process is to be conducted in a complex environment of other public bodies, each having own financial resources, competences and regulations, of which many foster own ideas about spatial development. (Chapter 2) Without the support, albeit with some distance, of the political responsible person, officials and experts have little room to move. The relations with higher authorities, often having the competence for approving spatial plans and own political objectives, are important. Strategic plans usually contain components of a scale beyond that of individual municipalities. Therefore support from higher level is a necessity.

Open communication through tiers of government is essential. Lower public authorities confronted with problems, make plans for addressing the problems and must fulfil obligations, set by the higher-level authorities having to approve the plans.

Like every communication, the outcomes do not only depend from the content of legal requirements but also from the interactions of persons representing the communicating organizations. Persons representing organization can take a formal attitude, juridical focussed on competencies, but can also behave solution-oriented and flexible. The distribution of competencies over governmental layers within a specific planning tradition is a factor of the multi-level embedding of a strategy making process, but the way in which competencies are exercised in the interaction between tiers of government depends also from personal characteristics of the actors.

	ONE	TWO	THREE
Bologna			X
Drechtsteden	X		
Glasgow	X		
Grödental	X		
Meetjesland			X

TABLE 13.4 Administrative layers to deal with

In the case of **Bologna** the decision-making process was embedded in a complex administrative context. The city was at that time¹³⁰ the fourth layer of government: from the top downwards: the national state of Italy, the Region of Emilia Romagna, the Province of Bologna, the Municipality of Bologna. All layers had a role to play in the legal strategic planning system. As a consequence of the multitude of historic values in Bologna, the presence of former military areas and the university, many national level institutions, which were not focused on solving local problems, were involved. The strategy making was organized in the juridical context of formal regulated planning procedures according to the regional planning regulations of Emilia Romagna:

- A formal planning agreement was required with the Province of Bologna.
- The *Piano Strutturale Comunale* (the visionary strategy) had to be formally approved together and at the same moment, with the regulative plans *Regolamento Urbanistico Edilizio* (which regulates land-use) and the *Piano Operativo Comunale* (about feasibility for implementation). This combination jeopardized achieving agreement on a commonly preferred development policy by requiring previous evidence about juridical and financial feasibility.
- In agreements of co-operation with the National Railways, National Domains and the University, not only the municipality, but also the provincial and the regional governments had to be included as contract partners.

¹³⁰

In June 2014 the existence of the Province of Bologna terminated.

That web of formal requirements did not offer extra value. The contrary is experienced: too many parties taking a (juridical) controlling attitude, without contribution to solutions. In the interviews, the national commission for the national heritage as well as the strict regulative planning culture of the region were referred to as not-solution-oriented bureaucratic obstacles. Against that background conceiving and approval of the *Piano Strutturale Comunale* based on the concept of “7 Cities” can be regarded as quite an impressive achievement.

The Bologna case, although initiated and later continued by the local politicians, suffered severely not only from the political discontinuity, but also from the legislative focus and the polycentric development policy of the *Emilia Romagna* region. Formal procedures, juridical focussed on strict procedural requirements took away societal interest and support. There was no support for the local process in the regional capital from the regional authorities. Instead request for support were denied; the region preferred the notion of polycentric development.

In **Drechtsteden** the decision-making process was organized in a much simpler administrative context. The grouping of municipalities had to communicate only with the province of *Zuid-Holland* having the competence of approving the local regulative plans ¹³¹, which may be prepared in later stages for implementing the strategy. And also that communication was simplified by active involvement of provincial experts in the production group. For financial support from the national level for urban regeneration, the province helped the grouping of municipalities to obtain extra facilities. On the level of the voluntary grouping of eight municipalities: the (informal) Council of Aldermen governing the grouping, made municipal experts available, their Heads of Municipal Planning and Development were regularly informed and the Mayors formed a more distant steering group. Municipal Councils were regularly consulted during the process of creating the vision. The provincial authority’s active involvement consisted not only at the political level where stimulating incentives were offered and by active participation in the process of creating the vision, but also as a co-financing principal also during several productions in later stages. The multi-level embedding of the process was helpful: the province acted as a partner, forming an alliance with Drechtsteden. The province connected conditions to their support by putting deadlines, which created a pressure cooker atmosphere to the production. Achievements were fixed in formal decisions of the municipal councils. The relation between the municipalities and the province was a clear example of loose coupling: the condition was an integrated approach involving relevant interests and unanimous agreement and approval in all municipal councils. The province promised inclusion of the sub-regional agreement in the regional plan, and support for a fast-track procedure for urban renewal, without securing financial support for desired investments. The province demonstrated vertical commitment to the local efforts.

¹³¹

Bestemmingsplannen.

The case of **Glasgow and the Clyde Valley** was also organized in a quite simple multi-level embedding: The grouping of eight municipalities had mainly to do with the legislative authority, being Scottish government. The political steering group of eight councillors was overseeing main lines of the project organization. The project organization consists of no more than six experts, mainly strategic planners. That small group being the executive part of the *Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan Authority (GCVSDPA)* coordinates, stimulates and mediates working groups. The *Futures Group* was a source of inspiration for the actual plan. Recently the Green Network initiative takes a lot of attention, while providing input for further sustainable considerations. As far as the UK-level organizations were relevant, parties like for instance with regard to Glasgow International Airport, *British Airport Authority* was involved in the *Futures Group*. The simple embedding was helpful; although rather formal juridical focused, the system delivered a continuously improving strategic development policy. But at the other hand, the formal regulative requirements of the planning procedures might entail a legalistic controlling attitude of national actors, which does not stimulate the process. Procedures, plan documents and specific planning objectives are determined at the national Scottish level and conformation is legally required. That creates a quite clear situation with regard to mutual positions and content aspects, but at the same time allows a legalistic controlling attitude to national level officers. There is no supportive partnership with the regional actors who are expected to implement national policy objectives. The approval letter offered no perspective since Scottish government denies any commitment to implementing the strategy.

In **Grödental** the province of *Südtirol* promoted and facilitated the local Master Plan (*Vision Gherdëina*) process. Since the province holds competencies for spatial development, this created a simple form of administrative embedding. In order to avoid negative influences of the legalistic planning system, the process was organized as an experiment in modern governance. The (newly elected) group of Mayors of the valley became after some hesitation actively involved and proposed their municipal councils to approve the vision. The decision-making in Grödental enjoyed positive aspects of its simple multi-level embedding. Although being a local initiative originating from the valley's tourist board, the provincial government, looking for a pilot for strategic planning and the related governance, adopted the process. So, only two tiers of government were involved. The involvement of the province through active co-steering the process by the director of spatial coordination was clearly supportive to its effectiveness. The province's active involvement of the process included an incentive: South-Tyrol financed the activities of *EURAC* as the consultancy to the process. Municipal as well as provincial elections have slowed down the speed of the progress. Local councils, receiving the achievements positively, elaborated and partly implemented proposed policies about limiting ski tracks, protecting natural areas and bicycle routes. But for addressing main problems of infrastructure, the newly elected regional government's support will be needed.

The case of **Meetjesland** clearly suffered from the complexities of the higher administrative levels. In Belgium legal competencies are on the level of the *Gewesten*. As a result the co-operating organizations in the *Streekplatform* have to communicate with the province of *Oostvlaanderen* and the *Gewest Vlaanderen*.

But the fact that municipalities are not directly involved as steering partners, positioned the thirteen municipalities as extra complicating factors.¹³² After stimulating activities in *streekplatforms* to work on integrated development, the policy of *Vlaanderen* changed and economic sector development had to be pursued in a new organization. That resulted in starting next to the *Streekplatform Meetjesland* a new regional economic and social organization: *RESOCs*.

The resulting struggle for hegemony paralysed both organizations for years. Although both types of organizations are not strictly regulated, allowing for a broad scope of activities, financial arrangements from sector ministries jeopardize solutions in terms of co-operating or merging.

The contrast between the cases with respect to effects of the multi-level embedding is large: the Belgium complexity suffocating the effectiveness of the limited ambitions (set of objectives) of Meetjesland versus the South-Tyrolean goal oriented informal decision-making in Grödental towards an ambitious¹³³ vision of future development. Simple multi-level embedding seems essential not only for effective decision-making but also for a successful strategy. Active involvement of the province as co-principal in Drechtsteden and anchoring achievements at higher levels fixed the outcomes in different administrative layers. That active involvement supports continued and consistent commitment, needed for implementing the long-term strategy. That positive aspect of embedding in a higher tier of government is also seen in the Grödental process. These two successful cases are examples not only of simple embedding and active support, but also of vertical commitment, loosely coupling the support to the process with the (higher-level) freedom to consider consequences of the output. In both cases the higher authorities of the provincial level demonstrated commitment to the process without promising blind support to any outcome. Both the province of Zuid-Holland and of Bolzano/Alto-Adige demanded an open process, including all relevant parties, both supported actively the strategy making and helped the acceptance of the achievements, without promising investing in infrastructural projects. The Glasgow case, although positioned in a rather strict top-down system is effective in another, more regulated way. Also in Glasgow we notice a simple multi-level embedding, but in that case the formal approval of the strategy was combined with an explicit denial of commitment.

¹³² Of the 19 members of the *Toekomstgroep*, only 2 members worked in municipalities.

¹³³ On the scale of the small valley

The other Italian case Bologna, in contrast, suffers from legalistic regulations and the related attitude of officials coming from regional as well as national level.

Although lower-level authorities are not in the position to change their administrative embedding, the negative effects of too many levels and the positive effect of having to relate to only one approving level would plea for aiming at simple vertical relations. A steering group composed of different higher level and sector-representing parties might create an appropriate, simple embedding.

The involvement of politicians in activities related to strategic policy-making is an important factor for effectiveness and success. It is about preparing the politicians who have to assume responsibility: they have to defend the chosen direction of development in public and in difficult discussions with other levels of government and other sectors. But there are also risks: too close involvement of politicians wanting to demonstrate their political leadership in the process is frequently experienced in practice. After being elected politicians are keen to deliver their promises. Some politicians tend to provide their solutions in a directive way: seeing the professionals as instrumental for executing predefined solutions. Some other politicians, feeling insecure about the field they assume responsibility, cannot come to decisions and have difficulties in playing the role of making choices among proposals. Because politicians must not feel trapped in the solution prepared by an expert, the required commitment should not include commitment to any output, but their support to the explorative process is indispensable. That implies some delicacy in the way politicians are involved and committed: Not too close and not too distantly; like in loose coupling. (§ 4.7) The fact that there was apparently a (latent) need for a strategy in the different cases will have supported the active involvement of the politicians. Previous discussions among the municipalities in the regional cases prepared for the common feeling that together coming to an agreement was in the interest of all participating municipalities.

CASES	POLITICIANS INVOLVED	HIGHER-LEVEL POLITICAL SUPPORT
bologna	X/--	--
Drechtsteden	X	X
Glasgow/ Clyde Valley	X	X/--
Grödental	X	X
Meetjesland	--	--

TABLE 13.5 Involvement of local politician and higher-level support

In the case of **Bologna** the newly elected (2004) politicians initiated the process of the *Piano Strutturale Comunale* and guided discussions up to approval of the plan in 2008. The Mayor and the Alderman for planning played active roles in the large open discussions about the future development of Bologna up to 2007. One of the reasons for the standstill of the *PSC* process was the discontinuity at the municipal executive. The Mayor elected in 2008 had to leave soon and during the period of the national Commissioner, no strategic political discussions were allowed. After elections of 2012 a new executive was starting and the politician who was responsible Alderman up to 2008, became Mayor and restarted the *PSC* process, inviting the former consultant for the plan as responsible political Alderman. But then the initial large support had already evaporated.

In **Drechtsteden** local politicians initiated the process together with provincial authorities and kept closely abreast with the production group, at the same time keeping sufficient distance from the production allowing room for the process.

The Alderman of the second large municipality presided the (informal) Council of Aldermen and acted as a motor of the process. Most of the involved politicians, also the provincial responsible, belonged to the same socialist party. This fact might have eased their negotiations, although the (then) presiding Alderman emphasized in the interview that each of the municipal representatives was very keen on the interests of his own municipality.

In the period between approval of the vision (1997) and the assessment (2012) political arrangements were gradually negotiated for step-by-step increasing the power of the Drechtsteden organization to implement policies and projects. This resulted in 2005 in establishing Drechtsteden as a formal *WGR* organization.¹³⁴

The **Glasgow** process is well embedded in the political context. The steering group in the form of the *Joint Committee* consists of two councillors of each of the eight constituting municipalities meeting four times a year. According to the minutes of their meetings they are occupied by main lines of the process, securing budgets and capacity and informing themselves about progress of the content of the work, which is rather strictly defined by Scottish level policy requirements. The position of the *Joint Committee* can be characterized as quite distantly involved, but supportive.

¹³⁴

Gemeenschappelijke Regeling (Dutch legal arrangement for co-operating of municipalities, translated in Joint Provisions Act

The involvement of politicians in **Grödental** was different. The five Mayors started the process after initiatives of the tourist organization by asking the provincial deputy governor for support. During the decision-making towards *Vision Gherdëina* some politicians were active in meetings and workshops from the start on, some Mayors joined when the process appeared successful. Part reason was an interruption by local elections. After some hesitations all newly elected Mayors joined the process. Due to the provincial planning tradition, which is strict regulative, Mayors did not fully trust the policy freedom suggested during plan preparation. Their main fear was that a master plan would imply more provincial regulations, coming on top of the actual strict regulations on planning and including more juridical top-down control. (§ 10.5) Although all municipal councils reacted positive on the vision after being presented, formal decisions waited long for the appointment of the new deputy governor.

The **Meetjesland** process was jeopardized due to struggles for power with the local politicians. The *Streekplatform*, which has been deliberately envisaged independent from local politics by the Flemish government, was put in a competing situation with the later coming social-economic oriented organization (*RESOC*), steered by local politicians. During years, efforts were oriented on institutional power play. Only some sectors could make some progress (tourism). The *Streekplatform Meetjesland* lost the battle.

Political involvement in the highly formal regulated processes of Bologna and Glasgow appear more distantly than in the informal processes in Grödental and Drechtsteden. Preparation of decisions may be a task of experts, the politicians have eventually to adopt the vision as their own and commit to implementation. Best chances for positive outcomes seems to provide a context where the strategy making process was a political initiative, which is organized in a way where involvement is not too close and not too distant; where loose coupling was applied. This regards the balance between steering and openness for professional support. In Drechtsteden as well as in Grödental, which are together with Glasgow the most effective processes, some specific politicians acted as motors championing the process.¹³⁵ In Glasgow political steering kept some more distance from the content. The exception was Meetjesland, where the local politicians were according to the original higher-level set-up of Streekplatforms, excluded from (steering) the process.

§ 13.7 Experts, experience and continuity

Co-production and interactive collaboration makes it hard to tell who is the planner. The professional experience of participating experts probably supports effective decision-making because experienced experts will be able to distinct main lines well from details, thereby avoiding dwelling on side paths. Professional educated planners nourish the process with information and insights. The continuity of the involvement of experts is expected an important factor for long-term effectiveness.

The most crucial experts in the **Bologna** process were experienced professionals. At the urban level the two years of discussions preceding the conception of “7 Cities” were well moderated, and the consultant expert conceiving the “7 Cities” concept, was a professor of planning at *Milano Politecnico*, experienced in planning practice, doing apparently¹³⁶ the right thing at the appropriate moment. The “multi-city” concept that has been applied refers to her earlier work in Rome, where the “City of Cities” concept resulted. The neighbourhood workshops in Bologna were equally professional guided by the experienced professionals of the *Urban Center Bologna*.¹³⁷

Without an exception, the multi-sector participants in the production group of **Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030** were each experts with over ten years of experience. That meant that all possessed an overview over their discipline and sector interests, which probably helped to avoid possible mistakes of beginners and enabled such a fast decision-making process. At the same time, mutual trust among experts, partly thanks to previous co-operation in the *Drechttoeversproject*, helped to avoid strategic institutional behaviour or unreasonable strong sector demands. In combination with the time pressure related to the provincial incentives, their experience was probably a factor favourable for the speed of the decision-making process.

The regulated Scottish system of strategic planning in which the **Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan** had to be decided and revised every four years is a factor for developing and sustaining experienced planners. The core organization of the specific authority consists mainly of experienced strategic planners. The director and his collaborators are explicitly mentioned in most interviews as professional, open and flexible experts, facilitating and stimulating sector contributions.

¹³⁶ According to almost all interviewees.

¹³⁷ The information centre displaying urban plans.

The **Master Plan of the Grödental** process was organized and led by two experts, which were professionally experienced, but not in similar interactive strategic participative processes. Nevertheless, according to all interviewees, their process management was experienced as professionally guiding, stimulating, facilitating, doing the right thing at the right moment and creating openness for the actors. All other actors in the decision-making process did also not possess previous experiences in strategic plan making. Nevertheless the process of the *Vision Gherdëina* is according to the interviews experienced as co-designing and assessed as one of the effective cases.

The role of the organizer and moderator in the **Meetjesland 2020** process was repeatedly referred to as the professional motor of the process. His enthusiasm and power to bring people together was highly appreciated as factor for achieving agreement about the set of objectives. His social-political profession provided tools for effective decision-making, but in retrospect he admitted that it would have been supportive to the progress if more concrete, place based interventions would have been proposed.¹³⁸ Also the other experts in the future group of the *Streekplatform* were experienced professionals, although not in strategic spatial planning.

The interviews revealed that most of the interviewed participants were involved in such a strategy making processes for the first time. Only the team of the Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan Authority forms a steady organization with experienced experts, and only the consultants in Bologna and Drechtsteden provided specific experience with practice in similar processes.

The professionalism of experts playing their roles as planners stimulating interactive explorations by facilitating and stimulating participants does not seem directly related to their earlier professional experience or specific experiences in similar previous processes. The open, neutral and respectful but professional attitude of experts seems decisive. The relation to personal attitudes is obvious.

Job-hopping and the demand in society for fast results are factors, which do not support commitment in general and more specifically to the necessary continued lasting commitment to a long-term strategy. Since the time horizon of strategies for future development covers decades, the turnover of personnel includes several generations of actors. That makes long-term strategies extra vulnerable, especially since newly involved people (also planners) tend to consider a fixed accomplishment as history¹³⁹.

¹³⁸

Interview Bart van Herck

¹³⁹

A general experience is that something existing, although conceived yesterday, belongs for a newcomer to the past. Especially achievements of a predecessor are often considered as out-dated, needing revision. That attitude should not exist among spatial planners, which claim a focus and expertise on long-term developments.

The **Piano Strutturale Comunale of Bologna** suffered from discontinuity of involved persons after adoption of the vision in 2007. The newly elected Mayor (2008) had to leave after a few months and the national Commissioner replacing him was not allowed to continue strategic political discussions. That created a stand still of the strategy making process. Restart was attempted after elections of 2012. The new Mayor is the previous Alderman, one of the 2004 initiators of the process. He aimed at restoring the continuity, by inviting the previous consultant (Gabellini) to take the political responsibility assuming the position of Alderman for structure planning. But the negative effects of the standstill of two years could not be compensated in the actual situation: The plan lost its support.

After termination of his political mandate, the responsible Alderman of the 1997 **Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030** process became Director of the developing Drechtsteden organization. That secured longer-term continuity: the person, who has been politically involved in the process of making the strategy, came on top of the organization and could probably make a difference when previously agreed aspects would be jeopardized. This un-envisaged continuity of involvement was undoubtedly a factor for the consistency of the implementation.

But in his interview the effect was doubted: he emphasized that being involved so long, made him in the eyes of newly involved politicians to someone referring to historic documents. And, not being politically mandated anymore but (only) a civil servant made him not an equal among the newly elected persons. His continued involvement will have been important for the effectiveness of the scenario study after adopting the vision: for initiating and conducting next rounds of decision-making the personal continuity will be of influence; but apparently with some limitations. The effect would have been probably larger if the involved person would have continued exercising influence at a politician level. Several participants in the production group remained at their post in different administrations and the prolonged involvement of an expert of the consultancy in later steps during 3-4 years after adoption of the vision was probably also a supportive factor for consistency. These specific experiences of the continuity of involved persons in the Drechtsteden process emphasize the importance of continuity of involvement for commitment to the vision for a successful strategy.

The decision-making process in **Glasgow** does not seem to suffer from discontinuity. The Director of the specific planning organization was before Vice Director of the organization. Also other team members are involved during longer time, several of them participated in the previous *Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Structure Plan of 2000* with alterations. That constant involvement will be a supportive factor for the continuous process of gradual improvements of the strategy. A disadvantage of the formally regulated planning system is that if at the national Scottish level new officials resume a function their rather distant position may bring about a non-involved, probable juridical controlling attitude.

Although rather recently decided, the **Grödental** process enjoys continued attention from the newly elected Mayors and the local councils of the valley; several influential actors said “to live the vision” already and are implementing policies and projects. The provincial elections were a factor of discontinuity of the process. The Mayors waited long with formal approval of their councils until they have discussed the vision with the new deputy governor. In agreement with the provincial officials, it has been decided that the vision is officially submitted to the provincial executive as a document informing them about the achieved agreement, without requesting for formal approval. That construction was chosen in order to avoid official bureaucratic planning procedures, which would jeopardize the achievements.

Meetjesland suffered from political discontinuity. The changing policy of Vlaanderen, disrespecting the achievements of the *Streekplatform* and shifting political support from integrated development towards economic sector development, created large problems. The first Director of the *Streekplatform*, who is referred to in the interviews as the inspirer and motor of the making of *Meetjesland 2020*, left the organization after being confronted with the new situation. Since then large efforts are put in revitalizing the *Streekplatform*, but the struggle for power demanded all energy. A system of patronage was installed, hoping that influential persons could bring new life, but that was largely in vain. We will never know how developments went in case the process would have included place related interventions and more concrete projects. The social-economic, aspects and impact of such projects might have created possibilities for improved relations with the economic sector and regional social and economic committee (*RESOC*). And we will also not know, how things would develop if the *Streekplatform* and the *RESOC* had succeeded in developing a constructive co-operation or merger. ¹⁴⁰

The eventual success of a strategy depends on the performance of the strategy in terms of indirect effects and implementation of concrete interventions, causing cultural, physical as well as regulative changes of reality, which result from experiences and learning. Implementation, after elaboration and specification of interventions, require continued consistent commitment to the strategy. Changing politicians after democratic elections as well as job rotating of experts are jeopardizing factors to the required continuity. Connecting the vision of a strategy to a politician's or an influential expert's personal ambition might create counterforce to discontinuity. The fast turnover of personnel in combination with the short-term memory of society is a context factor negatively influencing the performance of a long-term strategy. Process management cannot always influence the choice of team members who represent other organizations. Strategy making consisting of together developing story lines, and building coalitions, must be agreed with representatives of interest groups and sectors, who are appointed by others.

Process management can hardly influence the above factors of discontinuity. A remedy against unnecessary discontinuity in the direction of development is anchoring accomplishments in formal decisions preferably at a higher level of government. At the same time, an agreed strategy must not be pursued when new circumstances would require a different direction of development. Flexibility in strategic planning requires constantly assessing developments in the light of long-term desired futures. That should not be confused with doubting the direction of development at every moment of new information about for instance economic conjuncture or demographic developments. A strategic framework helps decision-making about elaborations, but would also provide a basis for deciding differently. Performance to a strategy complies better with sound spatial planning than strict conformance to specific rules or projects of a strategy.

14 Rival explanations

In our theoretic frame, we selected a set of variables, supposedly explaining the effectiveness of strategy making. However the complexity in society within the different countries might include other factors influencing the effectiveness as well. The accounts of cases showed several different potential influential factors, which are considered here for additional assessing the cases in order to detect possible rival explanations. The possible existence of explanations for the effectiveness of strategy making different from the interrelated process and context variables (the “rival explanations” as meant by Yin) required closer looking to properties of the cases and the local circumstances. The complexity of network society together with the large variety of local peculiarities would make the existence of such other, still hidden factors influencing effective strategy making, quite probable. Here we consider several thinkable independent variables as detected in the cases, which might appear relevant for strategy making. Aspects of local/regional complexity are considered in § 14.1. § 14.2 discusses possible influences of specific planning issues. In § 14.3 the possible influence of temporal aspects are considered.

§ 14.1 Complexity of Cases

The sizes of the related territory in terms of surface and number of inhabitants of our cases differ. Also, the number of councils involved and the intensity of public participation, which both add to the complexity, are different.

It could be imagined that the difficulty of the strategy making relates to the size of the settlements involved, the number of independent councils, the diversity of stakeholders and the intensity of participation.

Our five cases are characterized in table 14.1 according to various criteria of size, the surface of the territory, the number of inhabitants in the region and the number of inhabitants of the main city.

Type	CASE	HA	INH. REGION	MAIN CITY
Large city and region	Glasgow/ Clyde Valley	325.000	2.300.000	592.000
City	Bologna	14.000	---	370.000
Town/region	Drechtsteden	17.000	262.000	119.000
Region/center	Meetjesland	66.000	182.000	20.000
Small region	Grödental	15.000 ¹	15.000	5.000

TABLE 14.1 The cases according to size in Ha and number of inhabitants

¹ The territory regarded mainly the valley sole; a quite arbitrary boundary was traced on the steep Dolomite slopes.

The five cases strongly differ in size. The imagined argument of size contributing to the difficulty of agreeing on a vision is not confirmed in our cases. The largest and most complex case, (Glasgow) belongs to our effective qualified cases as well as the smallest case. (Grödental) The second smallest case is Meetjesland, is qualified ineffective. Size does not seem to establish a clear relation with chances for effective decision-making.

The **Glasgow** and the Clyde Valley case as well as the **Drechtsteden** case, although of different sizes, have in common that it concerns a functional region around a central city. In both cases, the functional area was defined by administrative boundaries of the constituting municipalities. Both cases are qualified effective and successful. The Drechtsteden case with Dordrecht as centre, although different in terms of size, can also be compared with the **Meetjesland** sub-region with the smaller town of Eeklo as (sub-) regional centre. The largest scores positive and the smallest qualified ineffective. Although different in size of territory, the smaller (in terms of number of inhabitants) rural regions of **Grödental** and Meetjesland could also be compared but qualify differently. Keeping in mind the differences, the experiences in the city of **Bologna** (ineffective) might be compared with those in Dordrecht (smaller) and in Glasgow (larger), both effective.

Our cases do indeed not confirm that the size in terms of Ha and number of inhabitants establishes a determinant influence on effective strategy making.

The complexity of the co-operation between more or less autonomous local authorities is the subject of next grouping. Achieving an agreement among larger numbers of independent councils would be more problematic than among a few councils.

The number of involved councils in the five cases differs from one to thirteen. That would suggest that **Meetjesland** is the case with most complex decision-making and that **Bologna** would be the simplest case in terms of the number of councils needed for formal adoption and approval of the results. Both are not qualified effective or successful processes.

CASES	NUMBER OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES
Meetjesland	13
Glasgow	8
Drechtsteden	8
Grödental	5
Bologna	1

TABLE 14.2 The number of involved local councils in the five cases

Probably more important than the mere number of more or less autonomous involved political bodies, is whether the co-operation included struggles for power among competing authorities. Did a culture of fighting parties develop or a consensus seeking culture? Struggles as well as forms of non-constructive institutional behaviour between sectors are probably related to previous experiences about conflicting interests and expectations about the role interpretation of parties. These aspects may be related to such previous place-related experiences as well as to the national or regional culture of planning and the openness planning legislation allows to actors.

It might be supposed that such struggles will occur less frequently, if the different local authority organizations co-operated earlier with satisfying outcomes and developed some mutual trust and common perspective.

All five cases had some previous experiences with co-operating. Our search did not address questions about previous experiences, although the open discussions with interviewees revealed information about earlier co-operation. We established however that the independent local authorities of **Glasgow** and the Clyde Valley, **Drechtsteden** and **Grödental** gradually built mutual trust: The municipalities around Glasgow openly supported the main city as their central place, the Drechtsteden developed in a large common organization of services for six towns and the Grödental villages consider amalgamation.

The number of involved councils does not seem to be of direct influence.

The differences between the interests and the perspectives of participants during decision-making, is a factor complicating the achievement of agreeing on a common vision for future development. The probability of achieving an agreement depends on possibilities of influencing or even changing mind-sets. Here the openness of the process architecture and management, as well as personal characteristics of the experts and the stakeholders comes into the play. These factors might relate to the national or regional planning tradition and the strictness of legal regulations and as well as the education of the planners.

Categorizing the degree of difficulty to achieve an agreement in relation to the diversity of stakeholders seems not feasible. The complexity of interests in the urban environment in the city of **Bologna** although larger, is for instance not necessarily more difficult than the confrontation among touristic, natural and agricultural stakeholders in rural **Grödental**. The fierceness of representing specific interests, the (lack of) reasonability and openness for other arguments or the inclination to an agreement or consensus, as displayed in interactions among individual stakeholders is probably more decisive for effective co-operation than the mere diversity of interests. Openness to other views is essential and confirms that together building common story lines is more important for achieving agreement than the formulation of interests.

It could be argued, that the more participants are involved in the making of a vision, the higher the degree of complexity would be. But the counterargument would be that a large number of participants representing the same interest is not necessarily an extra complicating factor. Hereunder we consider the number of participants in the decision-making round as a possible factor influencing effectiveness.

Interactive collaboration in decision-making requires different active participants representing different interests in several meetings during the conception of a strategic vision. The distinction between agreeing on abstract sets of objectives for development and a (more difficult) conceptual geo-referenced vision is relevant. Because the number of participants as provided hereunder regards participants in different meetings, the high amounts referring to public meetings in the first three lines, regarding massive groupings in forums considering objectives for development, do not indicate the number of different persons. It concerns total participants in various meetings.

CASES	PERIOD	NUMBER PARTICIPANTS
Objectives		
Bologna	2005-2007	1000
Meetjesland	2006-2007	100
Geo-referenced vision		
Grödental	2009-2010	100
Glasgow ¹	2007	23
Drechtsteden ²	1997	15
Bologna ³	2007	1

TABLE 14.3 Number of persons involved in the making of the vision in the cases

¹ Future Group

² Productie groep

³ Gabellini is the sole author of "7 Cities"

The participative processes in **Bologna** and **Meetjesland** resulted in sets of issues and quite general abstract objectives for future development.

The real problem to be addressed when preparing a spatial development strategy, which is to be agreed by different actors, regards the choices for the location of specific future developments and prioritization of investments for projects within the chosen location. Those choices affect interests of municipalities and stakeholders, which are perceived vital: “Will a large investment bringing prosperity be realized here or in the competing municipality? And when?” Public participation was large in *Bologna*¹⁴¹, *Meetjesland* and **Grödental**. In **Drechtsteden** and **Glasgow** the decision-making process was organized in groupings of experts, preparing participation in later stages of the process. The decision-making processes of conceiving the *Vision Gherdëina* and of *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* both decided on a set of objectives and a geo-referenced strategic vision in one process round and were qualified as effective processes of co-designing. The processes in *Drechtsteden* and in *Glasgow* involved broad participative activities in later rounds of decision-making.

The information gathered in this comparison does not support the viability of the number of participants as a relevant variable for effectiveness. Although it might be expected that the intensity of participative processes would stimulate support and success of strategy making, our five cases suggest differently: In Bologna large support resulted from the presentation of the “7 Cities” concept as authored by Patrizia Gabellini. The performing strategy of Drechtsteden, organised public participation after conceiving the strategy. The same applied for Glasgow. But Grödental provided a confirmative experience: the broad participative process created co-authorship. In contrast the broad participation in Meetjesland did not result in an effective round.

§ 14.2 Planning Issues and controversies

It would be possible that different degrees of difficulty, complexity or controversy result from differing planning content issues in our cases. In this Section we consider the distribution of functions and facilities over the territory, the related investments in housing, the generally important issue of infrastructure for public transport and private cars, the planning issue of natural development, brown field development and the occurrence of remaining controversies.

¹⁴¹

Up to 2007 about the objectives

A core issue of spatial planning: influencing the location of activities in a territory, is the spatial distribution of functions and services. Choices about concentration or spreading over the territory are normal relevant subjects for decision-making. Because such choices affect in a direct way the interests of co-operating actors, they concern almost invariably complex policy issues. As a result, the responsible politicians in a (sub) regional co-operation, which are elected for defending the interest of their own municipality and not for the higher-level interest of the region, are in the difficult position of competing solidarities. An indicator for effective co-operation is that an agreement has been achieved among such competing interests about locating functions in the territory.

In **Bologna** the issue of “hyperuse” of the central historic heart of the city creates great problems of suffocation by traffic and tourists. The “7 Cities” concept proposed distribution of central functions towards sub-centres within the Bolognese urban area, which are expected to regenerate the environment. The non-support of the region of *Emilia Romagna* was argued by referring to the European spatial development objective of polycentric development. The regional government supported development outside Bologna, thereby jeopardizing the development of their capital city.

The **Drechtsteden** scenario, like Glasgow but at a smaller scale, addressed the risk of loosing urban quality due to competition among sub-urban centres in the other municipalities, through concentrating city functions in the central city of Dordrecht. That policy was agreed and supported by the other municipalities during a long period. That is extra complicated in the specific local geography because of the separating effect of the large rivers cutting through the *Drechtsteden* territory. Organizing water-crossing relations through ferries and “waterbuses” partly addressed these divides and provided accessibility to urban services in the central city.

The *Glasgow Clyde Valley* region aims at concentration of central functions in **Glasgow** City. The municipal councils around Glasgow did historically not support concentration in the central city. Competition for attracting activities existed. One of the achievements of the *Strategic Development Plan* is the fact that all eight constituent municipalities now explicitly recognise the importance of the strong central city for the prosperity of the whole of their metropolitan region and support Glasgow’s development.

The villages in the **Grödental** are each of about an equal size and concentrated between the steep slopes of the Dolomites in the sole of the valley. The spatial concept of *Vision Gherdëina* is an interrupted ribbon development in the narrow valley, like a string of beads. Although Wolkenstein and Sankt Ulrich are the larger villages, Sankta Christina is located in the middle, thus in the proximity and better accessible for more inhabitants. Different functional accents in each of the villages (education/sport/wood industry/energy) are agreed in the vision.

The spreading of activities in **Meetjesland** also creates the risk of lacking central services, and the central town of *Eeklo* of about 20.000 inhabitants does probably not provide sufficient attracting power within the catchment area of the attractive neighbouring cities of *Gent* and *Brugge*. The sub-region of *Meetjesland* characterized by the flat landscape of northern *Vlaanderen* does not create any barrier for accessing those nearby surrounding cities.

The agreed common policies with regard to spatial spreading and concentration of activities, services and amenities in four of the cases reflect the effectiveness of strategies. This did not happen in Meetjesland.

The problems of social housing are apparent in all cases, but especially in the larger cities. In those larger cities: Glasgow, Bologna and Dordrecht housing projects are envisaged in city renovation areas as well in new residential areas.

The need for urban renovation in central residential areas of **Bologna** is still a large problem. The *PSC* included a housing capacity of over 6000 new dwellings, next to the large number of houses to be renovated in the existing built-up area. Some new residential areas are realised in the northern part of the city, in *Bolognina*.

In **Drechtsteden** the need for renovating large residential areas, mainly in the central city of *Dordrecht* formed a main occasion for developing the spatial framework. The envisaged urban renovation is largely realized in the first fifteen years of the 2030 strategy. New residential areas have been implemented in the central waterfronts in *Dordrecht*, *Papendrecht* and *Zwijndrecht*.

Large quantities of poor quality dwellings in **Glasgow** City required urban renovation. The other municipalities in the region desire urban growth for solving their local housing demand and supporting the level of services. That creates forms of competition. In the *Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Development Plan* the issue of establishing the demand for housing establishes a continuous source of problems in the region in the communication with the Scottish Housing Ministry. The discussion with the Minister concentrates on the method of exactly calculating the need for dwellings in the diverse locations on specific future moments.

In **Grödental** tourism is main driver of development. The vision enables some small numbers of new housing and hospitality.

In the **Meetjesland 2020 toekomstvisie** process housing has not been a central issue. Attractive environments for living were an issue and improving the attractiveness of central village areas.

The fact that housing formed a central issue in strategy making processes does not seem a factor influencing the effectiveness of strategy making in our cases, although a controversy with higher authorities regarded housing. (Glasgow)

Public transportation is a general item for improved spatial development throughout Europe. Cities and towns have difficulties in addressing the large claims for space for moving and parking private cars. Several options are considered, and establishing higher capacity for public transportation is a general policy objective for future development. Large investments are needed for improving infrastructure. Financial support from higher-level authorities is necessary.

In **Glasgow** and in **Bologna** more specifically, connections of the cities with the regional airports by means of a light rail system are proposed. Also in the *Grödental Masterplan* opening-up of the valley with a light rail system is aimed at. These expensive facilities requiring co-operation and financial support from higher authorities are not (yet) financially supported in each of these three cases. In Glasgow the scheme is dropped following disappointing communication with Scottish Ministers, after the central railway station was prepared for the new line. Bologna has to take this problem up within the new framework of the *Metropolitan Structure Plan*.

In **Drechtsteden** the improvement of the system of public transport mainly regarded the connections crossing the large rivers. That proposal coming from the earlier *Drechtsoever* project was incorporated in the *Drechtsteden Scenariostudie 2030* and is operating for some years already: waterbuses for cross connections to regional services connecting the towns with Dordrecht and fast ferries for connections to the Rotterdam agglomeration, mainly for commuting. New highway connections have been realized. New train stations as envisaged in the vision are realized and functioning. A light rail system providing connections with the Rotterdam area is not realized. Space for the line traces is reserved in relevant local plans.

The **Grödental** municipalities initiated studies for the location of tracing the line, but need negotiations with the provincial authority for specific support.

All cases except **Meetjesland** included proposals for light rail connections.

The large investments requiring higher-level support are a main problem in four of the cases. This underlines that acknowledging the structural influence of rail infrastructure on spatial development requires close(r) co-operation with and involvement of higher and infrastructure related authorities.

The general accessibility regarding all modes of transportation is an important spatial structuring aspect. Increased motorcar transport and the required parking facilities present problems in every city and region. The large cities continuously improve their

system of streets, dedicating space to pedestrians, bicycles, cars or lanes for buses and streetcars. Better connections with the surrounding highways require modifications in the system like roundabouts and city motorways in all of the five cases. Improved access to facilities of public transport is also a quite general theme: The strategic plans propose projects of higher density activities around rail way stations in Bologna, Glasgow and Drechtsteden, together with bus stations and facilities for slow modes, each in a specific (place-based) manner. In the valley bottom of the Grödental a specific new slow-mode (bicycle track with spots to rest) facility is foreseen in the vision and already partly realised.

Physical geographic peculiarities regard aspects of nature and cultural landscape features. Each of the cases addresses these aspects in an integrative way, as a constituent component of the long-term development.

The **Bologna** municipal area does not only contain built-up urban areas, the southern part especially regards a hilly landscape with typical natural assets, which are respectfully addressed in the “7 Cities” concept as one of the “cities”. In Bologna two of the “7 cities” regard enhancement of green qualities.

The large rivers of the Rhine estuary characterize the **Drechtsteden** sub-region. The vision for future development included enhancement of the quality of nature through proposing a gradually developing green belt around the urban agglomeration. The landscape design of the green belt is composed of parts located in the polders around the Drechtsteden, incorporating the different typical characteristics of those polder units. Investments are foreseen and realized according to those assets. One of those components consists of the landscape design in the tidal landscape of the *Biesbosch*.

The **Glasgow** plan includes main parts of the *Clyde Valley*, containing protected natural forested areas and some typical lochs. The *Green Network* of the Glasgow plan is a large success, which is followed and supported by the Scottish Government. Glasgow is explicit about de-carbonized development, as obliged through the Scottish Development Policy.

The *Dolomite* landscape of **Grödental** forms the spectacular asset of the sub-region. The tourist economy is based on the natural and cultural qualities of this *Unesco World Heritage* part of South Tyrol. The natural qualities are largely protected and the vision includes strict limitations to further development of ski tracks on the slopes. Also further urbanisation is limited for the sake of enhancing the landscape quality. The vision sets limitations to expansions of the villages in the valley: Green areas are projected in order to limit growing together of the villages. Grödental seeks enhancing the identity of its villages and protection of the spectacular *Dolomite* scenery in concrete interventions in the landscape and restricting the development of ski tracks.

In **Meetjesland** the open landscape is identified as one of its main assets.

The landscape at the northern part of Meetjesland, along the Dutch border provides typical qualities: that protected area is characterized by a system of creeks and brook lands. Meetjesland aims promotion of tourism related to its landscape assets, especially in the North of the sub-region.

Openness of the landscape is considered on of the main assets of Meetjesland for attracting tourists.

The above indicates that landscape protection and development is a common aspect in all five cases of spatial strategy making. In all cases the co-operating parties could agree on landscape protection and development as a factor for quality of life to be secured in their common spatial development policy. The general support for nature protection and creating ecological connections entails that this spatial planning issue does not have a direct influence on the effectiveness of strategy making

Compactness of development, minimizing land-take through prioritizing brown-field development, is generally seen as a sustainable strategy for protecting landscape values against sub-urbanisation. It could be imagined that different place specificities pose different degrees of difficulty, affecting effective strategy making.

All cases promote compact urbanization mostly referring to sustainable development. With regard to increased connectivity all cases, except **Meetjesland 2020** promoted important stops in the systems of public transportation as nodes of development. In **Bologna, Drechtsteden** and **Glasgow** large urban projects in terms of urban renewal and also urban expansions have been realized or are under construction. Higher density around stations and other stops of public transport, promotions of slow modes and pedestrianization of urban centres are spatial planning themes throughout these cases.

Urban renewal and brown field development characterize the **Glasgow, Bologna, Drechtsteden** and to a less degree the **Meetjesland** and **Gröndental** strategies. Complex brownfield developments in each of the cases imply difficult operations. Huge former heavy industry waterfront areas in **Glasgow** and **Drechtsteden** are under development or already realized. The problems with addressing brown field developments in **Bologna** added to the complexity of the strategy making process of the regional planning system: especially former military sites required difficult negotiations with national Ministries.

The physical planning issues in Bologna's brown field sites as such are not more complicated than the larger brown field sites in Glasgow or Drechtsteden. Less effectiveness is related to the complexity of the administrative embedding and the related planning culture in Bologna

Controversies existing at the start of a strategy making process are often a trigger for formulating a strategy for future development. The above planning content issues may include such controversies. If they still exist after strategy making, the controversies maybe a cause as well as expression of the ineffectiveness of strategy making.

The controversial debate about public transport systems at the start of the **Bologna** process was excluded from the strategy making. The problem remained, but the issue was not the reason for the evaporation of support. The fact that the region preferred investments in the region around the city, may be seen as a remained controversy, related to the complex administrative embedding.

In **Drechtsteden** the tension with surrounding municipalities about concentrating functions in the central city, was not a reason for hampering the process. Concentration is guiding and the tension still exists, but the strategy performed.

In **Glasgow** the same applied, but also here the surrounding towns supported the concentration of functions in the central city. The effect of common strategy making is the change of mindset: the common interest of concentration of functions is recognized.

In **Grödental** an important trigger was the ever-increasing expansion of facilities for skiing: lifts and parking. The powerful private organization *Dolomiti Superski* claimed new infrastructure and the individual municipalities could hardly influence the development. The effect of the strategy making process was an agreed limitation to further growth of winter sport facilities; the initial controversy evaporated.

In **Meetjesland** the initial struggle for power remained a controversy of which the *Streekplatform* became the victim.

In the effective cases existing controversies were reduced to relative minor items compared to the achieved agreements. In the non-effective case of Meetjesland the controversial power relations with the municipalities were destructive to the process. The failure of the Bologna process also suffered from complex administrative embedding, but the planning legislative requirements were probably a main barrier for continued support. In all cases infrastructural investments remained in need of support from higher authorities.

§ 14.3 Temporal Aspect

Temporal aspects, like the period of time used for making the strategy and the period of time between deciding on the strategy and assessing the outcomes may be possible influences on the result of an assessment. Also the way the strategy making process has been organized in the specific circumstances as a temporal organization or as a permanent part of the bureaucracy, might make a difference.

The period of time needed to conceive a strategic vision differs quite substantially among the cases. It might be argued that this process organization-related factor affects the effectiveness of strategy making: a short fast strategy making process would allow less time for internalizing the considerations resulting in a commonly agreed story line. Such short involvement in the process might lead to more superficial commitment of participants, entailing smaller chances for developing feelings of co-ownership and success.

In **Bologna** the start of the process in 2005 was a clear moment initiated by the newly elected executive. But that two years stage aimed at and resulted in a plethora of objectives, whereas the remedial conception of “7 Cities” more or less resembled the start of a new process, which was effective in a few months.

The **Drechtsteden** process resulting in an agreed vision and lasting only four months, was started as a new process, but the *Drechttoevers* project preceded it two years earlier providing views and experiences to participants in the strategy making.

The time used for conceiving the **Glasgow**, *Strategic Development Plan in Glasgow and the Clyde Valley* process, being part of a four years cycle, might be established as four years, but the continuing process delivered continuous information and experience during longer periods.

Also the **Gröndental** and **Meetjesland** strategy making processes were preceded with an earlier attempt to a development policy.

Taking into account the above considerations, a fair assumption for time used for the conception as established between a clear starting moment and the approval of the agreement would be like in table 14.4.

CASES	PERIOD OF CONCEPTION
Bologna (Objectives)	24 months
Bologna (Vision)	5 months
Drechtsteden	4 months
Glasgow and the Clyde Valley	Continuous developing in 4 years cycle
Grödental	21 months
Meetjesland (Objectives)	21 months

TABLE 14.4 Time used for the conception of the strategies

In the cases of **Drechtsteden** and **Grödental** agreeing about general objectives for future development was integrated in the activities for conceiving the concept. In the **Bologna** case, the vision was conceived in a few months after two years of discussions about objectives. The **Meetjesland** case resulted only in a set of objectives, containing basic ideas of a strategic development vision. The legal planning system of Scotland has as a consequence that the “conception of a vision” regards in the **Glasgow** case mainly the (important) improvements made in comparison with the previous version of strategic planning.

The period used for the conceptions does not seem to provide explanations for effectiveness.

The main criterion for our selection of cases was that they are valued successful among planning professionals in their country. (§ 6.5) That selection happened without applying a standardized criterion for qualifying them successful.

The difference between an effective round of decision-making and the final success of a strategy refers to the distance in time between the moment of approving the strategy and the time horizon used in the strategy. Assessment would be entirely fair at the moment in the (far) future, which coincides with the plan’s time horizon. However in the current study the moment of assessing the envisaged strategy is not determined by the strategy’s time horizon, but by the moment of carrying out this study. As a consequence conclusions about the success of a strategy cannot be qualified as final verdicts: they concern basically expectations about the success of the strategy. This aspect is related to the validity of our methodology. If we have to assess success of cases before the envisaged time horizon, the relevant information about performance is not yet available. The period between approval of the strategy and the strategy’s time horizon is needed for elaboration and implementation following on the making of the strategy. The longer that period, the more chances for organizing next rounds of decision-making and the time consuming procedures for realizing projects. But also, the longer ago the decision about the strategy was made, the bigger the chance for discontinuity of the process due to changed circumstances creating new contexts and short memory of persons. Next overview illustrates the differences in the period between deciding about the strategy and the assessments in the current study in the five cases.

DECISION	CASE	TIME HORIZON	PERIOD between Decided ¹ -- Study
1997	Drechtsteden	2030	15 years
2007	Bologna	(long term)	5
2007	Meetjesland	2020	6
2010	Grödental	2050	3
2012	Glasgow	2035	2

TABLE 14.5 Assessment (2012-2013) and strategy decided.

- ¹ The period of time between the moment of agreeing about the achieved agreement and the interviews conducted for assembling information for this study

Although the time horizon in **Drechtsteden** of the *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* was the year 2030, thirty-three years away from the moment of conception, the assessment in 2012 learned that most of the foreseen interventions were already realized in fifteen years and that realization continues slowly despite the crisis. For the other cases it is early for a final assessment of their eventual success. With regard to the success of the strategies mainly probabilities are suggested on basis of the detailed information of the Chapters 7-11 and the analyses of the effectiveness of the specific round of decision-making.

The cases of **Bologna** and **Meetjesland** assessed 5-6 years after being decided, could anyhow be evaluated as failed exercises. Despite the enormous amount of work resulting in a convincing concept (“7 Cities”) in Bologna, commitment and support have disappeared. In Meetjesland, the short period after its inception was also sufficient for a clear negative evaluation.

The **Glasgow** case is different. Although the period between approval and evaluation is short, but as an ongoing legal process, it continuous and clearly performs.

These observations stress that assessments of strategies should take the temporal aspect into account: acknowledging that this is seldom possible, long-term strategies require long-term assessments. Taking these temporal aspects into consideration in our five cases did not provide new explanatory insights for effectiveness.

A temporal-related aspect is whether strategy making was organized in a permanent organization, being often single sector problem-owner, or temporally organized, on some distance from the line organization, especially for making a specific long-term strategy.

CASES	TYPE ORGANIZATION	SINGLE PROBLEM OWNER
Bologna (object.)	Temp ¹	No
Bologna (vision)	Perm ²	Yes
Drechtsteden	Temp ³	No
Glasgow	Perm ⁴	Yes/No ⁵
Grödental	Temp ⁶	No
Meetjesland	Perm ⁷	Yes/No

TABLE 14.6 Type of process organization

- 1 Led by the Giunta, assisted by the communication department, later under the same director: Bologna City Center
- 2 Consultant, steering the Planning Department as problem owner.
- 3 Consultant leading specific multisector Productiegroep
- 4 The Glasgow and the Clyde Valley Strategic Plan Authority (GCVSDPA) office.
- 5 An in-between position applies: although the approach within the strategy making group is very open and informal, several interviewed sector experts referred trustfully to the strategic planners as if they were sole problem owners.
- 6 Specific process lead by consultant and provincial officer.
- 7 Streekplatform Meetjesland

The five processes are organized without relating to the specific competence of for instance an existing planning department being the single problem owner.

In **Bologna** the process consisted of interactively awareness raising up to 2007 resulting in a large number of unstructured objectives. During the 5 months period in the start of 2007 of Bologna in which the concept of "7 Cities" was designed, Gabellini owned the process, assisted by the municipal planning agency. The achievement of the conception of "7 Cities" in Bologna by the consultant supported by the municipal department of spatial planning was not heavily questioned by other sectors. The development strategy consisting of the broadly supported solution as conceived in "7 Cities" was approved in the Council, but drowned in juridical activities and political discontinuity. That resulted in disappearing from the political agenda.

The **Drechtsteden** case was organized as a temporal project organization, staffed with municipal experts from different sectors and planners of the consultant. The awareness raising had partly started during the foregoing *Drechttoeversproject*. The *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* was the interactive policy making activity, which' achievements were partly thanks to provincial support and the related time pressure, successfully put on the political agenda's of the co-operating municipalities, as well as on the provincial agenda.

The **Glasgow** process is legally organized in revolving procedures of a four years cycle. The permanent organization consists of a small core of planners, coordinating multi-sector working groups under supervision and distant steering of politicians of the constituent councils and co-operating with the planning departments of the municipalities. The main task of the specific organization (GCVSDPA) is to continue

strategy making. Refreshment of ideas raising awareness for new issues comes from the *Future Group* or other dedicated studies; the vision is under constant revision and the content directly relates to the political agenda. A weakness seems the relation to the Scottish level political agenda, which is required for implementing infrastructural developments.

In **Grödental** awareness of issues existed among the municipalities, they took the initiative. The interactive policy-making towards a development strategy was organized as a process to be delivered by the consultant and actively supported by the province. The interventions envisaged in the *Vision Gherdëina* are on the municipal political agendas and partly under construction. Infrastructural improvements requiring provincial support are not (yet) on the provincial political agenda.

Also in **Meetjesland** the *Streekplatform* can be seen as single problem-owner, interactively working with several sectors. But although acting as problem owner of the strategy, the *Streekplatform* was not a single sector problem –owner.

We observed that two of the effective processes consisted of interactive working in temporal organizations, but the Scottish model of a permanent organization, acting partly as single problem-owner is also effective. It is possible that the two cases, which are both valued as co-designing activities resulting in co-authorship, demonstrate that working in a temporal organization is most promising. What the successful cases have in common is that the process of strategy making was positioned at some distance of the existing bureaucracy. The case of Meetjesland demonstrates that this is not a sufficient condition for effectiveness.

§ 14.4 Financial aspects

Although policy making should precede budgeting and financial resources are not mentioned in our cases, they play often a role in strategy making processes and could imply a rival explanation of success or failure. Strategic planning or strategy making for long-term development consists of discovering the objectives of future development, as desired and agreed in a specific society. In that stage of spatial policy-making and openly considering global options, (combinations of) projects are not yet identified or decided, whereas for estimating costs, projects must be specified into a degree enabling concrete calculations.

But in the practice of strategy making often some participants will firmly state that considering certain ideas is useless because they are simply “not feasible”. Those participants implicitly refer to the in-availability of financial resources within the

existing short-term investment programs or even within budgets for maintenance of infrastructure, which are by definition based on previously decided policies. Such short-term, economic thinking often jeopardizes processes of open strategy making, because participants and politicians start doubting the degree of realism of the process.

Assessing our cases according to this possible rival explanation of success or failure would conclude:

Bologna: Discussions about financial resources were not the reason for failure. Political discontinuity caused the long standstills entailing evaporation of earlier support to the vision.

Drechtsteden: During strategy making the production group did not limit its considerations because of unknown availability of resources. The implementation of some projects experienced delay due to costs of cleaning of polluted soil in some sites. But the large majority of intended interventions have been realized.

Glasgow: Strategy making within the new legislation identified at the request of Scottish government the rail connection of Glasgow Central station with the airport as an essential project. But when it came to commitment for implementation, Scottish government did not provide a perspective on supporting financing that connection. (The wish for and commitment of the partners in the strategy to this connection remains since its necessity will increase, which probably means that resources will be made available on a later future moment, but then for a more expensive project)

Grödental: During the activities resulting in Vision Gherdëina, financial resources were not an important issue. Parties were identified for possible financial support for the implementation of projects.

Meetjesland: The process suffered from ongoing discussions about financing the organization of the Streekplatform itself. Resources for implementing projects of the vision were lesser issues of deliberation.

We may conclude that availability of financial resources was not a rival explanation of failure or effectiveness in our five cases.

15 Conclusions: effective processes

The accounts of cases in Chapters 7-11 demonstrate the place-specific character of spatial strategy making. They concern tailor-made processes influenced or even partly determined by local, regional as well as national characteristics. Because local circumstances define the issues and problems to be addressed by a strategy for future development, no case of strategy making is the same compared to any other case. That fact complicates analysis of cases and limits possibilities of generalizing conclusions, important for our search for lessons for planning practice and insights derived from experiences in the real world of network society. The large diversity of institutional, cultural and geographical contexts in which strategic planning is practiced in Europe, makes identification of general causal relations between specific practices of decision-making and the eventual success of a strategy extra difficult. As a consequence it should be emphasized that conclusions about experiences in specific cases may not be generalized to other cases without doing sufficient justice to the specificities of the context. This concluding chapter addresses the process as well as the context factors influencing the effectiveness of strategy making.

In our research frame (Chapter 5) distinction is made in the way openness, allowed by the different planning cultures, affects on the one-hand possibilities for process management and on the other hand the possibilities for dealing with place-specificities. That implies for our analysis that explanations of effectiveness or eventual success, consist of combination of factors from both sides, supporting commitment to outputs through co-ownership and co-authorship. Hereunder we first discuss the interdependencies of factors in § 15.1 § 15.2 considers the combined factors for effectiveness and success in the cases. The possible process variables listed in the chains of evidence of § 6.2, are concluded in § 15.3, which is further dedicated to responding the individual research questions. In 15.4 an overview of answers is summarized and we reflect on the core question of our search. In § 15.5 conclusions are summarized.




FIGURE 15.1 (Same as figure 5.3) Interrelations of Content, Context and Process

§ 15.1 Interdependent factors

As noticed before, (§ 2.3) the interdependencies of items involved in a strategy for future development entail that spatial strategy making consists of addressing wicked problems. The fragmented categorizations of the previous Sections did not provide explanatory indications for influences on the effectiveness of strategy making: The complexity in terms of size, number of co-operating parties does not directly influence the effectiveness of strategy making. Our cases do also not indicate that the number of co-operating councils or the diversity of participating stakeholders affects the effectiveness.

The related issues of the content and problems addressed in the five cases show several similarities. Most cases consider the interconnected general spatial planning problems of accessibility, mobility infrastructure and distribution of functions over the territory. Although several strategy making processes concluded in agreement about the interventions needed to address those issues, the dependence from higher authorities for realizing expensive projects of public transport and other mobility infrastructure implies interactions with higher authorities. These aspects of the administrative embedding of the processes seem of large influence.

The accounts of the content of the strategies in the cases made also clear that all five cases pursue sustainable development, albeit in different ways. The importance of developing facilities for public transport and slow modes was stressed everywhere with the most explicit policy with regard to decarbonised development in the Scottish case. Enhancing the existing qualities of the landscape was common in the five cases as well.

Those observations confirm that the strategic planning issues are quite similar throughout at least the five related territories. The distinct issues in the strategy making processes regard the space-specific interpretations of obvious general policies within the local circumstances. Important for our search is whether the local or regional circumstances allow sufficient openness for place-specific interpretations of general policies and planning issues. Sufficient openness is required for open process management as well for openness to address place specificities. Openness for place-specific solutions basically supports the EU policy emphasising place-based strategic regional development, thereby enhancing Europe's diversity.

That underlines the relevance of our research questions about the space –specific process aspects and the space-specific aspects of the planning culture, which contribute to effective strategy making: it is about the relevant combinations of factors.

The factors aiming at co-ownership of participants and preferably at co-authorship resulting from co-designing are listed in table 12.1 Hereunder those combinations of common factors for effectiveness are considered for respectively all cases, the effective and performing cases and the non-effective cases. The combinations and more specifically the differences between combined factors for effective cases and those for failed strategy making processes provide explanations for success.

§ 15.2 Combined indicators for (in) effectiveness

Table 12.1 shows that in all of the five cases:

- An agreement about the content of the strategy has been achieved.
- The process management has been perceived as informal.
- The roles of experts have been appreciated very positively.

That can be summarized in: planning practitioners¹⁴² have conducted in varying circumstances of different planning cultures a goal-oriented informal process, which succeeded in achieving an agreement.

But it is clear that that has not been enough for accomplishing effectiveness in all five strategy-making processes.

Effective processes

The *effective* assessed cases in table 12.1 are also assessed as *performing* cases. Those three cases: Drechtsteden, Glasgow and Grödental have in common next interrelated combinations of process management and space specific factors:

- Shared ownership of strategy and process
- Informal process management
- Application of several options
- Early introduction of visualizations
- Positive experienced roles of experts
- Continuity in policy and involvement of persons
- A simple multi-level embedding of the process

The informal process management succeeded in creating co-ownership in these cases. The positive experienced role of the experts included considering several optional scenarios for the strategy as well as introducing visualizations early in the process. These aspects of the process induced openness for place-specificities, which relate to co-designing and scenario planning. Co-authorship was apparent in two of the three performing cases.

The continuity of policies and politicians in those successful cases is also remarkable. The simple administrative embedding implying main interactions with only one higher-level authority seems an important decisive influence as well. In the two co-designing/ co-authored cases the higher-level authorities developed a clear constructive co-operation including providing incentives. Vertical commitment developed in Drechtsteden en Grödental. That may relate to the simple embedding: in cases of complex multi-level embeddings the decision-making process provides an arena for several higher authorities and their sectors for their mutual struggles of hegemony and institutional politics. That does not create the trustful environment in which representatives of higher authorities feel safe to commit to the process.

Failed processes.

The two strategy making processes, which have been evaluated as failed processes (Bologna and Meetjesland) have in common:

- Hardly/no feelings of pride among participants about their involvement
- Not defending the achievements
- Not claiming credit for aspects of the strategy
- Flexible participation
- None or late application of visualizations
- Negative interaction with politics
- No continuity in policy and politicians
- Complex multi-level embedding

The first three factors substantiate that shared ownership of the results did not entail the decision-making process. Flexible participation, which was introduced as an aspect of the openness of the process for representatives of non-envisaged actors is a factor distinctive to the factors in effective processes. A negative effect of flexible participation for successful decision-making might be that persons easily walking in and out meetings do not develop commitment.

Important factors for negative results are the non-constructive interactions with the local politicians in Meetjesland and the higher level politicians in Bologna during crucial periods. Both cases suffered from the lack of continuity.

On top, the complexity of administrative embeddings in both cases so that the process had to deal with too many different layers with their different institutional policies, created unmanageable situations. In Bologna, the large bureaucracy of three higher administrative levels with their procedural requirements about regulative plan documents had an evaporating effect on the initial local support for the “7 Cities”. (Which was enhanced by the political discontinuity). And in Meetjesland, the continuous struggle for power with the municipalities and the political discontinuity at the higher level were quite disastrous.

The comparison between effective processes and failed processes allows for next observation: Sharing ownership of output of strategy making processes is an essential management objective, which is reflected in the lack of feelings of pride and not defending or claiming credits in the failed cases.

Aspects of process organization distinctive for effectiveness are the application of several options and early visualizations. Aspects of place specificities distinctive for effectiveness are the continuity of policy and a simple administrative embedding.

Distinctive aspects of failed processes are, apart from not sharing ownership (or authorship) negative relations with politicians and discontinuity of policy and maybe most important, too much complexity of the administrative environment.

§ 15.3 Chains of Evidence and Research Questions

The assumed causal relation of process aspects of our theoretic frame was presented in § 5.1 as:

Co-producing → Co-ownership → Effectiveness

Although the small number and the selection of cases do not allow for quantitative analysis, we notice referring to and applying the chains of evidence presented in table 6.1 (§ 6.2.) that:

- All five cases are qualified as *open* processes.
- Four cases are qualified as *co-productive*; (All, except Bologna during 2007)
- Of the *co-productive* cases two are qualified as *co-designing*. (Drechtsteden and Grödentel)
- Three cases are qualified as *effective*.
- The *effective* cases consist of the *co-designing* cases (Drechtsteden and Grödentel) and the *co-production* case of Glasgow.
- *Shared ownership* of the content and the process was most apparent in these three *effective* decision-making processes.
- The two cases, which were assessed (provisionally) as *successful strategies* were qualified as *co-designing* resulting in *co-authorship*.
- In the two *not effective* qualified decision-making processes being Meetjesland and Bologna, initial feelings of co-ownership clearly evaporated

(In our chains of evidence in § 6.2 confirming evidence has been called “contributing to”, not confirming evidence is called “irrelevant”.)

The nine research questions listed in § 5.6 addressed process related issues as well as place-related variables. In order to formulate answers following from our analyses, each of the research questions are considered separately hereunder.

– **Is co-ownership essential for effectiveness?**

Information about feelings of shared ownership is assembled in interviews with participants on basis of questions about pride about participation, experiences of defending the output and taking credit for specific aspects of the strategy, claiming authorship. In the Bologna case we noticed some pride about participating in the process, but defending the output or taking credit for ideas hardly existed anymore. That was different in the cases of Drechsteden, Glasgow and Grödental. These are also the cases, which strategies are qualified as probably eventual performing successfully. (§ 14.1) In the case of Meetjesland weakened co-ownership replaced the initial pride about participating among participants.

We conclude that in the five assessed cases, the three effective decision-making processes were related to shared ownership and that the less/not shared ownership cases concern the two not effective strategy making processes.

The experience in this five-case study confirms the essential of co-ownership.

– **Is co-designing a strategy essential for effective strategy making?**

In four of the cases the process was organized as a co-production process. The exception is the case of Bologna. Conceiving the “7 Cities” was not a process of co-production. The difference between co-production and co-designing made in 4.5 seems relevant, because together making a product can be a positive experience resulting in some form of shared ownership. But producing a pre-defined product offers a less intensive experience than together inventing a new earlier non-existing product. The more intensive collaboration in a co-designing process and the resulting feeling of co-authorship might entail the longer-lasting support to an agreed strategy, which is important for successful long-term strategic planning. The processes of the Grödental and the Drechsteden were both qualified as co-designing and as (probably) successful strategies. The activities in these cases consisted of together imagining and specifying a new not before existing vision.

The listing of objectives as agreed in the Meetjesland case can be seen as co-producing the list. But the order of priorities of objectives resulting from the decision-making process in Meetjesland cannot be regarded as together inventing a new concept, like we defined co-design in § 4.5. The step-by-step improvements in the well-regulated processes in the case of Glasgow are more consistent with the characteristics of co-production.

The research question asking about the importance of co-designing is confirmed on basis of our five cases. Co-design can be seen as the ultimate open process management (every idea can be tested) and relates best to informal creative processes. But the case of Glasgow demonstrates that is not a necessary condition because the Scottish well-regulated formal strategy making process, also secures lasting continued support for an agreed strategy.

– **Is the application of scenarios essential for effective strategy making?**

As discussed in § 3.3 concepts play an important role in strategic planning as results of as well as tools in specific rounds of decision-making. In 3.4 we considered the advantages of applying several different options for possible directions of development as tools for decision-making processes. More specifically, we assumed scenario planning specifically useful as tool, because of its neutral dynamic process orientation. (§ 3.5) Introducing several different scenarios, which are defined as “*Descriptions of possible futures*” is helpful for creating an explorative search for a *desired future*.

In the case of the *Piano Strutturale Comunale* of Bologna no scenarios, or other forms of options have been applied. Nevertheless the concept of “*7 Cities*” was received enthusiastically. The fact that the support for the vision evaporated seems less related to the lack of ownership of the output of this regulated process, than to the legally obliged focus on juridical aspects of the regulative plans and to political discontinuity. The *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* clearly applied four value-based scenarios, which finally converged in the agreed preferred new vision for future development. The *Glasgow* case did not apply scenarios as tool to explore and agree on possible future developments. The four value-based scenarios applied in that case were used to assess the feasibility and risks for implementing the existing strategy. Such assessment provides information about the vulnerability of specific aspects of the strategy for possible future developments in society. The *Vision Gherduëina* applied three different scenarios, which eventually converged in the vision. The *Meetjesland 2020* case did not apply scenarios, other forms of options or plan concepts.

The experience in the five cases confirms the assumed importance of the application of scenarios. The three effective cases applied indeed different scenarios, although in Glasgow, the scenarios applied in the specific round of our case were not used for exploring different possible futures, but for testing the robustness of the existing strategy. In the previous stage of the Glasgow process, during the original conception of the strategic vision in the late nineties, also four scenarios were used. Both non-effective cases did not apply different options as decision-making tools.

– **Is application of visualizations essential for effectiveness?**

In § 4.6 discussing the application of visualization in strategy making process, we assumed that visualizing ideas, problems and proposals on maps would support effective decision-making. With regard to the moment of presenting options in the form of concepts or scenarios in a visualized manner, the assumption was argued that tabling visualized ideas in the early stages of decision-making would be supportive for an effective process. For addressing that research question, next observations are relevant: In the non-effective case of *Meetjesland* no visualizations as meant in 4.6 have been applied. All four other process applied visualization as a tool of communication. The non-effectiveness of the *PSC* of Bologna is not related to the visualization of the “*7 Cities*”. In the contrary, the presentation of that concept,

resulting in a positive reception was well visualized. The discontinuities in strategic thinking due to formal juridical requirements and the complex administrative embedding were disastrous for the Bologna process. Tabling mapped strategies in early stages was practiced in the three effective-qualified cases.

The effective cases applied visualizations on maps and introduced them in the early stages of the discussions. The assumption about visualization of 4.6 is supported in our five cases.

– **Is open process management essential for effectiveness?**

The openness in terms of agenda setting, informal interactions and flexible participation are important for successful process management. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) We assumed these aspects of openness relevant for the decision-making towards agreement about a strategic spatial development, (§ 5.2) because exploring possibilities and creating solutions require an open mindset. The interactive multi-sector and multi-level collaboration towards an agreed strategy for future development often requires changing mindsets.

Each of the five assessed decision-making processes could be qualified as open processes, but not all five cases were qualified as effective processes. That confirms that openness of process management is not sufficient for the effectiveness of a decision-making process. A process of co-designing implying ultimate openness to possibilities adds to, and enhances the effectiveness of open process management.

– **Do different planning cultures allow for sufficient openness?**

All five cases are qualified as open processes. That implies that in those cases the national or regional planning tradition did not put such limitations to the process that openness of the process was impossible. The fact that the *Meetjesland 2020* case was not conducted as a spatial planning process implies that the planning tradition of Vlaanderen was not relevant for this case. The formal regulated processes in the *Bologna* and *Glasgow* cases experienced some limitations to the openness: not only regulative requirements put obligations on procedures and participants, but also content aspects set some limitations to the process. (Traffic infrastructure excluded from considerations in Bologna and the required conformation to national development policy objectives of Scotland in Glasgow)

At first sight the different planning cultures of our cases do not seem to limit the possibilities for planners to conduct open processes although we expected that the different degrees of openness in planning cultures influence the freedom required for designing a strategy. Acknowledging that the planning cultures in *Emilia Romagna* and in *Bolzano-Alto Adige/ Südtirol* are both strict regulative and that the cases of *Bologna* and *Grödental* scored so differently with regard to the openness of the processes, would lead to the conclusion that the planning culture as such does not put limitations to the

openness of processes. But we have to take into account the fact that the *Grödental* case was deliberately conducted as an experiment. In strict regulated circumstances planning practice seeks to overcome rigidity. (Servillo and Lingua 2014)

These observations might lead to the conclusion that juridical regulated planning traditions also enable sufficient openness. But the experiences in Bologna and Glasgow show that those systems do not actively stimulate open processes. They tend to set top-down obligations and officials will take a controlling, probably not solution oriented attitude. The interviewees in both cases, Glasgow as well as Bologna referred to negative effects of the confrontation with juridical oriented controlling bureaucrats in terms of confronting behaviours. The hesitation of the Mayors of the Grödental municipalities for officially approving at the provincial level of their Vision Gherdëina (Chapter 10) was based on the fear that such an official decision would entail new juridical controlling procedures.

– **Which is the influence of multi-level embedding on the process?**

The administrative environment in which strategic development has to be decided is assumed an important factor for the conditions for and the possibilities of the organization of the process. That might severely influence the effectiveness of decision-making. Relevant is the number of administrative layers with which communication is required. Each level may foster its own policies, which have to be reflected within the development strategy. That can result in complex situations, limiting possibilities for effective policy making, (Teisman and Schaminee 2006, Sehested 2009) because the fact that existing government organization is based on hierarchy, influences interactions between tiers of government. The simplest multi-level embedding of having to relate to only one higher level regards the cases of *Drechtsteden*, *Glasgow* and *Grödental*. These are also the cases qualified as most effective. The other two cases suffered from the complexity caused by the multiplicity of layers with which communication was required: *Bologna* had to do with 3 higher levels; *Meetjesland* with 2 higher and 1 lower level. The *Emilia Romagna* region did not support the development of its capital city referring to the European policy of polycentric development. The *Streekplatform Meetjesland* conducted a struggle for power with the municipal politicians.

*A simple multi-level embedding seems a directly related condition to the effectiveness of decision-making. In the cases of *Drechtsteden* and *Grödental* the embedding was not only simple, but the higher-level supported the processes actively with incentives. Within the formal juridical case of *Glasgow* the Scottish government did not act as a partner; they simply denied commitment to the Strategic Development Plan.¹⁴³*

¹⁴³

The Scottish Ministers support the process; they legally oblige city regions to adopt a *Strategic Development Plan*. The sentence about not commitment within their approval letter of the *SDP* might also be understood as

– How important is the involvement of politicians?

Involvement of politicians is important for shifting the strategy from the policy level to the political agenda (Teisman 2000). But it would not be fair to ask blind commitment of politicians to an unknown output. *Loose coupling* (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2007) and commitment to the procedure may be asked in order to allow politicians to play their role as *chooser and decider*. (Teisman 1998) Politicians are to be involved in order to be well informed, but should act at such a distant from plan preparation that they keep the possibility to steer and decide independently. Initial involvement of politicians happened in all cases except in *Meetjesland*. In *Bologna*, *Drechtsteden* and *Grödental*, the local politicians initiated the process. In *Glasgow* the ongoing process regards a legal obligation. In *Meetjesland* the activities of *Streekplatforms* were initiated by the regional level: *Gewest Vlaanderen*. The local politicians in the processes of *Glasgow*, *Drechtsteden* and *Grödental* kept some distance from the strategy making as steering group, taking decisions if needed. In *Bologna* local politics lost interest in the *Piano Strutturale Comunale*. The involvement of politicians as steering group worked well in the three cases, which have been qualified effective; the cases performed in the sense of influencing later decisions and the strategies reached the political agenda. The case of *Bologna* suffered from political discontinuity and politicians losing interest. *Meetjesland* did not succeed in involving and gaining support of the politicians.

These observations confirm the research question; they emphasize the importance of involving politicians in the process. Although the start of the Drechtsteden process resembles almost blind trust in the consultant and the output,¹⁴⁴ involvement of politicians in a form of loose coupling, implying to support the process and willingness to consider support to the outputs is a factor for success.

– What is the influence of previous experiences of actors?

It has been assumed that planning experts, experienced in similar processes of strategy making would be a factor for effectiveness of the strategy making. That assumption refers to the overview experienced planners would have which would help them to avoid dwelling on side paths or details during deliberations.

In general, almost all participants in the cases that are considered here did not have previous experience with preparing a strategic development plan. Only the experts in the *Glasgow and Clyde Valley Authority* office and the consultants in *Bologna* and *Drechtsteden* brought previous experiences to the processes. The planning experts leading the *Grödental* decision-making process, although experienced planners, did

expressing that the approval does not include that Scottish government will automatically finance the ambitious infrastructural projects, which the *SDP* called the *essential core* of the plan.

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The consultant's task was basically formulated as "try to achieve agreement between the municipalities" and the province promised under specific conditions to insert the output in their regional plan.

not have previous experiences with similar interactive strategy making. Nevertheless without an exception, all interviewees referred to their activity as professionally guiding and doing the right thing at the right moment in order to stimulate an effective process.

This observation that previous experience is not a necessary condition for effective strategy making stresses the notion of the importance of personal attitudes of the planner being an essential factor for success. But the active role of planners in the process when nourishing deliberations with information and consequences, and tabling ideas on moments of dilemmas, require open-minded professionals.

§ 15.4 Overview of Answers and the Core Question

With regard to the answers to the research questions we conclude about the process aspects of our five cases of strategy making in different praxis that:

- *The assumed causal relation between co-ownership and effective decision-making is confirmed.*
- *Co-production and co-design resulted in shared ownership.*
- *Co-producing of strategies is not always enough.*
- *Co-designed strategies have a larger chance for eventually being successful.*
- *Open process architecture and management are essential for creating co-ownership.*
- *Applying the open explorative design attitude of co-designing probably entails co-authorship of the achievements.*
- *Co-designed strategies show largest commitment, although the co-produced Glasgow case is also clearly supported by the participants.*
- *The application of options in the form of scenarios supports the openness of strategy making.*
- *Visualizations are highly supportive to effective decision-making.*

The answers to the research questions allow for next conclusions regarding the place-related variables:

- *Simple multi-level embedding seems a necessary condition for effectiveness*
- *Politicians must be involved not too closely, not too distantly. Loosely coupling, implying conditional support to the process provides the necessary support to the process and sufficient freedom to decide about the content of the output.*
- *An open attitude of planners to other ideas and sectors is more important than experiences in similar processes.*
- *A juridical orientation is not supportive, even obstructive for effective decision-making about a strategy for future development.*
- *Open, informal processes were most effective and also possible in a regulated administrative environment, albeit as experiment.*

Besides, we learned in this exercise that:

- *The explorative activity of co-designing options for future development, informed and facilitated by professional experts with an open facilitating attitude, probably increases what in a specific society is considered as “the collection of possible futures”. This is essential for innovation.*
- *Co-designing seems to be the ultimate form of the openness, which is required for effective strategy making processes.*

The core question formulated in the introduction of this study (§ 1.1) was:

“Which process and place-based characteristics offer best possibilities for a broadly supported development vision”?

This study confirmed that co-ownership of a strategy is important for its effectiveness. Open processes, co-producing a strategy indeed supports shared ownership. The first process aspect supportive for effective decision-making is open process management in term of agenda setting, informal organization and flexible participation.

The Drechtsteden and Gröndental cases are both open and informally organized. In Drechtsteden a fixed grouping of experts prepared in four months the vision, which became a success in terms of performance and transforming power. In the case of Gröndental the participation was open and the strategy is promising with regard to its probable success. Effectiveness and gradually performing and transforming reality are also noticed in the Glasgow case. But the rather strict regulated procedures of Scottish government imply some limitations to the possible openness of the process, although the process does not seem to suffer from the top-down required policy objectives. The Bologna case, which is also legally regulated, suffered from limitations to openness (The issues of infrastructure and accessibility were excluded and are still main problems to be addressed). Those observations would imply that higher-level authorities should be very careful with requirements limiting the openness of processes.

The second process aspect supportive for effective decision-making is organizing a process of co-production, preferably through considering several possible options for future directions of development. Applying options is important for creating an open explorative collaboration. A process moving from content variety towards selection would help to minimize institutional strategic behaviour and struggles for hegemony because of the impartial character of tabling several options. Scenario studies of a value based, qualitative and explorative character are preferred, because of their option generating capacity, openness and focus on the dynamical evolutionary aspect of development, but more particularly also because these types of scenarios enable lay people's involvement in the deliberations. The three most effective and successful cases applied that type of scenarios.¹⁴⁵ Both less successful cases did not apply scenarios.

Process and context aspects, essential for the eventual success of a long-term strategy are those, which support consistent and lasting commitment to an agreed direction of development, and at the same time allow to flexibly react on un-envisaged opportunities. The process architecture and process management of a specific decision-making process towards an agreed concept for spatial development cannot secure lasting commitment to the resulting concept.

The theoretic part of this study, acknowledging that according to several authors forms of co-ownership of the outcomes and of the process itself are supportive for creating support, suggest factors supporting the eventual success of a strategy. The analysis of cases in this multi-case study confirms that feelings of co-ownership follow from a process of co-producing a strategy. But this study showed also that initially sharing ownership of the output and the round of strategy making does not secure lasting support. The eventual success of a long-term development strategy requires continued and consistent commitment to the content of the strategy. Continuation of such feelings can never be secured because of the multitude of not foreseen developments in the context, the turnover of politicians and experts and the freedom of each generation to influence developments. But it belongs to the professional responsibility of strategic planners that processes are organized in such a way that chances for continued commitment are optimal. That requires an enhanced degree of feelings of ownership. One of the main challenges for planning practitioners preparing strategic development policies is to enhance the chances for shared ownership so that lasting commitment to the results is more probable.

¹⁴⁵

(See Chapter 9: The Glasgow case has been conceived by applying four options. In the specific round analysed here, the case applied scenarios as a context factor for assessing the robustness of the existing strategy, not as a tool for creating a new strategy.)

According to the interviews among participants, shared ownership in the cases of Drechtsteden and Grödental seems most intensive. The wording used referring to the common activities expressed personally owning parts of the vision and taking credit for specific ideas of several different interviewees. This study suggests that the difference between co-producing a strategy and together inventing a new, not before existing vision is important for intensified feelings of ownership. That refers to the difference between producing according to given specifications, which may be called “making” and the creation of a concept, which may be called “inventing”. Designing a product precedes its production. The participants in such co-designing processes become co-authors. Co-authorship resulting from co-designing a new, place-specific option for future development may maximize the degree of ownership thereby causing more performing and transforming power. Both cases assessed as effective and eventual successful are the result of what has been defined here as co-designing in a decision-making process.

It is obvious that co-designing a strategy requires modern governance: the large degree of openness, interactive participation, and informal non-hierarchical creativity requires a specific, facilitating attitude of the professionals collaborating in the decision-making process.

But the environment of the decision-making process must enable and allow for such modern governance activities. Next to personal characteristics influencing the attitude of experts, the multi-level embedding seems most influential. The complexity in both less effective cases versus the simple two tiers of government involved in the three effective and more successful qualified cases forms a clear illustration of the importance of simple multi-level embedding. Related and probably equally important is the degree of involvement of the provinces *Zuid-Holland* and *Bolzano-Alto Adige/Südtirol* in the cases of *Drechtsteden* and *Grödental*. Active collaboration as team members contributing to story lines and offering incentives made the higher-level authority to an ally supporting the interest of the lower authorities.

The quality of experts, the involvement of politicians and especially such multi-level embedding of the process that higher-authorities act as partners, provide the necessary favourable context, for overcoming the complexity of network society.

Although flexible reacting at new opportunities is important for sound spatial development, a development vision provides those who have to decide, with a framework for making their choices. Such framework enables constant comparing with the long-term policy objectives, choosing and attracting supportive projects and avoiding the short-term decisions, which counter act structural potentials and jeopardize assets.

§ 15.5 Summarized Conclusions

In summary the findings of the multi-case study with regard to the relation of aspects of the process with the effectiveness of the decision-making are that with regard to the process, the cases confirm that co-ownership is indeed an important factor for successful decision-making; shared ownership of outcomes and the process supports the effectiveness of decision-making in processes aiming at achieving broad agreement on a development strategy.

An open process, freely allowing for ideas from different perspectives on the agenda is important for effective decision-making, co-ownership and for co-design.

Starting neutral discussions about several thinkable options for future development stimulates participants to explore possibilities. Such application of various options for different possible solutions stimulates neutral discussions and making choices, plus the co-designing of non-envisaged concepts or scenarios.

The interaction, consisting of co-designing a commonly owned new option seems the core activity of actors in a creative decision-making process for strategic planning. Co-designing through the application of options, together with visualizations of possibilities and consequences seem to be essential for developing co-authorship. Intensified co-ownership is supportive to the consistent continued commitment to the strategy, which enhances chances for eventual success.

Regarding probable success of strategies in three cases, two cases provide specific relevant experiences: The *Scenariostudie Drechtsteden 2030* of 1997, which is largely implemented, and the ongoing process in *Grödental*, which justifies the expectation of lasting commitment. The activities in both processes consist of co-designing, applying multi options and early visualizations as tools for decision-making. The third successful case, *Glasgow* differs in the sense of being a well-regulated continuing process. The risk of such processes in a regulated procedure is developing a legalistic controlling attitude at the approval level.

With regard to the context factors for effective decision-making processes, we noticed that the national or regional culture of planning as such is a partly limiting factor for effective decision-making. The cases suggest that combining strategy making with juridical regulating plans like in Bologna is destructive for the required support. At the same time planners found their ways in a rigidly regulated context, for instance in the experiment in Grödental.

Probably equally important is the influence on the attitude of representatives of higher-authorities in strict regulated planning traditions. The juridical focus and controlling attitude do not support the openness of processes. Effectiveness and success depends largely on personal attitudes of experts. Being goal oriented and at the same time, open, interested in and respectful to other ways of seeing is essential.

The multi-level embedding of the strategy making process is also crucial. Involvement of higher -level authorities requires interactions, which can create vertical commitment. Higher authorities, which actively support and even stimulate the local initiative through offering incentives, appeared to be of great positive influence: they engage in a common collaborative effort, which may according to their view, create risks to their freedom for controlling and approving. Simple multi-level embedding preferably as a relation between only two layers of government seems a condition for constructive vertical co-operation entailing effectiveness and success.

The experience of experts with similar processes is not a requirement for success; their attitude seems more important than experience.

Active involvement of politicians, steering the decision-making process from some distance, thereby keeping their roles for choosing and deciding is important. Responsible politicians must become the owner of a strategy. Excluding politicians from their roles as responsible elected persons is destructive for sound decision-making in a democracy.

Also with regard to the context the cases *Drechtsteden* and *Gröndental* provide lessons for successful processes. Multi-level co-operation of higher authorities preferably offering incentives and active experts seem of utmost importance. The involvement of politicians in their roles of democratically responsible persons is an important contextual factor as well. Essential is the attitude of the experts, guiding the process towards openness and respect regarding various interests and different perceptions of reality of the participants.

The above allows for conclusions about the conditions for effective strategy making. As mentioned before, an effective strategy making process does not aim in the first place at efficient decision-making, or at just facilitating a projected trend development. (The probable future) A spatial development strategy is needed when a society (re) orients on its desired direction of future development. Therefore strategy making focuses on largest chances for a performing, innovative strategy. (The desired future)

None of the variables presents solely a **sufficient condition** for an effective strategy making process; many conditions are required in combination for effectiveness in network society.

Necessary conditions are:

- An open and facilitating professional attitude of experts to every possibly relevant perspective of society.
- An open process organization aiming at shared ownership of outputs through co-production.
- Application of options and visualization
- A simple administrative embedding of the process
- Involvement of politicians in a more or less remote relation, allowing loosely coupling to the output
- Partnership relations with higher authorities.
- Collaborative co- designing scenarios: scenario planning.

Main lessons for largest chances for a successful strategy contain next recommendations:

- The decision-making process is to be managed by professional experts, who are fully transparent, interested in the variety of convictions in society and willing to professionally help actors to develop and articulate their vision about the future development of their territory.
- The organization must secure the support of the politicians, which are eventually responsible for choices and decisions.
- The decision-making process consists of informally working towards a common long-term development vision in an open process, considering, improving and (re-) designing several options, not only in story lines with verbal metaphors but also especially in drawings on maps.
- Co-designing a concept or scenario for long-term development creates co-authorship, which enhances lasting co-ownership of the content and the process.
- Enhanced co-ownership is essential for the required continued, consistent commitment to implementation.
- Discussions and activities should aim at converging to a commonly preferred vision for future development.
- The favourable context is characterized by on the one hand, multi-level embedding of local initiatives supported by active support and (even minor) incentives of higher authorities and on the other hand broad active participation of the stakeholders and individuals, which are deemed appropriate in the specific context.
- Higher authorities should assure a simple administrative embedding, which allows for open, informal communication.
- Representatives of approving higher authorities should commit to the strategy making process and develop partnership aiming at solutions, while avoiding a legalistic sector oriented controlling attitude.
- Network society conditions and integrated planning requires concerted actions between higher-level sectors. Preferably the higher administrative level prepares its own strategic development vision, creating clarity to the lower-level authorities.

§ 15.6 Recommendations for increased chances for a successful strategy

We identified openness of decision making together with co-designing as the maximum expression of open processes, as core requirements for effective and successful strategy making, but we are aware of the fact that strong juridical focussed planning systems do usually not comply with those requirements. Therefore our recommendations for planning practice pay extra attention to the issues of implementing recommended ways forward in strict regulated circumstances.

Apart from the procedural steps and requirements like specific issues to be addressed, the legend units of land-use types, the interest groups to be involved or consulted and the standards and norms to be respected in strong juridical oriented systems, the specific way in exact and precise terms of the steps in which a working group prepares a plan is not and cannot practically be prescribed in planning systems. Such strong, often prescriptive regulations tend to channel developments towards a continuation of the past, whereas new perspectives enabling emergence of innovations are needed. Although those strict regulations influence the attitudes of individual persons, the systems always provide room for professional movements. So the exact way of elaborating the content of a strategy depends also on the persons involved with their specific education, worldviews and institutional way of doing.

But at the same time the strong juridical focus of the institutions in several planning systems creates barriers to changes related to the adaption to requirements of network society. Such resistance to change is usually motivated through referring to the planning culture or identity of the region, ("we are different") ignoring that the actual situation is the resultant from developments in the past.

Acknowledging that many of the above main lessons (15.5) refer to important personal attitudes, which can be conducted within the room of professional movement in any planning culture, strong juridical focused environments will create difficult conditions for planners to bring such lessons into practice. Therefore special attention is given in next recommendations to difficulties planners would encounter in strong juridical focused circumstances. Besides, the importance of the experiential factor for initiating change (2.7) of planning cultures learns that deliberately organizing the process of preparing a long-term development policy outside formal statutory procedures can help to overcome legal rigidity. Such cases require extra attention for anchoring the outcomes.

Recommendation 1

The strategy-making process is to be managed by professional experts, who are fully transparent, interested in the variety of convictions in society and willing to professionally help actors to develop and articulate their vision about the future development of their territory.

This recommendation refers to a personal attitude.

Recommendation 2

The strategy-making process consists of informally working towards a common long-term development vision in an open process, considering, improving and (re-) designing several options, not only in story lines with verbal metaphors but also especially in drawings on maps.

Co-designing a concept or scenario for long-term development creates co-authorship, which enhances lasting co-ownership of the content and the process, which is essential for the required continued, consistent commitment to implementation.

Although they do not stimulate informal behaviour, strict juridical systems do not forbid informal behaviour or the application of options during the preparation of a strategy. Although a strong juridical focus of the planning culture induces formal behaviour, the Glasgow and Grödental examples show that the strict regulated systems do not exclude bringing this recommendation into practice.

Recommendation 3

Discussions and activities should aim at converging to a commonly preferred vision for future development.

This recommendation refers to a personal attitude to act constructively in co-operation towards a result. Strict juridical thinking is often related to focussing on boundaries between competencies and a struggle of hegemony of institutional views. The challenge of the process management is to identify overlapping interests as components of a common strategy and develop attractive perspectives. That requires creativity at least at the side of the process management. The initial positive reception of the "7 Cities" concept in Bologna showed the feasibility of this recommendation.

Recommendation 4

The organization must secure the support of the politicians, which are eventually responsible for choices and decisions.

Bringing this recommendation into practice depends on the politician as well as on the planners. Juridical focused systems probably create more formal distance. Elected persons sometimes do not (sufficiently) trust the public servants and keep distance. The challenge for planners is to create trust in the process and submit important information, considerations, dilemmas and decisions at the right moments and respect the freedom to choose of the politician. It is about loosely coupling to the process. Next to the successful cases, the experiences in Meetjesland illustrate the importance of this recommendation.

Recommendation 5

The favourable context is characterized by on the one hand, multi-level embedding of local initiatives supported by active support and (even minor) incentives of higher authorities and on the other hand broad active participation of the stakeholders and individuals, which are deemed appropriate in the specific context. Higher authorities should assure a simple administrative embedding, which allows for open, informal communication, and avoid that the process becomes a battlefield of several higher levels of government

The multi level embedding cannot be influenced in a specific strategy making process. Strong institutions in a juridical focused culture tend to keep the boundaries well protected. Informality of contacts crossing levels of government is then not stimulated from above. The challenge to develop informal relations from the lower level upwards is large; success depends on personal abilities and existing contacts.

Recommendation 6

Representatives of approving higher authorities should commit to the strategy making process and develop partnership aiming at solutions, while avoiding a legalistic sector oriented controlling attitude. Network society conditions and integrated planning require concerted actions between higher-level sectors. Preferably the higher administrative level prepares its own strategic development vision, creating clarity to the lower-level authorities.

This recommendation concerns the inverse of the previous one. From above it is usually less difficult to develop informal contacts to lower levels of government. The barrier is in this case that civil servants from the higher level in the hierarchy feel save in a controlling attitude. Getting involved in a process where co-operation at an equal basis is expected makes those persons feeling vulnerable. Planners should explicitly invite representatives of higher levels, initially as observers gradually involving them in deliberations.

16 Epilogue

§ 16.1 Effectiveness of Strategies

We discussed in § 3.4 our core notion of effectiveness and identified three understandings of effectiveness, including one which erroneously confuses with efficiency:

- Effectively making of a strategy,
- Contributing to its success and
- The quality aspect of opening new possibilities for future development.

Hereafter we consider the impact of our responses to the research questions mainly on the last two components of effectiveness.

Effective making of a strategy: a fast and goal oriented process.

This component of effectiveness, resembling efficiency of decision-making, is hardly addressed in this study. Reason is that the usual project management focus of delivering according to specific terms of reference, contrasts with a process of open policy making, giving due respect to interests and preferences of society. A process aiming at building support through consensus and changing mindsets requires openness of the agenda and several rounds of decision-making in a network society environment. It is no use to formulate a development strategy efficiently in short time, which remains a paper policy of the problem owner, without an effect on future development.

Contributing to the implementation of the strategy: a performing strategy

Our criteria for effective strategy making consist of achieving an agreement, continuing in a next round and satisfaction of participating stakeholders. That includes aiming at together agreeing to a concept for a strategy, which would build support. Further continuation of the process and enriching development with more views are needed in order to gain more support in society. Activities aim at gradually specifying and implementing the strategy. A performing strategy requires time.

A strategy, which developed and adopted new perspectives for future possible realities.

This interpretation of effectiveness refers to creativity in the strategy making process, which requires a design attitude. On top of the scientific evidence about existing trends in development providing information about *probable* futures, the research-by-design exploration of *desirable* and of *possible* futures is needed for nourishing the process with new possibilities and widened perspectives.

This aspect of effectiveness is probably most important for adapting to future circumstances and innovation of Europe's territory as aimed for in EU Cohesion Policy. Research-by-design and the related design attitude exploring possible futures will support local or regional society in formulating their desired future. Design in spatial development delivers, due to its evolutionary character usually not very spectacular outcomes. The value of a strategic framework is in new coherent structures of locations and synergies based on its endogenous social, economic, cultural and physical assets, sometimes combining earlier separately proposed interventions. Co-designing such a new vision for future development, through considering several visualized scenarios seems most promising way forward for effective strategy making.

§ 16.2 Our Subject in the Wider Context

After over forty years of spatial planning practice in several different environments it was time for reflection. Planning research and policy/management literature opened a world, which was quite new for me as a practitioner. Many notions discussed in literature were clearly recognizable, although often described from a somewhat different perspective. I felt being a reflective practitioner, (Schön 1983) enriched by encountering a plethora of theoretic notions, insights, analyses and discussions.

The current study, initiated for searching answers about the question, which of the intuitively applied factors in strategic planning are supporting the success of a strategy for future development, inspired for some afterthoughts. These are related to the position of spatial planning in the EU, the role of planning experts and the importance of what I call the design attitude.

Throughout Europe, spatial planning is insecure about its position. Spatial planning holds in fact a weak profession between the many spatial development relevant professions like architecture, social sciences, economics, geography, civil engineering, water management and landscape ecology. At the European level, the importance of those professions influencing spatial development is recognized together with the

overarching need to integrate knowledge and approaches for concerted development, effective functioning and coordinated investments in the European territory. But the profession practicing integrative approaches for spatial development throughout Europe is less involved in European spatial policy making, because planning is the national competence within the system of subsidiarity.

Spatial planning research is involved in conducting studies, but the translation in a EU spatial planning policy supporting the regions and cities is hampering. Very slowly, the European Council ¹⁴⁶ makes some progress in coordinating spatial development policy. Since Territorial Cohesion became part of the EU Cohesion Policy and the quite general notions are accepted that territorial cohesion is closely related to spatial planning and that place-based integrated planning is essential for the development and innovation of Europe's regions (Barca 2009) it is the moment of developing practical ways for conducting effective spatial strategy making. This is the more important since in many countries strategic planning is not (yet) regulated in planning procedures, and the lessons learned in this study stress the importance of non-hierarchical informal strategy making applying modern governance and design. The juridical focus of regulative planning, still dominant in several planning traditions is not supportive for strategic development policy making.

For me especially lessons and insights of policy and management sciences, which accept and study the context of complexity in network society, appeared relevant for successful strategy making. Co-operation with policy and management experts might help to elaborate practical methods to create effective and successful strategies in different contexts.

The relative weak position of the planning profession affects the way spatial planners conduct their roles. As civil servants or consultants, the general role interpretation of planners is serving society. That substantiates in supporting politicians at the different levels of government. The image of spatial planners is severely determined by the activities in the field of regulative planning, which applies legislation and procedures as tools for the protection of values. Such values regard not only obvious objects like culturally important ensembles, historic monuments, landscapes and natural areas, but also less tangible space related qualities like local identity or attractive environments. Such qualities are professionally identified and can sometimes hardly be formulated in clear criteria applicable by others. Spatial plan regulations usually imply limitations for building and use, which limit freedom of building and use of territory for actors in society. Those limitations create a negative image of planning to everybody feeling limited in its freedom, being for instance minor changes to the private homes,

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In the informal meetings of EU Ministers of Planning, prepared by the Urban Development Group (UDG) and Network for Territorial Cohesion Contact Points (NTCCP) working groups.

but also limitations affecting the possibilities for profit making of project developers. Politicians, not always sensitive of the importance of spatial values for the functioning, attractiveness or identity of the city or region they assumed responsibility for, are generally most impressed by the arguments of “feasibility” of project developers and they will fear loosing their project, thereby jeopardizing the quality of the city or region. Those fears of politicians are even stronger in times of hampering economic development, when jobs securing prosperity get high priority. Compromises or worse results may follow. That not only applies for building, but also for protecting environmental values. A negative image of spatial planners resulted. That adds to the lack of appreciation for a profession, which is perceived as abstract due to its focus on long-term and large-scale outcomes.

Strategic planning as a profession oriented on developing opportunities for the future, may theoretically be seen as very important for the future of society, in practice it suffers from the negative effects and image of the juridical tools of regulative planning. That background creates an extreme difficult position, especially for starting planners. The required open attitude towards all contributions to strategy making for the future, demands personal strengths to conduct professional approaches among the forces of complexity in network society. The big challenge is finding ways to effective strategy making and, more specifically to develop continued support and flexibility for implementing long-term strategies. The current study is hopefully a modest contribution to enhance the position of practitioners in showing how the proposals can be produced, which the responsible politicians ask for.

In *Planning Theory and Practice* Volume 15 Number 1 Heather Campbell, the senior editor, addresses the divide between planning academics and planning practitioners, which weakens the profession in applying its capabilities in society. She wrote: *“I am conscious that as an academic one can appear as content simply to chide the profession from the distant privilege of the ivory tower.”*(121) Whereas Van Eeten wrote: *“Spatial planners are strange characters. They traffic in fiction, and at the same time ask us to take it all seriously. Even more surprising, those of us who are not planners do take them at their word and grant them the authority they crave. This open-eyed fiction as a basis for public policy is remarkable, to put it mildly, and requires explanation.”* (Van Eeten 1999)(91) He aimed at formulating new agendas in order to address controversies in planning practice. These citations are both expressions of the divide Campbell wants to bridge, because interactive engagement between practice and theory is what the present discussion of the “knowledge society” requires of us. Responding to the need of the responsible politicians, planning practice focus less on conducting analytical studies and more pragmatically on proposals, for which the design attitude is indispensable.

Insights developed during our analyses may inspire further investigations. With regard to the context of strategy making processes, the administrative embedding seems essential:

The complexity of too many layers governing the ones on the ground, which have to solve the problems in society, must be avoided. Although our search did not fully focus on that item, we suppose that developing collaborative partnership and vertical commitment in Grödental and Drehtsteden depended from the simple embedding in which the process had to relate to only one higher authority. I assume that a simple two tier embedding would provide the only higher-level authorities the safe environment, in which loose coupling enables vertical commitment. Developing partnership between higher and lower-level authorities requires the first to engage in collaborative efforts, which may be perceived as risky in bureaucratic thinking. If the strategy making process would become the meeting point of several higher authorities and sector representatives, the strategy making process would become a confrontation point providing the arena for their struggles for hegemony. In such a context representatives of higher authorities will act extra careful avoiding any risk and refrain from developing commitment to a process that is influenced from many more powerful sides. The positive experience in the two co-designing processes in which the higher authorities co-operated as partners seems also to stimulate to open informality. The legally well-regulated case of Glasgow lacked partnership with the higher-level authority.

Another insight developed during this study is the confirmation of the importance of design and a design attitude in strategic decision-making. Higher authorities eager to implement their policy can provide a local or regional strategy making process with specific objectives to be conformed. But more trust in local or regional creativity would require less prescriptive issues and let the strategy making process develop openness for all thinkable options. That would quite probably bring better, more innovative solutions than the often well-known prescribed ones. Preset notions for complying with, as sometimes required by higher authorities depend from abstract general categorizations, which by definition imply less place-specificity. Collaborative open explorations of possibilities require trying solutions in the place-specific circumstances. Spatial planners should take the freedom to develop designing in decision-making processes.

The assessment of five cases of strategic plan making in this study confirms the importance of what I call the design attitude. Many strategic plan activities drowned in an approach merely focussing on analytic studies. In our cases the *Meetjesland 2020* case focused on studying for prioritizing the objectives for future developments. Although the reasons of its failure are related to the (non-) relation with politicians, the process was not aiming at locating interventions, activities and investments at specific locations in the sub-region, thereby not demonstrating opportunities for possible attractive development in specific municipalities. Regional agreement about such proposals would probably have created some support among the municipalities. Abstract sets of objectives contain less performing and transforming power. In the *Bologna* case the first two years resulted in chaos of studies, ideas, proposals, which

ended as soon as the concept of “7 Cities” was designed and specified chances and opportunities. The province of *Bolzano-Alto Adige /Südtirol* started in 2004 preparations of the regional development plan.¹⁴⁷ The activities of *EURAC* consisted of assembling all thinkable statistics without selectivity with regard to the relevance of plan making. In 2005¹⁴⁸ the process was stopped because the set of analyses remained without any form of proposal, priority, or recommendation. In 2007 it was decided to experimentally start pragmatic plan making for a strategy in the *Grödental* on basis of existing knowledge.

The cases of *Drechtsteden* en *Grödental* developed effectively agreement about the objectives for future development while sketching possible solutions and consequences.

The importance of designing plan-concepts and the related visualizations was emphasized long ago. (Zonneveld 1991) Research-by-design consists of iteratively trying solutions, considering consequences and improving previous options. The orientation on options for solutions and opportunities asking “what improvements are needed for making a proposal consistent with a desirable situation?” differs from a problem solving orientation. A solved problem includes that a specific barrier is removed, but for an attractive vision for the future development, we must know in which direction we find best opportunities for the future. The argumentative frame provided by a development vision helps to distinct the relevant barriers on the road to the desired future from other barriers, which may be irrelevant for the preferred direction of development.

During designing, consisting of sketchy “*if this, than that*” reasoning and considering consequences, questions to be addressed by research will emerge. That brings quite pragmatic selections of relevant issues to be addressed. The scenarios introduced in the successful cases were used as tools for open deliberations and keeping options open as long as needed conform recommendation for effective decision-making of policy science. (De Bruijn, Ten Heuvelhof et al. 2008) Our cases confirmed the effectiveness of this mix of creative exploration and effective process management.

I expect that the insights articulated in this study are sufficient for improving the initial intuitively formulated recommendations for planning practitioners in *Fifteen Steps towards Territorial Cohesion*.

My hope is also that this study executed by a practitioner, contributes in bridging the divide between planning research and designing in planning practice.

¹⁴⁷ Landes Entwicklung und Raum Ordnungs Plan (LEROP)

¹⁴⁸ EURAC (2005) Südtirol Wohin?

Appendix A Checklist of Questions

DRAFT CHECKLIST	
Personal information about the interviewee	
Effectiveness	
Involvement of politicians	Intensity of contact; selection roles: values
Agreement achieved	Type of agreement: How broad? How long since?
Satisfaction	Which participants are (not) satisfied; reasons
Next round	Next step for continuation followed: streams
Co-ownership	
Feeling co-owner	Which participants? Of results or of process?
Pride	Where expressed and how?
Defend	Against what? Why?
Support	In what context; effect
Openness of Process	
Neutral start	Agreed data and process architecture; clear goal
Agenda setting	Due attention to ideas; proposals welcomed
Flexible Participation	New participants invited; new territories included
Informal setting	No legal procedures; no competences; mutual trust
Co-Design	
Proposals	Concepts or scenarios of various frames welcomed
Scenarios	Alternative scenarios emerged; confronting values
Learning	Better understanding; surprising synergies
Co-design	Iterative; what-if: enriching; interweaving goals
Scenarios	
Number	2, 3, 4; more
Base	Quantitative; political values; trend
Type	What will, can or should be; exploring; deciding
Presentation	Graphics; story-lines
Role of experts	
Elaborations	Comparable; neutral
Assessments	Factual; impartial
Moderation	Facilitating; subservient/professional

Appendix B Long-list of cases

NL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •: Structuurvisie Twente 2030 •: Ruimtelijke Ontwikkelingsvisie Drechtsteden
UK	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> : <i>British planning systems differ nationally</i> •: The London Plan •: Glasgow-Clyde Valley development plan •: Manchester Information City
IT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> : <i>Italian planning systems differ regionally</i> •: Milano, Piano di Governo del Territorio •: Roma, Poster Plan •: Bologna, Piano Strutturale Comunale •: Grödental/Val Gardena
ES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •: Euskal Hiria (Baskenland) •: Valencia Regional Structure Plan
BE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •: Meetjesland •: Kortrijk-Leiedal

Twente: although information available and willingness to support exists, the process was not newly generating the option of Bandstad Twente for five (initially six) co-operating cities.

Drechtsteden: is more appropriate : eight municipalities agreed on a common vision on basis of three scenarios. Availability and willingness are apparent.

London: Contact is willing to support. Smooth four years process under one mayor, continued under new one.

Manchester: Contact not really active.

Glasgow: Active support may be expected.

Basque: Contacts did not react anymore.

Valencia: Contact not really promising (due to economic crisis?)

Kortrijk: Probable co-operative, but longer history of the agreed planning objectives maybe not provide an interesting case.

Meetjesland: A more recent, promising achievement. Co-operation from Flemish level promised.

Italian projects: The projects in Bologna en Grödental are promising with regard to support and co-operation.

Appendix C List of interviewees

INTERVIEWS PIANO STRUTTURALE COMUNALE DI BOLOGNA

A Skype interview with Davide Ponzini, assistant professor of Politecnico Milano, who evaluated the PSC.

Giovanni Ginocchini head of *Urban Centre Bologna*, responsible for communication and participation

Patrizia Gabellini, *Assessore Comune di Bologna*, previous consultant for the PSC

Mario Piccinini, president of communal commission for architectural quality, former president of local branch of national planning association INU

Pietro Maria Alemagna, actual president of local branch of INU

Luigi Amedeo Melegari, president of association of building companies.

INTERVIEWS SCENARIOSTUDIE DRECHTSTEDEN 2030

Gertjan Vogelaar, the (1997) alderman of Zwijndrecht, political responsible for the process

Fred Meerhof, (then) secretary general of Drechtsteden, responsible as principal for the project (Not related to Drechtsteden anymore)

Rudi Giskes, municipal planning expert (Retired)

Rob Steenbeek, economist of the Drechtoevers project (Just before retirement)

Wim van der Linden, housing sector economist (Still active for Dordrecht municipality)

Ton van Laar, social geographic expert/planner, project leader within the consultancy (Now working for province of Noord-Holland)

André Seip, current official responsible for spatial planning of Drechtsteden was later interviewed for establishing the actual state of realized projects

INTERVIEWS GLASGOW AND THE CLYDE VALLEY STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Max Hislop, Manager of the GCV Green Network

Gordon Laing, Assistant Business Manager (Development Plans) North Lanarkshire Council

Martin Wight, Senior Strategic Manager, Scottish Enterprise

Bruce Kiloh, Strathclyde Partnership for Transport the Regional Transport Authority of west Scotland

Stuart Tait, Manager of the CVSDPA

Kevin Murray, Consultant, Kevin Murray Associates, who conducted an evaluation of the Scottish strategic planning system

INTERVIEWS VISION GHERDĒINA

Virna Bussadori, spatial planner, provincial director of spatial coordination, acting principal on behalf of the relevant *Landesrat*

Lisa Kofink, spatial planner, project leader employed by Eurac,

Christina Demetz, director tourist organization Grödental

Adrian Senoner, farmer, alderman Wolkenstein

Petra Lorenzetto, teacher, alderman Lajen

Stefan Leiter, mayor Lajen

Ambros Hofer, sport/tourist expert, alderman Kastelruth, responsible for the ladin villages of Kastelruth within the Grödental

Eugen Hofer, industrial entrepreneur (wellness facilities), mayor of St. Christina

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INTERVIEWS MEETJESLAND 2020.

Mark Arnaut, head of regional social agency

Luc Joos: Community work of the province Oost-Vlaanderen

Freddy Bertin, former chairman of Streekplatform

Piet Quataert, regional landscape development

Erik Hennes, head of tourism office for Meetjesland

Eddy Matthys-de Zutter representative of regional farmers co-operation

Geert vande Woestyne, director of Streekplatform

Aimée Heenen, Emeritus Professor University of Ghent, strategic management, last chairman of Streekplatform Meetjesland

Bart van Herck, the first director of the Streekplatform until 2009, currently director of IdeaConsult in Brussels, (Skype-interview)

The summarized and (coded) accounts of interviews are accessible on:

<https://www.dropbox.com/sh/4b8t43csx56muvv/AAAnrK6kxWSksB7lWY4cLOd2a?dl=0>

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Curriculum vitae

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Studeerde van 1964 – 1971 aan de Technische Universiteit Delft, (Toen TH)

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Vanaf 1971 tot 2006 werkte hij als stedebouwkundig adviseur voor opdrachten uit alle overheidslagen in binnen-en buitenland; vanaf 1984 als directeur van adviesbureaus, sinds 2006 als zelfstandig adviseur.

Jan Vogelij speelde diverse rollen voor de beroepsgroep. Hij was voorzitter van de Bond van Nederlandse Stedebouwkundigen (BNS, 1989-1995) en President van de *European Council for Spatial Planners* (ECTP-CEU, 2003-2007)

Sinds 2007 vertegenwoordigt hij namens de ECTP-CEU de Europese *planning practitioners* bij het overleg tussen de lidstaat-ministeries voor ruimtelijke planning en stedelijke ontwikkeling.

