

Brentano on Space

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The End, or Fin-de-Siècle Vienna

Suddenly, the unthinkable was not only possible, but an actuality. The Hapsburg Empire unexpectedly was no more after centuries of being an established fact of existence; something perhaps to protest against, something to 'push' against, yet something always to rely upon. And abruptly the solid ever-present fact of it was nothing but dust.

In *Die Welt von Gestern: Erinnerungen eines Europäers*, Stefan Zweig tries to reconstruct an account of the unthinkable – the end of the Hapsburg Empire. He recounts after-the-fact what persons of a younger generation already had forgotten, those who never knew the taken-for-granted realness of impenetrable structures of empire, the 'certainty' and immutability of the governing classes. Indeed, Zweig explains, '*Sicherheit*' – certainty, security, stability – was the Highest Good for the subjects in the Austrian-Hungarian world. Yet it was as though the sheer historical determinism was hurling itself towards the abyss of time, slowly and inevitably, and one day the Empire was over the edge and no more.

Into this fray came Franz Brentano (1838-1917), a 'typical' subject of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. He was born in Marienberg in Prussia in an Italian-German family. Shortly after his birth, his father moved the family to Aschaffenburg, due to conflicts with the Prussian government concerning church matters. Here Brentano quite happily grew up in a quiet and stable environment, educated in various

German universities, and receiving his doctorate from the University of Tübingen in 1862. In 1864, Brentano took the vows of the priesthood in Würzburg and became a *Privatdozent* at the university there. Yet, although he would remain a devout believer until the end of his life, Brentano allied himself with a group of theologians that argued against Papal Infallibility. As a point of principle, no biblical or theological argument could be sustained that would show that the Pope was not a man, and as a man, inherently imperfect and capable of sin. Brentano became embroiled in this debate – on the wrong side as it were, for Papal Infallibility stands still to this day as a doctrine of the Holy Roman Catholic Church. Subsequently, his position at the University of Würzburg became untenable. Experiencing an existential crisis, Brentano felt that he could no longer reconcile the doctrines of the Catholic Church with his innate character as a searcher of truth, and as a developing philosopher of clear reason and induction. Yet in a world where the Catholic Church and the university were inextricably intertwined, he was forced to find other employment. This other university would become the Universität Wien, from 1875-1894, where he was named *Professor ordinarius*. Brentano eventually married, and this decision for an ex-priest was most problematic, not causing him to lose his position at the Universität Wien as such, but his status. First he lived within walking distance from the old university buildings on the Jesuitplatz, in modest accommodations in the Erdberstrasse 19, not far from the river, where he loved to walk and to talk

about philosophy with students.¹ Later, he conveniently lived just inside the ring on the Oppolzergasse 6, diagonally across from the new Universität building, in the complex with the City Hall [Rathaus] and the new Parliament.

The entire ring was constructed after the 1848 rebellion that rose up in Vienna at about the same time that all over Europe the workers and the bourgeois were demanding a surcease to repressive measures and free elections in a democratic system of government. This popular uprising was brutally put down, and draconian measures of control followed, including the cessation of the freedom of speech and assembly. From the 1850s onwards, the so-called *Grundzeit*, the 'foundational period', attempted to efface the vehemence of the 1848 malefaction, and saw the breaking down of the old city fortress walls, the re-routing of the river into manageable canals (*die Wienflussregulierung*), and the rapid construction of more than 500 buildings along what is now known as the Ringstrasse in Vienna, including precisely the above-mentioned Parliament (although this would be regularly dismissed from holding representative assembly), the Rathaus (City Council Chambers), the new University of Vienna building (although still controlled by the Jesuits), and the Volkstheater (a necessary distraction for the Viennese who loved the glittering *schauspiel*).² Further along the ring were the Opera, the Academy of Fine Arts, the Academy of Applied Arts, the Museum of Fine Arts, the Museum of Natural History, and various palaces of the aristocracy. Corruption was rife. However, this décor-building chiefly meant the superficial, albeit costly, beautification of the decaying Empire, and was in effect a *schaudekoration*. This massive urban generation project could not be considered a 'renewal', but rather an appeasement, a last gilding of the rotten structures that would be doomed to collapse. The squelching of the revolution and of the discontent leading up to it was not to be placated in a facile manner by turning Vienna into a City of Dreams. One may also note that these projects

for the city, with enormous parks, statuary to past monarchs and eclectic architecture, looked back for legitimisation to empires past. Actual regeneration was not planned. The technological advances of modern life, such as electric lights, tramways and a sewage infrastructure, were not planned because of a conservative sense of continuity. These projects would not be implemented until the beginning of the twentieth century. Further regeneration in terms of housing an exploding population had no place in the plans either. In a city of two million persons (more than inhabit Vienna even today), poverty and overcrowding were common. '*Sicherheit*' for the majority meant merely inescapable and unchanging misery. For the wealthy few, mostly bankrupt, including the Hapsburg dynasty through wasteful expenditures on the army, disastrous military campaigns and the stockmarket crash of 1873, the late nineteenth century was the ludic hysteria before the end.

In the remnants of pretensions to certainty, cracks began to appear through which would come some of the most innovative thinkers, artists, composers, writers and architects ever witnessed within a single generation. They would begin to ask: 'what can be known for certain about objects of sense experience?'. Behind the shadow-play, the hidden urge to truth, to pure unadulterated truth, emerged. Adolf Loos said 'ornament is crime'; Karl Kraus would satirise the Viennese propensity to self-deception, and Mahler would express raw naked *pathos* instead of false sentimentality.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Franz Brentano developed a philosophical method that would be a sort of middle way between the idealism inherited from Kant, the ontological gap inherited from Descartes, and a brute materialism advocated primarily by the emerging hegemony of scientific procedure. The question was (and is): What is my relation to the world? Is the world completely 'out there' and then a matter of discovery? If this is the case, then a philosophical account needs to

be constructed that explains how we can know the world. Is the world, on the other hand, completely 'in here', in my mind – the world being a mere representation of sense data? If this is the case, then a philosophical account would still need to explain how the world is constituted in my mind. Both accounts had failed historically. Furthermore, both accounts could not explain the relationship between my 'mind' and other 'minds'. This impasse, this *aporia*, was the birthplace of phenomenology.

Brentano sought a third way between the physical 'out there', and the psychic³ 'in here', in my mind. For Brentano, the physical and psychic are not radically different, rather two sides of the same coin as it were.⁴ Any object 'out there' in the world is known to us only by first directing our attention toward it, then perceiving it in some way with one or all of our five senses, and then getting a hold on it in our mind through some kind of representation of the object. Therefore, any consciousness of an object is always a consciousness of a specific object. This intrinsic connection links that which is thought (*noema*) with the conscious thought or intellection (*noesis*); to think, to purpose, to intend (*noeo*) with the mind (*nous*), the thinking/perceiving/sensing part of our soul in Aristotelian terms. Brentano uses in his work of 1874, the *Psychologie von empirischen Standpunkt*, the term '*Die intentionale Inexistenz*', which is already inherent in the ancient Greek derivatives of *nous*, for to think is also purposeful. As such, the will to know becomes critical; the world of sensible phenomena 'appears' to us, and our act of intention, our 'attending-to' the world, makes available objects of experience to our mind. The task of philosophy, then, is the description of the conscious experience or consciousness-of more accurately, with a method that Brentano will call Descriptive Psychology.

The account of the relation between the psychical and the physical, termed by Brentano as 'intentionality', is partly derived from the Scholastic term *intentio*, which means 'directed toward'. As a theo-

logian, Brentano undoubtedly would have known of the uses to which this term was put in the Scholastic tradition, namely with Thomas Aquinas,⁵ and much research has recently been completed tracing the etymological developments of the term *intentio*.⁶ Also, a homogeneous definition of 'intentionality' for Brentano is difficult to determine, the case being of course one of the continued development of thought by an extremely dedicated thinker.⁷ Yet, in brief, no doubt the term intentionality was resurrected by Brentano and put to use in order to explain the relationship between mental acts [*psychisch*] and empirical phenomena [*physisch*].⁸ Even though both the word 'intentionality' and 'phenomenology' would be given a different meaning by one of Brentano's students, Edmund Husserl, I would argue that the most profound influence on Brentano's conception of intentionality [*'Die intentionale Inexistenz'* - intentional in-existence⁹] is in fact Aristotle.

Aristotle remained throughout Brentano's life a continued source of admiration and inspiration. Brentano's extensive study on Aristotle's *de Anima* published in 1867,¹⁰ and specifically the notion of *nous poietikos*, forms the beginning point of Brentano's conception of intentionality [*intentional in-existence*]. Brentano, too, deeply held the ideal of the unity of sciences, each with its own realm and methodology, yet each unified into what was knowable. Exceedingly important is the realisation that in the late nineteenth century psychology was becoming established as an independent, autonomous science. Let us not forget that Brentano was in close acquaintance with Meynart, the clinical tutor of Freud, and that Freud himself attended many lectures of Brentano in Vienna. The university was only a short walk away from Freud's home and practice on the Bergstasse. The term psychology comes from the Greek, *psuché*, meaning the soul, and *logos* meaning a reasonable account, or what we would now call 'science'; psycho-logy is the explanation of the what is the soul, what are its faculties, and how it operates.

In *de Anima* (meaning the soul, *psuché*) Book 3;V (one of the most troublesome passages in all of Aristotle), Aristotle says: 'For in the case of things without matter, that which thinks and that which is thought about are the same; for speculative knowledge is the same as its object' (430a3-5).¹¹ This is not to say that the mind and the body are the same thing, but that they are 'common'. The *psuché*, soul, needs the body in order to perceive, to sense, to think, but the soul or the mind is 'separable', *chorismos*, always in relation to the body, but not the same. The thought is identical with the thing thought about. Or, as Brentano will state it: consciousness of an object is always consciousness *of* an object – these two being 'separable', but indivisible. In *The Psychology of Aristotle*, Brentano preserves the link between the thing that thinks (*nous*) and thinkable things (*noeita*). The mind (*nous*) is identical with that which is thought (*noema*). In Aristotle's philosophy, Brentano takes inspiration from this psychology in order to provide the bridge between mental acts [*psychisch*] and sensible phenomena [*physisch*]; the link or relationship which he calls *intentional in-existence*. I have expressly hyphenated the word *in-existence*, contrary to other English translations, in order to highlight that Brentano's conception of intentionality did not mean to suggest that mental acts, feelings, intuitions, sensations, etc. were not 'real' or existing; rather, the very thing that characterises psychic or mental representations of an object is the fact that, for Brentano, they include something of the object in themselves. They are immanently existing intentionally, and this intentionality sets them apart from objects, for objects have no intention, no 'directed-towards', only minds can have intention. What distinguishes the physical from the psychic is the fact that only the psychical has 'intention'.

Brentano's well-known citation from the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, states clearly:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by

what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, the reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not always do so in the same way. In presentation [Vorstellung] something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love [something is] loved, in hate [something] hated, in desire [something] desired, and so on.... The intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it.¹²

With this citation, Brentano clearly follows Aristotle¹³ in tying together thought with objects thought *about*; sensibility with the sensation *of* something; affectivity with a feeling *about* something, and perception with the perceiving *of* an object. The only discrimination between these pairs is that the physical object has no 'intention' in Brentano's terms; that is to say, that the *consciousness of* only exists in, or immanently, as an object in the mind. Psychical phenomena are always characterised by their relation to an object. McAlister explains that Brentano's intentionality thesis was not primarily about 'the objects of mental phenomena, but about the fact that mental phenomena are by their very nature relational, while physical phenomena are not'.¹⁴ Indeed, precisely this question about relationality was the original impetus for Brentano's phenomenology: what is the relation between my soul/mind and the world? McAlister goes on to say that, strictly speaking, Brentano did not mean that physical as opposed to psychic phenomena have absolutely no relations, but that they do not have the relation of embeddedness of the object in the mental.¹⁵ Physical phenomena have relations of a differing sort – that of space, time, magnitude, continuity, infinity, etc. And it is to these relations that we will now turn – specifically, Brentano on space.

Brentano outlines the six types of relations:¹⁶

1. Collective Relations (whole-part)
2. Accidental Relations (whole-part in the sense of modal logic)
3. Causal Relations (cause-effect)
4. Intentional Relations (thinking-thought)
5. Continuity Relations (border-bordered)
6. Comparative Relations (magnitude [large-small], ethics [good-bad], aesthetics judgements [beautiful-ugly], etc. – actually for Brentano not a true relation.

Obviously, this schema indicates that the *intentional in-existence* relation is an important part of the relatedness of all phenomena – the physical and the psychic; the question as to how the mind, or the materially unextended, relates to the phenomenally extended, and is a continuity relation. Brentano in this regard is highly inspired by Aristotle's *Physics*, where it is argued that all physical phenomena are continuities; that is to say, place, time, motion, magnitude, infinity, and continuous generation.¹⁷

Brentano on Space

The philosophical issues of the ontology of space and time would engage Brentano his entire life as a contemplative philosopher. Many of his thoughts on this subject are not published but have had extreme influences upon his students, specifically Anton Marty's studies on space, and Edmund Husserl's studies on internal time-consciousness. Nor was Brentano estranged from the emerging physics of his day; one of the most extended treatments on space and time comes from his engagement with and criticism of the physicist Ernst Mach's distinction between mathematical space and time and experiential/sensational space and time. This was published in *Über Ernst Machs 'Erkenntnis und Irrtum'*, which was dictated from 1905-6.¹⁸ Yet the most accessible collection of texts that reveal Brentano's last thoughts on the topic are collected in the posthumously published volume of dictated

thoughts¹⁹ and correspondence with former students Anton Marty and Oskar Kraus, as well as Ernst Mach, entitled *Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit, und Kontinuum*.²⁰

The collection is organised in three sections: the continuum, time and time-consciousness, and finally, space and time. The topic of time itself, and memory, including Brentano's famous theory of *proto-aesthesis*, receives the majority of attention. However, in this discussion, we will focus on Brentano's consideration of space.²¹ Space itself is a complex topic, but simpler in the sense that it has remained relatively less confused as to Brentano's actual thoughts on the topic, as opposed to his student Husserl, and his student Heidegger, who both extensively treated the topic of time, not to mention Freud's famous works on repression and memory. This worthwhile study will need another opportunity. Here we will focus primarily upon space.

As usual, Brentano goes to work like Aristotle: he sets out the positions of his predecessors, identifies the weaknesses in their argument, and then finally characterises the precise nature of the problem to be solved. In the section entitled "What we can learn about space and time from the conflicting errors of the philosophers" (dictated 23 February 1917 - which is to say just before he died on 17 March 1917 - these can literally be seen as his last thoughts on the matter), he sets out the problems of space and time.

Firstly, Brentano explains the terminology of space and time. The ancient Greeks had the words *topos* and *chronos*, which are generally speaking translated as 'place' and 'time' in English. In German, alternatively, for *topos* is the possibility of translation into *Raum*, *Stelle* or *Platz*, and for time, *Zeit*. Actually, Brentano uses the German expression, *die phänomenale Lokalität* (the phenomenal localisation). Also, it must be said, the ancient Greeks

had no term for 'space' as such.²² Rather, *topos* is a specific determination of 'place', individuated to the existence of a specific entity. For Aristotle particularly, space was not infinite, rather bounded by the divine heavenly spheres. In speaking about space/place and time, Brentano outlines the fact that there were various determinations of these terms historically, some more comprehensive than others, yet a unified conception is not possible. Consequently, in German, *an einem Ort* [at a location] and *in einem Raum* [in a space],²³ would not immediately correspond to the Greek *topos* for a conception of infinitely expanded space (and therefore of 'being in space'), and is not in fact thinkable in the ancient Greek system of physics. Importantly, also, is the non-symmetric nature of space and time; as ontological categories they have different structures.

Nevertheless, this historical survey renders Brentano capable of learning from the 'conflicting errors of philosophers', and enables him then, to construct an account of space and time that is consistent with his philosophy and its method: Descriptive Psychology. Although substantially disagreeing with his turn from the relational space/time of Leibniz to the absolute space/time of Newton, Brentano agrees with Kant that:

*just as time is an intuition of inner sense given from the start, so space is such an intuition of the outer sense.*²⁴

All the same, even though through this intuition the individual perceiver perceives itself within an overall unified space, this is not to say that space and time exist as a necessary condition, or synthetic *a priori*, of all possible experience, as is the case in the mature Kantian philosophy. Space and time for Brentano do not 'exist in themselves', although they are intentional relations. Brentano skirts the issue as to whether God exists in space and time, a theological and philosophical difficulty throughout history which attempts to determine the *arché*, or beginning

of phenomenal existence – a difficulty it must be said that remains to this day. God, of course, having no spatial extension and existing in eternity, cannot in principle be 'in the world'.

Given the dissension of historical views, Brentano turns to that which is most apodictic in his system of philosophy, the *intentional in-existence*. Only in the objects of experience can we be certain, and these objects phenomenally are precisely those that are apprehended in the inner perception of time, and the outer perception of space. In following Brentano's notion after Aristotle that thinking is always thinking *of* something, one could say that one intuits something, and this something is always the relation between the individual consciousness and 'the world'. Furthermore, that which one perceives corresponds to the perception of others. One could observe, indeed, as an object of experience, the consciousness of others through various 'representations', including language. And it is precisely this 'appearing' of phenomenal experience, which Brentano attempts to define and to describe. In this analysis, he briefly explicates his 'theory of projection', where he takes into consideration the paradox of an individual perception/thought of every thinker, married into an assemblage of the unity of continuity in space and time.²⁵ Indeed, 'there is lacking [Brentano says], *every absolute differentiation*, though relative determinations are given multifariously' in a phenomenal continuum.²⁶

In this regard, Brentano follows Leibniz. However, first a point of clarification. Brentano uses the term 'relative' [*Relativistische*] to describe Leibniz's philosophy of space and time. Strictly speaking, 'relative' applies to twentieth-century physics, such as that of Einstein, which is in fact a 'relative' space-time in an absolute infinite container, and as such a revision of Newton's mechanics. Leibniz, on the other hand, argued for a 'relational' notion of space and time, and as such comprises a comparatively unexplored avenue in the history of physics. For Leibniz, the

world is only the relation between things. 'Space and time are not things, but real relations.'²⁷ Space is nothing other than the continuous order of coexistence (the relation of one object to another); time is the continuous order of succession (the relation of the before to the after).²⁸ In this system of relations, then, the spatial and temporal determinations become paramount; and indeed if Leibniz's *Dynamics* is taken seriously, these determinations would be constantly changing. The mathematician would then be charged with describing these phenomena in the discrete systems of mathematics and geometry. The philosopher, following Brentano, would on the other hand be charged with describing these psychic phenomena using the tools of Descriptive Psychology. The two systems, although incommensurable, are tied together with the intentional act.

An emphasis is put on the 'act' for Brentano, for intention is also dynamic and changing - an enactment of the individual will. Therefore, immediate experience is always for Brentano the most apodictic. Through the *consciousness* of phenomena, each individual has access to spatial and temporal determinations. As such, space and time do not need to be determined as a whole, for 'we do nonetheless, possess the presentation of something spatially [and temporally] determinate in general, and also a manifold of determinations of relative spatial [and temporal] differences.'²⁹ Although Brentano feels that Leibniz had the 'correct insight', the paradox remains as to how an individual *intuition* of the relational spatial outer sense and the temporal inner sense could be made to "correspond" to some unity of perception of the world. The phenomenal world is a continuum, and yet how can the 'immanent' be said to be a unity as well? According to Brentano, if we say that in regard to time and space:

We have to do not merely with relative [née, relational] but also with absolute peculiarities, then we do not imply that a temporal or spatial point could exist without any connection to any others....

*Not merely should it be the case that no absolute temporal and spatial peculiarities should exist, but no relative specifications should exist in themselves either. These relativa should no longer have existence for the things in themselves, but only for the things as they appear to a perceiving subject.*³⁰

Therefore, the remaining project, philosophically, was to explain this link of 'intentional in-existence' to the continua of space and time. For Brentano, who was inspired by the ancient Greeks in using the term *aesthesia*, or 'appearing', inquired into how this appearing of the intentional object appeared in the perceiver.³¹ In this regard, Brentano would do well to consider Leibniz's theory of perception³² as well as his notions of relational space and time, because:

*Leibniz proposes a unified universe through perspectival multiplicity. Leibniz describes this unity as a City of God where only God has total comprehension, or vision by intuition (scientia visionis) of the entirety of the universe.... Only God can know the whole plan, both in the past and the future. Yet each monad 'maps out', as it were, its own neighborhood. Nevertheless, each of these maps overlaps with other maps, making a coordinated and coincident perception of the universe.... Yet each view is always in relation to every other viewpoint, composing a unified whole.*³³

Yet Brentano would not follow this path due to his dedication to Aristotle. In his theory of categories, rightly, no two individuated entities could 'overlap', for 'every definition, from the highest generic concept down as far as the last specific difference, proceeds monostochastically (universally in one series) [or literally, of the same element].'³⁴ This is to say that every genera and species has its own definition, which of course is 'bounded' with nothing outside of it, with no 'overlaps'. As a consequence, Brentano would then be left with the unfinished project of the inter-relatedness of individual consciousnesses - a problem, it must be pointed out, that even his

most famous student, Edmund Husserl, inspired by Leibniz, was unable to fully resolve even with his notion of the intersubjectivity of the transcendental ego.

Admittedly, Brentano's considerations on space were exceedingly influential in the twentieth century – not only in the philosophical development of the phenomenological school, but also the analytic in the form of the Vienna Circle, and in the 'linguistic turn'. Furthermore, as Toulmin and Janik point out, Vienna at this time was a rather intimate place of extraordinary people that somehow blossomed or exploded out at the denouement of European civilization.³⁵ Many of the most influential persons in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had at one time been a student of Brentano, including not only Husserl, but also Anton Marty, Carl Stumpf, Tomas Masaryk, Sigmund Freud, Alexius Meinong, Alois Höfler, Kasimir Twardowski, Christian von Ehrenfels, and Franz Hillebrand among many others.³⁶ Brentano was a dedicated and beloved teacher, a contemplative thinker who formed a bridge between the completely ossified philosophy of his time which had got stuck in Neo-Kantianism, and the philosophy that would come to be known as 'phenomenology'. Phenomenology would change the direction of how philosophy constitutes its problems entirely - the relation between the 'physical' and the 'psychic', the inter-relatedness of all things, as well as how phenomena 'appear' to consciousness. Nonetheless, one of Brentano's most important contributions to twentieth-century metaphysics has been the re-establishment of the Aristotelian link of the intentional in-existence, which enables the relation between physical phenomena, and the *thinking* of by that which thinks.

To Conclude, the End of Fin-de-Siècle Vienna

Aristotle, in his determinations of *topos*, stated that every individuated entity existed in some specific place. Brentano's place was Würzburg, Vienna, and Italy, at the historical time of the end of the Hapsburg

Empire, the end of which coincided with his death in 1917. Vienna, specifically, was an extraordinary place at this historical period. One could with confidence state that never before or since did one specific place, at one specific time, bring forth so many remarkable persons such as the likes of Fritz Mauthner, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Oskar Kokoschka, Arnold Schönberg, Adolf Loos, Gustav Klimt, Egon Schiele, Josef Hoffmann, Karl Kraus, Stephen Zweig, Sigmund Freud, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Hermann von Helmholtz, Ernst Mach, Ludwig Boltzmann, Albert Einstein, Gustav Mahler, Theodor Herzl, Georg Trakl, Josef-Maria Olbrich, Tomas Masaryk, and Otto Wagner. All lived and worked in the city of Vienna at this specific place and time. Franz Brentano was one among many that burst out through the fissures of conservatism and 'security' before civilization would descend into the barbarism of WWI. But for a brief moment in time, before 'the last days of humanity',³⁷ Vienna sparkled, and glittered, and shone.

Notes

1. These early years are lovingly reconstructed by one of Brentano's closest students, Carl Stumpf. See 'Stumpf: Reminiscences of Brentano' in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. MacAlister, Linda L. (London: Duckworth, 1976), p. 39. See also Spiegelberg, Herbert, *The Phenomenological Movement: An Historical Introduction* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978); Kastil, Alfred, *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos: eine Einführung in seine Lehre* (Bern: Francke, 1951); Kraus, Oskar with contributions from Carl Stumpf und Edmund Husserl, *Franz Brentano: zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre* (München: C.H. Beck, 1919).
2. See Sachslehner, Johannes, *Wien: Eine geschichte der Stadt* (Wien: Pichler Verlag, 2006); Mattl, Siegfried, *Wien im 20. Jahrhundert* (Wien: Pichler Verlag, 2000); Boyer, John W., *Culture and Political Crisis in Vienna: Christian Socialism in Power 1898-1918* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Brandstätter, Christian, *Wien 1900: Kunst und Kultur: Fokus der europäischen Moderne* (München: Deutscher Taschen-

- buch Verlag, 2005); and the canonical Schorske, Carl E., *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York: Knopf, 1980).
3. Here I am expressly using Brentano's term 'psychic' for precision. Of course, the term 'psychic' does not have the associations in the German of the late nineteenth century as it does now in English. But we must remember that psychology was an emerging discipline at the time. Meynart, Freud's clinical mentor, was a close friend of Brentano. Freud himself attended lectures of Brentano for a few years. Vienna also held the first hospital, now known as the Narrunturm that was dedicated to illnesses of the 'Geist', or 'psyche', from which we get the word psychology. Most importantly, the word '*psuché*' is of ancient Greek origin, the study of which in Aristotle is the text known as *de Anima*, the soul. Brentano, in his turn, published the results of his extended meditation on this work, especially the category of the soul known as *nous poietikos*, or the active intellect. See: Brentano, Franz, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous Poietikos* (Mainz: Kirchheim, 1867).
 4. Brentano was neither a mental immanentist, nor a materialist in the sense that all phenomena are mere electro-chemical stimulations of mental faculties. In spite of the fact that the reception of Brentano, even by some of his more prominent students, would push him into one camp or another, Brentano carefully navigates the middle way. Much of twentieth-century philosophy was originated by Brentano's 'descriptive psychology', both in the logical positivist, phenomenological (à la Husserl-Heidegger), and the analytic tradition. However, but much rests on a misinterpretation of Brentano's characterization of the psycho-physical. This viewpoint is forcefully argued by Hickerson, Ryan, *The History of Intentionality: Theories of Consciousness from Brentano to Husserl* (London: Continuum, 2007). As Hickerson explains: 'One of Brentano's most significant contributions to posterity was his unique concept of mental content, and with it the idea that acts of consciousness may stand in relation to one another, not simply by virtue of their causal histories or temporal indices, not simply by virtue of their associations with one another qua ideas, but by virtue of what they are about...; in the simplicist cases, Brentano treated this content as a physical phenomenon, a physical fact appearing in [the consciousness] and causing a sensation' (pp. 43-44).
 5. cf. Perler, D.(ed.), *Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality* (Leiden: Brill, 2001). Aquinas, of course, was an avid student of Aristotle and in his interpretation of *de Anima*, he would state that for Aristotle, 'sense receives the form without the matter, since form has a different mode of being in sense perception than it has in the sensible thing. For in the sensible thing it has natural being, but in sense perception it has intentional being.' Aquinas, Thomas, *Aristotelis Librum de Anima* (Taurini, 1948), 3rd edition, No.55. In English translation: Aquinas, St. Thomas, *Commentary of Aristotle's De anima* (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1994).
 6. For example, Marras, Ausonio, 'The Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality' in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. MacAlister, Linda L. (London: Duckworth, 1976), pp.128-139. See Gilson, Etienne; 'Franz Brentano's Interpretation of Medieval Philosophy,' *Medieval Studies* (1939): 1-10; Hedwig, Klaus, "Der scholastische Kontext des Intentionalen bei Brentano" in *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos: Beiträge zur Brentano-Konferenz, Graz, 4.-8. September 1977*, ed. Chisholm, R.M. and R. Haller (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1978), pp. 67-82; Runggaldier, E., 'On the Scholastic or Aristotelian Roots of 'Intentionality' in Brentano,' *Topoi*, 8 (1989): 97-103; Windisch, Hans Ludwig von, *Franz Brentano und die Scholastik* (Innsbruck: Rauch, 1936).
 7. In the 'Introduction to Brentano's Philosophy' in *The Cambridge Companion to Brentano*, ed. Jacquette, Dale (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), p. 7, Jacquette explains: 'the concept of intentionality in Brentano's early and later philosophy of psychology is center stage in every chapter. Although he made numerous contributions to many different fields of philosophy, his name is most frequently associated with the analysis of psychological phenomena as intentional, and he remained faithful to some version of the intentionality thesis throughout his philosophical career. Although

he drastically altered his opinion about the nature of intended objects, as his early doctrine of immanent intentionality or intentional inexistence gave way more resolutely to a strict *reism* or ontology of actual individual existents, he never abandoned his commitment to the intentionality of thought.'

8. *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1874).
9. The usual translation into English of Brentano's term is 'intentional inexistence'. I make a somewhat Heideggerian move here in hyphenating 'in-existence', but I do so as to *not* mean that psychic phenomena *do not exist*. Misunderstandings have arisen that have pushed Brentano into either the radical empirical camp, or the idealist camp. In using the term 'intentional in-existence', this rendering in English hopefully conveys the embedded character of the object of experience, in the mind. Indeed, one should also hear the echo of the Scholastic term *in-esse*, used to describe the 'participation' of Platonic forms in phenomena. See also Richardson, R., 'Brentano on Intentional Inexistence and the Distinction Between Mental and Psychical Phenomena', *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 65 (1983): 250-282; Stadler, Christine, *Der Begriff der Intentionalität bei Brentano und Husserl und seine Bedeutung für die Theoriebildung in der Psychologie* (München: Verlag Uni-Druck, 1987).
10. Brentano, Franz, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, insbesondere seine Lehre vom Nous Poietikos* (Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1867).
11. Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1995).
12. Brentano, Franz, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. McAlister, Linda L., trans. D.B. Terrell, Anotos C. Rancurello, and McAlister (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1873), p. 88-9.
13. See George, Rolf, 'Brentano's Relation to Aristotle,' *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 5 (1978): 249-266. Also see Sorabji, Richard, 'From Aristotle to Brentano: the Development of the Concept of Intentionality' in *Aristotle, the Later Tradition*, ed. Blumenthal, H. and Robinson, H., Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, (1991): 227-259.
14. McAlister, Linda L., 'Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality' in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. McAlister, Linda L. (London: Duckworth, 1976), p.157.
15. *Ibid*, McAlister, p.158. 'The crucial difference between mental phenomena and physical phenomena, i.e. between mental acts and sensible qualities, as Brentano saw it, is that the former enter necessarily into a *particular kind of relation* which is wholly foreign to the realm of physical phenomena. What are these relations? They are relations to something *as object*, and this is a kind of relation which a sensible quality could not possibly enter into, except as the object term.'
16. This Table of Relatives is constructed in Kastil, Alfred, *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos: eine Einführung in seine Lehre* (Bern: Francke, 1951) p. 133. This work collects and expounds in a systematic manner the philosophy of Brentano on the basis of his last dictations, letters to colleagues, and notes from former students – an unbelievable task. Brentano apparently was a devoted and generous teacher, however, he often did not write down everything he was contemplating (in fact, he believed in daily contemplation and 'meditation' – a habit no doubt of monastic life). His students, although grateful for the long walks (literally 'peripatetic philosophy') and the witnessing of thought 'appearing' in his lectures, also complained of the lack of a systematic publication of Brentano's philosophy. One of his closest students, Carl Stumpf, even goes so far as to propose that Brentano's own 'students were hindered in their literary production as a result of Brentano's own reservations about publishing his research. It is very awkward to have to refer to lectures or even conversations in order to explain to the reader the assumptions one uses as a starting point; it is even more awkward to attack points of view which came from your teacher and which you can no longer share, if these points of view are not available in printed form. How great is the possibility for misunderstanding and inaccuracy!'. Carl Stumpf, 'Stumpf: Reminiscences of Brentano' in *The Philosophy of Brentano*, ed. MacAlister, Linda L. (London: Duckworth, 1976), p. 43.
17. See Kavanaugh, Leslie, *The Architectonic of Philoso-*

- phy: Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007) for an extended discussion of the issues of space and time in Aristotle and his predecessors, especially Plato, Zeno, and the Atomists, as well as the foundations of geometry with Euclid.
18. Brentano, Franz, *Über Ernst Machs 'Erkenntnis und Irrtum'. Mit zwei Anhängen: Kleine Schriften über E. Mach. Der Brentano-Mach Briefwechsel*, hrsg. von R.M. Chisholm und J.C. Marek (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1988).
 19. Brentano became blind at the end of his life and his second wife devotedly enabled him to work on his *Nachlaß* by taking dictation.
 20. Brentano, Franz, *Philosophische Untersuchungen zu Raum, Zeit, und Kontinuum* hrsg. u. eingeleitet von S. Körner u. R.M. Chisholm mit Anmerkungen von A. Kastil (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1976). In English: *Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time, and the Continuum*, trans. Barry Smith (London: Croom Helm, 1988).
 21. See Smith, Barry, 'The Primacy of Place: An Investigation in Brentanian Ontology,' *Topoi*, 8 (1989): 43-51.
 22. cf. Lang, Helen S., *Aristotle's Physics and Its Medieval Varieties* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992). Also, the Platonic term *chora* is translated as 'space', but is a complex third genus between being and becoming in Plato's *Timaeus*.
 23. Brentano, Franz, *Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time, and the Continuum*, trans. Barry Smith (London: Croom Helm, 1988), p. 156.
 24. *Ibid.*, p.160. For Kant, see: Brittan, Gordan G., *Kant's Theory of Science* (Princeton, N.J.: Yale UP, 1978); Schönfeld, Martin, *The Philosophy of Young Kant* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000); Friedman, Michael, *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992); Kant, Immanuel, 'On the First Ground of the Distinction of Regions of Space' *Inaugural Dissertation and Other Writings*, trans. Handyside (Chicago and London: Open Court, 1929), as well as Kant, Immanuel, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp (New York and Hampshire: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003).
 25. Brentano, *Philosophical Investigations*, op cit, p.166-7
 26. *Ibid.*, p.167.
 27. From *A Specimen of Discoveries* (about 1686), published in the volume of Leibniz texts entitled: Arthur, Richard T.W., *The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686*, translation and commentary of the texts of Leibniz by Arthur (New Haven, CN: Yale UP, 2001), p. 313.
 28. Leibniz's position was also highly influenced by his studies of Aristotle on the continuum, the argument against Atomism, and Euclidean geometry. Let us not forget that Leibniz, besides being a philosopher, was also a mathematician and a physicist. See Kavanaugh, Leslie, *The Architectonic of Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2007), pp. 139-264.
 29. Brentano, *Philosophical Investigations*, op cit, p. 169. This citation comes from Leibniz's Letter to Volder, *Die philosophischen Schriften von Leibniz*, Hrsg. von C.I. Gerhardt (Berlin: Weidmann 1875-1890), Nachdruck: (Hildesheim und New York, 1978), GP II, p. 221.
 30. Brentano; *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 173.
 31. See Kent, O.T., 'Brentano and the Relational View of Consciousness' *Man and World*, 17 (1984): 19-51.
 32. The most extensive scholarship on the theory of perception in Leibniz has been done by Mark Kulstad. Cf. Kulstad, Mark, *Leibniz on Apperception, Consciousness, and Reflection* (München: Philosophia, 1991).
 33. Kavanaugh, pp. 158-9.
 34. Brentano, *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 180.
 35. Janik, Allan and Toulmin, Stephen, *Wittgenstein's Vienna* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973). See also Johnston, William M., *The Austrian Mind: an Intellectual and Social History 1848-1938* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1972), and Schorske, Carl E., *Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York: Knopf, 1980).
 36. cf. Albertazzi, Liliana and Libardi, Massimo and Poli, Roberto (eds.), *The School of Franz Brentano* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), and Smith, Barry, *Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano* (Chicago: Open Court, 1996).
 37. Kraus, Karl, *Die Letzten Tage der Menschheit* (München: Kösel Verlag, 1952).

Biography

Leslie Kavanaugh is both an architect and a philosopher. At present, she is a Senior Researcher specializing in the philosophy of space and time at TUDelft, the Delft School of Design (DSD). She is a registered architect in both America and the Netherlands. Kavanaugh recently published: *The Architectonic of Philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 2007). Forthcoming is the volume entitled: *Chrono-topologies: Hybrid Spatialities and Multiple Temporalities* with contributions from esteemed international scholars exploring the consequences of time, and its relationship with space through a multi-disciplinary approach.