LARGE SCALE HOUSING ESTATES IN NORTHWEST EUROPE: PROBLEMS, INTERVENTIONS AND EXPERIENCES

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Birgit Krantz
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OBITUARY

BIRGIT KRANTZ

Birgit Krantz died on 8th January 1998 from a cancer of the pancreas almost 15 years after I first met her. Early in 1983, she and some of her colleagues at the University of Lund visited the full-scale laboratory for architectural simulations at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne. Birgit, in her role of Head of the Department of Building Functions Analysis, wanted to reactivate the use of the full-scale architectural simulation laboratory in Lund. Her objective was realized well before her short retirement that began in July 1995.

Our initial meeting in Lausanne was the beginning of a collaboration at IAPS Conferences, at doctoral examinations and also ad hoc workshops which she or others organized. Birgit was an active participant in several IAPS Conferences and the Symposium on the Meaning and Use of Home and Neighbourhood at Alvkarleby, Sweden, in August 1989. It will be hard to forget the enthusiasm she had in assuming her role as Chairperson of the Scientific Committee responsible for the organization of the IAPS 14 Conference in Stockholm. Birgit's professional interests about the multiple kinds of relationships between people and the built environment did not diminish over the years I knew her despite the thrust of post-modernism in academic and wider circles. She had a profound sense of humanistic values and family life as well as a concern about issues related to gender. She was concerned not only about the ways people from all walks of life interpret buildings but also their rights and responsibilities in managing places they use regularly. She was committed to understanding and promoting the objectives of collective housing projects and she lived in a collective residential building in Stockholm after retiring from her Professorship at the University of Lund. I vividly recall visiting her home Saturday 31st May 1987 during a short stay in Stockholm. I was promptly reminded of the full-scale simulation of that housing unit I had seen in the Laboratory in Lund in 1990. One more example of how Birgit had achieved her objective by integrating research and practice.

After visiting her home Birgit wanted to have dinner although she had not fully recovered from the after effects of surgery. We ate at a restaurant in the old town, recalled our collaboration over the years and then said our farewell for what was to be the last time. I will always remember Birgit as a warm-hearted and heart-warming person who was willing to share her knowledge and experience. She had the capacity to listen to and learn from others. May her example and contribution to architectural research and teaching serve as a beacon for those of us who currently work in an academic world that is increasingly dominated by short-term interests and competitiveness.

Roderick Lawrence

Professor Birgit Krantz was an architect and researcher with a remarkable capacity to inspire, advise and create possibilities and networks for others. Birgit coordinated the work of the nordic research group on the New Everyday Life for nearly ten years. During that period she became a personal friend of mine. Birgit introduced me to swedish culture and life and she was a life long lover of Denmark. I was with great sadness that I paid my last visit to her in Stockholm, knowing she was fatally ill. Birgit died on the 8th of January, 1998. During her long professional carrier Birgit Krantz provided an altruistic service to friends and colleagues in the international research network.

Hedvig Vestergaard

PREFACE

Hugo Priemus

This book grew out of a symposium held in Sweden in Skåne Tranås. There, in June of 1995, housing researchers from Denmark, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden presented papers on the theme of Urban Rehabilitation and Social Housing. The symposium was chaired by Birgit Krantz, who was with the Department of Building Functions Analysis at the School of Architecture of the University of Lund. The workshop was devoted to the problems, interventions, and experiences of large scale housing estates. The idea was put forth to publish the revised papers in an edited volume. Birgit Krantz and Eva Öresjö took it upon themselves to turn that idea into reality. They made a plan and the papers were revised. Then Eva Öresjö took a new job and Birgit Krantz's health deteriorated. In 1997, Birgit asked me if it would be possible to have the book published by Delft University Press as part of the series Housing and Urban Policy Studies. I read the manuscript, in the state it was in at the time, and made specific recommendations about selection criteria and necessary improvements. Birgit expressed her full agreement, but then it got very quiet for a while. Birgit passed away on January 8, 1998. It was very tempting to give up on the initiative, once the driving force behind this publication had disappeared.

Anyone who knew Birgit Krantz will surely agree that there would be no more fitting tribute to her than to carry on with her initiative. She would have done the same under such sad circumstances. The Obituaries that Roderick Lawrence and Hedvig Vestergaard wrote, bears witness to her devotion to the field. Having read that testimony to her spirit, I contacted Eva Öresjö and together we were able to bring the project to completion after all.

Because of the particular history of this book, the lapse of time between the 1995 workshop and the date of publication has been longer than we may have wished. We did not ask the contributors to bring their papers up to date, as that would have led to further delay. Despite that limitation, this compilation does give a good overview of the problems in high-rise housing estates in North-West Europe and the range of experience that has been gained in rehabilitating them. The contributions make it clear that the temptation is widespread to concentrate on physical interventions such as renovation and demolition. But, as various authors demonstrate, such an approach is usually pointless. The problems are first and foremost of a social nature and therefore call for a socially oriented approach. In addition, they require

more than investments in development and redevelopment. Above all, the solution must be sought in tailor-made and hands-on forms of housing management. But the question is wider than how to manage housing estates and dwellings; the crux of the matter is how to address issues of housing in their broader environment. We hope that this book, which we dedicate to Birgit Krantz, will lead to deeper insight in the problems of large scale housing estates in North-West Europe and help us identify means to solve them.

1

LARGE SCALE HOUSING ESTATES IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE: AN INTRODUCTION

Birgit Krantz†, University of Lund

1.1 Introduction

All over Europe many of the large scale housing estates built in the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s are categorized as problematic, not providing good living conditions for their residents. Despite obvious historical variations in economical development, housing policy and socio-cultural traditions, the kind of problems are very much the same in the different countries. These large scale housing estates suffer from high rates of turnover, social isolation, vandalism and crime. Substantial proportions of immigrants, single parents, unemployed people and families receiving social allowances characterise their population. Their physical shape has many common features; the buildings are of prefabricated components, ranging from three to 12 storeys and higher; layouts are rational linear stereotypes with not seldom insufficient provision of local facilities. The size and scale is large, both regarding the buildings and the extension of the estates on the ground. During the construction boom, the scale continuously grew as time passed; in many countries strongly favoured by governments' financial support.

Increasing social difficulties and physical deficiencies at the estates made improvement interventions necessary already in the 1980s, only ten to fifteen years after completion (see in this book e.g. Turkington, chapter 3). In most countries the interventions could not finally stop the decline process in many areas, and politicians and housing authorities desperately have searched for better ways to changing the situation.

The shared problems of the large high-rise estates motivate exchange of experiences of improvements between countries. Even if initial positions differ not only between countries but also within countries, well-analyzed cases can provide ideas and useful knowledge to apply in the specific situation. This was the intention behind the initiative of a symposium held in Skåne Tranås in Sweden in June 1995. The theme was Urban Rehabilitation and Social Housing and the focus was on recent research on West-European renewal interventions for problematic large scale housing estates. The symposium was arranged by the Department of Building Functions Analysis at the School of Architecture, the University of Lund. The contributions of

the participating housing researchers from Denmark, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Sweden are presented in this book.

A series of questions emerge when governments and housing managers have to change the problematic situation of the large scale housing estates. One type of questions concern what kind of measures for improvement should be taken: measures directed to the building and the physical environment? Measures directed to changes of the management organization? Measures directed to social support to the residents, or to a combination of these different types of intervention? Other questions are related to implementation methods - what level of action should be appropriate? Which role should governments, local as well as central play? How to involve the residents in processes of renewal and regeneration?

The following chapters are dealing with the above issues based on experiences in some West-European countries. The chapters provide renewal models and suggestions for action, well-considered through research reflection and analysis, but without any claim to solving the problems once for all. A general aim of the book is to try to convince the actors involved in the field that there are no ready-made solutions to improving the problematic housing estates, instead various combinations of both social, organizational and physical measures are needed. The articles do not appear in one particular logic as many of them represent different approaches and experiences.

Today when criticising the design and characteristics of these housing estates built in the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s we can easily agree on their apparent weaknesses and shortcomings. There were, however, clear reasons why they were built and how, dependent on housing markets and national economies. Explanations about their unsuccessful development can also refer to this kind of societal factors. In this chapter, as a frame of reference for the following articles, I will give a brief background to the present state of many of the large scale housing estates with special emphasis on the situation in Sweden, where physical and social problems well correspond to those in other European countries (even if they in Sweden mostly appear with a less severe character). The chapter also contains a discussion of forms of intervention, based on important viewpoints in this book.

1.2 Massive housing - large scale, rationally produced, low-cost - a failure?

The high level of housing production during the decades after World War II aimed at meeting the great demand of dwellings when industry was recovering and urbanisation accelerated. The existing housing stock contained a big amount of obsolete housing; soon their standard was too low for many households who now could afford new and better dwellings. Housing policy had to respond to each of the three components that constituted the housing problem up to the late 1960s: quantity, quality and price, as stated by Malpass (1986). In the Swedish context this was expressed in a government bill in 1967: the whole population will be provided with healthy, spacious, well-designed, and practically equipped dwellings with good quality and reasonable costs. This goal was implemented through a large production

of dwellings located in multifamily housing estates according to the official priority for housing in bigger cities.

The introduction period for the massive housing provision could differ between countries. In Sweden the decision of the one-million housing units programme of a ten-year period was made in the mid-1960s even if the annual number of new dwellings had gradually grown the years before. In a European context this was late - the British government had already in the beginning of the 1950s started the massive housing programmes that came to an end in the late 1960s as a result of central housing policy (Malpass, 1986).

The awakening from the optimistic growth philosophy came also late in Sweden. The government and most of the local authorities did not realize that the housing demand had ceased before it suddenly happened in the first years of the 1970s, causing both financial and local-based problems for the new-built, large scale housing estates all over the country. Coincident factors can explain the sudden decrease of housing demand: demographic changes (fewer young adults at the housing market), the oil crisis followed by decrease in demand of labour-force, almost stop of government-supported immigration (Eriksson, 1996). As in many of the western countries at that time the lacking demand of housing resulted in vacancies, in some estates to a very high level.

When investment in multifamily housing in Sweden was scaled down the building industry started - with the support of government subsidies - a campaign for low-rise, mostly owner-occupied housing, and the proportion of single family houses very soon increased above the one of multifamily housing. This worsened the vacancy situation in the multifamily large estates. Better-off households moved to the taxation-favoured owner-occupied dwellings in low-rise areas, by that causing a drain of people with some capacity and contributing to the 'labelling' of the high-rise estates. Many factors, however, have contributed to the processes of decline that started very soon when the masshousing-construction period was over.

1.3 Background factors of problems

The Dutch sociologist Eva van Kempen (1994) discusses a set of background factors at work behind the problematics of the large housing estates. She distinguishes three groups of differentiating forces; physical design and location; the housing market; and the labelling process.

Since the articulations of the criticism of the large scale estates started (which happened in Sweden in 1968, most strongly by a culture journalist and a well-establish novelist!) the dispute has dealt with the connection between design and social problems. In the British context Coleman's report Utopia on trial (Coleman, 1985) has caused intensive discussions, and has also been highly questioned when she very categorically maintains the determined role of the design. Studies of problematic housing estates in Britain also deny the relationship between physical characteristics and the degree of decline; no connection regarding at least housing types and problems is found (Power and Tunstall, 1995).

The 'architectural determination' concept has also been referred to in the Swedish debate and questioned. Vidén (1994), one of the authors in this book, compares two estates built in the late 1960s with nearly identical design features and similar location qualities but different in tenure. The one was public rental housing, the other was tenant-owned. The development of the estates was both in technical and social terms totally different: the rental estate went very problematic showing the 'vicious spiral' with high rates of turnover and many technical deficiencies, whilst the other stayed as a very stable normal-aging estate. Thus, in this case the tenure can have an explanatory power. In Sweden, as well as in most countries, among various housing tenures the most critical is public rental housing. Tenant-ownership in multifamily housing shows usually less pressure of social problems; the population of these estates belong to better-off strata; they have less proportions of immigrants, unemployed and single parents (Lindén, 1998).

In general, when considering the influence of the design, one factor might partly explain the development, namely the size; the large scale of the buildings and the great number of housing units built in one short period of time at the same site contribute to the monotonous impression these environments give.

The changing housing market as a background factor for estate problems is apparent in the Swedish experiences. When the housing demand faded away resulting in a housing surplus the drainage of better-off households moving to single family houses or tenant-owned flats started the decline spiral. Vacancies grew, housing management was underdeveloped and ineffective when high rate of turnovers strengthened the needs of repair.

With reference to Dutch experiences Eva van Kempen (1994) points to the structure of the local housing market as an impact factor on demand preferences. In areas with a high proportion of high-rise flats, high-rise is not automatically valued as the least attractive type of housing; nor does low-rise dominated areas automatically give the highest position to single family housing. Instead, the discriminating factor is the location. Swedish experiences do not only evidence the location as an important factor (for instance, in more wealthy municipalities high-rise estates are more seldom in crisis), but also the type of tenure has a significant impact (also evidenced by the above example of Vidén, 1994).

The theory of labelling, developed within criminology, can help to the understanding of the decline spiral. Eva van Kempen (1994) states: "The central message is that the issue is not the life on problem estates itself but the way it is evaluated by mainstream society". As she shows, the labelling can occur early in the history of the estate: occupants with deviant behaviour or characteristics - recognized as 'the others' - can start the labelling process at once. In Bijlmermeer estate in Amsterdam, the transient population of homosexual couples, singles, and ethnic minorities were factors behind the negative development. Labelling can also be promoted and forced by the acting management authorities. In other Dutch cases the bad reputation was strengthened when the housing corporation temporary rehoused households from inner city renewal areas.

The labelling process is discussed by a Swedish ethnologist (Ristilammi, 1994) in terms of symbolic work and production of meaning. He describes how the name

of a suburb built in the 1960s in the south of Sweden, very quickly became a symbol for problematic estates in general, the name thus functioning as a strong media image. The author (like the authors in this book in chapter 3 and 4) found a discrepancy between personal experiences among those who had grown up and lived in the area and the different discourse images of the area. The group of people at the estate did not recognize what the media images told about their lives.

The strong negative image has not seldom led to renaming of the estates in connection with physical renewal. In the estate mentioned above, the subareas in connection with extensive refurbishment were given gilding names, quite extraneous to place, referring to flowers and gardens. This might be considered a positive thing if the decline process really has been stopped. In this case, however, an increasing number of immigrants of different origin living at the estate have contributed to the fact that the former reputation is retained, in spite of the heavy efforts with physical renewal.

In general, in western European countries a high proportion of newly immigrated people live in the big cities. In Sweden, the concentration of different ethnic groups in the large housing estates built in the 1960s and 1970s has occurred during the last ten years. In some estates the proportion goes up to 90 per cent. Of all immigration households, 25 per cent live in rented flats in these areas compared to 12 per cent of other types of households. Social problems particularly caused by severe unemployment among the non-Swedish groups have increased due to internal effects by internationalization and globalization of the economy. The socio-economic segregation has thus more and more been combined with an ethnic segregation, resulting in a sharpened polarization between rich and poor housing areas, even more strengthening the labelling process.

Lindén (1985) has presented the decline process consisting of levels where problems gradually accumulate and create a more and more complicated estate situation. Before the labelling process, the bad reputation, come changes in the environmental conditions, detoriating building quality as a result of lacking maintenance work and a weakening of social control with increasing vandalism and violence. This means that the physical degradation can be a significant indicator of future problems of the housing estate.

1.4 Governments' recognition of the large scale housing estate crisis

In the mid-1970s the Swedish government, influenced by an intense debate on the obvious physical and social decline conditions in the large estates, began to pay attention to the housing estates problem. The first intervention programme lasted up to 1986 and aimed at improving the outdoor qualities with the help of state grants. The open spaces and courtyards were considered very inhumane and stereotype in design. From 1986 up to 1990 government financial support has also been directed to the improvement of the buildings in the housing estates with high rates of vacant flats. In all about 30 000 flats in municipal housing companies' estates have been effected. With the entry of the 1990s the housing subsidy system was reconsidered

by the government and very few renewal grants remain. During the period of 1985-1990 government grants for improving estate facilities and service in poor estates (called 'coordinated service') were available for housing companies. A government inquiry presented in autumn 1996 contains proposals for the problematic housing estates. The proposal means financial support to local development programmes in the most exposed housing estates, and some grants to refurbishment activities. Local development programmes should be cofinanced by the municipality in question and by several ministries, responsible for housing, labour and social affairs. This might be considered a breakthrough in Sweden.

In some of the countries dealt with in the following chapters intervention programmes also started early in the 1970s.

In France in 1973 the Ministry of Housing forbid the construction of towers and slab buildings for housing purposes and in the following years the first attempts to improve the large housing estates started. In mid-1980s a programme for social redevelopment, focusing innovative projects to stimulate residents participation was launched. Later on this was followed by neighbourhood development programmes promoting local initiatives and physical rehabilitation investments. These programmes were not very efficient; in spite of all the interventions the urban crisis was not relieved, 'it had been slightly postponed'. The search for new approaches has continued, now with attempts to employ different levels of the society, especially to meet needs of the users (Conan in chapter 9).

In Britain interventions for improvement were initiated in the beginning of the 1970s. The problematic conditions of the estates arose as a combination of several factors; from technical shortcomings caused by untried construction technology, concentration of 'residual populations' resettled from slum neighbourhoods and later on the government's privatization process (through which the most low dense and popular houses where sold and the least popular, flats on high density estates, remained unsold). In the 1980s two main programmes were established by the Department of the Environment, a central government agency responsible for implementation of social housing policies. Parallel to governmental initiatives, some municipalities implemented their own programmes of estate-based improvement. Remarkable in Britain is a central government decision in 1994 to combine under one specific budget 20 government schemes across five government departments, what Turkington (chapter 3) comments as 'belated recognition of the need for a more inter-disciplinary and co-ordinated perspective'.

In Denmark in 1990 the parliament created a programme of housing improvement and rehabilitation in about eighty 'socially depressed estates' built in the period of 1965-1975. The measures carried out consisted of repair of building damages and defects, renovation of the buildings and the outdoor space, and stabilization of the economy of the estates. This programme was accompanied by an evaluation study commissioned to the Danish Building Research Institute. The evaluation findings showed that the social problems did not diminish. After a hard debate about the immigrant concentrations in the ghetto-labelled estates a governmental Urban Committee was established to create a new programme to solve the problems. In 1994 a programme including physical renovation, refinancing possibilities and

employment of 100 social workers in large housing estates was launched. The implementation should be a joint task between the housing estate managers and the local authorities (Chapter 4; see also Vestergaard, 1996).

Like in Sweden the central government in the Netherlands is now withdrawing from housing. Subsidies are being dismantled; for new dwellings they have almost disappeared, for urban renewal purposes they will be gradually finished. As Frank Wassenberg (in chapter 8) states: "---in 2005 urban renewal as a government task is finished in the Netherlands. This means the 'classic-style' pre-war urban renewal." From then on, housing management should be a task of owners and tenants, with no role for governments. Maintenance, repair and refurbishment should be paid out of the rents. Recently, however, things seem to be changing, a result of a growing awareness of the increasing segregation due to the effects of the market. Programmes are started for renewing deprived areas and restructuring the cheap, socially rented large scale estates of the fifties and sixties.

It is evident that many different attempts, following after each other, have been taken by governments since more than two decades without any real improvements in people's living conditions in the distressed areas. Some insight, however, has been reached (witnessed in the following) and experiences must continuously be reconsidered and updated; the development of both approaches and methods must have priority.

1.5 What types of interventions?

The ongoing segregation process, which could also be called the polarisation process, is difficult to stop when many negative forces are at hand. There is an increase of a poor population when cuts more and more hollow out the welfare system and unemployment is growing. The non-attractive environment in social and physical terms does not entice resource people into moving in. Vandalism, turnover and vacancies cause extremely high maintenance and management costs.

In spite of many attempts of improvement interventions authorities and management organizations are still searching for the appropriate means and methods to change the process of decline. The authors of this book can point out orientations of less success, but also many that seem quite appropriate. The orientations can be grouped into four main categories:

. physical top-down improvement measures,
. involvement of the local community,
. integrated renewal interventions,
. continuous maintenance and follow-up.

Naturally some of the above intervention categories in real improvement cases are overlapping.

Physical improvement as remedy for social problems?

Authorities and housing associations have had a strong belief in physical measures. The idea has been that refurbishment of the declining housing estates with repair,

painting and new design, will cause a change in people's living conditions in line with the 'architectural determinism' principle. This blind faith is witnessed by the contributions from both Britain and Denmark in this book. Turkington (in chapter 3) reports about the early governmental programmes of intervention from 1979 and later, which were 'housing-led'. Some improvements such as reduction of transfer requests, vacant dwellings, management costs and vandalism occurred, but the interventions did not change the life conditions - or the 'life-chances' - of the disadvantaged residents. For instance, if child-care facilities are lacking, single-parents (women!) are prevented from paid employment. Problems of unemployment are not solved by housing-led interventions.

The experiences of the Danish housing estate improvements, described by Vestergaard in chapter 4, clearly show the difficulties in choosing a strategy. Given a heavy governmental intervention in organisational and financial terms the outcome as improved social conditions was limited. Most of the activities were aimed at physical refurbishment such as comprehensive repair and renewal of both interior and exterior environment. In some estates changes were made in dwelling size (small to bigger or vice versa). According to the evaluation study only in one of the nine cases, the social problems diminished. The government's recent recognition of the social problems in the high-rise estates, in this case recognized as ethnic problems, has led to a new programme (referred to above) which includes physical renovation but aims above all at social intervention: employment of 100 social workers and a budget for social activities. However, in her article Vestergaard questions if it is possible to solve social problems which arise out of an national economy crisis at the level of a housing estate. This question may be answered after the new evaluation study that Vestergaard and her co-researchers have started.

The British and Danish experiences are similar to Swedish outcomes of renewal attempts. Ericsson (1996) has studied a turnaround project where the explicit goal was to change the household composition with the help of extensive physical measures - what he calls 'planned gentrification'. The method was to relocate the households, some just during the renovation process, but the major part permanently. After the reconstruction only 12 per cent of the households stayed. A very large scale improvement activity including the demolition of one building, the combination of small flats to bigger ones, and renewal of both the interior and exterior of the houses was carried through. As Ericsson reports, some of the goals were reached in a short-term perspective: reduction of vacant flats, decrease of the proportion of immigrant households, fewer single-person households. In other respects the goals were not attained; for instance no more families with children moved into the estate after the renovation and the same low proportion of younger households lived in the estate. New data show that vacancy occurred later in the estate. Of special interest is the fate of the relocated and never returned households. Some answers are given in another Swedish study (Salonen, 1997): a large majority wanted to stay at the estate, and among these those who had the longest living period were most angry about the renovation. The common attitude was that more limited measures had been appropriate: continuous repair, maintenance of outdoor spaces and better control of disturbing neighbours. Nearly half the group of permanently evacuated residents talked

about loneliness, worsened household economy, and a sense of homelessness and being violated.

The inclination for choosing physical solutions among the parties responsible for distressed estates might be an effect of a special phenomenon, discussed by Vidén (in this book chapter 10). Problematic social conditions seem to be transmitted to the physical environment. Vidén describes with reference to a renewal project in Seattle, USA, how historical and architectural values of a neighbourhood were disregarded when the living situation and the actual state of the buildings were very bad, and she insists that this is a common occurrence. She also reminds about the fact that the evaluations of a specific renovation object very often are influenced by a preconceived attitude to either preservation or demolition.

In chapter 6 Modh points out that the success of the renewal of the housing estate she followed must be understood as a result of the activities of residents that went hand-in-hand with the physical changes. Residents themselves on their own initiatives started recreational associations and self-management organisations, even cooperatives for common needs. This leads to the issue of participation and the necessity to anchor improvement interventions in the local community.

The involvement of the local community

Preconditions for tenants' involvement are different in the countries in question. Outstanding in this respect is the Danish organisational structure of housing estate management. In non-profit social housing in Denmark, tenants are members of the housing estate board and they also form the majority of the board, thus having the democratic control of the management. For rental housing in Sweden, the control is connected with the power of the tenants' organisation at a specific time and place. New ideas of extended tenants control are gradually being introduced and Göran Lindberg (in his article together with Marianne Liedholm, see chapter 5) describes a recently applied model for an agreement between municipal housing companies and tenants' organisations giving the tenants two representatives on the board of the housing company (but, regrettable, without decision power!), and more importantly, decentralising the management of the estate including a budget to the local tenants' association. This will mean that the tenants can have a say when renovation and improvement measures should be undertaken.

Outcome of British recent intervention programmes with and without tenants' involvement can confirm the importance of tenants' involvement. For the present British government policy, determined to reduce the role of municipal authorities in housing provision, a philosophy including tenant control has had considerable appeal, according to Turkington (chapter 3). However, tenant consultation can prove problematic. He states, like others who have been dealing with the issue of participation, that tenant involvement normally is a time-consuming and long-term task, counteracting the financial and temporal terms of implementation. His specific success story from high-rise housing estates in Birmingham Heartlands can in spite of this illustrate the possibilities of assigning responsibility for managing a housing estate to local residents through an Estate Management Board, one of the first of this kind in the country. Referring to well-documented experiences in Britain Turkington

states very firmly that 'sustainability can only be achieved by involving the local community'. One reason why the local involvement is important has to do with experience that tells that priorities of residents frequently differ from the view of the owners and municipal representatives: tenants seem to be more interested in caretaking and security measures than in specifically housing-addressed improvements.

Integrated renewal

The authors of this book definitely point out the importance of combined social and physical interventions. A Dutch renewal project demonstrates this combination, but adds one more dimension: the need of differentiation of activities, i.e. many parallel initiatives and measures with congruent goals. Wassenberg (chapter 8) labels this method of improvement 'integrated renewal'. The list of measures taken within the project included physical refurbishment; demolition (six high-rise complexes with 288 dwellings); and new housing units with owner-occupied dwellings; urban improvements such as a 'colour-plan'; and, most important, a series of social measures, including involvement of tenants, creation of tenant committees and targeted projects for the elderly, single mothers and immigrant youths.

Experiences from Germany document the need for an ecological approach when improvements are demanded (Knorr-Siedow, 1993). Governments and housing responsible agencies aim at the creation of ecological balance; reasonable use of water and energy, play grounds and open spaces 'with a sort of greenery nearer to a natural surrounding' are issues within this policy. This means a new strategy for the built environment, combined with social and economical organisation, what has been called 'Heterotopes'. In Sweden, this ecological orientation of estate interventions is a new central government ambition (Eriksson, 1996).

Continuous interventions and follow-up

Swedish experiences of high-rise estate improvements during the 1970s and 1980s gave significant evidence to the importance of continuous intervention or at least very close follow-ups of the situation. This means a permanent attention by housing associations and local governments to the physical and social conditions in the areas at risk, with a readiness to intervene before serious problems have appeared. The Swedish example of the housing estate Råslätt described by Öresjö (1996) shows that over a long period of time support by the local government to the cultural and recreational development of the housing estate did contribute to the social climate and the life quality of the residents. In comparison to other estates built at the same time, social problems did not appear to any serious level before the recent occurrence of the large amount of refugees from different countries in this estate. The immigrant 'camp' in some of the buildings in the estate, an unexpected invasion of new groups of foreigners broke to pieces the well-established social network and brought about a sudden turnover movement among the earlier rooted residents.

Efficient housing management organisation and running maintenance of the estates and the buildings are key factors that at least will limit a decline process, 'to swim against the tide' (Power and Tunstall, 1995; Öresjö, 1996). In Sweden in the

1980s, the municipal housing companies started to change their management organisation from a hierarchical model to a more local-based one, giving better prerequisites for residents participation in renewal activities (Lindberg, 1994).

Unconventional approach
In the early 1980s the French government, facing unsatisfactory results of its applied rehabilitation programmes, reacted with a new approach for solving the social problems. Based on a 'a city-wide perspective' (Conan, chapter 9), a special programme of improvement of houses for young workers (Foyers de jeunes travailleurs) located both in central and suburban areas was established. Conan evaluated the physical achievements and effects on the everyday life of the youths after the modernization process. He showed that many of the decision makers had vague ideas about the needs and expectations of the young foyers residents, as well as about the relation between the organisation and the architectural space that together caused shortcomings for the improvement of the houses. However, the evaluation convinced the researcher that the efforts instead of concentrating on the estates in crisis could address the inhabitants and give them opportunities to make a greater use of the city they live in by 'shifting the emphasis from place to people'. The idea of the 'foyers' has been, and still is, to help young people find their way into mainstream society, as Conan points out. The unconventional approach helps them out of the problematic neighbourhoods or at least gives them a new life-world structure like the content of the concept of the 'foyers'.

1.6 Conclusion

The research on interventions of problematic housing estates can show a whole range of experiences, sometimes as distinct failures, but more and more positive achievements as insight has grown. Most of the problems are similar in the countries dealt with in this book, even if they not are equally severe. Therefore it is not surprising that policies and programmes in the European context also show similarities. In the first period of time when many central and local governments began to worry about the housing estate problems, the main approach was housing renovation, repair and maintenance of the buildings. Decision-makers concentrated their efforts on physical problems including new design and technical improvements. Later on when they recognized that many of the social problems did not disappear, new approaches had to be developed and tried .

These new approaches imply combinations of intervention activities; improving local services and facilities, efforts to reduce unemployment in the area, support to cooperatives and other local initiatives, and promoting tenants' involvement in management and renewal. Work with physical improvement, repair and maintenance of buildings is often still needed but should rather be permanent activities than special interventions. The experiences do firmly point to the importance of empowering residents, and encouraging local initiatives, thus also promoting democracy through housing, making use of peoples own possibilities and responsibilities.

Ethnic segregation is not a new phenomenon in most of the European countries studied but is now growing in all countries. Learning from development in other countries this is an issue to take up very seriously. Minority ethnic groups, mostly representing individuals with high unemployment and low incomes, have to be included in society and their rights to a decent housing should be recognized in any improvement intervention.

A deeper understanding of the history and the processes of change of the large housing estates is an important prerequisite for any improvement intervention. This understanding should be based not only on a knowledge of general characteristics but also on specific information about contextual qualities and place-bound courses of events, requiring communication and local dialogue. A recent tendency in the Swedish housing discourse is a re-evaluation of environmental and design qualities of the large housing estate, many times echoing ordinary people's own opinions. A growing part of people concerned about the future of the problematic estates are beginning to be more conscious about their future possibilities both in physical and social terms, and thus considering more careful ways for improvement and regeneration.

Witnessed by the authors in this book is the growing dominance of the market and the parallel debilitation of housing policy, contributing to polarisation and marginalisation of people in the cities. The withdrawal of the welfare state in Europe, once started in Britain, is now transmitted to the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, and its effect on housing puts pressure also on research activities. As Ronald van Kempen (in chapter 2) states:

"We should keep in mind that a society where market forces are more and more dominating, a clear danger exists for the least desirable parts of the housing stock to become marginalised much faster than in a society that can be characterised as a welfare state. To prevent this, creative measures are needed. It is a major task of housing researchers to contribute to this thinking and to keep a very critical eye on housing market developments".

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2

LARGE SCALE HOUSING ESTATES IN THE NETHERLANDS: POSITIONS AND POLICIES

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2.1 Introduction

Almost all countries in Western Europe have built up an extensive social rental sector since World War II, with the aim to provide decent housing for people with a modal or low income. Yet, this does not imply that social rental units are always or exclusively occupied by households of these income categories. The Netherlands is a case in point. Although about 40 per cent of the country's dwellings belong to the social rental sector, these units provide housing for a large share of the households with an income above modal (Dieleman and Van Kempen, 1994).

The Dutch government has always actively promoted the function of the social rental sector for a wide range of income groups. Having done so since 1964, this policy has helped prevent the concentration of the poorest population in the social rental sector. Consequently, the social rental sector in the Netherlands is not stigmatised as a housing market segment destined for the have nots (Dieleman, 1994).

The main aim of this chapter will be to evaluate the current position of social housing in the Dutch housing market. We will also thereby focus on the position of different neighbourhood types, because social housing in the Netherlands, and especially in the cities, is spatially concentrated in certain areas. We can roughly distinguish between pre-war and post-war areas that are dominated by social housing. In this chapter we focus on two kinds of post-war areas: those built between 1945 and 1960 (the early post-war areas) and those primarily built between 1960 and the early 1970s (high-rise areas). We will mainly address the social composition of social housing and leave aside more technical aspects. The chapter can be seen as a background for chapter 8 by Wassenberg in this same volume.

In Section 2 we will address Dutch housing policy since World War II. This Section is necessary to understand the position of Dutch social housing in the current decade. In Section 3 we will focus on two important issues in Dutch housing: the mismatch on the housing market and the costs of social housing. In Section 4 we will go into some characteristics of the dwellings and the population of the two kinds of post-war areas mentioned before. We will end with a conclusion and an evaluation (Section 5).

2.2 Housing policy in the Netherlands: a brief historical overview

The Netherlands, like all Western European countries, intervened in its housing markets after World War II, establishing a wide range of social measures, including rent control and a variety of subsidies (Lundqvist, 1992). In addition, almost all countries created a social rental housing sector. The Netherlands went the farthest in this respect, compared by West European standards. The large proportion of social housing units within the stock is indicative of this policy.

1950s

The large housing shortage has almost continually set the agenda for housing policy in the Netherlands. The 1947 Census of Population revealed a shortage of about 300,000 dwellings. During the 1950s, the country was governed by the left-centre coalition which created the main institutions of the welfare state. This coalition introduced numerous measures - rent control, housing distribution, subsidised loans to housing associations and municipalities, and property subsidies for the construction of new dwellings - to alleviate the housing need and to restrict its negative effects. The property subsidies were primarily used to expand the social rental sector. Accordingly, the social housing stock was expanded greatly, from approximately 140,000 dwellings in 1945 (10 per cent of the stock) to more than 540,000 (25 per cent) by 1960 (Van Weesep and Van Kempen, 1993). Many of these dwellings were constructed in large scale developments.

1960s

During the 1960s, when the left-centre coalition had made room for a series of centrist and right-centre coalitions, deregulation became the explicit goal of policy. Non-subsidised housing became more prevalent, but still did not account for more than one-third of new construction in any given year. Diverse attempts were made to return to a more free housing market. However, two situations made it politically inadvisable to reduce state influence on the housing market (Van der Schaar, 1987). First of all, the number of households had grown very rapidly, especially in the second half of the decade. This was a result of three main factors: (a) the postwar baby boom generation had come of age; (b) more young one-person and two-person households wanted to live independently; and (c) immigration was rising as a consequence of a growing number of 'guestworkers'. Therefore, the housing shortage remained large, retaining a high priority on the political agenda.

Secondly, the effort to build sufficient dwellings in the non-subsidised sector was undermined from time to time by unfavourable market conditions. For instance, at the end of the 1960s, the interest rates on long-term loans were high. Moreover, construction costs had risen sharply. These factors led to a decline in non-subsidised housing completions. The government intervened with an anti-cyclical construction policy. This was the most powerful engine of growth for the social rental sector in that period. From 1961 to 1970, over a million new dwellings were built in the Netherlands. Slightly more than a fourth of these were not subsidised (Van Weesep and Van Kempen, 1993).

1970s

In the 1970s, the rising affluence of Dutch society was spread widely throughout the population. In combination with increasing access to mortgage loans, this sparked growth in home ownership (Harloe and Martens, 1985). The proportion of owner-occupied dwellings in the new construction rose from 40 per cent in 1974 to 60 per cent in 1978. The government used subsidies to promote new construction in this sector as well. However, between 1971 and 1980, 1.2 million new dwellings were put up of which less than a quarter of these were built without subsidy. Thus, the expansion of the social rental sector kept going at the same pace in the 1970s (Dieleman and Van Kempen, 1994).

In 1974, the government introduced a system of individual housing allowances (IHS). This system was supposed to give households with a relatively low income the opportunity to move into dwellings that were fairly new, of good quality, and (consequently) relatively expensive (see next Section).

By the end of the 1970s, the homeowner market collapsed. The Dutch state intervened, again providing huge subsidies for social housing construction.

1980s

The Dutch government was slower than other West European countries to make fundamental changes in its national housing policy (Boelhouwer and Priemus, 1990; Lundqvist, 1992). The Dutch state did cut back the property subsidies and the housing allowances, and hefty rent hikes were carried out in the 1980s. But the relations between the national government and the social rental sector, for instance, did not change fundamentally in this decade (Dieleman and Van Kempen, 1994).

During the 1980s, the rents were increased sharply, even though income growth was slight in this period. Not surprisingly, the number of recipients of housing allowances swelled to a torrent. By the end of the 1980s, more than 25 per cent of all renters received a housing allowance.

Table 2.1 Tenure in the Netherlands, 1960-1990 (%)

	Owner-Occupied	Social rental	Private rental	Total %
1960	30	23	47	100
1965	33	26	41	100
1970	35	31	34	100
1975	39	34	27	100
1980	42	36	21	100
1985	43	38	18	100
1990	45	41	14	100

Source: Meusen and Van Kempen (1994); MVROM 1992a

By the end of the 1980s, the tenure structure of the Dutch housing stock was as follows: 45 per cent owner-occupied; 41 per cent social rental; and 14 per cent private rental (Table 2.1). Both the owner-occupied sector and the social rental sector have gained in importance in the post-war period, while the private rental sector lost its position as the main housing segment.

2.3 Hot items in Dutch housing

Mismatch in the rental sector
The types of household that occupy the social rental sector in the Netherlands are highly diverse. In fact, nearly everyone who prefers to rent rather than to buy is relegated to the social rental sector. For this reason, the social rental sector houses many people, both young and old, with a relatively high income (Dieleman, 1994). Consequently, many people with a fairly high income pay a relatively low rent. This is called 'inexpensive mismatch'. In contrast, there are many people with a low income who live in expensive rental dwellings. They are able to do so by taking advantage of the opportunity for a housing allowance (IHS). This situation is called 'expensive mismatch'. Especially in the first half of the 1990s both kinds of 'mismatches' were considered undesirable by the Dutch government.

Inexpensive mismatch[1]
In 1990, 38 per cent of all inexpensive rental units in the Netherlands were occupied by households with an income above the normative rent. Around 23 per cent of all renters paid less than the normative rent in 1990 (MVROM, 1992b). In absolute numbers, this was 726,000 households in 1990 (MVROM, 1992d).

The incidence of inexpensive mismatch is for a large part due to the fact that many households do not move when their incomes rise. In many cases dwellings in the inexpensive social rental sector are allocated to households with a relatively low income. But it is impossible in the Netherlands to force them to leave when their incomes have increased. Neither is it possible to calculate a higher rent. Many households prefer to stay in their inexpensive dwellings, because the dwellings are generally of a very decent quality. But some households do not leave, because there are no good alternatives. We will return to this later.

A second cause of inexpensive mismatch is the allocation procedure itself. Housing authorities may have different allocation norms. These norms may differ from the norms as defined by the Ministry of Housing. For example, some municipalities only look at the income of the head of the household, while the norms of the Ministry are based on household income.

Many inexpensive dwellings are allocated to young starters in the housing market. Specifically this group often shows big changes according to their household situation, their position on the labour market and their income. In the short period between 1986 and 1990, there was an influx of 240,000 households whose housing costs were below the norm. Sixty per cent of these new inexpensive mismatches were starters (Dieleman and Van Kempen, 1994).

Young people (under 40 years of age) and households in which at least one person derives an income from wage labour are over-represented among households paying less rent than they can afford. The over-representation of younger households among those who could afford to pay a higher rent is in accordance with the observation that many starters are allocated an inexpensive rental unit.

Expensive mismatch[2]

In 1990, five per cent of the total number of renters lived in a dwelling that was considered to be too expensive (MVROM, 1992d). The existence of expensive mismatch is often associated with the application of the housing allowance (IHS). It is obvious that a policy aimed at diminishing the expensive mismatch will reduce the number of housing allowance recipients. At present, we cannot say whether or not a more stringent allocation policy and the enforcement of the so-called approval threshold (as of January 1 1989) for eligibility for housing allowance will have an effect.[3]

Relatively many of all those who fall into the category of expensive mismatch are at least 65 years of age. They are dependent on a social security benefit and a pension for their income. Their over-representation shows that mismatch is to some extent the result of inertia on the housing market. And it is also due to the fact that the elderly, possible under force of circumstance, are allocated dwellings that suit them in terms of amenities but are too expensive, in view of their income. A fairly large number of expensive mismatch households live in dwellings built after 1970 (MVROM, 1992c; Dieleman and Van Kempen, 1994).

The cost of social housing and subsidies

Since the 1950s, brick and mortar subsidies have played an important role in the Dutch housing system. Because the rents were frozen, the necessary construction effort to deal with the housing shortage could only be made by decreasing the investment costs. On the one hand, the government provided the capital for the construction of social rental housing in the form of (subsidised) loans to local authorities and non-profit housing associations responsible for social housing construction. In addition, operating subsidies were provided to these organizations. Private investors in rental housing also qualified for operating subsidies (Van Weesep and Van Kempen, 1993).[4]

The decrease of the brick-and-mortar subsidies from the end of the 1960s, implied increasing rent levels for new housing. To keep social rental housing affordable for low-income households, rent subsidies were introduced. The program was initially seen as a supplementary subsidy for the lowest incomes living in subsidised rental housing built since 1960. Its principle was that the tenant would pay no more than one-sixth or one-seventh part of taxable income for rent.

In 1975, the programme lost its experimental character. The contract rents were determined on the basis of what would be affordable for a household with a modal income, and to keep new social rental housing accessible to lower-income households, they would be entitled to a rent subsidy. Eventually this entitlement was ex-

Table 2.2 Individual housing allowance in The Netherlands 1975-1991

Period	Number of recipients	Total budget (million Dfl.)
1975	348,000	339
1979	395,000	473
1984	715,000	1,271
1988	880,000	1,551
1991	953,000	1,779

Source: MVROM (1992d)

tended to all households with a below-modal income in low- and moderately priced housing.

The programme was a huge success when measured in terms of the number of households enrolled (Table 2.2). This number expanded rapidly, partly because of increasing housing costs, partly because of the stagnation of the growth of personal incomes. Consequently, each year the average payment increased, and finally the budgetary effects became far larger than the government had foreseen. This eventually led to many changes in the rent subsidy program, from separate payment tables for single persons, to the lowering of the rent ceilings of qualifying housing. The individual rent subsidy program clearly benefitted the lowest income groups. In 1989, just over half of all the households with a minimum income was enrolled in the programme. But the main problem is of course that the programme costs a lot of money. In a retreating welfare state, this can be seen as a liability.

The existence of the mismatch in the rental sector, in combination with a large amount of brick-and-mortar subsidies and rent subsidies has prevented the Netherlands to become a segregated society. Clearly, in the Netherlands, the relation between a household's income and the place where one lives is blurred. Especially in the large cities socially homogeneous areas are non-existent, certainly at the lower end of the scale. Also ethnically homogeneous neighbourhoods do not exist.

2.4 Some characteristics of large scale post-war housing estates

Sections 2 and 3 identified some general issues of housing policy and the function of the social rental sector in the Netherlands. In this Section we will focus on specific neighbourhood types. What can be said about their housing composition? How can the population of these areas be characterised?

As stated before, the large housing shortage in the Netherlands has almost continually set the agenda for government policy. In every period after World War II, large parts of the urban landscape were covered with dwellings. Each period has its own characteristics, according to, for example, building heights, diversity,

availability of green spaces, parking lots, etcetera. In every city large scale post-war housing estates can be found.

Large scale post-war housing estates in the Netherlands can be distinguished in several types. Of course, a typology of districts can be made up in several ways, depending on the criteria used (see also Wassenberg, 1993; Van Kempen, 1992). Important aspects of the classifications are the period of construction, the prevailing type of dwelling and the urban planning structure. As already mentioned in the introduction, we will focus on two types of post-war areas. We will also say something about their population and present problems.

Early post-war neighbourhoods

These neighbourhoods were built between 1945 and 1960. The predominantly 3- and 4-room dwellings were initially built for family households. Rents were generally low, but higher than in many pre-war rental dwellings. The districts are characterised by (half) open blocks of buildings, arranged in a fixed pattern and with communal courtyards. The urban design was strongly influenced by the CIAM ideas, with much attention for 'light, air and space'. The neighbourhoods dating from this period do not only show apartment complexes, but also single-family dwellings, both in the rental sector, and in the owner-occupied segment of the housing market.

At this moment, the rents, especially those of the apartments, are among the lowest of the total housing stock. Consequently, many households with relatively low incomes live here: many Dutch households in the reduction stage of their family life-cycle, an increasing number of Turkish and Moroccan families, and also young starters in the housing market. As might be expected from the previous section, however, also households with higher incomes live in the inexpensive apartments, either temporarily (as one of the first steps in their housing careers) or more permanently. For example, in 1991, in the Amsterdam early post-war neighbourhoods an estimated 57 per cent of the inexpensive apartments were inhabited by households with higher incomes (Van Kempen, 1992).

Problems in these areas are manifold: more and more people are less satisfied with their dwelling and the living environment, many people move or definitely want to move, the quality of the housing is decreasing, and the neighbourhoods fall prey to dirt, graffiti, crimes and vandalism (Elsinga and Wassenberg, 1991). Many households, both with low- and high incomes, consider their neighbourhoods as deteriorating areas. Especially in Amsterdam, the influx of Turkish and Moroccan households into these areas is considered to be the main reason of this deterioration. Of course, this evaluation is made mainly by those who have lived in the same area (and often same apartment) for decades (Van Kempen, 1992).

Because so many old people live in the early post-war neighbourhoods, we may expect that many inexpensive dwellings in these areas will become vacant in the next ten years. Another reason for an increasing number of vacancies is the moving out of those people who can afford it to newer housing estates, to be built on the rims of the cities.

High-rise areas built in the 1960s and early 1970s

In the 1960s, new building techniques were introduced. They opened up the way to a high-rise boom. The high-rise dwellings from the 1960s differed not only in their physical lay-out from the low-rise dwellings that were built in the previous period. Generally, the new dwellings were also more luxurious. A facility like central heating, for instance, gave the new high-rise dwellings initially a qualitative advantage in comparison to other social rental dwellings, for which this luxury was not available.

Standardization and repetition were the buzzwords in this period. Neighbourhoods with many identical housing types were the physical result. This does however not mean that areas from the 1960s consist mainly of one housing type; many neighbourhoods in the Netherlands dating from this period show mixed housing types. Sometimes high-rise predominates, but more often there is a mixture of high-rise blocks, buildings with three or four storeys, and single-family dwellings. Moreover, the areas with high-rise apartments are characterised by green space (as well as open car parks and parking garages) between the complexes. There are few private outdoor spaces. Often the functions of living, working, recreation, and traffic are spatially separated (Wassenberg, 1993).

Often the high-rises of this period are occupied by a mixture of household types (see e.g. Van Kempen, 1994). The dwellings are not the sole domain of small households, nor are there excessively many low-income households. Many respondents are either under 35 years of age or over 55. Sometimes they have lived here ever since the apartments were built. Compared to other neighbourhoods, the percentage of non-Dutch households is often very low. Clearly, the high-rise stock is not a housing segment that only houses marginal groups.

Table 2.3 Dissatisfaction with the dwelling and the environment (percentage of respondents who are not satisfied)

Aspects of dwelling		Aspects of environment	
Maintenance of complex	(32%)	Safety of neighbourhood	(25%)
Security of complex	(32%)	Noise in neighbourhood	(15%)
Quality of the equipment	(27%)	Access to city centre	(14%)
Insulation (heat)	(24%)	Quality of green space	(13%)
Insulation (noise)	(16%)	Number of shops for daily good	(11%)
Layout	(14%)	Safety for children	(9%)
Size	(11%)	Number of sporting facilities	(7%)
Contacts with neighbours	(9%)	Number of shops for durable goods	(7%)
View	(6%)	Number of play facilities	(6%)
Air quality	(4%)		

Source: survey 1993

Many high-rise areas are considered not problematic. An example can be given from the Utrecht situation (Table 2.3). Compared to households in early post-war neighbourhoods in Amsterdam and Rotterdam and early 20th-century neighbourhoods in Amsterdam (Van Kempen, 1992), there is much less dissatisfaction about different aspects of the dwellings and the neighbourhood. Most of the complaints concern maintenance and security. Most of the respondents who feel insecure complain about the easy accessibility to the flats. Strangers can enter many complexes without much trouble. This fosters a fear of burglaries.

But the general opinion is very positive. The great majority is content with the layout of the dwelling, the size of the apartment, the contacts with the neighbours, and the view from the dwelling. The same holds for different aspects of the environment, like the number of shops and sporting facilities and the quality of the green space. If we closely look at these figures, we do not see a picture of a bad place to live. Also, almost nobody wants to move because of these negative aspects. The main reason to move form a high-rise apartment is the desire to have a house with a garden or to have a house with more rooms. Moving seems to be related more to more or less logical steps in the housing careers than to problems of high-rise itself. Especially for the young households, a high-rise apartment is apparently only a first step in the housing career.

For the elderly, high-rise apartments are generally places to stay. There is no indication that many of them want to stay put merely because there are no alternatives. Often the elderly have lived in their dwellings for more than two decades. They launched their children from there and they now have ample space, as their households have shrunk. They have grown accustomed to the neighbourhood, with its shops and other facilities, and they have family and friends close by. Often a combination of these positive aspects is mentioned as the main reason to stay (see e.g. Van Kempen, 1994). High-rise apartments therefore also have an important function for people at the end of their housing career.

Of course, not every neighbourhood is the same. The Amsterdam Bijlmermeer area is a famous example of a high-rise area built in the 1970s with many problems (see Wassenberg and Van Kempen, 1995). The aim of this extensive area was to house families from the older parts of the city, but they did not show much interest in it. At the same time, the Dutch colony of Surinam was on the brink of independency, which resulted in a wave of immigrants from Surinam to the Netherlands. Many of these Surinamese were housed in the Bijlmermeer area. Now, in 1994, it is still the area with the largest percentage of Surinamese in Amsterdam. Moreover, it can be seen as an entry point and haven for newcomers, largely because dwellings in this area are easy to obtain. The spiral of decline in this area was triggered by lengthy vacancies, falling revenues for the owner (a housing corporation), budget cuts in social provision and maintenance and a declining number of affluent households, in combination with an increasing number of households with no opportunities elsewhere (Blair and Hulsbergen, 1993).

2.5 Conclusions and discussion

As demonstrated before, the social rental sector in the Netherlands is huge, whereas the private rental sector has declined sharply under the influence of government policy after World War II. Accordingly, the types of household that occupy the social rental sector are highly diverse. In fact, nearly everyone who prefers to rent rather than to buy is relegated to the social rental sector. For this reason, the social rental sector houses many people, both young and old, with a relatively high income (Dieleman, 1994). Consequently, many people with a fairly high income pay a relatively low rent and live in districts that can be characterised by many affordable dwellings.

Two major disadvantages of this situation can be mentioned: (a) those who can afford to pay more, occupy affordable housing that was built with the help of brick-and-mortar subsidies; and (b) they limit the housing opportunities for low-income groups. On the other hand, two interrelated advantages can be mentioned: (a) households with a relatively high income living in the social rented sector keep this sector from becoming the sole domain of low-income households; and (b) they prevent social segregation within neighbourhoods.

For the Dutch government, however, the disadvantages prevailed, specifically in the first half of the 1990s. Inexpensive dwellings should be made available to low-income households. One way of doing this is strategic new construction: to make inexpensive rental dwellings available to low-income households by building more dwellings in the more expensive rental and owner-occupied sector. Building special units for the elderly is another way of strategic new construction. The need for new construction in the market sector was emphasised in a trend report (MVROM, 1992e) and in a letter from the Secretary of State for Housing to the Second Chamber of Parliament, reiterating this position. Because specifically in the big cities relatively many households live in a situation of inexpensive mismatch, they are the best places to build more expensive dwellings.

As a consequence of the policy of the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environmental, all Dutch cities now have plans for developing large areas close to the cities into large scale residential districts. These are the so-called VINEX-locations. Development of these areas may go a long way toward alleviating the city's housing shortage. It is likely that large numbers of expensive owner-occupied dwellings will be built here, given the logic of the development process and the current housing policies. Many middle-income and high-income households will opt to move here. Leaving their low-rent dwellings, these will then filter down to low-income households. Yet, this will also result in a reduction of the existing social mix in many pre-war and post-war neighbourhoods.

The segregation trend is underlined by adjustments of the rent-subsidy programme. The changes imply that the new 'rich' areas are no longer affordable for low-income households. The allocation of older, low-rent social housing to low-income groups leads to a further concentration of the poor in older neighbourhoods. Especially in areas where no expensive dwellings are added to the stock, this income

homogenization process can proceed rapidly. In the big cities, an increasing concentration of low-income households in early 20th-century and early postwar neighbourhoods is likely (Van Kempen and Van Weesep, 1994).

Some expectations for different neighbourhoods

The changing Dutch housing policy in the 1990s will have a major influence on the large scale housing estates from the different periods that were described in this chapter. Affordable housing cannot be found any more in the newly built areas and even in pre-war areas affordable dwellings will be replaced by attractive, but expensive dwellings, aimed at the more affluent. The low-rent segments of the (urban) housing market are more and more to be found in the often deteriorating post-war neighbourhoods. Especially the early post-war housing estates and, probably to a lesser degree, the high-rise areas of the 1960s and early 1970s will face problems in the decade to come. A fair chance exists that many higher-income households will leave the estates in this area to become the inhabitants of the newly built dwellings in other areas. This process may even lead to vacancies. And the number of vacancies may be compounded as the elderly in these areas pass away.

What will happen to the early post-war areas and the high-rise areas built in the 1960s and early 1970s?

Early post-war neighbourhoods

Because the dwellings in the early-post-war neighbourhoods will increasingly belong to the least expensive of the urban dwelling stock, we expect the low-income households to concentrate in these areas. Higher-income households will increasingly move to newly built areas, because these offer more diversity and better quality. Many early post-war neighbourhoods will become minimum choice areas. Consequently, tensions among different population groups may intensify.

But we can also have a more optimistic view. Many dwellings are still in relatively good shape. Also, many people still like to live here. Especially those who previously lived in small pre-war, low quality dwellings are relatively satisfied with living in an early post-war dwelling and neighbourhood. Among them are many Turks and Moroccans (Van Kempen, 1992). In the next decade, more and more of these immigrants will migrate to these areas, partly because of the lack of opportunities elsewhere, partly because they have a definite choice for the early post-war areas. If these new inhabitants are also satisfied with their new situation, we might ask if we have problematic neighbourhoods. Of course the disadvantages of concentrations of low-income immigrants (underclass formation, ghetto formation) are well-known, especially from the American literature. But we have to remember that the Dutch cities are not American and that the quality of Dutch social housing does not compare to American public housing.

High-rise areas built in the 1960s and early 1970s

Many high-rise areas in the Netherlands are not considered problematic. Some complexes are bad, either from a structural point of view, or from a housing market

point of view. Some complexes will even be demolished (see Wassenberg, Chapter 8 in this book).

The relative popularity of high-rise living may be due to a combination of 'historical' conditions (e.g., the elderly who moved in a long time ago), the lack of alternatives elsewhere, and the financial accessibility of the apartments. These factors are about to change, however. And that change will probably lead to vacancies. Vacancies, in turn, may very well lead to various kinds of decay. To prevent high-rise estates from becoming a liability, some measures will be necessary. Some options are given below.

1. High-rise living seems to be attractive to many elderly households. However, this is mainly true for elderly people who have lived in the same dwelling for many years. High-rise apartments in neighbourhoods built up in the 1960s and early 1970s should be made attractive to the elderly of the future. They will not be interested in expensive single-family dwellings in the surroundings of a big city. They are likely to move from the older urban neighbourhoods, where they live in dwellings with stairs, to dwellings with more amenities, including an elevator. Making high-rise living more attractive to this group might imply making changes in the dwelling (like installing facilities for the disabled). But it may also be wise to retain important shops in the neighbourhood (like a supermarket), as well as to keep facilities for social activities and health care close by.
2. It will still be possible to attract affluent young households to high-rise rental apartments in the urban neighbourhoods that were built up in the 1960s and early 1970s. Especially at the start of their housing career many such households may still prefer the rental sector, because their jobs (and their relations) are usually not yet secure. Of course when rental apartments are allocated to these households, there is a big chance that they will move within a few years to another type of dwelling. But as long as they are followed up by other relatively affluent households, a high mobility rate is preferable to vacancies or the marginalization of high-rise estates.
3. For the most desirable estates in the urban neighbourhoods of the 1960s and early 1970s, especially those in attractive places (like waterfronts or close to the city centre), the sale of rental dwellings to the sitting tenants might be advisable. Especially the more attractive and relatively expensive rental dwellings could be sold. Those dwellings are often not financially accessible for low-income households. As long as the households themselves consider home ownership to be a very good option, a high-rise apartment at an attractive location may be a good alternative to a single-family dwelling in a suburban setting. In this way, affluent households may be induced to stay within the city limits.
4. What about the low-income groups? In the urban neighbourhoods of the 1960s and early 1970s, many high-rise dwellings are still affordable. These rental units will be required to house all the current and future low-income households in the cities. In the Netherlands, new affordable dwellings will not be built. This means that money must go into major maintenance in high-rise neighbourhoods,

now and in the future. Moreover, keeping the rents from increasing too much should be a very important goal.

5. Measures should be combined. If high-rise dwellings are made attractive to the elderly only, a very monotonous residential area might be the result. It will be impossible to make every high-rise estate a desirable location for more affluent households. To gear all policies to the goal of keeping the rents low will eventually generate large areas of exclusively low-income households. From a social point of view, this would be very undesirable.

We should keep in mind that in a society where market forces are more and more dominating, a clear danger exists for the least desirable parts of the housing stock to become marginalised much faster than in a society that can be characterised as a welfare state. To prevent this, creative measures are needed. It is a major task of housing researchers to contribute to this thinking and to keep a very critical eye on housing market developments.

Notes

1 By inexpensive mismatch, we mean a household with a relatively high income that lives in an inexpensive rental dwelling. This refers to singles with a net disposable annual income over Dfl. 22,300 and to multi-person households with a net disposable annual income over Dfl. 30,400. Households with an income under these thresholds are considered priority groups of housing policy. In 1990, an inexpensive rental dwelling was defined as a unit with a basic rent (not including services) of Dfl. 490 or less.

2 Expensive mismatch occurs when households with a low income occupy expensive rental dwellings. See previous note for the income thresholds applied. In 1990 a dwelling was considered expensive if the basic rent (excluding services) was Dfl. 650 or more.

3 At the time it was introduced (1989), the approval threshold meant that in principle, no dwellings would be allocated to households who were eligible for a housing allowance of more than Dfl. 250, as determined on the basis of the ratio between their income and the rent charged for the dwelling.

4 For a more detailed description of the ways the subsidies were calculated and the changes in the post-war decades, see Van Weesep and Van Kempen (1993).

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3

MODELS OR MUDDLE? INTERVENTION ON LARGE HOUSING ESTATES: PRIVATISATION AND THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE

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3.1 Introduction

A review of the progress and impact of intervention on large scale housing estates is particularly timely as urban regeneration returns to the agenda in Britain, and the privatisation of municipal housing runs out of steam. Such a revival of concern is taking place in the context of a growing interest in the concept of 'sustainability', particularly in relation to the economic and employment consequences of regenerating large scale housing estates. Until the 1980s, intervention was concerned primarily with changing the physical fabric and tenure composition of estates, but the 1990s have witnessed a limited widening of concern and priorities to give greater prominence to social and economic intervention.

Such a shift in perspective is vital for the residents of large scale public sector housing estates. Unemployment rates of 60 per cent or above are not uncommon and, combined with the ageing of long-term tenants, more and more people are effectively confined to estates which describe the limits of their social world. Consequently, the 'estate' needs to be the focus for comprehensive intervention if the lives of residents are to be affected in any meaningful way.

This paper attempts to describe the range of approaches taken to intervention on large housing estates, and to indicate the main lessons learned. Whilst it is appreciated that such lessons may be specific to experience in Britain, the last fifteen years have witnessed a sustained experiment in attempting to promote the role of the private sector. Consequently, the British experience may have direct relevance for those countries considering taking this route.

In order to understand the range of approaches taken to intervention, it is necessary to begin by considering the changing status and significance of large housing estates in the social housing sector.

3.2 Social housing and large housing estates of the 1960s/70s

Until the 1960s, social housing was provided almost exclusively by municipalities, and with the aid of central government subsidy. Dwellings were typically single fam-

ily houses laid out in the form of housing 'estates'. Such housing was considered to be the most 'natural' dwelling form, and estates were assumed to provide a 'natural' environment for the development of communities. Both assumptions are important in understanding the development of the large scale housing estates built in the 1960s and 1970s.

Prior to the 1960s, flats played only a minor role in public housing. They were tolerated in the 1930s in connection with slum clearance schemes, and only found their place in the 1950s when housing volume and housing density were priorities. In both periods, heights seldom exceeded five storeys, and construction methods were conventional.

Why the new housing estates?

The consensus about the form of public housing was challenged in the 1960s in the face of two simultaneous pressures:

i. the need to meet a desperate shortage of affordable family housing which worsened dramatically in the 1950s;
ii. the need to renew up to one third of the dwelling stock, constructed in the nineteenth century to minimal or no standards.

What type of estates?

Such an exceptional situation required exceptional responses, and the social and political climate of the time welcomed radical change. To this situation must be added the advances made in the technology of building, in particular the use of concrete, steel and prefabrication. For the first time in British housing history, it became possible to industrialise the building of dwellings, and the resulting forms were radical in appearance. The most dramatic outcome was, of course, the tower block, and the 1960s was the almost exclusive decade of the high-rise flat. 5,000 blocks of 12 storeys or above and containing 170,000 flats were built in Britain during the high-rise era. The new technology was also applied to mid-rise dwellings of for example, six storeys in height, connected by above-ground walkways, or 'streets in the sky'.

What linked both low and high-rise dwellings was an adherence to the idea of the 'housing estate'. Whilst the scale might vary, from a hundred to several thousand dwellings, the principle remained the same, that local facilities from schools to shops should be provided on housing estates. In this way, neighbourhoods might be established and communities form. Indeed, formulae were developed in the 1940s relating the size of the 'neighbourhood unit' to the facilities provided. The priority in the 1960s and into the 1970s was to achieve the maximum number of dwellings, and it was quite typical for local facilities to be omitted in the interests of economy or speed of construction. Such omissions may never have been rectified.

Where were they built?

Whilst new municipal estates were built throughout Britain, development was concentrated on those locations with the greatest housing shortages and largest stocks of 'slum' housing. Consequently, Greater London and the industrial cities of Glasgow,

Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham and Leeds experienced massive slum-clearance and municipal house-building programmes. The scale of these schemes could be breathtaking, with whole neighbourhoods disappearing. As many as five million people were rehoused between 1945 and 1978, and 20 per cent of the pre-war dwelling stock was demolished.

For whom were they built?
The new estates were aimed primarily at manual workers with young children. They made up the majority of those on waiting lists, and constituted a considerable electoral force. Exceptions occurred where slums were cleared of residual populations including the elderly, single people and migrant workers. A limited amount of accommodation was provided for the retired elderly but, typically, all households were allocated to the same type of dwelling. Consequently, one tower block could accommodate both young families and retired single people in flats of different sizes. The social composition of the new estates proved critical to their subsequent social development, and some new estates with fragmented and highly residual populations experienced difficulties from opening.

To what standards?
The space and amenity standards of dwellings were extremely high, and were informed by the principles of the 1961 Parker-Morris Report (MHLG, 1961). Flats and houses were provided with fitted kitchens and bathrooms, and central heating (often underfloor electric systems) was normal. Unfortunately, the mass construction of dwellings within a short time-scale generates the simultaneous need for mass refurbishment or renewal, as at the present time.

3.3 Social housing and large housing estates since 1979

By the late 1970s, the British economy was in serious difficulty, and public expenditure on housing was reduced. However, these reductions were nothing compared to the impact of the housing policies of the first Conservative government of 1979. Their policies were based on the linked ideas of the centrality of the 'free-market' economy; a reduction in the involvement of the State in the direct provision of services, and an increase in individual 'choice'. Such ideas were to have a dramatic effect on the housing system in general, and on public housing in particular. Public spending on housing was reduced by the greatest proportion for any item of government expenditure, and between 1979 and 1980 was reduced by almost 50 per cent. Housing policy was determined by two related aims:

i. to diminish the role of municipalities in the direct provision of social housing;
ii. to extend the incidence of owner-occupation to become the 'normal' housing tenure.

Privatisation and its effects

From 1980, owner occupation was encouraged by the introduction of the 'right to buy' scheme for municipal tenants throughout Britain. The availability of discounts according to length of tenancy persuaded 1.5 million tenants to buy their homes between 1979 and 1990, almost 25 per cent of the total. Those dwellings sold were the most popular, i.e. single family houses on low density estates. Those who bought their homes were either using their savings or in full-time and stable employment. In contrast, those dwellings remaining unsold have been the least popular e.g. flats on high density estates, and those unable to buy have been either unemployed, in part-time or short term employment, low income single parents or retired elderly. By the late-1980s, it was possible to talk of 'residual' social housing and of 'residual' or 'socially polarised' tenants, with a frequent overlap between the two.

Despite the government's encouragement for owner-occupation, the demand for affordable social housing rose although the supply fell. This decline in provision was caused by:

i. failing to sustain the scale of development which existed at the end of the 1970s;
ii. failing to replace the housing sold by municipalities.

Since 1980, successive Conservative governments directed the limited resources available for building new social housing through housing associations. Although they built 330,000 new homes between 1978 and 1995, 1.5 million municipal dwellings were sold. Faced with a massive gap between the demand and supply of social housing, it was rationed on the basis of 'priority needs', applying a formal definition of 'homelessness'. Between 1978 and 1991, households accepted as statutory homeless rose from 53,000 to 147,000 per year. Consequently, those reaching the top of waiting lists included single parents without paid employment; those resettled from mental hospitals; those in medical need etc.

The 'growth' of large housing estates

Given the limited amount of new social housing available, there has been little choice but to make allocations to residualised municipal housing, and in particular, to the large scale estates of the 1960s and 1970s. In view of the loss of low density housing through the 'right to buy', such high density estates make up a **growing** proportion of the social housing stock. In some cases, municipal housing authorities have had no choice but to reverse 'no children in flats' policies, and to allocate families to the upper floors of tower blocks. Such policies coincide with the deterioration of this stock, and in Birmingham for example, almost 50 per cent of tower blocks require urgent action (Birmingham City Council, 1992). On the basis of the most recent national survey, 20 per cent of high-rise housing in England and Wales is concentrated in the worst 10 per cent of the housing stock (DoE, 1993).

In terms of the social composition of large scale estates, the effect of privatisation has been to create serious imbalances. Longer-term 'settled' residents are typically those who have been unable to exercise the 'choice' of owner occupation i.e. the unemployed and the elderly. To these groups are now added single parents and other

vulnerable groups. What all these groups have in common is multiple disadvantage and vulnerability, i.e. they are dependent on very low incomes determined by the State, and they are likely to experience other difficulties in coping on an everyday basis.

The extent of social polarisation on municipal housing estates is demonstrated by a recent social survey of residents in the 71 tower blocks which make up the Liverpool 'Housing Action Trust'. This revealed that: 'Almost all households receive some form of state benefit'; 60 per cent of households included one person aged 60 or over; 20 per cent of residents were unemployed and only 10 per cent were in (full or part-time) paid work (Liverpool HAT, 1993).

3.4 Intervention on large housing estates

Given the changing role and status of social housing in general, and of large scale estates in particular, what forms have intervention taken? Systematic housing improvement supported by the state has a relatively recent history in Britain, and only originated with the 'General Improvement' and 'Housing Action' Areas of the late 1960s. Such initiatives were directed at nineteenth century dwellings in disrepair and neighbourhoods in decline, and established the pattern of *area-based* and *physical* intervention.

Intervention on large housing estates has been almost exclusively area-based and has been concerned with improving physical conditions.

It was not until the 1970s that attention turned to intervention on more recent housing estates. By the late 1960s, it had become evident that some newly-constructed estates were in difficulty. Such difficulties arose from:

i. technical problems connected with, for example, the use of untried technologies and experimental dwelling types. Problems included: dampness in dwellings; leaking through the walls of tower blocks, and inefficient heating systems;
ii. the concentration of 'residual populations' resettled from 'slum' neighbourhoods, and which failed to develop social cohesion;
iii. design problems which created inhospitable living environments.

Problems expressed themselves through high levels of tenancy turnover, vandalism, lack of care for dwellings and an increase in physical and psychological health problems. In terms of this final measure, the research undertaken by Dr. Mervyn Goodman was invaluable. Dr Goodman moved with his patients from an old inner-urban neighbourhood in Liverpool to a new peripheral and high density estate, and recorded dramatic increases in such conditions as respiratory infection; anxiety and depression (Goodman, 1987). The obvious link, although methodologically problematic, was that the new housing and estate conditions had caused ill-health (Poon and Turkington, 1991).

The appearance of such problems, on estates designed to eradicate the problems of slum housing, was bewildering but undeniable. Within 10 years of opening, some high-density developments were already being abandoned by both tenants and housing managers. As the scale of problems grew throughout the 1970s, the option of abandoning such large stocks of dwellings was simply not viable, and intervention became inevitable. The first significant initiative, and which formed the basis for approaches to intervention practised over the last 15 years, was the 'Priority Estates Project' (PEP).

The 1980s – 'Priority Estates' and 'Estate Action' Projects

The 'Priority Estates Project' was established in 1979 by the Department of the Environment. This is the central government agency which controls and monitors capital expenditure on public housing, and which is responsible for implementing central government policies on social housing and the wider built environment.

PEP was a direct response to the growing number of estates (of all ages) which were physically run-down and difficult-to-let. The aim of the Project was, in collaboration with a pilot group of municipalities, to identify and implement those measures which could 'turn-round' problem estates. It is important to emphasise that, in 1979, unemployment was still at relatively low levels and therefore the 'problem' was defined almost exclusively in terms of housing quality and management.

The main findings of the first stage of PEP's work were:

i. that a 'decentralised' approach to intervention must be adopted in terms of the provision of estate budgets; local and on-site estate management; and a local repairs service;
ii. tenants' priorities for physical refurbishment were concerned with improving the security and manageability of dwellings (such as better heating systems)
iii. that 'tenants' direct involvement in and commitment to the improvement of an estate' was critical to its success (Power, 1982, p. 1).

Although PEP has subsequently developed into an independent consultancy, the major theme of its work has continued to be tenant control as the route to successful estate refurbishment. For a government determined to reduce the role of municipal authorities in the direct provision of services, such a philosophy had considerable appeal, but the need to act was given more urgency by:

i. the 1981 riots which took place throughout deprived neighbourhoods of English cities such as Toxteth in Liverpool and Handsworth in Birmingham;
ii. the need to prioritise the declining amount of capital expenditure devoted to refurbishing municipal housing;
iii. surveys in 1983/4 and 1985 which revealed the extent and cost of disrepair in municipal housing;
iv. a slow-down in the rate of sale of municipal dwellings under the 'right to buy'
v. programme as the first wave of most sellable dwellings had been disposed of.

Consequently, in 1985, the Department of the Environment established the 'Urban Housing Renewal Unit'. Its aim was to provide 'credit approvals' to municipal housing authorities to enable them to intervene on run-down municipal estates in order to:

i. improve quality of life through physical refurbishment;
ii. encourage decentralised or tenant management;
iii. develop partnerships with the private sector in relation to both refurbishment and management.

Under the 'Estate Action Project' (EAP), which commenced in 1986, these aims became more focused in accordance with government ideology into:

i. the concentration of central government resources for the capital improvement of estates into EAP;
ii. encouraging innovative approaches to estate management, principally decentralisation of delivery;
iii. tenant consultation;
iv. the diversification of tenure on estates to incorporate private sector activity;
v. the disposal of estates to alternative landlords.

As can be seen, such an initiative was defined mainly in terms of **housing outcomes**, and although managed by municipalities, intervention was intended to promote privatisation by transferring estates to the private sector.

EAP was not intended primarily to address the wider question of socio-economic conditions on estates, and frequent criticism was made that the lives or 'life-chances' of predominantly disadvantaged residents remained unaffected. A good example of the type of social problem present on many estates is the inadequate provision of child-care facilities, especially for the growing proportion of single-parents. Whilst this would enable parents to take paid employment, and improve their 'life-chances', such a concern was beyond the scope of housing-led EAP schemes.

Between 1985 and 1990, 632 estates were improved under EAP. An analysis of 523 schemes undertaken between 1986 and 1989 revealed that:

* 24 per cent of budgets had been committed to security measures;
* 25 per cent to environmental improvements;
* 22 per cent to heating, insulation and anti-condensation measures (Pinto, 1990).

Other spending was concerned with changes to housing management; initiatives to deal with homelessness and technical refurbishment (principally of tower blocks).

A further survey of 81 participating municipal housing authorities revealed the extent to which the Project's aims had been fulfilled (ibid., 1990).

i. almost 50 per cent of schemes had introduced housing management innovations, and 90 per cent had introduced estate-based management;
ii. the amendment of EAP guidelines to define housing associations as part of the private sector enabled 50 per cent of municipalities to claim they had achieved tenure diversification on estates;

iii. for similar reasons, 60 per cent of schemes claimed to have disposed of some stock to the 'private sector', but the transfer of large housing estates to private landlords did not take place.

Other central government measures of EAP success have included *reducing*:

* the number of transfer requests;
* the time taken to re-let dwellings;
* the number of difficult-to-let dwellings;
* levels of rent arrears;
* the number of vacant dwellings;
* management costs per dwelling;
* levels of crime and the incidence of vandalism and graffiti.

In all cases, significant reductions were recorded, although at the cost of increased expenditure on management (for 56 per cent of municipalities). Such costs can be accounted for by more intensive management at estate level, and by the employment of concierges in tower blocks and other security personnel.

Tenant consultation, one of the intended features of EAP has frequently proved problematic. Successful tenant involvement is a time-consuming and long-term task, but the need to commit expenditure within a rigid financial timetable (for example within financial years) has worked against effective tenant involvement.

The time-scale for intervention must acknowledge the requirements for effective tenant involvement

As can be seen, almost all the measures of EAP 'success' were housing outcomes. Even those municipalities in the EAP survey who wished to tackle the underlying social and economic conditions were constrained by budgetary considerations and the need to adhere to housing outcomes. This is despite the fact that the introduction of EAP coincided with a continual growth in unemployment, especially on large estates.

In an attempt to widen the benefit gained from housing-led estate intervention, a number of municipalities introduced such initiatives as 'Community Refurbishment Schemes'. Using sources of funding available from the Department of Employment, local unemployed people have been employed on non-EAP aspects of improving the environment of run-down estates. Pioneered on Merseyside, such work has included: enclosing public space into private gardens; landscaping and 'general cleaning'.

In terms of the employment of local labour, it is illegal in Britain to direct contractors as to who they should employ. The alternative, therefore, is to encourage local employment by means of 'employment charters'. A good example is the 'City of Liverpool Construction Charter' which was introduced in January 1995. Successful contractors are formally requested to employ a proportion of their workforce from certain neighbourhoods identified by postcodes. The outcome is that contractors tend to employ local labour, but only in low skilled/manual work, for example, bricklayers rather than surveyors. One reason might be the low levels of skills and expertise available locally, and consequently, government-funded training programmes can be

utilised to support apprentices for the duration of an improvement programme. Employed on one-year contracts, the apprentices can then develop the skills necessary to obtain further employment on refurbishment projects.

Such initiatives have demonstrated the potential for associating training and employment opportunities with housing-led estate regeneration, but the long-term benefits are difficult to determine within the limited time-scale of most schemes.

The social and economic benefits of estate-based intervention have been secondary under EAP, and are often difficult to determine

The 'DICE' Project

It is relevant here to mention a project which takes even further the idea of housing-led but estate-based intervention, and which has received considerable publicity in the UK and elsewhere. Based on her controversial research published in 1985 as 'Utopia on Trial', Professor Alice Coleman, a geographer, claimed to have identified a direct relationship between the design of housing estates and tenants' behaviour (Coleman, 1985). Using such measures as the incidence of litter, graffiti, urinating in entrance ways and households with children in care, Professor Coleman claimed that redesigning estates to remove 'confused space' would reshape behaviour.

Such 'architectural determinism' and the methods of her research have been the subject of sustained criticism, not least because contrasting behaviours can be found on identical estates and 'problem behaviour' can occur on low density estates of conventional housing (Hillier, 1986). However, Professor Coleman's ideas appealed to Prime Minister Thatcher, and in 1988, central government finance was made available for a pilot project. Termed DICE (the Design Improvement Control Experiment), £50 million was made available to remodel nine estates according to Professor Coleman's principles.

Whilst this experiment is still in progress, and no detailed monitoring has been made available, there has been considerable resistance by tenants to an imposed solution which involves consultation without tenant control. For example, on the Mozart Estate in London, Professor Coleman, recommended the demolition of four overhead walkways in order to improve security and increase a sense of 'territoriality'. Subsequent monitoring showed that almost 50 per cent of tenants wanted the walkways back as they now had difficulty in gaining access to shops (Brimacombe, 1989). The same survey also showed that tenants' priorities for improvements were caretaking and cleaning, but these had no place in Professor Coleman's design-oriented view of the world.

Re-design is only one aspect of intervention on estates and may be less of a priority for tenants

3.5 Municipal initiatives

Whilst the initiative for intervention has arisen primarily from central government, a small number of municipalities have also attempted to implement their own programmes of estate-based improvement. The examples provided here represent two contrasting approaches, Liverpool City Council's self-funded 'Urban Regeneration Strategy' and Birmingham City Council's public-private partnership, the 'Heartland's Project'.

The 'Urban Regeneration Strategy' in Liverpool
In municipal elections in 1983, the people of Liverpool elected an extreme left-wing socialist group. They immediately embarked on a strategy to achieve two goals:

i. the provision of good quality housing for 'working-class people';
ii. securing the maximum number of jobs through municipal employment.

These two priorities were connected by means of a municipal house-building programme which would create employment opportunities for the municipality's 'direct labour force'. It must be emphasised that such a policy was in direct and deliberate defiance of the Thatcher government's efforts to reduce the role of municipalities in the direct provision of services. Against all the odds, and by means of ingenious financial deals, an 'Urban Regeneration Strategy' was funded for four years. The policy was centred on 'priority areas' within which housing was refurbished and provided; the environment improved, and access increased to recreational and leisure facilities. Within four years, over 4,000 new houses and flats had been built; the same number improved, and over 8,000 flats demolished or condemned.

The significance of this Strategy, which was subsequently undermined by funding problems and local political change, is that it established a new set of standards for municipal housing, and provided jobs in a city with major employment problems. However, it was exclusively and tightly controlled from within the municipality, and served to reinforce the dependence of municipal tenants on decision-making external to the neighbourhood or locality.

Municipal programmes of housing improvement can have direct employment benefits

The centralised control of municipal programmes can remove control from tenants at the local level

Birmingham 'Heartlands'
A contrasting approach has been taken in the central England city of Birmingham which, although focused on the wider issue of urban regeneration, has had important consequences for social housing. Having experienced a significant decline in its manufacturing base in the 1980s, the city embarked on a series of prestige projects both to enhance its image and improve its economic prospects. Such an approach can be char-

acterised as 'trickle-down', whereby focused economic intervention has indirect benefits for the adjoining population.

In the case of Birmingham 'Heartlands', an Urban Development Agency (UDA) was established in 1988 as a partnership between the municipality and the private sector (Wood, 1994). The UDA acted very much as an enabling agency supporting development in a deprived but well-located area to the north and east of the city. Of the neighbourhoods on which the development strategy was focused, Nechells consisted of municipal housing estates incorporating several tower blocks. The intention in this neighbourhood was to improve housing quality, diversify tenure and choice, and improve community facilities.

The overall 'Heartlands' area has been physically transformed. By linking the upgrading of the Nechells neighbourhood to the wider area strategy, the local objectives have been achieved. One of the high-rise estates has witnessed the establishment of the first 'Estate Management Board', a device by which responsibility for managing a housing estate has been devolved from the municipality to local residents. This innovation provided a model for estate management which has been repeated throughout Britain.

In terms of the 'trickle-down' of economic benefits, the lack of detailed and systematic monitoring makes it difficult to determine whether or not new jobs have been created, and if so, what type. The lesson from 'Heartlands' is that, even though housing improvement may be secured on the back of a wider regeneration strategy, 'trickle-down' cannot be relied on to bring economic benefits to neighbouring areas or populations. The 'direct targeting of poorer neighbourhoods is essential' (Ibid., 1994, p. 57).

Detailed and systematic monitoring of 'trickle-down' employment effects from urban regeneration schemes is essential.

The direct targeting of economic intervention is more effective than 'trickle-down'.

3.6 Housing Action Trusts - a longer term and locally controlled initiative

As can be seen, the British approach to estate regeneration has been housing-led; it has tended to be controlled from outside estates, and its social and economic benefits have been limited, and in many cases unknown. The concept of the 'Housing Action Trust' (HAT) provides a final model for estate regeneration. Originating as another Conservative government initiative to find ways of privatising otherwise unsellable housing estates, the form which HATs took was quite different from that initially envisaged. Furthermore, they have provided one of the most encouraging models for future development and application.

Whereas 'Estate Action' schemes envisaged the possibility of the transfer of estates to alternative landlords, this was the stated intention behind HATs. Announced in 1987, HATs were to be selected by central government, with estates taken out of mu-

nicipal control and run by an external trust with tenant consultation but not control (Karn, 1993). Whilst the specific aims were estate regeneration and a transfer of ownership, HATs were seen as a means of taking responsibility for housing management away from municipalities. 6 estates were chosen initially, although none of them were subsequently established as HATs.

What the government had not counted on was the hostility of tenants to the removal of democratic control. Tenants were disenfranchised from voting either in favour of a HAT or, at the end of the scheme, on the choice of final landlord. By the time ballots on HATs had been agreed, hostility and suspicion were so great that not one of the original sample was proceeded with.

Imposed and undemocratic intervention risks losing all support

Out of this chaos emerged a second sample of HATs nominated by municipalities anxious to take advantage of the funds available. Rather than lose face by abandoning the initiative, the Conservative government supported the creation of six new HATs, now subject to tenant ballots. Dating from 1989, HATs were approved by tenants and established in:

	No. of properties
Waltham Forest, east London	2,084
Hull, northern England	2,400
Liverpool	5,337
Castle Vale, Birmingham	4,886
Tower Hamlets, east London	1,629
Stonebridge/Brent, north London	4,042
Total	18,378

With the exception of north Hull, all the HATs consist of large housing estates built in the 1960s/70s. However, a further exception concerns Liverpool, as the HAT is not area-based but consists of all the tower blocks in the city, irrespective of their location. Such a *housing-based* rather than a traditional *area-based* approach is unique in Britain, and is worthy of separate attention.

The Liverpool 'high-rise' Housing Action Trust

The Liverpool HAT was approved by tenants in August 1992, a 79 per cent turn-out produced an 83 per cent majority in favour. The life-span of the HAT is 7-10 years, far longer than envisaged under EAP or any other scheme.

What should be the time-scale for estate-based intervention?

The HAT is managed by a Board consisting of 11 members meeting monthly. Four members are elected tenants' representatives; one member is nominated by Liverpool

City Council, and the remainder are appointed by central government. All appointments are for three years.

In terms of tenant involvement, a High Rise Tenants Group (HRTG) meets monthly made up of two elected representatives from each block. This is the main forum for consultation with the HAT, but because of its size, a more manageable High Rise Steering Committee negotiates directly with the HAT. Because of its geographic spread, the HAT has been divided into nine areas, with two representatives for each area elected from the Tenants' Group making up the Steering Committee. Finally, Area Panels monitor the standard of housing management in each area. Professional and financial support is provided for all tenants' organisations, whether part of the HAT decision-making structure or not.

Since being formally designated by Parliament in February 1993, the housing stock has been transferred to the HAT and in October 1993, new housing management services were established by competitive tender for each of the nine management areas The impact of the residualisation of municipal housing in a deprived region of Britain was very evident. The social composition of the HAT's tenants was summarised earlier, but it is worth reminding ourselves of the key social characteristics:

* almost all were in receipt of state benefits;
* 45 per cent had an income of less than £75 per week;
* 51 per cent were retired;
* 20 per cent were unemployed;
* only 10 per cent were in paid employment;
* 45 per cent of households contained somebody with a long-term illness or disability;
* 67 per cent of households contained only one person.

By the time the HAT was created, the blocks were extremely run-down, and in some cases had not been improved since opening. In some locations, as many as 25-40 per cent of all flats were vacant and abandoned. A recurrent problem on such estates is the use of flats as 'Giro drops', by which those in receipt of Social Security Benefits receive a higher level of payment as a householder, but don't actually live there.

Despite the poor physical condition of many blocks, 74 per cent of residents surveyed were satisfied with their homes. However, a majority were dissatisfied with heating systems and the quality of external maintenance. The first priority for the HAT has been to improve the repairs and maintenance services, and to secure empty flats (estimated to total 4,250 in 1994/5). The overall budget for these activities in the financial year 1994/5 was just over £3 million.

The second priority was to determine the structural condition of blocks and the improvement options available, before commencing refurbishment. The extent of neglect was discovered to be so serious that the initial intention of retaining all blocks has had to be substantially revised. The option of demolition and rebuilding on site is now more viable, although the resilience of many blocks in the face of sustained neglect is encouraging for other locations with substantial high-rise stocks. The first

block demolitions took place during the summer of 1995, followed by refurbishment of those to be retained.

In circumstances of serious disrepair, employment and economic regeneration are easily overlooked, but the number of retired and elderly residents in Liverpool and elsewhere calls into question their relevance for a growing proportion of residents. Whilst not wishing to diminish the significance of the economic and employment benefits of intervention, there is a need to establish a measure of the effect of improvement which is relevant to all residents. Increasingly, attention is being given to health change as an indicator of housing improvement, particularly as more measures of subjective or psychological health are now available. Research undertaken by the author examining the health benefits of housing improvement on a large municipal estate in Liverpool has demonstrated how such psychological conditions as depression, anxiety and feelings of security and safety can be addressed, as well as more long-term physical measures such as the incidence of respiratory illness and coronary disease (Poon and Turkington, 1991).

To what extent might subjective and physical health states constitute effective indicators of the personal benefits of intervention on estates?

3.7 Comment

The relentless ideological pursuit by the Conservative government of market solutions to housing provision has blighted the quality of life of hundreds of thousands of British households. Furthermore, the preoccupation with measures designed to undermine municipal housing has led to a near exclusive emphasis on housing change as a measure of successful intervention on large housing estates. Such intervention has been accompanied by a 'residualisation' of social housing and a socio-economic 'polarisation' of tenants. The extent of this polarisation now calls into question the appropriateness of employment-related initiatives when a significant proportion of residents is beyond retirement age.

For an increasing proportion of the population of large estates, housing improvement fails to address the fundamental problem for them, their relative deprivation and disadvantage in British society. Whilst 'Estate Action' acknowledged the possibility of housing-related economic improvement, EAP intervention represented a largely lost opportunity to achieve wider social and economic benefits. This is clearly acknowledged in a highly significant survey of managers of estate initiatives undertaken for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Fordham, 1995). This survey confirmed that:

i. the work of the agencies involved with regeneration was seldom co-ordinated;
ii. effective intervention requires not only clear objectives, but a predetermined 'exit strategy' in order to leave an effective legacy of change;
iii. sustainability can only be achieved by involving the local community.

Similar conclusions were derived from analyses of schemes for 'neighbourhood regeneration' (Thake, 1995) and improving 'unpopular council estates' (Power & Tunstall, 1995). Thake confirmed the need for neighbourhoods to establish strong links with the wider economy through formally structured and business-oriented local partnerships. Power and Tunstall vividly demonstrated the limitations of housing-led intervention in the face of the social polarisation of unpopular housing estates and reaffirmed the absolute necessity of locally-led intervention.

The central government decision, effective from April 1994, to combine under a 'Single Regeneration Budget', 20 central government schemes ranging from 'Estate Action' to 'Safer Cities' across five government departments, is a belated recognition of the need for a more inter-disciplinary and co-ordinated perspective. The danger is, that after 15 years of narrowly-focused activity, ideas may be too firmly entrenched to accommodate a more integrated approach, and sustainable intervention will remain elusive. The 'ownership' of intervention on large scale housing estates has traditionally rested with those professionals concerned to achieve improvements in housing and the built environment, and not with local residents.

The need for an approach to intervention which is primarily socially-led, and which integrates the effort and resources of residents and professionals, calls into question the need for a new profession of sustainable estate intervention. This is the challenge for the next phase of action on large housing estates in Britain.

3.8 Four years on

Developments since 1995 have served to confirm the dominance of area-based approaches to regeneration, of a primary focus on large municipal housing estates and of a continual failure to achieve the 'joined up' thinking necessary to achieve sustainable estate intervention (Hall and Mawson, 1999). Sources of funding for capital improvement have remained tightly constrained by central government, and their allocation has continued to be determined by 'ugliness contests' held between municipal housing authorities at the regional level. The introduction of the Single Regeneration Budget spawned a further contest in the form of the Estate Renewal Challenge Fund, eligibility for which involved the proposed transfer of estates to Registered Social Landlords. Introduced in 1995, it was retained following the Labour Party's election to power in May 1997, but was due to be phased out by the year 2000.

The new government's approach has been strongly influenced by the concept of 'New Deal' policies, represented in relation to large housing estates, by the 'New Deal for Communities' initiative. A near inevitable weariness sets in at the prospect of further 'model projects' dubbed 'Pathfinder' partnerships under the New Deal programme. The rationale behind the new programme is the targeting of the most deprived 'neighbourhoods' in Britain, although disagreement continues over the methodology adopted by the newly created Department for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (Lee and Murie, 1995; DoE, 1997). The combination of two previously separate gov-

ernment Departments (Environment and Transport) is indicative of the Labour government's desire to develop more integrated urban policies, but progress remains painfully slow. Despite the New Deal focus on 'neighbourhoods', 'most deprived areas' and 'worst estates' are often used interchangeably, a careless interpretation which risks excluding minority ethnic and other disadvantaged groups concentrated in run down neighbourhoods of older private housing.

Whilst regeneration schemes develop a more holistic perspective, the ground continues to change beneath their feet. The deterioration of the municipal housing stock, which includes large housing estates, is now approaching crisis point, and piecemeal model projects are no response to the desperate need for comprehensive capital investment. The trend towards the concentration of deprived populations on such estates has continued unabated, and whilst the concept of 'social exclusion' redefines the problem, tenants are beginning to vote with their feet and abandon the worst estates. The emerging problem of 'low demand' social housing is causing near panic in some locations, principally in the restructuring former industrial cities of northern and central England. A combination of population decline and limited economic recovery have generated an element of 'choice' for those previously at the receiving end of allocated social housing.

The implications of such trends for the regeneration of large estates are immense. They raise serious questions concerning the validity of concentrating on the worst estates, when others which have yet to enter the feared 'spiral of decline' may be more promising subjects for regeneration. One of the valuable lessons of the 1990s has been the effectiveness of the technical refurbishment of multi-storey housing, and especially of tower blocks. A contradictory situation now exists where both blowing up blocks and their high profile improvement gain widespread media coverage. The tide may now have turned for multi-storey refurbishment in Britain, but decades of neglect have condemned many blocks to premature demolition.

Priority Estates Projects, Estate Action Projects, Housing Action Trusts, City Challenge, Estate Renewal Challenge Fund, New Deal Pathfinder Projects - more initiatives and more experiments - the regeneration machine grinds on. So what have we gained from all this experience? The lessons identified in 1995 remain relevant. The centrality of resident involvement, coupled with the potential of technical refurbishment still offer a simple model for change, but accompanied by much higher expectations of the ownership of the regeneration process, of the subsequent management of estates, and of the 'added value' of improving residents' chances in the labour market. Homes built for families employed in the paid work force typically house those who are neither employed nor live in conventional family units. The challenge remains the reconfiguring of large estates around urban populations whose lives may be as fractured as the housing in which they live. We're doing better than muddle, but after 20 years of effort, we still lack effective models for sustainable estate intervention.

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4

DID GENERAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMMES CHANGE SOCIAL CONDITIONS AT PROBLEMATIC HOUSING ESTATES? - Nine Danish Examples

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4.1 Introduction

The aim of this contribution is to discuss the current (1994/1995) state of affairs of solving social problems on the large troubled housing estates in Denmark. This occurs at a point when for the first time Danish housing improvement and rehabilitation programmes are being targeted directly at solving social problems at the estate level. The background for this discussion is research in troubled housing estates since the beginning of the 1980s including evaluation of the effects of extensive government sponsored improvement and rehabilitation programmes (Vestergaard, 1993).

4.2 Problematic housing estates in Denmark

In 1985 there was a potential for a financial, physical and social collapse among many sections of non-profit housing associations[1]. The Danish Folketing decided to create the financial basis aimed at a cohesive scheme of improvements and rehabilitation of estates built 1965-75. The scheme was based on the Act on the Remortgaging etc. of Certain Sections of Non-profit Housing Associations and amendment of the Act on Mortgage Credit Institutes and Act on Residential Building (Act No. 248 of 6 July 1985). Building damages and defects were to be repaired, the buildings were to be renovated, the environment was to be improved, and the economy of the estates was to be stabilised. It was also expected that these measures would help to improve social conditions on the estates, even without funding set apart for real social measures within the framework of the Act.

The aim was to raise standards over a broad front so that the troubled housing estates - often termed 'socially depressed estates' - once and for all could be lifted out of the vicious circle of constantly increasing problems.

Seven years later an evaluation of the effects of the improvement programmes initiated in 1985 concluded that there was no significant change in the social circumstances. In spite of the extensive financial, physical and environmental improvements (Christiansen et al., 1993) the social conditions of the residents were unaffected.

However, the residents' evaluation of the improvements had been positive at all the investigated estates, and with a few exceptions the residents expressed a high degree of satisfaction about living there.

Thus, when all results were tallied, the conclusion was that the efforts to safeguard the buildings against rapid physical decay and to transform the recreational areas into more pleasant places were met with success. Thus a physical basis for socially better balanced estates had been created. Also, it was concluded that the social problems on estates of this type were still a task that called for creative and targeted action, and that such action should be based on the existing knowledge and understanding concerning preventive work in the social sector.

It was also recommended as essential that any future action should be in the form of collaboration between the housing organisation or estate, and the social services department in the municipality in which the estate was situated. Unfortunately up till then, only a few examples of similar collaboration efforts had been developed to a satisfactory level and duration.

In short: the technical problems were handled but the social problems still remained to be taken care of.

4.3 Social housing in the Danish welfare state: From house builder to community maker!

Social housing is one of the corner stones of the 'Nordic Welfare State Model'. This position was one of the important explanations for the launching of large scale industrialised house building programmes in the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s executed by social housing associations. The success criterion for these organisations was to build new housing for the welfare state.

From the beginning many of these large scale estates came to house the less well-to-do groups. Since 1970 single-parent families, low income households, unemployed households, and single persons have become dominant groups in Danish social housing. Today, less than one third of the households are married couples with children, which was the norm earlier. Men and women with jobs are increasingly under-represented. Newcomers tend to have more children than the average or to be young, single or elderly (see table 4.1). Also, Turkish immigrant households and other ethnic minorities are increasingly over-represented on the less popular estates.

This has to be seen in the context that management of social housing in Denmark is very decentralised and partly under the democratic control of the residents. Initially, tenants' democracy had a number of obvious tasks in relation to technical, economic, and organisational matters. But the handling of social problems on troubled estates was an unforeseen task. A first reaction to the obvious need to deal with questions and problems in relation to the total life situation of residents was a discussion on the origin of the problems and whose task it was to deal with them. Many of these questions were considered irrelevant at the local community level of the tenants' democracy and housing mana-

Table 4.1 Over representation and under representation in total social housing stock and in the nine problem estates of different types of households in relation to total population [2]

Type of households	1970	1985	Total social housing stock 1991	The nine problem estates 1991
By age of principal:				
Under 22 years	-6	+27	+18	+76
22-24 years	+13	+13		
25-34 years	+27	0	0	+41
35-49 years	+16	-15	-14	+20
50-64 years	-16	+4	-4*	-30*
65 years and above	-27	+9	+16*	-46*
With children#	+24	-8	-12	+4
Single	+10	+45	+49	+36
Single w/children	+126	+161	+148	+188
Couple w/children	+22	-35	-46	-21
No active employment	-9	+42	+54	+26

\+ indicates overrepresentation in percentage points.
\- indicates underrepresentation in percentage points.
* limit with 66 years.
\# households with children < 25 years old living at home.

gement. Furthermore, 'disturbing elements' were referred to the welfare state, usually the municipal social services department. But this attitude had to be reconsidered, as the problems continued to present themselves in the form of 'disturbing elements' in the housing areas. Dealing with social questions has become a potential new task for the tenants' democracy and for housing management [3]. This task is at present being further developed as will be explained in section 4.5.

4.4 Improvement programmes and evaluations of results. What happened with the social problems at nine estates? [4]

As mentioned above it was anticipated that the mainly physical rehabilitation measures carried out on Danish housing estates in the years around 1990 would help to improve

social conditions on the estates, even without funding directly set apart for real social measures within the framework of the Act[5]. This did not happen.

In a single case (Tåstrupgård) where a specially designed programme to improve the social conditions on the estate had been established, the results were disappointing. At Tåstrupgård the need for a social programme was obvious and the presence of locally based people motivated to work with such a programme was decisive for its creation.

An improvement of social conditions could only be clearly affirmed at a single estate when concluding the evaluation in 1992. This was on an estate where a large part of the residents were newcomers and specially selected when moving in after the physical renovation (Vangdalparken).

The evaluation was carried out at nine housing estates. The basic data of the estates are given in information boxes alongside the case stories.

4.4.1 The nine case stories

The nine case stories elucidate how social housing in Denmark since around 1970 has reached its ideal goal on the demand side, i.e., housing the less well to do groups as indicated in Table 4.1. But no one is happy, because the change from mainly housing skilled workers before 1970 to housing less well to do groups in the 1990s has had a remarkably negative effect on the role, status and stability of social housing. Housing the poor is an admirable aspiration, and a good theoretical argument for access to resources. But in reality concentration of particularly vulnerable groups on large unpopular estates creates challenges for the social housing sector as well as the municipalities where they are located.

All nine estates were originally planned and designed for mainly skilled and unskilled workers and their families. In 1970 it was expected that households with two adults, two children and a car would become the dominant group of residents. However, these households never really moved in. The better off and well established families started to leave the social housing sector and entered the market for owner occupied housing. The large estates soon began to suffer economic and visible physical problems. In addition to this came the inability of the 'welfare state system' to deal with often urgent social problems concentrated there, at the same time as there was very little social fabric on which to build a community.

Egedalsvænge

Egedalsvænge never had many serious social problems. It is located in an attractive area with easy access to fast transportation. What characterised the estate was its relative unattractiveness compared with housing opportunities in other tenure types in the local area. Also, the main reason for Egedalsvænge being chosen as a case for evaluation was it's status as the first estate to implement and complete a rehabilitation programme supported under the 1985 Act. A main source of trouble in Egedalsvænge was the 166 youth housing units without kitchens - one at each stairwell landing. These units were originally a last minute design solution in 1972 to adapt an already finished project to new building regulations that put a new upper limit on the average floor space in new social

housing. This meant there was an unhappy mix of young people and families. The young people tended to stay up at night while the families living close by preferred to sleep. Part of the very skilfully done physical renovation project in Egedalsvænge resulted in reduced number of youth housing units. The plan is to continue this process of reducing the number of youth units. The relatively large share of ethnic minority households was not considered a source of tension in the area. Even though there were incidents of reported criminal acts, which labelled the estate in a very negative way, Egedalsvænge was not the least attractive social housing alternative in the area.

Location:	Karlebo, 30 kms North of Copenhagen
Builder:	FB - Fagforeningernes Boligforening, afd. 3045
Site area, sqm:	106,000
Type of buildings:	18 blocks of 4 floors
Period of construction/renewal:	1971-1973/1985-1988
No. of residents, before/after:	1,512/1,485
Total dwellings area, sqm, before/after:	52,283/52,883
No. dwellings, before/after:	662/657
Average size of dwellings, sqm, before/after:	79/81
No. Local employees:	9

Tåstrupgård

Tåstrupgård has had massive problems virtually since the start of the estate. Throughout the years the tenants' board on the estate as well as the housing association have initiated many efforts to improve the situation. Already in the beginning of the 1980s the estate went through a major renovation of its concrete structures. There was a constant struggle to keep the rent level down in order to let the apartments. The estate always had empty apartments and a very poor and depressing appearance.

There was an estate social worker employed by the housing association to help residents with social problems. There was an obvious need to do a special effort. The housing association was taking a proactive lead in developing an integrated social and physical renovation project on the estate. Special funds were allocated for improving the social situation at the estate. These funds were spent over a two-year period.

At the conclusion of the evaluation in 1992 it was obvious that Tåstrupgård still had major social problems. It had been a mistake to expect that running a rather high level of social activities with the help of professional community workers and advisers for a limited period of time could solve the problems of the estate. In a way it could be said that frustrations among the active residents and local employees were even higher after than before the renovation. They became disappointed about the level of conflicts and a continued high level of disturbing elements and crime on the estate. At Tåstrupgård it was apparent that there was a need for working with the social problems on a constant basis. A temporary project was not sufficient. It was also evident that the municipality did not want to take responsibility for the estate in the way of co-operating with other actors at the local level. The municipal administration saw this as a task beyond their means and resources.

About half the population at Tåstrupgård were ethnic minorities, mainly Turks, who were very satisfied with their housing situation. The other half were Danes, often with social problems, who seldom had wished to live at Tåstrupgård when they moved in. The social climate on the estate was very much dominated by conflicts between different groups and among these between Danes and Turks. At Tåstrupgård there were no attempts to spread or dilute the social problems, as was the case on other estates (for example Vangdalparken and Grønnedalsparken). Also the local market for rented housing was so tight that it was not possible. The municipal social service department had so many clients with acute housing needs that it used every fourth vacant apartment at Tåstrupgård for these clients. The whole idea behind the efforts at Tåstrupgård was to work for the people living there, not to get another kind of residents.

In the beginning of the 1980s several municipalities had started to demand that new residents in social housing should have a certain income and rent ratio. This practice was introduced in all suburban municipalities around Copenhagen by the end of the 1980s. But in the case of Tåstrupgård this had never been instituted. In the beginning of the 1980s Tåstrupgård had constant problems with vacancies and the local authority would not cause the estate to have even more empty units by enforcing the rule. As a consequence Tåstrupgård was the only social housing estate in the region where low-income residents could rent an apartment without being approved by the local authority. This might have been an important factor in causing the concentration of low-income households at the estate.

Location:	Høje-Taastrup, 20 kms West of Copenhagen
Builder:	Arbejdernes Kooperative Byggeforening, Taastrup, s.m.b.a., afd. nr. 4901
Site area, sqm:	150,225
Type of buildings:	8 joint blocks of 4 floors, 31 separate blocks of 3 floors
Period of construction/renewal:	1970-1972/1981-1983/1985-1991
No. of residents, before/after:	2,180/2,424
Total dwellings area, sqm, before/after:	80,480/80,870
No. dwellings, before/after:	953/961
Average size of dwellings, sqm, before/after:	84/84
No. Local employees:	15

Vejleåparken

Vejleåparken has since the beginning of the 1980s had an image of being the estate in Denmark with most immigrants. To this came prolonged disputes in the national press on how the local mayor tried to prevent immigrants and refugees from moving in. The reason for this reputation is probably that Vejleåparken initially counted for the dominant share of the housing stock in the municipality of Ishøj where Vejleåparken is located. It is one of the largest estates in Denmark and it became one of the first estates to experience a concentration of immigrants. Ishøj also became the municipality where the limits of the rights of the residents to get the apartment they have queued up for were tested in court.

Looked at from outside the estate appears as one large estate. Though it is formally divided into two sections belonging to two different housing associations. The smallest section with a little more than 300 housing units belongs to a very small local housing association where the mayor is the chairman of the board. The other with more than 1,700 housing units belongs to the largest and oldest social housing co-operative in Denmark. Today Vejleåparken accounts for about 25 per cent of the total housing stock in the municipality. When the persistence of the problems on the estate became obvious the local council demanded that the two housing organisations organise the management of the estate more efficiently. This had been a source of a lot of frustrations in the large housing co-operative as the normal routine here was to let the local tenants' boards function as the daily management at the estate level. This model of management has been successful at many smaller estates but did not work in Vejleåparken. In practice it is not possible for residents in their free time to manage an estate of this size and complication. At least not an estate characterised by social problems and ethnic minorities. There is no doubt that the constant attention and demands from the municipality on keeping up the standard of maintenance and management makes a difference in Vejleåparken. Also Ishøj is a municipality that takes it's responsibility towards solving social problems on the estate level seriously. To sum up, the social problems in Vejleåparken were not solved or influenced by the physical renovation project, but the municipality including the council continues to work with them. The same can be concluded about the organisational problems on the estate.

Location:	Ishøj, 15 kms South-west of Copenhagen
Builder:	Arbejdernes Andels-Boligforening, AAB, København, afd. 55
Site area, sqm:	320,300
Type of buildings:	45 blocks of 4 floors
Period of construction/renewal:	1970-1973/1985-1992
No. of residents, before/after:	3,896/4,105
Total dwellings area, sqm, before/after:	140,014
No. dwellings, before/after:	1,240 + 500 single rooms
Average size of dwellings, sqm, before/after:	103/103
No. Local employees:	24

Doravej

Doravej is located in a major provincial city (Aalborg) and is the smallest of the nine investigated estates - only 209 apartments. It has changed from a very unattractive run down estate to a much more agreeable and colourful place. The strength of this estate is probably that it is small and has relatively large and well equipped apartments. The estate is located inside an urban area with adequate local services and transport facilities. For a period the local social service department had a social worker attached to the estate. After the renovation the estate has been stabilised with a decreasing number of residents moving away from the estate. Also after the renovation more than 50 per cent of the residents expressed that they had less incentive to move than before. Both the pro-

fessional housing administration and the tenants' board were very satisfied with the results of the improvements.

Location:	Aalborg, county of Nordjylland
Builder:	Boligselskabet Cimbria, afd. 3
Site area, sqm:	43,421
Type of buildings:	15 blocks of 2 floors
Period of construction/renewal:	1967-1970/1986
No. of residents, before/after:	383/416
Total dwellings area, sqm, before/after:	19,252
No. dwellings, before/after:	209/209
Average size of dwellings, sqm, before/after:	92.1/92.1
No. Local employees:	3

Kildeparken

Kildeparken is a relatively large estate situated at the outskirts of the same major city as Doravej. From the start the estate was lacking urban facilities like good transport, shops, and both public and private services. The rate of resident turnover was very high and the local school had classes where more than half the pupils changed during the school year. There was a lack of activities for children in the local area. As early as the beginning of the 1980s the tenants' board had employed its own social worker on the estate. The municipality also had several projects aiming at improving the social conditions on the estate as well as in the neighbourhood. After the physical renovation the estate was subdivided into three individual sections each with its own budget, management, tenants' board etc. Generally there was satisfaction with the reorganisation of the estate at the local level. But as an unforeseen consequence several of the common activities covering the whole estate broke down. The estate social worker was cut from the budget. A common café popular among the group of residents spending most of their time on the estate was closed. The local newsletter published for more than 15 years stopped. The three new tenants' boards did not want to collaborate. After the renovation only 11 per cent of the residents expressed that they had less incentive to move than before. Nevertheless the situation has stabilised and former signs of negative behaviour and lack of maintenance has not reoccurred.

The reason for this was that a neighbouring estate had 'advanced' to the status of the worst estate in the neighbourhood. This happened in the time period between the renovation and the evaluation of the results in 1992. On this estate the residents tried to leave as soon as possible. They left partly because of a very badly managed rebuilding and renovation project causing water coming into the apartments and partly because of increasing rents. This meant that acute housing problems did not move into Kildeparken any longer. They moved in next door on the estate with empty units [6].

Location:	Aalborg øst, county of Nordjylland
Builder:	Himmerland, afd. 17
Site area, sqm:	466,181

Type of buildings:	73 blocks of 2 floors, 155 atrium houses
Period of construction/renewal:	1968-1972/1986-1990
No. of residents, before/after:	2,447/2,382
Total dwellings area, sqm, before/after:	101,844
No. dwellings, before/after:	975/1,059
Average size of dwellings, sqm, before/after:	105.5/96.2
No. local employees:	14

Vangdalparken

Vangdalparken was the only estate where it was possible to measure a change in the socio-economic composition of the residents in connection with the renovation. It was the estate that most convincingly changed its image and former negative labelling stopped. This was achieved despite the fact that there was an oversupply of rented housing in the local housing market. There are many factors present in the Vangdalparken case that contributed to this result. One is that a professional marketing bureau was consulted before the renovation in order to plan a marketing reposition campaign. This effort was carried out successfully. According to the marketing bureau the campaign was successful because the product was in order. A basic prerequisite for marketing a product successfully is that the product is in order. In a Danish social housing context to do a professional marketing campaign is very unusual.

Upon starting the renovation about half of the apartments on the estate were empty. It was the estate where most of the large apartments were rebuilt to create smaller apartments. This meant that after the renovation a large amount of the residents on the estate were households that had just moved in. Also, the households moving in after the renovation were smaller. Before the renovation the estate consisted primarily of large apartments fit for families with children. The housing association had in practice a policy about keeping households they expected to create trouble out of the estate when renting out after the renovation [7]. Also agents outside the housing association contributed to change the social situation. The municipality had and still has several day care facilities for children located in the area. One of these aiming at activities for school children was turned into a family centre. A new staff in this institution did a very good job in involving the adult members in the families in activities together with the children. Finally a local police officer did a special effort to keep contact with children from families where the adult members had trouble staying on the right side of the law. All the key persons including representatives from the residents found that Vangdalparken had turned into an ordinary housing estate. The social problems that earlier had been very visible and dominant in the area were either moved to other estates belonging to other housing associations (evaluation of the police) or 'we still have problems here, but now we work with them' (evaluation of the head of the family centre). Finally, it is also important to note that the professional housing association after the renovation was very conscious about keeping up standards and this association had a rather controlling attitude to the tenants' democracy. This is the project where the residents on the surface had the least to say about what should be done at the estate in general. But nevertheless the residents were

very satisfied with the result. This might be due to the fact that the residents actually were participating in the planning of the outdoor works at the green areas around the stairwell where they live.

Location:	Randers, county of Århus
Builder:	Randers Boligforening af 1940, afd. 29
Site area, sqm:	89,006
Type of buildings:	11 blocks of 2 floors
Period of construction/renewal:	1969-1970/1986-1987
No. of residents, before/after:	534/825
Total dwellings area, sqm, before/after:	33,715
No. dwellings, before/after:	320/344
Average size of dwellings, sqm, before/after:	105/98
No. local employees:	7

Bispehaven

Bispehaven is the only estate with high rise blocks. It is a relatively large estate and the built area is relatively densely utilised so that part of the estate is dominated by underground parking where also the main stairwell entrances was located. The estate had a difficult start being located at the very outskirts of a major city (Århus). The estate was original planned as part of a major centre with extensive shopping facilities and attached public transport services. The whole project was drawn up and started by a rather small municipality just before it was merged with the neighbouring large city as a part of a general administrative reform in 1970. It was not until about 20 years after the housing was constructed that the surrounding area attained an urban character and services and transport facilities started to match what had been the intention from the start.

Bispehaven has had a low status at the local housing market. But its location in a major growing city, with Denmark's second largest university, has always saved it from having major letting problems. The residents on the estate have, to a very large degree, been either people wanting a foothold in the local housing market when moving in from elsewhere in Denmark or people that ended up here as they needed to live in social housing.

The estate and the housing association, to which it belongs, were almost synonymous and run by the same group of people. Residents at the estate did not have a grip on managing a large and technical complicated estate. As the problems on the estate escalated in the beginning of the 1980s the social situation was also becoming worse. Many attempts to improve the situation were initiated, but they always faded out because of lack of resources and internal conflicts. Not until a new manager from outside the estate was employed did things start to change. This included a more professional approach in meeting the social problems. Thus new staff in the two jobs as social workers on the estate was employed by the professional housing association and not by the tenants' boards. Also a special effort to meet the needs of refugee children on the estate was established by the municipal social service department at the request of the housing association. The policy of the estate was to try to offer good housing at a discount price: "The Safeway of the

housing market". All in all the social problems on the estate were not influenced by the renovation project but the situation seems to be changing because of a new and more professional management being established after the physical improvements. This estate would have been in a far more depressed situation if it had been located in a part of the country with decreasing population and decreasing demand for rented housing.

Location:	Århus, county of Århus
Builder:	Boligselskabet Proestehaven, afd. 6
Site area, sqm:	140,000
Type of buildings:	7 blocks of 7 floors, 12 blocks of 4 floors, 4 blocks of semi-detached houses of 2 floors
Period of construction/renewal:	1969-1973/1985-1990
No. of residents, before/after:	1,679/1,816
Total dwellings area, sqm, before/after:	78,345
No. dwellings, before/after:	817/868
Average size of dwellings, sqm, before/after:	95.9/90.3
No. Local employees:	15

Grønnedalsparken

Grønnedalsparken was planned and built in the beginning of the 1970s mainly in order to house people being relocated from the Copenhagen area together with their employer: the Road Department of the Ministry of Transport. The location was the rather small provincial city of Skanderborg and the project was too large for the local social housing association to handle even though the estate would be a part of this association. So the management of the building project as well as the letting and the administration was done by a large housing association in the neighbouring large city of Århus. The estate was planned and built with relatively large apartments, special designed interiors and a high standard of individual facilities in order to accommodate the expected well-paid residents. But the Road Department never moved out from Copenhagen. This created a very low sense of responsibility for handling the situation in the local council. The situation was aggravated by a change in political majority in the local council and the death of the chairman of the housing association. To this came that the hired management was more interested in renting its own apartments than apartments in an estate belonging to another housing association. When the housing association of Grønnedalsparken in 1977 decided to establish its own professional management half the apartments on the estate had never been rented out and part of them were vandalised, interiors and installations having been removed. The new management quickly started to advertise the apartments all over the country. In less than a year all apartments were rented out. But then the problems started. Grønnedalsparken was already labelled and people 'from the grey blocks' at the very outskirts of the city could not get credit in the shops. In the middle of the 1980s the municipal social service office estimated that the majority of citizens on welfare lived in the new part of the city where Grønnedalsparken was situated. But the local politicians and civil servants still felt that the problems in Grønnedalsparken were none of their business. Nevertheless a community project was established with two social workers in

the area. The municipality and the two local housing associations having neighbouring estates with problems supported the project. Also, it was decided to engage in a renovation project. After the renovation the community project ended as the two housing associations were not prepared to collaborate and cover the costs without financial support from the municipality. Despite the lack of support the social problems on the estate lessened. The turnover of residents decreased. The relative attractiveness of the estate had increased. Residents making problems for others were not tolerated any longer. These residents found their way out of the municipality to the nearby large urban municipality, to a small estate owned by the municipality where alcoholics and drug addicts were offered a last housing opportunity, or large problem families moved out to rural areas renting former farmhouses etc. This change in the social situation in Grønnedalsparken also had an effect in the local school. Here the teachers reported fewer pupils with trouble. At the same time schools in the rural areas suddenly reported having children with a lot of problems. Also the professional housing association had changed its standards. All the employees that could not accept that the use of alcohol during the workday was banned had to leave. As the manager stated it: "When three people are employed more is done when all of them are working than if just one person is working".

All in all in Grønnedalsparken the number of social problems decreased. The same obviously also counted for organisational problems.

Location:	Skanderborg, county of Århus
Builder:	Skanderborg Andelsboligforening, afd. 17
Site area, sqm:	75,098
Type of buildings:	blocks of 2/4 floors, 42 semi-detached houses of 2 floors
Period of construction/renewal:	1971-1975/1986-1988
No. of residents, before/after:	744/845
Total dwellings area, sqm, before/after:	29,825
No. dwellings, before/after:	368/398/417
Average size of dwellings, sqm, before/after:	81/75/72
No. local employees:	1

Hedegårdene

Hedegårdene never really showed any result of the renovation in relation to improving its social status. Before and after the renovation the estate kept its status as the least attractive housing alternative in the area. As the manager of the renting department stated it: "If I can pick a potential resident up at the station, bring him to the estate, show him a newly renovated apartment and get him to sign the papers before he goes back on the train, he might go into the net." But as soon as the resident started his new job after moving in, he would be told that the estate where he moved in was no place to live. One of the puzzling things about Hedegårdene is that it is only the trained housing observer that notices on a first visit that something is wrong here. Judged by appearances the estate looks nice, the apartments large and well equipped, well kept courtyards etc. It does not show that the green areas are only partly kept. The laundries often are out of order and dirty. The garbage collection system is organised to the benefit of the renovation

company not the residents. Bikes and cars are wrecked. The schoolteachers often are prejudiced against the children from the estate. The main part of the children at the estate belongs to ethnic minorities. The residents almost as a rule never participate in decision-making bodies in relation to local community life outside the estate. There was very difficult communication between the professional management and the chairman of the tenants' board. Empty beer bottles might be thrown at you if you walk too close to certain balconies. Local politicians could not agree on how to take responsibility for the estate. A troubled housing estate was an argument for getting support from outside, not a local responsibility. All these issues are hidden.

Hedegårdene is located in a satellite neighbourhood with very little local service as well as poor public transportation outside peak hours. On top of this the rather modest physical renovation project was almost invisible. Hedegårdene was the only estate out of the nine where part of the financial resources from the refinancing was spent on rent reductions. The other part of the resources was spent at turning good large family apartments into smaller back to back apartments with a rather poor layout. When the renovation was finished the letting problems even escalated. The housing association employed a professional with established experience as member of a tenants' board to take up the post of community worker in the area on a daily basis. However, she never got the collaboration of the tenants' board in Hedegårdene and within a year she left. In an interview in 1994 she told me that working in Hedegårdene had been the most difficult and depressing period of her life.

Location:	Esbjerg, county of Ribe
Builder:	Andels Bolig- og Byggeforening af 1932, Esbjerg, afd. 8
Site area, sqm:	129,000
Type of buildings:	blocks of 4 floors surrounding 4 large park-like courts
Period of construction/renewal:	1972-1976/1986-1989
No. of residents, before/after:	777/879
Total dwellings area, sqm, before/after:	39,922
No. dwellings, before/after:	462/489
Average size of dwellings, sqm, before/after:	86.4/81.6
No. local employees:	6

Table 4.2 shows that the average level of investments in the nine estates was DKK 1,200 per m^2 floor space. On the average DKK 175 per m^2 were given as a subsidy for economic reconstruction. The level of the subsidy for economic reconstruction can to some degree be used as an indicator for how serious the problem of vacant apartments had been before 1985. The table is ordered by level of investment from the top down.

4.4.2 The common historical background

All the nine cases have a common historical background. And after the renovation they all to various degrees still have to deal with social problems in order to keep distress, general annoyance and discontent at a low level.

Table 4.2 Capital for economic reconstruction and level of investments in DKK per m² floor space in the nine estates

Housing estates	Capital for economic reconstruction	Investments
Average of all estates	175	1,205
Tåstrupgård*	439	2,226
Vangdalparken*	316	2,196
Kildeparken*	80	1,365
Doravej	88	1,343
Egedalsvænge	47	1,339
Grønnedalsparken	206	1,043
Bispehaven	97	1,016
Hedegårdene	195	630
Vejleåparken	152	604

*new community centres

They were all built at the very outskirts of a city. People did not want to live out there and the estates were difficult to let. After about ten years the level of rent arrears and residents moving out during the night became very high. The tenants' boards tried to solve these problems by employing a social worker at the expense of the estate in order to try to help residents cope with the situation and be able to stay and pay the rent. At many estates the initial effect of this was positive, but after a while conflicts often started. The outcome of the experiment often became that a sad and lonely estate social worker decided to leave before being cut from the budget at the tenants' next general assembly. The social workers that still survived were usually employed by the housing association.

The local schools often had a negative reputation. Dissatisfaction with the school was a reason for families with school children to avoid living on certain estates. On estates where the municipality did not do an effort to collaborate with the housing association and where the different departments in the municipal administration did not collaborate the situation was always worse than elsewhere. Understandably, the professional housing association and especially the tenants' board on the estate did not want to admit that there were serious social problems not being handled. Despite all the trouble residents experienced in their housing situation they had a tendency to be satisfied with the estate they lived on. Things had to be really bad before residents would express dissatisfaction about living on the estate where they had their home (see Table 4.3).

In the last column the figure before the slash means the percentage of the respondents who claim to be *either* satisfied *or* very satisfied. The figure after the slash *only* refers to the percentage of residents that are *very* satisfied. The qualitative information on the nine

Table 4.3 Overview over indicators for feeling safety and well being on the estates when the renovations were finished. The estates are ranked in relation to how many per cent of the respondents that never felt unsafe going about the estate in the evenings

Housing estate	Never unsafe	More safe now	Better reputation	Less incentive to move	Satisfied with housing situation
Grønnedal-sparken	80	9	58	39	93/63*
Egedalsvænge	75	4	57	30	90/63*
Doravej	75	12	69	52	93/73*
Vangdalparken	73	18	81	42	91/75*
Kildeparken	73	3	41	11	92/64*
Bispehaven	66	2	60	41	84/60*
Vejleåparken	65	11	46	24	91/54*
Hedegårdene	62	5	14	17	85/54*
Tåstrupgård	61	13	62	20	85/56*

* Percentage of residents being very satisfied about the housing situation.

cases and these survey data indicate that residents do perceive essential problems in their everyday lives on the estate unless more than 90 per cent of the respondents claim to be satisfied and more than 60 per cent say that they are very satisfied.

4.5 From an indirect to a direct approach to social problems: The Urban Committee programme

Until summer 1993 ethnic questions officially were a non-issue at the troubled estates. Despite the fact that one of the negative labelling factors at housing estates and schools in their neighbourhood were the presence of a large group of non-Danish looking residents and their children. This question was not being addressed politically by politicians in local councils nor in the Danish Folketing. Only right wing politicians openly stated their opposition to the immigrant situation.

The year 1993 was an election year for the local councils in Denmark. In the summer social democratic mayors in several suburban municipalities in the Copenhagen region started to demand the right to manage who could rent flats and houses in social housing estates located in their municipality. These mayors did not find criteria like being the next on the waiting list and having a sufficient income base adequate to avoid the creation of low income so called 'Ghetto' estates in their jurisdiction. Seven months after a new social democratic led coalition government had taken office and one month before local elections a so called Governmental Urban Committee was established. The aim of

the committee was to create a programme to solve the 'Ghetto' problems in Denmark. The Committee was headed by the Minister of The Interior and had the Ministers of Social Affairs, Housing, Justice, Church as well as Education as members. As a basis for further work an investigation of the extent of the 'Ghetto' problem was conducted. This investigation showed that 72 of Denmarks 275 municipalities claimed to have one or more troubled housing areas - practically all of them being social housing estates. A 30 point strategy plan was created. Twenty of these points addressed questions in relation to immigrants and refugees, while these matters only were ranked as a number five problem. According to the local authorities 'problems with Danes' occupied the first four rankings (Byudvalget, 1994a).

In the fall of 1994 a new programme package including physical renovation, refinancing possibilities and employment of 100 social workers as well as social initiatives in troubled housing estates was launched (Sørensen and Andersen, 1994). A budget of DDK 1,6bn for 1994-1997 was allocated for social activities. A shared financing between the Government, The Fund of Housing Associations and municipalities were prescribed. To this came a re-scheduling of DDK 10bn worth of loans to recently built social housing estates. The refinancing will allow possibilities for rent reductions, physical improvement projects, economic reconstruction and social initiatives (Byudvalget, 1994b).

The whole programme is created on basis of joint applications between housing estates and municipalities. Only projects based on very detailed plans stipulating tasks and cost are being funded via the Urban Committee Programme. Willingness and ability to collaborate on solving local problems have to be demonstrated at the local level in order to get project resources.

4.6 Conclusion

On the basis of the evaluation study of the nine estates it can be justified to conclude that social problems can be removed and dissolved from an estate, but physical renovation projects do not solve social problems, they cannot stand on their own. Investing an average of DDK 1,200 per m^2 floor space in physical rehabilitation and improvement projects did not solve the social problems on the estates.

Of the nine case estates only one - Hedegårdene - continued to have serious letting problems. This does not mean, however, that the other eight estates were seen as attractive housing opportunities. A main reason for the improved letting situation in the period studied (1988-1992) was a turn in the relative market position of owner occupied and rented housing in Denmark due to a tax reform in 1986. This reform made it relatively more costly to become a homeowner.

The Urban Committee Programme can be interpreted as a political commitment finally to deal with social problems on the troubled housing estates. If the question of social problems can be addressed and solved at the level of a housing estate still needs to be tested. So far rehabilitation programmes have made estates more pleasant places to live

on for the residents and to look at for the visitor. So far social problems have not been solved, but only moved on to other housing areas and diluted. We still need to see if all the local agents in and around the housing estates can collaborate to 'bring the horse to water'.

And then still: You can bring a horse to water, but you cannot make it drink.

Notes

1 In this contribution the concept social housing has the same meaning as non-profit housing.

2 This table is from Christiansen et al. 1993 page 33.

3 A background introduction to the present development in Danish social housing can be found in Vestergaard, 1992.

4 For a description of the different types and the aspects of the mainly physical improvement programme see Christiansen et al. 1993 and Vestergaard, 1993.

5 Act on the Remortgaging etc. of Certain Sections of Non-profit Housing Associations and amendment of the Act on Mortgage Credit Institutes and Act on Residential Building (Act No. 248 of 6 July 1985). The scope of the programme is described in Christiansen et al. 1993 and Vestergaard, 1993. Of course it can be argued that not all parties involved in the improvement programme shared the anticipation of an effect on social condition. But it stands as a fact that the evaluation research project was carried out along four dimensions: physical, economic, organisational and social. These evaluation dimensions were chosen in agreement with and on the wish of the two main clients of the evaluation: The Danish Ministry of Housing and Building and The Fund of Housing Associations in Denmark. The above-mentioned research project was presented at the International Research Conference: Housing, Policy and Urban Innovation, Amsterdam 1988. Here the important questions to be answered by the evaluation were presented as: 'Will the downward trends be arrested in the 81 troubled housing estates and will they be able to run without further outside help after 1993?' And also: 'Will most of the social problems that had to be dealt with in troubled housing estates in Denmark in the beginning of the 1980s be solved by the beginning of the 1990s, or will they (social problems) have moved to somewhere else, to some other section of the housing market by then?' See Vestergaard, 1988.

6 During a visit to Kildeparken late summer 1994 the positive development was obvious. So what at first looked as an unsuccessful renovation has turned out to be a development in a positive direction for Kildeparken. If this still would have been the case if the development at the next door estate had not become very negative is of course not possible to tell.

7 Today (1995) such a letting practice would not be possible as it is stipulated in the law on social housing. It has been declared unconstitutional not to follow the waiting list. But the local authority can help a housing association not to get a concentration of households, for instance certain ethnic minorities etc by offering alternative

housing opportunities to the household on the waiting list. At present there are many uncertainties about how the rules about letting are used in practice and how municipalities and housing associations interpret the law (Pedersen, 1995).

[8] This table is from Christiansen et al. 1993 page 121.

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5

TENANT POWER IN PROGRESS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TENANTS AND HOUSING STAFF IN SWEDEN'S MUNICIPAL HOUSING SECTOR

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5.1 The problem

Urbanisation in Europe, during the post-war period, has meant the construction of large-scale housing estates with a rental form of tenure. These are apparently in danger of being caught in a downward spiral involving the physical as well as the social environment. Purely physical changes and restoration have had limited effects and have been short-lived. Restoration and a strong arm policy on tenants, on the other hand, has had a more permanent effect, but there has been an enormous financial cost, while social problems are often transferred to new neighbourhoods. Transfer of ownership to tenants, in Sweden, has shown an impossible road because of a 'buying resistance' and because of a growing economic factor. Paternalistic or policing 'solutions', at the same time, has been widely thought as unthinkable, at least, in the Swedish context.

What is left is the possibility to try and develop a 'model of collaboration' between the existing tenants and the landlords' administrative organisations. This has been the leading theme in the development work which has been ongoing since the 1970s, especially within the local authorities' public housing sector. This paper discusses some of the experiences in this field, since the 1970s. From a larger theoretical perspective the paper deals with the problem of making real user influence possible by other means and social arrangements than ownership.

5.2 Background

What has long gone under the title of 'the Swedish model', for solving the conflict of interests in the different areas of the Swedish society, consists basically of efforts to establish a negotiating situation between the parties involved which are represented through the various official organs and recognised voluntary organisations. In the area of the labour market, the parties consist of, on the one side, the employers organisation and, on the other side, the trade unions. In housing, the parties consist of the landlord's organisation and tenant's organisation respectively. In general, the model implies that the overall framework in one area is negotiated on a central level

and that the concrete adjustments to 'reality' happen at the local level through local negotiations.

Disagreements which cannot be solved through negotiations can be assigned to a board composed of different parts of the relevant interest groups, sometimes with independent members who hold the balance of power.

The impact of the Swedish 'negotiating model' which is roughly described above, is an important factor behind the strong expansion in the body of ombudsmen, during the post-war period. It has also meant that the power of the more established organisations has strengthened while the area of manoeuvre for local and individual initiatives has gradually been reduced. In comparison to other countries in the Western world, Sweden has a strong tenants organisation on the national level. At the same time, the local authority owned housing companies are represented by a national organisation, SABO, and the privately owned companies by another organisation. In a similar vein Swedish housing co-operatives have strong national organisations.

The general background in which relations between tenants and landlords developed in recent years should be seen in the light of two processes. The first is the increase in the scale of housing projects, which was an integral part of post-war urban development. The second factor is that towards the end of the 1970s, working and middle class families with children, at least those which were well established in Swedish society, left the rental sector in favour of purchasing their own homes.

During this period, the renting sector was transformed by new single one-parent families, young people and immigrants. Movement within the new housing estates was often one of extreme importance.[2] For the Swedish negotiating model this meant, of course, strain. It was also established that those who were supposed to represent tenants in the negotiations did not always share the same living experiences as the tenants. A growing dissatisfaction with conditions in the new renting areas slowly emerged when the cost of living rose sharply as a result of the 1970s oil crisis, at the same time, the expansion of Swedish industry slowed down resulting in large-scale vacancies in housing and creating major economic problems for housing companies. As a result, the government and the local authorities were forced to bail out the companies with tax money to cover the huge rent losses which were seen, in the long run, as totally unacceptable. The 'crisis' resulted in decision-makers at the national level demanding reform of the conditions at the local level, both in the administration of the housing enterprises and the influence of the tenants (Karlberg, 1983; Lindberg and Karlberg, 1988; Bengtsson, 1991).

5.3 A short historical perspective on the influence of tenants

A quick glance over the events during the last few decades, in Sweden, shows that tenants have consolidated their position. Both housing contracts and government legislation have been used for the purpose of giving tenants greater influence over their homes without changing the ownership situation. In 1974 the housing political proposition established tenant democracy to be one of the major goals of housing

politics. Democracy for tenants was established with reference to 'how in the first place, tenants should be given greater influence from the starting point of the home, and understood in the broader sense." An important limitation was that is "above all' referred to the form of concession in the tenants contract, and that the influence of tenants should count during the period of use. Tenants freedom was greatly increased, when in 1975, they were given legal rights to paint and wallpaper their own flats, provided this did not reduce the value of the property. In 1978 a law of negotiation was passed which enable tenant organisations to negotiate rents with the housing companies. It is worth noting that this had previously been done on a purely voluntary basis. The framework of the agreement for tenant's influence, involving SABO[3] and HGF (the National Association of Tenants), shows the agreement to be an agent of change in 1979.[4]

5.4 The influence of tenants as a basic aim

In accordance with an official report in 1986, it was decided to give those individuals who rented housing more influence and responsibility:

"In accordance with our future terms of reference the basic aim of housing policy is to promote an equal and integrated living environment... ...the possibilities for the tenants to have an influence over the management of their properties are depending on the various terms of tenure. This point of view should also include increased equality which is met through better housing, improved areas of housing and more influence to the tenants".

The report puts forward equality and tenant integration as a major aim. Society's social stratification has a strong link with the division in the housing market of private and rented flats. This then poses the question; can the transfer of responsibility and influence for those who live in rented flats change the patterns of segregation? What the current form of social stratification means in terms of creating cooperation and influence is also a question well worth asking.

5.5 Theoretical perspectives of influence

Representative and participatory democracy
In the debate on housing democracy, it is the old dispute about what should be the aim which is always the bone of contention regarding representative and participatory democracy. It is worth recalling that the word democracy, ever since its original use in the Athenian state, has been given different meanings. One important difference is whether one grants democracy a value of its own or if one only sees it as a means to an end. If democracy only is a means, then one can discuss whether the goal can be reached equally well or better by other means. If democracy, in addition, is an end in itself, then there is no alternative but 'self-realisation'.

The need to achieve effectiveness in the decision-making process is an argument often used in favour of representative democracy, but in doing so it should also be made clear what sort of effectiveness we are concerned with here. Representative of elitist democracy can, from an administrative point of view, constitute a good starting point for quick and effective decision-making, but it is not a guarantee for effectiveness if one's aim is opinion-representation or opinion-democracy.

The theories about the necessity for and advantages of representative democracy have not been left uncontested and can also of course elicit the search of mechanisms which prevent of mitigate the oligarchic tendencies in the organisations.[5] Representative democracy has been criticised, among other things, for hampering moral and intellectual development and for not contributing to democratic education.

The difference in attitude towards participation is based, among other things, on a different opinion about the possibility of handling what is held to be the shortcomings in people. The participatory democrats believe in fostering and development while the elitist democrats want to make us passive to protect and keep us from human imperfection and civil foolhardiness[6] (Bachrach, 1969).

Leif Lewin (1970) emphasises in this book 'The People and The Elite', the strategic importance of participation for democracy, at the same time as he states that no democracy has been governed or can be governed solely through participation. One prerequisite for democracy's realisation is, according to Lewin's model, decentralised decision functions within schools, the workplace and the home environment.

"Though decision-making in non-political institutions the individual gets direct experience of societal effect and control of this social environment. This genuine influence quite naturally affects his subjective awareness of his influence so that he increases his degree of efficiency and thereby participation in general. He becomes fostered to assume political responsibility and is stimulated morally and intellectually."

Lewin's view of participatory democracy's importance agrees with the intentions and hopes expressed in the plan of perspectives adopted by SABO's congress in 1986, in which both the individual good and the public good were observed.

"Democracy means the belief that everyone has a will and the capacity for taking joint responsibility for decisions, as much as for their realisation. With the purpose of safeguarding the capacity of the inhabitants the local authority tries to carry their activities and decisions as close to the people as possible. In this work the residential areas constitute a natural starting point. Individual experience in influencing the adjacent environment is also important in giving him an opinion about his own action's significance for the society at large. For the preservation and development of democracy, it is necessary that possibilities are opened for citizens to contribute, be part of, and have responsibility for those closely allied questions. The increased interest for questions of democracy has, therefore, its natural starting point in the residential areas" (from SABO's Plan of Perspectives, 1986).

The participatory democratic view brings other aspects and grounds for judgement in connection with calls for, and efforts of, co-operation which the elitist view does not cover. The scope of participation and influence expands from being concerned with

concrete questions of influence of the local level, to include even human development in the broader sense.

Structuration theory and the meaning of influence

Anthony Giddens draws in his theory attention to the routine and our possibilities of breaking or going outside routine or usual behaviour. Giddens differentiates between practical non-verbalised consciousness and discursive verbalised consciousness (Giddens, 1984). Much of the practical consciousness lies in routine actions. We produce and preserve meaning not only through words but also through action. The routine is necessary, but for routine not to become a straight-jacket it is necessary to know that there is a potential for freedom. Only then we can both use and be masters over the routines.

The insight that action contains a moment of freedom must be mediated and learned. In general, we can maintain that the process of leaving routinization is favoured by dialogue. In dialogue the routine can be visible and enable us exceeding and liberation.

The moment of structuration, which Giddens attaches great importance to, is a moment when the actor is confronted with the structure and acts regionally by means of his/her judgement of the situation. According to Giddens the structure, that both hinder and facilitates, is intimately connected to rules and resources, but not in the usual sense of the concept. In Giddens' version rules are an abstract phenomena which appear and become sense at the moment of structuration, when the actor and the structure interact. The same is valid for the resources, which may be authoritative or allocative. The resources become resources not only through their existence but also through the meaning and legitimity they are given at the moment of structuring.

By means of dialogue and co-operation one should be able of influencing, both how the structure emerges and how the individual translates or interprets and, thereby, influences and effects the forms of the action.

The three faces of power

The discussions about co-operation and the influence of tenants have, in principle, referred to two different ways of achieving influence. Partly, it means that ownership and influence are so intimately connected with each other that the prerequisites for real influence is the transformation of a system of leasing to another form of ownership.[7] But there are those who also maintain that the influence of tenants should and can be developed even in the renting system. It is residence and not ownership which will constitute the basis for this influence. What is needed, in return, is participation. The point is if the idea of influence can be given such a high status that it can be realised without the support of ownership, or if the demand for participation is reasonable under such 'loose' conditions (Liedholm, 1988).

Steven Lukes' theory about 'the three faces of power'[8] is relevant here in connection with the discussions about co-operation and influence. The question concerns not only - what is decided (power of decision) - but also what - comes up on the agenda (power over the agenda) - and what tenants - think of (ideological

power) - or believe is possible or reasonable, under the circumstances. If one way communication, during a long period, is seen as sufficient, dialogue as unnecessary and individual and collective attempts of influencing as troublesome, then fantasy, stubbornness and energy will become necessary so as to be able to create a functioning dialogue or an evenly matched and trustful collaboration.

Lukes also differentiates between the external and internal possibilities of structures (Lukes, 1977). We can be hindered through executing and action or acting in a certain way, not only because the external circumstances are against us but also because of the impediments, obstacles and barriers we have built inside us. Internal obstacles can make external possibilities look unacceptable. The possibilities appear to lie outside the individual's capacity or they appear as incomprehensible for the acting individual. To account for our possibilities, Lukes uses the concepts ability and opportunity. Ability stands for the lack of internal obstacles, opportunity means the lack of external obstacles. If we bear in mind these concepts, co-operation and democracy can be seen not only as means to change the external circumstances, but also as a potential for change in relation to the internal structures, which increases the possibility of 'free' action.

The power of suggestion

One more interesting aspect in connection with influence and co-operation is who/whom will come with the ideas and the suggestions. Can the residents come with ideas and suggestions?[9] Have they a reasonable chance of carrying through their own suggestions or is tenant participation limited in principle to accept, modify or reject the suggestions of the housing companies? If the suggestions and ideas always come from above and are directed downwards for acceptance it is hardly genuine co-operation or tenant power and influence that we are dealing with here. The ideas and alternatives are already chosen from the top which, in Bourdieu's terminology, exist in another social field and have the possibility of deciding what shall be valid in this context (Bourdieu, 1986). It is a question of the realisation of already decided and directed ideals and measures, and not of openness for new ideas, changes in ideals, measures of forms.

Strong and weak networks

The importance of weak networks as intermediaries for bridging links and strategical tools deserve bo be mentioned in connection with discussions about co-operation and forms of co-operation.[10] In co-operation which demands coalition, one can presume that this leads to a development of weak networks, that is to say, of the networks which, according to Granovetter's theory, is particularly important for building bridges and links of mediation. Through the collective activities one builds up a better functioning ground for communication in a housing area which is useful in several ways and, furthermore, gives the possibility for developing stronger networks for those who wish so. A different well functioning social life in the neighbourhood is important both from management and a human point of view.

5.6 The development of tenant influence during the 1980s

Efforts to strengthen tenants possibilities in influencing housing management have been made in several countries, from the 1970s. The different kind of attempts have been increasing, but a general observation showed that the variants were very much conditioned by the characteristics of the general housing systems which functioned in those different countries. How the housing system, in general, conditions the shape of tenant democracy is perhaps more evident when comparing Denmark and Sweden.

Denmark, for several years, has followed a system where representatives of the tenants, in large parts of its public housing sector, have a majority power of the boards of the housing management, which is seen as 100 per cent tenant management. By all accounts, and to our knowledge, the system works smoothly and, on the whole, is not discussed.

In Sweden, tenant democracy has taken on several other forms and they have only, with some exceptions, reached the high degree of radicalism in the Danish model. Why this difference?

The fact remains that Denmark has a housing system where the economies of the different estates in the public sector is dependent on the historical cost in building the estates, including what is needed for maintenance. Consequently, each estate is, in principle, an independent unit and forms the basis for the tenant management board, although different estates can, of course, co-operate on housing management.

The traditional Swedish housing system, in the public sector, is one in which the financial resources of the different estates are, as a rule, pooled together.[11] The historical cost of building a particular housing estate, in principle, has no direct relationship to the rents in that estate. Rents are, instead, set through negotiations between the public housing company and the tenants' association.[12] The principle is that the total rent from tenants will cover the whole cost of the enterprises and the variations of rents between dwellings will reflect different use-values.[13] This has been seen as a method of avoiding the injustices between tenants in old and new housing which can arise as a result of inflation (Anas et al., 1985).

The 'peculiarities' of the Swedish housing system, described above, have made it much more difficult to introduce tenant management on a grand scale and as radical and as simple as in Denmark. The original idea of the Swedish public housing enterprises was to act as one of the instruments for local government in implementing its general social housing policy. In the wider perspective, to give present tenants the absolute power over housing management in their areas was thought inconceivable. Only the owner who represented all the inhabitants in the local authority could be expected to be impartial in the consideration of the common good.

In practice, this led to efforts in Sweden to strengthen the influence of tenants in ways similar to the democratisation which had been carried out in other areas of Swedish society. These solutions defined the different parties which have legitimate but different interests with a common concern and, at the same time, set up rules on how these parties should interact in the decision-making process.

To understand this development of influence in Sweden it is also necessary to know of the strong position the tenants' movement has as a rent negotiating partner.
The history of the Swedish tenants' movement goes back to the First World War. In 1923, a number of tenant associations joined together to form the National Federation of Tenants, which today consists of around 600,000 members.

The influence of tenants was established as a real activity through an accord which was signed at the national level, in 1979, between the National Federation of Tenants (HGF) and the National Organisation for Public Housing Companies (SABO). Behind the demands for the tenants stood a strong tenants organisation which in its national programme sanctioned that; local housing collectives should be able to negotiate with housing companies over conditions in their own living areas, as long as this was in line with the central negotiations and intentions, and as long as the collectives where part of the tenants' organisations.

The tenants' representatives at the local level, until the 1990s, were the contact committees. Of importance in this development was the HGF's efforts to stimulate the formation of contact committees in those administration areas where committees did not exist.

The contact committees subordination to the central organisation was questioned when the committees achieved higher status with the housing companies which led to an organisational change within the tenants' association. This meant that contact committees were given an organisational position with greater autonomy, but also more formalised. At the same time, the contact committees were changed into local tenant associations.

Tenant participation today

Tenant participation can be divided into individual and collective influence. The individual influence which in practice concerns the standards and the maintenance of the flat, is characterised by the direct communication and the contact between the tenant and the housing enterprise. Individual influence is taken for granted and the implementation is uncomplicated, at least in a well computerised enterprise. There are, however, special requirements and certain standards as well as the various ways to pay which may cause some problems with moving tenants. The individual has a chance to create a distinctive (personal) image for him or herself in his/her own flats.

As the world indicates, collective influence demands collective organisation and concerns conditions, interests and tasks well beyond the individual choice. Quality of living is not only determined by the design and the standards of the flat but also by the type of common sharing space, the activity and the social relations which exist in the area. Hopefully, besides the deeply rooted and well adapted administrative procedures, collective tenant participation leads to an increased sense of belonging, increased responsibility and improved social control.

The activity of collective tenant participation is conducted at different levels and with different aims and with different successes and results. Problem solving in most cases involves the company and the tenants. Information and knowledge are therefore, important elements. The realisation of a collective influence has naturally

turned out to be more difficult than individual influence. That is not to say that collective influence is neither unnecessary of impossible. Its importance and its possibilities are obvious in cases where the activity works.

Collective influence is used at different levels and is considered as stages of that development. This usually means the level of information, consultation and the level of decision-making. From the perspective of influence, the level of information is at the lowest level which is shown by the company's right to make decisions and the tenant's right to obtain information. It is also the company's duty to inform the tenants about its plans before they are carried-out. The second level is the level of consultation which involves negotiations and the shared rights of decision-making. The third level, the level of decision-making, is characterised by the tenant's rights of decision-making within certain terms of reference which are made in advance. For the company there is the right of veto which in event of happening, will mean discussions continuing in a Tenant Influence Committee consisting of both parties (Liedholm, 1991).

Attempts of adjustment by the housing administration

At the time of signing the terms of agreement for tenants influence, between the National Organisation of Housing Companies (SABO) and the National Federation of Tenants (HGF), most public housing companies were organised, more or less, like manufacturing industries with separate departments for housing management, park management, repairs, painting, leasing and so on. The structure in the larger housing companies was strongly hierarchical with heads of departments controlling the different levels. At the bottom of the ladder were the unskilled workers. The tenants soon discovered, however, that these visible representatives for the housing companies were not interested in the question of influence as the lacked powers of decision. To influence the conditions in any deeper meaning it was necessary to address those at the higher levels in the hierarchy. It also was clear that a strong hierarchy and a centralised decision-making structure did not go along with the expectations of the contact committees, who wanted greater influence through negotiations and co-operation with the housing companies (Lindberg, 1993a).

In 1981, SABO launched a model of organisation which was widely accepted (Lindberg and Karlberg, 1988). The main principles of the new model stated the need for decisions on housing management to involve tenants as much as possible, i.e. decentralisation, and the earlier principle of separate departments with different functions (cleaning, repairs, painting) should be changed to an area management. This latter change was also regarded as a necessary condition for the decentralisation policy.

The SABO-model involved a recommendation which divided the housing stock into management divisions of about 1000 dwellings. Each management area was to be directed by an executive, with a managing director in charge of operators and caretakers. The general idea was that an area manager who was locally based should have total responsibility for the housing management inside the appointed housing area. Specialist services, which could not be localised in the areas, would be requested from the central level by the area manager or contracted out. It is

important to note that the area manager would also have the responsibility of negotiating with the contact committees.

A quick evaluation

If we study the situation today, more than fifteen year after the first general agreement, we can speak in terms both of satisfaction and disappointment. The idea of participation has been accepted and implemented by the housing companies and in our view is a success.[14]

Looking on the practical side however, there are problems remaining. First, people consider the influence too limited. Second, are the problems of motivation and participation which are associated with the degree of influence and power. The groups without power are sometimes hard to motivate. It is important to find the right method and to work at the right level (Liedholm, 1991). Studies have shown that division into units of administration, which are small and proportionately independent, are successful and that informal meeting-places, besides the more formal policy-making meetings, work (Olsson, 1990). Interviews with the tenants show that they themselves often regard the block of flats, the building or even the staircases as an appropriate area of collaboration, but never a whole estate (Liedholm, 1991). The possibility of achieving high participation seems to increase if the field of work is broad and the work is done at various levels. Even so, the activity of the tenant's influence is allowed to encompass both administrative functions and social activities which promotes growth and democracy. There are more opportunities to reach people, and they have a better opportunity to work with tasks which are closer to them. The individual as well can become involved without necessarily becoming a board member (Liedholm, 1991).

An interesting aspect of this is the high number of women found on the contact committees - more than 50 per cent of the members have been women. The contact committees' informal states, up to now, has probably been of help in recruiting different types of people, and people with different 'internal structural obstacles'. There is no reason for doubting the competence of women, however, judging by the interviews, both women and other 'powerless' groups, it seems, need some self-confidence and self-belief (Liedholm, 1988; 1991).

The importance of social activities which are integrated with 'tenant influence activities' still remains. It is also important to use those organisations and the society's activities which are already made available. Studies have shown that some groups of immigrants, for instance, are motivated in activities on the society level much easier than on the individual level. Cultural projects, for example, involving tenants participation in amateur dramatic societies, fit in well with the strategies for self-help.

The fact that local sport associations, through their success, can improve a district's reputation and the tenants' self-confidence is a known fact (Liedholm and Lindberg, 1994).

The big question is if tenant influence, in its present 'normal' form, is capable of helping tenants to motivate housing company collaboration? In many places, there has been noticed a drop in active interest by tenants and a search for an even better

form of organisation in 'tenant influence' continues (Lindberg, 1993a; 1994). In the following chapter we introduce two such attempts of change.

5.7 Two attempts at renewal

BO 100 - an ideal model
An ideal image of collaboration which leads to a form of self-management is the building project Bo 100 in Malmö.

Bo 100 is a building project which started from the tenants desire and needs and a project which right from the very beginning included the residents. The completion of 39 flats, in 1991, had been planned and designed in collaboration with the tenants and is now managed by those tenants.

A short summary
The Bo 100 project's aim has been to achieve a good future housing and gain experiences and knowledge during the process. The tenants that move in shall - it was thought - experience that they are moving into better housing. The improvement emanates as much from the building process, as from the chosen methods and the quality of the end products. The tenants participation and influence should hopefully result in a house that clearly mirrored a number of individual and collective choices in respect as much to form, appearance, planing solutions, material, housing details as internal and external qualities.

Under the process one has also penetrated the expectations and knowledge about the future administration, regarding form, context and degree of self-management. As much practical and financial as social effects of different solutions have been discussed.

Project Bo 100 can be seen as a qualified test of which kind of freedom of choice is possible within the scope of the existing system of rules and of which benefits such type of co-operation and such freedom of choice can mean at different levels.

The building project has been influenced by experiences of similar buildings in Holland (Boelhouwer and Van der Heijden, 1992) and Austria. In particular it has been the project 'Wohnen mit Kindern' in Wien which is a source of information and inspiration (Groh et al., 1987). Characteristic for the project in Wien was that several tenants knew each other already before the project started and were animated by a common ideology. The idea and initiative came from tenants that established themselves as a group and chose the architect.

In Malmö the idea came from an architect who got the tenants association and housing company interested and afterwards, with help of the ordinary housing queue he found some interested tenants. The only thing asked of the tenants was that they as long as they were in the project, and until the house was finished they paid an yearly association fee of 100 SK to the Bo 100 Association, and that they were active in the working process. Malmö's Local Housing Company stayed as the owner of the house, but transferred in practice the building rights to the Bo 100

association. To be a pioneer is part of the Bo 100 house's idea. The ambition was to create a house that is revolutionary. And it shall give the tenants the possibility of gaining some confidence (Liedholm, 1988).

- The organisation of freedom

The goal was a working process that would give the future tenants a direct influence in the process and in the result. The tenants were challenged to let loose their fantasies and create and work in freedom, but it was also intended, within the scope of the project, to organise this freedom. The project was about both freedom of participation and freedom of organisation.

- The individual creation

Behind the idea and project is the conviction that the value of architecture in an aesthetic meaning must be seen in relation to the people that use it and that these people's absence from the working - process has, as a consequence, shown that superficial and neutral form elements are preferred before the individual creation. (Ivo Whaldör)

Hundertwasser's warning against sterile and impersonal homes... Never go in sterile homes, were the walls are flat and the windows alike. Such houses do you wrong... reverberates highly in some of the interviews with the Bo 100 participants. (From Gromark, 1993). Several keep away from houses and apartments that appear to be produced with carbon-paper in between.

- Architecture as a social adventure

Sten Gromark (1993) asks the question if one should make architecture a social adventure in which each one feels full responsibility instead of a pure administrative one. As an answer to this it can be said that project Bo 100 to the highest possible degree has showed to be a social adventure that both resulted in a house that the participates feel joy about, and that, again with reference to Gromark, to a house where society begins and is alive, in the sense that society begins where relations of one's neighbours arise. In this context the history of creation ought to be given a prominent place. It is not, enough with a house aesthetically and functionally attractive, some form of participation ought may also be implicated. The importance of influence and of the collective process for the feeling of belonging and of identification is worth attention.

The Bo 100 project has meant a gain as much from a physical and human point of view as from a management point of view. Besides this it has meant development of knowledge both at the individual level and at a more general level. For the architects the process becomes revolutionary. The architects that work with this will never be the same.

The tenants have personally formed the flats, but also a house they have a feeling of belonging to. Among the house's benefits we can count a good on the social climate and a strong sense of responsibility towards it. The creation process has been characterised by mutuality regarding ideas and proposals, but also of insight about the necessity of compromising and the advantage of mutual agreement.

The tenants learned during the process to discuss and argue as much to the housing company, the architects, and other experts as well as to each other.

As the process continued the prospective tenants became more and more interested, capable and to a certain degree dependent of taking charge themselves of house management. Even people who in the beginning of the project firmly rejected the idea of collaboration of self management, gradually changed their mind. In the end of the project the conformity was complete, the tenants themselves had to manage the house.

There were enough tenants willing to take care of the cleaning of the stairs, others could undertake other tasks as taking care of the garden and the flowerbeds, undertake the supervision of the sauna, the guest room and the local meeting place, ask for the technical control, do something about repairs, take care of the correspondence, take responsibility for keeping the accounts, show the homes, choose and introduce new guests, maintain social activities and so on. A number of working groups opened up which the tenants could join according to interest and capability. Obviously, the house association has a board, but there is also a garden group, an information group, etc.

Active participation in management work gives lower rent. The collective responsibility leads moreover - in a positive sense - to higher social control and keeps the social contact alive. Self-management with all its collective arrangements makes it easier for new tenants to get involved, to gain a feeling of belonging and to experience Bo 100 atmosphere that is called the spirit of Bo 100.

To tie up with the theoretical discussion in the beginning of the article the members in the Bo 100 project in a high degree have questioned their routines, tried their power under Lukes all three manifestations, increased the internal structure of possibilities, i.e. their ability, acquired information and knowledge and courage to exercise power of ideas, i.e. suggestions power, become more autonomous but also learnt the necessity of compromise and, not less important, through the collective process developed a weak network that can be developed into a stronger network if they desire. All this has resulted in a house that one can enjoy and that one has agreed to take care of and administrate. Care and responsibility have besides showed to be true not only for the house but also to each other, one is prepared to join in when someone needs help or perhaps just company.

The Helsingborg model

Even if the experiences of the Bo 100 project are very good and inspiring its validity is limited to new production and eventual radical rebuilding projects. For the majority of the tenants it is a matter of the houses being already built and they are not going to be replaced within the near future, which often stretches over several decades. What matters is if tenant influence can be increased even in the more 'normal' renting system. The North Skåne's Association of Tenants and the Local housing company Hålsingborgshem have worked out a model for management, named the new renting system, that is proportionally a more far-reaching form of collaboration, even if it is not a matter of self-management. You rent the dwelling -

but own the decisions - is the slogan under which the management model is marketed (Liedholm, Lindberg and Sjöberg, 1992).

Tenants organisation and influence

Characteristic of the Helsingborg's model is that the tenant through the Local tenants association gets a deciding influence over the management and the running of their neighbourhood. The residents can influence their rent costs, for example, by saving measures and their own working contributions. Each local tenants association area answers for its annual budget and for its results. The area is charged only for it's own real costs.

The areas that each local tenants associations have to watch and take responsibility for are proportionately small and in size identical to what is sometimes called a caretaker's area. A normal local tenants association area includes circa 200 flats. There are within the Hälsingborgshem 54 local tenants associations, that together form the Tenants association department within the Hälsingborgshem.

The prerequisites are obviously the existence of functioning local tenant associations. If the local tenants association do not work the Housing influence committees can step in. In the same instance one can turn to these if the negotiations between the are a manager and the local tenants associations do not lead to results. The principle applied is that the tenant associations decide and the area manager executes. At the hearing of the local administration's decision maker even the area manager and the house workers will be included and the area manager has in case of dissension the right to pass on the question to the tenants influence committee for decision. The tenants influence committee consists of 4 tenants representatives and 4 representatives of the Hälsingborghem. The aim is to reach an agreement, which according to information - as a rule does. If disagreement should still be the case the chairman who represents the Hälsingborghem has the decisive vote.

Another novelty in he Helsingborg model is that the tenants, through the Hälsingborgshem's department of tenant association, choose two representatives to the company's board. These members have the right of opinion and suggestion, but not the right of decision. The membership may be seen as a step forward in this democratic process.[15] This means the opportunity of communication and information and an increased possibility of central influence.

The connection with the tenants association has increased with the introduction of the new model. At the time of the transition the local tenants associations lowered the membership-fees, from 49 to 11 SK each month, which meant a quick increase in the number of people joining the tenants associations, from 30 to 70 per cent. The lower fee was compensated by an increase in the number of members, reduction of the union's fee and a compensation from the Hälsingborgshem of around 20SK per month and tenants.[16]

Basic rent and area rent

The meaning in the heading is the division of the rent into basic rent and area rent.

The basic rent that has been established through negotiations between the AB Hälsingborghem and the tenants association is based in the company's prime costs

regarding capital maintenance and other permanent costs. A certain levelling of costs occurs between the houses built at different times; the rules for use value of the Law of Tenancy puts limits on the rent. This part of the rent cannot be influenced by the local tenants association, but they can obviously through dialogue with their management area chief bring forward desires about maintenance that affects the cost.

The area rent, that can be up to half the total rent, is based on the costs that are budgets for the costs of the local tenants association area's management and administration and is determined by the local association of tenants. In this rent are included: costs for water and electricity, repairs, excess insurance, management of the property, cleaning, fuel, garbage disposal, chimney-sweeping, operation funds, and special supervision. Eventual surplus are only to the benefit of the residents in the area of the local tenants association, as well as the deficit merely burdens this level's own budget.

Besides the collective tenants influence the tenant are offered through Tenant Directed Maintenance (TDM) of the individual units, a comparatively extensive individual influence. The principle for this TDM is that the housing company answers for the maintenance of the flats but the tenant who wish so, may relinquish the planned maintenance and thereby get a discount. The tenant can also order special choices. The costs for these are taken out through increased rent.[17]

Company's organisation - stage 1

For the model to function it was necessary an adjustment of the company's organisation. During the first stage the housing company was divided in nine management areas of around 1 150 flats each. The management area is the area head's total area of responsibility. The management area was later divided in local tenant association areas (LTAA), that also is the lowest level of budget and account.

The area head's task is in this model of organisation the leader of the supervisors and estate workers. To the area head's tasks we count both the regular and spontaneous consultation with the local association of tenants, but also consultation with the area board, that is a joined body with tenants majority. The local decisions are taken at the level of the LTAAs (54 such associations in Hälsingborgshem, see above). The matters that concern all the LTAAs can be brought up for discussion and decision in the area board, but the ambition is not that in a great extent make decisions at this 'middle' level. The area's board can rather be defined as a collaboration body and forum for discussion within an management area.

Company's organisation - stage 2

During stage 2 one has gone further in the process of delegating responsibility and decision-making. In every LTAA it is now appointed a vicehost that can answer for the everyday contacts with the tenants. This has shown to be necessary to relieve the area's heads from their workload. The vicehost's responsibility and scope of decision-making is different both between different management areas and between the LTAAs within the same management area. The differences between the LTAAs depend of the different area heads having different ways to deal with the model. Differences in responsibility and scope for decision-making between vicehosts under

the same area can be related to the vicehosts being persons with different capabilities and interests.

Generally it can be said that the area heads have a heavy workload and the desire seem to be for getting the vicehosts so involved that they can work relatively autonomously and alone take care of the everyday contacts with the tenants. This would give the area heads greater possibility to work undisturbed with the overarching tasks like purchase and questions of policy.

Consequences of the model

The above model meant for the tenants a greater economic and administrative influence and by that also higher responsibility. The model has obviously given rise to questions and queries. Some of these questions appear to have been answered during the time the model was carried on. Other remain relatively unanswered or are the subject of discussion.

Already in an early phase of tenancy research we were able to establish the importance of small level and proximity for engagement and participation. This was confirmed in the Helsingborg model, where one in a high degree work at the LTAA level and delegate power and responsibility to this level. Further, we could in an early stage establish that co-operation and influence must be solved both qualitatively and economically. The economical scope of influence is in the Helsingborg model clearly defined and of a non-unimportant size.

A question that the Helsingborg model gave rise to, was which kind of tenants should try preferably to attract and what would happen with the social activities that earlier constituted a very big part of the activities of the contact committees. Was there a risk that the economical and administrative obligations could become so demanding that the social and vital living environment were set aside? Was there a risk that an elite of tenants put more energy in the pure administrative activities and the rest lied fallow or were judged uninteresting?

The questions and apprehensions have been proved relevant. Regarding the representativity of the association of tenants in the board, it is for example clear that they have difficulties in mobilising the many tenants with foreign background. That might be connected with cultural circumstances but surely also with the fact that the achievements of the elected representatives nowadays presuppose greater knowledge of the Swedish language to be able to read and understand the budget-proposal and other documents of the company. It seems also that the social activities have decreased. With this, there is a risk that some of the earlier democracy-education effects, will be lost.

Another uncertainty is if the company's overarching organisation in all respects are in accordance with the aims of the new model of influence. It was mentioned above that the company during phase 2 made the estate workers in the LTAAs more autonomous, among other things by diminishing the workload of the area heads that were starting to bread down with the extra-work that a greater tenants influence meant. But it is still the area head that from the company's part negotiate with the local association of tenants. The estate-workers risk here to be caught in a intermediate position that can influence negatively the climate of co-operation with the

tenants. We would like to raise the question if it would not be considerably more in accordance with the aims if the local heads were considerably more autonomous and had responsibilities for an area that did not exceed 500 dwellings.[18]

5.8 Discussion

In the theoretical part we called attention for the two functions of participatory democracy. One is to ensure that the activities at a given level of expertise is managed the way the majority wishes. The other is to educate and develop people so they can become mature and responsible citizens.

The first task can possibly just as well - and not less effectively - be handled through the representative democracy. Concerning the local authorities and the national affairs it is otherwise difficult to think any other alternative for those.

As for the other task, citizen education, there is hardly any alternative for participatory democracy, if one wants it to be for the benefit of the many individuals in society. We maintain that a prerequisite for a representative democracy to function 'democratically' at higher society levels is that many citizens, preferably all, have been practically educated in the democratic co-operation forms and that they also be fitted to represent a group of electors. By this it is not said that precisely tenancy is an obviously suitable area of training for democracy education. Strictly speaking could almost any activity that concern several individuals, be suitable as a 'citizen school'. One would also be able to assert that the modern western societies to a high degree got their vitality by many people being active in people's movements of different types.

Tenancy has undeniably the quality of involving all people and could therefore, one thinks, to be a suitable arena for participatory democracy at a big scale. But as both experience and reflection show this is not necessarily true. For many, particularly for the young, residence in a certain place is not long lasting, and that is obviously a hinder for deep engagement. Some people regard housing as a second-hand matter in relation to other activities that interest them more. In the actual Swedish context one can further point to language barriers and possibly also cultural ones that not seldom exist. These and several other circumstances make it irrealistic to expect that precisely tenancy will form the most important ground for citizen-education.

At the same time it is almost a forcing necessity to find some form of social network developed in the living-areas if those and society are to function. In this respect participatory democracy and the concrete co-operation at the small level are invaluable elements. Through these communicating well functioning weak networks are developed that afterwards can become the base for people who have the need to tie stronger contacts at the level of neighbourhood.

We said earlier that one important feature with the contact committees is that more than 50 percent consist of women. It is worth asking-what happens when the informal contact committees go over to more formalised local tenant associations with greater responsibility and more specific management tasks.

An important question in an increasingly culturally diversified society is of course if the foreigners should be integrated. How can social barriers be destroyed and social communion and control be developed to the degree that is desirable, if there are not something concrete to agree about or something around which the conversation can be kept alive. What is more it was shown that many of those who sought the Bo 100 house did that partly as a protest against the more stereotyped forms of living, but also and sometimes mainly, therefore they hoped for a living where anonymity was broken and where the social climate was warmer. The importance of the social network and of the neighbourhood for health and welfare have been shown in a great deal of studies, which are a more than enough ground for the investment on participation and co-operation within housing (although the pure management gains are also important and often the driving force). In the Bo 100 project it became clear that one sees influence not only as a means to get a flat of personal cut but also, in a broader sense. To have influence over the close everyday conditions that are part of the living is an important part in the need of being able to plan and to influence one's own life.

Purely from the point of organisation not only the importance of the little level should be emphasised, but also the importance of communication and information. Only with the help of open and deep information and communication, and with the help of knowledge building and the looking after of already existing knowledge, one can lay a thoroughly ground for the power of suggestion that is desirable and of which possibilities the Bo 100 project is a good example.

It is also a matter of bridging the eventual obstacles raised by the structure of possibilities. People can grow and surpass these obstacles and brake the less positive and less fertile traditions and routines that we sometimes keep. We have found several examples of that in our studies. In a co-operation and in what concerns an environment attractive to influence, one acquires and increased social competence, learn to make higher demands and in a better way handle questions and problems that demand solution. In this respect the social what one would call 'level of training' is not unimportant.

Notes

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[2] In the houses owned by the local authorities the turnover rate was in average about 20 per cent a year but in specific areas it was not unusual that half or more than half of the flats changed tenants in the course of a year.

[3] SABO is the national organisation to which most of the public housing companies are associated on a voluntary basis. The number of companies associated was in the 1990, 316. These 316 answered for the administration of 22 per cent of the country's total housing stock. In total there are in Sweden around 400 public housing companies.

[4] The most important in this general agreement is contained in the words influence, consultation and decision. It states that in a local general agreement one can agree on 1). The company shall continually inform about its administration, 2) consultation shall happen between the housing company and the contact committees in matters regarding the living environment or the living conditions in general, 3) the decision making in certain questions shall be transferred to the contact committees.

[5] One of the classics of sociology, Robert Michels, formulated already in the beginning of the 20-century the problem of the democratic interest organisations developing against the domination of the minority. According to Michels will unavoidably a conflict between the efficiency demand and the democratic demand to be decided for the benefit of efficiency at democracy's expenses (Michels, 1983).

[6] If one compares the elitist democratic view with the classic understanding of participatory democracy (i e Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1968) and John Stuart Mill (1859)), than the difference is big both regarding the background assumption and consequence development. Both Rousseau and Mill paid attention to the meaning of participation with democratic education in mind. Mill emphasised individuals through participation are trained to safeguard their interests and develop a responsibility for the whole. Rousseau maintained that participation increased the individuals control over his environment but he also pointed out that participation strengthens the feeling of belonging to a community and therefore simplifies acceptance of collective decision.

[7] In Sweden this discussion has in most cases referred to if tenancy should be transformed in the particular concession form called *bostadsrätt* and that means that the tenants are members in an economical association which in its turn owns the flats in the building. This form of tenure is often called co-operative tenancy-ownership. Another designation that is used in international contexts are "tenant-ownership".

[8] Power can be described as three-dimensional (Lukes, 1974) and be divided in power in decision-situations power over the agenda and ideological power. The ideological power focuses on people's possibility to realise which are their real interests. A structural obstacle can be so well established and fortified that one does not realise that a change would be in their own interest or that it would be possible to articulate even less to carry through.

[9] Cf.Bråten's concept *model power (Bråten, 1974)*, which includes the ability to present own alternatives and models as well as the power to get them accomplished in situations which also involve other actors with intentions and initiatives.

[10] A social network can in principle be described as either strong, weak or absent. The strength of the network is linked with a combination of time consumption, emotional intensity, intimacy and mutuality (Granovetter, 1973). The strong network is built to a high degree on grounds of similarity in standing, vision and interest, the weak network is characterised rather by being complementary.

[11] Usually there is only one public housing company per municipality but in case of the metropolitan areas and in some other municipalities there are more than one company. The pooling of the economies of different estates is only valid inside the companies.

[12] Sweden has a very strong tenant association movement which organises more than 30 percent of tenant households. The usual procedure is that the negotiations are made with the help of this already established organisation. But the present law also gives the possibilities to form local, independent, tenant associations, which can negotiate with the landlords if the majority of the tenants wish so.

[13] It would take too much space to give an exhaustive description of the Swedish rent setting system but overall the "use value rents" can shortly be described as a trial to get the same rent structure which had been the case in a "free" housing market but on another level of prices. The system has been very influential in shaping the whole Swedish housing system because, as it has been stated, no rent in the private housing sector is allowed to exceed the rent for an equivalent unit in the public housing sector. Needless to say the whole question of "use rents" contra "market rents" has been very much under political debate during recent years (see Bengtsson, 1993 for further details).

[14] In a questionnaire to the SABO-enterprises in 1993 an overwhelming majority said that they looked upon tenant democracy and its further development as a very important policy issue (Lindberg, 1994).

[15] Generally the tenants in Hälsingborgshem still have far less influence on this level than their counterparts in Denmark. A goal of the National Tenant Association in Sweden is that the tenants also shall have influence on the enterprises financial disposition and policy decisions. In Hälsingborgshem this has already been a matter of conflict between the tenant association and the company.

[16] It may be observed that the experience of the new type of activity financing has not been solely positive from the view of the tenant association. The reason for this is that the tenants association comes into a strong dependency towards the company through the latter's contribution to its budget. This became obvious when the tenants representatives in the company's board demanded surplus from the company's financial activity, that is income from interests, sales etc., should become subject to negotiation. This was something that the company would not accept which led to a collapse in the negotiation. The company got here immediately the better of the situation by being able to froze the payment of its contribution to the association of tenants.

[17] TDM is today adopted by a great majority of the public housing enterprises in Sweden. It is generally regarded as a great success (Lindberg, 1994).

[18] This is the basic organisation in the Teljebostäder, another public housing company we also have studied. Here the local heads are called block heads. These have usually a background as civil servants and the emphasis have been put in their social skills and administrative capabilities rather than on their earlier experiences of property management. In their new role they get however total responsibility for the estate management and contact with the tenants within

their block. To their help they have one or more permanent employees plus contractors hired according to need (Lindberg, 1993b; Liedholm, Lindberg, 1994; Lindberg, 1994).

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6

A HOUSING AREA DEVELOPED IN A COMPLEX CULTURAL CONTEXT

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6.1 Introduction

During the last thirty years a large proportion of the dwellings in the cities have been erected in housing areas. For some years the areas built in the 60s and 70s have needed renewal. Although the Swedish government has been willing to incorporate peoples' knowledge and experience of these housing areas it still seems to be difficult to achieve real participation. My intention is hereby to illustrate this business of building out of some different perspectives. I consider 'architecture' as the transformable result of a more or less joint work of creation in society as a whole. 'Housing management' is carried out by management employees and inhabitants as well as by other persons working in the area. 'Housing renewal' takes place in the homes and in the home area of people. Therefore a procedure for renewal is needed where the culture of the place is developed and reinforced.

The data for this research are primarily collected from Eriksbo in Angered, a suburb of Göteborg. In this area different categories such as dwellers, employees in the municipal institutions and the housing company are co-operating in order to benefit 'their' area. A complex culture consisting of links both within the mentioned categories as well as links interrelating the categories has been established and is argued to be essential to the development seen in Eriksbo. This fruitful culture might point out cultural context as important to good development of architecture both here and in general.

With this case I have the aim of contributing to the theory of architecture. Three fields of research affect my study: architecture, management and renewal.

6.2 Architecture

The word architecture has different significances. I here speak about architecture in a wide sense; as houses and buildings, and spaces within these, fulfilling practical as well as aesthetical needs. As built spaces they will also carry ideological connotations. The creation of architecture takes place in a joint process within the community. Laws and regulations play an important role as well as conventions in the

professional cultures of architects and other planners before the design process starts. The conventional myth of architecture describes the architect as the creator of a homogeneous piece of art. In reality, the design process is guided by many contributors.

The question is consistently debated whether or not it is possible to introduce user participation in the process of creation, and at the same time to claim an artistic ability. In this matter a progression is taking place among theoreticians as well as practitioners, especially in the field of design theory where improvements are made.

6.3 Management

Initially the influence of the inhabitants on the public dwelling utilities was not important. The individual inhabitants, as any citizens, could influence housing policy through general elections. The dwelling was considered a common right and the concept of 'the good dwelling' was established by the experts. This resulted in a rational way of planning and a fast means of producing a large amount of dwellings. During the post-war period,however, ideas about maintenance and participation have changed as time has passed. At the end of the 1960s there was a strong reaction against the contemporary planning taking place high above the heads of the users.

In the early 1970s some researchers of planning, as a reaction against the established planning perspective, made critical statements regarding people and inhabitants as being active and creative - subjects rather than objects (Forskning om..., 1973). This criticism of planning also contributed to investigations of the involvement of different groups of users in different local issues. By the middle of the decade the 'tenant participation' had become an official objective in Sweden when planning dwellings as well as parts of cities. In line with this way of thinking, several agreements concerning the tenants' influence on the maintenance were made around 1980. Both the council housing companies and the private landlords were affected (Bengtsson, 1985).

During the 1980s, however, the housing companies changed their policy parallel to contemporary discussions in society. They now acted more openly as a seller on the market and the inhabitants became known as 'customers'. When renewal was carried out, apartments within the same areas were altered to different standards and the inhabitants could make their choice according to the size of their wallets. The negative aspect of this attitude was the tendency to look upon the inhabitants as merely passive consumers. The positive aspect was that the owners now became more sensitive to what the tenants were asking for and therefore tried to adjust to these demands. In service management research the approach was taken further and was adopted by the associations of the real-estate owners. (See for example Hyresgästen i centrum).

Alongside this development other ideas have emerged both in reality and in research. In the beginning of the 1970s the inhabitants became claimed as users. From that discourse, the idea of the inhabitants as being co-producers in the maintenance of the dwellings later emerged (Högberg, 1984). In an extensive

inquiry, one researcher in the economic field, among other matters demonstrated that the participation of the inhabitants was more extensive and had far more economic significance than what the management of the housing companies would usually be apprehending (Öhrming, 1987). But still today, within the bigger housing companies and organisations, the change of attitude towards the inhabitants is far out of reach.

6.4 Renewal

Housing renewal can either be considered as a completely new building process or as one part of the maintenance and management procedure. When housing renewal is seen and administrated as a new building project a common consequence is that the inhabitants are inconveniently affected. The broadest survey of experience about housing renewal in Sweden was a report called Better Housing Renewal. The report appointed a process of renewal, more closely integrated in the continuous maintenance of the buildings. (See also: Holmdahl (1994), Hjärne (1993), Öresjö (1993) and Hurtig (1995)). The experiences and the conclusions from 19 research and development projects were summarized as:

1. Continuous renewal.
2. Careful treatment and use of resources.
3. Consolidated influence of the users.
4. Increased municipal responsibility.
5. Open co-operation of the parts engaged (Vidén et al., 1990: 20-25).

Not much attention has been paid to the other way of dealing with renewal: as a process within the maintenance and management routines. (Some examples except for the ones mentioned above are Vidén & Lundahl, 1992 and Öresjö, 1993.) I should like to acquire a deeper understanding of how new design is added to the existing context. How are new ideas generated and by whom? Who are the possible actors, the housing companies, the inhabitants, the professional planners or people working in the areas?

6.5 Experiences from Eriksbo in Angered

After the advent of the Functionalist movement, city planning has been carried out according to zoning principles. Today one commonly speaks about 'housing areas', not only referring to the newer areas in the suburbs but also to the older city districts as well. A housing area is generally what the planners referred earlier to as a neighbourhood unit. Eriksbo, with one thousand flats, is in many ways a typical housing area of the 1970s. The buildings are grouped around a series of courtyards which left the middle free with a big green area with primary school, sports grounds and an open-air recreation centre. The traffic was kept outside the area. The blocks were four stories high with façade elements of concrete.

Eriksbo was part of the so called 'million programme' in which Sweden planned one million dwellings between 1965 and 1975. Initially the area was considerably well planned, with low buildings and a close relationship to the natural surroundings. But, within a period of ten years, a large amount of flats became vacant, exterior spaces became drab and vandalised, and the buildings began to show constructional faults. Some of the elements of the architecture were not appreciated by the dwellers such as the absence of roof overhangs, the grey appearance of the buildings and the mainly hard-surfaced outdoor spaces. Around 1980 the inhabitants experienced some of their neighbours as disturbing. They also thought that public transport was too infrequent and that some public services, such as a post-office, was lacking.

At this point some of the inhabitants established outlines for a strategy involving themselves as responsible for their environment rather than just putting forward demands. With the guidance of a very far reaching vision, people were embraced by this attitude and mobilized to act. These ideas came to bridge the conventional relationship between the two parties, the tenants and the landlords, and became the seed for an exceptional evolution in Eriksbo. This process was first called self-maintenance. Later it has been redesignated as a co-operative development.

Quite a lot of societies have started in Eriksbo: An association for the recreational centre which originally was run by the municipality, but was shut down due to lack of money. 'The Green Group/Club', a society which started to make the outdoor space more pleasant. An athletics association, a fishing club. Clubs for the tenants around each courtyard. A cooperative association consisting of parents to school-children started a separate primary school beside the municipal one. An association for the open-air recreational centre. A cooperative association took over the local food shop when it was closed. These are just some of the examples. Some of them have died out, others still live and function.

The inhabitants have had a great influence on the management, more than in most other housing areas. They choose all the members of the board attached to the housing company which decides about questions concerned with management and maintenance in the area. For this reason Eriksbo has become quite well known to people working in the field of housing in Sweden. Representatives of the inhabitants have been interviewed in many articles and they have had numerous study visits.

I started my research on Eriksbo in 1986. At that time I was searching for a case where the residents were active and concerned about their dwellings and environment in a broad sense. Where they were not mere consumers of their dwellings. I was of the opinion that professionals' way of dealing with housing was not sufficient to provide really good spaces for living in. More direct experience from the residents to the planning and management professions was needed.

I got to hear about Eriksbo and found that it was a good example for me. What I considered important was the fact the inhabitants there had thought about what they wanted to achieve in their area. And - they had begun to act to implement their visions.

My aim was to study the relationships between the social and architectural development in Eriksbo. I wanted, if possible, to find new connections between the residents and the built environment. I did not merely want to study the tenants'

influence in a narrow and technical context. To achieve this I conducted interviews and visited meetings in Eriksbo; I have studied the written material available and have studied the place as it is. This research was conducted more or less continuously between 1986 and 1993 (Jadelius Modh, 1988; Modh, 1993; Modh, 1994). During 1990-1993 I was also appointed to follow up a special social project that the local tenants' organization ran with support of money from the government (Boserviceprojekt, sponsored by Boverket) (Lind & Modh, 1993).

In the evolution of Eriksbo I have been able to distinguish four different phases. During the first phase the dwellings were planned and prepared in a way to accomplish predetermined aims and demands. During the second phase, the years 1975-1985, some problems resulting from the planning process and the housing company's management methods became apparent. At this point the company was not capable of undertaking any measures, so the inhabitants started to deal with the problems themselves, which reinforced their dedication to the area. During phase three, 1985-1990, the housing company dealt with the problems with the help of governmental legislation and finance. Varying degrees of alterations were carried out to the buildings, and afterwards they had a much more pleasant appearance. The problem was that the refurbishment works in some cases were forced upon the tenants and many of the original ties were broken. The process was mainly governed by the rational machinery of production, and as a result of this the influence of the inhabitants became of less importance. The outdoor spaces were also refurbished during this phase. In the fourth phase, since 1990, the inhabitants strengthened their influence and took all the seats on the board leading the management of the area. The inhabitants became more rooted in the area and with better conditions; the landlord now acting more supportively. The landlord and the inhabitants together now tried to find new tenants and to overcome the difficulties. Many of them were caused by circumstances governed by society as a whole such as changed governmental regulations for the housing market and several municipal cuts due to the bad economic situation.

6.6 From rational uniformity towards locally characterised variation

These phases could be presented in another way. In the first phase pre-established goals and demands were carried through. Eriksbo was built with a uniform design regarding plans, façades, typology and courtyards. The housing estate was characterised by a cosmopolitan rational uniformity. During the second phase the residents worked with the improving of the qualities of the area. They tidied up storage rooms on the ground floors so that they could be used for various societies and activities. The range of common space at Eriksbo was a real resource, usable for the residents' various activities. The tenants were also organizing themselves in order to gain more influence on the management. This work was patiently carried out over a long period. Although great many ideas were discussed vividly during this phase only scare signs of that were visible for people visiting the place. At this time the

development to a great extent took place in the minds of people both within and outside Eriksbo.

In the third phase the previous efforts resulted in a greater degree of influence on the management. The alterations that the housing company carried out were however to a limited degree influenced by the local people. Roofs and windows were all redesigned to achieve a homogeneous character throughout the area. But as a new feature some details were diversified. For example the canopy roofs over entrances were designed in three different ways, and the staircases were repainted in one of three colours, continuously repeated. These variations had nothing to do with the different entrances but were designs from the drawing-board. Some of the designs, however, were influenced by local request, for example the shops in the square and the day-nurseries on the ground-floor of three buildings. All the yards were designed differently but with some features in common; the playgrounds, the social places for the families, and the overall general embellishment.

In the fourth phase the residents took on such a great degree of influence that they came to work more side by side with the company. But of course there were still different interests and views. A few years after the alterations of the buildings and outdoor space, some further improvements of the outdoor space were made. These changes were visually much smaller but were qualitatively very important. Several courtyards were reorganized by the people living there, sometimes aided by the staff of the housing company or the open-air centre. In some courtyards the playground facilities were changed. Another way of improving was to build a roof over the benches, in this way forming a better places for grilling in the summer. Some new vegetation sometimes made the yards more pleasant. From the beginning Eriksbo had rounded blocks of stones in some places in the yards and on the spaces by footpaths. Many of those stones were painted in bright colours at this time.

During phase two, three and four another evolution was important in Eriksbo. Inspired by the ongoing process of concern from the inhabitants, some of the employees of the municipal institutions tried to improve the effect of their work. For example they attempted to work more preventively by cooperating in new organizations. Also in Eriksboparken, the open-air recreational centre, the content, the buildings and the space was continually changed according to the needs of the local activities. These changes were designed in their context by the head of the park and carried out by him and his staff.

In the fourth phase the housing company supported the residents to renew their place. This started from about 1992 when the housing company reorganized and successively tried to get a better organization to cope with the economic difficulties. Tenants had difficulties in paying higher rents, and the subsidies for housing were lowered. Among other things, the housing company delegated more responsibilities to lower levels in the organization. In Eriksbo the company welcomed initiatives taken by the residents to improve their environment.

In the period around 1990, along with the big recession, the conditions for developing the areas of the 'million programme' were changed all over Sweden. The deteriorating financial situation made it necessary to undertake lesser alterations carried out in stages. This method came to be applied in several projects.

In some of the suburban renewal projects, the appearance and the aesthetic aspect of the buildings predominated. Instead of the uniformity characteristic of the period around 1970 the housing companies and architects tried to change the outlook of the buildings in variations designed at the drawing-board (One example of that is shown in Wikner & Janson, 1993). The renewal of Norsborg in Botkyrka outside of Stockholm shows another attitude, where the giant scale of the buildings and the area was modified and alterations performed as many small-scale projects. The participation of the dwellers was handled with an adapted programme consisting of different meetings for each court-yard. This process like the one mentioned above was starting with building activities (Hedtjärn, 1993).

In Eriksbo, however, there has been a mixture between social processes and physical changes and in the phases presented different actors have played the most important role. In the third phase the architectural questions were dealt with mostly by professionals but with some influence from the inhabitants. In the fourth phase the design was all the time dealt with in its context by the different types of users. No professional planners were contacted. One could here see some elements in another way of forming built environment. In this process of design maintenance, management and buildings were developed out of the needs and requirements of the existing users, the buildings and the activities performed there. Variations based on these conditions contribute to a different aesthetic experience than the ordinary process undertaken by professionals. I call that by the users created variations (conditioned by local activities). The architecture is in this case an expression of a living culture as opposed to what might be the case when variations are designed by architects (Jadelius, 1989; Jadelius, 1995).

The three types of design in Eriksbo's different phases of development:

- rational uniformity;
- designed variations;
- by the users created variations.

6.7 A complex cultural context

Often housing research focuses on the residents and the housing company. The residents are the weaker of the two. In many places the residents have tried to gain more influence on the management of their dwellings. This has in some ways become true, but even when the tenants have gained influence formally speaking, some important aspects often seem to be lacking. From my experience of Eriksbo I should like to put the light on some more actors from the housing estate. Perhaps one could say that I formulate hypotheses that others can discuss later in connection with other housing areas - other cases.

The inhabitants are of course very different. Measured on the conventional social scale people in Eriksbo belong to the lower part. Some are Swedish, and some are from other countries, some are women and some are men, some are old and some are young, some have children, some have not. Some participate in the different associations in Eriksbo and in the local tenants' organisation (Eriksbo Kooperativa

Förening, EKF, which is a so called 'Lokal hyresgästförening'). Some do not participate in these associations. In Eriksbo very few of the people not born in Sweden were involved in tenants' participation. But in this paper I shall not go further into this question, nor into the other differences among the residents.
After the first stages the inhabitants who actively worked to improve conditions in Eriksbo have emphasised the local identity of their housing area very strongly as well as the quality for the ones who lived there. Although they worked for several years without getting more influence on the management of the dwellings they could soon point out other results. For example that the residents started an association that managed to hold the recreational centre open after the municipality had shut it down.

In spite of the fact that the locality is emphasised by the local associations, the inhabitants are linked to a much wider range in their everyday life. Some use Eriksbo only for a relatively short time during the day. Some just sleep there and then go to work in another part of Göteborg and spend a lot of their free time at other places. Others only go there to work. For them Eriksbo is obviously only a part of the geographical arena within which they act. But also to people spending a great deal of their lives in Eriksbo, the city region is important. They leave Eriksbo to go shopping or to visit friends for instance. The housing estate is like a piece of jig-saw puzzle in the city-region. Even regions far away, in Sweden or in other countries, may also play an important role for people living in Eriksbo. Many of them are born and have grown up in those places. Often they have relatives there, and go back there now and then.

Developments in Eriksbo are generated out of a complexity of different influences on the local setting. And in the other direction developments in Eriksbo have had an influence on other organizations and parts of Sweden. In this connection there are links to the Tenants' Union at different levels, to the staff of the municipal institutions, to the employees of the housing company, to the local free parish in Eriksbo, to different Social Democratic organizations, to Cooperative organizations and probably many more. Out of the many different persons, ideas and cultures that had an impact on what happened in Eriksbo I take up here three categories that have played important roles in the development of Eriksbo. These are all linked to larger organizations outside the locality.

First of all we have the residents. Throughout the time the residents have struggled for improvement, their organization has been linked to the tenants' organization, both on the regional and national levels. Although the 'active' tenants were very strongly connected to the local development in their area, they had the tenants' organisation of the region and the country to compare with and spread their experiences to. The active tenants of Eriksbo, on their hand, have sometimes had the opportunity to hear and see what has happened in other housing areas. But they have also kept themselves informed about interesting examples of developments in small places with which they felt they had much in common.

Except for the residents, who have played the most important role, the employees of the municipal institutions (such as the day nursery, after-school centre, open-air recreational centre) and some of the social workers have participated in the

development. Many of them have become rooted in Eriksbo and become part of its culture. But they were also restricted by the regional organisation, the city of Göteborg. (During the period studied some changes occurred as Göteborg was divided into a number of administrative districts, with their own politicians and staff.) They have rules to work within, but also a kind of cultural link to their profession. In other types of areas teachers might cooperate well with the residents, but this has only partly happened in Eriksbo.

The staff of the housing company is the third group working in Eriksbo who have played an important role in the local development. When the housing company in 1985 opened a local office it recruited part of the staff to work with management and maintenance from people living in Eriksbo. They knew the area well and 'felt' for it. The work for the employees has changed at the same time as the housing area has developed. Their tasks have also been affected when the housing company has reorganized. Also in their case their actions were limited by the bigger organisation, in this case the housing company of which they are a part. This is on a national level organized in SABO (Sveriges Allmännyttiga Bostadsföretag, The Swedish Association of Municipal Housing Companies).

Each organization, whether it is the associations of the tenants, the housing company, or the institutions of the municipality, is not just representing one actor or one perspective, but many. Employees of the housing companies, day nurseries, and open air centres are not just acting as the executors of orders from above. They also create possibilities as well as hindrances according to their thoughts and professional values.

As time passed in Eriksbo, the networks and links grew, both within different groups but also between them. Eriksbo in this way acquired a complex culture where the locality became important. All from the beginning the links between the local knowledge and the general knowledge, the political contacts and so on have been essential in Eriksbo. Ideas may have been generated in a global context, but they have been transformed into the local context through the thorough knowledge about local problems and local ways of thinking the participants had.

When I started I had the following hypothesis. The residents have one way of thinking and the professional planners and persons in the housing company another. Little by little I realized that things were more complex. I started to see the links between different categories. And that those links were some of the important facts leading to lasting results in Eriksbo. Different actions have improved the conditions there and have inspired the participants of different categories.

The cultural exchanges described above are one of the crucial elements in the development of Eriksbo. Another special thing is that the inhabitants were not satisfied just formulating what they wanted, but acted to receive it. In this way they became important to themselves in a process of growing self-consciousness.
Still another fact to take into consideration trying to understand the relative success in Eriksbo is that the social processes went hand-in-hand with physical change. Gatherings and different social activities where people have had a good time together have been important ways of inspiring further action.

In a cultural perspective like the one presented in this contribution, the complete local network of actors concerning the development of the housing area, their desires and the framework for development is regarded. With such a cultural perspective, opposition between social projects, construction, and inhabitants can be dealt with constructively. In this way a locally characterized culture can consolidate the identity of people, bringing them to some extent to become co-producers in the improvement of their environment.

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7

THE LITTLE NEIGHBOURHOOD IN THE SUBURB

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7.1 Introduction

Most discussions and actions concerning rehabilitation of socially problematic suburbs use two different levels or units as their point of departure. The first level is the suburb or town-district as a whole. Since the suburb was built to be a coherent unit - neighbourhoodplanned - demarcated by roads and parks, it is normally thought of as a relatively homogeneous unit. Schools, social services and other municipal administration often use the suburb as a unit. And the suburb´s reputation goes for the whole suburb.

The second level, or unit, is the housing district within the suburb. Most suburbs consist of a number of housing districts or estates and they, in turn, consist of a number of identical-looking buildings. Usually a housing district has only one owner - municipally owned companies dominate but there are also private owners - who also take care of it. The company rebuilds and repairs buildings in the whole district in a similar way. And the tenements' local organization normally has the district as its base.

I propose that a third level should be noticed, having people´s housing situation as a point of departure. In a research project "The Little Neighbourhood" we (Sören Olsson, Gerd Cruse-Sondén and Marianne Ohlander) are studying the residents´ experiences and use of yards and buildings as well as their social contacts in a house or between people sharing the same yard.

In nine cases, from inner city blocks to the suburb, we try to understand what consequences the built environment, the organization of care and the composition of households have for the neighbourhood. Primarily the project is directed towards basic knowledge and understanding. But in some cases, where there are obvious problems, we have also made propositions for changes and we have had discussions together with staff personal from the housing company. I will present one of these cases here. It will be done partly in a rather detailed way - its physical character, care, population, social interaction and so on - but the aim is more general. To observe this level, what we call the little neighbourhood, in the suburb is important.

In this contribution I will not put forward any theoretical framework. But some references must be given. The level, which we call the little neighbourhood, has met

some attention in Swedish research during the last few years (Olsson, 1990; Rånlund, 1992 and Wikström, 1994). Above all, attention has been turned to the positive values, safety, home-feeling, the possibility of getting help and so on. The importance of weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) among neighbours has been studied (Henning and Lieberg, 1994).

Another research tradition deals with the dangers and problems of the neighbourhood. Some widely known and debated American and British studies (Jacobs, 1961; Newman, 1972 and Coleman, 1990) are important here. As a basic theoretical element those studies use the dimension private-public in order to point at differences in access and control of social space. The importance of this dimension in Western thought is well described in some fundamental texts by Habermas (1984) and Sennett (1974).

7.2 A little neighbourhood - buildings and structure

Our case is two four-storied buildings with the entrances opposite each other. They are a part of a housing district with twelve identical buildings in a suburb in Göteborg from the 60s. Close to this housing district is the small center of the suburb. In the center there are some shops and municipal services. Cars are parked outside the district. Through the district goes a system of pathways, also used by refuse lorries and sometimes by ordinary cars when people feel that they do not want to carry things from the shops.

The housing district has an extreme composition of flats. Eleven percent are four-room flats, the rest are two-room flats. Since the latter is generally considered too small for families, even for couples without children, this has important consequences for the composition of households. Every building has 41 flats.

The area between our two houses has a mixed character. A pathway goes through, the refuse lorries and removal vans come here, which makes it street-like. But a small sandpit and some symbolic fences at the ends of the area give it partly the character of a yard. But as a yard it makes a bare and standardized impression. The area is adapted for convenient care-taking more than anything else. And it is well-kept. The facades are newly painted and there is no litter on the ground.

On the backsides of buildings there are somewhat larger areas which also, to some extent, can be considered as yards belonging to the buildings. The ground is covered with grass and there are a small playground, some benches and twelve allotments for people from the district. But the 'yard' has no real demarcation, it is public, and it can not be reached directly from the entrances of the buildings.

Every staircase has seven flats. The residents here should see each other often enough to recognize who the neighbours are and even exchange some words when they meet. All staircases look the same. There are no signs of individuality or identity - but the rather narrow spaces are well kept. The entrance doors are never locked which makes the stairs almost public. Laundries, stores for bicycles, and stores for every flat are situated on the ground floor and can be reached through corridors. This together with the open entrances, forms a situation which is rather

difficult to control for those who live here. But the laundries, newly renovated, have new locks allowing only the actual user to get in.

7.3 Organisation of care and influence

A big municipally owned housing company is the owner of the estate as well as of the centre and some other districts in this suburb. The company has a local service office for these districts. It is situated rather close to our district. When people have complaints or need help they phone or visit the office. One employee is responsible for the care of our neighbourhood and for some more buildings.

From what we have seen of the organisation and the care it is very effectively run. The flats, the buildings and the area are taken well care of.
The tenants have very few responsibilities except to take care of the flat and pay the rent. It also means that they have very little influence beyond complaints and the possibility to move out.

There is a local tenements committee for this housing district and an adjacent one. We have not studied its role here explicitly. But very few are members of the organisation and no one interviewed (see below) knew anything about its role.

The twelve allotments are the only sign of people working in and taking interest in the out-door milieu. The allotments were created last summer by the company in cooperation with some interested persons in the district.

7.4 The residents

The immigrants are the most striking element in data about the population in our little neighbourhood. 118 persons live here and of these 23 (20 per cent) are of Swedish origin, 34 are Swedish citizens of foreign background (most of them have become Swedish citizens during the last few years) and 61 are non-Swedish citizens.

Among these 118 persons there are not less than 22 nationalities (and two persons without citizenship). If we had access to registration of membership in ethnic groups, the number would have been even higher. Turkish nationality can, for example, mean that a person is Kurdic, Assyrian or Turkish. Yugoslavia is still in our statistics one unit.

About one third of the non-Swedish population is refugees from wars in the Middle East, Africa or former Yugoslavia.

Data tell us two important things. The first is that immigrants dominate the neighbourhood. Many of them have come to Sweden during the last four years. We know from other sources that many are unemployed, having their income from subsidies. The second is that no single ethnic group is dominant. Instead there is an immense mixture of languages, religions and cultures. The old image of the immigrant ghetto - Chinatown, Little Pakistan and so on - has no correspondence to this situation. And that´s the way it is in several Swedish suburbs today. You could find 50-70 nationalities in a suburb. Obviously this means great problems for the

institutions in the suburb, especially for the schools. But it also means that a very confused situation in terms of culture development. It is hard to know what group people belong to, what their ideas are and what kind of behaviour they find appropriate. This problem is obvious also in our neighbourhood.

The Swedish group (20 per cent) is the largest single ethnic group. Its share of the population has diminished rapidly during the last few years. Only four years ago it was 50 per cent. These figures also point at the mobility of the neighbourhood. Only 24 out of 80 households lived here four years ago. As we will see later on, much indicates that the percentage of Swedish residents will diminish further.

The size of the flats is important for the household composition in the area. 60 out of 80 households are single. But some large immigrant families mean that the children are not so few, 23 below the age of sixteen. But there are almost no youths and very few over 65 years in the area.

The statistics point at low attraction. The neighbourhood is dominated by groups having small resources in order to have alternatives in the housing market. The mobility is high. The area has, at least to some extent, a transitional character.

7.5 To live in the neighbourhood

We have interviewed 15 households about their situation, how they use the neighbourhood and so on. We have also talked with the caretakers and those who administer the housing district, and we have made observations in the area. What do these data tell us?

The neighbourhood is calm. Two of our respondents have complaints about people being drunk and noisy, they also talk about some disturbances. But the rest says that on the whole nothing happens here. Other informants, as well as our own observations, confirm this. Perhaps this was somewhat unexpected in a district and in a suburb with the reputation of being troublesome and even dangerous, at least in evenings and at nights. One explanation seems to be that most troubles usually are caused by male youth gangs. And in this area we have almost no youth.

The respondents consider the neighbourhood to be neat and well cared. No one need to feel ashamed when they have visitors. Not so many are enthusiastic over the look of the area but there are no important complaints against the care, instead most express great confidence in the company.

There are certainly problems here - but these have to do with the social situation, with people´s feelings towards each other and with the social life in the neighbourhood.

The 'yards' are used very little. The frontside is mostly seen as a passage in the housing district, having public character and not meant to be used in some other way. One of the backsides are, during the warm part of the year, used as a meeting place for a group of Assyrian women and their children. They come from several adjacent districts in the suburb. Those who cultivate the allotments come here sometimes and a couple of families also use the area sometimes. But the overall impression from the interviews - and the observations - is that people do not see the

yards as theirs and that they find them hard to use. More than half of the respondents have suggestions where to place benches, flowers, small bushes and more arrangements for the children which would make the yards more attractive. Particularly the backsides get this kind of attention.

The tenants find the stairs, the corridors and stores hard to control. Bicycles are kept in the flats and not in the stores meant for. No one keeps anything of value in the stores on the ground floor. In spite of this more than half of the respondents have had burglaries in their store. Parts of the problems have to do with the unlocked entrance doors and six of the respondents say it is important to have locks installed. Some feel ambivalent to it because they have already bought a safety door to their flat - subsidised down to a rather small amount every month - from the company. The door gives security in the flat but is seen as unnecessary if the entrance door become locked.

Most of our respondents recognize those who live in the same staircase. But four of them recognize only some, one does not recognize any. Three claim that they recognize most people in our little neighbourhood, ten 2-15 persons and two say none. Most respondents (11) say that they exchange greetings with those they recognize but three say they do not. Several respondents point out that there are people in the neighbourhood who do not even say 'hello' when spoken to. Seven out of fifteen have small talk - the weather and so on - when they meet people they recognize but eight say that they never say a word to a neighbour. Two of our respondents have a more stable relation to a neighbour in this area.

The overall impression is that there are few contacts between neighbours. This is the neighbourhood among the nine cases in the research project which shows the fewest contacts and where people know each other least. Most people, who live here, consider to a great extent their neighbours strangers. This is also confirmed in other parts of the interviews. There are no meeting places, there is no social life outside the flats (except on a rather limited scale in one of the 'backside yards'). There are no questions people discuss with their neighbours, no common meetings or parties, no sign of a civil society with capacity to handle problems. And there are no 'neighbourhood personalities', people who are known by many and important for the area.

The question is to what extent this is a problem. When we ask people how they consider that contacts and relations among neighbours ought to be, the answers are much the same as the answers in our other neighbourhoods. It is to be important to know what people live around you, you should recognize neighbours and exchange some words when you meet. If needed you should get help from neighbours, but more intimate and stable relations must be chosen with great care. Many express doubts about the idea to develop friendship with neighbours, the risk of being dependent is too high.

Some of our respondents add that, in any case, it should be better than here. 'People should act normal, recognize you and talk to you when you meet' as one expressed it. When we, at the end of the interview, put the question if the interview has dealt with important issues everybody agrees on that and eleven say that the questions about neighbours and neighbour relations were the most important. The

neighbour relations are felt to be very unsatisfactory and are also felt to affect people's living situation as a whole.

Some of our respondents do not see their neighbours just as strangers, they see them as a threat. These respondents feel insecure in the neighbourhood. They are afraid of many things, above all they are afraid of people they don´t understand. The many different ethnic groups play an important role for this kind of reaction. I have judged that four respondents have problems of this kind. They have, for example, their Venetian blinds down all day - very unusual in a country where daylight plays such a role - because they feel that people can look into their apartments. And they feel, for the same reason, that the buildings are too close to each other (in other neighbourhoods, where the possibilities to look into the flats are bigger, the reactions are not so strong at all because people do not see the neighbours as threats). They say you can not trust people here and they tell dreadful stories about what has happened here or in other areas of the same kind. One or two of these people might have had the same problems also in other surroundings, but probably a context, where you feel alienated, both strengthens and produces such reactions.

The reactions on the social situation have impact when people talk about their overall satisfaction with their housing situation. Eight out of fifteen say that they are satisfied or rather satisfied. Two of these have the flat merely as a place where they sleep (and not every night) and two have a rather bad situation in many respects with no real alternative except to stay. Their satisfaction does not seem very convincing.

Seven are dissatisfied. For one family the main reason is that the flat has become too small. But at least four express strong feelings of dissatisfaction and confinement.

It is in this respect - the social dimension and its consequences for residents overall satisfaction - our little neighbourhood has problems. The problems do not show up in a violent way as it does when there are youth problems or open racial conflicts. But it affects people who live here, some of them rather strongly. In the long run its effects will be seen in health statistics and other welfare measures. The social services and the medical care will have to take care of individuals and families because we see very little of help or support man to man, and it is certainly very hard to trace any signs of a civil society.

It is necessary to come back to the mixture of ethnic groups in the neighbourhood. The interviews (and some other information) tell us quite a lot about its consequences.

The immigrants tell us that they want relations with two different groups. The first is their own ethnic group. Somalians want to meet other Somalians with whom they feel safe and enjoy life. They are not interested, they tell us, to have social contacts with other immigrants whom they feel alienated towards. Since most ethnic groups are spread out in this suburb and many other town districts too it is hard to find meeting-places located where people live. The Assyrians seem to be the only group in our district which have been successful in this. Somalians, for example, take the tram every evening to the inner-city area to meet in the Somalian club.

The second group immigrants want to have relations with is the Swedish people. In fact most immigrants tell us they want to live in a housing district dominated by Swedish people and Swedish values. There are several reasons for this. They know that low attraction of housing areas is associated with immigrant domination, troubles in schools and so on. The immigrants want to be part of the Swedish society (even if they plan to leave later on), not excluded, or nearly excluded, from the labour market and from the institutions of the society. The perfect solution in their opinion would be a Swedish dominated area in which there could be a substantial group from their own culture. One of our respondents told us what happened after an important football match in the European Championships for clubs. When IFK Göteborg had beaten Manchester United a lot of immigrants ran out on the 'yards' waving Swedish flags. They took part in this local and Swedish victory. But no Swedes joined the party.

The Swedish respondents were negative or disinterested to contacts or relations with immigrants. It was important (and we have the same experiences from some other neighbourhoods) for them to tell us that they were not racists and not against people from other cultures. And in fact we have very few expressions of open racism in areas with many ethnic groups. But they say they want to live Swedish. And they feel this being impossible here. To say the least, the mixture of ethnic groups is certainly not encouraging what people here and elsewhere consider a good or even normal neighbourhood.

At the same time it is necessary to remember that the problems in this area did not start with the immigrants. The housing area has for a long time been unattractive, long before the immigrants became dominant. It seems reasonable to believe that both its non- attraction and its way of functioning partly has to do with the physical structure of the neighbourhood.

7.6 Can the situation be changed?

The problems described points to the importance to discuss in what ways the situation could be changed. Such a discussion must be looked upon more as a way to find directions of action rather than ready-made solutions.

Some questions must be put forward. Are people in this neighbourhood interested in a change, do they want better contacts with neighbours, are they interested in a better social life in the area? Some facts speak in a negative direction. There are a number of persons - single households mainly - who want to live their lives somewhere else, together with pals and together with people from their own ethnic group. Many also feel hostile to contacts with neighbours. This of course means that a change of the household composition is an important issue. I will come back to that later on. But some facts also speak in a positive direction. Many feel that the situation should be changed. They want a better neighbourhood. Not so few are at home daytime and seem to have a boring time alone in their flats. And many have suggestions.

I will start the discussion from that point: changes in the buildings and the 'yards'. It is obvious from our interviews that there is a need for a neutral arena which could fulfil different functions: a place where you could sit with the newspaper and a cup of coffee, a place for children's play, a place which at the same time is safe and possible to control. In other words, a well-functioning yard is needed.

There are rather good conditions for real yards between the buildings. Should the yard(s) be at the frontsides or the backsides of the buildings? There must be a passage through the area for fire-engines, removal vans och refuse lorries. It seems easiest if the frontsides keep those street qualities. This should not prevent the frontsides to be made more attractive with benches besides the entrances, more flowers and so on.

One of the backsides is the most attractive area to go out to, as I have described above. As a yard it has two drawbacks. The first is the lack of clear demarcations against the pathways which make the area public. This could be remedied by fences and bushes. The second drawback is that the buildings lack entrances toward this side. People have to go around the building. Entrances should be located directly to the yard, otherwise the yard does not 'belong' to the residents. This could be arranged here, it does not demand too much rebuilding. Seating furnitures, flowers and maybe small bushes could be placed outside the entrances. So far - as I see it - it would be appropriate to go to offer those who live here a nice controllable space. Not all of them will use these possibilities, but some will and some will perhaps even get interested in caring for a part of the yard. If that happens it would be important for the neighbourhood.

The entrance doors must of course become locked. It has struck us in the research project that those areas, where there are most troubles and burglaries, often have open entrances, while calm areas often have not only one but two locked doors to pass before the residents come to their own locked door. This is not to say that locks produce calm districts, but at least the stairs and other semiprivate spaces become more easy to control.

Changes of the kind I have described could make the situation in the neighbourhood more safe, people will meet more often and perhaps be more interested in their neighbourhood. Another way to get people more interested and responsible is to change the balance of influence and care. Would it be possible here?

From the interviews we know that there is minor interest in participating in the care of, for example, the stairs or the 'yards'. I do not believe it would be a wise decision to force new responsibilities on the residents. Too many are negative and also mistrust each other.. But, as I pointed out before, if the yards become better, maybe some residents will find it interesting to care for the flower beds close to their entrances - as people do in some other neighbourhoods. If the housing company meets this interest in a positive way, perhaps we could get persons who take on responsibility not only for the flowers. I have used the concept 'neighbourhood personality' above, a man or woman (more often in our study it is a woman), who is known to the residents and who will take on responsibilities for the good things of the common. It is not a formal position but it can be combined with one. The

company or the tenants' committee cannot just decide to create these 'personalities'. But with some support they can develop.

The third way to treat the problems in the neighbourhood is of course to change the household composition. No one - least of all those who live here - finds the situation favourable in this respect.

The housing company already has plans for putting together some of the smaller flats. Together with better yards this should mean that families will find the neighbourhood more attractive. The high mobility of the area means that the rebuilding of some flats could be accomplished as a successive process not forcing anyone to leave.

The immigrant domination certainly is very hard to change in the near future. The housing company cannot force more Swedes to move in and when the choice is between empty flats and more immigrants the company have to choose the immigrants. Perhaps a quota system on the housing market could change the situation but we are very far from that.

Another step could be to try to diminish the number of ethnic groups. Two or three ethnic groups besides the Swedish group could make the situation more bearable. The residents could easier find support or help if needed - and the need is not small - and the ethnic groups could be easier to recognise and understand. The housing company has the possibility to support such a development when they recruit new tenants and the high mobility in the district could make this change rather rapid.

Most of these propositions must be seen as elements in a slow and sustained process. The physical homogeneity and the organisation of care in the housing district makes it easy for the company to treat it as a unit. But what have been proposed here is changes developed in an interplay between tenants and the company in what I have called the little neighbourhood, a much smaller unit than the housing district.

7.7 What will happen?

We, from the research project, have presented our analysis and suggestions for the local administrators and caretakers. They have read and they accept the description of the situation. They certainly experience problems due to the mobility and the many ethnic groups.

After we left the neighbourhood the staircases have been painted, individually and rather beautiful. Our analysis supports the local administration's plan to put together some small flats. The local administration was also very positive to the idea of diminishing the number of ethnic groups. Their intention is to start a discussion about this in the company, because it is against the company´s policy.

Possibly - it is hard to tell today - there will be a lot of changes in the neighbourhood. But the risk that the district perspective will defeat the perspective of the little neighbourhood is too obvious. This perspective is much easier to accept in small-scale settlements where there are traditional yards and where tenants are taking

more part in the neighbourhood. But, as I see it, the perspective is not less important in the suburbs.

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8

CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGING POLICIES FOR LARGE SCALE HOUSING ESTATES IN THE NETHERLANDS

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8.1 Introduction

In the second half of the eighties, it gradually became clear that the worst housing shortages in the Netherlands had been alleviated. The housing problem slipped down the political ladder. The central government, up to then the party most involved in housing policy, drew its conclusions.

The central government is increasingly withdrawing from housing. At a lower level of scale local authorities, housing associations, members of the market and residents must sort things out for themselves. Control is being replaced by cooperation and covenants. Subsidies are being further dismantled. Property subsidies for new dwellings have already almost disappeared, and the finiteness of urban renewal has already been announced ('in 2005 urban renewal as a government task is finished in the Netherlands'). For the renovation of post-war dwellings there are since 1991 no more subsidies at all available. Housing allowances have so far escaped the axe, but in every national budget they are again under pressure. The next section deals with all these changes.

Housing policy is determined increasingly at the local level. That means that many former government tasks are now being performed by local authorities (and regions) and owners (housing associations). The new relations between the participants are described in section 8.3.

Section 8.4 continues with the consequences of the changing policies and relations for the distinctive neighbourhoods. In the last part two examples are given how to improve problematic neighbourhoods. Special attention is given to the (changed) relations between participants.

This paper forms the second part of the Dutch experience. The first is in chapter 3 presented by Ronald van Kempen and deals with national housing policies and topics.

8.2 Changing housing policies in the 1990s

In the first decades after the Second World War, housing was dominated by alleviating the housing shortage. During the eighties, the political weight of the housing theme fell. Economic functions of the city were given greater weight than just housing. The emphasis in the field of housing returned from the suburbs back to the city. More was built within the city boundaries, first still above all in the inexpensive social rented sector, later also more expensively. Since the mid eighties the population of cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam has been growing again.

Property subsidies for house-building were reduced, which both encouraged and rendered possible a greater role for the market. Attempts were made to halt the continuing growth of the housing allowances (for tenants).

The reduction of government subsidies for house-building was visible throughout Europe (Companen, 1993). Throughout Western Europe housing has disappeared from the lists of political priorities, and is therefore an easy victim of further cuts. An exception is perhaps formed by Germany after reunification. The government controls less and relies more on the 'invisible hand' of the market sector.

In 1989 the Ministry of Housing published the important Memorandum 'Housing in the nineties', and since then much has changed in the Netherlands. The national government has reduced it's responsibility for housing. Important ideas from the Memorandum are the pursuit of deregulation, decentralization of powers and responsibilities to the lower level, the greater independence of housing associations and residents (and their organizations), and the manageability of the national budget.

Meanwhile, the ideas from the memorandum are being converted into actual policy. In January 1992 an order (the BWS) entered into effect transferring a number of financial powers and risks to local authorities. With effect from January 1993 the greater independence of housing associations was regulated (in the BBSH). Instead of regulations before the event, the emphasis now falls more on responsibility after the event. In 1995, subsidies and loans to housing associations were counted again each other, which reduced the debts for both the State and the housing associations with some 30 milliard Dutch guilders ($15 billion).

The Welfare State is tottering and is being 're-evaluated'. That is at the expense of the protection of the weaker members of society. They too have to stand on their own feet more, only the latter are not as strong as those of others. Various authors therefore speak of a dual society. Schuyt (1992) cites work by Dahrendorf from 1985 ('Law and Order') and 1988 ('The Modern Social Conflict'), who argues that the European welfare states have allowed that new underclass to come about.

The growing dichotomy within society is visible in the city. A more obvious split between good and bad districts is coming about. In the latter live the underclass: many unemployed, many school-leavers, many incomplete families, many foreigners, many recent migrants, much crime and, in brief, little future. In section 8.5 we give some approaches for these problematic neighbourhoods.

To deal with this the 'Social Renewal' programme was started in the Netherlands in 1989, focusing on more work, more training and improvement of the daily environment. The social arrears in certain areas were tackled by means of social renewal, in which local authorities had to take the initiative to tackle poor housing and living conditions and more general social problems like unemployment and crime.
When in 1994 a new government started, new plans were made to deal with the problems especially in the bigger cities. In April 1995, the Minister of Intern Affairs introduced his Big City Policy. In July 1995 the Minister and the four biggest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) signed the 'Big City Covenant', followed in October by 15 middle size cities. The goal is to improve the overall position of the cities within the contract period of four years. This has to be reached on the following themes:

- work and education: long term unemployment, concentrated in problem neighbourhoods, has to be reduced. Education must be directed to access on the labour market;
- safety. Reduction of crime and improvement of safety-feelings;
- improvement of the quality of life in problematic neighbourhoods.

The approach is multi-purposed and directed towards results that are visible and can be counted and measured. Examples are 'improvement of schooling results by 10 per cent every year', or '30 per cent less young persons who have contact with the police', or 'creating 40.000 jobs for supervision, caretaking, etc.' (Covenant, 1995). At this moment, results have to be waited for, but the signal looks positive.

8.3 The changing relationship between participants in Dutch housing policy

The transformation of responsibilities has its consequences for the other participants in housing. More local powers, not curbed by controlling government subsidies, mean that home owners take decisions themselves about their property. In the post-war districts many dwellings are the property of social lessors, in the Netherlands about 40 per cent, but countries like Britain and Sweden also have a high score. In the post-war districts the role of the housing association grows. This new generation of urban renewal policy must ensure that greater differentiation develops according to tenure and type of building. Demolition of estates not yet written off is no longer taboo.

The role of the market is getting stronger, and the housing associations are increasingly adopting the attitude of real entrepreneurs. This means decisions on new construction, demolition and improvement, but also on investment of the financial reserves. That this is highly risky became apparent some years ago, when a number of associations suffered enormous losses through speculation on the stock market. In this case, the Minister interfered and prohibited to speculate any more.

The new rules mean concrete interpretation of the decentralization and deregulation idea from the 1988 government memorandum 'Housing in the nineties'. Policy is

determined closer to the citizens, the central government no longer concerns itself with all kinds of local details, the rules have been simplified and financial risks are moved to municipalities and housing associations.

Housing policy is determined increasingly at local level. That means that many former government tasks are now being performed by local authorities (and regions) and owners (housing associations). Let's focus on the participants in the game, and see what did change for them.

Larger local authorities, with more than 30,000 residents, are given the availability of subsidy budgets that, again within certain limits, they may spend themselves on housing. Smaller local authorities are encouraged to collaborate in regions and in this way also to obtain these budgets.

Housing associations are assigned a more important role. Some twenty years ago it sometimes happened that the local authority developed a plan, had houses built and did not transfer them to a housing association for management of the dwellings until they had been completed.

Nowadays housing associations have a much greater part to play. They can determine much more for themselves what kind of houses are to be built or converted. Increasingly covenants are concluded for this with the local authority containing clear agreements. Housing associations can develop and implement a policy of their own more independently, and local authorities supervise this. The wealthier a housing association, the less supervision, and the more freedom of policy. An important new aspect for housing associations is for instance the freedom (within limits) to determine the annual rent increase themselves. Formerly the Minister fixed a percentage annually by which almost all rents in the Netherlands had to be raised. Now housing associations have the (admittedly limited) freedom to bring rents more into line with housing market conditions. This means rent increases for the more popular dwellings and rent freezes for those least in demand. However, the central government continues to set averages and the maximum limits.

The management of dwellings is above all for the responsibility and account of the owners, which in the case of social housing are usually the housing associations. They must themselves pay for the management, maintenance and adaptations of their dwellings. Government subsidies for this have been drastically reduced.

Less subsidies mean higher rents.As a result of rent policy the average rent has been rising every year for some ten years by a few per cent more than building costs and the cost of living.

Rising rents are for the account of tenants. The annual rent increase mentioned above exceeded the average rise of income, the result being that an ever-greater part of income is being spent on housing costs (which can be seen in Figure 8.1). In the Netherlands the macro ratio of housing costs to income rose between 1981 and 1993 from 17 to 21.2 per cent. This means one of the biggest increases in Europe, but at the same time a percentage that is still below the average of the wealthier EC countries (dates: Ministry of Housing, 1991; 1994).

Figure 8.1 Housing expenses compared with inflation and building costs in the Netherlands, 1980-1993



Source: Ministry of Housing, 1994

During the eighties only a few more expensive dwellings for rent and for sale were built in the Dutch cities. Recently, however, a change has occurred. For parties in the market such as property developers and investors a great role is expected in building these more expensive dwellings for those who can afford. Their wishes are met thereby, but what is at least as important for policy is that these 'dearer' residents thus release cheaper houses for people with less money; in this way the celebrated moving up the housing ladder is promoted.
Incidentally, there are also ever-more housing associations that are building more expensive dwellings, without government subsidies. That fits within the new view of housing policy, namely more responsibility for the local parties. In this the housing associations are increasingly taking up a position as genuine entrepreneurs: 'social' entrepreneurs.

The role of the State is changing too. Since the Second World War the greatest State effort was the construction of the largest possible number of dwellings, so as to deal with the never-waning housing shortage. The role of the central government in housing policy, in addition to the creation of legal frameworks, was above all a financial one. The authorities gradually saw themselves placed less in a controlling and more in a stimulating and organizing role, whereby local parties themselves made and implemented policy. Government funds were economized on more and

more drastically. Discussions on 'core tasks of the government' emerged in every country.

The role of the State is changing from regulating and financing to coordinating, stimulating and giving publicity to good examples. On several topics, the central government promotes 'Example Plans' and provides them with publicity. If there are any subsidies left at all, they are used for innovations and extra costs for experiments.

8.4 Consequences for the large scale neighbourhoods

The role of the State did change more over the last five years than the forty years before. That is clearest to see in the post-war districts, three quarters of the built-up Netherlands. Until recently the State was regarded there above all as a financier, but recently no (State) money has been available any longer for the improvement of post-war districts. The whole improvement policy has been examined in a large scale evaluation. The result was restriction of the subsidies for improvement to only pre-war dwellings. In post-war districts the local parties must solve their problems themselves. The central government can assist in this primarily in a non-monetary way.

Management no longer stops at the dwelling. Formerly housing management was a matter for the associations, and the environment for the local authority. That gave rise to problems at the interface: the semi-public spaces like entrances, galleries, cellar corridors, stairwells etc. The large scale neighbourhoods often have abundent semi-public spaces. It emerges from all kinds of investigations and resident surveys that persons living in so-called problem neighbourhoods invariably have trouble with pollution, vandalism and insecurity.

The types of household that occupy the social rental sector are highly diverse. For this reason, the social rental sector houses many people, both young and old, with a relatively high income. This situation can be seen as major asset of Dutch society. But the changing Dutch housing policy in the 1990s will have a major influence on the large scale housing estates from the different periods. Building large quantities of affordable social housing is replaced by building more housing in the market sector, the individual rent subsidy is capped, renewal subsidies for the post-war areas are considered not necessary any more. Moreover, pre-war areas are undergoing a massive transformation and are 'replaced' within the housing market.

Within the existing neighbourhoods, expensive housing is being built, contrary to for example the 1970s and 1980s when 'building for the neighbourhood' implied building for the resident population, i.e. the low-income households. The low-rent segments of the (urban) housing market are more and more to be found in the often deteriorating post-war neighbourhoods.

What are the specific effects for post-war areas? I follow a typology which is described in Wassenberg (1993).

A. Early post-war neighbourhoods

Improvements in the pre-war stock make that the dwellings in the early-post-war neighbourhoods increasingly belong to the least expensive of the urban dwelling stock. As a result, the low-income households concentrate in these areas. Higher-income households are increasingly moving to newly built areas, because these offer more diversity and better quality. Many early post-war neighbourhoods will become minimum choice areas. Consequently, tensions among different population groups may intensify.

The problems are exacerbated by the lack of refurbishing subsidies for these areas. Many of these areas are already 40 years old and desperately wait for refurbishment. Most problems are with the poor quality and the out of date floor plan.

Owners (housing associations) have to improve their houses with own capital, which is saved for decades by the rents of the tenants. However, some of them don't have these reserves, and their possibilities for improvements are small. As argued, owners can decided themselves to improve, demolish, refurbish or renovate their housing stock. They have to negotiate with the tenants, but in practice their role is very modest.

These areas are among the cheapest in town. The local authorities are very keen to maintain this inexpensive stock. This means, they are not very eager to support expensive improvement measures because of the consequences for the rents. Small improvements are not counted within the rents, larger renovations do raise the rents.

B. High-rise areas built in the 1960s and early 1970s

The high-rise areas form only a small part of the total stock. Nevertheless, they dominate most of the neighbourhoods of the sixties. Of all dwellings in the Netherlands, 6.8 percent or 390,000 are in high-rise blocks (five or more stories). This amounts to almost one-forth of all multi-family apartment buildings. The main problem is a market problem: there are more flats than people who want to live in these flats. High-rise living is preferred by only 2 percent of the population, according to the National Housing Demand Survey (WBO). (For the rest: 80 per cent want a single-family house or ground floor unit, 7 per cent a low-rise flat on an upper level, 5 per cent a flat with no preference for a level, and 6 per cent with no preference at all).

Some of these high-rise blocks are in serious trouble. Many problems are the same as in low-rise, but because of the large scale, in a larger extent. Problems concentrate not in the dwellings themselves, but in the surroundings of the blocks, and in the semi-public spaces such as halls, elevators, stairwells and passageways.

Rents in the high-rise of the sixties are higher than in the low-rise of the fifties. But because of the low popularity, low-income groups do have access to many high-rise blocks.

The majority of the high-rise estates are owned by housing associations. Because of the lack of subsidies, they have to maintain and improve the flats with own capital. The popularity of the high-rise blocks depends on the housing market

situation. When the demand is high, it is easier to fill up the dwellings. If other alternatives occur, it is harder to find tenants and vacancy easy occurs.

New target groups form new possibilities. It is striking to see that in the Netherlands many high-rise blocks are improved and targeted to older people, people with jobs, and people without children.

C. Neighbourhoods from the seventies

As a reaction to the massive high-rise, in the seventies construction is with much more variation, with small series, winding street patterns and a lot of differentiation. In these kind of districts hardly problems occur. Some of the housing types are too expensive. The new regulations give the housing associations possibilities to lower their rents, or to sell them.

D. Neighbourhoods from the eighties

The building of the seventies showed to be pretty expensive. The economic recession around 1980 obliged to cheaper housing, with no room for any exuberant design. The result is a lower rent, but also a lower quality.

At the same time, the concept 'compact city' made its entry. After years of attention to 'expansion', 'filling in the gaps' in an already built environment becomes the subject of interest. Roughly a third of the new dwellings added in the eighties lie within the built-up area, above all in the cities. Usually these are smaller dwellings in the social rented sector, often two- to four-storey.

In both types of these relative new houses do already occur quality problems, because of the use of too cheap materials. Owners have to improve their stock already after ten years! Newly built areas of the nineties form an attractive alternative for the residents of these neighbourhoods.

Many pre-war districts are improved but with the result of an uniformity of inexpensive housing of the same kind, owned by housing associations, without much diversity according to tenure. At the same time, economic functions are wiped out, which strengthens unemployment problems for the tenants.

E. Neighbourhoods of the nineties

The newly developed neighbourhoods are of a much higher quality than ten years ago. Most of the houses are not any longer in the social rented sector, but built for home ownership.

A large section of the housing market today is a demanders' market. Moreover, most of the new dwellings are built for movers, not for starters. On this market the customer, the (potential) resident, can make his choice. Suppliers (of housing accommodation) must listen to the customer's wishes more than before. The customer demands not only a good dwelling, but also decent surroundings. The demands for higher quality are becoming evident in the new districts. Housing associations (will) have to concern themselves in the future with the residential environment, a trend which is already observable. For this too the covenants mentioned above are a good means of arriving at clear agreements with the local authority.

8.5 Examples

In the Netherlands, many examples do exist of the approach of large scale neighbourhoods. We will not give a comprehensive overview, but take two interesting cases:

case a: Stokhasselt in Tilburg, as a neighbourhood where all participants worked together and within a relative short period were successful to improve the neighbourhood;

case b: The Flatstrip Groenewoud in Spijkenisse, as an example where a neighbourhood has a very poor position on the housing market, which makes it impossible to motivate tenants to participate.

a. The Stokhasselt area in Tilburg

Stokhasselt was built in the 1960s, the period of the Dutch high-rise boom. Within the area, three neighbourhoods can be discerned. These neighbourhoods all have the same form: single-family houses in the middle of the area, high-rise on the outside, and low-rise between. More than 50 per cent of the total dwelling stock of 2,700 dwellings is in high rise. Most of the houses are rented by housing associations. A relatively large part of the area is covered with green and water.

During the years, problems occurred and worsened in the eighties: vandalism, filth, criminality, drugs abuse, unsafely and unemployment of young people. The neighbourhood got a bad reputation, which stimulated movements and refusals. The municipality indicated Stokhasselt as an area for so-called integrated renewal. Within ten years, the area must be a better place to live. Integrated renewal means that many different measures will be taken. For example: six high-rise complexes, with a total number of 288 dwellings have been demolished. Owner-occupied dwellings have been built instead. All non-demolished dwellings have been refurbished.

These structural measures were accompanied by measures of urban design, like for example a so-called colour-plan. By giving all dwellings in the three neighbourhood a distinctive colour, a blue, a yellow and a red neighbourhood can now be recognized.

Social measures are the third strand: one central management point within the area, regular meeting of all civil servants who are active in the neighbourhood, the appointment of caretakers, tenant committees and specific projects for target groups like the elderly, single mothers and immigrant youths are among the most important measures.

This is a very good example of an integrated approach of a high-rise estate. The whole area and all important parties (municipality, housing corporations, tenants) are involved. The aim is to improve the district. Not to make it the best in town, but to make a reasonable neighbourhood with a reasonable image and popularity within the city, for affordable prices.

Figure 8.2 The Stokhasselt area in Tilburg

b. Groenewoud in Spijkenisse: Integral approach, but without tenants

The town of Spijkenisse is a centre of urban development nearby the port of Rotterdam. Most of the 70,000 inhabitants arrived in the seventies and eighties from Rotterdam. The 'Flatstrip Groenewoud' is one of the first neighbourhoods to enlarge the small village towards the large garden city of today. The eleven blocks in four stories with walkway-access were built around 1965. Most of the 566 dwellings have four rooms.

From the beginning problems arose, but during the years not much action was taken. At the end of the eighties all the indicators were negative: a high turnover, many refusals, a lot of vandalism and crime. For years, about twenty percent is vacant. The flats only function as a starting point, many leave as soon as possible. Segregation is high: 60 per cent of the (registered) inhabitants are from the former colonies Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, besides many illegals. Unemployment, many young drop-outs, incomplete families and the absence of positive examples made the flatstrip Groenewoud to a place hardly anybody wanted to live.

Action was necessary. After years of laissez-faire and concentrating the city-problems within just one neighbourhood, it lasted until 1990 before plans were made (see Figure 8.3). A prize contest of the province functioned as a catalyst. Although the Spijkenisse case didn't win, the local government and the housing association started the process. The aim was to improve the Flatstrip Groenewoud to a 'normal neighbourhood in town'.

When a project-team started in 1990, three parties were involved: the local government, the housing association and the tenants committee. The first two agreed about the financing: expenses would be totalized and losses would be shared.

To solve all the problems, an integral approach was necessary. Three kinds of measures were proposed:

- physical, aimed at the dwellings: improvement, refurbishment, demolition, maintenance of flats. Differentiation is the keyword;
- the environment, to improve the safety and to get rid of pollution and vandalism. This part worked out to be the easiest;
- social.

The last category can be divided into social management, such as the appointment of caretakers, the opening of an office in the neighbourhood, visiting of tenants inside their dwellings and stimulating of contacts between tenants within the blocks. Moreover, housing allocation was tightened and intake-talks were organized.
Another kind of social measures was aimed at the poor social-economic position of the inhabitants themselves. The young drop-outs were stimulated to go back to school again, for the older ones participation in job programs was stimulated, especially for the large group of Antillians. A network for young mothers was created to support them with the upbringing of their children.

The process was not very smooth. The municipality had to work together with the housing association, a form both were not used to. In the growing town of Spijkenisse nobody worked in a projectteam for the existing stock, as all attention

Figure 8.3 Old situation and plans, Flatstrip Groenewoud in Spijkenisse

OLD SITUATION



NEW SITUATION



Source: Woningstichting Spijkenisse, 1997

was concentrated to new building. The tenants committee was formed by only a very few members, who lived there for many years, so representativeness always was a problem. Most of the inhabitants were totally indifferent, or wanted to move. And because of the building boom of the seventies and eighties, there were a lot of attractive houses available in the rest of Spijkenisse, with not too long waiting times. The tenants committee faded away in 1992, in spite of some professional support.

In 1995, the situation was as follows. The first block is totally refurbished, 16 dwellings are added on top and the block is targeted for elderly people. At the end of the strip, the last block is demolished. Instead, a tower block is being built, the highest in Spijkenisse, with 162 rental apartments and shopping facilities beneath. 28

single family houses for owner occupiers are added nearby. The closest block of flats is being refurbished too. Two other blocks have been improved on a smaller scale, which means that the rents are not raised. A part of block number 7 improved a bit more and a lift is added. This block is mentioned for elderly too.

In 1995, a halfway evaluation was carried out. Based on this study, decisions were taken how to deal with the remaining five blocks (numbers 2-6). Later on, it would be decided to demolisch 2½ block more, to build new single family houses, to improve one block and to build a new Atrium-building for elderly. Figure 8.3 shows the alterations, while figure 8.4 gives an impression of the final situation in 2001.

As far as the process can be considered, the integral approach seems to be integral indeed. Differentiation will be the result, with improved, refurbished and reshaped flat blocks and new buildings like the single family houses and the tower block. The environment will be improved, with more open spaces and better lightening. Caretakers are guarding and the police intensifies control. New tenants are being selected on a 'positive attitude'.

The whole improvement is being undertaken without participation of the tenants. As argued, this was the intention, but no tenants are left willing to contribute. In such a situation, owner (housing association) and municipality have to handle alone.

What is happening with the drop-outs, the criminals, the young illegals and unemployed? Part of them ('the positives') joined one of the job or schooling programs. Part of them went back to Rotterdam, to the Antilles, or somewhere else in the Netherlands, mostly to relatives. Part of them also is moving to a neighbourhood nearby, actually one with the same characteristics as the Flatstrip Groenewoud. And part of them is still living here.

Figure 8.4 The new tower block and single-family houses at the end of the Flatstrip Groenewoud in Spijkenisse. The area used to be only low-rise blocks



Source: Woningstichting Spijkenisse, 1997

The physical and the social measures together seem to change the neighbourhood, but don't solve all personal problems. But that may never be an excuse not to take measures. The movement of a part of the problems is inherent to any intensive approach. Some of these problems are too large to be solved on a local level.

Flatstrip-area. Even after improvements, continuous attention has to be paid to the Flatstrip Groenewoud. The type of housing, and the weak position of the inhabitants make it necessary to follow developments very carefully.

At the same time, the partners should be aware of new problems. The Flatstrip in Groenewoud was the first management problem with existing stock in the municipality, but more are at hand. These are stimulated by the approach in the Flatstrip, which makes problems in other neighbourhoods become more clear.

8.6 Conclusions

During decades, housing was one of the main themes in Dutch policy. However, when the housing shortage diminished in the eighties, new priorities were set. Central government ruling and financing was not necessary any more. Responsibilities are set on the local level.

This has consequences for the large scale neighbourhoods. Subsidies for refurbishment or maintenance are stopped, so owners have to invest themselves. Tenants get the bill by the higher rents. Local authorities, housing associations and tenant committees have to negotiate about the future of their neighbourhoods, but at this moment, the parties seem not equally provided with possibilities. The interests of the partners did change in the last years.

In two examples it is shown how the local housing policies are changed. In both problematic neighbourhoods an approach was necessary, and is still going on. One blueprint is never the right one, but it is always possible to get out the right elements.

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9

PAVING THE WAY TOWARDS MAINSTREAM HOUSING FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

Michel Conan, CSTB, Paris

9.1 The move from housing estate to urban redevelopment programs

Public housing built after WW II in the industrialized countries stands as a symbol of the ambitions, the achievements and the failures of modern planning in its reliance on sheer instrumental rationality[1]. A wide-spread criticism of modern planning points to the lack of a more comprehensive view of existential rationality operating in the life-world. It denounces the lack of understanding of the production of everyday life[2]. Criticisms of large estate housing development were strong enough in 1973 to decide the minister for housing to forbid construction of both towers and slab buildings for housing purposes[3]. The first attempts at improving living conditions in the existing large housing estates were made during the following years. A remedial program linking rehabilitation of building structures and social and cultural programs were tentatively initiated in a dozen neighborhoods. More significantly though, a new fund for urban improvement (FAU: Fonds d'Aménagement Urbain) by bringing together, in 1977, several ear-marked public funds. This was the main management tool for an interministerial policy conducted under the aegis of the Ministry for Housing and Public Works and the Ministry for Social Welfare. Local authorities would present a general plan of action that derived from an analysis of social and economic structures in some parts of the city. This survey was accompanied by a strategic plan describing the various actions that were expected to contribute to a new course of local development. Both planning studies and public investment called forth by the strategic plan could receive financial help from the national fund which acted in close cooperation with departmental administration authorities (le groupe administratif départemental).

Major changes were initiated after a socialist president was elected in 1981. It was acknowledged that large public housing neighborhoods had been bureaucratically designed and that it led to powerlessness and to learned helplessness. Public concern about social unrest has supported a search for approaches that would to the contrary allow inhabitants to regain some control over their abodes and over their lives. A major normalization policy was launched in an incremental way, starting with a pilot program geared at "social redevelopment" of twenty two derelict urban neighbourhoods dating from the sixties[4]. It was quickly extended to 60. Then to 148 in 1985,

and to 546 by 1987. This so called "Neighbourhood Development Policy" (DSQ, i.e. 'Développement Social des Quartiers', in French), led to the creation of a new administrative organization that became a ministry in its own right in 1988 after the president had been reelected and started a policy of social development contracts between cities and the state[5]. 214 contracts have been signed, they are aimed at 1,300 residential neighborhoods as a whole.[6]

Tools for public management of these programs were borrowed from the existing FAU program with two major differences: a project leader under the authority of the local mayor was appointed in each neighborhood, and a national group of experts was called together in order to foster national support from the various ministries for intersectorial initiatives at the local level. The project leader, usually a free-lance modernization agent with very low legitimacy in the public arena, was made responsible for helping public bodies to avail themselves of existing sources of public money to finance innovative projects in the neighbourhood and stimulating residents participation in these developments. In order to achieve any result he had to stimulate support from both city and regional administrations and to capitalize on local initiatives taken by street-level public agents catering to the needs of the neighbourhood's inhabitants, such as teachers, social workers, cultural agents, or vocational training or delinquency prevention officers. Most of these agents were rather low in status. They were advocating new approaches to public intervention that they could not decide by themselves. The project leader could call upon the national experts for help. They were in a position to bring local decision makers together around a table for a joint discussion of these projects. The national experts constituted also a resource group of people able to help the project leader to prepare skilful submissions for funding from the different ministries. Very little urban planning or design was achieved along this process. Instead, the program gave rise to a new decision making system that facilitated muddling through the tangles of local, county, regional and national administrations in order to appropriate new investment funds for a series of independent neighbourhood projects.

These neighbourhood development programs led to a huge number of local initiatives. Besides they were accompanied by thorough building rehabilitation and energy saving investments, as well as somewhat haphazard ground landscaping. Despite a flurry of seminars and colloquiums as well as a large circulation of information papers and bulletins the whole program remained extremely vague in the definition of purposes and methods. The Hawthorn effect seems to have been rather powerful, with local initiative stirring lots of interest to begin with, and fading away as months or years were passing. It created both excitement and discouragement. These policies were supposed to enable deprived neighbourhoods to take off, and to become standard living areas in the city. They were supposed to last a few years during which remedial programs would be implemented until a normal situation resumed. From then on, such residential areas should have been treated again according to mainstream administration processes. This has not happened. It appeared that some buildings had to be renovated again a couple years after the first renovation was achieved. The sense of urban crisis had not disappeared, it had been slightly postponed. These neighbourhoods were concentrating poor people, immi-

grants, school violence, and non-employment, in particular among young men. Public officials started wondering whether social goodwill combined with zoning regulation were not an ill-fated recipe for ghetto development.

The new government in 1983 stressed that these projects should be pursued with a city-wide perspective in view. This was obviously very difficult to achieve, and a multi-pronged approach was attempted[7]. On the one hand local authorities were encouraged to take a broad look at the whole commune, and to develop a local housing policy and to attempt a reorganization of municipal administration along new lines doing away with the limitations created by sectorial organization. Public bodies at city and departmental level were encouraged to coordinate their actions. And a few actions calling for private organizations to cooperate with public agencies were launched at the national level with the financial support of a national lending bank the Caisse Nationale des Dépots et Consignations (CDC). This has allowed a search for new frames for public intervention. Public programs that rely upon new kinds of urban governance have been devised in an effort to make housing more responsive to its users.

9.2 Modernization of the foyers for young workers

One of these programs which concerned a major modernization of the French foyers has been taking place during the last five years[8]. A large number of Foyers had been built during the period of economic growth after World War II in order to give shelter to young people migrating to the cities for the sake of securing a job for themselves at a time of full employment and scarce housing opportunities. Many of them used old structures nearby the central city or in working-class neighbourhood, some where built in the large residential estates that were developed at the time, others were located in the industrial areas, and still a few were built as an isolated residence on a vacant lot in the suburbs. These foyers were providing shelter as well as social entertainment and moral supervision. Some of them were built and managed by churches or charities, others were rented from local housing companies by all sorts of non-profit organizations. At first they were very successful, but times changed and they ran into economic difficulties. They became totally unable to maintain their premises and they seemed as well unable to cope with a whole lot of new demands from young people migrating to the cities either to follow remedial programs, or to get out of an institution, or to attend a training program, or to improve their education. They were even unable to meet demands for better living conditions by those who had a job. At the end of the 80s there were 450 Foyers for young workers (FJT) in France and they were under the fire of heavy criticism by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Housing. The national union of these Foyers (UNFJT) felt very concerned and it started making blueprints for a major modernization. This was meant to shift the emphasis in services by the foyers from offering shelter to helping young people's integration into society and fostering personal development. In 1989 the state administration and a national saving bank, the Caisse des Dépots et Consignations, lent their support. Loans and subsidies were

offered. Since that time, 150 foyers have been rehabilitated and modernized. Besides this, modernization allows young people the full benefit of a personal allowance for housing, and this provides Foyers with a stable source of fair rents. In order to demonstrate its accountability the national savings bank asked us to carry out an evaluation of the first four years of the program. A formative evaluation of the modernization process has been conducted during the first three years of this program. It has been followed by a summative evaluation which was meant primarily to determine whether living in a foyers really helped young people's social integration at all. In the meantime the modernization is going on.

Management of the modernization program

This program was supposed to respond to difficulties met by young people when coming of age. Because of social, economical and environmental differences such difficulties are not exactly the same in every city. Thus this program was meant to address a nation-wide issue and to be responsive to local circumstances. Some cities had only one foyer, others had several managed by different organizations competing for ideological control of the youth (such as churches or political organizations), still others were running foyers as municipal quangos. In a few cities renovation of a foyer was linked to a DSQ project. Yet all of these differences were ignored to start with by the national committee that was put in charge of supervising the modernization process. After one year of operations a new approach was introduced.

A two level decision making system was put into effect: each project manager was asked to bring together, at city level, a local commission of public authorities in charge of youth oriented policy, in order to devise the best possible fit between the future organization of the Foyer and all existing local institutions and local policies in charge of social integration of young people. Besides a national commission was made responsible for discussing each project with this local commission and for giving advice on matters of general policy, as well as deciding financial support given by the state. The national commission comprised one representative from the Ministry of Social Affairs, one from the Ministry of Housing, one from the Ministry for Sports an Youth Affairs, one from the National saving bank (CDC), one from the union of public housing organizations and one from the union of young workers associations. Each project had to propose a new organizational framework for services to be offered to young people by the Foyer, as well as an architectural plan for renewal or retrofitting of the premises. Otherwise the local Foyer associations were left absolutely free to decide upon the content of their modernization, and upon the method they chose to follow for devising it.

Many modernization issues had been discussed in the general assembly of the national union of young workers Foyers, and it had been agreed that the national body (UNFJT) would provide general guidelines and personal assistance to all the Foyers which required it. Besides it must be noted that the national union had been invited by public officials to be a member of the national commission, and that it had a voice in the approval of public grants for all the projects.

A set of national goals was presented for discussion at the general assembly of the union of young workers housing associations. It was finally agreed that each project should contribute to :

* Putting together new or renovated accommodation fitting the diversity of young resident's demands, and located in places suitable for their social and economic integration.
* Improving upon the delivery of services to young people that are conducive to a better health, education and employment.
* Accommodating young people whatever origin or social situation in order to support development of communicative integration.
* Seeking a larger independence of both residents and the Foyer association through economic self-sufficiency.
* Developing the role of all associations, as a network, in every aspect of social development policies related to housing, from the local to the national level.

Each association that wanted to take part in the national modernization program was invited to choose a project leader, usually the chairman of the board of the association, or the director of the foyer, and sometimes both of them at the same time. Then it was advised to carry a list of preliminary studies concerning the situation of young people in the city and its surroundings, as well as financial planning for all future activities. They were offered the help of a few in-house experts, as well as the possibility to consult briefly two acknowledged specialists, an architect and a sociologist. Most of them called upon these experts, and showed great doubts in front of the advice they were given. Usually projects leaders went through a large process of internal consultation inside the Foyers, calling mostly upon the experience and the proposition of educators and advisers of young residents, as well as upon the ideas and the knowledge of the cook[9] and the warden in the existing Foyer. Since most of these associations do not own their premises, they had to consult extensively with the owner[10]. The local commission proved very useful in this respect, and helped each association muddle their way through a tangle of local fights with different administrations and local officials with a stake in social policy.

Evaluation of the program from the residents' point of view

First, we made an inquiry into the young residents' reactions to their new living conditions. This could easily be made through group interviews in the Foyers after they had been modernized. It showed, as we shall see a little further, that young residents were experiencing great changes for the better in their living conditions in the Foyers. But we wanted also to learn about the young people's integration into adult society. Since it is quite impossible to follow up, at a low cost, a cohort of young people after they have left the foyers, we resorted to a different strategy, asking young people living in a foyer what they had learnt during their stay there. We have also asked them how they felt with respect to a number of issues: their own prospects in life, and their expectations with respect to social change, attitudes about equality, racism, solidarity, social welfare, employment, justice, violence,

love, sexuality, family, war, military service and consumption. This presentation will be limited to a few very general findings.

Young people dwellings in these foyers are coming from middle and working class families, usually from the region around the foyer, but a few are coming from further away. Very few have been living on the streets, but some of them have been living in institutions. Most of them would find it almost impossible to find accommodation in the city outside the foyer otherwise. A slight majority of them comes from families were parents are still married. Nine out of ten have already worked for a wage at least temporarily, and 42 per cent enjoyed their work experience, while only one in twenty was dejected. Despite a lack of enthusiasm with politics almost half of them are already registered for voting, and the older they are the more numerous to be registered. The major differences between them, though, stem from either the previous difficulties they have encountered in life or from their attitudes towards education as a path for social mobility.

In Figure 9.1 we observe the individual courses of development of young residents in a foyer. The largest group (35%) considers school as a short-cut towards a job. About 22% are early drop-outs and 16% bet on education for social mobility. One out of five young residents feel discriminated by a sequence of misfortune.

Figure 9.1 Individual course of development of young residents in a foyer



Table 9.1 Reasons for coming to a foyer

Reasons for coming to a foyer	%
Studying	34
Working	28
Getting away from the family	22
Vocational training	20

Very few of them had any choice of accommodation in the city, but many of them had some other clear reasons in mind to look for a place where to live. A few wanted to pursue their studies at junior or senior high school level or at a higher level, and others wanted to get on a training program, to go to work, or to look for a job. But, on top of that, one out of five wanted to leave their family.

Once they had decided to settle at a Foyer, many of them entertained some expectations with respect to their stay, besides having a bed. We asked them to rate the importance of each of these expectations. Two out of three young people declared that accommodation was a very important reason for their coming. There was also a fair number of them who expected to find an environment that would be conducive to good working habits, or to learning about ways of living as an independent adult, or who hoped that they might be given all sorts of needed advice, or that they would be able to make friends and of course to discover new leisure activities.

Most residents declare that they have learnt several things during their stay at the foyer. Almost all of them have learnt about their rights to a housing allowance and how to claim them. A majority of them have also learnt how to cooperate with other young people, and to get various social benefits, and to search for housing accommodation. Actually neither do all residents learn the same things, nor do they rate them in the same way.

Table 9.2 Most important expectations with respect to foyers

Most important expectations with respect to foyers	%
Finding accommodation	67
Finding an environment that supports working habits	40
Finding an environment that helps to learn how to cope with adult life and to receive good advice	36
Making friends	31
Finding out more leisure activities	28

Table 9.3 Importance of knowledge gained at the foyer

How important is knowledge gained at the foyer?

	Very important %	Rather important %	Total %
Housing allowances	37	24	61
Cooperating with young people	18	31	49
Managing their own budget	30	16	46
Social welfare benefit	29	13	42
Dealing with public administration	20	22	42
Looking for accommodation	22	13	35
Getting oneself a new hobby	15	18	33
Looking for a job	25	4	29
Applying to an employment program	20	7	27
Learning about drug abuse	17	7	24

Actually one must notice that some young people pay very little attention to what they are learning, whereas others may acknowledge the importance of new learning for themselves. It was striking to note that a few of them develop an awareness of issues because their friends have been introduced to them, despite the fact that they have not. One should stress differences between showing a lack of concern for practical information, reaching an awareness of its practical value, mastering new knowledge, and developing a real know-how. It turns out, that depending upon the topic at stake, between one and two out of five young residents consider that they have learnt something of real importance for them at the foyer.

Learning about housing allowances, social benefits, dealing with public administration, looking for a job, applying for a vocational training program, or for employment, as well as learning how to cooperate with other young people, managing their own budget, or discovering new leisure activities are some of the most popular benefits they gain from staying in a foyer. It shows that modernized foyers are offering much more than shelter, and that they are providing support towards social integration to at least one third of the young residents.

Table 9.4 Overall judgment of young residents upon their learning experience in the four domains of development that UFJT was reaching for

	Very important %	Without importance %
Social system proficiency	29	6
Development of self-sufficiency	20	8
Cooperation and negotiation	17	18
Personal health	30	4
Political citizenship	10	18

This seems to show that the modernization of the foyers did meet some broad expectations of young people who would have been at a loss to find accommodation and support in their effort to make a place for themselves in an adult society.

9.3 Goodwill and personal experience as obstacles in public service planning

The national commission that was responsible for financing the modernization projects for each foyer insisted on a tremendous change of accommodation, calling for an independent bedroom with a shower and a toilet for each resident whenever possible financially. Reasons were very humane: the members did not see any reasons for denying youngsters the benefits of what they would consider as a required standard of comfort for themselves when sleeping overnight in a hotel. Besides, in order to help associations make some gains out of catering at lunch time for the neighbourhood they agreed to the enlargement of common restaurant facilities which precluded any kitchenette being installed either in the bedrooms or at each floor in most foyers. Otherwise facilities turn out to be somewhat different from one foyer to the next, even though they are serving a small number of similar functions: a cafeteria open for breakfast, after lunch-time, in the afternoon and in the evening, rooms for playing and for social activities, TV room, and eventually rooms for vocational training or a variety of educational programs. Usually, there is also a small kitchen which is open for residents during week-ends when the restaurant is closed.

Comparing modernized and non-modernized foyers

A few years before the beginning of this program, the National Union of Foyers had carried out a study of a small number of foyers in the Paris region. Residents' satisfaction had been shown to provide a very poor measure of the residents' view of their living conditions[11]. Instead it suggested that attention should also be paid to functionality of the building as a whole, to cleaning, and to a small range of variables depicting important aspects of the residents' life-world: intimacy, appropriation of space, its personalisation, social image of the Foyer, and its aesthetics. The modernization of the foyers was expected to bring improvements along all of these lines. Unfortunately they are rather difficult to assess, and it seemed impossible to decide when looking at the project for renovation of the building how much improvement it would bring in the level of each of these important variables. To a certain extent, improvements were taken for granted by most project leaders and local commissions once intentions with respect to these variables had been explained to the architect.

Henceforth it seemed reasonable to ask residents in modernized foyers for their own views along each of these lines. In order to do so, we devised a very simple-minded questionnaire to be used in group interviews. Each group of residents from a foyer was asked to tell what would be the answer given by the majority of residents in the foyer to thirty two questions about their living conditions. A closed set of answers was proposed. Most of the time there was some disagreement in the

group and they had to discuss together in order to make sense of the question and of their common experience. No vote was allowed, and a discussion leader helped the group explore its disagreements before a common judgment was reached. This provided a measure of group opinion on each of these variables as well as a phenomenological account of life experiences related to each of them in the foyer. Hence we could obtain both a crude measure for the sake of cross comparison between foyers, and an interpretation of the meaning of these variables in each of the foyers. Of course they were not exactly the same everywhere. This is a problem common to all opinion research: identical measurements may hide differences of meaning over time and place.

All the questions were very straightforward and we made an effort never to introduce words that might detract the residents attention from their own experience. We did not ask them about functionality, or intimacy or appropriation directly. We expected the discussion to yield an insight in each of these items in turn. And in order to reach this result we defined in a concise way each of the eight variables so that the leader of the discussion could focus the discussion on the concept to be explored.

Definition of the eight goals for housing quality in the foyers

Satisfaction	Value of the compromise struck between wishes and possibilities at present
Functionality	Level of fit between ordinary uses and the organization
Cleanliness	Level of concern shown for residents' comfort betrayed by maintenance practice
Social image	Self-image reflected by the social environment
Aesthetics	Ability to acknowledge somebody else's effort towards an ideal purpose
Intimacy	Capacity to enjoy tender feelings.
Appropriation	Ability to adapt settings to personal views of proper use
Personalization	Expressing an ideal of self

This approach was applied in four foyers that had not yet been modernized, and nine which had been. Differences are striking. Average measure for each variable are higher by 5 per cent to over 50 per cent in the modernized foyers.

Generally speaking the modernization has made the foyers very comfortable, and young residents derive a new sense of being cared for by society at large. This enables them to take a more objective view of the world they live in, and to adopt an open attitude with respect to the future. Instead of considering that they are relegated to an undesirable situation that cannot be helped, like residents in non-rehabilitated foyers did, they share a sense of being somewhat privileged in a difficult world that is amenable to change for the better. They clearly gain a view of themselves as responsible and independent persons. To a certain extent the moderni-

Table 9.5 Comparison between the opinion of residents about cohousing and after modernization along the eight goals

	Modernized compared to non-renovated foyer[12]
Satisfaction	XXX
Functionality	XXX
Cleanliness	XXXX
Social image	X
Aesthetics	XXX
Intimacy	XXX
Appropriation	XX
Personalization	X

zation compels them to yearn for a larger personal autonomy. This measure of success for the program is double edged. At the same time that residents enjoy this individual comfort, they complain about the experience of feeling lonely among the crowd of others. They experience boredom, a sense of loneliness, distrust for others, a fear of developing rumours that may ruin their reputation in the foyer, the impossibility to feel at home and to enjoy intimate experiences even in their private bedrooms. They certainly enjoy privacy, but they miss intimacy.

Limits of grass-root planning

This is true in most modernized foyers, but not in all of them. Because each Foyer could not comply with demands expressed by the national commission, projects have been designed according to a series of different principles. We may describe them as a continuum between two ideal types: the two-star hotel, where each resident has a room of his own with toilet and shower included, and a common restaurant on the ground floor; and the cohousing model where two residents share a room with shower, toilet, and kitchenette included, without a common restaurant on the

Table 9.6 Comparison between the opinion of residents about cohousing and about non-renovated foyers along the eight goals

	Cohousing compared to non-renovated foyer
Satisfaction	XXXX
Functionality	XXXX
Cleanliness	XXXX
Social image	XXX
Aesthetics	XXX
Intimacy	XXXX
Appropriation	XXX
Personalization	XXX

Table 9.7 Comparison between the opinion of residents about cohousing and about hotel-type foyers along the eight goals

	Cohousing compared to two star hotel type foyer
Satisfaction	X
Functionality	XX
Cleanliness	X
Social image	X
Aesthetics	0
Intimacy	XX
Appropriation	XXXX
Personalization	XXXX

premises. The second model demands much more initiative from the residents, it makes privacy more difficult to achieve, and it forces cooperation and negotiation with a room mate. One would expect it to be far less satisfactory on all counts given by our set of eight variables. The contrary proves to be true.

The interviews with the group of residents in the cohousing models explained very simply this result: they enjoy more initiative and they do not experience loneliness. To the contrary a sense of mutual accountability is prevailing in the cohousing foyers so that almost every one can be seen to care for the intimacy of the others. This was not a mechanical result of the choice to enforce pairing of room-mates, and to encourage self-sufficiency in everyday life. Actually it took some time for newcomers to make sense of this situation and to be able to enjoy it to the full. It was part of a learning process which took place because these foyers were supportive and caring for the residents: they would provide individual counselling whenever a resident ran into personal problems, and they would help each of them understand relationships between individual freedom and achievement of a common good in the foyer. But this was equally true in the hotel type foyers. So that it is quite striking to see that educators with the same kind of attention for young residents achieved such different results in these two types of foyers. The main difference between the two-star hotel type and the cohousing model derived from a very simple reason : young people felt at home in the second, not in the first. Then one may wonder how project leaders made their choices.

There is a good reason why the two star hotel has been so common. It provides a compromise between social motives that were upheld by the national commission and the shared belief among foyer associations that they need a common restaurant. Goodwill at the national level, and personal experience at the local level sustained the conclusion that such a kind of accommodation was highly desirable for young people. Actually educators knew that, when living in overcrowded foyers, young people craved for a room of their own, and even if residents rarely insisted that they needed a restaurant on the ground floor, one could observe that they used them. But one should also remember that project leaders used also to take the advice of their

employees in the foyers. In most places kitchen employees comprise the larger part of the work-force in a foyer. Renouncing to a restaurant in the foyer would have meant putting them out of employment at a time when finding a new job might have been near impossible for most of them. On the other the modernization offered an opportunity to improve their working conditions. Since this had to be justified in economic terms, it made a growth of the restaurant desirable. There were probably many other compromises that might have been devised, but they were never explored because nobody could foresee the inconveniences that this one would procure. Goodwill and a sense of righteousness derived from personal experience with young people as well as a sense of personal accountability to the employees were preventing further questioning.

Neither project leaders nor educators seemed to be able to explain how the new organization should facilitate young people's development and help them become self-reliant citizens. Everybody in each foyer was doing his best and rested confident that his personal experience with young people gave him a firm basis to judge what was best for them. There was no need felt for more knowledge of any sort because the program for the local modernization was achieved through a process of bargaining between competing interests. One might have expected the result to be different if young residents had taken part in the planning process. But, given the choice between those two types of foyer, almost any young person would have expressed the same interest in favor of the hotel type foyer because no youth can foretell what the consequences of new living conditions are going to be for his own development. One may yearn for independence and autonomy and yet experience great difficulties once they are realized. Independence can be granted. This is not so with personal autonomy. Exercising it craves moral resources that have to be developed through personal experience and reflection before it can be exerted. Unfortunately command of moral resources cannot be given away by mutual consent alone. This should remind us that production of the life-world does not result only from conflicts and compromises between differing interests, it calls for actual experience.

Our survey showed that the director's and the educators' knowledge could be well informed on certain issues and very inaccurate on others, and that this precluded a good judgment of the life experience of the residents. But they also fell short of any theory of personal development and of social integration, so that they were totally unable to take a critical distance with respect to their intuitive feelings when negotiating and devising the modernization of the foyer.

9.4 Splitting material experience and organizational ideas

Project leaders and educators were much more articulate about their intentions in one of the cohousing foyers. It was predicated upon a crude theory that assumed that it was possible to learn how to cooperate with others and to feel free in a group if the law defining the common good was a focus for discussion with educators. Thus the modernized organization in this cohousing foyer had been designed in such a way that it would create opportunities for cooperation. For instance, residents had no

common restaurant but each one had a kitchenette and they could take turns preparing meals, or they were encouraged to negotiate use of the scant furniture that was put in each double room, or otherwise to buy, or to make by themselves new stools, tables or cupboards. Observations confirmed that the experience of space provided very meaningful cues for socializing and for personal development of these residents.

There is a clear link between the kind of life experiences that were set up for them in advance, and the material and architectural space that can be acknowledged through direct observation. Yet such a link was difficult to grasp during the design process of any foyer. Most of the time a blueprint for the future organization had been established long before any contact had been made with an architect. It was expressed as a program list for changes to be achieved in the existing foyer together with some indications of the social purposes that were being pursued, and a financial limit to the budget that should not be exceeded. Architects would then proceed according to their understanding of the role of spatial experience in life. Most of them put much emphasis on meeting a number of well-publicized functional standards, and providing unexpected aesthetical experiences of geometrical forms.

During the formative evaluation we were given the opportunity to study carefully a number of organizational programs together with the corresponding architectural drawings. Plans complied with the program in a formal way. A sense of care for the well being of residents was always present, but nevertheless the plans evinced a lack of responsiveness to the aims of the modernization that totally escaped critical inspection by the project leaders. Actually they were very far from naive in front of plans, and they could explain how the plan would allow fulfilling certain functions, or sharing some aesthetic experience very much like the architect, but they had great difficulties distancing themselves from his point of view whenever it did not contradict their personal intuition. For instance they could not adopt the point of view of a resident when looking at the plans for a renovated bedroom.

It was also slightly disturbing to realize that spatial features that proved to be very successful in the daily operations of a foyer before its renovation would be destroyed for the sake of whimsical aesthetics. This was not so uncommon, because it is so difficult to grasp relationships between life and its environment. However artificial they are, the stages on which the dramas of life unfold are always mistaken for natural settings. Actors ignore most of the time how spatial arrangements influence the course of interaction between them[13]. In the foyers, for instance, designing an entrance hall may have far reaching consequences on the conditions under which residents will acquire a sense of autonomy. For security reasons, it is almost always necessary to have an information desk with a direct view on the entrance lobby. For aesthetical reasons these lobbies are very often designed with large window panes, and glass walls that make the information desk into a panopticon device. It may be difficult for residents in an institution to feel independent and autonomous when one's going in and out are subjected to constant surveillance. The foyer directors to whom this aspect of the design for their renovation was pointed out always reacted by declaring that they did not want such surveillance to counter their efforts towards helping residents to achieve a sense of autonomy while at the

foyer. They were dismayed to discover that they had failed to read this problem in the plans. Actually, it escaped their capacity to take a critical look at architectural drawings imbued by an aura of expertise. Architects were not to blame either. They were not disciples of Jeremy Bentham, and they did not realize that surveillance was an issue because they shared no experience at all with young residents in a foyer. This was just one more case of an overlooked problem of everyday life.

Since we could easily discover a few of them we decided to make a survey of all such problems which carried implications for spatial design that we could record. We visited a score foyers, most of them already renovated, and a few still awaiting rehabilitation, where we listed all kinds of everyday life interactions in particular settings that gave rise to difficulties or unpleasant situations, and we searched for ways of improving such settings that would make likely the disappearance of offensive behaviors. We made a memorandum of them into an illustrated book that became very quickly popular among foyer directors, and their architects[14].

It turned out to be of little value. Foyer directors found out that they did not know how to use it. And it took some time to realize that it had given rise to a new misunderstanding. The building environment was no longer looked at as natural, but rather as magical. They unwittingly re-invented architectural determinism. They expected that the choice of architectural design intentions would provide them with a clear and efficient view of future life in the foyer, ignoring the fact that it is impossible to decide which problems may arise in a given space unless you have at least some idea about the organization of everyday life. But even that would not be sufficient in a foyer. Issues about personal development cannot be dealt with bureaucratically. Developing a sense of political responsibility in the production of the good life in an urban setting calls for a cultural project for such a place. The difficulty stems from the mutual relationships between the life-world of residents, organizational culture and architectural space. As we have suggested conditions of realization of this cultural project that would allow young residents a field of experiences supportive of self-development into autonomous citizens depend upon sensible choices in the design of the physical environment, and only critical analysis of the life-world can teach us, after the fact, which were the sensible choices.

A sceptical note

Negotiated management of programming the foyers' rehabilitation at city level has resulted in a shared awareness by different local authorities and managers of public agencies that there should be a local policy geared at helping young people make their way into adult society. When there were several foyers, a search for a coordinated policy has been started. Public housing companies have been asked to pay attention to the difficulties that young adults face when they are looking for their first flat. A few local authorities have started wondering whether their were not deeper problems beyond the low demand for accommodation by young people at present. In particular a few of them have started wondering whether the trend, among unemployed young people living in large residential estates of the sixties, to stay in their parents' home and to hang around daily in the neighbourhood was not something they should be concerned about. Allowing young people an entry into

mainstream society seems to be making its way in local political agendas. Yet the means to achieve these goals do not seem to be within reach. It is certainly not enough to build new foyers, even if this can be part of a solution in many instances. But even producing the most supportive foyers for their residents is not likely to be an easy task. A few very interesting examples of local development have been achieved. One might hope that a learning process shared overtime by a few scores of foyers could help break away from circularity, and enable a more rational approach of foyer design, allowing for a dialectical appraisal of cultural ideals and material conditions that can be confronted to empirical observations of the actual production of everyday life.

In a sense this would amount to demanding that public investment be open to communicative action. Project leaders would be made accountable for each decision they have made, and should be able to spell out all the reasons behind their choices, and to acknowledge their prejudices and their mistakes. When called upon to explain the reasons for some unhappy events they might of course turn the arguments around and show that mistakes are not theirs but somebody else's. Yet such a soul searching exercise could be very threatening to many planning experts because they cannot achieve a comprehensive view of the problems of these organizations. The division of labour between architects and social planners allows each of them to claim expertise in a domain that the other cannot trespass, so that it exposes each of them to acting blindly with respect to the life-world of the constituency they are supposed to serve, as we have seen earlier. This makes their expertise open to impingement and it is unlikely that this would take place undisturbed by any efforts on their part to evade it or to deflect its course. The political conditions for the emergence of local governance that would encourage accountability of the planners to the final users have not yet been clearly outlined.

9.5 Conclusion

Modernization of young people housing aimed at helping young people find their way into mainstream society. In order to achieve that goal this program has rested upon development of projects by local task forms involving directly most shareholders, under supervision by a national experts' committee. This bargaining process has allowed a very significant improvement of accommodations and services given to young residents. And yet, it shows three important limitations:

1. The choice of independent accommodation seemed obvious and it pleased the residents. They did not know that they would suffer from social isolation. The educators did not know that it would hinder training in collective life in the foyer.
2. Local task force are bound to seek solutions that afford a compromise between their interests at the expense of developmental stakes for the young residents.
3. They believed that developing the organization and the architectural space were two independent tasks that did not bear upon each other.

Of course this is a very limited experience when compared to the problems raised by social distress in large residential areas. Nevertheless it may contribute in its limited way to the search for improvement.

Instead of concentrating all public efforts on residential areas in crisis in order to give them a better outlook one may consider concentrating efforts upon their inhabitants in order to give them opportunities to make a greater use of the city they live in.

Insofar as young people are concerned, it might mean helping them to find an other place where to live and where to find a supportive environment in the city.

Offering people who are isolated from the rest of society a new life-world through work, leisure, housing, sport or political activities calls for the creation of interactive settings and supportive networks. Most of these settings shouldn't be in the residential areas. Their development calls for joint endeavours!

Notes

1 Prak, Niels and Hugo Priemus (eds) (1985) **"Postwar Public Housing in Trouble"**, Delft, Delft University Press.

2 Lefebvre, Henri (1968) **"La vie quotidienne dans le monde moderne"**, NRF Idées, Paris, Chap II, La société bureaucratique de consommation dirigée.

3 Circulaire Guichard de 1973 dite "Ni tours, ni barres".

4 "Dubedout, Hubert, (1983) **"Ensemble refaire la ville"**, Rapport au Premier Ministre du Président de la Commission Nationale pour le développement social des quartiers, Paris, La Documentation française.

5 See "La politique de la ville et du développement social urbain en 1995", in Ensembles n°5, Journal of the Délégation Ministérielle à la Ville, 194 Av. du président Wilson , 93217 La Plaine Saint-Denis cedex.

6 Services municipaux et développement social des quartiers", avec la collaboration du C.F.P.C. (Recherche et développement) du Plan Urbain (MELATT) de la ville de Lyon et le concours financier de la CDC.

7 Conan Michel & Bernard Salignon (1994) Evaluation des effets du programme de modernisation des foyers de jeunes travailleurs, CSTB, Paris.

8 In most foyers there is a restaurant where the residents may have a dinner in the evening, and that caters to neighbouring at noon. Usually more than half the foyer's employees work under the leadership of the cook.

9 In one foyer out of two this is a public housing organisation that has little time to devote to such a small client.

10 Conan Michel & Bernard Salignon (1994) Evaluation des effets du programme de modernisation des Foyers de Jeunes Travailleurs - 1990/1993, CSTB, Paris.

11 Meaning of the crosses: in the article A compares to B:
X means that the index for A is 5% to 15% lighter than for B
XX means that the index for A is 15% to 25% lighter than for B
XXX means that the index for A is 25% to 50% lighter than for B
XXX means that the index for A is more than 50% lighter than for B

[12] It is common knowledge for instance that most crime recording contains no information on site and environmental conditions under which it was perpetrated.

[13] "Design Handbook for Foyers", translated from the memento "Foyers de Jeunes travailleurs" by Tarmac Construction Ltd, London

10

REHABILITATION WITH CARE AND MODERN HOUSING NEIGHBOURHOODS

- A rehabilitation project in Seattle, USA, in a Swedish perspective

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10.1 Introduction

The concept of 'rehabilitation with care' has gained ground in the last decades in Sweden. From 1987 it is stated by the Planning and Building Law (PBL)[1] that 'All changes of a building shall be carried out with care, taken into consideration the characteristics of the building and its technical, cultural, historical, environmental, and artistic values.' This citation is not based solely upon considerations of the values of the physical structures; several official reports and programmes are pointing to the welfare of the present residents as the ultimate goal for housing rehabilitation.

This certainly does not mean that all of today's renovation/rehabilitation projects are really carried through with care - the interpretations of 'with care' vary, and the law is sometimes totally neglected. Nevertheless, aging and troubled neighbourhoods are usually dealt with in a more respectful way in the mid-1990s than in the early 1980s. The warning examples may still be frequent, but there are also quite a few examples creating guiding stars for housing rehabilitation with care, in Sweden or elsewhere.

Since the interpretations of 'with care' vary so much, it is important to define what rehabilitation with care denotes in this contribution. It is:

- respecting all the existing qualities and values - of the physical environment and the human life within it - when deficiencies are to be eliminated or new qualities and functions are to be added - making use of the possibilities of thrifty and well-adapted measures offered by the existing environment;
- searching for solutions which will provide maximum benefits by minimum measures;
- renovating, replacing, and adding to the existing environment in ways which will facilitate future management, maintenance and improvements[2].

Thus, rehabilitation with care is a method of optimizing: to attain maximum advantage and comfort by minimum measures and interference. This means that the careful approach includes a preservative attitude and must be based on an overall view of what is already existing: buildings, environments, and residents - and of the

goals: recovered and new qualities and functions. 'Care' per se is not irreconcilable with improvements and change - but it demands an open-minded and critical searching for solutions which will both provide the wanted improvements and preserve existing qualities and values. Such solutions often exist, but in many cases compromises - in either direction - will be necessary. 'Care', then, does not imply a definite level of standard, or a definite level of preservation. It is a method of planning and implementing renewal and rehabilitation, based on needs of change as well as needs of preservation.

Why, then, are care and preservation a matter of interest in modern, vernacular housing? For some very important reasons, including social, cultural/historical, technical, economical, and ecological aspects. First, every existing housing neighbourhood, however simple, is a conglomerate of homes of the individuals living there. The everyday environments, with all their deficiencies, usually have some special values to a considerable part of their users: familiar characteristics, some good functions and qualities including vulnerable social networks and, sometimes, nostalgic marks of the past. Such qualities are easily overlooked by 'outsiders' like designers and developers, and they may not even be noticed as important by the residents and/or working staff until they are threatened by rehabilitation activities. Even seemingly trifling interventions can easily destroy such values[3].

Second, many neighbourhoods represent one or several steps of the cultural and historical development of housing. Even very anonymous buildings and neighbourhoods often display the mainstream of style and design of the period(s) when they were built, and thus provide valuable parts of architectural history and cultural continuity. Not-too-well-reasoned replacements of windows, roofing, indoor materials and lighting, etc., often unnecessarily diminish cultural and historical evidence - and demolition definitely wipes out some evidence of the local history of housing and society.

Third, the technical and economic values of buildings and neighbourhoods are directly affected by methods and intervals of maintenance, and by methods used for renovation and rehabilitation. Preservative and not very expensive care often helps to avoid major investments for replacements - and certainly keeps the neighbourhood in a nicer shape - e.g. regular painting of outdoor wooden frames, linings, etc. with traditional and well-tested paint or oil. Moreover, in many cases well-kept materials, fittings, and details of good quality cannot be replaced by the same quality today; the materials and the craftsmanship would be too expensive and may not even be found.

Finally, ecological reasons for a more preservative approach to management, maintenance, and improvements, are more and more considered of importance. Recycling of building materials may be possible in many cases, but in general care and prolonged use of existing fabrics will cause less environmental stress. Replacement of functioning fittings, at the most in need of minor repair, and other 'from-outside'-decided changes often upset tenants, not just because of what it will cost them, but because of the needless waste of resources.

The aim of this contribution is to use this concept of 'renovation with care' as a tool for a brief analysis of an American rehabilitation project. Experiences of the

development of housing rehabilitation in Sweden are basic starting-points. In the USA, many similar ideas and approaches are found: a growing interest in vernacular housing and environments, and in local, cultural and social history, a developed local democracy, and inventive methods for urban and social rehabilitation. Taking the different political, economic and housing systems into consideration, which are the crucial and common problems and questions, and what can we learn from each other?

Modern Public Housing in Sweden and in Seattle, USA

Sweden is a small country with about 8.8 million inhabitants and about 4.2 million dwellings. Some 2.3 million of the dwellings - more than 50 per cent - are built in multifamily apartment blocks. About 50 per cent of those dwellings are rental apartments owned by public housing companies. In general, this building stock is fairly young, well constructed and equipped, and in a pretty good condition. Still, for more than a decade now a growing part of the housing rehabilitation in Sweden has been directed towards the modern housing stock. In many of the large scale neighbourhoods built in the 1960s and 1970s 'destructive spirals' are growing out of technical, environmental, social and management problems; spirals and problems which seem to be universal.

What makes the Swedish perspective special is the form of public housing, which differs from social housing in most other countries. The goal of public housing in Sweden is to 'offer good housing at reasonable costs' for all kinds of households, not exclusively for poor and low-income people. Housing subsidies are not tied to special buildings or neighbourhoods where ambitions concerning standard etc. are limited more than elsewhere by general rules, but are given - within fixed limits - to qualified households no matter where they live. Thus, the segregation that actually exists is never 'complete' - even in neighbourhoods stigmatized by complex problems there is usually a mix of households with varying economic and social resources[4]. This probably partly explains why the problems of Swedish large scale housing seem to be less severe than those in countries with a more segregated housing market.

Seattle, USA, is a city about the size of Stockholm, Sweden. Here, as generally in the USA, the housing market is strictly segregated. Conditions may vary within a city district (a community) or a city block, but only in exceptional cases are low-income and middle-income households to be found in the same block of flats. As a matter of fact, the 'American Dream' of living in a detached private house with a garden is very strong, and leaves its mark on the housing market and the planning and design of housing blocks and neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, in Seattle about 50 per cent of the dwellings are built in rental or tenant-owned housing. Just 3 per cent of the dwellings are public housing, designed for low-income and very low-income households (with an income up to 80 per cent and less than 50 per cent respectively of the average Seattle household income). This is far less than the real needs in Seattle for 'affordable' housing, i.e. dwellings where the rent will not exceed 30 per cent of the household income. In spite of other forms of rent subsidies, such as "housing vouchers" paid by federal funds for households with special needs, the

shortage of 'affordable' housing is a severe problem affecting planning of new housing as well as rehabilitation.

Unlike many other American cities public housing in Seattle cannot be characterized by words like 'dense' or 'highrise'. The layout of lots and blocks generally does not differ in an apparent way from surrounding lots and blocks for middle-income people. In very central parts of the city there are highrise buildings also for public housing, but in the suburban areas the sizes of the buildings usually are adapted to the scale of the district.

10.2 An American example: Holly Park, Seattle, WA

Holly Park: One of Seattle's Four Garden Communities

The Holly Park neighbourhood is a wartime public housing project, built in 1941-1943 as part of the housing program for people working in the defence industries in Seattle. Until 1955 it was operated by the Seattle Housing Authority [SHA] as a Department of Defence housing complex, and then became a public housing community. Today (Spring 1995) the 893 units (872 used as residential units) in one- and two-story buildings, spread over a 102-acre site, are inhabited by about 2,200 people, and mainly by very low-income households belonging to several ethnic groups.

Holly Park was designed by the architects John Paul Jones, Fred Ahlson, and Paul Thiry; John R. Sproule designer. Butler Sturtevant was the landscape architect, also landscape designer of Yesler Terrace, another Seattle low-income 'Garden Community', built just before Holly Park and denser, but similarly designed. To architects these neighbourhoods are specially interesting as modest manifestations of the modern movement in housing architecture, and both of them are presented in architectural guide-books.

The Holly Park SHA area is located North-East of the highway Interstate 5 (I 5) and the Boeing Field in South Seattle, on a slope towards a valley in the east. A power transmission line is crossing the upper part of the area ('Upper Holly') from NNW to SSE, separating it into two parts; the 200' wide right-of-way is kept free from houses and vegetation, except grass. The street system is not the regular grid pattern of most housing areas in Seattle. Instead, many of the streets are curved and have short dead-end ramifications surrounded by 3-6 buildings. The connections between the streets, and to the adjacent street system, are not very easy to grasp. This site plan is generally believed to contribute to isolation and stigmatizing of the Holly Park area: e.g. the residents of the blocks around are not going to the public library there[5].

Quite a few big trees along the streets and the area bounds indicate the site layout. The hilly terrain and curving streets offer a variety of nice views. Still, the neighbourhood seems incomplete and somehow un-cozy; unlike other semi-central and suburban housing areas in Seattle it has very few visible signs of semi-private use of the ground close to the buildings. There are hardly any hedges, fences, terraces, low stone walls to diminish slopes, bushes, flower beds, etc. The landscape

is looking just the same as when the neighbourhood was just a few years old[6]. Some 15 years ago, though, this extremely plain environment was quite different, with planted and flowering yards[7]. The present state of it is enforced by the policy of the housing company. To put up fences, plant bushes, or grow vegetables, the residents have to pay a deposit of $50, to cover the costs for having such facilities replaced by grass if they leave. Lately, in the lower Holly Park area a (very) small common lot has been enclosed for people wanting to cultivate vegetables etc., and residents are talking about having another lot established in the upper area.

There are two major types of buildings: 111 two-story, four-plex buildings and 226 one-story duplex buildings. In all there are fourteen different building types, though. Entrances are usually from porches at the front corners. The buildings are simple, well proportioned 'boxes', originally with wooden lining, brightly coloured, and with mono-pitch roofs; all in a Modern-movement style[8]. Some of them have got some additional thermal insulation in the late 1980s, some have got a new vinyl lining covering the original wood, and the original windows have been replaced. Most of the units have two bedrooms (524), many have three bedrooms (225), or one bedroom (135). The rooms are fairly small.

Two parks are partly demarcating the area to the south and to the east. In the park to the south, facing S. Myrtle Street, is a big community building, and playgrounds, wading pool etc. The park to the east is little utilized. A public library is located in upper Holly Park, as are the SHA Redevelopment and Managers offices. Some buildings are adapted to social services, e.g. there is a learning center, and an afternoon-care center for the children of the area. Commercial services are located at Martin Luther King Jr. Way at the lower, east outskirts of the neighbourhood.

A Troubled Neighbourhood Facing Renewal by Demolition

Like many very concentrated low-income neighbourhoods Holly Park is troubled by severe social problems and criminality, as well as by maintenance problems. More than 50 per cent of the units are rented by single parents, and just over 50 per cent of the residents are children, 17 years or younger. Several nationalities and languages are represented in the neighbourhood: 44 per cent of the residents are asians, 33 per cent black, 11 per cent caucasians (white), almost 3 per cent each Native Americans and Hispanics, and 6 per cent others. 74 per cent of the households are listed for public assistance.

A total redevelopment is planned to overcome the problems of the area, to be implemented in the coming five years (1996-2000)[9]. The existing neighbourhood will be totally demolished and replaced by a partly new street system and dense housing blocks with building and block designs associating to traditional American design: gable roofs, clearly defined lots, path-ways, etc. The new development is planned to be mixed income-group housing: in all 1,200 units, of which 400 for very low-income households, 400 for low-income households, and 400 at market rate. In addition, 500 replacement units are to be created in small developments in existing mixed areas. This concept is achieved in a fairly unique cooperation between the City of Seattle, the federal government, SHA and the Holly Park Community Council,

formed and headed by residents of the area. The Seattle Planning Department is a partner in the design of the site and the types of buildings.

Needs for Change and Needs for Care; Motive Forces and Attitudes

Needs for change are evolving from the social problems of the neighbourhood, strengthened by the common effects of segregation and of growing needs of extensive maintenance. Those problems are the main motive forces for change. According to applicable laws, governmental grants are available for radical revitalization of severely distressed housing neighbourhoods[10]. In January 1995 Holly Park housing received a $47 million grant for a revitalization from the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. There are also some rules encouraging waiving of economic and other restrictions which would obstruct the ultimate purposes of such a revitalization: to overcome deficiencies and segregation. Thus, the possibility of radical change is a positive vision leaving its mark on the planning of the Holly Park rehabilitation.

The residents being an influential part of the planning process has helped claiming the needs for care of the present residents. Since there are few vacant units, the needs for replacement of housing, especially very low-income housing, is substantial. The planned distribution of new housing is decided according to the needs of the present residents, and even stated by a formal contract[11]. In addition, opportunities for home ownership for residents will be increased by suggested new rules for ceiling rents and saving opportunities.

During the planning process, any initial needs or wishes for preservation of the existing buildings and the 'garden community' character have been abandoned by the decision-makers. The report of technical investigations of the buildings and the supply systems[12] is thoroughly accumulating deficiencies due to aging, wear and tear, as well as to the original, thrifty and modernistic design. SHA representatives and residents involved in the planning process have been more and more convinced that renovation of the existing buildings would not be the right thing to do[13]. The present deficiencies, taken together and compared to ideal as-new qualities, also seem overwhelming. In addition, the expectations for the new concept, relieved of the stigma of the existing neighbourhood with its experienced and increasing deficiencies, overshadow any still existing qualities and possibilities of more preservative improvements.

Rehabilitation with Care?

According to the planning process the rehabilitation of Holly Park seems to include a considerable care for the present residents, providing much-better-than-usual conditions for participation, individual influence, and preserving of social networks. For instance, the redevelopment is planned to start by construction of new buildings on the site of the little used park to the east, thus providing units for replacement within the area before the demolitions will start.

The demolition, construction, and re-housing processes are very likely to turn out more trying and stressing than is expected, though. Probably the planned transfers of residents between old and new units of the neighbourhood will demand

some exceptional efforts, especially in order to find ways to get a good mixture of low-income and market-rate housing which will also attract higher income groups. A close cooperation between the housing company, the developer, and the residents, will be the essential clue to continued care.

On the other hand, care of the existing physical environment seems almost non-existing. The original design of the buildings is referred to mainly as the origin of 'inherent problems', and the site plan is judged as 'horrible'. A few of the streets will be left where they are, but all the buildings and probably most of the existing big trees will be destroyed by grading and construction activities, aiming at a totally new appearance and image of the neighbourhood.

10.3 Conclusions and questions

Facts and Attitudes

In general, almost all descriptions of present conditions of neighbourhoods facing rehabilitation demonstrate, more or less clearly, the predominant attitudes towards these neighbourhoods. As a rule the facts are correctly described, but the choices of words - the judgements of the resulting functions, and the estimated needs, possibilities and costs for renovation versus replacement - are coloured by the predominant attitudes: change-oriented or preservation-oriented. For example: a small kitchen can be described as 'too small, and poorly equipped', or as 'space-efficient and economically equipped', and an uncommon and somewhat complicated street system with curved streets like the one which is described as 'horrible' in the low-status neighbourhood Holly Park can be looked upon as 'charming' in a wealthy neighbourhood like Laurelhurst (a very high-income neighbourhood in the north-west part of Seattle).

It seems obvious that especially social distress stigmatizes the physical environment as well; social problems are considered firmly linked to the design of the buildings and the neighbourhoods. Poor maintenance is often part of the image, and considered an unavoidable effect of the original design. Examples from old and recent housing prove that this is a too simple image, though. In Sweden in the 1960s, many old blue-collar housing neighbourhoods in a seemingly terrible shape were torn down and replaced by modern housing. Still existing neighbourhoods, equal to the ones which were destroyed, prove that the buildings and block patterns did not per se maintain overcrowding, dirt, diseases, poverty, and social distress; preserved and carefully modernized they proved to be very attractive homes - and not just for blue-collar people.

This is true not just for older buildings and neighbourhoods with charming details and small-scale advantages. Recently built, large scale neighbourhoods of almost the same size and design can be well-kept and socially stabile, or really bad off, just due to their social and economic preconditions. Thus, the present bad social, economic, and sometimes managerial conditions are the basic problems, forming attitudes towards any physical environment where they happen to be

located. Awareness of this may help us to treat the facts of the environment in a more 'objective' and open-minded way.

The history of housing rehabilitation, studied in detail, displays complex interrelations between changing conditions, changing attitudes, and changing practice. True enough, preservative and careful approaches are often partly caused by the good technical and economic conditions of the project, but at the same time good technical and economic conditions are partly created as a consequence of existing, preservative attitudes, based on care for existing values: historical, cultural, artistic, environmental, and social[14].

It seems to be a dialectic process. Once the actors heading a rehabilitation project - the owners and/or their consultants - come to the conclusion that something is worth preserving, or deserving special care if replaced, this will leave its marks on their image of the existing conditions, and they will in some way find the profitable solutions that will meet all the legislative demands. Or, when such profitable solutions are already known and practised, they will help to underpin preservative approaches. Thus, mapping out and spreading knowledge of the qualities of old and recent buildings and neighbourhoods, and developing and spreading knowledge of how to adapt new facilities and uses without destroying the existing qualities, are essential missions to promote renovation with care.

Common Problems and Questions - What Can We Learn?

Holly Park in Seattle may well be yet another rehabilitation project where the major part of the original problems are still there after the project is finished - maybe a little diffused, and hidden for some time behind bright new facades, but still existing. Many Swedish examples can be found, where extensive and expensive rebuilding just moved the real - social - problems to another neighbourhood. Certainly, there may be severe problems tied to the physical environment, but they are very seldom essential, and could almost always be solved in less spectacular ways. The resources are much more needed for social work and improved management[15].

In the first place, a careful/preservative approach demands some kind of deeper understanding and appreciation of the existing environment, beyond its present, more or less worn and out-of-function appearance. It is partly a historic valuation, but also an ability to imagine what could be achieved by possible improvements. Certainly nobody wants to preserve a bad physical environment as such. Almost always, though, the essence of its original character can be kept, albeit extended by additions and alterations to meet today's - and tomorrow's - needs and wishes[16].

Second, the vision of the possible change has to be realistic and just as critically examined as the present situation. If low-cost building is the only option, we cannot expect it to be better than low-cost building in general, and in many respects not better than what is already existing. Limited financial resources, effectively utilized, can bring some very good results, but usually the financial restrictions will display in some way or another. Today´s economic and financial restrictions may have

similar effects on qualities like living space, materials, technical equipment, and landscaping, as previous ones.

Third, the knowledge and the affections of the present residents have to be a basis for the decisions on improvements and change. In reality, decisions on extensive interventions and change far too often display some shortcomings of 'grassroot' influence - at least as far as Swedish experiences go. The kiosk and the old rose-shrub by the bus stop, the sunny viewpoint with a bench, the porch with space for toys and a pot of flowers, the decorated staircase, the wood-framed fittings in the apartments: such qualities may be essential for comfort and well-being of many present residents, but are often overlooked or set aside by change-concentrated parties. Still, such 'details' should be taken into consideration by developers, planners and architects eager to find the essential qualities of a neighbourhood before deciding how to develop it.

The essential basis for promoting this kind of vernacular preservation is the cooperation between the parties involved, the attention to opinions of all the individuals, and the positive and open-minded attitude towards the existing environment. Those who are looking for deficiencies and shortcomings will find them dominating their entire image - and those who are looking for qualities and values will find new possibilities of improvements with care for those values.

Notes

1 PBL, Chapter 3, 10 §.
2 First time expressed by Ingela Blomberg, Eva Eisenhauer and Sonja Vidén, 1983.
3 Vidén, S., 1994.
4 Vidén et al., 1990, Vidén, S., 1993.
5 Telephone interview with Scott Jepsen.
6 Which can be seen from slides from the late 1940s; Architecture slide library, University of Washington.
7 Interview with Doris Morgan.
8 Sally B. Woodbridge and Roger Montgomery, 1980.
9 The schedule was later postponed; demolition started in 1997 and completion was then scheduled for 2004.
10 HOPE VI Program, the HOPE VI Plan for Holly Park, p. 11-23.
11 Contract/1995 between the Holly Park Community Council and the Seattle Housing Authority.
12 The HOPE VI Plan for Holly Park, pp. 2:6-2:12.
13 Interviews with Joy Anahonac, Doris Morgan, Scott Jepsen, and Stephen Antupit.
14 The interrelationships between environment and 'meaning' is discussed for instance by Rapoport, A., 1990.
15 Öresjö, E., 1993.

[16] Lynch, K., 1972, States the importance of **time** being expressed by the physical environment.

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Interviews with:

Joy Anahonac & daughter, residents, Holly Park

Stephen Antupit, Planning Department, Seattle

Doris Morgan, President of the Holly Park Community Council

Scott Jepsen, Head of the SHA Redevelopment Office, Holly Park

11

PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN A LARGE SCALE SUBURBAN HOUSING ESTATE. - The case of Råslätt, Jönköping, Sweden

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11.1 Introduction

In 1965, in order to remedy an increasingly difficult lack of housing, the Swedish Parliament decided that one million new apartments were to be built within ten years. The program was called 'the million dwellings program' and its goal was bold and politically controversial. Never before so much has been built in such a short time.

The million dwellings program had only been in progress for a few years, however, when a critical debate was sparked off. Public criticism was massive and was not only aimed at the physical design of the buildings but also indirectly towards the people who lived in them. Living in one of the program's most identifiable areas became socially stigmatising, and all those who could move away did so.

Dissatisfaction with the million dwellings program's large scale suburban areas was directly reflected in the number of apartment vacancies. This number rose quickly, especially in the municipal, non-profit stock. In 1975, the Government appointed a committee to propose solutions for suburbs with turnover problems (SOU 1979: 37). These were the first governmentally initiated and financed pilot projects in the million dwellings program's problem-ridden areas. But they were not to be the last.

20 years later the million dwellings program's large scale suburban neighbourhoods have once again ended up in focus for community planning. The background is formed by the research and commission of enquiry reports of recent years which show that there is increased polarisation between those estates in the urban landscape which are pleasant to live in and those which are least attractive; this is where the poor of society live, many of them with an immigrant background. Thus, once again strategies for change in the million dwellings program's areas are being lively discussed, along with the experiences that earlier renewal measures have provided (e.g. Olsson Hort, 1992; SOU 1995: 142, Öresjö, 1996b; Bohm & Khakee, 1996: 1; SOU 1997: 118).

11.2 Råslätt - an illustrative example

Råslätt, a large scale suburban area in a medium-sized municipality, Jönköping with about 105,000 inhabitants, is an interesting example of the development in Sweden that

is sketched above. The area is rather typical for the most problematic part of the million dwellings program. It is owned by a municipal housing company and consists of thirty similar 6-8 storey buildings with a total of 2,657 apartments, surrounded by an extensive area of fields and woods for walking and recreation. The first house was finished in 1968, the last in 1972.

The area is divided into a southern and a northern section joined in the middle by a complex containing a shopping centre (1972), a medical and social care centre (1974), a church (1975) and a recreation building, which is integrated with one of Råslätt's three schools (1975). Besides the centrally-located recreation building, there are two youth centres, each about 500 square metres (built 1971 and 1972), a soccer field, a lighted track and sports field (1974) plus a special section divided into small, individual garden plots (1976)

In 1973 when I started up my thesis-research in Råslätt, 4,719 inhabitants lived there. The area had a demography, which was very typical for these type of large scale suburbs, built up during the million dwellings program.

- the inhabitants were young, younger than in the rest of the municipality;
- the proportion of households headed by a lone parent were significantly larger than in Jönköping as a whole;
- it was a low-income housing area;
- 21 per cent of Råslätt's inhabitants were immigrants compared with 4 per cent in the whole municipality.

It should also be noted that the area in the beginning of the 1970s was characterised by threatening gangs of teen-agers, large drug problems, great mobility and social unrest. The percentage of children in need of help, who were registered with the Social Service Administration was significantly higher in Råslätt than in the rest of Jönköping.

Simultaneously, a sudden stop in population growth in the municipality had changed the housing shortage to a surplus of apartments. As could be expected, a low-status area like Råslätt was the hardest hit. In 1973, the first year I visited the area, 24 per cent of the apartments were empty, which is the highest rate in Råslätt's history.

Råslätt was one of the 13 million dwellings program-areas, which were parts of the said government-induced pilot projects aiming at improving the situation in housing areas with lease-problems. In particular, Råslätt was also chosen, because the government committee wanted to closely monitor the substantial investments among others in the leisure and cultural sector previously made by the City and municipal housing company. These investments in the leisure and cultural sector were also the reason for my choice of Råslätt as object for my thesis-research.

The basis of my thesis was to examine in various ways the concept of leisure and cultural activities localised in housing areas, a concept very much discussed in Sweden during the 1970s. Even if this concept was not completely new, bearing a clear relationship for example to the community centre idea in the 1940s, the existing knowledge concerning its practical consequences was rather insufficient.

Based on several and different kinds of empirical studies I could resume that the social climate in Råslätt had undergone a positive development, which means that in the last part of the 1970s considerably better conditions existed than were found in the

beginning of the decade. This amelioration must be viewed with the relatively large expenditure of time, effort and money made by the municipality and by the municipal housing company in mind.

One of the contributing factors to this improved situation in Råslätt was the growth of leisure and cultural activities localised in the housing area. This growth had been aided by the following conditions:

- access to various types of localities for neighbourhood activities;
- access to employed personnel who could support, initiate and organise the recourses which exist in the area;
- regional tradition;
- a new type of 'social mobilisation', that is, people who are affected by changes in the society try themselves to find a new identity and a new way of interact. Thus, these people use leisure as an instrument for change;
- the function of leisure time as 'a last resort': the character of Råslätt as a 'problem area' might probably have influenced the municipality and the municipal housing company to support various initiatives that have been taken both by the inhabitants of Råslätt and by individual public employees (Öresjö, 1979).

The positive development spiral, which I had noticed during my thesis-research, was also evident in a comprehensive mapping of all leisure and culture activities, that I carried out in 1979-1980. The number of associations had grown as well as the percentage of the inhabitants engaged in social life of the housing area (Öresjö, 1980). This development continued during the 1980s according to the sporadic contacts I had with people in the area. The city and the housing company made continuous actions and programs. Slowly but steadily the image of Råslätt changed positively. Råslätt gradually changed from an area, which by the local media was refereed to in negative terms into the image of a housing area with continuing progress and go.

11.3 Råslätt's process approach as an alternative to large scale rebuilding projects

Even though Råslätt never has been free from social problems, both tenants and staff felt that Råslätt was on the right course during the 1980s. A well-organised and well-managed suburban housing area seemed to grow up with comprehensive commercial and societal services. The negative image from the 1970s faded gradually. Simultaneously Råslätt was given a new physical appearance by painting the buildings in daring colours and refurbishing the gardens and parks.

It was this image, which in the early 1990s, made me planning a new research-project in Råslätt. The objective was to raise and high-light the opportunities of a process-minded community development that creates a positive development spiral in a problematic suburban housing estate. I wanted to emphasise this approach as an alternative to the large scale rebuilding projects as was tried in many housing areas during the 1980s with a view to attract more middle and higher income people to settle in polarised areas. Research on such large scale rebuilding projects had showed quite clearly that this was not a practical avenue, from either an economic, social or ethical

perspective (Johansson et al., 1988; Carlén & Cars, 1990; Jensfelt, 1991; Johansson, 1992; Ytterberg, 1992; Ericsson, 1993; Öresjö, 1993).

Economically, most large scale rebuilding projects turned out very costly without succeeding in attracting household with more money and resources. If the tenants before the renewal were afraid of crime and vandalism, afterwards their fears were how to afford to stay in the area.

Socially these revitalisation projects also caused the relocation of undesired and problematic households to other neighbouring housing areas, which then assumed the role image of being the least. This generated in turn the need for extra support and actions in these newly affected areas – the problems had just been moved around.

From an *ethical* point of view, this is a question of respect for an individual's home situation. When housing companies or planners are running a renewal program, they must be aware that they are tramping into the most profound domain of human beings, theirs homes. No matter how well-intentioned the programs are, they may cause unintended consequences for those involved. To be forced to leave one's home and abode against one's will is an extremely humiliating situation. *'Why do they move us like animals? Don't they know human beings have feelings?'* was one of the responses given in a large scale rebuilding project (Salonen, 1997).

11.4 New difficult situation in Råslätt

Råslätt as a positive example of step-by-step renewal proved being a truth with modification. Råslätt during the 1990s was something quit different than Råslätt during 1980s. After more than 15 years of positive development, of course not without problems, Råslätt was now facing a negative turn. One of the roots of this downward trend was a new and very complicated immigrant situation. This was emphasised by residents in Råslätt who were interviewed during spring, 1994. The change began about 1990, and reached its peak during 1993, with 600 refugees joining the over 50 per cent immigrants in the area. *'Råslätt was like a big refugee camp. People left the area in panic, and they were the stable tenants, who had lived here long'* as one interviewee described the situation. She continued reflecting over the growing dilemma of immigrants: *'It's a pity what happened, because Råslätt was well on the way of becoming a pleasant area. The problem families disappeared, and it became more easy and peaceful.'*

In a similar way another tenant describes the development in Råslätt from the early 1980s: *'Everything was super. People moved in and there was queuing-up for apartments. In 1989 everything was leased. Since then it has slumped.....Stable tenants since many years are now moving out. The number of immigrants are growing. When the old stock leaves the Råslätt-spirit disappears.....I will leave next year when my son finishes school. When the stable leave others take over and then the process runs fast.'*

More precisely the following had happened. During the early 1990s the number of non-leased apartments in Råslätt increased like in the rest of the country. The housing company chose, like they did in many other large scale housing areas with lease-problems, to co-operate with the Immigration Board in creating refugee camps. It reached the peak during 1993 with 600 refugees in the area, which became a very prominent element in an area of 4,400 residents of which already more than 50 per cent had an immigrant background from about 40 different nations.

The situation which then occurred in Råslätt did not just influence the opinions of the native Swedes, but also the naturalised immigrants who came to work in Sweden years ago and were well established in Råslätt and integrated into the Swedish society. These immigrants and especially their children now experienced a completely new situation.

'The difference between my and my children's situation is that in those days there were ordinary Swedish families in Råslätt. I was in their homes and had Swedish friends. My children have not.'

It seems that during the 1970s and early 1980s nobody looked at foreigners as immigrants, which is evident from the interviews I conducted with youths being raised in Råslätt. Neither the native Swedes nor the 'second generation immigrants' made such a distinction.

'I had only Swedish friends. I never thought of myself as an immigrant. I was a Swede with Yugoslavian background. But when more and more of the native Swedes left Råslätt, I started to realise that I was an immigrant.'

'Previously I never thought of immigrants in those terms. They were few and well-integrated. Up to mid-80 it was OK. But in 88-89 it turned. In 83-84 you noticed if there was a coloured kid in the playground. Today you notice if there is a native Swede. We have got too many immigrants in Sweden!'

'Many of my friends were from Yugoslavia. They soon learned Swedish and we spoke Swedish. Today almost all are immigrants in Råslätt's sporting club and Swedish is not spoken in the changing room. When I grew up there was no problem with the immigrants. The problem then was Swedes who caused troubles.'

To be a native Swede in Råslätt in the 1990s is to be deviant. This causes feelings of loneliness and isolation, according to several of the persons interviewed. But there is another very important consequence, which one of the interviewed immigrants pointed out; there is no Swedish society in Råslätt as a reference group, which in turn creates a distorted image of Swedes among the new immigrants. *'They never meet 'ordinary' Swedes, as those Swedes still living in Råslätt do not represent the everyday Swede'* (Öresjö, 1996a).

Living in an immigrant area, such as Råslätt has become, creates a special and difficult situation both for native Swedes and immigrants from different periods,

whether they came to work or as refugees. Råslätt is rapidly becoming an area, which is likely to be marginalized and pushed to the periphery, accentuated by a poor economy and high unemployment rates. In order to off-set such an evolution, the municipality and the housing company started a comprehensive project-program in Råslätt during 1996. It was directly controlled by the City Commissioner and was focused on increasing employment, improving knowledge of Swedish and rebuilding of the shopping centre. The outcome of this program will be studied in my further research in Råslätt.

11.5 'Swimming against the tide'

A team led by Anne Power of the London School of Economics has studied twenty of the most unpopular council estates in Great Britain between 1980 and 1995. The results are presented in a report with the striking title *Swimming against the tide. Polarisation or progress on 20 unpopular council estates, 1980 -1995* (Power & Tunstall, 1995). It is concluded that even though estate populations were already seriously disadvantaged when this study began, by the 1990s social polarisation had increased significantly. Greater concentrations of young people, lone parent families, and minority ethnic groups created new issues for residents and managers. Yet, the introduction of intensive, estate-based housing management with increased tenant involvement had led to dramatic improvements in environmental conditions and staff and resident morale. Over the 1980s, most of the estates were able to maintain and build upon the improvements, through further decentralisation, greater resident participation, and local and central government investment in physical regeneration. In other words: wider social and economic pressures pushed the most disadvantaged - often unemployed, lone parents, people from minority ethnic groups - to the most marginal areas. The polarisation was mitigated by upgraded conditions and local support. But, and this is important, these types of estates need permanent local management if marginal communities are to work (Power & Tunstall, 1995).

The same dual perspective must be applied when discussing the development over time in Råslätt. Råslätt is no dreamland, and will never be anything approaching this. It is an estate that acts as a regulator in the housing market and where new problems are always around the corner. But through good local knowledge, flexibility, versatility of approach, listening to, and respect for, the residents, it has been possible through the years to keep trouble at arm's length and to create optimism for the future during a period of almost fifteen years.

In a retrospective study I have described and analysed the positive processes taking place in Råslätt during more than one decade. As a base material for the study I have used the many evaluation reports covering the various types of renewal programs and improvement efforts realised in Råslätt as well as other documents and background material in writing. Interviews with about 20 key-employees working in the area completed and detailed this material. Finally around 25 tenants, living for a long time in Råslätt, were interviewed. They represented both still living in the area and those who had left, as well as natives and immigrants, youths and elderly people.

I found that the strength of the method which over a 15 year period had created a very positive development spiral in the estate lay in the ability to apply a process approach. Attempts were made all the time to overcome the problems, which seemed to be just around the corner, by creating new and positive countermeasures and development possibilities on the basis of the local conditions in the estate. In this process approach different types of projects activities played an important part. Because working in a project involves both a challenge and a demand to do something out of the ordinary, which creates a kind of mental preparedness. But even in project work there must be a long term perspective if each project is not to become just a passing phase. In my report I discuss the working method at Råslätt in terms of a series of locally based measures in order that I may succeed in describing the rehabilitation strategies applied over a period in a specific suburban housing areas of the Råslätt type. I have asked myself whether the projects carried out are connected to one another in an obvious sequence like pearls on a string, or whether they were imposed on the estate from above and perhaps only left disruption behind. It is namely striking how well the 'strings of pearls' metaphor describes the work at Råslätt. The experiences gained were made use of in ordinary work or in new projects in a very constructive way. They became like pearls on a string around which different forms of co-operation developed, both among the different authorities and the municipal housing company and also among the residents.

11.6 Some examples of improvement efforts

The first special project in Råslätt began in 1972 and was directed to gangs of young delinquents in the area. The latest project completed (in my research report) dealt with a similar problem, but in a radically different situation. This time it concerned a gang of Arabic-speaking youths and their parents. Between these two projects there was a wide variety of experimental and development efforts, many of which became permanent. Today almost nobody remembers how revolutionary some of these projects were considered at first. For example, moving medical and social care to Råslätt involved co-operation between government agencies. This was brand new for Sweden in 1974, something most common today in all large suburban areas.

Turning to tenants' participation, one good example is the creation of a mini-farm. The tenants erected all the buildings and took care of the animals during evenings and holidays. After ten years it is now threatened by the fact that the most active tenants are moving out of the area.

Another example of engaging the people in Råslätt was the "user appraisal for citizen participation." This method was initially developed by the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) and gives good opportunities to develop improvements, step by step and in dialogue with the tenants.

Step 1: The tenants participate and formulate the problem areas to be covered by user appraisal.

Step 2: The user appraisal forms are distributed to all households to be completed.

Step 3: The points and views from the user appraisal forms are collected and processed before returning them to all households.

Step 4: The tenants are engaged in discussions on appropriate measures and actions.

11.7 There is no panacea

In 1993 it was obvious, as already is described, that Råslätt was again facing a very difficult situation, perhaps a turning point. This does not mean, however, that the method applied at Råslätt should be rejected. What must be done instead is develop knowledge relating to the problem situation which now prevails, and which is by no means unique to Råslätt, and to act accordingly.

Greater knowledge is thus needed at both macro and micro level. At macro level in order that the strong socio-economic forces which all the time constitute a threat to the estates should be understand. At micro level in order that it should be possible to work constructively with the new problems now being faced. However, perhaps the most important lesson drawn from my research in Råslätt is the knowledge that there is no panacea, which once and for all solve the problems in the most unpopular estates. It is like swimming against the tide. Despite this circumstance it is possible to create positive development spirals, which is demonstrated by the Råslätt-case. A continuous and alert approach to community work is fundamental as new problems and perils constantly are just around the corner.

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After the Second World War, housing shortages were extreme in Northwest Europe. Many countries addressed the problem by constructing large estates. These symbols of the Welfare State were often built on the urban fringe; such locations were not popular with tenants. By the 1980s the housing shortage had been overcome and for the first time there were surpluses on the housing market. These large scale, often high-rise post-war estates were confronted with vacancies. Unpopular estates became concentration areas for the poor, the unemployed, and ethnic minority households. The physical problems of the estates became compounded by the societal ills of crime, vandalism and social exclusion.

This book provides an overview of the problems associated with large scale housing estates. It illustrates policy successes and failures by recounting experiences with those estates before and after intervention. If there is a lesson to be learnt from these experiences it is that there is no standard formula for resolving housing issues. Each case calls for its own prescription. Nevertheless, some common strands run through all the cases. The contributions reveal a bias towards physical intervention. We conclude that only by dealing with its social problems can we expect a sustainable improvement in the quality of an estate. The second common thread is the emphasis on the estate and the apartment itself. This suggests that if an intervention is to be effective, it must encompass the neighbourhood and the wider environment. In short, housing problems must be resolved, not merely shifted somewhere else.

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

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